


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
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14 ORAE-EXTRA-MURAL PAPER 11

9 SPAIN: NATO or NEUTRALITY

THIS STUDY ALSO APPEARS AS NATIONAL SECURITY SERIES NO. 1/80, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, ONTARIO.

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by

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ABSTRACT

This report examines the implications of Spain's entry into NATO from both the perspective of the Alliance and that of Spain. In the NATO context the author sets out the political and military advantages and disadvantages for the Alliance. From a Spanish perspective, the author concentrates on elaborating the various countervailing domestic political factions involved with the Spain and NATO decision.

RESUME

Le présent rapport étudie les implications de l'entrée de l'Espagne dans l'OTAN des points de vue de l'Alliance et de l'Espagne. Dans le cadre de l'OTAN, l'auteur énumère les avantages et désavantages politiques et militaires en ce qui a trait à l'Alliance. Du point de vue espagnol, il examine les diverses factions dont dépend la décision de l'Espagne et de l'OTAN.

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INTRODUCTION *

Before we begin our analysis of Spain's difficult choice between non-alignment and NATO membership, it may be useful to present a brief summary of the historical background. Spain, once a major power in Europe and in "the new world", has been in the wings of the international stage for so long that we need a reminder of its past as well as its present.

The Spain of the twentieth century inherited a past of rarely-equalled grandeur and more recent slow but steady decline. It was the greatest imperial power on earth in the 16th century; by the twentieth, Spain was reduced to the status of a third-rate power whose only colonial "projection" went into nearby North Africa. The great empire which occupied much of Europe, Asia, Africa, and most of Latin America was only a memory. The last of the colonies of any importance, Cuba and the Philippines, had been stripped from Spain as recently as 1898.¹

If the previous two and one-half centuries had been difficult for Spain, the first decades of the present one were to be no better, if not actually worse. Spain's adventures in Morocco were far from happy, and despite considerable economic prosperity resulting from its neutral position in the First World War, political problems continued to mount at home. Dictatorship resulted in 1923 when General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power. Even this drastic move resolved few of Spain's difficulties, which included growing separatism, economic stagnation, costly colonial wars which were never decisive, and major labour difficulties.² In 1930, Primo de Rivera's resignation led to the flight of King Alfonso XIII and the proclamation of the Republic. Successive elections and widespread terrorism gave the army justification for an intervention. However, the coup de main of 18 July, 1936 failed and Spain was shattered by three years of terrible civil war. Estimates vary but, according to one expert,³ deaths appear to have been at least 500,000 in number. Another figure went as high as 745,000.⁴ In the past

* A more extensive historical overview is included in Appendix I, page 177.

a blanket count of one million dead was often given.⁵ Wounded and maimed, however, would certainly have brought the total casualty figure to the latter number. The army, allied to conservative forces, eventually won and its commander-in-chief, Francisco Franco Bahamunde, became the effective dictator of Spain from the Republican collapse of 1939 until his death in November, 1975.⁶ Since that time, the successor to Franco, King Juan Carlos I, has steered Spain toward increasing democracy and a much more open society.

In international relations and security affairs, Spain has remained detached from the major alliances of Europe since the Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath. It thereby avoided major conflicts in Europe and has indeed done so throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it was internal disorder that made this aloofness from European alliances a policy for much of this period. Yet it is true that Spaniards tend to consider themselves to have had a successful record of "neutrality" in the case of major European conflict and of avoiding important political stands when great power questions could have injured Spain.

However, even in the international context, Spain's "neutrality" was not so difficult to achieve before the middle thirties. From 1815 to 1914, largely because of the Pax Britannica, there were few wars of major importance in Europe. Keeping out of the war in 1914 proved a wise but fairly easy decision to make and sustain.⁷ After 1918, the international context favoured Spanish desires to avoid European commitments. Only in World War II, when Nationalist Spain was a member of the Anti-Comintern Pact, did Madrid face problems in avoiding commitment in a European context.⁸ While it succeeded in reducing its involvement compared to that of the other Pact members, Spain was nonetheless drawn into close cooperation with Hitler's Germany and even dispatched a division to fight alongside the German army in the Soviet Union. Only Franco's formula of non-belligerency saved a semblance of Spanish "neutrality". This same "semblance" is all that has remained until today of the desire to avoid taking sides in potential conflict situations.

With the end of the war, Franco's Spain was isolated as the only remaining Fascist state. Desperate to open fruitful contacts with the West which would not only assist in the reconstruction of Spain but

would also be deleterious to anti-Franco forces in Western countries, Franco made every effort to establish a solid anti-communist reputation as the Cold War began in earnest.⁹ While refusing membership in NATO, Spain welcomed, in 1951, the return of British, French, and American ambassadors as well as its own entry into the United Nations.

An initial military agreement was reached with the United States in 1953 acknowledging full acceptance of American bases on Spanish soil and providing for American assistance to Spain over the next ten years.¹⁰ Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, increasing ties with the West meant that any claim to neutrality in the context of the Cold War was spurious indeed. However, attempts to enter NATO and the European Economic Community consistently failed, even as late as the year following the King's accession.¹¹ This was mainly due to reservations in NATO and the EEC about Spain's democratic credentials, even after Franco's death.¹²

Since the process of "democratization" began in early 1976, the regime has continued to be closely tied to the West. All parties except the Communists approve the United States bases agreement. All without exception favour joining the EEC. However, as will be seen, recent events have forced Spain to place economic matters first. The leadership knows that, while NATO generally now wants Spain in, the EEC is not so keen on Spanish membership. These points will be dealt with in detail in the following chapters.

NATO - WHAT'S IN IT FOR SPAIN?

Naturally enough, the internal Spanish debate on NATO entry has so far centred on the advantages and disadvantages for Spain in such a move. There are, of course, many points of view on this subject, reflecting real analysis of the options as well as mere political ideology. Most pros and contras have already been voiced either by the political parties or in the press. It is proposed to look briefly at these negative and positive factors, which will be expanded upon as our analysis progresses.

NEGATIVE

Taking the negative first, opponents of Spain's entry into NATO have practical as well as general political reasons for their stand on the question.¹ Most importantly they harken back to Spain's traditional neutrality, now sanctioned, in their eyes, by over a century and one-half of history. They wish to continue this tradition which they feel has served Spain well and avoid the pitfalls of membership in either of the two blocs. They point out that NATO membership will harm détente and efforts towards disarmament and arms control. It will also deny Spain the right to have its own defence policy, tailored to its particular security requirements. These matters related to Spanish neutrality will be discussed at greater length in a later chapter.

Opponents of membership also point out that Spain's recent successes under Franco in developing ties with the Third World, and particularly with Latin America and the Arab countries, would be placed in jeopardy by signing the North Atlantic Treaty. Staying out of NATO, on the other hand, would give Spain real possibilities of playing a major role in the Third World. They argue that the Alliance would actually reinforce the Franquist isolationism in which Spain found itself by making close relations with both the members of the Warsaw Pact and the non-aligned countries impossible. Spain would find itself the object of distrust from both of these quarters and its initiatives would be considered suspect on all matters of great concern to these two international groupings.

Others suggest that, within a European context, Spain's not joining NATO will help the forces hoping to construct an exclusively Western European alliance, without American participation. They point to Eire as an example of a country that, while not a member of NATO, still contributes to the building of the new Europe. In general, opponents suggest NATO membership will force Spain to be even more dependent on the United States than it has been in the past. The feeling that NATO serves the interests of the United States more than those of Western Europe is widespread among opponents of Spanish entry. They point to the unquestioned American leadership of NATO, its crucial role in providing the nuclear umbrella for the Alliance, its dominance in equipment and nuclear doctrine, and its basing of forces in NATO countries as proof that the Americans dominate the Alliance in ways, many would suggest, not terribly different from those employed by the Soviet Union in its relations with other Warsaw Pact countries. Lastly, they often point to the deleterious effects Spanish entry would have on Yugoslavia and other communist countries which are currently outside the Warsaw Pact Organization. We shall look at this last point in more detail later on.

Of all the international factors impinging on Spain and pressing for abstention, the greatest is that NATO members, it is suggested, base their defence policy more on Alliance priorities than on national ones. The argument seeks to show that Spain's international relations are different from those of other NATO members, and that therefore Madrid should keep its options as open as possible.

With these general points against Spanish membership in NATO go a number of practical ones. The left and many independent-thinking commentators argue that the cost of joining is prohibitive. Estimates vary over the effect of entry in the short- or long-run but one figure mentioned is \$600 million immediately with excessive annual amounts afterwards.² The cost of modernization of the services up to an acceptable NATO standard is argued to be simply too high for the Spanish economy to sustain, particularly in its current difficulties. Even if they concede that modernization must in any case proceed, the suggestion is that modernization within a NATO context will necessarily be aimed more at the acquisition of highly-sophisticated, ultra-modern and

expensive equipment. In addition, they point to Spain's requirement to pay its share towards the organizational costs of the Alliance headquarters and special facilities, the need to post numerous liaison officers abroad and, finally, possible troop and certain naval and air deployments and exercises far afield--all making the Alliance just too expensive.

From an industrial point of view, the negative argument is that standardization of weapons and equipment within the Alliance will damage the country's defence-oriented industries to the advantage of larger producers within the Alliance, particularly the United States. The Spanish arms industry declined under Franco and it hopes for a resurgence based on national requirements connected with current and future military modernization. The national organization, however, has taken no public stand on NATO membership and it is debatable whether the industry would lose or gain from Spanish entry into the Alliance. Opponents strongly contend that the loss from NATO competition would more than offset any gains from access to the large NATO market. They also argue that future status as a Western, fully-aligned country will damage the industry's prospects for sales to the Third World.

Another practical consideration is that of targetting. As we shall see later on, Spaniards often look at the NATO issue as one closely linked with Spain's survivability in case of nuclear war. Opposition to entry argues that the Soviet Union currently either does not have Spanish targets or has very few. The suggestion is that membership will bring direct targetting of all major Spanish military facilities as well as of any NATO installations established on national soil.³ Since the roles that Spain might eventually fulfill in the Alliance would involve the probability of a large number of such targets, the fear of the effects of conflict are not surprising.

There is also some suggestion from the left and elsewhere that entry into the Alliance is in some sense irreversible. The links that result from membership, at the political, military and economic level, are not easy to subsequently loosen. Infrastructural investment and other semi-permanent connections are difficult and expensive to abandon. The impact on national independence is thus likely to be negative, according to this line of analysis, in the long run.

The last major practical reason deterring membership is again connected with the probable roles of the country's territory and armed forces within the Western Alliance. These are likely to include the provision of a rear base, logistics and supply centres, staging, stockpiling, training and exercise areas. The armed services would likely provide air, naval and land services related to the provision of these facilities. While the navy and air force would have major combat roles as well, and the army would still at least be tasked with territorial defence, NATO opponents make it clear that these roles are not compatible with Spain's national honour or the traditions of the armed services. They feel that more nationally-oriented roles would keep the services' prestige higher and would not involve degrading jobs in support of the combat elements of other NATO countries' forces.

The combination, then, of neutralist or simply anti-NATO political thinking and practical considerations of the presumed negative aspects of entry for the economy, industry, and people of Spain, represents the case for the non-entry of Spain into the Western Alliance. It is helped by the fact that even pro-NATO elements recognize that "NATO needs Spain more than Spain needs NATO."⁴ The positive case, in favour of entry, is also a combination of political and practical considerations.

POSITIVE

Since the process of "democratization" began the most telling argument for Spain's entering NATO has consistently been the belief that NATO membership would not only help Spain's entry into the European Economic Community, but would also enormously assist in the Spanish national drive to become an effective part of the West European community. As will be seen, closer links with Western Europe have been the main aim not only of the Franco regime but also of the restored monarchy. This objective is immensely popular with the political parties and the population at large. NATO not only includes the United States, Spain's closest foreign collaborator since the early 1950's, but also thirteen other European countries. It includes the countries which most loudly ostracized Spain under Franco and is an organization which, as a body, rejected the coun-

try's overtures as long as the previous regime was in command. The argument is that, if Spain wishes to be a part of the major economic, political, and social trends in Western Europe, it must also take part in the security arrangements of the region. With the special exception of Ireland, all EEC members and the two current applicants for entry into the EEC other than Spain are members of the Western Alliance. The main context of their security relations is, of course, the Alliance. The context of their major political and economic developments is the European Economic Community. Spain's political, economic and defence future is tied up first and foremost with Western Europe, its geographical, historical, cultural, and social context. It is natural, then, that the defence arrangements of the new democracy also be those of Western Europe.⁵

It is difficult to come to any other conclusion on this particular point. If one accepts that NATO is Western Europe's alliance, and that the possibilities of a purely West European one being formed in the near future are slim, then Spanish membership in NATO as a corollary of the EEC appears logical. Spain is a Western and West European country. Geography argues this forcibly but it is more forcibly stated by the facts of economic and cultural links. The Spanish democracy, new but impressive, finds its obvious political framework in the union of Western democracies. For the foreseeable future, the defence arrangements of that rather small group of states will be overwhelmingly managed within the Atlantic Alliance.

Closely tied up with the European dimension of Spain's future is that of the United States' "special relationship" with Spain. As we shall see, this is of considerable importance and is a fait accompli which even the Spanish Socialists accept. Pro-NATO Spaniards point out that the left's fears of excessive American influence in Spain can be combatted by NATO entry. They argue that the possibility of "multilateralizing" Spanish-American relations is a means of reducing, not augmenting, American influence in the peninsula. Spain would be able to enter the Eurogroup of NATO and be able to form part of a regional group co-operating with the senior partner in the Alliance but perfectly capable nonetheless of maintaining a powerful influence overall. This,

they argue, is impossible for Spain on a bilateral basis where it must always play the poor, weak state confronted by the Colossus.

Another argument in favour of entry has been the requirement to give the Spanish armed forces a meaningful role which will demand all their professional interest. In this way it will not only be possible to make the forces more efficient and professional, but also to turn their attention away from politics. This will not be easy, but membership in a major alliance system, contacts with officers from other democracies, major modernization and organizational reform programmes, and other activities in NATO could, according to pro-Alliance sources, do much of the job. The new democracy needs time to gain truly the full confidence of the armed services, and NATO could not only help to obtain this but could also give the forces a role to keep them busy in the meantime. A new role for the forces is clearly needed since internal security at the former level is incompatible with a European democracy. No role appears to be as major and as satisfactory as the NATO one.

Given that all political parties accept the priority of improving Spain's armed forces generally, NATO membership could presumably help in this as well. The armed forces' problems will be discussed later, but some areas where NATO exposure and perhaps direct assistance can be of help could be mentioned. For example, NATO practice can be used as a convenient means of justifying vital reforms to conservative elements of the forces. This could help smooth matters such as the age of retirement for senior officers, the tendency to nepotism in the navy (not unknown elsewhere in NATO, however), over-officering and insufficient senior N.C.O.'s, standards of facilities in general, and the like. Clearly, specific NATO initiatives could deal with much more important technical, organizational, procedural and equipment requirements. Working with other national forces generally should add more of the spirit of competition on which, it is generally agreed, armed forces thrive.

There is also the feeling that NATO membership will provide a real increase in national security. While this is obviously dependent on one's threat-perception, pro-NATO Spaniards have argued that the Western Alliance will tie Spain to powerful allies who can and will defend the

peninsula if it is attacked. Spanish defence interests outside the NATO area would also be generally furthered, they argue, particularly in the Canaries, but also possibly in Ceuta and Melilla, however indirectly. The American nuclear umbrella would be fully extended to Spain in place of the half-measures of the successive American-Spanish treaties. Spain's means to defend itself would be increased through better forces and allied assistance. Lastly, Spain's very membership itself would deter foreign threats against the peninsula, since an attack on it would involve the entire Alliance in its defence.

Even more linked to a particular threat-perception is the other benefit to Spain claimed by those who are pro-NATO, that a contribution to Western defence made by Spain is actually a benefit to the country itself. The argument is that Spain's future is inevitably tied up with the Western democracies. Their defeat is equally Spain's defeat. Thus a contribution to the common defence is not only a good strategic decision but is required by Spanish national honour.

Others have argued that Spanish entry will help détente and disarmament, and that Spain's strategic position is so vital to the West that any other option is not a real possibility. Indeed, Senator Alberta Ballarin, former president of the Senate Committee on Defence, has argued that a real decision by Spain to move to neutrality would be such a disaster for the West that it would not only de-stabilize the East-West balance, but would also be an impossible decision for any Spanish government to make, primarily because of its shattering impact on the entire Western defensive system.⁶

These arguments have been pressed as well as more concrete ones related to direct Spanish interests. It is often suggested that the Gibraltar issue could be more easily resolved with Spain in NATO, as the transfer would be easier for Great Britain and less damaging to its defence. This question will be examined later on. With respect to the Canaries problem, it has been noted that, "Nothing would reinforce as much the Spanishness of the Canaries as the accenting of its Euro-Atlantic character."⁷ In defence terms, it does appear logical that with Spain in the Alliance, the Canaries could be more easily militarily-defended. In addition, claims about its "African" status would seem at

least slightly less logical if it formed part of NATO, a European and Atlantic grouping.

Arguments are brought forward with considerable force that NATO membership is cheaper than armed neutrality. In contrast to the left's position, pro-NATO spokesmen emphasize the level of defence costs of less strategically-valuable states which are neutral. These voices suggest that Spain's direct annual contribution to NATO expenses would not exceed figures in the area of 5,000 million pesetas (some \$70 million), a very small percentage of the current Spanish defence budget.⁸ This would, of course, leave aside the question of how much has to be spent on modernization, in or out of the Alliance. They conclude that Spain's defence expenditure will be lower with NATO membership than with armed neutrality, and that national security will be greater.

These, then, are the major "pros" and "cons" put forward in Spain regarding entry into the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, as important as these points are, it is difficult not to feel that the eventual debate will be something of a "dialogue des sourds." As we shall see, the political parties have taken stands on the issue which would be extremely difficult to change. The bulk of the debate so far has exhibited all the typical signs of the ideological division in Spain. The Right favours NATO. The Left opposes it. The Centre is divided on the matter, although the centrist government is in favour. It is hard to see how this will change. The onus lies with pro-NATO elements to convince a general public which is not keen on the Alliance or military commitments of any kind, that NATO membership is necessary and beneficial for Spain. It must overcome a natural opposition to major initiatives which involve the Spanish state and people in future commitments, when those initiatives do not appear urgent at the moment. In this, threat-perception plays now, and may well play in the future, a determining role.

SPAIN - WHAT'S IN IT FOR NATO?

In the discussion of the impact of Spanish membership on NATO, one can, in the author's opinion, largely exclude negative factors. Spain brings virtually no liabilities to the Alliance while it brings nothing less than enormous benefits. However, in order to dismiss the importance of the negative factors, they will be mentioned first. Firstly, Spain has territory which Moroccan irredentism will eventually covet more openly, that is, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Alboran islands in and off Northern Morocco. Secondly, the relatively recent birth, or if you prefer re-birth, of democracy in Spain is no guarantee that in the long run, the Alliance might not be yet again embarrassed by a right-wing junta or dictator ruling the country as was the case in Portugal and Greece. Such members of the Alliance can place a considerable strain on its unity, as has been seen in very recent memory.

In both cases, the facts speak for themselves. Morocco reserves the right to raise the Spanish enclaves issue at its discretion. The Spanish democracy is not only young but faces severe tests of internal order and controlled devolution of the central authority's powers. These international and domestic problems are, however, either not really of NATO concern, outside NATO's legitimate perusal, or more apparent than real.

On the Moroccan issue, Spanish North African settlements are clearly outside the NATO area. Few informed Spaniards would dream of expecting NATO support on the issue, other than the general hope that the Alliance will look with an understanding eye on the Spanish position in international fora where the subject might be brought up. This is not to say that Spaniards who reckon that NATO should be expected to assist them against Morocco do not exist. José Mario Armero, a generally well-informed observer of Spanish foreign affairs, has recently stated emphatically that this is a major advantage of Alliance membership.¹ However, this view is not shared by either government or most other pro-NATO elements.

On the prospects for future democracy in Spain, and the potential for eventual NATO embarrassment, much could be said. However, Greek,

Turkish and Portuguese politics have shown that in those countries, too, democracy is fragile. It is well to remember that in the past half century, a third of member countries have had undemocratic governments. Surely what is required is what all major political parties in Spain emphasize--further links with other democracies. The debating point in Spain is about whether defence links are also necessary alongside the political, economic, cultural and social ones. A last point might be made on this matter. It is surely in the interests of the Alliance that Spain, whether in or out of NATO, remains a democracy. This alone will ensure a friendly, compatible government in Madrid. Thus, the Alliance must be prepared to run some risks in attempting to assist Spanish democracy at this stage. If Spain were to opt for NATO membership, it is unthinkable that the Alliance would reject it because of the possibility that one day the democratic government of the country could come to an end and that this could embarrass its partners. If NATO, as a democratic alliance, can help Spanish democracy through linking it with its own member democracies, then this should be done in the interests of all concerned.

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Given that the negative factors are few and of slight importance, one can now address the major question of what advantages Spanish membership would bring to the Western Alliance. It is proposed to look at these in two categories--political or strategic advantages and then purely military ones. The political or strategic matters involve general, positional, political, industrial and socio-cultural factors. The military aspect will involve the specific details of the Spanish armed forces and their potential contribution to the West.

The most fundamental and obvious political advantage to NATO in Spain's entry would surely be the general boost it would give the Alliance. In these years of Alliance disarray, with France and Greece to differing degrees less than full members and others not exactly actively participating, there can be little doubt that Spanish interest in joining would be generally seen as a sign that the Alliance is really in better shape than it sometimes appears. The significance

of a newly-established democracy in Western Europe almost automatically accepting that NATO is the natural framework for its defence relations will escape no one. Not only would it reinforce the democratic nature of the Alliance but would remind current members of the basic terms of reference of NATO--an alliance of democratic states and a collective defence arrangement aimed at maintaining Western Europe's independence, among other things. The Western European defence function of NATO would be fully highlighted by such a move, a function often misunderstood or forgotten in Western European political circles.

There is also a more general, one is tempted to say "cultural," advantage to NATO in having Spain as a member. Spain is a traditional country in many ways. Religion is still a strongly-felt part of national life and atheism is looked at with, if not horror, at least surprise, in much of the country. The heritage left by religious aspects of Spain's historic international mission is still remarkably alive, and often a real force in the armed services. Military interest in subjects of religion is still strong, to such an extent that it surprises many Western military men. "Dios, Patria, Rey," and "Todo por la patria" are far from empty, out-of-date, slogans in many circles in Spain.²

Concepts of national honour are far from passé either. The NATO desire to avoid, at almost all costs, appearing to pressure Spain about membership is a case in point. Spaniards as a whole are sensitive not only to foreign criticism but to foreign advice. Whether because of an inferiority or a superiority complex is difficult to say, but it is clear that most Spaniards do not wish to be lectured to by foreigners, nor do they wish to appear overly impressed by foreign practices or ways of thinking.

Spanish soldiers seem to work particularly hard when foreign observers are about. They appear to wish instinctively to give the best impression possible. Proud of their country, they, like most Spaniards, are only too happy to demonstrate that sentiment.

The other traditional values known as being particularly striking in Spain include personal honesty, individual pride, and a certain ability to endure hardship. The onslaught of unbridled capitalism and post-war prosperity appear to have changed these attributes relatively

little to-date although Spaniards of rightist political views will assure you otherwise.

Spain is changing. There is more crime, by all accounts, than there was in the recent past. The population is less accustomed to doing without daily comforts than it was. It is even noticeable to some, though arguable, that the Spaniard's well-known sense of pride is waning. Whatever the truth of this last point, all observers agree that Spain is becoming more "European" and more "Western." Yet the country retains for the moment many of the traditional values that the right, in particular, suggests that most Western Europeans and North Americans have lost. Given that the Western Alliance is to at least some extent based on those historic values, it is argued that the addition of Spain to the association can only help to remind us of basic tenets of what has been called "Christian civilization" which may have become a little less than obvious in more Northern minds.

The political advantages to NATO of Spanish entry are, then, obvious enough. The cultural or moral advantages are more arguable. However, the strategic advantages are not only clear but enormous. They relate to Spain's geography, demography, and physical position.

The physical position of the country makes it one of the most important areas, strategically speaking, in the world. It faces on both the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. It has some 3,000 kilometres of coast-line with several good harbours on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean sides. It forms the closest point between Africa and Europe and its coast runs the length of the Strait of Gibraltar/Sea of Alboran constituting the whole of the northern land mass (excepting Gibraltar itself) above the narrow waterway connecting the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In these two seas are daily found many thousands of ships of almost all nations but primarily from NATO countries.

Its extra-peninsular dimensions include not only the somewhat tenuous holdings of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa but also the Canary Islands in the Atlantic and the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean, providing it with excellent harbour and air facilities (not to mention added tourism) directly north of Algiers and west of Sardinia. Their strategic importance has long been known and has had a histori-

cally great bearing on British and French, as well as Spanish, naval activities in the western end of the Mediterranean Sea.

The strategic importance of the Canaries, on the other hand, has been perceived more of recent date than historically. These islands hug closely the West African coast right at the western extreme of the Sahara Desert. They, too, provide excellent airfield and harbour facilities and project Spain's natural range of activities down to below the 30 degree line of north latitude. They are also relatively free from African anti-colonial targetting through the effectively total Spanish status of the local population.

Their main strategic importance, however, comes from their position athwart the great sealanes bringing the bulk of oil products from the Middle East to Western Europe and even North America. They also control from the southwest the approaches to the Mediterranean.

Returning to the peninsula proper, it constitutes, with Portugal, not only the southwestern extension of Western Europe but of NATO as well. Its 504,800 square kilometres are extremely mountainous--Spain is the second most mountainous country in Europe--and generally agreed to be ideal for defence. The only easy approach to the capital would be from NATO Portugal. The only other land approach is that leading south from France through mountains linking the Atlantic and the Mediterranean--the Pyrenees Range. These mountains are relatively impassable. They have few passes practicable for armed forces and are high and quite treacherous. On both coasts they run right down to the sea and offer only routes which are easily blocked. An invader from the North faces the further unsettling prospect of internal mountain ranges, once he has forced the Pyrenees, to the West, to the South, and to some degree, even to the East.

In addition, as Napoleon and his marshals discovered in the early nineteenth century, the valleys of the interior are deep, water is not plentiful, communications are difficult and easily cut, and living off the land is hazardous and problematical. The geographic and topographical conditions of the country are thus admirably suited to the defence.

The strictly strategic benefits of the addition of this territory to NATO are, as mentioned, very great indeed. In any consideration of

them, however, it seems that the concept of depth is the most crucial. It is clear to any military analyst that NATO lacks depth. The organization of defence in depth is a well-studied principle of operations related to this phase of war. Hence a constant concern of NATO planners is how to deal with this lack of depth to the Western position in the case of a major Soviet attack in Europe.

In contrast to the enormously deep extent of any possible Soviet defensive position, based on the European satellites, Eastern Europe's great river systems, and mere distance alone, NATO has little to offer. Even assuming full French co-operation in an allied effort, the Alliance's position is far from ideal. The Rhine is the only significant physical barrier before one arrives at the Channel from the East, linking as it does the North Sea with the Alps. From the Pyrenees to the East German border, there are no major mountain ranges an invading army would need to cross. Distances to the sea from Eastern Germany are measured in hundreds of kilometres, not more. Readers will be aware of the negative assessments this has led to, including statements that the Soviets could be at the Channel in twelve days or less.

The mere existence of a NATO Spain would be able to change all this. By linking Portugal, which is a full member of the Alliance, to France which is also a North Atlantic Treaty signatory, Spanish membership really implies the addition of the whole of the Iberian Peninsula to the depth available to the West's possible defensive deployments. The peninsula as a whole totals over 590,000 square kilometres (Spain is over 500,000, Portugal some 90,000). Spain alone is the fourth largest country in Europe after the USSR, Turkey, and France. As we have seen the territory is mountainous and far from ideal for invading forces. The Pyrenees form the only real natural barrier, other than the Channel, for forces heading west and south after crossing the Rhine.

It is not only on the land side, of course, that this depth is provided. Spanish airfields, of which there are many, are generally hundreds of miles farther from Eastern Europe than are French ones. NATO bases are crowded and dispersal and other operational priorities should make Spain very attractive indeed to NATO air planners. As another study has shown, air distances from Eastern Europe to central Spain are

in the 2,000 mile plus range.³ Protected by NATO air defence and warning systems to the East, but particularly in Germany and Italy, Spain offers an even more secure base for air operations than does the sole current NATO bastion beyond our natural barriers (the Channel and the Pyrenees), that is, the United Kingdom.

The geographical reinforcement to naval operations, while important, is perhaps not so striking to an Alliance virtually without significant depth on the land and air sides. It is the author's belief, that, from the strictly military point of view, this is Spain's major source of value to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If depth is a crucial advantage, however, there are very many other strategic gains to a NATO with Spain. That maritime position mentioned above would give the Alliance a vastly-increased Mediterranean dimension and a projection toward the South Atlantic which many would consider a godsend. From the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) point of view, Spain's own position and its Canaries extension would assure NATO a considerably enhanced basis of operations. Linked with the Azores, North American, and United Kingdom positions already assured to the Alliance (the Azores base agreement's continuity has been a virtual certainty since the spring of 1979), the Spanish contribution could make NATO ASW potential even more a force to be reckoned with.⁴ As Captain Komorowski has written:

A thousand mile arc from the Spanish Mediterranean port of Barcelona comfortably encompasses the straits of Sicily and Messina and the Tyrrhennian, Ionian, and Adriatic Seas. Looking west and north from the Peninsula toward the Atlantic, the same thousand-mile arc struck from the Atlantic port of El Ferrol includes the contiguous Bay of Biscay, the English Channel, and the approaches to the Channel ports, the southern portion of the North Sea and approaches to Rotterdam, the Irish Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean including portions of the North Atlantic trades... 5

The 1976 United States-Spain Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation already brings the latter country into direct and substantial co-operation with a NATO member on maritime matters affecting the Eastern Atlantic "zone of common interest." Some five million square kilometres of ocean are involved directly with some 30 per cent more covered by land-

base defensive means. In this zone are not only the peninsula's Atlantic coasts but their Atlantic island positions of Madeira (Portugal) and the Canary Islands (Spain).⁶ Given the United States and peninsular interests there, a NATO framework of co-operation appears obvious. NATO's own gain in terms of ASW, trans-Atlantic supply and support, and control of this access to the Mediterranean is clear.

Spain's Mediterranean position also gives it close connections with at least two of the three Maghreb countries, a region of the world of not only great potential instability but enormous strategic importance. As will be seen when the possibility of Spanish neutrality is considered, this position which Spain enjoys is a double-edged sword and the countries of the region find themselves often more involved in bipolar power politics than is their wont.

In the event of conflict, Spain could provide many vital services to Western forces even early on in the conflict and later on, if things went badly, it could be crucial for carrying on the struggle.

Early on, it could provide a relatively secure rear base, where weapons and equipment could be stored or from whence it could be shipped to the front. It, unlike Great Britain, forms part of continental Europe and material sent to the front could be sent by rail or road without a requirement for going part of the way by sea. However, Spain suffers from a somewhat inefficient national railway system. It has 16,000 kilometres of railways which are widely but unevenly distributed. While there are five connecting points to Portugal, there are only four to France and the Spanish railroads do not use the common gauge used in other Western European countries. Highways, though improving rapidly, are again somewhat restricted in value, particularly outside a few international crossing points. Nonetheless, the potential for improvement is there, and the potential improvement to the security of Alliance communications cannot be ignored.

If the Alliance's forces were being pushed back (not an impossible scenario), the peninsula could be a significant rear position, immensely strengthened by the Pyrenees and its other distinctive terrain features fitted so admirably to defence. From the beginning of any conflict a likely trans-shipment point for men and material arriving from North

America, in a negative situation, it could be a powerful bridgehead allowing the Alliance not only invaluable time but a real opportunity for continued military operations on the European scene. No other European country offers this possibility. While the United Kingdom is perhaps in some ways even more secure from attack, its island position makes offensive operations possibly more difficult to mount than they would be from Spain. While the United Kingdom is closer to the threatened Central Front, it does not have easy access to both NATO's key waterways--the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Spain, then, offers enormous and possibly vital strategic advantages to the Western Alliance through its position and the peculiarities of its internal, border and coastal geography. It would, however, be a mistake to consider these geographical factors as the only major strategic gains Spain would bring into the NATO Alliance. There are a number of general factors which make Spain of great potential value to the West, even if one leaves aside geography and culture.

One of these is the industrial strength of the country. Northern Europeans often tend to think of Spain as underdeveloped and almost exclusively agricultural. There is no doubt that Spanish agriculture is important and employs a large percentage of the nation's labour force. However, Spain is an industrial power in its own right. Depending on the year, Spain has been the ninth or tenth industrial state in the world for most of this decade. Its gross national product in 1977 was over \$100 thousand million. As of 1975, it ranked twelfth among the world's major steel-producing countries. It is a leading producer of automobiles, cement, and electricity, not to mention one of the three or four most significant shipbuilding states.⁷ Its agricultural production ensures a nearly self-sufficient status that is the envy of many European countries. Despite regional difficulties and the often chronic need for land reform, Spanish agriculture is often efficient and almost everywhere immensely improved over the last generation.

The country still maintains a great seafaring tradition. In 1975, it ranked thirteenth of the world's merchant fleets in number of ships. Its fleet is relatively modern and is complemented by Western Europe's

second largest fishing fleet, a truly vital industry.

While it has moderate amounts of several important raw materials, the country does suffer from a relative lack of these when compared with some other West European states. The shattering cost of imported oil has dealt a heavy blow to the Spanish economy which produces virtually none of this crucial commodity.

Industries directly involved in defence or defence-related production are many and varied. Table 1 shows the breadth of this involvement. These industries are capable of producing all the motor transport requirements for the armed forces. Some of this vehicle production has been under licence from foreign producers; other elements have been wholly Spanish. Some 100 industrial centres are involved in defence production and they employ around 65,000 people, many of whom are of course highly qualified technicians. Sales to the armed forces in 1977 were to a value of 38,000 million pesetas (roughly \$600 million). The same year, exports totalled \$166 million, a startling increase compared with \$96 million in 1976 and only \$48 million in 1975. Spain ranks eleventh in arms exports among the world's nations, behind the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.⁸

Despite major arms production growth in the 19th century, and considerable stimulation in the first World War and the Civil War, peace again brought decline to the industry. Industrial autarchy, particularly in military fields, was established as a goal of the National Industrial Institute (INI) in 1941. This new organization was to ensure the improvement and strengthening of Spain's arms industries, a heavy order in a Spain which, because of political isolation, could sell or buy abroad very little in this field. By 1959, the Santa Barbara National Enterprise (EMSB) was set up, having under its wing the six major military industries of the country. Similar reforms occurred in the Navy's related industries. Close co-operation is maintained through the INI and the EMSB on defence production matters.

The country has produced what it has needed in terms of rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, and anti-aircraft guns, along with their associated munitions. Armoured vehicles

activity involves essentially two activities--the refit of American M-47 and M-48 tanks by Spanish Chrysler, and licensed production of the French AMX-30 in which sixty-four Spanish firms have co-operated.⁹ Some activity in the fields of missiles and other advanced technology has been undertaken.

TABLE I ¹⁰

SPANISH INDUSTRY DEALING WITH BASIC AND LAND MATERIEL

| <u>Type of Weapon or Material</u> | <u>Enterprise</u> | <u>Service Relation</u> |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| Pistols and revolvers | Llama Gabilondo (Vitoria) | Private |
| | Star (Eibar) | Private |
| Z-45-60 and 70 (sub-rifles) | Star (Eibar) | Private |
| Assault Rifle and light arms | CETME | National Industry Institute (INI) |
| | FN Oviedo | Santa Barbara National Industry (ENSB) |
| | FN La Coruna | ENSB |
| Machine Guns | FN Oviedo | ENSB |
| Mortars and mortar ammunition | Esperanza Marquina | Private |
| 106 mm. recoilless rifles | FN Seville | ENSB |
| grenade launchers | INSTALAZA (Zaragoza) | Private |
| Field Artillery | FN Trubia (Oviedo) | Army |
| | FN Seville | ENSB |
| Anti-aircraft artillery | Placencia Armas, S.A. | Private |
| Rockets | Central Chemical Laboratory | Army |
| | INTA | Defence Ministry |
| | FN Trubia (Oviedo) | Army |
| | EXPAL (Vitoria) | Private |
| Chemical defence | FN La Maranosa | Army |

TABLE I (cont'd)

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------|
| Cartridges and Side arms | FN Palencia | ENSB |
| | FN Toledo | ENSB |
| Artillery ammunition, powder explosives | FN Marcia | Army |
| | FN Valladolid | Army |
| | FN Trubia | Army |
| | FN Granada | ENSB |
| | Barreiros Hnos., S.A. | Private |
| Hand Grenades | International (Orense) | Private |
| | VERT | Private |
| Mines and booby-traps | EXPALSA (Vitoria) | Private |
| | ORAMIC (S. Sebastian) | Private |
| Tanks | EXPALSA (Vitoria) | Private |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | FN Seville (AMX-30) | ENSB |
| | Chrysler (span) M-47/8 | Private |
| | ENASA (Valladolid) | Private |
| Other Vehicles | VIASA | Private |
| | SANTA ANA | Private |
| | ENASA | INI |
| Signals Equipment | MARCONI, S.A. | Private |
| | INDESA | |
| | SAGEN | |
| Optics | Artillery Workshop | Army |
| | ENOSA | Private |
| Fire Control and Radar | Industrial and Electronic experiments | INI |
| | Marconi Espanola | Private |

Thus, Spain has a strong defence industry on the land side. Naval construction, an almost equally ancient and important activity, also reflects government interest and effort. Spain's long naval modernization programme, now in its third phase, has an increasingly national context. Spanish yards have done the most varied work, and will undertake even more taxing employment in the future. With construction and conversion work already done on almost everything from submarines to missile destroyers, El Ferrol this year will begin on a replacement to the ex-American aircraft carrier "Dedalo." In addition to the El Ferrol establishment, naval construction is carried out in Cartagena (submarines and frigates in recent years) and Cadiz (patrol boats and specialist craft).

The air industry, like the air force, is of course a relative newcomer. Nonetheless, its efforts go as far back as 1914. Until the Civil War, its progress was impressive. The national industry--CASA-- is a result of various changes of status and amalgamations. Its major successes have been the "Aviocar" (CASA-212), which has sold well abroad, and the trainer "Aviojet" CASA-101. The industry's major stumbling block is lack of prospects through the small level of possible sales. There is a widespread feeling that the future of the industry depends on co-operation with foreign enterprises. Nonetheless, there is considerable optimism in the industry. It is pointed out that the mere replacement of current aircraft of American origin will assume an expenditure of more than 160,000 million pesetas (approximately \$ 2,300 million).¹¹

Spain would bring to the Alliance a mixed but generally modern, flexible arms industry, with wide-ranging experience in recent years. The alliance can assist Spain in the modernization and likely profitable specialization of its arms industry. It may also be able to provide markets for some Spanish defence products. Spain can offer NATO further back-up for its total defence production potential, a wider geographical and environmental context for such production and research related to it, and a valuable, and relatively secure, source of defence production of many basic weapon and equipment types which can expect to be in the Alliance arsenal.

THE MILITARY BOOST

The entry of Spain into NATO would not only provide the above general and strategic benefits to the West but would also bring major additions to the actual military strength of the Alliance in all three elements--army, navy, and air force. The armed forces of Spain are relatively large and well-disciplined. They vary considerably, however, in extent of modernity, efficiency, and equipment scales; in the professional to conscript mix, in roles, in the level of historic interest in politics, and in strategic posture.

The armed forces number some 315,000 personnel of whom 191,000 are conscripts theoretically serving 15-18 months with the Colours. In fact, the period of service involved at the moment is only 12-15 months, the rest being used up by various leaves.¹² Of these numbers, the army has by far the largest number--240,000 total personnel. These are made up of about 90,000 professionals and 150,000 conscripts. The navy numbers some 40,000 (including Marines) of whom 32,000 are reportedly conscripts. Of the air force's over 35,000 personnel, only 9,000 are conscripts.

On this force some 188,700 million pesetas (\$2,360 million) was spent in 1978.¹³ This represented some 13.2 per cent of the budget and 2.43 per cent of the projected Gross National Product. This last figure compares with 14.5 per cent of the budget and 1.9 per cent of GNP spent on defence in 1975, the last year of the Franco regime. In 1976, \$1,766 million was spent on defence (14.9 per cent of government spending) and in 1977, \$2,154 million (15.3 per cent). In these first two years of democratization, the percentage of GNP spent on defence fell to 1.8 per cent and 1.7 per cent, respectively. It is important also to note that these figures for defence expenditure do not include security forces such as the Guardia Civil and Policía Armada, both of whom are officered by the army and have military duties in time of crisis. It has been argued that the inclusion of their costs, as well as those of the pensions and somewhat notorious "passive lists" (clases pasivas), would have brought defence costs to 3.8 per cent of GNP and 24.8 per cent of the national budget in 1975. For strict defence purposes, however, Spanish expenditure has been less than most

NATO countries. The 1975 figure would place Spain at a level of expenditure greater only than Luxembourg in terms of percentage of GNP spent on defence. Nonetheless, the trend is definitely toward an increase in absolute terms even though there were percentage of GNP declines in 1976 and 1977. The 1978 figure is much more likely to reflect the real future trend. Indeed, dramatic increases can be seen in per capita defence expenditure over the years of advancing democracy. In 1975, the figure was \$48. With the first year of the Monarchy, not surprisingly, this increased enormously to \$59; and in 1978 to \$65.

