USARTL-TR-79-22A



AIRCRAFT CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE

SIMULA INC. 2223 SOUTH +8TH STREET TEMPE, ARIZONA 85282

DECEMBER 1980

FINAL REPORT

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APPLIED TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY POSTTLON STATES

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This revised edition of the Grash Survival Design Guide was provided the Apolied Technology Laboratory by Simula, Inc., Jundar the Lease of Contract DAAJ02-77-C-0021. The original Crash Survival Design didector published in 1967 as USAAVLABS Technical Report 67-32 and subscrewest of visions were published as USAAVLABS Technical Report 70-22 and USAASAA Technical Report 71-22. This current edition consists of a consol for the of design criteria, concepts, and analytical techniques downlowed they are research programs sponsored by this Laboratory over the past 30 years in to one report suitable for use as a designer's guide by aircord of decare engineers and other interested personnel.

This document has been coordinated with USAANRADOOD, the U. St Army Second Center, these. S. Army Aeromedical Research Asberroory, and several octors Covernment: agencies active in aircraft crathworthins a reporch and due to opment.

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Comments on suggestions pertnining to this Design Guide will be valeased by this Laboratory.

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PREFACE

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This report was prepared for the Safety and Survivability Technical Area of the Applied Technology Laboratory, U. S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories (AVRADCOM), Fort Eustis Virginia, by Simula Inc. under Contract DAAJ02-77-C-0021, initiated in September 1977. The Department of the Army Project Number is 1L162209AH76. This guide is a revision of USAAMRDL Technical Report 71-22, Crash Survival Design Guide, published October 1971.

A major portion of the data contained herein was taken from U. S. Army-sponsored research in aircraft crashworthiness conducted from 1960 to 1979. Acknowledgment is extended to the U. S. Air Force, the Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, and the U. S. Navy for their research in crash survival. Appreciation is extended to the following organizations for providing accident case histories leading to the establishment of the impact conditions in aircraft accidents:

- U. S. Army Safety Center (USASC), Fort Rucker, Alabama.
- Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C.
- U. S. Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia.
- U. S. Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton Air Force Base, California.

Additional credit is due the many authors, individual companies, and organizations listed in the bibliographies for their contributions to the field. The contributions of the following authors to previous editions of the <u>Crash Survival Design</u> <u>Guide</u> are most noteworthy:

D. F. Carroll, R. L. Cook, S. P. Desjardins, J. K. Drummond, J. L. Haley, Jr., A. D. Harper, H. G. C. Henneberger, N. B. Johnson, G. Kourouklis, W. H. Reed, C. H. Robertson, L. M. Shaw, Dr. J. W. Turnbow, and L. W. T. Weinberg.

Volume I is a compilation of criteria and checklists for the design of crashworthy aircraft. The criteria have been assembled in this one volume for the convenience of those involved in the design or evaluation of the overall aircraft and for use as a concise criteria reference. Additional background information is provided in Volumes II through V. The design criteria contained in this volume are the result of studies made and experience gained during design and manufacture of new, current Army aircraft.

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INTRODUCTION

For many years, emphasis in aircraft accident investigation was placed on determining the cause of the accident. Very little effort was expended in the crash survival aspects of aviation safety. However, it became apparent through detailed studies of accident investigation reports that large improvements in crash survival could be made if consideration were given in the initial aircraft design of the following factors that influence survivability:

- 1. Crashworthiness of Aircraft Structure The ability of the aircraft structure to maintain living space for occupants throughout a crash.
- 2. Tiedown Chain Strength The strength of the linkage preventing occupant, cargo, or equipment from breaking free and becoming missiles during a crash sequence.
- 3. Occupant Acceleration Environment The intensity and duration of accelerations experienced by occupants (with tiedown assumed intact) during a crash.
- 4. Occupant Environment Hazards Barriers, projections, and loose equipment in the immediate vicinity of the occupant that can cause contact injuries.
- 5. Postcrash Hazards The threat to occupant survival posed by fire, drowning, exposure, etc., following the impact sequence.

Early in 1960, the U. S. Army Transportation Research Command* initiated a long-range program to study all aspects of aircraft safety and survivability. Through a series of contracts with the Aviation Safety Engineering and Research Division (AvSER) of the Flight Safety Foundation, Inc., the problems associated with occupant survival in aircraft crashes were studied to determine specific relationships between crash forces, structural failures, crash fires, and injuries. A series of reports covering this effort was prepared and distributed by the U. S. Army, beginning in 1960. In October 1965, a special project initiated by the U. S. Army consclidated the design criteria presented in these reports into one technical document suitable for use as a designer's guide by aircraft design engineers and other interested personnel. The document was to be a summary

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^{*}Now the Applied Technology Laboratory, U. S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories, of the U. S. Army Aviation Research and Development Command (AVRADCOM).

of the current state of the art in crash survival design, using not only data generated under Army contracts, but also information collected from other agencies and organizations. The <u>Crash Survival Design Guide</u>, first published in 1967, realized this goal.

Since its initial publication, the Design Guide has been revised several times to incorporate the results of continuing research in crashworthiness technology. The last revision, TR-71-22, was the basis for the criteria contained in the Army's aircraft crashworthiness military standard MIL-STD-1290(AV), "Light Fixed- and Rotary-Wing Aircraft Crashworthiness" (Reference 1). This current revision, the fourth, contains the most comprehensive treatment of all aspects of aircraft crash survival now documented. It can be used as a general text to establish a basic understanding of the crash environment and the techniques that can be employed to improve chances for survival. It also contains design criteria and checklists on many aspects of crash survival and thus can be used as a source of design requirements.

The current edition of the <u>Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide</u> is published in five volumes. Volume titles and general subjects included in each volume are as follows:

Volume I - Design Criteria and Checklists

Pertinent criteria extracted from Volumes II through V, presented in the same order in which they appear in those volumes.

Volume II - Aircraft Crash Environment and Human Tolerance

Crash environment, human tolerance to impact, military anthropometric data, occupant environment, test dummies, accident information retrieval.

Volume III - Aircraft Structural Crashworthiness

Crash load estimation, structural response, fuselage and landing gear requirements, rotor requirements, ancillary equipment, cargo restraints, structural modeling.

 Military Standard, MIL-STD-1290(AV), LIGHT FIXED- AND ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 25 January 1974.

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Volume IV - Aircraft Seats, Restraints, Litters, and Padding

Operational and crash environment, energy absorption, seat design, litter requirements, restraint system design, occupant/restraint system/seat modeling, delethalization of cockpit and cabin interiors.

Volume V - Aircraft Postcrash Survival

Postcrash fire, ditching, emergency escape, crash locator beacons, retrieval of accident information.

In this volume (Volume I), Chapter 1 introduces and explains the intended use of the material contained herein. Chapter 2 contains definitions of terms used in the Design Guide. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain the criteria and checklists extracted from Volumes II, III, IV, and V, respectively. The reader of this volume is strongly encouraged to familiarize himself with the material in the other volumes, at least in his particular area of responsibility (e.g., seats and restraints or fuel systems), in order to more fully appreciate the limitations of the criteria.

The criteria are supplemented by checklists that are intended for use by aircraft designers in the original design stages and in the design review. These checklists should help the designer apply the necessary criteria in a comprehensive and orderly manner during the development of crashworthy designs, and provide a rapid and positive means of determining that none of the criteria have been overlooked. The responses on the checklists also should aid the designer in determining the strengths and weaknesses of an existing or proposed design.

After the designer has finished reviewing a system design, each item on the applicable checklists should have a check mark in one of the spaces following the item. Those items marked "NO" should be examined to determine the reason for noncompliance with the design criteria. Unless the reason involves a conflicting, overriding requirement, the design should be revised to meet the crashworthy criteria. Those items marked "N/A" should be carefully reviewed to be sure that the item is truly not applicable to the system under consideration.

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1. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

The overall objective of designing for crashworthiness is to eliminate unnecessary injuries and fatalities in relatively mild impacts. A crashworthy aircraft also reduces aircraft crash impact damage. By minimizing personnel and material losses due to crash impact, crashworthiness conserves resources, is a positive morale factor, and improves the combat effectiveness of the fleet. Results from analyses and research during the past several years have shown that the relatively small cost in dollars and weight of including crashworthy features is a wise investment (References 2 through 13). Consequently, new generation Army aircraft are being procured to stringent, yet practical requirements for crashworthiness.

To provide as much occupant protection as possible, a systems approach to crashworthiness must be followed. Every available subsystem must be considered in order to maximize the protection afforded to vehicle occupants. When an aircraft impacts

- ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF CRASH INJURY IN ARMY OH-58 AIR-CRAFT, USASC Technical Report 79-1, U. S. Army Safety Center, Fort Pucker, Alabama, January 1979.
- 3. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF CRASH INJURY IN ARMY CH-47 AIR-CRAFT, USAAAVS Technical Report 78-4, U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, Fort Rucker, Alabama, June 1978.
- 4. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF CRASH INJURY IN ARMY AH-1 AIR-CRAFT, USAAAVS Technical Report 78-3, U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, Fort Rucker, Alabama, March 1978.
- Carnell, B. L., CRASHWORTHINESS DESIGN FEATURES FOR AD-VANCED UTILITY HELICOPTERS, in <u>Aircraft Crashworthiness</u>, K. Saczalski, et al., eds., University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1975, pp. 51-64.
- Bainbridge, M. E., Reilly, M. J., and Gonsalves, J. E., CRASHWORTHINESS OF THE BOEING VERTOL UTTAS, in <u>Aircraft</u> <u>Crashworthiness</u>, K. Saczalski, et al., eds., University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1975, pp. 65-82.
- 7. Rich, M. J., INVESTIGATION OF ADVANCED HELICOPTER STRUC-TURAL DESIGNS, Volume I, ADVANCED STRUCTURAL COMPONENT DE-SIGN CONCEPT STUDY, Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technology Corporation; USAAMRDL Technical Report 75-59A, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, May 1976, AD A026246.

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the ground, deformation of the ground absorbs some energy. This is an uncontrolled variable since the quality of the impacted surface usually cannot be selected by the pilot. If the aircraft lands on an appropriate surface in an appropriate attitude, the landing gear can be used to absorb a signifi-cant amount of the impact energy. After stroking of the gear, crushing of the fuselage contributes to the total energyabsorption process. The fuselage must also maintain a protective shell around the occupant, so the crushing must take place outside the protective shell. The functions of the seat and restraint system are to restrain the occupant within the protective shell during the crash sequence and to provide additional energy-absorbing stroke to further reduce occupant decelerative loading to within human tolerance limits. The structure and components immediately surrounding the occupant must also be considered. Weapon sights, cyclic controls, glare shields, instrument panels, armor panels, and aircraft structure must be delethalized if they lie within the strike envelope of the occupant.

- 8. Hoffstedt, D. J., and Swatton, S., ADVANCED HELICOPTER STRUCTURAL DESIGN INVESTIGATION, The Boeing Vertol Company; USAAMRDL Technical Report 75-56A, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, March 1976, AD A024662.
- 9. Hicks, J. E., AN ANALYSIS OF LIFECYCLE ACCIDENT COSTS FOR THE ADVANCED SCOUT HELICOPTER, U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, Fort Rucker, Alabama, January 1977.
- McDermott, J. M., and Vega, E., THE EFFECTS OF LATEST MILITARY CRITERIA ON THE STRUCTURAL WEIGHT OF THE HUGHES ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER YAH-64, Journal of the American Helicopter Society, Vol. 23, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 2-9.
- 11. Haley, J. L., Jr., CRASHWORTHINESS VERSUS COST: A STUDY OF ARMY ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IN PERIOD JANUARY 1970 THROUGH DECEMBER 1971, paper presented at the Aircraft Crashworthiness Symposium, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 1975.
- 12. Hicks, J. E., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF UTILITY AIRCRAFT CRASH-WORTHINESS, USAAAVS Technical Report 76-2, U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, Fort Rucker, Alabama, July 1976.
- 13. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CRASHWORTHINESS AND FLIGHT SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES IN ATTACK HELICOPTERS, USAAAVS Technical Report 77-2, U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety, Fort Rucker, Alabama, June 1977.

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Ideally, it would seem most efficient to simply specify human tolerance requirements and an array of vehicle crash impact conditions, then develop the aircraft as a crashworthy system with a mixture of those crashworthy features that are most efficient for the particular vehicle being designed. Unfortunately, the validated structural and/or human tolerance analytical techniques needed to perform and evaluate such a maximum design freedom approach to achieving crashworthiness are not Furthermore, testing complete aircraft sufficiently available. early in the development cycle to permit evaluation of system concepts in time to permit design changes based on the test results is not practical. The systems approach dictates that the designer consider probable crash conditions wherein all subsystems cannot perform their desired functions; for example, aircraft attitude at impact may prevent the landing gear from absorbing its share of the impact crash energy. A balance must be struck between the two extremes of: (1) defining necessary performance on a component level only, and (2) requiring that the aircraft system be designed for an array of impact conditions with no component design and test criteria. Therefore, to achieve the overall goal, minimum levels of crash protection are recommended for the various individual subsystems.

Current aircraft crashworthiness criteria do require that a new aircraft be designed as a system to meet the vehicle impact design conditions recommended in Volume II. Also, minimum criteria are specified for a few crash critical components. For example, strengths and minimum crash energy-absorption requirements for seats and restraint systems are specified. A11 strength requirements presented in this volume are based on the crash environments described in Volume II. Testing requirements are based on ensuring compliance with strength and deformation requirements. Mandatory minimum crashworthiness design criteria for U. S. Army light fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft are stated in MIL-STD-1290(AV) (Reference 1). A11 pilot, copilot, observer, and student seats in either rotaryor light fixed-wing aircraft should conform to the requirements of MIL-S-58095(AV) (Reference 14).

Although much higher levels of crashworthiness can be achieved in completely new aircraft designs, the crashworthiness of existing aircraft can be significantly improved through retrofitting these aircraft with crashworthy components adhering to the design principles of this design guide. This can even be

^{14.} Military Specification, MIL-S-58095(AV), SEAT SYSTEM: CRASHWORTHY, NON-EJECTION, AIRCRAFT, GENERAL SPECIFICATION FOR, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 27 August 1971.

achieved while expanding the combat effectiveness of the aircraft. Examples of this are the successful program to retrofit all U. S. Army helicopters with crashworthy fuel systems (Reference 15), and the U. S. Navy program to retrofit the CH-46 with crashworthy armored crewseats (Reference 16).

In an initial assessment, the definition of an adequate crashworthy structure may appear to be a relatively simple matter. In fact, many influencing parameters must be considered before an optimum design can be finalized. A complete systems approach must be employed to include all influencing parameters concerned with the design, manufacture, overall performance, and economic restraint on the aircraft in meeting mission requirements. Tradeoffs between the affecting parameters must be made in order to arrive at a final design that most closely meets the customer's specified requirements. It must be remembered that for each type of aircraft, different emphasis will be placed in the parameter mix. Table 1 summarizes major crashworthiness criteria that must be considered during the preliminary design definition phase.

- 15. Cook, R. L., and Goebel, D. E., EVALUATION OF THE UH-1D/H HELICOPTER CRASHWORTHY FUEL SYSTEM IN A CRASH ENVIRONMENT, Dynamic Science, Division of Marshall Industries; USAAMRDL Technical Report 71-47, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, November 1971, AD 739567.
- 16. Domzalski, L. P., et al., U. S. NAVY DEVELOPMENTS IN CRASHWORTHY SEATING, Naval Air Development Center; <u>Pro-</u> <u>ceedings 1978 SAFE Symposium</u>, Survival and Flight Equipment Association, Canoga Park, California, October 1978.

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Crash scenarios	Primary structure	Energy absorption	Postcrash requirements
• MIL-STD-1290(AV) defines predom-	 Support of large mass items 	 Landing gear 	• Energency egress
inant impact conditions	 Support of sys- tems 	 Controlled structural collapse 	 Occupant release from seats
 Single axis and combination of: Vertical immact 	 Occupant support and protection 	 Crashworthy energy-absorbing seats 	 Door/exit opening Accessibility of
 Longitudinal impact 	• Cargo contain- ment and tiedown	 Shedding of large mass items 	exits • Ditching
 Lateral impact 	• Support of land- ing gear loads	• Tail boom	 Minimization of Dostcrash fire
 Postimpact Rollover Pitchover Nose plowing 	 Space consistent with occupant strike envelope 	<pre>(Shed items must not impact occu- pied areas)</pre>	 Parards Puel, oil, and hydraulic fluid
	• Emergency exit structure	(soft ground etc.)	containment • Fuel modification
			 Ignition source control
			 Reduction of ma- terial flammabil- ity, smoke, and toxicity.

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2. DEFINITIONS

2.1 AIRCRAFT COORDINATE SYSTEMS AND ATTITUDE PARAMETERS

• Aircraft Coordinates

Positive directions for velocity, acceleration, and force components and for pitch, roll, and yaw are illustrated in Figure 1. When referring to an aircraft in any flight attitude, it is standard practice to use a basic set of orthogonal axes as shown in Figure 1, with x, y, and z referring to the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions, respectively.





However, care must be exercised when analyzing ground impact cases where structural failure occurs, aircraft geometry changes, and reaction loading at the ground plane takes place. In the simulation of such impacts, it is often necessary to use more than one set of reference axes, including the earth-fixed system shown in Figure 1 as X, Y, Z.

• Attitude at Impact

The aircraft attitude in degrees at the moment of initial impact. The attitude at impact is stated in degrees of pitch, yaw, and roll (see Figure 1).

Aircraft pitch is the angle between its longitudinal axis and a horizontal plane. Pitch is considered positive when the nose of the aircraft points above the horizon and negative when it points below the horizon. Yaw is measured between the aircraft's longitudinal axis and the flight path. Roll is the angle between an aircraft lateral (y) axis and the horizontal, measured in a plane normal to the aircraft's longitudinal axis.

• Flight Path Angle

The angle between the aircraft flight path and the horizontal at the moment of impact. The algebraic sign of the Flight Path Angle is positive if the aircraft is moving downward immediately prior to impact. The sign is negative if impact occurs while the aircraft is moving upward.

Terrain Angle

The angle between the impact surface and the horizontal, measured in a vertical plane. The algebraic sign of the Terrain Angle is positive when the direction of flight is uphill, and negative when the direction of flight is downhill.

Impact Angle

The angle between the flight path and the terrain, measured in a vertical plane. The impact angle is the algebraic sum of the flight path angle plus the terrain angle.



2.2 ACCELERATION-RELATED TERMS

Acceleration

The rate of change of velocity. An acceleration is required to produce any velocity change, whether in magnitude or in direction. Acceleration may produce either an increase or a decrease in velocity. There are two basic types of acceleration: linear, which changes translational velocity, and angular (or 10tational), which changes angular (or rotational) velocity. With respect to the crash environment, unless otherwise specified, all acceleration values are those at a point approximately at the center of the floor of the fuselage.

Deceleration

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Acceleration which produces a decrease in velocity.

• Abrupt Accelerations

Accelerations of short duration primarily associated with crash impacts, ejection seat shocks, capsule impacts, etc. One second is generally accepted as the dividing point between abrupt and prolonged accelerations. Within the extremely short duration range of abrupt accelerations commonly experienced in an aircraft crash (0.2 sec and below), the effects on the human body are limited to mechanical overloading (skeletal and soft tissue stresses), there being insufficient time for functional disturbances due to fluid shifts.

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• The Term G

The ratio of a particular acceleration to the acceleration due to gravitational attraction at sea level (32.2 ft/sec^2) . In accordance with common practice, this report will refer to accelerations measured in G. To illustrate, it is customarily understood that 5 G represents an acceleration of 5 x 32.2, or 161 ft/sec².

2.3 VELOCITY-RELATED TERMS

• Velocity Change in Major Impact (Av)

The decrease in velocity of the airframe during the <u>major impact</u>, expressed in feet per second. The <u>major impact</u> is the one in which the highest forces are incurred, not necessarily the initial impact. For the acceleration pulse shown in Figure 2, the major impact should be considered ended at time t_2 . Elastic recovery in the structure will tend to reverse the direction of the aircraft velocity prior to t_2 . Should the velocity actually reverse, its direction must be considered in computing the velocity change. For example, an aircraft impacting downward with a vertical velocity component of 30 ft/sec and rebounding with an upward component of 5 ft/sec should be considered to experience a velocity change

 $\Delta v = 30 - (-5) = 35 \text{ ft/sec}$

during the major impact. The velocity change during impact is further explained in Section 7.2 of Volume III.

Longitudinal Velocity Change

The decrease in velocity during the major impact measured along the longitudinal (roll) axis of the aircraft. The velocity may or may not reach zero during the major impact. For example, an aircraft impacting the ground at a forward velocity of 100 ft/sec and slowing to 35 ft/sec before rebounding would experience a longitudinal velocity change of 65 ft/sec during this impact.

Vertical Velocity Change

The decrease in velocity during the major impact measured along the vertical (yaw) axis of an aircraft.

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Figure 2. Typical aircraft floor acceleration pulse.

The vertical velocity generally reaches zero during the major impact.

Lateral Velocity Change

The decrease in velocity during the major impact measured along the lateral (pitch) axis of the aircraft.

2.4 FORCE TERMS

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• Load Factor

A crash force can be expressed as a multiple of the weight of an object being accelerated. A load factor, when multiplied by a weight, produces a force which can be used to establish static strength (see Static Strength). Load factor is expressed in units of G.

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Forward Load

Loading in a direction toward the nose of the aircraft, parallel to the aircraft longitudinal (roll) axis.

Aftward Load

Loading in a direction toward the tail of the aircraft, parallel to the aircraft longitudinal (roll) axis.

Downward Load

Loading in a downward direction parallel to the vertical (yaw) axis of the aircraft.

• Upward Load

Loading in an upward direction parallel to the vertical (yaw) axis of the aircraft.

Lateral Load

Loading in a direction parallel to the lateral (pitch) axis of the aircraft.

• Combined Load

Loading consisting of components in more than one of the directions described in Section 2.1.

• Crash Force Resultant

The geometric sum of horizontal and vertical crash forces: horizontal and vertical velocity components at impact, and horizontal and vertical stopping distances. The Crash Force Resultant is fully defined by determination of both its magnitude and its direction. The algebraic sign of the resultant crash force angle is positive when the line of action of the resultant is above the horizontal, and negative if the line of action is below the horizontal.



Crash Force Angle

The angle between the resultant crash force and the longitudinal axis of the aircraft. For impacts with little lateral component of force, the crash force angle is the algebraic sum of the crash force resultant angle plus the aircraft pitch angle.



2.5 DYNAMICS TERMS

Rebound

Rapid return toward the original position upon release or rapid reduction of the deforming load, usually associated with elastic deformation.

Dynamic Overshoot

The amplification of decelerative force on cargo or personnel above the floor input decelerative force (ratio of output to input). This amplification is a result of the dynamic response of the system.

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• Transmissibility

The amplification of a steady-state vibrational input amplitude (ratio of output to input). Transmissibilities maximize at resonant frequencies and may increase acceleration amplitude in a manner similar to dynamic overshoot.

2.6 CRASH SURVIVABILITY TERMS

Survivable Accident

An accident in which the forces transmitted to the occupant through the seat and restraint system do not exceed the limits of human tolerance to abrupt accelerations and in which the structure in the occupant's immediate environment remains substantially intact to the extent that a livable volume is provided for the occupants throughout the crash sequence.

• Survival Envelope

The range of impact conditions--including magnitude and direction of pulses and duration of forces occuring in an aircraft accident--wherein the occupiable area of the aircraft remains substantially intact, both during and following the impact, and the forces transmitted to the occupants do not exceed the limits of human tolerance when current state-of-the-art restraint systems are used.

It should be noted that, where the occupiable volume is altered appreciably through <u>elastic</u> deformation during the impact phase, survivable conditions may not have existed in an accident that, from postcrash inspection, outwardly appeared to be survivable.

2.7 OCCUPANT-RELATED_TERMS

Human Body Coordinates

In order to minimize the confusion sometimes created by the terminology used to describe the directions of forces applied to the body, a group of NATO scientists

compiled the accelerative terminology table of equivalents shown in Figure 3 (Reference 17). Terminology used throughout this guide is compatible with the NATO terms as illustrated.



Figure 3. Terminology for directions of forces on the body.

Anthropomorphic Dummy

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A device designed and fabricated to represent not only the appearance of humans but also the mass distribution, joint locations, motions, geometrical similarities such as flesh thickness and load/deflection properties, and relevant skeletal configurations such as iliac crests, ischial tulerosities, rib cages, etc. Attempts are also made to simulate human response of major structural assemblages such as thorax, spinal column, neck, etc. The dummy is strapped into seats or litters and used to simulate a human occupant in dynamic tests.

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^{17.} Gell, C. F., TABLE OF EQUIVALENTS FOR ACCELERATION TERMI-NOLOGY, Aerospace Medicine, Vol. 32, No. 12, December 1961, pp. 1109-1111.

Human Tolerance

For the purposes of this document, human tolerance is defined as a selected array of parameters that describe a condition of decelerative loading for which it is believed there is a reasonable probability for survival without major injury. As used in this volume, designing for the limits of human tolerance refers to providing design features that will maintain these conditions at or below their tolerable levels to enable the occupant to survive the given crash environment.

Obviously, the tolerance of the human body to crash environments is a function of many variables including the unique characteristics of the individual person as well as the loading variables. The loads applied to the body include decelerative loads imposed by seats and restraint systems as well as localized forces due to impact with surrounding structures. Tolerable magnitudes of the decelerative loads depend on the direction of the load, the orientation of the body, and the means of applying the load. For example, the critical nature of loads parallel to the occupant's spine manifests itself in any of a number of spinal fractures, but typically, the fracture is an anterior wedge, or compressive failure of the front section of a vertebra. Forces perpendicular to the occupant's spine can produce spinal fracture through shear failures or from hyperflexion resulting, for example, from jackknife bending over a lap-beltonly restraint. The lap belt might inflict injuries to the internal organs if it is not retained on the pelvic girdle but is allowed to exert its force above the iliac crests in the soft stomach region. Excessive rotational or linear acceleration of the head can produce concussion. Further, skull fracture can result from localized impact with surrounding struc-Therefore, tolerance is a function of the meture. thod of occupant restraint as well as the characteristics of the specific occupant. Refer to Chapter 4 of Volume II for a more detailed discussion of human tolerance.

Submarining

Rotation of the hips under and about the lap belt as a result of a forward inertial load exerted by deceleration of the thighs and lower legs, accompanied by lap belt slippage up and over the iliac crests. Lap

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belt slippage up and over the iliac crests can be a direct result of the upward loading of the shoulder harness straps at the center of the lap belt.

• Effective Weight

The portion of occupant weight supported by the seat with the occupant seated in a normal flight position. This is considered to be 80 percent of the occupant weight since the weight of the feet, lower legs, and part of the thighs is carried directly by the floor through the feet.

• Iliac Crest Bone

The upper, anterior portion of the pelvic (hip) bone. These "inverted saddle" bones are spaced laterally about 1 ft apart; the lower abdomen rests between these crest bones.

• Lap Belt Tiedown Strap (also Negative-G Strap, Crotch Strap)

Strap used to prevent the tensile force in shoulder straps from pulling the lap belt up when the restrained subject is exposed to $-G_{\chi}$ (eyeballs-out) acceleration.

- 2.8 SEATING GEOMETRY (See Figure 4 from Reference 18)
 - Design Eye Position

A reference datum point based on the eye location that permits the specified vision envelope required by MIL-STD-850 (Reference 19), allows for slouch, and is the datum point from which the aircraft station geometry is constructed. The design eye position is a fixed point in the crew station, and remains constant for pilots of all stature via appropriate seat adjustment.

- 18. Military Standard, MIL-STD-1333A, AIRCREW STATION GEOMETRY FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 30 June 1976.
- 19. Military Standard, MIL-STD-850B, AIRCREW STATION VISION REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 3 November 1970.

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(Not necessarily the floor)

Figure 4. Seating geometry. (From Reference 18)

Horizontal Vision Line

A reference line passing through the design eye position parallel to the true horizontal and normal cruise position.

• Back Tangent Line

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A straight line in the midplane of the seat passing tangent to the curvatures of a seat occupant's back when leaning back and naturally compressing the back cushion. The seat back tangent line is positioned 13 in. behind the design eye position measured along a perpendicular to the seat back tangent line.
Buttock Reference Line

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A line in the midplane of the seat parallel to the horizontal vision line and tangent to the lowermost natural protrusion of a selected size of occupant sitting on the seat cushion.

Seat Reference Point (SRP)

The intersection of the back tangent line and the buttock reference line. The seat geometry and location are based on the SRP. ى خەتمەتلەر مەتمەتلەرلەردىغانىيە قارىغان ئۇرۇپلاردىغان بارلايغان بارلىغان بەتلەرلەر بارلىغان بارلىغان ب

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Buttock Reference Point

A point 5.75 in. forward of the seat reference point on the buttock reference line. This point defines the approximate bottom of an ischial tuberosity, thus representing the lowest point on the pelvic structure and the point that will support the most load during downward vertical loading.

Heel Rest Line

The reference line parallel to the horizontal vision line passing under the tangent to the lowest point on the heel in the normal operational position, not necessarily coincidental with the floor line.

2.9 STRUCTURAL TERMS

• Airframe Structural Crashworthincss

The ability of an airframe structure to maintain a protective shell around occupants during a crash and to minimize accelerations applied to the occupiable portion of the aircraft during crash impacts.

• Structural Integrity

The ability of a structure to sustain crash loads without collapse, failure, or deformation of sufficient magnitude to: (1) cause injury to personnel, or (2) prevent the structure from performing as intended.

Static Strength

The maximum static load that can be sustained by a structure, often expressed as a load factor in terms of G (see Load Factor, Section 2.4).

Strain

The ratio of change in length to the original length of a loaded component.

Collapse

Plastic deformation of structure to the point of loss of useful load-carrying ability. Although normally considered detrimental, in certain cases collapse can prove beneficial as a significant energy-absorbing process, maintaining structural integrity.

• <u>Failure</u>

Loss of load-carrying capability, usually referring to structural linkage rupture.

Limit Load

In a structure, limit load refers to the load the structure will carry before yielding. Similarly, in an energy-absorbing device, it represents the load at which the device deforms in performing its function.

 Load Limiter, Load-Limiting Device, or Energy Absorber

These are interchangeable names of devices used to limit the load in a structure to a preselected value. These devices absorb energy by providing a resistive force applied over a deformation distance without significant elastic rebound.

• Specific Energy Absorbed (SEA)

The energy absorbed by an energy-absorbing device or structure divided by its weight. SEA is usually presented in inch-pounds per pound.

Bottoming

The exhaustion of available stroking distance accompanied by an increase in force, e.g., a seat stroking in the vertical direction exhausts the available distance and impacts the floor.

Bulkhead

A structural partition extending upwards from the floor and dividing the aircraft into separate compartments. Seats can be mounted to bulkheads instead of the floor if sufficient strength is provided.

2.10 FUEL, OIL, AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TERMS

Boost Pump

A fuel pump installed in the tank of an aircraft to supply the main (usually engine-driven) fuel pump with sufficiently high inlet pressure to meet net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements under all flight conditions.

Frangible Attachment

An attachment possessing a part that is constructed to fail at a predetermined location and/or load.

• Fuel Valve

Any valve, other than a self-sealing breakaway valve, contained in the fuel supply system, such as fuel shutoff valves, check valves, etc.

• Self-Sealing Breakaway Valve

A fluid-carrying line or tank connection that will separate at a predetermined load and seal at both ends so that an absolute minimum of fluid is lost.

2.11 IGNITION SOURCE CONTROL TERMS

• Fire Curtain

A baffle made of fire-resistant material that is used to prevent spilled flammable fluids and/or flames from reaching ignition sources or occupiable areas.

• Fire-Resistant Material

Material able to resist flame penetration for 5 min when subjected to 2000°F flame and still be able to perform its intended function.

Firewall

A partition capable of withstanding 2000°F flame over an area of 5 in.² for a period of 15 min without flame penetration.

Flammable Fluid

Any fluid that ignites readily in air, such as hydrocarbon fuels and lubricants.

Flow Diverter

A physical barrier that interrupts or diverts the flow of a liquid.

Ignition Temperature

The lowest temperature at which a flammable mixture will ignite when introduced into a specific set of circumstances.

• Inerting

The rendering of an aircraft system or the atmosphere surrounding the system incapable of supporting combustion.

2.12 INTERIOR MATERIALS SELECTION TERMS

Autoignition Temperature

The lowest temperature at which a flammable substance will ignite without the application of an outside ignition source, such as flames or sparks.

Flame Propagation Index (I_s)

A number calculated by combining two factors derived from the radiant panel test for material flammability (see Section 6.5.3). One factor is derived from the rate of progress of the flame front and the other is derived from the rate of heat liberated by the material under test.

Flame Resistant

Material that is self-extinguishing after removal of a flame.

Flashover

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The sudden spread of flame throughout an area due to ignition of combustible vapors that are heated to their flash point.

