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IMPLICATIONS OF US POLICY ASSUMPTIONS**

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**SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD:
IMPLICATIONS OF US POLICY ASSUMPTIONS**

1. Study of the Soviet Union's role in the Third World
by

Keith A. Dunn

10 June 1980

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



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Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. KEITH A. DUNN joined the Strategic Studies Institute as a civilian in the summer of 1977. Prior to that time he was an Army intelligence officer. Dr. Dunn earned a master's degree and doctorate from the University of Missouri in American diplomatic relations, and has written and published articles on the interrelationships between detente and deterrence, the origins of the Cold War, and the Soviet military.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: IMPLICATIONS OF US POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

While the Soviet Union has been directly or indirectly involved in Third World politics for many years, the recent successes of pro-Marxist-Leninist forces in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Laos, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Cambodia as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have caused a rejuvenated interest in the USSR's role in such crises. The increasing instability and violent disorder that has permeated the Third World within recent years has directly affected bilateral relations between the superpowers causing each one to question—rather vociferously at times—the motivations, involvement, and intentions of the other in a particular region. Moreover, there is a growing apprehension in some government and academic circles that the USSR is now more brazen than in the past and is willing to take more risks in its drive to expand Soviet worldwide power and influence.

Frequently, this latter apprehension has been related to the phenomenal quantitative and qualitative growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. As long as the United States had and was perceived to have strategic nuclear superiority, hardly anyone questioned America's ability to protect its basic national interests. Even though the USSR has always had a quantitative conventional

superiority, the American nuclear umbrella was viewed as the great equalizer. The US nuclear force deterred the USSR from military attacks not only upon the continental United States but also upon America's closest allies in Europe and Asia. Also, America's strategic nuclear superiority combined with its refusal to adopt a no-first use of nuclear weapons position helped to discourage the USSR from undertaking adventurous actions which might bring the United States and the USSR into direct military conflict.

Currently, many analysts wonder if the former constraints upon the USSR are still operative. Neither of the superpowers can obtain nuclear superiority in the same manner as the United States did during the 1950's and 1960's; the future will be an era of strategic nuclear equality in gross terms but with asymmetries in particular means of delivery. This situation, it is feared, may encourage the USSR either by direct or proxy pressure to initiate actions which are inimical to America's long-term interests. While such activities would not necessarily be limited to the Third World, it probably would be an area of primary Soviet interest. These misgivings about future Soviet actions have caused the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment:

Although the Soviets traditionally have been very cautious in the direct use of their own military forces outside their immediate sphere of control, their present position of approximate strategic nuclear equality, with momentum toward a situation of possible overall military superiority, could create further incentives for greater risks.

The greater the Soviet perception of freedom of action in the military realm, the greater the danger that they might attempt to exert the leverage of military power (threatened or used) in extending their economic, diplomatic or ideological influence.¹

General Jones is not alone in his worries. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has criticized the Carter Administration for its inability "to convey a clear perception of where it stands" on the issues. He has claimed that the Administration "sometimes conveys the impression that we are more sympathetic to elements that oppose the people who have heretofore been our friends than to our friends."² Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker has linked his opposition to the SALT II Treaty to the overall US-Soviet military relationship including, "the situation in Africa, the situation in Cuba, the potentially troublesome situation in the

Arabian Gulf, in Southeast Asia and the massive buildup of Soviet conventional armaments.”³

No thoughtful observer would want to denigrate the extent of Soviet involvement in the Third World. Nor would one want to underestimate the potential damaging implications for American foreign and defense policies. Nevertheless, it is important to keep the recent Soviet “successes” in some sort of overall perspective. Undoubtedly Soviet opportunities and involvements in some areas of the world are greater than they may have ever been. But with benefits and potential successes also come costs and disadvantages. Too often, however, the latter are disregarded and the USSR is prematurely depicted as “winning” in a zero-sum game.

In an attempt to assess the implications of Soviet behavior for US foreign policy, this essay will identify and discuss some of the more often cited assumptions concerning Soviet behavior in the Third World.⁴ The list is far from exhaustive, and the assumptions are listed in no particular order. These assumptions are just some of the more important and common ones that have permeated some American policymaking and academic circles. The analysis of them may help to sharpen “American perspectives regarding Soviet opportunities and capabilities.”⁵

Assumption One: Somehow the Soviets are Primarily Responsible for Events Which are Adverse to American Interests.

As John Kenneth Galbraith has argued, two overriding fears have pervaded all aspects of American political life: “one is the fear of Communism; the other is the fear of being soft on Communism.”⁶ Those preoccupations have made it difficult—if not impossible—to develop a coherent, consistent policy toward the USSR. Nevertheless, almost all major US foreign policy initiatives in the post-World War II era have been related to American policymakers’ perceptions of the USSR. Even the recent normalization of relations with China has been widely characterized as an attempt “to play the China card” in the poker game with Moscow. Moreover, American force posturing, planning, and programming is predicated upon the intelligence community’s assessment of Soviet capabilities and the policymakers’ evaluation of Soviet intentions.

Given the military strength of the USSR, no prudent policy could belittle its significance for American foreign or defense policy. The

USSR is America's main political, ideological, and military adversary and is currently the only nation which is militarily capable of inflicting significant damage upon US territory. However, the obsession with the USSR and communism has often desensitized Americans and caused them to seek simple solutions—the Russians “must be” involved—for complex international events. In particular, the United States has continually underestimated the importance of nationalism and its powerful motivating appeal for the Third World.

A contemporary example is the ongoing Iranian Revolution. Since the autumn of 1978, there have been numerous reports implying that the USSR contributed to the events which exacerbated that crisis; the first question usually asked of American policymakers was, “what is the extent of Soviet involvement?” While the official American position was, as President Carter explained in February 1979, that the “revolution in Iran is the product of deep social, political, religious, and economic factors growing out of the history of Iran itself,” many analysts—both inside and outside government—believed that Moscow could not be absolved of all responsibility.⁷ Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger struck a responsive chord in many peoples' minds when he told an *Economist* reporter: “No one can claim that a Soviet decision started the upheavals that led to the departure of the Shah. But somebody who starts a rockslide nonetheless must be held responsible for the impact of stones that he himself did not throw.”⁸ In other words, whether the USSR was or was not directly involved in the crisis it must share in the blame.

