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
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Arms Transfer and Security Assistance
to the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1980: Impact
and Implications

by

Richard P. Cassidy
June 1980

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Claude A. Buss

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Since the Korean War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China have sought to maintain a peaceful stability on the Korean peninsula. Their strategies oriented toward maintaining such a stability has been based on three major factors: economic aid, military assistance, and, in the case of the United States, a continued presence of American military forces. The phenomena of arms transfers and security assistance has played a major role in the overall nation state development		

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Arms Transfer and Security Assistance
to the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1980: Impact
and Implications

by

Richard P. Cassidy
B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1969

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

Since the Korean War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China have sought to maintain a peaceful stability on the Korean peninsula. Their strategies oriented toward maintaining such a stability has been based on three major factors: economic aid, military assistance, and, in the case of the United States, a continued presence of American military forces. The phenomena of arms transfers and security assistance has played a major role in the overall nation state development of both Koreas; moreover, it has resulted in supplier entanglement for the three major suppliers. From the latter 1960s, these major suppliers have displayed great interest in maintaining a status quo, while the Koreans have moved toward limited independence by developing indigenous arms industries, expanding their defense budgets, and continuing an upward economic mobility. A consequence of these developments has been a reduction in the ability of the suppliers to control or influence their client states and a possible future threat to the status quo.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1950, the United States has, as an important facet of its forward defense strategy in the Far East, emphasized stability in the Korean peninsula. This strategy of stability has been based on three major variables: economic and military aid to the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred as South Korea) complemented by the continued presence of United States military forces. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, especially in recent years, also have sought to maintain the peaceful stability of the Korean peninsula. Their strategy, though based on separate though equally motivating reasons, has been founded on two major variables: economic and military aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter referred as North Korea).

It is important to note, however, that despite the continuity of relative stability since 1953, the strategic environment in Northeast Asia has changed and will continue to change. This changing strategic environment has affected and often determined the quantity and quality of arms transfers to North Korea and South Korea. This phenomenon of arms transfer has played a major role in the overall nation state development of both Koreas; it has also resulted in supplier entrapment for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. From the latter 1960's, especially after

the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the strategic powers in Northeast Asia have displayed great interest in maintaining a status quo between the two Koreas. Their respective military assistance and arms transfer policies have reflected this concern for sustaining a manageable military capability equilibrium.

However, both Koreas have resented the dependency implications in the current supplier-recipient relationship. North Korea has attempted limited independence by balancing arms transfers from the Soviets and the Chinese. South Korea has worked hard on developing an economy sufficient to support indigenous defense requirements while continuing its upward economic mobility. Both countries have developed their own indigenous arms industries, expanded their defense budgets, implemented armed forces modernization programs, and initiated bi-lateral North-South talks. A consequence of these developments has been a reduction in the ability of the strategic powers to control or influence their client states and a threat to their desire for a continuance of the status quo.

For over 25 years, the Korean peninsula has been one of the few geographic areas in the world where the highest state of readiness has been sustained by both sides. Full scale hostilities could be initiated by either side in a matter of hours. The situation was made potentially more volatile by the withdrawal of United Nations observers from the Demilitarized Zone. Stability in this area has been a key factor

affecting and determining policy formulation not only for the two Koreas but also for the interested strategic powers.

The dangers inherent with an outbreak of hostilities are obviously numerous and extremely important considerations to all concerned nation states. An outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula would be catastrophic for the People's Republic of China's modernization programs. Hostilities would adversely affect East-West detente and pose serious logistics problems to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Supplier entrapment into the actual conflict would be a logical reaction to a perceived defeat of a client state. A war in the peninsula would undoubtedly result in a shift in Japanese defense strategy, threat perception, and rearmament attitudes.

The objective of this thesis and its accompanying research is to analyze the impact and implications of arms transfers and security assistance to North Korea and South Korea and to form and offer conclusions drawn from the trends developed since the beginning of the security assistance and arms transfer programs and the problems still existing in the policies of both suppliers and recipients.

Thus, by analyzing the effects of arms transfers to the Korean states, a better understanding of strategic power policy formulation may be reached. Additionally, it is all the more important to analyze recent developments in the phenomena of arms transfer in that important changes in the

supplier-recipient relationship are currently evolving. This relationship change has the potential to alter the strategic environment in the Korean peninsula; a situation that could evolve into future conflict or, hopefully, a lessening of tensions between the two Koreas.

During the 1970's, both North and South Korea have committed an increasingly larger share of their national resources toward achieving relatively autonomous defense industries, armament capabilities, and enhanced force development which is significantly reducing the constraints imposed upon them in previous decades by the super powers' arms transfer policies. This hypothesis, if true, could have serious implications for the stability of Northeast Asia and the ability of the strategic powers to maintain a stable status quo.

This work will be an analytical study of the security assistance and arms transfers which have been made between 1945 and 1979 from the United States to South Korea, the Soviet Union to North Korea, and the People's Republic of China to North Korea. This thesis will analyze the changing strategic environment in which those transfers were made and show in clearly defined periods since World War II the impact of those transfers on the recipients and the resultant implications for the major suppliers. Additionally, the thesis will stress the recent changes which have occurred since the

advent of the Carter Administration. Conclusions will be reached and offered as a result of the impacts and implications developed since the beginning of this particular arms transfer phenomena and of the problems which still exist in the policies of the various suppliers and recipients.

Chapter I provides an overview of the phenomena of arms transfer at the most general level. This overview provides the reader an insight into how arms transfers may impact on or affect certain variables; such as the economic-politico-military objectives of the supplying and recipient nations, the supplier-client relationship, and the stability of a region.

Chapter II examines the effect arms transfers and military assistance had on the strategic environment of Northeast Asia from 1945 to 1964. Three chosen year groupings will be analyzed: the years leading into the Korean War (1945-1950); the war years (1950-1953); and, the period between the Armistice and the beginning of the major United States involvement in Vietnam (1953-1964).

Chapter III deals with the period of intense American involvement in Southeast Asia. This section examines the arms transfer to both Koreas, the South Korean involvement in the Vietnam War, the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on South Korea, and the subsequent evolution of the Nixon-Ford Administrations' arms transfer policies.

Chapter IV provides an in-depth look into the triangular relationship of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the People's

Republic of China, for the North Korean factor in the Sino-Soviet dispute has had major implications in the stability or instability of the Korean peninsula and affects the inter-relationships of all the major actors. That North Korea has had to utilize this triangle to maintain its defense capability is an important factor when considering the effects of arms transfers to the peninsula.

Chapter V deals with the first three years of the Carter Administration. President Carter's troop withdrawal plan and his stance on human rights resulted in a major shift from the previous arms transfer policies of previous administrations. This section examines the impact his withdrawal plan had on not only the Korean peninsula, but also on Japan and the related Asian perception of United States willingness to continue previously agreed upon security commitments in Northeast Asia. Other factors, to include the U.S.-PRC normalization of relations, the conflicts in Southeast Asia, the virtual freeze on U.S.-Soviet detente, and the events in South Asia, and their impact on arms transfers and military assistance programs to the Korean peninsula are examined.

Chapter VI presents reflections and concluding observations. The chapter will present the author's perception of the total impact of arms transfers on the Korean peninsula and its implication for the future of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

I. THE PHENOMENA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS¹

The transfer of conventional arms is, more often than not, a complicated interaction between the diffuse political, military, and economic interests of recipient and supplier nations. Arms transfers are often utilized to enhance the politico-military interests of both suppliers and recipients. However, the supply or acquisition invariably involves risks as well as benefits. It is important to note that arms trade is only one aspect of the politico-military-economic relationship between a supplier and his client. Therefore, it is often difficult to define with reliability the exact impact an arms transfer may produce.

This chapter provides an overview on how conventional arms transfers affects suppliers and recipients and the stability of an area in a most generalized manner. By acquainting the reader with the general effects arms transfers and security assistance may have on suppliers and recipients, as this chapter attempts to accomplish, a better perspective on how the specific arms transfers made to the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1980 may be reached. The subsequent chapters will address these specific arms transfers and the corresponding security assistance programs. It is important to keep in mind, during this chapter's discussions, that the three major

suppliers of arms and military aid to Korea have been and remain the United States (to South Korea), the Soviet Union (to North Korea) and the People's Republic of China (also to North Korea).

A. POLITICO-MILITARY EFFECTS ON SUPPLIERS

The political effects of arms transfers are often difficult to assess. Nevertheless, there are obvious political benefits to be derived from arms transfers and security assistance. Arms transfer, as in the case of all three major suppliers, provides an opportunity to show tangible support for their client. In the present situation concerning the Soviet Union and North Korea, security assistance provides the Soviets the means to maintain a level of political influence in Korea, though considerably less than that of China. Both Communist suppliers regard weapons transfers as a means of projecting their image as champions and leaders in world revolution.

By providing security assistance, arms, and military training, suppliers often establish and strengthen ties with the recipient nation's leaders, particularly its military leaders. Since military officers play important political roles in both Koreas, the friendship and allegiances that developed have yielded significant returns to the suppliers, especially to the United States.

However, political objectives pursued via arms transfers sometimes work to the detriment of the supplier. Because arms transfers tend to link suppliers with not only external policies, but also with the domestic policies of recipient nations, suppliers often receive both domestic and international criticism for supporting unpopular and dictatorial regimes. In recent years, the United States has borne the brunt of such criticism in its support of the Park government. The refusal to provide arms may also work to a suppliers disadvantage. When Khrushchev cut off military aid in 1962, North Korea regarded such a refusal as an unfriendly act. Later, the Soviet Union resumed military aid, but never regained the level of political influence it previously held.

At times, the relationship between supplier and recipient allows the supplier to persuade (or coerce) the recipient nation to take or not take actions against its will. This leverage results from the excessive dependence on a single supplier for the major portion of its military acquisitions. Recipients are then reluctant to take actions which are incompatible with the policies or desires of the principal supplier. South Korea's past relationship with the United States exemplifies this situation well.

Military benefits which supplier nations seek to achieve via arms transfers and military aid are more tangible and measurable than political benefits. Military objectives may include improvement of the recipient's

armed forces, acquisition or usage of military facilities in the recipient's country, and the ability to influence the recipient nation's military establishment.

Transfer of arms to South Korea has been a major component of U.S. arms exports with the expressed goal of bolstering and maintaining an effective ally. The Nixon Doctrine furthered this goal by emphasizing the improvement of South Korean self-defense capabilities with increased arms transfers. It must be noted, however, that while improvement of South Korea's self-defense capabilities was being enhanced by arms transfers from the United States, arms transfers to North Korea largely offset this strengthening.

Arms provided under the assumption that they be employed only for external defense have occasionally been utilized by recipient governments to suppress domestic dissidents. South Korea's use of army troops (utilizing U.S. provided or licensed arms) to quell disturbances has resulted in increasing Congressional and human rights activists' criticism of U.S. arms transfer policies toward South Korea. By carefully selecting the quality and types of arms to provide or sell, the suppliers are able to restrict the military capabilities and options of the recipient states. As will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, all the suppliers have exercised a level of technology control on arms transfers to both Koreas. The transfer of a high

technology weapon, such as the F-16 to South Korea, would invariably cause the North Koreans to demand from its suppliers MiG-23s. The reverse situation would yield the same demands from South Korea.

However, even when other suppliers in the world are willing to provide the desired high technology, the recipient, fearful of disrupting the existing supply relationship, will accept their supplier's imposed technology control. South Korea desiring a better quality aircraft requested F-16s but settled on up-dated F-4s and F-5s when the Carter Administration denied its request. North Korea desired MiG-23s from the Soviet Union but has also been refused. Since China does not yet have the capabilities to mass produce their MiG-23s, North Korea had to accept the lesser quality MiG-21s from the Soviets.

The ability of a supplier to exert leverage over a recipient has been difficult to achieve and will become even more so. When particular issues are viewed as extremely important and sensitive to their own national interests, recipients may refuse to accept a supplier's pressure, accept the termination of a security assistance relationship, and turn to another supplier.

B. POLITICO-MILITARY EFFECTS ON RECIPIENTS

Obviously, the most demanding reason for arms acquisition is to enable a recipient to maintain and enhance its armed forces to meet security needs, both external and

internal. Additionally, arms transfers may allow a recipient to wage war, or pursue an expansionistic goal, such as Kim Il-Sung's reunification goal.

Receipt of high technology weapons systems enhances a recipient's military force, but it also requires the supplier to often provide support services and training reducing a recipient's freedom of action. Additionally, a supplier may be less willing to provide sizeable quantities of spare parts. This reluctance requires the recipient to maintain a dependency relationship and generally prohibits the ability to wage a long term war. The Soviet Union may be applying this factor to North Korea, probably more for the latter reason than the former.

Arms transfers also impacts on the political structure of recipient nations. Recognizing that both the Soviet and the Chinese fear a loss of influence to each other, North Korea plays one off against the other in order to obtain relative independence and obtain better terms. Additionally, arms transfers allows a recipient nation's leadership the opportunity to satisfy their military leadership's needs and desires, thereby obtaining their support and loyalty. As both Korea's governments are top heavy with military or ex-military leaders, this hypothesis has proved valid.

The disadvantages to the recipients include vulnerability to political pressure from its suppliers, and the retardation of economic growth due to diverting resources from more productive utilization. North Korea's economic growth, though spectacular through the early 1960s, suffered serious set backs in the later years, partly due to excessive defense expenditures. This economic set back has resulted in North Korea yielding to the South the role of economic leadership in the peninsula, in turn severely handicapping Kim Il-Sung's reunification propaganda.

C. THE IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY

Arms transfers, beside affecting the politico-military variables of supplier and recipient nations, also impacts on the stability of the recipients' geographical region. The Korean War had been fought almost entirely with foreign-produced arms. Though the peninsula continues to enjoy peace, eventhough that peace was not incident free, the region has been one of the world's largest receptacles of arms to date and remains one of the most volatile. The Korean peninsula is a dangerous region not only due to the fervent hostility between North and South Korea, but also because the major powers, who are also the primary suppliers, are involved. Armed conflict would affect all the powers involved, possibly destroying the current regional equilibrium.

But even in regions of confrontation, as in the Korean peninsula, the transfer of arms would not necessarily be the primary cause of armed conflict. There would be underlying causes involving matters such as ideology, territory, economics, and nationalism. The recipient nations acquire foreign weapons which are not available through indigenous production to strengthen their positions in such confrontations. Thus, it can be argued that the transfer of arms to the two Koreas has played a role in convincing their two leaders, particularly Kim, that the risks of resorting to force would outweigh any gains achieved through military action.

Stability may be facilitated by furnishing only certain weapons to maintain or to establish a status quo power base. Additionally, the psychological/political importance of arms transfer can either reassure a recipient of continued supplies (South Korea), or dissuade an adversary which would be tempted to strike (North Korea).

Regional stability can be affected in both a negative and positive manner by the relationship between the recipient and its major suppliers who are themselves involved in dispute. The rivalry between China and the Soviet Union has allowed North Korea the opportunity to steer a more independent course of action, and to receive more advanced and costly weapons than may otherwise have been possible considering its economic situation. The Korean conflict

showed that once hostilities commenced, the supply of arms by the major suppliers had the effect of prolonging the conflict and complicating the process of reaching a peace settlement. The close ties developed between suppliers and recipients prior to and during the Korean War resulted in a much greater stake in the outcome for the major powers. There is the chance that the major powers may become involved in more than just a supplier role in another armed conflict. However, the only instance where arms transfers/military assistance has led to a direct military confrontation between suppliers was between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the Korean War. Even in this case, the conflict was limited in weapons technology and geographical region.

Depending on the circumstances, arms transfers may be neither stabilizing nor destabilizing to a region. While it may be possible to analyze the past transfers' impact on regional stability, it is difficult to predict in advance what future transfers' effects would be. There will always be the danger that arms transfers intended to maintain and support peace may, in the future, contribute to greater instability and armed conflict. On the other hand, the strengthening of the military balance between the two adversaries in Korea may convince both sides that utilizing armed force to alter the status quo would be too

costly or futile. The recent North-South talks have shown an increased willingness to resolve differences by peaceful means.

D. THE IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS ON THE ECONOMIES OF SUPPLYING AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Though economic concerns are of some importance, in the case of the three major suppliers to Korea, political and military motivations are the principal elements in arms transfer decisions.² In recent years, however, the Soviet Union has been using arms sales, primarily in the Middle East, as a hard-currency earner, the reason in part due to limitations on arms production.³ When assessing economic effects of arms transfers, one must distinguish between the impact on defense industries and the impact on the supplier government.

Preproduction costs (R&D and establishment of the assembly lines) account for the largest share of the total cost of a weapons system. By increasing the numbers of weapons produced at the same plant these initial costs can be spread over a larger number of units, thus reducing the average cost per weapon system. Where domestic weapons demands are immense, such as in the United States and the Soviet Union, exports are less essential to ensure economical production. However, rising costs and inflation has made it increasingly important to obtain lower average

costs through arms exports. This is especially true in the case of advanced jet aircraft, which are very expensive to manufacture and are generally required in smaller numbers than other less expensive weapons systems.⁴ Another obvious effect of increased arms exports by suppliers is to maintain high employment among workers in their defense industries.

In the case of military equipment deemed obsolete to the needs of supplying nations, export enables the supplier government to recoup a portion of the initial purchase price of the equipment while also improving its balance-of-payments. In the case of the United States, exports to South Korea helps to offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from essential United States military deployment in South Korea.⁵ An examination of both North Korea's and South Korea's armed forces shows a predominance of Soviet and U.S. equipment no longer utilized by either suppliers' armed forces. (See Tables 1 & 2).

However, it should be noted that a sizable share of the weapons provided have been on a grant or discount basis and were surplus or used equipment. Both the Soviet Union and the United States maintain a practice of discounting or allowing relatively easy credit terms in their arms transfer transactions with the Koreans. The terms China places on transfers is generally unknown but it is believed that what arms China does provides to North Korea, there is little, if any, compensation required.⁶ In recent years,

Table 1

Military Equipment of North Korea - 1979

Army

350 T-34, 1,800 T-54/-55 and Type 59 med, 100 PT-76, 50 T-62 lt tks;
800 BTR-40/-60/-152, M-1967 APC; 3,500 guns and how up to 152mm;
1,300 RL; 9,000 82mm, 120mm and 160mm mor; 1,500 82mm RCL; 57mm to
100mm ATK guns; 9 FROG -5 SSM; 5,000 AA guns, incl 37mm, 57mm,
85mm, 100mm, ZSU -57-2 SP.

Navy

15 submarines (4 ex-Sov W-, 11 ex-Ch R-class).
3 Najin frigates (1 building).
27 large patrol craft: 3 ex-Sov (2 Trai, 1 Artillerist), 15 S01, 4 ex-
Ch Hai Nan, 3 Sariwan, 2 Taechong.
18 ex-Sov FAC(m) (8 Osa-I, 10 Komar< with Styx SSM).
134 FAC(G): 16 ex-Ch (8 Shanghai, 8 Swatow), 4 Chodo, 4K -48, 20
ex-Sov MO IV<, 60 Chahoc<, 30 Chong-Jin<).
169 FAC(t): 78 ex-Sov (4 Shershen, 62 P6<, 12 P4<), 15 Iwon<, 6 An
Ju<, 60 Sin Hung< and Kosong<, 10 KM4.
70 Nampo< landing craft, 5-10 LCU, 15 LCM.

Air Force

565 combat aircraft.
3 lt bbr sqns with 85 I1-28.
3 FGA sqns with 20 Su-7, 40 MiG-15/-17.
21 Interceptor sqns with 120 MiG-21 and 300 MiG-15/-17/-19.
Tpts incl 200 An-2, 40 An-24, 10 I1-14/-18, 1 Tu-154.
Hel incl 50 Mi-4, 10 Mi-8.
Trainers incl 70 Yak-18, 100 Mig-15UTI/-21 U, I1-28.
AA-2 Ato1 AAM.
3 SAM bdes with 250 SA-2.

Source: The Military Balance 1970-80, (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979, p. 68.

Table 2

Military Equipment of South Korea - 1979

Army

60 M-60, 800 M-47/-48 med tks; 500 M-113/-577, 20 Fiat 6614 APC; 2,000 105mm, 203mm towed, 76M-109 155mm, 12 M-107 175mm, 16 M-110 203mm SP guns/how; 5,300 81mm, 107mm mor; Honest John SSM; 80 M-18 76mm, 100 M-36 90mm ATK guns; 57mm, 75mm, 106mm RCL; TOW, LAW ATGW; 66 Vulcan 20mm, 40 40mm AA guns; 80 HAWK 45 Nike Hercules SAM; 14 O-2A ac; 20 UH-1B, 44 OH-6A, 5 KH-4, 25 Hughes Defender Hel.

(On order: 150 Fiat 6614 APC, 37 M-109 155mm SP how, TOW ATGW, 56 OH-6A Hel.)

Navy

9 ex-US destroyers (4 Gearing, 2 Sumner, 3 Fletcher).
7 ex-US frigates (1 Rudderow, 6 Lawrence/Crossley).
6 ex-US corvettes (3 Auk, 3 PCE 827).
8 FAC(M) with Standard SSM (7 PSMM 5, 1 ex-US Asheville).
1 CPIC FAC(P)<.
10 large patrol craft (8 ex-US Cape<, 2 100-ft.)
23 coastal patrol craft: 10 Schoolboy<, 13 Sewart< (9 65-ft, 4 40-ft.)
8 MSC 268/294 coastal minesweepers, 1 minesweeping boat<.
22 ex-US landing ships (1 LSD, 8 LST, 12 LSM, 1 LCU).

(On order: 1 frigate, 120 Harpoon SSM).

Marines

LVTP-7 APC.

Air Force

254 combat aircraft.
9 FB sqns: 3 with 37 F-4D/E, 4 with 135 F-5E, 2 with 50 F-86F.
1 recce sqn with 12 RF-5A.
1 ASW sqn 20 S-2F.
1 SAR sqn with 6 UH-19, 5 UH-1D, 2 Bell 212 hel.
Tpts incl 12 C-46, 10 C-54, 10 C-123, 2 HS-748, Aero Commander.
Trainers incl 20 T-28D, 30 T-33A, 20 T-41D, 30 F-5B, 3 F-5F.
Hel incl 4 UH-19, 50 Hughes 500MD.
Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM.

(On order: 18 F-4E, 14 F-5E fighters, 24 OV-10G COIN, 6 C-130H tpts, 6 CH-47C, 50 Hughes 500MD, 27 UH-1H hel., AIM-9L Super Sidewinder AAM, Maverick ASM.)

Source: The Military Balance 1979-1980, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 68-69.

most or all of the Soviet arms provided North Korea have been paid for or are supplied against credits. Payment usually is over 8 to 10 years at 2 to 2.5 percent interest. The Soviets have also been willing to accept commerce goods or local currency and has reduced frequently or postponed payments when North Korea was unable to meet them. Soviet arms are priced usually lower than comparable Western equipment. The list price is based primarily on what Soviet planners estimate the recipient can afford.⁷

Arms provided on a grant basis to a recipient country creates no economy of scale for producing them, thus allowing fewer resources for use by the supplier in capital formation. The United States provided South Korea with nearly all its military needs on a grant basis under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) until 1971, at which time South Korea began to purchase weapons on a cash or credit basis. When MAP grants to South Korea ended in 1976, South Korea was able to purchase considerably more arms under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits than had been obtained through MAP in a like time period. (See Table 17). Congressional interest toward which countries received this expensive military assistance program aid resulted in a decline in grant aid and an upsurge in FMS. Through the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Congress separated sales legislation from grant-aid military legislation. As Secretary of State Rusk said:

"...this legislation will permit the financially independent countries of the free world to buy from the United States equipment needed to bear their share of the common defense burden."⁸

In recent years, supplier nations have begun selling and transferring technical information, and production know-how, rather than the weapons themselves. This is known as production of foreign-designed weapons under license. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have licensing arrangements with their client states in Korea. The economic benefits derived from such an arrangement include the buyer (recipient) obtaining the ability to produce a weapon without the extra burden of research and development costs (R&D) attached while the supplier is able to recoup somewhat on his own R&D costs without setting up an expensive production line.

Unlike the major suppliers, the recipient's economies are affected more drastically by the costs of arms imports. Given the need for capital and foreign exchange in the two developing countries of Korea, a diversion of resources by military imports, or just as significantly, the freeing of resources by grant military aid, may be significant. Due to the high level of U.S. grant aid received, South Korea was able to sustain a low military spending/GNP ratio for over 20 years after the Korean War, facilitating its rapid economic growth. Conversely, the high military spending/

GNP ratio North Korea began obtaining in the later 1960s resulted in a significantly slowed economic growth rate.

Whether arms acquisition will favorably or adversely affect the recipient's economy depends on several factors⁹:

- 1) the types and numbers of military equipment acquired,
- 2) the degree to which such a transfer would require the recipient country to increase spending on manpower, maintenance, and other related military functions,
- 3) the applicability of military equipment and training to civilian uses,
- 4) the terms of the arms transfer, and
- 5) the manner in which resources already allocated to existing import programs would be utilized in the absence of those programs.

The more expensive the arms imports, for example, jet aircraft, the greater is the diversion of the recipient's resources from domestic uses. The more specialized the military equipment and training, the smaller will be the civilian utilization. Learning how to build roads and bridges has considerably more civilian utility than learning how to operate a surface-to-air missile. The terms of arms transfers have important bearings of the economic effects of weapons acquisition. Grant aid, as discussed earlier, stimulates economic development by minimizing the diversion of domestic resources to the military sector. Equally true is the lower the proportion of the full price of the weapon the recipient is required to pay, the lesser will be the adverse effects on domestic economic growth.

To summarize the foregoing, factors which normally contribute to a favorable effect on economic development include: 1) arms acquisitions on a grant or low term credit basis, 2) imports which do not require excessive expenditures on support services, and 3) military equipment and training which have beneficial civilian adaptability. Factors which normally contribute toward an adverse effect on economic growth are: 1) the acquisition of weapons, especially expensive systems, at full price or with stiff credit terms, 2) large additional expenditures in spending on support services, 3) training and infrastructure programs which have little civilian "spin-off", and 4) a recipient government's willingness to divert manpower and foreign exchange from capital formation to the military sector.

In the case of both Koreas, a mix of these positive and negative factors may be found. Whether the net effects of arms transfers on their economic development are positive or negative depended on the nature of the mix and the relative importance of the various factors.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a more in-depth study of the phenomena of arms transfer in a conceptual form see: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, A Report to the Congress, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 12, 1974.
2. John Franklin Cooper, China's Foreign Aid, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 129. Uri Ra'anani, "Soviet Arms Transfers and the Problem of Political Leverage," Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries, Uri Ra'anani, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 131-135. "Arms Transfer Control," Strategic Survey 1977, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 105.
3. "U.S. Eyes Arms Sales Restrains Reactions," Aviation Week & Space Technology, (August 22, 1977), p. 57.
4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, pp. 69-70.
5. John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms, (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 80. In 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that the three principal goals of U.S. arms sales were to:
 1. Promote the defensive strength of our allies, consistent with our political-economic objectives.
 2. Promote the concept of co-operative logistics and standardization with our allies.
 3. Offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from essential United States military deployment abroad."
6. Harold C. Hinton, "China and Korea," The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halpern, eds., (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 113. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, pp. 38-39.
7. Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 271. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Policies on Arms Transfers and Military Assistance Programs. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. 95th Cong., 1st sess., March, April 1977, pp. 23-24.

The Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate (GIU), which is subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), is charged with the overall responsibility for implementing the Soviet arms aid and sales programs. For further insight as to how the GIU operates, see: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, pp. 35-37.

8. M. T. Smith, "U.S. Foreign Military Sales", Congress and Arms Control, Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978). p. 347.

9. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms, pp. 78-82.

II. BEFORE VIETNAM

A. 1945-1950 PREPARATION FOR THE KOREAN WAR

For nearly six centuries the Yi dynasty of Korea willingly accepted its tributary status under the Chinese imperial order. By the 20th century, this "hermit kingdom" had become one of the most sought after of China's tributaries by the Japanese and Russians. An era of imperial exploitation was climaxing in Asia with Korea as one of the focal points. Korea soon found itself an important colony of the expanding Japanese empire. Unfortunately, the end of 35 years of Japanese suzerainty did not result in a return to a unified Korea ruled by Koreans. General Order No 1, approved by the governments of the U.S., the UK, the USSR, and China, had legitimized the temporary partition of Korea.¹

In accordance with this agreement, the Soviet Union, which entered the war with Japan eight days before the Japanese surrender, promptly dispatched troops to their assigned area north of the 38th Parallel, and were equally prompt in establishing their own government. The Soviet move into Korea closely paralleling her actions in Eastern Europe helped to establish the Korean communists as the leaders in the North.

As the cold war developed, neither the United States nor the Soviets were willing to meet the terms of the other concerning the establishment of a national government in

Korea. Both major powers began to favor and support Koreans within their respective zones. Gradually two completely political, social, and economic systems took root in Korea. Thus, Korea paralleled the path taken in Germany with separate and hostile governments under tutelage by antagonistic and rival major powers, rather than the Austrian pattern with a single national government under joint great-power authority.²

Various military assistance programs were developed as part of the American strategy to counter Soviet challenges throughout the world. Military aid in the immediate post-war period was an outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine, under which the United States provided economic and military aid to not only Free World allies, but also to those countries faced with either internal or external communist aggression. President Truman summed up United States policy considerations in the First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program:

"The concept of peace for the United States has become indistinguishable from the concept of peace in the world as a whole. American security and well-being are now dependent upon, and inextricably bound up with, the security and well-being of free peoples everywhere."³

These post-World War II U.S. military aid programs began with emphasis placed on providing local forces adequate equipment to perform military tasks considered in the interest of the United States, or "substituting for what in

many cases might otherwise be a vastly more expensive direct American military presence".⁴ The majority of American major weapons exports went to countries contiguous to the Soviet Union or China, better known as the "forward defense areas". The magnitude of military aid and arms transferred varied proportionately to both the American perceived threat and its willingness to commit troops for combat.⁵

Two events in 1950 focused United States attention on the possibility of external threats in the Far East: the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the outbreak of the Korean War. The Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the subsequent alliance with the Soviet Union forced the United States to formulate a new Far Eastern policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to President Truman in September 1947 that Korea offered little strategic value to the United States.⁶ Even General MacArthur considered Korea militarily indefensible and recommended a United States pullout as sensible.⁷ Therefore, Secretary of State Dean Acheson's famous speech in January 1950 gave voice to a policy which his president had already approved a number of years earlier. Though Acheson did not write off Korea as completely as has been charged, he did clearly place it outside the area of primary U.S. defense interests in Asia.⁸ Such public statements (including a similar one by General MacArthur a year earlier), combined with the removal

of United States troops, made it appear to the Soviets and the North Koreans that the United States had limited military concern over Korea.⁹

The U.S. approach to Korea had been somewhat ambivalent before the outbreak of war. The American occupation Army had provided some arms and training to the South Koreans, but had taken the precaution to arm the South Korean Army with only light weapons for defensive purposes so as to preclude any temptation by the South to invade North Korea. In January, 1946 the National Constabulary was established with a cadre of Korean officers and men who had served with Japanese armies in Japan, Manchuria, and China. This Constabulary was the nucleus of the National Defense Force created in August 1948 when the Republic of Korea was inaugurated. At that time the total strength of the Army constituted 5 divisions comprised of about 50,500 officers and men. The Korean Coast Guard created in 1945, and equipped with only a few PT (Patrol & Torpedo) boats, became the basis for the Korean Navy. The Air Force developed from the National Constabulary's Reconnaissance Unit in October, 1949. It was provided with no combat aircraft and started the Korean War with a handful of L-4 and L-5 light planes and 10 C-4 propeller-drive non-combat aircraft, all provided by the United States.¹⁰

By 1950, the South Korean Army totaled eight organized divisions and about 100,000 men. With the exception of the

Republic of Korea soldiers (ROKs) maintained in southern South Korea to counter Communist guerrilla units, the ROK divisions were armed with American M-1 rifles left behind in 1948, American machine-guns, some small mortars, and 51 battalions of field artillery, all equipped with M-3 105mm howitzers which the American Army had junked. Those ROK units fighting guerrillas in the south were armed with old Japanese model 99 rifles. When the United States combat units withdrew, they had left behind arms for only about 50,000 men. This military force, labeled the "best damn army outside the United States" by outgoing Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) commander Brigadier General William L. Roberts, had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2 inch mortars, no recoilless rifles, and no spare parts for their transport. The ROK leaders also lacked training in large-unit maneuvers and integrating all the combat arms in a concerted effort. The South Koreans didnot even have a single combat aircraft.¹¹

At briefings only 5 months before the conflict began, United States and South Korean officials were regarding inflation, not defense, as their major problem. The KMAG commander, BG Roberts was reporting the ROK Army excellent, but in need of some antiaircraft guns, a few fast naval vessels, and a dozen planes of the caliber of the old P-51 fighters.¹²

This inadequacy of the South Korean military was not totally due to lack of United States concern for the necessary defense of South Korea, but rather it was due in large part to the fear that properly armed for offense, President Syngman Rhee would punch northward toward Pyongyang. Former Ambassador John J. Muccio recalled on the 25th anniversary of the Korean War:

"President Rhee had a very unrealistic attitude towards that whole issue. He thought that the people in the North were waiting for him to arrive on a white charger, that they would all get up and acclaim him, and that Korea would be unified. And, ... as many incursions north took place as incursions across the 38th Parallel into the South. That tied our hands, for there was a danger that the aggression would occur from the South."¹³

Therefore, as Ambassador Muccio points out, the South Korean military did not possess tanks, medium or heavy artillery, or combat aircraft because the American Embassy did not want them to have any. KMAG, under State Department control because the United States was determined to show the world its intentions in Korea were nonaggressive, had been instructed by Ambassador Muccio to take no chances with the possibilities that the South Koreans may attack the Communists in the north.¹⁴ In January 1950, General Roberts told members of the U.N. Commission on Korea that the government of the Republic of Korea had been informed that if it launched an attack against the North, all military and economic aid from the United States would cease.¹⁵

President Rhee's harsh character and belligerency were trying at best to the American diplomats and KMAG officers assigned to Seoul. Moreover, President Rhee even possessed "an ace in the hole" to stymie any movement toward peaceful unification. The Korean Aid Bill passed by the U.S. Congress in February 1950 carried a proviso that stipulated termination of aid "in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition government which included one or more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of North Korea."¹⁶

Not knowing the kind of tough, disciplined armies that were being built in Asia by the Communists, KMAG and Ambassador Muccio had no reason to expect that the South Koreans would have to fight. Combine this factor with the consistent bellicose attitude of President Rhee, and it is perhaps, understandable that United States military and political observers discounted the increasing warnings of North Korean incursions into the south, warnings which originated from South Korean intelligence sources.

During this same period, North Korea was becoming totally Soviet dominated and dependent. The first few months of Soviet occupation provoked fear and resentment among the Korean people. The one quarter million men occupation force's behavior was marked by low moral standards and a lack of discipline. However, unlike the American occupation forces, the Russian Army brought with

it a staff of Koreans and Korean-speaking Russians to facilitate establishing Russian control over all aspects of the sector in which they occupied.¹⁷ Eventually, discipline was tightened, but the impression lasted long after the last Soviet soldier left North Korea. The Soviets were the sole supplier of arms, ammunition, gasoline, vehicles, and other military equipment, with an estimated economic and military aid value of \$56 million.¹⁸

One of the more significant measures adopted by the newly formed and Soviet advised North Korean government was the creation of a large standing army. Conscription was introduced, military training schools established, and the schooling of Korean cadets and officers begun. The first units, called "poandae" (public security units) were activated in February 1946 under the guidance and control of Soviet occupation forces. By the first half of 1947 the "poandae" totaled nearly 150,000 men to include two paramilitary divisions equipped with Soviet material. By 1948, the North Korean armed forces had attained a strength of nearly 200,000 men. Formation of a conventional military force appears to have begun covertly in mid-1946. Therefore, the 1948 strength figures must have included both "poandae" and regular force units. Formal establishment of the Korean People's Army (KPA) was announced in February 1948, seven months prior to the foundation of the new state itself.¹⁹

The Soviets put over 200 Soviet planes for training at the disposal of this new army at an airfield near Pyongyang. In addition, the Soviets supplied North Korea Yak-9P fighters and Il-10 bombers, a total of about 150 first-line aircraft.²⁰ About 15 new airfields were also built by the Soviet forces and the Korean People's Army.²¹ By the time the Soviet forces had completed their withdrawal from North Korea at the end of 1948, the KPA's strength was near 60,000. Kim Il-Sung and his supporters had by then secured the controlling positions within the KPA. From that time until the beginning of the Korean War, the KPA underwent a massive buildup, all the while Soviet materiel streaming into the North. By summer, 1950 the KPA strength was estimated to be nearly 200,000 men, 10,000 of which were officers and technicians trained in the Soviet Union, and 40,000 of whom were veterans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).²²

Though the Soviets provided massive deliveries of tanks, trucks, and artillery, coupled with advice and training to the North Korean Army, it purposely refused to help expedite the formation of a North Korean air force. A former Red Army Colonel revealed that the Americans were not the only ones dubious of Korean intentions. Colonel C. D. Kalinow, who had been a member of the Soviet military mission to North Korea at the end of 1948, and attached to

the Soviet General Staff under General Zakharov in 1949, states that General Zakharov and the Politbureau refused an appeal by the Korean Communist Party for an air force. According to General Zakharov:

"It is necessary to be careful with these Koreans.... We are going to form a modern army, ... but we are not going to act like the sorcerer's apprentice, creating a force which could make mischief in the Far East. (and) ... bring war with the United States ... and we are not interested in provoking such a war."²³

From the military view, the North Korean military machine in 1950 was undoubtedly superior to the one fielded by the South Koreans. On one side of the 38th Parallel stood a 150,000 man, well equipped, trained and organized (using the Russian model) North Korean Army. On the other side, a 100,000 man, ill equipped, poorly trained and newly organized South Korean Army. The South Korean Government had repeatedly emphasized border clashes as a reason for seeking sufficient American military aid. However, apart from the equipment transferred from the departing U.S. combat troops in 1948, no direct aid reached South Korea until after hostilities had commenced. This was the case despite appropriations already approved by Congress under the October 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Program and a subsequent South Korean - United States agreement signed 26 January 1950.²⁴

Soviet policy toward the further development of the Korean situation had to consider the impression given by the United States that Korea was not a country in the defense of which particular American interests were vital. According to Mr. Khrushchev's memoirs, when Kim consulted Stalin as to his plan for forceful reunification, Stalin gave him the nod. There is little doubt that if Stalin had chose to do so, he could have hindered if not completely blocked Kim's crossing the 38th Parallel in June, 1950.²⁵

B. 1950-1953 THE KOREAN WAR

The war began with an invasion across the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950. Almost immediately, the conflict escalated to an East-West polarized conflict. South Korea became an important part of the U.S. "forward defense zone" of the Far East and has remained so since. The conflict changed the American strategy for stability from primarily providing economic aid and limited military assistance to providing massive military assistance including arms and equipment to South Korea's military forces and the direct employment of United States combat forces. Throughout the war, however, U.S. priorities remained in the supply of its own troops.

Although both South and North Korea acquired increasing autonomy in the latter stages of the conflict and their perceptions of the conflict differed from the super-power suppliers, the war had to be considered in the context

of super-power competition. One of the most important spin-offs of arms suppliers in that war was the manner in which supplying nations got drawn into the conflict. The Korean War provided the first example of supplier entanglement in a polarized context.

By providing weapons to the Koreans, the Soviet Union and the United States were implicitly and explicitly lending support. Both recipients became heavily dependent upon their respective suppliers. Neither super-power was willing to allow their client country to be defeated because a defeat for the recipient was considered a defeat for the supplier. Thus, dependency developed into a two-edged sword. The United States found it necessary to increase its military support to the extent of inserting its own combat troops. The variable of direct intervention of a supplier nation directly affected the variable of direct confrontation with other supplier states. The Chinese intervention proved this hypothesis correct.

