


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
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
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ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Volume V

OTHER NATIONALITIES

THE JEWS
THE TATARS
MOLDAVIA
COMPARATIVE TABLES

Contract No. IA-16666

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

This volume includes the following chapters:

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION - Zev Katz

THE TATARS AND THE TATAR ASSR - Gustav Burbiel

MOLDAVIA AND THE MOLDAVIANS - Stephen Fischer-Galati

COMPARATIVE TABLES FOR THE MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES -
Zev Katz and Frederic T. Harned

The chapters are based on papers contributed by the above-named specialists. However, the chapters as presented here have been edited by the project staff and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final versions therefore rests with the project.

The work reported in this document was conducted under contract between the U.S. Information Agency and the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The distribution of this paper does not indicate endorsement by the United States Information Agency, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official opinion of that Agency.

PREFACE

This volume is a part of the five-volume study, "Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities," produced at the Center for International Studies, MIT. The study deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities--the fifteen which have their own Union Republics, plus the Tatars and the Jews. Each nationality is the subject of one chapter. The nationalities are grouped by geographical and/or cultural affinity in four of the volumes: The Slavs, The Baltics, The Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. This volume, the fifth in the series, includes chapters on the Moldavians, the Tatars, and the Jews, as well as a set of comparative tables for all nationalities.

The inclusion of the three nationalities named does not imply that these nationalities are alike. Rather, they are included here since they did not fit in any of the other groupings. The Moldavians, though they have a Union Republic of their own, do not belong to any "group" in the USSR. The Tatars and the Jews were selected from among the many non-union nationalities: the Tatars because they are a well-known and rather important ethnic group in the heartland of the European RSFSR; the Jews because of the importance and topicality of their case. The Tatars have an Autonomous Republic but also a large dispersed population in the USSR. Officially, the Jews have an autonomous province in Birobidzhan, but in reality they are a dispersed people, of whom only a tiny minority live in this "Jewish province."

The comparative tables provide basic data for all republics and composite indexes ranking the republics on several criteria (described in the Introduction to the tables).

Since the chapters on nationalities are written according to a uniform pattern, the chapter outline and note on references given at the beginning of the volume apply to all of them.

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Acknowledgements are gratefully expressed to the specialists who have written chapters on each nationality and to all at the Center for International Studies, MIT, who have contributed to the completion of this study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE FOR EACH NATIONALITY

Part A. General Information

- I. Territory
- II. Economy
- III. History
- IV. Demography
- V. Culture
- VI. External Relations

Part B. Media

- I. Language Data
- II. Local Media
- III. Educational Institutions
- IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

Part C. National Attitude:

- I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes
- II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes
- III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

NOTES ON REFERENCES

Where several quotations are taken from a single source, reference is provided at the end of the last quotation. Similarly, where information in a paragraph is from one source, the source is cited at the end of the paragraph.

Sources used more than once in a chapter are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. Full citations are given in the list of references at the end of each chapter. Sources containing only one page are cited without page numbers.

Except where noted, emphasis in quotations has been added.

Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

prepared by

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Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

PART A

General Information

1. Territory

The Jews of the USSR are a dispersed nationality without a home republic, but they are for the most part concentrated in certain historical areas of settlement.

In 1772, the First Russian Imperial decree was issued establishing a Pale in the Western and Southwestern part of Russia within which Jews were allowed to settle. In 1804 the Caucasus was included in the Pale. A clear delimitation of the Pale was given by another decree in 1835. It consisted of Lithuania and most of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and "New Russia" (the southern RSFSR along the Black Sea). Jews already residing in the Baltic provinces were allowed to remain.¹ These traditional areas of settlement, together with the major cities of the Soviet Union, remain main centers of Jewish population. According to the census,² Jews amount to about 70% of the population in Chernovtsy, 13% in Odessa, and 9% in Kiev, while only 4% in Leningrad and about 4% in Moscow.³ (See Table A.2.)

During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet authorities and the Yevseksiya (see History) made attempts to settle the Jews on land in Jewish national districts (Kalinindorf in the Kherson province, Novo-Zlatopol'ye and Stalindorf in the Ukraine, in the Crimea). A special government organization (KOMZET) was established for this purpose.⁴ The largest such attempt was the creation of the Jewish Autonomous Province in Birobidzhan, an area of 13000 square miles close to the Chinese border. That province consists of plains along the Amur River, with extensive swamps and grassy steppes, as well as hilly areas rising toward the Bureya and the Little Khingan ranges. These are covered by oak-conifer and dense taiga forests. As in other areas of the

¹Greenberg, 1965: 10-11; Neustadt, 1970: 32. See also the sections on history and demography.

²Wherever no date is given, "census" refers to the 1970 census.

³Decter, 1971: 18-20; Newth, 1969; Millman, 1971: 13-18.

⁴Schwartz, 1951: 151-154.

car last, the climate is continental with very cold and dry winters (average 1979, and hot, moist summers (average 68°F). There are about 23 inches rain per year. The attempt to settle substantial numbers of Jews in this area never succeeded, but it remains nominally an autonomous Jewish province.

During the Soviet period major migratory processes among the Jewish population have been largely in two directions:

- (a) from the previous Pale of Settlement area towards the East;
- (b) from the Shtetl (small, predominantly Jewish townships) in general to the big cities and new industrial towns.

Traditionally, Jews were not allowed to own land or live in rural areas; as a result, they are highly urbanized. In 1887, their urban (town and hamlet) population amounted to 83%. In 1939 this figure was 87%; in 1959, 97%; in 1970, 97.8%.¹ Altogether, about two thirds of a million Jews are now living in four large cities. The exact number depends on the definition of Jew used for the statistic: census estimates, relying primarily on self-identification, are lowest, while estimates that include those who are Jewish by passport or descent provide considerably higher figures. (See Table A.2., e.g., 500,000 Jews in Moscow, 300,000 Jews in Leningrad, etc.)

¹Baron, 1964; Census data, 1959, 1970.

Table A.1.
Jewish Population in the USSR and the Eastern Republics, 1959-1970.

Ranking by 1959 census	Estimated ^b population in thousands	Population by census in thousands		% of Republic population		% of total Jews in the USSR	Net increase/decrease in %s
		1970	1959	1970	1959		
		1970	1959	1970	1959	(Census 1970)	1959-1970
	USSR total - Jews	3,000	2,268	2,151	1.1	100.0	- 5.2
	USSR total - population	----	208,827	241,720	100.0	----	+ 16.0
1	RSFSR	1,100	875.0	808.0	0.7	37.6	- 7.6
2	Ukraine	1,000	840.0	777.0	2.0	36.2	- 7.5
3	Belorussia	250	150.0	148.0	1.9	6.9	- 1.3
4	Uzbekistan	130	95.0	103.0	1.2	4.8	+ 8.4
5	Moldavia	130	95.0	98.0	3.3	4.5	+ 3.2
6	Georgia	110	52.0	55.0	1.3	2.5	+ 5.8
8	Latvia	40	36.6	36.7	1.7	1.7	- 0.3
9	Kazakhstan	40	27.1	27.6	0.3	1.3	+ 1.8
10	Lithuania	35	25.0	24.0	0.9	1.1	- 4.0
11	Tadzhikistan	18	12.4	14.6	0.6	0.7	+ 17.7
12	Kirgizia	10	8.6	7.7	0.4	0.3	- 10.5
13	Estonia	8	5.4	5.3	0.5	0.25	- 1.8
14	Turkmenia	5	4.1	4.1	0.3	0.5 ^c	+ 0.4
7	Azerbaijdzhan	100	40.2	46.1 ^c	1.1	2.1 ^c	+ 0.4
15	Armenia	n.d.	1.6	1.6	0.1	0.25	- 1.8

a including Dagestan ASSR. In both 1959 and 1970, there were approximately 22,000 Jews in Dagestan, comprising 2.0% (in 1959) and 1.6% (in 1970) of the total population of the ASSR.

b Estimates are from Decter, 1971: 18-21.

c in the 1970 census, data are not given separately for the three republics of Turkmenia, Azerbaijdzhan and Armenia.

Table A.2.

Cities with Major Jewish Concentrations, 1959-1970

City	No. of Jews	No. of Jews	Jews as % of total city population		Estimated numbers
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1970
Moscow	250,000	251,500	4.1%	3.6%	500,000
Leningrad	168,641	162,587	5.1%	4.1%	300,000
Kiev	153,466	152,000	13.8%	9.3%	225,000
Odessa	over 100,000 ^a	116,280	15.0%	13.0%	----
Kharkov	over 75,000 ^a	76,211	8.0%	6.2%	----
Tashkent	50,445	56,000	5.4%	4.0%	----
Dnepropetrovsk	over 50,000 ^a	68,776 ^c	7.6%	8.0%	----
Kishinev	42,934	49,905	18.2%	13.4%	65,000
Chernovtsy	over 42,140 ^a	37,221	28.2%	19.9%	50,000
Minsk	38,842	47,057	7.6%	5.1%	----
Riga	30,267	30,581	5.0%	4.2%	35,000
Baku	29,204	29,716	3.0%	2.3%	----
Lvov	over 20,000 ^a	27,584 ^c	4.9%	5.0%	----
Tbilisi	17,430	19,579	2.5%	2.2%	----
Vilnius	16,354	16,400	6.9%	4.4%	25,000
Samarkand	14,000	16,000	7.1%	6.0%	----
Alma-Ata	8,425	9,180	1.9%	1.3%	----
Tallinn	3,714	3,754	1.3%	1.0%	5,000

^a Estimate by Newth-Millman.

^b Estimates from Decter, 1971: 18-20.

^c Total urban population in the province, almost all in the main city.

Source: Millman, 1971: 13-18; Census Data (for Moscow and the republics);

Newth, 1969; Itogi 1970:IV : 98, 178, 187, 191, 200, 223, 258, 269, 279, 283, 320.

II. Economy

Before the Revolution the Jews made up about one-third of the total urban population of the Pale of Settlement. Most of the trade and crafts in that area was in Jewish hands. Jewish businessmen, professionals and merchants made a significant contribution to the development of a market economy and to the industrialization of Russia. Jewish enterprise had a large share in the sugar industry (33%) and in railways, building, banking, agricultural export companies, the oil industry, and heavy industry. Some Jews became millionaires (e.g., Brodsky, the sugar magnate) and successful merchants. Yet in 1897 about 50% were craftsmen, hired hands, and workers in small industries. About 40% were shopkeepers and commercial agents. Five percent were professionals, and only 2.5% were farmers.¹

World War I caused major dislocations in the Pale area. The Civil War brought large scale pogroms and control of the whole economy by the Soviet government. By 1920 the Jewish role in the traditional Russian economy had been largely destroyed. The New Economic Policy (1921-1927) allowed for a limited return to small-scale manufacture and trade, but many Jews were without work.

In the late 1920s and 1930s a major socio-occupational transformation occurred among Soviet Jews. In 1926, 25% of the Jews in the Ukraine were artisans and 35% were hired workers. By 1939, fully 71% of all Jews in the USSR were workers and employees working for the state and public organizations. Only 16% of the total were artisans and 6% farmers. About 43% of the total of workers and employees were manual workers; the rest (30.5% of all Jews) were professionals and white-collar workers.

¹Baron, 1964, passim; Ettinger, 1971: 4-5.

With the beginning of the Five Year Plans the country needed great numbers of literate and skilled bookkeepers, managers, traders, bureaucrats, propagandists, engineers, educators, and scientists. The Jews adapted to these roles more quickly than many other nationalities, and they soon became a vital and integral part of the Soviet managerial-technological machine and of the political and cultural apparatus. In the 1930s, though Jews made up only about 2% of the population of the USSR, they accounted for 16% of all doctors and workers in cultural institutions in the USSR, 14% of all students, and 13% of all scientists. This remains the socio-occupational profile of the majority of the Jews in the USSR, apart from the Oriental communities, among whom there still is a high percentage of artisans and of skilled and unskilled workers.¹ Since the 1930s, Jewish participation in farming and manual labor has gone down while participation in white-collar work and in the professions has increased.

Nonetheless, the relative weight of Jews in the educated and creative manpower pool is constantly falling because of the speedy growth of these strata. There is also well-documented discrimination in recruitment to some fields. In some categories even the absolute numbers of Jews are going down, as indicated in Table A.3.

The Soviet Jews are the most educated and professionally advanced of the ethnic groups in the USSR. If an estimate of 2,750,000 Jews by passport (as differentiated from "census Jews") is assumed, it appears that about one in four of the total (including those not able-bodied as well) are in the educated labor pool (see Table A.3.) -- a very high ratio by all counts. Jews in the USSR have 166 specialists (with higher or secondary specialized education) working in the economy per 1000 Jewish population. Georgians are second with 45 per 1000, and Moldavians are last with 12 per 1000.² The discrepancy between Jews and other nationalities is similar, though less extreme, for scientists and students.³

¹ Ibid.

² Nar. obraz., 1971: 240.

³ Nar. obraz., 1971: 196,278; Nar. khoz. 1972: 105.

Table A.3.

Jewish Educated Manpower in the USSR

	1963-4	1967-8	1970-1
1. Students in higher education (including evening and external)	82,600	110,000	105,800
Jews as percentage of total	2.5%	2.55%	2.3%
2. Students at specialized secondary schools	51,300	46,700	40,000
Jews as percentage of total	1.72%	1.12%	0.93%
3. Working specialists with higher education	322,700	327,800	356,800
Jews as percentage of total	7.1%	6.27%	5.2%
4. Working specialists with specialized secondary education	159,700	169,300	181,800
Jews as percentage of total	2.4%	2.2%	1.8%
5. Scientific and academic workers	50,915	58,952	64,400
Jews as percentage of total	8.3%	7.65%	6.9%
6. Total Jewish specialists and students in the USSR (1-4 above, including most of 5 as well)	616,300	653,800	684,400
Jews as percentage of total	3.5%	3.0%	2.0%

Sources: Soviet Union--50 Years (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968), pp. 237-8. Nar. khoz. 1967: 803,811. See also: J. A. Newth, "Jews in the Soviet Intelligentsia," Bulletin on Soviet Jewish Affairs, no. 2 (July 1968) vii, I-12. Nar. khoz. 1970: 651,648. This table is adapted from Katz (1970: 333).

History¹

Through the Revolution

Jews first settled in Eastern Europe in the days of the second Temple, several centuries B.C. Archeological finds of the first century A.D. speak of organized Jewish communities in Greek city colonies along the northern shores of the Black Sea. Like others in these cities, the Jews were craftsmen (potters, jewelers) as well as merchants in grain, fish, and slaves. They enjoyed certain rights of communal autonomy but not those of full citizenship. A stone inscription from Panthekapaion on the Kerch peninsula records a ceremony of manumission in the local synagogue. The Jewish colonies along the Black Sea were the first islands of monotheism in Eastern Europe.

In the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. nomadic Turkic tribes called Khazars settled between the Black and the Caspian Seas. They believed in a supreme God as well as in their magicians. Jews took advantage of their tolerance of other religions and settled in their commercial towns, such as Ethyl and Semander on the Caspian, lying along the routes from the East into Byzantium. In the eighth or ninth century the royal house of Khazar and large portions of its nobility and population embraced the Jewish faith. The conversion to Judaism of such a major kingdom was a unique case in Jewish history and remained something of a legend for many centuries.² The Jews remained a distinct community in Khazaria until the end of the tenth century when the Khazar kingdom was defeated by Sviatoslav, Grand Duke of Kiev.

¹This section is based on the following sources: Sachar, 1972; Halpern, 1968; Dubnow, 1916-1920; Ettinger, 1970; Schwartz, 1951 and 1966.

²According to some sources the royal house of Khazar came to its decision to accept Judaism only after prolonged disputes in which learned people of Islam and Christianity also presented their case. Israel Halpern points out, however, that there may have been political reasons for this decision by the Khazars, since their acceptance of Judaism underscored their independence of the neighboring Christian Byzantines in the west and the Islamic Arabs to the south. Halpern, 1968: 86 ; Dubnow, 1916: 52.

By the eleventh century, Kiev was the center of a growing Slavic state and a commercial center on routes leading from Germany to Byzantium. By that time there was a Jewish community in the town living in a quarter of its own. Some of them at least were associated with the authorities and suffered during a revolt in 1113. The Jewish community in Kiev had a Rabbi; a Jewish scholar in Kiev composed a commentary on the Bible in 1124. Rabbi Moses Raba of Kiev (twelfth century) corresponded with Jewish religious scholars in Germany and the heads of the great Yeshiva in Babylon. Also, holy books were sometimes transported from Babylon to Germany through the Kievan principality (Kiev Rus). There were small Jewish communities in other towns in Kiev Rus and in southern Poland, especially along the trade routes between Germany and Kiev. The Jewish community in Kiev disappeared with the disintegration of the Kiev principality itself, but the Jewish presence in the Crimea continued through the centuries.

Some Jews lived briefly in Moscow as foreign representatives, physicians, and merchants. But the authorities firmly opposed permanent Jewish settlement, particularly after the so-called "Judaisers" sect appeared in the fifteenth century. This nominally Christian sect denied that Jesus was literally "a Son of God" as well as the principle of the Trinity, and was opposed to the official Russian Orthodox Church. Though some Jews may have had an influence on the movement, it was never a part of the Jewish faith. It spread, however, among considerable portions of the nobility and the Church and convinced Moscow that Jewish settlement within its domain was undesirable. This conviction remained largely unchanged until the fall of the monarchy in 1917.

From the 14th century, Jews settled in large numbers in Poland, and from there they moved on to Lithuania and the present lands of the Ukraine and Belorussia. This development was a result of persecution in Western Europe, accompanied by a high rate of natural increase. Only a few of the settlers in these lands came from the areas previously inhabited by Jews in the south of Russia. The Polish kings and landlords encouraged the settlement of foreigners, especially Germans and Jews, since their skills in crafts and commerce aided the development of towns. Such urban settlements were a source of tax income as well as of economic and military strength and culture. The authorities granted them protection as well as certain privileges, including the right to practice their religion and autonomy in internal affairs. Jewish communities elected

their own communal authorities [kahal]; they also developed a network of regional and inter-regional self-governing councils, capped by the so-called Council of Four Lands [Maad Arba Haaratzot]. The Council included elected representatives from Great Poland, Little Poland, Ruthenia, and Volynia (territories presently in the Ukraine and Belorussia). Later, representatives from Lithuania were added. By the end of the 15th century there had been only several tens of thousands of Jews in the combined territories of Poland and Lithuania; by the middle of the 17th century they numbered hundreds of thousands.

This "golden age" of Polish Jewry came to an end with the Cossack uprising under Bohdan Khmelnitsky, 1648-1658. Forbidden to own land or engage in certain occupations, many of the Jews became linked to the economy of the Polish landlords, collected taxes for them and owned country taverns. The Jews were hated as foreigners and non-Christians. The Cossack-Tatar alliance against the Poles was victorious, conquering large areas and many towns with considerable Jewish populations. The Cossacks tortured and massacred the Jews and handed survivors over to the Tatars as slaves. In 1654 Muscovite forces also swept into Polish-Lithuanian territories, killing many Jews, exiling others into the interior, forcibly converting some to Christianity, and selling some into slavery. What was for the Ukrainians a war of national liberation, for Moscow a historic victory, was, like the Spanish inquisition or the later Nazi holocaust, one of the great calamities in the history of the Jewish people. Estimates of the victims range from one hundred thousand to half a million; 700 Jewish communities were destroyed and many thousands turned into refugees.¹

The number of Jews in Europe in the middle of the 18th century has been estimated at 1.5 million. The largest community was in Lithuania-Poland. With the three successive partitions of this state toward the end of that century the majority of these Polish Jews found themselves under Russian rule. Though there had been only few Jews in their domain, the rulers of Russia had already established a strong anti-Jewish tradition. Peter the Great, who labored at enticing foreigners to Russia, called the Jews "rogues and cheats."² His successors expelled them from inner Russia and parts of the Ukraine. Catherine II, who ruled during the partitions of Poland, granted them religious rights and recognized the autonomy of the kahal (it was convenient for collecting taxes), but continued the restrictions put on them during the period of Polish decline. In 1791 she created the Pale of Settlement. The legislation included stringent anti-Jewish rules outside the Pale.

¹Sachar, 1972: 240-241; Halpern, 1968: 212-265.

²Sachar, 1972: 310.

During the 19th century the seegay situation continued. With the accession of liberal monarchs, the Jews often hoped for liberalization, but more often the opposite action followed. It was the case with Alexander I, who at first seemed to be friendly to the Jews and encouraged their settlement on land outside the Pale, but later ordered the exile of the Jews from large parts of the countryside and persuaded them to leave land or close taverns. Nicholas I's reign (1825-1855) has been described as "a relentless 30-year war against the Jews", whom he regarded as "leeches and parasites...an unassimilable element."¹ Jewish youngsters (from 12 years of age) were liable to be inducted into 25 years of military service, which often meant forcible conversion to Christianity and a "living death" of the individual to his family and people. Compulsory education of Jewish children in government schools was decreed, the recognition of the autonomy of the kahal was withdrawn, and the Pale was narrowed, exiling 150,000 Jews from their homes.

Alexander II began as a liberal ruler. Talented, skilled, and wealthy Jews were allowed to settle outside the Pale, to study at universities, and even to enter government service. The forced military inductions were discontinued. A flowering of Jewish culture ensued. But towards the end of his reign reaction set in anew. After he was killed (in 1881) by revolutionaries and Alexander III became ruler, a new period of officially organized persecution began, lasting until 1917. Jews were expelled from Moscow (in 1891), the civil service was closed to them, and the settlement regulations were made more stringent. Possibilities for higher studies and for work in the professions were greatly limited. Many Jews fell victim to the pogroms, while the tsarist security forces stood by without interfering, so as "not to endanger the lives of the soldiers for the sake of a few Jews."² Even the revolutionary narodniks regarded the pogroms as a positive phenomenon, since they supposedly helped awaken the people from their apathy.

The pogroms, official anti-Jewish legislation, and expulsions continued during the reign of Nicholas II, the last Tsar. In 1903 the especially brutal Kishinev pogrom shook the Jewish world and brought protests from many countries. The Black Hundred, an officially inspired reactionary organization, purposely instigated a huge wave of pogroms in autumn of 1905 to divert the population from

¹Sachar, 1972: 313-315.

²Ettinger, 1970: 124-131; Greenberg, 1951: 77-86.

the evolving revolutionary movement.¹ In Odessa alone hundreds were wounded and tens of thousands of shops and homes were ransacked. Some of the Jews were active in the revolutionary movement and in self-defense organizations, for which many were hanged and thousands were exiled to Siberia. In 1911 Mendel Beilis was put on trial in Kiev for murdering "a Christian child to use his blood for Passover matzo." The concocted trial evoked worldwide protests as well as active opposition by prominent Russian intellectuals. The jury gave a verdict of not guilty, and after two years in prison Beilis was released.²

By the beginning of the 20th century, nearly half of all Jews in the world were within the confines of the Russian empire. On the eve of World War I their number was estimated at six million.³ Confined to the Pale, persecuted, and poor, many Jews looked for a solution through emigration either to Palestine (Zionism) or to the liberal and richer countries in Western Europe and America. By 1914 hundreds of thousands had left.⁴

The first years of World War I and of the Revolution (1914-1921) brought tragic events and momentous changes for Russian Jewry. At first hundreds of thousands were exiled, killed, and wounded during the advance and retreat of the Russian forces (especially by the Cossacks). The Jews enthusiastically greeted the fall of the monarchy in 1917 and the new democratic republic which repealed all discriminatory legislation against Jews. A short flowering of Jewish political and cultural activities ensued. For the first time, Jews held elections to an all-Russian Jewish congress. They could move freely in the country, and people of Jewish origin were among the leaders of the main political parties. Lenin's main opponent, the prominent leader of the Mensheviks, Julius Martov, was Jewish. So were several of the top leaders of the Bolsheviks and of the young Soviet state: Leon Trotsky; Jacob Sverdlov, the first 'president' of the Russian Soviet Republic; Grigori Zinoviev, the first chairman of the Third International, and many others. While parts of the Jewish population supported the Bolsheviks, many others opposed them, and many soon became their victims (the rabbinical clergy, the rich, the

¹ Dubnow, 1920: 124-131; Greenberg, 1965: 77-86.

² Greenberg, 1951: 88-91.

³ The 1897 census showed 5,215,800 Jews in Russia, of whom about 4,900,000 lived in the Pale. For details see Schwartz, 1951: 10-14.

⁴ Soviet statisticians estimate that between 1897 and 1926, 600,000 Jews emigrated. Schwartz, 1951: 14.

Zionists, and those active in non-Bolshevik political organizations). The Ukrainian nationalists, the Cossacks, and the Whites soon embarked on a course of persecution and massacres of Jews reminiscent of the times of Khmelnytsky. In the revolution and Civil War more than one hundred thousand Jews were killed, and many more had their property confiscated or their trade forbidden. Jews in the western territories (Poland, the Baltic areas, Moldavia) found themselves outside Soviet Russia.¹

During the 1920s and 1930s Soviet Jewish life was revolutionized. All independent Jewish organizations, parties, publications, educational and religious institutions were liquidated. On the other hand, the Communist Party organized Jewish institutions controlled by special Jewish sections of the Party (Yevseksiya). A Jewish culture was developed with communist content (see Section A-V, on culture). The Soviets made efforts to settle the Jews on the land in several "Jewish national districts" in the South of Russia, and Ukraine, and the Crimea. Though some measure of anti-Jewish feeling was utilized by the Stalinists against Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev -- all Jews -- there was no official anti-Semitism during the early period of Stalin's rule.² Jews occupied high positions: L. Kaganovich was one of Stalin's lieutenants; Maxim Litvinov was foreign minister; L. Mekhlis was a top security aide. In the early 1930s the Jewish sections of the Party were abolished. A swift decline in Jewish cultural institutions set in. Many Jews died in the purges of the 1930s, but not for being Jewish. In fact the 1930s were a period of rapid assimilation, with many Jews shedding their identity in the belief that all other nationalities would do the same and become one Soviet nation. The losses among Jewish writers and Yevseksiya activists caused by the purges were a blow to Jewish culture and facilitated the trend for assimilation.³

¹ Sachar, 1972: 381-383.

² Popular anti-Semitism was especially strong during the 1920s; see Weinryb, 1970: 298-303, Schwartz, 1951.

³ Schwartz, 1951: 90-148; see also Gittelman, 1972: 2-5.

Birobidzhan

In March 1928 the Soviet government announced that the province of Birobidzhan in the Far East (see Territory) would become a Jewish autonomous area, available for settlement. The motivations behind this were complex. Large numbers of Jews could not find work after the destruction of the previous economic fabric in the Pale area. The urge to make the Jews into "productive" citizens was a Russian tradition from tsarist times.¹ Soviet leaders also hoped to utilize the "Zionist" urge in order to settle an empty swamp-and-forest area on the border with China. They also hoped to attract money, sympathy, and some settlers from the Jewish diaspora. Inadvertently they actually recognized in this manner the validity of the central tenet of Zionism: the need for the Jewish people to settle in a land of their own where they could form a political unit. After thousands of Jews moved to Birobidzhan, the area was duly proclaimed a Jewish Autonomous Province in May 1934. However, the grand plans for Jewish colonization of the area never materialized. By the mid-1930s Soviet industrialization was in full swing, providing opportunities of employment at home for the skilled and newly educated Jews. Collectivization and the purges in Birobidzhan made conditions there decreasingly attractive. Following negative reports from the USSR, support from the West dwindled. Birobidzhan was not the Holy land and the Amur river was not the Jordan. During World War II further settlement was not allowed.

Ultimately very few Jews settled in the area. However, having been established as a Jewish Autonomous Province, the area remains designated as such and thus permits the Soviets to assert that Soviet Jews have their own territorial entity within Soviet borders. Appropriately, there is a Jewish Life which more accurately assesses the situation:

Question: What is true about the Jewish Autonomous Province?
 Answer: Well, it is not Jewish, nor autonomous -- but it is a province -- that's for sure...²

¹ Abramsky, 1970: 62-67; Schwartz, 1951: 160-180.

² Schwartz, 1951: 175-190; Schwartz, 1966: 192-197; Goldberg, 1961; Abramsky, 1970: 67-75. For a Soviet presentation on Birobidzhan today, see e.g., Soviet Life (May) 1972, p. 17, an article written by Lev Shapiro, recently elected Jewish First Party Secretary there.

World War II and the Black Years

The Soviet-Nazi pact (August 1939) at the beginning of World War II marked a new stage in the history of Soviet Jewry. Litvinov was removed and other Jewish officials were quietly eliminated from conspicuous positions. About two million Jews were among the new Soviet citizens in the incorporated areas of Poland, the Baltic states, and Moldavia. While many thousands of Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Poland were received well by the Soviet authorities, others were forcibly driven back over the Nazi border and up to a quarter of a million were exiled by the security police to camps in remote areas.¹ After the Nazi attack on the USSR (June 1941) a dual situation again developed. On the one hand Jews fought well in the war and had one of the highest ratios of heroes of the Soviet Union among all nationality groups. A Jewish Antifascist Committee was created in Moscow including the most prominent Soviet-Jewish personalities. It was the first "representative" Jewish body since 1917. Among other Soviet citizens, hundreds of thousands Jews were evacuated to the inner parts of the USSR and thus saved from extermination by the Nazis. But, on the other hand, during the same period anti-Semitism was revived in Soviet Russia—in the occupied territories, at the front, and in the inner parts of the country, which had become flooded by alien and often better educated and wealthier Jews. Nationalist and anti-Soviet local inhabitants became allies of the Nazis and took a willing part in hunting down and killing approximately 2 million Jews in the occupied lands. Jewish survivors, returning after liberation to their former areas, encountered popular anti-Semitism and official discrimination.²

With the beginning of the Cold War, and with Stalin's ever deeper immersion in Russianism and hatred of the West, the situation for the Jews continued to be tenuous. According to his daughter Svetlana, the aging Stalin became more and more anti-Semitic. He did attempt to capitalize on Jewish nationalism to get the British out of Palestine, and the USSR supported partition and recognized the newly created State of Israel in May 1948. However, the appearance in Moscow of Golda Meir as the first Israeli envoy, eliciting manifestations of sympathy from

¹ Redlich, 1971: 81-90. The estimate of 0.25 million Jewish deportees is by Zev Katz. Cf. Schwartz, 1966: 20-42.

² Schwartz, 1966: 43-177. On the role of Jews in the Soviet Armed Forces during World War II, see Ainsztein, 1970: 269-287.

Jews at the Moscow synagogue, was followed by a major anti-Jewish purge. The secret police had already been preparing for this action; in February 1948 it had arranged the killing (through a traffic accident) of S. Mikhoels, the USSR's most famous Jewish actor and an outstanding former member of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. In the fall, a campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" began. Thousands were imprisoned and died in the camps. The writers Leib Kvitko, Perets Markish, Itsik Fefer, Der-Nistor, David Bergelson, and others were imprisoned and later (August 1952) shot for supposed treason -- serving foreign powers and attempting to make the Crimea Jewish and cut it off from the USSR.¹ In Soviet-controlled Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia purges and trials (such as the Slansky Trial in 1952) with clear anti-Semitic features were organized under Soviet direction. In January 1953 the secret police "discovered" a plot by doctors who allegedly had poisoned some Soviet leaders. Among the 9 arrested 7 were Jewish. As anti-Jewish hysteria grew, Jews expected to be exiled to Siberia; preparation for such a measure were under way. Then, on March 5, 1953, Stalin suddenly died. A few weeks later the Soviet government announced that the "doctors plot" was a police fabrication, the doctors were released (except for two who had died in prison). The "Black Years" of Soviet Jewry were at last thought to be over.²

The death of Stalin, the public renunciation of the "doctors plot" and the years of destalinization aroused great hopes among Soviet Jewry. Diplomatic relations with Israel, which had been cut off during the "doctors plot" (on February 11, 1953), were restored. A small rabbinical school was opened at the Moscow synagogue. A Yiddish literary journal began publication (in 1961), and concerts in Yiddish were allowed. Yet in all other respects the official policy remained unchanged. Jews were still kept out of several fields of activity (diplomacy, foreign trade, the Party and security apparatus, responsible state positions). They were discriminated against in education, work, travel. During the campaign against economic crimes, for which the death penalty was

¹Sachar, 1972: 440. For an extensive treatment of the period, see Gilboa, 1972, passim.

²Schwartz, 1966: 198-231; Weinrb, 1970: 307-311; Alliluyeva, 1967, passim.

reintroduced, Jews were hunted, accused, and sentenced with special zeal: so that more than half of all those sentenced to death were Jewish. Following the destalinization campaign, and loss of faith in the Communist ideology, many in the Soviet Union turned back to their national roots. Others turned to religion and to the democratic dissent movement in which many Jews became active. Those who cherished their Jewishness came to realize that official policies would not change and that there was no possibility for a full and dignified Jewish life for themselves and their children in the USSR. The roots were laid for a rising demand for the right to emigrate.

¹Weinryb, 1970: 311-315. For events in recent years see the section on manifestations of nationalism, and for a recent extensive treatment of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, see Korey, 1973, passim.

IV. Demography

A. Introduction

There is a considerable divergence of opinion as to the total number of Jews in the USSR. The figure depends to some degree on one's definition of the term Jew. The following distinctions can be made:¹

(1) "Census Jews" - those who declare themselves to be Jewish or are registered as such during an official census. Since many do not care to declare themselves Jewish in front of the census takers and since there is no demand for documentary proof of "nationality," the census estimates of Jews provide the lowest numbers.

(2) "Passport Jews" - those registered as Jewish on the internal passport that is obligatory for every urban dweller in the USSR. Ninety-eight percent of Jews are urban dwellers. The registration as Jewish is entered in the passport for all offspring of two Jewish parents. Upon reaching the age of 16, the child of a marriage in which only one parent is Jewish may declare himself either Jewish or the nationality of the other parent. Once entered, the designation cannot be subsequently altered no matter what the individuals' later feelings or religion may be.

(3) Jews by descent - This category includes all persons with a Jewish parent or even grandparent, even if the person is registered as non-Jewish. It is in this sense that some attacker of Pavel Litvinov denigrated him as a "dirty Jew," since his grandfather was Jewish.²

(4) "Emigration Jews" - This category also includes non-Jews who have some family ties with Jews and as such may emigrate together with their Jewish family. Among those who have emigrated to Israel, there are numerous Russians, Ukrainians and others not ethnically Jewish but now Israelis for all practical purposes. This is potentially a large category.

¹ These categories are designated by the present author. But see Nove and Newth, 1970: 128-129.

² K. Van Het Reve, Dear Comrade: Pavel Litvinov and the Voices of Soviet Citizens' Dissent (New York: Pitman, 1969).