In other terms, however, the defence effort is greater than it first appears. Over 0.85 per cent of the population is in the armed forces. This compares with 0.34 per cent in Canada, 0.72 per cent in the Netherlands, 0.77 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany and 0.95 per cent in the United States. In addition, Spain's defence expenditure as a percentage of the national budget is generally greater than is that of, for example, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Luxembourg. Indeed, within NATO in these terms, Spain has lagged behind only Greece, the United States, Turkey, West Germany, and mutatis mutandis Portugal.

Spain's Civil Guard has a strength of some 65,000 men. In time of crisis, they would act as military police and light infantry and all observers agree they would be excellent in these roles. The Policia Armada, although slightly less militarized, is also almost completely officered from army resources and has para-military roles in war-time or national emergency. It numbers 38,000 men. Thus Spain has exceptional para-military forces available.

At this point, a word should be said about the reserve forces of Spain. In theory these include some 700,000 soldiers, 200,000 sailors and Marines and 100,000 airmen. In fact, these "forces" are neither organized nor trained but simply consist of lists of personnel who have served their "mili" (national service) and are now in the civilian community. They are not given any, even occasional, refresher training. Nor are they periodically brought together for exercises. They are required merely to file an occasional form advising the ministry of

their address and civil status. The fine for failure to do this is laughable and the result predictable. Nonetheless, there is, of course, a vast pool of manpower in Spain which has been through twelve to fifteen months of military service and which could be called up in time of crisis. This pool is estimated by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) at one million men. Further potential for military mobilization is slightly reduced because 4.6 per cent of the male population between eighteen and forty-five years of age is already in the service. This would be the third highest figure in NATO if Spain were part of the Alliance.¹⁴

The Spanish forces are generally fit and can be keen. While the "reserves" would probably suffer from the general overweight situation of the nation as a whole, the serving personnel seem to compare favourably with other Southern European forces.¹⁵ Much of the youth of Spain is accustomed to some hardships and takes well to exercises and training in basic military skills. Doing one's military service is still a nearly essential part in the Spaniard's coming of age. In rural areas it is considered an actual disgrace not to be chosen for the "mili". Social opprobrium and the requirements of "machismo" ensure that this state of affairs maintains itself.

The Spaniard tends to develop personal loyalty systems rather than collective ones. As a result he insists on being well-led if he is to effectively perform his task. While crack units may have internal loyalties to the organization, units based on a high percentage of conscripts must be led by officers who can command the loyalty of the men or they will generally function badly. While this is to some extent true in all countries' armed services, personal loyalty traditions are strong in Spain and it is a very obvious difficulty here.

In terms of fighting spirit, Spaniards have a historic reputation for toughness, even ruthlessness. Given the long period (since 1898) without major international war, however, it is difficult to be certain about this. While great courage and tenacity was certainly often displayed in the Civil War, and legendary fervour in the Napoleonic Wars, these may have been special cases. In the latter, it was the people as a whole involved in a highly emotional conflict. In the

former, Spaniard fought Spaniard over issues of apparently enormous political, social and moral consequence. During the French Napoleonic invasions, the people resisted manfully and tied down hundreds of thousands of French regulars in what many historians reckon to be the first modern guerrilla war ("guerrilla" means little war in Spanish). Critics suggest that these characteristics of valour do belong to the Spanish people but that the regular army has not shown itself a particularly impressive embodiment of them. Ortega y Gasset suggested that Spaniards made good fighters but poor soldiers and many foreign military observers have joined Spain's most recent great philosopher in his assessment.¹⁶

The army was certainly badly mauled in Cuba in 1898 and in some of the Moroccan campaigns of this century. Some Germans have claimed that the Blue Division fought little and with even less real heart. Many feel it was the pampered formation of the Eastern Front, and it appears likely that it was highly-privileged in many ways. Since the war, the army has only had to deal with the decolonization difficulties, not a major tasking, in the Western Sahara. Indeed, in this job the bulk of the work fell to that exceptional military organization--the Spanish Legion. This force, fully professional, is still largely kept outside the peninsula and is a model for the best in the rest of the army. However, sceptics point out that the army as a whole cannot hope to reach the Legion's standards and that few in the rest of the army have anything remotely resembling battle experience.¹⁷ The exceptions are, of course, the very senior officers and some senior N.C.O.'s who served in the Civil War, but their experience was special and is now forty years out of date.

Still, all this having been said, it is difficult for one to accept these criticisms. Spain's military traditions are old and deep. Individual courage does not appear lacking in Spaniards. The personal aspects of Spanish loyalties should assist in forming well-disciplined and motivated fighting teams. "Not letting down the side" is a well-ingrained sentiment in most Spanish males, reinforced by the sometimes ferocious requirements to maintain one's prestige or honour with one's fellows. All this needs sound leadership to bring

it to a successful battle outcome, and in this, perhaps, Spain has suffered, at the political and military level, for some time. However, this does not take away from the potential of this people whom Hitler considered the only Latin race which was "tough" and would resist by guerrilla warfare any German occupation.¹⁸

The only test for the military prowess of a people is war. Barring this means of assisting our analysis, one cannot properly come down on one side or another of the debate about the people of Spain's military capacities. However, one could surely say the same of most Alliance members in this century. How certain can one be of the fighting spirit of the Dutch, Belgians, Danes, Norwegians, Italians, French, Turks, or Luxemburgers? These countries have had unfortunate or even disastrous records in one or more wars this century but circumstances differ and one would be hard put to assess their prospects in another conflict. How would the German soldier of today compare with his father's generation? What lessons should one draw from the American experience in Vietnam, from Portugal's African decolonization, and Greece's Civil War? Are the populations of Britain and Canada, with their superb 20th century war records, now "too fat to fight" through long experience of purely professional armies and "easy living"? Clearly one does not intend to answer these questions. The point is to suggest that one must recognize the difficulties in attempting to assess personal and societal factors in determining fighting spirit or military prowess. In Spain's case one can say that the martial spirit, especially in times of invasion, has never been lacking. Nor has the Spaniard anything for which to apologize to his potential European NATO partners, insofar as military fighting records are concerned.

To continue on the general points related to the armed forces as a whole, the most disturbing is perhaps the rather extraordinary division of the defence budget among the three categories--personnel, operations, and investment cost. NATO prefers figures in the range of 40 per cent of total defence expenditure for personnel, 20 per cent for operational costs, and 35 per cent for investment. While this is rarely achieved completely, it is a common "ideal" and most Alliance

countries are not far off the mark. In the case of Spain, however, the gap between these figures and the actual ones could hardly be larger. Table II shows this state of affairs.

1978 Defence Budget (millions of pesetas)¹⁹

| | <u>Armed Forces</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>Total Defence</u> | <u>%</u> |
|------------|---------------------|----------|----------------------|----------|
| Personnel | 118,783.6 | 61.72 | 263,623.3 | 76.63 |
| Operations | 24,907.6 | 13.17 | 28,764.9 | 8.36 |
| Investment | 47,517.5 | 25.11 | 51,640.7 | 15.01 |

In France, 42 per cent of expenditure goes to personnel costs, in the United Kingdom--47 per cent, in the United States--53 per cent. Clearly the personnel costs of the Spanish armed forces and defence ministry are completely out of line with NATO preferred practice. They are more similar to certain Latin American countries. It is also important to note that these figures represent a slight improvement over the years of the Franco era. Also of importance is the fact that these personnel costs are so high despite the pittance (\$2 per month) the bulk of the recruits receive as pay. They represent the enormous costs of an over-officered, somewhat pampered service. Until something can be done with the figure for personnel costs, and this is unlikely for some years, the only means to raise the extremely low operational and investment outlays will be to increase the defence budget as a whole.

The low figure spent on operations is reflected in a number of ways. Exercises have been few and far between, as compared with most NATO countries, particularly in the army. This situation is improving but has a long way to go.²⁰ Exercises have rarely been conducted in a realistic or intense fashion. Training is generally conceded to put too much emphasis on courses and book learning and not enough on actual handling of troops or equipment in the field or at sea or in the air.

The impact of the low investment figure (25.11 per cent in 1978, up from 20.2 per cent in 1977) is even greater and even more easily observable. Military equipment has long been of the hand-me-down

variety and largely of American manufacture. This is changing rapidly, particularly in the navy and air force but also increasingly in the army. This is occurring, however, only because of recent increases in the overall budget which has allowed for the deployment of resources to more and more modern equipment and weapons. The comparative figures for France and the United Kingdom are 42 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively.²¹

As has been mentioned, the Spanish conscript is very badly paid. He is also, by NATO standards, badly housed and fed. All these features reflect the past practice of keeping the defence budget down while the economic transformation of the 1950's and 1960's was allowed to take its course.²² The government hopes to improve his lot at the first opportunity but has other priorities for expenditure which may delay expenditures on creature comforts for the long-suffering conscript. When one considers that vast improvements are needed in dormitories, messes, hygienic services, heating, the provision of hot water, sports facilities, clothing, food and other daily necessities, it is easy to see the effort required. This is especially true when one considers that in recent years inflation has meant that budget allocations for creature comforts have been totally inadequate.

There are also difficulties of command in the forces as a whole. As mentioned, they are over-officered. It was not until the end of 1977 that there was a combining of the three ministries into one Ministry of Defence. There are insufficient professional senior N.C.O.'s and officers spend far too long at each rank level. Promotion has been almost exclusively based on length of service, merit having little bearing until very late in the game. Lastly, the emphasis on the army has been reflective of internal security roles and political considerations and has been detrimental to the other two services.

The three ministries, navy, army, and air force, had a seemingly well-deserved reputation for lack of coordination. They were extremely jealous of one another and struggles for increased shares of the total defence budget were often even more hard-fought than in other countries. The top-heavy bureaucracy of the ministries ensured a rather stifling atmosphere in the forces as a whole, reinforced by the slowness and

general system of promotions and the long period of peace. The requirement for a second job was also most felt by those officers posted to the ministries in the capital. Not only was the city more expensive to live in, but also the opportunities for finding such secondary employment were of course greater at the governmental and financial centre of the country. Officers did not do a full day of military work and efficiency was thus cut even further. Nor were they inclined to be interested in postings out of their local environment, such normal professional stages being a major threat to their secondary jobs. This "vice" (called "pluriempleo") also existed and exists in other centres but it is in the capital that it has been most evident.

The Spanish officer corps is a very special institution. Generally well-motivated and anxious to be professional, it considers itself much more a "corps" than those of most other countries. It is large but, politically at least, remarkably cohesive. It numbers for all three services, some 34,800 of whom over 70 per cent are in the army alone.²³ It has been a major source of social mobility although most officers come now from the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie.

Higher-ranking officers tend, particularly in the army, to be former "crusaders" from Civil War days. They are often of more modest origins and owe their ascendance to their victory in that conflict. The professional officer corps of 1936 was simply not up to the vast requirements of the subsequent three years. Large numbers of personnel of likely lower origins on the social scale thus became officers as the war carried on. In the army, as in other areas of the government's control, at the war's end these officers were employed still rather than face the seemingly impossible task of returning them to the "economy." The armed services have not required this many officers in peacetime, with the consequent result that usually headquarters and even units are over-officered. This means that, given the shortage of N.C.O.'s, officers have lower tasks to perform including lectures and other instruction on subjects which they would not involve themselves with in other NATO armed forces.

Resulting at least partially from the large number of officers is the slowness of promotions. One is struck by the many stages the Spanish

officer has to complete before he is eligible for promotion to the next rank. Time in rank considerations are supplemented by posting, experience and courses factors. While his training is good, it is, as mentioned, "bookish." He can be expected to spend a full four years at the military academy and a further four preparing for and attending his staff course. Whatever the current government's intentions, the average age at promotion has increased in this decade relative to the last. Despite length of time between promotions, relatively little time is actually spent with the troops. The fact that merit has counted so little in promotion has, of course, affected the morale of the officer corps and particularly of the young and keen members of it.

At the lower levels of command, there are also problems. Senior N.C.O.'s enter under a fairly bizarre programme, when compared with most countries' experience. Like the officers, they enter directly and go off to a long course at a military academy where they too are a sort of cadet. They graduate directly as senior N.C.O.'s without having actually served in more junior positions in units of the field army. This has advantages and disadvantages. They are well-trained, professional, and well-motivated soldiers but can have difficulties in establishing a good working "rapport" with the person who is only doing his "mili." There are 36,150 senior N.C.O.'s in the three services, which is generally considered far too few, being as it is only just over 3,000 more than the strength of the officer corps. Some observers reckon that this reflects the Franco regime's fear of having a potential counterpoise to the loyalty of the officer corps.

Junior N.C.O.'s are almost exclusively found from the ranks of the conscripts. While they have a major role in instruction and particularly as the command element at the lowest, and perhaps most vital level, they suffer from little experience and time in service, and the consequent criticism which could be expected.²⁴

Nonetheless, it is clear that the present government is working hard to rectify the serious shortcomings of the service. The vigour of the reforms can be judged from the very staunch opposition to them currently voiced by certain conservative senior officers.

There has been since 1977 only one Ministry of Defence, and there

is now a Joint Chief of Staff to co-ordinate the activities of the three services. An organized way of developing strategic plans and force objectives has at least been instituted. The vast range of military interventions in the civil community, particularly in matters pertaining in other countries to the civilian judiciary, have been abolished. New general ordinances for the armed services have been issued.

A scheme to rejuvenate and improve the forces, particularly the officer corps, is being carried out. By the mid-1980's the army's total number of officers will have been cut by 40 per cent. New promotion and retirement policies will be the main pillars of this programme.²⁵ It will be aided by the fact that the retirement of Civil War veterans will increase automatically as the compulsory dates of their leaving the service present themselves. The full provisions of the new programme will apply as of the 1980 class of the Military Academy.²⁶

Postings will be made more frequent in order to reduce the tendency of officers to become overly sedentary. Some officers have stayed in one place, at one job, for fourteen years or more. This will no longer happen if the reforms are completed. Secondary employment has already been apparently greatly reduced and it is planned to eradicate it completely. However, until pay scales for officers are improved, this evil is unlikely to disappear altogether.

Exercises are eventually to be greatly increased, both in frequency and in numbers of days annually involved. If this is combined with more demanding tasks, all the way up the chain of command as opposed to the current practice of rarely testing higher commanders, the results could be very salutary indeed.

The army, as we shall see, has been the spoiled child of the three services. Essential for the stability of the previous regime and both more loyal and more vital during the Civil War than the other services, it has traditionally received the lion's share of defence spending, despite its relatively modest weapons and equipment requirements. Even this is changing, and very quickly as well. In 1972, for example, despite the naval re-equipment programme, the army received 55.62 per cent

of the defence budget, leaving only 44.38 per cent to be shared between the other two services. With the Monarchy, this has been corrected. In 1977, a small adjustment was made pointing to the trend to watch for in the future. In that year, the army received 53.2 per cent, the air force 25.08 per cent, and the navy 21.72 per cent.²⁷ However, it is the 1979 defence expenditure that reverses most strikingly the army's pre-eminence. In this year, the army received only 38.5 per cent, the navy 35.07 per cent, and the air force 26.4 per cent.²⁸ No longer is the army assured a vastly greater slice of the budget pie and, as will be seen later on, this has in no sense escaped its notice. The relationship of this shift in priorities has not escaped the left either who see it as "the thin edge of the wedge." The shift relates easily to likely defence priorities of Spain in NATO. Thus the accusation is made that, before the debate on NATO entry has begun, the government is already structuring the forces to its requirements to face the country with a fait accompli.²⁹

A more detailed analysis of the three services can now be made in order to understand the current direct military boost that NATO would receive from Spanish entry. Such an analysis, in a country like Spain, must begin with the army.

THE SPANISH ARMY

The strength of the largest of Spain's three services fluctuates slightly depending on the intake of conscripts. It has, however, some 44,000 professional and volunteer soldiers, and some 150-180 thousand "reclutas" or recruits. It is based throughout Spain, peninsular and extra-peninsular, and is in effect Spain's senior service, if not necessarily traditionally so.

Having done the bulk of the fighting in the Civil War, the army had maintained its role in domestic politics in a spectacular and successful fashion. It became the mainstay of the new regime as it had been at least the eminence grise of many of the previous ones. For example, from 1814 to 1923, there had been forty-three pronunciamientos and, while all were not successful, the army had become accustomed to a role in politics which it did not seem overly eager to abandon.³⁰

From 1939 on, it was in effect to become the regime, not merely through the personal leadership of its commanding general but also through the placing of its active or retired officers in key positions in most sectors of national life.

Despite the political colour of the Franco regime, it would be a mistake to label the officer corps irretrievably right-wing. It has gone through liberal as well as conservative stages. However, until recently the former tendency has been much less marked than the latter. The army was increasingly politicized as the last century advanced. Paradoxically one of the results of the Franco regime was that visible politicization decreased and the traditional values of discipline and honour returned. Nonetheless the whole structure of the regime gained from an army for whom discipline had regained its title as the supreme military virtue, because thereby the clique of close collaborators of the caudillo could be assured of the whole of the army's obedience even if its absolute loyalty could not be considered as a given at all times.

The senior officers are still remarkably conservative and, as we shall see, often distrustful of reform and democracy. They feel leaderless and sense acutely their loss of power and influence. Many feel their grip of the national situation is slipping, or has already slipped, from their hands; and they rarely fully trust the politicians into whose hands they reckon that power has slipped or is slipping.

Younger officers are generally more open to outside influence and new ideas. They did not fight the Civil War and were and are prepared to see political changes. They often welcome and rarely vigorously oppose military reforms which they usually agree are woefully overdue. In the last years of the Franco regime, some of them even became linked to leftist or at least moderately liberal groups, even clandestine ones, but this was a small minority. Most steered clear of politics completely and were content with the norms of obedience and discipline characteristic of military life.

Western observers often comment on the "politicization" of the Spanish military. However, it should be remembered that the armed forces of other NATO countries have also been, to a great extent, "politicized"

in this century. The cases of France, Greece, Turkey, and Italy could be mentioned in this context, and the Nazis certainly attempted to politicize the German army. It seems likely that a stable, democratic Spain, given some years of prosperity and peace, could succeed in the goal, shared by all the political parties with the exception of some individual politicians on the extreme right, of "de-politicizing" the armed services. It is worth noting that a major part of the army, and other services as well, seeks to cease being a political force. This is most marked among the younger professional army officers of the late 1970's, but has echoes throughout the officer corps. Many are very distressed by the instances of anti-democratic indiscipline so far shown. The government hopes that NATO will focus the army's interests on the external threat and turn them away from excessive introspection and interest in the politics of their own country.

It is possible then that NATO would welcome an increasingly professional army into its fold, at least insofar as decreasing politicization is concerned. In other senses, however, the force is not as professional as the other two services. Part of this is reflected in the ratio of professional to conscript personnel in the force as a whole. Sanchez-Gijón states that the army has only 19 per cent of its strength made up of professionals.³¹ This is much lower than the NATO average and only half of the navy's level, and must have a major impact on the efficiency and military skills of the army as a whole. Another factor is that the more elite elements of the army--the Parachute Brigade, Spanish Legion, Armoured Division, and mountain troops--are made up of regular soldiers, or to a much greater extent than other units. Headquarters and training staffs also of course use up much of the professional personnel. The result is that other units, particularly those of the Territorial Operational Defence forces (Defensa Operativa del Territorio - DOT), are often starved of regulars. Their efficiency and morale suffer greatly as a result.

This leads us to training as a whole. As mentioned, the conscript spends fifteen months with the Colours. Part of this is taken up with leave, but twelve to thirteen months are supposedly assured for effective training. The first stage is a six week course of basic training.

Then the programme calls for several co-ordinated stages of individual and collective training to bring the conscript up to the required level to take part in battalion exercises. The introductory course seems to most observers to be relatively good and to leave the recruit with a good basic knowledge of his weapon. The fault seems to lie with the units to which these recruits are then posted. While training proceeds progressively in theory, there is a general impression one gathers that often little real advanced training is achieved after the recruits' arrival at their unit. Rumours and personal accounts leave the impression of too much emphasis on drill, repetitive and unimaginative training, a great deal of time spent on administration and "housekeeping" duties, and the other pastimes which are well-known in most conscript armies.³²

The basic material is, however, undoubtedly good. The Spanish soldier is well-motivated, fit, and disciplined. With better training and other reforms, there can be little doubt that he would be a significant addition to NATO's basic military strength. The inculcation of traditional and national values is a process that the army works hard on in dealing with the recruits and most NATO observers seem to think it works. It is an open question whether this will survive as Spain becomes more "modern" and more "European."

The army's organization, equipment, and efficiency leave something to be desired but are far from being below the standards of all NATO countries. Spain, it must be remembered, is in many respects closer to Italy and Portugal, not to mention Greece and Turkey, than it is to Northern Europe. In this context, the Spanish army is in no sense "unworthy" to be considered up to NATO standards.

Divided into divisions, independent brigades, and special regiments, the army gives the impression of being larger than its actual size. The divisions are generally one brigade down from establishment strength as are some brigades one unit down. Larger non-specialist formations are of approximately 70 per cent of their theoretical strength. The formations are as follows:

- 5 Divisions: 1 armoured division
- 1 mechanized infantry division
- 1 motorized infantry division
- 2 mountain divisions

author has not been able to improve on the figures given by the IISS for Ceuta and Melilla. They show a total of 18,000 soldiers crammed into these two Spanish North African enclaves. The definite impression when one visits these spots is that one is in a military camp.

It is the land service which has had the least contact with other nations' forces. Despite many exercises with the French, which were not given any publicity until the end of the Franco regime and the re-establishment of the monarchy, the army has operated little with other countries' armies.³⁶ Individuals have been exchanged with the United States Army and a few officers have been on course in a small number of other countries. Only a very few French, German, and American officers have been attached to, or have attended courses at, Spanish units or schools. Foreign ideas and methods have not had the impact here that they have had in the navy and air forces.

From an equipment point of view, the Spanish armed forces are often criticized as out-of-date. There is some truth to this statement but it should again be emphasized that comparisons with wealthy North American or Northern European NATO members are not altogether fair. If the comparison is made with more southerly Alliance members' armies, Spain is not far, if at all, behind.

The army's tank forces are mostly old although major programmes aim at modernization. Despite some difficulties, deliveries continue of the more than 200 AMX-30 tanks to be built in Spain under French licence. A major refit of the 480 M-47 and M-48 tanks is being undertaken by Chrysler Espana at its plant near Madrid. The 180 M-41 light tanks in the arsenal are, of course, very old now but newer than some tanks still in service in Portugal and Greece. Even they will be modernized, in all probability in the near future through the installation of a new motor and 90 mm. gun.³⁷ Thus Spain has some 900 tanks of various ages (exact figures vary from 860 to 950). Rumours that the British were attempting recently to sell "Chieftain" tanks originally destined for Iran, to Spain, persisted in the spring of 1979 but any such deal has yet to be announced. While Spain would be unable to immediately contribute the number or quality of tanks that other large NATO members do, its tank force is nonetheless not small and its total

would be over 7 per cent of combined NATO tank strength in Europe if Spain joined the Western Alliance.

The tank forces are supplemented by modest armoured car forces totalling some 188 of the AML-60 and AML-90 types. Armoured personnel carrier strength is low with only 375 available of the M-113 variety. However Spain has ordered BMR-600 vehicles and further M-113's but there is some uncertainty as to the total number this will eventually reach.

To complete this picture, some 975 artillery pieces make up the main artillery stocks of the army. These are of a variety of types with the 105 and 155 millimetres in the largest numbers. There are also self-propelled guns of 105, 155, and 175 millimetres. Coastal artillery of 88 mm and other types maintains a rather constant Spanish interest in this weapons type largely ignored elsewhere in Western Europe. Considerable anti-aircraft artillery, some 550 pieces of various calibres, is also in use alongside the SAMs. The air arm of the army has a fair range of helicopters totalling some 114 machines. Further helicopters have been ordered. Anti-tank defence is centred largely on old models of recoilless rifles--90mm and 106mm. Increasingly, however, SS-11, "Milan" and "Cobra" systems are being deployed. Lastly, the SAM force uses "Hercules" and the improved "Hawk" missiles.³⁸

Thus Spanish equipment is far from exclusively out-of-date. It is, rather, a somewhat complicated mix of new and dated equipment, much of it quite old, it is true. However, it is not far behind, as already stated, some other NATO countries of the Mediterranean region. A general assessment would have to conclude that while the equipment scales of the Spanish army are not overly impressive, they would nonetheless constitute far from an insignificant gain to the whole equipment picture of the alliance in Europe.

The efficiency of the army is likewise a complicated matter. At the lower levels, most observers reckon it to be fair. The problem appears to arise at higher levels of command and administration. Part of this may be a result of the quite old age of commanders. Even crack formations can have commanders of seventy years of age or more. More

important is probably the past relative lack of exercises. While senior officers could be expected to have many years in rank and considerable experience generally, they often lacked recent experience in the handling of men in exercise circumstances. In addition, senior officers were rarely tested on exercise. To use British Commonwealth terminology, there were rarely "pinks" for the exercise. That is to say, the objectives were neither clear nor necessarily expressed. What lessons were to be learnt and taught were equally uncertain. Most particularly there was no attempt to test force commanders, only their juniors. After reaching the rank of lieutenant-colonel, it was quite unlikely that one would often be assessed for one's abilities in a tactical exercise.

Under such circumstances, efficiency is bound to suffer. At brigade level and above, one notices a decline in the standard of staff as well as tactical work. The general past lethargy related to difficulties addressed above surfaces again and stifles initiative. Thereby a good army appears to be less capable than it could be under tighter control. It will perhaps surprise some readers, but not those with military backgrounds, that the emphasis on the "bureaucratic war" (el papeleo) has led to less, not more, efficient staff work.

This leads one to a discussion of the over-officering of the army, a serious problem for all three services but perhaps most severe for the army. In the air force, functions such as air crew are largely the job of officers. The technical requirements of the service demand personnel who are specialists and with considerable preparation in their fields. Hence, the air force in all countries tends to be "over-officered," if not really, at least in comparison to the army. Some of the same factors occur in the navy.

In 1977, there were 340 generals, 7,338 other senior officers, 17,655 junior officers, and 22,000 senior N.C.O.'s in the Spanish army. The first implication of these figures is that officers are forced to undertake some taskings reserved in most armies for senior N.C.O.'s. There are thus 25,333 officers in the army but only 22,000 senior N.C.O.'s, a ratio common enough in Latin America but virtually unknown in

Europe. These two bodies represent the whole of the professional force, as junior N.C.O.'s and private soldiers come from the conscript troops. There is roughly one officer for every six or seven conscripts. There is one officer or senior N.C.O. for every three or four conscripts, and this does not include the additional level of the hierarchy at the corporal level. There is one general for every 647 men and for every 523 conscripts. There is a senior officer for every twenty-nine men (includes all ranks) and for every twenty-four conscripts. If there were a readily-mobilizable but under-officered reserve for which regular officers would be needed in time of crisis, then, of course, over-officering would be understandable. This is, however, not the case. For an essentially infantry force, with relatively little technical requirement, at least compared to the other two services, the army is over-officered indeed. Efficiency thereby suffers with much non-essential bureaucratic work having to be done before activities can be undertaken. Combined with the lack of senior N.C.O.'s, and their tendency to have received relatively little general education in the school system, the problem of lower-level efficiency is compounded.³⁹ However, on the N.C.O. side, it should be pointed out that the problem of low basic education levels is changing and, according to most observers, changing quickly.

There is a hope that reforms will improve the general efficiency of the army. A younger force, with fewer positions which are not vital, more and better training exercises, and better organization in general, should help with this goal. The adoption of NATO procedures, and exposure to NATO headquarters, officers, senior N.C.O.'s, and exercise methods could also be of assistance.

It is the author's conclusion that the Spanish army would be a major gain to the allied forces on the European continent for two reasons. It is a large force, with acceptable equipment in the short run, and a clear ability to at least man the increased depth of the alliance if Spain were to join. Furthermore, and even more importantly, it could offer NATO a force of great future potential. The government, and even the opposition parties, are determined to improve greatly the army's efficiency, equipment, training, pay, organization, and personnel. If they are able to achieve this, and if Spain were to sign the North Atlan-

tic Treaty, the Western Alliance would have a large, well-motivated and organized, efficient land force on the south-western flank of the treaty area that would strengthen immensely the military capabilities of the alliance in the region.

THE SPANISH NAVY

It is surely the navy, however, that would offer NATO the greatest obvious-strictly military gain, at least in the short run. This is related to two factors. Firstly, the roles mentioned earlier as possibly pertaining to Spain within NATO are to a great extent naval ones, and Spain's strategic position lends itself to these. Secondly, the Spanish navy is the most modern and efficient of the three armed services. It has benefited from both American assistance and a growing and substantial interest on the part of the Madrid government--under Franco and since.

As will be seen elsewhere, the Spanish Navy, while traditionalist and full of officers, especially senior officers, of rightist inclinations, has been historically, and probably is today, less politicized than is the army. Many factors account for this, among them the Civil War role of the fleet, the distance from the ports to the capital, the origins of naval officers, the greater technical nature of the navy, and its smaller size, among other points one could mention.

The navy's history has seen many "ups and downs". Despite the disaster of the Armada sent against England in 1588, the Spanish fleet was the major naval fighting force of Christendom throughout most of the 16th and much of the 17th century. It remained the essential cement keeping the empire bound together, at least from a military point of view, until the Spanish American revolutions for independence. As evidenced by its role at Trafalgar, it remained one of the great fleets of Europe into the early 19th century, even though in decline relative to France, England, Holland and others ever since the end of the 16th century.

After Trafalgar and the Latin American disasters, it continued its decline until the shattering blows delivered by the United States Navy at Manila and Santiago de Cuba in 1898. It is really only now that the navy's progress is again notable.

NATO observers generally consider the navy to be very good or even excellent. As we shall see, it has good equipment. It is highly professional with a healthier ratio of officers to men, officers to senior N.C.O.'s and senior N.C.O.'s to ratings than in the army. The navy's strength is approximately 38 per cent professional and it does not appear to suffer as much as the land force from divisions of units into elite and standard. It has 5,546 officers of all ranks, of whom eighty are admirals, and 6,537 senior N.C.O.'s.⁴⁰ While this is probably still "over-officering" for a force with 30,000 conscripts (and which includes 10,000 Marines), it is, for a more technical service like the navy, closer to a NATO norm than is the army in these regards.

The navy's total strength varies, according to source and year, between 40,000 and 48,000 personnel. Between 30,000 and 32,000 of these servicemen are conscripts doing their fifteen months. Training is generally felt to be superior in quality than is that in the army and it is, of course, easier for the navy to continue training after the basic course than it can be for at least some units of the army.

There are four major naval bases: the new one in the Canaries, Rota, Cartagena, and El Ferrol. There are also numerous smaller installations and detachments elsewhere. Rota gives ease of access to the Gulf of Cadiz and the Atlantic approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. Cartagena is on the southeast coast giving access to the Western Mediterranean and the eastern end of the narrow seas separating Spain from North Africa. El Ferrol is at the north-west tip of Spain on the Atlantic, shadowing the southern approaches to the Bay of Biscay and north-west Europe more generally.

The fleet is composed of a mix of foreign and Spanish-built craft. Spain has long benefited from American naval assistance and this is still reflected in many of the ships in the fleet. However, the PLANGEMAR (Plan General de la Armada--General Naval Programme), dating from 1970 and scheduled for general completion in 1982, aims to improve or replace those ships in service that are now out-of-date or almost unserviceable. The fleet includes at present:

- 10 submarines
- 1 aircraft carrier
- 13 destroyers

- 15 frigates and corvettes
- 12 large patrol craft
- 16 minesweepers
- 2 patrol vessels (ex-ocean minesweepers)
- 20 amphibious vessels

Of the submarines, four are the "Psyche" modification of the French "Daphne" class and four are ex-U.S. "Guppy" class boats. There are also two midget submarines recently in service, although at the time of writing their status was unclear. The aircraft carrier ("Dedalo") is also an ex-American ship used for helicopters, for which it has a capacity of twenty, and for the "Harrier" VTOL aircraft, for which it has a capacity of seven. As for the destroyers, ten are ex-American "Gearing" and "Fletcher" class ships. The others are older "Oquendo" class. The frigates and corvettes vary a great deal in size and characteristics. Many are Spanish-built and this section of the fleet is to continue to be increased. Five of these vessels now have the "Standard" surface-to-air missile system and ASROC anti-submarine rockets. The large patrol craft are well-armed and their number is to be increased by a further ten which are currently on order. The amphibious vessels include one LSD, three LST, eight LCT, and six medium landing craft.

The PLANGEMAR has been modified repeatedly, reduced, increased, and constantly under study. As of late 1978, however, fully planned or actually under construction for the fleet were:

- 1 aircraft carrier (to replace "Dedalo")
- 3 frigates
- 8 corvettes
- 4 submarines ("Agosta" class--French design but built in Cartagena)

In addition, the Maritime Vigilance Force (Fuerza de Vigilancia Maritima) has under construction:

- 6 heavy patrol craft
- 6 light patrol craft
- 8 ocean patrol launches
- 20 coastal patrol launches
- 30 harbour patrol launches

The PLANGEMAR also includes the construction of several oceanographic and hydrographic vessels. It is thus a major programme which will radically modernize this already fairly modern force. We have seen that all

this emphasis on the navy has brought naval expenditure almost up to the army level.

The Marines' 10,000 men are divided into four light infantry regiments and two independent groups. Despite their traditional "light" role, they are provided with fifteen armoured cars, fifteen "Panhard" armoured transports, eighteen M-48 medium tanks, six self-propelled 105mm guns, and sixteen landing vehicles. They hope to receive thirty-six AMX-30 tanks in the near future, with which they intend to form two tank companies; as well as to increase their landing vessel inventory.

To conclude this discussion on the navy's equipment, let us turn to naval air stocks. There are five "Harrier" (the Spaniards call them--not inappropriately--"Matador") and two TAV-8A aircraft forming a fighter-ground attack squadron. There are five helicopter squadrons with a total of fifty-one machines of various types; and a communications squadron with four "Commanche" units. On order also for the navy are five further "Harrier" aircraft and eleven helicopters, as well as forty "Harpoon" surface-to-surface missiles.

All in all, as has been seen, the navy is a powerful force which is flexible and increasingly modern. Some forty warships making up 200,000 tons of naval shipping would add considerable strength to the NATO maritime forces. The naval role of Spain has been a major one for hundreds of years. As discussed, it is the navy that provides most Spanish strategic thinking as it is the navy which does the bulk of the projection of Spain's defence forces abroad. Spain is dependent not only on the sea for its fishing industry and its shipbuilding but also for its trade with the rest of the world. Virtually all of its trade with the America's (over 20 per cent of imports and over 17 per cent of exports) goes by sea. Much of its trade with the EEC does as well (the EEC provides 34.4 per cent of Spanish imports and takes 45.6 per cent of its exports). The bulk of the rest of its trade goes by sea as well.⁴¹ Spain's maritime concerns are also highlighted by the dependence of its trade on foreign shipping resources. Some 52 per cent of Spanish imports arriving by sea in 1976 came in foreign bottoms. More striking still, 80 per cent of Spain's sea-going exports for the same year travelled in non-Spanish vessels.⁴² The requirement for security at sea is an ob-

vious one for Spain. Indeed, the very unity of the country depends on such security because of the Canaries, Balearics, and North African enclaves. The navy Spain has built as a result would add greatly to the strength of the Western Alliance as would the security of the Spanish position as a whole. The navy's position on this question, and moves already made regarding it, will be seen further on. Suffice it to say at this point, that the fleet and the amphibious force is by far the closest-linked of the armed services to NATO. Not only are procedures, signals, codes and the like already standardized with NATO practice, but there have been many exercises, general naval as well as specialist amphibious ones, with the fleets of Alliance members. In recent years, these have included particularly the navies of the United States and Italy, as well as France.⁴³

THE AIR FORCE

The Army of the Air (Ejército del Aire) is, despite the name, in fact totally separate from the Army of the Land (Ejército de Tierra). Despite some tentative attempts to form a proper air force earlier in the century, Spain's air force really dates from the end of the Civil War in 1939. Even then, it was to remain a small and largely insignificant force for a number of years. It only really began to surface as a meaningful element in the defence of Spain with the beginnings of American assistance of a military kind. Still today its equipment reflects the long years of American aid.

The air force is the most technical of the three services. This is reflected in the high percentage of non-conscripts. Of its total personnel, ranging according to various sources from 35,500 to 41,000 men, 79 per cent are professional airmen. The 1977 figures for the breakdown of officers and senior N.C.O.'s showed sixty-six generals, 1,750 senior and 3,108 junior officers for a total of 4,924 officers, under whom there were some 7,578 senior N.C.O.'s. This is by far the highest ratio of senior N.C.O.'s to officers of the three elements of the armed forces. The make-up is also closer to NATO armed forces in the sense that there is a large number of professional airmen and junior N.C.O.'s as well as conscripts in those ranks. As we have seen, this

is not the case in the other services. There are, in fact, more non-conscript airmen and junior N.C.O.'s than there are conscripts. Indeed, there are more officers and senior N.C.O.'s than conscripts as well.⁴⁴

All this reflects the high level of technical expertise required in the air force. Curiously for some, then, it has to be said that most observers are not as impressed with the air force as they are with the navy. There are several reasons for this. The air force was the most loyal to the Republic of the three services. Some sources suggest, for example, that as much as 80 per cent of the force remained in Loyalist hands at the time of the 1936 rising.⁴⁵ While this was for as much geographical as political reasons, the fact remains that, as a result, Franco was apparently not as keen on this element of the forces as he was on the others, especially for the first few years of his regime. Naturally enough, the service probably suffered to some extent as a consequence of this. Whether a result of this state of affairs or not, one problem is the age of some of the aircraft types still in service. Another is that procedures apparently require considerable streamlining and modernization. There is considerable bureaucratic "drag" in the system as well, according to most observers. Lastly, here also officers tend to be rather older than in similar NATO forces. Nor is the force operational on NATO signals, codes, orders, and the like to the extent of the navy. Finally, exercises with NATO countries have been few despite the U.S. Air Force presence at some Spanish bases and its instruction of numerous Spanish personnel.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, most observers think the air force is a good one and that, if it lags behind the navy in prospective ease of entry into NATO, it is much readier than the army. Its contacts with the USAF are varied, and are growing with the West German and French Air Forces. Indeed, one indication of improvement seems to be that the ratio of personnel to combat aircraft is now almost exactly the same as that for the Canadian and British air forces.

On the equipment issue, as we have said, there is a mix between Spanish and foreign types, and between some modern aircraft and some much less so. The air force has available some 617 aircraft and seventy-seven helicopters. Of this total, 124 are combat aircraft, twenty-five reconnaissance, eighty transport, and two anti-submarine with 104 for

practice flying, 229 for training, and fifty-three for liaison. The helicopters include training, search, and rescue, and transport types.

There have been five interceptor squadrons in the Air Defence Command. Two have seventeen F-4C(S) each; two others share twenty-two Mirage IIIE's and six Mirage IIID's; the last has fourteen Mirage FIC's. The re-structuring of the air force, announced in April, 1979, has reduced this number to four squadrons but it is possible the fifth will belong to the newly created Canaries Command. The Tactical Command consists of two fighter-bomber squadrons equipped with eighteen F-5A, two F-5B, and twenty-five HA-220 Super Saeta aircraft, and recce elements. Exactly how many of these remain to this command is not clear as some recce aircraft are also now serving with the Canaries Command. Transport Command has also lost an undisclosed number of aircraft to the new southern islands command. This command, based principally on Gando, has two squadrons--one of tactical air control and one of alert and control. These have fighter-bombers and recce aircraft as well as "Aviocar" light transports.

Divided among these functional commands and the Air Logistics Support Organization (Organo de Apoyo Logístico Aéreo) are a further twenty-two RF-5A recce aircraft, twelve maritime reconnaissance helicopters, nine C-130H, three KC-97, twelve CASA-207 "Azor", thirty CASA-212 "Aviocar," twelve DHC-4, five "Aztec," and one "Navajo" transport aircraft. Training aircraft have included twenty-four F-5B fighter-bombers some of which may no longer be used for this purpose, seventy-five F33, twenty-five T-34, seventy T-6, thirty-five F-33C "Bonanza," and forty-five HA-200 A/B "Saeta" planes, although the exact disposition of these training resources was not known at the time of writing. Training helicopters of various types and four squadrons of search and rescue aircraft of numerous origins complete the air picture for Spain.

Like the navy, the air force also stands to gain a great deal from modernization and the budget has at last begun to show this, if rather slowly. In the 1977 defence budget, the air force's share was 25.08 per cent. By 1979, this had increased to 26.43 per cent.⁴⁷ Already ordered are some fifty-eight Mirage FI's, four F-4C's, four RF-4C's, three F-27 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, six CASA-212 and sixty

CASA C-101 types, as well as seventeen Hughes 300C helicopters. Delivery dates range from 1979 to as late as 1982 (for the Mirage). The air force is very much looking forward to the purchases of new combat and attack aircraft for the 1980's. This programme is already established.

The air force has some "Sparrow," "Sidewinder," and "Magic" air-to-air missiles for its combat aircraft, and has ordered further missiles of the "Super Sidewinder" type. Spain's air defence command includes the SADA semi-automated air defence combat operations centre, NATO and French-linked systems of alert and control, as well as control or use of a large number of air bases in peninsular and insular Spain.

