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
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THE SOVIET UNION AND ASEAN

by 11) 1 Apr 80

10) Thomas L. Wilborn

1 April 1980

9) Strategic issues research
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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Kathleen M. Preitz.

FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. THOMAS L. WILBORN has been with the Strategic Studies Institute since 1974. He earned a bachelor's degree in journalism and a master's degree and doctorate in political science from the University of Kentucky. In addition to teaching political science and international relations at Madison College and Central Missouri State University, his professional background includes a position with the University of Kentucky educational assistance program at Bandung, Indonesia. Dr. Wilborn is the author of several research memoranda on nuclear strategy and Southeast Asia and has written book reviews published in professional journals.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ASEAN

As the 1970's draw to a close, with the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation continuing and the status of the Soviet-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea still unsettled, Soviet policy makers were directing increased attention to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the states which compose it: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Their proximity to Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos—now allies, if not clients, of the Soviet Union—and China's open conflict with Vietnam over Kampuchea and the treatment of ethnic Chinese make the region another battlefield in the cold war between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, the continuing conflict between Pol Pot's guerrillas and other anti-Vietnam forces, supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet and Vietnamese-sponsored Heng Samrin regime could cause part of one ASEAN country, Thailand, to become a hot war battlefield as well.

For ASEAN states to recognize the Kampuchean government imposed by Vietnam would not only imply their retroactive acceptance of Vietnam's invasion, but it would also dramatically deny legitimacy to China's armed assault against Vietnam and thus

be a stunning defeat for the PRC. But for ASEAN to continue to recognize Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, even though the regime was the object of universal condemnation when it was in power, and to accept China's linkage of its attack on Vietnam to the continued presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, must be considered a Soviet diplomatic defeat, a barrier to the spread of Vietnamese and Soviet influence in the region, and a sign of the growing influence of the PRC. The positions of ASEAN governments are thus of major importance in the struggle of the Soviet Union with its Communist adversary, the People's Republic of China.

This relatively high concern is very recent, however. From 1965, when the unsuccessful coup in Jakarta temporarily ended its already declining ability to influence Indonesian policy, until 1978, when the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed, the Soviet Union placed greater emphasis on relations (or lack of them) with the United States, China, Western developed nations, and other Socialist states, and also seemed to have imputed more significance to other Third World areas such as South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam and the other states of Indochina received more of the Kremlin's attention than either ASEAN as an organization or its member governments.¹ An examination of the reasons for involvement in Indonesia before 1965, the failure of that policy, and the relative neglect from then until very recently should help in understanding and evaluating present Soviet policy towards the region.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND FAILURE IN INDONESIA

Post-Stalin Soviet policy first recognized the Third World as an arena through which the influence of the West, particularly the United States, might be limited by encouraging neutralism. Then, as Khrushchev began to impose his personal stamp on Soviet foreign policy, an offensive was launched to expand Soviet influence and obtain allies among a few selected former colonies.

Indonesia was designated as one of the emerging nations forming what Khrushchev called a "zone of peace" with the Socialist countries. These countries were thought to be particularly open to Soviet assistance and Soviet interpretations of the international environment.²

Indonesia had a popular, anti-Western, charismatic leader in President Sukarno; a national elite that seemed largely committed to eradicating Western economic control and willing to make common cause with domestic Communists; a large and dynamic Communist party (by 1965, the largest in any non-Communist state); a leadership role among former colonies as a result of being the host of the first Afro-Asian summit (the Bandung Conference); and the potential to dominate the politics of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, because of its dispute with the Netherlands over the status of West Irian, Indonesia needed weapons and political support which the United States and its allies were unlikely to provide. Supporting Indonesia then seemed to Moscow a particularly useful way to promote tensions in an area of the world with important Western interests. To do so would present the Soviet Union as both an alternative source of foreign assistance and a consistent supporter of still weak former colonies against the exploitation of imperialists and colonialists.³

The expectations of Khrushchev and his colleagues, which must at least have included the calculation that Indonesia would not side with the enemies of the Soviet Union, were to be in large part unfulfilled. With Soviet support, Indonesia did cause tension and conflict in the region and present serious problems to the United States and its allies, but Soviet influence in Jakarta was always limited. The USSR offered Indonesia something over \$1 billion in economic and military aid (but actually spent much less)⁴ and gave Indonesia complete political support during its West Irian campaign and effective (albeit less enthusiastic) support against Malaysia. Nevertheless, President Sukarno and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) led Indonesia firmly into an alliance with the PRC, by then in open confrontation with the Soviet Union, and directly opposed Moscow's efforts to increase its influence with Third World nations. Thus the Soviet Union's diplomatic failure with Indonesia occurred before the abortive coup in 1965, partly as a result of relying too much on the response of one man, Sukarno, and partly as a consequence of the failure of the Soviet leadership to attend to the needs of the PKI as diligently as it did those of Indonesia's armed forces.⁵

Whatever the lessons which Khrushchev's successors learned from this "hare-brained" scheme,⁶ it seems clear that their predisposition for a more cautious foreign policy style was

affirmed. In the future they would intervene massively in the Third World only when significant Soviet interests were at stake and when favorable results were reasonably certain.

ASEAN'S LOW PRIORITY IN SOVIET POLICY

The low priority which Soviet policy makers had accorded the ASEAN area until recently grew out of ideology, the nature of foreign policy objectives, economic interests, and strategic considerations.