While Moscow disliked the Shah's close ties with the United States and probably would have preferred a more sympathetic government in Teheran, one should not mix desire with results. While neither nation completely trusted the other, it appears that, by 1978, they had agreed to coexist as peaceful neighbors, particularly as long as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Sheikdoms did not form a hostile coalition against Moscow's friends in the Middle East. If negotiated long-term agreements are any indication of the Kremlin's perception of the Shah's longevity, it would appear that Moscow believed there was no imminent crisis in store for Iran. Prior to the Shah's departure, Moscow and Teheran signed a new trade and economic agreement and discussed expanding their joint economic relations with several major new projects.⁹

Moreover, it appears that the USSR, like the United States, was surprised that Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini was able to organize such an effective anti-Shah movement in such a short period of time. Moscow's Marxist-Leninist perspective, which emphasizes the economic class nature of conflicts, inhibited the USSR from properly evaluating the religious motivations underpinning the anti-Shah movement. Throughout the fall and winter of 1978 commentators continually downplayed the importance of the Islamic element in the crisis. *Kommunist* claimed that "the religious factor has been of only secondary importance"¹⁰ *Izvestiia* argued that the apparent growing Moslem involvement in the crisis was a "religious guise"; the real motivations of the Iranian people were socioeconomic and a concern for who would determine Iran's destiny—the imperialists or Iranians.¹¹ It was not until the end of January 1979, after the Shah had departed Teheran and the interim government of Shahpour Bakhtiar was disintegrating, that Moscow stopped describing Khomeini as one of the religious opposition leaders and began to refer to him as "the main figure in the popular anti-Shah movement" and "the recognized leader of the Iranian people"¹²

Even though the indications are strong that Moscow was just as surprised as was Washington at the way Iranian events developed, initial American reactions appear to contradict the stated Administration position that the Iranian Revolution was wholly a domestic phenomenon. For instance, the January F-15 shuttle to Saudi Arabia was primarily intended to show that the United States could militarily support an ally in the area if the need should ever rise. In February, Secretary of Defense Brown visited Riyadh apparently carrying with him a long shopping list of military equipment which the United States was willing to sell the Saudis. He even discussed establishing a base in the area—an idea which the Saudis rejected.¹³ The main purpose of the Brown visit was, as the Secretary stated at a state dinner in Riyadh, to demonstrate that the "American government is even more determined to provide the strength to meet *external threats* to the kingdom."¹⁴ The Department of Defense began contingency planning to create a new 100,000 personnel corps which would include 40,000 combat troops to use in defense of American interests in sensitive areas. Also, the Departments of Defense and Navy advocated an increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean, probably at Diego Garcia. This

increased presence on a permanent basis would include an aircraft carrier, destroyers, amphibious assault ships with helicopters and armed P-3's in order to assure friendly states in the area "that we need them and will protect them," as one Navy official said.¹⁵

The question is, however, to protect them from whom or what? The overt American responses to the Iranian Revolution were primarily actions to protect American friends in the region from external threats. But the most significant problems that confront Iran and many of the other Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula states, as well as other Third World nations, cannot be solved or ameliorated by F-15's, aircraft carriers, or lists of available military equipment hardware. They are internal problems of modernization: growing unemployment, unfulfilled expectations, disparity of wealth, destruction of traditional values, corruption, a gap between economic reality and expectations, and restricted participation in the process of government in societies which are often monarchical and authoritarian.

Clearly, not all upheavals which occur in the world can be reduced, as Raymond Garthoff has said, "to fit the procrustean level of Soviet-American politico-military confrontation."¹⁶ To do so is not only to fail to learn from experience but also to misunderstand the complexities of international events.

Assumption Two: The USSR has no Legitimate "Interests" Necessitating its Involvement in the Third World.

This assumption is founded upon the belief that the USSR is virtually self-sufficient in natural resources; its historical interests have been continental, rather than global like America's; it is not dependent upon overseas trade for its economic survival; and it does not "need" flexible military forces deployable outside the European continent to protect its closest allies or core interests. Therefore, the USSR must be involved for disruptive rather than constructive purposes in the Third World.

There are several obvious flaws in this assumption. First, it depends upon a definition of "interests" which is American and not Soviet; it is a reverse mirror image of justifications for US global involvement. From a Soviet perspective, however, it is not only a legitimate interest but a Soviet duty to support "progressive" anticolonial factions which are fighting wars of national liberation. Second, it essentially postulates an overarching

reason for Soviet interest in all Third World countries. In fact, as Roger Kanet has concluded, Soviet Third World policy is characterized chiefly by its diversity "rather than developing a single unified policy towards the Third World."¹⁷

But the most important flaw is that the USSR has never accepted that its interests in the Third World are any less legitimate than those of the West. In fact, Moscow believes that it is one of the rights of a global power to participate in events and decisions which shape the events that occur in other parts of the world. Historically, all other world powers have played such a role, and, since World War II, Moscow has increasingly emphasized that it sees this as its legitimate right. This is why, as early as 1945, Soviet representatives asked for a trusteeship in Tripolitana in order to establish a naval base so that USSR could "take her share" in the inevitable world trade which would develop in the postwar period. As Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov told the American Secretary of State in September 1945, because of "the part she has played in the war," Moscow "had a [moral]right to play a more active part in the fate of the Italian Colonies than any rank and file member of the United Nations"¹⁸ Also, Moscow's perception of itself as a major world power explains in part why the Russians angrily chafed when they were eliminated from effective participation in the Allied Control Commissions in Italy and Japan. As Stalin once told W. Averell Harriman, the USSR "had its self-respect as a sovereign state" and it was distasteful to be treated as a "piece of furniture" in the Far East. Since the Soviet Union was one of the strongest postwar powers, Stalin objected that General Douglas MacArthur simply told the Russian representatives what he and the American government intended to do in Japan rather than consulting and soliciting Soviet advice. Harriman captured the essence of Stalin's 1945 concerns when he cabled the State Department: "Being new rich with a lingering inferiority complex and feeling gauche uncertainty in international society, Russia is inordinately sensitive re appearance as well as substance of prestige."¹⁹

Much of the concern about being treated as one of the world's major powers is still present today. Andrei Gromyko has regularly stated that the USSR is now so powerful and important that "no major international issue can, as a matter of fact, be decided now without the USSR's participation."²⁰ This helps to explain the Kremlin's generally dim view of Sadat's peace initiative and the

Camp David accords, since those moves circumvented the Soviet-American joint declaration of October 1977 and left Moscow with virtually no participation in that peace process. One of many reasons the Soviets rejected the Carter Administration's radical March 1977 SALT II proposal was a belief that the United States had unilaterally rejected previous commitments and refused to negotiate with the USSR "on the basis of equality." Instead, the Carter Administration publicly announced its SALT proposal and sent its Secretary of State to Moscow not to negotiate but to get the Soviet signature on the American proposals.²¹ Likewise, much of Moscow's vehement reaction to the human rights issue is a result of its hurt "ideological-national pride." As Adam Ulam has argued: "How could the Soviet Union, at the pinnacle of its power, give even an appearance of tolerating such interference in its internal affairs ...?"²² Finally, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov has with great frequency commented that one of the primary reasons and motivating factors for the growth of the Soviet Navy is that all influential world powers have had strong navies:

Navies have always played a great role in strengthening the independence of states whose territories are washed by seas and oceans, since they were an important instrument of policy. Naval might has been one of the factors which has enabled individual states to advance into the ranks of the great powers. Moreover, history shows that those states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power for very long.