Between 1959 and 1970 the number of "census Jews" decreased by about 17% whereas the total population of the USSR increased 16%. This decrease, however, was not evenly distributed among Jewish communities (see Table A.1.1.). Whereas in the RSFSR and in the Ukraine there were declines of 8% and 7.5% respectively, in Uzbekistan and Georgia there were increases of 8.4% and 6%. It appears that the Oriental Jews added to their number, as did the Jews of Moldavia (+3.2%). The main losses were among the Jews in the core areas of the Soviet Union. Jews registered minor losses in the Baltic area, part of which may have been a result of emigration to Israel.¹

The number of "passport Jews" has not been published. Nove and Newth think that the Soviet authorities themselves do not know the exact figure because of the lack of a system of accounting for this purpose. However, at various times Soviet sources have cited figures higher than those of the census (e.g., 2.5 million for 1965 and 3 million for the late 1960s, as compared with 2.268 million in the 1959 census.)² Israeli and recent emigre sources often give the number of Jews in the Soviet Union as 3-3.5 million.³ These figures may refer to Jews by descent. As far as the potential for emigration is concerned, the number of Jews may well be more than 3 million.

Although Soviet Jewry is usually regarded as one community, it actually consists of several distinct communities which are so different from each other that they are recognized as the same people only with great difficulty. These make up two broad categories, the Ashkenazi and the Orientals. Only very few of the Soviet Jews are by origin Sephardic Jews, a group initially from Spain who form a third major category of world-wide Jewry. Most of the Ashkenazi are originally from the Polish territories to which they immigrated from Germany (see Section A-III). They spoke Yiddish (based on medieval German) and had a distinct religious and historical heritage. The oriental communities do not understand Yiddish. They arrived

¹ See Census data. CDSP; XXIII: 16: 14-18; Itogi, 1970: IV: 9-19.

² Atlas narodov mira, 1964: 158 and Rabinovich, 1967: 45.

³ Decter, 1971: 17. See also a letter written by Soviet-Jewish actors of March 1967 (Decter, 1971: 40) and Gittelman, 1972.

in the Soviet Union from Asian countries and the Mediterranean, bringing with them distinctive religious and communal traditions of their own. Over the centuries, they have adopted some of the customs of their neighbors, much as the Ashkenazi Jews have adopted from theirs. Subgroups within these two categories are described below.

A small subgroup of some significance are the Jews in the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan who are mostly Ashkenazi settlers from European parts of the USSR. In 1951 their total number was 14,269 or 8.8% of the total population for the region. By 1970 their number had decreased to 11,452, 6.6% of the total. This appears to be the smallest percentage for a titular nationality within its own political unit. Also, the Jews of Birobidzhan amount to 0.5% of the total Jewish population of the USSR, an insignificant fraction by any criterion.¹

b. The Oriental Communities

(1) The Georgians. The Georgian Jews claim to stem from the ten tribes of Israel exiled by Babylon in the eighth century B.C. The Armenian historian Khorenatsi writes that an Armenian king received Jewish slaves from Nebuchadnezzar, and archeological finds from the first centuries A.D. in Georgia bear evidence of Jewish settlement in the area at that time.² In 1804, when the Tsar declared the Caucasus to be within the Pale of Settlement, many Ashkenazi Jews immigrated to the area, influencing in turn the Oriental communities already there.³

According to the 1959 census there 51,580 Jews in Georgia of whom 37,720 declared Georgian as their native language. Neustadt argues that the number of Georgian Jews in Georgia in 1959 actually exceeded 85,000. Together with Georgian Jews living in Baku, Dagestan,

¹Abramsky, 1970: 73-74; Eliav, 1969: 179-180; Itogi 1970: IV: 76; and Katz, 1968: 1-7.

²Neustadt, 1970: 16-39; Decter, 1971: 21-23.

³Eliav, 1969: 147-163.

and other parts of the USSR, he puts their total at approximately 100,000.¹ Though it is possible that some Georgian Jews were not included in the census, it is difficult to see how more than half of them were missed. The 1970 census figure for all Jews in Georgia was 55,000. A more detailed breakdown is not yet available.

Through all of Soviet history, the Georgian Jews have kept their traditional way of life. They live en masse in specific town areas, usually around a synagogue, and adhere firmly to the traditional large family in which the young are socialized in religious fashion. Even Soviet official ethnographers have recognized that under such conditions it is difficult to inject official ideology and that the Jews and Georgians live entirely separated lives.²

(2) Mountain (Tat) Jews. Another Jewish community in the Caucasus (Daghestan) are the "Mountain" or Tat Jews. They speak an Azerbaidzhani-Turkic language called Tat, and are variously referred to as descendants of the Khazars (see History) or as having arrived many centuries ago from Persian Azerbaidzhan (hence the language). They originally lived in mountain villages, but during the last few decades have moved to the cities, mostly along the Caspian sea (Derbent, Makhachkala and Baku). Though neighbors of the Georgian Jews for many centuries, they have little contact with them and possess a distinct culture of their own. Their total number is estimated to be around 100,000, though this may be high.³

(3) Bukharan Jews. The Oriental Jews of Central Asia are usually referred to as Bukharan. They also speak a dialect of Persian (Tadzhik) and came into the area from Persia, settling along the famous "silk road" which extended from

¹Neustadt, 1970: 103-104. On Georgian Jews, see also Section B-I.

²Neustadt, 1970: 103-104.

³Neustadt, 1970: 25-28; Eliav, 1969: 166-171; Decter, 1971: 18-21.

the Far East to the Mediterranean. Under the impact of contact with the Ashkenazi Jews of Russia, Jewish culture flourished in these areas during certain periods of the Middle Ages and again during the last decades of Imperial Russia. Today their main concentrations are in the Uzbek Republic (Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara); but they also live in the major towns of other republics (Ashkhabad, Dushanbe).¹ The total number of Jews in Uzbekistan, including the non-Bukharan, was 95,000 in 1959 and 103,000 in 1970. Israeli writers estimate the total of Bukharan Jews to be around 100,000. Available data and estimates of the three major Oriental Jewish communities in the USSR are as shown in Table A.4.

Table A.4.
Oriental Jews in the USSR^a

	<u>1959</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Estimates</u> ^b
Georgian	52,000	55,000	65,000
Mountain (Tat)			100,000
Dagestan ASSR	21,500	22,149	
Neighboring ASSRs ^c	11,000	12,667	
Bukharan	95,000	103,000	100,000
totals	179,500	192,816	265,000

Source: 1959 and 1970 Censuses Decter, 1971: 18; Itogi 1970: IV: 133, 135, 142, 147.

^aThese data include local and non-local Jews together.

^bEliav, 1969: 147; Neustadt, 1970: 25, 103-104, 145. According to high Western estimates, there are more than a quarter million Oriental Jews in the USSR. A more cautious estimate by this writer would put them at over 200,000. Decter (1971: 18, 20-24) estimates 225,000.

^cChechen-Ingush, Kabardino-Balkar, North Osetia.

¹Eliav, 1969: 147-163.

c. The Ashkenazi Communities

(1) Western Jews. The group commonly designated as "Western" Jews consists of the communities of East European Jewry that were not Soviet until World War II. Most Western Jews were religious and Zionist, and many were Bundist and socialist. Their children received a traditional Jewish education in Yiddish and Hebrew. During the interwar period many of their members had emigrated to Palestine and the West, with the result that almost every family has relatives outside the USSR. Since the death of Stalin, such families have kept some contact with their members abroad, and this has been a powerful influence on their national attitudes. Most members of these communities experienced anti-Semitism before the war, Nazism, the anti-Jewish purge of the late 1940s, Khrushchev's economic purges, and the anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish campaigns of the late 1960s. Many of them see no future for themselves but through emigration to Israel.¹

The Western Jews include former Rumanian citizens (from Moldavia and Bukovina), and Jews in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), together with some former citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, (from Transcarpathian Ruthenia), and Hungary who live in Soviet Russia. Their total number may cautiously be estimated at 250,000; Decter and Eliav estimate it at 300,000-400,000.²

(2) The Core Soviet Jews. The Core Jews are the Jews, mainly of Ashkenazi origin, who live in the areas where the power of the Soviet system was established from the beginning. They have felt the full brunt of official

¹Eliav, 1969: 141-147; Decter, 1971: 18-21.

²Eliav, 1969: 142-147; Decter, 1971: 18-22.

Table A.5.
"Western" Jews in the USSR

<u>Baltic</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Estimates</u> <u>1970</u>
Latvia	37,000	37,000	40,000
Lithuania	25,000	24,000	35,000
Estonia	5,400	5,300	8,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
totals	67,400	66,300	83,000
 <u>Former Polish areas</u>			
Western Ukraine	84,400	n.d.	100,000
Western Belorussia	10,000	n.d.	15,000
	<hr/>		<hr/>
totals	94,400		115,000
 <u>Former Rumanian areas</u>			
Moldavia	95,000	98,000	130,000
Bukovina (Chernovtsy province)	42,000	37,459	50,000
	<hr/>		<hr/>
totals	137,000	135,459	180,000
 <u>Former Czechoslovak areas</u>			
Transcarpathia	12,000	10,862	15,000
	<hr/>		<hr/>
Total in 'new' Soviet areas	310,800		393,000

Note: These figures include all Jews in these areas, including non-Western Jews who settled there. Estimates are from the sources given below.

Source: Census Data; Eliav, 1969: 142-147; Decter, 1971: 18-21.

at least propaganda, some mass indoctrination, intense government education, and dispersion of former social organizations and community structure.

Nove and Newth¹ subdivide these Core Jews "into two streams... one an immigrant population (high frequency of mixed marriage), while the other group, remaining at home, were much more conservative." In broader terms these categories can be identified with the Ukraine and Belorussia on the one hand (territories largely within the former Pale of Settlement), and on the other, the Russian RSFSR, including the major cities in European Russia as well as the new industrial areas in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. Table A.6. shows the number of Jews in these categories.

Table A.6.
"Core" Soviet Jews

<u>Old "Core" communities</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>Census 1970</u>	<u>Estimates 1970</u>
Ukraine	840,000 ^a	777,000 ^a	1,000,000
Belorussia	150,000 ^a	148,000 ^a	250,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
totals	990,000	925,000	1,250,000
 <u>New immigrant communities</u>			
Russian RSFSR	878,000	808,000	1,100,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
totals	1,868,000	1,733,000	2,350,000

^aFor a net figure for Core Jews, 84,400 in Western Ukraine and 10,000 in Western Belorussia must be subtracted from the total figures.

Source: Census Data, (1971: 20; estimates by Decter, 1971: 18-20.

¹Nove and Newth, 1970: 144-145. See also Eliav, 1969: 140-143; on Jews in the Ukraine, see Newth, 1969: 16-19.

Jews were traditionally active in revolutionary parties in Tsarist Russia, and they became important participants in the Bolshevik Party. Official figures put their percentage in 1922 at 5.2% of the Party. Since then, the percentage has declined. It was 4.3% in 1972 and apparently in 1940; and Western sources have estimated that Jews made up 2.8% of the Party Membership in 1961 and about 1.6% in 1965.¹ Despite this decrease, Jews may still have the highest Party membership relative to population of any Soviet nationality, since even 1.6% is almost double their percentage in the total population.² For example, in 1967, Jews constituted 0.9% of the Party membership in Turkmenia whereas in 1959 they were only 0.3% of the total republic population.³

Jews were very prominent among the Party leadership during the first years of Soviet power and all through Stalin's reign despite his late overt anti-Semitism. By now, however, there is not one Jewish member in the Politburo or Party Secretariat, or among the other high government positions. The highest-ranking Jewish person is the Deputy Prime Minister for supplies, V. Dymshits. Another is Aleksandr Chakovsky, the editor of the Literary Gazette, a leader of the conservative stream in the Writers Union, who was recently made a member of the Party Central Committee. In 1972, for the first time in many years, a Jew, Lev Shapiro, was made first secretary of the Party in the Jewish Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan.⁴

¹Rigby, 1968: 383-388

²Katz, 1970: 332-334; Newth and Katz, 1969: 37-38.

³See Artykov et al., 1967.

⁴Soviet Life (May), 1972: 17.

4. Age structure

In the RSFSR there are two young Russians for each young Jew and two older Jews for each older Russian. Only 15% of the Jewish population is in the 0-19 age bracket, whereas the Russians have 35%. Forty-three per cent of the Jewish population is over 50 years of age, whereas the comparable figure for Russians is 21.5%.¹ The gap would be much greater were only Ashkenazi Jews considered, since the fertility rate is much higher among the Soviet Oriental populations. The low weight in the 0-19 age group is a result of the low fertility of non-Oriental Jews and the high incidence of both intermarriage and assimilation. Altshuler found that in mixed marriages involving a Jewish spouse, only 12% to 18% of the offspring registered as Jewish.²

Data on language as related to age are given for the RSFSR only. Understandably they show that among the older age groups a much higher percentage declare a Jewish language as their native language. Among the middle-aged Jewish population, the percentage is much lower than average. For the younger age groups (0 to 11 and 11 to 15 years) the percentages are high (14.5% and 17.5% respectively).³ This may indicate the greater weight of Oriental children in the Jewish population.

Data on marriage indicates that Jewish men have a slightly higher ratio than that for Russians or Ukrainians. However, Jews (both men and women) generally marry later which may contribute to their lower fertility.⁴

¹ Itogi 1970: 373. These data relate to the Russian republic only; there are no data for other republics.

² Altshuler, 1970: 30-33.

³ See 1 above.

⁴ Itogi 1970: 386. The data are only for several republics, including the Ukraine and Moldavia.

V. Culture

By the end of the 18th century Russian Jewry, encompassing the Jews of Poland and Lithuania, had become a focus of world Jewish religion and culture. Just before the Polish areas became Russian, Rabbi Israel of Moldavia (the Baal Shem Tov) established the Hassidic movement, a tradition of serving God not only through scholarly study but through rejoicing in the Lord by song, prayer and simple living. The Gaon of Vilna (Elijah) established a renowned Talmudic Academy, a prototype for similar great religious schools which proliferated in many of the towns of the Pale.¹

In the 19th and the early 20th centuries Russian Jewry was the source of many of the cultural and national trends which were to make up the content of modern Jewish life. This was especially so in the second half of the 19th century during which a flowering of Yiddish and modern Hebrew literature occurred (e.g., Mendele Mocher Sforim, Y. L. Perets, Sholem Aleichem, S. Chernichovsky).

Toward the end of the 19th century, a proto-Zionist movement in Russia, "Hovevei Tzion" ["Lovers of Zion"] emerged. In 1882, 13 years before Herzl's Judenstaat, Dr. Leon Pinsker published his Zionist tract Autoemancipation. In the early 1880s the first groups of young Russian Jews went as pioneers [Bilu] to settle in Palestine. Early in the 20th century the Bund, which was a part of the general social-democratic movement in Russia, combined the philosophy of socialism with the demand for Jewish autonomy and Yiddish cultural development. Within Zionism several distinctive trends appeared, almost all led by Russian Jews: V. Jabotinskiv, the founder of the nationalist Revisionist Party; Ahad Ha'am, the theoretician of "spiritual Zionism"; B. Borochof and N. Syrkin, the ideologues of Socialist Zionism; and Rabbis L. Mohilover and H. Kalisher, the founders of religious Zionism.

¹ Sachar, 1972: 264-267.

Religion was the mainstay of Jewish life in Russia. Before 1917 there were religious institutions in every little shtetl: synagogues and prayer houses, religious schools, Talmudic academies, rabbinical courts, etc. Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution and following the decree of January 23, 1918, Soviet authorities began a campaign aimed at closing synagogues and suppressing Jewish religious life. This gained momentum in 1921 when Yevseksia representatives closed many religious institutions by turning them into emergency homes of refuge for the starving population during the famine. A second major anti-religious war by the authorities began in 1927-1928 and went on through most of the 1930's. The Nazi occupation liquidated whatever remained of Jewish prayer houses in all of the western USSR. After liberation by the Soviet Army, the restoration of synagogues was permitted only in very exceptional cases.¹

After the death of Stalin there was some relaxation of policy. In 1957 a small yeshivah was opened at the Moscow synagogue with 35 students, mostly from Georgia. A prayer book was printed in a limited edition. Several years later the yeshivah was crippled through the denial of residence permits to students; only a few people employed in the Moscow synagogue were registered pro forma as "students." In the 1960s a new wave of synagogue-closing was organized. There are numerous and conflicting figures for the present number of Jewish houses of worship in the USSR, varying mainly in whether they include only formally established synagogues (which are in separate houses and must have a responsible group of believers recognized by the authorities) or also minyan type prayer groups (which meet in the dwelling of one of the believers and are often ad hoc informal groups active mainly during the holiday season). In 1959 Soviet reports to the UN gave the number of existing synagogues as 450. By the early 1970s the number was reported at less than 100. (The lowest and most frequent figure given by

¹Rothenberg, 1971: 39-66 and personal talks with Soviet emigres by Z. Katz.

Jewish organizations outside the USSR is 62.) The majority of these synagogues are in the Oriental and "Western" Jewish communities (see Section A-IV); some may have been closed recently because of mass emigration to Israel.¹

Despite all, the synagogue remains the only officially recognized Jewish institution in the USSR today and as such it has acquired a new role. During Jewish religious holidays in the late 1960s and early 1970s many thousands of non-religious Jewish people, especially youth, gathered around the synagogues to sing, dance, talk, and generally demonstrate their Jewish identity. In 1972-1973 the police tried to prevent such demonstrations and bar access to synagogues. In several places a number of young Jews were arrested. The synagogues continue to be meeting places for Jewish and non-Jewish visitors from abroad with Soviet Jews. The Rabbi of the Moscow Synagogue is often presented as a spokesman on matters of Soviet Jewish affairs. From talks with emigres it appears that the "return to the synagogue" is a manifestation of Jewish national revival ("Zionism") and a return to Jewish tradition rather than to Jewish religion.

¹Rothenberg, 1971: 39-66 and personal talks with Soviet emigres by Z. Katz. See also A. Yodfat, "Jewish Religious Communities in the USSR," Soviet-Jewish Affairs, 1971: 2: 61-67.

External Relations

The Jews of Russia, like Jewish communities elsewhere, have historically kept close relations with their co-religionists abroad. They have been strongly influenced by Jewish spiritual trends in Central Europe (Haskalah, political Zionism, religious reform). Until 1917 Russian Jews were part of international Jewish organizations. They traveled abroad often for business, study, or pleasure. Many of them migrated to Western countries, creating bonds of family, friendship, community, and politics across the borders of Russia. Also, world Jewry and world public opinion took to heart the grave plight of Russian Jewry, especially during the pogroms--and to a degree it was able to influence tsarist policy.

These relations ended after 1917, though some fragmentary connections persisted until the late 1920s. A small number of Jews were still allowed to emigrate. An American Jewish charity organization, the Joint Distribution Committee, was allowed to provide aid during the famine of the early 1920s and to help finance Jewish settlement of the land in the late 1920s.¹ Even in the 1930s, Soviet authorities worked actively to get foreign (especially American) Jewish support for the Birobidzhan venture. During the war the Jewish Antifascist Committee was created to mobilize Jewish support in the West for the war in general and for the USSR in particular. Representatives of the Committee traveled to the U.S. and Britain and addressed Jewish gatherings. When the Cold War came they were the first to pay; they became victims of the "purge of the Cosmopolitans" (see Section A-III).

The first and second waves of pioneer immigrants to Palestine between 1880 and 1914 were predominantly Jews from Russia. They established the first Jewish agricultural colonies, created the first kibbutz settlements,

¹See Abramsky, 1970: 66-67.

and founded the Histadrut (the Jewish Federation of Labor) and the main political parties which remain the dominant forces of Israeli politics today. Though the Zionist movement was suppressed with all non-Bolshevik groups, some radically left Zionist groups were quasi-legally active until late in the 1920s.¹ But after 1939 Soviet Jewry again experienced the influence of non-Soviet Jews from Poland and the newly annexed territories. Many of these Jews were religious, Zionist, and highly knowledgeable about Jewish history and culture. There was a high incidence of intermarriage between Russian and refugee Jews during the war; so that after it a number of Russians along with their foreign spouses were able to return to Poland, and from there emigrate to Israel and the West.

The presence of Israeli diplomatic representatives in the Soviet Union after the USSR's recognition of Israel in 1948 added a new dimension to the world of Soviet Jewry. Meetings with these diplomats, who toured the country as extensively as possible, had a profound impact on both sides, as witnessed to by the later struggle of the Oriental Jewish communities for emigration to Israel. From such contacts came the first extensive reports on the conditions of Jews in the USSR.² In the mid-1950s, tourism from the West and later also from Israel was again allowed. Since the 1960s many thousands of Soviet Jews have been allowed to emigrate to Israel. Several thousand have arrived in Europe and the U.S. Jews in the West have become active in the campaign for the rights of Soviet Jews. These developments have created a strong bond between Soviet Jews, Israel, and the West.³

¹Goldman, 1960, passim.

²See, for example, Eliav, 1969.

³See Section C-III on manifestations of nationalism.

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

PART B

Media

Language Data

In the census of 1897, 96.9% of all Jews in Russia (including Polish Jews) regarded Yiddish as their mother tongue (in some areas of the Pale it was up to 99.3%). In 1926 the percentage was 70.4%, with 90.7% in Belorussia and 23.5% in the Caucasian republics (where the mother tongue of Oriental Jews was not Yiddish).¹

By 1959 only 17.9% gave Yiddish as their mother tongue (75% in Lithuania, 50% in Moldavia, 32% in the Kiev province and 26% in Mogilev and Gomel). Together with Oriental Jews who gave their own Jewish languages as their mother tongues, almost half a million Jews (21.5% of all Soviet Jews) regarded Yiddish or another of the Jewish languages as their own language.²

According to the 1959 census, the distribution for Jewish languages as the mother tongue was as follows:³

Georgian-Jewish	35,673
Tadzhik-Jewish	20,763
Tat-Jewish	25,225
Crimean Tatar-Jewish	<u>189</u>
(total Oriental Jewish)	81,850
Yiddish	<u>405,936</u>
Soviet total	487,786

In 1970, 17.7% of Jews declared Yiddish or another Jewish language as their mother tongue, a decrease of 3.8% since 1959. Russian was the mother tongue for 78.2%, an increase of 2.7% since 1959. 16.3% were also fluent in Russian as a second language. Thus, fully 94.5% of all Soviet Jews knew Russian well.⁴ In addition to 381,000 who gave Jewish languages as their

¹Schwartz, 1951: 18-21.

²Ettinger, 1970: 38-40.

³Itogi 1959: 184, 188. The 1970 census does not include these data.

⁴Itogi 1959: 184, 188; Nar. khoz. 1972: 32.

native tongue, 166,500 knew a Jewish language as a second language, for a total of 547,500. In addition, 28.8% of the Jewish population knew languages of other Soviet nationalities, one of the highest percentages for any ethnic group.¹

Like Jews in other countries, Jews in the Soviet Union have considerable linguistic ability and understand foreign languages. Many know English and German; Lithuanian Jews often know some Polish; Moldavians understand Rumanian; Bukharan and Mountain Jews understand some Persian, and many in all of these communities can follow Hebrew as well.²

Under Soviet conditions it is reasonable to accept the data on native languages as an indicator of national consciousness. The census data on Jews reveals a highly differentiated situation. The highest rate of knowledge of the native language is predictably registered among the Jews outside the core area: Lithuania (62%), Latvia (46%); and among the Orientals: Azerbaidzhan (41%), Uzbekistan (37.5%) and Turkmenia (30%). If autonomous republics are also included, then Dagestan is the highest of all with 87%, followed by the Kabardino-Balkar republic with 79%. The lowest of all is the RSFSR (The Russian Federation) with less than 12%, followed by the Ukraine with slightly more than 13%, mainly because several areas are included in it in which the knowledge of Yiddish (and national consciousness) are high-- e.g., Bukovina, Transcarpathia, Western Ukraine. The ratio between Lithuania and the RSFSR for Jews speaking native languages is 5.3:1. The figures for those who declared a Jewish language as a second language are especially high in areas where the Jewish language as mother tongue is low.

The greatest ratio of acculturation can be seen in the large Slav cities, especially those outside the traditional Pale areas: Kharkov (4.8%), Leningrad (5.2%), Novosibirsk (7.0%), and Moscow (7.6%). Even in the traditional centers of Jewish culture in Slav areas the percentages are low:

¹ Itogi 1959: 184, 188; Nar. khoz. 1972: 32; Itogi 1970: IV: 20.

² English is popular among the educated of the younger generation, and German among those who know some Yiddish.

Odessa (9.0%), Minsk (11.2%), and so on. At the other end are cities in the peripheral areas such as Chernovtsy, Riga and Kishinev, where almost half of the Jews declared Yiddish as their native tongue. Cities with large numbers of Oriental Jews also show a high ratio for a "Jewish native tongue": Tbilisi (40.5%), Tashkent (32.5%) and Baku (26.9%).¹

Table B.1.
Jewish Population in the USSR:

Identification with Jewish Languages
By Republic, 1959-1970 (in percentages)

Ranking by Jewish
native language 1970

	Jewish Language		
	as native	as native or second language ^a	
	1959 %	1970 %	1970 %
14 RSFSR	13.4	11.8	21.3
13 Ukraine	16.9	13.1	20.2
12 Belorussia	n.a.	17.8	28.3
4 Moldavia	50.0	44.7	52.1
2 Lithuania	69.0	61.9	63.0
3 Latvia	47.9	46.2	49.4
10 Estonia	24.8	21.5	24.8
6 Uzbekistan	49.6	37.5	42.3
1 Georgia	72.3	80.9	----
9 Kazakhstan	22.7	22.8	27.6
8 Kirgizia	30.3	26.7	33.5
11 Tadjikistan	23.2	19.9	21.9
7 Turkmenia	n.a.	30.2	36.7
5 Azerbaidzhan	35.2	41.3	46.6
- Armenia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

^a No such question was asked during the 1959 Census.

Data sources: Itogi, 1970: 96, 102-103, 202, 223, 253, 263, 273, 280, 284, 295, 306, 317.

Kommunist Tadjikistana, (May 6), 1971.

Zarya vostoka, (May 8), 1971.

Turkmenskaya iskra (May 22), 1971.

Bakinskii rabochii (May 21 and 22), 1971.

¹ Itogi, 1970: 20, 98, 103, 107, 133-147, 170-191, 253-283, 280-283, 317-320.

Table B.2.

Native and Second Languages Spoken by Jews

Number of Jews residing:	Speaking as their Native Language						Speaking as a Second Language	
	1959		1970		1970		1970	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
in the Birobidzhan autonomous province	14,269 (100%)	11,452 (100%)	1,970 (17.2%)	N.A.	9,479 (82.8%)	N.A.	1,804 (15.7%)	1,783 (15.6%)
all Soviet republics	2,268,000 (100%)	2,151,000 (100%)	381,000 (17.7%)	488,000 (21.5%)	1,733,000 (76.5%)	1,682,000 (78.2%)	351,000 (16.3%)	619,000 (28.8%)
Total								

Jews - Language Data - 4

Sources: Itoqi 1959: 184, 188; Census Data, 1970: 16; Nar. khoz. 1972: 32; Itoqi 1970: 76.

^aNo data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

^bIncluding Yiddish, Georgian, Tadzhiik, Tat and Crimean Tatar Jewish.

^cIncluding Jewish, if not the native language.

II. Local Media

In the second half of the 19th century a Jewish book publishing and periodical press appeared. On the eve of World War I, 13 Yiddish and two Hebrew dailies were published in Russia, with a total circulation of several hundred thousand. Though suppressed during the war, the Jewish press flourished after the February Revolution; in 1917-1918 some 170 periodicals were issued. Shortly thereafter, communist publications multiplied and non-communist ones were closed down. By 1935 there were Jewish dailies in Moscow, Kharkov, Minsk, and Birobidzhan. Ten Jewish periodicals appeared in the Ukraine alone, including one for children and one for artisans, as well as non-daily papers in Kiev, Berdichev, Odessa, Kremenchug, and in the Jewish national districts. In the late 1930s, however, a decline set in. By 1939 even the great Moscow newspaper Emes [The Truth] was closed and in the whole of the RSFSR only the Birobidzhan paper remained. In the same year only seven periodicals were left in the whole country, with a circulation of 38,700 for a population of 3 million. During World War II a Yiddish newspaper (Ainikeit) was again published in Moscow, and a limited revival of Jewish cultural activity set in; it was totally extinguished in 1948.¹

In all of the USSR today there are only two publications in Yiddish. One is the monthly Sovetish Heimland [Soviet Fatherland] published in Moscow since 1961 (at first as a bimonthly) with a stated circulation of 25,000. A considerable number of these are sold abroad. It is edited by Aron Vergelis (formerly a minor poet in Birobidzhan) who has assumed the role as spokesman for Soviet Jewry. Although it deals mostly with Soviet themes, it sometimes has items of Jewish interest, including a sheet for self study of Yiddish, news on Jewish concerts, meeting of Yiddish writers organized by the monthly, and some Jewish cultural news from abroad.²

The other publication is the thrice-weekly Birobidzhaner Shtern [Birobidzhan Star] which is mostly a two-page translation into Yiddish of the province newspaper in Russian. To publish a local-language edition of

¹ Brumberg, 1968; Abramsky, 1970; Friedberg, 1970: 94.

² See, e.g., Sovetish Heimland, 1972: 1 and 2; Pechat' 1970: 10,68 gives the circulation of this journal as 12,000 only. See Table B.2.

the official Russian newspaper is the usual procedure in all national units. Soviet official statistics for 1970 give the circulation of Birobidzhaner Shtern as 12,000, making for 4.28 copies per 100 in the Yiddish language group. Since the total number of Jews in Birobidzhan was about 14,000 in 1959, it seems that a large part of the printing is sent outside of the region.

During certain periods it was possible to subscribe to the Folks-shtime [People's Voice], published in Poland, which often had rather different information than that in the Soviet press. After the paper published some articles with implied criticism of Soviet policy regarding Jewish culture, its entry into the USSR terminated. It has been possible to read Hebrew publications of the Israeli Communist Party in some Soviet public libraries.

The fate of Jewish bookpublishing has been similar. There was a period of marked expansion of Yiddish publishing and of Soviet Jewish literature in the 1920s and early 1930s, which was followed by a decline and finally total annihilation in the late 1940s. At the peak of this activity, in 1932, 653 titles of Yiddish books were printed, with a circulation of more than 2.5 million.¹ Since 1959 about two dozen books in Yiddish have been published in the USSR; in 1970 four such books were issued, amounting to 3.56 copies per 100 in the language group, a ratio of 1:135 compared with the Lithuanians. The year 1970 was a very good year; there were years in which only one or no Yiddish books appeared.²

Apart from a brief news bulletin in Yiddish on Birobidzhan Radio, there is no radio or television program in Yiddish or in Russian on Jewish themes in the USSR. Due to their great interest in current events and in the world outside, Soviet Jews are avid listeners to foreign radio (Voice of Israel programs as well as Western stations). Oriental Jews who understand Farsi listen to broadcasts in Persian by various stations.³

¹Schwarz, 1951: 139-141.

²Pechat' 1970: 10,68.

³Chronicle (London), no. 1; also conversations with emigres by Zev Katz. Moscow's "Radio Peace and Progress" broadcasts in Hebrew to Israel.

Table B.3.
Jewish Publications

Note: The figures given here are the only ones available for Jewish publications.

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books and Brochures		Total Volume (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)		
Russian	1959										
	1971										
Jewish	1959										
	1970	1 ^b	12 ^c	4.28 ^d	1	12	4.28	4	10		3.56
Minority Languages	1959										
	1971										
Foreign Languages	1959										
	1971										
All Languages	1959										
	1971										

^a1970 figures do not include kolkhoz newspapers.

^bThree times per week.

^cThe total population of Jews in Birobidzhan is about 11,500.

^dBased on an estimated 280,000 who declared Yiddish as their mother tongue.

Source: Pechat'1970: 10,68.

III. Educational Institutions

The tsarist regime generally did not allow secular schools to teach in the language of the nationalities. Nevertheless the Jews of Russia had a widely ramified network of religious schools of their own. Jewish schools in the Russian language were also permitted. The Ministry of Education reported that in 1912 773 Jewish secular schools and 7743 hadorim [primary religious schools] were active, as well as 100 Talmud Torah [religious high schools]. Altogether, some 400,000 Jewish children were enrolled in these schools.¹

The secular schools taught mostly in Russian and the religious schools in Yiddish, with some Hebrew. During the last years of the Russian Empire Yiddish and Hebrew were quietly introduced in the secular schools.² During World War I and the Civil War the movement for Jewish schools was greatly strengthened with certain of the contending political forces proclaiming their support for them.³

During the early years of Bolshevism, Lenin and Stalin fought against "Jewish cultural autonomy" as opposed to Marxism. But soon after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government began an energetic campaign encouraging the Jewish-Yiddish schools to teach in the Bolshevik spirit. The first Soviet decree on Jewish schools was published in August 1918. The 1920s were a period of expansion of Soviet-Jewish culture. By 1931 there were 1100 Jewish schools with 130,000 pupils, from four-year primary schools to teachers colleges and technical high schools. There was also a Jewish Department at the Communist University of the Toilers of the West in Moscow.⁴

¹Vestnik Ope (February), 1914; Schulman, 1971: 2-15.

²Schulman, 1971: 18-25.

³Ibid.: 35-45.

⁴Kantor, 1934: 172ff; Schulman, 1971: 56-95.

The Jewish schools were organized and run under the supervision of the Yevsektzia (see Section A-III), which was suddenly abolished in March 1930. Many of its leaders and activists fell victim to the subsequent purges of the 1930s, and during this decade Jewish schools declined swiftly until only very few remained. World War II spelled an end to Jewish schools in the USSR. Several attempts to reestablish such schools after the war were nipped in the bud by Soviet authorities. Under Stalin's rule the Party no longer needed special Jewish sections or schools.¹

No Jewish schools whatever have been allowed in the USSR since, and there is not a single Jewish educational institution in existence there today. For other dispersed nationalities, some of whom do not have even an autonomous province of their own, there are government arrangements for teaching in their languages (e.g., the Germans, Poles and Crimean Tatars). There are also schools for minority groups outside their republic in central Asia. Not so for the Jews.

Recently, Jewish people awaiting departure for Israel have created unofficial Hebrew seminars and small private schools on Jewish topics. These are known to exist in Moscow as well as elsewhere in the USSR. Jewish education is transmitted mostly within the family, from generation to generation, especially among the Oriental Jews.² Jews are, however, prominent as teachers, university professors and students in the educational institutions of the USSR, especially in cities with large Jewish communities.³

¹Schulman, 1971: 1460165.

²Personal information from talks with emigres held by Z. Katz. And see Jews in Eastern Europe (November), 1971: 107-135.

³See Section A-II.

It is generally known that Soviet Jews--like Jews in other countries--have taken advantage of the educational opportunities available in a modern society. The 1970 census data corroborate that, despite the unofficial and official discrimination against Jews in the USSR, they have achieved a high standard of education and remain the most educated ethnic group in the Soviet Union.

