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
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET UNION

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## P r e f a c e

SINCE THE END of World War II, The Soviet Union has become a true "superpower," a nation occupying one-sixth of the dry surface of the globe, a nation well-endowed with natural resources, and, in recent years, a nation possessing an awesome military machine. Communism, the state religion of the Soviet Union, fundamentally antagonistic to any ideological outlook other than Marxism-Leninism, sees the spread of the true faith as its historic task. The free world can no longer rely on the comfortable assumptions that "truth will prevail," that "communism will not work because it is against human nature," and that "time is on our side." Since the United States has had the leadership of the free world thrust upon it, it behooves us as Americans to strive to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

Despite the Western origins of communism, the present ideology under that name has evolved its expansionist characteristics in the Soviet Union, and the stamp of Russian nationalism is deeply engraved upon it. Expansion is nothing new in the history of Russia. From the Grand Dukes of Muscovy in the fifteenth century to the rulers in the Kremlin today, the borders of the Russian state have been reaching out. The thesis which advanced Moscow as the Third Rome and world headquarters of Orthodox Christianity has been superseded since 1917 by that of Moscow as the center of world communism, but both represent ideological superstructures above basically imperialistic expansion.

This text is concerned primarily with the physical and human resources of the Soviet Union today and with its organization. The military and industrial powerhouse now facing us did not come into being in any mystical way; its present position is due to excellent natural resources, hard work, and skilled—albeit ruthless—organization. Because of limited space, the descriptive rather than the historical approach is used here; however, the historical chapter will help correct any imbalance. The reader should not regard the treatment of any subject touched upon in this text as definitive. The intent is rather to provide some background for a better understanding of the Soviet Union and to stimulate further study.

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## The Physical Setting of the Soviet Union

ANY analysis of the Soviet Union logically begins with the physical setting. Many of the problems that beset the tsarist regime and now haunt its Soviet successor derive from the vast expanse of the country, the location far to the north, the continental climate with extremes of cold and heat, the shortage of arable land, and the inadequate rainfall. Since a detailed physical description cannot be given here, a general view of the Soviet Union as a whole and a brief discussion of its regional characteristics will set the stage.

### 1. Size

In considering the physical factors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), we are struck first by its enormous size. It is a known fact that the area of the Soviet Union is 8,436,000 square miles. However, in an age when the word "million" is heard every day and is no longer held in awe, this figure means little. Comparative statistics serve to reduce this vast territorial expanse into terms that can be understood and examined. For example, the state of Texas would fit inside the Soviet Union some 31 times, and the Soviet Union is more than 126 times as large as the New England area. For the air-minded, the distance from Moscow to Vladivostok is about the same as from Moscow to New York. It is also enlightening to consider the Soviet share of the land mass of the world. The total area of the earth that is free of water and icecaps is slightly more than 50 million square miles. The Soviet Union occupies about one-sixth of that area.

### 2. Location and Orientation

Another important physical characteristic of the Soviet Union is its extremely northern location. Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea, is in about the same latitude as Halifax, Nova Scotia; Donetsk (Stalino),<sup>1</sup> in the Donbas region, which is in the southern Ukraine, is in the same latitude as Great

Falls, Montana; Moscow, the heart of the Soviet Union, is north of Edmonton or Goose Bay; and finally, Leningrad is about the same latitude as Anchorage, Alaska.

A circle of latitude through the northern edge of Edmonton includes about 200 thousand people of Alaska and Canada, but about 150 million people of the Soviet Union. In Canada and the United States, 99.5 percent of the population live south of the latitude of northern Edmonton; 75 percent of the Soviet population live to the north of it.

The very orientation of the main mass of the USSR tends to make its northern location even more unfavorable. On the whole it can be schematically pictured in the form of an amphitheater, elevated in the south and the east and dropping off to the northwest. The stands and bleachers of the enormous amphitheater are the mountain ranges that run along the southern and eastern borders of the USSR: the Caucasus, Tien Shan, Altay, Sayan, Yablonovy, Stanovoy, and Verkhoyansk ranges. In front of the stands is the floor of the amphitheater, the huge plain of European Russia and Western Siberia, spreading out toward the Arctic Ocean. There is nothing to stop the arctic air masses from moving in over this vast plain. Furthermore, much of the floor of the amphitheater is so tilted toward the Arctic Ocean that many of the largest rivers flow into it. An added disadvantage is that the moderating influence of the tropical air masses and the Pacific is almost entirely cut off by the encircling mountain ranges.

The implications in these factors of vast size, northern location, and orientation toward the Arctic Ocean are very important in assessing the geographic setting of the Soviet Union. The deadly cold of the Soviet Union and Siberia is almost legendary. The huge land mass means that a continental climate predominates; that is, suffers from extremes of heat and cold because of the distance from the world's great thermostats, the open oceans. The Soviet Union does have one very long seacoast, but it is on the Arctic Ocean, a gigantic icebox.

<sup>1</sup>As a result of the de-Stalinization program, the Soviets renamed this city. In this text other changes in name will be indicated by using the new name, followed by the old name in parentheses.

Because of the northerly latitude and continental climate, well over 40 percent of the USSR (3.5 million square miles) lies within the permafrost zone, called *vechnaya merzlota* in Russian. This means that the subsurface soil is permanently frozen from three to six feet on the lower Amur to around two thousand feet at Nordvik. Even in summer the surface soil thaws only to a depth of about six feet in the coniferous forests and as little as 18 inches in the peat bogs.

The *merzlota* line begins at the White Sea about a hundred miles north of Arkhangelsk, runs along the Arctic Circle to the Urals, and then swings southward. It crosses the Ob south of Beryozovo, and in a curve with a definite southern bulge reaches the Yenisey just south of Turukhansk at which point it swings sharply south, east of the Yenisey, until it reaches Outer Mongolia. It reenters the USSR west of Blagoveshchensk, follows the Amur to Lake Kizi and ends at the Tatar Straits, but reappears in the northeastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

The already difficult problems of building railroads, stable highways, the substructure of large buildings, and airports in distant Siberian regions are seriously complicated by permafrost. Agriculture and mining are also severely handicapped by this phenomenon, and until very recently Soviet industrial and agricultural development stayed outside of the *merzlota* zone.

The factors of location and terrain conspire against the USSR in another respect, a scarcity of precipitation. The arctic air masses, the distance from the open oceans, and the high mountain ranges of the east and south all contribute to depriving the area of snow and rain and maintaining a low relative humidity. This lack of precipitation is especially true of Central Asia and the arid steppes along the northern shores of the Caspian Sea, but even Eastern Siberia has light snowfalls and little rain. Worse still, the Ukraine, the best agricultural area of the Soviet Union, has a relatively light and not entirely dependable precipitation. The effect of this on agriculture is discussed later.

Furthermore, because of its location in the northern segment of the Eurasian continent, the USSR is to a large extent landlocked. Its arctic seacoast is frozen most of the year. The warmwater seas accessible to the Soviet Union are in turn landlocked: the Caspian Sea has no outlet, the Black Sea outlet (the Bosphorus) is held by Turkey, while the Baltic outlets are controlled by Denmark and Germany. The Soviet Union's only relatively unimpeded outlet into the Atlantic is from Murmansk on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula. The other exception is the Far East with its outlets on the Pacific. However, the Far East is at the rear of the amphitheater and is really cut off from the rest of the USSR by the Yablonovy and

Stanovoy ranges. The Soviets, realizing this themselves, have made every effort to build up this region as a self-supporting industrial and military unit.

### 3. Vegetation-Soil Zones

There are many ways of dividing the USSR into natural areas, but the method most commonly used by Soviet geographers is to differentiate by soil and vegetation. The changes of climate with the geographic latitude and distance from the ocean are very clearly seen in the definite variations in soils and vegetation. The enormous expanses of the USSR and the comparatively monotonous relief, however, result in wide zones of homogeneous soil and botanical types which stretch predominantly from east to west. The six basic soil and vegetation zones from north to south are (1) the tundra, (2) the forest zone, (3) the forest-steppe zone, (4) the *chernozym*-steppe zone, (5) the arid steppe, and (6) the desert zone. The mountain areas also have a soil-vegetation zonality, but it is vertical rather than horizontal.

**Tundra zone.**—The tundra zone is a vast, treeless area extending along the entire Arctic Ocean shore of the Soviet Union. The southern boundary of the tundra hovers around the Arctic Circle, above it in the Kola Peninsula and Eastern Siberia, but below it in the northeast, especially in Kamchatka. The tundra is not uniform in appearance; in the extreme north vegetation of any type is scarce and as the tundra extends southward there develops a covering of lichen mosses and dwarf shrubs. Much of the tundra zone is boggy because of poor drainage in the permafrost soil. About the only industry that flourishes in the tundra is reindeer raising, and the Soviet authorities have been devoting much time and effort to it. It is estimated that the tundra zone covers 15 percent of the USSR, or about 1.3 million square miles.

**Forest zone.**—The widest soil-vegetation zone of the USSR is the podzol and bog soils with predominantly coniferous forests, or taiga. This zone is widespread in Western and Eastern Siberia where it extends down to the southern boundary of the USSR. In these forests the Soviet Union has the largest timber resources in the world. This zone comprises about 4.2 million square miles, or around 50 percent of the entire territory of the Soviet Union. Much of it, especially in Western Siberia, is swampland, probably about 600 thousand square miles.

**Forest-steppe zone.**—The forest-steppe zone, as its name implies, is a transitional zone between the podzol-forest zone to the north and the *chernozym*-steppe to the south. It has areas of soils peculiar to itself as well: the grey forest soils and the

highly leached *chernozyoms*. The forest-steppe zone is largely confined to European Russia and Western Siberia, and there are only widely scattered islands of it east of the Yenisey. It represents about 7 percent of the Soviet Union, or 590 thousand square miles. It was in this zone that the Muscovite state arose, threw off the Tatar yoke in the fifteenth century, and gradually expanded into the present Soviet empire.

**Chernozym-steppe zone.**—Although Soviet geographers describe as many as five different types of *chernozyoms*, by and large the term refers to rich, black soils high in organic and mineral content. These are the most fruitful soils in the Soviet Union. The zone has its widest expanse in the Ukraine, and it extends in an ever narrowing triangle into Western Siberia. One estimate is that there are 925 thousand square miles of *chernozym* soils, or about 11 percent of the area of the Soviet Union. This is the basic Soviet agricultural area.

**Chestnut soil-steppe zone.**—This zone has its widest expanse in the southern region of Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. These steppes are now being exploited under the program of opening up the "virginal land." The entire zone is characterized by its treelessness and low precipitation. In the region around the north shore of the Caspian Sea and eastward, the land becomes semidesert, good for little except limited grazing. The chestnut soil-steppe zone is estimated at 675 thousand square miles, or 8 percent of Soviet territory.

**Desert zone.**—The great Soviet deserts are in Central Asia (the Turkmeneskaya, Uzbekskaya, Tadzhikskaya, and Kirgizskaya republics), a region made up predominantly of sand, rocky desert, and salt flats. The Kara Kum and Kyzyl Kum deserts, along with some smaller ones, are sandy deserts along the classic lines of the Sahara. Agriculture is feasible only in oases and along the river valleys, but in those areas where water is obtainable the crops are abundant. Most of the Soviet cotton is grown in the river valleys and on the irrigated land of Central Asia. The desert zone occupies about 9 percent of the USSR, or around 760 thousand square miles.

#### 4. Regions of the USSR

After looking at the Soviet Union as a whole in order to grasp its tremendous extent and variety, it is necessary to examine its various regions for a more detailed picture. Several criteria may be used in determining the division of the Soviet Union into regions. Some regions are almost self-evident autonomous divisions because of their geography, for instance, the Far East. Other regions are regarded as separate areas because of economic factors. Inexact as such breakdowns may be, the

following seven regions will be treated in some detail: European Russia, the Caucasus region, The Ural-Western Siberian region, Central Asia, Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic.

**European Russia.**—This region lies west of the Volga River and north of a line from Volgograd (Stalingrad) to Novrossiysk and the north shore of the Black Sea. Since the acquisitions after World War II, it is the old European Russia of the Tsars. In spite of economic expansion to the east, European Russia is still the richest part of the Soviet Union and the real heart of the Soviet empire. Almost the whole of the region is occupied by the East Russian Plain, an extension of the great flat expanse that begins at the North Sea, covers Germany and Poland, and then stretches eastward to the Urals. The average elevation of this vast plain is not quite six hundred feet above sea level. It is a region of wide vistas and monotonous landscape, probably best summed up in the Russian *prostor*, which means spaciousness, open expanse, and unlimited. It is over this plain that western invaders have come—the Teutonic knights, the Swedes under Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hitler. Although these invasions failed, they made the Russians very distrustful of the West, and the present Soviet satellite empire might be interpreted as an attempt to bolster the defense of this area.

The East Russian Plain is the Russian homeland, and the rest of the Soviet Union has been gradually acquired by conquest and colonization from the sixteenth century to the present. The Grand Dukes of Muscovite Russia, a relatively small area on the Oka River with Moscow as its center, finally threw off the Tatar yoke at the end of the fifteenth century. By the middle of the next century Ivan the Terrible was able to take the offensive against the Tatars. The Russians quickly conquered the Volga Valley down to the Caspian Sea and overran Siberia, reaching the Pacific in the mid-seventeenth century. The Ottoman Turks and their vassals, the Crimean Tatars, were not so easily dislodged from the northern coast of the Black Sea and the southwestern Ukraine, and it was not until the end of the eighteenth century, in the reign of Catherine II, that this area was wrested from the Turks.

Expansion to the west was slower and more painful. Ivan the Terrible fought a thirty-year war (the Livonian War) in an attempt to gain access to the Baltic Sea, and it was not until the first quarter of the eighteenth century that Peter the Great opened this "window to the West." Peter immediately built a city, St. Petersburg, on the swamplands and islands at the mouth of the Neva and made it his capital. It remained the capital of Russia until 1918, when its location on the periphery of the empire became precarious. The Bolsheviks

then moved the capital back to the more centrally located Moscow.

European Russia can be divided fairly naturally into three parts: the Dvina-Pechora coniferous-forest region in the north, the forest-steppe in the center, and the cultivated *chernozym*-steppe of the south. This leaves a fourth area that does not fit into the picture quite so neatly—the area encompassing the Kola Peninsula, Leningrad, and the Baltic republics.

The Kola-Leningrad-Baltic area is tied together by water routes: the Lake Ladoga and White Sea canal system and the coast of the Baltic Sea. Leningrad has long been one of Russia's main industrial complexes, and at present it is a great center for shipping, electrical equipment, machine tools, and other items whose production depends upon the ability of engineers and skilled labor. The Soviets built a new steel plant at Cherepovets, near Leningrad, to supply that center with steel and utilize the scrap generated in its industries. The new steel plant also strengthens the ties linking Leningrad with the Kola Peninsula, which supplies iron ore to Cherepovets, and with the Pechora area, the source of coking coal for the new plant. This is probably one of the most expensive long-distance operations in the metallurgical industry.

The Dvina-Pechora region became extremely valuable during World War II, when the German conquest of the Ukrainian coal mines made the exploitation of the Vorkuta mines both necessary and profitable. A railroad was built in record time, largely by forced labor, and the discovery of oil at Ukhta further stimulated the development of the region.

Although the forest-steppe region is mediocre farming country, it wears the political and industrial crown of the Soviet Union—Moscow. Not only is Moscow the capital and largest city, it is also the center of the country's largest industrial complex. It is the key point in a wide-spread network of railroads, and with the opening of the Volga-Don Canal it has become a maritime center with access to the White, Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas by means of an intricate system of canals and rivers. As the political, economic, and cultural hub of the Soviet Union and the meccas of the Communist world, Moscow is unquestionably one of the world's most important cities.

The *chernozym*-steppe region has a twofold importance: its black soil is the basis of the richest agriculture in the USSR, and its coal and iron ores provide the raw materials for a vast industrial structure. Most of this region is encompassed in the area usually referred to as the Ukraine.

The Ukraine was once called the granary of Russia, and although its proportionate share of the

total production of the Soviet Union has declined since the opening of the "virgin and idle lands," it is still the richest agricultural area of the Soviet Union. The deep black and chestnut soils abound in mineral and organic matter, chiefly as the result of centuries of low precipitation, which has prevented leaching of the soils. The light rainfall is also a drawback, as the Ukraine is never completely safe from the threat of drought. The annual precipitation in this area varies from 22 inches in the north to 14 inches on the coast of the Black Sea. Ukrainian agriculture is diversified and, in addition to its basic output of grain, produces large commercial crops, such as sugar beets, sunflower seed, flax, and tobacco.

In the southwest the great coal deposits of the Donbas, the iron ore of Krivoy Rog and Kerch, the manganese of Nikopol, all contribute to the Ukraine's vast industrial complex. The huge hydroelectric installations at Zaporozhe make that city a logical center for alloy steels. Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk (Stalino), Makeevka, and Mariupol are all large metallurgical centers, and Kharkov is a machine tool center.

However, all this wealth, both agricultural and industrial, is situated in the most vulnerable part of the Soviet Union. Even with the screen of satellites acquired as a result of World War II, the Soviet leaders are still nervous. Ever since the early 1930s there has been a continual emphasis upon shifting industry to the east. Even if returns on capital investment were less than they would have been provided that the same amount had been expended in European Russia, the added security was regarded as worth the price paid.

The European Russia area, although the homeland of the Great Russians, also has a variety of ethnic groups. The three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all have their own indigenous populations with well-developed languages and cultures. The other two great Slavic peoples—the Byelorussians (White Russians) and Ukrainians (Little Russians)—feel themselves to be distinct peoples. They have their own republics, historical traditions, and language differences. The newly acquired Moldavian Republic has a large Rumanian population, and there is a Turkish population in the Crimea. North and west of Moscow a number of Finnish peoples have kept their identity despite a long history of Russian domination.

**The Caucasus region.**—This region is usually divided into two sections: the area in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), lying north of the Caucasus Mountains, and the three republics lying south of the main range, Georgia, Azerbaydzhan, and Armenia, which combine to make up Transcaucasia.

The Caucasus Range, one of the world's great mountain chains, is 785 miles long, 60 to 140 miles wide, and 55 thousands square miles in area. The range begins at the Taman Peninsula on the Kerch Strait and runs in an east-southeasterly direction until it reaches the Caspian Sea. Except for the narrow shore routes along the Caspian and Black seas and several very high passes across the mountains, the Caucasus forms a real barrier between European Russia and Transcaucasia.

The plains between the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains and the Manych Depression are very fertile in the west, especially the Kuban valley with its *chernozym* soil. These plains gradually become less productive as they spread eastward into the valley of the Terek. Also precipitation declines toward the east.

South of the Caucasus Mountains lie the Colchis lowland on the west and the long Kura Valley to the east. The Colchis is one of the few really subtropical areas in the Soviet Union. Between the Colchis and the Kura Valley is the Suram Range which separates the two areas, the watershed between the rivers flowing into the Caspian and Black seas. The Colchis and upper end of the Kura Valley make up the republic of Georgia (*Gruziya* in Russian). The rest of the Kura Valley to the Caspian Sea is in the Azerbaydzhan Republic. South of Georgia and Azerbaydzhan is the Armenian highland, most of which lies within the Armenian Republic.

With the exception of the Colchis lowland on the Black Sea, the long Kura Valley, and the lowlands of the Caspian Sea, the Transcaucasus area is one of the most mountainous in the world. But the swift mountain rivers make it a hydroelectric treasure house. These are being rapidly utilized by means of a series of dams and reservoirs which equalize the flow. Deposits of coking coal, iron ore, manganese, and oil make the region one of the important industrial areas of the USSR.

*Georgia (Gruziya).* The Georgian Republic has a lowland area on the eastern end of the Black Sea, is adjacent to about half the main range of the Caucasus Mountains, and has a large area of highlands bordering on Azerbaydzhan and Armenia. From the military standpoint, Georgia's Black Sea ports and a 150-mile common frontier with Turkey make it one of the logical points from which a Soviet attack on Turkey could issue. Three times in the nineteenth and once in the twentieth century this border was the scene of Russo-Turkish military action.

Georgia's long history as an independent cultural entity dates back to the fourth century B.C. Georgia has alternated as an independent kingdom and as a vassal of Persia, Rome, the Byzantine Empire, and the Turks. Finally, in 1801, it became a part of the

Russian empire. Although Georgia is an integral part of the Soviet Union, there is no question of assimilation because of the differences of race and language, as well as the Georgian pride in a long cultural tradition. For all that, Georgia has provided more Soviet leaders than any other non-Russian group within the Soviet Union. Stalin, Beria, and Ordzhonikidze stand out in that list.

Georgia's industrial development has been rapid in the last few decades. A large steel plant at Rustavi, near Tbilisi (formerly Tiflis), provides the basic materials for the various industries and is the source of pipe for the Baku and Grozny oil fields. The manganese deposit at Chiatura is one of the largest in the world. Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, is now an industrial center well supplied with hydroelectric power.

*Azerbaydzhan.* The Azerbaydzhan Republic occupies the lower Kura Valley and has a long coast on the Caspian Sea. Most of Azerbaydzhan is in a zone which becomes increasingly arid as it moves eastward across Transcaucasia. Azerbaydzhan's industrial importance is confined to the one area and one product—petroleum from the great oil fields around Baku on the Apsheron Peninsula. Although Baku now produces a relatively small percentage of Soviet petroleum because of the rapid development of oil fields in the Volga-Ural region, and in West Siberia it was the Soviet Union's only great oil field until after World War II.

The region now called Azerbaydzhan has played an important historical role for thousands of years. The narrow plain along the Caspian shore was one of the main routes for peoples and armies moving from the Middle East into the great plains of Russian and also for nomadic tribes pushing into the Middle East. Until Russia came into possession in 1828, the traditional overlord of Azerbaydzhan was usually the ruler of Persia. About three-fifths of the population of the republic are Azerbaydzhanians who speak a Turkic language and adhere to the Moslem faith. There are also many Azerbaydzhanians in that part of northern Iran which borders on the Azerbaydzhanian Republic, and in 1945 the Soviet Union took a benevolent attitude toward an Azerbaydzhanian autonomous state in northern Iran. US—British protests, UN pressure, and Iranian firmness led to the collapse of the movement. However, one possible route for invasion of the Middle East is from Azerbaydzhan, a route protected on one flank by Soviet control of the Caspian Sea.

*Armenia.* The Armenian Republic lies entirely in the high, dry, and very rough Armenian highland. To the south the republic borders on Iran and to west on Turkey. A country of volcanic origin with deep ravines and steep ridges, Armenia has an

average altitude of about five thousand feet. The climate is continental with extremes of heat and cold. The average annual precipitation is between 12 and 22 inches. The only real body of water in Armenia is Lake Sevan with an area of around six hundred square miles.

The Armenians have one of the oldest cultures in the world, dating back to the eleventh century B.C. Their history is closely bound with most of the great empires of antiquity, from the Medes and Persians to the Byzantine Empire. In the sixteenth century the Armenians came under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Russia obtained control over the area of the present Armenian Republic as a result of the Russo-Turkish wars of 1827-28 and 1878. The population of the republic is 88.6 percent Armenian, which is the highest percentage of ethnic purity in any Soviet republic.

Once predominantly agricultural and pastoral, Armenia is developing into an industrial area. Mineral resources, especially copper, and an abundance of hydroelectric power together provide a basis for this change. In the last two decades, the Armenian chemical industry (calcium carbides, synthetic rubber, and plastics) has increased the importance of the republic in the overall Soviet economy.

**The Ural-Western Siberian-Kazakhstan region.**—There may be some question about the inclusion of Kazakhstan in this region, inasmuch as it is often treated as part of Central Asia. However, in the last two decades close economic ties have developed between Kazakhstan and the Ural-Western Siberian region. Magnitogorsk, the steel giant of the Urals, operates mainly on coal from the Karaganda Basin in Kazakhstan and the vast iron ore deposits of Kustanay in Kazakhstan will soon be able to supply both the Ural and Kuzbas mills. Also the "virgin and idle lands," whose development has been so widely discussed in the Soviet press since 1953, lie in both Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, and there are no natural boundaries separating the Kazakh from the Siberian soils.

Wedged in between the Urals, the tundra, the permafrost area of Eastern Siberia, and the deserts and mountains of Central Asia, this vast region is almost self-sustaining. It has large tracts of arable land in Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, good grazing lands, and ample lumber from the taiga of Western Siberia. But the real wealth of the region lies underground. The vast coal deposits of the Kuzbas and Karaganda and the smaller ones of the Urals together buttress the ferrous metallurgy of the region. Iron ore, the other necessary ingredient in the iron and steel industry, is relatively plentiful in the Urals and fair in the Kuzbas, but its

possibilities are almost unlimited in the Kustanay oblast of northern Kazakhstan. The Urals have always been a storehouse of nonferrous metals, and since the 1930s Kazakhstan has been credited with having the largest reserves of copper, zinc, and lead in the USSR. Furthermore, vast deposits of oil and gas have been discovered recently in Western Siberia.

This region is doubly valuable in the eyes of Soviet planners because its wealth is relatively secure from attack. In the early 1930s Soviet planners, apprehensive about the vulnerability of the Ukraine, began to establish a second industrial complex in the Urals and Western Siberia. The key to this development was the Kuznetsk-Magnitogorsk *kombinat*: coal from the Kuzbas to smelt Magnitogorsk iron ore, and iron ore from the latter to utilize Kuzbas coal. Later Kazakhstan was brought into the picture when its coal fields at Karaganda were developed and a railroad built to Magnitogorsk to take advantage of the shorter haul.

**The Urals.**—The Ural Mountains are very old and well worn, in many places offering little hindrance to east-west traffic. They have long been regarded as a boundary between Europe and Asia, but any attempt to divide the enormous land mass of Eurasia is arbitrary, particularly in view of the fact that a single power, the Soviet Union, controls the entire upper third of Asia and half of Europe. The average elevation of the Urals is sixteen hundred feet, and the highest peaks are only about six thousand feet. The range is about fifteen hundred miles long, extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Caspian Depression. The climate of the Ural section is continental, with severe winters that last five or six months, and rather hot summers. Precipitation is moderate in the central Urals, but declines in the south where the climate is similar to that of northern Central Asia.

The central oblasts of the Urals (Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk) contain the major industries of the area: the ferrous metallurgical plants at Magnitogorsk, Nizhniy Tagil, and Sverdlovsk, the great tractor plant at Chelyabinsk, the locomotive works at Orsk, and the chemical plants at Berezniki. The central Urals are well supplied with railroads: trunk lines from Leningrad and Moscow meet at Sverdlovsk, and a number of north-to-east lines connect the various major centers. This network of railroads ends just beyond the Urals at Omsk where the separate lines merge into the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In recent years oil fields have been developed in the eastern foothills of the Urals. In 1929 geologists struck oil while drilling for potash salts in the Perm oblast, along the Chusovaya River. These wells



have been only moderate producers, but the Ishimbay and Tuymazy oil fields in the Bashkir ASSR have developed prodigiously since World War II.

*Western Siberia.*—Western Siberia is an enormous expanse lying between the Urals and the Yenisey River, which is more or less the border of Eastern Siberia. This area of almost a million square miles is about nine-tenths level land, with a barely perceptible gradient toward the Arctic Ocean. The Ob-Irtysh river system drains this plain, but so poorly that much of Western Siberia is swampland. This is always the case in the spring when the upper Irtysh and Ob overflow because of thawing, while the lower course of the Ob is still frozen. In the southern portion of Western Siberia a wide strip of good soil extends from the wedged-shaped Kurgan oblast between the Urals and Kazakhstan to the Altay mountain system in the southeast. It is a good agricultural region and has a well-developed dairy industry. The extreme southeast of Western Siberia is very mountainous. The coal, iron ore, and nonferrous metal ores of the Altay range support the heavy industry in that section.

The great natural gas field at Urengoy near the mouth of the Ob River and the oil fields to the south in the Tyumen oblast have become the most valuable assets of the region. The Soviets hope to be pumping seven million barrels of oil a day from the Tyumen fields by 1980.

The climate varies considerably because of the great distances involved. On the whole, however, it is continental, with an extremely severe winter, a cold spring, a short autumn, and a brief, hot summer. The steppe zone in the southwest has many of the characteristics of Central Asia: low precipitation, heat, and strong winds resulting in dust storms. The Altay mountain region is more temperate with moderate winters and cool, humid summers.

The Altay region is rich in minerals. The Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas) has the largest reserves of coking coal in the USSR—estimated at over 400 billion tons. To the south, in the Ala-Tau range, iron ore deposits are within easy hauling distance of the coal, making the Kuzbas almost independent of outside iron ore and thus breaking the closely integrated *Magnitogorsk-Kuznetsk kombinat* into two independent elements. The main center of the Kuzbas is Novokuznetsk (Stalinsk).

In the last three decades the number of large cities in Western Siberia has greatly increased, particularly in the south. The largest city, Novosibirsk, has been called the "Chicago of Siberia." Located at the intersection of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Ob River, it is also the

northern terminus of the Turksib Railroad. Its population has increased from slightly over 100 thousand in the early 1920s to about 700 thousand today. Omsk, situated at the junction of the Irtysh River and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, has likewise shown tremendous growth in the last two decades. The other large cities such as Novokuznetsk (Stalinsk), Barnaul, and Kemerovo are in the Altay industrial region.

*Kazakhstan.*—The Kazakh Republic, second only to the RSFSR in size, occupies 12 percent of the territory of the Soviet Union. France, England, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Norway—all could be included in this one republic. The distance between its extreme eastern and western points is 1,860 miles; the distance from north to south is about 1,000 miles. The position of Kazakhstan, adjacent to the Urals and the populous segment of Western Siberia, favored the development of very close ties between the economies of the three regions. Most of Kazakhstan is a vast steppe area which grows more arid and desert-like toward the south.

Being far from any oceans, Kazakhstan has a continental climate that is only slightly ameliorated by the Caspian and Aral seas. There are very sharp temperature changes between summer and winter, and even between night and day. The winters are severe, especially when the arctic air masses push in from the unprotected north. Precipitation is low making the lack of water one of Kazakhstan's most serious problems. In the last few years the Soviets have ploughed up much of the grass cover of northern Kazakhstan in an effort to expand their grain production, and have thereby created a potential dust bowl. In spite of this, Kazakhstan has no equal in the Soviet Union as a grazing area.

Kazakhstan is very rich in underground wealth. It has over half the copper ore reserves of the USSR at Dzhezkazgan, Kounrad, and Bozshakul, over three-quarters of Soviet lead reserves, one-half of the zinc, and two-thirds of the silver. The Karaganda coal basin is the third largest in the USSR, and iron ore deposits at Atasuskoe, Ayatskoe, and Kustanay promise to make Kazakhstan a great ferrous metallurgical center. In western Kazakhstan, near the Caspian Sea the Ural-Emba oil fields, which produce top-grade oils, are being rapidly developed.

Kazakhstan, adjacent to both Chinese Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia, acts as a transmission belt between those areas and the rest of the Soviet Union. "Consequently, it is permissible to consider that in the present state of things the Kuzbas-Karaganda-Fergana trio is complemented by Sinkiang and that this bloc is the main citadel, the

donjon, or the central redoubt of the USSR. The redoubt abuts on the roof of the world, is protected naturally by the impassable mountains, is rich in its soil and subsoil, and secure from intervention; a pivot upon which the vast maneuvers of the Kremlin can lean."<sup>2</sup>

**Soviet Central Asia.**—Soviet Central Asia is comprised of four union republics: Uzbekistan, Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmeniya.<sup>3</sup> Soviet and non-Soviet geographers are divided as to whether to include Kazakhstan in Soviet Central Asia. Despite its geographic location, Kazakhstan is oriented toward the economic system of the Urals, and therefore is treated here as a part of that area. Soviet Central Asia is largely a belt of deserts stretching from the Caspian Sea and terminating in the south and southeast in the greatest mountain systems in the USSR. These enormous deserts are of all types: the classical sandy ones such as the Kara Kum, the Kyzyl Kum, and several smaller ones, or the clay deserts such as the Ustyurt, Krasnovodsk Plateau, and the stony deserts in the foothills of the Kopet Dag Range, the Fergana Valley, and others. Much of the desert area is used for nomadic pasturage. The mountains of Soviet Central Asia are mighty indeed, the Stalin and Lenin peaks towering to almost 25 thousand feet. On the southwest, along the Soviet border with Iran and Afghanistan, the Kopet Dag Range stretches roughly east to west for a thousand miles. To the southeast lie the Pamir-Altay ranges: Za-Alayskiy, Peter the First, Darvazskiy, Academy of Sciences, and others. Beyond are the very lofty highlands of the Pamirs, sometimes called the "roof of the world." Peaks of 20 thousand feet are common in this area. These mountain ranges make natural barriers which protect Soviet Central Asia from outside influence, although in the last two decades they have served rather to protect others from the Soviets. In this area of mountains the Soviet border runs contiguous to those of China, Afghanistan, and Iran, and a narrow strip of Afghan territory, in places not over 10 miles wide, is all that separates the Soviet Union from Pakistan and India.

Soviet Central Asia, as would be assumed from the prevalence of deserts, is a very arid area. Precipitation is negligible, and the low relative humidity makes evaporation a real problem in conserving what little water is available. The largest body of water is the Sea of Aral, which covers about

24 thousand square miles. Two rivers, famous in antiquity under the names of Oxus and Jaxartes and now called respectively the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, flow from the mountains and both empty in the Sea of Aral. The mesopotamia between these rivers contains most of the fertile land in Soviet Central Asia.

Soviet Central Asia produces over three-quarters of the entire Soviet cotton crop, and in the last two decades Soviet planners have attempted to convert the agriculture of this region into a monoculture. However, the fertile oases and river valleys still produce fruit, wine, and silk. Various nonferrous minerals are found in the region, and an industrial complex has grown up in the Fergana area. There is also a ferrous metallurgical plant, which is located at Bekabad (Begovat).

**Uzbekistan.**—Uzbekistan is the most important of the Soviet Central Asian republics from the standpoint of population, industry, agriculture, and location. It occupies the central part of the region and borders on the other three and Kazakhstan as well. Its configuration is bewildering, almost as if the Soviets had pushed gerrymandering to a "Rube Goldberg" extreme, but the tortuous boundaries of eastern Uzbekistan manage to encompass most of the very important Fergana Valley, the most valuable real estate in Soviet Central Asia.

Uzbekistan produces four-fifths of the cotton of Soviet Central Asia, which makes it the most important cotton area of the entire USSR. It also produces four-fifths of the growth industrial output of Central Asia. Sixty percent of the population of Soviet Central Asia and the majority of its large cities are in Uzbekistan, despite the fact that the western part of the republic is largely desert, and the southern part very mountainous. The eastern section lies in the foothills of the Tyan-Shan Mountains and includes most of the Fergana Valley. Comprising only 17 percent of the area of the republic, it nevertheless has over two-thirds of the population and the lion's share of industry and agriculture. The loess soil of the Fergana Valley, when irrigated, is a miracle of fertility. Uzbekistan's industrial life, based on local coal, oil, and nonferrous metals, has burgeoned in the last two decades. The mountain rivers, running into the Fergana Valley, are being tapped as sources of hydroelectric power. The potentials of the valley appear to be excellent.

**Kirgiziya.**—The Kirgiz Republic is next to Uzbekistan in order of importance in Soviet Central Asia. It is located in the extreme northeast of the region, chiefly in the Tyan-Shan Mountains. Its eastern boundaries run with those of China, while it touches upon Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan in other directions.

<sup>2</sup>Admiral Peltier, "Servitudes de l'Economie Soviétique," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, October 1957, p. 1471.

<sup>3</sup>The Russian designation for these union republics is Uzbekskaya, Kirgizskaya, Tadzhikskaya, and Turkmenskaya, which are feminine adjectives agreeing with the feminine noun *Respublika*. However, the Soviets also use the names as given in the text. Some geographers refer to these areas as the Uzbek SSR, Kirgiz SSR, Tadzhik SSR, and Turkmen SSR, others simply add the Turkic ending *stan* (land of) to the root, thus Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan.

The mountainous nature of the republic precludes large-scale agriculture, but it does permit well-developed truck gardens and vineyards, and limited production of cotton, sugar beets, and tobacco. The main industries of Kirgiziya are livestock raising and mining, the latter producing principally nonferrous metals such as antimony, mercury, and lead.

**Tadzhikistan.**—The Tadzhik Republic is the most mountainous region in the USSR. It is located in the extreme southeast of Soviet Central Asia, with its southern boundary along that of Afghanistan and its eastern boundary abutting that of China. In spite of its location, Tadzhikistan has good agricultural areas, especially in its southeastern section. Ranking next to Uzbekistan in the production of cotton, Tadzhikistan grows an excellent, fine-fiber cotton.

The most interesting feature of Tadzhikistan is its location. In an address to some leading Tadzhik Communists, Stalin summed up Tadzhikistan's frontier position with these telling phrases: "... republic of workers at the gateway to India," "the model republic for the Eastern countries," and "the lighthouse for socialism in the East." The total length of Tadzhikistan's international boundary is around 900 miles, of which 630 miles border on Afghanistan and 270 miles on China. Moreover, only a narrow strip of Afghan territory, nine to twelve miles in width, separates Tadzhikistan from Pakistan and India.

**Turkmeniya.**—The Turkmen Republic is the southernmost republic of the USSR, its southern boundary being contiguous with the boundaries of Iran and Afghanistan for more than a thousand miles. Although there is a string of oases along the Kopet Dag Range and the Amur Darya River, a very large part of the republic is desert, either uninhabited or inhabited by nomadic herdsmen. In area Turkmeniya stands only below the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, but in population it surpasses only Estonia. Turkmeniya has some oil and a small chemical industry, but otherwise it is a rather primitive region.

**Eastern Siberia.** This enormous region, some 2.8 million square miles, is bounded on the west by the watershed between the Yenisey and the Ob-Irtysh system, on the east by the watershed along the ranges paralleling the Pacific, and on the south by Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. It extends to the Arctic Ocean in the north. The distance across Eastern Siberia from east to west is nineteen hundred miles; from north to south, fifteen hundred miles. The Central Siberian Plateau lies between the Yenisey and Lena rivers and forms the great middle portion of the whole region. To the south is the Sayan-Baykal mountainous country, a broken area containing a number of large mountain ranges, such

as the Eastern and Western Sayans, the Baykals, and the Yablonovy Range. To the northeast of the plateau is the mountainous country of the Verkhoyansk Range. The only lowlands, located west of the Yenisey, are really part of the great Western Siberian lowland.

The climate is extremely continental. The district around Verkhoyansk and Oymyakon is the "cold cellar" of the world. In January 1897 a record low of -126 degrees Fahrenheit was registered at Verkhoyansk. Even lower temperatures have been unofficially reported from Oymyakon. At Yakutsk, 500 miles south of Verkhoyansk, the mean January temperature is -46 degrees Fahrenheit. Snow cover is light because of the very low annual precipitation, and almost all of Eastern Siberia lies within the permafrost region. The short growing season, extreme cold, light snow cover, and permafrost combine to make agriculture virtually impossible except in the extreme south of the region. Here Lake Baykal, 400 miles long, 30 to 50 miles wide, and 2,000 to 5,000 feet deep, acts as a moderator on the extreme weather conditions of the area.

The waterpower resources of Eastern Siberia are enormous. In addition to the mighty Yenisey and Lena rivers with their far-flung tributaries, the Angara, the only river flowing out of Lake Baykal, has tremendous volume. Several hydroelectric installations have been built to tap this source of power. One estimate puts the hydroelectric potential of Eastern Siberia at 40 percent of the total available in the Soviet Union.

The region is fairly rich in minerals, especially coal, but the largest coal deposits are in areas inaccessible for economic exploitation up to the present time. However, in rare minerals such as tin, wolfram, and molybdenum, Eastern Siberia holds first place in the USSR. The Lena gold fields are the richest in the Soviet Union, and diamond fields have been found in the Yakutsk area. This discovery was hailed with great enthusiasm, as industrial diamonds had been available to the Soviets only by purchase on the world market.

Eastern Siberia is the most sparsely inhabited region in the USSR, except for the Far North. Although it is 1.5 times larger than European Russia, its population is less than that of the Moscow oblast alone and averages less than one person per square kilometer. Non-Soviet peoples are scattered over the whole region. The largest groups are the Yakuts (almost 300 thousand) and the Buryat-Mongols (315 thousand). In the even wilder areas are other non-Russian peoples such as the Evenki, Khakassi, and Nentsy, all of whom have their own autonomous oblasts or the national okrugs.

**The Soviet Far East.**—This region stretches along the shore of the Pacific from the northern

border of Korea to the Bering Strait, a straightline distance of around twenty-eight hundred miles. Mountain ranges running parallel to the Pacific cover most of the region. With the exception of the Chukotsk Peninsula, which is under the influence of the arctic climate, the Soviet Far East lies in the monsoon area. In the summer the region is warm, wet, and foggy; in the winter it is very cold.

The Maritime Province, lying between Manchuria and the Sea of Japan, is the economic base of the region. It occupies less than one-twentieth of the Soviet Far East, but has around half of the population. Its capital, Vladivostok (Ruler of the East), is a large city of 450 thousand located on a peninsula which divides the Amursk and Ussurisk gulfs. Vladivostok is the terminal point of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and is the largest Soviet port on the Pacific. The lowlands around Lake Khanka and along the Ussuri River produce much of the food of the entire region—rice, sorghum, and soybeans. The other agricultural area of the Soviet Far East is the Zee-Bureinsk lowland on the Amur River, which produces wheat, oats, rye, and sugar beets.

As a result of the Yalta agreement in 1945, the entire island of Sakhalin, just east of the Maritime Province, came under Soviet control, oil fields and all. The crude oil from Sakhalin is transported by tanker across the Sea of Japan and up the Amur River to Khabarovsk, where it is processed.

Every effort has been made to convert the Soviet Far East into an economically viable region, as to all intents and purposes it is cut off from the rest of the Soviet Union. The only communications between the two are the Trans-Siberian Railroad, air transport, and shipping via the Northern Sea Route—all rather unreliable if a conflict should break out. Some coal, iron ore, and nonferrous metals have provided a tenuous base for Far Eastern industries. Foods from the Zee-Bureinsk and Lake Khanka lowlands, supplemented by fish and reindeer meat from the northern areas, go far toward making the region self-sufficient. The oil from Sakhalin lightens the load of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, especially in keeping the semiautonomous Far Eastern air force in fuel.

**The Soviet Arctic.**—Any attempt to fix a southern boundary for the Soviet Arctic is a rather futile task. Often the Arctic Circle is arbitrarily used, but this geographic line pays no attention to the fluctuating temperature and vegetation boundaries as it goes from west to east. In 1936 the Northern Sea Route Administration (Glavsevmorput) was given jurisdiction over the Arctic area, but not over most of the European Arctic land mass. From about 60 degrees longitude to the Pacific, however, its administration encompassed everything down to 62 degrees

latitude, thus giving it an enormous portion of the Siberias and the Far East. If the region around Arkhangelsk and the Kola Peninsula are added to the Glavsevmorput administrative region, it will answer our purposes here in defining the boundaries of the Soviet Arctic.

**The European Arctic.**—Most of the Soviet European Arctic is washed by the Barents Sea.<sup>4</sup> Because of the moderating influence of the Gulf Stream, which penetrates the Barents Sea, more than half of the southern shore remains open throughout the year. The main port, Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula, is one of the Soviet Union's few warm-water ports. The Barents Sea ends at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, and is connected on the east with the Kara Sea, by three straits: Yugorskiy Shar, Karskie Vorota, and Matochkin Shar. The Kara Sea is frozen throughout much of the year, and even when it is open to navigation, adverse winds can pile up drifting ice to the extent of blocking the straits through Novaya Zemlya.

The Northern Dvina entering the White Sea at Arkhangelsk, and the Pechora emptying into the Barents Sea at Naryan-Mar are the most important rivers in the European Arctic. Two great river systems of Western Siberia empty into the Kara Sea—the Ob-Irtysh and the Yenisey.

Most of the Soviet European Arctic region is either treeless tundra, swamp, or forest (taiga). In recent years the apatite (a phosphorous basis for fertilizers), the iron ore deposits on the Kola Peninsula, and the coal and oil of the Pechora Basin have made the European Arctic region economically very valuable.

**The Asiatic Arctic.**—The shores of the Soviet Asiatic Arctic, from Novaya Zemlya to the Bering Strait, border upon four seas: Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukotsk. The Kara Sea lies between Novaya Zemlya and the Severnaya Zemlya Islands. Between the latter and the New Siberian Islands is the Laptev Sea, and along the coast of the Chukotsk Peninsula lie the East Siberian and Chukotsk seas. All of these seas are frozen most of the year, and as one moves eastward, the pack ice of the Arctic Ocean approaches nearer and nearer the continent.

Two large rivers empty into the Laptev Sea, the Khatanga and the Lena, the latter being one of the world's largest rivers. The Indigarka and Kolyma rivers flow into the East Siberian Sea. As these rivers are frozen most of the year, they are of very limited use in penetrating the Siberias by water. Furthermore, the spring thaws begin fairly early at the headwaters of the rivers, while their mouths are still frozen. Thus extensive flood areas are formed

<sup>4</sup>The conventional Western spellings of the Soviet Arctic seas are used. Their Russian names, reading west to east, are Barentsovo More, Karskoe More, More Laptevskh, Vostochnosibirskoe More, and Chukotskoe More.

each spring and early summer, especially in Western Siberia.

All of the Soviet Asiatic Arctic lies within the permafrost zone, which makes the construction of buildings, rail lines, and air bases extremely difficult. The Soviets have devoted much time and effort to trying to solve the many problems associated with permafrost, and in some fields they have been very successful.

The end of World War II left only two great powers in the rapidly contracting globe, and geography made the arctic region the shortest avenue of approach between them. It is probable that at least part of any Soviet attack upon the United States would go over the pole; likewise the Soviets are vulnerable to SAC retaliation along their northern border. It is understandable that under these conditions the Soviets have shown almost frantic determination to master their arctic regions. Polar stations, airfields, and missile bases spread from the Kola Peninsula across the arctic to

the Bering Strait. A number of drifting scientific stations have yielded information which enables Soviet scientists to cope more adequately with this hostile environment.

### 5. Administrative Organization of the USSR

As is implied in the name Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the country is a union of republics centrally administered by the All-Union government in Moscow. The largest of the republics is the RSFSR. The use of "Federated" in the title indicates that many national groups are incorporated in the RSFSR. Fourteen other Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), usually called union republics, are supposedly free to leave the Union, but of course they actually have no choice (Table 1). The republics have their own legislative bodies, one-chamber Supreme Soviets, and Councils of Ministers, as though they were small replicas of the USSR itself (Table 1).

TABLE 1  
ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL UNITS WITHIN UNION REPUBLICS, 1 JANUARY 1968\*

UNION REPUBLIC	AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS	AUTONOMOUS OBLASTS	KRAYS AND OBLASTS	RAYONS	CITIES	VILLAGE-TYPE SOVIETS	RURAL SOVIETS
RSFSR	16	15*	55	1,720	963	1,824	22,418
Ukrainian	—	—	25	475	382	827	8,552
Byelorussian	—	—	6	117	78	125	1,542
Uzbek	1	—	10	97	40	87	905
Kazakh	—	—	16	173	67	172	1,890
Georgian	2	1	—	67	49	54	908
Azerbaydzhan	1	1	—	60	54	120	943
Lithuanian	—	—	—	44	92	22	656
Moldavian	—	—	—	31	20	32	672
Latvian	—	—	—	26	56	33	546
Kirgiz	—	—	1	30	15	31	354
Tadzhik	—	1	—	37	17	40	272
Armenian	—	—	—	33	23	27	445
Turkmen	—	—	—	34	15	66	219
Estonian	—	—	—	15	33	24	236
Total for USSR	20	18	113	2,959	1,904	3,484	40,558

\* Including 10 national okrugs.

\* *Yezhgodnik. Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1968.* (Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, 1968), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", 1968.

The next administrative division below the union republic is the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) which also has its own Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, but is more or less subordinate to the union republic in which it is located. The ASSR usually has a predominant nationality different from that of the parent union republic. There are also autonomous oblasts, krais and oblasts, national okrugs, and rural and city rayons to conform with the nationality problem.

The union republics and autonomous republics are subdivided into krais and oblasts, usually according to the demands of the economic plan. The rapidly changing economic pattern in the USSR has resulted in a constant change in the areas, boundaries, and names of the oblasts and krais.

The krais and oblasts, and in some cases the smaller republics, are divided into rayons, somewhat analogous to US counties. The size of the rayon varies enormously from 150 thousand square miles in the northern tundra region to less than one hundred square miles in the black-earth Ukraine. The smallest local units, and subordinate to the rayon, are the villages and village soviets.

The urban areas have a separate regime. The largest cities are directly subordinate to the republic and are themselves broken up into rayons. Smaller cities are under the krais or oblasts, and the small towns under the rayons.<sup>5</sup>

The date on a Soviet map is very important, as changes are constantly occurring in the boundaries of areas and names of cities. As a small village grows in size, the ending of the name will change because of the gender of the noun that it modifies, for example, a small village (feminine *derevnya*) will have an ending in *-skaya*. If it becomes a large village (neuter *selo*), it will end in *-skoye*, and when it becomes a workers' settlement (masculine *rabochiy poselok*), it will end in *-skiy*. Many Soviet cities are named after leading figures of the regime, and when these persons fall into disfavor the names

are changed. As an example, Yenakiyevo was changed at one time to Rykovo, but with Rykov's eclipse it was changed to Ordzhonikidze, who was then close to Stalin. With Ordzhonikidze's suicide and loss of prestige, the name reverted to Yenakiyevo. Some of the capitals of national areas have had their names changed to conform with the local language. This was the case in the North Ossetian ASSR where the name has undergone a threefold change: Vladikavkaz to Ordzhonikidze to the Ossetian, Dzauzhikau. Of course, the denigration of Stalin after Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 led to the changing of the names of a number of cities: Stalingrad to Volgograd, Stalino to Donetsk, Stalinogorsk to Novomoskovsk, Stalinabad to Dushanbe, and Stalinsk to Novokuznetsk. The city of Molotov and the oblast of Molotovskaya became respectively Perm and Permskaya after Molotov's fall from grace in 1957.

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<sup>5</sup>There is considerable confusion in translating the various names of administrative units from the Russian. Some of the more conventional translations are listed here:

Russian	English	Russian	English
krai	territory	rayon	district
oblast	region	gorod	city
okrug	area	selo, derevnya	village

## The People

IN MAY 1959 the Soviets released the results of the first census since 1939 and thus settled a long-disputed question of the total population of the Soviet Union. The official 1959 reading was 208.8 million. The statistical collection, *The National Economy of the USSR (Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR)*, for 1956 had listed the total population of the Soviet Union at 200.2 million, but that figure was merely an educated guess. Prior to 1956 no Western demographers had put the Soviet population so low. The answer is, of course, that the Soviet losses, both direct and in expected birth rate, were even more catastrophic during the collectivization of agriculture, the Great Purges of 1936-1939, and World War II than had been thought. The estimated population (Soviet estimate) in 1940, including the Polish, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian territories seized in 1939-40 was 191.7 million. Thus in 20 years the population increase was only 17 million. Consider the increase in the United States for the same period—from 131.7 million in 1940 to around 176 million in 1959, or an increase of about 44 million. The census of 1959 revealed several particulars inconvenient to the Soviet Union. The low birth-rate of the 1941-46 period resulted in a paucity of young people coming into the labor-force during the 1957-63 period. It also revealed a lop-sided ratio between females and males: 55 percent female and 45 percent male. Furthermore, although the Soviet Union was the world's second largest industrial power, 52 percent of its population (108.8 million) was still classed as rural.

The latest census, taken in January 1970, gave the figure of 241,748,000 for the population of the Soviet Union on 15 January 1970. This was an increase of 32.9 million in the 11 years since the 1959 census, or 15.8 percent. The female-to-male ratio was not quite so far out of whack as previously: 130.4 million females and 111.3 million males, or 53.9 percent to 46.1 percent. It also disclosed that the nation had become more urban than rural; 136 million urban inhabitants to 105.7 rural, or a ratio of 56 percent to 44 percent. The census also pointed up a phenomenon long suspected, namely that there has been a low growth-rate in the predominantly Slavic Russian Federation and the Baltic republics during the last decade, while the population in the

Central Asian and Transcaucasian republic has been increasing rapidly.<sup>1</sup>

The population of the Soviet Union is made up of a large number of different nationalities speaking various languages, many of which have absolutely no affinity to each other. For example, the Russian and Georgian languages have different alphabets, vocabulary, and grammar, and are as far apart linguistically as are English and Armenian. This nationality problem haunted the tsarist regime from its earliest expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, contributed to its demise in the 1917 Revolution, and since then has been a major problem for the Communist government.

### 6. Slavs

The largest racial group in the USSR is the Slavic race; and this group is a composite of the Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The Great Russians make up over 50 percent of the total population, 129 million, and are far and away the dominant group.<sup>2</sup> For example, the present Politburo of the Party, which is the ruling organ, is made up mostly of Great Russians. The official language of the USSR is Great Russian, and anyone desiring advancement in the Soviet Union must learn Great Russian. For centuries, the colonization drive of the Great Russians has scattered them all over the USSR, and in many areas they now outnumber the original inhabitants, especially in the urban areas.

The Ukrainians, sometimes called the Little Russians, are the second largest group in the USSR, numbering over 40 million. Although very heavily represented in the Ukraine, they are to be found in all parts of the USSR as a result of the mass deportations during the collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s and the evacuation of the civilian population before the German onslaught of 1941 and 1942. The Ukrainian language is similar to Great Russian, but with too many differences to be considered a dialect.

<sup>1</sup>*Izvestiya*, 19 April 1970, these were only preliminary figures. A more detailed breakdown is promised when the ethnic, migration, and occupational data have been correlated and analyzed.

<sup>2</sup>The figures for the various nationalities are from the 1970 Census unless otherwise stated.

The Byelorussians<sup>3</sup> are the smallest of the three Slavic groups, somewhat over 9 million. The swampy, unproductive land of Byelorussia held back the economic and cultural development of these people. Furthermore, the Byelorussians have been dominated by other peoples throughout their history: at first by the Poles and the Lithuanians, and then by the Great Russians. This has given them little opportunity to evolve a strong, independent culture and literature.

## 7. Baltic Peoples

The latest victims of Soviet expansion were the nationalities west of the USSR who were caught between the Nazi hammer and the Soviet anvil. Three of these peoples can be conveniently grouped as the Baltic nationalities: the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Soviet domination is nothing new to these peoples, as they were incorporated into the Russian Empire as early as the eighteenth century and experienced freedom as separate nations only in the period between 1918 and 1939. But even before 1918 and certainly during their period of independence they become conscious of themselves as distinct nationalities with well-developed languages, literature, and traditions. It is doubtful if they will ever become Russianized, and the Soviet government, acutely aware of the strategic vulnerability of the area, has deliberately colonized much of the territory with Russians.

## 8. Finno-Ugrians

In the enormous area lying to the east of Finland and to the north of the Urals and Western Siberia there are a few non-Russian nationalities, mostly of Finno-Ugrian stock. The Mordvinians, just over 1.25 million, are the largest group. Only about half of a million live in the Mordvinian ASSR, and these are outnumbered two to one by the Russians. The rest are scattered about in the Urals and in the Volga region. The Udmurts (also called the Votyaks) are the next largest group, numbering around 700 thousand. In the Mari Autonomous Oblast there are about 600 thousand Mari (or Cheremiss) people, and the smallest group is the Komi (or Zyryan) people (322 thousand). These nationalities came under Russian influence very early, especially when the focus of Russian expansion shifted from Kiev to Moscow in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In some respects their fate resembles that of the American Indian in the face of the Anglo-Saxon expansion. They are allowed to hold those

areas for which the Russians have no particular use, and only as long as that situation continues. The Komi ASSR is a good case in point. The native population held out until the coal and oil deposits of the Pechora Basin were discovered in the 1930s. Now the Pechora region alone has a greater population than the entire area of the Komi ASSR. The natives of the region have been swamped by the influx of settlers from other parts of the USSR.

## 9. Tatars

Russian-Tatar hostility has been endemic ever since the thirteenth century and the Mongol conquests; a large part of the Mongol forces were Tatar. The Tatars, strung out along the Volga and back to the Urals, were a block to Russian eastward expansion. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Ivan the Terrible conquered Kazan, the Tatar stronghold, and in a few decades the Russians held the length of the Volga and were swarming all over Siberia. But even under the Tsarist Russification policy the Tatars maintained considerable autonomy, and Kazan in the nineteenth century was a center for Tatar studies. Although "Tatar" is used to indicate the national groups inhabiting this area, there are really three different nationalities: Tatar, Bashkir, and Chuvash.

The Tatars have an autonomous republic, the Tatar ASSR, but they are also scattered widely throughout the Volga and Central Asian areas. There are almost 6 million Tatars in the USSR.

The Bashkirs, like the Tatars, are a Moslem people and a minority within their own republic, the Bashkir ASSR. As early as 1933 the Bashkirs made up only 25 percent of the population. Since Ufa has now become not only the capital of the the Bashkir ASSR but also the capital of the "Second Baku" oil region, the ratio of Bashkirs has dropped even lower. There were 1.24 million Bashkirs in the USSR in 1970 but not all of them lived in their own republic.

The Chuvash are Christians, and although their language is somewhat allied to the Tatar, they have never had close ties with their neighbors, in either cultural or national feelings. The Chuvash consider themselves as the heirs of the great Bulgarian Empire, part of whose people migrated to the present Bulgaria in the early Middle Ages. Unlike the Tatars and Bashkirs, the Chuvash are in the majority in the Chuvash ASSR; in 1970 there were about 1.7 million Chuvash in the USSR.

## 10. Central Asians

One of the great non-Soviet areas of the USSR is Soviet Central Asia. According to the 1939 census, some 8 million non-Soviets lived in the area, which

<sup>3</sup>Byelo means "white" in Russian; the original Russian term is generally used to differentiate the nationality from the political group who opposed the Reds in the Civil War (1918 . . .) and were called the White Russians.



had a total population of about 10.5 million. (Kazakhstan is not included in the Soviet Central Asia in this study.) The 1970 figure for the population of Central Asia is 19,954,000, almost double the 1939 total.<sup>4</sup> Most of the population of the area are Turkic and speak Turkic languages, with the exception of the Tadzhiks, who are Iranians (Persians). There are some small minority groups in Soviet Central Asia, but they play little part in the life of the region. The Uigurs, a Turkic people (numbering 173 thousand), are of the same stock as the Uigurs of Sinkiang (around 3 million) and move back and forth across the border rather freely. The Dungans, a very small minority of mixed Arab and Persian origin, probably total no more than 40 thousand. The several thousand Baluchis who live in Soviet Central Asia may prove valuable in Soviet dealings with Iran, Pakistan, and India, each having substantial numbers of Baluchis. There is even an Arab minority (20 thousand) in Uzbekistan.

Russian penetration of Central Asia began in the eighteenth century. The original Orenburg fort was established in 1737; by 1742 it was 165 miles from its original site, after having been moved twice in the direction of Central Asia. In the 1840s a real push began, and the Russians reached the mouth of the Syr Darya in 1847. In 1865 Tashkent was captured, and Samarkand fell three years later. Thus some of the oldest cities in the world, long closed to Western travelers, became parts of the Russian Empire. The British became extremely disturbed about this Russian drive toward India and, upon the Russian capture of Merv, expressed their feelings with the pun "Mervousness." Much of the British-Russian mistrust in the nineteenth century is traceable to mutual suspicion of the other's motives in Central Asia.

At the outset the Communist regime had a much bloodier time than did even Tsarist Russia in pacifying Central Asia. Apparently the nationalities of the area had accepted at face value the Soviet line on the right of autonomy. Once the opposition was silenced, the Soviet leaders proceeded to set up a Turkestani SSR plus two Soviet People's Republics, Bokhara and Khorezm. By 1925, however, atomization of the Central Asian region appeared to be the safer policy, and the present pattern—Kirgiziya, Uzbekistan, Turkmeniya, and Tadzhikistan—had emerged. Not all of these units became full-fledged union republics at the same time.

**Kirgiz.**—Soviet Central Asia is one of the most valuable pieces of real estate in the Soviet Union.

Not only are its oil, minerals, cattle, and cotton great assets for the national economy, but its geographic position is ideal for implementing Soviet expansionist policies in Asia and the Middle East. The republics of this area border on Sinkiang, Afghanistan, India, and Iran—all targets for Soviet domination, if not incorporation. Thus it is not strange that Soviet controls are very strict in the area, and any possibility of effective revolt in Central Asia would seem unlikely.

The Kirgiz have had a fairly rugged relationship with the Russians, both before and after 1917. The tsarist government began to settle Russians in Kirgiziya as early as the 1860s, and the process has gone on more or less steadily ever since. In 1916 the Kirgiz, along with some of their Central Asian brothers, rebelled against military conscription. They had been exempt from this service until the insatiable demands of the eastern front made the tsarist regime look around for new sources of supply. It is estimated that some 150 thousand Kirgiz decided to do their dying on the home front of Kirgiziya. Under the Soviets, non-Kirgiz colonists continued to pour in, and today it is doubtful that 50 percent of the population of the republic is Kirgiz. As a result of this century-long pressure, the Russians now control Kirgiziya; and its capital city, Frunze, is predominately Russian, while Russians make up almost 30 percent of the population. The Kirgiz, some 1,285,000, made up about 44 percent of the total population in 1970, up from 40.5 percent in 1959.

**Uzbeks.**—Uzbekistan is the wealthiest and most populous of the Central Asian republics. The Uzbeks, numbering well over 9 million, are the largest non-Slavic ethnic group in the USSR. They are an extremely proud people, as they demonstrated in the so-called Basmachi revolt against Sovietization in the early years of the Communist regime. Once the Soviet leaders gained full control, they began to pursue energetically the tsarist policy of converting Uzbekistan into a cotton growing region. By 1950 the acreage under cotton had been increased fivefold over that sown before the tsarist conquest. The necessary cut in cereal production resulted in a dependence upon imported foodstuffs and in an intensified anti-Soviet feeling. At the same time, the Soviets have done much toward industrializing Uzbekistan. The local coal, oil, and mineral resources, plus the potential waterpower reserves of the Fergana Valley, made this step almost inevitable. In January 1970 the total population of Uzbekistan was 11,963,000; 64.7 percent was Uzbek, up from 61.1 percent in 1959.

**Turkmenians.**—The Turkmenians were the last of the Central Asian peoples to be conquered by tsarist Russia, with the capture of Merv in 1884.

<sup>4</sup>*Izvestiya*, 19 April 1970

They are closest to the Anatolian Turks in language and consequently have been favorably inclined toward all the Pan-Turkic movements of the early twentieth century, especially in the wake of World War I. The 1939 census listed 830 thousand Turkmenians of a total population of 1.25 million in Turkmeniya; in 1970, the Turkeminians made up 1,216,000 of the republic's 2,159,000 people, or 65.6 percent, up from 60.9 percent in 1959. The discovery and exploitation of large oil and gas deposits in Turkmeniya (13 million tons of oil and over one billion cubic meters of gas in the late 1960s) brought prosperity to the republic. In addition, the completion of five hundred miles of the Kara Kum Canal, from the Amu Dar'ya River to Ashkabad, opened up cotton fields in what used to be the formidable Kara Kum desert.

