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
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
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THESIS

THE LEGACY OF IDEOLOGY
IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD THE WEST

by

Thomas Gene Wyckoff

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

Dr. Jiri Valenta

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THE LEGACY OF IDEOLOGY
IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD THE WEST

by

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Captain, United States Army
B.S., Oklahoma State University, 1969

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

→ This thesis suggests that Marxist-Leninist ideology continues to play a significant role in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations in that it demands a continuous, underlying hostility toward the capitalist west. Evidence of the continuing commitment to the ideology by the Soviet leadership is examined in three areas: the efforts of the Communist Party to impart the doctrine to the Soviet people; the bureaucratic stakes associated with the ideology in the Soviet domestic bureaucratic politics process; and evidence that the hostility toward capitalism demanded by the ideology has been present throughout the history of the Soviet Union tempered only by the relative power of the Soviet Union and the capitalist states. ↗

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

In a lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Doctor Vernon Aspaturian, of Penn State University spoke of a bilateral exchange of papers between academicians of the United States and the Soviet Union addressing the topic of "perceptions of detente and deterrence" with each group describing their respective government's views. The Soviet response was prepared by IMEMO and the USA/Canada Institute of Soviet Academy of Sciences (no author specified). American political scientists, hopeful of getting 'real' answers, were disappointed and disturbed upon finding that the Soviet effort contained the typical ideological interpretation of these concepts commonly found in official Soviet publications.¹ This represents a common attitude among American academicians and policy makers -- the belief that the ideological verbiage accompanying Soviet policy decisions is merely an icing covering the decision to make it more palatable to the Soviet populace, various domestic interest groups, or to promote a particular image abroad; that the real reasons for the selection of a given policy are to be found elsewhere in the Soviet policy process. Though a survey of literature dealing with the Soviet Union will reveal that most authors feel compelled to address ideology and concede that it must be considered to understand Soviet society

(at least to one degree or another), the current vogue is to assign to it a relatively minor role when evaluating Soviet foreign policy. It is the thesis of this paper that vogue is in error, that to understand Soviet foreign policy requires an understanding of its philosophical foundations. Put simply, ideology is a significant factor necessary for consideration when evaluating Soviet foreign policy.

This is not to suggest that ideology is the only determinant of Soviet foreign policy. James Rosenau suggests that to properly address the foreign policy of any country five sets of factors generally must be considered which impact on the policy process: the idiosyncracies of decision makers, the external behavior of officials generated by the roles they occupy, aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices of decision makers, non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior (including the major value orientations of the society), and systemic variables or the non-human aspects of a society's external environment.² Vernon Aspaturian supports this view by suggesting a multi-level, multi-dimensional approach to the study of Soviet foreign policy behavior.³ Thus it is not the thesis of this paper to suggest that Soviet foreign policy can be understood without reference to variables other than ideology. It does suggest, however, that if there are certain aspects of the Soviet foreign policy process which are significantly more important than others,

ideology is among them. It further suggests that Soviet foreign policy cannot be understood satisfactorily without consideration of this factor.

Any study of Soviet foreign policy is confounded by the nature of that society which limits access to hard data and, unless one understands the Russian language, is limited to those sources which others have seen fit to translate into English. Thus academic integrity requires that the major sources for such a study be clearly identified. This study has relied exclusively on English works essentially in the form of translations of the Soviet press, the works and memoirs of various Soviet leaders and dissidents, and works by western authors dealing particularly with those aspects of ideology which are discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter one introduces the concept of ideology as a theory in practice.⁴ The term 'ideology' as used in this thesis refers to the philosophical foundation on which the legitimacy of the political institutions of a state rests, which serves as the rationale that justifies public policy, and which forms the 'world view' on which rests the preparation of foreign policy. ('World view' is the conscious and unconscious framework within which data about the world is organized and analyzed.) It is a two dimensional concept which contains sets of factual and moral presuppositions which serve to explain or justify the ends and means of organized social action. The first dimension of ideology is

the 'fundamental dimension' which refers to the principles or philosophic foundations which determine the goals or direction of movement of a political or social movement including broadly conceived ways and means by which the goals are to be attained. The second dimension is the 'operational dimension' and refers to those principles of the movement which reflect more than do other principles a concern with practical and pressing exigencies -- political leaders generally try to relate the operational dimension to the fundamental dimension.⁵ In the Soviet Union the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology is Marxism supplemented or modified by Lenin's theories of imperialism and the vanguard of the proletariat. The operational dimension is represented by much of the remainder of Leninist thought and other principles developed by his successors based more on the reality of the moment than on close adherence to fundamental principles. As Zbigniew Brezezinski observes "Confusing these two, or failing to distinguish between Marxist theory [his term for what this paper refers to as the fundamental dimension] and the ideology [the operational impact of reality on theory], can lead to the simplistic conclusion that Soviet ideology is merely a cynical sham, consciously manipulated by the Soviet leaders . . . the Soviet Communist ideology must be viewed as combining certain doctrinal assumptions with principles derived from the theory but closely reflecting the specific reality of those who subscribe to the ideology."⁶ The

fundamental dimension is essentially a social science paradigm which serves to organize and prioritize data, and which suggests dependent/causal relationships between variables. On an operational level, the paradigm developed within the fundamental dimension serves to simplify complex, real world situations and suggests frameworks for evaluating alternatives in decision making.

Chapter two attempts to analyze Soviet ideology from the perspective of both the fundamental and operational dimensions to determine if the ideology itself has a direct conceptual impact on foreign policy formulation. Avoiding the tedious arguments of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the study will suggest and examine the following arguments. From the Marxist foundation of the philosophy develops a moral criticism of the capitalist system on two counts: first, that it represents the most exploitive -- and thus misery generating -- system of social organization which has ever existed; and second, it struggles to prevent the revolution which would bring on the next stage of human development. Lenin adds to this the theory of imperialism which suggests that the capitalists have temporarily averted the inevitable revolution by coopting the proletariat into the exploiting class by allowing them to participate, to some degree, in the exploitation of the imperial territories. The capitalist system is thus indicted morally on a third count of spreading its exploitation to world wide proportions and, in addition, corrupting the

proletariat class with notions of nationalism. Chapter two goes on to review the ascendancy of the security of the Soviet Union as the dominant foreign policy tenet which arose within the operational dimension.

Having established that the ideology does contain doctrines which have a direct impact on foreign policy formulation, chapter three turns to the question of whether or not there is evidence that the Soviet leadership is actually committed to or affected by the ideology, or if it is merely a sham which covers over cynical, pragmatic decision making. Evidence for this was sought in two primary areas. First, the extensiveness of the effort expended by the Soviet government to inculcate the Soviet populace with Marxist-Leninist ideology was considered. Second, the effort expended by the party through its selection process, internal education system, periodic elimination of non-productive members, and the continued and intensified organizational socialization process which rewards compliance and disciplines deviation within the party itself was studied.

The fourth chapter will utilize the bureaucratic politics paradigm to demonstrate the practical implications of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy process. Essentially, it will be argued that ideology plays a role in the policy process in several ways: first in shaping the shared values of those who participate in the policy process; second as one of the 'rules of the game'; third as a source of power in the policy process;

and finally as a factor which enhances or detracts from organizational perceptions and interests.

The fifth chapter will explore the impact of ideology on the Soviet foreign policy process as an historical phenomenon seeking evidence that the Soviets have carried out a foreign policy which is consistent with the ideological tenets discussed in chapter two. Three particular areas of foreign policy will be considered in the attempt to discern such evidence: first, Soviet rhetoric (i.e., what they say); second, what actions have been taken short of overt military action to achieve ideological goals; and finally, what military actions have been taken. Foreign policy as used in this thesis refers to the method by which states seek to resolve differences between themselves and others. Military, economic and political policies flow naturally from this concept. As a generalization, the more centrally controlled an aspect of the society, the more easily it can be used as a tool of foreign policy.⁷

The final chapter will review the findings of the previous chapters and suggest whether or not the general thesis of this paper has been supported or denied. However, prior to entering into the specifics of chapters two through five it would be appropriate to review the past consideration of ideology as a determinant in the Soviet foreign policy process.

The ideological factor, as an approach, developed almost immediately following the Russian revolution in 1917 and,

combined with the Bolshevik refusal to repay the war debts of the Tsarist and the Kerensky governments, provided the justification for the refusal of the United States government to recognize the government of the Soviet Union until 1934. The ideological differences between the Soviets and the U.S. (real or imagined) were covered over during the negotiations which surrounded the surrender of Germany and the establishment of a new world order. Mistakes in understanding and negotiation by both the Soviets and the United States led to a sharp conflict between the two. Ideology reemerged as an explanation of the motivations for Soviet actions. The views of U.S. policy makers crystalized around the position expressed by George Kennan in his article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."⁸ This view was later translated into policy with the publication of NSC 68 which in effect officially adopted the ideological interpretation of Soviet behavior and formulated the containment doctrine.⁹

The decline of this interpretation of Soviet motivations lies, not in the errancy of the evaluation, but in the nature of the United States political system. The logical response to the threat posed to the world in general by a powerful, ideologically motivated adversary was (as specified by Kennan and NSC 68) to respond to every effort at Soviet expansion. Given the relative weakness of the rest of the allies following the war, the burden of this response fell on the United States. This logic, coupled with a struggle within the government

bureaucracy as to what would be the role of the U.S. Military following the war, and with a significant lack of sophistication in U.S. dealings with the world, led to an interpretation that the best method to counter Soviet expansion was the maintenance of a strong military establishment.¹⁰ (This was supported by the fear that the large conventional military presence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe posed an immediate threat to Western Europe.) However, strong military establishments are expensive and in a government such as that of the United States support for this expense had to be generated in Congress and ultimately in the general population. The effort to generate this support led to an overreaction used by some politicians (Joe McCarthy for one, Richard Nixon for another) as a springboard to public attention. The Soviets and other Communist nations fueled this reaction of the American public by their actions in Berlin, East Germany, Iran, China, Korea and Hungary. The gradually increasing knowledge of the extensiveness of Stalin's purges and manipulations both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe added to the western perception of the Communist totalitarian monolith.

This reaction to the aggressive, totalitarian perception of the Soviet Union became so extensive that it led to an inability on the part of the American public and many political leaders to distinguish between the forces of 'nationalism' and 'communism', critical in an era in which the colonies of Africa and Asia were beginning to demand independence. It led to a

blind opposition to any third world leader, no matter how popular locally, that had links to or support from the Soviet Union (regardless of how limited) or who espoused Marxist-Leninist doctrines. It led to U.S. support for any regime which claimed to oppose communism no matter how unpopular that regime or how much in violation of U.S. ideals its policies were.¹¹

The policy came into question by the general public during the Vietnam war (although it had been questioned by academics earlier -- even George Kennan questioned the way the policy had been implemented) during which the social and economic costs became unacceptable. This questioning of the policy generated a reevaluation of the perceptions and ideas on which the policy was based.

With this questioning came a number of revisionist historians who suggested that the foundations of the cold war lay with misperceptions by U.S. policy makers of Soviet intentions and motivations at least partially caused by the ideological interpretation of Soviet actions.¹²

During the same period of time (World War II to the present) a change was occurring in the academic field of political science. The study of politics was acquiring, under impetus of the behavioralist school, an increasing sophistication which rejected single factor analyses in favor of the study of multiple variables impacting on political systems. In addition there was a growing

emphasis on developing 'theories' of political science which required precise definition of terms, conceptual frameworks and measurement (at least these were the hopes of those involved in the behavioralist movement). Finding the term ideology, like 'power', difficult to define precisely and thus to measure, those generalizations associated with it were relegated to positions of unimportance or at least placed in abeyance until a future time. Interest shifted to those areas which seemed, intuitively, more likely to yield to rigorous methodology. It should be noted that these attitudes were not universally held but that they reinforced in an indirect manner the positions of revisionist historians. At the moment at which the ideological interpretation of Soviet actions was being called into question by historians, it was placed on the back burner by political scientists.

The combination of these two developments, the reevaluation of the foundations of the cold war and the assumptions of U.S. post world war II policy, and the relegation of ideology to (at least momentarily) a minor role in the understanding of political phenomena resulted in a near reversal in the perception of ideology as a factor in Soviet foreign policy. From being the most important factor it now became only one of many determinants in Soviet foreign policy and in the minds of many analysts it became relatively unimportant.¹³

These rather academic reasons for lessening the importance of ideology as a determinant in Soviet foreign policy based on the reanalysis of data by historians and the difficulty in conceptualizing ideology as a term, are reinforced by another relatively complicated factor related to the weakness of the Western philosophical position vis a vis the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the Soviet Union. Marxist-Leninist doctrine attacks Western philosophy at its weakest point -- the confluence of capitalistic economic theory and the Judaeo-Christian ethic. By suggesting that capitalism generates greed and that greed is the basis of repression in the world, Marxism poses a criticism which the west cannot easily refute. As observed by "Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman: '(For many) socialism implies egalitarianism and that people are living for society, while capitalism has been given the connotation of materialism, 'greedy', 'selfish', 'self-serving', and so on'".¹⁴ Capitalistic economic theory is founded on the concept of self-interest stating that the single most important factor of economics is the law of supply and demand. The motivator for the consumer is the satisfaction of his desires or the meeting of his demands. The motivator for the producer is the satisfaction of his desire for profit. Yet this 'law' of economics directly contradicts the common ground of western moral thought, the Judaeo-Christian ethic of self-denial and concern for others. The West has yet to

produce a coherent, well received, philosophical response to this Marxist criticism. That this is a valid criticism is evidenced by the large number of the third world leaders in the 1950's who, educated in the west, rejected western philosophies in favor of socialism at least partially because of the hypocrisy between western religion which taught brotherly love and the western capitalistic economic system which exploited peoples.

The manner in which the United States, as a society has dealt with this philosophical contradiction has been to develop a pragmatic approach to problems in which as Henry Kissinger observes, "problems are segmented into constituent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. There is little emphasis or concern for their interrelationship... Though the importance of intangibles is affirmed in theory, it is difficult to obtain a consensus on which factors are significant and even harder to find a meaningful mode for dealing with them. Things are done better because one knows how to do them and not because one ought to do them... Pragmatism...seeks to reduce judgement to methodology and value to knowledge."¹⁵ Since the major bases of western philosophical thought are contradictory they are separated from reality. Decisions are made on the basis of practicality not philosophical consistency. It is commonly argued that because there is such a sizeable, demonstrable

discrepancy between the quality of life between the West and the socialist states, because the West is technically far superior, the argument is then assumed that the West is far advanced beyond the socialist in all areas -- to include philosophy (or at least that Soviet philosophy is not meaningful). Time magazine used just such an argument in March of 1978 when observing "in comparing neighboring countries where one is socialist and the other is not (North Korea vs. South Korea, Tanzania vs. Kenya) the statistical evidence almost always favors the non-socialist nations."¹⁶ Thus the assumption of errancy of the logic of the official state ideology is based on a statistical comparison. This tendency to emphasize the errancy of Socialism has been further complicated by a tendency to be overcritical of the socialist view. Though the U.S. has found it necessary to adapt a pragmatic approach to the application of its own philosophical beliefs, the Soviets were found wanting if they deviated from western perceptions of what consistent Marxist-Leninist foreign policy should be (i.e., ideological commitment was associated with blind faith). The Soviet leadership was not allowed a combination of commitment to an ideological conception of the world and a degree of common sense. As will be noted in the following chapters, the Soviets are fully aware that reality has had a very direct impact on their ability to implement doctrinal tenets. As Zbigniew Brezinski observes concerning the early years of the Soviet state

"given the weakness of the new Soviet state, ideology could not exercise a wide latitude in action. The number of policy alternatives open to the Soviet Union was relatively limited, if one excludes political suicide as an alternative; and Communist ideology...lays the greatest emphasis on self preservation."¹⁷

Furthering the tendency to reject ideology as a basis for action is a combination of two other factors. First, those individuals representing the United States dealing with the Soviet Union in the international arena are always tied to a president who will remain in office for a maximum of two terms and who thus tend to project the impact of policy only a short period into the future knowing full well that a following president may reverse current policies. Thus incremental changes in the international system are not perceived as significant. Further (and the second factor involved) the implications of Soviet ideological goals are so ominous as to be rejected out of hand as impossible to achieve (i.e., the demise of the capitalist system).

Because of the shortsightedness of western leaders (not limited to the U.S.) incremental changes which signify Soviet gains in what they refer to as the 'correlation of forces' are disregarded as unimportant. A given administration may view the expansion of Soviet influence into a new territory as a relatively minor shift in the balance of power between east and west even if the shift is clearly to

the detriment of the west, but such events attain significance when considering cumulative growth of Soviet power and influence between 1918 and the present.

This tendency to denigrate the importance of ideological differences between the two political systems has led to 'wishful thinking' on the part of those who choose to ignore the differences. This wishful thinking is quickly demonstrated by a visit by twelve U.S. senators to the Soviet Union. "The senators, led by Abraham Ribicoff (D) of Connecticut and Henry Bellmon (R) of Oklahoma left with the hope that at the very least they had managed to educate the top layer of leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin...Yet in interviews just before they left, several senators agreed they could point to few positive signs that the Soviets were willing either to understand the U.S. position or to compromise with it...The most hopeful signs, they felt, were the red carpet treatment they received at every step."¹⁸ Hugh Seton-Watson suggests that this tendency toward wishful thinking, exacerbated by western academicians who, having participated in a technical or cultural exchange with the Soviet Union involving an informal exchange of ideas with Soviet citizens not necessarily associated with the policy process, came to the conclusion that:

What 200,000 Communist party officials, from Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches in factories or collective farms, tell their subjects is all camouflage: The real views of the Soviet leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet delegation at the U.S. said over a quiet drink, or what

an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some friendly academician in Novosibirsk.¹⁹

These criticisms of the rejection of the ideological approach are not to infer that all criticism of the approach were unjustified. Any single factor approach is overly simplistic and as the field of political science has become more sophisticated so has the understanding of those factors which impact on the Soviet foreign policy making process. As noted earlier, numerous other determinants of Soviet foreign policy have been identified. This has been facilitated by a greater interaction with Soviet leadership, academic, technical and cultural exchanges, interviews with exiled dissidents, defectors and Jewish immigrants, and increasing sophistication in the analysis of the Soviet press. Some determinants have appeared so powerful initially that they reached, momentarily, the proportions of single factor analyses themselves. Particularly, following the death of Stalin, the personality of the leader as a determinant in the foreign policy process was considered of paramount importance. Others have suggested that there have been no significant changes in Soviet foreign policy goals since the times of the Tsars and have looked for clues to the understanding of Soviet foreign policy in traditional Russian foreign policy goals, thus reasserting the importance of the historical approach to understanding Soviet policy. The study of the domestic impacts on the foreign

policy process has led to a particularly fascinating approach to the Soviet foreign policy process stressing the impact of bureaucratic politics on the Soviet decision-making process.²⁰ Many now point to the interrelationship between Soviet Communism and Russian nationalism as a significant factor. Each of these ideas and others as well contribute valuable information to the understanding of the Soviet foreign policy process and must be examined in relation to the other factors.²¹ However, it is the position of this paper that, with the increasing sophistication of the study of political science and the understanding of the factors which impinge on the foreign policy process, with the discrediting of the ideological approach by revisionist historians, and with the inability or unwillingness of western philosophical thought to respond to the criticisms Soviet ideology in a coherent rational manner, ideology as a determinant in the Soviet foreign political process has been relegated to a role of relative unimportance. Thus the goal of this paper is not to exaggerate the role of ideology as a determinant in the Soviet foreign policy process but to reassert that it is a significant factor which cannot be ignored and must be considered fully as much as other factors in order to understand that process.

The importance of addressing ideology is that it answers to some degree the questions of 'why' the Soviets take certain actions. Though such concepts as cost/benefit analysis,

opportunism and risk taking suggest why particular actions are taken in the short run, each of these assume that risk taking is probable, that advantage will be taken of opportunity, that benefits will be weighed against costs when considering taking particular actions. Each of these concepts assumes the danger of conflict, none explains why the Soviet leadership would be motivated to risk current gains, why they should desire to take advantage of opportunity (at the expense of the west) or why benefits should be sought (again at the expense of the west) whether the risks are high or low. The answers to these questions are found in the motivations of those who determine the content of Soviet foreign policy. This paper suggests that ideology is one of the significant factors which motivate those individuals participating in the Soviet foreign policy process. The following chapters will address, successively, a series of questions which will attempt to show the role of ideology in that process.

CHAPTER II
FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY

Ideology, as it will be used throughout this chapter, must be considered as a social theory in practice. It is a two dimensional concept which contains sets of factual and moral presuppositions which serve to explain or justify the ends and means of organized social action. The first dimension of ideology is the 'fundamental dimension' which refers to the principles or philosophic foundations which determine the goals or direction of a political or social movement including broadly conceived ways and means by which the goals are to be attained. The second dimension is the 'operational dimension' and refers to those principles of the movement which reflect more than do other principles a concern with practical and pressing exigencies -- political leaders generally try to relate the operational dimension to the fundamental dimension.²² In the Soviet Union the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology is Marxism supplemented or modified by Lenin's theory of 'imperialism' and the 'vanguard of the proletariat'. The operational dimension is represented by much of the remainder of Leninist thought and other principles developed by his successors based more on the reality of the moment than on close adherence to fundamental principles. The fundamental dimension is essentially a social science paradigm which serves to organize and prioritize data, and which

suggests dependent/causal relationships between variables. On an operational level, the paradigm developed within the fundamental dimension serves to simplify complex, real world situations and suggests frameworks for evaluating alternatives in decision making.

Although not purporting to conduct a comprehensive review of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, those aspects of the doctrine which are fundamental to its cohesiveness and which cannot be altered without undermining its very nature will be considered as they impact, in a conceptual sense, on Soviet foreign policy. In addition, one important principle which has developed within the operational dimension but which has been related to the fundamental dimension (and thus fully legitimated) and elevated to the plane of ideological doctrine will be considered as it impacts on the foreign policy process.

A. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIMENSION

The most basic claim of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is its elevation of the study of society to a science, not in the sense used in the west when referring to the 'social sciences', but science in a physical science sense based on a fundamental understanding of the nature of change and the observation of empirical data. This claim is summed up in the concept of 'dialectical materialism', the concept upon which all other generalizations are founded.

The Hegelian concept of the 'dialectic' rejects the Aristotelian notion that what is, is, suggesting instead

that everything in nature contains within itself both those elements which define its nature and elements which contradict its nature. Thus within every observable phenomena can be detected contradiction and the seeds of change. Everything is in a constant state of flux, change is self generated because of inherent conflict.²³ However, the resolution of inherent conflict results in the elimination of immediate conflict and elevates the phenomena of conflict to a higher plane. Thus the phenomenon of the world are not viewed as static but as in a constant state of conflict which results in progressive change.

The concept of 'materialism' suggests that all that exists can be reduced to matter. Man is defined, not as a reasoning being, but as a creature which has material needs. Man's consciousness is defined as man's awareness of himself within his environment. The drive to satisfy material needs gives purpose to man. The application of consciousness and purpose by man is defined by Marx as 'labor'. The struggle of man with his environment is a struggle for the appropriation of nature or 'production'. Thus man differs from the animal not because he thinks but because he produces. Production is always a social activity. Society is viewed primarily as a way of organizing production based on a need for a division of labor to increase efficiency in production. The division of labor is linked to the technical achievements of a society, and class structure is a broad form of the division of labor.²⁴

The technological achievements or capabilities of a society translate into the 'forces of production' which in essence determine the nature of the society within which they exist. "All morality, philosophy, religion and politics are the result of the conditioning of men by their environment which is the expression of the mode of production."²⁵ Note that this entire argument has so far proceeded from the concept of 'materialism'. The relations between men (and referred to in Marxist terminology as the 'relations of production') or, more properly, between classes of men, are based on the current 'forces of production' and as such become the central phenomena of human society or the base upon which the societal superstructure is built. "When ...we ask ourselves why a particular principle was manifested in the eleventh or eighteenth century rather than any other, we are necessarily forced to examine minutely what men were like in the eleventh century, what they were like in the eighteenth, what were their respective needs, their productive forces, their mode of production, the raw materials of their production -- in short what were the relations between man and man which resulted from all these conditions of existence."²⁶

Returning to the concept of the dialectic and applying it to what Marx considers to be the central phenomena of society, the forces of production, he suggests that "neither force nor law can for long periods maintain social relationships that do not correspond to the mode of production."²⁷

Thus as man's technology changes it literally forces observable change in the society which utilizes it. Usually this change is radical and revolutionary. It is always progressive. Marx and Engles present as evidence of this progress an interpretation of history based on technological change suggesting the stages of progress as primitive communal living, slavery, feudalism and (at the time of their writing) capitalism. They argue that each stage represented a significant increase in man's ability to control his environment and produce to meet his physical needs. Capitalism represented the ultimate stage in man's technological capacity to dominate the environment.