The previous structure of the air force was based on territorial considerations, often linked to internal security as much as foreign defence factors. The new structure is interesting in that it is based principally on the function of the various commands, and in the case of the Canaries, of a visibly exposed territorial defence concern related to foreign powers.⁴⁸

The Spanish air force thus offers NATO a good addition to its air strength in Western Europe, relatively secure airfields, and a strategic position of immense value (for training in peacetime, for operations in war). Base and other infrastructural advantages would also be considerable. As with the other two services, the potential for further value to the Alliance is very great indeed if this air force is joined to those of the other members.

Summing up, then, insofar as the strictly military advantages are concerned, NATO stands to gain greatly from the addition of Spain to the Alliance. With a good arms industry and one with even greater possibilities in the future, Spain has basic strength to shoulder increasing research and development requirements. Its army is large, well-motivated, and has some units of excellent standing. In general, its soldiers are disciplined and fit. Its equipment, while often leaving something to be desired, has the beginnings of modernization under way. Despite its many difficulties, the government is determined to improve and rejuvenate it, making the force an even greater advantage

to have within NATO. The navy is already a very good force which would add considerably to the general forces available to the NATO maritime commanders of the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. A good equipment base is being expanded and greatly modernized and the force as a whole is already closely linked to the Western Alliance. Lastly, the air force is a good general fighting arm which would increasingly add to the total value of the air potential of the allied countries, especially in the crucial area of south-western Europe. The key to the value of these armed services to NATO is future potential. Spain's forces are coming out of a long period of internal security taskings and low budgets. They are only now the subject of analysis aimed at making them more suitable to roles connected with national defence aimed primarily at external enemies. It will take time for them to switch over, but once they do, their size, traditions, modernity, and the qualities of their personnel will make them of immense value to the Alliance.

On the more general strategic picture, NATO would not only benefit, as we have seen, from these additional armed forces but also from the addition of this vital peninsula and its insular dimensions to the Alliance. The uplift to NATO politically and morally from this new democracy joining it would be greatly enhanced by the boost to it strategically in the addition of depth and further Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Straits presence.

THE INTERNAL FACTORS - THE POLITICAL PARTIES

In the Spain of the late seventies and early eighties, it is likely that internal factors will, if anything, be even more important than external ones in the question of NATO membership or neutrality. While it is probably fair to say that the debate on this, as on most major foreign policy issues, has as yet hardly begun, it is possible to assess to some degree the attitudes of the major domestic elements concerned in any decision.

Among these factors, the major ones will probably be the attitudes of the political parties, the organized parliamentary expression of the state of opinion in the country. In Spain, these include two major left-ist parties--communists and socialists; one rightist amalgam with several extremist offshoots; a large centrist party resembling more often a coalition than a fully cohesive force; and, finally, a plethora of small, regionalist parties all clamouring for greater autonomy vis-à-vis Madrid.

Of greater import will also be the reactions of the armed services, by no means united on the subject of NATO. Of importance as well will be the attitudes of the establishment, that little-studied but obvious element in Spanish political life, the press, the King, and the general popular mood on the issue. Lastly, it may be worthwhile to include a brief discussion on the evolution of the perception of threat in Spain, always a major factor in alliance choices.

Firstly then, the political parties' attitudes must be assessed. They tend to reflect the historic circumstances in which they have found themselves since NATO was founded, as well as their ideological biases. Because of the pressures of recent years, they have rarely had time to conduct comprehensive analyses of Spain's international position. Hence, emotionalism, ideology, history, and domestic considerations tend to weigh at least as heavily in their attitudes as do concrete international political realities. One could ask if this is not true in all countries. It may well be, but it certainly appears true in the Spain of our day.

THE CENTRE (UCD)

Governing still with a minority in the Cortes, after two general elections, is the Union of the Democratic Centre (Union del Centro Democrático - UCD). This party, the result of a mix of quite disparate elements, undoubtedly reflects both the vast growth of the bourgeoisie in the last two decades of the Franco regime and the widespread desire on the part of many Spaniards for a government of the centre to see them peacefully through the difficult transition period between dictatorship and democracy. The troubled years of the Republic, the horrors of the Civil War, and the somewhat painful experience of the Franco regime, all give enormous prestige to the centrist forces in the country; forces which, it is hoped, will be able to steer a peaceful course between the excesses felt to be inevitable in the rule by either of "las dos Españas." Without this historical background, it is unthinkable that the UCD could have united its various elements or could command the strength which it does in the country.

A considerable body of thought in the country explains the 1979 general and municipal elections as reflecting this situation. The UCD did better than generally expected in the national elections because the Spaniard has tended "to speak with his heart but vote with his head." On major national issues, he tends to seek compromise and sound government. On the other hand, in the local elections, the UCD did relatively badly and particularly so in the big cities of Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia. This certainly reflects greater "Popular Frontism" between the communists and the socialists but it also appears to suggest that the Spanish voter is prepared to take more risks, and demand greater social gains, at the local than at the national level.

Nonetheless, the UCD is the major governing party with 168 of the 350 seats in the Cortes, about the same as in 1977. It is too early to say on whom the UCD will be most able to rely for survival in its minority position. Many feel that too great a link with the right will in the long run again polarize the country. Others feel that association with the regional parties could threaten national unity. The choice is not an easy one and the UCD may be expected to prefer to introduce relatively unexciting legislation in order not to upset the governmental apple cart unduly.

As the government, it has fallen to the UCD to take the first steps in formulating a foreign policy for the new Spanish democracy. After decades of isolation, largely enforced from abroad, the new regime has been courted by foreign countries of both major camps. The opening to the East, already begun in the waning years of Franco, has gathered momentum. Royal and presidential visits have included China and Cuba as well as a host of other countries.

A most marked feature of the government to date, however, has been its relative lack of attention to foreign affairs. Spain has had to be guided through so many stages in its domestic course that little time has been left over for an in-depth analysis of the international scene. The UCD has dealt with the establishment of democracy as the first priority. To some extent, the economy and foreign policy have had to wait. In addition, the constituent assembly elected in June 1977 to draft a constitution was ill-suited to deal with major questions of the future of Spain's international relations.

Nonetheless, the UCD has drafted the main lines of what it sees for the future in Spain's foreign relations. As a party, and now as a minority government, it has set down the principles of its foreign policy. While continuing to emphasize publicly the historic links with Spanish America and those with the Arab world and Africa, the UCD is essentially Eurocentric with the fundamental objective of its foreign policy being the rapid incorporation of Spain into the Common Market. Initially running alongside this desire was that of also joining NATO, although the lack of a perceived "link" between these two has led to overwhelming emphasis being placed on the EEC rather than the Alliance.

The UCD is thus keen on Spain's incorporation into Western Europe. It is anxious about the solid implantation of democracy in Spain. It wishes to give the armed forces a role related to a foreign threat unconnected with internal security or domestic politics. All these goals it sees as furthered by Spanish entry into the Atlantic Alliance, which it also tends to see as a way of regularizing or balancing the relationship with the United States. Thus it is unlikely that Spain's centrist party will waver greatly in its attitude to NATO membership. However, it must be said that up to the moment, NATO membership has steadily

become less important as the EEC card was seen not to depend on it, and as other trends such as armed forces "de-politicization" and the solidification of democracy gained ground even without NATO.

As a priority for the government, then, NATO has lost a great deal of importance in the last year or two. Nevertheless, it is committed to entry for both domestic and international reasons. While the perception of a Soviet threat is not great in the UCD leadership or rank and file, there is an understanding of the role the Alliance plays as a forum for the discussion of major policy questions affecting politics and the economy among the Atlantic countries. The UCD has commented on what little strategic analysis has been done to date in the following way:

Starting from being convinced that in an East-West confrontation, a Spanish desire for non-involvement would not be respected because of a lack of guarantees and because in a vital conflict "anything goes;" accepting that in such a confrontation our values, form of living, and belief in liberty would also be at stake... UCD is in favour of the immediate incorporation of our nation into...the Atlantic Alliance. 1

Rejecting the idea that NATO will be more expensive for Spain than neutrality, the party nonetheless calls for considerable increases in defence expenditure.²

Tactically, however, the UCD is under few, if perhaps some, illusions. It knows NATO membership is not popular with the public at large. It also realizes that the leftist parties will endeavour to defeat membership and embarrass the government on the issue. Finally, it knows that its only major parliamentary support for NATO may well come from the right, a "kiss of death" it has recently done its best to resist.³ Be that as it may, the party has compromised itself tactically on the issue by making NATO membership a major point of the President's speech at the opening of the new 1979 Cortes.

Therefore, the party and the government are likely to seek an optimum time for broaching the subject. No real strategic analysis for Spain has so far been done. The government has simply been too busy with other matters. Now that a government is in power for a normal constitutional term of four years, it may prove possible to complete such

a study. At that stage, and within the context of a well-thought-out general strategic view, it may well be possible to present to the Spanish parliament and people a foreign policy of European integration which will have, naturally, a defence outgrowth. That defence outgrowth, if the UCD has its way, will mean active participation in the North Atlantic Alliance. The vital question of timing, crucial in this issue, is probably in the government's hands. It can decide when to begin the debate. In its decision will be felt the usual domestic and tactical matters, but also questions related to the renewal of the treaty with the United States, progress on EEC membership, and the Madrid round of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. These timing factors will be discussed at greater length later in this discussion.

THE SOCIALISTS (PSOE)

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE) is the second strongest political grouping in the country. Representative of the long tradition of Spanish socialism, it has returned in new form from exile to a large measure of support. The second national political force by the 1977 elections, it was expected by many to win the 1979 vote. The surprise of its not doing so was somewhat softened by its excellent showing in the municipal elections of this same year. It proved to have exceptional local level strength and is widely reckoned to be the party of the future.

Its parliamentary strength, through party unions, has nonetheless increased (103 seats in 1977, 121 in 1979), while its popular vote stayed roughly the same (29.2 per cent in 1977, 29.4 per cent in 1979).⁴ Led by the youthful but dynamic Felipe Gonzalez, it had some difficulty in convincing the country of its viability as a governing party compared to the more traditional, if also rather youthful, figure of Adolfo Suárez. Despite Gonzalez's resignation as party leader as a result of the spring 1979 decision by the party congress to retain its Marxist ideological base, it is likely that a compromise of some sort will be reached. He will almost certainly remain the group's head and his "stamp" can be expected to continue to be obvious in the party's councils.

Being out of government, the PSOE has been able to avoid the need for a great deal of clarity on its foreign policy approach. However, several of its chief members, and Mr. Gonzalez himself, are outspoken on foreign policy matters and it is not overly-difficult to discover the PSOE position on most matters of foreign policy.

It is first important to realize that the Spanish socialists had been in exile for some time. They have therefore come into close contact with the radical thought of other exiled leftist parties and have developed a rather radical posture of their own in foreign policy, rather unlike most other Western European socialist parties. It is worth recalling at this point that the Spanish socialist parties were quite reluctant and slow to endorse the idea of Spain's entry into the EEC, and long gave importance to little other than domestic reform.⁵ They call for supposedly absolute Spanish neutrality, an infinitely expanded relationship with the Eastern countries, greater support for various "liberation movements" particularly in Latin America, Spanish initiatives on disarmament and arms control, a reduction of American influence in Spain, and a less conservative policy in North Africa. Not surprisingly, in the context of the above, it is avowedly and loudly opposed to any Spanish membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The PSOE is by far the most vocal opponent of moves in the direction of membership or even a closer relationship with the treaty organization. It has not only a "knee-jerk" negative reaction to the Alliance but also a deep-seated distrust of what it has considered to be a force of reaction on the world scene.

The roots of this antipathy are not hard to find. Many observers find them partially in the very close connection of the Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties when both were in exile prior to the April Revolution and Franco's demise. For the Portuguese left, as for the Greek, NATO was the prop which kept rightist authoritarian regimes in power. Salazar's survival was blamed on Portugal's NATO membership and the military assistance this association provided for the regime and latterly, if indirectly, for the colonial wars in Africa. The Spanish socialists clearly took the point. While diminishing in recent months, the virulence of socialist opposition to NATO has sur-

prised observers of all political persuasions from several member countries.

As early as December, 1977, a PSOE delegation headed by Felipe Gonzalez, on a visit to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entered into a joint declaration of total opposition to Spanish entry into NATO. The delegation joined its hosts in condemning any expansion of the two "blocs," a fundamental point in the Soviet Union's campaign to keep Spain out.⁶ Further statements by Gonzalez and other PSOE leaders had confirmed this attitude which seemed until the summer of 1978 to be a total "idée fixe" of Spanish socialist thought. Even then, Gonzalez continued to declare that, as socialists, "we have a neutralist vocation."⁷

The PSOE has been guilty of considerable wishful thinking on foreign policy issues, and the NATO question has been no exception. Repeatedly, PSOE sources have called for Spanish defence links with the Western Europeans while rejecting the Alliance "umbrella" of United States power. Antonio Sánchez-Gijón has pointed out the contradiction in a socialist defence policy that aims at: 1) co-operation with European countries and 2) "the progressive creation of a real third military force among countries which find themselves on roads toward constituting democratic socialism."⁸ One is at pains to understand how such a defence policy can be made to work.

More surprising still was the PSOE's acceptance, in the summer of 1978, of continued Spanish military co-operation, and indeed base arrangements, with the United States. Most NATO countries generally prefer to "multilateralize" their relationship with the United States. Thus, they are fourteen to one at the conference table and are jointly more effective in resisting pressures from the alliance giant; the Spanish socialists have stated a preference for a continued bilateral arrangement without the NATO framework.

All this has occurred before the national debate on the issue, insisted upon by the PSOE and repeatedly promised by the UCD, has properly begun. In recent months, some observers have begun to feel that the PSOE position is shifting. The acceptance of the American "connection" may have been the most spectacular example of that shift but other signs

also point, they suggest, to some change in PSOE perceptions. For a start, proximity to government has made PSOE leaders rub shoulders and have discussions with NATO officials and members of political parties and governments of NATO member countries. NATO may thereby not appear to be quite the ogre it had in the past. The evolution of socialist, and to some extent even communist, parties in some EEC and NATO countries toward an acceptance of the Alliance may also be influencing Spanish socialist thinking on the subject. The need for an external role for the armed services is felt by some observers to be increasingly seen by some PSOE leaders. Lastly, even the Portuguese socialists have recently been much less anti-NATO, some would even say pro-NATO, than before the return of democracy.

All this is highly speculative. The "tactical reasons" which Felipe Gonzalez has mentioned as playing a part in the PSOE's opposition to NATO may not have disappeared.⁹ More particularly, the rank and file of the party have shown no sign of moving away from an anti-Alliance stance of great conviction. The PSOE's problem remains to find a solution which can provide for a defence policy linked with the popular idea of closer Western European union and one which appears as slightly connected as possible with taking sides in the great East-West struggle. While this is a problem for the PSOE, it is not all that urgent. The next elections are far away. NATO membership is not a popular idea in Spain and the temptation to profit politically from the government's dedication to entry into the Alliance is stronger than the tendencies favouring membership, or at least opposing it less forcefully, within the PSOE. In addition, any change in policy in the near future would split the party on a major issue, and the leadership is unlikely to risk that result on a matter where there is felt to be little urgency. The party's fragility has already been shown by the "Marxist" question. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that in the short run the PSOE will change its attitude to NATO membership for Spain. Only the passage of time and a new relationship with other European countries and socialist parties can effect that result. For the foreseeable future, Spanish Socialists will, for ideological and historical reasons, continue their opposition to membership.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCE)

Spain's Communist Party presents something of a contrast to, as well as many similarities with, the other communist parties of southern Europe. It represents a long tradition going back to the last century and including, or having included, some of Spain's leading personalities. In exile after the Civil War, the party was extraordinarily quickly re-established after the restoration of the monarchy. Despite the opposition of the army and the right, the PCE was legalized in April, 1977. It is headed by one of the major figures of the world communist movement and the author of the major text on Eurocommunism, Santiago Carrillo.

Mr. Carrillo is a veteran party member whose book, "Eurocomunismo" y estado, has done much to shake the position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the international party scene. The author not only lays out the strategy of the Spanish party but insists on the right to national paths to communism, a high degree of democracy consistent with the political systems of Western Europe, respect for but not leadership by the CPSU, and new views of many communist ideological sacred cows, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. The relationship between Mr. Carrillo's thought and questions of Western defence is easily discovered by a study of his book in which he states:

... "Eurocommunism" must demonstrate that the victory of socialist forces in Western Europe will not increase a whit Soviet state power, nor will the extension of the Soviet one-party model be implied; it will be an independent experiment, with a more evolved socialism that will have a positive influence on the democratic evolution of the socialisms today existing. 10

Consistently criticized by the Soviet Union, at times savagely, Mr. Carrillo has steered his party along the road to a respectability unimaginable three years ago. His ability to inspire confidence and his calls for realistic compromises on major issues dividing Spaniards have brought new prestige to his old organization. Instead of overly praising the party's role in the Civil War, he has admitted the burning of churches and other excesses which made the Right's victory more likely. While clearly believing that time is on the PCE and the movement's side,

he has bent over backwards to ensure the strong re-establishment of parliamentary democracy in Spain. His reward has been to see his own prestige increase greatly and his party go on to receive 10.7 per cent of the popular vote (twenty-three seats out of 350 in the Cortes) in the general elections of March, 1979 (up from 9.1 per cent and twenty seats in 1977); and an even larger percentage of the vote in the municipal elections of a month later. In co-operation with the PSOE, the PCE has therefore already a considerable role in local government in many of the country's cities. While this may not compare with the exceptional figures of the French and Italian parties, it is striking progress in Spain where most commentators of three years ago did not even believe it would be legalized by this time.

The PCE has dealt with foreign policy matters in much the same vein of compromise that it has shown on domestic matters. It has played down issues that it felt would divide the country and threaten the fledgling democracy of the moment. As late as the 1979 elections, it was still calling for a "national" government which would continue the consensus politics of the previous two years. On NATO, it has been clearly opposed from the beginning. It wishes Spain to be neutral and thereby what it considers to be a more independent force in international relations.

However, it has left most of the strident denunciations of the alliance to the PSOE and has contented itself with quieter, often indirect, criticism of moves bringing Spain generally closer to the West. Its organ, the "Mundo Obrero," has consistently opposed NATO membership but has been much less critical than the PSOE and some leftist magazines and newspapers. It has even included at times articles on military co-operation with the West without unfavourable editorial comment.

While it is clear the PCE will oppose membership, it is probable that it could abide eventual membership better than the PSOE, which has so often gone on record as considering NATO virtually the work of the devil. While not opposed to eventually bringing about a "multipolar equilibrium" through "a phase in which defence is articulated at a European level," the PCE does not envisage a Soviet threat and insists that "military co-operation with other countries would have to be

founded on the fact that they are threatened or attacked by the same aggressor."¹¹ On the other hand, if the PSOE were to eventually compromise on the issue, and a treaty signature by Spain appeared likely, the PCE would surely feel obliged to take off the gloves and enter the anti-NATO struggle in a more forceful way. The influence of the French and Italian parties in these circumstances could count under such circumstances, but the PCE's not overly-declared but clearly-stated position is closer to the PCF's anti-NATO stance than to the PCI's "acceptance" position. Manuel Azcarate has made it clear that no "genuinely Spanish foreign policy would be possible if Spain were in NATO."¹² "Mundo Obrero" has repeatedly echoed this view and called on Spaniards to be on their guard against staged entry, that is to say, penny packet moves to enter without formal incorporation at the beginning.¹³

In passing, the creation of the now usual series of splinter parties of the communist movement is also the case in Spain. While these movements have little electoral weight, they are noisy. All oppose NATO membership, as far as can be discovered. Indeed, one of them, the Spanish "Labour" Party (Partido de Trabajo Espanol - PTE) has published a major book entitled Espana en la OTAN? which we have already cited under the author's nom de plume Alvarez de Castro. This is an attack by a study group of the party on eventual Spanish membership as too costly in independence and financial terms, with NATO being termed a tool of the United States and irrelevant to real European needs. The book has not sold very widely, making its influence rather difficult to discover. One interesting point about it is that, despite its unfavourable reaction to NATO, it is couched in moderate language and is far from the usual political polemic one hears on the issue.

THE RIGHT

After over thirty-six years of rightist rule, it may at first appear curious that the right should have been the least prepared for the results of Franco's death. However, the realities of the Franco regime were far from the "fascism" so often applied to it both in the Western democracies and in the East. The regime was much more a traditional, authoritarian, one-man-rule system than it was a fascist one.

The organized right only held considerable power early in the history of the Franco regime, and this position was steadily eroded in favour of centralized control from the one man at the top.

Whether King Juan Carlos' drive for "democratization" was a complete surprise for rightist leaders is a question of debate in Spain. What is certain is that the right has faced the challenge in a confused, disjointed and splintered fashion. Successive attempts to mobilize traditionalist and merely rightist Spain first against the process, then against the constituent assembly, then against the constitution, and finally against the general and municipal elections of 1979, have failed dismally. Unsure as to how far to oppose the "democratizing" process, the right has been split into two main factions--those who compromise with the parliamentary system and take part in it, and those even more extreme who have boycotted all activities which would "soil" their hands with democracy. This extreme wing goes so far as to claim that the increasing numbers of non-participants in the referenda and election of the last three years are supporters of its approach of not dealing with the current trend towards democracy. While this may be true to some extent, it seems clear that this percentage of the voting population more largely represents the portion of the population that generally takes no interest in politics, elsewhere in the West as well as in Spain. Nonetheless, lack of political participation on the part of many Spaniards concerns all parliamentary forces.

The "compromising" right has seen its percentage of the vote shift steadily downwards. In 1977, the right got 7.8 per cent of the vote and sixteen seats in the Cortes. In 1979, this had dropped to 5.5 per cent in the general elections with nine seats in the Parliament; and in the municipal elections to a very small percentage of the vote and very few municipalities in their hands.

Fragmented, confused by the loss of a leader who had made political activity by the right unnecessary, unable to find a positive ideological foundation, this wing of the Spanish body politic has drifted into opposition to the centre and the left unaccompanied by a coherent option of its own. Increasingly its often youthful membership has left the series of variously named coalitions (Alianza Popular, Coalición Democrática,

etc.) to join more activist, fringe organizations. It is somewhat disconcerting to see large numbers of youthful Spaniards joining the anti-parliamentary right where already extremist organizations such as Fuerza Nueva existed, and some going on to form avowedly falangist, fascist, or even Nazi organizations. This alarming trend is accompanied by seemingly inevitable spread of rightist inspired violence.¹⁴

Be that as it may, these groups are at the moment on the fringe of the right wing. The parliamentary right, whatever its weakness and prospects, believes in a strong and united Spain, firmly anti-communist and generally pro-Western. They oppose socializing policies of all kinds as well as particularly the goals of further autonomy on the part of many regions of Spain. They want the reinforcing of traditional values, including the Church, and are highly sensitive to questions which they consider to touch Spain's national honour.

Any such group, as can be imagined, is often well-received by the upper ranks of the armed services. There have been several cases of overly-close links with the parliamentary right on the part of serving officers. Nor are cases of such links with the extra-parliamentary right unknown. Similar connections with certain sections of the Church and of the "great families" provide a convenient target for leftist claims of a "rightist conspiracy" against democracy and reform. They believe the events surrounding the coup manque of November 1977 support this view.

Despite some fears of the negative effects of dealing closely with other democracies, the right is in a "faute de mieux" situation vis-à-vis NATO. After considerable hesitation and indeed opposition to NATO by the Alianza Popular, the realization that there is no other possible option has gained considerable ground within the parliamentary right.¹⁵ Except for extreme elements, it hopes for long-term stability in Spain. It fears communism, international and national. It is perfectly aware that it is not in a strong position and must look for assistance and support where it can. Hence, with some exceptions, the right now tends to endorse relatively heartily Spain joining NATO and is the only parliamentary group other than the UCD to do so. While it would undoubtedly prefer a more conservative alliance, such a body does

not now exist and its creation appears remote. NATO therefore appears the only option for the bulk of the right wing in Spain insofar as foreign policy objectives are concerned.

This having been said, there is a body of thought on the right which still believes that neutrality, even isolationism, is the only way to save Spain and its historic values. This element opposed Spanish entry into NATO but with decreasing force and conviction.

It is, all this having been pointed out, extremely difficult to speak of "the right" in Spain at the moment. It is in a period of crisis. Having lost its historic position of strength, it is in a game it little understands. It is unhappy with both the ends and the means of the process the King has set in motion, and it does not really know how to react. It is split into survivors of the "Movimiento," traditionalists, Carlists, religious zealots, persons simply happier with authoritarian rule, those fearful of Spain's eventual breakup, absolute monarchists, fascists and many other groups. It shares little except its opposition to current trends and its hope that a "strong man" will arrive again to lead Spain in the future, a future of which otherwise it is afraid. Since, as yet at least, that leader has shown little sign of appearing, the right is even more apprehensive. In such a mood it is likely to become more in favour of NATO, not less, in the future, if only "faute de mieux."

THE REGIONAL PARTIES

Spain is currently experiencing the pains of a long centralized authoritarian system of government now rapidly loosening the ties that bound the state rather forcefully together. Since the Reconquista and successive royal reformers, the Spanish state had been fiercely doing its best to destroy the powerful separatisms that had historically only come together in the common struggle against the occupying Moors. Spain is rather more a series of kingdoms than a single one.

Aided by geography as well as language and history, Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Aragonese, Navarrans, Castilians, Extremadurans, Andalusians and Leonese have to varying degrees retained their regional characteristics and local cultures. The always strong, and under Franco

even ruthless, attempts by Madrid to use all means, most recently and most effectively public education, to eradicate these "feudal" vestiges appeared to have succeeded up until the beginnings of serious Basque terrorism in this decade.

In the last years of Franco's life, this terrorism, largely in the hands of the Basque urban guerrillas known as ETA (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna--Basque Homeland and Freedom), struck increasingly often and murmurs of discontent in historically and linguistically separate Catalonia also began to be heard. With the process toward democracy, the regionalist tendencies have gone to full flood. To the dismay of many, and to the disgust of the conservatives and most of the army hierarchy, the demand for local autonomy became generalized in Spain and came to include, somewhat ludicrously, a similar demand from Castille, the centre and allegedly spoiled child of Spanish centralization.

The constitution provides relatively generous possibilities for a return to de-centralized government in Spain, although the government is accused by the most adventurous regionalists of promising autonomy but giving merely de-centralization. Nevertheless, the regionalist bandwagon has made great progress and the left has been quick to exploit the situation by linking itself with various regional movements. In the 1979 general elections, regional parties gained at least 8.2 per cent of the popular vote and twenty-eight seats in the Cortes. In municipal elections, their share of the vote varied greatly from region to region but was often impressive.

It is not easy to say what these very disparate bodies' attitudes to NATO might be in the future. Few have made any statements about it as yet except insofar as they are linked to national parties which have taken stands on the issue.

In general, however, it can be said that these movements have so far been apt to link up with the national left, and this tendency has of course not been pro-NATO. With the disarray of the national and regional right, this trend is likely to continue. However, for the moment the regional question has had only two really direct effects on the NATO debate. One has been to suggest to some Spaniards that armed forces which continue to be aimed at internal security problems, and

not Western European defence, are not such a bad idea. The other has been the anti-NATO stand taken by regional political forces in the Canaries, fearful of the possible effects of a "NATO base" in the islands. Since the Canaries are such a sensitive issue to Spaniards, and one of particular concern to Mr. Suarez, this could play some role in the future debate. The one likely pro-NATO regional party would be the Convergencia in Catalonia, a centre-right organization which most observers see as likely to back a UCD initiative to join the alliance.

THE ARMED FORCES

As mentioned, the armed forces of Spain are not united in favour of entry into NATO or of the option of neutrality. For reasons rooted in recent or not so recent history, they reflect divergent views as to the benefits one or the other option might provide to Spain, to their individual service, or to the careers of the officers in charge.

We have seen how they differ from one another in level of professionalism, equipment scales and modernity, efficiency and the like. One can now attempt to set forth some conclusions as to their attitudes towards NATO.

THE NAVY

Spain's senior service has often been considered to have had the least internal security role to play and therefore to have continued to be more interested in the international strategic picture than the other two services. Whether this is true or not, the Spanish naval officer, who travels with his service, is more likely to speak a foreign language than his army and even his air force counterparts. He has also inherited a tradition of concern for non-peninsular events. The influence of the Royal and Royal Netherlands Navies' traditions, while perhaps not as strong as in most other Western European navies because of Spain's own past, is still strong. More recently, the influence of the United States Navy has become important.

The Navy has a tradition of both monarchism and liberalism. While not really well-disposed to the Republic, it was much more reluctant to

rise against it than was the bulk of the Army. As a result, and because of its relative unimportance in any struggle with subversive elements, the Navy was far from a priority in the early years of the Franco regime.

However, the successive treaties with the United States brought the Navy again into the limelight. The United States valued the assistance a modernized Spanish fleet and its installations could afford it in the Mediterranean and Western Atlantic. There was also much the United States Navy could do to help the Spanish Navy recover from years of at worst distrust and at best indifference. The fleet has known twenty-five years of relatively steady improvement and modernization and, while at the beginning most of the equipment was second-hand and of American manufacture, recent trends have been toward new equipment of Spanish construction.

Dealing first with the U.S.N., later with the French and Italian navies and more recently with virtually all the NATO navies, there has been a requirement for the Spanish Navy to adopt standardized NATO procedures and even language. It may appear curious but two Spanish warships at sea communicate tactically in English as do NATO navies. The previously slow but currently rapid growth in visits and exchanges between Spain and the NATO navies has, to a great extent, made the Spanish Navy virtually a NATO force. This trend has in no way been slowed by the UCD government. Indeed, its action has tended to reinforce the incorporating tendency.

It is not surprising then, given Spain's position in the West, the past and current connection with the U.S.N., the prestige of the Royal Navy, the tendency toward naval strategic thought in Spain, and the rapidly increasing ties, procedural and informal, with NATO Navies, that the Spanish Navy appears to be overwhelmingly in favour of joining the Alliance and the sooner the better. Nor does it escape naval officers' attentions that a Spain linked with NATO would provide the greatest advantage to the Alliance through its naval support and facilities. Indeed many seem to feel that the Navy could eventually hope for a major expansion with consequent promotions and postings. It is an open secret that NATO membership for Spain would involve a straits command of some sort being set-up undoubtedly with a Spanish admiral in charge.¹⁶

The Navy is, then, and is very likely to remain, devoted to the idea of as rapid an entry into NATO as possible. Their analysis of Spain's situation, as well as service and personal interest, are the keys to this certainty on the issue.

THE AIR FORCE

The Spanish Air Force, as we have seen, is the most "professional" of the services in terms of the percentage of non-conscripts forming part of the force. It is also by far the youngest of the services and lacks the depth of foreign and colonial experience which would provide it with the other two's traditions. Nor has its role during the bulk of the Franco period been the stuff of which legendary air forces and air force morale are made.

This air force, considered by many to be over-officered and under-planned, is searching for a more meaningful role, one which would further the recent achievements made in aircraft procurement and modernization. Increasing contacts with the United States Air Force, and more recently with the West German and other NATO air forces, have given the Spanish service a keen desire to improve in efficiency and equipment terms. As with the Navy, so with the Air Force, there has been a steady (if slower) move towards the adoption of NATO procedures and the Spaniards can now grosso modo work fairly easily with their NATO comrades.

Again, as in the Navy, this has made for a force which is well disposed to, if perhaps not quite so passionate about, the idea of Spanish membership in the Atlantic Alliance. This tendency has been greatly reinforced by the personal considerations of likely career implications and professional concern for the betterment of the force. It has not escaped air force officers that much of the discussion of Spain's assistance to NATO has involved air facilities, an improved air force, greater support and communication facilities for allied air forces, and rear air bases far from the front and relatively invulnerable to Warsaw Pact attack. These officers also tend to appreciate the concept of the "Spanish aircraft carrier" which some feel the peninsula could become. All this points to a service very greatly disposed to enter the alliance, although still with the inevitable older officers who fear for a loss in their

previous and inadequate training and experience.

THE ARMY

If the Navy and Air Force are very much in favour of NATO membership, the same cannot be said of the Spanish Army. For long the mainstay of the Franco regime and by far the largest and most important element of the Spanish Armed Forces, the Army is far from united in support of entry. The reasons are many and varied but reflect the Army's historic position at the centre of Spanish political life, the largely sedentary role it has played militarily since the Civil War, and service and personal concerns.

The Army constitutes about three-quarters of the personnel in the Spanish forces. Despite recent spectacular gains by the other two services, it retained in 1978 almost forty per cent of the defence budget. It was its action, not that of the Navy or the Air Force, which effected the removal of the Republic in 1936-39. The bulk of the counter-insurgency role so obviously required under the previous government naturally fell to the Army. It had direct responsibility for and command over the Civil Guard and indeed provided the officers for the corps directly from its own ranks. It still does. Its senior officers had the ear of the Generalissimo to a greater extent than any other body.

This army has long considered itself the preserver of Spain's traditional values and the main bulwark against communism in the country. The experience of the Civil War, the "Blue Division" in the Soviet Union, and the internal security role's predominance since the war have confirmed these attitudes in the minds of many officers, particularly senior officers. These gentlemen are often distrustful of democracy and of recent modernizing tendencies in the West applied to Spain. They put emphasis on the first word of Spain's motto: "Una, Grande, Libre" (One, Great, Free). They despise regionalism and distrust de-centralization, reckoning their job to be ensuring that Spain remains "one." Even the most moderate elements of the forces insist that the watch-word should be, "La Unidad de España por encima de todo" (the unity of Spain above anything else).¹⁷ They resent capitalism's emphasis on materialism and its rejection of Christian values, and can even see the Western powers

as immoral, atheistic, and "soft on communism." Some feel that an alliance with those powers will not offer Spain a real increase in its security but will slowly but surely introduce the same sort of change which they fear from the East, only with different labels.

As has been seen, the Spanish soldier is well-disciplined, generally oriented toward traditional values, and accepts his military service with relative contentment. Some Spanish senior officers would fear to expose him to the long-haired, libertarian, badly-disciplined, and anti-traditionalist soldiers which they feel are often the rule in most of Western Europe. They point to trade unionism, feminism, ill-discipline and other aspects of "modernization" in some NATO forces as contaminants of the youth and martial spirit of Spain. Far from receiving the prospect of NATO service with pleasure, some of them reject it instinctively as inappropriate to Spanish history.

Other, more practical, considerations also make NATO membership less appealing to certain segments of the Army than might at first appear logical. The first of these is the perhaps well-founded belief that it is the Air Force and Navy which will receive the bulk of equipment and funds in future planning aimed at a NATO role. Even if a division were sent to the Central Front, which is far from certain, this would not make up for the air and naval activity Spain would expect as its share of NATO defence activity in the Western Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic. The logistics base and general support functions of the Spanish part of the peninsula in NATO planning also point to roles which some people in Spain and the Spanish forces, but particularly the Army, find demeaning. Many officers in the land force fear for their pre-eminence among the nation's armed services and therefore are hesitant about the NATO link.

The prospect that NATO membership will expose Spanish officers to professional, non-political, forces abroad is also not generally accepted with delight by Spanish senior army officers. Some resent their lost role in national politics but others fear in any case that such exposure will weaken the forces' belief in their role of guarantor of national unity. Given the fact that many officers have two jobs, particularly in Madrid--one civilian and one military--there are obvious

fears that postings abroad will ruin a fairly comfortable situation. Lastly there is the perhaps inevitable fear that increased professionalization will embarrass those, generally senior, officers who have not benefited from more advanced training programmes. With the general government desire to rejuvenate the forces, these usually older officers feel threatened in many ways and react instinctively and negatively to change.

Set against this are some senior and a large number of junior and middle-ranking officers who see the NATO option as holding just the possibilities of modernization, further professionalization, postings abroad, and non-political, meaningful national defence roles which they earnestly seek. Some of these officers even hope for a deployment of forces to the Rhine. They wish contacts with foreign, Western, armies. They want an escape from the internal security role which has so often placed them in a far from good light with the general public. They hope to gain from the rejuvenation of the forces and its greater professionalization.

Thus the Army is divided on NATO for many reasons. The General Staff have seen the danger and it is extraordinary, for a country linked to NATO and Western defence in several ways, to note how little attention is paid to the Alliance in Spanish military circles. Large-scale exercises do not assume co-operation with NATO and are still often aimed at somewhat dubious threats from North Africa. Recent courses at the Defence College, of five months in duration, included only two one-hour periods on the Western alliance. Only seven of NATO's members have defence or military attachés in Madrid. Exchanges with NATO armies, as opposed to navies, are few and far between.

Thus one can say that the Army is divided on the issue of NATO membership. While the trend appears to be toward greater acceptance of it, this trend is least noticeable among senior officers. If the First Vice President for Defence, a retired army general, Gutiérrez Mellado, is in favour, this very fact tends to make the more conservative wing of the Army hesitant or suspicious. The NATO issue is often perceived as part of a general government plan to reorganize the Army which meets considerable opposition from traditionalist officers.

When one considers that, due to the extraordinary age of retirement regulations in the Army, up until 1985 the majority of officers of the rank of lieutenant-general will still be Civil War veterans, there is perhaps some reason for feeling that opposition in the Army to NATO, and to reform in general, is not likely to disappear in the very near future. Some war-time generals should still be serving around 1990 unless reforms deal with the problem. While officers who do not reach general rank must retire at the age of 60, those who do make it can stay on for ten or even more years, particularly if they are needed for what might be called secondary duties.¹⁸

OTHER ELEMENTS

There are, of course, elements on the Spanish scene other than the government, the political parties, and the armed forces who can expect to have some influence on the decision as to the orientation of future Spanish security policy. These, loosely speaking, may include the King, the "establishment" in general, public opinion, and the press. One can now briefly discuss each of these.

THE KING

It appears from press reports and the general tenor of foreign policy during the transition period from Franco's death to the general elections of March 1979, that King Juan Carlos is personally in favour of NATO membership. The countries to which he and his family are most linked are signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. The democracies used as bases for the Spanish restoration are likewise members. Of Europe's national monarchies (excluded for this purpose are Liechtenstein and Monaco), all but one, Sweden, are in the Atlantic Alliance.

The King is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He may be in a particularly good position to see the advantages NATO offers in terms of the professionalization of the services. He also has personally worked with the navies of other NATO members while a young officer. His first major act as interim head of state was to sign the joint United States-Spanish parallel declaration to the Ottawa NATO Charter, although this is as much coincidence as anything else.

For whatever reasons, his support for membership seems clear. However, the likelihood of his putting the great prestige of the monarchy behind an issue which may bring into play serious differences of opinion in the country is not very great. Nonetheless, he can be considered a likely proponent of the idea, with considerable influence behind the political scenes.

THE ESTABLISHMENT

Spain's 1,000 great families and other elements of the establishment are divided, insofar as one can assess, on the issue of the Alliance. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that most of them are generally in favour of Spanish adhesion.

The establishment wants order and, at least to some extent, NATO can help provide this through the link with other Western democracies, the general improvement of the Army, and through the reinforced acceptance of the Spanish government by the West. Linked to the European Community, with hopes of increased prosperity through membership, it appears to be the majority of the Spanish establishment's view that Spain will be a more stable place.

However, as in the Army, some of the supporters of the old regime view with marked suspicion the arrival of even greater numbers of ideas and practices from the Western democracies. NATO is, in this regard, sometimes seen as simply another nail in the coffin of Spanish domestic peace. These people are appalled by the rapid increase in terrorism, violent and petty crime, housebreaking and other features of many Western cities' life which were very rare in Franco's Spain.¹⁹ While the figures are in no way alarming to a Londoner or a Parisian, and would seem totally insignificant to a New Yorker, they are extremely frightening to an upper class accustomed to nearly forty years of relative domestic peace. While NATO may improve the forces in some ways, its certain lowering of the emphasis on the internal security role will not be welcomed, or considered logical given the evolving situation, by this segment of the establishment.

Despite this instinctive reaction on the part of some of the establishment, the majority does, however, as mentioned, see it as a

lesser of evils. It is a reinforcement of the links between Spain and anti-revolutionary forces and this, they obviously consider, is all to the good. It could be better, but it is the only option offered by the present situation, as the bulk of rightist politicians have accepted as well. The oligarchy, closely linked to the Church and the armed services, must accept recent changes with a view to lessening the power of more revolutionary forces.

THE GENERAL POPULAR REACTION

The debate on NATO membership has not as yet reached very sizeable proportions. The general elections did not see the matter discussed, although policies on it figured in some published party programmes, and as mentioned elsewhere, it is the press which has given whatever discussion there has been, some public airing. Nonetheless, a wide range of private discussions with Spaniards of different social classes and political opinions does give one some feel for the public view of the question.

Firstly it must again be said that the Spanish public has for three years been bombarded with political propaganda essentially aimed at "politicizing" it after the decades of Franco's rule when the Spaniard was generally discouraged from too great an interest in politics, or any interest in opposition politics at all. Issues such as whether or not to move towards democracy (late 1976), the formation of a constituent assembly (spring of 1977), the drafting and ratification of the new constitution (1978), general and municipal elections (early 1979), have all emphasized domestic concerns. No less the people than the government have simply had too full a political plate to give too much attention to external policy.