Of every thousand Jews in the RSFSR, ten years old and above, 344 have a higher education, compared with 43 for Russians, a ratio of 8:1. Corresponding ratios for other republics are 8.5:1 in Moldavia; 7:1 in Belorussia; 6.5:1 in the Ukraine; and 5.5:1 in Latvia. In relation to less educated (non-Christian) nationalities the ratios are even greater: Jews to Tatars: 15.5:1; Chechens, 49:1; and the Nentsy (a formerly Pagan northern people), 115:1. All the figures above are for Jews within a given republic and for the dominant nationality within the same republic; there are no data for all Jews which can be compared with all members of an entire nationality in the USSR.¹

A similar pattern is evident in data on educated manpower in the USSR. For example, 81% of employed Jews in Moldavia have a higher or secondary education (including incomplete secondary) whereas the figure for Moldavians is 43.5%; in the Ukraine the figures are 91.5% and 63.7%, respectively. The census documents the socio-occupational structure of the Jews in the Soviet Union: in the RSFSR more than two-thirds of the Jews (68.2%) are specialists with higher or secondary special education; in the Ukraine, Latvia, and Belorussia, about half; and in Moldavia, about 40%. The respective ratios for local nationalities move from 7% for the Moldavians to 19% for the Russians and 20% for the Latvians. The percentage of Jewish specialists among their working population is seven times higher than that of the Moldavians and about 3.5 times higher than that of the Russians.²

¹ Itozi 1970: IV: 405,449,475-476,480,483,513,516,518.

² Ibid.: 577,579,588,590,614,618,632-633.

The data above may serve to explain the situation of Soviet Jewry today. As an urban population with a tradition for learning, the Jews have been "too successful" in the area of education. The official and unofficial efforts to stem the Jewish advance in education succeed in making it more difficult, but cannot radically change the situation. Ultimately, such efforts simply make Jewish citizens more conscious of their problem. Their relative exclusion from the sensitive political and security areas is additionally frustrating to this highly educated and active population.¹ Some react by hiding their Jewishness (assimilation); others look for a solution outside the USSR.

¹Personal information from talks with emigres by Zev Katz.

III. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

In the 1920s and 1930s the Ukrainian Academy of Science included an Institute of Jewish Proletarian Culture, and the Belorussian Academy included a Jewish Sector. These were described as "a laboratory of scientific thought in the field of Jewish culture." In particular, these two institutions concentrated on the history of the revolutionary movement within the Jewish population and on its socio-economic status.¹

In 1919 a Jewish State Theater was established. The Soviet state took special interest in it, and Jewish theatrical art flourished with such institutions as the Jewish Theatrical College in Minsk, Jewish departments at the Kiev Institute for Drama, and the Minsk Jewish State Theater. By 1934 there were 18 permanent Jewish theaters in the USSR; but by the end of the 1930s their number had diminished considerably and it further decreased as a result of World War II. In 1948, after the murder of Mikhoels by the secret police Jewish State Theater in Moscow was closed. Since then, there has been no permanent Jewish theatrical establishment in the USSR.²

Several temporary groups of professional actors and concert artists have made appearances in Yiddish which have been well attended by Jews. Amateur theater groups exist in Vilnius, Birobidzhan, and Riga. In March 1967 seven prominent Soviet-Jewish actors addressed a letter to the CPSU leadership asking permission to establish a State Jewish Theater in Kiev. Permission was not granted. In the meantime, a number of prominent Jewish artists (e.g., Nehama Lifshits, M. Goldblatt) have left for Israel.³

¹Schwartz, 1951: 138-139.

²Schwartz, 1951: 140-142.

³Decter, 1971: 39-40; Soviet Life (May) 1972: 17.

Though without any scientific or cultural institutions of their own, Jews in the USSR have made significant contributions to the development of Soviet science and culture. The famous Soviet MIG planes were built by Mikoyan (an Armenian) and Gurevich (a Jew). Abram Yoffe was the father of the Soviet school of atomic physics and the teacher of Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet atomic bomb. The physicist Lev Landau was regarded as "the Soviet Einstein." The economist Evsei Liberman is recognized as one of the fathers of the Soviet economic reform of the middle 1960s. Gersh Budker and Vladimir Veksler are among the prominent Soviet scientists in the science cities of Dubno near Moscow and Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk. L. Gurevich is the designer of the Soviet flax combine harvester. Soviet-Jewish musicians, such as D. Oistrakh, E. Gillels, and L. Kogan are known all over the world much as the "Russian" masters of chess, Tal and Botvinnik.¹

Jewish contribution to Soviet literature has been great, from Isaac Babel and Osip Mandelshtam to Ilya Ehrenburg, Boris Pasternak and Samuil Marshak to Yuli Daniel, Aleksandr Galich and Mikhail Vysotsky. Among the Jews who have been active in Soviet creative arts are Sergei Eisenstein in films, Maya Plisetskaya in Soviet ballet, Arkady Raikin in popular comedy, and Elena Bystritskaya in theater (she is the Russian woman hero in the film version of Sholokov's "Quiet is the Don").

In present-day Soviet sociology Igor Kon, Yuri Levada, and Ovsei Shkaratan have made significant contributions. Igor Kon is the only Soviet social scientist who has addressed himself to the roots of modern ethnic prejudice. Levada and Shkaratan have been an object of Party criticism for ideological "mistakes."²

¹Rabinovich, 1967, passim; Zionism, 1970; J. Turkevich, Soviet Men of Science, (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1963): 69,409.

²Igor Kon, "Psikhologiya predrassudka," Novy Mir, 1966: 9.

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

PART C

National Attitudes

1. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

For the last several decades formal indicators point to steady assimilation of the Jews into Soviet culture. They are without a potent national area of their own. Their natural increase is below replacement levels; the 1970 census indicated that their numbers had decreased 5% since 1959. They have no viable cultural institutions (apart from a monthly journal and a few concerts). Jewish religion is practiced by small groups, mostly by those over 50 years of age. In spite of these factors, a major national revival movement has appeared among the Jews in the USSR. Its clearest manifestation is the movement for mass emigration to Israel.

Parallel to the movement for emigration there is indeed considerable evidence of large-scale assimilation. The situation is complex. On the one extreme, there are outright assimilationists who easily deny their Jewishness. On the other, there are the traditional Oriental Jews and extremist Zionists. The following factors influence Jewish attitudes in the USSR; none are mutually exclusive, and their impact on the major Jewish subgroups varies.

- (a) anti-Semitism
- (b) official Soviet doctrine and policies
- (c) the revival of nationalism among Soviet ethnic groups
- (d) Israel
- (e) the Jewish diaspora
- (f) the Judaic religion
- (g) previous personal and group experience
- (h) the dissent movement

During the first two decades after the Revolution, the Bolsheviks actively discouraged anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, as an identifiable group, Jews found themselves hated for supporting the Soviet government or for becoming successful and prosperous in its service. At the same time they were often resented as private traders and blamed for speculation. During World War II,

anti-Semitism intensified in all parts of the USSR.¹ Since the war it has acquired a new form--that of political anti-Semitism, which is basically motivated by ideological and political concerns. Jews are excluded first and foremost from the general political sphere (consisting of the Party and state leadership and the security and diplomatic services). Jewish culture has been practically extinguished and their ethnic identity suppressed in the interest of political expediency as understood by the Soviets. (Political expediency was also the basis of the Soviet leadership's attitude toward other nationalities as well, e.g., the Crimean Tatars, the Meskhi Turks, and the Germans in the USSR.)² Political anti-Semitism is different from its racial or national variety: it does not totally exclude all Jews. Those prepared to accept the option of total assimilation are accepted into the fold, though not quite equal to the Russians and other Soviet nationalities. This inherent contradiction in Soviet official policy--assimilation accompanied by discrimination--has a decisive impact on the attitudes of both the assimilated and nationally conscious Jews in the USSR.

To this present-day picture must be added the long history of Jewish persecution from early tsarist and Soviet periods to the "Black Years" under Stalin. The tragedy of the second World War which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1-2 million Soviet Jews compounds the picture. Except for the Oriental communities, there is no Jewish family in the USSR which was not affected by the holocaust.³

The revival of nationalism in the USSR has been a powerful factor in the shaping of Jewish attitudes. The original idea of everyone giving up his previous ethnic identification to become Soviet was recognized to be unrealistic in the early 1930s as Stalin identified more and more with Russianism. The most recent wave of Russian nationalist

¹See section on history.

²See the Chronicle, 1968-1972 and Reddaway, 1972, passim.

³Decter, 1971: 25; Schwartz, 1965; Ettinger, 1971.

literature--both of the legal and samizdat variety--must have had a devastating effect on Jews, especially those who had assimilated into Russian culture. Among the most glaring examples of anti-Semitic literature are the novels by Ivan Shevtsov, In the Name of the Father and Son and Love and Hate. The central character in the latter is a Jew depicted as a mother-killer, a swindler, a pervert and drug pusher. 200,000 copies of this book were published.¹

Among samizdat materials, the journal Veche has reprinted anti-Semitic materials from the writings of the Slavophiles of the last century and argued for a return to Orthodox Russianism. Slovo natsii takes a flagrantly racist position, blaming white Americans for despoiling the race by too lax a policy toward the blacks. Not unnaturally, such assimilated Jews as Chakovsky and Pomerants fight this phenomenon as best they can. The former publishes attacks on it in the Literaturnaya Gazeta, of which he is an editor; the latter writes powerful samizdat essays from the position of a dissident-democratic, Russian-Jewish writer and critic.²

Nationalism is also growing among other minority nationalities of the USSR. Here the Jews are often caught in the middle: the local nationalists regard them as alien Russianizers and Sovietizers and the Russians regard them as Jews (i.e., non-Russians). Some Jews have made great contributions to the development of the national culture and economy of many of the republics. But when they identify with the local population, they are again apt to arouse the ire of the Russianizers, official and unofficial. It has been reported by recent emigres that certain minority groups (the Armenians, the Georgians, the Latvians) have adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the Jewish movement for emigration and toward Israel in general. Ukrainian activists have appealed for a condemnation of anti-Semitism and for a new relationship between Jews and Ukrainians.³

¹W. Bergman, Soviet Jewish Affairs, 1971: 1:119-125.

²Pomerants, 1970: 123-127: Samizdat Documents, 103,590,1020.

³Dzyuba, 1970; Katz, 1973; and Reddaway, 1972.

At the same time, the forces for the integration of Jews into Soviet society exert a powerful influence. Generations in the Russian environment have had their effect. Many Jews have immersed themselves in Russia and her culture and have accepted Soviet ideology so deeply that they hold to it even after de-Stalinization and the disenchantments of recent years. The Soviet Union is a large country with much potential, and despite the many obstacles, many Jewish citizens find careers and professional satisfaction.

Another strong assimilative force--especially for the young in the newly opened areas-- is intermarriage. There are no fully representative data on the amount of intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews in the USSR, but several partial surveys on intermarriage have been conducted in a number of Soviet cities and in several republics of the USSR. Following are some of the findings by Western writers based on these surveys.

Nove and Newth, extrapolating from the 1959 census data, show that intermarriage within the Pale was lower than without. In an attempt to discern a general pattern of Jewish intermarriage, Altshuler found that Jewish intermarriage in an old district of Tashkent inhabited mainly by Bukharan Jews was 7.7% of all marriages involving a Jewish partner (in 1962); whereas in a modern central district inhabited by Ashkenazi Jews, the figure stood at 33.7% (up from 19.2% in 1926). A Vilnius study showed that the rate of intermarriage was higher for Jewish men than for Jewish women.

Gittelman estimates that the present rate of Jewish intermarriage in the USSR is between 20% and 35%. Though high, this is somewhat lower than in the 1930s and not unprecedented in other Jewish communities (e.g., Jews in Germany in the 1920s and in some North American communities in the 1950s). Since the dispersal of the Jewish population is much higher than that of other ethnic groups in the USSR, Armstrong sees the fact that most Jewish marriages are still endogamous as an indication of strong national cohesiveness.¹

¹See Altshuler, 1970: 30-32; Gittelman, 1972: 20-30; Nove and Newth, 1970: 143-145; Armstrong, 1971: 62-67. These findings are similar to those reached from conversations with recent emigres.

As to the consequences of Jewish intermarriage, a detailed Soviet report indicates that the children of mixed couples "usually choose that nationality, the language and culture of which are most familiar."¹ This would mean that the great majority of children from mixed marriages with Jews choose Russian nationality.

Evidence suggests, however, that there are several factors which mitigate the acculturative effects of intermarriage. Where the father has a pronouncedly Jewish family name, where the Jewish side of the family is dominant, where Jewish-consciousness is high, or where the Jewish spouse is well known as being Jewish--it is difficult for the children to register as non-Jews. Edward Kuznetsov, who received a death sentence (later commuted to life imprisonment) in the Leningrad "highjackers" trial, is the son of a mixed marriage and was registered as Russian in his passport; yet he is regarded, and regards himself, as Jewish. Several of the leaders of the Jewish movement for emigration to Israel have non-Jewish spouses.²

¹ Lit. gaz. (January 24), 1973: 13.

² Talks with emigres by Zev Katz.

II. Basic Views on Jews and Their National Attitudes

a. The Soviet View

Soviet leaders, from Lenin to Khrushchev, have been rather outspoken in their views about Jews as a people and as individuals. Soviet theory differentiates between natsiya [nation], national'nost' (nationality in the sense of ethnic group), narod (a people in the sense of an ethnic community), and narodnost' (a small ethnic group, not fully constituted as a nationality). Lenin, and Stalin writing under Lenin's guidance,¹ consistently argued that the Jews were not a nation since they lacked such essential characteristics as a common territory, language, and a common economy. But they did recognize that the Jews "had a common religion, origin, and certain relics of national character" (Stalin) and "a common descent and nationality" (Lenin).²

After 1917, the Soviet Bolsheviks granted Jews the rights of a nationality and even some degree of cultural and organizational separateness (e.g., the Yevsektsiya, Jewish schools). At the same time, the Soviets deny that the Jews in the Soviet Union belong to the same group as Jews outside--that they are one people.³

Among Soviet leaders M. Kalinin was most outspoken in arguing for the preservation of the Jewish nationality. In 1934 he spoke about the need of the Jews "to have a state of their own." A Soviet decree stated in 1936 that "For the first time in the history of the Jewish people its ardent desire to create a homeland of its own, to achieve national statehood, is being realized" in Birobidzhan.⁴

¹See Stalin's book Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial'nyi vopros which appeared in 1913; an English translation, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, was published in London by Martin Lawrence, undated. See also Filosofskii slovar (Moscow: Izd. Polit. Lit., 1963), 298-301.

²Lenin, 1937: 293; Stalin, 1936: 6-8; and Korey, 1970: 76-77. See also the detailed discussion in Schwartz (1951:24-58), and for a recent discussion in the USSR on "nation," see Miller (1970: 48-51).

³See BSE, 1952: 15.

⁴Pravda (November 26), 1926; Goldberg, 1961: 171-174; Schwartz, 1951: 174, 181.

The Soviet view that the Jews need a state of their own reappeared in Soviet statements in 1947-1948 when the USSR supported the partition of Palestine and was among the first to recognize Israel. It would appear that in accord with Soviet official theory the Jews--or at least the Israeli Jews--should be recognized as a nation, since they display the necessary features, territory, language, culture, and a common economy.

Stalin's personal views on Jews are relatively well documented. When still a young delegate to the London Party conference (in 1903) he reported that someone remarked "jokingly" that since most of the opposition to the Bolsheviks was Jewish and the great majority of the Bolsheviks were non-Jewish "a little pogrom could take care of things." There is some evidence that during his struggles against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev (all Jews) his followers utilized anti-Jewish feelings to gain support. In 1931, Stalin answered a question from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in which he condemned anti-Semitism as "a phenomenon profoundly hostile to the Soviet system." The statement was later (in 1936) made public by Molotov, and it appeared in Pravda.¹ However, evidence of Stalin's strong anti-Semitism in the latter years of his rule comes from his daughter Svetlana and from Khrushchev. According to them, he regarded Jews as treacherous and dishonest.²

In several talks with foreigners Khrushchev admitted that "anti-Semitic sentiments still existed in the USSR and explained that the "indigenous inhabitants in the republics . . . have created new cadres and they would take it amiss should the Jews want to occupy the foremost positions in them." He argued that Jews "surround themselves with Jewish collaborators," and that they always argue about everything and do not agree among themselves in the end.³ He also explained that there were no Jewish schools in the Soviet Union and no Jewish theater because there was no demand for them,

¹Pravda (November 30), 1936; Lestchinsky, 1930: 263; Weinryb, 1970: 302-303.

²Alliluyeva, 1967: 197-198, 206, 217; Khrushchev, 1970, *passim*.

³Korey, 1970: 89-92. See also Khrushchev 1970.

...the Jews themselves preferred to send their children to Russian schools. As to attitudes of the present leaders, it was reported that it was Kosygin who attacked F. Kriegel, a leader of the Czechoslovak Spring, calling him "this Galician Jew."¹

3. Western Views

John Armstrong has developed the notion of "mobilized diasporas" using the Soviet Jews, "an ethnic minority that performs a special function in the modernization process," as his model. The members of such groups are, he claims, more urban-oriented, higher educated, and possessing a greater degree of managerial and language skills than the local population. Also, their women are more involved in the labor force. Because of these scarce qualities "mobilized diasporas" obtain a disproportionate share of the key positions in a modernizing society. However, when the local nationality develops an educated stratum of its own, "this apparently favored position of the minority group arouses jealousy. The diaspora group becomes subject to discrimination and usually ceases its specialized functions."²

Leonard Schapiro sees the fate of Soviet Jewry as intricately bound up with the fate of the political system of the Soviet Union: "The Jew suffers more than the other Soviet citizen from the circumstance that he lives in a totalitarian state, in which the principles of tolerance and equality before an independent law are not observed." He points out that much of what Jews suffer is directed not against the Jews alone, but rather against any nationality (especially of the diaspora kind) and against any religion in the USSR. But "the national consciousness of the Jew, where it exists, revolves around... religion and Zionism... Propaganda against priests does not...arouse hostile feelings against Armenians or Georgians or Russians. In contrast, lurid stories about the immorality of a rabbi...suitably caricatured with a hooked nose and other distinctive Jewish features stimulate hostility against Jews

¹Levenberg, 1970: 39-40. Other reports relate this incident to the then First Secretary of the Ukraine, P. Shelest.

²Armstrong, 1967: 131-135.

as such." Moreover, this "creates a sense among non-Jews that the Soviet authorities treat the Jews as second-class citizens, and that the Jews are, therefore, 'fair game.' The same line of reasoning applies to anti-Zionism..."¹

Rothenberg points out that "the anti-Judaic propaganda impugning the ethics and historical past of the Jewish people charts a distorted and maligned picture of the Jew. The negative assumption applies to every Jew and the onus of disproving the assumption lies on each Jewish individual."² While not disputing the effect of anti-Zionist propaganda campaigns, J. Frankel comes to the conclusion that this propaganda "was not part of a general policy directed against Jews per se. Rather, it represents ad hoc responses to new moves in the campaign for the freedom of Jews to emigrate to Israel--moves from inside and outside Russia." There is a deep division between "would-be Leninist attitudes and neo-Stalinist attitudes" among people in the Soviet Union. The latter attitude finds expression in extremely harsh trials and crude intimidation. The former--in attempts at persuasion--and greatly stepped up emigration.³

Alex Inkeles sees the attitudes toward Jews as a function of stress which develops when there is a "shift from class interest to ethnic interest: a class-based party becomes a ruler of an ethnic nation-state and comes to identify the class interest with the ethnic interests." Also, under Soviet conditions there has been a very high rate of social mobility into the elite; its new members bring with them many folk prejudices including anti-Jewish feelings. Moreover, the Soviet system has not done away with the socio-economic reasons for anti-Semitism: good positions are scarce, and the success of Jews in the competition for these positions breeds ill feeling. Of the two possible responses to the situation: "to deny one's identity more and more...(or) to build a heightened identity, Inkeles believes that the second is taking place in the

¹ Schapiro, 1970: 6-9.

² Rothenberg, 1971: 217-218.

³ Frankel, 1972: 53-54. See also Ben-Shlomo, 1970 passim.

Soviet Union. Anti-Semitism also plays a role for relieving tensions between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe which are in a difficult period of transition (e.g., when the Jews are used as scapegoats during a crisis).¹

Zvi Gittelman makes an attempt to discern the specific and complex processes going on among Soviet Jewry, to point out their simultaneous occurrence and contradictory effects. Jews undergo a rapid (and mostly willing) process of linguistic assimilation into Russian and of general Russian acculturation. But, as has already been mentioned, for some Jews this leads to total assimilation, while others become more nationally conscious. "Jews in the USSR are culturally Russian but legally and socially Jews. This split personality creates an internal dissonance the resolution of which can be achieved by becoming wholly Jewish or wholly Russian." The Soviet authorities create this contradictory situation, since on the one hand they press the Jew into assimilation while at the same time they make it impossible.²

c. Views of Soviet writers and dissenters

The problems of anti-Semitism and of emigration to Israel have become significant themes in the writings of the more liberal Soviet writers and dissenters in the post-Stalin period. One of the main characters in Ehrenburg's "Thaw" was a Jewish doctor who suffered during the doctors' plot period. "Babi Yar" was the name of the well-known poem by Yevtushenko as well as a book by A. Kuznetsov. The largely unknown letter by the writer Boris Polevoi to the Party Central Committee asking for the revival of Jewish culture in the USSR was one of many similar activities among members of the Soviet intelligentsia. Jewish personages are prominent in Solzhenitsyn's First Circle.³

¹Inkeles, 1971: 76-85.

²Gittelman, 1972: 1-5; 33-48.

³Ehrenburg, The Thaw (London: Mayflower-Dell, 1955); A. Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); Politicheskii dnevnik (Amsterdam: Herzen Foundation, 1972): 102-105.

Among dissenters, Yuli Daniel and A. Sinyansky have included passages on anti-Semitism in their stories. A. Marchenko described anti-Jewish prejudice in Soviet prison camps and A. Amalrik among Soviet students. At first, the dissent movement did not take an active stand on the Jewish issue, but the Jewish national revival became stronger and as the authorities intensified their struggle against it, prominent dissenters became more involved in it. Sakharov, the brothers Medvedev, Chalidze, and others have published appeals in support of the right of the Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel and condemning anti-Jewish discrimination in the USSR. Roi Medvedev devoted a special paper to the Middle East and the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. In his book On Socialist Democracy, he argues that the Jews have been living for hundreds of years in Russia and therefore should be regarded as a rooted [korenoye] population, much like any other. He also stated that the development of the previously backward nationalities had reached the level at which there was no longer a need to give them preference in appointments, and that these should be made without reference to nationality.¹

¹On Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); A. Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovannich, 1970); A. Marchenko, My Testimony (London: Pall Mall, 1969); A. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, (New York: Norton, 1968); Roi Medvedev, Kniga o sotsialisticheskoi demokratii (Amsterdam: Herzen Foundation, 1972).

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

Recent manifestations of Jewish nationalism are inextricably linked with recent events in the USSR, especially in the post-Khrushchev period. Immediately after the removal of Khrushchev there was an improvement in the situation of Soviet Jews. The economic trials were discontinued. An editorial in Pravda explicitly condemned manifestations of anti-Semitism in the country.¹ A virulent anti-Jewish booklet ("Judaism Without Embellishments"), published under the auspices of the Ukrainian Academy of Science by Trofim Kichko, aroused worldwide protests--even among Communist parties in the West. It was officially criticized by the Ideological Committee of the CPSU and reportedly was withdrawn.

From 1964 to 1967 (until June) there was also an improvement in the relations between the USSR and Israel. Cultural and tourist exchanges widened (including a visit by the Soviet writer K. Simonov to Israel and a tour by the Israeli Singer Geula Gill in the Soviet Union). Also, for the first time, several thousand Soviet Jews (mostly older citizens) were allowed to emigrate to Israel. At the same time, however, the Soviets were becoming ever more involved in support of the Arab position in the Middle East.²

The Six Day War in June 1967 led to far reaching changes in the Soviet position. Diplomatic relations with Israel were severed; the miniscule but significant emigration was halted. Soviet media undertook a most vicious and vituperative campaign against Israel, Zionism and Judaism--with direct and indirect anti-Semitic features.³ The previously rebuked Kichko reappeared with a new book published in Kiev (Judaism and Zionism) in which Judaism was presented primarily as "a creed teaching poisonous hatred for all other peoples,"

¹ Pravda (September 5), 1965.

² Weinryb, 1970: 315-316; Decter, 1971: 29-30; Lawrence, 1970: 33-44; Cang, 1969: 147-167.

³ For an extensive review, see Korey, 1973, passim.

and one which advocated "thievery, betrayal and perfidy." All during this period, the Soviet Union became more and more involved on the side of the Arab countries against Israel. On the other hand, the Jewish writer Ehrenburg freely expressed satisfaction with the Israeli victory in the Six Day War and criticized Soviet policies.¹

In 1968 the pattern of blaming an "international Zionist alliance which was playing the role of a secret channel between reactionary forces in the Imperialist states [primarily the U.S., German Federal Republic, and Britain] and Israeli militarists" for anti-Soviet developments, spilled over into Eastern Europe. In March 1968 during student riots in Warsaw, the Polish First Secretary of the Party, V. Gomulka--with the active support of the Soviets--blamed the "Zionists" as instigators and initiated a major expulsion of Jews from Poland. During the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis Soviet leaders consciously used anti-Semitism to weaken and split the Czechoslovak Spring movement by demanding the elimination of the Jewish leaders E. Goldstuecker, F. Kriegel, and O. Šik. In the USSR similar procedures were used to weaken the growing dissent movement, in which Jews were playing a significant role.²

In the fall of 1968 Soviet authorities began again to issue exit visas for Israel for some while denying them to others. Pressure from those not allowed to leave mounted. They had learned from the tactics of the dissent movement and arranged sit-ins, circulated appeals inside the USSR, and sent protest documents to prominent personalities outside the Soviet Union. In this way the foreign press was constantly kept informed. The Soviet security police conducted a constant campaign of harassment, suppression, and arrests in an attempt to limit the extent of the movement for emigration.

¹Korey, 1970: 45-46; Katz, 1968: 27; Frankel, 1972, passim; A. Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears (London: Cresset Press, 1969):242.

²Korey, 1970: 43-52; Lendvai, 1971, passim; Soviet Jewish Affairs, 1971: 1; 1972: 3; and other issues.

In November 1968 a Kiev engineer, Boris Kochubievsky, who had consistently criticized Soviet policies toward Jews and Israel was arrested and later sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Similar cases were later reported from Odessa, Kharkov, Sverdlovsk, Moscow, Riga and other places. When in March 1970 the Soviet Foreign Ministry arranged a press conference in which prominent Soviet Jewish personalities condemned Zionism and supported the official policies, a group of Jewish activists made a statement denying the right of these people to speak in the name of Soviet Jewry and demanding the right to emigrate to Israel.¹

In June 1970 arrests of the so called "hijackers" began. Thirty-four Jews were arrested, first in Leningrad, then in Riga, Kishinev, and Tbilisi. In December two were sentenced to death in Leningrad (Eduard Kuznetsov and Mark Dymshits), and nine others were condemned to various terms of imprisonment. Several other trials followed. An attempt to hijack a plane in order to escape from the Soviet Union to Israel was accepted by the court as an act of treason. The harsh sentences and prospective executions aroused a global response, and the Supreme Court of the USSR commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. However, instead of weakening the movement for emigration the trials strengthened it and gave it worldwide support and recognition. In spring of 1971, a world conference of Jewish communities convened in Brussels to deliberate on the position of Soviet Jewry. In Moscow, Jewish national activists from all over the USSR staged several demonstrations, including a sit-in in the building of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A samizdat Jewish chronicle entitled Exodus appeared. Following these developments Soviet authorities allowed a relatively large-scale emigration to Israel, which is continuing at the time of this writing.²

¹ Jews in Eastern Europe, 1969, 1971 (various issues); Katz, 1970: 328-329; Redemption, 1970, passim.

² Jews in Eastern Europe, 1971: IV: 6-7; Soviet-Jewish Affairs, 1970-1972 (various issues).

The exact numbers in the Jewish emigration from the USSR are unavailable since neither Israel nor the USSR publishes official figures, and the unofficial figures often vary. Table C.1. shows estimates based on several sources.

Table C.1.

Jewish Emigration from the USSR to Israel

up to 1964 ^a		4,667
1965		750
1966		1,613
1967		<u>1,412</u>
	total up to 1967	8,442
1968		231
1969		3,033
1970 ^b		1,000
1971		12,923
1972		32,200
1973 ^c	(first 6 months)	<u>16,400</u>
	total since 1967	65,787
	grand total	74,229

^aThe figure was given by Prime Minister Kosygin during a visit to Ottawa in October 1971.

^bFigures up to 1971 were released by the Jewish Agency.

^cEstimated by Zev Katz. Cf. a report in the New York Times (September 10, 1973: 5) saying that 18000 came to Israel in the first seven months of 1973.

Source: Gittelman, 1972: 9-10; Schroeter, 1972: 3-4; personal information of Zev Katz.

By the end of June 1973 almost 75,000 Jews had left the Soviet Union--about 8500 before the Six Day War and more than 65,000 since. In June The New York Times reported that Brezhnev had assured the U.S. that Jewish emigration would continue "at the rate of 36,000 to 40,000 a year."¹

¹New York Times (June 2), 1973.

Data on the composition of the emigration are even more scarce. Estimates of the composition are given in Table C.2.

Table C.2.

Jewish Emigration from the USSR by Community
(up to June 1973)

	Total no. in USSR (1000)	Total emigrated (1000)	% of all emigres	% of group emigrated	Potential total emigration (1000)
Georgians	55	25.0	33%	45.0%	49.5 (90%)
Central Asian (Bukharan)	100	4.0	6%	4.5%	60.0 (60%)
Baltics	80	19.0	25%	24.0%	60.0 (75%)
Ukraine (including Bukovina)	1,000	9.0	12%	0.9%	330.0 (33%)
Moldavia	130	9.0	12%	7.0%	97.5 (75%)
RSFSR	1,000	6.0	8%	0.6%	200.0 (20%)
Other (Belorussian, Mountain Jews)	385	3.0	4%	0.8%	115.5 (30%)
total	2,750	75.0	100%		912.5

Source: Estimates by Zev Katz.

According to these estimates, Georgian Jews may complete a total exodus to Israel within two years; almost half have emigrated already. About one in every four Baltic Jews has already left, and within several years the overwhelming majority of them will have done so. Altogether the Western and Oriental Jews who comprise only 20-25% of the total, make up some 85% of the emigres. So far, less than 1% of all Core Jews have left (altogether some 15,000, including the "Western" Jews of Bukovina and Transcarpathia). In the emigre total they amount to only 15%, though they are 75-80% of the total Jews in the USSR.

The reasons for this differentiated behavior lie partly in the history and background of the different Jewish communities (see the sections on demography and history). But it is also a result of the planning of the central authorities and of the different attitudes of the local and national leadership. The Core Jews live in the large cities, the centers of Soviet power, culture, science, and education. Many of them are educated or "important," and the authorities place all kinds of obstacles in the way of their emigration. In the list of 1000 Soviet Jews reportedly submitted to the Soviets by U.S. representatives (asking for their release), there are few Oriental Jews but many Core Jews. Knowledgeable observers think that the Soviets regard the Oriental Jews as expendable, and the Western Jews as nationalist (Zionist) and therefore undesirable (or dangerous). The latter designation certainly applies also to Jewish activists from among Core Jews; they are suppressed, harassed, imprisoned or allowed to leave. The basic policy seems to be to allow the departure of those Jews who are least assimilable into contemporary Slavic Soviet society--especially Oriental ones, Jews whose childhood was spent in non-Soviet areas--but to retain the Soviet-educated, professionally competent Jews of the core areas.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

THE TATARS AND THE TATAR ASSR

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

Center for International Studies
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Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

Introduction

In the USSR the name "Tatar" is today applied to two distinct ethnic groups: the Kazan Tatars, who have an autonomous republic of their own on the Volga and Kama Rivers to the east of Moscow, and the Crimean Tatars who were exiled by Stalin during World War II from the Crimean peninsula on the Black Sea to Central Asia.¹ Throughout much of their history these two groups have shared a common culture. Russian conquest and settlement eventually led to their geographical separation and partial dispersion.

Of the almost 6 million Tatars in the USSR about 300,000 are Crimean Tatars.² Some 2.5 million Kazan Tatars live in the Tatar and Bashkir ASSR's, and another 1.5 million in adjoining territories. (Other Tatars live in Siberia and in other areas and large cities of the RSFSR, as well as in the five Central Asian republics. The number of Tatars in the remaining union republics is negligible.) Soviet statistics do not distinguish between the Kazan and Crimean Tatars.³

This chapter deals with the Kazan Tatars and the Tatar ASSR. However, the author occasionally refers to the Tatar-Bashkirs as one group. The Bashkirs are a neighboring Turkic people with close historical, cultural, and demographic links to the Tatars. They live primarily in the Bashkir ASSR in which, however, there are more Tatars than Bashkirs.⁴ About one third of the Bashkirs regard Tatar as their mother tongue. The line of distinction between the two groups is then unclear and a topic for dispute, but differences do exist. Indeed, a rise in Bashkir national consciousness has been observed.

¹ Cf., e.g., Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1966) IX: 131.

² Declaration by Crimean Tatars to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1972, Pravda dispatch from Moscow of August 17, 1972.

³ Ibid. 1970: IV: 9, 12-17, 329.

⁴ See Section A-IV of this chapter.

THE TATARS AND THE TATAR ASSR

PART A

General Information

I. Territory

The historical homeland of the Tatar-Bashkirs stretches from the Oka-Don lowlands and the Volga uplands in the west to the Siberian slopes of the Ural Mountains in the east. In the north it extends to the Vyatka-Uval uplands near Kirov. In the South its boundaries run along the southern section of the Volga upland, on the right bank of the Volga, to the Caspian lowland and the city of Astrakhan.

This territory, the boundaries of which approximate those of the Khanate of Kazan (early 1400s- 1552), is now administratively divided into the Tatar ASSR (in the center), the Bashkir, Mari, Udmurt, Chuvash, and Mordvinian ASSRs; and parts of 10 oblasty of the RSFSR.¹ The present-day Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs comprise about a quarter of this historical homeland.

The Tatar ASSR (26,250 square miles) is the area of the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers and extends from the lower Belaya (Aghidel) River in the east to the Sviyaga, a right affluent of the Volga, in the west. The Volga and Kama rivers divide the republic into three distinct natural regions: (1) the right bank of the Volga, with a moderate continental climate, black earth, and deciduous (mainly oak) woodlands;(2) the right bank of the Kama, in the northern coniferous forest zone with a more extreme climate and podzolic soils; and(3) the left bank of the Kama, with a moderate, dry climate and black-earth wooded steppe.

¹The projected borders of the Tatar State of Idel-Ural, proclaimed in November 1917 (see Section A-III), did not stretch as far west and north as those of the Khanate of Kazan. However, its eastern and southern borders were shifted more toward the east and south.