Flash Point

The lowest temperature at which vapors above a combustible substance ignite in air when exposed to flame.

Intumescent Paint

A paint that swells and chars when exposed to flames.

• Optical Density (Dg)

The optical density is defined by the relationship

$$D_{g} = \log \frac{100}{T}$$
 (1)

where T is the percent of light transmission through a medium (e.g., air, smoke, etc.).

2.13 DITCH AND EMERGENCY ESCAPE TERMS

Brightness

The luminous flux emitted per unit of emissive area as projected on a plane normal to the line of sight. Measured in foot-lamberts.

• Candela (cd)

A unit of luminous intensity equal to 1/60 of the luminous intensity of 1 cm² of a black-body surface at the solidification temperature of platinum. Also called candle or new candle.

• Class A Exit

A door, hatch, canopy, or other exit closure intended primarily for normal entry and exit.

Class B Exit

A door, hatch, or other exit closure intended primarily for service or logistic purposes (e.g., cargo hatches and rear loading ramps or clamshell doors).

Class C Exit

A window, door, hatch, or other exit closure intended primarily for emergency evacuation.

Cockpit Enclosure

That portion of the airframe that encloses the pilot, copilot, or other flight crew members. An aircraft may have multiple cockpits, or the cockpit may be physically integrated with the troop/passenger section.

Ditching

The landing of an aircraft on water with the intention of abandoning it.

Emergency Lighting

Illumination required for emergency evacuation and rescue when normal illumination is not available.

Exit Closure

A window, door, hatch, canopy, or other device used to close, fill, or occupy an exit opening.

Exit Opening

An opening provided in aircraft structure to facilitate either normal or emergency exit and entry.

Exit Release Handle

The primary handle, lever, or latch used to open or jettison the exit closure from the fuselage to permit emergency evacuation.

• Foot-candle (fc)

A unit of illuminance on a surface that is everywhere 1 ft from a uniform point source of light of 1 candela.

• Foot-lambert (fL)

A unit of photometric brightness or luminous intensity per unit emissive area of a surface in a given direction. One foot-lambert is equal to $1/\pi$ candela per square foot.

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Illumination

The luminous flux per unit area on an intercepting surface at any given point. Measured in foot-candles.

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3. AIRCRAFT CRASH ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN TOLERANCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Design criteria that can be extracted from information on the aircraft crash environment and the response of the human body to that environment are presented in this chapter. Principles, data, and analysis methods that influence the survivability of aircraft occupants in a crash environment are summarized. The reader is referred to Volume II for a more complete discussion of factors from which these design principles are drawn.

3.2 DESIGN CONDITIONS FOR IMPACT

3.2.1 General

3.2.1.1 Application: In using the design data tabulated in this section, it should be emphasized that the values given are estimates for survivable accidents in pre-1978 aircraft. New aircraft can be designed to permit survival during a much more Although improvements in crashworthiness can severe crash. be achieved in existing aircraft by retrofit systems, such as energy-absorbing seats or crashworthy fuel systems, the improvements are limited and may result in prohibitive weight and cost penalties if requirements are too severe. Retrofit decisions are made as the result of tradeoffs between the benefits in survivability and the penalties of cost and weight. An aircraft should be designed as a system to provide the required occupant protection for the recommended velocity changes because deceleration is a design variable, a function of the structural stiffness of the fuselage. Consideration of crashworthiness in design of the complete aircraft system eliminates many of the limitations inherent in retrofit and makes possible the design for more severe environments without significant weight penalties.

3.2.1.2 <u>Deceleration Pulse Shape</u>: Experimental data obtained in full-scale crash tests of helicopters, light fixed-wing aircraft, and fixed-wing transports indicate that the deceleration pulse shape for <u>major</u> impact in accidents can be represented to a satisfactory degree for most engineering purposes by a triangle as shown in Figure 2. Energy-absorbing landing gear on new aircraft will produce a lower-level deceleration plateau preceding the fuselage contact, thereby reducing the energy that must be absorbed by fuselage crushing. However, the shape of the deceleration pulse during fuselage contact with the ground will still approximate a triangle.

3.2.1.3 <u>Impacted Surface</u>: Statistically, the crash surface most frequently impacted is sod. It is recommended that sod with a California Bearing Ratio (CBR) of 2.5 be accepted as the standard for crashworthy design. Trees are the second most frequently impacted obstacle; however, the secondary (in this case, major) impact would still be with sod.

3.2.1.4 <u>Impact Attitude and Velocity Change</u>: Information concerning impact attitude is extremely important to the adequate design of crashworthy aircraft. Data that would permit a complete statistical definition of aircraft impact attitude are not yet available. However, studies of crash data (from two helicopter types, cargo and attack) were reviewed, as discussed in Volume II, and the typical impact attitudes of rotarywing aircraft are:

Roll ±20 degrees

Yaw (not determined)

Pitch + (nose up) 25 degrees - (nose down) 15 degrees

The design information available for each major axis must be extrapolated to intermediate positions with the global coordinate system to provide guidance for the design of structure subjected to combined loading (combinations of loads with components in the three different axis directions). Wherever criteria are presented in this document for the three major axes, combinations of the conditions also apply for all intermediate positions between axes. To make this very clear, the criteria specified for the specific axes x, y, and z are not to be construed as constituting the only requirements. Consideration of combinations of the specified loads or velocity changes between axes also is required, as illustrated in Figure 5.

For helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft, the resultant velocity change for combined longitudinal, vertical, and lateral components does not appear to exceed 50 ft/sec. The vertical or lateral components do not exceed the 95th-percentile values based on the specific axis directions; i.e., 42 ft/sec vertically for all rotary- and light fixed-wing aircraft, 25 ft/sec laterally for light fixed-wing aircraft and attack and cargo helicopters, and 30 ft/sec for other helicopters.

Figure 5 illustrates combined longitudinal, lateral, and vertical velocity changes for helicopters, to be used in determining intermediate velocity change components. For light

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fixed-wing aircraft and attack and cargo helicopters, Figure 5(b) will still be correct, but (c) and (d) must be altered for a lateral velocity change of 25 ft/sec instead of 30 ft/sec.

In general, the three components are related by the equation

 $v_x^2 + v_y^2 + v_z^2 = v_R^2$ (2)

where v = longitudinal velocity change, ft/sec

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∢ ▶ ₩ ₹ v_v = lateral velocity change, ft/sec

v₇ = vertical velocity change, ft/sec

 v_p = resultant velocity change, ft/sec

and the axes are those illustrated in Figure 1. The curves have been terminated at 15 degrees, based on a study of accident reports discussed in Volume II.

Table 2 gives the velocity change $\triangle v$ in feet per second for the triangular pulse shape of Figure 2. The pulses resulting from the values given in Table 2 are recommended for design purposes for rotary- and light fixed-wing aircraft.

TABLE	2.	SUMMARY OF DESIGN
		CONDITIONS FOR
		ROTARY- AND LIGHT
		FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

Impact direction	Velocity change (ft/sec)
Longitudinal	50
Vertical	42
Lateral*	25
Lateral**	30
*Light fixed-wing, a	ttack, and

*Light fixed-wing, attack, and cargo helicopters. **Other helicopters.

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3.3 HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT

3.3.1 General

Results of research on tolerance of the human body to impact forces are presented in Volume II, Chapter 4. Although numerous experiments have been conducted and a wealth of information has been collected, very few criteria that may be useful in system design have been developed and validated. In this chapter, those criteria that are generally accepted for practical application in assessing the crashworthiness of an aircraft system are presented. As discussed here, these criteria may be used to determine the acceptability of an aircraft or components, such as seats and restraint systems, based on the results of dynamic testing with anthropomorphic dummies or computer simulations as discussed in Volume IV. Criteria are presented here only if validated quantitative values have been determined. Injuries to other body parts have also been studied and are discussed in Volume II.

3.3.2 Whole-Body Tolerance

Tolerance of the human body to abrupt acceleration has been shown to depend on the magnitude and duration of the applied force, as well as the direction and rate of onset. Data presented by Eiband (Reference 20) for occupants having upper torso restraint are summarized in Figures 6 and 7 for spineward (-G_) acceleration and in Figures 8 and 9 for headward (+G_) acceleration. Human tolerance to lateral (G_) acceleration² has not been extensively studied. However, based on the testing that has been conducted, a maximum lateral acceleration of 20 G at a duration of 0.1 sec is suggested for design.

An acceptable personnel restraint system for Army aircraft should include upper torso restraint, regardless of seat orientation. However, for reference and for comparison with the above values, a spineward (-G₂) human tolerance level of 20 G and a lateral (G₂) level of 10°G are recommended for lap-beltonly restraint. These levels are based on experiments with human subjects in which minor trauma were experienced.

Although Figures 6 through 9 indicate the regions of acceleration and rate of onset that may be considered acceptable for the aircraft interior, they do not permit complete evaluation of such protective systems as restraint systems, energy-absorbing seats, or protective padding. Injury criteria for critical body

^{20.} Eiband, A. M., HUMAN TOLERANCE TO RAPIDLY APPLIED ACCEL-ERATIONS: A SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE, NASA Memorandum 5-19-59E, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D. C., June 1959.



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parts, such as the head and spinal column, must be employed in order to answer such questions as whether a seat has sufficient stroking distance, or whether a given shoulder belt webbing has acceptable stiffness.

3.3.3 Head Injury Criteria

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Various criteria have been used as predictors of head injury. Concussive threshold values have been identified for four such criteria; peak G, peak transmitted force, Severity Index, and Head Injury Criterion. The Severity Index is defined as

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Duration of uniform acceleration, sec

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(3)

where SI = Severity Index

a = acceleration as function of time

n = weighting factor greater than 1

t = time

and the Head Injury Criterion (HIC) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 is calculated according to

HIC = max
$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & t^2 \\ t - t & \int^2 & adt \\ 2 & 1 & t_1 \end{pmatrix}^{2.5} (t_2 - t_1)$$
 (4)

where a is the resultant head acceleration, and t_1 and t_2 are any two points in time during the crash event.

Aircrewmen have experienced concussive head injury from helmeted head impacts that exceeded the following values for the four criteria; peak head accelerations that exceeded 150 G, peak force levels transmitted to the head that exceeded 1500 lb, Severity Index values that exceeded 600, and Head Injury Criterion values that exceeded 500. These values should be taken as the limits of human tolerance to concussion when using these criteria as predictors of head injury.

3.3.4 Spinal Injury Criteria

Although the Dynamic Response Index (DRI), as illustrated in Section 4.8.1 of Volume II, is the only model correlated extensively for ejection seat spinal injury prediction, it has serious shortcomings for use in accident analysis. It assumes the occupant to be well restrained and erect, so that the loading is primarily compressive, with insignificant bending. Although such conditions may be assumed for ejection seats, they are less probable for helicopter crashes, in which an occupant may be leaning to either side for better visibility at the time of impact. Further, the DRI was correlated for ejection pulses of much longer duration than typical crash pulses.

A more detailed model of the spinal column would yield more realistic results, but injury criteria for the more complex responses have yet to be developed. Consequently, the DRI is not recommended as the criterion for use in designing crashworthy seats. Rather, the data presented in Figure 8 are reccommended for use until more comprehensive data and criteria are developed.

3.3.5 Leg Injury Criteria

Femoral fracture due to longitudinal impact on the knee has been studied extensively, probably because of the frequency of this type of injury in automobile accidents. A criterion that assesses the dependence of the permissible human knee load on the duration of the primary force exposure has been suggested in Reference 21. The permissible peak knee load suggested for design is given by

F = 5200 - 160 t, t < 20 msec

F = 2000, t > 20 msec (5)

where F is in pounds and t in msec.

3.3.6 Tolerance of Other Body Parts

Although some research has been conducted on the tolerance of other body parts, such as the neck, thorax, and abdomen, welldefined, valid criteria have not been established. The results of this research are discussed in Volume II, Chapter 4.

3.4 HUMAN BODY DIMENSIONS AND MASS DISTRIBUTIONS

3.4.1 General

Anthropometric measurements are external dimensions of the human body that can be used to define aircraft requirements such as seat height and width, eye height, or cabin height. A specialized type of anthropometric measurement is the "link length," or distance between joint centers, which can be used in locating control positions and is essential for the design of

^{21.} Viano, D. C., CONSIDERATIONS FOR A FEMUR INJURY CRITER-ION, Proceedings, Twenty-First Stapp Car Crash Conference, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., New York, 1977, pp. 445-473.

mathematical or physical simulators of the human body. Finally, the inertial properties of the body and parts of the body also are required in the design of human simulators.

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Two types of anthropometric measurements have been recorded, and the use of both types in vehicle design has been summarized in Reference 22.

In the first type, conventional dimensions of the body with subjects in rigid, standardized positions are easily obtained. Extensive collections of such data are used in clothing design and may determine certain vehicle design parameters including seat height and eye height. The anthropometric data of greatest potential usefulness, illustrated in Figure 10, for U. S. Army aviators and soldiers of the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Complete data can be found in References 23 and 24.

The second type of anthropometric data, which may be referred to as workspace dimensions, is more difficult to obtain and can be applied only to the specific workspace studied. However, these workspace dimensions are es mintial in designing aircraft interiors for maximum occupant protection.

Workspace dimensions must involve a consideration of body joints, the distance between them, and their range of motion. Dempster reported on an extensive study of workspace requirements for seated operators, in which he determined "link lengths" between effective joint centers for major body parts

- 22. Roe, R. W., and Kyropoulos, P., THE APPLICATION OF ANTHRO-POMETRY TO AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN, SAE Paper No. 700553, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., New York, 1970.
- 23. Churchill, E., et al., ANTHROPOMETRY OF U. S. ARMY AVIA-TORS - 1970, Anthropology Research Project; USANL Technical Report 72-52-CE, U. S. Army Natick Laboratories, Natick, Massachusetts, December 1971, AD 743528.
- 24. White, R. M., and Churchill, E., THE BODY SIZE OF SOLDIERS: U. S. ARMY ANTHROPOMETRY - 1966, USANL Technical Report 72-51-CE, U. S. Army Natick Laboratories, Natick, Massachusetts, 1971, AD 743465.



Figure 10. Conventional seated anthropometric dimensions.

(References 25 and 26). These link lengths have a number of crashworthiness-related applications: first, in developing or expanding the strike envelopes shown in Chapter 5 of Volume II,; second, in designing crash test dummies; and third, in providing numbers for mathematical simulators. Skeletal joint locations and ranges of motion are presented in Section 6.2.2 of Volume II.

3.4.3 Inertial Properties

Anthropometric dummies and mathematical simulations require inertial properties of body segments, specifically moments of inertia, mass, and center-of-mass locations. Several studies of these properties have been made using live human subjects and

26. Dempster, W. T., and Gaughran, G. R. L., PROPERTIES OF BODY SEGMENTS BASED ON SIZE AND WEIGHT, <u>American Journal</u> of <u>Anatomy</u>, Vol. 120, 1967, pp. 33-54.

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^{25.} Dempster, W. T., SPACE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SEATED OPERA-TOR, WADC Technical Report 55-159, Wright Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1955, AD 087892.

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	Perc	centiles ()	<u>in.</u>)
Measurement	<u>5th</u>	<u>50th</u>	<u>95th</u>
Weight (lb)	133.0	171.0	212.0
Stature	64.6	68.7	72.8
Seated height	33.7	35.8	37.9
Shoulder breadth	17.0	18.7	20.3
Functional reach	28.8	21.1	34.2
Hip breadth, sitting	13.2	14.8	16.7
Eye height, sitting	29.0	31.0	33.1
Knee height, sitting	19.3	20.8	22.6
Popliteal height	15.1	16.6	18.3
Shoulder-elbow length	13.3	14.4	15.6
Elbow-fingertip length	17.6	19.0	20.3
Buttock-popliteal length	17.7	19.3	21.0
Buttock-knee length	22.0	23.7	25.4

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA FOR U. S. ARMY AVIATORS (Reference 23) 7. 27.11.114

cadavers, and such data as have been obtained should be integrated into the design of any anthropometric dummy or mathematical simulation. Results of several of these studies are summarized in Reference 27.

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^{27.} Singley, G. T., III, and Haley, J. L., Jr., THE USE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN CRASHWORTHY HELICOPTER SEATING SYSTEMS, in <u>Models and Analogues for the Evaluation of</u> <u>Human Biodynamics Response, Performance and Protection,</u> AGARD-CP-253, NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, Neuilly sur Seine, France, June 1979.

	Percentiles (in.)		
Measurement	5th	50th	95th
Weight (lb)	126.0	156.0	202.0
Stature	64.5	68.7	73.1
Seated height	33.3	35.7	38.1
Shoulder breadth	16.3	17.8	19.6
Nip breadth, sitting	11.9	13.0	14.5
Eye height, sitting	28.6	31.0	33.3
Knee height, sitting	19.6	21.3	23.1
Popliteal height	16.0	17.5	19.2
Shoulder-elbow length	13.3	14.5	15.7
Elbow-fingertip length	17.4	18.8	20.4
Buttock-popliteal length	18.0	19.6	21.3
Buttock-knee length	21.6	23.4	25.3

TABLE 4.SUMMARY OF ANTHROPOMETRIC DATAFOR SOLDIERS (Reference 24)

3.5 CRASH TEST DUMMIES

All of the recently developed dummies were designed for automotive testing and are based on the anthropometry of a 50thpercentile U. S. civilian male. In dynamic testing of an energy-absorbing seat, design for aircraft occupant weight can play a critical role. It would be desirable to evaluate a seat for a range of occupant sizes. A 95th-percentile dummy would verify the strength of the seat structure and restraint system as well as the adequacy of the energy-absorbing stroke. Testing with a 50th-percentile dummy would demonstrate the performance of the system for an occupant of average height and weight. A 5th-percentile dummy would probably experience accelerations of higher magnitude and would establish the severity of a given set of impact conditions for the smaller occupant. However, both the expense of dummy purchase and the cost of conducting dynamic tests may make such a test program impractical. An alternative procedure might be to establish the occupant protection capability of a seat design by analysis and to conduct a dynamic test with a 95th-percentile dummy to verify system strength.

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There are two additional factors that should be considered in dummy selection for aircraft seat testing. First, some designs are more suitable than others for testing with a headward $(+G_{-})$ acceleration component. None of the dummies have been designed for accurate response to vertical impact. The spinal column, which is a critical region of human tolerance to aircraft crash loading, has been designed to simulate response to $-G_x$ loading rather than the more critical $+G_x$ direction. However, the reinforced rubber cylinder used as the lumbar spine in a dummy designed in accordance with the specifications in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 (49 CFR) Part 572 (Reference 28) permits more consistent positioning than the steel ball-andsocket configuration used in some other dummies. Instability in the latter type could affect response of the upper torso with concomitant penalties on test repeatability. Another advantage of the Part 572 dummy for aircraft seat testing is a humanlike pelvic structure, which should result in load distribution on the cushion close to that for a human. Secondly, if the results of tests conducted at different facilities are to be compared, standardization of dummies and test procedures is mandatory.

At present, it seems that use of the Part 572 dummies, modified to improve their simulation accuracy to impact loading in the +G direction and sized to 5th-, 50th-, and 95th-percentile versions of the U. S. Army aviator, provides the best available simulation and is, therefore, the recommended approach.

28. U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Chapter 5, Part 572: ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DUMMY, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., (Rev.) 1978.

4. AIRFRAME STRUCTURAL CRASHWORTHINESS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Salient features required in the definition of a crashworthy structure are summarized in this chapter. The user is referred to Volume III for additional information concerning the criteria or their sources.

In a crash situation, the basic requirements for occupant survival of impact hazards are:

- The maintenance of a protective structural envelope.
- The attenuation of impact forces to maintain a survivable acceleration environment.

To achieve the desirable occupant environment, the following basic design requirements must be considered as an integrated problem and a practical solution must be obtained. Such design requirements should be included in new aircraft, and existing designs could be improved by incorporating these features where possible.

- The basic structural envelope surrounding occupied areas must be designed to maximize its energy absorption capacity.
- The structure that makes initial contact with the ground must be designed to minimize the probability of earth gouging and scooping of soil. This will minimize the acceleration and force levels to which the structure is subjected.
- All items attached to the structure must, where possible, be retained in a survivable crash environment. These items include large masses, such as transmissions, engines, and rotor systems; internal cargo and on-board equipment racks; externally mounted components, such as fuel tanks, wings, and external stores; and the empennage and landing gear. In the past, shedding of large-mass items has been considered advantageous in a crash environment. This is true from the viewpoint of reducing the energy content of the aircraft and, hence, the loads acting on the structure in resisting aircraft postimpact motions. However, it is possible that penetration of occupied areas could occur, and during the postimpact motions, the aircraft could traverse shed objects

causing high loading on the structure. It is, therefore, better to maintain a known mass if an optimum acceleration profile is desired for occupant survival. Thus, mass retention and landing gear integrity are required for optimum crashworthiness and occupant environment.

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- In the case of helicopters, certain areas of the cockpit and cabin structure must be reinforced to withstand loads induced by blade strikes, impacts with external objects such as trees, and rollover. In addition, if overhead-mounted crashworthy seats are used, the deflection of the overhead structure relative to the floor must be minimized.
- Unoccupied areas of structure, such as the underfloor, nose, and tail areas, must be designed to deform in a controlled manner to absorb as much energy as possible. Such deformation must be consistent with the safety requirements of other installed systems such as fuel cells or seats and should not intrude into adjacent occupied areas.

A crash can involve a wide range of dynamic conditions, from a simple unidirectional impact to a complex combination of rotational and multidirectional impact conditions. The current requirements for Army light fixed- and rotar/-wing aircraft are summarized in Table 5. Any light aircraft designed to similar criteria would exhibit improvements in crashworthiness. A summary of desirable features for overall crashworthiness is shown in Figure 11 for a single-rotor helicopter. Similar features must be implemented in all designs, whether fixed or rotary wing, to provide a survivable environment for all occupants.

When a more severe crash does occur, the service life of the aircraft is usually ended, and the only structural requirement is to provide occupant protection. In order to provide such protection, the design must permit large deflections of structural members and joints as well as loading in the plastic range of stress. Excessively strong airframe structure is no more acceptable than understrength structure for crashworthiness. Not only will unnecessary strength result in an unacceptable weight penalty, but on impact, high G levels that compromise occupant survivability may be generated.

4.2 AIRFRAME CRASHWORTHINESS

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The aircraft structure should provide a protective shell for vehicle occupants in crashes of the severity cited in Table 2.

Impact direction	Impacted Burface	Velocity differential <u>(ft/soc)</u>	Vehicle attitudo 	Porcentago volumo roduction	Other requirements	Data source
Longitudinel	Rigid	20		No hazard to pilot/ copilot	Does not impede posterash ograss	Volume II
		40		15 mex. length ro- duction for pass./troop compartment	Inward buckling of eide walls should not poso hezerds	MIL-STD-1290 Volume II
Latera]	Rigid	30	720° Yaw	15 mex. widch reduction	Lateral collapse of oc- cupied areas not hatard- ous. No entrapment of limbs.	MIL-STD-1290 Volume II
Vortical	Rigiđ	42	+25*/-15* Pitch 220* Roll	15 max. height red. In pass./ troop con- partmont	G loads not injurious to occupants	MIL-STD-1290 Volume II
Resultant	Rigiđ	50	Combination	As above for varicus components	Max. velocity changes: long. = 50 ft/sec vert. = 42 ft/sec lat. = 30 ft/sec 25 ft/sec	MIL-STD-1290 Volume II
Rollover	Earth	-	90° Bideward or 180° in- verted or any inter- nediate anglo	Hinimal (door hatchom stc. assumed to bc non-load carrying)	Porward fusciage buried to depth of 2 in. (inverted or on side). Load uniformly distributed over forward 25% of occupied fusciage length. Can sustain 4 G without injury to soated and restrained occupants. All loading directions be- tween normal and parallel to skin to be considered.	MIL-STD-1290
Rollover (post- impact)	Rigiđ		Two 350° golle (max.)	l5 max. volume ro- duction (5% domirod)		MIL-STD-1290
Earth plowing 4 scooping (longitudinal)	Earth	-		-	Preclude plowing when for- ward 25% of fusciage has uniformly applied vertical load of 10 G and rearward load of 4 G or the ditch- ing loads of MIL-A-008865A, whichever is the grant math	MIL-5TD-1290
Landing gear	Rigid	20	110° Roll 110° Pitch	None, Plas- tic deforma- tion of gear and mounting system al- lowable	Aircraft deceleration at normal G.W. for impact with no fuselage to ground contect. All other A/C structural parts, except blades, should be flight- worthy following crash.	MIL-STD-1290
Landing goar	80ġ	100 long. ^C 14 vert.	-5° Pitch 110° Roll 120° Yaw	15 max. volume re- duction (5% desired)	No rollover, or if rollover occurs, two 360° rolls without fuselage crushing	MIL-STD-1290 Volume II

TABLE 5. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR STRUCTURAL CRASHWORTHINESS

b) Other helicopters.c) Velocity at impact, not differential.

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These velocity changes are for the major impact, assumed to occur on a rigid surface and with a triangular accelerationtime pulse shape. The structure should allow deformation in a controlled, predictable manner so that forces imposed upon the occupant will be minimized while still maintaining the protective shell. In structural areas where large structural deformations are anticipated, joints and attachments should be designed to withstand large angular deflections and/or large linear displacements without failure. All exterior surfaces and all structures which could be exposed to contact with the impact surface should be constructed of materials that characteristically resist sparking caused by abrasion. Unless otherwise stated herein, the aircraft basic structural design gross weight (BSDGW) should be used for the vehicle weight in the analyses described below. Directions are assumed with respect to the aircraft (Figure 1) unless otherwise stated.

4.2.1 Longitudinal Impact

4.2.1.1 Impact Conditions: The basic airframe should be capable of impacting longitudinally into a rigid abutment or wall at a contact velocity of 15 ft/sec without crushing the pilot and copilot stations to an extent which would either preclude pilot and copilot evacuation of the aircraft or otherwise be hazardous to the life of the aircraft occupants. For such an impact, the engine(s), transmission, and rotor system for helicopters should remain intact and in place in the aircraft except for damage to the rotor blades. The basic airframe should be capable of impacting longitudinally into a rigid abutment or wall at a contact velocity of 40 ft/sec without reducing the length of the passenger/troop compartment by more than 15 percent. Any consequent inward buckling of walls, floor, and/or roof should not be hazardous to the occupants and/or restrict their evacuation. The aircraft should also be designed to withstand impact as in a low angle, missed approach; the impact conditions of this type accident are illustrated in Fig-These impact conditions in plowed soil can result in ure 12. a rollover, and rollovers can be critical for inward crushing and/or separation of the fuselage as shown by past accident experience. The volume of the cockpit for the occupied passenger/ troop compartment should not be reduced by mc - than 15 percent (5 percent desired) for these condition

Should the aircraft turn over, the price deal fion of the fuse age should maintain structural degrity to a minimum of two 360-degree rolls. The static heads to be considered for rollover analysis are described in Section 4.2.4.

4.2.1.2 <u>Earth Scooping</u>: Design features for reducing the earth scooping effects encountered in longitudinal impacts should include the following:

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Figure 12. Low angle impact design conditions (simulated approach with antitorque loss under poor visibility).

- A large, relatively flat surface should be provided in those areas which could otherwise gouge or plow, thereby increasing the aircraft's tendency to slide over the impact terrain.
- Inward buckling of the fuselage nose or engine nacelle should be minimized for the purpose of maintaining skid surface integrity.
- The nose section should be designed to preclude any earth plowing and scooping tendency when the forward 25 percent of the fuselage has a uniformly applied local upward load of 10 G and an aft load of 4 G, as shown in Figure 13.

4.2.1.3 <u>Fuselage Deformation</u>: To minimize hazards to personnel created by buckling or other deformation of the structure, the aircraft should be designed to:

> • Provide sufficient strength of structure to prevent bending or buckling failure of the fuselage in accord with Table 5.



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নাইগালে শিল্পাই মিনামানিকাটে ব্যায় কেন্দ্র হারিলেন নাইলাইন্টা হারি হারি বিশিষ্ট মিনান নাইলোকালে প্রায়ালিকাটিকা নাইগালে শিল্পাই মিনামানিকাটে ব্যায় কেন্দ্র হারিলেন নাইলাইন্টা হারি হারি বিশিষ্ট মিনান নাইলোকো বিশিষ্ট বিশেষকার

- Position personnel away from likely fuselage fracture areas.
- Buckle the fuselage outward, if at all possible, rather than inward into living space when its collapse strength has been exceeded.
- Provide sufficient strength and rigidity in structure surrounding exits to ensure their postcrash operability in accordance with the criteria presented in Chapter 6.
- Include cargo tiedowns that will restrain cargo should fuselage bending failure occur.

4.2.1.4 Floor and Bulkhead: The floor structure should possess sufficient strength to carry, without failure, loads applied by the occupant and cargo restraint systems in impacts of the severity cited in Table 2. Considerations must be made for the specific loads and moments applied by these items to the supporting structure in the warped conditions described in Chapter 5.

4.2.2 Vertical Impact

4.2.2.1 Impact Conditions: The aircraft should possess the capability to withstand an impact velocity of 42 ft/sec vertically, with respect to the ground, without reducing the height of the cockpit and passenger/troop compartments by more than 15 percent and/or causing the occupants to experience injurious accelerative loading. For this analysis, the aircraft or-ientation (attitude) upon impact should be any attitude within +25/-15 degrees pitch and +20 degrees roll.

4.2.2.2 <u>Design Application</u>: Design applications for accomplishing the above goal should include the following:

- To the greatest extent feasible, locate massive items in lower areas of the fuselage rather than in the upper areas.
- Increase cockpit and cabin vertical strength and stiffness to prevent the structure from crushing the occupants.
- Provide crash-force attenuating structure beneath cockpit/cabin flooring.
- Provide load-limiting landing gear capable of absorbing as much of the crash energy as practical.

4.2.3 Lateral Impact

The aircraft should have the capability to withstand lateral impacts into a rigid barrier/wall of 25 ft/sec for light fixedwing and cargo and attack helicopters and 30 ft/sec for other rotary-wing aircraft without reducing the width of the occupied areas by more than 15 percent or permitting the lateral collapse of occupiable portions of the aircraft to an extent that would be hazardous to life. Precaution should be taken during design of the vehicle to minimize the chance of the occupant or his extremities being trapped between the structure and any impacting surfaces following failure of docrs, canopies, or hatches.

4.2.4 Rollover Impacts

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The aircraft should be designed to resist an earth impact loading as occurs when the aircraft strikes the ground in either a 90-degree (sideward) or 180-degree (inverted) attitude. A rollover accident should not cause an injury due to structural intrusion into occupied areas. It should be assumed that the forward fuselage roof is buried in soil to a depth of 2.0 in. for the inverted attitude, and that the load is uniformly distributed over the forward 25 percent of the fuselage length. It should also be assumed that the forward fuselage side is buried in soil to a depth of 2.0 in. for the sideward attitude, and that the load is uniformly distributed over the forward 25 percent of the fuselage length. The fuselage should be capable of sustaining a 4-G (i.e., 4.0 x aircraft BSDGW) load applied over the area(s) described for either the inverted or sideward attitudes shown in Figures 14 and 15 respectively, without permitting sufficient deformation to cause



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injury to seated, restrained occupants. For both cases in Figures 14 and 15, the 4-G distributed load should be analyzed for any angle of load application ranging from perpendicular to the fuselage skin (i.e., compressive loading) to parallel to the fuselage skin (i.e., shear loading). When designing for this condition, it should be assumed that all doors, hatches, transparencies, and similar openings cannot carry any loading.

4.2.5 Wings and Empennage

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As discussed in Section 4.1, the wings and empennage structure should remain attached during a crash. However, in the event of high concentrated loads where failure is inevicable, their structures should be designed to ensure that failure occurs outside the occupant-protecting section of the fuselage.

The adjusted position of control surfaces such as flaps should not block doors or other escape routes from the aircraft.

4.2.6 Engine/Transmission Mounts

For light fixed-wing airc , mounts on the engine and on the supporting structure show we designed to keep the engine attached to the basic supporting structure under the crash conditions cited in Table 2, even if considerable distortion of the mounts and supporting structure occurs. The basic structure supporting the engine should fail or separate before engine mount failure occurs. Engine mounts and supporting structures, including firewall bulkheads, should be designed to minimize earth scooping. Engine casings should be compatible with these requirements.

Transmissions and rotor masts of helicopters should be designed to prevent potentially hazardous displacement or tilting under the crash conditions cited in Table 2. The transmission, rotor mast, rotor hub, and rotor blades should not displace in a manner hazardous to the occupants during the following impact conditions:

- Rollover about the vehicle's roll or pitch axis on sod.
- Advancing and retreating blade obstacle strikes that occur within the outer 10 percent of blade span, assuming the obstacle to be an 8-ir.-diameter rigid cylinder.