The ideological framework in which Soviet policy toward the Third World is articulated and rationalized has been described and analyzed by others,⁷ and need not be reexamined here. Suffice it to say that current orthodox interpretations of Marxism-Leninism still confidently assert the inevitability of the victory of socialism, but at the same time urge caution and tactical flexibility. Capitalism is still considered very strong and the leading capitalist state, the United States, still has the capability to destroy much of the world—and many of the gains of socialism—in nuclear war. Moreover, nuclear war would leave agrarian societies relatively less damaged than industrialized societies, “thus eliminating most of the industrial working classes and leaving the future to the peasant-based Maoist ‘model’.”⁸ As explained by Geoffrey Jukes of Australian National University,

... basically the [ideological] framework, which is more a Beatitudes than a Ten Commandments, reflects the historical conditioning of a regime which has found (a) that the world does not change as fast as it might like, but (b) it has nevertheless, and contrary to the expectations of its founders, not merely managed to hold on to power for almost two generations, but has advanced the country which it controls to the status of one of the world's two superpowers. History, in short, appears to be on its side, and may safely be nudged now and then but not to the point of cataclysm; and maximization of the Soviet position within the existing system not merely does not contradict the revolutionary imperative to replace it with something else, it is a necessary precondition if the eventual inevitable change is to be of a welcome variety.⁹

In other words, the doctrine which provides the framework for perceptions and interpretations of the international environment for Soviet decisionmakers not only does not require that the USSR be heavily involved in the Third World, but it also provides the assurance of ultimate success, in spite of temporary setbacks and diversions, without intervention. Marxism-Leninism, then, would

not appear to counsel a more radical policy for the USSR than *realpolitik* considerations alone might dictate. To the contrary, as currently interpreted in the Soviet Union, it contains a conservative bias when applied to the Third World.

In the recent past, "maximization of the Soviet position within the existing system" apparently did not require Soviet leaders to be particularly concerned with the states which make up ASEAN, and certainly not with ASEAN itself. The principal Soviet political objectives in Asia (limiting the influence of China, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Japan) have been negative,¹⁰ and were not seriously threatened since these three rivals did not significantly increase the levels of their activities in such a way as to adversely affect the Soviet Union's strategic position. Indeed, since the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975, the US presence—specifically its military presence—in ASEAN has been measurably reduced. The United States removed 25,000 men and equipment for them, including 350 aircraft,¹¹ from Thailand at the request of the Thai government. Also, the number of personnel assigned to the military assistance advisory groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand has significantly decreased. There are probably less than half as many US military personnel in all three countries as once were assigned for military assistance to Thailand alone.¹² While Japanese economic penetration of ASEAN nations and Chinese diplomatic efforts to gain support for its "anti-hegemony" campaign continue, the former has not seriously threatened Moscow's larger political or strategic interests there and the PRC has not been successful in its efforts.

In terms of volume, trade between the countries of ASEAN and the Soviet Union has been almost insignificant, and while it increased from \$134.1 million in 1971 to \$432.2 million in 1977, it represented a smaller share of total ASEAN trade in 1977 (0.7 percent) than it did in 1971 (0.9 percent). The figures for the Soviet Union's Socialist adversary, the PRC, included for comparison, suggest that Soviet trade is of little value in the overall competition. China maintained its share of ASEAN trade throughout the period at about twice the volume of the USSR's commerce. As shown in Table 2, thirty percent of this small volume represents trade with one ASEAN state, Malaysia, but this represented only 1.2 percent of Malaysia's total trade in 1977.

The small volume notwithstanding, Soviet trade with ASEAN

TABLE 1
 Aggregate of ASEAN Trade With the USSR, China, and the World, 1971-77
 (in Millions of Dollars)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<u>EXPORTS</u>							
USSR	103.8	83.8	192.0	335.0	202.1	309.6	366.0
China	33.4	50.2	140.8	152.0	135.3	183.2	390.4
World	6,579.2	7,842.8	13,371.1	18,594.2	20,764.5	29,991.0	31,826.2
<u>IMPORTS</u>							
USSR	30.3	21.8	21.8	54.7	59.6	61.2	66.3
China	226.6	251.6	456.8	605.4	706.3	661.2	719.2
World	7,993.0	9,403.3	14,217.9	22,956.8	23,412.4	26,230.8	30,131.8
<u>TOTAL</u>							
USSR	134.1	105.6	213.8	389.7	261.7	370.8	432.3
China	260.0	301.8	597.6	757.4	841.6	844.4	1,109.6
World	14,572.2	17,246.1	27,589.0	41,551.0	44,176.9	56,221.8	61,958.0

Source: Direction of Trade, Annual 1971-1977, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1978, pp. 154-155, 166-187, 224-225, 239-240, 256-255.

TABLE 2
 Malaysian Trade With the USSR, China and the World, 1971-77
 (In Millions of Dollars)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<u>EXPORTS</u>							
USSR	49.8	36.4	102.7	175.0	102.9	119.0	119.5
China	18.2	27.1	80.7	87.1	52.4	44.8	119.9
World	1,639.0	1,718.3	3,045.8	4,235.9	3,805.6	5,296.6	6,083.8
<u>IMPORTS</u>							
USSR	3.6	4.0	6.8	4.2	5.5	10.1	10.8
China	66.1	69.0	147.6	195.4	148.9	134.4	140.5
World	1,444.7	1,600.6	2,503.8	4,156.2	3,526.1	3,963.4	4,546.7
<u>TOTAL</u>							
USSR	53.4	40.4	109.5	179.2	107.5	129.1	130.3
China	84.3	96.1	228.3	282.5	201.3	179.2	260.4
World	3,083.7	3,318.9	5,549.6	8,392.1	7,331.7	9,260.0	10,630.5

Source: Direction of Trade, Annual 1971-1977, Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1978, pp. 224-225.

and especially with Malaysia is of some economic significance to the Soviet Union. This is because 97 percent of the natural rubber and latex it purchases comes from there. These purchases represent 12 to 15 percent of the total exports of these commodities from Malaysia, and 7 to 8 percent of the total export of them from Indonesia.¹³ The supply of natural rubber and latex is important enough for the USSR to endure a very unfavorable trade balance to obtain it (see Table 2), but it is not vital to Soviet economic or national security. At any rate, natural rubber and latex are available through normal commercial avenues which are likely to remain open unless there is a major conflict in the area.

The ASEAN area is typically described as of great strategic importance to the West because it contains the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, which connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and through which pass at least 85 percent of Japan's crude oil imports, as well as other important commodities. These straits and the entire ASEAN area are not of comparable strategic significance to the Soviet Union, however.¹⁴

The Soviets are not in any serious way dependent on trade which passes through these waterways, although the Pacific Ocean Fleet of the Soviet Navy does transit waters which belong to ASEAN nations. Most Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean, including the antisubmarine craft which monitor US SLBM's, are from the Pacific Fleet, and must pass through straits claimed by Indonesia and/or Malaysia to get there.¹⁵ A threat to free passage through the straits during a crisis might be inconvenient to the Soviet Union, to say the least, but such a development is highly improbable in the foreseeable future, since the littoral states are self-consciously nonaligned and unlikely to directly confront either superpower.

