SOVIET POLICY IN THE POST-TITO BALKANS

STUDIES IN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

VOLUME 4
SOVIET POLICY IN THE POST-TITO BALKANS

Volume 4. Studies in Communist Affairs

Edited by Phillip A. Peterson

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Volume 4

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The period of East-West detente has witnessed a substantial expansion of contacts of all sorts across what was once termed the Iron Curtain. Economic ties including capital transfers, cultural interaction and tourism, summit-level meetings and more traditional negotiations have all increased almost exponentially during the past decade. Yet, it must be borne in mind that improved relations between communist and Western states did not begin in the 1970's. In fact, much earlier than the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members, Yugoslavia and somewhat later Romania initiated policies of expanding relations with the industrialized West on the basis of what might well have been termed detente. To a substantial degree detente—viewed as a policy of reduced hostility toward and expanded contact with the West—was pioneered by these two communist states. The 1948 split with the Soviets forced President Tito and the Yugoslav leadership to search for economic, political, and even military support within the capitalist world, and later the Romanian decision to go ahead with plans for industrialization against the advice of their Soviet allies led to the decision of the Romanian leaders to turn to the West for financial assistance and capital imports. Similarly, the Albanians also sought support elsewhere after their break with the Soviets in the early 1960's. However, unlike Yugoslavia and Romania, they initially turned to the Chinese, while maintaining their hostile attitudes towards the West.

From the point of view of the Soviet Union, the Balkans have been especially important because of the challenges that they have presented to continued Soviet domination of both Eastern Europe and the worldwide communist movement. Of the four Balkan communist states only one, Bulgaria, has remained a faithful ally of the USSR. Yugoslavia and Albania have managed to conduct both foreign and domestic policies based on their own interests and independent of Soviet dictates. Even Romania, although a full member of both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, has been able to counter some Soviet foreign policy initiatives and to criticize its eastern neighbor openly on various aspects of foreign policy. In recent years both Yugoslavia and Romania have sided with the communist parties of Western Europe in resisting Soviet efforts to reestablish a dominant position.
within the world communist movement. For example, at the European communist party conference in East Berlin in 1976 they played an active role in opposing the Soviets and the other ruling European communist parties.

The Balkans are of interest to the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons—not the least important of which is the strategic significance of the area for Soviet military security. Even though the Northern Tier states of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia are more important to the military security of the Warsaw Pact, the presence of forces hostile to the Soviet Union in either Yugoslavia or Romania would be perceived by the Soviets as a serious threat to their security. In addition, actual Soviet control over Yugoslavia and Albania would provide them with access to naval bases on the Adriatic and a more secure role in the Mediterranean. More important for the Soviets, however, is the possibility of eliminating the political-ideological challenge which the independent Balkan communist states have signified during much of the past quarter century.

The future of the Balkans is extremely important, not only for the countries of the area themselves, but also for the future security of both East and West. In the following pages a number of specialists assess some of the various internal and external dangers presented by the succession crisis facing Yugoslavia. The various chapters cover some familiar material, but, more importantly, they also provide fresh insights on the interests, capabilities, and policy options of some of the principal participants in the international community with regard to the post-Tito Balkans.

ROGER E. KANET,
Urbana, Illinois.
## Chronology

**Steve Bowman**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1939</td>
<td>Italy occupies Albania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1940</td>
<td>Bulgaria and Romania join the Axis Powers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1941</td>
<td>Germany invades Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1944</td>
<td>USSR occupies Bucharest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1944</td>
<td>USSR occupies Sofia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1944</td>
<td>Tito's partisans occupy Belgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1945</td>
<td>National Democratic Front government formed in Romania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1945</td>
<td>Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed; Communist government of Enver Hoxha in Albania recognized by Allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1946</td>
<td>People's Republic of Albania proclaimed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1946</td>
<td>People's Republic of Bulgaria proclaimed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1947</td>
<td>King Michael of Romania abdicates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1948</td>
<td>People's Democratic Front formed in Romania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1948</td>
<td>Albania repudiates alignment with Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1949</td>
<td>Formation of COMECON; Pro-Yugoslav Albanian Koci Xoxe executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1949</td>
<td>USSR repudiates Friendship Treaty with Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>Albania joins the Cominform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1952</td>
<td>Romanian Anna Pauker is removed from the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Romanian Central Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1953</td>
<td>Death of Stalin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1953</td>
<td>USSR requests resumption of relations with Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1954</td>
<td>Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey sign a 20-year treaty of alliance, political cooperation, and mutual assistance (Balkan Pact).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1955</td>
<td>Formation of the Warsaw Pact; Austrian State Treaty signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May-2 June 1955</td>
<td>Krushchev visits Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1956</td>
<td>“Polish October.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1956</td>
<td>Hungarian Revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1957</td>
<td>Khrushchev denies Yugoslavia economic aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1958</td>
<td>Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Premier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1958</td>
<td>Soviet troops withdraw from Romania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1962</td>
<td>Sino-Soviet split (Foreign Minister Chen Yi admits there are “differences” dividing USSR and PRC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1964</td>
<td>Romanian “Declaration of Independence.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1964</td>
<td>Khrushchev is ousted; Brezhnev and Kosygin assume power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1965</td>
<td>Death of Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aleksander Rankovic ousted from Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1968</td>
<td>USSR invades Czechoslovakia; Romania refuses participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1968</td>
<td>Albania withdraws from the Warsaw Pact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1971</td>
<td>Albania and Yugoslavia exchange ambassadors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1971</td>
<td>Ceausescu visits the People’s Republic of China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January–February 1976</td>
<td>First Conference on Balkan cooperation since World War II. Conference attended by Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Albania declines to attend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1976</td>
<td>In keynote speech at the 7th Congress of the Albanian Communist Party, Hoxha stresses self-reliance, implying a move away from dependence upon PRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1977</td>
<td>Albanian Communist Party paper criticizes the PRC for departing from Marxism-Leninism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1977</td>
<td>Harold Brown is the first U.S. defense secretary to visit Yugoslavia; U.S. agrees to increase arms sales, training of Yugoslav officers, and expanded contacts between military officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>Peking halts all technical and economic aid programs to Albania; Albania publicly breaks with China over policy differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August–1 September 1978</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua visits Romania and Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1978</td>
<td>Nikola Ljubicic is the first Yugoslav defense minister to visit the United States; U.S. agrees to sell jet engines to Yugoslavia for use in a Yugoslav jet fighter under development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
November 1978 Romania rejects Soviet efforts during a Warsaw Pact summit meeting to increase the pact's defense budget and tighten integration among the armies of member states.
Introduction

Phillip A. Petersen

Among the major issues immediately confronting the great powers is the shape of the post-Tito Balkans. The ramifications of the changes ahead are crucial not only for the well-being and security of the Balkan states, but for the great powers and much of the rest of the world as well. As a result of the evolution of the political and military relationship between and among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China, there exists a pressing need to focus on the interests and policy options of the great powers with regard to the future of the Balkans. Consequently, this volume explores the current underlying issues inherent in Balkan instability and discusses the specific interests and policy options of the principal parties involved in shaping the region's future. However, with the Soviet Union possessing by far the greatest military, economic, and political latitude within which to hatch its machinations, the volume has been directed principally toward Soviet policy. Thus while Soviet interests and policy options are the central concern of the volume, this concern is not focused in isolation, but rather considered in the context of other interests, principally those of the United States and China, but to include the interests of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states as well.

The idea of assembling a manuscript on the post-Tito Balkans grew out of a discussion with participants at the 1974 Annual Central Slavic Conference, hosted by the University of Missouri at St. Louis. As part of the effort to bring interested scholars together to explore Soviet policy in the Balkans, panels were organized for the 1975 Central Slavic Conference, hosted by the University of Kansas at Lawrence, and for the 1976 Midwest Slavic Conference, hosted by the University of Illinois at the Chicago Circle Campus. Five of the chapters in this volume were written by participants on those two panels. As part of an effort to broaden the scope of this subsequent volume, two scholars other than those participating on the conference panels were asked to contribute chapters. The results of our collective effort to present and discuss the interests, tools, and processes that have a reasonable potential for playing a role in whatever will eventually occur in the Balkans after Tito departs the political scene constitutes an attempt, not only to deal with a very important current issue, but to provide a clear presentation of the various
great power interests involved in the Balkans, and of the policy alternatives available to them, in order that what ultimately does occur can be better understood. This volume has, therefore, at least two purposes: (1) to provide a basis from which discussion can proceed concerning the policy alternatives available to the great powers, and particularly to Moscow, for influencing the dissident communist states of the Balkans; and (2) to preserve a view of the subject as it was perceived by contemporary scholars before the occurrence of the emotions of events that might well prevent any reasonable attempt at providing an objective basis from which to understand whatever eventually happens in the Balkans.

The single most decisive factor in popular opinion concerning the post-Tito Balkans appears to be the increasingly widespread belief that the Soviet Union will be the broker in the Balkans once Tito passes from the political scene. However, even though the United States has utilized its Vietnam experience as an excuse to avoid assuming its leadership role in world politics, the country seems at last to be attempting to shake off its fear of taking an activist role in the international environment. For while President Ford's action in the “Mayaguez Incident” might be considered a first step, and President Carter's “human rights offensive” the second, it was not until May 1978 that the executive branch began to challenge the congressional constraints imposed by a rebellious Congress as a result of the Vietnam war. Clearly the French have attempted to fill the vacuum while the United States went through its decompression period, but it has become increasingly apparent to such diverse states as the People's Republic of China and Saudi Arabia that only the United States is capable of countering the new global nature of Soviet military power.

The opening salvo of the attempt to redress the congressional-executive balance in foreign policy involved a complaint by President Carter to a group of American editors and the release of an eight-page document entitled Restrictions on Presidential Authority to Provide Assistance to Foreign Nations and Conduct Foreign Operations. While some will continue to invoke the unwisdom of getting deeply involved in a conflict thousands of miles from American shores when the United States' security interests are not directly involved, and while the Soviets are apparently as confident that the United States will not challenge their activities as Germany was that the British would not fight over Poland, the unavoidable conclusion is that the Soviets will ultimately back the United States into opposing them somewhere. Concern, therefore, should not be focused on the issue of opposing specific Soviet actions, but on shaping a prudent policy making procedure insuring the flexibility required to manage effectively the West's continuing struggle with the Soviet Union. Only in such a manner can the United States public be assured that executive authority is given the required flexibility without maximizing the risks of American involvement in the wrong place, in the wrong way, and at the wrong time. Whatever the long-term course of
this struggle over foreign policy, the post-Tito Balkans constitute, perhaps, the greatest challenge that lies in the immediate future, and Congress may soon have to, as a January 1977 Congressional Research Service issue brief stated, "... make its own assessment of the U.S. stake in Yugoslavia and the actions and risks if it is willing to preserve those interests."

Understanding the stakes and risks involved in the Balkans must lead, not to tactical moves reflecting the state of Soviet-American relations, but to a long-term approach to the fundamental and continuing antitheses as represented by the two states. This struggle will not end with the Balkans, but it could get out of hand with the Balkans should any of of the interested parties misjudge the interests of others. In fact, the dangers of the situation may grow. Romania, for example, has rejected Soviet proposals for an increase in defense spending by the member states of the Warsaw Pact and any further centralization in Soviet hands of the control of the armies of the constituent states. Even worse, from the Soviet point of view, the Romanians refused to endorse the controversial stationing of Soviet MiG-23 aircraft in Cuba. Yet another danger, of a different sort, is the possibility, to which the Yugoslavs have from time to time alluded, that Yugoslavia might find it necessary to produce and, perhaps, even resort to the use of nuclear weapons to insure the country's territorial integrity and political independence. While the contributors to this volume lay no claim to being prophets, the evidence they have garnered and the interpretations they have offered should at least fulfill this volume's two purposes, hopefully thereby helping reduce the dangers inherent in the machinations to be expected in the post-Tito Balkans.
The Balkans, which have aptly been called "the tinderbox" and the "powder keg" of Europe, have historical and geopolitical importance beyond their limited geographic size. For centuries the area has been a microcosm of world events, tensions, and frustrations. In the Balkans one can see the multitude of problems that have plagued world leaders: imperialism, racism, economic exploitation of smaller nations by larger nations, nationalism, suppression of individual freedoms, civil war, etc. Also, it should not be forgotten that World War I originated in the area, as did many of the earlier manifestations of the Cold War. Geopolitically the Balkans straddle the military, economic, and communication lines that connect the USSR, Europe, and the United States with the Middle East and Africa. Because of their geographic location the Balkan nations have been called the "stepping stone between Europe and Africa." Moreover, the Balkan nations abut the Mediterranean Ocean, which in recent years has become an area of contention between the two major world military alliances. Because of the historical tensions that have occurred in the Balkans and because of its strategic location, it is important to examine Soviet post-World War II policies concerning the area and how the Balkan states have reacted to those policies.

This chapter will survey the history, and place in a larger perspective the problems that have divided the Soviet Union and socialist Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The central thesis is that the problems which face the USSR and the Balkan nations are problems which have long historical roots based upon nationalism. The Yugoslav-Soviet split, the Albanian-Soviet rift, and the current Romanian movement toward greater independence from the Soviet Union did not develop without antecedents. What Moscow defined as best for the USSR in the area was not necessarily what the three Balkan states defined as within their best national interests. While in most cases the conflicts were expressed in

Notes to references appearing throughout this chapter are located at the end of the chapter.
ideological terms, this motif more often than not masked the real problems: a Romanian historical distrust of the USSR, an Albanian fear that first Yugoslavia and then the USSR intended to engulf and enslave the smaller state, and a strong feeling of pride and independence among the Yugoslav ruling elites that they had liberated their country from fascism and intended to avoid Soviet incorporation. None of this implies that the three Balkan states were less Marxist-Leninist or communist nations than those states that obediently followed Soviet directives. It does mean, however, that nations can believe in Marxism-Leninism but at the same time be nationalists.

**Soviet Interests**

To understand the background to Soviet problems in the Balkans we must first look at Soviet military, economic, and political/ideological interests and aspirations for the whole of Eastern Europe. For it is only in this larger context that Albanian, Romanian, and Yugoslavian rebuffs make complete sense. Soviet control over Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, was Moscow’s attempt to create a *cordon sanitaire* or buffer from capitalist pressures. In an attempt to construct the buffer, Soviet national aims, ultimately, conflicted with Balkan desires.

**Security Interests.** From the tsars until the present, both Russian and Soviet leaders have tried to manipulate the politics of their weaker peripheral neighbors in an attempt to insure the boundaries of the Russian and Soviet state. The Russian fear of the West is a phobia based upon fact. Since the early 1800’s stronger Western nations have invaded the country and have, therefore, created an embattled mentality for Russian leaders. First Napoleon invaded, then Kaiser Wilhelm, then Russia’s World War I allies, and finally Hitler. Although in their own manner each invasion from the West was destructive, current Soviet leaders perceive the “Great Patriotic War” as the best proof of the need for a strong defense against the West. As a result of World War II, the USSR lost nearly 25 percent of its capital equipment, 15 to 20 million citizens, and had approximately 1,000 coal mines, 3,000 oil wells, 1,700 towns, 70,000 villages, and nearly 100,000 collective farms destroyed. The amount of destruction suffered not only has compelled Soviet leaders to consider methods that would prevent another invasion, but also is perceived to justify a protective *cordon*. For the Soviet leadership, an adequate military defense against invasion constitutes the essential national objective.

It should also be recognized that East European and Balkan nations greatly assisted Hitler’s armies in their attacks upon the Soviet Union and that after World War II Moscow would understandably feel little compassion for Eastern Europe. For example, Romania, with permission from Hitler, waged a war of revenge against the Soviet Union and reconquered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which the Soviet Union
had taken in 1940. Bucharest also occupied land between the Dniester and Bug Rivers. In 1941, Romania contributed 30 divisions to Hitler's campaigns against the Soviet Union and played an integral role in seizing the Crimea and Sevastopol. More than 15 Romanian divisions participated in the Axis assault on Stalingrad. In addition, Romania performed an important economic role in its support of the German Wehrmacht. From 1940 to 1944 Romania annually provided Germany with approximately 3½ to 4 million tons of petroleum, and, as the leading grain producer for Eastern Europe during the thirties, Romania supplied Hitler with valuable quantities of grain and lumber.4

As should be clear, Moscow had a historical interest in maintaining a ring of states which were compliant with the goals of the USSR. In the early years after World War II, Stalin enforced subservience by stationing troops in all East European occupied countries. When in 1955, after the Austrian peace treaty was signed, it became politically infeasible to maintain occupying forces in Eastern Europe, the USSR formed the Warsaw Pact to support Soviet military needs and thereby, legitimized the retention of Soviet forces in the area.

Even though the character of the Warsaw Pact and potential characteristics of war have changed considerably since 1955, from a Soviet perspective the continued maintenance of a military cordon sanitaire is justified.5 First, the pact stands as a visible military alliance against the West, and specifically Germany. Second, the treaty legalized the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and reinforced Soviet hegemony in the area. Third, Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact have provided the Soviet Union with an instrument of coercion which can and has been employed against governments that have threatened to withdraw from the Soviet organized defense perimeter. Fourth, having a military alliance with Eastern Europe enables Moscow to maintain forward military stockpiles of equipment and supplies, which partially reduces serious Soviet logistical weaknesses. Fifth, the Warsaw Pact performs a propaganda role which N. A. Bulganin, then Premier of the USSR, identified as early as 1955:

The Soviet government opposes the policy of forming military blocs and stands for the elimination of those blocs already established. . . .

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was forced upon us by the position of the Western powers, and we are willing to annul it as soon as a European collective system is established and the Western powers abandon the North Atlantic Treaty. . . .6

Such proposals have tended to keep the West on the defensive. Dismantling the Warsaw Pact and NATO would, of course, benefit the USSR because of its geographic proximity to Western Europe and America’s geographic separation. However, opposition to such Soviet proposals has enabled the USSR to characterize itself as a progressive nation opposed
to military blocs, and identify the U.S. as a conservative state which supports military blocs.

A sixth and final military reason for Soviet interest in Eastern Europe and the Balkan area—overflight and transit rights—is tangentially related to the Warsaw Pact, but it is still important if one views the area from a geopolitical position and believes that Moscow would like to see the *cordon sanitaire* completely intact from Poland through Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania. Bilateral and Warsaw Pact agreements allow the Soviet Union to transit the Warsaw Pact nations. However, no such longstanding agreements exist with other nonaffiliated socialist countries. For example, the USSR does not have overflight rights with Yugoslavia. This potentially could present a major problem to the USSR. In 1967 and 1973 Belgrade allowed the Soviet Union to overfly Yugoslavian airspace to support the Arabs, but there is no guarantee that Yugoslavia would always allow overflights. If Moscow views the Balkans as a bridge to the Middle East and Africa, it is important to the USSR that it have the unrestricted right to overfly the Balkans, for then Moscow can support its allies in the Middle East, and logistically support its growing global naval and marine presence. Thus, Yugoslavia’s absence from the historically desired ring of states that are friendly to the USSR could weaken the USSR militarily.

**Economic Interests.** The Soviet Union also has economic interests in Eastern Europe which have historical roots. As we shall see later in the Romanian example, Soviet economic objectives conflicted with the national interests of its Balkan neighbors. Generally, however, the Soviet Union’s economic objectives were very similar to its military objectives: Moscow wanted to break East European pre-World War II ties with Western Europe and orient Eastern Europe, to include the Balkan nations, toward the USSR.

Stalin’s reorientation was in the truest sense economic exploitation, even though the USSR justified its policies on the basis of the destruction that Hitler and his allies had wrought upon the Soviet Union. The USSR required reparations payments from liberated countries. In the Romanian case, Moscow charged Bucharest with reparations amounting to $300 million to be paid over an eight-year period at 1938 prices rather than the inflated 1945 prices. In addition, the USSR established joint stock companies in all major industries. In Romania the Soviet Union established sixteen such companies, which the USSR dominated, although the companies were ostensibly partnerships. Finally, the Soviet Union forced East European countries to sign economic collaboration and trade agreements that required the countries to barter specific amounts of goods to the Soviet Union. To meet all the Soviet requirements, Romania, in 1945, sent sixty-four percent of its oil production to the USSR to fulfill reparation, joint stock company, and economic collaboration agreements. Such actions accomplished the goal of reorienting East European
trade toward Moscow, and tied East European nations into an economic bloc, as Table 1 demonstrates, as well as a military *cordon sanitaire*.

Stalin wanted to isolate Eastern Europe economically. Initially, the Soviet leader discouraged bilateral trade among client states because, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has written, each nation, "much like every citizen in the USSR, was to face the Center alone. Its isolation would thus become a source of unity and purposeful cohesion."

The 1948 Yugoslavian split and the Marshall Plan caused the USSR to make some structural, but no real functional changes in its economic relations with Eastern Europe. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was the structural change. In 1949 the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania founded COMECON (Albania joined in February and the German Democratic Republic joined within a year) in order to establish "wider economic cooperation between the countries of people's democracy and the USSR," and to render "mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc." for member nations.

In practice, however, the USSR made few attempts to increase intermember trade or economic cooperation. Under Stalin's rule the most characteristic example of COMECON was the encouragement to pursue autarkic policies and to develop heavy industries based on the Soviet model of forced industrialization. It has been suggested that Stalin encouraged autarkic development because East European nations lacked sufficient raw materials to support heavy industries. With COMECON discouraging trade with Western nations, particularly Marshall Plan participants, Moscow would become the "predominant supplier from its own generous resources, thus tying COMECON members tightly to dependence upon it."

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev altered COMECON to remove the worst aspects of Stalinism, but the inherent Soviet nationalist character of its economic policy remained. As Khrushchev envisioned COMECON, the socialist bloc would cease individual autarkic attempts. COMECON would develop as an economic bloc of nations based on the "international socialist division of labor" with a supranational planning body programing

### Table 1.—Trade With USSR and Other People's Democracies (Imports and Exports in Percent of Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
production for all members. Each member nation would specialize in its particular areas of expertise, e.g., Bulgaria in agricultural production and Romania in oil, timber, and agriculture. Some bloc nations would cease efforts to duplicate heavy industry and machinery production that other bloc nations already had in production.

COMECON exemplified another Soviet effort to integrate Eastern Europe into a bloc, and it very much complemented the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact. A supranational economic organization ultimately meant the denial of nationalist objectives and the continued orientation of thought, interests, and trade toward Moscow. If each party supported the whole rather than its own interests first, then the USSR as senior member and most economically advanced nation would stand “considerably more equal” economically and therefore politically.” It is important to note, however, that Moscow never intended to specialize its production; specialization applied only to the East European nations.

**Political and Ideological Interests.** Soviet political and ideological goals for Eastern Europe complemented and supplemented her military and economic objectives. Stalin enforced political and ideological conformity upon the bloc by appointing compliant leaders, who had no mandate to govern in their own right, to head the bloc governments. De-Stalinization, the Hungarian Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia have forced Moscow to face political and ideological problems in a more pragmatic fashion. Nevertheless, the Soviets have at least two important and related reasons for desiring East European ideological and political conformity. First, the fact that other states look toward the Soviet Union for guidance creates a partial bond between those states and the Soviet Union. Second, support for the USSR promotes the idea that Moscow is the leader of a movement, and helps to insulate the USSR from polycentric rifts that have divided the Marxist world.

**The Soviet-Balkan Rift**

It is in the context of Soviet imperialism and historical Russian/USSR objectives that any analysis of the problems with Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia must take place. Unless one understands Soviet objectives for all of Eastern Europe, and Moscow’s perceived need to construct a military, economic, and political cordon sanitaire, the Balkan reaction does not make complete sense. The three Balkan nations in question have very little in common except their individual efforts to rebuff Soviet nationalistic objectives. As was mentioned earlier, this does not make them less “communist.” In fact, it is because they believed that they were good communists that the ultimate schisms became so offensive and bitter.

The issues which divided the USSR and the three states were in most instances different. Their domestic organization and foreign policies were
quite different. For example, until the late 1960's Albania and Yugoslavia bitterly attacked each other. After World War II, Yugoslavia attempted to incorporate Albania into a Yugoslavian sphere of influence and tried to direct the domestic affairs of Albania. Tirane adopted a centralized Stalin model for handling its economic and domestic affairs. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has adopted a decentralized or "self-management" form of socialism. The first issue which illuminated Soviet-Romanian problems was COMECON. This was a minor issue in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The issue of participation in the Warsaw Pact was far less troubling for Yugoslavia than for Romania and Albania.

Suffice it to say, the problems that surfaced among the Soviet Union and the three Balkan states manifested themselves in different fashions. However, in each instance, the three nations had one thing in common: they refused to suppress nationally oriented communism to the desires of the USSR.

To identify the difference among Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia it is necessary to look at how each nation's problems developed with the USSR. Therefore, each nation will be considered separately until 1968, and then collectively after 1968, for it was the Czechoslovakian invasion that apparently made Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia realize that they could not continue their differences with the USSR as separate issues. After 1968 the three Balkan states made concrete efforts to repair many problems that existed among them. Apparently they realized that, in spite of the lack of commonality among them on issues of foreign and domestic policy, the Soviet position constituted a collective threat to all of them.

**Romanian Problems With the USSR.** Historically there is little reason for amicable relations between the USSR and Romania in the post-World War II years. During World War II Romania acted as the most willing of the Axis allies. With permission from Hitler, Romania waged a war of revenge against the USSR, and gave Hitler indispensable economic assistance. When Moscow occupied Romania in 1944, Bucharest had few options other than cooperation with the USSR. Moscow tied Romania economically to the Soviet Union by means of reparation, economic collaboration agreements, and joint stock (Soviet dominated) companies. Red Army forces occupied the Romanian countryside to enforce acceptance of Soviet directives. The Soviet Union installed its own Prime Minister, Petru Groza, to run the country and sent Moscow-trained Ana Pauker to administer the Romanian Communist Party in conjunction with the Romanian-born Gheorghiu-Dej.

In 1952, when Gheorghiu-Dej purged foreign-born Pauker, Romania's "national communist" phase had its embryonic beginnings. It would be erroneous to believe, however, that Gheorghiu-Dej began with a plan to break with Moscow. In fact, upon assuming the position as head of
the party and the government, Gheorghiu-Dej pledged to strengthen his ties with Moscow. Gheorghiu-Dej believed that the most appropriate goal for Romania was rapid industrialization, which he hoped would create acceptance for the Romanian Workers’ Party. To accomplish this goal Gheorghiu-Dej intended to follow the Stalin model of forced collectivization and industrialization. However, his plan to industrialize Romania became his *raison d’etre* and, ultimately, the initial reason for the break between Romania and the USSR.

In the mid-1950’s Khrushchev announced the East European autarkic policies were counterproductive. In February 1956, the new Soviet leader attacked East European nations for building competing and duplicating industries. Rather than each socialist nation’s developing all branches of industry as the Soviet Union had done, Khrushchev called for cooperation in the socialist camp. In 1958 Khrushchev reiterated the idea and “suggested” that integration should occur:

> In the process of building communism the socialist commonwealth will integrate their economies with each other and will eliminate in time the differences of development.

Any misconception that Romania may have held concerning how Khrushchev intended COMECON to operate or Romania’s role in COMECON should have been dispelled when Soviet representatives at COMECON meetings told Romania that the Balkan country should make increased efforts to export more cereal, particularly corn, to other socialist states. Finally, in August 1962, Khrushchev published an article in *Kommunist* that called for COMECON to establish a supranational economic planning organization in order “to build a world socialist economy as a single complex.” Khrushchev argued that the world socialist states had reached a level of production “at which it is no longer possible to chart its development correctly simply by mechanically adding together the respective national economies.” The world socialist system, Khrushchev argued, needed a planning body which would foster the development of all socialist nations as a single entity.

Khrushchev’s proposals had numerous ramifications for Romania and Gheorghiu-Dej’s industrialization plans. First, specialization in conjunction with earlier Soviet remarks that Romania should produce more cereals implied that Romania should perform its historical role as agricultural feeder of Europe and reject industrialization. Second, strict adherence to specialization of production would mean a rejection of Romania’s plans for heavy steel production, since Romania had to import the raw materials to feed its heavy industry. Third, lack of industrialization implied a rejection of Gheorghiu-Dej because he had adopted the Stalinist model of forced industrialization at the expense of social freedoms and had made industrialization Romania’s primary goal.

Gheorghiu-Dej could not, and did not, accept COMECON’s specialization and integration model. With Moscow in a weakened position because of problems with the West over Berlin and Cuba, the Soviet
reluctance to use military pressure so soon after the Hungarian invasion, and the growing Sino-Soviet dispute, Romania sought assistance from foreign nations as a countervailing force to the USSR. In the fall of 1962 Gheorghiu and Premier Ion Maurer visited Indonesia and India and ultimately signed a trade agreement to purchase Indian iron ore in order to continue the plans to produce steel. In November 1962, an Anglo-French consortium agreed to provide $40 million to help build a steel plant, which the USSR had refused to finance, at Galati. In 1963 Romania signed trade agreements with Italy and China, thereby increasing trade with those two nations. Romania also sent its ambassador back to Albania in an effort to improve relations between the two countries, and became the only member of the Warsaw Pact to print summaries of the Sino-Soviet dispute in its party newspaper.

Romania’s friendliness with China resulted in the Chinese taking Bucharest’s side during the COMECON dispute. Even though it was unlikely that China would provide any significant assistance if Moscow decided to move against the rebellious Romanians, Chinese inroads into Romania so soon after Albania’s break with Moscow must have caused the Kremlin to wonder if its political and ideological sphere of influence would withstand the strains of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Support from the West and China apparently bolstered Gheorghiu-Dej’s confidence, for in 1964 he openly rejected the COMECON/Soviet proposals for specialization. Prior to 1964 Romania had been obstructive, but, given its geopolitical position and economic dependence upon the USSR, Gheorghiu had never taken a position that the USSR was wrong in its policies. However, in April 1964 the members of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party met and drafted what has since been called the Romanian Declaration of Independence, A Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers’ Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movement.

The Statement flatly rejected COMECON’s proposals for a joint planning body and stated that such measures inherently stripped an independent nation of its sovereignty:

Our party has very clearly expressed its point of view, declaring that, since the essence of the suggested measures lies in shifting some functions of management from the competence of the respective state to that of superstate bodies or organisms, these measures are not in keeping with the principles that underlie the relations among socialist countries.

The idea of a single planning body for all CMEA countries has the most serious economic and political implications. The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential, and inalienable attributes of sovereignty of the socialist state. . . . Transmitting such levels to the competence of superstate or extrastate bodies would turn sovereignty into a meaningless notion. . . .

The state plan is one and indivisible; no parts or sections can be separated from it in order to be transferred outside the state. The
management of the national economy as a whole is not possible if
the questions of managing some branches or enterprises are taken
away from the competence of the party and government of the re-
spective country and transferred to extrastate bodies.15

In another section the Statement defended Romania's policy of in-
creased trade with the West. The Central Committee said that it agreed
with cooperation among socialist nations and international division of
labor whenever state sovereignty was respected. However, the Romanian
party refused to accept a definition of "socialist international division of
labor" that implied isolating the Eastern bloc from "the general frame-
work of world economic relations." Romania insisted that it would con-
tinue, like the other socialist states, to develop "its economic links with
all states irrespective of their social system."20 In other words, Romania
would maintain its trade relations with Western nations.

Ostensibly the Statement referred to Romanian economic relations.
But, in the larger context it was an announcement that Romania intended
to think first in terms of the nation-state and its people. Moreover, the
Statement became the guiding light for Gheorghiu-Dej's remaining years
and also for his successor Nicolae Ceausescu. The Statement declared that
"immutable law" and development of the entire world socialist system
depended upon adopting the principles of "national independence and
sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, non-
interference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, [and] the principles of socialist internationalism."27

Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965 and the ascendance of Ceausescu led
to no relaxation of the Romanian position. In fact, Ceausescu has utilized
Romanian nationalism and traditional anti-Soviet feelings to solidify his
position of power and prominence as a national leader defending Ro-
mania from great power chauvinism. For example, in June 1966 on the
45th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party, Ceausescu criticized
the USSR's policies as being opposed to Romanian national interests. He
also said that the diktat of Vienna (1940) had given Romanian territories
to the USSR and left the Balkan country at the mercy of fascist Germany.
More important, however, Ceausescu reiterated his and Romania's con-
tinued support for nationalism and opposition to a suprastate planning
organization:

The huge diversity of the situations which occur in the life and
struggle of the over 90 communist parties presently existing in the
world excludes the possibility of their activity being directed from
an international center. . . . The deep differences between the his-
toric paths of development of the various countries, the different
and even contradictory character of their social systems, and the
different levels of their own social, political and economic devel-
oment, and the different degree of development of the conscious-
ness and organization of the working class have determined the far-
reaching differences in the problems facing the workers in various
countries. . . .
Life shows that no one can know better the economic reality, balance, and distribution of power in one country or another, all the domestic and international political situations, and the evolution of the latter than the communist party, the revolutionary and patriotic forces of that country. This is why they exclusively have the right to draw up the political line, the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the working class, and the methods of struggle, by creatively applying the general truths of Marxist-Leninist teachings. This can not be a disputed right: each communist party is responsible to the workers' class to which it belongs, to the entire people.  

Ceausescu's nationalistic announcements are supported throughout Romania. The Party paper, Scinteia, has carried editorials supporting the principle of national independence, sovereignty, equal rights, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and has criticized "reactionary forces" (i.e., the Soviet Union) for opposing Romania's progressive ideas. Moreover, there seems to be genuine support from the Romanian populace when Ceausescu defends Romanian interests. In 1968, when he called for mobilization to defend Romania against a possible Soviet invasion, for the first time in the 20th century a Romanian communist leader received spontaneous and popular support for his policies.

Romania's independent national path has branched to many different areas. The principles of noninterference in internal affairs of other states has carried over to the Warsaw Pact. Romania has refused to allow Warsaw Pact exercises on its territory and argued that no pact decisions should be made without unanimous support. Ceausescu in 1966 even suggested that the post of Commander in Chief of pact forces should rotate among the member nations and not remain a fiefdom of the Soviet Union. In addition, Bucharest has pursued an independent foreign policy which includes the diplomatic recognition of West Germany, a neutral path in the Sino-Soviet conflict, relations with the Israelis, and an open economic policy toward the West. For just one example on the latter point, Romanian trade with Communist bloc nations increased 2.1 times from 1960 to 1970, but trade with the West increased 4.5 times. West Germany in recent years has developed into one of Romania's largest trading partners. In 1970 Romania exported $167 million worth of goods to West Germany and imported $160 million. This made West Germany Romania's second largest trading partner.

The Romanian independence movement has thus become institutionalized into party politics, economic strategy, and foreign policy. Gheorghiu-Dej may have been a hesitant nationalist who was reluctantly pushed toward confrontation with the Soviet Union because he was too much of a Stalinist to accept the revisionist Khrushchev, as one author has suggested. Whatever the reasons for Romania's initial refusal to accept Soviet objectives, the outcome was the same: a Romanian movement that put national communism before Soviet-dominated international communism. It is significant that a change from Gheorghiu-Dej to Ceausescu
did not affect Romanian policies *vis-a-vis* the USSR. In fact, all top Romanian leaders are so inculcated with Romanian self-assertion that to reject it would be to reject their *raison d'etre*.

**Yugoslavian Problems With the USSR.** Three phenomena have shaped the pattern of Soviet-Yugoslavian relations for the last thirty years: (1) Yugoslavia essentially liberated itself from fascist Germany without Soviet assistance; (2) a constant flux of good and bad relations depending on Yugoslavia's interpretation of how Soviet policies would affect Belgrade; and (3) Yugoslavia's nonalignment position. Since the details of the Yugoslavian-Soviet rifts have been given elsewhere, I want to highlight how Soviet interests conflicted with Yugoslavian aspirations and where Yugoslavian and Soviet nationalism confronted each other.

Tito's and Soviet perceptions for ordering post-World War II Yugoslavia clashed over various issues. Probably one of the most irritating factors for Tito was the lack of Soviet support that Yugoslavia received throughout World War II. The British and United States initially recognized Draza Mihajlovic, a former Yugoslavian Army general staff colonel who was bitterly anticommunist, as the leader of the Yugoslavian resistance movement. The two Western nations sent military assistance to Mihajlovic until 1943, when it became clear that Mihajlovic was more concerned with fighting Yugoslavian communists than Germany. After 1943, both Britain and the United States shifted their assistance to Tito. During the same time period the Soviet Union likewise supported Mihajlovic, but it was not until 1944 that Moscow finally sent a military mission to assist Tito. Soviet activities upset Tito to such a degree that once he cabled Moscow: "If you cannot send us assistance, then at least don't hamper us."

The Stalin-Churchill agreement to divide Western and Soviet influence in Yugoslavia upon a 50-50 basis also infuriated Tito when he learned of the agreement. Moscow's refusal to support Yugoslavia's claims for all of Venezia Giulia, including the port city of Trieste, further angered Tito.

Moscow and Belgrade also differed on Yugoslavian economic development. In 1947 Yugoslavia proposed a 5-year plan that called for rapid industrialization. The plan proposed an industrial output 500 percent higher than 1939, and a 400 percent increase in electric power. Moreover, the plan called for products that never had been produced in Yugoslavia in order to make the state economically self-sufficient: trucks, tractors, heavy construction machinery, agricultural machinery, synthetic rubber, fertilizers, etc.

Such plans conflicted with Stalin's idea of incorporating all East European states into a Soviet-dominated economic bloc. The Soviet concept would have left Yugoslavia economically isolated and weak. In such a condition, she would have faced the communist center alone. As a means of countering Yugoslavia's industrial plans the USSR proposed estab-
lishing joint stock companies. When Yugoslav representatives stated that they were not interested in joint stock companies but wanted aid for their industrial plans the Soviet delegation declared: "What do you need heavy industry for? In the Urals we have everything you need." Thus, Stalin refused to support Tito's industrialization plans, referring to such ideas as utopian.

Tito and Stalin also clashed over organizing the Balkans and related foreign policy issues. Tito viewed himself as the self-appointed leader of the Balkan communists, and he looked forward to organizing a federation which included Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, with himself as the head. Stalin, however, rejected the federation idea. Moreover, in 1948, the Generalissimo lectured the Yugoslavs for taking foreign policy initiatives without Soviet approval and tried to force Tito's representatives in Moscow to sign an agreement that Yugoslavia would make no foreign policy decisions without prior approval from Moscow.

