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ATARS/ATC SIMULATION TESTS WITH SITE ADAPTATION LOGIC IN THE PHILADELPHIA TERMINAL AREA

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FINAL REPORT

MARCH 1980

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Systems Research & Development Service Washington, D.C. 20590

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE.

The purpose of this project was to provide further evaluation and refinement of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) concept. This report presents the results of a series of real-time simulation tests conducted to evaluate the performance of a recently improved ATARS algorithm in the Philadelphia Terminal Radar Control (TRACON). Specific objectives were to determine:

1. The impact of ATARS on the controller and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system in a terminal control area (TCA) environment;

2. The requirement for further desensitization of ATARS in a mixed environment of primary and satellite airport TCA operations;

3. ATARS alarm type, frequency, duration, and location in the terminal area; and

4. A characterization of proximity advisory activity among aircraft in the terminal area.

BACKGROUND.

This effort represents the third set of tests conducted at the National Aviation Facility Experimental Center (NAFEC) to assess the performance of the ATARS algorithm during its evolutionary development. Report No. FAA-RD-76-193 (reference 1) documented the results of a dynamic simulation in the Air Traffic Control Simulation Facility (ATCSF) at NAFEC. The simulation was conducted from May 1975 through September 1975, to investigate the original Intermittent Positive Control (IPC) algorithm. The acronym, IPC, was subsequently changed to ATARS. Report No. FAA-RD-78-138 (reference 2) documented the results of tests conducted in the ATCSF from December 1977 through April 1978 to assess modifications to the algorithm based on recommendations from the 1975 report. These recommendations included alarm threshold reductions and new desensitization logic designed to reduce the number of undesirable alarms experienced in the 1975 study.

The current series of tests was performed from May 1978 through October 1978 and investigated the ATARS algorithm in the Philadelphia TCA. Site-adapted desensitization logic was specifically designed to eliminate interaction between arrival aircraft on converging Instrument Landing System (ILS) courses close to the airport and between ILS and airport surface traffic. The Philadelphia area was selected for several reasons. Primarily, Philadelphia has been designated as the locale where pre-operational trials of the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS)/ATARS engineering model will be performed. In addition, the Philadelphia TRACON facility is responsible for the control of a number of satellite airports which provide a unique, complex, operational test environment. It is a major hub in a series of east coast hub terminals; as such, it is an ideal site for future multi-site DABS/ATARS testing.

DISCUSSION

TEST ENVIRONMENT.

The testing used the real-time ATCSF at NAFEC in a stand-alone configuration. This facility consists of an ATC laboratory, a simulator pilot laboratory, an ATARS simulator, and a target generator. The target generator causes all aircraft to fly in accordance with flight plan inputs. Controller personnel modify the flightpaths of controlled aircraft through a voice link to simulator pilot positions. Keyboard entries by the simulator pilots cause the target generator to respond to the control instructions. All aircraft automatically respond to ATARS commands which are transmitted to the target generator via a simulated uplink. The controller may at any time override the ATARS command by simply instructing the aircraft to do otherwise. As a result, the controller maintains control of the aircraft under his jurisdiction at all times.

The test environment simulated a single DABS sensor site serving the Philadelphia TRACON facility. Testing was accomplished utilizing the ATARS algorithm provided by the MITRE Corporation (reference 3) with new siteadaptation logic incorporated (reference 4). Desensitized zones were designed by NAFEC specifically for the Philadelphia airport. In general, these zones were defined about the ILS approach courses and extended from the end of the runways to the outer markers. In addition, they extended to 500 feet above the runways. Within these zones, ATARS would not issue threat or resolution advisories to either aircraft established on the ILS or aircraft on the airport surface. The intent of these zones was to eliminate undesirable ATARS alarms to aircraft on converging ILS courses and between arrivals and surface traffic. Further details of the desensitized zones are described in a later section of this report.

The simulated ATC facility consisted of 13 ATC control positions; north and south feeder control, Philadelphia local control, Philadelphia satellite local control, visual flight rules (VFR) feeder control, north and south approach control, north and south departure control, north and south satellite control, Philadelphia final control, and the TCA control position. Variations of this arrangement were made to support the various tests, and certain liberties were taken in combining certain positions and controller work assignments due to a limitation in the number of available test controllers. In general, the Philadelphia TRACON operation was faithfully simulated.

Five satellite airports were simulated. These were North Philadelphia (PNE), Trenton (TTN), Coatsville (CVE), Willow Grove (NXX), and Greater Wilmington (ILG). Typical traffic flows in the terminal area are shown in figures 1 and 2.

The arrival flows are shown by dashed lines and the departure flows are indicated by solid lines. No satellite traffic flows are shown. In general, satellite operations represent a highly coordinated effort wherein the satellite controllers direct their aircraft in a way to avoid much of the Philadelphia airport traffic. The locations of satellite airports around the TCA tends to







naturally create crossing route situations with the main flow of traffic. The terminal area included all traffic within a 50-nautical mile (nmi) radius of the center of the Philadelphia airport.

TEST SERIES--GENERAL.

Four series of tests were conducted. Each series consisted of four 1-hour and 15-minute simulation runs. The first 15 minutes of a run were used for traffic buildup and the last hour as the data base. The test series was established for two purposes; (1) to assist in familiarizing the controllers with the environment by studying first the Philadelphia airport and then increasing to satellite airports and greater traffic density, and (2) attempting to isolate the sources of ATARS activity to single airport versus multiple airports and instrument flight rules (IFR) standards versus VFR standards. The test series is identified as follows:

- 1. Philadelphia airport only, IFR separation = PI,
- 2. Philadelphia airport only, IFR/VFR separation = PIV,
- Philadelphia airport plus satellites, IFR separation = PSI, and
- 4. Philadelphia airport plus satellites, IFR/VFR separation = PSIV

In each of the four test series, all aircraft, whether IFR or VFR, were controlled by ATC. Futhermore, all aircraft were DABS equipped which means that the aircraft are equipped with ATARS and an altitude reporting capability.

TEST SERIES PI--ALL DABS.

This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in a purely IFR situation. The traffic sample density was 75 DABS equipped aircraft per hour. It was assumed that all aircraft were operating under IFR conditions.

TEST SERIES PIV--ALL DABS.

This series duplicated the trafic samples used in the PI series, except that 50 percent of general aviation and air taxi aircraft were operating under VFR. The remaining aircraft were operating under IFR.

TEST SERIES PSI-ALL DABS.

This series introduced satellite operations, and all operations were IFR. The Philadelphia airport hourly rate was 75 aircraft, but 42 satellite aircraft and 2 overflights were added.

TEST SERIES PSIV--ALL DABS.

This series was a mixed IFR/VFR environment with approximately 50 percent of the population operating under VFR conditions. Sample density was the same as series PSI except that seven VFR overflights were added. An overflight is defined as a flight which does not takeoff or land in the Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA).

SPECIAL TESTS.

In addition to the four test series, two special tests, non-mode C (NMC) and uncontrolled (UNC), were performed. The first, NMC, was made to study the interaction between ATARS equipped aircraft and non-mode C aircraft when ATARS issues commands to equipped aircraft. The second, UNC, was run to investigate the interaction between controlled and uncontrolled ATARS equipped aircraft operating in proximity to a TCA.

The NMC run is identical in aircraft density to the PSIV series, but a quantity of ATCRBS non-mode C aircraft, which are not recognized by ATARS, are introduced. Since ATARS is not aware of these aircraft, no ATARS advisories or controller alerts are provided when they are in potential encounters. Altitude information on these aircraft was not displayed to the controller. All the air carrier and air taxi aircraft are DABS equipped. For the general aviation aircraft, 20 percent are DABS equipped, 20 percent are ATCRBS mode C equipped, and 60 percent are ATCRBS mode A equipped.

The UNC run is identical in controlled aircraft density to the PSIV series. Twenty-five uncontrolled VFR DABS aircraft are added and programmed to fly in close proximity to the TCA area. The only responsibility the controller had for these flights was to issue, as necessary and workload permitting, traffic advisories to controlled aircraft. All aircraft are DABS equipped.

SEPARATION CRITERIA.

IFR separation criteria used by the controllers was a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical or 3 nmi horizontal. ATC separation used under assumed VFR weather conditions was 500 feet or 1.5 nmi between IFR/VFR, and VFR/VFR aircraft, and 1,000 feet or 3 nmi between IFR/IFR aircraft. Because of wake turbulence, aircraft were separated from heavy jets by 4 nmi when a heavy jet was behind a heavy jet, and by 5 nmi when a small or large aircraft was behind a heavy jet. These separations were applied to an aircraft if it was operating directly behind a heavy jet at coaltitude, operating directly behind a heavy jet and less than 1,000 feet below it, or if following a heavy jet and conducting an instrument approach. In addition, for landing aircraft, a small aircraft behind a large aircraft required 4 nmi at the time the preceding aircraft crossed the threshold. A small aircraft behind a heavy aircraft required 6 nmi.

TRAFFIC SAMPLES.