In addition, the consensus of all parties on the issue of future Spanish membership in the European Economic Community, by far the greatest international question facing Spain, allowed for a truce on foreign policy issues that made too loud a debate on the thorny subject of NATO seem an unnecessary luxury for a government with enough trouble on the domestic front. Almost everyone in Spain believes the main problems of the country to be economic. High inflation rates and very unsettling unemployment figures present a somewhat bleak picture. Spain

is not a rich country, lacking capital, infrastructure, natural resources and invulnerable markets for its export products. Spaniards are above all concerned with these difficulties and have often placed an exaggerated hope in the EEC panacea.

The long tradition of neutrality, and the downplaying of the importance of international matters under Franco, have given many Spaniards a feeling that there are no real threats to Spain and that defence considerations should therefore not be very great in Spanish affairs. Spaniards are united in the desire to see Gibraltar returned to the national territory and only slightly less united, it appears, in wishing to see Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canaries remain Spanish. Problems with Morocco, and to some extent Algeria, therefore concern many Spaniards in defence terms. Further convictions about the existence of a Soviet threat, however, are much more limited and reflect domestic political ideology much more than a careful study of the international situation in general. Most concerned Spaniards do not give much thought to matters related to the global balance but continue to focus on almost exclusively-Spanish external difficulties. These rarely involve the Soviet Union so the NATO aspect of future policy has not been prominent. As mentioned elsewhere, the lack of a NATO role in any difficulties between Spain and the African states on extra-peninsular territories reinforces some Spanish feeling that the Alliance is a secondary issue for Spanish defence.

The somewhat mythical neutrality of Spain has also led many Spaniards to a somewhat bizarre conclusion on the subject of the more direct physical threat of nuclear bombardment in case of war. It may appear curious but the question of the targetting of Spanish territory is an extremely common subject when NATO is discussed. There is a widespread belief in Spain that Alliance membership will mean some or greater targetting by the Soviet Union of Spain. Spaniards often believe they are not targetted at all and that they would largely escape the consequences of nuclear war if neutrality were to be "preserved."

While this does not appear to be a sound argument, it is often believed. That Soviet targetting would ignore the American bases or

Gibraltar (not to mention Portugal) seems to the author to be virtually impossible. That it would ignore the forces and facilities of an avowedly pro-Western Spain seems unlikely in the case of general war. Nonetheless the feeling remains well entrenched that Spain would possibly be left alone or at least less heavily attacked if the country remains aloof from the alliance than if it forms part of it.

Another aspect of membership involved the link with the application to join the EEC. This connection between the EEC and NATO has been denied by all concerned, with the result that entry into NATO as some sort of first step towards the EEC, a real consideration in 1976, no longer appears very relevant. The urgency of the much more politically-difficult issue of NATO membership has thus declined sharply.

Then there is the matter of cost. Spain is not a rich country and defence expenditure is keenly felt. The literature and press commentary has emphasized the financial aspects of NATO membership, the need for modernizing the forces and quite large-scale purchases of equipment and weaponry. Anti-NATO commentators have underscored the costs of all this and suggested membership would be more costly than neutrality. Pro-NATO commentators have argued that since unarmed neutrality is not really an option, European examples of armed neutrality tend to demonstrate greater rather than lesser defence expenditures on the part of neutral as opposed to NATO countries. While this latter argument has become clearer perhaps to the political left after visits to Sweden and Switzerland by interested politicians, the extent to which this is reflected in the public is more debatable. One often hears it said that Spain simply cannot afford to be in NATO.

This negative reaction is helped by the widespread belief that neutrality has served Spain well since the early 19th century, a belief reflected elsewhere in this discussion. In summary, then, and given that the debate on membership has not as yet really been joined in earnest, there appears to be relatively little public interest in joining the Alliance. Indeed, much of the previous regime's desire to get into NATO has dissipated as Spain's international respectability has become complete. Most commentators agree that a referendum on the subject would receive a negative vote to entry.

Nevertheless, the government is still desirous of signing the treaty and taking part in the Alliance. Although they are still keen, they are aware of the pit-falls. While spokesmen have pointed out the rather dubious idea that most of Spanish public opinion is in favour of NATO membership, they have recognized its uncertainty. "The dialogue is going to be difficult. There is a slight majority of Spanish opinion in favour of entry, but the willingness to enter is very low."²⁰ Such was the assessment of one of them in mid-1978, and the situation has, from a NATO point of view, not improved since then. They can be expected to seriously attempt to "sell" the idea of NATO for Spain as soon as other matters of greater concern are cleared away. The addition of a defence link to the political and economic links with the EEC could be, if phrased thus, a much more popular idea than NATO appears to be when assessed without that "optique." The key would appear to be in making the Alliance relevant to popular Spanish external goals. As seen elsewhere, this is extremely difficult in the case of Gibraltar. While it could be marginally so in the case of the Canaries, it is almost unthinkable that it could be to any real direct extent in the case of Ceuta and Melilla. Thus it would appear that if the alliance is to be well-received by the Spanish public, its connection with the desire to be more European would have to be reinforced in that public's mind.

THE PRESS

The Spanish press is not overly political, and its newspapers have had relatively little time to establish strong links with particular political parties. The post-Franco period has seen a vast expansion in the popular press. Not only are there now communist newspapers such as "Mundo Obrero," but the lack of censorship has permitted anti-government or at least independent newspapers to become established. The plethora of new newspapers has meant some difficulty in obtaining a reasonable number of readers to allow them to successfully continue in operation.

"El Pais," a daily of great prestige, has become a model of centrist journalism, eschewing both the right and the left. From its recent meagre beginnings, it has become one of the great national news-

papers of Spain. Other vaguely centrist, non-political journals such as "El Periodico," "Informaciones," and "Diario 16," compete rather successfully for a share of the market which appears to exist for non-political papers of generally centrist inclinations.

Nonetheless, the political orientation of the press in great part is evident. The historic "ABC," dean of Spanish newspapers, has clearly replaced its ancien regime links with the Opus Dei (the moderate reform group operating under Franco) with similar ones with the Union del Centro Democrático. "El Alcazar" is a successful rightist daily whose main difficulty seems to be adjusting to the constant fractionalism and changes of name endemic in Spain's rightist parties. "Pueblo" can count on much of the readership which can be expected to support the Socialist Worker's Party, although other socialist newspapers have recently contested that virtual unanimity in choice. The substantial religious newspapers retain considerable, if perhaps diminishing, support.

The printed press, then, appears to be prospering, although some newspapers will have to fail, in all likelihood, because of their growth in numbers. Television and Radio, however, are state-controlled and have not been above quite flagrant favouritism toward government candidates and UCD party positions. This has caused a series of flare-ups in the Cortes and much political and press commentary, some of it going so far as to question the government's real intentions insofar as democratization is concerned. The information services in particular are the brunt of serious complaint as well as the inevitable political joking about their pro-government stance.

Because of what might be called the "truce" on foreign policy and defence matters between government and opposition parties, the debate on NATO entry has largely centred in the press and not in the political programmes of the parties, much less in the Cortes itself. The UCD has repeatedly said that NATO membership will only result from a widely-based parliamentary and national debate on the question, and there is even a debate as to whether one should have a referendum on the issue.

While it is difficult to imagine the ballot-weary Spanish population going off again to vote on NATO membership, it is clear that the debate on this as well as other defence and foreign policy issues can begin in

earnest, now that there is a government-opposition agreement on a more or less normal basis in parliament. Some of the press has remained non-committal on the issue and has let various positions on the matter appear in its pages. Others have barely mentioned NATO due to the attention required to domestic issues, referenda, elections, and the like.

Most have, however, appeared to take some view. The Catholic "ya" has had articles pointing out the value of a Spanish contribution to the defence of the West against the perceived communist menace. This paper ranks fourth in size in the country and has a readership which is both influential and numerous--some 140,000.²¹ "ABC" has been thoroughly committed to the idea of NATO membership as a priority for Spain and its effective incorporation into Western Europe. "El Pais," perhaps because its defence editor had been Antonio Sánchez-Gijón, a long-time supporter of NATO membership, had tended also to reflect this view. Since his 1978 departure, however, "El Pais" has tended to be indifferent or even negative on the matter. It had average daily sales of over 125,000 in 1977 and has undoubtedly increased this figure since.

To the right of centre, "El Alcazar" (64,000) has generally been well-disposed toward membership but has also warned of the dangers possibly to be encountered in NATO for Spain's traditional values. To the left, "Pueblo" (113,000) has generally not reflected a positive view of NATO but has also allowed expressions of support for the organization to appear in its pages. Whether this reflects any doubts on the matter within the PSOE is anyone's guess. The communist "Mundo Obrero," only recently made into a daily, however, has come out strongly opposed to signing the North Atlantic Treaty on the basis that it would contribute to the de-stabilizing of the East-West balance and that it would destroy Spain's vital role as a neutral country with an independent foreign policy. The independent "Diario 16" (75,000) and "Informaciones" (52,000) are, if anything, vaguely opposed to NATO membership.

As mentioned, other newspapers have not committed themselves, although some may as, and if, the national and parliamentary debate gathers momentum. Since Spain has addressed few of its international relations problems in a systematic way since Franco's death, being obviously concerned with the domestic scene first, it is difficult to pre-judge how the debate will be carried on.

The Spanish National Radio and Television system has, nonetheless, been subtly supporting this as well as other government policies. News items often mention NATO in a favourable light, hardly surprising given Spain's situation internationally, and there have been several programmes on military questions related to NATO, none of which seemed to have emphasized perceived negative sides of Spanish potential membership.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERCEPTION OF THREAT

The relation between Alliance membership and a perceived threat is, of course, a major one. The NATO Alliance has been based on the threat of Soviet military and political designs on Western Europe, a threat perceived in somewhat similar terms by all the Treaty signatories, although with enormous variations over the thirty-year history of the Alliance.

Spain, while not completely so, has largely been on the margin of Western thought on this matter of threat perception. When the Alliance was formed, Spain was still a highly ostracized country, whose regime was frequently termed "fascist," and which could not even get into the United Nations. While the Spanish regime was clearly anti-communist, its past record and its then current government could not be welcomed into NATO however much successive Spanish foreign ministers might try. The real threat to Franco's Spain was internal, not external. After the Civil War, the armed forces and their adjuncts the Civil Guard and the Armed Police were given roles aimed overwhelmingly at the defeat of subversion and the maintenance of internal security. While the Franco regime certainly felt that communism internationally was a threat, its domestic concerns, and its ostracism generally, allowed for no real Spanish contribution to the Western defence effort.

As the years went on, the Navy and Air Force in particular, and in connection with the United States Treaty (first signed in 1953), began to take on roles connected with an external threat. The giant of the three forces, the Army, however, retained its internal security priorities. However, there was from the 1950's limited Spanish international defence activity somewhat related to Western threat perceptions.

Despite co-operation with NATO members on a bilateral basis, however, first with the Americans, and then with the French and Italians

(and to a much lesser extent with the Portuguese), recent years have changed the threat perception rather more away from than towards the general European scene. Spain found itself faced with an extremely difficult defence situation related to the Spanish Sahara. It still deals with a generally hostile Algeria and a Morocco that, while conservative and pro-Western, has serious difficulties with Spain not only over the territorial enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla but also over fishing rights. In none of these difficulties has NATO been, or wished to become, involved.

Spain has, therefore, for the better part of two decades, had tangible security problems which had nothing to do with NATO. At the same time, the popular perception of a real Soviet threat in Western Europe has lost some credibility in Spain as it has in most other countries of the region. Hence, the evolution of threat perception in Spain since the foundation of the Alliance has tended to be moving further away from, rather than closer to, that of the other Alliance members. It is difficult to see how this perception can be made to be even reasonably closer without a greatly increased feeling of Spain sharing the general destiny of Western Europe.

THE EXTERNAL FACTORS

THE UNITED STATES

It is, of course, the United States which has the greatest leverage of any one country on Spain. If the European Community represents Spain's hoped-for future, it has been the link with the United States which has been its anchor in the recent past. As has been mentioned, the United States has watched with considerable approval the evolution of the regime, after Franco's death, to full parliamentary democracy.

While America wants Spain in NATO, it is not the declared number one priority of the United States in the country. The priorities stated are:

- 1) The consolidation of democracy in Spain;
- 2) Spain's joining the EEC, and
- 3) Spain's membership in NATO

Fearful of the counterproductive impact of appearing to use its leverage to pressure Spain to join the Alliance, the Americans have bent over backwards not to be seen to be doing so. Nonetheless, the United States is extremely keen that Spain should join. Such a move would stabilize and "rationalize" the United States base arrangements with Spain. It would, as has been seen, also be a tremendous political boost to the Alliance, the lynch-pin of American policy in Europe. It would improve Spain's armed forces and increase the value of the strategic position of NATO by adding greatly to its depth.

The long evolution of American policy, aiming at bringing Spain into the Alliance, would have ended in success. Democracy would presumably be reinforced internally and the list of America's allies embarrassing through their governments' political leanings would be less likely to again include Spain. Any United States regime could scarcely avoid welcoming such an event, but the Carter administration would not be the least of them.

Because of, rather than in spite of, their impressive position, the Americans do not appear to be putting pressure directly on the Spanish to hurry up membership. However, they are not averse to pointing

out to the other European allies how advantageous it would be for them to be more vociferous in signalling to the Spanish the positive aspects of the Alliance. The Americans would particularly like the Germans to take up this role but so far Bonn has been less than anxious to do so. This undoubtedly reflects the Federal Republic's fears that they too could be accused of bullying the Spanish into precipitate action.

America's position in Spain is based on economic as well as political and military factors. Its links with Spain before the beginning of the Cold War were not great but in the last thirty years they have expanded enormously. After 1949, the strategic position of Spain was not to be ignored by the United States. Nor, as we saw, were the possibilities of benefits from an American connection lost on the isolated and exposed regime of Francisco Franco.

The first accord between the two countries, signed in September 1953, was an important one for each government. As Whitaker has written, "For the United States it was a reversal of its earlier anti-Franco policy. For Spain, it meant the abandonment of neutrality and isolationism."¹ The Pact of Madrid, as it was called, was really three agreements--for defence, economic aid, and mutual defence assistance. They did not require Senate approval as they were, formally, executive agreements and not treaties.

It was not an alliance but a "quasi-alliance." Although the bases the United States could use were not specified and were to remain under Spanish command and sovereignty, the senior partner was to have the right to station personnel and stock supplies and equipment in Spain. The United States agreed to contribute to Spain's air defence and to assist Madrid's military and naval forces with improved American stocks of equipment. American military and economic aid under the Pact's provisions in the first two years was to be \$ 327 million, although this in fact was somewhat increased. Base construction cost \$ 400 - \$ 420 million.² Thus began the twenty-two-year special defence and economic relations between the United States and the Franco regime. The bases were completed in 1958, giving the United States power further Mediterranean projection in the air and at sea.

American equipment sent under the Pact began to arrive in early

1954. Instruction programmes for the Spanish armed services began under American auspices both in Spain and in the United States. The level of this programme can be judged by the fact that between 1954 and 1958 some 4,800 Spaniards received American military training in Spain. Interesting also is the emphasis in aid on the improvement of Spain's air defence, a requirement which particularly concerned the Madrid authorities. American military assistance was allocated to the forces in the following way: air force--40 per cent; navy--30 per cent; army--30 per cent.³ Increasing costs for military equipment brought further Spanish efforts to gain assistance in the late 1950's, and while these were somewhat successful, they did not change matters much for the financially-pressed Spanish armed forces.

In 1963, the accords of 1953 were renewed for a further five years. The Spanish bases had become very important for the United States by this time and the Americans were anxious to renew the arrangements regarding them. If America was anxious to do so, the Spanish could be expected to be extremely keen. After all, in exchange for a slight weakening of the rather unlikely "bridge to the Arabs" role in Spanish foreign policy, Franco received invaluable support for his regime in economic aid, military assistance, political acceptance and even consultation. Indeed, in 1959 President Eisenhower visited Madrid putting the final U.S. stamp of respectful tolerance, if not approval, on the Franco regime. Here, after all, was the head of the allied effort against the Axis giving and receiving an "abrazo" or hug from the bête noir of Western liberals and the only surviving "fascist dictator."⁴ The significance of the gesture escaped no one. Despite continued rejection by NATO, Spain carried on receiving the guarded friendship of the United States. Progressively this friendship became less and less guarded.

However, Spain was rather less anxious for a renewal of the agreement with the United States when these again required action in 1968. Then, it basically wanted an increased price to be paid for the facilities provided. Negotiations went on without success until mid-1970 when the renewal was finally achieved. Spain had been seeking closer relations with the Europe of the Six. In this it had the support of the

United States. However, Spain had asked for a large increase in assistance and it was only when the United States balked at this and Franco intervened directly in the negotiation, that the firm hand of the foreign Minister, Castiella, could be loosened. Spain thereby accepted much less than Castiella had asked in return for the use of the American bases.⁵ Franco had not really been prepared to risk the end of the United States accords. Despite the infamous Burgos trials, the cooling of relations with the EEC, the continued rejection of NATO, and difficulties with the United Kingdom over Gibraltar, the last years of the Franco regime still saw the "partial partnership" of the United States and Spain in relatively good order.

The United States had proved a loyal ally. In return for his obvious anti-communism and defence co-operation on the base and other issues, Franco had been assured not only impressive practical assistance at the economic, scientific, and military levels, but also American co-operation in trying to get other countries to further accept his regime. The Americans made favourable noises about Spain's future in Europe and sponsored its membership flirtations with NATO.

There had been considerable fear that successor regimes would resent United States support of the Franco state. In fact, however, this issue has hardly surfaced despite its propaganda value to the exiles before late 1975. The government has renewed the base arrangements in the 1976 package (see Appendix II) and has continued a foreign policy closely tied to the West although more "open" in many respects than was that of Franco. As we have seen, the Socialist Workers' Party has accepted the indefinite existence of the bases and the PCE hardly mentions the matter.

Thus, while moving ever closer to the European Community, Spain has not forgotten its quarter century of friendship with the United States, whatever the reasons for its first twenty-two years of existence (those involving the Franco regime). This reflects the continuing special relationship between the two countries.

On the economic side, the United States is still important to Spain, although in a slow decline in comparison with Western Europe. The United States is Spain's second customer and took 10.5 per cent of the country's exports in 1976, 9.8 per cent in 1977 and 9.3 per cent in 1978. It is

also Spain's second source of Imports providing in 1976, 15.9 per cent of the total, in 1977--12.0 per cent, and in 1978--13.3 per cent.⁶ While not among the top four, the United States does contribute in a large way to Spain's tourist industry. Nonetheless, the trend is likely to move away from the United States and toward the EEC.

The United States both suffers and profits from a love/hate reaction from the Spaniards. They often resent its power and question its motives. However, its prestige is high and its methods and procedures widely copied. Its scientific assistance is appreciated by Spain as is its support for the new democracy. Its very size and power makes many Spaniards apprehensive, and the left is often convinced that there is a massive plot between the United States and the oligarchy to maintain the status quo in the peninsula.

Not surprisingly, the links between the military forces of the two countries are particularly strong. The long evolution of these links has been briefly traced. However, it should be brought up to date in an explanation of the current terms of the relationship. Firstly let us look at the state of the United States deployment in Spain. In terms of personnel, there are over 8,600 servicemen stationed in Spain. The Air Force represents the largest number with over 5,000, followed by the Navy with about 3,300. The Marines have 207 men and the Army only twenty-eight.⁷

The United States forces in Spain are based primarily at three large air installations and one naval station. The air bases are at Torrejón, Morón de la Frontera and Zaragoza, in all cases sharing facilities with the Spanish air force. The naval station is at Rota on the Gulf of Cadiz. There are in addition some sixteen smaller support installations scattered around the country.⁸

From Rota, combat and reconnaissance roles related to ASW in the Eastern Atlantic and Western Mediterranean are fulfilled. Maritime control and communications for SACEUR are also maintained for the region from here. All manner of support for AFSOUTH would also be staged from this massive installation, and local logistic and supply taskings are of great importance to the Sixth Fleet. Until July 1979, the base had also been in use by a squadron of eleven nuclear submarines carrying

"Polaris" A-2 and A-3 missiles. This function has been ended by the terms of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship. An ASW air patrol operation is maintained from Rota using P-3 "Orion" aircraft. A stockpile of fuel, ammunition and other supplies is kept at the base. It is worthwhile noting that the support for the Sixth Fleet is at the level one would expect for a force of two aircraft carriers, fifteen other major surface units and a Marine Amphibious Unit. Thus this base is an enormous undertaking of vital significance to the United States deployment in the Mediterranean and southern Europe. In time of war or crisis, its role, of course, becomes even greater. In co-operation with the U.S. Azores installations, it is the main operational element in the Eastern Atlantic south of the United Kingdom.

The USAF also relies greatly on its Spanish facilities. Torrejón is the headquarters of the 16th Air Force of the United States. It is also the permanent home base of the 401 Fighter Squadron. Established at the base there is also a squadron of strategic aerial resupply aircraft. The station is responsible for some of the maintenance requirements of SACEUR's C-30 transport fleet, and serves as a supply depot for reserve provisions in case of war. Finally, USAF command installations for the Western Mediterranean are established here essentially as part of the 16th Air Force headquarters.

Morón de la Frontera is of considerable importance as well. It has a maintenance and support function for elements of the Strategic Air Command bomber force. It houses transmitting facilities for naval communications. Finally, it maintains large reserves of supplies, fuel and ammunition for the receipt and despatch of SACEUR C-130's.

The last of the bases is Zaragoza in northern Spain. Its function is primarily a training one in peacetime. A tactical training squadron of fighters, No. 742, is maintained there. Some 70 per cent of air-to-air weapon training conducted by USAF Europe is carried out in Spain and most of it done from here. In passing, it should be noted that most United States ASW training in Europe is also carried out from Spanish bases. Also at Zaragoza are the support facilities for a squadron of tactical air transport and light transport and liaison aircraft of SACEUR. Storage of war reserve stocks is done here as well.

The loss of facilities in Malta and North Africa over recent years, as well as the ambiguous situation of France in general, has increased the importance of the Spanish installations to the United States and to NATO as a whole. Recent increases in the high-density communication needed to support United States forces in the European theatre have also highlighted the importance of the relatively removed facilities in Spain. The overcrowding of training installations in most of NATO Europe ensures a keen interest in training areas of various kinds now organized, or conceivably in the future to be established, in Spain, as it has done in Canada.

The 1976 Treaty of Friendship between Spain and the United States of America has introduced further aspects to the defence features of the Spanish-American partnership. Despite the hard bargains both sides naturally attempted to drive, the continuity of co-operation comes out loud and strong. The two parties agree that "they will seek to develop the appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces." Article V allows the United States to continue to use "specific military facilities" in Spain, especially the four bases mentioned and a firing range at Bardenas Reales. Tanker aircraft based in Spain were drastically reduced and the 1979 withdrawal of nuclear submarines from Rota was arranged. No nuclear components or devices were to be stationed on Spanish soil. Use of bases in emergency is subject to "urgent consultations" between Madrid and Washington governments, but really through a planned joint council which has now been set up.

From a NATO point of view, several important steps were taken. The two states agreed "to harmonize their defence relationship with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area." In addition the leader of the Alliance moved to co-ordinate its defence activities with those of Spain and to ensure reciprocal action happened as well from the Spanish side. Supplementary Agreement Number 1 set up a United States-Spanish Council to oversee the implementation of the treaty. The Council itself will meet at least semi-annually with the two countries' foreign ministers in attendance. Permanent military representatives of the two countries' Joint Chiefs of Staff would be designated. A Joint Military Committee dependent on the Council would meet semi-annually and

it would be composed of the two Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their representatives. A co-ordinating working body would be set up to co-ordinate and plan the military implementation of the treaty's provisions. The Council as a whole would have its seat at Madrid and "as one of its basic objectives, will work toward development of appropriate co-ordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." American support for Spain's entry into the EEC is also declared in the accords.

A supplementary agreement calls on the combined staff to prepare plans "for actions which could be taken in the geographic area of common interest...in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the context of a general attack against the West." Here is the description of this special zone.

"The geographic area of common interest is defined as follows:

- a) Spain, including adjacent air space.
- b) Atlantic area.
 - 1) Northern limit: the parallel of 48 north latitude to the European continent.
 - 2) Western limit: from the intersection of 48 degrees north latitude and 23 degrees west longitude, south to the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude.
 - 3) Southern limit: the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude eastward from west longitude to the coastal waters of the African littoral.
 - 4) Eastern limit: northward along the African coast to the Strait of Gibraltar, and thence northward along the coast of Europe to 48 degrees north latitude.
- c) Mediterranean area: from the Strait of Gibraltar to the meridian of 7 degrees east longitude.
- d) The area excludes the territory of third states and their territorial waters."

Another supplementary accord details arrangements regarding Spanish acquisition of American military equipment. The United States agreed to facilitate loans for these purchases to the amount of \$ 120 million during

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
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10-10

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NBS 1963-A

each of five years of the treaty's life. A further \$ 75 million in defence equipment would be on a grant basis. Another \$ 2 million per year for Spanish forces personnel training would be given also on a grant basis.

The United States agreed to "make the maximum effort to facilitate" Spain's purchase of four squadrons (72 aircraft) of F-16 light fighters or similar planes. It also agreed to improve Spain's aircraft control and warning system. Four ocean-going minesweepers and one tender for these craft were also to be provided at a "favourable price." The F-16 agreement provided for the Spaniards' leasing 42 F-4E aircraft, a lease which could be extended until the same number of F-16's could be made available.

It should be noted that other articles and supplementary agreements carried on United States-Spanish co-operation in other fields. These included economic, educational, cultural, scientific, technical and agricultural co-operation. Thus the 1976 treaty, valid until 1981, maintains the special relationship. Spain feels it needs United States assistance in all these fields. As has been mentioned, it is far from unhappy with the base agreement either.

There seems little doubt that another treaty will be signed in 1981 if Spain is not in NATO by then. Only the communists oppose the bases and they do so relatively quietly. The United States would, however, much prefer Spanish entry into NATO with the consequent rationalizing of the United States presence on the peninsula. However, barring that, it will almost surely wish to retain the bilateral defence relationship while hoping for a multilateral one in the still more distant future.

Some Spaniards believe they will be able to drive a very hard bargain with the United States in the 1980-81 negotiations. They point to the fact that the United States now needs them more than they need the United States. As we have seen, Spain is being courted by many countries. Far from being isolated or ostracized, its friendship is sought by virtually all the countries of the world. No longer is United States friendship so vital to it now that the EEC door is, if not completely open, at least well ajar. The Americans are wont to

reply that with the departure of the "Polaris" boats from Rota, the drift to the right in Portugal, and some settling in the Greek-Turkish dispute insofar as NATO concerns have been in play, the United States no longer needs the Spanish connection as badly as in the past. If, while abandoning the NATO idea in favour of a retention of the United States bases, Spain still tries to drive too hard a bargain with Washington on this bilateral co-operation, Madrid may find that the Americans simply will not play. The loss of the advantages of non-defence co-operation with the United States would be welcomed by few Spaniards.

The decline in the strength of the relationship is bound to accelerate in any case as Spain draws nearer to the EEC. This is largely welcomed by the United States because of the many other advantages of this tendency. Here, as elsewhere, however, timing will be of the essence. Spain needs the United States still and will not seek to loosen overly the ties until it is certain of new, and at least equally good ones, elsewhere.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

If there is no terribly clear general Spanish foreign policy, there is on the other hand no doubt at all about the first priority of the Suárez-Oreja team. It is to negotiate Spanish entry into the European Economic Community as quickly as possible and, of course, with the best possible terms for the Spanish economy. Like so much else, this also is a hand-me-down policy from the Franco regime. Successive foreign ministers of the previous regime agonized as to how to get Spain into the EEC, perceived as the only possible long-term solution to its problems of isolation and backwardness. Needless-to-say, they were barely able to get certain very limited accords with the Community, because to say Brussels was anti-Franco was to say the least. Even these were not achieved until 1970.

Since the return of democracy, steady if not problem-free progress has been made on EEC membership. While there are serious reservations, or downright opposition, on the part of some political forces in France and Italy, those countries' official positions are favourable to Spanish

entry and the other seven of the nine are fully supportive of Spain. In contrast to the situation with the political parties of Portugal and Greece, in Spain there is widespread consensus on the value of EEC membership among all major political parties. Thus, it has been not only a fundamental part of Spain's foreign policy "adjustment" to date but it has also fitted in well with the requirement for consensus on major issues which has characterized the first two years of fully democratic government in Spain.

The European dimension is, then, the main pillar of the somewhat incomplete edifice of Spanish foreign policy. Spain is tired of being isolated from the rest of Europe and, although not without serious reservations, looks to Western Europe as the obvious main focus of its international energies. This point of view is more than substantiated by the historical, political, and economic facts of Spanish life.

Historically, Spain has fought hard, often literally, to remain in the main stream of European life. A centre of some importance in Western culture in Carthaginian and Roman times, it shared the fate of the rest of Europe at the end of the latter's Empire. The short-lived Visigothic kingdom was overwhelmed by the surge of Islam northward across the Straits from North Africa and from then on, the European dimension of Spanish life has been a struggle to maintain. The "Reconquista," that Western crusade, involved not inconsiderable French and other West European energies for several centuries. At its successful conclusion in 1492, Spain's full incorporation into Europe was lessened by the immense efforts of the newly united kingdom undertaken in the New World. While for long a leader among West European nations in the drive to bring the world under European dominion, the very extent of Spanish commitment turned its eyes somewhat away from events in Europe. However, Spain's championing of Catholicism in the old continent brought it back onto the European stage, if rather disastrously, nonetheless in a convincing fashion.

Following the long unsuccessful effort to keep Europe Catholic, Habsburg power, Spanish and to some extent Austrian, began to wane. The Austrians found other areas than the North German states and the Netherlands to which their influence could extend. Spain's imperial position

itself, however, was challenged not only by Protestantism but by the chief Protestant states, England and Holland, and by "Catholic" France. With the death of the last Spanish Habsburg, Carlos II, childless, and the War of the Spanish Succession, the full extent of Spanish decline became apparent. The wealth of the Empire had largely been spent on fruitless wars. Now, Spain was again to be more closely connected with the rest of Western Europe, but this time it was not so much an actor on the European stage as the play's actual setting. Invaded and often defeated, it had by the early 18th century declined enormously since the 1640's when, before Rocroi, it was the most powerful land force in Europe. Many colonies and positions were lost, perhaps most painful of all the cession of part of the peninsula itself in the strategic Rock of Gibraltar. Finally, a branch of the Royal family of France, the Bourbons, came to Spain as the ruling house.

The Bourbons brought French methods of administration, the most advanced in Europe, to Spain. Attempts were made, it not always successfully, to rationalize Spanish metropolitan and imperial organization and government. The armed forces adopted essentially French methods and the country as a whole became more integrated, however painfully, into the reforming Europe of the time. While Louis XIV might declare, "L'Afrique commence aux Pyrenées," his distant relations were trying to ensure that this state of affairs did not continue.

The Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and French occupation, Napoleon's machinations regarding the Spanish monarchy, and the revolutions in the empire and civil war at home made clear, however, that the Spanish nation was in no sense united, except in self-defence against foreign invasion. A turbulent 19th century, badly begun for Spain with European humiliation and imperial disaster, continued in the same vein. Repeated crises and civil wars, pitting various and confusing interests and political ideas against one another, left the country in continued disorder. Regimes came and went. The army began to take an active role in politics, usually as a liberal force. There was even a brief republican government set up in Madrid. Spain was thoroughly involved with its own problems and failed to experience much of the economic progress and growth as well as the national consolidations occurring elsewhere in Western Europe. The century ended with further

imperial disasters but the Spanish state stuck to adventures abroad rather than integrating more closely with Europe--Africa simply replaced the Caribbean and Pacific as the focus of imperial policy.

As mentioned earlier, Spain has been neutral, at least in strict theory as seen from Madrid, since the Napoleonic Wars. Gaining much from such neutrality in the War of 1914-1918, it was able from 1939 to 1945 to avoid what would almost certainly have been yet another foreign military disaster by pleading exhaustion caused by the Civil War. However, this neutrality and attempt to avoid entanglements with the great powers and Western Europe kept Spanish foreign policy aimed away from Europe and the focus of the nation off most major international questions.

After World War II, the Franco regime, as we have seen, was extremely ill-received by both Western and Eastern European governments. Thus not only the foundations of Western Europe's defence but also of its economic future were laid with Spain being very much "outside looking in." The repeated attempts by Spanish foreign policy to re-establish the solid European links Franco desired were thus doomed to dismal failure. Despite the eventual accords of 1970 granting some degree of "European status" to Spain, the result remained essentially the same--the regime was simply undesirable company for EEC governments --six or nine.

This mixed past of a half-in, half-out, half-hearted Spanish sense of belonging to Europe, and a similar European sense of Spain being not quite a fundamental part of the continent, is the tradition which the UCD, and all major political formations, are determined to end. Brussels and the other EEC capitals have seen almost innumerable working and official visits by Spain's political leaders. The remodelling of Spain on a Western European basis is one of the few givens of the political scene in the country. All other issues pale when compared with EEC entry. Spain sees membership as not only the sole viable alternative for the future development, economic and political, of the country, but also as a fundamentally valuable and important experiment in which the country, given its geography and history, is fortunate enough to share.

The EEC is by far Spain's most important market, source of tourism

and investment, and source of imports. While this is true for all four sectors of activity it is particularly striking in the use of exports. Spain's 1977 exports went to EEC countries to the extent of 45.6 per cent of the total. In 1978, this figure was 46.3 per cent.⁹ Compared to the United States' figure of 9.8 per cent (1977) and 9.3 per cent (1978), this is extremely significant. Indeed both France and West Germany in both those years took a larger percentage individually of Spain's exports than did the United States, and this by a large margin. The trend in recent years has been toward a relative decline in exports to the United States and a striking increase in exports to the EEC.

In the import area, the EEC accounted in 1977 for 34.4 per cent and in 1978 for 34.6 per cent of Spain's imports. While the United States was the first-ranking source in 1977 (12.0 per cent), West Germany was not far behind with 10.1 per cent. However, in 1978, the United States increased its share to 13.3 per cent thus showing its continuing importance to Spain as a source of needed means for modernization. Lastly, EEC investment in Spain from 1960 to 1975 was 34 per cent of the total for foreign investment and this has been further accentuated recently. While 30 per cent of this figure came from Germany alone, that country was far from being the sole major EEC investor. The United Kingdom accounted for 28.9 per cent of this investment, France 15.5 per cent, the Netherlands 12.5 per cent, and Italy 6 per cent.¹⁰ Some two-thirds of tourists coming to Spain come from EEC countries--over 21 million in 1977.¹¹

For the EEC as well, Spain's importance has grown greatly. While in 1958, Spain only ranked twentieth as a source of imports, by 1976 it had moved to tenth position. As a customer, Spain's relative importance to the EEC has grown even more greatly. In 1958, it was in the sixteenth position as a market for EEC goods. By 1976, it was sixth.

Thus, Spain's links with the EEC, on the economic side, are important and the trend is for that importance to grow. No other economic grouping or option seems to relate so clearly to Spanish needs as does EEC membership, a step which has obvious political advantages as well.

However, entry into the EEC will not be easy. While past difficulties revolved around largely political factors, current questions

are much more economic and technical. With the possible exception of British entry, no other new member of the EEC, prospective or actual, has posed such economic difficulties for the Community. Neither Denmark nor Eire in the previous expansion, nor Greece nor Portugal in the current one, presented the complexity of Spain's entry application. Because of Spain's past lack of European links, its realities are not widely understood within the EEC.¹²

While Spain is much closer to EEC norms on many matters than is either Greece or Portugal, it is still often quite far off. It is also a much larger country than either other applicant, and therefore has a much greater potential impact. In 1976, the Spanish per capita GNP was \$ 2,855 while the EEC average was \$ 5,350, nearly twice as high. Nor is Spain's export picture similar to the EEC. Only 9 per cent of the Spanish GNP is made up of exports compared to an EEC average of 26 per cent.¹³ There is a constant trade deficit in Spain due essentially to weak competitiveness of its products and a lack of natural resources. Only the combined effect of foreign investment, earnings from tourism and remittances from Spanish workers living abroad has relieved this deficit. With some 20 per cent of the Spanish work force still in agriculture, it is also far from the EEC average level.¹⁴ The Spanish economy has been quite protectionist in the past and this leads to many problems of negotiation. Lastly, regional disparities in Spain are such that regional development policy in the EEC can hardly avoid being greatly influenced by Spanish entry.

On this last point, difficulties with members of the EEC who currently profit most, or hope to do so in the future, from regional policies--such as Italy, Eire, and the United Kingdom--can be expected. Spain's regions are widely diverging in terms of wealth and development. Areas such as Extremadura and Andalucia, agricultural and suffering around 10 per cent unemployment, and in some districts even more, contrast strongly with the industrialized northern areas of the Basque country and Catalonia.¹⁵ The last of these has only 16.8 per cent of the working population of Spain but produces over 30 per cent of the nation's industrial exports and almost 28 per cent of its industrial GNP.¹⁶

Spain's commercial policy must be adapted to conform to the Community's, particularly in terms of its application to Latin America, Africa, and the countries of both the European Free Trade Area and those of the Mediterranean region, but also to the general approach to the Lome Convention and Eastern Europe. This will involve considerable effort and will tend to reduce Spain's bilateral possibilities, economic and political, especially in the Mediterranean.

It is inevitable that industrial re-structuring will be required, to varying degrees, in many sectors including textiles, automobiles and related fields, iron and steel, shipbuilding, graphic arts, paper, lumber, furniture, cork, leather, shoes, glass, ceramics and toys, in order to ensure their prosperity and reduce their difficulties once EEC entry is assured.¹⁷ Many other changes, particularly with regard to administrative reforms of labour movement, state monopolies, and assistance to industry, will be required.¹⁸ Labour movement may be particularly difficult given the unemployment situation in more advanced EEC countries; and Spain's position as a major supplier of labourers to the North, affected adversely recently, may not be assisted greatly in the future.

While not exclusively there, opposition to Spanish entry into the EEC is centred in France and Italy, particularly in the former. Eire is somewhat concerned about the impact on EEC regional policy; West Germany may feel it will be costly in some ways to have Spain in; and Belgium has feared the weakening of the forces pushing for real European political union. However, it is in Italy and France that opposition has surfaced most strongly in the last two years.

Italy and France long favoured Spanish entry into the EEC because it would bring the Community's centre of gravity further down toward the south and would strengthen the "Latin" voice in an otherwise increasingly "Northern" organization. However, since the Spanish bid for entry has actually come about, economic issues have pushed others out of the limelight. It is true that the governments of both countries favour Spanish entry. However, it is equally true that strong forces in both countries are clamouring against it. In Italy, this is largely the result of straightforward competition with Spanish agricultural products. In France, it is much more broad and involves powerful concerns that hold considerable political punch.

Broadly speaking, France fears competition from Spain in a wide range of agricultural products and also in particular industrial goods produced in northern Spain. This fear has been used as the reason for the outright opposition of the Gaullists (under their tireless leader Jacques Chirac) and the French Communist Party to the expansion of the EEC and particularly to its acceptance of Spanish entry. While France's Socialists are also generally far from being in favour of Spanish membership in the near future, they are more receptive to the idea. They have not shown the determination or the forcefulness of either of those two major political formations in opposing the move.¹⁹

The reasons are not difficult to find. The farmers of France, particularly of the South-west, already reckon they have gained little from the EEC. They resent Italian competition in many similar product fields, not the least of which is wine. Spain produces these same products and, in the case of wine, has a strong and rapidly-improving industry. If Spain were in the EEC, its share of Community production of many goods would be extremely high. It would be producing 25 per cent of the wine, 60 per cent of the melons, 44 per cent of the lettuce and 18 per cent of the fish. There is also an immense latent capacity to produce greater quantities of these goods once structures, techniques and irrigation are improved.²⁰ France depends on EEC markets for its agricultural products and is not happy with ever-increasing Spanish competition. For example, 75 per cent of French vegetable exports go to EEC countries and 57 per cent of its wine exports. Competition from a country with much lower production costs (one recent source put these at 40 to 60 per cent lower) will be resisted strongly.²¹

Many Frenchmen believe that France has been asked to pay the price for Spain's entry while other countries can only profit from lower prices on Spain's exports. They resent the 1970 accords with Spain which, they argue, gave Spain the tariff advantages of a customs union without any requirement to conform to Community obligations. They want Spain's relations with the EEC to be based on reciprocity, not on the treatment of Spain as a "developing" country. Farming organizations point out that recent trends have shown a fall in French agricultural exports to Spain but an increase in Spanish agricultural exports to France. In 1976, France's exports of this type going to

Spain fell by 34 per cent, while in the other direction, from Spain to France, they rose by 24 per cent.²² It can hardly be surprising that there is concern and resentment.

On the industrial side, France suffers most from the export by Spain of domestic appliances and similar-level products. The French reckon their market is more permeable than is the Spanish. The fact that these products come from the North of Spain also brings fears to France that EEC entry by the Spanish will mean an increasing centring of industrialization in the Spanish border region at the expense of the French South-west. Lastly, France's trade with Spain generally, in the early 1970's, showed a favourable balance for the French. By 1976, this had been reversed.²³

The French government, larger French industrialists, EEC authorities, the West Germans and others, however, insist that many factors will work in favour of France and that Spanish entry can be achieved in a way that minimized disruptions. The markets for further French industrial activity in Spain can be much more easily profited from if Spain is in the EEC. Spanish entry will be a long and slow process which can allow for major assistance programmes to South-west France. Forces will be set in motion which will tend to offset Spain's initial advantages at entry. Wages and prices for some products will go up south of the Pyrenees. However, it is worth noting that, in theory at least, the essence of the mutual advantage from a common market arrangement is that specific countries retain certain comparative advantages or specialization to the mutual benefit of all parties to the market. Despite these arguments, however, much of France, already in difficult economic straits, sees the enlargement of the EEC to include Spain as little less than madness.

