



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A Review of Education and Training for Officers

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VOLUME 4 OF 5 RANK-INDEPENDENT ISSUES

- ANNEX M -- COMMITMENT
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A REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

(RETO) •

VOLUME 4 • RANK-INDEPENDENT ISSUE •

30 Jun 1978

Prepared by

A Study Group for the

Review of Education and Training for Officers

DACS - OTRG

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REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX M

OFFICER COMMITMENT

1. PURPOSE. Since education, training, and commitment are interdependent and coequal determinants of officer effectiveness, the purpose of this Annex is to add the dimension of officer commitment to the education and training review effort.

2. COMMITMENT. An effective Army officer may be described as one who is trained in the skills he needs to accomplish his mission competently; one who is educated in the knowledge and insights necessary for successful mission accomplishment within the context of broader organizational goals; and one who is committed to do his duty faithfully and well. The appendix to this annex provides a comprehensive review of officer commitment, as it relates to officer effectiveness in the 1985-1995 time-frame.

a. Introduction. Organizational commitment, in terms of human behavior, is described.

b. The American Society. Significant trends and value shifts likely to occur in the American society in the next 25 years or so are identified.

c. The American Army. Important professional and societal changes taking place in the Army and their implication for the future are discussed.

d. Commitment Assessment. The state of Army officer commitment today is assessed.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS. The following recommendations are made in Chapter V of the appendix:

a. Commitment Emphasis. Place direct, explicit emphasis on officer commitment at every Army level, with the primary and initial thrust coming from the top leadership of the Army.

b. Socialization. Place special emphasis, in terms of socialization, on the quality of early experiences of each new Army officer, to include his basic education and training, his first duty assignments, and the people who will be his role models during this period.

c. Military Professional Knowledge. Identify and assemble into a cohesive, usable body of military professional knowledge at least the following: Military standards and ethics, military history and tradition, military roles and missions, public service aspect of military profession, self(internal) regulation aspect of military profession, tradition of the practice of military science as a calling.

d. Commitment Impact Assessment. Require that a formal assessment of the impact on officer commitment accompany each recommended change of personnel policies and procedures to the decisionmaker.

e. Need for Positive Reinforcement. Until such time as a system of commitment assessment is established, assume that there is need for periodic positive reinforcement of Army officer commitment when deciding whether or not to change or establish personnel policies or programs.

f. Philosophical Writings. Develop the following philosophical writings for direct provision to each member of the officer corps:

(1) Army Values and Goals (mission, professional, qualificalional, ethical).

(2) Army Ethical System Construct (to include at least the following three components: the ultimate principle toward which the efforts of the profession and its members are to be directed, the values to be employed in pursuit of the ultimate principle, and the ethical system within which the values are to be employed to make value choices and decisions).

g. Military Professional Standards. Institute a system of explicit professional standards, which are keyed to several important points of an Army officer's career. (This recommendation appears elsewhere in detail in RETO recommendations.)

h. Internal, Written Argumentation. Encourage and reward internal, written argumentation within the officer corps on such subjects vital to the survival of the Army as fragmentation of the officer corps, the Army as a "calling" or an occupation, professional ethics, social changes within the Army community and within the Army work environment, and the Army of the future.

i. Commitment Monitoring and Measurement. Develop and implement a scientifically valid system to monitor, measure, predict, and influence commitment of Army officers. Such a system should have at least the following components:

(1) Capability to monitor and to anticipate broad societal (American and Army) trends (e.g., value shifts) having an impact on commitment.

(2) Capability to ascertain values of Army officers.

(3) Capability to articulate/focus Army values and value systems.

(4) Capability to monitor/measure state of officer commitment on a regular, continuing basis.

(5) Capability to monitor the impact on commitment of promulgation of individual Army policies and practices (See d, preceding).

(6) Capability to contribute in nontraditional ways to officer socialization.

j. Commitment Staff Responsibility. Assign specific responsibility for policies and programs to monitor, measure, predict, and influence commitment of Army officers to the human resources development element of the Department of the Army Staff.

k. Broad Societal Trends. Develop a capability to monitor and to anticipate broad societal (American and Army) trends (e.g., value shifts) having an impact on commitment. (See i (1), preceding.)

1 Appendix

1. Officer Commitment

OFFICER COMMITMENT

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

A Frame of Reference

In the next 20 years, extraordinarily heavy demands upon the United States Army to do more with less are expected to continue. Its leaders, the Army officer corps, will continue to bear the brunt of these demands, as they attempt to lead the Army through a thicket of global readiness responsibilities, ambivalent public support, increasingly close supervision by civilian leaders, competition for scarce resources, and internal professional reappraisal toward necessarily increased effectiveness. The effectiveness of the American Army in carrying out its wartime or peacetime missions--under varying kinds and degrees of stress and in continuous compliance with the will of the American people--is directly related to the state of education, training, and commitment of its members.

Education and training without commitment may be not worth the investment; commitment without education and training may be not worth the risk. Respected institutions of learning know that motivation is more reliable than intelligence and knowledge as a predictor of the quality of one's eventual contribution to society. Conversely, wise leaders recognize the propensity for fanaticism among followers who have a narrow understanding of the goals to which their strong commitment is attached. For very practical reasons, failure to apply such lessons to the profession of arms would be imprudent.

Soon after the Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO) began, it was recognized that there is a triumvirate of interdependent and coequal determinants of officer effectiveness, only two of which were addressed in the RETO mission. In order that the review be accomplished with the broader context clearly in mind, the third determinant, commitment, was incorporated into the review effort. Further, since review of education and training was to be directed at the 1985-1995 timeframe, to the extent feasible, study in the area of commitment has been undertaken with a similarly futuristic orientation. The pages that follow provide an overview of the study of officer commitment.

Commitment

An effective Army officer may be described as one who is trained in the skills he needs to accomplish his mission competently; one who is educated in the knowledge and insights necessary for successful mission accomplishment within the context of broader organizational goals; and one who is committed to do his duty faithfully and well. Commitment helps assure that reasonable return is received for investment in education and training. Reciprocally, adequate and relevant education and training reinforce and enhance commitment.

Commitment is important in analyzing the effective Army officer because commitment is an important predictor of behavior. To understand what makes a person act as he does, it is helpful to look at motivational phenomena in terms of two major factors and the way they operate in an intimate and inseparable relationship.

Needs

Certain physiological, social, and ego or personal needs are basic to each individual and account for a significant portion of all purposive behavior. Leaving aside physiological needs, the most demanding are the needs for security, belongingness, self-respect, and confidence. In attempting to meet these needs, an individual is trying to bring about or maintain that state of affairs he believes most likely to give him a satisfactory existence, as he perceives it. He does so by employing those ways of acting which have proved useful to him in the past.

Although separate, the needs for self-respect and confidence are interrelated and can be discussed as two dimensions of a single need. Self-respect, in large measure, is traceable to one's confidence in his own ability to perform well and to his perception that his performance contributes directly to accomplishing the larger organizational mission or goal.

Education and training are particularly important in developing and maintaining self-respect and confidence. If adequately educated and trained, one is more likely to have confidence in his ability to perform satisfactorily. Further, if the education and training are relevant to Army needs, one is more likely to feel confident of contributing directly to successful mission accomplishment, as well.

Goals are important to the individual only as they satisfy his needs. Therefore, it is important that the goals of the organization are such that the individual can satisfy his needs through their pursuit.

When the foregoing circumstances are favorable, the individual functions in a climate conducive to his achieving success in his own way. Feelings of self-respect and confidence are reinforced further as a result. When the foregoing circumstances are unfavorable to a marked degree, the individual may shift the focus of his commitment from organizational needs to his own individual needs.