The construction of the traffic samples was based on an analysis of flight progress strips. Since the Philadelphia TCA has no specific entry fixes published for VFR aircraft, the entry points used for these traffic samples conformed to the normal IFR traffic flow without deliberately mixing with that flow and reflected a consideration for the high level of experience to be found in Philadelphia pilots. The construction of the uncontrolled traffic sample was based on information derived from VFR flight plans obtained from the North Philadelphia flight service station. More detail on the traffic samples can be found in appendix A.

ATARS ALGORITHM.

The ATARS algorithm used during these ATCSF simulations is a modified version of the original IPC algorithm (Report No. FAA-EM-74-4, change 2). The principal modifications to change 2 include;

1. A uniform detection logic was employed; i.e., controlled and uncontrolled aircraft were treated in the same manner with respect to the detection of conflicts and the issuance of commands.

2. The generation of a Flashing Proximity Warning Indicator (FPWI) or a command would force the generation of a controller alert.

3. ATARS final approach desensitization zones were specifically adapted to the configurations of the Philadelphia runways.

A brief description of the ATARS algorithm and the types of messages generated by ATARS for delivery to pilots and controllers is presented in appendix B.

ATARS DESENSITIZATION.

Previous testing had demonstrated the need for desensitization of ATARS around the airport and its approach courses to eliminate undesirable alarms between airborne and surface aircraft. This also prevented unnecessary alarms between aircraft on parallel approaches. In earlier NAFEC tests, this desensitization took the form of a rectangular volume of airspace about the ILS course(s) within which the ATARS FPWI and command functions were inhibited. Under normal conditions, this method was adequate; however, as indicated in reference 2, improvements were made to minimize the size of desensitization areas while maximizing ATARS protection.

For the Philadelphia study, the size of the desensitization zone was reduced based on the attributes of the environment. Although there are parallel runways at the Philadelphia airport, the separation between the runways does not meet the requirement for parallel simultaneous approaches. For single aircraft ILS intercepts, it was felt that a desensitized zone beginning at the outer marker and extending to the airport would be adequate. Additionally, providing this area of coverage to the surface at the outer marker was considered unnecessary. Consequently, the desensitized zone was designed to be as shown in figures 3 and 4 with a rectangular sleeve of airspace allowing for 200 feet vertical and 0.5 nmi horizontal deviation about the ILS glide slope. To further protect aircraft which are established on the ILS from non-ILS intruder aircraft, an aircraft heading check was incorporated. Aircraft within the desensitization zone whose heading deviated by more than 10 degrees from runway heading were candidates for ATARS FPWI or commands. This was done to protect against aircraft crossing the ILS courses. In addition, an aircraft, even though established on the ILS course within the desensitization zone, was eligible for ATARS service if involved in an encounter with an unequipped intruder. Figures 3 and 4 represent the two operational configurations normally used at the Philadelphia airport; i.e., west for VFR use and east for IFR use. Although both desensitization configurations would be





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Section 2.



resident in the ATARS logic, only one would be selected by the facility supervisor at any given time. This would prevent any unnecessary desensitization. Arrival aircraft established on the ILS course would not receive commands generated by aircraft on the ground or in the immediate vicinity of the airport. However, if an arrival aircraft should execute a missed approach, ATARS would be automatically reactivated to protect against departing or transient aircraft the moment the aircraft exited the approach sleeve.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

GENERAL.

Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) interacts with pilots and controllers in the following ways;

1. When two aircraft are declared to be in potential conflict, ATARS issues (a) threat advisory Flashing Proximity Warning Indicator (FPWI) to the equipped aircraft, and (b) a controller alert to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility.

2. If the potential conflict persists and the command thresholds are met, ATARS issues (a) a resolution advisory (positive or negative command) to the equipped aircraft, and (b) a command notification to the ATC facility.

The events described in 1 and 2 above are generally described as ATARS alarms; however, the command alarm will clearly have a more serious impact on ATC operations.

In the discussion of results, it is important to separate the negative and positive aspects of ATARS/ATC interaction. Negative interaction occurs when ATARS issues threat and command alarms under circumstances in which the controller is using normal ATC procedures and operating within the guidelines of the ATC system. The effect of these undesirable alarms can be disruptive and the controller can become annoyed and casual to the ATARS. An effort will be made to identify the reasons for the alarms and suggest methods for eliminating or reducing them. ATARS positive interaction takes place when blunders in the system occur and ATARS provides a safe resolution service. How well ATARS handles the dynamics of the ATC system and how effective is the resolution attempted is the main thrust of these results.

OPERATIONS RATES.

The hourly operations rates achieved in each series, averaged over 4 hourly runs, are presented in table 1. Rates are broken out by arrivals versus departures at the main airport Philadelphia (PHL) and at the satellite airports collectively. A flight is counted in the operations rate if it either takes off or lands at any of the airports during the data hour. Overflights are counted separately from arrivals and departures. An overflight is a flight which neither originates nor terminates within the Terminal Radar Control (TRACON) area. The maximum and average instantaneous aircraft counts (IAC) for the 4 hourly runs in each series are also listed.

TABLE 1. HOURLY OPERATIONS RATES AND INSTANTANEOUS AIRCRAFT COUNTS (IAC)

PHL			S	<u>SAT</u> OVER		TOTAL	IAC	
<u>Series</u>	ARV	DEP	ARV	DEP	FLIGHTS		MAX	AVG
PI	25.3	36.3	0	. 0	0	61.5	26.3	19.1
PIV	33.8	35.8	0	0	0	69.5	23.3	15.6
PSI	26.0	36.5	16.5	20.8	2	101.8	39.5	30.3
PSIV	35.0	34.0	20.0	21.0	9	119.0	43.0	29.1

There was very little variation in operations rates among the four runs within each series. There was only a 4 percent difference between the run with the lowest and highest operations rates.

ATARS ENCOUNTERS.

The ATARS encounters in each 4-hour series were analyzed to determine: the type aircraft involved, the arrival/departure status, the IFR/VFR flight status, the equipment capability (DABS/ATCRBS), and the number and duration of ATARS advisories. All aircraft were DABS/mode C equipped except in the NMC runs. In the NMC series, a percentage of the general aviation aircraft were ATCRBS/mode C and ATCRBS/mode A equipped.

Tabular data are presented which include all encounters where either a threat advisory (FPWI), a resolution advisory (command), and/or controller alert occurred. An analysis of proximity advisories (steady PWI's) is presented in a subsequent section of this report. Appendix B describes the four types of messages provided to aircraft by the ATARS.

PI SERIES.

The first test series was performed to investigate arrival/departure operations at the Philadelphia Airport under IFR operating procedures. A traffic density of 75 DABS/mode C equipped IFR aircraft per hour was simulated. No satellite traffic was present. This series produced only one ATARS encounter in 4 hours of testing, for an average of 0.25 encounters per hour. This result parallels the results obtained in previous simulations of a single airport IFR environment where no ATARS encounters occurred in 4 hours of testing (reference 2). Aircraft density for both studies was comparable. The single ATARS encounter was between an air carrier arrival and a general aviation arrival and produced only one scan of controller alert and two scans of threat advisories (FPWI's). The controller had cleared an aircraft to level off 1,000 feet below another aircraft in level flight. If the vertical tracker had been able to sense the level off sooner, the advisory would not have been uplinked. The aircraft had leveled off when the FPWI was displayed.

PIV SERIES.

TARTE 2

This series investigated Philadelphia Airport traffic under mixed IFR/VFR operating conditions. The traffic density of 75 DABS/mode C equipped aircraft per hour was the same as used in the PI series. All air carrier aircraft were considered to be operating on IFR flight plans, and between these aircraft and other IFR aircraft, standard IFR separation was applied. One-half the air taxi and general aviation flights were considered to be IFR and the other half VFR. Within the TCA, 500-foot vertical separation was applied between IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR aircraft. Additionally, when aircraft were within 15 nmi of the radar antenna, horizontal separation could be reduced from 3 nmi to 1.5 nmi.

In this series, six ATARS encounters occurred in the 4 hours of testing which yields an average of 1.5 encounters per hour. Table 2 presents the details of the encounters. The duration of controller alerts (CA) is always one scan less than the total duration of an encounter involving an FPWI, since a two out of three rule was applied to the issuance of CA, whereas, no such rule applied to uplinked FPWI's. This rule required that CA thresholds be violated on two out of three consecutive 4-second scans before issuing a controller alert. No positive commands occurred and only one negative horizontal command of 4-second duration was generated for all encounters. The command encounter was between an arrival and a departure VFR general aviation aircraft. It occurred in the TCA approximately 5 miles from the airport. A plot of this TCA encounter is presented in appendix C (encounter 1). In five of the six encounters, at least one aircraft of each pair was VFR. Hence, VFR criteria was being applied.