Within each of the stages of historical progress were contained the dialectical contradictions which lead to the next stage of development. This is also true of capitalism. In each stage of development contradiction was most apparent in the realm of the 'relations of production' or the relation between classes. Though in each stage man had improved his ability to extract from the physical environment to meet his physical needs, in each stage there existed two significant 'classes' defined in terms of those who benefitted from or controlled the production forces and those who were manipulated to create the benefit for the privileged class. The exactitude of the degree of exploitation to which one class subjected another is bound up in the 'labor theory of value' which becomes fundamental to much of Marxist philosophy and will be dealt with to a limited degree shortly. The contradiction within capitalism

is that, though man has attained the capability to produce to fulfill all men's needs most men are in misery because of the exploitive nature of class relations. Due to the progressive nature of the dialectic this contradiction must be resolved in a higher form of social development. A review of other aspects of Marxist philosophy would explain why the proletariat class holds the seeds of the synthesis which will resolve the conflict and the nature of the new order will be a socialist one in which the contradictions found in the past societies will be resolved through the reconciliation of man and society.

The purpose of this review of Marxist theory to this point has not been to present all aspects and ramifications of Marxist philosophy but merely to support the fact that it claims to be a scientific understanding of history and social science flowing from an understanding of the cause of change in the world and from observable material reality. There are two points which flow from this claim to scientific reliability and accuracy which, as will be demonstrated later, have an impact on the legitimacy of the state and Soviet foreign policy. First, if the philosophy is scientifically reliable then it must describe phenomena which is universally observable and applicable. This point is particularly important to the legitimacy of the party as will be discussed in chapter four. Secondly, as a science, it allows prediction -- reliable prediction. This reliable prediction

comes in the form of the historical and scientific inevitability of the demise of the capitalist system and the rise of a new social order -- socialism. History is scientific and progressive; it is understandable, predictable and moving to a new and higher order of development. This leads to a discussion of another (and for the future discussion of foreign policy one of the most significant) of the basic aspects of Marxism-Leninism as the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology and that is the scientific basis of morality. "The notion that socialism has been made scientific, which Engels propounded in the very title of one of his pamphlets, implies not only that the coming of socialism has been proved, but also that a socialist program of action is the only action program justified by scientific analysis. Marxism says, in short, that moral values, too, can and must be derived scientifically. All action must be based on a scientific recognition of reality, not on some eternally valid moral laws" (emphasis added).²⁸

This moral implication of the Marxist philosophy becomes the 'cause celebre' of the Socialist movement and is reinforced by several implications of the doctrine. The basic moral position of the Marxist-Leninist is that the demise of capitalism and the triumph of socialism is a scientific inevitability thus those who oppose history and progress are out of step with science and truth. Morality, in essence, becomes defined as that which supports the progressive,

scientific reality of history; that which opposes it is immoral. This by itself is a rather deterministic concept not allowing for much input from man. However two corollary concepts allow for the fervor of moral indignation directed against those who stand in the way of the inevitable development of history: the theory of alienation and the labor theory of value.

The theory of alienation stems from the Marxist concept of the nature of man. Beginning with man as a physical being and having physical needs, and defining man as a creature which is distinguished from other animals only by the fact that man produces to meet his physical needs, Engels suggests that the original state of man was a condition of harmony with other men in the primitive effort of extracting from nature the minimum necessities of subsistence. As Engels presents it, the most striking features of primitive society were liberty and equality. Since there was no surplus production, there was no inequity of distribution. "All products, including the means of production, were communal property, so that there was no property system at all. For this reason, primitive society could know no leisure class, no exploiters, indeed no classes whatsoever, not even slaves."²⁹ In this state, man was free and in harmony with other men but subject to the forces of nature. Technological advances (the growth of the 'forces of production'), considered as a positive step in the direction of man's mastery over those natural forces

to which he was subject, included some negative aspects which became increasingly more negative as society progressed. These negative aspects have taken two forms.

First, man has become alienated from his environment. Man's natural relationship with the environment is a direct one of using for himself that which has been extracted from nature. Man, by the use of tools, machines and the processes of the division of labor, has become separated from his natural relationship with his environment. This was and is scientifically inevitable. "The very moment civilization begins, production begins to be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes and finally on the antagonism of accumulated labor and actual labor. No antagonism, no progress. This is the law that civilization has followed up to our own days."³⁰ Thus, referring back to the concept of the dialectic, it is out of the contradiction introduced to society by technological advancement that the antagonism arises which drives progress. As Marx says, "No antagonism, no progress."

A second feature of alienation is that in primitive society, societal relationships were natural and non-exploitive. Exploitive relationships are the "by-products of the growth of civilization."³¹

Labor...is separated from its product, because a special class that controls the means of production appropriates the product of surplus labor, leaving the laborer only the product of that necessary labor which he must expend in order to produce the

barest means for his continued existence. Thus the growth of society's productive forces beyond the most primitive level is seen as the indirect cause of the domination of men by men, of class differences and class subjugation. Furthermore, the Marxist theory of alienation holds that all natural, spontaneous relationships between men have been corroded and perverted by being cast into the rigid shells of oppressive institutions...And instead of a communal general will, a natural and spontaneous unanimity of purpose and implementation, there is the state. In short, the entire superstructure of institutions and relationships that exist on top of the division of labor and the class structure is something which Marxism not only describes, but also criticizes and condemns.³²

Thus man is no longer a natural being, he is stunted and perverted into something less than a real human being by his separation from nature and by having been 'cast into the rigid shells of oppressive institutions'. Capitalism is portrayed by Marx and Engels as the climax of man's effort to control nature representing the ultimate achievement of man's ability to control his environment and to produce to meet, in abundance, his physical needs. This provides man the opportunity to free himself from the drudgery of a relationship with tools and machinery which separates him from nature, to acquire the leisure time and the physical abundance to allow a rediscovery and reestablishment of man as man in harmony with his environment. However, this same system, capitalism, also contains within it the institutions which enforce a rigid division of labor in the form of a class structure defined simply in terms of those who own the means of production and benefit excessively from the

technical ability to produce abundantly and those who must sell their labor merely to attain a subsistence living. All aspects of the system from philosophic foundations, religious institutions, family organizations, social stratification, to political institutions (all of which Marx and Engels refer to as the superstructure of society) mutually reinforce the existing class structure and the system of exploitation which they support.

Each and every one of the elements of the superstructure (those elements of society which have been mentioned) is a means unconsciously and spontaneously devised by society, to keep itself integrated in its present class structure. The superstructure, therefore, seemingly mitigates the struggle between the classes because it aims to make the present class structure more palatable to the exploited classes, to turn their eyes away from the class struggle and to obscure its very existence.³³

In each of the stages of historical development, those who benefited most from the abundance produced through control of the instruments of production were in the minority and those who were exploited to create that abundance, the majority. However, under capitalism that minority which benefits and exploits the remainder of society is perceived to become smaller and more oppressive (necessary to protect their privileged position) while the majority becomes more and more oppressed and lives in greater and greater misery. The state, in particular, is the institution through which class relationships are manifested as power relationships. The basic function of the state is to develop and enforce a set of rules and

behavior which prevents antagonism between the exploited and exploiting classes from consuming themselves and society in wasteful struggle. Thus since the state becomes an instrument which preserves society in its present form by formalizing and perpetuating the existing class structure it is inherently beneficial to the exploiting or ruling classes. The state becomes a tool of the exploiting class (the capitalists) by which their privileged position is protected. Thus, of all the stages of history, capitalism represents a culmination of man's technical ability to produce to meet his needs, and an apex of human misery caused by the separation of man from his true nature and his exploitation by a minority of society reinforced by a powerful state structure. It was this argument which justified the violent overthrow of the Tsarist government in 1917 and is the foundation of those arguments which justify continued support by the Soviet government for various revolutionary movements throughout Soviet history. Within the Soviet Union itself, this aspect of Marxist theory has been modified to justify the continued existence of the Soviet government as a new and non-oppressive form of government.³⁴ The new role of the state in socialist society will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The second negative aspect of the current stage of historical development represented by capitalism is found in the labor theory of value. Classical political economy began with the assertion that labor is the source of value, that the amount

of labor embodied in a good is thus related to the amount of value in the good. The accompanying presumption is that the one who has created the value of the product by virtue of his labor in its creation has the right to be its owner. This applied most clearly in the most primitive forms of production. However, with the beginnings of the need for land and tools (and later machinery) belonging to others it was conceded that the owners of these instruments of production (capital) had the right to share in the product.³⁵ The actual market value of a product was not determined strictly by the amount of time and effort required to produce it but also by the amount of 'demand' for it and its availability (supply). Marx suggested that with the introduction of the concept of the private ownership of capital came the fact of exploitation. Regardless of the stage of history, those who control or own the means of production (capital) seek to pay the laborer only that wage necessary to meet his requirements for subsistence and reproduction. The worker's labor becomes a commodity for which, since there is a considerable supply of labor available, the wage paid is low. The capitalist produces for exchange in order to make profits. His profits come from the sale of products produced as "surplus value" by the laborer. The law of the concentration of capital suggests that the competition for markets and places to invest accumulating capital will force more and more of the owners of the means of production out of business and into the ranks of the exploited class thus the

exploiting class will become smaller with capital being accumulated into the hands of fewer and fewer people. As this happens, the exploited class (the proletariat) will become swollen, with not all even able to hold subsistence paying jobs. The misery of the proletariat will become greater and greater until finally this contradiction between the classes will explode into revolution bringing on the next stage of historical development.

Thus the moral condemnation of capitalism is based on two fundamental grounds. First, it stands in contradiction to scientific, historical inevitability and, second, it represents the most oppressive, degrading form of exploitation which has yet existed on earth. It is important to note this before moving to the next point because Marx and Engels spent more of their effort in explaining and attacking the capitalist system than in describing the nature of that system which would take its place. This tradition was continued by Lenin in the theory of imperialism. With the failure of the revolution of the proletariat to materialize in the late nineteenth century and the growth of trade unions and their power within the various representative forms of government in Western Europe and the United States, some Marxists began to question certain aspects of Marxist philosophy. They suggested that possibly revolution was not necessary -- that the contradictions of capitalist society could be resolved working within the existing political system. This was based particularly on the

very apparent fact that the working class was not only not more miserable but in most instances improving its conditions.³⁶

Lenin rejected this notion and offered his own explanation of why the revolution was not proceeding as expected. Essentially he argued that capitalism (the political institutions of the capitalist states primarily) had found a temporary solution to achieving higher profits while increasing (temporarily) the well being of the workers within their own countries. This was done by turning to the underdeveloped portions of the world for cheap raw materials, ready markets for products and for the use of excess capital, and cheap, exploitable labor -- in short, imperialism. In order to control business and thus preserve its own existence, the state entered into the process of regulating business bringing some order to the anarchy of capitalistic competition. With the concerted effort of business and government, imperialism provides the mechanism through which the capitalist states extort super-profits from their colonies and protectorates. Part of these super-profits are used to bribe the proletariat masses (or at least the union leaders) into acquiescence. In effect the proletariat of the imperialist nations becomes temporarily a part of the exploiting class. Another factor which blinds the proletariat to its true consciousness is the struggle which begins between the imperialist nations for control of the resources and markets in the underdeveloped world. In their attempts to maximize their share of the profits,

the unions support their own government in opposition to other nations.³⁷ In moral terms, Lenin thus reinforces those arguments which have been stressed earlier. Not only does capitalism stand in the way of historical progress and not only does it represent the worst form of human exploitation, it has elevated this exploitation to an even more extreme form (imperialism) and has corrupted the proletariat masses while doing so.

The moral issue does not simply end with the condemnation of the capitalist system. Marxism-Leninism is a philosophy of hope. The hope of progress. The basic assumption is that at one point though subject to the forces of nature, man was in harmony with his fellow men. Marx argued that changes in the means of production and the resulting contradictions in the relations between man have led to a progressive improvement in man's ability to control his environment. Capitalism represents man's mastery over nature but the contradictions within man's relations with other men remain. However, within capitalism lie the seeds of the reconciliation of man's social relations. This is found in the nature of the proletariat. The proletariat class is the first class in the progressive development of history since the primitive communal stage which, although it was so bound up in the production process as to be defined as a part of the process (the working class), it was totally devoid of ownership of the instruments of production. The laborer had in fact become a commodity in the

production process. In effect it had lost its humanity and "therefore it epitomized the entire inhumanity of the capitalist system."³⁸ Marx felt that this would lead the proletariat to a clear perception of the contradictions of a society organized on the basis of private ownership. With the revolution of the proletariat, the propertied class and private ownership will be done away with. Since the increasing mechanization of society will have reduced the need for the division of labor (i.e., as Marx perceived it, everything would eventually be reduced to the simplicity of pushing buttons while machines did all the work) there would no longer be a foundation for class distinctions. The productive capacity of the capitalist system would be retained allowing for an abundance of production to meet all mens' needs at a work rate which would allow sufficient leisure for man to rediscover and develop his true nature. Since private property would be abolished, those institutions of oppression which serve the sole purpose of supporting and protecting the interests of those who control and own the forces of production (the state, church, family, etc.) will cease to exist. Thus, not only does capitalism stand in the way of progress, it stands in the way of Utopia. Those who would assist progress (hasten the demise of capitalism) are morally just regardless of their means because they stand on the side of progress and Utopia.

So far this thesis has attempted to demonstrate several aspects of the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology. It claims to be a science based on an understanding of the nature of change (the dialectic) and observable phenomena (materialism). From this foundation flows a concept of history as science postulating that it is directional and progressive. It also addresses social science, tracing the alienation of man from his true nature and the expression of this alienation in existing social institutions. Combining all of these concepts Soviet ideology posits a scientific foundation for morality ultimately stressing that capitalism is an immoral system because it stands in the way of inevitable historical progress and because it represents the lowest form of human degradation especially in the form of imperialism. The socialist system represents a moral system because it is the next step in the historical progress of man and represents that stage of the development of man in which man's true nature will be reestablished and reasserted.

In summary form, the following assumptions and principles may be said to be part of the ideological framework within which the Soviet leaders evaluate and organize their perception of the outside world: Marxist doctrine is the basic source of their commitment to economic and dialectical determinism in history, and of their persistent conviction that the vehicle of history, is the class struggle... Closely related to this "scientific" conception of history is the apocalyptic image of the future and the belief in the inevitable triumph for their form of social organization. The basic organizational principles that they apply to society are rooted in the conviction that most social evils are derived from private ownership...³⁹

The ramifications of this moral conflict will be discussed shortly.

Note that the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology or its philosophical base suggests principles on which the current dominant system (capitalism) is criticized and the final goals toward which history is progressing.⁴⁰ Though the philosophy suggests more broadly conceived ways and means in which the goals will be realized (i.e., revolution and the establishment of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat') the specifics of the new order are not clearly developed.

B. THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

The basic argument of this paper is that ideology plays a significant role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. However, certain aspects of the operational dimension must be considered at this point to understand the confusion which exists over the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. This comes from the development of the doctrine of the protection of 'socialism in one state' which occurred in the operational dimension. As will be demonstrated shortly, this doctrine has not altered the fundamental anticipation of the inevitable demise of the capitalist system nor modified the antagonistic stance of the socialist system toward capitalism but has been devised and justified in recognition of the realities of the operational dimension.

The distinction between a purely philosophical concept and an ideology lies in the effort to put into effect the philosophical concepts. The resulting confrontation with reality leads to a concern with practical and pressing exigencies. Though attempting to relate decisions and policies to the fundamentals of the philosophy, political leaders must take account of reality, particularly in the short run, leading to modification of policies derived strictly from philosophy. The political leadership thus acts in an operational dimension in which reality is confronted, decisions made, and planning conducted. Within this dimension, the conscious attempt is made to relate decisions and planning to the philosophical tenets found in the fundamental dimension.⁴¹ The practical reality which affects the implementation of the doctrine is more than the problems which face its adherents. It includes the personalities of the leaders of the movement, the particular historical setting in which it is implemented (to include the historical experience of those on whom it is imposed), the level of social and economic development, and the political environment in which it emerges. The philosophy is prepared in abstract based on a perception of the world by its authors. The degree to which it appears to reflect accurately the nature of reality determines its appeal. Marx and Engels, two Germans writing in the mid to late nineteenth century, based their thoughts on observations of nineteenth century

Europe and the United States prior to the rise of trade unionism. With the apparent failure of the proletariat revolution to materialize, the increasing power of labor unions in parliamentary systems, and a considerable increase in the well-being of the working class of the capitalist countries, the theory of Marx and Engels appeared to lose relevance.⁴² However, revitalized by Lenin's theory of imperialism, it encouraged the Bolshevik Party in Russia, under the leadership of Lenin, to seize power. The theory was confronted by several immediate realities not dealt with within its context. First, the revolution occurred in a state just emerging from feudalism, not a fully developed capitalist state. Second, the expected revolution in Europe failed to materialize. Third, while the theory was detailed in its criticism of capitalism and its evils and weaknesses, it was general in its description of the socialist stage of development and how Communist society was to be achieved once capitalism was overthrown. Only general references to the intermediate phase of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', necessary to wipe out the vestiges of capitalism and the need to do away with private ownership of the means of production as the central contradiction of capitalism, were given. Few specifics as to the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat were proffered. It is this vagueness in stressing the specifics of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its implementation in a near feudal

state which allowed a significant degree of flexibility in Soviet short run decision and policy making. However, it is the argument of this thesis that though the conditions of the moment may have, practically speaking, limited the options available to the Soviet leadership to options not in keeping with the fundamental dimension, decisions were not made without reference to those considerations.

Lenin forever fought a dual war against two deviations from what he considered the most expedient course to be followed. One of these deviations is the path of opportunism; the other, that of ultraleftism, or ultraradicalism (no universally applicable term has been coined to label this second deviation). Opportunism may be defined as the readiness to adapt the party's course of action too much to ephemeral conditions of the moment. The opportunist is a man who forgets or neglects the goals toward which action should be oriented. He has become a mere tactician, whose actions are adjusted to momentary situations to such a degree that he becomes the slave of events. His actions therefore bog down in the mire of spontaneity. The ultraradical is a leader so preoccupied with the final goal that he tends to disregard the material obstacles separating him from it and therefore becomes unrealistic in his actions. Obsessed with the ideas of socialism, he cannot bear to have his hands soiled by compromises or alliances of any sort. Preserving his radicalism at all cost, he will engage in a blind and futile struggle against the existing order, ending in defeat and frustration.⁴³

Flexibility is possible precisely because of the fundamental doctrine of the scientific inevitability of the success of socialism which in practice means that, while the efforts of socialists can hasten the inevitable, mistakes or retreats have only momentary consequences.⁴⁴

In terms of Soviet foreign policy, certain of the decisions made in the operational dimensions have in effect been

cannonized and, although they remain on a secondary level of theoretical cannonization they have assumed the proportion of ideological doctrinal tenets. The most significant of these decisions was made initially by Lenin and the Bolshevik party leaders at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and continued more formally as a state doctrine by Stalin and his successors. This was the decision that the protection of the existence of the first socialist state should take precedence over the attempt to trigger a world proletariat revolution. This did not constitute a rejection of the philosophical notions of the inevitability of the proletariat revolution but a realization that the occurrence of the revolution in Europe was not imminent and that the Soviet state was too weak militarily, economically, and politically to confront the capitalist nations alone.⁴⁵ The theory of imperialism reinforced this concept suggesting that the capitalist nations were still strong but would be weakened later through continuous struggle between themselves. Stalin strengthened this argument by stressing that the Soviet Union would serve as a rallying point around which the socialist movement would coalesce and as a base from which it could expand. "In elaborating the socialism-in-one-country doctrine for which he became famous, Stalin in 1924 noted that one country (the USSR) could be used as a base for the coming world revolution, for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."⁴⁶ Lenin argued from a

position of pragmatism based on a combination of a recognition of the reality of the moment and a focus on fundamental goals:

The gist of this argument was the question: what things are expendable in the fight for the success of the world revolution, and what things are not expendable? Lenin's opponents were ready to sacrifice the existence of the Soviet state for the sake of maintaining socialist principles and proletarian orthodoxy. Lenin, on the other hand, thought that maintenance of the revolutionary regime in Russia was imperative. Its continued existence, he argued, was indispensable for the progress of humanity. Principles could be violated; constructive tasks even in Russia might have to be postponed. What mattered was that the party preserve its stronghold in at least one country. Once this stronghold was secure, the worldwide revolution might run its course, rapidly or slowly, as the dialectics of history would determine. The base would be in firm hands, and nothing else was of equal importance. 'When we shall, in the fullest measure, have realized the dictatorship of the proletariat in our own country, the greatest unification of its forces through the vanguard, through its advanced party, then we can wait for the world revolution.'⁴⁷

In effect, Lenin recognized the implications of the inter-relationship of the two aspects of ideology, the fundamental and operational dimensions. Commitment to philosophical principles need not infer blind adherence in the face of obvious adverse realities. Though political leaders may make decisions which are not 'strictly' in accordance with their principles, this does not mean that these principles have been abandoned.

...it would appear that ideology is not incompatible with rational behavior, once the basic assumptions are granted. While these assumptions may or may not be rational, they are at least so far removed from immediate concerns that they do not produce a conflict between the ideology and a rational approach to reality. The goal of an ultimate world-wide Communist society, allegedly determined by history, may be irrational, but it does not necessarily impose irrational conduct.⁴⁸

This principle of the recognition of reality in decision and policy making while remaining conscious of fundamental principles is evident in other areas of Soviet decision making but for the purposes of the consideration of the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy, the concept of the security of 'socialism-in-one-state' is the most significant.

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

As has been argued to this point Marxist-Leninist philosophy is relatively specific in its critique of the capitalist system but relatively general in its description of the nature of the socialist system. This leads to a considerable degree of flexibility in the operational dimension of Soviet domestic politics. Limited essentially only by the fundamental requirement to eliminate the private ownership of the means of production, the basic contradiction of capitalism which is the source of man's alienation from himself and his environment and which is the catalyst for exploitation and class struggle, Soviet domestic policy is characterized by considerable flexibility. However, the arena of foreign affairs is much more directly affected by the fundamental dimension in two particular areas.

First of all, the relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist nations relate directly to the moral aspect of 'scientific' socialism. The capitalist states are not only

characterized by internal and external exploitation of peoples, unstable in their relations with each other and toward the socialist states, and hostile toward the socialist system, but also stand directly in the way (at least temporarily) of historical progress. The capitalist states remain at odds with the Soviet Union (at least theoretically) because of the overwhelming effort that Marx placed on criticizing the nature of the capitalist system and the added aspect of imperialism suggested by Lenin which elevated the exploitation by the capitalists to an international scale. The socialist claim of being more in tune with the scientific understanding of historical progress and with the attempt to elevate man to a new level of humanity places the relations between the socialist movement and the capitalists on a moral plane rather than a strictly pragmatic state to state relationship. This relationship is affected by the operational considerations of reality which have led to the security of 'socialism-in-one-state' doctrine. The operational decision to place the security of the Soviet Union above the fundamental conflict between socialism and capitalism does not reflect abandonment of the fundamental principle of antagonism toward the capitalist system. In each instance in which it is obvious that state security has been placed above scientific inevitability (as Khrushchev did frequently in qualifying the policy of peaceful coexistence)⁴⁹ the operational decision is always placed within the context of its relation to the fundamental principle:

An absolute certitude of self-righteousness is also an inherent aspect of the ideological influence. Compromises and adjustments can never be ends in themselves and are only accepted by the Soviet leaders if they appear to be warranted in terms of their pursuit of higher ends. While in practice this may appear to differ little from the attitude of those nations that view such compromises in a favorable light and are prepared to consider them as ends of policy, the significant factor is the built-in element of transiency involved in any such compromise as far as the Soviet leaders are concerned. Indeed, Soviet policy-makers face a continuing dilemma of having always to differentiate between tactical expediency and concession of principle in order to be able to make such compromises. This difficulty, however, is minimized by the Soviet conviction that, in the final analysis, Soviet foreign policy is always objectively correct since it is geared to history.⁵⁰

That this is an issue to which the Soviet leadership is sensitive is reflected in the nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict. According to Donald Zagoria much of the disagreement originated with Chinese criticism of the Soviets for having abandoned fundamental Marxist-Leninist antagonism toward the capitalist states. The Soviets, on the other hand, claim that they have not abandoned the principles but have exercised good judgement in the face of the reality of the relative weakness of the socialist bloc vis a vis the west through 1973.⁵¹ Thus the Soviet leadership is aware of the relationship between pragmatic action based on the realities of the moment and the fundamental implications of any long term reconciliation with the west. As will be demonstrated in chapter four this issue bears directly on the legitimacy of the continuing rule of the CPSU in the Soviet Union.