In other words, the USSR perceives that it does have justified reasons for involvement in Third World politics. Moscow would like to reduce American presence and influence in the Third World and increase that of the Soviet Union. Because it is a global power, Moscow's political, economic, and military engagement in the developing world is, at least from a Soviet perspective, no more illegitimate than America's. It is worthwhile to keep this distinction in mind because to assume the USSR has no right to participate directly or indirectly in the decisions which determine Third World outcomes makes it difficult to affect future Soviet actions in the direction of peaceful solutions to international problems.

Assumption Three: The Soviet Union now has a Major Capability to Project Military Force Far From its Homeland.

There is a growing concern in the American defense community that the USSR has significantly improved its "power projection"

and "global reach" capabilities. With these enhanced capabilities it is feared that the USSR "has the potential to interfere with US interest around the globe ..." and "given the Soviet propensity to fish in troubled waters, could precipitate a confrontation which neither side wants."²⁴

No responsible observer believes that Moscow's enormous military investment for the last 10-15 years has resulted in a "Potemkin Village" force. As the invasion of Afghanistan indicates, the Soviet military is large, powerful, and useable in particular scenarios. However, much of the discussion about growing Soviet capabilities has been characterized by a failure to define the basic terminology.

Although most American strategists realize that "power projection" is a broad term that includes the ability to influence, they most often use it in a much narrower fashion: the capability to insert military forces into an area when opposed by a hostile adversary. This is the sense in which it will be used here.

The ability to convert theoretical military capabilities to actual military power is more difficult than some observers have suggested. A nation's military force structure, its geopolitical situation, the threats for which the military force was primarily designed to counter, and the types of military units which exist present all nations with particular opportunities but also constraints. For example, Soviet armored divisions and their tactics have been optimized for a European land battle which has a high potential to become nuclear. Soviet emphasis upon speed, mobility, preemption, unit replacement, limited organic logistical support, large mobilizable reserves to augment understrength divisions, and a preponderance of armored/mechanized units are military attributes tailored for Europe and thus make ground divisions inherently less "projectible."

Most of the discussions about Soviet enhanced force projection capabilities, however, have not focused on the Red Army but rather the Soviet Navy and its overseas "bases" and new "blue-water" capabilities. Again much of the cause of the debate is a failure to define what is being discussed. Specifically, in too many instances, the term naval "base" is used in a vague and improper fashion. As the case of "power projection," the term naval "base" has a rather definite meaning to most American strategists. As defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it includes the activities and

facilities for which the US Navy "has operating responsibilities, together with interior lines of communication and the minimum surrounding area necessary for local security."²⁵ Moreover, normally it is considered that American forces have either permanent or negotiated long-term access to a "base." Places like Subic Bay, Diego Garcia, and even Guantanamo are naval bases. The USSR has no such similar overseas ports anywhere in the world.

It does have access to land facilities for docking rights, port calls, repairs, and replenishment of depleted stocks at places like Vishakhapatnam, Um Qasr, most recently Cam Ranh Bay, and until 2 years ago Berbera. However, there is apparently no negotiated permanence to the Soviet presence. Also, the Soviets have used anchorages in sheltered international waters as floating logistic and supply facilities. While these accommodations have been helpful, in a conflict they would not be able to support the long-term needs of the navy, and, more importantly, they could be readily destroyed.²⁶

But even if we hypothesize the worst case from a Western perspective and assume that in the future the Soviet Union does obtain true overseas bases, this would ameliorate some problems but would exacerbate others. Much of the Soviet Union's naval strategy is determined by its geographical location which has forced Moscow to maintain four separate fleets. None of those fleets have uninhibited access to the open seas. Each one of the fleets must bypass chokepoints that unfriendly nations control. However, it is often argued that if the USSR could obtain real overseas bases its warships could be forwardly deployed and thus avoid the problem of bypassing the chokepoints during a conflict. This is a spurious argument. Since resupply vessels would still have to traverse those chokepoints, the Soviet Navy would remain in a vulnerable position.²⁷

Moreover, acquisition of true overseas bases would necessitate a significant change in the Soviet Union's naval posture. Currently the Soviet Navy's most credible capabilities occur at the ends of a continuum. At one extreme the USSR can display its naval power, carry out demonstration deployments (*Okean '70* and *'75* are good examples), react to localized shooting incidents, or engage in a brief "war at sea." At the other extreme, the Soviet Navy has the capability to participate in a strategic nuclear war. However,

between these two extremes there is a large "gray area" which includes the ability to oppose naval intervention, participate in a prolonged theater conflict, engage in an extended "war at sea," or fight an all-out conventional war.²⁸

If the USSR intended to alter its current Navy posture in a way to handle those "gray area" missions and to move away from its sea denial role toward sea control mission, analysts would observe new trends in ship construction rates. Since navies are high cost items and require long construction lead-times, one would expect to see some major changes in Soviet naval construction rates. However, no alterations are now apparent. Soviet ship designers and builders still tend to concentrate their efforts in two traditional non-"force projection" areas: strategic nuclear submarines and antisubmarine warfare.²⁹

Although Soviet military forces are primarily oriented toward a European contingency which constrains its ability to "project" Soviet power, Moscow does have the capability to use its military to influence the outcome of events in Third World nations. In an emergency the USSR has the proven capability to provide equipment and supplies to its allies, friends, and proxies, when unopposed by hostile forces. During the 1973 Middle East War, Moscow flew 930 sorties in order to supply its Egyptian ally with 15 million tons of supplies.³⁰ More recently, over a 3-month period in 1977-78, the USSR airlifted 600 armored vehicles, numerous tanks, and over 400 artillery pieces to Ethiopia.³¹ During the Angolan crisis, the more than 25,000 Cubans, which Aeroflot airlifted to Launda, played a determining role in the outcome of that conflict.