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NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS --- PTV ALL ATRCRAFT

No. of	4-Second	Scans
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Run No.*	Enc <u>No</u> .	Aircraft User**	Flight <u>Status**</u>	Flight <u>Rule**</u>	Total	<u>CA</u>	FPWI	Neg. Adv.**	Pos. Adv.
1	1	AC/AT	D/A	1/V	5	4	5	0	Q
	2***	GA/GA	A/D	v/v	3	2	2	1 NR	٥
2	3	GA/GA	A/A	V/I	7	6	7	0	Q
	4	GA/GA	A/A	I/V	3	2	3	۵	0
3	5	AC/GA	D/A	1/1	4	3	. 4	Q	0
•	6	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	3	2	3	0	0.
4	0								

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

** AC = AIR CARRIER, AT = AIR TAXI, GA = GENERAL AVIATION, D = DEPARTURE, A = ARRIVAL, I = IFR, V = VFR, NR = DON'T TURN RIGHT.

*** Example--encounter No. 2; total duration of 3 scans consisting of 2 scans of FPWI alone, plus 1 scan of negative right accompanied by FPWI. The controller was alerted (CA) for 2 of the 3 scans.

PSI SERIES.

In this series, aircraft operating to and from satellites around the Philadelphia TCA were added to the Philadelphia traffic. An additional 42 DABS/ mode C equipped satellite operations and 2 DABS/mode C equipped overflights increased the basic 75 aircraft per hour density previously used to 119 aircraft per hour. Standard IFR separation cirteria were used as in the PI Series, The control of this environment proved to be particularly difficult for the test controllers. The need to combine control functions, due to a shortage of controller personnel and the general complexity of the area, were contributing factors.

Table 3 presents the PSI encounter data. There were nine ATARS encounters in the 4 hours of testing for an average of 2.25 per hour. Except for encounter 3, which is the only encounter involving an air carrier aircraft, all encounters involved at least one satellite aircraft. Five of the encounters involved at least one aircraft from Greater Wilmington (ILG) to the southwest and an additional three involved at least one from North Philadelphia (PNE) to the northeast. The crossing route structure generated by the satellite airport traffic caused the increased ATARS activity out beyond the TCA boundaries.

TABLE 3. NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS--PSI ALL AIRCRAFT DABS EQUIPPED--IFR ONLY

Run No.*	Enc <u>No.</u>	Aircraft <u>User**</u>	Flight <u>Status**</u>	Test <u>Airport</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>CA</u>	FPWI	Neg. Adv.**	Pos. Adv.**
1	1	GA/AT	D/D	PHL/ILG	8	7	5	3 NL	0
	2	GA/GA	A/0	ILG/OVR	9	8	3	0	6 C/D
2	3	AC/AT	A/A	PHL/PHL	4	3	• 4	0	0
-	4	GA/GA	A/D	ILG/ILG	9	8	8	1 NL	0
	5	GA/AT	A/A	ILG/PHL	3	2	3	0	0
3	6	GA/AT	D/A	PNE/TTN	5	4	5	0	0
	7	GA/MI	D/A	PNE/NXX	11	10	5	4 NR	2 L
4	8	AT/AT	D/A	PNE/TTN	2	1	2	0	0
·	9	GA/GA	D/A	ILG/ILG	5	4	5	0	0

No. of 4-Second Scans

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

**AC = AIR CARRIER, AT = AIR TAXI, GA = GENERAL AVIATION, MI = MILITARY, D = DEPARTURE, A = ARRIVAL, PHL = PHILADELPHIA, ILG = GREATER WILMINGTON, O = OVR = OVERFLIGHT, PNE = NORTH PHILADELPHIA, NXX = NAVY WILLOW GROVE, TTN = TRENTON, NL = DON'T TURN LEFT, NR = DON'T TURN RIGHT, C/D = CLIME/ DESCEND, L = TURN LEFT. Two of the nine encounters resulted in negative horizontal commands of short duration and two resulted in positive commands. With the exception of a Philadelphia departure, all other commands were issued to satellite airport traffic. All command encounters occurred outside the TCA. Plots of the four command encounters along with a detailed description of the encounter are presented in appendix C. The major result of the PSI series is the complete lack of any ATARS activity within the Philadelphia TCA and the very low positive command rate of 0.5 per hour over the 4 hours of runs.

PSIV SERIES.

In this series, approximately 50 percent of the population operated under VFR conditions in a mixed IFR/VFR environment. Sample density was the same as series PSI except that 7 VFR DABS/mode C equipped overflights are added.

In the four runs of the PSIV series, the eight encounters shown in table 4 were recorded. All aircraft in these encounters were flying under VFR separation criteria. Four of the encounters resulted in threat advisories only, two resulted in positive vertical commands, and two resulted in negative horizontal commands of only one scan duration. All encounters occurred outside the TCA. Plots of all the command encounters are contained in appendix C. Here again, the major results of the PSIV series are comparable to the PSI series to the extent of no ATARS activity within the TCA, the almost exclusive involvement of satellite traffic in all encounters, and the identical low positive command rate of 0.5 encounters per hour over the 4 hours of runs.

TABLE 4. NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS--PSIV ALL AIRCRAFT DABS EQUIPPED

Run No.*	Enc <u>No.</u>	Aircraft User**	Flight <u>Status**</u>	Flight <u>Rule**</u>	Test <u>Airport</u>	Total	<u>CA</u>	FPW1	Neg. <u>Adv**</u> .	Pos. Adv**.
1	1	CA /AT	0/4	v/v	OUD / DNF	7	6	6	1 ND	n
-	2	GA/GA	A/D	v/v		ý	Ř	Š	0	Ă C/D
	3	AC/GA	A/A	1/V	PHL/PHL	3	2	3	Ō	0
2		NONE								
3	4	AC/GA	A/A	1/V	PHL/ILG	2	1	2	0	0
-	5	GA/GA	A/0	V/V	PHL/OWR	9	8	5	0	4 C/D
4	6	AT/GA	v/0	v/v	PHL/OVR	2	1	2	0	0
	7	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	PHL/ILG	6	5	5	1 NR	Ō
	8	AT/GA	D/D	v/v	ILG/ILG	2	1	2	0	0

No. of 4-Second Scans

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

** AC ~ AIR CARRIER, AT - AIR TAXI, GA- GENERAL AVIATION, D - DEPARTURE, A - ARRIVAL, O - OVR - OVERFLIGHT, I ~ IFR, V - VFR, NR - DON'T TURN RIGHT, C/D CLDMS/DESCEND.

LOCATION OF ENCOUNTERS.

In 16 hours of simulation, a total of nine command encounters occurred. Five of these resulted in negative horizontal advisories, three in positive vertical advisories, and one in positive horizontal advisories. The locations of the encounters are shown in figure 5 for the IFR environment, and figure 6 for the IFR/VFR environment. The 20-nmi circle about the primary airport represents the outer radius of the TCA boundary. (See figure 9 for greater detail.) The numbers on the charts represent the encounter numbers found in appendix C. All encounters occurred at or below 7,000 feet mean sea level (m.s.l.) and eight of the nine encounters were vertically or horizontally outside the TCA. The one encounter within the TCA was between a Philadelphia departure and an arrival to the VFR runway 17 at Philadelphia. VFR altitude separation was being applied, and at the time of the negative horizontal advisory, horizontal track divergence was in progress. In eight of the encounters, at least one aircraft of each pair was associated with a satellite airport.

ATARS/CONTROLLER INTERACTION.

The extremely low positive command rate of four aircraft pairs in 16 hours of data collection produced very little interaction with the controller. Negative commands were displayed to the controllers; however, none of these commands affected aircraft flightpaths and so did not interact with the controller. It was observed that controllers did not alter normal spacing or control procedures, operations rates were high, and no missed approaches resulted because of ATARS alarms. The controllers indicated that ATARS messages displayed as blinking characters in the third line of the ARTS III data block were sufficient information for the controller for the few times that they occurred.

AIRCRAFT SEPARATION ANALYSIS.

Figure 7 is a scan-by-scan plot of those encounters (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9) that resulted in negative resolution advisories. In those encounters (Nos. 1, 2, 4) that actually enter the 500 foot by 1.5 nmi area, the controller is applying separation based on the observed divergence of aircraft tracks. More detailed plots are contained in appendix C.

Figure 8 shows the separation between aircraft pairs that existed during each scan of the four ATARS encounters which resulted in the issuance of positive commands. The type of message; i.e., controller alert, threat advisory (FPWI), or resolution advisory that existed on each scan is also shown. Controller alert and FPWI time thresholds were the same; however, controller alerts were displayed only after thresholds were violated in two out of three consecutive scans. No such rule applied to FPWI; therefore, on the first scan of an encounter, an FPWI was uplinked to the aircraft, but a controller alert was not displayed. In encounters 5, 7, and 8, it is to be noted that although the aircraft are closing horizontally, they are diverging vertically. In these three encounters, the controller had issued instructions to vertically separate the aircraft prior to the ATARS algorithm generating any positive commands. Thus, in these encounters, the controllers essentially resolved the conflicts, although the ATARS controller alert may have attracted the attention of the



FIGURE 5. IFR ENVIRONMENT ATARS COMMAND ENCOUNTERS

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FIGURE 6. IFR/VFR ENVIRONMENT ATARS COMMAND ENCOUNTERS

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FIGURE 7. AIRCRAFT SEPARATION--NEGATIVE ADVISORIES

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controllers. Encounter 3 was clearly the result of a controller blunder and it was ATARS that saved the day. Both the horizontal and vertical separations decreased until the aircraft responded to the ATARS issued commands. At point of closest approach, the aircraft were separated by 0.3 nmi horizontally and 642 feet vertically.