Unless otherwise specified, all engines, transmissions, rotor masts, armament systems, external stores, and rotor hubs should be designed to withstand the following ultimate load factors (G) and remain restrained: • Applied Separately

Longitudinal	±20
Vertical	+20/-10
Lateral	±18

• Applied Simultaneously

	Design Conditions			
	1	2	3	
Longitudinal	±20	±10	±10	
Vertical Lateral	+10/-5 ±0	+20/-10 ±9	+10/-5 ±18	

4.2.7 Shape of Fuselage Cross Section

The shape of the fuselage has an inherent influence on its response to the crash environment. Both crash test experience and accident analysis indicate that an ellipsoidal shape is optimum for the fuselage. A cylindrical cross section inherently provides a curved surface to resist inward crushing. In addition, an ellipsoidal fuselage will result in lower rollover loads than would a flat-sided fuselage under identical conditions. Even though operational considerations may prevent the use of an exact ellipsoid-shaped fuselage, an approach to this shape is a worthwhile design goal.

4.2.8 Landing Gear

The landing gear geometry should be such that no abnormal characteristics result from aircraft taxis, takeoffs, and landings at the basic structural design gross weight on terrain with slopes of up to 12 degrees, or from landing sideways on a 15degree slope under zero wind. The sink speed should not exceed 6 ft/sec for the above slope conditions. A differential kneeling landing system should not be utilized to satisfy this requirement. These requirements should be met regardless of the orientation of the sloped site relative to the aircraft. The landing gear should be capable of ground taxi, towing, ground handling, takeoff and landing roll, and landings including autorotative landings at design sink speeds in accordance with AMCP706-201 (Reference 29).

29. ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOK, HELICOPTER ENGINEERING, Part One, PRELIMINARY DESIGN, AMC Pamphlet 706-201, U. S. Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia, August 1974. The gear system should be designed to minimize entanglement with wires, brush, landing mats, and other obstructions and should have provisions for attachment of flotation and ski devices to permit operation on snow, water, and marshy areas. The gear flotation capability should be such as to allow the aircraft, empty except for full fuel load and an additional 200 lb, to be towed across soil with a California Bearing Ratio of 2.5 by vehicles normally assigned to aviation units (i.e., 1/4-ton or 3/4-ton trucks).

4.2.8.1 <u>Tail Bumper</u>: Tail bumper wheels or skids should be provided as necessary. Skids should have a simple, hardenedsurface, replaceable shoe to absorb the wear and damage of impact.

4.2.8.2 <u>Ground Clearance</u>: The ground clearance, with aircraft level, for the antitorque (tail) rotor (exclusive of tail bumper wheel or skid structure), fairings, control surfaces, and external stores should not be less than 16 in. It should be assumed that the aircraft is at rest at BSDGW and that the landing gear struts are in the normal position with normal tire pressure. Alternatively, The clearance should not be less than 6 in. with the aircraft in any of the following attitudes:

- Three-point and, where applicable, four-point attitude with all shock absorber struts fully compressed and all tires flat.
- Three-point attitude with main wheel shock absorber struts and tires under static deflection, nose-wheel shock absorber strut fully compressed, and nose-wheel tire flat.
- Tail down, rolled attitude with main wheel shock absorber strut fully compressed, main wheel tire flat, and nose gear at maximum extension. The longitudinal attitude of the rotary-wing aircraft should correspond to that obtained by contact of the aft fuselage structure or tail bumper with the ground or deck. The lateral attitude should correspond to that obtained by rotating the aircraft 5 degrees about its roll axis.

4.2.8.3 Landing Gear Location: The landing gear subsystem location should minimize the possibility that a part of the gear or support structure will be driven into an occupiable section of the aircraft, or into a region containing a flammable fluid tank or line, in any accident falling within the crash conditions of Table 5. If this cannot be accomplished
by location, the gear should be designed to break away under longitudinal impact conditions, with points of failure located so that damage to critical areas is minimized.

Failure of the landing gear should not result in a failure of any personnel seat/restraint system or seat/restraint system tiedown. Failure of the landing gear should also not result in blockage of a door or other escape route, or prevent the opening of any door or other escape route.

4.2.8.4 <u>General Strength Requirements</u>: Unless otherwise specified, strength and rigidity requirements should be provided in accordance with MIL-S-8698. The limit sink speed at the BSDGW should be 10 ft/sec (level ground) and 6 ft/sec on a 12-degree slope in any direction. The forward velocity for level ground contact should be all speeds between 0 and 120 percent of the airspeed corresponding to minimum power required for level flight and landing gross weight. The reserve energy sink speed should be 12.25 ft/sec. The following paragraphs of MIL-A-008862 should apply for ground loads: 3.3 (except 3.3.7), 3.4, (except 3.4.3), 3.5, and 3.6. An analytical casting factor of 1.25 should be applied for the design of all castings which will not be statically tested to failure, or which are not procured to MIL-A-21180. The yield factor of safety should be 1.0.

4.2.8.5 <u>Vertical Crash Force Attenuation in the Landing Gear</u>: Landing gear, including the skid type, should provide maximum practical energy-absorption capabilities to reduce the vertical velocity of the fuselage as much as possible under the crash conditions defined in Table 2. Forward and aftward motion of the wheel in wheel-type landing gear of the trailing-arm type is allowable in meeting this requirement.

The landing gear should be of the load-limiting type, and should be capable of decelerating the aircraft at BSDGW from a vertical impact velocity of 20 ft/sec onto a level, rigid surface without allowing contact of the fuselage proper with the ground. Plastic deformation and damage of the gear and mounting system are acceptable in meeting this requirement; however, the remainder of the aircraft structure should be flightworthy after such an impact, with the exception of the main rotor blades. The aircraft should be capable of meeting this requirement in accidents with simultaneous fuselage angular alignment of ±10 degrees roll and pitch.

4.3 ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT RETENTION

Ancillary equipment is a general term for all removable equipment carried inside the aircraft that could constitute a hazard to personnel if unrestrained during a crash. Ancillary

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equipment includes emergency and survival equipment, aircraft subcomponents, and miscellaneous equipment. Typical items in each of these categories are:

Emergency Equipment

Oxygen bottles Fire extinguishers First aid kits Portable searchlights Crash axes

Survival Equipment

Survival kits Life rafts Life jackets Locator beacons Special clothing Food and water

• Subcomponents

Panel-type consoles containing control circuitry Radio and electronic equipment Auxiliary power units Batteries Special equipment

Miscellaneous Equipment

Navigation kits Briefcases Log books Flashlights Luggage Toolboxes

All ancillary equipment frequently carried aboard an aircraft should be provided with integrated restraint devices or anchors to the aircraft structure. Restraint devices or anchors should ensure retention of the equipment during any survivable crash of the severity cited in Table 2. Stowage space for nonrestrained items that are not regularly carried aboard an aircraft should be provided in all aircraft. This space should be located so that the items stored in it cannot become hazards to personnel in a survivable crash.

4.3.1 Strength

Restraint devices and supporting structure for ancillary equipment should be designed to restrain applicable items when exposed to static loads of 50 G downward, 10 G upward, 35 G forward, 15 G aftward, and 25 G sideward. Load-limiting devices are recommended for restraint of heavier equipment. Loadlimiter stroking should not allow equipment to enter an occupant strike envelope.

4.3.2 Emergency and Survival Equipment Stowage Location

Equipment should be: (1) located close to the primary crew chief station, if applicable; (2) stowed in easy view of crew and passengers; and (3) easily and reliably accessible in an emergency. Equipment should not be placed in areas where cargo shifting or fuselage distortion will prevent or impair access to it. Equipment stowage location should minimize the potential adverse effects of extreme temperature, abrasion, and uncleanliness.

4.3.3 <u>Retention Devices Release for Emergency and Survival</u> Equipment

Retention devices used to restrain emergency and survival equipment should be capable of quick release without the use of tools by one person using one hand. Release should be effected by a single motion actuating one device and should not require more than 5 sec from time of contact with the actuating device to the time when the equipment either falls free or is lifted free. If equipment is stowed in an enclosure, no more than 5 sec should be required for opening the enclosure and removing the equipment. Aircraft attitude should not adversely affect release device operation. It should be possible to see the latch position (open or closed) of the release device. The release device actuating handle should be of a color that contrasts with the surrounding area and be easily discernible in poor light or smoky conditions. No more than 30 sec should be required for release of life rafts and their deployment outside the vehicle. Time should be measured from the moment when the operator takes a stand adjacent to the release device or enclosure of the raft until the raft hits the water uninflated.

4.4 INTERFACE OF OCCUPANT AND CARGO RETENTION SYSTEMS WITH AIRFRAME

Both seats and cargo tiedowns require structural attachments capable of withstanding the applied loads without failure or excessive deformation. Although additional seat design and installation requirements are discussed in Chapter 5 of this volume, there are several important points to be considered where structural interface occurs. For example, the basic floor structure should evenly distribute loading to the underfloor frames and longitudinal members. All seat and cargo attachment fittings should be attached through the floor to primary underfloor structure; i.e., either the heavy, full-depth longitudinal beams or substantial underfloor frame elements. The elements should be compatible with the types and magnitudes of crash loading applied by the seat or cargo attachments. This includes reaching the loads and moments applied by the seats or cargo with deformed floor and bulkhead structure.

The tiedown points must be designed for the worst case combination of cargo weight, center-of-gravity height above the floor, and G environment during the crash.

If energy absorbers are used for the seat or cargo attachments, the attachments and their fasteners should be designed to the limiting load condition, considering the effects of angular displacement relative to the floor. To ensure structural integrity, all seat attachments must be designed to withstand or attenuate computed maximum loads with consideration for bottoming, or exhausting of available stroke. In the case of tiedown rings, which usually are rated to a certain load capability such as 5,000 lb, the attachments and structures must be capable of withstanding the worst case, angled load without yielding. Although cargo tiedown energy absorbers may be used, if a choice exists between energy-absorbing and nonenergyabsorbing tiedowns, the design criteria must be for the worst case, which will likely be the nonabsorbing equipment.

Structure surrounding an energy-absorbing seat must be designed to allow clearance for seat operation. Elastic deformation should be added to the envelope of seat stroke in determining the required clearance. If a well is provided in the aircraft floor to allow additional stroking distance, at least a 2-in. clearance should be maintained between the outer edges of the bucket and the innermost hardware extension on the sides or front of the well, including the tracks.

4.5 CARGO RETENTION

Cargo restraint should:

- Be as light in weight as possible.
- Require minimum storage space when not in use.
- Be easy to install and remove.

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- Be easily and reliably adjustable for different sizes and shapes of cargo.
- Provide sufficient restraint of cargo in all directions to prevent injury to personnel in impacts of the severity described in Table 2.
- Not permit cargo to shift in flight during turbulent weather.

If the structure of the fuselage and floor is not strong enough to withstand the cargo crash loads, load limiters should be used to limit the loads transmitted to the structure. Cargo restraints should be capable of maintaining their integrity under longitudinal loads of 16-G peak with a longitudinal velocity change of 43 ft/sec. Complete load and displacement requirements are presented in Table 6, and the requirements for the longitudinal and lateral directions are illustrated in Figures 16 and 17.

4	Downward	16 G	No requirement
5	Upward	5 G	No requirement
6	Forward) and { Combined Lateral }	See Figure 16 4 G	See Figure 16 No requirement

TABLE 6. CARGO RESTRAINT LOADS AND DISPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS

Nets used to restrain small bulk cargo should be constructed of material with low-elongation characteristics in order to reduce dynamic overshoot to a minimim. Restraining lines without load limiters used for large cargo, as defined in Table 7, for longitudinal restraint should be so arranged that maximum loadelongation characteristics are not used on the same piece of



Figure 16. Load-displacement requirements for energy-absorbing cargo restraint systems (forward loading of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft).



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Controlled lateral cargo displacement, in.



TABLE 7. AIRCRAFT CARGO CATEGORIES

Small bulk cargo (net restraint) This class includes all boxes or unpacked ₃ cargo of approxi- mately 3 ft or less in size.			Large rigid cargo (line restraint) This class includes all rigid cargo of 3 ft or more in size.				
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	Ammunition boxes Foodstuffs Medical supplies Clerical supplies Vehicle maintenance components	1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	Wheeled or tracked vehicles Aircraft engines Fuel barrels Artillery pieces Special weapons (priority carge)				

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cargo. If load limiters are used, restraining lines should be metal cables with low-elongation characteristics to ensure the most efficient energy absorption.

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4.6 TESTING

4.6.1 Aircraft System Testing

Instrumented, full-scale crash test(s) should be conducted: (1) to verify analyses performed and (2) to substantiate the capability of the aircraft system to prevent occupant fatalities and minimize the frequency and severity of occupant injuries during crashes of the severity cited in Table 2.

4.6.2 Landing Gear Crash Testing

Instrumented drop tests should be conducted: (1) to verify landing gear crash force attenuation and crash loading strength characteristics analytically predicted and (2) to substantiate the capability of the aircraft landing gear to meet the criteria of Section 4.2.8. Drop testing of wheel and skid landing gear should be conducted in accordance with paragraph 9-2.3 of AMCP 706-203 (Reference 30) and should include demonstration of compliance with the reserve energy and crash impact requirements of Section 4.2.8. The 20-ft/sec sink speed drop test should be conducted with the landing gear oriented in a 10degree nose down and 10-degree roll attitude and drop tested onto a level, rigid surface with a sink speed of 20 ft/sec at ground contact. Landing gear should also be drop tested in a 0-degree roll, pitch, and yaw attitude onto a level, rigid surface with a sink speed of 42 ft/sec at ground contact to demonstrate crash impact energy-absorption capability. Rotor lift for all drop tests should not exceed two-thirds of the BSDGW.

4.6.3 Cargo Restraint

Design loads are specified in Section 4.5. Static tests to these loads are recommended. All deformation measurements are to be made at the floor level. Sufficient dynamic tests should be made to assure that design predictions can be based on static test results.

4.6.4 Ancillary Equipment Retention

Design loads are specified in Section 4.3. Static tests to these loads are recommended.

30. ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOK, HELICOPTER ENGINEERING, Part Three, QUALIFICATION ASSURANCE, AMC Pamphlet 706-203, U. S. Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia, April 1972.

		168	NO	<u>N/</u>
4.7	DESIGN CHECKLISTS			
4.7.1	Landing Gear Design Checklist			
1.	Will the gear withstand an impact velocity of up to 42 ft/sec without catastrophic failure?			
2.	Will the gear prevent the fuselage from contacting the ground in a 20-ft/sec impact?			
3.	Will the gear survive a 10-ft/sec impact without structural damage?		_	
4.	Will the gear remain attached to the fuselage after impact?			_
5.	Is the gear located to prevent penetration of occupied areas during the energy- absorbing stroke or in the event of gear failure?			_
6.	Has the gear been designed to absorb the maximum energy consistent with available stroke?			_
7.	Is the gear located to prevent rupture of fuel cells?			<u> </u>
8.	Is every blow-off valve located where fluid will be confined or ejected outside the aircraft?			
9.	Has the gear been designed to avoid inter- ference with the stroke of energy-absorbing seats?			_
4.7.2	2 Airframe Design Checklist			
4.7.5	2.1 Fuselage			
	he forward bulkboods control of two as to be			
1.	the floor to prevent earth scooping?			
2.	Are the forward lower skin panels made of tough, yet ductile, material to minimize tearing?			
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>	r
3.	Are the forward lower skin panels shingled aftward to prevent scooping?				
4.	Will the nose structure support an upward load of 10 G and an aftward load of 4 G ap- plied over the forward 25 percent of the fuselage without failure that would increase earth scooping tendencies?		-		
5.	Is the underfloor structure designed for energy-absorbing crush under upward loading while remaining intact under longitudinal impact conditions?				
6.	Is structure designed to transfer loads due to overhead masses to floor level without hazardous crushing of the occupied volume?				
4.7.	2.2 Wing and Empennage				
7.	Will the loss of wings occur in a manner that does not endanger the occupants and that does not destroy the usable volume?		~		
4.7.	2.3 Rollover Structure				
8.	Will the forward fuselage roof support a 4-G load?				
9.	Are the side frame members designed for high load capacity to prevent collapse during a rollover-type impact?				
4.7.	2.4 Blade Impact Protection				
10.	Are overhead longitudinal members extended continuously over cockpit areas?				
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13. Are the supports for massive overhead components designed to withstand the following loads:

±18 G lateral?

±20 G longitudinal?

+20/-10 G vertical?

14. Will the supports for massive over that components withstand the following combinations of loads:

±20	G 10	ong.,	$+10/-5$ G vert., ± 0 G lat.?	 	
±10	G 1	ong.,	+20/-10 G vert., ±9 G lat.?	 	
+10	G 1	ong.,	+10/-5 G vert. ±18 G lat.?		

15. Do the engine mounts and fittings, integral to the engine as well as the aircraft structure, have sufficient strength to remain intact until after failure of major structural supporting members?

4.7.2.6 Fuel Cell Installation

- 16. Are fuel cells located above floor level and away from possible impact surfaces?
- 17. Are fuel cells located as far from occupiable areas as reasonably possible?
- 18. Is fuel containment assured for all anticipated survivable impacts?
- 9. Is the structure that supports fuel cells smooth and clean of projections to provide uniform support and avoid puncture?
- 20. Are frangible and self-sealing couplings used in fuel lines where relative displacements of structure may occur?
- 21. Are fuel cells located outside the likely landing gear motion envelops?
- 22. Have checklists of Chapter 6 peen referred to for fuel system a 3 n?

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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>	× •
4.7.2	2.7 Seat and Cargo Installation				
23.	Is structure around seats designed to avoid interference with seat stroking and has suf- ficient clearance been allowed to enable ef- ficient seat design (see Volume III)?				
24.	Are seat and cargo attachment fittings secured through the floor to primary struc- tural members?				
25.	Are tiedown points designed for the worst case combination of cargo weight, center of gravity height above the floor, and direc- tions of loading and structural deflection?				•
26.	Have checklists of Chapter 5 been referred to for seat system design?		~		•
4.7.2	2.8 Emergency Egress				
27.	Has the structure surrounding emergency exits been designed for minimum distortion?				
28.	Have the egress checklists of Chapter 6 been referred to for emergency egress require-				

ments?

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5. AIRCRAFT SEATS, RESTRAINTS, LITTERS, AND PADDING

5.1 INTRODUCTION

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Sec. 4.1. 1 . . .

This chapter summarizes the criteria for including crashworthiness into the design of aircraft subsystems that interface directly with the occupants. These subsystems include restraint systems, seats, litters, cockpit controls, and padding materials. The user is referred to Volume IV for additional information concerning the criteria and their sources.

It is important to remember the basic operational difference between passenger seats and crewseats. The primary function of passenger seats and litters is to provide a place for aircraft occupants to sit or lie during their transport, while the crewseats must provide the comfort, adjustments, and features that aid crew members in accomplishing their operational responsibilities. These functional requirements obviously are of highest priority; however, crashworthiness and the ability of the subsystems to help protect the occupant during crashes are also of extreme importance and can be accomplished without significant degradation of comfort and operational aspects.

5.2 PRIMARY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

5.2.1 General

Occupant protection and survival in aircraft accidents should be a primary consideration in the design, development, and testing of aircraft seats and litters. All operational requirements as specified in other design guides should also be met. Adequate occupant protection requires that both seats and litters be retained generally in their original positions within the aircraft throughout any survivable accident. In addition, the seat should provide an integral means of crash load attenuation, and the occupant's strike envelope should be delethalized.

Several environmental and operational factors other than those associated with crashworthiness affect the design of an adeguate seating system. They are very important in overall design, and are discussed in Section 3.2 of Volume IV.

5.2.2 Design Conditions and Envelopes

The design impact conditions for light fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft are presented in Volume II and are repeated in Chapter 3, Table 2 of Volume I. All seats, restraint systems, and litters should be designed to provide the desired performance in the design clash environments. It must be remembered that,

to produce a truly crashworthy design, systems analyses must consider likely combinations of loadings, including potential losses of energy-absorbing structure, such as landing gear.

5.2.3 Structural Distortion

Structural distortion of the airframe and its resulting loading of the seat must be considered in the design. A major consideration in providing crashworthy seating systems is the possibility of a local distortion in that part of the aircraft to which the seat is attached.

In ceiling-mounted seats the efficiency of use of the available stroke distance must be considered. Energy-absorbing stroke should be provided to maximize usage of the available space, but the effective stroke of a seat considered to be rigidly attached (no energy absorbers between the seat and roof) to the roof must be considered. The roof may deflect downward at loads too low to make efficient use of the available stroke, a particular concern for retrofit applications to older aircraft. A systems analysis should be used to evaluate the advisability of using ceiling-mounted seats in this situation and if so, establish the correct combination of variables.

A considerable amount of the downward motion of an aircraft ceiling may be elastic. It would be advantageous to eliminate from the occupant and seat the rebound due to recovery of this elastic distortion. Consideration should be given to a device that allows vertical downward motion of the seat but restrains it from following the roof during its elastic rebound.

Adequate support of the ceiling to support the applied loads with low deflections eliminates the problems mentioned above, and efficient use of ceiling-mounted seats can be achieved in aircraft with such features.

Considerations for seats mounted on the floor, bulkhead or sidewall, including requirements necessary for the attachments to survive fuselage warpage, are presenced in Section 5.4.5, Joint Deformation.

5.3 DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SEATS AND LITTERS

5.3.1 Seating System Orientation

There are several types of kimy aircraft seating systems: pilot, copilot, crew chief, gunner, observer, student, medical attendant, troop, and passenger. Cockpit seats are typically forward-facing; however, cabin seats may face in any direction. Most are single-place seats, but in a few aircraft, two-, three-, and four-occupant cabin seats are provided. A singleoccupant seat is the preferred configuration in order to avoid situations in which the energy-absorbing systems of multi-unit seats are rendered ineffective due to partial occupancy (insufficient weight to activate the energy-absorbing mechanisms at loads within human tolerance limits). To the maximum extent practical, seats should be interchangeable to enable standardization. It is desirable that all seats face in the same direction so that the seat backs protect occupants from loose equipment which can become projectiles during crash impact.

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The rearward-facing seat is optimal for providing maximum support and contact area in longitudinal impacts. The only critical impact sequence for the rearward-facing seat is one that involves a severe lateral component that allows sideward movement of the occupant prior to application of the longitudinal or vertical pulse. However, lateral torso movement can be minimized by use of an adequate restraint system of much lighter weight than that required for other seat orientations. When practical, the rearward-facing seat should be used.

Those crew members required to face forward in the conduct of their duties can be afforded adequate protection by the use of a restraint system consisting of shoulder straps, a lap belt, and a lap belt tiedown strap as discussed in Section 5.7. Lapbelt-only restraint is undesirable, as noted in the human tolerance section of Volume II. If all forward-facing passengers are provided with adequate upper- and lower-torso restraint, forward-facing seats are acceptable as a second choice to rearward-facing seats. If a single, diagonal upper-torso restraint is used, it should be placed over the outboard shoulder of the occupant to provide restraint against lateral protrusion of the occupant outside the aircraft or impact with the sidewall.

Previously, side-facing seats have been provided with lap belt restraint only. This arrangement is considered completely inadequate for providing crash protection. Even with the addition of a shoulder harness or diagonal chest strap, the tolerance to abrupt acceleration is minimal. The use of side-facing seats is least desirable from the crash safety standpoint; however, when no reasonable alternative to their use exists, adequate restraint must be provided. If a single, diagonal, upper-torso restraint is used, it should be placed over the forward-facing shoulder (relative to the aircraft).

5.3.2 Litter Orientation

Litters should be installed laterally to provide more positive restraint for expected combined crash forces. A lateral litter orientation also will prevent detachment of the litter from its supports, which may occur as explained in Reference 31. The litter must withstand all of the environments previously described for seats. ぼういき 吊い うい

5.3.3 <u>Materials</u>

Designers should select materials that offer the best strengthto-weight ratios while still maintaining sufficient ductility to prevent brittle failures.

The degree of ductility needed in a seat's basic structural elements is highly dependent upon whether the seat structure is designed to absorb energy by the use of a separate loadlimiting device or whether large plastic deflections of the basic structure are required. As a general rule, a value of 10-percent elongation is a rough dividing line between ductile and nonductile materials. The 10-percent value is recommended as a minimum for use on all critical structural members of nonload-limited seats because the exact peak load is unpredictable due to pulse shape, dynamic response of the system, and velocity change. A minimum elongation of 5 percent in the principal loading direction is suggested for use on critical members of load-limited seats because the loads and strains are more predictable. Also, castings are not recommended for use in primary structural load paths.

The effects of stress corrosion must be considered, as well as hydrogen embrittlement due to heat treating or various processing steps such as pickling. In short, adherence to all the normal engineering design principles must prevail.

Flammability and toxicity retardation requirements are discussed in Chapter 6. Upholstery padding and other materials used in seats should meet the specified requirements.

5.4 STRUCTURAL CONNECTIONS

5.4.1 Bolted Connections

For the manufacture of basic aircraft structure, most aircraft companies recommend 15- and 25-percent margins of safety for shear and tensile bolts, respectively. The margin of safety for shear and tensile bolts located in load-limited portions of

^{31.} Weinberg, L. W. T., AIRCRAFT LITTER RETENTION SYSTEM DE-SIGN CRITERIA, Aviation Crash Injury Research (AvCIR), Division of Flight Safety Foundation, Inc.; USAAVLABS Technical Report 66-27, U. S. Army Aviation Materiel Laboratories, Fort Eustis, Virginia, April 1966, AD 632457.

the seat where loads can be predicted accurately, can be reduced to 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Also, good aircraft engineering practice dictates that bolts less than 0.25 in. in diameter should not be used in tensile applications because of the ease with which these smaller bolts can be overtorqued. Because of the obvious advantages of structure being able to distort while maintaining load-carrying ability, fasteners of maximum ductility for the application should always be selected. Where possible, fasteners such as bolts and pins should have a minimum elongation of 10 percent. A bolt loaded in shear should have a shank of sufficient length to prevent application of the shear load on the threaded portion of the bolt.

5.4.2 Riveted Connections

Guidelines for riveted joints are presented in MIL-HDBK-5, and it is recommended that these guidelines be followed (Reference 32).

5.4.3 Welded Connections

Welded joints can be completely acceptable and even superior to bolted or riveted joints. However, strict inspection procedures should be used to ensure that welded joints are of good quality. The cross-sectional area of the basic material in the vicinity of a welded joint should be 10 percent greater than the area needed to sustain the design load. Welding processes are discussed in Military Specifications MIL-W-8604, -6873, -45205, and -8611; these specifications should be used as guides to ensure quality welding.

5.4.4 Seat Attachment

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Acceptable means of attaching seats to the cabin interior are listed below. (Refer to Section 3.3.3 of Volume IV for a discussion of ceiling-mounted seats and ceiling support stiffness.)

- 1. Suspended from the ceiling with energy absorbers, and wall or bulkhead stabilized.
- 2. Suspended from the ceiling with energy absorbers, and floor stabilized.
- 3. Wall or bulkhead mounted with energy absorbers.

32. Military Handbook, MIL-HDBK-5C, METALLIC MATERIALS AND ELE-MENTS FOR AEROSPACE VEHICLE STRUCTURES, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 15 September 1976.

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- 4. Floor mounted with energy absorbers.
- 5. Ceiling and floor mounted (vertical energy absorbers above and below seat).

Suspension or mounting provisions for all seats should not interfere with rapid ingress or egress. Braces, legs, cables, straps, and other structures should be designed to prevent snagging or tripping. Loops should not be formed when the restraint system is in the unbuckled position. Cabin seats must often be designed so that they may be quickly removed or folded and secured. Tools should not be required for this operation. The time required by one person to disconnect each single occupant seat should not exceed 20 sec. The time required by one person to disconnect multi-occupant seats should not exceed 20 sec multiplied by the number of occupants. All foldable seats should be capable of being folded, stowed, and secured or unstowed quickly and easily by one person in a period not to exceed 20 sec multiplied by the number of occupants.

5.4.5 Joint Deformation

To prevent seat connection failures induced by fuselage distortion, structural joints should be capable of large angular displacements in all directions without failure. A floor-mounted seat designed properly for structurally integral load limiting would also satisfactorily accommodate floor buckling and warping under crash conditions. Figure 18 illustrates recommended limits of floor warping or buckling that must be withstood by all floor-mounted seat designs. The mounts should be capable of withstanding a ±10-degree warp of the floor, as well as a ±10-degree rotation about a roll axis of a single track. The angles are based on distortions that have been noted in potentially survivable accidents.

The same general principles that apply for floor-mounted seats also apply for bulkhead-mounted seats except that the deflection and degree of warping of the bulkhead appear to be less than those of the floor. A possible bulkhead distortion configuration is shown in Figure 19. The recommended angular deflection requirement for bulkhead-mounted seats is a 5-degree rotation in the plane of the bulkhead. To accommodate local deformation, each attachment of the seat to the bulkhead should be released to permit ±10-degree rotations in any direction.

Sidewall-mounted seats require the same considerations as bulkhead-mounted seats. The sidewalls of aircraft tend to bow outboard during impacts with high vertical loading. Therefore, it is advisable that these seats be designed to accept relatively large distortions without failure.



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Figure 18. Static test floor warpage requirement to improve the probability of seat retention in crashes.

Seats that are mounted totally on the sidewall should not create a problem, as they will simply move with the sidewall. Extremely flexible seats also should be inherently immune from these problems. However, rigid seats mounted to both the floor

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(a) Initial configuration



(b) Postcrash configuration

Figure 19. Bulkhead in-plane warping.

and the sidewall will require special design considerations. One way to provide the flexibility needed is to include releases such as pin joints, oriented to allow rotation around an aircraft roll axis. An example is shown in Figure 20. The attachments should be designed to permit the angle Θ to reach 25 degrees at the maximum dynamic deflection. Liet.

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Figure 20. Pin joint releases oriented to allow rotation around an aircraft roll axis.

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THE WALLS

The underfloor, bulkhead, or sidewall structure must be designed to be compatible with the seat. For example, the design of structural releases between the seat and the track may enable the seat to maintain its attachment during large floor deformations but may add to the torsional responsibilities of underfloor beams. If a large downward load is applied to the floor structure through a joint that does not carry moment 1.2leased), then the underfloor beams must resist any moment that may be developed without assistance from the seat structure.

5.4.6 Material

5.4.6.1 General: An elastic stress analysis, as used in the design of airframes and aircraft components subjected to normal flight loads, is inadequate for the study of all the structure in a crash situation. For normal flight loads, keeping the stresses well below the material yield stress to avoid permanent deformation is necessary because of fatigue problems and other considerations. In a crash situation, however, where only one application of the maximum load is expected, fatigue is not a factor, and the final appearance of a structural component or its subsequent operational use need not be considered. Consequently, the load-carrying capacity of components deformed beyond the elastic limit should be considered in determining the ultimate seat strength. For certain items in the load path it is advisable to use the rupture strength as listed for many materials in MIL-HDBK-5 (Reference 32). The concepts of limit analysis or, in some circumstances, large deformation analysis may be employed to make the best use of materials in certain components.

5.4.6.2 Limit Analysis Concepts: Where ductile materials are used, strain concentrations do not produce rupture prior to significant plastic deformation. If the geometric configuration of the structure permits only small elastic deflections, a "rigid-plastic" mathematical model may be used. This permits the use of a limit analysis, which assumes no deformation of structure until sufficient plastic hinges, plastic extensors, etc., exist to permit a geometrically admissible collapse mode.

Limit analysis is concerned with finding the critical load sufficient to cause plastic collapse with the physical requirements of static equilibrium, yield condition for the materials, and consistent geometry considerations. Two useful principles are mentioned here: the upper and lower bound theorems. The upper bound theorem for the limit load (collapse load for a "rigid-plastic" structure) states that the load associated with the energy dissipated in plastic deformation will form an upper bound for the limit load. The lower bound theorem states that the load associated with a statically admissible stress distribution, which at no point exceeds the yield conditions, forms a lower bound for the limit load. Use of the upper and lower bound theorems to bracket the limit load for a given structure makes it possible to obtain a realistic evaluation of the structure's load-carrying capacity.

5.4.6.3 Large Deformation Analysis: If a structure contains elements that will permit large, stable elastic deformations when under load, the equilibrium of the deformed state must be considered in evaluating ultimate strength. For example, if a suitable attachment is made to a thin, flat sheet rigidly fixed at the edges so as to load the sheet normal to the surface, a diaphragming action will occur. The equilibrium and stressstrain (elastic-plastic) relations for the deformed state would determine the load-carrying capacity. An example of this situation is a seat pan in which membrane rather than flexural stresses are important.

5.4.6.4 <u>Strain Concentrations</u>: Handbook stress concentration factors will provide sufficiently accurate data to allow the designer to modify the structure in the vicinity of stress concentrations. When large deformations at high load-carrying capacity are desired, as in energy-absorbing seats, these areas frequently become strain concentration points, and rupture occurs due to excessive strain in areas with little deformation and energy input. Large amounts of energy can be absorbed in the structure only if large volumes of material are strained uniformly.

5.4.7 Restraint System Anchorage

The seat designer must consider the effect of the anchorage of the restraint system on the characteristics of the seat design. If possible, the restraint system should be anchored to the seat rather than to basic structure.