By 1948, when Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the communist fold, many of the Soviet-Yugoslav differences were clear. Stalin had tried to deny Yugoslavia its right to pursue either an independent industrialization program or an independent foreign policy line. On one hand, Stalin had established the Soviet Union as a nation which was uninterested in Yugoslavian national objectives. On the other hand, Tito had expanded his role from a nationalist leader fighting fascism to the role of a national communist. Typifying Tito's transformation, the Yugoslav Party informed the USSR in March of 1948 that: "No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, we can, in no case, love our country less, which also is developing Socialism. ..."

Set adrift ideologically, politically, and economically, in 1948, Yugoslavia charted a diplomatic path that ultimately would lead to its nonaligned status. At first, Tito looked to China as a revolutionary ally against the conservative, chauvinistic Stalin. But China rejected Yugoslavia's offers for diplomatic recognition, because Mao had not completely felt Stalin's restraining hand. Even though in these early years Tito did not trust the West, he was forced in 1949 to lay aside ideological problems and accept an American loan for $20 million to bolster the Yugoslav economy. Economic relations with the West, particularly the United States, increased during the following years. By 1955 the United States had loaned Yugoslavia $55 million, provided $406 million worth of grants and $88 million emergency relief.

Economic assistance from the West, however, did not make Yugoslavia a Western ally, and, given its geographic proximity to the USSR, Yugoslavian representatives made repeated efforts to demonstrate that the Balkan state intended to follow a policy separate from Cold War bloc alignments. For example, in 1949 Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslavian foreign minister, addressed the Yugoslavian National Assembly and announced that Belgrade would not join secret agreements against other nations. As Kardelj stated, Yugoslavia "does not belong to any military
blocs nor will it be a participant in any kind of aggressive planning against any country.⁴⁰ In a similar remark, which was a reaction to Western pressure that Yugoslavia should join NATO and the American bloc in its fight against the Soviet Union, Tito said that “we should rather go hungry and barefoot than sacrifice our independence.”⁴¹

The Kardelj and Tito statements demonstrate that the Yugoslavian elite understood its precarious position in a world that had begun to divide along military lines based upon ideology. Moreover, the statements suggested that the Yugoslavian elite did not want their break with Stalin to be misunderstood: Yugoslavia was a communist nation, and it intended to remain so. Yugoslavia had no intentions of agreeing to subservience either to Moscow or the West. Yugoslavia would try to chart a path between the West and the USSR. When Yugoslavian national interests were not affected, Belgrade, as Alvin Z. Rubinstein has shown, would support the Soviet position in the U.N.⁴² But at the same time Tito would accept Western assistance to obtain his objectives of economic rehabilitation and industrialization, which Moscow had refused to support.

In search of a policy that would not leave Yugoslavia isolated between the two military blocs, and thus an easy target for either the USSR or the West, Belgrade adopted the nonaligned position in the early 1950's. Kardelj made the initial definition of the policy before the United Nations General Assembly in 1950:

The peoples of Yugoslavia cannot accept the assumption that mankind must today choose between domination by one or another great power. We consider that there is another road, difficult, possibly, but the necessary road of democratic struggle for a world of free and equal nations, for democratic relations among nations, against interference from outside in the internal affairs of the nations and for an all-round peaceable cooperation of peoples on the basis of equality. . . .⁴³

The embryonic nonalignment policy espoused by Kardelj took better form during the Korean War years. India's nonpartisan role as chairman of the Korean armistice committee and as commander of units that supervised the exchange of POW’s impressed Tito, and he congratulated India for refusing to join any military bloc. Ultimately Nehru and Tito signed a nonalignment pact in 1954 which pledged each nation to pursue an independent policy in foreign affairs. At the same time Yugoslavia bolstered Burma in its fight against the Nationalist Chinese by providing military assistance and supported the Burmese position in the U.N. Burma's rejection of SEATO and all other military pacts led to firm contacts between Yugoslavia and Burma. Also, Yugoslavia viewed the overthrow of King Farouk as a true nationalistic movement and provided arms to the new Egyptian government when no Western government would support Egypt. This step in conjunction with arms sales to Burma and growing relations with India increased Yugoslavia's credibility among other third world nations, which had refused to join either a Western or Soviet-oriented military alliance system.
By the mid-1950's Tito had successfully drafted a policy based on non-participation in the Cold War military blocs, noninterference in the internal affairs of socialist countries, support for national struggles of liberation, the right to pursue an independent communist foreign policy between both the East and West, and military and economic support for other third world nations. Yugoslavia was no longer isolated and had maneuvered the fine middle road. The policy pursued by Yugoslavia was a clear manifestation of independence from both the West and the USSR. Criticism of the bipolar world and military pacts hit hard upon both the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had just formed NATO and viewed neutrals as inherently anti-American. Moscow was preparing to organize the Warsaw Pact and believed that nations either supported the USSR or supported capitalism. 44

Nevertheless, Tito was an old-line communist and he hoped to normalize relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such a step would allow Tito to operate within the international communist movement, increase Yugoslavia's influence, and legitimize Belgrade's policies. Stalin's timely death and Khrushchev's search for support to hold off his domestic critics generated a brief period of improved relations and a partial acceptance of Yugoslavia's nationalist objectives.

The rapprochement (1955–57) began when Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia in 1955, blamed Stalin for the 1948 split, and stated that "questions of internal organization, differences in social systems, and varieties in the mode of socialist development are (i.e., should be) solely the affairs of the individual countries concerned." 45 Soviet-Yugoslavian relations improved further in 1956 when the 20th CPSU Congress condemned Stalin's policies, and when Moscow and Belgrade established party-to-party relations that recognized "many roads to socialism" as a viable alternative.

Both Khrushchev and Tito had tactical reasons for rapprochement. For Tito, improved Soviet-Yugoslavian relations bestowed an element of legitimacy upon Yugoslavia. Legitimacy strengthened Yugoslavia's influence in third world nations and promoted Yugoslavia's long-term interest in nonalignment. For Khrushchev, reconciliation with Yugoslavia furthered Soviet policies in the developing world by notifying those states that the Soviet Union would no longer demand that they strictly follow the Soviet model. Khrushchev hoped that rapprochement would increase his domestic power because he could thus present himself as the unifier of the communist movement, which had just begun to feel the first strains of the Sino-Soviet conflict and anti-Stalinist pressures in Eastern Europe. Finally, as John Keep has stated, Khrushchev believed that Moscow could buy Yugoslavia's submission cheaply, and ultimately force Belgrade to "revert to its proper status as a junior member of the team." 46

Both men miscalculated, and rapprochement rapidly died when the Soviet Union moved to repress the Hungarian uprising. The USSR could accept "many roads to socialism" as long as the roads led to submission.
to Moscow. When the paths that national communists charted threatened Moscow's cordon sanitaire, the possible repercussions were more than Khrushchev could tolerate. In September 1956, Khrushchev criticized the "many roads to socialism" approach as the cause of East European problems and he stated that the Soviet model was the only correct communist model to follow. In November, Mikhail Suslov, the Soviets' chief theoretician, extolled the virtues of the Russian revolution and the progress that the USSR had made under socialism. Moreover, he implied that the Soviet approach was the only correct path since "the basic principles worked out in the course of our revolution and verified by the experience of developing the land of the Soviets" were used by all countries that were developing socialism. Suslov excluded Yugoslavia as one of the great socialist nations. Throughout his address on the 39th anniversary of the Soviet revolution he never mentioned Yugoslavia as part of the great socialist commonwealth which included the USSR and China as the leaders.

Again cast adrift by the Soviet Union and no longer recognized as practicing an acceptable interpretation of Marxist-Leninism, Tito redoubled his nonalignment efforts from 1957 to 1962. In December 1958 Tito visited Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Sudan, the United Arab Republic, and Greece; in 1961 he went to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic again.

During this period Soviet-Yugoslavian relations were cool, but not as bad as in the 1948 period. Khrushchev did not want to focus too much attention on Yugoslavia and have the Belgrade heresy overflow again into Eastern Europe. Tito was quite willing to spread his nonalignment policy through personal diplomacy. But Yugoslavia could no longer broaden its influence with U.S. assistance because Belgrade did not have the Western allies or assistance as it did in 1948.

The open Sino-Soviet schism in 1962 touched off a close six-year relationship between Moscow and Belgrade. With the rift between China and the USSR an open chasm, Moscow had a vested interest in furthering relations with Yugoslavia again. Since China accused both Yugoslavia and the USSR of revisionism, Moscow was nearly forced to support Belgrade. Moreover, with China making inroads in Eastern Europe through Albania, the USSR wanted to heal as many old wounds as possible in order to reduce Chinese successes. Also, an alliance with Yugoslavia could be utilized as a renewed sign to third world nations that the Soviet Union supported wars of national liberation and, thereby, deny China another possible propaganda tool to use against the USSR.

Tito likewise could again support rapprochement as long as Moscow did not try to subordinate Yugoslavia to the USSR. Despite the 1956 setback, Tito still looked to the USSR as a progressive force and had hoped to improve relations between the two countries. If Moscow became isolated by China, the Yugoslavs feared that Moscow would attempt to consolidate its sphere of influence and perhaps use military force to crush
the Yugoslavian experiment as the Red Army had done in Hungary in 1956, when the Kremlin felt threatened. Also, Maoism threatened to make inroads into Yugoslavia's relations with nonaligned states, particularly in Southeast and Southwest Asia.

Between 1962 and 1967 the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collaborated on a number of issues. Moscow supported Tito's efforts to call a world conference of nonaligned nations which met in Cairo in 1964. Soviet support was in contrast to Moscow's refusal to support a similar nonaligned conference which had met in Belgrade in 1961. Even more importantly, Moscow endorsed the Cairo conference's agreements of nonalignment, which included Yugoslavia's historical objectives of opposition to military pacts, noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, respect for the sovereignty of other nations, and peaceful coexistence among nations with different political, economic, and social systems. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Yugoslavia allowed Soviet planes to overfly its territory for the first time since 1948. Economic relations improved as Yugoslavia became an associate member of COMECON. Yugoslavian representatives even participated in Warsaw Pact exercises as observers.

The 1962 to 1967 rapprochement was the longest period of good relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Nevertheless, it was a fleeting détente. For as we shall see later, when Moscow moved to crush the 1968 Czechoslovakian liberalization movement, Tito interpreted Soviet actions as another attempt to force Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, into a military bloc relationship, a reemergence of Stalinism, and a rejection of the idea of "separate roads to socialism."

Albanian Problems With the USSR. Albanian history has been a saga of domination by foreign powers and constant threats of partition. Albania had to struggle to liberate itself from the Ottoman Empire, to throw out Fascist Italy in the 1940's, to avoid incorporation by Yugoslavia in 1948 and ultimately to free itself from a perceived Soviet-Yugoslavian conspiracy in the 1950's. Albania's embattled past has caused Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian Communist Party, to remark that "The Albanian people have cleaved their way through history with sword in hand." As a result Albania has pursued a xenophobic foreign policy wedded to a militantly revolutionary ideology. For nationalistic reasons both phenomena were compatible. A nationalistic foreign policy supported Albania's efforts to free itself from foreign domination, and the militant Marxist-Leninist ideology enables Albania to hold its two most recent threats, Yugoslavia and the USSR, at bay.

Even though Albania liberated itself from Hitler, the country and the Albanian Communist Party owed its existence to Yugoslavia. Prior to World War II, Albanian communists were split into four main factions. In 1941 Tito dispatched two of his partisans, Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa, to organize an Albanian Communist Party and the guerrilla
Partisan movement to fight fascism. Throughout the war Tito's emissaries directed and coordinated the activities of the party and the Partisan movement.³³

At the end of World War II, Tito attempted to continue Yugoslavia's predominance in Albania. To accomplish this goal the Yugoslavian leader called for the creation of a Balkan Federation and the incorporation of Albania into Yugoslavia as a federal republic. In 1946 Yugoslavia and Albania signed a series of economic collaboration agreements, including the same joint stock companies that Tito had rejected from the USSR. In addition, Albanian students were required to study Serbo-Croatian, and Albanian students received scholarships to study in Yugoslavia.³⁴

When the Soviet-Yugoslavian split occurred, Premier Hoxha moved to rid his party and government of Yugoslavian influence. First, the Albanian government unilaterally declared that its economic agreements with Yugoslavia were null and void. Albania also ordered all Yugoslavian advisers to leave the country within 48 hours and launched a press vilification movement against Titoism. Also, Hoxha had Koci Xoxe, Yugoslavia's leading supporter in the Albanian Party and advocate of a Yugoslavian-Albanian federation, purged in 1948 and ultimately executed in 1949.

Between 1949 and 1953 Albania turned to the USSR for assistance. As the weakest country economically and militarily in all of Eastern Europe, Albania had no alternative but to seek maximum assistance from the USSR. Stalin was willing to support Hoxha if it meant that Tito's influence would be weakened in the Balkans. In February 1949 Albania was granted membership in COMECON, which meant that the COMECON members would aid in Albania's economic rehabilitation. The USSR and its allies financially supported Tirane's $26 million annual balance of payment deficit when Hoxha initiated a Soviet-modeled Five-Year Plan. In 1950 Stalin sent Soviet and Bulgarian military missions to train the Albanian army. Subservience to Stalin, who was also anti-Tito and hoped to destroy any pro-Yugoslavian influence, provided the best—albeit poor—alternative for Hoxha. The plan worked reasonably well until Stalin's death. Then, however, Hoxha faced a renewed challenge in the form of a new Soviet-Yugoslavian rapprochement.³⁵

Moscow's revived relations with Tito and Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin established numerous threats for Albania. Hoxha feared that Yugoslavia might renew its earlier interest in absorbing Albania as part of Yugoslavia. This probably would have led to a purge of Hoxha and possibly his death, because Hoxha had eliminated Tito's followers from Albanian positions of power. Also, the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR generated internal tensions in Albania and spurred pro-Tito elements, who had active Yugoslavian support and tacit approval from Moscow, toward overthrowing Hoxha.³⁶ Finally, Khrushchev's denunciation of the "cult of Stalin" meant an equal repudiation of Hoxha who had patterned his personal style of government along Stalinist lines.
Following the Hungarian Revolution, Hoxha began to attack the Yugoslavs and the Soviets verbally. He charged that Titoism was the cause of all problems in Eastern Europe as well as in Albania, that “different roads to socialism” were a rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that, despite certain problems with Stalin, the Generalissimo

... remains a great Marxist-Leninist. Stalin was never mistaken in such questions as the protection of the interests of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist theory, the fight against imperialism and against the enemies of socialism. He was and remains an exemplary figure. 57

Even though the thaw in Soviet-Yugoslavian relations lasted only briefly, Hoxha would not forget that his life had been threatened and that Moscow and Belgrade rejected the Stalinist model which Albania had chosen. Thus, after 1956 Albania approached the Soviet Union cautiously. Luckily for Hoxha, the initial stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict provided another protector when he needed one most.

Ostensibly, China and its ally Albania, and Moscow and its ally Belgrade, maintained that the main divisive problems among them were ideological. Peking and Tirane espoused a view of socialism and communism based on violent revolution throughout the world, and condemned Moscow and Belgrade for their reformism, revisionism, and peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries. Domestically Albania has pursued the most inflexible Stalinist approach, and during the 1960's and early 1970's, carried out a version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution to maintain purity within the Albanian Party.

Underlying the ideological splits, however, lay important nationalistic motivations for Albanian policy. The unrelenting purges enabled Hoxha to remove dissidents and made the Albanian Party elites loyal to him. Support for revolutionary Marxism obtained Albania an ally in the 1950's when Tirane needed one most, and the new ally—China—provided the economic assistance that Albania needed badly. 58 Moreover, the Chinese ally was less of a physical threat than either Moscow or Belgrade due to its physical separation and the limited force projection capability that China has.

As in the Romanian and Yugoslavian examples, Tirane's primary objective apparently was an attempt to escape the domineering influence of its more powerful neighbors. In the late 1930's and early 1940's, the threat came from Italy; in 1948, Yugoslavia was the threat; and in the 1950's and 1960's, the possibility of rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia posed a threat for Albania. Also, very similar to the Romanian and Yugoslavian cases, Albania institutionalized external problems into its domestic politics. Hoxha obtained his position of prominence by purging Yugoslavian followers—specifically Xoxe—and made the struggle against Yugoslavia and the USSR a question of ideological right and wrong. Thus, to reject Albanian foreign and domestic policy.
would be a rejection of Hoxha. Nationalism had merged with self-preservation and became the ruling elite's *raison d'être*.

The post-1968 era must be examined separately, because the Czechoslovakian invasion simultaneously put the national communist movements of all three Balkan countries in jeopardy. The Czech invasion was the nearest event to a watershed in the history of Balkan-Soviet relations that anyone can imagine. The invasion forced the three dissimilar countries with different backgrounds and objectives closer together than any previous or subsequent event. Moreover, Moscow's activities in Czechoslovakia came closer to creating a Balkan Union with an anti-Soviet bias than anything that Tito envisioned in 1948.

**The Balkan Situation After the Czechoslovakian Invasion**

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine were just as much attacks upon Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia as they were physical attacks upon Czechoslovakia. By removing Dubcek, Moscow again demonstrated that it would not tolerate movements in Eastern Europe which the Soviet Union viewed as detrimental to the national interests of the USSR. Also, it revealed that Moscow continued to believe in a homogeneous ideological and political sphere of influence which denied nationalism as an objective goal. In November 1968 Brezhnev stated that Western nations supported nationalism "to isolate individual socialist states so that they can then seize them by the throat one by one." Moreover, the Soviet party leader explicitly condemned "separate roads to socialism" when he said that appeals to "defense of sovereignty" and "noninterference" were bourgeois propaganda attempts to infiltrate socialist nations. Appealing to the "time-tested truths" of Marxism-Leninism and "natural laws of socialist construction," Brezhnev argued that national conditions in socialist countries did not justify deviation from the accepted path to socialism, and that if deviationism occurred, socialist nations should repress the threat. 9

The Soviet position affected all three Balkan nations in different manners. Romania had based its policies from Gheorghiu-Dej through Ceausescu on noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and Romania's right to construct an economic and national program based on Romanian needs. Likewise, Yugoslavia had pursued a policy of bloc nonalignment and noninterference. Albania had rejected Moscow's "revisionism" and adopted a hard-line Stalinist approach. In essence, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Brezhnev's pronouncements completely rejected the historic policies of the three Balkan countries and told all socialist states to fall in line with the correct policy as verbalized by Moscow, because noninterference was an imperialistic tool, and nationalism, whether it was the type pursued by Czechoslovakia, Albania,
Romania, or Yugoslavia, was a rejection of the immutable laws of socialism as defined by the USSR.

Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia responded in a variety of ways to the Soviet invasion. They publicly denounced the invasion. The three countries developed closer military ties and created compatible programs to oppose the Soviet Union. Finally, much closer and amicable overall relations occurred among the Balkan states than ever existed before. Ironically, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia created the one thing that Moscow had been unsuccessful in accomplishing since World War II: a semblance of solidarity in the Balkans. Unfortunately, for the USSR, however, that solidarity reflected opposition to the USSR and not a cordon sanitaire hostile to the West providing protection for the USSR from Western invasions.

The three Balkan states condemned the Soviet invasion in strikingly similar ways. The Albanian Party denounced “Soviet revisionists and their stooges” for the “fascist-type” invasion of Czechoslovakia, which constituted “a flagrant violation of the principle of freedom and sovereignty of peoples.” In addition, Albania officially castigated the “Brezhnev-Kosygin-Khrushchevian revisionist clique” and called not only for Soviet forces to depart from Czechoslovakia but also from “all other countries where they have been stationed for domination. . . .”6 Ceausescu, on August 14, told the graduating class of the Bucharest Military Academy that there was no justification for Moscow’s intervention.6 One week later Ceausescu vehemently condemned the invasion as

... a flagrant transgression of the national independence and sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic; interference by force in the affairs of the Czechoslovak people; an act in complete contradiction with the fundamental norms that must govern relations between socialist countries and Communist parties and with the generally recognized principles of international law.6

Yugoslavia interpreted the attack upon Czechoslovakia as an indirect attack on Yugoslavia. One Yugoslavian political-military analyst wrote that the Soviet invasion concerned everyone since it was “a precedent calculated to warn and threaten all Socialist countries against endeavoring to develop socialism in accordance with their own national conditions.”6

Tito, who had visited Czechoslovakia in August and had given his full support to the Czechs and Dubcek, condemned the invasion as a violation of sovereignty on August 21.6 The Yugoslavian Communist Party unanimously endorsed Tito’s position and ridiculed Soviet justifications as mere ploys to hide the “attack against the independence of a socialist country in order to hinder its independent socialist development and to subject it [Czechoslovakia] to their [Soviet] will.”6

Albanian, Romanian, and Yugoslavian reactions and fears manifested themselves in similar military fashions as the three countries prepared to prevent a similar type invasion of their own countries. Yugoslavia increased its defense budget by fourteen percent.6 In 1969 Yugoslavia
adopted a new National Defense Law which reiterated the 1963 constitution, making military capitulation constitutionally illegal and added the clause that it was the duty of local administrators "to organize the total national defence and to command the battle directly if the regular forces were ever defeated." In essence Yugoslavia adopted a plan to apply the idea used by Tito in World War II, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara in which territorial armies of citizen-soldiers would fight an independent guerrilla war against an invading force. In a 1971 military scenario, an enemy attacked Yugoslavia from the north with heavy armor forces. Rather than fighting frontal warfare, which the modernly equipped enemy desired, Yugoslavia's military, paramilitary, and citizen-soldiers withdrew and harassed the enemy from a 360-degree front.

The basic idea of total defense is to mobilize the entire Yugoslavian population as rapidly as possible. On the basis of military maneuvers that occurred in 1971 and 1972, Yugoslavian government officials maintain that one-half of the country could be mobilized in 3 to 6 hours and the rest of the country within 2 days. Therefore, defeating the regular army forces would only partially solve an invader's problems. National Defense forces from urban and rural centers would continue to fight a delaying and harassment action covering the entire country, independent of what might happen to the regular forces. Yugoslavians are convinced that successful implementation of Total National Defense would force an invading nation to employ at least 2 million men. The belief in Belgrade is that it is unlikely that any Western or Eastern nation could afford to employ such a large force, given the precarious balance of power that exists in the world.

Civilian and military scholars know less about Romanian military responses to the Czechoslovakian invasion than they do about the Yugoslavian reaction, but there are some indications that Romania adopted a program similar to that of the Yugoslavian Total National Defense. On August 21 Ceausescu announced that any foreign invader would have to face the Romanian Patriotic Guards, composed of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. The Romanian leader encouraged all Romanians "to be ready at any moment" to defend the sovereignty and independence of the homeland. Whether Romanian actions deterred Soviet attacks or if Moscow had any real intentions to invade Romania is a moot point. Romania feared a Soviet invasion, and Ceausescu, with the full support of the Romanian people, apparently intended to organize a total defense military posture similar to that of Yugoslavia. Like Yugoslavia, Romania announced that any military invasion of the country would spark a prolonged guerrilla-type war with the total civilian population functioning as adjuncts of the regular military.

Albania took similar steps. First, Tirane denounced the Warsaw Pact and officially withdrew from the pact as a result of the invasion. Second, Albania increased its 1969 defense budget by 38 percent to reflect its unilateral status and its expanded military preparations. Third, Albania
increased its ties with China in a fashion that was similar to Romanian and Yugoslavian Total Defense concepts. In 1968 Bequ Balluku, the Albanian Defense Minister, announced that Albania would never stand alone, because it had the support of 700 million Chinese. In September 1968 Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai corroborated the remark by sending a joint telegram to Albania stating that China fully supported Albania's plans and that the Albanians and their 700 million Chinese allies would severely defeat any attempt by U.S. "Imperialists," Soviet "revisionists," or "their lackeys" that "dare touch Albania." 71

The closer and more amicable relations that developed among the three Balkan nations may be the most dramatic result of the Czechoslovakian invasion. During and after the Czech crisis Tito and Ceausescu met constantly and in effect created an informal alliance which must have caused some concern in the USSR that the two nations intended to formalize an alliance as a counterforce to the USSR. In fact, during the height of the Czech crisis the Bucharest Publishing House for Scientific Literature published The Little Entente, which praised the 1920 alliance system. The book maintained that the alliance era had protected Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia from the "dictatorial pressures" that major powers had sometimes exerted upon "their smaller allies." Moreover, Romanian and Yugoslav trade had continued to grow at an extremely rapid rate. In 1967 Romania exported $21 million worth of goods to Yugoslavia. By 1970 that export figure had nearly doubled to $41 million. 72 Also, Yugoslavia and Romania have developed their first joint ground support aircraft, which is a modest start toward making both nations less dependent upon foreign military equipment. 73

Relations between Yugoslavia and Albania also took a turn as a result of the Czechoslovakian invasion. In February 1971 the two countries exchanged ambassadors and officially ended nearly twenty years of hostile relations. Moreover, Albania began to tone down its ideological differences with Yugoslavia and even implied that a military alliance could exist:

Irrespective of the irreconcilable ideological and political contrasts which we have with the Yugoslav leadership, we reassert that we are brothers with the peoples of Yugoslavia and should their independence be endangered we shall be on their side. 75

In addition, in 1969 Western sources reported that Yugoslavia withdrew its military forces from the Albanian border as a response to the improved relations. Hoxha, in 1970, made another "strong political signal to Belgrade" when he admitted for the first time that the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia "had made steady gains toward winning equality and full national rights. . . ." 76 Finally, in 1972 Albania for the first time commented that Yugoslavian maneuvers were a response to Soviet military threats and praised Yugoslavia's Total National Defense doctrine. 77

Even though different styles of government, economic management, ideological outlooks, and territorial problems continue to cause divisive-
ness between Yugoslavia and Albania. relations have taken a different character than at any other time in history. The primary reason for the rapprochement seems to be the fear that the USSR might take action to repress the nationalistic communist systems which do not support the Soviets' national objectives.  

**Projections**

From this study one can draw at least three conclusions. First, the rifts among the USSR and Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia have deep historical roots. Soviet attempts to develop a *cordon sanitaire* alienated the three Balkan nations when the USSR overlooked the national interests of the Balkans and thought only of the USSR.

Second, the rifts have become partially institutionalized in the politics of the three Balkan states. Tito and Hoxha have led their countries since the end of World War II. Thus, any dramatic shift in relations with the Soviet Union would be tantamount to a rejection of their foreign and domestic policies. The same is true for Romania; since at least 1962 the policy line regarding relations with the Soviet Union has been one of national independence. Thus any change in the policy line of these three dissident communist states would constitute a traumatic change for the body politic. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that a mere change in leadership will totally erase the animosity.

Third, nationalism is the basic commonality that has caused the problems in the Balkans not only between the USSR and Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia, but also among the three Balkan states. The similarities among the Balkan nations exist in their opposition to Soviet policies. At times the three Balkan states have been just as hostile toward one another as they have been toward the USSR.

In the West some discussion has occurred about a revived interest in a Balkan Federation as a countervailing force against the USSR. In the post-1968 period the three Balkan nations could coalesce when they felt threatened physically by the USSR. However, the idea of an anti-Soviet federation seems unlikely. An essential element for all three Balkan state independence movements has been the rejection of any type of "supra-planning body" or Soviet orders that did not consider the respective national objectives first. Thus, it would seem unlikely that any of the three Balkan nations would join a federation or alliance system that possibly could dictate policies which would conflict with national objectives. Also, none of the three states would want to do something that might threaten Soviet national objectives to the point that Moscow would feel compelled, as it did in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to take military action.

Balkan efforts to maneuver national policies within the communist system ultimately led to dissension with the USSR because the states pursued national rather than Soviet policies. Balkan nationalism has ac-
quired a life of its own and in some ways has become the *raison d'etre* of Balkan leaders. Probably, much to the Soviets' chagrin, nationalism will continue to shape Balkan policies *vis-a-vis* the USSR.

**Notes**


2. Stavro Skendi has commented: "In the Communist world, conflicts have to take an ideological form even when the real motives may be the interests of individuals or groups or the power politics of countries." Stavro Skendi, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Foreign Affairs,* 40, No. 3 (April 1962), p. 474.


9. Ibid., p. 124.


15. See note 4.
23. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 284.
27. Ibid.
30. “Ceausescu's resistance to Soviet pressure has met with considerable approval. The general anti-Soviet feeling of the masses is an asset in Ceausescu's opposition to Moscow. . . . Any Romanian communist who dared to oppose him would have to face a hostile populace. There exists a paradoxical situation in Romania, where Soviet attempts to weaken Ceausescu's leadership have in fact strengthened it.” Richard F. Starr, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 75.
31. CIA, op. cit., p. 38.
36. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 278.
41. Mates. op. cit., p. 207.
42. Rubinstein. op. cit.
44. Hoffman and Neal. op. cit., p. 429.
46. Ibid., p. 757.
56. Ibid., p. 118.
59. CDSP, XX, No. 46 (December 4, 1968), p. 4.
April 1973), p. 55. For other discussions of Yugoslavia’s Total Defense concept see
A. Ross Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia (Santa Monica, Calif.: The
RAND Corporation, 1971); Paul Lendvai, “Yugoslav Unity,” Survival, XIII, No. 8
X., No. 2 (February 1968), pp. 48-49; and Col Aleksandar Krajacevic, “Certain
Factors in the Defence of Yugoslavia,” Review of International Affairs, XIX, No. 443
69. “Rallying the Nation,” East Europe, 17, No. 10 (October 1968), p. 66.
70. Cioranescu, op. cit., p. 3 and Fischer-Galati, 20th Century Rumania, p. 210 maintain
that Ceausescu’s policies were warmly received and for the first time in history a
Romanian Communist leader was spontaneously cheered.
73. CIA, op. cit., p. 36.
74. “Yugoslav/Romanian Aircraft,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (April 21, 1975),
p. 19.
II. U.S. Interests and Policy Options in the Balkans

Robert L. Farlow

The emergence of Eastern Europe as an issue in the 1976 primary contests between President Ford and Ronald Reagan, followed by the televised Ford-Carter debates in which they clashed over the question of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, recalled related controversies in the 1950's. Although there was a *deja vu* quality to the more recent debates involving Eastern Europe, these did serve to focus some attention on the question of the nature of the United States-East European relationship. The Reagan charge that the Ford administration advocated that the "captive nations should give up a claim of national sovereignty and simply become part of the Soviet Union" provoked the State Department to release once-secret official texts delineating American policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. An analysis of these suggests that the Ford-Kissinger approach to Eastern Europe was a more complex conceptualization than might have been expected, given East Europe's lack of salience in American foreign policy articulations. It was also clear that the Communist Balkans—Yugoslavia and Romania especially—had emerged as an East European subregion generating more American attention than the rest of Eastern Europe.

The present discussion concentrates on American foreign policy toward the Communist Balkans, past, present, and future. While the latter cannot be predicted with great specificity, certain calculations are possible. The general analysis will derive from several considerations: (1) the general evolution of American foreign policy toward Eastern Europe from World War II through 1968; (2) the impact of United States-Soviet detente on American approaches to Eastern Europe; and (3) concrete American interests in the Balkans, particularly in light of recent political transformations in the whole Mediterranean area. American policy toward the Communist Balkans (excluding Bulgaria) is a spinoff of long-term East European policy, modified in light of detente and expanding American interests in the Balkans. This American policy is characterized by increasing political, economic, and military support for Yugoslavia, more...
limited political and economic support for Romania and will probably witness the beginnings of limited interaction with Albania in the post-Hoxha period. Before developing these points further, however, we will sketch the essential elements of American policy toward Eastern Europe since World War II.

**United States-East European Relations, 1945–1968**

Despite the fact that World War II was triggered by the German invasion of Poland and that the Cold War was fueled by Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, that area has been secondary to American national interests and activity. Franklin Roosevelt avoided Western military involvement in Eastern Europe lest a united allied war effort be disrupted by Soviet displeasure. Harry Truman was unwilling to reverse this policy. Truman would later write: “I did not want to become involved in the Balkans in a way that could lead us into another world conflict.”

Instead, the Truman administration announced the policy of containment. This was a policy which rested on two premises: Soviet expansion must be halted, by both military and political means; and this in turn would create preconditions for an eventual mellowing or even breaking up of the Soviet system.

Eastern Europe would some day benefit from this, so it was suggested. The 1948 excommunication of Tito’s Yugoslavia from the bloc was not a result of containment but was to derive support from it. By the end of the Truman years, Eastern Europe had become a symbol of Soviet perfidy and a sphere of Soviet influence against which the United States would not move except through trade restrictions and propaganda. Paradoxically, these probably reinforced East European ties to the Soviet Union. The reality was that “containment offered no promise of early self-determination for East-Central Europe or of American initiatives to that end.”

Eisenhower and Dulles rejected what they saw as the passivity of American policy toward the Soviet bloc and in its place proclaimed a “rollback” of communism and the “liberation” of Eastern Europe. Although escalating rhetoric, in the last analysis, they were unwilling to use force to achieve their goals and were left with the continuation of tactics inherited from Truman’s containment. The 1956 Hungarian uprising demonstrated the essential impotence of American policy. In the end, liberation had only “manifested itself in a deluge of moralistic and legalistic rhetoric that... proved ineffective in easing the satellites’ subjugation.”

Dulles, however, for all his foreign policy rigidities, was willing to recognize emerging pluralism in Eastern Europe and to adjust American policy so as to support and further manifestations of national independence from Soviet control—as in Yugoslavia and Poland after 1956. Aid and trade concessions, including most favored nation (MFN) status, were
extended to these two states, and Yugoslavia was touted as an acceptable intermediate "model" on the way to liberation.*

By the beginning of the Kennedy-Johnson years, the rhetorical excesses were being scaled down. American leaders no longer exhorted the East Europeans to struggle so as to undermine their regimes. Kennedy and Johnson sought to differentiate levels of East European disengagement from Soviet control and to gear American policies toward enhancing those developments, primarily through trade and other exchanges. Secretary of State Dean Rusk articulated this policy:

Historic forces of nationalism are visibly at work. Gradually the smaller Communist nations of Eastern Europe seem to be finding for themselves a little more autonomy. They are taking steps to increase their trade and other contacts with the West. . . . We would like to do what we can to encourage these trends within the Communist world."

The same theme was keynoted by Lyndon Johnson in 1964, when he proclaimed that "there is no Iron Curtain. There are many. Each differs in strength and thickness." He then announced that America would "build bridges across the gulf that has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, of humanitarian aid."10

The Kennedy-Johnson efforts to extend trade normalization, however, generally failed. The Congress proved unwilling to grant discretionary authority to the President to waive trade restrictions. George Kennan, exasperated at these developments, wrote that the executive/legislative conflict over East European policy was so disruptive that "we have today two wholly different and mutually contradictory foreign policies being pursued simultaneously."11 Soon thereafter the war in Vietnam diverted American attention from "bridge building," and United States-East European relations languished.

The process of polycentrism, however, continued in both the East and the West. By the end of the Johnson years, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, noting these changes, especially in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, suggested that the terms "East" and "West," while once "somewhat coherent entities," were "now, even conceptually . . . no longer viable terms."12

Nixon-Kissinger, then, inherited an American policy toward Eastern Europe which was:

1. resigned to the reality of that area as a Soviet sphere of influence;
2. opposed to accepting this sphere as legitimate;
3. geared toward recognizing political differentiation within the area;
4. determined to provide limited alternatives to Soviet leverage; and
5. supportive of Yugoslav independence as being important to American interests.

All of this, however, had been premised upon Soviet-American Cold War hostility. It was this basic relationship which Nixon and Kissinger
sought to change under the rubric of detente. The view on Eastern Europe was to become somewhat more ambiguous in the process.

U.S.-East European Relations in an Era of Detente

The relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States—detente—emerged in full force between 1970 and 1973. In the context of the Washington-Moscow connection some observers concluded that East Europe had become expendable, as U.S. relations with that area could only exacerbate the more important dimension of detente. Charles Gati, for example, wrote that for Nixon-Kissinger, Eastern Europe ultimately became “an anachronism in international politics” and pursued toward it a policy of “deliberate indifference.”

Such an interpretation is overdrawn. The actual Nixon-Kissinger stance was one which recognized more openly Soviet “interests” in Eastern Europe, declared that the United States would not seek to disrupt Soviet security interests there, but reserved the right for “normal” interactions with those East European states which desired such. The United States was not going out of its way to normalize ties with Eastern Europe, but it was not going to ignore reasonable initiatives from that side either. In 1970 Nixon stated all of these elements:

It is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no part of our policy. Our pursuit of negotiation and detente is meant to reduce tensions, not to stir up new ones.

By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we can accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others.

We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual normalization of relations. We will adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization these countries are willing to sustain.

In this, and subsequent foreign policy reports to the Congress, special attention is paid to Yugoslavia and Romania—states which had sought out significant ties to the United States. In his 1970 report, Nixon even suggested that U.S.-Romanian relations were a model which other bloc countries might emulate. The United States, then, would not initiate, but it would respond to, East European desires for greater autonomy. A more active stance was left to the West Europeans, i.e., Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

Under Ford-Kissinger, the central dimensions of American policy did not change. American participation at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) underscored U.S. willing-
ness to recognize postwar boundaries considered by the Soviets as crucial to their security. At the same time, East-West interactions were ratified in such a way as to legitimize U.S. ties with Eastern Europe, while making future Soviet pressures on bloc states more difficult. The release during the 1976 campaign of the Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt comments to ambassadors stationed in Europe demonstrated, as well, the continuity in policy. Since these comments constitute the most elaborate official delineation of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, they are worth summarizing. 16

First, the Soviet Union is seen as an "emerging superpower" whose influence must be contained and balanced by drawing it into "relationships which are both concrete and practical... and create maximum incentives for a moderate Soviet course."

Second, Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe has been "inept" and has been unable to develop a "viable, organized structure," so that it is based on military power alone.

Third, this is "unfortunate" because Eastern Europe is within the Soviets' "scope and area of natural interest." The Soviets should have "roots of interest that go beyond sheer power."

Fourth, any "excessive action" on the part of the United States toward Eastern Europe would be counterproductive, as it would undermine the objective of an "evolution that makes the relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one" (i.e., one that does "not remain founded on sheer force alone").

Fifth, American policy, then, must be one of "responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence."

Sixth, it is in American "long-term interest to influence events" in Eastern Europe because the "inorganic" Soviet-East European relationship is "a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West."

Seventh, there are positive, independent tendencies in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, but Yugoslavia's independence "borders on the vital" for the West.