Values

To look at motivational phenomena another way, one may turn to those factors of individual behavior which are residues of experience--habits, learned tastes, ideals, and values. Important to the subject of commitment is the factor of values.

Values probably are acquired by several different processes. Children uncritically seem to adopt some from their parents, from other admired adults, and, to some lesser extent, from larger social groups. Other values may be accepted by way of conscious and deliberate learning and the weighing of issues in an attempt to find deeper meaning. Sometimes, values are changed through intense experiences. They also change to some extent as an individual matures. But whatever the process, its most important element is personal experience and personal interpretation of experience.

The value pattern of an individual may be described as one which places highest worth on those conditions of life which have contributed to his well-being (not necessarily physical well-being), as he conceives it. Those conditions tend to become cherished as desirable conditions of living. Put another way, values may be thought of as the criteria of success for an individual. Life is a success when it incorporates those conditions he cherishes; a failure when those cherished conditions are impossible to attain.

An individual tends to affiliate himself with an organization, the values of which are compatible (not necessarily identical) to his own. Further, one can be satisfied to live side-by-side with different, but compatible, values held by the organization. If, on the other hand, the individual perceives that the values of the organization are markedly and persistently incompatible with his own, frustration, conflict, and eventual alienation can occur.

Attitudes

It is hard to draw a constant distinction between values and attitudes. Values have to do with ends, whereas attitudes are expressed toward means. An attitude is a specific phase of behavior, and attitudes can be described as interrupted and suspended responses to situations. Thus, attitudes represent behavior while it is still tentative. Just as skills and knowledge are learned, to the extent that attitudes derive from experience, they are learned, also. (The relationship between values and attitudes has been simplified for ease of discussion. Figure I-1 provides a more descriptive visual analogy of the relationship.¹⁾

Socialization


An individual's life may be viewed as a series of passages from one role to another. Arnold Van Cennep calls the activities associated with such passages, "rites of passage."² In each instance of passage, socialization takes place.

Socialization, therefore, takes place repeatedly during the lifetime of an individual. Indeed, Edgar H. Schein describes the process as ubiquitous.³ It is the natural consequence of undertaking new tasks, pursuing new goals, associating with new groups, and the like. It happens so often that the tendency is to overlook it.

Of specific interest here is the process of organizational socialization, the process of "learning the ropes" in an organization new to an individual. It is the process by which a new member learns those values, norms, and behavior patterns which, from the organization's point of view, it is necessary for any new member to learn. This learning, as Schein says, is the "price of membership."⁴ The new member's socialization will be an intensely personal experience and will take place naturally, if conditions are right. And the effectiveness of the socialization process will determine the commitment and loyalty of the new member.

The speed and effectiveness of socialization depends upon two factors, the first of which is the degree of prior socialization. If, prior to his entrance, the new member has assessed the organization correctly, the socialization process merely involves a reaffirmation by the organization--through various informal and formal means--of the values, norms, and behavior patterns he had anticipated. If, on the other hand, the new member has assessed the organization incorrectly, the process of socialization will be more gradual.

**Figure I-1: A Visual Analogy
of the Relationship Between
Beliefs, Values, Attitudes,
and Opinions.¹**



Beliefs are strongly held and can be thought of as the roots of a tree. Values are strongly held as well, although less so than beliefs, and can be thought of as the tree trunk. Attitudes are more temporary, as are the leaves of the tree. Opinions are the least strongly held of the four.

Douglas T. Hall groups the activities associated with socialization into three phases: separation, initiation, and incorporation.⁵ Schein takes a similar approach, but describes the phases in somewhat less categorical terms: a destructive or unfreezing phase, a phase in which the novice acquires his new learning, and the transition to full-fledged member.⁶

Whichever the approach, recent writings suggest that socialization occurs not so much as a result of these kinds of experiences in sequential stages (as in the case of learning) as it occurs as the gradual, cumulative effect on the individual of all of these experiences concurrently. To simplify discussion, the following paragraphs address each phase separately.

The separation phase, not surprisingly, is one in which the novice is separated from his customary environment. This may take the form, as in Army basic training, of the implied disparagement of civilian status and the psychological and physical isolation from civilian life.⁷ A series of events serves to undo old values so that the novice will prepare to learn new ones. Often, the process is unpleasant. Therefore, either strong motivation is required to endure it, or, strong organizational forces to make the person endure it.⁸ Examples of the latter case are the imperatives of the enlistment contract in Army basic training; the investment in advance of tuition costs in college; and the possibility of humiliation in certain other situations.

The second phase, initiation, involves the acquisition of new learning.

[It]...is a highly visible component of institutionalized role transition; in it, personal changes are focused in a fairly short, intense time period. During the initiation the holders of the desired role test the newcomer to determine whether he will measure up to their standards. If he can, he is given public certification that he is now one of them. Because of this certification, he then begins to feel more like them; i.e., his identity has changed to that he now sees himself as part of the new group...⁹

Of the multiple formal and informal sources of the new learning probably the most potent for the novice is the senior members of the organization, and the instructions and guidelines they give.¹⁰

The third, and final, phase of the socialization process is incorporation--the transition to full-fledged membership. Transitional events help the new member make his new values, attitudes, and norms a part of his personal identity. These events usually signal some important added responsibility, evidence that the individual has earned the trust of the organization, and various titles or other symbols of status.¹¹

The socialization process is not without its conflicts, however. Schein identifies three basic responses to the process of socialization:

- Rebellion: rejection of all organizational values and norms
- Creative individualism: Acceptance only of pivotal values and norms; rejection of all others
- Conformity: acceptance of all values and norms ¹²

Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval historian and philosopher, among others, maintained that it is the minds of men that win battles, not the machines of war. History offers an abundance of examples of military leaders who have vanquished foes thought to be superior in fighting capability. An essential characteristic of these successful military leaders can be described simply as the ability to think creatively.

Organizational socialization occurs only in terms of the specific individual person and the specific organization concerned. Just as it is useful to the individual only when it is an intensely personal experience, it has utility for the organization only when it occurs in the specific context of the organization's point of view. In the Army's case, while discipline, obedience, and loyalty are essential attributes of individual Army officers, uncritical acceptance by officers of all Army values and norms (conformity) should not be. Such a response to the socialization process would deny the Army the needed stimulation and vitality of an appropriately questioning and creative officer corps.

Of the three preceding possible responses to socialization, the first would represent a failure of the socialization process for any organization. For the Army, the third response (conformity) would represent failure of the process, as well. It is the second response, creative individualism, which should be the Army's goal. Somehow, the Army should strive to avoid evoking total rejection by the individual officer, on the one hand, and to avoid rewarding only conformity, on the other.

Psychological Success

During the first few years of a management-level novice's career, a series of interrelated changes occurs in work attitudes and performance which Hall calls psychological (self-perceived or intrinsic) success. He hypothesizes that the phenomenon occurs as outlined below.

- For all managers, the need for achievement and esteem increases over the years they are with the organization.

- Managers who have met high standards of performance will be rewarded extrinsically, with promotions, pay raises, and the like.

- These managers have achieved a lot and have been given additional responsibility. Their satisfaction with achievement and esteem, therefore, increases and becomes significantly greater than that of their less successful colleagues.

- Perhaps as a result of their greater satisfaction with achievement and esteem, they become more involved in their jobs. By the fifth year, their work is significantly more central to their overall need satisfaction than is the work of the less successful group.