Another example of this two-edged sword, i.e. mutual dependence involving a polarized conflict, was the inability to withdraw tangible support. The Soviet's perception of a North Korean defeat as a serious set-back for the survival of the entire socialist camp as a whole resulted in increased pressure on North Korea and China to accept an armistice in 1953. Soviet fear of being involved as an actual participant most likely led to the cease-fire pressure. The same

reasoning would later guide Soviet military assistance policy in Southeast Asia.²⁶

The Soviets, however, were not the only ones concerned with the survival of the socialist camp. It is quite possible North Korea would have been defeated by the U.N. forces if China had not sent her 2.5 million "volunteers". This "aid", much more than the large quantities of equipment, supplies, and credits supplied by both the Soviets and Chinese, constituted a "debt" on the part of the North Koreans that would have later ramifications for all the major actors in the Korean peninsula.²⁷

Not surprisingly, Soviet history has put Soviet and Chinese contributions to the Korean War on a par. A Soviet book written in 1972 on Soviet-Chinese relations contained a rare Soviet admission of a Soviet active combat role during the war:

"Close military cooperation was realized between the USSR and the PRC in the period of military operations in Korea. The Soviet Union uninterruptedly supplied the people's army of Korea and the Chinese volunteers with arms, military supplies, fuel, foodstuffs and medicines. There were Soviet military advisers in Korea including outstanding military leaders. Soviet fliers took part in battles against the aggressors."²⁸

An earlier history also revealed that the Soviets were prepared to send into Korea 5 air divisions. The Soviets did not send those air divisions per se, but the fact that Soviets, piloting combat aircraft, took part in air battles

against United Nations forces is an established fact.²⁹ By the end of July 1950, North Korean aircraft had been reduced to about eighteen aircraft. The success of the United Nations offensive in the Fall of 1950 had the effect of not only bringing in the Chinese volunteers, but also of persuading the Soviets that if they wished not to see their client defeated, considerable materiel, especially aircraft, would have to be supplied. The Russians decided the best application of their air power would be in a defensive role. Thus, in November 1950, a new generation of Russian fighters, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15, appeared in North Korean skies.³⁰ The introduction of this aircraft, only two years into production, was to significantly change the course of the war and the technology of weapons brought to bear in the conflict.

By December 1952, the strength of Soviet supplied aircraft had risen to some 2100 aircraft of which nearly 1150 were jets, of these 950 were MiG-15's. Of even more significance was the entry of the Russian Ilyushin Il-28 twin-jet medium bombers, the latest aircraft produced by Russia at the time. The United Nations forces possessed no high performance aircraft to counter night use of these new bombers.³¹

It quickly became clear to the United States Air Force that the Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star was no match, performance-wise, to the MiG-15s. This required the Americans

to deploy its latest fighter, the F-86A Sabre to counter the Soviet introduction. Technically, the MiG-15 had slightly superior attributes in its fighter characteristics. Tactically, however, the Sabre pilots proved superior to their communist counterparts.³² This factor proved decisive in not only the air battles, but also in the outcome of the war.

The military balance on the Korean peninsula by the 1953 cease-fire was anything but equal. The North Korean Army had suffered enormous casualties and equipment losses. Its national air force, the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corp (KPAFAC), had to be completely regrouped and retrained due to the heavy losses suffered in the early stages of the war.³³ The extensive industrial damage and acute manpower shortage forecast a continued dependence on both the Soviets and Chinese following the war.

By the Armistice, the South Korean forces were not in much better condition. As denoted earlier, the supply to indigenous forces had played only a minor role in the United States war effort. But, the experience of the war resulted in a shift of the American forward defense strategy. Inherent in this shift was a change in U.S. military and economic assistance. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 had combined legislation concerning both military and economic assistance. It was believed by American policy-makers that political, economic, and military aid to the forward

defense areas, coupled with the threat of massive retaliation, would prevent a similar situation in which United States troops would need to be deployed. This period was also denoted by numerous mutual defense treaties, including the one signed with South Korea in October 1953.³⁴

By capsulizing the major military aid programs on the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1953 a number of factors stand out. These factors affected or impacted on all the major states interacting on the peninsula. First, total Soviet control north of the 38th Parallel in the pre-war years resulted in total North Korean dependency. North Korea was substantially aided, trained, and equipped by the Soviets. Once the tide turned against the North Koreans, the Soviets increased military assistance primarily in aircraft, tanks and artillery to preclude the defeat of their socialist brother.³⁵ The Soviets then persuaded the Chinese to assist. The Chinese assistance, in both military and economic aid, resulted in supplier entanglement in the actual conflict when it introduced 2.5 million "volunteers". This direct intervention of Chinese troops also resulted in a United States shift of threat perception to the People's Republic of China.

As for South Korea, she was totally dependent on the United States for both security and livelihood. The majority of the industrial sector of Korea had been located north of the 38th Parallel before the conflict began.

Therefore, economic growth and rising post-WW II inflation were the major concerns of United States and South Korean officials. Fearful of a "march-north" by President Rhee, the United States purposefully equipped and trained South Koreans only marginally. The United States reaction to the North Korean invasion was immediate intervention with troops and increased, though still minimal, aid to South Korean forces - the purpose to preclude the defeat of a democratic protégé by a communist nation. When the Soviet Union introduced a weapon system capable of shifting the tide of battle, the Americans had to quickly counter with the introduction of a like weapons system. Though high technology weapons were brought to bear in the conflict, weapons provided the Koreans were relative to their military needs and capabilities.

A pattern was initiated with this war, i.e., arms transfers patterns would be dominated by the conflict in the area. North and South Korea received nearly three-quarters of all major arms imports world-wide in the period 1950-1953.³⁶ Both the United States and the Soviet Union learned that in a polarized world, supplier entanglement was unavoidable. Realizing this, the Soviets pressured both North Korea and the People's Republic of China to agree to a cease-fire before it was drawn into the conflict as a major participant, not just a supplier.³⁷ Because

this pressure eliminated Kim Il-Sung's objective of reunification, the Soviets lost face in the eyes of both the North Koreans and their ally, the People's Republic of China. This resulted in reduced Soviet political influence and control over its Asian client states. Most important, both the Soviets and Americans learned through this experience that the supplier-recipient relationship comprised a two-sided dependency factor.

C. 1953-1965 FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM

The armistice was a military one, with all signators being military leaders representing the United Nations, the Chinese and the North Koreans. The sixteen nations who had fought under the United Nations Command issued a statement in August 1953, pledging themselves to renew the war if Communist aggression again occurred.³⁸ This armistice agreement also prohibited the introduction of new weapons and any increase in combat aircraft. However, the UN command which was highly U.S. influenced, voided the limitation in 1958 due to alleged North Korean non-adherence.³⁹

This was not the first instance since the Second World War that supplier countries had been urged to refrain from introducing armaments in a region. In 1948, the Security Council had recommended termination of all imports of war materiel to the Middle East during Palestine cease-fire agreements. In the 1951, the General Assembly, over Soviet

objections, had imposed a strategic embargo against North Korea and the People's Republic of China. In 1949, seven NATO members, as a result of an American initiative, established the Consultative Group (CG) on East-West trade policy. Its Coordinating Committee (COCOM) focused on coordinating trade policies and maintaining lists of arms and other strategic materials to be embargoed to Soviet-dominated Eastern European countries. In 1950, at the urging of the United States, these COCOM control lists were expanded to include the People's Republic of China and North Korea. In 1953, COCOM revised its lists to reflect changes in the European political climate and technological advances. However, the United States continued a virtual complete embargo on trade and financial transactions with Asian Communist countries, until President Nixon ended the embargo on trade with the People's Republic in April 1971.⁴⁰

The armistice also ushered in a period of confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The threat to American interests in Asia (those interests being peace and access to both Korea and the Chinese mainland) was now perceived squarely in Peking. The United States strategy of forward defense became better known as a "containment" policy.

During this period, it was believed that the main threat to the forward defense areas was an external threat. As noted earlier, following the Korean War, the U.S. had decided

on a strategy of mutual deterrence based on massive nuclear retaliation. In line with this view, it was decided that local forces should carry the burden of meeting a limited conventional attack.⁴¹ Subsequently, greater emphasis was lent to supporting assistance. Military aid to South Korea was necessary not only to enable its military to meet possible aggressions from the north, but also to make the United States commitment meaningful in accordance with its Mutual Defense Treaty. The capacity of the South Koreans to fight a limited conventional war was seen as an alternative to surrender or nuclear warfare.

Korea largely passed out of the consciousness of the American public after 1953. Troop reductions in South Korea were rapid and significant. From a total of over 200,000 stationed in South Korea in 1954, the total force count by 1960 was below 60,000. Regardless of a general apathy by the American public, the U.S. Government still considered the Korean problem an active one. The United States began to devote extensive time and resources in order to improve both the South Korean economy and its security posture.⁴²

The United States also began attempts to reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean Unification question. A Korean political conference was held in Geneva in 1954 for such a purpose. Most of the signators of the Armistice were present. However, the two sides (UN representatives

versus Communist representatives) failed to agree on three key issues: the authority and role of the United Nations, the principle of free elections, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The conference ended without reaching any agreement on any points discussed. This disagreement on the above three issues remains today and provides the lesson that perhaps no lasting solution to the reunification issue can be reached without the agreement of the major powers involved.⁴³

The South Korean economy was slowly rehabilitated with United States aid and advice, but its development was not given a high priority by Seoul during the 1950's. This caused many American observers to become increasingly pessimistic, especially when contrasting the South's poor economic growth rate to the rapid growth in the North. To permit South Korean resources to be concentrated on nation building and economics, the United States assumed the total costs for the support of the South Korean armed forces. It also provided the equalizing force margin by retaining two U.S. Army divisions, backed up with supporting air and logistics. In this process, America exercised the right to "prescribe the size, configuration, and weaponry of the South Korean armed forces."⁴⁴

United States major weapon exports to South Korea rose steadily throughout the fifties, reaching a peak in the years 1958-60.⁴⁵ President Rhee had, as a condition to agree

to an Armistice, extracted from the United States a pledge of large scale-American aid and a direct American security guarantee - the Mutual Security Treaty formalized in 1954. Nearly all of these arms exported to South Korea were WW II surplus, obsolete, or second hand. Additionally, these arms were single weapons (as opposed to weapon systems), which required minimal maintenance or few complex spare parts.⁴⁶ Aircraft imports between 1954 and 1960 consisted mainly of F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers; naval imports were primarily landing craft.⁴⁷

In North Korea, Kim Il-Sung had consolidated his power base. The Soviet initiative for an armistice had created widespread resentment among North Korean leaders who realized the lives lost were in vain and the goal of reunification could not be achieved. Kim showed his resentment by embarking on an independent path of reconstruction without Soviet approval. His efforts were facilitated by the presence until 1958 of Chinese troops. The People's Republic of China did much to help ease the manpower shortage by keeping more than 200,000 troops in Korea. Not only did the CPLA help with logistics and training, their presence alone made possible a significant reduction in the Korean People's Army. This greatly facilitated North Korea's efforts in reconstruction and economic development.⁴⁸

As Soviet influence had been paramount during the late 1940s, the diversification of North Korea's trade and political relationships after 1955 tended to reduce it more than it reduced a significantly lower Chinese influence level. Post-war economic aid to North Korea was considerable. Chinese aid, an estimated \$1.8 billion up to 1961 was nearly as large as Soviet aid (\$2.0 billion), with Eastern European Communist countries providing nearly \$620 million.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the Soviets retained their primacy of influence in North Korea through the summer of 1958.⁵⁰ They also remained the sole suppliers of major weapons to North Korea. Between 1955 and 1957, North Korea was supplied and trained in the use of Il-28 jet bombers and MiG-17s to replace obsolescent MiG-15s.⁵¹ Also during this period, Kim Il-Sung was able to develop within his newly formed armed forces a strong peasant base loyal to himself and to the Korean Workers Party.⁵²

By 1958, Kim was walking a diplomatic tight-rope between the pressures of China and Russia to take a side on the mounting Sino-Soviet dispute. To avoid becoming a pawn to either, he chose an independent line. Eventually, he leaned more toward China's side after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization (anti-cult) campaign and "peaceful coexistence policy".⁵³ (Chapter IV deals more in detail with the triangular relationship between North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the

People's Republic of China.) However, China had limited capacity to deliver major weapons prior to 1957. It wasn't until 1958 that Chinese-built MiG-15s and MiG-17s were delivered.⁵⁴ Therefore, Kim saw no alternative but to play a dual role of subservience to Moscow and Peking in return for the much needed economic and military aid.

Upon the assumption of office, President Kennedy changed the Eisenhower Administration's strategy of reliance on the threat of massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response, a doctrine implying a willingness to commit conventional troops for combat. The Kennedy strategy essentially left open the possibilities of response geared to the level of threat perception.

The increase in guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia also resulted in a re-appraisal of the threat perception. Subsequently, in the Far East, external threat perception gave way to the belief that an internal threat within Southeast Asia was more of a danger to American interests than an external one. Furthermore, an increased willingness by the Kennedy Administration to commit troops to limited wars (i.e., a doctrine of flexible response), coupled with a refocusing of threat perception, resulted in a reappraisal of the United States military aid programs for the Far East forward defense areas. The decision was made to concentrate more on countering the internal threats, particularly in

the Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. American military aid would be used to concentrate on training and equipping indigenous forces to counter their internal threats.

The United States' view of the authoritarian nature of President Rhee's rule was one of discouragement. The Rhee government's authoritarianism, corruption, and lack of substantial economic growth rate was proving to be an embarrassment to the United States. Therefore, it was not surprising that the April, 1960 bloodless coup overthrowing the Rhee regime was welcomed by Washington. Politically, the high tide of United States influence was probably reached in that short lived administration of Dr. Chang Myon.⁵⁵ Conversely, the coup d' etat of May 1961 led by then General Park Chung Hee and a group of military officers clearly worried the United States. A military rule was distinctly repugnant to Americans and the new Kennedy Administration. During the coup d' etat, the United Nations Command was seriously weakened in prestige when the military junta supporting General Park utilized unilaterally some Korean armed forces units, technically under UN Command, in support of the take-over action.⁵⁶

Prolonged efforts of persuasion and pressure were directed at General Park to restore civilian government to hold elections. General Park and his group of military officers responded by attempting to mold the former civilian

oriented government into a form more regimented and orderly. The Kennedy Administration responded forcefully, threatening to terminate not only economic aid but also military aid. Finally, in 1963 finding he had no choice but to acquiesce to Washington's pressure, General Park promulgated a new Constitution and held elections.⁵⁷ South Korea gradually developed a ruling base under a democratic system that the United States was no longer overly embarrassed to be associated with. The Kennedy Administration was equally pleased that President Park had entered into negotiations with Tokyo over normalization issues.

Military aid programs to South Korea fluctuated significantly during this period. U.S. military assistance to South Korea is shown in Table 17. The high point of U.S. assistance to South Korea during this period was fiscal year 1961. From that period until 1968, U.S. military assistance to South Korea decreased below the 1961 level. The major reason for the aid decrease was most likely the substantial increase in military assistance to Southeast Asia, particularly to South Vietnam rather than to dissatisfaction with the Park government. Nevertheless, as the figures in Table 18 show, considerable supplies of conventional armaments continued to flow into South Korea. This was the period when advanced missiles such as Nike Hercules, Honest John and the Hawk were supplied to the ROK

forces, the first deliveries made in 1961.⁵⁸ It is important to note that, though the supplies of conventional armaments continued, the share of U.S. military aid for new procurement was falling during this period. By 1964-65, nearly 80 per cent of military assistant grants went toward ammunition, parts, food and training.⁵⁹

To North Korea, the period 1960-1965 proved to be the historical low point in Soviet-North Korean relations. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy was widely interpreted in Asia as repudiating the cult of personality which meant in Asian terms, anti-Mao and anti-Kim. Kim Il-Sung, a great admirer of Stalin (and probably of Mao) refused to abide with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.

"Indeed, North Korea has never experienced 'de-Stalinization'. 'The adulation given him by all mass media', Dr. Scalapino writes, 'exceeds even that given Mao; the cult of personality reigns supreme.'"⁶⁰

In 1961 mutual defense treaties with both the Chinese and the Soviets were concluded by North Korea. The same year Kim introduced his 7-Year Economic Development Plan defying the Soviets who were trying to coordinate and direct all socialist planning. This action, coupled with a North Korean refusal to accept Soviet military command dominance resulted in the cessation of all Soviet military aid.⁶¹

The Soviet's "Retreat" in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis added fuel to the North Korean contention that Peking's

hard line attitude toward the United States offered more protection from the United States than Moscow was willing to provide. North Korea was particularly impressed when the Chinese wholly endorsed Kim's political and territorial ambitions. The Chinese also supported North Korea's contention that the United States alone obstructed the unification of the two Koreas and the two Chinas by its presence in the Republic of Korea and in the Taiwan Straits. This commonality of attitudes toward the U.S. was one of the major factors binding the two countries.⁶²

Thus, in the early 1960s the Chinese shared its scarce supplies of jet fuel and aircraft spare parts with the North Koreans. The Chinese also influenced North Korean training and organization during this period. The KPAFAC (North Korean Air Force) reorganized along Chinese lines while receiving new Chinese-built MiG-17s. By 1963, the KPAFAC had received 380 Chinese-built MiG-17s and MiG-15s, new Chen Shen yang Yak-18s and MiG-15 UTIs as well as Fong Shou No. 2 transports. Estimates credited the KPAFAC with 465 combat planes by 1964.⁶³ Another significant aspect of this period was the near doubling of North Korean expenditures which were nearly three times those of South Korea. See Table 16.

In examining the varied military assistance programs and arms transfers to the Korean peninsula between 1953

and 1965, a number of variables affecting the major actors can be identified and analyzed for their impact on both the recipients and their suppliers.

D. THE SUPPLIER-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP

The ties between the United States and South Korea were made stronger during this period. Due to the massive economic and military aid provided, the United States wielded considerable influence over nearly all aspects of South Korean development and policy orientation. This relationship was also strengthened in a large degree by mutual agreed objectives, i.e., a democratic structured society based upon a free-enterprise system (which, of course, was patterned on the American model). The United States had reappraised its ongoing military assistance programs in the early 1960s and shifted emphasis toward countering internal threats in Asia. Because internal security was not perceived as a major problem for South Korea, United States supplies decreased somewhat. However, the rise of grant aid and the continued presence of American forces allowed the South Korean government the ability to pursue economic goals.

While the ties between the People's Republic of China and North Korea strengthened, the relationship between both the Chinese and the North Koreans with the Soviets became strained. The Soviet Union's price for military

and economic aid was support for Soviet programs, ideas, and ideology. Additionally, North Korean resentment remained over the Soviet willingness to "capitulate" to the United Nation demands of a cease-fire. Conversely, the North Koreans were very aware of the "debt" they owed the Chinese for their help in the Korean War. Additionally, the Chinese did not require a quid pro quo for military or economic aid like the Soviets. Probably due to Chinese aid and particularly Mao's commitment of troops during the war, Kim Il-Sung did not side with Moscow in the developing Sino-Soviet dispute. Pyongyang chose instead to take a neutral stand.

However, by not supporting Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program, the Soviet proposed joint forces concept, and embarking on an agriculture reform program similar to China's, North Korea was identified by Moscow as being too independent, requiring a lesson. In 1963, the Soviet Union suspended all types of military aid to North Korea. Peking quickly stepped in to fill the gap. However, Chinese ability to supply North Korea with adequate and current major weapons programs was extremely limited. North Korea, realizing aid from China was insufficient for her desired programs embarked on a policy of self-reliance to which Peking had earlier advocated. This movement toward self-sufficiency or chuch'e was to have major ramifications for North Korea and her suppliers in the years following.

During this period, North Korea was resupplied only the necessary arms and equipment by both its suppliers to be able to defend itself adequately. The Soviet supplied arms began to taper off once parity with the South Korean forces was achieved.

South Korean forces were also equipped with sufficient arms, though generally technologically inferior to North Korea's, to deter a limited conventional conflict. This was in accordance with the policy of arming all forward defensive area nations sufficiently to preclude surrender or a United States resort to nuclear weapons. However, the American troop presence, coupled with the concept of "massive retaliation", comprised the real deterrence to renewed conflict on the peninsula.

E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AID AND ECONOMIC AID

The importance of economic aid supplementing military assistance in "containing communism" was recognized by the United States shortly after the Korean War. Two primary objectives of United States economic aid were assistance designed to increase economic development, thereby reducing internal discontent so easily exploited by communism, and supporting assistance designed to support the build-up of local military forces to counter a communist threat. Supporting assistance also ensured access to overseas bases in South Korea and financed strategic imports.⁶⁴

The Korean War experience lent greater importance to American supporting assistance because it focused on the external threat. The Mutual Security Acts of 1953 and 1957 reflected Congressional support for the tie-in of both types of aid.⁶⁵

A later shift in attitude in the U.S. Congress toward the relationship between economics and military aid resulted in pressure on the Kennedy Administration to make changes. The result was the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed that "revolutions arise from poverty".⁶⁶ Thus, from 1961, economic aid increased while supporting assistance fell. South Korean supporting assistance was not drastically affected initially. However, as the United States role in Southeast Asia increased, South Korean supporting assistance decreased proportionately.⁶⁷

By 1960, North Korea was outpacing China in economic development. Therefore, Chinese economic aid was less needed than military aid. Moreover, North Korea's rapid economic development required broader economic ties with the Soviets. In dealings with the Socialist nations, Moscow always puts a political price on all aid regardless of type.⁶⁸ So it was with North Korea. Subsequently, when the Soviets saw the need to teach North Korea a lesson, all types of aid were cut. Though military aid was considered necessary by the North Koreans, the near cut-off of economic aid was considered particularly harmful and resented.

"The Korean government bitterly criticized the Soviet Union for this and publicly cited evidence of the harmful effects of Soviet aid".⁶⁹

This Soviet policy of combining both types of aid for one purpose, i.e., influence, had a great deal to do with North Korea pursuing a policy of self-reliance.

F. THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

When the two sides involved in Sino-Soviet dispute created pressures on North Korea, Kim Il-Sung attempted accommodation to both. Although the Soviet pressures exerted on Kim Il-Sung were sufficient to defeat his Seven Year (1961-1967) Economic Plan, political interest prevailed with Kim Il-Sung persistently supporting Mao Zedong. In an atmosphere of increasingly mounting international tensions, the Sino-Soviet dispute converged to the point that Kim had to openly side with Mao against Khrushchev. Kim's lack of total support to the Soviet side resulted in decreased economic aid and eventual shut-off of all military aid.⁷⁰ However, because the level that Chinese economic development had reached was not much different than that in North Korea, Kim Il-Sung also felt the need to move his country more toward self-sufficiency. Subsequently, large amounts of funds had to be transferred or be planned for transfer from the domestic sector to a fledgling military-industrial complex.

Two significant events occurred in South Korea during this period: the student uprisings in 1960 which led to the overthrow of Syngman Rhee, and the subsequent military coup in 1961 which ousted the Yun Po-son and Chang Myon government of the Second Republic.⁷¹ The emergence of a military government in South Korea drastically altered Kim Il-Sung's plans to take advantage of the instability in South Korea resulting from the weakness of Dr. Chang Myon's administration. This golden opportunity, as Kim saw it, quickly vanished when President Park instituted rational economic reforms and increased the South's political stability. Due largely to the vast amounts of United States grant military aid and the deterrent presence of American troops, President Park was able to place primary emphasis in economic development. Thus, by the end of 1965, South Korea was successfully carrying out its First Five-Year (1962-1966) Economic Plan while Kim's Seven Year (1961-1967) Plan was heading for failure.

G. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF SOURCES

South Korea had virtually no option for diversification. Subsequently, it had to accept United States implied influence and accept what ever it was offered. Moreover, South Korea's state of economy obviously precluded her from shopping elsewhere for desired arms. However, having the United States as its only source of arms cannot be considered a

disadvantage in that South Korean goals continued to coincide with American goals.

North Korea had been able to maintain a relative degree of independence by balancing Soviet and Chinese supplies. However, this exploitation of competition between her two suppliers failed to provide North Korea any significant edge over South Korea. By 1963, North Korea found herself essentially in the same position as South Korea - only one source available for military assistance - the People's Republic of China. Even more significant, the ability of China to provide North Korea higher technology weapons was consequentially less than the Soviet Union's. It was not until 1965 that North Korea acquired missile systems, four years after the South Koreans were provided Honest John surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).

H. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Though both North Korea and South Korea received major weapons from the super-powers, the only true modern equipment transferred to the peninsula was Soviet warships and MiG-17s transferred to North Korea in 1956, and 200 F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers transferred to South Korea between 1956 and 1960.⁷² Missile systems had been in the Korean peninsula before the 1960s. However, it is significant to note that the recipient nations finally received their own missile systems during this period: South Korea in 1961,

North Korea in 1965. South Korea's Navy was first provided modern warships in 1963. North Korea had been equipped with Soviet-built ships in 1956. Of the above mentioned equipment and arms transferred, only the missile systems were still being utilized by the suppliers' own armed forces (see Tables 18 and 19).⁷³

I. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-SUPPLIERS

At the conclusion of the Korean War, the United States perceived its chief threat in Asia as an external one, i.e., the Soviet Union and/or the People's Republic of China. Its military assistance and arms transfer policies were so reflected in the various Mutual Security Acts initiated in the mid-1950s. Transferring arms and providing military assistance to South Korea was in the interests of American security strategy which was to arm South Korea, thus creating a buffer zone for Japan. By 1960, the perceived threat in the Far East had changed from external to internal. United States security interests shifted to counter the insurgency actions of communist sponsored "national liberation movements". And since the South Koreans had no serious internal threat, emphasis in military assistance shifted from the Korean peninsula/Taiwan to Southeast Asia. The era of pre-emptive supply began. Although there were some decreases in actual arms transfers to South Korea in the early 1960s, the decreases were relatively modest considering

the great amounts being transferred to peninsular Southeast Asia during the same time frame. (See Table 17).

Immediately following the Korean War, both China and the Soviet Union perceived their major threat as the United States, not South Korea. However, it is likely that both accepted the tenet that the United States was more interested in a status quo on the peninsula than a Southern initiated forceful reunification. It is also important to note that China's perceived threat had shifted from a possibly rearmed Japan of the future to a United States becoming more and more involved with neighbors to her south.

The Soviet Union believed continued support and assistance to North Korea was necessary because,

"North Korea is an indispensable forward and buffer zone to the Soviet Far Eastern strategy, especially in view of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it is also a potential vehicle for future expansion of Soviet influence, not only to the whole Korean peninsula but also to Asia in general."⁷⁴

China's security interests closely paralleled the Soviet's, in that North Korea acted as a buffer not only between China and the United States, but also as a buffer to future Soviet and Japanese expansionistic aims.

As Soviet influence fell in Asia so did its interest in transferring arms there. Attention turned to the West and Europe. The Cuban missile crisis perhaps was the turning point for Soviet strategic thinking. With the fall of

Khrushchev, the new Soviet leadership began to try to strengthen their position and reassert influence in Asia, while at the same time challenging the spread of Chinese influence. Though not realized until many years later in the United States, the Soviet threat perception had shifted toward China. Soviet aid to both North Korea and China were decreased significantly during this period of shifting threat perceptions.

Though the major threat to the People's Republic of China remained the United States, disputes with the Soviet Union were beginning to dominate the Chinese leadership's attention. Chinese military aid to North Korea increased significantly when the Soviets cut off all military aid in 1963. The need to reduce American influence and to gain North Korean support in the Sino-Soviet dispute were the foremost Chinese security interests during this period.

J. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-RECIPIENTS

The primary threat perception held by both North and South Korea was that each desired reunification by force. Therefore, arms transfers were imperative to deter the other from taking offensive military action. Both considered its received aid insufficient, but could do little to otherwise influence their suppliers.⁷⁵ The arms suppliers provided arms for potential use in an indigenous

limited war or for self-defense, not one in which the super-powers and China would become immediately involved.

While South Korea's perceived threat level may have been enhanced by the switch of suppliers to North Korea, North Korea's perceived threat remained focused on the American troop presence in South Korea. A commonality of perceived threat brought the North Koreans closer to the Chinese.

The United States provided military aid to South Korea to enable local troops to perform functions that were in the interest of the United States. This was possible because of two factors: South Korean interests were harmonious with those of the United States and the United States was in a position to control the forces of South Korea (all South Korean forces were under UN command during this period).

The above was not the case for North Korea. North Korean security interests did not exactly coincide with either Soviet or Chinese interests. Significantly, by 1957 the North Korean military was totally independent of external control. Therefore, military aid was provided by the Soviets in order to "retain friendships and to protect the inroads already won", while Chinese aid was provided to counter American influence and to gain North Korean support in the Sino-Soviet dispute.⁷⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 25-26. Two Army colonels, Charles H. Bonesteel and Dean Rusk were given about 30 minutes to define the surrender zones applying to U.S. and Russian forces in Korea. Given only guidance to place the demarcation line as far north as feasible, Bonesteel noted that since the 38th Parallel passed north of Seoul and almost divided Korea evenly, this was the most plausible boundary available. They had only a few minutes to make a recommendation. The interesting thing was that Bonesteel and Rusk hit on exactly the same line that the Japanese and Russians had picked much earlier as a dividing line between spheres of influence in Korea. See also: Francis H. Heller, The Korean War, A 25-Year Perspective, (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 10.
2. William J. Barnds, "The United States and the Korean Peninsula," The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, William J. Barnds, ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 170-171.
3. M.T. Smith, "U.S. Foreign Military Sales," Congress and Arms Control, Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 346.
4. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 428 (Former Sec of Def. Clark Clifford).
5. The Arms Trade with the Third World, (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1971), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, hereafter referred to as SIPRI 1971, p. 20.
6. Heller, p. 13.
7. William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, With MacArthur In Japan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965), p. 179.
8. For a complete text of the speech given by Secretary Acheson on 12 January 1950 see: Russell Buhite, The Dynamics of World Power, A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Volume IV, The Far East, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), pp. 357-64.

9. Barnds, p. 171.
10. Handbook of Korea 1979, Kim Young-Kwon, ed., (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1978), pp. 444-447.
11. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1963), pp. 17-18. Also see Sebald, pp. 180-181.
12. Sebald, p. 183.
13. Heller, p. 16.
14. Money allocated to military forces was based on the level of importance at this time. Since allocations were already low, and the Joint Chiefs had relegated Korea to a status of relative unimportance with Europe being the most important region of concern, it is more clear why such a situation existed. Heller, p. 16, Fehrenbach, p. 18.
15. Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 183.
16. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 18; also see Heller, p. 101.
17. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 285.
18. J. A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea", World Politics, No. 2, (January 1970), p. 241.
19. Nena Vreeland, Rinn-sup Shinn, Peter Just, and Philip W. Moeller, Area Handbook for North Korea, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-81, 1976, p. 314. Also see Dallin, p. 292.
20. SIPRI 1971, p. 411.
21. Dallin, p. 292.
22. Vreeland, et al., p. 315.
23. Stone, pp. 62-63.
24. Beloff, pp. 179-81.
25. Heller, pp. 100-101.
26. SIPRI 1971, p. 192.

27. John F. Cooper, China's Foreign Aid, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 24-25.
28. Morris Rothenberg, Whither China: The View From The Kremlin, (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1977), p. 159.
29. Ibid.
30. Christopher Chant, Richard Holmes, and William Koenig, Two Centuries of Warfare, (London: Octopus Books Ltd., 1978), pp. 450-452.
31. Ibid., p. 460. Alert to the possibilities that the Americans might resort to atomic weapons, the Il-28s were never used in the war.
32. Ibid., pp. 455-456. Beginning in March 1951, large numbers of Russian, Polish, and Czech pilots arrived in North Korea for 3-month tours of operational flying. This was due to the Soviet desire to provide as many of their own and their satellites' pilots combat experience with jet aircraft.
33. By 10 August 1950 an estimated 110 North Korean aircraft had been destroyed by UN forces. The remainder of the KPAFAC moved to Manchuria for reprogramming and re-equipping. It appears that the majority of Soviet MiG-15s flown against UN forces after November 1950 were piloted by Soviets. By 1953 the KPAFAC's operational strength was estimated at 250 aircraft - all Soviet supplied. SIPRI 1971, p. 411.
34. For the complete text and discussion of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea see: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 83rd Cong., 2d sess., January 13 and 14, 1954. Also see SIPRI, 1971, p. 149.
35. During the United Nations counter advance across the 38th Parallel, a good deal of equipment of Soviet manufacture was captured. The Soviet representative of the U.N. Security Council denied that any Russian weapons had been supplied to the North Koreans and stressed that Soviet support was solely moral. Beloff, p. 191.
36. SIPRI, 1971, p. 403.
37. When a major Chinese offense was launched in April, 1951, the course of fighting showed that, despite the large numbers of Chinese troops involved, they were still

inadequately supplied with modern weapons. The heavy losses inflicted upon them resulted in Russian peace feelers through Sweden. Beloff, p. 204.

38. For complete text of the Armistice Agreement see United Nations Document A/2228 Armistice Agreement, October 18, 1952. For extract see Buhite, pp. 405-413.

39. SIPRI 1971, p. 416.

40. U.S., Congress, The International Transfer of Conventional Arms. A Report to the Congress from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 85-87.

41. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 17.

42. Barnds, p. 172.

43. Richard G. Stilwell, "The Need for U.S. Ground Forces in Korea - Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea?" AEI Defense Review, no. 2, 1977, p. 16.

44. Ibid., p. 20.

45. SIPRI 1971, p. 410, (Chart 15.1). The reason I included 1960 was that in this period, the logistics system of the South Korean armed forces was highly inefficient. As there was no effective inventory of the supplies inherited from the Korean War period and no one knew what was in stock, there were many shipments made in excess of needs. Also see Ibid., p. 417.

46. World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1978, (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1978), p. 238.

47. SIPRI 1971, p. 416.

48. As soon as the war ended, China began to give economic aid to North Korea. China relieved North Korea of its Korean War debt and made grants-in-aid (1.32 m ruble), considerably more than the Soviet grants (1.0 m rubles). The Chinese PLA stationed in North Korea contributed nearly 5 million work-days building bridges, roads, buildings, railroads, and schools. The Economy of the Korean Democratic People's Republic 1945-1977, Youn-Soo Kim, ed., (Kiel: German Korea - Studies Group, 1979), p. 39.

49. Geoffrey Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 203.
50. Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975, (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. 20-26.
51. SIPRI 1971, p. 412.
52. Vreeland, et al, pp. 315-316.
53. Chin, pp. 26-46, p. 60.
54. SIPRI 1971, p. 364.
55. Robert Scalapino, "The Two Koreas - Dialogue or Conflict?", The Two Koreas In East Asian Affairs, William J. Barnds, ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 90.
56. The similarities between the actions taken by the Park junta and the General Chon junta nearly 20 years later are striking. So are the United States responses. Kyung Cho Chung, Korea, The Third Republic, (New York-The MacMillan Co., 1971), pp. 34-37, 135. Also see U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1971, p. 1589.
57. Gregory Henderson, Korea The Politics of the Vortex, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 186-187.
58. SIPRI Yearbook 1978, p. 244.
59. SIPRI 1971, p. 417.
60. Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change," Asian Survey, Vol. III, (January 1963), p. 37.
61. SIPRI 1971, p. 413.
62. Chin, p. 104.
63. SIPRI 1971. pp. 413-414.
64. Ibid., p. 154.
65. Ibid., p. 155.

66. Ibid., p. 155-156. "The Summary Presentation of the Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs for FY 1964 gave four objectives of supporting assistance":

1. to support the common defense (applied to S. Korea)
2. to maintain economic stability
3. to provide an alternative to excessive Soviet aid
4. to ensure access to U.S. bases.

67. Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1964, Summary Presentation to the Congress, AID, U.S. Department of Defense, GPO, April 1963.

68. Cooper, p. 26. For an in-depth look at Soviet foreign aid policies see Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), chapters 2 and 11.... "The Soviet Union has probably derived much less political advantage from the investment of her resources than her leaders anticipated. Apart from Cuba, hardly any major recipients are today politically closer to the USSR as a result of receiving aid, though their economies may be more closely linked." Strategic Survey 1977, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 67.

69. Cooper, p. 26.

70. In 1963, Moscow cut aviation gasoline and accessories for more than 500 Soviet made jet aircraft. This severely crippled the national defense capability of North Korea. The Economy of the KDPR, pp. 59-65.

71. C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea at the Crossroads: The Birth of the Fourth Republic," Pacific Affairs Vol 4, No 2 (Summer 1973), p. 218.

72. SIPRI Yearbook 1978, see Table 8.8. The spread of modern warships to Third World countries, 1950-1977, pp. 250-251.

73. SIPRI Yearbook 1978, see Table 8.8. The spread of modern warships to Third World countries, 1950-77, pp. 250-251, 252.

74. Choi Chang-Yoon, "Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives", Triangular Relations of Mainland China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1977), pp. 36-37.

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• Goldman, p. 195.

III. AID TO KOREA DURING THE NIXON, FORD, AND VIETNAM YEARS

A. 1964-1968 AID TO NORTH KOREA

Beginning in 1965, relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union began to improve. A number of factors can be attributed to this changing relationship. First there was the Chinese involved coup attempt failure in Indonesia. Secondly, events initiating the Cultural Revolution within China began to alienate North Korea; and probably more important than the first two reasons, the negative effects of Soviet aid cut-off placed planned North Korean industrialization and economic goals behind scheduled expectations. The base line was that Kim's Seven-Year Plan could not work without Soviet aid.¹ Subsequent developments showed that the North Korea and the Soviet Union relationship was improving.