The straits of the area would be of limited significance to the Soviet Navy in the event of a general war. Soviet naval doctrine assumes a brief conflict,¹⁶ and, in any case, the Pacific Ocean Fleet, the weakest of the four Soviet fleets,¹⁷ does not have the capacity to engage American naval forces so far away from its bases and ground-based air cover in Vladivostok and Petropavalovsk.¹⁸ In a crisis or conflict involving Japan, the Soviet Union might attempt to interfere with Japanese sea lanes of communications, but, as Jukes points out very strongly, there are easier ways for the Soviets to disrupt Japanese trade than launching a military operation against the Strait of Malacca.¹⁹ Should the speculation that a Soviet

naval base will be established at Cam Rahn Bay prove correct, it is possible that the mission of the Pacific Ocean fleet in the Southwest Pacific will be changed and the strategic significance of the ASEAN region enhanced in Soviet naval strategy, although the logistical problems for the Soviets of sustaining a military installation in the South China Sea would limit its utility in wartime.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ASEAN

When ASEAN was founded in 1967, Moscow had diplomatic relations with only two of its members, Indonesia and Thailand, and these ties were not cordial. The Suharto regime in Indonesia had allowed (if it did not conduct) the massive vendetta against Communists and Communist sympathizers and was suspicious of the Soviet Union as a Communist government which harbored and protected some of the leaders of the PKI (even though it distrusted the PRC more).

The Thai Government, the United States' most faithful SEATO ally, whose territory was being used to conduct the war against the "patriotic forces of Vietnam," was characterized by Soviet propaganda as a clique of reactionary traitors who served the cause of imperialism, and obviously were not entitled to friendly relations with the Soviet Union.²⁰ In fact, Soviet interactions with Singapore and Malaysia, with whom there was no formal diplomatic representation until 1968, were more responsive and profitable than those with the states which housed Soviet embassies, for mutually beneficial trade was developing. But even these former British colonies were aligned with the enemies of the Soviet Union, since they both accepted the protection of their former colonial masters. They soon would enter into a defense agreement with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, all participants in US-dominated anti-Soviet military blocs.

Given the nature of Soviet relations with the members of ASEAN, Soviet endorsement of the new organization was not anticipated and was not forthcoming. Instead, Soviet propaganda condemned it as a transparent effort of the United States and its followers to involve more Asian states in anti-Communist military alliances.

Today, the United States is taking particular interest in ASEAN, for besides the countries that are already tied to the West by military agreements, the organization includes Indonesia, one of the largest states in Southeast Asia. As pointed out in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Indonesia's membership immediately lent the new organization a "special character." Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore have even agreed to include in the ASEAN declaration a clause on the temporary nature of the foreign military bases on their territories. According to Reuter's News Agency, however, this was merely designed to "attract Indonesia."

The backstage initiators of ASEAN also hope to draw nonaligned states into the alliance . . . It is significant that after Indonesia joined ASEAN, Jakarta began to develop relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government and the South Vietnam puppet regime, and negative features began to appear in its foreign policy.²¹

Ultimately, after inducing other nonaligned states to join, the US imperialists hoped to merge ASEAN and the Asian and Pacific Council into one great military bloc, the Soviets contended. Moreover, they asserted that there was no possibility for ASEAN to achieve the goals of economic cooperation which were the formal basis for its existence.

Experience has shown that the success of regional alliances depends largely on the extent to which the countries involved are unified on an anti-imperialist basis, resist the pressure of foreign monopolies and on the extent to which their struggle for economic independence is supported by Socialist countries.²²

Obviously, ASEAN would not have a chance.

The first positions of Soviet commentaries on ASEAN were thus highly critical and focused on the reprehensible relationship of the United States with the regional organization. This was a regular theme through the rest of the decade. The evaluations of ASEAN were anything but constant during the 12 years, however. By early 1972, Soviet publicists were preparing for the signing of the first SALT agreements and the Soviet-American statement on Basic Principles of Relations,²³ which, among other things, constituted formal US recognition of the superpower status of the Soviet Union and the supplanting of the Cold War by peaceful coexistence or detente. And in the spirit of detente, the Soviets were now discovering active progressive forces in many parts of the world, including Malaysia and Singapore, which had seemed before to be totally dominated by the agents of monopoly capitalism. In the

Philippines, they reported the existence of a president (Marcos) who had campaigned on positions which were "in the national interest," a phrase always reserved for commendation, even though he had accepted American guidance by joining ASEAN and allowing US bases to remain on Philippine territory.²⁴

Descriptions of internal Indonesian politics in Soviet publications still failed to suggest any redeeming social value,²⁵ but they now did note that Suharto and his generals had refused to endorse American aggression in Vietnam and that Indonesia had resisted the transformation of ASEAN into a military bloc—both positions that allegedly enraged the Pentagon and thus pleased the Kremlin. The condemnatory tones of the first evaluations of ASEAN as an organization were also softened and then were replaced for a time by praise.

In a January 1972 commentary on the signing of the declaration by ASEAN foreign ministers supporting the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia (before the new line was clearly established), *Izvestia* Political Observer V. Kudryavtsev reasoned that this support for neutralization resulted from the fear in "certain circles" that the Vietnamization policy being pursued by the United States at the time was a prelude to greater Chinese influence or perhaps greater Japanese influence—conditions that these groups did not want to develop. Kudryavtsev thought that the tendency to seek neutralization of the area was a positive one "since it demonstrates the downfall of the illusion that it is possible to find among the imperialist powers an unselfish protector that will help to strengthen the independence of one Asian country or another." However, the other side of the coin was that all of the ASEAN states except Indonesia had some kind of military arrangement with imperialist states. Peace, freedom, and neutrality could not come to Southeast Asia until all American troops and bases were thrown out, the military alliances dissolved, and the Nixon doctrine rejected.²⁷ The absence of these conditions was regrettable, he thought, for neutralization was an idea which was based in the "existing situation in Southeast Asia," and therefore presumably in conformation with Soviet interests, which would also be based in the existing situation. "Possibly neutralization would be conducive to the creation of a system of collective security in Asia; the proposal for creating such a system is cherished by all those who seek the normalization of the situation in Asia and the ensuring of peace and security in that region."²⁸

