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COLD WAR AXIOMS IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA; (U)  
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
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COLD WAR AXIOMS IN THE POST-VIETNAM ERA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 6, 1980

Mr. Harry Schrecengost  
Defense Technical Information  
Center  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, Va. 22314

Dear Mr. Schrecengost:

Permission is hereby granted to the Defense Technical Information Center to accession into its collection all the U.S. Department of State supported contract studies contained in the seven boxes obtained from the Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Center on February 6, 1980.

Permission is also granted to further disseminate these documents into the private sector through the National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Sincerely,

Edward N. Lundstrom  
Research Documentation Officer  
Office of External Research  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

## INTRODUCTION\*

The generation of Americans that experienced the bitter consequences of post-Versailles isolationism, of beggar-thy-neighbor international economic policies, of military restraint in the face of rearmament by those committed to destruction of the existing international order, and of efforts to appease expansionist dictatorships by offering concessions, provided, in large measure, the leaders who formulated and implemented American foreign policy during the two decades after World War II. That such experiences should have shaped their thinking is neither surprising nor unprecedented in foreign policy decision-making.<sup>1</sup> The impact of

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1. The most valuable discussions may be found in Ernest R. May, "Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy", New York: Oxford University Press, 1973; and a chapter entitled "How Decision-Makers Learn from History" in Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.

See also, Louis Morton, "Historia Mentem Armet: Lessons of the Past," World Politics, XII (January 1960), 155-164; J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1969); Harvey A. DeWeerd, "Lessons of the Korean War," Yale Review, 40 (June 1951), 592-603; Peter Braestrup, "Limited War and the Lessons of Lebanon," The Reporter, 20 (April 30, 1959), 25-27; Harry A. Hadd, "Who's a Rebel? The Lesson Lebanon Taught," Marine Corps Gazette, 46 (March 1962), 25-26; Albert P. Sights, Jr., "Lessons of the Lebanon: A Study in Air Strategy," Air University Review, 16 (July-August 1965), 28-43; Anatole Shub, "Lessons of Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, 47 (January 1969); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1971), 211-253; and Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, I (Spring 1977), 3-24.

these events and the "lessons" drawn from them is dramatically evident in memoirs and diaries of many post-World War II foreign policy leaders, as well as in a number of recent studies of post-war diplomacy.

Out of the experiences of this period emerged a series of "lessons of history" or axioms<sup>2</sup> relating to the contemporary international system, a proper role for the United States within it, the nature of adversaries, and the aspirations, strategies and tactics that should constitute the core of this nation's external relations. Although these guidelines, or what we shall call "Cold War axioms," are not unique to this period--some of them can be found in political tracts going as far back as Machiavelli

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2. "Axioms of foreign policy" refer to a set of fundamental principles and assumptions that guide the basic directions of foreign policy. They are thus virtually interchangeable with such terms as "shared images" or "underlying assumptions." This term is especially appropriate for our purposes because, as Ernest May points out, it is historical experience, subjectively interpreted, that gives rise to axioms: "While historical experience is the substance of an axiom, it is not the mold. People read into history more or less what they want to read . . . ." It is precisely this interest in the a posteriori interpretations of the Vietnam War, and its meaning for the future conduct of American foreign policy, that served as the genesis for the present research project. For further discussions, see Ernest R. May, "The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated Versus the Axiomatic," Daedalus, XCI (Fall 1962), 653-667; Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1 (Winter 1970-71), 144-160; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974; Alexander L. George, "The Role of Cognitive Beliefs in the Legitimation of a Long-Range Foreign Policy: The Case of F. D. Roosevelt's Plan for Postwar Cooperation with the Soviet Union," Paper prepared for the Conference on Approaches to Decision-Making, Oslo, Norway, August 9-12, 1977; and B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and The Cold War," International Studies Quarterly, XIX (September 1975), 251-284.

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or Kautilya--they represented a rather significant change from the basic premises that had guided external relations during earlier periods in American history.

However, just as experiences before and during World War II gave rise to shared beliefs about foreign policy that differed sharply from those of previous eras, the Vietnam War may serve as a source of still another set of foreign policy axioms that represents as significant a break from the Cold War axioms as the latter did from their predecessors. Vietnam, in short, may shape the conduct of American foreign policy during the next several decades, in the same way that events surrounding World War II did during those just passed.

It is not possible to invalidate the alternative hypothesis that, even in the absence of the Vietnam War, the Cold War axioms would have come under serious criticism. Several students of foreign policy have commented on an apparently persistent American tendency to swing from periods of isolationism to internationalism and back to isolationism.<sup>3</sup> Theories of generation-long cycles in American moods toward international affairs thus suggest that by the mid- to late 1960's a mood of retrenchment from expanded global responsibilities would have set in. Perhaps it is significant that in 1964 (about one generation after Pearl Harbor) Barry Goldwater became the first major party presidential nominee since World War II who rejected some of these axioms.

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3. See for example, Frank L. Klingberg, "Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," World Politics, IV (January 1952).

But the Vietnam War did happen, and it served as a catalyst for frontal assaults by many leaders on the fundamental premises of American foreign policy. Biographical anecdotes will not establish even this limited parallel between World War II and Vietnam, but they may serve as an illustration. Prior to World War II Senator Arthur Vandenberg was a leading spokesman for American isolationism and a not wholly implausible candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. After the Japanese attack that brought the United States into the war, he wrote: "In my own mind, my convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist."<sup>4</sup> By that statement he indicated that the disaster in Hawaii was of such significance as to reshape his core beliefs about international politics and the proper American response to a rapidly changing world.<sup>5</sup> After World War II, J. William Fulbright was an influential congressional leader whose basic premises were consistent with the main contours of a globalist American foreign policy. After the escalation of the Vietnam War he became an articulate spokesman for those opposing the American war effort, in the process also rejecting many of the fundamental axioms that had guided his as well as the nation's external policies during the post-war years.

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4. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., editor, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, p. 1.

5. On the beliefs of Vandenberg and Fulbright, see Joel E. Anderson, Jr., The "Operational Code" Belief System of Senator Arthur Vandenberg: An Application of the George Construct, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973; and Kurt Tweraser, "Changing Patterns of Political Beliefs: The Foreign Policy Operational Codes of J. William Fulbright," Sage Professional Papers in American Politics, Number 04-016, 1974.



The Foreign Policy Leadership Survey

On the premise that Vietnam may in fact prove to be a watershed event, perhaps analogous to what students of American politics have called "critical elections," we have undertaken an extensive survey of American leaders with a view to gaining some understanding of how that conflict has been defined by those presently in leadership positions, as well as by persons who are likely to occupy such roles in the future.

Observations about the impact of the Vietnam War on American foreign policy have been in abundant supply during the past decade. Why, then, pursue the matter by means of a large-scale leadership survey? To acknowledge that for a decade Vietnam dominated many aspects of American life is not to answer all of the significant questions that can be raised about the present and possible future impact of that conflict. For example, most Americans would probably agree with the assertion, "No more Vietnams!" But when asked to be more specific about the policy implications of that slogan, or about the ways in which they would avoid repeating that disastrous experience, we could expect a rather wide range of answers. Stated somewhat differently, because people do indeed "read into history more or less what they want to read," understanding precisely which lessons are being drawn from the Vietnam experience, and by whom, becomes an empirical question rather than one to be answered solely by deductive logic.