The shifting of closer ties with the Soviet since 1965 was most probably motivated by the need to extract economic and military aid. As one student of North Korea pointed out:

"To be blunt about the whole changing attitude, Pyongyang needed more and new military equipment, scientific knowledges (sic) and, above all, oil from the Soviet Union. From China, they had little to gain or "study." In addition to these, the American bombings of North Vietnam since the beginning of February last year (1965) made themselves increasingly felt in North Korea. Pyongyang's desire for a new defense guarantee from Moscow increased... factors that contributed to the warming of relations included Moscow's successful

psychological manipulation of North Korean leaders, Pyongyang's urgent need for modern military equipment partly caused by the worsening development of the Vietnamese war and finally, Kim's own desire to acquire more practical economic and technical "interests" from the Soviet Union." 2

Therefore, in February, 1965 when Premier Kosygin visited North Korea and negotiations on military aid began, there was little doubt that North Koreans were anxious to gain Soviet military aid to relieve the losses to economic development caused by high defense expenditures. There were also three reasons strictly in the North Korean military view why Soviet military aid had to be resumed: 1) United States bombing strategy in North Vietnam called for a need to upgrade North Korean air-defense capabilities; 2) United States transfers of 60 F-5 fighters to South Korea that year; and 3) the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army modernization program was perceived as a threat to the superior North Korean ground force capabilities. A joint military agreement was signed, and although the terms were secret, North Korea soon received SA-2s, later model jet fighters (MiG-21 FLs), heavy field artillery and other weapons. 3

The rapprochement, however, did not result in an overnight "pro-Soviet" general policy. North Korean media stressed the need for North Korea to retain its economic, cultural, and ideological independence. This independence policy would result in eventual indigenous production of all small arms, including rifles, machine guns, mortars, and ammunition. 4

The nature and extent of Soviet military aid to North Korea between 1967-68 was substantial. As reported in The New York Times in February, 1968, Moscow provided: more than half of North Korea's 500 combat aircraft to include 21 MiG-21s, 350 MiG-17s, 80 MiG-15s, and 80 Il-28 bombers; 10 air-defense complexes containing 500 missiles; almost 100% Soviet equipment for its army; and 2 Soviet W-class submarines, 4 Komar-class guided missile ships, 40 motor torpedo boats, and 2 coastal defense complexes equipped with Soviet surface to ship missiles and radar.⁵

To further cement the improving Soviet-North Korean relationship, the Soviets championed North Korean causes at the United Nation's 22nd Session calling for among other things, an appeal for North Korean membership, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea, the dissolution of the UN Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), and an international conference to settle once and for all the question of Korean unification.⁶

While relations with the Soviets improved, relations with China worsened considerably between 1965-1968, the peak years of the Cultural Revolution. Though Kim continued his policy of neutralism in the widening Sino-Soviet dispute, China began accusing Kim himself of revisionism and siding with the "Soviet revisionists". Mao had even presented North Korea with a territorial claim on the Yalu-Tuman border on April 28, 1966. China claimed nearly a hundred

square miles of North Korean territory near Mt. Paektu as "compensation" for its assistance during the Korean War. There were even a number of border clashes with China in September, 1967.⁷ Under such conditions, North Korea probably had more reason to fear military action from China than from either the United States or South Korea. During this period, China made no new aid promise to North Korea, nor is there evidence that earlier grant aid promised was delivered.⁸

As previously noted, the economic and political threat from South Korea was highlighted by the South Korean's successful economic and foreign policies. South Korea had also been quite successful in its anti-Communist diplomacy. For example, South Korea instituted a free Asian bloc with nine Asian countries (Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)) in 1966, had normalized relations with Japan the year prior, and was successfully wooing Japanese business away from North Korea. At the same time South Korea was providing combat troops to South Vietnam.⁹

All of these developments were strong enough to persuade Kim Il-Sung that his program concerning national defense was inadequate. In spite of the North Korean worsening financial and economic situation, Kim began to adopt a national defense program utilizing increasingly prohibitive defense expenditures as seen in the following table:

Table 3

North Korean Defense Expenditures 1963-1970¹⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Nat. Defense</u>	<u>% of GNP</u>	<u>% of Nat. Budget</u>
1963	2,300	280	12.17	1.9
1964	2,500	300	12.00	5.8
1965	2,500	350	14.00	10.1
1966	2,900	350	12.07	12.5
1967	3,000	470	15.67	30.4
1968	3,500	610	17.43	32.4
1969	4,000	615	15.37	31.0
1970	4,500	700	15.0	31.0

unit: million U.S. dollars

As a result, the share of national defense to the total budget rose from an average of 6.4% during 1963-1966 to an average of 31.2% between 1967-1970. In the same period, the percentage of defense to national income jumped from an average of 3.1% during 1956-1966 to an average of nearly 17% during 1967-1970.¹¹

Although difficult to quantify, the consequences of large defense expenditure were substantial, to include an inherent shortage of labor. Nevertheless, Kim was determined to strengthen North Korea's defense capacity even if it required a restriction on the people's economic development. Expressed in the slogan "Weapon in One Hand and Hammer and Sickle in the Other," Kim described to his 1970 Party Congress how the national economy was to be geared to military considerations:

"The outcome of war depends largely on whether or not the manpower and materials requirements of the front and the rear are fully met over a long duration of time. We should secure an ample reserve of necessary materials by intensifying the struggle for increased production and economy in all fields of the national economy, develop the munitions industry, reorganize the economy in conformity with the demands of the situation ... prepare ourselves in advance ... build up a firm material basis to implement more thoroughly the principle of self defense in national defense."¹²

In that same report Kim repeated what he had told the Party in October 1966 regarding the cost of the military part of the "parallel development" policy:

Our national defense power has been gained at a very large and dear price. Frankly speaking, our spendings on national defense have been too heavy a burden for us in the light of the small size of the country and its population. Had even a part of the nation's defense spendings been diverted to economic construction, our national economy would have developed more rapidly and the living standard of our people have improved much more. But the situation never allowed us to do so. We could not throw to the winds the fundamental interests of the revolution to seek a temporary comfort.¹³

Not all North Korean leaders had supported Kim's viewpoint, however. A group of military generals had urged Kim to concentrate on economic reconstruction rather than overemphasizing military strength at the expense of a delay in the Seven-Year Economic Plan. These generals also feared Kim's growing insistence on a self-reliant posture and his anti-Soviet policy, which came at a time when the

Soviets were still providing all of North Korea's sophisticated military equipment. These generals apparently confronted Kim during the 15th and 16th plenums of the 4th Party Congress in 1967. By the 5th Party Congress in 1970, eight of the eleven members of the Political Committee of the party had been purged and replaced with hardliners.¹⁴

Between 1966 and 1971, Pyongyang was also committed on a fairly large scale in financial and military aid to supporting insurgent movements elsewhere in the world. The North Koreans reportedly set up a dozen training camps for insurgents from 25 countries. The North Korean instructors were also utilizing their own embassies in various countries for training and financing these guerrillas. North Korea was the first nation to offer "volunteers" to fight in Cambodia after the depose of Prince Sihanouk in 1970. Rationale for such efforts was not solely ideological. North Korea hoped to create as many "Vietnams" as possible for the United States, thereby weakening America through over-extension of resources, hopefully humiliating her through defeats, and finally causing her total withdrawal from East Asia.¹⁵

No doubt, the resumption of Soviet aid, resulting in an improved military posture, lent Kim increased confidence to renew overt military actions against the South. In the latter half of 1965, North Korean guerrilla tactics increased dramatically, from six cases reported between 1963 and 1964, to

27 incidents.¹⁶ In 1967, North Korean - South Korean clashes in the DMZ totalled over 500 with over 600 casualties, including some Americans.¹⁷ The year 1968 proved to be the most violent year for the peninsula since the Korean War. On 21 January 1968, a 31-man North Korean commando force attacked the South Korean Presidential mansion resulting in nearly 130 casualties, including two American soldiers killed and 12 wounded.¹⁸ Two days later, North Korean patrol boats seized the U.S.S. Pueblo resulting in an international crisis. President Johnson responded by calling up reservists in the U.S., redeploying the carrier U.S.S. Enterprise off the South Korean coast, reinforcing the U.S. forces in South Korea by about 5000 men, and taking the issue to the United Nations.¹⁹ Later, the next year, the North Koreans shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane.²⁰ Noteworthy is the restraint shown in the U.S. response.

With the Cultural Revolution winding down in 1968, relations between China and North Korea began to slightly improve. Chou En-lai visited North Korea in 1970 promising a resumption of both military and economic aid. The military assistance promised was in the form of ships, fuel and technical personnel. Mao might have made these promises with the purpose of sounding out the North Koreans in terms of their relations with the Soviets and the North Korean stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute that had developed into armed clashes the previous year.²¹

B. SOUTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR 1964 & AFTER

The increasing involvement of the United States in Vietnam resulted in increased counter-insurgency aid to Southeast Asia at the expense of military aid given to the forward defense nations. However, in the case of South Korea (and the Philippines), an exception to this trend occurred. Military aid remained at a stable level from FY 1965 - FY 1967 and thereafter increased each year. In essence, the American intervention in Vietnam can be considered largely responsible for the rise in South Korea's arms imports. Arms were supplied from 1965 as a quid pro quo for the deployment and use of South Korean troops in Vietnam.

The coup de etat of May 1961 had, as pointed out in the preceeding chapter, resulted in a decrease in American public support for the South Korean government. However, when South Korean troops fought in the Vietnamese conflict alongside Americans, the image of South Korea and its leadership improved dramatically. This participation of South Korean troops in the Vietnam War requires further examination. The American and South Korean involvement in that conflict affected the direction in which future American policy in Asia would be directed and the manner in which military assistance programs would be carried out.

Korean participation in the Vietnam War began in late 1964. The first South Korean unit dispatched was a ROK

Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). All expenses in 1964 concerning this unit were paid for by the South Korean government. In December, 1964 discussions were undertaken by the Korean and American governments with respect to sending combat units to Vietnam. In these talks, the United States agreed to pay subsistence, maintenance and operation costs, and special combat allowances. This payment of personal allowances was the first instance that the United States had ever paid allowances of this type to individual soldiers of another country.²²

In May 1965 while President Park was on a state visit to the United States, President Johnson obtained a verbal agreement from the South Korean president to commit combat troops to the Republic of Vietnam.²³ This agreement was followed up the next month by a formal request from the Republic of Vietnam for a combat division. Talks between South Korean and American authorities on the troop deployment had by then set down the necessary conditions and terms of United States support for these troops in Vietnam. The United States agreed to the following:²⁴

- 1) No American or South Korean force reduction would be made in Korea without prior consultation.
- 2) The MAP allocation for FY 1966 would not be affected by the deployment.
- 3) The MAP allocation for FY 1966 plus a \$7 million add-on would be utilized to completely equip three ready reserve divisions.

4) The MAP transfer program would be suspended for FY 1966 and the transfer items were to be procured by MAP in Korea.²⁵

5) The South Korean military forces in Korea would be provided equipment and training to improve their defense capability and modernize equipment relating to fire power, communications, and mobility.

6) The United States would provide, as necessary, the equipment, logistical support, construction, training, transportation, subsistence, overseas allowances, funds for any legitimate non-combatant claim brought against ROK forces in South Vietnam, and restitution of any cash losses not resulting from negligence of ROK forces in South Vietnam.

The first Korean combat troops (the Tiger Division) arrived in South Vietnam in October 1965. In February 1966, another formal request for additional South Korean combat troops was made by the South Vietnamese government. Again, discussions between American and Korean authorities provided yet another set of commitments for the United States:²⁶

1) The United States would provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for modernization of ROK forces in Korea which included complete equipping for three ready divisions and plans to expedite the modernization of 17 army divisions and one marine division.

2) The United States would provide the necessary equipment to expand the ROK arsenal for increased ammunition

production in Korea, and contribute to the improvement of ROK anti-infiltration equipment and procedure.

3) The United States would reimburse to South Korea all net costs, in won, incurred for the deployment of additional Korean forces to Vietnam as well as for the mobilization and maintenance in Korea of one reserve division, one brigade, and their supporting units. The South Korean air force would also be provided four C-54 aircraft for support of ROK troops in Vietnam.

4) The United States would procure in Korea, for the use of ROK forces, the items of supplies so suspended under the MAP transfer program in FY 1966, plus those on the FY 1967 list, utilizing U.S. dollars not American goods as payment.

5) The United States would provide various amounts of program and AID loans to South Korea.

In addition to the above terms of American support for South Korean troops in Vietnam, the daily allowance rates were increased, and death gratuities and wounded-in-action (WIA) benefits were paid for by the United States. The following table reflects the daily allowance rates for Korean forces in Vietnam as of July 1966.

Table 4
U.S. Financed Daily Allowance to South Koreans
Serving in Vietnam²⁷

Lieutenant general-----	\$10.00	Warrant Officer-----	\$3.50
Major general-----	8.00	Master sergeant-----	2.50
Brigadier general-----	7.00	Sergeant 1st class--	2.00
Colonel-----	6.50	Staff sergeant-----	1.90
Lieutenant colonel-----	6.00	Sergeant-----	1.80
Major-----	5.50	Corporal-----	1.50
Captain-----	5.00	Private 1st class---	1.35
1st lieutenant-----	4.50	Private-----	1.25
2d lieutenant-----	4.00		

The first units of this second combat troop deployment arrived in Vietnam in April 1966. In June 1967, the South Korean government, desiring to round out their forces in Vietnam, proposed a further 3000 troop reinforcement. These soldiers departed for Vietnam in July, that same year. In all, the South Korean government had deployed at least 47,872 military personnel to the Republic of Vietnam in four major increments.

Table 5
Major Deployments of South Korean Forces
to South Vietnam²⁸

Dispatched	Organizations	Strength
1964-65-----	Med/Engr (DOVE)-----	2,128
1965-----	Tiger Div (-RCT) w/spt forces and Marine bde-	18,904
1966-----	9th Div (_RCT and spt forces)-----	23,865
1967-----	Marine bn (-) and other spt forces-----	2,963
1969-----	Authorized increase C-46 crews-----	12

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

The 1967 dispatch of troops required no new commitments as far as United States support was concerned.

There had been no costs absorbed by the United States in support of ROK forces deployed to Vietnam in FY 1964. However, beginning in FY 1965 and ending in FY 1973, the total cost of United States support provided was approximately \$1.458 billion.²⁹ The support costs to the United States to maintain one ROK soldier in Vietnam one year was approximately \$5,000 compared to \$13,000 for an American soldier.³⁰

Beginning in 1965, the United States began honoring the above listed commitments to South Korea. F-5 Freedom fighter aircraft began arriving to replace the aging F-86s. To begin equipping the three ready divisions and expedite the modernization of all front-line ROK units, South Korea received, between 1966-1974, tanks, large amounts of artillery, small arms, patrol crafts, and other miscellaneous equipment.³¹ Nike-Hercules and Hawk air defense equipment, funded through MAP and not a part of the Vietnam quid pro quo agreement, was provided in 1965 and 1966 respectively.³²

A second reason responsible for an increased influx of American arms to South Korea apart from the above listed quid pro quo agreements was the increasing incidents of violence along the DMZ and in South Korea, the Pueblo incident, and the shooting down of a EC-121 reconnaissance plane. Fiscal Years 1968-1969 saw a major increase of U.S. arms

supplies and military assistance. When Cyrus Vance visited Korea in January, 1968 the South Koreans requested a squadron of F-4s to counter the recent acquisition by North Korea of MiG-21 jet aircraft. The following year, a \$100 million additional request to the already approved appropriations bill provided further anti-aircraft systems, fast patrol boats, radar, 2 helicopters, additional F-5A fighter aircraft and the squadron (19) of F-4E Phantoms South Korea had requested the prior year.³³

Furthermore, the United States loaned South Korea two more destroyers in 1968 and 1969 respectively. With a previous loan in 1963, this transaction brought the ROKN destroyer strength up to three. These were to be utilized in counter-infiltration patrols against North Korean agent boats.³⁴ To protect not only ROK aircraft, but also forward deployed United States air squadrons, a program of hardening aircraft shelters and their pads was undertaken. The cost of putting in the shelters came to approximately \$13 million per shelter.³⁵ In 1969, during Secretary Packard's visit, the South Korean Minister of National Defense urgently requested about two million rifles and small arms to equip the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) in order to provide effective infiltration counter-measures. The United States responded by shipping 790,000 excess weapons (M-1, M-1 and M-2 carbines, and M-3 SMGs) with accompanying ammunition, repair parts, and basic issue items. This shipment was made

at no cost to MAP except packaging and handling. Worthy of mention was the visit in June, 1969 by representatives of Colt Firearms Company to discuss the production of M-16 rifles in South Korea. Other companies soon followed. South Korea was about to embark on its own indigenous arms program.³⁶

South Korea received more than just the above mentioned aid and material for its role in South Vietnam. Also included in the U.S. defense budgets beginning in 1966 were the following programs, all applicable to South Korea:³⁷

- 1) Deliveries of excess stocks - weapons considered excess by U.S. armed forces were supplied without Congressional restriction until 1971. Prior to 1970, only the cost of shipping and refurbishing was charged to MAP.

- 2) Naval vessel loans - authorized under special legislation.

- 3) Supporting assistance - usually economic assistance was authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act and administered by AID.

- 4) Food for Peace Program (Public Law 480) - countries purchase surplus U.S. agricultural commodities with local currency. A share of the counterpart funds is allocated for military assistance and for supporting assistance.

- 5) Public Safety Program - assistance to police forces, administered by AID. In South Korea, the police forces use many military related weapons in maintaining internal security.

By 1971, due in large part to the military aid and assistance provided by the United States, a strong military machine was gradually developing in South Korea. Though common sense dictated a strong South Korean defense capability, the extensive military aid provided by the United States meant it was strengthening the potential political role of the South Korean military. As perceived in Washington, there was no problem to this as long as South Korea maintained a democratic direction.

The instability in most of Southeast Asia, particularly former French Indochina, galvanized United States attention to the point that the stability characterized in Northeast Asia since the Korean War was largely taken for granted. The bipolarity structure of Northeast Asia - the Soviets, Communist Chinese, and North Koreans on one side faced by the Americans, Japanese, Nationalist Chinese, and South Koreans on the other - no longer existed by the late 1950s. The most important change in East Asia since the Second World War, the Sino-Soviet dispute, had split the movement known as "international communism."³⁸ However, United States uncertainty as to the depth and durability of that dispute, coupled with continued Chinese and Soviet hostility toward the United States and Japan during the Vietnam War, caused the analysts to be slow to pick up on the extent and implications of the dispute until the armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops along the Ussuri River in 1969.³⁹

C. 1969-1973 THE NIXON YEARS

In this new international political context, American strategists had to reassess the meaning of United States involvement in Asia. Under this new multicentered international system which John Spanier has labeled a bipolycentric world, Korea had essentially become a buffer nation separating Japan from the communist giants in Asia.⁴⁰ When the Nixon-Kissinger team decided to promote detente, Korea was seen as a place where America could possibly be dragged into an unwanted war. Accordingly, the first steps were planned for eventual United States disengagement of military forces from East Asia.⁴¹

Thus, the doctrine of flexible responsible and the containment concept ended with the election of Richard Nixon. As Ralph Clough succinctly summed up: "the changes in East Asia had made a reassessment of the containment policy desirable; the public reaction in the United states to the Vietnam War made it imperative."⁴² In 1969, President Nixon announced a new policy toward Asia (tagged as the Guam or Nixon Doctrine) pledging that the United States would not automatically be involved in a new war in Asia. President Nixon stated:

".....we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."⁴³

The foundation of this policy was, as Zbigniew Brzezinski called it, a Bismarckian balance of power. Later pursued by Henry Kissinger, this policy balanced a psuedo-alliance system among the United States, Japan, and China against an equally psuedo-alliance system composed of the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union, allowing the United States the ability to play one off the other and to enjoy a dominant position without a risk of war and without a large military presence in East Asia. Nixon's later decision for Sino-American detente comes from this balancing scheme.⁴⁴

Essentially, Nixon was advocating more arms transfers to our allies to assume that responsibility noted above. To assuage any doubts the South Koreans might have harbored at the time, the American commitment to help South Korea defend themselves from external attack was reiterated in early 1969 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Laird stated:

"Regardless of the form of our assistance, its basic objective has remained the same: to ensure that other countries either individually or collectively, have the necessary military capability to deter aggression and, failing this, to withstand an armed attack until supporting forces arrive."⁴⁵

Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford put the new U.S. strategy in Asia in another perspective:

".....Besides costing substantially less (an Asian soldier costs about 1/15 as much as his American counterpart), there are compelling political and psychological advantages on both sides of the Pacific for such a policy."⁴⁶

At an address to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, 22 October 1970, Melvin Laird said:

"The U.S. Military Assistance Program and the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program serve as key instruments in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine."⁴⁷

Also implicit in President Nixon's Guam declaration was the United States' intention to gradually reduce its military presence in Asia. A year after his famous announcement, the President announced he would reduce American forces in South Korea by 20,000 men.

But, the South Korean willingness to dispatch troops to Vietnam and her strong objections to the proposed troop withdrawal placed Seoul in a relatively strong bargaining position for extensive military aid. Because the American troop level was being lowered and the need for economic aid declining, Seoul showed that, despite her need for more military aid, she was demonstrating an ability for self-help. Subsequent negotiations from 1970 to 1971 resulted in an agreement by the United States to largely underwrite a South Korean modernization program. Although labeled the 1st 5-year Modernization Program, the program was, in reality, set up to fill gaps in specific areas such as high performance aircraft needs, rather than developing the ROK Army into a truly modern force by Western standards.⁴⁸

Under this program, South Korea received in 1971, 18 F-4D Phantom fighters, 50 M-48 tanks, APCs, heavy artillery,

and 12 Honest John SSMs at a cost of \$95 million, all financed under MAP. Also promised was much of the 7th Division's equipment to include approximately 50 M-60 main battle tanks.⁴⁹ The redeployment of the 7th Infantry Division was completed in 1971.

Largely due to increased U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Congressional opposition to the programs of military aid, credit, and sales had gained momentum. Much of the criticism was directed towards U.S. overseas commitments, arms transfers, and military assistance provided to non-democratic or autocratic regimes. Arms transfers had been increasingly employed as primary instruments of United States bilateral diplomacy. Secretary Kissinger, in particular, perceived arms sales as an important factor in countering Soviet influence in the Third World. Major decisions to escalate the quantity and quality of arms exports to a region often came from high level diplomatic discussions, often without the review of the relevant government agencies. One of these precedent-setting transactions included the transfer of F-4s to South Korea in 1969.⁵⁰

Many in Congress were also angered over the way the administration evaded Congressional limitations established within the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act. One way utilized often by the Nixon Administration was the transfer of surplus American weapons which under law were not subject to Congressional authorization.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Congressional

criticism during the Nixon years never adversely affected the military assistance programs targeted for South Korea.

While the Nixon Doctrine was disconcerting to the Park regime, North Korean policy planners were encouraged and began to shift their strategic focus to a "more sophisticated politics - military manoeuvre (sic)."⁵² North Korea, by this time, came to realize a direct conventional attack would fail due to strengthened South Korean forces backed by a continued U.S. presence. However, to President Park, the North Korean threat, backed by the Soviets and Chinese was very real. South Korean confidence was further aggravated by four events between July 1971 and September 1972:

Kissinger's trip to Peking, the People's Republic of China's admission to the UN, the Nixon trip to Peking, and finally Japanese Premier Tanaka's visit to China. Understandably, those events confused and dismayed the leadership in Seoul. President Park's reaction to the rapid changes surrounding South Korea was to tighten internal security on one hand, and move toward a rapprochement with North Korea on the other.⁵³

To President Park, the rapprochement with North Korea meant three implications:⁵⁴ 1) South Korea proved it could respond to change in the international arena; 2) South Korea proved it was serious in past statements when it called for a peaceful negotiated unification; and 3) by showing progress in the above two areas, President Park was able to

strengthen his power base and facilitate the "coup in office". President Park initiated his coup by declaring a state of national emergency on December 6, 1971. According to Park, the emergency was "necessitated by the need to cope with changes in the international situation and to meet North Korea's 'aggressive design'".⁵⁵ Between the emergency declaration to the imposition of martial law in October, 1972, President Park repeatedly called upon the North Korean government to halt its aggressive attitude toward South Korea.

The year 1972 was significant for a number of reasons. In Vietnam, the last U.S. combat troops were leaving for home. In Washington, it was election time and Watergate was about to shatter the U.S. public confidence. President Nixon and Premier Tanaka visited China opening the door for future normalization of relations. And in the Korean peninsula, President Park promulgated his infamous Yushin Constitution, while initial contacts (initiated in 1971) between Red Cross representatives of North and South Korea were blossoming into the important North - South communiqué of July 4, 1972.

Premiere Kim-Il-Sung had finally responded to President Parks' call for a North-South dialogue in April 1972 with an extraordinary overture completely contrary to previous stands:

"It is my assertion that we should attempt direct North-South talks right away. The withdrawal of American troops is not a precondition for political talks."⁵⁶

This statement signalled a North Korean acceptance to the reality of the situation in East Asia. Three reasons can be attributed to this change in policy:⁵⁷ first, the rapprochement between the U.S. and China, and detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. brought about significant changes in the external milieu of the Korean peninsula; second, the detente among the Korean peninsula's two arms suppliers questioned the future viability of Soviet support for any North Korean initiated war for the purpose of forces unification; and finally, a reduction in tensions would allow Kim to redirect military assets and expenditures toward the industrial sector.

As previously noted, during the period 1967 to 1971, North Korea had been spending an average of 31% of its entire budget on defense. Defense spending was also taking more than 16% of the GNP (See Table 6). Adding to this problem was North

Table 6

North Korean Defense Expenditures (in million of won)⁵⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Budget</u>	<u>Military Spending</u>	<u>% of Budget</u>
1953	496.0	75.4	15.2
1954	729.6	58.4	8.0
1955	988.0	61.3	6.2
1956	956.0	56.4	5.9
1957	1,022.4	54.2	5.3
1958	1,649.6	56.8	4.8
1959	1,649.6	61.0	3.7
1960	1,967.9	61.0	3.1
1961	2,338.0	60.8	2.6
1962	2,728.8	71.0	2.6

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Budget</u>	<u>Military Spending</u>	<u>% of Budget</u>
1963	3,028.2	57.5	1.9
1964	3,418.2	198.3	5.8
1965	3,476.1	278.1	8.0
1966	3,571.4	357.1	10.0
1967	3,948.2	1,200.2	30.4
1968	4,812.9	1,559.4	32.4
1969	5,048.6	1,565.1	31.0
1970	6,186.6	1,917.9	31.0
1971	7,277.3	2,183.2	30.0
1972	7,344.0	1,256.1	17.0
1973	8,543.5	1,281.2	15.0
1974	9,801.2	1,568.2	16.0

Korea's high rate of military recruitment causing critical labor shortages in the domestic sector. Furthermore, because investment tended toward the heavy defense oriented industries, the lack of consequential light industry helped maintain the low living standards suffered by the North Korean populace. Even Kim acknowledged that the rising defense spending had proved a serious burden.⁵⁹

The attempt to continue high defense expenditures while raising the standard of living pushed North Korea toward a serious deficit spending problem. Beginning in 1970, North Korea had begun large-scale purchases of industrial plants and equipment from Western nations, most notably from Japan. The probable reason for the shift to Western technology was that that quality of western products was considerably higher than the quality coming from the socialist countries. While trade with Western nations increased dramatically between

1971 and 1974, trade with the Soviets steadily decreased. As imports from Moscow rose, exports declined significantly, resulting in a severe balance of payments deficit.⁶⁰

The attitude of the Soviets toward North Korea at this time was "correct but cool." In a major review of policy at the 29th Party Congress, Brezhnev included North Korea as one of four communist-ruled states whose relationship with the Soviet Union was not described as one of "friendship."⁶¹ Though the Soviets were still providing a considerable amount of military aid to the North Koreans, payment was made in cash or credits; it is doubtful that grant aid was extended.⁶²

By late 1972 the North Korean military was generally well equipped due to the program of expansion and modernization begun in 1967. Other than small arms ammunition, AK-47 rifles, Semyonov automatic rifles, frigates, and trucks, which were being manufactured domestically, the great majority of weapons had to still be purchased from foreign countries. In the early 1970s, intelligence reports indicated the Chinese were beginning to supply a considerable amount of military equipment to North Korea, and by 1972 China was reportedly providing more military aid than the Soviet Union.⁶³ Eighteen fast patrol boats, and a number of heavy and light gunboats were acquired for the North Korean Navy from the Soviets. Soviet and Chinese transfers of combat

aircraft raised the North Korean strengths to about 300 MiG-15s and MiG-17s and another 200 MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter bombers.⁶⁴

At this time the North Korean air force was almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union for aircraft replacement and parts, and aircraft fuel and oil. Also, as a result of construction programs begun in the late 1960s, nearly all combat aircraft by 1973 were protected by hardened shelters or revetments. These works, along with underground command posts and gun emplacements, were modeled after the Soviet system and constituted one of the most extensive systems of its kind in the world.⁶⁵ Also, during 1972-1973, their radar-missile defense system was considerably improved.⁶⁶ When considering the estimated cost of hardening shelters in South Korea (\$9-13 million/per shelter), this undertaking had to have been extremely costly to the North Koreans.

Another very costly program undertaken by the North Koreans at this time appears to have been their tunneling program.⁶⁷ It is difficult to understand Pyongyang's reasoning behind this effort, especially when considering the excessive costs put into this program while its domestic economy was in a dangerous downward spiral. Obviously, the tunnels were to serve a useful military purpose such as a surprise attack on the South. The North Korean leadership must have concluded that they had much to gain if the tunnels were completed undetected, but little to lose if discovered.

Another possibility is that one branch of government was ignorant of the operations of another and therefore acted independently.⁶⁸

Though military equipment was largely of Soviet manufacture, North Korea had by now established its own military school system; this was an attempt to break from both the Soviet and Chinese military models. Nevertheless, a number of North Korean command and staff officers continued to receive training in military institutions within the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

The fact that North Korea undertook an intensive arms build-up coupled with a costly tunnel digging commitment at the time it was entering into a dialogue with South Korea and the United States was reducing its forces in South Korea, suggests North Korea's forceful unification strategy had not been shelved.

On the other hand, President Park's imposition of martial law can be looked at as an example of ironic rationale. Prior to 1972, the requirement to counter a North Korean threat of aggression provided the rationale to curtail political liberties. However, while the world was experiencing super-power detente, Park, finding himself with no alternative but to carry on a dialogue with North Korea, considered such pressure a justification for a curtailment of democratic rights. Thus, the Yushin Constitution was promulgated. On December 23, 1972 President Park was

re-elected to his fourth term by a 2,357 to 0 vote. There was no opposition.⁷⁰ Understandably the above listed restrictions, coupled with Park's "coup in office" precipitated adverse reaction in the United States. The United States Government, which had by 1972 invested over \$11 billion in military and economic aid was caught in the dilemma of having to deal with an authoritarian government located in what it regarded as a strategically important region of the world.⁷¹

D. 1974-1976 THE FORD YEARS

Though the imposition of martial law by President Park resulted in a slight down turn in political relations between the United States and South Korea, what shocked the American public and the free world more was the political kidnapping in 1973, of the former presidential candidate, Kim Dae Jung, the opposition party's chief opponent to President Park. Subsequent revelations that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was responsible for this act tended to galvanize much of the American public, particularly the academe and press, against the South Korean government.⁷² South Korean political and student unrest through 1974 resulted in a series of Park decrees aimed at stifling all manner of political dissent.

At the same time the United States Congress began holding special hearings on the "human rights situation" in South Korea. Some Congressmen and Senators were calling for a

significant reduction of aid (including military) to Seoul to protest their displeasure in a tangible manner. Representative Donald Fraser pushed through an amendment to the FY 1975 Aid Authorization Act, setting a condition that the last \$20 million of the \$165 million authorized that year would only be provided if President Park rectified his restrictions on human and political liberties in South Korea.⁷³ In a later letter written by Congressman Fraser to Assistant Secretary McCloskey on May 23, 1974, he threatened:

"... If U.S. policy toward Korea does not change, some of us in Congress will be forced once again to use the question of military aid and troop levels as levers to force some change in the Korean Government's position."⁷⁴

Human rights was not the only issue Congress tied to military and economic aid during the Ford Administration. Feelings ran very high about allegations of Korean CIA activities within the United States. Congressman Obey summed up their feelings by stating:

"If some of those allegations are true, I would have no intention of voting one dime for Korea for any purpose. I don't care if it is economic loans, grants, military loans, grants, Public Law 480, anything."⁷⁵

When President Ford paid a visit to South Korea in November 1974, he told Park of the growing U.S. Congressional criticism over the suppression of human rights in South Korea. The President emphasized that the human rights issue would be a major factor in whether he could fulfill earlier assurances of continued military assistance. In the

face of mounting criticism and President Ford's advice, Park did make a gesture of moderation by releasing some jailed dissidents.⁷⁶ On balance, however, Ford's visit represented a modest triumph for the Park government. Park not only received from Ford a commitment for continued American security assistance but also demonstrated to his critics that the United States foreign policy interests in East Asia would require the Americans to deal with the existing Korean government regardless of its internal policies.⁷⁷ The Ford-Kissinger team obviously believed that for the United States to reduce military assistance in an almost certainly futile attempt to force political reform on a country which was located in an area of immense importance to the United States made little sense in the world of 'real politik.'

Nevertheless, Congress held true to its earlier threat when it approved only \$79.5 million in grant funding to South Korea in FY 1975. An additional \$20 million was withheld until the President was satisfied that democracy had been restored in South Korea.⁷⁸ The \$20 million never was allocated. The FY 1975 MAP and IMET appropriation reflected a \$13.1 million drop from the FY 1974 appropriation (See Table 17).

During the Ford Administration, Congress began, through a series of laws and bills, to assert its voice and influence on arms sales and military programs. The power of Congress to veto a specific arms transaction was reflected by the "Nelson Amendment," which had been attached to a military

assistance bill in December, 1974. This amendment required the State Department to provide advance notice to Congress of any proposed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts in excess of \$25 million and provided that the Congress would have 20 days in which to block the transaction.⁷⁹

The linkage between human rights violations and military aid was addressed by provisions and amendments in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 and the 1975 Military Assistance Authorization Bill. The 1974 law directed the President to "reduce or terminate military or economic assistance to any government which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights..." However, under another provision of the same law, the President may furnish aid in spite of human rights violations by advising Congress of extraordinary circumstances deeming military and economic assistance necessary. Amendments to the 1975 bill required the State Department to provide reports on the status of human rights in various countries and allowed Congress to terminate assistance based on these reports.⁸⁰

Congress attempted to further its influence on United States arms sales policies by sending to the President on April 28, 1976, the first version of the Arms Export Control Act which was vetoed by the President. Backed by Senate Democratic liberals, including Senators Kennedy and Humphrey, the Congress was able to work out a compromise bill which was

eventually signed by the President on June 30, 1976.⁸¹ The thrust of this act was toward restraint and balance in administration procedures and guidelines, in the levels of arms sales approved, and to identify the direction to be taken in influencing the scope of the world's arms trade.⁸²

The human rights, arms control and political ramifications of arms transfers reflected in this act were understood by Congress; however, to actually bar a sale required specifics supplied mostly by the State Department which often were outweighed by security or political advantages. Congressional sentiment was best summarized by Senator Humphrey, whose subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee initiated the 1976 act. His position was that arms sales should be generalized neither good nor bad; they require a careful balancing of the pros and cons by the executive branch, oversight by Congress, and openness to both public and congressional scrutiny. So long as the executive appears to have considered the risks and consequences of a sale, the majority of Congress will support that decision.⁸³

Under pressure by Congress due to some controversial sales to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries (not Korea), President Ford created an interagency committee to coordinate the official policies of the State Department, Defense Department, National Security Council and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency over any future arms sales to foreign

countries.⁸⁴ Further controls and restraints would be placed on arms transactions by the Carter Administration which will be further discussed in Chapter V.

Congress was seriously considering yet another significant reduction in FY 1976 military aid to South Korea based on the above considerations when an assassination attempt against President Park on 15 August 1974 killed Mrs. Park.⁸⁵

When South Korean authorities disclosed that the assassin was linked to a North Korean organization in Japan, Seoul-Tokyo relations sank to an all time post-war low, not to be improved until the following year. The assassination attempt and death of Mrs. Park offered Park an excuse to further tighten political dissent. Surprisingly, the reverse occurred. A new period of limited political liberalization began.⁸⁶ The linkage of the assassin to North Korea resulted in a reassessment of North Korean intentions. Park concluded the following:⁸⁷ first, North Korea obviously remained committed to reunification through communization regardless of the cost; second, South Korea must heighten their vigilance and act to deter further aggression; and third, short term sacrifices in political liberty would more than be offset by the long term benefits of preventing a forceful reunification by the North. It is significant to note that South Korean defense expenditures for 1974 were increased nearly 25% from the previous year. This was a marked upturn for South Korean defense spending (see Table 7).

Table 7

South Korean Defense Expenditures (\$ million)⁸⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Expenditure</u>	<u>% Increase Over Previous Year</u>
1970	334	
1971	394	15.2
1972	443	11.1
1973	456	2.6
1974	601	24.1
1975	747	19.5
1976	988	24.4

The year 1975 proved that some of President Park's warnings of the threat from the North were well-founded. Armed clashes occurred off the east and west coasts of South Korea, and a second tunnel under the DMZ was discovered by the UN command (the first had been discovered in November 1974).⁸⁹

However, the most dramatic event in 1975 disturbing the South Koreans most was the sudden collapse of the South Vietnamese government. This event, coupled with the earlier communist takeovers in Laos and Cambodia, shifted the balance of power in Southeast Asia and caused Asian allies consternation and doubt over future willingness of the United States to come to their aid if they had to face an overt military threat.

South Korean fears were further compounded by the ambiguities American leaders were providing when questioned about the United States commitments to the Republic of China

(Taiwan). When Secretary Kissinger, in a speech to the Japan Society in New York on June 18, 1975, reaffirmed United States treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific, he failed to include Taiwan.⁹⁰ Furthermore, following the fall of Saigon, American commitments to South Korea were being questioned in Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during a re-examination of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, heard eight pollsters tell them:

"The current American mood is distrustful - even of the President and the Congress - preoccupied with our domestic needs, the scarcity of resources to meet them, and wary of any foreign policy moves that drain off resources..."⁹¹

Lou Harris testified that 63% surveyed felt the United States government would not be justified in backing authoritarian governments that have overthrown democratic governments and that 68% felt the United States should put pressure on countries that systematically violated basic human rights.⁹²

Regardless of a seemingly prevalent public desire to detach itself militarily from South Korea, both the State and Defense departments made abundantly clear to Seoul that the United States would honor its 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea. Parallels between Korea and Vietnam were more apparent and emotional than realistic. South Korea is intricately locked into the economic and commercial web of the Pacific community (of which the United States is the largest member), and reflects a governmental system, though

not as democratically oriented as many would like, that is unquestionably preferred over its rival regime in the North. Of these two key factors, South Vietnam could not lay claim for comparison.

The fall of the Saigon government stopped, at least until the Carter Administration, Congressional moves toward decreasing and eventually withdrawing all American troops from South Korea. A reappraisal of the Chinese threat to the Korean peninsula had followed the improvement in United States relations with the People's Republic of China beginning in 1971. Consequently, the official rationale for keeping American forces in Korea had changed. Then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told a Congressional committee in February 1974 that the troops were "to serve as a symbol of America's continued interest in the overall stability of that part of the world during a period of some tension ... (and that) the political purpose is primary now."⁹³ The House of Representatives rejected on May 20, 1975, by a 311-95 vote an amendment calling for, among others, a reduction of 15,500 American troops from South Korea.⁹⁴ The United States driven out of old "Indochina" had shifted the focus of its Pacific defense policy to Northeast Asia.

Following the Communist victories in Southeast Asia, President Park began publicity to express the view that South Korea had to become self-sufficient militarily. Knowing that the mood in the United States Congress tended

to shift with public opinion, Park and his military chiefs devised a plan to enable South Korea within 4-5 years (1976-1980) to possess the capability of self-defense through an indigenous defense industry. Specifically, South Korea sought to develop within five years a force structure capable of holding its own against any North Korean attack, with the United States providing only necessary logistical support. This multi-faceted project, named the Force Improvement Program (FIP), was a follow-up to the five-year modernization program launched in 1971.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, the decision to support South Korea's 1971 5-Year Modernization Plan was due in large part to placate Park's fears over the withdrawal of the 7th Division's 20,000 troops. The decision was an Executive one and was subject to authorization and appropriation each year by Congress. The total commitment was \$1.250 billion plus \$250 million in excess defense articles. It was also established by a Congressional committee that by withdrawing those 20,000 troops and providing South Korea \$1.5 billion in aid the United States would save nearly \$500 million.⁹⁵ At the end of this five year period the United States had provided nearly \$1.3 billion in military assistance, to include \$890.4 million in grant aid and FMS credits and \$140.7 million in excess defense equipment transferred against the \$250 million goal. A breakdown in major categories of equipment provided under that program is depicted in Table 8.

Table 8
 U.S. Security Assistance Provided to South Korea
 Under Its Modernization Plan 1971-75 (\$/Thousands)⁹⁶

	MAP, fiscal year 1971-75 (value)	FMS credit, fiscal year 1974-75	Total
Aircraft	\$235,658	\$19,300	\$254,958
Ships	30,853	7,800	38,653
Vehicles and weapons	196,128	6,900	203,028
Ammunition	37,478	2,200	39,678
Missiles	10,090	40,300	50,390
Communication equipment	40,234	21,000	61,234
Other equipment	93,065	11,683	104,748
Rehabilitation and repair	16,148	6,500	22,648
Supply operations	90,187		90,187
Training	14,736		14,736
Other services	10,101		10,101
Total	774,678	115,683	890,361

In the FY 1971 to FY 1973 period, while U.S. assistance in the form of grants, excess defense articles (EDA), and budget support remained important, the role of U.S. funding declined. South Korea began to purchase small quantities of defense articles under foreign military sales (FMS) credit and cash programs. Grant aid support of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs ended by 1974, and grant aid funding for military equipment (investment) was terminated in FY 1976. Beginning in FY 1974, the United States provided increasing amounts of FMS credits, while South Korea utilized FMS cash purchase to cover O&M requirements (See Table 9).

To complement the \$5 billion FIP, President Park further directed an expansion of South Korean defense industries to

reduce the demands of defense requirements on scarce foreign exchange resources, and to lessen the dependence on foreign sources of supply. To finance this effort the defense budget's share of the Gross National Product (GNP) rose from 3.8% in 1975 to 6.2% in 1976 and 6.6% in 1977 (See Table 16). This increased share of the GNP was the first significant increase since 1962 when it was 5.9%. Much of the money for the industrial development program came from an 18 percent defense sales tax introduced in 1976. The tax was designed to raise nearly \$3 billion over the proposed 5 year span.

The new program concentrated on increasing the number of licensed production arrangements in South Korea, with an estimated cost of \$5 billion. President Park's goal was that South Korea produce all its military needs with the exception of highly sophisticated electronic equipment, high technology fighter aircraft, and of course, nuclear weapons.⁹⁷ Inherent in this program was the desire to be able to export South Korean manufactured arms.

The South Korean FIP was greatly assisted by FMS credits extended by the United States. In 1976, FMS credits totaled \$260 million while FMS orders by South Korea exceeded \$616 million. The largest portion of South Korean FIP expenditures was to be made in the United States.