The second aspect of foreign policy which is affected by the fundamental aspects of ideology is relations with the developing world. As suggested by the theory of imperialism, though the ex-colonies are not ready for socialism per se, they are perceived as natural allies of the socialist movement in the struggle to free the world from imperialism.⁵² This has a two-fold thrust. First, the ex-colonies serve as natural allies because they are the exploited peoples of the imperialist world. To the degree that third world leaders can be made to understand this they can be offered the socialist mode of development and assistance as an alternative.⁵³ Secondly, it is significant to note here that from the Soviet point of view this is a zero sum concept. Regardless if third world nations join the socialist camp, to the degree that they limit capitalist access to cheap labor, resources and markets, theoretically they have added to the difficulties of the imperialist nations and hastened their inevitable downfall.⁵⁴ Operationally, considerable flexibility is possible in this realm because all non-socialist states represent opportunities.⁵⁵ Failures are not directly attributable to failure of the ideology but to the inability of relatively backward peoples to understand history and to the tenacity of the capitalist system in holding on to its sources of profit. The direction of Soviet foreign policy actions toward the developing nations is thus encouraged and affected by two fundamental principles: weakening

the capitalist system and the humanitarian consideration of assisting the developing nations to the most rapid path to socialism. Yet this offer is conducted within the context of operational reality (i.e., recognition that the developing nations are not yet ready for socialism, and that the Soviet Union has only limited capacity to influence these nations without directly confronting the imperialist nations).

D. SUMMARY

It has been the goal of this chapter of the paper to demonstrate the interrelationship between the fundamental and operational dimension of Soviet ideology. In capsule form, it has been suggested that Marxist-Leninist philosophy claims to be a scientifically founded doctrine based on an understanding of the nature of change (the dialectic) and observable phenomena (materialism). From this foundation is derived a paradigm of 'scientific socialism' which suggests that capitalism represents the triumph of man over the environment. Capitalism also represents the pinnacle of man's alienation from his true nature. The paradigm also suggests a linear view of history in which the next step in man's progress is the reconciliation of the contradictions found in capitalism. This has been elevated to a scientific concept of morality which finds capitalism morally depraved on the grounds that it stands in the way of historically inevitable progress and that it is a system which creates

the misery and suffering of many for the benefit of a few. The socialist system is moral because it retains the capitalistic ability to produce abundantly but eliminates exploitive classes and institutions. The theory of imperialism revitalized the doctrine, explaining why the inevitable had not yet occurred. With the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia the attempt was made to implement the philosophy adding to it an operational dimension affected by the reality of the personality of leaders, historical experiences, social and economic circumstances, and the struggle for political power following the revolution. In addition there existed an external threat. These factors led to several foreign policy tenets which may be said to be derived directly from ideology. First, relations between the Soviet state and the capitalist nations are an overt expression of the moral confrontation between socialism and capitalism. This moral confrontation is fundamental to the philosophy and cannot be negated without questioning the entire doctrine. Second, practical recognition of the relative weakness of the Soviet Union initially dictated caution in dealing with the capitalist states; from this grew the tenet of the protection of 'socialism-in-one-state' while continuing to focus on long range goals. Third, the developing nations appear to be natural allies of the socialist movement in the effort to hasten the collapse of the capitalist system. All activities which disrupt the capitalist system are legitimate and useful. Finally, relations

between socialist states are potentially damaging to the coherence of the doctrine due to the claim of scientific, thus universal, application. The claim of alternate roads to socialism ultimately questions the reliability of the ideology as a useful instrument in the preparation of policy (and thus the legitimacy of the CPSU).

There are multiples of other factors which impact on the preparation of foreign policy on a day-to-day basis in the operational realm but the fundamental dimension, in essence, serves as a parameter to action. Though short run decisions may be made which run counter to fundamental tenets, counter policies must be justified in terms of necessity and placed in context with long run, over all goals.

CHAPTER III
IDEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

To lend credence to the argument of the importance of ideology as a factor of Soviet foreign policy, this paper now turns to the socialization process in the Soviet Union to consider the probability that those individuals involved in the foreign policy process are actually committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology. This process will be considered in the following manner: first, the general socialization process affecting the general population of the Soviet Union will be considered, and then the selection and socialization process of the Communist Party and its leadership.

"Political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes and behavior accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system."⁵⁶ "The agents of political socialization include family, school, church, peer groups, social class, ethnic group, the work life situation and the mass media."⁵⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington note that the individual in society receives his first political orientation from his family and then as his awareness begins to broaden, he is affected by other agents of the socialization process. Frequently in other societies these agents are many and unorganized, often operating at cross purposes. However, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington observe, in the Soviet Union "all non-family agents

of socialization are subordinated to the Communist Party and directed toward a single goal."⁵⁸

Thus the first factor to be considered in the socialization process which ultimately produces Soviet foreign policy makers is the family. Whether or not the family is supportive of the state desired goals of the socialization process, their impact has been lessened significantly from the impact which the family had prior to the revolution for several reasons. First, the family is changing from the extended family of the traditional Russian peasant to the relatively small urban nuclear family. According to the Soviet central statistical administration, by 1970 urban populations exceeded rural population. Of a total population of 241.7 million, 136 million were classified as urban.⁵⁹ Within this family, generally both parents work (70 percent of mothers in the Soviet Union work according to David Lane).⁶⁰ Of the children of women who work, 22.9 percent are in collective child care centers during the day.⁶¹ There are a large number of broken homes increasing the difficulty of control or impact on the socialization process by the working parent. Unwed mothers produced 17 percent of the total births in 1965 and 13 percent in 1967. The implication here is that the effective impact of the family on the socialization process in the Soviet Union is lessened through the necessity of parental absence during a large part of the working day.

This is not to presume that the family would work at cross purposes to the fundamental thrust of the Party socialization process. The recent emphasis of the Party on the strengthening of the family unit is "an indication of the Soviet belief that now families are no longer likely to inculcate values at variance with the dominant ideology."⁶² Families, now a third generation under the Socialist system, understand the system, are convinced of its legitimacy and in a typical parental way push their children toward success within the 'rules of the game'. For those who are recalcitrant to an extreme, the 1968 Principles of Marriage and Family Law provide that a court may remove a child from parents "if the child is endangered by remaining"⁶³ (usually used to pressure religious believers to refrain from teaching religious dogma to their children).

The real, overt effort to politically socialize Soviet youth begins with the Soviet youth program. Unlike western psychologists who stress the overwhelming importance of the earliest years in personality formation, the Soviets view the development process as one in which influences during more advanced stages of maturation are only slightly less important in determining adult behavior.⁶⁴ The Soviets thus have created a program which impacts on every aspect of a youth's life from age seven to twenty-eight. It is a closely coordinated integration of the education system and highly organized social groups. Though these two systems

are closely intertwined, for ease of study they will be considered separately.

The educational system is subordinated to four general goals: to build the Communist state in the Soviet Union; to overtake the U.S.; to extend Communism throughout the world; and to create the 'new Soviet man'. Teachers are expected to inculcate in youth Communist morality consisting of patriotic devotion to the motherland, hatred toward enemies of the people, and socialist humanism (the Communist version of brotherly love). A heavy emphasis is placed on self discipline, hard work, and emotional self control -- the attributes of the new Soviet man. Children are constantly reminded that they are growing up in the best of all possible worlds. They are taught Marxism-Leninism as ultimate truth.⁶⁵ History is seen as a tool for assisting the party to achieve objectives set forth in the party program and as a result is changed if necessary.⁶⁶ Finally, it is expected that the educational system will provide the inculcation of loyalty and support for the government, the party, its leaders and their policies.

The child frequently begins his education in a preschool sponsored by a factory, farm trade union or a local Soviet. The purpose of the school is two fold, first to release the parents to work and secondly to develop in the child the ideas of neatness, order and personal relations. His

political education is initiated through exciting stories about the glorious deeds of party and state leaders.⁶⁷

At age seven the youngster enters primary school where the major goal is general education with emphasis on physical education; aesthetic education stressing appreciation of the Soviet school of artistic realism; mental education which includes the development of a scientific and materialistic outlook, mastery of dialectical method, orderly and systematic study and thought habits; polytechnical skills (required for all students), and moral education which attempts to further reinforce self discipline, patriotism and proletarian internationalism, dedication to the goals of the state, community and the party, and acceptance of common rules of conduct and etiquette. Pressure on those who resist this instruction generally comes in the form of an oral reprimand or bad marks from the teacher, or peer pressure from other pupils who are members of the recalcitrant individual's work group (collective). As a further reflection of the role of the family in the socialization process, a more stringent measure is public criticism of the parents of the child by the Party, Parent-Teacher Associations or Trade Union branches.⁶⁸

Secondary school includes two formal courses in political study intended to make every student generally familiar with the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The subjects taught in these two courses are: an overview of Marxist-Leninist

philosophy and the importance of the role of the party, and a systematic and generalized course designed to form a Communist world outlook.⁶⁹ Secondary education is usually completed (the last two years) on a part time basis except for those who have been selected for higher education. Three factors are generally involved in gaining acceptance to institutions of higher education. First and foremost is academic excellence in secondary school. A character reference from the Party, the Komsomol, or from a place of employment is required. A third factor which is gaining in importance is family influence. It is at this point at which the first real filter through which future Soviet leaders must pass. Those who are openly antagonistic toward the system are not likely to proceed to higher education. This serves also to pressure youth into patterns of acceptance in order to achieve upward mobility.

In addition to filtering out those who are antagonistic to the system a continuing effort is made to imbue higher education students with proper ideology. Roughly 10 percent of a student's time and study are directed toward Marxist-Leninist ideology covering such topics as the history of the CPSU, dialectical and historical Marxism, political economy, scientific atheism and so on.⁷⁰ The educational program takes on added significance when considering that no other views are tolerated. Even those students who become bored or disaffected with this overt political indoctrination are

likely to acquiesce in their acceptance of general tenets if for no other reason than the fact that alternatives may not be apparent.

The educational system is complimented by a youth program designed to serve two distinct purposes. First is to further the ideological socialization of youth and second to monopolize the field to prevent the emergence of authentic youth movements. It is organized on three levels beginning with the Little Octobrists in the seven to nine year old bracket through the Young Pioneers (10 to 14 years old) up to the Komsomol which includes the ages of 14 to 28. It numbered on the order of 53 million members in 1965. Virtually every primary school student is a member and most secondary school students are members.⁷¹ Membership in the Komsomol is a requirement for attendance at an institution of higher education.

At the primary school level activities are so closely tied to the educational system that membership is taken for granted. All extracurricular activities such as athletics, hobbies, summer camps and so on are controlled exclusively by the Pioneer organization.⁷² Children are organized in 'links' of five to twelve members. Several links are joined to form a detachment and all of the detachments of a school are joined in an all-school brigade. The program of the Pioneers is similar to an elaborate Boy Scout program with heavy political overtones. The activities

are attractive and the organization well staffed. Most members are members by choice and most parents "now regard the Pioneer Organization with, at worst, indifference ... The current generation of parents is itself a product of the Soviet system."⁷³

Both the Little Octobrists and Pioneers incorporate a good deal of time presenting attractive Soviet versions of history, emphasizing comparisons between dark, prerevolutionary times and the achievements of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. An extraordinary amount of time is spent instilling a negative image of the West (especially the U.S.).⁷⁴

The Komsomol continues the political indoctrination of youth in a much more overt manner and many writers comment on the frequently negative results which ensue. Many youths become bored and apathetic toward the ideology. However, it is very apparent to Soviet youth that material rewards in the Soviet Union are generally awarded on the basis of usefulness to the state. Absolute differences in material rewards between ordinary occupations and those demanding advanced training are great. The opportunities for advancement depend substantially on access to higher education. The Komsomol has a large say in access to and continuation in education and also the kinds of career opportunities available on graduation.⁷⁵ Therefore there is tremendous pressure to conform.

As a doctrinal control on the Komsomol, its officers are all Communist Party members and its general secretary serves as a member of Party Central Committee.

Thus the educational system and the youth program serve as a methodological socialization of the young. It directly transmits to the young the values and attitudes determined by the society's political elite. Due to the importance of education in access to the material rewards of the system and the close relationship between the Komsomol and access to higher education there is tremendous pressure to conform. The adult population is a product of this system and is generally, at worst, acquiescent to it. For the most part it, at a minimum, produces adults who are acquiescent to the authority of the Communist Party and provides an opportunity for upward mobility to those identified by the Komsomol and the Party as promising.

As a further indicator of the importance of ideology in Soviet society it should be noted that the effort to instill Marxist-Leninist thought patterns into the Soviet populace does not end with the efforts aimed at Soviet youth. Every means of information dissemination are rigidly controlled. Newspapers are exclusively controlled and staffed by the Communist Party. The electronic media are expected to develop in Soviet people aesthetic appreciation of Soviet art forms and to present the party view of domestic and world affairs. Entertainment programs are expected to reflect and

reinforce appropriate ideological doctrines. A heavy emphasis is placed on those major efforts of Soviet competition with the West such as the space program, the Olympics and Soviet involvements in foreign affairs. Literature is expected to reflect correct ideological content and will not be published if it does not. Art which does not conform to the Socialist Realist school is repressed. Trade Unions (93 million members) serve the dual function of stimulation of production and continued indoctrination through guest speakers from the Komsomol and the Society for Knowledge (an adult education organization numbering about 2.3 million and covering topics dealing with ideology and practical subjects).⁷⁶ Leadership of all organizations are either Party members or closely monitored by the Party. No formally organized groups exist which oppose the official state ideology. Membership of most groups, and especially trade unions, include numerous party members who are responsible to the Party for setting examples for the general membership and running talks and seminars on ideological and other matters during breaks to insure that no time is wasted.

Existing alongside this effort to inculcate the Soviet populace with Marxist-Leninist ideology is a corresponding effort to suppress alternative ideas. Though currently not as ominous as during the Stalin era, the security police still conduct a pervasive clandestine surveillance of the Soviet public. Corrective labor facilities still exist for

those who do not adjust to the requirements of the system.⁷⁷ Individuals who become openly critical of the party and the government are pressured through various means such as the loss of privileges and position, pressure on families and harrassment by the secret police to conform. Those who are adamant and become difficult to deal with may be committed to mental treatment facilities (such as was Major General P.G. Grigorenko in December of 1969⁷⁸) without any possibility of appeal to the courts under the charge that the "patient shows poor adaptation to the social environment."⁷⁹

Another aspect of this effort is the attempt to isolate the Soviet people from corruptive contact with western social systems.⁸⁰ Such efforts are characterized by the maintenance of an informer network among ordinary Soviet citizens who are involved in "aspects of Soviet society related to foreign affairs."⁸¹ No group of Soviet citizens travelling abroad travels without a representative of the state security committee (KGB).⁸² The extent to which the Soviet government is prepared to go to suppress the threat of the impact of external ideas on the Soviet Union is apparent in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968 which in large measure was a response to the destabilizing impact of Czechoslovakian reforms on the Soviet Ukraine (as well as other areas of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Bloc).⁸³

More recently, though repression of dissent continues to be evident, the Soviets appear willing to continue their

process of isolating the Soviet people from alternative or corrupting ideas by expelling dissidents (Solzhenitzyn, Ginzburg, Grigorenko) or allowing them to emigrate (particularly the Jewish populations).

Though the end result, in many cases, may be to deaden political sensitivities, several positive results are achieved. First, given the lack of alternative ideas being presented, probably those political ideas which are held by the general populace are supportive of the government and the party. Second, those individuals who openly oppose the party are generally suppressed or isolated from Soviet society. Third, those individuals within the various organizations such as the Komsomol and Trade Unions with heightened political sensitivity are identified and brought into the Party where, as shall be discussed in the next section, their opportunities for self improvement are increased and their political commitment is reinforced and utilized.

Thus far the effort of this chapter has been to demonstrate the probable general acceptance of acquiescence to Marxist-Leninist ideology as the official state ideology by the Soviet people and that the process which produces this consensus also provides adequate opportunity for identification of individuals who are committed to the ideology. Those organizations designed to perform these functions are mass organizations affecting every aspect of Soviet society and all individuals within it. They are the instruments used by the

Communist Party to inculcate the general population with socialist ideals and to prevent the formation and spread of alternative ideals. The party itself differs significantly from this in its size and orientation.

The party is not a mass party seeking large memberships per se. It is an elite organization -- a vanguard -- intended to protect the ideological purity and orientation of the Soviet society. It is selective in its membership seeking only 'outstanding' citizens.⁸⁴ Candidates for memberships do not apply for memberships but must be nominated by three party members of five years standing. Those members are responsible for the performance of the candidate they have nominated. Size of the party in 1974 stood at approximately 14 million with roughly 650,000 candidate members (roughly 9 percent of the adult population).⁸⁵ The individual who is selected by the party is already highly politicized. He has been raised in a series of youth groups and possibly a trade union in which party representatives have had ample opportunity to observe him. Those who nominate him are tied to his success or failure, at least for the period of his candidacy and usually longer, and therefore have a serious interest in insuring that he is indeed committed and hard working.

The individual member is expected to perform various functions which tend to reinforce his initial commitment such as participation in various party organizations, participation in extracurricular party educational programs,

setting the example in his place of work and encouraging others in their work output. In addition, he will be expected to participate either in the Komsomol, Trade Union or other organizations as a leader in discussion and seminar groups.

Various advantages accrue to members but initially there are, again, those which tend to reinforce commitment to the party. Generally the initial rewards are simply the opportunity to participate in party meetings and the opportunity to address statements and suggestions to decision makers. This can be termed a sense of satisfaction in participation in the activities of the state. The opportunity exists to be elected to party organs and ultimately the possibility of access to high office -- these carrying substantial material rewards.⁸⁶ This opportunity for upward mobility appears to provide a greater incentive to persons of peasant and labor backgrounds than to those coming from families of the intelligentsia.⁸⁷

Another indicator of the importance of adherence to ideological purity is the existence of a number of agencies at the highest levels of the party established for the purpose of and charged with the responsibility of "ideological supervision, indoctrination and 'party discipline'."⁸⁸ That these agencies (such as the Department of Propaganda, Party Central Commission, Department of Education and Science, and party bureaucracies in the Soviet National Republics) take their

responsibility seriously is demonstrated by the expulsion of nearly 50,000 party members per year.⁸⁹ (Not all of these expulsions relate to ideological problems, some relate to failures to meet production quotas for which party members are held responsible). Those individuals who are expelled from the Party are treated as societal 'pariahs'. "What is very clear is that a person who views Party duties as distasteful is shrewder if he never becomes a member."⁹⁰

Every party member has the duty to "master Marxist-Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the molding and rearing of the man of Communist society."⁹¹ The Party member is expected to continue his education through correspondence courses and junior Party officials are expected to attend evening or part time elementary or intermediate political education consisting of course work such as the study of Lenin's life, CPSU history, and political and economic affairs. For higher level officials attendance at a Higher Party school in Moscow or a Party School in one of the Union Republics full time for four years may be required. Of the required 3200 hours of course work, 41.5 percent are devoted to political and ideological doctrine. Founded in 1946, some 55,000 Party officials attended in the first ten years. This training is "obviously intended to develop professional political leaders of society capable of providing expert social-economic direction within the framework of the ideological goals and political vested interests of the ruling

party."⁹² It is obvious that the ideological indoctrination of the Party membership and especially the party leadership is not taken lightly.

Brzezinski and Huntington observe that the more important a position in the Soviet system, the more likely it will be occupied by a Party professional.⁹³ The process which produces these professionals results in such a politically homogeneous group that organizations such as Pravda, Izvestia, and the electronic media need not be subjected to constant censorship but are controlled through the assignment of Party professionals to their management and staffs.⁹⁴

This combined selection and continuous education process leads to a leadership which reflects a general consensus in terms of ideology. Despite this consensus, power struggles do occur at times of succession and over various issues. However power struggles usually revolve around domestic issues which relate to the 'means' of achieving the Communist state rather than the commonly agreed upon ends. Foreign policy issues are more directly related to specified 'ends' of Marxist-Leninist ideology and result in a greater degree of consensus within the leadership. Those foreign policy issues which cannot be clearly defined in terms of the ideological ends could reasonably be expected to result in procrastination and conflict among the leadership. An example of this is presented in an article by Jiri Valenta considering the decision making process which resulted in

the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968⁹⁵ in which both positions (whether to invade or not to invade) were argued on ideological grounds with the non-interventionists concerned over the impact of the invasion on the Soviet's position as leader of the World Socialist movement (as well as its possible impact on the SALT talks) and the interventionists concerned over their ability to overcome the impact of Czechoslovakian liberalism on the carefully controlled indoctrination process being carried out in the Soviet Union. Obviously this was a foreign policy question whose relationship toward the ideological goals of Marxism-Leninism was not clear. However, note that those agencies most concerned with ideology (the KGB, the Department of Propaganda, the Department of Education and Science, and the Party leaders in the affected Union Republics) were those who favored intervention and who ultimately prevailed. It is also of interest that throughout the article it is readily apparent that the Soviet leadership was in total agreement over the need to change the Czechoslovakian liberalism -- the issue over which differences existed was how this change was to be achieved.

In other foreign policy decisions relating to the relationship between the Socialist Bloc and the West the issues are more clearly related to the "ends" of Marxist-Leninist ideology and allows a greater degree of consensus within the leadership.

This review of the socialization process in the Soviet Union suggests that the sheer size of the effort directed toward the indoctrination of the Soviet public with Marxist-Leninist ideals indicates the importance of the doctrine in the eyes of the CPSU leadership. Lyman Kirkpatrick, in his study of the Soviet propaganda effort notes that:

The vastness of the Soviet propaganda organization is hard to grasp. One estimate suggests that "the total of all types of propaganda, worldwide, involves some half million personnel and an annual expenditure of approximately two billion dollars." If such estimates of the resources devoted to Soviet propaganda seem high, there is one revealing comparison which can be made based on official Soviet data -- the resources devoted to internal propaganda in the USSR. The latest official data can be found in a long Pravda editorial of September 11, 1970, which claims that the propaganda work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is being carried out by 1.1 million party members, that is, by one out of every thirteen members of the party.⁹⁶

The effort to imbue the Soviet people with this ideology beginning at the earliest ages combining education and youth groups and continuing throughout the life of the individual through association with trade unions, peasant collectives and professional organizations and the total subjugation of the press and electronic media to the will of the Party are additional evidences. Other evidence of this commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology is the extent to which the Soviet leadership is willing to go to suppress alternative ideas. The success of this effort is difficult to assess but the reflection of acceptance of some aspects of the doctrine by such Soviet dissidents as Roy Medvedev are indicators:

Solzhenitzyn treats Marxism as though it were a dogma and imagines that it is enough to point out its inexactitudes, errors and inaccurate forecasts in order to cause its followers to turn away from it. When Solzhenitzyn and I were at school, Marxism-Leninism was indeed presented to us as a dogma. But Marxism-Leninism, scientific socialism, is not a dogma but a science, which has the same right to be developed like any other science and which has the same 'right to err'.⁹⁷

In addition to this socialization process, the selection process governing admittance into the political elite which demands conformity to party ideology and reinforces such conformity by continuous education and rewards to those who conform ensures that those who reach the highest levels of political leadership are relatively homogeneous in their world views and in their commitment to the system which has placed them in power. (This aspect will be considered further in the following chapter.)