In order to obtain such evidence, a questionnaire of 235 items was mailed in February 1976, with a follow-up mailing to non-respondents two months later. Approximately one half of the sample was drawn from the

latest edition of Who's Who in America. Because that source tends to have rather heavy representation of some groups--notably business executives and academics--it concomitantly underrepresents other types of leaders whose views on foreign policy were of interest. The remainder of the sample was thus drawn from more specialized directories of leaders from each of several other groups whose inclusion we wanted to insure, including: Foreign Service Officers, labor officials, political leaders, military officers, clergy, foreign affairs experts not presently holding government positions, leaders in the printed and electronic media, and women.<sup>6</sup>

Of the 4,290 leaders who received the twelve page questionnaire, 2,282, or somewhat over 53%, completed and returned them. Return rates ranged from a low of 38.7% for labor leaders to a high of 70.6% for the "foreign policy experts." Aside from the labor group, only the political leaders (47.8%) failed to achieve a return rate of better than fifty percent. There were also some variations within two sub-samples. The proportion of Catholic clergy returning the questionnaire (35.2%) was substantially lower than the comparable figure for Protestants (56.6%) and Jews (75.0%). Within the media group, chief editorial writers had a higher return rate (60.6%) than either the Washington-based press (50.0%) or the radio-television correspondents (42.1%).

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6. A detailed description of sources and sampling procedures may be found in "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam: A Study of American Leadership," Paper prepared for the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 1976, Appendix C.

↘ This paper, one of a series focusing on the impact of the Vietnam War on the beliefs of American leaders,<sup>p</sup> draws upon data from that survey to address three questions. To what extent do the fundamental principles that guided American foreign policy during much of the post-1945 period continue to generate strong support from American leaders? Is support for these axioms systematically related to respondents' occupations and, if so, among which do we find the greatest and least support for them? How does occupation compare to other correlates of foreign policy beliefs? ↗

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7. In addition to the paper cited in footnote 6, previous reports include: "Vietnam Revisited: Beliefs of Foreign Service and Military Officers about the Sources of Failure, Consequences, and 'Lessons' of the War," Paper prepared for the 10th Congress of the International Studies Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1976; "The Meaning of Vietnam: Belief Systems of American Leaders," International Journal, 32 (Summer 1977), 452-474; "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," Paper prepared for the Hendricks Symposium on American Politics and World Order, University of Nebraska, 1977; and "America's Foreign Policy Agenda: The Post-Vietnam Beliefs of American Leaders," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, editors, Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. IV, forthcoming.

also appeared in the Harvard-Washington Post survey of American leaders.<sup>10</sup> The remaining eighteen items were part of a larger set that we abstracted from pronouncements by various advocates during the extensive public debate of the appropriate "lessons of Vietnam."<sup>11</sup> The text of these thirty-seven items appears in the middle columns of the Tables 1-6. The final column in these tables describes the distribution of responses; in some cases respondents were given options ranging from "Agree Strongly" to "Disagree Strongly," and in others the choices ranged from "Very Important" to "Not at all Important."<sup>12</sup>

The results are organized around six sets of tables dealing with the nature of the international environment, adversaries, the Third World, the United States role in the world, the national interest, and instruments of foreign policy. For each of these topics the tables with aggregate results are followed by additional tables that report means scores for the occupational groups into which we have classified respondents: Military officers, business executives, lawyers, clergy, Foreign Service Officers, labor officials, public officials, educators, leaders and others.

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10. Barry Sussman, Elites in American, Washington: The Washington Post, 1976. Two items of this group are excluded from the following tables, one because it is less directly relevant to the cold war axioms, the other because of an ambiguity in wording.
  11. Procedures used in construction the questionnaire and the entire list of items relating to the "lessons of Vietnam" are reported in "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam: A Study of American Leadership."
  12. The "Very Important" to "Not at all Important" scale identifies items drawn from the Harris-CCFR survey.

The International System

The five Cold War axioms listed in the left hand column of Table 1 depict an international system that is characterized by a tight bipolar structure with cleavages on a single Free World-Communist axis, and by zero-sum conflict in which one side's gains are the other's loss. In such a system the primary imperatives of diplomacy were to avoid both concessions and nuclear war.

Responses to eight questionnaire items that more or less correspond to the cold war axioms revealed considerable ambivalence about the structure and characteristic patterns of interaction within the international system. On the one hand, the respondents indicated very strong support for both the validity of the "domino theory" and for the proposition that failure to honor alliance commitments will result in heavy costs. On the other hand, substantial if not overwhelming majorities questioned some core premises of the Cold War period; for example, the assumption of a zero-sum relationship between Communist gains and the American national interest. Moreover, neither of the primary purposes of Cold War diplomacy--containing communism and defending the security of America's allies--were rated as "very important" by as many as fifty percent of the respondents; indeed, one person in seven answered that containment was "not important at all."

Finally, the goals of maintaining peace and achieving arms control were considered as "very important" by strong majorities. In contrast, only a quarter of the respondents considered strengthening the United Nations to be very important, whereas thirty percent of them considered that goal to be of no importance.

TABLE 1 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to the International System**
Every nation that falls to communism increases the power of the Communist bloc in its struggle with the Free World	<p>Any communist victory is a defeat for America's national interest</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 15.4%</p> <p>Agree Somewhat: 24.0</p> <p>Disagree Somewhat: 35.4</p> <p>Disagree Strongly: 23.1</p> <p>No Opinion: 0.9</p>
Peace is indivisible. . . . Thus any expansion of Communist influence must be resisted	<p>Defending our allies' security [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]</p> <p>Very Important: 36.2</p> <p>Somewhat Important: 54.2</p> <p>Not at all Important: 4.4</p> <p>Not Sure: 3.9</p>
Concessions made under pressure constitute appeasement which only whets the appetite of aggressors	<p>There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 25.3</p> <p>Agree Somewhat: 42.0</p> <p>Disagree Somewhat: 18.1</p> <p>Disagree Strongly: 13.5</p> <p>No Opinion: 0.5</p>
The preeminent feature of international politics is conflict between Communism and the Free World	<p>A nation will pay a heavy price if it honors its alliance commitments only selectively</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 36.0</p> <p>Agree Somewhat: 42.1</p> <p>Disagree Somewhat: 14.4</p> <p>Disagree Strongly: 3.2</p> <p>No Opinion: 2.8</p>
	<p>Containing communism [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]</p> <p>Very Important: 38.4</p> <p>Somewhat Important: 41.7</p> <p>Not at all Important: 13.4</p> <p>Not Sure: 5.3</p>

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71), pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

TABLE 1 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF  
2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (cont.)

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to the International System**
Keeping peace in the world [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 69.8% Somewhat Important: 24.3 Not at all Important: 2.4 Not Sure: 2.5
Worldwide arms control [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 65.9 Somewhat Important: 25.6 Not at all Important: 4.6 Not Sure: 3.1
Nuclear war would be a great disaster and must be avoided	Very Important: 24.5 Somewhat Important: 36.5 Not at all Important: 29.6 Not Sure: 8.3
Strengthening the United Nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 24.5 Somewhat Important: 36.5 Not at all Important: 29.6 Not Sure: 8.3

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71), pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

The picture that emerges from these findings, then, is an ambivalent one. They do not represent a wholesale rejection of the axioms in the left hand column of Table 1, especially of those that are couched as general rules of sound diplomacy that are not explicitly confined to Cold War politics (e.g. about the importance of honoring alliance commitments). There appears to be a greater propensity to question axioms that are directed more specifically to relations between the United States and its adversaries.

When disaggregated according to occupation, the data reveal very striking and statistically significant differences between occupational groups (Tables 1a and 1b). On a four point scale (+2.00 to -2.00), differences exceeded one point on two of the three issues. Strongest support for all three items--definition of contemporary conflict in zero-sum terms, the validity of the "domino theory," and the sanctity of alliance commitments--is found among military officers and business executives. Conversely, persons associated with the media and educators consistently exhibited the least agreement with all three propositions; indeed, they were, on balance, in disagreement with the first two. Occupational group rankings for each pair of items in Table 1a resulted in rank-order correlations of .87, .90, and .83.<sup>13</sup>

Additional items relating to the international system also yielded statistically significant differences among occupational groups (Table 1b).<sup>14</sup>

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13. When computed directly for all 2,282 respondents, rather than by the ten occupational groups, correlation coefficients are .53, .32, and .34.