Spain's size itself presents a daunting as well as pleasing aspect. Its large population, fifth out of the potential twelve members, and three times that of the sixth in size (the Netherlands), will clearly add much to the Community. However, in terms of economic indices, the picture, as we can see, is far from rosy. While this is much less pleasant in the cases of both Portugal and Greece, each of which is considerably less developed than Spain, it is also less significant for the

Community in their cases. Greece has only nine million inhabitants and Portugal somewhat less, compared to Spain's more than four times this figure.

While there is no effective political opposition within Spain to joining the Common Market, there is increasing disquiet among some circles of Spanish industry. This concern reflects the growing awareness that entry into the EEC is far from being without difficulties for Spain. While Spain's markets for many products, particularly agricultural, should expand, and long-term advantages seem to apply in many sectors of Spanish economic life, the short-term impact is not such a positive one. It seems highly likely that the rationalization of industry within the newly-expanded EEC will hurt several protected Spanish industries which will not be competitive once other countries' products are entering Spain without tariff restraints. These matters are extremely complex and a close analysis is not possible here. However, two examples could serve to highlight the difficulties.

In the textile industry, centred largely in Catalonia, the EEC and Spanish situations vary enormously. Spain's industry is more important economically for the country, and more dynamic, than is the EEC's in general. Salaries in this sector are nonetheless less impressive in Spain. Spanish manufacturing establishments are inferior to the EEC average in terms of technical level and modernity, but still maintain fairly good rates of production and export. Clearly changes can be expected in this industry which may be disruptive to its recent relative prosperity south of the Pyrenees.

The automobile industry is likewise subject to dislocation. The privileged position of SEAT, the Spanish automobile firm, and other special features of this branch of national manufacturing, can be expected to end or at least change considerably. While in both cases clearly transitional periods can be arranged which will reduce disruption, it must be admitted that disruptions there will be. A relatively well-protected national industrial base cannot be exposed to the impact of free competition from countries the like of the EEC's major members without some major impact.

As has been mentioned, the Spanish economy is not strong. In 1978,

unemployment was over 10 per cent of the active working population. Similarly, inflation has been higher than in most European countries, sometimes as much as three times the EEC average.²⁴ Some disruptions of the economy may be expected to worsen both these figures, at least in the short term. Spanish food prices have been some 30 per cent lower than the EEC's and are still close to this.²⁵ These can be expected to move up at least some way toward the norm farther north. Such price rises are highly noticeable to the bulk of the Spanish public while likely eventual declines in prices of some industrial goods (the result of EEC imports and competition) may not be so obvious. While it is difficult to be certain of the short-term impact of EEC entry on the unemployment situation in the country, rationalization of industry in the wider market area can be expected to temporarily cause changes in labour requirements which could result in greater unemployment and a need for sizeable re-training schemes.

Of course, Spain expects confidently to gain much more than it loses from EEC membership. Most of these gains will be longer-term and included are the usual benefits of a common market partnership-- access to a larger market, increased competition resulting in some lower prices, increased efficiency through investment and continued specialization in areas of Spanish comparative advantage, and access to the benefits of international economic co-operation within the market area. The above difficulties have only been mentioned to suggest that pro-EEC sentiment has taken something of a loss as more concrete studies on entry's impact have been made both in the EEC and in Spain.

Political considerations, trade statistics and trends, the general success of the EEC, and cultural affinity all seem to point to entry despite possible short-term difficulties. The message has not been missed by the Spanish and, despite some popular grumbling, the idea of entry is still extremely well-received. While no longer often considered to be the panacea of a few years ago, it is felt to be at best a great step forward and at worst the only, "faute de mieux," real option for Spain's future economic progress and development.

The "European idea" is, then, largely uncontested. The unbreakable

links with Western Europe are taken as a given for the vast majority of Spaniards and further integration with the EEC a matter of course. Where, then, does NATO fit into this almost unanimous desire to join the EEC? The answer, discussed somewhat elsewhere, is "less and less." When Spain was rather desparately knocking at the EEC and NATO doors, the link appeared clear. NATO was declared to be the "military infrastructure of the Community" by the then Spanish Foreign Minister De Areilza as of January 1976.²⁶ The link no longer appears so obvious and the debate over NATO entry has, at least temporarily, been steadily becoming more divorced from that of EEC membership.

Most observers clearly agree that the alliance system which would be acceptable to, and even desirable for, the largest number of Spaniards would be a Western European one. A shared collective defence arrangement uniting the countries of the EEC, or even of "democratic" Europe, would be likely to receive large-scale support from all sectors of the Spanish political scene. The Right would accept it as an anti-communist bulwark. The Centre would see it as the necessary defence aspect of Spain's future European vocation. The PSOE would likely see it as a defence of democracy and a fundamental pillar of the West European system which could then distance itself from the United States. The PCE would likely see it as preferable to NATO and a move away from the two bloc system.

In the PSOE's case, the acceptance would be assured even further since the party has publicly declared that its only interest in an alliance would be in a Western European one. American bases might even be retained under such circumstances but as a separate aspect of eventual Spanish security relations.

The problem is, of course, that such a West European defence arrangement does not currently exist. Indeed, there does not seem to be the slightest real tendency, within the NATO Alliance or within other elements of the Western European political scene, to form such a grouping.

In Sánchez-Gijón's book, he well points out the current situation, underscoring the difficulties inherent in such a scheme. The European Defence Community of the 1950's proved not only an impossibility but a

disastrous experiment and experience which West European governments are loath to repeat. The Western European Union (WEU), whose members include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany has been rather more of a success. While its objectives included collective defence, all security considerations have been expressly transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, as the WEU is the only exclusively-European organization with a formal defence preoccupation, it could be important for the distant future and indeed France had on occasion supported the expansion of its defence role. Nonetheless, for the present and near future, it seems unlikely that health can be breathed into this grouping where defence matters are concerned. Recent echoes of French support have been less frequent.

The only effective West European defence co-operation, in anything like an extensive fashion, is conducted within the NATO structure through the "Eurogroup." Twice a year ten defence ministers of European members meet to co-ordinate the European contribution to the Alliance, at least to some degree. Discussions are held often with a view to adopting common European stands on Alliance matters. Since these countries provide the bulk of land, sea, and air forces on the conventional level to allied forces in Europe, their bargaining power is far from small. Indeed, while the United States dominates in many ways through its nuclear position, West European forces dominate in all other fields of Alliance defence effort.

Through a series of sub-groups, the Eurogroup operates in a number of defence fields including equipment standardization, communications, logistics, training, policy, force structure, and medical matters. Co-operation in these fields has been European but has not sought in any sense to abandon the NATO general rubric. While France is outside the Eurogroup, that grouping still expresses as concretely as has so far proved possible the widespread desire to make a distinctly-European effort in collective defence.

With the exception of France, no NATO member government has shown much interest in an exclusively-European alliance. There is a general understanding that the separate United Kingdom and French nuclear forces

provide a less than fully satisfactory replacement for the American nuclear "umbrella." Enormous problems plague efforts to devise a satisfactory joining of the two European nuclear forces in any case. Even greater difficulties arise in spreading the nuclear force more widely within Europe--non-proliferation and the problem of West German access being only two of the more obvious ones. Since European defence without an agreed European level of deterrence capability is not possible, West European countries continue to accept the leadership of the United States in the Alliance.

Thus Spanish desires to have a part to play in all aspects of the West European community--economic, political, cultural, security--come up against the facts of the defence relations within that community. All EEC members--with the special case of Eire as the sole exception--are members of NATO as well. The other applicants for entry are likewise NATO members as are the Norwegians, whose movement toward entry has been blocked for some time. While Spain's desires are most clearly for a European alliance, this is just not a real possibility at the moment. NATO is the acknowledged framework for West European defence and even France, despite its reservations, recognizes this fact. It is still to be seen if Spain will also recognize it and, even if it does, it is far from certain that the country will react to the state of affairs by entering the Alliance.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

German diplomats will tell you that there are three European countries where they and their country are generally liked and admired. These three countries are Turkey, Finland, and Spain. It does seem fair to come to this conclusion in relation to Spaniards' general reaction to Germany and the Germans. Even if their tourists are as badly viewed as are the Americans and the British, German businessmen and technicians are respected as knowledgeable and efficient.

Spain has no history of wars with Germany unless one goes back to those against the German Protestant states of the 17th century. Indeed, the country was closely tied, recent historical evidence would appear to suggest extremely so, to Germany during World War II. It was neutral

in World War I and has escaped the trials of most European nations occasioned by the perhaps inevitable results of German unification. Many influential Spaniards have close experience of Germany and German life. A highly intriguing group is that comprising the veterans of the "Blue Division." This formation was recruited from "volunteers" to fight alongside German forces in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. It was a sort of continuing contribution to the "Crusade" against communism already begun with such success, according to Francoist propaganda, in the Civil War in Spain. Its former members often occupy high positions in the Spanish armed services and the civil service. Spanish businessmen study closely German methods and are unstinting admirers of the German economic "miracle," West Germany has taken hundreds of thousands of Spanish "gastarbeiter" and, while this has fallen off a great deal as the German economy's growth has slackened, there are still many living there and more at home with a knowledge gained first-hand of the great Northern people.

West Germany provides Spain with over 10 per cent of its foreign investment. Indeed, 9 per cent of all West German investment abroad is in Spain alone.²⁷ In addition, Germany is Spain's second most important source of tourists. In 1978, German tourists spent DM 2,200 million (\$ 1,190 million) on holiday in Spain, according to the Commerzbank. Despite the long distances involved, Germans come to Spain in large numbers and have done so for many years. The Spanish received 7.8 per cent of all German tourist expenditure abroad in 1978.²⁸ It should also be noted that Germany's second place is only occasioned by the large number of "local" tourists coming from nearby France for short periods. If this were discounted, the Germans would be the first source of foreign tourism, in terms of economic importance, for Spain. German influence in Spanish philosophical thought and in the universities generally is significant. In engineering and scientific fields, Germany is watched with only slightly less interest than is the United States. Lastly, in the armed forces, respect and admiration for German military history and professionalism is extremely high.

Relations between Bonn and Madrid have been increasingly cordial ever since Franco's death. The Federal Republic has welcomed the

resurgence of democracy in Spain and has expanded its contacts between German and Spanish political parties. German Christian Democracy has a strong interest in, connection with, and reciprocated admiration for, the UCD. Even greater perhaps are the relations between German Social Democrats and the PSOE in Spain. Indeed, critics have gone so far as to accuse the PSOE of depending financially on their German friends. In any case, the political bonds between the two countries are many and multifaceted.

On the official level, Bonn is fully in favour of Spain's joining the European Economic Community. Having little to lose and possibly a great deal to gain, the Federal Republic is a main sponsor of Spain's application for membership. Germany has little to fear from Spanish industrial competition, and would welcome easier access to the Spanish market and cheaper prices for Spanish agricultural products.

West Germany is, of all the European members, probably the most anxious to see Spain enter the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, for purposes of political consultation and concerted foreign policy, as well as for reasons purely of defence, Bonn would like to see movement towards an eventual goal of the political boundaries of the EEC being likewise those of the European members of NATO. It favours Norwegian, Greek, and Portuguese entry into the EEC and Irish, as well as Spanish, membership in the Atlantic Alliance. In these ways, not only would NATO and West German defence be bolstered but more effective political co-operation could be achieved. This is reflected in German press interest in the Spanish NATO debate.²⁹

Nonetheless, the Germans are well aware of their special relationship with Spain and wish to avoid giving even the slightest hint that they are in any way pressing Spain. Bonn also has opted to say that while it would welcome a Spanish expression of a desire to join the Alliance, the decision is a solely Spanish one. Both the Germans and Americans suggest that the other, while of course not applying any pressure on Spain, ensure that the Spaniards are fully aware of the pleasure with which Bonn and Washington would see a favourable Spanish decision. The Germans point to the Americans' strong position and quarter century of defence relations with Spain as proof that the United

States has greater influence than they do. The Americans retort by saying that the Federal Republic's position, as a European state, the most significant EEC country, and having political influence through the Spanish party system, is ideal for subtle, unofficial influence on the decision.

Some such influence has, of course, been employed. The German political parties, centre-left and centre-right, have let their Spanish opposite numbers know that they approve of NATO and would like to see it strengthened. Indeed, the German parties were the first to break the "no comment" rule on the subject preferred by the Bonn government. In June 1978, a member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee announced in the strongest terms that NATO should do all it could to ensure that Spain joined the Alliance and participated fully in Western European defence.³⁰ All this has merely served to further convince the UCD. However, real interest has revolved around the Social-Democrats and Socialists being able to shift apparent PSOE intransigence on the subject and, as we have seen, this result has been far from forthcoming. PSOE members have listened politely but clearly feel they share little in common with the Germans in the all important perception of the threat.

Summing up, then, West Germany wishes to build a more united Western Europe. In this Europe, it seeks as much common ground politically as possible. Political consultation at an EEC level must be increased if anything like a common foreign policy is to evolve and without some move in that direction, European unity will remain a pipe-dream. That this commonality of economic interests should not have its political side would signify no real progress on European unity. That this political side should not have its security dimension appears as nonsense to the Germans. Spain in NATO would clearly be one step further toward the attainment of Bonn's major foreign policy goals in relation to Western Europe. One can expect the West Germans to continue privately suggesting to their Spanish friends the merits of NATO membership. While this may serve to help stiffen UCD resolve to press forward with the issue, it seems unlikely to be able to shift the all-important Spanish socialists from their negative reaction to the idea. Whatever

the outcome of the more-or-less "current" debate on NATO, the Germans can be expected to continue to remind their Spanish contacts that there is a defence dimension to European unity, a dimension which neither Bonn nor Madrid can completely ignore.

FRANCE

The relations Madrid maintains with Paris continue to reflect a historical pattern wherein France has been, as some Spaniards like to say, both the "hereditary enemy" and the "hereditary friend." The vibrance of French philosophy, politics, military affairs, territorial ambitions, and great men has influenced Spain for centuries. In the 18th century this state of affairs was particularly evident. Spain has had repeatedly to choose between its own traditions and values and those of Western Europe, largely French in origin. Ortega y Gasset has referred to this as the struggle between the minuet and the chacona.³¹ France, the great neighbour to the north, has been not only the route for, but often the source of, ideas coming from Europe to Spain.

France's attraction has tended to be one-way only. Louis XIV is supposed to have commented, "L'Afrique commence aux Pyrenées," a comment we have noted before. Spaniards are often thought to have an inferiority complex where France is concerned, although this is highly debatable.

What is certain, however, is that despite its fall in relative power, France has retained considerable prestige in Spain right up to the present day. The Franco regime expressed great admiration for De Gaulle and many of the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Many Spaniards willingly concede France a certain, however hazy, "leadership" of the Latin countries, particularly in Europe.

The long common border brings the two countries into political as well as territorial contact on a constant basis. This contact is often embarrassing to both sides as it was during the Civil War and more recently with Basque terrorists being considered in Madrid to have been granted a virtual permanent refuge in Southern France. While English and even to some extent German have put an end to the position of the French language as the general second language of Spain, culturally it is somehow still considered more refined and subtle. The older

generation, where it learned a foreign language, tended to opt for French. The facts of tourism, emigration, and international business, however, have to a great extent pushed this aside in favour of English and German. France's ten million tourists annually going to Spain have only marginally counter-acted this trend for the reasons mentioned before.

During and after the Civil War, republican elements fled the country generally through France, often staying in that country permanently. Indeed, France and Mexico were the largest recipients of refugees with the republican collapse of 1939. Headquarters of political parties in exile were usually set up in Paris and opposition printing presses and propaganda agencies hostile to the Franco regime were usually based in France. While the Nazi victory in 1940 disturbed this situation, in the years since 1944, it had again become the rule.

Despite these anti-Franco forces in France, the de Gaulle regime was able to have closer contacts with Spain than were most Western European countries. Long before the end of the Franco government, France was involved in defence production agreements with Spain. It also had an exchange arrangement whereby a Spanish officer attended the Ecole de Guerre in Paris and a French officer did likewise at the Escuela Superior de Guerra in Madrid. It held annual exercises with the Spanish army, although at that time of only battalion strength, in the Pyrenees. Lastly, we have seen that it signed defence accords with the regime in 1970 as part of an expansion of its Mediterranean diplomatic arrangements.³²

France was effusive in its welcoming of the democratization of the Spanish government set in motion by King Juan Carlos since late 1975. Indeed, some commentators believe there is a sincere bond of personal friendship and mutual respect between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the King. For long, France championed the idea of Spanish entry into the Common Market, feeling it to be not only inherently a correct move but also a way to re-establish some effective "Latin" counterweight to the more Northern, and Germanic, countries of the Community. While more recent economic, as opposed to political, consideration of the problems created by Spain's entry has caused a wave of opposition in France to

such membership, the government has remained markedly firm on the issue.

Since democratization, Franco-Spanish military activities have increased considerably. Joint naval manoeuvres have expanded considerably. The Pyrenees army exercises are also being expanded, and it is thought that discussions are under way regarding further joint defence production schemes. Visits of high ranking military and defence ministry personnel have increased sharply in late 1978 and early 1979, in both directions, but particularly of Spaniards going to Paris. While Washington probably remains the number one destination of Spanish military travellers, it is more debatable whether it is Paris or Brussels which is in second place.

The French official position regarding Spanish entry into NATO is that common to most treaty signatories: it would welcome a Spanish desire to sign the North Atlantic Treaty but this must come from the Spanish without pressure from current NATO members.

One can be forgiven for asking the question, however, as to whether it is in French interests to have Spain in NATO as a full member, or whether a link "à la française," would not suit Paris better. Let us take a look at the issues.

France is a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and has been since the original signing in 1949. In 1966, however, France formally withdrew from the integrated military structure of the Alliance over matters of Alliance policy. Since then, while there has been something of a growth of somewhat informal military co-operation, France has officially not taken part in the "structural" military aspects of the treaty organization. Nonetheless, as Antonio Sánchez-Gijón has pointed out, the Republic takes part in the alert and air control system, armament production committees, and co-operates with some aspects of the Eurogroup, not to mention its maintaining of a wide range of liaison officers at various NATO headquarters and participation in several NATO agencies.³³ Lastly, it is, of course, involved in the extensive framework of consultation and military planning of the Alliance.

Despite all this, with the exception of three relatively small NATO agencies based in France, the Alliance's infrastructure no longer has

access to the great advantages of France's territory and strategic position. And herein lies a possible difficulty for the French. If Spain were to join NATO, and were to have, among other roles, that of a rear base area, vital for logistic support to the front line and providing depth to the whole Alliance position, would there not be further difficulties for France to retain its somewhat aloof position from the NATO structural framework? It can be argued that this problem already poses itself with Portugal, and that France has easily resisted any temptation to co-operate more fully as a result of Portugal's position of depth. Yet it does seem odd that large Spanish forces, deployed in connection with NATO, responsible for providing depth to the Alliance position and a large part of the reinforcement, supply, support, and other rear base area functions necessary to the Alliance, should be separated in many essentials from the co-operation of the ally that forms the territorial link with that front, be it in Germany or Italy. The mechanics of such a role would seem to imply a greater degree of French co-operation than was ever necessary with the small and truly secondary roles one could have imagined fulfilling from Portugal.

Even beyond this difficulty, however, are the possible advantages to France of Spain choosing the "French option." One must be careful here. When one discusses the "French option" as a strategic question in Spain, there are two possible meanings. One "French option" refers to the choice, by Spain, of a relationship to NATO similar to that of France. That is to say, Spain would sign the North Atlantic Treaty and enter into those aspects of the Alliance which are most suitable to it, but without integrating its forces completely into the NATO defence structure. The French, as individuals, are the first to point out the strategic difficulties of such an option without a "force de frappe." However, there is undoubtedly some political advantage to Spain of such a "limited liability" approach to NATO. At least some political circles would see it as allowing Spain more freedom of action and a greater degree of independence than full membership. It could consequently be "packaged" in a fashion more acceptable to the left. From many points of view, this option is unworkable, however. One argument, other than the nuclear one, against it is that one of the main advantages of NATO is the increase in professionalism

and the decline of politicization in the Spanish forces. If the forces are not closely involved with NATO, it is argued, this advantage is lost.

The second interpretation of the "French option" is of perhaps even greater moment. It suggests a bilateral arrangement with France over a wide area of defence concerns including defence production, training, and the possible political advantages of a Madrid-Paris axis in the EEC and even possibly in foreign policy more generally. There have been rumours that this is the route Paris itself would most like Spain to choose. France and Spain are the only two European countries which are facing on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. France knows that Spain is the backplate of its defensive armour. Voices exist in Spain arguing that, in or out of NATO, the essence of Spain's defensive links with the West should be through co-operation with France.³⁴ This would serve France's special desires insofar as it would clearly show its ability to continue to be a real leader within Europe. Spain and France are both countries with long national histories and each fears overly dramatic moves toward complete or even greatly advanced political union in Europe. Thus the "Europe des nations" bloc within the EEC would gain strength through such Franco-Spanish co-operation. Many other elements of France-Spanish proximity exist on a large number of similar issues.³⁵

However, French economic interests could also expect great gains from close defence co-operation "à deux" rather than "à quinze" with the whole of the Alliance. France has already been particularly successful with arms sales to both Franquist and democratic Spain. Nor has Spain been unaware of the political impact of such arms deals, as witnessed by its careful timing of the announcement of major purchases. France's willingness to sell arms to Franco's Spain has meant that the representation of French equipment in Spain's arsenal is second only to that of the United States. Even in the traditionally pro-British navy, French equipment and ships are not unknown. The Spanish services include for example "Daphne/Psyche" submarines, Mirage FI and III aircraft, Puma and Alouette helicopters, and AMX-30 tanks.

The Spanish government is involved in or planning major modernization and re-equipping programmes for the armed forces. Whatever Spain's NATO decision, all major parties have recognized the require-

ment for modernizing the forces, in material as well as structural and personnel terms. Spain is likely to become a major purchaser of weapons and equipment from abroad although it will clearly attempt to steadily increase the proportion of its sophisticated defence requirements being produced by Spanish industry. France is not unaware that it is in a good position to benefit from these purchases and from the overhaul of the Spanish arms industry as well. Nor are French manufacturers unaware that a Spain in NATO would be much less likely to purchase the bulk of its foreign requirements from France than would a Spain closely linked on defence matters with France itself.

All this being said, it is far from certain that these considerations are reflected in actual French policy. In his visit to Spain in the summer of 1978, President Giscard d'Estaing emphasized that France was a member of the Alliance and said, as usual, that the decision was solely a Spanish one. Nonetheless, he also underscored the advantages to Spain of Franco-Spanish defence co-operation. The French deny that they have even given any thought to these "French" options and state that their declared policy and their real policy are one and the same. However, this reaction is to be expected and rumours persist.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Were it not for the Gibraltar situation, unqualified British support for Spain joining the Atlantic Alliance could be expected. That support is almost unqualified in any case but the matter is complicated by the Gibraltar issue. While the United Kingdom government has had no intention of linking its three major pending political issues with Spain--the EEC, NATO and Gibraltar--Spain has shown no such reluctance to publicly tie the last two of these together.

The United Kingdom supports in the strongest terms Spain's entry into the EEC. Not only can London expect to gain from cheaper prices for some agricultural produce, but exports to Spain should rise as well if that country's restrictive import tariffs on manufactured goods come down. London has also been with great pleasure the evolution of the new Spanish democracy and Dr. Owen had been unstinting in his praise in public statements on Spain. This is of course something new for a

Labour Foreign Minister, since as late as 1976 relations between the two countries could hardly have been described as good. The Labour government, however, looked forward to reinforcing Spanish democracy and "l'Europe des nations" by linking this historic country as closely as possible to the Western European community. The new Conservative government, while not quite so keen on insisting on the "Europe des nations," is certain to continue to press for Spain in the EEC.

The British government would clearly welcome a Spanish declared desire to join the Atlantic Alliance as well. However, it too has limited itself to saying that the decision is a wholly Spanish one and, officially at least, left it at that.

The Spanish, on the other hand, have repeatedly, if decreasingly, attempted to link the NATO entry question to the future of Gibraltar. Señor Oreja publicly did so in early 1978 when he allowed that Spain could not consider membership of the alliance while a foreign base remained on Spanish soil. He repeated this statement again, but later the UCD apparently began to realize it was painting itself into a corner and so future policy statements, including the series of policy papers issued during the summer of 1978, were toned down. They spoke of no entry until "substantial progress" towards the resolution of the Gibraltar issue had been achieved.

The Gibraltar question is a constant, if not necessarily loud, problem for Anglo-Spanish relations. These relations should be excellent. Trade between the two countries is still at a high level. The United Kingdom is the third most important source of foreign tourists visiting Spain and, as said, London is extremely content with Spain's political evolution and fully supports Spain's EEC aspirations. However, even though the issue is not always a hot one, it is one that united virtually all Spaniards in their determination to recover "el Peñon." Captured by the British in 1704 and ceded to the United Kingdom by the Treaty of Utrecht, Gibraltar in British hands is a humiliation to Spain. It is the last colonial "property" in Europe and serves as a constant and vivid reminder of the collapse of Spanish power, a reminder enormously resented by Spaniards of all classes and political persuasions.

The issue is a complicated one. The population of the Rock is, of course, British by citizenship but by national origins a mixture of Spanish, Portuguese, British, and other groups with Spanish ancestry predominant. The Spanish language is widely spoken and the personal links with Spain many. In one of the periodic boiling points on the issue, the Franco government, in the mid-1960's, closed the border with Gibraltar and made all shipping from the colony go to Tangiers across the Straits before it could come back to the Spanish peninsula. Support facilities provided by the neighbouring Spanish towns were cut off and thousands of Spaniards working in Gibraltar lost their jobs.

In the intervening dozen or so years, a truly "fortress" mentality has developed among the Gibraltarians. Spanish pressure tactics have brought about an anti-Spanish sentiment which even democratization in Spain has done little to reduce. The current Madrid government clearly would like to open the border again, but it does not wish to give up a bargaining chip without the United Kingdom making some conciliatory move as well.

Like the Spanish government, the British government also has its hands tied somewhat firmly. It would probably like to be rid of Gibraltar in the long run. The Rock's naval and military role is not very great any more and its status as a colony is a vaguely embarrassing one for the United Kingdom. The Gibraltarians, however, have voted overwhelmingly in favour of remaining British and are extremely suspicious of any moves by Whitehall to deal with Spain on the issue. They are well-aware that London is embarrassed by their situation and they have no intention of letting it make a deal with Madrid over their heads. With strong trade union links in the United Kingdom, they have considerable influence in the Labour Party. Because of their history and status, they can also count on the interest of what is sometimes called the "dinosaur wing" of the Conservative Party. In any event, armed with the referendum result of 1967, they know that the British government can hardly contemplate abandoning them against their will. In that vote, 12,182 Gibraltarians voted to retain British sovereignty over the Rock while only forty-four voted against the continuation of the current status.³⁶

In spite of attempts to negotiate on the issue of re-opening the border and returning to normal relations, even technical talks have made little progress. It is difficult for the Spaniards to realize that, given their situation, the British are in no great hurry to resolve matters in dispute. Meanwhile the restrictions continue to add fuel to anti-Spanish sentiment and the fortress mentality in Gibraltar.

Whatever the difficulties, it is striking how the "idée fixe" of the linking of Gibraltar and NATO has taken hold in Spain. All three major works on NATO entry have assumed that any such moves should have to be accompanied by a return of Gibraltar to Spain. Most newspaper or magazine articles of any length on either subject give considerable attention to the other's place in any discussion.

Given the difficulties of any real progress on Gibraltar, it is hardly surprising that the British desire no linkage between the two issues, whatever the Spanish might think. However, optimists point to the possibilities of the NATO aspect actually being of potential assistance in the resolution of the issue. Various schemes are aired privately (and not so privately) that might allow some progress. These include possible provision for Gibraltar remaining British for some years, then being turned over to NATO to be an alliance base jointly administered by the United Kingdom and the new Spanish member of the Alliance, and finally being admitted into the Spanish Kingdom as permitted under the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Other variations exist on this theme and many sound quite plausible. But in "Gib," the suspicions of any such schemes reflect a probably accurate assessment of them as being "thin edges" of very unpleasant "wedges."

Strategically, the base facilities would be of great potential use to NATO. Particularly in the context of Spain in NATO, the series of installations available along the peninsula's southern coast could provide a substantial system of naval control of the straits. At the moment, the United Kingdom is not in a position to use its Gibraltar facilities to the full. Air support based on Gibraltar is restricted. The decline of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet and the loss of the other naval installations in that sea truncate Gibraltar's military utility. While at the moment the Rock acts as a communications and

supply centre, with a naval support and air control role as well, it appears that at best its potentially significant ASW role is insufficiently developed. This could presumably be corrected within a NATO context.

All things considered, however, the Spanish requirement for sovereignty over the Rock, the Gibraltarian resolution to remain British "forever," and the British inability to abandon them, seem to paint a picture of little likely progress in the near future. It would seem that not only a highly novel formula is required but also a means of assuring the local population that Spain is not to be feared and that eventual incorporation into the Spanish state is not only logical but desirable. Unfortunately, in the author's view, the formula has yet to be found and Gibraltarians are far from being reassured as to the benefits of Spanish status.

The United Kingdom will, then, continue to try to keep the two issues, NATO and Gibraltar, disassociated. The Spanish government, if it presses on with entry into NATO, will seek some progress on the Gibraltar issue to show to the Spanish people as part of the supposed benefits of NATO membership. Since there are few areas for such progress from the Spanish point of view, the opponents of NATO in Spain may be able to profit from the UCD's own previous insistence that "substantial progress" on Gibraltar was a pre-condition for NATO entry. It is unlikely that the British government would be able to do much to assist Spain's government at such a difficult juncture. While London will continue to favour Spain's joining the Alliance, the Gibraltar issue's terms of reference are almost cast in iron.

THE TRADITIONAL OPPOSITION

The most formidable opposition to Spain's entry into, or association with, NATO has come from the most liberal regimes within the Alliance and the European Community. Most noteworthy have been the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands, both now members of the EEC and NATO; Norway, a member of the Alliance only; and, to varying extents, Belgium as well. As late as 1975, these countries, as well as others mentioned, particularly the United Kingdom's Labour government, effectively blocked any closer affiliation of the Franco regime with the

Alliance, an objective of United States policy at the time getting some considerable push. In the Labour government's case, the arms embargo on Franco's Spain, in operation for fourteen years, was only lifted in the summer of 1978, almost three years after the caudillo's death. To all these governments, any dealings with the Franco regime were anathema. The Civil war, and all it meant to the European left, as well as the negative aspects of the Madrid government since then, were all too clear in liberal minds in these countries.

Despite a great deal of initial scepticism about the democratic principles of the restored monarchy of Don Juan Carlos, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark have all gradually but completely swung around to not only an acceptance of Spanish entry into the EEC but, along with Norway, varying degrees of pleasure at Madrid's expressed desire to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

One by one, these countries' prime and foreign ministers have accepted the legitimacy of the return to democracy in Spain. And since, for them at least, the only real stumbling blocks for EEC and NATO entry were political, not economic, this democratic future made Spain an attractive partner. Using the well-known formula that a Spanish statement of a wish for NATO membership would be viewed favourably but that the decision was a purely Spanish one, these governments have made it clear that their opposition to the Spanish regime's political, economic, and defence incorporation into Europe is at an end. Thus has ended over three decades of fervent opposition to Spain's desire for much greater links with Western Europe.

These EEC countries have also been at the forefront of those assuring the Madrid government that there is no necessary "linkage" between an application for EEC membership and one for NATO entry. In the context of the relative desires of the Spanish government and opposition parties, as we have seen and shall see further on, this has caused a great slackening of the wind in the NATO entry sail.

ITALY

Rome has maintained the same official silence on the question of future Spanish membership of NATO that has characterized the formal

reactions of the other member countries. It is far from easy to gauge the real attitude underlying this apparent lack of concern.

As we have seen, there is no lack of fear in Italy of Spain's general incorporation into Western Europe. From being one of Spain's champions within the EEC, Italy has moved to being a doubting and worried participant in the debate on Spanish membership of that economic grouping. Fearful for its light industry, but particularly for its agriculture, Italy no longer is at the forefront of those seeking to further "Latinize" the Common Market. While the government still formally favours Madrid's application, it nonetheless tends to heed its domestic opposition's calls for caution and continued protection for Italy's agriculture exports.

While there has been no link made in Italy between Madrid's EEC application and its possible NATO bid, some features are common to both. With the added depth Spain would give to the alliance, Italy's strategic importance could be somewhat reduced. While the Italian military can be expected to welcome the Alliance's strengthening through the addition of Spain, they and other Italians may fear for their rather privileged position in the Alliance Mediterranean context.

The Italian case is, though, difficult to judge. Spaniards and Italians co-operate easily and can even make themselves understood on many points while using their own language with the other nationality. Links between the two countries stretch back for centuries. The two navies co-operate and have indeed been involved in rather grandiose schemes for Western Mediterranean defence co-operation. These have of course not reached fruition.

The French situation, described above, may also have a role to play in Italian perceptions of the matter. Trilateral co-operation in defence could have some appeal to some circles in Italy as well as in France and Spain. Be that as it may, rumours have circulated in Madrid suggesting that Italy would be far from distressed to see Spain not join the Alliance or at least retard its entry. The reasons for this, and the likelihood of the rumours having substance, are not easy to analyse fully. One can only guess, and such guessing is likely to be profitable only if we consider Italy's geography.

Italy's second largest neighbour is Yugoslavia. The link made between the Spanish NATO option and future Yugoslav relations with the Warsaw Pact has not been such as to please the Italians. The slightest prospect of a Warsaw Pact power on the Italian eastern frontier is enough to cause grave concern to the struggling Italian government. As a result, even the Italian Christian Democrats are becoming "encore plus tempéré" about Spain's joining NATO. If this is the case for them, the reaction of the other parties is not difficult to imagine.³⁷

EIRE

The Irish situation with regard to Spanish moves toward NATO entry is unique, as the Republic is alone of the Nine in not belonging to the Western Alliance. For historical reasons almost exclusively related to its bilateral relations with the United Kingdom, Dublin has shown no interest in being linked into defence arrangements with its otherwise very welcome and well-received economic partners. Eire is neutral and has demonstrated an intention to remain so. A defensive alliance with the British government, even within a multilateral context, is unlikely to be viewed favourably or even with indifference by much of the Republic's legislature and people.

While the government is well-aware of the difficulties its situation poses at the political level within the EEC, and of the desires of some of its powerful partners, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, that EEC boundaries and NATO European boundaries be the same, it has remained far from interested in broaching the issue on the domestic scene. While Eire has not made any public statements of reaction to the idea of Spanish membership in NATO, it seems likely that it would prefer it to remain out, at least for the near future. With two other NATO countries, Portugal and Greece, coming in to the market, the pressure can already be expected to grow with a view to resolving this single anomaly. If Spain were to join NATO as well as the EEC, thus abandoning a "neutrality" that was common only to it and Eire, the Irish anomaly would be even further underscored and could conceivably eventually become a real source of embarrassment.

Thus it seems likely that Ireland will welcome any trends that appear to be slowing the moves toward entrance into NATO on the part of Spain. It would thus please Dublin, in all probability, if Spain were not to join, at least not for the moment. If it were to join, then the preference would likely be for another special arrangement, short of full membership, to be instituted. Special conditions, such as those enjoyed by France, Greece, or Iceland, tend to a plurality of options within the Treaty's framework which can hardly fail to be more comforting for an Ireland outside of it.

THE OTHER SUITORS (CURRENT OR EVENTUAL) FOR EEC MEMBERSHIP

GREECE AND TURKEY

Neither of the Eastern Mediterranean countries has been forward in making comments about the prospects for Spanish entry into NATO. Both have of course had their difficulties with the Alliance and both seek, naturally enough, to profit as much from the grouping as possible in terms of their disputes with one another, most particularly over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

Greece has distanced itself from NATO's military structure since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the perceived abandonment of Greece by its allies in the face of aggression. Turkey also felt the Alliance did little to back up its legitimate demands on this as well as other issues of contention with Athens. The American arms sales embargo also gave the lie, as far as many Turks were concerned, to the real value of the Western Alliance for Turkey.

After long negotiations, Greece is scheduled to join the EEC on 1 January, 1981. Its links with Western Europe will thus be greatly strengthened. Turkey views this with considerable suspicion. It has a preferential agreement with the EEC and likes to think that eventual membership will come its way as well. Greek membership of the group before Turkey may place considerable difficulties in the way of such progress on the part of Ankara.

In the context of these very real bilateral disputes, the Spanish issue does not loom large. Nevertheless, Mediterranean considerations

do concern both countries and each looks for support in its disputes with the other. The Turkish foreign minister was in Madrid in April 1979 and, while no details were forthcoming, it is clear that Mediterranean and NATO questions were discussed.

While an assessment of these countries' views must be hypothetical, it does appear that some points merit mention. A strengthened southwestern flank to NATO will be seen with some pleasure by many on the southeastern side since from the Mediterranean point of view, the Alliance also needs depth.

On the other hand, both countries need assistance in many fields and much of this comes from the United States and to some extent the EEC. Spanish entry into NATO could be considered by some to be lowering the priority of Athens and Ankara in the wealthier NATO powers' eyes, in circumstances similar if not so striking as those of Portugal. Therefore there may well be some reservations on the issue. One can do no more than mention these factors. It has not proved possible to judge their comparative weight.

PORTUGAL

Of all the countries in the Western Alliance, it is surely Portugal that has the most to lose if Spain joins. For many years, Portugal has reckoned that in return for the valuable use of its territory, mainland and particularly the Azores, it should receive military and other assistance from the wealthier Alliance members. To a great extent, this has been the rule.

With the shattering impact of the revolution but even more so of the loss of its African territories, the Portuguese economy's decline in recent years is troubling and very marked indeed. Portugal wants the other Alliance members to be more forthcoming with aid than in the past and expects, in return for the continued use of the Azores and metropolitan Portugal, the allies to provide on very good terms, if not free, the modernized equipment that the Portuguese forces need but which the country can manifestly not afford.

The previous regime of Salazar and Caetano was linked for defence purposes with Franco's Spain by the Iberian Pact. This treaty, if not

quite a dead letter, has certainly been dormant in recent years, firstly as a result of the April 1975 revolution in Portugal and then because of Franco's death in November of that same year. It is surprising to outsiders to discover how little interaction there is between the two Iberian neighbours. Portugal has tended to look overseas to its colonial and former colonial possessions as well as to its traditional ally--Great Britain. Now it looks forward to membership in the European Economic Community with even greater need, if less generally-felt conviction, than Spain. It has little non-territorial connection with Spain. Indeed, only 2.73 per cent of Spanish international investment finds its way to this neighbour and commercial exchange is seriously limited by the competitive nature of the two economies, both producing generally the same sorts of products.³⁸ Even though tourism is numerically significant, for the purpose of this study it can be virtually ignored. While six million Portuguese visited Spain in 1977, the overwhelming majority of them came on quick day-trips, largely aimed at purchases of cheaper Spanish goods, rather than on tourist holidays in the usual sense.

The only strong card Portugal has had in NATO has been its strategic position at the gates to the Mediterranean and its control over the Azores islands in the mid-Atlantic, valuable for anti-submarine and air transport purposes to the Alliance. The Spanish now threaten this sole card by the immense "deck" they can provide to NATO if they join. The Canaries position would in many ways eclipse that of the Azores. Spain's strategic position vis-à-vis the Mediterranean is infinitely more valuable than is Portugal's. Its control over Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa simply puts further icing on the cake. Spain's size, contiguity to France, long coastlines, harbours, aerodromes, and powerful defensive position totally outshine Portugal's territorial and strategic contribution to the Alliance. In addition, Spain's economy is many times stronger than Portugal's, it can pay for most of the equipment it needs or can produce it at home, it has over four times Portugal's population, and appears to many observers to be more stable in the long run.

Lastly, the Spanish forces can contribute, in the same general region of the Alliance's concern, much more than the Portuguese. They

have, for example, over five times as many men under arms, twice as many warships, three times as many combat aircraft, eight times as many tanks, and nine times as many artillery pieces.³⁹ The Portuguese military know this and hence at least some of them are unhappy with prospects for the future.⁴⁰

Portugal must therefore feel very threatened by any Spanish move to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Such a change would abolish at a stroke much of Portugal's claim to be an Alliance priority. While it is difficult for Portugal to openly oppose Spain's entry, it is nonetheless clear that Spain would fulfil, and better fulfil, Portugal's traditional tasks within the Alliance and must therefore be seen in Lisbon as a serious problem for its policy within the Alliance.

The situation with regard to both countries' candidacy for membership in the EEC is not without parallels to this state of affairs. While Portugal, for its own purposes, must openly espouse an "open door" for all three candidates, Spain would obviously constitute not only a very powerful competitor for Portugal within the Community but could destroy many Portuguese hopes for a large share of the regional development budget the future "twelve" might have available.

SPAIN'S OTHER INTERESTS - FRIENDS AND THREATS

The imperial past and trading relations Spain has historically enjoyed with much of the world have meant a wide range of interests outside of Europe. However, it was in Spanish America, the Arab states and Africa that Franco sought closer relations to counter-balance the negative reception his friendly overtures received, initially in the United States and Europe, and still at the end of his regime, in Western Europe.

