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# The Cross and Laporte Kidnappings, Montreal, October 1970

Eleanor S. Wainstein

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A report prepared for  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AND  
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

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PREFACE

The following study of the kidnappings of James R. Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Quebec, on October 5, 1970, and Pierre Laporte, the Minister of Labor for Quebec Province, on October 10, 1970, by members of the *Front de Liberation du Quebec*, is one of a series of case studies completed for the Department of State.

Since 1973, The Rand Corporation has been engaged in a study of international terrorism, sponsored jointly by the Office of External Research of the Department of State and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The objective of this research has been to provide U.S. government agencies and officials directly concerned with the problem with a better understanding of the theory and tactics of terrorism, particularly as these may affect U.S. national security and the safety of U.S. government officials and other U.S. citizens abroad.

A primary focus of the research is on the problem of dealing with hostage situations in which terrorists have seized U.S. officials or other U.S. citizens abroad, or have seized diplomats or other foreign officials in the United States. The Rand Corporation was asked to provide specific recommendations concerning the policy and tactics of bargaining for hostages, and also to examine the experiences of the hostages themselves. The primary vehicle for this research was a series of detailed case studies of actual hostage events. These case studies are based on published accounts, a reconstruction of the cable traffic, and extensive interviews with key U.S. government officials who participated in the episode, where possible with the officials of other governments, and in many cases with the hostage or hostages themselves. The studies are the most detailed accounts of these events. They not only have historical value but are instructive to anyone who may have to deal with any such event in the future. Several of the studies were circulated in working-note form to a limited number of government officials. Considerable interest was expressed in making these case studies available

to a wider government audience as full Rand reports, and in March 1976 additional funds were made available by the Department of State for the necessary review, expansion, revision, editing, and publication.

The case studies follow a common format. Each discusses the political context in which the kidnapping or seizure of hostages took place, the existing government policies pertaining to hostage situations, developments within the government during the episode, the bargaining tactics employed, proposals and demands made and deadlines set by the participants, the disposition and activities of the local security forces, the terrorists' perceptions of the events, the means of communication, the use and role of public information and news media, the experience of the hostage or hostages, and the outcome and aftermath of the episode. Each includes an analysis of the episode.

These case studies provide the basis for many of the observations and policy recommendations made in Rand report R-1857-DOS/ARPA, *Dealing with Political Kidnapping*.<sup>\*</sup> That report also contains a history of the evolution of U.S. policy for dealing with hostage incidents based in part upon the case studies of incidents involving U.S. officials, as well as a chronology of all major international hostage incidents since 1968. For a chronology of all incidents of international terrorism, the reader should see R-1597-DOS/ARPA, *International Terrorism: A Chronology 1968-1974*, and its periodic supplements.<sup>\*\*</sup> And for a general discussion of the experiences of hostages, the reader is referred to Rand paper P-5627, *Hostage Survival: Some Preliminary Observations*.<sup>\*\*\*</sup>

The authors of the case studies are indebted to the officials of the United States and foreign governments whose cooperation and candor

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<sup>\*</sup> Brian Jenkins, David Ronfeldt, and Ralph Strauch, with the assistance of Janera Johnson, *Dealing with Political Kidnapping* (U), Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, R-1857-DOS/ARPA (Secret), September 1976.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, *International Terrorism: A Chronology 1968-1974*, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, R-1597-DOS/ARPA, March 1975, and *International Terrorism: A Chronology (1974 Supplement)*, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, R-1909-ARPA, February 1976.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Brian Jenkins, *Hostage Survival: Some Preliminary Observations*, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, P-5627, April 1976.

allowed a detailed reconstruction of the incidents. In most cases, these officials have not been named, as their remarks were given in confidence on a non-attributable basis. The authors wish to thank them all.

It will be apparent in reading some of these case studies that there were, and are, points of disagreement. The authors have not attempted to resolve the differences of opinion; rather they have tried to identify the issues of contention and present the opposing points of view.

While Department of State sources were used for information, the study and its conclusions were prepared solely by Rand. This report does not represent the Department's official position on the issues discussed.





SUMMARY

The kidnapping of James R. Cross, British trade commissioner in Montreal, by four members of the *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ) on October 5, 1970, precipitated a major crisis in Canada. The kidnappers' seven demands of the government in return for Cross's release included: a halt to police searches, the publicizing of an FLQ manifesto, \$500,000 in gold, and freedom for 23 "political" prisoners and their safe passage abroad. During the ensuing five days, the Quebec and Canadian authorities and the kidnappers, communicating through notes, the media, and an intermediary, slowly worked toward a settlement. Negotiations were suddenly shattered by a second kidnapping on October 10, when four men from another FLQ cell seized Pierre Laporte, the Minister of Labor of Quebec Province, also in Montreal. They threatened to kill Laporte unless the seven original demands of the Cross kidnappers were met.

The domestic crisis escalated dramatically with Laporte's seizure, on both the local and national levels. By October 14, threats of disorder and of further FLQ outrages had so overburdened police forces in Montreal that federal troops were called in. Premier Bourassa of Quebec offered parole for five of the 23 prisoners and safe conduct for the kidnappers and their families to Cuba in return for the release of both hostages. The next day, at the request of Montreal and Quebec Province officials, the Canadian government invoked the War Measures Act, under which the FLQ was outlawed and the police received extraordinary powers. One week after Laporte was kidnapped, his body was found in the trunk of an abandoned car.

A massive manhunt led the police, on December 2, to the hideout where Cross was being held. Following further negotiations, Cross was released unharmed when his four kidnappers and three of their relatives were flown to asylum in Cuba. One of Laporte's abductors had been arrested in early November. Police found the other three on December 28, hiding in a tunnel beneath a farmhouse 20 miles from Montreal. They and their accomplices were tried and sentenced.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is indebted to Emerson Brown, Donald A. Kruse, Line R. Rosen, and John Topping of the Department of State for their assistance during the research of this study. Also, thanks are due Mr. Kruse and Ms. Rosen, as well as James H. Hayes and Paul A. Smith of The Rand Corporation, for their comments on the draft report.



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## I. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

The *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ) culminated its seven years of violent struggle in the name of independence for Quebec with the kidnapping of James Richard Cross, the British trade commissioner in Montreal, and the abduction and murder of Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor and Immigration of Quebec. These acts, committed by a few dedicated revolutionaries, had critical political consequences at every level of the Canadian government and plunged the nation into its "October Crisis" of 1970. To understand the *raison d'être* of the FLQ, it is necessary to review the special status of French Canada, which gave rise to the separatist movement.

French Canadians constitute 28 percent of Canada's population, but 80 percent of Quebec's. Even in their own province, though, the French Canadians as a group occupy the lower rungs of the economic ladder. Their average incomes are lower and unemployment rates higher than those of the Anglo-Canadians, who control approximately 80 percent of Quebec industry. The Quebecois have tended to blame their economic and social ills on the Anglo-Canadians, and many see separation from English Canada and independence for Quebec as the solution to their problems. Their movement is formalized in the Parti Quebecois (PQ), which made a strong showing in the April 1970 Quebec provincial elections, winning 23 percent of the total vote (but only 7 out of 108 seats).

Restless elements among the young Quebecois, however, impatient with the legal means of achieving Quebec independence, polarized in 1963 in the clandestine FLQ. The first FLQ statement, in March of that year, included the words: "Quebec's independence is only possible through social revolution ... students, workers, peasants, form your clandestine groups against Anglo-American colonialism."<sup>\*</sup> The basis of FLQ violence was the rationalization that the people of Quebec were

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<sup>\*</sup>James Stewart, *The FLQ*, Special Report by the *Montreal Star*, 1970, p. 10.

exploited, colonized, and alienated, but were not fully aware of this, and that the FLQ therefore had to serve as their conscience.\*

Drawing inspiration from revolutionary movements, groups, and writers -- the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, the Cuban revolution, the Black Panthers, Marx, and Marcuse -- the FLQ attracted radical young French Canadians. Because of its cellular organization and also because of frequent arrests, the FLQ lacked a permanent active leadership. A reliable government observer estimated that in 1970 the FLQ consisted of: a nucleus of 40 to 100 extremists ready to commit violent acts; a limited group, removed from the action, constituting the editorial and propagandist element; some 200 to 300 active sympathizers and supporters; and 2000 to 3000 passive sympathizers, or "armchair cells."\*\*

As one reviews the record of the FLQ acts of outrage in Quebec, the escalation preceding October 1970 is evident. Between 1963 and 1967, FLQ extremists planted about 35 bombs, most of them small, and carried out 8 holdups. In the following three years they took credit for 50 to 60 bombings of noticeably larger scale and 25 holdups.\*\*\* Their actions and those of other activist groups by 1969 had begun to alarm the Montreal authorities. In November of that year, Lucien Saulnier, chairman of the executive committee of Montreal, brought to the attention of the authorities in Ottawa evidence of an organized subversive movement and planned armed insurrection. Linking the struggle for independence in Quebec with the threat to destroy the capitalist system, Saulnier's report described a three-phase program starting with bombings and demonstrations and leading to military action, as in Vietnam.\*\*\*\*

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\* Gerard Pelletier, *The October Crisis* (translated by Joyce Marshall), McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., Toronto, 1971, p. 47.

\*\* Ibid., p. 51.

\*\*\* Ibid., pp. 67-70.

\*\*\*\* Stewart, p. 50.



On February 26, 1970, the Montreal police had the first indications that the FLQ was planning diplomatic kidnappings, when police stopped a rented panel truck and found two men, arms, and a document indicating the FLQ's intent to kidnap the Israeli consul in Montreal. A raid on a cottage in the Laurentians on June 21 turned up a cache of firearms, dynamite, and the draft of a ransom demand for the proposed kidnapping of Harrison Burgess, U.S. Consul General in Montreal. The conditions set forth were almost identical to those of the subsequent Cross kidnapping demands. Three days later, the FLQ took credit for a bomb explosion that killed two and wounded two others at Defense Headquarters in Ottawa. In July, police defused 150 pounds of dynamite planted in a car outside the Bank of Montreal. During August and September, more than 3000 sticks were reported stolen in a wave of dynamite thefts.

Although the discovery of FLQ plans to kidnap two foreign diplomats alerted the Montreal foreign diplomatic community to take routine precautions to avert abductions, no drastic measures were taken. The new U.S. Consul General, John Topping, for example, was completely unaware of the fact that the FLQ followed him frequently that summer. Despite the warnings of Saulnier's report, the consensus was that in Canada the possibility of such violent actions was extremely remote. The liberal regime of Robert Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, saw the warnings, but pressed on with its healing measures of economic and social betterment for the Quebecois.

## II. GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Throughout the period that Cross was held hostage, the British government publicly and privately expressed full confidence in the Canadian government. The British said repeatedly that their primary concern was the safe return of Cross; at no point did they put pressure on the Canadian government. Cross's replacement in Montreal, sent from the embassy in Ottawa, maintained close ties between British and Canadian authorities. Sir Alec Douglas-Home replied with typical reserve to a question in the British House of Commons in mid-November, halfway through Cross's ordeal:

Since Mr. Cross was kidnapped on October 5, we have been in the closest touch with the Canadian Government, who have kept us fully informed of the measures they are taking to try to secure that Mr. Cross is released unharmed. I know all MP's will join me in expressing the hope that these efforts will prove successful, and in extending profound sympathy to Mr. Cross and his family in their ordeal.\*

Canada's historically close ties with the British influenced the kidnappers' perceptions of both the public and government reaction to the kidnapping. The FLQ cell that seized Cross had initially targeted the American consul general, but switched to the British consul at the last moment because his abduction would cause more of a stir in a society already divided between Anglo- and French Canadians. The avowed purpose of FLQ terrorism was to frighten the Anglophones, who had subjected the Quebecois to humiliation and hate for 200 years, "to make them go home to their mother country, to Ontario, or Great Britain or the United States."\*\*

The Canadian government had no announced policy concerning diplomatic kidnappings before Cross was taken and has had none since. Its stand throughout the October crisis was to pay no ransom and to release no

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\* *The Times* (London), November 17, 1970.

\*\* Kidnappers' tapes quoted in John Saywell, *Quebec 70*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 134.

prisoners remained firm, but neither the federal nor provincial authorities ruled out negotiation. On the contrary, they showed their willingness to deal with the kidnappers early in the crisis by publicizing the FLQ manifesto as requested in the original list of demands. They made every effort to maintain a dialogue with the terrorists and to keep their options open at all times.

The kidnappers, however, did not expect the government to remain firm and forceful in the face of their demands, estimating that perhaps "...in four or five days, a week at the outside, the government will agree to negotiate."\* And the hesitant negotiations during the first week might well have ended in accommodation, had the second kidnapping not hardened each side's stand.