14. Note, however, that whereas scores in Table 1a and many others may range from +2.00 to -2.00, those on Tables 1b, 3b, 4b and 6b vary across a much smaller range of 0.00 to 2.00.



TABLE 1a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM [Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business Executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.											
**Any communist victory is a defeat for America's national interest [F=22.8]	-0.27	0.26	0.10	-0.34	0.05	-0.14	-0.11	-0.36	-0.76	-0.84	-0.44
**There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path [F=30.7]	0.48	1.12	0.91	0.52	0.58	0.42	0.18	0.37	-0.02	-0.10	0.32
**A nation will pay a heavy price if it honors its alliance commitments only selectively [F=16.6]	0.95	1.39	1.13	0.80	1.11	0.75	0.79	0.88	0.69	0.66	0.79

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (Chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

Appraisals of the importance of containing communism bear considerable resemblance to the pattern of responses reported in the previous table, with military officers and business executives at the high end of the range, and media leaders and educators at the opposite pole. Groups scores on the containment issue, when compared to those in Table 1a, yielded rank order correlations of .88, .89, and .78.<sup>15</sup> A similar pattern does not, however, emerge with respect to the importance of defending allies.

The three remaining items concern the importance of peace, arms control, and the United Nations. These might be expected to have greater appeal to respondents that are more skeptical of the strategic propositions described in Table 1a. This expectation is only partially borne out by the data, however. Military officers and business executives did, in fact, ascribe somewhat less importance to these three goals, but the greatest support for them is to be found among labor officials rather than among educators and media respondents.

#### Adversaries

Beliefs about the international system are closely related to images of adversaries and their intentions. Cold War beliefs about America's opponents centered on the expansionist motivations harbored in Moscow and Peking. During the height of the Cold War assessments of these communist nations typically took one of two forms: (1) They are indistinguishable with respect to powerful expansionist motivations, or (2) the older Soviet

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15. When computed from individual rather than group scores, correlation coefficients between the item on containment and the three appearing on Table 1a are .55, .51, and .26.

TABLE 1b: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
 NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM  
 [Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
**Defending our allies' security [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=10.8]	1.34	1.51	1.31	1.38	1.22	1.43	1.23	1.37	1.22	1.35	1.21
**Containing communism [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=22.1]	1.27	1.47	1.49	1.44	1.40	1.39	1.24	1.22	1.01	1.11	1.04
**Keeping peace in the world [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=5.7]	1.70	1.56	1.70	1.77	1.68	1.75	1.81	1.78	1.73	1.77	1.74
**World wide arms control [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=10.5]	1.64	1.44	1.56	1.69	1.73	1.69	1.74	1.67	1.73	1.77	1.69
**Strengthening the United Nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=15.0]	0.94	0.72	0.70	0.87	1.20	0.88	1.15	0.95	1.12	1.02	1.16

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Very Important" as 2.00, "Somewhat Important" as 1.00, and "Not Important at all" as 0.00.  
 \*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

regime is relatively conservative, whereas that in Peking is not only inherently expansionist, but that it is also recklessly and irrationally so. Thus, American involvement in Vietnam was often justified as an exercise in containing Chinese expansionist goals, and the rhetoric of senior officials in the Johnson Administration rarely failed to portray the leadership in Peking as aggressive and not altogether predictable with respect to foreign affairs. Other core beliefs about adversaries centered on the monolithic character of the Soviet bloc and the central role of communist influence in disorder and violence within the less developed parts of the world.

The most interesting findings in Table 2 concern the strikingly different appraisals of Soviet and Chinese foreign policy goals. Skepticism of the Kremlin's purposes abounded among our respondents, more than eighty percent of whom regarded the USSR as expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals. Moscow's fidelity to a genuine détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was questioned by an only slightly smaller majority. On the other hand, fewer than thirty percent of the leaders in our sample agreed that Peking is pursuing expansionist ambitions, and less than seven percent of them expressed strong agreement with that proposition. Perhaps one explanation for the radical shift in leadership views of China is the venerable political adage that, "My enemy's enemy is my friend." It is worth noting, however, that less than a third of our respondents believed that present fissures among communist nations are irreparable. Finally, the equation of revolutionary movements and international communism was questioned by a substantial majority of the leaders in our sample.

TABLE 2 : COMPARISON OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS  
OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: THE NATURE OF ADVERSARIES

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to Adversaries**
Russian Intentions toward Western Europe are essentially expansionist. So, too, are Chinese Intentions in Asia	<p>China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals.</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 6.9                      Agree Somewhat: 22.9                      Disagree Somewhat: 36.3                      Disagree Strongly: 24.2                      No Opinion: 8.5</p>
The main sources of unrest, disorder, subversion, and civil war in underdeveloped areas is Communist influence and support	<p>Détente permits the USSR to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 18.5                      Agree Somewhat: 37.3                      Disagree Somewhat: 27.8                      Disagree Strongly: 8.5                      No Opinion: 5.7</p>
Communism is monolithic	<p>Revolutionary forces in "Third World" countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the USSR or China</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 21.1                      Agree Somewhat: 38.7                      Disagree Somewhat: 21.7                      Disagree Strongly: 11.4                      No Opinion: 5.3</p>
	<p>American foreign policy should be based on the premise that the Communist "bloc" is irreparably fragmented</p> <p>Agree Strongly: 7.3                      Agree Somewhat: 24.7                      Disagree Somewhat: 30.7                      Disagree Strongly: 28.8                      No Opinion: 6.9</p>

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

In summary, Table 2 indicates extensive concern about Soviet foreign policy goals, along with a concomitant tendency to assess others as acting independently rather than as agents or surrogates of the Kremlin.

Although the data in Table 1a and 1b revealed striking differences among occupational groups on some of the classic tenets of Cold War bipolarity, respondents in all groups agreed that the USSR is expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals (Table 2a). Not surprisingly, given the results reported earlier, strongest support for this view was found among military and business respondents, whereas media leaders and educators expressed more lukewarm agreement. The related proposition that Moscow is using détente to exacerbate rather than to restrain conflict brought forth a broad range of responses among the ten occupational groups, with rather strong support from the military and mild disagreement from educators and Foreign Service Officers.

Although appraisals of Chinese foreign policy differed among the ten groups, the pattern of responses deviated rather sharply from that on Soviet goals. Only the clergy agreed, on balance, with the proposition that the Peking regime is expansionist (and they did so by the narrowest of margins), and the strongest disagreement was expressed by Foreign Service Officers, representatives of the media, and educators. As with the other items reported in Table 2a, differences among occupational groups were statistically significant at the .001 level.