Thus, it can be seen that the early phase of detente had not relegated the area to an "anachronism" in American perceptions. What detente had done was to sensitize American policy to Soviet interests there, without granting to those interests an exclusive Soviet jurisdiction. On March 29, 1976, Kissinger, perhaps overstating his case in the wake of Reagan's charges, told a Congressional committee that "we do not accept a sphere of influence of any country anywhere—and emphatically, we reject a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe." He also noted that Sonnenfeldt's use of the phrase "organic relationship" was misleading when taken out of context. 17 Shortly thereafter, President Ford reiterated that the United States "opposes Soviet domination of Eastern Europe or any kind of organic unity. It seeks to be responsive to and to
encourage as responsibly as possible the desires of the East Europeans for greater autonomy."  

The Carter administration's orientation to Eastern Europe is still evolving. Yet, it seems that East European initiatives toward the United States will have a continuing hearing. One of Carter's chief advisors is Zbigniew Brzezinski, a noted scholar on Eastern Europe. Another Carter appointee, to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, has written:

There are, of course, practical restraints on what we can do to help Eastern Europe toward greater latitude of action. But our concern with detente with the Soviet Union should not signal either to that country or to the East European states that we espouse greater Soviet control as a means to reduce Soviet anxieties and to freeze twin spheres of superpower influence.

In fact, the return of St. Stephen's crown to Hungary in January of 1978 constituted more than a symbol of the blossoming friendship between Hungary and the United States, but also the conviction that American relations with the states of Eastern Europe should reflect the distinctive characteristics of each of those nations.

Within this general context of American policy, the United States has been more responsive to Yugoslavia and Romania, given their foreign policy initiatives, than any other states in Eastern Europe. This was true even before the recent changes in the Mediterranean area which have made the Communist Balkan states more important to American interests, as these states border an area of import for wider American calculations.

U.S. Interests and Options in the Balkans and Mediterranean Area

The Balkans—consisting of the communist systems of Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria, plus the noncommunist states of Greece and Turkey—sit at the European periphery, at the edge of the Mediterranean and close to the Middle East. As such, the area has links to the European core and to the Near East, making it susceptible to crosscurrents which draw the Balkan states into East-West, North-South and Arab-Israeli tensions. When the Balkan area itself undergoes political power shifts, as has been happening, the resulting instability has spinoffs which tend to exacerbate the other tensions, for these latter engage Soviet and American competitive interests. Indeed, with the conclusion of the CSCE and the agreements which preceded it, superpower attention has shifted south, to the area around the Mediterranean.

America’s stake in the Mediterranean area has expanded significantly since 1967. Two Arab-Israeli wars, an Arab oil boycott, political turmoil in Arab states, and an impressive Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean have turned the whole area into one more and more threatening
to American world interests. At the same time, the southern flank of NATO—Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal—and non-NATO state of Spain, have been going through political crises which have affected the actual and/or potential American security interests in the Mediterranean. Anti-American reverberations from the United States stance on the Cyprus crisis led both Greece and Turkey to close or limit American/NATO bases and port facilities and led to Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO military command. For a while Portugal appeared to be on the verge of a communist regime. The post-Franco situation in Spain and tougher Spanish attitudes toward the American military presence there created great concern in Washington. This was somewhat abated by a 5-year treaty which renewed the American presence, but at a cost of $1 billion in grants and loans. Both Greece and Turkey used this agreement as a model for renegotiating American base rights on their territories; the Turkish treaty ran into considerable opposition in the Congress, throwing relations with that state into greater confusion. 30 While all this was transpiring, Italy was moving closer to a government with communist participation, an eventuality which Kissinger indicated would mean that "NATO as it is now could not survive." 21 It is no wonder that the Secretary remarked that in the "southern tier [of NATO] we are having massive problems." 22

This recent history suggests that the Mediterranean political status quo cannot be presumed. American relations swing back and forth in response to the disequilibrium, which is heightened by congressional involvement in legislating foreign policy. As allies can no longer be relied upon in the Mediterranean area, the independent Communist Balkan countries take on more importance to American interests; 23 Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period generates particular concern and attention.

American interests in the Communist Balkans consist of a mixture of geostrategic and politico-ideological considerations. Within limits that seek to avoid provoking any Soviet military response, the United States is interested in preserving and furthering independent tendencies in the Balkans, especially as the general Mediterranean disequilibrium means that "Yugoslavia and the southern tier of Eastern Europe in general have presently assumed considerable strategic importance." 24 The dimensions of these interests will be clearer after examining American interests and options in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania. Bulgaria remains the most subservient of bloc regimes and does not enter significantly into American policy and strategy for the Balkans.

**Yugoslavia.** For the United States, Yugoslavia constitutes the core of the Communist Balkans. It is with reference to Belgrade’s nonbloc, nonaligned, and autonomous foreign policy that the U.S. has perceived a contribution to its geostrategic interests. The history of American and Western efforts to rescue Tito after the 1948 Cominform expulsion have been told before, and there is no need to repeat the details at length. 25
Suffice it to say that in the midst of the Cold War the United States gave extensive economic and military aid to Yugoslavia in order to counter a Soviet bloc embargo and thus bolster an anti-Soviet communist regime. Between 1951 and 1959 this aid amounted to $700 million for military assistance and between 1950 and 1967 almost $2 billion—mainly in surplus food—in economic assistance. It was crucial to Yugoslavia in the period before 1955 and helpful thereafter. Such aid, in the words of the State Department, was part of the American policy to “offer Yugoslavia alternatives to dependence on the Soviet Union and the East European communist states and to assist Yugoslavia in establishing its independence firmly and irrevocably.”

During the 1960’s this independence was seen as important for advancing American and NATO security interests in Western Europe. In the 1970’s Yugoslav independence was seen as increasingly important for American and NATO interests in the Mediterranean area. In the earlier period Yugoslavia’s nonalignment meant that the Soviet military presence “was moved back to the middle of the Balkan peninsula, Albania was cut off geographically from the rest of the bloc and pressure on Italy and Greece was relieved.” In the later period Yugoslavia’s noncooperation with Moscow in military matters meant that the Soviet ability to maneuver in the Mediterranean was constrained and its ability to disrupt American naval activities there was limited. The United States has an interest in denying the Soviet Union a secure foothold in the Balkans, particularly on the Adriatic. Close military collaboration between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would put pressure on Italy and enhance Moscow’s military capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The political psychological impact of such a development would have negative repercussions far beyond the immediate Mediterranean area.

American interest in the post-Tito Balkans will remain rooted in these geostrategic concerns, especially should the Soviets attempt to manipulate the departure of Tito to their own political/strategic advantage. It was not surprising, then, that both the Ford and Carter administrations indicated a willingness to sell arms to Belgrade. While early moves in this direction were stymied by Yugoslav sensitivity to Western news articles that tied such sales to the prevention of a Soviet military invasion of the country after Tito’s demise, subsequent efforts have apparently been more successful. After October 1977 talks between U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Yugoslav defense chief General Nikola Ljubicic, it was reported that the U.S. would probably provide Yugoslavia with wire-guided antitank missiles and antiaircraft radar as part of an effort to help insure that Yugoslavia “... remain independent and ... able to preserve its territorial integrity.”

Concomitantly, American economic interests in Yugoslavia are growing. Bilateral relations in this area are expanding, especially in the realm of trade. Between 1971 and 1974 the American share of Yugoslav trade rose to a 1974 total of $670 million, making the United States Belgrade’s
fourth largest trading partner. This reflects, in part, the growing number of U.S.-Yugoslav joint ventures—arrangements whereby each side puts up investment capital for specific economic undertakings and thereby assumes joint ownership. In 1975 American firms were involved in seventeen joint ventures, making the United States third in number of such ventures undertaken and first in the amount of capital invested in relation to other Western states.

Bilateral economic relations were facilitated when President Nixon authorized in 1972 the extension of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance to American investments in Yugoslavia. The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) has also been active in granting credits to Yugoslavia. Some sense of the evolving scope of economic relations can be gleaned from the recent decision by Dow Chemical Co. and a Yugoslav firm to jointly invest $750 million in the construction of a petrochemical complex. This is the “largest single American investment in any East European country to date.” An earlier agreement with Westinghouse led to American involvement in the construction of Yugoslavia’s first nuclear power plant.

Politically, the United States has never wavered from its support of Yugoslavia’s independence, although the intensity of the commitment has varied. Political support has been reaffirmed at the highest levels in recent years: Nixon’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1970, Tito’s visit to Washington in 1971, Ford’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1975, the 1977 visit to Belgrade by Vice President Mondale, and Tito’s 1978 visit to Washington were all geared to an affirmation of that support. During his trip to Yugoslavia, Ford asserted that “American interest in Yugoslavia’s continued independence, integrity, and well-being, expressed often in the past, remains undiminished.” What this would mean given the acid test of a Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia is not clear. When this seemed a possibility in the aftermath of the 1968 Czech invasion, President Johnson made ambiguous warnings against such an action by the Soviet Union. Since then, however, Yugoslavia’s geostrategic importance to the United States has increased. Whether it has reached the point where the United States would be ready—unilaterally or through NATO—to assist Belgrade against such an intervention is highly dubious, at least in terms of committing armed forces. It is unlikely that such an option would receive wide popular support in the United States and the risks of a nuclear confrontation would be great. While such issues as U.S. domestic support of and the nuclear risks involved in an American commitment of military forces to the defense of Yugoslav independence do not necessarily preclude U.S. action, they certainly aggravate the decision-making process. As noted by Sonnenfeldt in his now-famous remarks:

on Yugoslavia, we and the West Europeans, indeed, the East Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domi-
nation... Any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major setback for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal. [Emphasis added.]

As long as American decisionmakers continue to define Yugoslavia as “bordering on the vital,” it is doubtful that the more extreme option would be taken. It is conceivable, though, that unified NATO action, combined with an even more severe disruption of American support in the Mediterranean, might override internal American opposition to such a move. These contingencies, however, are themselves unlikely. In the last analysis it will probably be detente and the Helsinki agreements which will prove most effective in restraining Soviet machinations. Moscow must certainly realize that any attempt to pressure or maneuver Belgrade back into the bloc would disrupt American interests in a state “bordering on the vital” and would undermine the whole panoply of East-West rapprochements that have evolved since 1970.

All of this is not to suggest that U.S.-Yugoslav relations are free of problems. On many international issues, especially those associated with the North-South “dialogue,” Washington and Belgrade are far apart. There are some in the United States—including a former American ambassador to Yugoslavia—who feel that we have been too soft on Tito and that the Yugoslavs must reciprocate in terms of their policy positions. Despite such sentiment, American foreign policy makers are less inclined to be upset with divergent Yugoslav positions than they once might have been. Whatever the differences, the fact remains that a Washington-Belgrade connection serves the realpolitik of both states.

Romania. For the United States, Romania is the most important state in Eastern Europe, after Yugoslavia. During the last 20 years, the Romanians have been pursuing a foreign policy of partial alignment—remaining a member of Soviet bloc institutions, such as Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, but at the same time opposing bloc policies and cooperation when these were perceived to threaten key national interests as defined by the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). As the only East European state to remain within but to be independent of the bloc, Romania has become an obstacle to Soviet hegemony in the Balkans and in the international communist movement. In order to carry off such a policy with success, the Romanians realized that it was necessary to develop concrete linkages to other states. Thus, political and economic ties have been developed with Western Europe, the United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Third World, and deviant or autonomous communist regimes and parties, including the Eurocommunists.

In terms of the United States, Bucharest sought to normalize relations with Washington in 1964, in the milieu of “bridge building,” but the real takeoff in these relations did not occur until after the 1968 Czech invasion. Romania did not participate in the Czech invasion and, in fact, condemned it. This event drove home to American decisionmakers the depth
of the Romanian deviation and set the stage for Nixon’s visit to Romania in 1969. 40

That visit, the first by an American President to Eastern Europe, symbolized the new American interest and support for Bucharest’s foreign policy. It also initiated a much more active level of Romanian-American exchanges. Kissinger, on a return trip to Romania in 1974, recalled the 1969 visit:

I had the privilege to visit Romania 5 years ago, when I accompanied President Nixon. We had then one of the most important talks that I have ever had in the company of the President, talks with consequences which extended far beyond the scope of our bilateral discussions. 41

It is not at all clear that the unfolding of detente threatened to undermine Romania’s “special position” in Washington, but the subsequent slowing down of the superpowers’ rapprochement ensured that Bucharest would not be ignored. Romanian foreign policy remains of interest to the United States as a barrier to Soviet control of the Balkans with a positive spinoff effect on the American position in Europe and the Mediterranean. President Ford’s visit to Bucharest in 1975 demonstrated the continuity of American support.

On a geostrategic level, Romania bolsters the security of Yugoslavia by its limited cooperation with the Warsaw Pact. The Ceausescu regime has refused to allow regular Warsaw Pact military exercises on its soil and has indicated that it would resist a military incursion—from wherever. 42 The ever-increasing Yugoslav-Romanian foreign policy coordination gives greater strength to the anti-Soviet Balkan forces by making them more resistant to Soviet pressure. Since Romania is still a member of the Warsaw Pact, the ability of the United States to assist Bucharest in military terms is severely limited. Nevertheless, there have been exchanges of military delegations between the two countries—as if to indicate that even this sensitive area is not entirely off limits.

United States-Romanian economic relations in recent years have become more active, although the United States hardly has a significant economic interest there. Romanian trade turnover with the United States stood at just over $400 million in 1974, ten times the 1969 level. Such trade has been initiated by the Romanians in their quest for political alternatives to the Soviet Union, as well as the highest level of world market technology for their industrialization. While the trade imbalance with the United States, as well as with the West Europeans, raises serious problems, the Romanians seem committed to retaining approximately 40 percent of their trade with the West. 43

The prospect for Romanian-American economic relations, assuming no severe economic setbacks on either side, is one of relatively steady growth. As with Yugoslavia, Nixon authorized the extension of Ex-Im Bank and OPIC activities to Romania, in 1971 and 1972 respectively. 44 The Romanians have also authorized joint venture arrangements, similar
to Yugoslavia, but only one American firm, Control Data, has signed such an agreement. Joint ventures will not be as plentiful as is the case in Yugoslavia, given Romania's different political and economic context.

A milestone in the countries' relations was reached on August 3, 1975, when President Ford, during his visit, signed into law the granting of MFN status to Romania—something the Romanians had been lobbying intensely for since the mid-1960's. The fact that Romania was able to get Congress to go along with MFN, without a formal pledge to improve emigration policies, was a political coup, given the abortive Soviet-American effort on the issue. (The Romanians, however, did give private, informal assurances.) Romania thus joined two other East European states with MFN—Yugoslavia and Poland—and the projection was that trade turnover with the United States would reach $1 billion by 1980. A formal communique issued by Ford and Ceausescu stated that the trade agreement represents a major contribution to the expansion of economic relations between the two countries. [It] will help Romanian-American trade to grow and diversify, thereby influencing favorably the entire range of relations between the two countries.

All of this reflects political support for Romania by the United States. This has been in force since 1968, when Lyndon Johnson included Romania in his remarks of concern over another possible Soviet intervention. Nixon's visit to Romania in 1969, Ceausescu's visits to Washington in 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1978 and Ford's visit to Romania in 1975 have underscored Washington's interest in preserving partial alignment. Said Ford in 1975: "We recognize the importance of close ties with a country that shows such independence and vigor."

There is not, however, the sense of urgency regarding Washington's approach to Romania that one finds regarding Yugoslavia. It is in part because of the nonalignment of the latter that the U.S. responds so positively to the partial alignment of the former. The United States has extended and will extend its support to Bucharest if for no other reason than the adverse effect a Moscow-controlled Romania would have on Yugoslavia and the whole Balkan situation. The options vis-a-vis Romania are limited—mainly to maintaining economic ties and political support. Given Romania's membership in the bloc, there is not much more that the United States can do.

**Albania.** The United States and Albania, for all practical purposes, have no contact with one another. Albania is the only communist state in the world today which has no relations with either Moscow or Washington. Ever since Tirane's break with Moscow in 1961 and subsequent realignment with Peking, the country has remained politically isolated, unwilling to maneuver in broad international currents, except in terms of limited trade relations. Although the jolt of the 1968 Czech invasion led Albania into renewing formal ties with several Balkan states, including Yugo-
slavia, it has not been interested in developing any kind of concerted anti-Soviet coalition. 48

Albania is, thus, something of an anachronism in world affairs. Its geostrategic position on the Adriatic, next to Greece, makes it of potential consequence to both superpowers: the Soviet Union, which would find a military foothold in Albania invaluable for putting military pressure on Yugoslavia, NATO, and the United States Navy; the United States, which would find such an eventuality very damaging to its security interests. By denying Moscow access to the naval base which it built there in the 1950’s, Albania benefits the United States more than the Soviet Union by its current stance. But the potentiality for playing off the superpowers has not yet been tapped by the Albanians, to the detriment of their international position.

As the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL), under Enver Hoxha, gets increasingly old, there are steady signs that parts of the party and population are restive with the country’s political isolation. There are elements who would like to bring about a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, perhaps with the United States. Hoxha has been purging upper level and lower level party members who might be so inclined. A Washington Post report indicated that diplomats say there is evidence of growing disenchantment with Hoxha and his isolationist policies that have brought about economic stagnation and isolated Albania from the outside world. This disenchantment is believed to be strong in military and intellectual circles. 49

Given the shift by China toward the United States, the probable interest of Yugoslavia and Romania in greater cooperation with Albania, and the obvious advantages which could be reaped by playing off the superpowers for aid, it is probably only a matter of waiting for the post-Hoxha period before Tirane begins to practice realpolitik. In such a circumstance, Albania would find the United States ready to respond to any initiatives. Secretary of State William Rogers indicated in 1972 that

the absence of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of Albania stood out at the end of 1972 as unfinished business in our search for normal relations with all countries regardless of differences. However, the direction of movement in the policies of both the United States and Albania gave promise that in due course normal relations would be resumed. 50

It seems likely that the post-Hoxha era will find Albania breaking out of its political isolation and developing limited contacts with the United States.

Projections for the Future

Because of where they are situated—at the crossroads of East-West, North-South and Arab-Israeli tensions—the Communist Balkans can ignore the United States only through a rejection of realpolitik, and the
United States can ignore the Communist Balkans only at the risk of weakening its general strategic and political power position. In this context, then, those Communist Balkan states desiring a realistic independence will find the United States ready to extend varieties of support. This support has, and will, contribute to bolstering the independent proclivities of the Balkan states. Without such support, autonomous foreign policies would be more difficult to sustain. For the United States the mere existence of nonconformity within the Communist Balkan states represents a significant strategic and political gain with positive ramifications in Europe and the Mediterranean.

The future role of the United States in the Communist Balkans will be one of continuing, if limited, involvement through economic and political support and, in case of Yugoslavia, perhaps some military aid. Should Albania establish a working relationship with the United States, this would probably be in conjunction with an active, anti-Soviet axis composed of Tirane, Belgrade, and Bucharest which would, in turn, further stimulate American interest and involvement in that subregion. One thing, though, is reasonably clear: as long as the United States is involved in those international dynamics which conjoin in the Mediterranean area, it cannot afford to ignore the independent states of the Communist Balkans.

Notes


3. As quoted ibid., p. 50.


5. Kovrig, p. 80.

6. Ibid., p. 146.

7. As quoted ibid., p. 163.


16. These points are derived from the Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt summaries, op. cit.


19. Paul C. Warnke, “We Don't Need a Devil (to Make or Keep Our Friends).” *Foreign Policy*, No. 25 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 82-83.


27. Ibid.


29. Pentagon concerns over these possibilities are discussed in the *New York Times*, December 28, 1975.


34. RFE Research, Yugoslavia, March 22, 1976.


38. Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism," Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-27.

39. A more detailed discussion of these developments is found in Robert L. Farlow, "Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment," Problems of Communism, XX, No. 6 (November-December, 1971), pp. 54-63.


42. This threat was made by Ceausescu immediately after the Czech invasion.

43. For a detailed discussion of the economic dimension of Romanian foreign policy (as well as Yugoslav, Albanian and Bulgarian) see Cal Clark and Robert L. Farlow, Comparative Patterns of Foreign Policy and Trade: The Communist Balkans in International Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University International Development Research Center, 1976).


Ill. Chinese Interests and Policy Options in the Balkans

Steven I. Levine

From an historical point of view, it is quite remarkable that China, still largely a regional Asian power, developed such strong ties with the Balkan communist states of Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia over the past 20-odd years. These links originated from China's membership in the Soviet-led communist bloc during the first decade of the existence of the People's Republic of China (PRC), but their further development is a reflection of China's growing importance as a major actor in world politics. Contemporary Sino-Balkan relations form one strand of China's present hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, and PRC leaders perceive their support of the dissident Balkan communist states as a means of countering the threat which they assert Soviet power poses to China itself. Its Balkan ties are also a concrete example of China's important foreign policy theme of cooperation with small and medium states in order to transform the international system. Both these themes of China's Balkan policy require further examination.

If China's Balkan policy is a function of adversary Sino-Soviet relations, how would even a limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement affect Peking's interests in the region? Does China's emergence as a major power imply that it will soon diminish its cooperation with the smaller states and seek understandings with the other major powers along traditional lines? Can the Sino-Albanian relationship be restored in light of the current ideological dispute between the two formerly close allies?

This chapter will first examine Chinese views of the international environment and the historical context of Sino-Balkan relations. Through a consideration of the specific factors in China's regional and bilateral policies in the Balkans, it will then be possible to confront the question of Chinese policy options in the Balkans.

China's Perspective on International Politics

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and signs of America's impending failure in Vietnam encouraged Chinese leaders to reevaluate
their hitherto guiding perception that the United States and the Soviet Union posed nearly equal dangers to Chinese security. A sharp debate over the main lines of foreign policy eventuated in the still obscure purge of Lin Piao, Mao's erstwhile designated successor.¹ By the time of President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, it had become clear that China considered the USSR as its major adversary. The United States, which Peking viewed as a crumpled "paper tiger," was deemed to have entered a phase of accelerating decline, although its great influence and power still made it useful as a counterweight to the USSR.

No longer preoccupied with the notion that Soviet-American collusion threatened Chinese interests, Peking now focused on its own long-term competition with the USSR. Chinese leaders began to stress the need to establish a broad united front in order to counter the supposed universal threat which Moscow's "hegemonic ambitions" represent. Predicting that Soviet-American competition must inevitably eventuate in war, Mao Tse-tung's successors in Peking continue to point to Europe as the main arena of superpower competition while reminding their countrymen that Moscow still poses a serious long-term threat to China's own security.

This perspective suggests the essential content of PRC European policy. In Western Europe, China seeks to cultivate good relations especially with those political forces which are distrustful of detente and continue to believe in the reality of a long-term Soviet threat. In recent years China has given strong verbal support to European economic integration and a strong NATO.² In Eastern Europe, China seeks to weaken the solidarity of the Soviet alliance system by supporting independent-minded communist states such as Romania and Yugoslavia. Peking also savagely attacks alleged Soviet neoimperialist controls in that part of the continent.

Peking's vision of a new international order appears to be a world system in which superpower influence is restrained by the rise of countervailing centers of power in areas of direct superpower competition as well as in the secure backyards of the Soviet Union and the United States—Eastern Europe and Latin America respectively. As this new structure of power takes shape, China's developing political, economic, and military strength will garner for her a position of influence commensurate with her new power.

### China and the European Communist States

Chinese interaction with the European communist states, including the Balkan communist states, has gone through four somewhat overlapping phases: (a) 1948–56, limited interaction; (b) 1956–60, search for parity; (c) 1961–68, struggle for leadership; (d) 1968–, support for independence.

Before the actual establishment of the PRC in 1949 and continuing until 1956 when Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the Hungarian revolution produced a crisis in world communism, Chinese leaders were
inclined to follow the lead of the Soviet Union in international communist affairs. In 1948, for example, Liu Shao-ch'i, a top-ranking leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dutifully echoed the Soviet line on Yugoslavia in his essay "Internationalism and Nationalism," and Chinese media endorsed the purge of "Titoists" in Eastern Europe. China's accession to the communist camp coincided with the final years of the Stalin era when relations among the subordinate bloc members were discouraged by the Soviet dictator. Chinese leaders had their own considerable difficulties with the Soviet Union from the very beginning of the Sino-Soviet alliance, but there is no evidence that they sought to make common cause with the European communist states to pressure the bloc leader.

The half decade 1956-60 witnessed the origins of Communist Chinese involvement in European communist politics. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary appeared to validate Mao Tse-tung's doubts about the wisdom of de-Stalinization. Seizing the opportunity afforded by the crisis, China intervened vigorously in bloc affairs, seeking to establish a new and more equitable basis for intrabloc relations. Premier Chou En-lai's tour of Eastern Europe in the winter of 1956-57 not only demonstrated China's new interest in European communist politics, but also in effect asserted a claim to a Chinese junior partnership in running the camp.

The sharp deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1960, marked by the launching of open polemics at the Bucharest congress of the Romanian Communist Party, had a major impact on China's relations with Eastern Europe. Chou En-lai's walkout from the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, in response to Khrushchev's public attacks on Albania, dramatized China's developing commitment to what quickly became her staunchest ally during the next stormy decade. In its attempt to forge a new coalition of antirevisionist communist parties, China can have had little hope of making headway among the Soviet-dominated European communists. In fact, only Romania among the East European states skillfully used the split to bolster its autonomy. (Throughout this period, Yugoslavia continued to be a target of Chinese revilement.)

Relations between China and East Europe mimicked the downward curve of Sino-Soviet interaction with a sharp dropoff in trade and cultural exchanges. After recruiting only small bands of adherents in most of the communist parties around the world (reorganized into pro-Peking splinter groups or "pocket parties" as the Soviets derisively termed them), the Chinese basically withdrew from international communist affairs.

The last decade of Chinese foreign policy has been a renewed attempt to promote the long-term weakening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe by supporting any and all manifestations of East European autonomy from Moscow. So far, such signs have been limited, except in the Balkan communist states of Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Yet the Chinese do not concede a "natural" sphere of influence to the USSR in Eastern Europe. Although Chinese leaders are too realistic to expect a short-term
dissolution of Moscow's European sphere of influence, they can look to the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania as well as their own relationship with Moscow to validate the proposition that the appearance of a stable alliance may only thinly mask contradictions leading to rift and separation. In case of a new intrabloc crisis, it may not be possible to muster a Kremlin majority to sanction the use of military force as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In addition, it might be observed that the relationships within the world communist movement, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), have changed significantly over the past 15 years. At the conference of European communist parties in June 1976, Soviet leaders felt constrained to accept the principle of autonomy for the constituent parties of a movement which no longer possesses a formally designated center of authority. Within CMEA and the WTO, processes of bargaining and more equal structures of decisionmaking have marked an end to the era of Soviet fiat. Without a doubt, China's support of Albania and Romania has been an important catalyst in bringing about these changes. In an important sense, although the 1960's PRC ideological goal of countering "revisionism" in the world communist movement remains unattained, the 1970's goal of promoting autonomy and defending national sovereignty is much closer to fruition. Whether this will promote the undermining of Moscow's basic position in Eastern Europe or lead to its strengthening remains to be seen.

China's Regional Goals and Policies

China's leaders assert at present that the major long-term threat to their country's security comes from the USSR. As a global power with multiple interests and ambitions around the world, the USSR must closely consider the repercussions which its actions in one international arena may produce in all the other arenas where its interests are involved. Chinese strategists play upon this multiplicity of Soviet interests in an effort to weaken the Kremlin's ability to cope with the Chinese challenge. The extension of Soviet power produces vulnerability.

As noted above, Chinese media and leaders assert that Europe is the center of superpower contention and they constantly point to signs of Soviet activity which threaten the security of European states, both communist and noncommunist.

It is in this context that the PRC perceives the Balkan peninsula as an area of strategic significance which the USSR covets. The People's Daily has noted that, "The Balkan peninsula, which occupies a very important strategic position in Europe, has always been the scene of contention among imperialist powers. Today the sharp contention between the superpowers is threatening the independence and security of the Balkan countries." Another commentary makes explicit the contention that:
It is Soviet social-imperialism, inheriting the dreams of the old tsars, which harbors designs of naked aggression against the Balkans. In order to open a way for its expansion into the south of Europe and the Mediterranean, it carries out long-term threats, intervention and control against the Balkan States, and strives to absorb this area completely into its sphere of influence. . . . It is the main threat to the independence and security of the Balkan countries and the most dangerous enemy of the Balkan peoples. 9

The Chinese share the view that the strategic significance of the Balkan region derives from its pivotal position at the juncture of southern Europe, northern Africa and the Middle East. The Balkans' proximity to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, near the Soviet outlet from the Black Sea, makes them a particularly important object of Soviet military interest. Over the past several years, the PRC has repeatedly drawn attention to Soviet naval expansion, including the impressive growth of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, the ultimate object of which, allegedly, is to "turn the Mediterranean into a Soviet inland sea." 10 As one typical report stated:

From Portugal and the Iberian Peninsula through the Apennine and Balkan Peninsulas all the way to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus they either intervene directly, use pro-Soviet forces as a fifth column, or threaten military force, subvert from within, utilize contradictions, stir up discord, and exploit weakness. 11

This Soviet naval threat is combined with the increased activity of land forces.

Huge Soviet forces deployed in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula frequently stage military exercises as a blackmail against certain Balkan countries. The Soviet Union has also set up a South European command of the Warsaw Pact bloc on the peninsula, rigged up a South European army corps of this bloc, expanded airfields and depots and stockpiled huge amounts of materiel in preparation for opening up a land route to the Adriatic Sea when conditions are ripe. 12

What purpose are these Peking philippics designed to serve? Basically they are part of a broad PRC effort to pique the Western alliance into maintaining a strong military posture in Europe despite the slackness induced by detente. Secondarily, the Chinese hope to nurture the suspicion of Soviet power which is already naturally present in the region itself, and thereby to stimulate military preparedness in Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The clear signals from Tirane, Bucharest, and Belgrade in the wake of the Czech invasion that they would resist a Soviet invasion with an all-out national effort earned plaudits from the Chinese.

China's Military Involvement in the Balkans

Does PRC interest in the security and independence of the Balkans imply any commitment to the defense of that region?

China's most direct military involvement in the Balkans has been the partial supply and training of the Albanian armed forces. It is estimated
that between 1965 and 1974, Albania received $77 million in Chinese arms, the entire amount received from abroad in this decade. However, to put this figure in perspective, it should be noted that this was only 3.5 percent of the PRC's total arms export for this period (2.22 billion in current dollars) and that Albania is estimated to have spent $127 million for defense in 1975 alone. Moreover, most of Albania's heavy military equipment is obsolescent Soviet material from the 1950's. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, reports circulated that China had provided Albania with a coastal defense system of sorts including artillery, anti-aircraft missiles, and naval rockets to repulse any Soviet landing attempt. Sino-Albanian military consultations occurred on a regular basis until the end of 1975, but no military delegations have been exchanged since then.

During the same 1965–74 decade, China supplied Romania with $14 million dollars of military equipment or 2.6 percent, while the USSR supplied 95.1 percent of arms transfers to its WTO ally. Yugoslavia has not received any Chinese military assistance. However, during the past several years, exchanges of military delegations between China and Yugoslavia and Romania have been a prominent feature of the relations between these countries.

In the event of a Soviet-induced military intervention in the Balkans (either by the USSR itself or any combination of WTO states), for obvious reasons it is almost impossible to anticipate a direct PRC military response. The distance between China and the Balkans, the PRC's paucity of airlift or other long-range logistical capacity, and the ease with which the Soviets could interdict the movement of Chinese material in case of war would frustrate any PRC attempt to supply military goods to its Balkan friends. As Chou En-lai remarked to a Yugoslav journalist in 1971, "A fire cannot be extinguished with water from a distant well." Similarly, a senior Chinese official in November, 1977, expressing fear that Soviet forces might enter Yugoslavia after Tito dies, said that "We will help Yugoslavia. But we are far away and do not have sophisticated military equipment. We are convinced the Yugoslav people would fight an invader, but this may not be enough." Nor is the PRC stake in the Balkans large enough to make likely any large-scale diversionary moves along China's own borders with the USSR in the event of a Soviet intervention in the Balkans. (However, Chinese activity on this border in 1969, eventuating in the armed clashes of March, may have been a reminder of the Soviets that China could help ease the pressure somewhat on its Balkan friends even at such a distance.)

China could be expected to denounce a Soviet adventure in the Balkans in the strongest possible terms and to help raise the political cost of such a step. Implicit in the Chinese leaders' endorsement of people's war as the only correct defense strategy in the Balkans is the calculation that the likely outcome of an attempted Soviet blitzkrieg in the Balkans would be a protracted guerrilla war. In such an event, they hope but are by no
means confident that Western self-interest would prompt NATO to supply the Balkan guerrillas with materiel to continue their struggle.  

What China does contribute to Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia is political support which helps render the scenario of a Soviet military intervention improbable. For such an intervention would further fragment the international communist movement and confirm the shrillest Chinese rhetoric about the "military-fascist" character of the Soviet state. Moreover, Moscow might have to abandon whatever dim hopes it still entertains of constructing an Asian collective security system—a prime aim of its Asian policy for a number of years now. 

Of course, a closer look reveals that China's contribution to the security of Albania in the 1960's overshadowed its contribution to Romania. (Sino-Yugoslav relations did not begin to improve until 1969.) Throughout the bitter polemics with the PRC, Soviet leaders did not abandon the hope of eventually improving relations with Peking. A Soviet move to liquidate the Hoxha regime through military means (which Albania's geographic position would have made extremely complicated in any case), was virtually precluded by Tirane's ties to Peking. The takeover of China's European ally would have greatly diminished the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Thus Hoxha's calculation that the PRC could serve as a reliable protector despite its distant location proved correct. The Sino-Albanian ideological dispute which has flared since Mao Tsetung's death has called this calculation into question.

Looking at the reverse side of the equation, one can see a similar though smaller Balkan contribution to China's security. Soviet efforts to stabilize relations with Romania and improve them with Yugoslavia would be gravely damaged by a Soviet military move against the PRC. (Albanian reaction would be irrelevant in this connection.) Bucharest and Belgrade would be sure to join in a chorus of communist and non-communist voices decrying such a move. (Of course, to put things in proper perspective, it must be noted that Sino-American relations play a much greater role in ensuring Soviet restraint vis-a-vis China.) Romanian insistence that the Warsaw Treaty Organization cannot be used as an anti-China instrument, and Bucharest's refusal to participate in any international communist meeting whose purpose is to exclude China from the ranks of communist states has also afforded important protection to Peking.

**Peking's Support of Regional Integration in the Balkans**

The watchword of Peking's policy in the Balkans is support for the defense of state sovereignty and national independence. Unlike Soviet leaders from Stalin through Brezhnev who have employed crude tactics of economic and political pressure against Balkan communist states,
PRC leaders have generally been more subtle in their relation to the internal politics of these countries. To be sure, China lacks political leverage in Romania and Yugoslavia, and in Albania where its influence has been great until recently, it has apparently acted less cautiously and may have gotten involved on the losing side of Albanian political infighting.

In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, China contended that the principles of peaceful coexistence, which should order relations only among states with different social systems according to Soviet theory, were fully applicable as well to relations among socialist states. If these principles of respect for sovereignty and nonintervention were honored by the Soviet Union, then the events of 1968 could not have occurred. (Romania too has strongly endorsed the applicability of peaceful coexistence within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.) Yet despite their emphasis on the inviolability of state boundaries and the importance of national sovereignty, Chinese leaders are not 19th century nationalists leery of supranational cooperation. On the contrary, Chinese policy actively supports the formation of regional organizations for both security and economic purposes. Medium and small states can effectively counterpose the superpowers only by pooling their strength.

In this vein, China has endorsed tentative efforts toward greater regional cooperation in the Balkans. Peking's encouragement of the Albanians to pursue a more conciliatory line toward their Balkan neighbors in the late 1960's and early 1970's was one early sign of this. In early 1976 a Balkan nations conference on economic and technical questions held in Athens marked a small first step in regional cooperation. (However, Albania refused to participate.) The People's Daily hailed this conference saying that:

the fact that the Balkan states gathered, for the first time since the end of the war, to discuss ways to cooperate with each other, has a positive significance in itself. It is clear proof of the common wish of the Balkan states and peoples to draw closer their ties of cooperation.

Of course, the Chinese linked the conference to their leitmotif of opposing Soviet hegemonism:

The Balkan countries have come to realize that the reliable way to safeguard their independence and security is to strengthen their national defense, promote understanding and cooperation among themselves and oppose aggression, intimidation and intervention from without.

Similarly, another PRC commentary hailed Greek initiatives to strengthen relations with Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania, and Albania. Chinese dissatisfaction with Albania's refusal to participate in the Athens conference

*Soviet attempts to oust Tito and Hoxha are notorious. In addition, Khrushchev apparently attempted to engineer the removal of Romania's maverick leader Gheorghiu-Dej in 1963 but failed.
may be clearly inferred. This suggests, incidentally, that Albania's boycott of the Helsinki Conference was an autonomous decision which, however, Peking approved. After an initial reorientation of her foreign policy in the 1968–70 period, Albania reverted to an isolationist policy, and with increasing vigor after Mao Tse-tung's death condemned China's collaboration with her erstwhile enemies in Western Europe and the United States (see below).

In sum, China favors the "de-Balkanization" of the Balkans because an increase in interaction between the communist and noncommunist states of the region may serve to attenuate Soviet influence further. At the outer boundary of expectation, even Moscow's faithful Balkan ally, Bulgaria, might be lured into a loose grouping of Balkan states, and its automatic compliance with Soviet foreign policy might be called into question. (It should be added that the Chinese themselves do not give expression to this thought.) The PRC, then, in recent years has begun thinking of the Balkans not solely in terms of individual states but as a region whose potential for greater unity is founded on the allegedly common danger it faces from the Soviet Union. However, in view of the turbulent history of the peninsula, one may question how solid a base this is for future cooperation. Albania's adamant refusal under Hoxha to follow China's foreign policy lead has dimmed the prospects for pan-Balkan cooperation, and Chinese commentary since 1976 has focused on bilateral relations with the Balkan states, although PRC hopes for Balkan regional cooperation no doubt persist. If the beginnings of regional cooperation contribute even marginally to Moscow's anxiety about the loyalty of the states on its southwest border, then Peking will have attained its major goal.

**China's Economic Links With the Balkans**

China's economic transactions with the Balkan communist states have expanded in recent years in tandem with the PRC's growing political interest in the region, but these links have been of critical importance only to Albania. The PRC uses trade as a foreign policy instrument, though more often to reward its friends than to express its displeasure.

In 1976 China's trade with Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia was roughly $600 million or just about 5 percent of China's total trade turnover. This trade serves the important political purpose of strengthening the links between China and the three Balkan states, and in each case the growth of trade has paralleled as well as expedited the development of political ties. However, in terms both of size and commodity composition, this trade is not essential to the PRC and could be directed elsewhere if necessary.

