

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: EFFECTS OF ISLAMIZATION 2		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 6 June 80
7. AUTHOR(s) RAFIK BEN ABDELLAZIZ CHABBI, CPT, TUNISIAN ARMY		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZISW-DC-MS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 6 June 80
LEVEL		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 151
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at C-GSC in partial fulfillment of the Master Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Islam, Arab, Middle-East, State of Israel, Zionism, Religion, Jihad, Solidarity, Islamization, Jerusalem, Strategy, Oil.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study attempts to appraise the strategic effects at regional and global levels in the context of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The analysis addresses the weight of		

AD A 093085

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 9 1980

DDIC FILE COPY

religion in Middle-eastern politics, the forms of expression of religious solidarity and the strategic value of the Islamic world. Analysis reveals a religious perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely among Muslims in the short-term because of the growing spread of Islamic revival and the threat to Islamic values and holy places in Palestine.

Hence, in case of Islamization of this conflict, the regional strategic bearing is likely to be affected by:

- An upset of the regional balance of power.
- An impediment to great powers' direct involvement
- A change in great powers' ranking of their interests in the Middle-east.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Effects of Islamization

Rafik Ben Abdellaziz Chabbi, CPT, Tunisian Army
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8 June 1980

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the
faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: EFFECTS OF ISLAMIZATION

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in Partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

RAFIK BEN ABDELLAZIZ CHASSI, CPT
Tunisian Army

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1980

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: CPT Rafik Ben Abdellaziz Chabbi, Tunisian Army

Title of thesis: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Effects of Islamization

Approved by:

Hayden E. Boland, Thesis Committee Chairman
Major Hayden E. Boland, B.A., M.A.

Michael A. Petersen, Member, Graduate Faculty
Major Michael A. Petersen, B.A., M.A.

Richard D. Hirtzel, Member, Consulting Faculty
COL Richard D. Hirtzel, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.

Accepted this 29th day of May 1980 by Philip J. Brookes
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency, either in the United States or in Tunisia.
(References to this study should include the foregoing statement).

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	

ABSTRACT

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: EFFECTS OF ISLAMIZATION,
by Captain Rafik Ben Abdellaziz Chabbi, Tunisian Army

This study attempts to appraise the strategic effects at regional and global levels in the event of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The analysis addresses the weight of religion in Middle-Eastern politics, the forms of expression of religious solidarity and the strategic value of the Islamic world.

Analysis reveals a religious perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely among Muslims in the mid-term because of the growing spread of Islamic revival and the threat to Islamic values and holy places in Palestine.

Hence, in case of Islamization of this conflict, the regional strategic bearing is likely to be affected by:

- An upset of the regional balance of power.
- An impediment to great powers' direct involvement.
- A change in great powers' ranking of their interests in the Middle East.

DEDICATION

To my father, Abdellaziz, my first and best teacher.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to my wife, Soraya, without whose encouragement and patience, this work would have been more difficult.

I thank my committee chairman, MAJ H. Boland for his support and quick-wittedness.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	
I. TOWARD A RELIGIOUS DIMENSION	1
Graft and Rejection	1
Religious Escalation	4
II. THE WEIGHT OF RELIGION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL POLITICS	12
Diaspora	12
Birth of Zionism	14
The Secular Trends	15
The Religious Trends	18
Influence of Religion on Politics.	20
III. ISLAMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT	33
Islam and Politics	33
Perception of Threat	36
Values at Stake	40
Suitability of Jihad	45
IV. SCOPE OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY	55
Religious Ground and Political Development	56
Unifying and Dividing Factors	63
Overt and Expected Solidarity	66
V. STRATEGIC EFFECTS: ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE	75
Political Effects	76
Economic Effects	88
Military Effects	101
VI. CRITICAL CHOICES	127
Likelihood of Islamization	129
Strategic Reverberation.	134
The Religious Element of Power in Strategic Studies	142

LIST OF APPENDIXES

To Chapter I:

1. Balfour Declaration	9
2. Partition Plan Map	10
3. Geographical Expansion	11

To Chapter II:

1. Basle Programme	27
2. Agudist World View	28
3. Defining a Jew	29
4. Religious and Secular Trends	31
5. Reform Movement in Germany	32

To Chapter III:

1. EL-AQSA Mosque	54
-----------------------------	----

To Chapter V:

1. State of Israel	116
2. Egypt	118
3. Iran	120
4. Pakistan	122
5. Turkey	124
6. Flag and Symbols of the State of Israel	126

CHAPTER 1

TOWARDS A RELIGIOUS DIMENSION

This study attempts to appraise the strategic effects at regional and global levels in the event of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The analysis addresses the weight of religion in Middle-Eastern politics, the forms of expression of religious solidarity and the strategic value of the Islamic world.

Analysis reveals a religious perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely among Muslims in the mid-term because of the growing spread of Islamic revival and the threat to Islamic values and holy places in Palestine.

Hence, in case of Islamization of this conflict, the regional strategic bearing is likely to be affected by an upset of the regional balance of power, an impediment to great powers' direct involvement, and a change in great powers' ranking of their interests in the Middle East.

The lack of consensus in defining the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict gave rise to various approaches to this issue. Influential powers, trends and leaders contributed to increase its complexity by suggesting dissimilar perceptions. The political development within middle eastern countries and the growing strategic interests of great powers in the region had great influence over the evolution of the conflict. Moreover, some marking events reoriented the path of this evolution.

I. Graft and Rejection

On 15 May 1948, the unfeasible dream for some people, or the dreadful nightmare for some others, became reality: the National Zionist Council proclaimed the foundation of the state of Israel in Palestine according to the partition plan approved by the United Nations.¹ While several states and international organizations welcomed the new state, the Arab population of Palestine realized that they were the scapegoat in this international arrangement. As a matter of fact, one problem was solved and another was created. Both related to the need of a community to live in freedom and in security on its own homeland. The historical right to own Palestine was invoked by both sides as the cornerstone of their territorial claims. For the Jewish community,

and according to their religious belief, Palestine was the "promised land" to the "people of God," errant for centuries, suffering the "diaspora," enduring the "ghettos," and subject to anti-Semitic persecution. For the Palestinians, losing their identity and gaining a refugee status, Palestine was their legal and legitimate homeland which they had protected for centuries against foreign lust. Their hope to obtain independence at the end of the British mandate, was dissipated by the enforcement of the Balfour Declaration.²

Refusing the new geopolitical adjustment, the Palestinians rose in protest against the partition resolution by forming political committees to face the crisis. But, because of the uncontrolled emotions of both sides, the use of violence became unavoidable. The Palestinians "with no really strong central authority" failed to cope with this rapid escalation. An atmosphere of civil war spread in the country making the practice of atrocities a rule of game.³ Unsuccessful in their hasty attempt to establish sovereignty on Palestine, the Palestinians began seeking refuge in neighboring Arab countries. In the author's opinion, at that moment, the problem crossed the Palestinian borders to spread as an Arab concern. Indeed, when the British mandate in Palestine formally ended and the state of Israel was proclaimed, "armies from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq poured across the frontiers to assist the Palestine Arabs."⁴

So, the first Arab-Israeli war began in 1948 and continued until the armistice agreements established the first long and vulnerable truce in 1949. This war resulted in the state of Israel's moving its frontiers toward the north, the east, and the south.⁵ An important part of the city of Jerusalem was affected by this geopolitical extension: Henceforth, Jerusalem was divided into two parts between Jordan and the state of Israel.

The resulting feeling that the Arab countries were not able to wage an effective war, affected the morale of the committed troops and provoked among some Egyptian officers the will to initiate an internal change to continue addressing the Palestinian problem as an Arab concern under more favorable conditions. The Egyptian coup d'etat in 1952, partially rooted in this conflict, instituting it as the motive to build the Arab unity. The state of Israel perceived this trend as a threat to its existence. Then, exploiting the Suez Canal Company nationalization in 1956, the state of Israel acted jointly with France and Great Britain to throw off the Nasserian regime to protect their interests in the area. The reaction of the Arab world to this tripartite action, either through popular demonstrations or official positions, were in the Arab opinion an acknowledgement of the Palestinian problem as an Arab national issue. The author believes that the massive Arab solidarity was due to the development of the means of

communication among the Arab countries and also to the fact that the supporters of the state of Israel were the traditional colonizers of the Arab lands. Later, many Arabian revolutionary regimes invoked the Palestinian's problem as a main concern of their movement and defined the state of Israel as a western outpost threatening their independence. This position was often required for new regimes to gain the support of the masses. Turmoil was henceforth caused by nationalism although some Arab socialist trends tried to define the problem as a one of capitalism and portrayed the state of Israel as the guardian of the capitalism's interests in the area.⁶

II. Religious Escalation

The perception of the conflict remained conditioned by these views until the 1967 war introduced another one when the Arab military losses were again exploited by the state of Israel to extend its frontiers. All the city of Jerusalem, including the "El AQSA" mosque, was drawn from Jordanian sovereignty to become a part of the recently declared capital of the state of Israel.⁷

This step resulted in the surfacing of a latent religious flame scrupulously, till now, kept apart from the conflict by both belligerent sides. The Moslems throughout the world were deeply affected by the intentions of the state of Israel to maintain its authority over the entire

city of Jerusalem and to consider it as an indivisible capital. The Moslems' fear concerning an eventual violation of their holy shrine was confirmed later by the fire of "El AQSA" mosque. This fire was perceived by Moslems in Palestine and abroad as a premeditated aggression organized by the government of Israel. The official denial of this charge was not compatible with the largely diffused rumors among Moslems in Jerusalem that the intention of the government of Israel was to start an archeological search for the temple of Soloman in the proximity of "El. AQSA" mosque. This event made religion a thinkable aspect of the conflict.

Thus, once again in the tumultuous history of the Middle East, religion emerged as a political issue despite the modern political trends in the world rejecting the involvement of religion in politics. The history of the area is rich in examples relating this connection between religion and politics. That is why "it is not an exaggeration to say that no understanding of the complex political patterns of the area can be attempted without giving prior attention to its religious characteristics."⁸

Native land of the three monotheist religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the area was often witness to bloody battles among these opposing religions which preached peace and taught tolerance. The residues of religious discord were inherited and accumulated through generations to be stirred anytime for political purposes. The

importance given to the weight of religion in Middle Eastern politics does not reflect an old fashioned political thinking. It is today necessary to understand the religious context prior to any analysis of political behavior. In this perspective,

The most difficult aspect of Islam to evaluate is the residual deposit of attitudes and unconscious reactions from the past that, in some sense, determine the way modern Muslims react to their world.⁹

The violence and the speed of change which recently occurred in Iran surprised many observers who underestimated the influence of religion on politics in the modern era. Some others, more specifically raised questions about an eventual revival of Moslem fundamentalism.

That is how many observers interpret a series of recent events: the arrest of Prime Minister Bhutto in Pakistan, the application of Koranic laws in Lybia and Saudi Arabia, the major role played by Ayatollah Khomeini in the turmoil in Iran, the vehemence of the anti-Kemalist reaction in Turkey, anti-Copt rebellions in Egypt, and the Maschino affair in Algeria. While each of these events differs from the others, all are related.⁻⁰

So many events occurring in the same area, at almost the same period and bearing a common religious signature, may not be a coincidence. Although an organizational connection between them is not yet confirmed, it is possible to deduce that people of common faith and similar culture, react in a similar manner to their environment. Furthermore, latent or overt solidarity is generally expected in a religious community. This solidarity may bear the aspect of passionate commitment if any actual threat to religion is perceived.

Is the Arab-Israeli conflict now in the appropriate posture to be drawn from nationalist consideration to religious sponsorship?


ENDNOTES

1. See Appendix I: The Partition Plan Map.
2. See Appendix II: The Balfour Declaration.
3. According to Don Peretz in his book The Middle-East Today, p. 277, "The most notorious atrocity perpetrated was the Irgun massacre, in April 1948, of all the men, women and children in Dier Yassin near Jerusalem."
4. Don Peretz, The Middle-East Today (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 278.
5. See Appendix III.
6. Baas and Communist parties or organizations.
7. "EL AQSA" mosque is the third holiest shrine for Muslims.
8. James A. Bill, The Middle-East Politics and Power (Allyn and Bacon, 1974), p. 25.
9. Peretz, p. 50.
10. Maxine Robinson, "Islam's Growing Political Power," Atlas World Press Review, March 1979.

APPENDIX I


His Majesty's government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

APPENDIX II



1947 United Nations Partition Plan

APPENDIX III



Results of the 1967 War

CHAPTER 2

THE WEIGHT OF RELIGION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL POLITICS

Muslims' perception of the state of Israel as enemy if Islam can be possible if the former realize that the latter's politics are influenced by religious concepts. Such influence can be established by investigating the genesis of the Zionist movement and some marking events in state of Israel political development. Even if some official decisions have been concealed under cultural label by peculiar trends, Muslims used to detect therein a religious signature. This perception may become an issue in case where Islamic values and symbols incur risks from such decisions and derived measures.

Is it possible to discern Jewishness from Judaism?

Is the state of Israel ruled by a secular government under religious authority?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to review the past of the Jews, examine the current political dynamics of the state of Israel and consider the aspirations of influential Jewish trends.

I. Diaspora

According to the First Book of Kings (IV 21) and to the Second Book of Chronicles (IX 26), the Jewish Kingdom

knew its apogee under Solomon. It extended from the Euphrates to the border of Egypt including the land of the Philistines. Among the peoples of this kingdom, the twelve tribes of Israel were reunited. They occupied the land between Dan and Beersheba.¹

This image of the Jewish state in full bloom, exercising sovereignty over the land of Palestine and carrying "the mission of serving as a light into the nations," remained after the collapse of their kingdom and for centuries, a dream for many Jews and a challenge for some more enterprising among them. The condition of the Jews, dispersed throughout the world, varied from country to country and from period to period. For centuries, they underwent the destiny of the minorities, rarely treated with tolerance. The ghettos were the answer for the Jews worrying about the conservation of their authenticity and were also the solution for the host countries mistrusting the religious minorities.

A natural phenomenon surfaced within these closed societies over time. It was called, by the Jews, the Assimilation. This sign of opening on the host society provoked, among the Jewish community, a relative rift. Two main trends appeared, the Orthodox and the Reformers. Their discord related to the safeguard of the Jewishness as a distinctive touch of their race, their faith and their culture. For the most attached to the idea of return to the "Promised

Land", the Assimilation could transform the geographical Diaspora into a disintegrated Jewish community, thereby into the loss of the commitment to their common cause of building a nation.

II. Birth of the Zionist Movement

The shadow of Assimilation was frequently dissipated by the host society repulsion. Thereof, the ghettos shriveled up in fear and sorrow. It was precisely when a host society gave loose to its anti-Semitic feelings that an active Jewish revival occurred. Indeed, at the time of Captain Dreyfus' trial in 1894 in France that Theodor Herzl appealed to the Jewish people throughout the world to act toward obtaining a homeland where they could live free and secure.³ It was through his manifesto "Der Judenstaat," the Jewish state, published in 1896, that Herzl set the basis of the Zionist movement. The Jews were almost prepared for this movement by Leo Pinsker sixteen years before, through his book called "Autoemancipation."

If one had to find a formula to cover the historic beginnings of Zionism, it might be that Pinsker had the idea, Herzl created the institutions and found the wherewithal, and Ahad Ha'am's message inspired his fellow Russians to go and start the hard work.⁴

But if the large majority of the Jews concurred on the necessity of building their own independent state, many factions among them disagreed about the political, social and cultural orientations to give to the proposed state. This

disagreement is still today a prominent feature of the political life of the state of Israel. The principal matter of discord was and remains, the "interference" of religion in politics. The scope of this interference, if any, may lend support to the idea that the Arab-Israeli crisis could bear a religious aspect.

III. The Secular Trends

Russia was, for several supporters of the secular concept of Jewish identity:

. . . the only community in the world in which a Jew could not merely drift away from his religion or be indifferent to it, but actively reject and combatively oppose it, and still see himself and be seen by others as recognizably and meaningfully a Jew. It was here that secular Judaism was born.⁵

Asher Ginzberg,⁶ considered by many Zionists as the prophet of Secular Zionism, regarded the religion as no more than a form of culture which expressed in the past "the national creative power."⁷ He also considered the will of return to Palestine a national instinct oriented toward the embodiment of "the national creative power" in the land. For Herzl, the founder of Zionism, the Jewish problem was merely a national problem. He considered the Jews as a nation lacking a land to fulfill their national needs. The main concern of Herzl was, initially, the grant to the Jews of a land offering the proper conditions for a people to develop its political and social life as a nation acting for a better future. He suggested, for this purpose, Palestine

or Argentina as a possible Jewish homeland. It is important to remark that:

Leo Pinsker, in his remarkable work, Autoemancipation, and even Herzl in Der Judenstaat, did not conceive of national redemption and solidarity only in Palestine, or there at all.⁸

This secular view of the Jewish problem meant for many Jews a divorce between Jewishness and Judaism. But some of them found in this secular attitude toward the concept of homeland a false pretence of apathy. Indeed, they described the secular Zionism as a "non-metaphysical claim to metaphysical 'otherness'," "a messianism without messiah," "an election without elector."⁹ Besides, "the national creative power," invoked by Ahad Ha'am¹⁰ as a substitute of the religious motivation, was refuted by the fact that:

When he looks for a tangible witness, Ahad Ha'am refers to the Bible and the Talmud, monuments to the religious spirit. When he speaks of a national creative power which remains the same through all ages, he seems either to be uttering a disguised religious credo or making an idol of that racialist myth, born of the infant crudities of nineteenth century biology, of which the twentieth century has had more than enough. . . . For the moment, it is enough to remark that the prophetic message of secular Zionism may not have been as secular as the prophet supposed.¹¹

Herzl himself yielded to the Zionists of Russia, victims of the terrors of pogroms, as they vehemently refused any substitute of Palestine when Chamberlain, England's secretary for colonies, proposed Uganda as a possible homeland for the Jews. The first Zionist Congress, adopted at Basel in 1897, defined the goal of Zionism as "the creation in

Palestine of a homeland for the Jewish people guaranteed by public law."¹²

In the formulation of this goal, the religious found one satisfaction and one disappointment. The exclusive option for Palestine was the positive aspect while the word "creation" was incompatible with the idea of return to a usurped fatherland. Besides, the appeal for an effort to strengthen the "national consciousness" concealed under this vague expression a latent discord between seculars and religious.

The Balfour Declaration made on November 2, 1917, was formulated in concordance with the secular vision of the issue. Indeed, it stated that "His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people. . ."¹³ Once again, the religious replied that the word "establishment" did not refer to their right to re-establish sovereignty on Palestine. The split of the Jewish community was sustained by a long controversy, although it was sometimes hushed-up in a compromise. The formulation of the declaration of independence in 1948, illustrated this kind of agreement. It stated that, "In the land of Israel, the Jewish people came into being. In this land was shaped their spiritual, religious, and national character."¹⁴

Nevertheless, as the new state was dealing with the practical aspect of the political life, the discord between

seculars and religious rose to the level of an actual rift.

The interpretation of the law of return was the matter of a long crisis which led to a large debate about the crucial question of the Jewish identity. Who is a Jew? How to gain the Jewishness status and how to lose it? What is the weight of the Halacha in the juridical scale?¹⁵ The debate was officially extended to the whole Jewish community throughout the world to reach a "consensus facit legem."

Does the political decision-making process escape from the will of the seculars, yet known as the rulers of the state?

IV. The Religious Trends

Since the birth of Zionism, the "Leitmotiv" of the religious trends was the fear of a distortion of the true faith by the efforts of secular Zionists to divorce religion and nationalism. Accordingly, the repossession of the "Promised Land" can only be achieved through strict obedience to the Torah.¹⁶ In fact, they believe that the reason for the exile was a religious one and that the means for the return or redemption of the people has also to be a religious one. The secular position considering the religion as a private matter, was harshly attacked for threatening the essence of the Jewish being. Even the religious Zionists, who founded in 1911 the Mizrachi Party, were blamed for being

"Satan's dupes" engaged in a war "against God's design for his people."¹⁷ The Agudat Israel, representing the firm religious trend, maintained that faith is the necessary bond of Jewish unity. This tough position, refusing any other alternative, made the split of religious trend unavoidable. Thereafter, Orthodox and Reformers claimed, each in its own way, to best serve the religious interest of the Jewish people. The protection of the Halacha and its application to modern conditions was an appropriate forum for this controversy. The pressure of the Orthodox on the government, at the time of Rufeisen case in 1950. and later during the Schaalit case in 1969-70, was interpreted by the Reformers as an attempt to have monopoly over the religious life of the Jewish people in the state of Israel and abroad. The Reformers' criterion specified that:

It is not the desire to preserve the Halacha, which motivates the Orthodox Rabbinate, but rather the desire to keep the Halacha as their special reserve. . . . In so doing, they employed old fashioned¹⁸ political blackmail clothed in the garb of religion.