Results for the remaining items on Table 2a, concerning the sources of revolutionary movements in the Third World and the permanence of fissures among communist nations, conformed rather closely to a familiar pattern, with media leaders and educators at one end of the spectrum and

TABLE 2a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
THE NATURE OF ADVERSARIES

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)											
<p>This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.</p>	All respondents	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
	Military officers	1.15	1.44	1.33	1.14	1.15	1.20	1.14	1.25	0.84	1.08	1.01
	Business executives	-0.49	-0.41	-0.20	-0.35	0.01	-0.72	-0.45	-0.45	-0.71	-0.69	-0.49
	Lawyers	0.30	0.88	0.46	0.28	0.59	-0.10	0.47	0.06	-0.10	0.08	0.14
	Clergy											
	Foreign Service											
	Labor officials											
	Public officials											
	Educators											
	Media											
Others												
<p>**The Soviet Union is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals [F=11.0]</p>												
<p>China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals [F=6.8]</p>												
<p>**Défente permits the USSR to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict [F=22.1]</p>												

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 2a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
 THE NATURE OF ADVERSARIES (cont.)  
 [Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.	All respondents	(2,282)									
	Military officers	(500)									
	Business executives	(294)									
	Lawyers	(116)									
	Clergy	(101)									
	Foreign Service	(125)									
	Labor officials	(74)									
	Public officials	(110)									
	Educators	(565)									
	Media	(184)									
Others	(213)										
**Revolutionary forces in "Third World" countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the USSR or China [F=18.0]	0.37	-0.02	-0.05	0.39	-0.09	0.66	0.23	0.63	0.73	0.77	0.53
American foreign policy should be based on the premise that the Communist "bloc" is irreparably fragmented [F=14.9]	-0.50	-0.86	-0.84	-0.62	-0.82	-0.43	-0.31	-0.51	-0.10	-0.14	-0.40

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.



military and business respondents at or near the other. It should be noted, however, that the clergy held the most skeptical view of revolutionary forces in the Third World.<sup>16</sup>

Three of the five items in Table 2a brought forth a rather consistent pattern of responses. Occupational groups expressing the highest degree of support for the belief that the USSR is expansionist were the least prone to agree that revolutionary forces in the Third World are nationalistic ( $r_s = -.54$ ) and also least likely to view conflict among communist nations as permanent ( $r_s = -.84$ ).<sup>17</sup>

#### The Third World

Not long after the end of World War II, as boundaries between the West and Communist states in Europe had become relatively stable, the most dramatic changes in the map of the world were taking place in Asia and Africa. Virtually all former British, French and Dutch colonies achieved independence, and many of them proclaimed their non-alignment with respect to East-West issues. As a consequence the "Third World" came to be viewed as a vital prize in Cold War competition.

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16. This item was one of several in our questionnaire that has also appeared in other recent surveys of American leaders. Russett and Hanson found that 84 percent of military officers and 74 percent of business executives agreed that, "Revolutionary forces in the 'Third World' are usually nationalist rather than controlled by the USSR or China." In Barton's study the comparable figures were: Business leaders (70 percent), Republican politicians (77 percent), Democratic politicians (72 percent), labor leaders (60 percent), civil servants (84 percent), volunteer organizations (83 percent), and media persons (91 percent). Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen, San Francisco: L. H. Freeman and Co., 1975; and Allen H. Barton "Conflict and Consensus Among American Leaders," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXVIII (Winter 1974-75), pp. 507-530.
17. The corresponding correlation coefficients, when computed on individual rather than group scores, are  $-.29$  and  $-.23$ .

One response to the disappointments of Vietnam has been to reassess America's role in the Third World. Some have suggested that a policy of "benign neglect" is appropriate. The judgment that American vital interests outside this hemisphere are largely confined to the industrial powers in Western Europe and Japan reflects at least in part the perspective of the Trilateral Commission, whose membership includes President Carter and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. However, our respondents rejected this formulation of the nation's vital interests by a margin of about 3-to-2, and with nearly thirty percent expressing strong disagreement (Table 3).

We noted earlier that a substantial majority of our respondents believe revolutionary movements in the Third World are nationalist rather than communist in character. Nevertheless, relatively few of them (28.8%) disagreed with the view that American efforts to influence the Third World toward democratic development may be limited to the power of example.

A similar ambivalence occurs with respect to appropriate American policies toward the Third World. Fewer than ten percent of our respondents believed that helping to improve the standard of living on less developed countries is of no importance, but when faced with a tradeoff between foreign economic aid and inflation at home, support for assistance programs gained support from less than half of them.

These results seem to indicate a somewhat reduced sense of urgency about the military-political importance of the Third World for this country, combined with a continuing sense of concern about such basic problems as hunger in many less developed parts of the world.

TABLE 3 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: THE THIRD WORLD

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to The Third World**
The best way to encourage democratic development in the "Third World" is for the U.S. to solve its own problems	Agree Strongly: 26.3% Agree Somewhat: 38.1 Disagree Somewhat: 19.9 Disagree Strongly: 8.9 No Opinion: 5.4
Vital interests of the U.S. are largely confined to Western Europe, Japan, and the Americas	Agree Strongly: 12.3 Agree Somewhat: 25.8 Disagree Somewhat: 28.1 Disagree Strongly: 29.5 No Opinion: 2.4
The U.S. should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home	Agree Strongly: 11.2 Agree Somewhat: 36.7 Disagree Somewhat: 31.2 Disagree Strongly: 18.4 No Opinion: 1.4
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 37.5 Somewhat Important: 50.1 Not at all Important: 8.7 Not Sure: 2.7
Combating world hunger [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 50.2 Somewhat Important: 39.4 Not at all Important: 7.1 Not Sure: 2.5

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

The disaggregated data reported in Tables 3a and 3b fall into two very distinct patterns. All occupational groups disagreed with the proposition that America's vital interests exclude Third World countries other than those in this hemisphere. And respondents in all groups agreed, on balance, that the best way for this country to encourage democratic development is to solve its own problems. The most striking finding on these two items is the stance of labor leaders. The views of this group are by far the most consistent with a narrow geographical definition of American interests, as well as the most doubting about the extent to which Washington is able to influence developments in the Third World.

The second cluster of items focuses on American obligations and policies for economic assistance to the less developed nations. Differences among the ten groups are statistically significant in all three cases. Moreover, the pattern of responses across groups is highly consistent. In each case, military officers, business executives, and lawyers are least enthusiastic about foreign assistance efforts, whereas the clergy and media respondents expressed the strongest degree of support for the importance and desirability of such undertakings. For each pair of items, rank order correlations of the groups were quite high, reaching .84, .92, and .79.<sup>18</sup>

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18. The corresponding correlation coefficients for individual rather than group scores are .48 , .42 , and .59.

TABLE 3a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
THE THIRD WORLD

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)																					
<p>This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.</p>	All respondents	(2,282)	Military officers	(500)	Business executives	(294)	Lawyers	(116)	Clergy	(101)	Foreign Service	(125)	Labor officials	(74)	Public officials	(110)	Educators	(565)	Media	(184)	Others	(213)
	**The best way to encourage democratic development in the "Third World" is for the U.S. to solve its own problems [F=3.6]	0.54	0.46	0.64	0.59	0.46	0.24	1.06	0.42	0.48	0.55	0.81										
	Vital interests of the U.S. are largely confined to Western Europe, Japan, and the Americas [F=2.1]	-0.38	-0.35	-0.43	-0.34	-0.68	-0.08	-0.01	-0.54	-0.36	-0.31	-0.55										
	**The U.S. should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home [F=32.4]	-0.09	-0.77	-0.45	-0.24	0.77	0.32	-0.03	-0.11	0.34	0.20	0.06										

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 3b: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY  
[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)																					
<p>Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal.</p>	All respondents	(2,282)	Military officers	(500)	Business executives	(294)	Lawyers	(116)	Clergy	(101)	Foreign Service	(125)	Labor officials	(74)	Public officials	(110)	Educators	(565)	Media	(184)	Others	(213)
	**Helping solve world inflation [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=10.9]	1.45	1.22	1.47	1.46	1.58	1.47	1.52	1.53	1.51	1.58	1.55										
	**Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=10.9]	1.69	1.58	1.53	1.61	1.85	1.75	1.76	1.65	1.79	1.74	1.77										
	**Securing adequate supplies of energy [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=7.5]	1.70	1.74	1.82	1.76	1.53	1.75	1.69	1.78	1.60	1.75	1.63										

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Very Important" as 2.00, "Somewhat Important" as 1.00, and "Not Important at all" as 0.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (Chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

The Role of the United States

The essential premise of the "revolution in American foreign policy" after World War II was a belief that an active American role in world affairs was a necessary, if not sufficient condition for avoiding another major war. Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Grand Design" for the postwar world included membership for this nation in the United Nations and active cooperation by the "Big Four" to ensure peace. With deterioration of relations between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, an active role in the world came to include a policy of containing Soviet expansion, the first peacetime alliance in American history, and economic and military assistance to allies in Europe and elsewhere. For at least two decades the premises of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO served as the foundations of our external relations; these assumptions are summarized in Table 4 as two axioms concerning American responsibility for Free World security.