An elaborate propaganda campaign made much of Spain's historic, cultural, social, and economic ties with the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America. The same effort was attempted in making Spain out to be the natural bridge between Europe and the Islamic countries. Lastly, a special role was claimed for Spain in Africa. All this was little more than a desperate attempt to find some friends for a regime whose natural relations were having little or nothing to do with it.

These links with the Third World, as we shall see, fitted in easily with the neutralist tradition and have, somewhat curiously given their Franquist origins, come to loom large in PSOE and PCE foreign policy statements. To understand Spain's position and options, as well as the impact of NATO membership on its other foreign relations, it is necessary to briefly examine these other areas of Spanish foreign interests.

SPAIN AND LATIN AMERICA

The existence of a Spanish linguistic "commonwealth" is, and has for long been, a fact. The shared "hispanidad" of Spain and eighteen of the twenty Latin American republics is a factor of continued importance in Spain's foreign relations. Historically, it was principally in that region of the world that Spain's greatness took root. The main focus of Spain's imperial ambitions for five centuries, it has remained into the twentieth a main goal of Spanish emigration and commerce. The family links between Spain and these countries are great and the attraction of the "madre patria" retains much of its allure for Spanish Americans. Indeed, the Spanish American historical experience with politics has more than one thread common to Spanish political history as well.

Spanish-Latin American trade is significant. In 1977, those countries took 7.1 per cent of Spain's exports to a total value of \$ 724.2 million, and supplied Spain with 7.6 per cent of its imports to a value of \$ 135.3 million.⁴¹ Events in the region are watched closely by the Spanish press and public and Spanish activity there, of all kinds, is considered natural and fitting.

However, the realities of an expanded and meaningful political and economic role in the region are difficult to envisage. Despite continuing Spanish influence after the two "waves" of Spanish American independence (1806-1825 and 1898), and notwithstanding the considerable diplomatic and to some extent financial efforts of the Franco regime, Spain's political clout locally is, to say the least, slight. While the prestige of the new Spanish state is high, and the Royal visits of 1978 a series of triumphs, real political influence has remained minor since independence and shows no signs whatever of a real revival. The links are often emotional and not necessarily substantive. Spanish Americans

are jealous of their independence and resent any foreign interference, especially from the former metropolis.

Even economically, the Spanish position is easily exaggerated. The trade figures for the region are important to Spain but very minor compared to West European standards. Nor is trade with the area growing as fast as with some other regions of the world. In many areas, Spain and some Spanish American countries have basically competing, not complementary, economies.

On the subject of Spanish entry into the European Economic Community, Spanish Americans have differing opinions. Some feel it means Spain turning even further its back on its former colonies. Others feel they can use their emotional ties with the mother country to get a better deal themselves from the EEC, and that therefore Spanish entry could be a god-send for them. It seems that both these positions are easily overstated. The Spanish government has rarely been really interested in Spanish America as a fundamental of its actual foreign policy priorities. As said before, the link was mostly emotional. Franco had his own domestic reasons for raising the region's priority in his foreign policy and this higher status was rarely reciprocated in the other direction by Spanish America. Thus Spain turning its back on the region presupposes perhaps more state interest than there has actually been. Likewise, it is easy to exaggerate the likely advantages Spain could get for the region from the EEC. Spain has its hands full getting a reasonable deal for its own agricultural and industrial interests in the Common Market. Given the likely reception it would get as a sponsor for Spanish American desires from the EEC, Spain is going to be extremely reluctant to seriously raise such issues and, if at all, not for a very long time, indeed. On the other hand on some matters including aid, where there is already an EEC interest in Latin America, Spanish support for its former colonies could hardly fail to help their interests, if not tremendously, at least to some degree.

As far as NATO is concerned, the states of the region are divided. Dr. Castro has of course told Mr. Suarez that Cuba would much prefer that Spain not join the Alliance. However, most of the countries in

the region are allied to the United States, at least formally, through the Rio Pact; and many of the more conservative ones would like to see Spain tied more closely to Western defence, particularly because of Spain's strategic position vis-à-vis the Southern Atlantic through its control of the Canaries. Other regimes are indifferent to the subject and have expressed no official or unofficial interest in the matter. With the exception of Cuba, however, it is unlikely that any of the governments of Spanish America would consider their relations with Spain vitally affected whatever decision the Spanish government made on NATO membership.

THE ARAB STATES AND AFRICA

Being the natural geographic link between Europe and Africa, Franco's foreign policy argued, Spain should also undertake the role of cultural and political "bridge" between the two continents. Under Franco's regime, the difficulties of such a role being a realistic one given Spain's own colonial position in the continent were not raised. The role was an invention for propaganda purposes and remained one until the end of the regime.

Since the liquidation of the Ifni and Saharan positions, Spain has had little political or economic interest in Africa. Only the small enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla constitute effective interests. Spain's trade with Africa is small indeed. Its political influence in the continent is limited to the Arab Northwest African states of Morocco and Algeria and, even there, is far from a great or indeed positive factor for Spain. Except for colonial issues, one can generally say that African states, with the exception of Morocco as a neighbouring country, have tended to ignore Spain. Madrid has not had available the resources to be a significant provider of aid to the region nor has it been a likely market for African exports of any major kind. Even as a supplier to Africa, Spain has not had the appeal of its more northerly European neighbours.

Excluding any real current role for Spain in the region, how would the local governments react to Madrid joining the Atlantic Alliance? The answer to this question depends on the type of regime ruling each

individual African country. Leftist and more actively anti-Western colonialist governments would almost certainly react negatively. They fear an extension of NATO's territorial terms of reference and would not like Spain to use its "historic African role" to take part in some sort of Alliance "police" role in the continent. Other regimes might like to see such a development, but those actively in favour would be few. Neutral regimes would be much closer to the leftist position than to the conservative one. Most governments would prefer to keep NATO at arm's length and reduce, rather than increase, outside influence.

Spain's Arab relationship has been at least marginally more successful. While a colonial power in the Muslim area of Africa, Spain was not seen with the same disfavour as other colonial powers. After all, the Spanish Sahara, with its nomadic population, was a different case from most Arab experience with European colonialism. Also, with nearly eight centuries of at least partial Moorish rule over Spain, there was some considerable historic claim to a special relationship. Thus, Franco could with at least slightly greater logic play the Arab card than he could the African. In addition, the Spanish refusal to recognize Israel was a welcome one to the Arabs. The influence it had on real political issues is, however, more doubtful. In any case, Spain has tried hard to build on this relationship.

The effort has not brought striking results. Spain has not been given special consideration in questions of Arab oil supply and prices, a severe blow to the Spanish economy since 1973. Madrid found itself with few Arab African friends when the question of the "Africanization" of the Canaries was raised at the Organization of African Unity Khartoum meeting of 1978. Trade with the Arab countries, especially discounting oil, is not at impressive levels. As mentioned, political influence outside Arab Northwest Africa is virtually nil. Even in Northwest Africa, Spain's relations with Algeria have ranged from bad to very bad, and with Morocco from bad to barely tolerable. This has been for colonial and fishing rights reasons, although there had been notable recent improvement before the spring of 1979, resulting not from Franco's emphasis on the "links" but from the requirement of King Hassan for Spain's support on the Sahara issue.

In most of the Arab world, then, reactions to a Spanish decision to join NATO could be expected to follow vaguely ideological lines, as in Africa but with some slight differences. Conservative regimes would probably be rather pleased to see the Western Alliance reinforced and the Straits of Gibraltar under strengthened Western control. Leftist regimes would tend to see the reinforcement of the Alliance as unfortunate. In most cases, however, neither support for, nor opposition to, the move would be very firm.

The exceptions would probably be Algeria and Libya. Colonel Gaddafi has made no secret of his assessment of NATO as a colonialist and anti-Arab alliance. His attitude generally and most recently to the United Kingdom's departure from its military installations in Malta and to the possible neutralizing of the Mediterranean reflect clearly a position of total opposition to any reinforcement of the Alliance along the shores of that sea.

The Algerian regime is likewise a special case. For essentially national reasons involving its hostility to Morocco, Algeria harbours great resentment of Spain and distrusts its policy in North Africa. The Madrid accords of late 1975, disposing of the Spanish Sahara in favour of Morocco and Mauritania, have been resisted strongly by Algeria. The Algerian government has virtually founded and completely supported and supplied the Polisario in its fight against Moroccan and Mauritanian control of the former Spanish territory. Algeria considers the Madrid accords a thinly-veiled attempt by Spain to ensure that access to the mineral wealth of the territory is not lost and that the region profits conservative Morocco. The NATO question has already been discussed between Madrid and Algiers, obviously at the latter's request, and there is no doubt whatever that the Algerian government views with alarm the possibility of Spain's joining the Western Alliance. As we have seen, to some Spaniards, the main advantage of NATO is that it at least would provide some favourable backing for Spain on issues like the Canaries. The opposition on this issue has, of course, been situated in Algiers, anxious to do anything to rattle the Spaniards and pressure them into a new look at the Madrid accords. Naturally enough, then, a reinforcement to Madrid's strategic position and the

gain of virtually automatic support in fora such as the United Nations for the Spanish position in the Canaries is not welcomed by Algeria. Lastly, given Algeria's leftist penchant, it is generally opposed to a strengthened NATO either in the Mediterranean or Atlantic. Nor is it pleased with the prospect of increased NATO naval use of the Canaries. Particularly distressing is the thought of a NATO base so close to Morocco and to the Sahara territory. For all these reasons, and whatever the evolution of Mr. Suarez's attempts to "normalize" Spanish-Algerian relations, Algeria is likely to strongly oppose Spanish membership in the Alliance, especially while no solution favourable to Algiers is found for the Sahara problem.

If Algeria's attitude is of some concern, Morocco's could be of even greater moment. As it is, Morocco has not been particularly interested in the debate about NATO in Spain. Morocco's relations with Spain have three main aspects:

- 1) Common concern for the future of the former *Spanish Sahara*;
- 2) The difficulties inherent in the existence of Ceuta and Melilla (and the few small Spanish islands nearby) on the Moroccan side of the Straits; and
- 3) Fishing rights for Spanish fishermen.

On the first issue, Morocco very much wants Spain to stand by the Madrid Accords ceding the Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. Rabat fears that Spain may be drawn into renegotiations because of pressure from Algiers.

Secondly, Morocco has stated repeatedly that it wants "eventually" to integrate the two remaining colonial positions in the country into the national fabric. It has so far shown remarkable patience on the issue but has not resisted the temptation to apply subtle pressures on the two points, particularly by economic means.

Finally, the Spanish fishing industry is not only extremely important economically and politically, but is also in great difficulties. Recent European, North American, North Atlantic and African regulations have closed or limited access to much of Spain's traditional foreign

fishing areas. The Moroccan zones are very important to the industry and their increasing control has caused Madrid to act with haste to secure a general fishing agreement with Rabat.

Thus, on two major issues, Spain needs Morocco more than the latter needs Spain. Only on the Sahara issue is Morocco in a condition of needing Spanish support. In addition, Spain is comfortable with a conservative, monarchical, pro-Western government in Rabat. King Hassan is clearly comfortable with a centrist, monarchical, pro-Western government in Madrid. There is considerable room for the development of close relations and both countries have gone out of their way to bring these into being despite the differences between them.

King Hassan has shown restraint on the issue of the enclaves and has given Spain highly privileged status, at least temporarily, in Morocco's fishing zones.⁴² The Spanish had for long reacted unfavourably to Algeria's drive for a renegotiation of the Madrid Accords, and were moving forward to arrange a Royal Visit to Morocco, a sign of friendship apparently much desired by the Moroccan government. Nonetheless, the events of May 1979, with Suárez's Algerian visit and his discussions with the Polisario, have gravely threatened Moroccan-Spanish relations. It is no coincidence that Morocco loudly raised the Ceuta and Melilla issue as Suárez left Madrid for Algiers.

NATO membership for Spain is a subject of some interest in Morocco, although not as great as was to be expected a year ago. At that time, Morocco's acting as a Western gendarme in Africa was being widely discussed in the press and some NATO circles. Talk of a Paris-Madrid-Rabat axis was also being aired. Since then, events in Africa and the three capitals mentioned have evolved. King Hassan's domestic, Arab World, and African position would be greatly eroded if his links with the West were overplayed. He is not amused by the lack of support he has received from the United States in the struggle with pro-Soviet Algeria. The Moroccan economic and military situation has gone from bad to worse. Yet another Islamic monarchy, Iran, has collapsed.

It seems likely that the Moroccans would not be terribly displeased by Spain joining NATO. They realize that NATO is not foolish enough to underwrite the Spanish position in Ceuta and Melilla, the only really

dangerous potential event for Morocco linked to a Spanish Alliance treaty signature. However, what Morocco really wants is the continuation in Madrid of centrist, pro-Western and monarchical government. If this is ensured, Morocco will neither oppose nor suggest that Spain join the Atlantic Alliance.

THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

Faced with the prospect of Spain joining NATO, the two great communist states display the opposing attitudes so characteristic of their relations for the last nearly two decades. The Soviet Union opposes resolutely Spanish entry into the Atlantic Alliance and has been publicly forceful in its pressures on the Spanish government.

It is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union should adopt such an unfavourable attitude. For the same reasons discussed in our chapter on the advantages to NATO of Spanish entry, the Soviet Union must logically oppose such a step. A "Sunday Times" article has gone so far as to suggest that keeping Spain out of NATO is such a Soviet priority that they are even using Cuba's new links with Madrid as a way of pressuring Spain on the issue.⁴³ Be that as it may, Soviet opposition is evident. Repeated "Tass" articles and editorials have denounced the possibility as a threat to détente, a de-stabilizing of the European balance, an American attempt to bring Spain completely into its sphere of influence, a threat to disarmament negotiations, and the like.

The Soviet Union's formula for opposing Spain on this issue has been to repeatedly propose no extensions of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO. Since Spain is the only prospective new member of either alliance, this has not generally been considered a real issue except by those already decided in their opposition to entry. The Soviet Union has threatened to include Vietnam, Cuba, or even Yugoslavia in the Warsaw Pact if Spain were to join NATO. In the first two cases, some Spaniards have commented that their entry would change very little the real state of affairs; and in the case of Yugoslavia, it is exceptionally difficult to see how the Soviets could pressure an obviously-reluctant country to join the Pact. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Yugoslavia would prefer to avoid the issue altogether and has therefore, although to the

PSOE rather than to the Spanish government, expressed a preference for a Spain out of NATO.⁴⁴

As discussed elsewhere, the "Yugoslavian argument", while having little credibility with the Madrid government, does have some small influence here and there in NATO, principally among socialist parties, and does offer the PSOE and PCE another argument for the domestic debate in Spain. A future strong representation from the Yugoslav government could embarrass the UCD but this is not considered likely in Madrid.

The Soviet Union can be expected to continue to oppose Spanish entry although perhaps not quite so visibly. It may decide that the PSOE and PCE can adequately carry the load of the struggle without outside interference. This is far from certain, however. Some observers believe that the Soviets have overplayed their hand in openly attacking Spanish membership. They point to the historic tendency of Spaniards to get their backs up if outsiders appear to be pressuring too hard for a particular Spanish decision. This may well be true. When Foreign Minister Oreja visited Moscow in early 1979, he subtly but clearly informed his hosts that Spain's NATO policy was not a subject for discussion and involved a purely Spanish decision. Elsewhere in UCD there are some visibly negative reactions to Soviet pressure. Nonetheless, there seems to be little real press, and even less popular, reaction to the Soviet's pressure, and since the UCD is already pro-NATO, it is difficult to see how NATO can profit from Moscow's overplaying for the time being.

If the Soviet Union is opposing strongly Spain's flirtation with NATO, China on the other hand would like the wedding to take place at the earliest date possible. Again, because of the advantages Spain would give NATO, China sees Spanish Alliance membership as a major boost to Western European defence and thus of major assistance in blocking Soviet expansionism. Chinese officials made this clear to the King during the Royal visit to China in 1978, and can be heard making the same comments in Madrid and in the NATO capitals. However, Chinese influence is much less felt in Madrid than is Soviet. China is unlikely to be able to have any great effect in making the NATO idea more popular, and on the left-wing parties in Spain its potential influence is infinitely less powerful than is the Soviets'. While Spain wants much closer relations

with China, and like most Western countries, hopes to profit economically from the latest Chinese opening to the West (this feeling is naturally strongest in the UCD which is not only the government party but also closely tied to business interests), Spaniards realize the relative weight of the two communist "giants" and understand the pit-falls of an overly pro-Chinese policy. The PSOE and PCE, while not unfriendly to China, are fearful of antagonizing the Soviet Union by too close contacts with Peking and the Chinese Party. This situation is likely to remain constant for some time. Santiago Carrillo already has enough trouble with the Soviets to look for any more and Felipe González has made little secret of who he considers to still be the real force in at least the main branch of the Eastern socialist movements.

EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union is thus firmly against Spain in NATO and the People's Republic of China is firmly in favour of such a move; geopolitics in action, a geopolitician might argue. Certainly geopolitics counts in the reaction of the states of Eastern Europe. These countries are firmly opposed to Spain joining NATO and this for reasons related to their own political and geographic situation.

The Yugoslav case has already been discussed. Clearly they are not to be easily forced into the Warsaw Pact when they do not wish to belong. Yugoslav history and the strong sense of national honour precludes that. Thus, much of the Soviet position regarding the "expansion of the blocs" thesis holds very little water. However, the Yugoslavs would obviously prefer that the matter never arose. Their situation is already delicate enough without further exacerbation which can only make an already nervous Moscow even more jittery.

In the case of the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact, the reaction is equally clear-cut. They fear that whatever the truth of the matter is, the entry of Spain into NATO will give those forces favouring a further WPO defensive build-up an obvious boost. They feel that the Soviets will have additional reasons to argue for further efforts for Pact defence and, perhaps more sinister, for further efforts at a Pact co-ordinated response. The propaganda machine will be able to say that

Spain's action proves that the West is not serious about détente or progress on European tension-reducing measures. Hence, the argument will run, the Warsaw Pact must respond to these further imperialist provocations by preparing more purposefully for their own defence.

The argument is often heard in Spain that the country's joining NATO will not be of sufficient importance to affect Eastern Europe. This is probably false because of the perception of the Soviets on the issue and their likely reaction of tightening the rein on the Warsaw Pact to the extent this is possible. Even if that extent is not going to be very great, it is understandable that the Eastern European States would prefer to avoid the issue altogether, and that requires that Spain not join the Atlantic Alliance.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR RE-THINKING

With no strategic analysis out of which might fall a new foreign and defence policy, apparently the result of a government already overworked in setting up a democratic system after forty years of authoritarian rule, Spanish foreign policy has not changed much since Franco's death. That authoritarian gave his foreign policy, before the United States relationship became firm, a Spanish-American, pro-Arab and pro-African stance, at least in its public expression. This stance was not built on very solid historic, economic, or political foundations, although it had varying degrees of cultural viability.

Not only on the NATO question but more generally on the EEC aspect of Spain's foreign relations, these secondary aspects of Madrid's foreign policy seem to require rethinking. The Arabs, Latin Americans, and Africans believe they have received relatively short shrift from the EEC, and given the current economic difficulties, this state of affairs seems unlikely to change. Spain's defence incorporation into Western Europe will probably be seen with indifference by many, with opposition from the left, and qualified support from the right, in these regions. But even if Spain is to anchor only its economic, political, social, and cultural future to Western Europe, it is debatable whether it will also be able to blow life into the rather moribund, unrealistic Arab, Latin American and African policies of the Franco era. That it will probably be some-

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what more difficult in NATO is surely true. That it will likely make very little difference since the potential and past substance of such policies is so limited is also surely true.

NEUTRALITY AND OTHER OPTIONS

NEUTRALITY

Before discussing the option of "neutrality" in some detail, it must be emphasized that the term is not used with a closely-fitting definition in mind. Most Spanish observers and interested persons use the term in only very vague senses. They frequently take the form of neutrality, being Spain's past and possible future practice of aloofness vis-à-vis long-term alliance systems and commitments to other powers. It is in this sense that the word will be generally used.

We have seen earlier how Spain's neutrality up until 1914 was more a result of international circumstances, backed up by internal disorder, than it was a chosen preference of the government. Pax Britannica helped preserve peace in a way helpful to a Spain which had its hands full on the home, and to some extent colonial, fronts. Neutrality in World War I was logical for Spain and, as it proved, profitable as well. Not only were domestic difficulties not exacerbated by major international conflict but also an enormous boost was given to Spanish industry and agriculture in the markets of the belligerent powers, particularly the Entente states. The League of Nations and general European exhaustion assisted the maintenance of neutrality up until the Civil War. From then until today it has seen "ups and downs" but has been essentially a cherished fiction among certain sections of the Spanish political scene and population as a whole.

Increasing ties with the fascist powers, after victory in the Civil War, were logical. Spain's neutrality in the Second War was a constantly shifting policy aimed at simple survival in the enormous upheaval. From neutrality she moved to "non-belligerence" but with a pro-Axis bent of considerable proportions. Facilities of many kinds were provided to the Axis powers for the war--military and commercial. Once war with Soviet Russia began, Spanish forces even served alongside Axis troops on the ground although on a very limited basis.

After the war, Spain's neutrality was imposed by others, not chosen

by itself. It tried desperately, employing heavily its anti-communist credentials, to join Western organizations whose aims were anything but neutralist. Its failure to achieve these goals was not because the regime was neutralist but because it was tarred, in the eyes of many, with the "fascist" brush.

As discussed, Spain's other policies in the post-World War II international arena have resulted from the lack of acceptance the regime found in its normal Western European political orbit. Its economic and cultural relations were overwhelmingly with the West but, because of the regime, it could not extend these relations easily to the political and security fields. While the defence and other agreements with the United States, dating from the early 1950's, could draw Spain closer to the West's leader, they made little difference to most other Western powers' attitudes to Spain right up to the mid-1970's.

Other policies have reflected this desperate situation of isolation felt by the Franco regime. As we have seen, the Latin American, Arab, and African planks of the platform of foreign policy were added because of the lack of real options. They received little but lip-service from the regime and indeed they have borne few concrete results for Spain over the last twenty to thirty years. Nor has there been an infusion of life into them in the first years of the Monarchy. Spain has competitive economic status vis-à-vis most of them and does not have the political or economic clout to be of real use to them as a friend, a market, or even a source of aid.

Nonetheless, it is in the furthering of these relations that the left in Spain sees prospects for a future neutral status for the country. While confusion on the issue is general, the left points to the advantages of closer links with the Third World, the Mediterranean community, its historically colonized areas of the America's, and the Arab community. It points out that these relations will suffer if Spain is not neutral and that newly-established relations with Warsaw Pact countries will suffer even more.

There is certainly some truth in this. As far as the African and Arab states are concerned, there is little doubt that Spain's relations with the more radical states of the regions will be affected. While

these relations may not be hurt badly because they are so little developed in any case, their prospects for greater development will be harmed. The Algerians have gone on record as concerned and even alarmed at the prospect of Spain joining NATO. The Libyans will surely share this reaction. Co-operation on the proposals for de-militarizing the Mediterranean, or at least reducing non-Mediterranean forces in that sea, is unlikely to make much progress with Spain in the Alliance, although it could be argued that NATO can only gain from any attempt to exclude outside powers since the Western fleets of Italy and France, not to mention Turkey, Greece and Spain, would dominate totally the waterway if there were no outside naval forces there.¹

As for relations with Latin America, only those with Cuba would probably be adversely affected by Spain joining NATO. Given Cuba's recent activities, this is unlikely to have much influence. Most Latin American governments, as we have seen, would be indifferent or vaguely pleased by such a Spanish initiative. Africa would split along ideological grounds but the farther away a particular African state, the less vocal its opposition or support would be. Given that non-Arab African states are far from Spain, and the virtually total lack of comment on their part on the subject, their reaction is not likely to be heated one way or the other.

There is one general tendency on the question of Spanish neutrality which should surprise no one, that is that ideologically-inclined states take stands which are obvious. Pro-Western states tend to see Spanish neutrality with slight disfavour or indifference. Pro-Soviet states see this option as the most they can hope for, given Spain's obvious Western status in so many basic ways. Neutralist states see it as reinforcing their own strength and as a blow at the division of the international system into two blocs. Thus the neutralist position has many and powerful friends abroad.

Curiously it does not have so many friends in Spain itself. The Communist Party is the only political force of weight that wishes Spain to be completely neutral. The PSOE wishes, as mentioned, to have both neutrality and defence links with the United States and Europe. In his speech to the plenary session of the Cortes in June 1977, Felipe Gonzalez

stated:

We want our country to adopt a position of active neutrality, outside bloc politics, that will favour authentically the policy of détente and international peace.

We believe that Spain belongs to Europe; and in the current process of integration, we show ourselves in favour of the application for membership in the Common Market and other European organizations.... We must pay special attention to Mediterranean and African policy...(which requires) an innovative policy of drawing closer to a continent that can be decisive for world peace and progress. 2

Further to these declarations, the leader of the PSOE has, at a later date, been more clear. He has called for the retention of the American bases, and hence a clear military link with the United States, for better or for worse; and for a search for "some procedure to relate ("homologar") its (Spain's) defensive system to that of its European neighbours."³ These steps would presumably be temporary, as the long-term goal is stated as well, "Europe as a whole must procure its own defensive system..."⁴

Exactly what all this means is not easy to say. As we have seen, a PSOE stance on foreign policy is far from developed fully, as yet. The party apparently wants links with the United States. Senator of the PSOE Fernando Moran has stated that such links are vital for the maintenance of the Sixth Fleet's supposed ability to counter Soviet superiority on the Central Front, and the PSOE as a whole has accepted the need for the American bases to remain in Spain.⁵ The development of defence links with Western European countries, those with which Spain has "a common economic and political destiny," is also approved and proposed by the socialists. The states must be those of the EEC, and overwhelmingly, at least signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty.

There, then, is the socialist dilemma yet again. "Active neutrality" with an open, friendly policy to all the world is the aim, a policy striving for peace and an end to the blocs. This general position is immediately compromised by Spain's geographic, economic, strategic, and political realities in the acceptance of defence ties with the U.S. and

other NATO members, as well as France. Thus the reality of declaratory neutrality eludes everyone concerned. Spain is thus perceived as being fully integrated into the West but retains, through constant declarations on neutrality, supposedly "clean" hands to deal with neutral states, particularly in the Third World. It is easy to foresee what would happen to such neutrality in time of real crisis. The Spanish socialist idea of neutrality is no more real, at the current moment, than was Franco's during the early years of his regime. It is a state of close co-operation with the West leaving only slight room for manoeuvre elsewhere and on only relatively minor issues.

The Communist Party, however, is at least slightly more straightforward in its vision of the future of Spanish foreign policy, particularly where security matters are concerned. As mentioned, the PCE wants Spain to be completely neutral of both blocs. It does not wish to see the United States base facilities remain nor military co-operation with that country continue in any other form. It does not desire defence co-operation with other NATO countries either and calls for a position equidistant from the two blocs. Thus Spain will benefit, it argues, from real possibilities for an independent foreign and defence policy. Nothing experienced in recent months would lead one to believe, as some Western observers had hoped, that the PCE would approach Spain's membership of NATO with a "fairly positive attitude" similar to the way the Italian communists see it--that is, to "advocate that their country remain in it until all blocs are dissolved, that is, indefinitely."⁶ Santiago Carrillo's reaction to NATO is very clearly stated in his major work and there is little reason to expect it has changed. He states therein that,

...to the extent that, for more than twenty years, there has not been a Soviet aggression and that the fundamentally defensive orientation of the Warsaw Pact has been confirmed, NATO has transformed itself into a bureaucratic-military superstructure, in search of an objective which will justify it; and in the final analysis has become, above all, an instrument of American political, economic and military control of Europe. 7

The PCE wishes to consolidate democracy and stability in Spain, at least for the time being. Its policy aims at entering the EEC as a full member but envisages no necessary corollary of Western European defence arrangements. Spain should use its defence policy, the PCE believes, as an adjunct to an independent, neutralist foreign policy. The Communists argue that Spain's own priorities should come first. The PCE recognition of Spain's already-Western defence commitment was stated early by its leader who complained that, "if one can talk of an official military policy, this is limited today to an auxiliary role of support to United States forces and of the fight against 'internal subversion'."⁸ Defence considerations should revolve around national interests exclusively, such as defence of Spanish territory and the security of the sea links to non-peninsular Spain. Foreign policy of an independent stamp, unlinked to the blocs, will provide Spain with friends in North Africa and Europe who will thereby not pose any threat to Spanish vital interests. Arguing for neutralist foreign policy positions, the PCE suggest that thereby relations with Algeria and other "progressive" countries can be improved and the need for bloc alignments with NATO or others will no longer be necessary as the potential opposition will then be friendly.

In effect, this PCE analysis raises the real issue regarding neutrality. Many interested parties suggest that by entering NATO, Spain is "abandoning" neutrality. The PSOE position instinctively reflects this. However, given what we have seen before, throughout various chapters, this is simply not accurate. Spain is currently closely tied to the West, not only in political and economic but also in military terms. There is a wide-ranging defence agreement with the United States, which is in the process of making the Spanish forces at least a "silent partner" for the North Atlantic allies. Under these terms of reference and others, those forces are being reformed in a way which will suit them more easily to NATO requirements--and this by design, not by accident. There are vastly-increased contacts and exercises, particularly at sea, with NATO countries as a whole and not just the United States. West Germany uses Spanish air training facilities. Since June 1970, there has been a defence co-operation agreement with the French, and

this accord has led to joint activities in several domains. Spain is in a complex foreign and defence policy nexus but one thing it is not neutral. As argued forcibly on many occasions by Senator Ballarín, who has been mentioned above, Spain will have to "abandon" an already established pro-Western posture if it is to opt for neutrality. To some extent, the PCE sees this and has the courage to state that this is the case and that the challenge must be accepted. The PSOE suggests that these connections can, indeed must, still be kept but that does not preclude an overall policy of "active neutrality." It seems obvious that, in their case, rather little attention has been paid to the logic of the situation.

Clearly Spain can opt for neutrality if it decides to do so. However, other than the parties of the extreme left, there is no significant political force saying it should. The UCD and the Right call for a declared Western position within the North Atlantic Alliance. The PSOE calls for a continued Western alignment combined with a declaratory policy of neutrality. The Communist Party of Spain and some of its fringe organizations alone call for steps to break the links with the West, on the political and military if not on the economic fronts, and to adopt a truly neutralist position vis-à-vis the two blocs, the members of the two blocs, and the non-aligned countries.

The neutralist case is then a leftist solution limited to somewhat radical political forces. The popularity of the idea, however, explains why other political parties, particularly the socialists, have wished to appear neutralist as well. There is widespread concern in Spain over the impact and influence of the United States in its domestic and foreign affairs. There is a fear of war and of being further caught up in that war through participation in defence arrangements with the West. There is a desire to make Spanish priorities the crucial ones in foreign and defence policy. There is a general feeling that neutrality may have done well by Spain and should be maintained or returned to, depending on one's analysis. Lastly, in many circles there is a fervent wish that Spain should contribute to furthering world peace. The blocs are seen as monolithic and as having a vested interest in maintaining themselves. There is thus a reluctance to take part in these organizations or to appear to be acting in a way that could de-stabilize the

status quo, at worst, or at best help to sustain the bloc division as it now stands.

All these arguments are powerful and ensure a ready audience for neutralist and anti-NATO themes. Some of the PCE's intellectual appeal, and perhaps even some of its election success, can be attributed to this appeal. The PSOE has also been adept at using the neutrality stance electorally while accepting reluctantly and privately, that the realities of the Spanish general situation do not allow for real neutrality.

Is Spain really neutral? The answer must be 'no'! Three decades of increasing defence and political connections with the West have left little of traditional Spanish neutrality. Can the country become neutral? The answer must be "yes." If the Spanish people resolve that they will build a neutral Spain, and are prepared to pay the price, there is no reason why it could not be. Links with the Third World, at least in the political if not very much in the economic or defence fields, are established and could be deepened. Much of the Third World would welcome such an initiative although its impact on that vast body of states would necessarily remain minor. It would be possible to avoid renewing the treaty with the United States, in 1981. While the American government would obviously be displeased, it will not be so dependent in the near future as it has been in the past on Spanish facilities.⁹ It would be equally possible to abrogate the French defence accords of 1970 and the arrangements for training and exercises with other NATO countries. It would also be possible to get the Spanish armed forces to turn their gaze more firmly to the peninsula and its appendices rather than to the increasing vogue of Europe and the West in general. Finally, it would be conceivable to join the European Economic Community without becoming a NATO member, as the Republic of Ireland has done. The willingness of EEC members of NATO not to link the two issues is proof of this, however unfortunately some NATO countries, notably the U.S. and West Germany, may feel this is.

Thus, the option of abandoning the defence links with the U.S. and the West in general is open to Spain. However, it must be recognized that it is not an easy option to choose. As repeatedly mentioned, Spain's economic links are overwhelmingly with Western Europe and the United

States. It now has a political system of the dominant Western type as well. Its cultural affinities are with the same group of countries, as are its religious traditions. The Third World, and particularly the non-Latin American Third World, can offer little in the way of replacement for these enormous connections which would normally have a defence aspect as well. The "tie that binds" could hardly be stronger than the one now holding Spain to the West.

As for the treaty with the United States, it, like relations with that country in general, is the product of a fairly lengthy coming-together of two states which had a good deal to gain from one another. These relations are far from merely defence-related and include scientific, technical, agricultural, and cultural aspects as well. Spain undoubtedly gains more than does the United States from these non-defence joint activities, which are part of a long and relatively old programme of aid in the modernization of vital elements of the Spanish economy. The extensive modernization of the armed forces, which need is agreed to by all political forces in the country, will also be made much more difficult without American assistance. Paying full price for modern equipment in an effort as great as that required for the Spanish armed forces would prove a daunting prospect for any national treasury, and Spain's is not the most flourishing. Nor is armed neutrality cheap, as members of several parties have recently discovered in the visits already mentioned to Switzerland and Sweden. In general, despite the existence of some distrust of the United States, the love/hate relationship has some degree of the first sentiment which would surely surface if the connection were seen to be in danger. Defence links with France seem obvious enough given the common border and similar concerns. The EEC dimension is not absent from this matter as well. France is anxious for even closer, not less, defence co-operation between the two countries and is likely to be less than amused by a real policy of neutrality taking Spain further away from French influence and co-operation.

As for the forces, for obvious reasons, they would be suspicious of moves toward neutralism. If they are not unanimous about NATO, they are in effect unanimous about anti-communism. While some senior officers would like to see defence concerns return to essentially national

priorities, particularly the struggles against terrorism, even they would be afraid of a total disregard or abandonment of the alignment with the West. Among most junior officers, and the bulk of the navy and the air force, neutrality would be nothing less than anathema.

Finally, while membership in the EEC is possible without full NATO membership, or without even signing the North Atlantic Treaty, it would be ridiculous to suggest there is no significant link between the two international groupings. While the EEC is currently searching for means to achieve a co-ordinated international expression, as part of the growth of West European cohesion, NATO is accepted as being the essential portion of the security aspect of the EEC's international activities. To speak of West German defence policy outside of NATO is meaningless. With the exception of the particular circumstances of the Southern rim of the alliance, the same can almost be said of other European members of NATO. There is a major effort to co-ordinate EEC members' approaches to NATO problems and the Eurogroup gives an even greater dimension to this. Clearly, given the likely future lack of a solely West European alliance, Spain's relations with its new partners, in the security field where Spain is so deeply involved, are naturally within a NATO context. After all, some 65 per cent of the petroleum imports and 57 per cent of important commodity imports of Western Europe (some 400 ships daily) go through the United States-Spanish Zone of Common Interest.¹⁰ The region's strategic interests are deeply tied into the Iberian area and this would be likely to become more, rather than less striking, if the American presence were less obvious. The EEC has strategic interests as a grouping. These involve in a direct way the crucial geographic situation of Spain. This simply must impinge on Spanish desires for neutrality in the long run.

Thus, the neutrality option is open to Spain but is fraught with difficulties of the greatest kind. Even if one rejects the Ballarín argument that a Spanish move to neutrality would be a full-scale disaster for the West threatening the whole East-West balance of forces, it must still be admitted that it is an option which would be difficult in the extreme to implement and which might leave Spain less close than it would like to be to its most important partners while being only

close to countries with which it shared little.

OTHER OPTIONS

If neutrality is not likely to be chosen, for the above as well as other reasons, this is not to say that full NATO membership is the only option. This is far from being the case. A number of possibilities might offer themselves short of full membership of this particular alliance. They are:

- a. A Mediterranean defence grouping;
- b. The PSOE possibility;
- c. Signing the North Atlantic Treaty without incorporation into the alliance military structure;
- d. As for "c" above but with bilateral ties with France; or
- e. Entry into the alliance accompanied by a statement of principle regarding eventual movement toward a Western European defence agreement.

As a connected aspect of proposals to bring the Mediterranean out of great power politics, it has been suggested that a Mediterranean defence grouping be established which would ensure the security of the Mediterranean area through the action of states bordering on that sea. While this is theoretically possible, the odds against it are staggering. The importance of the region and the sea that is its common feature is so overwhelming that it is almost unimaginable that the superpowers could truly restrict their activities there. The differences that divide the countries there unfortunately are much more impressive at the moment than those that link them--historical animosity, economic frictions, religious and cultural incompatibilities, membership in vital non-Mediterranean political, economic and military groupings; such are only a few of the obstacles. In addition, the fact that at least three of the region's countries are NATO members and two others closely tied to Western defence in general (Spain and France), while none are Warsaw Pact members nor are any closely tied to the Soviet Union, means that any such move would be de-stabilizing in that it would be a disaster for NATO while affecting infinitely less the interests of the Soviet Union.

The PSOE alternative, already mentioned, to remain tied to Western defence but have a declaratory policy of neutrality, is more feasible. Inconsistent policy is no rarity in international relations and, at least in the short run, it could be possible to keep the United States and Western European defence links operational while moving much closer to neutral, or at least Third World, groupings. While this would seem to be going against the principal objective Spain has, that is coming closer into line with the European Community, it could still be implemented in all likelihood. Leftist governments, in and out of the Third World, would be happier knowing that at least the NATO link had not been chosen. Rightist governments would look to the realities of the situation and would at least prefer this option to real neutrality.

Spain could also simply sign the North Atlantic Treaty without incorporating its defences into the military infrastructure of the Alliance. This could have some appeal. Spain's "independence" vis-à-vis other powers would be visibly less altered than if full NATO membership were chosen, and the example of France, mutatis mutandis, would show that such independence could be relatively real (leaving aside the nuclear question). However, other than questions of "profile," it is difficult to see how Spain would benefit from such a half-step. The Third World would see that it had chosen to be a Western-aligned country in defence terms. So would the Warsaw Pact with consequences that are obvious for defence planning and targetting of strategic weapons. Nor would Spain have the benefits for its West European policy, its defence, or its armed forces reform and de-politicization that, it is argued, will come with NATO membership.

As a slight variation on this, Spain could sign (or not sign) the North Atlantic Treaty but develop the sort of bilateral defence relations with France that have been mentioned before. This could have advantages for Spain but would also have the same disadvantages as the previous option with the additional one of playing "second fiddle" to France, a situation which many Spaniards would hardly find palatable. Spain would still be seen as Western-oriented, would still be targetted by the Soviet Union, and would have a "tied" policy in Western Europe. Far from being considered less Western, it would be linked to what many

states in the Third World consider to be the archetypal interventionist power.

There is finally the possibility of entering the Western Alliance as a full member but making a statement of principle at the same time as to why and with what long-term goal in mind. This might include statements about eventual West European defence arrangements, excluding the United States and in all likelihood Canada, being desirable. Statements about the future of the Eurogroup, the Western European Union or an Anglo-French nuclear force transformed into a West European one could even be included. The advantages are that, conceivably at least, this might lessen leftist opposition in the Cortes at home and even be a starting point for bargaining in order to achieve some degree of consensus on NATO. One disadvantage is that the reaction of some NATO members, principally the United States and the Federal Republic, would be disappointment at the declaration of principles as damaging to the Alliance. However, it is likely that they would be so pleased to see Spain in NATO that they would accept its "reservations" on this issue. Another disadvantage, obvious in this as in the previous two options, is that Spain would have chosen definitively to be in the Western camp, with inevitable results for its own "Ostpolitik" and some of its extra-European policy.

Hence, the neutrality option is open for Spain. However, it is not only fraught with difficulties but is truly put forward by only one major political formation, the PCE. Options short of full membership of NATO are also open, all of which have their disadvantages and at least some advantages. The PSOE option is really only one of these.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND TIMING

It is not possible to say if the final decision as to Spain's choice of security options has been taken. The government says its choice is made. The UCD contends that Spain will go into NATO and it now seeks only a proper majority in the Cortes for parliamentary approval after a debate on what is already government policy. Since the government can be almost certain of some sort of majority, however slim, on the issue, this does not seem a surprising attitude.

However, NATO entry is really far from a foregone conclusion; Spain has not committed itself as yet and may well not do so for some time. For largely internal reasons this is the case, and those reasons we have discussed above at length. It remains to sum up where the debate on entry now stands within Spain and consider the all-important time factors at work before reaching some sort of conclusion on which way Spain is likely to go.

As far as the government is concerned its policy has not changed greatly. Its determination to enter the Alliance still appears firm. It has not only accepted the need for a parliamentary and national debate on the issue but has actually welcomed the idea in that this allowed it to at least temporarily keep its attention almost exclusively fixed on the vital job of establishing relatively-stable democracy in the country.