II. Economy

Tatars took an active part in the industrial development of Russia as early as the 18th century. Between 1750 and 1800 Tatar entrepreneurs built textile factories near Kazan. By 1814 these factories accounted for 75% of all textile manufacturing in Russia. A Tatar leather factory was established in Kazan in 1881; in 1812 there were 18 such factories, 13 of which were owned by Tatars. In 1854, 10 of the 13 soap factories in Kazan were owned by Tatars. In addition, Tatar enterprises produced candles, paper, paint, and metal goods.¹

By 1913 there were 388 industrial plants in the area inhabited by Tatars. Their output for that year totaled 99 million rubles.² Nevertheless, because of a manpower surplus many Tatars emigrated to seek work in other industrial centers such as the Donbas, Baku, Astrakhan, the Urals and Siberia. From 1906 to 1910 alone, 219,000 Tatars left the province of Kazan to search for work elsewhere.³

Good transport facilities, a large labor force, and its secure location in the interior led the Soviets to speed up the industrialization of the area. The post-war discovery of oil turned the Tatar ASSR into one of the Soviet Union's most important economic areas. Today the ASSR has highly developed oil, chemical and engineering industries. Oil output in 1971 was 102,000,000 tons, by far the highest in the USSR.⁴ Tatar oil is piped to Moscow, Yaroslav, Ryazan, Odessa, Novorossiisk, Orsk, Ishimbay, Saratov, Kuibyshev, and other industrial centers.⁵ The Tatar ASSR is first in the

¹Devletchin 1958:72, quoting Bertold Spuler, Der Islam (Berlin, 1949), 29:2:170.

²Ibid., quoting Revolutsionnyi vostok [The Revolutionary East] (Moscow, 1935) 1:21:156.

³Ibid., quoting Revolutsionnyi vostok (1934) 5:27:162.

⁴Total oil output in the USSR for 1971: 371,800,000 tons. See Nar. khoz. 1972: 137,736.

⁵Qazan Utlary 1972: 11:142.

manufacture of fur goods, photographic film,¹ film gelatine, and liquid gas.² Heavy machinery, optical instruments, medicines, and high-heat-resistant glass instruments are among other items manufactured in Tataristan.³ The production of timber, building materials and textiles is expanding. Clothing and food are important industries. Among the major industrial centers in the republic are Chistopol, Elabug, Bugulma, Almat, and Leninogorsk.

The capital, Kazan (population 904,000⁴), has shipyards, railroad yards and auto repair works. Typewriters, calculating machines, agricultural implements and aircraft are manufactured there, and about half of all fur processing in the USSR is done in the city. It also has clothing, shoe and felt-boot industries and large food processing plants.

The Tatar ASSR supplies the Chuvash, Bashkir and Mari ASSR's and the Gorky and Kuibyshev oblasty with electric energy.⁵ Total output in 1971 was 16.7 billion kwh.⁶

The largest automobile works in the Soviet Union are under construction on a 13,400,000 square foot area on the Kama river.⁷ About 2000 industrial products manufactured in the Tatar ASSR are exported to 60 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and America.⁸

Industrial production in the Tatar ASSR in 1969 was 337 times as large as in 1913 (compared with 119 for the RSFSR and 121 for the entire

¹The Tatar ASSR supplies half of all film used in the USSR. See: Qazan Utlary, 1972:5:4-7.

²Qazan Utlary, 1972:11:141.

³Ibid., 1972:5.

⁴Population as of January 1, 1971. See Nar. khoz. 1972: 22.

⁵Qazan Utlary, 1972:11:142.

⁶Nar. khoz. 1972: 736.

⁷Qazan Utlary, 1972:5.

⁸Ibid., 11:142.

ASSR.¹ Despite this enormous industrial expansion, however, large numbers of Tatars still seek work outside their native homeland. In fact, the population of the republic has grown only 8.4% since it was created in 1920.²

Since 1970, when construction of the new automobile works on the Kama began, an unspecified number of Tatars seem to have returned to their native republic with the intention of staying on after the completion of the huge project. But there has also been an influx of non-Tatars of 40 nationalities.³

Another important factor in the republic's economy is agriculture. Wheat and rye are grown throughout its territory, but wheat predominates in the northwest. Oats are grown south of the Kama River and millet and hemp north of it. Hemp is also grown in the area southwest of the Volga. Other agricultural products include leguminous plants and fodder crops. Dairy cattle are raised extensively along the Kama River, and poultry along the Volga River.⁴ In 1970 there were 588 collective and 167 state farms.

¹ Ibid.: 141.

² The total population of the Tatar ASSR in 1920 was 2,919,300. Of these one half (1,459,600) were Tatars. Devletchin, 1958: 70.

³ Qazan Utiary, 1972: 12:22.

⁴ Shahad, 1951.

III. History

Today's Kazan (or Volga) Tatars are descendents of the Volga-Kama Bolgars, the Qypchaq Turks from Central Asia who came to the Volga-Ural region in the 13th century, and Turkicized Finnish tribes. The Turkic-speaking Bolgars appeared in the region in the 7th century. By the 9th century they had formed a state which gradually expanded to include those Bashkirs who lived west of the Urals. They accepted Islam in 922 A.D. The Bolgar state eroded during the early 1200s when the Mongol-Tatars under Batu invaded the area and established the Golden Horde. The Mongols, who were a small minority in the conquering force, were quickly assimilated by the Turkic majority, and the Bolgars and Qypchaq Turks became the ethnically dominant elements in the Golden Horde. During the second half of the 14th and into the 15th centuries the Bolgars moved further north and west. They merged with the aforementioned Turks and Finns and became known as "New Bolgars," and finally "Kazan Tatars."

During the first half of the 15th century the Golden Horde broke up into the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimea, and Siberia, and the Noghay Horde. The Khanate of Kazan also included the Turkic-speaking Chuvash, the western Bashkirs, and most of the Finnish-speaking Mordvinians, Maris, and Udmurts, all of whom had been part of the Bolgar state. The Khanate of Kazan remained a formidable opponent of Muscovy for more than a century. It finally succumbed to superior Russian power in 1552, opening the way for Russian expansion toward the East.

During the two centuries following the fall of Kazan, the Moslem Tatars found themselves subjected to political persecution and to severe economic and religious pressures¹ which forced large numbers of them to leave their homes and move eastward to Bashkiristan, the Urals, and beyond. Others moved to the lower Volga region in the south. Their situation began to improve after the Pugachev uprising of 1774. Although Pugachev and his armies - which

¹For example, in 1744-1755 in the area of Kazan alone 418 out of a total of 536 mosques with schools were destroyed. Tarikh', 1959: 230.

confronted mainly of Tatars, Bashkirs, and Chuvash - were eventually defeated, the uprising brought Tatars important religious and economic concessions. A decree in 1788 established the Muftiat of Orenburg, giving Islam official status in Russia, and in 1792 Tatars were granted extensive rights in Russia's trade with Turkestan, Iran, and China. Due to the fact that they spoke a similar language and shared the same religion as their Turkic trading partners, Tatars soon controlled most of Russia's trade with the Moslem East. This period of Tatar-Russian cooperation lasted for more than half a century until the 1860s when Tatars were subjected to new, organized attempts at Christianization and Russification. Tatars responded with local uprisings and manifestations of a still more fanatic adherence to Islam. Some emigrated to Turkey.

At the same time, the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the second half of the 19th century created a new situation to which Tatars had to adjust. Combined with a growing realization that European education was necessary in order to win equality with Russians, and with awareness of Turkey's turn toward Europe, this change resulted in a growing orientation toward Europe and an awakening of Tatar national consciousness. Three Kazan Tatars, Shihabeddin Mardjani (1818-1889), Husseyin Fayeshani (1821-1866), and Qayyum Nasiri (1825-1902) were responsible for early reforms in religion and education. The Paris-educated Crimean Tatar Ismail Bay Gaspiraly (1851-1914), under the motto "Unity of Language, Thought and Action," promoted the unity of all the Turkic peoples in the Russian empire and the introduction of European methods of education. With the Kazan Tatar Yussuf Aqchura and the Azerbaidzhani Topchybashev, he was instrumental in the formation of the "Union of Moslems of Russia" in 1906.

Under the more liberal conditions of early twentieth-century Russia, Tatar political and cultural life progressed rapidly. The Tatar press was by far the most important Turkic press in the empire. Tatar newspapers and journals of various political views, which appeared in such national centers as Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Astrakhan, Troitsk, and Ural'sk, were distributed throughout the empire. In the Moslem struggle for greater

national and political freedom and for social and economic changes, Tatars gained the leadership. The fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917 forced them to re-examine their position within the Russian state and to reassess their political, national, and cultural relations with Petrograd.

In May 1917 a congress of all Moslems of Russia was held in Moscow under the motto of national unity. The congress elected a "free" Mufti (the liberal and progressive Tatar scholar Ghalimdjan Barudi), declared the political equality of the sexes, prohibited polygamy, decided to form Moslem national military units, and demanded the abolition of private landed property and the introduction of the eight-hour working day. However, the delegates were split on the question of whether Moslem autonomy should be territorial within a federal republic or cultural in a unified, but democratic, Russian republic. To coordinate joint political action it established the Moslem National Council (Milli Shura).

In July 1917 a united Moslem congress convened in Kazan and proclaimed the cultural autonomy of the "Moslem Turko-Tartars of Inner Russia and Siberia." It named a national administration headed by the Sorbonne-educated Kazan Tatar Sadri Maqsudi (formerly a leader of the Moslem faction in the Russian Parliament [Duma]). In November this administration convened in Ufa and organized free multi-party elections to a National Parliament of 120 members. On November 29 it declared the Territorial autonomy of the state of Idel-Ural,¹ which existed until the middle of April 1918 when its National Council and National Assembly were officially dissolved by the Bolsheviks. A few days earlier, on March 23, 1918, the Bolsheviks issued a decree calling for the formation of a Soviet Socialist Tatar-Bashkir Republic (the Soviet version of the state of Idel-Ural).²

¹The Bashkirs who had participated in the Moscow congress subsequently held their own congress in Orenburg and, under the leadership of Zeki Velidi Togan established on August 1, 1917, a "Bashkir Central Council," whose principal task was the solution of the land question. On November 29, 1917, Bashkirs proclaimed national autonomy within a "Little Bashkiria," which lasted until February 4, 1918.

²The decree was signed by Stalin and by Mullanur Vakhitov, chairman of the Central Moslem Commissariat, Ghalimdjan Ibrahim and Sherif Manatov, both members of the same Commissariat, and Dinanshtein, Secretary of the People's Commissariat for the Nationalities. (See Tatarstan, 1925: 239.)

The decree had a considerable political impact and gained the support of many Tatar-Bashkir intellectuals for the bolsheviks, but it evoked the opposition of practically all Russian communists in the Volga-Ural region. Its implementation was delayed by the outbreak of the civil war, and eventually the decree was rescinded. Idel-Ural was broken up into smaller components. The Bashkir ASSR was established March 23, 1919 (enlarged July 14, 1922); the Tatar ASSR on June 25, 1920. The formation of two small, separate Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics instead of the promised Soviet Socialist Tatar-Bashkir Republic undermined the strength of Moslem unity. It left three-quarters of the Tatar population outside the boundaries of the Tatar republic and more Tatars than Bashkirs¹ living in Bashkiristan. Moreover, it relegated the fifth largest ethnic group in the USSR to a political-administrative status inferior to that of smaller groups which had been granted union republics.

As a result, the Tatar-Bashkir intellectuals who had joined the bolsheviks in 1917 became disillusioned. Dissatisfaction also spread among the leading Tatar-Bashkir communists. Mirsayit Sultanghaliev² began to work, in part with exiled Moslem nationalists, toward the establishment of a genuinely autonomous Tatar-Bashkir state. Expelled from the Communist Party in 1923, he set up a clandestine political network aimed at the formation of an independent "Federated Peoples Socialist Republic of Turan," which was to comprise Tatars, Bashkirs, the five Central Asian republics (Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tadjik) and possibly Chuvashia and Azerbaidzhan.³ Sultanghaliev was eliminated, and during the

¹According to the 1970 census there were 898,092 Bashkirs and 947,986 Tatars in the Bashkir ASSR.

²Mirsayit Sultanghaliev was the highest-placed Moslem in the communist hierarchy. He was chairman of the Moslem Commissariat in Kazan, chairman of the Central Moslem Military Soviet and later (in 1920) one of Stalin's private assistants in the People's Commissariat for Nationalities (NARKOMNATS). He was the first communist leader in history to organize a national communist movement in his own country and he ranks with M.N. Roy in his emphasis on the revolutionary primacy of the underdeveloped world. See Seton-Watson, 1960: 87. See also Section C-II of this chapter.


³The state would have had a population of over 30 million, of whom 75% would have been Turkic Moslems. The attempt ended with his arrest and trial in 1929.

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During the 1930s the Tatar-Bashkirs lost virtually their entire intelligentsia.

Tatar-Bashkir national life revived somewhat in the more liberal atmosphere after Stalin's death and particularly after the 20th Party Congress. The publication of many Tatar classical cultural works was allowed, a fact of great importance not only for Tatar literature, but also for national education and national cultural life in general. The percentage of Tatars holding key posts and other positions in the administrative apparatus of their republic is approaching their percentage of the population. Tatars also hold important positions in the industry and economy of their republic. However, due to the fact that they have an Autonomous and not a Union Republic, Tatars as a group are more restricted and have fewer rights than those nationality groups possessing Union Republics. For example, on account of their ASSR status, the 6 million Tatars have only 11 deputies in the Soviet of Nationalities, whereas the 1 million Estonians and 1 million Kirgiz have 32 deputies each.

This paradox has not gone unnoticed by the Soviet authorities. A 1966 study in the Tatar ASSR by the Institute for State and Law of the Academy of Sciences¹ called for an extension of the rights of the Tatar ASSR to correspond with the high cultural and economic level of the republic. Some steps have been taken in that direction. For example, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR and its executive organs have been given a stronger role in the management of enterprises and organizations ultimately controlled by higher organs of the RSFSR. The state organs of the Tatar ASSR have been granted more rights and privileges in apartment building, culture, consumer goods production, water pollution, and other areas.²

¹ Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, 1967: 4.

² Tatarstan kommunisty, 1972: 11:16.

II. Geography

According to the 1970 census there were 5,931,000 Tatars in the USSR in that year,¹ an increase of 19.4% over 1959. Their distribution in the USSR and rates of growth since 1959 are summarized in Table A.1.

Table A.1.
Distribution of Tatars in the USSR 1959-1970

Territory	1959		1970		% increase 1959-1970
	Tatar population (1000)	% of all Tatars	Tatar population (1000)	% of all Tatars	
USSR	4,075	82.0	4,758	80.2	16.8
of which:					
Tatar ASSR	1,345	27.1	1,536	25.9	14.2
Bashkir ASSR	769	15.5	945	15.9	22.9
Central Asia	588	11.8	750	12.7	27.6
Kazakh SSP	192	3.9	288	4.9	50.0
Other Republics	113	2.3	135	2.2	19.5
TOTAL	4,968	100.0	5,931	100.0	19.4

Source: Itogi 1970: IV:9,12-17,329.

The total population of the Tatar ASSR in 1970 was 3,131,000, an increase of about 9.9% over the 1959 total. The Tatar population increased considerably faster--14.2%--and its share of the republic's total population increased from 47% to 49%.

The balance between the two principal ethnic groups in the Tatar ASSR--the Tatars and the Russians--has remained within narrow limits ever since the republic was established, as Table A.2. shows.

¹Neither the 1959 nor the 1970 census distinguishes between Kazan and Crimean Tatars.

Table A.2.

Tatars and Russians in Tatar ASSR
(percentage of total population)

<u>Year</u>	<u>% Tatar</u>	<u>% Russian</u>
1920	50	N.A.
1924	51.1	40.9
1926	45.0	43.0
1939	50.4	41.8
1956	49.0	43.0
1959	47.0	43.9
1970	49.0	42.4

Source: Dergi, 1958: 14:70.

Fifty-three percent of the population of the Tatar ASSR in 1970 lived in urban areas, but only 38.6% of the Tatars in the republic did so. They thus constituted 36% of the total urban population, a slight increase over 1959. According to the Bureau of Statistics of the Tatar ASSR, the percentage of Tatars in such major cities as Kazan (33.2%),¹ Almat (43.6%), and Minzele (35.9%)² remained virtually unchanged from 1959 to 1968.³

In 1970 the proportion of Tatars in the Bashkir ASSR was 24.7% or 947,986, up 23.3% from 768,566 in 1959.⁴ Together Tatar-Bashkirs made up 48.1% of the republic's total population, up from 45% in 1959.⁵

¹Up from 19.4% in 1924. See Bish yil echende Tatarstan, 1925-26: 233-34.

²In comparison, Uzbeks make up 33.8% in Tashkent, Kirgiz are 9.4% in Frunze, and Turkmens 29.8% in Ashkhabad. Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1967: 5:25.

³Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1970: 3:6.

⁴Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1972: 6:40.

⁵In 1959 Russians made up 42.4% of the total population of the Bashkir ASSR. The remaining 12.6% consisted of Chuvash (109,970), Mari (93,902), Ukrainians (63,594), Mordvinians (43,582), Udmurts (25,388), and Belorussians (20,792).

In 1970 25.9% of all Tatars and 72% of all Bashkirs lived in their respective republics.¹ Approximately 70% of all Tatar-Bashkirs lived within the borders of Idel-Ural as proclaimed in 1917. Calculated on the basis of their growth rate for the RSFSR, their number in this area should now be close to 5 million. Outside their historical borders, but within the RSFSR, Tatars live in large numbers in and around Moscow (133,000 in 1959) and Leningrad (51,500 in 1959).² In Siberia there were approximately 300,000 to 400,000 Tatars in 1959.³

Of the Tatars in Central Asia (Crimean and Kazan together), more than half, i.e., 574,000 (up 29% since 1959) live in Uzbekistan, where they are mainly concentrated in and around Tashkent, Samarkand, Andijan, and Ferghana. In 1959 65% of the Tatars in Uzbekistan lived in urban areas. In Kazakhstan, Tatars numbered 284,000 in 1970 (up 50% since 1959), mostly in the "virgin lands" region and in southern Kazakhstan. As in Uzbekistan, two-thirds of the Tatars there live in the cities. In the Kirgiz SSR most of the 69,000 Tatars live in and around Osh. The number of Tatars in Turkmenistan is small: 36,000 (up 20% since 1959), of whom 87% live in and around the cities. In Tadzhikistan, Tatars in 1970 numbered 71,000 (up 24.5% since 1959); 75% live in urban areas.⁴

As of November 16, 1970, 109,200 Tatars with higher education and 173,500 with a specialized secondary education were employed in the national economy. At the end of 1970 there were 11,617 Tatars listed as scientific workers.⁵

¹ Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1972: 6:40.

² Practically all Bashkirs live within the historical borders of Idel-Ural.

³ Excluding those West Siberian territories which fell within the borders of Idel-Ural.

⁴ Itogi 1970: IV:202,223,284,295,306.

⁵ Har. obraz., 1971: 240,270.

Data showing the membership of Tatars and Bashkirs in the Communist Parties of their republics are extremely difficult to come by, especially for the more recent years. More complete data are available for the pre-war years, and indicate that Party representation tended to be noticeably lower than the share in population, as shown below.¹

Area	Percent of natives in population 1926	Percent of natives in Party organization		
		1922	1927	1930
Tatar ASSR	48.3	19.8	32.4	36.3
Crimean Tatar ASSR	25.1	2.5	4.8	10.7
Bashkir ASSR	23.7	17.8	15.6	17.8

In 1959 Tatar Party membership in the Tatar ASSR had risen to 40% of a total of 101,000 members, still 7% short of their percentage of the republic's total population.² In 1967 the Communist Party of the republic had 160,000 members.³ The chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (Salikh Batyev), the chairman and the vice-chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Tatar ASSR (Ghabdulkhay Abdrazyayev and Khasanov), and the First Secretary of the Tataristan Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (Fikret Tabeyev) are Tatars. In the Bashkir ASSR the positions of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Fayezrahman Zagafuranov) and the vice-chairman of the Soviet of Ministers (Ghabbas Shafiqov) are held by Bashkirs. Of the 61 delegates⁴ from the Tatar ASSR who

¹Data from Rigby, 1968: 369.

²Tatarstan ASSR Tarikhy, 1970: 620.

³Ibid.: 661. Tatar percentage for the more recent years has not been made available.

⁴According to the Tatarstan ASSR Tarikhy, the Tatar ASSR sent 64 delegates (see p.654), but the "Stenographic Report of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (Moscow, 1966, pp.389-623) lists the names of only 61 delegates.

participated in the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, 29 were Tatars; of the 60 delegates from the Bashkir ASSR 34 were Tatar-Bashkirs.¹ The report on the 24th Party Congress (1971) does not indicate the delegates' home territories.

In 1959 labor unions in Tataristan had a total of 672,000 members. By 1966 membership had grown to 915,000.²

¹"Stenographic Report of the 23rd Party Congress," pp. 389-623.

²Tatarstan ASSR Tarikhy, 1970. No ethnic breakdown given.

1. Culture

The Tatars have a rich written heritage in the Tatar language, which has roots in the ancient common Turkic literature and was molded and developed under the all-pervading influence of Islam until well into the 19th century. Tatar poets were also greatly attracted by legends and themes of romantic love. Early Tatar literature mirrored historical and social events, national customs, and traditions. By the 19th century traditional Islamic forms were subjected to the modernizing influence of Turkish reform movements and of Russian and Western European writing with which Tatar intellectuals were familiar. This introduced new types of Tatar prose--novels, novellas, dramas, and comedies.

In the later 19th century Tatar literature became important in the struggle for cultural and social reforms and for the spreading of new ideas. Educational reforms, the oppression of Moslems in Russia, the emancipation of Tatar women, and the fight against religious fanaticism were among topics treated in the literature of that period.

After the revolution of 1905 a whole group of liberal democratic writers¹ emerged. Working under the comparative freedom which prevailed until 1917-18, they lifted Tatar literature to new heights which--except perhaps for the first 10-15 years after the Bolshevik revolution--have not since been equalled. This period is generally referred to as the Golden Age of classical Tatar literature. Major issues raised in the works of this period were: the hard life of workers and peasants and the rural poor; education of the young generation; national aspirations of the Tatar people; love for the Tatar homeland and language; anti-Tatar discrimination among the Russians; and the role of youth in the revolution. When the Bolshevik revolution came, Tatar literature had firmly established itself as an important and effective vehicle for the realization of social, political and national-cultural aspirations.

¹ These included Ghabdulla Tuqay, Madjit Ghafuri, Ghaliasghar Kamal, Sharif Kamal, Fatih Amirhan, Ghalimdjani Ibrahim, Fathi Burnash, F. Sayfi Qazanly, Karim Timburin, Ghayaz Ishaqi, Mirkhaydar Fayzi, Saghit Soncheley, Derdemend, Saghit Remi, Shaykhzade Babich, and others.

Up to the creation of the two separate Tatar and Bashkir republics Tatar was the common literature for Tatars and Bashkirs. No distinction was made between Tatar and Bashkir writers, both of whom used the Tatar literary language. However, the Bolsheviks set about creating a separate Bashkir literature based on the Bashkir dialect. Until the late 1920s Tatar literature had been comparatively unrestricted, and the ranks of prerevolutionary writers were swelled by many new writers of the younger generation. Important topics included: prerevolutionary times, the revolution and the civil war, the conflict between old and new, the birth of a new life, a new man, the formation of a new moral order.

Stalin's more repressive nationality policy initiated a tragic chapter in Tatar life and literature. In the process the Tatars lost almost all their political leaders, and only a handful of Tatar writers survived the disaster.¹ After Stalin's death Tatar literature began to revive, especially after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Practically all of the previously arrested and "convicted" Tatar writers were rehabilitated (most of them posthumously) and many of their works republished. Tatar literature received further stimulus in 1963-64 and has since managed to produce some impressive works. These works, which reflect concern for human problems and issues as well as a love for the Tatar homeland, mother tongue, culture and history, are often remarkably candid in the presentation and criticism of existing social and national conditions. Tatar literature has thus shown remarkable resilience and has recovered much of its old vigor and aggressiveness.²

Tatar dramas first appeared in the late 1800s. However, due to the strong conservatism of the Moslem clergy and Tatar society, performances were held in private homes. The first public theater performance, which also marked the official establishment of the Tatar theater, took place in Kazan in 1906. Tatar theaters opened in Ufa, Orenburg, Astrakhan, Uralsk, and other cities soon thereafter. Tatar repertory companies began to travel

¹Bashir, 1965: II:363.

²See Burbiel, 1969: 40-46.

all over the country, performing even in Siberia and Central Asia. Until the Bolshevik revolution their repertoire consisted mainly of comedies and dramas written by such renowned Tatar playwrights as Ghaliasghar Kamal (1879-1933), who is regarded as the father of Tatar theater, Karim Tinchurin (1887-1947), Fatih Amirhan (1866-1926), Ghayaz Ishaqi (1878-1954), and Mirhaydar Fayzi (1891-1928). Tatar translations of Russian and West European plays were also included. The first Tatar musical was shown in 1916-17 and the first Tatar opera in 1925. During the 1920s Tatar theaters also presented numerous satirical plays which rocked both the old-fashioned bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviks.

During the purges of the 1930s the Tatars lost practically all their prerevolutionary writers, and the Tatar theater declined sharply. Until the 1956 20th Party Congress its repertoire consisted, with certain exceptions, of poorly written and rather primitive propaganda plays. The subsequent rehabilitation and return to the Tatar people of a large part of their literary heritage, as well as the relaxation in Party control over literature and art, gave new life to the Tatar theater. Today, Tatar theater repertoires comprise both modern plays and prerevolutionary classics, as well as Russian and foreign dramas, comedies, and operas in Tatar translation.¹

As the direct heirs to the culture of the Bolgar state (9th-12th centuries) bequeathed by their Moslem ancestors, the Bulgars and other Qypchaq tribes, Tatars have traditionally been a part of the Islamic world. For centuries Islam has played a tremendous role in their social, economic, political, cultural, and spiritual development. Continued deep adherence to the principles and spiritual values of Islam enabled them to resist attempts at Christianization by their Russian neighbors and their Islamic tradition continues to limit the success of Russification today.

¹XX joz bashynda Tatar adabiaty [Tatar Literature at the Beginning of the 20th Century] (Kazan, 1966); see also publications of The Ghaliasghar Kamal Tatar State Academy Theater, Kazan, 1970.

The awakening of Tatar national consciousness in the second half of the 19th century and the steady growth of Turko-Tatar nationalism (Turkism) after the revolution of 1905 led to reform and modernization in Islam without, however, diminishing its importance in Tatar life. Until after the Bolshevik revolution Islam formed the roof under which the Moslems of Russia rallied in their efforts to unite and coordinate their political and cultural actions.

Today the Moslems of the Volga-Ural area and Siberia (mostly Tatar-Bashkirs) are under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Directorate for the Sunni Moslems of European Russia and Siberia, which has its headquarters in Ufa, Bashkir ASSR.¹ Data showing the exact strength of Islam in the territories administered by this Directorate are unavailable. However, two studies published in 1970 and 1971 show that adherence to Islam or Islamic practices among Tatars living in the rural areas of the Tatar ASSR is strong. According to the more recent study² one-fifth of Tatar men and more than a third of Tatar women (average 30.4%) questioned believe in Islam, while approximately another fifth were undecided. Furthermore, more than half (50.9%) favored circumcision, and about two-fifths (39.9%) said that they celebrated Moslem holidays. Also, the study showed how the Moslem clergy, by presenting religious rites as part of the national heritage, wins the undecided over to Islam.

The other study, published about a year earlier,³ showed an even higher percentage of Tatars celebrating such Moslem holidays as Ourban Bayram and Ramadan and favoring circumcision, particularly when questioned by Tatar interviewers.

¹There are three more Directorates: one for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, one for the North Caucasus, and a third for Transcaucasia.

²Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1971: 1.

³Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1970: 2.

	Nationality of Interviewer	
	<u>Tatar</u>	<u>Russian</u>
Celebrate Moslem holidays	44%	34%
Don't celebrate	24%	41%
Indifferent	28%	-
Difficult to answer	4%	25%
Favor circumcision	59%	45%
Against circumcision	11%	18%
Difficult to answer	20%	5%
No answer	10%	32%

II. External Relations

The Tatars and Bashkirs are part of the large family of Turkic peoples who inhabit a broad belt of territories stretching from Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) and Mongolia in the east, across Central Asia and portions of Siberia, to the middle Volga basin, the eastern Caucasus, and the eastern Mediterranean in the west. These people number about 50 million, of whom about 33 million live in the Soviet-Union. Occupying the northwestern corner of this huge area, the Tatar-Bashkirs have since early times had contact with Finno-Ugric and Slavic peoples dwelling among them or in territories adjoining their western borders.

After the loss of independence to the Russians, Tatar-Bashkir relations with the latter remained generally strained, though there were periods of cooperation. An enterprising people, the Tatars developed a fairly strong merchant class which established close trade relations with other Turkic peoples in Central Asia. Cultural ties between the Tatar-Bashkirs and other Turkic peoples had, of course, existed for centuries, and with the Tatar national and cultural renaissance in the second half of the 19th century, especially after the revolution of 1905, Kazan became the most dynamic and enlightened Turko-Tatar center in Russia. With pan-Turkism as their political ideal, the Tatars sought to unite all the Turkic peoples of Russia into one nation. Kazan reformers maintained strong cultural relations with liberal circles in Ottoman Turkey. Turkish, they thought, should become the common language of the united Turkic peoples of Russia. Turkey was viewed as the home of all Turks, and many Tatars went there to study, or to take up permanent residence.¹ During World War I most Tatar-Bashkirs sympathized with Turkey and hoped for a victory for Russia's enemies. After the Bolshevik take-over many prominent Tatar-Bashkirs and other Turkic intellectuals found a haven in that country. But the pan-Turkic idea was also pursued by the Tatar Nationalists, who under the leadership of Sultangaliev tried to establish

¹ Turkish policy has traditionally permitted any Turkish immigrant to become a citizen of Turkey immediately on the basis of ethnic and linguistic kinship.

a Socialist People's Republic of Turan. According to Soviet historians Sultanghaliev's underground organization maintained close relations with the Basmachis in Turkestan and with emigre circles in Turkey and Germany.¹

As part of their general policy of discouraging the integration of Turkic peoples into one nation, the Bolsheviks for more than 30 years kept them isolated from each other and from the outside world. This isolation ended for Central Asian Moslems when, after the rapprochement of the Soviet Union with the Asian and African world, their usefulness for Soviet foreign policy became apparent to Moscow. The Tatars were kept isolated for a much longer time. (Kazan was opened to foreign tourists only in the late 1960s.) With the relaxation of this policy the Tatar-Bashkirs and the other Turkic peoples of the USSR began to re-establish mutual relations.²

Turkish cultural festivals were organized and the study of Turkic culture intensified. In Central Asia, Moscow, Leningrad and other surrounding regions, Tatars again became active in matters concerning their original homeland (Idel-Ural). The desire to establish stronger cultural ties with both the Tatar and Bashkir republics was expressed.

Tatar writers and officials are now permitted to travel abroad, and several of them have published travelogues in the journal Qazan Utlary. For example, the Minister of Education of the Tatar ASSR Mirza Makhmutov traveled to Chile in 1971 to acquaint himself with the school system in that country.³ The Tatar literary critic Rafael Mostafin made a trip to Syria, North Korea and Singapore in 1970 and to East Germany in 1971.⁴ The well-known Tatar writer Ayaz Ghiladjev traveled in Turkey as a member of a Tataristan tourist delegation.⁵ Other countries visited by Tatars within the last six years were Egypt, Iraq, India, Nepal, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, England, Denmark, Sweden and the USA.

¹Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967:184.

²See Qazan Utlary 1966, and the Bashkir literary magazine Aghidel of the same year.³

Qazan Utlary, 1972:2.

⁴Qazan Utlary, 1971:2,3,4; 1972:4.

⁵Qazan Utlary, 1970:8.

Tatar emigration is mainly directed toward Turkey, the USA, and Finland. In Turkey there are several thousand Kazan Tatars. The Kazan Tatar Culture and Relief Society publishes a 64-page cultural and literary magazine called Kazan which appears in Istanbul once every 3 months. The journal is in Turkish, but examples of Tatar literature are usually given in Tatar with Turkish translation.

In the USA there are about 1500-2000 Tatars, most of whom live in New York and San Francisco. They have no community organ.

In Finland Tatars are settled mainly in Helsinki and Tampere. Their community organ is the Mahalle Heberlere [Community News], published in Tatar with the Arabic alphabet. Unlike the Tatars in Turkey or the USA, the Tatar community in Finland maintains cultural relations with Tataristan, and Tatar artists and scholars from the Tatar ASSR have given concerts and lectures in the Tatar communities in Helsinki and Tampere.¹

¹Kazan Utlary, 1969: 9:192.

THE TATARS AND THE TATAR ASSR

PART B

Media

Note: Because data for the Tatars and the Tatar ASSR do not appear in the sources for union-republics, tables B.2.-B.5. are incomplete.

1. Language Data

Both Tatar and Bashkir belong to the northwestern, or Oypchaq, group of Turkic languages. The difference between Tatar and Bashkir is basically phonetic; the vocabulary and grammar are similar. Kazakh and Kirgiz also belong in the Oypchaq group. However, while these latter two languages are closely related to one another, they differ from the Tatar and Bashkir languages in phonetics, grammar, and vocabulary. A Tatar-speaking person cannot readily understand Kazakh without special study. Although it does not belong to the Oypchaq group, Uzbek is closer to Tatar than Kazakh is.

Until the late 1920s both Tatars and Bashkirs used the Arabic alphabet which their ancestors, the Volga Bulgars, had used since the 9th century.¹ In 1927 the Arabic alphabet was officially--against strong opposition--replaced by the Latin alphabet.² Twelve years later in 1939-40, in line with Soviet nationality policy toward Russification, the Latin alphabet was in turn replaced by a modified Russian alphabet.³ This last alphabet change gave the Soviets a convenient opportunity to reprint, in the new Cyrillic alphabet, only those works they considered acceptable, thus relegating all others to oblivion.

In 1970⁴ 89.2% (down almost 2% since 1959⁵) of Soviet Tatars considered Tatar their mother tongue. The rest indicated Russian, Bashkir, Kazakh, Uzbek and, to a lesser extent, other languages. The percentage of Tatars claiming Tatar as their first language varies from more than 98% in the Tatar ASSR to 1% in Leningrad, and it is still lower among smaller groups of Tatars living in the Soviet Far East.⁶ Almost two-thirds (62.5%) of the Tatars in the USSR are fluent in Russian. As is to be expected, this

¹ Ourbatov, 1960: 25.

² Ibid.: 77.

³ Ibid.: 105.

⁴ Itogi 1970: IV:20.

⁵ Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1972: 6:44, quoting the same census, gives 93.6% for 1959 and 90.5% for 1970.

⁶ Itogi 1970: IV:70,74,77. See also Section C-I of this chapter.

percentage is lower in the Tatar ASSR, especially in rural areas, and higher in areas where Tatars live in a more or less totally Russian environment.