Despite these attacks, the Agudat kept an unbending attitude in acting for the institution of the Halacha as the exclusive source of law. This inflexible conception was, for the Agudat, the best means to ensure the preservation of the physical and spiritual genuineness of the Jewish people. It expressed their will to resist all forms of Assimilation with the non-Jewish environment. Although they declined this dogmatism, the Reformers were concerned about a possible

split of the Jewish community into two kinds of Jews, the "real" Jews and the "pseudo" Jews. The discord primarily related to the application of the Halachic law in matters of marriage and divorce and consequently, in matters of Jewish nationality.

The fact that the Reformers within the state of Israel did not represent the adequate balance-weight to the influence of the Orthodox Rabbinate, limited their hearing in the governmental spheres. On the other hand, their large representation abroad and especially in the United States, was taken into consideration by the government because of the considerable assistance a Jewish lobby can provide to the state of Israel. However, it may be that a common ground existed between the different religious kinds. It was the belief that the new home of the Jews has to be their spiritual center and that, in this land, the Jewish people will, once again, devote to their faith in full freedom and through the vision of mission and destiny and ultimate redemption for man.¹⁹

V. Influence of Religion on Politics

Since the beginning of the Zionist movement, the scope of influence of religion on politics has been many times put to the test. The confrontation between seculars and religious often led to a compromise clearly favorable to the religious. In making concessions, the seculars'

objective was to preserve the internal unity, especially when the threat is at the gates. The first agreement dated from the Basel Congress when Argentina was categorically rejected as a possible Jewish homeland. Indeed, the Congress resolution related the firm attachment to the land of Palestine. This position, rejecting any other alternative was confirmed a few years later, when Chamberlain,²⁰ anxious about an eventual unrest in the Middle East, proposed Uganda as a convenient solution to the Jewish problem. Initially, Herzl himself, and secular scholars, asked for a land, any land, which can allow the Jewish people to fulfill their needs as a nation. In the author's opinion, the secular concession in this matter implied a tacit acceptance of a spiritual aspect of the proposed state. A derived measure was the establishment of the "law of return," and not of migration, as a selective system based on religious criteria. Religious symbols were chosen to identify the new state. The name of Israel replaced the name of Palestine, the flag was designed with the David Star and the candelabra design was chosen for the state emblem.

Another important compromise, relating to public life, was made just before the proclamation of the state of Israel at a time when only a coalition could save the political future of the Jews. This compromise was embodied in a letter sent on 19 February 1947 to the Agudat by the Zionist coalition. It comprised positive answers to the Orthodox's

claims about the legal rest on Sabbath,²¹ the observance of dietary laws in every state kitchen, the religious authenticity of marriage and the non-interference with religious conscience in education.

The case of Rufeisen, a Jew converted to Christianity asking for his Jewish citizenship under the Law of Return, and the case of Schaalit, a Jew married to a Christian wife asking for recognition of the Jewishness of his children, led to a long and serious confrontation between the government and the religious authorities. The lack of exactitude in the definition of the criteria of citizenship widened the quarrel. The seculars declared that the acquisition of citizenship needed only an identification with the Jewish-Israeli culture and values while the religious maintained that the issue was "anterior to the state and beyond its jurisdiction."²² After long polemic involving the whole Jewish community, the government presented to the Knesset, in March 1970, a substantial amendment to the "Law of Return" reinstating the Halachic criterion for registration of Jewish "ethnic affiliation."²³ It was the restoration, by the government, of the religious definition of a Jew. Likewise, education was given a religious orientation in 1959 according to a resolution of the Knesset.

The aims laid down for teaching in the secular schools included the following. To foster in the children the notion that the sublime principles of Israel's religion, the vision of Israel's prophets concerning the Messianic era, the Jew's perseverance in the study of the Torah (divine law), the

preservation of the unity of their religious ceremonial, their firm belief in Israel's divine Protector, their continuous attachment to their ancestral homeland, and their belief in redemption have endorsed our people with the strength to resist all our enemies and to maintain our independence.²⁴

The importance of religion was recognized even by notorious seculars as Prime Minister Meir when she qualified it as the indispensable cement of Jewish unity and the necessary tie for the survival of the Jewish people. It is interesting to remark that it was under the government of the same prime minister that the capital of the state was moved from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. Was it for pure administrative purposes? Was it for security considerations? The author's opinion is that the unique motivation for this change is a religious one. For all three monotheist religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, this city has a religious meaning and a holy rank.

Therefore, the need of the state of Israel to maintain its internal unity, to ensure continuous assistance from Jews abroad, to effectively face the permanent external threat, and to develop a spiritual motivation for defense, made the contribution of the religious authorities and organizations a vital element for the existence of the state. Aware of their importance and worried about the integral preservation of their belief, the religious are exercising a considerable influence on government policy. Will they succeed again in using the religious pressure to

achieve their political objectives? The extension of the present frontiers to those of the Promised Land, and the restoration of the temple they venerate and they need may be among the demands of a people "incapable of finding meaning in life strictly devoted to the here and now. . . hypnotized, now as always, by the idea of ultimate meaning, final denouement."²⁵

ENDNOTES

1. First Book of Kings, IV 25.
2. S. Clement Leslie, The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 155.
3. Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French officer, was charged of treason and sentenced to imprisonment on Devil's Island. He was later exonerated and restored to rank.
4. Leslie, p. 21.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
6. Ahad Ha'am, one of the people, was Ginzberg's pen name.
7. Expression often used by Asher Ginzberg.
8. David Ben-Gurion, Israel: Years of Challenge (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 5.
9. Leslie, p. 24.
10. Asher Ginzberg's pen name.
11. Leslie, p. 24.
12. Maxine Robinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Monad Press, 1973), p. 44.
13. Ibid., p. 46.
14. Leslie, p. 57.
15. "The Oral Law, originally and accurately so called in distinction from the Hebrew scriptures. Then codified and written down in the earliest centuries AD in the Mishna, later embodied in the Talmud. The meaning of the work itself is close to that of "The Way" as used in the Gospels and applied by early Christians to their own sect."
16. The five books of Moses.

17. Leslie, pp. 26, 27.
18. Ibid., pp. 47, 48.
19. However, the coming of the Messiah poses a dilemma for the Jews in that he is to establish his rule in Jerusalem.
20. England's Secretary for Colonies.
21. Saturday. The Ashkenzi and Yiddish form is Shabbas.
22. Leslie, p. 40.
23. Ibid., p. 43.
24. Ibid., p. 51.
25. Ibid., p. 155.

APPENDIX I

THE BASEL PROGRAMME

Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

APPENDIX II

Here is a statement of the Agudist world view, as interpreted in a sympathetic Hebrew newspaper about a decade after independence. The world was created for the sake of Israel. It is the duty and merit of Israel to maintain and fulfill the Torah. The place where Israel is destined to live and, therefore, to maintain the Torah, is the land of Israel. This means that the establishment of the regime of the Torah in the land of Israel (*Italics added*). The foundation of this ideal has been laid. There are now Jews living in their homeland and fulfilling the Torah. But completion had not yet been attained. For all Israel does not yet live in its land, not even the majority, and the greater part of the promised land is still in the enemy's hands. Finally, all Israel is not yet fulfilling the Torah. . . It is our duty to complete our mission which must become our innermost concern.

S. Clement Leslie, The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 60.

APPENDIX III

How, then, can we define the Jews? The only process by which we can come to a definite result is that of elimination. . . We must seek for a common bond of unity which characterizes the Jew, and that is his faith. Here, again, it is necessary to draw the line very clearly and very sharply. Faith is not a distinguishing feature in the modern classification of nations. . . With the Jews, however, the position is totally different. Faith and nationality go hand in hand; nay, they are indissolubly united. No one can be a Jew who does not belong to the Jewish faith, and he who belongs to the Jewish faith belongs to the Jewish nation. He becomes absolutely identified with all the traditions of the past, and the outlook of the future is for him the same as for the rest of the Jews. No difference is made between a proselyte and one born in the faith. The new Jew is a full-weight Jew. He is at once connected with the founder of the race, with Abraham. . . It is thus faith alone which creates the Jewish nation, and it is the abandonment of the faith which carries with it "excision", complete uprooting from the community. A Jew who changes his faith is torn up by the roots. There is no longer any connection between him and other Jews. He has practically died. . . It is of extreme importance to realize that this

alone constitutes a Jew--that the nationality of the Jew depends on his faith; for Judaism is a national religion.

Dr. M. Gaster, "Judaism as a National Religion" in Zionism and the Jewish Future ed. by H. Sacher (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc.), pp. 90, 91.

APPENDIX IV

As one of many, we can allow the Dzikover Rebbe, speaking in 1900 from his Orthodox fastness, to strike the note and set the scene: for our many sins, strangers have risen to pasture the holy flock, men who say that the people of Israel should be clothed in secular nationalism, a nation like all other nations, that Judaism rests on these things, national feeling, the land and the language, and that national feeling is the most praiseworthy element in the brew and the most effective in preserving Judaism, while the observance of the Torah and the commandments is a private matter depending on the inclination of each individual. May the Lord rebuke these evil men and may he who chooseth Jerusalem seal their mouths.

The Rebbe plainly understood what confronted him, and knew how to make his point.

S. Clement Leslie, The Rift in Israeli: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 26.

APPENDIX V

As a simple matter of historical truth, the Reform movement in Germany is in substance part of the struggle for emancipation. It begins with that struggle and it dies away with it, and its central features are political, not religious. These features are: (1) that there is no longer such a thing as a Jewish nation. . . . The same stroke which was to open a career for the Jewish arriviste was to open a career for Judaism; (2) The Jewish tradition as expressed in the Talmud and the later codes was no longer authoritative and convenient. . . .; (3) Hebrew was to yield place to German as the language of worship and prayer. . . .; (4) The substitution of the individual for the commonwealth of Israel, as the name in the shaping of prayer, in the acceptance or rejection of practices, in the weighing of all the problems of Judaism; (5) The elimination of Palestine as a motif.

H. Sacher, "A Century of Jewish History" in Zionism and the Jewish Future ed. by H. Sacher (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc.), p. 39.

CHAPTER 3

ISLAMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT

An Islamic analysis of the prevailing situation in Palestine, referring to Islamic sources of law, to assess the state of Israel behavior, leads to the identification of the latter as a religious enemy of Islam. The relationship between ruler and masses in Islamic political system shows the interest given to religious factor in Islamic countries' political life. This fact may dictate to Muslims' rulers more commitment to the Palestinian problem if a threat to Islam is therein perceived. The well rooted animosity between Jews and Muslims may rapidly develop if religious value incur risks. If such will be the case, the Islamic response will be Jewish oriented. The political authority of religious parties over the state of Israel government and the growing Islamic revival are providing the suitable conditions for a religious orientation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I. Islam and Politics

Jewish religious authorities experience some difficulty getting at the helm of the political life of their community. The bearing of religion upon politics among the actual and potential enemies of the state of Israel seems

to be a matter of course although it is avowed in some countries and hinted in some others. There is every reason to believe that this situation results from the peculiar nature of Islam. Indeed, this religion is not a mere theology, it is principally a concept defining how Islamic society should be organized.¹ Thus, the attempt to separate religion and state in explaining the political systems in Islamic countries may be misleading.

Rulers' Prerogatives and Requirements

The universality and centrality of Islam entailed from its inception an association with power which led to a complete identity of religion and government. For this reason, the function of head of the Islamic state and the religious leadership were joined; the prerogative of a single person called Calif² or Amir Al Mominin³ or Imam.⁴ Muslims owe obedience to their leader as long as his faith, his behavior and his leadership remain consistent with Islamic precepts. This way of assessing the legality and legitimacy of the ruler did not change throughout the centuries because of the permanent recourse to specified and unaltered sources of law, Quran and Sunna.⁵ The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly formulated this belief and stated the requirements for leadership. According to this document, and especially to Articles 5 and 109, the leader, who is higher than the President, must be a

preeminent jurist, pious, courageous, socially and politically educated and qualified for directing the state affairs.

Masses' Politico-Religious Behavior

For some countries of a less decided Islamic character, the ruler often tries to derive from religion the legitimacy for his plans or actions. Even if he wants to readjust or innovate a system, he always seeks justification by proposing a new and acceptable interpretation of some religious principles. On the other hand, the masses are to rigorously react to any attempt of the ruler to disregard or oppose religious precepts. A striking illustration is the popular reaction in Syria to the article "The Means of Creating a New Arab Man" written by Ibrahim Kalas, and published on April 25, 1967 by the Syrian official army magazine "Jaysh Al-Shab." In this article, the author criticized the religious mind and advocated the "absolute faith in the new man of destiny." To cool down the resulting tension and violence, the Syrian government formally denounced the article and on May 11, 1967, a military court sentenced the author and editors to life imprisonment. Aware of this kind of reaction, the decision makers in Islamic countries are continually paying full attention to religious considerations in the decisions they make. Moreover, the credibility of their leadership is spontaneously evaluated by the masses with regard to their religious liability.

Even secular regimes or faithless leaders carefully weigh this consideration as a preliminary condition to obtain popular support. The Turkish Nationalist Movement is, in this way, a significant illustration.

Yet the revolt of the Kemalists in Anatolia was in its first inspiration as much Islamic as Turkish. Islamic men of religion formed an impressive proportion of its early leaders and followers. The language used at the time, the rhetoric of the Kemalists in this early stage, speaks of Ottoman Muslims rather than of Turks, and the movement commanded a great deal of support in the Islamic world. It was not until after the establishment of the republic that, as a result of many factors, they began to lay the main stress on nationalist and secular aims.⁶

II. Perception of Threat: Roots and Symptoms

From previous analysis, it appears that belligerents, in the Arab-Israel conflict, are, in somewhat different ways, accepting religion as a political censor. Their respective religions, Islam and Judaism, because of a geographical association for more than fourteen centuries, experienced rough discords although they shared some ground of non-conflict. The author believes that this area of non-conflict was not an obvious ground of concord because no tangible cooperation was built on it. The myth or belief in a common ethnic origin of Arab and Jews,⁷ the kindred of Arabic and Hebrew languages, the belief in one God, the veneration of Bani Israel⁸ prophets are among the factors expected to bring a harmonious coexistence for these two

communities. However, many differences put them at theological and political variance.

Muslims and Jews: Roots of Discord

The Jews did not accept that Islam was to abrogate and consume earlier revelations, did not appreciate the frequent condemnations of Bani Israel in the Quran for disobeying, exasperating and killing prophets, for falsifying Torah and adding to it, and for hiding the truth. These faults were stated in the following translated meaning of Quran verses:

When it is said to them, "Believe in what God hath sent down," they say, "We believe in what was sent down to us." Yet they reject all besides, even if it be truth confirming what is with them. Say: "Why then, have ye slain the prophets of God in times gone by, if ye did indeed believe? And remember, we took your covenant and we raised above you (the towering height) of Mount (Sinai): (saying) Hold firmly to what we have given you, and hearken (to the law)." They said, "We hear and we disobey," and they had to drink into their hearts (of the faint) of the calf because of their faithlessness. Say: "Vile indeed are the behests of your faith if ye have any faith!" And remember ye said: "O Moses! We shall never believe in thee until we see God manifestly," but ye were seized with thunder and lightning even as ye looked on. . . . But the transgressors changed the word from that which had been given them; so we sent on the transgressors a plague from heaven, for that they infringed (our command) repeatedly. . . . Ah! Who is more unjust than those who conceal the testimony they have from God? But God is not unmindful of what ye do!"

The Jews refused Islam's universalism in which their idea of the chosen people may lose its unique significance. In fact, the Jewish tribes in Arabia actively opposed Islam

since its inception by encouraging Arab tribes to refuse it and by directly and indirectly interfering with some decisive battles between the Prophet and the pagans.¹⁰ This attitude was criticized by Dr. Israel Wolferson in his "The Jews in Arabia" stating that:

It was the duty of the Jews not to allow themselves to get involved in such a scandalous mistake. They should have never declared to the leaders of Quraysh that the worship of idols was better than Islamic monotheism even if this were to imply frustration of their request. . . Furthermore, by allying themselves with the pagans, they were in fact fighting themselves and contradicting the teachings of the Torah which commands them to avoid, repudiate--indeed to fight--the pagans."¹¹

The expulsion of Beni Qayneuqua and Benul Nadir and the quasi-annihilation of Banu Quarayza, following the charges of dishonoring their treaties with Muslims and plotting against the Prophet's life, remained striking events in Muslim-Jewish relations.

Many Muslims believe that the death of the Prophet was due to a residual effect of eating a bite of poisoned lamb cooked by a Jewish woman in 7 AH.¹²

Muslims and Jews: Symptoms of Hostilities

Later, the aversion between the two communities was maintained by their divergent views of social co-existence. The Jews disliked their Dhimmi status,¹³ though the "golden age" of the Diaspora was under Muslim rule in Spain, the Muslims disapproved of the Jews practice of usury and related business.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the foundations of the Jewish state were being set while those of the Ottoman empire, last Islamic state, were being undermined. Muslims regarded this simultaneous rise and fall of states as evidence of a large conspiracy against their unified state, the Ottoman empire. The established relationship ruler--special status citizen seemed close to turning upside down.

The potential threat to the Islamic identity of Palestine meant for Muslims a potential prejudice to their established tradition or right of guardianship of the monotheist holy places in Nabulus, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jerusalem. Later, the issue developed from guardianship to safeguarding the authenticity of the holy shrines in all the "Promised Land" claimed back by the influential religious parties in the state of Israel. The expanding map of the state of Israel, initially delineated by the partition plan, seems to head toward this end. Consequently, Muslims perceive a threat to the shrines and land of Islam in Palestine.

Muslims may react to this "threat," identified as the state of Israel, in the same way they reacted to the crusaders. The relative similarity between the prevailing political condition of Muslims at that time and the one during the establishment of the state of Israel may forebode a similar evolution of conflict from a local scale to a world wide Islamic dimension. Indeed, the Islamic reaction

to the Crusades was caused by a similar threat, under similar conditions, and was carried out by a motivation rooted in the immovable Islamic sources of law. God said in Quran, which means:

Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors. . . And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out.¹⁴ And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God. . ."¹⁵

Hence, the ingredients making the perception of threat to Islam, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, may place the belligerency in a religious frame since the target audience, Muslims, can be attuned to the issue by calling on its cultural background and its religious consciousness. This approach seems to be the most appropriate for the Muslim mind and has been successful in the past as well as in this era in waging struggle against different aspects of occupation like colonialism. In the case being analyzed, the threat is directed toward Muslims' holy places and shrines in an Islamic enclosed land undergoing non-Muslim ruler authority.

III. Values at Stake

"The guardianship of holy places renders the little country important to the world of politics because important to the world of religion."¹⁶ A particularly eventful history testifies to the critical status of a land bearing holy character for three faiths convergent in theology and divergent in politics. Each of them exercised for a period

of time full sovereignty on this land or at least enjoyed great influence on it. Yet tolerance was not always an obvious quality of the ruler. Frustration and will of vengeance of deprived communities maintained a climate of mutual dislike and of latent animosity. The status-quo used to break up whenever a threat to holy shrines was perceived either by the local community or by related fellows abroad.