Reflecting afterward on their misjudgment of official policy, the kidnappers blamed the crisis on the government of Prime Minister Trudeau, which they said had double-crossed the FLQ and had "...stirred up the city much more than we thought they could...." They attributed the government's stand to the hard line imposed on Trudeau by the Anglo-Canadian community. According to the kidnappers, the Prime Minister, to compensate for being a French Canadian, had had to cater to the Anglo-Canadian powers in Ottawa by taking a hard stand on the dissenting Quebecois. "If it had been Pearson or Stanfield ... or another government chief ... anybody but Trudeau ... you could say he would probably have accepted negotiations and liberation of the prisoners."\*\*

The U.S. Government's role in this crisis was one of anxious observer. According to John Topping, the U.S. Consul General in Montreal, there was no official U.S. reaction to the kidnapping. The U.S. Government did comply with a Canadian request for close border surveillance and additional protection for Canadian diplomatic and consular personnel throughout the United States.\*\*\* There were persistent rumors in Canada, however, of U.S. troop movements on the U.S. side of the border.

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\* Ibid., p. 129.

\*\* Ibid., p. 130.

\*\*\* Department of State, internal letter, October 20, 1970.

Even three years later, the *Toronto Star* reported that a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) intelligence officer claimed that there had been a large-scale CIA infiltration of Montreal during the crisis, as well as a buildup of American tanks and equipment just south of the border; however, no official credence was given these reports.\*

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\**Toronto Star*, September 22, 1973, p. 1.

### III. NEGOTIATING THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE

#### MONDAY, OCTOBER 5

At 8:15 a.m. on Monday, October 5, 1970, a maid at the Cross residence in Montreal admitted two young men delivering a wrapped "birthday" gift for the British trade commissioner. Once inside, the delivery men produced a submachine gun from the gift package and forced the diplomat to leave with them. The maid called the police, but by the time they arrived, there was no trace of Cross. Witnesses -- Mrs. Cross, the maid, and a gardener across the street -- could report only that four men had kidnapped him in a LaSalle taxi.

Within a few hours, the FLQ, in an anonymous call to radio station CKAC in Montreal, claimed credit for the abduction. The caller said that information relating to Cross had been left at the Lafontaine Pavillion of the University of Quebec. There police and reporters found communique No. 1\* from the FLQ Liberation cell -- a wordy, propagandist message containing the kidnappers' demands. The authorities were told to:

1. Cease all police activities relating to the kidnapping;
2. Make public the full text of the FLQ manifesto in newspapers, on radio, and on television;
3. Release the 23 "political" prisoners whose names were listed;
4. Provide aircraft for their flight to Cuba or Algeria;
5. Reinstate the Lapalme postal drivers who had lost jobs when a government contract was changed;
6. Give the released prisoners \$500,000 in gold bars; and
7. Identify the informer who had helped police apprehend members of another FLQ cell.

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\* The texts of the communiques are given in English in Saywell, op. cit.; for communique No. 1, see p. 35.

Furthermore, the demands were to be met within 48 hours, that is, by noon on Wednesday, October 7. Detailed instructions accompanied the demands, as did assertions of support for liberation movements throughout the world. The note was almost identical to the one prepared for the kidnapping of an American consul and discovered the previous June in a police raid.

Jerome Choquette, Minister of Justice of Quebec, summarized the kidnappers' intentions in a public statement that afternoon, and Mrs. Cross appealed to the kidnappers to consider her husband's health and to administer two daily doses of a certain drug to counter high blood pressure. Also that day, Robert Lemieux, a Montreal lawyer who was sympathetic to the FLQ and who represented many of the FLQ members when they were later tried, said that the kidnapping could have been avoided had the Quebec government granted the amnesty he had previously demanded for what he called political prisoners.\* The Quebec cabinet met in emergency session for three hours that evening. A spokesman would say only that the provincial government was working closely with the federal authorities.

Because Cross was a foreign diplomat and therefore under the protection of the Canadian government and because most of the kidnappers' demands concerned the federal government, Ottawa moved directly into the Cross affair. A task-force headquarters with direct communication to the Prime Minister, Quebec and Montreal authorities, and commercial news services was established in the Department of External Affairs. Mitchell Sharp, the Minister of External Affairs, announced the kidnapping in Commons that first afternoon and assured added protection to diplomatic and consular personnel in Canada.

#### TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6

A second communique from the Liberation cell, enclosing a letter from Cross to his wife, was delivered through radio station CKAC on Tuesday, October 6. It called upon the media to make all communiques

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\* Stewart, p. 59.

public and to break "the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the liberation operation." The text contained assurances of Cross's good health and warned the authorities to take the FLQ demands seriously because "when the time limit has passed we will not hesitate at all to liquidate J. Cross ... because the life and liberty of the political prisoners and of the Lapalme guys are well worth hundreds of diplomats serving only the financial interest of the Anglo-Saxon and American big bosses. The present authorities alone will be truly responsible for his death."\*

Both the Quebec and federal cabinets met to discuss the emergency. After consultation with Bourassa and British Prime Minister Heath, the Trudeau government announced its position in a statement to Commons by Mr. Sharp. Calling the demands, such as the 48-hour deadline, unreasonable, Sharp added: "I need hardly say that this set of demands will not be met ... we have the double responsibility to do our best to safeguard Mr. Cross and at the same time to preserve the rule of law in our country. The House can be sure that everything possible is being done...."\*\* Although he refused the FLQ demands, by limiting his statement to "this set of demands," he left the door open for government negotiations. In Quebec, Bourassa endorsed the stand taken in Ottawa.

That evening Robert Lemieux complained to the press that the authorities were not allowing him to see some of his jailed clients who were on the list of 23 prisoners to be freed. He claimed also that neither he nor his clients had contact with the kidnappers.

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7

As the noon deadline approached, Justice Minister Choquette told a press conference that the government was ready to seek a solution. Declaring himself available by telephone at any hour, Choquette appealed to the abductors to allow their respect for human life to prevail over their political aspirations. In Ottawa, the Prime Minister told the

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\* Saywell, p. 39.

\*\* Ibid.

morning sitting of Parliament that a minority could not be allowed to impose its view on the majority by violence.\*

The noon deadline passed; at about 1:30, a cabbie delivered to station CKLM communique No. 4\*\* and two letters from Cross, one of which was to his wife. The Liberation cell had extended the deadline 24 hours, within which time the authorities had to meet two preliminary demands: (1) to broadcast the FLQ manifesto on the state network and (2) immediately to halt all police searches, seizures, and arrests. The letter,\*\*\* signed J. Cross, was as follows:

1. I ask the authorities to respond favourably to the demands of the FLQ.
2. It will be faster and easier for everyone if all the FLQ communiques are published in full.
3. Please be assured that I am well and receiving the medicaments for my blood pressure.
4. I am being well treated but the FLQ are determined to achieve their demands.

In Montreal, Lemieux called on the authorities to stop making vague declarations and appoint a neutral intermediary. Toward the same end, Sharp, in Ottawa, read a statement asking the kidnappers to name someone with whom the authorities could deal with confidence. The statement, although it again referred to the demands as unreasonable, expressed official willingness to broadcast the FLQ manifesto.

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8

The second noon deadline again passed without a communication, but at about 2:30 p.m., a tip to Pierre Pascau, a CKLM disc jockey, led to

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\* Stewart, p. 62.

\*\* No. 3 had apparently been delivered to the Cross house and was not made public. Saywell, p. 41.

\*\*\* Saywell, p. 41.



a message in a telephone booth. Repeating that the two demands of the previous day must be met, the Liberation cell asked the authorities to specify exactly what they meant by unreasonable demands. Communique No. 5 ended with the note: "We reject the idea of a mediator; we will continue to establish our communications in our own way, avoiding the traps set by the fascist police."\* Nevertheless, Lemieux, still aspiring to be a mediator, appeared to be speaking to the FLQ when he said that evening before a television camera that the government "claims it wants to negotiate...." Then he hinted that the government wanted to negotiate to gain time for the police to find the hostage.\*\*

In the meantime, the police rounded up a number of suspects, and the Royal 22d Regiment, the famed French Canadian regular unit, moved 250 men to the Montreal area. Rumors indicated (correctly) that Mrs. Cross and her maid had identified one of the kidnappers from pictures as Jacques Lanctot, who had been arrested in February on charges of conspiracy to kidnap the Israeli trade commissioner and subsequently jumped bail, but there was no official confirmation.

The government met one of the FLQ demands at 10:30 that evening, when the French network of Radio-Canada broadcast the FLQ manifesto. A lengthy Marxist diatribe against both Canadian and Quebecois institutions and government leaders, it called on the workers of Quebec to revolt, naming as the real oppressors "the big bosses" compared to whom "Bourassa and Trudeau, the fairy, are peanuts." The manifesto ended with the warning: "You cannot hold an awakening people in misery and contempt indefinitely. Long Live Free Quebec."\*\*\*

#### FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9

The FLQ responded the next morning to the government move with communique No. 6, setting forth the two final conditions for Cross's

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\* Ibid., p. 45.

\*\* Ibid., p. 46.

\*\*\* Ibid., pp. 50-51.

release. The message, addressed to Pierre Pascau of CKLM, went astray and was sent again at 6 p.m., along with a later message (No. 7), accusing the authorities of trying to gain time by not releasing the earlier communique.

Meanwhile, Choquette asked the kidnappers through Pascau to postpone any decision on Cross and to supply proof that he was alive and well. The confirmation was to be in the form of a specially worded, handwritten note from Cross. Such a note was delivered, along with the kidnappers' two notes, at 6 p.m.

The FLQ's two conditions for Cross's safe release were (1) the liberation of "consenting" political prisoners and their transportation, along with their wives and families, if they so desired, to Cuba or Algeria, as set out in the first communique, and (2) immediate suspension of all "searches, raids, arrests and tortures on the part of the fascist police forces."<sup>\*</sup> According to communique No. 6, Cross would be released within 24 hours following the return of observers who were to accompany the political prisoners. The FLQ added the warning that, if the police interfered before Cross's release, "be sure that we will defend our lives dearly and that J. Cross would be executed at once. And we have enough dynamite to feel 'safe.'" The 6 p.m. message stated that it was "the last communique in the event the ruling authorities do not free the political prisoners between now and 6 o'clock"<sup>\*\*</sup> (the evening of October 10).

Since Canada appeared quite normal that Friday, Bourassa flew to New York as previously planned to meet investment dealers and government officials. "What will they say if I don't go? They will say Quebec is not a safe place to invest because the Premier is afraid to leave."<sup>\*\*\*</sup> He returned the following afternoon before the 6 p.m. deadline.

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<sup>\*</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> *Toronto Globe and Mail*, April 4, 1972.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10

Lemieux spoke twice to the press, once accusing Cross of using his letters to reveal his whereabouts and later offering to accompany the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria. He also said that a vigilante group had warned that they would kill him if Cross were killed.\*

Choquette answered the kidnappers at 5:30 p.m., an hour before the deadline. He emphasized the dedication of the Quebec government to social reform and its desire to correct injustices. Describing the Cross kidnappers as "mature and adult enough" to see that there was need for differences of opinion on these issues, he called on them to understand the government's position and to contribute to a constructive solution of society's problems. The government, the Justice Minister added, was prepared to parole prisoners by normal procedures and to show clemency toward all prisoners. As a final concession, it was prepared to offer safe conduct for the kidnappers to a foreign country. In exchange, it asked for Cross's release.

A review of the negotiations from Monday to Saturday between the government and the Liberation cell indicates that both sides were compromising to work out a settlement. The original conditions had eroded, as had the original 48-hour deadline. The government had fulfilled the demand of publicizing the FLQ manifesto and, although still rejecting the release of prisoners, was willing to grant safe conduct to the kidnappers. The Liberation cell had waived the ransom of \$500,000 and the demands concerning the Lapalme postal drivers and the police informers, and by Saturday were insisting on only two of the original seven demands: the release of prisoners and cessation of police action.

At 6:18 p.m., after Choquette broadcast the government's counter-proposal, four members of another FLQ cell thoroughly undermined the negotiations for Cross's release by kidnapping Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor and Immigration of Quebec, as a second hostage.

All Canada was stunned.

In a single moment of Pierre Laporte's kidnapping, the crisis escalated a thousandfold. In the week after the Cross

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\* Saywell, p. 52.

kidnapping, the negotiations with the kidnappers had been carried out as a cool, dispassionate diplomatic exercise.... The kidnapping of Cross at first seemed a single criminal incident, but a second kidnapping carried the implicit threat of a third. The crisis was now greater than the sum of its parts.\*

Police activity immediately accelerated as guards were assigned to the homes of all cabinet ministers and other public figures. Bourassa moved into heavily guarded quarters in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal. Messages were reported to have been sent from Ottawa to prominent Quebec businessmen warning them that the government could not be responsible for their personal safety.\*\*

#### SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11

Laporte's kidnappers did not hesitate to announce their aim. Early Sunday morning, Daniel McGinniss of CKAC was informed of an envelope near a subway station. By 9 a.m., he had located communique No. 1. Signed by the Chenier financial cell and accompanied by Laporte's National Assembly identification card, it announced that the cell had kidnapped the minister and set 10 p.m. that evening as the deadline for his execution unless all seven of the Liberation cell's demands were fully complied with. "Any partial acceptance will be considered as a refusal." At one that afternoon, CKAC received communication No. 2, claiming to be its last, from the Chenier cell. It repeated the demands and enclosed a note from Laporte to his wife saying that he was well, but that the "main thing is that the authorities take action."