ATARS DESENSITIZATION ANALYSIS.

In the previous NAFEC ATCSF/ATARS simulation tests in a Chicago-type environment (reference 2), ATARS desensitization zones were considerably different from those used in the Philadelphia tests. One of the objectives of the present study was to provide insight as to the location, size, and shape of the desensitization zones required to site adapt ATARS to the Philadelphia TCA environment. A second point of interest was whether any of the runways at the numerous satellite airports should be desensitized.

All the encounters recorded during these simulation runs occurred either in the vicinity of the satellite airports or at the major crossover points for the Philadelphia arrival and departure aircraft. Very few of the conflicts occurred right at the satellite airports, but rather occurred at those crossover points where Philadelphia traffic patterns intersected the satellite airports traffic patterns. Insufficient encounters were recorded at any given airport to justify desensitization. This may, however, be due to the total density simulated at the satellite airports. Although ATARS was desensitized for aircraft on the ILS approach course at Philadelphia, provisions were made to collect ATARS encounter data in the desensitized final approach zones (FAZ). even though alarms were not uplinked to aircraft inside the zone. This was done for two purposes: (1) to assess the effectiveness of the desensitization zone in eliminating undesirable ATARS alarms between aircraft on converging ILS approach courses, between aircraft on final and surface traffic, and between arrival and departure aircraft; and (2) to gather data that could be used to determine if the desensitization zone could be further reduced in size, thus, providing a higher level of protection closer to the airport. Table 5 shows the total number of encounters that occurred in each series, the number that occurred in the FAZ (not uplinked to aircraft), and the percent in the FAZ.

The percent of encounters in the desensitization zone ranged from a low of 81.6 percent recorded in the PSI series to a high of 96.8 percent recorded in the PSIV series. It is to be recalled that, although FPWI's and commands are generated for aircraft in the desensitized zones, only steady PWI's were uplinked.

TABLE 5. ATARS ENCOUNTERS

Series	Enc <u>Total</u>	* Enc FAZ	Percent <u>FAZ</u>
PI	31	30	96.8
PIV	122	116	95.1
PSI	49	40	81.6
PSIV	104	96	92.3

*Encounters in which at least one of the aircraft was located within the FAZ. After a preliminary analysis of the number of alarms in the FAZ was completed, additional study was undertaken to determine if even further reduction of the FAZ could be achieved. For this purpose, only the PSI and PSIV series were investigated. These two series were felt to be the most realistic and representative of TCA operations. An analysis was made of the distance from the runway threshold when the first FPWI would have been uplinked to an arrival aircraft in an ATARS encounter, had it not been inhibited by the desensitization logic. For departure aircraft, a determination was made of the distance from the runway threshold when the last FPWI would have been uplinked had it not been inhibited.

Tables 6 and 7 show the number of aircraft that would have received FPWI's at the indicated distances from runway threshold had the desensitization not been in effect. As can be seen in table 6, in the PSI series, all conflicts occurred within 1.0 nmi of the runway thresholds. In table 7, in the PSIV series, 98 percent of the arrivals and all of the departure ATARS encounters occurred within 1.5 nmi of the runway threshold. The remaining 2 percent occurred 1.5 to 2 nmi from runway threshold. Based on this analysis, the Philadelphia ATARS desensitization zone used in this study, which extended to the outer marker, can be further reduced to less than half the distance (about 2 nmi) from the runway to the outer marker.

CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE LOGIC.

In the algorithm used in the 1975/1976 ATCSF/ATARS tests, special checks were made on a conflict pair to test the relative times of horizontal and vertical convergence. The special logic looked at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions simultaneously, and inhibited generation of controller alert. FPWI's and commands when the aircraft were projected to be converging in one dimension, but diverging in the other. Basically, the relative positions of the aircraft pair in both dimensions were projected to determine if conflict thresholds were simultaneously violated. See reference 3 for a more detailed explanation of this logic. This special logic was not used in the current tests. Had the algorithm contained the convergence/divergence logic, two of the command encounters that occurred in the PSI series, and two in the PSIV series would have been reduced in duration by one or two scans. None of the command encounters would have been completely eliminated. In fact, all four of the aforementioned command encounters would have had two scans of commands generated, even with the special logic. Some form of convergence/divergence logic should, however, be incorporated into all future versions of the ATARS algorithm.

VERTICAL TRACKER LAG.

Vertical tracker lag continues to impact the performance of the ATARS algorithm in that it is responsible for either triggering an alarm unnecessarily or continuing it unnecessarily. This is particularly true under VFR separation procedures when aircraft are leveling off 500 feet below or above an aircraft in level flight. The tracker overshoots the level off and triggers an alarm. An analysis of the track plots of all encounters indicated that in seven encounters, tracker lag was involved in either triggering an advisory unnecessarily or extending its duration. The tracker lag did not have a significant impact in the nine command encounters.

	RUNWAY				
NTSTANCE FROM	ARR	DEP	DEP	TOTAL	
RUNWAY THRESHOLD	<u>9R</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>17</u>	AIRCRAFT	
ON RUNWAY	16* ·	33*	9	58	
0.0 - 0.5 nmi 0.5 - 1.0 nmi	13 <u>5</u>	0 0	3 _0	16 <u>5</u>	
TOTAL	34	33	12	79	

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TABLE 6.NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY
WHEN FIRST FPWI UPLINKED—PSI SERIES

TABLE 7. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY WHEN FIRST FPWI UPLINKED---PSIV SERIES

		RUNWAY			
DTEMANOR PROM	ARR	ARR	DEP	DEP	
RUNWAY THRESHOLD	<u>27R</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>17</u>	TOTAL
ON RUNWAY	24*	7	25*	17	73
0.0 ~ 0.5 nmi 0.5 ~ 1.0 nmi 1.0 ~ 1.5 nmi 1.5 ~ 2.0 nmi	5 11 32 <u>1</u>	10 17 8 <u>1</u>	0 0 0 0	5 0 0 0	20 28 40 2
TOTAL	73	43	25	22	163

* Includes one scan duration uplinks on runway

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UNCONTROLLED SERIES SPECIAL TESTS.

At the conclusion of formal data collection, several test runs were conducted which introduced a quantity of uncontrolled aircraft into the simulated environment. VFR flight plans were obtained from the North Philadelphia Flight Service Station (FSS) and were studied to determine flight tracks for uncontrolled aircraft. The data proved to be inadequate since the intended courses in the immediate vicinity of the Philadelphia area were not indicated. Information was not provided on whether the pilot would remain uncontrolled or would contact Philadelphia approach control and become a controlled flight. In order to develop and verify a traffic model of uncontrolled aircraft in the Philadelphia terminal area, a more extensive and time consuming data collection and analysis would have been required. For this study, it sufficed to develop a realistic uncontrolled traffic sample which could be used to highlight problem areas. The intent was not to gather alarm rate data, hence, no quantitative results are presented.

For simulation purposes, it was postulated that a pilot desiring to transit the geographical airspace outside the TCA from "A to B" without communicating with the control facility would only deviate from the intended track sufficiently to avoid the physical boundaries of the TCA. Depending upon the altitude of the flights, which in most cases are low performance aircraft, this tends to constrict the uncontrolled aircraft to areas below the floors of the TCA or in a narrowband outside the TCA (figure 9). Even though this is normal procedure for uncontrolled aircraft today, it is conceivable that TCA's might not exist when all aircraft have collision avoidance systems (CAS). Moreover, even in a TCA terminal environment, pilots of equipped aircraft might be less concerned about skirting a TCA with the electronic protection of ATARS.

The results of the uncontrolled test series indicated that in some cases, where conflict resolution between uncontrolled aircraft flying below the TCA involved vertical commands, aircraft were maneuvered into the supposed inviolate TCA.

Two solutions to this problem, if indeed it is a problem in light of complete ATARS protection, would be:

1. Include the TCA dimensions in the ATARS adaptation data similar to the way a restricted area would be handled to prevent a violation of such airspace.

2. Define buffer zones near a TCA to exclude uncontrolled aircraft operations. Most resolutions can be achieved within a 1-nmi horizontal or 500-foot vertical deviation. Therefore, advising or ruling that aircraft maintain these distances (a simple feat with area navigation (RNAV)) from the TCA should eliminate inadvertent entry.