Meanwhile, the thinking behind future security policy was only rarely being expressed. The Foreign Minister's March 1977 speech on strategic factors in foreign policy partly clarified the government's position. Speaking of the increasing role of international organizations, and of increasing international interdependence, he placed emphasis on Spain's privileged strategic position and the requirement to fulfil the responsibilities the country had as a result. He rejected isolationism and emphasized the need for Spain, a maritime nation, to avoid that path. In an obvious slap at the PSOE's pro-European political and economic stand but neutralist defence policy, he said, "the cardinal criterion which must guide Spanish policy when contemplating possible alliances cannot be other than that of the congruence ("coincidencia") of interests with one's future associates."¹ While Spain could not expect an absolute

guarantee of its security, NATO would provide more commonality of interests than any other grouping. Spain is an Atlantic, a Mediterranean, and a European country, Mr. Oreja added, and all these facets of its existence require consideration and attention. Clearly only NATO has the dimensions which make of it an Atlantic, Mediterranean and European alliance. Crucial in the government's view, however, appeared to be the vital fact of this high degree of shared interests between Spain and the NATO members--economically, politically, culturally, and hence, in security terms as well.

Delays and domestic problems of all kinds, the need for consensus, and foreign policy questions regarding non-European matters; all these seemed to be reinforcing a trend away from NATO as a government priority. This was underscored by the increasing division between the issues of membership of the EEC and that of the Western Alliance. However, the strength of UCD resolve seemed as strong as ever when Adolfo Suárez made his introductory speech on the UCD programme to the Cortes on 30 March 1979. In a rather uncompromising fashion, he put clearly forward the government's intentions on the matter; while recognizing the need for clear parliamentary support for the idea. He said,

Union of the Democratic Centre is in favour of the adherence of Spain to the Atlantic Alliance. But it understands that our entry into NATO must be carried out, in the event, taking into consideration the adjustments which derive from our particularities and our security needs, as well as the need for a broad parliamentary endorsement. To this body it will fall, at the appropriate time, to debate the theme, analysing rigorously and with imagination the conditions and nature of such an adherence, in the form which would be most favourable for our political and strategic interests. Because truly there are many economic, military, and political factors which must be weighed and there are many possible solutions to which one could come in each of these fields. 2

Thus, Mr. Suárez reiterated the government's intentions without overly tying its hands on the subject. Flexibility within the NATO option was clearly implied and Spain's bargaining position with NATO was not to be hamstrung by overly great rigidity of approach or any

unnecessary hurry to achieve entrance. Among other things, this left the Gibraltar question as one on which some progress would be made, at least in theory, before the NATO membership became a fact.

The debate on the national and parliamentary levels has yet to be launched officially and is gaining momentum only slowly. Indeed, some commentators go so far as to argue that the issue is less debated currently than it has been for some time.

The press debate has probably slowed slightly as of the late spring of 1979. The wave of terrorism following so shortly after the general and municipal elections has meant relatively little interest for international affairs issues. What interest there has been has concentrated on more striking issues such as the Royal and Presidential visits to Africa, the evolution of the Western Sahara problem, fishing difficulties, and moves toward EEC entry.

The parliamentary debate, once begun, can of course be expected to have an enormous impact on the press debate which will undoubtedly closely reflect it. The government can to a great extent control the beginning of these parliamentary discussions and will obviously choose, if possible, timings for them favourable to the UCD's pro-NATO stand. It is highly likely that the UCD will seek first to further prepare public opinion for the NATO entry idea. As we have seen above, public disinterest or even hostility is not unlikely if there is no change, and the government has done virtually nothing to date to effect a change in public attitudes. Various pro-NATO or pro-government individuals, such as Antonio Sánchez-Gijón outside politics and Javier Ruperez and Alberto Ballarín inside, have tried to have some pro-NATO impact on the debate but real official echoes from the cabinet are still awaited.

Nor has the opposition been particularly active. As with the government, so with the PSOE and PCE, there has been far too much on the political schedule to allow for less-than-vital issues to be debated fully. While "Mundo Obrero" has had articles on NATO, and PSOE leaders occasionally mention it, the opposition has been happy to stay generally off the issue. The PSOE is probably moderately embarrassed by it given the socialists' rather bizarre defence links cum neutrality stand. The communists see the issue as not only dangerous internationally but of a

nature to threaten the consensus political arrangements with Spain for which they have worked so hard.

This question of consensus may be a crucial one for NATO, not only within the Cortes but within Spain as a whole. "The UCD government governs," is a favourite political statement by the party's propagandists.³ After the March 1979 general elections, the government by consensus which followed the 1977 elections was supposed to have come to an end. Both major parties suggested they would henceforth play the normal government and opposition roles known in other Western democracies. The Right said as well that it would now be a more "political" force as opposed to being a partner in a consensus. Only the communists publicly mourned what seemed to be the end of the consensus, marked particularly clearly in the 183 to 140 vote split in the Cortes voting on the UCD programme of March 1979.

However, one can still ask if on all issues the "political" aspects will be seen in the same light. There is no doubt that Spain needs consensus still on a number of issues. While foreign policy and counter-terrorism are two obvious examples of this need, the economic policies of the new government are likely to be as well. Spain suffers from high inflation and unemployment. Considerable social unrest and the loosening of formerly-tight authoritarian controls have created a situation where economic disruption could conceivably become widespread. The challenge of the Common Market integration experience could at least temporarily deepen these already-significant difficulties. The previous government, profiting from the consensus atmosphere, had controlled within reason these disquieting forces through a series of wide-ranging social and economic agreements: the so-called Pacts of Moncloa, named after the Palace where they were signed. Given the continuing economic difficulties of the country, it seems unlikely that the government would not wish to do everything possible to re-new and strengthen these accords with a view to assuring a degree of domestic peace for the still-new, and obviously-threatened, Spanish democracy. In order to do this, as well as provide the required agreement on counter-terrorism, the fabric of consensus would have to be at least partially retained at the parliamentary level. After all, this tactic is not new, or even rare, at the moment in the West.

The question arises as to how NATO might affect such a continuation of partial consensus government, at least regarding key issues where the UCD needs the opposition, particularly on its parliamentary left. Professor Raul Morodo has argued, and quite convincingly, that the NATO issue has the potential to disrupt to a great degree prospects for a continuation of some of the more positive aspects of consensus government as practised before the spring of 1979.⁴ The UCD government is in a minority situation. It has good prospects for a long tenure of office but the problems it, and Spain, face are very great, indeed. In this context, is it really likely that the UCD would, or should, embark on the implementation of a policy which is rejected by the second and third largest political parties in the country, who between them represented some 40 per cent of the 1979 popular vote? This is not to say that the mere raising of the NATO issue, or even actually going into the Alliance, would necessarily herald the end of all possibility of consensus on domestic or other foreign policy issues. However, the prospects for the issue damaging severely the chances of the continuation of such consensus are considerable. NATO entry is taken very seriously by the PSOE, who see it in ideological terms as a definite backward step for Spain. For the PCE it is anathema and the end of their neutralist aspirations. The fight on this issue is expected to be a real struggle for all concerned. This is all the more striking when one considers that no other issue of foreign policy would be likely to produce nearly as much heated debate. Spanish foreign policy continued with remarkable consensus since General Franco's death. While there have been some differences on the Western Sahara issue and some very minor ones regarding the schedule of Royal visits, it is fair to say that on almost all issues, the three major parties at least have been in general if not overall agreement. Obviously this is not so with the NATO issue.

One cannot judge, of course, at this time the effect of the debate. It would depend on how the government presented the issue, on the evolution of the PSOE and PCE attitudes regarding the matter and, to some extent, on the reaction of the regional parties. It would also depend on public attitudes but the Cortes, at the moment, are more likely to forge public attitudes than to react to them, at least at the beginning of the

debate. After all, public indifference has been the key-note of the public "debate", such as it has been up to now.

It is possible that the debate could be carried on, and the government win it, with little fuss and with relatively minor damage done to consensus prospects. However, there are a number of difficulties that make this far from the assured result. Clearly, opposition determination to resist is one of these, as seen above. Even more damaging potentially is the interpretation being given to the major UCD statement on the issue --Mr. Suarez's parliamentary address of 30 March 1979. For a start, the left would generally have preferred a referendum on the issue, but this is highly unlikely. However, Mr. Suarez has not assured parliament that nothing will happen without "un amplio respaldo parlamentario." This "broad parliamentary endorsement" of the NATO entry proposal has occasioned much debate. On a matter of major foreign policy significance, what is broad support for an action which, at least in theory, reverses a long national tradition? Some have argued a two-thirds majority, others 60 per cent, others a simple majority, and one guess is as good as another as to what the government really intends.

It seems clear enough that the constitution would only require a simple majority for passage of an endorsement of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, the head of government himself has recognized the need for a special arrangement on this issue and the opposition has already begun to pressure the government to ensure that these special terms do in fact apply. A number of analysts agree that the government could get a simple majority now for passage. This would appear sufficient, however, only if one of the opposition parties abstained rather than voted against entry. It is difficult to conceive at the moment of either the PSOE or the PCE doing so, which raises the question of whether the NATO pill can be "sweetened" by government compromises on other issues about which the opposition feels strongly. It raises the second question of whether an option short of full Alliance membership could not be chosen and receive more general support than unconditional NATO membership now does.

At various points above, mention has been made of timing factors relating to Spain's decision on NATO. There are at the time of writing

two of these which are obvious and there is one more that could be a factor of importance later. The two are the Madrid CSCE meeting and the renewal date of the United States-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.

In late 1980, Madrid will be the site of the next round of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Spaniards of all political persuasions are delighted to be hosts for this major international conference and look forward to it with obvious pleasure. This reaction is of course sustained by the knowledge that Madrid would never have been chosen before the demise of General Franco and that it is a highly visible expression of Spain's new-found international respectability for East and West.

The domestic effect of this meeting being held in Spain has already been felt. The Soviets had made open and negative remarks as to the impact of a Spanish bid to join NATO on the convening of the conference in Madrid. It is only recently that they have more or less abandoned this tactic, at least as a high profile one. Abroad and domestically, however, there are many echoes of this way of thinking regarding the conference. In Spain, many voices of the left, and quite a number from the centre, argue that it is at least illogical, or even foolish, to make a move toward NATO entry before the conference is held. The suggestion is that at the same time that measures are being established to build East-West mutual confidence, Spain, by joining NATO, would be demonstrating its total lack of confidence in Soviet-bloc policy and intentions in Europe.

This argument has been well-received in many circles. Indeed, many factors make it seem unlikely that Spain will make the move before the conference has been held or even soon after. It could appear as simply a hurried move by the government, not considered in the light of its direct international impact, particularly on the search for peace in Europe.

The second time factor, that of the renewal of the Treaty with the United States is, to say the least, of equal or even greater importance to that of the CSCE. In late 1980, all things being normal, negotiations should begin for a renewal of the Treaty. Other than the PCE, no other political formation of importance opposed this renewal and, indeed, were

it not to be renewed, the impact on United States-Spanish relations would be great. The Spanish government, then, would wish to renew the Treaty if a more broad framework for rationalizing their defence could not be arranged. This, of course, would mean NATO.

There is a great deal of discussion as to the impact of this factor on the Spanish internal debate on NATO. On the CSCE issue, there are only two voices: those that say that the CSCE point is irrelevant and that one should join NATO in any case; and those, seemingly much more numerous, who argue that nothing can be lost by a few months' delay, and if one can thereby contribute ever so slightly to détente, why not do so. In the matter of the United States Treaty, however, the issue is less clear. There are, of course, those who do not wish it renewed. There are those who wish it renewed but with slight changes, perhaps the eventual PSOE position. There are those who wish it renewed on the same basis as it applies at the moment. And, lastly, there are those who wish it to be subsumed under a general Spanish and Allied defence arrangement which would almost certainly take NATO as the obvious basis.

There are, leaving aside the PCE, two basic positions on the Treaty insofar as the time factor applies. One suggests that Spain should renew the Treaty and then see about NATO later on. The other suggests that Spain should insist on bringing the Treaty under NATO aegis and doing away with the elephant and mouse aspects of the accord as it now stands. The early 1981 date for renewal may force the issue onto a rather reluctant Madrid government at a time when it would prefer not to be troubled. It would be extremely embarrassing to appear to be dragging one's feet on the issue as had the Franco regime in its last years, though for different reasons. The American preference would also be to see Spain incorporated into the whole fabric of Western defence and thereby for Washington not to need overly-particular defence relations with the Spanish that fell outside of NATO arrangements.

Thus, the government would probably like to go into NATO as soon as possible, before the CSCE and before the United States Treaty renewal comes up. Rumours in Madrid, often of United States origin, suggest they may well have already opted for this course. However, this appears improbable. Of course, the government is pro-NATO and would like the matter

settled. It is well-aware that it will be difficult to again tell the Americans that one would like to include all the "beaux mots" about NATO into yet another Treaty renewal but without doing anything concrete to implement them. Nonetheless, not only the CSCE factor but infinitely more importantly the domestic difficulties with NATO acceptance are far from overcome. Thus one returns to "the debate on the debate" and the prospects for the government to maintain sufficient consensus to see the country through its current problems if it forces NATO through the Cortes without a change in the attitude of at least some of the Alliance's declared opponents.

A further timing factor could conceivably be that of the scheduled enlargement of the EEC. Greece will enter officially on 1 January 1981. Portugal and Spain's negotiations are proceeding. If these negotiations continue to make progress, and a date for entry can be set, there may be enough pro-European sentiment built up in Spain to tempt the government to try something of a package deal. The opportunity, while far from perfect, might under the circumstances be too good to miss. Thus the UCD might attempt to capitalize on economic and political pro-Europeanism to press the issue of further defence links as well. While this has risks, it could be a factor which the government will take into consideration.

A factor also related to timing concerns the actual invitation by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Spain. The North Atlantic Treaty's Article 10 (see Appendix II) states the terms whereby a state in the area can become a member. They make very simple reading: "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."

As we have seen, it is extremely likely that NATO would be willing to offer the invitation at any time. The main point here is the rather obvious one that NATO would not wish to make the offer before there is a virtual certainty of its being accepted. One can easily imagine the humiliation for an already rather long-suffering alliance in tendering an invitation to a friendly state to accede to the Treaty and having the invitation rejected. Thus NATO will watch carefully Spanish political events and will have to be assured of a favourable response to its offer

before the offer is made.

Nor is it impossible that if the delay is too great, some NATO governments' reluctance to tender the invitation would grow because of the impending CSCE negotiations. As seen above, there is some slight reluctance even now because of the Yugoslavian question. This could grow as the CSCE meeting draws nearer although its real impact is perhaps easily exaggerated.

CONCLUSION

The Spain of 1979 is a rather bewildering mix of promise and problems. A relatively-prosperous, increasingly-developed, historic and proud country, it has emerged from a very difficult, extremely long period of decline and is now seeking to find a place in Western Europe as a re-established democracy with a constitutional monarchy of great prestige. In the midst of all this promise, indeed exciting experiment, there are numerous and grave problems. National unity is in jeopardy, terrorism is increasingly brazen, economic problems abound and according to some are likely to get worse; all of which reinforces more historic reasons for concern that the Spanish democracy could easily find itself again imperilled.

Thus on the domestic scene, all is far from bright. Regional movements for autonomy frighten conservative elements fearful of national disintegration. Terrorism has spread alarmingly and has increasingly chosen the armed forces and forces of public order as targets for an obvious attempt to de-stabilize the fledgling democracy. Unemployment is above 10 per cent in a country where, until the very end of the Franco era, it was virtually unknown. Inflation is higher than in almost any other European country and hits hard a relatively recently urbanized population. Lastly, the fuel crisis strikes particularly painfully in this country where natural resources are lacking and fuel sources especially so. These are surely the major difficulties of the country and are accepted by all political forces as being so.

Internationally, the country seems also both full of promise and equally faced with major difficulties not easy to resolve. The Western Sahara problem, left to sort itself out, will not go away. Ceuta and Melilla will clearly only last so long before their already curious status becomes a major problem for Spain. Since 1976 the Canaries have often become the target of the machinations of various African states, particularly Algeria which has used their "Africanization" as a means to pressure Spain to change its attitude on the Western Sahara to a more pro-Algerian one. Gibraltar remains firmly British despite its status as what the Spanish consider a "stain on the nation's honour." Even entry into the European Community has proved more a jungle trail than a garden path for

Spain and Madrid's negotiators are trying desperately to open the way to a new fundamental objective and role for Spanish foreign policy.

Thus, a new democratic state, whose friendship is sought by all the countries of the world, after decades of isolation, relative or even absolute, finds itself confronted with international problems inherited from the past and fraught with difficulties in finding their solutions. Far from finding a "tabula rasa," the first democratic government has faced a series of historic obstacles that have dogged its initial forays in international politics and have made what might have been an idyllic situation very far from it, indeed.

Any Spanish analysis of NATO, and there has been really very little to date, must logically ask where the Alliance fits into the national fabric of problems. Can it help to alleviate them; will it exacerbate them still further; or will it have no impact at all?

On the domestic scene, there is a fair bit to say on this question. We have seen how some elements, particularly in the older sections of the army, feel that a NATO priority will reduce the ability of the state to deal with terrorism. Others point to the debatably higher or lower costs of NATO participation compared to "going it alone" or some other option. Similarly uncertain is whether Spanish industry would gain or lose from the connections. It is, however, likely that the Spanish forces might gain something, in terms of professionalism and even in "de-politicization," through working with other NATO forces. It remains to be seen how much of a real factor this continues to be considered in government circles in Madrid.

Internationally also, clear-cut statements are difficult to make regarding the impact of NATO membership. Clearly, national freedom of choice on specific issues will be reduced, as it is subsequent to every major foreign policy commitment. Relations with non-aligned countries and any general Third World role would be more circumscribed in impact than it would be if Spain remained outside the Alliance; of that there can surely be little doubt. Nor can NATO get Spain out of the Western Sahara embroglio or greatly help it avoid the eventual one over the North African enclaves. While the Gibraltar question could conceivably move toward solution within certain NATO contexts, this is as yet far

from a reality and supple brains will be needed to achieve much on that front--In or out of NATO. Some vague assistance on future Canaries disputes might be afforded by the Alliance, but it can be argued that the NATO connection could also raise the profile of the islands as a target for outside interference.

To the author's mind, the NATO issue for Spain must, in the last analysis, be seen as part of the European issue, as must questions of possible neutrality and a Mediterranean grouping as well. The evolution of Europe as an international entity is at least two decades along. As the expression goes, Spain is mounting on a moving train. For better or for worse, the community which all Spanish political groupings have made their goal and the cornerstone of their external policy has overwhelmingly reacted to its geopolitical situation by forming an Alliance with the United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland and Turkey for collective defence. Eight of the nine countries making up the EEC are signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and both Greece and Portugal as well. Ireland and Spain have little in common and Spain is perceived as vital to Western defence.

If Spain is to take part in the West European experiment, it is not likely long to remain a purely economic and political activity. Most members already accept the EEC's security aspect, even if one must exclude the Irish Republic. That country also appreciates the security aspect but cannot publicly acknowledge this for reasons which have nothing to do with defence since Eire is, in any event, automatically protected by NATO in all but name. Spain, if only because of its crucial position, will be a factor in the defence of Western Europe. Barring enormous changes in the strategic analyses of the EEC's members, Spain can be expected to be asked to increase its defence co-operation with its European partners whether it is in or out of NATO.

The real choice is far from an easy one. The domestic difficulties have already been underscored and are crucial. There is simply no consensus on an issue which needs consensus very much. The decision to go in, while in theory reversible, is in fact hardly that. If Spain were to join the Atlantic Alliance, then change governments, and subsequently leave it, that indeed would be a disaster for the West. Spain

must weigh the consequences with care. If Madrid were to opt for neutrality, it could build policies to suit that stance. However, these in the long run would be unlikely to be compatible with a Western European community moving toward greater independence vis-à-vis the United States Colossus. The choice is really either Europe, with its commitments and general loss of some independence; or neutrality, with the opening of possibilities, albeit limited possibilities, in other areas of the world. Spain will not be able to have its cake and eat it too, although one would think so if one were to listen to the current debate.

In conclusion, it appears that Spain's approach to NATO will continue to evolve as its role in international and European affairs becomes clearer. Because of the lack of domestic consensus, the CSCE meeting, and other priorities, it appears less than likely that Spain will join NATO before very late 1980 although rumours persist of the imminence of such a move. However, barring a true shift to a neutralist vocation, and given relative domestic peace and success with the EEC negotiations, it is likely that Spain would join some time in the very few years following that event. In the long run, if NATO survives, it is extremely likely that Spain will be much more closely-connected. It is also possible that one of the solutions short of full membership may be brought forward to try to overcome the opposition and move toward membership more rapidly.

As Spain becomes more a part of Western Europe, it is believed that a trend will emerge. Slowly but surely, Spaniards will feel a part of the Western European community from which they were so long ostracized. When they have a stake in that European community, then it will be logical for them to wish to take part in its defence. It is essentially for this reason that I believe Spain will in the long run foresake the seemingly admirable but tangibly unrewarding temptations of neutrality in favour of a West European and Atlantic option.

EPILOGUE

The last months of the seventies and the first of the eighties have confirmed the trend away from considering the NATO decision as vital for Spain and requiring immediate attention. Spanish attendance at the 1979 non-aligned conference in Havana, while only as an observer, underscored the indecision of Madrid about which way it should move on security matters.

Near the end of 1979, a consensus of political parties agreed to postpone consideration and debate on NATO membership until after the 1980 Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This was undoubtedly a reverse for pro-NATO elements in Spain as the conference, if held, will presumably highlight matters relating to the advantages to be had by European nations having less, not more, to do with the two blocs. Such a decision was not unexpected, as noted in Chapter IX.

Nonetheless, some other events have heartened NATO supporters within the country. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the illness of Marshal Tito, and the generally unstable conditions prevailing in much of the world, but particularly in the Middle East, have led to some calls for Spain to "stop sitting on the fence" on security issues. The increasing estrangement of the Communist and Socialist parties has also led to the feeling that an anti-NATO front is losing ground within the Cortes and in the country at large. Opposition to the Canaries base complex is also apparently slackening. Lastly, the visit of Herr Schmidt to Madrid in January 1980 can hardly have failed to include some plain talking on the issue from a pro-NATO and influential source.

However, barring very major changes both internationally and domestically, the author does not feel Spain will join NATO until, at the very earliest, late 1980. Even then, it is believed entry is not likely for the reasons elaborated in the body of this study. The recent increase in domestic pressures on the government, especially the questions of terrorism and autonomy for Euzkadi, Catalonia, and Andalusia, make the government less than keen to introduce major foreign policy proposals which are likely to further decrease its popularity.

One is forced to conclude that until there is a greater feeling in Spain that belonging to the Western European community should have a defence dimension, as well as the political and economic one, and that Spain should take a part in building this aspect of a new Europe as well, one can expect the NATO decision to go against the Alliance. Some possibility of a solution favourable to NATO entry is possible if an initiative is undertaken related to the forthcoming extension of the U.S.-Spanish defence accords, but nothing has been made public on this aspect of future Spanish foreign policy to date.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION - Pages i to iii

- ¹ Several other Caribbean and Pacific colonies were, of course, lost at the same time.
- ² E. Allison Peers, The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936, pp. 3-12.
- ³ Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 790.
- ⁴ William L. Langer, Encyclopedia of World History, pp. 985-985.
- ⁵ Thomas, op. cit., p. 789.
- ⁶ Peers, op. cit., pp. 209-212.
- ⁷ Brian Crozier, Franco, pp. 299-326.
- ⁸ Langer, op. cit., p. 980.
- ⁹ Ibid., pp. 435-446.
- ¹⁰ See Arthur Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the West, pp. 45-46.
- ¹¹ "Spain Seeks Association with NATO," International Herald Tribune, 29 September 1976.
- ¹² "Invitation by NATO to Spain," Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1976.

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- ¹ For the most complete discussion of these negative aspects of NATO for Spain, see the Partido de Trabajo's Espana en la Otan?, pp. 133-140.
- ² Ibid., p. 136.
- ³ This has been a feature of the Spanish security scene since the 1950's, as mentioned in Whitaker, op. cit., p. 52.
- ⁴ L. Saez, "España y la Otan," Reconquista, November 1978, p. 59.
- ⁵ Influential foreigners visiting Spain recently have been emphasizing this, but this has been on a private basis with debatable impact. Two examples have been the historian Hugh Thomas and the president of the European Movement Georges Paul Berthoin. For details, see "Diario 16," 20 November 1978, p. 7; and "Pueblo," 5 April 1979, p. 8.
- ⁶ Speech before the Club Siglo XXI, 30 April 1979.
- ⁷ Pedro J. Ramírez, "Diez Razones a favor de la OTAN," ABC, 17 September 1978, p. 7.
- ⁸ Ibid.

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- 2 "God, country, King," and "Everything for the country (fatherland)."
- 3 A. Komorowski, "Spain and the Defense of NATO," p. 193.
- 4 "Reconquista," April, 1979, p. 27.
- 5 Komorowski, op. cit., p. 193.
- 6 Antonia Sánchez-Gijón, España en la Otan, p. 72.
- 7 Komorowski, op. cit., p. 195.
- 8 "Que hace España en materia de armamentos?" Reconquista, April 1979, p. 5.
- 9 Jesús de las Heras, "El tanque vetado por los ingleses y el Aviocar utilizado por Somoza," El País, 25 November 1978, p. 17.
- 10 Source: "La Industria de Guerra en España," Reconquista, April 1979, p. 6.
- 11 "La Industria aeronáutica española," Reconquista, April 1979, p. 9.
- 12 Fernando de Salas López, Español, conoce a tus fuerzas armadas, pp. 52-53.
- 13 Figures on defence expenditure are from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance, 1978-9," pp. 30-31 and p. 88; and from Alvarez de Castro, op. cit., pp. 172-4.
- 14 IISS, The Military Balance 1978-9, p. 90.
- 15 "Nos sobran a los españoles," Pueblo, 26 March 1979, p. 14.
- 16 Whitaker, op. cit., p. 73.
- 17 José de Carranza, "La Legión española," Defensa, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 46-50.
- 18 Crozier, op. cit., p. 351.

- 19 Alvarez de Castro, op. cit., p. 174.
- 20 Antonio Sánchez-Gijón, "Spain's Doubts on the Atlantic Journey," NATO's Fifteen Nations, February-March, 1979, p. 63.
- 21 Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., España en..., p. 235.
- 22 Fernando de Salas Lopez, España, la Otan y los organismos militares internacionales, p. 234.
- 23 Alberto Huerta, "Las Fueras Armadas miran al frente," La Actualidad, 4 June 1978, p. 10.
- 24 J.R. Amat Gutiérrez, "Craiova y los cabos españoles," Pueblo, 23 April 1979, p. 9.
- 25 Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., "Spain's Doubts....," p. 63.
- 26 "El País," 20 February, 1979, p. 20.
- 27 Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., España en..., p. 235.
- 28 Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., "Spain's Doubts...", p. 63.
- 29 Alvarez de Castro, op. cit., p. 34 and elsewhere.
- 30 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 85.
- 31 Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., Espana en la OTAN, p. 234.
- 32 Jesús Ynfante, El Ejército de Franco y de Juan Carlos, p. 64.
- 33 IISS, op. cit., p. 30.
- 34 Carranza, op. cit., p. 48.
- 35 Alvarez de Castro, op. cit., p. 91.
- 36 Fernando de Salas Lopez, op. cit., p. 278.
- 37 José Rivera Izquierdo and Javier de Mazarraza, "España moderniza sus carros de combate," Defensa, July 1978, p. 23.

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- 46 Fernando de Salas Lopez, op. cit., España, la OTAN y los organismos internacionales, p. 239.
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- 7 Press conference by Felipe Gonzalez, quoted in "El Socialista," 25 June 1978, p. 18.
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- 43 Peter Calvocoressi, "Why go-go Castro is planning a visit to Madrid," Sunday Times, 24 September, 1978, p. 10.
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- ¹ The Mediterranean is of course far from being de-militarized. In the region are more than three million soldiers, sailors and airmen deploying 4,200 combat aircraft, 20,500 tanks, 143 surface warships, and 91 submarines. This does not include forces from non-Mediterranean states whose deployment is of course also massive. Sánchez-Gijón, op. cit., España en la OTAN.
- ² Quoted in Felipe González, España y su futuro, pp. 73-4.
- ³ Ibid., p. 82.
- ⁴ Idem.
- ⁵ Talk by Senator Moran at Conference of the International Affairs Institute, Jaca, May 1979.
- ⁶ Kaiser and Schwarz, America and Western Europe, p. 254.
- ⁷ Santiago Carrillo, op. cit., p. 80.
- ⁸ Ibid., p. 77.
- ⁹ C.E. Zoppo, "The West Mediterranean and Its Approaches: A Difficult Strategic Equation," paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs Conference, Jaca, May 1979.
- ¹⁰ Maurizio Cremasco, "The Western Mediterranean and the South-Central Atlantic: A Different Strategic Equation," paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs, Jaca, May 1979.

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- ¹ Marcelino Oreja, published speech before the CESEDEN, "Los Factores estratégicos en la política exterior de España," March 1977, p. 11.
- ² Speech published in "Pueblo", 31 March 1979.
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APPENDIX I

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Few countries could claim to be more historic than Spain. Its geography and position have ensured the active interest of other peoples and states for millenia. One of the first real states of Europe, it is in this century a complex product of the extraordinary past which it has suffered or enjoyed. It is therefore vital to set the scene for the discussion of the aspect of Spain's future which concerns us--its security options--by a brief look at its past.

"Historia no facit saltum", quotes Ortega y Gasset, surely Spain's principal 20th century philosopher.¹ Yet a look at the history of his own country would at least tempt one to query this statement. In many ways, Spain remains to this day a country of extremes. And even if these extremes are not as striking as they often were in the past, the very history of the nation itself shows relatively sudden shifts of considerable impact.

From a series of weak, divided, and warring regions, Spain was able, in a few generations, to become the major imperial power on earth. The country of the Inquisition and the Expulsion of the Moors and Jews is also the country most famous for religious tolerance in the Middle Ages. The greatest empire since Roman times was overturned in a single generation and a state known for its active centralism disintegrated into generations of internecine warfare, political conflict, economic collapse and obscurantism.

History may indeed not make great leaps but if there is one country whose past has come close, it is surely Spain. Of legendary wealth in pre-Roman times, particularly through its southern mines, Spain saw Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians set up colonies in a territory inhabited by Celtiberians, a mix between ancient Iberian peoples and the more recently arrived Celts. After the Celts, however, the first people to occupy the whole peninsula and have a major impact on the country in general were the Romans, a part of whose Empire Spain was to be for six centuries. They were the first to build roads which linked the highly separate regions of the country together. As the second most mountain-

ous country in Europe Spain must have been a great challenge to these superb engineers but master it they did, and the marvels of their skill are still frequently to be seen in still serviceable Spanish bridges, roads, and aquaducts. This somewhat distant corner of the empire provided Rome with statesmen, philosophers, soldiers, and eventually even emperors. Although fiercely independent before the Romans' arrival, the benefits of Pax Romana eventually converted Spain into a model province--loyal and law-abiding.

The fifth century was thus a great shock to Spain as to most of the Western Empire. Left to its own devices, the peninsula was conquered by the Visigoths whose kingdom left few traces. When the tide of Islam reached the Northwestern shores of Africa, there was no force strong enough in southern Spain to ensure that it made no inroads into Western Europe. In 711, a military operation began which brought almost the entire peninsula into Muslim hands. Indeed, only Charles Martel was able to halt Arab expansion and that was only after their arrival at the gates of Tours. This was followed by the seven and one-half century see-saw struggle for the peninsula known to the Spanish as the "Reconquista," arguably the key formative experience of the Spanish people and state. Alternating Moorish and Spanish successes, more frequently in the style of civil than of international wars, crowned the political efforts of a series of independent Muslim and Christian kingdoms in the peninsula. Such was the intrigue that frequently alliances crossed religious bounds and Christians found themselves allied with Muslims against other Christians. The Thirty Years' War, at least in this sense, had nothing over the Reconquista.

The Islamic kingdoms had built a thriving society in Spain, particularly in Cordoba and Granada. All three of the country's major religions lived in relative harmony primarily in Moorish kingdoms, where the arts, commerce, and the traditions of Roman engineering prospered. With the final defeat of the Moors in 1492, Spain attained national unity under "Los Reyes Catolicos"--Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castille. In the same year Spain was launched on its greatest imperial adventure through Columbus' discovery of America.

Spanish power, fed largely by the wealth of the Indies, expanded

into North Africa and the Mediterranean and, linked with the Austrian Habsburgs under Charles V (Charles I of Spain), became a great force in Europe as well. After Charles' death, the Spanish Habsburgs retained the Low Countries and important Italian dominions, to which they were to add in 1581 the vast dominions of Portugal for a period of eighty years. In the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain carried the flag of Catholicism as well as imperial interest not only against the Reformation, but in a continuing sense against Islam. In 1609, Philip III expelled the remaining Moriscos and Jews from Spain, thereby dealing a body-blow to Spain's industry and commerce from which many scholars feel it has yet to fully recover. The vast expense of the wars in Europe, particularly the Thirty Years' War, meant that, to a large extent, the wealth coming from the overseas empire was simply transferred directly to suppliers outside of Spain, indeed often in the Protestant countries of England and Holland. The social opprobrium attached to "trade" in Spain meant that Spaniards of initiative chose the state, the army, or the church as their major fields of endeavour. This, combined with the loss of the bulk of the traditional artisan and commercial classes in the Jewish and Moorish expulsions, brought about a calamitous state of affairs for Spanish industry, and even agriculture to some degree.

The long trail of Spanish land victories ended with the shattering defeat of the once-invincible "tercios" at the Battle of Rocoi in 1643. While most of Europe returned to peace after the Thirty Years' War in 1648, Spain was forced not only to carry on a separate fight with the rapidly ascending strength of France for a further eleven years, but also to quell an enduring, nineteen-year revolution in Catalonia. Finally, in 1659 the Peace of the Pyrenees was signed with France, and the Catalonian revolt was defeated with Barcelona being re-taken. After forty years of warfare, however, Spain was to have only eight years of peace. War with France then continued on and off until the French prince, Philip of Anjou, succeeded to the Spanish throne in 1700, thus touching off the fourteen-year War of the Spanish Succession.

Lest this chronicle of conflict continue unduly, one can sum up the next ninety years as a series of only slightly less frequent but equally costly wars in which Spain was almost invariably one of the

losers. Spain's decline continued despite various Bourbon attempts to improve the administration of the empire abroad as well as the metropolis.

Then came the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which, while in some ways represented Spain's "finest hour," were to cause the final eclipse of the Spanish Empire as a serious power on the international scene. Badly mauled in their interventions on both sides in the Revolutionary wars, the Spanish then suffered the humiliation of the forced abduction and abdication of their king. Rising against the French, the Spanish, with vital British assistance after a long struggle, were free by 1814. They were free to engage fully in the bloody and disastrous wars against the revolutions in Spanish America, and by 1825 the Spanish Empire in the Americas was reduced to the Spanish West Indies alone. Meanwhile, the struggle between liberals and absolutists in Spain had repeatedly produced domestic chaos which eventually brought European military intervention.

The rest of the 19th century confirmed the seemingly irreversible trend. Carlist wars, revolutions, coups d'état, and pronunciamientos were the rule at home. Despite some economic prosperity, the concept of "the two Spains" ("Las Dos Españas") continued to apply. It should be noted that generally "Las Dos Españas" is used to refer to the division of Spain's population into rich and poor. In fact, it was originally used for the perhaps less important, but equally intriguing, concept of the nation divided into "official Spain," being the horrendous weight of the government and bureaucracy; and "vital Spain," being the reality of Spanish life.² The rich and the poor were clearly established but the growth of a large bourgeoisie was still only being prophesied in the 19th century, not really fulfilled. Indeed, economic growth created an even larger bloc of urban poor. Labour unrest, particularly in centres such as Barcelona, culminated in the anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist movements gaining support and becoming active. The end of the century brought final imperial collapse in the Americas and Asia with the mercifully rapid defeat of the Spanish forces in the war with the United States.

Our own century therefore began with anything but a "tabula rasa." With nearly three centuries of imperial decline approaching its end, the country faced enormous difficulties. The lack of natural resources, the loss of historic markets, the failure of capitalist creation, and the

seemingly hopeless state of the national finances, made the economic situation seem dismal indeed. Socially, revolutionary movements continued to prosper, culminating in the 1909 general strike and anti-clerical insurgency in Catalonia.

Governments succeeded one another every few months until the European war broke out in the summer of 1914. Spain declared its neutrality in the conflict while the King gave France assurances that, if the Pyrenees were denuded of French troops, France would not be threatened by Spain.

Spain then entered into a period of four relatively good years. The war sent demand soaring for all sorts of products, some of which Spain could supply. Iron and munitions requirements in particular led to major growth in Spanish industry, particularly in Catalonia. Despite labour difficulties, growing Catalonian regionalism, and difficulties in Spanish Morocco, the country prospered with high prices for agricultural products stimulating production in many areas.

Shortly after the war, the Rif rebellion in Morocco gained even further momentum culminating in the total military disaster at Anual where the Spanish army was defeated and lost some 12,000 men. Political crises, connected with the rebellion and Catalan separatism, erupted and ended with the coup of September 13, 1923, when General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power and established military law throughout the country. A full dictatorship was set up and friendly links were established with Fascist Italy, but popular disquiet led to the King naming Primo de Rivera prime minister but without dictatorial powers. In 1930, his resignation marked the growth of Republican and other opposition forces, and the 1931 elections brought a Republican victory and the flight of King Alfonso XIII.

A constituent assembly with a large Socialist and Republican majority was elected and drafted a Republican constitution which separated Church and State, secularized the educational system and nationalized Church property. Not only was Catalonia given special status, but the government was empowered to undertake nationalization and extensive agrarian reform.

Conservative and extremist radical elements violently opposed

the Republic over the next two years and other separatisms raised their heads demanding similar status as that enjoyed by the Catalans. When the elections of 1933 were held, this time for a regular assembly, 41 per cent of the seats went to the Rightist parties while only 21 per cent went to the left. Spain drifted towards chaos as syndicalist, anarchist, anti-clerical, communist, and fascist violence spread rapidly. Successive cabinets were unable to bring order to the country. In January 1936, new elections were victoriously fought by the Left on a Popular Front basis. Anti-clerical policies, land reform, and the granting of regional autonomies were re-instated and rightist violence began to grow.

On the 18th of July the coup d'état manqué that was to lead to the Civil War was mounted. It is impossible to say much about the war in a brief way. Its cost was immense. In three years, many areas of the country had been ravaged, and the fighting was often extremely fierce. Foreign intervention, particularly German and Italian but also Soviet, featured prominently and followed clear ideological lines. Estimates are varied, one that some 700,000 fatal battle casualties had been suffered, hundreds of thousands more wounded or maimed for life, as well as another 15,000 persons killed in air raids. Some 30,000 people were said executed or assassinated in the brutal reprisals or counter-reprisals succeeding major local changes in the balance-of-power between Republicans and Nationalists.³ The economic cost was incalculable and the new Nationalist government was able to convince Hitler that Spain was in no condition to afford significant assistance to "the cause" when the European war broke out just five months after the Civil War's end. Europe itself had split along ideological lines and volunteers favouring both left and right had arrived in large numbers to fight alongside Spaniards or at least theoretically-similar political convictions. Particularly for the liberal democratic left of Western Europe the war became a crusade against fascism. The memories of this political persuasion have been long and have had a major impact on the attitude of European NATO members to Spain. No less long has been the memory of Spaniards about the horrors of the war. It cannot be over-emphasized that one of the great unifiers of the Spanish people, both during and since Franco's regime, has been a widespread desire to avoid repeating the experiences

of the 1936-1939 conflict.

Spain desperately needed to remain out of the Second World War. Shattered by its domestic conflict, it could ill afford military adventures abroad. While Spain had objectives which were heavily dependent on an Axis victory--Gibraltar's recovery and possible territorial gains at the expense of French North Africa--Franco steered away from actual military activity against the Allies. This was limited to the 'volunteers' making up the "Blue Division," sent to fight alongside the Germans in the invasion of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it was no secret that grosso modo the regime hoped for an early Axis success and supported the German war effort in various ways until very late in the campaign.

During the whole of the Franco period, according to Jose Mario Armero, the author of the major work on Franco's foreign policy, Spanish policy was dominated by the great man himself.⁴ Foreign relations were seen by the Generalissimo as essentially one more aspect of national life requiring attention if the regime's stability was to be ensured. He was far from personally interested in international relations and before becoming caudillo had had virtually no exposure to foreign issues or indeed foreign countries. His policy was "a slow game, without dynamism, full of patience, which pursues adapting to circumstances."⁵

SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Spain's security relations have always been a high priority with the country's government, either as a function of the crusading, expansionist spirit of the country before the mid-17th century or more latterly related to the requirement to defend what it had already. Imperial expansion in the West was achieved by Spanish efforts alone. In Europe and Africa, however, it was accomplished with the Austrian Habsburgs, and for a time with the Portuguese, as part of a general European effort against Islam. Generally speaking, it was done in association with other like-minded Catholic countries. Threats to the Empire, however, were quickly on the horizon. The challenge of the growth of French power was met either alone or in league with the Austrians or others. While for long successful, these efforts eventually failed. The challenge of the English at sea was originally, and un-

successfully, met by the Spanish alone. The long decline of the empire, combined with the arrival of the Bourbons, made an alliance with France seem a permanent feature of Spain's foreign policy for most of the 18th century, a feature only destroyed by the coming into being of a revolutionary regime in Paris.