Though this is not conclusive proof of the importance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy it supports the simple argument that this dedication to ideological indoctrination indicates that the party leadership is in fact committed to it and concerned that successive generations of Soviet citizens are also committed to it. Carrying it one step further, given this emphasis on political ideology in Soviet domestic society, it would be surprising if it did not play a significant role in the Soviet foreign policy process.

CHAPTER IV
IDEOLOGY AS A FACTOR IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS
OF THE SOVIET UNION

A. IDEOLOGY AND THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM

Thus far in this paper it has been argued that Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a consistent body of thought (given an acceptance of its primary assumption -- dialectical materialism and that certain aspects of the fundamental dimension of the philosophy have a direct impact on Soviet foreign policy. First and foremost, it dictates an antagonistic stance toward the capitalist nations on the grounds of scientifically based morality. Second, it suggests a natural interest in the third world on two grounds: as allies in opposition to the exploitation of the imperialists and as a method by which to increase stress on the capitalist system thereby hastening its downfall. More indirectly derived from the philosophy is a principle of a natural fraternity between socialist brothers. The philosophy as an ideology has a second dimension, the operational dimension, which takes into account the realities of the moment allowing deviation from these foreign policy tenets in the short term based on a pragmatic evaluation of the capability of the Soviet Union given its internal and external situation. The operational dimension has yielded one (at least) long term principle which has been legitimized in ideological

terms and stands firmly alongside the principles of the fundamental dimension, that being the decision to preserve the Soviet Union at all costs to serve as a base from which socialism could be spread. In addition, the previous chapter reviewed the Soviet socialization process and the selection process of the CPSU suggesting that, given the effort expended on inculcating the Soviet public with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialization process within the party itself, the current generation of the Soviet leadership is a product of the system and probably accepts and is committed to the ideology.

It is the purpose of this chapter to use the vehicle of the bureaucratic politics paradigm to demonstrate the practical implications of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy process. Essentially, it will be argued that ideology plays a role in the policy process in several ways: first in shaping the shared values of those who participate in the policy process; second as one of the "rules of the game"; third as a source of power in the policy process; and finally as a factor which enhances or detracts from organizational perceptions and interests. At this point it would again be appropriate to reiterate that it is not the position of this paper that ideology is the most important factor in the consideration of Soviet bureaucratic politics but that it is significant and does impact on the policy process.

A short review of the bureaucratic politics paradigm applied to foreign policy by Graham Allison in his book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis⁹⁸ suggests a framework for analyzing the governmental foreign policy decision making process which orients on the bureaucratic interests of the various agencies involved in that process. He suggests the consideration of governmental action as a "political resultant" as the basic unit of analysis. Study is first directed toward determining who the actors are in the foreign policy process (both formal and informal), what their roles are and what determines their stands (parochial priorities, organizational goals and interests, personal perceptions of national interest, domestic considerations, etc.), and what the stakes are for each actor in each situation. Effort is then directed toward ascertaining what determines each actor's impact on the political resultant -- essentially a function of the actor's 'power' or bargaining advantages such as his formal authority and responsibility, control over resources necessary to carry out action, expertise, and control of information on which the decision will be based. Given an understanding of the actors and their roles, perceptions and capability to influence the policy process, using the bureaucratic politics paradigm one then turns to the policy/decision-making process itself to determine what the 'action-channel' is for a given issue (how the issue enters the decision-making process, who

will be included in the policy process, and who will be the implementor of the action or decision) and what the 'rules of the game' are (i.e., those factors which constrict the range of governmental action and decisions, and which determine what the pertinent positions are, how these positions are filled and what the relative power of incumbents in these positions will be). The output of the process is viewed as a result of 'pushing and hauling' between varying interests not reflecting a rational choice per se but a compromise of sorts between the varying interests. Rational choice is limited by the environment in which choices are made such as uncertainty about what should be done, serious consequences involved, number of issues competing for the decision maker's interest, number of players involved, the speed with which a decision may have to be made, and so on.⁹⁹

Though the bureaucratic politics paradigm suggests some useful generalizations which will be considered in the course of this paper it should be noted that this paradigm requires careful qualifications when applied to the study of the Soviet Union. All studies of Soviet political processes are limited by the closed nature of the Soviet system which severely limits access to reliable data and thus places all conclusions on a conjectural plane. No reliable theory of politics has yet been proposed which is generally accepted in the study of our own system of government much less that of the Soviet Union.

The real value of a paradigm is in its comparative value. Thus an assumption (rarely stated but always implicit) is made, that given certain fundamentals (i.e., the existence of governmental bureaucracies, governmental processes, interaction between domestic agencies and foreign interest and so on), generalizations found applicable in one system to which the researcher has relatively greater access will be in some way applicable to other systems to which the researcher has less access. The value of this assumption will not be debated here other than to comment that it appears intuitively to be valuable as long as certain qualifications are maintained well in mind. Some of those qualifications should be mentioned -- particularly as they impact on this paper.

First of all, the major weakness of the bureaucratic politics paradigm when applied to the foreign policy process is that, in various ways, through processes of cooptation, socialization, selection and self-interest those individuals who stand at the head of various bureaucratic agencies are perceived to come to identify with the interests of the agencies which they head. Lower ranking members of the various agencies also come to identify with the interests of their own agency with which they come to associate their own well being. Thus the various agencies are perceived (within the paradigm) as relatively cohesive bodies of individuals having similar interests and identifying with

the major organizational interests of their agency (at lower levels there may be struggle within the agency between various sub-groups over sub-group interests, but at the national level and in struggle with other agencies for budget allocations and mission enhancing policies, members of the agency are perceived to coalesce around common interests).¹⁰⁰ Yet the bureaucratic politics paradigm fails to perceive the international milieu as an arena of competing national bureaucracies containing multiple actors, having various rules of the game and so on, competing for resources, markets, allocations (of aid from international agencies) and enhancement of national interest. Probably the most striking feature of international relations in an arena of competing national bureaucracies is the cohesiveness of these bureaucracies vis a vis one another. The national government, in effect, is another level of bureaucratic competition in which there is considerable cohesiveness among the actors in pursuit of their own nation's goals. This is not to suggest that there are not divisions of opinion, interest and competition at lower levels but that the lower levels clearly identify with the interests of the larger bureaucracy when that bureaucracy competes with outside foreign interests.

In the Soviet Union there exist factors which considerably strengthen the centralizing or unifying forces within the government which are literally non-existent in western bureaucracies.¹⁰¹ The concept of democratic centralism is

rigidly adhered to, at least publicly. Debates occur only on those issues which are allowed by the party, on issues which are as yet unsettled and for which policy has not yet been determined or on issues which have extremely powerful and diverse factional backing. This principle is reinforced by the lack of autonomy in the Soviet bureaucracy.¹⁰² The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is pervasive throughout all agencies of the bureaucracy -- the most important posts in each being dominated by party members. Party members owe their first loyalty to the party and frequently are beholden as much (or even more so) to the party for their position and promotions within the bureaucracy as to the agency itself. In addition, the costs to the bureaucrat for failure or opposition to those who are superior to him are real costs. Salaries, 'dachas', access to restricted government stores, travel abroad and so on, are all dependent upon position -- loss of position means loss of privileges. There are few alternatives available to the Soviet bureaucrat who opposes the decision of his superiors or peers -- there are no congressional investigative committees, no free press available for 'leaks', no civil service commission to appeal to, no sympathetic court system, no powerful monied lobbies, etc. The Soviet bureaucrat who represents an alternative view without significant, sure backing runs serious risks. There exists in the Soviet Union no concept of the separation of powers as exists, particularly, in the United States.

"The declared opposition of Soviet theorists to the principle of separating the powers arises, too, from the theoretical consideration that there is no need to protect different sections of the community against the state, or one part of the state against another. Such an idea would run counter to the present-day Soviet notion that Soviet society contains no internal contradictions."¹⁰³ All power is centralized in the party. Alternative views outside of the party are actively suppressed and significant state agencies exist to conduct that suppression (i.e., the KGB). Power within the bureaucracy is concentrated at the top -- advancement is as dependent upon loyal associations with superiors as it is to ability (as evidenced by Khrushchev's 'Stalingrad group' and Brezhnev's 'Dnieper mafia'). Thus, when significant disagreement occurs, it occurs at that level. It is important to note these factors by which the Soviet Union differs from the western bureaucracies and which limit comparative understanding of the Soviet system generated by various theories of political science which stress the pluralistic forces of a society. "It is sometimes assumed that a growing recognition of occupational-functional-group interest in decision making may eventually lead to the gradual institutionalization of pluralism and the evolution of the system away from the Marxist-Leninist mode. But developments do not seem to point in this direction. So far interest articulation is channeled within the Party and there are no signs of the

formation of independent foci of political influence."¹⁰⁴ Finally, in a political system which associates position with privilege (as is the case in the Soviet Union), incumbents, from low ranking to high, have a vested interest in the continuation of the system. As Vladimir Petrov observes, "It would be farfetched to say that the more enlightened part of the elite is in opposition to the regime: it constitutes an integral part of the regime and has no desire to replace it with anything else."¹⁰⁵

Having qualified the unquestioned application of the bureaucratic politics paradigm in the study of the particular situation in the Soviet Union, several aspects of the paradigm will be used to demonstrate the role of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy process. It will be argued that ideology serves as a point of consensus in the 'shared values' of decision makers in the Soviet Union, it determines some of the 'rules of the game', and finally, that the most powerful of the bureaucratic agencies in the Soviet Union have 'stakes' in the preservation of the ideology.

B. SHARED VALUES

There are a number of shared values within any political system -- this is a fundamental requirement for the cooperation necessary to form a government and for it to govern. These may range from consensus on pragmatic matters such as the provision of domestic tranquility and protection from external

intervention, to more idealistic concepts such as 'democracy', 'free enterprise' or 'socialism. Morton Halperin gives as examples of such consensus during one era of United States foreign policy such specific tenets of consensus as "The preeminent feature of international politics is the conflict between Communism and the Free World" and "The surest simple guide to U.S. interests in foreign policy is opposition to Communism"¹⁰⁶ which were drawn from the statements of policy makers in the post World War II era. Nathan Leites suggests an entire series of formalized guides upon which the Soviet leadership acts.¹⁰⁷ Graham Allison is more general, merely stating that "Some national security objectives are widely accepted."¹⁰⁸ It is the position of this writer that the foundation of the consensus of shared values among Soviet leaders is a world view shaped by a lifetime experience of continual exposure to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and adherence based on a combination of acceptance of the doctrine and the constant necessity of phrasing arguments which rationalize their own positions in Marxist-Leninist terms.

As a world view, the ideology provides a conceptual framework which suggests how information about the world should be organized and prioritizes (or gives value to) that information. "Ideology gives the Soviet leaders a framework for organizing their vision of political developments; it sets limits on the options open to them as policy makers; it defines immediate priorities and longer range goals..."¹⁰⁹

It serves as "an analytical discipline for viewing international as well as domestic politics..."¹¹⁰ In effect, it serves, as does any paradigm of social science, as a simplifying device which gives weight to some information and relationships and suggests that other data are not as important. It allows the leader to sift through the unmanageable amount of data reaching him to pick out that which is most meaningful. It serves as a psychological device "to avoid the discomfort of information overload, and thereby keep the range of alternatives to which he responds much narrower..."¹¹¹ Particularly, it simplifies decision making by eliminating some options and stressing the value of others thus providing criteria of selection between varying options. The world view which emerges from the Soviet 'scientific' understanding of the forces of history is that "conflict between communist and capitalist states is inevitable, even though wars between them are no longer 'fatalistically' inevitable. But no real conflict can or should exist within a socialist society. Any conflict which does occur is a holdover from the capitalist era or the work of capitalist agents. The end of external conflict will come only with the end of the 'external' capitalist world. World peace requires world socialism, and the forces of history are inevitably marching in this direction."¹¹² This world view has been reinforced historically beginning with the 1918 intervention of British, French and American forces at Murmansk and Archangel, the invasion of the Soviet

Union by Germany in 1941, and the formation of the NATO alliance following World War II, all described by the Soviets as directed capitalist attacks on the socialist system. The ability to stand firm in the face of those powerful opponents has given credence to Soviet perceptions of the correctness of their beliefs. This perception has been doubly reinforced when coupled with a pragmatic assessment of the growth of the physical size, population, and military power of the Socialist bloc compared with the capitalist states in 1917 and today. The historical developments which have reinforced Soviet perceptions will be considered in detail in chapter five of this study. As chapter three demonstrated, considerable effort is expended in the Soviet Union to educate the general populace to this world view and there exists evidence that this world view has been internalized, at least in simplified form, throughout the society as evidenced even in the writings of Soviet dissidents.¹¹³ That the Soviet leadership is committed to the ideology and has internalized it is suggested by Walter Lippman's observations about Khrushchev...

communism is destined to supplant capitalism as capitalism supplanted feudalism. For him this is an absolute dogma, and he will tell you that while he intends to do what he can to assist the inevitable, knowing that we will do what we can to oppose the inevitable, what he does and what we will do will not be decisive. Destiny will be realized no matter what men do. Much the same has been said by Khrushchev, privately and publicly, to many others. For this reason his prescription for the West is closely bound up with his long-range perspective. As he once put it to Adlai Stevenson,

"You must understand, Mr. Stevenson, that we live in an epoch when one system is giving way to another. When you established your republican system in the eighteenth century the English did not like it. Now, too, a process is taking place in which the peoples want to live under a new system of society; and it is necessary that one agree and reconcile himself with this fact. The process should take place without interference.¹¹⁴

At the intermediate and lower levels of Soviet leadership:

there are two broad categories: the professional party bureaucrats, the apparatchiki, from among whom the top level generalizers eventually emerge, but to whom, on the whole, the ideology has become internalized and is not a matter of continuous preoccupation; and secondly, the large staffs of the agitprop, containing the often dogmatic, doctrinaire, and conservative professional ideologues. They are the ones who most often view any new departure as a betrayal. In the lower echelons, it is more a matter of simple stereotypes and formulas than fanatical commitment...¹¹⁵

That there is considerable commitment to Soviet ideology throughout the Soviet Union is further evidenced by the fact that the majority of studies of the Soviet Union regardless of the subject in one form or another address the topic of ideology as a factor significant enough that it could not be ignored.

Domestically, the consequences of a shared value revolving around the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in constant conflict with the pressures of reality, and with the lack of clarity of the doctrine in the workings of the Socialist state, there is considerable leeway for differences of opinion providing that the subject of the private ownership of capital goods (as the fundamental source of exploitation in capitalist society) is dealt with tactfully. However, in

foreign policy, especially in dealing with the capitalist states, the ideological character of the policy relationship gains clarity. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, the policy issue is the fundamental concept of the conflict between socialism and capitalism. This immediately narrows options. A policy of antagonism on moral grounds (based both on 'scientific' socialist theory and ethical grounds) must be maintained. Tension may be relaxed for practical reasons but the tentative nature of this relaxation must be clearly specified along with the notation that this in no way alters the fundamental issue. The simplistic, black and white nature of the ideology when addressing socialist-capitalist relations is clearly recognized by the public as well as the party. With this clarity of the issue involved in the foreign relations between capitalist and socialist states comes a degree of consensus within the leadership resulting not only from the commitment of the leadership to the ideology but realizing that the ideology is one of the 'rules of the game' in Soviet politics and must be advocated when ideological issues are at stake.

C. RULES OF THE GAME

The second implication of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy process is derived from shared values as they impact on the political process. As stated by Morton Halperin,

By definition, most participants share the images dominant within the government at any one time. However, even those who do not will be constrained by

their knowledge that the shared images influence others, and this will affect the kind of arguments which are put forward.

Participants will have considerable difficulty getting the ordinary administrator or politician to believe facts that go against the shared images. Officials react as all individuals do to evidence which goes against strongly held beliefs. They either ignore the evidence or reinterpret it so as to change what it seems to mean...

Participants learn that it is not productive to put forward a proposal or to take a stand in such a way that acceptance depends on rejecting shared images...

Participants seem to believe that their influence and even their continuation in office depends on their endorsement or seeming endorsement of shared images. Even men who appear invulnerable to opposition zealously guard their reputations for accepting shared images...¹¹⁶

Thus:

Participants shape arguments in terms of the shared images of the society and the government even if they do not believe that those images are an accurate reflection of the world...

If participants believe that taking a certain stand which they think wise will be interpreted as deviation from shared images, they will take the opposite stand for fear of losing influence or indeed their position in the government...¹¹⁷

The shared values then become part of the rules of the bureaucratic game. They "constrict the range of governmental decisions and actions that are acceptable...[they] sanction moves of some kinds...while making other moves illegal, immoral, ungentlemanly, or inappropriate."¹¹⁸ In terms of the Soviet experience, though revolutionary zeal may be gone, "ideology may grow less significant in creating commitment; it becomes pervasive in supplying the criteria of administrative choice...orthodoxy substitutes for conviction and produces its own form of rigidity."¹¹⁹

Evidence of the impact of the adherence to shared values even in the face of obvious factual conflict is readily available in the form of continued Soviet adherence to the farm collectivization principle in the face of obvious superior production from private plots -- even when forced to import agricultural produce from the capitalist states to make up for shortages resulting from their own inefficient system. Another example of this is evidenced by Kosygin's effort to free the bureaucracy from some party supervision in which both he and his opponents felt compelled to couch their arguments in ideological terms, thus tacitly recognizing the 'rules of the game'.

In his speech of March 19th... /Kosygin/ clearly indicated that Gosplan, and generally speaking the Government as a whole, should thereafter be able to manage the economy without any outside interference. His only reference to Lenin was on that very point:

'Lenin cared about Gosplan's authority, about a certain autonomy, a certain independence that it was meant to enjoy. "Gosplan", he wrote, "is visibly turning into a committee of experts... A certain independence, a certain autonomy are necessary if this scientific institution is to have the necessary authority" ' ¹²⁰
(Planovoye Khozyaystvo, no 4, April 1965).

This argument was answered a few days later in Pravda also in ideological terms.¹²¹ Such are arguments obviously not intended for external consumption but reflect bureaucratic conflict within the Soviet Union and particularly the ideological confines within which the conflict was conducted. The arguments tacitly reflect the degree of acceptance by

all parties of the role of ideology and its impact as a 'rule of the game' and particularly that arguments had greater force or legitimacy if couched in ideological terms. In effect, ideology becomes a tool of power. "Each [Ideology and power] reinforces the other, and the Soviet leader must keep an eye on both. If, like, Trotsky, he neglects power for ideology he eventually loses his authority in both realms. If, like the economic planners Voznesensky and Saburov, he becomes too concerned with technical matters, he incurs the wrath of the Party leader, and is 'faded' from the scene."¹²²

In terms of Soviet foreign policy, "orthodoxy requires the maintenance of a posture of ideological hostility to the non-Communist world even during a period of coexistence."¹²³ Coexistence is fully acceptable within the rules of the game provided that the commitment to the ultimate downfall of the capitalist system is maintained in other forms. (For example continued struggle in the third world.) This is sanctioned within the rules of the game because of the focus of scientific socialism on the progressive nature of history and which addresses means only in terms of the ends. 'Coexistence' as a method in the pursuit of the ultimate goal is entirely acceptable. The inability to discern that pragmatism in the selection of means does not mean alteration or rejection of ends leads western observers to confuse "the zigzagging of Soviet policy with alleged ideological cynicism."¹²⁴ What is sanctioned by the shared values of ideology within the

Soviet bureaucratic politics process is the selection of means which are either in accordance with ideological tenets or, if antithetical or ideological tenets, clearly identified as temporary deviations based on expediency. No deviation from commitment to the ideology can be sanctioned.

Finally, as a rule of the game, the ideology is self reinforcing:

A leader still has to phrase his policy in ideological terms; he employs categories of analysis which imperceptibly shape his thoughts; he acts as if committed to it. His operational language and concepts in their turn affect the process of communication and information. His lieutenants respond likewise, emphasizing to the lower echelons the desirability of observing ideological niceties. They, conscious of their careers, accordingly strive to demonstrate their ideological fidelity, and their orthodoxy then filters back to the top, making it difficult for the leaders to act in open disregard of the ideology. There is thus an ideological feedback with in the political elite,...¹²⁵

D. BUREAUCRATIC "STAKES" AND IDEOLOGY: THE PARTY

Stakes are the interests of the various bureaucracies and the individuals within them.¹²⁶ They are the benefits or concerns which bureaucracies seek to protect or enhance; when threatened they become the costs associated with a particular decision or policy. Each bureaucratic agency within the government has stakes in various governmental decisions, sometimes significant and sometimes minor. Several of the bureaucracies have stakes associated within Soviet ideology both as benefits and as costs and the following section will deal with a number of these. However, the CPSU

must be dealt with separately when considering the bureaucratic stakes associated with Soviet ideology because the party's stakes are extremely high in terms of both benefits and costs. The Party and its membership benefit directly from the impact of ideology in that ideology legitimizes the party's claim to the right to rule the Soviet Union.

Thus a distinction is made here between the legitimacy of the state as an institution which performs various functions within society and that minority of society which rules the state and society. The party is dependent upon ideology for legitimacy -- not the state. In all nations certain functions are performed by various institutions of society -- frequently by the state -- such as the protection of public safety, the construction and control of communications networks, monitoring and protection of public health, and so on. In a highly interdependent, complex, modern society those institutions which perform these various functions, by and large, legitimize themselves if the functions are performed satisfactorily.

Ideology, however, serves to legitimize the right of one group in society (always a minority in comparison to the size of the group governed) to rule or direct the government and the people of the state. In the past, such concepts as the 'divine right of kings' served to legitimize the right of a king and his entourage to govern society (along with a considerable amount of physical force). In modern western

democracies, the concept of the 'general will' voiced through some form of general election serves to legitimize the right of one group in society (usually a political party) to control the functions of government and to establish the rules which govern society. In all societies, however, the ruling minority, though possibly in power only through the use of physical violence, postulates a principle or idea which legitimizes its claim to rule. In the Soviet Union that principle is the moral issue of moving Soviet society to a higher order of human life, a process which is only fully understood by those who have studied and are qualified to practically apply Marxist-Leninist doctrine. "Throughout history, regimes (or if you prefer, the ruling class) -- sovereigns and privileged persons -- have tended to justify themselves by invoking a legitimizing principle. Obviously, Marxism-Leninism is the legitimizing principle of the Soviet regime. It transfigures the regime of the party, or of an oligarchy within the party, or of a man within the oligarchy, into a step toward human salvation. If the party ceased viewing itself as the vanguard of the proletariat, it would become the collective tyrant, the Prince who governs according to his mood and his own personal advantage."¹²⁷ The Communist Party has found its right to rule Soviet society on a claim to superior understanding of the scientific movement of history toward the highest order of human development: communist society.

The genesis of the right of the party to rule based on ideology rather than the 'general will' was Lenin's skepticism concerning the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. He felt that though the capitalist system did carry within it the seeds of its own destruction in that the frustration of the masses would lead to spontaneous uprising, the proletariat as a group was so repressed that it required direction in order to hasten the movement toward establishment of the new socialist order. He conceived of the party as the source of this direction. "The party is conceived as the organization, incarnation, or institutionalization of class consciousness. In it, historical will and purposiveness are to acquire domination over unguided and irrational instinct and drift."¹²⁸ This was particularly important in Russia which, at the time of the revolution, had little 'proletarian' consciousness at all:

Too impatient to allow the Russian working class movement to develop gradually on the basis of economic pressure, he /Lenin/ was concerned to imbue it with revolutionary class-consciousness. This, he argued, could be brought to the working class only 'from outside' -- that is, by non-proletarian intellectuals. 'Socialism is introduced by ideologists into the proletariat's class struggle which develops spontaneously on the basis of capitalist relationships.'¹²⁹

Lenin firmly rejected democratic principles. The Marxist-Leninist future was not founded on 'the will of the people' but on historical inevitability. The future socialist society represented the general good and the sooner it arrived the better. The fastest way to move social development

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
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
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toward the utopian goal was for those who understood the scientific nature of human development to control that development. Democratic institutions which allowed those who had not yet developed their understanding or 'consciousness' to have a say in the development process would only hinder the historical process. "Lenin...firmly refused to be guided by grass roots public opinion among the working class and denounced the Mensheviks for making a fetish out of democratic rules. Disdainful of majority opinions, he wrote that 'the important thing is not the number, but the correct expression of the ideas and policies of the really revolutionary proletariat.'"130

This concept, then, serves as the basis for excluding those who are not acceptable to the party from participation in the governing of Soviet society. The right of the party to govern exclusively is based on its superior understanding of the scientific development of history toward a higher plane and the need to guide the Soviet people to early attainment of that level of development.