If the harness is anchored to basic structure, a desirable reduction of loads on the seat frame results; however, the restraint system must be designed to permit the energy-absorbing deformation of the seat during an impact. For example, if a load-limited seat strokes vertically and the seat belt is anchored to the floor, loosening of the belt permits the occupant to either submarine or move laterally under the belt. When the harness is anchored to the seat structure, the problem of maintaining a tight harness is reduced.

5.5 ENERGY-ABSORBING DEVICES

The seat structure, in order to perform its intended retention function, must possess either (1) the capability of sustaining, without collapsing, the maximum inertial forces imposed by the deceleration of the occupant and the seat, or (2) sufficient energy-absorption capacity to reduce the occupant's relative velocity to zero before structural failure occurs.* The first alternative may result in an excessive strength requirement because the input pulse shape and the restraint system and cushion elasticity can result in a large dynamic overshoot. Computer simulation and experimental investigation have shown that overshoot factors range from 1.2 to 2.0. This would necessitate a seat design strength requirement of 24 G to 40 G to accommodate an input floor pulse of 20 G.

The second alternative of using collapse behavior (load limiting) appears to offer the more practical approach to most seat design situations. With this option, the seat structure would begin plastic deformation when the acceleration of the occupant and seat mass reaches a level corresponding to the critical structural load; the seat must absorb enough energy without failure to stop the motion of the occupant relative to the air-This energy must be absorbed at force levels within hucraft. man tolerance limits to provide the intended protective function. The energy can be absorbed either by plastic deformation of basic structure or by the introduction of mechanical loadlimiting devices. Energy-absorbing motion of the seat can be provided in all three directions as well as for all combinations of directions; however, it is absolutely necessary for the vertical direction. A properly restrained occupant can withstand the loads associated with the design environment in the longitudinal (x) and lateral (y) directions but cannot sustain the loads in the vertical (z) direction without injury. Therefore, the requirement for load reduction through use of energy-absorption devices is mandatory for the vertical direction.

Energy-absorbing mechanisms in aircraft structures which transmit crash forces to the occupant should stroke at loads tolerable to humans and should provide stroke distances consistent with these loads and with the energy to be absorbed.

^{*}The term "failure" implies a rupture of restraint linkage, while the term "collapse" pertains to a state of active deformation with restraint integrity maintained.

Desirable features of energy absorbers are as follows:

- The device should provide a predictable force-versusdeformation characteristic.
- The rapid loading rate expected in crashes should not cause unexpected changes in the force-versusdeformation characteristic of the device.
- The assembly in which the device is used should have the ability to sustain tension and compression. (This might be provided by one or more energy absorbers, or by the basic structure itself.)
- The device should be as light and small as possible.
- The specific energy absorption (SEA) should be high.
- The device should be economical.
- The device should be capable of being relied upon to perform satisfactorily throughout the life of the aircraft (a minimum of 10 years or 8000 flight hours) without requiring maintenance.
- The device should not be affected by vibration, dust, dirt, or other environmental effects. It should be protected from corrosion.
- The device(s) should decelerate the occupant in the most efficient manner possible while maintaining the loading environment within the limits of human tolerance. A multiple-limit-load device, adjustable for occupant weight, is desirable.

5.6 SEAT CUSHIONS

5.6.1 General

The seat bottom and back with which the occupant is in constant contact should be designed for comfort and durability. Sufficient clearance between fabric backs and bottoms or sufficient cushion thickness of the appropriate material stiffness should be provided to preclude body contact with the seat structure when subjected to either the specified operational or crash loads. Seat bottoms made of fabric should be provided with means of tightening to compensate for sagging in use.

For seat cushions, the problem is one of developing a compromise design that will provide both acceptable comfort and safety. The optimum aircraft seat cushion should:

- Be extremely lightweight.
- Possess flotation capabilities.
- Be nonflammable.
- Be nontoxic; not give off fumes when burned, charred, or melted.
- Be tough and wear resistant.
- Be easily changeable.
- Provide comfort by distributing the load and reducing or eliminating load concentrations.
- Provide thermal comfort through ventilation.
- Provide little or no rebound under crash loading.
- Allow an absolute minimum of motion during crash loading.

5.6.2 Requirements

For seats of light movable weight (less than 30 lb), cushions should be used for comfort only. The maximum uncompressed thickness for a properly contoured cushion should be 1-1/2 in., unless it can be shown through analysis or through dynamic tests that the cushion design and material properties produce a beneficial (reduced force transmissibility) result.

For seats of greater movable weight, such as integrally armored seats, every effort should be made to design a cushion that minimizes relative motion between the occupant and the seat and that acts as a shock damper between the occupant and the heavy seat mass. Again, dynamic analysis and/or testing should be conducted to demonstrate that the cushion design produces a desirable system result over the operational and crash environmental range of interest.

5.6.3 Energy-Absorbing Cushions

The use of load-limiting cushions in lieu of load-limiting seats is undesirable. The only justifiable use of energyabsorbing cushions instead of load-limited seats might be in retrofit circumstances where, because of limitations in existing aircraft, another alternative does not exist.

5.6.4 Net-Type Cushions

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This type of cushion serves the same purpose as the filled cushion; however, a net material is stretched over a contoured seat frame, and the body is supported by diaphragm action in the net rather than by deformation of a compressible material. The net-type cushion might more properly be called a <u>net support</u>. If a net support is used in the seat, its rebound characteristics should be capable of limiting the return movement from the point of maximum deformation to 1-1/2 in. Net supports should not increase the probability of occupant submarining or dynamic overshoot.

5.6.5 Seat Back Cushions

The back cushion should be of a lightweight foam material or net. The foam can be a standard furniture type that meets the other requirements listed in Section 5.6.2. Lumbar supports, particularly those that are adjustable by the occupant, are desirable for comfort and because a firm lumbar support that holds the lumbar spine forward in extension increases the tolerance to $+G_{\tau}$ loading.

5.6.6 Headrests

A headrest should be provided for occupant head/neck whiplash protection. Headrest cushions are used only to cushion head impact and prevent whiplash injury due to backward flexure of the neck. The cushioning effect can be provided by a thin pad and a deformable headrest or a thicker cushion on a more rigid headrest. For a rigid headrest, the provisions of Section 5.12 should be applied and at least 1.5 in. of cushion should be provided if possible within the space limitations of the application.

5.7 DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR PERSONNEL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS

5.7.1 General

Restraint harnesses for personnel should provide the restraint necessary to prevent injuries to all aircraft occupants in crash conditions approaching the upper limits of survivability. Appropriate strength analysis and tests as described in Section 5.9 should be conducted to ensure that a restraint system is acceptable. Qualities that a harness should possess are listed below:

- It should be comfortable and light in weight.
- It should be easy for the occupant to put on and take off even in the dark.
- It should contain a single-point release system, easy to operate with one (either) hand since a debilitated person might have difficulty in releasing more than one buckle with a specific hand. Also, it should be protected from inadvertent release; e.g., caused by the buckle being struck by a cyclic control or by inertial loading.
- It should provide personnel with freedom of movement to operate the aircraft controls. This requirement necessitates the use of an inertia reel in conjunction with the shoulder harness.
- It should provide sufficient restraint in all directions to prevent injury due to decelerative forces in a potentially survivable crash.
- The webbing should provide a maximum area, consistent with weight and comfort, for force distribution in the upper torso and pelvic regions and should be of low elongation under load to minimize dynamic overshoot.

5.7.2 Types of Systems

5.7.2.1 <u>Aircrew Systems</u>: The existing military lap belt and shoulder harness configuration with a center tiedown strap as shown in Figure 21 is the minimum acceptable harness for use by U. S. Army pilots. The configuration shown in Figure 22 is preferred because it provides improved lateral restraint due to the addition of the reflected shoulder straps. This system resulted from the investigation reported in Reference 33. Details of the hardware in these systems are discussed in Section 7.5 of Volume IV.

^{33.} Carr, R. W., and Desjardins, S. P., AIRCREW RESTRAINT SYS-TEM - DESIGN CRITERIA EVALUATION, Dynamic Science, Division of Ultrasystems, Inc.; USAAMRDL Technical Report 75-2, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, February 1975, AD A009059.



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Figure 21. Basic aircrew restraint system.

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Figure 22. Aircrew restraint system, including reflected shoulder straps.

5.7.2.2 Troop Systems: Considerations in the selection of a troop or passenger seat restraint system are different from those for an aircrew system. First of all, the seat may face forward, sideward, or aftward. Secondly, the restraint system must be capable of being attached and removed quickly in an operational environment by troops encumbered by varying types and quantities of equipment. Also, whereas a pilot probably uses the restraint system in his aircraft so frequently that its use becomes a matter of habit, troops and passengers can be expected to be unfamiliar with the system. The effects of this lack of familiarity would probably become more pronounced in a combat situation when the risk involved in not using the restraint system becomes even higher. Therefore, hardware should be uncomplicated and, if possible, resemble the familiar, such as automotive hardware. Finally, the need to guickly remove and stow the seats requires compact and lightweight restraint systems.

Two systems that resulted from the investigation reported in Reference 34 are shown in Figure 23. The Type II troop restraint system is preferred and consists of a two-strap shoulder harness and a lap belt assembly. The two shoulder straps are attached to two single inertia reels. They extend forward and down over the occupant's upper torso and are connected into the single-point release, lift-lever buckle. The lap belt assembly includes left- and right-hand belts, with adjusters, that are connected together at the lap belt buckle. The Type I troop restraint system is acceptable and differs from the Type II restraint by having a single shoulder strap that passes diagonally across the occupant's upper torso. For side-facing seats it should pass over the shoulder closest to the nose of the aircraft. If the Type I system is used in either a forwardor aft-facing seat, the diagonal shoulder strap should pass over the outboard shoulder to restrain the occupant from protruding outside the aircraft during lateral loading.

5.7.2.3 <u>Crew Chief and Door/Window Gunner Systems</u>: Restraint systems for crew chiefs and door/window gunners are similar to troop systems; however, they must allow the crewmember to move out of the seat to perform duties such as maneuvering the gun or observing tail rotor clearance while landing in unprepared areas. The system should restrain the occupant to the seat the instant he returns to the seat and provide adequate restraint during a crash. The system should maintain the lap belt buckle

^{34.} Carr, R. W., HELICOPTER TROOP/PASSENGER RESTRAINT SYSTEMS DESIGN CRITERIA EVALUATION, Dynamic Science, Division of Ultrasystems, Inc.; USAAMRDL Technical Report 75-10, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, June 1975, AD A012270.



Type I

Type II

Item identity

- 1. Inertia reel
- 2. Shoulder strap
- Lap belt anchor
 Buckle with shoulder strap connection
 Lap belt
- 6. Adjuster/fitting



in the proper relationship to the gunner, preventing the shoulder straps from pulling it up or the lap belt from pulling it sideways. Such a system has been described in Reference 35 and is shown in Figure 24. It consists of a lap belt with inertia reels on each side of the seat and two shoulder straps connected in an inverted-Y arrangement to a single inertia reel strap. The lap belt with thigh strap attachment is easy to put on and prevents the lap belt from riding up during operation of The lap belt is plugged into the two seat pan inerthe gun. tia reels when the crewmember is to be seated or is standing in front of the seat. The shoulder harness and lap belt with thigh straps may serve as a "monkey harness" when the crewmember disconnects the two lap belt plug-in fittings from the inertia reels. The resultant configuration permits the crewmember more extensive travel within the cabin while still being connected to the shoulder harness inertia reel, thereby restraining the crewmember from falling out of the aircraft.

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5.7.2.4 <u>Inflatable Systems</u>: An automatically inflatable body and head restraint system, IBAHRS, for helicopter crewmen has been jointly developed and tested by the Naval Air Development Center and the Applied Technology Laboratory. As illustrated in Figure 25, this system provides increased crash protection because it provides automatic pretensioning that forces the occupant back in his seat, thereby reducing dynamic overshoot and reducing strap loading on the wearer when the inflated restraint is compressed during the crash. The concentration of strap loads on the body is reduced because of the increased bearing surface provided by the inflated restraint, and both head rotation and the possibility of whiplash-induced trauma are also thus reduced.

Although more complex and costly than conventional belt systems, such a system may be justified because of its occupant protection potential. Development of the system and results of testing are documented in References 36 and 37.

- 35. Reilly, M. J., CRASHWORTHY HELICOPTER GUNNER'S SEAT IN-VESTIGATION, The Boeing Vertol Company; USAAMRDL Technical Report 74-98, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, January 1975, AD A005563.
- 36. Schulman, M., and McElhenney, J., INFLATABLE BODY AND HEAD RESTRAINT, NADC-77176-40, Naval Air Systems Command, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., September 1977.
- 37. Singley, G. T., III, TEST AND EVALUATION OF IMPROVED AIR-CRAFT RESTRAINT SYSTEMS FOR COMBAT HELICOPTERS, Paper No. A.18, presented at NATO/AGARD Aerospace Medical Panel, Aerospace Specialist's Meeting on Aircrew and Survivability, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bodo, Norway, May 20-23, 1980.

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5.7.3 General Design Criteria

5.7.3.1 <u>Comfort</u>

Comfort must not be compromised by crash-survival requirements for obvious reasons. The main comfort consideration for restraint harnesses is the absence of rigid hardware located over bony portions of the torso. Also, hardware assemblages that are too wide or large, or are not configured efficiently to fit the desired location on the body could be uncomfortable. Webbing that is too wide or too stiff could also cause discomfort through creasing of the webbing or perspiration due to reduced ventilation.

5.7.3.2 Emergency Release Requirements: From a crash survival point of view, it is mandatory that a shoulder harness/lap belt combination have a single point of release that can be operated by one (either) hand to make it easier for debilitated occupants to quickly free themselves from their harnessing after a severe crash because of the dangers of postcrash fire or sinking in The force required to release the harness with only one water. finger should fall between 20 and 30 lb on the basis of existing requirements for military harnesses. Further, the release should be possible with the weight of the occupant hanging in the restraint system after experiencing the full crash loads. The release forces for the inverted case should be minimized and, in any case, should not exceed 50 lb applied with only one finger. It should be possible to produce the torque necessary to release rotary buckles by applying a load at a single point on the handle as described above.

In restraint systems other than the Type I of Figure 23, if a lift latch or similar type buckle is used, the restraint system design should ensure that the latch lifts from left to right on all installations. This will reduce the possibility of reverse installations and their resultant hazard.

The release device must either have the capability to withstand the bending moments associated with deflections and motions during loading, or it should contain features that allow the fittings to align themselves with the loads, thereby reducing or eliminating the moments. If belt loading direction is such as to cause the strap to bunch up in the end of a slot, failure can occur through initiation of edge tear. The fitting and motion angles illustrated in Figure 26 are recommended.

If the integrity of the attachment of the fitting within the buckle can be compromised by rotation, then rotation must be completely eliminated. Eliminating fitting rotation in the flat plane of the buckle during loading may prove to be difficult in lightweight systems. Experience has shown that it is

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Figure 26. Buckle fitting attachment and motion angles.

better to design the attachment of the fitting within the buckle to be insensitive to rotation than to rely on restraining the fitting against rotation. For example, a round pin in a round hole would be preferable to a flat-faced dog which must seat on a flat face of a slot. In the latter case, a small amount of rotation can cause point loading of a corner of the dog against one end of the slot. The point loading can easily increase the stress applied at the contact point to its ultimate bearing strength. This will result in metal deformation and the formation of a sloped surface which then can act to cam open the attachment mechanism.

Further, the release mechanism (buckle) should be protected against accidental opening. Neither decelerative loading of components nor contact with aircraft controls, such as cyclic controls, should open the device. It was mentioned earlier in this volume that required cockpit dimensions should be reviewed. It appears that the occupant can be placed too close

to the cyclic control in helicopters and that a fully retracted cyclic head can contact the buckle. The buckle release mechanism should be protected against inadvertent release either during operation or in a crash. It should be emphasized that, if contact between the cyclic control and the buckle is possible in an operational mode, a considerable overlap can exist during crash loading when the restraint system is deformed forward several inches.

5.7.3.3 Lap Belt Anchorage: The actual anchorage point for the lap belt can be located either on the seat bucket or on the basic aircraft structure, although it is usually desirable to locate it on the seat. If the anchorage is located on basic aircraft structure, consideration must be given to the movement of the seat when load-limiting means are used so that the lap belt restraint remains effective regardless of seat position. Longitudinal load limiting of the seat serves little purpose if the lap belt is attached to the basic structure. However, careful consideration must be given to the belt assembly strength since the belt must restrain the motion of the seat, as well as the occupant.

The lap belt should be anchored to provide optimum restraint for the lower torso when subjected to eyeballs-out $(-G_{1})$ forces. One of the anchorage variables which has an influence on restraint optimization is the location of the lap belt anchorage in the fore-and-aft direction. The important characteristic is the angle in a vertical fore-and-aft plane between a projection of the lap belt centerline and the buttock reference line, or plane. This angle defines the geometrical rela-tionship between the longitudinal and vertical components of the belt load. A small angle provides an efficient path for supporting longitudinal loads while a large angle provides an efficient system for supporting large vertical loads. Thus, for supporting large forward-directed loads, a small angle would be desirable, but for reacting the large vertical loads imposed on the lap belt by the loaded shoulder harness a large angle is required. The compromise for location of the anchorage must consider all the variables including the tendency for the occupant to submarine under the lap belt.

In order to avoid the increased possibility of both spinal and abdominal injury, a properly designed restraint system should not allow submarining to occur. Still, an efficient angle should be maintained to limit the forward motion of the occupant.

Comfort is another concern in lap belt anchor location. A pilot must raise and lower his thighs during operation of rudder pedals or antitorque pedals. If the lap belt anchor is too far

forward, the lap belt will pass over the pilot's thighs forward of the crease between the thighs and the pelvis and thus may interfere with vertical leg motion. It is important, therefore, to position the lap belt anchorage so that it provides optimum restraint while not interfering with the pilot's operational tasks. A forward location of the anchor does not negatively influence the comfort of passengers since passengers are not required to perform operations with their legs.

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In order to satisfy comfort and crash safety requirements, the vertical angle between the lap belt centerline and the buttock reference line as installed on the 50th-percentile occupant should not be less than 45 degrees and should not exceed 55 degrees, as shown in Figure 27(a). Further, it is desirable to locate the anchor point at or below the buttock reference line to maximize comfort and performance. If the anchor point must be located above the buttock reference line, as on most armored seats, the anchor point should be positioned to ensure that the belt angle lies within the desired 45- to 55-degree For a system having a lap belt tiedown strap to counrange. teract the upward force of the shoulder harness (e.g., in pilot seats), the lap belt anchors should be positioned so that the centerline of the lap belt passes through the seat reference point as shown in Figure 27(b). If the restraint system does not have a tiedown strap (e.g., in passenger seats), the lap belt anchor should be positioned so that the belt centerline passes through the buttock reference line 2 to 2-1/4 in. forward of the seat reference point as shown in Figure 27(c). This position provides sufficient vertical load components to help counteract the upward force of the shoulder straps. For positioning anchors that do not fall on the buttock reference line, the angle between the lap belt centerline and the buttock reference line can be assumed to be 45 degrees for systems with tiedown straps and 55 degrees for those without.

For seats that limit lateral motion of the occupant with structure, such as in armored seats, the anchorage point and hardware should possess sufficient flexibility and strength to sustain design belt loads when the belt is deflected laterally toward the center of the seat through an angle of up to 60 degrees from a vertical position. The side motion of fittings on other seats should also be capable of supporting design loads with the lap belt deflected laterally away from the center of the seat through an angle up to 45 degrees from the vertical. These recommendations are made to ensure that lateral loading on the torso will not result in lap belt anchorage failure.

5.7.3.4 <u>Shoulder Harness Anchorage</u>: The shoulder harness or inertia reel anchorage can be located either on the seat back structure or on the basic aircraft structure, although it is usually more desirable to locate it on the seat. In placing

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Figure 27. Lap belt anchorage geometry.

the inertia reel, strap routing and possible reel interference with structure during seat adjustment or energy-absorbing stroke of the seat must be considered. Locating the anchorage on the basic aircraft structure may be the only practical approach for improving crashworthiness in light aircraft, particularly in retrofit applications. It will relieve a large portion of the overturning moment applied to the seat under longitudinal loading. However, due consideration must be given to the effect of seat bucket movement in load-limited seats. Vertical movement of the seat pan can be provided for by placing the inertia reel aft of the seat back shoulder strap guide a sufficient distance so that seat vertical movement will change the horizontal position and the angle of the straps very little.

Shoulder straps should pass over the shoulders in a plane perpendicular to the back tangent line or at any upward (from shoulders to pull-off point) angle not to exceed 30 degrees, as illustrated in the upper-left sketch in Figure 28. A shoulder harness pull-off point should be at least 26 in. above the buttock reference line.

The shoulder harness anchorage or guide at the top of the seat back should permit no more than 0.5-in. lateral movement (slot no more than 0.5 in. wider than strap) to ensure that the seat occupant is properly restrained laterally. The guide should provide smooth transitions to the slot. The transition contour should be of a radius no less than 0.25 in. and should extend



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completely around the periphery of the slot to minimize edge wear on the strap and reduce the possibility of webbing failure due to contact with sharp edges under high loading.

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> 5.7.3.5 Lap Belt Tiedown Strap Anchorage: A lap belt tiedown strap is required for forward-facing crewmembers. It is recommended that the tiedown strap be located on the seat pan centerline at a point 14 to 15 in. forward of the seat back. For shorter seat pans, the anchor must be placed as far forward as possible.

> 5.7.3.6 Adjustment Hardware: Adjusters must carry the full design load of the restraint system subassembly of which they are a part without slipping or crushing the webbing under items such as locking cams. In extremely highly loaded applications, this may require that the strap be doubled in a manner that requires the adjuster to carry only one half of the strap assembly load. The force required to adjust the length of webbing should not exceed 30 lb in accordance with existing military requirements for harnesses. Insofar as possible, all adjustments should be easily made with one (either) hand. Adjustment motions should be toward the single-point release buckle.

5.7.3.7 Location of Adjustment and Release Hardware: This hardware must not be located directly over head points of the skeletal structure, such as the iliac crests of the pelvis or the collarbones. The lap belt length adjuster should be located either at the center of the belt near the release buckle or at the side of the hips below the iliac crests, preferably the latter. The shoulder strap adjusters should be located as low on the chest as possible in order to avoid concentrated pressure on the collarbones.

5.7.3.8 Webbing Width and Thickness Requirements: Webbing reguirements are discussed in detail in Section 5.7.4.

5.7.3.9 <u>Hardware Materials</u>: All materials used for the attachment of webbing (release buckles, anchorages, and length adjusters) should be ductile enough to deform locally, particularly at stress concentration points. A minimum elongation value of 10 percent (as determined by standard tensile test Epecimens) is recommended for all metal harness-fitting materials. There are obviously some components that, for operational purposes, rely on hardness. These components should be designed to perform their necessary function but be made from materials as nearly as possible immune to brittle failures.

5.7.3.10 Structural Connections

5.7.3.10.1 Bolted Connections: The safety margins for shear and tensile bolts in restraint systems should be 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Also, bolts less than 0.25 in. in diameter should not be used in tensile applications. Wherever possible the bolts should be designed for shear rather than tension.

5.7.3.10.2 Riveted Connections: The guidelines presented in MIL-HDBK-5, Reference 32, are recommended for restraint system hardware design.

5.7.3.10.3 Welded Connections: Acceptable welding processes are discussed in Military Specifications MIL-W-8604, -6873, -45205, and -8611; however, strict inspection procedures should be used to ensure that all welded joints are of adequate guality. (Other provisions presented in Section 5.4.3 also apply.)

5.7.3.10.4 Plastic Strength Analysis: Plastic analysis methods should be used for strength determination wherever applicable in order to obtain maximum-strength hardware at the lowest possible weight.

5.7.4 Webbing and Attachments

5.7.4.1 Properties: The main advantage of a single-strength harness (only one restraint harness in the inventory) would be the assurance that harnesses could be interchanged between load-limited seats and nonload-limited seats without fear that an understrength harness might be installed on a nonload-On this premise, the design strength of all limited seat. forward-facing and side-facing restraint harnesses should be equal. The design loads for the various harness components attached to the seat are listed in Table 8. The elongation of all webbing used in the harness must be minimized to decrease Table 8 shows that the shoulder strap elongation overshoot. is restricted to 1.5 in., while the lap belt is restricted to 2.0 in. of total end-to-end stretch or 1.0 in. of loop elonga-Restraint systems for the new generation of Army helition. copters use a low-elongation polyester webbing, the characteristics of which are listed in Table 9.

5.7.4.2 Width and Thickness Requirements: Minimum webbing width requirements are specified in Table 10. All webbing used for restraint harnesses must be thick enough to ensure that the webbing does not fold or crease to form a "rope" or present a thin sharp edge under high loading that will cause damage to soft tissue. A minimum thickness of 0.055 in. is considered acceptable.

TABLE 8.	RESTRAINT	HARNESS	COMPONENTS	LOAD-ELONGATION
	DESIGN AND	TEST R	EQUIREMENTS	(MIL-S-58095(AV))

Harness components	Minimum load (1b) ^(a)	Maximum elongation (design goal) (in.) ^(b)
Inertia reel strap(s) Shoulder harness strap(s)	6000(C) 4000(d)	1.5 ^(e)
Lap belt	4000	2.0
Lap belt tiedown strap	4500	0.5

NOTES: (a) Applied in straight tension.

- (b) Total length of harness component tested must be the same as when installed on the seat and adjusted for a 95th-percentile clothed occupant.
- (c) This represents the total load from all shoulder straps. A single diagonal shoulder strap should carry 6000 lb.
- (d) This represents the minimum load that one of two shoulder straps should carry.
- (e) This applies only to the shoulder harness and inertia reel strap outside the reel (exclusive of the webbing wound on the spool of the inertia reel).

Restraint system component	Nominal webbing width _(in.)_	Webbing thickness (in.)	Minimum breaking strength (1b)	Elongation* (percent)
Inertia reel	1-3/4	0.057	6980	6.9 @ 3000 lb
Shoulder straps	2	0.057	7800	7.6 @ 4000 lb
Lap belt	2-1/4	0.057	8880	7.8 @ 4000 1Ь
Lap belt tiedown strap	1-3/4	0.057	6980	6.9 @ 3000 1b

TABLE 9. RESTRAINT WEBBING CHARACTERISTICS

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TABLE 10. MINIMUM WEBBING WIDTH REQUIREMENTS

Webbing identity	Minimum widch (in.)
Lap belt	2-1/4*
Shoulder strap	2
Tiedown strap	1-1/2
*A greater width (up to sirable in the center a	4 in.) cr pad is de- bdominal area.

5.7.4.3 Webbing Attachment Methods

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5.7.4.3.1 Stitched Joints: The strength and reliability of stitched seams must be ensured by using the best known cord sizes and stitch patterns for a specified webbing type. The stitch patterns and cord sizes used in existing high-strength military restraint webbings appear to provide satisfactory performance. The basic stitch pattern used in these harnesses is a "W-W" configuration for single-lapped joints. The 50-lb strength No. 6 cord at 4-1/2 to 5 stitches per inch is recommended, as illustrated in Figure 29, for use on MIL-W-25361 webbings. The use of the 50-lb cord and an 80-percent efficiency results in a minimum strength of 160 lb/in. (4 stitches x 50 lb/stitch x 80 percent) for a single-lapped joint or 320 lb/in. for a looped joint. Thus, the total stitch length needed can be determined by the total required load.

It has been shown recently that the heavier thread is not compatible with the new low-elongation polyester webbing (Reference 38). For these webbings, a smaller diameter cord offers the advantages of reduced webbing fiber damage and the ability to be used with automatic sewing machines and is therefore acceptable.

The use of a 30-percent increase in the total stitch length required is recommended to offset the normal aging strength decrease as well as the possible abrasion strength decrease. Covering the stitched joints with cloth to provide wear protection for the cords is also recommended.

^{38.} Farris, L., HIGH STRENGTH STITCHING FOR AIRCRAFT PERSON-NEL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS, Pacific Scientific Co.; Proceedings, 1978 SAFE Symposium, Survival and Flight Equipment Association, Canoga Park, California, October 1978.



Figure 29. Stitch pattern and cord size.

The size of the overlapped and stitched area should be minimized to reduce weight, reduce the stiffened section of the webbing, and provide more room between fittings for adjustment.

5.7.4.3.2 Webbing Wrap Radius: The wrap radius is the radius of the fitting over which the webbing is wrapped at buckles, anchorages, and adjusters, as illustrated in Figure 30. The 0.062-in. minimum radius should be carried around the ends of the slot as shown in Figure 30 to preclude edge cutting of webbing if the webbing should be loaded against the slot end.

5.7.4.3.3 Hardware-to-Webbing Folds: A possible method of reducing fitting width at anchorage, buckle, or adjuster fittings is to fold the webbing as shown in Figure 31. This reduces the weight and size of attachment fittings; however, it can also cause premature webbing failure because of the force applied by the top layer of webbing compressing the lower against the fitting slot edge. If this technique is to be used, tests to demonstrate integrity are recommended. Also, for configurations that require two load paths, such as lap belts, where an adjuster cannot hold the required 4000-lb load, the webbing is looped through a full-width slot which halves the load in each strap. An adjuster is then included in one strap. Adjustment requires that the webbing be freely drawn through the fitting, a requirement that folded webbing cannot meet.



Figure 30. Wrap radius for webbing joints.



Figure 31. Webbing fold at metal hardware attachment.

5.7.4.3.4 Surface Roughness of Fittings: A surface roughness of no more than RMS-32 is recommended to prevent fraying of the webbing due to the frequency of movement over the metal.

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5.7.4.4 <u>Energy-Absorbing Webbing</u>: Energy-absorbing restraint system webbing has been considered for limiting loads on the occupant. However, primarily because of the increased potential for secondary impacts of occupants, energy-absorbing webbing is not recommended for use in seating systems. The limited space available in aircraft requires that the strike envelope be minimized. Therefore, the use of the lowest elongation available is specified.

5.7.5 Inertia Reels, Control, and Installation

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The inertia reel should give the crewmember full freedom of movement during normal operating conditions while automatically locking the shoulder harness during an abrupt deceleration. The design requirements specified in MIL-R-8236 (Reference 39) are compatible with the other restraint harness requirements listed in this chapter, and it is recommended that the use of this specification be continued with the single exception of strap load. The specification requires reels to exhibit a minimum ultimate strength of 4000 lb applied to the spool. Since 6000 lb is required (Table 8), strap friction must be relied on to reduce the loads to tolerable values at the reel. Therefore, higher strength reels should be developed to eliminate the weakness.

In addition to the MIL-R-8236-type reel, which has the function of preventing further strap extension, there are power-haulback reels that rapidly retract slack to apply a tensile load to the belt. Generally, these systems, some of which use a basic MIL-R-8236 inertia reel, are powered by a gas generator and must be manually actuated prior to impact. Automatic actuation by an acceleration sensor is not recommended because human tolerance considerations limit the haul-back velocity. By the time the crash could be sensed, there would not be time to complete the haulback within tolerable accelerative limits.

It is recommended that the rate-of-extension type reel be used on all aircraft types to assure locking regardless of load direction.

The inertia reel may be anchored to the seat back structure or to the basic aircraft structure with the same reservations previously mentioned in Section 5.7.3.4. The shoulder straps must be maintained within the acceptable angle range as presented in Figure 28. If an anchorage to basic structure is used, consideration must be given to the possible seat bucket motion so that the shoulder strap angle or length does not change by a

^{39.} Military Specification, MIL-R-8236D, REEL, SHOULDER HAR-NESS, INERTIA LOCK, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 19 December 1975.

significant amount during energy-absorbing stroke. The reel should be mounted and the webbing routed so that the webbing does not bear on the reel housing.

5.8 SEAT STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

5.8.1 Recommended Occupant Weights for Seat Design

The 95th- and 5th-percentile occupant weights are recommended for the upper and lower limits of occupant weights to be considered in seat design. Ideally, seat stroke limits should be sized for the 95th-percentile occupant, while the occupant acceleration limits should be determined for the 5th percentile. In this way, the resistive forces would be tolerable to all occupants, while the stroke lengths also would be adequate for all. In most situations, sufficient stroke distance will not be made available in the aircraft to permit using the ideal approach; therefore, compromises will have to be made. Specific criteria for these cases are presented in this chapter.

5.8.1.1 <u>Crewseats</u>: The design weight should be based on the <u>typical</u> weight of the seat occupant, not the extremes. This means that the aviator weight recommended for crewseat design should not include combat gear. Typical weights are presented in Table 11.

Item	95th- percentile weight (1b)	50th- percentile weight (1b)	5th- percentile weight (1b)
Aviator	211.7	170.5	133.4
Clothing	3.1	3.1	3.1
Helmet	3.4	3.4	3.4
Boots	4.1	4.1	4.1
Total weight	222.3	181.1	144.0
Vertical effective weight	175.2	142.3	112.6

TABLE 11. TYPICAL AVIATOR WEIGHTS

Variable-load energy-absorbing systems are highly desirable to maximize efficiency and provide protection in limited space. Therefore, they should be incorporated in seat designs whenever possible.