Importance of Jerusalem

The current situation in the state of Israel may illustrate this kind of environment although the Christian holy places are not exposed to a specific threat at the present time.¹⁷ Indeed, such a threat is incompatible with Islamic teaching and with Jewish interest. However, the picture is totally different when it is a question of Islamic and Jewish shrines. Some of them, maybe the most important, are claimed by both communities for an exclusive ownership. It is, at least, the case of EL AQSA mosque in Jerusalem.¹⁸

For Muslims, Jerusalem, as a place, is blessed by God. Even its name in Arabic "Qods" means holy. It was the first "Qibla"¹⁹ for Muslims in prayers. From there, and more specifically from EL AQSA mosque, the Prophet made his heavenly ascension as related in the following verse meaning:

Glory to (God) who did take his servant for a journey by night from the sacred mosque to the

farthest mosque, whose precincts we did bless, in order that we might show him some of our signs, for he is the one who heareth and seeth (all things).²⁰

The fact that the Prophet did his miraculous travel, from Mecca to Jerusalem to make the ascension, is for Muslims a significant sacrament to this place. The Prophet recommended Muslims visit EL AQSA mosque because of its exceptional importance.²¹

On the other side, Jerusalem is for the Jews a unique political symbol of ancient sovereignty while the temple of Solomon remains their holiest shrine. They embodied this feeling in a major decision made in 1949:

That Zion (i.e., Jerusalem) was and always would be the capital of the state of Israel. That was a reply to a resolution of the United Nations Assembly to establish an international administration of the city. It was an article of the religious faith shared by all sections.²²

Furthermore, proof exists that the temple of Solomon is located immediately beneath EL AQSA mosque. Archeological searching has already started, and many Muslims believe this has caused cracks in the mosque walls. The author believes that what has happened to the walls may also happen to the prevailing vulnerable truce.

Muslims' View of Today's Jews

The archeological venture associated with the believed culpability of the state of Israel in the EL AQSA fire in 1969 may also unmask the religious interests of a state displaying a secular likelihood. Such view of the Jewish state, formerly peculiar to some Islamic groupings.

is gaining a larger audience among Muslims world wide by the means of an involuntary converging actions originated by Jews and Muslims. The share of the Jews is to loudly identify themselves with the genuine image of all the preceeding Jewish generations, and to devote themselves to the fulfillment of their ancestral mission in the way prescribed by Torah, Talmud and also by the protocols of Elders of Zion.

The latter document is not yet officially recognized and is still denied to large publication and analysis. The effective use of the anti-Semitism charge against whoever tried to take it to public attention, proved to be herein a good deterrent. In the author's opinion, the contents of this document are incompatible with humanitarian standards and are beyond usual xenophobia limits.²³ Even when, for political convenience, the Jews asked the Pope to relieve them from the charge of crucifixion bearing on them, they never blamed their ancestors for what they were charged, still, less for the attempts upon the life of Prophet Muhammad.

As for the Muslim share in this sensitizing religious approach, it is done by the recourse to Quran to define the Jews of all times:

Strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou find the Jews and pagans; and nearest among them in love to the believers wilt thou find those who say "We are Christians" because amongst these are men devoted to learning and men who have renounced the world, and they are not arrogant. The Jews say "God's hand is tied up, be their hands tied up and be they accursed for the (blasphemy)

they utter. . ." Curses were pronounced on those among the children of Israel who rejected faith, by the tongue of David and of Jesus, the son of Mary, because they disobeyed and persisted in excesses.²⁴ . . . When there comes to them that which they (should) have recognized, they refuse to believe in it, but the curse of God is on those without faith.²⁵

In addition, Muslims emphasize and believe that a single glance to the geographical expansion of the state of Israel and an analysis of the growing authority of its religious parties show that this state is heading toward the frontiers of the "Promised Land" which may include the holy city of Medina, the Shi, holy places in Iraq, and many more holy places of sacred importance. The case of Abraham's shrine in Hebron, gradually moving from mosque to synagogue since it undergoes Jewish rule, may be used as standard for forecast.

Are Muslims today attuned to this kind of issue? Their violent and spontaneous reactions to what they perceived as a plotted violation of their shrine in Mecca may be used to gauge their response when warned against actual or potential threat to religious values and holy places.

Do Islamic laws and traditions provide adequate "left motive" and guidance for individuals, groupings and states to face the identified threat? Can it be a "Jihad" situation?

IV. Suitability of "Jihad"

To state that "Jihad" is a "holy war" or a mere fanatical and bloody religious venture, as it used to be depicted in non-Islamic literature, is not an accurate translation or even an adequate description of this notion. It is necessary to acquire full understanding of Jihad prior to any attempt to explain the rapid spread of Islam in its earlier time, to analyze the relative decadence of the last Islamic state, and also to foresee the scope of influence the current Islamic revival may have on an eventual socio-political change within the Islamic community.

Jihad Objectives and Concept

The etymological meaning of "Jihad" in Arabic is doing one's utmost to reach a given objective. In the Sharia, divinely revealed law of Islam, Jihad is waging war to spread Islamic authority over all the world and establish the society of truth and justice. However, spreading Islamic authority does not mean the elimination of other monotheist religions, but rather to get human society rid of destructive features such as the practice of usury, gambling, adultery and other prejudicial practices. Some of Jihad objectives and its compulsory character are clearly defined in the Quran:

Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is

wrong, and believing in God. . .²⁶ And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God altogether and everywhere. . .²⁷ . . . Apostle! rouse the believers to the fight. . .²⁸ Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. . .²⁹ Then fight in the cause of God and know that God heareth and knoweth all things.³⁰

The four major schools of Islamic theology, Hanafites, Maliki, Shafites and Hanbalites agree that Jihad is initially a collective obligation for the community. Yet it may become an individual duty as important as any of the five pillars of Islam in case Muslims are attacked. Throughout the Quran, Jihad is often co-cited with prayer and fast and established as an obligation in the same Surat, Baqara, establishing the fast of Ramadhan. Many Muslim jurists assert that Jihad has to be waged once a year and that the abstention to wage it cannot be regarded as a matter of principle but merely as a temporary hindrance. Jihad can be activated by the decision of the Imam if he estimates that the situation fits requirements.

The ideological nature of this war made it people-oriented rather than land-oriented. Indeed, Islamic history shows that political authority was often granted to new converted natives once Jihad was over in a given province. The target people for Jihad are generally divided into four categories. The Harbis,³¹ the refractory Dhimmis,³² the Turncoat Muslims,³³ and the aggressors.

Jihad Motivation

The means of Jihad are defined as the actual fighting and the financial support to this fight as stated in the Quran:

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of God, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.³⁴ Those who spend their substance in the cause of God and follow not up their gifts with reminders of their generosity or with injury, for them their reward is with their Lord. On them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.³⁵

The system of reward and chastisement, established in Islam to sanction obedience, is widely applied to Jihad. The rewards for Muslims, killed in Jihad and then named "Chahid," are so attractive that Muslims' fights were characterized by a passionate momentum upsetting combat ratios. This important combat multiplier roots in the Muslims' belief that to be killed in Jihad means an automatic and immediate resuscitation in paradise and that Chahids never feel the pain of death:

And say not of those who are slain in the way of God. They are dead. Nay, they are living, though ye perceive (it) not.³⁶ Think not of those who are slain in God's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their substance in the Presence of their Lord.³⁷

On the other hand, the abstention or reluctance to participate in Jihad is penalized by chastisement. Moreover, no Muslim can expect the Jihad rewards if his actual motivation is to gain authority, celebrity or wealth.

Jihad Ethics

Jihad has to be waged according to its ethics prohibiting pillage, mutilation of corpses, killing women, children, old persons or wounded enemy and wasting means of livelihood. Abnegation, loyalty, cohesion, discipline, spirit, steadfastness and serenity are among the required psychological conditions in the Jihad environment. Some Quran verses relate to these requirements:

Ye who believe! When ye meet the unbelievers in hostile array, never turn your backs to them.³⁸
 . . . Apostle! Rouse the believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred. If a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the unbelievers, for these are a people without understanding.³⁹

The derived warlike tradition is deeply anchored in the Muslim mind and values. Mourning and sorrow are not justified in a Jihad home; not participating in Jihad is a motive of shame; a wound during Jihad is a testimony of honor, keeping anonymity while financially supporting Jihad is a self authentication of faith.

Jihad and Today's Muslims

This moral value system applies alike to individuals and governments. Some recent examples may illustrate the lasting validity of the system. The operational code given to the Suez Canal crossing in 1973 was "Badr" 40; the galvanizing assault order remains "God is the greatest." The rebels against colonization in North Africa were named

"Mujahidin". The Turks killed in action against Greece were named "Chahid", the P.L.O. is called "Fatah" which is "a technical term meaning a conquest for Islam gained in the holy war," even the P.L.O. units are named after the great victories won by Muslim arms in the battles of Qadisiya, Hattin, and Ain Jalut. The military communiques of "Fatah" always begin with the religious invocation "In the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate."

Likewise, the manual of orientation of the Supreme Command of the Egyptian Forces issued in 1965 qualified the Egyptian expedition in Yemen and the war against the state of Israel as a Jihad for God:

Even more striking is the appearance of religious language among the secular Turks, who in the fighting in Cyprus, used numerous Islamic terms to describe themselves, their adversaries, and the struggle between them.⁴¹

Is it proper to conclude that the Arab-Israeli conflict is now a feasible case of Jihad? For Muslims, the state of Israel represents the Jews defined by God as their fierce enemy, being in refractory Dhimmi position, occupying a Muslim land, denying to Muslims political authority and threatening their holy shrines. Moreover, many Imams declared that Muslims have to wage Jihad against the state of Israel. The reward for Jihad is so attractive and the chastisement in case of reluctance is so deterrent that an organized call on Jihad is expected to meet a favorable echo among Muslims' masses now fascinated by their spectacular

religious revival. However, the favorable echo needs to be embodied in joined action to meet the Jihad requirements. Is there now enough solidarity among Muslims to support a so ambitious enterprise?

ENDNOTES

1. Judaism, in its true sense, is also a way of life, but the scattering of the Jews for hundreds of years prevented the same influence over daily life and secular matters as is the case with Islam.
2. Substitute of the Prophet. Some Muslims give this title to Abu Bakr, the first Calif.
3. Means: commander of the believers, given to Califs after Abu Bakr.
4. Means: leader. This title is especially used by Shia.
5. Sunna: "custom, law, exemplary life of the Prophet Muhammad."
6. Bernard Lewis, The Return of Islam, p. 41.
7. Many thinkers from both sides do not agree that Abraham is their common ancestor.
8. Jews are often named Bani-Isra-i-l in Quran.
9. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meanings of the Glorious Quran (Cairo, Beirut, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masri, Dar Al-Khbab Allubrani) Surat II, Begara, Verses 91, 93, 55, 59, 140.
10. A valuable historical analysis of these events can be found in "the life of Muhammed" by Haykal (American Trust Publication), pp. 299-316.
11. Haykal, The Life of Mohammed (American Trust Publication), p. 301.
12. The Prophet died in 10 AH.
13. Jewish or Christian citizens living under Muslim rule.
14. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Verses 190, 191.
15. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 39.
16. Eric, F. F. Bishop, "Islam in the Countries of Fertile Crescent," in Religion in the Middle-East, general ed. A. J. Arberry, VOL II (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 61.

17. Still Christian leaders complain of vandalism of Christian shrines by Jews, with little result.

18. See Appendix I.

19. Place faced by Muslims in prayer.

20. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Surat XVII, Ibra, Verse 1.

21. In fact, the Prophet declared three mosques of exceptional importance; the Haram in Mecca, his own mosque in Medina and EL AQSA mosque in Jerusalem.

22. Norman Bentwich, "Judaism in Israel" in Religion in the Middle-East, general ed. A. J. Arberry, VOL I (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 88.

23. Some studies concluded that this document was not authentic, based on its incompatibility with Torah. The answer may be that it is not the first time Jews acted against Torah. Anyway, the purpose here is to relate the perception of Muslims vis-a-vis this document. They believe in its authenticity and may look at today's Jews from this perspective.

24. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Surat V, Maida, Verses 85, 87.

25. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 89.

26. Ibid., Surat III, Al-i-Imran, Verse 110.

27. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 39.

28. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 65.

29. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 216.

30. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 244.

31. Non-Muslim person under non-Muslim rule.

32. Jewish or Christian citizens of Islamic state.

33. Known as "Riddah," Muslims rejecting their faith.

34. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 60.

35. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 262.

36. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 153.

37. Ibid., Surat II, Baqara, Verse 169.
38. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 15.
39. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 65.
40. Name of first battle waged by the Prophet against pagans.
41. Bernard Lewis, The Return of Islam, p. 48.

APPENDIX I

The Farthest Mosque must refer to the site of the temple of Solomon in Jerusalem on the hill of Moriah, at or near which stands the Dome of the Rock, called also the Mosque of Hadhrat Umar. This and the Mosque known as the Farthest Mosque (Masjd-ul-Aqsa) were completed by the Amir Abd-ul-Malik in AH 68. Farthest, because it was the place of worship farthest west which was known to the Arabs in the time of the holy Prophet. It was a sacred place to both Jews and Christians. But the Christians there had the upper hand, as it was included in the Byzantine (Roman) Empire, which maintained a Patriarch at Jerusalem. The chief dates in connection with the temple are: it was finished by Solomon about 1004 B.C.; destroyed by the Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar about 586 B.C.; rebuilt under Ezra and Nehemiah about 515 B.C.; turned into a heathen idol temple by one of Alexander's successors, Antiochus Epiphanes, 167 B.C.; restored by Herod, 1770 B.C., A.D. 29; and completely razed to the ground by the Emperor Titus in A.D. 70. These ups and downs are among the greater signs in religious history.

From The Meanings of Glorious Quran by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masri, Dar Al-Kitab Allubnani) VI, p. 693.

CHAPTER 4

SCOPE OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY: POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS

Today's solidarity among Muslim masses and Islamic governments is in a transitory phase. The perception of Islamic solidarity is not yet identical within the Muslim world. The spread of Islamic revival, along with the development of education and the improvement of means of communication, is in a favorable posture to attract worldwide Muslims to the issue of solidarity. The importance given to this issue in the Quran, its place in Islamic tradition and culture kept this ideal of solidarity alive, yet not very active. The successive trials to embody an ideal of Pan-Islamism in Muslims' political life expressed the attributes of pervasiveness, polycentrism and persistence characterizing contemporary Islamic trends. The interest of Islamic countries in an organized and effective solidarity is promising enough to be granted priority over some peculiar considerations. The existing, yet limited, Islamic solidarity with regard to the Palestinian issue, has been enhanced by the asserted full commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The local and regional considerations in Pakistan and Turkey make these two countries likely to be

ruled by Islamic type regimes in the mid-term. Is it possible to see this Islamic solidarity moving from talks to facts?

I. Religious Ground and Political Development

The ideals of fraternity and equality, preached by Islam since its inception, lent a convenient ground for effective solidarity. Providing necessary support and protection, enabling early Muslims to perform religious duties despite a particularly hostile environment, illustrated the eldest form of Muslims' solidarity. The struggle for the faith knew, in the same period, a striking example of sacrifice to which alternated a striking echo of abnegation. It was the epic event of "hijra"¹ which has been chosen by Muslims as the starting date of the Islamic era to consecrate the extent of sacrifice a Muslim must consent for his faith and also the scope of solidarity Muslims have to have in support of such a purpose.

The Ansar Antecedent

The total support of El Ansar² to El Muhajirun³ was characterized by abnegation and altruism, and became rooted in the Muslim mind as the pattern of solidarity due to the fighters for a just cause. God praised it in Quran, and made it a complement of Jihad worthy of similar reward:

. . . As to those who believed but came not into exile, ye owe no duty of protection to them until

they come into exile; but if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance. And (remember), God seeth all that ye do,⁴ Those who believe, and adopt exile and fight for the faith, in the cause of God, as well as those who give (them) asylum and aid-- these are (all) in very truth the believers, for theirs is the forgiveness of sins and a provision most generous.⁵

The solidarity of El Ansar put Muslims in a proper posture to wage Jihad and to rescue other Muslims being oppressed:

And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)? Men, women, and children, whose cry is: "Our Lord! rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors, and raise for us from Thee one who will protect, and raise for us from Thee one who will help."⁶

The perception of Islamic solidarity is strengthened by the ideal of unity commended to Muslims' community.

Persistence of Solidarity

In the absence of actual unity, Muslims throughout the world feel bound to a common entity. This perception is derived from many aspects of daily and periodic worship. Five times a day, Muslims pray in one direction in the same way.⁷ During the month of Ramedhan, all Muslims undergo the same test of will and observe the fundamental principles of fraternal co-existence;⁸ by "Zakat", wealthy Muslims cheerfully share with the poor a part of their wealth.⁹ During the pilgrimage to Mecca, Muslims take off all distinctive marks and enjoy fraternity and equality in anonymity and spiritual fusion.¹⁰ By kissing the "Blackstone",

the individual Muslim kisses the entire Muslim community throughout the world and the time.¹¹ The author compares the kissing of the "Blackstone" to a deed of fraternity signed by the lips. The Prophet asserted that the validity of the faith depends on the perception of sincere fraternity with other Muslims.¹²

As long as Muslims were governed by a single Islamic state, the notion of solidarity could hardly be discerned from social cohesion. However, at times of political metamorphosis, this solidarity was embodied in several forms: active and organized at the time of the Crusades,¹³ passive and scattered when collapsed, the Islamic state of Andalous.¹⁴

In the 18th century, when, under the impact of Austrian and Russian victories against Turkey and British successes in India, Muslims began to be aware that they were no longer the dominant group in the world but were, on the contrary, threatened in their heartlands by a Europe that was expanding at both ends. The only really vital responses were religious reform movements, such as the Wahhabis in Arabia and the reformed Naqshbandi order which spread from India to other Muslim countries. In the early 19th century, when the three major European empires ruling over Muslims, those of Britain, France, and Russia, were advancing in India, North Africa, and Central Asia, the most significant movements of resistance were again religious--the Indian Wahhabis led by Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi from 1816 to 1821, the struggle of Abd-Qadir in North Africa from 1832 to 1847, the dogged resistance of Sharii to the Russians in Dagistan, and the Northern Caucasus from 1830 to 1859. All of them were crushed, but made a considerable impact at the time.¹⁵

Rise of Pan Islamism

These reactions seem to be the forerunner signs of Pan-Islamism which has been later conceived and formulated by Jemal Eddin El Afghani (1838-1897). This concept looked suitable for Sultan Abdulhamid II to remedy the internal disintegration of the Islamic empire and also to rally the believers to face the growing external threat. Yet, this appeal was perceived through different perspectives reflecting more concern about local issues. The Indian Muslims responded favorably because of the aid they needed to face the hostile Hindus' environment while Arab Muslims, already indoctrinated by nationalist revival, reacted with great caution. Although this trial to put Pan-Islamism in concrete form did not win the expected massive support, some of its offshoots appeared later in other forms such as the building of the Hejaz railway and the founding of the "Red Crescent."

The total collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1924 stirred again the idea of an Islamic revival. The brotherhood organizations were the political expression of these trends such as "Ashubban Al Muslimun" in 1927 in Egypt,¹⁶ "Al-Ikhwan Al Muslimun" in 1928 in Egypt,¹⁷ "Fidaiyani Islam" in Iran,¹⁸ "Khaksars" and "Jamati Islam" in Pakistan.¹⁹ Their programs aimed to maximize the interest in Islamic values and called for Islamic unity to achieve political independence, economical development, and social progress for

all Muslims. The foundation of the state of Israel in Palestine gave the Islamic brotherhoods the genuine opportunity to convince Muslims about their urgent need of unity or at least of solidarity. Many factions of Muslim brethren participated in 1947-48 in the fight against the state of Israel; elsewhere, many isolated aspects of solidarity were noted.

The rise of brotherhood alternated with diplomatic attempts to concretize the Pan-Islamic ideal. However, the lack of political and theological cohesion within the Muslim community denied tangible success to these attempts. This was seen in the Salonika Congress in 1911,²⁰ the Cairo Congress in 1926,²¹ and the Mecca Congress in the same year.²²

In 1931, Haj Amin Hussaini, mufti of Jerusalem,²³ organized the first "Islamic World Congress" to discuss the protection of Islamic holy places in Palestine. Three years later, four Islamic states, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan formed the "nucleus of a Moslem League of Nations" by signing the Pact of Saadabad which called for mutual consultation between the signatories. More programmatic conceptions appeared after the birth of the Islamic state of Pakistan. Indeed, the latter organized in 1949, the first Islamic economic conference including in its program the project of founding a Pan-Islamic air company, a Pan-Islamic bank and the regular holding of Islamic world congresses.