In 1975, most of the \$78.2 million in MAP funds were spent on aircraft, trucks, and supply operations. In 1976, the \$59.4 million was utilized largely for aircraft, ships, communications, and supply operations.⁹⁸

Table 9
U.S. Security Assistance to South Korea
FY 1973-76 (\$ Millions)⁹⁹

	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
FMS Orders	1.6	100.3	214.3	616.5
FMS Deliveries	2.4	13.3	70.9	161.4
FMS Credits	25.0	56.7	59.0	260.0
Commercial Sale Delivered	N/A	1.0	1.2	19.9
MAP Funded	296.6	91.1	78.2	59.4
MAP Delivered	264.7	91.7	134.1	175.6

Table 9 depicts United States security assistance to South Korea during the Ford Administration.

Between 1975 and 1977, South Korea acquired or ordered through FMS credit, 54 F-5E and 6F-5F fighters with ground equipment and ten spare engines, 19 F-4E and 18F-4D¹⁰⁰ Phantom fighters, 120 Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles with 12 launchers, 24 Rockwell OV-10 recce/night observation helicopters, 10 AH-1J helicopter gunships, 3 Improved Hawk battalions, 40 Standard missiles, 1000 Tow missiles and 5 mobile radar systems. Honest John and Sergeant missiles were also being phased out and replaced by Lance surface-to-surface missiles.¹⁰¹

One of the most significant transfers of 1975 to South Korea was the purchase in December of the complete facilities for manufacturing solid-fueled rocket motors from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. South Korea paid \$2 million for the facility which produces motors utilized for only two purposes: for use on offensive or defensive missiles and rockets, or for boosting satellites into space. Lockheed, unsuccessful in

obtaining U.S. approval to sell the equipment and to set up a training program, sold the equipment to a commercial exporter who, in turn, obtained a license from the Commerce Department.¹⁰² The fruits of this missile-producing facility would come out in 1978 when South Korea launched its first indigenously produced ground-to-ground missile.¹⁰³

Equally noteworthy are the strides other indigenous defense industries were making by the end of the Ford Administration. South Korea was building its own patrol boats, had set up a tank manufacturing plant (with European advice), were co-producing M-16 rifles, and had had talks with Brazil and some African governments on building warships for them.¹⁰⁴

When one examines South Korea's arms trading pattern, it is readily apparent that it had been nearly 100 percent dependent on the United States. Up through 1975, South Korea had received \$3.7 billion through the United States Military Assistance Program. Between 1973 and 1976, South Korea imported arms valued at \$770 million while exporting only \$15 million worth of military equipment.¹⁰⁵ In 1975, however, South Korea made a single million dollar order with Italy to co-produce 150 Fiat, 6614 Armored Personnel Carriers. Though this was the first significant non-U.S. purchase, there had been other less expensive buys in the past. South Korea had purchased from Switzerland some Oerlikon radar-directed anti-aircraft guns, 2 oiler tankers from Norway in 1953, 2 Kawasaki-Bell KH-4 aircraft from Japan in 1966, and 10 DHC-2

Beaver aircraft from Canada, also in 1966.¹⁰⁶ Beginning in 1974, the Korean government began sending representatives to talk with European and Japanese (Mitsubishi) manufacturers of arms.¹⁰⁷ This turning to Europe reflected Seoul's concern over adverse Congressional reactions to its government's internal policies and the subsequent reluctance of the American Congress to provide all of its military requests.

The year 1976 was a year of unexpected gains and successes for South Korea, mostly at the expense of North Korea. The pivotal event was the 18 August axe-slaying of two U.S. Army officers at Panmunjom. The United States reacted swiftly and with a large show of force to include dispatching a carrier task force from Japan, placing all American and South Korean troops on full alert status along the DMZ, deployment of an F-111 squadron from the United States, and aerial reinforcements from Okinawa.¹⁰⁸ On top of this event, North Korean diplomats were ordered out of four European countries on charges of drug trafficking and blackmarketeering. This event lent substance to reports that North Korea was in dire need of local currency.¹⁰⁹ In August, Kim in an unprecedented move, issued a "semi-apology" to the United States for the slaying of the two U.S. officers. Shortly after the apology, North Korea asked the sponsors of a UN resolution calling for the immediate U.S. withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea to withdraw their resolution.¹¹⁰ In partial response to the North Korean actions, U.S. military aid appropriations to

South Korea jumped from \$195 million in FY 1975 to over \$438 million in FY 1976/76T. Those in Congress still desiring to link South Korea's human rights scoresheet with arms aid were losing support. While debating a military assistance bill in June, 1976, a House committee voted to limit spending for Korea due to repressive policies. A later vote by the full house deleted the committee's limits.¹¹¹ 1976 was also a busy year for arms sales approvals to South Korea (See Tables 17 and 18).

In the mid-1970s North Korean relations with the USSR remained critically important. The Soviets were still the North Korean's only source of high technology arms and its principal trading partner. The North Koreans also looked to the Soviets to champion their causes in the various international forums, particularly in the United Nations. Although they endorsed Kim's policy of "peaceful" reunification, the Soviets showed no willingness to risk detente with the United States for the sake of reunification. Instead, the Soviets tended to advocate a theme of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans angrily viewed this Soviet theme as supporting the status quo. In retaliation, North Korea refused to support Moscow's Asian Collective Security System. Furthermore, the axe-murders of two American officers at Panmunjom greatly embarrassed the Soviet Union and showed the limits of influence the Soviets held over the North Koreans.¹¹²

Relations between Peking and North Korea remained cordial during this period. Numerous visits back and forth between Chinese and North Korean military officials were made in 1972-1975. Perhaps Kim desired to gain some independence from Moscow by getting promises from Peking; or he intended to use Chinese aid commitments to bribe more aid from the Soviets.

When Kim Il-Sung visited Peking the same month Saigon fell and asked for tangible support in his goal of reunification, the Chinese only granted moral support for a peaceful reunification, but refused to provide the advanced armaments Kim was seeking. Prior to Kim's visit to China, it was reported that Peking had promised military aid in the form of tanks, torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines, and fighter planes. Kim, apparently encouraged by the communist victory in Vietnam had publicly called for this Chinese support and assistance to renew his war against the South.¹¹³

The United States responded to Kim's public pronouncements by threatening to use without hesitation nuclear weapons on North Korean industrial centers if he launched an invasion of the South.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, it is important to note that there is no evidence that North Korea received all of the above promised military aid from the People's Republic of China. However, it is certain that by 1976, the size of the North Korean submarine fleet had grown to a total of over fourteen. Two Romeo L-class submarines had been delivered

by the Chinese in 1973, two in 1974, and three in 1975. The Russians had previously provided four W-class submarines. In 1976, two more Romeo class submarines, reportedly indigenously produced, were put into active service. These two had apparently been built utilizing sections already produced in China, or at least, with substantial Chinese technical assistance.¹¹⁵

Considered by naval experts as among the most sophisticated conventional submarines in use at the time, the manufacture of this Romeo class submarine by North Korea seriously upset the naval balance on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹⁶ The South Korean emphasis on obtaining fast partial interdiction craft and two additional destroyers were perhaps, in part, a counter to this new threat.

Because the Soviet Union was showing restraint in its supply of modern weapons, China was called upon to provide the bulk of North Korean arms requests, especially MiG-21s and T-59 tanks. However, China itself was in need of more modern weapons for its own forces and too limited in its ability to spare any of the higher technology weapons systems demanded.¹¹⁷ Soviet arms transfers to North Korea dropped significantly from \$250 million in 1973 to only \$32 million in 1976.¹¹⁸ It is uncertain whether this drop reflected Soviet unwillingness to supply or North Korean inability to pay.

Signs of serious economic difficulties surfaced in 1975 when North Korea was unable to meet payments of part of its

outstanding debts. This debt estimated at about \$1.7 billion was due to two political and two economical factors. The two political factors are: 1) extravagant financial disbursements for Kim's "World Revolution", and 2) excessive defense expenditures due to first, the military threat caused by China during the Cultural Revolution, and secondly, to the military and economic emergence of South Korea. The two economic factors are: 1) extensive import of capital and plants from Western countries, and 2) a decline in prices of North Korean export goods.¹¹⁹ Pyongyang's Six-Year (1971-1976) Economic Plan had been based on continued high prices for its staple exports of coal and iron ore. However, prices fell about the same time the oil import bills were increasing due to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Of that \$1.7 billion debt, \$700 million was owed to the Soviets and about \$50 million to the Chinese. When North Korea began defaulting, both the Soviets and the Chinese began reducing economic and military aid.¹²⁰

While the Chinese and Soviets were decreasing the level of aid, North Korea was significantly raising its military expenditures (See Table 16). A look at North Korean budget revenues and expenditures during this period shows serious deficit spending during years 1971, 1972 and 1975. In 1971 and 1975 the imbalances were 5% and 4% respectively. Only in 1972 and 1973 did revenues exceed expenditures. Noteworthy also is the fact that defense expenditures were below

normal those two years.¹²¹ By 1976, the ability of the North to build its own arms had increased substantially, thus allowing Kim to be less dependent on either the Soviets or the Chinese. This indigenous arms industry, coupled with stockpiling of reserve equipment and munitions, would allow North Korea greater freedom of action, either militarily or in later negotiations with Seoul.

When one attempts to differentiate the military related industries from the civilian industries in the United States or South Korea, it is a relatively simple matter. However, in the opinion of the Korean analysts at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), "there is no difference between the military industry and the civilian industry in North Korea."¹²² Furthermore, when tension increases in the peninsula, North Korea conceals not only the names of military units, but those of important factories.¹²³ This factor makes the true nature of North Korea's defense industry difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is known that North Korea by 1976 had begun to build submarines, frigates, MiG-21 aircraft (less avionics), helicopters, M-1973 armored personnel carriers, T-59 tanks, K-61 amphibious vehicles, artillery, AK-47s and all types of needed munitions.¹²⁴ Apparently, the only arms not indigenously produced by 1976 were missiles, avionics, and sophisticated electronic gear. Through this impressive indigenous arms base, supplemented, of course, with the military assistance provided

by Peking and Moscow, North Korea was capable of dramatically increasing its military force structure between the years 1971 and 1976.

North Korean armored forces were increased nearly four-fold (mostly T-54/55s), with almost equally impressive gains in the multiple rocket launcher, artillery, armored personnel carrier, and helicopter inventories. Fighter aircraft and amphibious craft also made pronounced gains in inventory (See Table 10).

Table 10
North Korean Equipment Inventory Trends (1972-1976) ¹²⁵

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Multiple Rocket Launchers	900	950	1050	1150	1300
Tanks	600	850	1300	1700	1950
Submarines	5	5	7	10	10-12
Fighters (MiG-15, 17, 19, 21 & 50-7)	470	530	560	560	570
Helicopters	26	31	31	43	65
Naval Combatants	200	250	350	390	425-450
Artillery Pieces	2500	2600	2700	2800	3000
Armored Personnel Carriers	150	250	400	500	750
Amphibious Craft	18	20	60	65	90
Fighter/Bombers (SU-7) & Light Bombers (IL-28)	90	90	90	105	105

In the comparison of the respective force configurations of the two Koreas, it is essential not to view force capabilities solely on a numerical variable. Other factors such as the strategic doctrine, the ability to achieve surprise, and the level of technical training and familiarity with

modern weapons systems must be included when assessing the military equation.¹²⁶ Tables 11 and 12 depict the force structure trends between North and South Korea during the period 1975-1976.

Table 11
North Korean Force Structure Trends (1975-1976)

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Manpower	467,000 (active) 330,000 (reserve)	495,000
Tanks	1,130, including 300 T-34, 700 T-54/55/59's 80 PT-76's, and 50 T-62's	1,350, and 250 T-34, 900 T-54/55/59, 150 PT-76, and 50 T-62
APC's	200	Same
Artillery	3,200 guns and howitzers up to 152-mm; 1800 RL's, 2,500 mortars, RCL's, AT-guns, 2,500 AA-guns	negligible increase
Missiles	12 <u>FROG</u> -5/7 SSM, 180 SA-2's	24 <u>FROG</u> , 250 SA-2
Combat A/C	588, including 70 SI-28, 28 SU-7, 150 Mig-21, 40 Mig-19, 300 Mig-15/17's	600, mix about same
Ships	185, including 12 subs, 18 <u>Komar</u> - and <u>Osa</u> -class FPBG's (Carry Styx SSM), 90 torpedo boats	250, now incl. 150 torpedo boats, 14 submarines.

Sources:

The Military Balance, 1975-1976, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 56.

The Military Balance, 1976-1977, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 57.

Table 12

South Korean Force Structure Trends (1975-1976)

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Manpower	625,000 (active) 1,134,000 (reserve)	595,00 1,000,000
Tanks	1,000 M-47, M-48, M-60 med. tks.	840 M-47/48
APC's	400 M-113, M-577	500 M-113/577
Artillery	2,000 guns, howitzers mortars, RCL's	2,000, now including 175 mm and 8" guns
Missiles	1 Honest John SSM battalion; 2 SAM bns. (Hawk and Nike Hercules	Same
Combat A/C	216, including 36 F-4C/D, 70 F-5A, 100 F86F, and 10 RF-5A	204, including 72 F-4D/E, 50 F-86F, 70F-5A/E, and 12 RF-SA (18F-4E and 60 F-5E/F on order)
Ships	143, including 16 destroyers/destroyer escorts, 22 patrol boats, 10 coastal minesweepers	174, including now 44 patrol boats, 12 coastal minesweepers

Sources:

The Military Balance, 1975-1976, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 56.

The Military Balance, 1976-1977, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 57.

As depicted in the above tables, North Korea possessed nearly a 2:1 advantage in tanks. However, nearly a quarter of that North Korean tank force was comprised of aging T-34 tanks, hardly a match for the South Korean M-48s. North Korea first received T-59 medium tanks from the Chinese in 1974.¹²⁷ The imbalance in artillery pieces is in large part due to the fact the North Korean army was (and still is) organized along Soviet doctrine. Conversely, the smaller artillery inventory in South Korea's army reflects American influence. Both North and South Korea have reflected heavy investment in combat equipment at the expense of logistic capabilities. South Korea, in its 1st Force Improvement Plan (FIP), did not even seriously address this problem.

One of the major reasons American military officers felt the South Koreans could not go it alone against a North Korean invasion was the air equation. Though the F-4 had proved more than a match for the MiG-19 and MiG-21, sheer numbers was a significant variable. Moreover, North Korea could operate out of 16 airfields all equipped with hardened shelters, and rely on some pilots with combat experience. The 28 SU-7s were probably provided by the Soviets, at the insistence of North Korea, as a response to the supplying of F-4's by the Americans (See Table 20).

As with the difficulties in force comparison, the same holds true for attempting an objective comparison of defense expenditures. The crux of this problem is that the direct military aid and defense support from the major suppliers often constituted a substantial portion of the two countries' defense efforts. In the 1960s and early 1970s United States security assistance offset the resource burden on South Korea enabling South Korea to maintain stable economic growth. Therefore, when comparisons between North and South Korea are made, allowance for the foreign assistance, both past and present must be made.

Again, by examining the military assistance programs and arms transfers to the Korean peninsula between 1965 and 1976, a number of variables affecting the major actors are apparent. This section will analyze the impact these variable had on both the recipients and their respective suppliers.

E. THE SUPPLIER-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP

Though one would never find a government official stating so "for the record", both the Soviet Union and the United States exported arms to the Korean peninsula to exert, or in the case of the Soviets, attempt to exert influence over their client states. A hegemonic relationship via the vehicles arms transfers and military assistance had evolved. The Soviet Union, the major supplier to North Korea until 1972-1973, in reality, found it could exert little control over

Pyongyang's actions. The commando raid on the "Blue House" and the axe-slayings of American officers at Panmunjom were but two examples.

In the case of the United States, its monopoly in South Korean arms imports fortified its ability to influence. Of Soviet and American military influences, that of the United States was by far the greatest. Except for a comparatively few Soviet advisors in North Korea, American military presence had been pervasive since the Korean War. Also, the training of South Korean officers in the United States was far greater than comparable training provided the North Koreans by the Soviets. Between 1963 and 1976, the South Korean military had received arms and training costing nearly three times that given to North Korea by both the Soviet Union and China combined.¹²⁸

The deal to send South Korean combat troops to Vietnam was a prime example of a hegemonic relationship utilizing arms transfers and military assistance as the influence variable. The United States involvement in Southeast Asia placed a tremendous burden on its military assistance programs. The quid pro quo agreements helped alleviate the American manpower requirement, while South Korea benefitted in a number of ways. First, it obtained the necessary funding to modernize its forces while not adversely affecting its economic progress. Secondly, South Korean forces obtained valuable combat experience for nearly its entire regular ground

force. And finally, the infusion of sophisticated weapons such as F-4 and F-5 aircraft, surface-to-surface (SSMs), and surface-to-air(SAMs) missiles gave the ROK armed forces a credible deterrent against superior North Korean forces. However, as the war in Vietnam created severe criticism internationally against the United States, South Korea found itself neither in a position to join the criticism or renege on its promised commitments and support. To do so would have meant possible loss of the much needed and desired military aid programs. Thus, the supplier-recipient relationship between the United States and South Korea remained one of continued American strong-arm influence with heavy South Korean dependence and total acquiescence.

The Nixon Doctrine, in reality, did not adversely affect the relationship. If anything, the onus of stronger dependency on arms imports fell on the South Koreans with the subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division. However, the shifting of strategy, inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, also required the United States to concentrate more on arms transfers. When the non-communist governments in Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed, some Asian leaders began to doubt whether Washington would honor its defense commitments, or even possessed the will to respond militarily if an ally were threatened.

Furthermore, by late 1974 the relationship between Seoul and Washington had become very strained over Park's modus operandi within South Korea. For the first time since

President Kennedy coerced Syngman Rhee to fulfill his commitment for the institution of a democratic process, did the United States actually resort to strong arm tactics to influence events in South Korea. The cuts in military aid in FY 1975 marked a turning point in the Congressional -Administration's relationship over the issue of arms exports and military assistance. Mounting Congressional criticism over the modus operandi of American arms exports led to the enactment of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. One of the major effects the AECA had on Korea was the end of Defense Department control over arms requests. The change required all requests to be forwarded through the State Department.

The year 1976 also saw the end of military assistance program (MAP) grant aid to South Korea. By this time, however, South Korea was economically solvent and could rely on either cash or foreign military sales credits (FMS) when buying arms. The relationship between supplier-recipient was no longer a big brother - little brother relationship. Instead, Seoul had to contend with an increasingly belligerent and powerful Congress holding the purse strings while the Ford Administration had to cope with both an increasingly independent Congress and Seoul. The situation seemed made to order for President Park. Because of increased U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia, he felt he could rely on this redefined United States stake in South Korea

as a deterrent against North Korea. He also felt, possibly for the first time, that he had leverage over the United States concerning the flow of military assistance.

China's inward isolation during the Cultural Revolution had completely reversed the developing supplier-recipient relationship of the early 1960s with Pyongyang. By cutting its aid to North Korea, China lost influence and support, particularly at the time most needed. North Korea, by necessity, had to look to the Soviets for support and assistance. The Soviets obviously gained by China's loss. The new leadership in Moscow had quickly perceived the need to re-cultivate relationships with its Asian Socialist brothers. By renewing economic and military aid, the Soviets regained some of the influence they previously lost due to North Korean ideological divergences. North Korea, though obtaining its much needed military and economic aid to carry through with Kim's Seven-Year Plan, became once more almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union to meet its economic goals and supply its defense needs. Though he may have been heavily dependent on the Soviets for livelihood, Kim showed a great deal of independent action through a series of armed provocations with South Korea and the United States from 1968-1970. How much influence the Soviets were able to exert over those North Korean military incidents is difficult to judge.

In view of its own vulnerability to retaliation by the United States, the Soviets would probably have counseled against some of these provocations, if it had been consulted in advance. It is hard to accept the premise that the seizure of the Pueblo was part of a well-coordinated Communist strategy to disperse American attention and power; i.e., the Tet offensive in Vietnam, actions in Eastern Europe, the Seoul commando raid, and the Pueblo seizure.

Following this period of excessive militancy, North Korea began to attempt minor independence from its supplier by initiating an indigenous manufacturing capability. However, regardless of the intent toward relative independence, North Korean dependence on Soviet weapon technology was in fact strengthened during this period. By 1976, arms transfers and military assistance to the North Koreans had not bought the Russians increased influence. North Korea continued to show neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and, in fact was beginning to lean more and more toward the Chinese. Nevertheless, Soviet-North Korean relations, though cool and correct, remained strong. The renewal of the Soviet - North Korean Mutual Defense Treaty in 1976 was ample evidence. More importantly, Moscow, very interested in SALT II and detente with the United States, saw little to gain in underwriting a second installment of Kim's reunification campaign.¹²⁹

By 1973, China was providing the bulk of arms to North Korea. However, China's inability to provide all of North

Korea's needs furthered Kim's belief in self-sufficiency. Subsequently, China, like her northern neighbor, was also unable to exert significant influence over North Korean foreign policy. The Chinese, like the Soviets were also interested in maintaining its Washington connection. Thus, the request made by Kim in Peking in 1975 for Chinese support in a renewed bid for "peaceful" reunification met with polite silence.

F. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND THE IMMINENCE OF WAR

North Korean indignation over the participation of South Korean troops against a brother socialist nation, the embarrassing lack of comparison in economic growth, and frustration in not fulfilling the goal of unification seriously contributed to the explosive nature of the Korean situation. By stepping up its guerrilla activities against the South, North Korea had hoped to hamper economic growth by showing present and potential foreign investors the hazards of investing in the South. Guerrilla and terrorists actions also created psychological tensions in the South which were intended to destabilize the Seoul government. Finally, guerrilla actions, when utilized in home-use propaganda, were justified as retaliation against initial South Korean aggression. The North Korean people were told that because of these South-initiated provocations, "massive preparation for a renewed aggression" required building up North Korean

military capabilities, "and that, consequently, (the country) must divide its efforts between economic construction and military preparedness."¹³⁰ Thus, one can see how North Korea, by emphasizing that "war is right around the bend", justified continued arms imports, even when the military balance tilted toward the North. On the other side of the coin, South Koreans pointed to the same incidents to emphasize their need for more arms imports.

There was little doubt that North Korea scored an impressive propaganda victory in the Pueblo crisis. In the short run, it enhanced Kim's stature in the Communist world and strengthened his campaign to rally the North Korean people against the "imperialist" Americans and their "lackeys" in the south. However, in the long run, the seizure of the Pueblo proved more counterproductive to North Korea. American and South Korean leaders reassessed their perception of threat in the North resulting in a refortification of their forces in South Korea. South Korea was voted a special military aid grant by Congress, the United States reinforced the 40,000 U.S. soldiers stationed below the DMZ with an additional 5,000, and South Korea began forming an armed militia of nearly 2.5 million reservists. More significantly, South Korea decided to place more emphasis on defense expenditures. In constant dollars, South Korea steadily increased its defense expenditures by about \$50 million annually from 1968 (See Table 16).

An interesting aspect of the Pueblo crisis involved a serious set-back in U.S. intelligence capability. The ship had contained:

"The most sophisticated and modern intelligence mechanisms on board. The equipment was fifteen years ahead of anything Soviet Russia possesses.the Pueblo's crew....were the most highly trained and skilled experts in the cryptographic and intelligence fields."¹³¹

It would be hard to accept the premise that the Soviets did not remind the North Koreans just who gave them the means to capture the Pueblo. A quid pro quo was in order. Soviet arms transfers might have provided an unexpected bonus!

G. SUPPLY OF ARMS AND ITS EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL SOCIAL CONFLICTS

The United States had provided nearly \$4 billion in security assistance since the Korean War. Under the protection of the United States, South Koreans were able to devote the majority of their resources and energy to economic expansion. In 1965 for example, of the \$112 million budgeted for defense by South Korea, 64% was covered by United States Military Budget Support derived from economic assistance.¹³² This meant that the South Koreans had to provide only about \$41.5 million or 1.5% of the GNP from their own resources. Additionally, the United States furnished \$173.1 million in grant security assistance aid. By adding the two funds, the United States had provided 85% of the total joint ROK/U.S.

forces expenditure on Korean defense. The presence of two United States combat divisions with supporting troops also provided a significant input to the Korean economy.¹³³ By multiplying similar commitments over the next five years, it is not difficult to realize the economic impact United States assistance had on the South Korean economy.

Another key contributing factor allowing Seoul's economy to make impressive headway was South Korean participation in the Vietnam War where it was the United States who paid for the upkeep. South Vietnam also became a major importer of South Korean goods. By combining the above two factors with continued American MAP funding in Korea, South Korean leaders were able to make great strides in their Second Five-Year Economic Plan. South Korea's annual growth averaged about 10 percent. According to the South Korean Ministry of Culture and Information the growth rate of South Korea's GNP was 7.8% (1962-1966), 10.5% (1966-1971), and 11.2% (1971-1976).¹³⁴

However, as the public mood within the United States shifted its support away from the Vietnam cause, so it was with Congressional support. By 1970, Congressional criticism was being leveled at all aspects of the modus operandi of American arms exports. While some critics felt the United States was dealing in too much arms traffic to the lesser developed countries, thereby linking itself to these countries' military actions, the majority of criticism was directed toward America's deep involvement in Southeast Asia. However,

the 1968 incidents in the Korean peninsula helped to consolidate support for the continuing security assistance programs to South Korea. President Park took advantage of the bellicose North Korean gestures to maintain a high stage of readiness and to clamp down on political dissidence. His repressive actions did not totally enhance his security objectives, but rather had the opposite effect when the resultant decreased American aid is taken into account.

To offset the balance of payments costs of maintaining American troops overseas, successive United States administrations considered selling arms a valid policy. Former Defense Secretary McNamara stated that the three objectives of American arms sales (during the Kennedy-Johnson years) were: 1) to promote the defense capabilities of allies, 2) to promote standardization and the concept of cooperative logistics with allies, and 3) to "offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from essential United States military deployment abroad."¹³⁵ It would also be safe to say the later Nixon Doctrine gave the U.S. arms manufacturing industry increased business.

As the South Korean economy strengthened during this period, the United States continued to provide large amounts of security assistance. However, the assistance shifted from one of total grant aid to a system of credits. By 1976, South Korea had become a major importer of American weapons systems. It had also found the economic viability to lay

the foundations of a self-supporting indigenous arms industry. In spite of the above considerations, the high level of military preparedness on the peninsula had placed both political and economical burdens on the two Korea's governments. There can be little doubt, however, that North Korea had borne the heavier burden.

In competition with South Korea, economics has been a most serious factor. Because North Korea realized it could not easily persuade citizens of the South to choose its style of government unless its own were economically superior to the South's, economic development had been given high priority during the 1950s and most of the 1960s. Table 13 reflects the annual growth rate in national income.

Table 13.

North Korean Annual Growth Rate (1957-1970)¹³⁶

1957 - 1960	21 %
1960 - 1963	10.8 %
1964 - 1966	7.9 %
1967 - 1970	3.3 %

With the cut-off of virtually all types of Soviet aid in 1963, significant economic hardships were suffered by North Korea. To maintain its level of military readiness, North Korea had utilized funds originally targeted for industrial growth. Thus, by 1965 the Seven-Year Plan was far behind schedule. The later infusion of large amounts of Soviet military aid and arms following the ouster of Khrushchev allowed North Korea to begin redirecting its funding back to industry.

Up to the mid 1960s, North Korea had been winning the "economic" battle with South Korea. However, as noted earlier in this paper, Kim adopted in 1967-68 a policy of reunification by force of which he succinctly described in an interview:

"Only when we use force of arms can we gain power. We cannot gain power simply by holding elections. The most decisive and positive of all forms of struggle is the struggle with arms for the liberation of our people.¹³⁷

The "Weapon in One Hand and Hammer and Sickle in the Other" theme resulted in a drastic increase in defense expenditures, from 12.5% in 1966 to over 30% in 1967. Defense expenditures stayed over 30% of the budget for another three years. When Soviet economic aid fell below what had been planned for, the result was a serious crippling of the North Korean economy. The failure of his reunification program coupled with an almost bankrupt economy resulted in a re-evaluation of the political climate. A continuance of defense expenditures at the same rate was sure to bring further economic problems. However, a reduction in military spending also was considered a danger in that Seoul might feel the time was right to attack northward. Hoping they could simultaneously pursue economic development while maintaining the momentum of military buildup, North Korean leaders chose to decrease their defense expenditures to about 16% of the budget and obtain credits and loans from Western and Japanese sources. The result was major defaulting on all their loans.

In a series of meetings over rescheduling of debts, the creditors, to include the Soviet Union, presented a united front to force North Korea to make progress toward payment. The result was a three-year depression in North Korea causing the then Six-Year Economic Plan to end in failure.¹³⁸

Tied in with dwindling and, most likely, reluctantly given foreign aid by China and the Soviet Union, and North Korea's policy of "chuche", the increased spending had to have caused a depressing effect on the economy and probably played a major role in shaping the course of economic development. However, the poor performance cannot be attributed solely to defense. The basic problem appeared to be that the North Korean economy was not structured or prepared to be competitive with other Western nations.¹³⁹

Comparative growth rates between North and South Korea during the period 1971-1976, clearly show that South Korea had surpassed North Korea's growth rate substantially. South Korea's rate exceeded 10% while North Korea's was less than 6%. North Korea's GNP for 1976 was \$7.3 billion as compared to \$25 billion for the South. Of monumental significance to both countries is the fact that these figures had provided Seoul that "tangible but invaluable commodity: confidence" by the international business community.¹⁴⁰

H. DIVERSIFICATION OF SOURCES

The lack of a different supplier of arms and military assistance other than the United States was not troublesome

initially to Seoul. However, after watching the fall of Vietnam, American rapprochement with a major enemy, and having to placate Congressional criticism in order to receive desired arms, Seoul began to look elsewhere in the international arms business. Though no substantial deals were made, Seoul made it clear to Washington that it was willing and capable to go elsewhere if the United States would not fulfill its perceived basic requirements.

North Korea, on the other hand, fluctuated between being able to diversify and finding only one willing supplier. It is important to note that even though the Soviet Union renewed military assistance after the demise of Khrushchev, Kim was not willing to allow the Soviets to exert undue influence or pressure. Of equal significance was the shifting in 1972 from the Soviets to Chinese as the major supplier of arms to North Korea. Not only was there a shift to China as a primary arms provider, but also in the area of crude oil and other petroleum products essential to North Korea's industrialization.

I. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

During the period of and immediately following the Vietnam War, there was a significant influx of new technology to both Koreas. In some cases, it was simply a case of replacing an obsolete system with a more current one. In other cases, such as the importation of high technology aircraft (F-4Ds,

SU-7s, Romeo class submarines, etc.) there developed a mini-arms race. When one side obtained a specific system that was perceived as tipping the military balance, pressure was placed on that side's supplier to provide an equalizer (or better system. One student of Korean affairs feels that "United States military aid to South Korea has been geared to the relative Soviet and Chinese aid policies to North Korea."¹⁴¹ If that were the case, the goals established for the South Korean FIP were based on an out-dated evaluation of North Korean capabilities held at the end of the 1960s.

J. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-SUPPLIERS

In terms of the entire Far East, U.S. security strategy in the beginning of the Kennedy administration was based primarily on counterinsurgency. By the late 1960s, however, the major threat was perceived to be external rather than internal. The events beginning in 1968 played a large part in shattering the internal threat perception. First, the 1968 Tet offensive forced U.S. leaders to reappraise the U.S. role in Vietnam; secondly, the increased violence in the Korean peninsula culminating in the Pueblo incident resulted in a reassessment of who really was the threat on the peninsula - the finger had to be pointed at North Korea; third, and probably the most important event, was the armed border clashes between China and the Soviet Union. This third event finally

made clear the fact that the United States did not face a combined Sino-Soviet conspiracy in Asia, but rather a separate and different type threat from each. The Nixon strategy for U.S. security in the Far East discarded the Kennedy-Johnson policy of committing U.S. troops to counter the internal threat. Calling the previous strategy unworkable, the new Guam Doctrine advocated an Asian self-defense concept. Asian allies were to be provided the means (military and economic aid) and the ways (new arms imports and modernization programs) to defend against small neighbor aggression. The U.S. would counter the super-power threat vis a vis negotiation, detente, and mutual deterrence. Detente was the strategy with the Soviets, normalization with the Chinese. The foundation of this new policy could be labeled a Bismarckian balance of power.

A basic theme of American defense and foreign policy under the Nixon and Ford Administrations had stressed the importance of maintaining a "worldwide military equilibrium." In his FY 1975 annual report, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated,

"The United States today...bears the principal burden of maintaining the worldwide military equilibrium which is the foundation for the security and survival of the free world."¹⁴²

That commitment to the goal of maintaining a worldwide military equilibrium, combined with the demise of the Thieu and Lon

Nol governments, led policy makers to emphasize a "single short-run goal."¹⁴³ That goal was to demonstrate continued American interest in Asia by maintaining the current troop level in South Korea and providing adequate arms for allies. In applying this policy toward South Korea then, it becomes clear that the real purpose of maintaining troops in Korea is fundamentally political, and not military.

The 1972 Nixon visit to the People's Republic of China rounded out the President's strategic design in Asia. By removing a major war contingency in East Asia, Nixon was thus able to replace the 2 1/2 war strategic concept with a 1 1/2 war concept that is still in effect as of this writing. Inherent with this strategic concept was limited redeployment of some units and a reduction in the number of active duty Army divisions by 3 1/3. One of those divisions earmarked for redeployment was the 7th Infantry Division in Korea.¹⁴⁴

How did this changed United States security strategy affect South Korean arms imports and military aid? From the viewpoint of the South Korean military, the change resulted in South Korean high technology weapons requests seriously considered and often fulfilled. A case in point was the import of F-4 and F-5 fighter aircraft, Honest John SSMs, and the loan of two destroyers; all delivered shortly after the Guam Doctrine announcement. These arms imports greatly enhanced South Korean defensive capabilities.

Furthermore, the American MAP and FMS programs were to serve as the primary instruments in the implementation of Nixon's doctrine. As seen in the past, a shift in U.S. security strategy resulted in a change in military assistance programs.

With the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, Soviet military and political leaders discarded Khrushchev's theory of mutual deterrence based upon a one weapon concept. Soviet security interests were better served in countering the new U.S. "flexible response" concept advocated by the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. The Soviet perceived threat in the Far East included enhanced American influence in Southeast Asia and enhanced Chinese influence in the whole of Asia. Subsequently, Soviet arms exports were utilized to improve the Russian image in Southeast Asia, specifically in North Vietnam, thereby diminishing both American and Chinese influence levels.

The Russian success in this effort can be attributed to arms exports and two other factors largely beyond their control. First, the increased American involvement in Vietnam was considered a security threat in both North Vietnam and North Korea. The Soviets were the only suppliers capable of providing sufficient arms to block a U.S.-South Vietnamese victory. Secondly, China's Cultural Revolution resulted in reduced relations with both North Korea and North Vietnam.

Renewing the relationship with North Korea offered the Soviets the opportunity to counter Chinese influence in

Northeast Asia. With the United States bogged down in Southeast Asia, the Soviets were able to place more emphasis on its "Chinese problem". As the Sino-Soviet "cold war" turned into a "hot war", Soviet security interests obviously shifted to its border with China. Because the cultivation of North Korea as a buffer state was of strategic importance to the Soviets, the massive military aid and arms imports to Pyongyang during the period 1965-1971 provided the Soviets the catalyst for improvement of relations and the added insurance of future arms dependency of Soviet not Chinese equipment.

This massive military aid provided North Korea was expected to yield a tilt toward the Soviet view in the Sino-Soviet conflict. However, as noted earlier, Soviet image in North Korea was insufficient to significantly affect North Korean - Chinese relations. Beginning in 1968, and particularly after the 1972 Nixon visit to China, Soviet threat perception in the Far East focused on the People's Republic of China first and the United States second. Arms transfers and military aid to North Korea after 1968 was as much a function of countering a renewed Chinese interest in the peninsula as the fulfillment of defense commitments.

Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution had resulted in near total international isolation for China. External security interests were secondary to the purge of "revisionism" within. After the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam showed the inadequacy of American tactics, Peking realized the United States most

likely would not invade China proper. Subsequently, Mao sent out "feelers" to the U.S. hinting of a willingness to lessen tensions and negotiate toward future normalization. After the United States announced its intention of phased withdrawal from Vietnam, China turned her attention to the north and the Russians.

Essentially friendless in Asia due in large part to the adverse reaction to the events of the Cultural Revolution, China embarked on a program in 1969 to regain influence and friendly relations with its Socialist neighbors. The end of the Cultural Revolution allowed China's foreign envoy Chou En-lai to begin fence mending. One of the first fences to be worked on was the one between China and North Korea. For centuries the Korean peninsula had been an integral part of China's buffer defense system. It was logical that North Korea was one of the first states to receive renewed Chinese interest. Promises of Chinese military and economic aid were utilized as tokens of good will not only to reopen North Korean doors but also to test Pyongyang to determine the level of Soviet influence and their stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, the same carrot the Soviets used to open North Korean doors earlier, i.e., massive military and economic assistance, was realistically beyond the means of the Chinese at this time.

The early 1970s saw a development of a quasi-detente between the two adversaries. Even so, their number one

perceived threat in Asia remained each other. How did this mutual threat perception affect arms transfers to North Korea? Both utilized arms transfers, military and economic aid in the same manner and for the same purpose - enhanced influence. It follows then that when North Korea began leaning toward China in the early 1970s China was in fact furnishing the majority of security assistance. Arms transfers to North Korea was directly proportional to the leanings of Pyongyang in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

K. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-RECIPIENTS

For perhaps the first time since the Korean War, North Korea began to take a serious look at South Korean threat factors. Prior to 1965, the only serious threat to North Korea came from continued United States presence. However, after 1965 a number of factors, all relating to the phenomena of arms transfers, turned North Korean attention to its southern neighbor. First, the successful completion of South Korea's First Five-Year Economic Plan of 1962-1966 and even more spectacular Second Five-Year Economic Plan of 1966-1971 showed South Korea moving closer to the threshold of economic self-reliance. Much of this success had come as a result of South Korean participation in the Vietnam War. Due to the quid pro quo deal with the United States, South Korea received nearly all its armed forces modernization funding

from the United States, enabling her to redirect budget funding toward non-military industrial development. Another off-shoot of South Korean involvement in Vietnam was the huge influx of dollars poured into South Korea from export earnings to South Vietnam and U.S. paid wage supplements to Vietnam based South Korean soldiers. Secondly, South Korea received a significant amount of high technology arms imports between 1965 and 1972, most significantly the F-4 and F-5 fighter aircraft. Finally, the large influx of conventional ground weapons (M-48 tanks, howitzers, and Honest John SSMs) to the ROK Army, during and following the withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division, gave South Korea an impressive ground offensive capability. The withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division did not bely North Korean apprehensions concerning a continued American presence in South Korea; still present were the 2nd Division and two USAF fighter wings.

On the other hand, the massive infusion of Soviet arms to North Korea beginning in 1965, coupled with the dramatic use of North Korean guerrilla raids, the armed clashes along the DMZ, and the 1968 commando raid on the "Blue House" obviously did nothing to bely South Korean fears of an impending North Korean attack. Of even more significance, North Korea's armed forces had been expanding at a much faster rate than South Korea's. By 1971, North Korean defense expenditures of \$911 million was nearly three times the South Korean expenditure of \$394 million. The application

of the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea also initially disturbed the South Korean government. To them the "North Korean armed threat, backed by China and the USSR, was real."¹⁴⁵

It could be said the events of the period proved out President Park's contention that North Korea could not be trusted. Though realizing that North Korea no longer possessed the absolute support of either China or the Soviet Union, South Korea was still militarily inferior to the North. However, the presence of U.S. troops, a stated United States commitment to employ nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion from the North, and a sound economy had to lessen Park's apprehensions toward the North. Because of events in the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Park had initiated a five-year Armed Forces Modernization and Improvement Plan. Twenty-five per cent was covered by U.S. grant aid (MAP) and the other seventy-five per cent by military sales credits (FMS). By the end of 1976, that program was progressing well. South Korea was moving toward self-sufficiency in all aspects; its economy was strong, its military was steadily improving, and the political apparatus was securely in power.

As 1976 drew to a close, Pyongyang saw its policy options severely limited. It was clear that neither the Soviets or Chinese would provide support or help in the cause for armed reunification. Any military act would have to be viewed as unilateral. With both its suppliers pursuing better relations with its primary enemy, North Korean defense planners

had to perceive the military equation as not being in their favor. More arms imports would hardly make any difference. The massive demonstration of American military response after the axe-murders in Panmunjom showed Kim the U.S. fully intended to honor its defense commitment to South Korea.