**Tadzhiks.**—The Autonomous Tadzhik Soviet Republic, established in 1925, became a union republic in 1929, in conformance with Soviet foreign policy. It was self-evident that the region did not warrant such an elevation in status, but the tumbling of pro-Soviet King Amanullah from the Afghanistanian throne at this time made a Soviet countermove seem very desirable. This move and countermove in Central Asian politics clarify Tadzhikistan's main importance in the scheme of things—it is a frontier post facing Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Iran, with all the implications of such a situation in the light of unceasing Soviet efforts to carry Communist gospel into Asia. For example, according to Soviet figures (obviously compiled to be used as propaganda), there are 2 million Tadzhiks, one million Uzbeks, and 380 thousand Turkmenians in Afghanistan. Since the Tadzhiks are an Iranian people, Soviet scholars have valiantly tried to prove that the Tadzhiks are the real soul and mind of the Iranian world. The implications of this line of thought are very obvious if the Soviets move toward Iran. The population of Tadzhikistan was 2.9 million according to the 1970 census, 56.2 percent Tadzhik (1.63 million), up from 53.1 percent in 1959. The erection of hydroelectric

facilities in the 1960s attracted aluminum, chemical, and other industries into the republic, hitherto mainly concerned with the raising of cotton and fruit.

**Kazakhs.**—From an ethnic point of view, the Kazakhs can logically be grouped with the other Central Asian peoples. They were nomadic until recently and speak a Turkic language, as do most of the people of Central Asia, the Iranian Tadzhiks being the exception. Economically, as has been pointed out earlier, Kazakhstan is closely knit into the industrial complex of the Urals and Western Siberia. The Kazakhs have fought a losing battle with Russian colonists since the 1890s, and by 1910 the town of Verny (present capital of Kazakhstan and now called Alma Ata) had 26 thousand Russians among its 37 thousand inhabitants (730 thousand in 1970). The whole process is reminiscent of the feud between the cattlemen and the farmers, or "nesters," in the United States in about the same period; wherever the grasslands were fertile enough for profitable agriculture, the nomadic stock-raisers were driven off.

The Kazakhs attempted a comeback right after the Revolution. They drove many Russians colonists out, and in 1927 the Communist Party of the region, controlled by Kazakh nationalists, was able to pass a law giving Kazakhs a preference in land distribution. As a result the Russian farmers were rapidly relocated on the most unproductive land. This was unacceptable to the central government, and it decided in favor of the Slav peasants. The big blow came when the Turksib railway line was built across Eastern Kazakhstan in 1930. This encouraged further colonization. The Kazakh nomads also suffered bitterly during the collectivization period as they fought against being held down to the collective farms. The opening up of the Karaganda coal basin, the discovery of large copper and iron ore deposits, and the general industrial expansion added further to the decline of the traditional Kazakh way of life. Khrushchev's virgin land policy brought in even more Slavs as settlers.

TABLE 2. NORTH CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

Nationality	Number in 1970	Administrative area
Chechen .....	613,000	Chechen-Ingush ASSR
Ossetian .....	488,000	North Ossetian ASSR
Kabardinian .....	280,000	Kabardinian-Balkar ASSR
Ingush .....	158,000	Chechen-Ingush ASSR
Karachay .....	113,000	Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast
Adyge .....	100,000	Adyge Autonomous Oblast
Balkar .....	60,000	Kabardinian-Balkar ASSR
Circassian (Cherkess) .....	40,000	Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast

Kazakhstan reported a population of 12,850,000 in the 1970 census; 4,163,000 were Kazakhs, 32.4 percent of the total, up from 29.8 percent in 1959. Russians, however, made up 42.8 percent of the total, or about 5.5 million. However, there are 5.3 million Kazakhs in the USSR. The Sinkiang province of the People's Republic of China, which has a long common border with Kazakhstan, has a large Kazakh minority. In the mid-1960s some 60 thousand Kazakhs fled to the Soviet side of the border to join their kinspeople.

### 11. North Caucasians

Eight nationalities occupy the northern area of the Caucasus Range: Chechens, Ossetians, Circassians (Cherkess), Kabardinians, Ingush, Balkars, Adyge, and Karachays. In the nineteenth century the Russians encountered many difficulties in their conquest of the region, especially from 1840 to 1859 when most of these peoples, under the leadership of the Chechens, fought under the Moslem banner of the Iman Shamil. It was only by cutting down whole forests, building a network of roads, and razing the native villages one by one, that the Russians finally overcame the resistance.

The Communists, on coming to power, were rather puzzled as to what to do with this mélange of peoples. In 1920 they set up the Gorskaya ASSR (Mountain Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic) combining all eight nationalities, but soon found that the "divide and conquer" technique would be more effective. Between 1921 and 1926 a number of separate autonomous oblasts were established, three of which became autonomous republics in 1936—Kabardinian-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, and North Ossetian.

The German invasion of the North Caucasus in 1942 revealed the superficiality of the Soviet hold over these peoples. Four of the national groups regarded the Soviet enemy as their friend. After the Soviets had driven the Germans out of the region, the Soviet authorities rounded up and deported to Siberia the five "bad" peoples, the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachays, and Kalmyks. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR and Karachay Autonomous Oblast were abolished, and Kabardinian-Balkar ASSR bereft of its Balkars, became simply the Kabardinian ASSR.

By comparison with the "bad" Chechens, the "good" Ossetians have always been pro-Russian. It is true that the Ossetians valiantly fought collectivization in the 1930s, but they never showed the bitter animosity of the Chechens. As a reward for their pro-Soviet attitude during World War II, they received part of the Ingush area, and their capital, Vladikavkaz, which in Russian means "ruler of the Caucasus," was given the Ossetian name of Dzauzhikau.

Two little nationalities of the region, the Circassians and Adyge, are now fighting a losing battle with the horde of Slavic colonists. However, the Circassians, who have racial ties in Turkey, Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan, may become a valuable pawn in the Soviet game in the Middle East.

In 1957 the Stalinist deportation of entire peoples was denounced in the Supreme Soviet and a program for bringing them back was begun. The 1970 census lists the following ASSRs: the Chechen-Ingush (1,065,000 people), the Kabardino-Balkar (589,000), the North Ossetin (553,000) and the Kalmyk (268,000). A Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Region was also established in 1958. To some extent, the iniquitous Stalin deportation has been undone.

### 12. Daghestani

Daghestan is the perfect example of a polyglot area and has been aptly termed an "ethnic museum." For centuries various peoples have moved from the Middle East and the Russian plains through the gap between the eastern end of the Caucasus Range and the shore of the Caspian Sea. Many of these travelers left small groups behind in the mountainous Daghestan. The inaccessible valleys high in the mountains made it possible for these splinters of nations to survive in a relatively pure ethnic state, retaining their ancient customs and languages. As a result, Daghestan, with an area of just over 14,000 square miles, now has almost a million and a half people representing 32 distinct nationalities.

Although Russia has claimed suzerainty over Daghestan since 1813, the date of the Treaty of Gulistan with Persia, it took nearly 50 years to "pacify" the region. Like the Chechens, the Moslem Daghestani fought vigorously under Shamil. The glorious traditions of the Holy War forced the Communists to move very cautiously in attacking Mohammedanism in Daghestan. Even their moderate success may have been a Pyrrhic victory, as it weakened the use in the Moslem schools of Arabic—the only *lingua franca* of the region. There is no predominant language in Daghestan. Even the most widespread, Avar, is spoken by about 400 thousand people, and this represents a coverage of less than 30 percent. Since 1950 the Soviets have sought to make Russian the second language and have also systematically attacked Shamil, the national hero of the Daghestani, North Caucasian, and Azerbaydzhanian peoples. But he remains the shining hero, and all denigration efforts seem to have been in vain.

In both the North Caucasus and Daghestan, the biggest obstacle to Sovietization has been Islam and

the tenacity of the people in retaining their native tongues. Soviet propaganda has fallen on deaf ears, especially as the peoples concerned cannot read the Russian message. Administering the North Caucasus from the Russian oil city of Grozny has made the job that much harder. Grozny to most North Caucasians represents Russian oppression. The brutal Russian general Yermolov built Grozny, which means "threatening" in Russian, the same word as the "Terrible" in Ivan the Terrible.

### 13. Transcaucasians

Strangely enough, the Russian conquest of the region south of the Caucasus Range, Transcaucasia, was much easier than that of the Caucasus itself. Russia in its nineteenth century wars with Persia and Turkey bypassed the mountaineers and operated from the more easily controlled regions of Azerbaydzhan, Georgia, and Armenia. These three areas were happy, on the whole, to have the Russians fighting off their traditional enemies.

At the present time the Transcaucasian region is really a salient in the Middle East. The peoples of the area have always been an integral part of Middle Eastern history, either as opponents of the Persian and Ottoman empires, or under the control of one of them. To stir up Armenian or Georgian hatred for Turkey would be a simple task for the Soviet Union; the real problem is more nearly that of keeping their enmity under control until it is needed to supplement Soviet policy.

**Armenians.**—Armenia has a long history in Middle Eastern politics, a history that reaches back to the Greeks and the Romans. The Armenians accepted Christianity early in the fourth century, and in the fifth century the patriarch Mesrob devised an alphabet based on Greek and Semitic letters. Unfortunately, Armenia's position on the periphery of the Transcaucasian area encouraged one conqueror after another to sweep over the land and subject its people to vassalage. Furthermore, a small Christian island in a Moslem sea was doomed to a precarious existence in the Middle Ages. By the thirteenth century Armenia was firmly under the heel of the Ottoman Turks, whose domination, interspersed with short intervals of Persian control, lasted until the nineteenth century.

Russia came into control of the territory roughly corresponding to the present Armenian SSR as a result of the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1829. From that date until the present, Armenia has been a political pawn in the almost continuous Russo-Turkish feud, and it was especially victimized in the early twentieth century when Turkish fears of the Russian use of the Armenian minority in Turkey led to a series of infamous

massacres—shocking examples of man's inhumanity to man. Memories of the massacres are still vivid in Armenia. The author, in 1969, was shown the beginnings of a project to plant a million fruit trees in the environs of the capital city, Erevan, in commemoration of the victims of the Turks.

Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey temporarily buried the hatchet in the early 1920s, but unfortunately it was buried in the Armenians. Both powers, being anti-Versailles and revolutionary, felt it in their interest to keep the Armenian question from boiling up. The cooperated closely in putting down the Dashnaks, a socialist party dating from the 1890s which was dedicated to Armenian independence. Since the hectic days of the 1920s, Armenia has been one of the most tractable national groups within the USSR, and has supplied many of the Soviet Union's leading figures, including Anastas Mikoyan, a perennial member of the ruling clique, his brother Artem Mikoyan, who was the codesigner of the famous MiG series of fighters, and Marshal Bagramyan, the only non-Slav to become a top commander in the Red Army.

According to the 1939 census there were 1,281,000 Armenians living in the republic. This number, however, uses only about 60 percent of their countrymen living in the Soviet Union. Like the Jews, the Armenians suffered their own diaspora, and they are scattered throughout the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Immediately after World War II, an attempt was made to gather the wandering brethren back into the Armenian SSR and, with the assistance of the Patriarch of the Armenian Church, some 85,000 Armenians were repatriated. But word soon spread that the Soviet Utopia left much to be desired, and the great trek "home" died down to a trickle. The 1970 census listed the population of the Armenian Republic at 2,493,000, an increase of 730,000 (41 percent) since the 1959 census. 88.6 percent of the people are Armenian (2,108,000), thus making the republic the most ethnically pure of the 15 union republics.

**Georgians.**—Like the Armenians, the Georgians have a long cultural tradition and a highly developed language and literature. And as Christians, they too suffered cruelly throughout the period of Moslem domination in the Middle East. The Georgians came to regard Christian Russia as an ally as early as the sixteenth century, when they requested the suzerainty of Ivan the Terrible. Finally, in 1801, Georgia was voluntarily incorporated into the Russian Empire and became a reliable base from which the Russians conducted campaigns against the Turks in 1828, during the Crimean War, the War of 1878, and during World War I.

The Russian Revolution brought the Mensheviks

to power in Georgia, and they managed to stave off the Bolsheviks until 1921. At one time it even seemed that Georgia would become the showpiece for non-Bolshevik socialism. The Red Army, however, proved too strong. Just as the Armenians have provided the Soviet Union with many of its important figures, their fellow-Transcaucasians, the Georgians have outdone them. Leaders of Georgian birth played an important role in the first four decades of Soviet history. Stalin, Beria, Ordzhonikidze, and Yenukidze head the list.

Again like the Armenians, the Georgians have a general dislike for the Turks and would probably be very useful in any way against Turkey. In 1945, two Georgian professors wrote an article in which they asserted Georgia's claim to about 170 miles out of Turkey's Black Sea coastline. It is true that several hundred thousand people speaking a Georgian dialect live in that part of Turkey, but they—the Lazi—are Moslem and have lived there for centuries as Turkish citizens. *Pravda* played up the article, and the Soviet propaganda machine went into full gear. It was all part of the Soviet move in 1945-47 to force Turkey to give up Kars and Ardahan and allow the Soviets to build fortified check points on the Straits. Although this attempt came to nothing, the fact remains that Georgian irredentists are always available for future use.

The population of the Georgian Republic (Gruzinskaya SSR) has grown more slowly than that of Armenia in recent years, increasing from 4,044,000 in 1959 to 4,688,000 in 1970, or by 16 percent. Georgians make up 66.8 percent of the population, some 3,131,000, up from 64.3 percent in 1959.

**Azerbaijdzhanians.** The third of the Transcaucasian nations, Azerbaijan, has neither the long historical unity nor the homogeneity of population that are found in Armenia and Georgia. In addition, the Azerbaijanis are Moslem in religion and Turkish in language and race. The fate of Azerbaijan has always been closely linked with that of its largest city, Baku. When Baku fell to the Russians in 1806, the fate of the rest of the nation was more or less sealed. In 1875, the Nobel brothers built the first oil refinery at Baku, and this city soon became synonymous with Russian petroleum production. The population increased from 15,000 in 1873 to 333,000 by 1913, and the metropolitan area had expanded to include 901,000 people. Thus over one-fourth of Azerbaijan's 3,400,000 inhabitants live in Baku, while only one-third of the city's population is Azerbaijanian. In 1970 the population of the republic had increased to 5,111,000 and the city of Baku to 1,261,000. The 3,772,000 Azerbaijanians make up 73.8 percent of the republic's population, up from 67.5 percent in 1959.

The predominance of Baku in Azerbaijanian affairs played an important part in the success of the Communists. In the early days of the Revolution both Turkish and British forces tried unsuccessfully to intervene in Azerbaijan, and the native Mussavat (Equality) Party held power until April 1920. But the multinational Baku was the weakest link in Mussavat's brief sway, and was a likely target for reconquest by the oil-hungry Communists. Another factor militating against the independence movement in Azerbaijan was that the Christian states of Armenia and Georgia stood between the Azerbaijanians and their brother Turks of Anatolia. Furthermore, the Turks were deeply concerned with their own troubles at that time, having just gone down with Germany in defeat.

A clear-cut Soviet policy has developed in Azerbaijan since 1920: develop Baku oil, increase the acreage under cotton (as in Uzbekistan), and strive to make the republic a shining example to the Moslems of the Middle East. On the negative side the strategy has been to sever all cultural ties between the Azerbaijanians and their Moslem coreligionists in Turkey and Iran.

#### 14. Peoples of the Soviet Far East

The Far East comprises the oblasts of Chita, Amur, Magadan, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, the Khabarovsk Kray, the Maritime Region, and the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, in short, the Pacific Coast back to the mountain ranges running parallel to it plus the area immediately north of the Amur River as far west as Lake Baykal. Within this area of about 1.5 million square miles live some seven million people, only a small percentage of which is indigenous. The great majority is Slavic.

The indigenous peoples can be classified under three general headings: Buryat-Mongols, Tungus, and Paleo-Asiatics. The Buryats, who live in the region immediately east and west of Lake Baykal, number about 300 thousand. They have their own culturally autonomous units, the Buryat ASSR and the Ust-Orda Buryat national okrug. As far back as 1941, however, the Buryat-Mongols in the Buryat ASSR were a minority of 43 percent, the rest being Slavs.

The Tungus, now called the Evenki, are found widely scattered throughout Eastern Siberia as well as in the Far East. The main subdivision in the Far East are the Lamuts, or Eveni, along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Golds, or Nanais, in the Amur and Ussuri valleys. Altogether they number no more than 35 thousand.

The Paleo-Asiatic peoples are divided into six main groups: about six thousand Gilyaks, or

Nivkhi, along the lower Amur and on Sakhalin Island; in the north on the Chukotsk Peninsula, the Chukchi—three thousand living on the coast and nine thousand tending a half million reindeer in the back country; from seven thousand to ten thousand Koryaks, or Nymlyan, in northern Kamchatka, also subdivided into coastal and reindeer-breeding types; some four thousand Kamchadals, or Itelmens, on the Kamchatka Peninsula below the Koryaks; and finally, about sixteen hundred Eskimos on the Bering Sea coast and about five hundred Aleut on the Kommandorski Islands. Except for the Chukchi and Koryaks who raise reindeer and can thus keep to themselves, most of these indigenous peoples are being rapidly assimilated.

The Soviet Far East also contains some nonindigenous minorities, including 100 thousand Chinese, 350 thousand Koreans, and a few Japanese. In the Birobidzhanian Jewish Autonomous area there were some 108 thousand Jews in 1939. But all these minorities, indigenous and nonindigenous, are overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Slavs. Strictly speaking, there is no nationality problem in the Soviet Far East in the same sense as in Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasian area.

### 15. Soviet Nationality Policy: Past and Present

When the Communists came to power in 1917 they inherited the nationality problem, and it was indeed a chaotic and complex problem after the tsarist officials had finished bungling it. By the 1880s a policy of Russification had been initiated as part of the "autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism" concept of governing adopted by the gloomy Alexander III. Both the Marxist radicals and the liberals referred to Imperial Russia as the "prison house of nations." In the cultural sphere, Russification consisted in liquidating or minimizing local schools and in imposing the Russian language and the Orthodox Church upon the various nationalities. The Russification policy was furthered by playing one nationality against another, as was the case in the Transcaucasian region. But the most bitterly resented practice was that of sending Russian colonists into a nationalistic area, as in Central Asia, where they took over the best land, gained a monopoly in local business, and gradually drove the natives to the wall.

These policies reacted against the tsarist regime in the revolutionary situation that prevailed from 1905 to 1917. During that time most nationalities had produced a native intelligentsia who gave their allegiance primarily to the liberal and radical anti-

tsarist organizations. Even the Communists made every effort to appeal to these dissident nationality groups.

Marx was an internationalist with no interest in such concepts as "nation" and "nationality." In the *Communist Manifesto* he summarily dismissed the problem.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

But Lenin and his companions could not take such a cavalier attitude toward the nationality problem. They were planning a revolution in a huge ethnic conglomerate, Imperial Russia, and needed the support, or at least the neutrality, of the nationalities making up half the population. Lenin urged his "wonderful Georgian," Stalin, to tackle the problem, and in 1913 Stalin brought forth his essay, *Marxism and the National Question*, written in Vienna under Lenin's close supervision. According to Stalin, the main fallacy of the "nation" concept was its unification of the employers and workers, who, according to Marxist dogma, were natural enemies. However, Stalin could not afford to permit the bourgeoisie to utilize all the appeal of nationalism, and he admitted that autonomy, federation, and separation were permissible under certain "concrete historical conditions." Obviously *the Communist doctrine contradicted itself on the nationality question*: it maintained the right of each nationality to self-determination, including the right of independence, but at the same time it also maintained the international solidarity of the working class with the obligation to prefer the working class of a neighboring country to its own bourgeoisie.

So much for the theory. In actuality, after the Communist seizure of power, the problem of the independence or inclusion of the various nationalities within the Soviet Union was decided not on theoretical principles, but upon the geographic position of the countries and the military might of the Soviet state. The Poles, Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians became independent of Russia because they were occupied by Germans at the beginning of the revolution and were later able to call upon the Allies for help, which was available because the Allied fleet dominated the Baltic. Georgia, Azerbaydzhan, and Armenia kept a semblance of independence for a few years with assistance from first Germany and then Britain, but when Turkey and the Soviet Union found it expedient to subjugate them, the Red Army quickly made the kill.

By 1921 the nationalities still within the Soviet Union were almost completely controlled by Moscow. But the control was not firm enough to warrant arousing any unnecessary antagonism. From 1921 to 1928 the Bolsheviks walked and talked softly in the spheres of economics and nationality: this was the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and *korenizatsiya* policy in the nationality problem. The term *korenizatsiya* comes from the Russian word *koren* meaning "root" and refers to the rooted population or indigenous people. The slogan for this period was "culture—nationalist in form, socialist in content." To illustrate concretely, although newspapers in Georgia were printed in the Georgian language, in content they differed not at all from *Pravda*. Attempts were made to give an alphabet to those nationalities having no written language and to simplify and make more phonetic the alphabets of other groups. For example, the Latin alphabet was substituted for the Arabic, partly because it was thought to be a more efficient alphabet, and partly in an effort to break the hold of the Islamic clergy over the cultural life of the people. The emphasis, however, upon the history, culture, and language of the various national groups began to boomerang: the native intelligentsia, although Communist, tended to side with their fellow nationals against undue Russian influence.

The *korenizatsiya* policy came to an end with the introduction of forced industrialization and collectivized agriculture. The merciless centralization necessary to a wholly planned economy was inconsistent with self-rule in the nationality groups. Each of the nationalities wanted to retain as much self-sufficiency as possible, and this made total planning rather difficult. Stalin carried out his plans ruthlessly, however, and "national in form" became a pretty thin camouflage for total Russian domination. The Great Purges of the 1930s finished the job; among the first large-scale casualties were the intelligentsia of the national groups. All national cultures were now instructed to stress in their literature, art, and music certain general themes more compatible with Russian domination: the backwardness of the older culture, the cleansing power of the revolution, the advantages of the classless society, and the progressiveness of Russian culture, before and after 1917. This formula was a reversal of the themes that had been stressed under the *korenizatsiya* policy: the glory of the past ages, the folk heroes, and the valiant struggle against the tsarist conquest. Although the majority of ministers in the union republics remained non-Russian, the deputy ministers were usually Russians, and there was little doubt as to which of the two held the reins. It soon

became evident to ambitious native bureaucrats that only those who became proficient in Russian were allowed to climb the ladder of official life.

Even the Army was affected by the changes in the nationality policy. In the 1930s the national divisions were abolished and the non-Soviet troops were placed in ethnically mixed units, with Russian as the language of instruction and command. (In 1942, when the Soviet leaders had to utilize national consciousness to whip up resistance against the German invaders, the regime again reverted to ethnic grouping in the armed forces.)

This period also saw religious persecution at its worst: like the kulaks, priests and church officials were tortured and exiled. Most of the churches, whether Orthodox, Moslem, Jewish, or Buddhist, were either destroyed or turned into antireligious museums, libraries, or schools. The main objective of this antireligious crusade was to gain control of the minds of the younger generation, and in the urban areas it seems to have been fairly successful.

Finally, on 13 March, 1938, the Soviet government ordered the obligatory teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools. In many cases this meant that the students had to learn two alphabets: either that of their native tongue or the relatively new Latin alphabet and the Russian Cyrillic. As an answer to this problem, the Soviet government began its second alphabetic revolution and replaced the Latin alphabet with the Russian Cyrillic. Although this called for the junking of books printed before the second alphabetic revolution, it was a giant step toward making Russian the dominant language even in the national areas. The magnitude of the language problem in the USSR can be appreciated if the large number of linguistic groups are considered (Table 3).

Victory in World War II produced not only a resurgence of Russian nationalism in the official propaganda but also an identification of patriotism with the Stalinist version of the totalitarian state. Opponents of the regime were now regarded as traitors to the *Rodina*, the motherland. Whole nations, which had been tolerant of German occupation or which were suspected as potential traitors, were wiped out. The Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechen-Ingush, Karachay-Balkars, and Kalmyks—all these fell victim to deliberate, systematic extermination.

The Great Russian people became synonymous with Soviet patriotism. Stalin gave his support to the new Great Russian chauvinism when he made this famous toast:

I want to drink a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and, first of all, to the Russian people.

I drink, first of all, to the health of the Russian people because it is the most advanced of all our nations in the Soviet Union.

# THE PEOPLE

I drink to the Russian people because it served in this war as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I drink a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it has a clear mind and a sturdy, enduring character.

The Soviet Union had become one of the two great world powers after 1945, a world power with an empire of its own. This new phrase of Soviet imperialism led to fresh assaults upon the national traditions of the non-Great Russian peoples of the

TABLE 3.—MAJOR LANGUAGE GROUPS IN THE SOVIET UNION\*

Major division	Subdivision	Language	Number of speakers (in thousands)
Indo-European	Baltic	Latvian	1,430
		Lithuanian	2,665
	East Slavic	Russian	129,015
		Ukrainian	40,753
		Byelorussian	9,052
	Armenian	Armenian	3,559
	Iranian	Tadzhik	2,136
		Ossetian	488
Turkic		Uzbek	9,195
		Tatar	5,931
		Kazakh	5,299
		Azerbaydzhanian	4,380
		Chuvash	1,694
		Turkmenian	1,525
		Bashkir	1,240
		Kirgiz	1,452
		Yakut	296
		Karakalpak	236
		Tuvinian	139
		Uigur	173
		Karachay	113
		Khakass	67
		Balkar	60
Mongolian		Buryat	315
		Kalmyk	137
Finno-Ugrian		Mordvinian	1,263
		Estonian	1,007
		Udmurt (Votyak)	704
		Mari (Cheremiss)	599
		Komi (Zyryan)	323
		Karelian	146
North Caucasian		Chechen	613
		Kabardinian	280
		Avar	396
		Lezghian	324
		Darghin	231
		Ingush	158
Georgian		Georgian	3,245

\*William Kleesmann Matthews, *Languages of the U.S.S.R.* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1951).  
Walter Kolatz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952). *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia) (1st ed., Moscow: Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1926-39). *Pravda*, 4 February 1960, pp. 1-2; *Pravda*, 17 April 1971, pp. 1-3.



Soviet Union. Examples of this phase are the condemnation of the national heroic poetry of the Moslem peoples and the rewriting of the histories of the various peoples to stress the benefits not only of Soviet domination but also of the tsarist conquests. Russian culture was "a good thing," regardless of how it had been imposed. Part and parcel of this theme was the campaign against cosmopolitanism. The Tadzhiks were called upon to forget their common culture with the Persians and to emphasize the benefits gained by their contact with Russian culture. The Germanic influences in the Baltic area were now automatically regarded as bad influences. The Jews suffered especially—they were naturally cosmopolitan, and the establishment of the Israeli nation poured oil on the already burning anti-Semitism. Even Ivan the Terrible was refurbished as a great tsar who had been libeled by bourgeois historians.

## 16. Results of the Soviet Nationality Policies

Without a doubt the nationality groups, like all other groups in the Soviet Union not created by the Communist regime, have been atomized and are now tightly controlled by the state. But how much of this can be attributed to Russification? In the Georgian and Armenian republics there is little, if any, Russification. These are nations with long histories, well-developed languages, and strong cultural traditions. The two republics are governed chiefly by their own citizens. The Ukraine is largely governed by Ukrainians today, but the strong Russian elements are much more influential than their numbers would suggest. In Azerbaydzhan the large Russian population in Baku offsets to some extent full Azerbaydzhanian control of the republic.

For strategic reasons there have been mass deportations of local populations and mass colonization by Russians in such areas as the Western Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, and Sakhalin Island. This same type of Russian Ukrainian colonization has also appeared in the new industrial centers of Central Asia, the Second Baku region, and the Buryat-Mongolian capital of Ulan-Ude. The genocide of much of the Kazakh population during the collectivization left a vacuum to be filled with Russian colonists, and Khrushchev's new agricultural policy of tilling the virgin and idle lands was another blow to the Kazakhs. The Crimea has also been completely Russified since deportation of the Tatar population.

Many factors, then, have contributed to the Russification of the various nationalities that make up the Soviet Union. One of the most important, of course, is the required use of the Russian language in the secondary schools and universities in the

national areas. Another is the use of the Cyrillic alphabet with the Asiatic languages and the gradual accretion of Russian words within the vocabularies of these languages. And usually upon the deportation of dissident groups, colonization by Russians was the next step. All nationalities are constantly being reminded of the "beneficial results" of their contacts with progressive Russian culture throughout history.

Is this Russification the result of a deliberate policy determined by the Kremlin leaders along the lines laid down by Alexander III and the Nicholas II? Here the evidence is contradictory and the authorities differ widely. According to Professor Seton-Watson,<sup>5</sup> the Soviet government is not primarily interested in Russifying the non-Great Russians. He states that the conflict exists not between the Russians and the little nationalities, but between these little nationalities and the centralized totalitarian regime. The regime persecutes all groups not created by it; in the case of the little nations it uses Russians as its instrument, flattering their national pride in order to get them to carry out its policies. But the aim of the regime is absolute power, and to attain this the Soviet government systematically atomizes society. The two groups that are most deeply rooted in the past and are thus independent of communism for spiritual nourishment are the religious groups and the nationalities. As long as a Moslem looks first to the Koran and the Islamic law, the *shariat*, for guidance, or an Uzbek feels more closely allied to other Uzbeks than to his Communist leaders, then the Party cannot be certain of unswerving allegiance from the population.

The Uzbek, watching his church become the object of Russian derision, his literature suddenly appear in Cyrillic, and his heroic poetry take queer and unfamiliar turns in the hands of Soviet scholars, cannot but feel that Russification is upon him. The fact that the Uzbek sees all evil emanating from a Kremlin full of Great Russians convinces him that Russification is the goal of the regime. But the exiled Russian kulaks and the Orthodox clergy are Russians persecuted by Russians, and their hatred of the Kremlin leaders is just as intense as the Uzbek's.

## 17. The Nationality Problem Today

A new intelligentsia has arisen among the nationalities. Among the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Tatars, Georgians, Uzbeks, and others there are hundreds of thousands of students, teachers,

<sup>5</sup>Professor Seton-Watson, "Natsionalnaya politika Kremlya v SSSR" (The Nationality policy of the Kremlin in the USSR), *Fourth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR*, Munich, July 5-7, 1954.

engineers, and bureaucrats. These people owe their careers to the Soviet government. Are they grateful for this boon and have they become staunch supporters of the regime? A possible analogy can be found in the tens of thousands of intelligentsia in the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa who were trained in the schools and universities operated by France, Britain, and the United States. Are these natives grateful for their education and are they deeply attached to the Western powers? On the contrary, they have become the leaders of their peoples in the struggle against those same powers. A similar process may be going on within the intelligentsia of the Soviet nationality groups, especially among the Asiatic segments. The recurrent Soviet campaigns against bourgeois nationalism is indirect evidence of this.

On the other hand, it would be unwise to count too heavily on this as a serious weakness within the Soviet Union. Planned economy within the USSR is making it increasingly difficult for local regions to be self-sufficient. For example, the economy of the Ukraine and the Soviet Union complement each other very closely; Central Asia has practically converted to monoculture (cotton) in the last thirty years, and many of the smaller nationalities have been so firmly welded into the overall industrial structure and planned agriculture as to be incapable of survival outside of it. The predominance of Russians in the large urban centers and their control of the skilled and technical positions in the economy would make unlikely any effective movement toward autonomy on the part of the national groups.

George Fischer, a keen observer of the Soviet scene, states that the very process of industrialization with its sociological effects is gradually eliminating the nationality problem. Industrialization, which results in a tremendous mechanization of work and urbanization of population, demands a huge investment to keep going. The mixed populations of the large urban centers tend to weaken the national homogeneity. Furthermore, industrialization and urbanization produce a standardized existence—a mass culture, mass education, and mass press—and these are easily controlled by the central government.<sup>6</sup>

There is a potentially serious problem in the offing, however, and that is the almost zero growth rate of the Great Russian population versus the dramatic growth rate in some of the less advanced republics. For example, the rate increase in Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan was 2 percent. Since the Great Russian majority fell from 54 percent to 53 percent between 1959 and 1970, it is easy to predict

that the Great Russians could fall below the 50 percent level in a couple of decades.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>George Fischer's answer to Seton Watson, *Fourth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR*, Munich, July 5-7, 1954.

<sup>7</sup>Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (May-June 1974), pp. 1-22.

## A Brief History of the Soviet Union

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**T**HROUGHOUT the period of modern history the Russian people have occupied the great plain between nomadic Central Asia and Europe. Whenever nomadic peoples in Central Asia migrated, they usually passed through the Caspian-Ural gap on their way to Europe. As there were no natural barriers between these points, the Slavs were overrun. Later, when the Germans and Swedes expanded, the great plains of Poland and Russia offered little in the way of natural protection to the Russians. This continuous pressure from the east, west, north, and—with the advent of the Ottoman Empire—the south, partly accounts for the Russian state taking the form it did.

### 18. Russian Autocracy—A Natural Development

If national survival was to be achieved, Russia had to become an armed camp. And as is the case with any effective organized armed group, leadership and discipline were logical outgrowths. Thus up to 1917, first from necessity and later from habit, Russia was an autocratic state operating under the slogan of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism." Furthermore, until the establishment of the State Duma as a result of the 1905 Revolution, the tsar's right to absolute rule was questioned only by a small segment of the population.

The problem of maintaining the autocracy became serious only after the national catastrophes of defeat in the Crimean War (1854–56) and in the Japanese War (1904–05). Up to 1917, the tsars were usually able to maintain their position with the aid of a relatively small police force and a rather indifferent censorship. The tsarist charism sufficed for the landowning aristocracy and the peasantry; a strong middle class was nonexistent; and the troublesome intelligentsia could find no popular base from which to launch an attack.

Despite the existence of great unrest, it erupted only sporadically, usually in the form of peasant uprisings against specific grievances, or assassination attempts by revolutionary extremists. A familiar statement was that the government of Russia was tsarist absolutism tempered by the fear of assassination.

### 19. Expansion of the Russian Empire

By the nineteenth century the Russian Empire included enormous areas inhabited by non-Russian peoples. In an effort to consolidate these peoples into an organic Russian state, the autocracy encouraged a Russification program. The main result was the birth of counternationalistic movements that tended to weaken the state.

The Russian Empire had reached gargantuan proportions by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and throughout the nineteenth century had striven to consolidate areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia. The further expansion of the empire fluctuated with pendulum-like regularity, first in the Near East and then in the Far East. There was also a constant jockeying with Great Britain in Central Asia. These territorial drives met with little success. In the Balkans the Russians ran athwart the Austrian drive in the same direction; in the Far East they clashed with the Japanese expansion; and on the northern borders of India and Persia they had to find a *modus vivendi* with Great Britain. The most consistent Russian expansion in this period was in the Near East and the Balkans, largely at the expense of the decaying Ottoman Empire.

An analogy between the expansionist aims of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union is dubious. The geographic position is the same, of course, and this encourages the drawing of pseudo analogies. Pan-Slavism in the Balkans and Eastern Europe and pro-Christian propaganda in the Ottoman Empire had some similarity to the present Communists methods, but on the whole the expansionist methods of Imperial Russia were very similar to those of the great powers in the nineteenth century.

## 20. Peasant Problem

One of the constant problems of the tsarist regime—the peasant problem—continues to harass the present regime. In 1860 Alexander II, stating frankly that revolution from above was preferable to revolution from below, emancipated the serfs. Although this action temporarily relieved the pressure, on the whole the problem remained without an adequate solution. The peasant allotments were too small, the indemnity payments too large, and the retention of the communal methods of administering and farming the land too backward. Furthermore, most of the agricultural surplus used to feed the urban population and to pay for imports had come from the better-managed estates, now largely eliminated. Industrialization proceeded too slowly in Russia to siphon off the excess population, and consequently the agricultural areas were over-populated.

The last half century of the old regime was one of constant peasant discontent, and revolutionary groups tried feverishly to capitalize on this situation. Considering the Marxist philosophy of the Bolsheviks, it is paradoxical that the backbone of their staying power in 1918-21 was their manipulation of this agrarian discontent.

In the economic sphere Russia was always the retarded child of the European family of nations. When the industrial revolution finally did accelerate in Russia, it took a peculiar course of development. E. H. Carr has summarized this situation:

First of all, large scale Russian industry almost from the moment of its birth was geared to the production of 'war potential,' including railway construction, rather than to the needs of the consumer market. It was 'planned' in the sense that it depended primarily on government orders, not on spontaneous market demand; it was financed by loans accorded for political reasons rather than for the traditional 'capitalist' motive of earning commercial profits. In these respects it anticipated much that was to happen in Russia under the Five Year Plan 30 years later.

Secondly, the tardy arrival of industrialization in Russia meant that it skipped over many of the earlier stages through which the much slower growth of the industrialization had passed in Western Europe—the gradual transformation from the singlehanded craftsman to the small workshop, and the first primitive factory to the giant agglomeration employing hundreds and thousands of workers.

When modern Russian industry was born at the end of the Nineteenth Century, it immediately assumed the characteristic modern shape of the large scale factory. Already before 1914, one quarter of all Russian industrial workers worked in factories employing more than one thousand persons each . . .

## 21. Development of the Intelligentsia

Because of the highly centralized, autocratic

nature of the Russian government, the middle class, intellectuals, and professional classes found themselves without influence in the operation of the state. A peculiar group, the intelligentsia, developed. This term almost defies definition. It cut across class lines, and it was more nearly a profession of faith than anything else—and that profession of faith was a belief in some kind of an evolution or revolution that would bring on a limitation or elimination of the tsarist autocracy. Most of the intelligentsia were intellectuals, but not all intellectuals were in sympathy with the intelligentsia. For at least a hundred years before 1917 an antiregime group had been developing among the intellectuals of Russia. Beginning with the strictly aristocratic revolt of the Decembrists in 1825, the Russian autocracy was constantly beset with conspiratorial-revolutionary plotters. These were generally ineffectual; nevertheless, they established a conspiratorial tradition later capitalized on by the Bolsheviks. Some of these groups advocated terrorism as a weapon, and the assassination of Alexander II was their work.

Behind this persistent agitation by the intelligentsia lay two factors: one was the importation of Western ideas and the attempts of the tsarist regime to stifle them; the second was the lack of a strong middle class that as a buffer between the extremist ideas of the revolutionaries and the autocratic absolutism of the regime. Finally, this agitation undermined the confidence of the nobility, already economically ruined by the breakup of the estates following the emancipation.

## 22. The Revolution

By 1917 the stage was set for the collapse of the tsarist regime. Russia's ineptness and failure in World War I was the last straw. The establishment of the State Duma following the 1905 Revolution had only whetted the appetite of the intelligentsia for an active parliamentary government. The peasants wanted peace and land. The non-Russian national groups were restive under the Russification program, and the economic structure collapsed under the pressures of war. A combination of these factors was too much for the creaking machinery of the tsarist government, especially one headed by such an ineffectual and irresolute monarch as Nicholas II. A bread riot in St. Petersburg in March 1917 was enough to topple the whole precarious structure.

The striking feature of the Revolution of March 1917 was its spontaneity; it occurred with a suddenness that left a power vacuum at the top of the huge, sprawling empire engaged in a major war. From March until November 1917 all efforts failed to curb the revolution. If any law can be applied to

<sup>1</sup>Current History, August 1953, p. 65.

revolutions, it is the principle that they always move relentlessly to the left in their initial stages. The population of Russia, from the war-weary peasants to the power-hungry intelligentsia, wanted some kind of definite program to seize upon, and the leaders, prior to the advent of Lenin on the Russian scene, offered little.

In April 1917 the German High Command, with malice aforethought, allowed Lenin to cross Germany on his way from Switzerland to Russia. Their purpose was to inject the virus of subversion into the already staggering Russian army. The rise of Lenin to power and the resulting Treaty of Brest-Litovsk bore out the expectations of the German military leaders. Once in Russia, Lenin offered a program that brought together three of the major trends in Russian revolutionary thought: Western ideas in the form of Marxian socialism, a conspiratorial party (the Bolsheviks), and an appeal to the discontented peasants in the slogan of "Land, Peace, and Bread."

Always aware of the realities of power, Lenin saw that it would be necessary to destroy the Russian army as the bulwark of the regime, and in April 1917 the Bolsheviks set up a centralized agency, the Military Organizations, to propagandize the simple, but effective, slogan of "Land, Peace, and Bread" among the soldiers. But even while destroying the old army, Lenin was also trying to establish a military force of his own. This was the Red Guard, a factory militia with its roots in the 1905 Revolution.

By November 1917 Lenin and Trotsky felt that the revolutionary situation was ripe; the Provisional Government had failed to achieve peace, to solve the land problem, or to show the people a definite program. Desertion in the army had become wholesale. As Lenin put it, "The army voted for peace with its legs." With a maximum of planning and a minimum of force, the Bolsheviks were able to oust the Provisional Government in two days, 5-7 November 1917.

### 23. Bolsheviks in Power

The power gained so easily proved to be much harder to retain over the long pull. The new government was faced with a number of crucial problems, some of which were these: how to establish the peace they had so glibly promised; how to handle the legally elected Constituent Assembly, which had a majority of non-Bolsheviks; how to force the peasants to release enough grain to feed the urban population; how to cope with the anti-Bolshevik elements; and, finally, how to halt the disintegration of the empire, already advanced in Poland, Finland, and Ukraine, and other areas. It is well to examine the techniques used by the new

Bolshevik government in solving these problems, as the same pattern has endured throughout the last fifty years of Bolshevik rule.

To Lenin the peace problem was simple: sign an armistice with the Central Powers and take whatever terms they would give. With world revolution just around the corner, any temporary retreats could be compensated for later; or for that matter, in a world controlled by the proletariat, international boundaries would be of little consequence. However, the bulk of the Party refused to jettison their national consciousness so easily, and a sharp struggle developed. Trotsky, the chief negotiator at Brest-Litovsk, thought that he had the solution in the novel attitude of "No peace, no war." But the Germans reminded him that although it may take two to make a war it takes only one to claim the fruits of war. The German advance forced the Party to submit to Lenin, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk followed.

The problem of the Constituent Assembly was easier of solution. When the Reds found that the electorate had given them only a small minority of the delegates, they simply dissolved the Assembly by means of the Red Guard. With this show of naked force, any hope that democracy had come to Russia disappeared under the muzzles of Red Guard rifles.

The same naked force was used in wresting grain from the unwilling peasants. The government had nothing to offer in payment, and love of the Bolsheviks proved an insufficient stimulus. Armed detachments were sent to the rural areas to confiscate the grain.

The anti-Bolshevik elements became more and more troublesome as time passed. The expression of opposition did not set well with Lenin's ideas of a monolithic Party in complete control of the situation. Finally, in December 1917, the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) was established for "combating counterrevolution and sabotage." This was an out and out terroristic secret police, and the progenitor of an infamous brood: OGPU, NKVD, MVD, MGB, and KGB. These were merely new titles for the same organization, which has never smelled any sweeter by another name.

Faced with the centrifugal forces that were tearing away national groups on the periphery of the empire, the Bolsheviks were in a quandary. One of their slogans, proclaimed loudly at Brest-Litovsk, was the right of self-determination of peoples. Now these peoples were deciding to assert this right. Again the Bolsheviks resorted to force, and the Red Army was used in the reincorporation of the Ukraine, Caucasian republics, and Central Asian territories.

It is interesting to note that in four out of five of these solutions the Bolsheviks resorted to force. The probable explanation is that the Bolsheviks were a tiny minority in the teeming millions in Russia, but they controlled the only organized force that could act effectively. And being a minority they had to use other than democratic means to accomplish their ends. As was stated above, the pattern was set in these years.

From the Bolshevik coup to 1921 is usually known as the period of War Communism, during which the Bolsheviks faced civil war within Russia and foreign intervention from without. It was also the era of radical communism involving almost complete nationalization of industry, transportation, banking, trade, and food distribution. The Bolsheviks believed world revolution to be imminent, and their diplomacy reflected that expectation.

Overriding all other considerations in the period of War Communism was the armed threat of the anti-Bolshevik elements, both Russian and foreign. The Germans, in spite of Brest-Litovsk, pushed into the Ukraine and the Caucasus. On the day the Bolsheviks took power, General Kaledin assumed leadership of the anti-Bolshevik force in the Don region; similar so-called White armies sprang up on the periphery of the empire, and were soon pushed in from all four points of the compass. Four days after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the British landed troops at Murmansk, and foreign intervention was under way. To complete the confusion, toward the end of May 1918 the Czech troops, who were being moved to the Western Front via Vladivostok, seized and held the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Kazan to the Pacific.

#### 24. Establishment of the Red Army

To meet these numerous threats the Bolsheviks established the Red Army on 23 February 1918. Lenin set a goal of three million men by the spring of 1921, and by fervent exhortation and ruthless application of the draft this goal was attained by the end of 1919. The Red Army proved capable of protecting the Bolshevik regime from badly organized Whites and the halfhearted foreign intervention, and by 1921 the Civil War and intervention had come to an end. The Reds had several advantages in this conflict. First, they had internal lines of communications and were able to coordinate their activities. Second, they had inherited the military equipment of the tsarist regime. Third, they were able to appeal to the patriotic sentiments of the population because of the foreign intervention and aid to the Whites. And, finally, they managed to win over a large percentage of the peasants, who feared a restoration of land to

the former owners if the White Army should win.

Despite victory on the battlefield, the Bolsheviks faced chaos in their newly proclaimed workers' paradise. The little vitality remaining in Russian industry at the time of the Bolshevik triumph had been effectively strangled by the new nationalization decrees of 1918. The peasants seized all available land in line with the Bolshevik invitation, but even the government's "goon squads" were finding it hard to extract grain from the rural population. Furthermore, the peasants were planting only enough for their needs and were skillful in hiding that minimum. The vision of the world revolution was fading by 1921, even among the members of the newly established Comintern. Also, the fact that the Soviet government was so obviously backing subversive movements abroad led the rest of the world to intensify its diplomatic boycott of the new state. Even within the Soviet Union, the Kronstadt revolt had shocked the Bolshevik faithful. It was clear to the realistic Lenin that something drastic must be done, and in 1921 he undertook an amazing shift in policy by launching the New Economic Policy, usually called the NEP.

#### 25. Lenin's New Economic Policy

The NEP meant retreat on all fronts—economic, diplomatic, and even ideological, or so it seemed to some of the loyal Bolsheviks. Lenin, however, felt that as long as the state held the "commanding heights" on the economic front in the field of banking, international trade, transportation, and key heavy industries, the revolution would be safe. Internal trade and small manufacturing plants were left to private enterprise. The grain requisitions were changed to a definite tax in kind. Inasmuch as the tax in kind left the peasant with a grain surplus to dispose of, it logically followed that some free trade had to be legalized. In short, the heavy hand of the state was relaxed and Russians were encouraged to "enrich themselves."

Lenin had been forced into the retreat. The Kronstadt revolt accurately reflected widespread discontent with War Communism, especially on the part of the peasants. If the great mass of peasants, the main ally of the small proletariat, deserted the regime at this stage, it was doubtful that the regime could survive. Furthermore, during the horrible years of War Communism, a large percentage of the proletariat had drifted back to the villages, strictly from hunger. Lenin knew that a tactical retreat must be made to keep the peasants aligned with the regime, or at least prevent them from attacking it.

The first three years of the NEP were difficult ones on the economic front. The prices of industrial goods were rising steadily and those of agricultural

products were declining. In September 1922 Trotsky, calling it the "scissors crisis," urged the government to force down industrial prices before the gap widened disastrously. By 1924 the crisis seemed to be over, and a degree of stability ensued.

## 26. Rise of Stalin

In 1922 Lenin suffered a stroke and was forced into partial retirement. Stalin, who had become the General Secretary of the Party, immediately began to fill Party and government positions with his own men. Even at this early date Stalin saw the value of controlling the organizational structure of the party. Lenin, becoming aware of Stalin's objectives, wrote a "Testament" in late 1922 in which he advised the Party to appoint another General Secretary, since Stalin was too "rude" in his management of Party affairs. Stalin, however, had little to fear from the ailing Lenin; his great opponent was Trotsky, the organizer of the Red Army and Lenin's closest collaborator in the strategy of the October Revolution. Strangely enough, many leading Bolsheviks felt that Trotsky, rather than the almost unknown Stalin, was more likely to become the man on horseback. Thus Stalin had little trouble in getting Zinoviev and Kamenev to ally with him in the famous "troika." Trotsky made a grievous blunder in January 1924, when he failed to attend Lenin's funeral, and the Stalinist group made political capital of the error. Trotsky's influence with the Red Army was undermined when the "troika" appointed his rival, Mikhail Frunze, as his chief assistant and removed his most trusted subordinates to distant or nonmilitary posts. Stalin also diluted the old Bolshevik element by a wholesale enrollment of new members into the party, and clinched his control by appointing loyal Stalinists in all important Party positions. Thus, when the Thirteenth Party Congress met in 1924, Stalin had absolute control. In the meanwhile Zinoviev had eliminated the Trotsky element in the Comintern, both at home and abroad. Trotsky tried to hit back in a book entitled *1917*, in which he pointed out Zinoviev's and Kamenev's refusal to go along with Lenin in the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. But the day of the monolithic Party had dawned, and Trotsky was accused of trying to splinter the Party, from then on the most heinous crime in the Bolshevik lexicon.

In 1925 there was a complete reversal—Zinoviev and Kamenev deserted Stalin to join hands with Trotsky. Stalin quickly turned to the right wing of the Politburo for help. The seven-man Politburo now stood: Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev on the left; Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomskey on the right;

and Stalin in the center—the most maneuverable position. While a stalemate continued for two years on the top level, Stalin relentlessly transformed the Party organization into a pro-Stalinist instrument. Finally, on the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1927, the Trotsky faction tried to set off an anti-Stalin demonstration which fizzled completely. Trotsky was expelled from the Party eight days later, and in January 1928 he was exiled to Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan.

## 27. Industrialization

Having disposed of Trotsky and his Leftist bloc, Stalin immediately turned on his allies on the right. He announced the First Five-Year Plan for the industrialization of the Soviet Union under forced draft, and the Sixteenth Party Congress backed him. The Rightist bloc, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskey, opposed this *volte-face*, but the Stalin machine was now a smoothly functioning instrument of power, and the Rightist opposition lasted less than six months. By the end of 1929 Stalin was firmly established as an absolute dictator.

The idea of a planned and forced industrialization of the Soviet Union was not new with Stalin; it was more nearly original with the Leftist bloc that Stalin defeated in alliance with the Rightists. It had also been adequately discussed by Mikhail Frunze in his essay "The Front and Rear," and Lenin had laid the groundwork for this type of planned economy in his Goelro plan for the electrification of the Soviet Union. However, Stalin began to drive toward his goals with a savagery and tenacity that would probably have been beyond the capacity of Lenin, Frunze, or Trotsky.

The inauguration of the first of the Five-Year Plans in the USSR makes October 1928 probably the most important date in Soviet history except for 7 November 1917. It was the beginning of the "Second Revolution," and it marked the conscious attempt to speed up the productive basis for equipping and maintaining a modern military force. The new Soviet industrialization reversed the usual capitalist development of consumer demand leading to an expansion of consumer goods production and that in turn stimulating production goods. Under the Five-Year Plan the goal was heavy industry, and if anything was left over for consumer-goods industries, well and good. The prime targets were steel, coal, oil, machinery, and armaments. For example, steel production had only regained its prewar level of 4.5 million tons by 1928, but by 1938 it had risen to over 18 million tons.

Shortly after the first plan got under way it was decided to establish a large part of heavy industry in the East. The Ural-Kuznets *kombinat* was one of

the results of this decision, and it would seem to have been at least partly motivated by military considerations. The same amount of investment capital poured into the ferrous metallurgical industry of the Ukraine would have produced far more steel but would have been in the extremely vulnerable plains area.

## 28. Collectivization of Agriculture

Along with the industrialization of the Five-Year Plans went the collectivization of agriculture. It is doubtful if anyone outside the Communist Party today believes that Stalin had the welfare of the peasant in mind in the collectivization program. The peasant problem had many facets. Some 25 million individual peasant households striving to "enrich themselves," as urged by Bukharin, were just that many bourgeois units; this was not at all compatible with the new socialist offensive. Stalin shrewdly saw that collectivization would solve many of the problems involved in the industrialization program. First, consolidating the peasant holdings and using agricultural machinery would produce a surplus rural population so badly needed to supply the insatiable demands of the new industry. Second, collectivization would ease the problem of getting grain from the peasants to feed the urban population as there would be fewer collection points to watch. Third, it created a rural proletariat, and the farmer would lose the psychology of independence which came with tilling his own land. And, finally, the industrial program had to be financed largely through the efforts of the peasant. Collectivization was thought to be ideal for keeping peasant consumption on a new level, thus leaving a surplus for export and for feeding the factory workers.

The Party began its campaign for collectivization by attacking the kulaks, or richer peasants, as early as the fall of 1928. The program was accelerated in 1929-30, and the term "kulak" came to mean any peasant who opposed the collectivization policy. So rapid was the tempo that by March 1930 some 55 percent of all peasant households had been forced into collectives. At this point Stalin intervened and in his letter "Dizzy With Success" called for a slow-down and leniency. This was monstrous hypocrisy, as the whole program was his to begin with, and the speed with which it had been implemented had also been his idea. The peasant's antagonism to the collective farm immediately became manifest when some 9 million out of the 14 million households dropped out of the collective farms in the first two months of the new policy. The carrot was now given more prominence than the stick. By assuring the peasants of private ownership of their homes, garden plots, livestock, and small tools, giving them

preferential treatment in taxes, and setting up machine-tractor stations for the distribution of agricultural machinery, the government succeeded in enticing peasant households into the collective farms. By the end of 1932 some 14 million households were collectivized.

The cost of collectivization had been enormous. Livestock was down by almost 50 percent; 1931 and 1932 had seen man-made famine in the Ukraine and the northern Caucasus that cost millions of lives; and untold numbers of kulaks had been torn from their homes and shipped to Siberia and the plains of Kazakhstan.

## 29. Constitutions in the Soviet Union

One of the pastimes of Soviet leaders has been their propensity for making constitutions in a vain attempt to conceal the fact that the Party runs the state. In July 1918 the Fifth Party Congress promulgated the first Constitution for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), formally the official name of the Soviet Union. Under this Constitution the supreme power was vested in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. When the congress was not in session the authority was delegated to a Central Executive Committee (VTSIK), consisting of about two hundred members. The Central Executive Committee in turn designated the authority to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom). In addition to establishing the superficial government, the Constitution ironically made provisions for freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of religion.

In 1924 Stalin took the credit for a new Constitution of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the official name of the state since December 1922. This Constitution made a few changes in the governmental structure. The Central Executive Committee was divided into a Council of the Union and a Council of Nationalities. The Council of the Union was made up of representatives from the Soviet Union as a whole. The Council of Nationalities consisted of representatives from the union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous regions. Generally, the main purpose of the Central Executive Committee was listing the changes in the nomenclature of the various governmental organs.

The "Stalin Constitution" of 1936 made the hypocrisy of the two earlier constitutions look insignificant in comparison. In June 1936 a draft form was published, and the newspapers were filled with discussions on the different aspects of the document. Stalin presented the Constitution in its final form to the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets for ratification in November. Superficially,



this document is almost a model of good democratic government, even extending the suffrage to the age of 18 and allowing the secret ballot. The Constitution established a Supreme Soviet of two houses—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—as the highest authority in the state. Between the meetings of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has all authority. The Council of People's Commissars, which was renamed the Council of Ministers in 1946, is responsible to the Supreme Soviet or its surrogate, the Presidium.

Like its predecessors, the "Stalin Constitution" enumerated the "rights" belonging to the citizens, including the right to work, leisure hours, social security, as well as the usual freedoms of speech, press, religious assembly, petition, and demonstration. The feigned nature of these "rights" was amply demonstrated by the wholesale purges then being carried out. The elaborate provisions for the judicial system of the USSR in the Constitution meant little to the millions of people who were tried and convicted by secret police tribunals, if they were tried at all.

Unlike the two previous Constitutions, the 1936 version at least mentioned the Communist Party and pointed out in Article 126 that the Communist Party represented the vanguard of the workers. But this Article only hinted at the source of real power, namely the Party. All candidates for government office were to be approved by the Party before the electorate had a chance to vote. Therefore the voter either approved or disapproved the picked list of candidates.<sup>2</sup> The People's Commissars were selected by the Politburo, or Stalin himself, and their elevation was merely ratified by the "legislative organs." The gulf that lay between the Constitution and the political reality was awesome—Hitler's favorite weapon, "the big lie," was never better demonstrated than in the "Stalin Constitution."

The ostensible reason for the promulgation of the new Constitution was to mark the attainment of socialism in the USSR. The real reason was to hookwink both the Soviet citizens and the peoples outside of the USSR. This was the era of the United Front, the period when Communists everywhere were urged to stand shoulder to shoulder with "other" democrats against the rise of fascism. There can be little doubt that the "Stalin Constitution" impressed many people in the West, but it is doubtful if many people in the USSR were equally impressed as they waited fearfully for the NKVD to knock on their door.

<sup>2</sup>The farce of the right to vote is further demonstrated by the fact that there were no elections to the Supreme Soviet from 1937 to 1946.

### 30. The Great Purge

Ironically enough, this constitution was promulgated on the eve of the most deadly reign of terror in Russian history, the Yezhovshchina.<sup>3</sup> In December 1934 a leading Soviet figure, Kirov, was assassinated in Leningrad. Apparently, Stalin felt this to be a manifestation of a powerful opposition, although one school of thought, including Khrushchev, believes that Stalin was behind the assassination. At any rate, this was the beginning of a purge which gradually grew to hysterical proportions by 1938.

Statistics are lacking, but millions of Soviet citizens were arrested, interrogated, and sentenced without trial. Most of the old Bolsheviks, including such famous ones as Bukharin, Zinoviev, Radek, Pyatyakov, and Tomsy, were eliminated. Even the officer corps of the Red Army was radically purged and most of its high-ranking officers were executed. Finally, in 1938 the purge reached such proportions that industry was in danger of collapse. At this point Stalin stepped in, removed Yezhov, and put Beria in charge of the NKVD.

What lay behind the purge? Dozens of theories have been advanced, and none gives a complete answer. Stalin apparently sensed a widespread opposition to the rigors of the forced industrialization and collectivization, plus a growing demand for more democracy. The purge was his way of eliminating this opposition, especially among the old Bolsheviks.

The purge changed the composition and leadership of the Party, and made it more amenable to Stalin's control. This can be seen in the fact that in 1934 four out of every five delegates to the Party Congress were members who had joined the Party before 1920, and in the 1939 Congress the figures were reversed—only one out of five could date his membership to 1920 or earlier. The delegates were now Stalin-trained and automatically obedient to the line laid down by him.

With the Party and the police solidly under control, the only other element in the Soviet Union capable of opposing Stalin would have been the Red Army but this threat had been removed by the military purge in 1937 and 1938. In summary the two main results of the purge were a Party controlled by Stalin alone and an extension of police controls to the point where government without a secret police became inconceivable in the Soviet Union.

<sup>3</sup>Yezhov was the head of the NKVD at the height of the purge, and his name came to designate this epoch of Russian history.

### 31. Germany versus the Soviet Union

Stalin's interest in collective security began to wane after the Munich settlement and the rape of Czechoslovakia. Soon he began to angle for a *rapprochement with Hitler*. On 23 August 1939, the Soviet-German Pact was disclosed to the unsuspecting world, and almost immediately the Nazi forces triggered off World War II by their invasion of Poland. Stalin, who had expected a long and bitter war between Hitler and the Allies, must have been amazed at the speed with which Hitler seized country after country. The Polish and French armies provided little more than good training for the Nazi forces. Stalin tried desperately to buttress his own security by absorbing the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, a sizable portion of Poland, and beating the Finns out of the area near Leningrad. However, Stalin remained stubbornly faithful to the provisions of the Pact. Somehow he was convinced that Hitler would keep his attention riveted on the West.

On 22 June 1941, the Wehrmacht crossed the Soviet borders and the newest German *Drang nach Osten* was under way. Hitler felt cramped between an undefeated England in the west and a voracious, unscrupulous Soviet Union in the east. He decided to knock out the Soviets first, and then confiscate food and raw materials to finish off the war with Great Britain.

The opening of the German offensive in the Soviet Union, three weeks late because of the Yugoslav affair, was an impressive operation in terms of planning, manpower, and strategy. The estimated 180 German divisions included about 20 divisions of Finns and Rumanians and 20 armored divisions with approximately 8,000 tanks. In addition, the Luftwaffe had committed three air fleets with a first-line strength of 3,000 aircraft. The Red Army capability was, numerically speaking, about the same as the German—some 160 divisions, 54 tank brigades (around 10,000 tanks), and an air strength of 6,000 planes. However, in training, battle experience, and strategic know-how, the Germans held a distinct advantage.

The German plan of attack called for three army groups, each penetrating deeply into USSR in order to encircle, break up, and destroy the Soviet armies before they could stabilize their fronts. The northern army group, under Field Marshal von Leeb, was to proceed against Leningrad, taking the Baltic states as it went. The central army group, under Field Marshal von Bock, was to move in the general direction of Moscow. The southern army group, commanded by Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was to move into the Ukraine. In the far north, an army of Finns and Germans under

General Falkenhorst was to operate against the Kola Peninsula with the objective of either cutting off, on capturing, Murmansk. In the far south, under von Rundstedt's control, there was a Rumanian army. The whole front was around eighteen hundred miles in length, and the logistics problems were colossal.

The Soviets gave the commands in the south and north to the old heroes of the Civil War, Budenny and Voroshilov. Timoshenko was put in command of the center.

For the first month the Germans seemed all-powerful, and the Soviets were engaged in retreating or in fighting their way out of traps. Von Leeb advanced rapidly toward the north and on 4 September began his assault on Leningrad. Von Bock's group, paced by his panzers, advanced hundreds of miles in a few weeks. Finally, he forced the Soviets to fight at Smolensk, and their resistance was formidable enough to hold him up for three weeks, 20 July to 9 August. In the meanwhile, von Rundstedt was slowly advancing from southern Poland into the Ukraine. At Zhitomir, a tank battle lasted a month, but part of the German force reached Kiev by 21 July. At this point German strategy was changed, and part of von Bock's forces, Guderian's panzers in particular, were sent to help surround Kiev. Finally, Kiev fell on 26 September, and the Germans rounded up some 675 thousand prisoners. The whole of the Ukraine now lay open to the invaders.

But the diversion of part of von Bock's force to von Rundstedt had delayed the advance on Moscow. From 1 October until 5 December, the Germans tried both frontal attacks and pincer movements in an attempt to seize Moscow. The combination of overextended German lines and an early winter gave the Soviets an advantage. On 6 December Zhukov threw his carefully hoarded reserves against the Germans, and the Nazi drive was not only stopped but thrown back.

The Soviets had experienced a bad six months in 1941. Budenny and Voroshilov had failed miserably, and both were sent to the rear to train reserves. Even the hero of the Finnish War, Timoshenko, had a temporary run of bad luck and was removed from the Moscow front to the south. The real hero of 1941 was Zhukov, the defender of Moscow. But with a fairly profitable winter offensive going in the Moscow area, and Timoshenko making a comeback by recapturing Rostov in the south, the Soviets were confident of their ability to withstand the coming German offensives.

In early 1942, however, the Germans delivered several severe blows. In the spring Manstein cleaned up the Crimea except for Sevastopol, and by 2 July he had taken that strong point.