Pan Islam Today

The simultaneous development of nationalism within the states of the Muslim world was considered by many observers as a dividing factor in the Islamic community while some others regarded the phenomenon as a phased Islamic reunification starting at national level. Pan Turanism, like Pan Arabism were the notorious cases viewed through both perspectives. Nasser, as an active promoter of Pan Arabism, emphasized in his "Philosophy of the Revolution," the need for a strong link with Islam:

I came out increasingly conscious of the potential achievements cooperation among all these millions can accomplish, cooperation naturally not going beyond their loyalty to their original countries, but which will ensure for them and their brethren-in-Islam unlimited power.²⁴

Is this continual search for proper forms to express the Muslim need of solidarity and hope of unity, an evidence of the vitality of Pan-Islamism? Is it a premonitory sign of a possible political Muslim block?

It is a long familiar fact that events in one Moslem country exercise men's minds in the remotest corners of the Islamic world. This is just as much a fact in the twentieth century as in the time of the caliphs. Anyone who strikes a note in Morocco or in the Sudan must be prepared for the Islamic strings to be set in vibration as far as Pakistan and Indonesia. Thus, Islamic brotherhood is a living reality in the broad masses of the whole Moslem community, ignoring state frontiers. It is a reflection of popular feeling. The forum of the United Nations is offering governments clear evidence of Moslem solidarity.²⁵

This finding was borne out by some events such as the Arab states voting as a bloc for Pakistan against India's candidacy for the U.S. security council despite India's permanent support to Arab issues. The holding of an emergency "Islamic World Congress" in Islamabad this year to examine the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is another show of eagerness for Islamic solidarity.

It is curious to remark that some non-Islamic powers were also interested in Pan-Islam although they were animated by different motivations. In the past, Mussolini appropriated the label of "Protector of Islam" during the days of the "Ethiopian incident." Today, Great Britain's government is allocating funds to establish an Islamic radio station in London named "The Voice of Islam" which will broadcast in six languages starting June 1981. This decision implies, in the author's opinion, the anticipation of rapid spread of Islamic revival. The British instigation in the foundation of the Arab League in 1945 was perhaps incited by similar fear and hope with respect to the growing Arab nationalism at that time.

The Muslim solidarity in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict is influenced by the perception of risk to which are exposed religious values in Palestine and also by the current status of Pan-Islamism. Indeed, in 1976:

Delegates of a 44 country Islamic conference adopted a statement at the UN on March 12 denouncing what it terms Israel's systematic policy to

change the status of Jerusalem and gradually obliterate the Moslem and Christian heritage in the Holy City. Protest was prompted by recent incidents in Jerusalem when Jews said prayers and chanted hymns on Templem, a shrine holy to both Jewish and Moslem faiths.²⁶

II. Unifying and Dividing Factors

The political picture of the Muslim world in the last decades was characterized by a diversity of regimes, a wide spectrum of ideological trends, antagonistic influence of great powers, hasty searches for identity and surfacing of Islamic revival activities. This picture stood out in a world of political blocks still in fashion as a major aftermath of World War II. Seldom an Islamic country could escape from the satellite path evolving around a great power. The label of non-aligned scarcely fits some of them, although many aspire to adhere to a homogeneous political block where equal membership is supposed to replace the satellite status.

Within the existing blocks, common bounds are usually either geographical, strategic, ethnic or ideologic. The latter seems to be the kind of block suitable for Islamic states. The author thinks that it is relevant to make the political difference between Islamic states and Muslims' countries. The latter, although of limited number, apply secular systems while the formers assert in their constitution that Islam is the religion of state, which entails an obligation to seek conformity with Islamic

precepts in all fields of decision making. Some Western observers summarize their appraisal of the Muslim World's political unity by affirming that there are as many unifying factors as dividing ones among this world's countries.

Interests in Solidarity

Are there concurrent and conflicting interests in Islamic solidarity in general? To what extent do they affect the Arab-Israeli conflict? The following answers are given in form of findings and logical deductions inferred from an analysis of Muslim countries' political choices reflecting internal political condition and external diplomatic posture. On the internal ground, a show of Islamic solidarity may entail a gain of credibility among masses and may facilitate a preemptive sponsoring of Islamic revival by a government. Then, internal unity can be achieved and guaranteed since Islam forbids dissidence as long as the ruler himself conforms to religious principles.

This environment may also help developing and promoting a proper identity. It may, thereafter, provide the Islamic states with adequate means to defeat outsider trends looking for ideological vacuum. Solidarity is known for its capability of diverting from internal issues or at least the postponement of their surfacing. As for the international ground, the interest of these states could be the adherence to an interdependent block representing an important human

and material potentiality. This block may also provide a convenient platform for its states to solve bilateral discords or to seek support in case of conflict with a third party. Moreover, belonging to a mutually responsible block of credible weight usually deters any outsider from attempting to prejudice any member of the block. The interest in Islamic solidarity has been expressed by Saudis in these words: "The kingdom espouses and pursues solidarity because it is the best solution for the Arab and Islamic nation from its plight and from the obstacles which block the road to a bright future.²⁷

Islamic Solidarity and Palestine

These general considerations may be augmented by specific ones when related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The nature of the religious values at stake for the Islamic states in this case, and especially the perceptible threat to holy places and shrines of Islam at the present time and in the future, are of high interest for all Islamic countries. The economic potential of some Arab countries firmly committed to the Palestinian issue can satisfy the needs of many Islamic countries and lessen their dependence on some undesirable and impeding partners. Even Turkey, the sole Muslim state recognizing the state of Israel, perceived a positive outcome from Islamic solidarity. Indeed:

Metin Munir analyzes Turkey's attempts to diversify its traditionally western-linked foreign

policy, cites Turkey's joining of Islamic conference to gain non-aligned support and its permission to the (PLO) to open bureau in Turkey, finds strategy successful in (giving) Turkey solidarity with Islamic states and Islamic conference support for Turkish Cypriots; notes Islamic conference adopted a resolution recognizing federal system in Cyprus and granting implicit recognition of geographical and ethnic separation of Cyprus community.²⁸

On the other side, the ideal of Islamic unity, often expressed as a reliable frame of solidarity, may find some difficulties today because of the peculiar concerns of each state and because of ideological, political and economical ties each state may have with great powers. Indeed, regimes in Muslim countries range from medieval feudality to scientific socialism. Political systems include totalitarian monarchies and western type democracies as well as eastern ones. The incompatibility of these social, political and economical structures reduce the chances of a rapid political unity of the Muslim world. However, the solidarity, existing today in multiple forms, may not be so negatively affected. It may rather be a question of the possible field of solidarity and expected degree of commitment each Islamic country is likely to choose.

III. Overt and Expected Solidarity

In the mid-term, the Islamic solidarity related to the Arab-Israeli conflict is expected to remain variable according to the political role given to religion in each state and according to the perception of the Palestinian issue from an Islamic perspective. The effect of this

solidarity is affected by geographical considerations and the status of elements of power of each state. Like the Arab solidarity today, the Islamic solidarity in the mid-term may show each state participating in the general effort in its own way before and during crisis. In this context also, solidarity is expected to be waged in two minds: pledging oneself beyond prejudicial sacrifice or short of it. A forecast on the degree of solidarity in crisis time cannot be accurate because of the emotional development that may rise and the contagious behavior of solidarity that may spread. Then pre-established priorities may be changed at the expense of local programs.

The Iranian Pattern

As for the forms of Islamic solidarity, with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they also vary in consistency, continuity and timeliness of the expected support. The present analysis will focus especially on the political, economical and military fields of this solidarity. In the past and in the Arabic context, this solidarity drew a sinusoidal path reaching its peak at crisis periods. In the mid-term, some non-Arab Islamic countries, advocating equal responsibility vis-a-vis the conflict, may considerably affect the prevailing strategic balance in the region. If tangible, this commitment will discontinue the Arab monopoly of the issue and open it to actual Islamization.

It is timely to remark that the idea of Islamization surfaced when a major Arab state, Egypt, withdrew from the belligerency and a non-Arab Islamic one, Iran, claimed full commitment to the issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran will be considered in the following assessment as an example of an Islamic state emerging from an Islamic revival movement; however, similar regimes may be adopted in preemption of a long and violent process.

Since the first days of the new Iranian regime, total support to the Palestinian issue has been officially expressed. Moreover, Iranians pledged themselves to share the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. In fact, their new constitution stipulated in Art. 3, para 5, 15 and 16 and in Art. 152, that Iran will defend the right of all Muslims, will fight colonization, will strengthen Islamic solidarity and will organize its foreign policy according to Islamic values. Imams Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheriet Madari were more specific by claiming that the Palestinian question is not an Arab concern but rather an Islamic issue and that Muslims have to wage "Jihad" against the state of Israel. The influence of the Iranian call for an Islamization of the conflict may be evaluated through the favorable response of Muslims throughout the world in organizing the annual day of Jerusalem on the last Friday of Ramadhan. The scope of this symbolic solidarity may be measured through the comments made by Menachem Begin and Moshe Dayan after the successful

celebration of this day in August 1979. Both, and in very similar words, asserted that the era of darkness began for the state of Israel. Moshe Dayan exploited the event to warn the West of the growing threat of Islamic revival among Arab countries and others such as Turkey and Afghanistan.

Possible Developments in Pakistan and Turkey

The author believes that the next Middle Eastern states expected to adopt Islamic regimes and attitudes are Pakistan and Turkey.

For the case of Pakistan, the measures radically Islamizing the legislation and affecting many aspects of political and social life, express by their implementation, the government's determination to safeguard the religious character of the state. The prevailing political situation in the area and the attempts by external powers to disunite the state, by plotting strife among ethnic groups, can only be overcome by maximizing religious values commending unity and obedience. The growing animosity with regional and world powers and the still fresh lessons from the Bangladesh War show the urgent need of Pakistan for reliable solidarity. The Islamic identity of the state, its geographical location, cultural affinities and the recent political development of Islamic revival in the region, are expected to direct the choice of Pakistan toward the Islamic block. The concurrent informations about the building of a nuclear bomb partially

financed by Lybia and labeled in the West as the "Islamic bomb," relate Pakistan's great concern of security, urgent need of assistance and suitable frame for political cooperation. Moreover, the recent information on the said bilateral cooperation between India and the state of Israel in nuclear fields, are likely to bring together Pakistan and Arab countries. Hence, the commitment of Pakistan to the Palestinian cause within the frame of Islamic solidarity seems to have national and emotional grounds corresponding to the people's aspiration and to the government's need.

As for Turkey, the appraisal lacks convincing facts, although a rapid and violent change is not totally excluded. Indeed, some symptoms of change, not too different from those which prevailed in Iran before the revolution, let one expect the spread and development of Islamic revolutionary behavior in this country. The Kemalism which tried to root Turkey out of the oriental culture and graft her to the occidental one is now being criticized as entailing a clumsy cross-breed rejected by one side and repudiated by the other. In fact, during their conflict with Greece about Cyprus, many Turks felt betrayed by the West and ignored by the East. The influence of religious reawakening in Turkey made the supporters of Kemalism claim that Kemalism was a religious reform using secular methods to achieve rapid change.

In 1979, the tone of some religious organizations such as the "Raiders" and the "Idealist Youth" showed their

determination in the struggle for an Islamic Turkish state despite the government's violent and illegal reactions. The "Raiders" asserted in a statement made on 29 Nov 79 that:

A Muslim can never yield to the snares of oppression and exploitation. Everyone, no matter who they are, will pay individually for what they have done to the Muslims. One day, those who terrorize others will have their turn to be afraid.²⁹

The "Idealist Youth Organization" stated their goals and policy in a declaration made on 9 Jan 79.

Our ideal is to rebuild Turkish Islamic civilization. The idealist movement is not a counter movement against a handful of communists; it is a movement for the revival of the idea of world order against the age of oppression. It is a movement to rebuild Islamic civilization, which will liberate mankind as opposed to a materialist civilization. We must be prepared for the tougher, larger struggle. . . . We believe that the Turkish nation will return to itself and to the great holy activities. Signs of this have begun nationwide, even in the remotest corner of Anatolia. . . . Let us unite under the slogan that people are the only fist against unbelief. Let us struggle for our nation, our religion and the liberation of Islam. May the peace of Allah be upon us.³⁰

The author thinks that the return of Turkey to the Islamic block in the mid-term looks very likely because of the serious internal political problems, the vulnerability of an economy depending on both energy producers and industrialized countries, and the regional political development highly influenced by Islam.

Thus, the effect of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the mid-term will be examined with the assumption that Iran, Pakistan and Turkey will be committed to the Palestinian cause as an Islamic issue needy of block

solidarity. The remaining non-Arab Muslim countries and influential Muslim minorities will be considered for a lesser degree of commitment and for limited fields of solidarity. Their role is not expected to be a determinant strategic factor. However, their contribution, either active or passive, would be a considerable backing.

ENDNOTES

1. The Prophet's exile from Mecca.
2. Muslims of Medina who granted asylum to the Prophet and His fellows.
3. Muslims who left Mecca and joined the Prophet in Medina.
4. Abdullas Yusuf Ali, The Meanings of the Glorious Quran (Cairo, Beirut, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masri, Dar Al-Kihab Allubrani) Surat VIII, Arfal, Verse 72.
5. Ibid., Surat VIII, Anfal, Verse 74.
6. Ibid., Surat IV, Nisaa, Verse 75.
7. Prayers are done in the direction of Mecca and are organized in the same way everywhere.
8. The fast makes wealthy people feel the hunger endured by the poor; besides, gossip and slander are incompatible with fasting.
9. Zakat is a mandatory alms giving and not an act of charity.
10. Men usually wear two pieces of fabric and enjoy fraternal co-existence with each other.
11. Muslims use to kiss the "Blackstone" when they visit the Kaaba. The "Blackstone" is located at one corner of the Kaaba.
12. It is now a tradition to call a Muslim "brother".
13. The war waged under Saladin.
14. Muslims of Maghreb (North Africa) gave asylum and assistance to Muslims expelled from Andalous, Spain.
15. Bernard Lewis. The Return of Islam, p. 49.
16. Muslims' youth.
17. Muslims' brethren.

18. Faithful defenders of Islam.
19. Islam's group.
20. This Congress adopted a resolution to meet annually in Constantinople.
21. Sponsored by the "Ulemas" of Al-Azhar University.
22. Many countries did not attend the congress.
23. Mufti is the highest authority in Islamic jurisprudence.
24. Gamal Abel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo n.d.), pp. 67, 68.
25. F. W. Fernau, Moslems on the March (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p. 84
26. New York Times, March 13, 1976, p. 4, column 8, Fiche 72-6-57.
27. Editorial. Al-Riyad (in Arabic), Nov 14, 1978, p. 1 (JPRS:072571 p. 57).
28. Middle-East, July 1976, p. 33, column 1.
29. Milli Gazete, (in Turkish), Nov 29, 1979, pp. 1, 11.
30. Milliyet, (in Turkish), Jan 9, 1979, p. 9 (JPRS:072851, pp. 118-120).

CHAPTER 5

STRATEGIC EFFECTS: A MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE

The possible strategic effects of an Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict may affect the regional balance of power at the expense of the state of Israel. The power of the Arab states, when augmented by those of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey along with a possible moral backing from other Islamic countries, may unbalance the power ratio prevailing in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Otherwise, the political and economical interdependence among nations makes the involvement of great powers in such conflict almost unavoidable. However, the strategic interest of these powers in the Middle East, often described as vital, may remain vulnerable to credible pressure in the mid-term. Subsequently, critical choices may ultimately be made in variance with current policy, thus removing strong taboos from changing traditional commitment in the conflict.

The geographical element of power of the Islamic political block, expected to oppose the state of Israel, includes some influential factors that may affect the policy making of the rival powers with regard to the regional issues. Indeed, the size, the location, the natural resources and the demographic features may incite great powers to reassess and reconsider their current Middle

Eastern policies. As for the use of these geographical advantages along with the political and economical ones, it is foreseeable that they will be committed to isolate the state of Israel from her supporters and suppliers. Then, once weakened, the use of the military element of power may be considered in a situation where antagonists claim exclusive right to rule the land of Palestine.

The use of political, economical and military elements of power, by the opponents of the state of Israel, is expected to be directed on the political decision making arena of influential powers to include major actors, agencies, and public opinion. However, it is difficult to foresee the reactions of these powers in a crisis environment, when time is not adequate for rational process, emotion affects logical options, risk jeopardizes vital interests, and uncertainty prevails over opponents' behavior. Nevertheless, an empirical approach enhanced by comparative technique may lead to workable deductions with regard to this potential case.

I. Political Effects

A. Anticipated Environment

Denying moral support to the state of Israel and impelling her to political isolation along with splitting the political consensus of the Jewish community are the potential effects of a joined Islamic political endeavor. It is generally admitted that the political strength of the

state of Israel lies in the extensive use of psychological persuasion and deterrence through adopted and expedient propaganda. Indeed, the state of Israel exploited the historical and mythical aspects of the Nazi "Holocaust" to graft to the western mind a perception of guilt toward the Jewish community. The western target audience was gained by an abundant literature and other forms of art and communication, portraying the state of Israel as an innocent community threatened by ruthless neighbors. This image of eternal victim, heroically withstanding an environment traditionally hostile to the West, gave the state of Israel the touching picture of ambassador of occidental civilization and defender of its interests in the region. From these considerations, now accepted as verities in the West, the state of Israel drew considerable moral and material support reaching sometimes the level of unconditional commitment.

This support was relatively unlimited by guaranteeing to Israel an overall power exceeding those of the Arab countries combined. It was illustrated by the huge support granted to Israel by the United States during the 1973 War to give her an overwhelming military power. This decision was implemented at the expense of the strategic military posture of the United States forces themselves. Besides, the issuing of a nuclear alert order to the United States forces, in the same period, showed the extent of commitment

consented to the security of Israel. Curiously, the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to this issue led to the same objective, yet through another approach. The Soviet Union was among the first countries to recognize the state of Israel in 1948. The first Arab-Soviet partnership was made by the first Egyptian Republic at the time of the arms deal right after failing to conclude a similar one with the United States. Thus, recouring to the eastern block, despite a spontaneous preference for the West, was dictated merely by an urgent need of defense. Hence, the existence of Israel compelled the Arabs to collaborate with the Soviet Union. Thereupon, the policy of the Soviet Union consisted in providing the collaborating Arab countries with enough means for self defense but never enough to jeopardize the existence of the state of Israel. This policy was illustrated in 1971 by a disguised refusal to provide Egypt with offensive means to wage a decisive war against the state of Israeli.²

The state of Israel drew a part of her strength on one hand from the political division among Arab governments and on the other hand, from the active solidarity of the Jews abroad. The Jews who did not emigrate to Palestine, on purpose according to Arab analysis, provide moral, financial, and political support to the state of Israeli, considered by Zionists as the state of all the Jews whatever may be their official citizenship.³ On the contrary, Arab

states did not perceive Arab nationalism in a common perspective; their consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict was generally described in general terms. This lack of political cohesion was aggravated by a competition of leadership between parties and high officials and various states. This political variance was also extended to the Palestinians' movements impeding any tangible action in proportion with their actual potential.

Therein, while Jews congregate around religious motive, Arabs experienced many difficulties in trying to gather around a nationalist concept. Thus, it is likely that the efforts of Islamic opponents of the state of Israel will act to occasion a political holdup within the state of Israel and among Jewish communities abroad.

B. Diplomatic Spheres

The large representation of Muslim countries in almost all international and regional organizations, the sum of diplomatic affinities gained by each Muslim country, and the advantage of great power rivalry, offer to Muslim states the opportunity to win over the support of international organizations. This support is necessary to contest the diplomatic legality of Israel as well as her legitimacy in dealing with Palestinians. This diplomatic conjuncture may favor the settlement of the Palestinian political entity and may also compel the Egyptian government

to reconsider its commitment to the implementation of the peace treaty with Israel.