**Albania.** Like the Soviet Union in Cuba, China discovered that maintaining a poor and distant ally can be an expensive proposition indeed.
Although few statistics are available to help gauge the real cost of China’s links with Albania, American officials estimate that the PRC’s Albanian aid bill may have run about $100 million a year between 1971 and 1975. 28 This would have amounted to a subsidy of $40 per capita for each Albanian, a substantial figure in view of China’s own estimated per capita income of about $240 per year in the mid-1970’s. 29

China’s economic assistance to Albania commenced in 1954, but it was only after the Soviet verbal attack on Tirane that the PRC became a key factor in Albania’s economy. 30 When the USSR withheld vital grain supplies from Albania in 1960, a year of severe drought, and reneged on her economic commitments in order to break the will of the Albanian leadership, Peking stepped in to provide emergency shipments of foodstuffs and other assistance. 31 Coming at a time of profound economic crisis in the PRC, the aid extended to Albania in 1960–61 (including the expenditure of foreign exchange to purchase Canadian wheat for Tirane), was an indication of how much importance Peking attached to the survival of the anti-Soviet Hoxha leadership. 32

Major Chinese loans of $123 million in 1961 and $214 million in 1966 helped finance the Albanian third and fourth Five-Year Plans. 33 Additional loans were later provided in unspecified amounts. The most recent was included in the July 1975 Sino-Albanian trade protocol which included a long-term, interest-free loan for the purchase of equipment, and a 1976–80 trade agreement. 34 In 1959 Sino-Albanian trade had accounted for only 3 percent of Albania’s imports and 2½ percent of its exports, but by the mid-1960’s the PRC accounted for about 55 percent of Albanian foreign trade (see table 2). For the period 1971–1975, China is estimated to have provided 53 percent of Albanian imports while taking 23 percent of her exports. 35 Albania’s chronic deficit in this trade is a major form of Chinese assistance. Chinese capital goods and technology have been central to Albanian economic development during the past 17 years. 36 Only Albanian chrome exports have been of any real economic significance to China.

### Table 2.—Sino-Albanian Trade (in millions U.S. $).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total turnover</th>
<th>As percent of Albanian trade</th>
<th>As percent of PRC trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>22.25</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>53.84</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>65.03</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>85.64</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–76 per annum estimate</td>
<td>125.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
China's economic relations with Albania have been based upon long-term trade protocols and facilitated through the Sino-Albanian Commission for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, the Sino-Albanian Shipping Company, and so on. Although China paid a stiff price for its links with Albania, in recent years signs multiplied that top Albanian officials had been dissatisfied with the level of PRC aid. During Mao Tse-tung's lifetime, Enver Hoxha reaffirmed his support of Albania's ties with China, although he too admitted that in the future Albania would have to rely more on its own efforts and less on Chinese aid for economic development.

Although Sino-Albanian economic exchanges continued after the open ideological rift of mid-1977, the increasingly anti-Chinese criticism from Tirane and Albanian expressions of support for Vietnam in its disputes with China ultimately led the Chinese to terminate their aid program. In a 22 July 1978 open letter replying to China's 13 July 1978 decision to sever aid to its former ally, the Albanians accused Chinese leaders of megalomania and betrayal of communism. Then on 30 July 1978 the Albanians released a 56-page letter from the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that detailed the Sino-Albanian split. According to the letter, what had provoked the ideological rift between the two countries had been China's periodic attempts to repair relations with the Soviets and, at other times, to seek accommodations with the West. On 1 August 1978 Albania's official press agency quoted an Albanian worker's statement as saying: "Neither pressure and blackmail, nor blockades, encirclement, and the cessation of economic and military aid intimidate us."

**Romania.** It is well known that one aspect of Romania's partial estrangement from the Soviet bloc was the shifting of much of its trade away from the CMEA countries. By 1973 only 42.4 percent of Romania's foreign trade was within CMEA. During this same time Sino-Romanian economic links steadily expanded. Romania has climbed from sixth to first place among Peking's CMEA trading partners (see table 3). Moreover, in 1971 Romania became the first CMEA nation with which the PRC signed a long-term trade agreement. It covered the period 1972-75. A renewal of this agreement was signed for the period 1976-80. The bulk of this trade consists of Romanian industrial goods (e.g., trucks, electric locomotives, machine tools, pipes) exchanged for Chinese non-ferrous metals, rolled steel, chemicals, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. In October 1971 a 2-week Romanian industrial exhibition in Peking drew the largest reported attendance of any such exhibit in China. Another Romanian trade fair was held in August 1974. China participated in the First Bucharest International Consumer Goods Fair in May 1974.

What is more striking as an indication of the importance which Peking ascribes to its relationship with Romania is the extensive aid which Peking
TABLE 3.—Sino-Romanian Trade (in millions U.S. $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total turnover</th>
<th>As percent of Romanian trade</th>
<th>As percent of PRC trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>84.40</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>81.75</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>133.88</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>188.70</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>218.54</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>217.03</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>435.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>453.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

has provided to Bucharest. In November 1970 China agreed to provide Romania with a long-term interest-free loan of $245 million, and the following October extended another loan of an amount unspecified. Following these loans, the intensity of Sino-Romanian economic exchanges increased. Peking also earned Romanian goodwill by making substantial contributions to flood relief and reconstruction during the disastrous floods which Romania experienced. PRC loans to Romania (an example of the poor giving to the less poor) were well-timed, coming when Romania’s trade opening to the West was faltering and Western credit was becoming more difficult to obtain.

The economic links which the PRC has developed with Romania are of benefit to both countries. In addition, as a tangible instrument of Peking’s support for Romania’s autonomous foreign policy, these ties are likely to remain an important component of the Sino-Romanian relationship.

Yugoslavia. The visit of a Yugoslav trade mission to China in February-March 1969 (unreported in the Chinese press) was the first fruit of the Chinese decision to resume relations with a regime which in 1963 they had termed a “special detachment of U.S. imperialism for sabotaging the world revolution.” From a very modest $1.59 million in 1969, trade turnover increased spectacularly to $116 million by 1974, but declined precipitously in the next 2 years (see table 4). Recent indications are that trade will again expand considerably to the highest levels yet attained.

A Yugoslav industrial exhibit in Peking in December 1971 led to a Chinese order for a dozen Yugoslav ships as well as diesel engines and other marine equipment. (In 1973, 65 percent of Chinese imports from Yugoslavia were ships and related goods, while China exported foodstuffs, animal hides, consumer goods, etc.) The Yugoslav port of Rijeka is used as a transshipment point for Chinese goods going to Eastern
Europe, and China has chartered a number of Yugoslav ships for its European trade.\textsuperscript{54} During the visit of the late Yugoslav Premier Bijedic to Peking in October 1975, agreement was reached to establish a joint Sino-Yugoslav trade committee to facilitate trade relations.\textsuperscript{55} During Tito's visit to China in August-September 1977, the Chinese said that interference from the "Gang of Four" had been responsible for the sharp downturn in Sino-Yugoslav trade in the past several years, and the Minister of Foreign Trade, Li Chiang, indicated that Sino-Yugoslav trade in 1978 would rise to about $120 million.\textsuperscript{56}

China's trade with Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia has, in the past, been of much greater political than economic significance for the PRC. While this trend can be expected to continue, the recent Chinese pursuit of technology and greater economic progress may lead to the development of a significant increase in trade with Romania and Yugoslavia. For the present, however, China's economic interests in the Balkans are fairly modest and can best be viewed as an outgrowth of her primary political involvement in the region.

The End of Ideology?

China's initial involvement in the Balkans was prompted, at least manifestly, by ideological considerations. In 1960–61, together with the Albanians, the Chinese took up their polemical sticks against the revisionist Yugoslavs and their Soviet sympathizers and beat a steady tattoo of criticism against Yugoslavia throughout the Cultural Revolution. During this same period, Albania served as China's ideological claque in international communism and lauded the wisdom of Mao Tse-tung during the Cultural Revolution apogee of the Mao cult. By late 1978 the situation had changed considerably.

Analysts have noted that a concomitant of the reorientation of Chinese foreign policy in 1969–71 was a decline of CCP interest in the Marxist-Leninist breakaway parties which had looked to Peking for leadership and inspiration during the 1960's.\textsuperscript{57} Claiming that the "restoration of

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Total turnover & As percent of Yugoslav trade & As percent of PRC trade \\
\hline
1969 & 1.59 & 0.07 & 0.04 \\
1970 & 6.81 & 0.24 & 0.16 \\
1971 & 7.01 & 0.21 & 0.15 \\
1972 & 19.26 & 0.56 & 0.31 \\
1973 & 66.23 & 1.40 & 0.67 \\
1974 & 116.60 & 1.40 & 0.85 \\
1975 & 30.90 & 0.26 & 0.21 \\
1976 & 28.90 & 0.24 & 0.22 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Sino-Yugoslav Trade (in millions U.S. $)}
\end{table}
capitalism" in the USSR had transformed the former socialist bloc into semi-colonial dependencies of the Soviet Union. China virtually ceased its efforts to wage an ideological and organizational struggle within the international communist movement. Peking's studied silence on the sputtering efforts to convoke a new world conference of communist parties in the 1970's was striking evidence of its change of course. By the mid-1960's, of course, the Chinese could already rely upon the Romanian and Italian communist parties—later joined by many others—to resist any Soviet attempt to mobilize world communism against Peking or to restore Soviet hegemony in the movement. And by 1969, as Kevin Devlin aptly noted, the Budapest conference of seventy-five communist parties "marked the institutionalization of diversity and dissent in the world communist movement."

In effect, the outcome of the epic Moscow-Peking struggle for ideological and organizational leadership in world communism was a loss of authority for Moscow without a victory for Peking, at least on the terms it had originally envisioned. This was amply confirmed by the East Berlin conference of European communist parties in June 1976, whose final statement endorsed "the principles of equality and sovereign independence of each party, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for their free choice of different roads..." along the lines which Tito and Ceausescu, among others, had long been seeking. Whether or not the new principles which the CPSU likewise endorsed will have any effect on Soviet activity in Eastern Europe remains to be seen, but in any case the control and manipulation of ideology from an authoritative center has ceased to be an important form of power in world communism.

The experience of the last decade has apparently taught Peking that its acceptance of ideological diversity is a more effective weapon against Moscow than its previous quixotic attempt to form a new antirevisionist majority from among the diverse communist parties of the world. Perhaps Peking's new realism is just a Hobson's choice. In this context, since 1969 the CCP appears to have adopted a distinctly Low Church approach to doctrinal matters with respect to Balkan communism, except where it has been attacked by the Albanians. In response to Tirane's attacks on Mao Tse-tung's three worlds theory, the Chinese continue to emphasize their adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, although the content of Maoism has been significantly altered since Mao's death and the purge of the so-called Gang of Four. The CCP has also mustered its supporters within the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties to endorse the correctness of Mao's three worlds theory and defend China against charges of revisionism.

With respect to Romania and more particularly Yugoslavia, the PRC glosses over ideological issues almost entirely. Chinese high officials prefer to stress that their links with the two nations are based on common opposition to imperialism and hegemonism and a commitment to state sovereignty and national independence. Although the era of Chinese
diatribes against Yugoslav revisionism is fast fading into the past. China has still not quite accepted the notion that Yugoslavia is a socialist country. In his speech at a welcoming banquet for President Tito in August 1977, Hua Kuo-feng noted that “Yugoslavia has developed into a prosperous industrial and agricultural country.” His omission of the term “socialist” was striking. However, after the Tito visit, as Sino-Yugoslav relations continued to flourish, the first contacts between the Chinese Communist Party and the Yugoslav League of Communists developed with a CCP delegation to Yugoslavia in March 1978. In addition, the Chinese have expressed interest in the Yugoslav system of workers’ self-management as of possible relevance to Chinese industry.

In short, although it cannot be said that ideology has ceased to exist in China’s Balkan policy, it is clear that the scope and salience of its role has decreased. A period of united front vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is hardly the time to emphasize the remaining ideological differences between China and the Balkan communist states.

China’s Bilateral Relations in the Balkans

China and Albania—The Collapsed Alliance. The PRC-Albanian alliance which was forged in adversity during the early 1960’s was destroyed in the course of China’s rapprochement with the United States, Western Europe, and Yugoslavia. Despite the break over ideological and policy differences, given China’s broad participation in the international system, any link with Albania would have been an increasingly minor component of PRC foreign relations. In the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Albania served several important functions: (1) spokesman for PRC ideological views; (2) symbol of support for China’s foreign policy success. Somewhat later, when PRC foreign policy had suffered setbacks both in the international communist and world political arenas and China was preoccupied with Cultural Revolution domestic political issues, the link with Albania embodied the ideological zeal of PRC policy and was a token of ultimate revolutionary success.

Significant policy differences between China and Albania appeared as the PRC began to reverse its foreign policy course. Albania’s unease at the beginning of Sino-Soviet talks in the fall of 1969 mounted rapidly in 1971, when Peking began its rapprochement with the United States and also received a delegation from the “revisionist” Spanish Communist Party led by Santiago Carillo. At the Sixth Congress of the Albanian Labor Party in 1971, Enver Hoxha signaled his disapproval of China’s invitation to President Nixon by warning that:

As long as the imperialist United States and the revisionist Soviet Union are two imperialist superpowers and come out with a common counterrevolutionary strategy, it is impossible for the struggle of the peoples against them not to merge into a common trend. You cannot rely on one imperialism to oppose the other.
Similarly, *Zeri i Popullit*, the Albanian party newspaper, condemned China's invitation of Santiago Carillo by saying that, "One cannot have contacts and talks with some revisionists because they have differences with certain other revisionists."

China boycotted the Sixth ALP Congress, and reiterated its new foreign policy line, but refrained from directly attacking Albanian leaders. The divergence between Albania and the PRC grew as China's new line of support for European integration, the EEC, and NATO came into full force. In the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania moved to improve its relations with its immediate neighbors such as Yugoslavia and Greece, and with Western Europe but, as noted above, it has been extremely leery of efforts at Balkan cooperation, no doubt in part because of strong memories that, as a result of its neighbors' intrusions, modern Albania has managed only a precarious independence. Between 1971 and 1976 the state of Sino-Albanian relations varied in accordance with the direction in which the political winds were blowing in Peking. Tirane responded warmly to signs that the Cultural Revolution radicals were gaining control, but relations chilled in periods when the Chinese "moderates" seemed in the ascendancy.

In the spring of 1976 as the radicals pressed their campaign against Teng Hsiao-p'ing, First Secretary Hoxha denied the "slander" that "the friendly relations between China and Albania have become cold." and he reaffirmed the "glorious and unbreakable friendship between the Albanian and Chinese peoples, [and] between our two Marxist-Leninist Parties..." But at the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Labor Party in October 1976, Hoxha repeated his 1971 criticism of China's policy toward the United States and, as noted above, asserted that Albania would be more self-sufficient in the future. Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng sent a message of greeting but no delegation to the ALP Congress.

The purge of the Cultural Revolution radicals—the so-called Gang of Four—and the ascendancy within the PRC of a pragmatic coalition severely exacerbated Sino-Albanian relations. Hoxha was also unhappy about reduced levels of Chinese economic assistance. On July 7, 1977 *Zeri i Popullit* published a major broadside against Mao Tse-tung's theory of the three worlds which is the theoretical underpinning of post-1971 Chinese foreign policy and a central strand of contemporary Maoist ideology. While refraining from directly naming Mao and the PRC, the Albanians asserted that the theory of three worlds was "anti-Leninist" and "ignores socialism." By ignoring class relations, Tirane suggested, adherents of the three worlds theory had degenerated into revisionists. In subsequent months, the Albanians pressed their ideological attack. Thus, ideology which had brought Peking and Tirane together in the first place now became the solvent of their relationship. The PRC response to the Albanian attack was both restrained and indirect, but it was clear...
that a watershed had been reached in the Sino-Albanian relationship. Within a year Sino-Albanian differences would lead to an open break.

**China and Romania—The Limited Partnership.** Romanian policy since the early 1960's is a model of the evolution which China would like Eastern Europe to undergo. The skillful leadership, first of Gheorghiu-Dej and then of Nicolae Ceausescu, has not only maximized Romania's freedom of action within the formal boundaries of the Soviet alignment system, but also contributed a great deal to transforming internal relations within that system and in the world communist system as a whole. Robert L. Farlow aptly describes “signs of a movement toward functional alignment despite the country's structural alignment through membership in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact.”73 The present close Sino-Romanian relationship is maintained through important economic links and frequent political, cultural, and military exchanges.

In the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Romanian leaders swiftly availed themselves of the crisis of authority within the bloc to articulate their own economic demands in opposition to Soviet efforts at promoting supranational integration through CMEA.74 This policy entailed, among other things, a neutral attitude in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and a refusal to participate in any international communist meetings convened to condemn China. For its part, the PRC hailed Romania’s position on CMEA integration as an example of the necessary struggle for state sovereignty within the communist bloc.75 However, Romania’s attempt in the mid-1960's to play the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute was not so well appreciated in Peking.

The Czech invasion served as a catalyst to the quickening of PRC-Romanian relations. At a Romanian diplomatic reception in Peking celebrating Romania’s liberation, Chou En-lai pledged China’s support for the Romanian people, who were faced with the danger of Soviet aggression.76 An exchange of congratulatory messages on the occasion of the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969, and the 10th RCP Congress in August, along with a resumption of high-level official visits marked a further step forward in Sino-Romanian ties, and indicated a mutual decision to expand their links in the face of a common danger.77

President Ceausescu’s state visit to Peking in June 1971 (the first by an East European state or party leader since the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute) was accompanied by new expressions of mutual friendship and support, and came in the wake of China’s $245 million loan to Bucharest and the signing of a long-term trade agreement.78 This visit caused great concern in Moscow, which increased its pressure on the Romanian leader.79 Since that time a steady stream of high-level visitors between Peking and Bucharest, including CCP Chairman Hua’s visit to Romania in August 1978, has consolidated the close links between them. A significant feature of this intercourse is the participation of high-ranking military personnel on both sides, suggesting a regular exchange of military
information. It might be noted in this connection that Peking fully approves of the fact that since the events of 1968, Romania has carefully limited its participation in WTO military exercises.80

Chinese media devote considerable space to publicizing the domestic accomplishments and foreign policy of Romania. Consequently, Chinese readers are probably better informed about Romania than about most other foreign countries. Romanian ceremonial messages are usually listed very prominently in Chinese publications.

While China recognizes Romania as a fellow socialist country and lauds its accomplishments in the field of socialist construction, the heaviest stress in PRC reporting about Romania is on its defense of national independence and state sovereignty and its opposition to imperialism and hegemonism.81 Ceausescu's emphasis on the nation as the basic unit of socialist development fully accords with the Chinese view.

In this connection, China has entered the ostensibly historiographical battle of words over the territorial limits of Romania.82 Articles in the Chinese press have echoed Bucharest's rejection of Hungarian and Bulgarian claims to parts of Romanian territory and counter that the former Romanian district of Moldavia, now incorporated into the USSR, was forcibly seized by Russia.83 As far back as 1964, in a famous talk with Japanese socialists, Mao Tse-tung while listing examples of Soviet territorial aggrandizement accused the Russians of having "appropriated part of Romania" after World War II.84 There is little doubt that China intends to keep territorial irredentism, as well as ethnic dissatisfaction within the USSR itself, alive as issues with long-term appeal in Eastern Europe.

As many observers have noted, Romania's freedom of action since the early 1960's owed much to the existence of the Sino-Soviet split which provided a determined leadership valuable room in which to maneuver. Yet, in the long run, Romania's ability to survive as a quasi-independent member of the Soviet alignment system depends much more on the realities of European politics than it does on China. That Peking acknowledges this fact is indicated by its acceptance of Romania's continuing involvement in the bloc organizations such as CMEA and the WTO, and its silence about Bucharest's participation in the Helsinki Conference and other obligatory exercises which its position entails. The capital requirements of China's continuing industrialization program also set definite limits to the largesse which Peking can confer on a country roughly six to seven times as wealthy in per capita terms as itself.85

In short, of necessity and by mutual agreement, the Sino-Romanian relationship is rather carefully tailored to fit the requirements of Bucharest's delicate position somewhere between Moscow and nonalignment. It might be argued that Romania's greatest service to China has already been performed and that the same holds true of China's services to Romania. If Romania is able to continue the zigzag line whereby it barely mollifies Moscow but maintains its essential independence, there is reason
to expect that the PRC will be satisfied. A drastic shift in Romania's line bringing much greater alignment with Moscow, either as a result of domestic changes or Soviet occupation as a result of crisis-induced intervention, would demonstrate the strict limits of the PRC's ability to affect the political situation in the Balkans in any fundamental way.

China and Yugoslavia—From Symbolic Enmity to Cooperation. The resumption of Sino-Yugoslav relations in 1969 was even more surprising in some respects than the contemporaneous initiation of Sino-American rapprochement. Except for a brief period from 1955 to 1958, China's view of Yugoslavia had been extremely hostile, but since 1969 Chinese leaders have come to value Belgrade's tenacious independence.

That China's Balkan policy has been essentially a derivative of the Sino-Soviet relationship is most clearly attested in the case of Yugoslavia. From 1948 to 1953 Peking followed Moscow's lead in exorcising the enemy of socialism embodied in Belgrade, even failing to acknowledge Yugoslavia's early diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1949. Then, as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved following Stalin's death, the Chinese discovered unsuspected virtues in Tito's brand of socialism. The high point of their relationship occurred in 1956-57, but soon thereafter China renewed its strong criticism of Yugoslav revisionism. In the early stages of the Sino-Soviet debate, Yugoslavia served as the surrogate object for many Chinese ideological attacks refracted from their actual target, the Soviet Union.

Thus, in the entire period 1948-68 China treated Yugoslavia as an expendable chip in the game of international communist politics. In PRC foreign policy Yugoslavia had value only as an ideological symbol. By dismissing the most powerful of the Balkan states—Yugoslavia—as an ideological heretic, China revealed its inattention to the importance of the Balkans as a factor in European politics.

The resumption of Sino-Yugoslav contacts in the spring of 1969 through the medium of trade was clearly prompted by anti-Soviet motives, and the cessation of Chinese polemics and a generally warmer atmosphere soon led to the exchange of ambassadors in June 1970. Just one year later, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac visited Peking. The process of normalizing Sino-Yugoslav relations has been marked by the exchange of economic and cultural delegations, including the perhaps inevitable table tennis teams. By October 1974 things had improved to the point where a Yugoslav army delegation led by Lt. General Branko Joksovic, Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army visited Peking to "enhance cooperation between the armies of Yugoslavia and China and friendship between the two peoples." A year later, in October 1975, Premier Djamal Bijedic visited China amidst a flurry of publicity. Mao Tse-tung received the premier and even conveyed his regards to Tito. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's welcome speech lauded Yugoslavia's adherence to a policy of nonalignment and cooperation with
third world countries as well as its resolute defense of its own national sovereignty and independence.  

The culmination of the Sino-Yugoslav relationship was President Tito's visit to the PRC in August-September 1977. Accorded an unusually lavish reception, Tito was greeted at the airport by Hua Kuo-feng, and praised for his stature as a world leader and his accomplishments as the leader of the Yugoslav people. As a mark of honor, Tito was the first foreigner allowed in to visit Mao Tse-tung's memorial hall. One wonders what thoughts crossed Tito's mind as he gazed at the remains of the man who had once reviled him as a "dwarf standing in the mud" and an arch revisionist.

Although the two sides reserved their differences on many international issues and failed to issue a joint communiqué, it was clear that the visit had strengthened their bilateral relations and would lead to enhanced cooperation and exchanges in economic and cultural affairs. While the Chinese avoided any provocatively anti-Soviet statements during Tito's visit, it was not difficult to fathom what they valued in Yugoslav foreign policy. The People's Daily editorialized (August 30th) that "anyone who should dare to encroach upon the independence of Yugoslavia and subvert Yugoslavia will certainly be badly battered and smashed before the iron bastion built by the Yugoslav people." This was, of course, one of the themes of CCP Chairman Hua during his August 1978 visit to Yugoslavia, when he took the opportunity to remind the Soviets that "Yugoslavia is ready at all times to repel an enemy that would dare mount an invasion."

From the Yugoslav point of view, the ameliorated relationship with the PRC is clearly only one part of a broad foreign policy designed to safeguard Yugoslav independence. The PRC, too, can have few illusions about what it can contribute to Yugoslavia in this respect, but the new Peking-Belgrade link does strengthen Yugoslavia politically as well as bolster Peking's position in European and nonaligned politics.

Any Soviet attempt to exploit the ever tense nationality problem in Yugoslavia with the aim of disrupting Yugoslav unity or of achieving Yugoslav reintegration with the CMEA-WTO bloc would be sure to encounter vigorous PRC objections. Already the Chinese have been quick to point to even the slightest evidence of Soviet support for Yugoslav "cominformists" and similar dissidents as proof that "social-imperialism is engaged in unbridled subversive activities" against Yugoslavia.

In sum, since 1960 Sino-Yugoslav relations have become substantive rather than symbolic. Although Chinese officials still largely perceive Yugoslavia's importance through a Sino-Soviet prism, it is with a realization of Yugoslavia's important role in the politics of the Balkans as well as its status among the nonaligned nations of the third world. Nevertheless, one must point to a certain fragility in Sino-Yugoslav relations deriving from the fact that the ideological issues between them—formerly the only salient ones—have been suspended rather than elim-
inated through agreement. It is always possible, though not very probable, that a new leadership in Peking might choose to revive the ideological questions and undo the process of normalization which the past decade has witnessed.

**Peking's Policy Options**

The three basic policy postures which exist for Peking in the Balkans may be labeled as follows: (1) Ideological anti-Soviet; (2) Geographical-pragmatic anti-Soviet; (3) Low profile, laissez-faire. Each of these options has its own attraction and may appeal to different groups in the Chinese leadership.

It is difficult to predict the ultimate balance of forces in post-Mao China even though the present coalition appears to have set a pragmatic course toward modernization and development. Since the future lines of Chinese foreign policy will be greatly influenced by domestic political outcomes in Peking, only some preliminary remarks about future Balkan policy can be hazarded here.

Ideological anti-Soviet considerations governed the PRC's Balkan policy throughout most of the 1960's. The exorcism of Yugoslavia and the enfolding of Albania were manifestations of a policy aimed at capturing the citadels of world communism from the Soviet usurpers. Of equal importance, this policy appealed to a strain of Chinese political pride in the distinctive virtue of Maoist revolutionary development which hacked out its own path while supposedly hewing to Marxist-Leninist norms. The effect of this policy (which at its Cultural Revolution height was even intolerant of Romania's hedging independence) was to align the PRC with the weakest Balkan state and to alienate the centers of power in the peninsula. Despite this drawback, ideological anti-Sovietism appealed, and presumably continues to appeal, to those persons in the Chinese leadership who are basically more concerned with the purity of doctrine and the course of domestic development than they are with external power politics. Even the purge of the so-called "Gang of Four" is not likely to have completely eliminated such persons from the Chinese political arena.

The present PRC Balkan policy may be termed one of geopolitical pragmatism, and is supported by those Chinese leaders who advocate a high level of Chinese participation in the international system as a means toward security. In order to oppose Soviet military rather than ideological threats more effectively, China has aligned itself with Romania and Yugoslavia—the more powerful states in the Balkans—although in so doing it has had to shelve its antirevisionist line vis-a-vis the latter. Strong verbal support for Balkan independence and regional cooperation, the promotion of Sino-Balkan trade, and the frequent exchange of political, trade, cultural, and military delegations are the concrete signs of this policy. However, the success of this strategy is dependent upon factors
which are largely beyond Peking's control, such as American and West European support for Balkan independence from the USSR. Peking has condemned the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine, according to which the United States had an interest in seeing a more "organic" relationship develop between Moscow and Eastern Europe, as an outmoded sphere of influence policy. Meanwhile, although China realizes it cannot sever any Soviet arteries in the Balkans, it can raise the Soviets' blood pressure and keep alive the fear of an anti-Soviet axis of Balkan states supported by Peking. For as long as Chinese leaders believe that a Soviet expansionist threat requires the building of countervailing global power balances, they are likely to persist in their present Balkan policy. On balance, this entails only limited investment and very low risk.

But how would China's Balkan policy be affected by a lessening of Sino-Soviet tension? Although in the immediate post-Mao period the new Chinese leadership reaffirmed Mao's anti-Soviet policy direction, there is still a reasonable possibility that Chinese leaders may appreciate the utility of a limited Sino-Soviet detente and be willing to move in that direction. A diminution of Sino-Soviet tension might allow China to shift funds from military procurement to economic development, create pressure on the United States to yield on the Taiwan issue, and generally enhance Chinese bargaining capacity in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle. Thus there are strong reasons for the post-Mao Chinese leaders to disentangle themselves from the anti-Soviet part of Mao's legacy as they have from so much else, although such a process would likely take both time and skill. (Such a lessening of tension need not preclude continued progress in Sino-American relations.) In such a case, we may suppose that the PRC would adopt a third alternative, a low profile, laissez-faire Balkan policy. A limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement would undercut the geostrategic rationale of Peking's current policy by diminishing Chinese fears of a Soviet military threat. This would probably have little effect on Yugoslavia, but it might make it marginally more difficult for Romania to adhere to its autonomous course and more certainly would affect Albania's Stalinist semi-isolation. Tirane, then, might either move back toward the Soviet alignment system for economic aid and protection, follow Yugoslavia's example by moving toward the West and the nonaligned world, or cling even more tightly to its isolationist course. In any case, the level of Chinese economic and political involvement in Balkan politics would probably diminish somewhat. However, there would be no reason to expect a return to the Stalin era pattern of only minimal Chinese involvement in East European politics. Chinese airliners now link Peking with Tirane, Bucharest, and Belgrade. The era of China's isolation from Europe is probably over forever. China's development into a major world power virtually ensures her continuing interest in the Balkans as part of the European region which is now a permanent factor in China's external relations.
Notes


15. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


23. With the major exception of the long-term Chinese criticism of Tito which amounted to a call for his removal from power.


25. NYT, February 9, 1976, p. 10.

27. Ibid.


32. Ibid., p. 77.


34. For a list of Chinese aid projects in Albania see Wolfgang Bartke, China’s Economic Aid (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), pp. 79-84; also John Franklin Copper, China’s Foreign Aid (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), pp. 35-38.


37. Ibid.

38. NYT, May 4, 1976, p. 11.


41. Ibid.


45. PR, February 26, 1971, p. 5.

46. PR, February 6, 1976, p. 3.

47. Y. Avsenev, L. Karshinov, and I. Potyomkina, “China’s Foreign Trade,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), 1975, No. 4, p. 28.


50. Bartke, op. cit., p. 159.


53. Avsenev et al., op. cit., p. 29.


55. PR, October 17, 1975, p. 7.


58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 22.
70. NYT, Nov. 3, 1976; May 4, 1976.
74. See, for example, Remington, op. cit., pp. 56–73.
78. PR, June 4, 1971, pp. 4–10; June 11, 1971, pp. 3–5, 8–19; June 18, 1971, pp. 18–19.
81. PR, May 14, 1976, p. 5.
82. NYT, May 31, 1976, p. 2.
83. PR, April 23, 1976, p. 32; May 28, 1976, pp. 20–21.
90. PR. November 1, 1974, p. 4.
91. PR, October 10, 1975, pp. 6–7; October 17, 1975, pp. 7–8.
92. For coverage see FBIS–PRC, 29 August to 9 September 1977.
93. PR, September 2, 1977, pp. 3–6, 8–13.
95. A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito, pp. 31–42.
96. PR, March 19, 1976, p. 32.
97. For a full study of Yugoslav foreign policy see Lars Nord, Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice (Stockholm: Raben and Sjögren, 1974).
IV. The Warsaw Pact and Soviet Policy in the Balkans

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Each May the perceived urgency of contingency planning for post-Tito Yugoslavia increases. In 1979, the aging godfather of Yugoslav communism celebrated his 87th birthday, setting off another round of speculation. Fear that the Soviets will benefit from an inevitable succession crisis, thereby potentially destabilizing the European balance of power, is a realistic worry for policy makers in Washington and other NATO capitals. Much of that anxiety centers on the possibility that, when Tito dies Yugoslavia will slide or be pushed into the Warsaw Pact.

This analysis is based on the assumption that the relationship of post-Tito Yugoslavia to Soviet-East European coalition politics entails not one but two fundamental questions:

1. To what degree can the Warsaw Treaty Organization be used as an effective instrument of Moscow's policy attempts to eliminate the Yugoslav alternative to the Soviet model and establish hegemony in the region?

2. In what manner will the political situation in Yugoslavia influence the dynamics of Soviet interactions with the Balkan members of the pact, Romania and Bulgaria? With the "fallen-way" member, Albania? After all, the Warsaw Pact has played a well-documented role in Soviet tensions with both Albania and Romania. It is of potential significance with respect to Bulgaria as well.

The tentative hypothesis that question 1, dealing with the role of the Warsaw Pact as a Soviet policy instrument vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, may be less salient than the impact of post-Tito Yugoslavia on the position of Romania and Bulgaria within the alliance will be investigated in terms of three political scenarios:

1. That the Yugoslav succession crisis is already well underway and consequently Tito's death will have little immediate impact;

2. That the Yugoslav army will become the dominant force after Tito dies, either as a result of a military coup or fusion of party-army leadership roles;

Notes to references appearing throughout this chapter are located at the end of the chapter.
3. That Tito's death will throw the country into civil war.

Before going further, however, it is important to take note of Karl Deutsch's warning that "real life differs from formalized games in that life offers possibilities for change in the rules and even in the units of competition."1 In the 1970's, the Warsaw Pact has been increasingly recognized as a significant unit of competition both in intracomunist politics and East-West dialogue. Public statements from Soviet and East European leaders alike applaud growing consultation leading to WTO political and military policies.2 As early as 1971 Brezhnev personally claimed that the alliance acted as the "main center" for coordinating the foreign policy of European communist states.3

Whether or not such coordination is sufficient in Moscow's view, it undoubtedly exists as witnessed by the systematic, ultimately successful campaign for a European security conference. Indeed, the intensive bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the road to the 1975 Helsinki meeting added to the importance of the Warsaw Pact both as a factor in Soviet European policy and as an actor in European politics.

In short, the Warsaw Pact has changed and is continuing to change. To even begin the task of projecting the role of that alliance in the post-Tito Balkans, one must understand the direction of that change and the restraints these developments impose on future manipulation from Moscow. Therefore, let us briefly address some fundamental but not simple questions. What are the rules of the game within the Warsaw Pact? How do they function? And how have they changed?4

In the interests of precision, it is useful to keep in mind what the Warsaw Treaty Organization is not. Despite the unfortunate tendency in the literature to use the Warsaw Pact as a confusing political shorthand for the entire complex of Soviet-East European political-military relations, the alliance has clear institutional boundaries.

First, like its western counterparts, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS), the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is composed of states, limited in membership (despite its officially open-ended membership policy), and embodied in a separate organizational machinery.

Second, unlike NATO and the OAS, Warsaw Treaty members have undergone similar revolutions, i.e., fundamental changes in political organization, social institutions, economic control, and myth structure. For our purposes, normative judgment of that fact is irrelevant. It happened, and in order to understand the workings of the Warsaw Pact it is necessary to try to understand how the fact that Warsaw Treaty members have a common ideological orientation as well as similar social, economic, and political systems modifies the rules of the game in communist coalition politics.5

Third, despite its formal ideological symmetry, today the Warsaw Pact is an alliance increasingly subject to conflicts of interest. Contrary to postwar prediction, there is no Soviet empire in East Europe. The in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia notwithstanding. East European communist states have retained their national identities, have resisted extensive economic integration, and have kept control of their national armed forces. These states are all tied to a "national base" and govern peoples with a memory of precommunist history. Recurring intra-alliance conflict is an explicit reminder that such memories frequently cut across ideological lines. Consequently the Warsaw Treaty Organization is and will be faced with differing interpretations of correct action springing from genuine conflicts of interest among member states. The crucial question in such cases is who decides—Moscow or a collectivity in which the Soviets have the loudest but not the only voice?

**Origin of the Warsaw Pact**

As it was established in 1955 the WTO was a formally egalitarian military-political institution with prescribed rules regulating both its own operation and the member states' relations to each other and to non-members.

The treaty itself consists of eleven articles. The majority of its clauses deal with relations among member states. Basing the treaty on the "principle of respect for independence and sovereignty of others and noninterference in internal affairs," (article CIII), the members agreed: (1) to settle all disputes peacefully (article I); (2) to consult on all international issues affecting their common interests; (3) to consult immediately in the event one of the treaty partners is threatened with armed attack, so as to "ensure joint defense" (article III); (4) to establish a joint command (article V) and a Political Consultative Committee (article VI); and (5) to promote economic and cultural intercourse within the group (article VIII). With respect to the United Nations, the treaty specifies that it is in accordance with the U.N. Charter (article I) and that measures of joint defense will be taken under article 51 of that Charter (article IV). As for nonmember states, "all European" states are invited to join the treaty if they agree with its aims "irrespective of their social and political systems" (article IX). The treaty partners pledge to take part in international activities designed to safeguard the peace (article II) and, conversely, not to join any coalitions or alliances or make any agreements in conflict with the Warsaw Treaty (article VII). The duration of the treaty was made contingent on the signing of an all-European collective security treaty and thus dependent upon an action of members and nonmembers alike.¹

Little is known of the actual institutional structure set up by the Warsaw Treaty. Its text only referred to a Political Consultative Committee with the power to appoint auxiliary bodies. Further organizational details were worked out in closed session during the January 1956 Political Consultative Committee meeting at which it was decided that the PCC should meet not less than twice a year, with chairmanship of the meetings to rotate among members. At that time two auxiliary institutions were cre-
ated: (1) a standing commission to work out recommendations on questions of foreign policy, and (2) a joint secretariat which was to be staffed by representatives of all the treaty members. Both bodies were to be located in Moscow. From 1956 until the 1969 changes in command structure, organizational decisions were not made public. There was no further mention of the activity of either the standing policy commission or the joint secretariat. 7

As for the motive, there is not much doubt that the Warsaw Pact was a spinoff of the Soviet 1954 campaign against admitting a rearmed West Germany into the West European Union (WEU), probably symbolically intended to counter the NATO December 1954 decision to develop tactical nuclear weapons as well. At that time there is little evidence that the Warsaw Treaty served or was intended to serve as a channel by which to speed up military integration of Soviet-East European armed forces. For such purposes the pact would have been unnecessary. Even prior to the defense alliance, the Soviets had remolded the armed forces of the “people’s democracies” in East Europe into a separate yet largely subordinate arm of the Red Army.