Six months later (after the friendly line toward ASEAN was established), the same observer wrote an upbeat analysis which deemphasized the conditions which were unfavorable from a Soviet perspective. Although the advocates of neutralization in Southeast Asia were not always consistent, he said the idea was gradually asserting itself. One had to be wary that neocolonialism was not camouflaging some devious scheme, but:

It would be wrong to ignore the frame of mind in the political circles of many Asian countries that is beginning to understand the pernicious effect of blocks, which prevent them from making full use of all their potential opportunities for economic and cultural development in conditions of national independence.²⁹

The only evidence of this beneficial trend cited was President Marcos' verbal attacks on the agreements which allowed US military bases on Philippine soil.

Apparently, Soviet policy makers considered that positive trends continued to dominate developments within ASEAN and its members until late 1976. During this period, when the governments of ASEAN were attempting to come to grips with the Nixon doctrine, the fall of South Vietnam, and the expulsion of US forces from Thailand, Soviet commentaries on the individual states were generally benign. They virtually always noted that in the spirit of detente and in recognition of the victories of the patriotic forces of Indochina, the ASEAN states were seeking to broaden relations with the Socialist states and achieve more independent foreign policies. The principal theme applied to ASEAN itself was that the declaration to transform Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality might be consistent with the Soviet proposal for Asian collective security, and that the declaration was evidence that the peoples of the area really desired true independence and the removal of foreign military forces.³⁰

The theme that US imperialists wanted to convert ASEAN into a military pact was revived during 1976, especially after an agreement was reached to dismantle SEATO. This was very possibly a reflection of the general deterioration of US-Soviet relations at the time. Unlike the commentaries of 1968-70, the new versions always noted, until 1977, that ASEAN leaders rejected the devious scheme of American militarists, and they also made positive reference to the neutralization proposal. In a July 1976 broadcast in Indonesia,

Radio Moscow listeners were told that "sources close to the Pentagon" had confirmed that Indonesia had been offered an increase in annual aid of from \$100 million to \$700 million in exchange for approval of the development of a "so-called training base" for ASEAN which was to double as a harbor for part of the Seventh Fleet.³¹ That Indonesian leaders refused such offers suggested that they were men of integrity committed to genuine peace.

During the same time (1967-76), Soviet activity among ASEAN nations was more consistent than the themes of its media. There was a continuous effort to expand trade, increase the volume of ASEAN nationals visiting the Soviet Union, and expand cultural contracts. When formal diplomatic relations were finally established with the Philippines in 1976, the Soviet Union had achieved full representation with all ASEAN nations, filling its embassies, according to some observers,³² with many more people than the volume of trade or other interactions justified. This attention, which only involved routine relations except for a major initiative with Indonesia in 1975, still represented a much greater degree of Soviet activity than ASEAN governments were accustomed to. Foreign Minister Romulo of the Philippines described the situation this way in 1971:

We in Asia are beginning to feel the impact of a Soviet Russian offensive, something we have never experienced before. The Soviets have sent mission after mission to almost all countries of the region except mainland China; she has put up trade fairs in Singapore and Malaysia and has in turn received missions from these countries. There is no denying the growth of Soviet presence.³³

The major initiative toward the area was the extension of \$100 million credit to Indonesia for the construction of two hydroelectric plants in 1975 and an offer of \$360 million to build an alumina plant on Bintan Island.³⁴ Whether the latter represented a major attempt to regain a position of influence in Indonesia or primarily reflected the Soviet Union's resource needs is uncertain.³⁵ At any rate, the offer was rejected in 1977, presumably because the Suharto regime objected to the influx of Soviet technicians which would accompany such a project.

In late 1976, the allegations that the United States, supported by the Maoists, planned to convert ASEAN into another SEATO became more numerous and began to dominate commentary on ASEAN. Unlike the comments of early 1976, these broadcasts and

articles noted that some official ASEAN leaders, such as the militarists who had overthrown the short-lived democratic government of Thailand and the Indonesian minister of defense, supported the American generals.³⁶ Indeed, it was pointed out that there were already a number of bilateral military cooperation agreements, and that, if the practice were expanded, ASEAN would become a military bloc in fact even though it was not one in law.³⁷ As before, the intense American pressure on ASEAN leaders was emphasized, but with the new twist alleging that some of the military leaders of ASEAN countries, the special target of militaristic imperialism, had been won over.

Attaching great role to the ASEAN in its Asian strategy, the Pentagon devotes special attention to the military circles of that organization. By bribery, flattery, paid trips to resort areas of the United States, by different receptions and promises, the Pentagon and the CIA are trying to make the military circles of the ASEAN countries take a pro-American stand in respect to the future of the association.

It is mainly with the help of the military of the ASEAN that the Pentagon managed not only to strengthen its positions in Thailand but to a great degree to preserve its positions in Indonesia, in the Philippines and to penetrate other countries.³⁸

The charge that the United States was attempting to make ASEAN into an anti-Communist military alliance was almost the only theme of greatly increased media coverage for about a year. American imperialists and military industrialists applied all manner of pressure, apparently with unlimited resources, by providing economic assistance to obtain political levers over military policy of ASEAN states, and by "imposing its own weapons and ammunition on them."³⁹ US militarists also enrolled the assistance of Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in the campaign to replace SEATO with ASEAN.⁴⁰ The Soviet media in this period avoided any commendation for the governments of ASEAN. Only "the people" or "progressive people" who opposed the dangerous trends received praise.⁴¹

Several developments apparently were unusually distressing to the Soviet media. One was a three-day symposium on military problems in Jakarta attended by representatives of ASEAN states, a gathering which was said to be inconsistent with the purpose of ASEAN. General Surono, identified as deputy commander of the Indonesian armed forces, addressed the symposium and called on