The United Nations organization looks to be the best forum for the Islamic countries to grapple with the legality of Israel since this state was officially born in this organization. For obvious religious motives, the Islamic countries, except Turkey and Iran, never recognized the new state. The diplomatic struggle initiated by the Arab states gained in intensity and effectiveness at the time of the Islamic solidarity in 1969. Indeed, the burning of EL AQSA mosque, in Jerusalem in the same year was the reason behind the establishment of the "Islamic Conference Organization," now representing forty-four countries and granted the status of permanent observer at the United Nations since October 1975. One of its diplomatic achievements was the condemning of Zionism as a form of racism in the United Nations General Assembly on November 10th, 1975.⁴

Delegates of many countries that sponsored or voted for resolution indicate that some of the principal factors in their decisions were determination of some Arabs to destroy Israel, effective lobbying by Palestinians, Moslem unity, persuasive influence of Moslem dominated oil cartel, and anti-American pique in some third world countries.⁵

However, the proposition made in Jeddah in July 1975 to expell the state of Israel from the United Nations organization was postponed by Muslim foreign ministers in the United Nations despite the fact that Israel is the most frequently condemned state by the United Nations in the world.

Besides, it is likely that the position of some Islamic countries, especially Iran and Pakistan, will be tougher vis-a-vis state of Israel. Indeed, Iran accused the state of Israel of previous assistance to the "Savak" and of inflaming the Kurdish problem in Kurdistan,⁶ Pakistan charged Israel for collaborating with India in building her nuclear capability.⁷ On account of these considerations, and in the absence of signs of possible change in the state of Israel position toward the United Nations resolutions concerning the Palestinians, it seems very likely that the forty-four members of Islamic Conference Organization will not postpone their resolution to use all available diplomatic means to expell the state of Israel from the United Nations Organization. Many African and third world members may join this endeavor because of the growing political and economical mutual support between Israel and the South African government.⁸

In a parallel way, the Islamic countries, which have already suspended Egyptian membership in the Islamic Conference Organization because of the Camp David Peace Treaty, are providing diplomatic support to the PLO as the legal and sole representative of the Palestinian people. This growing support is expected to bring more official recognition of the PLO and subsequently more chance for a settlement of the Palestinian question in acceptable terms. Meanwhile, the

"Jerusalem Committee" established by the Islamic Conference Organization will continue its efforts to lead an international action for the liberation of Jerusalem.⁹

On another hand, the future of the peace treaty between the governments of Israel and Egypt seems to be a preferential target for the Islamic political solidarity which has already inflicted on Egypt a political isolation and internal unrest. The traditional diplomatic weight of Egypt, as an influential member in Arab and Islamic spheres, totally disappeared. The result may lead both signatories of the treaty to reassess its anticipated optimistic outcome. Moreover, the rise of Islamic revival in Egypt and abroad may keep the momentum of the treaty short of the Sinai border. Thus, on the diplomatic ground, the posture of the state of Israel may face difficult experience especially if effective pressure is directed on her traditional supporters. Meanwhile, the PLO may keep gaining diplomatic credibility.

C. Public Opinion

Diplomatic action may not be effective without a parallel effort on public opinion in some countries. Hence, it is very likely that the Islamic countries will try to defeat the state of Israel in her traditional stronghold and major source of moral support, the western public opinion. This need of waging a broad informative action, to counter the Zionists' indoctrination of western public opinion, looks very timely because of the striking misunderstanding

of the essence of the conflict. It is generally believed in Arab and Islamic spheres that this misunderstanding is mainly due to the fact that "Jews have either ownership or corporate level control" over influential means of communication in western Europe and the United States.¹⁰ Thereby, the state of Israel has always been portrayed for the western mind as a "bastion of democracy" and "champion of peace" facing a risk of annihilation. The reactions of a target audience exposed to a quasi-monopoly of information, were obviously consistent with the anticipated effect of congeniality and support. Besides, the resignation of the late Chief of Staff of the United States, General Brown, of Andrew Young, the United Nations Ambassador, the defeat of President Carter in the New York Primaries, and the precarious position of Secretary of State G. Vance, show the span of influence on United States politics enjoyed by the state of Israel, through the American Jewish lobby, considered by Muslims actual ruler of the mass media.

These very means of information waged a broad anti-Islamic campaign at the time of the rise of Islamic revival in Iran and subsequent political developments in Iran and other Muslims countries. The Islamic answer to this campaign was expressed by the Islamic Conference Organization new Secretary General, Habib Chatty, as an informative action: "revealing Islam in its true light, destroying the

too numerous legends and the overly harsh view which presents Islam as a dogma of violence, fanaticism and intolerance."

It is likely that Islamic countries will reinforce previous Arab attempts to reach international public opinion and to provide it with another version of the conflict. The financial means, the access to broad information, and the mastering of many languages are as much resources as Muslim countries may commit to this purpose. Then an important outcome may result from the anticipated objective receptivity of the public opinion: Palestinians and their supporters will forsake violent proceedings to attract the notice on this issue. The western mind, still traumatized by the heinous misdeeds of racism during the second world war period, may then be easily attuned to the Palestinian complaints of similar deeds.

International public opinion may also be reached through coordinated action of Islamic secondary institutions representing several social groups. These organizations, either labor unions, student organizations, sport leagues or professional associations, represent a large body of members in Islamic countries because of the growing demographic factor. Besides, the important number of Muslim workers and students abroad may support this overall informative action, to influence international public support by acting within their range of contact. Thus, a planned program and a

coordinated action, directed towards denying moral support to the state of Israel, is likely to be conceived to influence Western public opinion. Accordingly, adequate resources may be committed to make an end to the monopoly of information and lessen its indoctrinal effect.

D. Interest Groups

The political effect of an Islamic endeavor, attempting to thwart the state of Israel's ascendancy over western political decision making areas, would be incomplete and perhaps vowed to failure, if interest groups will not be adequately and properly handled. Indeed, minority groups and multinational corporations, which used to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict are expected to keep on this influence. The Jewish community, especially in the United States, considerably affected the American political options in the Middle East and thereby enhanced the state of Israel posture. This influence dates back to 1942, after the steamer "Struma" accident, when the "American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs" was established. Two years later:

In his concern for the outcome of the election, Harry Truman bowed to the will of the Zionists. Since seventy-five percent of American Jewry lived in fourteen cities concentrated in the states with the largest electoral vote, and forty-two percent were resident in New York City, the key to the Empire State with its forty-five electoral votes, he could do no less. . . . Unfortunately, until recently, domestic politics in America have dictated U.S. reaction to all Arab-Israeli conflicts. No American leader, whatever his stature or party affiliation, has had political courage to suggest

that a re-examination of American policies might be in order. Israel's influence on American politics stems from a variety of factors that should be mentioned. First is the concentration of the "Jewish vote" in the five key states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and California. No candidate aspiring to the White House can ignore the electoral votes of these states. The financial contributions of wealthy pro-Israeli American Jews and firms to the campaigns of the political parties are equally important. Another element is the Jewish influence in, if not near control of, American mass-media.¹²

Moreover, the Jewish communities in western countries and especially in the United States, are providing the state of Israel with substantial financial support since a favorable tax structure facilitated such action.

It is against these influential capabilities that Islamic countries are likely to react by using several converging ways. They have already started a campaign calling for a distinction between a Jew and a Zionist. Only the latter is being described as enemy because his political program is considered by Muslims as highly prejudicial to Islamic values. On the contrary, the Jew is defined solely with respect to his religious belief and is anticipated to espouse the political ideals dictated by his actual citizenship. This approach has not yet entailed tangible outcome because of the strong emotional ties bounding Jews whatever may be their citizenship or their political orientation. Besides, the gap remains wide even between political views of moderate Muslims and moderate Jews. Hence, Jewish influence on presidential elections in the United States may continue to be powerful.

It is not excluded that another minority group, the American blacks, may interfere with their action. First, because of the growing number of blacks converted to Islam; second, because of the recent animosity developed between Jews and blacks after the resignation of United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young. This animosity is likely to develop because of the close political and economical ties between the state of Israel and the South African government.¹³ In addition, the weight of the black minority in elections is important. As for the financing of these elections, the wealth of some Islamic states when associated with the power of sympathizer oil companies, may counter-balance the financial influence of the Jews. The same coalition may lead to a readjustment of legislation allowing transfer of funds to the state of Israel as well as the one authorizing dual citizenship for American Jews residing in Palestine.

Thus, the possible action of Islamic countries at the interest groups level seems to be uncertain, especially in a crisis situation. However, the means traditionally used by Jewish lobby to influence western politics may be available, in the mid-term, to other interest groups having common interests with Islamic countries.

So to sum, the political effects that may result from Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict with the anticipated participation of the majority of the Islamic

Conference Organization in diplomatic and informative efforts, the following changes are possible:

- The state of Israel may undergo a severe diplomatic isolation along with possible expulsion from the United Nations Organization.
- The PLO may gain more diplomatic credibility and foresake violent behavior to attract the notice of the public opinion.
- The Camp David Peace Treaty may become obsolete and may incite Egypt to seek reconciliation with other Islamic countries.
- A mass media campaign may break the Jewish monopoly of information and place the western audience more objective conditions of information.
- The western moral support to the state of Israel may weaken and ultimately disappear.
- Conflicting interests among interest groups may lessen the influence of the Jewish lobby on western political decision makers.

II. Economical Effects

A. Anticipated Environment

The use of the economic element of power by Islamic opponents of the state of Israel may seriously affect the already critical condition of the latter's economy. The important economic resources of the Islamic countries, the proved relative dependence of great powers on these

resources, the effectiveness of previous economic pressures, the considerable amount of financial assets owned by Islamic countries, and the economic vulnerability of western alliances, are factors that may contribute to weaken Israel. These pressures may hinder the development of her economy, deter Jews abroad from emigrating, limit the opportunities for favorable trade, and aggravate the economic strain resulting from political isolation. The Islamic economic action may amplify the attempt already begun by Arab countries. In addition to these countries, Iran is already committed to the action, some other Islamic countries may join it whenever a common interest exists or as long as conflicting interests do not surface.

External pressure and internal economic requirements are the main constraints that may limit the scope of commitment of some Islamic countries although the development of effective Islamic solidarity may lessen the effect of these constraints. As for the new spirit that may characterize this action, it stems from a religious outlook that can motivate a protracted action despite an eventual risky condition.

The current organizational framework for such an action seems to be the Islamic Conference Organization which encourages inter-Islamic trade as well as the development of technical and financial cooperation and sponsors an association of Islamic economic boards. Three of its agencies show

the political interest in the economic cooperation: the "Islamic Solidarity Fund," the "Islam Bank" and the "Jerusalem Fund." However, it is not sure that this frame will be suitable for such an action in crisis situation unless cautious planning pre-conceives a contingency scheme of action. Moreover, the vital economic interests of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the Middle East region for the mid-term, may impose great caution on Islamic countries in conceiving or implementing a broad economic action.

Both pre-emptive and retaliatory measures may characterize the spectrum of actions and reactions available to the Islamic economic endeavor. However, the degree of motivation and organization, as well as the cautious and expedient approach to economic divergence within alliances and to economic rivalry between great powers, may place the Islamic countries in a favorable posture to face possible counter-measures. The favorite ground of this economic confrontation or pressure will normally be found everywhere as Islamic strength alternates with a weakness of its actual or potential opponents. These grounds seem to be within the circles of influence of oil, financial assets, and trade with the participation of larger numbers of Islamic countries in auxiliary level of support.

B. The Oil

The use of oil by Islamic opponents of the state of Israel may seriously aggravate the world energy crisis and impel influential powers to critical choices leading to significant political concessions to Islamic countries or to a violent confrontation open to great power direct involvement. A West-East compromise on the issue in non-crisis situations as well as in a crisis looks unlikely because of their antagonist strategic interests in the area for the mid-term. Also, it is not excluded that an oil crisis, either plotted by a great power or organized by producers may be exploited to improve a given military posture in the area.

The economic dynamism in most countries depends on the availability of adequate suitable affordable amounts of energy. The importance of oil stems from the fact that it is a nonrenewable source of energy concentrated in an area known for political instability. Oil is still considered a vital material for industrialized countries' economy as well as for oil producers who have no alternate economic resources. The Islamic countries are among the most important producers of oil and holders of the greatest amount of published proved reserves of crude oil in the world. The Arab OPEC (AOPEC) plus Iran hold more than one half of the world crude oil needs. As for Indonesia, she may not be fully committed to an Islamic use of the oil weapon,

nevertheless, keeping on her current policy within OPEC would be adequate backing to the Islamic endeavor.

The United States, Western Europe and Japan depend considerably, yet in different degrees, on the Islamic oil for their economy while the USSR is expected to experience similar needs by 1982. Western observers think that the Soviet Union will take a different approach to the oil energy issue and indicate that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may be the first step in this approach.

The present analysis will emphasize the situation for western countries as direct influential powers on Israeli politics. The role and weight of oil companies in these states remain essential despite an ebbing status within OPEC. Indeed, they went from sole owner in 1908 to partner in 1950 to contractor or consultant today. The success of the Lybian breakthrough in 1972, the relative failure of H. Kissinger's project of an "International Energy Agency" and the 1973 Arab oil embargo made both producers and consumers of oil aware of the effect of the use of such a weapon. In fact, many countries are still experiencing the prejudice of these measures and cannot neglect the effect of similar ones in the future. It would be too optimistic to expect a replacement of oil as an essential source of energy by alternate means in the short or even mid-term. Indeed, the key element of a possible change, the breeder reactor, is not yet welcomed for the near future in

the United States.¹⁴ Anyway, the modern technology and the material conditioning of the human life are today and may remain for the mid-term, closely dependent on oil as a source of energy and as the basic material for industry.

Based upon the above considerations, the AOPEC plus Iran are likely to use the oil weapon in any economic action against Israel. This action may range from deterrent to retaliatory measures. Limiting production, raising the price, modifying relationship with oil companies, nationalizing companies assets, and imposing a partial or total boycott are all options open to AOPEC and Iran. It is obvious that the weight of these countries in OPEC gives them a great authority on OPEC policy. In a crisis situation, the escalation, through the spectrum of options available to them, may be driven to cope with the rythm and scope of hostilities.

In both cases of non-crisis and crisis situations, direct and indirect effects on the state of Israel may affect many aspects of her security. The direct effect may be the limitation of access to oil since Iran, which used to provide Israel with her oil, has taken a position against her, thereby denying her a cheap, secure and close source of energy. It may also augment the constraints on delivery or sales of oil to Israel by applying a sanction to organizations providing oil supply to Israel. Thereon rises the question regarding the United States' commitment to provide

oil to this state according to the clauses of the Camp David Agreement. Is it possible to carry out this pledge despite a potential Islamic coalition? It seems that the clause was included in the blissful belief in conjunctural optimism that may not withstand the mid-term ups and downs. A new '73 boycott on an Islamic scale and spirit may lead to serious fissures in western alliances since western Europe and Japan cannot take the risk of jeopardizing their economies as long as their vital interests are not threatened.

The peaceful options open to the United States, either developing alternate sources of energy, waging a conservation campaign, increasing domestic production, or storing oil in reserve, look suitable to face the sole domestic problems in the long term. Also, diversifying foreign suppliers and reproposing a new "International Energy Agency" are still unproved theory. Otherwise, the military options calling for an improvement of contingency capabilities in projecting forces into oil field regions is so jeopardizing for world peace in normal strategic conjuncture, that such an option may not be considered as long as the real security of the United States is not exposed to risk.

Another means of pressure is available to western countries, and especially the United States--the food weapon. Although the western public opinion does not favor such a response, it is probable that its use would be considered in

high intensity confrontation. In fact, Islamic countries, in general, are not in good agricultural posture to face such an eventuality. Nevertheless, the fact that they hold important financial assets may neutralize the effect of the food weapon or threat. The eventuality of forsaking the dollar in the oil market may be considered although the resulting inflation may also affect the oil producers themselves.

Therefore, the use of oil by Islamic opponents of Israel may inflict upon the latter a serious shortage of energy and may place her suppliers in such a critical situation that their own vital economical interest may be exposed to risk. In such a situation, support for Israel may well weaken dramatically.

C. The Financial Assets

The use of financial assets by Islamic countries may be considered to deny the use of food as a countermeasure to the oil weapon. It may also provide opponents of Israel with adequate means to meet the financial requirements of a broad anti-Zionist campaign. The financial assets, mainly coming from oil sales, may be considerably augmented in a relatively short time by the collection of Zakat (almsgiving) and occasional or periodic people contribution.

The Islamic countries with huge monetary holdings in western countries could upset the entire international monetary system if the funds were to be withdrawn from western

banks or from a given country. It is likely that such a decision would be opposed by a freezing of assets. But the recourse to the International Court of Justice and the risk of losing banking credibility could prevent western countries from taking such a step. Even in the event of such a freezing, the western assets in the interested countries may face a nationalization causing conflict between the political administration and the affected interest groups. Besides, the flow of funds will head toward other countries. In addition, Islamic producers of oil may consider selling their product for other currency than the U.S. dollar. The inflation that may result looks disastrous, especially for the American economy already strained by inflationary pressure.

If another western currency were selected by Islamic oil producers, the western alliances may face another risk of fissure; thus the possibility of the use of Islamic funds may deter other powers from using the food weapon and may interfere with the excessive economic assistance granted to the state of Israel.

Another way to use Islamic financial assets would be to provide adequate support to countries and organizations directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Countries undergoing economic strain, because of their exhausting defense expenditures or lacking funds to diversify sources of arms supply and acquire modern technology, may

be granted sufficient funds to meet the requirements of potential hostilities. These funds may also be used to balance eventual deficits in countries encouraged to drop their economic interests linked to Israel and also to relieve those undergoing economic pressure because of their solidarity.

The financial endeavor may also be extended to the participation of other Islamic countries by dedicating Zakat or a portion of it in support of the overall action against the state of Israel in a Jihad perspective.¹⁵ Moreover, people may participate in occasional or periodic fund raising; they may attain impressive figures due to the number of Muslims throughout the world.

Therefore, financial assets available to Islamic countries committed to wage Jihad against the state of Israel seem to be adequate to support an eventual use of the oil weapon, to deter the use of food weapon, to provide funds for a better military posture and to sustain a larger economic isolation of the state of Israel. The use of oil and financial assets may be strengthened by other economic components of second importance that may effectively be used in conjunction with oil and funds.

D. The Trade

A common Islamic action, directed on trade and related business, may support the overall attempt to economically isolate Israel, weaken her internal economy, and

reduce the Jewish emigration to this state. The geographical element of power of the Islamic countries would be the major support for such an intention. Indeed, a huge size and a particularly important location, astride Africa Asia and Europe, made the Islamic countries a traditional cross-roads for international trade. The development of modern means of transportation increased their importance since waterways, maritime, and aerial facilities existing in Islamic countries are today needed for international trade. Also, the demography, when associated with the developing type economy predisposes conditions in these countries to be a favorable market for industrialized states. Trade increases in importance because of the relatively convenient conditions ruling the export of raw materials to industrialized countries.

The Islamic trade endeavor may limit trade organizations to the choice of only one regional partner: the Islamic countries or Israel. Implementing such a policy may be primarily carried on by Arab countries and Islamic type states. The remaining Islamic countries are expected to join this endeavor when no serious risk is anticipated, yet they may participate within acceptable risks in a show of solidarity in crisis periods.¹⁸

The most likely way to use trade as a means of economic pressure would be to organize a systematic boycott of all organizations and companies providing Israel with

whatever means to strengthen its political, economic and military postures. This option is being implemented by some Arab countries and is causing severe restrictions on trade with Israel.

In the Islamic dimension and spirit, such a boycott would deter trade organizations from cooperating with Israel because they may no longer compete for the Islamic market. The boycott may as well be directed against recipients of Israel products to unbalance the latter's economy. Thereafter, Jewish emigration to Israel may be considerably reduced because of the resulting scarcity of livelihood.

Israel's economy has already been damaged by the break with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, a senior governmental source (in the state of Israel) said:

Some of the exports cut off cannot be diverted. This is the greatest economic catastrophe of the last few years. Enterprises are expected to collapse. We cannot yet estimate the level of the damage and it will take some time before the situation is clarified.¹⁶

This critical status may be further damaged by the extension of these actions to the tourism which benefits the economy and the propaganda of the state of Israel. This can be achieved by refusing visas to all persons who visited the state of Israel. Many Arab countries are now implementing this measure. Another factor affecting trade, and likely to be used by Islamic countries, especially during crisis periods, is labor union members refusing to handle and

service any shipment that may have direct or indirect positive impact on Israel's posture.