Throughout the day, Bourassa met with his cabinet and consulted with the government in Ottawa and with members of the opposition party. Robert Lemieux was arrested that morning and held without bail on the charge of impeding police agents in their duties relating to the Cross kidnapping.

By 5 p.m., CKAC had another communique from the Chenier cell containing Laporte's credit cards and a letter from Laporte to Bourassa.

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\* Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, *Rumours of War*, New Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 15.

\*\* Ibid.

Laporte warned of more kidnappings if the authorities refused to release prisoners, adding "one might as well act now and avoid a blood-bath...."\* The letter also contained a personal appeal concerning his family responsibilities (see below, p. 41).

At 9:55 p.m., five minutes before the deadline set by Laporte's abductors, Bourassa broadcast an appeal to the FLQ for a mechanism by which to negotiate and for some assurance that the release of the political prisoners would result in the release of the hostages. It was a deliberately ambiguous statement: Bourassa hinted that the government would consider freeing what, in an obvious concession, he called "political" prisoners.

The two FLQ cells responded separately to the government's apparently softer stand, but each interpreted it as indicating a different degree of concession. A few hours after Bourassa's address, Cross's kidnappers sent a note to CKLM. Repeating demands for the release of consenting political prisoners and their safe conduct to Cuba or Algeria and for a halt to police searches, it stated that Robert Lemieux should serve as intermediary between the two cells and the authorities. No time limit was imposed, and a letter from Cross to Bourassa was enclosed as proof that Cross was alive. This step toward negotiation after Bourassa's apparent acceptance of negotiating on the prisoner issue indicated progress toward a compromise solution.

#### MONDAY, OCTOBER 12

Before noon on Monday, the Chenier cell, still uncompromising, responded to Bourassa's message as if it had been the government's acceptance of the FLQ demands. They accepted Lemieux as the intermediary, agreeing that "Each of his decisions will be final. He and we are as one." But they refused to negotiate on the six remaining conditions, insisting that Laporte would be freed only after all of the demands had been fulfilled. An accompanying letter from Laporte to Bourassa also assumed that the authorities would meet the original FLQ demands.

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\* Saywell, p. 61.

Laporte's note instructed the government to release the prisoners that evening or the next morning and suggested ways to employ the Lapalme drivers.\* A second communique from the Chenier cell, sent through Pierre Pascau of station CKLM that afternoon, summed up the FLQ position: Cross would be freed when (1) the prisoners were freed and (2) police repression was halted; Laporte's release depended on the complete fulfillment of all the original FLQ conditions. It was to be the last communication from the Chenier cell before execution or liberation of Pierre Laporte.

Troops were seen taking up positions around Montreal, but the Canadian Army denied that this had any connection with the crisis. Another vigilante group threatened a 3 to 1 reprisal against families of political prisoners if Cross or Laporte were killed.\*\* In Ottawa, after senior ministers called for preservation of the security of the federal capital, troops were moved in to guard public buildings and prominent public figures.

At 7:15 p.m., after meeting with cabinet and opposition leaders, Bourassa named Robert Demers, a Montreal lawyer, to represent the Quebec authorities in negotiations with Lemieux. Later that evening, Demers and Lemieux met in Lemieux's prison cell.

#### TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13

Lemieux, released on his own recognizance, met twice during the day with Demers. The government's position was that there would be no discussion of FLQ demands until the initial question -- the safety of Cross and Laporte -- had been settled. Lemieux suggested that the released prisoners and the ransom be held by the authorities in Cuba or Algeria until the Canadian government reported Cross and Laporte safe. Demers countered with the suggestion that one member from each of the cells be held hostage by the government until prisoners were freed, after which they would be allowed to join their colleagues.

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\* Ibid., p. 67.

\*\* Ibid., p. 69.

Lemieux declared at a press conference that evening that he could not meet with Demers again without a new mandate from the FLQ. He said that Demers had given him the impression that the government was buying time, and that he would not be used.\* Lemieux's statements could be understood as indicating intransigence on the part of either side; they also could be interpreted as a plea for guidance or a mandate from the FLQ. Apparently, his method of communicating with his clients was through the media, and he was using the press conference to let them know that the authorities would negotiate and to ask them how far he could go. The FLQ did not respond that day.

The cabinet met in Ottawa to discuss messages about the crisis from Montreal and Quebec and the possible use of the War Measures Act (WMA). That afternoon, the Prime Minister, questioned by two reporters as he entered Commons, revealed a harder line on negotiation with the kidnappers than Bourassa's. Asked about the seven FLQ demands, he replied, "My position is that you don't give in to any of them." He took the press to task for calling the 23 outlaws political prisoners and said in answer to a question about civil liberties:

I think society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power in this country and I think that goes to any distance. So long as there is a power in here which is challenging the elected representative of the people, I think that power must be stopped and I think it's only, I repeat, weak-kneed bleeding hearts who are afraid to take measures.\*\*

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14

The two cells of the FLQ issued a joint communique, again through CKLM, answering Lemieux as follows: (1) They refused to turn over a member of each cell as guarantees, but accepted Lemieux's suggestion to have the political prisoners held in Cuba or Algeria until Cross and Laporte were released. (2) They questioned the goodwill of the

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\* Ibid., p. 70.

\*\* Ibid., p. 73.

the authorities, because of continued police searches, raids, and other activities. (3) They renewed Lemieux's mandate, giving him carte blanche to negotiate. (4) They asked Lemieux to make public the results of further negotiations, after which they would communicate their decision. During the afternoon Lemieux met again with Demers for an hour.

"Total war" was how John Roberts, the Prime Minister of Ontario, described the Quebec situation to the press in Toronto. Indeed, troops continued to move to Camp Bouchard, 25 miles from Montreal. Meanwhile, the harassed Premier of Quebec hinted to (among others) two prominent Quebecois, Rene Levesque, leader of the Parti Quebecois, and Claude Ryan, influential editor of *Le Devoir*, that the government might take a small step toward toughness.\* Bourassa denied repeatedly, however, that the Quebec government was being driven by a hard line from Ottawa,\*\* and that evening announced that his government had not yet taken a final stand on the terms to be negotiated. Levesque, who had earlier urged the government to comply with FLQ demands and suggested that federal authorities leave the negotiation to Quebec, and Ryan decided on joint action. After meeting that evening with 14 other prominent Quebecois, they issued a statement calling for negotiation to save the lives of the hostages, criticizing the influence of Ottawa and the attitude of the Ontario Prime Minister on what they considered a Quebec affair, and offering to support Bourassa on his earlier stand favoring negotiation.

In Ottawa, Stanfield, the leader of the opposition, pressed Trudeau for an assurance that his government, even if it had the authority in law, would not declare emergency powers without seeking the approval of Parliament. Trudeau replied that "if such action were ever contemplated it would certainly be discussed in the House of Commons. Whether it would be immediately before or immediately after would depend, of course...." Later that evening the cabinet discussed every possible way in which the government of Canada, in conjunction with Quebec, could meet the crisis, including by invoking the War Measures Act.\*\*\*

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\* Haggart and Golden, p. 29.

\*\* Saywell, p. 76.

\*\*\* Ibid., p. 79.



THURSDAY, OCTOBER 15

Thursday was a tense and decisive day in Montreal and Ottawa. Trudeau canceled his trip to the Soviet Union, which was to begin on Sunday. University students in Montreal boycotted classes to study the FLQ manifesto and planned a mass evening rally at the Paul Sauve Arena, after which the organizers intended to march through the streets to the City Hall and Palace of Justice. Faced with these demonstrations, numerous bomb threats, and an increasing number of calls for assistance, the Montreal police requested outside help. The Quebec Provincial Police, also taxed to the limit, did the same. Consequently, at 3:07 p.m., Bourassa called on the Canadian Army, which sent more than one thousand soldiers, who took up positions in and around major public buildings in Montreal, Quebec, and other points in Quebec Province.

Lemieux, meanwhile, told the FLQ in a television appearance that he had information that the police had found the Chenier cell and were only waiting to find the Liberation cell before attacking both. He demanded an answer from the government.

After consultation with Ottawa, Quebec officials worked out their next key reply to the FLQ, which Bourassa announced at 9 p.m. First, he asked that the International Red Cross or the Consulate of Cuba in Montreal act as intermediary for the release of the two hostages. His government refused freedom for the 23 prisoners, but recommended the parole of five of them who had requested it; promised safe passage for the kidnappers to the country of their choice; rejected the other demands; and demanded a reply from the FLQ within six hours. Indeed, this was a considerably harder stand than Bourassa had hinted at on Monday.

Lemieux reacted immediately, calling the offer to free five prisoners who should have been paroled a long time ago a mockery of the people of Quebec. Asked if he were walking out of the negotiations, Lemieux replied that he had been thrown out.\* That night at the Paul Sauve Arena, students, activists, radicals, FLQ supporters, among them Lemieux, cheered for the FLQ and the liberation of Quebec.

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\* Ibid., p. 82.

Claude Ryan, deploring the day's events in an editorial, compared the two hostages to pawns on a much bigger chessboard. He continued: "When confronted with the appeal made in the streets by Mr. Lemieux and his friends, the Quebec government, with the experience of the past few years in mind, judged it necessary to call in the armed forces. And quite rightly so...." He added that he hoped the crisis would go no farther, for to move the Canadian government to invoke the War Measures Act would allow political authority and initiative to pass to the central government: "We must at all costs avoid the downfall of Quebec into civil war and its subjugation to martial law."\*

#### FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16

The Quebec authorities, however, saw a further deteriorating situation. At 3 a.m. on Friday, the deadline that Bourassa had set for the FLQ, letters arrived in Ottawa from the City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec requesting emergency measures to deal with a state of apprehended insurrection. The federal government, already prepared to act, invoked the War Measures Act at 4 a.m. The act had been on the books since World War I, but had never before been invoked in peacetime. Using the new powers granted them by the act, the government outlawed the FLQ and granted the police extraordinary powers of arrest and detention. At 5:15 a.m., when the public announcement was made, the police started arrests throughout the province; by nightfall they had picked up 250 suspects, including Lemieux.

That day in Commons, Trudeau defended the government's action, although he sympathized with those who were concerned about the suspension of civil liberties. The opponents were few but vocal; according to one, "The government ... is using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut."\*\* Later, on television, Trudeau appealed for understanding, admitting that he found the measures distasteful and promising that

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\* Ibid., pp. 83-84.

\*\* Ibid., p. 91.

the government would revoke them as soon as possible. He said that the government

...is acting to prevent fear from spreading.... It is acting to make clear to kidnappers, revolutionaries and assassins that in this country laws are made and changed by the elected representatives of all Canadians not by a handful of self-styled dictators.\*

In Quebec, Premier Bourassa took complete responsibility for the decision to invoke the War Measures Act. He explained that the FLQ plan, which began with bombings and demonstrations, had progressed to kidnappings; the next stage, he said, would include selected assassinations and the risks of anarchy; thus, he concluded, the state had to act firmly.\*\*

#### SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17

The FLQ had not been heard from since Wednesday. Finally on Saturday morning, the Liberation cell sent out its tenth communique, along with a letter from Cross to his wife. The communique announced that Cross's death sentence had been revoked and that he would be executed only if the police discovered them. It said also that the Chenier cell was studying Laporte's case and would make known its decision shortly.

Jacques Lanctot, one of the Cross kidnappers, later told Bernard Mergler, the lawyer who negotiated Cross's release, that the Liberation cell had intended this communique as a signal to the Chenier cell that Laporte should be kept alive. But because the police did not allow the message to be released to the media, the Chenier cell did not receive the signal.

The Chenier cell was silent until 7 p.m., when an anonymous caller to station CKAC said that a package could be found in an abandoned car near the St. Hubert airfield. Thinking it a hoax because many anonymous

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\* Ibid., p. 93.

\*\* Ibid., p. 92.

calls were being received, the station employees did nothing. A third call directed a reporter to a theater, where he retrieved a note containing the message:

Pierre Laporte, Minister of Unemployment and Assimilation, was executed at 6:18 tonight.... You will find the body in the trunk of the green Chevrolet (9J-2420) at the St. Hubert Base. We shall overcome.

FLQ.

The reporter found the car, which was locked, and called the police, who arrived at 12:20, pried open the trunk, and found the remains of Pierre Laporte.

Premier Bourassa, unaware that the body had been found, broadcast an appeal to the kidnappers for the release of Cross and Laporte. He proposed an exchange involving representatives of the Cuban government, a neutral location (the Expo-1967 site), and adequate protection against a double cross.

#### SUNDAY, OCTOBER 18

The news of Laporte's murder reached Ottawa early Sunday morning. At 3 a.m., Trudeau arrived at Commons, in session to consider the War Measures Act, and informed the nation that Pierre Laporte had been "so cowardly assassinated by a band of murderers." Some TV and radio stations reported the death of Cross as well. The suspense continued until 1 p.m., when CKLM received a reassuring message from him that he was well. He wrote that he had seen his death reported on television and that "this must have been terrifying for my wife." He suggested that the Red Cross or the Cuban consulate act as intermediaries for his release in exchange for that of the political prisoners.