This relatively new Soviet capability is quite important because in many contingencies a limited input of force can greatly affect the military situation. Tanks and aircraft, which are antiquated by American and Soviet standards, can provide quantum technological advantages to one contender when the other adversary has no tanks or aircraft. Moreover, the mere appearance of power can have an impact upon the perceptions of developing nations. Although the differences between the Soviet *Kiev* vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) ship and the USS *Nimitz* or *Enterprise* strike carriers are so immense as to make them nearly incomparable, quite frequently "in a world of unsophisticated propaganda targets, a carrier is a carrier is a carrier"³²

Kenneth Booth has made a powerful case that analysts should

not dismiss the importance of Soviet naval deployments in particular regions of the world just because they are not significant threats to Western navies. Limited deployments of small naval forces may have significant political and diplomatic results.³³ Nevertheless, policymakers must keep in mind to what they are responding. The appropriate response to Soviet actions that have a military character but are primarily focused on influencing events should be much different than the response to a Soviet attempt to inject its military forces into a situation. The current analysis on Soviet "power projection" capabilities needs to be refined and sharpened.

Assumption Four: Change/Instability is Always Good for the USSR and Bad for the United States.

Of all the assumptions discussed here, this is one which probably most closely approximates reality. It should not be so but unfortunately the United States has generally aligned itself with the status quo and opposed major changes in the sociopolitical structure of developing nations fearing that radical change would bring anti-American governments to power. As a result, American actions have had an element of the self-fulfilling prophecy in them. Washington's past supportive arrangements with colonial powers have made many developing nations suspicious of its intentions and interests.

From the Kremlin's perspective there is also a great deal of truth to this assumption. Economic, political, and military disorder in the developing world inevitably must hurt US and Western interests from a Soviet view because the West has been the "imperialist colonizer" of the world. Indeed, the USSR believes that the capitalist and socialist worlds are locked in a constant struggle for survival—a struggle which socialism will ultimately win. As Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the CPSU Politburo, has commented, "if the influence of socialism on the course of events grows, this means that the resources of the imperialist and reactionary forces will diminish correspondingly, and the resources of peace, national independence, and social progress will increase."³⁴ Individual relapses may temporarily occur but the "general crisis of capitalism" will inevitably cause Western capitalism to fall apart. Thus, a capitalist setback is a socialist success by its very nature. And, from a Soviet perspective, progress

in the struggle against colonialism has improved dramatically during the last 10 to 15 years. By one calculation the ratio of victories to defeats has improved from 60:62 from 1956-60 to 33:12 in the first half of the 1970's "in favor of the forces of progress and national liberation."³⁵

A long abiding Soviet problem, however, has been how to balance its national interests with the struggle against capitalism. When national interests clash with revolutionary interests which one should predominate? China asked Moscow the question nearly two decades ago and the Soviet response contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. Since historically Moscow has been quite willing to sacrifice local Communists and their interests for good relations with national regimes,³⁶ it would appear that Moscow does differentiate and does not see all destabilizing trends as leading to positive benefits for the USSR.

Assumption Five: Soviet Presence and Influence Has Significantly Expanded.

The first part of this assumption is quite obvious. The other part, however, is less clear but is often accepted due to the Soviet Union's increased presence. There is no question that Soviet involvement and presence in the Third World has increased dramatically over the last two decades. Although Soviet economic aid to developing nations has declined in recent years, its arms sales programs have remained at near-record highs. In 1977 alone, Moscow signed agreements for \$4.2 billion and delivered \$3.2 billion in arms to the Third World. Only in 1974 were sales higher and that was because Moscow had to restock badly depleted Middle East stocks in the aftermath of the Middle East War.³⁷

Moreover, a significant number of Soviet and East European military personnel, not to mention Cuban, have been sent to Third World nations to train local forces in combat techniques and to assemble, operate, and maintain the influx of new military equipment. In 1977, there were more than 10,000 Soviet and East European military technicians in the Third World; over half of the military technicians were in Africa. Between 1976 and 1977, Soviet and East European advisers increased in the Third World by more than 10 percent.³⁸

As a result of this increased Soviet presence, it is becoming more common to hear assertions like "the importance of American

friendship" or "American influence" is on the decline in the post-Vietnam era. On the other hand, Soviet "power and influence" is seen to be expanding, at the expense of the West in general and the United States in particular. Moreover, as one former member of Kissinger's National Security Council has recently argued, the increased Soviet presence and arms deliveries to the Third World—Africa particularly—is intended "to cement dependency relationships," directly influence the course of armed struggles, and "obtain leverage over states hosting guerrillas."³⁹

As was noted earlier, increased Soviet presence and involvement in the Third World is an indisputable fact. However, the level and extent of Soviet influence upon the events and nations of the developing world is less obvious.

As K.G. Holsti and others have argued, influence is not something that one nation holds over another like a club. Rather influence is an ongoing process by which one nation tries to convince another to take or not to take particular actions. It is not a one-sided relationship but a mutually interactive process. Thus, it is not necessarily true that the nation which has the most obvious and visible economic, military, or political capabilities will automatically have the most "influence" in this dynamic relationship. If influence were one-sided, the United States would have been able to convince the Shah to participate in holding down oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil embargo.⁴⁰

Two recent works, one by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and the other by Robert H. Donaldson, quite clearly illustrate that an extensive presence is no assurance of Soviet influence.⁴¹ Rubinstein has concluded that between 1967 and 1972 Moscow adjusted more than did Cairo to the demands of their relationship, that the USSR had limited influence upon any important Egyptian foreign or domestic decisions, and that Moscow was unable "to mobilize or strengthen the position of Egyptian officials or interest groups disposed to accommodate to Soviet desires."⁴² Likewise, Donaldson has concluded that, since 1967, there were only two very minor instances where the Soviet Union caused India to take actions which it otherwise would not have taken.

The history of Soviet (and American) involvement in the Third World is replete with other examples of the Kremlin's inability, despite extensive economic and military investment in a country, to curb actions which are antithetical to its long-term interests.

Moscow's expulsion from Indonesia, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Ghana, the Iraqi government's recent execution of 21 Communists for trying to reestablish party cells in the military, and China's total break with the USSR in the 1960's are other examples of the USSR's lack of influence over its erstwhile allies.

To define American interests in various areas of the world in terms of Soviet presence or nonpresence is to misunderstand the dynamics of the influence relationship. It makes US policy reactive rather than deliberate. Worst of all, it can put American policymakers in the uncomfortable position of supporting less popular and narrow-based movements, as in Angola in 1975, primarily because they are anti-Communist and oppose the USSR, and not because they meet any other standards compatible with American national interests.

Assumption Six: Some Grand Design Lies Behind all Soviet Actions.