'The socialist consciousness of the Soviet people', Konstantinov informs us, is not spontaneous, but is molded under the guidance of the Communist Party on the basis of its scientific world outlook.' The relationship between the party and the masses is one not of rule, but of leadership; as the advanced detachment of the masses, the party, because of its scientific competence, manifests the will of the masses in its monolithic purity with cerebral precision;

The political and ideological inspirer, the organizer and leader of the conscious building of the new society is the Communist Party, which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism...¹³¹

This legitimizing principle is formalized under Article 6 of the new Soviet Constitution which reads:

The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism.¹³²

The position of the absolute authority of the party is reinforced by the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which represents an intermediate stage between the demise of the capitalist system and attainment of the communist society. The state, dominated by the party, becomes the tool by which the vestiges of bourgeois exploitation are rooted out of socialist society so that the state may ultimately begin to wither away. However as long as vestiges of the bourgeois system of exploitation exist and as long as there continues to exist an external capitalist threat to the socialist system, the state must continue.¹³³

The role of the state becomes two-fold. First to suppress the remnants of the old system, "old social ideas which hamper the development and the progress of society"¹³⁴ and all

remnants of the capitalist system of 'wage slavery'. "We must suppress them in order to free humanity from wage slavery: their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that there is no freedom and no democracy where there is suppression and where there is violence."¹³⁵ (Thus the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' is viewed as a stage in which repression and violence is accepted as a tool for wiping out the remnants of capitalist society.) And second, to protect the new socialist state from the threat of intervention by capitalist states -- a common expression of Stalin who explained that "the state was a necessary institution because of 'capitalist encirclement' and that it would persist in socialist and communist society until this encirclement was finally liquidated."¹³⁶ In both cases, however, the state is viewed as a tool of the party for the protection and building of a communist society.

The legitimacy of the party as the ruler of the Soviet state does not lie solely in the ideology. It is reinforced by its successes. In 60 years, under the guidance of the communist party, the Soviet Union has moved from a society only in the early stages of industrial development to the second most powerful state in the world. It leads the world in the production of wheat, barley, iron ore, chrome, manganese, coal and platinum, and is second only to the United States in many other areas of production.¹³⁷ It has defeated a major foreign threat (which at one point reached the gates of Moscow and actually penetrated Stalingrad) emerging from

World War II as one of the two most powerful states in the world. It has placed men in space and has developed one of the two most technically advanced military forces which have ever existed. Under Communist Party leadership the Soviet Union has become a state whose interest must be considered by all other governments as a factor in their own foreign policy making. But all of the efforts expended, sacrifices demanded and goals achieved have been accomplished in the name of the ideological goal of moving the Soviet state (and the world) toward a higher level of human development. The right of the party to demand sacrifices and select goals and to determine the allocation of resources within society has been based entirely on its claim to superior understanding of the scientific course of history. Successes have only served to further legitimize this claim. It has served further to justify the exclusion of other groups from the process of determining goals and establishing policy.

For the party, thus, the stake in ideology is high. Continued adherence to the ideology justifies the continued privileged position of the Communist party and its membership in the determination of the goals and rewards of Soviet society. Abandonment of ideology as a shared value, as a rule of the game, and as a source of legitimacy would undermine the right of the party to exclude others from the policy process. The continued privileged position of the party depends on maintaining the cohesiveness and comprehensiveness

of the ideology. As Adam Ulam observes, "probably in their most cynical moments they adhere to a domino theory of their own: acknowledge that one vital element of the ideology is obsolete, and the whole structure, not only that of the ideology but of Soviet power, may collapse."¹³⁸ Several examples of this exist domestically as well as in foreign policy. As has been mentioned earlier, the party leadership has continued to adhere to the socialist principle of non-private ownership of the means of production and continued to press for the collectivization of farms even in the face of obvious evidence of superior production from private plots. The E. Lieberman proposals stressing the introduction of the capitalist concepts of profit earning into the economic sector was another example (introduced by Khrushchev and opposed adamantly by those in the party fearful of losing control of the Soviet managerial class).¹³⁹ De-Stalinization had a similar impact by tacitly implicating the party with Stalin's 'crimes'.¹⁴⁰

However, in foreign policy there continues to exist the major moral confrontation which legitimizes the party rule. The fundamental legitimizing principle of the party is the promise to raise Soviet society and ultimately the world to a utopian plane of existence. This promise is the offer of a dramatic change from a world dominated by the immoral, exploitative, misery filled capitalist system to a system fully meeting the physical needs of man and free from

exploitation. It is the capitalist states which most clearly stand in the way of the fulfillment of that goal. This struggle with the capitalist cannot be abandoned without conceding that the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is wrong, that the capitalist system is not as bad as the ideology says it is, that there are alternative methods to achieving socialism. To concede this would undermine the right of the party to dominate Soviet society in the pursuit of the communist goal. Thus, the abandonment of an antagonistic stance in the long run is a threat (or cost) to the party in terms of loss of legitimacy.

However, this same issue may be translated into a benefit for the party if the antagonistic stance is rigidly adhered to. Domestically, the longer the Soviet state exists, the more difficult it becomes to generate enthusiasm within or without the party in searching out remnants of bourgeois exploitation, blame for failures must increasingly be laid at the doorstep of inefficiency and incompetence from within the socialist system itself. However, within the relationship between the socialist bloc and the capitalist states, the confrontation on the basis of principle is more readily apparent and the ability to generate moral fervor within the party ranks on the pretext is on firmer ground. As Ulam observes:

...to the Soviet leaders, the field of foreign relations offers the best opportunity to attempt to demonstrate the viability of Marxism, conscious as they are of the

necessity of preserving and developing the ideological élan of the Communist Party and of the regime. Marxism may be irrelevant to the problems of the Soviet Union now that its industrialization is accomplished and the state has shown no signs of withering away or becoming, in essence, less authoritarian...The battle to preserve Soviet ideology in the USSR and with it the rationale of the totalitarian system is thus being fought in a world context, and the spread of Soviet ideology, influence, and prestige throughout the world becomes increasingly crucial to the preservation of the Soviet system as we know it.¹⁴¹

The foreign policy arena becomes a field in which party dynamism and zeal is demonstrated to both its own membership and to its critics. Brzezinski notes that:

To the Party membership, Soviet international achievements are increasingly becoming the 'ersatz' method of establishing the correctness of the ideology, thereby preserving the inner sense of ideological purpose without which the Party could decay.¹⁴²

Because of the pragmatic nature of the Marxist-Leninist focus on ends rather than means it is possible for the party to demonstrate its vitality in arenas outside direct confrontation with the west and, resulting from the theory of imperialism, the shift of emphasis to the third world is natural (see chapters two and five). The degree of Soviet sensitivity to criticism over abandonment of the principle of fundamental antagonism toward the capitalists and willingness to exploit western weaknesses is adequately demonstrated by vehement Soviet rejection of Chinese Communist criticism.¹⁴³

The point is that the stakes associated with ideology for the party in foreign policy are extremely high. Abandonment of ideological rigidity toward the west strikes at

the right of the party to rule the Soviet Union. It also poses benefits for the party by demonstrating the correctness of its understanding of the world demonstrated by its successes, and by revitalizing the moral enthusiasm of the party membership by directly confronting the most fundamental element of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the struggle of the proletariat (and its representative in the world -- the Soviet Union) to destroy the capitalist system.

E. BUREAUCRATIC "STAKES" IN IDEOLOGY: OTHER ACTORS

Several other actors have stakes in the adherence to ideological tenets both as costs and as benefits. The ones which will be considered here are those which appear to have some direct impact on the foreign policy process either as a source of information, as a decision-maker and/or as an actor in the implementation of policy. First will be considered parts of the bureaucracy which appear to benefit from a rigid application of ideology and would appear to reinforce the party interest in maintaining ideological orthodoxy; next those who have an input but do not appear to have direct stakes in ideology; and, finally, those parts of the bureaucracy to which ideology appears to represent a cost. A qualification here must refer back to an earlier argument which stressed that no bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is clearly autonomous from the influence of the party. All top positions in the bureaucracy are held by party members,

and most others throughout the bureaucracy are also party members. Many of these party members may have mixed opinions or clearly side with the party on an issue in which there is conflict between their agency and the party.

That bureaucracy which most clearly benefits from the ideological impact on foreign policy is the Soviet military industrial complex or, as Khrushchev referred to them, the 'metal eaters'. As Sidney Ploss observes, "It cannot be stressed too heavily that the traditional (Soviet) patterns of investment and resource allocation which greatly favor the interest of industrial-military power over the interest of popular consumption are essentially legitimized in terms of international imperatives."¹⁴⁴ Without a perceived significant threat there is no need for a large, standing military force. The capitalist-socialist ideological conflict assures the military-industrial managers of a long term antagonism which legitimizes continued heavy budget allocations and manpower commitments in their field. It further enhances the relative importance of members of those bureaucracies in the Soviet political system. In addition, promotions and appointments within the highest levels of these bureaucracies is tightly controlled by the party and failure to cooperate with the party can threaten advancement opportunities of individuals within the bureaucracy.¹⁴⁵ Khrushchev's efforts to allocate resources away from this bureaucratic complex by downgrading the imminence of a

foreign threat and by shifting resources to less costly strategic forces were largely unsuccessful, being opposed by both the military industrial complex and party ideologues¹⁴⁶ and probably contributed to his ultimate downfall. The rising antagonism between the Soviet Union and China provides an alternative justification for use by the military and, given an interest in acquiring increasing technology from the west, could lessen usefulness of the ideological antagonism between east and west to this group.

The second group within the bureaucracy which benefits from ideology as a stake in the policy process is the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Having both a domestic and foreign mission of protecting the Soviet Union from subversion,¹⁴⁷ it is totally legitimized by Soviet ideology. Though, as some authors suggest, the KGB may profit from short term lessening of tensions between east and west,¹⁴⁸ a long term rapprochement would undermine the rationale for the inclusion of an extremely high number of KGB representatives in all official Soviet foreign delegations¹⁴⁹ and would be a definite threat to the overall mission of the organization.

Other agencies of the Soviet government appear to have no cost or only indirect costs associated with ideology as a stake in the policy process. The indirect costs are largely that these agencies are not autonomous from the party and that the senior cadres are party members, thus

having close ties to the party, and benefitting from its continued privileged position in Soviet society as well as from their own position of responsibility within a particular bureaucracy.

The foreign affairs ministry is involved in and responsible for programs which are frequently hindered by ideological clashes between the Soviet Union and the west. Those members of the ministry charged with achieving a SALT agreement with the United States or with gaining increasingly advanced technology and trade credits from the western states in particular are hampered. However, to the degree that these members of the ministry make the Politburo aware of the costs associated with a particular antagonistic policy toward the west (i.e., the Cuban-Soviet action in Angola, military aid to Ethiopia and South Yemen, etc.), the costs are not to the ministry. No jobs, prestige, or budget allocations are on the line, and programs continue despite many setbacks. The most significant evidence of this is the remarkable continuity of Foreign Minister Gromyko in his position since 1957 and elevation to Politburo membership in April 1973, despite the ups and downs of Soviet foreign relations over the past twenty-two years. A significant example of this point occurred during the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in which the foreign ministry repeatedly warned the Politburo membership of the possible consequences of the intervention on the expected

initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Johnson Administration later that year.¹⁵⁰

Two other agencies which have a limited impact on the policy process but which have minimal interests in ideology as a stake in the bureaucratic politics process are the Academy of Science on which the Party relies heavily for expertise and TASS which serves not only as a source of information but assists in the implementation of policy through the publication of speeches and official pronouncements which serve as foreign policy 'signals' to the west. However, similar to the foreign ministry, neither have costs or benefits in terms of jobs, prestige or budget allocations directly associated with ideology.

Those elements of the bureaucracy which do have a stake in ideology in terms of costs appear to be in the field of the light or consumer goods industries and those charged with agricultural production. Both would be more capable of achieving their goals if tensions between east and west were relaxed. Some resources allocated to defense industries could be redirected to these consumer oriented agencies and greater access to western technology and resources would be enhanced. However, as mentioned earlier, two examples tend to indicate a reluctance of the party to introduce such changes. First, it is evidenced by the refusal to abandon or modify the farm collectivization versus private plot production program based on a refusal to abandon the Marxist

principle of collective or state ownership of the means of production. A second example is the effort of Khrushchev to re-direct resources away from the 'metal eaters' toward the consumer production agencies.

F. SUMMARY

Though revolutionary fervor may have been significantly reduced in the USSR, Marxist-Leninist ideology continues to play a role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in three ways suggested by the bureaucratic politics paradigm.

First, as a widely held common value, it impacts as a world view or conceptual framework through which the Soviet leadership views and evaluates the world. It suggests that this world view is one which accepts as inevitable, and thus anticipates and prepares for, long term antagonism between the socialist and capitalist states. This is a view which has been historically reinforced.

Second, it has become a 'rule of the game' in Soviet politics. It constricts the range of actions or decisions which may be considered; it becomes a tool of power for those who can couch their arguments in ideological terms and a liability to those who cannot; it sanctions some moves while disallowing others.

Third, the most powerful of the bureaucracies in the Soviet Union have a stake in the continued consideration of ideology in the foreign policy process. The Communist Party,

the most powerful bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, gains the most from continued emphasis on ideology due to its reliance on ideology as the legitimizer of party rule to the exclusion of all others. Questioning the ideology is a threat to the legitimacy of the party. Since the antagonism toward capitalism is a fundamental part of the ideology, the long term antagonism toward the west cannot be dismissed or altered without also ultimately threatening the legitimacy of the party. The military-industrial complex also benefits from this ideological antagonism toward the west which provides it with a significant enemy through which to rationalize significant budget allocations, manpower commitments and enhances the relative prestige of its leadership. The KGB also benefits indirectly from the ideological orientation of the state since it serves the party primarily as an instrument for the protection of the Soviet state from both internal and external subversion -- meaning, to a significant degree, ideological subversion. These agencies, all represented at the highest level of Soviet policy making -- the politburo -- are capable of impacting directly on the foreign policy process. The foreign ministry, Academy of Sciences and TASS have only minimal organizational costs or benefits associated with ideology. Those agencies having the greatest costs associated with the impact of ideology on foreign policy are the light or consumer industries and the agricultural production agencies -- those which have the least direct impact on the foreign policy process.

The implication of this evidence of the continuing impact of ideology in the bureaucratic politics process, especially as the fundamental element of legitimizing the dominant role of the CPSU and as a useful tool for other powerful bureaucratic agencies, is that continued antagonism toward the west is likely despite efforts to come to terms with the Soviets through SALT negotiations, cultural exchanges and so on. Soviet efforts will merely shift into other areas of conflict -- particularly in the third world. Only those actions by the west which confront the Soviet Union in the operational dimension on a significant scale will result in a temporary overriding of the foreign policy tenets generated within the fundamental dimension.

CHAPTER V
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

So far, previous chapters of this thesis have suggested that Marxist-Leninist doctrine impacts on the Soviet foreign policy process by dictating, as a concept integral to the doctrine, a foreign policy posture antagonistic toward the capitalist West. Further, the doctrine suggests that the weak link in the capitalist system is its dependence on the third world for markets, cheap resources and cheap labor. An operational concern, the security of the state, has been doctrinally approved and justified as a moderating factor on the conduct of this antagonistic policy toward the west. It has also been suggested that the Soviet leadership is generally committed to the doctrine; that the Soviet people are at least acquiescent to it. The Soviet bureaucratic politics process reinforces, at a minimum, outward conformance to the doctrine on the part of those Soviet leaders who are not totally committed to it. Further, several parts of the bureaucracy have a stake in continued adherence to the ideology.

As has been noted throughout this paper, the arguments presented here do not infer that ideology is the most important determinant in the Soviet foreign policy making process -- only that it is a significant factor. This chapter will explore the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy as an historical phenomenon focusing on historical evidences of

continuing ideological impact on the Soviet foreign policy process in the form of antagonism toward the West.

At this point, it would be appropriate to define the term 'antagonism' as it is used in conjunction with foreign policy throughout this chapter. All states pursue security and other interests which enhance the well-being of their citizens and of the state -- interests generally termed 'national interests.' To the degree that these interests overlap from state to state the possibility of conflict between states exists. However, in the context of this paper, the foreign policy of a state is not considered antagonistic to that of another state unless the policy of one of the states is such that the only resolution of the conflict between them is the destruction or fundamental alteration of the nature of the opposing state(s). Illustrations of this concept would include, as examples of antagonistic policies, some wars (i.e., World Wars I and II) and such policy conflicts as exist between the majority of the Arab states and Israel in which the policy of the former is to seek the destruction of the latter (ultimately seeking the return of the lands of Israel to the Palestinians). The relations between the United States and Mexico, on the other hand, while reflecting considerable conflict of interest at the time of President Carter's visit to Mexico City in 1979, are not (within the limits of this definition) antagonistic relations because neither seeks the destruction or fundamental alteration of the nature of the other state. In application to

the relations of the USSR toward the western world, it is the argument of this paper that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, throughout its history, has been not only theoretically antagonistic but in fact antagonistic toward the west. The Soviets have actively pursued a policy which sought to alter the fundamental nature of the capitalist states.

Given this definition of antagonism, this chapter suggests that the commitment to an antagonistic policy toward the West is fundamental to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and to Soviet foreign policy. However, referring back to the nature of ideology (as a two dimensional concept as presented in chapter two: fundamental versus operational dimensions), the pursuit of this fundamentally antagonistic goal has been moderated by an operational concern for the security of the USSR. The variable within international relations which most directly affects Soviet security concerns is the relative strategic strength of the USSR in relation to the capitalist states. It is the argument of this chapter that Soviet security concerns have not altered their commitment to the fundamental alteration of the capitalist system but merely the aggressiveness with which the Soviet leadership has sought to attain this goal. In the attempt to support this position, several forms of Soviet foreign policy actions will be considered. First will be considered Soviet rhetorical commitment to the goal (i.e., what they say). This will be considered as a form of low risk activity which should be apparent throughout

Soviet history even in periods of relative Soviet weakness. Also to be considered are those periods in which the Soviets have sought to cooperate with various capitalist states (to determine if such cooperation has signaled an alteration of Soviet commitment to the overthrow of capitalism). Those evidences which are stronger than rhetoric up to and including the use of military forces will also be considered. It would be expected that, within the framework of this analysis, as Soviet capability to economically and politically support such efforts, more aggressive activity would increase.

For convenience of presentation, this analysis will divide the history of Soviet foreign policy into two phases in which each form of evidence will be considered. The first phase is the period from 1917 to 1943 in which the Soviet Union was, in fact, strategically inferior to the capitalist states. This was discovered by the Bolsheviks early in their historical experience at the hands of the Germans leading to the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk¹⁵¹ and later, in 1920, at the hands of the Poles.¹⁵² The period following those events clearly reflect the awareness by the Soviet leadership of the relative weakness of the USSR. The overwhelming success of the invasion of Russia by Germany in June of 1941 which reached Smolensk in only four weeks and was on the outskirts of Moscow by November suggests that the Soviet leadership was correct in their understanding of the Soviet situation. However, as the impact of aid and assistance from the United States and Great

Britain following the invasion by the Germans began to take effect,¹⁵³ the situation began to change. Phase two in this analysis begins in 1942-3 with the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad and Kursk. These battles marked the beginning of a Soviet military drive which terminated only at the fall of Berlin and the surrender of Germany. This marked a change in the perception, by both the Soviet and Western leadership, of the Soviet Union as one of the two most powerful states in the post-World War II world. The evidence which will be sought is that the commitment to the fundamental alteration of the capitalist West has remained constant throughout both phases and as Soviet relative power has increased (as it has in the second period) the aggressiveness with which the Soviets have actively pursued this goal has increased as well.

A. PHASE ONE: 1917-1943

The first phase of the conduct of Soviet foreign policy was characterized by (as has been mentioned previously) the strategic weakness of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist states. This weakness was the result of several factors probably the most readily apparent of which was the weakness of the Russian army. Poorly equipped and underfed, frequently affected by mass desertions and the rebellion of whole regiments when ordered into combat, defeated repeatedly by the Germans,¹⁵⁴ Austrians, Rumanians,¹⁵⁵ Poles,¹⁵⁶ and others, it was evident that the army was in no condition to conduct

successful warfare against foreign powers. As Lenin himself stated as he argued for the immediate signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk regardless of the conditions set by the Germans:

There can be no doubt but that our army is absolutely in no condition at the present moment, and will not be for the next few weeks (and probably for the next few months), to resist a German offensive successfully; firstly owing to the extreme fatigue and exhaustion of the majority of the soldiers, coupled with the incredible chaos in the matter of victualling, replacement of the overfatigued, etc.; secondly, owing to the utter unfitness of our horses, which would doom our artillery to inevitable destruction; and thirdly, owing to the utter impossibility of defending the coast of Riga to Revel, which affords the enemy a certain chance of conquering the rest of Livonia, and then Esthonia and of outflanking a large part of our forces, and lastly of capturing Petrograd.¹⁵⁷

The Russian economy was not the strongest of the European states' prior to the beginning of the war. In the prewar years the other major European powers had been developing industrially quite rapidly while Tsarist Russia had lagged behind. At the time of the outbreak of the war, though Russia was the largest state in the world and had nearly twice the population of the second largest state in Europe -- Germany -- the Russians only produced 20 percent more food crops than Germany. Germany outproduced Russia in such industrial products as pig iron by over 400 percent.¹⁵⁸ Initial Bolshevik efforts to introduce socialist production methods met with utter failure.¹⁵⁹ Compounding the economic difficulties of the new Soviet state was a civil war which continued to drain the economy for two years following the end of the

war with Germany.¹⁶⁰ Thus the immediate strategic foreign policy problem confronting the Soviet Union during the inter-war period was the rebuilding and modernization of the Soviet economy and the development and equipping of a credible, stable military organization.

The date of 1943 has been selected as the termination of the period of Soviet weakness for two reasons. First, in 1941 the German army nearly succeeded in its attempt to destroy the Soviet state. In a period of roughly four weeks the German army crossed the Soviet borders and reached the city of Smolensk. By November of the same year, they had reached the outskirts of Moscow. Thus it is fairly obvious that the Soviet Union was in fact strategically inferior to at least one of the capitalist states in 1941. Other factors which will be considered later will demonstrate that the Soviets were fully aware of this weakness. However, by 1943, with the aid of the United States and Great Britain, the Soviet Union began to overcome the German armies with significant defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk and initiating a campaign which did not terminate until Germany had fallen thus marking an apparent change in the strategic situation of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist states and, in particular, Germany.

This apparent weakness of the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1943 was not absolute however. Strategic capability is a relative concept. The evaluation of the strategic capability of a state is only meaningful when compared to the capability

of that state (or those states) against which the potential for conflict exists. During the same time frame (1917-1943) the capitalist west was not at all times (or possibly at any time) resolute and unified in its opposition to the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union. Considerable animosity developed during the Versailles Peace Conference between the allies themselves and, following the conference, between the victors and the vanquished parties. Economic instability leading to chaos (political as well as economic) in Germany, France and Great Britain immediately following the war and during the Great Depression of 1929 contributed significantly to continued political conflict among the capitalist states. The rise of facism and Nazism (both considered as forms of capitalism by Soviets¹⁶¹) served to further cause division in the capitalist camp. The exploitation of these divisions as an opportunity for a relatively weak state to act aggressively will be considered shortly. However, in this period of Soviet weakness, it would be expected that the pursuit of foreign policy goals associated with ideological antagonism to the capitalist world would be conducted with caution.