The police issued a nationwide warrant for the arrest of two suspects in the kidnapping: Paul Rose, an ex-schoolteacher, and Marc Carboneau, 37, a taxi driver. A published picture of Paul Rose led to his identification by residents of Armstrong Street in the suburb of St. Hubert. Police investigated the house where he had lived for

the past six months and found blood matching Laporte's, fingerprints of known FLQ members, and other evidence, leaving no doubt that it was the hideout where Laporte had been held for a week and killed.

Pierre Laporte's body lay in state in the Montreal Courthouse from Sunday evening until Tuesday. Thousands of people paid their respects, among them the Prime Minister. Sunday night, Trudeau appeared on both the English and French television networks to speak eloquently of Laporte, of the FLQ and their terrorism, violence, and murder, and of the will of the Canadians to resist the FLQ. "These loveless creatures who have tried to divide us through tragedy have today caused us to unite together in a common purpose."\* Bourassa also spoke that day on television, promising that his government would not buckle under FLQ pressure. He repeated the offer of safe conduct to the Cross kidnappers if they released their hostage unharmed.

#### MONDAY, OCTOBER 19

Commons approved the government's action under the War Measures Act by a vote of 190 to 16 after the government announced that within a month the WMA would be replaced by new legislation. The public overwhelmingly supported the government's action, as did the opposition, united behind the government by Laporte's murder.

#### TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20

Pierre Laporte's funeral was attended by prominent Canadian and Quebecois government officials under heavy security. Not until the day after Laporte's burial was the manner of his death revealed by the coroner in a brief autopsy report: He had been choked to death with the chain of a religious medal he wore around his neck.

The kidnappers continued to communicate after Laporte's death. A communique on October 27 enclosed Paul Rose's passport. The communique was not made public despite the threat that if it were not, the Chenier

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\* Ibid., p. 105.

cell would cease communications. On November 6, police raided the Montreal apartment where the four Laporte kidnappers had been hiding since the murder; one of the suspects was captured, but the other three eluded the police. Later, they sent their last communique, describing their escape and mocking the police for allowing them to do so. They remained at large until late December.

On November 4, Canadian newspapers received a photograph of Cross sitting on a case labeled explosives, playing cards. The Associated Press in New York also received a photograph and a communique which made no mention of Cross's release. On the 21st, the *Quebec Presse* received the last communique from Cross's kidnappers, enclosing a letter from him. The communique complained of government torture, searches, arrests, and censorship, and called on the U.N. to mediate with the Canadian government to release the political prisoners. Cross's note assured all interested, "if there are still some," that he was well treated and in good health. "They consider me a political prisoner [sic] and they will keep me in captivity as long as the authorities do not accept their demands."\*

Quiet and exhaustive police work finally led to the apartment where Cross was being held. The hideout had been under surveillance for about a week when police arrested Jacques and Louise Cosette-Trudel as they emerged on the afternoon of December 2. When the police closed in at midnight and turned off the electricity, the kidnappers tossed out a note:

If you try anything at all (gas, gunfire, etc.), Mr. J. Cross will be the first to die. We have several sticks of "detonated" dynamite (powerfrac). If you want to negotiate send us a reporter from *Quebec Presse* or *Le Devoir* plus Mr. B. Mergler. We shall overcome.

FLQ.

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\* Ibid., p. 124. Cross misspelled "prisoner" in an attempt to indicate that the message was dictated and not really his words.

By morning security forces had cordoned off and evacuated the area. The authorities, taking seriously the warnings of the Liberation cell that if they discovered the hideout before Cross's release he would be the first to die, moved with extreme caution. Bernard Mergler, a lawyer, agreed to negotiate and at 11 a.m. entered the apartment to find Cross and three terrorists: Marc Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, and Yves Langlois. The Canadian authorities had alerted the Cuban Embassy and arranged for a Canadian military aircraft to fly the kidnappers out of Canada. Mergler explained the details of the transfer and safe conduct to Cuba and extended the offer to the Cosette-Trudels and to Jacques Lanctot's wife and child. Surrounded by hundreds of heavily armed police and troops, the kidnappers agreed to accept the government's terms, and Cross was released unharmed.

#### IV. THE TERRORISTS

The eight terrorists responsible for the two kidnappings in Montreal were young French Canadian revolutionaries and members of the FLQ. They had been active in earlier disruptive FLQ activities, a few of them even jailed for short periods. Their cause concerned their own people -- freedom for French Canadians -- but they felt themselves part of a worldwide terrorist movement. They compared their struggle to that of the NLF in Algeria and the Black Panthers in the United States and studied the writings of Carlos Marighela of Brazil and Che Guevara of Cuba. But, although they specified that the released prisoners be sent to Algeria or Cuba, they had no direct connection with terrorist groups abroad in carrying out the Cross and Laporte kidnappings.

The FLQ had no formal structure or hierarchy. A cell could be formed by any group, at will, to carry out their revolution: The Liberation cell, for example, was organized to kidnap Cross; the Chenier financial cell, which was responsible for Laporte's abduction, had originally been constituted to raise funds for the FLQ.

The Liberation cell was composed of four young men -- Marc Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, Jacques Cosette-Trudel, and Yves Langlois -- assisted by Cosette-Trudel's wife, Louise. Marc Carbonneau, a former Montreal taxi driver, had been involved during the previous summer in a taxi-driver protest in Montreal. Lanctot had been arrested in February and charged with possession of a sawed-off rifle; he jumped bail. The van in which he had been riding contained the press releases announcing the kidnapping (which did not take place) of the Israeli consul. Lanctot's brother Francois had been arrested in June in possession of notes announcing the kidnapping (also not carried out) of the American consul. Jacques Cosette-Trudel, 23, had been a high-school teacher in Montreal and a summer guide at CBC, but said he found no satisfaction in working while other French Canadians suffered from discrimination, and had begun participating in FLQ activities.



Sharing his FLQ sympathies and joining him and the kidnappers in the hideout was his wife, Louise, a former librarian, who was also Lanctot's sister. Yves Langlois, 25, alias Pierre Seguin, had once been a stenographer for the Superior Court and the Quebec Police Commission. After spending a year in England, he had returned to Canada in January 1970, and encouraged his FLQ friends in kidnapping activity.

During the summer of 1970, the young men worked out the plan to kidnap some prominent person in Montreal. Driving around the wealthier sections of the city in either Lanctot's old car or Carbonneau's taxi with the dome light removed, they followed and discussed abducting several people, among them U.S. Consul General John Topping, an official of the International Air Traffic Association, and James Cross, all of whom lived in the same area. The day before the planned kidnapping, they chose Cross over Topping, because "we figured the English in Quebec would never identify with an American, but if we took the Englishman we thought it would stir more hostility from the English in the province and across Canada...."\*

The Cross kidnapping was well planned and went off without major problems. The kidnappers stole a taxi from a LaSalle taxi garage, used it for the kidnapping, changed to their own car, and returned the taxi before the owners knew it was missing. This ruse explains why the kidnap vehicle was never found.\*\* The terrorists made one error of forgetting to don their hoods; as a result, Mrs. Cross and her maid were able to identify Jacques Lanctot from a police photograph, and the security forces got their first important lead in the case. They used the hoods in the hideout so that the hostage never saw their faces.

The month before the kidnapping, the Cosette-Trudels, using an assumed name, had rented the flat in the suburb of North Montreal where Cross was to be held. The flat proved ideal: It could be entered from

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\* *Weekend Magazine* (supplement of *Toronto Globe and Mail*), January 22, 1974, p. 2.

\*\* Mergler interview in *Toronto Daily Star*, March 9, 1971.

the garage, through a door that could not be seen from the street. Cross remained in the back bedroom with the curtains drawn, except when he used the bathroom immediately adjacent. The other two bedrooms were occupied by the Cosette-Trudels and the three remaining terrorists. The modest, working-class neighbors noticed nothing amiss in the comings and goings of the group.

Cross reported that his captors were neither warm nor hostile and looked upon him as a symbol. Among themselves they maintained a formal courtesy, calling each other "monsieur" throughout even the tensest periods. Although he could not see them, during the first week of his captivity he carried on amicable conversations with them concerning their political objectives in the kidnapping. Their answers were full of political rhetoric about establishing a revolutionary state in Quebec, and their minds generally closed on political matters. Cross's impression was that they were capable of violence and would be prepared to go to any ends, including their own deaths, for their cause.\* Their early communiques indicated their willingness to use violence, warning that Cross would be killed if the hideout were discovered before the terms were settled. However, after the unexpected complications introduced by the Laporte affair and the long wait for Cross to be discovered, they faced the choice of a violent end or bargaining for Cross's life and their safe conduct; they chose the latter.

The Liberation cell left behind in the hideout some revealing taped conversations in which they discussed their accomplishments and expectations. They expected the government to agree to their demands within four or five days or a week; their expectations were, in fact, borne out when, in answer to the Liberation cell's "last" communique, Choquette offered safe conduct for the kidnappers and clemency toward prisoners in exchange for Cross's release. Cross had the impression, as he and his jailers watched Choquette on the television together, that they would accept the compromise. When he asked what they would do with him, they answered that they would hold him for a few days to

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\* Haggart and Golden, p. 231.

taunt the police and then let him go. Lanctot, whom the police were hunting, could avail himself of the offer of safe conduct, but the others might not need it, inasmuch as they could not be identified, even by Cross, because of the elaborate precautions they had taken not to be seen.\*

The Laporte kidnapping, following immediately the Choquette speech, was a complete surprise to the Liberation cell. Cross, who viewed the television reports of the second kidnapping with his captors and heard their reactions, verified the fact that they had no joint plans or connections with the Chenier cell during the early stages of his captivity. Initially, his captors approved the Laporte kidnapping and because of it changed their minds about going along with the compromise as outlined by Choquette.\*\*

In the second week of the confinement, some hostility replaced the cool but friendly dialogue between Cross and his jailers because of speculations on the part of the media that he might be sending coded messages about their location in his dictated communications. When days passed and they were not discovered, their fears subsided, as did their hostility. Then shock of Laporte's death put an end to the communication between the kidnappers and their hostage, and they remained in separate worlds as they waited out their discovery.

On December 2, the police arrested and questioned the Cosette-Trudel couple. The following morning, Bernard Mergler came to the flat with the government's offer of safe conduct for the kidnappers and their families in return for Cross's release unharmed. The three terrorists tried to extract concessions on freeing other prisoners, but the government held firm. They were concerned that the police would not keep their word and would fire on them. As they prepared to leave, they kept machine guns and dynamite ready to use if the security forces or gathering crowds interfered. They were allowed to drive their own car to the Expo site, where the Cuban representatives awaited them. To allay their fears of police ambush, Mergler and Cross rode with them.

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\* Ibid., pp. 231-232.

\*\* Ibid., p. 233.

At the Expo site, Jacques Lanctot's wife and 20-month-old son and the Cosette-Trudels joined them for exile. They went off to their new life with only a few personal possessions; the lock of the car trunk, which contained most of what they intended to take with them, jammed and they were unable to pry it open. They did, however, take the television set that Cross had watched during his captivity. When one of them remarked that it would be bourgeois to have it in Cuba, another suggested that perhaps they could donate it to a children's home. As the four cell members and the wives of two of them left for the airport, Cross said sadly to Mergler, "It was a case of six kids trying to make a revolution."\*

The young revolutionaries who made up the Chenier cell were a tougher breed. In March 1970, the leader, Paul Rose, 27, a former teacher, had rented the house at 5630 Armstrong Street in St. Hubert where Laporte was held. There he lived with his girl friend as Mr. and Mrs. Paul Blais; the other three members of the cell also lived there at times during that summer, planning FLQ activities, including kidnapping. They were: his brother, Jacques Rose, 23, a former mechanic; Francis Simard, 23; and Bernard Lortie, 19, a student. During the previous summer, the group had lived together in the Gaspé in a casual housekeeping arrangement, organizing demonstrations against privately owned American fishing lodges there.\*\*

In late September 1970, the Rose brothers, with \$600 between them, along with their mother, sister, and Francis Simard, drove to the United States. According to Rose, their purpose was to raise funds and buy weapons for FLQ activities, although his mother thought they were going to get jobs. Driving through Texas on October 5, they learned from the car radio that James Cross had been kidnapped by the FLQ in Montreal. Deciding that the FLQ needed another hostage because the government would never give in for Cross, they immediately headed back to Montreal, arriving four days later.

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\* *Toronto Daily Star*, March 9, 1971.

\*\* Haggart and Golden, p. 36; *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 20, 1971.

The three men bought weapons in a pawn shop and stayed for a day in a motel while Simard went to the house on Armstrong Street to find out if it had been under surveillance. On October 9, they returned to the house to plan the kidnapping. Deciding on Laporte, a fellow French Canadian, because he lived within a 10-minute drive of their house, they observed his house and movements, bought disguises, and plotted the abduction. As their fourth man, they picked Bernard Lortie, who had discussed kidnappings with them previously and was willing to cooperate.

After listening to Choquette's October 10 broadcast, which appeared to be about to succeed in bringing about Cross's release and an end to the crisis, the four Chenier cell members, carrying two M-1 rifles and a sawed-off shotgun, left for Laporte's house in Rose's Chevrolet. They stopped at a restaurant along the way to call Laporte and learned from his wife that he was outside. Finding him on the lawn, Paul Rose and Lortie, wearing masks, ordered Laporte into the car at gunpoint. He was blindfolded and made to lie on the floor between the back and front seats, under a trenchcoat.