- With increased job involvement, they become more likely to achieve success in future assignments than members of the less successful group. They have become caught in an upward spiral of success.

While psychological success may not be the type of success which is perceived by other people, it will be perceived by the person, himself. Goal-directed behavior is thought to lead to psychological success when the following conditions prevail:

- The goal represents a challenging but attainable level of aspiration.
- The goal is defined by the person.
- The goal is central to the person's self-concept.
- The person works independently to achieve the goal.¹³




Figure I-2: The Psychological* Success Model of Career Development¹⁴

*self-perceived or intrinsic success

Following the experience of psychological success, the person is likely to feel a sense of increased competence and self-esteem relative to his duties, and to engage in additional goal-directed behavior in which, frequently, more difficult goals are selected. Figure I-2 is Hall's depiction of the Psychological Success Model of Career Development.¹⁴ It is an illustration of an upward spiral of success.

Implications

Commitment, as described in this chapter, represents more than passive loyalty to the Army. If committed to his Service, the Army officer will demonstrate--

- a strong desire to remain a part of the Army;
- a willingness to exert high levels of effort on behalf of the Army;
- a definite belief in, and acceptance of, the basic values and goals of the Army (while still being willing to criticize and question specific actions of the Army when necessary); and
- a deep concern about the fate of the Army.¹⁵

Commitment of an Army officer to his Service implies an informal, but understood, contract between the two parties--the officer and his Service. There is, therefore, the obligation of the Army, as one party to the contract, to demonstrate its commitment to the officer, as well. In so doing, the Army must--

- deal fairly with the officer as a person, and make every honest effort to satisfy his needs and goals;
- be open about what its organizational values and goals are, and hold to them consistently throughout its functioning;
- insist upon a professional climate in which the officer can believe in, trust, and be proud of his organization, of his contribution to it, and of the leaders senior to him;
- be explicit about what is expected of him in terms of performance standards, provide him the opportunity to prepare himself to meet these standards, and evaluate his performance honestly and objectively, in a way which contributes to his professional growth; and

Following the experience of psychological success, the person is likely to feel a sense of increased competence and self-esteem relative to his duties, and to engage in additional goal-directed behavior in which, frequently, more difficult goals are selected. Figure I-2 is Hall's depiction of the Psychological Success Model of Career Development.¹⁴ It is an illustration of an upward spiral of success.

Implications

Commitment, as described in this chapter, represents more than passive loyalty to the Army. If committed to his Service, the Army officer will demonstrate--

- a strong desire to remain a part of the Army;
- a willingness to exert high levels of effort on behalf of the Army;
- a definite belief in, and acceptance of, the basic values and goals of the Army (while still being willing to criticize and question specific actions of the Army when necessary); and
- a deep concern about the fate of the Army.¹⁵

Commitment of an Army officer to his Service implies an informal, but understood, contract between the two parties--the officer and his Service. There is, therefore, the obligation of the Army, as one party to the contract, to demonstrate its commitment to the officer, as well. In so doing, the Army must--

- deal fairly with the officer as a person, and make every honest effort to satisfy his needs and goals;
- be open about what its organizational values and goals are, and hold to them consistently throughout its functioning;
- insist upon a professional climate in which the officer can believe in, trust, and be proud of his organization, of his contribution to it, and of the leaders senior to him;
- be explicit about what is expected of him in terms of performance standards, provide him the opportunity to prepare himself to meet these standards, and evaluate his performance honestly and objectively, in a way which contributes to his professional growth; and

• demonstrate to him that he is a valued and valuable Army member.

To return to the description of the effective Army officer—the product of education, training, and commitment—attitudes are the reflection of commitment; knowledge and skills, on the other hand, are the results of education and training, respectively. Education and training are employable as systems. In comparison, commitment is a state of being. It is an important predictor of behavior. If one considered a continuum of behavior predictors with commitment at one end, alienation would be at the other and apathy would be midway, in between the two.

It is necessary to keep the phrase "effective Army officer" in mind for two reasons. First, as indicated previously, a response to the Army socialization process other than one of creative individualism is, in fact, evidence of failure of the process. Neither rebellion nor conformity contributes to Army effectiveness.

Secondly, "the effective Army officer" is a useful mental frame of reference because the Army specifically needs committed to it the most capable members of its officer corps, or a high percentage of them. It is neither feasible nor necessary that all Army officers be committed strongly to their Service. Moreover, it is even less desirable to have commitment concentrated among those officers with less than significant potential to absorb and to employ education or training. Unfortunately, the Army has less than a solid track record of generating sufficient commitment among its best officers.

A finding reported in a study by Lyman W. Porter and Vance Mitchell illustrates the foregoing point:

...some 700 commissioned officers in one of the branches...were asked to rank-order 10 different behavioral characteristics (e.g., 'self-confident,' 'cooperative,' etc.) in terms of 'how necessary they are for success in your particular position.' Among the 10 characteristics to be ranked was 'imaginative.' Consistently, at all levels (from Lieutenants to Brigadier Generals) this trait was ranked as only fifth or sixth in importance. By contrast, in a comparable sample of managers and executives in business organizations, this trait was consistently ranked first. Furthermore, at all officer levels of the military sample the trait of 'imaginative' was ranked as less important for success than was the trait of 'tactful.' Again, by contrast the reverse was true in the industrial sample.¹⁶

Applications

It is clear that the individual commitment of a high percentage of its most capable officers is an important determinant of overall Army effectiveness. Unaddressed individual needs can become obstacles to the pursuit of Army organizational goals. Personal values which are incompatible with those of the Army can contribute to behavior aberrant to Army standards. And a socialized officer who has not retained his creative individualism promises to do no real good for the Army over the long term. With this much at stake, haphazard Army efforts to enhance commitment would fall far short of what is needed.

Education and training strategies implemented for the Army officer corps will have a major impact on the commitment of its members. To the extent that such strategies improve the quality of education and training and address the mission needs of the Army, self-respect and confidence of its officers will be enhanced. Further, to the extent that such strategies are perceived to signal continuation of an organizational value pattern with which the individual has found compatibility, conditions potentially favorable to his success, as he defines it, will continue to exist.

Education and training, however, are not the sole contributors to commitment. A period of socialization which, while not contrived or manipulative, takes into full account the experiences the young officer will have, and the effect on him of these experiences, is of utmost importance both to the Army and to the officer. Whether or not a climate is provided during his early Army years in which he can achieve intrinsic, as well as extrinsic, success, is of utmost importance, also. Satisfaction of needs and compatibility of values are affected also and importantly by the various officer management subsystems and the rationality with which they are perceived to function by each individual officer.

To realize the full implications of eliciting and keeping commitment of individual officers, especially the very capable ones, it may be useful to consider some real-life Army situations, such as those identified in the paragraphs that follow. While doing so, it also may be useful to realize from the outset that all real-life Army situations have the potential of producing one, or both, of the following effects:

- obstruction of the level of commitment of an individual officer from reaching its full potential; or, detracting from an already high level of commitment; or,

- erosion of the belief of an individual officer that the Army is worthy of, or capable of meriting, the officer's commitment.

Consider, first, the real-life situation of the new officer's first duty assignment: It is abundantly clear in social science writings that this may be the most important period of his career, in terms of his commitment. If he is not permitted to understand, first hand, and to internalize the pivotal values and norms of the Army during that period, it is unlikely that he ever will. If the job he is given is not sufficiently challenging and difficult for him that it stretches his new capabilities to the utmost, he may come to believe that mediocre performance is all the Army expects of him. In such a case, mediocre performance is all the Army is likely to get from him thereafter. If the peer and senior role models within his real perspective are not prepared to be just that, then cynicism or incorrect values and norms will be learned.