5.8.1.2 <u>Troop and Gunner Seats</u>: The same percentile range of occupant sizes should be considered for troop and gunner seat designs. A greater variation of clothing and equipment is used by troops than by aviators; troop seats should be designed to accommodate them. The 95th-percentile occupant should be considered heavily clothed and equipped, while the 5th-percentile occupant should be considered lightly clothed and equipped. The typical weights of seated troops in aircraft are as shown in Table 12.

These	95th- percentile weight	50th- percentile weight	5th- percentile weight
ltem	(11)	(16)	(10)
Troop/Gunner weight	201.9	156.3	126.3
Clothing (less boots)	3.0	3.0	3.0
Boots	4.0	4.0	4.0
Equipment	33.3	33.3	33.3
Total weight	242.2	196.6	166.6
Vertical effective weight clothed	163.9	127.4	103.4
Vertical effective weight equipped	197.2	160.7	136.7

TABLE 12. TROOP AND GUNNER WEIGHTS

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5.8.2 Strength and Deformation

5.8.2.] Forward Loads: For a load-limited system, a minimum displacement must be achieved if the system is to remain in place during a given decelerative pulse. Actually, all systems are load limited, although not necessarily through original intent. The inherent load-deflection curve for any system imposes a definite limit on the system's ability to resist impulsive loading. The objective of intentionally load-limited seat systems is to make the best use of the space available for relative displacement of the seat and occupant with respect to the airframe, while maintaining loads on the occupant consistent with the type of restraint system used and the occupant's capacity to survive the loads imposed.

Design curves for the forward direction are presented in Figure 32, where it is estimated that the requirements are not conservative for the input pulses selected for design purposes. These are a 30-G peak triangular pulse of 50-ft/sec velocity change in the cockpit and a 24-G peak with 50-ft/sec velocity change in the cabin area.

The st 'ic loads that the seat must withstand are obtained by multiping the load factors (G) shown in Figure 32 by the sum of the total weight of the 95th-percentile crewmember or passenger plus the weight of the seat and any armor or equipment attached to or carried in the seat. For crewseats, the weight of combat gear is not included (see Section 5.8.1.1).

Longitudinal displacement of approximately 6 in. for cockpit seats and 12 in. for cabin seats measured at the seat reference point (the seat reference point may be projected to the outside of the seat pan for measurement convenience) is the practical limit for seats in existing Army aircraft. Since there is typically more room available in cabins than in cockpits, the advantages of longer energy-absorbing strokes can usually be achieved. Longer strokes permit the absorption of equivalent energy at lower loads and thus can serve to reduce seat weight and increase the level of protection offered over a wider occupant weight range.

In viewing Figure 32, it can be seen that for cabin seats 12 in. of stroke enables the minimum limit load to be reduced to 15 G, whereas for cockpit seats a 20-G minimum limit load is required with only 6 in. of stroke. The 15-G and 20-G minimum limit loads fix the G levels of the base curves for the cabin and cockpit seat, respectively. The available stroke will be unique for each specific aircraft, and the energy-absorbing mechanisms in the seats should be compatible with the available stroke distances. If forward or sideward motion threatens to





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limit the effectiveness of the vertical energy attenuating system or increase the possibility of severe injury caused by secondary impact of the occupant with items in the aircraft, then energy-absorbing stroke in directions other than vertical should not be used. The 6 in. and 12 in. allowed by the curves of Figure 32 should be viewed as maximum distances which are subject to limitations of available space in each specific aircraft and location in the aircraft.

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The initial slope of the cockpit seat base curve to 1.0 in. of deflection allows for elastic deformation consistent with a relatively rigid crewseat while the lighter weight and more flexible troop/gunner seat requires a lesser slope. The 30-G and 35-G upper cutoffs reflect consideration of human tolerance limits, load variations between cockpit and cabin locations, and practical limitations of seat weight and excessive airframe loading.

5.8.2.2 Use of Design Curves: To be acceptable, a seat design must have a characteristic load-deflection curve that rises to the left and above the base curves of Figure 32 and extends into the region beyond the upper curve. This requirement also applies to the lateral strength and deformation requirements discussed in Section 5.8.2.6. In Figure 32, curves A, C, and E are acceptable curves, but curve B is unacceptable because it does not reach the required ultimate strength. Curve D reveals inefficient use of seat deflection by intruding into the base area. The seat is deflecting at too low a load, thus absorbing less energy than desirable.

5.8.2.3 Aftward Loads: Large aftward loads seldom occur in fixed-wing aircraft accidents but may occur in rotary-wing accidents. A capability to withstand 12 G is recommended for aftward loads for all seats. This value will usually be automatically met by all seats meeting the forward load requirements. Occupant weight should be the total weight of the 95th-percentile crewmember or trooper as presented in Section 5.8.1.

5.8.2.4 <u>Downward Loads</u>: Human tolerance to vertical impact limits the acceptable forces in the vertical direction for all aircraft seats. The maximum allowable headward acceleration (parallel to the back tangent line) for seated occupants, is on the order of 23 G for durations up to approximately 0.006 sec. Therefore, the 48-G design pulse imposes the requirement for energy absorption in the vertical direction by some form of load limiting.

The effective weight in the vertical direction of a seat occupant is approximately 80 percent of the occupant's total weight because the lower extremities are partially supported

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by the floor. The effective occupant weight may be determined by summing the following:

- Eighty percent of the occupant's body weight.
- Eighty percent of the weight of the occupant's clothing (less boots).
- One hundred percent of the weight of any equipment carried on the body above knee level. Combat gear is not included in the effective weight of the pilot or copilot (see Section 5.8.1.1).

The dynamic limit load for the load-limiting system should be established by use of a load factor (G_1) of 11.5. The dynamic limit load is determined by multiplying the summation of the effective weight of the seat occupant, and the weight of the movable or stroking portion of the seat, by 11.5. The resulting dynamic limit load includes the total force resisting the vertical movement of the seat in a crash; the dynamic limit load of the energy-absorption system, simple friction, and friction due to binding, etc. This requirement is difficult to satisfy with a sliding guidance system because the frictional load varies with contact load which, in turn, varies with the impact load vector direction. A relatively frictionfree rolling mechanism or collapsible structure is therefore recommended.

The 11.5-G design criterion, taken from Reference 40 and modified to provide a tolerable deceleration of the 5th-percentile occupant, considers the dynamic response of the seat and occupant. The factor of 11.5 was established to limit the decelerative loading on the seat/occupant system to less than 23 G for durations in excess of 0.006 sec (the tolerable level for humans as interpreted from the Eiband data) in crashes that do not exhaust the stroke of the seat.

Crewseats should be designed to stroke a minimum distance of 12 in. when the seat is in the lowest position of the adjustment range. This distance is needed to absorb the residual energy associated with the vertical design pulse. Further, the load-limiting system should be designed to stroke through the full distance available including the vertical adjustment

^{40.} Desjardins, S. P., and Harrison, H., THE DESIGN, FABRICA-TION, AND TESTING OF AN INTEGRALLY ARMORED CRASHWORTHY CREWSEAT, Dynamic Science, Division of Marshall Industries; USAAMRDL Technical Report 71~58, Eustis Directorate, U. S. Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Eustis, Virginia, January 1972, AD 742733.

distance. Since a vertical adjustment of $\pm 2-1/2$ in. from neutral is typically required by crewseat specifications, proper design can provide up to 17 in. of stroke, depending on seat adjustment position.

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If it is absolutely impossible to obtain a minimum of 12 in. of stroke, a lesser amount is acceptable, but in no case should it be less than 7 in. The reduced stroke is acceptable for a retrofit application or for use in small aircraft in which it is simply impossible to find the space for a 12-in. stroke. In such cases a systems analysis is mandatory; the analysis must show that occupant protection is equivalent to the system in which the 12-in. stroke is available.

For retrofit applications, the maximum protection possible should be obtained in any component being modified, i.e., seats, gear, etc. Separate test criteria have been established for seats not having the required 12 in. of stroke and are presented in Section 5.10.2.2 of this document.

Energy-absorbing systems should be designed for 11.5 plus 1 G minus 0 G including the effect of the dynamic loading rate. To obtain the static test loads, dynamic limit loads should be reduced by the amount due to rate sensitivity of the particular device used. Further, in the design of the system the desired total resistive load on the seat should be obtained by summing the resistive load provided by the energy-absorbing system and the resistive load resulting from friction and/or other mechanisms unique to the particular system. Thus, the resistive load of the energy-absorbing subsystem must be less than the load required to decelerate the seat by the amount of the other stroke-resisting variables.

If the energy-absorbing system is to provide only one force setting, the effective weight of the 50th-percentile occupant from Tables 11 and 12 should be used for sizing it in order to ensure a tolerable stroke for the majority of the occupants, not exceeding the stroke limitations of the seat. These weights are 142.3 and 160.7 1b for pilot/copilot and troop and gunner seats, respectively.

In order to use the stroke distance available at maximum efficiency, regardless of occupant weight, a variable-force loadlimiting mechanism is desirable. With an infinitely variable force system, the deceleration levels can be maintained within acceptable limits (if the stroke is not exhausted) for the full range of occupant weights for either crew or troop seats while using equal stroke lengths for identical pulses. A compromise is possible for a seat design that uses a load-limiting device rather than collapsing structure. The device can be designed

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to produce two or more limit loads that can be selected by the seat occupant. The selection would be made on the basis of seat occupant weight. For example, for a dual-limit-load device, the lowest force might be established by using the weight of a 5th-percentile occupant. The second force might be designed for the weight of a 50th-percentile occupant. In operation then, the occupant would be required to select a limit load by movement of a lever or dial upon entering the seat. It is recommended that at least a dual-level load limiter (preferably three or more levels) be used to provide maximum protection over the complete occupant weight range. ----

The interaction between the occupant and the movable seat masses increases with seat mass. Therefore, the movable seat mass should be minimized.

Troop seats should be designed for the maximum stroke feasible to maximize protection over the large weight range represented by the fully equipped and lightly equipped occupant. It is recommended that the full 17-in. seat pan height normally considered desirable from the human engineering standpoint be used for energy-absorbing stroke. It is further recommended, as a minimum, that the limit load of the system be sized using the 11.5-G load factor and the effective weight of the 50thpercentile heavily equipped occupant (160.7 lb). Variablelevel load limiters sized as discussed previously are also desirable for troop seats.

5.8.2.5 Upward Loads: A capability to withstand a minimum upward load of 8 G is recommended for all aircraft seats. Occupant weight should be that of the 95th-percentile crewmember or trooper as presented in Section 5.8.1.

5.8.2.6 Lateral Strength and Deformation Requirements: The lateral load and deformation requirements for forward- and aftfacing seats are presented in Figure 33. Two curves are presented. One is for rotary-wing aircraft, and the other is for light fixed-wing aircraft. The deflections at the seat reference point should be measured. Occupant weight should be as specified in Section 5.8.1 and should be that of the 95thpercentile aircrew member or trooper.

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Lateral loading in the forward direction (aircraft reference system) on side-facing seats should be the same as for forward loading (Figure 32) except that load limiting should be employed.

For crewseats, the lateral deflection should be minimized; however, it is doubtful if any great stiffness can be achieved in lightweight hardware. It is believed adequate, as a design



Total controlled deformation (y), in. measured at seat reference point

Figure 33. Lateral seat load and deformation requirements for all types of Army aircraft.

goal, to attempt to limit the initial deflection to 1 in. with a 2-in. requirement. Because of the possible loading rate sensitivity of the seat materials, it is felt to be acceptable to allow analysis of test data to demonstrate compliance. This analysis might include adjustments of static test data by use of measured or known deflection and load data from dynamic tests. Further, in cases where wells are provided under the seats to increase the available stroke distance, the deformation should be elastic. This will allow the seat to realign itself with the well prior to entry after reduction of the lateral and longitudinal loads in those cases where the loads are relieved soon enough.

5.8.3 Other Seats

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The requirements presented for crewseats and troop and gunner seats also apply to passenger seats and any other seat installed in the aircraft for any purpose. Unique seats installed for special uses are not to be exempt.

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5.9 PERSONNEL RESTRAINT HARNESS TESTING

The restraint harnesses are to be statically and dynamically tested along with the seat and/or structure to which they are attached. However, the lap belt, shoulder straps, and tiedown straps, including all hardware in the load path, should be statically tested separately to ensure that all components possess adequate strength and to determine elongation. The strength and elongation test requirements of restraint system subassemblies are specified in Table 8. s take d

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Specific component tests, including operational tests, are detailed in a draft military specification (Reference 41). However, all components and subassemblies should be statically load tested. Each subassembly should be tested to its full design load to demonstrate its adequacy. Elongation characteristics should be measured to document these data for comparison with requirements and use in systems analyses.

5.10 STRUCTURAL SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS

Both static and dynamic tests are recommended, and it is also recommended that all seat and litter systems be tested as complete units. This is not to imply that component tests are not useful; on the contrary, they can be extremely useful and should be employed wherever possible to verify required strengths. This practice is particularly valid where analyses, such as by finite element methods, have been used to accurately predict distribution of loads in redundant structures.

Upon acceptance of prototype systems tested under both static and dynamic conditions, no further tests should be required except for quality assurance. Major structural design changes in the basic seat system will require static retesting of the new system to ensure that no loss in strength has been caused by the design changes. If the changes could affect the energyabsorbing, or stroking, performance of the seat, additional dynamic tests should also be conducted. Major structural design changes are those changes involving principal load-carrying members such as floor, bulkhead, or ceiling tiedown fittings, structural links or assemblies, seat legs, or energy-absorbing systems. Minor changes, such as in ancillary fittings, can be accepted without a structural test. A significant weight hacrease, however, such as the addition of personnel or seat inmor, would require additional testing. In summary, changes that increase loading, decrease strength, produce significant changes in load distribution, or affect the stroking mechanism will require retesting.

^{41.} Proposed Draft Military Specification, MIL-R-XXXX(AV), RESTRAINT SYSTEM, AIRCREW, September 1974.

All testing is to be conducted with the seat cushions in place and, for seats with adjustments, the seats should be in the full-up and full-aft positions unless another position is shown to be more critical. All tests should be conducted under simultaneous conditions of floor buckling and warping as illustrated in Figure 34 or bulkhead warping as illustrated in Figure 35. The combination of warping conditions should be that which represents the most critical case for seat performance, such as that most likely to impede seat stroking. For example, considering the combined-load static test (No. 5 in Table 13) of a seat such as that shown in Figure 34, if the lateral load component were applied to the right, the right-hand track should be warped upward at the forward end (+10 degrees) to evaluate the possibility of interference with vertical stroke. Also, the seat should be mounted for testing on actual aircraft hardware, i.e., tracks or bulkhead fittings.

If desired, dynamic tests may be substituted for static tests; however, loading in all principal directions is required. Alternate dynamic tests are presented in Section 5.10.1.9.

5.10.1 Static Test Requirements

5.10.1.1 <u>General</u>: Table 13 presents the static test requirements for complete seat units. All static tests should be conducted under simultaneous conditions of floor or bulkhead buckling and warping as described above.

5.10.1.2 Unidirectional Tests: Where separate strength and deformation requirements have been specified in Table 11 for longitudinal, vertical, and lateral loading of seats, the loads should be applied separately. Seats must demonstrate no loss in structural integrity during these tests and should demonstrate acceptable energy-absorbing capacity.

5.10.1.3 <u>Combined Loads</u>: Seats must demonstrate no loss of structural integrity under conditions of combined loading as shown in Table 13 and should demonstrate ability to stroke in the vertical direction with the transverse loads applied.

5.10.1.4 Load Application Method: The test loads should be applied through a body block (see Section 5.10.1.5) restrained in the seat with the restraint system. The loads are to be applied at the expected center-of-gravity location of the occupant or occupants of each seat, as illustrated in Figure 36.

The loads calculated by multiplying the weight of the occupant and equipment plus the weight of the seat by the required load factor should be applied continuously, or in not more than 2-G increments while the load-deformation performance of the seat is recorded. Maximum loads need not be held for more than

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rest ref. <u>no.</u>	Loading direction with respect to fuselage floor	Load required	Percentile occupant used in load <u>determination</u>	Load/deformation requirements ^{a, i}
1	Upward	8-G minimum	95	No requirement
2	Downward ^{b,d}	11.5 +1.0 G -0 G	50	See Section 5.8.2.4
3	Aftward	12-G minimum	95	No requirement
4	Forward	See Figure 32	95	See Figure 32
5	Combined			
	Forward ^{e,f}	See Figure 32	95	See Figure 32
	Downward ^C	11.5 +2.0 G -1.0 G	50	Same as Test 2 ^h
	Lateral ^f	9-G mininum	95	No requirements
6	Lateral ^g	See Figure 33	95	See Figure 33
(b)	duct of all static cation. If more than one 1 tative sample of s tested. If more than one 1	tests and kept oad-limiter set ettings spannir oad-limiter set	deformed throu ting is provide of the range of	ghout load appli- d, a represen- loads should be d. the highest
(d)	load should be use Subsequent to the vice, cockpit seat the effective weig occupant per Secti to the basic struc and is supported b	d. stroking of the s should carry ht of the 95th- on 5.8.1 plus s ture except whe y the floor.	e vertical energ a static load o percentile clot seat without los en the seat pan	y-absorbing de- f 25 G, based on hed and equipped as of attachment has stroked to
(e)	In the event that direction, a 20-G pit seats may be u	no load-limitir load for cabin sed for this co	ng device is use seats and a 25- ombined loading.	d in the forward G load for cock-
(f)	For seats employin combined loading a teral loads should This sequence demo after transverse 1	g vertical guid nd cause bindir be reached pri nstrates whethe oads are applie	les which could ng, the maximum for to initiation for the seat will ad.	distort under forward and la- n of stroking. stroke downward
(g)	The lateral loads tion. In the case is optional.	should be appli of symmetrical	ed in the most seats, the loa	critical direc- ding direction
(h)	Failure to meet th	e 11.5-G +2.0/-	1.0-G static ve	rtical load

TABLE 13. SEAT DESIGN AND STATIC TEST REQUIREMENTS

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limit should not be cause for seat rejection if the seat vertical energy-absorbing system meets dynamic load requirements. Plastic deformation is permissible; however, structural integrity

(i) must be maintained.







1 sec. The maximum load reached, regardless of duration, is to be used to assess compliance.

On integrally armored crewseats, care should be taken to assure that the loads are applied proportionally to the proper assembly or test item to simulate the loads that would typically be carried by the restraint harness and the seat support structure. In other words, the portion of the load that could be expected to be restrained by the restraint harness should be applied to the body block as described above. The portion of the load representing inertial loading of the movable assembly should be applied separately at the center of gravity of the appropriate substructure through another provision. For example, a lever to proportion the load between the body block and movable section of the seat, and a sling to apply the appropriate portion of the load to the bucket, can be used. For seats with a relatively heavy frame, the inertial load of the frame can be applied separately at its appropriate center of gravity. This technique, although adding complexity to the test setup, assures that all components in the seat and restraint system assembly have been tested to their approximate static design loads and that, as far as a static test simulation can be extended, performance and structural adequacy have been demonstrated. For lightweight seats (less than approximately 45 lb for total seat and restraint system), the total load can be applied to the body block.

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Figure 36. Static load application point and critical body block pelvis geometry.

5.10.1.5 Static Load Body Block: The static test loads must be applied through a body block contoured to approximate a 95th-percentile occupant seated in a normal flying attitude. The body block must contain shoulders, neck, and upper legs, and provide for passage of a lap belt tiedown strap between the legs. The upper legs should be contoured to simulate the flat-tened and spread configuration of seated thighs and to allow the proper location of the buckle. Critical pelvis dimensions are shown in Figure 36. Buttock contours must be provided to permit proper fit in a contoured seat pan. The leg stubs should be configured to permit proper seat pan loading as the body block rotates forward under longitudinal loading; i.e., the leg stubs should be only long enough to provide a surface to react the lap belt load. The side view of the buttocks should include an up-curved surface forward of the ischial tuberosities to allow the forward rotation of the body block

while maintaining the primary contact between the ischial tuberosities and the seat pan through the cushions.

5.10.1.6 <u>Deflection Measurements</u>: Deflection should be measured as close to the seat reference point as possible to eliminate seat structure rotational deformation from influencing the test results. To simplify these measurements, the seat reference point can be projected to the outside of the seat pan or bucket.

Normally the restraint system will be attached to the seat. However, if a unique situation should develop in which the only option for increasing crashworthiness is to attach the system (lap belt and shoulder harness) to the basic aircraft structure rather than to the seat, certain factors should be considered. First, the forward and lateral deflection requirements of Figures 32 and 33 need not be considered because the restraint harness limits torso and seat deflection. Second, the vertical deflection of the seat pan still must be considered since the downward movement of the seat pan could cause excessive slack in the restraint harness, or the harness could limit the stroke of the seat, depending on where the restraint system is anchored. Neither of these conditions is acceptable in the design.

5.10.1.7 Load Determination: The total load required for all test directions, except downward, is determined by multiplying the required load factor from Table 13 by the weight of the 95th-percentile clothed and equipped occupant from Table 11 or 12 (Section 5.8.1) plus the weight of each seat. The effective weight of the 50th-percentile occupant should be used to calculate vertical components of loading (Test Nos. 2 and 5 of Table 13) as discussed in Section 5.8.2.4; the effective weight of the 95th-percentile clothed and equipped occupant should be used for the bottomed test (Test No. 2(d) in Table 13). The weight of that portion of the seat that strokes with the loadlimited portion of the seat must be added to the occupant weight to determine the total required load in the vertical direction.

5.10.1.8 <u>Multiple Seats</u>: Multiple-occupancy seats should be fully occupied when tested. If it is determined that the most adverse loading condition occurs in other than full-occupancy situations, additional tests should be run for those conditions.

5.10.1.9 Substitution of Dynamic For Static Tests: It is recommended that static tests be conducted because they are more economical to run than dynamic tests; their slow rate of load application permits closer real-time observation of seat response to the loading, and static testing provides structural response information which is more comparable to the static analyses typically used in the development of present seat designs. In the future, when dynamic analysis becomes more reliable, this latter point will no longer apply. A significant consideration in static-versus-dynamic testing is the cost of the hardware. Static testing can be conducted with a minimum number of seats because the condition of the seat can be monitored and judgments made as to its acceptability for continued testing. If failures due to previous tests occur, parts can be replaced and the test economically rerun.

If final acceptance decisions are based on dynamic tests alone, a considerably more rigorous dynamic test matrix is required to enable testing in all the principal loading directions. Dynamic tests are usually more expensive than static tests and the increased number of tests will also require additional hardware. If new hardware is not used for each test, the results may be inconclusive. If the seat passes the test, the results are acceptable; but if the seat fails the test, another test must be run since it will not be apparent whether the failure was due to damage inflicted during a previous test or due to a basic design or manufacturing flaw.

If for any reason, dynamic tests are substituted for the static tests previously described, then loading in all principal directions must be conducted. The dynamic test requirements are presented in Figure 37. These three tests must be conducted in addition to the two presented in Section 5.10.2 and all five must be passed. These tests are to be conducted in accordance with the same ground rules as those presented in Section 5.10.2 and are subject to the same testing parameters and evaluation procedures. A 50th-percentile dummy should be used in Test 1 and a 95th-percentile dummy in the others, both of the type and weight described in Section 5.10.2. Further, the static upload of 8 G and the static aftward loading of 12 G must be imposed and satisfactorily passed.

5.10.2 <u>Dynamic Test Requirements</u>

5.10.2.1 Dynamic Test Requirements for Seats Having at Least 12 in. of Vertical Stroke: All U.S. Army prototype seats should be dynamically tested to the two conditions specified in Figure 38. A 50th-percentile anthropomorphic dummy complying with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Part 572 specification for dummies (Reference 28) should be used to simulate the seat-system occupant for Test 1. A 95th-percentile anthropomorphic dummy simulating as closely as possible the features of the 50th-percentile dummy described above should



			Cockpit sea	its	Cabin seats	
Test	Configuration*	Parameter	Qualification	RéD	Qualification	R6D
1	Dumpy inertial load	t ₁ sec t ₂ sec	0.036 0.051	0.02C 0.051	. 050 . 074	.028
	KK ∣	ថី៣រោ	46	46	32	32
		Gmax	51	51	37	37
		Δv min, ft/sec	42	42	42	42
2.a	Utility and obser- vation helicopters	t _l sec	0.062	0.036	. 962	. 036
	Durny	t _z scc	0.104	0.104	.104	.104
1	inertial load	G min	16	16	16	16
		G max	21	21	21	21
		∆v min, ft/sec	30	30	30	30
2Ь	Light fixed-wind, carge and attack beliceptors	t ₁ sec	0,057	0.033	.057	.033
		t ₂ sec	0,100	0.100	.100	.100
	inertia?	Gmin	14	14	14	14
		G max	19	19	19	19
		Av min, ft/sec	25	25	25	25
3		t ₁ Mec	0.066	C.038	.081	,046
	A inertial	t ₂ sec	0.100	0.100	.127	,127
		Gmin	28	28	22	22
		С тах	33	33	27	27
		∆v min, ft/mec	50	50	50	50

*All tests should be performed with aircraft floor or bulkhead deformed as shown in Figure 34 or 35, respectively. The combination of warping conditions should be that which represents the most critical case for seat performance.

Figure 37. Requirements of additional dynamic tests if substituted for static tests.

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Test	Configuration *	Parameter	Qualification	ROD	Qualification	RED
1	Dumy inertial load	t ₁ sec t ₂ sec G min G max ∆v min, ft/sec	0.043 0.061 46 51 50	0.024 0.061 46 51 50	0.059 C.087 32 37 50	0.034 0.087 32 37 50
2	Dummy inertial load	t ₁ sec t ₂ sec G min G max Av min, ft/sec	0.066 0.100 28 33 50	0.038 0.100 28 33 50	0.081 0.127 22 27 50	0.946 0.127 22 27 50

*All tests should be performed with aircraft floor or bulkhead deformed as shown in Figure 34 or 35, respectively. The combination of warping conditions should be that which represents the most critical case for seat performance.

Figure 38. Dynamic test requirements for qualification and for research/development testing.

be used to simulate the seat-system occupant for Test 2. Total weight, including instruments, of these two test dummies should be:

50th	percentile:	Pilot/Copilot Troop/Gunner	= *	181.1 196.6	1b 1b
95th	percentile:	Pilot/Copilot Troop/Gunner	2 2	222.3 242.3	1b 1b

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Dynamic testing of multiple occupant seats should be performed with the maximum number of occupants specified for the test seat. Additional tests should be run if it is determined that the most adverse loading condition occurs in other than fulloccupancy situations. For both tests of Figure 38, adjustable seats should be adjusted to the full-aft and up position of the adjustment range. Plastic deformation of the seat is permissible; however, structural integrity must be maintained in all tests. For Test 1, the seat should limit the acceleration as measured in the pelvis of the dummy to values which ensure that the 50th-percentile clothed seat-system occupant (see Section 5.8.1) will not experience vertical, +G, accelerations in excess of human tolerance as defined in Sections 4.3 and 4.8 of Volume II (see Figure 8). The roll direction (10 degrees right or left) for Test 1 should be the more critical loading, if applicable, for the specific seat design.

When determining compliance of the achieved test pulse with the dynamic test requirements of Figure 38:

- 1. Determine the maximum acceleration and construct the onset slope for the test pulse by the method explained in Section 5.10.3.
- Compare the achieved onset and peak acceleration of the test pulse with those allowed and presented in Figure 38. The achieved onset slope should lie between the minimum and maximum onset slopes using the values of t₁ and t₂ listed in Figure 38 for the specific test conditions. The maximum acceleration should also fall between the upper and lower limits allowed.
- 3. Integrate the actual acceleration-time curve of the test pulse and establish the achieved velocity change. The velocity change achieved should be equal to or greater than that tabulated for the specific test conditions.

5.10.2.2 <u>Special Dynamic Test Requirements for Seats Having</u> Less Than 12 in. of Vertical Stroke: In the event that the systems approach permits the seat to have less than 12-in. minimum vertical stroke, additional requirements are made of the dynamic testing. First, it would be desirable to perform a full-scale crash test with the test specimen, including all assemblies involved in the energy-absorbing process. This would include a section of the fuselage, landing gear, and the seat or seats. This approach is totally acceptable for demonstrating the dynamic response and acceptability of the system.

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Since cost associated with the type of system testing described above is usually prohibitive, a different approach is acceptable. This approach includes dynamically testing the seat only, as is done for systems with at least 12 in. of stroke, but modifying the input pulse to represent the energy-absorbing processes of the gear and fuselage. An example of such a modified test pulse is presented in Figure 39. The initial plateau (t_1 to t_0') represents the acceleration-time history created by stroking of the landing gear. The sharp increase in acceleration at t_0' relates to fuselage impact, and the pulse beyond t_0' represents the crushing of the stiffer fuselage section. The velocity change under the pulse should be the same as identified for the particular crash force direction for other established tests (50 ft/sec for Test No. 1 or No. 2 of Figure 38). ·.....



Figure 39. Example of input pulse for seats having less than 12 in. of stroke.

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The most comprehensive and rigorous analytical techniques, supported by test data, should be used for determining the properties of the fuselage. Since drop tests of landing gear are required, a much more accurate approach exists for obtaining the landing gear influence on the pulse. Seat testing should await completion of landing gear tests so that the results can be used to establish the initial plateau (or other shape) between t_1 and t_0^{\prime} of the input pulse.

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Since each system may display different characteristics, it is not appropriate to present in this document specific quantitative limits for use in evaluating the acceptability of the test pulse. However, the same general approach and tolerances already presented for the standard pulse apply and should be used. The technique described in Section 5.10.2.1 for establishing compliance with the required test pulse applies directly to the portion of the special test pulse following to. 禯

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5.10.3 Data Acquisition and Reduction

Data acquisition and reduction should comply with the requirements of SAE J211 (Reference 42) for measurements on anthropomorphic dummies and structures.

Data should be presented in both analog and tabular form in compliance with the sign convention shown in Figure 3. Impact velocity should be determined and recorded for the test platform or vehicle. In the analysis of the data, velocity change should be computed through either electronic means or graphically with a planimeter by integrating the area under the measured acceleration-time trace.

The method recommended for use in establishing the acceptability of the pulse (see Section 5.10.2) and to determine other parameters associated with the data is similar to that presented in MIL-S-9479(USAF); see Reference 43. Parameters such as rise time, onset slope, and acceleration plateau duration may be obtained using the following graphic approximation technique as shown in Figure 40.

- Locate the calibration baseline.
- Determine the maximum (G_p) acceleration magnitude.
- Construct a reference line parallel to the calibration baseline at a magnitude equal to 10 percent of the peak acceleration (G). The first and last intersections of this line^P with the acceleration-time plot defines points 1 and 2.
- 42. SAE Recommended Practice, SAE J211b, INSTRUMENTATION FOR IMPACT TESTS, <u>SAE Handbook 1979, Part 2</u>, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 1979, pp. 34.117-34.118.
- 43. Military Specification, MIL-S-9479, SEAT SYSTEM, UPWARD EJECTION, AIRCRAFT, GENERAL SPECIFICATION FOR, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 24 June 1973.



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Figure 40. Graphic approximation example. (From Reference 43)

- Construct a second reference line parallel to the calibration baseline at a magnitude equal to 90 percent of the peak acceleration. The first and last intersections of this line with the acceleration-time plot define points 3 and 4.
- Some practical judgment may be required for selection of the first and last intersections depending on the degree of noise, structural or electronic, apparent in the data. Significant tendencies are important, not noise.
- Construct the onset line defined by a straight line through points 1 and 3.
- If desired, construct the offset line defined by a straight line through points 2 and 4.
- If desired, construct a line parallel to the calibration baseline, through the peak acceleration. The time interval defined by the intersections of this line with the constructed onset and offset lines (points 5 and 6) is the plateau duration (Δ t).

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• Locate the intersection of the constructed onset line with the calibration baseline (point 7). The time interval defined by points 7 and 5 is the rise time $(t_r - t_0)$. Referring to Figure 38, the rise time should be greater than t, but less than t, when determining compliance with dynamic test requirements. Point 7 is the initial time t_0 in Figure 38.

5.10.4 Seat Component Attachment

Since components that break free during a crash can become lethal missiles; it is recommended that attachment strengths be consistent with those specified for ancillary equipment (see Section 6.6.5.9, Volume III). Therefore, static attachment strengths for components, e.g., armored panels, should be as follows:

Downward:	50 G	
Upward:	10 G	
Forward:	35 G	
Aftward:	15 G	
Lateral:	25 G	

5.11 LITTER STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

5.11.1 General

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The ultimate vertical strength of existing litters with a 200-lb occupant and a total system weight of 250 lb (see Section 5.11.2) is about 13 G. Since the desired decelerative loads to be imposed on these litters exceed 13 G, special techniques must be used to limit the deflection and to support some of the occupant load.

Lateral orientation in the aircraft is preferred because of the characteristics of existing restraint systems used on litters which provide more support when loaded laterally than when loaded longitudinally.