The least expensive or risky means of demonstrating continued adherence to an ideologically based antagonistic foreign policy is rhetoric. Beginning with the first Soviet state paper -- the Decree of Peace -- which contained an outright plea for an immediate peace and a unilateral declaration of

the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the new Soviet state initiated its official propaganda campaign against the West laying the blame for the war at the feet of the imperialists. "The Soviet government considers it the greatest crime against humanity to continue this war for the sake of dividing among the powerful and wealthy nations the weaker nationalities which they have conquered..."¹⁶² At the same time it initiated a new era of diplomacy with an appeal over the head of the governments of the three major powers involved in the war direct to the people of those states to support Soviet efforts to end the war:

While addressing this proposal of peace to the Governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia appeals also in particular to the class-conscious workers of the three most advanced nations of the world and the three mightiest States taking part in the present war -- England, France and Germany.¹⁶³

Other appeals to the European proletariat to revolt against the capitalist states were issued in the name of the new Soviet state on 19 December 1917:

...We do not attempt to conceal the fact that we do not consider the existing capitalist Governments capable of making a democratic peace. The revolutionary struggle of the toiling masses against the existing Governments can alone bring Europe nearer to such a peace. Its full realization can only be guaranteed by the victorious proletarian revolution in all capitalist countries.¹⁶⁴

The treaty with the Germans itself became a bone of contention within the Bolshevik party -- the primary issue being the question of how to justify any form of cooperation or

peace with a capitalist state. The treaty was treated by the Soviets not as an abandonment of ideological hostility toward the capitalist states but as a respite necessary as a matter of expediency. The peace treaty was signed only after considerable ideological debate within the Bolshevik leadership concerning whether or not the war should be continued in expectation of a sympathetic revolution by the proletariat in Germany. It should be noted here that the Bolsheviks initially felt that the revolution in Russia was not an isolated event but a spark which would ignite a revolution of the proletariat throughout Europe. However with the failure of the revolution to materialize in Germany and the renewed offensive of the German army in February of 1918 which began to threaten Petrograd,¹⁶⁶ Lenin argued that peace was necessary not because it was desirable but because there was no alternative:

The Socialist government of Russia is faced with the question --a question which brooks no postponement -- of whether to accept this annexationist peace now, or at once to wage a revolutionary war. Actually speaking, no middle course is possible. No further postponement is now feasible, for we have already done everything possible and impossible artificially to protract the negotiations. [Lenin's emphasis.]¹⁶⁷

The Soviets made every attempt to make it perfectly clear that the treaty was, in effect, an ultimatum given under circumstances leaving no alternative.¹⁶⁸ The point here is not that ideological commitment played a significant role in the decision to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers but that

the Soviet leadership felt the necessity to place such cooperation into ideological perspective when justifying such a document to the party membership. The party leadership was apparently sensitive enough to this issue that a formal resolution was passed at the Seventh Party Congress in 1918 specifically declaring that the sole reason for acceptance of such a treaty was expediency.¹⁶⁹

By 1921 the most pressing problem facing the Soviet government was economic reconstruction and modernization. Complicated by the refusal of the allied powers to recognize the Soviet government (because of its repudiation of foreign debts and the radical nature of the propaganda and policies flowing from revolutionary Russia) and the economic boycott imposed by the allies, the Soviet leadership was faced with growing unrest. "Peasant mutinies, disaffection of the workers, and the considerable dissidence within the Communist Party in 1921-23 were all by-products of the lag in recovery."¹⁷⁰ The option available to the Soviets was along the Leninist lines of dividing the capitalists and thereby weakening their united front against Russia.¹⁷¹ The direction of this divisive effort was directed toward the vanquished of World War I as obvious potential allies. Thus the Bolsheviks "branded the Versailles Peace treaty as unjust, vindictive and imperialistic...the Bolsheviks established not merely this sentimental link, whose significance must not be underestimated, but also an economic and political bond between Russia and Germany."¹⁷² The

conditions which demanded this form of cooperation were expressed clearly in the Resolution of the Ninth All-Russian Soviet Congress on the International Position of the RSFSR which noted that:

...the most essential prerequisites for the restoration and rehabilitation of the national economy are the quickest and widest possible development of trade with other countries, the attraction of foreign capital and technical personnel to exploit the natural wealth of Russia, and the receipt from other States of co-operation in the form of loans... ¹⁷³

Soviet fears concerning the ideological dangers of economic cooperation with capitalist states were expressed by George Chicherin when he noted that such assistance, though needed would be a "new and serious danger of an attempt to unite all economic interests for the purpose of turning economic collaboration with us the Soviets into our economic enslavement."¹⁷⁴ Protection against such danger was only possible through the conclusion of such agreements as the Treaty of Rapallo and even this cooperation was qualified in Marxist-Leninist terms.¹⁷⁵ The treaty of Rapallo was represented as a demonstration of Soviet support for oppressed peoples.¹⁷⁶

Early evidences of Soviet commitment to ideological tenets and the impact of such tenets on Soviet foreign policy are not limited to rhetoric. During the early years of existence of the Soviet state more direct actions intended to place stress on the capitalist system were taken as well. The theory of imperialism suggested several inherent weaknesses of the imperialist system which were available for exploitation by the

Soviet leadership. As G.A. Morgan puts it:

The primary contradiction, both chronically and in its acute manifestation as economic crisis, impels the bourgeoisie to increase pressure against the proletariat, against colonial peoples, against each other (in rivalry for spheres of influence) and against the Soviet Union. The culmination of these trends is war of one kind or another: the colonies fight for liberation, the capitalist nations who demand greater spheres of influence fight to get them...

War between capitalist countries further intensifies the resentment of the masses and at the same time both exhausts the strength of the bourgeoisie at home and makes it difficult for them to intervene against revolution abroad...¹⁷⁷

Thus three particular areas of possible exploitation by the Soviet Union were: one, division among the capitalist states (already discussed to some degree); two, appeals to, and support for struggles against the imperialist powers by the oppressed peoples of the various colonies; and third, appeals to the increasingly oppressed proletariat of the imperialist nations.

It is striking to note that several of the initial actions of the new Soviet state expressly aimed at exploiting these contradictions. On 26 December 1917, with the revolution only seven weeks old the Council of People's Commissars appropriated two million rubles to support the revolutionary activities of "the left internationalist wing of the labour movement of all countries, regardless of whether these countries were at war with Russia, in alliance with Russia, or neutral."¹⁷⁸ Even earlier than this had come an appeal to the "Moslems of Russia and the East" in which the Council of People's

commissars had appealed to the colonies of the Middle and Far East to follow the lead of the Russian revolution and revolt against the imperialist states.¹⁷⁹

The efforts of the Bolsheviks were not limited to appeals to the colonies, nor were they limited by any agreement which they had signed. Under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Article II) both the German and Soviet governments had agreed to "refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the government or the public and military institutions of the other party."¹⁸⁰ Yet only four days after the signing, Lenin noted, "Yes, of course we have broken the treaty, we have broken it thirty or forty times..."¹⁸¹ probably referring, at least, to those activities of Adolf A. Joffe, the Russian ambassador to Berlin who was working:

...assiduously against the Imperial Government. More than ten Left Social Democratic newspapers were directed and supported by the Soviet Embassy in the German capital. The embassy bought information from officials in various German ministries and passed it on to radical leaders for use in Reichstag speeches, in workers' meetings and in the Press. Anti-war and anti-government literature was sent to all parts of the country and to the front. Tons of literature were printed and clandestinely distributed by Joffe's office. 'It is necessary to emphasize most categorically,' Joffe wrote in an almost unknown memorandum, 'that in the preparation of the German revolution, the Russian Embassy worked all the time in close contact with the German Socialists.' Leaders of the German Independents discussed most matters of revolutionary tactics with Joffe, who was an experienced conspirator. In a radio message, dated December 15, 1918, broadcast by Joffe to the revolutionary soviets of Germany, he admitted having paid 100,000 marks for the purchase of arms for the revolutionists and announced that he had established in Germany a 10,000,000 rouble fund for the support of the revolution, which was entrusted to Oskar Kohn, a Socialist deputy.¹⁸²

The efforts of the Bolsheviks became even more obvious with the formation of the Third International on 2 March 1919. The purpose of the organization was clearly one which was antagonistic to the capitalist states being intended to "recruit party members in other countries, consult on revolutionary and political tactics and strategy, try to suborn government or military officials in capitalist countries, and infiltrate business, labor unions, the media, universities, the League of Nations, and even religious organizations."¹⁸³ The effort to create a separate organization to pursue the internationalist aims of the Communist party while separating from those activities the state functions of the Soviet Union (which needed the economic assistance of the very states the Third International sought to undermine) was a relatively ineffective subterfuge due to (at various times) the serving of individuals such as Lenin, Trotsky, Radek, Bukharin, and Stalin on both the Central Executive Committee of the Third International and in positions of responsibility in the Soviet government simultaneously.¹⁸⁴

The first instance of an overt military action by the Soviets occurred in 1920 with the initially successful attack of the Red Army into Poland. Several factors contributed to Soviet optimism concerning the likelihood of the success of such a venture. The majority of the 'White' armies had been defeated and the intervention of the allies had proved unsuccessful. The new Soviet state had apparently successfully

withstood the initial reaction of the imperialist world to the first socialist state. The capitalist themselves were clearly divided into two camps -- the victors and the vanquished with considerable animosity remaining from the conduct and outcome of the Versailles Peace Conference.¹⁸⁵ Even among the allies existed a considerable amount of conflict concerning the treatment of the Central Powers -- ultimately resulting in the refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty and, subsequently refusing to participate in the League of Nations.¹⁸⁶ The heavy burden of reparitions had led to economic chaos in Germany and conflict between France and Britain over what to do about the situation.¹⁸⁷ Thus despite the apparent weakness of the Soviet Union in 'real' terms, the weakness and division of the capitalist states made Soviet weakness relatively less. In addition, the action in Poland was actually initiated by the Poles, who, under Pilsudski, sought to expand Polish territory at the expense of apparent Soviet weakness. Initial Polish expectations appeared to be well founded as the opening thrust of the Polish army carried it forward to the capture of Kiev.¹⁸⁸ However, the attack by Polish forces generated a general arousal of the European proletariat in support of the Soviet Union much as the Bolsheviks had expected it to occur during the World War. As Louis Fischer records it:

Everywhere in Europe the proletariat was aroused. 'Hands off Russia' became a universal slogan. The sentiment for Russia, both in the days when Pilsudski's legions penetrated victoriously into the Ukraine, reached an even higher pitch when the Polish offensive

had given place to a Red advance, and fiery appeals from Moscow to 'The Workers of the World' supplied Labour opposition with material for protest.

Campaigns to prevent the forwarding of war materials to Poland developed in all transit countries. Working men in Czecho-Slovakia stopped and searched trains moving in the direction of the Polish frontier and refused to pass them when munitions were discovered...

Opposition to Allied intervention against Russia grew stronger in England...Lloyd George...contemplated military assistance for Pilsudski and Wrangel. The British trade unions, then very Radical and pro-Russian, objected strenuously to such measures. They wanted no war on the Soviet Republic. Not only did they obstruct the shipment of munitions to Poland: they organized a serious movement to paralyze any effort the Government might undertake on behalf of the Warsaw regime...

...for a moment it seemed as if England were on the verge of revolution.¹⁸⁹

These conditions led to over confidence on the part of the Bolsheviks (to include Lenin himself) particularly with the successes of the Red Army beginning in June leading to the rout of the Polish army and the march to the outskirts of Warsaw. Though this effort failed in the long run, it was clearly perceived by the Bolshevik leadership as an attempt to attain their ideological goals "on the bayonets of the Red Army."¹⁹⁰ The expectations of the outcome of the attack on Poland were expressed clearly by the Soviet commander of the expedition, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in an order which proclaimed that the "destinies of world revolution will be settled ultimately in the West. Our route toward the world wide conflagration passes over the corpse of Poland."¹⁹¹

It might be argued that previously described statements and actions were only those of a newly formed government led by an as yet still idealistic leadership to the external meddling of foreign powers and the opportunity presented by the Polish invasion. However as the allied armies withdrew and the Polish expedition terminated, the rhetoric continued. At the 14th Party Congress in 1925 the report of the Central Committee expressed serious concerns about the capitalist world and its relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁹² In the same year Stalin listed as the first two tasks of all communist parties:

1. To exploit to the utmost each and every contradiction in the bourgeois camp with the object of disintegrating and weakening its forces, with the object of strengthening the position of the proletariat.
2. To mark out concrete ways and means of bringing the working class of the leading countries into close contact with the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries with the object of the widest support of that movement against the common enemy, against imperialism.¹⁹³

Given the relative weakness of the Soviet Union (as clearly demonstrated by the failure of the Red Army's excursion into Poland) the Soviet leadership sought alternative methods of placing pressure on the capitalists. The colonies of the imperial powers appeared to be a lucrative target for Soviet efforts at disruption of the capitalist system for two particular reasons. First, due to the fact that the Soviet Union represented one group -- the workers -- oppressed by

the imperialists and the colonies represented a second group also being exploited by the imperialists, they were natural allies. This is a direct outgrowth of the theory of imperialism.¹⁹⁴ Second, again according to the theory of imperialism, the colonies served as a large market and source of raw materials and cheap labor for the imperialists by which the capitalists had temporarily averted the collapse of the capitalist system. As the Central Committee report of 7 December 1927 notes, the Soviet Union already represented a large market lost to capitalist exploitation which placed stress on the capitalist system. The loss of the colonies would add further stress.¹⁹⁵ The dependence of the imperialist states on external sources for markets, raw materials and cheap labor were identified as the weak link in the imperialist system.¹⁹⁶ As Stalin put it in 1921:

If Europe and America may be called the frontline, the stage of principal battles between socialism and imperialism, the semi-independent nations and colonies, with their raw materials, agricultural products and immense manpower, should be acknowledged as a hinterland, the reserves of imperialism. In order to win a war, it is necessary not only to win victories on the front, but also to revolutionize the hinterland and the reserves of the enemy. This is why the victory of the world proletarian revolution may be assured only where the proletariat knows how to combine its own revolutionary struggle with the liberating movement of the toiling masses in the semi-independent nations and the colonies, against imperialists and for the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹⁹⁷

Early efforts by the Soviet leadership to exploit this dependence of the capitalists on their colonial possessions (such as the earlier mentioned appeal to the Moslems of the Far

Eastern colonies to revolt¹⁹⁸) were not particularly successful the reasons probably being three fold: first, the relative inability of the Soviets to logistically support independence movements in any area except those contiguous with the Soviet Union (as evidenced by their tenuous efforts in Iran, Turkey, China and Afghanistan¹⁹⁹); second, the relative weakness of the colonial independence movements in the interwar period; and third, the relatively tenacious hold which the imperial powers had on the colonies.

By 1934, with the rise of Hitler in Germany, the Soviet leaders became increasingly concerned with the likelihood (or inevitability as Stalin put it) of another major European war. This concern was complicated for the Soviets by the increasingly aggressive activities of the Japanese in the far east. As Molotov observed in his report to the Seventh Soviet Congress in 1935, "We must bear in mind that the direct danger of war against the USSR has increased, certain influential circles in Japan have long been openly talking of a war on the Soviet Union."²⁰⁰ In the same speech, Molotov mentioned several ominous developments in the international situation:

Not only Japan, but Germany also has withdrawn from the League of Nations, and the meaning of this policy is patent to all. They did so in order to leave their hands free in the matter of armaments and preparations for war...The diplomacy and foreign policy of the bourgeois countries are more and more becoming the servants of those who are already seeking allies for a war for a new redivision of the world among the imperialist powers at the expense of the weaker countries.²⁰¹

The following year, in an address to the Central Executive

Committee, Molotov again reviewed the situation noting that aggression by Japan and Germany was becoming more and more likely and that the USSR had concluded mutual aid treaties with both France and Czechoslovakia designed as a "partial step towards ensuring peace in Eastern Europe"²⁰² which appeared to be the direction of Hitler's greatest interest.

The usefulness of the agreements with France and Czechoslovakia came into question very quickly when, within the next three years, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland and then seized Austria and Czechoslovakia with no response from France in any way other than diplomatic protest. This caused the Soviet leadership to question the value of a mutual assistance pact with France. As the opportunity presented itself, the Soviets signed the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Given the nature of previous criticism of Germany by the Soviet leadership and the anti-Communist propaganda campaign carried out by Hitler throughout his rise to power, such an agreement required immediate qualification within the party as a political expedient. The treaty was presented as such by Molotov to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet in which he stated:

Since the third session of the Supreme Soviet the international situation has shown no change for the better. On the contrary it has become even more tense...

In view of this state of affairs the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union...²⁰³

During the opening days of World War II the Soviets conducted two military actions which in some ways reflected ideological overtones. Though the Soviet leadership was concerned about the growing unrest in Europe several circumstances combined to suggest that the relative position of the Soviet Union to the capitalist world had improved considerably -- setting the background for these two military operations. Consider the strategic situation which confronted the Soviet Union. Communist control of the Soviet Union had been consolidated under Stalin and was undisputed by the capitalist states. The Soviet state modernization program, though brutally implemented, had been relatively successful (an example, having quadrupled the production of pig iron in a twelve year period between 1928 and 1940²⁰⁴). The development of the Soviet military had been emphasized as well -- by 1938 the Soviet armed forces numbered 1,513,000 and had at its disposal nearly 7,000 aircraft, 13,837 guns (of a caliber in excess of 76mm), and 10,180 tanks.²⁰⁵ The capitalist world, in contrast, was viewed by the Soviets as fraught with division and weakness. First of all was the failure of the League of Nations to respond forcefully to the aggression of Mussolini in the seizure of Abyssinia. Closely following this was Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In each case, though protesting, the traditional major powers of Europe acquiesced to the actions of the aggressors.²⁰⁶ Shortly after these actions, the Soviets

dropped their previous reliance on their French allies as useless in opposition to Germany and, when it was offered by Ribbentrop in 1939, accepted a treaty of non-aggression with Germany. This treaty had hidden clauses which provided for the division of Poland and the recognition of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.²⁰⁷ The division of Poland served as a tentative test of the usefulness of military action to attain political goal.. It is significant to note that though the German army invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and the French and British declared war on 3 September, the Soviets waited two full weeks to see what actions the British and French really intended to take. With the failure of these states to respond forcefully to the German actions (and coupled with the growing concern as to where the German advance would halt) the Soviet army crossed the Polish border on 17 September. Although there were obvious other reasons for the conduct of this operation it was justified by Molotov in the following terms in an address to the Fifth (Extraordinary) Session of the Supreme Soviet (31 October 1939):

When the Red Army marched into these regions it was greeted with general sympathy by the Ukrainian and White Russian population who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry, from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists...²⁰⁸

It is interesting to note that in the interim period between the partition of Poland and the Soviet attack on Finland (the next overt military effort of the Soviets) that no significant effort was made by any of the capitalist nations to

take action on the declarations of war exchanged early in the fall. Again, though the effort against the Finns obviously had other motivations, the Soviets couched their justifications in ideological terms, equating the Finnish government with imperialism and the imperialist threat against the Soviet Union:

All this has definitely shown that the present Finnish Government, embarrassed by its anti-Soviet connections with the imperialists, is unwilling to maintain normal relations with the USSR. It continues to adopt a hostile position towards our country and will take no heed of the stipulations of the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded between the two countries, being anxious to keep our glorious Leningrad under a military menace.²⁰⁹

The invasion by the German army of the Soviet Union with its overwhelming initial successes halted these Soviet adventurist exercises and compelled another Soviet period of cooperation with imperialist states: the United States and Great Britain. The magnitude of the assistance received by the Soviet Union from the United States alone was publicly acknowledged by the Soviets in June of 1944 to be "6,340 aircraft, and in addition 2,442 aircraft received from the USA on account of British obligations...3,734 tanks...206,771 lorries...food deliveries amounted to 2,199,000 tons."²¹⁰ Soviet history books refer to the period of 1941 to 1945 as the "period of 'coalition' (koalitsiya), or loose ties with the Western Allies for the purpose of 'repulsing the fascist enemies' (emphasis added)."²¹¹ This period of cooperation with Great Britain and the United States led to a softening of the

Soviet rhetoric toward their two allies, however, even this relationship was colored by a continuing suspicion of the motives of the capitalist powers. This became particularly evident in the delay of the opening of the 'second front' in western Europe so desperately desired by the Soviets with Stalin remarking at one point to American officials, "The paucity of your offers shows that you want the Soviet Union defeated."²¹² However for the most part, ideological attacks on the capitalist system were muted during the period from 1941 to 1942 and did not begin to reappear until the "Red Army victories in 1943 and subsequent arguments among the Allies regarding the second front and post war boundaries."²¹³

The point that has been made in this summary of Soviet foreign policy in the period from 1917 to 1943 is that, though the Soviet Union was strategically weaker than the capitalist states, there is ample evidence in their rhetoric of a continuing hostility to the capitalist system and that periods of cooperation with capitalist states were viewed by them as matters of expediency and not as affecting their long term ideological goals. To the extent that it was possible, they continued to place stress on the capitalist system in the form of support for revolution in Europe and early appeals to the stirrings of national liberation movements in the imperial colonies. Finally, as the capitalist states appeared divided and unwilling to take action to halt aggression in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the Soviets attempted

in three instances to achieve foreign policy objectives through military action -- one of those instances (Poland, 1920) being directly linked to the pursuit of ideological goals, the other two indirectly linked to ideological goals but being justified in ideological terms.

B. PHASE TWO: 1943 TO THE PRESENT

As has been previously mentioned, the distinction between the pre- and post-1943 eras of Soviet foreign policy conduct being drawn in this chapter is based on the relative strategic strength of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist states. Prior to 1943 both the capitalist states and the Soviets themselves saw the USSR as, at best, one of several world powers among which the Soviet Union was not sufficiently powerful to actively pursue an independent and aggressively antagonistic foreign policy. It was a multipolar world with no single state being perceived as significantly more powerful than any of several other states. However beginning with the turning of the tides of war against Germany on the eastern front in 1943, this situation began to change. For a number of reasons, the Soviets emerged from the war as a state perceived by both the western and Soviet leadership as one of the two most powerful states in the world. First, they and they alone had been in constant combat with the German army since 1941 on their own territory and had succeeded in defeating that army culminating their efforts with the seizure of Berlin in 1944.²¹⁴

At the end of the war with Germany, the Soviets controlled all of Eastern Europe and had the largest standing army in the world.²¹⁵ United States military forces were rapidly demobilized under domestic pressure. As Walter LaFeber puts it:

Pressured by the public demand to "bring the boys back home," determined to use peaceful economic pressures instead of military force to reorder the world, and disturbed by the long string of wartime unbalanced budgets, the President Truman reduced a 3.5 million-man army in Europe to 5000,000 men in less than ten months.²¹⁶

Neither France nor Britain was in any condition to place pressure on the Soviets and the Germans were still the recently defeated enemy. The United States had exploded nuclear weapons in Japan but their value in threatening the Soviet Union was limited for several reasons. For one thing, Stalin refused to recognize the atom bomb as a weapon which significantly altered the nature of warfare.²¹⁷ For another, the only existing bombs at the end of the war had been used on Japan -- though this was known only to the US -- production was limited and took considerable time for each device.²¹⁸ Sophisticated delivery systems did not exist -- targets in Russia, unlike Japan, would have to be attacked after crossing large areas of Russian territory in B-29 bombers. By 1949, the Soviets themselves had the bomb and, although US delivery systems had been modernized to jet engined aircraft, the Soviets soon generated the 'missile gap' crisis by launching the first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. Another factor

which discredited the usefulness of nuclear weapons as a decisive element giving the capitalist states advantages in dealing with the Soviet Union was the hesitancy of the United States to use those weapons in the Korean War even in those stages of that conflict in which United Nations forces suffered serious setbacks. Further enhancing perceptions of Soviet power were successful revolutions in China and Cuba which identified themselves with communism and developed close ties with the Soviet Union. Soviet perception of their own power relative to the west was encouraged by the failure of the capitalist states to support anti-communist uprisings in Eastern Europe. Finally, the attainment of independence by a majority of the colonies in the 1950's and 60's was perceived by the Soviets as initiating the final stage in the collapse of capitalist system.²¹⁹

These developments clearly depicted the Soviets as one of the two major powers in the world following World War II but within this same period several events occurred which made it apparent that, prior to 1973, they were second in relation to the United States. The most obvious event was the Cuban Missile crisis which represented a head on clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. Whatever the motivations of each side, the outcome was clear -- the Soviet Union had backed down. The resolve with which the west initially responded to Soviet strategic development and aggressive pursuit of their foreign policy goals during the 'Cold War' era also

reflected the intention of the capitalist to limit Soviet efforts. The formation of such alliances as NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and ANZUS, and bilateral agreements between the United States and Japan, the Phillipines, South Korea, and South Vietnam represented a unity and resolve in opposition to the Soviet Union and served notice that the west would not stand idly by while the Soviets attempted to alter the world. Less obvious but just as important in the demonstration of the relative inferiority of the Soviets to the United States was their inability to prevent the US from bombing a fraternal socialist state--North Vietnam--thus dispelling the myth of the protectiveness of the Soviet strategic umbrella over the socialist world. This was also the period in which the animosity between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union broke into the open particularly following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 thus demolishing the western fears of a monolithic communist bloc.