Earlier in this chapter, the most demanding individual needs were identified as security, belongingness, self-respect, and confidence. Reductions in force, for example, threaten fulfillment of the security need. Oversupervision and an unwillingness to delegate authority appropriately, for example, have a negative impact on self-respect and confidence. Failure to integrate an individual officer fully into the specific work team as a contributing member causes the need for belongingness to go unsatisfied. Assignment of an officer to a duty for which he is unprepared and for which there is little opportunity for him to become prepared renders remote any prospect that he will be proud of his contribution in that assignment. In intensely personal situations such as these, it matters not that they may be exceptions in Army life, and not the rule. Commitment, itself, is an intensely personal matter, and the individual officer views the Army subjectively through the eyes of his own, intensely personal experience.

As personnel subsystems become more and more complex, the likelihood increases correspondingly of their appearing in specific instances to function inconsistently or irrationally in terms of Army policy. Restriction on permanent changes of station, for example, thwarts consistent implementation of officer distribution policy. Despite the Army goal of training only in response to Army need, it occasionally becomes necessary to train an officer for a specific position because officers already possessing requisite skills cannot be identified or

are unavailable temporarily. In the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), itself, the need to manage by specialty skill identifier is implied. Yet, the system cannot accommodate management by anything more than the two-digit specialty code.

Clearly, there is a balance to be struck between two contending considerations: The advantage to be gained from strongly centralized and interrelated personnel subsystems; and the disadvantage incurred in terms of individual officer disenchantment when the policy concerned cannot be applied in his specific case. Ironically, individual officer frustration of this sort arises most frequently from employment of complicated subsystems designed to give him more individual attention. Regardless of the worthiness of intention, when the appearance of inconsistency, irrationality, or loss of control on the part of managers is the result, loss of credibility as an organization in control of its own affairs often follows.

Other kinds of situations can be cited, which appear to individual officers to be susceptible to cynical or self-serving manipulation. For example, many believe that officers serving with certain activities at Department of the Army level reserve the best assignments for themselves. In the case of the promotion system, there are those who believe that officers who are known by someone serving on the board stand a better chance of being promoted than those who are not. The point is that personnel systems prone to be perceived with distrust, justified or not, must be conspicuously beyond corruption.

The question of how to elicit commitment in individual Army officers remains unanswered in generally applicable scientific research. But one thing is certain: There are as many answers as there are experiences in the career of the officer concerned. In some instances, it is beyond the power of the Army as an organization to influence commitment. Therefore, it is all the more important for the Army to exert positive influence when and where it can.

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CHAPTER II. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

Army officers who will be affected most by recommendations resulting from the Review of Education and Training of Officers have not been commissioned yet. These are the young men and women who will begin their military service as officers in the next 5 or 6 years.

Chapter I placed commitment in a common context with education and training as one of the three interdependent, and equal, determinants of officer effectiveness; and explained the important role of individual value systems in human behavior.

This chapter identifies some significant societal trends and value shifts which are likely to occur in the American society in the next 25 years or so. To do so is important for two reasons: To try to understand what the American society, of which American Army officers will be a product, may be like; and, equally important, to try to understand what the view of that society might be toward its Army.

Situation

Erich Fromm expressed his concern for the seeming malaise of modern man when he wrote:

While creating new and better means for mastering nature, [modern man] has become enmeshed in a network of those means and has lost the vision of the end which alone gives them significance--man himself.¹

Preoccupation with man's vision of himself, and hence his values, is as old as man himself. From ancient philosophers to their present day posterity, generations have tried to find some absolute meaning or truth to life, which remained constant regardless of the times in which they lived. Failing this, they sought to develop systems of thought which could serve as useful substitutes. F.A. Lange, a 19th century philosopher,² illustrates the struggle to find a philosophical compromise. He believed that knowledge tends to mold man's mind toward a more naturalistic interpretation of the world. He believed further that knowledge tends to cause man to submit the world's demonstrations to his comparison of their relative goodness and ideality in terms of his imagination's desires. Lacking absolute truth and the ideal world, man substitutes value judgments for truth judgments.

Alvin Toffler states that virtually all of man's actions are based on predictions about future values. This point becomes important when coupled with a second Toffler observation that the rate of value change has accelerated to the extent that major shifts in the value system of a society now are apparent within the span of a single lifetime or less. Such acceleration removes the comfortable assumption that values of future generations will resemble those of the present one.³

Historically, value systems have been important links between generations, and generations have tended to be troubled when the stability of such linkages for some reason has appeared no longer to be reliable. Irving Howe may have been describing such a situation when he wrote the following about the so-called "lost generation."

For writers like Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Cummings, and the early Dos Passos there could no longer be any question of clinging to traditional values. But more important, there could not even be a question of trying to find a new set of values: they were beyond such ambitions or delusions; they knew it was their lot to spend their lives in uncertainty, and the problem that troubled them most was how to do this without violating their feelings about courage and dignity.⁴

There are those today who believe that such a time has come again. Causes are thought to be many and complex: The exponential acceleration of technological change with which today's citizen must cope, for example; as well as the transitory nature of society, in which the average person today moves at least five times in his lifetime. Whether contemporary American society actually suffers from anomie or whether it is making a transition to somewhat different values has been argued--by some, fearfully; by others optimistically. In either case, the issue of what value system will have meaning in the future retains its essential significance, as man continues to substitute value judgments for truth judgments in this less than perfect world.

Changing American Values

Paradoxically, Americans in the next decades are expected to become more independent and increasingly insistent for individual rights and prerogatives, while their Nation is expected to become increasingly dependent, internationally. Reflecting generations of experience in the world's most affluent society, they also are expected to become more oriented toward relaxation and toward a higher degree of self-centeredness at a time when greater effort in many important areas and a greater sharing of much of the world's resources likely will be needed. Moderately slowing standard of living and industrial growth rates will make it increasingly

difficult to satisfy their wants, especially those of various minorities and other special interest groups.

By 1990, urbanization will have increased to include 90 percent of the population, as compared with 73 percent in 1980. Migration into the southern and southwestern United States will continue. Restrictions on immigration are expected to be liberalized in the coming decades, but illegal immigration probably will continue to increase markedly.⁵

The foregoing trends, and others, may contribute to a further blurring of historical regional societal differences and of traditional differences between urban and rural populations. In contrast, larger groups of immigrants may be assimilated into the larger society at a slower rate. These situations, if they come to pass, may exacerbate a trend already identified by some as leading in the United States toward a sense of loss of community and described by others as a growing sense of rootlessness. Vance Packard theorized that such a rootless people may have a life style which develops into an unconcern for social consequences.⁶

In 1966, Nicholas Rescher conducted a questionnaire study of American values. The research was designed to study the change in American values, as affected by scientific, technological, demographic, and socio-economic changes between now and the year 2000 A.D.; and the nature, magnitude, casual mechanism, and desirability of such change. Fifty-eight highly respected scientists and science administrators whose interests are oriented toward the future responded to a special questionnaire. Their responses reflected a large degree of consensus and can be summarized, in part, in the following general observations:

- A continuing commitment to American values (country, honor, independence, probity, etc) was anticipated much along present day lines, except for an increased emphasis upon social values and a decreased emphasis upon religious values.
- A strengthening of materialism was anticipated; as well as a broadening from local to international perspectives and a strengthening of intellectual, cultural, and aesthetic values.
- Only three cases of anticipated value changes were regarded as desirable by less than half of the respondents: decreased emphasis on "self-reliance" and "devotion to family" and increased emphasis upon "novelty."