What amounted to a copy of the Soviet pattern had been imposed on East European armed forces by 1950. 8 Rapid physical buildup based on Soviet tanks, motorized weapons, and airplanes paralleled the drive for education, expansion, and modernization on all levels. Ironically, despite “continual perfecting” of the defense mechanism of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets may have had a more genuine control over East European armed forces in the 1950’s than Moscow has today.

Whether or not such specific reorganization of forces actually resulted from the creation of a Joint Command is unknown. In the West it has been generally accepted that, apart from a further standardization of weapons, the Warsaw Treaty Organization simply continued earlier arrangements whereby East Europe served largely as an extension of the Soviet early warning and air defense system. 9

This is not to say that the Warsaw Treaty had no military importance to Moscow, but only that the importance was not what it was cracked up to be. The treaty extended Soviet military commitments to Albania, the only East European country with which the Soviets did not have a bilateral mutual assistance pact. Even more significant, it legalized Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania that by all rights should have withdrawn after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955. As Malcolm Mackintosh has pointed out, it facilitated, whether or not it brought about, reorganization and redeployment, at least to the extent that each Warsaw Pact ally received a new Soviet military mission in 1955 headed by a senior general. 10

However, the more basic importance of the Warsaw Pact was, and is, political. For an unreliable ally is a dubious asset at best. The question is not so much the number of tank divisions in Romania or Czechoslovakia or the level of equipment with which East European armies are equipped.
The question is whether, in a crunch, Moscow can actually make use of those forces in other than a defensive war against the West? To come to grips with that question, one must have an understanding of how, in fact, the Warsaw Pact has functioned in periods of intra-alliance conflict.

The Impact of Intra-Alliance Crisis Management Upon the Warsaw Treaty Organization

Since 1956 there have been challenges to Soviet authority by every East European member of the Warsaw Pact except Bulgaria. These instances fall into two broad categories: domestic change on the part of a small member state unacceptable to Moscow, and unpalatable foreign policy initiatives. This analysis is based on three simple assumptions:

1. That the efficiency in operation of any political alliance, indeed any institution, depends upon an accurate assessment of the adjustments that must be made and the ability to make them;
2. That there is always struggle between the cost of adjustment and the cost of trying to alter the environment to make adjustment unnecessary; always a time lag in perceiving changes that must be responded to and the ability to respond;
3. That all conflict resolution moves along a continuum of persuasion to force.

With respect to the Warsaw Pact, this raises the following core questions:

1. In what way was the institution of the coalition involved in instances of conflict among member states?
2. What effect did the conflict have on Soviet perception of the coalition? Did it change the nature of obligations or expectations of the East European members?
3. Did actual institutional changes in the alliance result?

On the basis of this information, it is then possible to tentatively predict the role of the alliance in future policy, both Soviet and East European.

From this perspective one can consider six explicit challenges to Soviet authority: the Polish October, 1956; the Hungarian Revolt, 1956; sustained Albanian defiance dating from 1960; Romania’s continued organizational maneuvering both within the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, which is best documented from 1963; the Czechoslovak experiment with Dubcek’s “socialism with a human face” in 1968; and a largely submerged but determined tug-of-war by the East Germans against the pace of detente, particularly with respect to Berlin from 1969 to 1971.

In terms of question No. 1, the role of the Warsaw Pact as an institution in the Polish October and the Hungarian uprising in 1956 can be considered together. In both cases that role was extremely limited. There were no Political Consultative Committee meetings during these crises, although bilateral consultation between the Soviet Union and Hungary did include references to the Warsaw Pact. And in the Hungarian case Imre
Nagy did attempt to withdraw from the alliance, after (not, as is so often assumed, before) Soviet troops had invaded the country.

With respect to Albania the differences on intraparty matters rapidly affected Albanian participation in pact meetings. Tirane, which also had taken an independent stand on foreign policy issues within the alliance was de facto excluded from meetings of the coalition by 1961. There was some evidence that Moscow attempted to use the January 1965 PCC meeting to improve Albanian-Soviet relations. However the tentative Soviet overture was emphatically rejected by Hoxha, and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania announced it had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact—an act assiduously ignored by the other member states.

In Romanian-Soviet differences the institution of the pact has played an increasingly important role, amounting almost to conflict containment. In 1958 the Political Consultative Committee approved the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. Subsequently the Soviets attempted to use the alliance to push for consolidation, the Romanians to increase their influence on joint policy. There was conscious and deliberate balancing on both sides, particularly with respect to Bucharest’s premature (from the Soviet view) recognition of West Germany in 1967. In general this did not affect Romanian participation in alliance councils, although it sometimes affected the level of their representation.

As for Czechoslovakia, from January to August 1968 the Warsaw Pact was intimately involved in the conflict with Czechoslovakia. This was a conflict that went beyond a challenge to Soviet authority to question the Soviet model of socialism at its most basic level, something threatening to the more orthodox East European members of the alliance as well as to the USSR. Moscow consistently referred to Prague’s obligations under the pact, both as a means of pressuring for a multilateral meeting in the summer of 1968 and as an excuse for military maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. The Czech General Vaclav Prchlik expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of East European opportunities to participate in decision-making within the alliance. There was even the much attacked “memorandum” of the Klement Gottwald Military Academy (since dissolved) calling for an “independent military doctrine” more in line with Czechoslovak national interests.

Attempts to use the joint machinery, however, were not limited to Moscow in 1968. The Dubcek government tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to use the issue of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact to ward off direct interference in its country’s internal affairs. The Political Consultative Committee met only once, March 8, 1968. This meeting was followed by extensive bilateral and multilateral consultation dealing with the conflict, but not by official Warsaw Pact meetings. The issue was resolved by multilateral invasion, which was condemned by the legal governments of both Czechoslovakia and Romania. Despite Soviet and individual East European attempts to cite the Warsaw Pact as an ex post facto justification
of that act, this position has never been taken in a formal Warsaw Pact document.

In Soviet-East German differences the Warsaw Pact has played a role similar to the coalition’s part in the Romanian case. From 1969 to date Moscow has used the alliance to pressure East German policy into line with Moscow’s current desire for rapprochement with Bonn. The Ulbricht regime countered by attempting to use the pact to keep control over other members’ initiatives toward West Germany. This was particularly clear at the December 2, 1970, meeting in Berlin. As a corollary, meetings of the Political Consultative Committee increased, combined with extensive bilateral consultation between the Soviets and the East Germans. These differences seemed to lessen with Ulbricht’s replacement by Erich Honecker in May 1971. However, there are signs that Honecker too would like to act as a brake and that at best he views potential Soviet troop cuts in East Europe with distaste.

As for question No. 2 on the effect of conflict on the superpowers’ perception of the coalition and the expectation of the smaller member states, one can say that the events of 1956 were such that Moscow tried to use the alliance primarily as ex post facto justification for its unilateral decisions. Nonetheless, in the cases of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, the Soviet awareness of the importance of the Warsaw Pact for accomplishing policy objectives in Eastern Europe clearly increased, while in the instance of Soviet-German tensions, the pact seems to have served once again as a vehicle for broader Soviet policy toward Europe.

On the East European side, successful Romanian maneuvering within the alliance has certainly heightened the sensitivity of other small member states to the opportunity to do likewise. Although Czechoslovakia’s failure in this respect did not encourage further experiments (it at best signalled the advisability of extreme caution), such attempts have not ceased. Both Polish policy in 1969-70 and East German efforts to sabotage “joint coordinated policy” when that policy conflicts with what the GDR considers its own vital interests indicate that the invasion of Czechoslovakia may have increased the sophistication of East European maneuvering within the alliance rather than ending it.

When one views these conflicts from the point of view of question No. 3 on the institutional changes in the Warsaw Pact itself, one can only conclude that the trend is toward increasing importance of coalition politics with the Soviet Bloc. This was true even in 1956, despite the fact that at that time the conflict seemingly contracted activities of the alliance, in that no meetings were held for 2 years. Not only was the Soviet Declaration of October 30, admitting mistakes and trying to make the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary dependent on all Warsaw Treaty states, an indication of the alliance’s future trend, but the joint treaties concluded with Hungary, Poland, Romania, and East Germany on the stationing of Soviet troops in those countries were in some sense
an extension of the Warsaw Pact. In general these crises spurred Moscow
to renewed emphasis on the socialist nature of the alliance, an emphasis
that implied change in content of the WTO rather than form.

As for Albania, the conflict caused de facto exclusion of Albania from
the coalition and resulted in the end of Chinese observer status. Yet even
as it appeared to bring a decline in the political substance, military ac-
tivity, first in the form of joint maneuvers, increased.

The Soviet-Romanian conflict went still further. The number of War-
saw Pact meetings increased and the coalition itself assumed unaccus-
tomed importance in both Soviet-East European and world communist
affairs. Witness Bucharest's successful insistence that the alliance not be
used as a forum to attack China or even to completely side with Moscow
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In the case of Czechoslovakia there were serious attempts to manip-
ulate the joint political machinery on both sides. The invasion, uncom-
mendable as it was, met not only Soviet but perceived Polish and East
German interests. It was not formally a Warsaw Pact affair, despite Soviet
attempts to portray it as such, and there is some hope that its multilateral
nature might make such acts of repression more difficult in the future.
Immediately after "normalization," pact activity resumed at a higher
level than before. This state of affairs has been contributed to by Soviet-
East German maneuvering which repeats the Romanian pattern. Thus,
ironically, since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Warsaw Pact
has virtually flourished. Its joint command has been reorganized in such
a way as to allow increased East European input into joint policy. The
Political Consultative Committee has met regularly, supplemented by
many more meetings of foreign ministers, defense ministers, and party
leaders.

For purposes of this analysis the importance of past conflicts is the
extent to which they provide models for the future. Hence we can ap-
proach the problem of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of Soviet Balkan
policy with three models for potential intra-alliance conflict: exclusion
(Albania), containment (Romania) and political intervention (Czecho-
slovakia). It should be kept in mind that in no case has the Warsaw Pact
been involved in or sanctioned military intervention as a solution, despite
Soviet attempts to make it appear otherwise. This leaves hanging the
question of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet policy towards the key post-Tito
problem for Balkan security: Yugoslavia. In that Yugoslavia is not a
member of the Warsaw Pact, that is a different game, with different rules
and must be considered separately. Yet Soviet-Yugoslav policy is a pivotal
variable in all scenarios involving Balkan members of the Warsaw Pact.
Romanian and Bulgarian response to Moscow's objectives vis-a-vis post-
Tito Yugoslavia most likely will be the defining consideration in how
necessary organizational maneuvering via the Warsaw Pact is in Moscow's
relations with Bucharest and Sofia. All of which raises a much debated
issue in and outside of Yugoslavia: after Tito, what?
The Catalyst: Post-Tito Yugoslavia

It is hard to imagine a Yugoslavia without Tito, which in itself is the Achilles' heel of Yugoslav socialism. For as Huntington has pointed out, the party dependent on a single, charismatic leader has little survival capability. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) may, in fact, be sufficiently institutionalized to withstand the coming succession crisis. In politics no one ever knows for sure. Nonetheless, hopes and fears for the future, distorted or real, are political variables influencing policy options. Even before the Croatian crisis of 1971, Yugoslavia existed in a state of political hypertension. Since that time the country has been swamped in the chaos of constitutional change, rising nationalism, student unrest, party purges, skyrocketing inflation, rumors of external dangers compounded by veiled attacks on "internal enemies."

One not implausible approach is to assume that the succession crisis is already well underway and that Tito's actual departure will make little immediate difference. In terms of timing, this postulates either a) that Tito dies soon or b) that for political purposes post-Tito Yugoslavia dates from the formalizing of the collective presidency in the 1974 constitution. It also assumes continuity of political actors operating in the contemporary political context. To be specific:

1. That, as indicated by the May 1977 replacement of Podgorny, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Co., having weathered the factional tensions within CPSU, will be making Soviet policy for the near future;
2. That Soviet policy in Europe is torn by conflicting priorities, divided between attempting to retain, if not control of, as much influence as possible over the Eurocommunism of the increasingly independent West European parties, while hoping to take advantage of growing communist popularity, particularly in Italy;
3. That Yugoslavia is a key factor in both intracomunist politics and Soviet policy towards the West;
4. That despite emigre provocations, Croatia will not explode and will not be subjected to martial law.

In this case, there is little reason to assume that the pattern of Soviet maneuvering would differ markedly from the "carrot and stick" approach that has characterized such policy since the spring of 1971. At that time, at least indirect pressure for "closer" relations with the Warsaw Pact appeared to be part of the package. Rumors of Soviet aid to Croatian separatists intensifies worries about Moscow pressure for a naval base at Split or Pula. Whether or not such fears were accurate, in Belgrade they were openly discussed as fact. The situation eased only after Brezhnev personally dismissed the "Brezhnev Doctrine" as a western fabrication during his visit to Yugoslavia in September.

Despite Brezhnev's conciliatory gesture, in some quarters nervousness persisted, focused in part on the perception that Moscow misinterpreted Yugoslavia's position. There was grumbling that wording of the joint
statement referred to "socialist internationalism" like a document of former times. Others expressed concern that the Soviet leader's subsequent travels to Sofia and Budapest (reportedly the Yugoslav side had not been informed of the itinerary) had an uncomfortable implication that he had been simply touring "the bloc," i.e., deliberately flouting Yugoslavia's nonaligned status. Certainly Soviet press coverage did nothing to dispel such an impression. Lumping the three visits together, Pravda concluded,

"... talks in Belgrade, Budapest, and Sofia were a significant step on the road to ever closer coordination of the foreign activities of fraternal parties and countries. ... The further strengthening of the unity of socialist countries was realized indeed in the results of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia." 18

The language would appear to be pointedly that used in referring to Warsaw Pact consultation.

Still, subsequently, both Moscow and Belgrade emphasized harmony and "normalization" of relations. Tito received red-carpet treatment on his trip to Moscow in June 1972, the Order of Lenin and a Soviet sabre. The Western press spoke of a political "honeymoon," speculating Yugoslavia would slide into the Warsaw Pact even before Tito died. Tito's blunt denials notwithstanding, 19 Soviet-Yugoslav economic contacts were flourishing. Also, there was a disquieting coincidence of the forced resignation of liberal republican party leaders in Serbia, Slovenia, and Macedonia with credit negotiations with Moscow. The impression of Soviet interest in these internal Yugoslav developments was heightened by Pravda's praise for Tito's methods of handling his "national" problems. 20

Yet there is no evidence that Moscow inspired the crackdown rather than approving it, or that Tito would have the slightest compunction about getting desired economic side benefits for moves he intended to make in any case. In my view, the continuing conflict in Soviet and Yugoslav policies towards European security is more important than a temporary overlap of preferences for Yugoslav domestic solutions in assessing Yugoslav response to either persuasion of political pressure for "liaison" with the Warsaw Pact. European security Yugoslav style is not the same concept as European security in Moscow or, for that matter, Washington. 21 The central tenet of Yugoslav policy towards European negotiations, both the CSCE and Mutual Force Reductions (MFR), is that new names for the old Europe won't do. A Europe with less ideological divisions but one in which spheres of influence replace camps, "client states," and the satellites of yesterday is not a Europe in which Yugoslavia can feel secure. Hence the Yugoslav demand that all European states should have a voice in restructuring the political status quo. Hence the suggestion that the superpowers should at least begin thinking about dissolving military blocs rather than institutionalizing them still further through MFR negotiations, which some Yugoslav scholars cyni-
cally describe as a means of maintaining superpower monopoly of Euro-

cpean problem solving.

In short, with or without Tito, Yugoslav opinion on the options open
to small states in Europe continues to reflect Pijade's blunt assertion of
1949: "There is no justification at all for the view that small nations must
jump into the mouth of this or that shark." Nonalignment is a sometimes
confusing, often misunderstood political option. It remains a fundamen-
tal element of both Yugoslav domestic politics and foreign policy, making
"close relations" and potential membership in the Warsaw Pact sym-
bolically problematical for any Yugoslav government under current con-
ditions.

This conclusion would seem supported by the recently escalated po-
lemics against "cominformists"—the catchall term for a variety of pro-
Soviet factions in Yugoslavia. Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, historic leader of
the Croatian party and member of the LCY Presidium, has attacked such
groups as "instruments of alien influences" whose political line "amounted
to compelling Yugoslavia to join the Warsaw Pact." Whether or not
Bakaric overstated, his direct reference to the Warsaw Pact does imply
that Moscow continues to toy with the idea even as it underlines Yu-
goslavia's hostile reaction.

"Antocominformist" activity may be a cause or symptom. Soviet-Yu-
goslav relations deteriorated in 1975, both as a result of differences in
interpretations of the proposed pan-European conference of communist
parties and the unwelcome restatement of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in
the October 1975 Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty. At the same
time, political and economic negotiations continue, as evidenced by the
December trade agreement specifying a 150-percent increase over the
next five years. Tentative statements of "full unanimity of views" aside,
Yugoslav policymakers are well aware of the extent to which perceived
instability continues to tempt at least "some forces" in the Soviet Union
to meddling. Significantly, trials of "cominformists" continue, as do closer
Yugoslav relations with China and Albania.

Barring radical shifts in political context, seesaw Soviet-Yugoslav re-
lations in which Moscow tries to maneuver the Yugoslavs closer to the
Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia takes one step forward to two steps back
is a pattern likely to continue. Such a situation has the following im-
plications for the use of that alliance in Soviet policy towards Balkan pact
members, Romania and Bulgaria.

Romania has long been a maverick within intra-alliance councils, using
organizational tradeoffs to buy independent policy initiatives elsewhere.
Throughout the negotiations centering on the CSCE it was Bucharest
(to the annoyance of Moscow and Washington alike) that insisted on
procedural equality. Romania, even more than Yugoslavia, saw to it that
if anyone "won" in Helsinki, it was the policies of the "nine" small and
medium-sized European states.
Most recently the Romanians and Yugoslavs have again allied, this time in the prolonged preparation for a pan-European communist conference that culminated in the June 1976 Berlin meeting. On the frequently elusive conference trail, these two ruling parties joined with Spain and Italy to form “the southern axis,” whose procedural victories in 1974 consultations effectively blocked Soviet objectives for that meeting. Once decisionmaking by consensus had been agreed to, those parties pushing for the lowest common denominator of agreement had virtual veto power as protection against “hegemonism.”

Soviet attempts to reverse the situation seem to have been limited to low-key persuasion so as not to jeopardize the goal of a widely based platform of support for Soviet European policy. Such agreement was crucial as a wedge for taking advantage of the favorable political environments developing in Western Europe. For if the communist parties of Europe could not agree, what was to be expected of any potential tactical alliance with “left democratic” forces? Ultimately, the lengthy process seems to have been a dead end for Moscow. The western parties proved less, not more interested in Soviet goals, while the Romanians and Yugoslavs had a new, impressive platform for putting forward a variety of alternatives to Moscow’s desired direction for intracommunist politics.

It is likely, although there is no specific evidence, that Moscow attempted to use Warsaw Pact consultation at the 11th Hungarian Party Congress (March 18, 1975) to press for “coordination” of alliance policy towards the pan-European conference preparations. If so, such “coordination” either was never agreed to (likely) or collapsed at the April session of the working group in East Berlin. Here the Yugoslavs continued to insist on consensus, no binding resolutions, no criticisms of parties. That position was strongly supported by the Secretary-General of the Spanish party in his interview with the Yugoslav press, an interview immediately reprinted in Romania.

The Soviet decision to temporarily abandon the conference project just before the 20th CPSU Congress in 1976 demonstrated changing priorities and expectations. The sudden shift for a strong communique might have succeeded. It would not have been the first time Moscow gained support by rewriting the ground rules for an interparty meeting at the last minute. In any case, there was nothing to lose. Brezhnev would have no document for the Soviet party congress. So what? A weakly worded compromise would have been far worse in terms of his domestic position. The Soviet party leader’s passing reference to significance of the role of regional communist conferences in his report to the Central Committee put these meetings firmly in the context of the long-delayed Soviet desired world communist conference.

It’s unclear what spurred the sudden Kremlin change of mind in the spring of 1976. Why then CPSU Party Secretary Katushev unexpectedly agreed to everything in Belgrade in early June in contradiction to the
attempt to mobilize support for the ideologically time-tested formulas at
the East Germany Congress in May remains a mystery.

Nonetheless, as a result the long-postponed pan-European communist
conference was held and was anything but a Soviet victory. On balance
the Berlin gathering climaxed the procedural successes of the Eurocommu-
nist "southern axis." There was no mention of proletarian interna-
tionalism, the general line, or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rather,
voluntary cooperation, equality, sovereignty, noninterference in internal
affairs, and respect for different roads to socialism were put forward as
the platform of European communism in the 1970's. Soviet moral or
political leadership was ignored, while the session urged a dialogue with
noncommunist progressives and praised nonalignment as a progressive
factor in world politics. In short, the Romanian-Yugoslav line had won
out.

Should Soviet-Romanian relations worsen in the context of a renewed
Soviet push for a world communist conference. Yugoslavia now and in
the post-Tito period will remain a natural ally, particularly in view of
Romania's attempt to become a de facto member of the Nonaligned
Movement. The Warsaw Pact, as before, likely will be an arena of
conflict containment in which Bucharest and Moscow alike press to max-
imize their advantages or minimize loss in other interparty forums.

As for Bulgaria, there is little reason to think that in this situation
Moscow would change course. Bulgaria has been the only member of the
Warsaw Pact not to make problems. There has been no challenge to
Soviet authority, no charges of "hegemony" from Sofia. Bulgarian troops
loyally participated in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Bul-
garians have supported Moscow-sponsored plans for CMEA integration
with such enthusiasm that there has even been speculation of that
country's "integration" into the USSR—unlikely, but indicative of the
nature of Bulgarian-Soviet fraternal relations. These relations include
support for such Soviet interparty objectives as the world communist
conference and condemnation of Eurocommunism as "anti-Sovietism."

Good behavior has been profitable, translating into vast amounts of
economic assistance and numerous bilateral exchanges. Moscow is not
unaware of the value of Bulgaria both politically and strategically. Sofia
remains the only reliable socialist outpost in the Balkans. It borders two
domestically shaky noncommunist countries, Greece and Turkey, both
with increasingly ambiguous relations to NATO, stemming from the 1974

* By April 1975 Bucharest's attempt to establish institutional links with the nonaligned
movement can be seen in Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu's request that Yugoslavia
support the Romanian petition for observer status at the nonaligned summit meeting held
in Sri Lanka in 1976 (Tanjug, April 29, 1975). This effort was formalized by a Romanian
Central Committee statement and the National Assembly's endorsement of the govern-
ment's policy towards nonalignment at the end of the year (Scintea, December 17 and 20,
1975). This process could hardly be said to strengthen Romanian solidarity with the Warsaw
Pact.
Cyprus intervention by Turkey. Indeed, Bulgarian initiatives towards better relations with both these Balkan neighbors serve the policy interests of Soviet as well as Bulgarian diplomacy. The particularly vigorous efforts for closer contacts with Greece have been increasingly reciprocated with the overthrow of the Greek dictatorship. This is in no way to suggest that Sofia's Balkan policy is not equally a matter of Bulgarian self-interest, only to point out that to date it coincides with Soviet desires. Further, such a policy is likely to continue even if the broader East-West detente collapses in stalled arms control negotiations and acrimony over conflicting interpretations of the relationship of that process to Soviet African policy and President Carter's "Human Rights" campaigns.

In addition, Bulgaria's Balkan initiatives indirectly serve as a brake on Romanian gains. Until recently the Bulgarian position has emphasized bilateral rather than multilateral contacts, a preference that could well have been influenced by Soviet distrust of Bucharest. In any case with the new opportunities opening to Greece, Bulgarian hesitation at multilateralism seems to have declined.

With respect to Yugoslavia, Bulgarian aggressiveness on the Macedonian question has been a consistent barometer of Soviet-Yugoslav tensions. Yet there are signs that on this historically sensitive issue, the Bulgarian leadership is less pleased to act as a loyal echo of Soviet priorities. Even in 1971, Sofia's priorities appeared complex. When Brezhnev went to Belgrade in September, a number of already agreed upon Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaties remained unratified because of insistence on the Yugoslav side that its official language for the purposes of these particular treaties was Macedonian. Macedonian is a language not recognized in Bulgaria. From Belgrade, Brezhnev went to Sofia. The treaties were ratified in November. Perhaps unimportant, perhaps not. At a minimum, one can assume such ratification was distasteful to the Bulgarians and that Brezhnev agreed to the delay. At the outside, it could be seen as the first visible sign of Bulgarian reluctance to follow Moscow down an increasingly costly path in terms of potential domestic strain.

The issue is further complicated by Yugoslavia's public campaign against Bulgaria's ethnic policy in Pirin Macedonia. Since 1973 Yugoslav Macedonians have loudly objected to what they perceive as "denationalization" of the Macedonians living in Bulgaria (estimated at 170,000), who since 1956 have disappeared as a separate group in the Bulgarian census. Macedonian historic holidays and heroes are not celebrated in Bulgaria, a fact also openly criticized in the Skopje press. To date Bulgarian responses have been moderate. Nonetheless, the Macedonian question could easily have a delayed fuse. Take the following possible development.

Yugoslav pressure on Macedonia escalates in the post-Tito period of adjustment in hopes of deflecting domestic dissatisfactions into a foreign policy issue. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, born in 1911 and reportedly in poor health, is unable to hold the line against younger challengers.
for control of the Bulgarian party. A new leadership seeking popular support might be less inclined to wait for signals from Moscow before responding to alleged Yugoslav provocations. Or, conversely, it might push for Soviet support of Sofia's Macedonian irredentism as a Soviet obligation under the Warsaw Pact. The East Germans undeniably were able to influence Soviet German policy for years within alliance councils. Bulgaria might be less successful, but the possibility of attempts in that direction via the post-Tito Balkans cannot be discounted. In short, alliance structures are potentially instruments of "clients" as well as "patrons."

Depending on events in Yugoslavia and opinions in Moscow, the Soviets might go so far as to support Bulgarian pressure on the Macedonian border. If not, Bulgaria might no longer be so stable, secure, and pro-Moscow. If so, undoubtedly the new regime would be publicly most appreciative. Still, there would be a subtle shift. Bulgarian policy would no longer be so directly tied after a major change in direction initiated by Sofia had succeeded.

A second political environment to consider, one that has been speculated upon within Yugoslavia since the early 1970's, involves the Yugoslav army as the answer to stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Two possible versions of such an outcome are (1) that the army with Soviet support seizes power once Tito becomes incapacitated or dies, or (2) that the current increased participation of the Yugoslav armed forces at the top of the party, so evident after the 10th LCY Congress in May 1974, develops into a fusion of party-army leadership roles, i.e., predicts that the Yugoslav army will become the vanguard of the party.

Version 1 virtually amounts to the army's replacing the party as the governing institution within Yugoslavia, while at the same time postulating Soviet support. Such a prediction has to be based on the following assumptions:

1. That if Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Co. are still in power, their hopes for a continuation of East-West detente have declined to the point of becoming nonexistent, thereby permitting a radical policy shift regarding Yugoslavia; or that the Soviet leadership has changed along with its priorities;
2. That either the Italian party has suffered major reverses, or that the PCI has publicly and completely broken with Moscow;
3. That a major provocation on the part of Croatian emigres is both likely and seriously risks throwing Yugoslavia into civil war.

In this author's view, it is unlikely that Soviet policy objectives in Europe will become as linear as implied by such assumptions. If it should happen, the use of the pact in Soviet-Yugoslav relations would depend on the nature and amount of Soviet support for the JNA coup. Such a coup might or might not make Yugoslavia more enthusiastic about participating in the Warsaw Pact. If pressed, the likelihood would be opting for an ambiguous "observer" status. Moreover, even if Moscow sup-
ported an army takeover both in principle and with financial assistance for the new government, the Soviets might well prefer to minimize the reaction to such a move by not bringing the new regime into the WTO alliance in any way for quite some time. That was the pattern with respect to East German participation in 1955–56, for example.

Thus, paradoxically, in this version of events the pact might be neutralized rather than elevated as an instrument of Soviet Balkan policy vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. Relations with Romania would potentially be severely strained. Although, again, that would depend much more on the nature of both Soviet support and the new Yugoslav leadership. Nor is there reason to think that Soviet-Romanian differences could not be contained within the alliance as in the past. The impact on Bulgaria would vary widely, depending on the policies of the Yugoslav military towards Macedonia, and will be discussed after considering version 2, which sees postulating the army as a solution.

In version 2, assuming fusion of party-army leadership in Yugoslavia, it is possible to return to the three earlier assumptions. This does not necessitate assuming radical changes in Soviet leadership, priorities, or the contemporary international environment. It does agree with the army coup contingency on one point: major emigre provocation or uprising in Croatia raises a realistic danger of civil war.

Since the army as the vanguard version differs little in fundamental assumptions and is a continuation of current trends within Yugoslavia, its implications for using the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of Soviet policy are roughly the same as those sketched out by those postulating continuity. The Soviets would have no reason to object to an army-party leadership devoted in principle to the leading role of the party and towards the dogmatic end of the spectrum when it came to interpreting what such a “leading role” entailed. Such a Yugoslav leadership might be willing to consider “observer status” in the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, it might be even more jealous of territorial integrity and the trappings of nonaligned sovereignty. The danger is less of such a post-Tito Yugoslavia sliding into the Warsaw Pact than that domestic law-and-order solutions, a continuation of campaigns against Croatian nationalists, Serbian chauvinists, anarcho-liberals, and even cominformists could erode the unique content of Yugoslav socialism until the Yugoslav alternative amounts to token self-management, collective leadership in form with a military dictatorship in content.*

* On the face of it, the 11th LCY Congress of June 1978 makes this less likely. That congress institutionalized the military’s access to decision-making at the highest party levels. The Yugoslav defense minister sits on the reconstituted presidium, and representation of the party organization in the army at the central committee level equal to that of an autonomous province has been guaranteed. In this context potential military dominance is undermined by having clearly spelled out the rules of the game for power sharing.
As long as such a leadership remained dedicated to the principles of sovereignty, integrity, noninterference in internal affairs (i.e., party autonomy) it would not create problems for Romania within or outside of the Warsaw Pact. Bucharest has demonstrated that repressive internal dictatorships can be as touchy about national independence of foreign policy as any other country—communist or noncommunist.

The situation with respect to Bulgaria would hinge on a mix of Yugoslav policy and Soviet hopes and expectations. Continuation of the Yugoslav campaign against Bulgarian treatment of “their” Macedonians, resulting in maneuvering by Sofia for Soviet support within Warsaw Pact councils, remains possible in this version. But there is another possibility as well. Let us assume that Tito dies and the new army or army-party leadership remains officially nonaligned, but expresses “interest” in closer contacts with fraternal countries, perhaps even in the observer status within the Warsaw Pact. And what if the price of such closeness is improvement of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations—perhaps insistence on “cultural” contacts with the Pirin Macedonians that Bulgaria has “lost” in the census since 1956? It would not be an unreasonable gesture of good faith to expect on the Yugoslav side.

For the Bulgarians such expectations could well lead to pressure within the Warsaw Pact to put the collective good first and to “coordinate” its foreign policy towards Yugoslavia as Sofia has done in the past. If Bulgarian attempts to sidestep such demands within the alliance failed, it could open a Pandora’s box in the Balkans. Could the Zhivkov regime survive being forced to sacrifice Bulgarian ethnic policy to Yugoslav demands? If this were the cause of a Bulgarian succession crisis, the nature of the outcome would surely have major implications for Bulgarian participation in and attitudes towards the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This is not the place to second-guess that outcome. We know far too little about even the forces that would be involved. Who were those responsible for the tantalizing, abortive coup attempt of 1965, for example?

There is a third, even less desirable possibility, that of civil war sparked either by emigre activity or uprising in Croatia upon Tito’s death. This assumes (1) that Soviet policy and the international context are irrelevant in the event of sudden crisis; (2) that a major provocation on the part of Croatian extremists (a subculture living on hope and desperation) is inevitable; and (3) that there is a large possibility given such a provocation that Yugoslavia will reenact the violent drama of King Alexander’s interwar dictatorship. Even without external provocation, the danger of civil war lurks in the shadow of an army coup.

Moves to equalize the ratio of “national” participation in the officer corps notwithstanding, the JNA is predominantly Serbian (conservative estimates range around 70 percent). The army may, in fact, perceive itself as neutral and operating in Yugoslav as opposed to parochial ethnic interests. How the JNA sees itself, however, is less important than how it is seen by the other non-Serbian nationalities. Bakaric has warned that
for the army to seize power would mean civil war, "... we too organize our army..." 31

What the Croatian leader meant by "our army" was unspecified. The logical assumption would be that he referred to Croatian territorial units (TDU's) organized as a part of the strategy of "all peoples' defense" since 1969. Such a possibility raises the ugly prospect of confrontation between the JNA and one of its "coequal" partners in the defense of Yugoslav security. 32

For our purposes the question of civil war is not so much why it would occur, but the consequences for the entire Balkans. First, this analysis assumes that a civil war in Yugoslavia is high on the list of nightmares in Moscow. Should the situation collapse into armed struggle, the Soviets have a lot to lose, and potentially very costly gains at best.

If a Croatian uprising occurs, the Warsaw Pact would undoubtedly go on alert. It is extremely doubtful that the alliance itself would agree to take any further action. Moscow's preference would most likely be for a quick victory of the establishment, leaving Yugoslavia intact, if politically shattered. If, however, outside aid or prolonged resistance appeared to threaten Yugoslav integrity, the Soviets might feel trapped into an intervention to try to salvage the strategic southern half of Yugoslavia for "socialism."

Should such an intervention occur, there would be the question of Bulgarian participation, with all of the painful consequences and potentially messy aftermath regarding Bulgarian-Soviet relations. Indeed, even the possibility of such a move raises a difficult problem for the Bulgarians. If the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated over time rather than being a short, violent outburst, it could well lead to demands for Soviet troops to be stationed in Bulgaria. Such a request would come under Bulgarian obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, there has been speculation that even without the impetus of a major crisis, the Soviets would like to see Russian troops based in Bulgaria for quick and speedy access to the Middle East. No matter which leadership was in Sofia, the response would be unenthusiastic. Under the pressure of events surrounding a Yugoslav civil war, it would also be extremely difficult to say "no." Thus such a possibility can be seen as one in which the Warsaw Pact becomes once again an instrument of pressure on East European members, Bulgaria, and most likely Romania as well, to acquiesce to demands for military collaboration, demands that could easily escalate to include expanded political control. In these circumstances, as hypothesized, the central question would not be the role of the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis Yugoslavia but the impact of the Yugoslav situation on interalliance politics, particularly the position of Bulgaria and Romania.

Albania

Albania is a special case, again. In 1968 Albania denounced the Warsaw Pact as a "treaty of slavery" and formally withdrew from the alliance
even though the WTO was not involved in, and did not sanction, the intervention in Czechoslovakia. In turn, Tirane began to try to strengthen relations within the Balkans—even with Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Hoxha regime has violently resisted all attempts to use the framework of the alliance to reconcile Soviet-Albanian differences.

As long as the present Albanian leadership holds power, any future development that implied post-Tito Yugoslavia's moving closer to the Warsaw Pact would be considered intensely threatening. Such a posture would shake, if not disrupt, the increasingly close cultural ties between the Albanian region of Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and Albania.

Unless, and until, Hoxha disappears from the Albanian political scene, the Soviets will probably continue as before to ignore Albania. Once having de facto excluded Albanian participation (1961), tolerated rejection of alliance overtures (1965), and dismissed withdrawal from the pact without comment (1968), it is highly unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would be a major part of Soviet policy toward Albania.

Nonetheless, the situation could change dramatically if the Albanian leadership is changed. Nor is that a distant possibility. In the summer of 1975 there were three consecutive shake-ups of top Albanian party and government leaders. Hoxha, like Tito, gives every appearance of strenuously trying to control the outcome of a succession struggle already swirling around him. It is a process undoubtedly intensely followed in Moscow, Belgrade, and Pristina, capital of the Kosovo. For the timing and nature of that change could influence a variety of post-Tito Balkan options as seen by all these policy makers.

It is most unlikely that either Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces would be involved in “saving Albanian socialism.” However, if there seemed half a chance, Moscow might well turn once again to the Warsaw Pact as the institution best equipped to smooth reconciliation with a new, potentially less blood-feuding Albanian regime.

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In sum, the role played by the Warsaw Pact in Soviet and East European policies in the post-Tito Balkans cannot be separated from the nature of post-Tito Yugoslavia. It is safe to say that the alliance will have a role, although in no case is it likely to be a determining factor. That role may be as a channel for conflict containment or political intervention. It potentially includes demands of Balkan alliance members upon Moscow as well as Soviet pressures on the East European members of the pact. It will be limited by restraints imposed by past intra-alliance conflict, the nature of East-West detente, the politically changing environment, and the rate of turnover of those political actors dominating today's stage.

Notes

9. See especially Thomas W. Wolfe. The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, December 1965). Before joint maneuvers began in the fall of 1961, Western scholars considered the Warsaw Pact of negligible military importance. For example, H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking (N.Y.: Praeger, 1959), does not mention the WTO, although he does refer to the November 1954 note stressing the necessity for joint measures should West Germany join the WEU. Nor does Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962), consider the WTO as other than one aspect of Soviet field forces—an aspect which he makes no attempt to evaluate.
13. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
25. The "nine" originally referred to sponsors of the 1965 U.N. Resolution to promote good neighbor relations among European states with different social and political
systems, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Finland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Subsequently joined by the Netherlands, this group stayed in contact and to a large extent coordinated their European security initiatives.

26. For analysis of the pan-European communist conference maneuvering see Kevin Devlin, "The Interparty Drama," *Problems of Communism*, No. 4, July/August 1975, pp. 18-34.


29. Ibid., p. 55.


Despite 30 years of "communist" dominance over most of the Balkan Peninsula, the area remains highly unstable as a result of great power interests and intraregional tensions. For the Soviet Union, the Balkans represent a fundamental linchpin of interests which lie far beyond regional problems. Soviet naval, Mediterranean, Middle East, East European, strategic, and ideological interests all are affected drastically by the strains and stresses which dominate the peninsula. Given the undeniable military value of a "Sovietized" Balkans, it would be extremely negligent of the West to fail to take an extremely close and careful look at the potential of and for Soviet military action to "stabilize" the region.

After the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the governments of the Balkan communist states have little reason to doubt the Soviet propensity for taking such action against them, should the leadership in the Kremlin perceive the costs of not invading one or more of them as outweighing the costs of military intervention. If the meaning of the invasion of Czechoslovakia had not been clear, the subsequent Soviet theoretical justification would have erased any doubts among Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The month after the invasion S. Kovalev was telling readers of Pravda that

there is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement. . . .