However, this was not a period of idleness for the Soviets as will be demonstrated later. It should be also noted that the world situation has again changed since the Cuban missile crisis. Prior to that event, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was a significant power to be reckoned with. The Cuban missile crisis and other subsequent events did not denigrate the power of the USSR but placed it into perspective in comparison to the strategic power of the United States. Developments which have occurred since 1962 (specifically the continuing development of the Soviet economy and Soviet military forces) and particularly since 1973 have again demanded a reevaluation

of the strategic relationship of the Soviet Union to the capitalist world and specifically to the United States. The Soviet economy, though currently exhibiting growth difficulties, has become the number one producer of iron ore, chromium, manganese, uranium and potash in the world. It is second only to the United States in the production of coal, petroleum, natural gas and steel.²²⁰ Its technology is sufficient to support an ongoing space program and to support the development of increasingly sophisticated military hardware. Militarily the Soviets have created and maintained the largest conventional army, navy and airforce in the world and (by some calculations) the largest nuclear force in the world.²²¹ In the mean time, the ring of alliances which once surrounded the Soviet Union has weakened considerably with only NATO retaining serious credibility. France has all but withdrawn from NATO and the remaining nations are enmeshed in economic difficulties. The United States has undergone the trauma of a serious failure in a major test of its foreign policy in the loss of the Vietnam War resulting in an ongoing reevaluation of the purpose and goals of US policy. The domestic struggle introduced into the US by the Vietnam War, racial conflict, and the Watergate episode have cast doubt on the resolve and unity of the American government in its ability to pursue or even identify its own foreign policy interests. The formation of the OPEC cartel and the subsequent introduction of a degree of instability into the capitalist economic system has also served

to weaken the Western alliance. Events since 1973 (as will be discussed shortly) indicate an awareness on the part of the Soviets that the strategic relationship has again shifted. As the argument being presented in this chapter is that the active pursuit of Soviet ideological goals has been limited by the strategic inferiority of the USSR this section will review that period of the history of the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in which Soviet strategic capabilities vis a vis the west have increased. It should be expected that under circumstances of increasing Soviet strategic strength and capability that the historical evidence of continuing Soviet foreign policy antagonism toward the west should take on increasingly aggressive characteristics.

During the war, the propaganda attacks against the allies of the USSR were muted. The target of their propaganda was the Axis alliance. However, in April of 1945, Stalin reaffirmed his pre-war analysis of the post-war international situation when he observed: "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."²²² This is also evidenced by:

Stalin's quiet advise to Communist leaders in France and Italy to refrain from trying to seize power immediately after the war, though his caution in this regard may have stemmed no less from wanting to lull US apprehensions than from his appreciation, as expressed later to the Belgrade Politburo, that the way the war ended -- i.e., without Soviet forces reaching France and Italy -- had "unfortunately made it impossible for the Soviet Union to establish 'people's democracies' in those countries."²²³

The Moscow Higher Party School textbook notes that the only factor which has prevented the establishment of Soviet Socialist regimes in the rest of Europe was the intervention of the "Anglo-American armed forces, who...helped to install into power a bourgeoisie government..."²²⁴ It is significant that a month prior to Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in Fulton, Missouri, "Stalin had delivered his celebrated February 9 1946 election speech in Moscow, which...publicly reintroduced the assumption of deep-rooted conflict with the West and foreshadowed a return to the doctrine of a world divided into two hostile camps."²²⁵ The success of the expansion of Soviet control into Eastern Europe was facilitated by the exhaustion of the European nations in 1945 and the recognition that to dislodge the Soviets would require a continuation of the war not only against the previous enemy but against a former ally. In addition there was a tremendous amount of public pressure to demobilize the military forces (in the democracies).²²⁶ In response to such pressures, the western states had "largely demobilized their own wartime forces within a year or so after the end of the war."²²⁷ As a result, within the three years immediately following the end of the war, the Soviets had, in effect without opposition and through the overt use of their military forces, consolidated their control over Eastern Europe and established socialist regimes in power. By Soviet estimates, the 'overthrow of capitalism in Eastern Europe with the formation of the first World Socialist System'

was a key event in the 'Second Stage' of the 'General Crisis of Capitalism.'²²⁸

The western response to the economic chaos in Europe following the war and the apparent aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy (coupled with the acquisition of the Atom bomb by the Soviets in 1949) was the initiation of the Marshall plan to economically rebuild Europe and the formation of a series of treaties (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, etc.) in an attempt to 'contain' Soviet aggression. But this did not overtly demonstrate the willingness of the west to oppose the use of military force in the conduct of foreign policy. This became a particularly important question as the preparations for the North Korean invasion of South Korea, sponsored and directed by the Soviet Union, were prepared. Key considerations by the Soviets were the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in 1949, the significant degree of congressional opposition to the commitment of economic or military assistance to Korea (due to increasingly costly commitments to Western Europe), and statements by key American officials such as General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson specifically excluding South Korea from the American defense perimeter.²²⁹ These factors, coupled with a low opinion of the readiness and quality of the South Korean defense forces (and an underestimation of the usefulness of the U.N. in the absence of the Soviet veto due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council in protest against the seating of the Nationalist Chinese

delegate) led to a Soviet calculation of a "relatively quick and easy North Korean victory."²³⁰

The Korean conflict failed to accomplish significant gains for the Soviets but served to strengthen the resolve of the West resulting in the activation of SHAPE under General Eisenhower, the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the strengthening of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and the formation of the European Defense Community which included a provision for the ultimate rearmament of Germany.²³¹ These events, compounded by the death of Stalin and the ensuing succession struggle in the Soviet Union and associated disturbances in East Germany served to momentarily temper Soviet willingness to utilize military power to expand the power of the Socialist system.

Following the death of Stalin and the relaxation of internal controls in the Soviet Union, there was hope in the west that this also signalled the introduction of moderation in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. During the period of the succession struggle, although the Soviet leadership did not abandon its rhetorical support for third world liberation movements, they did moderate their open hostility toward the capitalist states.²³² Even with the rise of Khrushchev, the leadership continued to exhibit a specific concern for the avoidance of direct confrontation with the west. However, this did not signal a departure from the struggle against capitalism. With the succession crisis

settled it was made clear by Khrushchev that two factors had made open war between the capitalist and socialist systems less likely: first, the strength of the socialist system which insured that an attack by the capitalist on the socialists would be extremely costly and ultimately unsuccessful;²³³ and second, with the advent of nuclear weapons, war had become too destructive to be a practical alternative.²³⁴ However, this avoidance of war only caused the struggle against the capitalists to shift to other arenas. As stated by Dimitri Shepilov (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1957):

Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life. As long as different social-political systems continue to exist, the antagonisms between them are unavoidable. Peaceful coexistence is a struggle, political, economic and ideological...coexistence means that one does not fight the other, does not attempt to solve international disputes by arms...²³⁵

Khrushchev made similar observations in an article published in Foreign Affairs (October, 1959):

The principle of peaceful competition does not at all demand that one or another state abandon the system and ideology adopted by it...

...The main thing is to keep to the positions of ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is right.²³⁶

At the 81st Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow (1960) the nature of the struggle against capitalism was described in this manner:

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle...The coexistence of states with different

social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism...The communists...will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere of action by the active struggle for peace, democracy, and national liberation.²³⁷

In clarifying to party members what 'peaceful coexistence' with the capitalists was not, the theoretical journal

Kommunist stated in 1962:

First, peaceful coexistence does not weaken, but contributes to an intensification of the class struggle of the proletariat;; second, peaceful coexistence does not weaken but strengthens the position of fighters for national independence; third, peaceful coexistence does not mean refusal to fight imperialism -- on the contrary, it champions and permits an intensification of the ideological, political and economic struggle against imperialism; fourth, under conditions of peaceful coexistence, there are real possibilities for the development of socialist revolution and all forms of revolutionary movement.²³⁸

It is interesting to note that Mikhail Suslov noted that whether or not the policy of peaceful coexistence was successful in avoiding war was dependent upon the capitalists and how violently they resist being deposed by alternative methods:

Communists and the working class, of course, prefer the most painless forms of transition from the one social system to the other...Whether the means used are more peaceful or more violent depends not so much on the working class as on the extent and the forms of resistance used by the exploiting classes which are being overthrown and which do not wish to part voluntarily with the vast property, political power, and privileges which they possess.²³⁹

Regardless of the form which the struggle against capitalism takes, under Khrushchev the goal remained an antagonistic one -- the demise of the capitalist system and its replacement with socialism.²⁴⁰

The vigorousness with which the goal has been sought by the Soviets has increased as they have become stronger. As A. Sovetov commented in an article published in the Soviet journal International Affairs (1960) the pressure against the capitalists is no longer limited to verbal criticism: "This moral condemnation is now supplemented by material and technical resources of the world Socialist system..."²⁴¹

The most obvious evidence of this effort is found at that point which the Soviets believe the capitalist system to be the weakest -- the dependence on the imperialist states on the colonies. As has been mentioned, this dependency was clearly identified by Lenin in his theory of imperialism²⁴² and had been stressed by Stalin as an arena likely to prove decisive following World War II.²⁴³ The significance of Soviet efforts to exacerbate the conflict between the imperialist states and their colonies and ex-colonies is two-fold, first in the effort expanded by the Soviets in support of the struggle of the colonies against the imperial powers and, secondly, in the motivations to which the Soviets attribute their efforts. Prior to World War II and in the immediate post-war period (particularly prior to the death of Stalin) the strength with which the colonies were held by the imperial states was essentially acquiesced to by the Soviets. Though considerable lip service was paid to support of the exploited colonial peoples, support in real terms was limited to those states in close proximity to the USSR (Turkey,²⁴⁴ Central Asia,²⁴⁵

China²⁴⁶). Even the organization of the effort directed toward these areas reflected this recognition, with the Comintern oriented primarily on Europe and with the delegation of responsibility for efforts directed at the colonies to the Communist parties of the various imperial states.²⁴⁷ However, the weakened condition of these states following the war, coupled with a growing movement for independence throughout the colonies and the resultant higher costs of administering and controlling colonies led to the breaking up of the colonial empires was expected by the Soviets to initiate the final stage of capitalism. As has been mentioned earlier, Stalin had predicted that the pressures of another world war would result in a radical reordering of the world system and particularly the collapse of the colonial system.²⁴⁸ It is important to reiterate that, from the theoretical point of view, the significance of the collapse of the colonial system was not particularly important for the development of socialism in the colonial areas but because it denied to the capitalists cheap labor and resources and free access to foreign markets, and thus signalled the initiation of the final stage of the collapse of the capitalist system.²⁴⁹ The value of the colonial independence movement was not as an enhancement of socialism but as a major tool in the attack on the capitalist system.²⁵⁰ The support for 'wars of national liberation' and other third world movements is an inherently antagonistic policy from the Soviets' point of view. Though

they offer to the third world an alternative method of modernization, social development, and political organization, the Soviets openly stress that this effort is a tactic designed to damage the capitalist system by denying to it access to cheap resources and labor.²⁵¹ The Soviets expect that the result of this loss of resources and cheap labor will result in friction between the capitalist states,²⁵² economic destabilization due to inflation and uncertainty in access to raw materials,²⁵³ and ultimately, to final contradiction between the capitalists and the proletariat in the industrialized states in fulfillment of the predictions of Lenin's theory of imperialism.

The Soviets have gone to great lengths to establish rapport with the emerging third world since the mid 1950's. The effort in the Middle East was established in a grand manner with the conclusion in 1956 of an agreement between Egypt and the Soviet Union for the construction of the Aswan Dam -- which the United States had refused to provide assistance for. In the following year, I.M. Maisky, head of a commission which supervised the Academy of Sciences of the USSR observed that "in the countries of Asia and Africa truly grandiose events are now taking place. The collapse of the colonial system is going on at such a speed that the greatest possible effort must be made not to lag behind life."²⁵⁴ On February 26, the same year, the Soviet Africanist Co-ordinating Conference was held at the Ethnographical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and

coordinated research and language training programs were developed.²⁵⁵ In 1958 a special African department was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later an African Commission formed to deal specifically with sub-Saharan Africa head by Ivan Potekhin (who later came to head the African Studies Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences).²⁵⁶ The recognition of the growing possibility of influence in the third world particularly in Africa, and the reorganization to take advantage of this opportunity, was accompanied by a growing commitment by the Soviet leadership toward active involvement in the efforts of the third world to free themselves from dependence on their previous colonial masters (and thus, from the Soviet point of view, exacerbate the internal contradictions of the industrialized capitalist nations). Initial Soviet expectations were high. The decolonization process was yielding governments which were hostile to the west (Nasser, Sekou Toure, Patrice Lumumba, etc.) supporting Soviet initiatives in the United Nations and actively seeking alternatives to the west. As Robert Legvold observes, the Soviet leadership believed that the decolonization process heralded the "early arrival of the Socialist revolution...and interpreted the anti-Western fulminations of Africa's angry young leaders...as reliable evidence that those leaders had fully rejected capitalism."²⁵⁷ The Soviets presented themselves as an alternative to the Western mode of modernization. They had attained modernization

largely without the assistance of the West (to include recovery following World War II) and had rejected the social and economic structure of the west.²⁵⁸ In addition to presenting themselves as an alternative to the West, the Soviets were committed to active pursuit of relations which would lessen the dependence of the third world on the west. For example, in 1955, Soviet imports from Africa totalled \$31 million and exports to Africa totalled \$13 million. But by 1971, Soviet imports totalled \$584 million and exports to Africa totalled \$601 million.²⁵⁹ Soviet aid to African states prior to 1958 was non-existent but by 1972 the Soviets had provided economic assistance to over 19 African states totalling over \$837 million (not counting the Aswan Dam project in Egypt.) Egypt).²⁶⁰

Several events occurred in the late 1950's and early 1960's which encouraged the Soviet leadership to develop an enhanced opinion of their own strength and to underestimate the resolve and determination of the west to oppose antagonistic Soviet foreign policy moves. The inaction of the West in response to the Hungarian revolution (especially in light of previous statements by the Eisenhower administration suggesting an intent to 'rollback' communism in Eastern Europe) joined with several other factors to enhance Soviet perceptions of their own strength and led them to question the resolve of the West to oppose their initiatives. First was the unilateral decision of the United States government not to use

nuclear weapons in military conflicts subsequent to World War II (the Korean War) establishing a precedent by which the Soviets could determine, to some degree, that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons in a conflict which did not directly impact on U.S. interests.²⁶¹ Another factor which enhanced Soviet power was the launching of Sputnik I and II in 1957 -- missile systems clearly capable of delivering nuclear weapons of considerable size to the continental United States in a very short period of time -- and generating the 'missile gap' crisis of the late fifties. In early 1961, another event which possibly generated a misreading of the credibility of United States foreign policy was the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion which cast doubt and criticism on the newly elected Kennedy administration.²⁶² In addition, in June of 1961 President Kennedy met with Khrushchev at Vienna, a meeting at which the two leaders disagreed sharply and from which "Kennedy returned visibly shaken by the belligerent steeliness of his opponent."²⁶³ Though Kennedy's response to this confrontation and subsequent Khrushchev demands concerning Berlin and East Germany was to call up 250,000 reservists, the response proved to be ineffective in deterring the Soviets from constructing the Berlin wall in August. Even American critics "demanded to know why American tanks had not pushed over the wall before it could be so solidly build."²⁶⁴ However, the only western response was the reinforcement of the small U.S. garrison in Berlin by 1500 men.

Such actions probably led to a misperception of the willingness of the western nations, and the United States in particular, to take concerted, forceful action in response to Soviet actions which did not directly threaten their security. These factors, coupled with other considerations (as discussed in Graham Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis),²⁶⁵ contributed to the Soviet willingness to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba while assuring President Kennedy that no such action would take place. The Cuban missile crisis itself probably has very little relationship to ideological considerations with two exceptions. First it was an action which was clearly antagonistic to the West and sure to be perceived as such in the West. Those arguments which suggest that the action was taken due to Soviet fears of the growing strategic military strength of the United States are difficult to substantiate due to the demonstrated unwillingness of the U.S. to use such power following the World War II in any manner which directly confronted the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets were under considerable pressure from the Chinese to take advantage of the Soviet possession of ICBMs to actively pursue the socialist revolution under the protective deterrent umbrella of Soviet nuclear weapons. As Donald Zagoria prophetically observed in a Rand Corporation report published in July 1962 (two months prior to the October missile crisis): "Our [the United State's] dangers may increase if Peking's charges that

Moscow is soft towards the West goad the Russians to pursue the offensive more vigorously."²⁶⁶ A second effect of the Cuban missile crisis for the purpose of this research is that it generated a major reassessment of the strategic strength of the USSR vis a vis, in particular, the growing nuclear might of the United States and the willingness of the United States to use that might if necessary.

In terms of the willingness of the Soviets to aggressively pursue a foreign policy openly antagonistic to the west, the Cuban missile crisis and resulting reevaluation served as a major inhibitor to Soviet military action. As Thomas W. Wolfe notes, aside from the essentially deterrent functions of Soviet military power, the usefulness of "military power as a political instrument was less than clear under the constraints of the nuclear age."²⁶⁷ The net result was a period of intensive building of Soviet armaments across the board including conventional ground, air and naval forces and strategic nuclear forces. It is interesting to note that in the period between 1962 and 1974 Soviet annual production of major conventional weapons systems has been greater than that of the United States with the exception of tactical aircraft (which, during the peak years of the Vietnam war, the United States slightly outproduced the Soviets) and helicopters (which, during the war the U.S. significantly outproduced the Soviets)²⁶⁸ in all years. In addition, Soviet strategic nuclear forces have expanded from their clearly inferior position at the time of

confrontation in October, 1962, to a position of superiority (at least in delivery systems) by 1976.²⁶⁹ This trend is also evident in the development of strictly defensive weapons systems as well.

Overt Soviet actions were characterized by considerable caution and coupled with efforts to support diplomatic policies which lessened tensions in the world which were dangerous to the Soviet Union as well. This was particularly important as the Soviet leadership maneuvered for position during the period of uncertainty immediately following the removal of Khrushchev in 1964.

However during this period of building and reconsolidation within the USSR a number of events occurred on the international scene which suggested to the Soviets that the unity and resolve of the west was again weakening. As previously discussed, the Soviets viewed the collapse of the colonial system as having a major destabilizing effect on the capitalist states and began emphasizing their effort at separating these sources of raw material, cheap labor and ready markets from the capitalists. This was a low risk and potentially a high return operation at a time in which high risk options had been reevaluated. Other events occurred in this era which exacerbated divisions between the capitalist states and dampened their ability to concert efforts to oppose Soviet foreign policy actions. Between 1963 and 1967 France separated itself from the rest of the western alliance by withdrawing from active participation in

NATO and by expelling non-French forces from France. In addition, twice during this period France vetoed the entrance of Great Britain into the European Common Market. In 1966 President DeGaulle conducted an extended visit to the Soviet Union demonstrating his willingness to follow a policy independent of the remainder of the Western alliance.²⁷⁰ In 1964 and again in 1967 two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, came to blows over Cyprus, generating tension throughout the alliance. The United States was confronted by internal strife due to racial tensions (riots in Harlem and Jersey City in 1964; Selma in 1965; Chicago, Brooklyn, Cleveland and Watts in 1966; Newark and Detroit in 1967; Cleveland in 1968; Augusta and Jackson State College in 1970)²⁷¹ and opposition to the Vietnam war (demonstrations involving literally hundreds of thousands of participants in New York City and San Francisco in 1967; in Chicago at the Democratic National Convention in 1968; nationwide moratoriums in October and November of 1969; again nationwide demonstrations following the invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent deaths of several students at Kent State University at the hands of National Guardsmen in 1970; etc.)²⁷² These problems were compounded by double digit inflation beginning in the late 1960s in much of Europe and particularly in Great Britain. Other evidences of confusion and wavering resolve on the part of the west were the lack of response by the western states to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968²⁷³ and the admission of the People's

Republic of China to the United Nations in 1973.²⁷⁴ Possibly more important than any other single factor was the destabilizing impact of the Watergate investigation on the effectiveness of the Nixon administration between 1972 and August of 1974. Finally the effectiveness of the 1973 oil embargo particularly as it impacted on Europe was fully in accord with Soviet expectations.

Each of these events was readily observable by the Soviets as evidence of the deterioration of the post World War II unity of the western alliance which had developed in response to Soviet over-aggressiveness which had occurred between 1944 and 1951. Initial Soviet success in the expansion of the socialist system through the use of military forces resulted from their relative strength at the end of the war and considerable weakness and disunity among the European nations and the United States. As recovery proceeded in Europe and as tensions grew between the Soviets and the West, the formation of NATO (and other alliances) and strategic rearmament of the United States the West again attained superiority over the Soviets as was demonstrated rather conclusively during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following era, from 1962 to 1973, was a period in which the USSR devoted considerable effort toward attaining strategic parity (or superiority?) with the west. During the same period the west suffered a number of reverses which noticeably weakened and divided the post war alliance system. Thus in the period following 1973

the Soviets were confronted with an opportunity to again utilize their military forces to achieve foreign policy objectives which they consider to hasten the collapse of capitalism.

Whether or not the Soviets encouraged or even favored the Arab attack on Israel in October, 1973, is a question the answer to which is unclear. For the purpose of this study, however, the implications are clear. The Soviets were aware that the action was going to take place some days in advance, and support for such an action was in contradiction to the declaration of "Basic Principles" of detente signed in May of 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union which stated that:

the two countries "attach major importance to preventing the developments of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations." The Basic Principles also said the two superpowers would "do their utmost to avoid military confrontations..." and that they had a special responsibility to prevent from arising situations which would increase international tensions.²⁷⁵

The failure to coordinate with the United States over such an impending development which was bound to stir international tensions was also in violation of the formal obligation undertaken by both U.S. and the Soviets in the agreement of 24 June 1973 (only four months prior to the outbreak of the war).²⁷⁶ The second importance of the Soviet involvement in the October War is that not only were they aware of the imminence of war but that the Soviet military actively supported the Arab

armies. A week prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Soviets launched Cosmos satellites to observe the Israeli forces on both fronts. Soviet ships departed from Egyptian ports, and the families of Soviet advisors in both Egypt and Syria were evacuated. In Chaim Herzog's angry account of the Soviet involvement, he notes that only:

A few days after the outbreak of war a major Soviet airlift was under way as giant Antonov 22 cargo carriers landed at short intervals in Damascus and Cairo. They flew from the Soviet Union, staged in Budapest and thence across Yugoslavia to Cairo and Damascus. Soviet ships loaded with thousands of tons of equipment passed through the Bosphorus Straits on their way to Latakia and Alexandria.²⁷⁷

By the 5th of November the Soviets had fully reequiped Egypt and Syria with Sagger, RPG and SAM-6 missiles²⁷⁸ and within months the destroyed armored vehicles of the Arab armies had been replaced and supplemented with additional equipment.²⁷⁹ This is in marked contrast to the ability of the Soviet Union to respond to the Arab losses in 1967. Following that war it took the Soviets nearly two years to refit the Arab armies. Thus the Soviets demonstrated two characteristics which had not been readily apparent prior to 1973. First, 'detente' as a concept was not clearly linked to Soviet support for actions not related to direct east-west confrontations. Second, the Soviet economy and military were clearly capable of rapid and efficient logistical support for military operations not contiguous to Soviet borders.