The sample for this survey was small and the bias of the respondents toward the "hard" sciences. Apart from these limitations, however, the project is interesting beyond its findings because it demonstrates the feasibility of such an undertaking.

Using the Rescher research as a model, Orris Kelly, current Chief of Army Chaplains, conducted a similar study at the Army War College, when he was student there in 1973. One hundred and seventy-eight students of his class responded to Kelly's questionnaire. A consensus considered the following "core" values desirable: economic security, self-fulfillment, law and order, equality and civil rights, human dignity, and social justice. The Army War College respondents also--

- anticipated a decrease in emphasis on traditional American values.

- perceived an increasing support for social values. (Social injustice was expected to concern society more in the future than individual injustice.)

- anticipated a loss of support for such values as devotion to family and patriotism and for religious and spiritual values.

- anticipated an eroding of attachment to human needs, such as friendship and freedom, with a contrasting increased emphasis upon escape, diversion, and amusement.⁸

Frank Friedlander believes that there is evidence that the values and perspectives manifest in certain behaviors of the youth in the 1960's are durable and should not be viewed as a temporary and eccentric phase. To elaborate, he describes three life styles he says are to be found in varying degrees in the general society today and observes that there is an apparent shift from the first to the second and third:

- The formal orientation, in which the individual needs to receive direction from authorities before he acts.

- The social orientation, in which individual action is preceded by discussion and agreement with others, so that needs are integrated and goals mutually agreed upon.

- The personal orientation, in which the individual looks within himself and questions himself as to his own experience for direction.

Table II-1 describes the behavioral characteristics of each of these orientations in greater detail. The arrow across the top of the Table is to show that an increasing proportion of people hold social and personal orientations.⁹

Changing American Views Toward its Armed Forces

Roger A. Beaumont observed that

TABLE II-1: The Behaviors and Values of Three Major Life-Orientations

Behavior/Value	Formal Social Personal		
	Formal	Social	Personal
Basis of action	direction from authorities	discussion, agreement with others	direction from within
Form of control	rules, laws, policies	interpersonal commitments	what I think is right or needed
Responsibility to	superordinate powers	peers, colleagues, self	self
Desired end	compliance	consensus, agreement	actualization of individual
To be avoided	deviation from authoritative direction	failure to reach agreement	not being one's self
To get material goods	compete	collaborate	taken for granted
Basis for growth	following the established order	interaction	acting on awareness of self
Position vis-a-vis others	member of hierarchy	peer group member	separate individual
Identify with/loyal to	organization	group	individual
Time perspective	future	near future	present

NOTE: 9. Reproduced from "Technology, Youth, and Organizational Structure: Some Changing Patterns Relevant to the Military," a paper by Frank Friedlander presented at the Leadership Workshop Conference, U.S. Military Academy, 25-27 June 1969.

...since 1953 and the first really large establishment of services in peacetime in America, the erosion of the hardy flowers of professionalism has been mounting. The hostile environment of fashionable criticism oriented to win votes from some members...of Congress has not made a service career more attractive to many young people who look to the Congress for guidance in terms of their values...¹⁰

To an important extent, the ability of military officers to achieve and maintain high standards of professionalism depends upon the nature of the society they serve and the economic and moral support given to them by that society. In the United States, such support has followed a cyclic pattern of ebb and flow--of alternation between benign distrust or strident anti-militarism to indifferent toleration or even positive support.

Ronald Inglehart, in examining this cyclic pattern on a theoretical basis, advances the hypothesis "... (1) that people have a variety of needs and tend to give a high priority to whatever needs are in short supply, but (2) that they tend to retain a given set of value priorities throughout adult life, once it has been established in preadult years. ¹¹

Samuel P. Huntington's overview of civil-military relations in this country appears to support the Inglehart hypothesis. First, Huntington characterizes the relationship between these two often contending groups as one of a "...changing pattern of balance and accommodation between the societal imperatives and the functional ones..."¹² He describes the conservative realism of the American professional military ethic as having been traditionally in contrast to the liberal, antimilitary consensus of the American society.

From the point of our Nation's beginning through the period immediately prior to World War II, the manifestations of the liberal, antimilitary consensus persisted. It was an unsurprising outgrowth of the almost accidental unimportance of military forces to a nation protected by geography and ignored, for the most part, by European politics. As a consequence, the small military forces prior to World War II generally remained outside the mainstream of American society and received only occasional economic, political, or moral support from that society.

During the Cold War period, this situation changed dramatically, as the necessity and utility of Armed Forces in terms of national security and foreign policy was acknowledged generally by most Americans. Military influence at the national policy making level, and the economic and moral support given to the Armed Forces, increased correspondingly.

This Cold War period, as well, was followed by a dramatic shift of public attitudes which began in the 1960's. General support was replaced by an antimilitary feeling described by professor

and occasional pollster Bruce Russett in 1974 as "...absolutely unprecedented from the beginning of scientific opinion-sampling."¹³ By 1975, however, this wave of antimilitarism showed signs of waning, and public attitudes toward the military have become more positive in the immediate past.

Nevertheless, when one returns to Inglehart's hypothesis and studies the present situation in light of its implications, growing indications of a long term trend toward antimilitarism become apparent. This can be observed not only in the United States, but in a number of other Western nations also. In view of the absence since World War II of wars that threatened the physical safety of the national citizenries involved, these populations, over time, have begun to shift their priorities to needs which, to them, seem in shorter supply.

Such beginnings of change, not surprisingly, are most discernable among those who have reached adulthood since World War II, a point of some importance if the second part of the Inglehart hypothesis is to be believed: Is there a set of value priorities being established among these young adults which is likely to be retained throughout their lifetime? The validity of the hypothesis remains largely untested.

In any case, many observers believe that unless, or until, a situation comes along which causes a shift of priorities back to support of military institutions--a major war, for example--the gradual, long term erosion of public support for these military institutions should be anticipated.

Implications

Value shifts predicted to occur among the general American society during the next twenty years are important to the Army today for two reasons: First, because survey techniques now have reached a stage where such predictions can be made with reasonable validity; and, second, because having an idea of what the future will be like in such an important area permits the Army to prepare for it.

Value change research is part of a growing interest in futurology found among advanced societies throughout the world. Large corporations frequently have futurologists as a part of their permanent staffs, and usually placed at a fairly high management level. "Club of Rome" and "zero growth" are examples of futurist phrases which have crept into the lexicon of many average citizens. The fact is that the future is too soon the present, with all of its implications of accelerating change, to risk mere reaction to it. Yet, for all of this and as incongruous as it seems, the Army rarely looks ahead to view the people of the future, despite accustomed leadtimes of a dozen years or more for sophisticated weapons systems.

Values held by young people as they weigh career alternatives will continue to have an important influence on whether or not they perceive the values of the military profession as potentially compatible with their own. Those who eventually are appointed or commissioned as officers will fulfill their military obligation generally in consonance with the values they bring with them to officer status. Those who remain in civilian life also will view the Army and military service through the filter of their own individual values.

For the first group, those who become Army officers, their commitment and their effectiveness will depend, in large measure, upon whether or not Army life and work incorporates those conditions--those values--these future officers cherish. Many social science writings predict increasingly independent and self-centered life styles and a greater reluctance to accede to external authority. Military leadership, in the traditional mold, may not be effective if these value predictions hold true. The Army's organizational effectiveness program, commented on in Chapter III, is a step in the right direction, but a more thorough examination may be needed of the Army officer of the future.