ASEAN countries "to sacrifice certain national interests for the defense of the region,"⁴² presumably against communism. Another was the alleged conspiracy between imperialism and Chinese hegemonism which was tied more directly to ASEAN militarization than before.⁴³ Chinese support for US forces in Southeast Asia was roundly condemned, and typically linked with the charge that Beijing manipulated the ethnic Chinese communities of ASEAN nations for use as spies and "fifth columns." A third dangerous development was the continuing proliferation of bilateral military agreements among ASEAN members. Long lists of such agreements were included in several commentaries, giving special attention and condemnation to a proposal for joint production of ammunition "with the support of US military industrialists," Indonesian Defense Minister Panggabean's plan for all ASEAN air forces to standardize with the F-5, the various joint maneuver proposals, and the agreement between Thailand and Malaysia to cooperate in opposing the "so-called Communist rebels" operating along their common border.⁴⁴ A practice which was held particularly incompatible with the cause of peace was the alleged use of the Seventh Fleet to influence the decisions of the Bali Summit in 1976 and the foreign ministers' meeting in 1977.⁴⁵ During both meetings, Soviet media reported that the United States deployed warships into the Indian Ocean for the purpose of putting pressure on ASEAN. Finally, outrage was repeatedly expressed against the slanderous, false, and malicious accusations of Beijing and the imperialists that the peaceloving outpost of socialism in Asia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), was a threat to any of its neighbors.⁴⁶

Moscow's line changed abruptly in November 1977. All of the developments which had disturbed the Soviet media as recently as the previous month were still present and in fact tended to become more extensive and visible in the following months. The bilateral military cooperation agreements which, they had repeatedly complained, would automatically transform ASEAN into a military alliance at some point continued to proliferate. ASEAN weapons standardization, the practice which was supposed to lead to the dependence of the member nations on the military-industrial complex in the United States, was still discussed, being partially implemented by some ASEAN members. None of these matters were any longer mentioned as significant factors which should influence the relations of the Soviet Union and the five members of

ASEAN, however. According to the Soviet publicists, the reason for the positive appraisal was that members of ASEAN had finally "demonstrated a realistic and sober understanding of the situation"⁴⁷ that developed in Southeast Asia after the victory of the Vietnamese patriots over the American aggressors. As a result:

In the past three years the developing countries of Southeast Asia have acquired great political weight in the international arena. This is explained above all by the fact that in the search for ways to resolve the urgent problems of development, an understanding of the need to establish and reinforce neighborliness is prevailing in the region. When the socialist countries of Indochina launched peace-loving initiatives, they did not fall on barren ground but met with a positive response among ASEAN countries.⁴⁸

Additionally, the journal of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada concluded that ASEAN was founded, as the ASEAN members claimed, to develop cooperation in economic, social, and cultural questions, and that it was an outgrowth of "the objective trend toward economic integration in this area" which was manifest in 1967.⁴⁹ ASEAN must be congruent with the laws of historical development, then, and not a conspiracy created for the purpose of enmeshing Indonesia into an anti-Communist alliance, as it had been described in *International Affairs* in 1969.

The explanation for the shift back to positive media treatment can only partially be explained by changes within the member-states of ASEAN or in conditions of the region. It is true that Vietnam and the nations of ASEAN were expanding diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations, and the doctrinaire anti-Communist Thanin regime in Thailand had been replaced by a much more pragmatic one headed by General Kriangsak. But this might not have been adequate justification to ignore the developments which had previously been criticized. Except for improved ties with Thailand, the Soviet Union's diplomatic and economic relations with the members of ASEAN were generally unchanged, in spite of propaganda shifts. Media treatment of the individual countries also was generally unchanged, except that some atypical attacks were made against Indonesia,⁵⁰ and the Marcos regime received brief censure after signing the amendments to the base agreements with the United States in early 1979.⁵¹ There were no reports of offers of Soviet economic aid to any ASEAN state other than Indonesia, although East Germany did extend \$30 million to the Philippines.⁵²

The principal reasons for the Soviet shift must have been the emerging conflict in Indochina and China's demands on Vietnam, which made it necessary to compete with Beijing for favorable relations with the states of ASEAN. As that conflict intensified, with Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and, later, China's attack on Vietnam, the strategic importance of ASEAN for the Soviet Union increased geometrically. If the neighbors of Indochina would accept the new regime in Kampuchea and condemn the Chinese attack against Vietnam, their action would tend to legitimize the domination of Indochina by the Soviet Union's ally, the SRV. Without their acceptance and condemnation, international recognition of Vietnamese hegemony of Indochina would be difficult to achieve.

Within the new approach, the Soviets continued to expose the devious schemes of the imperialists to turn ASEAN into a military alliance and the even more reprehensible plans of the hegemonists in Beijing to subdue Southeast Asia through the extensive overseas Chinese fifth columns. An extremely heavy barrage of anti-Beijing propaganda, especially stringent in the Mandarin language broadcasts to Southeast Asia, was unleashed about the same time that the new line toward ASEAN was adopted. Now, however, listeners and readers were assured that "responsible representatives" of ASEAN,³³ realistic enough to know that economic progress required stability and neighborly relations in Southeast Asia,³⁴—that is good relations with Vietnam—had not been seduced. Public assurances that ASEAN would never be allowed to become a military pact, questioned only a year before because of the many bilateral military cooperation agreements, were now accepted at face value.

Following the positive line, Soviet writers began to find successes where a short time before contradictions or inconsistencies had always been present. ASEAN's economic achievements, which most Western observers think are rather modest, were described as extremely important accomplishments of economic cooperation. ASEAN states were even excused for accepting capital from foreign monopolists, because their poverty, resulting from years of exploitation by colonialists and neocolonialists, gave them no other choice. They were praised because they were trying "to limit manifestations of the exploitative essence of imperialist capital."³⁵ ASEAN's international policy was described as "constructive,"³⁶

and the members' foreign policies were said to contain principles that were almost the same as those of Vietnam.⁵⁷