Spain had thus been allied with various powers over the three centuries, 1492-1792. Having opposed the growth of British power on the seas and French on the land, and having failed in its opposition to both, Spain then suffered through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and even lost the bulk of its overseas empire. Given the vicissitudes of the early 19th century in Spain, and the continuing domestic difficulties of the country, it is hardly surprising that Spain sought to reduce its commitments and entanglements abroad after the final success of the South American revolutionaries in 1825. Worn out and divided, the Spanish state sought effective neutrality as a means of avoiding the heaped up disasters of the previous third of a century. However, it was more by accident than by design that Spain retained neutral status for over a century.

Spain has entered no full-fledged Alliances since the Napoleonic Wars. From a major actor on the international scene, Spain had passed to being a target of other powers' ambitions and even a battle field for others' operations. The full significance of this decline in power was made clear by the events of 1808-1814, after which Spain sought to put its own house in order, or at least reduce the disorder. While this process has been long and difficult, it has required reduced activity abroad. Neutrality has seemed to many Spaniards to have provided the answer.

Madrid was able to avoid international wars in Europe from 1815 to the present. This is, of course, an extraordinary record, equalling Sweden's and surpassing Switzerland's. Despite the debacle of the Spanish-American War of 1898, most Spaniards reckon that neutrality has served them well.

What are the facts of this neutrality, though? How has Spain been able to accomplish this extraordinary feat of keeping out of European wars for over a century and one-half? It is the author's belief that the success of neutrality for Spain has been more the result of the general international situation than of real Spanish attempts to avoid

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
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conflict. For a start, the period 1815-1914, largely that of the Pax Britannica, was remarkably free of major European wars. Barring small localized conflicts, the only ones during this period were those involved with German or Italian unification. Spain easily avoided these.

Keeping out of the First World War was undoubtedly a major achievement for Spain. Spain had not joined any alliances before the war despite various pressures to do so, and had thereby put itself in a position to profit from the war rather than suffer through it. However, internal and external factors before and during the war assisted Spain in not making a choice as to whether to join the Entente or the Central Powers. Spain's population would not have unanimously approved either option, nor was Spain leaning internationally towards a complete community-of-interests with either one grouping or the other.

Neutrality was again an easily maintained policy from 1918 to 1936, largely as a result of the international context and the League of Nations. In the Civil War, Spain was the focus of the activities of two expansionist ideologies and the great powers that championed them. These were, of course, communism and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and fascism and Germany and Italy on the other. The victorious Nationalists enjoyed very close relations with the Axis powers after the war. Spain signed the Anticomintern Pact in March 1939, and in the same year signed friendship treaties with Germany and Portugal. Out of friendship for its Italian and German associates, Spain withdrew from the League. With the outbreak of war, Spain declared its neutrality but assured the Axis powers that this neutrality was imposed by economic and military weakness, not by any hesitance to support the cause of fascism. In any case, by the treaty with Portugal and the agreement therein not to allow Spanish territory to be used for aggressive purposes against Portugal, Spain had given "advance notice" of its neutrality,⁶ for Portugal was, and is, Britain's oldest ally. In the early stages of the war, however, such neutrality was not such an obvious rebuff to Germany for, of course, Italy as well was enjoying such status.

The economic gains so impressive with Spanish neutrality in the First World War began to be seen again. With France's defeat, Franco abandoned neutrality for the status of a benevolent "non-belligerent,"

a condition which appeared more pro-Axis without demanding a real military effort. Economic relations were still more Western-oriented than German. In October 1940, the famous Hendaye meeting between Franco and Hitler took place. Hitler wanted Spain to fully join the Axis and to assent to German forces assaulting Gibraltar. Franco came only "to appear willing" but determined to avoid specific commitments.⁷ He asked if Germany could supply food, weapons, and other goods for Spain's desperate straits. Franco emerged the winner, from not only this but future wrangles with the Germans. Increasing pressure for Spanish entry into the war subsided dramatically with the invasion of the Soviet Union and the offer of what was to become the Blue Division smoothed matters considerably.

Whatever one can say of the attempts to lessen Spain's role in the war, it must be admitted that especially friendly relations with the Axis lasted until very late in the war. The truth of this statement, not appreciated by the Franco government, has been confirmed by recently-released material. Spain was not really neutral. Franco knew his regime would be likely to suffer gravely if the Allies won outright. Nor did he wish an absolute Axis victory which would leave Germany overly dominant in Europe. He did want the defeat of Soviet Russia and attempted, and largely succeeded, in keeping his options open. He did not get drawn militarily into the war, except with the Soviets and that with "limited liability." Spain did afford limited facilities to Axis forces on the peninsula and provided easy access for the Axis to obtain goods they wanted from the country. Indeed, even late in the war, Spain apparently continued to trans-ship some imports from the Allies on to the Axis powers.

Nonetheless, through the formula of "non-belligerency," Franco was able to maintain a semblance of Spanish neutrality. Since this suited the Allies, and particularly the United Kingdom, for some time, Spain's status was recognized as such despite the special favours the country provided to the Axis. As we shall see, only the semblance of neutrality has remained a constant with Spain since 1939, except for the period 1945-1953, despite the realities being easily interpreted somewhat differently.

As the tide shifted in the war, Spain found itself in increasing difficulty with the soon-to-be-victorious Allies. Its ministers abroad complained to the Allies that Spain had had to become closer to the Germans to avoid invasion but that the support for Hitler was not real. With the Axis defeat, Spain found itself outside the new Allied club--the United Nations--ostracized and still extremely weak. Indeed, the United Nations not only ignored but attacked the Franco regime. The term "fascist" stuck and it appeared incongruous to many that after the war to stamp out that ideology, one fascist state still existed. Anti-Franco opposition re-doubled its efforts but, without massive outside intervention, the defeat of the regime was extremely doubtful.

Franco began to weaken the opposition to his regime internally, notably through concessions to the monarchists, and to actively seek friendship wherever it could be found in the outside world. It was in the following years that Spain established the foreign policy interest in courting the favour of Latin America and Arab countries, (to be discussed later). Desperate to find international respectability and an end to the extreme isolation in which the regime found itself, these planks in the platform of Spanish foreign policy were inevitable. Similar regimes existed in Latin America which also sought friends elsewhere.⁸ Naturally Spain was interested in securing their friendship. Israel's anti-Nazi stance automatically opposed Franco's regime. This prompted the Spanish to make something of a virtue out of necessity by not recognizing the new state and thereby gaining some acceptance from Arab countries.

The Cold War and the Korean Crisis were to prepare the groundwork, however, for the beginning of a return to the Western "family." With the formation of NATO in 1949 and the appearance for many of a need to halt communism's advance, Spain began to seem less sinister for many Western Europeans and North Americans. The year 1950 saw the first relaxation of United Nations' opposition to Franco; and American, British, and French ambassadors returned to Madrid early the next year. The same year, 1951, marked Spanish entry into the first agencies of the United Nations.

The 1950's saw Franco aim particularly at establishing closer rela-

tions with Washington and the Vatican. In both cases he was successful. The regime's anti-communism now bore fruit, however tardily, and not only were relations improved with both these centres but in 1952 a concordat was signed with the Holy See and a military accord and base agreement with the United States. Not only was the regime no longer ostracized fully by the West, but it became a de facto ally in at least "quasi-alliance."⁹ The danger of Western support for domestic opposition to Franco virtually disappeared at a stroke. In return, Franco promised that Spanish support for the West, in the event of Soviet aggression, was "completely assured."¹⁰

Spain had gratefully abandoned real neutrality for the security and friendship of the West. Nonetheless, Spanish desires to complete the switch by joining NATO, the Western European Union, and the Council of Europe were effectively hamstrung by the absolute opposition of the left in almost all member countries of these organizations. This attitude continued through the next twenty years of the regime's existence to defeat all attempts at including Spain in the Alliance.

Various attempts were made, both by Spain and on its behalf by the United States, to force open the NATO door. The United States steadily expanded its assistance programme and base arrangements, naval and air, in the country; but nothing could budge the traditional opposition to the regime in the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, and, when under Labour governments, the United Kingdom as well. The French reaction varied slightly depending on essentially French strategic perceptions. The Germans generally backed American initiatives but for obvious historical reasons not very loudly.

For the United States, the interest in Spain joining NATO was obvious. Its own close relations with the Franco regime could be an embarrassment if not closely-seconded by other Western democracies. It highly valued Spain's strategic position and its firmness in the anti-communist struggle. The same could not be said for all the Western Europeans. They were laying the groundwork for, and eventually building, a democratic European union. The Franco regime was anathema to them and an obvious denial of their most cherished principles. They stood firmer on Spanish accession to the EEC, when the question arose,

than they did on NATO. There was no question of close relations and no consideration of the idea of Spanish membership. Eventually a purely commercial agreement with the EEC was signed in 1970, surely the classic example of "too little too late," as far as Madrid was concerned.

In the last years of the regime, further efforts were made to expand the connection with NATO and the EEC. Little progress was made, again largely because of the reaction of the Western European left to the Franco regime. Real progress in ending isolation had proved somewhat difficult to establish. As late as 1975-76, the NATO left was still rejecting Spanish membership in the Alliance. In 1973, Spain's Arab "friends," while not actually restricting sales to Franco, provided no special arrangements to Madrid, nor did they lower their price from those offered elsewhere. The EEC and other Western European bodies maintained a negative attitude to the regime. Indeed, only the communist countries appeared truly interested in closer relations with Spain.

The monarchy of King Juan Carlos I also had, at least initially, a difficult job dismantling the built-up opposition to closer relations with NATO and the West. Europe and NATO were originally and understandably slow in reacting to the new regime's overtures. Despite the change of leaders in November 1975, and the increasing importance of Spain to the Alliance through the losses of bases in France, Malta, and North Africa, the European left continued to oppose early efforts by the monarchy to enter NATO until it was proven to be sufficiently democratic. Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom continued to lead the opposition as of the autumn of 1976.

With the referendum on democracy scheduled for December 1976 and intense Spanish diplomatic activity, the opposition bloc began to weaken. In November of that year, Spain was invited to send parliamentary observers to future meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly, with the proviso, however, that this could be done "as soon as Spain had its next free General Election."¹¹ In addition, it was made clear that Spain's membership in the Alliance could not be considered "until such time as a truly democratic system of government has been fully restored..."¹²

The Americans by now fully realized that only a European invitation to Spain to join NATO could make sense. The new democracy clearly saw

NATO and EEC membership, at the beginning, as being closely linked. Spanish leaders hoped that full incorporation into both bodies could be arranged but the greater importance of the EEC, given Spain's economic difficulties, became steadily more obvious to all.

Despite increasingly great attention being paid to the EEC, security matters continued to loom large. A "Protocol of Collaboration" with France had already allowed for increased military co-operation in mid-1970. Naval co-operation with the United States Navy and other NATO Navies moved forward rapidly with democratization becoming a reality.

Eventually, however, internal political factors temporarily intervened. The opposition to NATO membership and support for the EEC in the major leftist parties meant that the centrist government elected in June 1977 to draft the new democratic constitution had to face a difficult situation. It wanted desperately to rule through consensus while Spain moved through the rather uncertain first two year's of democracy. If it raised the NATO entry issue, it was likely to lose that consensus at a point when Spain most needed it. The result has been continued emphasis on the negotiations for EEC membership combined with a decision to defer the decision on NATO until after a national debate on the subject has been completed. This has meant NATO's being put distinctly on a "back burner" and it is difficult to see exactly when its priority with the government will be increased. The government of Spain remains committed to the idea but the opposition's negative attitude remains firm on the issue. Already the debate has been delayed and many time factors must now weigh in the government's mind.

FOOTNOTES

APPENDIX I - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

- ¹ "History does not make a leap," Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Sobre las carreras," in Misión de la universidad, p. 147.
- ² Arthur Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the West, p. 102.
- ³ William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, pp. 984-985. However, after extensive research Hugh Thomas comes to the figure of some 400,000 violent deaths, and believes there to have been 100,000 of other war-related causes. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 790.
- ⁴ José Mario Armero, La Política exterior de Franco, p. 69.
- ⁵ Idem.
- ⁶ Brian Crozier, Franco, p. 303.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 328.
- ⁸ The memorial in the Army Museum in Madrid to those countries (all Latin American) which supported the regime's attempt to enter the United Nations in the 1940's includes only one type of government.
- ⁹ Whitaker, op. cit., p. 44.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 53.
- ¹¹ "Spain Seeks Association with NATO," International Herald Tribune, 29 September 1976.
- ¹² "Invitation by NATO to Spain," Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1976.

APPENDIX II

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C., 4 April 1949

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6¹

For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France², on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

(1) The definition of the territories to which Article V applies has been revised by Article 11 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

(2) On 16th January 1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on 1st July, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on 3rd July, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3rd July, 1962.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.

APPENDIX III

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Governments of Spain and of the United States of America;
Impelled by their shared concern for the maintenance of world peace
and security;

Affirming that their cooperation is beneficial for the security of
both countries; strengthens the defense of the West; plays an important
part in the security arrangements for the North Atlantic and Mediterran-
ean areas; and contributes to the achievement of their shared goals;

Desiring to reaffirm and strengthen the friendship between their
peoples and to continue and enrich the cooperative relationship which
exists between the two countries, in the spirit of the Declaration of
Principles between Spain and the United States of America, of July 19,
1974;

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The close cooperation between the two countries on all matters of
common concern or interest will be maintained and developed on a basis
of sovereign equality. This cooperation shall encompass economic, edu-
cational, cultural, scientific, technical, agricultural, and defense
matters, as well as other matters upon which they may mutually agree.

The Governments of Spain and the United States of America will keep
their cooperation in all these areas under continuous review and seek to
identify and adopt all appropriate measures for carrying out this co-
operation in the most effective manner possible with a view to maintain-
ing a balance of benefits, equal and effective participation of both
parties, and coordination and harmonization of their efforts with those
which may be being made in other bilateral and multilateral contexts.

For these purposes, a Spanish-United States Council is established
under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of Spain and the Secre-
tary of State of the United States of America. The functions and or-
ganization of the Council are set forth in Supplementary Agreement
Number One. The Council will meet at least semi-annually.

ARTICLE II

Given the increasing international importance of economic affairs,
the two parties will seek to develop their economic relations so as to
ensure mutual benefit under conditions of equitable reciprocity and to
promote, in particular, cooperation in those fields which facilitate
development. That cooperation shall also take into account the impact
which the state of the economy of each country has on its defense efforts.
Their economic relationship will be carried out in accordance with Supple-
mentary Agreement Number Two.

ARTICLE III

Given the relations of friendship which exist between the peoples of Spain and the United States of America, and recognizing that science and technology are essential factors in meeting the growing needs and in furthering the general economic development of both countries, the two Governments will carry out a broad program of scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful purposes. In the framework of that cooperation, they will direct their efforts principally to areas having the most significance to the social and economic welfare of their peoples, and to developmental progress. Their relations in these areas will be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number Three.

ARTICLE IV

In order to continue to expand their cooperation in the educational and cultural fields with a view to furthering the familiarity of their peoples with the important cultural achievements of the other and to strengthen the friendship and understanding between their peoples which provide the necessary foundation for the overall cooperative relationship between the two countries, their relations in these areas will be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number Four.

ARTICLE V

Having recognized that their cooperation has strengthened the security of the Western World, and contributed to the maintenance of world peace, there is established a defense relationship between Spain and the United States of America. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles of July 19, 1974, they will, through this defense relationship, seek to enhance further their own security and that of the Western World. To such end, they will seek to develop the appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces. This coordination will be carried out by a coordinating body set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Five.

To further the purposes of this Treaty, the United States of America may use specific military facilities on Spanish territory, in accordance with the provisions set forth in Supplementary Agreement Number Six. The two parties will also, for these ends, cooperate in the acquisition as well as the production of appropriate material for their armed forces, in accordance with the provisions of Supplementary Agreement Number Seven.

ARTICLE VI

In view of the contribution the use of the facilities mentioned in Article V makes to the defense of the West, the parties, through mutually agreed steps, will seek on the basis of reciprocity and equality to harmonize their defense relationship with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area. To this end, they will, periodically, review

all aspects of the matter, including the benefits flowing to those arrangements from the facilities and make such adjustments as may be mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty and its Supplementary Agreements shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification between the two Governments and will remain in force for five years, whereupon they may be extended for an additional five year period if the parties so agree.

ARTICLE VIII

In order to facilitate the withdrawal of the personnel, property, equipment and materiel of the Government of the United States of America located in Spain pursuant to Article V of this Treaty and its Supplementary Agreements, a period of one year from the termination of the Treaty is provided for the completion of withdrawal which will begin immediately after such termination. During that one year period, all the rights, privileges and obligations deriving from Article V and its Supplementary Agreements shall remain in force while United States forces remain in Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
THE UNITED STATES-SPANISH COUNCIL

(Number 1)

ARTICLE I

The United States-Spanish Council will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It will review the cooperation under that Treaty; examine any problems which may arise as well as measures which might be taken to deal with them; consider steps to facilitate or improve United States-Spanish cooperation; and submit to the Governments such findings and recommendations as may be agreed. The Council will also be charged with carrying out the consultations provided for in Article III of Supplementary Agreement Number six.

ARTICLE II

The Council will be chaired by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Spain, and will meet at least semi-annually. Each Chairman will have a Deputy who will serve as Permanent Representative on the Council and assure its functioning in the absence of his Chairman. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each party or their designated representatives will be permanent military representatives on the Council. The parties shall designate such other representatives and advisors to the Council and its subsidiary bodies as they deem appropriate, taking into account the variety of matters which may be before the Council at any particular time and the need for adequate representation on the Council from responsible ministries and departments.

ARTICLE III

The Council will have under its aegis a Joint Economic Committee, a Joint Scientific and Technological Affairs Committee, a Joint Educational and Cultural Affairs Committee, and a Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs. It may form such other committees and subsidiary bodies as may be deemed appropriate to facilitate the performance of the Council's functions.

The Committees and other subsidiary bodies will seek to resolve problems and advance cooperation in their areas of competence to the fullest extent possible without formal referral to the Council. They shall periodically report to the Council on matters which have come before them, actions taken, progress made, and make appropriate recommendations to the Council.

The Council will be assisted by a Permanent Secretariat under the joint direction of a United States and a Spanish Secretary, with appropriate staffing mutually agreed upon.

ARTICLE IV

In order to establish the necessary coordination between them and to ensure greater effectiveness of the reciprocal defense support granted by each to the other, the two parties agree to establish a Joint Military Committee dependent on the Council, composed of the two Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or their designated representatives, which shall meet semi-annually.

Dependent on this Committee and as a working body, there shall be constituted a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, as provided in the Supplementary Agreement on Bilateral Military Coordination.

The respective co-directors of this Combined Staff shall serve as permanent representatives of the Chairmen of the Joint Military Committee.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of obtaining the maximum effectiveness in cooperation for Western defense, the United States-Spanish Council, as one of its basic objectives, will work toward development of appropriate coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In furtherance of this purpose, the Council will establish by mutual agreement a commission formed by members of the two contracting parties which shall propose to the Council specific measures to promote the establishment of meaningful coordination.

ARTICLE VI

The Council will have its seat at Madrid, where it will be provided with suitable facilities by the Government of Spain.

The administrative support for meetings of the Council and its subordinate bodies will be provided by the Spanish Government inasmuch as it is the seat of the Council. Permanent administrative costs of the Council, including salaries of any employees of the Council, will be shared equally. Each party will bear the cost of its own participation in the work of the Council, including salaries of its members of the Secretariat.

The representatives, advisors, experts and other participants of each party in the work of the Council or its subordinate bodies shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when in the territory of the other, in accordance with the norms to be agreed.

ARTICLE VII

This agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

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Done in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

ON

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

(Number 2)

ARTICLE I

In their economic relations, the United States and Spain will be guided by their shared desire to encourage economic growth, trade expansion, and other economic relations among nations, and by the principles contained in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments reaffirm their determination to intensify their commercial relations and to take all appropriate steps to encourage the growth of their respective exports. In order that this growth may take place on a basis acceptable to both parties, they will seek to avoid the development of a disequilibrium that could be mutually disadvantageous to their overall economic relationship. To this end, the two Governments will seek to avoid imposing restrictions on the flow of trade between them in accordance with their obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other existing international agreements.

ARTICLE III

The two Governments agree on the desirability of having a normal flow of United States direct investment to Spain, and to that end they will endeavor to arrive at appropriate and mutually agreeable measures to facilitate such an investment flow, within the limits of their respective laws and international obligations.

ARTICLE IV

Both Governments recognize the importance of the role played by the Export-Import Bank of the United States both in stimulating the purchase of United States capital goods by Spanish enterprises and in assisting the progress of Spain's energy and industrial development program, and therefore they will seek to strengthen these financial relations in the future.

To this end, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, in order to contribute to Spain's development, is currently prepared to commit credits and guarantees of approximately \$450 million for Spanish companies.

ARTICLE V

The Government of Spain reiterates its objective of achieving its full integration in the European Economic Community, and the Government of the United States declares its favorable understanding of this Spanish objective. The two Governments agree to maintain contact in seeking to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions of any problems that may arise for either of them in this connection.

ARTICLE VI

In order to facilitate achievement of the goals established in Article II, the two Governments will reinforce their consultations regarding the most appropriate manner in which Spain can qualify for the benefits of the generalized system of preferences provided for in the United States Trade Act of 1974.

ARTICLE VII

The two Governments reaffirm their interest in carrying out a regular program of consultations on all economic matters of mutual interest. To that end, they agree to establish a Joint Economic Committee under the United States-Spanish Council. The Joint Economic Committee will monitor bilateral economic relations, discuss matters of mutual interest, seek to resolve problems which may arise, and make appropriate recommendations for furthering their economic cooperation.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain. It supersedes the Agreement of July 15, 1968, establishing a United States-Spanish Economic Committee.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

(Number 3)

ARTICLE I

The common efforts of the two Governments under their program of scientific and technological cooperation will, in conformity with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, be directed principally to those fields of applied research and technological development having the most significance to the social and economic welfare of the peoples of the United States and Spain. In this context, the fields of energy, industrialization, environmental and urban problems, agriculture, and natural resources are recognized as having particular importance to developmental progress. Both Governments will give early and special emphasis to these fields within the program of cooperation.

ARTICLE II

Cooperation between the two Governments will be based on the following principles:

- a. mutuality of interest;
- b. selection of specific scientific and technical sectors of major interest; and
- c. preparation of plans for collaboration between institutions and entities of the two countries.

Their cooperation and activities in the fields of science and technology will be subject to the legislative requirements of the two countries, including the annual appropriation of funds.

ARTICLE III

Cooperation may take such forms as deemed appropriate, including but not limited to:

- a. joint or coordinated planning, support, or implementation of projects and the supply of equipment;
- b. exchange of scientific and technological information, subject to the conditions agreed to by the two countries;

c. establishment, operation, and utilization of scientific and technical installations related to individual projects; and

d. exchange of scientific and technical personnel related to the cooperative projects and activities contained in this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Cooperative programs and activities may be the subject of specific agreements for their appropriate implementation.

ARTICLE V

Scientific and technical cooperation shall be effected as follows:

a. annual programs composed of sets of specific projects financed by contributions from the United States Government;

b. special programs in which each participant will, in general, bear the costs pertaining to its obligations;

c. funding for annual and special programs shall be subject to the availability of the necessary funds.

ARTICLE VI

Cooperation in science and technology shall be coordinated through the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation which shall be responsible for:

a. formulation of an annual program of scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries;

b. review of all programs, activities, and operations, including the preparation of an annual report; and

c. the Joint Committee may recommend to the Governments modification, postponement, or termination of programs, where warranted, after consultation with all affected agencies and institutions.

ARTICLE VII

The annual program of scientific and technical cooperation, under this Agreement, shall be established through exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States at Madrid, or through formal decision of the United States-Spanish Council, acting on the basis of recommendations of the Committee.

ARTICLE VIII

Scientific and technical information of a non-proprietary nature resulting from cooperation under this Agreement shall be made available to the world scientific community through customary channels in accordance with normal procedures.

The disposition of any patents, know-how, and other proprietary property derived from the cooperative activities shall be provided for in the specific agreements referred to in Article IV.

ARTICLE IX

Each Government will facilitate, consistent with law, the entry and exit of equipment and material to be utilized in cooperative activities under this Agreement, as well as the personal effects of scientific and technical personnel and their families.

ARTICLE X

Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude or prejudice scientific and technological cooperation outside the terms of this Agreement by institutions of the United States or Spain or by nationals of either country with each other or with third parties.

ARTICLE XI

Institutions, organizations, or entities of third countries may participate in cooperative programs or activities with the joint approval of the Governments of the United States and Spain.

ARTICLE XII

Programs and activities currently in force and established by the competent authorities shall not be affected by this Agreement. However, they may be included in this Agreement when both Governments so decide.

ARTICLE XIII

In the field of energy, both Governments consider that cooperation in research and development in nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of energy and energy conservation is important. To increase cooperation in energy research and development, both Governments will endeavor to remain within the framework of cooperation in the context of the International Energy Agency and will ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, appropriate research linkages are maintained with the organization and its member countries.

ARTICLE XIV

With respect to nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, the areas of interest for both countries which shall receive early consideration in the development of cooperative programs and institutional agreements will include: basic physics research, reactor technology, fuel safety and treatment, radioactive metrology, contamination, and radioactive wastes.

ARTICLE XV

Cooperation in solar energy research and its applications for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use is of interest to both countries and shall receive early consideration in the preparation of the general cooperation agreements and in the development of special programs within those agreements.

Both Governments will also give consideration to cooperation on other forms of energy.

ARTICLE XVI

In the field of environmental and urban problems, both Governments recognize the usefulness of annual programs already carried out, and consider it desirable to increase this cooperation wherever possible, giving special attention to the following aspects:

- a. monitoring, reduction, and, where feasible, elimination of environmental pollution;
- b. conservation and protection of reserves and natural areas, including their fauna; and
- c. urban and regional planning directed to improvement of the quality of human life.

ARTICLE XVII

In the field of agriculture, both Governments recognize the continuing importance that cooperation holds for the peoples of each country and of the world, and will continue to encourage, as appropriate, cooperation in such programs and activities as may be of mutual interest. These may include, inter alia, agricultural scientific research, agricultural health standards, professional training, exchange of instructors and researchers, and exchange of information for technical and scientific progress in agriculture. In the development of cooperative programs, the special problems and priorities of each country shall be taken into account.

ARTICLE XVIII

In the area of natural resources, both Governments recognize the importance of research to their identification, conservation, and efficient utilization, and agree to develop and implement cooperative programs in areas to be jointly defined. Such programs may include, inter alia, information exchange, provision of expert services, specialized work experiences, and development and intensification of inter-institutional linkages. In the development of natural resources cooperation, early attention shall be given to oceanography.

ARTICLE XIX

This Agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Madrid, January 24, 1976

No.

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to Supplementary Agreement Number Three on Scientific and Technological Cooperation signed today. To begin the fulfillment of the provisions of said Supplementary Agreement, and to facilitate cooperation between the United States and Spain in scientific research and technological development, I have the honor to inform your Excellency of the following:

1) The Government of the United States will provide each year, as a grant, the sum of \$4,600,000, which represents over the five year duration of the aforementioned Supplementary Agreement a total grant of \$23,000,000 to carry out the annual programs which, in accordance with paragraph a of Article V, will be made up of groups of specific projects.

2) In addition, it is agreed that the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation will be charged with bringing together United States and Spanish experts to develop the special programs mentioned in paragraph b of Article V of the said Supplementary Agreement, including in this effort the investigation of possible sources of financing, both public and private.

3) In view of the interest of the Spanish Government in rapid implementation of the provisions of Article XV with the establishment of a Solar Energy Center located in Spanish territory, it also is agreed that the two Governments will charge the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation with presenting, within two months from the entry into force of the said Supplementary Agreement, a plan for carrying out appropriate studies necessary for the eventual creation of the Center. United States experts who may come to Spain to make such studies will receive all the assistance necessary from the Government of Spain so that they may carry out their tasks in the fullest collaboration with the experts whom the Spanish Government may designate.

If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of Spain, I have the honor to propose that this note and Your Excellency's note in reply indicating concurrence shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments on this matter.

Accept, Excellency, my renewed assurances of highest consideration.

His Excellency

D. Jose Maris de Areilza y Martinez-Rodas,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

(Number 4)

ARTICLE I

Aware of the importance of the cultural achievements of the two countries and the desirability of strengthening the traditional friendship and understanding between their peoples, Spain and the United States will expand their cooperation in the educational, cultural, and scientific fields. Through the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs they will seek to develop programs for more effective cooperation; carry out programs already approved for that purpose; seek to resolve problems that may arise; and make such recommendations as may be necessary in relation to these matters. Their cooperation and decisions in the fields of education, culture, and science will be subject to the legislative requirements of the two countries, including the annual appropriation of funds.

ARTICLE II

The program of exchanges between Spain and the United States in these fields will be expanded in both numbers and scope. The expansion will involve teachers, researchers, scientists, scholars and students and will be extended into all branches of learning, especially natural and applied sciences, economics, and the language and culture of the two countries. In the field of arts and letters, the two Governments will sponsor visits of authors and artists and encourage the reciprocal dissemination of their works.

ARTICLE III

The two Governments will cooperate in the expansion of the Spanish educational system. The United States will assist Spain in research, development, and advanced training for professors and other teaching personnel. The United States will also provide documents, equipment, and materials to educational research and teaching laboratories and libraries, as appropriate, for Spanish universities and other centers of higher learning. Both Governments will foster an exchange of cultural materials.

ARTICLE IV

Both Governments recognize the importance of the Fulbright-Hays program in promoting educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries, through the Commission on Cultural Exchange between Spain and the United States of America. Both Governments will contribute regularly to the financing of the Fulbright-Hays program. The Commission and the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs will cooperate as appropriate in their respective fields to reinforce the effectiveness of the action of both parties.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments consider it a matter of special interest to increase the knowledge of their respective languages in the two countries by encouraging the activities of institutions and organizations engaged in the teaching of Spanish and the dissemination of Spanish culture in the United States, and at the same time encouraging the work of institutions and organizations engaged in similar activities with respect to the language and culture of the United States.

ARTICLE VI

The annual Educational and Cultural Cooperation Program which is the subject of this Agreement will be established by exchange of notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States at Madrid, or by a formal decision of the United States-Spanish Council, taking as a basis the recommendations of the Committee.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
BILATERAL MILITARY COORDINATION

(Number 5)

ARTICLE I

A Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff shall be established at Madrid to facilitate coordination between the Spanish Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the United States, as well as other forces dedicated to North Atlantic defense.

The Combined Staff will operate within the overall framework of the United States-Spanish Council and receive the Council's guidance through the Joint Military Committee. The Council will be kept apprised of the work of the staff, including all proposed joint exercises or other activities. The staff will have no command function.

ARTICLE II

The mission of the Combined Staff shall be to prepare and coordinate plans, which are in harmony with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area, for actions which could be taken in the geographic area of common interest as defined in Article III, in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the context of a general attack against the West.

All such activities of the Combined Staff will take into account the requirements of the constitutional processes of the United States and Spain which must be met before any plans or other measures may be implemented.

Every effort shall be made to insure that these activities of the Combined Staff serve to complement and strengthen Western defense as a whole.

The Combined Staff shall be the vehicle to provide the Spanish Armed Forces the United States doctrine and information required to achieve the necessary strategic, tactical and logistical coordination within the area of common interest.

The geographic area of common interest is defined as follows:

- a. Spain, including adjacent air space.
- b. Atlantic area.

(1) Northern limit; the parallel of 48 degrees north latitude to the European continent.

- (2) Western limit: from the intersection of 48 degrees north latitude and 23 degrees west longitude, south to the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude.
- (3) Southern limit: the parallel of 23 degrees north latitude eastward from 23 degrees west longitude to the coastal waters of the African littoral.
- (4) Eastern limit: northward along the African coast to the Strait of Gibraltar, and thence northward along the coast of Europe to 48 degrees north latitude.

c. Mediterranean area: from the Strait of Gibraltar to the meridian of 7 degrees east longitude.

d. The area excludes the territory of third states and their territorial waters.

ARTICLE IV

The organization of the Combined Staff shall be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Spain with the approval of the respective national authorities. The Combined Staff shall be headed by two co-directors, one from each country, both having the same general/flag rank. Administrative arrangements will be established by mutual agreement. Militarily, the staff will be responsible to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Spanish Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Military Committee.

ARTICLE V

Spanish liaison officers shall be assigned to such headquarters as are agreed upon.

ARTICLE VI

This agreement shall enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States of America.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

ON

FACILITIES

(Number 6)

ARTICLE I

Pursuant to Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and by way of contribution to the Western defensive effort, the Government of Spain grants the United States of America the right to use and maintain for military purposes the existing facilities in or connected with the Spanish military bases and installations listed in this agreement and its annex.

The facilities referred to above include those located at Rota Naval Base; the Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Bases, the Bardenas Reales firing range; and Moron, which remains on stand-by status.

The 98th Strategic Wing of tanker aircraft will be withdrawn from Spain but a detachment of a maximum of five tanker aircraft may be stationed at and use the Zaragoza Air Base. The nuclear submarine squadron will commence a phased withdrawal from Rota beginning on January 1, 1979 and this withdrawal will be completed by July 1, 1979.

Facilities within each Spanish military base or connected with it, such as lands, buildings, installations, and other major permanent items, made available for use by the United States forces, shall be listed in an inventory maintained by the parties, which indicates the purpose for which they are used. The parties will also maintain a list containing the identification and general strength levels of the United States military units stationed in Spain for the use and maintenance of these facilities.

United States Forces may obtain supplies by means of the Cadiz-Zaragoza pipeline, under conditions which will be agreed.

The United States will not store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil.

ARTICLE II

The use and maintenance of the facilities authorized by Article I of this Agreement and the status of the United States forces in Spain as well as the use of the Spanish air space will be regulated by the express terms and technical conditions contained in arrangements agreed between the two Governments.

ARTICLE III

In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities referred to in this Supplementary Agreement to meet such threat or attack will be the subject of urgent consultations between the two Governments, and will be resolved by mutual agreement in light of the situation created. Such urgent consultations shall take place in the United States-Spanish Council, but when the imminence of the danger so requires, the two Governments will establish direct contact in order to resolve the matter jointly. Each Government retains, however, the inherent right of self-defense.

ARTICLE IV

Through the Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs, the parties will seek to assure the necessary coordination between the two Governments, and to resolve such problems as may arise as a result of the application of this Supplementary Agreement.

The organization and operation of the Committee will be developed with a view to dealing effectively and expeditiously with the problems which may arise, to promoting the direct contact between military and civilian officials of both parties appropriate to these ends, and finally, to fostering the maximum cooperation in all matters of mutual concern.

Prior to the expiration of the Treaty, and no less than three months before, the Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs will study the modalities and timetable resulting from the application of Article VIII of the Treaty, in case the extension established by Article VII does not go into force.

ARTICLE V

This agreement will enter into force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and remain in force with it and thereafter in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE I

In addition to the facilities listed in Article I, there are minor facilities outside of the principal Spanish installations mentioned in this Article. These facilities are:

Jarama Water System Annex
Sonseca Weather Station Site
Torrejon ILS Outer Marker
Zaragoza Radio Beacon Annex
Soller Tropo Site and Housing Annex
Humosa Tropo Site
Guardamar Tropo and Transmitter Site
Inoges Tropo Site
Menorca Tropo Site
Moron Naval Communications Facility
Estaca de Vares LORAN Station
Estaca de Vares Communication Relay Station
Estartit (Gerona) LORAN Station
Cartagena Petroleum and Munitions Storage Facilities
El Ferrol Petroleum Facilities
Loeches Petroleum Storage Farm
La Muela Petroleum Storage Farm
El Arahal Petroleum Storage Farm

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
ON
COOPERATION REGARDING MATERIEL
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

(Number 7)

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States will issue repayment guarantees under its foreign military sales program to facilitate the extension of loans to the Government of Spain by eligible lenders for the purpose of financing the purchase by the Government of Spain of defense articles and defence services in furtherance of the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The aggregate principal amount of loans guaranteed by the Government of the United States in accordance with this Article shall total \$120,000,000 during each of the five years during which the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation shall remain in force.

ARTICLE II

1. The Government of the United States will furnish defense articles to the Government of Spain on a grant basis with a value of \$75,000,000 over the period during which the present Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation shall remain in force.

2. In addition, the Government of the United States will continue to furnish on a grant basis training for personnel of the armed forces of Spain, the value of which shall be \$2,000,000 during each of the five years of validity of the Treaty.

3. The value of defense articles furnished under this Article will be calculated in the manner most favorable to the Government of Spain, consistent with applicable United States laws and regulations.

ARTICLE III

All defense articles or defense services furnished to the Government of Spain in accordance with this Agreement shall be furnished subject to the terms and conditions set forth in Article I of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of September 26, 1953 between the two Governments, except that Article I, paragraph 3, of that Agreement shall not apply to defense articles and defense services purchased by the Government of Spain pursuant to this Agreement. In addition to such terms and conditions, the Government of Spain agrees that the net proceeds of sale received by it in disposing of any weapon, weapons system, munition, air-

craft, military vessel, or other implement of war, including scrap therefrom, furnished on a grant basis by the Government of the United States, will be paid to the Government of the United States and shall be available to pay the official costs of the Government of the United States payable in the currency of Spain, including all cost relating to the financing of international educational and cultural exchange activities in which the Government of Spain participates. Defense articles and defense services are furnished pursuant to this Agreement exclusively for legitimate self-defense, or for participation in collective measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States will assign a high priority to the delivery to Spain of grant materiel agreed upon and of the necessary logistic support of the aforesaid needed materiel for the life of the Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United States agrees to make the maximum effort to facilitate acquisition by the Government of Spain of four complete squadrons (of 18 aircraft each) of F-16 fighter aircraft, or others of similar characteristics.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the United States agrees to contribute to modernizing, semi-automating and maintaining the existing aircraft control and warning network utilized by the United States Air Force in Spain, in an amount not exceeding \$50,000,000.

Details of those improvements and of the maintenance and the cost-sharing arrangements shall be set forth in a subsequent implementing agreement.

ARTICLE VII

With regard to the execution of new joint utilization projects agreed to by the armed forces of the two countries, such as the case covered in the preceding article, the two parties shall mutually agree on the respective percentages of participation in such projects to be charged to the defense budget of each country.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the United States will offer for sale to the Government of Spain, at a favorable price consistent with applicable law, naval vessels of the following quantities and types: four MSO oceangoing minesweepers and one ARL minesweeper tender.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the United States agrees to give prompt consideration to proposals for transfer to the Government of Spain of the technical data, equipment, and materials necessary for production in Spain of specific defense items. In each case, such production shall remain subject to specific agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE X

1. The Government of the United States will make available for lease to the Government of Spain 42 F-4E aircraft from the inventory of the United States Air Force the delivery of which aircraft shall be effected on the dates agreed upon.

2. The Spanish Government will pay the United States Government the amount agreed upon for lease of these aircraft. The lease may be terminated by the Government of Spain prior to expiration of the lease with one year prior notice to the Government of the United States. The lease may be extended by the Government of Spain beyond the term of the lease for an amount to be agreed upon until an equivalent number of F-16 aircraft can be made available for delivery to Spain pursuant to Article IV hereof.

3. The Government of Spain will sell to the Government of the United States 34 F-4C aircraft and F-4C specific support equipment and accessories for an amount agreed upon. The delivery of the F-4C aircraft to the Government of the United States will be concurrent with the delivery of the F-4E aircraft to the Government of Spain.

4. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Spain the necessary spare parts and support equipment for maintenance of the F-4E aircraft until termination of the lease.

ARTICLE XI

It is expressly agreed by the two Governments that the undertakings of the Government of the United States provided for in this Agreement will be carried out in accordance with, and subject to, applicable provisions of United States law and the appropriation of the necessary funds by the United States Congress.

The undertakings of the Government of Spain hereunder will be carried out in accordance with and subject to applicable provisions of Spanish law.

ARTICLE XII

The Agreement will enter into force and remain in force contemporaneously with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain.

DONE in Madrid, this 24th day of January, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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| <small>(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)</small> | | |
| 1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY Department of National Defence Operational Research and Analysis Establishment | 2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED | |
| | 2b. GROUP III | |
| 3. DOCUMENT TITLE SPAIN: NATO or Neutrality | | |
| 4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive date:) | | |
| 5. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, middle initial) KLEPAK, H. P. | | |
| 6. DOCUMENT DATE April 1980 | 7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES | 7b. NO. OF REFS |
| 8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. 96103 | 9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S) ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 11 | |
| 8b. CONTRACT NO. 2SU78-00085 | 9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO.(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this document) | |
| 10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Qualified requesters may obtain copies of this document from their defence documentation centre. | | |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | 12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY ORAE | |
| 13. ABSTRACT <p>This report examines the implications of Spain's entry into NATO from both the perspective of the Alliance and that of Spain. In the NATO context the author sets out the political and military advantages and disadvantages for the Alliance. From a Spanish perspective, the author concentrates on elaborating the various countervailing domestic political factions involved with the Spain and NATO decision.</p> <p>Key Words</p> <p>Spain NATO Domestic political factions External factors</p> | | |

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