From the standpoint of the controller, the major problem which was caused by the uncontrolled aircraft was the clutter produced on the display as a result of ATARS displayed data. When a controlled aircraft is in an encounter with an uncontrolled aircraft, the complete data block of the uncontrolled aircraft is forced onto the display. These data, in conjunction with the flashing



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vector line, tends to sggravate an already complex traffic picture. In addition, the controller, not being in communication with the uncontrolled aircraft, has no knowledge of what that aircraft might do. It might maneuver immediately to relieve the situation or it might not maneuver until the controller had initiated some instruction to the controlled aircraft and then possibly maneuver so as to negate the controller's instruction. It should be mentioned that, in these particular tests, the uniform logic concept replaced the former logic that would have caused the uncontrolled aircraft to receive an ATARS command prior to a controlled aircraft. The use of the original logic would undoubtedly have eliminated many of the controller alerts experienced in these tests.

The tests indicated that a horizontal and vertical buffer is necessary to preclude a high number of undesirable alarms between controlled aircraft operating within the TCA and uncontrolled aircraft flying in proximity to the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the TCA. Also, uncontrolled aircraft operating around TCA's and in high density terminal areas such as satellite airport environments, should receive advisories and advisory resolution prior to controlled aircraft in order that the organization of controlled aircraft not be disturbed.

NMC SPECIAL TESTS.

The primary purpose of the non-mode C runs was to highlight problems that might exist with non mode C-equipped aircraft flying in proximity to DABS-equipped aircraft which might be maneuvering in response to ATARS commands. There was concern that an aircraft responding to an ATARS command would be maneuvered into a conflict with a non-mode C aircraft for which no ATARS protection exists. Within the basic VFR traffic sample of 126 aircraft, 36 general aviation type aircraft were considered to be only mode A (non-mode C) equipped, 12 were considered to be ATCRBS mode C equipped and the remainder or 78 aircraft were DABS mode C equipped. In analyzing the individual encounters, there was no evidence to show that ATARS lack of knowledge of ATCRBS mode A aircraft introduced any hazardous situations. This is a reasonble expectation in a controlled environment with a managed traffic flow. In a more random uncontrolled environment, unequipped aircraft may pose a more serious threat to equipped aircraft being maneuvered by ATARS.

PROXIMITY ADVISORIES (PWI) ANALYSIS.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>. Proximity advisories are involved in all uplinks sent to aircraft to include steady PWI's, flashing PWI's, and commands all of which provide relative altitude and relative bearing of the intruder aircraft.

The proximity advisory data was analyzed to determine: how often a typical aircraft experienced traffic advisories, how long the advisories lasted, how many were received at one time, and the geometry of the encounter; e.g., headon or tail chase. Only the data for PSI and PSIV are included, since these series most resemble the Philadelphia IFR and mixed IFR/VFR TCA controlled aircraft environments, respectively. Uncontrolled aircraft were not included in these tests. Undoubtedly, proximity advisory rates would have been higher, had a valid uncontrolled traffic scenario existed and been included in the traffic scenarios. These data are an initial estimate of proximity advisory activity in a fully equipped DABS/ATARS environment and reflect what the distribution might be in a controlled TCA environment.

ATARS INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT EFFECT.

There was an average of 101 ordinary PWI (OPWI) encounters per hour in the PSI series and 144 encounters per hour in the PSIV series in which at least one PWI advisory was issued to both aircraft. As can be seen from table 8, a typical aircraft under IFR operations was involved in about 1.7 encounters per hour, and under mixed IFR/VFR operations in 2.4 encounters per hour. The closer proximity of aircraft under VFR operations results in increased OPWI activity. Advisories lasted approximately 48 seconds for both the PSI and PSIV encounters.

TABLE 8. PWI ENCOUNTER SUMMARY

<u>Series</u>	Average Number of Active Aircraft <u>Per Hour</u>	Average Number of OPWI Paired Encounters Per Hour	Average Number of Encounters Per Aircraft	Average Encounters Duration (Seconds)
PSI	115.8	100.8	1.7	47.2
PSIV	120.0	143.5	2.4	49.2

In order to characterize the level of OPWI activity a pilot might experience in the cockpit, the data were broken down into the number and duration of lights lit on the IPC (BADCOM) display. The BADCOM, figure 10, is a candidate cockpit display which displays PWI advisories and negative and positive commands to a pilot. The 12 sets of three lights on the outer ring of the display are used to indicate the relative bearing (at 30° intervals) and relative altitude, above, below, or coaltitude (+,-500 feet) of an intruder aircraft. A red X instructs the pilot not to maneuver in that direction and a green arrow directs the pilot to execute a maneuver in the direction and dimension specified.

Table 9 presents data on the number of proximity advisory lights lit on the display at any one time and the average duration of these lights. The table lists the number of aircraft that had exactly n lights lit simultaneously, where n=1, 2, 3, 4. A single aircraft in which one light was lit for five scans, two lights lit simultaneously for an additional five scans, and three lights lit simultaneously for an extra six scans, would have a 1 added to each of the totals for n=1, 2, and 3 lights lit. The numbers represent averages over the four runs of each series. Thus, in the PSIV runs, there was an hourly average of 35 aircraft in which the pilot had two lights on his BADCOM display lit simultaneously for an average duration of 36 seconds (nine scans). The maximum number of multiple lights lit simultaneously on a single aircraft was four. This happened to only one aircraft and lasted for three scans.


TABLE 9.AIRCRAFT PROXIMITY ADVISORIES HOURLY RATE
(PILOT DISPLAY VIEWPOINT)

		Average Flight	Average Flight					
	Number of	Duration	Simultaneous	Proximity	Advisorie			
<u>Series</u>	Active <u>Aircraft</u>	Minutes and Seconds	No. of Air 1	craft (No. 2	of 4-Sec. 3	Scans)		
PSI	115.8	14.54	84.8(27)*	19.5(9)	0.5(3)			
PSIV	120.0	13.47	102.4(28)	35 (9)	6 (4)	0.3(3)		

*Numbers in parenthesis represent average duration in 4-sec. scans.

Over many flights in the environment, an aircraft would on the average have one or more OPWI's displayed 9.8 percent of its flight time in the PSI series and 13.2 percent in the PSIV series. In only a small percentage of flight time, 0.7 percent for PSI and 1.4 percent for PSIV, were 2 or more lights simultaneously lit.

An analysis was made of the relative position of aircraft at the start of an encounter to determine whether the aircraft were diverging in a tail-chase or flying head-on. These situations were defined by the relative bearing of each aircraft from one to another during an encounter. If paired aircraft viewed each other at the 8 o'clock through 4 o'clock relative bearing, this was considered a head-on encounter. If the lead aircraft showed the intruder to be in the 5 o'clock through 7 o'clock bearing and the following aircraft displayed the lead aircraft at the 8 o'clock through 4 o'clock bearing, the encounter was a tail-chase. A diverging encounter existed when both aircraft were in the 5 o'clock through 7 o'clock bearing relative to each other. Figure 11 defines the three encounter situations by clock positions of the bearing of each aircraft relative one to another. Table 10 shows the percentage of total encounters that were head-on, tail-chase, or diverging. In less than 1 percent of the encounters were the aircraft diverging, a significant portion, roughly 71 percent, were encounters in which the intruder was within a bearing from 8 o'clock to 4 o'clock relative to its own aircraft. The remaining encounters, approximately 28 percent, were tail-chase situations. It can also be seen that the average horizontal separation between aircraft at the start of an encounter was 2.5 nmi over all encounters.

TABLE 10. GEOMETRY AT START OF ENCOUNTER

Series	Percent <u>Head-On</u>	Percent Tail Chase	Percent <u>Diverging</u>	Average Range Between Aircraft (nmi)
PSI	66.5	33.5	0.0	2.5
PSIV	75.8	23.3	0.9	2.5





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Table 11 lists the percent of a data hour in which 0, 1, 2, ---, 10, aircraft were uplinked at least one advisory within the same second. The maximum number of aircraft sent an uplink during any 1 second was 10. As can be seen, there were no aircraft sent (X = 0 column) an uplink 60 percent of the time in the PSIV series and 66 percent of the time in the PSI series.

TABLE 11. PERCENT OF HOUR WITH X AIRCRAFT BEING UPLINKED ADVISORIES

					•	X =					
SERIES	_0_	1	2	3	4	_5	_6	_7	8	9	10
PSI PSIV	66.1 60.8	10.8 7.7	15.2 18.5	3.3 5.3	3.0 4.3	1.1 1.7	0.4 0.8	0.1 0.4	0.2	0.2	 0.1

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of the simulation tests, it is concluded that:

1. <u>ATARS had no impact on the controllers or control procedures</u>. Operations rates were consistently high, and no serious violation of ATC separation criteria occurred. Controllers used standard ATC control procedures and no increase in separation between aircraft was required to accommodate ATARS. The display of ATARS data to the controller did, however, introduce objectionable display clutter when uncontrolled aircraft were in encounters with controlled aircraft. The use of identical threat thresholds for both categories of aircraft, coupled with insufficient information regarding the intent of the uncontrolled aircraft, created a confusing display of flashing data blocks.