Four ASEAN positions apparently accounted for these commendations. The advocacy of friendly relations among all states of the region and the refusal to allow ASEAN to become a military pact have already been cited. In addition, ASEAN's proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality for Southeast Asia was also praised, sometimes very profusely, as being consistent with Soviet foreign policy.⁵⁸ (The Soviet Asian collective security proposal, always before the framework for discussing Southeast Asia neutrality, was no longer mentioned.) Soviet writers had some difficulty with semantics, however, since Vietnam had surfaced its own proposal for a zone of "peace, independence, and neutrality," and the difference between ASEAN's "freedom" and Vietnam's "independence"—the latter implying repudiation of existing security arrangements with the West—became the subject of some controversy.⁵⁹ At least once Vietnam's formula was identified with the original ASEAN proposal,⁶⁰ but finally the solution of leaving out the disputed words altogether and speaking of a "zone of peace and neutrality" was adopted for Southeast Asian audiences.⁶¹ The contrasting solution of using both words—a zone of peace, freedom, independence, and neutrality—and ascribing authorship to Hanoi became the most favored mode of reference in the Russian language press.⁶²

A final reason for the laudatory Soviet comments about the foreign policies of the ASEAN states related to their rejection of China's efforts to incorporate ASEAN into its anti-Soviet strategy, and otherwise frustrate Beijing's aggressive designs. China's threat to ASEAN was one of the major themes of Moscow's propaganda effort, reminding listeners and readers that the great-Han-nationalist hegemonists were conspiring with the imperialists to make ASEAN a military pact;⁶³ that the Hau/Deng clique supported antigovernment terrorists in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand;⁶⁴ that their spies were all over Southeast Asia;⁶⁵ and that the overseas Chinese communities were potential fifth columns.⁶⁶ The spectre of Beijing manipulating 20 million overseas Chinese for its own purposes was particularly emphasized after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam.⁶⁷ The Soviets' determination not to criticize ASEAN governments was most obvious during the

Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. In all of the coverage of those two wars in the Soviet Union section of the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report* there is no reference to the failure of the ASEAN states to adopt pro-Vietnam positions. For instance, there was no acknowledgement that the resolution before the Security Council linking Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea with the Chinese attack on Vietnam, which Vietnam and the Soviet Union adamantly opposed, was drafted by the ASEAN members. Although the Pol Pot regime which Vietnam deposed was characterized as bloodthirsty and tyrannical and the People's Republic of Kampuchea was called a true peoples' democracy,⁶⁶ Soviet media did not demand that ASEAN governments withdraw their recognition from Pol Pot and confer it on the government imposed by Vietnam. On the contrary, Soviet publicists implied some satisfaction that Southeast Asian "personages" and periodicals supported the Heng Samrin regime, and they simply failed to report the absence of support from political leaders and governments.

More and more signs have shown that personages in ASEAN are increasingly fond of Kampuchea's new leadership and are planning the establishment of neighborly ties. . .

Newspapers and magazines in this area say that ASEAN countries are likely to recognize Kampuchea's new leadership. This shows that the five ASEAN countries are taking an increasingly greater liking to the real democratic leadership of Kampuchea . . . ASEAN countries are taking a sober and patient attitude toward the SRV's policy in this area. . . .

The ASEAN countries are taking a friendly and neutral stand toward the democratic forces in Indochina. They have rejected Beijing's anti-Vietnam and anti-Kampuchea appeal, and it is possible they will engage in constructive cooperation with Vietnam and Kampuchea in the future.⁶⁷

The first significantly critical commentaries about ASEAN in almost two years appeared only in July 1979 in the context of the refugee question. The final communique of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting considering the massive influx of "boat" and "land" people into the ASEAN countries called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and placed the blame for the refugee problem on the SRV.⁷⁰ It was obligatory, therefore, for the Soviet Union to protest, since its position was that the whole

refugee problem had been instigated by the United States and China, and that Vietnam was blameless. It was a muffled criticism, however, apparently distributed only within the Soviet Union:⁷¹

...attitudes were reflected which are hardly likely to lead to cooperation being established among the countries of the region... Responsibility for creating the so-called refugee problem is placed on Vietnam; and this is done despite facts known to all which testify that the departure of Chinese nationals from Vietnam was provoked by the Beijing leaders. Such positions are similar to Western appraisals of the situation in Indochina. This is connected, observers believe, with the desire of the countries of the association to obtain wider economic aid from the developed capitalist countries during the talks which begin today between ASEAN representatives and the US Secretary of State Vance and the Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand foreign ministers.⁷²

In the next several days, the Soviet commentary on ASEAN directed to Southeast Asia questioned whether ASEAN's existence was endangered because of the tension being whipped up by Beijing. But these sources failed to mention the refugee question and they ended with positive appraisals.⁷³

SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Has Soviet foreign policy in ASEAN been a success or failure? Evaluation of a nation's foreign policy is always difficult, even in a general way, because the causes of international events and conditions are always complex. For instance, a goal of Soviet foreign policy toward the ASEAN states is to reduce the influence of the United States, but the possibility that US influence is less now (and almost certainly was less in 1976) than it was in 1967 does not necessarily imply that Soviet policy after 1967 was effective. A more plausible explanation would be that any reduction in US influence was a result of the outcome of the Vietnam War, at most only partially accounted for by Soviet policy, and the decision of the American government to concentrate on other areas of the world—Europe and the Middle East—rather than Southeast Asia. Thus, a condition desired by Soviet policy makers may have been partially achieved, at least temporarily, but more as a result of good fortune than of conscious design.

In contrast, the significantly improved official standing of the Soviet Union in the ASEAN region today compared to 1967 while

no doubt facilitated by favorable (from the Soviet viewpoint) regional and international conditions which the Soviets did not themselves create, was directly the result of deliberate efforts by the USSR to take advantage of the opportunity provided by changes in US policy and to expand its diplomatic and trade relations with the five ASEAN members. This accomplishment should not be scored as an extremely important achievement, since most ASEAN elites were disposed to favor improved relations with the Soviet Union anyway. But it did represent a modest success. Uncertain about US intentions in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, the elites of ASEAN were probably more inclined to be responsive to Soviet policy needs (although they were suspicious at the same time) from 1975 until 1978 than at any other time.