Timoshenko, trying to forestall a Nazi offensive, attached south of Kharkov, but he was badly beaten. In the meanwhile the Germans had decided to strike southward at the Caucasus, the lower Volga, and eventually at the Baku oil fields. The main objective in this drive was the city of Stalingrad, which straggles for 20 miles along the west bank of the Volga at the great bend. For over two months, 14 September to 19 November, the Germans battled to take Stalingrad, but their superiority in mechanization, air power, and maneuverability was dissipated in this type of positional warfare. Finally, Zhukov was able to collect his reserves and stage a counteroffensive. The result was the encirclement of General Paulus and his Sixth Army; he surrendered in February 1943. The German losses were 330 thousand men killed, 200 thousand captured, 60 thousand trucks, sixty-seven hundred guns, and fifteen hundred tanks. It was the worst defeat ever suffered by a German field army. It was also the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front—from now on the Soviets were on the offensive.

The fiasco at Stalingrad made the German positions in the Caucasus and the middle Don untenable, especially as the Soviets had mounted offensives in these areas simultaneously with the Stalingrad counteroffensive. By the end of February 1943 the Soviets had retaken all the territory the Germans had overrun in 1942. In the north Zhukov led an offensive that wiped out the Rzhev salient and alleviated that danger to Moscow.

There was no relaxation for the Germans; the new Soviet offensive was a continuous effort. The Soviets now had a superiority in manpower and materiel that they were more than willing to use. By the end of the summer of 1943 the Germans had been pushed back along the whole front, and were attempting to set up a defensive line on the Dnieper. Even winter did not stop the Soviet offensive. By December 1943 the Germans had lost Kiev, they were in a shaky position on the Dnieper Bend, and they were isolated in the Crimea.

Soviet industry was steadily increasing its output throughout 1942 and 1943, and Allied aid was pouring in continuously by January 1944 it amounted to 7,800 aircraft, 4,700 tanks and tank destroyers, and 170,000 trucks, to name only a few items. The Soviets now had air superiority for the first time, and their 320 divisions gave them a comfortable margin over the 250 Axis divisions. With this mass of men and equipment the Soviets cleared the Dnieper Bend, raised the siege of Leningrad, encircled ten German divisions at Korsun, and recovered the Crimea. In the center the Germans were pushed back to the Pripet Marshes.

By the end of the winter offensive of 1943 the Red Army was in complete control of the Soviet Union.

In the summer and fall of 1944 the Soviet offensive gathered new momentum. It began by knocking Finland out of the war. With their superiority in men and materiel the Soviets were able to shift the attack to the weakest spots on the German front. They cut off 30 German divisions in the Baltic states, and then proceeded to chop up the trapped Germans piecemeal. Another Soviet front drove into East Prussia, while a third front hammered away at Poland. Rumania collapsed at the end of August, and Bulgaria followed shortly. On 30 December a Provisional Hungarian government declared war on the Reich. Germany was now without allies.

During 1945 until the German surrender on 8 May, the Soviets drove relentlessly across Poland and Prussia and reached Berlin by 22 April. Four days later, they had contacted patrols of the US Ninth Army at Torgau, and Berlin surrendered on 2 May.

## 32. Apotheosis of Stalin

As the Soviet armed forces gave way before the Nazi onslaught during the dark days of 1941, the leaders in the Kremlin saw that their only hope lay in playing up the patriotic motif. The people obviously were not interested in dying for the tenets of a Marx-Lenin-Stalinist philosophy, but they would struggle for "Mother Russia," or "Rodina." Therefore, every effort was made to stress the Soviet Union's glorious history: military heroes were dragged out of oblivion and refurbished; decorations and awards were literally showered upon the military heroes; and even the Guard Regiments were restored. The climax was reached when the Church was induced into an alliance with the atheistic Kremlin. With a slightly softened censorship—still absolute by Western standards enough information leaked through about Allied aid to destroy the carefully built myth of "encirclement."

At the end of the war, as a result of a policy of expediency, Stalin and his leaders found themselves faced with the problem of nullifying this propaganda which had served its purpose.

Even during the war the Soviet press was untiring in its praise of the leadership of Stalin. It was relatively simple to turn Stalin, the "great leader," into Stalin, the "architect of victory." In this way such military heroes as Zhukov were thrown into oblivion. The next step was the removal of popular heroes from Moscow to obscure and distant posts. Soon the Soviet victory was hailed as the triumph of Stalin and the Party under his wise leadership.

The deification of Stalin was not restricted to his military strategy. Day after day from 1945 to 1952 Soviet propaganda glorified the Great Stalin; his achievements were expanded to include the fields of science, literature, and linguistics. Every congress of scientific or literary workers, every political gathering, devoted a large part of its agenda to praising the accomplishments of the leader, the *vozhd*. In short, there was no place in Soviet communications for any other hero; Stalin was heroism personified. Papal infallibility and royal absolutism paled into insignificance compared with the authority of a Stalin pronouncement on any subject.

The Soviet press, even before hostilities ended, had begun to work at drying up the reservoir of good will toward the West. The terms "imperialist warmongers," "Fascist bandits," and "lackeys of Wall Street," came to be synonymous with the United States and Britain. Anyone who shrank from using these epithets was termed a "rootless cosmopolitan," and this term soon became equivalent to an accusation of treason.

The actual apparatus for controlling the nation remained much the same in the postwar period, at least until the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. On 15 March 1946, all commissariats were rechristened ministries by a constitutional change, but their functions were left intact. In 1948 there began a gradual reduction in the number of ministries, especially those concerned with economic affairs. The total dropped from 59 in 1947 to 48 in 1949. But the real reduction in ministries came after Stalin's death when Malenkov reduced them to 25 in March 1953, and Khrushchev abolished all but a few in 1958.

### 33. Collective Leadership

Soviet historians have a penchant for "periodization" in their historical writings, and there is no better dividing line in postwar Soviet history than the death of Stalin. The domestic scene was rather stagnant after the war, with the membership of the Politburo remaining relatively stable.<sup>4</sup> In 1946 Kalinin died, and Voznesensky replaced him; Bulganin and A. N. Kosygin became members in 1948. There was a real flurry in 1948 when Voznesensky was demoted and executed, and in the same year Zhdanov died or was executed, thereby triggering off the mysterious "Leningrad Affair." Apparently Zhdanov fought vigorously for the use of force to solve the Berlin situation and to

depose Tito. Malenkov led the opposition to this policy and after Zhdanov's death, wiped out many of his followers. Kosygin, however, escaped the general purging of Zhdanovites. Khrushchev continually included the "Leningrad Affair" in his diatribes against the "anti-Party group" of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich after 1957.

In October 1952 Stalin convoked the Nineteenth Party Congress, the first since 1939. At the Congress he changed the name of the Politburo to the Presidium and enlarged its membership from 11 to 25. The name "Bolshevik" also disappeared from the title of the Party, now to be known simply as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The title of the chief theoretical journal of the Party was also changed from *Bolshevik* to *Kommunist*. Apparently Stalin was becoming disgustingly respectable and seemed to think that the name *Bolshevik* was associated with bomb-throwing and wild-eyed revolutionists. The old *vozhd* was not very revolutionary-minded by 1952.

The outstanding feature of the Nineteenth Party Congress was the radical change in the upper echelon of the Party, the diluting of the old 11-man Politburo by the appointment of a 25-member Presidium. Evidently Stalin meant to weaken the position of his old comrades, although the reorganization included the bureau of the Presidium which had the same functions and personnel as the old Politburo.

Rumors reported that Stalin was up to his old tricks, that he was planning a new purge on the 1936-39 *Yezhovshchina* scale, plus a virulent strain of anti-Semitism. In January 1953 *Pravda* published the story of the indictment of nine doctors, six of them Jews, who were accused of having "medically murdered" Zhdanov and others and who were planning more such murders of highly placed people. Beria was accused, by implication, of not being sufficiently alert in the protection of high Kremlin figures. As fear of the new purge was reaching hysterical proportions, Stalin conveniently died. Just how, and whether with or without help is a mystery, but the death of any leading figure in the Soviet government usually casts suspicion upon his rivals. Nevertheless the timing of Stalin's departure seemed almost too good to be true.

For years Kremlinologists in the West had been speculating about the effects that Stalin's death would have on the course of Soviet history. Since no method of legitimate succession is recognized in the Soviet system, the actual power, as opposed to the "legal" elective system, is gained by intrigue and force. Once the old *vozhd* was gone, such powerful figures as Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria would fight to the death to grasp the fallen mantle. Ever since the Nineteenth Party Congress, Malenkov had

<sup>4</sup>From 1939 to 1946 the Politburo included the following: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Kaganovich, Andreyev, Mikoyan, Zhdanov, and Khrushchev. Malenkov and Beria, candidate members from 1939, became full members in 1946.

obviously been in the heir apparent, but how could he consolidate his power if others in the inner group of the Presidium opposed him?

Immediately upon the death of Stalin, the inner group called upon the people to avoid "confusion and panic" and promised a solid collective leadership of the Leninist type. The 25-member Presidium was abolished, and the inner group of the old Politburo resumed its powerful position.<sup>3</sup> Even if the real power lay in the hands of Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov, the ability of Kaganovich and Mikoyan to shift allegiance would keep the collective leadership going. Malenkov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Beria was the head of the newly consolidated police. (The separate MGB was merged with the MVD into a single ministry.) Apparently the other collective leaders feared Malenkov's control of both state and Party, and within two weeks forced him to relinquish control of the Party to Khrushchev. Malenkov must have believed that the state apparatus had grown more powerful than that of the Party, although Stalin owed his own rise to power to his control of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

In less than four months the nonviolent period of collective leadership ended on 10 July with the announcement that Beria had been arrested. Hysterical charges, including treason dating back to the 1920s, were leveled at Beria, but fear of his police empire was probably his undoing. There followed a mass purge of Beria-men in the police and among the Party organizations in the union republics, especially in Georgia.

In an attempt to please the managerial elite and the population in general, Malenkov came out strongly for more consumer goods, for a higher standard of living. To realize this goal he was willing to slacken the pace of heavy industrial development and to reduce the military budget. After steadily building up power through manipulation of Party appointments, Khrushchev threw down the gauntlet by attacking Malenkov's policies late in 1954. A phenomenon occurred in December 1954 and January 1955: *Izvestiya*, the state organ, and *Pravda*, the Party newspaper, supported two different leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, respectively. In February 1955 Malenkov resigned as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Khrushchev immediately nominated his own man, Bulganin, for the job. Khrushchev's growing power was evident to all.

<sup>3</sup>The new 10-member Presidium was made up of eight "old hands"—Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev—and two relatively new figures, Saburov and Pervukhin.

### 34. The Khrushchev Era

In mid-1955 the Bulgarian-Khrushchev team made a pilgrimage to Belgrade to woo Tito, at first by blaming everything on the dead Beria, and then by promising to mend their ways in the future. In the summer of 1955 the pair went to the summit in Geneva, where they exuded goodwill and a spirit of tolerance. At the same time Shepilov, a former editor of *Pravda* and the new favorite of the Bulganin-Khrushchev team, was with Nasser negotiating an arms agreement that would deal a deadly blow to the "spirit of Geneva" in 1956.

In February 1956 the Twentieth Party Congress met as scheduled, and was dominated by Khrushchev from start to finish. The Congress approved the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60), which emphasized a continuation of heavy industrial development; it conceded that Tito had the right to take a different road to socialism; and it heard Khrushchev explode the myth of the "great Stalin." None of Stalin's opponents in exile or his foreign enemies could have more thoroughly blackened his reputation than Khrushchev did in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress.

Khrushchev's control of the Presidium remained fairly weak, and his only victory was the addition of several of his people as candidate members of the highest body. He did, however, boost the power of the Secretariat by adding Katherine Furtseva, the first secretary of the Moscow Party, and Brezhnev, the first secretary of the Party in Kazakhstan—both were dynamic young supporters with strong Party connections. Marshal Zhukov and Mukhitdinov, first secretary of the Party in Uzbekistan, were made candidate members of the Presidium.

The denigration of Stalin and a general loosening of controls in the satellites led to appalling results, from the Soviet standpoint. In June 1956 an uprising of the Polish workers in Pozan plunged the Polish Communist Party into chaos; Gomulka, imprisoned in 1948 for Titoism, was elected first secretary of the Party in October. This brought Khrushchev rushing into Warsaw, but Gomulka faced him down. A few days later the students in Budapest revolted, and the bloody battle between men and tanks—the Hungarian Revolution—followed. Khrushchev found relief in the untimely Israeli-British-French attempt at an armed solution of the Suez situation and the refusal of the United States to support the invasion of Egypt. The Soviets, accusing the British and French of being "imperialist bandits," managed to divert attention from their own imperialism in Hungary. But it was a besmirched Soviet Communist Party that emerged from the October events of 1956.

In early 1957 Khrushchev attempted to kick the last supports from under Malenkov by

decentralizing the economy. He divided the USSR into more than a hundred economic regions, and set up an economic council to control industry in each of these regions. The economic regions coincided with the political divisions of the country, either oblasts or union republics, and the Party leaders in each region dominated the local economic council. The increasing role of the Party in the nation's economy, plus the abolition of the powerful ministries in Moscow, weakened Malenkov and made a comeback doubtful.

Khrushchev had built well in the lower and middle echelons of the Party structure since March 1953, and it stood him in good stead in June 1957. The anti-Khrushchev block in the Presidium outvoted him, which was assumed to be tantamount to ending his power. Khrushchev was not to be overthrown that easily, and he took his case to a special meeting of the Central Committee of the Party where he had strong support. Just what happened there is still a mystery, but after several days of wrangling, the majority stood by Khrushchev, and the nucleus of the anti-Party group—Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov—were dismissed from the Presidium and the Central Committee. It is possible that Marshal Zhukov put the Army behind Khrushchev and that this move tipped the scales. If this is true, Zhukov blundered disastrously. The only way the Army could continue to have a voice in the leadership of the Soviet Union was to see that no one man gained complete and absolute power. Khrushchev, now the supreme boss, repaid Zhukov in October 1957 by returning him to that same obscurity he had known under Stalin after World War II. The Party had again attained unquestionable dominance, and Khrushchev controlled the Party after June 1957. The pinnacle was reached in September 1958 when Bulganin was deposed and Khrushchev became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He now held the top job in both the state and Party hierarchies.

The new Khrushchev Presidium and Secretariat put all emphasis on career Party men. By December 1959 the 14-man Presidium and the 10-man Secretariat were made up principally of first secretaries of union republic or big city Party organizations. Representatives of the so-called managerial elite were scarce in both of these top organizations. However, many of the career Party people belonged to the new breed which had come into the Party through technological schools and industry. They were capable of wearing both hats, although their first allegiance was to the Party.

The Twenty-second Party Congress convened in October 1961 primarily to launch the last drive toward the elusive "state of communism," the era of plenty for all. But domestic issues were pushed back by developments within the Communist bloc.

Khrushchev insisted upon ousting Albania from the Communist block and bitterly assailed Enver Hoxha, the Albanian leader, for having purged Moscow-oriented Communists in Albania. Chou En-lai, the head of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Congress, walked out after objecting to this public denunciation. He was effusively greeted by Mao and the top Chinese leaders on his return to Peking, probably a means of announcing to the world that Chou had correctly represented the Chinese view in Moscow.

The trouble that came to a climax at the Twenty-second Congress had been brewing for some time. The Chinese and Russian leadership have held opposite views on Khrushchev's coexistence policy since its inauguration in 1946 at the Twentieth Party Congress. Although these leaders seemed to have compromised their differences at the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist parties in November—December 1960, a fundamental divergence of views remained. During this internal feud between Mao and Khrushchev over foreign policy, Albania placed itself squarely on the side of the Chinese. Khrushchev reacted with a public castigation of Communist China's only European ally. Mao knew that he, not Hoxha, was the real target.

Khrushchev again attacked the anti-party group—Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov—and was especially vitriolic in his remarks about Molotov. Inasmuch as Molotov's views on Communist policy toward the West coincided with those of Mao, Khrushchev was again probably including Mao in his attack. There is some reason to believe that the anti-party group did represent the views of a number of Soviet Party members, and Khrushchev, therefore, had grounds for uneasiness. Incidentally, Voroshilov was included in the anti-party group in this go-around.

Finally, the denigration of Stalin was continued at the Twenty-second Congress, only this time, unlike the 1956 attack, his sins were revealed openly. Practically every top Party leader who spoke at the Congress disclosed some unsavory information about the late *vozhd's* iniquitous behavior. The climax came with the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum and reburial near the Kremlin wall. He was judged unfit to lie by the side of Lenin.

During 1962 Khrushchev seems to have lost his touch and he began to flounder about in domestic as well as foreign policies. The Sino-Soviet quarrel grew in intensity—Mao and Khrushchev were now berating each other openly without the subterfuge of using Tito and Enver Hoxha as whipping boys. When Khrushchev came a cropper in the Cuban missile fracas, the Chinese brethren rose to new heights in vitriolic commentaries about Nikita's "adventurism in putting the missiles in Cuba" and

his "cowardice in taking them out" and it is now evident since his ouster that the Chinese estimate of his awkwardness in foreign policy was shared by some of his colleagues.

It was also evident by 1962 that all was not well on the economic front. Brezhnev, the successor to Khrushchev's Party job, in a speech to a plenary session of the Central Committee in March 1965, pointed out that although Khrushchev had promised to increase agricultural output by 70 percent during the Seven-year Plan (1959-1965), actually it had increased only 10 percent during the first six years of the plan, or less than 2 percent a year. Thus it scarcely kept up with the population increase. The same gloomy picture was also present in animal husbandry—the number of pigs, sheep, and poultry had even declined during the first six years of the plan.<sup>6</sup>

The climax in Khrushchev's declining fortunes came when the grain crop of 1963 was a catastrophic failure and the Soviet Union had to purchase 12 million tons of wheat from the "imperialist" countries. Nikita barnstormed the countryside in a desperate effort to raise agricultural production, but to no avail. By this time even the dullest Soviet citizen was aware that his boasting about the Soviet Union overtaking and surpassing the United States in the per capita production of meat, butter, and milk in the early 1960s was a pipe dream.

Although the Soviet consumer was certainly living better in 1964 than in 1953, Khrushchev had merely whetted his appetite. Furthermore, he had promised the consumer more than he could deliver. Housing was going up much slower than anticipated, clothing was still expensive and shoddy, and unbelievably poor distribution made it difficult for the shopper to buy even those things that had been produced. All in all, Nikita's image was becoming rather tarnished.

In October 1964, while Khrushchev was vacationing on the Black Sea, the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to oust its leader. It must have been a carefully laid plan since the army and the police would have been brought into the plot either as allies or at least neutrals. The members of the Presidium also took the lesson of 1957 to heart and coordinated their plans with enough members of the Central Committee to insure the backing of that body. They knew Khrushchev would appeal to it. Although the sources are vague and conflicting about just what happened when Khrushchev appeared before the Presidium and later the Central Committee, the net result seems to have been an overwhelming rejection of him. He lost his job as Secretary General of the Party to

Leonid I. Brezhnev, his former protege, and his job as Chairman of the Council of Ministers to Aleksei N. Kosygin, his deputy in that body.

### 35. A Decade of "Collective Leadership"

The new leaders, especially Brezhnev and Kosygin, began their regime by accusing Khrushchev of "harebrained" schemes and they promised a more responsible administration. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin had come to power as residual legatees in the absence of any really outstanding personalities in the upper echelons of the Party. Over the next decade, Brezhnev gradually forged ahead of his Politburo colleagues and by the mid-1970s had his own minor "cult of the personality" going, although his charisma was only a pale reflection of that of his predecessors: Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.

The new leadership almost immediately did away with Khrushchev's two-track Party hierarchy (agricultural and industrial Party organizations) and reverted to the pre-1962 setup. They eased the restrictions that Khrushchev had imposed on the peasant's private plot, and even encouraged the peasant by authorizing the State Bank to lend him money to buy cows and heifers. In March 1965, Brezhnev, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, outlined a new strategy for increasing agricultural output. He stated bluntly that an upsurge in agriculture was vitally necessary for the economic health of the nation and that a firm economic foundation must be put under farming. After promising a number of badly needed changes, he then stated that the government was going to invest 71 billion rubles (\$1.10 to the ruble) during the next Five-Year Plan (1966-70). The other half of the team, Kosygin, in a report to the Party Plenum in September 1965, advocated some relatively important changes in the economic planning procedures and in the incentive system for managers.

In the five years between the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 and the convening of the Twenty-fourth Congress in 1971, the stability of the Politburo, that is, continuance in office of the membership, was remarkable. There were rumors that important changes were in the offing, the usual guess being that some members would be dropped at the coming Party Congress. But all eleven members of the Politburo were re-elected in 1971 (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Pel'she, Podgorny, Polyansky, Suslov, Shelepin, Shelest, and Voronov). So firmly rooted were the eleven that the only way Brezhnev could strengthen his position in the Politburo was to enlarge it. Four new men were co-opted: Grishin, Kunaev, Shcherbitsky, and

<sup>6</sup>Pravda, 27 March 1965

Kulakov. The last three were generally thought to be Brezhnev proteges. Then, in April 1973, Shelest and Voronov were ousted and three new members brought in: Andropov, head of the KGB, was promoted from Candidate membership; Marshal Grechko, Minister of Defense, and Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were directly appointed to full membership. At the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in 1976, the whole Politburo was reelected except for Polyansky, who was made the scapegoat for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1975. Ustinov and Romanov were elevated from candidate to full membership. In April 1975, Shelepin was dropped from the Politburo and in May 1977 Podgorny was ousted from both his position on the Politburo and his job as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the technical "head of state" in the Soviet scheme of things. In June 1977 Brezhnev took over Podgorny's old job as head of the Supreme Soviet. Thus by 1978, only six of the eleven full members of the Politburo of 1966 were still on the job.

Why some fell by the wayside and others survived is a mystery that provides grist for the mills of the Sovietologists. For example, the dropping of Dmitri Polyansky in 1976 was ostensibly because he failed as Minister of Agriculture; that is, he should have prevented the deep winter freeze and the unusual summer drought. But Kulakov, who was in charge of agricultural affairs for the Central Committee, kept his place on the Politburo. The answer seems to be that Polyansky was a Brezhnev competitor and Kulakov a protege. The case of Shelepin is more dramatic. Under Khrushchev, Shelepin gained full membership on the Politburo, was in the Secretariat, and was made head of the powerful Committee of Party-State Control set up in 1962. Shelepin proteges headed the Komsomol and the KGB. But between 1965 and 1975 Shelepin's power was steadily whittled away. The Committee of Party-State Control was downgraded in 1965, Shelepin was eased out of the Secretariat in 1967 and given the innocuous job of heading the trade union. Then in April 1975 he visited England as guest of the TUC and this caused such an uproar that he had to cut his visit short—the main cause of the uproar was the fact that he had once been the head of the dreaded KGB, hardly a credential likely to win friends and influence people in England. A month later he was dropped from the Politburo and lost his job as head of the trade union. One explanation smacking of Byzantine politics is that a clique in the TUC acted as a Judas sheep in leading Shelepin to slaughter, that is, giving his Politburo comrades an excuse to knife him.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Daily Telegraph (London), 17 April 1975

By the end of 1977, Brezhnev seemed solidly ensconced as the top man in the Politburo. He was the General Secretary of the CPSU, the traditional locus of power in the Soviet Union. He was now the official "head of state" in his role of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and he had been made a Marshal of the Soviet Union, the highest military rank attainable in the Soviet Armed Forces. Although not the all-power *vozhd' a la* Stalin, nor even the lone decision-maker as was Khrushchev, nevertheless, he was certainly more equal than his comrades in the Politburo. In a dozen years he had outdistanced his rivals and was top dog in the Soviet *apparatus*.

In the dozen years following the fall of Khrushchev, the lot of the non-conformist in the Soviet Union grew steadily worse. In February 1966, two Soviet writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, were tried and give stiff sentences in labor camps for publishing abroad. From then on, orthodoxy in political and aesthetic matters was strictly enforced.

The anti-Stalinist line fostered by Khrushchev, especially at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, was altered. No more mention of the "cult of the personality," no more memoirs about life in the slave labor camps under Stalin, and no more literature critical of the regime. At the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, the title of "General Secretary" was revived and the organ of top leadership in the Party, the "Presidium," reverted back to its old name of "Politburo." But, apparently, there was enough opposition to Stalinism to prevent any rehabilitation of the old tyrant—the regime played it neutral on that issue.

The "Prague Spring" under Dubcek and the subsequent Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 only confirmed the Soviet leadership in the correctness of their policy of repression of all dissension in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the policy of "detente," originating in Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and then taken up by Washington, resulted in a further tightening of controls within the USSR lest Western "subversion" seep into the land of the proletariat as a result of closer relations with non-Communist nations. In other words, after a short "honeymoon" in late 1964 and early 1965, the lot of the Soviet dissenter became more and more miserable. Those who persisted in their unorthodox ways were either incarcerated (in prison camps or psychiatric clinics) or deported to the West.

By mid-1978 the big political problem was a geriatric one, both an aging Politburo (average age of 69) in general, and a sick and aging Brezhnev in particular. It was evident both in Russia and abroad that there would be a radical turnover in the Politburo's personnel in the relatively near future.



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## CHAPTER IV

# The Government and Party Structure

### 36. The Government of the Soviet Union

The government of the Soviet Union is a complex hierarchy of legislatures, ministers, and courts on both the All-Union and Union-Republic levels (see Figs. 1 and 2 for organizational charts). The prerogatives and duties of these organs are spelled out in detail in the Constitution of the USSR. However, the Party can, and does, limit the amount of independence of these institutions in spite of the Constitution. This is done either through "double-hatting;" that is, the head of a governmental organ is also a Party member, or through various other Party control mechanisms. It is necessary to keep this fact in mind when studying the structure and functions of the Soviet Government.

**Supreme Soviet.**—Article 108 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR states that the Supreme Soviet is the "supreme body of state power in the USSR." The delegates to the Supreme Soviet, however, have very little real political power, either nationally or locally, and almost nothing to say about the bills that they ratify. They are convened for the purpose of legitimatizing actions either taken or contemplated by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party or by the Council of Ministers.

The Supreme Soviet is made up of two houses: the Soviet of the Union, with one deputy for each 500,000 inhabitants, and the Soviet of Nationalities, with 25 deputies from each union republic, 11 from each autonomous republic, five from autonomous regions, and one from each national district. The elections to the present, the Ninth Supreme Soviet, were held on 16 June 1974. Of the 161,724,222 eligible voters, 161,689,612, or 99.98 percent, turned out to elect 767 deputies to the Soviet of the Union and 750 deputies to the Soviet of the Nationalities, or a total of 1,517 deputies. The deputies are elected for four years and are scheduled to assemble twice a year. If the two houses disagree, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet can dissolve them and order new elections. To date they have never disagreed nor are they likely to in the future.

The new 1977 Constitution, published in *Pravda* on 8 October 1977, calls for some changes in the elections to, and the make-up of, the Supreme

Soviet. Article 110 states that the two chambers shall have an equal number of delegates. The Soviet of Nationalities shall be elected on the basis of the following quotas: 32 deputies from each union republic, 11 from each autonomous republic, 5 from each autonomous region and one from each national district. Furthermore, according to Article 90 of the Constitution, deputies to the Supreme Soviet shall be elected for a five-year term.

The election of deputies to the Supreme Soviet is a major attempt by the Party to portray the Soviet Government as democratic. Everybody eligible to vote is dragooned to the polls, including the halt and the blind. Even people traveling on business far from home are allowed to vote in the district they happen to be in. On the other hand, there is usually only one candidate for each office, and three-quarters of the candidates selected to run are Party members. Needless to say, any non-Party candidate is bound to be reliable from the Party's point of view.

The Supreme Soviet, according to Article 108 of the Constitution, "is empowered to resolve all questions within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, including amendments to the Constitution, admission of new republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts, ratification of the state economic plans, and the State Budget. It has the right to legislative initiative as well as the right of ratification (by majority vote of both houses) of all laws.

**Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.**—Between sessions of the Supreme Soviet its powers are vested in its Presidium. The new Constitution (article 120) states that the Presidium shall consist of a Chairman, a First Vice-Chairman, 15 vice-chairmen, one from each union republic, a Secretary, and 21 other members, a total of 39 people.

The Constitution states that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has the power to convene and dissolve the Supreme Soviet, appoint and discharge ministers on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, interpret the laws of the USSR, ratify treaties, proclaim martial law, mobilize the armed forces, and declare war when the Supreme Soviet is not in session.

THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY STRUCTURE




Figure 1. Government and Party Structure.


USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Figure 2.

Most of the listed powers are exercised only in ratification. The processes of the Soviet Government would be thrown out of kilter if the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium ever tried to exercise the powers given to it by the Constitution. Even if by some miracle the Supreme Soviet were to find itself the fount of authority in the Soviet Union, the very unwieldiness of the body and its long history as an organ of ratification only would militate against its acting effectively.

**Council of Ministers.**—Article 128 of the Constitution states that the Council of Ministers is "the highest executive and administrative body of state power in the USSR." In Articles 129 and 130 it is described as formed and accountable to the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. The Council of Ministers resigns *in toto* when a new Supreme Soviet is elected, but its members are usually all reappointed immediately unless the powers that be have decided to drop some of them. The Council of Ministers has the authority to supervise the

ministries, to direct the national planning, to conduct foreign affairs and to control the armed forces.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR is headed by a Presidium made up of a Chairman, Kosygin; a first deputy chairman, Mazurov; and 12 deputy chairmen. The main body of the Council consists of 50 economic ministers, 10 noneconomic ministers, and 17 heads of committees and specialized agencies with ministerial rank. In addition, there are 15 chairmen of the Union Republic Councils of Ministers who are ex officio members. This somewhat unwieldy body of around 100 members runs the Soviet Government and the Soviet economy.

The top members of the Council of Ministers work closely with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in deciding general lines of action, new policies, and radical changes in organization in both the government and the economy. There is probably a good deal of give and take between these top governmental and party

organs, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers is usually a very high-ranking Politburo member—Khrushchev from 1958 to 1964 and Kosygin since October 1964. Furthermore, since April 1973, four other Politburo members are also on the Council of Ministers (Mazurov, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko). Thus the transmission of ideas from one organ to the other should be rather smooth.

New policies and governmental directives are issued as decrees (*postanovleniya*) of the Council of Ministers and are signed by the chairman or, in his absence, by a first deputy chairman. Decrees of the Council of Ministers are binding as law on all in the Soviet Union.

The Council of Ministers directly controls the economy of the Soviet Union through its industrial ministries and several state committees, especially the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the State Bank and the Central Statistical Administration. The noneconomic activities of the government, such as foreign affairs, national defense, culture, and internal policing, are controlled by the Council of Ministers through its nonindustrial ministries and several state committees. If this looks like bureaucracy gone mad, it must be remembered that the USSR Council of Ministers is not just the main organ of the central government in a conventional sense, but it is also in charge of the entire economy, education, and cultural life of the nation.

There are two types of ministries: the first consists of the All-Union organizations, which directly administer their subordinate plants and activities, regardless of where they are located, and the second consists of the Union Republic ministries, which operate through counterpart ministries in the Union Republics. For example, the Ministry of Transportation is All-Union and has direct control over all the railroads in the USSR. The Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand, is a Union Republic ministry, and it works through the Ministries of Agriculture of the various Union Republics. The minister is assisted by a first deputy minister and several deputy ministers, and together they form a presidium or collegium. Below them are the directorates and departments in charge of the different activities of the ministry.

During the heyday of the Khrushchev regime (1957-64), the state committees proliferated enormously (some 50 of them by 1964) and the number of ministries was cut back drastically. The economy was largely handled through some 105 national economic councils, called *sovnarkhozy*, an attempt to decentralize the economic life of the nation. Even before the ouster of Khrushchev, however, the number of *sovnarkhozy* was curtailed and since October 1964 the whole concept has disappeared. Apparently local autonomy and

centralized planning proved to be incompatible. Some of the state committees have been retained, but only the ones concerned with very large segments of the economy or with coordinating a number of industrial sectors, for example, the State Committee for Science and Technology, for Agriculture, for Construction, and for Labor and Wages. Of course, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the Committee for State Security (KGB), that is, the Secret Police, are time-honored institutions in the Soviet scheme of things.

**Lower Government Organs.**—As implied in the name Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the country is a union of republics centrally administered by the All-Union government in Moscow. The largest of the republics is the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), often referred to simply as the "Russian Republic." There are 14 other SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics), usually called union republics. These republics have their own legislatures, one-chamber Supreme Soviets, and Councils of Ministries, as though they were small replicas of the USSR itself.

The next administrative division below the union republic is the ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), which also has its own Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, but it is more or less subordinate to the union republic in which it is located. For instance, there are 14 ASSRs within the Russian Republic (RSFSR). The ASSR usually has a predominant nationality different from that of the parent union republic. There are also autonomous oblasts (provinces), krays (territories), national okrugs (regions), and rural and city rayons (counties) which conform with this concept of separate national divisions.

The union republics and ASSRs are subdivided into krays and oblasts, usually according to the demands of the economic development of the USSR. The rapidly changing economic pattern in the Soviet Union has resulted in a constant change in the areas, boundaries, and names of the oblasts and krays.

The krays and oblasts, and in some cases the smaller union republics, are divided into rayons, somewhat analogous to US counties. The size of rayons vary enormously from 150 thousand square miles in the northern tundra region to less than 100 square miles in the black-earth Ukraine. The smallest local units, and subordinate to the rayons are the villages and the village Soviets.

The urban areas have a separate regime. The largest cities are directly subordinate to the Union Republic and are themselves broken up into rayons. Smaller cities are under the krays or oblasts, and the small towns under the rayons.

The oblasts, krays, rayons, and cities have Soviets (councils) elected for two years<sup>1</sup> and executive committees (*ispolkoms*) which are theoretically responsible to the Soviets. But it is usually the *ispolkom* that wields the real authority. In 1962 Khrushchev reorganized the structure below the Union Republic Council of Ministers by creating two parallel lines of authority, one concerned solely with agriculture and the other with industry. For example, instead of a single oblast *ispolkom*, there were two; an agricultural *ispolkom* and an industrial *ispolkom*. This "two-track" system was one of the first casualties of the Khrushchev system following his fall in October 1964.

### 37. The Party Organization of the Soviet Union

The real locus of power in the USSR is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Behind the outwardly impressive system of legislatures, courts, and ministries is the Party, organized in such a way that its own organs are parallel to those of the government.

The Party operates under a formula called "democratic centralism." Incidentally, "democratic centralism" is now enshrined in the 1977 Constitution which says in Article 3 that the Soviet state shall be organized and shall function in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. In theory this formula provides for discussion at the various echelons below the top and for the transmission of the protests and suggestions arising from these discussions to the top echelon. Thus, the opinions of those on the grassroots level—that is, the members in the Party cells in the plants, collective farms, and army units—are supposed to find their way up through the oblast, kray, and union republic levels to the top organs of the Party hierarchy. At these lofty heights, the protests and suggestions are supposedly carefully considered and their implications reflected in the decrees and decisions filtered back through the chain of command. Once a decision is made, however, debate is no longer permissible, and the only discussion allowed to the lower organs is how best to implement the decision.

In practice only one route exists in the system, and that is downward. If any discussion is allowed on the lower levels, it is for propaganda purposes. Otherwise only the "centralism" part of the formula is operative. Decisions are made at the very top—by

Stalin alone for many years. How unrestricted Khrushchev was in making decisions is still debatable, and at the present time decisions are made collectively. These decisions determine the Party line; hence they are expected to be carried out without question.

At one extreme of the Party hierarchy is the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, called the Presidium between 1952 and March 1966.

The Politburo/Secretariat announced at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress (24 February-5 March 1976) was made up of 16 full and six candidate members plus an eleven-man Secretariat, six of whom also wore Politburo, full or candidate, hats. Polyansky, scapegoat for the agricultural debacle of 1975, was dropped from full membership and two candidate members, Romanov and Ustinov, were elevated to full membership. Aliyev, Party chief in Azerbaijan, became a candidate member, and two new secretaries came aboard: Chernenko and Zimyanin. Since the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, however, Marshal Grechko died in April 1976, Shelepin was ousted in April 1975, and Podgorny was dropped from the Politburo and ousted as President of the Supreme Soviet in May 1977. Brezhnev took over as President of the Supreme Soviet in Podgorny's place. Yakov P. Ryabov was added to the Secretariat in October 1976.

The Politburo is supposedly elected by the Central Committee of the CPSU, but actually its members are co-opted. From the mid-1930s until early 1953, Stalin picked them; from March 1953 until mid-1957, there was a strange period of confusion during which most members held their jobs by inheritance; but after Khrushchev's victory over the so-called "anti-Party" group in June 1957, he was most influential in the selection of Politburo members. Since his ouster in October 1964, the "collective leadership" has been co-opting new members for this exclusive club and ejecting others.

Closely associated with the Politburo, really an integral part of it, is the Secretariat, theoretically subordinate to the Central Committee, but in reality, like the Politburo, a co-opted body. The Secretariat is composed of its General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, and ten other secretaries, five of whom are full or candidate members of the Politburo, and five are full-time secretaries. Stalin derived much of his power from his position as General Secretary, as did Khrushchev. Brezhnev, using the same fulcrum, has become more equal than his Politburo associates. The Secretariat, which meets frequently, directs the day-to-day activities of the Party.

The policies and plans governing all phases of Soviet life are drawn up by the 26 men making up the Politburo/Secretariat and the rest of the vast

<sup>1</sup>According to Article 90 of the 1977 Constitution, deputies to Soviets down to the autonomous republic level to be elected for five-year terms and those below (autonomous regions, national districts, city, and village) for two and one-half years.

# THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY STRUCTURE

## POLITBURO/SECRETARIAT

### POLITBURO (FULL) (14)

Brezhnev\*  
Andropov  
Grishin  
Gromyko  
Kirilenko\*

Kosygin  
Kulakov\*  
Kunayev  
Mazurov  
Pelshe

Romanov  
Shcherbitsky  
Suslov\*  
Ustinov

### CANDIDATE MEMBERS (8)

Aliyev  
Chernenko\*  
Demichev

Kuznetsov  
Masharov  
Ponomarev\*

Rashidov  
Solomentsev

### Secretariat (11)

Dolgikh  
Kapitonov  
Rusakov

Ryabov  
Zimyanin

\*Indicates membership in the Secretariat

organization of the Party is engaged in the task of seeing that its directives are implemented. Just how decisions are arrived at in the Politburo is unknown to outside observers, although Brezhnev, in one of his expansive moods did reveal a little information. On 14 June 1973, he received 11 Western correspondents in the room at the Kremlin where the Politburo meets and he explained its working methods. According to him, the Politburo's policymaking discussions resemble Congressional debates in the United States. Asked whether the Politburo settled differences by a majority vote, he said voting was rarely needed and 99.9 percent of the time a consensus was achieved after long discussion. If there was no agreement, a small committee was selected to resolve the issue. He also stated that the Politburo usually met Thursdays at 3 p.m. and the sessions lasted three to six hours. Traditionally, foreign policy issues are given priority ahead of domestic problems.<sup>2</sup>

**Central Committee.**—Theoretically the Central Committee is elected by the Party Congress, but in practice its membership is selected. According to the Party rules, the Central Committee "directs the entire work of the Party" during the interval between Party Congresses, and it holds plenary meetings at least once every six months. Its membership is made up largely of Party secretaries of the republics, oblasts, and krais; a number of ministers; some chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the union republics; and some representatives from among the top military leaders, scientists, and artists. In short, it represents

groups with a vested interest in keeping the Soviet Union more or less as it is today. The Central Committee "elected" at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress consists of 287 full members and 139 candidate members, or a total of 426 members.

The meetings, activities, and authority of the Central Committee were shrouded in mystery in the later years of the Stalin regime. It seemed to be a body concerned solely with casting an aura of legality about the actions of the director. Under Khrushchev the activities of the Central Committee were much more publicized, and in June 1957 Khrushchev called on the Central Committee to override a decision against him in the Politburo. The maneuver worked, and as a result Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov were cast out. Just how much this realignment of power will affect the future role of the Central Committee is difficult to say, but it does represent a force to be reckoned with in case of a tenuous balance of power among the top leaders. For example, in October 1964 when the Presidium decided to fire Khrushchev, they cleared it with the Central Committee, and when Khrushchev appealed to that body, the verdict was negative.

In the last decade, meetings (plenums) of the Central Committee have been convened more than twice a year, as specified by the Party rules. From 1957 until late 1964 its function was to act as the executioner of Khrushchev's political opponents in the Presidium, or as the "legitimatizer" of his numerous policy changes and reorganizations. Thus, in June 1957 it sanctioned the expulsion from the Presidium of six senior members; in October 1957 Marshal Zhukov was fired as Minister of Defense and expelled from the Presidium, and in 1958 Bulganin was ousted as Chairman of the

<sup>2</sup>Theodore Shabad, "Brezhnev, Who Ought to Know, Explains Politburo," *The New York Times*, 15 June 1973.

Council of Ministers and dropped from the Presidium. The plenum of the Central Committee in December 1956 approved modifications in the Sixth Five-Year Plan and a November 1958 plenum approved the Seven-Year Plan. In 1962 a plenum gave approval to Khrushchev's division of the lower Party and government organs into agricultural and industrial sections. Recent plenums have ratified the abolition of the MTS (Machine-Tractor Stations), the intensification of investment in the chemical industry, and numerous other organizational and economic changes.

The Central Committee, however, was used by Khrushchev in a rather cavalier manner after 1957. His technique is well described by Richard Lowenthal in the following paragraph:

Further, beginning in December 1958, Khrushchev sought to reduce his dependence on the Central Committee by turning the meetings of this body into semi-public shows, attended by hundreds or even thousands of outside experts on whatever happened to be the main subject. Kolkhoz chairmen and agronomists, industrial managers and technicians, economists, scientists, or literary men. Some parts of the CC meetings were still reserved for members and candidates only, and their debates remained secret; but minutes of the enlarged sessions were published, including Khrushchev's frequent interruptions of speeches by other party hierarchs. This dilution of the Central Committee meetings amounted to a serious depreciation of their deliberative character: the pledge to submit all major issues to regular meetings was formally honored, but their policymaking authority was skillfully undermined.<sup>1</sup>

This Khrushchev undermining of the new-found dignity of the Central Committee may explain its reluctance to back him in the crisis of October 1964.

Unlike the delegates to the Supreme Soviet, the members of the Central Committee are important people who, when they return to their own localities or to their jobs in Moscow, try to whip up enthusiasm among their associates and subordinates for the new policies they have just ratified. They are like missionaries spreading the newest gospel from Moscow.

**Party Congress.**—In Soviet mythology all the powers of the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Secretariat flow from the Party Congress. Originally, meetings of the Party Congress were scheduled every three years, but Stalin found the frequency of the meetings a nuisance, and the intervals between the meetings grew longer as Stalin grew older: the Sixteenth Congress met in 1930; the Seventeenth, in 1934; the Eighteenth, in 1939; and the Nineteenth, in 1952. The new rules laid down at the Nineteenth Congress made it mandatory that Party Congresses be convened at least every four

years, and the Twentieth Congress met on schedule in 1956. In January 1959 the Twenty-first Party Congress was convened to approve the new Seven-Year Plan. There was only a two-year interlude before the meeting of the Twenty-second Congress in 1961, but the Twenty-third Congress in 1966 was almost a year late. The timetable was thrown off by the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964.

At the Twenty-first Congress there was one voting delegate for every 6,000 Party members and one nonvoting delegate for every 6,000 candidate members, or a total of 1,269 voting delegates and 106 nonvoting delegates. The number elected to the Twenty-second Congress (4,408 voting delegates and 405 nonvoting) was more than three times the number elected to the Twenty-first Congress. There was one voting delegate for every 2,000 Party members and one nonvoting delegate for every 2,000 candidate members. Over the next fifteen years the number of delegates to the succeeding congresses increased as number of Party members as a whole increased. At the latest Party Congress, the Twenty-fifth which met between 24 February and 5 March 1976, there were 4,998 delegates representing some 15,694,000 Party members. The delegates are carefully chosen for their reliability by the top Party officials, and thus there is little danger of undirected initiative being generated by this well-disciplined body. In reality the Party Congress is a large chorus that is periodically assembled to chant a loud *da* to all changes, policies, and plans put before it by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. To the 4,998 delegates assembled in February 1976 for the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, the chief attraction was the free trip to Moscow and an opportunity to be present at the rites and ceremonies associated with the convocation of this body.

**Lower Party Organs.**—The Party organization of the union republic closely resembles the All-Union organization. Each has its Party Congress, Central Committee, and an executive body of eleven members, including three secretaries who are confirmed by the All-Union Central Committee. The First Secretary is the real power in the union republic. Control of the Union Republic Party organization is exercised jointly through the All-Union Central Committee representative, who is attached to the union republic organization, and the Party-Government Control agent who enforces discipline. On the whole, the Union Republic Party organization is well tailored to carry out the directives of the Party leadership.

The kray (territorial) and oblast (provincial) organizations differ from those of the union republics in having Party Conferences instead of Party Congresses. The Conference is authorized to

<sup>1</sup>"The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January-February 1965, p. 12.



elect an executive body (the kraykom or the obkom), which in turn elects a bureau and three secretaries. The names of the candidates for the bureau are usually sent down from the All-Union Party apparatus. The First Secretary of the kraykom or obkom is a very powerful figure in Communist administration; he is the local viceroy representing the authority of Moscow and, in the eyes of the local inhabitants, he has awe-inspiring powers.

The gorod (city) and rayon (rural district) Party organizations are controlled by the local Soviets, called gorkoms or raykoms. These in turn elect bureaus and secretariats (three members). The First Secretary of the gorkom or raykom must be approved by Moscow. The fundamental unit is the Party cell. Every one of the 14,455,321 members and candidate members belongs to one of the more than 370,000 primary Party organizations or cells.<sup>4</sup>

If there are no more than 100 members, the bureau and secretary of the cell are not exempt from their regular jobs and must serve without pay. If there are over 100 members, the Party secretary is a full-time paid Party official. The job of the Party cell is to further Party education, recruit new members, and whip up enthusiasm for the Party's objectives - usually more and better production.

### 38. Party-Government Controls

Keeping the enormous bureaucracy of the Soviet Union relatively efficient and honest is a never ending problem for Soviet leadership. For example, how are the enterprises, local areas, and even Union Republics restrained from following "selfish" local interests to the detriment of the overall state interests? This problem became very serious after the 1957 decentralization of the economy into 105 semiautonomous economic regions. On a less grandiose scale is the problem of individual honesty - how to keep the plant manager, the local Party official, and just plain Ivan Ivanovich from making shady deals and stealing state property?

Over the half century of Soviet experience there has been created a system of controls which acts as the eyes and ears of the top Soviet hierarchy. These agencies of control operate in both the economic and political spheres of Soviet life - spheres which are much more closely welded together than in capitalist countries. Where the political begins and the economic ends is difficult to determine when dealing with things Soviet. The USSR is somewhat analogous to an enormous corporation, a corporation on a national scale.

In an arbitrary breakdown, the Soviet controls can be considered in the following categories: (1) the Party, (2) the secret police, (3) the Party and People's Control Committees, (4) financial controls, and (5) legal controls. All of these are intermeshed to some extent, but they also watch each other in a check and countercheck system.

**The Party.** The Communist Party of the Soviet Union makes no pretense of being other than a select group,<sup>5</sup> whose mission is to propagate any line decided upon by the latest Kremlin interpretation of the gospel of Marx and Lenin. As a member of the elite group, the Party member gains certain privileges, but he also takes on heavy obligations. He must pay Party dues, attend lectures and study courses, act as an agitator and ward heeler, and constantly spur on non-Party workers to fulfill the Party's economic, social, and political programs. As far back as 1903 Lenin described the role of the Bolshevik as a tightly-controlled, obedient, 24 hour-a-day worker in the cause of Marxism and revolution. Of course, all Bolsheviks do not live up to those demands, but the dedicated members give the Party an effective instrument for carrying out the Government's policies.

The close-knit Party hierarchy, from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the USSR down to the smallest cell, makes an ideal channel for transmitting orders from the top to the bottom throughout the length and breadth of the over eight and one-half million square miles of the USSR, as well as beyond the boundaries of the nation. Every plant, collective and state farm, and army unit has its Party group which strives to whip up enthusiasm for the fulfillment of current Party goals. It is almost as though the Kremlin had over fourteen million full-time evangelists engaged in bringing the non-Party sinners to the true faith of Marx and Lenin. The same Party members are also fired with the enthusiasm of Spanish inquisitors when it comes to smelling out heresy.

**Secret Police.** Heresy, however, is not left entirely up to the judgment of the average Party member. Behind the facade of monolithic Party unity there has always been a tendency for heresies to arise, for cliques to form, and for dissident groups to develop. To deal with this problem, a vast secret police system has been the hallmark of the Communist totalitarian state.

<sup>4</sup>The size of the party is increasing rapidly. In 1956 the official count was 7,215,505 Party members. It was reported in the Twenty-second Congress that the Party had increased to 8,872,516 full members and 843,489 candidate members, or a total of 9,716,005. *Pravda* 22 October 1961, p. 5. The Soviets estimated the size of the Party in early 1965 at almost 12,000,000 members and candidate members. *Pravda*, January 12, 1965, p. 2. In 1966 the number jumped to 12,471,079 members. *Pravda*, 1 April 1966, p. 6. The figures given in *Kommunist* #16, Nov. 1960) was "almost 14 million." The figure 14,455,321, occurs in *Partynaya Zhizn* #10, May 1971. Brezhnev in his report to the Twenty-fifth Party Congress on 24 February 1976, said there were 15,694,000 members (*Literaturnaya gazeta*, 25 Feb 1976, p. 6).

<sup>5</sup>Figures from *Partynaya Zhizn*, #10, May 1971, p. 4, and *Pravda* 18 May 1971.

The police not only ferret out and destroy any heresy in Party membership, but they are indispensable in keeping the nose of the Soviet people to the grindstone and in extracting universal obedience to the state. Immediately upon coming into power, the Bolsheviks found that as a minority group they needed terror to keep their subjects in line. The Cheka (Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolutionaries, Saboteurs, and Speculators) deliberately used terror tactics to immobilize or eliminate all opposition to the regime. In 1922 this organization was given a new name, the GPU (State Political Administration), but its function did not differ an iota from that of its bloody predecessor. Since then the secret police have had several names, but always the same function—ferreting out real or imaginary opposition to the regime. Designated in the 1930s as NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), it gained worldwide infamy as the agency in charge of the Great Purges. These years were known to the Soviet population as the *Yezhovshchina* period, after Yezhov the head of the NKVD.

Under Stalin, especially after 1936, the power of the secret police reached its apogee. The Soviet citizens were cowed and beaten into absolute conformity with the Stalinist line, but even conformity was not enough. The police were always in the background ready to pounce on anyone they suspected of deviationism, wrecking, or sabotage. These terms had a special meaning in the Soviet jargon of the Stalin era. Deviationism was any straying, however innocently, from the current Party line as dictated by Stalin. If the line was changed, the citizen did well to readjust immediately. Wrecking and sabotage referred to sins in the economic sphere. Managers who were inefficient, who made mistakes in judgment, who were unable to fulfill quotas which were beyond the capabilities of their plants, or who failed to receive the materials necessary for plan fulfillment, were often charged with wrecking or sabotage. Stalin also charged the secret police with supplying the large pools of forced labor needed in those areas shunned by free labor.

In April 1943 the police power was divided between two commissariats, the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and the NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security), and in 1946 the commissariats became ministries, thus changing the short titles to MVD and MGB, respectively. The MGB took over the traditional secret police functions of ferreting out heresy, watching over army security, managing foreign espionage, and guarding the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The MVD continued its task of providing and utilizing forced labor, operating forced labor

camp, and managing numerous construction activities.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the MVD absorbed the MGB and the unified ministry came under Beria. Beria, however, was purged by the "Collective leadership" in June 1953, and in March 1954 the secret police functions were taken away from MVD and a new organization, the KGB (Committee for State Security) under the Council of Ministers, was established. The MVD retained control of the militia, the nonsecret police, until 1960 when the ministry was abolished and its powers given to the Union Republics.

The KGB was under General I. A. Serov until he was replaced by the former Secretary of the Komsomol, A. N. Shelepin, in 1958. Shelepin, now on the Politburo, was succeeded by V. V. Semichastny, also a former Secretary of the Komsomol. In May 1967, however, Semichastny was replaced by Yuri V. Andropov, a candidate member of the Politburo, probably the highest ranking Party leader to head the secret police since Beria was shot in 1953, and in April 1973 he was promoted to full membership in the Politburo. In November 1968 the MVD was resurrected and it now handles the five services, vital statistics, internal passports, and the prison camps (Gulags).

The evil deeds of Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria, so well publicized in Khrushchev's bloodcurdling revelations at the Twentieth and Twenty-second Party Congresses, may have eroded the prestige of the secret police to some extent. Nevertheless, the institution remains an integral part of the Soviet state apparatus. It is still the watchdog charged with the task of sniffing out any potential opposition to the regime, any ideological nonconformity. In the last decade, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, apparently alarmed by the rising dissent among the intellectuals, has been using the KGB more and more extensively. A number of writers and other intellectuals, as well as those agitating on their behalf, have been sentenced to stiff terms in labor camps or incarcerated in psychiatric clinics. The tiny modicum of intellectual freedom that blossomed so timidly during the Khrushchev years is now being sternly repressed by his successors. The KGB is riding higher than at any time since the death of Stalin.

**The Party and People's Control Committees.**—Since the earliest days of the Soviet regime, there have been agencies whose task was to check on how efficiently the Party and government officials were carrying out their assignments. Sometimes there were two agencies, one for the Party and one for the government; at other times the agencies were merged into a unified organ. Stalin, with his penchant for playing one group against another,

kept them divided and they remained so until the November 1962 plenum of the Central Committee unified them into the Party-State Control Committee.

Khrushchev told the Central Committee plenum that established the new organ that the pilfering and embezzlement of state property was getting out of hand. The new organization was to work closely with the local Party authorities, the Komsomol, and the trade unions in order to stamp out the prevalent corruption and theft.

A. N. Shelepin, former head of the KGB, was appointed to head the new Party-State Control Committee and was made a member of the Secretariat of the USSR Central Committee. At the time it was generally thought that Shelepin was Khrushchev's personal agent and that his new job gave him tremendous power in that his agency could collect complaints against any State or Party official. Shelepin, however, seems to have deserted his patron in the October 1964 crisis and opted for the Brezhnev-Kosygin team. He was rewarded by appointment to the Presidium. In 1966, however, the power of the Party-State Control Committee was reduced when it was split into a Party Control Committee, headed by A. Ye. Pelshe, a newcomer to the Politburo, and a Committee for People's Control under P. V. Kovanov. By separating the power into both a government and a Party committee, the authority of both has been reduced. Apparently it was felt that Shelepin was in too powerful a position to make a stab for the top job when he controlled a unified Party-State Control Committee. The Committee of People's Control is an effective watchdog since it has a large number of inspectors who have access to the files of ministries and other organizations.

**Financial Controls.**—The top elite of the Soviet Communist Party is, in the words of Milovan Djilas, former vice president of Yugoslavia under the Tito regime, a "new class." This "new class obtains its power, privileges, ideology, and customs from one specific form of ownership—collective ownership—which the class administers and distributes in the name of the nation and society."<sup>6</sup> Although this is an oversimplification, nevertheless, following the analogy, the owners of the Soviet business—the Communist elite—have every incentive to increase the worth of their holdings. The terror engendered by the secret police and the evangelical exhortations of the Party faithful are not enough to keep Soviet business operating in the black. Reporting to the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Lenin stated in unequivocal terms that the

Communists must learn to trade, must learn from the "ordinary salesmen [who] have had ten years' warehouse experience and know the business. . . ." From 1922 to 1928, the NEP period, the Communist elite literally went to school to learn their new profession, namely, how to run a huge nation as one national business.

Once the Five-Year Plans had begun in 1928, one of the big problems facing the Soviet leaders was just what branches of industry should be developed, where investment capital should be placed. There was no argument between consumer goods and heavy industry; the latter was regarded as a *sine qua non*. As Lenin put it as early as November 1922: ". . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without heavy industry we shall be doomed as an independent country. . . ." Stalin wanted heavy industry both for the reason given by Lenin and because it alone could make the Soviet Union a potent military power. But within heavy industry itself there were alternatives.

**Gosplan.**—To solve these difficulties, the Soviet leaders established an intricate planning mechanism based on five-year periods and a system of control groups to set up feasible goals, to offer guidance toward the accomplishment of those goals, to reward managers overfulfilling their quotas, and to penalize the laggards. The main organ within the control structure was the Gosplan (State Planning Commission), the rudiments of which had been laid down as early as 22 February 1921, when it was assigned the task of "working out a single general State economic plan as well as the means and order for its fulfillment." Its functions were further defined by a statute in August 1923, and in 1938 it became a permanent, 11-member commission under the Council of Ministers (called People's Commissars at that time). Gosplan developed into a powerful instrument with which the Soviet leaders could manipulate the economy. Its duties were to plan the long-term, yearly, and quarterly goals of the entire economy to keep track of progress, and to reward or punish, depending upon achievement. In 1948 Gosplan was raised from commission to committee rank, becoming the State Planning Committee. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Gosplan in both the planning and supervision of the national economy programs. Its power has grown steadily since 1921, and Khrushchev's 1957 gambit, the decentralization of the economy, strangely enough gave Gosplan an even larger role in the Soviet economy.

Even in this field Khrushchev could not resist the temptation to pile reorganization upon reorganization. In 1962 Gosplan was confined to long-range planning and a new agency, the All-

<sup>6</sup>Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1957), p. 45. This material is used with permission of the publisher.

Union Economic Council, took over short-range planning. A USSR State Committee for Construction (Gosstroï) was given the main authority in construction matters throughout the USSR. A year later a superagency, the USSR Supreme Council of the National Economy, was established just below the Council of Ministers and took over the direction of most of the state committees, either directly or through Gosplan. Since the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 Gosplan has resumed its customary role of overall planning.

Once the macro-economic decisions have been made in the Politburo, *Gosplan* takes over the planning of the implementation of those decisions. Quotas are assigned to the various economic ministries, which in turn allot outputs and inputs to their subsidiary units. The big problem of course is the balancing of supplies and outputs, and since one unit's output is another's input, this is no easy task. After much haggling and bargaining, the *Plan* is set and at that point it has the force of law.

**Ministry of Finance and the Banks.** The unified budget of the USSR, which includes all the local and central budgets as well most of the funding of the entire Soviet economy, is usually announced with a good deal of fanfare by the Minister of Finance V. F. Garbuzov and is promptly rubber-stamped by the Supreme Soviet. Garbuzov is in charge of the over-all distribution and accounting for the budget.

The actual disbursal and control of funds to the enterprises and collective farms, however, is handled by *Gosbank* (the State Bank). This organization not only disburses most types of funds to the individual enterprises, but also is the agency which creates cash in the USSR. *Gosbank* has more than 150 thousand employees, over three hundred main offices, some thirty-five hundred local branches, and two thousand collection points. It controls the finances of a quarter of a million enterprises, some 40 thousand *kolkhozes*, and countless government agencies.<sup>7</sup> Since every agency and enterprise in the Soviet Union has to deal with a specified branch of *Gosbank*, there is little chance of financial finagling without *Gosbank* being aware of it. Although there are two other banking systems in the USSR, *Gosstroibank*, created in 1959 to handle construction, and *Vneshtorgbank*, (Foreign Trade Bank), which takes care of the financing of imports and exports, Soviet banking is overwhelmingly dominated by *Gosbank*. George Garvy, an expert on Soviet banking, says that while

in Russia he was told that *Gosbank* had 30 thousand officials engaged in inspecting the finances of individual enterprises.<sup>8</sup>

**Legal Controls.**—Just as in any other complex society, the Soviet Union has a legal system, laws, and enforcement agencies. Because of the fierce tempo of industrial development and the tight control of consumption; the laws of the Soviet Union are more complex, more closely interwoven-politically, socially, and economically—and more rigidly enforced than are laws in capitalist states.

The hierarchy of courts ranges from the Supreme Court of the USSR and the Supreme Courts of the union republics, elected by the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the union republics, down to the People's Courts elected by the citizens of the rayons. The whole elaborate procedure is described in Articles 102 through 112 in the Constitution of the USSR. Article 112, which states that "judges are independent and subject only to the law," must have been grimly humorous to the millions of Soviet citizens condemned to forced labor camps in the last four decades.

More to the point in controlling various ministries is the system headed by the Procurator-General of the USSR. Appointed by the Supreme Soviet for a seven-year term, he has "supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all ministries and institutions subordinate to them." He in turn appoints procurators for the republics, krais, and oblasts, and approves the procurators selected by rayons and cities. The procurators supervise the courts, prevent state organizations from exceeding their powers, and serve as public prosecutors. They carry out their functions independently of any local organs and are subordinate only to the Procurator-General of the USSR. Until recently, however, they have had little control over the secret police, although the office of Procurator was founded in 1933 partly to supervise the legality of the activities of the GPU.

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## Soviet Economy

SEVERAL fundamentals must be kept in mind in any discussion of the Soviet economy. First the entire economy of the Soviet Union is owned and operated by the state, and the state is synonymous with the leadership of the Communist Party. As Milovan Djilas has pointed out in his book *The New Class*, the owners of the economy in a Communist state are the Party leaders. Second, the Soviet economy has been a totally planned economy since 1929. Total planning has resulted in total control, or perhaps total planning automatically entails total control. Finally, the production goals for all aspects of the economy are established by a small group at the top of the Party hierarchy and are directed toward bolstering the Party's power, increasing the military effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces and expanding Communist influence throughout the world.

These considerations led the Party leadership, logically enough, to emphasize heavy industry and to relegate the consumer-goods industries and agriculture to secondary roles in all plans. The stress on heavy industry made total control an absolute necessity in order to enforce "consumer starvation." When few carrots are available, use of the stick is a necessity.

During Stalin's reign, and even into the Khrushchev era, some segments of the Soviet economy were living off their tsarist heritage. It was not until the late 1950s that serious attention was given to the almost unbelievably poor housing situation and agriculture remained the neglected child of the regime until the Khrushchev period. In other words, the Soviet consumer was the victim of the extreme emphasis on the military-industrial complex. Even the tax structure—the so-called "turn-over" tax—penalized the consumer for the benefit of the favored heavy industry. Both the worker and the peasant have paid a heavy price for Soviet heavy industrial growth. Because of the dearth of consumer goods, they could not spend their rubles. This is the ideal rationing system—just do not produce the goods. Soviet statistics show that heavy industrial production increased 83 times from 1913 to 1958, while the production of

consumer goods increased a little less than 14 times.

Perhaps the best way of understanding the Soviet economic system is to look at the way in which it developed.

### 39. Development of the Economic System

When Lenin and his small band of followers took over the power in November 1917, they violated almost every principle of classical Marxism. According to Marx, the revolution was to occur in countries with advanced economies and huge proletariats. Marx never bothered much about the peasants; they were too backward to fit into his schemes. Russia in 1917 was a nation with a backward economy and a relatively small proletariat; over 80 percent of the population was peasant. Lenin won both the revolution and the following civil war by influencing, or at least neutralizing, the peasants, a very un-Marxian procedure.

By early 1921 it became obvious to Lenin that the peasants were turning against the regime. During the so-called period of War Communism (1918-21), the regime confiscated the grain at gunpoint since there were no consumer goods to trade for it. The peasant retaliated by hiding the grain, or just not raising it. With his usual flexibility Lenin inaugurated the New Economic Policy, usually called the NEP. The NEP was merely a return to small-scale capitalism in agriculture and the production of consumer goods. The Soviet economy, which had declined to 20 percent of its prewar level in 1921, had regained its prewar output by 1926.