Thus, through different aspects of the trade and by properly using the geographical element of power, Islamic countries may upset Israeli trade leading to more dependence on other powers, therefore placing Israel in an influential posture, vulnerable to pressure, and compelled to concessions. Hence, summing up the economic effects that may result from a joint Islamic action against Israel, it is likely that:

- A new and serious energy crisis may be initiated in case of failure of other means of pressure on oil consumers.
- Conflicting interests between the state of Israel and her traditional supporters and suppliers may rise.
- Monetary system may upset in case of use of food weapon.
- More funds will be available to Islamic belligerent countries and organizations to wage political and military endeavors.
- Unless a United States reassessment of their commitment to the state of Israel versus the allied's interest in the area occurs, fissures in western alliances seem unavoidable.
- An economical isolation of the state of Israel will weaken her own economy and compel her to political concessions.

III. Military Effects

If Islamic political action and economic pressure cannot bring a solution to the Palestinian problem, it seems unavoidable that a military action would be considered. Such an action, if planned and prepared during the process of peaceful approach, will attempt to restore the Palestinians in their homeland, hence excluding the political authority of Israel on this land. As for the strategic military effects of an Islamic endeavor, it is likely that the resulting unbalance of the regional military power will place Israel in an unfavorable combat ratio in a time of actual hostilities. Indeed, an Islamic military coalition augmenting the Arab forces by those of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, may favor the Islamic side with large size forces, a huge arsenal, diversified combat experience, significant projectable units, along with a positive geographical condition affecting the prevailing regional strategic concepts as well as the possibility of an outside power's direct or indirect involvement in hostilities. The assessment of the military effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict will be made conspicuous when related to the anticipated new strategic conditions, the non-crisis situation, and the hostilities context.

A. Anticipated Environment

The geopolitical credit enjoyed by Islamic countries expected to participate in a belligerency against

Israel, affects regional and global strategic considerations. Indeed, valuable geographical features give a chance to these countries to take considerable advantage from the great powers rivalry. In addition to an impressive size and an exceptional location, the land of the considered Islamic block controls the following choke points: Straits of Gibraltar, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Bab El Mandab, Hormuz, and the Suez Canal. The seaways going through these choke points are of vital importance for the United States, Western Europe, Japan and Soviet Union. The United States is concerned by the flow of energy and the rapid deployment of naval forces between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. For the Soviet Union, it is an important junction with the horn of Africa and a valuable alternative to the vulnerable trans-Siberian strategic artery. For similar reasons, the Islamic airspace is of similar importance and may be denied to non-authorized aircraft.

As for the strategic value of the land, it is for the west a necessary complement to secure the south of the European front, a necessary link for the early warning chain, and an obstacle denying the Mediterranean warm waters to the Soviet Union. For these very considerations, it is in the best interests of the Soviet Union to gain the friendship or at least the neutrality of these countries.

On the regional scale, the geographic element gives the opponents of Israel an important strategic depth beyond

the current capabilities of Israeli forces. This new geographical dimension may make meaningless the concepts of resorting to pre-emptive attacks, opting for "blitzkrieg," occupying buffer zones, and gaining secured borders. Indeed, in the Islamic context, threatening Damascus, Amman or Beirut is no longer a decisive factor in the strategic sense. On the contrary, the spread of Israeli forces in these zones may weaken her entire defensive array by dispersing her forces and enlarging the size of the hostile population. The blitzkrieg may no longer be imposed to the adversary because of the fresh capabilities located beyond the range of Israeli forces and that may be committed either in an attrition concept or in long war scheme to maintain the opposing forces in permanent mobilization, hence jeopardizing Israel's economy and exhausting the strategic supply depots.

In this new strategic frame, another important change may occur: an upset of the prevailing military balance as described by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States for fiscal year 1980:

Israel is currently capable of defeating on all fronts any likely combination of Arab countries in hostilities ranging from a war of attrition to a full scale Arab attack, and is expected to retain its military superiority.¹⁷

Nevertheless, with the anticipated participation of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the regional balance of power and other

components of military elements of power may be affected as follows:

- The state of Israel forces will be greatly outnumbered in personnel, equipment and weaponry.¹⁸
- Significant projection of power capabilities throughland, sea and air will be available to Islamic forces.
- Most of the western hardware used by Israel will be available to Islamic forces for testing and conceiving effective counter measures.
- Islamic forces mastery of both military doctrines: NATO and Warsaw Pact.
- Unless major contingency situations occur on their own borders, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran may have important units available for commitment.
- The strength factor when associated with the geographical advantage, may give the Islamic forces the capability of performing sustained active operations.
- The Islamic troops will fight with the Jihad spirit, enhancing their willingness and combativity.
- Islamic forces will dispose of significant intelligence resources: human, material and organizational.
- Spare parts and major end items may be provided by the important financial means and the diversity of sources of supply available to Islamic states.
- Relatively important naval forces in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean may impede any eventual support to Israel.

- Remote and secure logistical bases provided with multiple supply routes will be available for Islamic forces.

- The level of technology will be improved through exchange of scientific information and acquisition of costly means of research by Islamic states.

- A race between opponents to acquire or develop strategic nuclear capabilities.

- Development of Islamic military hardware industry to lessen dependence on traditional sources of supply.

- Competition between major military hardware producers to dispute the new Islamic market.

Along with these changes, it is likely that:

- The Peoples Republic of China will attempt to exploit the possible great power vacuum created by the United States' continuing support to Israel and the Soviet Union's continuing unwillingness to provide opponents of Israel with an overwhelming military power.

- The great powers' endeavor to obtain military bases in the region may force them to compromises favorable to Islamic forces.

- The observance of peace treaty clauses by Egypt may not be carried out in time of hostilities because of possible popular pressure calling for Islamic solidarity, whereas joining the belligerency may give Egypt the opportunity to reinstate the Arab and Islamic communities.

It is important to remark that these new conditions may not be achieved in the mid-term without a parallel and successful action on political and economical grounds. Then, the implications of these conditions may be deduced with respect to non-hostility and hostility situations.

B. Non-hostility Situation

The obvious concern during non-hostility period is the improvement of military posture in view of anticipated hostilities. For Islamic opponents of Israel, the matter is to work out the problems of cooperation, to improve technology, to modernize and enlarge military hardware and to improve the professional skills of the personnel.

Since the Islamic forces that may face Israel are trained and equipped in different ways, an effort to reduce or eliminate impediments for effective cooperation is very likely. The problems that may surface are common in nature to any military alliance in its beginnings. However, for the case of Islamic states, some factors may facilitate military cooperation:

- Many armed forces are trained and equipped in either NATO or Warsaw type perspective.
- Some forces have already been members of the same western type military alliance: Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
- Some forms of military cooperation have already begun between some others: Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Lybia, Alteria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Kuwait.

- Almost all Arab forces cooperated, yet in limited dimension, in effective hostilities against Israel, therein included the process of projecting forces.

- The geographical characteristics of Palestine are common to almost all the countries opposed to Israel.

- The English language can be easily used by almost all participants to facilitate cooperation at headquarters level and among air forces. Anyway, the NATO alliance proved that this level of communication is sufficient for cooperation.

The difference between military doctrines adopted by Islamic forces needs some time to be resolved, although an early outbreak of hostilities may not make these doctrinal problems a major obstacle to profitable cooperation. Was not the same true among allied forces against Germany in World War II?

Nevertheless, Islamic forces are expected, in the case of an alliance, to develop a common military doctrine and to standardize essential tactical procedures. This theoretical product will have to be embodied in training and implemented through exchange of advisory assistance and development of other forms of cooperation. Islamic forces are also expected to improve their capabilities by acquiring the weapons and equipment they need on a modern battlefield, which may be open to great powers direct or

indirect involvement. This goal may be reached through two possible ways:

- Using financial assets and political influence to equip Islamic forces with up-to-date weapons in adequate quantity to deny to Israel any superiority in this field. These arms deals may include large quantities of spare parts and end items to constitute necessary depots and insure freedom of action in initiating hostilities.

- Developing an Islamic military hardware industry by enlarging the existing Arab projects with those existing at local level in other Islamic countries. However, it seems ambitious to expect full production within the mid-term. Thus, the combination of arms deals and arms production looks the likely option for Islamic states.

To cope with the likely military capabilities of Israel in the mid-term, Islamic forces ought to consider the nuclear factor.

Israel is said to be in possession of some nuclear capabilities developed in collaboration with South Africa and perhaps India. This sign indicates the determination of Israel to impose her existence by achieving an overwhelming military power. The use of these nuclear means by Israel may not be subject to the same scrupulousness binding the nuclear powers because of her declared fear and concern for her existence.

The Islamic response to such a nuclear step would logically be to cope with the escalation. Islamic countries are expected to join their previous efforts at local scale with the financial support from wealthy Islamic countries. Such a cooperation is said to be organized between Pakistan and Lybia, and Iraq is expected to build her own bomb in the near future. The intellectual potential among Muslims, within Islamic countries and abroad, may contribute to this program when provided with proper technical means. Also, other needs in modern technology may be met to help Israel the myth or fact of technological superiority.

In a parallel way, Islamic countries may establish a collaboration in the field of intelligence and intelligence activity in preparation or in expectation of hostilities. The number of agencies and their connections, the diversity of techniques and experiences, the material and financial means that may be available to them may deny to Israel another factor of success.

In addition to these preparations, and consistently with them, a form of active hostility is expected to be maintained at low intensity level. The PLO, now enjoying political support as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinians, may receive the military assistance she needs to wage a guerilla type war in Palestine to disrupt the political unity of Israel, to affect the morale of her forces, to impede her economic development and to spread a

feeling of insecurity among her population. The Islamic military contribution in such case would be to provide military advisors, appropriate training, adapted weapons, adequate intelligence, secured bases and sufficient financial means to the PLO. Some forms of this assistance are already provided to the PLO by Iran, and Pakistani aid is expected to develop.

Thus, during non-hostility situations, the military effect of an Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict may be summarized as follows:

- Enhancement of Islamic military cooperation through adjustment of military doctrine and training.
- Acquisition and production of modern weapons and equipment.
- Development of nuclear capability.
- Cooperation in the field of intelligence.
- Support of low-intensity conflict in Palestine.

C. Hostility Situation

Hostilities in the Arab-Israeli conflict used to break out after a rapid political escalation or by total surprise. In both cases, hostilities used to start with massive use of lethal means denoting studious preparation and excessive emotion. The future hostilities, in case of an Islamization, are expected to include more military power and to be waged with more ongoing emotion. However, some

of the previous features may no longer be found in the context of these potential hostilities:

- The principle of pre-emptive cutback, used by Israel as the best way to insure an effective defense and conceived to neutralize and destroy the opponent's attacking capabilities, may no longer be a valid method in the Islamic geographical context. Indeed, Israeli forces do not have the means to launch simultaneous pre-emptive attacks in many directions and in important depth. Such an attempt against potential attacking forces may cause Israeli forces important losses that may weaken her own defense. The conditions of Pearl Harbor and of 6 June '67 attacks may not be regarded as situations of frequent recurrence. Besides, the pre-emptive attacks present the risk to lose public opinion support and provoke among non-committed Muslims a movement of solidarity that may be prejudicial to Israel.

- The concept of "blitzkrieg" that Israeli forces used to impose during previous hostilities to limit the duration of mobilization, may not be successfully applied in a conflict with Islamic countries. Indeed, such wars used to be effective against an opponent presenting critical deficiencies in one of its tactical dimensions or if its strategic zones may be found within the proved capabilities of the attacker. The reasons developed earlier, and refuting pre-emptive attacks principle, may also be used to discredit further implementation of blitzkrieg concept.

However, this does not imply that Israel would give up this concept because the other alternative remains costly for her economy and wearing out for her military forces.

- The recourse to chemical warfare or nuclear means may become the only alternative to Israel if her traditional concepts of war may no longer be applied, or if she will be compelled to wage a long war against overwhelming classical forces. However, this option may be forsaken if opposing forces may oppose similar means. Indeed, if such nuclear weapons will be used, losses for Israel may not be acceptable to a state worrying about its own existence.

- The alledged aerial superiority enjoyed by Israeli air forces over some Arab opponents and considered for a long time as the Israeli arm of decision on the battlefield, can no longer claim such superiority when faced by other Islamic states' air forces equipped with similar aircraft and manned with similarly qualified personnel. Moreover, the opponents of Israel will have, for the first time, offensive type aircraft in large number that may threaten strategic targets in Palestine or at least provide front countries with an adequate aerial umbrella. This fact may deny to Israel her favorite tactical and psychological means to influence the fate of the war.

- In electronic warfare, Islamic cooperation may place Israeli forces in an uncomfortable situation. This is due to the fact that Islamic forces are provided with

sophisticated means and techniques of electronic warfare as used by NATO alliance and Warsaw Pact countries. This element bears capital importance since some of the Islamic forces will master the type of electronic warfare being used by Israeli forces. A like military intelligence may be considerably enhanced by Islamic cooperation and electronic warfare improvement.

- The Islamic forces may have available for them several units in reserve that may impose a convenient rhythm of the hostilities without recouring to costly mobilization.

- Strategic supplies to Israeli forces may be considerably impeded by overflight restrictions in all Islamic countries and the countries they may influence. Naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean may interfere with strategic shipments to Israel,²⁰ leaving her forces with limited strategic supply. Islamic belligerents may have available adequate and renewable logistical support.

- The quality of Muslim soldiers will be enhanced by Jihad motivation, making the morale of fighters a valuable combat multiplier. This kind of motivation seemed to be totally absent in 1967 while in 1973, the assault order was "God is the greatest" which galvanized the fighters and provided them with remarkable moral and physical courage.

The fight, in the anticipated Islamic frame, will be characterized by an overwhelming momentum due on one hand to

the Jihad spirit and also to professional competition among Muslims; on the other hand, it is due to Israeli determination to defend her existence, whatever may be the price. Thus, the lethality of such a battlefield may increase by the emotional factor which multiplies the effects of the existing lethal weapons and of those already ordered. Therefore, the military effects of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be an unbalance of the combat ratio in favor of the opponents of Israel by enlarging the size of units, improving their quality and their equipment, impeding substantial external supply and impelling Israeli forces to fight in unfavorable strategic and tactical conditions.

To sum and synthesize the strategic effects resulting from the interaction of geographical, economic and military elements of power that the Arab states, when augmented by Iran, Pakistan and other Islamic Conference Organization members for limited forms of auxiliary support, it very likely that:

- The state of Israel will undergo political and economic isolation as a result of:

- Broad diplomatic and informative actions initiated to refute the legality and legitimacy of Israel as a member of the United Nations and to deny to her moral support by denouncing the Zionism racist behavior in Palestine and its close ties with the apartheid regime of South Africa.

- Use of oil, funds and trade to reach an acceptable settlement of the Palestinian problem.

- The western alliance may risk more fissures by the rise of conflicting interests and dissimilar policies toward the Middle East issue.

- Great powers may reconsider their Middle Eastern strategic interests to deny possible prejudices to their global interests.

- Israel will become more vulnerable because of the upset of the military balance of power and the uncertainty in relying on outside military support.

- The nuclear means will be acquired by both belligerents primarily as a means of deterrence and ultimately as a decisive weapon.

- The expected momentum of the Camp David Peace Treaty may vanish because of its incompatibility with an Islamic conception of the issue and because of the growing local discredit on Egyptian leadership.

These effects may vary in intensity in crisis situation entailing emotional options and behavior; they may also vary in scope depending on the chance of success of Islamic revival in Egypt and Turkey.

APPENDIX I

STATE OF ISRAEL

Population: 3,820,000.

Military service: men 36 months, women 24 months (Jews and Druses only; Muslims and Christians may volunteer).

Annual training for reservists thereafter up to age 54 for men, up to 25 for women.

Total armed forces: 165,600 (125,300 conscripts) mobilization to 400,000 in about 24 hours.

Estimated GNP 1978: \$10.5 bn.

Defence expenditure 1979-80: £I 34.5 bn (\$1.62 bn)

\$1 = £I 21.25 (1979), £I 16.44 (1978).

Army: 138,000 (120,000 conscripts, male and female),
375,000 on mobilization.

24 armd bdes.*

9 mech bdes.*

9 inf bdes.*

5 para bdes.*

9 arty bdes.*

3,050 med tks, incl 1,000 Centurion, 650 M-48, 810 M-60, 400 T-54/-55, 150 T-62, 40 Merkava; 65 PT-76 lt tks, about 4,000 AFV, incl AML-60, 15 AML-90 armd cars; RBY Ramta, BRDM recce vehs; M-2/-3/-113, BTR-40/-50P(OT-62)/-60P7-152 APC; 500 105mm how; 450 122mm, 130mm and 155mm guns/how: 120 M-109 155mm, L-33 155mm, 60 M-107 175mm, 48 M-110 203mm SP guns/how; 900 81mm, 120mm and 160mm mor (some SP); 122mm, 135mm, 240mm RL; Lance, Ze'ev (Wolf) SSM; 106mm RCL; TOW, Cobra, Dragon, SS-11, Sagger ATGW; about 900 Vulcan/Chaparral 20mm msl/gun systems, 30mm and 40mm AA guns; Redeye SAM.

(On order: 325 M-60 med tks, 800 M-113 APC, 175mm guns, Lance SSM, TOW ATGW.)

Navy: 6,600 (3,300 conscripts) 10,000 on mobilization.

3 Type 206 submarines.

19 FAC(M) (7 Reshef with Gabriel and Harpoon SSM, 12 Saar with Gabriel SSM).

35 Dabur <coastal patrol craft.

3 ex-US LSM, 6 LCT.

3 Westwind 1124N MR ac.

Naval cdo: 300.

*11 bdes (5 armd, 4 inf, 2 para) normally kept near full strength; 6 (1 armd, 4 mech, 1 para) between 50% and full strength; the rest at cadre strength.

(On order: 5 Reshef FAC(M), 2 Qu-9-35 corvettes, 2 Flagstaff II hydrofoils with Harpoon SSM, 3 Westwind MR ac.)

Bases: Haifa, Ashdod, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Eilat.

Air Force: 21,000 (2,000 conscripts, AD only), 27,000 on mobilization; 576 combat aircraft.

12 FGA/interceptor sqns: 1 with 48 F/TF-15, 5 with 170 F-4E, 3 with 30 Mirage IIICJ/BJ, 3 with 60 Kfir-C2.

6 FGA sqns with 250 A-4E/H/M/N Skyhawk.

1 recce sqn with 12 RF-4E, 2 OV-1E, 4 E-2C AEW.

Tpts incl 10 Boeing 707, 24 C-130E/H, 12 C-97, 10 C-47, 20 Noratlas, 2 KC-130H tankers, 14 Arava, 12 Islander.

Liaison: 23 Do-27, 15 Do-28D, 5 Cessna U206, 3 Westwind.

Trainers incl 24 TA-4H, 50 Kfir, 70 Magister, 16 Queen Air, 30 Super Cub.

Hel incl 8 Super Frelon, 17 CH-53G, 12 CH-47C, 12 S-61R, 6 AH-1G, 23 Bell 205A, 20 Bell 206, 12 Bell 212, 25 UH-1D, 19 Alouette II/III.

Sidewinder, AIM-7E/F Sparrow, Shafrir AAM; Luz, Maverick, Shrike, Walleye, Bullpup ASM.

15 SAM btys with Improved HAWK.

(On order: 75 F-16 fighters, 30 Hughes 500 hel gunships.)

RESERVES (all services): 460,000.

Para-Military Forces: 4,500 Border Guards and 5,000 Nahal Militia.

APPENDIX II

EGYPT

Population: 40,460,000.
Military service: 3 years.
Total armed forces: 395,000
Estimated GNP 1977: \$18.1 bn.
Defence expenditure 1979-80: £E 1.5 bn (\$2.17 bn).
\$1 = £E 0.692 (1979), £E 0.394 (1977).