Before the end of the year Brezhnev himself provided further clarification:

. . . when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this is no longer merely a problem for

Notes to references appearing throughout this chapter are located at the end of the chapter.
that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.4

The invasion of Czechoslovakia was to be the model for the execution of a tight bipolar theory in which the Kremlin would decide, through consultation with those communist states that concurred, when a dangerous situation exists. In fact, the invasion of Czechoslovakia effectively polarized the communist states in the Balkans, and resulted in the emergence of a tacitly anti-Soviet communist grouping. Of the four communist states on the peninsula, only Bulgaria endorsed the Soviet position.

To Romania, the invasion of Czechoslovakia constituted a flagrant transgression of national independence and sovereignty. Ceausescu, as First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, announced that Romania would not permit any violation of its territory. While making numerous tactical retreats, Romania attempted to block all Soviet attempts to exert pressure through defensive efforts both within the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization and from without. In an informal manner, Yugoslavia, Albania, and China became her allies on this issue.

While the invasion of Czechoslovakia caught the Yugoslavs by surprise, they quickly touched all the bases in an attempt to indicate a balanced and determined defense against the Soviets. Better relations were immediately sought with both Western states and other communist states at odds with the Kremlin. Tito's "...hasty meeting with Ceausescu on the Yugoslav-Romanian border..."3 was among the first steps taken. The two leaders "...met regularly, the exchange of other top-level delegations, including military ones, was routinized, and bilateral relations took on the character of an open if informal alliance."4 In time, even China was willing to lend support to Yugoslavia as part of its campaign to promote anti-Soviet feelings in Eastern Europe.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a sudden and drastic reappraisal of the Albanian geopolitical stance. Party leader Enver Hoxha stated flatly that

the theory of "limited sovereignty" is the theory of chauvinism and great power expansion, the theory by whose help the new Soviet imperialists are trying to stifle all sovereignty of other peoples and arrogate the "sovereign right" to intervene where and when they should. 5

Within a month Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. Of much more significance were the Albanian initiatives toward improving the political atmosphere of the Balkans. These initiatives extended to a tacit military alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia. In particular, for the Albanians there was little question as to the tremendous value of an "independent" Yugoslavia to the Albanian defense posture. The following serves as an example of Tirane's offer to support Romania and Yugoslavia:

Despite the divergence of an ideological character we have with the Romanian Party and State leadership on many issues, the Albanian people
people and their Party of Labor firmly back the just resistance of the fraternal Romanian people and the Romanian working class against the aggressive intentions of the Soviet chauvinists and their followers, against any blackmail or provocation, overt or covert, the chieftains of the Soviet Union might resort to in order to subjugate Romania. Whatever may happen, we will always be on the side of the Romanian people, on the side of the Romanian working class.

Apart from Romania, the policy of the expansionist hegemonic objectives of the Soviet revisionist leaders threaten also Yugoslavia. But one thing is certain. The Kremlin chieftains are well aware that an eventual assault by them on the Yugoslav borders will come up against the fierce and heroic resistance of the Yugoslav peoples. The political and ideological demarcation line separating us from the present Yugoslav leadership is now well known. But the Albanian people, strictly abiding by the principles guiding them and at the same time remaining true to their freedom-loving, progressive and anti-imperialist traditions of long standing, will support without hesitation the resistance of the peoples of Yugoslavia to aggression.

Although the leaders of all three countries continue to reflect this determination to resist Soviet domination, the imminent crisis situation, though certainly not the general flammability of the situation, has been reduced. As John C. Campbell has so correctly pointed out,

... the situation in the Balkans today is one that recalls the area’s reputation in an unlamented past. And if the region still merits the old label of the world’s “tinderbox,” the reason is in large part that Russia is vigorously pursuing its great-power destiny there and, as in past history, is running into the interests of other world powers and the tangles of local nationalism.

For despite the little attention the Balkan area attracts in Western strategy, the Soviet Union finds it a positive advantage to avoid East-West dialogue that might possibly restrict Soviet freedom of action in dealing with the communist states in the region. “The exclusion of Hungary as a full participant in the MBFR talks and even from the zone covered by the talks... was a sign that the USSR intended to keep its forces in that country intact, a standing threat to the neighboring Balkan States...” Yet the Soviets have not hesitated to utilize their strategy of “detente” against their communist opponents in the Balkans as well as against the West. Taking advantage of the fragility of Yugoslavia’s internal situation and the lack of a broad base of popular support for the Romanian Communist Party, the Soviets have, at least since 1971, attempted to open up wider possibilities for Soviet influence by emphasizing “... the theme of Balkan cooperation as a part of a tactic of wearing down the anti-Soviet edges of Yugoslav and Romanian policies rather than attacking the policies and leaders directly.” Yet whatever tactical strategy the Soviets attempt to utilize, it may be assumed that they intend to tackle the challenge of nationalism and the interests of other powers in their historical struggle to achieve a pax sovietica in the Balkans. The question
of whether Soviet military power will actually be utilized to achieve the
Soviet goal in the Balkans is merely a question of whether it is perceived
as the most appropriate means at any given moment. In essence, then,
it is not a matter of whether the Soviets would utilize military power in
the Balkans, but rather a matter of determining the circumstances in
which they would perceive the use of military force as the most appro-
priate means of achieving their goals in the region.

The Soviet military presence in the area of the Balkans is impressive.
Yet Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania are not totally without military
options, and there exists the possibility of assistance against aggression
from the east. Under such circumstances, the most “rational” military
alternative for the Soviets, should they perceive a military “solution” to
their Balkan difficulties as a necessity, would be the quick and decisive
destruction of non-pro-Soviet governments in all three countries without
becoming locked into a protracted antiguerilla war around which world
public opinion could be mobilized. Though the political and military
“disincentives” for such an attack may appear to be great, the Russian
dream of “warm water ports” and the Soviet desire to end internal dis-
sidence within its East European cordon sanitaire and, thereby, prevent
any further fractionalization of the Soviet-sponsored international com-
munist movement, could be expected to weigh heavily in favor of dramatic
action, should an opportunity to intervene present itself during any crisis
that might arise with Tito’s passage into history. What follows will hope-
fully lend some assistance in understanding why things are the way they
are.

The Military Organization and Strength of the
Protagonists

Any comparative analysis of the military capabilities of the Soviet
Union and the communist countries of the Balkans must be prefaced by
some comments on the function of these forces within their primary roles
of defending the national interests of their respective states. After all,
one must expect that the Soviet Union will, because its national interests
are much more extensive, maintain a much larger military establishment.
The Soviet Union has geographically extensive requirements and com-
mittments that tend to reduce its quantitative military superiority with
regard to its communist opponents in the Balkans. Of course the Soviets
could, depending upon the world situation at the time, alter their com-
mittments elsewhere in order to augment their commitment in the Balkan
area. Much of the significance of the military power of the Soviet Union’s
communist Balkan opponents therefore depends on insuring that this
concentration of military forces is not allowed to happen. Only within
the parameters of this assumption does military resistance on the part of
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania to Soviet armed aggression make
sense.
In the Soviet Far East, approximately 43 divisions are preoccupied by China's People's Liberation Army. NATO manages to fix at least 50 of the 95 divisions the Soviets have stationed in Europe and European USSR. Another 24 divisions are committed to Southern and 6 divisions to Central USSR. Thus, if the Soviet Union would mobilize her ground forces to full strength, approximately 45 divisions would be available for use in the Balkans. This assumes, of course, that demands elsewhere would not change fundamentally as a result of a Soviet military engagement in the Balkans. The potential for disaster in a Soviet miscalculation with regard to this assumption is a fundamental element in the intimidating effect of threats to resist made on the part of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. This is the core of the reason behind Romanian and Yugoslav attempts to cultivate their relations with Peking, and the answer to why they pressed so hard for a visit from then President Ford immediately after the Helsinki European Security Conference. This is not to say, however, that the military power and strategy of a small country is irrelevant when confronted by the awesome might of one of the superpowers, but only that indigenous military power alone does not guarantee the Romanians, Yugoslavs, or Albanians against a Soviet onslaught.

There continue to be comments in the West concerning the impossibility of the military situation for Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania should the Soviets stage a full-scale invasion. These kinds of evaluations must have been made either by civilian intelligence specialists so entrapped by their ideological studies that they failed to familiarize themselves with the history of guerrilla movements, or by military planners so imbued with their own propaganda concerning "the Soviet soldier" that they have begun to believe it. While the myth about the invincible American soldier simply required his getting kicked in the seat of his fatigues a couple of times to be deflated to reality, "Ivan" just as simply hasn't had that dubious opportunity yet. In fact, a "dirty little war in the Balkans" just might be what is needed to bring the Soviet military minds back down out of the clouds of the Great Patriotic War.

The key to the success of any Soviet military action in the Balkans would have to be the political action that would eliminate the need for much military action. The Soviet opponents are not Czechs, who could rationalize the futility of resistance. History tells us that the peoples of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania could be expected to resist a Soviet military invasion, and that orthodox Soviet politicians and generals could be expected to fail to adapt conventional military tactics to meet a predominantly political war. "Ever since Scythian guerrillas kicked hell out of Emperor Darius's magnificent army in 512 B.C., orthodox military commanders have had their hands full in dealing with peoples who refused to fight by their standards."

**Military Organization and Defense Planning.** As could be expected, the military organization and defense planning of Romania and Yugo-
slavia reflect an attempt to forge a credible defense posture by fixing objectives which are not so disproportionate to their real military capabilities as to allow the "cost" factor of an invasion to fall below the Soviet perception of the benefits to be obtained as a result of an invasion. While the success of this policy requires

... the existence of a national defense force having the tradition, numbers, training and equipment for operating in a credible manner against potential aggressors, credibility is ... the central issue. The small nation's ability for carrying out limited military operations ... must not be placed in doubt; neither should the capacity of its political leadership for total resistance be in doubt. 14

Military organization and defense planning in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania must, therefore, be evaluated in terms of their military preparedness and determination to resist.

Although little information concerning Romanian military organization and defense planning has been made public, some insights can be obtained. That Romania intends to utilize the total resistance of a mobilized society can be concluded from the fact that soon after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ... Ceausescu sought to dramatize popular determination and unity by creating a sort of Romanian 'Home Guard' consisting of armed detachments of workers, peasants, and intellectuals for the defense of the fatherland. 15 Ceausescu was attempting to develop the organization for total resistance and to increase his capacity for the execution of such a policy. In light of the objective political environment in Romania, "the firmer the anti-Soviet stand, the firmer the support of the broad masses of the people who are profoundly nationalistic, non-communist, and distrustful of the Russians." 16

Much more information concerning military organization and defense planning is available for Yugoslavia. In fact, the Yugoslavs have conducted military maneuvers in the presence of Western observers. Following a principle of total national defense, the Yugoslavs have designed a system that calls for the regular armed forces to delay enemy penetration long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization. In the words of the Yugoslav State Secretary for National Defense, "the principal thing is to prevent the aggressor from achieving decisive successes, and thus to create, by fighting, the necessary conditions for a quick and organized putting up of resistance both by the Army and by all other forces of the country. 17 The Territorial Defense Forces of each Yugoslav republic would join the regular army forces in waging an active defense in depth, employing a mixture of combined and partisan tactics as they withdrew from border areas.

On "occupied" territory, both urban and rural, [Territorial Defense Forces] and paramilitary forces would fight a guerrilla war. Only if an entire region of the country were occupied, however, would [the regular armed forces] and [Territorial Defense Force] units revert exclusively to partisan tactics, as in World War II. By following such a strategy, Yugoslav military writers argue that an occupying force
in excess of 8.5 soldiers per square kilometre, or two million men, would be required to completely subjugate the country. Given the Central European balance of power, the Yugoslavs assume the Soviets are most unlikely to deploy such a force in South-Eastern Europe.

The military organization and defense planning on the part of Albania leads to the conclusion that a total national defense or “people’s war” is the only option available should the country go to war. Military forces are small in total numbers and poorly equipped. While much military manpower is expended on what might best be called “public works,” military exercises are conducted in a rather austere manner that tends to leave the military poorly trained. If a successful resistance to a Soviet invasion were to be mounted, it would have to be a popular resistance based in the difficult terrain of the country’s mountains and ravines.

While Albania cannot be said to follow a nonalignment policy, both Yugoslavia and Romania practice a form of neutrality that perceives third world security problems as interdependent. The fact that Romania is a formal member of the Warsaw Pact may not serve her needs as insurance against occupation for reasons of military “assistance,” but neither is her membership a matter of choice. That the Romanian leadership perceives that security problems are not solved by membership in one of the two most powerful military alliances ever to exist was evidenced by the Romanian press “... announcement that Romania and Yugoslavia were jointly developing a fighter aircraft.” Furthermore, “the announcement did not mention that the plane is ... powered by a Rolls-Royce jet engine.” Such military cooperation outside of a concrete alliance is as important politically as it is militarily because it denotes a modicum of neutrality and independence that, sometime in the future, the Soviets may come to accept. It is toward this goal that Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania direct their defense planning and their informal alliance.

**Military Strength and Disposition.** While there can be little question concerning the overwhelming military strength of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, several objective facts negate the assumptions that might otherwise be deduced from this preponderance of Soviet military power. As has already been mentioned, the Soviet Union has military obligations elsewhere, and it would involve fundamental risk taking to weaken the forces meeting those obligations. Only the naive could fail to appreciate the Soviet apprehension concerning any significant unilateral reduction of their military forces in Northern and Central Europe or along the Soviet border with the People’s Republic of China. Yet attempting to come up with the requisite forces for an invasion of the Balkans by mobilizing beyond the extent of “calling up” reserves to fill out Soviet regular ground force units would certainly increase the sense of apprehension in both the West and in Asia to the point of provoking military responses that would require that a good share of the newly mobilized reserves would be unavailable for use in
operations other than the bolstering of units facing the Soviet Union’s principal adversaries. Thus, without either weakening their military position elsewhere or provoking a military buildup by their opponents, the Soviets could probably mobilize a total of only 522,000 troops. While to these forces would probably be added the 315,000 troops that Bulgaria could contribute, the three dissident communist countries could probably mobilize almost 3 million troops (see table 5). Clearly, the disposition of Soviet military resources in meeting commitments tends to reduce Soviet regional military strength to the point where the threats of resistance on the part of the three dissident countries appear to gain a measure of credibility. This alone may be the greatest factor in preventing a Soviet invasion of the Balkans over the long haul. For if anything will dissuade the Soviets from a Balkan invasion, the sobering effect of a change in the military balance between NATO and the Soviet Union or between the Soviet Union and China resulting from a redistribution of Soviet forces should cause the politicians, if not the generals, some reservations about their ability to find a quick and clean military resolution to their political problems in that region.

Peculiarities and Weaknesses of the Respective Military Forces. Each army has its Achilles’ heel, and it is critical for each country’s well-being that the peculiarities and weaknesses of its military forces be addressed and resolved during times of peace so as to insure that the country is capable of providing for the population’s ultimate welfare. While it is not possible to render a finite evaluation of an army and be certain of the

Table 5.—The Relative Ground Force Strength of the Protagonists in the Balkans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ground Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania¹</td>
<td>212,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania²</td>
<td>1,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia³</td>
<td>1,609,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,998,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria⁴</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union⁵</td>
<td>522,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>837,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes Army regulars, paramilitary forces, and about 75 percent of the total reserve forces of the country.
² Includes Army regulars and reserves, paramilitary forces, and the Patriotic Guard.
³ Includes Army regulars, reservists, Frontier Guards, Territorial Defense Force, and Youth units.
⁴ Includes Army regulars and reserves.
⁵ Includes Soviet Group of Forces in Hungary, 33 of the divisions in European USSR, and all 8 airborne divisions.

outcome of any engagement between it and some other military opponent, it is possible to examine military establishments in light of their ability to execute the strategy and tactics most appropriate for their objective situations. The evaluations that follow will examine the armed forces of the three dissident communist states in terms of their ability to cope (within their limited objectives) with the tactics the Soviets could be expected to employ, and examine the Soviet armed forces in terms of their ability to deal effectively with the type of resistance they could expect to encounter, should the Soviet Union attempt to utilize military intervention as a solution to its problems in the Balkans.

The Romanian leadership can logically visualize essentially two military intervention scenarios. They could be faced with an armed conflict against a Soviet-encouraged Bulgaria, or a Soviet (perhaps with Warsaw Pact participation) invasion. Barring a case where the Romanians would be caught totally unaware by the Bulgarians, the Romanians could probably hold their own against the Bulgarians, at least over the short term. However, it is likely that an invasion of Romanian territory by the armed forces of Bulgaria would essentially constitute a diversionary tactic to draw Romanian military forces away from the Soviet invasion routes in the north and east. Any such tactics that would draw Romanian ground forces out into the open plains would provide Soviet airpower with a lucrative target once Romanian aircraft had been swept from the skies. Assuming Romanian aircraft would not be caught on the ground, Romania does potentially have the requisite aircraft to handle a Bulgarian threat, but, if faced with a Soviet air attack, it is doubtful whether she has enough punch to buy much time for a withdrawal of her ground forces to mountainous terrain. It is also questionable whether the Romanian navy would be of much utility in that it is highly likely that Romanian naval facilities could be expected to be overrun by a Soviet ground advance before any significant naval operations would be launched against Romanian territory. A bright spot in the Romanian defense establishment would have to be the highly mechanized ground forces, which include mountain and airborne units. It is specifically this capability of moving military forces quickly that provides any possible hope for responding to Soviet airmobile operations. It is also the ability of the ground units to withdraw quickly into the mountainous areas of the northern part of the country that sustains any hope of retaining an organized Romanian military force in the field around which popular resistance could be built. "Home Guard" units could, of course, lend immensely to the withdrawal movements of the regular military units by fighting delaying actions which terminated in their dispersal into guerrilla units for the protracted conflict to follow. Thus, for the Romanians, any increase in antiaircraft defensive capabilities would lend significantly to the survivability of their largest ground force units, and greater availability of simple hand-held antitank devices would add significantly to the potential of the "Home Guard"
for any measure of success both during the initial stages of an invasion and during a post-invasion protracted-conflict stage.

Yugoslavia has, since 1968, undertaken "... a farsighted and profound redirection and restructuring of its defense establishment and strategy." Within this redirection and restructuring of efforts there exist some fundamental considerations. As opposed to the 1941–45 efforts, the task now is to

... build and exploit satisfaction and confidence in the existing system, not the opposite. One consequence ... is that all of the established instruments of the existing state, and especially the military one, must be seen to be fully and effectively engaged ... if the rest of the population is to be expected to have the morale and confidence they need to play their assigned roles.

Yugoslav survival depends upon fulfillment of the slogan that "... all soldiers are citizens and all citizens are soldiers." Yet the same economic realities that played a role in causing the Yugoslavs to forswear a large standing army in favor of their new total national defense approach, have also contributed to the lack of mobility on the part of the ground forces and a relatively small number of combat aircraft, as well as the lack of a sophisticated air defense system. While the Yugoslavs could hold their own in the air against the Bulgarians, their air force could be expected to be quickly swept from the skies by any concerted Soviet effort. The Yugoslav navy could probably, at least over the short term, hold most of the coastal areas, and the mountainous terrain of the hinterland could be expected to lend significant assistance to the ground forces in any attempt to resist a limited incursion or delay any massive invasion. Also, Yugoslavia appears to have the potential of gaining some flexibility of conventional military response due to the fact that the country has ordered a relatively large number of French helicopters that could add significantly to the ability to influence fluid situations for as long as the air force can prevent an opponent from interdicting heli-borne operations. However, without question the most critical link in the redirected and reconstructed defense establishment and strategy would have to be the territorial defense forces (TDF), which consist of citizen-soldiers organized by the republican political authorities. The very structure relied upon to "... insure that large-scale military resistance will continue even if the apex of the military command structure is destroyed" harks back to the question of whether "... all the peoples of the quarrelsome multinational state would be willing to fight as they did in 1941–45 in defense of the present state and its system." As has been noted, one of the great fears of the present Yugoslav regime is that the Soviet Union will forge an alliance with the disaffected Croatians, rendering support in the struggle against the Serbs in return for such eventual concessions as the acquisition of naval bases. Reports from Croatian emigre organizations have lent substance to these fears.
For indeed, some Croatian nationals have become so dissatisfied with the situation in Yugoslavia that they have actually called for the creation of an independent Croatia under Soviet protection.7

Even a quick look at the statistics on the Albanian military is enough to conclude that the country could probably be occupied by a few relatively well-equipped and well-supported divisions. The small Albanian navy and air force would be almost irrelevant factors in any conflict. Furthermore, the relatively small army lacks mobility and adequate antitank and antiaircraft capabilities. In effect, the continued existence of the present system, once a concerted effort to invade the country has been made, would depend exclusively on the degree of total participation of the population in offering resistance to the occupiers. Thus, the military assistance the Albanians could render Romania and Yugoslavia, beyond food and things of that nature, would be negligible.

Romania and Yugoslavia can be certain that Bulgaria will never attack them without both the expressed approval of and significant assistance from the Soviet Union. For although the Bulgarian armed forces are well equipped, they are probably not large enough to overwhelm either Romania or Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian ground forces are completely mechanized and equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and the latest Soviet antitank and antiaircraft guided weapons. However, they simply do not have the requisite numbers to undertake an invasion of either Romania or Yugoslavia, particularly if they had to deal with a front against both countries. While the Bulgarian navy has more capabilities than the Romanian navy, it simply is not capable of mustering the power to outclass the Yugoslav navy. The Bulgarian air force is pretty much equaled in numbers of sophisticated aircraft by both Romania and Yugoslavia. Thus, the Bulgarian armed forces do not, in themselves, represent a significant threat to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Their real significance is as a means through which the Soviet Union could "fix" a portion of the Romanian and Yugoslav military forces in the south while Soviet forces attack from the north. As long as the period of large unit engagements is relatively short or the Soviets reinforce them, the Bulgarian armed forces should be able to carry out this limited task. There appears to be no lack of loyalty to Moscow on the part of the Bulgarian leadership, and there exist enough animosities between the Bulgarians and their Balkan neighbors to motivate the troops.

Aside from the problem of the availability of the requisite ground force manpower, the Soviet Union could be expected to encounter a logistics problem in any invasion of the Balkans. Just as the Soviets had difficulty in mustering transportation for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, they could expect to again find themselves pressing trucks, railroad cars, and barges from civilian service, where this increased shortage would cause a "snowballing effect" in the civilian economy that could come back to haunt the military effort, should the "war" not be a short one.
Considerations Concerning the Course of a Military Conflict

Most certainly, there are many factors which could be expected to influence the course of a Soviet military invasion of the Balkans. Aside from the military power factor itself, the military strategist must be concerned with the geography and demography of the area in which he is to meet his opponent. In addition, that the military strategist is faced with the task of finding a military solution to problems born of unresolved political conflicts may very well mean that there is no solution short of total annihilation. Thus, the relative expendable military power must be analyzed in the context of the physical and political realities of the Balkans.

Military Topography and Geography. Romania presents a relatively simple landform pattern consisting of a sharply curving line of mountains, with, along its outer edge, foothills and plains, and a series of mountains (including the Bihor massif) extending like a chord across its open side (see figure 1). This “chord” of mountains is much more open, and, in fact, consists of broken hills in a few places in the far north. The circuit formed by these mountain ranges contains the Transylvanian Basin, which...
measures about 90 miles from east to west and about 120 miles from north to south. On the west side of this ring of mountains lies a flat plain running from the Soviet border in the north along the entire border with Hungary to about one-half the border with Yugoslavia. To the east and south sides of the ring of mountains lie plains which run to within 45 miles of the Romanian Black Sea coast. The coastal area consists of a delta area in the north, where the Danube flows into the sea, and a low plateau to the south. Thus, while the landforms of Romania leave her capital and largest city wide open to a quick armored thrust from the Odessa Military District, the Carpathian Mountains do provide a natural fortress to which the Romanian military forces could withdraw in the face of a Soviet onslaught.

To a great extent, the landform regions of Yugoslavia can be described as "... a simple division between a northern region of lowland, drained by the Danube and its tributaries and the rest of the country, which is without exception mountainous" (see figure 1). Northwestern Yugoslavia is an alpine region. From the mountains in the northwest to the Albanian border run the Dinaric system of mountain ranges—high, barren plateaus, and deeply incised valleys, thus forming the "mountain heartland" of Yugoslavia. The mountainous terrain of this system is nowhere far from the Adriatic shore, in some places plunging precipitously into the sea. While the Dinaric system is terminated short of the Bulgarian border by a great river-cut trench, "the eastern boundary of Yugoslavia, like the northwestern, runs through a zone of high and rugged mountains." Towards the north these mountains consist of a continuation of the Carpathian mountain system running from Romania, though breached by the Danube, into Bulgaria. "To the south they form the most westerly extension of the ... massif known as the Rhodope." These two mountain systems are split by a river-made valley that constitutes the historically most important link between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. To the northeast of the Dinaric system, along the Yugoslav border with Hungary and a good share of the border with Romania, lies the Danubian Plain. Although this region is far from flat, the hills and plateaus of this area do not dominate the landform scene in any manner that would constitute a formidable barrier. Clearly, then, the landforms of Yugoslavia provide a mountainous fortress into which the Yugoslav military could withdraw, but the Danubian Plain leaves a significant portion of the nation's population exposed to a quick armored thrust from Hungary.

The landforms of Albania consist of three major regions (see figure 1). A coastal plain extends from the Yugoslav border in the north for a distance of about 125 miles to a point just outside of Vlore. The plain ranges from 4 miles to over 30 miles in width. While in general it is rather flat, the plain is broken by a number of hilly ridges that at times rise to more than 1,000 feet. Inland from the coastal plain lies a mountainous zone that runs the whole east of the country, although it is at its highest and most rugged in the extreme north. The third major landform region
is an exception to the second, in that an alluvial plain, dotted with marshy areas and small lakes, runs for about 30 miles along the Albanian border with Yugoslavia and Greece. Thus, the geographical location of the country, and her landforms, seem to isolate Albania rather effectively, leaving airborne operations and naval landings as probably the most effective means of quickly occupying the country.

**Population and Settlement.** A majority of the population of Romania lives in villages and hamlets. In fact, while there exist no less than thirteen cities having a population of more than 100,000 persons, there is really only a single large city, Bucharest. It is important to note, however, that some of the Transylvanian towns (most prominently Brasov, Sibiu, and Cluj) have become the economic focus of recent industrial development.

Yugoslavia is also a predominantly rural, agricultural country, with only a little over a half dozen towns having a population of over 100,000 people. These towns are, however, quite well dispersed among the geographical regions of the country. "The whole of the mountainous interior of Yugoslavia is characterized in greater or lesser degree by a dispersed pattern of settlement. . . ." Settlement tends to become more tightly nucleated along the valleys and on the plains. A significant portion of the total population lives on the Danubian Plain, leaving it exposed to any land invasion from the east or northeast. "The coastal towns are few and most of them are small."

Albania is the least urbanized country in Europe. Only the capital city exceeds a population of 100,000 people. "Settlement usually takes the form of small and rather loosely grouped villages. . . ." The towns that exist are essentially bazaars, with narrow and poorly paved streets. They " . . . tend to lie . . . either on the coast or along the junction of mountain and plain, with a few of the smaller towns serving as market centres in the larger and more fertile basins of the interior."

**The Political Ramifications of a Protracted Conflict.** Another fact which could possibly play a critical role in the outcome of any Soviet invasion of the Balkans is the fundamental difference between the lightning-quick operations which the Soviet generals would envision, and the protracted guerrilla-type resistance which could be expected to be offered by the peoples of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. While none of these countries has any illusions about "defeating" the Soviet Union on the battlefield, they hope that their determination to resist will either deter the Soviet Union from armed intervention or, at a minimum, cause such a protracted distasteful scene that the arena of contention would move from the military back to the political theater. The words "winning" and "victory" quickly fade from political reality in a situation in which an unassailable base consisting of mountainous terrain and the creed of a national independence with pride and dignity is linked to a flexible strategy and tactics that insure the enemy's need to "destroy" the country.
in order to “save” it. Furthermore, the longer the conflict remained at the military level, the more difficult a time the Soviets might have extracting themselves when they finally recognized that a political solution was the only way out of the maze. Attaining the light at the end of the tunnel might require the assistance of others at, of course, the going rate for such services rendered. The total cost of “failing to win” could be expected to be directly proportionate to the intensity of the “distasteful scene” that is promoted by the three dissident states’ resistance.

It is quite possible that both traditional liberals and the new left, as well as the more conservative observers, would find heroic the massive resistance on the part of the peoples of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Such heroic action might even be found deserving of assistance. A favorable Western public opinion fostered by a stoic resistance could possibly encourage NATO military assistance in the form of supplies and equipment. As conjectural as outside military assistance seems, it remains within the parameters of the strategic thinking presently being done by both U.S. and Soviet diplomats and defense planners. Certainly the West has important interests at stake in the future of Yugoslavia. Soviet military bases in the Central Mediterranean would threaten to cut NATO’s southern command in half, and would make infinitely more complex the Italian political equation as well as transform Italy’s military position. It has been suggested that “... an attack on neutral Yugoslavia would have ... to reckon with military countermeasures by NATO,” and it was reported that then President Gerald Ford’s August 1975 visit to Yugoslavia was to assure Tito and his successors that

the U.S. has a strong interest in the continued independence of Yugoslavia and would strenuously oppose—short of armed intervention—any Russian attempt to move in on the country during the critical period expected to follow the death of the nation’s aging strong man. . . .

The issue was also raised in the 1976 U.S. Presidential campaign when Jimmy Carter stated that he would not send U.S. troops to Yugoslavia if the Soviet Union invaded the country. Carter’s comment caused a minor flap and he was soon backing down, saying that he would have to make a final decision at the time of any such event.

Besides concerns over Western reactions to a Soviet invasion of the Balkans, the Soviets must also take into consideration the consequences in Eastern Europe of such an action. A protracted conflict in the Balkans might very well stimulate anti-Soviet activities in Poland and Hungary. The very possibility of such a spreading of Soviet “security” problems is certainly enough to suggest that the Soviets might seek to avoid aggravating the situation by excluding any institutional Warsaw Pact involvement in an invasion. If it ever occurs, an invasion might have to be a Soviet affair, except for the Bulgarians, of course.
The Probable Scenario of a Military Conflict

Without doubt, it is safe to assume that the present Soviet leadership recognizes that military intervention in the Balkans, even after Tito has left the political scene, is bound to be a high risk adventure. Yet there has not been demonstrated, and there is not likely to be either, any disposition to accept a limitation on Soviet options. While detente with the United States appears to mean a great deal to the present Soviet leadership, the degree to which the Soviet Union desires to continue to reap the benefits of economic and technical cooperation can be expected to be weighed very carefully on a continuing basis against Soviet needs and opportunities.

Much will depend on whether the United States . . . maintains balancing power in the Mediterranean and Middle East; on whether China continues to be a check on the Soviet Union both directly and through its influence in the Balkans; . . . on whether relations between Western and Eastern Europe can flourish. Unless the forces making for local independence and cooperation have some help from a favorable world environment. . . . Soviet military intervention will remain an option, no matter how impractical it really might be.

Among the most explosive stories concerning possible Soviet action against any of the three dissident Balkan communist states was a 1974 interview with Major General Jan Sejna. Sejna, a defector from the Czechoslovak army, claimed that the Soviets had developed a contingency plan for military action against Yugoslavia in the event of the development of "unfavorable" or "undesirable" circumstances in conjunction with the death of Tito. This plan, code named "Polarka," called for an invasion of eastern Austria by Czechoslovakian troops. According to the plan, once the Soviets had assured themselves that the United States, Great Britain, and France were not going to take any significant military action to counter the Czechoslovak invasion, and the KGB and its Austrian collaborators had secured eastern and southern Austria, the Soviets would use the territory as a base from which to launch an invasion of Yugoslavia. While the existence of the "Polarka" plan is inherently plausible, it remains an inordinately high-risk means by which to gain the rather dubious "advantages" of the geographical position for an attack on a country that could better be attacked from a position already occupied by the Soviets—Hungary. Furthermore, the plan is out of character with the kind of operation the Soviets utilized in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, always aware of the importance of effectively eliminating resistance, would hardly be willing to wait for such resistance to be mobilized. If they use military power in the Balkans, they will do a complete job, and do it quickly. The attempted destruction of formal resistance by quick armored thrusts and the capture of Romanian and Yugoslav capitals by airborne and airmobile forces, along with the installation of collaborationist governments, would be more the
Soviet style for exercising military intervention as a solution to their problems in the Balkans.

**Probable Soviet Operations.** A Soviet ground advance into Romania could be expected to be concentrated along the Prut River, which forms the eastern boundary between Romania and the Soviet Union (see figure 2). The spearhead of the operation would undoubtedly be directed out of southeasternmost Odessa Military District, across the plains to the south of the Carpathian Mountains and straight to the capital. The Romanian leadership could expect Soviet airborne or airmobile forces to assist ground units in the assault on Bucharest. After having installed a collaborationist regime in the city, the Romanian people would be asked by the new government to cease resistance against the fraternal assistance being rendered in an attempt to stem the reactionary counterrevolution running rampant in the country. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to utilize the Bulgarians as proxy for their own intervention if only because of the inability of the Bulgarians to mount the type of lightning-quick military operation that would seem to be required in order to have any chance of crushing the Romanian will to resist. This does not preclude, of course, a Soviet attempt to reduce this determination.
through the use of Bulgarian attacks along the Danube in an effort to cause a Romanian perception of a hopeless onslaught that could only be averted by complete and immediate capitulation. Should the Soviets fully expect the full-scale protracted resistance that the Romanians threaten, Soviet thrusts from the Odessa Military District and Bulgarian attacks across the Danube might be joined by drives directed from out of the Carpathian Military District to the north of the Bihor massif and out of Hungary to the south of the Bihor massif in an attempt to breach the chord of mountains surrounding the Transylvanian Basin. Such an action would most certainly find Soviet airborne or airmobile forces being employed against the strategic terrain involved, as well as against the major cities of Transylvania.

Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia would, unquestionably, be launched from out of Hungary onto the Danubian Plain (see figure 2). The spearhead of any such operation would seek to capture Belgrade as quickly as possible. Again, the defenders of the city could expect that the ground assault on the city would be assisted by the utilization of airborne or helicopter-borne forces in an attempt to keep the defenders off balance. Other key cities could also expect attempts at seizure through the use of air-moved forces. In the present context, the Soviet strategy would undoubtedly be linked to some political attempt to “break up” the present People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, unless the entire operation were in support of some sort of internal military coup. Bulgaria could best lend the Soviets assistance in any invasion project by exerting military pressure from the south by launching a drive against the Nisava valley, which penetrates the mountainous terrain along the Yugoslav border with Bulgaria.

Albania could expect to escape military intervention in the first stages of any Soviet invasion of the Balkans. The Albanians would constitute such an insignificant factor in the total crisis in which the Soviets would find themselves entangled that it is likely that they would be unwilling to invest the resources required to occupy Albania when those resources might be sorely needed in Romania and Yugoslavia. While the Albanian regime would be direly threatened by the Soviet presence in Yugoslavia, it would not be threatened with immediate Soviet military intervention, if only because it has to be one of the last places in the world where the Soviets have anything significant to gain by taking such action.

Respective Defensive Tactics. The most immediate task of the armed forces of both Romania and Yugoslavia is to delay enemy penetration long enough to allow their respective countries to carry out total mobilization. This task would involve both employing frontal tactics (although taking care to insure that large losses are avoided) across invasion routes and making quick and effective responses to the Soviet employment of airborne and airmobile forces. Once the Soviet “blitz” has been slowed, it might then be transformed into a protracted conflict in which a mixture
of combined and partisan tactics could be employed to exact the maximum cost from the invaders. The defenders can only hope that the maximum cost would be too high for the Soviet military and Western political sensitivities.

The Romanian leadership would hope to be able to utilize their land-forms in the event their country is invaded. The army has, therefore, an area organization comprised of two military regions and the Bucharest garrison. 43 Military units to the east and south of the Carpathian Mountains would have as their principal tasks the job of opposing any land invasion out of the Soviets' Odessa Military District, any naval landing along the Romanian Black Sea coast, and any operations launched from across the Danubian border with Bulgaria. A secondary, but critical, task would be the isolation and destruction of any Soviet airborne or airmobile forces that could be expected to be employed against Romanian cities and other crucial points. As these Romanian military forces withdrew in the face of the enemy, they would hope to make their way to the Eastern and Southern Carpathians where they could utilize the terrain in an attempt to keep the Soviets out of the Transylvanian Basin. Romanian military units in the north and west would hope to slow any Soviet advance in order to prepare defensive positions along the Western Carpathians. Success on the part of the Romanian military would allow for the existence of an independent Romania in the "heartland" of the country. The continued existence of this heartland fortress would depend upon many factors, not the least of which is the ability of the Romanian military to keep Soviet armor out of the Transylvanian Basin and to deal effectively with Soviet airborne and airmobile force operations against the Basin and its shielding ring of mountainous terrain. Should the potential Romanian fortress break down, the Romanians would hope to resort to guerrilla operations based in the Carpathians, but operating throughout the entire country as well.

The Yugoslav leadership hopes that their regular armed forces can delay any Soviet advance and deal effectively enough with any Soviet airborne and airmobile operations to insure that each Territorial Defense Force would have the time for their mobilization and deployment. Soviet military units should expect to find Yugoslav People's Army units to be increasingly flexible as mobilization proceeds. Where Yugoslav units are holding their own, there would be no withdrawal. Those units that are not capable of containing a Soviet thrust would trade territory for time through the use of a mixture of combined and partisan tactics until their ever-increasing strength stabilizes the situation, or they disengage in order to shift to the partisan tactics of a protracted conflict. With the immediate Soviet objectives lying on the east side of the country, the Yugoslav coastal defense command would probably not find itself being challenged in any significant way during the initial stages of any Soviet invasion. It would, therefore, be in a position to assist units withdrawing into the mountainous terrain along the coastal side of the country, where the
Yugoslavs managed to maintain as many as 30 divisions during World War II, and to assist in the movement of and security for any supplies from the West that might land along the coast. At least another 8 divisions could probably operate in the mountainous terrain in southeastern Yugoslavia. Should the Yugoslav strategy be successfully executed, "the expected consequence would be a merging of front and rear, the transformation of the entire country into a 'hedgehog.'"