Many of the comrades were unhappy about the tactical retreat, as the NEP was called. They could see a petty bourgeoisie of rich peasants emerging as well as a class of traders, or Nepmen, who were the antithesis of good socialists. Furthermore, they realized that restoring the pre-war level of economic output was one goal, and a rapid future expansion of the economy was another. Fat peasants and prosperous Nepmen were a poor source of

## SOVIET ECONOMY

TABLE 4  
SOVIET HEAVY INDUSTRY (Selected Items)\*

	1913	1940	1960	1970	1975	1977
Coal (mill tons) .....	32	182	564	686	771	814
Steel (mill tons) .....	5	20	72	128	155	162
Oil (mill tons) .....	11	34	162	388	540	592
Elect Power (bill KWH) .....	2	48	327	740	1038	1150
Machine tools (1000s) (metal cutting) .....	2	58	155		232	236

\* *Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1963*, pp. 145, 151, 154, 157 and 168; *Pravda*, 30 January 1965; *Izvestiya*, 25 January 1968 and 25 January 1970; *Pravda*, 31 January 1976, 23 January 1977, and 28 January 1978.

investment capital. Two schools of thought arose in the middle twenties: one group, the Rightists, felt that the emphasis should remain on agriculture and consumer-goods industries. The stream of consumer goods would stimulate the peasants in producing more grain to feed the industrial workers and to raise grain for exports, thus increasing the capital for new industries.

Their opponents, the Leftists or super-industrializers, said that this plan would not work. The capital investment needed for new industry was much greater than that required for the NEP. To attain the industrial level necessary for socialism, huge investments were needed for factories, transportation, power plants, schools, and medical care. This type of capital investment had a very delayed pay-off. For example, a steel plant with its associated iron-ore mines, coal mines, blast furnaces, and rolling mills requires tremendous amounts of labor and capital before any return is visible, especially to the peasant consumer. They felt that the Rightist plan of encouraging agricultural development would never result in the amounts of capital needed. The poor peasants would eat the grain they raised, and the petty-bourgeois kulaks, the rich peasants, getting control of the grain supply, would withhold it if they thought the government was too socialistic. Thus the arguments of both groups centered on the peasants. One group adduced that the peasants had to be pampered as they were the basis of economic growth, and the other group asserted that the peasants just would not cooperate in raising the amounts of capital needed.

In 1928-29 Stalin emerged as the *vozhd*, or bossman. He chose rapid industrialization, and the goals of the First Five-Year Plan astonished even the superindustrializers. But Stalin also realized that in a predominantly agricultural economy the main source of investment capital was the peasant. He must have more food for the increased number of industrial workers, and he must take some of the peasants off the land to get the new industrial

workers. However, he needed agricultural surpluses to sell abroad for the equipment and technicians in the industrialization program—in short, the peasant was to be the goat for the whole program. This is the old story of the city slicker fleecing the country bumpkin, but on a colossal scale. Thus Stalin was up against the same problem as the Rightists and Leftists—the peasant.

Stalin solved the dilemma through the use of collective farms. He went all out in the collectivization of agriculture and drove the peasants onto the collectives literally at gunpoint; in short, he declared war on the peasantry. Millions of farmers died in the process, but Stalin had the solution for emphasizing heavy industrial development in a peasant country. The collective farm made it easier to collect produce, siphon off labor, and keep the peasants from eating the surplus, or even having enough to eat. The farmer was reduced to the subsistence level, and the surplus provided the capital needed to industrialize.

Stalin also realized that the rapid development of heavy industry in a predominantly agricultural land demanded strict controls. Workers would not labor for a pittance unless coerced, just as peasants had to be forced into the collectives at gunpoint. The all-powerful secret police was an essential ingredient in Stalin's recipe for industrialization.

The other ingredient in Stalin's recipe was total planning. The heart of the planned economy was Gosplan. The economists of Gosplan drew up quarterly, annual, and five-year plans, and also supervised their fulfillment. A Gosplan quota had the force of law: overfulfillment meant rewards, and underfulfillment carried drastic penalties. Needless to say, the success or failure of Stalin's forced industrialization hinged on the ability of Gosplan to synchronize the economy. On the whole, the Gosplan seems to have worked reasonably well.

Thus by the 1930s the Soviet economic ideology was fully developed; the inflexible goal was the rapid development of heavy industry; the capital was to be raised by consumer starvation; the

population was made amenable by totalitarian controls, especially the police; and the whole program was to be centrally planned.

#### 40. Industry

Soviet industry, like all other aspects of Soviet life, is highly organized. From the formation of the national overall Five-Year Plan, put together by the Gosplan in accordance with general directives from the top Party leaders, to the operation of the smallest plant, everything is done according to detailed plans and complex regulations. There are informal methods that grease the gears of the economic machine, but these activities are outside the formal structure.

Soviet industries are organized under various All-Union and Union-Republic ministries. The All-Union ministries are headquartered in Moscow and the planning and control goes from Moscow through a complex set of channels down to the individual enterprises. Most heavy industries are All-Union, while the light and food-processing industries are usually Union-Republic, thus giving some autonomy to the Union-Republic governments. But they do receive a lot of unsolicited guidance from Moscow. Finally, some small industries, concerned with local needs, come under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

Under this system, economic planning begins in the Politburo, where macroeconomic decisions are made. The broad economic directives evolved in the Politburo are then passed on to the Council of Ministers, which in turn uses Gosplan to break down these broad directives into detailed plans. The plans are then sent to the ministries, either All-Union or Union-Republic, and they implement them through channels to their local enterprises.

Ideally, the planning process is based on "material balances," that is, a balancing of the inputs and outputs of the entire economic system. Gosplan comes up with a preliminary set of tentative output goals and the inputs needed to insure the outputs. It then proceeds to bargain and negotiate with the various ministries. The latter are after attainable targets and assured inputs.

The ministries in turn send the tentative plan figures down to the enterprise level where the managers get into the bargaining process. They also want realistic or, even better, easy target figures. Their figures as to their ability to produce are usually lower than the ministry can accept and certainly lower than Gosplan had in mind. But it is all this bargaining, claims, and counterclaims that provide Gosplan and the ministries with the data necessary to arrive at material balances. Once the bargaining is over, Gosplan comes up with the plan

and that is the end of the negotiating. It is up to the ministries and their enterprises to produce the goods.

This system of planning agencies, ministries, and enterprises is very complex, to say the least. Since there are some 50 economic ministries and since these ministries administer almost the entire Soviet economy, the complexities arising in trying to adjust each other's inputs and outputs can be easily imagined. Furthermore, each ministry, in striving to reduce its dependency upon someone else's outputs, tends to build its own empire of suppliers. Oleg Hoeffding points out that the Ministry of Machine Tool Production developed only 55 of the 171 plans for making machine tools; 19 other ministries contributed to some extent.<sup>1</sup>

**Autonomy of management.**—This problem of autonomy reaches down to the enterprise itself. One of the recurring phenomena of Soviet economic life has been the dispute over the amount of autonomy to be given to the manager of an enterprise. On the whole, however, the tendency has been toward one-man control, or *yedinonachalie*. Until the early 1930s, the enterprises were usually under a collegiate type of management: the director was concerned primarily with coordinating the independent supply, production, planning, and financial branches of his enterprise. In 1930 Stalin made the following comment on this topic in his report to the Sixteenth Party Congress:<sup>2</sup>

We cannot any longer put up with our factories being transformed from productive organizations into parliaments. Our Party and trade union organizations must at length understand that without insuring one-man management and strict responsibility for work done we cannot solve the problems of reconstructing industry.

Gradually the director has come to control all divisions of his enterprise and also to assume all responsibility. He issues orders to the chief engineer, who transmits them through channels—the shop chiefs, foremen, and brigade leaders. The director is the final authority within the enterprise and is solely responsible if the quotas are not attained. However, he can exercise authority and show initiative only within the limits delegated to him. Furthermore, the director has to keep an eye on the Party organization which is more powerful than he.

In spite of all these restrictions, the plant director is often a dynamic individual who takes the *yedinonachalie* concept seriously, even to the point of using illegal methods to push up his production.

<sup>1</sup>"The Soviet Industrial Reorganization of 1957," Rand, December 1958, p. 12.  
<sup>2</sup>J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, Vol. XII, p. 342.



Undoubtedly the Soviet government often "looks the other way" as long as such individualistic methods produce results. On the other hand, the Party periodically makes frantic efforts to control industrial management when it tends to follow its own laws of development. The danger of the "owners" of industry losing control of "management" is just as possible in the Soviet Union as in the United States.

Another method for controlling the fulfillment of production plans and for checking on the responsibility of management is the so-called cost-accounting, or *khozrachel* system. Under this system each enterprise has its own budget, which is a means of compelling the enterprise to explore all possibilities of economy in production and show a profit. The habit of Soviet economic literature in censuring high production costs and praising enterprises that show a profit would make the *khozrachel* system appear to be a return to capitalism. On the other hand, the control of raw materials, the setting of production quotas, and the establishing of the prices of the finished product by the higher echelons—whether Gosplan or ministry—all serve to limit drastically the functioning of anything like a profit system comparable to that of capitalism. In this respect the director is legally restricted in exercising individual initiative.

**Incentives.**—What makes Soviet industry "tick"? What stimulants motivate management to fulfill the plans assigned to it? It must be assumed that, over a fifty-year period, something above and beyond Party propaganda has provided the necessary drive to the managers and workers of Soviet industry. The Soviet methods of stimulating and controlling management are twofold: premium payments and negative sanctions—the old carrot-and-stick technique.

The payment of monetary rewards for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of production targets is the Soviet equivalent of the profit motive in a capitalistic society; it is the main incentive for keeping Soviet management on its toes. Apparently premium payments are frequent and substantial. Two factors probably account for the widespread receipt of such payments: the realistic, or attainable, targets set by the planners, and the ability of management to arrange for assigned plans to be well within maximum plant capacity.

On the other hand, management is well aware of the negative sanctions that can befall a manager who uses too many short cuts and illegal devices in trying to fulfill or overfulfill his plan. The Soviet manager, therefore, has developed a keen sense in the evaluation of sanctions, and when a choice is involved, he can almost invariably pick the lesser of the sanctions. For instance, if faced with these alternatives—subquality production or failure to

fulfill the plan—he will usually choose the former as it entails a less serious sanction. But if the output is military goods, the manager will choose underfulfillment in preference to a subquality product as the quality factor in military supplies is sacrosanct.

**Methods of management.**<sup>3</sup>—An expression used by Soviet defectors in describing their life in the Soviet Union is *zhít spokojno*, to live peacefully. But to live "peacefully" in the Soviet industrial rat race usually involves unlawful, or at least questionable, actions. To keep production up to the planned targets, the manager must resort to wheedling reasonable plans from his superiors, filling out fake work orders to keep his subordinates satisfied, and using illegal methods of procuring materials to keep production running. The necessity of committing illegal acts in order to live peacefully is one of the dubious aspects of Soviet society. It must be just as ulcer-producing among Soviet managers as is competition for the American executive. The combined desire to gain premiums, to avoid negative sanctions, and to live peacefully results in a definite pattern of behavior on the part of Soviet management. Berliner has reduced the pattern to three principles of behavior: *strakhova*, the safety factor; *ochkoviratelstvo*, simulation; and *blat*, a cross between bribery and simple reciprocity.

One safety factor consists in having the output target set below the ability of the enterprise to produce. The manager is aware that success is not judged by an absolute volume of output, but by the ratio of actual output to planned output. Hoarding materials is another safety factor, since lack of materials is the chief bottleneck of Soviet production. Management may also try to undertake new production in which time, labor, and other cost factors are unknown. This gives management the opportunity to distort the planned production schedule by concentrating on items that are easy to produce, and by producing goods on machinery supposedly laid up for repair. The manager must constantly and feverishly maneuver for enough slack so that shortages of materials and breakdowns of machinery will not disrupt his planned production to the extent of underfulfillment.

The second principle of Soviet unorthodox economic behavior is simulation. It is mostly concerned with shifty bookkeeping and an ability to get away with stratagems in meeting plan figures. The literal translation of the Russian word *ochkoviratelstvo* is "to throw dust in the eyes, rub one's spectacles," or in our idiom, "pull the wool

<sup>3</sup>This section owes a great deal to Joseph S. Berliner's *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957). Berliner has just about staked out the area of "informal organization" of Soviet industry.

over someone's eyes." For instance, large machine units count for more in judging plan fulfillment than does the production of spare parts. Therefore the production of spare parts is a perennial headache in the Soviet Union, as managers avoid that part of the plan if possible. Some managers find ways of crediting the output of one period to another period, or concealing overproduction as a safety factor to insure fulfillment of the next plan. Who can tell how the machines will operate or if the proper supplies will be forthcoming? Reduction in quality is also a common device.

The third principle of informal behavior is *blat*, the real lubricant of the ponderous economic machine. However, *blat* occurs in all phases of Soviet life. If a worker does a favor for an official, and later the official finds the worker an apartment to which he is not strictly entitled, that is *blat*. *Blat* is most prevalent in the procurement and supply areas of the Soviet industrial structure. Even an allocation order with high priority may not enable a manager to get the necessary material to keep his production lines in full operation. In many cases when the materials are vital to plan fulfillment, the manager resorts to a *tolkach*, a pusher or an expeditor. The *tolkach* holds an extralegal position in the Soviet economy, but as his services help to smooth the flow of supplies, the regime "looks through its fingers" at this nonplanned activity. The successful *tolkach* gets to know the people having supplies, knows how to approach them, and even knows who is open to influence. For instance, if a coal enterprise needs lumber badly, the *tolkach* will haunt lumber camps until he finds an executive who is willing to exchange coal for the required amount of timber. A bottle of cologne to the right girl in the State Bank might result in the approval of a doubtful account. Usually "good relations" are established over a period of time by a series of gifts, perhaps a bottle of vodka now and then to a responsible worker who can speed up the loading and shipping. *Blat* is often used to influence the drafting of a plan that can be fulfilled, or in getting the difficult and unprofitable kinds of production shifted to another plant.

These informal aspects of Soviet industry keep the ponderous planned machine from creaking to a halt. So it is not surprising to find the ministry willingly "deceived" by managers who indulge in extralegal maneuvering as long as they are successful in fulfilling their plans.

*The Khrushchev Period.*—Khrushchev, in his decade of power from 1955 to 1964, gradually changed from a Stalinist-type heavy-industry enthusiast to an advocate of high priority for consumer goods and meaningful investment in agriculture. In his efforts to push his programs

Khrushchev was very likely to thrash about nosily, suddenly decide upon a scheme for reorganizing some sector of the economy, or even the whole economy, and then rush about the Soviet Union excoriating officials right down to the local level if he thought them insufficiently responsive to his latest gambit. Needless to say, the Soviet economy was in a state of turmoil during Nikita's hey-day from 1957 to 1964, and even a brief outline of his many reorganizations is bound to seem like a complex story.

On 7 May 1957, Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on the subject of an overall reorganization of the Soviet economic management and announced some drastic changes. The experts are still arguing about the underlying motives for these changes, although everyone admits that it was high time something was done about the extreme centralization in Moscow of economic planning, direction, and control. In announcing the new program, Khrushchev stated:

The tasks of further advancing the national economy at the present stage of its development, as has already been said, make it necessary to shift the center of gravity of operational guidance of industry and construction closer to enterprises and construction projects. However, this can be done only by a transition from the management of the national economy through the industrial ministries and agencies to management based on territorial principles. The Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers hold that the economic councils, which are to be set up in economic administrative regions, should become the organizational form of such management.<sup>4</sup>

Whether this was the primary motive is another matter. Some critics of the Soviet scene think that Khrushchev's main objective was to strengthen the position of the Party leaders at all levels and to curb the growing independence of the technological-managerial class.

Under the new system a large number of economic ministries were abolished and 105 Councils of the National Economy (*sovnarkhoz*) established in their place. Each of the 15 republics had at least one *sovnarkhoz*, and large republics such as the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR had many. Each of the *sovnarkhozy* was thus charged with the guidance of a wide variety of enterprises within its geographical area.

In connection with the reorganization, the composition of the USSR Council of Ministers underwent considerable change. Only six All-Union ministries (Construction of Electric Power Stations, Foreign Trade, Medium Machine Building, Railways, Sea Fleet, and Transport Construction) and ten union-republic ministries were retained.

<sup>4</sup>Speech of 7 May 1957, as reported in *Pravda*, 8 May 1957.

This was a drastic reduction from large numbers of ministries prior to the reorganization. But the new Council included 15 chairmen of the Republic Councils of Ministers as well as 11 high officials of Gosplan, raised to ministerial rank. In addition, the heads of over 20 state committees and commissars were also members. Thus the USSR Council of Ministers had over 60 members.

Under the new system the importance of the USSR State Planning Commission, or Gosplan, was augmented considerably. Khrushchev summed up the role of Gosplan in his speech of 7 May 1957.

The USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan USSR) must become the scientific economic planning agency of the country. It is called upon to submit the requirements of the national economy to profound and comprehensive study, to take into consideration the achievements of science and technology and, on this basis, to draw up proposals for the development of all branches of the national economy, taking the potentialities for the integrated development of the economy most carefully into account, and to rationally utilize resources in the general interests of the state. Under the new conditions, the national economic plans will be drafted on the basis of the union republics and the economic administrative regions. The USSR State Planning Commission must insure the correct and proportionate development of the branches of the country's economy and check from these positions the plans of the different union republics and regions.<sup>1</sup>

Long-range planning, said Khrushchev, was to be improved considerably. In addition to annual and five-year plans, Gosplan was to draw up long-range plans and supervise the rational distribution of enterprises as well as push continually toward their increased efficiency of operation. To encompass this enlarged role the Gosplan needed more authority and thus the elevation of 11 of its officials to ministerial status on the Council. In addition, Gosplan was to be aided by a newly established Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work whose job was to study the achievements of science and technology in the USSR and abroad and publish information about them.

The increased importance of Gosplan, however, belied the official assertions that the reorganization was aimed primarily at decentralization. The old process of sending the plan through channels from the Gosplan to the lower echelons, getting their comments on the feasibility of fulfilling the goals, reviewing these objections, and then resubmitting definitive plans backed by the force of law was still pretty much the system. The only change was in the channels. The plans were formerly routed from Gosplan to ministry to *glavk* to enterprise, but under the new system they went from Gosplan to

Republic Councils of Ministers to their Gosplans to *sovnarkhozy* to enterprise. This was mandatory if the local desires of the *sovnarkhozy* and Republic Councils of Ministers were not to take precedence over the goals of the national plan.

The reorganization of 1957 seems to have led to more problems than it solved and Khrushchev busied himself for the next seven years in trying to make his system work efficiently. In April 1960 Gosplan USSR was restricted to the annual plan and a new organ, the State Scientific-Economic Council (*Gosekonomsovet*) took over long-range (20 year) and the 5-to-7-year planning. But Gosplan's authority in guiding the separate branches of industry was actually increased—it took on many of the functions of the former ministries. The Republic Gosplans were also revamped to fit in with the changes in Gosplan USSR. Gosplan gained more and more control of interrepublican deliveries; that is, it controlled the supplies going to the various enterprises in different republics. This dependence upon a highly centralized supply system led many of the enterprises to engage the services of *tolkachi* to expedite matters.

The Councils of Ministers in the multi-sovnarkhoz republics found themselves overburdened with detail in trying to settle disputes among their *sovnarkhozy*. For example, the RSFSR had 67 *sovnarkhozy* to cope with. In July 1960 all-Republic *sovnarkhozy* were set up in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to deal with *sovnarkhoz* problems within their jurisdiction.

In May 1961 the Soviet leadership came up with a plan to establish 17 large economic regions (10 in the RSFSR, 3 in the Ukraine, one in Kazakhstan, one for the 3 Baltic Republics, one for the Transcaucasian Republics, and one for the 4 Central Asian Republics). These large economic regions were an attempt to coordinate the production of the various *sovnarkhozy* more in the way of what the central planners wanted. Nothing, however, seemed to lick the problem of "localism". New protective "family circles" composed of the top officials of the *sovnarkhoz*, the enterprises, and sometimes the Republic Gosplan were constantly emerging, and drastic penalties did not seem to stop the tendency. These officials put their local welfare first and the national plan second whenever they thought they could get away with it. Sometimes the *sovnarkhoz* tried to make itself self-sufficient so as not to be dependent on the vagaries of outside sources of supply, even though the local inputs cost more. In other words, they were guilty of the same sin that the former ministries had been accused of, but this time it was on a local level. Finally, in November 1962 Khrushchev drastically reduced the

<sup>1</sup>Pravda, 8 May 1957.

number of *sovnarkhozy*. For example, the number of *sovnarkhozy* in the RSFSR went from 67 to 24 and the 4 *sovnarkhozy* in Central Asia were combined into a single "Central Asian Inter-Republic Sovnarkhoz."

By November 1962 Khrushchev seems to have gone overboard on the matter of reorganization as a tool for stimulating the economy. All construction was taken out of the hands of the *sovnarkhozy* and centralized in the USSR. State Committee for Construction (*Gosstro*). Gosekonomsovet was abolished, its long-range planning functions given to Gosplan, and a new outfit, the All-Union Economic Council, took over short-term planning. Only four months later, in March 1963, the new organ, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, was imposed on the bureaucratic crazy-quilt in an attempt to coordinate the activities of Gosstro, the All-Union Economic Council, and Gosplan. With the establishment of the Supreme Council of the National Economy the decentralization of 1957 had been largely liquidated and the Soviet economy was again centralized.

With the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, it was possible to liquidate his experiment in decentralization, the *sovnarkhozy*. The new Brezhnev-Kosygin team began to listen, somewhat half-heartedly, to the so-called "modernists," that is, economists interested in efficiency. In a report to a Party Plenum in September 1965, Kosygin called for some changes in the planning of the economy and in the system of rewards to management and labor.

**Economic Reforms.**—Since the early 1960s there has been a good deal of controversy and discussion in the Soviet media concerning economic reforms. This is one area in which both the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev-Kosygin regimes encouraged discussion. The various proposals ranged widely on the theoretical plane, but the actual economic reforms have been quite modest.

Although a number of Soviet economists had been advocating substantial changes in the organization of the economic structure, the proposals of an economist at the Kharkov Engineering and Economics Institute, one Yevsei G. Liberman, received the most publicity in the early 1960s. Liberman published an article in *Pravda* (9 September 1962) entitled "The Plan, Profits, and Bonuses," which caught everyone's eye. The very fact that the article was in *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU, implied at least some endorsement by the Party leadership. The Liberman article opened up a wide-ranging discussion that went on over the next three years.

Liberman's proposals, to simplify outrageously, called for changes in the planning process that would give the enterprise manager more autonomy.

Prices and the overall production targets were to remain the province of the central planners, but the enterprise was to draw up the final plan covering labor productivity, the number of workers, wages, capital investment, and innovations. The enterprise performance would be judged by its profits, calculated on the basis of its total capital investment. Thus the bonuses earned by the enterprise would be computed on the basis of the profit/capital ration. This would encourage the enterprise manager to seek targets consonant with the enterprise's capabilities and not try to play it safe with "easy targets."

Liberman also proposed that profits to be computed on actual sales of output, not on gross output alone as previously, in order to encourage managers to produce better goods and the proper variety. Furthermore, the enterprise would receive a high bonus for fulfilling its plan and decreasing rewards for overfulfillment. As one author puts it: "... to make the rules more like contract bridge, where one gets a bigger bonus by bidding more, than like auction bridge, where one bids only as high as necessary to win the auction."<sup>6</sup> In other words, the idea was to get the manager to come up with a plan that would utilize his total capability and not strive, as previously, for the lowest plan figure that he could get away with to insure a large overfulfillment bonus. It was hoped that in this manner he would bring out of hiding the concealed machinery, hoarded inventory, and redundant skilled labor so typical of managerial practice under the old system. And by figuring only output sold in the calculation of his profitability, he would be encouraged to comply with the desires of his customers in quality and assortment of his product.

In mid-1964, before his ouster, Khrushchev made a faltering step in the direction of Libermanism when two large garment-manufacturing associations, "Bolshevichka" in Moscow and "Mayak" in Gorky, were directed to work out their own production plans on the basis of what the retail outlets thought they could sell. The reason for this step was a serious increase in unsold inventory. The Soviet buyer, hungry as he was for consumer goods, was just not buying some of the junk being produced.

On 2 October 1965 the so-called Kosygin Reform was ratified by the Supreme Soviet. The new statute is usually referred to in Soviet literature as "the new system of planning and economic incentives." The new system, to some extent, followed the Liberman proposals. The enterprise was to get larger bonuses for fulfillment of plans than for overfulfillment and fulfillment was to be measured by actual sales. The

<sup>6</sup>Howard J. Sherman, *The Soviet Economy*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969, p. 312

enterprise was permitted to retain a sizeable percentage of its profits for bonuses, for social-cultural expenditures, and for local investment. Interest charges were levied on part of the investment loans received from the government as well as on fixed and working capital. This was to encourage the manager to utilize his capital efficiently since he was paying interest on it. And, finally, there was to be stricter enforcement of contracts between enterprises. These innovations were basically directed at changing the incentive system so that the manager's bonus would not depend solely upon volume of output, but rather upon output sold and profits derived from the sales.

By December 1969, some 36,000 industrial enterprises, which accounted for 83.6 percent of the total industrial output and 91 percent of the profits, were under the new system. Yet, in the spring of 1970 there was anything but cheers going up over the new system. What was wrong?

It would seem that the fundamental reason for the mediocre results was the fact that the reforms were entrusted to the very centralized bureaucracy that was least enthusiastic about their success. Bureaucrats, trained under the Stalinist system, were just not suited to insure a de-centralization of authority, moderate as it was. Even many of the managers, also Stalin-trained, were finding it difficult to readjust their thinking and also had doubts about the permanence of the new system.

Another serious handicap for the new system is the unrealistic, centrally computed prices. If the prices of inputs and outputs are not realistic, the profitability criteria can hardly be a valid assessment of economic efficiency. In addition, the inputs and outputs are still largely centrally planned, further hamstringing the efficiency of management at the local level. Lastly, although the managers have been, on the whole, earning large bonuses under the new system, the workers have been getting extremely small ones. Thus, there is little to encourage the average worker to increase his labor productivity, and low labor productivity is one of the most serious flaws in the Soviet economic system.

Furthermore, the Czech attempt to liberalize the economy in 1967-68, which led to the Soviet military intervention of August 1968, soured the Soviet leadership on radical economic "reforms." It seemed obvious in the Czech case that liberalization in the economic sphere had repercussions in the political arena. Thus in the 1970s there has been a "creeping re-centralization," an emphasis on improving the centralized planning through better computers, more input-output matrices, and improved linear programming. Another innovation is the so-called "production association," an intermediate organ between the ministry and its

enterprises. Enterprises with similar outputs and more or less in the same area are to be supervised by these production associations. The association is responsible for much of the planning and is especially directed to insure more and better utilization of new technology. These associations look very much like the traditional *glavki* or trusts, long a feature of the ministry's chain of command, but they are larger and have been given more responsibilities. One suspects, however, that the great hopes expressed that these new organs will lead to more efficiency will gradually fade as the new institutions get to resemble the old *glavki* more and more as they are internalized by the bureaucracy. In other words, they will become just another bureaucratic organ in the already complex chain of command.

In addition, there is a constant barrage of propaganda urging better labor discipline and a more patriotic response from labor in the matter of productivity. But after a half a century of such rhetorical overkill, the worker has become somewhat immune to hortatory economics. What he wants is better housing, more and better consumer goods, and, above all, a better diet and he wants them now, not in some distant "stage of communism."

The real problems facing the Soviet economists are a growing labor shortage, a declining capital-output ratio, and a general slowdown in the overall economic growth rate. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) indicates an awareness of all those problems. The planned increases are the lowest since centralized planning began in 1928 and what growth is planned is dependent upon increases in labor productivity and new technology. In short, the traditional Soviet method of using enormous amounts of labor and resources to get high growth rates is no longer feasible. The Soviets will now have to resort to intensive, not extensive, methods to push the economic growth rates upward. For them it will be a new ball game.

#### 41. Transportation

Soviet planners, like their tsarist predecessors, have had to face the hard facts of enormous distances and unfavorable terrain in their efforts to provide the nation with adequate transportation facilities. In addition to the sheer size of the USSR, almost one-sixth of the world's land area, there is always the problem of the extremely northern location with the related problem of permafrost. This seriously complicates the building of railroads, motor highways, oil pipelines, and airfields.

The need for adequate transportation is especially great because the resources necessary for industry are widely scattered. The two largest

centers of industrial fabrication are Moscow and Leningrad, neither of which is near the great coal and steel centers. Steel from the Ukraine, the Urals, and Western Siberia has to be hauled to the fabrication centers. Cotton for the textile centers, mostly concentrated in the Moscow region, has to be brought from Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan. Inasmuch as the fabrication and heavy industrial centers are not self-supporting in foodstuffs, transport must be assigned to this task. The exhaustion of basic natural resources such as oil, coal, and iron ore in European Russia now makes it imperative that the resources of the Siberias, the Far East, and Central Asia be exploited. This complicates the transportation problem since railroads and highways are, to put it mildly, extremely sparse in those areas.

**Railroads.**—As can be seen from the distribution of freight turnover in billions of ton-kilometers (Table 5), the railroads handle a huge percentage of the total. Rail transport is much cheaper than either truck or air transport, and much faster than water transport. Since the importance of rail transportation in the Soviet Union can hardly be over-estimated, it is only logical that Soviet planners have tried to offset the increased load by promoting greater efficiency in rail operations. Every effort has been made to cut down on the number of idle cars by speeding up turnaround time. Apparently they have been successful as all Soviet figures indicate that turnaround times are steadily decreasing. They have also tried to put more emphasis on other forms of transportation, but in spite of their efforts, the railroads are still hauling the major share of Soviet freight.

According to official Soviet figures, the burden thrust upon the railroads has been a steadily growing one as the economy expanded. In 1913 Russian railroads carried 76.4 billion metric ton-kilometers of freight and in 1976 they hauled 3.295 trillion ton-kilometers, an increase of more than 43 times. It must also be remembered that during that 63-year period there occurred World War I, the Civil War (1918-21), the dislocations associated

with the introduction of the Five-Year Plans and the collectivization of agriculture, and World War II, all of which militated against efficiency of operation.

One of the more popular theories before World War II was that the Soviet railroad system would collapse if any unforeseen strains were put on it. In the middle of the 1930s there was a railroad crisis severe enough to ask for assistance from the old troubleshooter Kaganovich. Why then did not the railroad system collapse, especially in World War II? There seem to be several reasons for its continuing vitality. The Soviets have improved to an extraordinary degree the operating efficiency of the rail network inherited from the tsarist regime. Between 1928 and 1940 the average turnaround time per freight car decreased from 10.5 days to a little over 7 days, and the average speed of freight trains increased from 14 kilometers an hour to over 20 kilometers an hour. By 1956 the turnaround time was down to 6.3 days and the speed up to 24.8 kilometers an hour, with stops included.<sup>7</sup> These figures indicate an increase in efficiency of about 60 percent. Much of this increase can be credited to better locomotives, especially in the last few years. In the early 1960s it was decided to go all out in converting from steam to electric and diesel. By 1965 some 80 thousand kilometers of the railroad system was electric and diesel; the growth was steady thereafter: 88 thousand kilometers by 1966, 96 thousand kilometers by 1967, 100 thousand kilometers by 1968, and 105 thousand kilometers by 1969. In 1969 some 96 percent of rail freight was hauled over electric and diesel lines.<sup>8</sup>

The increasing use of heavy four-axle freight cars and improved automatic signaling systems has also helped increase the capability of the Soviet railroad system to bear up under the ever increasing

<sup>7</sup> *Transport i Svyaz SSSR: Statisticheskii Sbornik (Transport and Communications in the U.S.S.R.: A Statistical Collection)* (Moscow: State Statistical Publishing House, 1957), pp. 48, 52.

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, 3 February 1966, 29 January 1967, 25 January 1968, 26 January 1969, and 25 January 1970.

TABLE 5  
Freight Turnover in the Soviet Union\*  
(In billions of metric ton-kilometers)

Year	Railroads	Inland Waterways	Truck	Oil Pipelines
1913	76.4	28.9	0.1	0.3
1928	65.7	28.5	0.1	0.3
1960	1504.3	99.6	98.5	129.9
1970	2494.7	174.0	220.8	339.9
1976	3295.1	222.8	360.0	532.0

\* *Narodnoe Khozaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu*, p. 373, *Pravda*, 3 February 1966, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1977*, CIA, September 1977, pp. 143-49.

demands being made upon it. The traffic density over Soviet rail lines is astonishingly high.

Another factor accounting for Soviet railroad efficiency is the rapid loading and unloading of freight. Little time is lost by having cars held up in the yards. Unlike the American user, the Soviet user has to fit his requirements into the freight schedule, and it is his responsibility to see that the cars are quickly unloaded. With the railroads in the dominant position, the movement of freight can be planned well in advance and thus avoid the alternation of high and low density of traffic.

The density of railroad mileage in the Soviet Union is extremely uneven. Most of it is concentrated in former European Russia, while the north, both Siberias, and Central Asia have a very low density. The railroad lines in the west (Baltic, northern, central, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Volga regions) carried about 65 percent of Soviet freight in 1949; the lines in the east (Urals, Central Asia, both Siberias, and the Far East) carried only 35 percent in the same year. Looking at the problem from another angle, the density of railroad mileage in the Moscow area and the Ukraine is over 5 miles per 100 square miles; in the Far East it is only 0.2 miles.

The constant emphasis upon heavy industry, especially steel, has put a burden on Soviet railroads. In the 1930s the building of the Magnitogorsk-Kuznetsk *kombinat* almost led to a collapse of the railroad system. Today the railroad lines between Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, Magnitogorsk and Karaganda, and Krivoy Rog and the Donbas are bearing the brunt of the iron ore and coal hauling to keep the steel production steadily climbing. Because of the expansion of Soviet industrialization to the east, the railroads crossing the Volga at Saratov, Kuybyshev, Ulyanovsk, Kazan, Gorky, and Yaroslavl have become vital lifelines in the functioning of the Soviet economic system.

The new railroads built during the Soviet period have been aimed primarily at increasing the industrial productivity of the country. The tsarist regime usually planned a new railroad line in the light of military strategy—the transport of troops and supplies to the frontiers. But times have changed. What was good military strategy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became outmoded by the time the Soviet regime was ready to consider building railroads. Soviet planners soon realized that heavy industry, the backbone of military might, was the real strategic necessity of agrarian Russia. To follow a policy at variance with the great European powers, the Soviet Union could not depend upon them for the technical instruments of war. In pursuance of this policy the Soviet regime built the Turkestan-

Siberian (the Turksib) and the South Siberian (Yousib) railroads, both of which have contributed much toward the economic development of Central Asia and the industrial south of Western Siberia. During World War II, with the Germans in control of the industrial complex of the Ukraine, these regions proved the validity of such strategic thinking. During the war the Soviets built a new railroad (732 miles long) to the Pechora coal basin, to make up to some degree for the loss of the coking coal of the Donbas. Since the war the line has been double-tracked, and spurs pushed on to the sea at Anderma and Kara. Another spur went to the estuary of the Ob at Salekhard, and recently was extended to Igarka, 620 miles away.

The big transportation project for the Tenth Five-Year Plan is the Baykal-Amur Mainline Railroad (BAM), a rail line from Taishet, east of Lake Baykal, to the Pacific at Sovetskaya Gavan, a distance of nearly 2,000 miles. Building was started in the spring of 1974 and it will not be completed until the middle 1980s. Half a million workers, \$15 billion in investment, and lots of push from the top echelon of the Party are being poured into the BAM RR. The line will cross a half dozen mountain ranges and over 140 rivers. But it will open up Eastern Siberia for the exploitation of its valuable oil, coal, minerals and diamonds and, even more important, it will provide a second rail line for supplying the Soviet armed forces stationed in the Trans-Baykal and Far Eastern Military Districts to defend against any Chinese invasion. The only rail line now available for the Soviet forces in the Far East is the Trans-Siberian RR and it is extremely vulnerable as it runs close to the Amur River and then runs south right up against the Ussuri River.<sup>9</sup> There is talk that the Five-Year Plan for 1971-75 will include a second railway line from Lena north of Lake Baikal to Komsomolsk, a distance of almost 2,000 miles. The vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian, which is only 150 miles from the Chinese frontier for long stretches, is becoming only too evident with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in recent years.

But new railroad construction accounts for only a comparatively small part of the increased Soviet freight turnover, some 20 percent according to the Soviets themselves. The greatest part of capital investment (around 80 to 85 percent) going into railroads has been put into the networks that were inherited from the previous regime. Electrification of mountain routes, doubletracking, expanded switching yards, automatic signaling, more powerful locomotives, and heavier cars have been

<sup>9</sup>A good account replete with pictures in *Smithsonian* February 1978, pp. 36-47.

regarded by the Soviet planners as more productive than an extension of mileage.

In recent years there has been some criticism of the efficiency of the railroad system. For example, the commentary accompanying "The Report on Fulfillment of the 1969 Economic Plan" comes up with the following summary of inadequacies:

The productivity of locomotives and freight cars in railroad transport, of dry-cargo vessels in river transport and of common-carrier trucks increased somewhat. However, the plans for the average daily productivity of locomotives and freight cars were underfulfilled. The demurrage of freight cars during shipping operations and at repair stations increased, the section speed of freight trains decreased, and there continued to be a large number of empty runs by freight cars. A considerable number of industrial enterprises were responsible for demurrage of freight cars during loading and unloading operations above the established norms, and many enterprises and organizations did not promptly haul incoming freight shipments away from the railroad stations.<sup>10</sup>

The vulnerability of the Soviet railroad system in any future conflict is another debatable point. If the conflict was of long duration, the loss of bridges, main lines, and switching yards would have a seriously adverse effect on Soviet industry, especially as there are no alternative means of transportation. Whether these targets would be worth the risks incurred and the weapons expended would have to be determined at the time. If the conflict was of short duration, railroads would hardly be a prime target. Also to be considered is the fact that the Soviets showed great skill at restoring operations on damaged or demolished railroads in World War II. Soviet railroads cannot be counted upon to provide a convenient Achilles' heel in the Soviet ability to conduct a war.

**Water transportation.** The Soviet Union possesses some of the world's greatest rivers, many of which are navigable. But most of the transportation needs of the country lie in a lateral, east-west direction, and the large rivers run north-south. Furthermore, some of the greatest of the Soviet rivers, such as the Ob-Irtysh system, the Yenisey, Lena, and Kolyma, flow northward into the Arctic Ocean. The northern geographic position of the USSR also adversely affects water transportation. Even the southerly Sea of Azov, across which iron ore is hauled from the Kerek Peninsula to the Ukrainian ferrous metallurgical plants, is frozen during much of the winter. Farther to the north the length of the navigational season declines rapidly. Each March and April, *Vodnyy Transport*, the newspaper published by the ministries of the Sea and River Fleets, jubilantly announces the various dates for the opening of

navigation on the Don, the Volga-Don Canal, and the lower Volga. For example, the issue of 20 March 1958, contained the following announcement:

Navigation on the Lower Volga, from Stalingrad [Volgograd] to Astrakhan, has begun. The early opening of navigation in this section was helped by the icebreaker, *Volga*. On 16 March the first fuel was shipped from Astrakhan to Stalingrad [Volgograd].

In 1913 river transportation took care of about a quarter of Russian freight in ton-kilometers. By 1917 the figure had dropped by over one-half. In February 1918 a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, signed by Lenin, nationalized all river and sea transportation. In 1919 the newly nationalized fleet, some 2,188 ships in all, carried about 8 million ton-kilometers of freight, and gradually the total rose until by 1926 it reached 33 million ton-kilometers.

The first two Five-Year Plans (1928-37) provided for the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal (the Stalin Canal) and the Moscow-Volga Canal. Port facilities along the river and sea routes were improved and mechanized. During World War II river transport carried around 200 million tons of freight, with an excellent record in supporting Volgograd (Stalingrad) and in maintaining the lifeline across Lake Ladoga during the siege of Leningrad. But the Germans seriously damaged the facilities along the Dnieper and the Stalin Canal, and it was not until the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1950) that these routes were restored to their prewar condition.

According to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, river transportation in 1955 was hauling 36.7 percent of the lumber, 21.5 percent of the petroleum and its products, 6 percent of the building materials, 1.7 percent of the coal, and 9 percent of the wheat of the Soviet Union. The real deficiency in river transport lies in its ability to haul coal. But this is the fault of Soviet geography, and little can be done about the failure of rivers to run from the coal fields to the steel centers.

It was not until the mid-1930s that Soviet river transport got back to the 1913 level in freight turnover. Since then there has been a slow, but steady, rise in the quantity hauled, although it has dropped in the percentage of the total freight hauled. In 1976 the 223 billion metric ton-kilometers carried by river transport was almost 8 times more than carried in 1913, but in percentage of the total it had dropped from 25 percent to around 6 percent.

Much emphasis is being given to the future of river transport in the Soviet economy. In 1952 the Volga-Don Canal (the Lenin Canal), which connects the Caspian and Black seas, was opened. According to the Soviet press, the Lenin Canal "...

<sup>10</sup>Pravda, 28 January 1970, as translated in the Russian Press, in Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 4, p. 6.



connected in a unified system the internal waterways of five seas which wash the European part of the country—the Baltic, White, Caspian, Black, and Azov." This is only the first of a new series of great hydroelectric installations to be constructed on the rivers of the country, installations such as the Kuybyshev Dam and the others on the Volga, Angara, and Great Stony rivers.

**Pipelines.**—Soviet planners were extremely slow to take advantage of pipelines to transport oil and gas. Until the mid-1950s, about a fifth of the oil and oil products were hauled by river transport and most of the rest by railroads. The planners seemed reluctant to admit that the cost of transporting these products by pipeline would be much cheaper, more reliable, and would take a burden off the already heavily laden railroads and river fleets.

There were several reasons for this lag. First, as long as the main supply of Soviet oil came from Baku, water transport was easily available through the Caspian Sea and up the Volga. Furthermore, there was a pipeline from Baku to Batumi on the Black Sea. Second, both the steel and the facilities to manufacture the pipe necessary for pipelines were in relatively short supply until the 1950s.

The opening of the "Second Baku" oil fields in the area between the Volga and the Urals in the 1950s made the use of pipelines more imperative. Rivers just did not flow laterally across this area. Also by this period the available steel and pipe-manufacturing facilities were in being. Another factor entered the picture shortly after the death of Stalin: the Soviet planners decided to shift toward oil and gas as fuels. New thermal electric power plants, diesel locomotives, and more emphasis on truck and air transport are all predicated on the use of petroleum and natural gas.

Until recently, however, the expansion of pipelines was slow indeed. The first pipeline (kerosene) was built in 1907 from Baku on the Caspian Sea to Batumi on the Black Sea, a distance of 515 miles. By 1940 the total length of pipelines was 2,750 miles, and by 1955 pipelines were carrying 10 percent of Soviet oil.

The discovery and exploitation of the great oil fields in the so-called "Second Baku" in the Volga-Urals region (Kuybyshev Oblast, the Tatar ASSR, and the Bashkir ASSR), put the Soviet Union in second place in oil production by 1961. In European Russia, pipelines to Perm' and Gorky were built in 1958 and in the next few years pipelines went to the Moscow and the Leningrad areas. A Trans-Siberian pipeline was extended first to Omsk and then to Angarsk, near Lake Baikal. The Friendship trunk pipeline, completed in 1964, facilitated the export of Volga oil to Poland, East Germany,

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. By 1965 there were 28,200 kilometers of trunk pipelines in the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup> Another 16,100 kilometers were installed between 1965 and 1969, which brought the total to 44,300 kilometers by 1970.<sup>12</sup> By 1976 there were over 30,000 miles of pipeline for crude oil and about 6,500 miles for refined products.

Natural gas was a latecomer as an important fuel in the Soviet economy. A major natural gas deposit near Saratov, discovered during World War II, led to the laying of the first major gas main, a 12-inch, 500-mile-long pipeline to Moscow in 1946. By 1955 natural-gas production had increased to 9 billion cubic meters. Then large natural-gas deposits were found in several areas and the building of pipelines began in earnest. By 1965 there were 41,800 kilometers of line handling 128 billion cubic meters. In the next five years another 12,900 kilometers were installed so that by the end of 1969 some 183 billion cubic meters of natural gas were transmitted through 54,700 kilometers of gas pipelines.<sup>13</sup> Some of these were 48-inch in diameter. By 1976 there were well over 56,000 miles of natural gas lines in the Soviet Union.

Since the Soviet Union is now the largest oil producer in the world, and since that oil is more and more coming from Siberia, and since oil is the Soviet Union's largest hard currency earner, there is every reason to anticipate a rapid expansion of the oil pipeline system. And the new natural gas field near the mouth of the Ob River promises to insure a major role for the Soviets as gas exporters—but again, the main hindrance will be adequate pipelines. The Soviets are now major players in the world's oil and gas drama; they are, incidentally, second only to the United States in refining capacity, about 10 million barrels a day according to the *Oil and Gas Journal* (27 March 1978).

**Auto transport.**—According to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, "... twice as much freight is hauled by truck as by railroads and river transport combined, but over much shorter distances. Therefore, the freight turnover of auto transport in comparison with railroads is still very small." The much shorter distances mentioned are indeed very short. There is practically no intercity highway transportation because of poor roads, and most trucking is confined to urban areas, to short hauls from railhead to plant, or plant to plant within a metropolitan area.

The Soviet statisticians give two series of figures in summarizing the Plan result each year: one is

<sup>11</sup>Theodore Shahad, *Basic Industrial Resources of the U.S.S.R.*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 12-19.

<sup>12</sup>*Pravda*, 25 January 1968, 26 January 1969, and 25 January 1970.

<sup>13</sup>Shahad, *op. cit.*, p. 21. *Pravda*, 25 January 1970.

freight turnover in billions of ton-kilometers and the other freight volume in millions of tons. For example, in 1976 although trucks hauled only 360 billion metric ton-kilometers, while the railroads were hauling 3.295 trillion ton-kilometers, in volume trucks carried 22 billion metric tons to the railroad's 3.6 billion tons.<sup>14</sup> These statistics demonstrate vividly the short-haul bias in trucking.

Auto transport in the Soviet Union suffers badly from a shortage of both vehicles and decent roads, the latter deficiency being the more serious of the two. Let us first look at the vehicle situation. On the eve of World War II the Soviet Union was producing about 150,000 motor vehicles a year, mostly trucks. During the war truck production slowed down to a standstill, and the United States supplied the Soviet deficiency—probably the most valuable single item in the lend-lease program as far as the Soviet war effort was concerned. After the war the production of automobiles increased gradually and by 1950 had risen to 362,900 a year, 298,300 of which were trucks and buses. Production rose to 445,300 vehicles in 1955 with the output of trucks and buses at 329,000. One authority guesses that there were about 2.5 million automotive vehicles of all types in the Soviet Union in 1956.<sup>15</sup> Over the last two decades the output of trucks and buses has increased slowly but steadily from 329,000 in 1955 to 734,000 in 1977. One guess is that the Soviets had a total inventory of trucks and buses in 1975 of 5.8 million versus the US total of 25.25 million in that same year.<sup>16</sup>

Roads have always been a Russian headache and, in the case of invasions, an advantage. According to Guderian, the main handicap his Panzer divisions faced in their drive on Moscow in 1941 was the bottomless mud tracks, which the Soviets called roads.

The Soviets claimed in 1967 to have a total of 1,363,600 kilometers of highways, 405,600 kilometers of which were "hard surfaced" (*s tvyordym pokrytiem*).<sup>17</sup> According to the CIA *Factbook* (July 1975), there were in the USSR about 866,000 miles of highways, only 161,000 of which were paved. Inasmuch as the non-surfaced roads are almost useless throughout much of the year, the Soviet highway situation is not conducive to a rapid increase in trucking. Many of the roads are only dirt tracks connecting thousands of small villages and collective farms, roads that are

bottomless bogs in the rainy season and deep in dust when dry.

In European Russia there are a number of "superhighways" which connect some of the larger cities. The author rode over some of the superhighways and they seemed more like the average American two-lane macadam country roads than anything that could be called a superhighway. But a few hours bouncing about on the roads labeled "of local importance" taught him that everything is relative—in the Soviet context, superhighways are super.

Siberia and the Arctic are gradually getting their share of the road-building program, for military reasons if nothing else. A 760-mile all-weather highway now connects Yakutsk with the Trans-Siberian Railway at Nery. The Kolyma Highway connects Magadan, the metropolis of Northeastern Siberia, with the navigable part of the Kolyma River. The combination of the Kolyma Highway and the Kolyma River forms a direct route from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Arctic Ocean, thus cutting out the sea route through the relatively narrow Bering Strait to get around the Chukotsk Peninsula. A seasonal highway to connect Yakutsk with Magadan via Churapcha is under construction.

Since the advent of the new regime in October 1964, there has been a growing awareness in the Soviet Union that something drastic needs to be done about truck transport. In March 1965, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Aleksei Kosygin, told the USSR State Planning Committee that the types of trucks being turned out in the Soviet Union were "economically inefficient."<sup>18</sup> They had not been manufactured in the West for a long time. "There trailer trucks are produced, which have greater capacities than our trucks. They carry loads of 15 to 20 tons and have very high speeds." Furthermore, on a trip to East Germany, while driving along the Autobahn from Leipzig to Berlin, he noticed that 90 out of every 100 trucks were loaded. But riding along the Moscow Belt Highway he counted 70 empty trucks out of every 100 he passed. To quote Kosygin, "These are shocking facts."

Two engineers, Khartsyev and Baz'ylenko, wrote an article in *Pravda* on the same topic.<sup>19</sup> They pointed out that truck transport accounted for less than 6 percent of the total volume of Soviet freight tonnage. The reasons for this sad state of affairs were multiple, but the main ones, according to them, were the small size of Soviet trucks, too many

<sup>14</sup> *Pravda*, 25 January 1970.

<sup>15</sup> A. Lebed, "The Development of Soviet Highway Transportation," *Bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Munich, Vol. III (December 1956), p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> *Izvestiya*, 28 January 1978, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, CIA, September 1977, p. 151.

<sup>17</sup> *Ezhгодnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii*, 1968, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1968, p. 89.

<sup>18</sup> *Planovoye Khozyaystvo*, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 3-10 translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XVII, No. 18 (26 May 1965), pp. 17-20.

<sup>19</sup> *Pravda*, 18 May 1965, p. 2.

different models which increased the repair costs, low economies of scale in manufacturing trucks because of the plethora of different kinds, too many small manufacturing plants, and the lack of good highways. A number of other articles have appeared in the Soviet press concerning the need for more and better trucks, and also complaining about the scarcity of gas stations, the poor roads, and the lack of coordination between the truckers and their customers.

Over the last decade the Soviets have resorted to tapping Western technology to boost their auto production. Fiat was brought in to set up a complete production facility to produce a Soviet version of the Fiat 124, the *Zhiguli*. Between 1965 and 1977, passenger auto production went from 201,000 to 1,280,000. The new Kama River Truck Plant, which is scheduled to produce prodigious quantities of heavy trucks and diesel engines, was largely designed and its technical equipment provided by Western contractors. Truck output will be greatly increased once this plant is in full operation.

**Air transport.** In much of the Soviet Union the construction of either railroads or highways is a difficult task because of the lack of stone and gravel in many areas and the prevalence of permafrost in others. Thus air transport seems to be made to order in many of these cases. But even air transport has a long way to go before it can serve the entire USSR adequately. Tremendous as the Soviet need for air transportation may be, Aeroflot can carry only an infinitesimal part of the total freight hauled in the USSR. In passenger service, however, the picture is much brighter since Aeroflot hauled over a hundred million people in 1976.<sup>20</sup>

From the very birth of the Soviet state, its leaders have been aware of the potentialities of the aircraft in solving the problem of the vast distances in the USSR. In the 1920s the Soviets took advantage of German know-how and a joint German-Soviet airline, Deruluft, operated over regular air routes between Berlin and Moscow, and Berlin and Leningrad. In 1932 the Council of People's Commissars organized the Main Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, sometimes referred to by its initial letters GVF, or by its better known title, Aeroflot.

Getting actual figures on the extent of Aeroflot operations is a difficult task as the authorities use percentage figures. According to the figures given in the 1949 edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, by 1932 the USSR airlines measured 22,650 miles, and the 1937 figures jumped to 58,300 miles. In 1939, at the Eighteenth Party Congress, Stalin gave

the following information on civil aviation. In 1933 air transport had flown 3.1 million ton-kilometers, and by 1938 this total had climbed to 31.7 million ton-kilometers, an increase of over 1,000 percent. The confidential Supplementary Plan for 1941, captured by the Germans, listed a total of 44 million ton-kilometers for the main lines of civil aviation for that year. This included 40,000 tons of freight and 387,000 passengers.

For more than a decade following the end of the war, figures on the accomplishments of Aeroflot were vague, mostly percentage increases on base figures not revealed. It was not until the 1960s that the Soviets began to give Aeroflot's freight and passenger turnover totals in ton-kilometers. Although the number of passengers carried was not given in the usual manuals and plan fulfillment tables, various officials of Aeroflot revealed enough data to come up with a reasonable estimate. In 1962 E. A. Smirnov, Aeroflot's general agent in the United Kingdom, stated that Aeroflot carried 22 million passengers in 1961.<sup>21</sup> In February 1963 Bashkirov, deputy head of Aeroflot claimed that 27 million passengers had been carried in 1962.<sup>22</sup> He also estimated that 35 million would be hauled in 1963. If this figure is used, although it is probably overly optimistic, then the total should be about 40 million in 1964 as the published plan results claimed a 15 percent increase for that year.<sup>23</sup>

Since 1965 the Soviets have published each year the number of passengers carried by Aeroflot: 1965: 42 million; 1966: 47.2 million; 1967: 55.1 million; 1968: 60 million; and 1969: 68 million.<sup>24</sup> The total had jumped to 101 million by 1976.<sup>25</sup> The published results of the Plan for 1977 stated only that the volume of traffic on Aeroflot increased by 10 percent.<sup>26</sup> Ergo, one might then assume that Aeroflot transported some 110 million passengers in 1977.

Previous to 1955 Aeroflot's work-horse was the Il-14, a twin-engine piston aircraft. In that year the Soviet Union entered the jet transport age with an aircraft that startled the West, the TU-104. This plane was demonstrated at the summer Tushino Air Show and it entered regular Aeroflot service in September of 1956. In 1957 a four-engine turboprop transport, the AN-10, was introduced, and in the next year the Soviets unveiled two more large transports, the four-engine turboprop Il-18 and the enormous four-engine turboprop TU-114.

<sup>20</sup>H. J. Coleman, "Aeroflot Changing to Rear Jet Aircraft," *Aviation Week*, March 19, 1967, p. 43.

<sup>21</sup>*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 February 1963, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup>*Pravda*, 30 January 1963, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup>John Stroud, *Soviet Transport Aircraft Since 1945* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 35. *Zhigodnik Bolshoi Novoskiy Enskikopedy*, 1968, p. 89. *Pravda*, 26 January 1969 and 25 January 1970.

<sup>24</sup>*Pravda*, 23 January 1977.

<sup>25</sup>*Pravda*, 28 January 1978.

<sup>26</sup>*Soviet Life*, March 1978, p. 13.

## LARGE AEROFLOT TRANSPORTS

Soviet Designation	NATO Code	Engines	Passengers	Range (naut. mi.)
AN-10	CAT	4 turboprop	100	650
AN-24	COKE	2 turboprop	50	1,400
IL-18	COOT	4 turboprop	110	2,000
IL-62	CLASSIC	4 turbofan	185	4,000
IL-76	CANDID	4 turbofan		3,100
IL-86		4 turbofan	350	3,400
Tu-104	CAMEL	4 turbojet	100	2,000
Tu-114	CLEAT	4 turboprop	200	6,000
Tu-124	COOKPOT	2 turbofan	60	650
Tu-134	CRUSTY	2 turbofan	80	1,100
Tu-144	CHARGER	4 turbofan	140	4,000
Tu-154	CARELESS	3 turbofan	150	4,000
Yak-40	CODLING	3 turbofan	32	900

Thus by 1958 Soviet civil aviation was being rapidly equipped with a modern fleet of jet aircraft.

The Il-86 wide-body transport, an air bus seating 350 people will end some of the congestion in the airplanes around the larger airports. The Tu-144, the Soviet supersonic transport comparable to the *Concorde*, has been flying the Moscow-Alma Ata run for a year now and has recently flown the Moscow-Khabarovsk route. A new freighter, the An-72, which has two turbofan jets mounted above the wings, is about to enter service. This plane cruises at about 450 mph and carries around five tons of freight. There is also a Yak-42 in the works, an aircraft designed to carry 120 passengers at somewhat over 500 mph.

The Soviet civil aircraft inventory totals around 1,100 large jets and about 1,500 turboprops. According to Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation, in 1977 Aeroflot was serving about 3,600 cities and towns over a total route of 565,000 miles. It had regular air connections with 76 countries. And the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) calls for the building of 40 more air terminals.<sup>27</sup>

Aeroflot not only provides air transport service over scheduled routes, but also supplies aircraft and operators for medical work, agriculture (for example, fertilizing, spraying, sowing), forestry work, geological surveying, prospecting, or construction work—any job where light fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters can be used. These types of service make up about half of Aeroflot's operations. The AN-2 is the fixed-wing workhorse in these operations, and a large fleet of helicopters ranging from the Mi-2 which can lift a ton of fertilizer to the Mi-6 with the capability of carrying 12 tons or 70 to 80 passengers give Aeroflot flexibility in this area of its operations.

<sup>27</sup> *Izvestia*, 18 March 1977.

## 42. Agriculture

There is no doubt that the weakest link in the Soviet economy is agriculture. One of the reasons for the poor showing of agriculture is the poor resources in soil and climate upon which it is based. The *chernozom* soil occupies only a small part of the 8,446,000 square miles that make up the USSR, and the podzolized soils of the forest-steppe regions are too far north to have an adequate growing season for many crops. And in many of the areas where the soils are good, the precipitation is erratic. For example, the Ukraine with its *chernozom* soil is often the victim of drought.

As a result of the relative scarcity of good soils (in comparison with the total area of the USSR and its large population), the northern latitudes in which the country is located, and the almost marginal precipitation in many of the agricultural areas, the untapped agricultural resources of the Soviet Union are extremely limited. Strenuous efforts are being made to push agriculture to the north, but with little success. In the last few years marginal land (the so-called "virgin and idle lands") has been put under cultivation in the southern part of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan, but the results have varied enormously from year to year. There is little doubt that the tearing off of the grass cover of these marginal areas has resulted in soil erosion on a large scale.

The total agricultural area of Russia in 1913 (in the area comparable to the boundaries of the Soviet Union before 1939) was 875 million acres. In 1957 (within the same area) it was 1,260 million acres. The new land brought into use almost kept up with the increase in population—70 percent more land and 75 percent more people. The increase in sown area from 282 million acres in 1928 (Table 6) to 545 million acres in 1963, or less than 50 percent, is probably a more meaningful figure. But even if the rosiest Soviet figures are accepted, the increase in

TABLE 6  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE 1970s

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Grain (mill m. tons)	186.8	181.2	168.2	222.5	195.7	140.1	223.8	195.5
Cotton (mill m. tons)	6.9	7.0	7.3	7.6	8.4	7.9	8.3	8.8
Sugar Beets (mill m. tons)	78.3	72.1	75.7	86.8	76.4	88.5	98.6	93.3
Oil Seeds (mill m. tons)	6.1	5.7	5.0	7.3	6.7	N.A.	5.2	5.8
Potatoes (mill m. tons)	96.8	92.6	73.3	107.7	80.7	88.7	85.1	83.4
Vegetables (mill m. tons)	20.3	20.0	19.1	24.5	23.1	N.A.	23.5	23.0
Meat (mill m. tons)	12.3	13.1	13.6	13.5	14.5	15.2	13.3	14.8
Milk (mill m. tons)	83.0	83.2	83.2	87.2	91.8	90.8	88.7	94.8
Eggs (billions)	40.4	44.9	48.2	50.8	55.0	57.7	55.1	61.0

\*Pravda, 4 Feb 1971, 23 Jan 1972, 30 Jan 1973, 26 Jan 1974, 25 Jan 1975, 1 Feb 1976, 23 Jan 1977, and 28 Jan 1978.

land under cultivation has just about kept up with the growth in population. The land is not capable of indefinite expansion.

**Collectivization.**—When the Communists came to deal with the agricultural problem in the early 1920s, they soon realized that the owners of 20 million independent farms were thorough-going capitalists. Imbued with the Marxist doctrine that only large-scale industry would be effective in the socialist state, the Communist leaders transferred this concept to agriculture and began an attempt to convert the small farms into larger units. During the NEP period (1921–28) they tried to lure the farmer into the larger collectives, the *kolkhozy*<sup>28</sup> by giving every advantage to the *kolkhozy*. But the effort was very unrewarding. By 1927, according to Soviet figures, only 0.8 of 1 percent of the farmers had joined the *kolkhozy*; apparently they liked nothing about the collective farm. At this point the “second” revolution took place—the forced industrialization under the Five-Year Plans—and Stalin felt that the time had come to put on pressure for collectivization. Four years later, by 1931, some 52.7 percent of the farmers were in the *kolkhozy*, and by 1940 some 97 percent, along with 99.9 percent of the cultivated land of the Soviet Union.

The victory, however, was incomplete. As a carrot to help the stick, the government was forced to allow the peasant to retain his own house, some tools, a few animals, and a small plot of land. The

remnants of private enterprise soon became the focal point of the peasant's real affections. He devoted much of his time to his own animals and small plot of land, and that much less time to his assigned work on the *kolkhoz*. The peasant has received much of his income in the last thirty years from selling the produce of his own plot on the free market. This is one of the few examples of really intensive agriculture in the Soviet Union.

The human suffering caused by the forced collectivization, especially in the 1929–33 period, is beyond statistical calculation. Millions of kulaks<sup>29</sup> were exiled to Siberian forced-labor camps or left to starve, because even their seed grain had been confiscated. The peasants fought back at first, and the figures for livestock show the catastrophic effects of collectivization. Rather than donate their livestock to the *kolkhozy*, the peasants slaughtered them, either to sell or eat the meat themselves. In 1928 there were 66.8 million head of cattle, 27.7 million hogs, and 114.6 million sheep and goats in the USSR. By 1933 the totals had dropped to 33.5 million cattle, 9.9 million hogs, and 37.3 million sheep and goats, a decrease of about half in cattle and two-thirds in other livestock. It took until 1955 to restore the cattle to the 1928 level. Probably even more of a severe blow was the decrease in the number of horses, which the peasants also slaughtered for food. The *kolkhozy* were to be mechanized, and they eventually were. However,

<sup>28</sup>In Russian *kollektivnoe khozaystvo* (collective economic unit). This is abbreviated to *kolkhoz*, the plural *kolkhozy*.

<sup>29</sup>Kulak means “fist” in Russian, and it was long used to describe a rich peasant who “squeezed” his poorer neighbors. But from 1928 on any peasant opposing collectivization was called a kulak.

the disappearance of half the horses in the 1928-32 period left the farmers extremely short of draft power for plowing and harvesting.