These men imposed much harsher conditions on their hostage than did the Liberation cell members on theirs. They kept Laporte blindfolded and handcuffed to his bed during the whole week of his captivity. The captors set up 8-hour watches, with two on watch at all times, one in the front of the house and one in the rear. They had a radio to keep them informed of the bargaining and other events related to the crisis.

During the week that they held Laporte, the kidnappers evidently were in and out a good deal. Paul Rose used taxis and buses to get around the city to make anonymous calls from phone booths and to deposit communiques. On Tuesday, he noticed that he was being followed in Montreal; instead of returning to the hideout, he spent most of that evening at a friend's house while the police watched outside. He managed to leave in his friend's car without being seen by the police, but left behind his overcoat. That week the police raided a house on Armstrong Street, near the hideout; both Laporte and his jailers were apprehensive that they had been discovered.

Paul Rose felt increasingly pressed after the two brushes with the police. Public tension was also mounting as the government held firm in its determination not to capitulate to the FLQ. Rose was later reported to have said that when he met with Jacques Cosette-Trudel of the Liberation cell on Wednesday,

it was clearly decided that if the government did not accept our demands, that is, the liberation of the political prisoners, the FLQ would not intercede in favor of the minister, Pierre Laporte, in the death sentence imposed on him by the present authorities, and that Mr. Cross from that moment on would be considered as a permanent political prisoner.\*

On Friday, a week after he was abducted, as the kidnappers were listening to the radio, Laporte attempted to escape by throwing himself through a window and was seriously cut in the move. Lortie bandaged the cuts and later met Rose in Montreal to tell him of the attempted escape. Rose sent Lortie to hide with FLQ friends in Montreal, and himself returned to St. Hubert. He later gave the following account of what happened afterward:

On Saturday, October 17, 1970, we talked about the War Measures Act, the speech by Bourassa the night before, the airlift at the St. Hubert air base, and we also discussed the mechanics of Laporte's execution and the measures to take to complete the operation, that is, the disposal of the body.

All three of us were in the house at 5630 Armstrong when Laporte was executed. Two of us were holding him while the third tightened the chain that he wore around his neck. Later we placed Laporte's body in the trunk of the 1968 Chevrolet.\*\*

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\* *Toronto Daily Star*, March 9, 1971. This is part of a long statement Rose is alleged to have made when arrested, 2-1/2 months after Laporte's kidnapping. It differs only in minor details from Lortie's testimony taken at the Laporte inquest on November 7. Rose later denied the statement, but because police officers swore to its authenticity under oath, the court accepted it as evidence in Rose's trial.

\*\* Ibid.

After killing Laporte, the three kidnappers joined Lortie at the Montreal apartment of three young women. The men built a wall inside a large closet to make a hiding place. When the police came, only three of the terrorists had time to hide; Lortie and the women were arrested. The others remained in the closet; 24 hours later, when the police went out to dinner, they slipped out. A communique followed to the police.

The three fugitives took refuge in a farmhouse twenty miles outside Montreal. They dug a tunnel under the basement floor and hid until the police finally closed in on December 27. Even then they threatened a shoot-out, rather than surrendering quietly. The police agreed to negotiate, but the kidnappers still insisted that the prisoners be released. The government went so far as to agree that bail for those in jail would no longer be automatically opposed, but would be determined by the courts. At that the fugitives surrendered.

Two questions were of major concern to the authorities throughout the crisis: What were the objectives of the kidnappers? Was there any connection between the two cells? Answers to both questions were related to the larger concern of whether the kidnappings were part of an insurrection movement in Quebec. The kidnappers' communiques had warned of further action, suggesting cooperation with other FLQ groups. The Chenier cell also signed its communications as the Vigier cell, Dieppe cell, and so on to confuse the authorities and make it appear that a multiplicity of cells were involved. The authorities and the public were aware that large amounts of dynamite had been stolen by the FLQ in the months prior to the kidnapping, and they feared that a campaign of bombings and terrorism was the next step.

Only after the crisis was over was it known that the kidnappings were the work of but two four-men groups. Their aim was to shake the established government, disturb public order, and force the government to take extreme measures, and in that they succeeded beyond their dreams. They had no plans to follow up the kidnappings by seizing power in Quebec or carrying out an insurrection.\*

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\* Pelletier, p. 53.

The question of cooperation between the two cells has been debated at length. According to Cross, his captors had no prior knowledge of the Laporte kidnapping. During the week that followed, however, he had the feeling, but no solid evidence, that there was communication between the two cells. Communiques stated that the two cells had agreed to the conditions for release of the hostages. And Rose talked of meeting Cosette-Trudel in Montreal Wednesday. From the kidnappers' reactions as they viewed television together, Cross felt that his cell knew of the Laporte killing before it was announced.\*

Rose's statements revealed that during the summer of 1970 Liberation cell and other young FLQ members had visited his house and discussed kidnapping. Reporters investigating the possibility of coordination between the cells have uncovered evidence of association among the members of the two cells during the months previous to the kidnappings, indicating that they knew each other and had cooperated in other FLQ activities. But there is no evidence that the two cells coordinated plans for the two kidnappings, either as an end in themselves or as a prelude to an insurrection.

What motivated these eight men to act as they did? Numerous studies and speculations have been made on the Quebec terrorists. Observers have pointed out that despite the fact that they claimed to be fighting for the Quebec working class, only one of their demands concerned the workers -- the reinstatement of Lapalme drivers -- a demand that the Liberation cell was willing to give up in a compromise. All other demands related to the survival of the organization. A Canadian psychologist, Dr. Gustave Morf, called the terrorists young, impatient idealists struggling against authority, living in a world of ideas rather than in reality. "They all revolted against the inferiority complex which in the past had made the church-led Canadian so submissive."\*\* They were products, not of poverty, as were some of the South American revolutionaries, but of a comparatively affluent, permissive society.

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\* Haggart and Golden, p. 235.

\*\* Gustave Morf, *Terror in Quebec*, Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., Toronto, 1970, p. 168.



Yet the specific romantic-criminal terrorism of the FLQ would have burned itself out long ago if it were not for the fact that its militants operated ... in a highly emotional, demanding and rebellious adolescent culture, and in a self-indulgent, permissive society which produces a rapidly increasing number of people who refuse to grow up and who believe in taking the law into their own hands.\*

The members of the Liberation cell seem to have conformed to this description. Bourassa was quoted as having said of them, "Those kids ... are from our own neck of the woods and basically they aren't bad, they won't kill."\*\* Cross had called them six kids trying to make a revolution, referring to the four Liberation cell members and the wives of two of them. The authorities gambled on the assumption that they were not killers -- and in the case of the Cross kidnappers, they won.

Morf points out that up to the time of the Laporte kidnapping and murder, political assassination had never been seriously contemplated by the FLQ, despite wild threats in their writings. But the Rose brothers and their friends in the Chenier cell were more hardened than the members of the Liberation cell and had been active in FLQ terrorist activities for a longer time. Violence, in their case, got out of hand. Whether the murder was instigated by the hostage's conduct, or as Morf suggested, it was the consequence of drug use or a ritual the dedicated revolutionaries felt compelled to perform, remains a question.

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\* Ibid., preface.

\*\* Haggart and Golden, p. 28.

V. THE HOSTAGESJAMES R. CROSS

James Richard Cross, 49, senior British trade commissioner and head of the British government office in Montreal, had no specific warning of his abduction. Twice during 1970, police had uncovered FLQ kidnapping plots that should have alerted the Montreal diplomatic community to the possibility of further attempts. Nevertheless, when it happened, the Cross kidnapping was a surprise to all concerned.

The morning of October 5, two of the kidnappers entered the Cross home, forced Cross to dress at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and led him out of the house; a third armed man waited on the driveway and a fourth behind the wheel of a taxi. As the group sped away, Cross was made to don a blacked-out gas mask and lie on the floor of the car. After being taken into the rear bedroom of the hideout flat, he was fitted with a cloth hood, which had a slit at the mouth enabling him to breathe, and made to lie on a mattress on the floor, still handcuffed. The room, containing the mattress, a chair, table, and television set, was so heavily curtained that he could not see the sunlight. Except for trips to the bathroom next door, Cross stayed in that room for two months.

Not seeing his captors, Cross was never sure of how many there were. When he sat up to watch television or write letters, he was told not to turn his head toward them, and as an extra precaution he adjusted his hood to serve as blinders. When he went to the bathroom his captors donned hoods. His ignorance of his captors and of his location helped to insure not only the life of his captors, but his life as well.

By Thursday, Cross was allowed to sit up in the chair and view television, still handcuffed, but after two weeks the handcuffs were removed during the daytime. His two meals a day consisted of a breakfast of toast, cheese, and peanut butter, and dinner usually of spaghetti, soup, or sausage. Occasionally, Chinese food from a carry-out restaurant varied the menu. During his two months of captivity, Cross lost 22 pounds, but emerged in good health. When his wife announced through the

media that he had high blood pressure and should receive certain medicine, the kidnappers arranged for him to have it.\* Early in November, a Montreal newspaper reported that a kidnapping suspect, Marc Carbonneau, had purchased a 6-month supply of blood-pressure pills a few days after Cross's kidnapping.\*\*

Cross's relations with his captors remained amicable. They did not maltreat him and showed him respect, though sometimes grudgingly. He was a symbol to them. He never felt they would kill him, despite the fact that he heard their threats to do so broadcast in the communique. Conversation with them was difficult, both because he was not fluent in French and because he could not see the individuals with whom he talked. Nevertheless, throughout the first week, he carried on a dialogue about political motives.\*\*\*

The second week of his confinement, when Laporte was being held hostage, was tense and uncertain for him. He followed his and Laporte's drama on television, but felt helpless. One matter that caused him and his jailers great concern was speculation in the media that he had sent coded messages within his letters. Lemieux at one point also accused Cross of doing so. He was made to rewrite letters to his wife to insure against any coded message. After release, Cross said of hostages, "... people have a responsibility to the chap in there; he's the loneliest man in the world. And speculation about what he's trying to do may cost him his life."\*\*\*\* The week was one of mounting tensions all around them, but Cross and his captors in their isolation could have been a thousand miles away. Cross suffered under the strain, reaching the climax in what he later described as the worst night of his life when the television news revealed Laporte's death and he heard a report that his body had also been found. The horror of his wife's hearing the news tortured him. He was eventually to find out that she had slept through the broadcast.

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\* *Montreal Star*, December 4 and 9, 1970.

\*\* Situation Report No. 6, American Embassy, Ottawa, November 6, 1970.

\*\*\* Haggart and Golden, p. 233.

\*\*\*\* Ibid., p. 234.

After Laporte's death, Cross drew into himself and seldom talked with his captors. "We lived in two solitudes; mine, me in my little chair, and them in the rest of the house...." They occasionally discussed the communiques or something on television, but Cross spent most of his time watching innumerable French movies and thinking over his past.\* He was permitted to write a letter to his wife after six weeks of imprisonment, in which he assured her that he was in good health, but that time dragged heavily.

Cross assessed his position shortly after his capture and decided that escape was impossible. Nevertheless, he continued daily to think about escaping, but never attempted it. Nor did he attempt to bribe or deceive his captors. He decided that the only practical alternative was to cooperate as much as possible and to try to survive each 24-hour day as it arrived.\*\* He felt despair, but never gave in to it. Once his death penalty was lifted after Laporte's death, he and the kidnappers settled into their long quiet wait to be found.

Upon his release in December, Cross immediately joined his wife in London and did not return to further duty in Montreal. In February, his daughter reported that he suffered some damage to his eyes as a result of the restricted vision of his hood.\*\*\* In recognition of his services, the Queen invested him as a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.\*\*\*\* The British government later awarded him £5000 as compensation for his enforced captivity.\*\*\*\*\* Acquaintances report that he talks readily and without bitterness of his experience.

#### PIERRE LAPORTE

Pierre Laporte, 49, Minister of Labor and Immigration in the Quebec government, a native of Montreal, lawyer, and journalist, who like his

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\* Ibid., p. 237.

\*\* Ibid., p. 229.

\*\*\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 15, 1971.

\*\*\*\* Ibid., February 24, 1971.

\*\*\*\*\* *The Times* (London), November 11, 1971.

friend Prime Minister Trudeau had turned to politics, was an important figure in his own right and as a member of the Bourassa administration. His prominence in Quebec was the reason that the Chenier cell of the FLQ chose him as a victim; they wanted to shock the authorities into action, which they thought had not been done with the kidnapping of the British diplomat. The fact that his house was conveniently located within a ten-minute drive of the kidnappers' in St. Hubert also influenced their choice.

Laporte had no warning that he was the kidnappers' target. Cross's abduction and the FLQ rhetoric that followed were warnings to all public figures and diplomats in Montreal, but the swiftness and efficiency with which Laporte was taken surprised all Canada. That Saturday evening, after listening to Choquette's television message to the Cross kidnappers, Laporte strolled out on his lawn and tossed a football with his nephew while he waited for his wife to finish dressing for dinner. Four men drove up in a car, and two with masks and a submachine gun emerged and forced Laporte into the back seat. As they sped away, the nephew got the license number, then ran into the house; he and Mrs. Laporte telephoned the police. Within minutes, the alarm was out and there were police blocks on all main thoroughfares, but no trace of the car was found.