Responses to eight questionnaire items focusing on this nation's global obligations reflect, once again, considerable ambivalence. By a margin of more than 3-to-2 the leaders in this survey rejected the proposition that we should turn away from international concerns to concentrate on domestic problems. Indeed, one respondent in three expressed strong disagreement on that point. But at the same time a slight majority agreed that some scaling down of Washington's leadership role in world was in order. These results, on balance, appear to indicate support for a policy of retrenchment from the almost limitless global role envisioned, for example, in President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, but stopping substantially short of a return to isolationism.

TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE WORLD

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to the U.S. Role**
America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down	Agree Strongly: 15.2 Agree Somewhat: 40.8 Disagree Somewhat: 20.5 Disagree Strongly: 21.8 No Opinion: 0.6
We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems	Agree Strongly: 10.7 Agree Somewhat: 26.1 Disagree Somewhat: 28.7 Disagree Strongly: 32.6 No Opinion: 0.9
Maintaining a balance of power among nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 43.2 Somewhat Important: 40.3 Not at all Important: 8.7 Not sure: 6.4
The U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel	Agree Strongly: 32.4 Agree Somewhat: 35.9 Disagree Somewhat: 17.6 Disagree Strongly: 11.2 No Opinion: 1.7

The United States--and only the United States--has the power, ability, responsibility, and right to defend the Free World and maintain international order

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974) pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.



TABLE 4 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE WORLD (cont.)

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to the U.S. Role**
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 22.3% Somewhat Important: 63.0 Not at all Important: 8.6 Not Sure: 4.7
Protecting weaker nations against aggression [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	Very Important: 18.2 Somewhat Important: 59.6 Not at all Important: 11.9 Not Sure: 8.9
The United States has an obligation to aid any Free People resisting Communism at home or abroad	Agree Strongly: 9.8 Agree Somewhat: 38.4 Disagree Somewhat: 30.4 Disagree Strongly: 10.0 No Opinion: 9.6
Weak allies excessively influence U.S. foreign policy	Agree Strongly: 37.4 Agree Somewhat: 23.3 Disagree Somewhat: 23.9 Disagree Strongly: 12.6 No Opinion: 2.1
The U.S. should avoid any involvement in the Angolan civil war	Agree Strongly: 37.4 Agree Somewhat: 23.3 Disagree Somewhat: 23.9 Disagree Strongly: 12.6 No Opinion: 2.1

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71), pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

Ambivalence also characterizes responses to more specific undertakings. Almost one half of the leaders in our sample described the goal of maintaining a global balance of power as "very important," and less than ten percent appraised that goal as of no importance. On the other hand, substantial majorities rated strengthening friendly countries and protecting weak nations as only "somewhat important" rather than as "very important." And the proposition that weak allies exert excessive influence on American foreign policy gained the agreement of a plurality but not majority of our respondents; considerable uncertainty is reflected by the large proportion of "no opinion" responses to this question. A plausible explanation for these findings is that many persons attributed undiminished importance to maintaining general global responsibilities (for example, a balance of power), but they were not especially impressed with the urgency of commitments that bear some resemblance to those we undertook in Vietnam (strengthening friends or protecting weaker nations from aggression).

Finally, by a margin of more than two-to-one the leaders in our sample agreed that the United States has a moral obligation to prevent destruction of Israel, but a somewhat smaller majority supported Congressional refusal to permit any American involvement in the Angola conflict.

The aggregated data appear to reflect a preference, on balance, for neither unlimited American involvement abroad, nor a deep penchant for isolationism, and at least a somewhat discriminating view about whose security requirements properly fall within the limits of American concern. The fears, often expressed in recent years, that disillusionment with the results of the commitment to preserve an independent regime in South Vietnam would ultimately endanger all such international commitments,

appear to have been exaggerated or premature--at least insofar as Israel is concerned. Whether Israel is a special case in this respect remains to be seen. In any case, the data summarized in Table 4 seem somewhat more consistent with the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine than of the Truman Doctrine.

The first two items on Table 4a appear to include a common element of doubt about extended international commitments for this country. It takes no great contortions of the imagination to suggest, however, that some respondents who supported scaling down America's role in the world (believing that position to be excessively concerned with strategic-political issues), may also have disagreed with the proposition that we should concentrate more on our own national problems (believing that we have significant international opportunities and obligations on economic, environmental, humanitarian and related issues).<sup>19</sup> When disaggregated into occupational groups, the data reveal some support for the latter view, as there is virtually no correlation between responses to the two items ( $r_s = .09$ ).<sup>20</sup> The most striking uniformity is the rather strong support from labor officials for both items. Thus, the somewhat isolationist views expressed by labor leaders toward American interests and involvement in the Third World appears to extend beyond that part of the world.

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19. For a more extended discussion of the hypothesis that the international-nationalist dimension can be crossed with an issue-area dimension to form four distinct clusters of beliefs, see "America's Foreign Policy Agenda."

20. When computed on individual rather than group scores, the correlation coefficient between these two items is .18.

TABLE 4a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE WORLD

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.	0.07	-0.57	0.04	0.23	-0.03	0.04	0.37	-0.04	0.52	0.30	0.20
**America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down [F=19.0]	-0.47	-0.50	-0.14	-0.23	-0.75	-0.71	0.40	-0.46	-0.75	-0.52	-0.20
**We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on own national problems [F=9.3]	0.61	0.57	0.22	0.54	0.58	0.59	1.03	0.82	0.67	0.93	0.60
**The U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel [F=5.1]	0.08	0.10	0.25	0.13	0.09	-0.07	0.36	0.11	-0.05	0.06	0.00
Weak allies excessively influence U.S. foreign policy [F=2.1]	0.49	-0.38	0.38	0.59	0.41	0.36	0.93	0.64	0.98	1.01	0.82
**The U.S. should avoid any involvement in the Angolan civil war [F=33.7]											

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

Four other items in Tables 4a and 4b focus on somewhat more specific issues relating to this nation's international role: Maintaining a balance of power, strengthening friends, protecting weak nations, and the influence of weak allies on American foreign policy. Responses of the ten occupational groups fell within a very narrow range on all four items. Perhaps the most noteworthy finding was that only on the question of excessive influence of weak allies did labor leaders exhibit a notably isolationist stance.

The other two items centered specifically on American support for Israel and avoidance of involvement in the Angolan civil war. The former issue revealed strongest support among groups that elsewhere had expressed a generally skeptical stance toward extensive global commitments--labor leaders and educators--whereas business and military respondents were much more lukewarm in their support of Israel. A plausible hypothesis is that business executives and military officers may be more sensitive to possible tradeoffs between requirements for Middle Eastern oil and support for Israel.

The question of involvement in the Angolan Civil War clearly divided respondents along occupational lines as the range among these groups reached almost one and half points. Moreover, those most adamant about avoiding involvement in Angola exhibited the strongest support for American obligations to Israel, and vice versa. The rank order correlation of groups on these two items was .76.<sup>21</sup>

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21. The correlation between these two items when computed on individual rather than group scores, is only .06, however.