In addition to the kolkhozy, the Soviet leaders began to establish sovkhozy<sup>30</sup> immediately after the revolution. These were to be examples of progressive agriculture, model farms, for the kolkhozy to emulate. By 1928 the government had set up 1,407 of these state farms, but they were poor examples on the whole, and did little to entice the peasants into joining larger agricultural units. By 1940 the number of sovkhozy had risen to 4,159.

In order to use the scarce farm machinery to the greatest extent possible, as well as to act as agencies for the collection of the kolkhoz crops at artificially low government prices, machine-tractor stations (MTS)<sup>31</sup> were established during the period of forced collectivization. In 1928 there were only six machine-tractor stations, and by 1940 the number had increased to 7,069. These stations dispatched both machinery and operators to the kolkhozy and sovkhozy which the stations were assigned to service; they also kept track of the crop yields so that the government's share would not be eaten by the collective farmers. An additional role of the machine-tractor stations was that of watchdog for the Party, since the rural areas were weakest in the number of Party enthusiasts.

The kolkhozy, sovkhozy, and the machine-tractor stations combined, although at a very high cost in human suffering, to carry out the mission of the government. They served as controls upon the peasant's consumption of his own produce. To finance the enormous costs of the forced industrialization of the Soviet Union, a profit had to be derived from the peasant. Inasmuch as the new industry was operating primarily to produce heavy capital goods, there were few consumer goods to exchange for food. It was only by confiscating a large part of the agricultural production that the state was able to feed the growing urban population and pay for the needed tools and machinery from abroad. In the early 1930s, while millions of peasants starved to death, the Soviet Union exported grain to pay for imported equipment and for the services of foreign technical experts. To watch 20 million individual farms was an impossibility, but with the aid of the machine-tractor station it was possible to maintain surveillance over a quarter of a million kolkhozy.

In keeping with the Marxist contention that large-scale units are more efficient and profitable,

the government in the late 1930s began to consolidate the kolkhozy into larger units. By 1940 the number of kolkhozy had dropped from a high of 243,500 to 236,900. In World War II the Germans plunged across the richest agricultural area of the Soviet Union destroying some 98,000 kolkhozy. After the war the Soviets took advantage of the disorganization and reconstituted kolkhozy of a much larger size. By 1955 the number had been whittled down to 87,500, and in 1958 it dropped to around 78,000.<sup>32</sup> By 1969 the number of kolkhozy was down to 34,700 and still falling, while the sown acreage per farm had risen to around 7,000 acres.<sup>33</sup> Only 2 percent of American farms are over 500 acres. Gigantism seems to be one of the major ills of Soviet agriculture.

Khrushchev was an ardent advocate of bigger farms, both kolkhozy and sovkhozy, and as early as the last years of the Stalin regime he backed the idea of *agrorods* (agricultural cities), but he failed in getting his idea accepted. During his period of power he looked more and more favorably upon the sovkhoz as the hope of the future. By 1963 there were 9,176 sovkhozy averaging 70,000 acres, with 25,000 sown, and employing about 775 workers.<sup>34</sup> The sovkhozy are much more Marxian than the kolkhozy. Here is the factory farm with wage earners, that is, a rural proletariat.

The constant pressure on the agricultural sector to supply the growing demand for a better diet for the Soviet population has resulted in a sharp upturn in the funds being channeled toward the farms. Agriculture has also developed a voracious appetite for machinery. The output of tractors, for example, rose from two machines a year in 1923 to 1,300 at the beginning of the first five-year plan. In 1977 Soviet industry produced 569,000 tractors.<sup>35</sup>

**Livestock and dairy problem.**—"We must overtake and surpass the United States in the per capita production of meat, milk, and butter" was the slogan most frequently used in the Soviet press during the Khrushchev period. This emphasis on the production of meat, milk, and butter was treated as the first step in the transition from socialism to communism. The statement stared down at the strollers in the Park of Culture and Rest as if reproving them for wasting time; it was emblazoned on the banners carried in the ubiquitous parades. Khrushchev had made increasing the production of the livestock and dairy industries his personal objective. He did all he could to realize this goal

<sup>30</sup>Sovkhoz is the abbreviation for the Russian words *sovet'skoe khoz'yaistvo*, literally "Soviet economy," but usually translated as "state farm." The plural is sovkhozy.

<sup>31</sup>MTS is an abbreviation of the Russian *ماشинo-тракторная станция* (machine-tractor station).

<sup>32</sup>*Pravda*, March 1, 1958. Khrushchev stated that there were "around 78,000 kolkhozy, 8,000 MTS, and 5,800 sovkhozy at the present time in the country." *Narodnoe Khoz'yaistvo SSSR v 1958 Godu*, p. 347, lists 69,100 kolkhozy on January 1, 1959.

<sup>33</sup>Gregory, P. R. and R. C. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance*. *Narodnoe Khoz'yaistvo SSSR v 1963*, p. 341.

<sup>34</sup>*Pravda*, 28 January 1978.

without cutting drastically into the heavy industrial goals of the Seven-Year Plan. In the opinion of many foreign observers, he was thrashing about rather aimlessly in search of short cuts to the promised land of meat, milk, and butter. But it was difficult to find short cuts for the main obstacles he faced: the prevalence of poor stock, the peasant ownership of a large percentage of the cattle, and the shortage of animal feeds.

Statistically, the Soviet totals compare unfavorably with those of the United States. In 1964 the United States had 106.5 million head of cattle to the Soviets' 85.5 million, although the Soviets had more milk cows, 38 million to the United States' 18 million. The United States had 56 million hogs to the Soviets' 40.9 million, but thereby hangs a tale. The Soviets had 70 million hogs in 1963, but because of the serious grain shortage of that year, they were forced to slaughter about half of their hogs for lack of feed, and thus the Soviet population got a temporary bonanza in meat. The gap has remained somewhat similar since then. Today (1977) the United States has about 123 million cattle to the Soviet total of 110 million. In meat production the United States' total was 18 million metric tons in 1976 while the Soviets produced 13.4 million metric tons.<sup>36</sup> With all their efforts over the last two decades, the Soviets are only producing about 75 percent of US output in meat and they have about 45 million more mouths to feed.

Numbers are not the entire story, since the quality of the animals is more important. In quality the Soviet husbandry falls far below par. The weight of the beef cattle, the total milk output of the dairy cow, and the butterfat content of the milk, in all these factors the Soviet animal falls well below American standards. Improvement of the characteristics of Soviet livestock is bound to be a long and arduous task. The long reign of Lysenko as the absolute dictator of the science of genetics reduced the science to quackery. The peasant member of the kolkhoz shows little enthusiasm for the kolkhoz's herd, but he is deeply interested in his own cow.

This peasant's cow has been a continuing source of contention between the government and the collective farmer. The peasant finds the kolkhoz tolerable only so long as he has his own plot of land and his own cow. But it is going to be hard to improve the cattle as long as a little less than 50 percent of all cattle and over half of the milk cows belong to the individual collective farmer, or even the nonagricultural worker. Under Khrushchev's urging many kolkhozy built so-called "cow palaces" as part of the drive to put more capital investment

into the improvement of the collective's herd. The writer visited one of these "cow palaces" on a kolkhoz in Samarkand. It was a well-built structure with cement floors, good stanchions, and elaborate milking apparatus, but the inefficient use of manpower was appalling. For example, the manure was gathered, the straw removed by hand, and then it was moulded into cakes and set out on boards to dry. But at least the building and the equipment were there; the efficient use of labor may be worked out in time.

Agriculture has long been the poor orphan in the Soviet economy. Since Stalin's death, however, it has been getting a larger slice of the total capital investment; for example, the Soviets claim that total investment in agriculture increased from 2.2 billion rubles in 1953 to 8 billion rubles in 1962.<sup>37</sup> The production of mineral fertilizer, long a crying need in Soviet agriculture, was increased from 5.5 million metric tons in 1950 to 19.9 million metric tons in 1963.<sup>38</sup> The figures for 1977 point up the rapid increase in the flow of investment into agriculture: capital investment of 32.9 billion rubles and a fertilizer output of 96.7 million tons.<sup>39</sup>

One of Khrushchev's pet projects was to emulate the US corn-hog production cycle. Soviet delegations of agronomists and other experts toured the corn belt and looked into the American methods. Khrushchev himself spent some time on his American tour in 1959 getting a firsthand view of the fabulous production of corn and hogs in Kansas and Iowa. As a result, much of the rich grain land of the Ukraine was put to growing corn to increase the supply of animal feeds. *Kukuruza*, the Russian word for "corn," appears constantly in Soviet writings on agriculture and in the daily press as well. However, the low precipitation and rather short growing season in most parts of the Soviet Union has made corn growing difficult, at least up to this time. Some idea of the importance of this crop during the Khrushchev regime can be gained from the fact that an entire building at the permanent exhibition in Moscow was devoted to *kukuruza* and that area sown in corn went from 9 million acres in 1940 to 85 million acres in 1963. Since the ouster of Khrushchev, the *kukuruza* mania has subsided considerably.

The total grain area of the Soviet Union in 1953 was somewhat less than it had been before the war, although the population was constantly increasing. This is a very serious matter in a country that is dependent upon bread for its main staple. Raising the productivity per hectare turned out to be rather unsuccessful, so in 1953 the attack on the grain

<sup>37</sup>SSSR v izbrakh v 1962 godu, p. 249, quoted in Laird, *loc. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>38</sup>Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1963, p. 141.

<sup>39</sup>Pravda, 28 January 1978.

<sup>36</sup>CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, 1977, pp. 132-134.

problem was shifted to increasing the acreage. In the 1954-56 period almost 90 million acres were ploughed up in the so-called "virgin and idle lands." Most of these lands lie in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan, and the reason that they had been "virgin and idle" up to 1954 is obvious: nearly all of the land concerned lies in areas with low precipitation and has been used largely for grazing, if used at all. The land is so marginal that three good crops out of five is a normal expectation, but even this can vastly increase the grain supply of the Soviet Union.

Every appeal and all types of pressures were used to persuade young people to settle the virgin lands. Men being discharged from the armed forces were urged to become pioneers in the great project. By the end of 1956, the virgin lands in Kazakhstan alone had absorbed some 600 thousand "pioneers." But the living conditions were bad, even by Soviet standards, and the turn-over in personnel has remained a serious problem.

Khrushchev, however, did not rely entirely on the establishment of enormous sovkhozy in the arid virgin lands, nor on the emulation of the Iowa corn-hog cycle, to solve the agricultural problem. He also tried to appeal to the collective farmers by rationalizing the state procurement system and making it worth while to produce more by raising prices—especially on the less prosperous collectives.

Previous to the reforms of 1958, the state procurement of agricultural products was a complex system of outright robbery and ineffective carrot dangling. The government set up production quotas for grain, potatoes, meat, and other products that the collective farmers must raise per hectare. These compulsory deliveries were paid at a confiscatory rate. Collective farmers raising such industrial crops as hemp, cotton, or sugar beets were paid according to a graduated scale to spur the production of badly needed products. State purchases above the quota received a considerably higher price, and the prosperity of a kolkhoz depended on its extra-quota sales. Finally, the services of the machine-tractor station were paid in kind.

After Stalin's death in 1953, some of the worst features of the state procurement system were gradually eliminated. Most emphasis was put on paying extra-quota prices, and compulsory deliveries were reduced drastically. As a result the cash income of the collectives increased from 42.8 billion rubles in 1952 to 130 billion in 1958. Therefore cash distributions became possible for the peasants on the collectives. In 1952 these cash payments totaled 12.4 billion rubles and rose to 42.2

billion rubles by 1956.<sup>40</sup> Since 1 January 1958, the collective farmers and state farm workers have been freed from compulsory deliveries of farm products and livestock from their private plots. Selling these products in the free markets enables the peasant to appreciably increase his cash income.

In June 1958 state procurement was rationalized and a uniform price system established. Compulsory deliveries were abolished, but the government retained its power to set quotas for production per hectare. The state agreed to pay uniform prices for commodities in the various regions and also to review the prices annually. The annual price adjustments seek to insure some stability in farm income, although the policy looks like capitulation to the capitalist law of supply and demand. Premium prices were abolished, and with the end of the machine-tractor station, so were payments in kind. The new system favors the less prosperous collectives since the abolition of premium payments came as a blow to those growing industrial crops. But Khrushchev, in a speech to the Plenum of the Central Committee, claimed that many collectives raising industrial crops were being overpaid per unit of a commodity in comparison with the smaller collectives.<sup>41</sup> In addition the new decree promised the establishment of uniform prices for farm machinery, petroleum, and fertilizer for all types of farms.<sup>42</sup>

The abolition of the machine-tractor station in itself was a step that might well have caused Stalin to turn in his newly-dug grave. Khrushchev, however, stated that it was time to get rid of "two bosses on the land." There were several factors that made this drastic move feasible: the increase in the size of the farms, the strengthened Party apparatus in the rural areas, and finally a desire to sop up some of the collective's cash by giving it something to invest in and thus avoid inflation. By mid-1959 most of the collectives owned their own machinery.

A bumper crop in 1958, the Soviets claimed a total grain harvest of 141.2 million metric tons, seems to have made Khrushchev over-optimistic about the future growth of agriculture and he began to make reckless promises. He talked about catching up with the United States in the per capita production of meat, butter, and milk by 1960 or 1961. This meant the production of 70 million tons of milk and 20 million tons of meat. The euphoria of the 1957-1958 period soon turned to bitterness as agricultural production leveled off in the next five years to be followed by the catastrophic failure in 1963 when grain production fell to 107 million

<sup>40</sup> Lazar Volin, *op. cit.*, p. 39 (Figures in old rubles, i.e. worth one-tenth of new ruble.)

<sup>41</sup> *Pravda*, June 18, 1958.

<sup>42</sup> Decree of the Council of Ministers, *Pravda*, July 1, 1958.



metric tons, according to Soviet figures which were probably exaggerated, and Soviet buyers had to fan out over the world to buy up 12 million tons of grain.

Khrushchev began to seek ways of getting agriculture out of the doldrums, but his remedies were mostly organizational. He reorganized the Ministry of Agriculture in an attempt to make it actually carry the latest in scientific techniques to the grass-roots level. He set up a new State Procurement Committee to handle purchases more efficiently and also to supervise agriculture at the farm level. To replace the gap left by the abolition of the MTSs, a new organization, the All-Union Farm Machinery Association (*Soyuzselkhoztekhnika*) was set up. This outfit acted as a liaison between the farm and the agricultural machinery manufacturers and also took over the farm machinery repair centers.

Reorganization after reorganization seemed to do little good. Then Khrushchev again went in for extending the acreage under crops, this time at the expense of fallow lands and those planted in grasses. For example, fallow land decreased from 40 million acres in 1961 to 15.7 million acres in 1963. In June 1962 the government announced an increase of 30 percent in the price of meat and 25 percent for butter in an attempt to make it worthwhile for the collective farmers to raise more livestock—they were actually losing money on every pound of meat prior to the price increases. But public dismay was widespread, and there were even riots and bloodshed in many areas.

Finally, in November 1962 Khrushchev resorted to the really desperate remedy of splitting the Party into industrial and agricultural branches. His reasoning was that the Party leaders on the local, rayon, and oblast levels had to divide their time between industrial and agricultural duties and did neither well as a consequence. Now they could specialize in one field or the other.

By the autumn of 1964 Khrushchev's colleagues in the Presidium had had enough of Nikita's *ad hoc* solutions in agriculture, industry, and foreign affairs and they ousted him. The new leadership in November 1964 cancelled Khrushchev's division of the Party into agricultural and industrial sections and also encouraged the collective farmers to expand their private plots and increase their livestock holdings, both of which Nikita had frowned upon.

Khrushchev's attempts to increase agricultural output drastically was probably doomed from the start. He realized that the Soviet population was increasing at a rate that made increased farm output a necessity. Furthermore, the urban population was clamoring for a more varied diet, especially for

more meat, dairy products, eggs, vegetables, and fruit. His attempt to solve the dilemma through the expansion of the area under cultivation plus the advocacy of more corn as animal feed went sour by the beginning of the 1960s. When he tried to get his colleagues to go along in a drastic increase in the chemical industry in order to get more fertilizer and tried to persuade them to put more investment capital into the farm machinery industry, he ran up against too many vested-interests. This outlay in capital would mean a curtailment in funds for heavy industry and the military, and they were not about to buy it.

Perhaps, however, the fundamental reason for Khrushchev's failure was the fact that all his moves to increase agricultural output had to be made within the framework of collectivized agriculture. The large kolkhozy and sovkhozy are not efficient agricultural units as they are too overburdened with bureaucrats and provide insufficient incentives for the man on the bottom, the individual collective farmer. The fact that much of the Soviet production of meat, milk, eggs, vegetables, and fruit comes from the private plot of the collective farmer demonstrates where his heart is and where he puts his best efforts. Khrushchev's measures did remove some of the worst aspects of collectivized agriculture, but they were only home nostrums administered to a patient who requires major surgery.

**Soviet agriculture since Khrushchev.**—Five months after Khrushchev's exit, a plenary session of the Central Committee was convened in Moscow to deal with the agricultural problem. Brezhnev, the Party chief, delivered the main address and suggested some relatively drastic measures aimed at curing the number-one headache of the Soviet economy.<sup>43</sup> He began by damning the Khrushchev program, pointing out that the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) was supposed to increase the gross agricultural output by 70 percent, but in fact agricultural production had only gone up 10 percent in the first six years of the plan. Grain production was the sorriest of the failures. But animal husbandry was also far behind the plan figures—the number of pigs, sheep, and poultry had actually declined. One cause of these troubles was the improper handling of procurements, according to Brezhnev. Sometimes prices did not cover the cost of production.

Brezhnev then described a new strategy for boosting agricultural production. First, procurement plans were to be set for the next six years (1965-70) and the prices to be paid were to be increased substantially. Grain purchases made by

<sup>43</sup>Pravda, 27 March 1965, pp. 2-4

the state above the procurement plans would receive a price 50 percent higher than that procured according to the plan. Second, some grains, called "groats" by the Soviets, such as rice, buckwheat, and millet, were to receive much higher prices in the future in order to encourage wider planting. Third, livestock procurement plans would also be fixed over the next six years and prices raised from 30 to 70 percent according to the type of meat and the geographical location of the farm. Fourth, the new Five-Year Plan (1966-70) envisaged a 71 billion ruble investment of state resources and collective farm funds in agriculture. This was to be used for construction, an increase in the production of farm machinery, and other investments aimed at upping production. The tractor production goal by 1970 was set at 625,000 units a year, thus delivering 1,700,000 tractors to the farms during the Five-Year Plan. Grain combines were to be upped from 84,000 a year to 125,000 annually by 1970. Finally, during the Five-Year Plan some 7.5 million acres of land were to be irrigated and 15 million acres of soggy soil to be drained.

Brezhnev, it would seem, promised too much. Other demands on the budget, such as the military build-up, heavy industry, and foreign adventures, made mock of his grandiose plans for agriculture. For example, only 459,000 tractors were produced in 1970 and grain combine output came to only 99,000 units. And in the Report on the results of the Five-Year Plan (1966-70), nothing was said about the total investment in agriculture.<sup>44</sup> Grain production, the key item in Soviet agriculture, was erratic between 1965 and 1970: 120 million tons in 1965; 170 million tons in 1966; 147 million tons in 1967; 169 million tons in 1968; 160 million tons in 1969; and 186 million tons in 1970.<sup>45</sup> Meat production, a very sore point with the Soviet public, stayed almost stagnant during the first four years of the Five-Year Plan: 1966: 10.7 million tons; 1967: 11.5 million tons; 1968: 11.6 million tons; and 1969: 11.6 million tons.<sup>46</sup>

If the results of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70) were less than breathtaking, there was the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) to look forward to and again grandiose targets were set up for agriculture. But the rosy plans of the Brezhnev leadership for grain production during the Ninth Plan, namely an average yearly output of 196 million tons, were shattered by two shortfalls, the mediocre harvest of 168 million tons in 1972 and the disastrous failure, 140 million tons, in 1975. In spite of a record harvest of 222 million tons in 1973, the average for the Ninth

Plan came to only 181.5 million tons, some 13.5 million tons shy of the target.

Seemingly undeterred by that experience, the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) calls for an average yearly grain yield of 215-220 million tons, about 35 million tons a year more than the 1971-75 average. The increase is to come from a much more plentiful use of fertilizer, the output of which is to leap from 75 million tons in 1975 to 120 million tons by 1980, or an increase of over 9 percent a year.<sup>47</sup>

Tractor production is to total 1.9 million during the Tenth Five-Year Plan, or an average of 380,000 units a year. Furthermore, the average horsepower is to be increased from the 76 horsepower of 1976 to 93 by 1980. But the target in the Ninth Plan was to attain an average of 93 horsepower by 1975. Since Soviet tractors do not wear too well, it has been a major headache trying to build up an adequate park of machines—the Soviets see the need for some 3.2 million tractors. For example, the retirement rate for tractors over the late 1960s and early 1970s was 12 percent a year. If that rate keeps up, the 1.9 million tractors planned for the Tenth Plan will be offset by the retirement of 1.4 million units. The Soviet tractor park came to 2.4 million machines in 1975 (versus a US park of 4.2 million units).<sup>48</sup>

Another scheme of Brezhnev to get more production out of agriculture is the so-called Non-Black Soil Zone plan. This term applies to the less fertile, but better watered, section of the European RSFSR which lies to the north of the *chernozym* region. By draining the bogs and with generous application of fertilizer as well as favored treatment in the allotment of machinery, it is hoped that grain production in the area can be raised from the 19 million ton output of 1975 to 31 million tons by 1980. Comparable results are hoped for in the production of meat, milk, and potatoes.<sup>49</sup>

The main problems of Soviet agriculture are not beyond solution, but they will not be solved in a single five-year plan. For example, because of the USSR's northerly location, almost every aspect of agriculture takes more effort and costs more than similar activities in a more favored climatic environment such as the United States. Animal husbandry, which suffered such neglect for twenty-five years under Stalin and which was victimized by Lysenko's genetic quackery, can be expanded only

<sup>44</sup>*Pravda*, 4 February 1971.

<sup>45</sup>*Pravda*, 3 February 1966, 29 January 1967, 25 January 1968, 26 January 1969, 25 January 1970, and 4 February 1971.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup>This discussion of the immediate past and the future of Soviet agriculture is based largely on David W. Carey, "Soviet Agriculture: Recent Performance and Future Plans," in Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, GPO, 1976, pp. 575-99.

<sup>48</sup>Discussion of tractors largely based on Earl M. Rubenking, "The Soviet Tractor Industry: Progress and Problems," in *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, pp. 600-619.

<sup>49</sup>Carey, pp. 593-94.

with large investments in buildings, storage facilities, and transport.<sup>50</sup>

More efficient use of labor is another long-term nagging problem the Soviets face in their efforts to improve agriculture. The young and the ambitious tend to leave the farms and migrate to the urban areas. The result is that the agricultural population is now 65 percent female, and rather elderly at that. In 1975, only 4.6 percent of the US labor force was in agriculture while the Soviet Union was using over 25 percent of its labor force on the land.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, the days when Soviet industry could tap the rural areas for prodigious quantities of labor are gone. More machinery, more fertilizer and better use of it, and better farming practices may allow an eventual reduction in the size of the agrarian labor force, but it will take time.

That the present regime is serious about improving agriculture cannot be doubted. The agrarian catastrophe of 1975 shocked the Soviet leaders into all-out efforts to solve the agrarian dilemma. After all, they had to import some 25 million tons of grain in 1976, a disastrous drain on their foreign currency and gold reserves. In addition, to point up how serious they were, they even signed an agreement to import some eight million tons of American grain a year over the next five years. Finally, since about one-fifth of the Soviet GNP is derived from agriculture, any serious shortfall in that sector of the economy is a real blow to the economy as a whole.

<sup>50</sup>James R. Millar, "The Prospects for Soviet Agriculture," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1977, p. 10.

<sup>51</sup>Millar, p. 8.

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# BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET UNION

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## Soviet Education

**I**N THE OFFICIAL contest between the United States and the Soviet Union for world leadership, the technological lead of the United States seemed unassailable. But in October 1957 the Soviet "first" in launching its Sputnik into orbit shocked most Americans and jolted American scientific prestige around the world. There has been an agonizing reappraisal going on ever since, and the focal point of this national stock-taking is education. A sea of ink has been used in thrashing out the pro's and con's of American education versus the Soviet system. Even the formerly impregnable bastions of the educators have been shaken.

The Sputnik shock, of course, led to a gross over-estimation of the virtues of the Soviet educational system and resulted in an inordinate amount of praise for the Soviets and condemnations of the "permissive" American schools. But it would seem, however, that a comparison of the two systems is not only difficult, but in some ways impossible. The fundamental objectives of the two educational systems are so diametrically at variance that comparisons are meaningless. As one authority has pointed out:

Twin concepts underlie all Soviet education, including teacher education: the use of the schools and higher education facilities as a form of ideological control and the centralization of all educational systems under state domination.<sup>1</sup>

In the United States education is under local control and there are enough pressure groups with political clout to prevent ideological monopoly. Furthermore, right from the nursery school up Soviet education puts enormous stress on the "collective" aspect of life, while in the United States the "individual" is the main emphasis.

This chapter is concerned with a brief description of the Soviet system of education, and value judgments are kept to a minimum. Comparisons between the American and Soviet systems, when necessary, will be largely quantitative, not

qualitative. Furthermore, there is insufficient information about the details of Soviet education upon which to judge its quality with any exactitude.

Put another way, Soviet education has two main goals: First to instill in the student those values and outlooks encompassed in the term, the "new Soviet man," or from the viewpoint of Soviet leaders, the development of good citizens. Second, to provide training in those subjects which best advance the economic and military interests of the state. However, the Soviet leaders do not want a generation of citizens trained to act and think independently and prepared to analyze and evaluate the adequacies and inadequacies of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology and as a basis for a system of government.

### 43. Development of Soviet Education

The tsarist regime in the latter part of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries was not very interested in universal education, particularly among the peasants, the largest group in Russia. But the picture of Russian education was not as dark as the Communists have painted it. For instance, Russian higher education was excellent, and to some extent the Soviet regime enjoyed that inheritance until recently. As early as 1864 the supervision of local schools was entrusted to zemstvos, local groups in charge of such things as health, statistics, and scientific agriculture. By 1914 there were around 50,000 zemstvo schools. Furthermore, there were plans for universal education by 1922.

Lenin's father, Ilya Nikolaevich Ulyanov, managed to graduate from the University of Kazan. Ilya Nikolaevich, the son of a tailor, became a teacher and later an inspector of the schools in Simbirsk Province. His elevation to the nobility well rewarded him for his arduous labor. It is true that Ilya Nikolaevich was an unusual man, but his career refuted the extremely dark picture painted by the Bolsheviks.

By 1914 the educational situation was improving steadily. At least half of the eligible children were in

<sup>1</sup> Donald K. Sharpe, "Eye witness Report: Soviet Teacher Education," *Journal of Teacher Education* X, XXIV, No. 1 (Spring 1973), p. 113.

primary schools. Illiteracy among the peasants was very high, but the future was bright. Even budgetary plans had been made for a rapid expansion of the educational system. All this, of course, was a casualty of World War I and the following revolutions.

For the first ten years of Bolshevik rule Soviet education was in a state of chaos. The seven years of war and revolutions had torn the social fabric of Russian society to tatters, and the leaders of the country were determined to make a new society divorced from its tsarist heritage. It was a wild period of experimentation in which all kinds of theories—good, bad, and crackpot—were tried. Classroom discipline disappeared, and the teacher resembled a referee in the midst of unruly pupils. In a morbid attempt to get away from anything traditional and authoritarian, emphasis was put on group action, brigade work, and social adjustment.

By the early 1930s Stalin had consolidated his control of the state, inaugurated the First Five-Year Plan, and realized that the new industries needed many scientists, engineers, and technicians, as well as a literate labor force. He began to bring some order into the chaotic educational system, ending the era of experimentation. Moreover, the authoritarian Stalin saw nothing wrong with the traditional Russian educational methods. The teacher again became the classroom dictator who stressed memorization, rote recitation, and heavy homework. Stalin needed many technically trained people, so he tailored the school system to educate them.

The biggest problem was the shortage of competent teachers. All kinds of solutions were attempted, such as accelerated courses to train teachers, the use of industrial scientists and engineers as part-time teachers, and even the use of upper-grade students to teach those in the lower grades. These expedients, however, were marginal at best and in many cases simply disastrous. Finally Stalin reverted to the slower, but more effective, system of training large numbers of teachers by

requiring four or five years of higher education. The best graduates in each higher school were reinvested, so to speak, by making them into teachers. By the end of the 1930s the Soviet educational system was turning out enough well-trained teachers to meet its needs.

Theoretically, the Soviet system provided education for all, from the nursery for ten-week old infants to schools for adults. But obtaining an education was not as simple as that. Many Soviet citizens found getting their share of education rather difficult, especially if they lived in rural areas, were not quite as brilliant as their comrades, or had intellectual bents that did not coincide with the state's objectives. In spite of these drawbacks, the Soviet Union developed an enormous public school system, in many respects similar to that of the United States.

Until 1959 the Soviet educational system was organized on a four-seven-ten year breakdown in the general education schools, often called respectively primary, incomplete secondary, and complete secondary schools. The pupil entered the primary, or four-year school, at the age of seven, and then went on to the incomplete secondary, or seven-year school. All children were supposed to go through at least the seven-year school, although in many rural areas this was merely an aim rather than a reality, as the facilities were lacking for seven-year education. Upon graduation from the seven-year school, the student had three choices: he could work, enter a specialized technical school, called a technicum, or attend the ten-year school in preparation for higher education. If he elected to go to the ten-year school, grades eight through ten, he would carry a heavy college preparatory load. Upon graduation from the ten-year school, the pupil was eligible to take the entrance exams for college.

In the years between 1928 and 1958 the number of schools and the students attending them increased very rapidly. The number of general education schools was almost doubled, the number of technicums tripled, and the number of universities

TABLE 7  
NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN SOVIET SCHOOLS\*

Students (thousands)	1960-61	1966-67	1970-71	1974-75	1977-78
Kindergarten & Nurseries	3,115	9,000	9,300	11,000	13,000
General Secondary	36,187	49,000	49,000	49,000	45,500
Technicums	2,000	4,200	4,400	4,500	4,700
Vocational-Technical			2,500	2,200	1,700
Higher Educ Institutions	2,396	4,300	4,600	4,800	5,000

\* *Narodnoye Obrazovanie SSSR v 1967 godu*, pp. 555-556, *Izvestiya*, 25 January 1968, *Pravda*, 4 February 1971, 25 January 1975, 28 January 1978.

quintupled. The number of students increased even faster. The enrollment in the general education schools rose from around 11 million in 1928 to over 31 million in 1958. The number of students in the technicums increased from about 200,000 in 1928 to 1,875,000 in 1958, and the total number of university students rose from 176,000 to 2,178,000 in the same period (Table 7).

Beginning in 1959 a great deal of confusion has developed in the general education system. Khrushchev, in September 1958, presented a speech to the Presidium of the Central Committee entitled "On the Strengthening of the Ties Between School and Life and on the Further Development of Public Education." After considerable discussion, Khrushchev's theses were approved by the Supreme Soviet in December 1958.

Under the new scheme the 7-year incomplete secondary and the 10-year complete secondary schools became respectively 8-year and 11-year "general education labor-polytechnical schools with production training." The goal was compulsory education for all through the 8-year school and education through grades 9 through 11 was for most Soviet citizens to be by extension and evening schools. Up to 80 percent of those accepted in the higher educational institutions had to show evidence that in addition to having completed their secondary education they had also worked at least two years or had served in the armed forces. The other 20 percent admitted were to be talented students who had been allowed to continue through secondary school without working.

"The ties between school and life" were to be strengthened by including a good deal of "polytechnical" education in the new program. Although the Soviet educationalists tried to put the "polytechnical" aspect on a high plane, it really boiled down to vocational training in industrial and agricultural production.

Why had Khrushchev decided to drastically alter the Soviet general education system? The Soviet propagandist have pointed proudly to their schools as models of socialist efficiency. For several years the announced goal has been a ten-year education for all by 1960, and the steadily increasing number of secondary-school graduates made the accomplishment of that aim ever more probable. There must have been some weighty reasons behind Khrushchev's new look.

The first reason, and one agreed upon by most scholars, is demographic: a decrease in the birth rate and the high infant mortality rate during World War II was beginning to affect the industries, farms, and armed forces. The annual crop of 18-year-olds badly needed in the labor force began to shrink in 1957 and continued to decline. This deficit in young people remained a severe problem until 1965. One

figure from the 1959 census shows the essence of the problem: there were only 8.2 million in the 10- to 15-year age group in 1959, compared with 14.9 million in 1939, or a drop of 40 percent.<sup>2</sup> Thus at the time when the Seven-Year Plan called for a steady expansion of industry, the young people needed in industry were in short supply. Khrushchev's answer was to cut down on the length of the educational period so that more young people could enter the labor force on the theory that muscles today are more important than skilled brainpower tomorrow. In the dilemma between the nonfulfillment of the plan and short-changing education, the plan had been chosen.

Nicholas DeWitt, an outstanding authority on Soviet education, contends that a conflict has been steadily growing between state planning and the option of the individual to develop his own potential.<sup>3</sup> If every child is allowed to decide whether he shall complete the ten-year school and go on to higher education, the plans demanding large numbers of unskilled and semiskilled workers may be jeopardized. The Soviet leaders have always used such devices as examinations, quotas, and at times sheer compulsion to keep trained cadres flowing into the desired channels. But they have also held out the carrot that the individual could develop himself to the limits of his own capability. The goal of a ten-year education for all was a step in that direction. Even the promise held out in Article 121 of the 1936 Constitution was changed by inserting the weasel words that education shall be "based on the principle of the tie between education and life and production." This amendment was passed in 1958 in line with Khrushchev's new look.

There can be no doubt that the curriculum of the complete secondary school solely prepares students for higher education. The graduates are not trained in manual skills. For years there has been agitation for more "polytechnization"—to use the word derived from the Russian—that is, more manual skills, a closer connection between industry, agriculture, and transport and the educational system. When the number of students completing the ten-year school was about equivalent to the vacancies in higher educational institutions, the problem was easy. But as the number of graduates began to grow to the extent that there were three or four applicants for every vacancy in the universities and institutes, trouble followed. For example, in the autumn of 1959 the higher educational institutions accepted around 229,000 full-time students in their day divisions, and in the spring some 1.4 million persons received their diplomas from the complete

<sup>2</sup>Pravda, 4 February 1960.

<sup>3</sup>Nicholas DeWitt, "Uphaval in Education," *Problems of Communism*, VIII, No. 1 (January-February, 1959), pp. 25-34.

secondary schools.<sup>4</sup> This meant that there were about six applicants for every vacancy in the higher educational institutions, or to put it another way, five out of every six graduates must go to work, enter a technicum, or wait a year to take the entrance examinations again. The problem of "waiting a year" irritated Khrushchev very much. These one-year loafers, living off their families, had contempt for manual labor, and Khrushchev resented their attitude toward "socially useful labor." The government, however, tried to correct this situation by emphasizing previous employment as a prerequisite for admission to higher educational institutions. In the autumn of 1959, of those accepted in the day divisions of higher educational institutions, 122,000 or 49 percent had worked at least two years after graduation from the ten-year schools.<sup>5</sup>

Another reason for the revolution in secondary education was Khrushchev's objective to weaken the power of the managerial elite, as opposed to the Party bureaucracy. The managerial elite had been able to perpetuate itself because the children of its members had been getting the best education in the Soviet Union. A "gilded youth" had developed not only a contempt for manual labor but also for the classes that performed it. If the Party was to retain control, the managerial elite must not be allowed to dominate the educational system.

Just how enthusiastic the education people were about Khrushchev's so-called "reforms" is hard to say. The Soviet system does not encourage frank opposition to the leader's pet ideas. The President of the Academy of Sciences did point out that the most productive years in scientific training are precisely those during which, under the new system, the student might be forced to put in a two-year stint driving a tractor or running a drill-press. Needless to say, the managerial elite did not look with pleasure upon this treatment of their children, the same ones that Khrushchev referred to as *byeloruchki*, the "white handed ones." Soviet sociologists came up in 1965 with the statistic that the son of a white-collar worker was about eight times more likely to get into an institution of higher learning than the son of an agricultural worker; 89 percent of the *byeloruchki* who wanted to go on to higher education did so, while only 13 percent of the children of agricultural workers were able to fulfill their ambitions.<sup>6</sup> It would seem that the managerial elite had managed to circumvent Khrushchev's "reforms."

On 13 August 1964 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR announced that beginning 1 September 1964 the 11-year system would revert to the old 10-year system.<sup>7</sup> The increased vocational training in the 11-year system had been a flop. By and large, the on-the-job training had been expensive and useless. Factory managers had either gone to great expense to train apprentices, most of whom never came back after graduation, or else they provided menial jobs that included no adequate training. Thus on the eve of Khrushchev's ouster, his pet educational reforms were being openly attacked. The last graduation from the 11-year school took place in 1966.

The Directives of the Twenty-third Party Congress CPSU in 1966 called for the completion of the transition to universal, or ten-year, secondary education by 1970. Also in 1966 an All-Union Ministry of Education was established to replace the Union-Republic ministries of education, that is, more centralization. Simultaneously the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (the de facto main teacher-training and educational experimentation institution in the Soviet Union) was made the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR. The new regime that had ousted Khrushchev in October 1964 had no intention of throwing the baby out with the bath and insisted that Soviet education must continue to stress labor training and polytechnic education along with general secondary education. In 1969, after much experimentation, the four-year primary school was shortened to three years, and the ten-year school system was now based on a three-five-two system, or three-year primary, five-year lower secondary, and two-year upper secondary school.

The Twenty-fourth Party Congress (March-April 1971) adopted another resolution concerning the completion of the transition to universal secondary education and the further development of general education. And a little more than a year later (June 1972) still another resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Party Central Committee called upon all concerned to put their shoulders to the wheel and shove harder in striving to attain the goal announced by the Twenty-fourth Party Congress. The resolution noted that because of increases in the number of secondary schools and qualified teachers, the conditions for completing the transition to universal secondary education were now ripe.

The resolution instructed the Ministry of Education and the Union-Republic Councils of Ministers to do everything possible to carry out the transition. As it was phrased in the resolution, the

<sup>4</sup>Pravda, 22 January 1960.

<sup>5</sup>Christian Science Monitor, 24 July 1965.

<sup>6</sup>Pravda, 13 August 1964, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>U. I. Tomak, *The Soviet Union*, Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1972, p. 26.



educational authorities were enjoined to carry out the following tasks:

Educational agencies and Party, Soviet and public organizations have been instructed to take steps for the more complete inclusion of young people in secondary education, to develop and perfect the general education school as a labor and polytechnical school that is the basic form of obtaining a general secondary education, resolutely to improve the work of evening (shift) and correspondence general education schools, to create the necessary conditions for working young people to complete their secondary education, and, in conjunction with vocational technical and specialized secondary educational agencies, to ensure a high level of general education training in the secondary vocational technical schools and technicums.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the goal of every young person completing ten-year secondary school or its equivalent, the Twenty-fourth Party Congress' resolution called for a "new look" at curricula, teaching methods, and more extensive use of graphic aids. The June 1972 resolution stated that the "introduction of new study plans and syllabuses in all the school courses is to be completed by 1975."<sup>10</sup>

For the next five years the constant chant in the Soviet media was "complete the transition to universal secondary education." But as late as early 1978, the completion of the transition was still under way, especially in the rural areas of the USSR.

M. A. Prokofyev, Minister of Education USSR, stated in January 1977 that during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) about 23 million young people will finish incomplete secondary school (eight-year school); of these, 8.5 million will enter specialized secondary or vocational-technical schools and the rest will enter the ninth grade. Furthermore, about 14 million will finish complete secondary school in that period and 6.5 million will go on to higher educational institutions, specialized secondary schools or technical schools, while about 7.5 million will take jobs.<sup>11</sup>

#### 44. Organization of the Soviet Primary and Secondary Schools

The Soviet educational system is organized in an ascending order, from the nursery to post-doctoral work in the Academy of Sciences. Since 1971 the oft-stated target is that everyone become graduate of the complete secondary school or its equivalent.

Every student upon leaving the eighth grade is supposedly entitled to one of three options: continuation through the ninth and tenth grades of the regular ten-year school, transfer to a specialized secondary school, or entry into a vocational-technical school. In the last few years there has been a concerted drive to inject into the specialized secondary and vocational-technical schools general educational subjects so that they may be more and more the equivalent of the ten-year secondary school. Every encouragement is given to young people to continue their education until the equivalent of a complete secondary education has been attained.

**Preschool education.** The Soviet Union has a rather elaborate preschool system, partly because it takes two salaries to sustain the average Soviet family, thus making it mandatory for most mothers to work. Therefore, the preschool system vitally affects the family budget and also makes recruiting the necessary labor force for the state much easier. As a result, the preschool institutions operate on an all-year basis.

A system of nurseries (*yashi*), or crèches as they are often called, is operated in most plants under the supervision of the Ministry of Health for the care of the very young children, from ten-weeks to three years of age. The nurseries have no educational function, but merely care for the child while the mother works. The children from three to seven years attend kindergartens, if one is available. The usual preschool methods are used, namely supervised play and some training in drawing and music. A good deal of controversy exists among Soviet educators on the advisability of teaching the alphabet and the rudiments of reading in the kindergartens. However, the main function of the kindergarten, as in the case of the nursery, is to take care of the child so that the mother can work.

Most observers are favorably impressed by the Soviet preschool education facilities and teaching. The nurseries, however, are not nearly so popular as the kindergartens. Soviet parents, like parents everywhere, would rather be in personal charge of the upbringing of their children during the first two or three years. Once the child has reached three, however, there seems much less reluctance to sending him to preschool. Statistics would seem to bear out this observation since the kindergartens have waiting lists while the nurseries are not filled as a general rule.

One of the goals of the preschool training is to make the child "collective-minded," to induce the child to submerge his individuality into the group, the "collective." From what can be gathered from outside observers, the process is relatively

<sup>9</sup>On "Completing the Transition to Universal Secondary Education of Young People and the Further Development of General Education" (Passage 25 June 1972 as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXIV, No. 25, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 29 January 1977.

successful. The worst punishment the child can get is to be isolated from the collective.<sup>11</sup>

**Primary or three-year school.** The Soviet child begins regular schooling at the age of seven in the primary school of the general education system. The primary school is usually located in the same building as the other grades of the incomplete secondary school or the complete secondary school. In some rural areas, however, the primary school may be the only educational institution readily available.

The primary school is mainly concerned with teaching the pupil to read, calculate, and gain an elementary knowledge of the natural sciences through his reading program. The pupil usually has the same teacher for the first three years so that she becomes acquainted with the child and his parents to help in the evaluation of the pupil's strengths and weaknesses, and the way that the home environment affects the pupil's problems.

The combination of reducing the primary school from four to three years, which meant in practice the attempt to accomplish the four-year workload in three years, and the revision of the curriculum with new text books and other educational materials, has resulted in great confusion. Under the old system, memorization and repetition were stressed, while the new system calls for less rote and more understanding of why things happen as they do. The "new math," for example, is an attempt to get the pupil to understand the *why* of mathematics, not just the memorization of a plethora of rules and axioms. Needless to say, many teachers object to the "new look" and in many cases, it would seem, the new ways have turned out badly.

The teachers, one would gather from the Soviet press, have tended to increase the homework load in primary school to make up for the year that was lost in the reorganization. Since the Soviet pupil already carried a heavy homework load, the new burden led parents, doctors, and even some teachers to advocate a reduction in the homework load. As the child goes to school six days a week, even the weekend is not much of a rest from the homework load. The Council of Ministers in 1970 limited homework to a maximum of one hour a day in the first grade up to four hours a day in the tenth grade. But many primary school teachers ignore the ruling and continue to pile on the homework, often two or three hours a day.<sup>12</sup>

**Incomplete secondary or eight-year school.** In the eight-year school, the subjects become more specialized, and each subject is handled by a different teacher. Natural sciences are taught

individually, and geography and history are introduced as separate subjects. Foreign languages are also introduced in the fourth grade, and the pupil elects one language to study for the next five or six years. The choices are English, German, French, and Spanish, although not all schools have teachers for these languages.

Completion of the eight-year school used to be the end of formal education for many. It is now to be the point at which the students selects the type of training he wants during the next few years of his educational career. Many, however, still have to complete their secondary education through extension courses or via correspondence. In spite of all the agitation in the press, resolutions by Party and Government, and high-flown speeches at high-level gatherings, the eight-year school is the end of the educational line for many in the rural areas.

**Complete secondary or ten-year school.** The complete secondary school prepares the student for higher education. He continues his courses in history, natural sciences, foreign languages, Russian language and literature, and mathematics. At the end of the tenth grade he must pass a series of examinations to be eligible for graduation. The examinations are either written or oral, or a combination of the two. They are administered by a board made up of teachers, the director of the school, and representatives of the educational administration. If the student passes the examinations, he is granted a certificate of maturity and is eligible to take the entrance examinations for one of the higher education institutions.

**Curriculum of the general education schools.** In the non-Russian republics, autonomous republics and lesser national areas, there are usually two parallel school systems: those in which the non-Russian native language is the vehicle for instruction and where Russian is taught as a second language, and those in which Russian is the main language of instruction. But the curriculum except for the language is standard throughout the USSR.

Soviet elementary and secondary education differs from the American system in many ways, but two differences are especially evident. First, the entire system is highly centralized and uniform standards are established. For example, the same textbooks, teaching methods, and examinations are used from Leningrad to Vladivostok. Although such rigid standardization may have drawbacks, it does allow the Soviet planners to assume that the graduates of secondary schools will meet certain minimum standards. Second, the stress on mathematics and sciences is much greater in the Soviet elementary and secondary schools than it is in American schools. Out of slightly more than 10,000 hours of instruction in the old ten-year

<sup>11</sup>For an excellent first-hand account of the Soviet preschool system, see Susan Jacobs, *Inside Soviet Schools*, New York, Hill & Wang, 1974, especially chapter 1.

<sup>12</sup>Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

system, over 2,000 hours were spent in mathematics. Only the Russian language and literature got more emphasis. Soviet educators do not believe in "general" courses, for example, general science. The motto is "learn the fundamentals" of each science. Biology is taught in the fourth grade through the ninth grade; while physics is begun in the sixth grade and continues through the tenth grade; chemistry is taught in the seventh grade through the tenth grade; and a course in astronomy is given in the tenth grade.

The curriculum for the general schools vividly demonstrates the Soviet view that education is primarily for the development of the state, not the individual. The whole program is aimed toward getting an individual who is imbued with the value of Marxist-Leninist society and is available for use in technological development of the national economy. Over 40 percent of the curriculum is devoted to science and mathematics, and the humanities heavily stress Marxist doctrine. For example, all history courses form ancient to modern times show the Marxian evolution of social institutions.

On the other hand, the Soviet pupil gets a consistent survey of history from the earliest times to the present, with emphasis on chronology, names, geography, and facts. Soviet pedagogy does not regard the child's memory as a fragile instrument to be protected from use. Even in the first grade mathematics is treated as one of the facts of life, something that cannot be avoided and does not need to be sugar-coated in its presentation. Therefore, all graduates of the tenth grade have mastered arithmetic, algebra, plane geometry, and trigonometry. The study of foreign languages is mandatory through the upper grades.

How well US education in the public schools measures up to Soviet education in the general schools is hard to say. As Mrs. Jacoby points out, the quality of Soviet education varies with the school and the region, or even with the teacher and principal. The American tendency in the early 1960s to see the Soviet education system as ideally designed to turn out oodles of excellent scientists, technicians and engineers was a very dubious assumption. Mrs. Jacoby quotes a school administrator in Latvia as complaining that the lavish praise bestowed upon the Soviet educational system by Americans in the early post-Sputnik period led the Soviet educators to rest on their laurels. Thus the American educational reforms led eventually to a Soviet counter-response in educational catch-up reforms that are still going on.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

The overall quantitative picture in Soviet general-education schools is impressive. In the 1975-76 school year, according to the Minister of Education Prokofyev, there were 149,500 general-education day schools: 51,000 complete secondary, 48,000 incomplete secondary, 48,000 primary, and 2,500 others. Some 43 million youngsters were enrolled in those schools.<sup>14</sup> The Plan Fulfillment figures for 1977 give the total in general-education schools as 45.4 million.<sup>15</sup>

*Specialized secondary schools.*—The specialized secondary schools come in many varieties, but basically they are middle-grade professional schools in which semi-professional workers are trained in everything from dental assistants and "feldshers" (doctor's assistants) to computer operators. The graduates are subprofessionals, so to speak. They are not trained to the level of engineers or doctors, but to the degree that enables them to handle jobs just below the professional level. Soviet planners have long claimed that there is need for several such technicians for every professional.

Some of the schools cater to those graduating from the eight-year schools, while others are largely peopled by ten-year school graduates who have to set their educational sights somewhat below the higher educational institution level. In 1977 there were 4.7 million people enrolled in specialized educational schools.<sup>16</sup>

*Vocational-technical schools.*—The vocational-technical schools are an outgrowth of the old factory schools where the worker was trained in some skill needed by a factory, railroad, or other branch of industry. The vocational-technical schools train mechanics, woodworkers, agricultural workers, and other types of skilled workers. Since the Party decided in late 1966 that the goal was either complete secondary education or its equivalent for all students, there has been a steady stream of admonitions to the Party authorities to beef up the status of the vocational-technical school.

Since the 1971 resolution of the Twenty-fourth Party Congress concerning the transition to universal secondary education, a good deal of effort has gone into trying to make the vocational-technical schools "respectable" through the inclusion of academic subject matter comparable to that taught in the ten-year schools. The graduate now gets two certificates: one for vocational proficiency in, say, metal-working, lathe operation, or welding; and the other for completion of the complete secondary school.

<sup>14</sup>Izvestia, 8 July 1976.

<sup>15</sup>Pravda, 28 January 1978.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

But try as they may, the authorities do not seem able to make vocational-technical schools very popular. One reason is the lack of cooperation on the part of the plant or factory in which the training takes place. Obsolete machinery in bad repair, poor instructors, and an irritated management. In some cases principals have informed parents that if their young hopeful didn't shape up, he might end up in a vocational-technical school. The statistics would tend to bear out the general low estimate of the vocational-technical school on the part of the populace since only 1.7 million were enrolled in them in 1977.

**Special schools.**—Artistically gifted children are often sent at an early age to special schools. For example, a child who shows a special aptitude for dancing may be sent to one of the 14 ballet schools in the USSR; or if the talent is music, he is sent to a school specializing in music. The artistic phase of education is in addition to the regular academic curriculum. Upon graduation the student may go to a conservatory or art institute for further training, or go directly into concert work. The state regulates the number of artists according to the cultural plan—the circuses to go with the bread. A desire to “go on the stage” makes little difference in the Soviet cultural world.

Physically or mentally handicapped children are educated in special schools for the blind, deaf, and the mentally retarded. The schools have teachers who took special courses in the pedagogical institutes. These teachers usually receive extra pay.

**Closed secondary military schools.**—According to the official Soviet description, the closed secondary military educational institutions are designed to train students for entry into military schools. The cadet schools were established in 1943–44 to train the sons of Soviet officers killed in combat. Two types of cadet schools are the Suvorov schools, which train cadets for the army schools, and the Nakhimov schools, which prepare cadets for naval training. The naming of the schools after Suvorov, a great general during the era of Catherine the Great, and Nakhimov, an admiral in the Crimean War, is indicative of the rise in Russian nationalism. The Suvorov and Nakhimov schools are equivalent to the Soviet complete secondary schools, but with a much greater emphasis on military studies, riding, dancing, and the traditions associated with the officer corps. The number of students enrolled in the cadet schools is not tabulated in the official Soviet educational statistics.

#### 45. Higher Educational Institutions

Under the heading of “Higher Educational

Institutions,” the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* accurately defines the mission of Soviet higher education as follows: “Higher educational institutions in the USSR are educational institutions which train qualified specialists for the various branches of the national economy and culture.”<sup>17</sup> The writer might well have added the word “military” to those of “economy” and “culture.” The key word, however, is “specialist.” The average Soviet student in a higher educational institution devotes far more time to an extremely narrow field than does his counterpart in the United States. There is no equivalent of the American liberal arts program in even the 60 or so Soviet universities, let alone in the 765 or so more specialized institutes.

There were 825 institutions of higher education in 1975, and only 58 were universities, the rest being institutes. The total enrollment in institutions of higher education in the 1977 academic year was 5 million, but over half of these students were in extension and correspondence divisions, that is, part-time students.

An outstanding characteristic of Soviet higher education, as in secondary education, is its extreme emphasis on natural sciences and engineering. A quick look at the top elite of the Soviet educational system—the Academicians of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which includes the humanities—bears out this extreme emphasis on natural sciences and engineering, for the ratio is four to one against the humanities.

The system of higher education in the Soviet Union can be divided into two basic types: universities and institutes. The chief mission of approximately 60 universities is to supply a large number of the theoreticians and teachers for the higher educational institutions, and to some extent, the secondary schools. Each union republic has at least one university, but the real concentration of students—over 50,000—can be found in the universities of Moscow and Leningrad. The size of the universities varies with the population of the republics, ranging from five faculties in the universities of the smaller republics to twelve faculties in the universities of Moscow and Leningrad. A faculty is a broad division, such as a faculty for history, a faculty for biology-soils, or a philological faculty, which includes languages and literature. The faculty in turn is broken down in subdivisions called *kafedry* (literally, chairs), which are similar to the departments of American universities.

The university course usually runs five years and the graduate receives a certificate of completion

<sup>17</sup> *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. IX (2nd ed.), p. 514

instead of a formal degree.<sup>18</sup> The entrance examinations are very stiff indeed for the better universities and since the number of students graduating from the ten-year schools far exceeds the number of places available in the institutions of higher learning, the competition is murderous. For example, in 1974 the University of Moscow philological faculty had 175 vacancies and 1,200 applications.<sup>19</sup> As a result private tutors do a land-office business in preparing students for their entrance exams.

The term "institute" is generic for a variety of higher educational institutions, such as forestry schools, technical schools, and conservatories of music. Any higher educational institution can be classified as a VUZ (*vysshee uchebnoe zavedenie*), the initial letters of the Russian words for "higher educational institution." Of the more than 765 institutes, over 200 are technical institutes that train specialists for industry, transport, construction, and communications. An institute of this type is called a VTUZ (*vysshee tekhnicheskoe uchebnoe zavedenie*), or "higher technical educational institution." Most of the higher educational institutions are integrated under the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education which has jurisdiction over them in all respects — administrative, scholastic requirements, financing, and others.

The 765 VUZs listed by the Soviets probably under-counts the total. For example, well over twenty military schools are of VUZ caliber, as are some of the Higher Party Schools. But none of these are included in the official statistics of the VUZs.<sup>20</sup>

Each university is headed by a rector; each institute, by a director. The faculty is under a dean, and each department (*kafedra*) has its own head. Each institution has an academic council made up of the deans, the department heads, representatives from the Komsomol and Party organizations in the school, as well as from the plants associated with the school.

The close integration of the entire Soviet educational system differentiates it radically from that of the United States. The top officials of the Ministry of Higher Education are in constant contact with their counterparts in the other ministries and branches of the government, and thus the needs and demands of the state — military and economic — are well known to them. The top scholars of the Academy of Sciences often wear

several hats. In addition to their teaching and research activities at the Academy, they may be serving as teachers at the leading universities and institutes, as high-ranking military officers, and as advisers to various industrial planning groups. For example, a leading designer of aircraft is at the same time a member of the Academy of Sciences, a consultant to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and a teacher at the air force's Zhukovskiy Academy. His activities can be directed and coordinated at several levels, thus allowing scarce talent to be fully utilized.

Although the qualitative aspect of Soviet education is difficult to estimate with any accuracy, there seems to be an agreement among scholars that it compares very favorably with that of the United States. The solid training in mathematics and basic sciences given in the secondary schools, the incentive to avoid the draft by enrolling in higher education, and the ample rewards for proficiency in the technical fields mean that higher educational institutions have a more than adequate supply of well-trained candidates to select from. This has brought about a stiffening of the entrance examinations as well as more exacting standards for the courses given in the higher educational institutions.

During the first two years in a VTUZ, the student takes courses primarily in the basic sciences, mathematics, and nonspecialized engineering. In the next two years, he specializes to a much greater degree. His fifth year is largely taken up with his diploma project, which is similar to a master's thesis under the American system. Over 15 percent of the Soviet student's time is earmarked for physical and military instruction and for courses in Party doctrine. DeWitt uses Soviet curricula to give a time-percentile breakdown of the Soviet engineering curriculum: nonscientific and political courses, 6 to 8 percent; general sciences, 26 to 30 percent; nonspecialized engineering, 22 to 28 percent; physical training and military instruction, 6 to 10 percent.<sup>21</sup> The rest of the time is devoted to specialization.

In addition, the Soviet engineering education is very closely tied to the actual production line. During the summer after the second year, the student spends four weeks getting a general look at a plant associated with his special field. Eleven weeks of the third summer are spent observing more closely the industrial process of his specialty, and finally the summer between the fourth and fifth years is devoted to an eleven-week tour as an actual administrator in a plant dealing with his specialty.

<sup>18</sup> *Diplom ob okonchani vysshego uchebnogo zavedeniya* (diploma for finishing a higher educational institution).

<sup>19</sup> Jonathan Steele, "Moscow's Academic Rat Race," *Atlas World Press Review* February 1975, p. 58.

<sup>20</sup> Zateski, E., J. Kozlowski, H. Wignett, R. Davies, M. Berry, and R. Amann, *Science Policy in the USSR* Paris, OECD, 1969, pp. 298-299.

<sup>21</sup> Nicholas DeWitt, *Soviet Professional Manpower*, p. 119.

Obviously, this practice reduces the amount of on-the-job training between graduation and productive work. Furthermore, it provides the student with practical material for his diploma project in his fifth year.

In 1977 higher education institutions admitted 1.17 million people, but only 613,000 of them entered day divisions; that is, the other 557,000 began either extension or correspondence courses.<sup>22</sup> In other words, almost half of the five million people enrolled in higher educational institutions are part-time students. The Soviet authorities have kept and are continuing to keep a tight lid on the numbers in higher education. Since the way to the top in the Soviet Union is mostly through higher educational training, the elite is kept small and manageable.

Higher degrees in the Soviet Union are fewer and harder to get than in the United States. The best students of the higher educational institutions can apply for graduate training, called *aspirantura* in Russian, and after three or four years of study and research receive a *kandidat nauk*, or candidate of sciences degree. The three-year training consists of about one and one-half years of reading and seminar work and one and one-half years devoted to a dissertation. The candidate degree falls somewhere between the master's and doctor's degrees in the United States. Students obtaining a candidate degree may be permitted to work for a doctor's degree. Applicants for doctorates are required to submit a list of their published and unpublished works, a plan research, and evidence of competence in foreign languages. At the end of the training the candidate must submit a dissertation and demonstrate an ability to handle scientific literature in three foreign languages.

Both the candidate and doctor's degrees must be confirmed by the Supreme Attestation Committee (VAK), a division of the Ministry of Higher Education. Higher degrees can be, and have been, awarded without strict adherence to the steps outlined above, but the practice is fast disappearing. Dissertations for advanced degrees in the Soviet Union are likely to be worthwhile in the scientific fields, especially in engineering, physics, mathematics, and chemistry. But they are usually of little value in the nonscientific fields, particularly in modern history and other areas that impinge on the present and past political actions of the Party and its leaders.

The entire Soviet educational system has one goal: the production of specialists for service to the state. Ever since the beginning of the intensified

industrialization of the First Five-Year Plan and the military buildup that accompanied it, there has been a shortage of trained manpower in the Soviet Union. This has led to the extreme emphasis upon engineering and science that has already been discussed. In the early 1930s Stalin attempted an accelerated program for training a large number of engineers, but the quality was so poor that it was necessary to get back to more fundamental training. As a result, in the last two decades a very large percentage of Soviet students have been trained as teachers, the essential basis for the production of scientists, technicians, and engineers. According to the Soviets, they had a pool of 1.3 million scientific workers in 1977.

#### 46. Academy of Sciences

At the very top of the Soviet scientific world stands the Academy of Sciences. A Soviet scholar can aspire to no higher honor than to become a member of this august body. The Academy was founded in 1724 by Peter the Great as the nation's highest authority on things academic. It was designed to carry out scientific research, to solve practical problems, to advise the government, and to oversee the nation's higher education. Its role is more or less the same today, except that carrying out scientific research is of much more importance now than it was in 1724. In 1934 the Academy was moved from Leningrad to Moscow.

Since 1930 the Academy's work has been closely integrated in the national economic planning and each member spends at least two months a year fitting his work into the overall plan which has been approved by the Council of Ministers. The Academy plays a major role in Soviet technological research. It has also been in a tug-of-war in which the Party and government have continually urged more emphasis on the practical application of science to production, while the academicians have tended to stress basic research. As a result there has been a good deal of governmental interference with the Academy's internal affairs during the last thirty years.

The Academy is made up of full members, or academicians, and corresponding members, both of whom are elected to membership by the members of the Academy. Thus it is a self-perpetuating body. In 1969 the Academy had 231 academicians, 414 corresponding members and 65 foreign members.<sup>23</sup> These are the cream of the Soviet scientific community. The members form a General Assembly which in turn elects a Presidium to run the Academy between meetings of the General

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, 28 January 1978.

<sup>23</sup> *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1, p. 55.

Assembly and also elects the President of the Academy. On 25-27 November 1975, the General Assembly elected a new Presidium and also a new President, Academician Anatoly Petrovich Aleksandrov, an outstanding nuclear physicist. There is also a Chief Scientific Secretary who is the direct representative of the Party *apparatus*.

Below the Presidium and Chief Scientific Secretary there is a descending order of authority through councils, functional departments, and other organs down to the research institutes controlled by the Academy. In 1935 the Academy was put directly under the control of the Council of Ministers so that its mission could be better integrated with the overall state plans and also to insure that the applied science got proper emphasis.

The Academy was reorganized in the spring of 1961. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 9 April, issued three decrees on the coordination of scientific research affecting the Academy of Sciences. One decree abolished the State Scientific and Technical Committee of the Council of Ministers, an organization working closely with the Academy of Sciences. The second decree established a new State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work, and the third decree named M. V. Khrushchev as head of the new committee and as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.<sup>24</sup>

A few days later an article in *Pravda* briefly explained the position of the government.<sup>25</sup> It pointed out that the Soviet Union had built up a vast network of scientific research institutions which employed more than 350,000 scientific workers. For this reason, a radical reorganization of the methods of supervising this enormous structure was necessary. Better coordination of the planning of scientific research was essential in order to avoid duplication of effort.

Furthermore, the Academy of Sciences had too much administrative work because of its association with so many scientific institutions. The administrative work prevented the Academy of Sciences from resolving its long-range problems in science. The new committee, therefore, was being established to carry out the necessary coordination. In order that the Academy of Sciences might have enough time for its own research, it was instructed to relinquish control of a number of scientific institutions hitherto under its supervision and to give up control of its affiliates as well.

Beneath this rationalization loomed the fact that Khrushchev was dissatisfied with the overemphasis on "pure" science and lack of it on applied science.

Warnings in previous years indicated that the "pure" research people were not getting enough scientific achievements into industrial production fast enough. The appointment of Khrushchev, an experienced production man, and upon his death in June 1961, his replacement K. N. Rudnev, showed that his move was intended to put industry in a driving position above the scientific establishments. In other words, this part of Khrushchev's educational reforms of 1958-59 injected the factory into the schoolroom, only at the top level.