It is to the second group, those who remain civilians, together with the rest of American society, to which the Army must look for support. To a significant extent, there is little that the Army appropriately can do to influence the degree of support it receives from the American public. Nevertheless, it is important that apparent trends in that support be recognized so that shifts in the views of American society can be anticipated with reasonable accuracy. Presently, there are indications of a probable gradual erosion of public support. If it came to pass as unfortunate as it would be, it would be better for the Army to plan for the coming decades with no illusions.

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CHAPTER III. THE AMERICAN ARMY IN TRANSITION

Professionalization of the United States Army Officer Corps probably took place during the 30 years following the War of 1812.¹ In recent years, the professionalism of the officer corps--specifically, its ethics, value system, and capability to lead has been questioned and has been the source of conflict and self-examination within the Army.

Symptomatic are a number of books and articles written by present and former Army officers and by civilian military-watchers, and several scandals, in which military officers have figured prominently. Symptomatic, also, is the apparent breakdown of trust and respect for more senior Army members by their juniors. This condition has been of such concern as to prompt several studies, at least two of which were conducted by the Army War College: one on professionalism² and the other on leadership.³ Both confirmed the need for concern.

Compounding the dilemma are professional and social changes taking place in the Army today which potentially could make more difficult resolution of the problems alluded to above. This chapter identifies certain of these changes.

Situation

The Army officer's environment is made up of three parts: his professional environment, his work environment, and his societal environment. As a practical matter, the three are inseparable. But each, in its own way, adds a special dimension to the military career equation and, thus, deserves separate attention. The first half of this chapter addresses each of the three environments in turn.

The Professional Environment

Most today agree that the practice of military officership is a profession. Both Samuel B. Huntington and Morris Janowitz have written extensively on this subject, and it is perhaps upon their argumentation that the case for military professionalism most solidly rests. Both count expertise, responsibility, and corporateness as the three characteristics which distinguish a profession as a special type of vocation: both contend that the practice of military officership fits this three-characteristic model. For the unifying and distinguishing hallmark of the

professional military officer, Huntington has adapted Harold Lasswell's "specializing in instruments of violence" to the now familiar "management of violence."⁴

Professional Pluralism

Rather than employing the three-characteristic model of Huntington and Janowitz, Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederick J. Brown contend that the military profession more properly should be defined in terms of its uniqueness: The obligation of the military profession for unconditional service to the lawful authority of the state. They further contend that there is no need, with such a definition, to identify a unifying, unique expertise such as "management of violence." These contentions are precursive to Bradford's and Brown's central issue: The need to include under the general aspect of military professionalism any skill necessary to the Army to fulfill its unconditional obligation to the Nation.⁵ Within Bradford's and Brown's broader conceptual framework, all military officer skills can be included.

The apparent need of Bradford and Brown to broaden the military professional philosophy to include a variety of skills which are not exclusively military recognizes a trend about which much has been written in the recent past: The trend toward a more pluralistic military profession. Regardless of whether or not it prompts eventual consensus within the profession, the Bradford-Brown thesis is born as much from recognition of reality as it is from persuasion of logic.

Intensifying specialization within the Army has made it increasingly difficult for individual Army officers to relate their respective skills to a central, unifying skill and to place these skills in a meaningful relationship to the many and varied skills practiced by Army officers. The intensive specialization demanded of officers is, necessarily, so absorbing that it is difficult in an increasing number of specialties to find either the time or the context within which to view and understand the overall relationship of Army career specialties. Another important reason for the dilemma is the sheer number, still increasing, of the specialized skills involved.

The need for specialization among Army officers is real and enduring. Nevertheless, specialization directly and indirectly tends to reinforce certain other trends present today in the Army. If not counter-balanced, these trends could have a long term, unfavorable effect on the professional cohesion of the Army officer corps.

Calling Versus Occupation

In a study of the Army in 1990, the Strategic Studies Institute predicts that, unless the economy of the country takes a downward trend or the size of the Army is decreased significantly, the value system of the soldier in 1990 will be such that military service will be thought of more as a job and less as a way of life.⁶

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., elaborates on a similar prediction by using three models: calling, profession, and occupation. Although elements of all three models have been present from time to time, he begins with the position that the practice of military science traditionally has been more of a calling than of a profession, and an occupation only to an insignificant extent. Moskos contends that it is now moving increasingly toward the occupational model and identifies two derivative changes in particular which he believes are apparent presently in military social organization:

- The growing likelihood of unionization in the Armed Forces; principally because military social organization has moved in the direction of the occupational model, while much of its membership continues to expect the social supports of the older, institutional model of a calling.

- The increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks, a consequence of which is that the structure of the military system no longer encompasses the full range of military functions.⁷

Moskos' concern is how to "...adapt and reinvigorate the calling aspects in a modern and complex military system..."⁸

When an Army general officer wrote the RETO Chairman recently, he addressed this same aspect of the military profession's uniqueness by observing that it incorporates concurrently the features of an institution, a profession, and a career. In contrast, in the ministry or in the field of medicine, a career and a profession are involved, but not necessarily an institution. A university professorship, on the other hand, may involve a profession and an institution, but not necessarily a career.

This general officer went on to observe that this unique aspect of the military profession may help to explain why young officers have so much trouble understanding the special ethics associated with an institution; as compared with somewhat different ethics associated with a profession; as compared with the far different ethics ordinarily associated with careers or jobs.⁹

Apparently, a vaguely similar disquiet prompted a field grade Army officer recently to write a letter which is quoted in part below:

...We are losing sight of our purpose. We are becoming quite proficient at resource management but neglecting the fundamental discipline for which we exist--the profession of arms. Granted, resource management is certainly relevant today. But where are Army strategists, writers, tacticians; i.e., soldiers in the classical tradition? Do we have time for or foster those attributes and qualifications one needs to be a professional soldier? Is the profession of arms in the classical tradition relevant today? I believe it is very relevant....¹⁰

Professional Ethics

You must retain your own high sense of honor, knowing that you will not receive civilian recognition to the measure you deserve, and knowing that the severe antimilitarism and moral upheaval of our times will test you severely.¹¹

--Richard M. Nixon, 37th President,
in a graduation day address at the
U.S. Military Academy, 29 May 1971

The sad irony of these words from this Commander in Chief speaks with silent eloquence.

Within the last dozen years or so, there has been mounting concern among Army officers relative to the apparent breakdown in trust and respect for more senior Army officers by their juniors. Two separate studies by the Army War College were manifestations of this concern: The first addressed professionalism; ¹² the second, leadership.¹³ Certain of the findings of the first study are of particular interest here.

Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the Officer Corps...There is also concern among officers that the Army is not taking action to ensure that high ideals are practiced as well as preached...

The climate...is one in which there is disharmony between traditional, accepted ideals and the prevailing institutional pressures. These pressures seem to stem from a combination of self-oriented, success-motivated actions, and a lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers....¹⁴

The importance of ethics to any profession cannot be overstated. They are the moral glue which binds members of a profession together. They are the recognition of an essential resolve to provide a special service to society in accordance with high standards which do not vary from time to time and from place to place.

When adherence to the profession's ethical standards is strong, a client can predict with reasonable assurance the quality of service he will receive, regardless of the professional member from whom the service is requested. When adherence to the profession's ethical standards is strong, there is reasonable assurance that any member of the profession will represent his client in a manner reflective of, and fitting for, the larger society of which both the professional and the client are a part.

These two points are important because, by definition, a profession provides a service which is essential and which generally is unavailable except from a member of the profession concerned. Were the client to be ill-served by the profession, to whom could he turn for the needed essential service? There is, then, a moral obligation--a trust--involved when a profession undertakes to serve society; this is true in the extreme for the profession of arms.