Laporte was forced down on the floor of the car and blindfolded. Rose later reported that he was quite calm during the trip to the hide-out. They quickly drove into the garage of the bungalow in St. Hubert and closed the doors, entering the house by a hole cut through the wall. The car was to remain there, out of sight of police, until it carried Laporte's body out.

The conditions under which Laporte was held were much more severe than those imposed on Cross. He was kept in a rear bedroom, in bed and blindfolded during the entire week, except for brief periods when he ate, exercised, or wrote letters. One set of handcuffs bound his wrists; another secured him to the bed. In the next room was a radio, which the kidnappers kept tuned to news of the mounting crisis, answers to their communiques, etc.

Feeding of the hostage was sporadic at best, from fragmentary evidence gathered. The first morning he had a ham sandwich and tea. Lortie reported that he asked for tea frequently, but he ate very little because there was little to give him. Lortie said there was nothing in the house but bread the second day.\* However, when the house was searched after Laporte's death, police found untouched carry-out meals. When Laporte was captured, he had \$60, which he gave to his captors. Some of that went for food, but Paul Rose used most of it for taxi rides to plant his communiques. Two days after he was seized, Laporte wrote to his wife, "I have started on a little voluntary diet which I am sure will do me good."\*\*

Laporte could communicate readily with his jailers. Paul Rose said in his statement that on Sunday evening he, Jacques, and Francis Simard were with Laporte listening to "Boubou" Bourassa. They spent half an hour talking over the Bourassa statement, and Jacques, Rose, Simard, and Laporte all agreed that Bourassa was ready to negotiate. He seemed to be seeking negotiation and, for the first time, referred to "political" prisoners. Laporte asked that he be allowed to write a letter to Bourassa, and they allowed him to do so.

Laporte wrote four letters during his confinement: two to his wife and two to Premier Bourassa. The first to his wife, written the day after capture, was a short note in which he assured her he was in good health and asked her to accept things. The second, written on Monday after two days of captivity, but not made public until the following February, was an attempt to keep up her spirits and make light of his condition. He assured her that he didn't worry about her or the family and then continued:

I am in good health and very calm. Having had absolutely nothing to do for days I have at least been able to fulfill, in spite of myself, your wish to see me get some rest. A rest is a rest, after all.

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\* *Montreal Gazette*, November 9, 1970.

\*\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 25, 1971.

Then he told her of his "voluntary diet" and ended up urging her to take things philosophically and never to lose hope.

Laporte's two letters to Bourassa were also written on the Sunday and Monday after he was taken. The first one, addressed "Mon cher Robert," was subjected to numerous interpretations. He began, "I feel I am writing the most important letter of my life. At the moment I am in perfect health. I am well treated, even with courtesy." He insisted that police searches be stopped to avoid a shoot-out, which would be a death warrant for him, and then continued:

In other words, you have the power to dispose of my life. If this were the only question and if this sacrifice were to produce good results, one could entertain it, but we are facing a well-organized escalation which will only end with the release of the "political prisoners." After me, there will be a third one, then a fourth, and a twentieth. If all political men are protected, they will strike elsewhere, in other classes of society. One might as well act now and avoid a bloodbath and an altogether unnecessary panic.

You know my own case, which should be borne in mind. I had two brothers. They are dead, both of them. I remain alone as head of a large family which includes my mother, my sister, my own wife, and my children as well as the children of Roland, whose guardian I am. My departure would mean an irreparable loss. For you know the closeness which unites the members of my family. I am no longer the only one whose fate is at stake, but a dozen people are involved -- all women and young children. I think you understand!

If the departure of the "political prisoners" is organized and carried out satisfactorily, I am certain that my personal security as well as that of those who would follow will be absolute.

This could be done rapidly, as I cannot see why, in taking more time, they should continue to make me die little by little where I am presently detained. Decide ... on my life or on my death. I rely on you and thank you.

Friendly greetings,

Pierre Laporte

P.S. I repeat: have the searches stopped and don't let the police carry them on without your knowledge. The success of such a search would mean a death warrant for me.\*

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\* Saywell, p. 61.

Laporte's second letter to Bourassa was written after Bourassa's conciliatory speech and showed his eagerness to believe that the authorities were willing to negotiate on the prisoner issue. He also gave some hint of his anxieties. "My dear Robert, I have just heard your speech. Thanks, I was expecting as much from you.... While eating very frugally this evening, I sometimes had the impressions of having my last meal." Then he continued with particulars of fulfilling the FLQ demands. He assured Bourassa that he accepted the word of the kidnappers and that he hoped Bourassa would do the same. He thanked him for the "reasonable decision which you announced with strength and dignity," and said he hoped to be free within 24 hours.

Bourassa, however, had announced no decision, but only asked for assurance before even discussing demands that the safe release of the hostages would result. Laporte -- imprisoned, restrained, blindfolded, in touch only with his jailers and the radio -- was desperately anticipating the solution that would effect his release. That he feared for his own safety was evidenced by the repetition of the admonition to call off searches that could result in his own death. Indeed, when police raided a house in the neighborhood, his captors reported that Laporte, and they too, were frightened at the prospect of discovery.

As the week progressed and the hopes for negotiations on his release dimmed, Laporte made an attempt to escape. Friday, after having been restrained for six days, he prevailed upon his jailers to loosen the handcuffs that held him to the bed. That was the first day under the War Measures Act, and undoubtedly the radio was reporting the details of the arrival of troops and the numerous arrests in Montreal. From the hideout, Laporte and his captors could observe helicopters landing troops at the nearby St. Hubert airport. Laporte slipped out of his handcuffs and, shielding his body with a pillow, threw himself half way through the window. Jacques Rose and Lortie heard the window break and pulled him back in. He was badly cut, bleeding heavily, and wanted to go to the hospital; instead, Lortie bound his wounds.\* His

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\* *Montreal Gazette*, November 9, 1970.



left wrist was slashed deeply enough to cut several tendons and leave his middle finger paralyzed.\* They watched him closely that night. The next evening they killed him.

Laporte's state of mind his last few days is not known; undoubtedly it was one of desperation at being blindfolded, tied, and made to listen to reports of mounting crisis with diminishing hopes of a settlement that would free him. Rose said, after his arrest, that the captors had discussed in the hideout how Laporte should be killed; Laporte must have heard them as he lay there.

The question of why Laporte was killed and Cross survived may depend not only on the personalities of the terrorists who held them, but also on the personalities of the two hostages. Laporte's captors were ready for action and violence, and Laporte may have responded to this. He did try to escape, whereas Cross accepted his imprisonment. With traditional British reserve, Cross kept his own counsel. Laporte was a French Canadian who was working to bring about changes for Quebec through the political system and was confronted with terrorists who were throwing Quebec into chaos. It would have been natural for him to carry on a spirited dialogue. That his arguments might have provoked his volatile jailers to carry out their threat to kill him is a possibility that should be taken into account.

A further clue to Laporte's death may be some rather dubious connections he reportedly had with racketeers in Montreal. Recent investigations of Montreal underworld figures revealed that during the 1970 provincial elections, Laporte met with "two known underworld figures."\*\*

An American diplomat in Montreal at the time said in answer to the question of why Cross lived and Laporte was killed that Cross was the traditional controlled Englishman to the core, who would bear up under the ordeal. Laporte, however, according to the American, was no innocent in politics, and his captors might have had something on him;

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\* Pathologist's report, *Montreal Gazette*, March 3, 1971.

\*\* *Montreal Star*, January 26, 1974.

there were probably arguments and insults, he said, that ended in his death. It should be added that the statement allegedly made by Paul Rose gives no hint of such an explanation.

## VI. COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION

The Quebec crisis was the biggest domestic news story Canada had ever experienced. Not only did the media pursue their role of seeking out, publicizing, and criticizing every angle of the story, but in addition took on that of principal communications channel. In the opinion of many, the media also served to escalate the crisis and on that account received severe criticism.

The kidnappers from the beginning used two Montreal radio stations to communicate their messages, insisting on full publicity for all their pronouncements and demands. Their usual method was to call anonymously from a public telephone booth to radio station CKLM or CKAC and to give directions to specific locations -- at theatre, a telephone booth, a trash can -- where a written communique was to be found. Less frequently, a taxi driver would be asked to deliver an envelope, or a message addressed to one of the radio stations would be left in his cab. CKLM was the favored station of the Liberation cell, so its downtown studios on St. Catherine Street became a communication center in the Cross drama. Pierre Pascau, the disc jockey, who was neutral in the case, established a special line for the use of the FLQ.\*

The government also used the media to communicate with the kidnappers. Spokesmen scheduled speeches or press conferences to announce bargaining positions to the kidnappers, and on occasion the authorities called Pascau at CKLM with a message for the terrorists. For instance, on October 9, they asked the kidnappers to let them know that James Cross was still alive by having him write a message using certain words. The words came back in a letter from Cross before the day was out. The federal government set up a task force in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa to serve as the main nonpolice communications and information center throughout the crisis. Lines were established from there to the Prime Minister, the Quebec and Montreal authorities, and the media to accelerate the flow of information.

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\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, October 10, 1970.

The media served also as links between the kidnappers and their intermediary, Robert Lemieux. Lemieux sought the microphones at every opportunity, blasting police and authorities and commenting on the "political" prisoners whom he visited at the prisons. He ended early interviews with the press with a French expression meaning "hang on, boys," evidently aimed at the kidnappers.\* There is no evidence that the FLQ cells communicated directly with him; they answered him in their publicized communiques.

The hostages kept in touch with the negotiations and the mounting crisis through the media -- Cross by the television set in his room, Laporte by the radio to which his jailers listened constantly. The two men were allowed to send written messages only, and in the case of Cross, these were dictated or revised by his captors because of their fear that he was sending secret messages. His only trick was misspelling, which he later said was to indicate that the letters were dictated. Laporte's two letters to his wife and two to Premier Bourassa were written by him under the eye of his jailers.

The two FLQ cells communicated with each other only once during the crisis and later issued a joint communique. In the aftermath, members of the Liberation cell claimed that their communique No. 10, released just before Laporte was killed, was a signal to the Chenier cell to spare Laporte's life. In it, the Liberation cell suspended Cross's death sentence and said that the Chenier cell was studying Laporte's case and would soon make known his fate. The message was not made public either because it was not found immediately or because of the WMA prohibition on communicating FLQ statements. The Liberation cell thus reasoned that the authorities, by suppressing their message, were responsible for Laporte's death.

Initially, the kidnappers' communications hit their mark and were widely publicized. As the crisis escalated, however, the stations began to receive hoax calls, and employees stopped responding to each one.

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\* Ibid., October 9, 1970.

For this reason, an anonymous call telling Norman Maltais at CKAC that the body of Laporte could be found in an abandoned car near the St. Hubert airfield went unheeded. Only when the call came the third time did he investigate and follow up. On a few other occasions communications were lost or not located.

There were no secret negotiations connected with the Cross and Laporte kidnappings. The second communique from the Liberation cell, sent the day after Cross's abduction, contained an appeal to the media anticipating suppression of the news:

We call upon your cooperation as media agents to break the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the liberation operation by systematically stealing all the communiques and our manifesto which were destined to the various information media.

The FLQ wanted maximum publicity for their kidnappings, and they were given this in all the media. Radio and television broadcast full details and were quick to publicize the communiques and the frequent statements by Lemieux and his friends. Within two days, the newspapers were advising the government on handling the case, and they continued to do so. Special editions were put out on the October 12 holiday to help satisfy the public demand for news.

Three days after Cross was taken, the FLQ manifesto was read on radio and television to meet one of the demands. Reaction to it was mixed, but as one critic said,

For the first time many English Canadians, and perhaps many Quebecois as well, realize that the FLQ were something other than separatists in a hurry.\*

The authorities were disturbed by what they considered to be excessive media coverage during the first week. Although polls showed that

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\* Saywell, p. 51.

only 1 percent of Montrealers totally approved the kidnappings and that a large majority disapproved, the media gave widespread coverage to the vocal FLQ sympathizers. The Prime Minister suggested that the press use restraint in reporting on the FLQ. It was a mistake, he said, to give the FLQ the publicity they wanted, and to use the term political prisoners for criminals. The media were quick to counter that: (1) communication was coming through the media in both directions, (2) the manifesto was read at government request, and (3) Bourassa had referred to political prisoners in his radio broadcast.\* In invoking the WMA, the government did not call for press censorship, but made the communication of statements from the FLQ illegal. The media then turned FLQ communiques over to the police.

After the weekend of frantic coverage of Laporte's death and the false report that Cross had been killed, the media backed off to some extent. George Davidson, CBC President, asked producers to exercise a greater degree of restraint in reporting on the kidnapping crisis, but not to the point of cutting off discussion. He said there had been irresponsible speculation and inaccurate reporting and that the time had come to cool the publicity.\*\* Some voluntary restraint followed.