By the spring of 1963 it was amply evident that the 1961 decentralization of scientific research was not working out any better than was the 1957 decentralization of the economy. M. V. Keldysh, President of the Academy, called for more centralization and coordination in determining the basic directions of research throughout the Soviet Union, and shortly thereafter another reorganization took place reversing that of 1961. The Academy was reestablished as the mainspring of the Soviet scientific endeavor. The Academy, hitherto divided into eight divisions, was now reorganized into fifteen divisions: mathematics, general physics, nuclear physics, physical-technical problems of energy, earth sciences, mechanics and control processes, general chemistry, physical chemistry, biochemistry, physiology, zoology, history, philosophy and law, economics, and languages and literature.<sup>26</sup> How much the new reorganization will improve Soviet scientific research is a moot point. As James M. Swanson has pointed out: "The essentially bureaucratic belief that a reshuffling of organizational structures and administrative responsibilities produces effectiveness in operation is characteristic of Soviet institutional philosophy."<sup>27</sup>

The USSR Academy of Sciences is the overall director and coordinator of the 14 Republican Academies of Sciences, the USSR and the Ukrainian Academies of Construction and Architecture, the Academy of Arts, the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the six Republican Academies of Agricultural Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences, the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and RSFSR Academy of Municipal Economics. It also controls some ten *affiliates* (Dagestanian, Kola, Komi, Ural, Bashkir, Karelian, Buryat, Eastern Siberia, Far East, and Yakutsk) as well as the prestigious Siberian Branch. In 1969 the Urals and the Far Eastern Scientific Centers were created. At the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the founding

<sup>24</sup>*Pravda*, 9 April 1961.

<sup>25</sup>*Pravda*, 12 April 1961.

<sup>26</sup>James M. Swanson, "Reorganization 1963," *Survey*, No. 52 (July 1964), pp. 37 and 39.

<sup>27</sup>*Loc. cit.*, p. 40.

of the Academy, Acting President V. A. Kotelnikov reported that the Academy consisted of 250 scientific institutions, more than 160,000 scientific workers, some 40,000 of whom were highly qualified research scientists.<sup>28</sup>

The USSR Academy of Sciences is directly controlled by the CPSU Central Committee. Since a rather large number of academicians are members of the Central Committee CPSU, the Academy does have some representation at high Party levels. How direct Party control can be was demonstrated at the election of Aleksandrov in 1975. The nominating speech for his candidacy was delivered by the ideological warhorse of the Politburo, Suslov, and after that it was a foregone conclusion as to who would be elected. Politburo interference in Academy affairs in recent times, however, has been rather subtle. After all, the Brezhnev regime needs the scientific output of the Academy too much to hamstring its effectiveness by injecting too large a dose of politics.

#### 47. The Teacher

The Soviet educational system, like any other, is about as good as its teachers. When Stalin began to emphasize the need for "trained cadres" in the early 1930s, the first obstacle was the shortage of competent teachers, especially in the higher educational institutions where more teachers were to be trained. In addition, there is the continuous problem of reconciling sound education with Party control as many of the teachers were, and are, not Party members. The solution of this problem has been to place Party members into key positions in the school administration.

The Soviet government has worked hard over the last 30 years to produce an adequate number of teachers and to improve their quality. In 1928 there were 349,000 teachers in the general education schools, by 1955 the figure had risen to 1,733,000,<sup>29</sup> and in the 1963-64 school year there were 2,339,000.<sup>30</sup> One criterion of effective education is low ratio of students to teachers. In 1931 the ratio was 19 students per teacher and by 1947 it was less than 10 to 1. Then it began to climb and was 17 to 1 by 1956.<sup>31</sup> By the 1963-64 school year there were 2,339,000 teachers in the general educational schools with a student body of 44,682,000 which meant a ratio of about 19 to 1.<sup>32</sup> Ten years later, in the 1972-73 school year, there were 2,850,000.<sup>33</sup>

Although the teacher-student ratio looks good in the form of gross statistics, by the time administrators, small special classes, and small rural schools are added in, the student load is high. Mrs. Jacoby says that in the primary grades it runs from 35 to 45 pupils per teacher.<sup>34</sup>

Teachers for the secondary schools are trained in Pedagogical Institutes (*Pedagogicheskie institut*), which are classed as higher educational institutions and whose training lasts four or five years. If the student is training in one specialty, the course is for four years; if he is training in two specialties, it lasts five years. The two-field training is very valuable if the student is to teach in the rural schools. In 1973 there were 199 Pedagogical Institutes in the USSR with 792,000 students. But half the students (400,000) were enrolled in either the evening or the correspondence divisions.<sup>35</sup>

One level below the Pedagogical Institutes are the Teacher-training Schools (*Pedagogicheskie uchilishcha*) which train teachers for the preschool and primary grades. Students who have completed the ten-year school get a two-year course, while graduates of the eight-year school go for four years. In 1973 there were 406 Teacher training Schools in the USSR with about 282,000 students.<sup>36</sup>

Teachers in higher educational institutions and in scientific research centers are well paid by Soviet standards. In the general education schools, however, the salaries are low. About three-quarters of the teachers in the Soviet Union are women, and in the preschools and primary grades it runs nearer 100 percent. Most of the administrative positions, especially the principals, are men—so much for equal rights à la Russe.

The real problem in Soviet education is how to "keep 'em down on the farm." The turn-over in rural schools is horrendous. The combination of rural isolation, poor housing, and low salaries causes the new graduates from teachers' training colleges to shun such employment. The Soviet press is replete with sad stories of rural schools whose teachers have run out on them. Another problem that is getting a good deal of attention is that of getting good teachers in the vocational-technical schools. It seems that it is not only the students who regard these institutions as dumping grounds for misfits.

If many of the pedagogical problems besetting the Soviet educators seem familiar to observers of the American educational scene, it should not be surprising. Each of the systems is engaged in trying to educate an entire population to at least the high-school-graduate level, no easy task when it is

<sup>28</sup> *Pravda*, 8 October 1975.

<sup>29</sup> *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* (1956), p. 222.

<sup>30</sup> *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* 1963 *Godu*, p. 556.

<sup>31</sup> Nicolas DeWitt, *Soviet Professional Manpower, Its Education, Training, and Supply*, p. 176.

<sup>32</sup> *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* 1963 *Godu*, p. 556.

<sup>33</sup> F. G. Panachin, *Teacher Education in the USSR* (*Pedagogicheskoe obrazovanie v SSSR*), translation in *Soviet Education*, vol. XIX, No. 9-10 (July-August 1977), p. 243.

<sup>34</sup> Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

<sup>35</sup> Panachin, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244.



necessary to cope with severe minority problems and linguistic differences among many other problems. On the whole, however, the Soviets are successfully augmenting the numbers of people with high school and college-level education. Thus a quantitative accomplishment cannot be denied them; but how the accomplishment stacks up qualitatively is more arguable.

#### 48. The Technological Race

In the decade of Khrushchev's ascendancy, 1955-64, a good deal was said about various races between the Soviet Union and the United States in the overall economic growth rate, in general technological development, and especially in the conquest of space. Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy seemed to be based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was destined to win the races, although his missile gambit in Cuba in 1962 did not seem to be of a piece with that assumption.

The Soviet leadership, first under Stalin, and then under Khrushchev, recognized the central role of education in the technological race, and there can be no argument that the output of skilled personnel between 1930 and the present has been impressive. The heavy emphasis, of course, has been on scientific and technical training. According to Soviet statistics, there were 4,724 scientific establishments (under the USSR Academy of Sciences and the various ministries) in 1965.<sup>29</sup> In 1969 there were 220,000 scientists with doctor's or candidate degrees and more than 870,000 scientific personnel. The rate of increase in the number of scientific personnel is interesting: 750,000 in 1967, and 1.3 million in 1977, or an increase of over half a million in a decade.<sup>30</sup>

In the fine art of persuasion the Soviet leadership has been particularly successful. The materialistic basis of Communist ideology gives the Soviet state an initial advantage in the training of scientists and technicians. Things "scientific" have assumed an aura of the religious, and Soviet youth has almost been persuaded that science can provide the answer to all problems. Everything from the explanation of history to the building of an ideal future is credited to science; Soviet youth can aspire no higher than to enter the ranks of so dedicated a calling.

Another motivation toward technical training is provided by the vast and well-organized paramilitary society for Soviet youth, the DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Support of the Army, Air Force, and Navy). Since 1951, this is the new name for the old OSOAVIAKHIM (Voluntary Society for the Support of Aviation and

Chemistry) which was formed in the late 1920s. This society, embracing over 15 million young people, sponsors all kinds of military training and the development of skills that will be useful to the national economy as well as the armed forces. In a speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of DOSAAF on 23 January 1977, Marshal of Aviation A. Pokryshkin, head of the organization, pointed up this aspect of DOSAAF training:

The training of cadres in major technical occupations for the national economy has an important role in the organization's work. During the 9th Five-Year Plan we trained over 8 million drivers, electricians, and other technicians, including some 3 million for work in farming.<sup>31</sup>

DOSAAF is a huge organization of 80 million members in 330,000 primary units whose main role is preinduction training for the military draftees.<sup>32</sup> However, much of the military training is technical and applicable to the national economy as well.

In addition to the Communist adulation of science and the social pressure to participate in the activities of DOSAAF, there is a new surge of patriotism in the Soviet Union. This is partly the result of the constant barrage by all the Soviet organs of propaganda, and partly the result of the victory over the Germans in World War II. One manifestation of the extreme nationalism has been the ridiculous series of "firsts" claimed as Russian inventions and technical discoveries. But beneath this childish disregard for truth lies a pride in Soviet achievement and a determination to advance Soviet science and technology further and faster in the future.

The output of scientists and engineers in the next decade will depend largely on the interests and capabilities of the students now in elementary and secondary schools. An adequate number of trained students presupposes an adequate number of well-trained teachers in the precollege schools, and it is precisely here that the United States is lagging. Of the Soviet Teachers training pedagogical institutes, around 50 percent are majors in science and mathematics. These graduates are now science teachers in the Soviet educational system. Not only is there a smaller percentage of mathematics and science majors in the total output of trained teachers in the United States, but a staggering number of these never become science teachers, or do so for only a short period of time. Many are attracted to the better-paying jobs in industry.

One frequently noted weakness of the Soviet educational system is the extreme concentration of higher educational institutions in the two areas of Moscow and Leningrad. Moscow has 90 such

<sup>29</sup> *Izvestia*, 25 January 1968 and 28 January 1978.

<sup>30</sup> *Pravda*, 23 January 1977.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

institutions, with almost 300,000 students; Leningrad has 50, with 150,000 students. This would imply a waste of much potential talent in the vast extent of the Soviet Union, even granting that many of the students in the Moscow and Leningrad areas are imported. The Soviets seem to be acutely aware of this problem, and many recent articles in the Soviet press have discussed the need for expanding rural school facilities, for raising the standards of the outlying universities and higher educational institutions, and in general for decentralizing education somewhat.

Another aspect of the race for production of technically trained manpower is the effort to evaluate the numbers themselves. The Soviet statistics seem accurate enough as far as they go, but it is likely that some of the students are censored out of the totals. Statistics are not available on the number of Soviet engineers turned out by military schools. We know that there are a large number of Soviet military schools, both secondary and on the higher levels, but the number of graduates is not given. When Stalin presented the figures for higher education to the Communist Party Congress of 1939, he pointed out that he was not including the military figure. The *Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR* (1956) omits military schools in its otherwise comprehensive compilation of statistics. Furthermore many educational institutions under the various ministries have military engineering sections under "special faculties," and their figures are not given. Engineers involved in the production of special weapons are not counted in any breakdown, nor is there any tabulation of the graduate students working in such establishments. Gorokhoff<sup>40</sup> suggests that some idea of the magnitude of this group can be obtained from a study of the atomic energy system of the United States and the number of engineers engaged in it. The only approach to this problem is to assume that a rather sizable group of engineers is being trained and to recognize that figures on this group are never included in published Soviet statistics.

Any attempt to evaluate the technological capabilities of two nations is bound to be impressionistic since such an evaluation must encompass a vast array of scientific and technological fields. The first fact to keep in mind is the planned nature of the Soviet economy—things are produced and priorities determined in accordance with the planners' preferences and not those of the average consumer. Thus the Soviets have been able to funnel scarce resources, both human and material, into those areas most helpful

to the military-industrial complex. Of course, this preference has had dire consequences for the consumer and agricultural sectors. Therefore, it is not surprising that Soviet technology in the military area is not far behind that of the West in many fields and even ahead in some.<sup>41</sup> In the consumer and agricultural sectors, however, Soviet technology lags behind the West in almost every respect. In such fields as computers, the Soviets are at least a computer-generation behind the West in both hardware and software. The technological lag in the civilian sectors of the economy can be seen in the low Soviet labor productivity—some 40 percent below that of the United States.

As in most things Soviet, accurate evaluations and estimates are difficult because of either outright suppression, or partial censorship, of information. Furthermore, some things are hard to compare. How does one compare an MIT-trained engineer with his Soviet counterpart? The Soviet engineer seems to be far more narrowly trained in his field of specialization, but on the other hand there are so many times more Soviet engineers being trained that the state may feel that it can afford this degree of specialization. About all that can be said is that the current direction and velocity of Soviet education seems adequate for the immediate needs of the state in the scientific and technical fields. In the humanities the picture is far more gloomy.

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<sup>40</sup>Boris Gorokhoff, "Materials for the Study of Soviet Specialized Education," pp. 31-33.

<sup>41</sup>For an excellent discussion of the present technological balance see Edward J. Philbin, *Soviet Technology: Status, Trends and Strategies* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1978). Chapter 5 is especially useful.

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## Soviet Foreign Policy

ON 8 NOVEMBER 1917, the Bolsheviks, under the aegis of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, set up a new government to rule Russia, and like most governments of that period, it had a cabinet. The Bolsheviks, however, called their cabinet the Council of People's Commissars, or *Sovnarkom* in Russian. Trotsky took over the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and at this point he began a foreign policy that has probably created more tension among the world's diplomats than all other causes combined. The new Commissar of Foreign Affairs proposed an immediate armistice that repudiated all annexations and indemnities, published the secret agreements of the tsarist government with its allies, and some time later unilaterally annulled the foreign debts of the former regime. To the staid diplomats in the foreign offices of London, Paris, and Berlin, Trotsky must have seemed like an irresponsible urchin happily tossing monkey wrenches into the world's delicate diplomatic machinery. In February 1918 Trotsky capped his brief, but stormy, career as Commissar of Foreign Affairs by refusing the German terms at Brest-Litovsk and then advancing the novel thesis that the Soviet government was in a state of "neither war nor peace." Apparently a new era in diplomacy had arrived, and the Bolsheviks seemed intent on alienating all the major powers in the world.

Three years later, in March 1921, the Soviets concluded a trade agreement with Great Britain and gained *de facto* recognition. A year later, by the Treaty of Rapallo, they gained *de jure* recognition from Germany, not the most respected nation of the major powers at that time, but even a back-door entry into respectability was a far cry from Trotsky's attitude in early 1918.

### 49. Problems in Analyzing Soviet Policy

These events merely illustrate the difficulty of analyzing Soviet foreign policy. Two strands run through the history of Soviet foreign policy, including its policy today. One strand affecting the foreign policy of a great power is its geographical

position and its political status. The other strand is the influence of the Marx-Leninist doctrine with which the Soviet leaders view the world around them. Sometimes the political observer can easily distinguish the two strands, and at other times they seem inextricably tangled. For example, in the 1920s Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, seemed to follow a conventional foreign policy, while Zinoviev, through the Communist International, urged foreign Communists into actions that thwarted Chicherin at every step. When Stalin gained power in the late 1920s, the divergent strands were merged. The Communist International became merely a branch of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and during the 1930s the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy required the leaders of the non-Soviet Communist parties to gyrate like dervishes.

Soviet foreign policy has constantly puzzled political observers in its dedication to expansion. The question is asked, how much of it is a continuation of the historical Soviet expansion beginning with the Muscovite Grand Dukes, and how much of it is a result of the Communist compulsion toward world domination? Some of the present objectives of the Soviet foreign office have a very long history. Ever since the rulers of Kiev attacked Tsargrad in the tenth century, the Russians have been trying to find some way of controlling the Straits and gaining free access into the Mediterranean. Control of the Straits became an obsession with Russian rulers from Catherine II to Nicholas II. Therefore, it is no surprise that Stalin had the traditional yearning to make the Bosphorus and Dardanelles a Soviet canal.

However, when the Soviet leaders concern themselves with a revolution in Guatemala, or urge an anti-American policy on Castro, or suddenly find a deep interest in Yemen, they have departed from the traditional Russian objectives and are clearly engaged in a crusade to expand communism.

Such a change in policy must seem academic to Hungarians behind the Iron Curtain, or even to a Soviet diplomat. But in the present cold war, it may make a vast difference to know whether the Soviets

primary motive is merely to bolster a weak point in their defensive position or whether they are relentlessly trying to push an area one step closer to ultimate world revolution. A brief historical sketch of Soviet foreign policy during the last fifty-three years may illustrate the complexity of its motivations.

## 50. Lenin and World Revolution

Lenin and his chief lieutenants were confident that their success in the Soviet Union was just the beginning of world revolution. In fact, in the early years of the revolution no one thought that the new Communist state could survive unless socialist revolutions occurred in some of the leading industrial countries of Europe. Lenin had persuaded his comrades to accept the unpalatable Treaty of Brest-Litovsk because the approaching world revolution, he believed, would obliterate all territorial boundaries anyway. There was no reason to be upset over the onerous conditions of the treaty. The establishment of a Communist regime in Hungary under Bela Kun, the various attempted coups in Germany, and the general confusion in a war-weary Europe brightened the hopes of the Bolsheviks for an expansion of the revolution. In March 1919 the Soviets set up the machinery for carrying out the world revolution, the Communist International, or Comintern. Finally, having defeated the White Army and discouraged the intervention of France, England, Japan, and the United States, the Red Army took the offensive against the Poles. Under the leadership of a brilliant Red general, Tukhachevsky, the Reds drove the Poles out of the Ukraine and back to Warsaw. Even Lenin hailed the Policy offensive as the first step in carrying the revolution throughout Europe.

The successful Polish resistance at Warsaw and the subsequent retreat of Tukhachevsky's forces cooled the Bolshevik ardor for spreading the revolution by armed force. The Kronstadt revolt in Petrograd, a revolt in the name of the original promises of the Bolsheviks, shocked the Bolshevik faithful. These events, combined with the return to "normalcy" in Western Europe, dimmed the hopes for an immediate world revolution. Lenin realized that a respite was necessary, and in March 1921 he shifted to his New Economic Policy.

## 51. The Search for Recognition

Soviet diplomacy had reversed itself. The Soviets now sought recognition and trade instead of immediate world revolution. Almost simultaneously with Lenin's announcement of the NEP, the Soviets concluded a trade agreement with

Great Britain, thus gaining *de facto* recognition by a major power. At the same time, the age-old Russian differences with Turkey were resolved and a treaty to that effect was signed with Kemal Ataturk, who was as anti-Versailles as the Soviets. Shortly thereafter Soviet delegates went to the Genoa Conference, and failing to win concessions from the major Versailles powers, they signed an agreement with Germany at the neighboring town of Rapallo. The first *de jure* recognition of the new Communist state by a major power, this treaty between the two major anti-Versailles nations placed the other powers in an awkward position and strengthened the Kremlin's hand considerably. Having broken the ring of isolation, the Soviet government was recognized by most of the major powers in the next few years.

The effects of the NEP on Soviet domestic and foreign policy have been well summarized by E. H. Carr as follows:

The change of front carried out by Moscow in March 1921 affected the climate in which Soviet foreign policy henceforth operated rather than the substance of that policy. It did not mean, in domestic affairs, the abandonment of the goal of socialism and communism or, in foreign affairs, of the goal of world revolution. But it meant a recognition of the necessity of a certain postponement in reaching these goals, and in the meanwhile building up the economic and diplomatic strength of Soviet Russia by all practicable means, even if these means were in appearance a retreat from the direct path of socialism and world revolution. The new foreign policy had been adopted, in the words used by Lenin of NEP, 'seriously and for a long time.' It was the relative durability thus imparted to expedients hitherto invoked only as short-time practical maneuvers which, more than anything else, changed the character of Soviet foreign policy after 1921.<sup>1</sup>

## 52. Stalin's Foreign Policies

Between 1921 and 1928, Soviet foreign policy reflected the internal situation of the country. There was confusion at the top as Stalin and Trotsky fought for Lenin's crown, and foreign Communist parties were as confused as was the headquarters. Living conditions were improving in the Soviet Union, food production was getting back to its pre-revolutionary levels, and under the "mixed" economy even steel production was approaching its 1913 output. Although Soviet diplomacy found it hard to resist targets of opportunity, on the whole it restricted itself to agitation, except in China. It had, however, embarrassing moments when Zinoviev and his Comintern threw sand in the gears of the diplomatic machinery. The "regular" diplomacy and the Comintern policies were not synchronized; they were more often at loggerheads.

<sup>1</sup> *The Bolshevik Revolution*, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1953, Vol. III, p. 304.

By 1928 Trotsky was out and Stalin had control of all the levers of power in the Soviet Union. Stalin now moved to the other extreme from the idea of immediate world revolution. He came out for "socialism in one country," the building of the Soviet Union into an impregnable fortress, a self-sufficient major power able to hold its own against capitalist attacks. To do this it was necessary to industrialize at a forced tempo and to collectivize agriculture to support the needs engendered by the rapid industrialization.

The new socialist offensive involved not only building a self-sufficient Soviet Union through a forced industrialization but also, at least during the initial stages, avoiding any foreign policy that would endanger its success. Furthermore, the Red Army had been reduced to a cadre of 562,000 men since 1924 and was thus in no position to carry on any full-fledged war with a major power. Under these conditions Soviet foreign policy had to be strictly defensive. The Soviet-dominated Comintern, holding its Sixth Congress in Moscow in 1928, paid its usual lip service to the world revolution and then took as its main task the defense of the Soviet Union. Thus the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union directed the Party faithful throughout the world to work toward implementing its defensive policy. The Comintern became a tool of Soviet foreign policy and put the defense of the USSR above all else.

The Soviet leaders continued to point accusing fingers at France and Great Britain as the "capitalist military threat," but soon recognized that the real threat came from the East; Japan was on the rampage in Manchuria. By early 1932 Manchuria had been transformed into the Japanese puppet, Manchukuo. In line with their policy of avoiding conflicts, the Soviet leaders agreed to sell their share of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan; however, they were fully aware that this concession relieved, but did not settle, the Japanese problem.

Hitler came to power in January 1933 and the Soviet leaders were soon disabused of the idea that the Nazi regime was going to be one that could be easily toppled by a German Communist revolution. By 1934 the threat of Japan in the East and Hitler and Mussolini in the West caused the Soviets to opt for a "united front," a working coalition among Communist, Socialist, and any other anti-Nazi groups that could be enticed into joining. The Popular Front in France demonstrated the speed with which Moscow's orders could be carried out by the Party faithful abroad.

### 53. Collective Security

In the search for collective security, the Soviet Union signed nonaggression pacts with every

neighbor that could be talked into one. Pacts were signed with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Later Czechoslovakia and France signed alliances. Then the Soviets took the final step by joining that "bourgeois conspiracy," the League of Nations, and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, made quite a name for himself as an advocate of all-out disarmament. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1934 came out for a "united front" with democratic groups, parties, and governments. This Soviet obeisance to democracy was made more convincing in 1936 by the publication of the new Constitution which seemed to grant a variety of liberties. The devices nullifying with one hand what was given with the other were fairly well hidden, and the Soviet new look helped in cementing collective security abroad.

The collective security policy received a severe jolt in 1938 when France and Great Britain capitulated to Hitler's demands at Munich. The Soviet alliance with Czechoslovakia demanded action only if France decided to act. Their exclusion from the negotiations at Munich soured the Soviets on collective security. At the Eighteenth Party Congress on 10 March 1939, Stalin hinted at a new policy when he accused Great Britain and France of abandoning collective security in an attempt to engender a German-Soviet conflict. He also stated that Germany had no designs on the Ukraine. Germany, as we know now, got the hint, and the way was opened for immediate German-Soviet negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

In the meanwhile Great Britain and France had taken a rather difficult attitude toward negotiating any hard and fast alliance with the Soviet Union. Great Britain, hesitantly followed by France, wanted more flexibility in dealing with Germany, whereas the Soviet Union wanted a tight alliance that would protect the countries on its western border. Furthermore, Poland feared Soviet aid as much as German aggression, and the British were inclined to overrate the Polish military capacity. As a result, Great Britain and France proposed a three-power declaration of mutual aid if they were drawn into war by a German attack on either Poland or Rumania.

While sparring with Great Britain and France, the Soviets had been putting out secret feelers to Germany. The first definite event pointing toward a change in policy came on 3 May, when Litvinov, a symbol of collective security, was ousted to make way for Molotov. This shift, combined with increasing German truculence toward Poland, aroused France and Great Britain to increase their

<sup>2</sup> *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41* (Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Department of State, Washington, 1948), p. 76.

efforts toward obtaining a mutually satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union. They sent military missions to Moscow.

#### 54. The Great Reversal—the Soviet-German Pact

In the light of the evidence revealed in the US State Department's publication of the Nazi-Soviet relations and the Nuremberg trials, it would seem that Great Britain and France would have had to take heroic steps to stop the Nazi-Soviet *rapprochement* after 3 May. Voroshilov was stalling for time with the British and French military missions while Stalin and Molotov completed negotiations with Hitler. The refusal of the Poles to allow Soviet troops on their soil, even to repel German attack, gave the Soviets an excuse to end the talks with the military missions. Thus on 21 August, collective security, as far as the Soviets were concerned, came to an end. Two days later, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed a nonaggression treaty providing that neither party would commit an act of aggression against the other and that, if either party should become engaged in war, the other would provide aid of all kinds.

This treaty gave Germany two advantages: first, the war could be held to a single front once Poland was knocked out; second, the economic provisions of the treaty removed the sting from Great Britain's chief weapon, the blockade. An added bonus that accrued to Hitler was that communism's huge international propaganda machine was directed toward putting the onus for the war on the Allies. This worked to Germany's advantage, especially in France.

For the Soviet Union the secret protocol was even more important, as it gave the territorial guarantees which the Allies were so reluctant to grant. The protocol stated that in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) the northern boundary of Lithuania was to represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. On any division of Poland, the line formed by the Narev, Vistula, and San rivers was to designate the respective spheres of influence. Finally, Soviet interests in Bessarabia were conceded by Germany.

With the Soviet Union showing favorable neutrality, Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, and World War II was under way. German superiority in air power, mechanization, and organization enabled Germany to pulverize Polish defenses in a very short time. By 18 September, the Red Army, with German approval and encouragement, marched into Poland and delivered the *coup de grâce*. On 28 September a

treaty was signed which extended the German sphere of influence slightly to the east and gave Lithuania to the Soviets.

Germany, having destroyed Poland and fixed its eastern boundaries with the Soviet Union, was now free to throw its entire military might against the West. Economically the Soviet alliance worked well: in the first 12 months the Soviets were to deliver almost a million tons of oil, 100 thousand tons of cotton, 500 thousand tons of iron ore, 300 thousand tons of scrap iron, 2.5 tons of platinum, as well as manganese, timber, and oil seeds. Although the Germans were very often behind in their payments of manufactured goods, the Soviets usually maintained their end of the bargain. Moscow also acted as a broker in buying strategic materials abroad and transshipping them through its own territory to Germany. All in all, the economic arrangements resulting from the nonaggression pact of 23 August were very favorable to Germany.

As soon as the Soviets had seized their share of the Polish booty, they put pressure on the Baltic countries to sign mutual assistance pacts and to allow Soviet military contingents within their territories. By 10 October 1939, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had signed. Finland, however, steadfastly refused to lease any territory on the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union. On 29 November 1939, the Soviet Union broke off relations with Finland and attacked. The Russo-Finnish War, which lasted until 12 March 1940, revealed many weaknesses in the Soviet military machine, but the results were ultimately in favor of the Soviet Union. The Finnish border was moved in some 75 miles, and the Hangö Peninsula was leased to the Soviet Union for thirty years. The Soviets, although rearming feverishly, made no further territorial strikes until June 1940.

Although the Soviets were ostensibly cheering the German victories, the fantastically rapid conquest of France caused serious misgivings in the Kremlin. Almost immediately the Soviets began to convert the mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic states into absolute incorporation of these territories within the Soviet Union. In short, the Soviet Union was trying desperately to build up a bulwark against the rapidly expanding empire of Hitler. The Soviets also seized Bessarabia in July 1940. It was no coincidence that the Baltic countries and Bessarabia were seized and occupied in the three weeks following the collapse of France.

In the stress of diplomatic maneuvering in 1939, Hitler had given the Soviets a free hand in Bessarabia, but when they took full advantage of this agreement, Hitler was alarmed. He began to look suspiciously at Soviet penetration of the

Balkans, especially when the Soviets demanded Bukovina as well as Bessarabia. In an effort to freeze the Soviets out, on 30 August 1940, Germany compelled Rumania to cede much of Transylvania to Hungary and the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, offering in return a guarantee of the new Rumanian frontier. Moscow bitterly objected to this unilateral action, regarding it as a violation of the secret protocol of August. In retaliation the Soviets began to negotiate for trade and navigation agreements with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Hitler now wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from further encroachment in Europe at any point—which explains the pro-Finnish attitude in September 1940 and the refusal to grant Lithuania a free port at Memel in August 1940. The Three Power Pact (Germany, Japan, and Italy) signed on 27 September 1940, aimed chiefly at England, but it was also useful in putting the Soviet Union in a precarious position. An attack on Germany would leave the Soviet rear exposed to Japan. As a final step, Hitler decided to go after the Balkans himself.

German troops were sent into Rumania in October, ostensibly to protect the oil fields, but in reality to get the jump on the Soviets. Mussolini, trying to assert himself in the face of Hitler's growing power, attempted a *fait accompli* on his Axis partner and launched his ill-fated attack on Albania and Greece—an action that greatly complicated the Balkan situation.

In November 1940 Molotov came to Berlin in an effort to solve, or at least clarify, the situation. He came right to the point and asked three questions: Would Germany recognize the Soviets full liberty of action in Finland and withdraw German troops from the country? Did the German guarantee of Rumanian boundaries apply to the Soviet Union? Would Germany look with favor on the establishment of Soviet bases in the Dardanelles? Hitler tried to evade such blunt and detailed questions by holding out global bribes. Why did not the Soviets join the Three Power Pact and thus gain a free hand in expansion toward India and Iran? This attempt to steer the Soviets eastward failed to impress Molotov, and he stuck stubbornly to his original demands: concrete terms in regard to Finland, the Balkans, and the Straits. Forced to answer, Hitler admitted that he regarded any war in the Baltic over Finland as inadmissible, and expressed the opinion that Russia should be satisfied with a revision of the Montreux Convention as far as the Straits went. The Berlin talks revealed that Germany and the Soviet Union were heading for a collision of interests, and Hitler became convinced that war was inevitable.

The Soviet Union and Germany now entered an open race to control the Balkans. Mussolini's

reverses in the Greek campaign, plus the Yugoslav *coup d'état* of 25 March 1941, forced the Germans to accelerate their consolidation of the Balkans. These two operations left the Germans with their right flank protected and Rumanian oil secured.

About the only advantage that the Soviet Union obtained in the last few months before the German attack was the declared neutrality of Japan—a result of the pact signed in April 1941. At least the Soviet Union would have only a one-front war.

## 55. Grand Alliance

After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, an uneasy alliance came into being between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This eventually developed into a tripartite alliance when the United States entered the war. Throughout the succeeding four years of the struggle against the Axis, the leaders of the three great Allied powers were in almost constant contact with each other, and in spite of some ruffled feathers now and then, worked together effectively at their main task of defeating Germany.

The points of concern and discussion were many, but three problems stood out. Of immediate importance was the problem of military and economic aid to the Soviet Union from Great Britain and the United States. Another was the question of military cooperation, which boiled down to the Soviet demand for an immediate second front in France and Allied insistence upon adequate preparation. And finally, there were discussions involving the fate of Germany, the small countries on the Soviet western border, territorial settlements, and the creation of a world organization at the end of hostilities—in short, politics.

Immediately upon hearing of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Churchill stated that Great Britain would give whatever help it could, and on the following day the United States also pledged economic aid and military supplies. The Soviet Union badly needed all the help it could get, for although some of its industry had been either built up or relocated in the east, it had suffered a calamitous loss when the German armies swept across the Ukraine in 1941.

The negotiations were simple in comparison with the problems of getting the goods to the Soviet Union. Three routes were available: by sea to Murmansk, by sea to Iran and overland from there, and through Siberia. The Murmansk route was the easiest, but by 1942 the Germans, from their position in Norway, were able to destroy much of the shipping along this route by means of submarines and aircraft. The Siberian route, because of the inadequacies of the Trans-Siberian



Railway, was not very satisfactory. Although the route through Iran was long, it was the safest. American and British engineers built up the transport facilities along this route, and by 1943 it was the main highway for lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union. During the entire period the Soviets had been irascible and unreasonable, refusing to consider the difficulties faced by the Allies and constantly demanding the promised deliveries. Tempers became frayed, but in spite of this bickering the Allies were able to deliver vast quantities of materiel. A total of four protocols were negotiated during the war, and these covered a stupendous amount of armaments, raw materials, foods, and other items. Probably the most important item was the number of trucks sent to the Soviet Union—trucks which enabled the Red Army to supply its rapidly advancing forces after the victory at Stalingrad.

During the entire period from May 1942 until the carrying out of Overlord in 1944, the second front was a constant irritant in Soviet-Allied relations. It haunted the Moscow conference of October 1943 and was a major topic at Teheran in November 1943. This demand may have been a defense mechanism on Stalin's part. Obviously he had negotiated the pact with Hitler in August 1939 in the expectation of watching Germany and the Allies exhaust themselves. Now the Allies had him in a similar vise. But there was seemingly a sincere conviction on the part of the Soviets that the invasion of Europe was a simple operation. They apparently thought of the Channel as nothing more than a large river.

At the time of Molotov's trip to Washington in June 1942 the Soviets were asking for an immediate second front, and Molotov believed it could be managed during that same year. Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Marshall were in favor of an early attempt to land in Europe, but Churchill and the British were much more reluctant. When Churchill went to Moscow in August 1942, he was coolly received because of the absence of the second front. The Soviets were convinced that the Allies were stalling and bluntly said as much during the next two years.

Political negotiations between the Soviets and the Allies began almost as soon as the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union. In the Anglo-Soviet agreement of 12 July 1941, it was stated that neither party would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace with Germany except by mutual agreement. In December 1941 Eden went to Moscow to survey tentative war and peace aims. Stalin asked for (1) recognition of the Soviet boundaries of 22 June 1941, and (2) a check on Germany by the creation of a separate Austria, the annexation of East Prussia to Poland, and the possibility of an independent

Rhineland and Bavaria. Churchill regarded these requests as fair enough, but negotiations ended when the United States refused to discuss territorial arrangements before the defeat of Germany.

The idea of terms for Germany was definitely killed with the Roosevelt declaration at Casablanca for "unconditional surrender." Churchill concurred in this. There can be little doubt that Roosevelt, being in the midst of the Giraud-DeGaulle squabble, contemplating the divergent aims of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and having to consider Chinese desires in the Far East, felt that the doctrine of unconditional surrender was necessary to bring about harmony among the Allies. But this declaration made negotiations with the Axis impossible. At Teheran in November 1943, Stalin pointed out to Roosevelt that unconditional surrender was awkward as it kept the Germans united; that specific terms would make surrender easier.

At the time of the Teheran Conference it was apparent that the defeat of Germany would leave a vast power vacuum all along the borders of the Soviet Union from Bulgaria to Finland. An immediate and critical question was the fate of Poland, now that the Germans were about to evacuate it. Churchill seemed inclined to divide the whole vacuum area into separate spheres of influence, but the United States vehemently opposed this. It seemed as though the ghost of Wilsonian self-determination still haunted American statesmen. Roosevelt supposed that if he gave Stalin security and asked for nothing, the problem would be solved. The result was that very little was accomplished at Teheran.

## 56. Yalta Conference

By the time of the next Big Three meeting—at Yalta in February 1945—the Soviet armies were already filling the vacuum of the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe. The American and British troops were just recovering the ground lost in the Battle of the Bulge and had not yet crossed the Rhine. On the other hand, the Soviet armies held most of Poland, East Prussia, and even up to the Oder in spots; they also had troops in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Eastern Czechoslovakia. Thus from a military viewpoint, Roosevelt's job at Yalta was to gain concessions from Stalin, not give them.

The toughest problem at Yalta was to get a settlement on the Polish question. The Soviets held the country and had recognized their own group, the Lublin Committee, as the legal government of Poland. Both Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed

with Stalin on this issue; they maintained that the Lublin group did not represent more than a fraction of the Poles, and the Polish government in exile in London should have representatives in any new government. Furthermore, Roosevelt would have to explain to six million Polish-Americans at home if he gave in to the Soviet Union on this issue. The three heads of state agreed upon a Curson Line as the eastern boundary of Poland, but no agreement could be reached on a western demarcation. The Soviets were holding out for the Oder-Neisse line, and Churchill felt obliged to warn them that "it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it gets indigestion." The resolution of the Polish question looked very good on paper. It called for a reorganization of the Lublin government on a "broader democratic basis with inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." The new government was to be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and was "pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot."

After much haggling over the amount of reparations to be required of Germany, a Declaration on Liberated Europe was published in an effort to bring about a solution for the numerous problems which had not been adequately discussed. The substance of the declaration was an agreement by the three powers to assist the peoples liberated from the Axis in solving their pressing economic and political problems "by democratic means." The three powers were pledged to consult together when problems arose in those areas and "to act jointly" in their solution.

Toward the end of the Conference, terms were agreed upon by which the Soviet Union was to enter the war against Japan. Briefly summarized, the Soviet Union won these concessions: recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, control over the southern part of Sakhalin Island, a lease on Port Arthur as a naval base and internationalization of Dairen with Soviet interests admitted as preeminent, joint control with China of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railway, and possession of the Kurile Islands. The Soviet Union was to recognize the full sovereignty of China in Manchuria. It is evident that the concessions made at Yalta showed Roosevelt's anxiety to get the Soviet Union into the Japanese conflict; his military advisers had given him some dour prognostications on the difficulties involved, and the atomic bomb was still in the future.

Upon the German capitulation, the Soviet position in Europe was excellent. The negotiations at Teheran and Yalta had given them a good legal position in respect to the penetration of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, especially in view of the new

definition of "democracy" to be evolved by the Soviets. The Red Army was in physical control of Poland, the eastern part of Germany, part of Czechoslovakia, and all of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The regimes of Yugoslavia and Albania were Communist and looked reliable from the Moscow point of view. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had an entire corps of refugee Communists from the newly occupied areas; these people had been in Moscow for years undergoing an intensive training for just such a time as this, and they were literally carried into the occupied countries in the baggage of the Red Army. To say that a "confused situation," so dear to the hearts of the Soviet leaders, existed in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 1944 and 1945 is a masterly understatement. The situation was made even more favorable for the Soviets by the decisions or lack of decisions or by the ambiguity of the decisions at Teheran and Yalta.

## 57. Building the Soviet Empire

In taking advantage of the situation to seize and control those countries now called the satellites, the Soviets followed a general pattern of procedure. Consider the name given to the states that became satellites of the Soviet Union. This name, "people's democracies," was not pulled out of a hat in 1945 by the Politburo. It was the name used in the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia since the early days of the revolution. There, over a 30-year period, the Soviet Union had been developing a technique for ruling a "captive country" absolutely and yet allowing it to keep a facade of autonomy. Thus in 1945 the Soviet Union already had the name for the new satellites and the technique for their seizure and control.

Furthermore, with great foresight, the Politburo had in Moscow a group of highly trained, absolutely obedient Party members who would serve as Soviet proconsuls in the newly established satellites. Tokaev, an expatriated Soviet engineer, refers to this group as the "Kremlin Column" gang. Some became notorious in their rise to power—Rakosi in Hungary, Anna Pauker in Rumania, Dmitrov in Bulgaria, Beirut in Poland, and others. Thus while the Americans and British were still concentrating on the military victory, the Soviets had already set the stage for one of the biggest territorial grabs in history.

The dozen countries seized or threatened by the Soviet Union can be divided into groups which follow more or less similar patterns. First there was the Baltic group—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—already incorporated into the Soviet Union by August 1940, and promptly reincorporated following the German exodus in 1944-45. The

second group was made up of those countries in which a civil war raged either while they were under Axis control or immediately following their so-called liberation, namely, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Poland. In Poland, the civil war was imported by the Soviets. The third group—Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary—was occupied swiftly and completely by the Red Army, and gradual or relatively gradual Sovietization followed. In the fourth group—the “periphery states” of Greece, Finland, and Iran—the Soviet Union was unsuccessful. And finally there was Czechoslovakia, a peculiar case which deviated from the pattern in the first stage of subjugation.

In Yugoslavia and Albania the Axis forces smashed the social structure of the country and tried to fill the gap with quislings. The Communists in the resistance movements in these countries fought not only the Axis forces and their quislings but also waged civil war against the more conservative resistance movements—Mikhailovic in Yugoslavia and the Zogists in Albania. In both these countries there emerged a full-fledged Communist leader on the downfall of the Axis—Tito in Yugoslavia and Enver Hoxha in Albania.

In Poland the situation was much more complex. There was a well-organized, strong, and dedicated underground, the Homeland Army, in constant courier and radio communication with the Polish Government-in-Exile. The Communists were extremely weak in the resistance movement. Furthermore, the stab-in-the-back of 1939, the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers, and the deliberate Soviet sabotaging of the Warsaw uprising had inflamed the traditional anti-Russianism of the Poles. The Soviet Union realized that the establishment of a subservient government in Poland would necessitate the smashing of the Homeland Army. This it proceeded to do by means of the Red Army and the Lublin Committee. This undoubtedly explained the inactivity of the Red Army while the Germans smashed the Warsaw uprising.

Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary had experienced fairly stable regimes during the period of Axis control. The Red Army invaded and occupied these countries swiftly, and there was little opposition to their liquidation of the pro-Axis regimes. It is in these three countries that we see a definite pattern of Sovietization emerging. The pattern developed in three stages: (1) genuine collaboration, (2) bogus collaboration, and (3) the establishment of the monolithic regime.

In the first stage the Communists cooperated with the independent non-Fascist parties of these countries in purging the Fascists and in beginning a reform program. The length of the stage varied from country to country. In Bulgaria it lasted only from

September 1944 to January 1945. At that time the Communists forced the resignation of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov of the Agrarian Union. In Rumania, Vyshinsky forced King Michael to appoint a stooge, Groza, as head of the government in March 1945. In Hungary the Soviets moved slowly, and the first stage ended in February 1947 with the arrest of Bela Kovacs.

The second stage, bogus collaboration, saw the non-Communists still in the government, but these men were handpicked by the Communists. The independent parties in this stage were driven into opposition, and more and more restrictions were placed upon their freedom of activity. Newspapers were severely censored and denied paper, and their printers were controlled by the Communists. Meetings were broken up by gangs of thugs, and non-Communist leaders were jailed. This stage lasted in Rumania and Bulgaria from early 1945 until the fall of 1947; in Hungary, from the spring of 1947 to the spring of 1948, with the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty. Poland went through a similar stage from 1945 to the autumn of 1947.

In the third stage, the “monolithic” regime, all political activity was concentrated in one party. All opposition came to a halt or was driven underground. The opposition leaders were arrested and tried as agents of Anglo-American imperialism, with the exception of those who escaped abroad, as did Nagy of Hungary and Mikolajczyk of Poland. In this final stage the satellites became pawns of Soviet politics.

In Greece, Turkey, and Iran the Soviet drive collapsed, but in these cases the Soviets restricted themselves to limited force. When these attempts failed, they withdrew with only a minor loss of face. The Soviet bid to become a Mediterranean power failed. The British managed to land forces in Greece in October 1944 and were successful in breaking up the attempt of the Greek Communists (EAM) to take over the country. The Greek Communists were never able to regain the initiative, although a civil war raged in Greece until late 1949. United States aid to Greece under the Truman Doctrine kept the anti-Communist government alive, and in July 1949 Tito closed the Yugoslav-Greek border in retaliation for being ejected from the Communist camp in 1948. The Greek Communists were thus deprived of their center of operations, and defeat was inevitable. In Iran the Soviets had troops in the northern area, Iranian Azerbaydzhan, in 1945. These troops, according to treaty, were to be evacuated by March 1946, six months after the cessation of hostilities. But the Soviets used these troops to back up the Tudeh (Communist) Party and established an autonomous Azerbaydzhanian state within Iran. An Iranian appeal to the United Nations—the first appeal to reach the United

Nations—pressure on the Soviet Union by the United States, and some clever work by the Iranians resulted in the frustration of this Soviet scheme.

In Turkey the Soviets tried a combination of methods to gain some historic objectives in the aftermath of World War II. First they threatened to drop the 1921 Friendship Treaty with the Turks if they were not granted Soviet bases on the Straits and the fortified towns of Kars and Ardahan. Twenty-five Soviet divisions were stationed on the eastern border of Turkey, and the Soviet press and radio directed their efforts to anti-Turkish propaganda campaigns. Two Georgian professors made some absurd claims to Turkish territory, and the Soviets pressured the Bulgarians into pushing the Turkish minority over the border faster than the Turks could take care of them. All that saved Turkey from the synchronized effort was the Truman Doctrine for aid to Greece and Turkey plus the age-old Turkish hatred for the Russians.

The Western powers were becoming more and more displeased with Stalin. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 was a firm step in the direction of stopping Soviet expansion in one area. The Soviets seized Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and established the Berlin Blockade in June of the same year, thus proving that Stalin was not amenable to reasonable negotiations. As a result the Western powers formed the NATO alliance of 1949. Stalin had reached the limits of his expansion in Europe and the Middle East.

## 58. Soviet Policy in Asia

The march of communism in the Far East, however, was progressing nicely in the Kremlin's opinion. If the confusion resulting from the collapse of the Nazi empire had facilitated Soviet expansion in Europe, the chaos following Japan's defeat in the Far East was even more promising for the spread of communism.

As early as the Yalta Conference it was obvious to Stalin that if he were to gain anything in the Asiatic theater, he would have to commit the Soviet Union in the war with Japan. Roosevelt, believing the Japanese to be still a formidable force, especially in view of the powerful Kwantung Army, was anxious to have Soviet help as soon as possible. Capitalizing on the eagerness of the United States, Stalin drove a hard bargain and obtained exorbitant terms for Soviet participation. These terms have already been discussed in the account of the Yalta agreement. They provided that the Soviet Union would come into the Pacific war not later than three months after the cessation of hostilities against Germany. It is debatable whether the Soviets would have complied with this time schedule if their intelligence

in Tokyo had not warned them that the end was near for Japan. However that may be, on 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on an already beneficiary of the deceased Japanese Empire.

Part of the Soviet booty was control of Manchuria, which meant control of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways, a naval base at Port Arthur, and predominant interests in Dairen. All of this was concurred in by Chiang Kai-shek, but in all fairness, the Generalissimo had been presented with a Hobson's choice. The Chinese did manage to extract a few concessions in their negotiations at Moscow in July 1945, and among them was a pledge that Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria would be respected and that the Soviets would withdraw their troops three months after the defeat of Japan.

The Soviets, however, decided to support Mao and the Communists in China. They followed two policies: one was a constant pressure on Chiang to accept "democratic" (Communist) elements into his government; the other, to hand over all the Japanese equipment possible to Mao's forces. The Soviet position in Manchuria facilitated the latter policy. Here was located the tremendous arsenal of the Kwantung Army, little of which it had ever had a chance to use. It was also the best industrial area of China. By calculated obstruction, the Soviets were able to keep the Nationalist forces from getting into Manchuria in time to stop the Communist infiltration of the territory.

Immediately upon declaring war on Japan, the Soviets were able to move into Korea. At Potsdam it was decided that for temporary administration the Soviets would control Korea north of the 38th parallel, and the United States south of that line. The Soviets hastened to set up Communist-controlled committees in South Korea, but General Hodges made short work of this system when he arrived with American troops.

Once the Nationalists began to fail in Manchuria in 1947, the rout snowballed. In 1948 they lost Mukden. In January 1949 the Nationalist capital, Nanking, fell, and the great commercial ports of Shanghai and Hankow followed in May. The Nationalists were forced back to their wartime capital, Chungking, and by the middle of 1950 the disaster was complete except for Formosa.

By May 1948 the relations between the two regimes in Korea had deteriorated to the extent that the North Koreans cut off all electric power going to South Korea. The United Nations Commission finally got an election underway, but only in South Korea; and on 17 July 1948, the newly elected assembly met, promulgated a constitution, and named Syngman Rhee as President. About the same time a government was established in North Korea which also claimed to represent the entire

country. It was modeled closely on the government of the Soviet Union.

The United States withdrew its troops in 1949 and took a very ambiguous stand on whether it would back Korea militarily. Probably taking advantage of this wavering US attitude, the North Korean regime sent troops across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. The United States immediately called the UN Security Council into session and, as the Soviet Union was then boycotting the Security Council, got condemnation of North Korean's action. The North Koreans, with Soviet armament and Soviet advice, almost succeeded in occupying all of South Korea. But soon the forces of the United States, with their UN allies, were able to roll the Communists back, almost reaching the Yalu by the end of October 1950. One month later, the Chinese Communists stepped in and again the battle line went south. In mid-1951, after months of bitter fighting and heavy losses, truce negotiations began as the battle line hovered around the 38th parallel. An armistice was finally signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. The war in Korea was obviously the spearhead of world communism on the march, and only the prompt action of the United States halted this overt expansion.

### 59. Coexistence Policy (1953—1958)

The signing of the armistice at Panmunjom took place a few months after the death of Stalin, and in this case *post hoc, propter hoc* is probably applicable. The armistice talks had been stalled for a year on the question of voluntary repatriation of prisoners, and the fact that the new Malenkov regime gave in on this point was an indication of a change in Soviet foreign policy. Many of the non-essential, but extremely irritating, aspects of the Stalinist foreign policy were discarded. The new regime realized that the bellicose Stalinist policy only welded the opposition tighter, and the Truman Doctrine, NATO, and the Korean conflict were prime examples. The new approach aimed at transforming the world-image of the Soviet Union. In place of the dour, belligerent Stalinist regime there now emerged a government that advocated peace and coexistence. The non-Communist world was urged to relax, for the Soviet Union no longer presented a clear and immediate danger; therefore, alliances and pacts could become looser and armament expenditures could be curtailed.

Soviet foreign policy was now directed toward wooing the uncommitted nations, especially those in the underdeveloped areas of the world. The old Stalinist policy of seeking to gain complete control of an area now gave way to a policy of merely getting an area out of the influence of the Western

powers. Stalin had been very suspicious of revolutionary movements he could not control completely. His bitter experience with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in 1927 and 1928 plus his differences with Tito in 1948 made him reluctant to cooperate with leaders and groups that were not entirely under his control. He believed that the newly independent India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon were merely puppets of their former masters. Stalin's successors, however, saw that inciting Communist forces, usually very small groups, with no chance of gaining power, against Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno was only driving these would-be neutrals into the Western camp. This does not mean that post-Stalin policy-makers were less interested in the eventual communization of the uncommitted areas. However, the Soviets were aware of the revolutionary situation that had developed in these regions since World War II, and felt that collaboration with the nationalist movements would pay large dividends in years to come. Khrushchev emphasized this new policy in 1955 by touring some of the Asian countries.

Khrushchev's first major reversal of Stalin's policy was his pilgrimage to Belgrade in 1955 to tell Tito that all was forgiven. An attempt was made to blame the episode on the deceased Beria, but Tito's chilly reception made this explanation unprofitable. Then Khrushchev, in his secret anti-Stalin speech at the Twentieth Congress in February 1956, ascribed the break with Tito to Stalin. In April 1956 the *Cominform*, the main weapon used in the attack on Tito, was abolished, and in June Tito went to Moscow for a hero's welcome. Rakosi, the boss of Hungary and Tito's arch-enemy, was replaced by Gero in July. In other words, every move was made to bring Tito closer to Moscow.

The Middle East had been more or less neglected in Soviet foreign policy during the last years of Stalin's regime. The Communists worked assiduously in most of the Middle East countries, but most of the Parties were small and ineffective, with the exception of the Party in Syria. Therefore, the news of the arms agreement between Nasser and the Communist bloc came as a severe jolt to the Western powers. Nasser's explanation that he turned to the Communist bloc because the Western powers were slow in supplying him with arms displeased Western statesmen. Seldom had Soviet diplomats bought so much trouble for the West so cheaply.

The Khrushchev policy seemed to be rolling along nicely throughout 1955 and most of 1956. After the denigration of Stalin there was a relaxation of controls in the satellites—everyone was now talking about the "thaw." The tenor was something like the "Spirit of Geneva" which had resulted from the Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks at

the Summit. But trouble seemed to be brewing in Poland: the Poznan riots in June and the reinstatement to the Party of Gomulka, who had been jailed during the Stalinist regime as a Titoist, seemed to indicate that Poland was getting out of hand. Then on 19 October the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party elected Gomulka as its First Secretary. Khrushchev left for Warsaw on the same day, but Gomulka faced him down, even to the dismissal of Marshal Rokossovsky, the Kremlin-appointed defense minister of Poland.

Student demonstrations in Budapest in favor of the Poles broke out on 23 October and continued the next day. The Hungarian secret police (AVH) fired on the students and a full-scale revolt broke out. But the Hungarian Army refused to fire on the revolutionists, and many soldiers joined the rebels. Imre Nagy became premier, refused to ask for Soviet help, and even withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. It looked as though Hungary had won its revolution. Then, on 4 November, Soviet mechanized and armored forces smashed into Budapest and put down the revolt by sheer brute force. The Western powers protested, but kept their objections far short of any physical commitment of forces.

The Western powers, however, were deeply in trouble in another area. In July 1956 the United States had informed Nasser that it would not help in the financing of the Aswan High Dam, and the British and the World Bank had taken a similar position. Within a week Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Relations between Nasser and the main users of the canal, Great Britain and France, deteriorated steadily during the next three months. Finally, on 29 October, Israeli troops invaded the Suez peninsula and the English and French attacked the canal area.

Nothing could have so effectively helped the Soviets with their Hungarian troubles. While Soviet tanks were smashing the Hungarian revolution, the Soviet diplomats in the United Nations were pointing an accusing finger at the colonialists and speaking loudly about the heinous crimes being committed by the British and French in Egypt. To confuse matters even more, the United States found itself on the Soviet side of the debate and opposed to its NATO partners. The Soviets went so far as threatening to send "volunteers" to Egypt and hinted darkly at the use of ballistic missiles against England and France. As a result the events of October and November 1956 boosted Soviet prestige in the Middle East and neutralized Western interference in the Hungarian question. Without a doubt the Hungarian affair had an adverse effect on the Communist-inspired image of the Soviet Union as the purveyor of peace and coexistence, but probably did not damage its image as much as the

Western powers had hoped. Moreover, notice had been served on its satellites that the Soviet Union would not tolerate revolutionary activity—they had, and were prepared to use naked force again in that area. Any goodwill that had emanated from the Summit in 1955 was dissipated by the Suez and Hungarian affairs, and for the next year Khrushchev's messages to the West were couched in belligerent language.

By 1958, however, the Soviets began a new peace offensive. In February of that year they asked for a discontinuance of nuclear testing, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, and a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. The Rapacki Plan, establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, was presented to the United Nations in October 1957, and was resubmitted in February 1958. In March the Soviets announced a unilateral suspension of nuclear tests, having just finished their own series of tests. Strangely enough, in the midst of this new peace offensive in June, the Soviets aroused hostile feelings throughout Europe by announcing the execution of Imre Nagy and other Hungarian revolutionists.

Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy really flourished in 1959. In that summer Vice-President Nixon visited Moscow for the opening of the American Exhibition, and even the "kitchen debate" between Nixon and Khrushchev did not dampen the latter's enthusiasm. In September Khrushchev visited the United States, and at the conclusion of his tour he met with President Eisenhower at Camp David. By early 1960, there was much hope that the Summit Conference to be held in Paris in May would lead to a lessening of the tensions in the cold war.

## 60. Soviet Foreign Policy (1959-64)

The story of Khrushchev's foreign policy moves in the 1959-64 period, however, is one of rapid oscillations between violent missile rattling and endeavors to get a detente with the West. Some observers have regarded this as a Pavlovian technique designed to demoralize the West, but most students see it as a desperate attempt by Khrushchev to gain some kind of a diplomatic victory to shore up his sagging reputation as a dynamic leader on the world scene. A quick review of his policies in that period demonstrates the capriciousness of his essays into world politics.

The coexistence policy was at its warmest stage in the fall of 1959 as was demonstrated by Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his talks with Eisenhower at Camp David in September. The time limit aspect of the Berlin "ultimatum" was

suspended and Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed that a solution of the problem should not be prolonged indefinitely; the groundwork was completed for a Summit meeting in Paris in the spring of 1960 at which, apparently, Khrushchev thought he could get some kind of an agreement with the United States on the Berlin problem.

In early 1960, however, Khrushchev apparently lost some of his optimism about euchering a favorable deal on Berlin out of Eisenhower at the scheduled Summit, or else he wanted to needle Ike into a receptive mood, because he began to bring up the Berlin issue with monotonous regularity. In a speech delivered in Moscow on 14 January, 1960 he threatened to make a separate peace treaty with Ulbricht and while on a visit to Indonesia in February he stated that a treaty with the East German regime would mean an immediate end to all Allied rights in Berlin. On 3 April, while on a trip through France, he repeated his threat of a separate treaty, and at Baku on 25 April he brought the subject up again, this time promising to back the East Germans with force. There seems little doubt that he was trying to build up enough pressure on Eisenhower to get a favorable decision on Berlin at the Summit. But it would also seem that even the irrepressible Nikita realized by the end of April that he was not going to get his way at Paris.

The shooting down of the U-2 on 1 May was made to order, and Khrushchev used the incident to torpedo the Summit on 16 May. The awkward US cover story and Eisenhower's acceptance of responsibility for the U-2 flights allowed Khrushchev to wax indignant and even rescind his invitation for an Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union. The last vestiges of the Camp David spirit seemed to have gone down the drain.

But Khrushchev, despite his histrionics at the Paris Summit, was in no position to end his peaceful coexistence policy entirely, for his erstwhile partner to the East, Mao, was becoming more and more obstreperous. An actively hostile West and an aggressive China was a situation to be avoided at all cost. If there is one thing that Russia's rulers have always feared, it is a simultaneous squeeze from the East and West. Stalin's China policy from 1928 until well into the 1940s was based on keeping a strong China to offset Japan, and when a German attack loomed in the days of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Stalin made every effort to insure Japan's neutrality. In Khrushchev's case, Sino-Soviet relations had become so strained by mid-1960 that he pulled his technicians out of China, blueprints included, and almost all Soviet aid to China came to an end. Thus Khrushchev had to keep looking over his shoulder as things went from bad to worse in his relations with the United States.

In retrospect, it is extremely doubtful that Khrushchev was ever serious in his threats to sign a separate treaty with East Germany, or at least one that would allow Ulbricht to determine access to Berlin. This would be tantamount to giving Ulbricht the power to bring on World War III, an abdication of responsibility no Soviet statesman could even contemplate. So, in spite of his disappointment at getting nowhere in 1960, Khrushchev stated that he would await the election of a new president and deal with him.

In early June 1961 Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna for a very inconclusive conference and a few days later, 15 June, Khrushchev stated that there had to be a peace treaty with East Germany; it could not be postponed any longer. Finally, on 13 August, the East Germans with the help of Soviet Divisions, erected the Berlin Wall. This got Khrushchev off the hook as there could be no doubt that the East German regime was being badly hurt by the massive migration of skilled workers and professionals to the West. This flow of refugees through West Berlin was the constant irritant that forced Khrushchev to look so desperately for some solution to the Berlin problem. The Wall, to some degree, was a loss of face for the Communist world, but it was more than offset by getting Ulbricht out of Khrushchev's hair.

Of all the problems Khrushchev faced in the 1959-64 period, the growing gulf between Moscow and Peking was by far the worst. Not only was the "monolithic" solardity of the Communist bloc being split into Soviet and Chinese camps, but even the Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe were beginning to take advantage of the split and were paying less heed to admonitions from the Kremlin. One of Khrushchev's boasts in his January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet was the unassailability of the Soviet Union because of the "consolidation and growth of the mighty socialist camp."<sup>3</sup> Six months later the socialist camp had become very unconsolidated. Furthermore, it was not only Kremlin leadership in the world Communist movement that was being threatened, but even its military strategy was being undermined.

Although the roots of the Sino-Soviet split reach back to the 1920s, the issues in dispute were exacerbated during the post-Korean War era and came to a head in the 1958-59 period. The situation was, and is, complex, but the main points can be outlined as follows:

1. The Soviet Union, in order to keep the Chinese in the war between 1950 and 1953, had to supply them with modern weapons and provide

<sup>3</sup>Pravda, 15 January 1960.

technological training in their use. This accelerated the PLA's (People's Liberation Army) development as a professional army with a professional officer corps, which to some degree put Mao on the spot as the professional officers were becoming less and less enamoured of Mao's military doctrine; only the heavy preponderance of old guerrilla leaders in the upper echelons of the army and government prevented the scuttling of these doctrinal ideas.

2. Sometime, probably in 1954-55 when Khrushchev needed all the help he could get in his fight for power, he promised to help the Chinese create a base for an indigenous nuclear capability. In October 1957, according to the Chinese, the Soviets made some definite promises about this help.

3. In 1958 (exact time unknown) the Russians began to tie conditions to any nuclear weapons supplied to the Chinese. According to Alice Langley Hsieh, the following possibilities existed:

In any event, it would appear that some time in the course of 1958 Moscow sought to bring certain aspects of China's military establishment under Soviet control. Soviet proposals, as some commentators have suggested, may have been limited to a joint naval command in the Pacific and integrated air defense arrangements (Crankshaw, 1961; Garthoff, 1963, p. 87). Or they may have included a Soviet bid for bases in China and joint Sino-Soviet control of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems on Chinese territory, or even for close military cooperation across the board.<sup>4</sup>

The Chinese balked: they wanted a nuclear capability, but not at the price of putting China's military and foreign policies under Soviet control. Anyway, Soviet behavior in the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 made the Chinese dubious of the value of the Soviet nuclear shield, especially if the Chinese were carrying out foreign policies at some variance with Soviet objectives.

4. Sometime in the 1958-59 period the Chinese opted for a "go-it-alone" policy. At this point (September 1959) Marshal P'eng Teh-huai (a member of the Politburo, head of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee, and Minister of National Defense) and General Huang K'o-ch'eng (member of the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Committee and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA) were fired. Why?

5. The evidence seems to indicate that P'eng and Huang represented the professional officer corps which was against the "go-it-alone" policy in weapons production, and that they represented their colleagues too vociferously. They saw the military and political implications of such a policy.

There may, or may not, have been an understanding between P'eng and Khrushchev.

6. In mid-1959, according to the Chinese, the Soviets welched on the 1957 agreement. The Chinese claimed that Khrushchev did this to get a ticket of admission to the *vita dolce* spirit of Camp David.

7. During 1959 Soviet aircraft deliveries to China were cut back. In mid-1960 the Soviets took out their economic and military advisers and technicians. By the end of 1960 the Chinese were really on their own.