FOOTNOTES

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14. Suh Dae-Sook, "Political Leadership of Kim Il-Sung", Triangular Relations of Mainland China, The Soviet Union, and North Korea, (Seoul: Asiatic Reserach Center, 1977), pp. 201-202.
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p. 1021. For a listing of terrorist groups the DPRK has assisted see U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), "Translations on North Korea," no. 631, (November 20, 1978), pp. 1-3. The KDPR trained between 1966 and 1971 more than 1,300 Latin-American and about 700 Asian guerrillas. In the period 1971-77, the KDPR unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow, through its various supported guerrilla units, the Mexican, Argentine, Paraguay, and Sri Lanka governments. The Economy of the KDPR, pp. 78-79. In more recent years, North Korea seems to have abandoned this policy in favor of trying to gain world-wide diplomatic recognition.

16. Koh, pp. 146-147.

17. Ibid., p. 147.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 148; also see World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook 1972, (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1972), p. 269.

20. Sang-Woo Rhee, "North Korea's Military Capabilities and Its Strategy Toward South Korea, Triangular Relations of Mainland China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, 1977), p. 264.

21. Cooper, p. 27.

22. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 91st Cong., 1971, p. 1566.

23. Ibid., pp. 1542-1543.

24. Ibid., p. 1569.

25. Ibid., p. 1618. In 1960 the U.S. advisory team in South Korea decided that there were certain consumables made in Korea that were purchased out of MAP funds that could and should have been purchased by the ROK using funds from their own budget. Therefore, this team made a 10-year schedule to transfer all these consumables gradually to the won budget from the MAP budget and leave the MAP dollars for modernization and investment. This program was called MAP transfer.

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IV. THE NORTH KOREA FACTOR IN THE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have shifted often as Kim Il-sung has leaned one way and then toward the other in order to assert his independence and secondly, to gain or maintain support for his unification policies and goals. In recent years, Kim has been less successful in that second objective. Moscow has not accorded Korean affairs a high priority nor has Peking been willing to give unquestioned support. Of even more importance to Kim's unification goal is the viability of South Korea, both economically and militarily. Nevertheless, Kim does enjoy some advantage in his relationship with the Soviet Union and China.

"If the Sino-Soviet conflict has dispelled any lingering doubts about Peking's emergence as a power in its own right, it has also provided Pyongyang with an opportunity to assert autonomy. Its oscillating posture toward the two feuding Communist powers over the years is symptomatic of the degree to which the small country has succeeded in neutralizing and, in effect, exploiting the considerable political, economic, and military leverages of both Moscow and Peking over Pyongyang."¹

When considering the Korean factor in the Sino-Soviet dispute, one must analyze how North Korea has dealt with the situation. Though the United States, Japan, and South Korea play key roles in any peninsula interaction, North Korea has been and continues to be a significant actor in the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute. It is necessary then to examine how

North Korea has reacted to specific issues and events in Sino-Soviet relations from the late 1950's through 1979.

The 38th parallel, planned as a temporary boundary pending a four-power trusteeship agreement, soon developed into a dangerous and heavily armed frontier. The 1950-1953 Korean War resulted in United Nation, Chinese, and of course, Korean military forces maneuvering north and south of this frontier zone. The Military Demarcation Line (MDL), lying slightly north of the 38th parallel and agreed upon by the Korean Armistice on 27 July, 1953 denoted the second re-partitioning of Korea. This MDL has since become a heavily fortified, institutionalized border. It has also become the de facto boundary between the Communist and non-Communist worlds in Northeast Asia.

Four major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan converge on the Korean peninsula, largely due to their developed post-Korean War alliance systems. The noted Asian historian, Harold C. Hinton has written:

"Korea is involved, in various ways, in two armed confrontations, one of which has led to war in the past and the other of which could lead to war in the future."²

The former conflict was, of course, the one between the two Koreas. The latter conflict referred to above involves the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China or in a better

known term, the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus, it is understandable why these major powers remain interested in, for their own reasons, the situation on the peninsula.

On the surface, the Sino-Soviet dispute may be seen as a contest for influence between the two major powers with the lesser neighboring states eventually drawn in and required to take sides. This fact is essentially true but for one socialist state in North East Asia - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Initially, the Sino-Soviet dispute posed a dilemma for North Korea and its leader Kim Il-Sung. On the one hand, Kim was often confronted with pressure to side with one of the antagonists; on the other, he could not afford economically or militarily to alienate either China or the Soviet Union. However, over the years, Kim Il-Sung has become adroit in utilizing the dispute to his advantage. He has been able to force both Moscow and Peking to court his support in their ideological and political battles.

It is quite safe to state that the major powers presently share the hope of no future war in the Korean peninsula. Because of this desire, each of the four major powers in the region prefers a status quo to any form of reunification that could cause instability. Additionally, each of these major powers seems to perceive only north Korea as the major threat to the status quo and stability.³

The eight major sections of this chapter are arranged chronologically, corresponding to North Korea's interaction with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The first section covers the period from WWII to 1957. The section essentially gives a brief background of the Sino-Soviet split. Section one explains how much and why the PRC increased its influence over North Korea.

Section two examines the beginnings of the dispute and how Pyongyang attempted to maintain a neutral stance between the two protagonists. Section three examines why Pyongyang began tilting toward Peking beginning in 1962. Section four explains the shift back to Moscow during the Cultural Revolution.

The fifth section brings the reader up to date with Pyongyang firmly in the Peking camp. This section examines the motivations and reasons why Moscow fell from Pyongyang's favor. Sections six and seven look at current issues and problems facing first the North Korean-Soviet relationship and then the North Korean-Chinese relationship.

Finally, section eight presents some conclusions and forecasts based on the interactions, issues, and problems discussed in the previous sections.

A. BACKGROUND 1945-1957

It appears fairly certain that North Korea was fast-becoming or had already attained the status of a Soviet

satellite prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1950. Soviet advisors, officers, and technicians were positioned in all levels of the North Korean government and economy. North Korea was the first large-scale experiment in the application of Soviet techniques of control and organization to a Far Eastern agrarian, familial society.⁴

North Korean Communists were required to adhere to three implicit "articles of faith": (1) the Soviet Union was the superior country and was the only source for any socialist wisdom; (2) the Soviet model was the only way to achieve human progress; and (3) the Soviet Union held the right to determine the course of North Korea's foreign affairs. The Soviets also attempted to Sovietize the people of North Korea via cultural infiltration and economic integration.⁵

To develop their economy, the North Koreans turned to the Soviets for help. A formal economic and cultural cooperation agreement was signed in March, 1949. By 1950, over seventy-five percent of North Korea's total foreign trade was with the Soviet Union, with a third of this trade in arms purchases. Because of Soviet advisors orienting developing North Korean heavy industry toward "meeting Soviet needs" and the extremely unfavorable terms of trade imposed by the Soviets, North Korea found herself quickly being absorbed into the Soviet economic system.⁶

Though Soviet occupation troops were finally withdrawn from North Korea in 1948, the Soviets maintained control within North Korea via advisors in the military, government, and ruling Korean Worker's Party. After the withdrawal, the North Koreans were provided by the USSR with large deliveries of tanks, trucks, artillery, and planes with an estimated aid value of \$56 million.⁷

The outbreak of the Korean War with the subsequent infusion of 2.5 million "Chinese People's Volunteers" into the conflict marked the end of sole Soviet dominance and influence in North Korean affairs. This massive intervention of "Chinese Volunteers" undoubtedly saved North Korea from total defeat and the North Koreans, particularly Kim Il-Sung, were impressed and gratified by this Chinese assistance. Though there were some problems in the relationship of some Korean officers subordinated to Chinese commanders,⁸ the two nations established, in the words of Jen-min Jih - pao, the CCP official voice, "an unbreakable, militant friendship" that was "cemented by blood."⁹

The Soviet Union's esteem, however, suffered greatly in the eyes of both the North Koreans and the Chinese. A fact not lost on the North Koreans was that it was Chinese, not Russians, who provided the crucial aid (fighting soldiers) which precluded the extinction of the North Korean state. Never again

would the Soviets be able to exert the level of influence over Pyongyang that it had prior to the end of the Korean War. North Korea's exclusive military and economic dependence upon Moscow dissolved after the war, with the People's Republic of China surfacing as the Soviet's primary rival in influencing North Korea.

China's primary motive in involving itself in the Korean War and its subsequent post war aid to North Korea was to protect its own security by continuing the North Korean buffer against United States' "imperialistic aims." It appears that Peking's major strategy was to cultivate long-term goodwill with North Korea rather than attempt to attain dominating control over North Korean affairs. Regardless of this strategy, Soviet primacy of influence, though weakened, was maintained until 1958 when Pyongyang began to show more interest in the Chinese model rather than the Russian's.¹⁰

Increased Chinese influence did not result in increased influence for pro-Chinese KWP leaders after the war. Both the pro-Soviet leaders and the Yen-an group suffered extensive purges led by Kim Il-Sung with the Yen-an group suffering most. A look at the KWP Central Committee membership showed that in 1956, of 71 members, 65% were pro-Soviet, 21% pro-Chinese, with the remaining 14% neutral. The Standing Committee was composed of eleven members, eight pro-Soviet and three pro-

Chinese.¹¹ Clearly, the Soviets retained the primacy of influence. Soviet influence was most evident in the North Korean army, where organization, training, discipline, and equipment were all based on the Soviet model.

The three year war had not only destroyed an embryonic North Korean industrial base, it caused the North to rely even more heavily than before the war on economic and military aid from the socialist bloc. The economic and military assistance provided primarily from the Soviet Union and China enabled the North Korean government to lay the foundation for peaceful economic development. Significant economic gains offered Kim Il-Sung the opportunity to begin establishing more "self-reliance" or chuch'e. In 1955, Kim stressed the need for "firmly established chuch'e and stated:

"Although certain people say that the Soviet way is best or that the Chinese way is best, have we not now reached the point where we can construct our own way?"¹²

Five major factors were accountable for an increased emphasis of chuch'e: (1) memories of the war; (2) Kim's post-war political consolidation; (3) impressive economic headway; (4) the possibility that Soviet and Chinese influence levels on North Korea affairs had reached a state of equilibrium; and (5) the growing dispute between Moscow and Peking.¹³

This steadily growing dispute between North Korea's two neighbors placed the leadership in Pyongyang in a serious

dilemma. The "cult of personality" attack on Stalin by Khrushchev adversely reflected on both Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung. Soviet co-existence policies toward the West, especially toward Pyongyang's number one enemy, the United States, ran counter to stated North Korean foreign policy guidelines. There now existed a fundamental question as to who had the right to claim socialist camp leadership, Moscow or Peking? Finally, what was the right model to follow when attempting to build a true socialist and communistic state?

The Sino-Soviet dispute on the above issues would often force Pyongyang to choose sides at a time when she could least afford to alienate either. Continued support from both the Soviet Union and China was required to further North Korea's military, industrial, and scientific potential. Kim thus embarked on a policy of avoiding total alignment which in essence meant maintaining good relations with both. Though Kim was partially successful because North Korea achieved limited independence, the Sino-Soviet dispute also required Kim to serve two masters.

B. NORTH KOREA IN THE GROWING SINO-SOVIET CLEAVAGE 1958-1961

Both sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict refrained from making direct verbal attacks at each other through the years

1959. Three important events dominated these years:

emergence of Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and "people's com-

mune" programs, the Chinese refutation of Khrushchev's strategy for "peaceful coexistence", and the American deployment of tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea. The three Chinese actions posed a threat to Moscow's traditional position as leader and determiner of Communist bloc doctrine. Because Kim's priority lay in the rapid development of the North's economy, he knew this development would depend a great deal on the amount of aid, particularly military aid, offered by the two protagonists. Therefore, irrespective of how much Pyongyang desired and stressed chuch'e, or a self-reliant economy, she also needed to remain neutral in the developing stages of the Sino-Soviet split.

Though Kim Il-Sung was primarily concerned with his Five Year Economic Plan (1957-1961), he was also faced with the desire to maintain a more aggressive ideological line. China and North Korea shared similar views on socialism. Both countries' leaders desired economic self-sufficiency; both believed the way to achieve it was thru labor-intensive policies. Thus, in the summer of 1958, North Korea moved to emulate the Chinese Great Leap Forward. Kim's program, called the Flying Horse Movement, ended like Mao's, a relative failure. North Koreans, in their deviation from the Soviet model, found themselves severely criticized by the Soviets.¹⁴ This criticism undoubtedly impressed Kim and other North Korean leaders of

the wisdom in maintaining a position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet argument over which path to socialism and Communism was the correct path.

Primarily due to Soviet and Chinese arms transfers violations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the United States had introduced tactical nuclear weapons systems into South Korea. Both North Korea and China attempted to persuade the Soviets to counter this move by also deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the North. When Moscow refused, Peking withdrew its Chinese People's Volunteers in October 1958. By not insisting upon a quid pro quo from the United States, i.e., that U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea at the same time, Peking gave up an important lever for promoting an American withdrawal. North Korean leaders were less than happy over this outcome. Peking's level of influence over Pyongyang was "obviously reduced by this performance."¹⁵

North Korean emulation of Chinese policies did not, however, carry over into the military or political arenas. More noteworthy is the fact that by the end of 1959, Kim Il-Sung had, through extensive purges of pro-Soviet and Yen-an faction party leaders, attained undisputed control over both the KWP and the government.¹⁶ Thereafter, neither Moscow nor Peking maintained within Pyongyang's Party and governmental structure a loyal faction which could be relied upon to support a pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese viewpoint.

When Khrushchev introduced his new foreign policy strategy of "peaceful coexistence" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), China did not comment. She was more involved in the de-Stalinization issue. However, in 1958 Peking publicly attacked Khrushchev's new policy. Pyongyang, on the other hand had been publicly supportive of the Moscow line since 1956; she even supported by favorable reporting Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1960. North Korea also supported Moscow's nuclear test ban and disarmament propositions to the United States.¹⁷

However, while Kim endorsed Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy, he was not willing to apply such a strategy to his relationship with either South Korea or the United States. In fact, increased hostile actions against the South was the main of Kim's unification policy. Pyongyang's non-adherence to Moscow's policy strategy apparently worried Soviet leaders.

"In October 1959, Khrushchev publicly cautioned the North Korean leaders against the use of force because 'the United States is not seeking a military conflict in Korea.'"¹⁸

North Korean leaders after 1959 began to view Khrushchev's strategy as unworkable and possibly detrimental to the North Korean goal of reunification. Even more noteworthy was the compatibility of views expressed by the Chinese concerning problems of great interest to the North Koreans. While the

Chinese were essentially attacking American presence in Taiwan, the polemics were also ascribable to the United States' presence in South Korea. This American presence blocked unification desires of both Mao and Kim.

Pyongyang's full support for the Chinese actions in the Sino-Indian border conflict reflected an undeniable divergence from Moscow's line on neutrality. The neutral stance of the Soviets on the Sino-Indian border dispute revealed to the world that all was not well between Moscow and Peking. The June 1960 Bucharest Conference confirmed the fact that indeed relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were severely strained. The conference revealed an ever widening gulf between ideological and world movement strategy. Khrushchev continued to emphasize peaceful competition, while China's representative P'eng Chen called for more militancy. Though the Soviet attacks on the Chinese line displeased the North Koreans, Pyongyang essentially remained neutral, resulting in a position reflecting sympathy toward both factions.¹⁹

Throughout the summer after the Bucharest Conference, the angry denunciations directed at each other by the Communist giants were complimented by the continued desire of North Korea to remain neutral. However, both China and the Soviet Union began to woo Pyongyang with earnest in the expectation that North Korea would lend support in the upcoming Moscow Conference (November, 1960).

Beginning in October 1960, Peking exerted a number of pressures on Pyongyang. A loan of \$105 million and promises of military assistance, primarily in arms transfers, were coupled with public statements reminding North Korea of the close relationship established during the Korean War, primarily due to the infusion of the Chinese People's Volunteers.²⁰ This pressure coincided with Khrushchev's cancellation of a scheduled visit to Pyongyang. Though Moscow attempted to assuage Pyongyang's anger with a cancellation of a \$190 million North Korean debt, feelings in Pyongyang remained somewhat negative toward the Soviet Union.²¹

The Moscow Conference was perhaps the most important gathering of its kind in the history of the Communistic movement. The conference tended to confirm and even deepen the dispute between the two Communist powers. "Polycentrism" became a reality within the international Communist movement. Chinese pressures on North Korea paid off in that North Korea explicitly recognized Peking as a co-leader with Moscow. However, to retain his stance of neutrality, Kim publicly supported the majority of Soviet resolutions.²²

From the Moscow Conference to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU (November 1961), there existed a tug-of-war between Moscow and Peking for influence in Pyongyang. Both protagonists were willing to concede much in military and economic aid to gain support. Kim Il-Sung, desperately in need

of such assistance, utilized this opportunity to reap the advantages of being wooed by rival powers. North Korea was able to gain security treaties with Moscow (6 July 1961) and Peking (10 September 1961), important trade agreements with both, and substantial promises of military assistance. This period was one of great satisfaction for Kim Il-Sung. Through the security treaties, he obtained assurance of support in the event of war with the West (particularly the United States); and because of the economic and military assistance, his country was moving far ahead of his southern neighbor in strength, economically and militarily. Couple these factors with unrest and the two coups in South Korea, and North Korea's position looked very strong.

During the period 1958-1961, North Korea found itself caught in the battle for influence between the Soviet Union and China. Because of Kim's need for economic and military assistance, he found a neutral stance to be of great benefit. However, by the end of 1961, North Korea could not accept Moscow's ideological line or its strategy of world communist domination through peaceful means. Pyongyang began to lean toward Peking.

C. PYONGYANG IN THE PEKING CAMP 1962-1964

As the Sino-Soviet relationship worsened, North Korea's attempts to remain neutral were aggravated by five events or

issues in 1962. First, China, despite its own economic problems, was becoming an increasingly important supplier of goods, technology, and military material.²³ Secondly, Soviet economic and military assistance was not increased; arms transfers were, in fact, greatly decreased. This factor would have grave implications for the next 3-4 years on Kim's industrial programs. Kim's belief in chuch'e was also strengthened.

Third, on the issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute, Pyongyang gave full support to Peking's actions. Moreover, although Pyongyang attacked the Indians as the instigators of the dispute and supported Chinese defense against Indian "aggression", official statements intentionally omitted any mention of Soviet views.²⁴

The turning point in North Korean policy toward the Sino-Soviet dispute was Moscow's withdrawal of missiles from Cuba in October 1962. Pyongyang strongly echoed Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's "appeasement" policy toward the "imperialist" United States. The North Korean leadership considered the Cuban crisis as a surrender of socialism to imperialism. Additionally,

"Moscow's 'adventurism' and 'capitulationism' in the Cuban crisis may also have provoked the Pyongyang leadership to recall the bitter memory of the Korean War."²⁵

Kim could not forget that the Korean War was to a large

degree a Soviet sponsored 'adventure' which resulted in a 'capitulation' to the Americans when the Soviets pressured him into accepting the Armistice.

Finally, during the East European Communist Congresses held November and December 1962, North Korea began to attack indirectly the Soviet Union, utilizing essentially Chinese verbage. The Soviets, employing the Czechs and East Germans as their mouth pieces, attacked the North Koreans for supporting the Chinese position.²⁶ The Soviets began to punish North Korea for her verbal attacks by significantly decreasing economic aid and totally cutting off military aid. As a result, Kim Il-Sung re-emphasized chuch'e and revised his Seven-Year Economic Plan to strengthen the economy while maintaining a high level of defense expansion. Annual industrial growth rate significantly dropped from 21% (1957-1960) to 10.8% (between 1961-1963).²⁷ The severance of Soviet aid was to adversely affect North Korea's annual growth rate from 1962 to the present.

From 1963 until the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, Pyongyang mirrored the Chinese on all Sino-Soviet disputed issues. Pyongyang and Peking refused to abide or sign the 1963 Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Khrushchev personally was attacked in early 1964. As North Korean polemics echoed China's anti-Soviet pronouncements, Moscow began applying economic pressure. Not only was Soviet military aid

refused completely and economic aid drastically reduced, Moscow was also isolating North Korea economically from other socialist countries. Though China significantly increased economic aid and became North Korea's sole supplier of weapons, the important fact remained that China could not provide heavy machinery or factory equipment, items absolutely essential to Kim's Seven-Year Plan.²⁸

The Soviet boycott on North Korea, coupled with inadequate assistance from China, forced Kim Il-Sung to purchase needed heavy industrial equipment in a number of non-communist countries, including Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Austria. Equally noteworthy is the fact that North Korea did not have diplomatic relations with these countries.²⁹

There were eight basic factors that drew North Korea to the Chinese side. First, Pyongyang accepted Peking's hard line attitude toward America and found compatibility in each other's unification policies. Second, both North Korea and China were still in the formulative years of their evolution; both were still militant Stalinistic states. Third, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was an attack on Mao's and Kim's cult-of-personality. Fourth, both North Korea and China held similar views toward economic development; both stressed heavy industry and self-reliance.

Fifth, North Korea was angry over the limited Soviet aid, particularly military aid. Sixth, there was strong resentment in Pyongyang over Khrushchev's attempts to interfere in internal North Korean affairs. Seventh, North Koreans perceived Soviet insensitivity toward Asians, i.e., Soviet occupation behavior in North Korea after WWII and the lack of a troop commitment in the North Korean War. Lastly, there was the historically important cultural affinity between China and North Korea.

D. THE SHIFT BACK TO MOSCOW 1964-1969

By 1964, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang had deteriorated to its lowest level. However, after the fall of Khrushchev in October, the new leadership moved to reestablish friendlier relations with North Korea. Significantly, the desire to reestablish better relations was not a Soviet unilateral goal. North Korea also had reasons for reestablishing ties with Moscow.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin team desired to reassert Soviet influence over North Korea. They also were willing, apparently, to pay the price to bring a member of the Chinese camp back into the Soviet fold. The Soviets reinstated military assistance, increased significantly economic aid, and agreed to cease Soviet interference in North Korean internal affairs.³⁰

North Korea, meanwhile, had made a realistic assessment of its policy of supporting China in the Sino-Soviet split. Five factors were considered crucial. First, North Korea realized the Soviet and Eastern European "boycott" had had disastrous effects on its Seven-Year Plan and had strained its national defense capability. Secondly, South Korea was undergoing a military modernization program, largely assisted by United States aid. Third, Japan was reasserting itself, though only economically, on the Korean peninsula in South Korea.³¹ Fourth, the growing Chinese inflexibility on ideological issues and the accompanying uncompromising Chinese attitude toward "united action" against "international imperialism" was causing concern in Pyongyang. Largely due to Chinese inadequate technical assistance during the Soviet "boycott", North Korea had decided to do business with these "international imperialists". The decision to move away from Chinese dogmatism was considered in Pyongyang's best interests. Finally, once the Cultural Revolution gained momentum, Chinese criticism of North Korea, originating from the radicals in charge, proved very distasteful to Kim and his cohorts.³²

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU (March-April 1966) proved the turning point for Pyongyang-Moscow relations. Though the North Korean delegation did not talk about any controversial

Sino-Soviet disputed issues, they did praise the Soviet Union profusely. Brezhnev reciprocated with a speech supporting the North Korean's unification goals.³³

North Korea's changing attitude toward the Soviet Union, however, did not result in exchanging one friend for another. Rather, Kim Il-Sung's policy reflected a pragmatic assessment of what was best for North Korea. Kim insured his policy of neutrality with another purge of both Chinese and Soviet factions from the higher ranks within the KWP. Thus, neither Chinese or Russian oriented Korean Communists could manipulate against the Kim leadership. Kim's overall posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute remained "one of neutrality - not neutrality pure and simple but with a slight slant in favor of Moscow".³⁴


E. THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK TO PEKING 1969-1979

By 1969, the North Korean leadership once again felt the need to reassess its policies toward its Communist neighbors. Peking's policy was also changing. As the Cultural Revolution was ending, Chou En-lai was able to re-establish political relations with several countries. North Korea was one of the first to receive renewed Chinese attention. There were also indications that Soviet military and economic assistance was neither abundant nor always forthcoming as expected the past five years.

Nevertheless, five years of Soviet aid had resulted in an

improved military posture that lent Kim increased confidence to renew overt military actions against South Korean and American forces. The increasing involvement of the United States in Vietnam had resulted in increased counter-insurgency aid to South East Asia at the expense of military aid given to forward defense nations. South Korea, as pointed out in earlier chapters, was an exception. The United States was able to persuade the ROK Army to involve itself in Vietnam by promises of increased economic and military aid. When Kim Il-Sung pressured Moscow for more arms, it was provided, but with restraints. The Soviets refused to provide high technology weapons systems such as MiG-23s (which it provided to some Middle East nations), long range surface-to surface missiles or sophisticated air defense systems. The United States responded with similar restraint to high technology demands from the South Koreans. It is apparent that even today, both Moscow and Washington adhere to an unwritten agreement to control arms transfers in order to preclude a tip in the balance of power.³⁵

As Kim became more bellicose in subversive actions directed at the South, Moscow's endorsements of such actions were provided with less enthusiasm than he felt was warranted from a supporter. Relations slipped somewhat following the downing of an EC-121 U.S. intelligence aircraft in April



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

1969 when Moscow's endorsement of the attack came three days after the Chinese endorsement. A visit by Podgorny in May, probably designed to restrain North Korea's increasingly aggressive actions, did not please Kim Il-Sung. As a result, Kim refused to participate in the 1969 Moscow Conference.³⁶ The turning point in Sino-North Korean relations was most likely in October 1969 when President Choi Yong Kun of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly attended China's National Day celebrations and reportedly received Chinese concessions on the disputed Mt. Paektu territory as well as new trade arrangements. This event was soon followed by the visit of Chou En-lai to Pyongyang in April, the following year. As a result of this visit, relations were restored, trade contracts renewed, and promises of renewed military aid were made. The promises of military assistance (ships, fuel, and technical advisors) were made with the purpose of sounding out the North Koreans in terms of their relations with the Soviets and the North Korean stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute that had developed into armed clashes the previous year.³⁷

For reasons that need not be discussed in this paper, events in 1969 along the Sino-Soviet border had forced Peking to reevaluate its external priorities and to place the Sino-Soviet rivalry and confrontation at the top of its

lists. No longer was the United States China's foremost enemy and threat; the threat from the Soviet Union now far out-shadowed the perceived threat from either Japan or the United States. Since 1969, Peking had become apprehensive about further American withdrawals from Asia (less Vietnam and Taiwan). Therefore, it made sense to the Chinese to counter a growing Soviet threat with a continued strong American presence friendly to China.

In the early part of 1970, Chinese-North Korean relations received a boost when Pyongyang withdrew under protest from an international oceanographic project for the Sea of Japan, due to Soviet insistence on the inclusion of Japanese scientists. The Chinese took immediate advantage of this incident by energetically cultivating North Korean favor of Chinese actions.³⁸

However, the 1971 Sino-US rapprochement was to initially cause problems between Pyongyang and Peking. To assuage North Korean apprehensions, Peking sent a number of high-level delegations following the Kissinger-Nixon visits to China. Upon receiving considerable economic and military assistance promises from those delegations, Kim announced that the Sino-US rapprochement had little bearing on North Korean affairs.³⁹ Peking's task in wooing North Korea was made easier by Pyongyang's shift in stated policy toward reunification with the South. On July 4, 1972 the first joint

North-South Communique was issued declaring that both factions desired unification through peaceful means.

The Soviets played upon Kim's apprehensions about the Sino-US relationship by blasting the rapprochement and by providing additional economic and military aid. Moscow's attempt to gain influence met with limited success. Nevertheless, North Korean dependence on Soviet weapon technology was strengthened due to large influxes of missile systems, tanks, and missile-carrying patrol boats.⁴⁰ North Korea appeared to gain significantly from both Nixon visits to Peking and Moscow.

Because of mounting economic problems, largely due to high defense expenditures and increasing credit problems with the West and the Soviet Union, Pyongyang attempted to use the Sino-Soviet split to obtain as much economic and military assistance as possible. She was more successful with Peking than with Moscow. Peking began providing cheap oil to Pyongyang while the Soviets increased their prices. A pipeline linking China and North Korea was completed in 1976.⁴¹

Even more significant, South Korean officials in 1975 stated that there had occurred a drastic shift in arms supply to North Korea. In 1972, over 80% of military assistance had come from the Soviets. By 1975, over 50% of North Korea's

arms imports were provided by China.

Beginning in 1975, there evolved signs of increasing strain between Moscow and Pyongyang. Moscow's response to Pyongyang's economic problems has been unenthusiastic. North Korea has defaulted on over \$700 million worth of credits from the Soviets.⁴² Kremlin support of Kim Il-Sung's unification policies has also been less than enthusiastic; unification would have grave implications for Soviet policy-makers concerned with Europe. Kim, following a trip to China in 1975, failed to visit Moscow. Other indications of a chill in Soviet-North Korean relations included media from both sides down-playing or omitting anniversary occasions, Kim's efforts to join the so-called "non-aligned" bloc, Moscow's obvious avoidance toward any close identification with Kim's militant stance proclaimed during the 1975 China visit, and Moscow's invitation to South Korean sportsmen participating in the world amateur wrestling championships.⁴³

The August, 1976 axe murders of two U.S. Army officers at Panmunjom created an extremely unfavorable international image for North Korea. The action was embarrassing to both the Soviets and Chinese, who "conspicuously refrained from commenting on the incident". Washington hardened its commitment to South Korea by providing more military aid. Conversely, the incident underlined the explosive Korean situation and fueled US Congressional proponents of American

disengagement from Korea. Such a turn of events was not considered to be in the best interest of either Moscow or Peking. Nevertheless, friendly relations continued between North Korea and China and between North Korea and the Soviet Union. Particularly noteworthy was the automatic extension for five years of the North Korean-Soviet Mutual Security Treaty of 1961.⁴⁴

North Korean relations with Peking and Moscow reflected in 1977 the North's need for economic and military assistance. There apparently was a slight shift toward better relations with Moscow. Most likely, this movement is based on a real need for higher technology weapons and industrial equipment than was forthcoming from China.⁴⁵ Trade agreements were signed by North Korea with both powers during 1977. Of perhaps some significance, the Soviet trade delegation came to Pyongyang for the signing while the Chinese agreement was concluded in Peking.⁴⁶

The most important guest that Kim Il-Sung has received to date was Hua Kuo-feng in May, 1978. This was the first visit to North Korea by the leader of the People's Republic of China. No Soviet leader has yet visited Pyongyang. Accompanying Hua was his minister of economic relations; it can be assumed that continued Chinese economic and military aid and co-operation were discussed. This was undoubtedly good news for a debt-ridden and deficit-plagued North Korea.

Hua apparently felt that economic good-will from China would help assure Kim that the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan and the climaxing Sino-US normalization would not mean that he was left to fend for himself against Japan and the United States.

A significant trend was becoming discernible in the triangular relationship between Pyongyang, Peking and Moscow in 1978. The North Koreans were signaling a willingness to openly favor the Chinese on a range of issues, to include the Sino-Soviet conflict. The indicators go back to Hua's visit. While Hua was in Pyongyang, the DPRK media reported a PRC protest to the Soviets over a border incident; the Soviet reply was ignored.⁴⁷

Shortly following Hua's visit, the North Korean press attacked "dominationism", a code-word North Korea uses when referring to the Soviet Union. Previously, the North Koreans had not specifically linked "dominationism" to Soviet policy. However, following this reprinting of the bitterly worded anti-Soviet polemic by China's Defense Minister Hou Hsiang-chien, North Korea appeared more willing to criticize Soviet policy actions, particularly Soviet military activities in Africa.⁴⁸ Pyongyang has also criticized Cuba, who often acts as a surrogate for the Soviets criticizing China, and has openly acknowledged Sino-Albanian differences, explaining only China's viewpoint.⁴⁹

In September, Pyongyang was visited by high level delegations from both rivals. The Chinese delegation was led by then Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping. Deng's mission evidently was to soothe Kim's ruffled feathers over China's impending signature to the PFT with Japan.⁵⁰ Though Kim met with Teng, he snubbed the Soviet delegation.⁵¹ This coolness was largely due to Moscow's relative stinginess as far as further aid to North Korea was concerned.

During 1977-1978, Moscow had been unwilling to provide new aid commitments to North Korea. Most observers believed this refusal was due to Pyongyang's inability to make good in its outstanding Soviet debts. While Moscow acted stingy, Peking was being quite generous. One of the economic agreements promised was a cheap supply of Chinese oil at only half the price the Soviets were charging the Koreans.⁵²

The next month, when Deng agreed with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda that there was no danger of war on the Korean peninsula, it represented a total negation of Kim's previously stated contention that South Korea was undergoing "war preparations".⁵³ Although Kim was not receiving everything he desired, he must have realized total alienation by either Moscow or Peking would have severe adverse effects on his economy and defense status. Chinese willingness to provide economic and military assistance was no longer based on ideological grounds

or an "old friends" rationale. If one desired Chinese aid, he had to reciprocate in political and strategic support for China's desire to contain Soviet expansion.⁵⁴

Therefore, it is probable that during his May 1978 visit to North Korea, Hua may have intimated future Chinese action against Vietnam and attempted to line up support against probable criticism.⁵⁵ If this is true, Hua's strategy worked. The first official North Korean official to comment on the Sino-Vietnam War was Kim Yong-nam, chief of the KWP international department. Commenting to the Japanese Jiji press, Mr. Kim initially took a neutral position by stating that the border clash was regrettable in that both China and Vietnam were responsible for the conflict. However, Mr. Kim went further by indicating to Jiji that China counterattacked the Vietnamese invasion. This assertion, coupled with an earlier attack on the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia clearly placed Pyongyang's support behind Peking.⁵⁶ Furthermore, North Korea provided a temporary home for long time Peking friend, Prince Sihanouk.

When Washington and Peking announced their intentions to establish full diplomatic relations, Pyongyang radio on 22 December welcomed the decision calling the event "an irresistible trend of our time".⁵⁷ China rewarded North Korea's support by issuing an editorial in the People's Daily on 26 January 1979 calling Kim's proposals for reunification "rational, reasonable and practical".⁵⁸ The lack of

any monitored supporting comment from Moscow media underscored the chill prevalent in Soviet-North Korea relations.⁵⁹

Recent indications show that North Korea has modified its stance toward the Soviets.⁶⁰ The normalization of relations between Peking and Washington and the establishment of triangular ties among Washington, Tokyo, and Peking is not seen as favorable events by either North Korea or the Soviet Union. North Korean news media has yet to report the Japan-China peace treaty. This indicates, at least, that Pyongyang was more unhappy with that event than the Sino-American normalization. Some Korean experts put this absence of comment to a fear by Pyongyang that the new PFT would hinder or prohibit unification of the two Koreas.⁶¹

Perhaps more disconcerting than the PFT was to the North Koreans, was the nullification of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty. The problem for North Korea is that it has a military alliance with both Moscow and Peking. (Both these treaties were renewed in summer 1979.) Both treaties contain agreements that prohibit activities considered hostile by the co-signor. It is important to note that Moscow's Defense Treaty, specifically prohibits North Korea from entering any alliances hostile to the Soviet Union. The irony of this situation is that when both treaties were promulgated, they were directed against the United States, Japan, and South

Korea. However, the Sino-Soviet dispute has changed old threat perceptions and caused consternation in Pyongyang.⁶² Both Moscow and Peking regard their alliances with North Korea as deterrent in purpose. Usually, because they hope never to have to live up to them, their alliances are mentioned in public only on special occasions.⁶³

North Korea's tilt toward China, clearly evident by its support on three key issues in 1979, was modified enough not to antagonize the Soviets. Kim had learned a lesson from Vietnam by not choosing one communist big brother over the other. The Soviets have promised increased economic and military aid, to include advanced MiG-23 fighter aircraft. In return, the Soviets may be allowed to establish a naval base at Najin.⁶⁴ It is also worthy to note that unlike China, North Korea has not condemned the Soviet's Afghanistan invasion. Kim has neither supported nor condemned the Soviet act.⁶⁵

It is reasonable to assume then, that both the North Koreans and the Soviets are watching with considerable interest (and perhaps apprehension) the changes in Chinese foreign policy and its trends in domestic politics and economics. The Soviets have little choice but to wait and see whether future Chinese policy decisions will result in friction between Peking and Pyongyang and allow the Soviets to regain a measure of influence.

F. NORTH KOREAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

There are many issues and problems facing North Korean and Soviet policy-makers when considering their current relationship. However, there are some that may be identified as being more important than others. First, and perhaps most important to Soviet planners, North Korea has tilted decisively toward Peking since 1969. For reasons listed above, Peking has remained the favorite of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung.

Secondly, Moscow has been reluctant to give whole-hearted support to Kim's reunification strategy. Soviet media and leaders have not accorded Kim's policy a high priority. Moscow's reluctance can be understood more clearly when taking their European policy (two Germanies) into account. Reluctant Soviet support of Kim's policy had produced severe strain in the relationship.

Third, there has been a sharp contrast in content and tone between Soviet and North Korean commentaries on Korea. Moscow continually refers to the peoples of "both Korean states", while Peking and Pyongyang claim North Korea as the sole legitimate sovereign state. While Pyongyang refers to the need for "independent" reunification, Moscow invariably drops "independent", intimating its desire to participate in any future negotiations settling the Korean problem.⁶⁶

Fourth, Moscow has not denounced former Secretary Kissinger's call for a 4-Power conference to discuss problems.

Pyongyang rejects this proposal, calling for direct North Korean-United States negotiations. Moscow also continues to support the view that a North-South agreement is required as a first step toward solving the Korean problem. Pyongyang has vacillated on this view. Presently, she is participating in the preliminary talks with South Korea.

Fifth, the high debt (over \$700million) owed the Soviet Union represents at least one-third of the total \$2.1 billion foreign debt accumulated by North Korea. Soviet pressure to repay this debt would undoubtedly push Pyongyang further in the Chinese camp. Conversely, Soviet waiver of this debt could have positive results for North Korean-Soviet relations.

Sixth, Pyongyang remains heavily dependent upon Moscow for some of its oil requirements, modern combat aircraft, and air-defense systems. Though North Korea has achieved limited self-sufficiency, high technology systems are still beyond her capability. Moscow has been unwilling at least until this year, to provide more advanced aircraft, air-defense systems, or large SSMs. North Korea chafes at the fact that these systems have long since been provided to Syria, Libya, and Egypt, non-socialist states.

Seventh, Soviet detente with the West and Japan has been seen by Pyongyang as a dangerous trend for the Communist

world. On the other hand, still the most Stalinist nation in the world, Pyongyang is considered by Moscow as an unstable government.

Finally, even though the Soviets have publicly supported a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, privately, it is known that the Soviets consider an American presence more stabilizing. The Soviets, like the Chinese must be concerned with Kim's growing capability to undertake independent military action. Should Kim, through misperceptions of U.S. commitment, attempt to exploit a future withdrawal, the chance of Soviet and U.S. involvement is very high.

The above differences reflect a basic incompatibility of interests. Soviet leaders do not trust Kim Il-Sung, while the reverse is probably true. The Soviet Union does not see a unified Communist Korea under Kim Il-Sung in their best interest. The Soviet-North Korean relationship resembles

"more a marriage of convenience than a close alliance and it is beset with chronic strain and tension."⁶⁷

Presently, the best options for the Soviets to follow is to use its influence to preclude any North Korean military action against the South, do not unilaterally recognize South Korea, do not publicly advocate a two-Koreas solution, or lastly do not pressure North Korea to recognize South Korea.

G. NORTH KOREAN-CHINESE RELATIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Unlike the Soviet policy planners, the issues and prob-

lems facing Chinese planners are not as numerous nor as difficult. First, while Peking has been strongly vocal in its support for reunification, she has insisted in recent years that reunification be peaceful. Kim's stated policy has been reunification by any means, including armed force. Unification under any circumstances would be undesirable to Peking because of the risk to stability and its current level of influence.

Secondly, Peking's keen interest in a strong Japan has left not only Japanese Communists and leftists wondering but also leaders in Pyongyang. Kim must be aware that for China to woo the conservative Japanese businessman, Peking must assure them that their investments in South Korea will remain safe.

Finally, for the above reason and, of course, to offset Soviet power in Asia, Peking favors the maintenance of stability, i.e., the status quo, and continued U.S. troop presence. Like the Soviets, Chinese officials have also expressed their opposition to further U.S. military withdrawals from North East Asia. They fear the "vacuum" would be filled by the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

H. CONCLUSIONS AND FORECAST

North Korea, has been the exception rather than the rule when considering the dynamics and history of Asia since 1945. While most Asian Communist regimes and parties preserved relations with both Peking and Moscow without becoming excessively dependent upon either, North Korea seems to be always

caught in that web spun by the Sino-Soviet dispute. As long as the dispute continues, Pyongyang will have to pay the price for either tilting too far or for taking a neutral stance.