In the case of the Soviet Union's policy toward ASEAN, evaluation is also complicated by the low priority which the region apparently was assigned by the Soviet policy makers until very recently. Given the low priority, it probably was (and would be) considered acceptable to try to limit Chinese influence only by propaganda, diplomatic representation, and other relatively low cost tactics. It may have been enough for Moscow that ASEAN formally abjured any kind of military role; Soviet publicists could claim that this was a victory achieved in spite of intense imperialist pressure. They undoubtedly would have preferred for governments of the area to be friendly to the Soviet Union, and for ASEAN to serve as an institutional framework through which its members could reduce their economic dependence on the West. Given the limited resources that the USSR committed to the region, however, the conditions that prevailed in 1977 were probably pleasing to the Soviets, particularly when compared to the late 1960's.

If (as has been argued here), ASEAN is no longer a low priority region, present Soviet policy must be judged by different criteria. At the least, a successful Soviet policy would have to strengthen the position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia and serve to reduce Chinese influence. Instead ASEAN governments have developed policies concerning the Vietnam-Kampuchea, Vietnam-China, and Indochinese refugee disputes which have been partially coordinated with the United States, and which are closer to Beijing's positions than those of Moscow. Moreover, the Soviets appear to have been excluded from participating in what they consider the most important regional decisions since the end of the second Vietnam

war. The limited deference and responsiveness which ASEAN displayed toward the USSR for a brief time was completely negated by Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and for Hanoi's expulsion of hundreds of thousands of refugees.

The Soviets must be especially displeased that all ASEAN governments still recognized the Pol Pot regime as the legitimate government of Kampuchea at the end of 1979, that they drafted the resolution debated by the Security Council which linked the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, and that they have levied the blame for the refugee problem primarily on Vietnam, rather than on the targets of Soviet propaganda—the United States and China.

In fact, in the relatively short time since ASEAN has become dramatically more salient in the Soviet perspective, there has probably been nothing which the Soviets could have done to improve their position. Presently there are no Moscow or Hanoi-associated Communist parties of any significance in any ASEAN country which could have been manipulated to put pressure on the regimes of the region. Soviet trade with ASEAN was very small and could not have been used to influence any of the governments in the current regional conflicts. Promises of foreign aid may become a factor in future Soviet strategy to obtain more favorable decisions from ASEAN governments, but given the swift pace of developments in Indochina and the sensitivities raised by the refugee problem, it could not have been an effective short-term instrument of Soviet policy. Demonstrations of military force might not have been as impressive as those the United States could have deployed, and, in any case, probably would have proven counterproductive by playing into the hands of factions which supported the presence of US forces in the area.

Appropriate opportunities and usable capabilities simply were not available to the USSR. The failure to obtain short-term objectives was part of the price for acquiring its relationship with Vietnam, and Soviet leaders may have been more than willing to pay it in the short run. In the longer term, however, the relative advantage *vis-a-vis* China that has been gained through pro-Moscow governments in Indochina will lose much of its value to the Soviet Union if ASEAN governments become more responsive to Chinese and/or US desires. At the least, the Soviet Union needs to induce ASEAN governments to accept the Heng Samrin

government in Kampuchea and to support the SRV against China, possibly using assets (e.g., insurgent groups and military bases) acquired as a result of SRV victories in Indochina. Soviet efforts to achieve these ends should be expected to intensify and probably become more varied.

Thus the answer to the question of the success or failure of Soviet policy toward ASEAN at this time must be that there is as yet no evidence of success. However, the final judgment cannot be rendered until a degree of stability in Indochina has been achieved, and this may take a long time indeed.

ENDNOTES

1. See Robert C. Horn, "The USSR and Southeast Asia: The Limits of Influence," in *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World*, ed. by Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 156-178, and Geoffrey Jukes, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 31, April 1977, pp. 174-184.
2. See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The Soviet Union and the Third World: From Khrushchev's 'Zone of Peace' to Brezhnev's Peace Program," in Kanet and Bahry, p. 4.
3. Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union are briefly discussed in most accounts of the abortive coup in 1965 and in analyses of Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia. See, for instance, Antonie C. A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Benteng: Indonesia Communists between Moscow and Peking, 1959-1965*, The Hague: Mouton, 1973, *passim*; Horn; Jukes; Guy Pauker, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia," Rand Paper Series, P-5080, July 1973, and Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 175-245.
4. Pauker, p. 8, computes the total grants of credits at more than \$1 billion. Except for the sports coliseum in Jakarta and a hospital which was a gift to the people of Indonesia, no Soviet economic projects were completed. Horn, p. 164.
5. Horn, p. 164; Jukes, p. 176; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia," in *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*, ed. by Roger E. Kanet, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 103, emphasize that the basic cause for the Soviet diplomatic defeat was overdependence on President Sukarno personally. On the other hand, Ra'anan, p. 235, tends to stress the fact that the PKI was not discouraged from supporting Chinese positions by the USSR.
6. Valkenier, p. 4.
7. See Horn; Jukes; Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin," in Kanet, pp. 27-50; Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970's and Beyond: An Interperceptual Study*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976, especially Chapter 1, and "An Approach to the Study of Soviet Policies for the Third World," in Kanet and Bahry, pp. 20-32; and Valkenier, pp. 3-9.
8. Jukes, p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
10. See Horn; Sen Gupta; *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970's and Beyond*; and Pauker for discussions of Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia.
11. These were the figures used by *The New York Times*, March 18, 1975, p. 1.
12. The Security Assistance Program proposed for FY 1980 authorized 98 personnel in the three countries. US Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Security Assistance Program: Congressional Presentation, FY 1980*, p. 40.
13. Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), No. 72385, p. 37, translated from *DDR Aussenwirtschaft* (Berlin), January 31, 1979, p. 3.
14. Jukes, pp. 181-183, for elaboration.
15. Donald C. Daniel, "The Soviet Navy in the Pacific," *Asia Pacific Community*, Spring/Early Summer 1979, p. 73.