The Army Code of Ethics exists in the example set by generations of Army officers for those who follow them, for it cannot be found anywhere in writing. It is a product of the American Heritage, both political and spiritual, and of military customs and traditions, both European and American.

When asked, many officers probably would respond that they understand the Army Code and the ethical conceptions associated with it. When asked to outline the code and its ethics, many officers probably would include duty, honor, country, the motto of the U.S. Military Academy, as part or all of their response. If pressed further and asked how useful these three words are to them in specific, every-day situations requiring ethical choices, most officers probably would be a least more hesitant in their response.

Melville A. Drisko, Jr., did research in the area of professional military ethics while a student in 1976-1977 at the Army War College. He employed a 34-question survey to obtain the views of a random sample of the officer corps. The sample was comprised of three to four percent of the total officer population in each rank and in four other demographic categories. Findings are summarized below.

- Ninety-four percent of the respondents believed that the subject of ethical behavior is an important issue for the Army officers today; 77 percent believed that, based on behaviors observed in fellow officers, ethical conduct should be more of an issue than it is.

- Only rarely or occasionally is appropriate action taken against officers who act unethically, according to 78 percent of the respondents.

- Relative to current Army training programs to develop concepts of trust, honor, and integrity, 65 percent and 66 percent believed that the Army school system and TOE units, respectively, are moderately/very ineffective in their training or that training is nonexistent.

- While there was a high degree of acceptance for duty, honor, country, as an informal Army code, only 37 percent of the respondents believed that these three words are moderately or very effective as a practical matter.

- Slightly over one-half (55 percent) believed that the Army should have a formalized professional code of ethics.

Recurring themes from subjective, narrative responses to the same survey are shown in Table III-I. 15

The Work Environment

Changes in the military work environment in the 1980's will come as a result of three interrelated changes: Changes in the orientation of military people, changes in military tasks, and changes in military organizational structures within which military people will perform military tasks. Each aspect is examined in turn in the paragraphs that follow.

Military People

Decades of relative affluence since World War II have called to question accustomed motivational strategies of the past not only in the military services, but in most major institutions of society. Apparently, attitudes toward authority and toward the values of openness, questioning, and candor are changing. Certainly, there is less willingness to tolerate practices at odds with these values.

A survey of work-life related values and preferences was conducted under Navy auspices in 1973. Respondents included a sample of Navy unit personnel and a national random sample of civilians, as well. Study findings seemed to indicate that traditional American values of independence and material success are likely to remain important at least for the immediate future. The findings also disclosed that, of six demographic variables, age and education were the most important.

With respect to age, younger respondents (whether officers, enlisted, or civilians) seemed to attach great importance to controlling one's personal life and avoiding entangling bureaucracy. Respondents who were 43 years of age or older, regardless of status, appeared to attach less importance to these aspects. On the other hand, older Navy respondents valued more highly than those

Table III-115

Recurring, Narrative Themes From Subjective Responses
An Analysis Of Professional Military Ethics

<u>THEME</u>	<u>NO. RESPONSES</u>
1. Ethical instruction needed throughout the Army	115
2. Ethics must start at highest levels	81
3. Need for a formal code	78
4. OER/Career Survival	77
5. Leaders must set example	71
6. Lack of integrity in senior officers	63
7. Pressure on junior officer/unrealistic standards	59
8. Readiness Reports inaccuracies	52
9. More emphasis on ethics	51
10. Ethics can't be taught	42
11. Don't need new codes; enforce ones we have	41
12. "Can-do" syndrome/"Zero defects"	41
13. Tell the boss what he wants to hear	40
14. Need to create a healthy environment	38
15. Ethics are vague/early socialization	35
16. More selective in commission/precommissioning training	33
17. Cover up to look good	31
18. Can't distinguish between military and civ/personal ethics	29
19. Ethics are dictated by society	25
20. Ethical instruction should be realistic	25
21. "Cover your ass" syndrome	21
22. Use the chain of command to enforce	21
23. No "freedom to fail"	19
24. Code is too USMA-oriented	17
25. Ethics are relative/dual standards	14
	<u>1119</u>

who were younger service to one's country and challenging work. Respondents with more education showed less concern about economic issues and more concern about having challenging work. These respondents also attached less importance to service to one's country and more importance to personal independence. This was true for both Navy and civilian respondents.¹⁶

The foregoing findings are consistent with Friedlander's observations relative to life styles in Chapter II. He predicts continuation of a shift already underway from the formal orientation to the social and personal orientation, with the personal orientation becoming increasingly prevalent in the long term. (For a description of the three life styles, see Table II-1, Chapter II.) The foregoing findings generally are consistent with the Rescher research findings (Chapter II), as well.

Military Tasks

The changing nature of tasks is a direct result of recent decades, and the rapid technological changes which have made them decades of relative affluence. Friedlander predicts that tasks of the 1980's "...will tend to increase in complexity, uncertainty, and changefulness....," whereas, the relatively simple, certain, stable tasks will decline proportionately.¹⁷ Table III-2, extracted from Friedlander's work, elaborates on his point.¹⁸ The Table describes extreme polarities for the sake of clarity. Most task characteristics, of course, would be found somewhere between the two extremes.

It is apparent from Table III-2 that, as tasks become more complex, task activities become more unstructured, more novel, and less defined. Communications become more a matter of diffused interplay; task definition, more a matter of a search process; and decision making, more complex and less categorical. Friedlander contends that "...any organization whose progress is potentially linked to technological and social advances within its environment will be increasingly affected by...[the environment suggested by Table III-2]..."¹⁹

Military Organizational Structures

Organizational structures are the connections between the tasks to be performed and the people who will perform them. Earlier portions of this paper have described changes apparent in individual life styles, in which the orientation increasingly is toward participation, collaboration, integration, and consensus; in which the emphasis, increasingly, is on direction from within and a time perspective of the present, rather than the future. The preceding section described tasks as becoming less predictable,

TABLE III-2: Two Sets of Task Characteristics Relevant to Various Organizational Functions¹⁸

Organizational Function	Routine Task Characteristics →	Complex Task Characteristics
Activities	discrete and segmented concrete established and stable automatic implementation	Integrated and interdependent abstract and cognitive uncertain and unpredictable concern for implementation
Authority	structured well-defined routine problem solution coordinate single best solution	unstructured ill-defined novel problem construction exploration of alternatives
Communication	discrete, serial categorical centrally comprehended	diffused interplay pattern noncategorical shared comprehension or uncomprehended
Decisionmaking	narrow range centrally evoked programmed	complex and wide-scope evolves from search process nonprogrammed
Objectives	routine single procedure clear, precise not open to interpretation determined by hierarchy stable product and issues	innovative alternative procedures unclear and evolving interpretive established by mutual influence changing products and issues

NOTE:

18. Reproduced from "Technology, Youth, and Organizational Structure: Some Changing Patterns Relevant to the Military," a paper by Frank Friedlander presented at the Leadership Workshop Conference, U.S. Military Academy, 25-27 June 1969.