TABLE 4b: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN THE WORLD

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
Here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal.											
**Maintaining a balance of power among nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=3.6]	1.37	1.45	1.42	1.35	1.39	1.48	1.45	1.47	1.27	1.36	1.26
**Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=5.5]	1.15	1.16	1.24	1.21	1.17	1.24	1.25	1.30	1.04	1.05	1.12
Protecting weaker nations against aggression [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=3.3]	1.07	1.18	1.01	1.02	1.17	1.05	1.06	1.05	1.01	1.02	1.07

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Very Important" as 2.00, "Somewhat Important" as 1.00, and "Not Important at all" as 0.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

### The National Interest

It is no revelation that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, everybody talks about the national interest, but nobody has defined it to everyone's satisfaction. As a yardstick against which to obtain precise judgments about the merits of foreign policy undertakings it often suffers from such disturbing qualities as an almost limitless elasticity. Yet there are periods—notably in times of war—when, for better or worse, there is widespread consensus on the nation's interests. During the Cold War opposition to communism served as a yardstick on which many agreed.

That support for this conception of the national interest has eroded among many American leaders is evident from the data reported in Table 5. By a margin of two-to-one the leaders in our sample disagreed with the proposition that the United States should spare no measure to stop the spread of communism. They also expressed disagreement by a somewhat greater margin with the view that better Soviet-American relations work to the disadvantage of this country. Slightly over one-third of the respondents indicated that they "disagree strongly" with each of these items.

Only on a much more specific issue—the wisdom of selling wheat to improve relations with the USSR even if doing so exacerbated inflation—was there a significant deviation from the general tendency to appraise somewhat favorably the prospect for better relations with communist nations. Answers to the last item may reflect dismay with the unforeseen consequences of the "great wheat robbery" of 1972, as well as skepticism about the premise that increased Soviet-American trade will pay dividends in the form of better strategic-political relations between Washington and Moscow.

TABLE 5 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF  
2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to the National Interest**
The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of Communism	Agree Strongly: 8.9% Agree Somewhat: 24.0 Disagree Somewhat: 30.1 Disagree Strongly: 34.8 No Opinion: 1.1
The surest simple guide to U.S. interests in foreign policy is opposition to Communism	Agree Strongly: 8.9 Agree Somewhat: 19.9 Disagree Somewhat: 34.0 Disagree Strongly: 33.8 No Opinion: 1.8
It is not in our interest to have better relations with the Soviet Union because we are getting less than we are giving to them	Agree Strongly: 4.9 Agree Somewhat: 31.5 Disagree Somewhat: 31.5 Disagree Strongly: 37.5 No Opinion: 2.7
Even though it probably means higher food prices here at home, it is worth selling grain to the Soviet Union since it may improve our relations with Russia	

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974) pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.



The disaggregated data in Table 5a reveal quite sharp and statistically significant differences among groups on all three items. The first question brought forth once again the familiar pattern of strongest support from military and business respondents, and sharpest dissent from media leaders and educators. A similar pattern appears on the second item, although labor leaders stand out as the only group that, on balance, rejected the value of better Soviet-American relations. Labor officials also expressed the strongest disapproval of grain sales to the Soviet Union.

The relatively consistent pattern of responses across occupation groups to these three items is reflected in correlation coefficients between the first and second ( $r_s = .63$ ), first and third ( $r_s = -.49$ ), and second and third items ( $r_s = -.82$ ).<sup>22</sup>

#### Instruments of Foreign Policy

Immediately after World War II, demobilization and lack of clarity on such key concepts as deterrence<sup>23</sup> characterized American defense policy, but even a casual perusal of military budgets will reveal that the Korean War represented a watershed in militarization of the Cold War. Similarly, the dominant mood at the end of World War II was one of quick reconversion to a peacetime economy and of cutting lend-lease and other types of foreign assistance. Even a postwar loan to Britain faced formidable opposition in the Congress. But slow European recovery from the

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22. The corresponding correlation coefficients for individual scores are .39, -.13, and -.34.

23. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

TABLE 5a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
 THE NATIONAL INTEREST [Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
**The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of Communism [F=32.3]	-0.58	0.18	-0.39	-0.70	-0.43	-0.52	-0.70	-0.68	-1.05	-1.19	-0.85
**It is not in our interest to have better relations with the Soviet Union because we are getting less than we are giving to them [F=19.6]	-0.65	-0.12	-0.53	-0.68	-0.51	-0.92	0.07	-0.88	-1.00	-1.12	-0.78
**Even though it probably means higher food prices here at home, it is worth selling grain to the Soviet Union since it may improve our relations with Russia [F=10.5]	-0.46	-0.89	-0.38	-0.30	-0.52	-0.23	-0.93	-0.50	-0.22	-0.31	-0.32

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

war, the devastating winter of 1946-47, and the threat of communist gains in the face of economic hardship led to the Marshall Plan and other programs of foreign assistance. The Allison-Halperin list of Cold War axioms includes two that center on military and economic instruments of foreign policy.

That failure of the Vietnam undertaking despite a military effort costing some fifty thousand lives and 150 billion dollars should have given rise to sober second thoughts about the role of military power in contemporary foreign affairs is scarcely surprising. By a 2-to-1 margin our respondents agreed that the efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining (Table 6). They were divided almost evenly on two related beliefs concerning the role of military advice in the conduct of foreign affairs and the wisdom of self-imposed restraints on the uses of power. A very slight majority expressed agreement with the latter point, quite likely reflecting among many persons a sense of frustration with the policies of graduated escalation pursued in Vietnam.

Two other items are of special interest in light of President Carter's avowed goals of withdrawing American troops from South Korea and of reducing arms sales abroad. By approximately a 3-to-2 margin persons returning our questionnaire agreed that stationing troops abroad encourages the host countries to let the United States do their fighting for them. But by a roughly comparable margin they rejected the proposition that military assistance programs will draw this country into unnecessary wars.

This group of American leaders thus expressed rather mixed feelings, on balance, about the role of military power in the conduct of foreign affairs. In contrast, the data reveal considerable appreciation for the

TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to Instruments of Foreign Policy**
The efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining	Agree Strongly: 15.4% Agree Somewhat: 44.9 Disagree Somewhat: 19.3 Disagree Strongly: 11.8 No Opinion: 6.5
The conduct of American foreign affairs relies excessively on military advice	Agree Strongly: 19.5 Agree Somewhat: 28.5 Disagree Somewhat: 29.5 Disagree Strongly: 17.5 No Opinion: 3.4
Stationing American troops in other countries encourages them to let us do their fighting for those countries	Agree Strongly: 15.2 Agree Somewhat: 43.7 Disagree Somewhat: 27.8 Disagree Strongly: 8.2 No Opinion: 3.1
Military aid programs will eventually draw the United States into unnecessary wars	Agree Strongly: 10.0 Agree Somewhat: 30.6 Disagree Somewhat: 38.3 Disagree Strongly: 17.1 No Opinion: 2.9
The U.S. should never try to get by with half measures; we should apply necessary power if we have it	Agree Strongly: 25.4 Agree Somewhat: 26.2 Disagree Somewhat: 23.3 Disagree Strongly: 20.2 No Opinion: 2.9

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974) pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

TABLE 6 : COMPARISON OF AXIOMS OF THE POSTWAR ERA WITH THE BELIEFS OF  
2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY (cont.)