For example, in 1969 the percentage of Tatars in rural areas of the Tatar ASSR who had a command of the Russian language (degree not indicated) was as follows:¹

Age	Command of Russian
16-17	25.0%
18-22	27.9%
23-27	31.6%
28-34	23.8%
35-49	16.5%
50-59	11.8%
60 and over	5.6%

Tatar is also the mother tongue of approximately one third of the Bashkir population.²

¹Voprosy filosofii, 1969: 12. Cf. Itogi 1970: IV:144,370. Data are given there separately for urban and rural Tatars in the Tatar ASSR, and separately for all Tatars by age. No data are available for urban Tatars by age.

²The 1970 census gives no information on the mother language of the remaining 33.8% of the Bashkirs. According to the 1959 census, 344,556, or 36.1% of the then 953,801 Bashkirs in the USSR indicated Tatar as their mother tongue. Itogi RSFSR 1959: 300,302.

Table B.1.
Native and Second Languages Spoken by Tatars
(in thousands)

Number of Tatars residing:	1959		1970		Speaking as their Native Language						Speaking as a Second Language ^a			
					Tatar		Russian		Percentage Point Change 1959-1970		Russian		Other languages of the Peoples of the USSR 1970	
					1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
in the Tatar ASSR	1,345 (100%)	1,536 (100%)	1,330 (98.9%)	1,513 (98.5%)			15 (1.1%)	23 (1.5%)	-0.4	+0.4	841 (54.8%)	2 (0.1%)		
elsewhere in the USSR	3,623 (100%)	4,395 (100%)	3,243 (89.5%)	3,776 (85.9%)			334 (9.2%)	585 (13.3%)	-3.6	+4.1	2,868 (65.3%)	92 (2.1%)		
Total	4,968 (100%)	5,931 (100%)	4,573 (92.0%)	5,289 (89.2%)			349 (7.0%)	608 (10.3%)	-2.8	+3.3	3,709 (62.5%)	94 (1.6%)		

Sources: Itogi 1959 and Itogi RSFSR 1959; Tables 53 and 54.
Itogi 1970: IV:20,144.

^aNo data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

11. Local Media

According to the Tatar journal Azat Khatyn [Free Woman] a total of 111 newspapers and 11 journals were published in the Tatar ASSR in 1970.¹ These figures include local and kolkhoz publications. Qazan Utlary lists five republican and 71 district newspapers and eight journals for 1966.² But the Letopis' Periodicheskikh Izdaniy SSSR 1961-1965 [Chronicle of Periodical Publications of the USSR 1961-1965] lists 90 newspapers, 6 of them republican, 22 city, and the rest district papers.³ Forty-two newspapers (not including local or kolkhoz papers) with a combined circulation of 860,000 (up from 801,000 in 1970) and 6 journals with a total circulation (usually monthly) of 712,000 (up from 533,000 in 1970) appeared in the Tatar ASSR in 1971.⁴ According to the same source the total number of Tatar newspapers appearing inside and outside the Tatar ASSR in 1971 was 81 with a total circulation of 731,000 (up from 77 newspapers with total circulation 703,000 in 1970).⁵

Of the Tatar-language newspapers appearing inside the Tatar ASSR, the following are republican:

Soviet Tatarstany [Soviet Tataristan], which had a circulation of 131,000 in 1970.⁶ It has been the organ of the Tatar Oblast' Committee of the CPSU since April 13, 1917.

Sotsialistik Tatarstan [Socialist Tataristan], also an organ of the Tatar Oblast' Committee of the CPSU, which had a circulation of 150,000 in 1972.⁷

¹ Azat Khatyn, 1970: 7. Divergencies between figures in the text and the media tables in this section reflect differences in inclusion (e.g., with or without kolkhoz papers), sources, and dates.

² Qazan Utlary, 1966: 11:93.

³ Letopis' periodicheskikh izdaniy SSSR 1961-1965 (Moscow 1967), II:313-326.

⁴ Pechat' 1971: 184. These figures seem to refer to Tatar journals only. They do not include the Almanach Idel (Volga; see below) and the two theater magazines Kynelle Saxnase [The Gay Stage] and Pioner Saxnase [The Pioneer Stage] which appear in Kazan.

⁵ No further breakdown was given.

⁶ Sovet Mektebe [Soviet School], 1970: 12:30.

⁷ Tatar Calendar, 1972.

Tatarstan Jashlere [Tatar Youth], the Komsomol organ, present circulation unknown.

Jash Lenenche [The Young Leninist], the organ of the Pioneers.

All republican newspapers are published in Kazan. Local Tatar newspapers appear in the cities of Almat, Bogelma, Buinsk, Jelabuga, Zelenogorsk, Leninogorsk, Tetyush, and Christay. The average circulation of newspapers in the Tatar ASSR in 1972 was 1185 copies per 1000 inhabitants.¹

The most important Tatar newspaper outside the Tatar ASSR is Oyzyl Tang [The Red Dawn]. This paper, which is published in Ufa, is also a Party organ with a circulation approximately that of Sotsialistik Tatarstan.

By far the most important Tatar journal is Qazan Utlary [The Lights of Kazan].² It is a monthly literary and social-political journal, and the organ of the Tataristan Union of Writers. Since the mid-1950s the journal has consistently followed a liberal line and its monthly circulation has grown from 6000 in 1957 to nearly 90,000 in 1972. It enjoys great popularity among Tatar readers inside and outside the Tatar ASSR as well as among Tatar-Bashkir intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and members of the Armed Services.

Other important journals include:

Azat Khatyn [Free Woman], an illustrated socio-political and literary journal for women. It has appeared since 1926, and in November 1972 its circulation was 303,500.

Sovet Mektebe [Soviet School], the organ of the Ministry of Education of the Tatar ASSR. In November 1972 its circulation was 21,646.

Yalqyn [The Flame], the monthly organ of the Tatarstan Pioneers, with a circulation of 71,346 in 1970.

¹Sovet Mektebe, 1972: 11:62.

²From 1932-1965 it appeared under the name Sovet Adabiaty [Soviet Literature].

Tatarstan Kommunisty [Communist of Tataristan], an organ of the Tatar "blast" Committee of the CPSU. In Tatar it had a circulation of 17,246 in November 1971, while in Russian its circulation was roughly comparable (17,854 in November 1971).

Mayan [The Scorpion], the official satirical journal. It appears twice per month. In June 1972 its circulation was 240,500 (up from 40,000 in November 1966).

Volga [The Volga], an almanac for young writers and readers. Its publication began in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Tatar ASSP in 1970.¹

Export abroad of Tatar and Bashkir newspapers is prohibited, but most of the journals can be obtained through subscription.

In 1971 583 books and booklets were published in the Tatar ASSR, with a total circulation of 6,472,000.² Of these, 302, with a total circulation of 4,538,000, were in Tatar (up from 195 books and booklets with an edition of 2,891,000 in 1970).³

A considerable portion of the Tatar-Bashkir literary heritage remains "taboo," i.e., it is not republished. Also "taboo" are all the works of Tatar-Bashkirs who have emigrated abroad. Those classics whose republication is permitted are chronically out of print. Often reprints appear in intervals of 10 years or more. Contemporary novels are also hard to get because their editions are usually small.⁴ The reason for this is Moscow's publishing policy, which is highly discriminatory in that it is

¹For a time it seemed as though the first issue would also be the last, but two years later issue #2 appeared.

²Rechat' 1972: 11.

³Of the 302 Tatar books and booklets 132 were belles-lettres and 106 titles were translations into Tatar (total edition 2,058,000; up from 84 translated titles with an edition of 1,287,000 in 1970).

⁴For example, the three-volume Selected Works by Fatih Husni, who for years has been the most popular Tatar novelist, appeared in 1966-68 with an edition of 14,000 copies for each of the first two volumes, 12,000 for the third.

guided not by a nation's size, cultural and educational level, or needs, but solely by its political-administrative status - as a union or autonomous republic, for example. Consequently, the six million Tatars and approximately 400,000 Bashkirs who consider Tatar their mother tongue, although they constitute the fifth largest ethnic group in the USSR, are allotted lower publishing quotas than the smaller nationalities in union republics. Thus, by contrast, in 1971, 817 books and booklets with a total circulation of 9,922,000 copies were published in Azeri for 4,380,000 Azerbaidzhanis, and 657 titles with an edition of 13,189,000 in Kazakh for 5,300,000 Kazakhs.¹

In 1970 there were 900,000 radio sets and wired loudspeakers (no breakdown available) in the Tatar ASSR.² Broadcasts are in Tatar and Russian (no breakdown available). The number of television sets in that year totaled 300,000.³ There are two daily programs in Russian and Tatar (again no breakdown available.)⁴ The republic has a motion picture studio and (in 1972) 2500 movie theaters (see Section B-IV).

Foreign press organs (mostly communist ones) are quoted in the Tatar press, but news items are usually classified by the capitals of the countries from which the news has been received. The only foreign radio station broadcasting in Tatar is Radio Liberty. Its Tatar programs total four hours per day.

Foreign films are shown in the Tatar ASSR. In fact, almost a quarter of all films shown in the republic in 1966 were from countries of the "socialist camp," and 66% were Soviet (Russian and films from other union republics).⁵ The rest (9.2%) presumably were from non-socialist countries.

A study conducted by the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on the subject of social-ethnic aspects of rural culture

¹ Pechat' 1971: 10

² Azat Khatyn, 1970: 6:7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Sovet Mektebe, 1970: 12:29.

⁵ Qazan Utlary, 1966: 11:93.

in the Tatar ASSR reveals that among the rural population radio is the most widespread means of mass communication.¹ Tatars listen to the Tatar language radio programs from Kazan because they understand them. The local radio not only satisfies interest in local news but also meets the need for national music. Almost all requests for musical radio programs made by Tatars living in villages are for Tatar national music. This interest is especially noticeable among the rural Tatar intelligentsia, whose letters always contain such requests. Besides the interest in traditional folk music there is also a great interest in contemporary music.

According to the same study, 58% of the Tatars and 48% of the Russians in the Tatar ASSR read newspapers regularly. Records of subscriptions to periodicals as of January 1, 1969, show that 790 persons per 1000 subscribed in the Tatar districts while in the Russian districts the ratio was 610/1000. Tatars are especially interested in the republican press, i.e., in Tatar language publications.

The same source indicated that while the Russians only read books published in their own language, 63.9% of the Tatar readers read books in only Tatar. About one-quarter of readers in the Tatar ASSR read both Tatar and Russian, and 11.1% Russian only. Workers in the republic read mostly books in the Tatar language only. The intelligentsia usually reads both Tatar and Russian. Tatars appear to go to the movies somewhat more frequently than Russians do. If films deal with Tatar national themes, the audience is usually only Tatar.

More than 10% of the Tatars and 17.7% of the Russians watch television. The languages of the television broadcasts were not indicated in the source.²

¹ Lovetskaya etnografiya, 1971: 1:3-13.

² Ibid. The study reflects the situation in the late sixties. Since then the television audience may have expanded considerably. See also Annals of Lemerrier-Quelquejay, 1960: 225.

Table B.2.

Publications in the Tatar ASSR and in the Tatar Language in the USSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers			Magazines			Books and Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1970	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
Tatar ^a	1959	87	263.4	6.9	8	97	2.5	353	4,149	108.72
	1970	77	703	13.3	6	933	10.1	195	2,891	54.7
Minority Languages	1959	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1970	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
Foreign Languages	1959	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
	1970	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	--
All Languages ^b	1959	105	366	N.A. ^c	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	609	6,158	N.A. ^e
	1970	78	801	N.A. ^c	11	653	N.A. ^d	441	4,619	N.A. ^c

^a Figures for the Tatar language include all Tatar language books, journals, and newspapers published in the USSR; data on Tatar ASSR not available.

^b Tatar ASSR only.

^c Copies per 100 inhabitants of the republic: 12.84 in 1959 and 25.6 in 1970.

^d Copies per 100 inhabitants of the republic: 20.9 in 1970.

^e Copies per 100 inhabitants of the republic: 216.1 in 1959 and 147.5 in 1970.

Source: Pechat' 1959: 37,61,133,160,163;
Pechat' 1970: 11,60,69,80,154,184.

Data for Tatars are scarce since they are not included in the tables of union-republic nationalities.

Table B. 3.
Electronic Media and Equipment in the Tatar ASSR

Year	Radio				Television			Theaters			
	No. of Stations (1000)	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of wireless sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	No. of Stations	Of which relay points	No. of sets (1000)	Sets /100 population	Attendance /100 population	
1960	N.A.	371.4 ^a	13.0 ^e	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	--	1329	1408
1965	N.A.	381.4 ^a	12.4 ^f	N.A.	--	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	--	2075	1686
1969	N.A.	397.8 ^a	12.7	(500) ^b	16.0	N.A.	N.A.	300 ^c	9.6	2348	1778

^aTsSU RSFSR, 50 let Tatarskoi ASSR, 1970: 109.

^bEstimate. See text.

^c1970. See text.

^dTheaters and mobile screening units.

^ePopulation figures taken for 1959.

^fPopulation figures taken for 1966.

III. Educational Institutions

Until 1918 the Tatar educational system was closely tied to religious institutions. It included both primary schools (mekteps) and schools of higher learning [medreses], both under the administration of the Moslem clergy. Tsarist colonial policy froze any prospect for development of this system and was also responsible for the destruction of a considerable number of mosques along with their schools. With the Tatar cultural renaissance of the late 1800s, modernization of the schools became one of the central issues of Tatar national life. After the 1905 revolution, school reform and the building of new schools progressed rapidly. In 1911 there were 1822 mekteps and medreses (with 132,000 pupils) in the school district of Kazan. In the district of Ufa there were 1500 mekteps and medreses with 53,000 pupils.¹

Large medreses existed in Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Troitsk, and several major villages in 1911. Among them, the Muhammedive medrese, which was built in Kazan in 1901 by Ghalimdjani Barudi, a progressive religious leader and later mufti of Orenburg, became well known among Moslems of Russia. Its curriculum comprised Koran Science, Hadi (the Prophetic Tradition relating to the acts and utterances of Mohammad and his associates), Islamic History, Arabic Language and Literature, Turkish Language and Literature, Russian, Natural Science, Arithmetic, and Geography. The medreses in Kazan attracted students from all over Moslem Russia.² By the time of the Bolshevik revolution most young Tatar men and women were literate.³ Tatar achievements in the field of education are especially impressive since the Russian state did not allocate any financial support for Moslem schools. Tatar schools were usually established by progressive clergy, rich Tatar merchants and industrialists, and voluntary contributions.

A reorganization of the Tatar educational system began in 1918. In the course of the Tatarization [korenizatsiya] decreed in 1921, the Tatar language

¹Tatary, 1967.

²Dergi, 1958: 13:16.

³Kazan Utlary, 1968: 11:144.

was given official status in Tataristan and a number of institutions of higher learning (among them the Society for Tatar Studies) were established. In 1930-1931, more than 96% of all Tatar children were receiving their entire education in their mother tongue.¹

In 1927 the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet, and Kazan appeared to be on its way to establishing itself firmly as the foremost cultural center of all Moslems of the USSR.² However, a more repressive Soviet nationality policy toward the Tatars, emphasizing Russification, began in 1929-1930, and put a halt to the burgeoning Tatar cultural life. In the fall of 1929 the Society for Tatar Studies was denounced as a "center of nationalism" and closed. In the three following years extensive purges were carried out in the Pedagogical Institute of the East and in Tatar schools for the preparation of national cadres. In 1939-1940, in a further move toward Russification, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic in a somewhat modified form.

Since then the general level of education in the Tatar ASSR has risen considerably. In 1970 the total number of schools in the republic was 3236.³ Of these 1480 were Tatar and Tatar-Russian (mixed), 130 Chuvash and Chuvash-Russian, 36 Udmurt, 20 Mari, and 2 Mordvinian.⁴ In addition, in 1958 there were approximately 2000 Tatar schools outside the border of the Tatar ASSR;⁵ 1225 in the Bashkir ASSR and the rest in other ASSR's and provinces of the RSFSR. No Tatar schools are permitted in other union republics.⁶ At present only primary and secondary education is offered in Tatar; higher education

¹Dergi, 1960: 20:55, quoting Revolutsiya i natsionalnosti (Moscow, 1933) 12:63.

²Samoylovich, 1925: 1-2.

³Nar. obraz., 1971: 34.

⁴Tatarstan kommunisty, 1971: 12:13.

⁵Devletchin, 1960, quoting Natsionalnyye shkoly RSFSR za 40 let (Moscow, 1958).

⁶This may be interpreted as discriminatory Soviet educational policy. For example, there are Armenian schools in Georgia, Kazakh and Tadzhik schools in Uzbekistan, and Uzbek schools in Kirgizistan and Tadzhikistan. However, Belorussians and Ukrainians are denied the right to an education in their native languages outside the borders of their own republics. The Tatars are denied this right except in the RSFSR. There are no restrictions on Russian schools; they may be established anywhere in the Soviet Union. Crimean Tatars did receive permission to conduct classes in the Crimean Tatar language in their areas of deportation after their partial rehabilitation in 1967.

is normally in Russian. Exceptions to this rule can be found in the National Pedagogical Institute and in the Tatar Philological Faculty of Kazan University.¹ In 1970 the Faculty had 250 students, many of whom planned to become teachers.²

Soviet conditions have resulted in increased Tatar attendance at Russian schools. While in 1948 less than half of all children in the Tatar ASSR attended Russian schools, by 1966 their percentage had increased to almost two-thirds. Approximately one-quarter of all Tatar children attended Russian schools in 1969.³ During the same period the percentage of Russian schools in the Tatar ASSR rose from 42.8% to 44.9%. By 1968, however, there was a slight drop to 44.2%.⁴ Nevertheless, the number of Tatar children attending Tatar schools also rose steadily. In 1971 211,000 Tatar children in the Tatar ASSR received their education in Tatar,⁵ up from 170,000 in 1965.⁶ The number of those completing their secondary education in Tatar schools rose from 41,000 in the 1950s to 68,000 in the 1960s.⁷

According to the 1970 census the average level of education in the Tatar ASSR was slightly over the average for the RSFSR. In the Tatar ASSR, 664 of every 1000 employed persons (up from 456 in 1959), had had a higher or secondary education (including the 8-year secondary). (The average for the RSFSR was 656 per 1000, up from 440 per 1000 in 1959.⁸) In 1970 87,000 Tatars were studying in institutes of higher learning and 98,000 in specialized secondary schools. There were 11,617 Tatar scientific workers. Of the Tatars employed in the national economy 109,200 had had a higher education, and 173,500 had received specialized secondary education.

¹ Dergi, 1960: 20:55.

² UNESCO Features 1970: II:571.

³ Voprosy filosofii 1969: 12:134.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Tatarstan kommunisty, 1971: 12:13.

⁶ Kazan Utlary, 1966: 11:89.

⁷ Tatarstan kommunisty, 1971: 12:13.

⁸ Izvestia (April 17), 1971.

In republics with large Tatar populations the average level of education of Tatars was somewhat below that of the Russians but considerably above that of other Turkic groups.¹

In Tatar-language schools the study of Russian is compulsory beginning in the first grade. In fact, as shown below in a tabulation for the 1972/73 school year, the total hours per week dedicated to Russian language and literature exceed the total of hours reserved for Tatar language and literature.²

Subject	<u>Weekly hours by grade level</u>										<u>Total</u>
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	
Tatar language and literature	8	7	7	5	5	4.5	4	3	2	2	47.5
Russian language and literature	6	8	7	7	9	6.5	6	5	6	5	65.5
Foreign languages	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2	2	12

Russian schools in the Tatar ASSR are legally required to provide two hours of Tatar per week in grades II to VIII. However, it appears that this rule is not always observed.³

In 1970, there were 723,000 pupils in 3236 schools in the Tatar ASSR; 420,000 of them were in schools with grades 5 to 10, 52,000 were in general secondary schools (8-10 grades only), and 47,700 were in 39 specialized secondary schools [tekhnikum].⁴ Of the Tatar schools, 60% were elementary, 27% were eight-year, and 30% secondary.⁵ The 11 higher

¹See Itogi 1959, volumes for individual republics, Tables 57 and 57a.

²Data from Sovet Mektebe, 1972: 7.

³Qazan Utlary, 1973: 4: 164

⁴Nar. obraz., 1971: 34.

⁵Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1972: 6:47.

educational establishments had 60,300 students. The University of Kazan, founded in 1804, had 8 faculties, 60 chairs and 9997 students. It provides specialist training in radio-physics, electronics, bio-chemistry, astronomy, geodesy, etc., and for 150 years it has also been an important center for oriental studies. In 1970 there were 1770 libraries in the Tatar ASSR.¹

¹Nar. obraz., 1971: 35.

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Tatar ASSR (1969-70)

Population: 3,131,600 (1970)

		<u>Per 1000</u> <u>population</u>
<u>All schools</u>		
- number of schools	- 3,446	1.1
- number of students	- 827,100	264.1
<u>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</u>		
- number of schools	-	
- number of student places	-	
<u>Secondary special schools</u>		
- number of schools	- 52	
- number of students	- 45,900 (of whom Tatars 18,100)	14.66
<u>Institutions of higher education</u>		
- number of institutions	- 11 + 3 branches of other institutions	
- number of students	- 60,000 (of whom Tatars 22,600)	19.48
<u>Universities</u>		
- number of universities	- 1	
- number of students	- 9,007	
Total	- 9,007	
day students	- 5,340	
evening students	- 1,561	
correspondence students	- 2,106	
- newly admitted		
Total	- 1,726	
day students	- 1,125	
evening students	- 302	
correspondence students	- 299	

Tatars - Educational Institutions -
Table B.4. (continued)

Selected Data on Education in the Tatar ASSR (1969-70)

Universities (continued)	Per 1000 population		
- graduated			
total	-	1,659	
day students	-	915	
evening students	-	322	
correspondence students	-	422	
 <u>Graduate students (1969)</u>			
- total number of	-	1,052	0.34
- in scientific research institutions	-	132	0.04
- in Vuzv	-	920	0.29
 <u>Number of persons with (in 1970) higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education</u>			
- per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	-	468	
- per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	-	664	
 <u>Number of workers graduated from professional-technical schools, 1969</u>	-	23,100	7.38

Source: Nar. obraz., 1971: 8:8-11, 160; TsSU RSFSR, 50 let Tatarskoi ASSR, 1970: 136,153,157,164.

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

A branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is located in Kazan, with 39 scientific research institutions. The director of its Chalimdjian Ibrahim Institute of Language, Literature and History, is M. Mokharramov, a Tatar.

The work of the Kazan Film Studio is limited mostly to the production of documentaries and local-language sound tracks for full-length films. In 1971 the studio produced four documentaries and 36 newsreels in Russian, Tatar and Chuvash.¹ The newsreels dealt with the four autonomous republics on the Volga which are served by the Kazan Film Studio. Furthermore, the studio produced Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash, Mari and Udmurt synchronized sound tracks for 70 full-length films. It produced one artistic film, about the famous Tatar composer Salih Saydashev.

In 1972 there were 2500 movie theaters in the Tatar ASSR.² In 1966 the average urban resident of the republic went to the movies 15 to 22 times per year; for those in the countryside, the ratio was 7.9 to 13.6 times per year.³ Nine state theaters and 48 "people's" theaters and music ensembles operated in Tataristan in 1972. Among them were the Tatar State Academy Theater and the Tatar State Opera and Ballet Theater, both in Kazan, and the Tataristan Song and Dance Ensemble. There are also 8 museums, a conservatory, and a Tatar State Philharmonic Society in the republic.⁴

¹Qazan Utlary, 1972: 11:155,156.

²Sovet Mektebe, 1972: 11:62.

³Qazan Utlary, 1966: 11:90-93.

⁴Sovet Mektebe, 1972: 11:62.

Tatars - Cultural and Scientific Institutions -

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in the
Tatar ASSR (1969)

Population: 3,131,600 (1970)

Academy of Science

- number of members
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy
- total number of scientific workers in these

Museums

- number of museums 10
- attendance 1,113,000
- attendance per 1000 population 355.4

Theaters

- number of theaters 9
- attendance 1,722,500
- attendance per 1000 population 550.0

Number of persons working in education and culture

- total
- no. per 1000 population ND

Number of persons working in science and scientific services

- total
- number per 1000 population ND

Number of public libraries

1,763

- number of books and magazines in public libraries

17,263,000

Number of clubs

2,553

Source: TsSU RSFSR, 50 let Tatarskoi ASSR, 1970: 8,166-8.

THE TATARS AND THE TATAR ASSR

PART C

National Attitudes

1. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

Tatars are the most Westernized of the Turkic peoples of the USSR. They were the first Turks to develop a middle class, and on the eve of World War I they possessed a rather large proletariat. However, since most Tatar workers lived outside of Tataristan (in the Donets basin and the industrial regions of the Urals and Siberia), they did not exert much political influence in their homeland. The first Tatar socialists emerged from the more radical section of the young bourgeois intelligentsia, and early Tatar communism was dominated by non-proletarian elements.¹

Since then a new generation has grown up and a new intelligentsia has appeared. Tatar and Bashkir publications of the 1960s and 1970s (particularly the Tatar literary monthly Qazan Utlary and the Bashkir literary magazine Aghidel) have shown a firm adherence to their traditional national values and culture. The Tatar-Bashkir intelligentsia has become very outspoken in its demands for improvements, especially in the cultural and national sectors. This attitude is also shared by the Tatar diaspora in Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, there have been instances of Tatars displaying relative indifference toward their own culture and language, especially among Tatar youth in the cities. These have provoked open criticism from such Tatar intellectuals as the well-known writer and former chairman of the Tatar Writers' Union, Ghomar Bashir, who decried "Europeanization" and advocated Tatar youth working among their own people.²

It should be noted that Tatar men of letters have been among the most ardent and articulate defenders and promoters of the Tatar language and culture. Through their literary writings, critical articles and speeches at conferences and congresses, they have contributed (and continue to contribute) a great deal

¹ Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967:50-51.

² Sovet Adabiaty [Soviet Literature], 1957:11. Note: Sovet Adabiaty is the old name for the journal Qazan Utlary.

to the strengthening of Tatar national consciousness, especially among the young. Throughout the post-Stalinist period they have worked untiringly to popularize the Tatar language and culture and to alert or sharpen public awareness to current Tatar national problems. The Tatar Writers' Union headquarters in Kazan has become a veritable Mecca to Tatars from all over the Soviet Union. In addition, Tatar writers frequently travel throughout the Tatar ASSR to meet their readers and to discuss with them their own works, as well as literature in general.

In spite of the fact that in the Tatar ASSR Tatars hold only a small majority over the Russians, Russification does not seem to have made significant headway. The Tatars have lived with the Russians for centuries and, as we have seen, the present balance between the Tatar and Russian population in their republic has, with slight fluctuations, existed ever since its establishment. According to Ghomar Usmanov, Premier of the Tatar ASSR, and Murkhazid Valiyev, party secretary for ideology, this balance is not expected to change in the near future.¹

As the 1959 census has shown, Tatars residing in the Tatar ASSR and in the oblasts and the other autonomous republics lying within their historical borders have preserved their language to a very high degree. For example, more than 98% of the Tatars in the Tatar ASSR gave Tatar as their mother tongue. In the Bashkir ASSR the percentage was 97.6% and in the Mordvinian ASSR, 98.5%; elsewhere in the Volga-Viatka region the percentage ranged from 92%-98%. For the Tatars in Central Asia the figure was 90% (with the remaining 10% divided between Russian and the local Turkic languages), and in the Siberian oblast of Omsk, 94%. Even in large Russian cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, the great majority of Tatars, 78% and 71% respectively, considered Tatar their mother tongue.²

¹ New York Times, March 25, 1970.

² Among other non-Slavic groups residing in and around Leningrad the percentage of those indicating the language of their nationality as their mother tongue was the following: Estonians (14,067) 26.1%, Armenians (9,437) 32.7%, Latvians (8,752) 31.5%, Lithuanians (5,017) 41.5%. See Itogi *SFSR, 1959: 312.

Moreover, a considerable number of those Tatars who gave Russian as their mother tongue undoubtedly retained a command of Tatar. For example, of the Tatars in Kazan who indicate Russian as their mother tongue, 19.2% continue to speak Tatar at home.¹

Alexandre Bennigsen of the Sorbonne considers the Soviet army the principal instrument of Russification. To this the educational system should be added. The unavailability of higher education in Tatar and the obvious advantage of knowing Russian induces many Tatar parents to send their children to Russian schools at a very early age. This disrupts Tatar socialization processes and contributes to the process of Russification.

¹Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1972: 2:33.

II. Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

Geoffrey E. Wheeler, retired Director of the Central Asian Research Centre in London, and Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, both of l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne, seem to be rather optimistic about the future of the Moslems in the USSR. They have expressed the opinion that Islam and the Moslems of the USSR may prove to be more than a match for the Soviets and that the latter have up to now failed in their attempts to assimilate them.

Wheeler writes that even convinced communists may be Moslems at heart.¹ In his opinion, the Soviet Moslems are technically, mentally and spiritually far better fit to undertake the independent government of their own people than many former colonial Moslem countries of whose independence the Soviet government has been such an eager advocate. Silent but persistent struggle is sensed, if not thoroughly comprehended, by the Soviet authorities. Though less spectacular than the triumphant progress of the Arab and Ottoman armies during their earlier empires, it demonstrates just as strikingly the inherent vitality and integrity of Islam as a social force, and may in the long run prove just as effective.

Bennigsen argues that the attitude of the new generation toward the fundamental problems facing the Moslem peoples is reminiscent of that of Sultangaliyev, the earlier Tatar and communist leader, who was "firmly attached to this national culture, not only in its form but also in its content."² That the Moslem Tatars wish to preserve their religion and traditional heritage--even if that heritage is scarcely compatible with proletarian culture--is obvious, according to Bennigsen. Their idealization of the Moslem past brings them into conflict with the Russians. Finally

¹Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, 1967: foreword.

²Ibid.

and it is here that one can detect most clearly the influence of the ideas of Sultanghaliyev--they seem to want to relate their own notion of communism to antecedents other than those of the Russian Bolsheviks, implying that "Oriental communism" is an original concept.

Bennigsen goes on to state that more than his predecessors of the 1920s and 1930s, the Moslem intellectual of today is emerging as the real representative of his people. His national consciousness is at once more keenly felt, more rational and, in the final analysis, more firmly hostile to Russian influence than that of any other sector of the Moslem population.

It should be noted that Tatars and Bashkirs have traditionally belonged to the most devout group of Soviet Moslems and that long before the Bolshevik revolution they had developed a rather strong national consciousness.¹

A study of the ethno-social structure of the urban population (mostly Kazan) of the Tatar ASSR published the following results:²

Tatars residing in Kazan had, on the average, 47.8% Tatar friends and 42.4% Russian friends. For the Russians the figures were 58.3% Russian and 31.9% Tatar friends.

In Kazan 87.4% of the Tatars had spouses of their own nationality, 10.7% were married to Russians. Of the Russians in Kazan, 91.6% were married to persons of their own nationality; more than 5% were married to Tatars. The percentage of intermarriage was higher among intellectuals, lower among unskilled workers.

More than half (51.4%) of the children born of Russian mothers and Tatar fathers chose Tatar as their nationality.

¹Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Ouelquejay, 1967: 225.

²Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1970:3.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

In contrast to the Crimean Tatars whose struggle for return to their homeland has attracted worldwide attention, Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs have up to now not produced any samizdat. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence of the existence of Tatar-Bashkir nationalism.

For the Tatars and the Bashkirs the preservation of their national integrity, culture and language against the current Russification drive of the Soviet government is an important issue. Tatars and Bashkirs in the Party and government apparatus of their respective republics, as well as the Tatar-Bashkir intelligentsia, use every opportunity (sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR, writers' congresses, conferences of scientists and professional groups, in publications, etc.) to speak up on behalf of their people and to promote the interests of their republics.

Moreover, it is in literature that Tatar nationalism becomes most conspicuous. Besides a few prominent scientists, Soviet poets, playwrights, novelists, and journalists constitute practically the only group in the population which has succeeded in establishing a forum in which it can raise, within certain limits, important issues that confront the people. By skillfully using their literary characters, Tatar writers have been able to convey thoughts and ideas which could never be expressed directly through other communication media. Since literature is extremely popular among Tatars and Bashkirs, it is therefore an excellent means of reaching large segments of the population.¹

For example, anti-Russian feeling is reflected in the Tatar novel Yamashev by Atilla Rasih.² In the story, set in the pre-revolution years at the turn of the century, a somewhat "negative" character, the Tatar Jaghfer,

¹See Burbiel, 1969:40-46.

²Published in Qazan Utiary (1967:9-12), its author is one of the more important modern Tatar writers. Husseyn Yamashev was a leading Tatar social-democrat (1882-1912).

confronts the "positive" social-democrat Yamashev. He is told by the latter that after socialism all nations will prosper, and this is the major theme of the work. However, during the ongoing argument between the two, Jaghfer, as a Tatar suffers certain indignities and disillusionment; it is not difficult for the Tatar readers to identify mainly with the "negative" Jaghfer.

Another example is found in a poem by Ildar Yuziev entitled "What Things Does the Smith Make?"¹ The author enumerates all kinds of things made by the smith, such as fish hooks, nails for caskets, wolf traps, etc. Among them:

"Locks which lock up the writer in jail
Hoops to lay around the necks of the freedom loving."

Besides furnishing Tatar youth with a solid national foundation by acquainting it with the Tatar national heritage, Tatar literature tackles such topics as: Russification, discrimination against Tatars, intermarriage, the forced assignment of Tatars to work outside their republic, distortion and vilification of the Tatar image, promotion of education in Tatar schools, exposure of existing class differences in Soviet society, corruption among Party and government officials, exploitation of the worker by the existing Soviet labor system, etc. This is done with the aim of stimulating the reader's national feelings, fostering in him a devotion to the welfare of his own people and his native homeland, and showing him the injustice and shortcomings of Soviet society.

Nationalism and anti-Russian feelings among Tatars and Bashkirs have also been reported by recent emigres from the Soviet Union. In 1969 the Ukrainian Information Service Smoloskyp (Baltimore, Md.) reported a document in which a pro-Russian Ukrainian living in Ufa, Bashkir ASSR, warned against nationalism in Ufa, and Kazan and in other republics. The document consisted of a letter written to a member of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow by a Ukrainian "renegade" who had married a Christian Tatar woman and was teaching in one of the institutes of higher learning in Ufa.

¹Oazan Utlary, 1972:5:80. Ildar Yuziev is a prominent contemporary Tatar poet.

The author of the letter cited a number of examples of contempt toward everything Russian among the Tatars in Bashkiria and in the Latvian, Baltic, Kirgiz, Moldavian, and Ukrainian republics. Most of the examples are of events that happened in Ufa during the author's residence in that city. He claimed that cadres were selected by nationality (i.e., from among the native people) even if they were "blockheads." In the same manner professors' chairs were filled, and the same applied to universities and medical institutions.

According to this author, the Secretary of the Ufa Party Committee had said that it was not necessary to invite specialists and scholars from the outside, that they already had their own, and that, in general, the Bashkir ASSR was ready to become an independent state.

The letter also reported on a banquet given in May 1966 by the local authorities to celebrate the Day of Victory. Seating was according to nationality. The Tatars sat and talked together in their own language, and the Russians sat as though they were guests or poor relatives.