A major and influential school of thought still exists which works from an assumption—most often implied but occasionally stated overtly—that the best way to understand Soviet behavior is to view it as motivated by deep-rooted imperialist impulses combined with Communist ideology. Particularly in the post-SALT II period, people like Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, Leon Goure, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., and other members of the Committee on the Present Danger have warned American policymakers that the USSR marches to a different drummer than does the United States. The Soviet Union, according to this school of thought, is committed to an expansion of its influence as well as its military power. As Colin Gray has put it, the Kremlin's "commitment to world domination is nonnegotiable. Moreover, its intentions are written indelibly in the course of Russian/Soviet history," because "expansionism is the Russian/Soviet 'way': The Pacific Ocean has been reached but not (yet) the Atlantic."⁴³

The adherents of this school of thought implicitly assume that a consensus concerning the direction and scope of Soviet foreign and defense policy objectives exists within the Soviet bureaucracy. Such an assumption can and has been criticized in numerous works which have identified perceptual differences within the Soviet elites and demonstrated how different interest groups interact to affect Soviet policy.⁴⁴

It is important, however, to point out that this assumption can have significant impact upon American policymakers. By overestimating the consensus within Soviet elites we may encourage US officials to react to events as if Soviet actions were always the intended result of some evil blueprint rather than occasionally being the result of bureaucratic politics or simple inertia.

For instance, one quite plausible explanation for the large number of items of equipment in the Soviet arms inventory is the Soviet decisionmakers' need to protect the vested interests of design bureau managers.⁴⁵ One example of this problem is the production of the *Foxbat* aircraft. It is generally accepted that the *Foxbat* was originally designed to counter the planned production of the American B-70 bomber. However, rather than stop production of their aircraft when the United States failed to build the B-70, the Soviet Mikoyan factories continued to produce *Foxbats* into the 1970's. The production of the Yak-25 is another example of an attempt to satisfy bureaucratic interest group needs rather than military requirements. In the 1950's, when the Mikoyan design bureau rather than the Yakovlev received Stalin's approval to produce a new combat aircraft (the MIG-15), Yakovlev personally appealed to Stalin to revise his decision because, as Yakovlev recounts, "I was very worried about the situation developing in our design bureau. You see, behind me stood 100 people who might lose faith in me as the leader of the design collective." The net result was that Stalin also approved production of the Yak-25 in order to satisfy Yakovlev.⁴⁶

Thus, the outputs of the Soviet decisionmaking process need to be examined on an issue-by-issue basis. Bureaucratic and interest group analyses can never totally explain Soviet behavior in the Third World. But, if American policymakers are interested in obtaining a complete picture of the Soviet political process, it is another tool to further expand their knowledge. Moreover, it can help US decisionmakers to react in more rational methods to Soviet actions and thus to avoid interpreting every Soviet action "in a totally offensive, threatening light."⁴⁷

Assumption Seven: The Soviet Union is Attempting to Put Itself in a Position Where it Can Deny Vital Raw Materials to the Developed World.

It is sometimes argued that one objective of the Soviet Union is to establish a Third World alliance system in order to enable the

USSR to exert pressure or even to sever in times of crisis the industrialized world's vital trade and natural resource supply lines. Most discussions based on this assumption focus upon Middle Eastern oil and particularly the vulnerability of supertankers and the sea routes which carry more than 80 percent of Western Europe's and Japan's essential oil resources. If the Kremlin could assist pro-Soviet governments to come to power in areas near to the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Mozambique Channel, Straits of Malacca, the African Cape, and the West African littoral and those governments would either refuse the United States port-call rights or would allow Soviet naval vessels to obtain port facilities, it is argued that Moscow could not only pressure the industrialized nations' commerce and oil routes, but also limit Western access to other valuable natural resources such as chromium, cobalt, platinum, and manganese. Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn in a recent work captured the essence of this assumption and voiced the concerns of a significant group of American analysts:

The Soviet pattern of naval expansion, in short, seems to be following the trajectory of Western tanker routes from the Persian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe One clear objective is the achievement of a position from which leverage could be applied over the Cape sea route around Africa—with all the implications that this could have in the event of a conflict or crisis."

When considering and evaluating this assumption, it may be helpful to keep some caveats in mind which might sharpen the speculation on this issue. First, this assumption is primarily based upon a belief that there is a great amount of coherence to Soviet actions. While some of the fallacies of this view were discussed in relation to Assumption Six, it is worthwhile to reiterate that such consistency is not always as apparent as some analysts have hypothesized. For instance, if the USSR is primarily interested in putting itself, or its friends, in positions to sever Middle Eastern oil lines, one would have expected that it would have refrained from taking actions which threatened its access to Berbera. In fact, by supporting the Ethiopian cause, it did exactly the opposite. While the USSR followed a course which it could easily justify ideologically and morally, its actions quite clearly have damaged its geopolitical situation on the Horn of Africa and caused it to lose access to the best port facilities in the area.

Second, a putative Soviet aim to coerce the United States and its

allies by pressuring the oil supplies during peacetime or in a crisis situation is a risky policy option and would seem to run counter to Moscow's historical inhibitions against taking actions which might cause a direct confrontation with the United States. During the Iranian crisis, America policymakers publicly announced that the steady flow of oil was considered a vital US security interest. President Carter reconfirmed this interest in his 1980 State of the Union Address. Thus, any direct or indirect Soviet attempt to impede the flow of oil could very well turn a crisis situation into a conflict.

The increased American interest in forming a rapid deployment force is just one of many options apparently being considered as a means to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the industrialized nations. The implicit message which Washington has recently attempted to convey to Moscow is that it would be willing to use military force to protect its vital interest in the Middle Eastern oilfields. In other words, if the USSR or its allies want to somehow attempt to restrict the flow of oil, they must be willing to face the risk of escalating a crisis situation to the point where the United States may commit military forces to defend its vital interests. This the USSR has not historically been willing to do, primarily because it fears that a direct confrontation between the superpowers has a great potential to escalate to a nuclear confrontation.⁴⁹

Third, if Soviet military leaders are seen as cautious planners interested in maximizing their options in order to economize military forces and insure success, for them to dedicate a significant portion of their navy in war to sever the industrialized world's oil supply sealine would be a less than optimum use of their sea denial forces. By far the easiest and most efficient method to stop the flow of oil would be to stop it at its source. Minimal military actions, even sabotage, could easily destroy Middle Eastern oilfields, drilling equipment, pipelines, and storage areas from which the supertankers are refueled. This would be less difficult than destroying convoys of tankers at sea.

Those analysts who assert a major Soviet threat to the Cape sea route conveniently disregard the Soviet Union's naval geographic situation and resupply problems. If one takes a map, as Kenneth Booth has suggested, and inverts it so the African Cape is on the top and Murmansk is on the bottom, it is possible to see the

problems of interdicting the sea line from a Soviet perspective.⁵⁰ To sever the sea line, the USSR would have to accomplish more than individual acts of terrorism against tankers. It would require a coordinated, systematic campaign which would necessitate secure ports—most likely bases—in order to resupply ships and exchange crews on a rotating basis. Since the USSR not only lacks the bases but also employs ship construction rates and designs that do not appear able for the foreseeable future to support such an ambitious program, the most rational choice open to Moscow would remain disruption of oil at the source.