Army: 350,000, incl Air Defence Command.
2 armd divs (each with 1 armd, 2 mech bdes).
3 mech inf divs.
5 inf divs (each with 2 inf bdes).
2 Republican Guard Brigades (div).
3 indep armd bdes.
8 indep inf bdes.
2 airmobile bdes.
1 para bde.
6 cdo gps.
6 arty, 2 hy mor bdes.
2 ATGW bdes.
2 SSM regts (up to 24 Scud).
850 T-54/-55, 750 T-62 med, 80 PT-76 lt tks: 300 BRDM-1/-2
scout cars, 200 BMP-76PB MICV, 2,500 OT-62/-64, BTR-40/
-50/-60/-152, Walid APC; 1,300 76mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm,
152mm and 180mm guns/how; about 200 SU-100 and ISU-152 SP
guns; 300 120mm, 160mm, 240mm mor; 300 122mm, 132mm,
140mm, 240mm RL; 30 FROG-4/-7, 24 Scud B, Samlet SSM; 900
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATK guns; 900 82mm, 107mm RCL; 1,000
Sagger, Snapper, Swatter, Milan, Beeswing ATGW; 350
ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns; 20 Crotale, SA-7/-9 SAM.*
(On order: Swingfire ATGW.)

DEPLOYMENT: Oman: 200. Sudan: 2 armd, 3 inf bdes (50,000).

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND (78,000): 360 SA-2, 200 SA-3, 75 SA-6
SAM; 2,500 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm
AA guns; missile radars incl Fan Song, Low Blow, Flat Face,
Straight Flush and Long Track; gun radars Fire Can, Fire
Wheel and Whiff; EW radars Knife Rest and Spoon Rest.

RESERVES: about 500,000.

*There is a shortage of spares for Soviet equipment and many
ac are grounded.

Navy: 20,000
 12 ex-Sov submarines (6 W-, 6 R-class).
 5 destroyers (4 ex-Sov Skory, 1 ex-Br Z-class).
 3 ex-Br frigates (1 Black Swan, 1 Hunt, 1 River sub spt ship).
 12 ex-Sov SOL large patrol craft.
 16 FAC(M); 10 ex-Sov with Styx SSM (6 Osa-I, 4 Komar),
 6 October 6 with Otomat SSM.
 26 ex-Sov FAC(T) (2 Shersten, 20 P-6<, 4<P-4).
 4 ex-Sov Shersten FAC(G).
 10 ex-Sov ocean (6 T-43, 4 Yurka), 4 inshore (2 T-301, 2 K-8)
 minesweepers.
 3 SRN-6 hovercraft.
 4 ex-Sov LCT (3 Polnocny, 1 MP4).
 14 ex-Sov LCU (10 Vydra, 4 SMB1).
 6 Sea King ASW hel.
 (On order: 6 Vosper Ramadan FAC(M), 3 SRN-6 hovercraft,
 Ctomat SSM.)

Bases: Alexandria, Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Port Suez,
 Hurghada, Safaqa.

RESERVES: about 15,000.

Air Force: 25,000; about 563 combat aircraft.*
 1 bbr regt with 23 Tu-16 (some with AS-5 ASM).
 4 FB regts: 2 with 100 MiG-21/PFM/F, 1 with 90, MiG-17F, 1
 with 46 Mirage IIIIE/DE.
 4 FGA/strike regts: 3 with 120 Su-7BMK, 1 with 46 Su-20.
 3 interceptor regts with 108 MiG-21MF/U, 1 sqn with 24 MiG-
 23S, 6 MiG-23U.
 2 EC-130H, Il-14, ELINT ac.
 Tpts incl 5 C-130, 26 Il-14, 16 An-12, 1 Falcon, 1 Boeing
 707, 1 Boeing 737.
 Hel incl 20 Mi-4, 32 Mi-6, 55 Mi-8, 28 Commando, 6 Sea King,
 54 Gazelle.
 Trainers incl 50 MiG-15UTI, 100 L-29, 40 Gomhouria.
 AA-2 Atoll, R.530 AAM, AS-1 Kennel, AS-5 Kelt ASM.
 (On order: 42 F-5E, 8 F-5F, 35 F-4E, 14 Mirage, 5, 60 MiG-19/
 F-6 fighters, 164 Alpha Jet trainers, 12 C-130H tpts, 50
Lynx, 20 Gazelle hel, Sidewinder AAM.)

Para-Military Forces: about 50,000; National Guard 6,000,
 Frontier Corps 6,000, Defence and Security 30,000, Coast
 Guard 7,000.

*There is a shortage of spares for Soviet equipment and many
 ac are grounded.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1979-1980, London: Bartholomeu Press, 1979.

APPENDIX III

IRAN

Population: 39,330,000.
Military service: 1 year.
Total armed forces: 415,000.*
Estimated GNP 1977: \$75.1 bn.
Defence expenditure 1978-79: 700.4 bn rials (\$9.94 bn).
\$1 = 70.45 rials (1978), 71.2 rials (1977).

Army: 285,000.
3 armd divs.
3 inf divs.
4 indep bdes (1 armd, 1 inf, 1 AB, 1 special force).
4 SAM bns with HAWK.
Army Aviation Command.
875 Chieftain, 400 M-47/-48, 460 M-60A1 med, 250 Scorpion
lt tks; BMP MICV, about 325 M-113, 500 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152
APC; 710 guns/how, incl 75mm pack, 330 M-101 105mm, 130mm,
112 M-114 155mm, 14 M-115 203mm towed, 440 M-109 155mm,
38 M-107 175mm, 14 M-110 203mm SP; 72 BM-21 122mm RL;
106mm RCL; ENTAC, SS-11, SS-12, Dragon, TOW ATGW; 1,800
23mm, 35mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm towed, 100 ZSU-23-4/57-2 SP
AA guns; HAWK SAM.
Ac incl 40 Cessna 185, 6 Cessna 310, 10 Cessna O-2A, 2 F-27,
5 Shrike Commander, 2 Falcon.
205 AH-1J, 285 Bell 214 A, 50 AB-205A, 20 AB-206, 90 Ch-47C
hel.

RESERVES: 300,000.

Navy: 30,000.
1 ex-US Tang submarine.
3 destroyers with Standard SSM (1 ex-Br Battle with Seacat
SAM, 2 ex-US Sumner with 1 hel).
4 Saam frigates with Seakiller SSM and Seacat SAM.
4 ex-US PF103 corvettes.
7 large patrol craft (3 Improved PGM-71, 4 Cape).
6 Kaman FAC(M) with Harpoon SSM.
3 ex-US coastal, 2 Cape inshore minesweepers.
2 landing ships logistic, 1 ex-US LCU.
1 replenishment, 2 fleet supply ships.
8 SRN-6 and 6 BH-7 hovercraft.
(On order: 1 Tang sub, 6 FAC(M) with Harpoon SSM, 2 log spt
ships.)

*60% of army reported to have deserted. Details listed relate to pre-revolution situation. Serviceability of equipment, particularly ships and ac, is doubtful.

Bases: Bandar Abbas, Booshehr, Kharg Island, Korramshar, Chah Bahar, Bandar Pahlavi.

NAVAL AIR:

1 MR sqn with 6 P-3F Orion.
 1 assault sqn with 6 S-65A.
 1 ASW sqn with 20 SH-3D.
 1 MCM sqn with 6 RH-53D.
 1 tpt sqns with 6 Shrike Commander, 4 F-27, 1 Mystere 20.
 Hel incl 4 AB-205A, 14 AB-206, 6 AB-212.
 3 Marine bns.
 (On order: 3 P-3C MR ac, 17 SH-3D hel.)

Air Force: 100,000; 447 combat ac.
 10 strike/FGA sqns with 190 F-4D/E.
 8 FGA sqns with 166 F-5E/F.
 4 interceptor/FGA sqns with 77 F-14A.
 1 recce sqn with 14 RF-4E.
 2 tanker/tpt sqns with 13 Boeing 707, 9 Boeing 747.
 4 tpt sqns with 54 C-130E/H.
 1 tpt sqn with 18 F-27, 3 Aero Commander 690, 4 Falcon 20.
 Hel: 10 HH-34F, 10 AB-206A, 5 AB-212, 39 Bell 214C, 2
 CH-47C, 16 Super Frelon, 2 S-61A-4.
 Trainers incl 45 F33A/C Bonanza, 9 T-33.
Phoenix, Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM, AS.12, Maverick, Condor
 ASM.
 5 SAM sqns with Rapier, 25 Tigercat.

Para-Military Forces: 74,000 Gendarmerie with Cessna 185/310
 lt ac, 32 AB-205/-206 hel, 32 patrol boats.

APPENDIX IV

PAKISTAN

Population: 80,170,000.
Military service: voluntary.
Total armed forces: 429,000.
Estimated GNP 1978: \$18.5 bn.
Defence expenditure 1978-79: 10.24 bn rupees (\$1.05 bn).
\$1 = 9.75 rupees (1978).

Army: 400,000 (incl 29,000 Azad Kashmir troops).
2 armd divs.
16 inf divs.
3 indep armd bdes.
3 indep inf bdes.
6 arty bdes.
2 AD bdes.
5 army aviation sqns.
M-4, 250 M-47/-48, 50 T-54/-55, 700 T-59 med, 15 PT-76, T-60,
50 M-24 lt tks; 550 M-113 APC; about 1,000 75mm pack, 25-
pdr, 100mm, 105mm, 130mm and 155mm guns/how; 12 M-7 105mm
SP guns; 270 107mm, 120mm mor; 57mm towed, 8 M-36 90mm SP
ATK guns; 75mm, 106mm RCL; Cobra ATGW; ZU-23, 30mm, 37mm,
60 40mm, 57mm, 15 90mm, 3.7-in AA guns; 9 Crotale SAM;
40 O-1E, 30 Saab Supporter lt ac; 12 Mi-8, 35 Puma, 20
Alouette III, 12 UH-1, 15 Bell 47G hel.
(On order: TAM med tks; M-113 APC; TOW ATGW.)

RESERVES: 500,000.

Navy: 12,000
6 submarines (4 Daphne, 2 Agosta).
5 SM-404 midget submarines.
1 ex-Br Dido cruiser (cadet trg ship).
6 destroyers: 2 ex-US Gearing, 4 ex-Br (1 Battle, 1 Ch, 2
CR).
1 ex-Br Type 16 frigate.
3 large patrol craft (2 ex-Ch Hai Nan, 1 Town).
12 ex-Ch Hu Chwan hydrofoil FAC(T)<.
7 ex-US MSC coastal minesweepers.
1 ASW/MR sqn with 3 Atlantic, 2 HU-16B.
3 Alouette III, 6 Sea King ASW/SAR hel.
AM-39 ASM.
(On order: 40 ASROC ASW msls, 40 Mk 46 torpedoes.)

Base: Karachi.

RESERVES: 5,000.

Air Force: 17,000, 256 combat aircraft.
 1 lt bbr sqn with 11 B-57B (Canberra).
 12 FGA sqns: 4 with 17 Mirage IIIEP, 38 Mirage 5PA/DP, 5
 with 140 MiG-19/F-6, 3 with 40 Sabre 6/F-86F.
 1 recce sqn with 10 Mirage IIIRP.
 2 tpt sqns with 14 C-130B/E, 1 L-100, 1 Falcon 20, 1 F-27,
 1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza.
 Hel: 10 HH-34B, 4 Super Frelon, 14 Alouette III, 1 Puma,
 12 Bell 47G.
 Trainers incl 5 MiG-15UTI, 24 MiG-17 (F-4), 5 Mirage IIIDP,
 23 Saab Supporter, 20 T-33A, 50 T-37C.
Sidewinder, R.530, R.550 Magic AAM.
 (On order: 32 Mirage 5 FGA; 25 Supporter trg ac.)

RESERVES: 8,000

Para-Military Forces: 109,100: 22,000 National Guard, 65,000
Frontier Corps, 15,000 Pakistan Rangers, 2,000 Coastguard,
5,100 Frontier Constabulary.

APPENDIX V

TURKEY

Population: 44,400,000.
Military service: 20 months.
Total armed forces: 566,000 (271,000 conscripts).
Estimated GNP 1978: \$45.3 bn.
Defence expenditure 1979-80: 64.8 bn liras (\$2.59 bn).
\$1 = 25 liras (1979), 25 liras (1978).

Army: 470,000 (210,000 conscripts).*

1 armd div.
2 mech inf divs.
14 inf divs.
5 armd bdes.
4 mech inf bdes.
5 inf bdes.
1 para bde, 1 cdo bde.
4 SSM bns with Honest John.
3,500 M-47 and M-48 med tks; 1,600 M-113, M-59 and Commando
APC; 1,500 75mm, 105mm, 155mm and 203mm how; 265 106mm,
109 155mm, 36 175mm SP guns; 1,750 60mm, 81mm, 4.2-in mor;
18 Honest John SSM; 1,200 57mm, 390 75mm, 800 106mm, RCL;
85 Cobra, SS-11, TOW ATGW; 900 40mm AA guns, 2 DHC-2, 18
U-17, 6 Cessna 206, 3 Cessna 421, 7 Do-27, 7 Do-28, 20
Beech Baron, 40 Champion Citabria 150S trg ac; 100 AB-205/
-206, 20 Bell 47G, 48 UH-1D hel.
(On order: 193 Leopard med tks, TOW, Milan ATGW.)

DEPLOYMENT: Cyprus: 2 inf divs (26,000).

RESERVES: 400,000.

Navy: 45,000 (31,000 conscripts).
13 submarines (3 Type 209, 10 ex-US Guppy).
12 ex-US destroyers (5 Gearing with ASROC, 5 Fletcher.
1 Sumner, 1 R H Smith).
2 Berk frigates with 1 hel.
11 FAC(M) (2 Lurssen with Harpoon SSM, 9 Yartal with Penguin
SSM).
8 FAC(T) (7 Jaguar, 1 Girne).
42 large patrol craft (incl 2 ex-US Asheville, 6 PC1638, 4
PGN71, 1 SAR33 type) some with Gendarmerie.
4 83-ft coastal patrol craft.

*About half the divs and bdes are below strength.

1 Nusret, 6 coastal minelayers.
 21 coastal (12 ex-US Adjutant, 4 ex-Can MCB, 5 ex-Ger Vege sack), 4 ex-US Cape inshore minesweepers.
 4 ex-US LST, 32 LCT, 16 LCU, 20 LCM.
 1 ex-Ger depot ship (trg).
 1 ASW sqn with 12 S-2E Tracker, 2 TS-2A.
 3 AB-204B, 6 AB-212 ASW hel.
 (On order: 1 Type 209 sub, 2 FAC(M), Harpcon SSM, 10 AB-212 ASW hel.)

Bases: Golcuk, Istanbul, Izmir, Eregli, Iskenderun.

RESERVES: 25,000

Air Force: 51,000 (30,000 conscripts); 303 combat aircraft.
 11 FGA sqns: 3 with 65 F-4E and 8 RF-4E, 3 with 60 F-5A/B, 3 with 50 F-100C/D/F, 2 with 30 F/TF-104G.
 3 interceptor sqns: 1 with 20 F-5A/B, 2 with 32 F-104S, 4 TF-104G.
 2 recce sqns with 30 RF-5A, 4 F-5B.
 5 tpt sqns with 7 C-130E, 20 Transall C-160, 30 C-47, 3 C-54, 3 Viscount 794, 2 Islander, 2 CASA C-212, 6 Do-28, 3 Cessna 421 ac; 5 UH-19, 6 HH-1H, 10 UH-1H hel.
 Trainers incl 40 T-33A, 30 T-37, 19 T-41, 50 F-100C/F. Sidewinder, Sparrow, Falcon AAM; AS.12, Bullpup, Maverick ASM.
 8 SAM sqns with 170 Nike HERCULES.
 (On order: 6 RF-4E, 30 T-38A trainers, Sidewinder Sparrow AAM).

Para-Military Forces: 120,000 Gendarmerie (incl 3 mobile bdes).

APPENDIX VI

On 21 July 1891 at the dedication of Zion Hall in Boston, Massachusetts, the B'nai Zion Educational Society displayed a flag based on the tallis or Jewish prayer shawl. It was white with blue stripes; in the center was the ancient Mogen David (Star of David, often erroneously called Shield of David).

In 1891, this flag was submitted at the World Zionist Organization Conference in Basel by the Boston delegate, Isaac Harris. Other Jews had conceived of similar designs. The flag quickly became accepted as the Zionist emblem, and in 1948 it was adopted by the state of Israel.

The state arms reflect other ancient Jewish symbols. The name of the state and the olive branches of prosperity frame a candelabra such as the Romans carried off in triumph after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. The continuation of the candelabra and branches is mentioned in Zechariah IV: 2-3 in the Bible.

Whitney, Smith, Flag Through the Ages and Across the World (Verona, Italy: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1975), p. 284.

CHAPTER 6

CRITICAL CHOICES

Since its inception, the Arab-Israeli conflict has attracted the notice of a variety of interest groups within the Middle East and abroad. Each group bore out specific interests and tried to achieve its goals through its peculiar policies. Thus, the conflict was driven from dilemma to dilemma by a deepseated antagonism between direct opponents and by a selfish approach of influential powers. The continuous tension characterizing the conflict was exploited by opponents and their partners to achieve specific objectives.

Israel used this tension to claim her need for better security and to justify territorial expansion toward defned-able borders. Some Arab governments¹ made it an opportunity to build military forces at the expense of other productive sectors and the United States and the Soviet Union took advantage of this situation to justify their military presence in the region consistently with the schema of their global strategy. Also, the ideologies found therein a propitious ground to extend the span of their influences over the Middle Eastern societies. Through the state of Israel, the West tried to valorize capitalism in a western type democracy while the East attempted to sell socialism as

the best way for the Arabs to recover their land through a process of socio-political changes. Nevertheless, all these modern suits did not fit such opponents used to their religious garbs.

In many cases, religion appeared to be a central issue for both sides, Jews and Muslims. For the former, the establishment of the state of Israel was embodied in their destiny as "chosen people" returning to the "Promised Land" while for the latter, that was an aggression against Islamic political authority over Muslim people in the Muslim Holy Land. Thereafter, a rational process was used to achieve emotional objectives dissipating possible hope for rapid and acceptable settlement. However, religious motivation and outlook were rarely expressed or espoused by officials of either side, yet they never disregarded them.

The fact remains that since the theoretical inception of the conflict at Basle, religious inspiration has been perceived in the major decisions and reactions of both sides. In the unpredictable Middle East, the recent sudden revolution in Iran loudly reinstated the religious factor in the Middle Eastern political scene. Islamic sponsorship of the Palestinian issue is openly claimed by Iran. However, an anti-Islamic bias given by Israeli officials contributed to revive religious litigations. The anticipated spread of Islamic revival in the mid-term, after the Iranian

pattern, makes the Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict very likely. However, Islamization does not necessarily mean a general Islamic endeavor committing full resources to solve the issue at the expense of local or national interests.

Islamization is better described as the commitment of some non-Arab Muslim countries to the issue along with modifying the Arab nationalist motivation by an Islamic one among Arab states. Before anticipating the possible effects of such an Islamization on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is necessary to appraise the possibility of its advent.

I. Likelihood of Islamization

The great political influence enjoyed by the Jewish religious parties over the Israeli government, the perceived threat to Islamic holy places in Palestine and in the "Promised Land", the well rooted animosity between Jews and Muslims, the suitability of Jihad to the situation and the availability of a political structure to organize some forms of solidarity, concur to make "Islamization" a likely step in the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Religious Path of Israeli Politics

Among the factors favorable and perhaps responsible for the possible Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the considerable weight enjoyed by religion in Israeli politics. The Muslims' perception of Israel as a vengeful

religious enemy attempting to recover an alledged national and spiritual home at the expense of the Muslim community, shrines, and land, lends support for describing Israel as a religious enemy.

By exploring the genesis of Israel and her current political dynamics, it appears that religious trends enjoy considerable authority over the political decision making process.² The key options of the Zionist Congress and later those of the Israeli Kneset and government used to bear a religious stamp, despite the official secular character of the state. Indeed, the disagreements between secular and religious groups, which remain a salient feature of the political life of the state of Israel, usually end in the secular groups' conceding important ground. The perception that only a coalition could preserve the political future of the Jews made the religious groups aware of their importance and gave them good opportunity to rally political support to achieve religious goals inherent in the Talmudic view of their state.