In the institutions of higher education, nationalism is (not surprisingly) implanted by the members of the social science departments. Incidents at the Institute of Agriculture were related in the Ukrainian's letter. A teacher began his seminar in Tatar. The Russians asked him to speak so that they too could understand. He obliged. Teachers gathered in their departments and talked in their own language; when there were Russians among them, they behaved as if they weren't there. At a Party Committee meeting of the Institute, the Tatars (the rector, vice-rector, and the heads of social science departments) switched to their language as though the Russians were not there at all.

The letter also alleged that 90% of the inmates of a privileged local sanatorium were Tatars and Bashkirs, although Russians made up half of the population of the Bashkir ASSR.

Finally, the author writes "the great Russian people, who have led Tatars, Bashkirs. . . out of the darkness of slavery, injustice . . . are little by little encroached upon here, but this process will go on more rapidly if measures to stop it are not taken on a state-wide level . . ." ¹

¹Ukrains'kiy visnyk, 1971:I-II:111-118.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

MOLDAVIA AND THE MOLDAVIANS

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This chapter is based on a paper contributed by the above-named specialist. However, the chapter as presented here has been edited by the project staff, and some of the data, tables, and other materials have been added. Responsibility for the final version therefore rests with the project.

Center for International Studies
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Cambridge, Massachusetts

June 1973

MOLDAVIA AND THE MOLDAVIANS

PART A

General Information

Introduction

Since the various national designations used in this chapter may be confusing to the reader, definitions are supplied below.

Rumanian Moldavia: A portion of northeastern Rumania.

Bessarabia: Formerly part of Rumanian Moldavia; annexed by Russia in 1912, restored to Rumania in 1918, annexed by the USSR in 1940.

Moldavian Autonomous SSR: The original Soviet "Moldavian" republic, established in 1924 as part of the Ukrainian SSR and consisting of a portion of the USSR whose boundaries included a significant Rumanian resident population.

Moldavian SSR: The present union republic consisting of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR plus Bessarabia.

Moldavians: Members of the officially designated titular nationality of Moldavia; basically ethnic Rumanians.

1. Territory

The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed on August 2, 1940, through the incorporation of the central section of Bessarabia into the Moldavian Autonomous SSR. The smallest of the constituent republics of the USSR, it covers an area of 13,012 square miles.¹ The Moldavian SSR lies to the extreme southwest of the USSR, bordering on Rumania, by the river Prut, to the southwest and on the Ukrainian SSR to the north, northeast, and southeast. The Moldavian SSR has 32 districts, 20 towns, and 33 urban settlements.² Its capital is Kishinev.

The central portion of the republic is a plateau known as the Bessarabian-Moldavian upland, which rises to 1410 feet and extends westward beyond the Prut. The upland is composed of young sedimentary rock, mainly limestone, covered with a layer of loess. Its higher, wooded portions, known as the Kodry, have podsollic soils which support deciduous forests of oak, ash, and maple. North of the plateau lies the level, treeless Bel'tsv steppe, and to the south, the dry Budzhak steppe. Both are covered with rich black-earth soils. In the south, tree vegetation is found only in the flood plains of the lower Dniestr and Prut rivers.³

The republic is one of the warmest regions of the European USSR, having a mean annual temperature of 50° F. In January average temperatures range from 27° F in the south to 23° F in the north. In July the respective temperatures are 68° F and 73° F.⁴ Precipitation varies between 22 inches in the north and 12-16 inches in the south yearly. Most of the rains occur

¹ Shabad, 1951:464.

² BSE Yezhegodnik., 1971:151.

³ Moldaviya, 1970:17-27; Shabad, 1951:464.

⁴ Moldaviya, 1970:28-33.

in June and July.¹ The prevalent winds are northeasterly.

Construction materials constitute the chief mineral resource. Gypsum deposits lie in the vicinity of Lipkany, in the extreme north of the republic. Granite, chalk, and cement rock are found in the Dniestr valley.

¹Moldaviya, 1970:33.

²Shabad, 1951:464.

II. ECONOMY

Agriculture, including livestock-raising, is the chief economic activity of the Moldavian SSR. Moldavia includes about one-third of the vineyard acreage of the USSR. Grain crops, of which corn is the most widely cultivated, occupy 75% of the total cultivated area which, in turn, represents 23% of the total area of the republic. Aside from corn, winter wheat, barley, and winter rye are the main grain crops. The chief industrial crops are tobacco, sugar beets, soybeans, sunflowers, flax, and hemp. The main processing industries are fruit and vegetable canning, wine making, distilling, flour milling, vegetable oil extraction, tobacco processing, and sugar refining. Of lesser importance are tanning, knitting, woodworking, and quarrying industries.¹

Animal husbandry, while well developed in terms of the needs of the republic, is significant in terms of total USSR figures only with respect to pig raising - 3.8% of the total. The actual number of pigs in the Moldavian SSR reached 1,573,000 in 1970, in contrast to 1,187,000 in 1965. By contrast, the number of beef and dairy cattle was lower in 1970 (903,000) than in 1965 (914,000). The number of sheep and goats also declined: the figures for 1970 and 1965 respectively were 1,417,000 and 1,676,000.² Livestock and animal products accounted for 30% of the gross value of Moldavian agricultural output in 1970.³

Moldavia ranks first among the union republics in the production of wine and related products. In 1970 the winemaking industry produced 64,700,000 gallons of grape wine as against 42,200,000 gallons in 1965. The wine production in 1970 was approximately 18% of the total for the USSR.⁴ In 1970 the canning industry produced 945,800,000 tins of canned food (about 5% of the

¹ Moldaviya, 1970: 101-134.

² BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 153.

³ Nar. khoz. 1972: 222.

⁴ BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 152; Shabad, 1951: 466-467.

total for the USSR) as against 684,800,000 in 1965¹. In the same year the vegetable oil industry produced 159,000 tons of vegetable oil as against 132,700 tons in 1965. The increase in the production figures of other branches of the food industry since 1965 has been much less spectacular.² However, the ruble value of Moldavia's food industry output in 1970 reached 2.3 billion against 1.5 billion in 1965. The average annual volume of the gross output of agriculture increased by 26.7% since 1965, and the general growth in gross industrial production ranks among the highest for the union republics³

Light industry, primarily tanning, footwear, and knitwear, has also developed rapidly since 1965, as have the machine building and metal working industries. Even so, the food processing industry represents approximately 60% of the total industrial structure as against 25% for light industry, and 15% for heavy industry.⁴ In terms of total industrial development, Moldavia still has the lowest productivity, the lowest capital investment, and the lowest rate of industrial employment of all union republics.⁵

Statistics indicative of the standard of living in the republic uniformly rank Moldavia well below the other European republics of the USSR. They suggest that in these aspects of development, Moldavia is more closely comparable to Central Asia than to the rest of the European USSR. Savings per capita in 1970 averaged 93.70 rubles, less than half the USSR average. Trade turnover per capita was 488 rubles, compared to 639 for the USSR as a whole and 956 for Estonia, the most favored republic in this respect. The number of doctors per 10,000 inhabitants in 1971 (21.5) was well below the USSR average (28.3), but equally far above Rumania's 14.1 doctors per 10,000 in 1968. In the number of television sets per 100 population, Moldavia also compared favorably with Rumania (11.5 versus 6.4), although not with the average for the USSR (14.5).⁶

¹ BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 152.

² Ibid.

³ Pravda (April 4), 1971: 2-3.

⁴ BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 152.

⁵ Cole and German, 1970: 127, 133, 160, 163-164, 166, 171, 177.

⁶ Nar. khoz. 1970: 564, 579; Nar. khoz. 1972: 515ff, 610, 616. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1971: 300, 822.

III. History

On October 12, 1924, an Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was established as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to formalize the Kremlin's opposition to the incorporation of Bessarabia into Rumania at the end of World War I and to provide a political nucleus for the eventual reunification of all "Moldavians."¹ From its inception the Moldavian Republic was an instrument of Soviet political action against Rumania.

The boundaries of the republic were so drawn as to include a substantial segment of the Rumanian population east of the Dniestr but by no means all of the Rumanian-speaking inhabitants of Transdnistria and the Ukraine. The boundaries were drawn in such a way that only 30% of its population was Rumanian. It has been suggested that this was done in order to "prove" that the relative proportion of Moldavians in the entire area stretching from Rumanian Moldavia to Odessa was similar, and thus to invalidate Rumania's claim that its seizure of Bessarabia was justified by the overwhelmingly Rumanian character of that province.² These demographic arguments were supplemented by "historic proofs" stressing Russia's historic rights to Bessarabia based on possession of the province at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and the allegedly illegal dismemberment and subsequent transfer to Rumania in 1918 of the Democratic Moldavian Republic, first established in December 1917.³

The Soviet claims to Bessarabia can be challenged both on demographic and on historic grounds. Bessarabia was historically part of the Rumanian principality of Moldavia and its incorporation into Russia in 1812 was prompted by strategic and political considerations related exclusively to Russo-Turkish relations and Great Power interests. The return to the principality of Moldavia of parts of Bessarabia at the Congress of Paris of

¹ Clark, 1927:239ff.

² Babel, 1926:198-233.

³ The most eloquent and most thoroughly documented statement of the Soviet position is by J. Okhotnikov and N. Batchinsky, La Bessarabie et la paix europeenne (Paris, 1927).

1856 was again a decision of the powers, as was the restitution of those same sections to Russia in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin. And despite determined efforts by the tsarist regime to Russify Bessarabia between 1812 and 1917 (largely through the settlement of Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews), over two-thirds of the inhabitants of Bessarabia were Rumanians at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Democratic Moldavian Republic, established in 1917 by the dominant Rumanian political forces in Bessarabia, was expressly anti-Bolshevik in character and was intended as an instrument to allow the incorporation of the province into Rumania should its autonomy be threatened by the Bolsheviks. In fact, therefore, the union of the Moldavian Republic with Rumania in April 1918 was voluntary.¹

The Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, the theoretical reincarnation of the Democratic Moldavian Republic of 1917, was assigned by Moscow the task of working toward the reincorporation of Bessarabia through propaganda as well as through revolutionary action within Bessarabia proper. The promotion of Moldavian culture in the Autonomous Republic by the Ukraine, the development of a national "Moldavian" language and literature, and the sporadic revolutionary activity exported to Bessarabia by members of the Communist Party were, however, ineffectual.² The reincorporation of Bessarabia into the USSR was made possible only by Soviet military action which occurred early in July of 1940, when the USSR, on the basis of the secret provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, was permitted by Hitler to march into and annex Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. It was then that the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was established as a union republic. The boundaries of the republic were changed to improve its "Moldavian" image by transferring 1900 of the 3200 square miles of the former Autonomous Republic to the Ukraine and incorporating most of Bessarabia into the Moldavian SSR.

After the 1941 German attack on the USSR, the Moldavian Republic and

¹Clark, 1927:151-157.

²Ibid., 261-276: Okhotnikov and Batchinsky, 1927:149-153.

the area previously comprising the Autonomous Republic were overrun by Rumania, allied with Berlin, largely to recover Bessarabia.¹ Only in 1944 was the legitimacy of the Moldavian SSR formally guaranteed when the Soviet-Rumanian Armistice Convention recognized the legality of the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The reaffirmation of this agreement by the Rumanian peace treaty of 1947 closed de jure if not de facto the Bessarabian and "Moldavian" questions.² But it is precisely in the context of the "illegal" reopening of these questions by "forces inimical" to the USSR that the history of the Moldavian SSR must be understood.

The history of the Moldavian SSR since 1947, and particularly since the development of the Rumanian "independent" (or anti-Soviet) course in the early 1960s, has been characterized by consistent Russian attempts to strengthen the bases of Soviet power in Moldavia and to isolate the republic from Rumania and Rumanian influences.³ The former aim has been implemented by securing control of the party and state apparatus by non-Moldavians, by systematic communist indoctrination of the Moldavian population, and by development of the republic's economy. The latter aim is pursued by cultural propaganda designed to prove the historic validity and legitimacy of the Moldavian Republic, by constant attacks against pro-Rumanian nationalist manifestations on the part of the Moldavians, and by the virtual elimination of all personal contacts between Soviet Moldavians and Rumanian Moldavians. These policies, carried out by several First Secretaries of the Moldavian Communist Party--including in the fifties Leonid Brezhnev himself--have proven satisfactory to the Kremlin, and possibilities for change from the present status of the Moldavian SSR appear inconceivable at this time.

¹ Cioranescu, 1967:165ff.

² Ionescu, 1964:91,129-131.

³ Cioranescu, 1967:196ff.; Fischer-Galati, 1967:55ff.,78ff.

Demography

The Moldavian SSR was inhabited by 3,568,873 people in 1970, a 24% increase over the 2,884,477 inhabitants recorded in the census of 1959.¹ It recorded the highest birth rate (20.7 per 1000) and the lowest death rate (8.8 per 1000) of all of European union republics.² 2,304,000 ethnic Moldavians, or 65.4% of the total 2,698,000 Moldavians in the USSR, lived in the republic, constituting 64.6% of the population there. The percentage of Moldavians had thus declined from the 65.4% recorded in 1959. The percentage of Ukrainian inhabitants of the republic similarly decreased from 14.6% in 1959 to 14.2% in 1970 while that of the third largest nationality, Russians, increased from 10.2% to 11.6%. Of the remaining nationalities the Turkish-speaking Gagauzy represent 3.5% of the population, the Jews 2.7%, and the Bulgarians 2.1%.³ The population density of 114 inhabitants per square mile is the highest in the USSR.

The 1970 census records a substantial increase in the size of the urban population since the previous census was taken in 1959. The total urban population rose from 642,300 (or 22.3% of the total population of the Moldavian SSR) in 1959 to 1,130,000 (or 31.4% of the total) in 1970.⁴ The population of the capital, Kishinev, increased from 216,000 in 1959 to 374,000 in 1970 and, among other major towns, that of Tiraspol from 63,000 to 106,000, that of Beltsy from 61,000 to 102,000 and that of Bendery from 38,000 to 43,000. Nevertheless, the level of urbanization of the Moldavian SSR is the lowest of all union republics.

Little specific information is available with respect to the social structure of the population of the Moldavian SSR. Some relevant data

¹ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (May 5), 1971:1.

² Cole and German, 1970:105.

³ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (May 5), 1971:1; Itogi 1970:14.

⁴ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (May 5), 1971:1.

data from the 1970 census have been released, including evidence of an increase in the number of workers and employees, accounting for a major share of the large increase in the republic's urban population. In 1959, there were 113,000 white-collar employees and 294,000 workers, representing, respectively, 3.9% and 10.2% of the total population.¹ In 1970, the corresponding figures were 269,000 (7.4% of the total population) and 675,000 (18.7%).² The number of full-time students (at all levels) in 1970 is given as 891,000 or 25% of the population, but no breakdown between urban and rural students is available.³ 46.6% of the total 1,604,000 employed inhabitants of the republic are engaged in agriculture, including 570,000 kolkhozniki.⁴

In 1959, 90% of the Moldavians lived in rural areas while 67% of the Russians in the republic were urban dwellers. The pattern was similar in 1970: 82% of the Moldavians were still in rural areas, while the urbanized Russian population had grown to 77%.⁵ According to other sources, of the 113,000 employees only 35,000 (31%) were Moldavians, and of the total number of specialists with higher education employed in the Moldavian SSR in 1959 one-third each were Moldavians and Russians, 17% Ukrainians, and the rest members of other nationalities.⁶ No such detail has been published for 1970, but calculations based on the available data indicate that 31% of the persons with higher education in Moldavia are Moldavian.⁷ The insignificance of the number of Moldavians classified as "scientific workers" is striking. In 1955, out of 223,893 recorded for the USSR as a whole, only 305 (.015%) were listed as Moldavians.⁸ By 1971 there were 2624 Moldavian "scientific workers," 8.5 times as many; but they still amounted to only 0.26% of the total in the USSR, much less than their weight in the overall Soviet population (1.1%). Thus, the Moldavians are grossly underrepresented in leading social strata, even in their own republic.

¹ Manchester Guardian (April 29), 1966. The Russian word "sluzhashchiye," translated as "employees" implies white-collar occupation.

² Nar. khoz. 1972:612.

³ Moldaviya, 1970:234.

⁴ Ibid.:612-613.

⁵ Manchester Guardian (April 29), 1966: Itogi 1970:IV:276-278.

⁶ Pravda (October 27), 1961:3-4.

⁷ Itogi 1970:III:18 and IV:380,513.

⁸ Tsameryan and Ronin, 1962:99.

Information with respect to membership in political and professional organizations is also limited. The Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSP consisted in 1970 of 315 deputies, of whom 113 were women.¹ The membership of the Communist Party as of January 1, 1971, was 110,131 exclusive of 5033 candidate members. The party's Central Committee consisted of 210 members and candidate members, of whom 163 were workers and members of collective farms.² The Leninist Union of Communist Youth had a membership of 338,139 at the beginning of 1971.³ At that time membership in professional unions reached 1,041,926.⁴

Data on the actual or relative representation of different nationalities in political organizations are scarce. On the basis of studies of the composition of the republic's Party organization and of its Central Committee made available during the 1960s, it has been established that in 1963 the Party membership was 34.6% Moldavians, as compared to 36.9% Russians and 23.5% Ukrainians.⁵ Only 1.3% of the Moldavian population of the republic belonged to the Party in contrast to 7.3% of the Russian and 3.8% of the Ukrainian.⁶ For the CPSU as a whole, Moldavians are the most underrepresented of the republic nationalities. They constituted 0.4% of the CPSU membership in January 1972, versus 1.1% of the total Soviet population in the 1970 census.⁷

No comparable statistics are available for determining the configuration of the CPM Central Committee on the basis of nationality. However, the

¹ BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971:151.

² Ibid.:152.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Rigby, 1968:381.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 24:12 (December 1972).

supreme body of the Party, the Bureau of the Central Committee, elected at the Thirteenth Congress of the Moldavian Party in February 1971, consisted of 9 members, of whom 5 were Russians, 3 Ukrainians, and one Moldavian.¹ An analysis of incomplete data on the composition of the Supreme Soviet and of the Council of Ministers by nationality suggests that nearly two-thirds of the leading cadres are Russians and the rest about equally divided between Moldavians and Ukrainians.

¹ BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 151.

Culture

The Moldavian SSR, both within the framework of the Soviet Union and as Bessarabia in the context of Rumanian civilization, has always been on the periphery of Rumanian and Russian culture. The population of Bessarabia and of the Moldavian republic has produced no writers, artists, musicians, or other intellectuals who have made a mark in the history of Moldavian civilization. The primary reason for this has been the isolation of the Rumanian inhabitants of these areas from the mainstream of the cultural life of pre-World War II Rumania and of tsarist or Soviet Russia. Writers, including such well known figures as Grigore Ureche, Miron Costin, Gheorghe Asachi, and Bogdan Petriceicu Hajdeu, practiced their craft outside Bessarabia, usually in the cultural center of Iasi, the capital of historic Moldavia. They identified themselves with the Moldavian intelligentsia rather than with the Bessarabian peasant masses or non-Rumanian urban dwellers.¹ Writers and artists who made their contributions to Moldavian culture within the borders of Soviet Moldavia have attained little distinction. This is primarily due to the preponderance of Russian and Ukrainian authors and artists in the Moldavian SSR, and also to the customary restrictions imposed upon all authors and artists by the Soviet regime. The literary works of such better known Moldavian writers as M. S. Delianu or A. P. Lupan are limited to socialist-realist themes and as such have cultural value mainly in terms of Soviet plans for the cultural development of the Moldavian SSR.²

The aspects of Moldavian culture encouraged by the Kremlin are limited to those involving raising the educational level of the Moldavian population, disseminating propaganda through the printed word, the theater, and other media of communication, and preserving and developing folk culture, particularly in the spheres of music and dancing. In these terms much has been achieved.

¹Constantinescu, 1969:425-443;532-542.

²Ocherk, 1963:93-223.

Illiteracy, which was among the highest of all the Rumanian provinces prior to the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Moldavian republic, has been eliminated. The educational system, extremely backward before World War II, consisted in 1970 of 2, 7 regular primary and secondary schools, 46 secondary special educational institutions, and 8 institutions of higher learning with a total number of students of respectively 795,000, 51,700, and 44,800.¹ The Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR, established in August 1961, by 1971 had as many as 17 academicians.² In 1970 there were 7 theaters, including the Moldavian opera theater, 1925 choirs and 420 orchestral ensembles exclusive of 247 ensembles specializing in Moldavian folk music. Also in 1970, there were 1897 public libraries with holdings of 17,100,000 books and newspapers, 22 museums, and 1749 film projectors. 1710 books were published in 11,778,000 copies in 1970. In the same year 201 newspapers and periodical publications appeared in the Moldavian SSR.³ (See also Section B-IV.)

Impressive as these statistics may be, they require qualification with respect to the Moldavians of the republic. The republic's cultural activities, except for folklore, are dominated by non-Moldavians. This is also true of the higher educational institutions.⁴ The content of cultural activities is also non-Moldavian if not actually anti-Moldavian in the historic sense because it denies the Rumanianism of the Moldavians' national origin and cultural heritage even in relation to contemporary Communist Rumania. This is even true of the folkloristic cultural manifestations in music and the dance which historically were intimately linked to, if not actually the same as, those of Rumanian Moldavia and which are now stylized to blur and minimize that organic relationship. The customs of the Moldavians, based on the Rumanian rural patriarchal society and steeped in a profound and fundamentalist Rumanian Orthodox tradition, have also been subject to attack in the predominantly rural Moldavian territories.⁵ The collectivization of

¹Moldaviya, 1970:93-94,234; Pennar, 1971:311-323.

²BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971: 153-154.

³Ibid., 154-155.

⁴Moldaviya, 1970:81-100.

⁵Ibid., 81-93.

agriculture, which affected the Moldavian peasant only after the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Moldavian republic, was a major cultural as well as economic blow, since Bessarabia was one of the oldest strongholds of private ownership of rural property in Rumania.¹

The extent to which urbanization, Sovietization, and education have affected the cultural values and traditions of the rural Moldavian masses is difficult to assess. Probably the essential elements of the Rumanian peasant culture have not been obliterated. However, almost no data other than that related to "nationalist manifestations" is available with respect to the youth, the educated, the urban, or the non-resident (the latter approximately 15% of the total Moldavian population of the republic) Moldavians which would permit an intelligent assessment of the cultural transformation and current values of these important segments of the Rumanian population of the Moldavian SSR.

¹Cioranescu, 1967:254-256.

III. External Relations

The external relations of the Moldavian SSR are determined primarily by the republic's underdeveloped economy and by the Moldavians' geographic location with respect to the Socialist Republic of Rumania.

The republic's relations with other component republics of the USSR appear to be limited to normal inter-republic affairs. The special political and economic ties which linked Moldavia to the Ukraine (as an Autonomous Republic within the Ukrainian SSR) before the annexation of Bessarabia and in the years immediately following World War II have been eliminated in recent years. Due to the proximity of Rumania, with its historic national ties with the Moldavians, relations with that country have always been restricted. They have all but ceased since 1964 when the legitimacy of the annexation of Bessarabia was de facto questioned by Bucharest.¹

The only external relations, exclusive of foreign trade arrangements, mentioned in the Moldavian press and by official speakers of the Moldavian SSR are those with Bulgaria and Hungary, which are restricted to exchanges of information in the field of agricultural production and processing.² However, contracts for reciprocal trade, concluded by the Ministry of Trade of the Moldavian SSR and its counterparts in socialist countries, are in force between Moldavia and Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and bilateral foreign trade arrangements concluded by trading delegations are in effect with all European socialist countries.³

¹ Fischer-Galati, 1967:99ff; New York Times (November 6), 1971.

² Pravda (April 4), 1971:3.

³ Sovetskaya trgovlya (January 24), 1967.

MOLDAVIA AND THE MOLDAVIANS

PART B

Media

Language Data

What in official post-1945 terminology is called the "Moldavian" language is one of the regional dialects of Rumanian. Therefore, Moldavians and other Rumanians understand each other readily, and we refer to the "Moldavian" language in quotations. The Soviet regime has imposed the use of Cyrillic script in the republic. Thus, written "Moldavian" appears different from Rumanian.

According to data provided by the 1970 census, 95.0% of all Moldavians in the USSR (2,188,000 out of 2,214,000) regard "Moldavian" as their native language, a slight decrease from 1959 when 95.2% did so (see Table B.1.).

In the Moldavian SSR itself, where 85.4% of the USSR's Moldavians live, 97.7% claimed that their native language was "Moldavian." In addition, 33.9% gave Russian as a second language of fluency, as did nearly half of the 394,000 Moldavians living in other parts of the Soviet Union.¹

Of the 1,264,957 non-Moldavian inhabitants of the republic, only 13,790 consider "Moldavian" to be their native tongue and only 173,612 speak it as a second language. Only 40.3% of the total urban population of the republic, and 42.7% of the population of Kishinev, speak "Moldavian" as either their first or second language.²

¹ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (May 5), 1971; see also Pravda (April 17), 1971.

² Itogi 1970; IV; 276-279.

Table B.1.

Native and Second Languages Spoken by Moldavians
(in thousands)

Number of Moldavians in the Moldavian SSR	Speaking as their Native Language						Spoken as a Second Language ^a					
	1959		1970		Percentage point change 1959-1970		Percentage point change 1959-1970		Russian 1970		Other Languages of the USSR, 1970	
	1959	1970	"Moldavian" 1959	1970	Percentage point change 1959-1970	Russian 1959	Russian 1970	Percentage point change 1959-1970	Russian 1970	Other Languages of the USSR, 1970	Percentage point change 1959-1970	
	1,887 (100%)	2,304 (100%)	1,853 (98.24%)	2,251 (97.7%)	-0.54	25 (1.3%)	46 (2.0%)	+0.7	781 (33.9%)	57 (2.5%)		
	328 (100%)	394 (100%)	255 (77.7%)	312 (79.2%)	+1.5	55 (16.8%)	67 (17.0%)	+0.2	193 (49.0%)	40 (16.2%)		
Total	2,214 (100%)	2,698 (100%)	2,108 (95.2%)	2,563 (95.0%)	-0.2	79 (3.6%)	113 (4.2%)	+0.6	974 (36.1%)	97 (3.6%)		

Sources: Itoigi SSSR 1959 and Itoigi Moldavia 1959; Tables 53 and 54; Itoigi 1970: IV:20,276.

^a No data are available for 1959, since no questions regarding command of a second language were asked in the 1959 census.

^b Including "Moldavian," if not native language.

- 2

Local Media

In 1971, 192 newspapers and periodicals of all types, with a total per-issue circulation of approximately 3,280,000 copies, were published in the Moldavian SSR.¹ About 45% of these publications were in "Moldavian" and 55% in Russian, although the circulation of the "Moldavian"-language publications was nearly twice as large as that of the Russian-language publications.² The principal newspaper, the official publication of the republic party organization and government, is Sovetskaya Moldaviya, in Russian, of which an identical version in "Moldavian," Moldova Socialista, is printed for the use of the Moldavian inhabitants. Both papers are dailies and are typical of republican newspapers in that they carry relatively little news of strictly republican character. No recent circulation figures are available for these newspapers but it is known that the total circulation of "Moldavian"-language newspapers in 1971 was 1,364,000 as against 651,000 for Russian-language newspapers³ (See Table B.2.). The seven republic-level newspapers included four in "Moldavian," two in Russian, and one with both "Moldavian" and Russian editions. Of the four city newspapers, those of Kishinev and Tiraspol have both "Moldavian" and Russian editions, while those of Bel'tsy and Bendery appear in Russian only.⁴

Of the periodicals the most important is the Party journal Kommunist Moldavii. This is published in Russian, and its theoretical articles show no regional characteristics.

As far as can be ascertained by reading several publications in "Moldavian," the Moldavian press is the Russian press in translation. The "Moldavian" language used in the press is staid and artificial in comparison to that currently used in the Rumanian press, and to a Rumanian reader it would appear to be written

¹ Pechat' 1971:159,189. "Periodicals: includes bulletins, scientific notes, and other serial publications not included in the category zhurnaly (magazines).

² Moldaviya, 1970:236.

³ Hopkins, 1970:198.

⁴ Gazentyi mir, 1971:52053.

⁵ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (February 16), 1967. See also The New York Times (November 6), 1971.

by foreigners. It is unknown whether the Rumanian press is available in the republic but on the basis of statements by Party spokesmen it would appear that Rumanian language newspapers published outside the Moldavian SSR are not circulated in the republic.¹

Available data regarding transmitters, radio sets, and other statistical elements are provided in Table B.3. Little information is available on the listening and viewing habits of the Moldavian population. The official programming, as far as is known, is more regionally oriented in radio than in television transmission. About 12-15 hours a day are devoted to the broadcasting of local materials by local radio stations.² The dissemination of news, foreign and domestic, adheres strictly to the patterns established by Moscow. The extent of the reception of foreign broadcasts is unknown. No information is available with respect to reception or popularity in Moldavia of broadcasts emanating from BBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, or other western stations. It is known, however, that broadcasts and television transmissions originating in Rumania are received and viewed in the Moldavian SSR.³ It is also known that the Party has repeatedly attacked the nature of these transmissions because of their anti-Russian orientation and has warned Moldavians against listening to foreign propaganda.⁴ All this indicates that the massive Soviet efforts at indoctrination and isolation through the vast use of network media originating in the USSR have not been altogether successful.

¹ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (February 16), 1967. See also New York Times (November 6), 1971.

² Hopkins, 1970:259.

³ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (February 16), 1967.

⁴ Ibid.

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Table B.2.
Publications in the Moldavian SSR

Language of Publication	Year	Newspapers ^a			Magazines			Books and Brochures		
		No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No.	Per Issue Circulation (1000)	Copies/100 in Language Group	No. of Titles	Total Volume (1000)	Total Volume /100 in Language Group
Russian	1959	45	231	54.1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	415	3,152	735.5
	1971	62	651	102.2	9	48	7.5	1,192	5,161	810.1
Moldavian	1959	49	384	20.6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	411	3,244	173.6
	1971	49	1,364	60.2	11	492	21.7	613	6,960	307.2
Minority Languages	1959	2 ^b	4	6.7	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	7	37	6.2
	1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	93	14.0
Foreign Language	1959	0	0	0	N.A.	N.A.	-	(14) ^c	(140)	-
	1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	(23) ^c	(232)	-
All Languages	1959	96	619	21.5	10	90	3.1	847 ^c	6,563	227.5
	1971	111	2,015	56.5	20	540	15.0	1,833	12,446	348.7

Moldavia - Total

Sources: Pechat' 1959: 56, 129, 165.
Pechat' 1971: 96, 159, 189.

^a 1971 figures do not include Kolkhoz newspapers.

^b This figure may include publications in non-Soviet languages.

^c Book totals as given in Pechat' sometimes differ from totals in language categories. The indication is that books are published in other languages, but no data is given.

Table B.3.

Electronic Media and Films in the Moldavian SSR

Year	Radio			Television			Movies		
	No. of stations (1000)	No. of Wired Sets (1000)	Sets /100 popula- tion	No. of wireless sets (1000)	Sets /100 popula- tion	No. of stations (1000)	Of which stations originating programming	No. of sets (1000)	Sets /100 popula- tion
1960	N.A.	397 ^a	13.1 ^d	236 ^a	7.8 ^c	N.A.	1 ^e	21 ^a	.7 ^c
1970	N.A.	617 ^a	17.0 ^d	577 ^a	15.9 ^c	N.A.	1 ^e	417 ^a	11.5 ^c
1971	N.A.	649 ^d	17.6 ^d	642 ^d	17.5 ^c	N.A.	1 ^e	465 ^c	12.7 ^c
								123 ^b	4.1 ^d
								315 ^b	8.7 ^d
								N.A.	N.A.

^a Transport i svyaz' SSR, 1972:296-298.

^b Nar. obraz., 1971:325.

^c Nar. khoz. 1972:610, 616.

^d Computed.

^e Televidekiye i radioveshchaniye, 1972:12:13.

III. Educational Institutions

In 1971 Moldavia had 2165 primary and secondary schools with 804,000 students, 45 secondary specialized educational institutions with 52,400 students, and 8 institutions of higher education with 43,800 students, (see Table B.4.). The increase in the number of students at each level since 1961 was impressive since in that year the respective enrollment figures were 545,000, 19,200, and 17,200.¹ Nevertheless, the Moldavian SSR ranks next to last among all the union republics in the percentage of inhabitants who had either attended or completed a course of instruction in a secondary or higher educational institution. In 1970 only 39.7% of the inhabitants of Moldavia had a complete or an incomplete secondary or higher education, and only 50.8% of the employed population of the republic had similar qualifications in contrast to the all-union percentages of 48.3% and 65.3% respectively.²

In the school year 1970-1971, 199,000 of a total of 734,000 students enrolled in primary and secondary schools were attending urban schools.³ The proportion of urban vs. rural school attendance (27.1% vs 72.9%) was somewhat higher than that recorded during the school year 1962-1963 (23.7% vs. 76.3%).⁴ However, the growth did not keep pace with the size of the urban population of the Moldavian SSR (from 22% in 1959 to 32% in 1970), indicating a sustained higher birth rate in the countryside.

A significant decline in instruction in the "Moldavian" language has occurred since the end of World War II. In 1955-1956 27% of the schools, embracing 33% of the student body, used Russian as the medium of instruc-

¹ Moldaviya, 1970:234; Sovetskaya Moldaviya (May 5), 1971.

² Pravda (April 17), 1971.

³ Nar. obraz. 1971:64-65.

⁴ Pennar, 1971:314-315.

tion.¹ This figure exceeded the percentage of Russians living in Moldavia more than threefold.² That trend was accelerated in the 1960s when the doctrine of the supremacy of the Russian language as "the language of the common struggle of the peoples of our country for Communism" was officially advanced in the Moldavian SSR.³

The unfavorable situation of Moldavians in education and with respect to their language is most evident in the area of higher education. As late as the academic year 1966-1967 the percentage of Moldavian students in Soviet institutions of higher education was 0.6% whereas the Moldavian population in the USSR amounted to 1.1% of the total.⁴ Specific data compiled for the academic year 1960-1961 on the basis of students per 10,000 of each ethnic group gives an even better picture of the development of higher education among different national groups living in the republic. There were 51 Moldavian, 70 Ukrainian, 150 Russian, and 129 Jewish students in vuzy [institutions of higher education] per 10,000 of their respective nationalities in the 1960-1961 school year. The USSR average was 111 per 10,000 inhabitants. In 1970-1971 there were 114 Moldavian students per 10,000 of their population, a significant increase but again the lowest ratio of all union-republic nationalities.⁵

Official explanations for the small proportion of Moldavian students in higher education center on the inadequacy of the preparation received by them in rural schools, particularly in the Russian language.⁶ This appears to be accurate but does not take into account the corollary reason: the stringency of the Russian language requirements of the vuzy, given that Russian is not the predominant language of the republic. The small proportion of Moldavians is also related to the Russification of the elemen-

¹ Pennar, 1971:315.

² Ibid.

³ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (December 19), 1965.