Kim's tactic of playing the Soviet Union off against China and vice-versa has kept him in a fairly strong position and has offered limited independence. On the other hand, he has learned through experience not to lean too far one way, thus precluding the chance of severing relations. Peking has recently indicated it is no longer willing to provide support solely on a ideological basis. Recipients of aid and assistance must support Peking's goals and strategy, including containing Soviet "hegemonism".

For Kim, this quid pro quo has meant open support of Peking's position on the Sino-Vietnam War, the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia, and most important, the Sino-Soviet dispute. It has also meant the improbability of receiving any large amounts of much sought after and needed advanced Soviet weapons systems. When Pyongyang determines that obtaining Soviet higher technology is in her best interests, a shift back to a neutral stance might not be enough for Moscow. The leaders in the Kremlin would most likely demand a total commitment.

Although the relations among the great powers, especially China and Russia, will hold an important place in the solution of the Korean problem the intra-relationship between the

Koreas will ultimately be decisive. An interesting question which can only be answered in the future asks would a Sino-Soviet rapprochement facilitate or hinder the prospects for a Korean settlement? This question most certainly supports the importance the Sino-Soviet dispute has meant in the past and will continue to mean in the future of the Korean peninsula.

FOOTNOTES

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V. THE CARTER YEARS

The 1976 United States Presidential campaign must have caused deep apprehension in Seoul. Its relationship with the United States Congress had undergone increasing strain the past 3-4 years, and now it was faced with a future President whose campaign platform included three issues deeping concerning the leadership in South Korea - a proposed withdrawal of American combat troops from Korea, an increased interest and concern for human rights violators and their relationship with the United States, and, a pledge to significantly reduce the export of American arms. When analyzing the effects American security assistance and arms transfers from 1977 has had on South Korea and the other actors involved in Korea, one sees that the Carter years have been characterized by a series of issues rather than a progression of understandings over time. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the above issues beginning with Mr. Carter's Withdrawal Plan.

A. THE WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL

By the time President Carter had taken office in January, 1977 all the major actors in the Korean peninsula were watching with great interest, and some with concern, as to how American policy in Northeast Asia would be changed and upon what values it would be based. The first major change in policy came with

the withdrawal announcement. Though there were powerful Senators and Congressmen of both parties strongly allied against the plan, Congressional reaction was for the most part supportive. Where the Carter administration's plan received the most criticism was in Northeast Asia, specifically in South Korea and Japan. In fairness to Mr. Carter, the scaling down of American forces in South Korea had been specifically written into the Democratic platform before he was nominated.¹ In fact, Congress had approved in 1974 a recommendation by the House Appropriations Committee that the 2nd Division be repositioned well to the rear of Seoul and converted into a genuine reserve force. This committee had further recommended that if the division was not so repositioned, it should be withdrawn entirely from South Korea beginning in 1976.²

Basically, President Carter had justified his withdrawal decision on two premises. First, he felt Korea would be sufficiently developed economically to defend itself at the end of the proposed withdrawal period, and secondly, the President and his advisors considered the political climate in Northeast Asia stable enough to facilitate the pull-out.³ However, Japanese and South Korean critics of the Carter plan pointed out that if South Korea was capable of defending itself because of recent economic successes, shouldn't the same apply to West Germany? By stressing the paramount importance of Western Europe and NATO to America's security, the President was insinuating to Asian allies that their

importance was secondary to Europe. South Korean and Japanese criticism also focused on the failure of the Carter Administration to obtain a quid pro quo from the Communist powers in return for the United States drawdown.⁴

Though both South Korea and Japan agreed that the withdrawal was not in their best interests, their reasons varied somewhat. For South Korea, there were essentially five reasons why the withdrawal of United States ground forces threatened the security and stability of Northeast Asia.⁵ First, while the South Korean Army was capable of defending its country against a North Korean attack, it was certainly not capable of deterring such an attack. South Koreans firmly believe in the "trip wire" theory. Secondly, South Korea feels that the Sino-Soviet dispute has provided Kim Il-Sung the latitude to take independent action if he so desires. This factor, coupled with Kim's unswerving 35 year goal for reunification on his terms, tempered by the knowledge that time is no longer on his side to see that goal reached, constitutes a grave danger to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Third, the withdrawal may result in pushing Japan toward a more neutralist stance or even accommodation with the Soviets for security reasons. A Soviet aligned and influenced Japan would possibly favor the North over the South in its economic and political dealings. Furthermore, a frightened Japan may take the course of rearming, resulting in increased

tension for all nations concerned. The Japanese militancy of the 1930s and 1940s has not yet been forgotten in Korea.

Fourth, the presence of United States forces in Korea is considered by Seoul as playing a key role in deterring both Soviet and Chinese pressures. Seoul feels that where the United States has maintained forward-deployed forces (Western Europe and Northeast Asia), the Soviets have displayed restraint and caution. Finally, a withdrawal may mark the beginning of the end of an American military presence in Asia. The apparent unwillingness of the American people, reflected in U.S. policy by their elected officials in Congress, toward any re-intervention militarily in Asia, has not been lost on American analysts in Korea.

Understandably angered over the lack of consultations before the decision was announced in March, Japan had to consider both the role the American presence played in deterring a renewed Korean conflict and the consequences of such a war to herself. On the first issue, Japanese officials made clear to visiting American officials that the troop presence served a function that neither South Korea nor Japan could replace. Tokyo believed that only the presence of American troops restrains Kim Il-Sung's willingness to attack South. Additionally, Japanese officials felt that South Korea could not be trusted not to attack the North, given the nature of the provocation from the North.⁶

On the second point, views diverged as to what effect renewed hostilities would have on Japan. Some felt Japan's security would be threatened by a Communist ruled, united Korea. Others considered that the Korean Straits provided enough of a buffer, providing the United States security commitment remained intact. Japanese officials were reluctant to openly criticize the Carter Administration for fear that Congress would call on Tokyo to assume a larger burden of its own defense or even increase its economic aid to South Korea.⁷

Even though most North Korean statements calling for an American troop withdrawal are commented on with approval by Chinese media, Peking inwardly worried that developments in Korea may have a harmful effect on the equilibrium of Northeast Asia. Since China's primary security concern is with the Soviet Union, any change in the status quo is evaluated against the advantages the Soviets may gain. Therefore, China feared a U.S. withdrawal would signal a reduction in the American commitment to Northeast Asia and enhance Soviet efforts to fill the vacuum.⁸

This paper will not dwell on the vast amounts of Congressional rhetoric concerning the pros and cons of President Carter's withdrawal plan.⁹ However, even though the President has suspended his plan until 1981, there is still the need to identify the major aspects of the plan with emphasis on how it fit into the scheme of military assistance and arms transfers to South Korea.

B. THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN¹⁰

In March, 1977, President Carter announced his intention to withdraw all 28,000 U.S. ground combat troops from Korea in 4 to 5 years. The first phase of withdrawal was scheduled for 1978. However, at the time of this paper, the withdrawal has been temporarily suspended with only 570 withdrawn.¹¹

The withdrawal was to consist of three phases. Each phase would include support troops and one brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division. Under the plan, all ground combat forces were to be withdrawn by 1981 or 1982. This phasing allowed the United States to reassess the situation throughout the withdrawal effort.

To compensate for the removal of the division from the U.S.-South Korean force structure, the following actions were to be taken:

1) Provide South Korea \$275 million in FMS credits in FY 1979 and a like amount for each of the next several years; these FY 1979 credits were to be used to continue programs already underway to improve firepower and mobility in the following manner:

a) \$35 million plus for improved anti-tank capabilities -- purchase of TOW missiles and kits to upgrade M-48 tanks;

b) \$52 million to improve air defense by purchasing HAWK missiles and additional AD command and control equipment;

c) \$125 million to procure F-4 and F-5 fighters, improved air munitions, and radar homing and warning systems;

d) \$30 million to improve mobility by purchasing C-130s and helicopters; and

e) \$20 million to purchase HARPOON missiles to counter North Korean ships and to interdict fast infiltration craft.

2) Provide to South Korea on a cost-free basis, selected items of equipment of the withdrawing forces, or equivalent items in some particular cases. Identified equipment slated for transfer included:

a) Upgraded M-48 tanks and TOWs; 12

b) Honest John SSMs and howitzers;

c) Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs);

d) Engineer combat construction equipment, trucks, and tactical raft sets;

e) Radars and target acquisition equipment; and

f) Communications and air traffic control equipment.

The estimated value of the above equipment is \$800 million.

3) To ensure the equipment to be transferred can be effectively used after the withdrawal, technical and operations training to the South Korean armed forces were to be accomplished via: on-the-job training supervised by U.S. personnel prior to their withdrawal, by assigning U.S. personnel to assist in instruction at Korean schools, and by sending South Korean students under the IMET program to the U.S.

The estimated cost was \$2.5 million of which \$2.0 million was to be covered under IMET funding and \$.5 million provided by the South Koreans under FMS procedures.

4) An increase in the USAF presence by adding 12 F-4s to the 60 already there.¹³

5) An increase of U.S. war reserve stocks worth \$90 million, for allied support for Korea.

By spring of 1978 President Carter was slowing down the withdrawal phasing. His excuse was that Congress had to approve his \$800 million in equipment and \$250 million in FMS credits promised to South Korea, or else a possible destabilization might occur. There was also the distinct possibility that the Koreagate scandals would be linked to further military aid funds requested for Korea.¹⁴ The stiff opposition from Congressional critics in the United States as well as from our East Asian allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, was also beginning to take its toll.¹⁵

In February, 1979 the President announced a temporary suspension of the plan, followed by a formal announcement in July that he would maintain the current strength level until at least 1981. There were a number of reasons for the change in Presidential policy. The official reason given was the increased North Korean personnel and tank strength provided showed in an updated intelligence estimate. This new estimate showed that between 1972 and 1977 the North Koreans had undergone a considerable reorganization of its

ground forces.¹⁶ Reasons of almost equal value for the suspension included growing Congressional criticism and hearings, enhanced allied apprehensions as to American credibility, the initiation of talks between North and South Korea, the normalization with China, the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the depose of the Shah of Iran. However, the growing awareness of the Soviet strategic challenge due to significant Soviet Pacific Fleet growth was perhaps, the key factor in Mr. Carter's decision.¹⁷

The reaction by both South Korea and Japan to the withdrawal suspension was predictably positive. Equally predictable was the North Korean negative reaction. Pyongyang called the United States' revised estimates of North Korean troop and tank strengths "lies" and countered with the statement that the North is "entirely devoted to peaceful construction."¹⁸ Pyongyang resumed its anti-American propaganda, calling Carter a hypocrite and accusing him of stepping up "war preparations against North Korea."¹⁹ What the North Koreans meant when they referred to "war preparations" is unclear; however, the large amount of aid that was being promised to South Korea in 1979 was indeed substantial.

C. CARTER ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL POLICY

When President Carter was candidate Carter he had promised, "If I become president, I will work...to reduce the commerce in weapons."²⁰ However, the amount of arms transferred to

South Korea the first three years of the Carter Administration has been more than any other previous administration had transferred during a like period. On 19 May 1977, Mr. Carter had proclaimed his new arms transfer and control policy. He directed that the export of weapons be used only as an exceptional tool of American foreign policy, that military aid and the transfer arms would be used only "to promote our security and security of our close friends." Less than a year later arms exports were being redefined as an important tool of American foreign policy.²¹

The Carter policy covering weapons exports was delineated in Presidential Decision 13 (PD-13), an outgrowth of Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 12 on the same subject.²² Mr. Carter's approach to weapons exports is keyed to three objectives: first, to decrease the volume of weapons exports below that exported in FY 1977 (To do so, Mr. Carter set a dollar ceiling on arms sales in FY 1978); secondly, to control what the United States sells, to whom, and for what purpose; and third, to try to convince other major arms suppliers (especially the Soviet Union) to follow the American example.²³

The implementation of the new Carter arms transfer policy was guided by six basic controls: first, the United States would not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly-developed advanced weapons which would create a significantly higher combat capability; second, the United States will not sell or permit coproduction of such weapons until they are

operationally deployed with U.S. forces; third, the United States will not allow development of advanced weapons solely for export; fourth, the coproduction by other countries of significant weapons, equipment, or major components will not be permitted; fifth, the transfer of U.S. weapons and equipment to third countries is prohibited without U.S. approval; and sixth, the promotion of sales of arms by either diplomatic or military officials is prohibited.²⁴

In addition to promulgating a new arms transfer policy, President Carter created the interagency Arms Export Control Board under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Mrs. Lucy Benson. This board with its working groups advise Mrs. Benson in her recommendations to the Secretary of State of major arms transfers and security assistance issues. Before any major arms sales is approved, Mrs. Benson's office reviews the request and coordinates any recommendations with concerned executive branch agencies and offices.²⁵

There are many loopholes in the Carter policy. Besides the weapons, equipment, and services sold through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in which the U.S. acts as a middleman between U.S. companies and the foreign buyers, there is a commercial sales channel. These commercial sales account for an additional 10 percent of arms exports not covered by the Carter policy even though they require State Department and Commerce Department approval.²⁶ The South Korean government

has in recent years increased its buys through this channel. Also not included in the Carter guidelines are services such as military construction, "non-weapons-related" advice, training, and like services. The President may also set aside any part of his policy if extraordinary circumstances arise or if he decides the sale is needed to maintain a regional balance.²⁷

In spite of President Carter's intentions to slow down United States arms exports, the opposite occurred. In November 1977 the Defense Department announced that sales ending for Fiscal Year 1977 (Sept 1977) totaled nearly \$11.4 billion, the highest annual arms sales in United States history to that date. This higher-than-expected total embarrassed the White House so much that Lt. General Howard Fish, the Pentagon's man in charge of arms sales, was relieved.²⁸ The following year another record was set with nearly \$13.6 billion sold or promised to foreign countries.²⁹ In Fiscal Year 1979, the total fell slightly to \$13.1 billion.³⁰ The Carter administration was finding itself forced to rely increasingly on the sales of sophisticated arms to back up foreign policy initiatives. As one expert put it:

"Carter was governor from Georgia who didn't think the whole thing out very far. He is just more realistic about it now."³¹

By looking at the transfers made to South Korea the past three years, it is plain the new Carter arms policy has had little if any adverse effect on Seoul's requests. When comparing the transfers made in 1977 (FY 78 figures) to those in

1978 and 1979 (FY 79-80) one can see there has been a substantial increase (See Tables 17 and 18) during the Carter Administration. South Korea, in FY 1978, was the United States' seventh largest FMS purchaser (\$390 million). The following year Korea jumped to fourth place (\$900 million), exceeded only by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.³² Projected sales to the South in FY 1980 rose to \$1700 million.

Carte blanche was not afforded to South Korea's desires for new technology armaments, however. Against the advice of both the Pentagon and the State Department, the President decided not to sell advanced F-16 and A-7 fighters.³³ The Carter Administration felt that an F-16/A-7 transfer to Korea would force the Soviets, under understandable North Korean pressure to introduce MiG-23s as a countermeasure.³⁴ However, with the recent reports that North Korean pilots have been undergoing extensive Mig-23 training in Libya and that the Soviets will provide two squadrons of the aircraft in the near future, Mr. Carter may be forced to review that decision.³⁵

Past American reluctance to supply modern weapons to South Korea was perhaps the driving force behind Seoul's desire to build their own defense industries. The initial 1971 Modernization Program was intended to replace worn-out equipment and to institute the needed defense industries. At the same time North Korea was stepping up its weapons production and procurement. By 1976, Seoul had realized a successor program was needed to keep pace with the North Koreans and to fill the void left by departing American combat troops.

Because United States security objectives were served by maintaining and improving the South Korean defensive capability to deter any attack from the North, United States efforts to assist in South Korea's Force Improvement Plan (FIP) made Korea its primary arms customer in East Asia.

D. SOUTH KOREAN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN (1977-81)³⁶

The South Korean government's Five Year Force Improvement Plan (FIP) called for the expenditure of \$5 billion by 1981, to include \$3.5 billion in foreign acquisition costs. The South Koreans have asked the United States for a modernization plan loan of about \$1.5 billion stretched out over the five year period. The Koreans will use a rough equivalent amount of its own funds for FMS cash purchases. However it needs the \$1.5 billion financing in order to procure sufficient arms and equipment to meet its modernization goals without adversely affecting its own economic progress. Much of the money for the industrial development comes from the 1976 18% defense tax.

The program concentrates on increasing the number of licensed production arrangements in Korea of American light weapons, acquiring advanced fighter aircraft (F-4, F-5), and the conversion to the Improved Hawk systems. Other acquisitions covered under the FIP include air traffic control and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) equipment, TOW anti-tank missiles, helicopter gunships, air-to-air missiles,

precision-guided munitions, air defense radars, and a tank-upgrading program (providing M48 tanks with larger guns).

South Korea is also purchasing through FMS financing artillery - locating radars, Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWAC), night vision devices, armored personnel carriers (APC), anti-ship missiles, short-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarine aircraft, search-and-rescue helicopters, trainer aircraft, communications equipment, and operational and maintenance items. Commercial purchases will include items such as spare parts and communications equipment.

Furthermore, more than a dozen new coastal patrol and interdiction craft (CPIC) and two minesweepers will be built in American shipyards. Air defense improvements included replacing aging Honest John and Sergeant missiles with new Lance missiles. Domestically built artillery and small arms will be used to improve South Korean ground forces.

Because of the vast amounts of equipment being transferred under this program, a Defense Field Office (DEFO) was established in 1978 to replace the current joint U.S. Assistance Advisory Group in South Korea. This DEFO manages the U.S./ROK security assistance program by monitoring the delivery of equipment and assisting its integration into the Korean defense structure.³⁷

In order to better understand how a sale agreement between South Korea and the United States is processed, a short explanation is in order. A request for U.S.-manufactured arms

or military equipment is generally channeled through the DEFO or the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C. to the United States State Department, or through military channels to the Department of Defense and then to the State Department. If Mrs. Benson's office, the Defense Department, and the Congress agree to the sale, the appropriate United States military service prepares a Letter of Offer (DD Form 1513) for the material requested. Upon acceptance of the LO by Korean authorities, it is returned to the issuing United States military service which in turn implements the contract in accordance with the same procedures that govern its own procurements. In the case of an arms transfer with a country other than America, South Korea usually utilizes its embassy to act as an intermediary.³⁸

While the South Korean economy continues to grow and expand, the burden of the 5-year Force Improvement Plan is seen as a possible inhibitor to growth. The policy of high growth rate coupled with increased defense expenditures and high inflation which South Korea has accepted since 1974 is beginning to take its toll.³⁹ The prospect of producing a range of equipment including newer versions of the U.S. M-48 tanks, 105mm and 155mm cannon, surface-to-surface missiles, and the complex Vulcan AA gun has given many South Korean businessmen reasons to worry. To make it worthwhile in a business sense, South Korea must look to exporting arms. The problem largely facing such a possibility are the

American patent holders who would see a South Korean arms industry an unwelcome competitor.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, South Korean businessmen have initiated a modest but growing export industry. The South Korean electronics industry has set an export target of \$5 billion by 1982. Recently, its shipping industry has sold four patrol boats to Indonesia, six interceptor crafts to India, and has had talks with Brazil and Africa on building warships. By the end of 1977, South Korea had exported over \$120 million in arms and equipment with \$110 million sold in 1977 alone.⁴¹ (See Table 14 for a comparison of North-South arms exports.)

Table 14

Comparison of North-South Export of Arms/Military Assistance

	<u>Item/Assistance</u>	<u>Exported To</u>
North Korea ₁	multiple rocket launchers, artillery	Pakistan
	multiple rocket launchers	Egypt
	infantry weapons	Zaire
	patrol/boats/advisors	Guyana
	MiG 21/23 (Soviet supplied)/flown and serviced by N. Koreans	Libya
	pilots supplied during 1973 war	Syria/Egypt
	various missions involving revolutions - training and advisors	various countries world
South Korea ₂	troops, F5s, equipment	South Vietnam
	4 patrol boats	Indonesia

6 interceptor crafts	India
electronic equipment	?
warships (talks concerning possible sales were held)	Brazil, Africa

Sources:

- ¹ Newsweek, (April 21, 1979), p. 23.
Newsweek, (July 9, 1979), p. 43.
FEER Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 211.
FBIS Trends, Korea, (February 15, 1979), pp. 11-12.
JPRS: 072860, (February 26, 1979), p. 15.
JPRS: 073512, (May 22, 1979), p. 13.
Francis J. Romance, DIA

- ² DMS 1979, South Korea Summary, pp. 6, 8-9.
International Defense Review, Vol 12 no. 2 (1979), p. 290.

Plans for a second FIP for the years 1982-86 is already in the planning stages. The projected cost of this plan has not yet been released. However, a major feature of this program will be the co-assembly of approximately 70 Northrup F-5 fighters and trainers.⁴² It is possible that much of this plan will take into account the recently released Pentagon Task Force Study of South Korea's defense capabilities. The study, initiated in 1977, recommended the sale of more than \$8 billion in arms to South Korea to compensate for the planned withdrawal. The study recommended, among others, that 239 jet fighters, more than 200 helicopters and observation planes, a large number of missiles, and six destroyers be sold to the Koreans. It further recommended U.S. assistance in the establishment of tank and helicopter production facilities.⁴³ It is not known whether President Carter has committed the United States to any of these recommendations.

When applying American arms transfers to South Korea to Mr. Carter's six basic controls, one sees that the guidelines have generally been followed. However, it is likely that in the not too distant future (perhaps 1981-82), South Korea will be co-producing fighter aircraft (the Northrup F-5E) with the United States. Most would have to agree that by any standards this is a 'sophisticated' weapon and would violate the guidelines set under Mr. Carter's fourth basic control. Another significant policy switch and a violation of his third basic control, came in January, 1980 when President Carter agreed to support efforts to build a new American fighter plane solely for export to replace aging F-5s in service in a variety of countries, to include South Korea. Officials said the main factor behind the Carter policy switch was the view that unless the United States built a new fighter to replace the aging F-5s, the countries holding those aircraft would turn to other sources.⁴⁴ This action by Mr. Carter also resulted in freeing American manufacturers to compete for billions of dollars of orders that have been off-limits for the first years of the Carter terms.⁴⁵

Mr. Carter's suspension of his withdrawal plan certainly improved the relationship, for during the first two and one half years of Mr. Carter's term in office, the climate between Seoul and Washington could not be described as overly warm. Marked differences in Mr. Carter's style, policy direction, and the level of emphasis on human rights had been interpreted by Seoul as serious trouble for the relationship.

E. KOREAGATE

During Mr. Carter's first year in office, the Korean lobbying scandal, known as "Koreagate," attracted a great deal of attention through the media and in Congress. Two investigations were conducted, one by the Justice Department and the other by the House Ethics Committee.⁴⁶ South Korea's initial refusal to comply with investigators produced a serious strain in the relationship between Seoul and Washington. Seoul's refusal to allow the return of Tong Sun Park, who investigators claimed was the central figure in an influence buying scheme among U.S. Congressmen and officials, resulted in the House Committee on International Relations refusing to move on Mr. Carter's proposed transfer of \$800 million of equipment to South Korea under the withdrawal compensation plan.⁴⁷

In October 1977, the House in a unanimous vote of 407 to 0 adopted a resolution demanding the full cooperation of the South Korean government in the investigation of the lobbying scandal.⁴⁸ Senator Byrd, Senate Majority Leader, also warned the Korean government that refusal to cooperate would cause a negative reaction in the United States that could harm future United States assistance to Korea.⁴⁹ Stunned by these and other threats that Congress would use every conceivable means to pressure Seoul, the South Korean government backed down from its earlier intransigence.

The Carter Administration attempted to facilitate its own investigators while also allowing the South Korean government to retain 'face' in the ensuing investigation. A deal was agreed upon whereby Washington would limit the Koreagate probe to United States involvement only, leaving both President Park and his government out of the influence-peddling charges. However, the Ethics Committee's chief investigator, Leon Jaworski, and some Congressmen were not willing to let up their pressure on Seoul to yield two diplomats, one of whom was the former ambassador to Washington.⁵⁰

Behind their persistence was the belief that if Congress continued its tough position, as it had earlier, President Park, faced with a choice of sending former ambassador Kim Dong Jo to testify, or a cut in U.S. military aid, would opt for the former.⁵¹ Events soon proved Mr. Jaworski and the Congress wrong in their assessment of Mr. Park. Not only was Park opposed to such a concession, the State Department was similarly adamant about not forcing a diplomat to testify before any foreign government. It is ironic that these same Congressmen who felt morally and legally right in pressuring the former Korean ambassador testify, vilify the Iranian militants who threaten to force our hostage diplomats to testify before trials in Tehran.

When the Washington Post and New York Times reported that the United States had first learned of the influence lobbying through electronic eavesdropping of President Park's

Blue House, the Korean government's reaction was one of subdued anger. Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told the Times that he had warned the State Department as early as 1970 of a covert South Korean lobby effort. He also asserted that this Korean effort was aimed at undermining the Nixon decision to withdraw the 7th Division from South Korea. Mr. Laird reported that the bugging had occurred between 1967 and 1971, when South Korea had nearly 52,000 of its own troops in Vietnam. The State Department apparently was not eager to investigate the Korean lobby "lest it lead to complications in the war effort." Mr. Laird also stated that he warned the South Koreans personally that their illegal activities were jeopardizing the American plan to spend nearly \$1.5 billion to help the 5-Year Modernization Plan initiated in 1971.⁵² Nevertheless, the aid was forthcoming and the influence buying continued.

On 22 June, 1978 Congress finally got tough with Seoul in a tangible manner. To show its displeasure over Seoul's refusal to provide Kim Dong Jo for testimony, \$56 million in food aid was cut off. This action resulted in Kim resigning as President Park's International Affairs Advisor, but it also extinguished the last flicker of hope that he or the South Korean government would cooperate any further with the investigation.⁵³

Shortly after the above amendment was adopted, Representative Burton, of California, offered another amendment to cut

off the entire military assistance program for South Korea. However, this time Congress overwhelmingly defeated the proposal by a 2-1 margin. Representative Stephen Solarz, of New York, reflected the majority vote when he stated before a House Subcommittee:

"...the overwhelming majority of Members of the House on a matter involving the national interest and security recognized that if we were to cut off all aid to South Korea, simply because of the Koreagate scandal, we would be cutting off our nose in spite of our face." 54

The so-called "Koreagate" scandal ended essentially in August 1979 when the Justice Department dropped all charges of illegal lobbying against Tong Sun Park. Besides punishing few of those in Congress who were implicated, the investigation failed to prevent Seoul from achieving the ultimate goal the lobbying effort was intended for: to insure the continuance of the large amounts of American military and economic aid.⁵⁵ Not only was South Korea receiving more and better military equipment than in the past, but President Carter had also placed a freeze on his withdrawal program.

F. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS LINKAGE TO ARMS TRANSFERS

Though the Koreagate issue had terminated, Mr. Carter's interjection of "human rights" considerations into United States foreign policy has continued. To complement Mr. Carter's moralistic foreign policy is the 1976 Arms Export Control Act previously mentioned in this paper. The portion of the Act

concerned primarily with the issue of human rights is contained in Section 301(a) which revised Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.⁵⁶ This section defines United States policy as being that,

"no security assistance may be provided to any country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."⁵⁷

The Section further directs that the Secretary of State must send to Congress with any military aid requests a human rights status report on each country targeted for such aid. If there are violations cited involving a country receiving aid, the Secretary must describe what "extraordinary circumstances exist," and cite how it relates to the national interest of the United States.⁵⁸ Even with the above reports submitted, Congress has the right under the 1976 Act to adopt a joint resolution curtailing or terminating military aid or sales to countries violating human rights. However, joint resolutions also require the President's signature to take effect.⁵⁹

Mr. Carter's emphasis on morality in foreign policy was largely due to his perception that America needed to restore confidence in its own democratic processes after Vietnam and Watergate. However the perception by the authoritarian Asian nations, to include South Korea, was that, instead of rectifying Kissinger's "amorality," Mr. Carter had swung the United States from one extreme, indifference, to another, over-concern, resulting in unacceptable interference in their internal affairs.⁶⁰

Within a short time after assuming office, however, Mr. Carter and his advisors realized the complexities involved in interjecting morality into foreign policy decisions. The policy of pursuing a consistent human rights policy in South Korea met with a number of obstacles. First, United States security interests in Northeast Asia were still firmly tied to a viable and strong South Korean government. Secondly, the opposition parties in South Korea firmly opposed the United States linking security assistance to human rights pressures, and thirdly, the South Korean government was becoming less willing to bow to American influence when it came to matters they considered internal. Thus, Mr. Carter was more or less forced to come to grips with a modified policy concerning South Korea. In March 1977, the Asst. Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs reflected this fact when he reported before a House Subcommittee:

"We are particularly concerned about restrictions on political activity which have led to the arrest of many Korean citizens voicing peaceful opposition to the present government.... At the same time, we believe it would be a serious mistake to cut back our longstanding assistance to the South Korean armed forces which helps these forces better cope with the formidable task of protecting their country against the threat from the North. Moreover most South Koreans, including domestic critics of the government, strongly favor continuation of U.S.-Korean security ties and assistance." 61

When the Secretary of State Vance testified before Congress in 1977 on countries identified as committing human rights violations, he defended continued military assistance to South

Korea due to security considerations.⁶² In spite of the administration's desires, there were some reductions in United States aid that year as a result of American displeasure over Seoul's human rights record. Mrs. Pat Derian, Mr. Carter's human rights coordinator was able to block the sale of a quantity of handcuffs to South Korea on moralistic grounds.⁶³ Congress also abstained on two Asian Development Bank loans to Korea in order to express its concern about the human rights situation.⁶⁴

Many in South Korea perceived Mr. Carter's withdrawal program linked to the American president's human rights crusade. Even the opposition parties could not perceive how withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula would help their cause or the cause of human rights in South Korea. Their reason is two fold: one, they fear the Communist regime to the north even more than they disliked President Park and his authoritarian policies; and second, they felt a militarily strengthened regime, without the restraining presence of American troops, would "ride even more roughshod over domestic opposition than before."⁶⁵ A good example of this is the statement made as early as 1975 by dissident leader Kim Young Sam,

"Korea and America are long-time friends, but if American tanks and guns are used to suppress democracy, human rights, and freedom, and for religious persecution, then this becomes a very serious matter. But I cannot demand that the United States suspend its aid to Korea."⁶⁶

Ironically, the groups in Congress opposing military aid to Seoul on its poor human rights record strengthened President Park's hand. Park argued that a lessening of necessary aid required "domestic cohesion" to present a united front to the North.⁶⁷ It also became fashionable, for the first time in the long relationship between Seoul and Washington, for senior officials in the Korean government to openly criticize the United States. Culture and Information Minister, Kim Seong Jin warned the United States,

"Koreans will never accept the fate of the Vietnamese... People of a divided country who have to live with threats to their security aspire for peace many times more ardently than people of affluent societies without security problems... The polemics of peace and human rights by outsiders is just academic. We simply cannot allow ourselves to be the object of charitable idealism and meaningless theories or discussion..."⁶⁸

By 1978 relations between Seoul and Washington were warming, but still strained. Mr. Carter's advisors apparently began to realize their approach on human rights with South Korea was producing only strained relations. Interestingly, the State Department's 1978 report on human rights presented a much improved picture of the situation in South Korea. This report was angrily denounced by a number of prominent dissidents who accused the Carter Administration of regressing to the Kissinger formula, i.e., over-emphasizing South Korea's security at the expense of human rights.⁶⁹ The American officials in Seoul privately defended the report on the grounds that a better

image of Seoul was required to impress the Congress, which was about to consider the 1979 military assistance bill for South Korea.⁷⁰

The value of presenting a better image of South Korea to the United States was not absent in President Park's considerations either. Prior to his inauguration for a second six-year term, a term he got through a revision of the South Korean Constitution, President Park released nearly 4,000 prisoners, one of whom was Kim Dae Jung, a key figure in South Korea's opposition parties.⁷¹ This improved image was warmly acknowledged by both the Administration and many in Congress. With the Koreagate scandal all but forgotten and the supposedly improvement of South Korea's human rights image, President Carter announced that he would finally visit Seoul in June 1979.

The proponents of human rights and greater freedoms in South Korea were on the whole unhappy about the visit because they believed it would lead to greater repression by the Park administration. They requested Mr. Carter to take a public stand while in Seoul calling for the return of democracy to South Korea. They pointed out that when President Ford had expressed concern for human rights in private, the pressures brought to bear on the Park government were minimal.⁷² Park reacted to this criticism by restricting most of the prominent dissenters during the Carter visit.⁷³

Mr. Carter, the third president to visit South Korea since Park became its leader, was warmly welcomed by her people. Mr. Carter apparently had already decided to freeze the troop withdrawal before he arrived in Seoul. Therefore, the visit's purpose was three-fold. The first, and primary reason for the visit was to alleviate the South Korean and Japanese concern over United States commitments to South Korea. He did this by freezing the withdrawal and pledging further military aid to South Korea.⁷⁴ The second purpose of the visit was to attempt to reduce tensions in the peninsula by calling for three-way talks with North Korea and South Korea. The third reason was to apply new pressure on Seoul for human rights reform.

He did the latter by lecturing President Park on a live telecast broadcast to the entire South Korea countryside. Mr. Carter called for the need to ease restrictions contained in the Yushin Constitution and the supporting Emergency Decree Number 9 which prohibited any criticism of the government outside the National Assembly building. Mr. Carter cited that the economic progress achieved by the South Koreans could be "matched by similar progress through the realization of basic human aspirations in political and human rights."⁷⁵ By saying so publicly, Mr. Carter didn't repeat the mistake he had made with the Shah of Iran. South Korea, unlike Iran, was not told it was such an indispensable factor in United States strategic

thinking that America would continue providing him a "blank check on the human rights issue."⁷⁶

The South Koreans were not happy over the lecture nor could they comprehend Mr. Carter's seemingly two-path logic on human rights. As one Seoul official put it:

"Sometimes it seems the U.S. asks much more of its friends than of countries that do not even try to measure up to American ideas on things like human rights."⁷⁷

Nevertheless, Seoul responded to Mr. Carter's not so subtle pressure by releasing 86 dissidents later in the month.⁷⁸

The improving relationship was shattered in October when the Park influenced National Assembly expelled opposition leader Kim Young Sam. The United States showed its displeasure by recalling Ambassador Glysteen, the first such recall since the Kennedy Administration.⁷⁹

Two days later, serious rioting broke out in Pusan and Masan. Martial law was declared and the student demonstrations were put down by force. This violence was coincided by the visit of Defense Secretary Brown and the return of Ambassador Glysteen. Arriving for the annual U.S.-South Korean security review, Brown presented President Park with a strongly worded letter from President Carter complaining about Seoul's failure to improve its human rights record.⁸⁰

Though Secretary Brown delivered the letter, he obviously was not willing to involve the United States in the internal problems of Seoul. His primary mission to South Korea was to discuss upgrading both countries' defense forces on the

Korean peninsula. For the Koreans, Mr. Brown's visit was quite lucrative. Not only did Brown agree to allow South Korea to co-produce the Northrup F-5E, he also promised significant strengthening of the American forces stationed in South Korea. Besides deploying AWACS, Orion P-3 long range anti-submarine patrol planes, and a squadron of Air Force A-10 attack fighters, all to be accomplished by 1981, he promised adding two artillery battalions and more helicopters to the 2nd Division. The only disappointment for Seoul was the disapproval of any U.S. submarine transfers.⁸¹

Of equal significance, Secretary Brown stated twice for emphasis during the conference that "the security of the Republic of Korea is vital to the security of the U.S." This was in part to refute an earlier suggestion by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield "that South Korea was outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific."⁸² According to both American and South Korean sources, Secretary Brown's emphasis on this issue ended Washington's ability to use the only real influence (security assistance) it has over President Park's internal policies.⁸³ Though his intentions were well stated, the bottom line showed that President Carter's human rights policy influenced South Korea only minimally. Due to a variety of reasons, security interests probably being the most important, security assistance and the vast majority of arms transfers made were not affected by the human rights issue. By looking at the record of arms transfers to South

Korea made from 1977 (See Table 17), there seems to be little if any linkage between Mr. Carter's human rights policy and his security assistance program.

The Carter style of implementing stated policy has disturbed and perplexed American allies in Asia. United States credibility in Asia has been determined as much by the events outside Asia as within. The Carter foreign policy failures in Iran and the Middle East, the giving-up of the Panama Canal, and the sudden abrogation of the Mutual Defense Agreement between the Republic of China and the U.S. without prior consultation or advice from allies does not contribute toward the belief that the U.S. will stand by its commitments in Asia. The fact that President Carter announced the U.S. troop withdrawal plan without prior consultations with Japan angered leaders in Tokyo, who are as much concerned with stability on the Korean peninsula as are South Koreans.⁸⁴

Asian allies may have been even more disturbed over a 1979 disclosure that the United States had planned a clandestine removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea without notifying either Japan or South Korea.⁸⁵

The secret plan, designed to bypass not only Asian allies but also Congress and the U.S. military, was formulated by a small Carter transition team in 1976. The group, whose membership supposedly included Richard Holbrooke, currently Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific and East Asian Affairs, Les Gelb, former director of Political-Military Affairs at the

State Department, and Peter Bourne, formerly head of the White House drug program, formulated a plan to secretly replace all American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea with dummy warheads.⁸⁶ This group also formulated the initial troop withdrawal plan. Once in office, President Carter ordered the Pentagon to act on both decisions. President Carter made it very clear he was not looking for discussion on the decision - just implementation. The Joint Chiefs, appalled at the nuclear decision, threatened to "leak" the plan to the press and Congress if the President stuck with his decision. The President relented and the weapons stayed in Korea. When analyzing this story, it is no wonder why Mr. Carter had been tough on military criticism in the early years of his administration.

G. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

The only nuclear weapons known to be located on the peninsula are maintained and controlled by the United States. Though their presence has acted as an integral facet of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" in Northeast Asia, South Korea has been the only Asian ally willing to permit their deployment on indigenous soil. The Carter administration, as part of the withdrawal plan and nuclear non-proliferation efforts, had considered removing the land-based weapons. However, even if this would have been accomplished, the United States would still have had a formidable nuclear arsenal of about 192 weapons in South Korea.⁸⁷ The table below indicates the extent of that arsenal.

Table 15

American Nuclear Weapons in South Korea* 88

Service	System	Number of nuclear-capable systems	Load & Reload (# per system)	Total Nuclear Weapons	Explosive Power per weapon (maximum kilotonnage)
US Air Force	Fighter-Bombers (F-4 Phantom)	48	4	192	10kt**
US Army	Artillery 8" (M-110)	28	2	56	1kt
	155mm (M-109)	76	2	152	1kt
	Surface to Air Missiles Nike-Hercules	144	1	144	5kt
	Surface to Surface Missiles Honest John	4	20	80	100kt
	Sergeant	2	6	12	100kt
	Atomic Mines	25-50	1	25-50	5kt
TOTALS		327-352		661-686	Nuclear Weapons

*Estimates based on the following methodology: Nuclear capable systems in Korea were identified and then, using estimates based on European load and reload experience, a total for each system was computed.