5.11.2 Recommended Occupant Weights for Litter Design

The litter strength and deformation requirements defined below are based on a 200-lb, 95th-percentile litter occupant with 20 lb of clothing and personal gear, a 10-lb splint or cast, and 20 lb of litter and support bracket weight for a total
weight of 250 lb (the weight of a litter and patient as specified in MIL-A-8865 (ASG), Reference 44).

5.11.3 Vertical Loads

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5.11.3.1 <u>Downward Loads</u>: In the case of litter systems, human tolerance is not the limiting case in the vertical direction. The loads would be applied in a transverse direction to the body of a litter occupant. However, design to the 45-G human tolerance level is impractical due to the strength requirements for litters and for the basic structure to support the litter systems.

Litters are either hung from the ceiling or supported at the floor. In either case, the input deceleration pulses are the same as for floor- or bulkhead-mounted seats (see Volume II). Litters should not be suspended from the overhead structure unless it is capable of sustaining, with minimum deformation, the downward loads from the tiers of litters. Therefore, in the design of an efficient system, intentional load limiting should be related to the floor pulse.

The vertical strength and deformation requirements for a litter system are detailed in Figure 41. This curve is read in the identical manner as the seat load-deflection curve shown in Figure 32. The load factors in units of G are based on the summation of the weights of the occupant plus clothing, personal gear, splint or cast, and the weight of the litter and attachment brackets for a total of 250 lb as described in Sec-The curve of Figure 41 is based on the assumption tion 5.11.2. that 3 or 4 in. of vertical deflection will occur at the midpoint of the litter. In the unlikely event that a rigid litter is used, an additional 2 in. of deflection should be added to the curve. The deflection curve is limited to 6 in., because a large deflection occurring on one corner of the litter due to an asymmetric loading could cause ejection of the litter occupant. A larger energy-absorbing stroke can be used effectively if a mechanism is included in the system to control the amount of tilt allowed. For example, a system mechanism could be designed that forced all four corners of the litter to stroke the same distance (within elastic limits) thus achieving this goal.

The additional problem associated with inadequate litter strength must be dealt with in the design of litter systems. The curve of Figure 41 assumes a litter capable of at least 17 G with a maximum of 25 G. If the existing litter is used,

44. Military Specification, MIL-A-8865, AIRPLANE STRENGTH AND RIGIDITY MISCELLANEOUS LOADS, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 18 May 1960.

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0 1 2 3 4 5 Total controlled deformation (z), in.

*G value based on 250 1b per litter position.

Figure 41. Litter downward load and deflection requirements.

then a pan, net, or other device should be included under the litter to catch and support the litter occupant if the litter fails. Actually the device should limit the deflection to a value less than that required to fail the litter and should stroke with the litter. If all of these provisions are included, i.e., a rigid new litter or old litter with supporting pan underneath, together with the tilt-limiting mechanims, then

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the stroke can be extended to 12 in. at a 17-G limit-load factor. The load-deformation curve of Figure 41 would be extended at 17 G to 12 in. of stroke.

5.11.3.2 Upward Loads: All litter systems should be capable of withstanding a minimum upward load of 8 G.

5.11.4 Lateral and Longitudinal Loads

Litter systems for all aircraft should be designed to withstand the load and deformation requirements indicated in Figure 42 in all radials of the lateral/longitudinal plane. The litter lateral loads are made equal to the longitudinal loads because the litters may be oriented in either direction depending upon the aircraft.



Total controlled forward** deformation of litter bed, in.

*G value based on 250 lb per litter position.

**Forward is the direction towards the nose of the aircraft regardless of litter orientation in the aircraft.

Figure 42. Litter forward or lateral load and deflection requirements for all types of Army aircraft.

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The 20-G acceptable load level indicated in Figure 42 is predicated on the tolerance to acceleration of an individual restrained by straps on existing "table top" litters. If litters and allied restraint harnesses are designed for improved crashworthiness, the 20-G load should be increased to 25 G.

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Acceptable or nonacceptable load-deformation characteristics are read from Figure 42 in the identical manner as the readings from Figures 32 and 33 for seats. The deformation is measured with respect to the aircraft floor along the longitudinal axis toward the nose of the aircraft, regardless of litter orientation.

5.11.5 Litter Restraint Harness Testing

The restraint used in existing military litters consists of two straps wrapped around the litter. These straps should withstand a straight tensile minimum load of 2000 lb (4000-lb loop strength). The maximum elongation should not be more than 3.0 in. under the straight pull (end-to-end) test on a minimum strap length of 48 in. Elongation is restricted for litter belts in order to minimize dynamic overshoot.

5.11.6 Litter System Test Requirements

5.11.6.1 Static Test Requirements

5.11.6.1.1 General: Table 14 presents the static test requirements for complete litter systems. Since previous studies have shown that existing litters will not withstand the loads as specified in this chapter, the assumption must be made that a litter of sufficient strength will be developed prior to implementing these recommendations. If a pan or net to catch the litter occupant is included in the system, it should also be included in the static testing to demonstrate its adequacy.

5.11.6.1.2 Unidirectional Tests: The test loads for forward, lateral, and downward loading of litter systems as presented in Table 14 should be applied separately.

5.11.6.1.3 Combined Loads: Litter systems must demonstrate no loss of system integrity under conditions of combined loads as specified in Table 14.

5.11.6.1.4 Point of Load Application: The loads should be applied through a body block that simulates a supine occupant.

5.11.6.1.4.1 Forward (Longitudinal) - Lateral Tests: For systems using the existing litter, a rigid simulated litter may be substituted for the actual litter. This will enable application of equal loads at all attachment points between the litter

TABLE 14. LITTER SYSTEM STATIC TEST REQUIREMENTS Test Loading direction ref. with respect to Deformation no. fuselage floor Load required requirements 1 Forward See Figure 42 See Figure 42 2 Lateral See Figure 42 See Figure 42 3 See Figure 41 See Figure 41 Downward 8 G 4 Upward No requirement 5 Combined loading Downward plus See Figure 41 See Figure 41 transverse load along any radial in the x-y-plane of the aircraft See Figure 42 See Figure 42

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and the suspension system and allow testing of the suspension system. The rigid litter substitution does not apply if the litter system has adequate strength to take the loads.

5.11.6.1.4.2 Downward and Upward Tests: Downward and upward loads may be applied to each vertical suspension point separately. If the suspension system has the tilt-limiting features, and the litter strength is adequate, then the load should be applied at the center of gravity of the body block.

5.11.6.1.5 Deflection Measurements: Downward, forward (longitudinal), and lateral deflections should be measured at the bracket attaching the litter to the suspension system.

5.11.6.1.6 Load Determination: The test load should be determined by multiplying the required load factor (G) as specified in Table 14 by 250 lb.

5.11.6.2 Litter System Dynamic Test Requirements: A single test to evaluate the vertical load-limiting system is required. Litter systems with 95th-percentile anthropomorphic dummies and 30 lb of additional weight (250-lb total) in each litter should be subjected to a triangular acceleration pulse of 48-G peak and 0.054-sec duration (42-ft/sec velocity change).

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The same test pulse tolerances, data, handling, and processing requirements as presented for the seats in Section 5.10.2 apply. At least three accelerometers should be placed in the dummy; one in the head, one in the chest, and one in the pelvic region. The instruments should be positioned to sense accelerations in the vertical directions (x-axis of the supine occupant, z-direction relative to the aircraft). The input acceleration-time pulse also should be measured. It is advisable to use redundant accelerometers to sense the input pulse to assure acquisition of the needed impact environment data.

5.12 DELETHALIZATION OF COCKPIT AND CABIN INTERIORS

5.12.1 General

The kinematics of body action associated with aircraft crash impacts are quite violent, even in accidents of moderate severity. The occupant's immediate environment should be designed so that, when the body parts do flail and contact rigid or semirigid structures, injury potential is minimized.

Several approaches are available to alleviate potential secondary impact problems. The most direct approach, which should be taken if practical, is to relocate the hazardous structure or object out of the occupant's reach. Such action is normally subject to tradeoffs between safety and operational or human engineering considerations. If relocation is not a viable alternative, the hazard might be reduced by mounting the offending structure on frangible or energy-absorbing supports and applying a padding material to distribute the contact force over a larger area on the body member.

5.12.2 Occupant Strike Envelopes

5.12.2.1 <u>Full Restraint</u>: Body extremity strike envelopes are presented in Figures 43 through 45 for a 95th-percentile Army aviator wearing a restraint system that meets the requirements of MIL-S-58095(AV) (Reference 14). The restraint system consists of a lap belt, lap belt tiedown strap, and two shoulder straps. The forward motion shown in Figures 43 and 44 was obtained from a test utilizing a 95th-percentile anthropomorphic dummy subjected to a spineward (-G_) acceleration of 30 G. The lateral motion is based on an extrapolation of data from the same 30-G test. In positions where an occupant is expected to wear a helmet, the helmet dimensions must be added to the envelope of head motion.



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5.12.2.2 Lap Belt-Only Restraint: Although upper torso restraint is required in new Army aircraft, strike envelopes for a 95th-percentile aviator wearing a lap belt-only restraint are presented in Figures 46 through 48 for possible use. They are based on 4-G accelerations and 4 in. of torso movement away from the seat laterally and forward. In positions where an occupant is expected to wear a helmet, the helmet dimensions must be added to the envelope of head motion.

5.12.2.3 <u>Seat Orientation</u>: The strike envelopes of Figures 43 through 48 apply to all seat orientations.



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Figure 44. Full-restraint extremity strike envelope - top view.

5.12.3 Environmental Hazards

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5.12.3.1 <u>Primary Hazards</u>: The primary environmental hazards are those rigid or semirigid structural members within the extremity envelope of the head and chest. Since the upper torso, and particularly the head, is the most vulnerable part of the body, maximum protection must be provided within its strike envelope.

5.12.3.2 <u>Secondary Hazards</u>: Secondary environmental hazards are those that could result in trapping or injuring the lower extremities to the extent that one's ability to rapidly escape would be compromised. Areas within the lower extremity strike envelope must also include ample protective design.





5.12.3.3 <u>Tertiary Hazards</u>: Tertiary environmental hazards are those rigid and semirigid structural members that could cause injury to flailing upper limbs to an extent that could reduce an occupant's ability to operate escape hatches or perform other essential tasks.

5.12.4 Head Impact Hazards

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5.12.4.1 <u>Geometry of Probable Head Impact Surfaces</u>: Typical contact hazards in the cockpit area include window and door frames, consoles, controls and control columns, seat backs, electrical junction boxes, glare shields, and instrument panels. Contact hazards commonly found in aircraft cabin areas include window and door frames, seats, and fuselage structure. Use of suitable energy-absorbing padding materials, frangible breakaway panels, smooth contoured surfaces, or ductile materials

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Figure 46. Lap belt-only extremity strike envelope - side view.

in the typical hazard areas mentioned is recommended to reduce the injury potential of occupied areas.

5.12.4.2 <u>Tolerance to Head Impact</u>: Protection of the head in the form of protective helmets and energy-absorbing structure and padding in the occupant's immediate environment is essential.

Tolerance levels for head impact are discussed in detail in Volume II, and the reader should refer there for an understanding of the problem. However, for the case of forehead impact on a flat surface, which is pertinent to the discussion of this section, the most widely accepted collection of tolerance data is represented in the tolerance curve of Figure 49.

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Time duration of effective acceleration, msec

Figure 49. Wayne State Tolerance Curve for the human brain in forehead impacts against plane, unyielding surfaces. (From Reference 45)

5.12.4.3 <u>Test Procedures</u>: The simplest test procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of protective structure and padding in preventing serious head injury makes use of an instrumented headform. The headform, equipped with an accelerometer, can be propelled by a ram, dropped, or swung on a pendulum to impact the surface to be evaluated. This procedure is described in SAE J921 (Reference 46). The measured acceleration pulse can be averaged for comparison with the Wayne State Tolerance Curve, or integrated to compute a Severity Index, as discussed in Section 4.4.1 of Volume II.

- 45. Patrick, L. M., Lissner, H. R., and Gurdjian, E. S., SUR-VIVAL BY DESIGN - HEAD PROTECTION, <u>Proceedings</u>, Seventh <u>Stapp Car Crash Conference</u>, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., New York, 1963.
- 46. SAE Recommended Practice, SAE J921b, MOTOR VEHICLE INSTRU-MENT PANEL LABORATORY IMPACT TEST PROCEDURE - HEAD AREA, <u>SAE Handbook, 1979, Part 2</u>, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 1979, pp. 34.133-34.134.



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5.12.5 Instrument Panel Structure Proximity

In most aircraft cockpits, the instrument panel and its supporting structure are placed directly above the pilot's lower legs. The danger of impact from this proximity dictates that designers consider using suitable energy-absorbing padding materials, frangible breakaway panels, or ductile panel materials for structure within the lower leg strike envelope. E Same

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5.12.6 Rudder Pedal Configuration

Rudder pedals should be capable of supporting both the ball of the foot and the heel, and provide a surrounding structure of sufficient strength to prevent crushing and trapping of the lower limbs. The geometry required by MIL-STD-1290(AV) (Reference 1) to prevent entrapment of feet is illustrated in Figure 50.



Dimensions A, B, and C must be either less than 2 in. or more than 6 in.



5.12.7 Controls and Control Columns

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It is recommended that control columns be designed so that fracture due to the occupant's striking the column will occur at a point no more than 4 in. above the pivot point. The failure should occur in the form of a clean break, leaving no jagged or torn edges. Control columns that pass longitudinally through the instrument panel are not recommended since these tend to impale the crewmembers in severe longitudinal impacts. However, where they are used they should be equipped with a frangible or energy-absorbing section similar to automotive steering columns.

5.12.8 Sighting and Visionic Systems

Delethalization of the copilot/gunner (CPG) station of an attack or scout helicopter equipped with a weapon sighting optical relay tube (ORT) can present a difficult design problem. The cockpit should be designed to minimize the probability of the CPG head/neck striking the ORT and minimize injury if the CPG should strike the ORT, for both the "head-up" and "headdown" CPG positions. Some of the options available to the designer given this task are:

- ORT Eyepiece Relocation Consideration should be given to reducing occupant strike hazards by moving the ORT further away from the CPG.
- <u>Restraint System</u> The restraint system of Figure 22 would offer improved upper torso restraint, particularly when combined with the power-haulback inertia reel.
- Inflatable Restraint Consideration should be given to the inflatable restraint system (IBAHRS) discussed in Section 5.7.2.4. This type of restraint harness can prevent injury to the CPG in both the erect and head down position by reducing slack, supporting the head, and increasing the surface area of the body over which the harness reacts.

Frangile/Breakaway Features - ORT or ORT components designed to be frangible should break away at a total force not to exceed 500 lb. For the frangible ORT, this force should be applied along any direction of loading within the plane normal to the axis of the ORT, as well as along the axis of the ORT. Breakaway point(r) of the ORT should be outside the head strike envelope.

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• <u>Collapsible Features</u> - If the ORT is designed to collapse in order to avoid injuring the CPG, the collapse load along the axis of the ORT should not exceed 500 lb. Figure 51 illustrates one crushable sight eyepiece concept (from Reference 47). Two advantages of the crushable sight eyepiece are that it is always available and it should function regardless of head location. A helmet crash-absorber pad would attenuate crash loads to the helmet when available crushing is expended.

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Power-Haulback Inertia Reel (PHBIR) - On the basis of Air Force testing accomplished for the development of PHBIR, the retraction time is 0.3 to 0.4 sec, which is too slow for effectiveness in most crashes. If this time were reduced, the retraction velocity of the torso would have to be increased considerably over the current limit of 9 ft/sec. A retraction velocity greater than this is not recommended due to the lack of human tolerance data on this type of loading. In a crash with a single pulse of 30-G peak and 50-ft/sec velocity change, the retraction velocity should be approximately 25 ft/sec; therefore, the known tolerance limits would be exceeded at the higher velocity. In summary, the PHBIR, as currently qualified under both Air Force and Navy military specifications, requires excessive time to position the torso by crash sensing. To be fully effective, the system should move the torso into position in approximately 0.06 sec, but the resulting acceleration would exceed known human tolerance The primary crashworthiness advantage of limits. the PHBIR would be as a manually activated tightening device for the head-up CPG position; the PHBIR offers only limited advantage for the head-down CPG position.

5.12.9 <u>Energy-Absorbing Requirements</u> for Cockpit and Cabin Interiors

5.12.9.1 <u>General</u>: To minimize occupant injury, the acceleration experienced during secondary impacts of the occupant with surrounding structures must be reduced to a tolerable level. The areas of contact to be considered for energy absorption

^{47.} Fox, R., Kawa, M., and Sharp, E., DESIGNING CRASHWORTHI-NESS INTO THE YAH-63, paper presented at the Aircraft Crashworthiness Symposium, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 1975.



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Figure 51. Crushable eyepiece concept. (From Reference 47)

include instrument panels, glare shields, other interior surfaces within the occupant's strike envelope, and seat cushions. A padding material should not only reduce the decelerative force exerted on an impacting body segment, but should distribute the load in order to produce a more uniform pressure of safe magnitude.

In order to prevent head injury, materials must be carefully selected to absorb and attenuate the energy of impact. The

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material must reduce the level of acceleration, the rate of onset, and the amount of energy transmitted to the head.

5.12.9.2 <u>Padding Material Properties</u>: The selection of a foam material for vehicle energy-absorbing applications involves an evaluation of its processability; its mechanical, thermal, and chemical properties; as well as its cost. Along with the primary foam materials, the characteristics of adhesives and surface coatings must be considered, particularly with respect to emission of smoke and toxic vapors. The characteristics of suitable materials for such use are listed below:

- Adaptability and ease of processing
- High energy dissipation
- Effective load distribution
- Low rebound
- Temperature insensitivity
- Low water absorption
- Resistance to chemicals, oil, ultraviolet radiation, and sunlight
- Nontoxic fume generation
- Favorable flammability rating
- Minimal smoke generation
- Durability and long life
- Cost competitive
- Aesthetically acceptable

5.12.9.3 <u>Standard Test Methods</u>: ASTM standard test procedures are widely used by manufacturers to specify various properties of a particular type of material. Table 15 summarizes ASTM test methods and specifications for flexible cellular plastics that provide a basis for comparison of materials. Here it may be noted that most ASTM tests involve simple tests, whereas the operational environment involves dynamic loading and more complex conditions.

TABLE 15.	SUMMARY OF ASTM TEST METHODS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR FLEXIBLE CELLULAR PLASTICS (Reference 48)
D1564-71*	Testing Flexible Cellular Materials- Slab Urethane Foam
D1667-76*	Specification for Flexible Cellular Materials - Vinyl Chloride Polymers and Copolymers (Closed-Cell Sponge)
D1565-76*	Specification for Flexible Cellular Materials - Vinyl Chloride Polymers and Copolymers (Open-Cell Foam)
D1C55-69* (1975)	Specification for Flexible Cellular Materials - Latex Foam
D1056-73*	Specification for Flexible Cellular Materials - Sponge or Expanded Rubber
D3575-77	Testing Flexible Cellular Materials Made From Olefin Plastics
D1596-64* (1976)	Test for Shock-Absorbing Characteristics of Package Cushioning Materials
D2221-68* (1973)	Test for Creep Properties of Package Cushioning Materials
D1372-64* (1976)	Testing Package Cushioning Materials
D696-70*	Test for Coefficient of Linear Thermal Expansion of Plastics
E143-61* (1972)	Test for Shear Modulus at Room Temp- erature
D412-75*	Tests for Rubber Properties in Tension
D1433-76*	Test for Rate of Burning and/or Excent and Time of Burning of Flexible Thin Plastic Sheeting Supported on a 45- degree Incline
D1692-76	Test for Rate of Burning and/or Extent and Time of Burning of Cellular Plas- tics Using a Speciman Supported by a Horizontal Screen
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*Indicates that the standard has been approved as American National Standard by the American National Standards Institute.

In particular, ASTM D 1564-71 describes "Standard Methods of Testing Flexible Cellular Materials - Slab Urethane Foam" (Reference 48). Among other tests, there are compression-set and load-deflection tests. i.

The above tests provide results that specify the material, but do not necessarily portray its performance under actual impact situations. A simple dynamic drop test, such as ASTM D1596-64 (1976), "Standard Test Method for Shock-Absorbing Characteristics of Package Cushioning Materials" (Reference 49), more closely simulates actual impact conditions.

Other standard test procedures include SAE J815, "Load Deflection Testing of Urethane Foams for Automotive Seating" (Reference 50), which points out the factors of interest in testing materials for vehicle seat cushions: the thickness of the padding under the average passenger load, a measurement that indicates the initial softness, and a measurement that indicates resiliency.

Also, SAE J388, "Dynamic Flex Fatigue Test for Slab Urethane Foam" (Reference 51), describes procedures for evaluating the loss of thickness and the amount of structural breakdown of slab urethane foam seating materials.

SAE J921, "Motor Vehicle Instrument Panel Laboratory Impact Test Procedure - Head Area," describes a test procedure for evaluating the head impact characteristics of such areas as instrument panels (Reference 46).

- 48. ASTM D 1564-71, STANDARD METHODS OF TESTING FLEXIBLE CELL-ULAR MATERIALS - SLAB URETHANE FOAM, <u>1977 Annual Book of</u> <u>ASTM Standards</u>, R. P. Lukens, et al., eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Easton, Maryland, 1977, Part 38.
- 49. ASTM D 1596-64, STANDARD TEST METHOD FOR SHOCK-ABSORBING CHARACTERISTICS OF PACKAGE CUSHIONING MATERIALS, <u>1977 Annual Book of ASTM Standards</u>, R. P. Lukens, et al., eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Easton, Maryland, 1977, Part 30.
- 50. SAE Recommended Practice, SAE J815, LOAD DEFLECTION TEST-ING OF URETHANE FOAMS FOR AUTOMOTIVE SEATING, <u>SAE Handbook</u> <u>1979, Part 2</u>, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 1979, p. 34.31.
- 51. SAE Recommended Practice, SAE J388, DYNAMIC FLEX FATIGUE TEST FOR SLAB POLYURETHANE FOAM, <u>SAE Handbook, 1979,</u> <u>Part 2</u>, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 1975, pp. 34.28-34.30.

5.12.9.4 Acceptable Stress-Strain Characteristics: Energyabsorbing materials with stress-strain curves that fall between the limits shown in Figure 52 will offer reasonable survival potential for head impacts at velocities of up to 22 ft/sec where a padding thickness of 2.0 in. is used. The impact surface is assumed to be flat; the data from which Figure 52 was developed were obtained for simulated head impacts on flat surfaces with energy levels up to 84 ft-lb, i.e., 11.2-1b head weight x 7.5-ft drop height. The acceleration of the head should not exceed 120 G at an impact velocity of 20 ft/sec (or greater) while a higher level of acceleration can be sustained at lower velocities (shorter pulse duration). This accounts for the different stress-versus-strain values shown in Figure 52, i.e., a higher G or crush stress is acceptable at the lower design velocity expected for the thin padding.

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Figure 52. Recommended stress-strain properties for padding material for head contact, with cushion thickness of at least 1.5 in.

The criteria of Figure 52 are to be satisfied by the padding material over the entire anticipated operating temperature range if the potential for survival is to be maintained. Practical considerations and risk analysis, however, may reduce the temperature range requirements. Temperature sensitivity must be considered as a padding material selection criterion. Other padding material evaluation methods are discussed in Section 10.9.4 of Volume IV.

Stress-strain curves for several polyurethane-foamed plastics are shown in Figure 53. The curves show that a density of



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Figure 53. Effect of density on stress-strain curves for polyurethane-foamed plastic.

3 lb/ft³ or less will satisfy the criteria of figure 52 (superimposed as a crosshatched area) over at least part of the operational temperature range.

5.12.9.5 <u>Application of Padding Material</u>: In the absence of data for extremity impacts, it is assumed that padding material that is suitable for head impact protection will be suitable also for protecting extremities. Extremity impacts are not likely to have the potentially severe effects of head impacts. It is suggested that areas within the extremity strike envelope having radii of 2 in. or less be padded and that such padding have a minimum thickness of 0.75 in.

Caution must be exercised in padding sharp edges and corners. Padding installed in a manner that allows it to be broken away from the corner or cut through by sharp edges offers no protection. It is recommended that edges and corners to be padded have a minimum radius of 0.5 in. prior to padding. A definite volume of the padding must be crushed to absorb the initial kinetic energy of the head and protective helmet.

5.12.9.6 <u>Ductile Materials</u>: In cases where the use of padding material is impractical or the thickness allowed is inadequate to provide the necessary protection, ductile energy-absorbing materials or frangible breakaway panels should be used where possible. Window and door frames, control columns, electrical junction boxes, etc., should be designed with large radii (1 in. or more) rather than with sharp edges and corners.

Swearingen concluded in Reference 52 that at impact velocities of 30 ft/sec against rigid structure padded with materials even 6 in. thick, unconsciousness, concussion, and/or fatal head injuries will be produced. Where possible, a combination of deformable structure and padding material should be considered to absorb the impact energy and to adequately distribute the forces over the face. Surfaces to which this combination should be applied are instrument panels, seat backs, bulkheads, and any other structure that the head may impact during the crash sequence.

52. Swearingen, J. J., EVALUATIONS OF VARIOUS PADDING MATER-IALS FOR CRASH PROTECTION, FAA Technical Report AM 66-40, Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, December 1966, AD 647048.

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Yes No N/A

5.13 DESIGN CHECKLISTS

5.13.1 General Design Checklist

- For load-limited seats, do all materials in critical structural members possess a minimum elongation of 5 percent in the principal load direction?
- For nonload-limited seats, do materials in critical structural members possess a minimum of 10 percent elongation?
- 3. Is there adherence to the flammability and toxicity requirements of Chapter 6?
- 4. In load-limited portions of the seat, where loads can be predicted accurately, are minimum margins of safety for shear and tensile bolts 5 and 10 percent, respectively?
- 5. In nonload-limited portions of the seat, are minimum margins of safety for shear and tensile bolts 15 and 25 percent, respectively?
- In the vicinity of welded joints, have cross-sectional areas been increased by 10 percent to account for uncertainties, stress concentrations, etc.?
- 7. Have seat attachments been designed so that neither buckling nor warping of the floor or bulkhead will interfere with seat operation or seat integrity in a crash?
- 8. Has the restraint system anchorage been designed so that the restraint system will function effectively as the seat strokes?
- 9. Is the use of castings avoided in the primary seat structure?
- 10. If castings are used, are they sufficiently ductile, or does the design allow for realistic seat deformation during crash load application without failure of the castings? _

		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
11.	Do nonmetallic materials comply with FAR 25?			
12.	Can troop seats be removed in 20 sec per occupant position?	. <u> </u>	-	
5.13	2 Seat Strength and Deformation Checklist			
1.	Does the seat meet the longitudinal load- deformation requirements of Figure 32?			
2.	Will the seat withstand a 12-G aftward load?			
3.	Is the vertical energy-absorption system de- signed for a load factor of 11.5 G based on the effective weight of the 50th-percentile aviator or trooper?		-	
4.	Does the crewseat possess a minimum vertical stroke distance of 12 in. (from the lowest vertical adjustment position)?			
5.	Has the use of a variable-force energy ab- sorber been considered?			~
6.	Does the troop seat possess a minimum of 17 in. of vertical stroke?		_	
7.	Does the seat have a capability of with- standing an upward load of 8 G?			
8.	Does the seat meet the lateral load- deformation requirements of Figure 33?			
9.	Are the static attachment strengths for components mounted on the seat, such as armored panels, based on the following load factors?			
	 Downward: 50 G Upward: 10 G Forward: 35 G Aftward: 15 G 			
	• Lateral: 25 G			

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Yes No N/A

5.13.3 Seat Cushions Checklist

- 1. Are seat cushions of the type that minimize dynamic overshoot in vertical deceleration?
- 2. Is the thickness of the compressed seat cushion between 0.5 and 0.75 in., or has it been demonstrated that the cushion design and material properties produce a beneficial result?

5.13.4 Litter Strength and Deformation Requirements Checklist

- Does the litter system possess the vertical strength-deformation capability of Figure 41, based on an occupant weight of 250 lb?
- Does the litter system possess the capability of withstanding an upward load of 8 G?
- 3. Does the litter system meet the lateral load-deformation requirements of Figure 42?
- 4. Can the litters be loaded laterally into the aircraft?
- 5. Can the complete set of litters be loaded and unloaded to flight readiness in 10 sec or less in an emergency situation?
- 6. Does the litter system eliminate need for special mounting hardware that remains attached to the aircraft?
- 7. Can the standard cargo tiedown system be used as the primary litter system attachment to the aircraft structure?
- 8. Will the litter installation accept the current standard military litter?
- 9. Does the installation support the litter in such a manner as to develop the maximum losg-carrying capabilaty of the standard litter?

	· ·	Yes	No	<u>N/7</u>
10.	Would the litter installation be adaptable to a new and improved military litter de- sign?		_	
11.	Does the litter installation, when removed from the aircraft, leave the aircraft free of all protuberances, brackets, and other objectionable operational hazards?		_	
5.13.	5 Restraint System Design Checklist			
1.	Are the lap belt anchor points located so that a maximum angle of 55 degrees and a min- imum angle of 45 degrees exists between the lap belt and the buttock reference line, as illustrated in Figure 27?		_	
2.	Is the point where the shoulder harness is attached to or passes through the seat back between 26 and 27 in. above the seat ref- erence point?			
3.	Does the shoulder harness anchorage or guide on the seat back permit no more than 0.5-in. lateral clearance?		_	
4.	Does the shoulder harness guide on the seat back have a 0.25-in. minimum radius as il- lustrated in Figure 307			
5.	Is the lap belt tiedown strap (crotch strap) attached to the seat pan centerline at a point 14 to 15 in. forward of the seat back?			
6.	Are the forces required for adjustment of all vebbing item lengths no greater than 30 lb?			
7.	Are the lap belt adjusters located so as to not exert pressure on the iliac crests?			<u></u>
8.	Are the shoulder strap adjusters located low enough on the chest to avoid concentrated pressure on the collarbones?			
9.	Do the restraint harness subassemblies meet the minimum load and maximum elongation re- quirements of Tables 8 and 9?			

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		Yes	NO	<u>N/A</u>	`
10.	Have the stitched joints in the restraint harness been designed according to the cri- teria discussed in Section 5.7.4.3 and do the joints have a 30-percent margin?				
11.	Is a minimum webbing thickness of 0.055 in. used on all restraint harness components?				
12.	Do the restraint harness components meet the following minimum width requirements?				
	 Lap Belt - 2-1/4 in. Shoulder strap - 2 in. Tiedown Strap - 1-1/2 in. 				
13.	Do all webbing fittings, over which webbing is wrapped, possess the 0.062-in. minimum radius illustrated in Figure 30?				
14.	Does the restraint harness have a single- point release system that can be released after being exposed to design crash loads by exerting a 30-1b force with one finger or a 50-1b force with one finger when sup- porting the entire weight of the occupant?				
15.	Is the single-point release protected from inadvertent release?				
5.13	.6 Protective Padding Checklist				
1.	Are all areas within the extremity strike envelope, having radii of 2 in. or less, padded with a minimum thickness of 0.75 in.?		_		
2.	Do padded corners of edges have a minimum unpadded radius of 0.5 in.?				
3.	Are ductile energy-absorbing supports used where possible under padding, particularly where head impact is likely?				

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Yes No N/A

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5.13.7 Cockpit Controls and Equipment Checklist

- Are rudder pedals separated from each other and from adjacent structure by less than 2 in. or more than 6 in., as illustrated in Figure 50?
- 2. Are controls and control columns designed so that fracture due to an occupant's striking the column will occur at a point no more than 4 in. above the pivot point, and so that the failure will be clean without jagged or torn edges, or are they equipped with an energy-absorbing section?

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6. AIRCRAFT POSTCRASH SURVIVAL

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the criteria that are to be applied in designing postcrash survival into an aircraft. Although initial crashworthy considerations, such as maintaining structural integrity around the occupant and reducing the crash forces transmitted to the occupant, are of primary importance in survival, hazardous postcrash conditions must be prevented or reduced if the occupant is ultimately to survive. The threat of postcrash fire must be minimized and adequate escape and rescue provisions must be incorporated into the aircraft.

The criteria presented in this section include those for designing fuel, oil, and hydraulic systems to minimize the occurrence of postcrash fires; for selecting less flammable interior materials; for selecting provisions that increase survival chances during aircraft ditchings; and for designing emergency escape provisions and crash locator beacons. The user is referred to Volume V for more complete information and reference sources.

6.2 FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA

The following criteria are applicable to all auxiliary fuel systems, such as ferry systems and extended range systems, as well as to the primary aircraft fuel system.

6.2.1 General

The fuel system must be designed to minimize fuel spillage during and after all survivable crash impacts. It also must be designed to prevent spillage of fuel through the vents during a rollover or in any other adverse attitude. Spillage that cannot be avoided, such as during the functioning of selfsealing breakaway couplings, must be precluded from ignition by controlling ignition sources (see Section 5.5 of Volume V).