Axioms of the Postwar Era*	Responses of the 2,282 Leaders with Respect to Instruments of Foreign Policy**
U.S. prosperity depends on the economic health of other developed nations, a favorable U.S. balance of payments, and the preservation of the American gold supply	<p>Helping solve world inflation [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]      Very Important: 49.1%                      Somewhat Important: 41.5%                      Not at all Important: 5.7%                      Not Sure: 2.7%</p> <p>Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy      Very Important: 69.7%                      Somewhat Important: 25.6%                      Not at all Important: 2.4%                      Not Sure: 1.2%</p> <p>[as a foreign policy goal for the United States]</p> <p>Securing adequate supplies of energy      Very Important: 71.1%                      Somewhat Important: 24.7%                      Not at all Important: 2.3%                      Not Sure: 0.9%</p> <p>[as a foreign policy goal for the United States]</p>

\*Source: Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974) pp. 11-12; and Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign Policy, No. 1, (Winter, 1970-71) pp. 150-151.

\*\*Columns add up to less than 100% because "Uncodable and No Answer" figures are not included.

importance of the economic aspects of external relations. Items relating to inflation, international cooperation on common economic problems, and energy were rated as "very important" by substantial numbers of respondents; over seventy percent did so on the energy question.

The items reported in Table 6a focus on the role of military capabilities. Although there is no significant difference among occupation groups with respect to the declining efficiency of military power—all expressed moderate agreement—the remaining issues brought forth sharp and statistically significant divergences. Several points stand out in the results. Not surprisingly, military officers as a group expressed strongest disagreement with the items concerning excessive military advice in policy-making, and with the adverse consequences attributed to stationing American troops abroad and military aid programs. On the other hand, labor leaders were at the other end of the spectrum on each of these issues.

The final three items, on several economic aspects of foreign policy, also resulted in differences among the ten occupational groups. But perhaps the most significant point that emerges from Table 6b is the consistently great importance attributed to such issues as inflation, energy, and international cooperation on non-military issues.

#### Occupation versus Policy Preferences on Vietnam

The preceding analysis indicated that support for the Cold War axioms is not evenly spread across all sectors of American leadership. The remaining pages will be devoted to comparing two of the many possible

TABLE 6a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	All respondents	Military officers	Business executives	Lawyers	Clergy	Foreign Service	Labor officials	Public officials	Educators	Media	Others
	(2,282)	(500)	(294)	(116)	(101)	(125)	(74)	(110)	(565)	(184)	(213)
The efficiency of military power in foreign affairs is declining [F=1.4]	0.33	0.29	0.30	0.09	0.61	0.26	0.18	0.31	0.40	0.39	0.30
**The conduct of American foreign affairs relies excessively on military advice [F=69.9]	0.03	-1.11	-0.20	0.11	0.33	-0.16	0.74	0.34	0.60	0.61	0.60
**Stationing American troops in other countries encourages them to let us do their fighting for those countries [F=7.9]	0.30	-0.07	0.51	0.30	0.28	0.18	0.75	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.49

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 6a: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY (cont.)

[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)	
<p>This question asks you to indicate your position on certain foreign policy issues. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.</p>	All respondents	(2,282)
	Military officers	(500)
	Business executives	(294)
	Lawyers	(116)
	Clergy	(101)
	Foreign Service	(125)
	Labor officials	(74)
	Public officials	(110)
	Educators	(565)
	Media	(184)
Others	(213)	
<p>**Military aid programs will eventually draw the United States into unnecessary wars [F=16.8]</p>	-0.22	
<p>**The U.S. should never try to get by with half measures; we should apply necessary power if we have it [F=45.3]</p>	0.14	
	-0.74	1.09
	-0.34	0.51
	-0.28	0.01
	0.14	0.10
	-0.41	0.15
	0.26	-0.21
	-0.20	-0.15
	0.01	-0.51
	-0.05	-0.39
	0.22	-0.16

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Agree Strongly" as 2.00, "Agree Somewhat" as 1.00, "No Opinion" as 0.00, "Disagree Somewhat" as -1.00, and "Disagree Strongly" as -2.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.



TABLE 6b: BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION:  
THE THIRD WORLD  
[Mean scores\*]

	Occupation (N)										
	(2,282)										
All respondents											
	(500)										
Military officers											
	(294)										
Business executives											
	(116)										
Lawyers											
	(101)										
Clergy											
	(125)										
Foreign Service											
	(74)										
Labor officials											
	(110)										
Public officials											
	(565)										
Educators											
	(184)										
Media											
	(213)										
Others											
	1.30	1.01	1.12	1.24	1.69	1.44	1.43	1.32	1.43	1.49	1.41
**Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=26.9]	1.45	1.18	1.30	1.34	1.82	1.53	1.60	1.49	1.56	1.63	1.54
**Combatting world hunger [as a foreign policy goal for the United States] [F=24.5]											

\*Mean scores were computed by scoring a response of "Very Important" as 2.00, "Somewhat Important" as 1.00, and "Not Important at all" as 0.00.

\*\*Differences among occupations significant at the .001 level, whether computed according to parametric (analysis of variance) or non-parametric (chi-square) statistics. F ratios (given in parentheses immediately following each item) exceeding 3.47 are significant at the .001 level.

explanations of foreign policy beliefs.<sup>24</sup> More specifically, we shall compare the relative potency of occupation and the policy preferences during the Vietnam War in explaining responses to the thirty-seven issues considered here.

Our questionnaire included two items that asked respondents to state whether during the early and late stages of the Vietnam War they had preferred a policy of seeking a military victory, a complete withdrawal, or something in between these two options. Respondents were then classified into groups, based on answers to these two questions (Table 7). Although there are sixteen combinations of answers, several of them were grouped together to form seven groups. For example, all those who favored a complete withdrawal toward the end of the war, but who had supported some other position earlier (victory, "in between," or not sure) were classified as "converted critics."

Two previous studies using these seven categories have revealed consistently strong relationships between respondents' policy preferences

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24. In future analyses we shall consider other explanations; for example, that divisions on foreign policy issues fall along generational lines (the "Munich generation" versus the "Vietnam generation") as has been suggested by Allison, *op. cit.* For other arguments along these lines, see Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, 89 (Fall 1974), 563-588. Also useful on the effects of generations are: Bruce Russett, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, 90 (Spring 1975), 1-21; Davis Bobrow and Neil E. Cutler, "Times-Oriented Explanations of National Security Beliefs: Cohort, Life Stage, and Situation," Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 8 (1967), 31-37; Neal E. Cutler, "Generational Succession as a Source of Foreign Policy Attitudes," Journal of Peace Research, 1 (1970), 33-47; Alan B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," American Historical Review, 78 (December 1973), 1353-1385; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," Political Science Quarterly, 89 (Spring 1974), 1-26.

TABLE 7: THE 2,282 RESPONDENTS CLASSIFIED INTO SEVEN GROUPS BY POSITIONS ON VIETNAM DURING EARLY AND LATE STAGES OF THE WAR\*

Some people felt that we should have done everything possible to gain a complete military victory in Vietnam. Others felt that we should have withdrawn as soon as possible. Still others had opinions in between these two. Please indicate which position came closest to your own feelings--both when the war first became an issue and later toward the end of U.S. involvement.

WHEN THE WAR FIRST BECAME AN ISSUE	TOWARD THE END OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT		
	I tended to favor a complete military victory	I tended to feel in between these two	Not sure
I tended to favor a complete military victory	SUPPORTERS (n=363)	AMBIVALENT SUPPORTERS (n=346)	
I tended to feel in between these two		AMBIVALENTS (n=128)	CONVERTED CRITICS (n=867)
Not sure	CONVERTED SUPPORTERS (n=128)		
I tended to favor a complete withdrawal		AMBIVALENT CRITICS (n=63)	CRITICS (n=378)

\*Nine respondents did not indicate their position on Vietnam in either the early or late stages of the war.


during the Vietnam War and their beliefs about a broad range of contemporary foreign policy issues, including those that have been included in Table 1-6.<sup>25</sup>

Not surprisingly, the relationship between respondents' occupations and policy preferences during the Vietnam War is not a random one. For example, among all respondents, those who consistently favored pursuit of military victory in Southeast Asia ("supporters") roughly equalled in number the advocates of a complete withdrawal ("critics"). Among military officers, supporters outnumbered critics by a ratio of more than 20-1, but among educators the ratio is 4-1 in favor of the critics. And whereas 38% of our respondents came to prefer withdrawal from Vietnam despite having favored some other option at the beginning of the war, a substantially higher number of the media leaders (53.8%) are classified as "converted critics." Figure 1 provides complete information on the distribution of policy preferences during the Vietnam War for each of the occupational groups.