2. <u>A further reduction of the Philadelphia main airport ATARS desen-</u> sitization zones is warranted. The desensitization zone used in this study extended from the runway out to the outer marker. The results show that the length of this zone can be reduced to about half that and still eliminate virtually all undesirable ATARS alarms between arrival aircraft on converging ILS courses and between arrival aircraft and airport surface traffic.

3. <u>Further studies are required to determine the need for ATARS desen-</u> sitization at satellite airports. Two major factors to be considered are (1) the type of ATC service provided at the airport, and (2) the volume of traffic to be serviced. Under conditions of minimum ATC coverage and low density traffic at satellite airports, ATARS may provide a very effective separation assurance system without desensitization at the expense of only a few undesirable alarms.

4. <u>ATARS provided adequate resolution to conflicting aircraft</u>. ATARS detected all instances of potential conflict and provided resolution advisories to adequately separate aircraft.

5. <u>The positive command rates were low under both IFR and VFR flight</u> procedures. An average of only 0.5 encounters per hour involved positive commands. No positive commands were issued to aircraft inside the TCA.

6. <u>ATARS advisories generated in the Philadelphia environment are</u> <u>primarily caused by the crossing route structure generated by the satellite</u> <u>airport traffic outside the TCA</u>. All the command encounters except one occurred outside the TCA and involved at least one satellite aircraft. The one exception was from the PIV series in which no satellite aircraft were simulated and involved the use of VFR separation criteria.

7. <u>A horizontal and vertical buffer is necessary to preclude a high</u> <u>number of undesirable alarms between controlled aircraft operating within the</u> <u>TCA and uncontrolled aircraft flying near the horizontal and vertical bound-</u> <u>aires of the TCA</u>. Without regulatory action to prevent uncontrolled aircraft from flying immediately at the boundaires of TCA's, ATRAS commands will inevitably cause some of these aircraft to penetrate TCA's.

8. Vertical tracker lag triggers advisories and/or continues them unnecessarily in cases where aircraft are leveling off above another aircraft. Although it was not apparent in any of the command encounters, tracker lag was responsible for seven of the thirteen encounters where only threat advisories were generated.

9. <u>Although convergence/divergence logic did not significantly reduce</u> alarm levels, it did shorten the duration of some command encounters. Four of the command encounters would have been reduced in duration by one or two command scans had the convergence/divergence filter been used. This filter eliminates alarms in circumstances where aircraft are violating ATARS alarm thresholds but are projected to be diverging in one dimension when at the closest point of approach in the other dimension.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The horizontal dimensions of the Philadelphia ATARS desensitization zones should be reduced so that they only extend to 2.0 nautical miles (nmi) from the threshold of the respective runways rather than all the way to the outer markers.

2. Allow uncontrolled aircraft operating around terminal control areas (TCA's) and in high density terminal areas, such as satellite airport environments, to receive threat and resolution advisories prior to controlled aircraft in order that the organization of controlled aircraft not be disturbed.

3. Some form of convergence/divergence logic should be incorporated into all future versions of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) algorithm. This logic looks at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions simultaneously to prohibit the generation of resolution advisories when the aircraft are projected to be in conflict in one dimension, but clearing in the other. 4. Investigate the possibility of reducing tracker lag by improving turn and climb/descent/level-off detection.

REFERENCES

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2. Windle J., Morfitt G., Devine P., Rossiter S., and Fillius A., <u>ATARS/ATC</u> <u>Simulation Tests with Site-Adaptation Logic</u>, Report No. FAA-RD-78-138, January 1979.

3. McFarland, A. L., Patel, K. R., and Roberts, D. L., <u>Multi-Site Intermittent</u> <u>Positive Control Algorithm for the Discrete Address Beacon System</u>, Report No. FAA-EM-74-4, Change 2, May 1976.

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APPENDIX A

ATARS/PHILADELPHIA TRAFFIC

The construction of the traffic samples was based on an analysis of flight progress strips obtained from the Philadelphia TRACON. These strips were for 4 days of the first 6 months of 1977, during which the daily strip count ranged from 1,665 to 2,040. Further breakdown of this daily traffic to the busiest 16 hours provided a distribution of traffic by user, aircraft type, flight status, arrival/departure, and airport of operation.

Not all of the information for the VFR flights were available on the flight progress strips. Some operational interpretation and liberties were taken with this traffic. The controller, in most cases, handwrites a strip for VFR aircraft when they contact the facility for TCA entry clearance. This strip generally only indicates what instructions the controller issues and contains no preentry route data. Additionally, the Philadelphia TCA has no specific entry fixes published for VFR aircraft. The entry points used for these traffic samples, in general, conform to the normal IFR traffic flow without purposely mixing with that flow and reflect a consideration for the level of experience to be found in Philadelphia pilots.

Six different series of tests were designed to investigate the source and level of ATARS activity that might be expected to occur in the Philadelphia terminal area. These series are called PI, PIV, PSI, PSIV, NMC, and UNC. Five similar, but different, traffic samples were built for each series. One sample was used for training and four were used for data collection. The traffic samples used in each series of runs are summarized in tables A-1 through A-4. Table A-1 shows the total number of aircraft simulated in each series. The Philadelphia core traffic used in all data runs consisted of 75 aircraft of which 25 were general aviation (GA), 18 were air taxi (AT), and 32 were air carrier (AC).

TABLE A-1. TRAFFIC SAMPLE COUNTS

SERIES	AIR	PORT	OVERFL	IGHTS	
	PHL	SAT	CONTROLLED	UNC	TOTAL
PI	75	0	0	0	75
PIV	75	0	0	0	75
PSI	75	42	2	0	119
PSIV	75	42	9	0	126
NMC	75	42	9	0	126
UNC	75	42	9	25	151

TEST SERIES PI.

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This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in an IFR situation. The runway configuration was easterly and only one runway (09R) was used for arrival operations. A parallel runway (09L) was used for high performance departure aircraft. Low performance aircraft were permitted to depart on runway 17. All 75 aircraft were flown under IFR separation criteria.

TEST SERIES PIV.

This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in a VFR situation with landings on runways 17 and 27R and departures on runways 17 and 27L. The traffic volume for this series was 75 operations per hour. Separation criteria applied between VFR/VFR aircraft and VFR/IFR aircraft was 1.5 nmi horizontal or 500 feet vertical. It was assumed that 50 percent of general aviation and air taxi operations were operating on VFR flight plans. The flight rule by aircraft user breakdown is shown in table A-2.

TABLE A-2. PHILADELPHIA IFR/VFR AIRPORT TRAFFIC

USER FLT RULE	VFR	IFR	TOTAL
General Aviation	13	12	25
Air Taxi	9	9	18
Air Carrier	_0	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	22	53	75

TEST SERIES PSI.

In series PI and PIV only the 75 aircraft were simulated. The PSI series introduced satellite operations to the environment and required additional controllers and increased coordination. As in series PI, all aircraft were considered to be operating in IFR conditions. Standard ATC separation criteria of at least 3 nmi horizontal or 1,000 feet vertical were applied between aircraft. The volume of aircraft was increased to 119 aircraft and included satellite operations and two overflights. The breakdown of the 42 satellite aircraft by airport, type, and flight rule is presented in table A-3.

TABLE A-3. SATELLITE AIRPORT TRAFFIC

AIRPORT		GA	AT	MIL	TOTAL	IFR	VFR
Greater Wilmington	(ILG)	11	4	0	15	5	10
North Philadelphia	(PNE)	8	4	0	12	6	6
Trenton	(TTN)	5	3	0	8	6	2
Willowgrove	(NXX)	0	0	5	5	5	0
Coatsville	(CVE)	_2	_0	_0		_2	_0
Total		26	11	5	42	24	18

TEST SERIES PSIV.

This series is identical to the PSI series, except that seven VFR overflights are added for a total of 126 aircraft and VFR separation criteria is used where appropriate.

TEST SERIES NMC.

1

This series was established to vary the ATARS equipment capability of the participating aircraft. It used the same traffic as in the PSI series plus seven VFR overflights for a total of 126 aircraft. In tests PI, PIV, and PSI all aircraft were assumed to have DABS equipment with displays to accept ATARS PWI and resolution data. ATARS does not process data on aircraft without mode C altitude encoding capability, and in the initial period of ATARS implementation there is liable to be a considerable percentage of unequipped aircraft. The intent of this series was to determine what problems could be encountered in an environment of equipped and unequipped aircraft.

The distribution of ATCRBS mode A, ATCRBS mode C, and DABS was based on estimates of aircraft equipage for the 1980 time period obtained from SRDS DABS briefing material. For the purposes of this test series, it was assumed that all air carrier and scheduled air taxi flights would be equipped with DABS/ ATARS equipment. For the general aviation population, it was assumed that 60 percent of the general aviation fleet would not have mode C altitude encoders. Of the 40 percent with mode C, it was decided that one-half might have complete DABS/ATARS and one-half ATCRBS mode C only. Table A-4 presents the aircraft equipage for the NMC series.