⁴ Pennar, 1971:319.

⁵ Ibid. See also Nar. obraz., 1971:196.

⁶ Uchitelskaya gazeta (July 13), 1967.

ary and secondary schools. This is because the majority of the students attending institutions of higher learning, whether Moldavian or of other nationality, specialize in education (68% in 1960-1961, in contrast to 20.6% in agricultural studies, and 9.5% in public health), and must therefore be prepared to teach in Russian.

No breakdown by nationality is given for the instructional staffs of any educational institution in the Moldavian SSR. It is safe to infer that Moldavian teachers are still predominant in the rural school system and that Russian teachers are dominant in the urban and higher education systems.

¹Pennar, 1971:318.

Table B.4.

Selected Data on Education in the Moldavian SSR (1971)

	population: 3,670,000		Per 1000 population
(p. 617) <u>All Schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	2,165	.59
- number of students	-	804,000	219.1
(p. 615) <u>Newly opened elementary, incomplete secondary, and secondary schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	65	
- number of student places	-	37,300	10.2
(p. 617) <u>Secondary special schools</u>			
- number of schools	-	45	
- number of students	-	52,400	14.3
(p. 617) <u>Institutions of higher education</u>			
- number of institutions	-	8	
- number of students	-	43,800	11.9
(p. 438) <u>Universities</u>			
- number of universities	-	1	
- number of students			% of total
Total	-	7,635	
day students	-	4,035	53%
evening students	-	0	
correspondence students	-	3,600	47%
- newly admitted			
Total	-	1,346	
day students	-	940	70%
evening students	-	0	
correspondence students	-	406	30%

Selected Data on Education in the Moldavian SSR (1971) (continued)

Universities (continued)

		<u>Per 1000 population</u>	<u>% of total</u>
- graduated			
Total	- 1,412		
day students	- 855		61%
evening students	- 0		
correspondence students	- 557		39%

(p. 108) Graduate students

- total number of	- 756	.21	
- in scientific research institutions	- 460		
- in universities	- 296		

(p. 607) Number of persons with (in 1970)
higher or secondary (complete and
incomplete) education

- per 1000 individuals, 10 years and older	- 397		
- per 1000 individuals employed in national economy	- 508		

(p. 614) Number of workers graduated from
professional-technical schools

- 21,300	5.8		
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% of
total

53%

47%

70%

30%

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972. (Page references given above.)

IV. Cultural and Scientific Institutions

The Moldavian SSR has standard Soviet cultural institutions including, at the beginning of 1971, eight theaters, 1925 choruses, 420 orchestras, 247 orchestras of Moldavian folk music, 1775 houses of culture, 22 museums, and 1897 public libraries.¹ The data provide no specific information as to urban-rural distribution of national representation or composition.

Only rudimentary information is available from Soviet and Moldavian sources with respect to scientific institutions, except for the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, established in 1961.² In 1970 the Academy had 17 academicians and 20 corresponding members. From fragmentary data it would appear that the majority of the academicians and section heads are Russian and that the principal spheres of scientific investigation are mathematics, geology, and history.³ The scientific contributions of the Academy appear to be generally undistinguished (for additional data, see Table B.5.). Among its works are monographs on the Moldavian working class in 1940-1965 and the history of the Moldavian intelligentsia, and collections of research papers in philosophy and sociology.⁴

¹BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971:154-155. Later 1971 figures: libraries down to 1865; museums to 21. Nar. khoz. 1972:106,451.

²BSE Yezhegodnik, 1971:153-154.

³Ibid.

⁴V. K. Vizer, et al. Razvitiye rabocheho klassa Moldavskoi SSP (1940-1965) (Kishinev: Moldavian Academy of Sciences, 1970); A. I. Babii, Formirovaniye Moldavskoi intelligentsii (Kishinev: Shtinitsa, 1971), V. N. Yermuratsky, et al., Filosofskiye i sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya v Moldavii (Kishinev: Moldavian Academy of Sciences, 1970).

Table B.5.

Selected Data on Scientific and Cultural Facilities and Personnel in the
Moldavian SSR (1971)

Population: 3,670,000

Academy of Science

- number of members	36
- number of scientific institutions affiliated with the Academy	20
- total number of scientific workers in these	721

Museums

- number of museums	21
- attendance	1,956,000
- attendance per 1000 population	532

Theaters

- number of theaters	8
- attendance	1,197,000
- attendance per 1000 population	326

Number of persons working in education and culture

- total	120,000
- no. per 1000 population	32.7

Number of persons working in science and scientific services

- total	23,000
- number per 1000 population	6.3

Number of public libraries

	1,865
- number of books and magazines in public libraries	17,926,000

Number of clubs

1,787

MOLDAVIA AND THE MOLDAVIANS

PART C

National Attitudes

I. Review of Factors Forming National Attitudes

The nationalism of the Moldavians, according to Party critics, is rooted in continuing adherence to pre-World War II traditions both social and national.¹ This criticism implies non-reconciliation, if not actual opposition, to the social and cultural changes and the de-Rumanization to which the Moldavians have been subjected under Soviet rule.

Historically, the nationalism of the Rumanian population of Bessarabia was characterized by anti-Russianism and anti-Semitism.² The opposition to Russia, based primarily on the tsarist Russification of Bessarabia, was if anything exacerbated by the Bolshevik Revolution and by communist activities in Bessarabia in the interwar years. As beneficiaries of drastic land reforms prior to union with Rumania in 1918, the Rumanian peasants of Bessarabia were at all times fearful of the agrarian policies of the Bolsheviks. The Rumanian intellectuals always regarded the Russians as foreign oppressors.³ A corollary factor influencing the anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik sentiments of the Rumanians was anti-Semitism. The urban centers of Bessarabia, particularly Kishinev, were essentially Jewish towns and the Russians were held responsible for planting the normally non-Rumanian-speaking Jews in the cities as well as in certain rural areas of Bessarabia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The anti-Semitism of the Moldavians was exacerbated by the policies of the Bolsheviks, which not only temporarily emancipated the Jews but sought to rely on parts of the Jewish population of Bessarabia for the execution of their plans and programs, both before and after the incorporation of Bessarabia into Rumania and again after the reincorporation of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union during World War II. It is noteworthy that the Rumanians from Bessarabia were among the most virulent exponents of the anti-Russian and anti-Semitic programs of such extremist right-wing Rumanian organizations as the Iron Guard

¹ Pravda, 4 April 1971: 2-3.

² Mischer-Galati, 1969: 373-395; 1971: 112-121; Weber, 1966: 500-573.

³ Boldur, 1943: 1ff.

and the League of National Christian Defense during the interwar years and that the only pogroms by Rumanians recorded in World War II occurred in Bessarabia following reoccupation of that province by the Rumanian armies during World War II.¹

This right-wing Rumanian nationalism, so prevalent among the young, the intellectuals, and even the peasant masses, at least until the definitive return of Bessarabia to the USSR in 1944, has evidently not been eradicated. Rather, it has been converted into a more explicitly Moldavian nationalism. The collectivization of agriculture did not lessen the anti-Russianism of the Moldavians. The restrictions imposed upon the Moldavian youth with respect to higher educational and professional opportunities appear to be contributing factors to the maintenance of anti-Soviet attitudes. The imposition of Soviet cultural policies, offensive to the deeply religious orientation and prejudices of the Moldavian masses, appear also to increase Moldavian nationalism.²

Moldavian nationalism has also flourished in recent years because of the revival of historic nationalism in Rumania proper and of the negative reaction of the Soviet Union to that Rumanian phenomenon.³ The appeals emanating from Rumania for the reunification through Rumanianism of all natives of Rumania throughout the world has apparently affected most directly the Rumanians most proximate to Rumania itself.⁴ The Moldavians' response to the neo-nationalism of communist Rumania appears to be limited to identification with a Rumanian historical rather than a Rumanian communist tradition. The rulers of the Soviet Union, however, have cut off contacts between Moldavians and Rumanians while attempting to perfect and legitimize

¹ Cioranescu, 1967: 165ff.; Weber, 1966: 517ff.

² Fischer-Galati, 1970: 15-37; Scinteia (May 7), 1966; Sovetskaya Moldaviya (March 2), 1966.

³ Swearingen, 1971: 355-364; Pravda (April 4), 1971: 1-3.

⁴ Tribuna Romaniei, 1972: 1-3; 1973: 4-6.

a "Moldavian" historic tradition and nationality separate from the Rumanian. At the same time, this process does not entail abandonment of discriminatory socio-economic and cultural policies toward the Moldavian inhabitants of the republic. For all these reasons Moldavian nationalism has continued to manifest itself.¹ The "Moldavianization" of Rumanian "bourgeois," Christian, anti-Russian, anti-communist, and anti-Semitic nationalism may have changed, albeit superficially, the historic character of the nationalism of the Bessarabians, but it would seem only to have transplanted it, not to have rooted it out.

¹Pravda (April 4), 1971: 2-3; Sovetskaya Moldaviya (August 3), 1971.

Basic Views of Scholars on National Attitudes

There are no studies by leading Western scholars on attitudinal factors affecting the Moldavians or, for that matter, even the Rumanian inhabitants of historic Bessarabia. Several Western scholars such as Henry L. Roberts,¹ Eugen Weber,² and Stephen Fischer-Galati,³ who have been concerned with Rumanian national attitudes in historic Moldavia, are in agreement on the essentially anti-Russian and anti-Semitic character of Moldavian nationalism. The anti-Russian and particularly the anti-communist bases of Moldavian nationalism are stressed by G. Cioranescu in a recent study on Russo-Rumanian relations.⁴ Contemporary Rumanian scholars, for obvious political reasons, have failed to mention Bessarabia by name during the past three decades and have paid no attention to the problems of the Rumanian inhabitants of the Moldavian SSR.

Soviet scholars have also shied away from the study of attitudinal factors affecting the Moldavians. The few who have ventured into this field have stressed, routinely and dogmatically, the historically pro-Russian and more recently pro-communist sentiments of the Moldavians. Among the more conspicuous exponents of the view that the Moldavians are Russophiles by tradition and communists by conviction are S. Afteniuk⁵ and V. A. Surilov.⁶ Their contentions on the eternal brotherhood of Moldavians and Russians and on the wandering propaganda emanating from falsifiers of history with respect to alleged anti-communist and anti-Russian sentiments on the part of Moldavians cannot be taken seriously. Similar theses, in a strictly historical context, have been propounded in the collection Istoriya Moldavii, edited by A. D. Udal'tsov and L. V. Cherepnin,⁷ and in Istoriya Moldavskoi SSR, edited by

¹Roberts, 1951:1ff.

²Weber, 1966:501-574.

³Fischer-Galati, 1969:373-395; Fischer-Galati, 1971:112-121.

⁴Cioranescu, 1967:1ff.

⁵Afteniuk, 1957:1ff.

⁶Surilov, 1967:1ff.

⁷Udal'tsov and Cherepnin, 1951: Volume I.

L. V. Cherepnin and other Moldavian scholars.¹ Even more distorted theses, stressing the "eternal friendship" among Moldavians, Russians, and Ukrainians, were presented at several Moldavian-Ukrainian-Russian "friendship conferences." The "scholarly findings" of the most notorious of these, held in Kishinev in November 1958, were published by the Moldavian Academy in 1961.² Their contentions cannot be considered to be scholarly contributions. In fact, the politically delicate problems connected with the Moldavians and their attitudes account either for the absence or for the falsification of data related to attitudinal factors affecting the Moldavians. Essentially, Soviet sources argue that "the Moldavian language, much like the Rumanian, belongs to the East-Roman group of languages," and that the Moldavians are a separate nationality, quite apart from the Rumanians.³ Western views of Moldavia, including those of this writer, can be summarized as follows.

The Moldavian SSR is among the most artificial of the union republics, in that its very name and national composition are based on the obfuscation of historical reality. The majority of the republic's inhabitants are in fact Rumanians separated from the Rumanian inhabitants of historic Moldavia by artificial means. The historic arguments provided by Soviet historians, politicians, and propagandists with respect to Moldavian national characteristics, language, and historic evolution and aspirations are baseless. They serve only as a screen for obscuring historic reality. The leaders of the USSR and of the Moldavian SSR, aware as they are of the true history of the republic, of the reasons for its formation, and of the dangers of the proximity of Soviet Moldavia to Rumanian Moldavia, are pursuing a conscious and deliberate policy of isolating the predominantly rural Moldavian population of the republic from the political and urban-technological order of the Moldavian SSR, an order dominated by Russians and to a lesser extent by Ukrainians. The Soviet regime has encouraged the development of the traditional agricultural pursuits of the Moldavians with resultant economic prosperity for the Moldavian

¹ Cherepnin, 1968: Volumes I and II.

² Vekovaya Druzhiba, 1961:1ff.

³ See e.g., BSL, 1954:28:105. Moldavia has been selected by Soviet ethnographers as the first union republic to be studied in connection with a survey of national attitudes based on a pilot study conducted in the Tatar ASSR. The extent to which the results of this study are published will be interesting to observe. See Sovetskaya Etnografiya, 1972: 3:3-20.

peasantry. It has also encouraged the maintenance of the traditional folk culture of the Moldavians. However, in both the Sovietization of traditional forms of rural life through collectivization of agriculture and de-Rumanization of the essence of Moldavian folklore and way of life, the securing of the allegiance of the Moldavian population to the Soviet order and to the aims of the leaders of the Kremlin and of the Moldavian SSR has been at best tenuous.

The historic and national ties linking the Moldavians of the republic with the Rumanian inhabitants of the Moldavia "across the river" have apparently not been severed by the Soviet regime despite the "iron curtain" erected on the eastern bank of the Prut. Yet the virtual isolation of the Soviet Moldavians from the Rumanian Moldavians is indicative of the delicacy of the Moldavian question in the USSR. Alone of all union republics, the Moldavian SSR has an equivalent in the greater Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, in adjoining Socialist Rumania. The leaders of the Socialist Republic of Rumania have legally relinquished all rights to the reincorporation into Rumania of most of the territory now comprising the Moldavian SSR. However, they are constantly trying to remind the Moldavian inhabitants of the republic of their Rumanianism and of their national ties with their brethren in Rumanian Moldavia.

III. Recent Manifestations of Nationalism

According to the First Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, I. I. Bodyul, "harmful phenomena" - a euphemism for bourgeois-nationalist manifestations - occurred in Moldavia as late as the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU in April 1971. Illustrations and details were not provided by Bodyul, for that matter, by any critic of Moldavian nationalism in recent years, but identification of the phenomena does provide a clue as to the nature of the nationalist manifestations:

We still encounter instances of the penetration into literature and the arts of works that represent a distorted view of socialist reality.... We cannot regard as normal the obsession of certain creative workers with the archaic past and the glorification and poeticization in their works of long-outworn customs and traditions and their contraposition to our own times.... Playing upon the people's respectful attitude toward the past, upon feelings of national distinctiveness, the authors of such works essentially preach the idea of the classless, uncritical acceptance of the past, and therefore create conditions for the activation of harmful survivals, especially among young people, and prepare the soil for the penetration of alien views and sentiments into the people's minds.¹

Attacks of this kind, together with countermeasures designed to invalidate the "unhealthy" nationalist attitudes of Moldavians, have been frequent since the publication in Rumania, in December 1964 within the context of rising Soviet-Rumanian tension, of the book Notes on the Rumanians.² That volume, consisting of notes written by Marx himself on the "rape of Bessarabia" by tsarist Russia in 1812, was not circulated in the Moldavian SSR but its contents became known there. The first major public denunciation of the volume, of the implicit Rumanian claims to Bessarabia, and of the acceptance of the validity of this propaganda emanating from "certain bourgeois quill drivers" by Moldavians, was by Bodyul himself on the occasion of the Twelfth Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party in March 1966.

¹ Pravda (April 4), 1971: 3.

² Marx, 1964:1ff.

At that time, while reiterating the validity of the historic Russian claims to Bessarabia, he even went so far as to declare that the Moldavian people had enthusiastically welcomed the incorporation of Bessarabia into the "Motherland" in 1940 and that those Moldavians who questioned that view should be set straight by Party activists.¹

Despite these admonitions, nationalist manifestations and sentiments apparently survived long enough to evoke even more extreme official statements. In February 1967 the same Bodyul followed the customary castigation of nationalism with the statement that "Our children and future generations must know that their fathers did not conceive of a life for themselves outside of Russia" and with the demand that a concerted campaign for the "elucidation in depth of the real history of the Moldavian people" be initiated at once.²

Repetition of such statements and admonitions - combined with continuing efforts to inculcate official Soviet theories regarding the Moldavians' past and present aspirations into believers and skeptics alike - may be partly preventive in character. It may also represent a case of overreaction by the rulers of the USSR and of the Moldavian republic. Nevertheless, the constant repetition of this Party line by historians, by the press, and by other media of communication is indicative of the survival of nationalism and provides substantiating evidence for the validity of Bodyul's criticisms of 1971.³

¹ Sovetskaya Moldaviya (March 2), 1966.

² Sovetskaya Moldaviya (February 16), 1967.

³ Moldaviya, 1970: 63-100.

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Project: Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities

COMPARATIVE TABLES
FOR THE MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES

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June 1973

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Introduction

In the tables which follow, the first 23 rank the major Soviet nationalities in terms of specific demographic, political, economic, educational, and cultural characteristics. The remaining tables attempt to arrive at more complex indicators of national development and vitality. Wherever possible, rankings include all 17 nationalities covered in this series -- the union-republic nationalities, the Tatars, and the Jews. Where data are not available or not applicable, only the union-republic nationalities are included. Tables dealing specifically with republic populations omit the Jews, since only a small fraction of Jews in the USSR live in the Birobidzhan "Jewish Autonomous Oblast," and very few regard it as "the Jewish national area."

The rankings in Tables 24-29 were obtained by combining ranking numbers from earlier tables, as follows:

Table 24 presents a ranking for national political vitality, arrived at by combining the rankings for population growth (Table 2), titular nationality as a percent of its republic population (Table 6), concentration of the nationality in its republic population (Table 7), percentage for whom the national language is native (Table 8), and weight of nationality in the CPSU (Table 11).

In Table 25, a ranking for economic development was developed by combining the rankings for produced income per capita (Table 15), savings per capita (Table 16), and trade turnover per capita (Table 17).

Table 26 gives a ranking for socio-cultural development, reached by combining the rankings for urbanization (Table 9), educational standards (Table 18), students in higher education (Table 19), scientists (Table 20), doctors (Table 21), and books (Table 23) per population.

In Table 27, a combined ranking for socio-cultural and economic development is given by combining the indicators in Tables 25 and 26.

Table 28 presents a ranking for overall national development, reached by combining the indicators in Tables 24 and 27.

In Table 29, nationalities are grouped into broad ethnic-geographic categories and a ranking developed for overall development by ethnic-geographic category, using the indicators from Tables 24, 25, and 26.

The above approach -- obtaining cumulative rankings by adding individual rankings -- has the virtue of simplicity. However, the results cannot be taken as definitive statements of the relative political vitality and economic and socio-cultural development of Soviet nationalities. The use of different criteria or more refined and complex calculations for Tables 24-29 would probably have produced somewhat different conclusions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the differences would be extreme -- that is, that a nationality's rank in any of the tables would switch from high to low or vice versa if a different approach were used.

Some of the rankings would also change if all data used in Tables 1-29 were uniformly available by nationality. In some instances, data on a particular indicator were not available for a particular nationality, and data on that indicator for the national republic were used instead. The validity of the rankings thus obtained depends on the weight of the nationality in its republic. The most important instance of error introduced by this approach is the relative ranking of Kazakhs and Uzbeks in Tables 24-28. Most evidence suggests that the Uzbeks are generally more developed than the Kazakhs; the Kazakhs rank higher in the tables because most of the Kazakh data available were for the Kazakh SSR, in which the more highly developed Slavs are a majority of the population.

Thus, the assessments in Tables 24-29 are very rough and subject to correction and refinement. Still, they are useful in providing an overall picture whose outlines would be difficult to discern directly from the mass of separate data on which they are based.

Table 1
BASIC DATA ON NATIONAL REPUBLICS

	<u>Area</u> (sq. mi)	<u>Population</u> (1970 census)	<u>Development Rank of Titular Nationality^a</u>
RSFSR	6,592,818	241,720,000	1
Ukrainian SSR	233,089	47,126,000	8
Belorussian SSR	80,134	9,002,000	11
Estonian SSR	17,413	1,356,000	3
Latvian SSR	24,595	2,364,000	4,5,6
Lithuanian SSR	25,173	3,128,000	4,5,6
Armenian SSR	11,175	2,492,000	4,5,6
Georgian SSR	26,757	4,686,000	2
Azerbaidzhan SSR	33,425	5,117,000	7
Kazakh SSR	1,048,305	12,849,000	10
Kirgiz SSR	76,100	2,933,000	12
Turkmen SSR	187,200	2,159,000	9
Uzbek SSR	172,741	11,960,000	13
Tadzhik SSR	54,900	2,900,000	15
Moldavian SSR	13,012	3,569,000	14
Tatar ASSR	26,250	2,850,000	N.A.
Jews ^b	(Birobidzhan 13,900)	(total population of nationality in USSR 2,151,000)	N.A.

^aSee Table 28.

^bNot a national republic; only a small minority live in the "Jewish Autonomous Oblast" of Birobidzhan. Data are given for Jewish nationality where applicable.

Table 1 (Continued)

	<u>Language Group</u>	<u>Alphabet</u>	<u>Religion</u>
RSFSR	Slavic	Cyrillic	Christian/predominantly Russian-Orthodox also other Christian sects, Islamic, and Buddhist
Ukrainian SSR	Slavic	Cyrillic	Christian/Russian Orthodox and Uniate
Belorussian SSR	Slavic	Cyrillic	Christian/Russian Orthodox and Catholic
Estonian SSR	Finno-Ugric	Latin	Christian/predominantly Lutheran
Latvian SSR	Indo-European/ Baltic	Latin	Christian/Lutheran and Catholic
Lithuanian SSR	Indo-European/ Baltic	Latin	Christian/predominantly Catholic
Armenian SSR	Indo-European/ Caucasian	Armenian	Christian/Armenian (Gregorian) Church
Georgian SSR	Ibero-Caucasian	Georgian	Christian/Georgian Orthodox Church
Azerbaidzhan SSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic/Shia
Kazakh SSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic and Christian
Kirgiz SSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic
Turkmen SSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic
Uzbek SSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic
Tadzhik SSR	Iranian	Cyrillic	Islamic
Moldavian SSR	Romanian	Cyrillic	Christian/East Orthodox
Tatar ASSR	Turkic	Cyrillic	Islamic and Christian
Jews	Yiddish	Hebrew	Judaism

Table 1 (Continued)
Mode of Accession to the USSR

RSFSR	Proclaimed November 7, 1917, as Federative Soviet Socialist Republic; became a union republic with the establishment of the USSR in December 1922; presently includes 12 autonomous national republics, 5 autonomous provinces.
Ukrainian SSR	After a brief period of independence (1918-1919), constituted as a Soviet Republic allied with RSFSR; since December 1922 a union republic within the USSR.
Belorussian SSR	Established as Belorussian Soviet Republic, allied with the RSFSR, after a brief period of struggle between a national movement for independence and the pro-Bolshevik forces; in December 1922, became a union republic within the USSR.
The Baltic Region	
Estonian SSR	Independent republics, 1918-1940; taken over by Soviet forces in 1940 and incorporated as union republics in the USSR.
Latvian SSR	
Lithuanian SSR	
The Transcaucasus	
Armenian SSR	A brief period of independence of the three republics (1918-1920) was terminated with the victory of the Red Army. A Transcaucasian Soviet Federation of Socialist republics was created in 1921 and became a union republic with the creation of the USSR in December 1922. The separate national units were autonomous republics until December 1936 when the Transcaucasian Federation was abolished and the units became full union republics of the USSR.
Georgian SSR	
Azerbaijan SSR	
Central Asia	
Kazakh SSR	A Turkestan Soviet Republic within the RSFSR was proclaimed in the spring of 1918. After a period of civil war between local movements for independence and pro-Soviet forces (1918-1920), the Red Army established effective rule. A Kazakh (called at first Kirgiz) Autonomous SSR within the RSFSR was established in August 1920. Soviet authorities also recognized the autonomy of the People's Republics of Khiva (Khorezm) and Bukhara. In 1924-1925 these autonomous units and the Turkestan Republic were abolished and the Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kirgiz SSR's were created. The Tadzhiks had at first an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR (1924). In 1929 it was transformed into a union republic. The Kazakh ASSR was created as a union republic in December 1936.
Kirgiz SSR	
Turkmen SSR	
Uzbek SSR	
Tadzhik SSR	

Table 1 (Continued)

Moldavian SSR	An Autonomous Moldavian Republic within the Ukrainian SSR was created in the left-bank areas in October 1924. In June 1940, the Soviet forces entered Bessarabia (the right bank previously under the rule of Rumania) and in August 1940 a union republic of Moldavia comprising both territories was proclaimed.
Tatar ASSR	Established in May 1920 as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR.
Jewish Autonomous Province (Birobidzhan)	Jewish Autonomous Province within the RSFSR - first decreed in March 1928.

Table 2
 MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES: SIZE, GROWTH, AND WEIGHT
 Ranked by Weight in Total USSR Population, 1970

Rank	Nationality	Population in Thousands			Growth (%)		Rank by 1959- 1970 Growth	% of Total USSR Population	
		1926	1959	1970	1926- 1970	1959- 1970		1959	1970
	USSR Total	147,082	208,827	241,720	64.3%	15.8%	d.n.a.	100.0	100.0
1	Russians	77,791	114,114	129,015	65.8	13.1	13	54.65	53.37
2	Ukrainians	31,195 ^a	37,253	40,753	b	9.4	14	17.84	16.86
3	Uzbeks	3,989	6,015	9,195	130.1	52.9	2	2.88	3.80
4	Belorussians	4,739 ^a	7,913	9,052	b	14.4	12	3.79	3.74
5	Tatars	3,311	4,968	5,931	80.0	19.4	10	2.38	2.45
6	Kazakhs	3,968	3,622	5,299	33.5	46.3	6	1.73	2.19
7	Azerbaidzhani	1,713	2,940	4,380	155.7	49.0	5	1.41	1.81
8	Armenians	1,568	2,787	3,559	127.0	27.7	7	1.33	1.47
9	Georgians	1,821	2,692	3,245	78.2	20.5	9	1.29	1.34
10	Moldavians	279 ^a	2,214	2,698	b	21.9	8	1.06	1.12
11	Lithuanians	41 ^a	2,326	2,665	b	14.6	11	1.11	1.10
12	Jews	2,672	2,268	2,151	-19.5	-05.2	17	1.09	0.89
13	Tadzhiks	981	1,397	2,136	117.7	52.9	1	0.67	0.88
14	Turkmen	764	1,002	1,525	99.6	52.2	3	0.48	0.63
15	Kirgiz	763	969	1,452	90.3	49.8	4	0.46	0.60
16	Latvians	151 ^a	1,400	1,430	b	2.1	15	0.67	0.59
17	Estonians	155 ^a	989	1,007	b	1.8	16	0.47	0.42
	All Other	11,181	13,958	16,227	45.1	16.3	d.n.a.	6.68	6.71

Notes: ^a Does not include population in territories subsequently incorporated into USSR. 1926-1970 Growth Rates not computed for these nationalities.

^b See a above.

Sources: Nar. khoz. 1972: 31; Itogi 1959: 84.

d.n.a. = does not apply.

Table 3

SIZE, GROWTH, AND WEIGHT OF MAJOR NATIONALITIES BY
GEOGRAPHIC-ETHNIC CATEGORY

Nationality Group	Population in Thousands			Growth (%)		Weight in Total USSR Population (%)	
	1926	1959	1970	1926-1970	1959-1970	1959	1970
Slavs ^a	113,725	159,280	178,820	57.2	12.3	76.3	74.0
Other Europeans ^b	3,298	9,197	9,951	201.7	8.2	4.4	4.1
Islamic ^c	15,480	20,913	29,918	93.2	43.1	10.0	12.4
Armenian-Georgian	3,389	5,479	6,804	100.8	24.2	2.6	2.8

Source: Calculated from data in Table 2.

^aRussians, Ukrainians, Belorussians.

^bEstonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Jews. 1926-1970 growth reflects incorporation of territories inhabited by these peoples in 1939-1945.

^cUzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Azerbaidzhani, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, and Kirgiz.

Note: The Islamic group has the highest rate of growth and the "other Europeans" the lowest (ratio 5.25:1). The Slav ratio is second lowest (ratio 3.5:1). Since the Slavs together amount to about three-quarters of the population, they will remain the predominant group for a long time even if they continue losing in relative weight to the Islamic group.

Table 4
 REPUBLIC POPULATIONS, 1959-1970
 Ranked by Growth Rate

Rank	Republics	Population in 1000s		Percent Growth 1959-1970	Percent of USSR Population	
		1959	1970		1959	1970
	USSR TOTAL	208,827	241,720	16%	100.0	100.0
1	Tadzhik SSR	1,981	2,900	46	0.95	1.20
2	Uzbek SSR	8,261	11,960	45	3.96	4.95
3	Turkmen SSR	1,516	2,159	42	0.73	0.89
4	Kirgiz SSR	2,066	2,933	42	0.99	1.21
5	Armenian SSR	1,763	2,492	41	0.84	1.03
6	Kazakh SSR	9,153	12,849	40	4.38	5.32
7	Azerbaidzhan SSR	3,698	5,117	38	1.77	2.12
8	Moldavian SSR	2,885	3,569	24	1.38	1.48
9	Georgian SSR	4,044	4,686	16	1.94	1.94
10	Lithuanian SSR	2,711	3,128	15	1.30	1.29
11	Estonian SSR	1,197	1,356	13	0.57	0.56
12	Latvian SSR	2,093	2,364	13	1.00	0.98
13	Ukraine SSR	41,869	47,126	13	20.05	19.50
14	Belorussian SSR	8,056	9,002	12	3.86	3.72
15	RSFSR	117,534	130,079	11	56.28	53.81
16	Tatar ASSR	2,850	3,131	10	1.36	1.29

Sources: Izvestia (April 17), 1971; CDSP, 1971: XXIII: 16: 16-18;
Itogi 1970: I: 12.

Table 5

ADULT POPULATION (20+) OF REPUBLICS, 1959-1970
 Ranked by Growth Rate of Total Population, as in Table 4

Rank	Adult Population in 1000s		% of Total Population of Republic		% of USSR Adult Population		
	Republics	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
	USSR Total	130,656	149,747	62.57	61.95	100.0	100.0
1	Tadzhik SSR	1,057	1,287	53.36	44.38	0.8	1.0
2	Uzbek SSR	4,405	5,401	53.32	45.16	3.4	3.8
3	Turkmen SSR	819	987	54.02	45.72	0.6	1.0
4	Kirgiz SSR	1,144	1,433	55.37	48.86	0.9	1.0
5	Armenian SSR	976	1,266	55.36	50.80	0.7	1.0
6	Kazakh SSR	5,217	6,870	57.00	53.47	4.0	7.0
7	Azerbaidzhan SSP	2,032	2,397	54.95	46.84	1.6	1.0
8	Moldavian SSR	1,677	2,079	58.13	58.25	1.3	1.0
9	Georgian SSR	2,524	2,855	62.41	60.93	1.9	1.0
10	Lithuanian SSR	1,746	2,048	64.40	65.47	1.3	1.0
11	Estonian SSR	839	957	70.09	70.58	0.6	0.6
12	Latvian SSR	1,466	1,687	70.04	71.36	1.1	1.0
13	Ukraine SSR	27,489	31,538	65.65	66.92	21.0	21.0
14	Belorussian SSR	4,976	5,624	61.77	62.48	3.8	3.0
15	RSFSR	74,290	83,316	63.21	63.87	56.9	55.0
16	Tatar ASSR	1,707	1,853	59.89	59.18	1.3	1.0

Source: Itogi 1970: II: 12-75, 157.

Note: Moslem republics have most youthful populations; Estonia and Latvia, the oldest

Source: Itogi 1970

Note: Itogi 1970

Table 6

TITULAR NATIONALITY AS PERCENT OF REPUBLIC POPULATION, 1959-1970

Ranked by % of Population, 1970

1970	Republic	Members of Titular Nationality Residing in Republic (1000)		Titular Nationality as % of total Republic Population		Percentage Point Change	
		1959	1970	1959	1970	1959-1970	
		0.9	1	Armenian SSR	1,552	2,208	88.0
3.6	2	RSFSR	97,864	107,748	83.3	82.8	-0.5
0.7	3	Belorussian SSR	6,532	7,290	81.1	81.0	-0.1
1.0	4	Lithuanian SSR	2,151	2,507	79.3	80.1	+0.8
0.8	5	Ukraine SSR	32,158	35,284	76.8	74.9	-1.9
4.6	6	Azerbaidzhan SSR	2,494	3,777	67.5	73.8	+6.3
1.6	7	Estonian SSR	893	925	74.6	68.2	-6.4
1.4	8	Georgian SSR	2,601	3,131	64.3	66.8	+2.5
1.9	9	Turkmen SSR	924	1,417	60.9	65.6	+4.7
1.4	10	Uzbek SSR	5,044	7,734	61.1	64.7	+3.6
0.6	11	Moldavian SSR	1,887	2,304	65.4	64.6	-0.8
1.1	12	Latvian SSR	1,298	1,342	62.0	56.8	-5.2
21.1	13	Tadzhik SSR	1,051	1,630	53.1	56.2	+3.1
3.8	14	Tatar ASSR	837	1,285	40.5	43.8	+3.3
55.6	15	Kirgiz SSR	2,723	4,161	29.8	32.4	+2.6
1.2	16	Kazakh SSR	1,345	1,536	47.2	49.1	+1.9

Sources: Izvestia (April 17) 1971; CDSP, 1971: XXIII: 16: 16-18; Itogi 1979: 203; Itogi 1970: IV: 144.

Note: Nations increasing as a percentage of their republic's population, 1959-1970: all non-Europeans plus the Lithuanians.

Nations decreasing as a percentage of their republic's population, 1959-1970: all Europeans except for the Lithuanians.

Table 7
 CONCENTRATION OF TITULAR NATIONALITY IN REPUBLIC 1959-1970
 Ranked by
 % of Total Population of Nationality in USSR
 Who Live in their Own Republic

Rank	1959		Rank	1970		Net Change in Percentage Points 1959-1970 ^a	
	Nationality	% Living in Respective Republic		Nationality	% Living in Respective Republic		
1	Georgians	96.6	1	Georgians	96.6	-0.1	
2	Latvians	92.7	2	Lithuanians	94.1	+1.8	
3	Lithuanians	92.3	3	Latvians	93.8	+1.1	
4	Turkmen	92.2	4	Turkmen	92.9	+0.7	
5	Estonians	90.3	5	Estonians	91.9	+1.6	
6	Kirgiz	86.4	6	Kirgiz	88.5	+2.1	
7	Ukrainians	86.3	7	Ukrainians	86.6	+0.3	
8	Russians	85.8	8	Azerbaidzhani	86.2	+1.4	
9	Moldavians	85.2	9	Moldavians	85.4	+0.2	
10	Azerbaidzhani	84.8	10	Uzbeks	84.1	+0.3	
11	Uzbeks	83.8	11	Russians	83.5	-2.3	
12	Belorussians	82.5	12	Belorussians	80.5	-2.0	
13	Tadzhiks	75.2	13	Kazakhs	78.5	+3.3	
14	Kazakhs	75.2	14	Tadzhiks	76.3	+1.1	
15	Armenians	55.0	15	Armenians	62.0	+6.3	
16	Tatars	30.7	16	Tatars	25.9	-4.8	
MEAN CONCENTRATION:					84.33	85.39	+1.06

^aSequence of nationalities as in 1970 column.