6.2.2 Fuel Tanks

6.2.2.1 <u>Fuel Tank Location</u>: The location of fuel tanks in an aircraft is of considerable importance in minimizing the postcrash fire hazard. The location must be considered with respect to occupants, ignition sources, and probable impact areas. The fuel tanks should be located as far as possible from probable impact areas and from areas where structural deformation might cause crushing or penetration of the tank. If possible, fuel tanks should not be installed:

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- Immediately adjacent to occupiable areas.
- Immediately adjacent to engine compartments.
- Immediately adjacent to electrical compartments.
- Under heavy masses, such as transmissions and engines.
- Near the bottom of the fuselage.
- Over landing gears.
- In leading edges or anticipated failure areas of wings.

6.2.2.2 <u>Fuel Tank Construction</u>: Fuel tanks should have smooth, regular shapes, with the sump area contoured gradually into the tank bottom. All concave corners should have a minimum radius of 3 in., and all convex corners a minimum radius of 1 in.

All fuel tanks must be fabricated from crash-resistant material which meets or exceeds the requirements of MIL-T-27422 (Reference 53). All fuel tank fittings must have a tank pullout strength that meets or exceeds that specified in MIL-T-27422.

A self-sealing, breakaway, tank-to-tank coupling should be used wherever two tanks are connected directly with no intervening fuel line.

6.2.3 Fuel Lines

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> Fuel lines should be constructed and routed so as to withstand all survivable crash impacts. This may be done by allowing the lines to elongate or shift with deforming aircraft structure rather than being forced to carry high tensile loads.

6.2.3.1 Fuel Line Construction: All fuel lines that could be readily damaged in an accident of severity up to that indicated in Table 2 should consist of flexible hose with a steel-braided outer sheath, where possible. The hoses should be capable of elongating 20 percent without the hose assembly spilling any fuel. If "stretchable" (20-percent minimum elongation) hoses are not used, all hoses should be a minimum of 20 percent longer than necessary to provide added length for structural displacement.

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^{53.} Military Specification, MIL-T-27422B, TANK, FUEL, CRASH-RESISTANT, AIRCRAFT, Department of Defense, Washington, D. C., 13 April 1971.

When the hose assemblies are subjected to pure tension loads or to loads applied at a 90-degree angle to the longitudinal axis of the end fitting, as shown in Figure 54, hoses must not pull out of their end fittings, nor the end fittings break, at less than the minimum loads shown in Table 16. Loads must be applied at a constant rate not exceeding 20 in./min.

The number of fuel line couplings should be held to a minimum. Wherever possible, a single, one-piece hose should be run through a bulkhead opening rather than being attached to the bulkhead with rigid fittings. The opening should be 1 in. larger in diameter than the hose diameter, with the hose stabilized by a frangible panel or structure. A grommet must be installed in the opening to preclude wear on the hose. Selfsealing breakaway couplings must be used whenever a line goes through a firewall so that the line will seal if the engine is displaced during crash impact. Breakaway couplings will not be required if the engine is tied down to a strength level of 20 G, 20 G, and 18 G and if the engine is located so that crushing of the lines and^Yfittings is not likely in any survivable accident.

All fuel line-to-fuel tank connections must consist of selfsealing breakaway couplings. These couplings must be recessed into the tank so that the tank half does not protrude outside the tank wall more than 1/2 in. after coupling separation. The shape of the tank coupling half must be basically smooth to avoid snagging on adjacent structures or cutting the tank wall. An acceptable substitute for a breakaway valve is a hose constructed of material identical to that of the tank with an end fitting strength equal to 80 percent of the tank tear-out strength (MIL-T-27422, Paragraph 4.6.5).

6.2.3.2 Fuel Line Location: Fuel lines should be located as far as possible from probable impact areas and areas where structural deformation can cause crushing, penetration, or excessive tensile loading of the lines. When fuel lines must be routed through areas of probable large displacement, such as wing-to-fuselage attachment points, self-sealing breakaway couplings must be incorporated into the lines to allow for complete line separation with a minimum of fuel spillage.

Fuel lines should not be routed in the following areas:

- Near the bottom of the fuselage.
- Over landing gears.
- Under, in front of, or at the sides of heavy masses, such as engines and transmissions.



Hose end fitting type	Fitting size*	Minimum tensile load (lb)	Minimum bending load (1b)
STRAIGHT	-4	575	450
Tension:	-6	600	450
	-8	900	700
	-10	1250	950
	-12	1900	1050
Bending:	-16	1950	1450
	-20	2300	1600
	-24	2350	2750
	-32	3500	4000
90° ELBOW	-4**	575	800
Tension:	-6**	600	850
	-8**	900	1250
	-10	1250	575
	-12	1900	675
Bending:	-16	1950	1200
	-20	2300	1250
	-24	2350	2025
	-32	3500	3500
45° ELBOW	-4**	575	
Tension:	-6**	600	425
	-8**	900	425
	-10	1250	425
	-12	1900	600
Bending:	-16	1950	1000
	-20	2300	1600
	-24	2350	2400
	-32	3500	3700
<pre>*Fitting size 1/4 in. **Elbow materia</pre>	given in 1/. al is steel.	l6 in. units, i.e	., -4 = 4/16 or

TABLE 16.REQUIRED MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL LOADS FOR STANDARD
HOSE AND HOSE-END FITTING COMBINATIONS

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- In anticipated areas of rotor blade impact.
- Adjacent to electrical wiring.

Fuel lines must not be routed through electrical compartments or occupiable areas unless they are shrouded or otherwise designed to prevent spillage.

In order to protect the lines from impact damage, fuel lines should be routed along heavier their structural members wherever possible. All fuel lines is the adequately supported by frangible clamps attached to other structure.

Fuel lines should be grouped together and exit a fuel tank in one centralized location. This location should be in the area of the tank that is least vulnerable to anticapated crash loads and structural deformations. However, ballistic vulnerability considerations may modify this requirement.

The number of fuel lines in the engine compartment should be minimized. When more than one line enters an engine compartment, the lines should be grouped together and pass through the firewall in a protected location unless the structural integrity of the firewall would be compromised.

6.2.4 Frangible Attachments

Frangible structures or frangible bolts must be used at all attachment points between fuel tanks and aircraft structure to prevent fuel tank components from being torn out of the tank wall during impact. Frangible attachments should be used at other points in the flammable fluid systems where aircraft structural deformation could lead to flammable fluid leakage.

The load required to separate a frangiple attachment from its support structure must be between 25 and 50 percent of the minimum load required to fail the weakest component in the attached system, as illustrated in Figure 55. (The failure load of the attached system components may be determined either by analytical computations or by testing methods based upon the failure modes most likely to occur during crash impact.) To prevent inadvertent separation, failure loads must be at least five times normal operational and service loads at the frangible attachment location.

A frangible attachment must separate whenever the required load (as defined above) is applied in the modes most likely to occur



ITEM	LOWEST FAILURE LOAD (1b)*	FAILURE MODE			
Aircraft structure Tank fitting Flange Frangible bolt	4000 3000 5000 Not more than $\frac{3000}{2} = 1500$	Shear Pull out of tank Shear Break (tension-shear)			
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	Not less than $\frac{3000}{4} = 750$				
*Loads may or may not be representative; values are for explanatory purposes only.					

Figure 55. Sample frangible attachment separation load calculation.

during crash impact. These modes--whether tension, shear, compression, or combinations thereof, such as bending (tensionshear)--must be determined for each attachment by analyzing the surrounding aircraft structure and probable impact forces and directions.

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All frangible devices must be statically tested in the three most likely anticipated modes of separation. Test loads must be applied at a constant rate, not exceeding 20 in./min, until failure occurs. In addition, all frangible attachments must be proof tested under dynamic loading conditions in the three most likely anticipated modes of operation. The test load must be applied in less than 0.005 sec, and the velocity change experienced by the loading jig must be 36 ± 3 ft/sec.

6.2.5 Self-Sealing Breakaway Valves

Self-sealing breakaway valves should be installed at all fuel tank-to-fuel line connections, tank-to-tank interconnects, and at other points in the fuel system where aircraft structural deformation could lead to system failure. The valves must allow only a minimal amount of spillage upon separation and should permit no external leakage when partially separated.

The load required to separate a breakaway valve must be between 25 and 50 percent of the minimum load required to fail the weakest component in the attached system, as illustrated in Figure 56. To prevent inadvertent actuation during flight and maintenance operations, the separation load must be greater than five times normal operational and service loads at the coupling location. To avoid complete or partial breakaway coupling separation during maintenance operations, the separation load must never be less than 300 lb, regardless of the fuel line size.

A breakaway valve must separate and seal whenever the required load (as defined above) is applied in the modes most likely to occur during crash impact. These modes, whether tension, shear, compression, or combinations thereof, must be determined for each coupling by analyzing the surrounding aircraft structure and probable impact forces and directions.

All breakaway valves must be subjected to static tensile and shear loads to establish the load required for separation, nature of separation, leakage during valve actuation, general valve functioning, and leakage following valve actuation. The rate of load application must not be greater than 20 in./min. Tests to be used where applicable are shown in Figure 57.

In addition, all breakaway values must be proof tested under dynamic loading conditions. The values must be tested in the three most likely anticipated modes of separation. The test configurations should be similar to those shown in Figure 57. The load must be applied in less than 0.005 sec, and the velocity change experienced by the loading jig must be 36 ± 3 ft/sec.



Figure 56. Typical method of breakaway load calculation for fuel tank-to-line breakaway valve.

All breakaway valves must incorporate positive provisions for ascertaining that the valve is locked together during normal installation and service. In addition, all breakaway valves must incorporate provisions in their design to prevent uncoupling due to operational shocks, vibrations, accelerations, etc.



6.2.6 Fuel Drains

All fuel tank drains must be recessed into the tank so that part of the drain protrudes outside the tank wall. All attachments of fuel drains to aircraft structure must be made with frangible fasteners. Ž 1

The number of fuel line drains should be held to a minimum by designing the fuel system to avoid low points in the lines. If drain lines are necessary, they must be made of low-strength materials.

Drain values for tanks and lines must be designed to be positive locking in the closed position. Fuel drain actuation must not require the operator to lie down under the aircraft. Drains should be located where discharged fuel will not cause an added fire hazard.

6.2.7 Filler Units

The filler unit must be fastened to the structure with a frangible attachment, and filler caps must be recessed into the tank wall to ensure that the cap remains with the tank if the tank moves relative to the aircraft structure.

Long filler necks should be avoided if possible. If they must be used, they should be fabricated from frangible materials and designed so that the filler cap remains with the tank and does not snag on the aircraft structure during impact.

Tank fillers must not be located adjacent to engine intakes or exhausts where flammable vapors could be ingested and ignited.

6.2.8 Fuel Boost Pumps

Boost pumps should be selected according to the following order of preference:

- 1. Suction system, engine-mounted pump.
- 2. Air-driven, tank-mounted or in-line pump.
- 3. In-line electric pump.
- 4. Electrically operated tank-mounted pump.

Pumps mounted within the fuel tanks should be rigidly bolted to the fuel tank only. If the pump must be supported or attached to the aircraft structure, a frangible attachment should be used.

The state of the art in fuel system design has shown that electrically driven boost pumps can be eliminated. Air-driven boost pumps and engine-mounted suction-type boost pumps now in operation are much less hazardous alternative solutions.

If electric boost pumps are used, the electrical wires must contain 6 in. of extra length at the pump connection to accommodate crash-induced structural deformation. The wires also must be shrouded to prevent their being cut during crash impact. Nonsparking breakaway wire disconnects may be used in lieu of the extra wire length.

6.2.9 Fuel Filters and Strainers

Fuel filters and strainers should not be located within the engine compartment or adjacent to engine intakes or exhausts, if at all possible.

Filters and strainers should retain the smallest possible quantity of fuel.

Filters and strainers must have a structural attachment capable of withstanding a 30-G load applied in any direction.

Self-sealing breakaway values should be used to attach fuel lines to fuel filters and strainers in those locations where structural displacement is likely to cause a separation of those components.

6.2.10 Fuel Valves

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The number of fuel valves should be kept to a minimum.

Large values (e.g., fuel shutoff values) must have a structural attachment capable of withstanding a 30-G load applied in any direction. Self-sealing breakaway couplings should be used at the value-fuel line connections. Small values (e.g., check values) must be fastened to the aircraft structure with frangible attachments.

If electrically operated values are used, they should be mounted on bulkheads so that the electrical wires are on one side of the bulkhead and the values and lines are on the other side.

6.2.11 Fuel Quantity Indicators

Fuel counters and float-type quantity indicators are preferred over rigid capacitance probes to preclude puncture of the fuel tank during impact. If a capacitance probe must be used, it

should be fabricated from material possessing as low a flexural rigidity as is consistent with operational requirements. A slightly rounded shoe should be incorporated at the probe bottom end to avoid any tank-cutting tendency. Consideration should be given to the use of frangible low-flexural rigidity curved probes to reduce the danger of puncturing the tank during crash impact. The probe may also be mounted frangibly or at an angle.

If tank-mounted quantity indicators must be attached to the aircraft structure, frangible attachmonts must be used.

6.2.12 Vents

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Vent systems must be designed to prevent fuel flow through the vent lines regardless of aircraft attitude or vent line failure. For this reason, high-strength fittings should be used between the metal insert in the tank and the vent line. If the vent outlet must be supported, it should be supported by frangible attachments. The vent line should be made of wirecovered flexible hose and should be routed so that it cannot be snagged in displacing structure during a crash. Self-sealing breakaway valves must be used at the tank-to-line attachment if there is danger of the tank being torn free of the supporting structure.

Vent lines should be routed inside the fuel tank in such a manner that, if rollover occurs, spillage cannot continue. This can be accomplished with siphon breaks and/or U-shaped traps in the line routing.

Antispillage vent valves inside the fuel tank are particularly advantageous during rollover accidents and can be used in lieu of flexible lines, breakaway valves, and all other alternate considerations. These valves must be designed and tested to demonstrate that:

- The vent will remain fully open during all normal flight environmental conditions.
- The vent valves will close in extreme attitudes such as would occur in a rollover.
- The vent valves will possess adequate venting capability under critical icing conditions in flight.

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If the fuel system is to be pressure refueled, a bypass system for tank overpressurization must be used. However, care must be taken to ensure that spillage resulting from overpressurization due to tank compression during a crash is released away from aircraft occupants and ignition sources.

6.3 OIL AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA

6.3.1 General

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Even though oil and hydraulic fluids are carried in relatively small quantities, they are easily ignited and can serve, in turn, as ready ignition sources for fuel. Therefore, oil and hydraulic fluid spillage must be prevented at all reasonable cost. The crashworthy design criteria presented in Section 6.2 for fuel systems also are generally applicable for oil and hydraulic systems.

6.3.2 Oil and Hydraulic Fluid Reservoirs

Oil tanks and hydraulic reservoirs must not be located where spilled or sprayed fluid can readily be ingested into the engine or ignited by the engine exhaust.

Oil tanks and hydraulic reservoirs must not be located in the following areas:

- Near the bottom of the fuselage.
- In or above engine compartments.
- In electrical compartments.
- In occupiable areas.
- Under, in front of, or at the side of heavy masses, such as engines and transmissions, nor above landing gears.

Reservoir construction and mounting must be able to withstand 30-G forces applied in any direction.

Oil tanks should be constructed from flexible, crash-resistant materials that meet or exceed the strength and tear resistance required in MIL-T-27422 for fuel tank material.

Alternatively, a metal tank can be used if it is in a relatively safe area and is shielded and coated to prevent leakage in the event of a tank rupture.

6.3.3 Oil and Hydraulic Lines

6.3.3.1 <u>Construction</u>: Oil and hydraulic lines should consist of flexible hoses with steel-braided outer sheaths, where possible. If the hoses cannot elongate 20 percent without the hose assembly spilling fluid, 20 percent extra length should be provided to compensate for structural displacement during a crash. All hose assemblies must meet the requirements of Table 16 when tested as shown in Figure 54 (Section 6.2.3.1).

Where high-temperature operational requirements preclude the use of flexible hose, coiled metal tubing should be used in areas where large crash deformation is expected.

The number of line couplings must be kept to a minimum. Wherever possible, a single, one-piece hose should be routed through a bulkhead opening rather than attached to the bulkhead with a rigid connection. The opening should be 1 in. larger in diameter than the hose diameter, with the hose stabilized by a frangible panel or structure. However, selfsealing breakaway valves must be used wherever a line goes through a firewall so that the line will seal if the engine is displaced during crash impact.

Self-sealing breakaway valves must be used to connect flexible hoses to engines, oil tanks, hydraulic reservoirs, and system components, if enough structural deformation to cause line elongation to the breakage point is probable.

When hydraulic or oil lines must be stabilized, they should be attached to the aircraft structure with frangible fasteners.

6.3.3.2 <u>Routing</u>: Hydraulic or oil lines must not be routed in electrical or occupiable areas unless they are shrouded to prevent spillage. Hydraulic or oil lines should not be routed in the following areas:

- Near the bottom of the fuselage.
- Over landing gears.
- Under, in front of, or at the sides of heavy masses, such as engines and transmissions.
- In the leading edges of wings.
- In areas of anticipated rotor blade impact.
- In any area where flammable fluids could be spilled or sprayed onto hot surfaces or ingested into the engine.
- Above electrical wiring.

The number of hydraulic and oil lines in the engine compartment must be kept to a minimum. The lines should be grouped together and enter the engine compartment in a protected location.

6.3.4 Oil and Hydraulic System Components

System components (e.g., pumps, valves, filters, actuators) must not be located in electrical compartments or occupiable areas. Components should not be located near the bottom of the fuselage or in the leading edges of the wings.

Components located in the engine compartment should be restricted to those absolutely necessary for engine operation. For example, oil filters must not be located there unless they are an integral part of the engine.

The construction and mounting of all system components must be able to withstand 30-G forces applied in any direction.

6.3.5 Oil Coolers

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Oil coolers must not be located in the engine compartment and should not be located under the engine or transmission, or in any area where oil could be spilled or sprayed onto hot surfaces, or ingested into the engine.

The oil cooler should be located as far as possible from anticipated impact areas.

The oil cooler mounting(s) must be able to withstand 30-G forces applied in any direction.

6.4 IGNITION SOURCE CONTROL CRITERIA

6.4.1 Electrical Systems

6.4.1.1 <u>Wiring</u>: Electrical wires should be routed along heavier structural members of the airframe wherever possible. Structural openings for wire passage should be 8 to 12 times larger in diameter than the wire. Sharp metal edges must be protected by grommets to prevent chafing. Wire bundles must be supported at frequent intervals along their length by frangible attachments to the aircraft structure.

Wires that must pass through areas of anticipated structural deformation should be approximately 20 to 30 percent longer than necessary. The extra length should be accumulated in the form of loops or S-shaped patterns and located at the areas of anticipated structural deformation.

Wires should be routed above or away from flammable fluid lines, and they should never be closely spaced between cuter skin and fuel lines. Wires must not be routed near flammable fluid tanks unless the wires are shrouded to prevent arcing. Wires should not be routed in the following areas:

- Near the bottom of the fuselage.
- Over landing gears.
- In the leading edges of wings.
- In areas of anticipated rotor blade impacts.
- In areas of anticipated fuel spillage.
- Immediately adjacent to flammable fluid lines and vent openings.

Electrical wiring and components must be kept to a minimum in flammable fluid tank areas.

Nonsparking breakaway connectors should be used in areas where excessive tensile loads may be applied, such as the wing-tofuselage joint. All wire connectors must be of the shielded, nonsparking type.

6.4.1.2 <u>Batteries and Electrical Accessories</u>: Batteries and electrical accessories should be located as far as possible from flammable fluid tanks.

Batteries and accessories should be housed in compartments built into the airframe. These compartments should be lined with flexible, nonconductive, fire-resistant panels as specified in Section 6.4.1.5.

Electrical wires must exit the batteries and inverters on their least vulnerable side. There must be one full 6-in.-diameter loop of extra wire at the battery and inverter connections to accommodate crash-induced structural deformation.

The battery and accessory mountings must withstand a force of 30 G applied in any direction.

6.4.1.3 <u>Generators and Magnetos</u>: If generators and magnetos are not engine mounted, they should be installed in compartments built into the airframe. These compartments should be located fairly high in the structure and as far as possible from flammable fluids. The compartments should be lined with panels as specified in Section 6.4.1.5. Electrical wires must exit the generators and magnetos on their least vulnerable side regardless of their location. The generator and magneto mountings must withstand a force of 30 G applied in any direction.

6.4.1.4 Lights and Antennas: Lights and antennas should be located as far as possible from flammable fluids. Lights should be located as high as possible on the airframe structure. Landing lights must not be located in front of wing fuel tanks.

The wires that attach to the lights should contain a 6-in.diameter loop near the connection to accommodate crash-induced structural deformation.

6.4.1.5 <u>Liners and Shrouds</u>: Nonconductive paneling must be used as a liner for all electrical compartments. The paneling materials must possess a minimum tensile strength of 250 lb/in. of width and allow a minimum elongation of 200 percent.

Nonconductive material must be used to shroud all electrical wiring that could be cut by deforming aircraft structure during crash impact. The shrouding material must meet or exceed a tensile load of 250 lb/in. of width and must possess a minimum elongation capability of 200 percent.

6.4.2 Shielding

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Shielding should be used wherever necessary to prevent spilled flammable fluids from reaching potential ignition sources or occupiable areas.

6.4.2.1 <u>Spillage Barriers</u>: Fuel tanks must be isolated from the occupants by a minimum of two spillage barriers. These barriers may consist of the normal tank cavity chafing liner and the surrounding airframe structure. If the chafing liner is considered as a barrier, it must be continuous structure completely encasing the fuel tank.

6.4.2.2 <u>Firewalls</u>: Firewalls must be designed to withstand all survivable crash impacts without losing their structural integrity or sealing ability.

6.4.2.3 Fire Curtains: Fire curtains made from fire-resistant cloth may be used to protect occupiable areas or ignition sources from flammable fluid spillage. Fire curtains may be installed in addition to but not in place of the spillage barriers required in Section 6.4.2.1.

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6.4.2.4 <u>Flow Diverters</u>: Drainage holes must be located in all flammable fluid tank compartments to prevent the accumulation of spilled flammable fluids within the aircraft. Drip fences and/or drainage troughs should be used to prevent the gravity flow of spilled fuels from reaching ignition sources such as hot engine areas or electrical compartments. MAR IN THE

6.5 INTERIOR MATERIALS SELECTION CRITERIA

6.5.1 General

All aircraft interior materials such as seat fabrics and cushions, interior wall insulations, and nonmetallic structural components must be flame resistant and produce the least amount of smoke and toxic gases possible. Interior materials in all U. S. Army aircraft must meet the flammability criteria specified in Federal Air Regulation (FAR) 25.853 (Reference 54); these requirements are summarized in Section 6.5.2. Passengercarrying aircraft should meet the flammability and smoke emission criteria guidelines issued by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) (Reference 55); these criteria are summarized in Section 6.5.3.

6.5.2 FAR 25.853 Flammability Requirements

Materials used in each compartment occupied by the crew or passengers must meet the following requirements:

• <u>Ceiling panels, wall panels, partitions, structural</u> <u>flooring, etc.</u> Must be self-extinguishing when tested vertically by applying a 1550°F flame to the lower edge of the specimen for 60 sec. Average burn length not to exceed 6 in.; average flame time after removal of test flame not to exceed 15 sec. Drippings may not continue to flame more than an average of 3 sec.

^{54.} U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter 1, Part 25, Section 853: COMPARTMENT INTERIORS, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., (Rev.) 1980.

^{55.} Transportation Systems Center, PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR FLAMMABILITY AND SMOKE EMISSIONS SPECIFICATIONS, (Unofficial) U. S. Department of Transportation, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

- Floor coverings, textiles (including upholstery), seat cushions, paddings, insulations (except electrical insulation), etc. Must be self-extinguishing when tested vertically by applying a 1550°F flame to the lower edge of the specimen for 12 sec. Average burn length not to exceed 8 in., average flame time after removal of test flame not to exceed 15 sec. Drippings may not continue to flame more than an average of 5 sec.
- Acrylic windows, signs, restraint systems, etc. May not have an average burn rate greater than 2.5 in./ min when tested horizontally by applying a 1550°F flame to the specimen edge for 15 sec.

See Reference 54 for the complete text of the regulations and test requirements.

6.5.3 UMTA Flammability and Smoke Emission_Guidelines

Combustible materials used in transit systems are required to possess the following flammability characteristics:

- Seat cushions and insulations (except electrical insulation). Must pass ASTM E 162-76 (Reference 56) Radiant Panel Test with a flame propagation index (I) not exceeding 25, with the added provision that there shall be no flaming, running, or dripping.
- Wall and ceiling panels, seat frames, partitions, etc. Must pass ASTM E 162-76 Radiant Panel Test with a flame propagation index (I) not exceeding 35, with the added provision that there shall be no flaming dripping.
- Upholstery Materials. Burn length must not exceed 6 in. when tested by FAR 25.853 vertical test. Average flame time after removal of flame source may not exceed 10 seconds. Flaming dripping not allowed.
- <u>Carpeting (tested with its padding)</u>. Must pass NBS flooring Radiant Panel Test, NBS1R-74-495 with a minimum critical radiant flux of 0.6 watts/cm².

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56. ASTM E 162-76, STANDARD TEST METHODS FOR SURFACE FLAMMA-BILITY OF MATERIALS USING A RADIANT HEAT ENERGY SOURCE, <u>1977 Annual Book of ASTM Standards</u>, R. P. Lukens, et al., eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Easton, Maryland, 1977, Part 18.

- <u>Plastic windows</u>. Must pass ASTM E 162-76 Radiant Panel Test with a flame propagation index (I_s) not exceeding 100.
- <u>Flooring</u>. Must withstand requirements of ASTM E 119-76 (Reference 57) when underside is exposed to a flame up to 1400°F for 15 min.
- Elastomers. Must pass the requirements of ASTM C542-76 (Reference 58), with the added requirement of no flaming dripping.

When tested in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association Standard No. 258-1976 (Reference 59) in both flaming and nonflaming modes, combustible materials should meet the following smoke emission requirements:

- Upholstery, air ducting, insulation (except electrical insulation). Optical density (D) must not exceed 100 within 4 min after start of test.
- All other materials, (except foam seat cushioning, electrical insulation, and carpeting). Optical density (D) must not exceed 100 within 90 sec after start of test, nor exceed 200 within 4 min after start of test.

The UMTA guidelines and the NFPA standard are being voluntarily used by several transit authorities and manufacturers although the guidelines are not Government standards and have no official status. See References 55 and 59 for the complete text of the regulations and test requirements.

If fire-retardant coatings are used for fabric and trim materials, the effects, if any, of routine maintenance and cleaning procedures must be assessed. If the coatings can be removed

- 57. ASTM E 119-76, STANDARD METHODS OF FIRE TESTS OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIALS, <u>1977 Annual Book of ASTM Standards</u>, R. P. Lukens, et al., eds., American Society for Testing and Material3, Easton, Maryland, 1977, Part 18.
- 58. ASTM C 542-76, STANDARD SPECIFICATION FOR LOCK-STRIP GAS-KETS, <u>1977 Annual Book of ASTM Standards</u>, R. P. Lukens, et al., eds., American Society for Testing and Materials, Easton, Maryland, 1977, Part 18.
- 59. NFPA 258-1976, STANDARD TEST METHOD FOR MEASURING THE SMOKE GENERATED BY SOLID MATERIALS, <u>National Fire Codes</u>, <u>1979</u>, National Fire Protection Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979.

by routine cleaning procedures, the flammability and smoke/ toxic fume tests should be repeated after a representative number of cleaning cycles.

6.6 DITCHING CRITERIA

6.6.1 General

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Occupant survival during a ditching is highly dependent on egressing rapidly from the aircraft before it sinks. This is especially true in helicopters, which tend to roll inverted and sink very rapidly. Disorientation and poor underwater visibility further hamper successful egress. Available escape times from helicopters range from a few seconds to a few minutes. The availability of emergency exits, adequate emergency exit lighting, and helicopter flotation provisions can all increase the available escape time. Adequate and easily deployed ditching equipment increases the probability of survival after successful egress.

6.6.2 Emergency Exits

All U. S. Army aircraft must meet the criteria for emergency exits contained in Section 6.7. Passenger-carrying helicopters operating over water environments, however, should contain more and larger emergency exits than might normally be provided. Additional escape exits should be provided in the overhead, deck, and tail sections.

Explosively created exit systems should be considered because of their rapid initiation times and immunity to the crash environment. Linear-shaped charges should be placed around and extend beyond existing windows and hatches to preclude the problem of jammed or stuck exits. Strategically placed shaped charges in the overhead, deck, empty bulkhead spaces, etc. can provide the additional emergency exits required in the ditching environment. Criteria for these types of systems are contained in Section 6.7.

6.6.3 Underwater Emergency Lighting

Emergency exits must be lighted with high intensity lights if they are to be seen underwater. The required brightness of the lights depends on the turbidity of the water, the distance between the observer and the light, and the threshold sensitivity of the observer's eyes.

The escape hatch lights must have a minimum brightness of 120 fL. However, higher brightness levels of light, if possible, should be employed for underwater escape lighting.

6.6.4 Helicopter Flotation Systems

An adequate number of helicopter flotation devices should be provided. Combinations of flotation methods, such as sponsons in conjunction with flotation bags, sealed hulls, etc., should be used.

Sponsons can help stabilize a helicopter in relatively calm seas. However, they must be guite large to be of any value in providing flotation to counteract the inherent instability due to a helicopter's high center of gravity. Calculated aircraft stability must be verified by data from tests performed on the aircraft or on a scaled model thereof.

The calculated stability afforded by flotation bags also must be verified by test data. To achieve maximum effectiveness, the bags must inflate simultaneously prior to or upon water contact at slow speeds. Reliability of a flotation bag system is of prime importance.

6.6.5 Ditching Equipment

Tiedown or stowage locations must be provided for life rafts, life preservers, survival kits, and miscellaneous ditching equipment. Restraint devices and supporting structures must be designed to restrain the equipment to static loads of 50 G downward, 10 G upward, 35 G forward, 15 G aftward, and 25 G sideward. All survival equipment must be readily available and easily released from restraining devices after ditching.

Life raft mountings and restraining devices must be located and designed so that rafts can be removed and deployed outside the aircraft within 30 sec from the time the release or removal action is initiated.

When exterior installations for life rafts or other survival equipment are provided, the mountings and restraining devices must be designed to prevent inadvertent release or damage in flight or when ditching. Such equipment must be recoverable from an exit intended for use in ditching. Release mechanisms must be designed to minimize the possibility of jamming due to structural deformation incurred during ditching.

6.7 EMERGENCY ESCAPE DESIGN CRITERIA

6.7.1 Emergency Exits

6.7.1.1 <u>General</u>: Exits of sufficient size and number must be provided to ensure that all occupants can evacuate the aircraft before postcrash conditions become intolerable, even if half

of the exits are blocked. If a crash-resistant fuel system is not installed, the maximum number of personnel to be carried must be able to evacuate the aircraft within 10 sec. The allowable evacuation time can be extended to 30 sec if a crashresistant fuel system is installed in the aircraft. The emergency exit criteria presented in this chapter are predicated on a 30-sec evacuation time.

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6.7.1.2 <u>Types of Exits</u>: A Class C exit constitutes the minimum requirement for an emergency exit. (A Class C exit is a window, door, hatch, or other exit intended primarily for emergency evacuation). Class C exit closures must be capable of being removed from the exit opening within 5 sec regardless of the aircraft's attitude.

A Class B exit consists of a door, hatch, or other exit intended primarily for service or logistic purposes (e.g., cargo hatches and rear loading ramps or clamshell doors). Class B exits may be used instead of Class C exits if adequate emergency releases are installed. A Class A exit (doors, hatches, etc., intended primarily for normal entry and exit) generally may be used in lieu of a Class C exit; however, if either Class B or Class A openings are used in place of Class C exits, they must meet the 5-sec opening requirement.

6.7.1.3 <u>Size of Exits</u>: All exits must be sufficient in size and shape to allow 95th-percentile combat-equipped troops and aviators to pass through the exit at a rate of 1.5 sec per man or less. Therefore, Class C exits must be a minimum of 22 in. in diameter, or 22 in. square, with 6-in. radius corners, although larger exits are recommended. Other shapes may be used if the minimum dimensions are met or exceeded.

6.7.1.4 <u>Number of Exits</u>: Each flight crew member must have access to at least one usable emergency exit regardless of the attitude of the aircraft after impact. When sliding or clamshell canopies are used, Class C exits must be provided for crew escape in case the postimpact attitude of the aircraft prevents jettisoning of the canopy.

A minimum of two Class C exits (or equivalent) must be provided in troop/passenger sections, one on each side of the fuselage. Cockpit exits may not be counted toward this requirement. Additional exits must be provided whenever the ratio of seats to passengers exceeds the 1-to-10 ratio (e.g., if the capacity is 21, three exits are required). These requirements also apply to cargo compartments if the compartments have a capability for troop transport.