Finally, if the past is any indicator of the future, possible restrictions upon US access to Third World raw materials are less likely to result from Soviet actions than from actions taken by new nationalistic governments in response to American policies. It is important to remember that, in the case of access to vital raw materials, OPEC actions since 1973 have done more to damage US security interests than have any Soviet actions. The 1979 oil crisis was in part the result of a conservative reaction in Iran to the Shah's pro-Western policies and to the extensive American/Western impact upon the Iranian traditional society. Moreover, it is quite possible that some African nations may attempt to increase prices or deny American access to their natural resources as a means of punishing the United States for its former support of all-white African governments.

Assumption Eight: Moscow's Use of Proxies is a Low Risk and High Benefit Approach.

There is an increasingly popular perception that the Soviet Union has been able to employ proxies to achieve a variety of successes from Africa to Southeast Asia at very minimal cost to Moscow. Indeed pro-Marxist-Leninist factions have come to power in a number of states with outside military assistance but without the USSR suffering military casualties. For a variety of reasons, most of which relate to Cuban motivations rather than to Soviet directions, Havana has been willing to commit its men and blood, at least in Africa, and Cuban soldiers have become, in a sense, the Soviet Union's "cannon fodder."

The surrogate/proxy is not necessarily a one-way street of benefits for the USSR. Accomplishments beget commitments; commitments quite often lead to entangling responsibilities;

successes create some risks; and benefits sometimes must be balanced by costs.

On the issue of costs, Colin Legum has pointed out a potential liability facing the USSR as a direct consequence of the Cuban-Soviet connection in Angola and Ethiopia. In the past, a majority of African leaders saw the USSR as neither a reliable friend nor a major threat, but as a valuable counterweight to continuing domination by the West. However, Soviet activities have contributed to a debate about Moscow's overall ambitions and have given credence to a former minority view that the Soviet Union does present a serious threat to the non-Communist African governments. Now, as Legum has argued, African leaders are reading with great interest the writings of Soviet military personnel in an attempt to evaluate the Kremlin's Third World military activities.⁵¹ If this evaluation should gain increasing prominence as Soviet activities increase, Moscow's short-term successes could actually work against Soviet long-term abilities to affect the policies of black African nations.

Moscow is learning that efforts to become more politically, economically, and militarily involved in world events beget commitments and, as the United States has learned over time, those commitments sometimes create unwanted responsibilities. When the Cubans sent thousands of troops to Angola in 1975 and the Soviets provided military arms and assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), was this because the Kremlin dictated that the Cubans should act as its proxies? Or did the Cubans act independently, as Fidel Castro has continually claimed, without Moscow requesting intervention? Probably the truth lies somewhere in the middle, as Soviet and Cuban interests coincided but for different reasons.⁵²

Moscow did not start flying Cuban troops to Angola until after January 1976. This was after the United States had successfully pressured various countries to deny landing rights to Cuban planes, so that Cuban commercial aircraft could no longer support Havana's committed military forces. Moreover, Soviet IL-62 flights began only after South African and Cuban forces clashed in early December 1975, resulting in a resounding defeat for the Cubans. Thus, the sequence of events can suggest that Moscow was forced to come to the assistance of a valuable ally to bail it out of a very dangerous situation.

In addition, Moscow's growing propensity to sign treaties of friendship that call for consultation, collaboration, and in some instances coordination of foreign policies between the signatories may create special problems for the USSR. As Legvold has pointed out, "the rather casual or ill-considered decision to grant a special relationship to parties like the Vietnamese who want protection for their own aggressive purposes is fraught with dangers," and carries with it the risk of drawing "the Soviet Union into local instabilities far more than it may now intend."³

As the USSR becomes more involved in its attempt to fulfill the global role to which it aspires, the more it will face complicated and entangling situations. With greater frequency its Third World friends and allies will initiate actions that Moscow may prefer they not take. Nevertheless, because of formal and informal commitments, the Kremlin will be forced to respond in some manner. The decision to support an ally might endanger Soviet relations with other regional powers or global East-West relations. But failure to support a Third World friend might perpetuate a common belief within some developing nations that the USSR is opportunistic and contradictory—too often willing to sacrifice friends, even Communists, in order to further Russian state aims.

While not all the cards have yet been played in the China-Vietnam game, it could be one of those entangling situations that Moscow would have preferred to avoid. This may suggest why the USSR took no major diplomatic or military actions against China during the crisis.

Suffice it to say, the problems of a global power are many and great. If Moscow's opportunities are greater than ever before, the complexity of the situations are also greater. To argue because of the absence of Soviet casualties that Moscow has followed a course of maximum benefits with little costs is to miss the complexity of the problem. With benefits come costs, and the Kremlin will—if it has not already done so—learn this as did the United States and all the world's other imperial powers of the past.

Assumption Nine: Force is the Best Way to Respond to Soviet Actions.

Finally, there is a belief among a small but influential group of observers that military force is the best way to respond to Soviet opportunistic action. No one is really advocating a military shoot-out with the USSR, because the possibility of escalation to strategic nuclear weapons is too great when the two superpowers confront

each other directly in an international game of chicken. But it has been suggested that force or threat of force are the only actions which Moscow understands. As Helmut Sonnenfeldt has recently argued, "random punitive responses" are unlikely to halt Soviet military actions once they are underway because "substantial risk on the ground" is what deters Soviet leaders.⁵⁴ In his first military posture statement to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also implied that the force or the threat of force is the primary instrument which will cause the USSR to desist from its adventurous and mischievous activities:

We should not regress to the tensions and confrontation of the Cold War, but neither should we permit present trends in Soviet capability and behavior to achieve by default in the 1980s what they could not accomplish by force or threat in the 1950s. I see little cause for optimism in the future unless the United States maintains both the power and the will to deter encroachment, defend our interests, and steer Soviet policy away from adventurism.⁵⁵

Colin Gray has probably more succinctly captured the essence of this school of thought when he wrote: "The Soviet Union, as Russia before it, is an expansionist power that can be contained only by the threat of force and by a manifest, credible (in the Soviet eyes) determination to exercise that force."⁵⁶

The fact that military is an important element of the Soviet notion of the "international correlation of forces" provides some credence to this belief. However, it is often overlooked that the "correlation of forces" is not predicated upon physical force alone. It is only part of the equation, and economic, political, social, and psychological factors are given equal consideration. In the long run, American policymakers need to shape US foreign and defense policy so that Third World nations do not regard military actions—supported and sometimes sponsored by the USSR—as the only option available to them.