Sources: computed from census returns cited in Tables 4 and 6.

Note: Except for marginal decrease in percent of Georgians in Georgia, Russians, Belorussians and Tatars were the only nationalities to become less concentrated in their own republics. The highest gains in concentration are among the Armenians, Kazakhs and Lithuanians.

Table 8

SPEAKERS OF LANGUAGES
OF MAJOR NATIONALITIES OF USSR, 1970

Ranked by Total Speakers

Rank	Language	Native Speakers	Fluent as Second Lang.	Total Speakers
1	Russian	141,830,564	41,937,995	183,798,559
2	Ukrainian	35,400,944	5,618,837	41,019,781
3	Uzbek	9,154,904	543,023	9,697,727
4	Belorussian	7,630,007	903,024	8,533,031
5	Tatar ^a	5,493,316	344,414	5,837,730
6	Kazakh	5,213,694	146,057	5,359,751
7	Azerbaidzhani	4,347,089	263,160	4,610,249
8	Georgian	3,310,917	190,115	3,501,032
9	Armenian	3,261,053	147,727	3,408,780
10	Moldavian	2,607,367	283,426	2,890,793
11	Lithuanian	2,625,608	152,523	2,778,131
12	Tadzhik	2,202,671	261,248	2,463,919
13	Latvian	1,390,162	215,376	1,605,538
14	Turkmen	1,514,980	50,996	1,565,976
15	Kirgiz	1,445,213	41,493	1,486,706
16	Estonian	974,649	69,520	1,044,169
17	Jewish ^b	381,571	166,571	547,649

Source: Itogi 1970: IV: 20,76,331-332,333-359..

^a Complete data available only for RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Central Asia.

^b Includes Yiddish and other languages of Jews in the USSR. Data not available on non-Jewish speakers of the language except in Jewish National Region (Birobidzhan). However, the number of such speakers is estimated to be negligible.

Table 9
 URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION, 1959-1970
 BY NATIONALITY
 Ranked by Urban Percentage

1959				1970			
Rank	Nationality	% Urban	% Rural	Rank	Nationality	% Urban	% Rural
1	Jews	95.3	4.7	1	Jews	97.9	2.1
2	Russians	57.7	42.3	2	Russians	68.0	32.0
3	Armenians	56.5	43.5	3	Armenians	64.8	35.2
4	Latvians	47.5	52.5	4	Estonians	55.1	44.9
5	Tatars	47.2	52.8	5	Tatars	55.0	45.0
6	Estonians	47.0	53.0	6	Latvians	52.7	47.3
7	Ukrainians	39.2	60.8	7	Ukrainians	48.5	51.5
8	Georgians	36.1	63.9	8	Lithuanians	46.7	53.3
9	Lithuanians	35.1	64.9	9	Georgians	44.0	56.0
10	Azerbaidzhani	34.8	65.2	10	Belorussians	43.7	56.3
11	Belorussians	32.4	67.6	11	Azerbaidzhani	39.7	60.3
12	Turkmen	25.4	74.6	12	Turkmen	31.0	69.0
13	Kazakhs	24.1	75.9	13	Kazakhs	26.7	73.3
14	Uzbeks	21.8	78.2	14	Tadzhiks	26.0	74.0
15	Tadzhiks	20.6	79.4	15	Uzbeks	24.9	75.1
16	Moldavians	12.9	87.1	16	Moldavians	20.4	79.6
17	Kirgiz	10.8	89.2	17	Kirgiz	14.6	85.4
	USSR average	47.9	52.1		USSR average	56.0	44.0

Sources: Itogi 1959: 190-196; Itogi 1970: IV: 20,27,28.

Highest urbanization: Jews, Russians, Armenians, Latvians, Tatars (highest Islamic group), Estonians.

Lowest urbanization: Central Asians plus Moldavians.

Note: Only three nationalities--Jews, Russians, and Armenians--are above the USSR mean level of urbanization. They and the Tatars are the only peoples who exceed the urbanization levels of their respective republics. The Tatars are far more urbanized than the other Moslem peoples, who, with the Moldavians, are grouped at the bottom of the urbanization ranking.

In 1970, the urbanization ratio between the lowest group (Moldavians) and the highest (Jews) was 1:6.7 and the second highest (Russians), 1:4.7. However the gap closed somewhat in comparison with 1959.

Table 10
 URBAN-PURAL DISTRIBUTION, 1959-1970
 BY REPUBLIC

Ranked by Urban Percentage

Rural	Rank	1959		Rank	1970		% Increase in Urban Population 1959-1970	
		Republic	% Urban		% Rural	Republic		% Urban
		1 Estonian SSR	56	44	1 Estonian SSR	66	34	36.1
.1		2 Latvian SSR	56	44	2 RSFSR	64	36	37.0
.0		3 RSFSR	52	48	3 Latvian SSR	64	36	30.3
.2		4 Armenian SSR	50	50	4 Armenian SSR	61	39	80.2
.9		5 Azerbaidzhan SSR	48	52	5 Ukraine SSR	56	44	41.0
.0		6 Turkmen SSR	46	54	6 Tatar ASSR	54	46	45.4
.3		7 Ukraine SSR	46	54	7 Lithuanian SSR	53	47	61.2
.5		8 Kazakh SSR	44	56	8 Kazakh SSR	52	48	70.7
.3		9 Georgian SSR	42	58	9 Azerbaidzhan SSR	51	49	52.3
.0		10 Tatar ASSR	42	58	10 Georgian SSR	48	52	35.6
.3		11 Lithuanian SSR	39	61	11 Turkmen SSR	48	52	57.1
.3		12 Kirgiz SSR	34	66	12 Belorussian SSR	46	54	69.6
.0		13 Uzbek SSR	34	66	13 Tadzhik SSR	38	62	80.3
.3		14 Tadzhik SSR	33	67	14 Kirgiz SSR	38	62	67.2
.0		15 Belorussian SSR	31	69	15 Uzbek SSR	37	63	68.5
.1		16 Moldavian SSR	22	78	16 Moldavian SSR	33	67	90.7
.6		USSR Total	48	52	USSR Total	56	44	36.0

Sources: Nar. khoz. 1972: 499-725.
Itogi 1959: 20-29.

Note: With some exceptions, republics with a low urban percentage had a very high growth of the urban population in 1959-1970, and those with a high urban percentage had a lower growth. The ratio between highest (Estonia) and lowest (Moldavia) closed somewhat (from 2.5 in 1959 to 2.0 in 1970).

Table 11
 NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CPSU, JAN. 1, 1972
 Union-Republic Nationalities Only
 Ranked by Weight Index

Rank	Nationality	Number	Percent	Weight Index ¹
1	Georgians	242,253	1.66%	1.24
2	Russians	8,927,400	61.02	1.14
3	Armenians	223,372	1.52	1.04
4	Ukrainians	2,333,750	15.95	0.95
5	Belorussians	511,981	3.50	0.94
6	Azerbaidzhani	206,184	1.41	0.78
7	Kazakhs	246,393	1.68	0.77
8	Estonians	45,454	0.31	0.74
9	Latvians	60,843	0.42	0.71
10	Lithuanians	93,271	0.64	0.58
11	Kirgiz	45,205	0.31	0.52
12	Uzbeks	282,918	1.93	0.51
13	Turkmen	43,111	0.29	0.46
14	Tadzhiks	57,271	0.39	0.44
15	Moldavians	58,062	0.40	0.36
	Other Nationalities	1,253,821	8.57	1.28
	Total	14,631,289	100.00%	1.00

¹Weight Index: Nationality's % of Party total divided by % of 1970 population total

Source: Kommunist vooruzhennykh s'il 1972: 24: 12.

Table 12
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CPSU BY GEOGRAPHIC-
ETHNIC CATEGORY, JAN. 1, 1972

Group	% of Party	Weight Index
Russians	61.02	1.14
All Non-Russians	38.98	0.84
Other Slavs	19.45	0.94
All Slavs	80.47	1.09
Other Europeans	1.77	0.43
Islamic	6.01	0.48
Armenian-Georgian	3.19	1.14

Source: Calculated from data in Table 11.

n total.

Table 13
 REPUBLIC COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS BY POPULATION
 Ranked by Size Relative to Population, 1971

Rank	Republic	1 JAN 1959 Size	% of 1959 Pop.	Index	1 JAN 1971 Size	% of 1970 Pop.	Index
	USSR	8,708,000	4.16%	1.00	14,455,000 ^b	5.98	1.00
1	RSFSR	5,799,540 ^a	4.93	1.19	9,252,922 ^a	7.11	1.19
2	Georgian SSR	208,584	5.16	1.24	296,375	6.32	1.06
3	Latvian SSR	65,947	3.15	0.75	127,753	5.40	0.90
4	Estonian SSR	33,382	2.78	0.66	73,168	5.40	0.90
5	Armenian SSR	80,350	4.56	1.10	130,353	5.23	0.87
6	Azerbaidzhan SSR	143,730	3.89	0.93	258,549	5.05	0.84
7	Ukraine SSR	1,388,488	3.32	0.80	2,378,789	5.05	0.84
8	Belorussian SSR	203,447	2.52	0.61	434,527 ^c	4.83	0.81
9	Kazakh SSR	318,000	3.42	0.82	575,439	4.42	0.74
10	Lithuanian SSR	54,324	2.00	0.48	122,469	3.92	0.66
11	Uzbek SSR	202,865	2.50	0.60	428,507	3.63	0.61
12	Kirgiz SSR	61,646	2.98	0.72	104,632	3.57	0.60
13	Turkmen SSR	45,225	2.98	0.72	69,862	3.24	0.54
14	Moldavian SSR	54,324	1.88	0.45	115,164	3.23	0.54
15	Tadzhik SSR	48,225	2.43	0.58	86,407	2.98	0.50

Note: Party members in the Soviet Army units stationed in a republic are counted as members of that republic's Party.

^aComputed by subtracting total of other republic parties from CPSU total.

^bMembership as of March 1971

^cMembership as of 1 January 1970.

Source: BSE. Yezhegodnik, 1960, 1971; Nar. khoz. 1972: 10.

Index = $\frac{\% \text{ of republic population in republic CP}}{\% \text{ of USSR population in CPSU}}$

Table 14

WEIGHT OF REPUBLIC COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN ADULT POPULATION

Ranked by size relative to Adult Population, 1971

Rank	Republic	January 1959 Party		January 1970 Party	
		members as % of adult population	Index	members as % of adult population	Index
	USSR	6.66	1.00	9.65	1.00
1	RSFSR	7.81	1.17	11.11	1.15
2	Azerbaïdzhan	7.07	1.06	10.78	1.12
3	Georgia	8.27	1.24	10.38	1.08
4	Armenia	8.24	1.24	10.30	1.07
5	Kazakhstan	6.10	0.92	8.38	0.87
6	Uzbekistan	4.61	0.69	7.93	0.82
7	Belorussia	4.09	0.61	7.73	0.80
8	Estonia	3.98	0.60	7.65	0.79
9	Latvia	4.50	0.67	7.57	0.78
10	Ukraine	5.05	0.76	7.54	0.78
11	Kirgizia	5.39	0.81	7.30	0.76
12	Turkmenistan	5.52	0.83	7.08	0.73
13	Tadzhikistan	4.56	0.68	6.71	0.70
14	Lithuania	3.11	0.47	5.98	0.62
15	Moldavia	3.24	0.49	5.54	0.57

Sources: As for Table 13, plus Itogi 1970: I, Table 3.

Note: Because more of their populations are adult, Baltic states fall in the ranking compared to Table 13.

Adult population = 20 years and over

Index = $\frac{\% \text{ of republic adult population in republic CP}}{\% \text{ of USSR adult population in CPSU}}$

Table 15

PRODUCED NATIONAL INCOME BY REPUBLIC, 1960-1970
Ranked by Rubles Per Capita

1960 ^a			1970 ^b		
1	Estonia	872	1	Estonia	1587
2	Latvia	855	2	Latvia	1574
3	RSFSR	732	3	Lithuania	1336
4	Turkmenia	708	4	RSFSR	1332
5	Ukraine	658	5	Ukraine	1158
6	Lithuania	636	6	Belorussia	1092
7	Kazakhstan	601	7	Kazakhstan	979
8	Azerbaidzhan	590	8	Moldavia	969
9	Belorussia	552	9	Armenia	923
10	Armenia	530	10	Turkmenistan	878
11	Moldavia	521	11	Georgia	871
12	Uzbekistan	506	12	Kirgizia	797
13	Georgia	501	13	Azerbaidzhan	737
14	Kirgizia	492	14	Uzbekistan	728
15	Tadzhikistan	443	15	Tadzhikistan	673
	USSR Average	678		USSR Average	1194

^aComputed from 1960-1970 growth rates, in "comparative prices."

^bIn "actual prices."

Source: Narodnoye khozyaistvo Latviiskoi SSR, 1972 (Riga, Statistika, 1972), p. 56.

NOTE: Produced National Income is a Soviet unit for measuring the performance of the economy which is not identical to any Western measure. See Campbell *et al*, 1973: 122-146. Measured by this unit the Baltic republics rank highest, the Slavs second. Except for Kazakhstan the Moslem republics are lowest. The numbers for Armenia and Georgia are low because they do not include the product of the unofficial private sector, which is especially large in these republics.

Table 16

MONEY IN SAVINGS ACCOUNTS BY REPUBLIC, 1960-1970
Ranked by Rubles Per Capita

	1960		1970	
37	1 Russia	61.81	1 Estonia	297.20
74	2 Estonia	59.90	2 Armenia	252.09
36	3 Georgia	53.09	3 Georgia	248.08
32	4 Latvia	51.98	4 Latvia	240.02
58	5 Ukraine	46.92	5 Lithuania	237.15
92	6 Armenia	45.89	6 Russia	216.15
79	7 Kazakhstan	35.26	7 Ukraine	194.17
69	8 Azerbaidzhan	32.18	8 Belorussia	161.89
23	9 Lithuania	32.13	9 Kazakhstan	139.58
78	10 Kirgizistan	31.85	10 Kirgizistan	103.34
71	11 Belorussia	31.69	11 Azerbaidzhan	102.40
97	12 Turkmenistan	28.96	12 Turkmenistan	97.27
37	13 Tadzhikistan	24.43	13 Moldavia	93.70
28	14 Uzbekistan	24.11	14 Tadzhikistan	87.03
73	15 Moldavia	21.66	15 Uzbekistan	79.72
	USSR average	52.24	USSR average	192.78

Sources: Computed from Nar. khoz., 1970: 563-564.

NOTE: In 1970, the Balts and Armenia-Georgia were at the top, the Slavs in the middle, and the Moslem republics and Moldavia at the bottom.

Table 17
 TRADE TURNOVER BY REPUBLIC, 1960-1970
 Ranked by Rubles Per Capita

Republic	1960	Republic	1970	% increase, 1960-1970
	Rubles/Capita		Rubles/Capita	
USSR mean	376	USSR mean	639	70
1 Estonia	530	1 Estonia	956	80
2 Latvia	518	2 Latvia	944	82
3 RSFSR	414	3 Lithuania	702	115
4 Kazakhstan	374	4 RSFSR	700	69
5 Lithuania	327	5 Ukraine	582	82
6 Turkmenistan	324	6 Belorussia	579	112
7 Ukraine	319	7 Kazakhstan	557	50
8 Georgia	307	8 Armenia	507	72
9 Armenia	295	9 Georgia	492	60
10 Kirgizistan	286	10 Moldavia	488	108
11 Uzbekistan	284	11 Turkmenistan	466	44
12 Belorussia	273	12 Kirgizistan	466	63
13 Azerbaidzhan	267	13 Uzbekistan	417	47
14 Tadzhikistan	253	14 Azerbaidzhan	397	49
15 Moldavia	235	15 Tadzhikistan	396	57

Source: 1960: Ekonomika Litvy, 1970: 457. Computed on basis of 1959 population.
 1970: Nar. khoz. 1970: 579. 1970 population figures.

NOTE: Baltic republics at the top followed by the Slavs. Armenia-Georgia are relatively low because these data do not reflect the unofficial private market. The Moslem republics and Moldavia are at the bottom.

Table 18

PEOPLE WITH HIGHER AND SECONDARY (COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE)
EDUCATION PER 1000 PEOPLE AGED 10 YEARS AND OLDER, BY REPUBLIC

Ranked by 1970 level

Rank	Republic	1939	1959	1970
	USSR	108	361	483
1	Georgian SSR	165	448	554
2	Latvian SSR	176	431	517
3	Armenian SSR	128	445	516
4	Estonian SSR	161	386	506
5	Ukraine SSK	120	373	494
6	RSFSR	109	361	489
7	Turkmen SSR	65	387	475
8	Azerbaidzhan	113	400	471
9	Kazakh SSR	83	348	470
10	Tatar SSR	89	359	468
11	Uzbek SSR	55	352	456
12	Kirghiz SSR	46	342	452
13	Belorussian SSR	92	304	440
14	Tadzhik SSR	40	325	420
15	Moldavian SSR	57	264	397
16	Lithuanian SSR	81	232	382

Note: Latvian and Estonian figures significantly exceeded USSR averages in 1939, before incorporation.

Source: Nar. obraz., (August) 1971, JPRS, Translations on Political and **Social** Affairs, No. 180, pp. 29-34.

Table 19

STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
BY NATIONALITY, 1970-1971

Ranked by Student/Population Ratio (Relative Weight)

Rank	Nationality	No. Students	Per 1000 Pop. of Nat'lity	% of Total Students in USSR	Relative Weight
	USSR	4,580,600	18.95	100.00	1.00
1	Jews	105,800	49.19	2.31	2.60
2	Georgians	87,800	27.06	1.92	1.43
3	Armenians	81,500	22.90	1.78	1.34
4	Russians	2,729,000	21.15	59.58	1.12
5	Azerbaijani	86,000	19.35	1.88	1.04
6	Kazakhs	100,300	18.93	2.19	1.00
7	Lithuanians	49,800	18.69	1.09	0.99
8	Kirgiz	26,400	18.18	0.58	0.97
9	Estonians	17,900	17.78	0.39	0.93
10	Uzbeks	150,700	16.39	3.29	0.87
11	Ukrainians	621,200	15.25	13.56	0.80
12	Latvians	21,800	15.24	0.48	0.81
13	Tatars	87,000	14.67	1.90	0.78
14	Turkmen	22,500	14.75	0.49	0.78
15	Belorussians	130,200	14.38	2.84	0.76
16	Tadzhiks	28,100	13.16	0.61	0.69
17	Moldavians	30,800	11.42	0.67	0.60

$$\text{Relative Weight} = \frac{\% \text{ of all Students (USSR)}}{\% \text{ of all Population (USSR)}}$$

Source: Nar. obraz., 1971:196.

NOTE: The figures include students in evening and correspondence studies. The ratio between the lowest (Moldavians) and highest (Jews) - 1:4.33; second highest (Russians) - 1:2.38.

Table 20

SCIENTIFIC WORKERS BY NATIONALITY
Ranked by Relative Weight Index, 1971

Rank	Nationality	1960		1971		Point Change in Weight Index 1960-1971	
		Number	% of Total	Number	% of Total		
	USSR	354,158	100.0%	1,002,930	100.0%	1.00	
1	Jews	33,529	9.47	66,793	6.66	7.48	-1.21
2	Armenians	8,001	2.26	22,056	2.20	1.50	-0.20
3	Georgians	8,306	2.35	19,411	1.94	1.45	-0.37
4	Russians	229,547	64.81	666,059	66.41	1.24	+0.05
5	Estonians	2,048	0.58	4,959	0.49	1.17	-0.06
6	Latvians	2,662	0.75	6,262	0.62	1.05	-0.07
7	Lithuanians	2,959	0.84	8,751	0.87	0.79	+0.03
8	Azerbaïdzhani	4,972	1.40	13,998	1.40	0.77	-0.22
9	Ukrainians	35,426	10.00	107,475	10.72	0.64	+0.08
10	Belorussians	6,358	1.80	20,538	2.05	0.55	+0.08
11	Tatars	3,691	1.04	12,619	1.26	0.51	+0.11
12	Turkmen	707	0.20	1,946	0.19	0.40	-0.02
13	Kazakhs	2,290	0.65	8,629	0.86	0.39	+0.01
14	Kirgiz	586	0.17	2,100	0.21	0.35	-0.02
15	Uzbeks	3,748	1.06	12,928	1.29	0.34	-0.03
16	Tadzhiks	866	0.24	2,550	0.25	0.28	-0.08
17	Moldavians	590	0.17	2,624	0.26	0.23	+0.07

$$\text{Index} = \frac{\% \text{ of USSR Sci. Workers}}{\text{Weight (\% of Total USSR Pop.)}}$$

Source: Nar. khoz. 1972: 105.

Note: Jews, Armenians and Georgians who had a very high weight ratio have gone considerably down. The Russians have gone up, though considerably "over-represented."

Table 21

DOCTORS PER 10,000 INHABITANTS BY REPUBLIC:

1960, 1966, 1971

Ranked by Number

1960	Doctors per 10,000 pop.	1966	Doctors per 10,000 pop.	change in rank	1971	Doctors per 10,000 pop.	change in rank
Georgia	33.0	Georgia	35.5	0	Georgia	36.8	0
Latvia	26.4	Latvia	32.6	0	Latvia	36.2	0
Armenia	24.0	Estonia	30.7	+1	Estonia	33.8	0
Estonia	23.9	Armenia	28.4	-1	Russia	30.1	+1
Azerbaidzhan	23.7	Russia	25.8	+1	Armenia	29.4	-1
Russia	20.8	Ukraine	24.8	+1	Lithuania	28.6	+2
USSR average	20.0	USSR average	24.6		Ukraine	28.3	-1
Ukraine	19.9	Azerbaidzhan	24.1	-2	USSR average	28.3	
Turkmenia	18.7	Lithuania	23.1	+2	Belorussia	26.7	+1
Tatar ASSR		Belorussia	22.6	+2	Azerbaidzhan	25.1	-2
Lithuania	17.4	Turkmenia	21.4	-2	Tatar ASSR	23.5	+1
Belorussia	16.4	Tatar ASSR	19.7 ^a	-2	Kazakhstan	22.9	+2
Kirgizia	15.4	Kirgizia	19.4	0	Turkmenia	21.9	-2
Moldavia	14.3	Kazakhstan	18.9	+1	Moldavia	21.5	+1
Kazakhstan	14.1	Moldavia	18.5	-1	Kirgizia	21.4	-2
Uzbekistan	13.8	Uzbekistan	17.9	0	Uzbekistan	21.0	0
Tadzhikistan	12.7	Tadzhikistan	15.4	0	Tadzhikistan	16.5	0
		High-Low Ratio:	2.3:1		High-Low Ratio:	2.2:1	

^a1965 data

- Notes: 1. All European republics rise in rank or stay the same.
 2. Two out of three Transcaucasus republics fall in rank.
 3. Central Asia is clustered at the bottom, led by the Tatars and Kazakhs.

Sources: 1966: Soviet Union 50 Years, 1969: 261.1971: Nar. khoz. 1972: 101-118.See Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data
(New York: The Free Press, 1973): 101-118.

Table 22
 BOOKS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE MAJOR
 SOVIET NATIONALITIES, BY LANGUAGE, 1970
 Ranked by Copies/100 Speakers of the Language^a

Rank	Language	No. Books	Total Volume (1000)	Speakers of Language (1000)	Copies/100 Speakers of Language
1	Estonian	1,346	9,290	1,044	889.7
2	Latvian	1,165	11,870	1,606	739.3
3	Russian	60,216	1,033,333	183,799	562.2
4	Lithuanian	1,415	12,019	2,778	432.6
5	Georgian	1,613	12,963	3,501	370.3
6	Uzbek	925	29,203	9,698	239.3
7	Turkmen	308	3,796	1,566	242.4
8	Kazakh	634	12,807	5,360	238.9
9	Ukrainian	3,112	92,800	41,020	226.2
10	Kirgiz	410	3,322	1,487	223.4
11	Armenian	822	7,224	3,409	211.9
12	Moldavian	550	6,102	2,891	211.1
13	Azerbaijani	850	8,857	4,610	192.1
14	Tadzhik	377	4,118	2,464	167.1
15	Belorussian	430	9,371	8,533	109.8
16	Tatar	195	2,891	5,838	49.5
17	Jewish	4	10	382	2.6

Sources: Pechat' 1970: 10-11; Itogi 1970: IV: 20,76,331-332,333-359.

^aNative speakers and all fluent in the language as a second language, with exceptions noted in Table 7.

NOTE: The Balts and Russians are high. Some Moslem nationalities are relatively high. The Belorussians and Tatars are at the bottom and the Jews very low. By copies/100 speakers Russian is third after Estonian and Latvian. But cf Table 6 which shows the predominance of Russian in other ways.

Table 23

BOOKS, PERIODICALS, AND NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN
TITULAR LANGUAGES, BY UNION REPUBLIC, 1970
Percentage of Total Titles Published

Republic	Books	Periodicals ^a	Newspapers ^b	National group % in the population of each republic
RSFSR	93	95	93	82.2
Ukraine	37	35	80	74.9
Belorussia	21	26	75	81.1
Uzbekistan	44	27	57	64.7
Kazakhstan	31	16	37	32.4
Georgia	73	73	86	66.8
Azerbaidzhan	64	64	80	73.8
Lithuania	64	70	81	80.1
Moldavia	31	22	47	64.6
Latvia	52	52	64	56.8
Kirgizia	47	40	55	43.8
Tadzhikistan	52	36	84	56.2
Armenia	75	73	88	88.6
Turkmenia	65	43	70	65.6
Estonia	74	74	72	68.2

^aIncluding periodically issued collections and bulletins.

^bIncluding kolkhoz newspapers.

Source: Nar. obraz., 1971: 359-363, 369-370, 378-379.

Table 24

INDEX OF NATIONAL POLITICAL VITALITY

<u>RANK</u>	<u>GROWTH</u>	<u>NAT % REP</u>	<u>CONC REP</u>	<u>NAT LANG</u>	<u>NAT CPSU</u>	<u>CUM IND</u>	<u>MEAN IND</u>
1 Georgians	9	8	1	6	1	25	5.0
2 Russians	13	2	11	1	2	29	5.8
3 Turkmen	3	9	4	2	13	31	6.2
4 Azeri	5	6	8	7	6	32	6.4
5 Lithuanians	11	4	2	9	10	36	7.2
6 Uzbeks	2	10	10	4	12	38	7.6
7,8 Kirgiz	4	15	6	3	11	39	7.8
7,8 Armenians	7	1	15	13	3	39	7.8
9 Ukrainians	14	5	7	15	4	45	7.0
10,11 Estonians	16	7	5	11	8	47	9.4
10,11 Tadzhiks	1	13	14	5	14	47	9.4
12 Belorussians	12	3	12	16	5	48	9.6
13 Latvians	15	12	3	10	9	49	9.8
14 Kazakhs	6	16	13	8	7	50	10.0
15 Moldavians	8	11	9	12	15	55	11.0
Tatars	10	14	16	14			
Jews	17			17			

high:low = 55:25 = 2.2:1

Growth - Population growth (Table 2).

Nat % Rep - Nationality as percentage of republic population (Table 6).

Conc Rep - Concentration of the nationality in its republic (Table 7).

Nat Lang - Percentage who declared the national language as native (Table 8).

Nat CPSU - Weight of nationality in CPSU (Table 11).

Cum Ind - Cumulative index (sum of all indicators).

Mean Ind - Mean index $\left(\frac{\text{cumulative index}}{\text{number of indicators}} \right)$

Table 25

INDEX OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

<u>RANK</u>		<u>PI CAP</u>	<u>SAV CAP</u>	<u>TR CAP</u>	<u>CUM IND</u>	<u>MEAN IND</u>
1	Estonians	1	1	1	3	1
2	Latvians	2	4	2	8	2.22
3	Lithuanians	3	5	3	11	3.67
4	Russians	4	6	4	14	4.67
5	Ukrainians	5	7	5	17	5.67
6	Armenians	9	2	8	19	6.33
7	Belorussians	6	8	6	20	6.67
8,9	Georgians	11	3	9	23	7.67
8,9	Kazakhs	7	9	7	23	7.67
10	Moldavians	8	13	10	3	10.33
11	Turkmen	10	12	11	33	11.00
12	Kirgiz	12	10	12	34	11.33
13	Azeri	13	11	14	38	12.67
14	Uzbeks	14	15	13	42	14.00
15	Tadzhiks	15	14	15	44	14.67

high:low = 44:3 = 14.7:1

PI Cap - Produced income per capita (Table 15).

Sav Cap - Savings per capita (Table 16).

TR Cap - Trade turnover per capita (Table 17).

Cum Ind - Cumulative index (sum of all indicators).

Mean Ind - Mean index $\left(\frac{\text{cumulative index}}{\text{number of indicators}} \right)$

Table 26

INDEX OF SOCIO-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

<u>RANK</u>		<u>U/R</u>	<u>STU</u>	<u>EDU</u>	<u>BOK</u>	<u>SCI</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>CUM IND</u>	<u>MEAN IND</u>
1	Georgians	9	2	1	5	3	1	21	3.50
2	Russians	2	4	6	3	4	4	23	3.83
3	Estonians	4	9	4	1	5	3	26	4.33
4	Armenians	3	3	3	11	2	5	27	4.50
5,6	Latvians	6	12	2	2	6	2	30	5.00
5,6	Jews	1	1		17	1		20	5.00
7,8	Lithuanians	8	7	16	4	7	6	48	8.00
7,8	Ukrainians	7	11	5	9	9	7	48	8.00
9	Azeri	11	5	8	13	8	9	54	9.00
10	Kazakhs	13	6	9	8	13	11	60	10.00
11	Turkmen	12	14	7	7	12	12	64	10.67
12	Tatars	5	13	10	16	11	10	65	10.83
13	Belorussians	10	15	13	15	10	8	71	11.83
14	Uzbeks	15	10	11	6	15	15	72	12.00
15	Kirgiz	17	8	12	10	14	14	75	12.50
16,17	Tadzhiks	14	16	14	14	16	16	90	15.00
16,17	Moldavians	16	17	15	12	17	13	90	15.00

high:low = 90:21 - 1:4.3

U/R - Urban-rural division (Table 9).

STU - Students per population (Table 19).

EDU - Educational standards of population (Table 18).

BOK - Books per capita (Table 23).

SCI - Scientists per capita (Table 20).

DOC - Doctors per capita (Table 21).

CUM IND - Cumulative index (sum of all indicators).

MEAN IND - Mean index $\left(\frac{\text{cumulative index}}{\text{number of indicators}} \right)$

Table 27

INDEX OF SOCIO-CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

<u>RANK</u>		<u>CUMULATIVE INDEX^a</u>	<u>MEAN INDEX</u>
1	Estonians	29	3.22
2	Russians	37	4.11
3	Latvians	38	4.22
4	Georgians	44	4.88
5	Armenians	48	5.33
6	Lithuanians	51	5.67
7	Ukrainians	65	7.22
8	Kazakhs	83	9.22
9	Belorussians	91	10.11
10	Azeri	92	10.22
11	Turkmen	97	10.78
12	Moldavians	100	11.11
13	Kirgiz	109	12.11
14	Uzbeks	114	12.67
15	Tadzhiks	134	14.89

^aArrived at by adding all indicators in Tables 25 and 26.

Table 28
 COMPOSITE INDEX: OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF
 SOVIET NATIONALITIES

<u>RANK</u>		<u>SOC, CULT, & ECON</u>	<u>NAT POL VITAL</u>	<u>CUM IND</u>	<u>MEAN IND</u>
1	Russians	37	29	66	5.50
2	Georgians	44	25	69	5.75
3	Estonians	29	47	76	6.33
4,5,6	Latvians	38	49	87	7.25
4,5,6	Lithuanians	51	36	87	7.25
4,5,6	Armenians	48	39	87	7.25
7	Azeri	92	32	124	10.33
8	Ukrainians	65	45	100	8.33
9	Turkmen	97	31	128	10.67
10	Kazakhs	83	50	133	11.08
11	Belorussians	91	48	139	11.58
12	Kirgiz	109	39	148	12.33
13	Uzbeks	114	38	152	12.67
14	Moldavians	100	55	155	12.92
15	Tadzhiks	134	47	181	15.08

high:low = Tadz: Rus = 181:66 = 2.74:1.

SOC, CULT, & ECON - Index of socio-cultural and economic development (Table 27).

NAT POL VITAL - Index of national-political vitality (Table 24).

CUM IND - Cumulative index (sum of all indicators).

MEAN IND - Mean index $\left(\frac{\text{cumulative index}}{\text{number of indicators}} \right)$

Table 29

COMPOSITE INDEX: DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES
BY GEOGRAPHIC-ETHNIC CATEGORY

Ranked by the Composite Index (column 4)

<u>Rank</u>		<u>Mean Index for Group in:</u>			<u>Composite Index^a</u>
		<u>NAT POL VITAL</u>	<u>ECON DEVEL</u>	<u>SOC, CULT DEVEL</u>	
1	Armenian- Georgian	6.4	7.00	4.00	6.50
2	Balts	8.8	2.30	5.77	6.94
3	Slavs	7.5	5.67	7.88	8.47
4	Islamic	7.9	9.58	11.53	12.02

^aMean index for previous columns.

Source: Mean indexes from Tables 24, 25, and 26.

Summary

Despite decades of far-reaching modernization, and official Soviet declarations notwithstanding, there are still immense differences among the major Soviet nationalities. In the tables based on indicators of level of economic and socio-cultural development, these differences are fairly consistent, that is, the nationalities appear in about the same order, with the Balts, the Russians, and the Georgian-Armenian group at the top, the Islamic nationalities at the bottom, and the non-Russian Slavs in between. This is also the order of the composite tables, 28 and 29.

However, in Table 24 the order is entirely different, because the table reflects demographic data, such as natural growth and national concentration in the republic, which are high for nationalities at a low level of development. As a result, Islamic nationalities like the Turkmen and the Azeris occupy a high position, while the Latvians and the Estonians rank low.

Certain individual nationalities score consistently a similar position: the Moldavians are low and the Russians are high on almost all indicators. While some Soviet nationalities are urbanized, wealthy, well-educated, and industrialized, other nationalities are still mainly rural-agricultural, poor and with low standards of education. While the differences between them are narrowing in some respects, they are simultaneously widening in others. It is questionable whether major gaps among the Soviet nationalities can be closed in the foreseeable future.

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