6.7.1.5 Location of Exits: Emergency exits must be equally divided between both sides of the aircraft to provide alternate means of escape if, for any reason, the exits on one side become blocked. If feasible, in order to prevent crowding during evacuation, side exits should not be located directly across from each other. At least one exit on each side must be well above the anticipated waterline during a ditching.

If the width of the fuselage between side exits is 5 ft or more, at least one additional Class C exit must be provided overhead so that easy access to an exit is available when the aircraft comes to rest on its side. If more than 20 occupants can occupy the troop/passenger section, one overhead exit must be provided for every 20 occupants. If overhead exits are not feasible, bottom or fore and/or aft exits may be provided instead. Alternatively, side exits may be located where interior aircraft structures or components can be used as steps to gain access to the upside exits. Such component-steps must be able to support at least 300 lb. They must also maintain their structural integrity and attachment to the aircraft when exposed to static loads of 50 G downward, 10 G upward, 35 G forward, 15 G aftward, and 25 G sideward.

Emergency exits should not be located in the following areas:

- In close proximity to the main landing gear.
- Under heavy components, such as engines and transmissions.
- In any area where it is necessary to move equipment, cargo, etc., to gain access to the exit.
- In any area where external components, such as engines or armament, will interfere with occupant escape.
- Near potential fuel spillage areas.
- Near major ignition sources, such as hot engines.

6.7.1.6 Operation of Exits: The method of releasing and opening an emergency exit must be simple, obvious, and natural to all personnel carried in the aircraft. All emergency exits must be capable of being completely opened within 5 sec after the person initiating the action first places his hand on the release handle.

Exit release mechanisms must permit release handle actuation and exit opening by one person using one hand. The releasing action must be natural to the position of the operator initiating the action and must be a continuous motion from start to finish without sharp changes in direction. Secondary operations must not be necessary. The final motion of the release handle should contribute to the opening of the exit.

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Release handles must be located on the exit closures themselves, or immediately adjacent to the exit openings, so that they are readily accessible. However, the handles must not obstruct the removal of the exit closure or impede escape through the exit opening. Release handles in cockpits and troop compartments must be located so that crew members need not unlock their shoulder harnesses in order to actuate the release mechanism.

Accidental release of exits in flight must be prevented. Release mechanisms must be designed so that improper or incomplete closing of the exit closure will be obvious. Easily removable protective covers may be used to prevent inadvertent actuation of exit release handles.

It is essential that all emergency exits be capable of being opened by rescue personnel from outside the aircraft. Internal and external release mechanisms must be capable of being actuated simultaneously without interfering with each other. Means to prevent icing of the outside release mechanisms and handle mounts must be provided.

Once the release mechanism has been actuated, only the single operation of pulling or pushing the exit closure into the clear should be necessary. All emergency exit closures must be designed to fall free or be easily pushed outward if the aircraft : not pressurized. In pressurized aircraft, exit closures must be removed inwardly, but, if possible, should then be canted at an angle and pushed out the exit opening. "Push out"-type Class C exits also must be capable of being pushed in from the outside by rescue personnel.

Emergency exits must be designed to permit removal of the exit closure in spite of seal vulcanization, ice accumulation, and moderate fuselage deformation. A peripheral clearance of at least 0.20 in., provided between the exit closure and its frame, will help accomplish this goal.

6.7.1.7 Explosively Created Exits: Explosive systems for cutting emergency exits through existing doors and windows and through fuselage structures should be considered. These systems provide the advantages of extremely rapid release times,

simplicity of operation, and immunity to jamming. If an explosive exit system is incorporated into the aircraft, the following design criteria apply.

The arming/firing system must be designed for simple and rapid actuation of the explosive system, yet provide maximum safety against inadvertent actuation. Arming and firing must be accomplished in two separate and deliberate actions, with the arming function always under the control of the flight crew. The safe/arm mechanism must remain in its chosen position (armed or disarmed) until a deliberate action to change its position is initiated. The safe/arm mechanism must not change positions due to system failure, or due to any environmental or crash inputs. Disarming capability must be provided to permit safing the system when normal safing modes are inoperable.

The firing mechanism must be independent of any external energy source. Firing mechanisms should be located adjacent to each emergency exit so that each exit can be opened independently, from both inside and outside the aircraft.

The linear shaped charges used to cut the exit openings must be held securely in position against the aircraft structure. The size of the exit openings must conform to Class C requirements. The jettisonable section must be ejected outward. Energy-absorbing backup material must be placed behind the shaped charge to control the backblast of the explosive.

All explosives used in the system should possess as high a thermal limit as possible. The system must be able to function when exposed to ambient air temperatures up to 400°F, yet not function during brief exposure (30 to 60 sec) to postcrash fires. The system must be designed to minimize the possibility of system actuation igniting any spilled fuel. Thus, the amount and duration of any exposed flame must be minimal.

6.7.1.8 Access to Exits: Access from aisles to all exits must be provided so that exits are not obstructed by any aircraft structures or components that would impede escape. The width of aisles at any point between seat rows must allow unobstructed movement of 95th-percentile troops with full combat equipment. Therefore, the aisle width must be at least 17 in. Where it is necessary to pass through seat rows to gain access to emergency exits, the longitudinal spacing between the rows must be sufficient to permit these troops to move at a rate consistent with the capacity of the exit (1.5 sec per man or less).

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6.7.2 Emergency Lighting

6.7.2.1 Interior Emergency Lighting: Interior emergency lighting must provide sufficient illumination throughout cockpit and cabin areas to permit occupants to locate emergency exits and survival equipment, perceive escape paths, and avoid obstacles while moving toward the exits. Minimum average illumination in clear air along passageways leading to each exit and in front of each exit must be 0.05 fc measured 20 in. above the floor (excluding canopy aircraft).

6.7.2.2 <u>Emergency Exit Lights</u>: Supplementary emergency lighting units, with adequate brightness to permit occupants to identify exits, read exit operating instructions, and actuate exit release mechanisms during reduced visibility conditions (darkness, smoke, etc.), should be provided at or near each emergency exit. All passenger/troop-carrying aircraft must contain internally illuminated exit signs with a minimum brightness of at least 25 fL, although brighter lights are strongly recommended. Aircraft whose mission requirements include troop transport over water should contain exit sign lighting meeting the requirements specified in Section 6.6.3. Canopy aircraft may be excluded from these requirements.

6.7.2.3 Exterior Emergency Lighting: For noncombat missions, exterior emergency lighting should be considered to illuminate the ground near each exit and in areas where escape and survival equipment will be deployed. The light intensity on the ground should be 0.02 fc minimum.

6.7.2.4 <u>Structural Requirements</u>: All emergency lighting units must be self-contained, explosion-proof, operable under water, and accessible for periodic maintenance. To ensure structural integrity and continued operation after a crash, the lighting system must be capable of withstanding the following crash loads: 50 G downward, 10 G upward, 35 G forward, 15 G aftward, 25 G lateral. The crash environment is more fully defined by the velocity changes presented in Table 2. Except for those lights directly destroyed by the crash, breakup of the fuselage must not render any portion of the lighting system inoperative.

6.7.2.5 <u>Power Sources</u>: All units must be capable of operating independently of the main aircraft lighting system. Emergency lighting power sources must be independent of the main power source of the aircraft. They must contain power sufficient to provide effective illumination for a minimum of 15 min.

6.7.2.6 <u>Actuation of Lighting Units</u>: Emergency lighting units should be actuated automatically in as many survivable accidents as possible. This can be accomplished by using inertia

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sensors capable of sensing lower-severity accidents. Sensor criteria should be identical to those specified for crash locator beacons in Section 6.8. An override switch to nullify the automatic feature when desired must be provided. Manual actuating switches must be provided so that emergency lights can be turned on prior to a crash if desirable.

6.7.3 Emergency Exit Markings

Emergency exits must be clearly marked both inside and outside the aircraft. In addition, instructions for releasing the exits must be clearly marked beside the exit release mechanisms.

All U. S. Army aircraft must be painted and marked according to the requirements of TB 746-93-2 (Reference 60). Although these requirements are summarized in Volume V of this guide, the reader is referred to TB 746-93-2 for complete details.

6.7.4 Crew Chief Stations

At least one crew chief station must be located in each troop compartment. The station should be located as near the main or emergency exits as possible and should provide complete surveillance of the troop compartment.

6.7.5 Alarm Systems

Aircraft with passenger or troop compartments should be equipped with an audible emergency alarm device that can be heard over the highest decibel noise level expected in the aircraft. Consideration should be given to providing visual as well as audible warnings.

6.8 CRASH LOCATOR BEACON DESIGN CRITERIA

6.8.1 General

Crash locator beacons may be fixed, portable, or deployable, as specified by the procuring activity according to its aircraft mission requirements.

Fixed equipment is permanently mounted in the aircraft. Although the transmitter, antenna, and power supply need not be contained in one package, their close proximity to each other will reduce the chances of connecting circuitry being damaged during crash impact.

60. Technical Bulletin, TB 746-93-2, PAINTING AND MARKING OF ARMY AIRCRAFT, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 10 August 1978. Portable and automatically deployed beacons must contain the transmitter, antenna, and power supply in one package. Portable beacons must be easily removed from their installations by crew members, yet their installations must be secure enough to protect them from impact damage.

Automatically deployed beacons must be designed to withstand ground impact forces following their ejection. They must also be buoyant, self-righting, and stable when floating in water, and not adversely affected by immersion in fresh or salt water for the life of the power supply.

Crash locator beacons may be either manually or automatically activated. Since automatic activation requires no previous action on the part of the crew, it is the preferred method. However, an arming switch must be provided so that automatic activation can be used or not, depending on the aircraft mission. A manual activation switch also must be provided so that the beacon can be activated if the arming switch is not on, or if, for any other reason, the beacon is not automatically activated.

6.8.2 Crash Sensors

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Although different types of crash sensors might be used, the current state of the art is such that inertia sensors are the preferred choice. Regardless of the type of sensor used, the sensor must be responsive to the majority of survivable aircraft accidents, including those accidents in which the crash forces and damage are minimal. At the same time, the sensor must ignore normal vibrational loads and flight loads up to the limits of maneuverability.

In order to sense 75 to 80 percent of rotary- and light fixedwing accidents, an inertia sensor must have a sensing threshold of 2 G. Although the 2-G threshold level is below the accelerations sometimes experienced during flight, the inertia sensor can be designed to filter out vibration and flight loads if it also must detect a velocity change typical of crash rather than operational conditions before it actuates.

Since most fixed-wing aircraft accidents have a major longitudinal component of velocity and force, a unidirectional inertia sensor mounted with the active axis forward in the direction of the longitudinal axis of the aircraft is sufficient. A longitudinal inertia sensor should be designed to actuate at a threshold of 2-G acceleration and a minimum velocity change of 3 ft/sec. These specification limits are shown in Figure 58.

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The above specifications are also satisfactory for rotary-wing aircraft in the longitudinal direction. However, since helicopters often have large vertical crash forces with minimal longitudinal forces, a vertically oriented crash sensor must be employed in addition to a longitudinal sensor. The vertical sensor should be designed to actuate at a 2-G acceleration level when the velocity change is 10 ft/sec or more. The specification limits for this case are shown in Figure 59.





The sensor must be able to withstand impact forces associated with severe survivable crashes and still function. Thus the sensor must withstand shock pulses equal to or greater than those listed in Section 6.7.2.4.

The inertia sensor criteria presented above are based on crash forces typical of those experienced in the occupant compartment during survivable crashes. Therefore, the sensor must be located in an area that will experience crash forces representative of those in the occupant compartment. The sensor must, of course, be protected from possible impact damage.

The sensor must be mounted to rigid structure to prevent the amplification or attenuation of flight or crash loads that can occur with flexible structures. For the same reason, soft mounting materials, such as flexible straps or Velcro fasteners, must not be used.

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6.8.3 Transmitters

Operating frequencies and transmitter ranges (power) must be determined by the procuring activity according to its own needs.

The transmitter must be capable of being either manually or automatically activated. An arm switch must be provided so that automatic activation can be selected or not, as desired.

A cockpit warning light must be provided to alert the crew to inadvertent transmitter activation.

The transmitter must be located in an area that is not subject to impact damage. The transmitter and its mounting must be designed to withstand the impact forces of a severe survivable accident without compromising the operation of the transmitter.

6.8.4 Antennas

The antennas, except for those used in portable and deployable beacons, are usually mounted outside the aircraft. The antennas must be located away from anticipated impact areas, such as the front or bottom of the aircraft, wing or tail surfaces likely to impact trees, etc., and those portions of helicopters apt to experience rotor blade strikes during impact. The antenna mounting must be able to withstand the decelerative forces of severe survivable impacts.

6.8.5 Power Supplies

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The crash locator beacon must have its own independent power supply so that it is not dependent on aircraft power for its operation. The power supply must be capable of providing the necessary power for optimum transmitter operation over the time period and under the environmental conditions specified for the particular aircraft.

If the power supply is not integral with the transmitter, it should be mounted to the aircraft in a location away from anticipated impact areas and must have an attachment strength equal to that of the transmitter.

All electrical wiring between components of the system must be protected from impact damage unless the components are packaged together. Protection can be accomplished by following the criteria in Section 6.4.1.1.

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			Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
	6.9	DESIGN CHECKLISTS			
	6.9.1	Fuel System Design Checklist			
	6.9.1	.l <u>Fuel Tanks</u>			
	1.	Are the fuel tanks located as far as possible from anticipated impact areas, occupiable areas, large weight masses, and primary ig- nition sources?			
	2.	Are the fuel tanks located as high up in the structure as possible?			
	3.	Are the fuel tanks located where there is no danger of puncture by a collapsing landing gear?			
	4.	Are the fuel tanks located so that transmis- sions, engines, and similar massive compo- nents will not crush the tanks during a crash?			_
	5.	Are the fuel tanks relatively safe from penetrative damage by structural stringers and stiffeners?			
	6.	Can each fuel tank displace in the airframe structure without tearing or inducing leaks around the filler area, the fuel line entry and exit, the quantity indicator, and the tank-to-structure attachment points?			
	7.	Do the fuel tanks have smooth, regular shapes, with the sump gradually contoured into the tank bottom?			
	8.	Do all fuel tank concave corners have a min- imum radius of 3 in., and all convex corners a minimum radius of 1 in.?			
	9.	Do all fuel tanks meet or exceed the re- quirements of MIL-T-27422?			
	10.	Do all fuel tank fittings meet or exceed the tank pullout strength specified in MIL-T-27422?		_	
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6.9.3	1.2 <u>Fuel Lines</u>			
11.	Are all fuel lines made from flexible hose with a steel-braided outer sheath?			•
12.	Do all hose assemblies meet the strength re- quirements listed in Table 16, Section 6.2.3.1?			
13.	Can all hoses elongate 20 percent without the hose assemblies spilling fuel?			
14.	Do fuel lines exit the fuel tank in one pro- tected location?			
15.	Has the number of fuel lines in the engine compartment been kept to a minimum?			
16.	Are fuel lines routed along heavier struc- tural members wherever possible?			
17.	Is as much of the fuel line as possible routed through the fuel tanks?		_	
18.	Are fuel lines routed as far as possible from occupiable areas and electrical com- partments?			
19.	Are fuel lines routed as far as possible from all electrical equipment and wires?	<u> </u>	_	
20.	Are fuel lines routed away from areas where large structural damage is likely during a crash?		<u> </u>	
21.	Are fuel lines routed away from the exhaust system and high-temperature heating ducts?			
22.	Are the fuel system lines designed with as few fittings as possible?			
23.	Are the fuel system lines designed so that uncut hoses are run through bulkheads rather than attached to the bulkheads with fit- tings?			
24.	Are self-sealing breakaway valves used wher- ever a fuel line goes through a firewall or bulkhead or is attached to the bulkhead?			

Yes No N/A

¥.• €.≢			Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
	25.	Are lines entering and exiting in-line boost pumps made of flexible hose that is approxi- mately 20 percent longer than necessary?			
	26.	If fuel lines are not longer than necessary for in-line boost pumps, are self-sealing breakaway valves used in the lines near the boost pump?			
-	27.	Are self-sealing breakaway valves used at all points in the fuel lines where aircraft structural deformation could lead to line failure?		_	
•	28.	Are fuel line supports frangible to ensure release of the line from the structure during crash impact?			
	29.	Will the frangible supports meet all opera- tional and service loads of the aircraft?			
	30.	Are all continuous lines running through bulkheads stabilized by frangible panels?			
	6.9.	1.3 Frangible Attachments			
	31.	Are frangible attachments used at all at- tachment points between the fuel tanks and aircraft structure?			
	32.	Do the specified frangible tank attachment separation loads exceed all operational and service loads by a satisfactory margin?			
	33.	Are the specified frangible attachment separation loads between 25 and 50 percent of the loads required to fail the attached system or components?			
•	34.	Will the frangible attachments separate whenever the required loads are applied in all possible modes likely to occur during crash impacts?			
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6.9.1.4 Self-Sealing Breakaway Valves

- 35. Are breakaway valves installed in all fuel tank-to-fuel line connections, tank-to-tank interconnects, and at other points in the fuel system where aircraft structural deformation could lead to system failure?
- 36. Are the shapes of the breakaway valves remaining in the fuel tank basically smooth?
- 37. Are the breakaway values recessed into the tank wall so that the tank half does not protrude outside the tank wall more than 1/2 in. after value separation?
- 38. Do the specified breakaway valve separation loads exceed all operational and service loads of the aircraft?
- 39. Are the specified breakaway valve separation loads between 25 and 50 percent of the loads required to fail the attached components or lines?
- 40. Are the breakaway values required to separate whenever the required loads are applied in the modes most likely to occur during crash impacts?

6.9.1.5 Fuel Drains

- 41. Are all fuel line drain valves stabilized where necessary with frangible attachments?
- 42. Are all structural attachments of fuel tank drains made with frangible attachments?
- Are all fuel tank drains recessed into the tank so that no part of the drain protrudes outside the tank wall?

6.9.1.6 Filler Units

- 44. Are filler units attached to the aircraft structure with frangible attachments?
- 45. Are filler caps recessed into the fuel tank wall?

		Yes	No	<u>N/2</u>
46.	Are long filler necks avoided?		_	
47.	If filler necks are used, are they made from frangible materials and designed so that the filler cap stays with the tank after filler neck separation?			
6.9.	1.7 Boost Pumps			
48.	Can an engine-mounted, engine-driven boost pump be used in the aircraft?			
49.	If an engine-mounted suction system cannot be used, can an air-driven boost pump be used?		_	
50.	Do in-line boost pumps have a structural attachment capable of withstanding a 30-G load applied in any direction?			
51.	Are tank-mounted boost pumps fastened to the structure with frangible attachments?			
6.9.	1.8 Fuel Filters and Strainers			
52.	Are fuel filters and strainers mounted out- side the engine compartment wherever pos- sible?		_	
53.	Do all strainers and filters have a struc- tural attachment capable of withstanding a 30-G load applied in any direction?			
54.	Do all strainers and filters retain as small a quantity of fuel as possible?		_	
6.9.	1.9 Fuel Valves			
55.	Has the number of fuel valves been kept to the minimum required for operation?			
56.	Are self-sealing breakaway valves used at all valve-to-fuel line connections where crash-induced line failure is likely?		_	
57.	Are all small in-line valves fastened to the structure with frangible attachments?	, 	_	
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>	:	
58.	Do large valves have a structural attachment capable of withstanding 30-G loads in any direction?					
59.	Are fuel shutoff valves located outside the engine compartment, either on the outside face of the firewall or at the fuel tank outlets?		_			
6.9.	1.10 Fuel Quantity Indicators					
60.	Can float-type quantity indicators be used in this fuel system?				-	
61.	If probe-type indicators are used, are they fabricated from material that either is frangible or possesses as low a flexural rigidity as possible?				<i>.</i>	
62.	Is a slightly rounded shoe incorporated at the probe bottom end of all probe-type in- dicators, or is the probe mounted at an angle toward the rear of the aircraft?					
63.	Are frangible attachments used where it is necessary to stabilize the indicator by fastening it to the structure?					
6.9.	1.11 Vent Systems					
64.	Are high-strength fittings used between the metal insert in the tank and the vent line?					
65.	If vent outlets must be supported, are they supported by frangible attachments to the structure?					
66.	Is the vent line made of wire-covered flexi- ble hose?				•	
67.	Is the vent line routed so that it cannot be snagged in displacing structure during a crash?				•	
68.	Is a self-sealing breakaway valve used at the tank-to-line attachment if there is danger of the tank being torn free of the supporting structure?		_		1	
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
69.	Are vent lines routed inside the fuel tank in such a manner that spillage cannot con- tinue after a rollover accident?		_	
70.	If an antispillage vent valve is used inside the tank in lieu of the above items, will the valve remain fully open during all nor- mal flight conditions?			
71.	Will the vent valve close in the extreme at- titudes that will occur during a rollover?		~	
72.	Will the vent valve possess adequate venting capability under critical icing conditions in flight?			
73.	If the fuel system is to be pressure re- fueled, is a bypass system provided in case of tank overpressurization?			
74.	Is any spillage due to tank overpressuriza- tion released away from aircraft occupants and ignition sources?			
6.9.	2 Oil and Hydraulic System Design Checklist			
6.9.	2.1 Oil Tanks and Hydraulic Reservoirs			
1 .	Are the tanks and reservoirs located as far as possible from anticipated impact areas, occupiable areas, large weight masses, and primary ignition sources?		_	
2.	Are the tanks and reservoirs located as high up in the structure as possible?			
3.	Are the tanks and reservoirs located where there is no danger of puncture from a collapsing landing gear?			
	Are the tanks and reservoirs located where transmissions, engines, and similar massive			
4.	crash?			
4. 5.	crash? Are the tanks and reservoirs relatively safe from penetrative damage by structural stringers and stiffeners?		_	

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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>	,	
б.	Can the oil tanks displace in the airframe structure and still not leak around the filler area, the fluid line entry and exit, the quantity indicator, and the tank-to- structure attachment points?					
7.	Are the hydraulic reservoirs constructed and mounted to withstand 30-G forces applied in any direction?		6			-
6.9.3	2.2 Oil and Hydraulic Lines					
8.	Are all oil and hydraulic lines made from flexible hose with a steel-braided outer sheath wherever possible?					
9.	Do all hose assemblies meet the strength requirements listed in Table 16, Section 6.2.3.17					
10.	Can all hoses elongate 20 percent without the hose assemblies spilling fluid?					
11.	Is coiled metal tubing used in areas where flexible hose cannot be used, but large structural deformations are expected?		~			
12.	Has the number of fluid lines in the engine compartment been held to a minimum?					
13.	Are fluid lines routed along heavier struc- tural members wherever possible?					
14.	Are fluid lines routed as far as possible from occupiable areas and electrical com- partments?					
15.	Are fluid lines routed as far as possible from all electrical equipment and wires?				•	
16.	Are fluid lines routed away from areas where large structural damage is likely during a crash?		~		•	
17.	Are fluid lines routed away from the exhaust system and high-temperature heating ducts?		-			

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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
18.	Are the fluid system lines designed with as few fittings as possible?			
19.	Are the fluid system lines designed so that continuous hoses are run through bulkheads rather than attached to the bulkheads with fittings?			
20.	Are self-sealing breakaway valves used wher- ever a fluid line goes through a firewall or a bulkhead or is attached to the bulk- head?		~	
21.	Are self-sealing breakaway valves used at all points in the fluid lines where aircraft structural deformation could lead to line failure?			
22.	Are fluid line supports frangible to ensure release of the line during crash impact?			
23.	Are uncut lines running through bulkheads stabilized by frangible panels?			
6.9.	2.3 Oil and Hydraulic System Components			
24.	Are all oil and hydraulic system components located as far as possible from anticipated impact areas, occupiable areas, and electri- cal compartments?			
25.	Are the components located in the engine compartment restricted to those absolutely necessary for engine operation?			~
26.	Can the construction and mounting of all system components withstand 30-G forces applied in any direction without leakage?			
6.9.	2.4 <u>Oil Coolers</u>			
27.	Is the oil cooler located outside of the engine compartment?			
28.	Is the oil cooler located as far as possible from anticipated impact areas, (ccupiable areas, and other potentially injurious com- ponents?			

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29.	Can the oil cooler and connecting lines ex- perience considerable deformation without leaking?		_		
30.	Can the oil cooler mounting withstand 30-G				
	forces applied in any direction?				
6.9.3	3 Ignition Source Control Checklist				
6.9.3	3.1 <u>Electrical Systems</u>				
1.	Are wires routed as high up in the structure as possible?		_		•
2.	Are wires routed away from areas of antici- pated structural damage, i.e., landing gear				•
	rallure, nose crush-in, etc.?				
3.	Are wires routed above or away from flam- mable fluid lines?				
4.	Are all wires routed through the structure so that extensive structural collapse or displacement can take place without breaking wiring?				
5.	Are wire bundles supported at frequent in- tervals by frangible attachments to the aircraft structure?				
6.	Are wires shielded by felt or similar pro- tective covers in areas where crushing is likely?				
7.	Are wires to electrically operated boost pumps 20 to 30 percent longer than neces- sary?				
8.	Is all electrical wiring going through the fuel tank compartments shrouded?				•
9.	- Is wiring in the fuel tank compartment routed as high as possible in the compart- ment?				•
	······				
10.	Are electrical wires in the fuel tank com- partment 20 to 30 percent longer than neces- sary?				~
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
11.	Are batteries, generators, and inverters located in areas relatively free from struc- tural collapse?		_	
12.	Are batteries, generators, and inverters located as far as possible from flammable fluids?			
13.	Are batteries and generators (unless engine mounted) housed in compartments built into the airframe?			
14.	Are battery, inverter, and generator mount- ings capable of withstanding a 30-G force applied in any direction?			
15.	Are the wires connecting the generator, battery, and inverter into the system lo- cated in relatively crush-free areas?			
16.	Are light bulbs and attaching wires on lower airframe surfaces designed to readily dis- place, rather than remain stationary and be broken?			
17.	Are all electrical compartments lined with a tough, nonconductive paneling?			
6.9.3	3.2 Shielding			
18.	Are fuel tanks isolated from the occupants by a minimum of two spillage barriers?			
19.	Are firewalls designed to withstand all survivable crash impacts without losing their structural integrity or sealing ability?		_	
20.	Are drainage holes located in all flammable fluid tank compartments?			
21.	Is the hot metal of the engine shielded from flammable fluid spillages?			
6.9.4	Interior Materials Selection Checklist			
1.	Do all interior materials meet the flamma- bility requirements specified in Federal Air Regulation (FAR) 25.853?			
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
2.	Do all interior materials produce the lowest possible amount of toxic gases?			
3.	Do all interior materials in troop/passenger- carrying aircraft meet the flammability guidelines recommended by UMTA? (See Sec- tion 6.5.3)			<u> </u>
4.	Do all interior materials in troop/passenger- carrying aircraft meet the smoke emission guidelines recommended by UMTA? (See Sec- tion 6.5.3)			
6.9.	5 Ditching Provisions Checklist			
1.	Are emergency exits larger and more numerous than normally required to meet minimum standards?			
•				
۷.	Are additional escape exits provided in the overhead, deck, and tail sections?			
3.	Have explosively created exit systems been considered?			
4.	Are emergency exits lighted with high inten- sity lights with a minimum brightness of 120 fL?		_	
5.	Even though escape lights meet the minimum requirement, is the brightness level of escape lighting the highest permitted by other design conditions?			
6.	Has more than one aircraft flotation method been provided?			
7.	Does the flotation bag system have a high reliability?		_	
8.	Are tiedown or stowage facilities provided for life rafts and other ditching equipment?			
9.	Are equipment restraint devices and support- ing structures designed to restrain the equipment to loads of 50 G downward, 10 G upward, 35 G forward, 15 G aftward, and 25 J sideward?			
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10.	Is all survival equipment readily available and easily released after ditching?	 	
11.	Can life rafts be removed and deployed out- side the aircraft within 30 sec?	 	
6.9.	6 Emergency Escape Design Checklist		
5.9.	6.1 <u>Emergency Exits</u>		
1.	Are the numbers, sizes, and locations of the exits such that a full load of troops and crew can evacuate in 30 sec when the air- craft is on its side?	 	
2.	Are all escape exits a minimum of 22 in. in diameter, or 22 in. square with 6-in. radius corners?	 	
3.	Can all ϵ gency exits be completely opened within 5 s., after the person initiating the action first places his hand on the release handle?	 	
4.	Does each crew member have access to at least one emergency exit regardless of air- craft attitude?	 	
5.	Are a minimum of two exits, one on each side of the fuselage, provided in troop/passenger compartments?	 	
б.	Is at least one exit provided for every 10 persons expected to occupy troop/passenger compartments?	 _	
7.	Are emergency exit locations equally divided on each side of the aircraft?	 	
8.	If the width of the fuselage is 5 ft or more, are additional exits provided in the overhead, bottom, fore or aft sections of the aircraft?	 	
9.	Are all exit release mechanisms of the single motion type?	 	
10.	Is the number of different types of exit re- lease handles held to a minimum?	 	
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>		2
11.	Can all exits be opened from both the inside and outside of the aircraft?					
12.	Can the exits be opened even if the fuselage evidences considerable distortion?					
13.	Can the exits be easily operated when the aircraft is on its side?					-
14.	Will removed or opened exit covers inher- ently be positioned so as to not block the exit openings nor interfere with occupant egress?					
15.	Is the exit opening operation designed to inherently resist jamming by loose objects?					
16.	Can an exit be opened easily when the oper- ator is being pushed or crowded by other occupants?					
17.	During emergency evacuation, do all passen- gers have essentially the same distance to move during egress?					
18.	Are aisles between seat rows wide enough to allow unobstructed movement of occupants (at least 17 in. minimum)?					
19.	If occupants must pass through seat rows to reach the exits, can they move to the exits at a rate that permits one person to exit every 1.5 sec or less?					
6.9.	6.2 Explosive Exit Systems					
20.	Are arming and firing accomplished in two separate and deliberate actions?		_			
21.	Is the arming function under the control of the flight crew?					
22.	Will the safe/arm mechanism remain in its preselected position regardless of system failure or environmental or crash inputs?		_			•
23.	Is the firing mechanism independent of any external energy source?		_			
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		Yes	No	<u>N/A</u>
24.	Can the exits be opened independently of each other?			
25.	Are the explosive charges used to cut the openings held securely in position against the aircraft structure?			
26.	Are energy-absorbing backup materials placed behind the explosive charges?			
27.	Can the system function in ambient air temp- erature up to 400°F, yet not function during 30- to 60-sec exposures to postcrash fires?			
28.	Are the amount and duration of any exposed flames from explosive actuation minimal?		-	
6.9.	6.3 <u>Emergency Lighting</u>			
29.	Does the interior emergency lighting provide sufficient illumination to permit occupants to locate emergency exits, survival equip- ment, and escape paths?			
30.	Is there an average illumination in clear air of 0.05 fc or greater, measured 20 in. above the floor along passageways leading to exits?			
31.	Are supplementary lighting units located at or near each emergency exit?			
32.	Do all internally illuminated exit signs have a minimum brightness of at least 25 fL?		_	<u> </u>
33.	For noncombat missions, is exterior emer- gency lighting provided to illuminate the ground near each exit and the areas where escape and survival equipment will be de- ployed?	<u></u>	_	-
34.	Is the exterior light intensity on the ground at least 0.02 fc?			
35.	Can the lighting system withstand the crash conditions listed in Section 6.7.2.4, and still function?			
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		Yes	No	<u> N/A</u>	
36.	Is emergency lighting power independent of aircraft power systems?				
37.	Can the emergency lighting system be actu- ated both automatically and manually?				
6.9.	6.4 Emergency Exit Markings				
38.	Are emergency exits clearly marked both in- side and outside the aircraft?				
39.	Are instructions for releasing the exits clearly marked beside the exit release me- chanisms?				÷
40.	Do all exit markings meet the requirements of the Department of Army Technical Bul- letin 746-93-2?		_		-
6.9.	7 Crash Locator Beacon Checklist				
1.	Can the crash locator beacon be activated both automatically and manually?				
2.	Is an inertia sensor used to automatically activate the beacon?				
3.	Do the longitudinal inertia sensors in fixed-wing aircraft meet the actuation limits shown in Figure 58, Section 6.8.2?		_		
4.	Are both longitudinal and vertical inertia sensors provided in rotary-wing aircraft?				
5.	Do the inertia sensors in rotary-wing air- craft meet the actuation limits shown in Figures 58 and 59?				
6.	Is the inertia sensor mounted solidly to rigid structure located in an area that will experience crash forces representative of those in the occupant compartment?				
7.	Are the transmitter and antenna located in areas that are not subject to impact damage?				•
8.	Can the transmitter and antenna withstand the crash forces listed in Section 6.7.2.4?		_		
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			Yes	<u>No</u>	<u>N/A</u>
	9.	Does the crash locator beacon have its own independent power supply?			
	10.	Is all electrical wiring between system com- ponents protected from impact damage?		_	
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