The most serious among the many questions debated in the Canadian press were: (1) negotiation for the exchange of prisoners in return for the lives of the hostages, (2) subjection of the Quebec government to the federal government in Ottawa, (3) division of opinion and weaknesses within the Quebec government, and (4) infringement of civil liberties under the War Measures Act. The debate on some aspects of these still goes on. To the extent that they pertained to government actions or policies and were critical of the authorities, press comments often elicited strong responses from members of the government. Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks referred to above were extremely critical. Premier Bourassa, in a Quebec National Assembly debate a month after the crisis, said that "the government's leaders were treated like dogs by the newspapers." He suggested that it might be

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\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, October 14, 1970.

\*\* Ibid., October 16, 1970.

time "to reexamine equally the inherent dangers of verbal violence in the analysis of and the search for solutions and the elaboration of solutions."\*

The American consul general in Montreal judged that the Canadian press as a whole was even-handed in its treatment of the crisis. He thought the press was guilty of exaggerating the threat at the time, as were members of the government; one encouraged the other to excesses. The orgy of press comment was the price paid for a free press.

Public opinion in Montreal, as throughout Canada, was more solidly behind the government approach than one would have judged from the media. A poll by the Information Collection Institute, published October 19, showed that 78 percent of Montrealers totally disapproved of the kidnappings and only 1 percent totally approved. A majority believed that maintaining law and order was more important than saving two lives.\*\* A poll taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs the day after the WMA was invoked, but before Pierre Laporte's death, tallied 32 percent of Quebecois as believing the government was not tough enough and 54 percent that government policy was about right. For all Canada the corresponding percentages were 37 and 51.\*\*\* In other words, 86 to 88 percent of Canadians approved of the War Measures Act or the government's firm reaction at the time. A poll taken on November 15 by Omnifacts for CTV suggested that about 85 percent in Quebec supported the government. Another poll on November 27 showed the percentage eroding to 73 percent, indicating some citizens were having second thoughts about the crisis once fears had subsided.\*\*\*\*

The public also showed its approval in the voting booth of the men most closely allied to the October crisis. Montrealers reelected Mayor Drapeau on October 25, before the crisis subsided. Premier Bourassa was reelected in 1974 by a healthy majority, and Prime Minister Trudeau continues to preside in Ottawa.

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\* Quoted in American Consul Quebec, Airgram A-60, November 25, 1970.

\*\* Saywell, p. 61.

\*\*\* Ibid., pp. 93-94.

\*\*\*\* Ibid., p. 118.

VII. LOCAL SECURITY

Three police forces operate in Montreal: the Montreal Police Service, about 3800 in number, including specialists and backup office staffs; the Quebec Provincial Police (QPP), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. An estimated 300 men of the three services make up a specialized antiterrorist squad, organized during the 1960s to combat the growing FLQ terrorism.\* Inevitably, there were complaints of lack of coordination and rivalry among the three services in the October 1970 crisis. According to reports from Americans who had worked with the antiterrorist squad, however, relations among the men of the three services assigned to that group were good, and the squad itself performed well.

The RCMP represented the federal government in Quebec, and their activities were frequently unpopular there just because they were considered the arm of the English-speaking federal establishment. In turn, the RCMP were unhappy with control from Ottawa and with instructions to avoid getting too involved in Quebec, and therefore they tended to tell Ottawa less than they should have about undercover activities. In addition, Canada had no counterparts of the CIA or the FBI to assist the police forces with their expertise.

The FLQ's first demand after it had kidnapped Cross was that the "repressive police forces" not be allowed to conduct searches, investigations, raids, etc., which would jeopardize the success of the kidnapping operation. The demand went unheeded: The authorities did not curtail police work; on the contrary, they put the police forces on alert to make an all-out effort to find Cross's kidnappers; at the same time, they gave diplomats in Montreal added protection. The antiterrorist squad raided homes and hangouts of suspected FLQ activists and questioned many. They were instructed, however, to avoid any act that might panic the abductors.

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\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, October 13, 1970.



Thorough police work, aided by a combination of tips and shadowing, paid off with the discovery of the Cross hideout. Police caution in evacuating neighbors, cordoning off the block, and securing the route to the Expo site indicated that the police respected FLQ threats to use guns and dynamite.

The security role of the British government was passive throughout; at no time did they take issue with Canadian tactics or urge a different course of action. Publicly and privately, the British government expressed full confidence in the Canadian government's handling of the affair.

The kidnapping of Laporte escalated police activity to the maximum possible in Montreal and vicinity. Police cancelled all leaves and put some members on double shifts. The antiterrorist squad carried out scores of raids across the province within 24 hours after the kidnapping. Lemieux and other FLQ sympathizers were jailed. The police set up tight security for Bourassa and other government officials in Quebec; federal troops protected top leaders in Ottawa. A Toronto newspaper reported that by October 12, the costs of extra police work were up to \$672,000, or \$84,000 for each of the eight days since Cross had been taken.\*

As the crisis escalated the police were more and more harassed by bomb threats, rumors, false leads, and increased demands for protection. On October 15, after numerous pressures, including a bomb threat that forced the evacuation of the Palais de Justice, and with the prospect of a march and rally that evening by FLQ supporters, Premier Bourassa and Mayor Drapeau called on the armed forces for help. More than 1000 soldiers took up positions at the strategic buildings in Montreal that day. The Bourassa government passed an order-in-council that placed all police and army personnel under the command of the director of the Quebec Provincial Police. Troops were to perform police duties only and to carry nothing but small arms.\*\*

During the following night, the Quebec and Montreal authorities formally asked the federal government for emergency powers. A letter

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\* Ibid.

\*\* Saywell, pp. 79-81.

from Maurice Saint-Pierre, Director of the Quebec Provincial Police, which accompanied the requests by Bourassa and Drapeau, explained the situation in Quebec:

The recent kidnappings of a foreign diplomat and a Crown Minister of the province have signalled the launching of this movement of their seditious projects and acts leading directly to the insurrection and the overthrow of the state.

Under these circumstances, the investigation which the police authorities must undertake must necessarily delve into all aspects of the activities of the networks of this seditious movement, and should not be restricted to simply searching for the individuals who perpetrated the odious kidnapping of the two people who are still prisoners -- for this would mean failure.

The efforts to investigate the "manifold tiny cells, each impervious to the others" were proving too much under ordinary procedures. The authorities should have additional means appropriate to protect society.\*

Under the War Measures Act, the number of federal troops on duty in the province at the peak of the crisis reached about 7500.\*\* The regiment sent to Montreal was the French Canadian Royal 22d, which had a good reputation with the people in Montreal. The government was careful to say that the province was not under martial law, but that troops were in Quebec only to assist police.

Security forces under the WMA had the right to arrest without warrant suspected FLQ members or those promoting insurrection. They could enter and search and seize property as evidence without warrant. They took over no other extraordinary powers or controls.

On November 2, the governments of Canada and Quebec offered a joint reward of \$150,000 for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers. The offer included assurances that the payment would be kept confidential. In order not to jeopardize future police capabilities, Canadian authorities would not reveal the role played by the reward.

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\* Ibid., pp. 85-86.

\*\* Ibid., p. 128.

The police were criticized by the press and the public throughout the crisis, as were other arms of the government. Two incidents made them vulnerable to such criticism: (1) Three days before Laporte's death, the police had had Paul Rose under surveillance as he traveled around Montreal and visited a friend; that night, after dark, Rose left the friend's house with the family, in their car; the police tail did not spot him and he was able to return to the hideout unnoticed. (2) A few weeks later, Rose slipped through their net a second time when he and his accomplices were hiding out in the apartment of three young women on Queen Mary Road. The kidnappers had built a partition inside a large closet behind which they could hide when the police came. The antiterrorist squad found the apartment by tracing a telephone number found in the house where Laporte had been held. When they knocked on the apartment door on November 6, the Rose brothers and Simard hid in the closet. There was no time for Lortie to hide. The squad searched the apartment, arrested Lortie and the women, and continued to guard the apartment. The three kidnappers remained motionless for 24 hours; when their guards left for dinner the following evening, the kidnappers walked out free. They issued a communique thanking the police for the weapons they had left behind. Although the police claimed that none was missing, they were severely criticized for the incident.

VIII. AFTERMATH

The outcome of the Cross kidnapping was successful from the point of view of both the Canadian and British authorities. The hostage was released unharmed, and no deaths or injuries were sustained by others involved in the case. Of the seven original demands made by the FLQ when Cross was kidnapped, only one was fulfilled by the government: the reading of the FLQ manifesto on television and radio. The government neither paid ransom nor released the 23 prisoners as demanded. It failed, however, to bring the kidnappers to justice; instead, they were given safe conduct to Cuba in return for Cross's freedom.

Arrangements for safe conduct of the kidnappers were begun by the Foreign Office with the governments of Cuba and Algeria soon after the initial communique mentioned the two countries. Cuba was selected and details were worked out for the actual transfer of the kidnappers and hostage to Cuban diplomats on the site of Expo 67. These details were made known to the kidnappers even before the death of Pierre Laporte and repeated afterward so that Cross's captors would know how to proceed. Claude Roquet, head of the External Affairs Department task force established to negotiate Cross's release, and Allen Rowe, an officer in the department, explained the planning for the safe conduct as follows:

The object was to make sure that the kidnappers not only would know that this had been formally offered by the authorities, but that they would also be aware of all the mechanics of it, so they could assess the fairness of the proposal and know exactly how to proceed.

There is no doubt that the kidnappers received all this information immediately. They knew that the arrangements had been organized around the cooperation of the Cuban government. The Quebec and Canadian authorities early decided that it was essential not simply to make a vague offer of safe conduct but to be very concrete and even dramatic -- to hold out to the kidnappers something which they could clearly visualize. The device of consular immunity was deliberately designed to provide for a kind of neutral ground. The site of Expo 67 had been chosen for the temporary extension

of the Cuban Consulate to assure these people also that they would be coming to a wide-open space, an area that was familiar to them.

The arrangements for clearing and protecting the site were made known. The fact that aircraft were standing by was publicized for several weeks. It was obvious that everything was ready if only the kidnappers would come forward.\*

Roquet accompanied the prisoners to Cuba in a Canadian aircraft and described the atmosphere as relaxed, quiet, and subdued.

In April 1971, the Quebec Justice Department issued warrants for the arrest of Lanctot, Carbonneau, Langlois, and the Cosette-Trudels on 33 charges relating to the Cross kidnapping. The exiles will face prosecution if they return to Canada; \*\* none has returned so far. They lived quietly for 3-1/2 years in a Havana hotel as guests of the Cuban government. The men worked occasionally on such jobs as translating, teaching French, harvesting cane, or mechanical jobs. A good part of their time was spent in meetings and seminars with members of other revolutionary groups and other FLQ people in Havana. \*\*\*

In late June 1974, three of the Cross kidnappers, Jean Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, and Yves Langlois, along with Lanctot's wife, left Cuba for Paris, via Prague. They slipped in with Cuban papers, unnoticed by French security. Prime Minister Trudeau, asked whether his government would request extradition, replied that Canada did not want them. French officials said privately that any request for extradition of the FLQ members would be denied, because France does not extradite to their home countries people wanted in political cases. \*\*\*\*

The remaining two members of the cell, Jacques and Louise Cosette-Trudel, arrived in Paris in August. They told police that they played only a minor role in the kidnapping of James Cross, just renting the flat where he was held and furnishing the car. They did not like life

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\* *Canada Today*, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1971.

\*\* *Toronto Star*, August 2, 1971, p. 7.

\*\*\* *Weekend Magazine* (supplement of *Toronto Globe and Mail*), January 22, 1972.

\*\*\*\* *Montreal Star*, June 25, 1974; *Toronto Globe and Mail*, June 26, 1974.

in Cuba and came to France "where life was easier than in a socialist nation." Their ultimate goal is to return to Montreal.\*

The outcome of the Laporte kidnapping was a tragedy in all respects. Laporte's abductors were offered the same terms as those finally accepted by the Cross kidnappers, but they refused any compromise. Bernard Lortie, captured by police in the Montreal apartment where the other three kidnappers were hiding, appeared on November 7 at the coroner's inquest, at which the details of Laporte's death were first revealed to the public. Lortie admitted openly his involvement in the kidnapping and named his accomplices. He was found guilty of kidnapping; his sentence was moderated to 20 years, because he had been the one to bandage Laporte's wounds after his abortive escape attempt.\*\*

After a seven-week trial during which he was removed from the court three times for contempt, Paul Rose was sentenced March 14, 1971, to life imprisonment for the murder of Laporte. Although at the trial Rose admitted to the kidnapping, "And I'm proud of it,"\*\*\* he denied the murder charge. His earlier statement describing Laporte's kidnapping, imprisonment, and murder was admitted as evidence, despite the fact that Rose claimed during the trial that it was false. The policemen who were present when he allegedly made and recorded the statement testified under oath to its authenticity.\*\*\*\* The jury deliberated 25 minutes and found Rose guilty of murder. Rose thanked them for their long hours of deliberation. He was later convicted for his part in the kidnapping and received another life sentence, which he is serving concurrently.

Francis Simard is serving a life term for murder and has not yet been tried for kidnapping.