The success of the religious groups in the key issue of defining a Jew, by subjecting the Jewish ethnic affiliation to Halachic criterion in the amended Law of Return, witnesses of undesirable influence. This has been confirmed by their success in influencing the laws affecting marriage, education, diet and legal rest on Sabbath. However, the most important religious options of the state of Israel were

the transfer of the capital to Jerusalem followed by the burning of EL AQSA mosque and starting of archeological search for the temple of Solomon beneath the same mosque. This very religious behavior of the state of Israel when related to the Jewish claim over the whole "Promised Land" enables us to suppose that the geographical expansion of this state since 1948 fits in with the religious scheme relative to their geographical dream. It is in this perspective that more and more Muslims perceive the nature of the state of Israel and express their great concern about the future of their holy shrines and places in Palestine.

Islamic Solidarity With Respect
to the Issue

An Islamic assessment of the Zionist phenomenon in Palestine, based upon the state of Israel's political dynamics and behavior and referring to Islamic sources of law, leads to the conclusion that Jihad has to be waged against refractory Dhimmis denying political sovereignty to Muslims over their own land and threatening their shrines. The implementation of this conclusion is being claimed by some Islamic countries and organizations. However, it is generally accepted that such a design cannot be carried out without a credible Islamic solidarity.

The Pan-Islamic ideal of solidarity evolved from a hasty and utopic concept at the end of the 19th century to

an organized and feasible one at the time of its elaboration in 1969 within the Islamic Conference Organization as an immediate response to the burning of EL AQSA mosque in Jerusalem. The massive and spontaneous adherence to the organization after the incident was an expression of a deep concern of all Islamic countries for the Islamic values being exposed to risk in Palestine and a clear intent to liberate Jerusalem. However, contribution to an endeavor of solidarity does not entail an anticipation of political unity of Islamic countries in the mid-term or even the establishment of a pressure-proof political block. Nevertheless, it is expected that all members of the Islamic Conference Organization will contribute to settle the Palestinian problem in various degrees of commitment and in different fields according to the peculiar situation of each member.

Gaining popular support, overriding conflict with Islamic revival trends, and investing in a mutually responsible block are the rational motivations of some Islamic countries in sharing this endeavor. For some others, this solidarity stems from a perception of religious obligation to rescue threatened Islamic sacred symbols. The latter countries are those instituting Islam as political censor, either following a rise of Islamic consciousness or by virtue of traditionally established Islamic regimes. In addition to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are likely to bear

in the mid-term, a fast-standing Islamic attitude as a result of a religious development sponsored by the government or following a violent process very similar to the Iranian one. If such will be the case, these three non-Arab Muslim countries will dedicate part of their resources to the Palestinian issue. Then, the strategic factors determining the regional balance of power as well as the great powers strategic interests in the area may be greatly altered. The opponents of Israel would be greatly strengthened while her supporters would be placed in a very serious situation.

Considering that the political influence of religious authority in the political decision making arena of the state of Israel and their desire to extend Jewish political rule to the whole Promised Land; considering that the decision to maintain Jerusalem as capital of the state of Israel is irreversible and that the efforts to restore the Temple of Solomon, even at the expense of EL AQSA mosque will be pursued; considering that the Islamic values at stake have been an exceptional importance for all Muslims; considering that the sources of Islamic law lend support to apply Jihad to this situation; considering that the Islamic revival gave a political consciousness to Muslims; considering that the Islamic Conference Organization is primarily established to organize an Islamic solidarity to liberate Jerusalem; considering that Iran had already pledged herself

to the total support of the Palestinians; considering that Pakistan and Turkey are likely to stand on the side of the Palestinians, it appears that the Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the mid-term is a very likely advent.

II. Strategic Reverberations

The combined use of the geographical, political, economical and military elements of power available to the Islamic opponents of the state of Israel when enhanced by a religious motivation is likely to upset the prevailing power ratio in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

By isolating the state of Israel from her supporters and supplies and by reducing or eliminating divisions among the opponents of the state of Israel, the latter will lose the ideal conditions which enabled her to impose her existence through unceasing use of military means.

If an Islamic solidarity concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict can be managed by the Islamic Conference Organization to conceive, plan, coordinate, implement, control and evaluate the joined Islamic endeavor with respect to the possibilities and constraints of each member, the future of the conflict may not follow its usual path. Otherwise, since the strength of the state of Israel stems from the great forces' perception of the advantageous existence of this state in achieving their regional objectives, the effect of an Islamization will affect the direct adversaries as well as their supporters or manipulators.

At Great Powers Level

Isolating the state of Israel from her supporters and suppliers will be the principal effect of a joined Islamic effort waged abroad and especially in the West. The strategic competition of great powers for the Middle-East impels both rivals to adjust their policy to keep a credible political foothold in the area. Indeed, the geographical features and the economical resources of the Middle-East make the area of vital interest for these powers. It has been, so far, possible for influential powers to satisfy their strategic needs by turning to account the local rivalries, the political and economical strains of these countries as well as their political docility in acting within the desired scheme. However, the 1973 oil embargo, although extemporaneous and hastily managed, made the Arab decision makers and Arab public opinion aware of the effectiveness of a joined use of natural resources to achieve a common goal. That is why it is very likely that Islamic countries will use this pattern as key policy in opposing the state of Israel. Besides, the spirit of Islamization as well as the Judaistic geographical ambitions will preclude tangible political compromises and will compel great powers to the embarrassing choice of only one partner.

Although it seems that the Soviet Union has already made her choice, the ideological incompatibility with Islamic trends and the eventuality of a reconciliation

between the Islamic block and the West, may place the Soviet Union in a crucial situation. Is it precluded to foresee a change of partners in the conflict? The spectacular changes of great powers' roles in Sub-Saharan Africa, after the last Ethiopian turnover, allow one to consider the unthinkable.

For the western countries and especially the United States, the Islamization will impel them to answer some embarrassing questions: to what extent the "long standing commitment to the survival of the state of Israel" will prevail upon other national vital interests? Is this commitment the highest national interest? Is it acceptable to jeopardize its own national security for other considerations? Is it tolerable that another state, whatever she may be, continues to dictate through lobbying the political decision making arena, the national policy in an area of vital interest?

If the traditional answer will keep referring to the dynamics of a democratic system favorable to legal competition, the anti-Israeli Islamic block will be in favorable posture to gain the western support or at least its neutrality through the use of appropriate means to contest the state of Israel influence. Once the western position is perceived as objective or favorable by Islamic countries, it will be possible for the West to achieve its interests

in the Middle-East such as:

(a) continued access by the United States, Western Europe and Japan to the region's oil resources at reasonable prices; (b) continued use by the United States and its allies of the communications, land, sea and air power and transit facilities of the region; (c) maintenance and strengthening of economic ties with Middle-Eastern countries, and continual access to regional markets for U.S. trade and investment; (d) prevention of the establishment of an external power, in particular the Soviet Union, of a predominant political and military presence in the region.³

As for the options available to Islamic opponents of the state of Israel, to bring such political shift, they are:

- Provoking a world wide energy crisis by the use of Islamic oil. This may entail a risk for the western economic standing, the western strategic military posture, the stability of international monetary system and the western alliance political cohesion. The food weapon or the military response to this option is not likely to be used because of its negative outcome in the long run.

- Reducing the Jewish lobbying of the western political arenas by allocating adequate funds to wage a broad informative action and by collaborating with other influential interest groups sharing common grounds with Islamic countries.

- Discrediting the state of Israel in international organizations and impelling her to political and economical isolation like the one being inflicted to South-Africa, yet the latter is much more self sufficient and can withstand isolation to a greater degree than the former.

- Implementing a boycott policy on trade organizations supporting the state of Israel and devoting necessary funds to encourage such boycott.

- Refusing military facilities or collaboration with supporters and suppliers of the state of Israel. This may deny them valuable opportunities to maintain and improve a strategic presence in the area.

Hence, the Islamization will place great powers in uncomfortable situation where abstention or undecisiveness may be exploited by the rival power to fill the vacuum. The Soviet Union will face a dilemma: assisting Islamic countries to solve the issue means eliminating the reason for soliciting further Soviet assistance; refusing the required assistance is incurring the risk to be replaced by the United States in the area as what happened in Egypt in 1976 under similar conditions.

As for the United States, the global posture may not allow her to jeopardize her vital interests being at stake, because of an emotional inclination toward the state of Israel. The Taiwan precedent in the American foreign policy lets us expect similar options with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict in its Islamic dimension.

Otherwise, these constraints on the great powers' choices in the Middle East are expected to remain determinant in the mid-term because of:

- The need for oil as principal source of energy and essential material for other industries.

- The security and logistical considerations will require physical facilities in the region as long as revolutionary means of intelligence and transportation are not available to dispense with such facilities.

- The growing demography of Muslims, about 25% of world population by year 2000, is worthy of attention for powers needy of credible political allied and economical partner.

Subsequent to this impact on great powers, the Islamization will affect the strategic picture of the Middle-East itself.

At Regional Level

Is Islamization a strategic checkmate to the state of Israel? The geographical, demographical, political, economical, military and religious will elements of power available to an anti-Israeli player are as much winning pawns if properly arrayed.

Indeed, if at great powers' level, the Islamization can considerably reduce the political, economical and military support to the state of Israel, the latter will ultimately be raised to a serious dilemma, making important political concessions, leading to a Palestinian control of political authority is giving up the military Jewish dream of exclusive sovereignty on the "Promised Land;" returning to the use of all available military means, either conventional or nuclear, to maintain her existence at the expense

of Palestinian people is likely to be unsuccessful and perhaps prejudicial to her security.

The anticipated effects on great powers in the mid-term will entail the following:

- Uncertain western support to the state of Israel which may ultimately mean:

- High probability of expulsion of the state of Israel from the United Nations Organization and derived institutions.

- Limitation on economical and financial assistance that may lead to disastrous inflation and economic bankruptcy.

- Limitation on military assistance which will impel her to develop local hardware industry and nuclear capability causing more defense expenditure.

- Increasing great powers' rivalry in the region which may allow Islamic countries to have:

- Better conditions to use their geographical advantages and natural resources for political purposes.

- More changes to up-date their military hardware and acquire modern technology.

- Positive diplomatic environment to obtain more recognition for the P.L.O.

- Unbalance of the regional power ratio and extension of the size of the battlefield which will deny to the state of Israel ideal conditions to use her military forces.

Under such conditions, other political features may change:

- The P.L.O. will be dedicated to maintain a low intensity type conflict in Palestine and will give up violence on an international scale.
- The Jewish emigration to Palestine will considerably lessen because of the state of Israel's economical limitations.
- Once Sinai is recovered, Egypt will attempt to reinstate Islamic community by forsaking the endeavor to extend the Camp David treaty to other Arab countries.

Thus, in case of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the outcome of the Middle-Eastern game may show two big losers: the state of Israel and the Soviet Union. The former may lose her status as a state while the latter may not harvest the fruits of many decades of investment in the area. That is why these two potential losers may plan to interfere with such Islamization and with the spread of Islamic revival in general. Will it be a joined effort? It seems too hazardous for both of them vis-a-vis their partners as long as Islamization remains unembodied theory. However, in case of change of partners, the Soviet Union may keep Islamic forces on Soviet borders and increase the flow of emigrants to the state of Israel. Anyway, the positions of the state of Israeli officials toward Islamic revival in the area and the Soviet response to the Islamic revival in

Afghanistan, denote their negative appraisal of this politico-religious phenomenon.

III. The Religious Element of Power in Strategic Studies

From the analysis of the potential case of Islamization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it appears that the religious factor is still worthy of attention in strategic studies. It is, today, common among political thinkers to scornfully address the religious factor as an outfashioned turn of mind. However, it is curious to remark that the trends describing religion as "opium of people" are in fact preaching an ideology written in red books, sponsored by a clerical structure and claiming the holding of the ultimate truth.

It is also curious to find that religion is given a marginal importance in strategic assessment of national elements of power. Indeed, the only reference to religion is included in a sub-paragraph addressing the sociological factors affecting the national will element of power. It seems that this tendency stems from the contemporary (uneasiness) to consider the ties between religion and politics.

The influence of religion on individual behavior, social cohesiveness, moral values system and group attitude toward the dynamics of their environment, is worthy of consideration in assessing the sociological and psychological factors influencing the state's politics. However, it is obvious that criteria of assessment of the religious element

of power may not need the same emphasis for all kinds of belief. Otherwise, the impact of religion on human history testifies of the role held by the religious belief in orienting the political behavior of nations.

Religious Motivation and Politics

A look at the history of nations shows that marking events were usually provoked by religious motives and that the genuine faith gave the religious fighters the moral strength they need to carry out ambitious tasks despite risky conditions. Some striking examples in ancient and contemporary history illustrate this religious power:

- The Jew's resistance in conserving their belief despite Pharaoh's threats, their patience in undergoing the hazards of the exodus, their determination to withstand attractive forms of assimilation during the Diaspora, and their sustained efforts to gather in Palestine and wage therein violent forms of terrorism under British mandate, all these events show a determined behavior deriving from religious belief which remained through centuries the sole proved link between Jews of the world. Is it not striking to see them today in the United States calling themselves the American Jews and not the Jewish Americans?

- The rapid spread of Islam over continents showed how Jew tribes could overthrow strong empires when bound and galvanized by a strong religious belief. With the Jihad

spirit, many battles were won despite unfavorable tactical and geographical conditions.

- The religious motivation of the crusades was able to gather traditional enemy in a joined endeavor overseas and to establish in Palestine a Christian authority.

- The early American settlers left their original countries and accepted to face an unknown future and wage perilous adventures to conserve their belief and escape from religious intolerance.

- Today and in many locations of the world, religious variance or antagonism are the motive of furious and violent clashes and wars. The situation of Ireland, Lebanon, Biafra, Philippines, Thailand, Chad, Comeroan and Mali illustrate the political influence of religion on groups and states.

It seems that religious wars in the third world will become the distinguishing features of the struggles in this period. This is because such wars conceal all kinds of strife that do not reach the status of warfare. If religious wars were possible and expected in certain locations where no historical reasons for friction and repression do exist, the outbreak of such wars in locations where they were not expected signifies that there is an international disposition towards that trend.⁴

Even when religion is denied a political role and despite the attempts to name peoples' reaction with scientific labels, the residual religious consciousness may suddenly develop and bring religion to the foreground of the political scenery and rapidly raise up shows of solidarity among fellow believers abroad.

In analyzing the anatomy of Islamic revival, R. Hrair Dekmejian asserted that:

The third factor contributing to the crisis milieu of the Islamic countries is the persistence of military defeats. Implicit in their long quest for independence was the aspiration to acquire sufficient military potential to safeguard their vital territorial interests. However, this deeply felt aspiration to develop military prowess has not been realized. With the single exception of Algeria, no Islamic country acquired independence through a protracted struggle with a European imperial power. After the achievement of independence, a number of Islamic countries were repeatedly unsuccessful militarily against non-Islamic foes. The successive defeats of Pakistan by India are a case in point. Yet from the Pan-Islamic perspective, the Arab military failure to contain Israel was more significant in its general impact. The effects of the July 1967 War were particularly devastating due to the magnitude of the Arab defeat and the loss of Arab-Jerusalem, a factor which concerned the whole Islamic community. Aside from its human and economic costs, the defeats produced shock waves affecting both Arab and non-Arab Muslims in engendering feelings of fear, insecurity and inferiority. The manifest inability of the Arab states to remove the Israeli occupation of Arab territory sapped the legitimacy of Arab ruling states and their military regimes. Furthermore, the failure of non-Arab Islamic leaders to support the Arab cause diplomatically and militarily brought an outpouring of protest from the Islamic faithful in such important countries as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.⁵

Therefore, it is perhaps necessary and timely to give the religious element some importance in strategic studies to adequately and properly cover a powerful determinant of political behavior in some societies.

The Religious Element of Power

The assessment of the religious element of power as a part of the overall strategic assessment of a given country's power may be addressed as an independent criterion of analysis especially when dealing with non secular-type regimes or with deeply religious population governed by secular governments.

This element of power does not preclude the national will one, although both of them may share common factors depending on the type of regime or society being assessed.

A tentative approach to assess this element may be conducted according to the following suggested pattern:

- Type of religion: monotheistic, polytheistic, other ideology

Does it call for individual or collective worship?

Does it affect individual and collective behavior?

- Geographical distribution: Within the given state and abroad.

Is there a geographical continuity? Status in neighboring countries?

- Demographical features: Size of fellows, growth rate, movement of conversion, predominant ethnic group, status of religious minorities, relationship between sects.

- Religious requirements: What are those affecting social and political life?

Is the religious observance measurable? What is the motivation system? Are there requirements compatible with development?

- Structuration: Is there a clerical system? Influence of clergy on masses and on governments? Does the clergy manage important financial assets?

- Scope of influence: On behaviors: passivity, tolerance, xenophobia,

- On civilian status: marriage, divorce, inheritance,

- On education,

- On political dynamics.

This tentative approach to the religious element of power may be a useful tool to uncover some intangible factors which may surprise strategists who underestimate the scope of influence of religion on politics in many countries even in this era.

ENDNOTES

1. Especially Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2. Like Agudat Israel.
3. Congressional research source The Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (CGSC A551-5, April 1977), p. 7.
4. Editorial, Al-Howadith (London, in Arabic) Nov 9, 1979, p. 14.
5. R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy, Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives", The Middle-East Journal, Winter 1980, p. 7-8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah, Yusuf Ali. The Meaning of the Glorious Quran
Cairo, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masri; Beirut, Dar Al-Kitab
Allubrani.
- Arberry, A. J. The Koran Interpreted. London: Allen and
Orwin; New York: Macmillan, 1955.
- _____. Religion in the Middle East. Cambridge: Univer-
sity Press, 1969. Vol I Judaism and Christianity,
Vol II Islam.
- Asad, M. Islam Politics. Chicago: Kazi Pubns.
- Ben Gurion, David. Rebirth and Destiny of Israel. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1954.
- _____. Israel: Years of Challenge. New York, Chicago,
San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.
- Binder, Leonard. The Ideological Revolution in the Middle
East. New York: Wiley, 1964.
- Blunt, W. S. The Future of Islam. Chicago: Kazi Pubns.
- Burrell, Robert Michael. Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Cali-
fornia: Sage Publications, 1978.
- Burton, Richard F. The Jew, the Gypsy and El-Islam. Holly-
wood: Angriff Pr, 1974.
- Don, Peretz. The Middle-East Today. New York, Chicago, San
Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rinehart, Winston,
Inc., 1963.
- Evrom, Yair. The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East.
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1977.
- Fernon, Friedrich W. Moslems on the March: People and
Politics in the World of Islam. New York: Knopf, 1954.
- Gibb, H. K. Modern Trends in Islam. New York: Octagon, 1971.
- Goitein, S. D. Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the
Ages. New York: Schocken Books, 1970

- Golen, Galia. Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis. Cambridge: University Press, 1977.
- Graves, Philip. Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths. Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1976.
- Hughes, Thomas P. A Dictionary of Islam. Columbia: South Asia Books, 1976.
- Karmi, H. S. How Holy is Palestine to the Muslim? Islamic Quarterly, 1970.
- Koyani, A. S. Islam and Muslims in Red Regimes. Chicago: Kazi Pubns.
- Khalizad, Almay. Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power.
- Leslie, S. Clement. The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.
- Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the Arab World. New York: Knopf, 1976.
- Mandidi, A. A. Political Theory of Islam. Chicago: Kazi Pubns.
- _____. Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State. Chicago: Kazi Pubns.
- Qutb, Sayed. Islam and Universal Peace. Indianapolis: Am Trust Pubns, 1977.
- Robinson, Maxine. Israel, a Colonial Settler State? New York: Monad Press, 1973.
- Rosen, Steven J. A Stable System of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
- Rosenthal, Irwin. Judaism and Islam. Cranbury: A.S. Barnes.
- Sacher, H. Zionism and the Jewish Future. Westport, Connecticut: Hyperium Press, 1976.
- Spector, Ivan. The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958. University of Washington Press, 1959.
- Steiner, W. J. Inside Pan Arabia. Chicago: Packard and Company, 1947.
- Tibanic, Abdul Latif. Jerusalem, Its Place in Islam and Arab History. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969.

Udovitch, A. L. Critical Choices for Americans, Vol 10, The Middle-East. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1976.

Wagner, Abraham R., Richelson, Jeffrey T. Israel: Perception of Strategic Balance.

Widengren, Geo. Iran and Islam. N.J.: Humanities, 1977.