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25. "Vietnam, Consensus and the Belief Systems of American Leaders;" and "America's Foreign Policy Agenda."

ALL  
RESPONDENTS  
(N=2,282)



MILITARY  
OFFICERS  
(N=500)



BUSINESS  
EXECUTIVES  
(N=294)






FIGURE 1. EARLY AND LATE POLICY PREFERENCES OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS

LAWYERS  
(N=116)



CLERGY  
(N=101)



FOREIGN  
SERVICE  
OFFICERS  
(N=125)






FIGURE 1. EARLY AND LATE POLICY PREFERENCES OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS

LABOR  
OFFICIALS  
(N=74)



PUBLIC  
OFFICIALS  
(N=110)



EDUCATORS  
(N=565)





FIGURE 1. EARLY AND LATE POLICY PREFERENCES OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS

MEDIA  
PERSONS  
(N=184)



OTHERS  
(N=213)




FIGURE 1. EARLY AND LATE POLICY PREFERENCES OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS ON THE VIETNAM WAR; GROUPED BY OCCUPATION (cont.)



In order to assess the relative impact of occupation and policy positions on Vietnam, we undertook two analyses, as summarized in Table 8. The first two columns report the relationship (contingency coefficient) between occupation and policy positions, on the one hand, and responses to each of the thirty-seven questionnaire items on the other. Items are listed in order of decreasing contingency coefficients. Results of a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) are summarized in columns 3 and 4.

The results summarized in Table 8 are mixed, but with a rather clear tilt toward the greater potency of policy positions on Vietnam. But embedded within this overall pattern is another that highlights the importance of the issue under consideration.

The most striking differences between groups, whether defined by occupation or policy position, occur on issues with a strong military-strategic component (as opposed to some that focus on economic or other aspects of foreign affairs). Of the thirteen items listed on the first page of Table 8, all but one (on America's conception of its leadership role), are of this type. And, whether measured by the C coefficient (strength of relationship) or the F ratio (ratio of differences between groups to that within groups), the results indicate that scores for policy positions are uniformly higher than those for occupations.

A number of other items focus on economic aspects of this nation's foreign relations; for example, economic aid, efforts to combat hunger, improving living standards in less developed nations, grain sales to the USSR and fighting inflation. For each of these issues, both statistical measures result in higher scores for occupation than for policy preferences.

TABLE 8: COLD WAR AXIOMS AND THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: COMPARING POLICY PREFERENCES ON VIETNAM AND OCCUPATION AS EXPLANATIONS

Questionnaire Item	Contingency Coefficient (C)*		F Ratio: Two-Way ANOVA**	
	Vietnam Policy Position	Occu- pation	Vietnam Policy Position	Occu- pation
There is considerable validity in the "domino theory" that when one nation falls to communism, others nearby will soon follow a similar path	.54	.35	96.4	6.6
The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of Communism	.54	.36	85.4	7.4
The U.S. should avoid any involvement in the Angolan civil war	.51	.36	70.7	10.4
The U.S. should never try to get by with half measures; we should apply necessary power if we have it	.51	.41	59.7	17.7
Containing communism [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.51	.36	65.7	7.4
The conduct of American foreign affairs relies excessively on military advice	.50	.47	47.8	36.3
Any communist victory is a defeat for America's national interest	.49	.32	60.8	5.8
Revolutionary forces in "Third World" countries are usually nationalistic rather than controlled by the USSR or China	.41	.30	38.6	6.2
Détente permits the USSR to pursue policies that promote rather than restrain conflict	.40	.33	27.6	8.3
A nation will pay a heavy price if it honors its alliance commitments only selectively	.40	.31	25.2	4.6
Military aid programs will eventually draw the United States into unnecessary wars	.40	.28	33.8	6.5
America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down	.40	.28	31.6	6.0
It is not in our interest to have better relations with the Soviet Union because we are getting less than we are giving to them	.36	.31	21.9	8.6

TABLE 8: COLD WAR AXIOMS AND THE BELIEFS OF 2,282 AMERICAN LEADERS: COMPARING POLICY PREFERENCES ON VIETNAM AND OCCUPATION AS EXPLANATIONS (cont.)

Questionnaire Item	Contingency Coefficient (C)*		F Ratio: Two-Way ANOVA**	
	Vietnam Policy Position	Occu- pation	Vietnam Policy Position	Occu- pation
Strengthening the United Nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.35	.27	18.0	6.7
The Soviet Union is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals	.33	.26	19.0	3.4
Defending our allies' security [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.33	.22	18.0	3.9
American foreign policy should be based on the premise that the Communist "bloc" is irreparably fragmented	.32	.25	17.4	5.7
Protecting weaker nations against aggression [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.31	.15	15.5	ns
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.31	.17	18.7	3.9
Combatting world hunger [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.31	.33	10.9	13.6
The U.S. should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home	.31	.36	11.6	19.6
China is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals	.30	.22	17.1	4.3
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.30	.33	9.7	14.8
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.28	.24	11.5	4.9
Worldwide arms control [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.27	.16	7.0	3.7
Maintaining a balance of power among nations [as a foreign policy goal for the United States]	.23	.14	8.0	ns

Thus, for the types of policy issues that were often at the core of the Vietnam debates (e.g. the universal validity of the "domino theory" and others cited on the first page of Table 8), policy positions on that conflict are a relatively better predictor of responses. On the other hand, for issues that seem somewhat more removed from those that engaged advocates and opponents of American policy in Southeast Asia during the decade-long war (e.g. economic assistance, and the like), occupation appears to be the more potent variable.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have paired a series of axioms, or "widely shared images" that "a majority of American officials (as well as the American public)"<sup>26</sup> held during much of the postwar period, with thirty-seven more or less corresponding items from our survey of over two thousand American leaders. Even a quick glance at the results will confirm erosion of support for some of the axioms, as well as a general absence of consensus on many others. To be sure, a number of key propositions still drew widespread support among our respondents. An overwhelming majority of them continued to regard the Soviet Union as an expansionist power, and two-thirds of them considered the "domino theory" to be valid. But, on the whole, change and disagreement are more evident than continuity and consensus. In short, many beliefs about world politics and foreign policy that were taken for granted rather than debated a few years ago no longer appear to be unquestioned verities.

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26. Halperin, op. cit., p. 11.

The analysis also undertook one step in the search for sources of support and rejection of the cold war axioms. When disaggregated according to respondents' occupations, the data revealed rather consistent cleavages among the resulting groups. Emerging as the sources of the sharpest divisions between occupation groups were issues that bore the closest resemblance to the military-strategic axioms of Cold War conflicts. Thus, included among those most clearly reflecting such cleavages were such issues as: The role of military advice in foreign policy, the wisdom of restraint in the use of power, intervention in Angola, the "domino theory," the relationship communist successes to America's national interest, and containment of communism.

The final section examined the impact of occupation on responses to the Cold War axioms with a somewhat different way of classifying respondents: Their policy positions during the early and late stages of the war in Vietnam. The results indicated that the latter proved to be the better explanation for strategic-military issues, whereas for issues relating to the economic aspects of foreign policy, occupation proved to be more important.