America should not seek to obtain more popular and successful surrogates to fight and defeat Soviet surrogates. This is a response to symptoms and not to causes. Rather it should be an American objective when possible to work to eliminate the causes of intra and interstate Third World conflict. This could make the resort to force in some instances a less attractive Third World option and thus reduce the number of situations which Moscow can support for its own interests.

This brings us back nearly full circle to where we started in Assumption One. The inability to see that Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's dynasty was not in touch with its traditional Muslim society and thus was inherently more unstable than a series of American administrations believed was a classic foreign policy failure. The United States was quite willing to provide the Shah with nearly unlimited military assistance because he supported American objectives and goals in the area. However, until it was too late, we were relatively unconcerned with the Shah's domestic policies. The United States and most of the industrial world is now reaping the results of that myopic policy. In hindsight, it would have been more in America's interests to have had a less pro-Western but more stable Iranian government than the situation we now face.

The United States must become more sensitive to the internal dynamics of Third World nations and less obsessed with the Soviet Union. The reality of the situation is that most threats to US prestige and security or economic, political and military interests cannot be solved by military force. The use of American military force could not have altered the fate of the Shah of Iran, deterred OPEC oil price rises which threaten world economic chaos, bolstered confidence in the dollar, protected American markets, or developed a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Such matters can, however, be affected by sophisticated reassessment of American "long term interests, and a more skeptical look at what military power can do."¹⁷

CONCLUSION

Robert Jervis has written that if a person or nation is to act intelligently it must predict how others will behave. The better policymakers know and understand their adversaries the more aware they should be to their own policy alternatives and options.¹⁸ This essay suggests a complementary adaptation of the Jervis argument: it is equally important to know and understand the assumptions about an adversary's behavior which are prevalent in one's own policymaking circles. In some instances those assumptions are valid while in other instances they are not. Nevertheless, what policymakers expect or are predisposed to believe about Soviet actions can significantly influence how they

interpret Soviet behavior, and thus how they fashion responses.

In the future, if the United States wishes to formulate a rational and developed approach to Soviet involvement in the Third World, it must begin with a more refined analysis of Soviet opportunities, capabilities, advantages, and disadvantages. To do this it will be important to keep in mind some caveats about recent Soviet experiences. First, in recent years, pro-Marxist-Leninist factions have come to power in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Laos, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Cambodia. In many of these instances, Moscow has seized the opportunity to enhance its influence by supporting various pro-Soviet factions. The USSR has also been willing to provide military support—or in the case of Afghanistan unilateral invasion—in order to bolster pro-Soviet factions. However, in the final analysis, the Kremlin has resorted to the use of military force only when it apparently believed it could do so cheaply and with minimum risk to the Soviet Union and its interests. If there are threads which tie such disparate events and movements as Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, the answer probably cannot be found in some Soviet master plan theory. Rather, Stanley Hoffman is probably correct when he said that recent Soviet successes are tied by two threads: "low risks, and opportunities provided by previous Western mistakes, defeats, or (as in Afghanistan) indifference." Second, most Western nations made few attempts—other than declaratory—to inhibit Soviet activities in any of those recent crisis areas. Thus, it is difficult to conclude, as some observers have, that Soviet activities in Angola, Ethiopia, or even Afghanistan were great accomplishments of "force projection." Third, while Soviet presence in an area such as Afghanistan may show sudden growth, such situations are not immutable and can become heavy burdens for the USSR rather than net additions to enhance its politico-military capabilities. If the United States absorbs these and other "lessons," its approach to the Third World may produce more understanding and success in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *United States Military Posture for FY 1980*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979, p. vii.
2. "An Interview With Kissinger," *Time*, January 13, 1979, pp. 29-30. See also "Kissinger's Critique," *The Economist*, February 3 and 10, 1979, pp. 17-22 and 31-35.
3. John Robinson, "Baker to Tell Soviets of Hill Doubts on SALT Ratification," *The Washington Post*, January 7, 1979, p. A20.
4. The technique used in this essay is one that Raymond L. Garthoff used in "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1978, pp. 22-32, when he identified the ten most common fallacies used to estimate Soviet military and foreign policy intentions.
5. Robert Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Spring 1979, p. 761.
6. Quoted in J. William Fulbright "The Soundness of U.S. Policy-Making Procedure," in US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 441.
7. *The New York Times*, February 21, 1979, p. A4. While there were few overt dissenters from the Administration position on Iran, private conversations with individuals would indicate much less consensus. Moreover, on the larger issue of Soviet involvement, there are some indications that highranking Presidential advisers were sharply divided. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Marshall D. Shulman, the State Department's top ranking Soviet expert, had a greater tendency to emphasize Soviet limitations and Moscow's need for closer relations with the United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski and James R. Schlesinger were much less optimistic and focused on Soviet challenges to American security interests. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Issues for US: Soviet's Intent," *The New York Times*, December 7, 1978, p. A12.
8. "Kissinger's Critique," *The Economist*, February 10, 1979, p. 31.
9. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977*, ER 78-10478U, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, November 1978, p. 31.
10. J. Bereznirovskiy, "What is Happening in Iran," *Kommunist*, December 7, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, December 14, 1979, p. F7 (hereafter cited as *FBIS: Soviet Union*).
11. U. Kudryavtsev, "Iran: Sources of the Crisis," *Izvestiia*, December 7, 1978, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, December 11, 1978, p. F7-8.
12. *FBIS: Soviet Union*, January 23, 1979, p. F6 and January 31, 1979, p. F1.
13. Richard Burt, "Saudis Reject Idea of a U.S. Base," *The New York Times*, February 27, 1979, p. A2.
14. John K. Cooley, "Brown Reconfirms US Defense of Mideast Allies," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 12, 1979, p. 4. Emphasis added.
15. Drew Middleton, "U.S. Earmarks Force for Fast Deployment in Middle East," *The New York Times*, April 20, 1979, p. A12 and Bernard Weinraub, "Pentagon is Urging Indian Ocean Fleet," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1979, p. A14.

16. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," p. 27.
17. Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies," *The World Today*, August 1975, p. 338.
18. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, 1945: Volume II General; Political and Economic Matters*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 173 and 192 (hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations* with appropriate year and volume). Secretary of State James F. Brynes recounted the conversation more bluntly and wrote in his memoirs that Molotov had said: "The Soviet Union should take the place that is due it...and therefore should have bases in the Mediterranean for its merchant fleet." See James F. Brynes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947, p. 16.
19. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, Vol. VI, pp. 789, 790 and 809.
20. *FBIS: Soviet Union*, Supplement, Part IV, March 20, 1979, p. 55.
21. *FBIS: Soviet Union*, April 1, 1977, pp. B1-10.
22. Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978*, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1979, p. 559.
23. Sergei G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 100, January 1974, pp. 21-22.
24. JCS, *United States Military Posture for FY 1980*, pp. 17 and vii.
25. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JCS Pub. 1, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, p. 223.
26. C.J. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., Glasgow, Great Britain: Robert MacLehose and Co. LTD, 1974, p. 143; and F.M. Murphy, "The Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 93, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 42-43.
27. Too many people underestimate the importance of geography and logistics in determining a nation's strategy. As Theodore Ropp has written, "Geography is the bones of strategy; the terrain and lines of communication have governed the course of many campaigns and battles." While it may be personally exhilarating to discuss and analyze grand strategy, the actions most nations take or fail to take are determined by other factors. World War II is a good example. Geography and logistics were two of the prime determining factors in America's decision to fight in Europe, not the Pacific, first. Rather than some abstract gamesmanship strategy guiding the US decision, it was a recognition that because of America's geographic position and logistics constraints it could not prosecute both campaigns with equal vigor. Choices were made and policy determined on the basis of those factors. See Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern Age*, New, Revised Edition, New York: Collier Books, 1973, p. 6, and K. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, London: Croom Helm, LTD: 1977, pp. 175-176.
28. Steve F. Kime, "Soviet Naval Strategy for the Eighties," *National Security Affairs Monograph 78-3*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1978, pp. 5-9.
29. Alva M. Bowen, *Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Naval Shipbuilding*, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 5, 1976; Michael McCWire, "Western and Soviet Naval Building Programmes 1965-1976," *Survival*, Vol. VIII, No. 5, September/October 1976, pp. 204-209; and Gary Chairbonneau, "The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 105, March 1979, p. 37.

30. To put these numbers in some sort of perspective the United States flew 567 sorties and supplied its ally Israel with more than 22.4 million tons. In other words, the United States flew nearly half as many missions and provided 50 percent more supplies over a distance which was four times greater than the Soviet effort. Also, the US effort was severely hampered because most US allies—except Portugal—refused landing rights to American planes. See Robert P. Berman, *Soviet Air Power in Transition*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 65.

31. Daniel S. Papp, "The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia," *Current History*, Vol. 76, March 1979, p. 113.

32. K. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p. 71.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-47

34. Quoted in Michael J. Deane, *The Soviet Concept of the "Correlation of Forces"*, Arlington, Virginia: Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center, May 1976, pp. 28-29.

35. General I. Shavrov, "Problems of Theory of the Postwar Period: Local Wars and Their Place in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," *Voyenno—Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 3, March 1975, translated in *Joint Publications Research Service* 64649, p. 38.

36. For just a few examples, see John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf," Part II, *Russian Review*, July 1970, pp. 248-253; and Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-68*, Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1972, pp. 192-212.

37. US CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World*, 1977, p. 1.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

39. Chester A. Crocker, "The Quest for an African Policy," *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1978, p. 72.

40. See K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, pp. 154-173; and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analyses," in *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 1-22 for more conceptual analysis of the influence relationship.

41. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977; Robert H. Donaldson, *The Soviet-Indian Alignment: Quest for Influence*, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3-4, Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1979.

42. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, p. 334.

43. Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution*, New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1977, pp. 38 and 67. See also, Committee on the Present Danger, *Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance*, Washington: The Committee on the Present Danger, 1978, p. 1. On announcing the formulation of the Committee on Present Danger Paul Nitze claimed that the Soviets continue to "cling to their goal of worldwide domination." Cited in Dennis Ross, "Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1978, p. 3.

44. For some examples, see Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968-1972," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 1975; H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 1966, pp. 435-451. Edward L. Warner, *The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis*, New York: Praeger, 1977; and Arthur J. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Papers, No. 148, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978/79.

45. The author recognizes that other reasons to include threat analysis, geopolitical considerations, and arms transfer policies, are major inputs into determining Soviet force posture and equipment inventories. The point is that there are factors other than some grand politico-military plan which affect Soviet decisionmakers' perceptions.

46. Alexander, *Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, pp. 24 and 34.

47. Ross, "Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications," p. 2. Although Ross was primarily interested in Soviet strategic weapons, doctrine, and policy, the quote is equally applicable to a macroview of Soviet foreign and defense policies.

48. Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, *Naval Race or Arms Control in the Indian Ocean? (Some Problems in Negotiation, Naval Limitations.)* Agenda Paper No. 8. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1978, pp. 34-35. See also Patrick Wull, ed., *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World: New Studies in Global Strategy*, London: Stacey International, 1977.

49. Afghanistan notwithstanding, this still seems to be a valid judgment. A recent Brookings Institution study, *Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove*, indicates that the Soviet Union has not rashly resorted to the use of military force to achieve its objectives in the Third World and to challenge the United States. The study concludes that the Kremlin has used military force pragmatically and turned to its use only when Moscow believed that it could do so cheaply and with minimum risk to the Soviet Union and its interests. Moscow has been willing to support the use of military force in Third World countries like Angola but not necessarily to signal, "an increased Kremlin aggressiveness or acceptance of risk in the use of military power.... What Moscow did was take decisive advantage of extremely easy pickings." Likewise, Soviet involvement in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict was a low risk military operation because if the United States had chosen to intervene in opposition to the USSR, Washington would have had to support Somalia which had started the conflict and who had been condemned by the Organization of African Unity. Given America's historic lack of interest in South Asia and past diplomatic failures in the region, one can present a good case that from a Soviet perspective the invasion of Afghanistan was also a low risk venture. See Stephen S. Kaplan, ed. *Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1979. The study was originally done under contract for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. In 1980, it should be published as a Brookings study under the same title.

50. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p. 173.

51. Colin Legum, "The African Environment," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXVIII, January-February 1978, p. 11.

52. For a few examples of Soviet and Cuban objectives in Angola, see William J. Dorch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Professional Paper no. 201, Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses,

September 1977; Gabriel Marcella and Daniel S. Papp, *The Future of Soviet-Cuban Relations*, Military Issues Research Memorandum, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1, 1979; and William M. Leo Grande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 22-26, 1979.

53. Legvold, "The Super Rivals," p. 769.

54. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Linkage: A Strategy for Tempering Soviet Antagonism," *NATO review*, No. 1, February 1979, p. 4.

55. JCS, *United States Military Posture for FY 80*, p. viii.

56. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, p. 67.

57. Richard J. Barnet, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Need for a Comprehensive Approach," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Spring 1979, p. 792.

58. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

59. Stanley Hoffman, "Muscle and Brains," *Foreign Policy*, No. 37, Winter, 1979-80, p. 5.

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