16. In sustained naval conflict, the Pacific Ocean Fleet would have to be resupplied through the straits of the area. With their present capabilities, however, the Soviets could not protect these routes, especially from air attacks. This may be the major reason—it is certainly a sufficient reason—why Soviet doctrine only provides for a short naval campaign.
17. *Asia Yearbook*, 1979, p. 39.
18. Daniel, p. 73, and *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, Third Edition, Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, January 1978, p. 14.
19. Jukes, p. 183.
20. For example, see Y. Kusnetsov, "Thailand: People and Bases," *New Times*, No. 12, October 1967.
21. V. Pavlovsky, "Problems of Regionalism in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1969, p. 50.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
23. The Statement on Basic Principles of Relations was signed at the Moscow summit in conjunction with the first SALT agreements. Basically, these principles affirmed that the United States and the Soviet Union should practice peaceful coexistence or detente.
24. William Pomeroy, "New Trends in the Philippines," *New Times*, No. 5, February 1970, p. 20, and V. Spandaryan, "In the Land of Rubber," *New Times*, No. 22, May 1967, pp. 21-24.
25. B. Vetin, "The Situation in Indonesia," *New Times*, No. 8, February 1973, pp. 26-27.
26. For example, *Ibid.*, and N. Volghin, "The Options Before Indonesia," *International Affairs*, December 1971, pp. 65-68.
27. Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. XXIV, No. 1, p. 11, translated from *Izvestiia*, January 7, 1972, p. 2.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
29. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, No. 25, p. 9, translated from *Izvestiia*, June 22, 1972, p. 3.
30. Dimitry Volsky, "Common Cause of the Asian Peoples," *New Times*, No. 50, December 1974, pp. 18-19.
31. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Soviet Union Daily Report*, July 13, 1976, p. K2, translated from Radio Moscow broadcast in Indonesian to Indonesia, July 7, 1976. (All subsequent reference to FBIS will be from the *Soviet Union Daily Report*.)
32. Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN: Stopping Any Shade of Red," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 24, 1979, pp. 24, 26.
33. Sen Gupta, *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970's and Beyond*, p. 234, reprinted from the *Manila Bulletin*, February 17, 1971.
34. US Central Intelligence Agency, p. 24.
35. The Soviet Union is dependent on imported bauxite and aluminum.
36. Alexander Usuatov, "Where ASEAN is Being Pushed," *New Times*, No. 3, January 1977, pp. 8-9.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
38. FBIS, January 7, 1977, p. K1, transcribed from a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia, July 5, 1977.
39. FBIS, April 6, 1977, translated from *Krasnaia Zvezda*, April 2, 1977.
40. FBIS, March 2, 1977, K1, translated from Moscow Radio broadcast in Indonesian to Indonesia, February 21, 1977.

41. *Ibid.*, p. K2, and FBIS, June 23, 1977, p. C1, translated from Radio Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, June 20, 1977.
42. FBIS, February 7, 1977, p. K1, translated from TASS International Service, February 3, 1977.
43. For example, see A Chernyshov, "The Pacific: Problems of International Security and Cooperation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1977.
44. FBIS, September 19, 1977, pp. K1-K2, translated from *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, September 13, 1977, p. 3, and October 7, 1977, p. K1, translated from *Krasnaia Zvezda*, October 2, 1977, p. 3.
45. FBIS, March 2, 1979, p. K1, translated from Radio Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, February 21, 1977.
46. Chernyshov, p. 82.
47. FBIS, July 18, 1978, p. K1, translated from *Izvestiia*, July 12, 1978, morning editorial, p. 5.
48. FBIS, November 1, 1978.
49. JPRS No. 72348, p. 78, translated from *SSHA: Ekonomika, Politika Ideologiia*, No. 10, October 1978, pp. 61-65.
50. FBIS, May 8, 1978, p. K1, translated from Radio Peace and Progress in Indonesian, May 3, 1978; and January 3, 1979, p. K2, transcribed from TASS in English, December 25, 1978.
51. FBIS, January 8, 1979, pp. K1-K2, translated from Radio Moscow in Japanese to Japan, January 5, 1979.
52. US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1978*, March 15, 1979, p. 28.
53. JPRS, No. 72348, p. 78.
54. FBIS, June 19, 1978, p. K1, transcribed from TASS in English, June 16, 1978.
55. FBIS, October 10, 1978, p. K1, translation from V. Kalinin, *Pravda*, October 4, 1978, p. 4.
56. FBIS, August 16, 1978, p. K1, translated from Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, August 8, 1978.
57. Yuri Nikolayev, "Soviet Writer Looks at ASEAN Indochina Relations," *Business Times* (Kuala Lumpur), April 15, 1978, p. 6.
58. For instance, FBIS, September 13, 1978, p. K1, translated from Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, September 9, 1978.
59. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "The USSR and Indonesia," pp. 6-7, for a discussion of the controversy.
60. FBIS, March 19, 1979.
61. See note 53.
62. CDSP, Vol. XXX, No. 42, p. 10, translated from *Pravda*, October 21, 1978, p. 5, and No. 43, p. 9, translated from *Pravda*, October 29, 1978, p. 4.
63. FBIS, January 12, 1979, p. K1, translated from Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, January 10, 1979.
64. CDSP, Vol. XXX, No. 43, p. 9, translated from *Pravda*, October 26, 1978, p. 5.
65. FBIS, February 14, 1979, p. K4, translated from Radio Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, February 9, 1979.
66. FBIS, September 12, 1978, p. C2, translated from TASS International Service, September 8, 1978.

67. FBIS, June 20, 1979, pp. E1-E2, translated from TASS International Service, June 19, 1978.
68. FBIS, June 21, 1979, p. E1, transcribed from TASS in English, June 19, 1979.
69. FBIS, January 18, 1979, p. L9, translated from Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, January 16, 1979.
70. FBIS, July 3, 1979, p. E3, translated from Moscow Domestic Service, July 2, 1979.
71. FBIS contained no criticisms beamed at foreign audiences.
72. FBIS, July 3, 1979, p. E3.
73. FBIS, July 10, 1979, pp. E4-E5, transcribed from TASS in English, July 2, 1979.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum considers whether Soviet foreign policy in the ASEAN countries has been a success or failure. The author contends that after Vietnam invaded Kampuchea with Soviet support--and the ASEAN area assumed greater importance to Moscow than ever before--whatever influence the USSR had in ASEAN capitals was negated. ASEAN countries forcefully have opposed Vietnamese and Soviet policy toward Kampuchea and the refugee problem, and indirectly have supported China. The author believes that Soviet strategy to contain China requires at least ASEAN neutrality, and that Soviet moves to reverse current trends can be expected.		

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