	AIR	AIR	0	ENERAL AVI	ATION	
AIRPORT	CARRIER 	TAXI/MIL DABS	DABS	MODE A	ATCRBS MODE C	TOTAL <u>ATCRBS</u>
PHL	32	18	5	15	5	75
ILG	0	4	2	7	2	15
PNE	0	4	2	4	2	12
TTN	0	3	1	3	1	8
NXX	0	5(mil)	0	0	0	5
CVE	0	0	0	2	0	2
OVERFLTS	_0	0	_2	_5	_2	_9
TOTAL	32	34	12	36	12	126

TABLE A-4. NMC SERIES AIRCRAFT EQUIPAGE

TEST SERIES UNC.

This series was designed to investigate the impact of uncontrolled aircraft operating in close proximity both horizontally and vertically to the TCA. The construction of the traffic sample was based on information gleaned from VFR flight plans obtained from the North Philadelphia Flight Service Station. This was the only available source of information short of a full-blown airport-byairport interview of pilots. Since the requirement for filing a VFR flight plan is not mandatory, but only good operating practice, there was no guarantee that the flight plans obtained were completely representative. In fact, the filing of a VFR flight plan does not indicate uncontrolled flight but merely an intent to fly clear of clouds. Consequently, the uncontrolled aircraft in the UNC series present a combination of fact and postulation as to how a pilot might circumnavigate a TCA while maintaining his planned direction of flight.

The volume of traffic was the same as the NMC series except that 25 uncontrolled flights were added. The controller had no ability to communicate with these aircraft. All aircraft were DABS equipped, and the uncontrolled flights responded automatically to ATARS commands. When commands to an uncontrolled flight were discontinued, the aircraft was programmed to return to its orig-inal flightpath in the most appropriate manner.

APPENDIX B

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ATARS ALGORITHM

The ATARS algorithm used in the simulation could generate four types of messages for delivery to the pilot and one message type for delivery to the controller. These messages are described as follows:

1. Proximity advisory or ordinary proximity warning indicator (OPWI).

Informs the pilot that another aircraft is nearby but not on a collision course. The intruder's relative bearing is depicted within a 30° relative bearing sector and relative altitude is indicated as above, below, or within 500 feet of its own altitude.

2. Threat advisory or flashing proximity warning indicator (FPWI).

Informs the pilot of a potential conflict and that a command may be issued if the present condition persists. It also contains the data provided by the OPWI.

3. Negative resolution advisory or negative command.

Negative commands may be effective or non-effective. An effective negative command requires the pilot to take action and stop an existing horizontal or vertical maneuver. A non-effective negative command informs the pilot that his present flightpath is safe, but that a conflict would develop if he were to maneuver in the indicated direction. Four negative advisories were provided, "do not turn left," "do not turn right," "do not descend," and "do not climb." Negative commands were always accompanied by an FPWI.

4. Positive resolution advisory or positive command.

Informs the pilot that a conflict exists which must be resolved by a maneuver. Four positive commands were provided, "turn right," "turn left," "climb," and "descend." Positive advisories were always accompanied by an FPWI.

5. Controller Alert.

The controller is provided with an alert whenever an FPWI, negative or positive advisory is issued to a pilot. The alert consists of a blinking character, in the third line of the aircraft's data block, which indicates the advisory being uplinked to the aircraft.

An aircraft can receive multiple threat and multiple resolution advisories; i.e., a pilot could receive positive horizontal and positive vertical advisories simultaneously.

B-1

The ATARS detection algorithm is described below in terms of the conditions required to generate each of the preceding messages.

1. OPWI's are issued to both aircraft whenever the altitude separation (ALT) and range separation (RANGE) between the two aircraft satisfy the following:

ALT < 2000 feet

and

RANGE $< \sqrt{2(v_1^2 + v_2^2)} \cdot 30$ sec or Range 2 nmi

where V_1 and V_2 are the speed of the two aircraft expressed in nmi/sec

2. FPWI's are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

a. Time to closest approach in the horizontal dimension $(T_{\rm H} \text{ or horizontal tau}) < 45 \text{ sec};$

where,

 $T_{H} = - \frac{R - DSQ/R}{R'}$ R = Range separation R' = Rate of change of Range $DSQ = ADET (V_{1}^{2} + V_{2}^{2}) + BDET$ $ADET = 7.5 \sec^{2}$ $BDET = 0.025 \text{ nmi}^{2}$

b. T_v (vertical tau) < 45 sec or ALT< 900'

where:

 $T_{V} = \frac{(Z_{2} - Z_{1})}{Z_{2}^{2} - Z_{1}^{2}}$

 Z_2 , Z_1 = altitudes of AC 2 and 1, respectively Z_2^* , Z_1^* = altitudes rates of AC 2 and 1, respectively

c. Horizontal Miss Distance (MD) < 1 nmi

3. Negative commands are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

a. $T_H < 30$ sec b. $T_V < 30$ sec or ALT < 900' c. MD < 1 nmi

4. Positive commands are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

a. $T_H < 30$ sec b. $T_V < 30$ sec or ALT < 470 feet c. MD < .5 nmi 5. Controller alerts are issued to the appropriate ATC facility whenever the criteria for a FPWI are satisfied for a controlled aircraft. A listing of significant system parameters used in the algorithm are presented in table B-1.

TABLE B-1. PARAMETER VALUES

Parameter	Value
ADET	7.5 sec ²
AFCONI	470.0 ft
AFIFR	900.0 ft_
BDET	0.025 nmi ²
MDTHF2	4.0 nm1 ²
TCONT	45.0 sec
TL6	30.0 sec
TL11	45.0 sec
TL15	30.0 sec
TL16	45.0 sec

The parameters listed in table B-1 are defined as follows:

ADET, BDET--parameters used in the horizontal modified tau calculation, AFCONI--altitude threshold for a controller alert in an IFR/IFR conflict, AFIFR--altitude threshold for issuing a flashing PWI to an IFR aircraft, MDTHF2--square of the projected miss distance threshold for issuing an FPWI, TCONT--controller alert look-ahead time in the terminal area, TL11--look-ahead time for issuing a flashing PWI when one aircraft is unequipped, TL16--look-ahead time for issuing a flashing PWI when both aircraft are equipped, TL6--look-ahead time for issuing an ATARS command when one aircraft is unequipped, and

TL15--look-ahead time for issuing an ATARS command when both aircraft are equipped.

APPENDIX C

ATARS COMMAND ENCOUNTERS

This appendix presents plots and descriptions of the nine ATARS encounters (one in PIV, four in PSI, and four in PSIV series), which resulted in positive or negative commands. Two plots are included for each encounter. One presents the encounter's horizontal profile and the second shows the encounter's vertical profile. Both axes of the horizontal plots are in nautical miles measured from the location of the radar. At Philadelphia, the radar is located just south of the threshold end of runway 09R. The aircraft identifications denote the starting locations of their respective tracks. The plus (+) symbol on an aircraft's track indicates the aircraft's actual position as recorded by the air traffic control simulation facility (ATCSF). The aircrafts' heading, as calculated by the ATARS algorithm, is shown by a straight line that emanates from the current position of the aircraft as perceived by the ATARS algorithm. The horizontal profile plots list the values of the closest point of approach in the horizontal plane (CPAH) in nmi, in the vertical plane (CPAV) in feet, and the slant range (SCPA) in nmi. The horizontal (SCPAH) and vertical (SCPAV) separations at the scan of minimum SCPA are also listed. For each scan of an encounter, the following information is printed: A symbol indicating the advisory issued to an aircraft; i.e., proximity (S for steady PWI) threat (F for FPWI), or resolution (negative and positive resolution advisories): the horizontal (TH) and vertical (TV) times to collision; the horizontal range between aircraft (range); the projected miss distance (MD); and the vertical separation (DZ).

The vertical profile plot uses time and altitude for its axes. The aircraft identifications, plus symbols, indicate the mode C altitude quantized in 100-foot increments. The position coordinates; i.e., X, Y, and Z, and heading (HDG) of each aircraft when the first threat advisory (FPWI) is generated are listed on the right side of the plot. For each scan of the encounter the following information is tabulated: the control status of each aircraft; i.e., controlled (C) or uncontrolled (U) horizontal velocity of each aircraft in knots and relative vertical velocity (VRZ) in feet/minutes. The issuance of a controller alert is indicated on both plots by an asterisk beside the appropriate scan number.

ENCOUNTER NO. 1 - PIV-2.

N3929L, a VFR departure climbing to 2,000 feet, and N3352U, a VFR arrival descending to 2,000 feet, momentarily triggered a two-scan FPWI after their horizontal paths had crossed but projected miss distance was within 1 nmi.

ENCOUNTER NO. 2 - PSI-1.

N7422A, an IFR departure from Philadelphia, was controlled by the north departure position. BLT721, an IFR departure from Newcastle, was controlled by the north satellite position. The aircraft were at coaltitude and converging in the horizontal plane when a controller alert was issued by ATARS. To prevent BLT721 from crossing in front of N7422A, the north satellite controller turned BLT721 to the right so he would pass behind N7422A. The turn command "fly heading 120" was issued on the first "no left" command issued by the algorithm. The north departure controller issued a "descend and maintain 6,000" command to N7422A on the third FPWI.