At this same time, the Soviets stepped up their efforts to exploit western dependence on the third world for resources

by actively encouraging the formation of raw material cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).²⁸⁰

As a Soviet expert on developing nations argued: "The success of the oil producing countries serves as a good example for other developing countries producing mineral raw materials and agricultural export crops." Soviet spokesmen have called, in particular, for developing countries generally to resort to nationalization of their resources and creation of cartels to control prices. The Soviets have noted with approval that "nations are following OPEC's example, raising the prices on their exports of minerals and agricultural raw materials and food items."²⁸¹

Not only have the Soviets encouraged the formation of such cartels but they have also encouraged the specific application of this tool against the West. Robert Conquest states that the Soviets, at the time of the 1973 oil embargo against the Western nations, "had been encouraging them [OPEC] to apply the 'oil weapon' against the West (later it urged them to continue the oil embargo against the United States until the moment it had been lifted).²⁸²

This focus on the dependence of the capitalist states on former colonies for resources is not limited to a wishful desire based on a theoretical concept developed by Lenin before the revolution. It is also based on current Soviet assessments of western dependency on the third world. An article in Pravda in 1974 observed:

In U.S. imports, the share of strategic raw materials imported from Africa amounts to 100 percent of the industrial diamonds, 58 percent of the uranium, 44 percent of the manganese, which is used in the steel smelting industry, 36 percent of the cobalt, essential

for aircraft engines and high-strength alloys, 33 percent of its oil and 23 percent of its chromium, used in the manufacture of armor, aircraft engines and gun barrels.²⁷⁴

Soviet African specialist E.A. Tarabrin notes that:

The USA imports from Africa nearly 100 percent of her imported diamonds, lithium derivative, beryllium, columbite, cobalt and palm oil; over 50 percent of her cocoa, vanilla, long-staple cotton and mahogany, 25 percent of her antimony, chrome, graphite, manganese and tantalum; and significant quantities of rubber, gold, uranium, and oil.²⁸⁴

Tarabrin also notes that in the 1980's the West's dependence, particularly on Africa, will increase.²⁸⁵ G. Skorov, a member of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences further stressed this point:

Having strengthened their political independence in the protracted struggle against imperialism, the developing countries launched a powerful offensive against the entire system of their exploitation in the world capitalist economy under conditions of growing raw materials and fuel shortage at the beginning of the seventies. They are making use of the enormous dependence of the industrial centers of capitalism on reserves and supplies from the developing countries of such important types of mineral raw materials as oil, tin, manganese, bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, and rare elements. Many developing countries are taking energetic steps to liquidate the domination of foreign capital in their economy... Supplies of mineral raw materials on the world market are now shifting into the hands of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.²⁸⁶

Recent party congresses (since the demise of Khrushchev) have continued to stress adherence to ideological hostility toward the capitalist system and have placed the concept of "peaceful coexistence" into the proper perspective. At the 23 Party Congress, in the section of his speech dealing with America:

...Brezhnev made no mention of the principle of peaceful coexistence. He said only that the relations between capitalist nations, not to mention those between Russia and the West, were being increasingly governed by "contradictions" which were deepening.²⁸⁷

At the 24th Party Congress (1971) three topics of priority were listed by Brezhnev in the opening remarks of his report on international affairs:

1. For the Further Development of Friendship and Cooperation by the Socialist Countries.
2. Imperialism -- Enemy of the Peoples and Social Progress. The Peoples Against Imperialism.
3. The Struggle by the Soviet Union for Peace and the Peoples Security. Opposition to the Imperialist Policy of Aggression.²⁸⁸

The 25th Party Congress followed this vein specifically stating its continuing support "for anti-Western forces in the emerging nations of the Third World..."²⁸⁹ In other addresses Brezhnev has stated that:

Naturally there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the class and national liberation struggle in the capitalist countries between oppressors and the oppressed, between colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.²⁹⁰

More recently (1975) Pravda quoted Brezhnev as stating that the current period of 'detente' renounces:

...the form and the methods of the Cold War era and not the ideological struggle...During the transition from cold war toward detente and the development of cooperation between East and West, the ideological struggle, far from subsiding, has gained in scope... Detente in no way annuls the battle of ideas.²⁹¹

As Gerhard Niemeyer observes:

Brezhnev said recently: "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change,

the laws of class struggle." Other Soviet leaders have emphasized that the "Spirit of Helsinki" does not apply to ideological struggle. For twenty years the Soviets have insisted that "peaceful co-existence" is a form of class struggle, and that the ideological struggle must be intensified in the presence of peaceful external co-existence (emphasis added).²⁹²

Further indications of the growing Soviet capability to support a foreign policy antagonistic to the west distant from Soviet borders and reflecting an increasing willingness to use that capability to achieve their foreign policy goals occurred in 1975. The operation conducted by the Soviet military in Angola is similar to that in the Middle East with the addition of one new factor -- the introduction of well trained military forces from a Socialist state, Cuba. Whether or not the Cubans became involved in Angola of their own accord and for what reason is not at issue here. The important factor is that Cuban forces could not have been introduced into Angola in the numbers involved without active Soviet support. As Jiri Valenta observes about the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola:

To the extent that the Cuban intervention depended upon logistic support by the Soviet Navy and Air Force and upon Soviet military aid, the intervention can be seen as a result of the Soviet rather than the Cuban decision-making process.²⁹³

The increase in the Soviets ability to logistically support a military operation distant from Soviet borders was made readily apparent by contrasting the Soviet effort at support for Patrice Lumumba in the Belgian Congo in 1960 which was largely ineffective due to "poor coordination and shortages

of air lift capabilities and experienced personnel which had led to serious difficulties and the ultimate failure of Soviet operations..."²⁹⁴ when compared with the efficiency and effectiveness of the Soviet logistical support of the MPLA in 1975:

This time the operation was executed perfectly with substantial airlift and naval covering operations in adjacent waters. The Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Navy carried military equipment from the USSR through Algeria and the Congo-Brazzaville to Angola, while Soviet and Cuban airlift operations brought Cuban combat troops and Soviet and East German advisors to assist the MPLA. Soviet arms included surface-to-surface missiles, the hand-held SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile, Dartyushka rockets, T-34 and T-54 tanks, new PT-76 amphibious tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), helicopters, gunships, heavy artillery, and light aircraft, and in January, 1976 even MIG-21 aircraft. The operations were protected by a Soviet naval squadron, based in Conakry in Guinea, which had operated in West African waters for several weeks...Overall, in 1975 the USSR supplied \$300 million worth of arms to the MPLA..."²⁹⁵

Thus the operation in Angola reflected the increased Soviet ability and willingness to logistically support a military operation distant from the USSR and additionally introduced the new factor of the use of military units provided by a Soviet ally and Soviet assistance in the transportation and support of that ally during the operation in a third world state.

Another instance of Soviet willingness to use its growing military capability to support actions viewed in Marxist-Leninist terms as damaging to the West took place in Ethiopia following the pattern established in the Middle

East and Angola with the massive infusion of military supplies for the Ethiopian army (then in combat with Somalia and Eritrean rebels), the transportation and support of Cuban military units and advisors to participate in combat,²⁹⁶ but adding a new factor -- the active participation of Soviet commanders in the direction of the operations of the Ethiopian army. At least one of these leaders appears to have been General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, a member of the Party Central Committee and the first deputy commander of all Soviet ground forces.²⁹⁷

A recent effort which apparently combined increasing Soviet willingness to use military support to achieve foreign policy goals and to exploit western economic vulnerability to disruption of western access to third world raw materials was the disruption of the production of cobalt as a result of the invasion of Shaba province in Zaire by guerilla forces "trained in neighboring Angola by Cuban military advisors with Soviet support."²⁹⁸ The Soviets, in apparent anticipation of global shortage, bought up a major share of the available world supply of cobalt in the months immediately preceding the Shaba province invasion. The invasion shut off 65 percent of the world's cobalt production for roughly nine months and drove the price of cobalt from the pre-invasion price of seven to eight dollars per pound to thirty dollars afterwards.²⁹⁹ This event takes on more significance when considering Colin Legum's accusation that the entire action against Zaire was directed by East Germans.³⁰⁰

In 1976, at the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union was in full support of the efforts of the third world nations "to shake off all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth."³⁰¹ In the same speech he noted the impact of the struggle on the West:

Imperialist rivalry and dissention in the Common Market and within NATO have grown. The increased might of international monopolies has made the competitive struggle even more merciless. But such is the nature of imperialism that each is striving to gain advantage at the cost of others, and to impose his own will. All this goes to show that the present crisis is unusual and everyone can see that...the myth that present day capitalism is capable of overcoming the crisis has been dispelled.³⁰²

The significance of these observations take on greater meaning when considering that the bulk of recent Soviet support for governments hostile to the West and for national liberation movements has been in those areas upon which the industrial nations are most dependent for raw materials: the Middle East and southern Africa.

Soviet efforts have included activities other than those conducted in the third world as well. Soviet links to terrorist organizations are readily apparent. As Samuel T. Francis, an analyst for the Heritage Foundation observes:

International [terrorist] operations have been an effective instrument of political warfare by which the Soviets have contributed to international instability, maintained an armed underground apparatus in the Western states, and exerted an influence on the Palestinian movement, Arab states, and Middle Eastern developments in general.³⁰³

While there is no evidence that the Soviets directly control such terrorist organizations as the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades, or the Palestinian Liberation Organization, support of such organizations is compatible with "a discreet policy of letting the other fellow do it when and if the other fellow could do a little here and there to destabilize Western democratic society."³⁰⁴ Considerable evidence does exist that the Soviets have in fact supported such destabilizing activities -- even as far back as 1918³⁰⁵ but continuing well into the present. In 1971 a four ton Czech arms shipment bound for the IRA in Northern Ireland was seized by Dutch authorities in the Netherlands.³⁰⁶ Eastern Europe has served as a sanctuary, escape route and as a rest and relaxation center for Western Europe terrorists.³⁰⁷ Training camps for terrorists exist in Eastern Europe, Moscow, Cuba, and North Korea. For example:

The camps inside Cuba are nothing new. They were opened in 1966 by the DGI, under the Soviet KGB's close supervision, directly after the first Tricontinental Conference in Havana to "organize the world's antiimperialist forces." Similar training has long been available elsewhere under the KGB's eye as well: North Korea alone has turned out 2500 guerrilla fighters so far, says the London base Institute for the Study of Conflict, a good share of them coming from Latin American countries. What is new is Cuba's redirection of these professional talents toward Europe.

...Fifty-four such courses were held throughout Eastern Europe this past year: thirty-five inside Russia, eight in East Germany, four apiece in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, three in Poland.³⁰⁸

The Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow also serves as a

training ground having trained such urban guerrillas as I.R. Sanchez (better known as the Venezuelan born terrorist 'Carlos') and Mohammed Boudia of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) the most active of the international terrorist groups.³⁰⁹ In addition, the Soviets have opened special training camps for Palestinians in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, South Yemen and Iraq.³¹⁰

The Soviets have also been helpful in supplying arms to terrorist organizations:

...very large consignments of Soviet weapons shipped originally to the Middle East -- explosives, rifles, pistols, bazookas, SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles -- are reshipped once a week from Palestinian bases in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Lybia westward to be stored away for future use.

The stopovers may be in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, or, most important, East Germany. Stolen cars from Western Europe are driven in freely, refitted in East European garages to conceal weapons, then driven out again after loading, with advance notice to Communist border guards. Three such carloads were intercepted in West Germany not long ago...³¹¹

Only as the European states began to react with a unified front to terrorism with the formation of a "formidable counter terrorist network of police and security services ... including not only the nine Common Market states but also Austria and Switzerland" did the Soviet Union and its allies begin to cooperate in the control of terrorists (with the apprehension and extradition of a terrorist on Bulgarian soil).³¹²

C. SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate, via a historical review of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to the present, that Soviet commitment to an antagonistic policy toward the capitalist system has been continuous and that it has not been limited to rhetoric but has included actions clearly intended to disrupt the western economic and political system. The aggressiveness with which the Soviets have carried out such actions appears to have been tempered by their own capabilities vis a vis the capitalist states and the determination and unity with which the west resisted such actions. The argument can be made (and it must be accepted as a valid argument) that other factors may have been as important or more important than Soviet commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology but the fact remains that the Soviets continue to attack the capitalist states in ideological terms, justify those actions which are hostile to the west in ideological terms, and to explain cooperation with the western states not as a modification of the inherent Marxist-Leninist antagonism to capitalism but as a matter of expediency not affecting the long term ideological struggle.

As Soviet strategic strength has increased so has their willingness to expand their activities to hasten the collapse of the capitalist system. This is particularly evident in the post-World War II era in which the Soviets have emerged as one of the two most powerful nations in the world.

Particularly, the Soviets have sought in the post-war era to exploit the Achilles' heel of the capitalist system -- the western dependence on third world resources and markets. Also, with the continuing increase in Soviet strategic power, they have used the Soviet military to expand Soviet influence into Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and most recently, Africa. This willingness to use their enhanced position of power has only been limited by the willingness of the west to respond forcefully to Soviet actions as evidenced by Soviet concerns over the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany, and the nuclear confrontation over Cuba.

There is no evidence of a modification of Soviet commitment to the Marxist-Leninist antagonism toward the capitalist system. Periods of cooperation with the west have always been explained by the Soviets as expedients. Thus considerable evidence exists that the Soviets have continued to adhere to Marxist-Leninist antagonism to the capitalist system in fact as well as in theory throughout Soviet history. The significance of such evidence is that it suggests that statements made by Soviet spokesmen concerning the relationship between 'detente' and the continuation of the 'ideological struggle'³¹³ are not merely rhetoric but reflect an active Soviet commitment to foreign policy goals which are fundamentally antagonistic to the capitalist states.

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

The thesis of this research has been that Marxist-Leninist doctrine continues to play a significant role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Four questions have been addressed, the answers to which have attempted to demonstrate this role.

The first question, addressed in chapter two, was: does Marxist-Leninist doctrine have foreign policy implications which are fundamental to the doctrine and which, if ignored, would undermine its coherence? The answer to the question is: Yes. The relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist nations relate directly to the moral aspect of 'scientific' socialism. According to the doctrine, the capitalist states are characterized by internal and external exploitation of peoples, unstable relations with each other, and hostility toward the socialist states. They also stand as an obstacle to the natural (scientific) progress of history to its final and highest stage: communism. The socialist claim of being more in tune with the scientific understanding of historical progress and with the attempt to elevate man to the higher stage of human progress places the relations between the socialist and capitalist states on a moral plane rather than a strictly pragmatic state to state relationship.³¹⁴ This moral confrontation developed as a part of the fundamental (or philosophical) dimension of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. A

second aspect of Marxist-Leninist ideology (as distinct from philosophy) is the operational dimension which adds to the fundamental dimension an awareness and responsiveness to real world circumstances. The foreign policy result of this awareness has been Soviet concern for the security of the USSR. Thus the fundamentally antagonistic foreign policy of the Soviet Union toward the capitalist states has been tempered by realistic evaluations of the world situation. As a third foreign policy implication of the ideology, the colonial system was identified by the Marxist-Leninist ideologues as the weak link of the imperialist system for two reasons: first the oppressed colonial peoples and the proletariat were natural allies in the struggle against the common enemy -- imperialism; second, the capitalist economies were (and are) totally dependent upon the colonies for cheap labor and resources, and for new markets. The collapse of the colonial system in the 1950's and the 1960's was viewed by the Soviets as the event which signalled the beginning of the final stage in the collapse of the capitalist system. Thus it has been determined that the ideology does contain two fundamental foreign policy tenets: first, it dictates a fundamentally antagonistic foreign policy toward the capitalist system; and second it suggests to the Soviets that efforts to disrupt the capitalist system will be most effective if directed toward the third world in an effort to disrupt the capitalist economic system.

The second question, addressed in chapter three, was: even if the ideology does have foreign policy implications does it continue to affect those who lead the Soviet Union? The answer to this question cannot be absolutely ascertained but the evidence considered suggests that the likely answer is: Yes, at least to a significant degree. One form of evidence considered was the tremendous effort expended by the Soviet government to inculcate the people of the Soviet Union with Marxist-Leninist world views including massive efforts directed at youth through the educational system and youth groups such as the Little Octobrists, Young Pioneers, and the Komsomol, and extending (on a slightly less extensive scale) throughout the life span of the average adult by efforts directed through trade unions, professional organizations and farm collectives. Another aspect of the effort to inculcate the Soviet public with these ideals is the total control of the mass media and the existence (and effective functioning) of organizations designed to suppress alternative ideals. The selection process for entry into the communist party and the rigorous organizational socialization process within the party rewarding those who conform to party ideals and punishing or expelling those who do not, and the vigorous ideological education programs conducted within the party membership are further evidences of the commitment to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

The third question, addressed in chapter four, was: does the commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology have an impact on the foreign policy process? The answer to this question is: Yes, in three particular areas. First, as a widely held common value, it impacts as a world view or conceptual framework through which the Soviet leadership views and evaluates the world. Second, it has become a 'rule of the game' in Soviet politics. It constricts the range of actions or decisions which may be considered; it becomes a tool of power for those who can couch their arguments in ideological terms and a liability to those who cannot; it sanctions some moves while disallowing others. Finally, the most powerful bureaucracies in the Soviet Union have a stake in the continued adherence to ideology. The right of the Communist party to rule exclusively in the Soviet Union is totally legitimized by reference to the ideology. Attempts to alter or abandon the ideology threaten this legitimacy. Since antagonism toward capitalism is a fundamental part of the ideology, it cannot be dismissed or altered without threatening the legitimacy of the party. Two other powerful bureaucracies -- the KGB and the military -- industrial complex -- also have significant long term stakes in continued adherence to the ideology because it enhances their mission and justifies budgets and personnel requirements, and enhances the prestige of their organizations and leadership. Those agencies whose organizational interests are damaged or

hampered by the ideology (the light and consumer industries and agriculture) are those which have the least impact on or input to the foreign policy process.

The final question, addressed in chapter five, was: have the Soviets acted, historically, in a manner which is in accordance with the foreign policy tenets suggested as fundamental to the ideology in chapter two? Again, the answer is: Yes. By considering two variables which would fall within the operational dimension (and thus impact on Soviet concerns for the security of the USSR) as they affect the ability of the Soviet Union to pursue a foreign policy antagonistic toward the west, it is readily apparent that the Soviets have, in fact, maintained a foreign policy antagonistic toward the west throughout their history. As Soviet strategic strength has increased vis a vis the capitalist states, and particularly in moments at which western resolve was low, they have conducted increasingly aggressive activities which they clearly perceive and declare to be damaging to the capitalist system. The effort which they have conducted is multifaceted including much more than the obvious military actions they have taken and include subversion, terrorism, diplomatic initiatives, efforts designed at denying resources to the west, support for wars of national liberation, espionage, and a continuous rhetorical attack on the capitalist system. One of the most important historical evidences of the continuing importance of ideology in the Soviet Union is the

concern exhibited by the Soviet leadership, throughout its history, to justify periods of cooperation with the west as short term expedients which actually hasten the downfall of capitalism by strengthening the Socialist system. These are arguments obviously intended for domestic consumption and are evidence of the existence of a powerful constituency which must be satisfied in ideological terms.

Thus, the thesis that Marxist-Leninist ideology continues to play a role in the Soviet foreign policy process is supported. As a final reminder, this thesis has not suggested that ideology is the only determinant in the Soviet foreign policy process but tht it is a factor which is significant and which, if not considered, can lead to a serious misunderstanding of Soviet foreign policy motivators.

Two factors which may in the future impact on the continuing role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy but which have only been considered in a minor way within this thesis are the Sino-Soviet confluct and Eurocommunism. The Sino-Soviet conflict, as has been mentioned periodically in this paper, has definite ideological effects in two particular areas. The mere existence of opposing Marxist-Leninist based ideologies undermines the fundamental philosophical claim of the scientific, thus universal, nature of the ideology. As has been mentioned in chapter four of this thesis, this doctrine is the basis of the legitimacy of the CPSU's exclusion of other parties and ideas from participation in the political

process of the Soviet Union. To admit that alternative roads to socialism exist undermines this legitimacy by allowing the theoretical possibility that there might exist another group within the Soviet Union which could claim to have a better understanding of the path to socialism and thus challenge the right of the party to its privileged position. The spread of Eurocommunism as a concept also poses this threat -- particularly as the members of the Warsaw pact seek to follow this trend and to generate policies separate from the Soviet Union. A second aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict is that, in terms of bureaucratic politics, the Chinese may serve as an alternative to the west as a threat justifying budget and personnel allocations in the military-industrial complex and thus lessen the reliance of this bureaucracy on the ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism.

The most important implication of this thesis is in terms of the western response to Soviet foreign policy efforts. If, in fact, the Soviets are continuing to pursue a multifaceted, antagonistic foreign policy toward the west as this thesis suggests, then the two variables which impact on Soviet security concerns become the keys to containing such Soviet efforts. In 1971, Thomas Wolfe, in a report written for the Rand corporation, asked the key question:

Now that the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity with the United States, how will this affect Soviet behavior? Can we expect more assertive and bolder Soviet policies, or will the Soviet Union now settle down into a more responsible and stabilizing role in world affairs?³¹⁵

J.I. Coffey writing in Orbis gave the answer which does not take into account a fundamental ideological antagonism to the capitalist system:

So far, Soviet leaders have given little indication that the erosion of U.S. strategic superiority might "make the world safe for aggression"...Although Khrushchev endorsed and promised to support "wars of national liberation" by oppressed peoples, he stopped short (both then and later) of committing Soviet forces to participation in such wars...The Soviets have continued to regard even armed intervention in "wars of liberation" as potentially dangerous...³¹⁶

This opinion was rendered in 1970 prior to Soviet support for the Arab invasion of Israel in 1973, the MPLA in Angola in 1975, the Ethiopian struggle against Somalia and the Eritrean rebels, the Marxist coup in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, all in 1978.

A consideration of the fundamental ideological content of Soviet foreign policy with its inherently antagonistic aspects coupled with the attainment of nuclear parity and low resolve and division in the capitalist camp would have supported Thomas Wolfe's answer to his own question: "My own view is that more assertive Soviet conduct is likely..."³¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹This opinion was expressed by Dr. Vernon Aspaturian in a lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, on 17 November 1978.

²James N. Rosenau, "A Pre-theory of Foreign Policy," Policy Sciences, vol. 4, 4, (1973). p. 39.

³Vernon Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), pp. 57-81.

⁴Jonathan Harris, Ideology and International Politics: An Introduction to Soviet Analysis (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1970), p. 1.

⁵Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 4.

⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 101.

⁷This definition of foreign policy is drawn from a lecture by Dr. Roger Glenn Brown delivered on 10 October 1978 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

⁸George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.

⁹Report to the National Security Council: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14 April 1950, NSC 68, (Washington D.C.: The National Security Council).

¹⁰This is the basic thesis presented by Daniel Yergin in his book Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978).

¹¹See David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc. 1973).

¹²A sample of this revisionist school of history would include D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace.

¹³Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors, (Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975).

¹⁴"Socialism: Trials and Errors," Time, 13 March 1978, p. 24.

¹⁵Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3d ed. (New York; W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 29-30.

¹⁶"Socialism: Trials and Errors," p. 25.

¹⁷Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Communist Ideology: Key to Soviet Policy," The Cold War: Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle? Norman D. Graebner, ed., (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1963).

¹⁸David K. Wills, "US Senators Try to Teach the Kremlin," Christian Science Monitor, 24 November 1978.

¹⁹Robert Conquest, "A New Russia? A New World?" Foreign Affairs, An American Quarterly Review, vol. 53, 3 (April 1975), 9. 496.

²⁰See Graham T. Allison's work Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971).

²¹Aspaturian, pp. 57-81.

²²Seliger, p. 4

²³Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954) 9. 35.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 11-16.

²⁵Joseph Cropsey and Leo Strauss, eds., History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 700.

²⁶Karl Marx as quoted by Meyer, p. 19.

²⁷Meyer, p. 16.

²⁸Ibid., p. 44

²⁹Friedrich Engels as discussed by Meyer, pp. 55-69.

³⁰Meyer, p. 56.

³¹Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978), p. 56

³²Meyer, p. 58.

³³Ibid., p. 59

³⁴Vernon Aspaturian, "The Contemporary Doctrine of the Soviet State and Its Philosophical Foundations" American Political Science Review XLVIII, No. 4 (Dec., 1954), p. 1046.

³⁵Ibid., p. 60.

³⁶Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952), Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 39, Book One, Chapters 5, 8, 10, and 11.

³⁷See Alfred G. Meyer's discussion of Edward Bernstein in Leninism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 46.

³⁸Meyer, Leninism, pp. 240-246.

³⁹Meyer, Marxism, p. 95.

⁴⁰Brzezinski, Ideology and Power, p. 99.

⁴¹Seliger, p. 4.

⁴²Meyer, Leninism, pp. 258-259.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 88-89.

⁴⁴Bertram D. Wolfe, Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine (New York: The Dial Press, 1965), p. 358.

⁴⁵Meyer, Leninism, pp. 217-226.

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
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