Since 1960 Mao had a free hand to carry out China's foreign policy; to get the United States out of the waters of the Western Pacific, to get a favorable, to him, solution of the Taiwan problem, to expand into the rice bowl of Southeast Asia, to get domination over Outer Mongolia, and to put enough pressure on India to cause her to lose face in Asia. But he did not have the tools to bring these policies to fruition. He needed many more nuclear weapons than he had plus a decent delivery capability. The Soviets could have gone far toward providing these, but their price, in terms of controls over China's military and foreign policies, was too high for Mao to pay. Ironically, however, the lack of Soviet backing in the military field meant that the Kremlin was to some extent actually dominating Mao's foreign policies.

An analogy might be made between General de Gaulle's "go-it-alone" nuclear policy within NATO and Mao's within the Communist world. De Gaulle objected to sole United States control over the only tools that make a foreign policy meaningful today—nuclear weapons. The Suez crisis in 1956 was probably the turning point in de Gaulle's thinking along this line. Mao also objected to having his foreign policy dependent upon the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union. His "Suez" was probably the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been willing to provide their partners with promises of adequate nuclear protection, but at a price that both regard as too high.

Khrushchev had been missile rattling quite frequently after 1957 on the assumption that the West conceded a Soviet lead in ICBMs, and by 1960 the famous "missile gap" even played an important role in the United States presidential race. By late 1961, however, there was a growing Soviet realization that the United States military strategists were no longer buying the "missile gap," or at least one in favor of the Soviet Union. Confidence in the United States' strategic superiority was growing rapidly in the West, and the Soviet prestige based on the Sputniks seemed to be waning by the end of 1961. How much this had to do with Khrushchev's decision to try an end run by

<sup>4</sup> "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue 1963," *The Journal of Conflict*, VIII, No. 2 (June 1964), p. 112. The Crankshaw article is in *The Observer*, 12 and 19 February, 1961; the Garthoff article in *The Annals*, CCCXIX, September 1963 and entitled "Sino-Soviet Military Relations."



planting MRBMs, IRBMs, and IL-28s in Cuba is hard to prove in the conventional scholarly sense since the chapter and verse cannot be footnoted. But it does seem to have been engendered by a desire on Khrushchev's part for a "quick fix" in the strategic dialogue with the United States.

In the fall of 1962 the Soviets shipped some 42 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as 42 IL-28s into Cuba. When caught with his hand in the cookie jar, Khrushchev blustered momentarily. But when President Kennedy stated clearly that any nuclear launches from Cuba would be treated as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union, Khrushchev pulled his gadgets out of Cuba.

There has been a good deal of speculation as to whether Khrushchev's intention was ever more than to get a non-invasion-of-Cuba pledge out of Kennedy, or to get a *quid pro quo* deal in which the United States would take its obsolescent missiles out of Turkey in return for the Soviet withdrawal. It would seem in retrospect that Khrushchev was hunting sparrows with an elephant gun if that was all he was after. Why go to the brink of war to accomplish such limited objectives?

The Chinese and Albanian comrades were disinclined to believe that he had such limited objectives in mind, and after October 1964 it was evident that his Kremlin associates also disbelieved in "Khrushchev's brilliant diplomatic achievement." Like the Chinese, his successors in the Kremlin seem to regard his Cuban gambit as an unmitigated calamity. It brought the Soviet Armed Forces face to face with the threat of an all-out war. Once the gauntlet had been thrown down and the Soviets had backed off, there was bound to be a rising disbelief in that Soviet superiority so assiduously fostered between 1957 and 1962.

Khrushchev in his famous "new strategy" speech of January 1960 had advocated all emphasis on the missile and the nuclear weapon and a drastic cut-back in conventional armaments, but when the crunch occurred in October 1962 it was precisely United States superiority in long-range aircraft and ICBMs that forced him to back down. His marshals were undoubtedly humiliated. His mystique as a strategist, if he ever had one, was badly bruised. There were many facets to the Cuban crisis, but the damage to Khrushchev's reputation as a military savant is indisputable. It led to a bitter dialogue between him and his marshals in the last two years of his reign and the marshals grew even more critical of his military views.

In 1963 Khrushchev decided to draw nearer the West, a detente bound to alienate the Chinese even more. They were already furious with Khrushchev

for his pro-India stand in the Himalayan border dispute during October and November of 1962. Skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border resulted, and there is some evidence that the Soviets were fomenting trouble in Sinkiang.

The reason behind Khrushchev's resumption of a warmer coexistence policy was probably his desire for more economic cooperation with the West. He was pushing a major build-up of the Soviet chemical industry, especially in plastics, artificial fibers, and fertilizers, and needed long-term credits to buy the equipment from the industrial states of the West. Only a detente in the cold war would make this plan feasible.

In July 1963 Khrushchev gave a token of the new spirit by agreeing to the nuclear test ban. In the same month the Chinese were in Moscow meeting with the Russians in an effort to iron out their differences. Nothing came of the meeting, and the nuclear test ban added to the Chinese fury, if that were possible.

In 1964 Khrushchev began to court the arch enemy of all good Communists, West Germany. He hinted at a visit to West Germany and even sent his son-in-law, Adzhubei, to pave the way in July 1964. This so irritated some of his Kremlin colleagues that they instigated the KGB to carry out a mustard-gas attack on a West German diplomat near Moscow in September 1964. However, before the West German-Soviet detente could mature, Khrushchev's colleagues ganged up on him and thrust him from power.

## 61. Soviet Foreign Policy Since Khrushchev (1965-1978)

Although Khrushchev's ever worsening relations with Mao Tse-tung, his unsuccessful missile gamble in Cuba, and his personal diplomacy with Bonn undoubtedly contributed to his downfall, it is probable that the main causes for his ouster were domestic—continuous and erratic reorganizations and a disastrous crop failure in 1963. His successors have been no more successful with the Chinese than he was; and, just as Khrushchev had to send troops into Hungary in 1956, his successors had to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia in 1968. As Mao once put it: The new regime is Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.

There is some truth in Mao's observation. Khrushchev jettisoned Stalin's "continental strategy" in the middle 1950s and began to move outside the Eurasian continent whenever a target of opportunity presented itself in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. The main trouble with Khrushchev's policy was the lack of military muscle to back his play. Brezhnev, Kosygin, *et alia*, over the last dozen years have

overcome that lack. They have attained not only a strategic nuclear backup, but have also acquired the seafight and airlift needed to back their global ploys. In other words, they are following the Khrushchev "extra-continental" strategy, but they, unlike him, have the military tools to make it work.

**Within the Communist world.**—After a brief honeymoon, from October 1964 until March 1965, Sino-Soviet relations returned to their more normal vicious state. Peking again accused Moscow of collaborating with the United States in a joint effort to dominate the world. By the autumn of 1965, the following events tended to exacerbate Peking's xenophobic foreign policy: The obliteration of the Chinese-backed Communist Party of Indonesia; the unsuccessful attempt by Peking to dominate the projected Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held in Algiers—it was called off; the successful Soviet intervention in the Pakistan-Indian conflict; and, above all, the onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China itself. The Chinese refused an invitation to attend the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in March-April 1966, and even expressed amazement at Soviet expectations that they would. Thus it was no surprise when the Soviets in November 1966 openly ridiculed the Cultural Revolution and called for the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung—proof positive that the Soviet leadership had given up all hope of solving its differences with Mao.

The Soviets then began a campaign to convene a conference of most of the Communist parties in the world in order to oust Peking from the circle of legitimate members of the international Communist movement—sort of an excommunication from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist church. A conference at Karlovy Vary in April 1967 got nowhere, while a consultative conference in Budapest in February 1968 did schedule a world conference in Moscow for 25 November 1968; it was a stormy session and the Rumanians walked out. The invasion of Czechoslovakia made postponement of the scheduled conference mandatory. The world conference finally was convened in early June 1969. Some three hundred leaders of seventy-five Communist parties gathered in Moscow, but such powerful leaders as Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Tito, and Castro refused to attend. Even though the Soviet leaders had promised not to inject the Chinese issue, Brezhnev, in a bitter speech, accused the Chinese of preparing to start a war and of trying to shatter the unity of the international Communist movement. He did, however, shy away from trying to oust the Chinese from the Communist camp. He probably realized that many of the leaders gathered at the conference would refuse to go along with any such step.

In the meanwhile, just three months before the conference, Soviet and Chinese troops had engaged in open hostilities. On 2 March 1969, and again on 15 March, there was fierce fighting over the jurisdiction of Damansky (Chenpao) Island in the Ussuri River. This was merely the most publicized of the thousands of Sino-Soviet clashes that had occurred along the 5,000-mile common border. In mid-August 1969 there was another military engagement, but this time it was along the Kazakhstan-Sinkiang border. Peking and Moscow have been negotiating their dispute in a desultory manner since October 1969, but there seems to be no real desire to come to an agreement. In the meanwhile, both sides have augmented their military forces along the border, each accusing the other of preparing for war.

At the other end of the Soviet Empire, disunity with the "socialist commonwealth" has proceeded apace. By late 1967 Czechoslovakia was the focal point in satellite unrest. Novotny, Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and President of the country, along with his aging *apparatchiki*, had succeeded in running the Czech economy into the ground and in alienating a number of powerful groups, including the Slovaks, the intellectuals, and the workers. On 3 January 1968 the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party removed Novotny as Secretary and gave the job to Alexander Dubcek. This opened the floodgates and a deluge of reforms and innovations ensued in the spring and summer of 1968. Although Brezhnev, in Prague in early December 1967, had supported Novotny rather unenthusiastically, he seemed willing at first to go along with Dubcek. As reform followed upon reform, however, Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues became alarmed. Ulbricht in East Germany and Gomulka in Poland were also pointing out the danger that the Czech experiment presented for their regimes, while the Soviet military leaders were conjuring up visions of the Czech linchpin being removed from the Warsaw Pact defense forces. The most alarming aspect of the Czech experiment in "Communist humanism," however, was that its heretical concepts might spread to the Soviet Union itself—an intolerable prospect in the eyes of the Kremlin leadership.

The net result was the armed invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Although the military operation went off efficiently enough, it was a political shambles. The Soviets, who had arrested Dubcek and his top colleagues and carted them off to Moscow, found it expedient to return them to Prague. This was followed by a long, drawn-out process of whittling away at the Dubcek regime, gradually ousting the liberals one by one, and finally expelling Dubcek from the Party in June 1970.

In an attempt to justify their military intervention, the Soviets came up with a new concept, the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine." It began with an article in *Pravda* on 26 September 1968 in which it was stated that any socialist state that is in a system with other socialist states constituting the socialist commonwealth cannot be free of the common interests of that commonwealth. Then Brezhnev, in a speech to a Congress of the Polish Party, as reported in *Pravda* on 13 November 1968, spelled the doctrine out in detail:

... when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of a restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—it is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries.

As is obvious, this doctrine justifies in advance any Soviet intervention in its satellites, and would also "legitimize" from Moscow's point of view, armed intervention in Albania, Yugoslavia, mainland China, or North Korea.

The ruthless suppression of the Czech attempt to put a "human face" on Communism and the subsequent Brezhnev Doctrine quelled any further overt questioning of the Soviet authority in the East European satellites. But there have been rumblings in Poland that caused anxiety in the Kremlin. For instance, in mid-December 1970, Gomulka made the mistake of raising food prices just before the Christmas holidays in Catholic Poland. After a week of violence in the shipyards on the Baltic coast, Gomulka resigned and his successor, Gierk, had to get a loan from the Russians to continue the subsidization of food prices, thus enabling his new Prime Minister, Jaroszewicz, to announce in mid-February 1971 that the increase in food prices were revoked. Seemingly having learned nothing from Gomulka's blunder, Gierk announced a food price increase on 24 June 1976 and touched off a nationwide uproar of such proportions that he had to rescind the increase the next day. The Poles, it would seem, are not reticent when it comes to making their voices heard when the issue concerns the cost of living.

The Kremlin's other problem child among the East European satellites is Rumania. Khrushchev had waged a running feud with Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of the Rumanian Worker's Party, the Communist outfit that runs Rumania, and the new Soviet regime had hardly settled in office when Gheorghiu-Dej died only to be succeeded by an even tougher opponent of Kremlin *bossism*. The new leader set the tone for

his strong domestic control by pushing through the Ninth Congress of the Rumanian party in July 1965 an act to change the name of the party to the "Rumanian Communist Party" and to change his job title from "First Secretary" to "General Secretary," thus on a par with Brezhnev. Ceausescu has run a tight ship since 1965.

But like his predecessor he has continued to play a neutral role in the Sino-Soviet dispute, maintaining relations with both Moscow and Peking. He also refused to break off relations with Israel in 1967 along with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Furthermore, Ceausescu, like Gheorghiu-Dej, has tried to steer as much of Rumania's foreign trade as possible to the West. This enables him to get better goods, to obtain convertible currency, and to avoid utter dependence upon Soviet trade. Finally, Ceausescu has not hesitated to voice his resentment at the Soviet retention of two former Rumanian provinces, Bessarabia and Bukovina, the present Soviet republic of Moldavia.

The Soviets are also upset by yet another phenomenon in the Marxist world, the growth of what for a better name is called "Eurocommunism." This is the term used to describe an increasing dissatisfaction on the part of a number of West European Communist parties with Soviet domination of their policies. They are now insisting that they can and should come to power in accordance with their own historical and cultural traditions. Although the heresies of Tito and Mao provided some of the stimulus for this attitude, it was probably Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's psychopathic behaviour that gave the movement its greatest impetus. The armed invasion of Hungary in 1956 and later the invasion of Czechoslovakia, plus the outrageous treatment of Soviet dissenters, all these actions made the Khrushchev revelation of Stalinism in action look somewhat like the present Kremlin leadership in action, and many of the West European parties have not hesitated to express their disapproval.

The largest non-ruling party is the Italian Communist Party and it has been and is now at the head of the Eurocommunist movement. Togliatti, the outstanding postwar leader of the Italian party, began to let Khrushchev know in the mid-1950s that the Italians needed a longer leash, and the present leader of the party, Enrico Berlinguer, has gone far beyond Togliatti in tweaking the Kremlin nose. The Italian party now asserts that if it came to power it would try to stay in NATO, about as independent a position vis-à-vis Moscow as a Marxist party can take.

Berlinguer's lead is now being followed, if not

surpassed, by Santiago Carillo, head of the Spanish Communist Party, and to a more limited extent by Marchais and his French Communist Party. The latter, at its last Party Congress, rejected the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a necessary step in the onward march to the stage of communism, the pot at the end of the Marxist rainbow.

Some of the smaller West European Communist parties have, in order to keep their workers happy, evolved into democratic socialist movements without dropping their "communist" appellations. The Communist Party of Iceland is a good example. Other parties remain staunch followers of the Moscow line, for example Cunhal's Portuguese Communist Party. Diversity in the Communist world is now a fact of life which the Muscovite leaders will have to face up to eventually even though they are fighting the proposition today.

**Soviet policy vis-à-vis Western Europe and the United States.**—At least up to the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Brezhnev-Kosygin objectives in Western Europe were roughly as follows: to facilitate the breakup of NATO, to weaken Western European ties with the United States, and to isolate West Germany from its NATO allies.<sup>5</sup>

The American preoccupation with Vietnam on one hand, and the unpopularity of that war in many NATO countries on the other hand, presented the Brezhnev-Kosygin team with an opportunity to weaken US influence in Western Europe. In addition, de Gaulle's "Europe-for-the-Europeans" line plus his decision to withdraw the French military forces from NATO found some sympathy even among America's NATO partners. Many West Europeans, bemused by the disunity prevalent in the Communist world and by what looked like a prudent and moderate leadership in Moscow, began to talk of the advisability of dismantling NATO when its twentieth birthday came around in 1969.

The Soviets played on the hopes and fears of those who desired less US influence in Western Europe. At the Warsaw Pact Bucharest Conference in July 1966 the call went out for a liquidation of the NATO and Warsaw alliances and for the creation of a new security system to be decided upon at a proposed all-European security conference—the US presence at this conference was deliberately left vague. During de Gaulle's two-week visit in the USSR in June 1966, the Soviet leaders ran out the red carpet with a vengeance. And in April 1967, at the meeting of European Communist parties in Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev assailed NATO as an anachronism in the Europe of the 1960s.

<sup>5</sup>See Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1965-1969*, Santa Monica, RAND, July 1969 (RM-5991-PR), for an excellent analysis of Soviet policies in both Eastern and Western Europe.

But the Soviets were not putting all their eggs in one basket, and while they seemed intent upon getting the United States out of Europe they were simultaneously holding out the bait of talks on the limitation of strategic weapons systems. Gromyko was quite explicit in stating Soviet interest in such talks in a speech delivered in June 1968.

Soviet relations with West Germany were rather cool during the first year of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, probably as part of an effort to assuage Ulbricht's fears of a Bonn-Moscow rapprochement engendered by Khrushchev's uncertain gestures in 1964. In the autumn of 1966, the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition launched a new look in relations with the East and in December announced its willingness to jettison the so-called Hallstein Doctrine<sup>6</sup> and to establish diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries. On 31 January 1967 Rumania and West Germany agreed upon mutual diplomatic relations, much to the chagrin of both Ulbricht and his Russian masters. There were, however, talks between Brandt and Tsarapkin, the Soviet envoy to Bonn, in July and again in August 1967, talks that touched upon the possibilities of a renunciation-of-force agreement. The Soviet price for the agreement, namely recognition of East Germany, was too high for Bonn. All the while that Bonn was pursuing its *Ostpolitik*, a policy aimed at bridge-building between East and West, the Soviets continued their usual propaganda line that West Germany was a revanchist, neo-Nazi, war-mongering nation bent upon conquest in Eastern Europe.

Then came the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and most of the Brezhnev-Kosygin West European policy lay in ruins. As a rationalization of the invasion, West Germany was made the whipping boy—its *Ostpolitik* was described as a cover for a German plot to tear Czechoslovakia away from the "socialist commonwealth." The NATO nations now agreed that NATO's continued existence was desirable and little was now said about dismantling it in 1969. Interest in any Soviet-sponsored pan-European collective security scheme was dead for the time being. Even Moscow had lost interest in such a scheme since it now needed the institutional framework of its Warsaw alliance to keep its satellites in line. The image of Soviet moderation and liberalization, which had so fascinated many in the West, was shattered in August 1968. In short, sacrifice of the Brezhnev-Kosygin diplomatic gains in Western Europe between 1965 and 1968 was the price paid for the reversion to raw force in Czechoslovakia.

<sup>6</sup>This doctrine (dating from 1955) ruled out diplomatic relations with states recognizing the German Democratic Republic, with the exception of the USSR.

By late 1969, however, the Soviets again shifted their stance vis-à-vis Bonn and talks on the renunciation of force began on 8 December 1969. Further exploratory negotiations were held beginning on 30 January 1970. In the meanwhile, there were talks with the Poles in regard to the Oder-Neisse boundary and in March Chancellor Willi Brandt met with Willi Stoph, Premier of East Germany, at Erfurt. This was the first meeting of the heads of the two states since their establishment in 1949. Finally, with all this groundwork laid, Walther Scheel, Bonn's Foreign Minister, went to Moscow to begin bargaining with Gromyko over a renunciation-of-force agreement; the talks began on 27 July and two weeks later they came up with an agreement. The main points of the treaty were a renunciation of force and the West German recognition of the validity of the postwar boundaries. Scheel did not accord *de jure* recognition to East Germany, which had been one of the Soviet demands for the treaty—apparently this was a Soviet concession in return for West German recognition of the boundaries.

Soviet-American relations were far from smooth in the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. As early as November 1964 the new leaders were saying that they were prepared to give all necessary assistance to North Vietnam if the latter were attacked by the United States. In mid-February 1965, Kosygin headed a mission to Hanoi which almost coincided with the extension of American air raids into North Vietnam. This involved the Soviets in two ways: First, a brother Communist regime was under attack by imperialists and Moscow was honor-bound to assist the Vietnamese, and, second, Vietnamese defense against American planes called for sophisticated anti-aircraft equipment, something only the Soviets could supply. Hanoi's need of Soviet sophisticated equipment also meant a diminution of Chinese influence in North Vietnam, a bonus to be gratefully received. By the end of September 1975, Brezhnev was able to inform the Central Committee that the Soviet Union had already supplied North Vietnam with large amounts of weapons and equipment.

The Americans and Soviets were also in opposition in the Middle East in the late 1960s, both before and after the June War of 1967. Secretary Rogers, however, worked assiduously to end the so-called "war of attrition" between Egypt and Israel at the end of the 1960s in order to tone down US-Soviet tensions.

For all the tensions between the two superpowers, there were attempts to find some solution for the strategic arms race that was becoming horribly expensive for both sides. President Johnson even sent a letter to Kosygin in January 1967 concerning negotiations on strategic weapons and Kosygin

replied affirmatively in March. The subject came up again during the Johnson-Kosygin meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967 in the aftermath of the war in the Middle East. But all these tentative essays into arms limitation talks went down the drain as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. It was not until November 1969 that the first of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) meetings began. The talks alternated between Helsinki and Vienna over the next three years and finally culminated in the signing of SALT I in May 1972. One factor that may have motivated the Soviets was the American-Chinese rapprochement that was blossoming in 1971-72 and which culminated in President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. Fear of a close US-PRC alignment was enough to spur Brezhnev into a warm endorsement of a Soviet-American detente, even while American planes were mining the harbor at Haiphong and bombing Hanoi.

Detente was somewhat bruised during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, but it survived enough to find the rivals in a joint statement in December 1973 which called for a Geneva conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the UN but with the two superpowers as co-chairment. The spirit of detente even influenced the Soviets enough to increase Jewish emigration from the USSR to almost 32 thousand in 1972 and almost 35 thousand in 1973.

In June 1973 Brezhnev visited the United States for a week and in July 1974 Nixon again went to Moscow for a summit meeting. In October 1973 the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks got under way in Vienna and the groundwork was being laid for the future Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC) to be held in Helsinki. Detente even survived the fall of Nixon and his successor, Ford, met with Brezhnev in Valdivostok in November 1974 to sign an agreement limiting both sides to no more than twenty-four hundred strategic delivery vehicles each.

One of the reasons for Brezhnev's original enthusiasm for detente was his vision of the huge amounts of American technology that would come with the general relaxation of tensions encompassed under detente. The Soviets, especially in their consumer goods sector, were in dire need of a technological transfusion that could best be supplied by the United States. What the Soviets wanted above all was a most-favored-nation status in order to avoid discriminatory tariffs and next in order of priority was some large scale Export-Import Bank financing. In mid-October 1974, Senator Jackson announced that a Soviet-American agreement had been reached under which the Soviets would permit much freer emigration in

exchange for US trade concessions—he even mentioned a figure of 60 thousand exit visas per year. The Soviets retorted that they had given no Jewish emigration pledge and in mid-January 1975 Kissinger stated that the trade agreement had been cancelled.

In the meanwhile Soviet-American frictions were developing in Africa. The military coup in Portugal in April 1974 brought in a more liberal regime and signaled the end of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa, a bait which proved too tempting for the Soviets to resist. But it was also an area that Kissinger felt to be a test of Soviet good intentions under detente. It is precisely on this point that the Soviet and the American understanding of detente diverge radically. The Soviets maintain that aid for wars of liberation in the Third World is not part of detente, while the Americans feel that detente means the avoidance of superpower frictions everywhere, not just in SALT negotiations.

The Portuguese set 11 November 1975 as the date for Angolan independence, but in the six months preceding that date there was a running battle between the various groups seeking power. The Russians decided to back Augustinho Neto's MPLA and began to funnel in military supplies. This enabled Neto to push his competitors out of the capital, Luanda, and somewhat later, with the backing of thousands of Cubans, to get a nominal hold over the country. When Kissinger tried to contest the actions of the Russians and Cubans by sending aid to Neto's rivals, Congress hamstrung him by denying funds.

By late 1975 detente was a very frayed concept and in the presidential campaign of 1976, President Ford refused to use the term. The Soviet military buildup proceeded at full steam and Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa became ever more widespread—on the Horn, in Mozambique, and almost a monopoly in the supply of weapons to the guerrillas operating against Rhodesia, Manibia, and South Africa. The Carter administration has had to face a more and more aggressive and militarily powerful Soviet Union. Thus, to many observers, the term "detente" is either irrelevant or a cover for Soviet aggression.

**Soviet policy in the Middle East.**—The Brezhnev-Kosygin team inherited an on-going Soviet policy in the Middle East that had been surprisingly successful since the initial breakthrough with the arms-for-cotton deal with Egypt in 1955. In the Suez crisis of 1956, although the United States played the major role in stopping the hostilities by bringing its NATO allies, France and Britain, to heel, it was the Russians who yelled the loudest and impressed the Arabs the most. Soviet willingness to underwrite the Aswan High Dam and its role as the supplier of arms and military advisors to Nasser

transformed Egypt into a Soviet client state by the early 1960s.

Having leapfrogged over the CENTO barrier, the Soviets then turned their attention to the CENTO powers of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Podgorny, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, led a Soviet delegation to Turkey in January 1965, and in 1967 the Soviets played a circumspect role in the Cyprus dispute. A \$200-million loan to Turkey and a visit of Premier Demirel to the USSR in 1967 went a long way toward improving relations between the two countries. In the case of Iran, Soviet economic and military aid, beginning in 1966, and the Soviet agreement to purchase iron ore, petroleum and natural gas eased relations with the Shah. Kosygin's visit to Teheran in April 1968 was symbolic of a new era in Iranian-Soviet relations. The Soviets had not only leaped over the CENTO barrier, but were successfully undercutting American influence with the members of the alliance itself.

In May 1967, the Soviets deliberately increased Arab-Israeli tensions by charging that Israel was about to invade Syria. Nasser, who was smarting under Syrian accusations that he was dragging his feet in the liberation of Palestine, demanded the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force, a demand that U Thant complied with, and proceeded to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba, vital to Israeli shipping. The Israelis responded with a lightning sweep through Sinai, the west bank of the Jordan, and the Golan Heights, decisively defeating the armies of the UAR, Jordan, and Syria. The speed and magnitude of the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War caught everyone by surprise, not least the Soviets. The latter hastened to assure the United States that they were not about to intervene in order to rescue their clients. Immediately after the war, however, the Soviets proceeded to rearm the Arabs, especially the UAR, on a massive scale and also to build up the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Soviet influence in the Middle East, from Algeria to Pakistan, grew by leaps and bounds in the years immediately after the Six-Day War.<sup>7</sup>

The Arab-Israeli conflict continued to smoulder. The UAR built up its defenses along the Suez Canal and with Soviet-supplied artillery began massive shelling of the Israeli lines on the opposite side of the canal. Beginning in July 1969 the Israelis responded with air attacks on the Egyptian artillery positions, but in early 1970 expanded their activities to attacking targets deep within the UAR. At this point Nasser, whose position was becoming intolerable, called upon the Soviets to protect him. In March 1970 the Soviets began to install SAM-3

<sup>7</sup>See Joseph Churba, *Soviet Penetration into the Middle East*, Air University, 1968, and *Perceiving Options in the Middle East*, Air University, 1970, for a scholarly analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.

anti-aircraft missiles and to increase the number of MiG-21s in the UAR, only this time Soviet pilots came with the planes. It became obvious that the Soviets had taken over the air defense of the UAR. The Israelis in turn were pressuring the United States to provide Phantoms and Sky-Hawks to offset the Soviet buildup. At this point in the escalation of hostilities, Secretary of State Rogers proposed that both sides accept a temporary ceasefire and negotiate. Nasser, after a long visit to Russia, accepted the proposal as did King Hussein of Jordan, and on 1 August 1970 the Israelis also agreed to accept the Rogers proposal.

Hardly had the Rogers Plan been accepted by Jordan when Palestinian guerrillas based in Jordan threatened Hussein. On the 6 and 9 September, one of the more radical Palestinian bands hijacked three foreign airlines and, on 12 September, blew them up on Jordanian soil. Five days later, Jordanian troops attacked guerrilla strongholds in Amman and elsewhere. The situation involved much of the Middle East, since Syria and Iraq were strongly pro-guerrilla and Israel would hardly stand peacefully by in the face of a Palestinian takeover of Jordan. In any case, the ceasefire in the Suez area would hardly hold up if the Palestinians came to power in Jordan, thus giving the United States an interest in the outcome in Jordan.

To stop the advancing Syrian tanks, Hussein needed to use his tiny air force, but it was vastly inferior to the Syrian air force. Ergo, he needed air cover from some external source. The United States gave him assurances that air cover would be forthcoming if the Syrian air force intervened while he was mopping up the Syrian tanks. The Sixth Fleet put two aircraft carriers, a helicopter carrier, a cruiser, and 10 destroyers within 250 miles of Israel. Another aircraft carrier was located near Athens. The Syrians and the Soviets got the message and Hussein's planes mopped up the Syrian tanks; the situation in Jordan was under control by 26 September. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron again stood by while the Sixth Fleet intervened in Middle East politics.

On 14 May 1971, Sadat purged his cabinet of several pro-Soviet members, including his Vice-President, Aly Sabry; the Minister of Interior, Gomaa; and the War Minister, General Fawazi. The Russians were alarmed and dispatched a high-level delegation to Cairo. The group included Podgorny, Gromyko, and General Pavlovsky. Podgorny negotiated a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (27 May 1971), a fifteen-year deal proclaiming that "unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries." Treaty or no treaty, relations between Cairo and Moscow were rapidly becoming tenuous, and, in October,

Sadat and his new War Minister, General Sadek, visited Moscow to demand offensive weapons. The Egyptians needed the weapons to make Sadat's monotonously repeated slogan that 1971 would be "the year of decision" a little more credible. They obtained nothing, however. Fifteen months later, in July 1972, Sadat, irritated by the Soviet "no peace, no war" policy, ordered most of the Soviet military advisors out of Egypt. The Soviets complied, since they had no other option, and, within a month, between 15 thousand and 20 thousand Soviet military personnel, including all Soviet pilots, had left Egypt. Fewer than one-thousand technicians remained.<sup>8</sup> The biggest Soviet loss was probably the bases for the Tu-16s—aircraft with Egyptian markings flown by Soviet crews—that had been dogging the ships of the Sixth Fleet. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron was partially blinded.

Sadat, however, soon realized that his projected war with Israel depended on access to the Soviet arsenal. In December 1972, he agreed to extend the five-year agreement on Egyptian facilities for the Soviet naval forces; the agreement had been signed in 1958 and was due to expire in March 1973.<sup>9</sup> This normalized Soviet-Egyptian relations again, and, by March 1973, Soviet arms were again pouring into Egypt. The Russians were apparently willing to jeopardize their new detente with the United States in order to insure the use of Egyptian ports for their ships in the Mediterranean.

Adequately armed, the Syrians and Egyptians struck on 6 October 1973, on Yom Kippur, the most holy day in the Jewish calendar, and began advances in the Golan Heights and across the Suez Canal into the Sinai. The Israelis were caught flat-footed, and the Arabs were able to advance on both fronts. There were two surprising developments in the first few days of the October War: the effectiveness of the Arab air defense and the deadly accuracy of the Soviet-supplied antitank weapons. The air defense was based on a combination of the mobile SA-6 missile in combination with the ZSU-23-4 SHILKA, a quad, radar-controlled, tank-mounted antiaircraft gun system. Of the 120 Israeli aircraft lost, 80 were downed by the SA-6s and most of the remainder by the SHILKAs.<sup>10</sup> The Israeli tank units, whose commanders were hypnotized by memories of the unopposed advances in the Six-Day War of 1967, dashed toward the canal ahead of

<sup>8</sup>Rubenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>10</sup>Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 127-29. The literature on the October War is simply enormous and it would take pages merely to list the works available. Glassman's account is an excellent and relatively brief description of the events leading to the war and the political side of the war.

their infantry and artillery. To their surprise and consternation, the Egyptian infantry used their Russian-supplied SAGGER missiles and RPG-7 rocket launchers with deadly effect. Without adequate air cover because of the effectiveness of the Arab air defenses and without artillery to keep the SAGGER firers under cover, the Israeli tank units took a terrific beating in the opening days of the war.

By 9 October, however, they had run into fewer SA-6s on the Golan Heights: the Syrians had exhausted their missiles. The Israelis counterattacked and inflicted heavy losses on the Syrians. And, on the Suez front, the Egyptians had exhausted their ammunition. The Soviets, apparently honoring a commitment made prior to the war, began to resupply their clients. The first shipload of supplies left the dock at Odessa on 7 October.<sup>11</sup> On 10 October, the Soviets began to airlift equipment to Syria and Egypt, and, by 12 October, they were making between 60 and 90 flights a day. US resupply to Israel did not really get under way until 14 October. The Soviet resupply effort probably enabled the Arabs to prolong the war by two weeks. The whole operation indicated a significant change in Soviet policy toward the third world, since it was the first massive Soviet airlift to a non-Communist client during a war. All in all, the combined Soviet airlift and sealift came to 100 thousand tons: 85 thousand by sea and the remainder by AN-12s and AN-22s.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Soviet military advisors were working with the Syrian ground forces and air-defense units; Soviets drove the tanks delivered on the docks at Tartus and Latakia to Damascus; and the Soviets set up and operated the air defenses at the ports.

By 16 October, the Israelis had the Syrians on the ropes and could concentrate on the Suez front. General Sharon got a force across the canal and raised hell with the Egyptian SAM installations, which allowed the Egyptian fighters to provide air cover, and it was not long before the Egyptian Third Army found itself in serious trouble. Sadat then urged his Soviet sponsors to obtain a cease-fire. By 21 October, Kissinger and Brezhnev worked out a cease-fire that was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. Although accepted by both sides, the fighting somehow continued and the Third Army's position got worse by the day. On 24 October, Sadat asked Brezhnev and Nixon to send a joint force of Americans and Soviets to enforce the cease-fire, but the United States had no intention of getting involved in a joint effort in the Middle East

war. Brezhnev, however, informed President Nixon on the twenty-fourth that, if the United States would not move in with them, the Soviets would go it alone. The US response was a Defense Condition Three alert for all American forces worldwide. This drastic riposte was based on intelligence reports that the Soviets planned to load several battalions of airborne troops. In addition, the Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra had been increased from 60 to 84 ships, thus exceeding the number of ships in the Sixth Fleet.<sup>13</sup> But both fleets were careful not to make any move that would trigger an exchange of fire. The net result was a Soviet signal that no troops would be sent to the Middle East, and the United States put pressure on the Israelis to let up on the Egyptian Third Army.<sup>14</sup>

However, the Soviet Union discovered in the next couple of years that client states are likely to seek other sponsors if they think that they can get a better deal. In 1974-1975, Egypt began to see advantages in having the United States as its broker in dealings with Israel, especially with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as the agent. Between March and September 1975, Kissinger shuttled around the Arab capitals and Tel Aviv in search of an interim agreement as part of his step-by-step diplomacy. Finally, on 1 September, Egypt and Israel initialled an agreement that called for a limited Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai, the presence of some 200 American technicians to monitor the peace, and a heavy American commitment in the clearing and reopening of the Suez Canal.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviets, on the other hand, had found the going heavy in Egypt. They continued their seduction of Syria and Iraq with deliveries of MiG-23s and SCUD SSMs, but Syria was also becoming somewhat estranged. Sadat continued to turn more and more to Saudi Arabia and the United States for economic and military assistance. Then, in May 1975, Kosygin visited Gadaffi in Libya, a visit followed by an 800 million-dollar arms agreement consisting mostly of tanks and MiG-23s.

Soviet fortunes in the Middle East did not improve in 1976. Two of her clients, Syria and the PLO, used Soviet-supplied weapons to slug it out in Lebanon. Neither devoted much attention to Soviet efforts at mediation. Egypt added insult to injury in July 1976 when Sadat unilaterally abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship of 1971. And

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161. However, Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31, gives the total of "close on 100 ships" by the early days of November. He lists 5 cruisers, 22 destroyers, frigates and other missile ships, 25 submarines, 8 LCTs and LSTs, and 35 support ships. As he puts it: "From the Black Sea they came and through the Strait of Gibraltar."

<sup>14</sup> Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 81. Glassman, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-65, thinks that the Soviets bluffed the airborne intervention to get the US to put the arm on the Israelis to let up on the Third Army. If so, the gambit was a great success.

<sup>15</sup> *Strategic Survey 1975*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976, pp. 75-77.



Soviet hopes for a Geneva Conference on the Middle East were dashed. In short, the Soviets were relegated to the sidelines in the Middle East in 1976 and early 1977. Port facilities in Egypt that had taken so long to acquire had all but slipped away by 1977.

Then on 1 October 1977 the Soviets and Americans issued a joint statement calling for a major effort at reconvening the Geneva Conference on the Middle East. The Soviets were all for it since it would give them, as co-chairmen of the conference, a chance to get back in the Middle East ballgame. Why the Americans wanted the Soviets back in the peace negotiations is harder to explain. Probably because at that time it was thought that no lasting peace between the Arabs and Israelis was possible if the Soviets were excluded. Whatever the thinking at that time, Sadat grabbed the ball away from the superpowers by visiting Israel and appearing before the Knesset. The prospects for a Geneva Conference, in the near future at any rate, went aglimmering. Furthermore, Soviet activities in Africa, especially on the Horn, made the Carter administration less than enthusiastic about co-chairing a conference with the Soviets.

**The Soviets and the Indian Ocean.**—Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean area began in the mid-1950s largely as a response to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, both designed to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the later 1950s, and in the early 1960s, Khrushchev wooed India and other nations on the Indian Ocean littoral more in response to the growing belligerence of the Chinese than against the Americans. Then, in December 1964, an American *Polaris* submarine armed with the new A3 SLBM went on patrol in the Pacific. To the Soviets it was obvious that the A3 SLBM, if launched from the Arabian Sea, had the legs to reach targets in European Russia and Soviet Central Asia. The *Poseidon* SLBM, with a range of twenty-eight hundred NM, which came on the scene shortly thereafter, made the Arabian Sea one of the best deployment areas available to the Americans. The new SLBMs, the new long-range communications station being built in Australia at Northwest Cape and the Anglo-American agreement in 1964 to survey Diego Garcia as a possible base convinced the Soviets that sooner or later US submarines would be sailing in the Indian Ocean, especially in the Arabian Sea section of that ocean.

The Soviets, however, were just beginning to carry out their forward deployment in the eastern Mediterranean where there were already aircraft carriers and *Polaris* submarines. With no available base facilities in the Indian Ocean, with the Black Sea Fleet straining its resources to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean, and with the long

distances involved in sending ships from the Northern Fleet or the Pacific Fleet into the Indian Ocean, the Soviets had to forego an immediate flotilla in that ocean. They tried another gambit, a proposal in the UN that the Indian Ocean should be declared a nuclear-free zone, but the proposal did not sell. At this point, the Soviets seemed to lose interest in the Indian Ocean, and little was heard from them in this area until 1968.

As a result of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the US and the UK restricted arms deliveries to both countries, a policy that hurt the Indian navy since it had been procuring its ships from the British. The Soviets rushed in to fill the gap, and they sent landing ships in 1966, torpedo boats in 1967, and the first of six submarines in 1968. In honor of the delivery of the first sub, the C in C of the Soviet Pacific Fleet came to India on a good will visit. He headed a contingent of three ships, two destroyers and a cruiser. When the boss went back to Vladivostok, the cruiser and one of the destroyers stayed on to visit Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and Pakistan. From then on, a steady stream of Soviet ships visited in the Indian Ocean; all of these ships came from the Pacific Fleet since the Suez Canal had been blocked during the June War in 1967.

One reason that the Soviets delayed sending warships into the Indian Ocean was probably their awareness that the British intended to withdraw from east of the Suez, and they did not wish to make any move that might cause the British to nullify that decision. Thus, when the withdrawal was completed in 1968, the Soviets came in pronto. Furthermore, the high priorities accorded the forward deployment on the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap and in the eastern Mediterranean left little to dispatch to the Indian Ocean in the mid-1960s.

The Soviet Navy gradually increased the number of ship days spent in the Indian Ocean, going from 8,800 days in 1972 to 10,500 in 1974. Although there was an especially large number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, partly in response to the presence of an American carrier task force in the Bay of Bengal, and during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the usual Soviet deployment is modest enough. The reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, however, made Soviet access to the Indian Ocean far easier since the Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea route is far shorter than either rounding Africa or sailing all the way from Vladivostok.

The Soviet Indian Ocean flotilla has shown a penchant for operating in the northwestern quadrant of that ocean, in the area of the Persian Gulf, probably as strategic an area as one can imagine in an oil-hungry world. It may also account for the intense interest the Soviets have shown in acquiring bases in the Yemens, Somalia, and

Ethiopia. In 1977 they had to choose between the latter two and they opted for the big one.

Soviet effort to find bases in South and Southeast Asia have not been successful up to the present. The littoral states, many of them vociferous about the US base at Diego Garcia, find the Soviet presence equally as disturbing. They really fear a naval race between the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean and the concomitant pressures that might be exerted by those powers to acquire base facilities. Especially during Indira Gandhi's regime, the Soviets sought bases in the Andaman Islands and at Visakhapatnam, but the bases were not forthcoming. Since her defeat in 1977, their chances of acquiring bases in India are even slimmer. Brezhnev's call in 1969 for "collective security" treaties in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, has gone unheeded up to the present.

**The Soviets in Africa.**—The collapse of colonial regimes in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s presented apparent golden opportunities for the Soviets to fish in some troubled waters. In the early 1960s, several charismatic leaders of the newly fledged African nations aligned their foreign policy outlooks with the policy of the Soviet Union: Sékou Touré of Guinea, Nkrumah of Ghana, and Keita of Mali were outstanding African leaders. About this time came the troubles in the Belgian Congo (now Zaire), and the Soviets tried to play a major role in the confused situation that followed the Belgian pullout. But the Soviets had neither the ships nor the planes to back their ploy in the Belgian Congo and, probably, also lacked the nerve at the time to use what they did have. Persistence, however, is one virtue possessed by the Kremlin leaders; thus, in spite of the downfall of Nkrumah and Keita in the mid-1960s and a miserable showing in the Congo, they stuck to their policy in sub-Saharan Africa. By the mid-1970s, they had access to facilities in several states, the most important of which were Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, and Somalia. During the worldwide maneuvers of the Soviet Navy in *Okean 75*, which involved more than two hundred ships, the Soviets were able to fly from Cuba to facilities in Guinea in surveillance of the south Atlantic and from Berbera in Somalia in reconnaissance over the Arabian Sea.

The long struggle between the Portuguese and the various guerrilla movements in their African colonies gave the Soviet and the Chinese Communists profitable areas for exploitation. They supplied the guerrillas with arms and advisors and were, thus, in a favorable position to push their proteges into power when a military coup ousted Premier Caetano in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. The new regime had no desire to hang on in Africa since that struggle had triggered the coup. The FRELIMI

assumed control in Mozambique, but, in Angola, there was no predominant group to take over—the three main contenders were striving for power themselves. The three main movements were the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FLNA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

The MPLA, headed by Dr. Augustinho Neto, was founded in 1956 as a branch of the Angolan Communist Party, which, in turn, was a satellite of the Portuguese Communist Party. Neto's connections in Moscow were impeccable: frequent trips to Moscow and Havana, the Joliot-Curie award, high positions in Soviet front organizations, and regular financial assistance from Moscow. His movement consisted largely of Angolan radicals, both black and white, and the lumpenproletariat of the Luanda slums.

The FLNA was derived from a movement that began in 1957 to restore the ancient kingdom of the Bakongo people, 600 thousand strong. The Bakongo lived in the northern region of Angola and the southern area of Zaire. The movement was broadened in the 1960s to include the liberation of all Angola and it acquired a new leader, Holden Roberto. Roberto received aid from his brother-in-law, President Mobuto of Zaire, from the Chinese Communists, and from the US CIA.

UNITA was the result of a split in the FLNA in 1966 when Dr. Jonas Savimbi formed a new party with *its strength in the southern half of Angola*. Savimbi was probably the most popular of the leaders in 1974 and 1975, and he could probably have gained over half the votes in any fair election in Angola.

To make a confused situation even hairier, a fourth liberation movement came into being, FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda). Cabinda is an enclave separated from Angola by a strip of Zaire and the Congo River. Its oil revenues were the major source of income for Angola; thus, whoever finally obtained power would insist on Cabinda as an integral part of the new nation. But FLEC, with backing from Zaire, was determined to make Cabinda an independent state.

On 3 January 1975, the three leaders met in Mombassa in Kenya to form a united front in their negotiations with the Portuguese, and, on 15 January, they met with the Portuguese negotiators at Alvor in Portugal. The ensuing Alvor Accord laid down the ground rules for the transfer of power in Angola to a transitional government in which each of the contending parties would have a fair share. Elections to a constituent assembly would be held before 11 November, the date set for the transfer of power.

The Alvor Accord, however, was too pat a solution for the deep fissures that separated the MPLA and the other two movements. The Soviets, firm in their support of Neto and his MPLA, realized that their man in Luanda would fare badly in any honest election and began to pour arms and advisors into Luanda to strengthen Dr. Neto's military punch. The Chinese and the CIA backed Roberto's FLNA on a very modest scale. Dr. Savimbi, however, favored peace and the elections since he was sure that he had the popular support necessary to win. In March, the three movements began to battle each other in Luanda and the struggle was out in the open. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it: "It is no coincidence that major violence broke out in March 1975 when large shipments of Soviet arms began to arrive—thousands of infantry weapons, machine guns, bazookas, and rockets." In April, a Yugoslav freighter tried to unload trucks and SA-7s in Luanda, but Portuguese authorities intervened and the freighter had to unload the remainder of its cargo at Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville. By May, Soviet ships and aircraft were pouring arms into Congo-Brazzaville for later distribution in Angola, and, in July, an all-out civil war ensued. The MPLA drove its competitors out of Luanda and proceeded to seize 11 of the 15 provincial capitals and oil-rich Cabinda. At this point, the FLNA and UNITA joined forces in an alliance against the MPLA. In October, the FLNA drove on Luanda and almost seized the capital. Soviet and Cuban advisors to the MPLA were increased significantly in October, and Cuba even inaugurated its own airlift of troops. The rationale was that South African troops had entered Angola in August in support of Savimbi's UNITA forces in the south and had inflicted major damage on the MPLA troops in that region. According to Kissinger's account, this was the course of events:

The weight of Soviet aid and advisors and the massive Cuban expeditionary force began to tip the scales of battle in December. By this point most of the effective fighting for the MPLA was being done by Cubans.<sup>16</sup>

The MPLA, in control of Luanda on 11 November when the Portuguese left, declared itself the sole government of Angola although the departing Portuguese high commissioner officially handed over the government to "the people of Angola." Two weeks later, Nigeria recognized the MPLA government, citing as its rationale the presence of South African troops in southern

Angola. By the end of the year, more than eleven thousand Cuban troops and a sizeable contingent of Soviet advisors were assigned to Angola. The Soviets had delivered some 200 million dollars in arms and equipment to Angola for use by the MPLA and the Cubans. In the meantime, US aid to the FLNA was stymied when the Senate blocked any further aid to Angola, and the Chinese had dropped the FLNA-UNITA combo like a hot potato when the South Africans intervened in support of UNITA.

Thus, by the end of 1975, Neto's MPLA, supported by an army of Cubans and a generous supply of war materiel from the Soviet Union, controlled the capital at Luanda and a large part of the countryside. The Soviet gamble had paid off, but it had its costs. Detente, although still receiving lip service, was badly damaged since the American concept of detente did not encompass the projection of Soviet military power into the third world, especially such naked power that had been used in Angola. The Soviets had supported their side with ample supplies of weapons and Cuban troops when they realized that the MPLA could not hack it alone. The Soviet airlift was apparently efficient, using facilities in Conakry (Guinea) and at Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire in the Congo. The influence gained in those two states during the decade of the 1960s paid off in 1975-1976 when their airports were needed. Kissinger summed up the Soviet involvement in 1975 as follows:

A total of at least 46 flights of Soviet heavy and medium transports have ferried Soviet military equipment from the USSR to Luanda and Congo-Brazzaville, while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops across the Atlantic. Soviet naval involvements clearly related to the Angolan event, have continued in West African waters for several weeks.<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet-Cuban-MPLA victory in Angola impressed the leadership in Mozambique, the leaders of guerrilla forces in Rhodesia, and the SWAPO movement against South Africans in Namibia. According to one observer, the primary motivation for Soviet intervention in Angola was to weaken the Chinese role in the guerrilla movements against the white regimes in southern Africa.<sup>18</sup> A pro-Soviet Angola might also mean Soviet access to the deep-water ports of Luanda, Lobito, and Mocamedes. Whether the Neto regime would grant such facilities is one thing and whether the Soviets would risk alienating other African states by such "imperialistic" conduct is another. The main

<sup>16</sup> Angola, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., GPO, January and February, 1976, p. 17. Cited hereafter as *Angola*.

<sup>17</sup> *Angola*, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas H. Watson, *The Angolan Affair, 1974-1975*, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Air War College Research Report No. 257, 1977, p. 10.

conclusion, however, seems to be that the Soviets regarded the benefits accruing from an intervention in Angola as worth the risks. It also demonstrated, in vivid fashion, Soviet capability of projecting military power some 6,000 miles from Russian borders.

The Soviets were displaying an interest in Somalia in the early 1960s, an interest that became much more intense following Mohammed Siad Barre's seizure of power in 1969. In 1974 Somalia became the first nation in black Africa to sign one of the standard treaties of friendship and cooperation being peddled by the Soviets. As a *quid pro quo* for Soviet economic and military aid, the Soviets were permitted to convert Berbera into a naval facility for the Indian Ocean flotilla. Barre also claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist thus making him a natural client in the eyes of Moscow. By 1976-77 the Soviets had enabled Barre to outfit and train a relatively large army equipped with modern planes and tanks.

While the Soviets were wooing the Somalis so successfully, the American client state on the Horn, Ethiopia, was undergoing its time of troubles. It was thought that the presence of the American communications station at Kagnaw and the fact that America was the main supplier of arms would be enough to keep Ethiopia in the US camp. In February 1974, however, as a result of several years of drought in the Wollo and Tigre provinces of Ethiopia in which enormous numbers of people died of starvation, a group of officers, known as the Dergue, pulled off a coup d'etat that really shook up Emperor Haile Selassie's regime. The Dergue, which gradually became more Marxist in outlook, arrested the emperor in September 1974—he died in prison in August 1975.

Major Mengistu Haile Mariam gradually assumed the leadership of the Dergue, consolidating his power in February 1977 when he and his clique emerged victorious in an internecine shootout among the Ethiopian leaders. Mengistu, who had engineered a secret military aid agreement with the Soviets in December 1976, began to flirt openly with the Russians and Secretary Vance announced that US military aid to Ethiopia was to be cut. In April Mengistu ordered the expulsion of the American military aid mission and the closing of Kagnaw. In May 1977 Mengistu went to Moscow and signed the usual friendship pacts and military aid agreements.

The Soviet role of arms supplier to both Ethiopia and Somalia, sworn enemies over eons of time, came under severe strain in the autumn of 1977 when a liberation movement of Somalis living in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia began to get reinforcements and equipment from the Somali regular army. The Soviets had tried to smooth things over at a conference in Aden in April where

they proposed that Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Djibouti join in a union, a proposal that neither Barre nor Mengistu was prepared to accept. In November 1977 Barre expelled all the Soviet military advisers and closed Berbera and other Somali airfields and ports to the Soviets.

The Soviets then put all their eggs in the Ethiopian basket and moved in thousands of Cubans and a thousand or so Soviet military advisers. In late November they began a major air and sealoft of arms to Ethiopia. In the spring of 1978 the Ethiopians and Cubans drove the Somalis out of Ogaden. It was, in some respects, a weird conflict in which Somalis armed with Soviet weapons fought Ethiopians flying American aircraft under the direction of Soviet advisers.

**Soviet policies in the Third World.**—Soviet theory concerning Moscow's role in the newly emerging nations, which had been hard-nosed and unrealistic in Stalin's time, has fluctuated considerably in the last fifteen years. The real turn in policy came in 1955 when Khrushchev and Bulganin toured India, Burma, and Indonesia, promising all kinds of goodies and when the arms-for-cotton deal gave the Soviets access to the Middle East. By 1960 the Soviet theoreticians had evolved the theory of "national democracy."

National democracy was defined as an intermediate stage in which an oppressed people has broken loose from "imperialist oppression" and has been taken under the wing of the communist bloc; domestically, however, it is engaged in carrying through "bourgeois" reforms and has not yet embarked on the "building of socialism." Stated in other terms, a national democracy is a state that has achieved the status of a junior associate of the Soviet bloc; only after it has entered the stage of "socialist construction" will it achieve full membership in the "commonwealth of socialist nations."<sup>9</sup>

By 1964 a new concept was created: "revolutionary democracy." This title was applied to radical but non-Communist regimes favored by Moscow. Some of these states, like Egypt and Algeria even jailed their native Communists, a difficulty that Moscow overcame by ordering the Communists to join the single-parties in control of Egypt and Algeria. To be a "revolutionary democracy" the regime should be pursuing a "non-capitalist" route in its economic development, that is, state ownership of at least some of the productive enterprises; it should be more or less aligned with Moscow's foreign policy, at least to extent of being anti-American. Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Indonesia, Algeria and the UAR were termed "revolutionary democracies" at one time or another. But the abnormally high mortality rate among the

<sup>9</sup>Philip Mosely, "The Kremlin and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1967), p. 67.

charismatic leaders of these states (Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Sukarno, *et alia*) tended to dilute Soviet enthusiasm for the concept.

Since 1965 about the only consistent criterion for Soviet support of nations in the third world is a tendency to follow the Soviet line in the international arena or nonalignment. Thus monarchical regimes such as those in Afghanistan or Iran, military regimes such as those in Pakistan or Iraq, or democracies such as India or Turkey have all received Soviet largesse and favorable mention in the Russian communication media. Their potential value in facilitating Soviet *national* objectives is the touchstone; their potential as future socialist (Communist) states is of small importance. Peking has complained vociferously since 1960 that Moscow is uninterested in helping "wars of national liberation," and with some justification. Castro also complained, up to 1968 about Moscow's tendency to seek normalization of its relations with Latin American governments which were busy suppressing guerrilla activities inspired and supported by Havana. But domestic economic troubles and the fiasco of the Che Guevara attempt to incite a rebellion in Bolivia resulted in a more chastened Castro in the last ten years. He is now supplying the Gurkhas for the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa.

The Soviets need airfields and naval facilities to accommodate their long-range aircraft and a growing navy. Also, the Kremlin leaders seem unable to resist a target of opportunity in the third world and are further motivated by their desire to undercut the Chinese in underdeveloped nations. All these drives give the Soviets an appetite for influence in far-off places, an appetite that seems to grow with the eating.

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## Religion, the Arts, and Dissent

THE SOVIET PRESS, absolutely controlled by the Party, publishes little about the major discontents and dissensions in Soviet society. Only when a campaign is under way to correct some flagrant defect in the system is there an admission in the press that the Soviet way of life is anything but perfect. There is, however, a great deal of direct and indirect evidence of discontent and dissension within Soviet Society.

Some evidence is implicit. It seems safe to assume that no government entirely convinced that its population was content and satisfied would put in the time, money, and energy expended in the Soviet Union on an enormous police force and an army of censors. Neither would it continue its restrictions on, and persecution of, the various religious groups. Only a government convinced or at least strongly suspicious, that potential dissension is lurking immediately beneath the surface would devote so much energy and treasure to repression.

Other evidence is more explicit. The huge hard-labor camps for political prisoners, the notorious trials of dissenters, and the curious custom of incarcerating political offenders in insane asylums indicate intellectual unrest in Soviet society on more than a minor scale. The relatively large number of nonconformist writers who circulate their writing clandestinely in the USSR plus the protest literature smuggled abroad for publication in the West also indicates dissent on the part of a sizeable number of intellectuals. Finally, defectors, ranging from Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliyeva, to literary figures and diplomatic personnel have testified to the repressiveness of the Soviet regime.

Since the discontents of the various non-Russian nationalities and the economic reformers are dealt with in previous chapters, the main emphasis in this chapter will be upon the religious groups, the alienated artists, and the dissident scientists. Inasmuch as the literature on each of these aspects of Soviet dissent is enormous and often controversial, what follows will be more descriptive than analytical. On the whole, however, the facts speak for themselves.

### 62. Religion

The Communist attitude toward religion can best be summed up in Marx's oft quoted dictum: "Religion is the opiate of the people." His most famous disciple, Lenin, was in total agreement with his teacher on this point and immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia anti-religious activities were part and parcel of the Communist plan to remake Soviet society. Although the main target was the Russian Orthodox Church, the religion of 70 percent of the population, the Communists showed no less vigor in attacking the numerous other religions in Russia. These, to name the main ones, included the Old Believers, the various Protestant denominations, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and the independent churches of Armenia and Georgia.

**Russian Orthodox Church.**—Since the Bolsheviks were forced to establish their power primarily in Petrograd and Moscow during the Revolution and the Civil War, their main opponent in that period was the Russian Orthodox Church. Shortly before the Bolshevik *coup d'état* a Russian Church Council (*sobor*) elected a Patriarch, its first since Peter the First abolished the office in 1721. The new Patriarch, Tikhon, anathematized Lenin's new government in January 1918, partly because of the Church's allegiance to the Tsarist legitimacy, and partly because the new government had already nationalized all ecclesiastical property, taken all schools away from church control, authorized civil marriage, and stopped state subsidies to the church. In January 1918 a decree of the Council of People's Commissars forbade religious teaching in schools and deprived all churches of their corporate character so that they could no longer own property. Local "religious associations" of at least twenty people, the so-called *dvadtsatka*,<sup>1</sup> had to register with local Soviets and obtain permission from them to use the church buildings and religious objects.

<sup>1</sup> *Dvadtsatka* means literally "group of twenty"; the plural is *dvadtsatki*.

The struggle between Patriarch Tikhon and the Bolshevik regime was hardly an even match and in September 1919 Tikhon instructed the clergy and the faithful to desist in their opposition to the government. Tikhon was arrested in August 1922 and while he was under the control of the secret police an opposition group within the church established what it called the "Living Church," one pledged to cooperate fully with the Communists. Tikhon, however, in June 1923 proclaimed his regret over his anti-Soviet activities and professed his loyalty to the new regime, thus taking some of the wind out of his opponents' sails. When Tikhon died in April 1925, the Soviet government was able to prevent the election of a new Patriarch. Although metropolitan Sergius became de facto head of the Church, his election as Patriarch was not permitted until 1943 when the exigencies of the war forced Stalin to garner support from any quarter.

All religions in the Soviet Union have been forced to operate under the Law on Religious Associations of 8 April 1929, which codified and revised all previous ecclesiastical legislation. This law reaffirmed the requirement that the *dvadtsatki* register with the local Soviet and obtain its permission to use religious facilities and objects; it also stated that the "servants of religion," that is, the clergy, was restricted to a single local religious association (even bishops), and that churches were forbidden to organize any auxiliary groups, societies, or circles.<sup>2</sup> This law is still operative and, of course, makes a farce of Article 124 in the Soviet Constitution which grants "freedom of religious worship."

The years of the *Yezhovshchina* (1934-39) were especially difficult for the clergy and the faithful of all religions in the Soviet Union. Since the Great Purge was aimed at the elimination of all actual and even *potential* sources of opposition to Stalinist totalitarianism, the churches were a favored target for the NKVD. Religion was the logical alternative if one could not stomach the Stalinized version of Communism, and Stalin, trained in a seminary himself, was well aware of the danger. Even the fact that Metropolitan Sergius had called upon the faithful in July 1927 to be loyal citizens and to be obedient to the government did little to soften the waves of anti-religious terror that all but extinguished organized religion in the 1930s.

The Communists, in addition to governmental decrees and the assiduous application of police terror, resorted to still another technique in their unrelenting war on religion, the use of atheistic propaganda. As early as 1922 a publishing house

called *Bezbozhnik* (Atheist) was established and it put out two periodicals, *Bezbozhnik i Stanka* (The Atheist at the Workbench) and *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless). An organization called the Society of Friends of the *Bezbozhnik* was formed and in April 1925 held a congress at which the name was changed to the League of the Godless. This new name was apparently not regarded as dynamic enough, so it was changed to the League of the Militant Godless in 1929. By 1930 the League claimed a membership of three million and by 1935 it had risen to five million. The Census of 1937, never published, is said to have revealed 50 million believers in the Soviet Union—a real shock to the Communist regime.<sup>3</sup> It also revealed the inefficacy of the League of the Militant Godless; the organization was ruthlessly purged by the NKVD and its membership declined drastically. Although it made a comeback during the years of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939—June 1941), the State-Church detente that emerged during World War II led to the demise of the League of the Militant Godless, and to the suppression of its journal, *Bezbozhnik*.

The League was not revived at the end of the war, which, as Kolarz puts it, was "... an implicit judgment on the League's inefficiency, of which it had given ample proof in the sixteen years of its existence."<sup>4</sup> In June 1947 the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge was founded. This is an elite society made up of teachers, scientists, and other intellectuals dedicated to the promulgation of scientific atheism. Its major technique is the revelation of the fallaciousness of supernatural religion. By 1950 it had 130 thousand members and by 1959 its membership had increased to 850 thousand. Its work is largely carried out through lectures (300 thousand in 1958) and the publication of pamphlets explaining the incompatibility of science and religion. It also publishes a monthly journal, *Nauka i Religiya* (Science and Religion). The main difference between the new organization and the old League of the Militant Godless is a smoother and more subtle technique. Whether it is more effective is questionable.

In 1942 Metropolitan Sergius announced that Stalin was the nation's divinely anointed leader and put the Church solidly behind the war effort. In September 1943 his election as Patriarch was permitted. Sergius died in 1944 and a Church Council in 1945 elected Alexis as his successor. Alexis, as "Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia," led the Church for the next quarter of a century. Upon his death in 1971, the present Patriarch,

<sup>2</sup>Bohdan R. Bocurkew. "Church-State Relations in the USSR," *Survey*, No. 66 (January 1968), pp. 10-11.

<sup>3</sup>Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, London: Macmillan, 1962, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.



Pimen, was elected to head the Church. Pimen has had good relations with the Kremlin leaders and has been loyal to the regime.

Since World War II the Church was hardly prosperous and unfettered under Stalin and it underwent a major persecution during the Khrushchev period. The present regime, it would seem, having despaired of exterminating or even cutting back significantly on the number of faithful, reached a *modus vivendi* with it. Thus over the last dozen years there has been a more or less live and let live atmosphere between the Church and the state. But all in all the Russian Orthodox Church did take a severe beating over the last 60 years. Instead of the 110 million members it had in 1914, it now has between 20 and 30 million, and there are only 22 thousand churches still used for religious services; the rest, probably four-fifths of the 1914 total, have been either demolished or converted into clubs or museums, often anti-religious museums. The fact, however, that the Russian Orthodox Church exists at all after half a century of war with the state speaks well for the resilience of the faithful in the USSR.

One of the main strengths of the Russian Orthodox Church in its struggle with the Party over the last half century was the close connection that has existed between Russian nationalism and the Church over the centuries. As the Soviet Communists, from the mid-1930s on, became more and more nationalistic, as they came to look more favorably upon Russia's past, they became aware of the Russian-ness of the national church. In addition, pre-revolutionary Russian art and literature were permeated through and through with religion. Unless the Party was determined to obliterate its national and cultural heritage, it was impossible to extirpate its religious content. This does not mean that the road ahead is not going to be rocky for the Russian Orthodox Church, but it does seem to imply that it can avoid oblivion.