**The Hiroshima bomb was 15 kt.

South Korea's policies toward the acquisition of nuclear arms has reflected the changing environment in Northeast Asia and its threat perceptions. When the United States had substantial troops present, to include the above nuclear weapons, the desire for nuclear arms was usually dormant. However, when the United States began talking about withdrawing troops, or the perception of United States defense credibility began to erode, South

Korea had given serious consideration to developing a nuclear weapon capability. Such was the case shortly following the last major withdrawal of United States troops in 1971 and again in 1975 following the fall of South Vietnam. South Korean's fear of being abandoned by the United States had strengthened the advocates of nuclear arms in Seoul in each of the above instances. Thus, in the period between the 1971-72 withdrawal of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division and the fall of Saigon, Seoul had initiated a series of efforts to obtain its own nuclear weapons capability.⁸⁹

At that time, President Park established an ad hoc "Weapons Exploitation Committee" to begin researching the feasibility of building a nuclear weapon. This group approached Canada, South Africa, and France with proposals to purchase commercial reactors and nuclear fuel reprocessing plants.⁹⁰ Israel was also approached with a proposal to buy Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles.⁹¹ In the meantime, on April 23, six days before the fall of Saigon, South Korea had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty under pressure from both the State Department and Congress, who had threatened to defer financing of a nuclear reactor.⁹²

The Communist victory in Vietnam, though probably expected, was difficult to accept in Seoul. Shortly after this impressive event, President Park was quoted as having said:

"If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we would have to start developing a nuclear capability to save ourselves."⁹³

In reality, President Park, as seen in the events listed above, had already taken that step. Some members of Congress had already expressed concern that South Korea might embark on such a project. Representative Les Aspin, of Wisconsin, demanded that shipments of enriched uranium needed to fuel South Korea's two research reactors be halted, asserting that the plutonium by-products would be utilized in atomic weapons.⁹⁴

The work done by Park's "Weapons Exploitation Committee" was uncovered in 1976 by a special United States intelligence group organized to track down nations with covert nuclear weapons programs.⁹⁵ Upon learning of the South Korean plan, President Ford had pressured Seoul into cancelling both the French processing plant and Israeli missile deals. By threatening to withhold export licenses and Export-Import Bank financing for a second nuclear reactor, South Korea was persuaded not to purchase the small pilot fuel-reprocessing plant from France. The United States also arranged with Canada to hold up a sale of a "Candu" reactor to Seoul.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the United States persuaded France to sign an agreement with South Korea stipulating that no material furnished by France shall:

"be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or to further any other military purpose or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device."⁹⁷

Though the Ford Administration's actions were severe regarding Seoul's nuclear dabblings, the large amount of security assistance promised that year coupled with a renewed statement

of commitment to South Korean defense needs eased Seoul's security apprehensions somewhat. It is also important to remember that South Korea had acquired in 1975 the means to manufacture a land-based delivery system when it purchased the complete Lockheed facility for manufacturing solid-fuel rocket motors.

When the Arms Export Control Act was being formulated in 1976, Senator Stuart Symington added an amendment which has great significance to South Korea if she decides to again pursue a nuclear arms capability. The Symington Amendment required two conditions be met by any country desiring economic and/or military assistance if that country were also receiving any equipment, materials, or technology for enriching uranium or reprocessing nuclear fuel. First, the recipient had to place delivered items under multilateral control and management when available, and second, the country had to agree to place all such items and all other fuel and facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEC) safeguards. If any of the above conditions were violated, aid was to be cut off unless the President certified in writing to the Congress that such a termination of aid would adversely affect the security of the United States, and that the violating country would agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.⁹⁸

When the Carter Administration announced its withdrawal program, Seoul found itself once again questioning American intentions on remaining a viable presence on the peninsula. And once again, the proponents of nuclear weapons were being heard

in Seoul. During the negotiations over the withdrawal program between South Korean defense officials, United States Under-Secretary of State Philip Habib and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs George Brown, the Koreans demanded that the nuclear weapons be handed over to the Korean forces rather than be withdrawn with the 2nd Division. Habib and General Brown refused to even discuss nuclear weapons.⁹⁹ When they informed the Koreans that land-based missiles would be pulled out with the ground troops, the South Korean Foreign Ministry let it be known that:

"Although we do not intend to develop nuclear arms,... (and) despite the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we have the right to take whatever steps are appropriate, irregardless of the conclusion of international treaties or agreements..."¹⁰⁰

Perhaps even more significant than the statement of a Korean government official was the view told the staff of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a leader of the official opposition in the Korean National Assembly. He warned that his party might support the demand of some members of the ruling party that South Korea begin building its own nuclear weapons.¹⁰¹

Though South Korea has presently stated it does not intend to conduct any nuclear weapons production at the present, it is still necessary to look at the requirements necessary for either Koreas to attain the capability to produce nuclear arms, and their present capacity to do so. Three major factors - fissile materials, weapons fabrication, and delivery systems -

are essential to the development of nuclear weapons. Of the three factors, acquisition of fissile materials in suitable amounts and suitable quality is probably the major problem in producing atomic weapons. Of the three types of fissile materials commonly utilized, only plutonium -239 (Pu-239) is presently affordable and is available to South Korea. As for North Korea, it is at least 6-10 years behind South Korea's development and should be considered in such a context as South Korea's potentials are discussed.¹⁰²

In order to produce military grade plutonium, a chemical reprocessing plant or a separation plant is necessary. In South Korea, development of fuel-recovery technology has been a top-priority project since 1976. Thus, if South Korea desired to invest \$1-3 million, it could build a separation plant within one to two years with the capability of producing enough Pu-239 per year for two or three explosive devices. Moreover, South Korea possesses a sufficient amount of skilled and technically trained personnel to man such a project. Even in North Korea, this process may be accomplished, though on a smaller scale.¹⁰³

As for delivery capacities, both countries possess a variety of delivery modes. South Korea has both F-4 fighter bombers, which can be adapted to carry tactical warheads, and an indigenously produced surface-to-surface ballistic missile capable of hitting Pyongyang from inside South Korea. North Korea has light bombers (Il-28) and MiG-21 fighter bombers. It also has an unguided ballistic missile, the FROG-5.

Therefore, as described above, both North and South Korea have the capacity, if they choose, to go nuclear. However, there are important disincentives for the future proliferation. The most important disincentive is the hostile reaction by the other four actors in the peninsula - the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and of course, Japan. The pressures that the United States might exert on South Korea have already been discussed (Symington Amendment). However, in order to be able to exert such influence, the relationship, economically, politically, and militarily, between Seoul and Washington must remain strong. Recent history has not shown the Soviet Union nor China willing to help a small client state attain an independent nuclear capability. Furthermore, it is likely that each would oppose the other from doing so.¹⁰⁴

Another disincentive would be cost. According to a United Nations report on proliferation, the ten-year cost of a small nuclear force would run approximately \$2-7 billion.¹⁰⁵ Considering the burden national defense expenditures has had on both countries in recent years, the cost of such a program would be obviously prohibitive. As for incentive to go nuclear, the only one worthy of mention is enhanced security. However, that enhanced security may only be illusory. Alienation from the "big brother" suppliers may, in fact, be detrimental to external security in a conventional battlefield situation.

How does the transfer of conventional arms tie in with possible nuclear weapons proliferation? Various analysts suggest that the provision of arms and security assistance, supported by the "nuclear umbrella" and defense pacts, is the most effective means to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula. Conversely, the denial of conventional arms due to policy restraint could force South Korea, at least, to go nuclear.¹⁰⁶ Once the country acquires nuclear arms, the more difficult, and less advisable it would be for suppliers to restrict conventional arms transfers. The result may be an open-ended arms race, in which the supplier is caught in the middle.

In this chapter, covering mainly the Carter years, we have looked at the impact the Carter Administration has had on South Korea via its arms control policy, its human rights policy and the withdrawal program. Additionally, we have seen the United States Congress begin to assert its influence on arms transfers and military assistance programs to Korea, with Koreagate, perhaps, the prime catalyst for this increased interest. Finally, the factor of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula was discussed. A final section must deal with how some of these factors and issues have affected the relationships between the other major actors. The previous chapter had already discussed the triangular relationship of China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Of equal importance, however, is the state of relations between the other major powers during the Carter Administration.

Mr. Carter's changed perceptions and mistrust toward the Soviets due to their opportunism and aggression in South Asia has placed a chill on detente and has affected American policy wherever East meets West. This current strain in relations was not however, on the horizon three years ago. Detente was as strong as it had ever been when President Carter met with Premier Brezhnev in Vienna to sign the SALT II Treaty. Relations with the People's Republic were steadily moving toward normalization. The Chinese were warning the United States of Soviet duplicity in SALT II; but, the Chinese were always crying "wolf" when it came to the Soviets. Sino-Japanese relations were also progressing smoothly, much to the chagrin of the Soviets. It must have appeared an opportune time for Mr. Carter to pull out American troops. The situation on the Korean peninsula seemed stable and the international arena showed few problems for the United States except in the Middle East where Carter's personal diplomacy seemed to be bringing the Israelis and Egyptians toward peace.

However, Mr. Carter's announcement of intent to withdraw the 2nd Division from Korea was met with both concern and resentment by Japan; resentment over the fact that the surprise announcement was made by Vice-President Mondale without consulting with Tokyo, and concern over the sharp change in United States policy toward Korea.¹⁰⁷ Mr. Carter had not learned a very important lesson from one of his predecessors, Richard Nixon. Mr. Nixon's disregard for the importance of cooperation with

Japan in the task of creating a new network of constructive relationships with the Soviet Union and China had been considered a serious flaw in the execution of successful American diplomacy.¹⁰⁸

Soon after Mr. Carter's election win in November 1976 the Japanese Ambassador to Washington had publicly and officially stated the Japanese government's opposition to any withdrawal move. But when Mr. Carter took office, his "consultations" consisted only of calling Prime Minister Fukuda and stressing (among other items discussed) the need for close Japan-United States consultations on the military situation in South Korea.¹⁰⁹ It must be remembered that Japanese defense policy is based on three basic assumptions: 1) the effective functioning of the Japan-United States Security Treaty; 2) a gradual increase in Japan's self-defense capabilities; and 3) continuation of the status quo in Northeast Asia, i.e., continued Sino-Soviet tension, continued detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a maintenance of a basic military balance in Korea.¹¹⁰

Therefore, the attitude of Japan must be taken in the context of utmost importance when considering changing the status quo in Northeast Asia. The principal justification for the American defense commitment to South Korea has been the continued viability of Japan and its economic importance to the United States.¹¹¹ Following the fall of Saigon, many Japanese leaders were questioning American defense commitments to Japan

and to other American allies in Asia. While watching with apprehension the growth of a great Russian Pacific Fleet, Japan saw the American Navy decrease almost as significantly. It was in this context that Japan received from Washington, the official decision to withdrawal all its ground combat forces from Korea by 1981. The problem Japan faced until mid-1979 was how to adjust to this new situation in Northeast Asia.¹¹²

While Japanese-American relations were somewhat strained over the withdrawal issue, Sino-American relations continued to improve. At the same time the Sino-Soviet dispute was focusing its attention on Southeast Asia. Border clashes between Cambodia and Vietnam escalated into a state of open war. Relations between Vietnam and China became severely strained over Hanoi's actions against overseas Chinese living in Vietnam. The Soviet Union, unwilling to allow its new client state to be influenced by any Chinese threat, signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Vietnam on November 3, 1978.¹¹³ Essentially, a quasi-military alliance, the implications, as perceived by China, Japan, and the United States, were grave indeed.

The Soviet-American detente began its downward trend when the Soviets ignored American warnings to stay out of Southeast Asia. At the same time America and China were on the verge of normalizing relations. By establishing closer relations with China than with the Soviet Union, both Japan and the United States were abandoning the concept of tripolarism for bipolarism.

The Soviet Union perceived these moves as a heavy blow to its efforts of collective encirclement of China in Asia.¹¹⁴ It was now more important than ever for the Soviet Union to maintain ties with North Korea.

On Christmas day, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with over 100,000 regulars. As of this writing, those forces still remain in Cambodia. This invasion of Cambodia resulted in China beginning to prepare for its own incursion into Vietnam.¹¹⁵ Vietnam's invasion greatly irritated and embarrassed the Japanese, who were providing economic assistance at the time. Tokyo froze this aid for less than three months in protest, a move deeply criticized by the Americans and many Asians as insufficient. Tokyo was finding itself increasingly entangled in international political confrontations its post-war diplomacy had long sought to avoid. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira, initially slow to respond, began to respond to these external pressures by applying regional Realpolitik.¹¹⁶ North Korea in a surprise move openly criticized Vietnam, accusing it of "dominationism," a North Korean code-word referring to the Soviet Union. This action clearly allied Pyongyang with China.

Six days later, on 1 January 1979, the United States and the People's Republic climaxed their rapprochement by officially normalizing relations. Hoping that this new relationship might facilitate a lessening of tensions in Korea, Mr. Carter approached Deng Xiaoping on the subject when he visited Washington in late January. However, Deng refused to commit

himself, mostly out of fear that the unpredictable Kim Il-Sung would feel alienated and move closer to the Soviets.¹¹⁷ When the United States recognized the People's Republic, it also de-recognized the Republic of China. Though the event was known well in advance, South Korea had to have been profoundly impressed by the ease of President Carter's abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the government on Taiwan.

Events in South Asia were also producing strains on American credibility and the Soviet-American detente. When the American backed Shah's regime was overthrown in February, repercussions must have been felt throughout Northeast Asia. Here was a strong ally of the United States, overthrown without the United States doing anything tangible to come to the Shah's aid. One can be certain that President Park had some serious contemplations over this turn of events. The similarities of politics and military structure between Iran and South Korea were many.

On February 17, 1979 China carried out its pledge to "punish" Vietnam, when Chinese forces crossed the Vietnamese border on a 450 mile front.¹¹⁸ This Chinese invasion deeply embarrassed the United States and tainted the image of "peace-loving" Chinese.¹¹⁹ The Soviet Union angrily denounced the United States as being in collusion with China. President Carter, very concerned about a Soviet intervention on behalf of its Vietnamese ally, saw the potentiality of a Sino-Soviet war. If this occurred, North Korea would surely be tempted to

launch its own invasion southward. Thus, perhaps based on this scenario, the updated intelligence estimate of North Korean tank and personnel strength, and pressure by some Congressmen, it was no wonder the proposed troop withdrawal was put into deep freeze.

Because of the above events, the Carter Administration began to take a new look at Asia and to formulate a policy based on two goals: 1) to prevent any non-Communist nation from being drawn into the intra-Communist wars and disputes, and 2) to protect United States political and economic interests in Asia.¹²⁰ Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told the Koreans that the new policy meant the United States would "maintain an ability to react in a region and will remain deeply involved."¹²¹

The assassination of President Park Chung Hee, and the subsequent battle for power in South Korea cast uncertainty over the future stability of that country and the region. Upon notification of the assassination, President Carter placed all U.S. troops in Korea on alert and warned North Korea that the United States would "react strongly" to any outside attempt to exploit the situation in the South.¹²²

A subsequent military coup on 12 December again changed the leadership of South Korea. When the coup leaders unilaterally deployed several battalions of South Korean troops in support of the coup, troops that were at the time under the control of the UN Commander, General John A. Wickham, the United States soundly condemned the action and demanded a pledge that there

would be no further actions of this type.¹²³ Whether these generals will allow the United States to pressure them into stepping down from power still remains to be seen.

The North Korean reaction to the leadership changes in Seoul was one of restraint. In early January, however, Pyongyang requested resumption of the stalled North-South Talks. Seoul later agreed to send representatives and renew the talks. With Kim's succession issue and continued problems for the North Korean economy in the horizon, analysts will be watching with interest the upcoming (October) 6th Congress of the Worker's Party.¹²⁴

United States - Soviet detente, which is applied selectively by the Soviets according to its judgement of the gains and losses in a given situation, was gravely affected by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. Also because of this invasion, talks between China and the Soviet Union have been suspended. The relationships throughout Northeast Asia have largely polarized due to this Soviet aggression. Only North Korea appears to have manipulated the situation to its benefit. The reports that Kim may receive advanced MiG-23 fighters in return for allowing Moscow to establish a naval base in North Korea is indeed ominous for the future stability of the region.

The Korean peninsula, due to its strategic geopolitical position remains a crucial area in the manipulation and maintenance of the new balance of powers systems in the East Asia/Western Pacific region. American actions there, whether to stay

or to depart, will be carefully weighed around the world and will significantly influence the judgement on whether or not America is retreating from its free world responsibilities or whether it intends to erect barriers against Soviet advances.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Chalmers Johnson, "Contradictions in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward East Asia," Occasional Paper, Chan Young Bang, dir., (San Francisco: Institute for Asian/Pacific Studies, 1978), p. 36
4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Study Mission to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Jacob K. Javits, 95th Cong., 1st sess., December 1977, p. 6.
5. Chong-Whi Kim, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Troops and the Security of Northeast Asia: A South Korean View," Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia, Richard B. Foster, James E. Dorman, Jr., and William M. Carpenter, eds., (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1979), pp. 155-164.
6. Strategic Survey 1977, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 86.
7. Ibid.
8. Richard M. Saunders, "Chinese Reactions to the U.S. Withdrawal From Korea," Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol VIII no. 3, (September 1978), pp. 70-77. FEER Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 29.
9. For a well researched summary of the arguments for and against the withdrawal, see Sungjoo Han, "South Korea 1978: Preparing for Self-Reliance," Asian Survey, Vol XVIII no. 1, (January 1979), p. 47.
10. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Security Assistance Programs. Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Korea. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1978.
11. A total of 3,436 American military personnel were withdrawn in 1978. (Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Armacost). However of this total only 570 were combat troops. These men were members of the 2d Bn 9th Inf which was redeployed to Fort Riley, Kansas in December 1978. The following June, the last

U.S. Army active-duty Honest John Battalion was deactivated in South Korea. This inactivation was separate from the President's withdrawal plan. The Honest John missiles were turned over to the South Koreans. John K. Cooley, "U.S. Troops Coming Home from South Korea," Christian Science Monitor, (14 December 1978), p. 9. Army Times, No 31, (March 5, 1979), p. 42. Army Times, No 48, (July 2, 1979), p. 20.

12. The M-60 tanks employed by the 2nd Division are not the same model as those in the South Korean inventory. M-48 tanks already in their inventory were to be provided on a two-for-one basis.

13. These were deployed in 1979. It is interesting to note that while about 600 men had been withdrawn, this F-4 squadron had a strength of about 900 men. In 1980 between 1000-1500 troops of a Hawk air defense unit will be withdrawn under an arrangement made during the Ford Administration. Don Oberdorfer, "Carter Scraps Plan for Korean Pullout," San Jose Mercury News, (July 21, 1979), p. 1F.

14. On 3 May 1978 the House International Relations Committee voted to grant the authority requested by the President to transfer the \$800 million equipment transfer. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Foreign Assistance Legislation For FY 1979. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Relations. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., March 1978, p. XVII.

15. President Carter had effectively ended overt military criticism when he fired Major General Singlaub. Furthermore, rumors that other officers at the Pentagon had been warned to keep their silence if in disagreement with the policy resulted in an inquiry by the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee chaired by Rep. Samuel Stratton. Bob Gatty, "Mr. Carter, Congress and The Generals," Army, (December 1978), pp. 28-29.

16. This is the period when North Korea's major supply had shifted from the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China. Russell Spurr, "Yanks Who Won't Go Home," FEER Vol 103, no. 8 (February 23, 1979), p. 16. Army Times, No. 23 (January 8, 1979), p. 1, 21.

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24. Ibid.
25. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Fiscal Year 1980 International Security Assistance Authorization. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 96th Cong., 1st sess., February, March, April 1979, p. 423. For additional information concerning the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) during the Carter Administration see U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1978. Policies on Arms Transfers and Military Assistance Programs. Hearings before the subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations. 95th Cong., 1st sess., March, April 1977, pp. 72-75.
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27. Ibid.
28. Strategic Survey 1977, p. 106.
29. George C. Wilson, "Arms Sales Record Set in Fiscal 1978," Washington Post, (October 3, 1978), p. A3
30. "Why Drive Against U.S. Arms Sales Failed," U.S. News & World Report, (December 3, 1979), p. 57.
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VI. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. REFLECTIONS

By 1946 the two post-war powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had established themselves as the protectors, de facto governors, and major suppliers of arms and security assistance to the Korean people. Much has happened the past 35 years to change that situation. And though this change in environment has been caused by the interaction of many factors, the flow of arms and military assistance to the peninsula has been one of the more important impacting variables.

Since the early 1950s the parameters or constants of the Korean milieu have been two-fold. First, the motives behind arms transfers and security assistance have remained relatively unchanged. The suppliers desire to continue the patron-client relationship by binding the Koreans to them through trade, economic aid, arms transfers, and security assistance. In their view, this relationship contributes to the well-being of both supplier and recipient. It also ensures a relative balance of power and provides a level of influence over independent actions which could threaten the status quo or stability of the region. The other constant present is the volatility of the relationship between North and South Korea. This continuous North-South confrontation is the parameter in which all other interactions have revolved, especially the phenomena of arms transfer and security assistance.

As seen in the previous chapters, various factors have influenced the flow of arms and military assistance to North and South Korea. Perhaps, the two most influential factors affecting this influx are the changing threat perceptions of the major power suppliers and the perception of their recipient client as to the willingness of these powers to continue the supply. The amounts of arms transferred and the level of technology inherent in those transfers have, in turn, affected or impacted upon the stability of the region, the supplier-recipient relationships, and the viability of the recipient nations' economies.

Reflecting upon the past 35 years of security assistance provided the two Koreas, one sees that the suppliers' interests have been and will continue to be the dominant factors in their provision of military arms and aid. Because the threat of armed conflict has not diminished significantly since the Korean Conflict, the supplier and recipient states' security interests have been tied to the maintenance of a military equilibrium. To maintain this equilibrium, a classic example of hegemonic supply and demand had developed.

The United States has played the key role in the protection of South Korea since the end of World War II. Although security assistance to South Koreans prior to and during the Korean War was comparatively moderate when stacked against Soviet material assistance to the North, it must be remembered that it was the United States which provided the largest combat contingent under

the United Nations force structure. After the armistice, a Mutual Defense Treaty was signed with Seoul pledging a continued American commitment to South Korea's defense.

This continuing commitment to defend the viability of South Korea has been predicated on a pattern of American strategic policies in Asia and elsewhere in the world. From Truman and Eisenhower's policy of containment, through Kennedy and Johnson's policies of flexible response, to the Nixon Doctrine advocating increased self-defense efforts by allies, American policy toward Asia, and especially Northeast Asia, has been affected by changing threat perceptions. When the threat perception shifted, usually the policy of arms aid and transfer was also shifted to match the change in environment.

The United States has always considered its national interests best served when there has been peace and access in Asia. However, the experience of the Korean War had made the United States wary of any future involvement in another land war in Asia. Because the American perceived threat was external, i.e., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the threat of massive retaliation was thought sufficient to prevent such an involvement. But the effectiveness of American nuclear deterrence also required a commitment to provide the means to friendly Asian allies to defend themselves against their smaller communist neighbors. Therefore, besides the mutual defense treaty, South Korea began to be supplied with considerable amounts of security assistance materiel.

Shortly following the Korean War, approximately one-third of the total American security assistance to the Far East went to South Korea. This massive infusion of arms and military aid, mostly on a grant aid basis, was to significantly contribute to a successful South Korean economic resurgence. Though the majority of weapons provided South Korea were WW II surplus, obsolete, or second-hand, the military equation in the peninsula remained balanced, primarily by the presence of two American combat divisions and a small number of air squadrons.

When the Kennedy administration shifted the threat perception from external to internal and focused attention on Southeast Asia, major weapons transfers to South Korea initially decreased. However, in the latter half of the 1960s, largely due to the quid pro quo South Vietnam deployment agreement, South Korea enjoyed a significantly increased infusion of military aid from the United States.

The most dramatic shift in United States' threat perception and the correlating change in security assistance policy developed as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This disintegration of cohesiveness within the communist bloc produced a rearrangement in the pseudo alliances of Asia, a reassessment of American policy toward the People's Republic of China, and the subsequent Nixon Doctrine.

America's Vietnam experience also contributed to this readjustment in security strategy. Once again, American policy makers were focusing attention toward Northeast Asia and the

Korean peninsula. South Korea became the last mainland Asian state where an American presence continued. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine of providing the means necessary for self-defense, South Korea was able to enjoy an increased input of American made weapons. Significant during this period was the influx of sophisticated aircraft and missiles systems. Equally important, Seoul was able to place even greater emphasis on building its economy without diverting vast resources to defense. North Korea, not as free to allocate funds to the domestic sector, found itself falling behind Seoul in the economy race.

The fall of Saigon in 1975 sent shock waves throughout the capitals of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Though the United States was quick to reassure its allies with continued security commitments, this event signified to them the end of Pax Americana in Asia. The pursuit of self-reliance was seen by South Korea as the most effective way to preclude paralleling the course taken by the Saigon government.

While Seoul was planning and implementing its military modernization programs, the American mood toward Korea was undergoing change. The relationship between America and South Korea had been characterized by a series of ups and downs since the Korean War. By the early 1970s the mood was definitely on a down swing. Americans were asking why the United States was supporting a government which was decreasing fundamental human liberties, which resorted to kidnapping

and incarcerations to stifle public criticism, and which resorted to illegal influence buying to gain continued or increased military and economic aid. The Ford administration found itself in a serious quandary. On one hand an allied and free South Korea was considered essential to the overall strategic security system of Northeast Asia - a system established primarily to protect Japan and U.S. interests in the area. On the other hand, the United States would be hypocritical of its own image as the defender of freedom's basic rights if it did not attempt to influence Seoul to follow a more democratic orientation.

How to influence or pressure Seoul into acquiescing to America's varied demands almost became an obsession with part of the United States Congress. However, by the mid 1970s, the polity in South Korea had become highly centralized and was no longer willing to bow unhesitatingly to American pressure. The results were increased emphasis on movement toward self-reliance for South Korea and a hostile Congress more than willing to punish Seoul's actions with aid cut-offs. America's mood swung back again in support of Seoul when North Korean soldiers murdered two American officers at Panmunjom in August 1976. Though many critics still wondered why it has taken South Korea so long to establish an ability to defend itself without the need of American ground troop presence, more security assistance than ever before was provided to Seoul along with a pledge by the Ford administration to retain ground troops in South Korea.

President Carter's decision to withdraw those ground forces confirmed to Seoul their suspicions that new American strategic thinking had downgraded the Korean peninsula's military importance. President Park's government bargained skillfully and forcefully over the terms of the withdrawal. The resulting compensation promised Seoul was enormous in its context. Though President Carter had campaigned on human rights, arms control and the restitution of morality into American foreign policy, the level of influence on South Korea became increasingly limited. Mr. Carter discovered campaign promises often are unkept due to the reality of the situation. When the Carter administration made it clear to all parties concerned that a free and allied South Korea was an integral part of United States security interests, the swing back to "Real politik" was confirmed. Inherent in such a policy switch was the knowledge in both Seoul and Washington that the supply of arms would continue no matter what the internal environment in South Korea, and that military aid would not, or more realistically, could not be used as an effective influence tool.

The year 1979 proved an eventful and momentous year for South Korea. The Republic of Korea had turned 31 years old. While wracked by mounting inflation, domestic unrest, and a number of changes in leadership, the commitment by the United States to support and help defend South Korea was as strong as it had ever been.

While South Korea has been strongly bound to the United States due to its supplier-recipient relationship, North Korea since 1953 has followed a policy of greater independence in its dealings with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Though this line of equidistance has resulted in minor diversification in weapon sources, varied influx, and occasional economic hardship, it has also given Kim Il-Sung the ability to maintain a degree of autonomy in the Socialist camp.

During the most intense period of the cold war, the Korean War, North Korea was the only developing country that received significant amounts of arms on a grant basis from the Soviet Union. The peak year was 1953. Following the armistice, the Soviets continued support to Pyongyang, but with restraint. This restraint was a function of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence, which basically meant avoiding military confrontation with the United States. In essence then, the Soviet military aid to North Korea following the war was designed to do no more than maintain the balance between North and South. This assistance was also provided to exert some influence over the North Koreans and to restrain any precipitous action that might involve the Soviets as participants in another conflict on the peninsula. In accordance with this policy, the level of weapons sophistication also remained relatively low.

North Korea, unlike its southern adversary, possessed the option of diversification. Because of the developing Sino-Soviet dispute, North Korea became the beneficiary of competitive support as well as the target of competitive pressure. Kim became very adroit at playing one supplier off the other. When Soviet tactics became unacceptable during Khrushchev's anti-cult attacks and later accommodation with the West over Cuba, North Korea's allegiance swung toward China. Unwilling to accept this defection, the Soviets chose to punish North Korea with the most potent influence tool it possessed short of armed force, the total cut off of military aid in 1962.

The effects of this action on Pyongyang were varied and mostly adverse in nature. The cut off of military aid most affected the economic programs and growth rate of North Korea. To sustain both a growing economy and a growing military capacity, Pyongyang had relied considerably on outside aid, nearly all of it from Moscow or the Soviet influenced Eastern European states. The subsequent failure of Kim's Seven Year Economic Plan caused not only domestic hardships, but also allowed South Korea to catch up and surpass the North in economic growth.

The Soviets were also losers in this punishment strategy. Not only was their level of influence substantially reduced, Pyongyang began siding with Peking on a number of issues contrary to Soviet viewpoints. Peking also became Pyongyang's

sole supplier of arms during this period. Though Chinese aid was substantial and relatively free of the political strings the Russians had attached, the level of sophistication was considerably lower than the previously supplied Soviet arms. Moreover, Chinese economic development was no further along than North Korea's. These factors convinced Kim Il-Sung that North Korea, like China, had to move toward total self-sufficiency. This period marked the beginning of what would later become an impressive indigenous arms industry, capable of producing nearly every weapon required in the North's arsenal, less sophisticated aircraft and electronics.

When Soviet aid was resumed in 1965, the Russians found a more independently minded North Korea. Soviet influence would never be as it was prior to 1962. Though the Soviet Union continued to be in East Asia, it was not considered of it. It lacked the cultural and historic ties with North Korea that China enjoyed. It possessed a past history of aggression in Northeast Asia, to include the Korean peninsula. And because of its heavy handedness in its dealings with North Korea during the Khrushchev years, the Soviets gained a reputation of not playing fair with a socialist state. The Soviets, however, did learn from their mistake of cutting military aid to North Korea. In the future, when Pyongyang was seen as clearly in the Chinese camp, Moscow would continue to supply arms and military aid; if for any reason, to continue a toe-hold in the Korean peninsula.

Following the anxious years during China's Cultural Revolution, North Korea once again was wooed by both its large Communist neighbors. Throughout the latter 1960s and the 1970s, arms transfers and military aid to North Korea would be a primary factor in the Sino-Soviet competition for influence over Pyongyang. It must be understood that though the Sino-Soviet competition was the primary vehicle that facilitated the flow of arms to North Korea, events in and out of Asia also had an effect.

The American and South Korean involvement in South Vietnam significantly enhanced North Korea's threat perception of its southern neighbor. The proliferation of Vietnam related weapon technology had a significant impact on the increase of weapons technology to the Korean peninsula. When the quid pro quo arms transfers to South Korea included sophisticated weapons systems such as F-4 fighter aircraft, the Soviets were pressured to quickly counter with an equivalent system. Previously, North Korean requests for arms were made to attain superiority over South Korean forces, or parity with American systems deployed in Korea. Now, for the first time, South Korea possessed a more sophisticated combat aircraft than the North had. These events marked the end of the suppliers reluctance to provide first-line weapons systems. The trend was toward qualitative imports. Sophisticated systems brought into the peninsula by one supplier would be matched by comparative systems transferred to the

other side's client state. This situation did not result in an all-out arms race, however, There remained corresponding restraint by all the major suppliers in the technology level of fighter aircraft, missile systems, and tanks. Of course, total prohibition of nuclear weapons transfer was also adhered to by the suppliers.

Since 1973 the Chinese had become Kim's major suppliers of arms and aid. Soviet-North Korean relations had become strained due to a number of reasons. These included the inability of Pyongyang to make good on Soviet loans, the lack of Soviet support for Kim's reunification policy, and Soviet-American detente. Following the 1975 communist victory in Vietnam, Kim Il-Sung made a highly visible trip to Peking to gain Chinese support for a similar action in Korea. However, the Chinese were willing to support only a peaceful reunification program, and reportedly denied Kim's request for more advanced weapons.

The culminating Sino-American rapprochement, the normalization of relations between Peking and Tokyo, the lack of total Chinese and Soviet support, and the growing economic and military viability of South Korea were factors clearly hindering Kim's unification objective. The military equation in the peninsula was perceived as becoming less favorable for North Korea as time went on. Even with his massive arms build-up beginning in the early 1970s, Kim's primary obstacle to a march south was the continued presence of

American troops. Mr. Carter's announced plan for withdrawing this obstacle must have delighted Kim. However, it soon became apparent that not only were the South Koreans and Japanese unhappy over such a proposal, but Kim's two primary allies and arms supporters were hinting in private that they too were not happy to see American presence withdrawn.

There appears to have been a certain structural stability in the relationship among the three major powers and suppliers concerned with Korea. Though none of these three saw the situation as totally satisfactory, all three have found themselves unwilling or unable to push too hard for changes. They fear the status quo would be radically altered causing adverse reactions for not only regional stability, but also in established relations among themselves. In recent years, in large part due to American military and economic assistance, the Republic of Korea has clearly emerged as a major power in Northeast Asia. Neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China have been totally willing for the sake of North Korea to ignore this fact.

When Mr. Carter suspended the troop withdrawal and increased American military aid in support of Seoul's FIP program, Pyongyang was understandably angered. Particularly worrisome to Pyongyang is the strides that are being and will be made by the South in the field of indigenous weapons production. Equally troubling to Kim must be the decrease in American influence over Seoul. However, for a number of

reasons, it is difficult to envision Park Chung Hee's successors undertaking a march north. Neither tangible support nor sympathy would be extended by the United States in such a situation. Equally important, both North Korea's allies would not stand by and allow a military imposed unification of Korea by a non-communist state.

While the ability of the United States to influence Seoul's actions the past seven years has decreased because of the South's economic vitality and the movement away from grant aid to military sales, there is no reason to believe Soviet or Chinese ability to influence Pyongyang has increased proportionately. More likely, the recent closeness of Peking to Washington and the invasion into Afghanistan by the Soviets have produced a strain in their relationships with North Korea. While still remaining closer to Peking, the North Koreans in recent months have indicated a warming toward the Soviets. An oscillating posture toward Peking and Moscow has become a fact of life for North Korea.


The problem facing Pyongyang in the not too distant future is how to continue this trend of relative neutrality without overly antagonizing either arms patron. As pointed out earlier, North Korea has a military alliance with both parties. Both treaties require that North Korea not engage in activities which are hostile to the co-signor. The treaty with the Soviets specifically prohibits either party from entering any alliance with another party hostile to the

Soviet Union. The dilemma facing Pyongyang, therefore, is that both treaties negate each other. The North Korean-Chinese treaty is now anti-Soviet and the Soviet-North Korean treaty is now anti-Chinese. The likelihood of North Korea dropping Moscow is infeasible because its sophisticated weapons inventory is dependent upon Soviet parts and replacements. In the same context, since China is currently supplying the majority of arms and petroleum products without the price tag the Soviets have demanded, it would be economically counterproductive to side against the Chinese.

To round out an overview of the past thirty-five years, it is important to also reflect upon the relationship between the Korean military establishments and their supplying patrons. Throughout this period, the leadership in both Koreas has been predominately senior military officers. Their influence on the politics and policies of both countries has been a constant since the Second World War. Because there had been no example on which to base the newly formed Korean armed forces following this war, i.e., a native military tradition, the occupation armies of the Soviet Union and the United States were mirrored in many ways. The Americans and Soviets, and to a lesser degree the Chinese, organized the Koreans in their image, trained them according to their own tactics, armed them with foreign manufactured weapons, and advised them on nearly every aspect of military procedure.

This military assistance was an important vehicle in the transfer of values and political beliefs from the supplying patrons' culture and political systems to the recipients'. In South Korea few, if any, of the military leadership have not had close contacts with senior American military officers. Moreover, most have attended at least one American service school in the United States. Unfortunately, the extent of North Korean military experience in Soviet or Chinese schools is not readily available. However, the Korean Workers Party and the North Korean military are clearly bound together, with many military members holding roles of extreme importance. The economic and military programs established within the North, emulating similar programs in China or the Soviet Union, show some level of influence accepted by the North Koreans.

Because these military men were firmly established in the political processes of each country, the civilian leaders have seen the need to enhance their armed forces by enlarging them, equipping them with the best arms possible, and allowing them continued influence and importance. Obviously, the rationale was to maintain the military establishment's loyalty. The result has been not only an increased capability of North and South Korea's military structures, but also the maintenance of a high level of threat perception and hostility toward each other. The base reality has been that North and South Korea's armed forces protect its people and government from the other's military forces, and by so doing, has perpetuated the separation.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Because so many of South Korea's military leaders have been introduced to American ideals and values through American military training and education, it is no wonder that the military establishment in the South has been so anti-communist and unwilling in the past to compromise with the North. Moreover, the imminent possibility of war with North Korea has tended to strengthen the advice of South Korean military leaders in government circles, providing the incentive for advocating tightened controls over the civilian populace, coupled with enhanced readiness capabilities and posture. In the South, ex-military leaders such as Park have shown themselves more capable of controlling their military machines than the predominantly civilian administrations of Rhee and Myon. With the recent high levels of military assistance being provided to both Koreas by their patrons, the respective military establishments will continue to maintain or even increase their levels of influence over internal and foreign affairs.

The trend toward indigenous arms production, an improved capacity to afford the best arms money can buy due to successful economic growth rates, and the self-assurance that comes from both of the above, has enabled the Korean military establishments to continue their powerful influence on the political leanings and foreign policies of their countries. Commensurate with an enhanced self-assurance has come a decreased willingness to heed advice or bow to the pressures of their

big-power patrons. It is ironic that a relaxation of tensions, which would facilitate stability on the peninsula and maintain the status quo, an objective all the major powers desire, has been largely thwarted by the accommodating of the respective Korean military establishments by their supplier patrons.

B. CONCLUSIONS

This final section presents the author's perception of the overall impact arms transfers and military aid has had on the Korean peninsula and the possibilities for the future. When assessing the impact of arms flow to the two Korean states, a number of questions must be raised. First, what were the major underlying purposes in the supply of arms? Have these goals been achieved by the major suppliers, and at what cost?

The United States has had essentially three major purposes for supplying security assistance and arms to South Korea. First and foremost was the need to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and to ensure access for trade, investment and other peaceful interests. Inherent with peace on the peninsula is peace in Northeast Asia and access to Japan for trade and investment. Secondly, there was the need to maintain the status quo, or better put, continued viability of a government friendly to and greatly influenced by the United States. Finally, military aid helped to facilitate an American presence on mainland Asia and to standardize the weapons utilized by its South Korean ally.

In assessing the current situation in South Korea, one could say all of the above goals have been met. It is therefore logical to believe the tool of arms sales and military aid has served a valid purpose. However, it would be ludicrous to assert that the supply of arms and security assistance were the primary variables responsible for this success. Economic aid must also be considered as a key factor. Without the infusion of all three, it is unlikely that South Korea would be in the position of economic or military strength it now holds. The costs incurred by the United States have been enormous. Tens of billions of dollars and thousands of American lives have been spent to achieve these goals. Even though the trend in recent years has been toward decreased influence over South Korean affairs, the United States will find itself spending even more to support its policies and presence in South Korea.

The motives by the Soviet Union for supplying arms to North Korea are not very different from those shown by the United States. Peace on the peninsula allows the Soviets to maintain not only trade relations with North Korea, but also with Japan. Therefore, supplying arms to North Korea in quantities sufficient for self-defense, but insufficient enough for a march south, facilitates such an objective. By supplying arms to North Korea, the Soviet's political self-interest and image in other parts of the Third World and communist bloc is enhanced. The Soviets also utilize

arms transfers as a tool to counter any increased American influence in the Korean peninsula. By keeping the military balance between North and South Korea in the North's favor, the American "influenced" ROK forces are deterred from "marching north." Finally, arms transfers and sales to North Korea have been primarily utilized, since the latter 1960s, to increase Soviet prestige and influence at the expense of the Chinese.

The only goal the Soviet's have had trouble securing has been increased influence over North Korea. Though supplying nearly all the sophisticated weapons to North Korea, the Soviets have not been able to get Pyongyang to significantly tilt toward Moscow in the competition for influence with Peking. As long as Kim Il-Sung remains undisputed leader of North Korea, North Koreans will be reminded of the "debt" Pyongyang owed China for its participation in the Korean War. Nevertheless, Soviet military aid, particularly sophisticated weaponry that China cannot offer, will continue in the capacity of a carrot offered in return for enhanced influence, or at least, military base rights. The Soviets most likely will not repeat their 1962 mistake by cutting off all military aid because Pyongyang does not respond in accordance with Soviet desires. It is interesting to note that while munitions industries in the Soviet Union undoubtedly promote arms sales, the finance ministry must often oppose such sales. The sale of arms has undoubtedly complicated the repayment problems of North Korea.

Chinese motives for supplying arms and military aid to North Korea is not easily perceived. Since it has provided less than ten percent of the total arms flow to North Korea prior to 1973, its initial importance as a supplier had been less relevant. In past years, probably the most important, if not the only reason for supplying arms has been to counter Soviet influence in North Korea. By supplying arms, China has also allowed Pyongyang some independence from Moscow, a factor repayed through Kim Il-Sung's initial neutrality and later tilt toward China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Another motivation for supplying Pyongyang arms, particularly since 1973, has been insuring that North Korea supports Chinese foreign policy initiatives with the West (particularly with the United States and Japan) and its handling of its Vietnamese neighbor.