A Soviet military invasion of either Romania or Yugoslavia would cause the Albanian leadership to mobilize their countrymen, and lend what little assistance they could to their "allies." Every possible action could be expected to be taken by the Albanian leadership to prepare the population psychologically for a possible Soviet attack on the country. Most certainly, frantic meetings between the Albanian leadership and important Chinese leaders would occur in the hope of preventing further Soviet military action by increasing Soviet apprehension with regard to Chinese military action along the Sino-Soviet border. The Albanians might very well even look to the West for some sort of assistance.

**International Counterintervention.** Quite understandably, the role the rest of the world should choose to play in the event that the Soviet Union opts for military intervention as a solution to its problems in the Balkans could very well be the crucial issue in the outcome of such a conflict. Partly as a result of Romania's rather isolated geographical position, it is doubtful that the Romanians would receive much material aid from the international community. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, would undoubtedly find the mobilization of material support much easier. Historical precedent, as well as geography, increase the chances that Yugoslavia would be able to find the West willing to provide at least military goods, although the first assistance she could feel confident of receiving is the assurance that she could divert her military forces from the Austrian, Italian, and Greek borders.

While all three of the dissident communist states would appeal to the international community as a whole to take action against any Soviet aggression in the Balkans, they would probably most hope, in addition to receiving material assistance from China and the West, to be able to mobilize the nonaligned nations against the Soviets. Success in this endeavor would, of course, fit into the ideological patterns of the three states. Unfortunately, while it could very well be an effective way of bringing political pressure to bear on the Soviet leadership, the pursuit of a very narrow self-interest on the part of most developing nations could easily cause them to sit the conflict out in favor of Soviet promises of economic and military aid.

**Projections**

Any attempt at considering the outcome of a Soviet invasion of the dissident communist states of the Balkans must be done within the context
of a potential incipient conflict situation within which unpredictable internal and external initiatives could cause cataclysmic chain reactions. In effect, such an attempt is quickly reduced to the raising of considerations that should not be overlooked. At best, the answers arrived at appear as doubts about what will occur rather than confidence about what will take place.

The immediate questions that arise concern military capabilities. First, could the Soviets manage to muster the forces that would be required to intervene on a massive scale in the Balkans in the present international environment? In view of the problems of mobilizing such a large force in addition to the already large Soviet force in Eastern Europe, the answer would have to be that the Soviets probably would not attempt to muster such a force as long as they perceive that they could not do so without major military, as well as political, repercussions elsewhere. Second, if the world environment were altered to the extent that the Soviets could muster the requisite military forces for such an intervention, could the defenders execute the strategy that has been so carefully mapped out for themselves? The answer to this question may only be arrived at in an actual conflict, but the pre-World War II Yugoslav strategy that was in some ways remarkably similar to present-day plans failed miserably. However, historical experience also lends a great deal of credibility to the Yugoslav threat to continue to resist by means of guerrilla warfare should conventional warfare fail. The doubt raised here is whether the political climate of the present and past will be similar enough once Tito has left the scene. There are indications that the political loyalties to Yugoslavia, as opposed to its constituent states, simply do not exist.

Even if the Yugoslavs are capable of launching an effective partisan war against a Soviet occupation force, it must not be overlooked that the Yugoslavs would, in time, require a great deal of outside military assistance. The Yugoslavs simply could not possibly hope to produce or capture all the armaments that would be necessary to maintain the offensive on a massive scale against an occupation army. The most likely source for such armaments would be, of course, the United States. Any assessment of the extent of U.S. military assistance that American public opinion would accept would have to take into consideration changed perceptions of America's vital interests and the possible threat to those interests. Without doubt, public toleration of military assistance to any of the three dissident states of the Balkans would depend upon the public's perception of whether the resistance can be successful or that the costs are not entirely disproportionate to the interests at stake.

Certainly all major parties involved or concerned with what occurs in the post-Tito Balkans will make some effort at analyzing the cost-effectiveness of attempting to utilize military action as a solution to their respective problems. In light of the extensive uncertainties, it should not be surprising at all if the Soviets relegate military intervention to a "last resort" status. If there is a solution to the dilemma of how the Soviets
might maximize their influence, it has to lie with a multifarious approach. While the most promising opportunities for political intervention lie in Yugoslavia and the most promising opportunities for a successful military intervention lie in Romania, it is Yugoslavia that represents the more formidable military opponent and Romania the one with the fewest political options for the Soviets. It can be assumed that there will be ample opportunities for the Soviets to enter the political game in post-Tito Yugoslavia. A politically neutralized military situation in Yugoslavia would have tremendous repercussions for the military situation of Romania. Thus, though an infinite number of scenarios for some form of Soviet military intervention can be postulated, it would be safest to assume that the Soviets will wait for a political “opening.” “The future viability of the tension-ridden Yugoslav state will depend to a great degree on the will and ability of its bickering leaders to cope with the economic and special crisis which is fed by nationalism.” The future of independent-minded Romania and Albania remains very much dependent upon this viability. Military intervention, then, is not now a solution to Soviet problems in the Balkans, although it or its threatened use might prove to be a valuable tool in support of other forms of intervention. As long as the governments of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania can present a credible threat to resist, the Soviets can be expected to emphasize other forms of intervention. This, of course, leads us back to Yugoslavia, which is both the strongest and the weakest link in the three states’ search for independence.

Notes

8. Ibid, p. 5.

11. NATO commands the attention of at least 27 divisions in Europe, 2 divisions in the Leningrad Military District, and 21 divisions in European USSR.


20. Henry Kamm, "Romanians Tighten Emigration Curbs." The New York Times, April 29, 1975, p. 4. This aircraft, which was originally referred to as the "Jurom" (for Yugoslavia and Romania), is now called the Orao. It is a single-seat, high-wing ground-attack fighter with large air intakes on both sides of the fuselage just behind the cockpit, and has a long slender nose. See John W. R. Taylor, editor. Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1976-77 (London: Jane's Yearbooks). p. 96. The joint program that led to the development of the Orao (Eagle) is expected to extend to the testing of new variations of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. See Néphadsereg, Budapest. March 5, 1977, p. 4.


30. Ibid.
32. Ibid, p. 689.
34. Ibid, pp. 839-40.
39. There have been, in the past, suggestions that Polish and Hungarian leaders have informed the Soviets that an invasion of Yugoslavia could make it difficult to keep the lid on the situation in their own countries. See "Washington Whispers." U.S. News & World Report, November 29, 1976, p. 5.
42. In October of 1974 reports "that President Tito had suffered a heart attack and that a pro-Soviet group of officers in the Yugoslav army was prepared to seize power" caused the Austrian government to meet in a hastily summoned conference. See Charles Mitchelmore, "Yugoslav Dispute With Austria Worsens," The New York Times, May 17, 1975, p. 3. Such reports have in the past also found their way to Italy. See Rusinow, The Yugoslav Concept of "All-National Defense," p. 8. In fact there has, at times, been concern expressed among the public in Yugoslavia that the Army might attempt to seize power. See Paul Lendvai, "Yugoslav Unity," Survival, XIII, No. 8, August 1971.
44. See map facing page 61 in United States Department Of The Army Pamphlet Number 20-243, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), August 1954.
45. Ibid.
46. Johnson, Total Defense In Yugoslavia, p. 4.
47. In 1968 the Italians informed the Yugoslav government that they would guarantee the security of Yugoslavia's border with Italy so she could redeploy troops stationed along this border to the east. See Rusinow, "Yugoslavia And Stalin's Successors, 1968-69," p. 7, footnote 1. Greece has its own reasons for both working to keep the Soviets out of post-Tito Yugoslavia and for desiring calm along her northern, non-Turkish borders. See Steven V. Roberts, "Detente, Even in the Fractious Balkans," The New York Times, October 26, 1975, sec. 4, p. 4.
48. "Yugoslavia is an organizing leader of the so-called Non-aligned Movement of Nations, an informal organization that created a permanent secretariat and some of the trappings of a regular international body in 1973." From Malcolm W. Browne, "Tito Backs U.N. Troops Exit from Korea," The New York Times, June 11, 1975, p. 6. The Yugoslavs have in the past attempted to institutionalize the intervention of the non-


50. In 1971 there occurred a census "... in which residents of one of Yugoslavia's republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were directed to declare themselves as Serbs, Croats, Moslems (who are one of Yugoslavia's legally recognized nationalities) or simply as Yugoslavs. Only 4 per cent declared themselves Yugoslavs." From Malcolm W. Browne, "Tito, Preparing for the Succession. Tightens His Reins." *The New York Times*, March 4, 1975, p. 2.

51. Apparently, the Soviets have in the recent past attempted political intervention in Romania. It was, of course, a failure. See Brown, "Romania Today: Towards 'Integration.' " p. 10. Ceausescu has found, however, that his independent foreign policy is not enough to satisfy public aspirations for increased individual freedom and social progress. In all fairness to Ceausescu, however, it must be conceded that if he attempted to move too quickly toward goals similar to those in Czechoslovakia, he would be courting even more trouble with the Soviets. See George Cioranescu, "Romania After Czechoslovakia: Ceausescu Walks the Tightrope." *East Europe*, 18, No. 6, p. 5.

52. The Soviets have apparently already entered the political game in anticipation of Tito's passing, for a leading Yugoslav official has recently claimed that "pro-Soviet organizers are intensifying their illegal political efforts ... to set up illegal 'Cominformist' and 'neo-Cominformist' organizations in opposition to the ruling ... party ..." From Malcolm W. Browne, "Yugoslav Leaders Denounce 'Stalinist' Influences and Pledge Independence," *The New York Times*, October 23, 1975, p. 10.

VI. Economic Intervention as a Solution to Soviet Political Problems in the Balkans

Elizabeth Clayton

When international trade occurs between partners with equal power to haggle and withdraw, there is no economic intervention, only trade. However, when one partner exceeds the other in the power either to haggle or withdraw, intervention arises with consequent gains for the more powerful partner. Traditionally, the power to intervene came from monopoly or monopsony power in private markets and the gains went to private profit-seeking organizations. At its peak, this was untrammeled imperialism; today, international bodies police and regulate such activity. The concern of this paper is a new form of economic intervention where the power to intervene belongs to a state trading agency, and the gains from the intervention are not economic but political. Thus, economic intervention requires both that trading partners be unequal in their market power and that the more powerful partner desire a political objective.

The Soviet Union possesses the market power to intervene in the domestic economy of Balkan nations, singly or severally. It exceeds them in population, gross national product (GNP) and labor force. Its trade with each Balkan country is a large share of their total trade and GNP, but not of its own GNP or trade. The asymmetry of market power creates a relationship of dependence among the Balkan states, a dependency which may be exploited for political gain.

Political gain is difficult to define and more difficult to quantify. In this paper, it is akin to old-fashioned imperialism and some assert that the Soviet Union is a modern imperialist. The next section of this paper explores that analogy in the context of the theoretical literature of imperialism in some detail. An inherent difficulty with imperialism, from an economist's perspective, is the juxtaposition of political motivation with economic processes, where political goals are sought by economic trade. If the Soviet Union sought simply to strike a good bargain with a Balkan state, the old analysis of haggling would apply; a Soviet trading agency even might be analyzed as a classic monopolist. Such analysis

Notes to references appearing throughout this chapter are located at the end of the chapter.
would be spurious. Soviet traders do not always seek to maximize profits, but have absorbed losses or reduced their gains for other motives which are political. Further, pure profit maximizers would enter any product market that offered profit, but economic intervenors trade more selectively on markets for goods that have extraordinary value for either military or development strategies.

Underlying this study is the belief that economic intervention may substitute for military intervention. The two have not always been so separate. In 1960 Robert Loring Allen wrote of "Soviet Economic Warfare," where the weapons were military aid, price concessions, and embargoes, and where the intent to expand markets was not far from the intent to expand territory. Writing of this immediate post-World War II period, Paul Marer documented the coerced transfer of resources, where machinery was dismantled and shipped to the Soviet Union and trading "advisors" enforced uneconomic transactions. The results of this expansion into East Europe was an undeniable extension of Soviet hegemony. Since the early 1950's, however, any expansionist strategy includes economic tools, along with the political and military, but the tools have been more subtle.

An economic tool uses trade as a strategy, calling forth the term "economic imperialism." James Caporaso ably defines this as the confluence of dependency, inequality, and exploitation. Of this triad, exploitation is least susceptible to analysis in a quantitative economic framework relevant to the Balkans. For that relevancy, one turns best to Sidney Morgenbesser who dissecta a myriad of working definitions in the context of imperialism and finds succinctly the desire and ability to humiliate. That humiliation applies unequal and unfair standards of conduct by a dominant nation to a target nation; it is exacerbated by face to face contacts. Humiliation is an appropriate ascription to Soviet motives (or their perceived realization) but it lies outside the economics of international trade, which is the analysis chosen here. Setting aside exploitation, inequality and dependency are highly susceptible to such analysis and we turn to them now.

**Macroeconomic Inequalities in Soviet-Balkan Trade**

Inequality occurring in the national economic base, the aggregate of foreign trade, or its share in the base, is macroeconomic inequality. Sheer size of the economic base is an indispensable requirement for an imperialist, but extrapolations from size alone must be cautious. The Soviet Union exceeds any Balkan nation (or even their sum in basic population, labor force, and gross domestic product (table 6, col. 1-3). However, adjusting for differences in population removes this inequality (column 4). In the Balkan economies, per capita income is remarkably equal both within nations and between. This suggests that any imperialism among socialist states seeks objectives that are not captured by a statistic of
TABLE 6.—Population, Labor Force, and Gross Domestic Product, Soviet Union and Balkans, 1975 (estimated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (Millions of persons)</th>
<th>Labor Force (Billions)</th>
<th>Annual Gross domestic product (Billions U.S. $)</th>
<th>Per capita (U.S. $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>254.8</td>
<td>133.6</td>
<td>478.8</td>
<td>1.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>2.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See note 10 at end of this chapter.

personal wealth. Whereas traditional capitalistic imperialists achieve both personal and national aggrandizement, modern socialist imperialists separate these accomplishments. Individual economic gain is diminished, but political gain is retained. Although we observe that the goals are not related directly to wealth, the alternative goals are not obvious, either. One set of alternative goals may be found in the work of an early writer on imperialism, Joseph Schumpeter.

Schumpeter theorized that imperialism was motivated not by capitalism but by nationalism and militarism. When nationalism ("an aggressive sense of superiority") and militarism ("when high military circles become a political power") unite with export monopoly, the result is Schumpeterian imperialism. In his judgment, imperialism arises when a system loses control of its nationalists, militarists, and monopolists: "This alliance kept alive war instincts and ideas of overlordship, male supremacy, and triumphant glory—ideas that would have otherwise long since died." 12

The Schumpeterian analysis adds an insight to Soviet goals in the Balkans and policy options. Although nationalism can appeal only to nationalists of a similar persuasion, militarism provides a service valuable to recipients but at little cost to them. In a perceptive essay, William Zimmerman notes that the classic free rider problem is apparent in the Soviet supply of military services to East Europe: the military services are undervalued by the recipients until needed; at that time, recipients are willing to concede a high price. 13 In a change of leadership, as in Yugoslavia, Soviet leaders might find those eager recipients. An internal alliance of these same groups (militarists and nationalists) under Soviet socialism would produce imperialism without income inequalities as observed in the Balkan data. Gain accrues not to individuals but to nationalism; nationalists and traders have abandoned the nexus of profit.
Macroeconomic inequality in Balkan trade also occurs in the shares of the trade in the national economy (table 7). All Balkan states are highly dependent on foreign trade; this is characteristic of economies whose scale or size is production and consumption is too small to attain a diversity of goods characteristic of contemporary life and an access to standard of living higher than that of an autarchic and nonmodern system. Unequal also is the vulnerability of these states to disruption in normal trading. Conversely, the Soviet Union, with a small share of product in international trade, would suffer asymmetrically from disruptions in trade. Another aspect of the asymmetry can be perceived from table 8, which shows exports per person. In general, an export share is higher in countries that are more developed and smaller. Comparing tables 6 and 8 shows also that the share of per capita product from outside the domestic economy is large in the Balkans but small in the Soviet Union. In each instance, however, the share rises with national product. Nevertheless, the socialist Eastern economies rely less on trade than their Western counterparts. Trade has grown faster in the world than in the socialist sphere, which has not shared fully in the general expansion. (Yugoslavia, ostensibly the most market oriented of the Balkan economies, is no exception.)

A macroeconomic intervention strategy manipulates policy to control these aggregate trade variables; the tools are embargoes, tariffs, devaluation, entry and exit in markets. As a strategy, this is costly and unwieldy; the intervention effort is massive and disruptive, and fine-tuning is impossible. However, a reversal is dramatic. In 1938, East European

**Table 7.**—Share of Foreign Trade in Gross Domestic Products. USSR and Balkans, selected years (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** See note 14 at end of this chapter.

**Table 8.**—Foreign Trade, Per Person. USSR and Balkans, selected years (in dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** See note 15 at end of this chapter.
countries exported over two-thirds of their goods to West Europe; by the early 1960's, that same share was exported to East Europe. Figure 3 shows recent developments in intra- and extra-regional trade. The Soviet Union is the dominant trading partner, although trade with the West has grown, modestly in most but dramatically in Romania.

Western ability to compete in similar macroeconomic intervention, by expanding trade with the Balkan area, is limited by two major factors. The first is geographic. Edward A. Hewett has estimated the effect of distance on trade; a 1-percent increase in distance reduces eastern bloc trade by 1 percent, roughly the same as in nonsocialist economies. Reasons are not difficult to find; distance increases the costs of transportation and of transacting, as language and cultural barriers rise. An alternative strategy is to encourage renewed trade ties with neighboring Western allies such as Austria and West Germany.

A second limiting factor is the nature of socialism itself. Socialist economies trade less than market economies of similar size and development. Their pricing rigidities and inconvertible currencies preclude an easy evaluation of comparative advantage, and central planning in practice tends toward autarchy. However, this limitation reduces trade with both market and socialist economies and effects are offsetting.

The socialist economies also are experiencing limits to trade expansion. Yury Korchagin, a Soviet analyst, analyzed 106 trade indicators in the Soviet Union and East Europe to conclude that industrial production in bloc countries increased in structural similarity during the 1950–70 period.

Figure 3.—Shares of Foreign Trade, by Trading Partners, USSR and Balkans, 1965 and 1974 (Total = 100%)
Heavy metallurgy, extracting, and chemical industries became increasingly similar and the comparative advantage of intrabloc trade correspondingly was reduced. According to his study, the strongest basis for Soviet-Balkan trade occurs with Hungary and Bulgaria and the weakest with Romania.19

In sum, economic growth expands all trade within the Balkans, probably more slowly than elsewhere but the direction of that trade, toward or away from the socialist bloc, is influenced by opposing forces. For a more detailed analysis of the strength of these influences, one must turn to the dependency aspect of imperialism.

Microeconomic Dependency in Soviet-Balkan Trade

In theories of imperialism, inequality and dependence conditions are tangled and difficult to separate. Most logically, inequality is a precondition of dependence, a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic imperialism.20 This relationship between the two concepts is implicit in most theories of imperialism. For example, Johan Galtung speaks of “center” nations and “peripheries” characterized by inequality between them (and within them as well); William Zimmerman speaks of “hierarchical regional systems,” or client states led by an hegemon.21 Both follow the inequality with a dominance-dependence relation. Thus conditions other than size are necessary before one can conclude that an imperialist relationship exists. Following James Caporaso, the relevant conditions here are subsumed under the concept of dependence. Caporaso makes his point forcefully: 22

When A and B speak to each other in a mutually balanced, equal way, we do not speak of dependence. We then talk of mutual association and integration; but it is precisely when states become unbalanced and asymmetric that we talk about dependence.

Although a center or hegemon by definition is larger in size or wealth, some smaller states are dependent but some are not. For example, Sweden or Qatar is smaller than the United States but not necessarily dependent on it. Economic criteria for dependency are based on the characteristics of traded products. An early use of this class of criteria is found in Lenin’s theory of imperialism, where a dependent economy exported raw materials and products of unskilled labor working with primitive capital. It imported manufactured and processed goods.23 In neo-Marxist-Leninist theories, a second element is added; a dependent state trades with only a few partners and in only a few goods, perhaps as few as one of each. A center state trades with a diversity of partners and in many commodities.

For contemporary analysis of dependency, it is necessary to consider these points separately and to integrate the effects of changing resource endowments, as raw materials and agricultural factor endowments have become increasingly scarce. Aggregate trade concentration by partners
was subsumed in the previous discussion of macroeconomic intervention. However, commodity concentration is a condition of dependence. To be sure, a dependence is heightened by trading a commodity with only a single partner, but the dependence itself is a separable concept.

Dependence arises when a client state cannot substitute easily between commodities; it is microeconomic because only a fraction of total trade need be involved. Although a quantitative assessment of dependency is a complex problem and includes many incommensurables, this definition provides a first break in the intractability, the use of elasticities. Ordinarily, elasticity measures the ability to respond to price, but it measures also the ability to respond to any incentive. An inelastic demand (low in responsiveness, though not necessarily in total quantity) implies dependency because few substitutes are available; the cause may be institutional (for example, a contractual obligation) but primarily is technological (for example, fossil fuels).

According to estimates of elasticity based on United States products in international trade, substitution is less feasible, and demand more inelastic, in primary raw material imports than in finished goods. Conversely, trade in finished goods is more elastic and creates less dependency because these commodities substitute easily for each other. Since elasticity estimates are unitless, they indicate also dependence on balance, by comparison of export and import elasticities. A country is most dependent when it imports raw materials and exports finished products that have many substitutes.

When compared to data on trade, the elasticity definition of dependency used here and the Leninist interpretation of imperialism differ, because a dependent state would import raw materials under the first definition but export them under the second. However, the Leninist interpretation may be interpreted otherwise, in terms of commodity concentration, where dependence arises not from the composition of trade, e.g., in raw materials, but in its concentration on only a few products. Concentration then would create dependency because risk is not spread among a diversity of products with different characteristics but is centered on only a few. In table 9, commodity concentration coefficients are given for each Balkan economy. This statistic is a unitless coefficient of variation; a low estimate indicates less concentration of commodities and

| Table 9.—Coefficients of Commodity Concentration. Balkans, 1973–74. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                | Imports         | Exports         |
| Bulgaria       | 0.55            | 0.51            |
| Romania        | 0.50            | 0.39            |
| Czechoslovakia | 0.42            | 0.54            |
| Hungary        | 0.44            | 0.47            |
| Yugoslavia     | 0.41            | 0.45            |

SOURCES and METHOD: See note 28 at the end of this chapter.
more diversity than a high estimate. The less developed economies of Bulgaria and Romania show more commodity concentration in imports than the more developed economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. However, Romania has the most diversification in exports.

The Soviet Union, in its trade with East Europe, has been characterized "as the all-purpose purveyor of raw material inputs for the industries of Eastern Europe and as the never-sated outlet for their manufactures." Commodity concentration in energy commodities where demand is inelastic and few substitutes are available has received special emphasis. Table 10 shows estimated energy requirements, from the Soviet Union and elsewhere, for the Balkan economies. Energy needs not supplied domestically depend largely on Soviet imports. By 1980 the Soviet Union is expected to supply a large share of these total energy needs, up to 80 percent overall; almost none will go to Romania, but Hungary and Bulgaria will be almost wholly dependent. These latter two Balkan states have few alternatives to this dependence, none of them palatable.

However, dependence is an unavoidable fact of life for the small nation, but Soviet ability to exploit dependence in primary raw materials, particularly in energy, is subject to several restraints. Soviet energy supplies may be reaching capacity limitations with their present technology. Further, using trade as a foreign policy tool is relatively new and untried; up to the present time these supplies have not played a vital role.

Table 10.—Production and Consumption (domestic usage), Major Fuels Balkan Economies, 1975 estimates (standard fuel equivalents) (in millions of tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net balance</td>
<td>(19.6)</td>
<td>(24.7)</td>
<td>(8.5)</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(10.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net balance</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard coal:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net balance</td>
<td>(4.5)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown coal:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net balance</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See note 48 at end of this chapter.
assess the Soviet ability to effect strategic changes, one must examine the domestic and international organizations controlling trade.

Economic Institutions for a Strategy of Intervention

While macroeconomic in quality provides power to intervene and microeconomic dependence provides its means, the implementation of a strategy based on trade requires an administrative organization capable of control. Too often, this requirement is ignored. Planned economies are distinctly advantaged in this requirement. Domestically, Soviet trade is directed by the Foreign Trade Ministry, with subordinate bureaus specializing in products or nations. Thus, the bureau Soyuzneftexport trades in crude oil and oil products, the bureau Licensintorg trades technology in patents and licenses. This hierarchical organization of foreign trade indicates that an intervention strategy designed to foster dependence can be formulated in broad terms at the highest level and implemented in microeconomic detail at lower levels.

This administrative structure of Soviet trade is coupled with a strong bilateralism, where imports and exports are balanced closely by nation and with few cross-settlements. Bilateral trade balance is inherent in planned economies; it contrasts with modern market economies who balance trade multilaterally. One purpose is to integrate domestic plans with the domestic and international distribution of output. Bilateral balancing is less disruptive of intricate planning procedures. Imports and exports are balanced not only by country but by commodity groups. J. M. Montias has measured and compared the extent of this bilateral balancing by an index of irreciprocity. The Soviet Union balanced its trade bilaterally much less than its socialist trading partners, indicating a strategic independence for the Soviet Union, in that it can switch between commodity categories more easily.

The international institutions for administering trade occur in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and its corollary financial organization, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC). The CMEA includes the Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, with Yugoslavia as an observer in some commissions. Among other goals, it is pledged to increase regional specialization ("the socialist division of labor"). While this regional specialization is economically rational, it also increases dependence. This dilemma is particularly acute for the small Balkan states. The major issues are twofold.

First, all these countries seek industrialization and economic growth through economic planning. In order to achieve regional specialization, the CMEA must persuade its members to relinquish sovereignty over their plans to a supranational planning body. Thus far they are unwilling to subscribe to this requirement and few CMEA bureaus are authorized to make decisions binding on national plans. Since Romania and Bulgaria are less industrialized than other bloc trading partners, any inter-
national specialization based on present-day factor endowments truncates their national industrialization plans in favor of economies already industrialized. Romania has been particularly effective in resolving this dilemma to its own advantage and in asserting its right to continued domestic industrial expansion.  

Second, the economic rationality of regional specialization is based on mutual benefit from exchange and freely moving prices. Planned economies do not use prices which reflect factor scarcities, a bloc currency with meaningful exchange rates, nor voluntarism in exchange (due to planning). For example, prices in the CMEA are well above world market prices. During 1958–64, the surcharge averaged 20 percent; since then, 10 percent. It now is higher for manufactures than for raw materials, where it almost has disappeared. Thus, achieving a reasonable regional allocation of specialities relies on barter transactions with many incomensurables, and this process is costly. The outlook for transformed conditions of exchange is not sanguine, although recent improvements have eased some difficulties; the prospects for a narrower manipulation are much greater.  

Supranational authority to intervene in domestic planning has been granted in only narrowly defined commodity categories and in only a few CMEA economies, but it has yielded a demonstrable expansion of trade in those commodities. Super standing commissions, who can intervene, are Intermetall (ferrous metals), Interkhim (Chemicals), Interatominstrument (atomic technology) and two commissions for bearings and non-ferrous metals. Major trade creation 1965–70 occurred only in commodities from this group (chemicals, iron and steel, nonelectric machinery), thus demonstrating the effectiveness of these supranational organizations. Overall, the CMEA has expanded bloc trade and, with that, dependence.

**Prospects for Economic Intervention**

Fostering dependence is not a new concern of the Soviet Union in the Balkans. Paul Marer has written:

The principal economic objectives of the USSR in Eastern Europe since World War II appear to have been to establish and maintain the economic dependence of these countries and to derive maximum economic benefit from the relationship, subject to certain political constraints.  

However, fostering dependence has become increasingly costly for the Soviet Union. Through aid and differential prices, the Soviet Union has subsidized the East European economies through the 1960's, and the Balkans have been major recipients of this largesse. In the 1970's and 1980's the subsidy must increase simply to retain that dependence already established. By providing materials to the Balkans that foster dependence, the Soviet Union loses the opportunity to offer these materials elsewhere, for greater economic benefit. In Yugoslavia, for example, the
trade deficit has grown rapidly; withdrawal of Soviet trade would cause macroeconomic and microeconomic disruption, but continuation requires subsidies. The foreign policy goals of economic benefit for self and political dependence for others are in conflict. Among the economic benefits, or the opportunity cost of dependence, three are noteworthy.

First, continued expansion of Soviet fuel raw materials requires imports of technology suited to the new reserves, particularly for offshore drilling and natural gas transmission. Exports to acquire this capital must increase and the increase is likely to come from those products enhancing Balkan dependence. Russian crude oil sales to Western Europe jumped from 2.9 million tons January-June 1975 to 7 million tons in the same period of 1976 to Western Europe alone, and one may expect this trend to continue.  

Second, as the Soviet Union increases the price of its raw materials to equal that of its competitors, the Balkans may respond with a hostile backlash. Thus, the purchase of political loyalty may require further subsidies and reduced economic gain.

Finally, the basis for trade with Balkans and the Soviet Union is diminishing as the economies become more similar in economic structure. As regional development equalizes the economic potential, the differences required for trade based on comparative advantage are reduced. Macroeconomic inequality is damped by internal development policies.

In a recent penetrating analysis, Cal Clark and Robert Farlow suggest that trade patterns follow foreign policy decisions, rather than the reverse. The theories of imperialism investigated here suggest that this perception is accurate; those theories relying on trade and economic variables do not predict a composition of traded products observed in the Balkans. Those theories, such as Schumpeter's, which rely on political explanations remain unchallenged.

Notes

Emilio Pagoulatos and Hans Michelman contributed helpful comments, but they are not responsible for errors. The Summer Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois provided excellent facilities for the work, as did the Center for International Studies at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. My thanks go to all of these.


2. Balkan States are defined loosely to include Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. While some might quite properly insist that Czechoslovakia and Hungary are not Balkan States, they were included to provide more data for a proper assessment of Soviet policy. Albania should have been included, but data were too sparse and unreliable.

He notes that imperialism was more a burden than a benefit, when one calculated the total costs and benefits.


8. Sidney Morgenbesser, "Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 3, No. 1 (Fall 1973), pp. 3-44. He concludes that imperialism has no single definition but is a "family of sufficient conditions." This practice is followed in the present paper, but the intent is nonnormative; that is, the benefits and disadvantages of the practice of imperialism for either partner are virtually ignored.


12. Ibid., p. 59.


18. Hewett, loc. cit., distinguishes between policy makers who choose deliberately to pursue a policy of reduced trade and those who are constrained by the socialist system as an inevitable concomitant of that system to reduce their trade. The distinction is real, but it is difficult to validate on the basis of observations available.


24. Elasticity first was defined in Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, bk. V, chap. 6, 8th ed. (Macmillan, 1920). Factor demand is more inelastic when the factor is (1) necessary and essential; (2) a low proportion of total cost; (3) used to produce a good whose own demand is inelastic (most true in a planned economy); and (4) competitive with other factors in inelastic supply. Conditions (1) and (3) refer to technological substitution.


26. High elasticity in supply or demand implies competition; however, a monopolist (monopsonist) will produce in the elastic portion of a demand (supply) curve to maximize profit. In an intervention, a monopolist might lower profit or absorb a loss for political gain, and produce in an inelastic portion.

27. Coefficient of Commodity Concentration = (Σ share of commodity in trade)².

28. Sources: commodity shares from *Yearbook–IT*, in eight categories. Method: from C. L. Taylor, M. C. Hudson et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), Table 6.6. Coefficients are higher in this paper than in the source due to the small number (8) of categories used. Calculations were made by Dale Swoboda.


33. Russell, op. cit., p. 211.

34. See, for example, Sonnenfeldt, op. cit. Private traders can pursue only short-run objectives for economic gain; only public traders can pursue longer-run objectives for political gain.

36. Montias, op. cit., p. 672. The index ranges between 0 (bilateral balancing in all commodity groups) and 1 (no bilateral balancing in any group). From Montias, the indexes for the mid 1960's are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade with:</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Other CMEA</th>
<th>Rest of world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


38. Hewett, Prices, p. 5.


41. Hewett, Prices, chap. 1.


44. Cal Clark and Robert L. Farlow, Comparative Patterns of Foreign Policy and Trade: The Communist Balkans in International Politics, No. 23 (Bloomington, Ind.: International Development Research Center, 1976), p. 98. This outstanding study came to the author’s attention as the present work was nearing completion. It covers the same geographic area from a complementary perspective and is highly recommended to the reader.

45. Campbell, op. cit., p. 87.


Soviet Interests in the Balkans

The recent political changes in Spain, Portugal, and Italy have focused attention on the Mediterranean basin. The Balkans are an important part of the area, and the incipient instability of the general situation has made the Balkan states once more a focus of great power politics. The United States and its NATO allies look with apprehension toward the European states of the Western Mediterranean, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and the policy makers must wonder what effects the governmental changes in those states might have. The Soviet leaders keep an equally apprehensive eye on the Eastern Mediterranean, where the age of Tito and the special positions of Romania and Albania are just cause for apprehension. The communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain have all rejected Soviet leadership in varying degrees and have heaped increasing criticism on Soviet theory and practice. Viewing this in combination with the record of dissidence in such states as Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders may well be concerned.

The Soviet Union has been able to maintain a measure of control over dissident movements in all the above-mentioned states. Yet, Soviet security in the area has been bought at a substantial political cost. The current situation presents the possibility of the emergence of communist movements entirely outside Soviet control, representing ideologies hostile to Soviet practice. Furthermore, such movements might conceivably emerge under the protection of the NATO alliance, which would reinforce the position of polycentrism in the Balkans. The leaderships of the Balkan states would be strengthened, should alternate forms of communism prevail in Western Europe.

The Soviet loss of bases in Egypt and its declining influence in the Middle East could be offset by securing more control in the Balkans. In 1973 Yugoslavia provided landing rights for Soviet aircraft ferrying supplies to the Middle East, but such cooperation certainly cannot be taken
for granted by Soviet political and military leaders. Friendly regimes in Yugoslavia and Romania could certainly provide Soviet foreign policy makers with a wide range of benefits, especially in view of the substantial Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.¹

Yugoslavia, with its aging national leadership and domestic tensions, provides the Soviet leaders with both temptations and opportunities. Should the Soviets manage to return Yugoslavia to full-fledged bloc membership, the repercussions would be felt throughout Europe. It would not be out of line with past Soviet policy to prefer to reintegrate the Balkan states into the bloc at the cost of undermining Western communist parties. The Soviet leaders might prefer an ideologically cohesive bloc to an expansion of various forms of communism over which they exercised little control. They have repeatedly intervened against such movements. Boundary maintenance has always been a great preoccupation of Soviet policy makers, and detente has only intensified their determination.²

The Soviets have traditionally maintained control over East European communist parties by the manipulation of factions within them. Military intervention has been utilized only as a means of last resort. Such was the case in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. When such states as Yugoslavia and Romania organized regimes which could not be easily penetrated or split, or when the cost of military intervention threatened to become inordinately high, as in Poland and Romania, the Soviet Union has opted for moderate approaches. The Soviets have tried to modify the actions of such regimes by the more traditional approaches of power politics, such as the manipulation of trade, military aid, etc. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Soviets used their power to establish favored factions within the indigenous communist parties, thereby avoiding the protracted use of direct occupation.

The Soviet Union has its partisans among communists of all the East European states. Bulgaria has been ruled by pro-Soviet party leaders since the inception of the regime.³ In most Slavic states the communist party has been able to tie into existing nationalistic folklore and utilize pan-Slavic sentiments which in the pre-Soviet era affected all portions of Slavic Europe.

The Soviets have been conservative in the use of military power in situations with the potential of leading to great power confrontations. Their cautious actions in East Europe, in the Middle East, and during the Cuban missile crisis bear this out. The use of Soviet military power in the Warsaw Treaty area was established in 1956. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 saw the first massive use of Soviet military power to install a friendly regime. The United States' policy of noninterference set the stage for the Soviet military moves in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary proved to be very costly to Soviet prestige. The Soviet loss of influence over the West European communist parties accelerated after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The French and Italian communists decried the
intervention with varying degrees of intensity. The polemics of the 25th Congress of the CPSU attest to the depth of the rift.4

The Soviets have a variety of goals in the Balkans. To achieve these they can use a combination of military, economic, and political pressures which carry different costs. The costliest of these would be direct military intervention, which in view of the present Romanian-Yugoslav understanding might be unacceptably high, particularly in view of the U.S. pledge to assist in the maintenance of an independent Yugoslavia.5 Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia carries the risk of great power confrontation and possible internal splintering of a none-too-solid Warsaw Treaty Organization. Under these circumstances, it is the least likely of all the scenarios which can be envisioned for Soviet policy in the post-Tito Balkans. This is not to say that the Soviets would be restrained in aiding an internal Yugoslav faction which might resort to arms in order to obtain a favorable outcome. The activities of Soviet intelligence in the local politics of the Balkan states, coupled with the potential volatility of the situation, offer the Soviets a far more promising hope for securing their aims than overt military intervention. Therefore, I will concentrate on nonmilitary opportunities which the Balkan situation might offer to Soviet foreign policy makers. While the opportunities represented by the aging Yugoslav leadership are quite pronounced, so are the dangers.6

The Soviets have seriously misjudged Balkan politics before. The only state which remains reliably with the Warsaw Treaty Organization is Bulgaria, which is also strategically the least significant. Romania is a dissenting member of the WTO, while Albania has resigned entirely. Yugoslavia steadfastly maintains its nonaligned position. The Soviet leadership might be persuaded to tread with caution in the hope of preserving an undesirable status quo, rather than to buy an even more disastrous future.

The acceleration of Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation in the economic, political, and military spheres is most threatening from the Soviet point of view. The Romanian and Yugoslav policies seem fairly immune from direct Soviet pressures. The net effect on Soviet policy is that the Soviet Union continues to be denied direct access to the Adriatic coast, permanent bases on the Adriatic, or even direct access to Bulgaria.7 The Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation integrates an area with a population in excess of 40 million. It radiates influence into other parts of East Europe, heightening Soviet unease vis-a-vis the entire East European bloc.

Bloc cohesion is certainly an overriding consideration for the Soviet policy makers. The military invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were precipitated by the plans of the reforming regimes to change their internal policies. This would have encouraged reformers throughout the bloc and in the Soviet Union itself. Regimes which could assure the Soviets of maintaining the "leading role of the communist party," such as Romania and Poland, suffered opprobrium but have not faced Soviet military intervention. If the past can be considered a guide to the future,
then the Soviets will not be tempted to overthrow the Yugoslav or Romanian regimes as long as they can maintain a modicum of internal stability. The Brezhnev Doctrine will be involved only in the name of saving the socialist camp from counterrevolution.