When the first "no left" command was uplinked by ATARS, N7422A had crossed the projected path of BLT721 and had started to descend. Although the aircraft were still converging horizontally, the projected miss-distance and altitude separation were both increasing. The closest projected miss-distance, 0.93 nmi, occurred on the third FPWI. The aircraft came within 1.3 nmi and 190 feet on the last scan of "no left" commands. The violation of ATC separation standards was attributed to controller coordination problems.

ENCOUNTER NO. 3 - PSI-2.

N6101, an IFR Newcastle arrival, was level at 4,000 feet flying a heading of 180°. N7864K, an overflight having descended from 4,000, was level at 3,000 feet also on a heading of 180°. The north approach controller instructed N7864K to "climb and maintain 6,000, fly heading 240" which caused N7864K to follow a collision course with N6101. On scan 896 control of N6101 was transferred from the north satellite controller to the south departure controller. Two scans later, scan 898, FPWI's were issued to both aircraft. The aircraft continued to converge in both dimensions until ATARS issued climb commands to N6101 and dive commands to N7864K and the aircraft responded to the commands. Minimum projected miss-distance during the 10-scan encounter was 0.28 nmi. At the end of the encounter the aircraft were separated by 0.34 nmi, and 468 feet. When the first vertical command was uplinked, the aircraft were separated by 1.51 nmi, and 380 feet. Violation of ATC separation standards was attributed to controller coordination problems and ATARS issued an appropriate resolution maneuver to separate the aircraft.

ENCOUNTER NO. 4 - PSI-4.

N7763T, an IFR arrival to Newcastle, and N6528N, an IFR departure from Newcastle, were involved in an encounter which resulted in eight scans of FPWI's and one scan of a "no left" command. Both aircraft were controlled by the south departure position. At the time of the conflict, N5528N was climbing to 5,000 feet at maximum rate and N7763T had leveled off at 3,000 feet. They were flying headings of 270 and 180°, respectively. The aircraft were diverging in the vertical plane after the second scan of FPWI when the horizontal separation was 1.91 nmi.

ENCOUNTER NO. 5 - PSI-7.

N8781U, an IFR departure from North Philadelphia, and V48211, an IFR arrival to NXX, were at coaltitude and converging horizontally at about a 90° crossing angle when the ATARS was triggered. Both aircraft were controlled by the North satellite position. The aircraft were converging until horizontal separation was 1.28 nmi at which time they started to diverge vertically.

ENCOUNTER NO. 6 - PSIV-1.

N75500, a <u>VFR</u> arrival to Trenton (TTN) had been cleared for an ILS approach to runway 7, level at 1,500 feet, and was flying a heading of 090°. RAN557, a <u>VFR</u> arrival to North Philadelphia (PNE) had been cleared for an ILS approach to runway 24, was descending through the altitude of N75500, and was flying a heading of 240°. When the first negative right command was generated, the aircraft were separated by 2.46 nmi and 70 feet. Closest point of approach was 1.75 nmi. When the two aircraft received the negative commands, they both executed missed approaches and started to climb.

ENCOUNTER NO. 7 - PSIV-2.

N3029, a VFR departure from Newcastle (ILG) was level at 3,500 feet on a heading of 010°. N3305V, a VFR arrival to Newcastle (ILG) was descending to 3,500 feet on a heading of 160°. At the time the FPWI's were uplinked, the aircraft were coaltitude at 3,500 feet and converging horizontally. When the fourth of five FPWI's was uplinked, the aircraft were at coaltitude and separated by 2.6 nmi. It was at this time, scan 790, that the departure controller, who was controlling both aircraft, instructed N3305V to fly heading 270° and descend to 2,500 feet at its maximum rate. The ATARS uplinked positive vertical commands to the aircraft on scan 792. The ATARS command to N3305V was completely opposite to the controller's instructions. That is, the ATARS issued a climb command to N3305V, whereas the controller had issued a dive command. The ATCSF/ATARS was designed to allow the controller instruction to take precedence over the ATARS command.

ENCOUNTER NO. 8 - PSIV-5.

N9206, a VFR arrival to runway 17 at Philadelphia was flying on a heading of 350°. N5223N, a VFR through flight, was on an intercepting heading of 080°. Both aircraft were at a coaltitude of 3,500 feet. ATARS uplinked FPWI's to both aircraft starting on scan 639. On scan 641, as the third FPWI was being uplinked, the TCA controller instructed N9206 to descend and maintain 2,500 feet. After uplinking 5 scans of FPWI's, ATARS started uplinking 4 scans of positive vertical commands. The aircraft had started to diverge vertically because of the TCA controller instructions when the first positive command was uplinked.

ENCOUNTER NO. 9 - PSIV-7.

N3087V, a <u>VFR</u> approach to Newcastle (ILS), was level at 6,500 feet on a heading of 210°. TW118, an <u>IFR</u> approach to runway 27R at Philadelphia, was descending to 7,000 feet on a heading of 100°. As TW118 leveled off, the alarm was sounded. Vertical tracker lag was responsible for the alarm. No ATC violation had occurred. At closest point of approach, the aircraft were separated by 0.58 nmi and 503 feet.

7799 엹 NO= 0.000 ENCOUNTER NUMBER 1 PIV-2 XANG= 0.00 SCPAV = 32.649 CPA DN SCAN 924 SCPA = 0.915 2888855 CPRV = 16.520 39.98.58.85.89 2 RANDE 5 CON DABS CON DABS Ŧ AT SCAN D ALT= 0.0 ٩o Pos ACI ID = N3352U AC2 1D = N39291. 4. SCPAH = 0.915 AC1 AC2 CPAH = 0.915 POSCHD= 0 888 886 885 883 200 SCAN 0.00 END SCAN = 931 ACZ N3929L ATARS SAMPLE : ATARS PHL TEST -1.50 **Jeres Constanting** ST SCAN = 895 25531253 -6.00 -4.50 -3.00 NAUTICAL MILES END TIME = 10 51 1 NAFEC VERSION 2.0 MPTS FT RC1 = 45 MPTS FT RC2 = 45 PRT/PLT PD2 PIVI-II JUL 78 RCI N3352U STRATTINE - 18 48 0 -7.50 ATARS VERS. NTAC-4.5 **1352U** . 00.6-1.10 2.60 4.10 NAUTICAL MILES 0*.0-06· 09.8 01.1 4

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GLOSSARY

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ALARM	An ATARS message consisting of an FPWI and/or command
BADCOM	A candidate aircraft cockpit display for displaying ATARS messages to the pilot
CPA	Closet point of approach
СРАН	Horizontal CPA
CPAV	Vertical CPA
DATA BLOCK	That grouping of operational data, e.g., ACID, SPEED, ALTITUDE, associated with in aircraft target and dis- played to the controller on his PVD.
DESENSITIZATION	Suppression of some ATARS data link information (FPWI and/or command) to the aircraft and ATC facility when the aircraft is located within a specified three dimensional zone and meets specified operational con- ditions.
ENCOUNTER	Exists whenever ATARS issues a message (OPWI, FPWI, or command) to one or more aircraft.
EQUIPPED	The status of an aircraft that has a DABS transponder with altitude encoder and a cockpit display for ATARS messages.
FAZ	Final approach zone within which the ATARS was des- ensitized.
FPWI	Flashing proximity warning indicator (See appendix B)
MD	Miss Distance——The projected CPA between an aircraft pair in the horizontal plane
Negative resolution advi (see appendix B).	sory or command
OPWI	Ordinary proximity warning indicator (See appendix B)
Positive resolution advi (see appendix B).	lsory or command
SATELLITE AIRPORT	An airport other than the primary airport associated with an ATC facility for which that ATC facility assumes the responsibility for the control of air- craft operating under instrument flight rules.

SCAN	One complete 360° rotation of the DABS antenna (4 seconds)
SCPAH	Horizontal separation at slant range CPA

SCPAV Vertical separation at slant range CPA

TCA Terminal Control Area--Controlled airspace extending upward from the surface or higher to specified altitudes within which all aircraft are subject to operating rules and pilot and equipment requirements specified in FAR Part 91.

TH Modified horizontal tau (See appendix B)

TRACON Terminal Radar Control Facility

TRSA Terminal Radar Service Area—Airspace surrounding designated airports wherein ATC provides radar vectoring, sequencing, and separation on a full time basis for all IFR and participating VFR aircraft.

T_v Time to coaltitude for a pair of aircraft (See appendix B)

UNEQUIPPED IN ATARS terms, the status of an aircraft that has an ATCRBS transponder with an altitude encoder but no capability to receive or display uplinked data from ATARS.

VECTOR LINE A display technique used on a controllers PVD to indicate the projected track of an aircraft target. The vector line is controlled in length by a system parameter time, e.g., 60 seconds.