Another factor working in favor of a *modus vivendi* between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church after the war was the expansion of the Soviet empire into Orthodox countries such as Romania and Bulgaria. The churches in these countries were encouraged to keep relatively close ties with the Patriarch in Moscow. Furthermore, since the Patriarch backed Soviet foreign policies, including a condemnation of US "germ warfare" in Korea, his influence throughout the world was an asset to the regime.

**The Old Believers.**—The Old Believers came into being in the latter half of the seventeenth century as a protest movement against the changes made in the ritual and in the liturgical books of the Russian Orthodox Church. Once they had split off from the main body of the Church, the Old Believers tended

to sub-divide into groups with little in common except their antagonism to what they regarded as heresy within Orthodoxy. The two main groups were the *popovtsy*, the "Priestists," and the *bezpopovtsy*, the "Priestless." The Priests were able to maintain something of a national organization, but the Priestless disintegrated into isolated communities of believers. Just how many Old Believers there are at present in the Soviet Union is impossible to even estimate. The 1897 Census gave the figure of 2,204,590, but that was probably a gross understatement of their true strength.

The Old Believers, persecuted by the Orthodox Church and the Tsarist government for 250 years, became very adept at isolating themselves from any involvement in Russian society and seem to have continued that habit during the Soviet period. They are not specifically anti-Soviet—they are merely perpetuating their 300-year-old protest against any interference in their personal lives.

The largest of the Old Believer groups is the Belo-Krinita Concord, with around a million members. Its present head is Archbishop Flavian, elected in 1952. The headquarters of the church is in Moscow, the Rogozhkoe Cemetery with its huge Pokrovsky Cathedral. The Cathedral contains a veritable treasure of Russian ikonography, over 400 of the ikons dating before the Great Schism in 1666.

The Priestless Old Believers are harder to describe in any detail since by their very nature they scorn organization and are scattered in small communities throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. For example, Priestless Old Believer groups were still being newly discovered in isolated regions as late as the 1940s.

The Old Believers have long been noted for their independence, moral behavior, and frugality. But their determination to ignore Soviet society as much as possible brings them into conflict with the state which is doing its best to obliterate these islands of nonconformity. The Russian Orthodox Church as far back as 1800 began a *Yedinoverie*, or "single faith" movement in an attempt to bring the Old Believers back into the fold, but with little success. Whether the Old Believers can maintain their way of life in a totalitarian society that abhors nonconformity remains to be seen, but they do have three centuries of stubborn resistance as a precedent to fall back upon.

In addition to the Old Believers there are several more eccentric sects. To discuss in detail the eccentric sects which have evolved in Russia both before and after the Revolution is impossible in a study of this length. Some sects such as the Dukhobors (Spirit Wrestlers) and the Molokans (Milk Drinkers), which were fairly large before the Revolution have either been liquidated or have

emigrated. Smaller sects such as the Imyaslavtsy (Glorifiers of the Holy Name), the Khlysts (Flagellants), the Molchalniki (The Silent Ones), and the Skrytniki (The Hiders) often cause the Soviet authorities local miseries, but they are too small to be more than irritations. One sect, the Skoptsy (The Castrated), are in decline, which is not surprising since, as their name signifies, self-liquidation over time seems to be inevitable.

**The Protestants.**—The Protestants in the Soviet Union, although nowhere nearly as important in numbers as the Russian Orthodox, have been distinguished in recent times for their dynamism. The main denominations are the Lutherans and the Evangelical Christians/Baptist, plus smaller groups such as the Calvinists and the Mennonites. Protestants are not newcomers in Russia since there was a Lutheran Parish dating from 1632 in the same locality in which Tsar Peter erected his new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703, and the first Protestant church in Moscow was built in 1575. The Communists, devoting their major attention to the attack on the Orthodox in the early years of their rule, were relatively easy on the Protestants until the late 1920s. During the 1930s, however, the Protestants were subjected to the same police terror as their Orthodox brethren.

The Lutherans were widely scattered throughout Russia prior to the Communist Revolution, but were especially numerous in Estonia, Latvia, and the Leningrad area, as well as in the Volga German region. The total membership came to well over a million. When Estonia and Latvia became independent nations in 1919, the number of Lutherans left in the Soviet Union was drastically reduced. Soviet anti-religious policies in the 1930s almost obliterated the organized Lutheran church in the Soviet Union. By 1936 there were only ten pastors remaining in office and even those ten were eliminated by 1937.

The Soviet occupation of Estonia and Latvia in 1940 dealt a severe blow to these strongholds of Lutheranism, and the German invasion and occupation of the area between 1941 and 1944 did little to help since many churches were destroyed and large numbers of pastors fled to Germany with the retreating German armies. The re-annexation of the two countries in 1944-45 put the Lutheran churches under Soviet control again. Although Soviet anti-religious efforts have been more subtle since 1945, the Lutherans have been under constant attack. In 1957, after a dozen years of Communist harassment, the Estonian Lutheran Church claimed 350,000 active members and the Latvian Lutheran Church had 600,000 members. In addition, there is a sizeable number of Lutherans in Lithuania, some in the Ukraine, and a large number of the million and a half Germans scattered throughout Central Asia

and Siberia are now in the midst of a Lutheran revival.

The exigencies of Soviet diplomacy in the last two decades has tended to mitigate the plight of the Lutherans in Estonia and Latvia. The desire for good relations with the German Democratic Republic, with its large Lutheran population, is one factor, and the enhancing of the Soviet image throughout Scandinavia is another. Since 1955 the Soviets have been able to trot out Archbishop Kiivit of the Estonian Lutheran Church and Archbishop Turs of the Latvian Lutheran Church at international conferences.

The Evangelical Christian/Baptist movement also antedates the Communist Revolution. The first Baptist was immersed in the Kura River near Tiflis (now Tbilisi) in 1867, while the Evangelical movement was initiated in St. Petersburg in the 1870's. The Baptists spread mostly in the Ukraine and the Evangelical Christians tended to be Great Russians. The number of Baptists and Evangelical Christians at the present time is uncertain, but one estimate is half a million. That figure, however, included only those over 18 who were baptized; if their families were counted, the total may have been as high as three million.<sup>5</sup> Later estimates show a sharp drop, and one figure in 1977 still gives the total strength of the movement as half a million.<sup>6</sup>

Both groups did fairly well during the first decade of Soviet rule and then suffered severely during the crackdown on religion in the 1930s. In 1944 the two faiths were amalgamated at an All-Union Conference into a single organization, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians/Baptists. The government allowed this since religions are easier to control, and to attack, if they are highly organized and centralized. Most writers, however, refer to the united group as the Baptists.

Although the Baptists number some five thousand congregations with 500 thousand members, they have no seminaries in which to train their clergy. They have petitioned the state for permission to establish one, but they have not obtained permission up to now.

Nobody knows how many Baptists there are among the "unregistered" congregations, those which try to evade such government restrictions as the age of baptism by meeting more or less clandestinely. The state takes a dim view of the "unregistered" Baptists. For example, on 30 August

<sup>5</sup> *Bratsky Vestnik* (Brotherly Chronicle), 1954, no. 3 4, p. 91, as quoted in Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia*, London, Macmillan, 1968, p. 2. The figures given in the *Bratsky Vestnik* are: 5,400 congregations with at least 20 members and 512,000 believers who had been baptized. If the families and unbaptized attendants at services are counted, a total of three million. One thing that makes estimates so difficult is the provision of the 1929 Law that requires a *dvadtsatka* to register with the local Soviet. Many congregations cannot get registered by the local Soviets and others do not bother to apply. These unregistered congregations do not get into the statistics.

<sup>6</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1977.

1977 in the town of Bryansk 300 policemen and KGB agents spent six hours breaking up a demonstration of Baptists who objected to the closing of their new church upon which they had expended some \$60,000. About 150 church people were beaten up in the fracas.<sup>7</sup> But persecution does not seem to faze the "unregistered" Baptists unduly. There are constant reports by Western newsmen of baptisms performed outside the law—even in bathtubs in private apartments.

The Communist Party has found the Baptist appeal to youth especially hard to counter. The high moral standards exhibited by the Baptists attract many who are in search of some basis for moral values other than Marxism-Leninism. During the last years of the Khrushchev period a vigorous attack was mounted against religion, but especially against the Baptists. Things became so desperate that one group of 32 journeyed from Siberia to appeal for help from the American Embassy in Moscow.<sup>8</sup> As will be pointed out in the case of Jehovah's Witnesses, the sentencing of Baptists to prison camps in various regions of the Soviet Union tends to spread the faith—each prisoner is a subsidized missionary, so to speak.

The Calvinists are a tiny minority among the religious groups in the Soviet Union, and are mostly located in the Transcarpathian Ukraine annexed to the USSR in 1945, although there are a few in the Ukraine proper and in Lithuania. The Calvinists are mostly Magyar (Hungarian) caught up in the territorial switch after World War II and probably total around 100 thousand.

The Mennonites trace their origins back to the Anabaptists, especially to Menno Simonis (1496-1561), a Dutchman, and hence their name. They first settled along the Dnieper in 1788, and another group migrated into Russia to establish a center in what is now the Zaporozhe Oblast in the Ukraine. In the late nineteenth century and during the early Soviet period many Mennonites continued their migratory habit, but this time out of Russia to the Western Hemisphere. Those that remained were hard hit during World War II as they were largely of German ancestry and their main settlements lay in the path of the Nazi invasion and retreat routes. There are an estimated 20 thousand Mennonites now living in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

Three sects that seem to be giving the Soviet regime quite a bit of trouble are the Pentacostals, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Seventh Day Adventists. The first group is technically

amalgamated with the Evangelical Christians/Baptists, but seems inclined to go off on its own bent. The zeal of the Pentacostals is hard to contain, and they are now spread all over the Soviet Union. In addition to their successful recruitment program in the labor camps to which they are sent with great regularity, they also have a tendency to migrate in groups as a deliberate policy—sort of religious nomadism. The net result is a widespread Pentacostal movement throughout the USSR.

Jehovah's Witnesses are on the increase in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere in the world. The Soviet government, in addition to its usual anti-religious attitude to any religion, dislikes the Witnesses because they have an excellent clandestine organization, are bold and skillful proselytizers, and also take a frankly anti-government stance. They preach that the world is now in its last days, that wars, famines, and oppression are the signs of the end, and that to compromise with government is to betray their faith. But sending the Jehovah's Witnesses to the prison camps is to provide them with a fertile soil for proselytizing. For example, in March-April 1951, according to the Witnesses, some seven thousand of the faithful were sent to do hard labor in the camps in the Arctic, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Yet the movement seems on the increase.

The Seventh Day Adventists, like the Orthodox Jews, observe the Sabbath on Saturday, and this complicates their life considerably in a state where little or no consideration is given to religion in general, let alone the peculiarities of various sects. The Adventists also abstain from smoking and drinking, and they give one-tenth of their income to their Church. These generous tithes enable the religious leaders to finance various activities, none of which is really acceptable to the Soviet government. In 1955 the tithes came to three million rubles. The sect seems to be increasing in membership, although the exact number of adherents is unknown. Right after World War II, the estimate was 26 thousand, but that was probably a gross underestimate.

**The Roman Catholics.**—Russian antagonism to Rome dates back to the tenth century when, with the acceptance of Christianity from Greek Orthodox Constantinople, there was inherited a hatred of the Western Church. For the next eight hundred years the long feuds with Poland and the Hapsburg realms, both Roman Catholic, served to keep the antagonism alive. The Communists, in turn, regarded Roman Catholicism as the worst of the religious enemies. The following quotation sums up the Soviet attitude succinctly:

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, 8 September 1977.

<sup>8</sup>Bourdeaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

The Roman Catholic Church was a major obstacle to the spreading of the world revolution; it was the ally of capitalism, reaction and fascism; it was a driving force behind the war of intervention of the capitalist world aiming at overthrowing the young Soviet regime; and it never ceased to be a major element in the anti-Soviet front.<sup>9</sup>

In the first few years of Bolshevik rule, the organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia was almost obliterated—one bishop after another suffering arrest. The attempt to set up a new organization in 1926 was savagely dealt with as well and by 1937 the attack on the Roman Catholic Church reached a peak with the execution of Bishop Frizon. The fact that a large minority of Polish Catholics in the Ukraine (475 thousand) and about 100 thousand in Byelorussia tended to look toward Poland for support worried the regime in Moscow.

The Roman Catholic problem assumed even greater importance as a result of the Soviet post-war empire-building in Eastern Europe. The incorporation of Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR brought around three million more Roman Catholics into the Soviet Union. In spite of a ruthless policy of reducing the numbers and influence of the Roman Catholic clergy in Latvia, Lithuania, and western Byelorussia, about half the priests are still carrying out their functions. National identity and the Roman Catholic religion are loosely intertwined in the area and this makes the lot of the Communist anti-religious cadres doubly hard. To make matters more complicated, Roman Catholic Poland, and the large Roman Catholic populations of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, have tended to make the Soviet authorities a little less blatant in their religious persecution of the Roman Catholics within the USSR. According to one source, there are about five million Roman Catholics in the Soviet Union today.<sup>10</sup>

**The Armenian National Church.**—The Holy Apostolic Church of Armenia has always been an integral part of Armenian nationalism. Although the Soviet regime was able to reduce the number of Armenian churches in the USSR from 1,446 in 1914 to 89 in 1954, and in the Armenian SSR itself from 459 to 38, it has not been able to eliminate the concept among many Armenians that the Church and nation are identical. The Patriarch, or Catholicos, of the Church, who has his seat in the religious complex of Echmiadzin, a few miles outside of the capital city of Erevan, is a symbol of Armenian nationality to many Armenians, both within and without the Soviet Union.

The Soviet authorities have tried to use the Catholicos to influence the hundreds of thousands of Armenians scattered throughout the world. For example, in the immediate postwar period the Catholicos, Kevork VI, issued the call for Armenians living abroad to return to Soviet Armenia, and many responded; but the word soon got out that Soviet Armenia was not the El Dorado portrayed in the propaganda and the migration "back home" dwindled to a trickle. To inject a personal note, the author, who visited Echmiadzin in 1969, was amazed to hear his Communist guide bragging about the treasures contained in the Cathedral—treasures such as the head of the spear that pierced Christ's side and a fragment of Noah's Ark, among others. Armenian national pride seemed to be overcoming the young lady's ideological training as she lectured on about the greatness of Echmiadzin in the historical development of Armenia.

**Judaism.**—The Communist attitude toward the Jews in the Soviet Union is dual in nature: it is antagonistic to Judaism, the religion, and also to the Jewish national identity. The main target before World War II was Judaism as a religion, but since the war the Jews have suffered mostly because of their nationality. First Zionism, and then the creation of the state of Israel, accentuated Communist antagonism toward the Jews in the USSR.

The task of obliterating Judaism in the Soviet Union during the first years of the Communist regime was assigned to Jewish Communists, the so-called "Jewish sections," or *Yevsektzia*. These groups used several tactics in accomplishing their job. They did everything in their power to make it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for Jewish workers to observe the Sabbath, observed on Saturday by the Jews. They also tried to prevent the proper observance of the Holy Days such as the Passover, Rosh ha-Shanah, and Yom Kippur, even to the prevention of the baking and sale of unleavened bread, matzot. But the main assault by the *Yevsektzia* was against the rabbis and the synagogues. For example, in the single year 1928 some 59 synagogues were closed by the *Yevsektzia*.

During the Great Fatherland War (1941–45) the Soviets took a new tack in order to woo their Western allies and portrayed their attitude toward Judaism as benign. They even stated that in 1940 there were 2,559 rabbis and 1,011 synagogues in the USSR, but they did not point out that these were mostly in the territories newly acquired in Poland, the Baltic countries, and Bessarabia under the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In these areas the Soviets had not had time to carry out their anti-religious policy effectively.

<sup>9</sup>Kolart, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>10</sup>B. W. Jancar, "Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union," in R. L. Tokes (ed.), *Dissent in the USSR*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 197.

As soon as the war was over, the persecution of the Jews was resumed, only this time under the rubric of "anti-cosmopolitanism," that is, the Jew as an internationalist and thus lacking in real Soviet patriotism. The Yiddish language, literature, and theater suffered terribly during the postwar *zhdanovshchina*, a name signifying the cultural dictatorship of Andrey Zhdanov who acted as Stalin's alter ego in things aesthetic. The Jews were forbidden to publish any religious literature whatsoever and were prevented from training rabbis. Stalin's anti-Semitic campaign culminated in the so-called "Doctors' Plot" in late 1952 when a number of Kremlin doctors, largely Jewish, were accused of medically murdering a number of high-ranking Soviet leaders. Only the death of Stalin in early 1953 prevented their execution.

Although there was a temporary lull in the anti-Jewish policy of the government following the death of Stalin, and the Jews were allowed to open a small Yeshivah in Moscow, to obtain matzot more freely, and even to publish a small prayerbook, by the late 1950s the anti-Jewish campaign was again under way. As Soviet policy has become more pro-Arab and more anti-Israeli in the last decade, the lot of the Jew in the USSR has become more and more difficult.

There are probably about three and a half million Jews in the Soviet Union, but it is doubtful that half a million observe any Jewish religious rites, let alone keep the Sabbath and observe the dietary laws. Of the 1,034 synagogues that existed in 1917 in the Ukraine alone, only a few remain today; there are only about 60 synagogues in the entire USSR.<sup>11</sup> In 1959, the author found only one small synagogue in the city of Kiev, which has a Jewish population of over 100,000, and the rabbi said that only a few hundred come to the synagogue even on the Holy Days. On another visit, this time in 1963, the synagogue had no rabbi.

The real tragedy of the Jews in the Soviet Union is that the main attack upon them is now directed against their Jewish nationality and this tends to arouse the traditional anti-Semitism of the Russians. Even if the Jew abjures his traditional religion, he is still under attack as a Jew. His internal passport still lists his nationality as Jewish. The government propaganda organs still thump out the message that Judaism is the religion of the imperialist state of Israel and of the American Jewish community and is therefore "the handmaiden of Israel and American imperialism."<sup>12</sup> Whether Judaism can survive for long in the Soviet

environment is a question often asked these days; but unsuccessful attempts to blot out Judaism over the last two millennia lends some hope that it will surmount the Soviet attack.

In the meanwhile, there has been considerable Jewish emigration in the last few years. From 1948 through 1969, about 7,600 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel. Then there began a dramatic increase as the following figures demonstrate:<sup>13</sup>

1970	1,000	1974	20,000
1971	14,000	1975	13,000
1972	31,500	1976	14,000
1973	33,500		

As is obvious, the fortunes of the Jews seeking to exit from the USSR seems to a large extent dependent upon the amount of tension prevailing in US-Soviet relations. At the height of the detente, the figures went up dramatically, and fell swiftly when the tensions, especially in regard to the Middle East, increased.

**Islam.**—Within the Soviet Union there are a number of nationalities which are traditionally Islamic; these nationalities had a total of over 30 million people according to the 1970 census. Among these nationalities, to name only the main ones, are the Uzbeks, Turkomen, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Azerbaydzhanians, Tatars, and Bashkirs, as well as a plethora of smaller nationalities in Daghestan and the northern Caucasus. Over the last decade these nationalities have been breeding much faster than the Slavs and should total well over 30 million in 1970.

The Communist regime in Moscow was very hesitant about openly attacking the Moslems during the first decade of its power. It was not until the late 1920s that the government began to close the Koranic schools and the mosques. The clergy (mullahs) were greatly reduced in numbers and the traditional religious law, or Shariat, courts were abolished. By 1928–29 the anti-Islamic campaign was gathering momentum, but it was during the Great Purge (1936–39) that Islam took its greatest beating in the Soviet Union. Moslem religious leaders and Communist officials who had been "soft" on their Moslem brethren became the prime targets of the NKVD round-ups.

The German attack in June 1941 put a stop to the anti-religious propaganda against Islam as the government tried to woo Moslem support for the war effort. But unlike the Russian Orthodox Church, which had a long tradition of Russian patriotism, the Moslem peoples were all minorities

<sup>11</sup>Zvi Gittelman, "The Jewish Question," *Survey*, no. 66 (January 1969), p. 81

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>13</sup>GIST, Department of State, July 1977.

who had been oppressed by the Russian tsars and commissars alike. Toward the end of the war some Moslem nationalities (Balkar, Karachay, Chechen and Ingush) were exiled to Kazakhstan and Siberia for allegedly cooperating with the German invaders.

In the mid-1950s the Khrushchev Middle-East policy gave the Soviet leadership every incentive to come up with a favorable image in its treatment of the Moslems within the USSR. The Chief Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Babakhanov, who resides in Tashkent, was trotted out to meet visiting Moslem leaders such as Sukharno in 1956 and Nasser in 1958; he was also sent to international meetings and even allowed to make the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca.

How effective the Soviets have been in eliminating Islam within the Soviet Union is impossible for the outsider to evaluate at all accurately. They have closed numerous mosques, Koranic schools, and religious courts; they have made it well nigh impossible for Moslem urban workers to observe the fast of Ramadan; but how deeply these acts have cut into the faith of the religious Moslems is unknown. The Soviets provide no surveys of how well or how badly the Moslem religion is doing, while outside observers seldom get into the rural areas where the religion is most likely to survive. Islam as a cultural element, however, is so tightly interwoven into the national cultures of the Tatars, Uzbeks, and Tadzhiks, that it is doubtful that it will ever be eliminated. As long as this is true, there is always an environment in which a resurgence of Islam as a religion is possible.

### 63. The Arts and Dissent

In this section the use of the term "the arts" is somewhat misleading since the discussion will be largely concerned with literature in the Soviet period and deal with the graphic arts, music, and the cinema very briefly. The Party tries to control, with considerable success unfortunately, the work of the artists. The Party seeks to subsume all aspects of life under its ideological precepts and the duty of the artist is to further the cause, not to depict the seamier sides of reality. But artists are hard to control and in the continuous struggle between the artist and the Party *apparatchik* that has gone on over the last half century, much has been revealed concerning the tenacity with which some of the artists have clung to aesthetic integrity and have sought to portray truth and beauty as they saw it.

**The First Decade (1918-1928).**—When the Bolsheviks came to power, the arts in Russia were in a state of flux. Experimentation was the order of the day in literature, the graphic arts, and music. Lenin and Trotsky, the two intellectual giants of the

early period of Communist rule, had little objection to experimentation in the arts. If the artist was not flagrantly anti-Communist, he was allowed to go his own way. The great poets of this period were Blok, Yesenin, Mayakovsky, and Pasternak, none of whom were Communists, although Stalin was later to make Mayakovsky the patron saint of Communist poets. Blok died in 1921, Yesenin committed suicide in 1925, and Mayakovsky died by his own hand in 1930. Pasternak alone survived until 1960. All, however, were disillusioned with communism before their deaths, although they had greeted the Bolshevik Revolution warmly in 1917. Most of the outstanding novelists emigrated almost immediately after the Revolution (Bunin, Andreyev, Kuprin, and Merezhkovsky). Three novelists, although antagonistic to the new regime at the outset, later returned and made their peace with the Party: Maxim Gorky, Ilya Ehrenburg, and Alexei Tolstoy.

During the 1917-1928 period the arts were under the somewhat genial authority of Anatoly Lunacharsky. The realistic descriptions of Russian society during the Revolution and the Civil War to be found in Isaac Babel's short stories, in Leonid Leonov's early novels, and in Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* are proof of Lunacharsky's mild stewardship as the aesthetic boss during the first decade of Soviet power. The best artists of the period were, as Trotsky dubbed them, "fellow travelers," that is, not Communists, but not in open opposition to the regime either.

There was, however, opposition to the "fellow travelers," mainly from RAPP, the Association of Proletarian Writers. This group insisted that all artists conform to its version of Communist ideology, namely the arts as the expression of "proletarian consciousness," whatever that was supposed to mean. The fact that most of the members of RAPP were short on creative ability only served to make them even more vindictive toward the "fellow travelers" who had their own organization, the All-Russian Union of Writers. Many now look back on this "NEP Period" in Soviet letters as a Golden Age.

**The Era of Stalinism (1929-53).**—At the end of the 1920s Stalin succeeded in consolidating his hold on the levers of power and he began to work feverishly at controlling every aspect of Soviet life, be it economic, political, religious, or aesthetic. He was enormously successful in his efforts. No nation in history was ever so totally controlled by one man as was the Soviet Union under Stalin. Although Stalinism was a logical further development of Leninism, Stalin's awesome personality gave the further development its unique quality. Stalin in his role of *vozhd'* did not confine

his omniscience to politics, but set himself up as the coryphaeus of everything—science, aesthetics, military strategy, and even linguistics. Once he announced his opinion on any aspect of Soviet life, absolute obedience or physical destruction were the alternatives open to the Soviet citizen.

In August 1929, RAPP, with the authority of Stalin behind it, forced a showdown with the "fellow travelers" of the All-Russian Union of Writers. The chief victims were Boris Pilnyak, its chairman, and Yevgeni Zamyatin, head of the Leningrad branch. Pilnyak was accused of publishing his story *Mahogany* abroad and Zamyatin was condemned *in absentia* for the foreign publication of his novel *We*, a precursor of Orwell's *1984*. Both were victims of a literary frame-up, a practice that was to occur with monotonous regularity over the next forty years. In April 1932 Stalin, not at all enamored of the "preletarian" zeal of RAPP, replaced the organization with the Union of Soviet Writers, which still has a strangle-hold on the literary life of the Soviet Union. Having gained control of the mechanics of literary production, Stalin then dictated the official aesthetic canon to which all writers were to model themselves on the nineteenth century Russian classics. They were to use the language of Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Chekhov, but they were not to be realistically critical of society in the manner of their great predecessors. As late as October 1963 one of the criticisms leveled at Solzhenitsyn was that he was violating the canons of socialist realism by mechanically transplanting the nineteenth century tradition of critical realism to socialist soil. Soviet writers were to *affirm* the new socialist order; they were to assist the Party in building socialism. Any defects in Soviet society were to be exposed as "survivals of Capitalism" since Soviet society itself cannot generate defects. *Partiinost'*, complete submission to Party guidance, was the cornerstone of socialist realism. Reduced to more meaningful terms, all Soviet heroes were to be bigger than life and all villains were "survivals of capitalism." Actually, socialist realism has come to mean whatever the Party says it means at any particular time, and those artists who take it seriously have managed to spawn an inconceivably dreary output.

The 1930s were years of ever increasing oppression in the arts, as in all other areas of Soviet society. During the *Yezhovshchina* there was a steady flow of artists to the forced-labor camps to join the millions of other actual and potential opponents of Stalinism. Some artists, by painting or writing "for the drawer," that is, storing their work in the hope of better times to come, or by confining themselves to translating or editing, were able to survive the Great Purge. Needless to say, little in the

way of creative work was published, exhibited, or played by Soviet artists in this period.

Horrible as the Soviet experience in World War II was, it was a period of release for the artists. The necessity of gaining popular support for the war effort caused Stalin to relax controls over the artists, just as the same exigency brought him to seek a detente with the religious leaders. Soviet society, almost completely atomized during the Great Purge, a period when almost nobody felt able to trust anyone else, was now united in a common effort. As Pasternak was to write in 1956, "when the war broke out, its real horrors . . . were a blessing compared with the inhuman power of the lie, a relief because it broke the spell of the dead letter."<sup>14</sup>

Many writers served as war correspondents and a number of works were published which would have been axed by the censors in the 1930s. Novels such as Simonov's *Days and Nights*, Korneychuk's *Front*, and Fadeyev's *Young Guard* (before it was rewritten at the command of the Party) became classics. Zoshchenko's *Before Sunrise*, a very unsocialist-realist experiment in autobiography, got published, and poets, long silent, such as Pasternak and Akhmatova, were again creating and getting into print. The comradeship engendered in the common war effort, the alliance with the democracies, and the relative freedom given the artists created an expectation that postwar Russia would be a freer and better place to live.

Stalin, however, lost little time, once the war was over, in bringing Soviet society, including the artists, to heel. In August 1946 Andrey Zhdanov, Stalin's cultural Gauleiter, reinstated the Party control over the artists in an even more constricting manner than ever before. The technique was very similar to the method used in 1929 when Pilnyak and Zamyatin were framed, only this time the chief victims were Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, and Pasternak. Bad as the 1932-1941 period was for the creative artist, the 1946-1953 era of *Zhdanovshchina* was worse. For all intents and purposes art was dead during those seven years. Even such outstanding composers as Prokofiev, Shostakovich, and Khachaturyan were taken to task for "formalism," that is, for kowtowing to Western influences in their music. If Stalin couldn't whistle the melody, then the music suffered from "formalism." Painting, which the canon of socialist realism had reduced to "calendar art," now became largely a matter of producing enormous pictures of Stalin in heroic postures. The cinema almost ceased to exist. Things got so bad that Soviet movie houses were playing captured Nazi films, dubbed in

<sup>14</sup>Quoted in *Dissenting Voices in Soviet Literature* (edited by Patricia Blake and Max Hayward), New York, Pantheon Books, 1962, p. 156.

Russian, and labeled as "new foreign films."<sup>15</sup> After all, the anti-American/British propaganda in the Nazi films fitted in smoothly with Stalin's new line.

The arts in the Khrushchev era (1954-1964).—The death of Stalin in March 1953 left the artists uncertain as to what was going to happen: Would the new "collective leadership" relax controls, or would things remain as tight as during the Stalinist period? At the end of 1953 Pomerantsev, a literary critic, published an article in *Novy Mir* (New World) entitled "On Sincerity in Literature" and the effect was enormous, not only in the literary world either. For example, Solzhenitsyn, in his novel *Cancer Ward*, published abroad in 1969, depicts the enthusiasm of a relatively uneducated patient, Dyomka, who reads this article on "sincerity" in a two-year-old copy of *Novy Mir*. "Sincerity" was a new concept to him. In early 1954 Ilya Ehrenburg's *Thaw* was published and gave the name to this short period of relaxation. Ehrenburg, among other things, discussed the inanity of socialist realism under Stalin and even brought up the anti-Semitic aspect of the "Doctors' Plot" of late 1952. The "Thaw" did not last long and by late 1954 the conservatives were attacking Pomerantsev and Ehrenburg. But it was only a light "freeze." The artists had tasted freedom and they were hungry for more.

In February 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev delivered his tirade against the iniquities of the "cult of the personality," that is, Stalinism. As a result Dudintsev's novel, *Not by Bread Alone*, was published. This novel depicts the stupid bureaucratism of the Party *apparatchiki* in the industrial world, and was a big step in the direction of artistic honesty. Julia Neiman's poem, "1941," came out in the almanac, *Literary Moscow* #2, in the same year, a poem in which she described 1941 in Moscow as the year in which "... through the blackout and the camouflage/We saw our comrades' faces—undisguised." The creative euphoria, however, was brought to an abrupt end by the Hungarian uprising.

During the relaxed atmosphere in mid-1956, Boris L. Pasternak, an outstanding Russian poet as early as 1914, decided to submit a novel, *Dr. Zhivago*, for publication. The "freeze" in late 1956 ended hopes for the novel's publication in the Soviet Union, but an Italian publisher refused to abide by Moscow's decision and brought out the book. It was an immediate success all over the non-Communist world and Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1958. Khrushchev, aided and abetted by the conservative literary jackals, launched such a hysterical attack against Pasternak, even

threatening deportation, that he felt it necessary to refuse the Nobel award. *Dr. Zhivago*, however, is now widely hailed as one of the great novels of the twentieth century, and is widely circulated in the Soviet Union itself through clandestine channels. Pasternak, pushed out of the official literary life of the Soviet Union, led the life of a recluse in his dacha at Peredelkino, a village near Moscow. He died in May 1960. Each anniversary of his death is observed by a small band of the faithful at his grave in Peredelkino. It would seem that when Pasternak wrote, in his poem, "Hamlet," that "I am alone. The pharisees drown everything," he was unduly pessimistic. On the tenth anniversary of his death, in May 1970, the crowd at his graveside was larger than ever.

By 1959 Khrushchev was again relaxing the artistic tether and at the Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in May he was rather good-humored about the artists' tendency to fall into "error." Tvardovsky, the liberal editor of *Novy Mir*, was coopted onto the board of the Union. At the Twenty-second Party Congress (October 1961) it was to be Tvardovsky who pressed the case for the liberals when he pleaded for a Soviet literature that discussed reality without varnishing it (*bez lakirovski*). Khrushchev's loose hand on the rein continued and in 1961 Yevtushenko's poem, "Babi Yar," was published.<sup>16</sup>

By April 1962 the liberal writers were able to gain control of the Moscow branch of the Union, a powerful position since a quarter of all the writers in the Soviet Union belong to that branch. Yevtushenko's poem, "Stalin's Heirs," was published in October 1962 and Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* came out in November 1962. The publication of both works was authorized by Khrushchev himself. In "Stalin's Heirs," Yevtushenko describes the removal of Stalin from his place beside Lenin in the mausoleum in Red Square and how Stalin, Yevtushenko fancies, has a telephone in his coffin to instruct his heirs. The bite comes in the lines "We carried him from the mausoleum./ But how carry Stalin's heirs/ away from Stalin!" The Solzhenitsyn novelette is an account of one day in a Stalin prison camp as related by an inmate named Ivan Denisovich Sukhov. Since Solzhenitsyn spent eight years in just such a camp, the life there in all its horror is accurately described. But the calm understatement and the marvelously pithy style of Solzhenitsyn alerted many in the Soviet Union and abroad that a new giant had arrived on the Soviet literary scene.

<sup>15</sup> *Dissident Voices in Soviet Literature*, p. xxviii.

<sup>16</sup> Babi Yar is a ravine outside Kiev in which thousands of Jews were slain by the Nazis in 1941 and buried there. Yevtushenko, on visiting it, was appalled that no monument marked the site and he is quite blunt in attributing this omission to Russian anti-Semitism.



In later works, the best of them never published in the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn has more than fulfilled the expectations of his admirers.

The conservatives did not give up and they maintained a constant barrage of criticism, redolent with invective, aimed at Solzhenitsyn and the new generation of poets, especially Yevtushenko and Voznesensky, a protégé of Pasternak. On 1 December 1962, Khrushchev, flanked by some members of the Party's Presidium, visited an art exhibit being held in the Manezh, near Red Square. The exhibit was a bit avant-garde in the Soviet milieu, and Khrushchev reacted violently. Khrushchev, for some reason, has an intense dislike of abstract art and those who persuaded him to attend the exhibit probably counted on a typical Khrushchevian explosion. They got it. He stated that as long as he was chairman of the Council of Ministers there was not going to be a kopeck for pictures painted by such jackasses. He asked the artists: "Are you pederasts or normal people? . . . What's the good of a picture like this? To cover urinals with?" To another artist he said: "The people and the government have taken a lot of trouble with you, and you pay them back with this shit."<sup>17</sup> After calling the artists "pederasts" a few more times and claiming that their paintings gave a person constipation, he ended his tirade with the ominous words: "Gentlemen, we are declaring war on you."<sup>18</sup>

The conservatives seized the opportunity and immediately applied Nikita's critique of abstract art to their literary rivals in the liberal camp. The new formula was more or less as follows: Abstract art and the West are the same thing and to have anything to do with either is treason. Khrushchev's explosion at the Manezh exhibit gave them a stick and they lost no time in belaboring their opponents with it.

On 7 March 1963 Khrushchev supplied more ammunition to the conservatives when he partially rehabilitated Stalin during a speech before 600 artists and other intellectuals. Even Khrushchev, who had initiated de-Stalinization in 1956 and had pushed it vigorously in 1961-62, was finding it no easy problem to resolve. As a member of Stalin's inner clique during the Great Purge, Khrushchev was vulnerable if de-Stalinization went too far and since most of the *apparatchiki* of the Communist Party were trained under Stalin, they tended to be against the denigration of their late *vozhd'*. Even the increasingly important "fathers and sons" gap was partly a matter of how to treat the Stalin problem.

The "sons" were contemptuous of the "fathers" who had stood by meekly while the Great Purge raged. As Priscilla Johnson sums it up, in political terms the issue reads:

Let us de-Stalinize the Communist Party. Let us get rid of all those who were in responsible positions during the 1930s and let others who are innocent take their places.<sup>19</sup>

Khrushchev apparently thought that he could use the artists in his de-Stalinization campaign and then turn them off when they went too far. His real dilemma was how to do this without the use of crude force à la Stalin. One method was to play the liberals and conservatives off against each other. Thus having given the conservatives their inning, Khrushchev now gave the liberals a turn at bat. At a garden party at Gagra, his retreat on the Black Sea, in the presence of visiting foreign artists, he asked Tvardovsky to read his long poem, "Tyorkin in the Other World," a work as yet unpublished. Tyorkin, the mock hero in an earlier work, is killed and goes to the next world. There are, he finds, two next worlds: one bourgeois and the other Communist, and he is in the Communist one. It is replete with overblown bureaucracy, secret police, and a Stalin-like Supreme One, busy putting up monuments to himself. As his guide points out, "Our world here is organized/ With full precision in everything:/ Planned by zones/ And divided by departments."<sup>20</sup> The Khrushchev on-and-off policy in the arts continued until his outster in October 1964.

**The Arts Since Khrushchev (1964-1970).**—The new leadership, headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin has been far less ambivalent than Khrushchev in its attitude toward the liberal writers. For one thing, in the eyes of the new leadership, the liberal movement had gotten out of hand during the years of the Khrushchev era. It was no longer confined to a few dissonant voices in the literary front, but was now getting widespread support from the intellectual community in general. The scientists, a favored breed in the Soviet scheme of things, were buying abstract paintings and reading avant-garde poetry. University students were displaying a singular lack of interest in Marxism-Leninism and were even circulating underground literary journals.<sup>21</sup> Another phenomenon was the so-called *samizdat* literature, the duplication, largely in the form of typewritten carbon-copies, of literary works which could not be legitimately published.<sup>22</sup> For example,

<sup>17</sup>"The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964," in *Khrushchev and the Arts*, p. 43.

<sup>20</sup>*Khrushchev and the Arts*, p. 270; a translation of the entire poem, which was published in *Izvestiya*, 18 August 1963, can be found on pages 247 to 271.

<sup>21</sup>One of them, *Syntaxis*, was suppressed in 1960, but another, *Phoenix*, flourished in 1965 and 1966.

<sup>22</sup>*Samizdat* means literally "self-publishing" in Russian; it is derived from the word *sam* meaning "self" and *izdat*, "to publish."

<sup>17</sup>*Khrushchev and the Arts* (Edited by Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz), Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965, p. 103.

<sup>18</sup>*Khrushchev and the Arts*, p. 105.

when Khrushchev invited Tvardovsky to read his "Tyorkin in the Next World" at Gagra, it was already well-known in the intellectual community because of the *samizdat* press. To all this can be added the regime's irritation over the fact that works by Russian authors were being printed abroad. Someone using the pseudonym of Abram Tertz managed to get a number of novels, short stories and critical pieces published abroad, while another author, under the name of Nikoali Arzhak, managed to smuggle several stories to the West. Tertz's article, *On Socialist Realism*, was a bitter and devastating attack on the official Soviet aesthetic canon, while one of Arzhak's stories, "This is Moscow Speaking," was fantasy on the nightmarish quality of life in the Soviet Union. Radio Moscow announced that 10 October will be Public Murder Day when it will be permissible to murder anyone except the police and children under sixteen. The point of the story emerges when an old man, horrified by the murder of a young man, expresses his horror. When it is pointed out to him that that is permitted by governmental decree, he says "... but there is such a thing as conscience," and receives the answer:

You're holding the wrong end of the stick, mister. Do you think that conscience and a government decree are two different things? If I were you, I'd stop that kind of talk!"<sup>23</sup>

In September 1965 the identities of Tertz and Arzhak were revealed as Andrey D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel respectively. They were arrested and tried for violation of Article 70 of the Criminal Code in February 1966 on the charge of "slandering the Soviet state." Sinyavsky was sentenced to seven years at hard labor and Daniel drew five. Both the judicial travesty of the trial and the severity of the sentences agitated the Soviet intellectual community, although the repressive attitude of the regime in general probably had more to do with upsetting the intellectuals. They feared a rehabilitation of Stalin and a return to Stalinist methods. In short, what had begun in 1953 as a movement for a little freedom in the arts had now developed into a wider agitation for more freedom and legality in all walks of Soviet life.

The Sinyavsky-Daniel affair has turned out to be a chain reaction in dissent. Aleksandr I. Ginzburg, a journalist-actor in his thirties, compiled a "White Book" on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial which revealed the whole thing as a judicial farce. In January 1967, he, along with four companions, was arrested for engaging in a demonstration calling for the release of Sinyavsky and Daniel and the repeal of Article 70

of the RSFSR Criminal Code.<sup>24</sup> Then Pavel M. Litvinov, a young physicist and the grandson of Maksim Litvinov, the former Commissar of Foreign Affairs, compiled an account of the trials of Ginzburg and his companions and circulated his "White Book" in the spring of 1968. Not daunted by police pressure to desist, he joined a protest in August 1968, held in Red Square, against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. For this he was tried in October 1968 and was sentenced to five years in Siberian exile. One of his associates in the demonstration, Mrs. Larisa Bogaraz-Daniel, wife of Yuli Daniel, was exiled to Siberia for four years.

Obviously, the public demonstrations against Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia are aimed at bringing about greater social changes than was Pomerantsev's plea for sincerity in literature that was published in *Novy Mir* in December 1953, although the progressive broadening of the dissent can be traced step by step from that point. A number of Soviet scientists, for example, have also joined the chorus of dissenters. Andrey D. Sakharov, a leading nuclear physicist, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and a Stalin-prize winner, came out publicly in 1964 against the charlatanism of Lysenko's genetic theories, was one of the protesters in 1966 against any rehabilitation of Stalin, and in 1968 wrote an article entitled *Thoughts on Progress, Co-Existence and Intellectual Freedom*, a 10,000-word essay calling for Soviet-American cooperation in solving the major world problems. The essay has never been published in the Soviet Union, except in *samizdat* form, but it has appeared in translations in the West.

Another scientist, a 45-year-old biologist named Zhores A. Medvedev, took up the attack on Lysenko where Sakharov left off. Medvedev, who until his clash with the regime was head of the Department of Molecular Biology in the Institute of Medical Radiology at Obninsk, some 60 miles southwest of Moscow, is a specialist in genetics and gerontology. He wrote a book in which he traced the career of T D Lysenko as the grand panjandrum of Soviet genetics and pointed out in great detail the asinities of the Lysenko "theory" of acquired characteristics. He also described how Lysenko had used his position under Stalin and Khrushchev to liquidate his scientific rivals. The book has not been published in the Soviet Union, but it has appeared

<sup>23</sup> *Dissident Voices in Soviet Literature*, p. 296; translation of the story on pages 262 to 306.

<sup>24</sup> Article 70 reads as follows: Agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of weakening or subverting the Soviet regime or of committing particularly dangerous crimes against the State, the dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous inventions discrediting the Soviet political and social system, as also the dissemination or production or harboring for the said purposes of literature of a similar content is punishable by six months to seven years of detention with or without a further period of two to five years of exile, or by two to five years of exile.

in translation in the West.<sup>25</sup> Medvedev also publicly protested the censorship of scientists' foreign mail and the extremely rigid controls over their travel to foreign countries, pointing out that these restraints retard the quick assimilation of Western ideas and achievements in science. On 29 May 1970 he was seized in his home in Obninsk and taken immediately to a mental hospital in Kaluga for "examination." The uproar in the scientific-intellectual community was unprecedented. Twenty scholars and authors, including such famous ones as I. Y. Tamm, a Nobel prize winner, Peter Kapitsa, Andrey Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn signed a public letter of protest. Sakharov even posted a sign at the Lebedev Institute of Physics in Moscow requesting signatures. Solzhenitsyn released a biting indictment of the practice of putting dissenters in insane asylums; he call it "spiritual murder" and a "variant of the gas chamber," only worse.<sup>26</sup> For once the Party responded to public pressure and released Medvedev on 17 June 1970.

The practice of incarcerating dissenters in mental institutions has become fairly common in recent years. It is not a new Soviet technique, however, since Tsar Nikolas I declared the philosopher, Chaadaev, insane a way back in the 1830s and put him under house arrest. The list of dissenters suffering this peculiar punishment in recent years is too long to be retailed in a study of this brevity, but the fate of a famous victim, Major General Piotr G. Grigorenko, demonstrates the technique. He has been active in various protest movements since 1961, and in 1964 he was reduced to the ranks and confined in an insane asylum for 14 months. When released he continued his protests, including an appeal for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. In the spring of 1969 he went to Tashkent to be present at the trial of ten Crimean Tatars and was arrested in May. He was declared insane and confined to a mental institution.

Even the social scientists are now getting into the act. A young historian, Andrey Amalrik, wrote an article in early 1969 entitled "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" It was smuggled out to the Alexander Herzen Foundation in the Netherlands and was published first in the periodical *Survey* (Autumn 1969) and later came out in book form. The Amalrik article begins with a description of the evolution of the "political protest movement" over the last 15 years. He sees the movement as one largely confined to academics, artists, engineers and teachers, and he thinks these people are "least capable of purposeful activity." As he puts it, "the

success of a democratic movement based on this social stratum appears to me highly problematical."<sup>27</sup> In those same 15 years the regime has become a passive bureaucratic elite incapable of decisive action to reverse the on-going deterioration. In addition, the bulk of the people, either peasants or recently urbanized peasants, respect only "strong government" and have a negative concept of justice summed up in the idea that "nobody should be better off than me." He considers these two attitudes inimical to democratic ideas based on individualism. Putting these factors together, Amalrik sees the regime becoming incapable of coping with its problems, the political opposition, largely intelligentsia, incapable of purposeful action, and the bulk of the population as inherently unable to conceive of what democracy is all about.

This leads Amalrik to the conclusion that the collapse of the regime, which he regards as inevitable, will come from outside pressures triggering off domestic reactions. At this point he comes up with the following scenario: Sometimes between 1975 and 1980 there will be a war between Russia and China; it will be a long war and will lead to chaos within the Russian empire. The non-Russian republics within the USSR and the satellites in Eastern Europe will throw off the Moscow yoke. Amalrik goes on to assert flatly that even if that particular scenario does not come to pass, "I have no doubt that this great eastern Slav empire . . . has entered the last decade of its existence."<sup>28</sup> Amalrik was arrested and imprisoned in May 1970.

The campaign against religion, the artists, and the political dissenters in the last few years has been growing in its severity. The secret police has been beefed up and the propaganda organs are now singing its praises. The Komsomol, or Young Communist League, has been called upon to increase its *Druzhiny*, volunteer patrols to help the police, and the *Druzhinniki* are not the most cultured and intellectual young people in the USSR. In 1962 a new law, Article 191, was added to the RSFSR Criminal Code, and it specified that "Resistance to members of the police or the *Druzhinniki*" was punishable by a year in prison, and Article 190, added in 1966, stated that "dissemination by word of mouth of deliberately false statements derogatory to the Soviet state and social system" is punishable by three years in jail or one year at corrective labor.<sup>29</sup> With laws as loose as

<sup>25</sup>*Survey*, No. 72 (Autumn 1969), p. 53.

<sup>26</sup>*Survey*, loc. cit., p. 78.

<sup>27</sup>Pavel Litvinov, *The Demonstration in Pushkin Square: The Trial Records with Commentary and an Open Letter* (translated by Manya Harari), Boston, Gamit, 1969, pp. 13-14 and 161-162.

<sup>28</sup>Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, (translated by Michael I. Lerner), New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

<sup>29</sup>*New York Times*, 17 June 1970.

Articles 70, 190, and 191 on the books, the police and the *Druzhinniki* can arrest almost anyone expressing any opinion not lifted straight out of the current edition of *Pravda*. Judging from the trials of Sinyavsky, Daniel, Ginzburg, Litvinov, and Larisa Daniel, the guilt of the accused is foreordained if the government desires a conviction. The numerous "trials" of dissenters that have taken place since the late 1960s only confirm the fact that the government insists on a conviction at such exhibitions.

Mostly because of his involvement in the protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, regarded as a besmirching of the army by a former major-general, Pyotr G. Grigorenko was arrested in May 1969 and sent to a "psychiatric clinic." This action spurred the creation of an Action Group for the Defense of Human Rights in that same month. The group included Leonid Plyushch, a leading Ukrainian dissenter, and Pyotr Yakir, son of a famous general purged in the Stalin era. Most of the members of the Action Group were later imprisoned, committed to insane asylums, or forced to emigrate.<sup>30</sup> Almost simultaneously a new vehicle for dissent appeared—the so-called *samizdat*, or unofficial self-publishing.<sup>31</sup> The outstanding accomplishment in this genre of dissent was the publication of the *Chronicle of Current Events* (*Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*), a newspaper typed on onionskins which detailed the *samizdat* available, the fate of political prisoners, and accounts of political trials. It came out with astonishing regularity between April 1968 and early 1973, some 27 issues. A *samizdat* publication similar to the *Chronicle* appeared in the Ukraine in 1970, the *Ukraine Herald* (*Ukrainsky Visnyk*).

A committee for Human Rights was formed by three nuclear physicists (Andrey Sakharov, Andrey Tverdokhlebov, and Valery Chalidze) in November 1970. The dissident movement seemed to be flourishing. Then in January 1972 the KGB went all out in crushing the *Chronicle of Current Events*. Apparently an order from on high (a Central Committee directive to the KGB) came down in December 1971 to silence the *Chronicle*.<sup>32</sup> In a show-trial in August 1973, Pyotr Yakir, after being in prison from June 1972, seemed to be a broken man. He probably revealed much to the KGB. His revelations enabled the police to harass the editors of the *Chronicle* to the point where the publication went into limbo, temporarily at least.

The advent of *Detente* in 1972 did little, if anything, to help the Soviet dissenters—on the contrary, as the Soviet government permitted more and more trade and contacts with foreigners, it felt it necessary to crack down even harder on the dissenters lest they spread poisonous ideas gleaned from their contacts with Westerners. In addition to hounding the *Chronicle* into near impotence, the list of dissenters imprisoned, committed to psychiatric clinics, or forced into emigration grew even longer.

But dissidence went on, KGB notwithstanding. Dr. Valentin Turchin founded the Moscow branch of Amnesty International in the autumn of 1974. Sakharov, the towering figure among the dissenters, continued to write, send messages to the West, and to protest in person at political trials. Another towering figure, Solzhenitsyn, really shocked the Communist leaders when the first volume of his monumental indictment of the system of Soviet justice was published abroad in late 1973—the famous *Gulag Archipelago*. In this work Solzhenitsyn not only described in detail the horrors of the Soviet slave-labor camps under Stalin, but to the dismay of the Soviet ideologues, he put the blame on Lenin as the inventor of the system. This did it—no one could slander St. Vladimir with impunity. Something had to be done with Solzhenitsyn. His reputation abroad was too great, even among the European Communist parties, to just slam him into a *gulag*. So it was decided to exile him to the West. On 12 February 1974 he was arrested and on 13 February put on a plane for West Germany. As Barghoorn puts it:

The Kremlin's resort to selective terror against dissenters, especially from early 1972 on, indicated that Brezhnev and his fellow oligarchs viewed the silencing of dissonant voices as less costly than a more tolerant policy.<sup>33</sup>

One of Solzhenitsyn's first acts as an exile was to establish a fund, The Russian Social Fund to Help Those Who are Persecuted and Their Families, financed by the royalties from *Gulag Archipelago*. As of 2 February 1977, the fund, administered up to then by Aleksandr Ginzburg, had spent 270 thousand rubles (\$360,000) in aiding political dissenters and their families.<sup>34</sup>

Then came the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, especially its climax in Helsinki and the signing of the Final Act on 1 August 1975. The dissidents now had a cause, a rallying point, and international document dealing with human rights and signed by Brezhnev himself.

<sup>30</sup>George Saunders (ed.), *Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition*, New York, Monad, 1974, pp. 12-13.

<sup>31</sup>A Soviet acronym from *sam* : "self" and *izdat* : "publishing" and is usually accomplished by typing manifold copies on a typewriter, copies of illegal literature and anti-regime comments, and distributed clandestinely.

<sup>32</sup>Barghoorn, "The Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent: Perspectives, strategies and Techniques of Repression," in Tokes, Rudolf, *Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 70.

<sup>33</sup>Barghoorn, *Loc. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>34</sup>*New York Times*, 3 February 1977. Ginzburg was arrested on 4 February 1977 and his wife took over the management of the fund. But the fund has been under harassment by the KGB.

The Soviet leaders, especially Brezhnev, were intent upon the "legitimization" of the postwar boundaries in Central Europe. After lengthy negotiations and persuasion at Geneva during the European Security Conference, the Soviets got 33 European nations and the United States and Canada to agree on a charter acceptable to all. A final summit-level conference in Helsinki beginning on 30 July 1975 was also agreed on. On 1 August the leaders of the 35 assembled nations signed the "Final Act" of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, a 30,000-word document that asserted the legitimacy of the postwar European boundaries, called for a reduction in the armed forces in Central Europe, and, in "Basket 3," dealt with such things as more communications between East and West, better treatment of journalists, the right of families to be reunited, and human rights in general.

Apparently Brezhnev was so anxious to get general acceptance of the Soviet territorial acquisitions in World War II and its immediate aftermath that he agreed to what he probably thought was a bunch of platitudes in the Third Basket. But the ink was hardly dry on the Final Act before he realized that he had bought "a pig in a poke." Throughout both the satellites and the Soviet Union itself there was a wave of rising expectations that the Helsinki agreements were for real. "Monitoring groups" sprang up to check on the compliance with the provisions of the Third Basket and though various channels were able to inform the West of the fact that the Communist leaders were extremely laggard in implementing the human rights provisions of the Third Basket. In Czechoslovakia the *Charter 77* group embarrassed the regime and were dealt with severely which only pointed up the lack of human rights in that state. In the Soviet Union such self-constituted "monitors" as Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky, Valentin Turchin, and Andrei Sakharov cause the Brezhnev regime no end of trouble. The dissidents now had a focus, a set of norms with which to measure the regime against the Final Act. Furthermore, one of the provisions of the Helsinki agreement called for a conference in 1977 to review implementation of the agreement, a chance for the dissidents to work toward this future forum for grievances.

On 4 October 1977 delegates from 33 European states and from the United States and Canada met in Belgrade for a full-scale review of how well the signatories of the Final Act had complied with its provisions since 1975. Arthur Goldberg headed the US delegation and Yuli Vorontsov headed that of the Soviet Union. After sparring about for a month, on 1 November 1977 Goldberg finally got down to specifics concerning human rights, or rather the

lack of them, in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The Soviets, who were trying to avoid the issue, claimed that this was interference in the internal affairs of the accused countries, an assertion hard to maintain since the Helsinki agreement contained the specific provision that the nations of Europe respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. Two days later the Dutch and the Belgian delegates spoke vigorously about the misuse of psychiatry against political dissidents and accused the Soviet Union of restrictive actions against religious groups. This was the agreed position of 14 Western countries. Although Vorontsov continued to bleat that the attack on the Soviet human rights record could break up the Belgrade meeting, it turned out to be an empty threat. One Soviet commentator called this "fussing about human rights" as so much "demagogy." By mid-December the US delegates were mentioning specific Soviet victims by name and the Soviets were snarling back about American illiterates, poverty-stricken masses and millions of unemployed. A real name-calling contest was in progress. One of the reasons for the West's insistence on being specific was the arrest of the Soviet monitor of the compliance with the Helsinki accord, Mr. Anatoly Shcharansky.

In mid-January 1978 the various delegations tried to come up with a final document that would be acceptable to all since the rules of engagement called for a consensus. The Soviet version was vague on most things and ignored human rights. Goldberg felt that the final document should contain an objective account of the implementation of the Helsinki agreements. The Russians dug in and refused to agree to any document that was specific on human rights. After better than a month of running into Soviet intransigence, the Western nations, on 28 February, presented a two-page document that said nothing—just what the Soviets were seeking. After another week of wrangling, the conference ended on a sour note with the US and Soviet delegates pointing out each others weaknesses. About the only thing the conferees agree upon was to meet again on 11 November 1980 in Madrid. Thus after five months, with time out for the Christmas season, the conference came to a close on 9 March 1978.

It was not, however, a total loss. It did force the issue of human rights into a public debate and did force the Communist delegates to listen, albeit unhappily. Furthermore, the agreement to meet again in 1980 gave a focus for the "monitoring groups" behind the Iron Curtain; they could again collect the evidence needed to take the Soviets to task at Madrid. There can be no doubt that the

Belgrade conference was an embarrassment for the Kremlin leaders and they can look forward to a similar embarrassment in Madrid in 1980.

A group called the Committee for Assistance to Fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement was formed in May 1976 by nine activists in the dissident movement. Their goal was to record and transmit to the Western signatories of the Final Act Soviet sins of omission and commission in compliance with Basket Three of the Helsinki document. Similar groups sprang into being in Kiev, Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Vilnius as well as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other Soviet satellites. Yuri Orlov, who headed the Moscow unit, cleverly established links with such various types of dissidence as nationalists, Jews, religious dissidents, and artists. This maneuver was enough to bring on a KGB crackdown and Orlov was warned in January 1977 to cease such stratagems.

The tough years for the dissidents were 1976 and 1977. In July 1976 Amalrik, who after his release from a prison camp in the Magadan area of northeast Siberia, became a thorn in the side of the regime by continually contacting foreign newsmen. He was forced to emigrate in July 1976. Bukovsky, who had revealed the details of life in a "psychiatric clinic" to the West, was exchanged for the Chilean Communist Luis Corvalan in December 1976, and Andrey Tverdokhlebov, secretary of the Moscow unit of Amnesty International, was tried and sentenced to remote exile within the Soviet Union, that is, "restricted to the boondocks," in April 1976.

Dr. Valentin Turchin, who founded the Moscow unit of Amnesty International in July 1974 and was immediately fired from his job as a specialist in computer languages, was permitted to go to the United States to take a teaching post at Columbia in September 1977. Turchin wanted a temporary visa, but the authorities gave him only a choice of permanent exile or no visa. Ex-Major General Grigorenko, once he got out of the "psychiatric clinic" in which he was imprisoned for five years, resumed his cantankerous ways, that is, fighting for human rights. But he was allowed to go to the United States to see his son and to undergo medical treatment in November 1977. However, on 10 March 1978 a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet declared him an enemy of Soviet society and revoked his citizenship.

The foreign newsmen in Moscow had been treated with care during the height of detente and in the aftermath of the Final Act of Helsinki. Not one had been expelled since 1970. But in the spring of 1976, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the official organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, accused three American reporters (Friendly of *Newsweek*, Wren of *The New York Times*, and Krimsky of the Associated Press) of being agents of the CIA. The accusation was

repeated in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in early February 1977 and this time was followed by the expulsion of George Krimsky of the AP. Apparently President Carter's policy of support for human rights was getting a response from the Kremlin.

Andrey Sakharov, on 21 January 1977, sent a letter to President Carter in which he detailed how unbearable the situation had become for dissenters in the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the government was making no "concessions to the most vital human rights (freedom of belief, and information, freedom of conscience, freedom of the choice of country of living, etc.)."<sup>35</sup> He went on to say that the authorities were persecuting members of the Committee for Assistance to Fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement and he asked the president to help in obtaining the release of political prisoners. He appended a list of 15 to his letter. President Carter, in a letter dated 5 February 1977, told Sakharov that he would try to help and that he sympathized with the predicament of the dissenters. The whole exchange was the equivalent of waving a red flag before the Kremlin bull and in the first ten days of February three outstanding members of the Helsinki monitoring group were arrested: Yuri Orlov, a physicist who headed the group, Aleksandr Ginzburg, who was also in charge of the disbursement of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, and Mikola Rudenko, a Ukrainian poet and head of the Kiev monitoring group. Sakharov, however, was not arrested. His reputation as an outstanding scientist and human rights leader both at home and abroad put him in the same "untouchable" class as Solzhenitsyn, but unlike the latter, he was not likely to be forced into exile. The authorities undoubtedly felt that he was acquainted with too much highly classified information and, furthermore, if such a walking repository of secret information were allowed to emigrate, how could they justify the refusal of visas on that ground to scientists and technicians with infinitely less knowledge.

Soviet violations of the provisions of the Third Basket, in addition to being revealed at Belgrade between June 1977 and March 1978, were also considered at a number of international conferences. One such consideration that hurt badly was the decision at the annual conference of the World Psychiatric Association in Honolulu when that organization on 1 September 1977 censured the Soviet Union for its abuse of psychiatry for political purposes, a direct slap at the use of psychiatric clinics for the imprisonment of dissenters. The evidence supplied by Bukovsky, Shtern and others was too overwhelming to be any longer ignored.

<sup>35</sup> *The New York Times*, 28 January 1978; text of the Sakharov letter in translation produced in full.

Even the artists (musicians, painters, and sculptors) were not immune from the ubiquitous KGB. The world renowned cellist, Mstislav Rostropovich, who had gallantly sheltered Solzhenitsyn during the dark days of 1973-74, was allowed to go abroad for an extended stay in May 1974. But in March 1978, as in the case of Grigorenko, Rostropovich was stripped of his citizenship by a decree of the Supreme Soviet. Ernst Neizvestny, the sculptor with whom Khrushchev had such a hot exchange at the Manege exhibition in December 1962, left the Soviet Union in April 1976. Incidentally, Neizvestny and Khrushchev became good friends after the Manege affair and his widow commissioned Neizvestny to do the monument that marks his grave in the Novodevichi cemetery. These were only two of a steady stream of writers, painters, ballet dancers, and other artists who have left the Soviet Union either legally or illegally. Some observers are reminded of the flood of talent that fled Germany under Hitler.

In 1978 the three outstanding dissenters in jail awaiting trial were Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky, and Aleksandr Ginzberg. All had been arrested in February or March 1977 and were being held beyond the legal pretrial detention period. Finally, in May 1978, Orlov was tried in small courtroom in a Moscow suburb in a typically farcical style. Only his wife and his two sons were allowed into the courtroom otherwise packed with fifty handpicked goons hired by the government to heckle the prisoner. Orlov was not allowed to examine the documentary evidence against him nor to question the government's witnesses. To no one's surprise, the court gave him the maximum sentence of seven years in prison and five years of remote exile in the USSR. The American government through the State Department expressed its horror at such a distortion of justice.

Shcharansky, a leading figure in the fight for freer Jewish emigration, is still awaiting trial (June 1978). All signs, however, point to an indictment for treason under Article 64 of the Criminal Code, which can mean the death penalty. According to the authorities, Shcharansky was an agent of the CIA, an accusation that President Carter has publicly denied. If the Soviets try and convict Shcharansky on that charge, it will be the equivalent of calling the President a liar.

Aleksandr Ginzburg is also scheduled for trial in 1978. Since he has already undergone two tough sentences, his friends fear that another term in a prison camp will kill him, a potentiality hardly likely to worry the Soviet authorities very much.

In summary, Soviet dissenters, who appeared to be in fair shape at the end of the sixties with a flourishing *samizdat* organization and a number of

outstanding leaders, now see their movement in shambles. *Samizdat* is under constant and, apparently, effective pressure. The best leaders, with the exception of Sakharov, have been imprisoned, committed to insane asylums, or forced to emigrate. And the hopes aroused by the Final Act at Helsinki have been brutally dashed by a regime that never intended to abide by the commitments it made in signing the document. The trials of the dissenters, for example that of Orlov, are coming more and more to resemble those under Stalin. To quote a younger and bolder Yevtushenko:

While Stalin's heirs walk this earth, Stalin, I fancy, still lurks  
in the mausoleum.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>"Stalin's Heirs," in *Khrushchev and the Arts*, p. 95.

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