To prevent the risk of such a dangerous course, the Soviet leaders might opt for that which they have already accepted, namely, communist regimes which continue on their present course within the limits recognized by all. Yugoslavia and Romania have shown a high degree of sensitivity to Soviet interests by adapting their systems to the Soviets' requirements.8

The Domestic Politics of the Balkan States

The Soviets have not been nearly so determined to put down movements which challenged the hegemony of Soviet foreign policy. They have not perceived such deviations as fatal to their system. Poland and Romania are examples in case. Both these states have enjoyed a measure of latitude in the conduct of their foreign policies. It can be safely assumed that the Romanian neutrality vis-a-vis China caused the Soviet policy makers major discomfort, as evidenced by the frequent blasts at Romania's foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Soviets have thus far avoided the use of direct military force against Romania, despite oft-repeated proposals which would bring Soviet troops onto Romanian territory under one guise or another.9

Poland has been similarly permitted to expand its economic relations with the West. Gomulka's policies in the 1960's brought Poland into a close alignment with the Soviet leadership out of sheer economic and political necessity. This must have been reassuring to the Soviet leadership. Despite frequent warnings, the Polish and Romanian states have been spared direct Soviet intervention.

Albania's strategic position differs from either Romania or Yugoslavia insofar as it is out of easy geographic reach of the WTO forces. In order to believably threaten Albania with intervention, the Soviet policy makers would have to opt for seaborne operations or invasion through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, not to mention Greece, which is a NATO power.

If one were to establish a typology of Balkan systems along a continuum of most and least favored by the Soviets, the sequence would follow this descending order: Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. It is Romania's foreign and economic policies which are a source of constant concern and annoyance to Soviet foreign policy makers. Some East European communists have stated with glee that one of the most repressive systems in East Europe tends to be favored by the West solely because it annoys the Soviets. Romania is one of the few WTO systems where the president of the state also acts as party chairman. It utilizes charismatic images reminiscent of the personality cult which has gone out of style elsewhere in the bloc. President Nicolae Ceausescu prides himself
on his accessible style, but most analysts of the Romanian scene point to few institutional or personal obstacles to the exercise of single-handed and single-minded authority. The Romanian party and population accept the monolithic nature of the regime as the price of continued national independence. In Romania even the most remote local organs are now appointive. Obviously the Romanian leadership has concluded that the Soviets are most likely to intervene in the situations where the domestic modus operandi of the communist party represents a challenge to the Soviet practice. The Romanian leadership has avoided presenting this opportunity to the Soviet policy makers. It should be considered that the Soviets made two efforts to avoid the invasion of Czechoslovakia, at the Cierna-nad-Tisou and Bratislava Conferences. The Soviet leadership warned Dubcek that they would use forceful means to "restore" the situation if the Czechoslovak leaders persisted.

The Romanian leadership is fully aware that they are testing the limits of Soviet tolerance, yet seen from a historical perspective their appraisal of what might be tolerable to the Soviet leaders has so far been more realistic than that of Dubcek and his followers. They have managed to communicate enough threat to the Soviet leaders, which forces the latter to put a much higher cost on any Romanian operation. The Czechoslovak leaders tried strenuously to convey to the Soviets that they intended no harm or threat to the Soviet Union, and avoided purging their secret police or army of Soviet influence. The Romanian leadership acted most resolutely during the Czechoslovak crisis by giving the appearance of mobilizing for resistance in the event of an invasion of Romania. They have also secured the loyalty of the army and secret police, a policy initiated by Ceausescu's predecessors. It is frequently said that Ion Maurer and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej constructed the anti-Soviet power base within the country. If a pro-Soviet faction remains within the Romanian Communist Party, it is difficult to find. The Romanian economy has manifested a growth rate dramatic enough to keep dissent muted.

For the past two decades the Albanians have perceived Yugoslavia as their major threat. During the Second World War, Yugoslavia represented a major source of support for the Albanian partisans, and a number of Yugoslav memoirs have reported that at the end of the war, Stalin offered up Albania to Yugoslavia for annexation. While Stalin's motives remain obscure, the reports of Stalin's conversations with Tito had a profound impact on the Albanians. The Albanian problem is exacerbated by the fact there are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia as in Albania. Since the war, Albanians have sought refuge in Yugoslavia, even though the Yugoslav regime did not pursue benevolent policies towards its Albanian minority. The breaking point between Albania and the Soviet Union came when the Soviet leaders tried to effect a rapprochement with Yugoslavia in 1959. The Albanian leadership feared that the restoration of Soviet-Yugoslav relationships might make Albania a Yugoslav dependency. This prospect was particularly alarming to the
Albanian leaders because the present leadership had persecuted and executed the pro-Yugoslav wing of the Albanian party. The Albanian alliance with the People’s Republic of China did not increase Albanian popularity in Soviet Union or in Yugoslav quarters. The turning point in the Yugoslav-Albanian relationship came with the fall of Aleksander Rankovic in 1966. Rankovic, the Vice President and one-time Minister of the Interior, controlled the secret police, which was largely Serb. After 1966, the regime pursued a more benevolent policy toward its Albanian minority by creating an Albanian language university in Pristina, by importing lecturers from Tirane, and in general granting a much greater role to the Albanian minority in the governance of Kosovo. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was perceived as a threat by both states, brought even closer cooperation and led to the signing of an open road agreement in 1969. This facilitated Albanian trade with the West and brought Albania out of its isolation. The Albanian leadership is essentially charismatic, presiding over an underdeveloped society which retains many tribal characteristics. Its inner circles have been subject to repeated purges. In the summer of 1975 after the purge of some Albanian leaders, Albania began to retreat back into isolation. Should the Soviet Union succeed in establishing its influence over Yugoslavia, the Albanians would be forced to yield without much additional Soviet pressure, military or otherwise. Albania’s unique ability to remain isolated is facilitated by its geographic and political remoteness and its low level of economic development.

Bulgaria is the most successful showcase of Soviet-style development in East Europe. The pro-Soviet faction of the Bulgarian party defeated all dissident elements immediately after World War II. With the death of Georgi Dimitrov and the trial of Traicho Kostov, the last dissident strains were removed from the party which has been noted for its unswerving loyalty to the Soviet leadership. Soviet aid to Bulgaria has been substantial and it is generally acknowledged that Bulgarian industrialization and its efforts to modernize agriculture have been quite successful. Like Romania, Bulgaria is a state in which intellectual discussion is largely stifled. The only ripples which ever appeared on the seemingly becalmed surface of Bulgarian politics were allegations of an attempted military coup in 1965. Bulgaria also imposed its own brand of diplomatic isolation by its complete lack of autonomous initiative. In the 1970’s it became more active in the Balkans, allegedly with the encouragement of the Soviets. The Soviet leaders have viewed the extension of Bulgarian influence as an extension of Soviet influence itself.

The most complex threat to Soviet foreign policy in the Balkans is and has been the continued independent existence of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav domestic system, despite an effort to revitalize the League of Communists, continues to be palpably different from the Soviet model in practice and ideology. Yugoslavia must maintain its ideological separation for system maintenance if its leadership wants to claim a rational
reason for remaining outside the Soviet bloc. The recent efforts to consolidate the party are partially aimed at foreclosing the opportunities for foreign manipulation.

Yugoslavia’s politics differ from the other communist systems in several major aspects: (1) Yugoslavia possesses a unique ideology based on the concept of workers’ self-management which decentralizes political and economic decisionmaking; (2) Yugoslavia is not a planned economy in the sense of the other communist states under examination; (3) Yugoslavia has a system of well-institutionalized local politics which enjoy a measure of autonomy from central direction; (4) the Yugoslav press has operated without the precensorship common to all other communist states; (5) Yugoslavia has a defense establishment largely geared to territorial warfare; and (6) Yugoslavia’s official foreign policy of non-alignment differentiates it from all the other communist states.

These differences present a major challenge to Soviet policy makers because they are a constant and irritating example that socialism need not be necessarily organized along Soviet lines. Few would dispute that Yugoslavia, at least through the 1970’s, achieved a degree of consumer welfare envied throughout the bloc. Even Soviet economic reforms have been inspired by the Yugoslav example.

The greatest Yugoslav problem is the discrepancies in national income between its republics, which spill over into ethnic and political realms. The income differential between the most developed republic, Slovenia, and the poorest area, the autonomous province of Kosovo, is approximately 6 to 1. The Yugoslavs on the lower end of the income continuum harbor opinions that decentralization and workers’ self-management have contributed to the growth of those already prosperous. On the other hand, Croat and Slovene opinions tend to reinforce self-management and decentralization. Centralist elements feel that the Serb peasantry has made the greatest contribution toward providing the income for the industrialization of present-day Yugoslavia while obtaining the least benefit. Many of these elements would favor a regime which would play a greater redistributive role in the allocation of economic benefits. The regime has staked its existence on the success of workers’ self-management and has labeled opposing groups as pro-Soviet or Stalinist. Whether such groups favor a return to Stalinism is dubious. Yet, there are elements within Yugoslavia which would not mind climbing to power over the bodies of the present leadership with outside help, and who are latent in any ideological direction in order to achieve this end.

The years 1960 through 1971 represent a discrete period in Yugoslav political development. The removal of Vice President Rankovic from the political scene heralded the downgrading of the secret police (SUP), which he and his lieutenants had controlled for many years, and removed a threat system which had restrained all shades of Yugoslav public opinion. This led to a rapid pluralization and an atrophy of the League of Communists. Nationalism became an overt and a legitimate organizing
issue. Other groups of liberalizing intellectual communists supported the Croat Marxist journal. Praxis, which has since been suppressed. It had its analogue in all major Yugoslav cities. The philosophers and social scientists participating in the debates carried in the pages of various journals claimed the right to interpret ideology in competition with the League. This was recognized by the League Statutes passed by the Ninth Party Congress in March of 1969. Democratic centralism was diluted and party members were given the right to dissent on issues of conscience. The party merely asked them not to work actively against the proclaimed party line.

The loosened political atmosphere contributed to the emergence of many protest phenomena. The Serbo-Croat linguistic dispute of 1967 became a vehicle for Croat intellectuals to express their dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be the Croat variant's secondary position to Serbo-Croatian. The student demonstrations at the University of Belgrade in June of 1968 hastened the process of pluralization. Under the pressure of the student demonstrations Tito openly acknowledged the shortcomings of Yugoslav socialism and accepted personal responsibility for these. In 1969 Albanian unrest in Kosovo transferred the struggle for greater local prerogatives to a new and potentially troublesome locale. The Ninth Party Congress of March 1969 recognized that a socialist society was not necessarily conflict-free.

The drive for greater autonomy did not resolve the question of how political power and scarce resources could be allocated on an equitable basis among the competing nationalities. The federal government is the only agency capable of such allocative functions, but it could perform these only at the expense of republican powers. Yet, the republics and autonomous provinces resolutely clung to the autonomy they had gained from decentralization. This was the basis for conflict in Croatia which surfaced in the fall of 1971, in which nationalist and economic factors interacted to forge a new political constituency which was at least partially outside the control of the Croatian League of Communists. The events in Croatia were a tribute to the powers of communal and republican organs which contributed to making the League of Communists largely idiosyncratic. The League no longer served as the sole guide to official policy at any level, and its membership was eroding in terms of interest and attendance.

At this point the central authorities intervened and wrested control from the liberalizing republican leaderships which had utilized particularistic nationalism to mobilize their respective political constituencies. The purge of republican leaderships was not confined to Croatia, but extended to all the republics with the exception of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro. Removals affected not only the republican governments but also many intellectuals who supported liberalization.

The Yugoslav institutional framework contributed to the growth of republican institutions which resembled American-style political ma-
The removal of the republican leaderships in 1972 was coupled with an effort to revitalize the role of the League of Communists, yet the institutions which created republican autonomy remained essentially unchanged.

The liberalization in Yugoslavia was carried forward by economic success and by the institutionalization of governmental processes. It was not foreseen that the League itself would become a focal point of nationalism, which was legitimized by the amended party statutes of 1969. During much of this period Tito and his federal leadership reigned rather than ruled. Tito intervened decisively in only three major crises during the years 1966 to 1971. In 1966, he removed Rankovic when the latter openly opposed the economic reforms. Rankovic had also made himself spokesman for those factions demanding greater orthodoxy and obviously was preparing to succeed Tito. Tito intervened in the student strike of 1968 and put his prestige behind a course of further liberalization. In 1971, he resorted to crisis management in the Croat crisis and proceeded to replace the republican leaderships with his appointees. These appointees replaced leaderships which had enjoyed substantial confidence and popularity in their republics. Tito’s measures had the effect of removing from the political scene those who had genuine political bases in the republics and who, therefore, were best qualified to bring about an orderly succession.

The Yugoslav federal leadership at present rests on the continued health and well-being of three major personalities within the League. These are Tito himself, Edvard Kardelj and Vukan Bakaric. These three leaders derive their position from their roles in the formation of present-day Yugoslavia as well as from their political longevity. Bakaric and Kardelj are in uncertain health; in Tito’s case, age alone constitutes a hazard. The remainder of the federal leadership largely hold their positions at the pleasure of Tito and the League apparatus. They are not strong political personalities in their own right, and it is questionable if they will be able to inherit Tito’s mantle. This is recognized in the Yugoslav Constitution, which provides for a collective presidency to succeed Tito. It is doubtful that a collective body can succeed Tito, who has wielded power for close to 35 years. However, the collective presidency may provide a period of grace during which a national leader may emerge. Needless to say, given the tense relationship between the national components, the succession process is fraught with hazard. This period of uncertainty might offer the greatest temptation to an outside power to intervene politically or militarily.

The Yugoslav course in 1971 manifested the political circumstances under which the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. In 1971 the League of Communists was exercising tenuous control over the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. From the Soviet point of view, Tito’s intervention in the Croat crisis remedied the situation. Yugoslavia remains now at least committed to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the party exercising the principal guiding function. On the other hand, the
Yugoslav leadership is determined to maintain its independent position, as evidenced by the continuous purges directed against those who would represent Soviet interests on the Yugoslav scene. Romania’s continued assertion of an independent course and support for the Yugoslav position must offer little reassurance to the Soviet leaders.

**Scenarios for Soviet Politics in the Post-Tito Balkans**

The simplest, and most likely, Soviet policy in the event of Tito’s departure from power would be to treat the matter as an internal Yugoslav problem and follow a hands-off policy. The gains from outright intervention may be potentially great, but so are the hazards. The Soviet Union might face the possibility of a NATO involvement. This is a situation unlike that of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, since Yugoslavia is not a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. On the contrary, Yugoslavia was a member of the 1955 Balkan Pact with NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Should the Italian communists enter the Italian government as a coalition partner, they might seek NATO involvement on behalf of Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet invasion. The strategic situation of Yugoslavia offers a more feasible situation for Western assistance than either Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Traditionally, Soviet military moves have been cautious and aimed at preventing a possible Western military reaction. There is no evidence that Soviet policy has changed in this regard.

The only kind of Soviet intervention within the realm of possibility would be an invitation by a Yugoslav faction in the name of preserving socialism. Direct Soviet assistance might propel such a group to a position of power within Yugoslavia. Even in this case, the risk factor might be too high and the Soviets might consider nonmilitary alternatives. In 1948, Soviet might assisted the Czechoslovak communists in attaining power by means of an internal coup. Such a policy must seem far more desirable from a Soviet point of view.

A hands-off policy in which the Soviets would make no overt efforts to destabilize the Balkans offers major benefits. This avoids the risks of a great power confrontation and might maintain the current situation in the Balkans. Unsatisfactory as the status quo may seem to the Soviets, it avoids the risks of a confrontation which might be exploited by other communist powers, be it Romania or the People’s Republic of China. The subsequent evolution need not be necessarily unfavorable to the Soviets, in view of their dominance of the area’s trade. Yugoslavia must maintain a stable relationship with both the East and West in order to prosper. This might ultimately be the greatest stimulus to a Soviet hands-off policy, and therefore it remains one of the likeliest options.
Destabilization Scenarios

Destabilization might become an acceptable risk under two sets of circumstances. The first might occur if a socialist Yugoslav government took a strident anti-Soviet tone, and sought to underwrite its own security by encouraging dissident forces within the bloc, in cooperation with Romanian leaders or the Italian communists. The second scenario which might prove tempting to the Soviets is an internal fragmentation within Yugoslavia. The Soviets might feel impelled to render aid to those groups whose ascendancy they favor. The first scenario is highly unlikely. Tito’s successors will be forced to steer a cautious line in order to secure support from the country’s diverse ethnic components. It can be further predicted that such a regime would be extremely cautious in the international realm, in order to minimize outside interference. Should no such group emerge into secure leadership, the Soviet policy makers might be tempted to take advantage of the potentially volatile Yugoslav political scene.

It is rumored that the Soviets have in the past launched various destabilization schemes, albeit cautiously. The major game plan appears to be an appeal to potentially sympathetic constituencies in the south of Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo, for the restoration of a centralized Yugoslav state, within which these nationalities would become dominant. This game plan builds on the sense of frustration in the underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia and is based on the belief that workers’ self-management has benefitted those who already have. It also capitalizes on the widespread Serb belief in centralism.

There is a Croatian variant based on essentially the same game plan. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive if destabilization becomes the major objective. It has been rumored that Soviet agents have indicated to Croat nationalists that they are willing to permit them to coalesce with Slovenia and turn West should this bring the southern portions of Yugoslavia back into the bloc. It has been reported in the German press that the Soviets have sought contact with Croat nationalist emigres in the West. It can be taken for granted that pro-Soviet sympathies are not overwhelming in Slovenia and Croatia, however disappointing the situation may be to some Slovene and Croat communists. This strategy is based on the correct assumption that the West radiates great influence in the north of the country. However, it is doubtful that the Soviets would be willing to subdivide Yugoslavia in order to secure an alliance with a reconstituted Serbia. It would set a dangerous precedent for multinational states in the bloc. It is more likely that the Soviet leadership would opt for a centralistic regime in Belgrade which would bring Yugoslavia into the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comecon. To secure this maximum outcome the Soviets might be willing to follow a variety of destabilization plans and make seemingly contradictory promises in the various parts of the country.
A pro-Soviet group has always been part of the Yugoslav political scene. While their popular support at large may not be great, pro-Soviet individuals have occupied positions of influence. Few of these have been overtly pro-Cominformists or Stalinists, despite Yugoslav publicity, but they have pushed a pro-Soviet line within the limits of official tolerance. In more liberal times they always tested the waters by overt discussions which were well understood by those in power, only to be slapped down in the official press. The dividing line between centralism and Stalinism has been blurred by Yugoslav leaders who have repeatedly equated centralism with Stalinism. However, in the Yugoslav political context, it is possible to be a centralist without being Stalinist. Centralists who favor a strengthened federal structure are frequently Serb nationalists rather than Stalinists, and would continue Yugoslavia’s independent policies. Nevertheless, determined centralists would be more willing to accept Soviet aid to reach power. This is an explanation of why the present leadership is attacking capitalism, neofascism, and Stalinism simultaneously in order to unbalance all oppositional forces. By blurring the images they risk alienating many potential allies who have criticized the regime for its shortcomings during the era of liberalism, but have supported its independent stance. The government’s recentralization has created a veneer of surface calm, but the recent arrests and constant attacks on a variety of “enemies” do not bespeak a great sense of internal security.

The viability of Soviet options depends on their correct assessment of the various groups whom they might assist. In Serbia the impetus toward centralism is derived from a variety of sources. Centralistic opinion is relatively infrequent in intellectual circles, apart from those which are identified with the state bureaucracy. Whatever centralist sentiment exists among Serb intellectuals can be usually placed in the category of nationalism, which is not necessarily hospitable to Soviet aims. These intellectuals represent the view that Serbia has paid an excessive political and economic price for the federation and that only Serbs can safeguard the integrity of Yugoslavia. Such individuals would not necessarily be co-opted into supporting a Soviet-sponsored scenario.

The Yugoslav Army will be a major determinant of any outcome in any post-Tito political settlement in Yugoslavia. The Army’s officer corps is predominantly Serb, largely because the Army is not viewed as an attractive career by most Croats and Slovenes. This trend has become particularly pronounced in the last decade, when Army salaries did not keep up with the rise of incomes in the civilian sector in Croatia and Slovenia. Moreover, the Army is viewed by Croats and Slovenes as an essentially Serb and Montenegrin preserve where they feel out of place. Just as the Army is largely Serb, in the Navy Croats dominate, as a result of the geography of the country. The Air Force is the most cosmopolitan of the services, because its rather generous flight pay has attracted Slovene and Croat pilot officers. It is said that even the non-

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Serbs who enter the armed services become socialized into a Yugoslav ideology, and view transfers of power to the republics with question. Most individuals associated with the armed forces and the security organs would welcome a more centralist policy.

Segments of public opinion in Serbia hope for a larger role for the Army in the event of Tito's departure. Since the Army does not have a stated policy line, all can project their own image into an enlarged role for the Army. The nationalists hope that it would redress the ethnic balance by granting much greater influence to the Serbs. This has been perhaps partially achieved in the wake of the events of 1971. These same circles hope that the Army would be less ideological, and would try to recreate a sense of Yugoslav nationalism which all but vanished in the late 1960's. If nationalist interpretations are correct, the Army would not be a willing tool for the reintroduction of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. Another segment of opinion views the role of the Army with more concern. These individuals view the Army as the only force capable of suppressing factional and ethnic infighting. The Army might not be too secure in this role, and, therefore, they might turn to the Soviets for support, in which case the Soviets would dictate the terms. While this course might be popular with some Serbs, it would evoke the resistance of non-Serb nationalities. It would represent a dubious risk for the Army leadership, even with Soviet support.

In the last 60 years communist systems have established a political style. During all these years there have been only rare instances when Army leaders or establishments sought major political power. One of these is an attempted Army coup in Bulgaria. The information is so scanty that it is difficult to analyze what really transpired or what were the political aims of the conspirators. The other instance of major army influence occurred in the wake of the near-collapse and chaos brought about by the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Even then the People's Liberation Army rapidly relinquished its role, once it found authorities stable enough to relinquish it to. Tito's departure might bring on an emergency in which the Army would pursue major influence to ensure the stability of the succession. The Yugoslav Army suffers from a dearth of charismatic personalities. The Army certainly can wield major influence over policy decisions, but its top commanders have been sufficiently socialized into communist political culture to defer to the legitimately constituted political leadership. Despite the Army's rumored dislike of the Constitutional Amendments of 1971 and the Revised Party Statutes of 1969, the Army did not enter the political arena to defeat them. This is not to underestimate the influence of the military leaders in the inner councils, but to underline that they have maintained a correct relationship toward the government in accord with the precepts of socialist legality. Logically it is difficult to imagine that the Army leadership would take power against all of their previous instincts, only to acquiesce to foreign influence, which many of them have resisted most of their adult lives. The
Soviets could not integrate the Yugoslav Army into the Warsaw Treaty command without major purges. This must give pause even to officers who are sympathetic to a pro-Soviet course of action. The loyalties of the rank and file, recruited from all parts of Yugoslavia, would be of an unknown entity in the event of a pro-Soviet coup. Therefore, any Soviet reliance on the Yugoslav Army alone to bring about a pro-Soviet regime might be as fleeting as the Portuguese communist hope of reaching power through the Portuguese Army. Under the circumstances it is more likely that the Army might use its influence on behalf of its chosen political constellation rather than attempt to wield direct power with Soviet aid. Nevertheless, should internal strife occur in Yugoslavia, the Soviets might try to launch a movement of national unity based on the Army and a promise of greater recentralization, for which there is some regional support in Yugoslavia.

The secret police of the Ministry of Interior is also a largely Serb organization and its personnel probably harbor some centralist sentiments. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that it is this organization which is fingering many of the pro-Soviet elements and delivering them to jail. A radical change of course would constitute a major threat to the individuals who were responsible for combating pro-Soviet elements.

The Croat Scenario

The Croat situation is the festering sore of Yugoslav politics. Until 1967, most Yugoslavs complacently believed that the Serb-Croat conflict had been largely solved. Since the Serb-Croat linguistic dispute of 1967 these hopes have proved illusory. Dissatisfaction still permeates Croatian intellectual groups, party and nonparty alike. It was these innate feelings of frustration which the Croat leaders Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar tried to use to gain political leverage. In other words, Croat nationalism existed not only outside the League, but within the League as well. Between 1968 and 1971 the federal authorities tried to defuse Croat nationalism by yielding on those issues most amenable to solution. By 1971 Tito and the top federal leadership apparently concluded that Croat nationalist demands were insatiable and that some elements would not rest until the federation was dissolved.

At present, Croatia offers the best arena for a Soviet destabilization attempt. The Soviets, however, are probably under no delusion that their variant of communism has any great amount of appeal in Croatia. In order to achieve destabilization, the Soviets would probably have to offer the Croats independence or a form of autonomy that would result in the dissolution of the present Yugoslav state structure. Now while it has been rumored in Yugoslavia that the Soviets would not object to moves on the part of Croatia and Slovenia to turn to the West if Serbia and Montenegro could be brought firmly into the Soviet bloc, such suggestions by the Soviets would undoubtedly constitute no more than the encour-
agement of secessionist movements in order to provide the opportunity to place the central Yugoslav government in a position of dependency upon Soviet assistance in order to stabilize the fractionalization. Unlikely as this scenario might seem, it has some possibilities because of the fact that the present personalities surrounding Tito derive much of their authority from their relationship with him as opposed to the strength of their own personalities or the institutional positions they occupy. It is this personal weakness that might conceivably lead some of them to turn to the Soviets for support.

The large proportion of Croats among the Gastarbeiter (guest workers) in West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and elsewhere in West Europe heightens the regime's apprehension about Croatian politics. It is known that their ranks have been partially penetrated by Croat emigre nationalist organizations. These have already used their new recruits to carry out numerous acts of terrorism against Yugoslav diplomatic personnel and some acts of terror in Yugoslavia itself. So far these movements have not gained noticeable sympathy in Yugoslavia itself, but the potential of such groups for destabilization exists. The Yugoslav security organs have been trying to contain potential subversion, as evidenced by the 15 October 1975 conference dealing with foreign diversion. All official attacks on Stalinists are usually balanced with corresponding attacks against the Western "imperialists." Nevertheless, it is apparent that the largest gain from any destabilization program would be for the Soviets, and that the West would prefer to maintain the status quo.

Therefore, a "Croat strategy" would be most likely only a cover for a "Yugoslav strategy" to restore Soviet-style orthodoxy. Even the most ardent Croat nationalists are aware that any cooperation with any destabilization program may lead to a tightened police state rather than independence.

Subsidiary Destabilization Scenarios

Almost any nationality in Yugoslavia could be targeted for destabilization efforts by the Soviets. Yet none of them have the central importance of the Serb-Croat relationship. In Slovenia, there are also widespread pro-Western sympathies, but Slovenia has no place to go outside of Yugoslavia. The virtual disappearance of the Slovene minority in the Austrian province of Carinthia does not encourage many Slovenes to secession. Many Slovene party leaders have become alarmed at the manifestations of Croat nationalism, and played a major role in the settlement of the Croat issue. During the crisis Stane Dolanc rose to the chairmanship of the Executive Committee, a role for which a Slovene is ideally suited. In this he followed the traditional Slovene role of mediating interethnic conflict in Yugoslavia.

The Slovenes have prospered economically in the general framework of the Yugoslav federation. While some complain that they might have
obtained greater economic benefits had they been integrated with the West, Slovenia has enjoyed a protected market in Yugoslavia. Branches of Slovene enterprises are very much in evidence outside of Slovenia and have also created a measure of anti-Slovene resentment. An orthodox group exists within the confines of the Slovene Communist Party, but it is doubtful that they would opt for devolution or a rigidly centralistic system imposed by Soviet power.

The Macedonian republic might offer a similar target for Soviet destabilization policies. It is often said that the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations can be ascertained by the examination of Bulgarian statements on the Macedonian issue.³² The Yugoslavs are the only state which recognizes a unique Macedonian nationality and has encouraged the formation of a Macedonian literary language. This is in sharp contrast to Bulgarian policy which insists that Macedonian is merely a dialect of Bulgarian, and that Macedo-Bulgars are indistinguishable by historical or cultural tradition from other Bulgarians.³³ The Yugoslav position must have some appeal among the Macedonians of Bulgaria, judging by the stridency of the Bulgarian response. It cannot be excluded that the Bulgarian leadership views the Yugoslav policy as a subtle form of destabilization aimed at Bulgaria. The controversies have swirled through the pages of the presses of both states for decades. Like the Slovenes, the Macedonians appear to be fairly content in the context of Yugoslavia. The treatment of the Macedonian question in Bulgaria or Greece provides them with examples of how much worse their situation could be. The Macedonian scenario could be utilized merely as a part of much broader destabilization policies, both because of the peripheral location of Macedonia and because of the apparent lack of response to Bulgarian blandishments by Yugoslavs of Macedonian nationality.

The Albanians are second only to the Croats in terms of potential national discord. There are more Albanians than there are Macedonians. They are non-Slavic in culture and predominantly Muslim in religion. They reside in the area considered by many Serbs as the historic heartland of the medieval Serb Empire. This accounts for the reluctance to give Kosovo republic status within Yugoslavia. The Serbs now constitute a minority in the autonomous province of Kosovo, and feel themselves discriminated against by the Albanian majority. This issue has symbolic emotionalism for the Serbs, and it is difficult to understand in purely academic terms. The Albanians have not been well treated within Yugoslavia, as was widely publicized by the Brioni Plenum which ousted Rankovic in 1966. Since then, Yugoslavia has made major efforts to make amends for past injustices. The greatest contribution to the pacification of the Albanian question was the improved relationship between Albania and Yugoslavia, which extended from the ouster of Rankovic until 1976, when a purge decimated the Albanian leaders most in favor of good relations with Yugoslavia.³⁴ Albania has returned to its traditional isolation and the tensions reemerged.
It is doubtful that the Soviets could use Albania for destabilization. The Albanian leadership has demonstrated substantial fear of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yugoslav-Albanian relations became closer after the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia; the Albanian leadership shows preference for remaining beyond the grasp of Soviet power. Yugoslavia's continued independence insulates Albania from any Soviet diversionary efforts among the Albanians.

The last major grouping in Yugoslavia which holds the potential for exploitation by an outside power is the Hungarian minority, resident in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. This minority has a record of acquiescence to Yugoslav rule. Most of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia reside in an agriculturally rich area and have enjoyed the benefits of the liberal Yugoslav agricultural policy. Even those collective farms which do exist tend to be quite prosperous and provide those who work them with a satisfactory living standard, when compared to Hungary. The urban Hungarian population has also fared well. They are permitted wide cultural autonomy, and Yugoslav policies have not threatened their sense of cultural identity. The Yugoslav Hungarians also enjoy the universal privilege of traveling West or emigrating, something their conationals across the borders may be denied. The Hungarian nationality in Yugoslavia has been remarkably quiet. In the past they could not be used by either the Hungarian or Soviet regimes for destabilization.

The grouping which might be considered most troublesome is the several thousand Cominformist emigres who have lived in exile ever since the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in 1948. Many of them are still active publicists in the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav government has attempted to persuade the Soviet leadership to disown the emigres ideologically and politically, but the Soviet leaders have thus far resisted the Yugoslav efforts. This group is potentially troublesome because it consists largely of former Yugoslav party members who held major positions of influence before their expulsion. It is also an aging group. The recent misadventures of former Colonel Vladimir Dapcevic represent a sample of how the Yugoslav secret police is trying to cope with this potential threat. Their representatives would emerge from the shadows in any major Soviet push for destabilization.

Conclusions—Summary

All Soviet destabilization scenarios are risky. The Soviets would like to maintain Yugoslav politics within a communist context, something which the present regime has managed quite well. The Croat scenario, once initiated, might be difficult to control. Soviet action might open a Pandora's box to nationalist and right-wing elements which could plunge Yugoslavia into a fratricidal war. This might also involve the Soviets in the risk of great power confrontation in which other powers might aid their respective favored factions. The Mediterranean area is volatile.
enough to discourage the Soviets from military adventure. Any interventionist moves might have profound ramifications within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Romania would not lend itself to any destabilization moves in Yugoslavia and might resist any Soviet military moves. The Soviet leaders are well aware of the subterranean influence which the Yugoslav model has exercised in the East European states and the Soviet Union itself. It is not possible to predict the loyalty of all Warsaw Treaty forces in case of an intervention in Yugoslavia.

Workers' self-management has always enjoyed support among East European communists. During the chaos of the 1956 uprising, the Hungarian workers spontaneously implemented workers' councils in some enterprises. Czechoslovakia in 1968 also tried to transit to some model of industrial democracy based on the Yugoslav experience. East European Marxist philosophers and dissidents have stressed socialism "with a human face" in the wake of the Yugoslav counterreformation of the 1960's. Moreover, Yugoslavia is a multinational state resembling the Soviet Union itself. A revolt of nationalities in a multinational state must seem an appalling scenario to the Soviet leadership. Major upheavals can cause demonstration effects which do not necessarily respect political boundaries. The year 1968 saw student revolts ranging from France and Poland to Prague and Belgrade. It is not at all certain that the Soviets could confine any destabilization based on ethnic particularism to Yugoslav territory.

Any destabilization scenario in Yugoslavia depends on Romanian involvement to be effective. It is predictable that Yugoslavia and Romania would consult on how to maintain their independent status. Such an event would place the other East European leaders with the choice of becoming active collaborators with the Soviets. To build destabilization schemes around a few hundred agents trying to work with sympathetic Yugoslav party members is one thing, but it would be another matter to arouse public passions to the point of widespread participation in a Soviet cause. The Soviets would be reluctant to encourage participatory revolts in communist states.

The Soviets have worked exceedingly hard to bring about the Helsinki Conference (ESCE). Any destabilization effort would undermine the already vulnerable structure of detente. It is doubtful that the People's Republic of China would remain passive if its only European ally, Albania, came under threat. In recent years the People's Republic of China has also encouraged the independent positions of Romania and Yugoslavia. The Chinese and Soviets share a long frontier on which many levels of conflict can be escalated. It is a strategic element which Soviet foreign policy makers cannot discount.

The Soviet leadership will exercise caution in dealing with Tito's succession. They will encourage those factions within the Yugoslav League which are the most amenable to their influence. Most likely they will tempt a leadership weakened by the loss of the leading personality to
accept Soviet support in the economic and political realms. Such Soviet support would not be offered without conditions. The Soviets have consistently exercised some influence over external and internal developments in Yugoslavia. The present Yugoslav leadership has avoided policies which give overt provocation to the Soviets, but it has drawn the line at altering its basic ideological position on workers' self-management and nonalignment. In other words, it has opted for the continuation and maintenance of its independent line in both the domestic and international spheres. Tito's charisma has maintained Yugoslavia's unique position.

The Yugoslavs have demonstrated an uncompromising attitude toward the maintenance of their national sovereignty. It is difficult to envision that a native leadership would risk the wrath of all the nationalities by subordinating themselves to the will of a foreign power. Historically, the Soviet success with destabilization in Yugoslavia has not been overwhelming. Every conceivable scheme to overthrow the Yugoslav government was tried between 1948 and Stalin's death. These ranged from economic blockade to military threats on the borders to internal subversion. The Yugoslav government coped with all of these. It is difficult to imagine that the Soviet leadership would wish to chance repeating this experience in a world in which Yugoslavia is far less isolated than in 1948.

Notes

3. There have been some deviations from conformity even in the experience of Bulgaria. These originated with Georgi Dimitrov's flirtation with a Balkan federation in 1947, to subsequent factional politicking over Brandt's Ostpolitik. See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Bulgaria's Politics of Conformity." *Problems of Communism*, XXI, No. 4 (July-August 1972).
4. *New York Times*, 3 March 1973, p. 6. The U.S. commitment to support Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet aggression was blurred by Carter's statement during the 1976 Presidential election debates, only to be reaffirmed later at a news conference.
6. Past Soviet success with the maintenance of discipline in the communist movement must not be particularly reassuring to the Soviet leaders. The victories the Soviets have won, such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were very costly and had an erosive effect on Soviet control of the communist movement outside the USSR.
8. It is generally stated that the Soviet embassy in Belgrade urged strong action against both Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov, who were an embarrassment not only to the Yugoslav government but strident critics of Soviet ideology as well.


15. Yugoslavia does practice post-publication censorship, which is common to many European states. At times the authorities in Yugoslavia have banned journals deemed objectionable. Among these were *Paradoks* and *Praxis*, of Zagreb, and *Filosofija* of Belgrade.

16. With the Sovnarkhoz reform Khrushchev tried to decentralize the cumbersome Soviet planning system. The reform failed because ultimately the Soviet leadership was not willing to transfer authority away from the central organs. Liebermanism, another reform of the Khrushchev era, attempted to apply elements of market socialism to some sectors of the Soviet economy.


22. Under the new Constitution of 1974, most federal organs and the national assembly are bodies whose membership is delegated from the republics and provinces.


24. The individuals arrested belong to many different Yugoslav nationalities and a variety of occupational groupings. These have been discussed in some detail in a variety of journals. Labeled, op. cit., and *New York Times*, 23 November 1975, p. 6.


26. Ibid.

27. This position is symbolized by Mihajlo Djuric, a law faculty professor at the University of Belgrade, who advocated the primacy of Serbia within Yugoslavia, and the expansion of the Serbian republic into territories where Serbs reside, i.e., Croatia. In the aftermath of the published debates, he was prosecuted and sentenced for "hostile propaganda" and "inflaming chauvinist passions." *Borba*. 18 July 1972, p. 5.

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31. The Slovene minority in Austria, estimated at some 20,000 to 50,000 has been the focus of recent tension between Yugoslavia and Austria. Yugoslav sources maintain that a recent Austrian census which listed only 2,600 Slovene speakers in the province of Carinthia, down from 17,000 in 1971, was the result of intimidation of non-Austrians by the Austrian authorities. New York Times. 27 November 1976, p. 7.


33. As Ilya Ehrenburg neatly stated. “It was customary to concede that there was a ‘Macedonian problem,’ but no one would admit that there was a Macedonian people.” European Crossroads (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1947), p. 45.


37. Colonel Dapcevic, a pro-Soviet emigré to Belgium, was seized while on a trip to Romania in August of 1975. In July of 1976 Dapcevic was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for attempting to organize anti-Yugoslav groups in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the USSR, France, Belgium and Austria. Radio Free Europe Research: Background Report. #171. 5 August 1976, p. 48.

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