Obviously, China does not desire to destroy the new relationships with the United States and Japan by providing a dangerously large amount of arms to North Korea. Such a move would be viewed with great alarm in Tokyo, Washington, and certainly Moscow, and would produce a strain in relations with the West. On the other hand, China, more than the Soviet Union, is contrained in decreasing aid and moral support to North Korea. To North Korea, the level of military aid has been an indication of how much support it is receiving in its unification policies. By significantly decreasing military aid to Pyongyang, China would be perceived as supporting

the status quo or the "two Koreas" solution. This not only would lessen its influence over North Korea, but would be contrary to its policies regarding reunification with Taiwan.

The cost of providing arms to North Korea must be taxing on the Chinese. Because China reportedly provides North Korea most of its arms on a grant or a significantly reduced price basis, the cost of such aid must be detrimental to its own on-going Modernization programs. Add to this factor the enormous cost of three weeks of intense combat last year with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. One must ask how much longer China will be able to continue as the primary supplier of arms to North Korea before economic realities overshadow the political objectives.

Has the influx of arms and military assistance contributed to the national security of the recipient nations? Has receiving major arms heightened or lowered the recipient's threat perception? And has the security assistance rendered and arms transferred by the major suppliers been adequate? Yes-no answers to these questions are difficult to support or refute. Obviously the environment of the peninsula must be accounted for when analyzing such questions. The transfer of arms before and during the Korean War produced a situation under which the national security interests of all parties, both supplier and recipient nations, were at stake. Following the war, the flow of arms to the Korean peninsula was more a function of supplier threat perception than recipient threat perception.

One might assume that South Korea's security would have been certain without the major military assistance programs if one believes that American troops deployed in Korea were sufficient security assurance. However, it is a fairly safe assumption that without this American troop and air deterrent present, a South Korea not provided sufficient arms, training, and logistics would have been a tempting target for the North. Because the United States did provide considerable security assistance, much of it in a grant aid form, South Korea was able to devote considerable resources to economic growth. This factor has enabled the South in the 1970s to divert more resources from the domestic sector to the defense sector without adversely affecting their economic growth rate, as was experienced by North Korea in the 1960s. If and when the United States does withdraw its forces from the peninsula, the contribution American arms transfers and military aid had had on South Korea's national security will certainly become clearer.

The large influx of arms into Korea since the latter 1960s has surely heightened the recipients' threat perceptions. This heightened perceived threat can prove very dangerous for the future. The recent input of sophisticated equipment to Seoul, with orders for more and better equipment, cannot sit well in Pyongyang. Comparatively, the revised DIA intelligence estimate of larger North Korean troop and tank levels have made South Korean leaders, some American

Congressmen, and the present administration nervous over North Korean intentions. As seen by past experience, threat perceptions and arms imports act in a directly proportional manner. When the threat perception on one side has risen, so does the demand for more and sophisticated weapons. The receipt of weapons causes the recipient nation's threat perception to lower. However, on the other side, the reaction will be the negative. Once again the cycle begins. The only control to this cycle seems to be the supplier. As seen in the previous chapters, when recipient threat perception is heightened, supplier threat perception is also raised. This is especially true on the Korean peninsula because super-power interests have been inextricably linked with the two developing states. Amicable relations between the major suppliers may offer the hope of multi-lateral control vis a vis supplier pressure and influence over independent actions taken by their client state. As of this writing, however, there appears little evidence the Carter administration is currently taking such a strategy tack.

As there has not been war on the peninsula since 1953, one may be induced to conclude that the supply of arms has been addquate to maintain stability and the status quo. Of course, the view from Pyongyang, when taking in account Kim Il-Sung's strategy for reunification, is quite different from that conclusion. However, as previously discussed, the level of the arms input has been a function more of the suppliers' goals and purposes than of the recipient's. This situation has

resulted in a no-war no-peace situation for the Koreans. Moreover, the external support provided has probably done more to impede unification than any other factor.

As long as the current military equation remains relatively unchanged, North Korea will be able to negotiate from a position of strength in any North-South Talks. South Korea, on the other hand, can negotiate only with the known support and presence of United States troops in Korea. This dependence on a continued United States presence could produce a psychological stigma affecting the confidence of its own military. How can the South Korean military establishment attain the respect and confidence of the people it is sworn to protect when most Koreans look to a much smaller American troop contingent as the main deterrent to invasion from the North?

In the interests of national security, the South and North Koreans have not desired to continue their dependence on foreign made weapons. A major change in the arms trade pattern on the Korean peninsula began in the early 1970s with the development of minor indigenous arms production. By 1980, both countries' indigenous arms industries have drastically reduced their need for the import of foreign produced elementary weapons systems (vehicles, artillery, tanks, small arms, etc.) and spare parts for weapons previously provided by their suppliers. The economic growth of the Korean states, coupled with their increased indigenous capacity has tended to reduce their dependence on the three major suppliers, with a corollary decline in their willingness to follow advice.

The trend towards arms independence by both Korean states will continue through the 1980s. This drive for self-sufficiency will be fueled by uncertainty regarding the commitments of their suppliers. One of the central questions South Koreans must be asking themselves is whether or not the United States can be trusted. A Korean instructor told this author recently that there is a proverb making the rounds in Seoul these past three years: "Don't be deceived by the Soviets, but more important, don't trust the Americans."

To the South Koreans the relationship with the United States has not seen much warmth the past five years. South Koreans have strongly resented their country being treated by the United States as a buffer between the communist threat and Japan. Moreover, the realignment in power relationships in Asia has not improved Seoul's security perceptions. The United States, under President Carter's helm, has evoked emotions of vulnerability and abandonment in South Korean leaders. South Korea seems to have concluded that the only reliable defense must be achieved through a strong economy and military-industrial base. If the current FIP is successfully completed, South Korea will have attained a position of parity or superiority in economic and military power relations with North Korea.

North Koreans must also resent being caught in the see-saw effects of the Sino-Soviet competition for influence. North Korea, like its Southern neighbor, has been attempting

to adjust to the shifting policies of its two suppliers since 1971, when their relationships with the United States began to change. The maneuvering done by North Korea has not produced the results desired. The problem is that while Kim was willing to adjust to the shifting styles of her supplier states, he was unwilling to adjust his methods of attaining unification. North Korea must have concluded that the great-power strategic concept of stability did not allow for his reunification concepts. Therefore, through a limitation of military aid and arms transfers by North Korea's suppliers, the partition of Korea is sustained and welcomed by both Pyongyang's allies and enemies. However, until Pyongyang is certain that Seoul represents a economically, militarily and politically viable force no longer dependent on the United States, there will be little hope for a lessening of tensions on the peninsula.

As long as the tensions on the peninsula remain high, the two Koreas will have to rely on foreign sources for sophisticated arms. This will allow the major suppliers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to maintain through military assistance and sophisticated arms transfer programs a degree of influence on the nature and structure of the North and South Korean military establishments. To be able to influence those military establishments is to be able to influence their respective governments. However, at present, none of the major suppliers appear to have the will or the capability to exercise any decisive influence

over the policies, particularly domestic, of their client states. Furthermore, under the present conditions, it is unlikely any of the major suppliers will reduce their level of flow unilaterally. Most certainly, a precondition would be the resumption of a healthy Soviet-American detente. In such an environment, assurances of arms control or a quid pro quo aid reduction deal might find acceptance.

C. THE FUTURE

Operating under the assumption that the Carter withdrawal plan will eventually continue, the following situations might occur. First, because the cost would reach over \$2 billion, without even accounting for the 2nd Division's redeployment costs, advocates of budget cuts would target in on the program. Moreover, if human rights violations persist in the South, and the current military leadership does not yield to a more democratic oriented civilian government, Congressional unhappiness will adversely affect the funding and perhaps even the phasing of the program. These critics will call for reassessments in the whole military assistance program to South Korea. The danger of these actions lay in the level of American credibility in Asia. The importance of the United States living up to its part of any withdrawal agreement cannot be underestimated.

Nationalism will begin to play a larger role in South Korea. As the generation that grew up with war passes on, the newer generations may question the reasoning behind

opposition to unification. However, to become more attractive to such reasoning, Pyongyang must ensure its unification strategy employs peaceful tactics. Most likely, as the North falls further behind the South economically, the desire for Pyongyang to achieve a forced reunification will grow; but, the prospect of victory through the use of force will diminish. If any temptation for forceful unification were to remain, North Korea would demand more and better arms from its suppliers. Increased arms to the South would develop from the threat cycle.

Upon the death of Kim, some faction within the North Korean military will have a major say as to his successor. That successor may find himself wielding less power than Kim. Since the military is interested in obtaining more sophisticated weapons than China can presently offer, a shift toward Moscow might be the result. Undoubtedly, the death of Kim Il-Sung will result in renewed security pledges by the Soviets and Chinese with the possibility of increased military aid. Obviously, a major influx of arms to North Korea would set off a counter reaction by the South.

Nearly all Soviet approaches to future Korean problems will be evaluated against the Sino-Soviet dispute. Encirclement of China will remain the major objective of the Soviets. The Chinese will also use the Sino-Soviet dispute as background to any policies toward Korea. Nevertheless, China will find it more difficult than the Soviets to justify to Pyongyang any significant agreements involving the United States. Peking

will find itself in a position that may demand the transfer to North Korea more aid and arms than it would have preferred or could possibly afford. A question to be answered in the future will be what will be the effects on the Sino-North Korean relationship if American arms transfers (currently being considered) to the People's Republic of China becomes reality.

Soviet interest will remain strong in the Korean peninsula not only because it serves as an important buffer to China, but also because of Soviet desires to obtain ice-free port facilities for its expanding and powerful Pacific fleet. Soviet attitudes may harden on North Korean independence. Furthermore, the price for arms and aid may involve basing and port rights, a factor to be seriously considered by all parties involved.

The major suppliers will remain the same. However, as the Korean indigenous arms industries produce more and varied weapons, the less dependent they will be on foreign produced weapons. The successful completion of the South Korean Force Improvement Plan will allow Seoul the capacity to build most of its conventional arms and allow for limited export. Furthermore, the agreement to co-produce F-5 combat aircraft will enable South Korea to indigenously produce such aircraft by the mid-1980s. Seoul has already taken the initial steps to supplement United States as a source of technology. If relations with Washington sour, France would be a prime candidate

as an alternative source. However, even if South Korea possessed a plan to adopt a completely different weapon system beginning this year, based on Egypt's experience, it would take nearly a decade to make an effective switch.

Because the cost of heavy tanks and high quality sophisticated combat aircraft is extremely high, Seoul will emphasize in its future purchases of arms, precision-guided munitions (PGM). Primarily defense-oriented weapons systems (TOW, Redeye, Stinger), these represent relatively cheap counter measures to North Korea's superior numbers in tanks and aircraft. As South Korea's military inventory grows in quality and quantity, North Korea may also become more interested in acquiring PGMs to enhance the North's defense capabilities.

Throughout this paper, the intent has been to show the changing environment of the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1980, applying the phenomena of arms transfer and security assistance as a variable affecting or being affected by the factors changing the strategic environment. The importance of arms transfers to both Koreas has been pervasive. While it is safe to assume it has sufficed somewhat the interests of the suppliers, the intrinsic importance of arms input to the recipient states has been harder to measure. The fact that the arms flow into the peninsula has not produced a war may be only half the story. The other half may be a dangerous and costly conflict affecting and involving all the major actors involved in the Korean peninsula.

Chart 1

Milestones: Significant Events - Significant Arms Transfers

	WW II Ends		South	North
1945			P-4 T-6 F-51	Yak-18 PO-2 I1-10
1950	PRC created Sino-Soviet Treaty Stalin dies	Soviets depart Korean War begins US-ROK Treaty Korean War Armistice	M47/48 Tank	Yak-9P MiG-15 La-9 Tu-2 I1-8 T-34 Tank
1955	Chinese depart		F-86F	MiG-15 Chinese built MiG-17 " " MiG-19 " "
1960	NK-PRC Treaty NK-USSR Treaty Khrushchev out	Kennedy Admin. Johnson Admin. U.S. troops in Vietnam	Honest John Nike Hercules Hawk	
1965	Cultural Revolution Sino-Soviet clash	SK troops in Vietnam Tet offensive Nixon Admin. begins Pueblo Crisis	F-5A F-5B F-4E	MiG-21FL SA-2 SAM T-54/55 Tank PT-76 Tank Atoll AAM
1970	Japan-PRC Normalization Mid-East War Salt I	Guam Doctrine 7th Div. leaves SK SK troops leave Vietnam US troops leave Vietnam Ford Admin.	F-4D F-5E Destroyers AIM-9J AAM Patrol boats w/ missiles M-60 Tanks TOW AIM 7E AAM Harpoon ShShM Hel. gunships	SU-7 FGA FROG-5 SSM Styx ShShM SA-7 Missile boats Submarines MiG-21MF
1975		S. Viet falls Axe Murders-Panmunjom Carter Admin. U.S.-PRC normalization Shah of Iran Deposed		T-62 Tank
1980	Soviet Inva- sion-Afghan- istan	US Hostages taken in Iran Park Chung-Hee assassina- ted	F-16(?)	MiG-23(?)

TABLE 16
North-South Comparative Military Expenditures 1952-79¹

Year	North Korea ²			South Korea		
	Total Exp	% GNP	% Nat Bud	Total Exp	% GNP	% Nat Bud
1952	N/A		N/A	67	N/A	N/A
1953			15.2	154	5.7	10.1
1954			8.0	185	6.6	11.5
1955			6.2	151	5.1	10.9
1956	484.5 million		5.9	145	4.7	11.4
1957	won (N. Korean)		5.3	146	5.8	13.7
1958			4.8	172	6.2	14.3
1959			3.7	180	6.4	15.8
1960			3.1	178	6.1	15.7
1961	275		2.6	185	5.7	19.2
1962	305		2.6	213	5.9	25.3
1963	280	12.2	1.9	177	4.2	14.9
1964	300	12.0	5.8	167	3.6	10.7
1965	350	14.0	10.1	175	3.7	11.6
1966	350	12.1	12.5	214	4.0	13.7
1967	470	15.7	30.4	238	4.1	14.2
1968	610	17.4	32.4	281	4.2	16.4
1969	615	15.4	31.0	324	4.1	17.8
1970	700	15.0	31.0	334	3.9	17.0
1971	911	17.1	34.1	394	4.3	17.3
1972	584	13.8	17.0	443	4.4	18.2
1973	630	14.0	15.4	470	3.9	13.3
1974	765	15.8	16.1	601	3.2	15.6
1975	950	16.3	16.4	730	3.8	18.0
1976	1030	11.2	16.7	1460	6.2	19.5
1977	1060	10.5	16.6	2033	6.6	19.1
1978	1230	11.4	16(+)	2586	5.6	19(est)
1979	1231	N/A	N/A	3219	6.4(est)	N/A
1980				4470(est)	N/A	N/A

¹Years 1952-56 (South Korea) are in U.S. \$ million at the 1960 exchange rate. Years 1957-1972 (South Korea) are in U.S. \$ million at 1973 rates. Years 1962-1979 (North Korea) and years 1973-1979 (South Korea) are in \$ U.S. million at current rates.

²Because \$ U.S. to won conversion fluctuates and is difficult to measure accurately, figures denoted may vary slightly with other sources.

Sources:

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Chart 2

\$ US million

Comparative Military Expenditures 1961-1979




Table 17
U.S. Security Assistance to the
Republic of Korea (U.S. \$ mil/FY⁴)

Fiscal Year	Total ⁵	(Grant) Fund Del	Training Grant	FMS ³ Credit	Orders	Del	DEL ⁷ EDA	Total US Aid To E. Asia & Pacific	% To Korea	
49-52	11.7	-	-					160.7	7.3	
53-57	527.8	-	-					2403.7	30.0	
1958	331.1	-	-					627.8	52.7	
1959	190.5	-	-					606.7	31.4	
1960	190.2	total	total					501.6	37.9	
1961	192.2	1950-65	106.3					495.4	38.8	
1962	136.9	\$970.1	1950-66					523.3	26.2	
1963	182.5							651.8	28.0	
1964	124.3							563.7	22.1	
1965	173.1 ⁶							648.9	26.7	
1966	153.1 ⁶	161.7	153.1				38.6	535.6	35.8	
1967	153.4 ⁶	169.4	149.7	3.7			8.3	673.0	23.5	
1968	205.5 ⁶	253.4	197.4	6.6	-	1.5	1.5	51.4	1495.5	13.7
1969	373.1 ⁶	425.2	365.2	7.2	-	3.1	.7	49.3	1509.2	24.8
1970	473.8 ⁶	313.1	466.9	5.0	-	-	1.9	133.6	2147.6	22.1
1971	432.1 ⁶	521.0	411.7	5.4	15.0	.4	.4	51.0	2559.1	16.9
1972	502.9 ⁶	470.4	481.2	4.7	17.0	8.8	.4	24.6	3074.7	16.4
1973	291.7	296.6	264.7	2.0	25.0	1.6	2.4	37.3	4708.8	6.2
1974	149.9	91.1	91.7	1.5	56.7	100.3	13.3	35.3	1850.2	8.1
1975	194.4	78.2	134.1	1.3	59.0	214.3	70.9	16.6	1874.9	10.4
1976	437.9	59.4	175.6	2.3	260.0	616.0	161.4	7.0	683.1	64.1
1976T	1.3	1.1 ¹	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	-
1977	169.0	1.1 ¹	15.3	1.3	152.4	656.1	178.9	7.3	347.7	48.6
1978	302.8	0.4 ¹	26.3	1.5	275.0	390.3	414.4	.9	478.5	63.3
1979	N/A	0.97 ¹	N/A	1.8	225.0	900.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	-
1980 (Proposed)	N/A	0.97 ¹	N/A	1.8	225.0	1700.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	-

* Totals will not necessarily add up due to rounding.

Notes:

- ¹Supply operations only
- ²Excludes undistributed assistance to Southeast Asia
- ³FMS legislation included in MAP prior to 1968
- ⁴Totals are in Fiscal Year dollars
- ⁵Total reflects MAP delivered + FMS Credit + Training grants.
- ⁶Military Assistance Funding related to South Korean forces sent to Vietnam not included. See Table 4 in Chapter III.
- ⁷Delivered Excess Defense Articles - already included in MAP delivered figures.

Sources:

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Table 18
Major Arms Transfers to South Korea
1950-1979

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1950		75	NA F-51 Mustang	1950-52	
		15	Piper L-4	1950-52	
		15	Douglas C-47	1950-52	
		20	Curtiss C-46D	1950-53	
		2	Frigate, "Tacoma" class	1950	on loan
		1	Patrol Boat "PC"	1950	Cost-\$18,000
		100	M-Sherman Tank	1950-51	
		50	M-5 Stuart	1950-51	
		50	M-24 Chaffee	1950-53	
		70	M-10	1950-53	
		200	M-8 Greyhound	1950-59	
1951		500	M47/M48 Patton Tank	1951-66	
		2	Frigate, "Tacoma" class	1951	
		4	Patrol Boat "PC"	1951	
1952		4	Patrol Boat "PCS"	1952	
		4	Motor Torpedo Boat	1952	
1953		1	Frigate "Tacoma"	1953	replacement
	Norway	2	Oiler	1953	
1954		70	M-36	1954-60	
		3	Aero Cdr 520 aircraft	1954	
1955		5	NA F-86F Sabre	1955	
		1	Oiler	1955	on loan
		2	Tank Landing Ship	1955	
		2	Escort "PCE" ships	1955	on loan
		6	Supply Ship	1955-57	
1956		2	Escort "PCE" ships	1956	
		1	Tank Landing Ship	1956	
		2	Frigate "Bostwick" class	1956	

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1956		9	Medium Landing Ship	1956	
		3	Coastal Minesweepers	1956	
		75	NA F-86 F Sabre	1956	10-20 converted to recce version
		6	Sikorsky S-55	1956	
1957		4	Coastal Minesweepers	1957	decommissioned in 1962
		3	Medium Landing Ship	1957	
		9	Lockheed T-33A	1957	
		5	Cessna O-1A Birdog	1957	Recce Plane
1958		30	NA F-86F Sabre	1958	
		3	Tank Landing Ship	1958	
		12	Honest John SSM	1959	
		2	Tank Landing Ship	1959	
		1	Escort Transport	1959	modified destroyer escort
		3	Coastal Minesweeper	1959	MPA transfer
1960		1	Rocket Landing Ship	1960	
		2	Patrol Boat "PC"	1960	
		1	Landing Craft Repair Ship	1960	
		30	NA F-86D Sabre	1960-62	equipped w/ 360 Sidewinder AAM
		5	Cessna LC-180	1960	
1961		4	Escort, "PCE" Type	1961	
		150	M113 APC	1961-65	
1962		2	Tug	1962	
		30	NA F-86D Sabre	1962	equipped w/ Sidewinder AAM
		16	NA T-28	1962	
1963		1	Destroyer "Fletcher"	1963	
		1	Frigate "Rudderow" class	1963	
		1	Escort "Auk" class	1963	
		2	Coastal Minesweeper	1963	MAP transfer
1964		1	Patrol Boat "PC"	1964	

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1964		8	Cessna 185 Skywagon	1964	
1965		15	Cessna 0-1E Birddog	1965	
		30	F-5A Freedom Fighter	1965-66	
		150	HAWK SAM	1965	
		25	Nike Hercules SAM	1965	
		4	Curtiss C-46D	1965-66	MAP
		50	105mm howitzer	1965-66	
		50	155mm howitzer	1965-66	MAP
1966	Japan	2	Kawasaki-Bell KH-4	1966	
	Canada	10	DHC-2 Beaver	1966	
		2	Escort Transport	1966	
		60	203mm howitzer	1966-67	MPA
1967		5	Douglas C-54	1967	
		2	Curtiss C-46	1967-68	MAP
		5	Cessna 0-1A Birddog	1967-68	MAP
		3	Escort Transport	1967	2 transferred under MAP
		2	Escort "Auk" class	1967	
1968		2	F-5B Freedom Fighters	1968	MAP
		40	F-5A Freedom Fighters	1968	
		1	Coastal Minesweeper	1968	MAP
		1	Coastal Minesweeper	1970	MAP
		2	Destroyer "Fletcher" class	1968-69	on loan
		1	Hydrographic Survey Vessel	1968	
		9	Patrol Boats	1968-69	
1969		19	F-4E Phantom	1969	\$52m - ROK \$48m - US MAP
		5	Bell UH-1D Helicopters	1969	\$2.4m
		700,000	M-1 rifles	1969	
1971		-	M-16 rifle factory	1971	\$10m factory contract replaced F-5s sent to Viet- nam, leased until 1976-bought for \$46.5m

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1971		18	F-4D Phantom	1972	
		10	Grumman S-2 Tracker	1971	
		12	Honest John SSM	1971	
		2	Bell 212 Twin Pac	1971	
		50	203mm Howitzers	1971	MAP
		50	M113A APC	1971	MPA
		50	M60 Tanks	1971	Transferred from U.S. 7th Div.
		50	M107 Howitzer	1971	MAP
		50	M48A2C Patton Tank	1971	MAP
		1	Patrol Boat	1971	
		1	Oiler	1971	
		1	Supply Ship	1971	
		2	Destroyer "Gearing" class	1972	on loan
		4	Pazmany PL-2 light Aircraft	1972	built for evaluation
1972		72	F-5E Tiger fighters	1974-22	MAP
				1975-24	MAP
				1976-21	MAP
				1977-2	MAP
		0	Hughes AGM-65 Maverick ASM	1975-76	to arm F-5Es
		733	AIM-9J Sidewinder AAM	1974-220	
				1975-240	
				1976-210	
				1977-63	
		1	Patrol Boat	1973	
		2	Coastal Minesweeper	1975	MAP
		22	T-33A Lockheed Trainer	1972-4	
				1973-4	
				1974-4	
				1975-4	
				1976-4	
				1977-2	

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1973		3	Fast Patrol Boats PSMM	1973-74	\$16m credit
	Great Britain	2	HS 748 Transports	1974	
1974		4	Coastal Patrol "Tacoma"	1977-2	3 others being produced by SK under license
		7	Fast Patrol Boats PSMM	1975-2 1976-2 1977-3	
		40	Standard ShShM	1975-77	
1975			Solid Fuel Rocket Motor Plant from Lockheed Corp.	1975	\$2m
		19	F-4E Phantom Fighters	1978-79	\$178m; arms; Sidewinder AAM & Maverick ASM
		54	F-5F Tiger - 2	1978-79	\$205m; follow-up order in '72 ordered in '72
		6	F-5F Tiger - 2	1977	
		120	Harpoon ShShM	1978-79	\$81m; mil. trans- port equip, spares, training
		600	AIM 96 Sidewinder AAM	1977-79-(480)	arming F-4 fighters
		1	"Casa-Grande"-class dock landing ship	1976	arms; AA guns
		2	"Gearing"-class destroyer	1977-2	in add. to 2 previously acquired
		66	Vulcan 20mm AAG	1975	
1976		34	"Hughes" 500/MD armed heli.	1976-78	\$50m for total of 100; 66 license produced by S.K., 4 del. in '76 w/o arms; arms: TOW ATM
		24	Rockwell OV-10G Bronco observ. heli.	1977	\$58.2m; part of total \$116.1m. sale before FY77

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1976		200	Hughes AGM-65A Maverick ASM	1977-78.(150)	\$10.2m, arming 60 F-5Es
		1152	Hughes TOW ATM	1977-78-(720)	arming heli.
		421	M-48 main battle tanks	1977	\$35.6m for con- version to the M-48A3/AS
		3	"Asheville"-class fast missile boats	1975-76	new const.; 4 more built under license in S.K.
	Italy	170	Fiat-6614 CM APC	1977-20	built under license in S. Korea
		?	Lance SSM	1977	to replace Honest John & Sergeant
		12	Cessna A-37A COIN/ trainer	1977	
		10	Bell AH-1J heli. gunship	1977	
		10	Fairchild C-123 transport	1977	
		100	Hughes-500 M defender hel missile	1976-4 1977-30	
		45	Nike Hercules SAM	1977	
1977		341	AIM-7E Sparrow AAM	1979	
		45	Bell UH-1H Cobra Hel		\$40m
		20	Bell UH-1B Hel	1977	\$1.1m
		100	Laser Guided Bomb Kits	1977	\$3.7m
		6	Lockheed C-130H Hercules trans		\$7.6m
		18	F-4E Phantom fighter		\$156.2m
		24	Honest John SSM	1978-79	Transferred from US forces
		15	M-88 A1 Tank recovery vehicle	1978	\$12m
			MIM-23B Hawk SAM	1978	\$82m
1978	France	?	MM-38 Exocet ShShM		Unknown # ordered
		72	A-10A Fighter	1978-2	Pending approval for remainder

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1978		?	M48A3 Tanks		\$7.1m
		6	CH-47C Chinook Hel		Pending approval
		2,208	Hughes BGM-71A-1		Pending approval
			Air-to-Surface TOW ATM		\$17m
		4	Patrol Ship "Asheville"		
		37	M-109A2 SP Howitzer		\$24m
		1	Patrol Boat "Grasp" 1978		
1979		1,800	Hughes BGM-71A TOW ATM w/10 launchers		\$13.7m
		4	AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder		\$29m
		60	F-4E		Pending LOA
		180	F-16A/B Fighter		Disapproved by President

*Supplier is the United States unless indicated in this column.

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Table 19
Major Arms Transfers to North Korea
1950-1979

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1950	China	100	MiG-15	1950-51	Built in USSR
		35	La-9	1950-51	
		200	Ba-64	1950-51	
		100	Su-76	1950-53	
		100	BTR40	1950-57	
		150	BTR152	1950-59	
		450	T-34 Tank	1950-52	
1951		35	Tu-2	1951-52	
		10	I1-12	1951-52	
1953		100	MiG-15	1953	
		5	I1-28	1953	
		70	La-11	1953	
		2	I1-28U	1953	
		8	Li-2	1953	
		5	Mi-1	1953	
		15	Yak-17 UTI	1953	
		15	MiG-15 UTI	1953	
1954		10	YAK-11	1954	
		4	Patrol Boats, "MO 1" Type	1954	
		8	Fleet Minesweepers, "Fugas" Type	1954-55	
1955		30	I1-28	1955	
1956		100	MiG-17	1956-58	
		12	Motor Torpedo Boats, "P4" Type	1956	
1957	China	4	Fong Shou No. 2 fighters	1957	AN-2 produced under license in China
	China	24	Inshore Minesweeper	1957-60	
1958	China	80	MiG-15	1958	
	China	40	I1-28	1958-59	

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1958	China	4	I1-28U	1958-59	
	China	20	Shenyang Yak-18	1958-59	Supplement those supplied before '50 by Soviets
	China	300	Shenyang F-4	1958-60	Chinese version of MiG-17
1959	China	20	MiG-19	1959-60	
		2	Patrol Boat "Artillerist" Type	1959	
1963		2	Minesweeper, "T43" type	1963	
		9	Motor Torpedo Boat "P4" Type	1963	
1965		14	MiG-21FL	1965	
		15	I1-14	1965	
		3	MiG-21 UTI	1965	
		5	An-24	1965-66	
		100	Su-100	1965-68	
		250	BTR 152	1965-71	
		250	BTR 40	1965-71	
1966		150	PT-76	1966-68	
		21	MiG-21	1966	
		360	SA-2 SAM	1966	
		20	Mi-4	1966	
1967		70	T-54/55	1967	
		2	Submarine "W" class	1967	
		7	Gunboat "MGB" type	1967	
		3	Torpedo Boats, "PTF" Type	1967	
	China	4	Patrol Boat "Shanghai"	1967	
		18	Torpedo Boat "P4"	1967	
1968		4	Gunboat, "PTG" type	1968	
		65	MiG-21	1968-71	
		390	K-13 "Atoll" AAM	1968-71	
		250	T-54/55 Tanks	1968-70	

<u>Ref Year/ Date Ordered</u>	<u>Supplier</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Date(s) Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1971		28	SU-7 FGA	1971	
		40	"Frog-5" SSM	1971	
		3	"Samlet" SSM	1971	
		132	"Styx" ShShM	1971-72	to arm 8 "OSA" class & 6 "Komar" class patrol boats
		8	Missile boat, "Osa" class	1971-72	
		6	Patrol boat, "Komar" class	1971-72	
1972		200	SA-7 SA missile	1972-73	
		20	Frog 7 arty rocket	1972-73	
		50	T-55 tanks	1972-73	
		2	Submarine "W" class	1972-73	
1973	China	2	Submarine "Romeo-L" class	1973	Co-produced w/ China
1974	China	2	Submarine "Romeo-L"	1974	
	China		T-59 Tanks	1974	
		2 sqns	MiG-21 MF	1974-78	latest version license prod. begins '78
			Frog-7 SSM	1974	deployed at est. 2 sites
1975			SS-N-2 "Styx" ShShM	1975	to arm new missile boats
			Fast patrol boats	1975	
		50	T-62s	1975	
	China	3	Submarine "Romeo-L"	1975	
1976	China	2	Submarine "Romeo-L"	1976	
1978			MiG-23?		

*Supplier is the Soviet Union unless indicated in this column.

Note: More often than not, "date ordered" and "number ordered" are not available. Information on arms transfers to North Korea is sketchy and difficult to obtain.

Sources:

- SIPRI Yearbook 1972, p. 137.
SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p. 333.
SIPRI Yearbook 1974, p. 274.
SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 232.
SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 266.
SIPRI Yearbook 1977, p. 324.
SIPRI Yearbook 1978, p. 268.
Arms Trade Registers. The Arms Trade With The Third World, SIPRI 1975,
pp. 10-12.
FEER Asia Yearbook 1980, pp. 48, 211.
"Home Made Romeos," Aviation and Marine, January 1977, p. 29.

Table 20
 Combat Aircraft Transferred to the Korean Peninsula
 1945-1979

1949-50	Yak-18 & Po-2 trainers, Il-10 bombers, Yak-9P fighters (estimated total = 150 first-line aircraft)	P-4 liaison planes, T-6 Texan trainers
1950-53	MiG-15, Yak-17, La-9 fighters, Il-12 and Tu-2 bombers, Il-28 twin-jet bombers (estimated total after war = 250 first-line aircraft)	F-51 Mustangs
1954-55	Additional Il-28 jet bombers Yak-11	F86 Sabre fighter-bombers (5)
1956-57	MiG-17s begin replacing MiG-15s ¹ ; An-2	F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers (75) replaced USAF fighter-bomber wing
1958-60	MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-19s Yak 18s from China	F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers (total by end of 1960 = 200)
1965-68	MiG-21 FL, MiG-19s, An-24, Su-100s	F-5A (70); F-5B (6)
1969		F-4E (19)
1972	Su-7 (28)	F-4D (18)
1974-77	MiG-21 MF	F-5E (72)
1978-79		Requested F-16s - request vetoed by President Carter F-5E (54), F-5F (6), F-4E (18)
1980	MiG-23 (?)	F-16 (?)

¹The first Chinese-built MiG-17 on Soviet license was completed in 1956, with subsequent production of 20-25 per month. More than likely these MiG-17s were Chinese built. (From Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1960-61, John W. R. Taylor, ed., London, 1960.)

Table 21
License-Produced Weapons - South Korea

<u>Year</u>	<u>Licenser</u>	<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Date in Prod.</u>	<u># Planned/Produced</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1971	USA	M-16 Rifles	1971	-	\$95m coproduction agreement
1974	USA	CPIC-type coastal patrol boat w/ "Harpoon" ShShM		5/1	One built & delivered by U.S. in '74. Remaining 4 to be built in S. Korea
1975	USA	"Bell" helicopter transport version	1977		S. Korea planning to set up own hel. industry
1975	USA	Multi-mission patrol ship w/SSM	1975	7/3	3 were built in U.S.; 4 being built in Korea
1976	USA	Medium-range ballistic missile	1976		South Korea purchased all plant & equip. from Lockheed - developed own missiles in '78
1976	USA	"Hughes" 500 MD helicopter	1978	100/34	66 to be assembled in S. Korea., 34 del. by USA in '76-'77.
1976	USA	"Pazmany" PL-2 light plane		/4	S.K. AF built 4 as prototype & evaluation as a trainer aircraft
1976	Italy	Fiat, 6614 APCs	1977	170/20	First 20 built in Italy
1979	USA	F-5E/F Fighters		68/	Agreed upon when F-16 deal was disapproved. Agreement calls for co-production of engines & airframes for 36 aircraft w/ Northrop Corp. Pending Congressional approval.

Sources:

- SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 209.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 245.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1977, p. 301.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1978, p. 218.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1979, p. 164-165.
- "Foreign Military Markets," DMS 1979, South Korea Summary, pp. 7-8.

Table 22
License-Produced Weapons - North Korea

<u>Year</u>	<u>Licenser</u>	<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Date in Prod.</u>	<u># Planned/ Prod.</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1970	USSR	"P-6"-class fast attack torpedo boats	1972	/at least 15	growing numbers being built in N. Korea
1975	USSR	MiG-21	pro. 1978	"	
1976	China	Chinese "Romeo"-class submarine	?	/9-11	production continuing
?	USSR	T-62 tank	?	200+/?	

Sources:

- SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 209.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 245.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1977, pp. 300-301.
- SIPRI Yearbook 1978, pp. 217-218.
- Don Hirst, "N. Koreans Making T-62 Tanks", Army Times, No. 23 (8 January 1979), p. 21.
- FEER Asia Yearbook 1980, p. 48.

Table 23

Indigenously Produced Weapons in Korea

South Korea¹

The South Korean government's defense industries produce artillery howitzers, spare parts, rifles, small caliber ammunition, small displacement naval ships, mortars, rocket launchers, Vulcan air defense systems, tactical communications equipment, medium tanks, and solid fuel rocket engines for larger surface-to-surface missiles. Under its Force Improvement Program (FIP) launched in 1976, plans call for the eventual capacity to produce large caliber weapons, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, fighter aircraft and large naval ships (frigates).

Nearly 50 percent of all military equipment utilized by the South Korean military is indigenously produced. However, as the majority of South Korea's defense equipment is of United States manufacture, Seoul remains heavily dependent upon the United States for parts replacement or the technology to produce them in South Korea. South Korea desires to export indigenously manufactured arms.

North Korea²

Except for sophisticated items such as aircraft, electronic equipment and missiles, North Korea can produce virtually all their military equipment to include T-62 tanks and self-propelled artillery. The arms base in North Korea is significantly larger and has been established longer than that of the South's. The present indigenous production base and stockpiling gives Pyongyang the capability to sustain offensive operations for several months without the need of external support.

Sources:

¹SIPRI Yearbooks 1977, 1978, 1979

"Foreign Military Markets," Defense Marketing Services, (Greenwich: DMS, 1979), South Korea Summary, p. 17.

²SIPRI Yearbooks 1977, 1978, 1979

"U.S. to Beef Up Equipment in Korea," Army Times, No. 30 (February 25, 1980), p. 37.

Table 24
Comparative Army Strengths

	<u>North Korea*</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
Personnel	560,000-600,000	520,000
Infantry	35 Inf. Divs. 3 Mot. Inf. Divs. 4 Inf Bdes. 3 Recce. Bdes. 8 Lt. Inf. Bdes 5 AB Bns	17 Inf. Divs. 1 Mech. Div. 5 Special Forces Bdes. 2 Armed. Bdes. 2 AD Bdes.
Tanks	2 Tk. Divs 5 Indep. Tk. Regts T-34: 350 T-54 T-55 1800 T-59 Med. PT-76: 100 T-62 Lt. Tks.: 50** BTR-40 BTR-60 BTR-152 800 M-1967 APC	7 Tk. Bns. M-47 M-48 860 M-60 M-113 M-577 500 Fial 6614 APC: 20
Artillery	3AA Arty. Divs 20 Arty. Regts. 10 AA Arty. Regts. Guns/How.: 3,500 Mortars: 9,000 RCL: 1,500 RL: 1,300 AA: 5,000	30 Arty. Bns SP Guns/How.: 2,000 Mortars: 5,300 TOW, LAW ATGW; Vulcan AA Gun
Missile	3SSM Bns. w/ FROG FROG-5SSM: 9	1 SSM Bn. w/ Honest John 2 SAM Bdes, w/ improved HAWK & Nike Hercules SAM HAWK: 80 Nike Hercules SAM: 45
Reserves:	260,000 23 Divs.	1,100,000
Para: Military	40,000 security forces & border guards 2,500,000 civilian militia	2,800,000 Homeland Defense Reserve Force

* Figures reflect 1979 updated intelligence reports

** Sources in Seoul say the North Koreans may have already deployed about 2,600 indigenously produced T-62 tanks.

FEER Asia Yearbook 1980, p. 211.

Source: The Military Balance 1979-1980, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), p. 68.

Table 25
Comparative Air Force Strengths

	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
Personnel:	45,000	32,000
Total Combat Aircraft:	565	254
Bombers	I1-28: 85	-
Fighters	Su-7: 20 MiG-15/17/19: 340 MiG-21: 120 (on order: MiG-23?)	F-4D: 18 F-4E: 19 F-5E/F: 135 F-86F: 50 RF-5A: 12 S-2F: 20 (on order: 18 F-4E, 14F-5E, 24 OV-10G)
Transport	251	34
Helicopters	60	54
Missiles:	AA-2 Ato11 AAM SA-2: 250 (3 SAM Bdes)	Sidewinder, Sparrow, AAM (AIM-9L Super Sidewinder and Maverick ASM on order)
		Reserves: 55,000

Source: The Military Balance 1979-1980, (IISS), p. 68.

Table 26
Comparative Navy Strengths

	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
Personnel:	27,000	47,000
Submarines	15	-
Destroyers	-	9
Destroyer Escorts	-	9
Coastal Escorts	-	10
Coastal Patrol Craft	27	33
Fast Patrol Boats, Guided Missile (SSM)	18 (Styx)	8 (HARPOON, EXOCET)
Fast Patrol Boats	303	5
Coastal Minesweepers	-	9
Landing Ships	70	22
Frigates	3 (1 building)	-
Motor Gunboats	100	-
Motor Torpedo Boats	157	-
		Reserves: 25,000
		<u>Marines:</u> 20,000
		1 Div
		2 Bdes
		LVTP-7APC

Source: The Military Balance 1979-1980, (IISS), p. 68.

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