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\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1974.

\*\* *Montreal Star News and Review*, March 3, 1973.

\*\*\* *Ibid.*, March 15, 1971.

\*\*\*\* *Montreal Gazette*, March 9, 1971.

Jacques Rose was tried twice for his part in the kidnapping; the first trial ended in a hung jury and the second in acquittal. Evidence of his involvement in the kidnapping was only circumstantial. His handwriting was not on the communiques, as were those of Paul Rose and Simard, and his fingerprints found in the St. Hubert house and the automobile could have been from an earlier time. His murder trial also resulted in acquittal, but he was tried again in June-July 1973 -- almost three years after the kidnapping -- and found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte by assisting his brother to escape. At that same trial, Robert Lemieux, the defense lawyer and intermediary between the FLQ and the government, was sentenced to 2-1/2 years for contempt of court.\*

Others, convicted of complicity in the Laporte kidnapping (hiding and transporting the fugitives), received sentences ranging from six months to eight years.\*\*

The 7500 federal troops began to leave the province in mid-November 1970; all had left by early January. The War Measures Act was in force until December 3, when it was supplanted by the Public Order Act, which remained in effect until the end of April 1971. During this period, the police retained emergency powers to search and arrest or detain on suspicion. The FLQ was outlawed under both measures; suspects could be held without charge for 21 days under the WMA and 7 days under the Public Order Act. By the end of 1970, police had conducted 5000 raids and arrested 468 suspects, of whom 408 were released without charge and 41 held.

Prosecutors had trouble pressing charges under the WMA. They found juries reluctant to convict on such charges as seditious acts and membership in or support of the FLQ. In mid-August 1971, the Quebec Justice Department suspended action on 32 awaiting trial; as a result, Lemieux and other prominent FLQ supporters were released.\*\*\*

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\* *Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 18, 1973.

\*\* Ibid., July 26, 1973.

\*\*\* Ibid.

The FLQ never recovered from the October crisis and the WMA. Pierre Vallieres, author of the manual of the revolutionary movement in Quebec, *White Niggers of America*, and more than any other the symbol of the FLQ, disassociated himself from the movement in December 1971, recommending that all other members do likewise and support the electoral process to gain independence for Quebec. He allied himself with the Parti Quebecois as the agent for liberation, attributing this switch to the lessons learned from the October crisis: In October 1970, he said, the FLQ brought about just what it claimed to be fighting -- the repression of the people and of organizations fighting to make Quebec independent. He gave a "categorical no" to any continuation of the course of violence that the FLQ had followed since 1963.\*

The Canadian government extended the protection of diplomats in Quebec and took other steps to increase security; there have been no further kidnapping incidents in Canada. But the debate continues. On the fifth anniversary of the crisis, a series of articles in the press and a 2-1/2-hour documentary film on the English network of Radio-Canada once again exposed the wounds. The press again called on Trudeau and Bourassa to defend their stand on the War Measures Act. One historian of the crisis sums up the long-term reaction this way:

The crisis was over, but the debate was not -- and perhaps never would be. The major issues around which political and public controversy centered were the unwillingness of the government to negotiate the freedom of the twenty-three criminals; the alleged subordination of Quebec to Ottawa; the reasons for the use of the army and the War Measures Act; and the intermediate and long term effects of the crisis on both the governments and the society of Quebec and Canada and their future relations.\*\*

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\* Pierre Vallieres, *Choose!*, translated by Penelope Williams, New Press, Toronto, 1972.

\*\* Saywell, p. 136.



## IX. CONCLUSIONS

The crisis of October 1970 touched the raw nerve of the problem of two Canadas and made Canadian government authorities reluctant to discuss the Cross and Laporte kidnappings with an outsider. Although Rand's interest here involved only the government handling of the actual kidnappings, and not French Canadian separatism, during the author's visit to Ottawa, officials in the Department of External Affairs limited the discussion to government policy and to aspects of the case already made public; Rand researchers were requested not to interview involved parties in Quebec. Despite limitations on the access to information, however, some conclusions can be drawn.

Canadian federal and provincial authorities, using an effective balance of firmness and flexibility, were able to bring the Cross kidnapping episode to a successful conclusion: They gave the Liberation cell to understand that the government would negotiate; they were firm on the ransom and prisoner issues; and despite the FLQ cell's miscalculation of the degree of firmness the government would show, Cross was ultimately released unharmed.

The task force at the Department of External Affairs skillfully worked out the details of the safe conduct to Cuba for the kidnappers in exchange for Cross's release. The Canadian authorities announced this alternative to the FLQ within the first week and continued to propose it at frequent intervals until Cross was freed. Why the terrorists did not come forth and accept asylum, but instead waited two months to be found, remains a question. The task force's careful planning of every detail, together with the Cuban government's cooperation, made the transfer on the neutral Expo site acceptable to the terrorists. The life of the hostage was the main concern, and extreme care was taken for his protection during the transfer.

Throughout the negotiations Cross's government gave the Canadian authorities its trust and support, thereby providing an atmosphere free

of the international strains and misunderstandings that have often hindered similar exchanges. The difficulties that U.S. negotiators have confronted in dealing through other governments to obtain the release of American hostages, in contrast to the Canadian negotiators' success in obtaining Cross's release for the British government, point to two general conclusions: First, it is easier for a government to deal with a situation involving terrorism when it does not have to act through another government. And second, despite modern communications, distance creates a time delay (for message processing, delivery, decoding, etc.) that prevents real-time knowledge. Therefore, wherever possible, full power to negotiate should be given to representatives on the spot.\* Where the U.S. Government has a relationship of mutual trust with the host government, as is the case with the United Kingdom and Canada, decisions should be left to the host government; in the absence of such a relationship, our diplomats on the scene should be delegated to negotiate.

Canada responded to the tragedy of Pierre Laporte with a national soul-searching into the reasons for his murder and into the larger question of how a major national crisis had been precipitated by just two independent FLQ cells of four men each. Laporte's kidnapping by the more intransigent Chenier cell had escalated the crisis, but not the bargaining power of the FLQ: The government had committed itself to making no concessions for the life of a British diplomat; it could not but do the same for the life of a Quebec minister. The Chenier cell also miscalculated the government's firmness. In this case, however, the government failed to obtain the hostage's release. But more was lost than the life of a French Canadian official. With the invoking of the War Measures Act -- because the government overestimated the FLQ's strength and because the public, police, and media overreacted to the FLQ threat -- French Canada temporarily lost a part of its civil authority and all the Canadian people temporarily lost a number of their civil liberties.

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\*The author is grateful to J. H. Hayes, a Rand colleague, for suggesting this correlation.

X. CHRONOLOGY

October 5	8:15 a.m.	James R. Cross kidnapped by four armed men from home.
	11:45 a.m.	Communique No. 1, containing seven demands, received.
	2:40 p.m.	External Affairs Minister Sharp informs Commons of kidnapping.
	3:00 p.m.	Quebec Justice Minister Choquette makes public the kidnappers' demands.
October 6	a.m.	Prime Minister Trudeau confers with Quebec Premier Bourassa and with cabinet on Cross kidnapping.
	6:00 p.m.	Communique No. 2, written at noon, received. Sharp speech in Commons calls FLQ demands unreasonable, but asks for dialogue. Bourassa endorses Ottawa government stand.
October 7	11:15 a.m.	Choquette at press conference before noon deadline appeals to humanitarianism of kidnappers.
	1:30 p.m.	Communique No. 4 from Liberation cell extends deadline another 24 hours. Letter from Cross enclosed. Robert Lemieux requests a neutral mediator.
	10:00 p.m.	Sharp reads official statement. Asks assurance of Cross release if demands are met.
October 8	2:30 p.m.	Communique No. 5 rejects mediator as trap. Demands manifesto be read and police activity halted or Cross will be killed.
	6:00 p.m.	Lemieux on TV says authorities stalling for time in order to find Cross. FLQ manifesto read over radio and TV.
October 9	a.m.	Communique No. 6 goes astray. Sets more limited conditions for release of Cross.
	3:00 p.m.	Bourassa flies to New York on business. Choquette asks kidnappers for proof Cross is alive.
	6:00 p.m.	Communique No. 7 released with copy of No. 6 and letter from Cross answering Choquette's request. Sets deadline of 6 p.m. on 10th for release of prisoners.

October 10	10:00 a.m.	Lemieux says Cross using letters to reveal his whereabouts.
	3:00 p.m.	Lemieux offers to accompany prisoners abroad.
	5:30 p.m.	Choquette on TV makes counteroffer to FLQ. Proposes safe passage to Cuba for kidnappers in return for Cross.
	6:18 p.m.	Four men kidnap Pierre Laporte from Montreal home.  Police and military accelerate activity.
October 11	a.m.	Robert Lemieux arrested.
	9:00 a.m.	Communique No. 1 from Chenier cell saying Laporte will be executed if seven demands for exchange of Cross are not met.
	1:00 p.m.	Communique No. 2 from Chenier cell repeats demands and sets 10:00 p.m. deadline.  FRAP meets and endorses objectives of FLQ manifesto.
	4:45 p.m.	Communique from Chenier cell. Letters from Laporte to Bourassa and to wife.
	9:55 p.m.	Bourassa reads statement asking for mechanism for conducting negotiations and guaranteeing release of hostages.
October 12	1:45 a.m.	Communique from Cross kidnappers with reduced demands.  Vigilantes threaten reprisals against families of political prisoners.
	10:50 a.m.	Communique from Chenier cell assuming government will negotiate prisoner issue. Appoints Lemieux as mediator.
	4:30 p.m.	Communique from Chenier cell summing up situation.
	7:15 p.m.	Bourassa announced appointment of Robert Demers as government negotiator. Lemieux and Demers meet.
October 13	a.m.	Troops guard public figures in Ottawa.
	noon	Robert Lemieux arraigned, refuses to plead and is released.
	3:00 p.m.	Lemieux and Demers meet.
	6:00 p.m.	Lemieux meets press; calls off negotiations until FLQ gives him more of a mandate.  Trudeau in CBC interview stresses government hard line. Cabinet meets and hears urgent message from Montreal.

October 14	5:00 a.m.	Message from Liberation cell gives Lemieux approval to negotiate.
	2:00 p.m.	Lemieux and Demers meet for 1 hour.
	9:00 p.m.	Sixteen prominent Quebecois issue statement calling for negotiation on prisoner issue.
	p.m.	University rallies and sit-ins support FLQ.
October 15	a.m.	In Ottawa cabinet meets for 3 hours to discuss crisis. Trudeau cancels visit scheduled for Sunday to Soviet Union.
	2:00 p.m.	Quebec government calls for Canadian Army troops to aid police. Troops take up position.
	9:00 p.m.	Bourassa rejects FLQ demands and offers safe passage to kidnappers and normal parole of prisoners. Sets 3:00 a.m. deadline.
		FLQ rally at Paul Sauve Arena; sympathizers hear Lemieux and Vallieres call for liberation of Quebec.
October 16	3:00 a.m.	Deadline for reply from FLQ. Letters from Quebec and Montreal arrive Ottawa requesting emergency measures.
	4:00 a.m.	Cabinet invokes War Measures Act.
	5:15 a.m.	Public announcement of WMA. Predawn raids.
	11:00 a.m.	Debate starts in Commons on WMA.
		Laporte makes escape attempt, is badly cut.
	p.m.	Bourassa at press conference takes responsibility for WMA decision. Trudeau appears on TV appealing for understanding and support.
October 17	6:18 a.m.	Kidnappers strangle Laporte with chain of religious medal around neck.
	7:00 p.m.	Anonymous call to CKAC saying that a package had been left at St. Hubert airfield.
	8:15 a.m.	Repeat of message.
	9:30 p.m.	Call to CKAC saying note left at theatre. Note picked up saying body of Laporte in trunk of car.
	11:30 p.m.	Bourassa, unaware of note, appeals for release of hostages and outlines arrangements for safe passage of kidnappers to Cuba.

October 18	12:25 a.m.	Police open trunk of car and find body of Laporte. TV and radio announce Laporte murder. False report of Cross death.
	1:00 p.m.	Message from Cross received that he was alive and well.
	6:00 p.m.	Laporte's body lies in state.
	11:00 p.m.	Trudeau on TV says FLQ will not shake Canada.
October 19	1:00 a.m.	Police find Chenier cell hideout where Laporte held.
		In Ottawa Commons votes 190-16 to approve WMA.
October 27		Communique from Chenier cell.
November 4		Press receives photograph of Cross showing him playing cards on a case of dynamite.
November 6		Lortie, one of Laporte's kidnappers, arrested in Montreal flat while three other kidnappers evade police.
November 7		AP in New York receives Cross photograph and a communique commenting on events.
		Lortie testifies at Laporte inquest.
November 14		Communique from Laporte's kidnappers regarding their escape.
November 21		Communique from Liberation cell and letter from Cross.
December 2		Cross kidnapper Cosette-Trudel and wife arrested. Police close in on apartment where Cross is held.
December 3		Cross released after kidnappers flown to Cuba.
December 28		Police find three remaining Laporte kidnappers in tunnel hideout beneath farmhouse 20 miles from Montreal.

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