TABLE III-3: Bureaucratic and Organic Structures Utilized in Various Organizational Functions²⁰

Organization Function	Bureaucratic Structure →	Organic Structure
Activities	narrow, single purpose categories of activities; coordination at higher levels of hierarchy	overlapping integrative, interdependent, shared activities
Authority	authority vested in higher level in hierarchy	authority vested in expertise; developed through mutual influence
Communication	direct communication along hierarchical lines; defined mechanisms; instructive and directive; coordination via mechanical means	infusing and diffusing in many directions; searching process for sources of information; advisory and consultative; coordination via people
Decisionmaking	decisions along hierarchical lines; hierarchically imposed decisions	decisions via mutual influence; evolving and interpretative decision process in broad decision structure
Objectives	precise and clear; objectives are determined and imposed by hierarchy	interpretive; local objective important; objective established by mutual influence; objectives are part of shared beliefs and values
Role Expectations	well-defined prior to task definition defined by authority stable specified	ill-defined prior to task definition defined with colleagues flexible seeking out
Relationships	one-to-one relationships long term relationships groups with stable membership familiar members conflict suppressed expertise defined by hierarchical role hierarchical coordination dependence upon hierarchy	links with many temporary relationships groups with changing membership strangers conflict utilized expertise sought out in organization collaboration interdependence with colleagues

NOTE:

²⁰ Reproduced from "Technology, Youth, and Organizational Structure: Some Changing Patterns Relevant to the Military," a paper by Frank Friedlander presented at the Leadership Workshop Conference, U.S. Military Academy, 25-27 June 1969.

less defined, and less stable.

Table III-3 outlines how Friedlander views the link between changing life styles and the increasingly complex tasks, as compared with the more traditional, bureaucratic organizational structure.²⁰ The arrow across the top of the Table shows that an increasingly organic structure is made necessary by the changing nature of tasks. Friedlander believes that the bureaucratic structure depicted in Table III-3 will fall far short of responding to implications of changing life styles, as well as being inadequate in terms of increasingly complex tasks. While there will still be a need, to some degree, for bureaucratic structures, the flexibility of employing organic structures will be needed more and more, as well.

Organizational Effectiveness in the Army

In response to the social and technological changes described in preceding paragraphs, the Army has begun to institutionalize an organizational effectiveness (OE) concept which draws heavily on the experience of industry over the past 20 years in organizational development (OD). The step was taken after 3 years of study and several pilot projects. Results showed that Army effectiveness could be enhanced by applying certain behavioral and management science skills and techniques.

Institutionalization of the program is proceeding toward an Army-wide capability through selection and training of organizational effectiveness staff officers, allocation of appropriate manpower authorizations, and an active education and information program. A new Army Regulation (AR 600-76), establishing program policies and objectives, already has been distributed throughout the Army.²¹

The Societal Environment

The military society is changing. Many of the pressures for change arise out of changes in the larger American society; some are peculiarly military in origin. Three of the most important areas of social change in the military community have been selected for addressal here: the military family and Blacks and women in the Army.

Other changes, not so prominent yet as the three selected, are likely to require increasing attention as time passes and deserve to be noted here. One is the possibility that more military families will be ones in which both spouses are on active duty; or in which the husband qualifies as a military dependent. Two changes involve single Army officers, who are becoming less willing to accept what they perceive to be the comparative inequity between the entitlements of a married

officer and a single one; and single Army officer parents, whose impact on unit readiness already has begun to be noted.

Another change which merits mention here is the steadily increasing size of the American Latino population, especially in certain areas of the country, and the special, bilingual implications that a larger military Latino population might involve.

The Military Family

"...[T]he family more than any other major social institution facilitates social change by adapting its activities and structure to the changing needs of other social institutions and to society at large."²² This probably is as true in the contemporary American military society as it is in the larger American society. A supportive, contented family life contributes importantly to a military member's effectiveness as a military member; a home life beset with problems and stresses, on the other hand, is a significant distraction. Beyond the question of effectiveness, it is likely that many military people have left the service because they are unable to arrive at a satisfactory family adjustment within the military environment. In short, the family is an increasingly important factor in the equation of the successful modern soldier.

This was not always so. In fact, the large numbers of married service people with children and the larger family size is a relatively recent military condition. When the 20th century began, very nearly the only married active duty people were older officers, and the numbers of these were insignificant. Since then, the Armed Forces have changed gradually from a population of mostly single people to a population who are mostly married. Moreover, officers have tended progressively to marry at an earlier age. By 1974, 83.1 percent of American Armed Forces officers were married, with 1.75 children per family. The children tend to be younger than their equivalents in the general population. The basic social unit for a large majority of military officers now is the family.

Life on Army posts in the early 1900's became somewhat less isolated because of the railroad and the automobile. Nevertheless life for the officer's family at these installations was hard. Living accommodations often were severely inadequate, and few posts provided even schools for the children. It was not until World War I that the first system of family allotments was initiated, for example, as a permanent Army service to officers' families. It was not until 1942 that these benefits were expanded to include monetary provisions for dependents and some obstetric care. Until the

relatively recent past, the Army was ambivalent with regard to any obligation toward the families of its officers. Some of that ambivalence may persist today.

As dramatic as some of the changes have been over the last century, certain of the significant stresses on the military family have remained unchanged. One of these is the frequent relocations, which are characteristic of military service. Much of the study conducted in the area of residential instability has been from the standpoint of mental health. It has been found that such mobility is particularly stressful for wives and for adolescent children. Adolescent children tend to place greater importance on their peer-group relationships than do younger children. Wives often are called upon to assume both parent roles during the separations associated with frequent moves, which tends to foster matriarchal family structures. "The military shares the dubious honor with a few other occupational groups and institutions of being a pioneer in the trend toward parental absence that has emerged in our society..."²³

Much has been written about the officer's wife; much has been written for her. In the latter category are the pamphlets which occasionally are provided to her to explain her role in furthering her husband's career. It soon becomes clear to her, whether or not she intended to do so, that she embarked upon a career at the same time her husband began his. Although the traditional life of the officer's wife is not without intrinsic reward, it is not an easy one.

Ellwyn R. Stoddard and Claude E. Cabanillas conducted a study of the social stresses encountered by the Army officer's wife and made the following observation early in their study report: "...[T]he expectations of their [wives] involvement in the officers' careers are based on the pre-World War II codes, which were mostly applicable to senior officers, who were the only ones to enjoy an on-base family."²⁴

Stoddard's and Cabanillas' research was conducted between 1972 and 1975 at two major Southwest military posts. Employing focused interviews, data were obtained from 50 permanent party officers' wives. Findings showed that an Army officer's wife experiences a continuously increasing level of role stresses throughout the first half or so of the husband's career. Then, depending on the perceived future career opportunities open to the husband, the role stresses may continue to increase or diminish. Events which forestall future opportunities or decisions to retire are accompanied by a marked and rapid decrease in role stresses.

Another of Stoddard's and Cabanillas' observations merits attention here:

...[C]radually the instability of marriages and family disintegration so very evident in civilian life is becoming common to military personnel as well. In addition to this, the growing influence of the Women's Liberation Movement in trying to destroy the demeaning female stereotypes of the past and give a new positive image of independence and self-respect is not lost on many officers' wives, who review their own circumstances in the light of this new perspective. It could well be that the future strains within the Army's organization will not be those of race, ethnicity, and sex integration of military personnel on the job, but rather those developing in the homes of military personnel between husbands and wives.²⁵

In the present and increasingly in the future, the manner in which officers' wives are encouraged to define their respective, individual roles in the Army community will have a profound effect on the commitment of their Army officer husbands, as well as on their own. Certainly, there will continue to be those women who choose to share their husbands' careers in the traditional manner. Innovative ways to permit such traditional participation to present personally rewarding and stimulating challenges to these women will be needed. There will be an increasing number of women, also, who will prefer to pursue careers of their own, without being divorced totally from the camaraderie and sense of community which Army life can offer. For these women, an environment which does not impose social demands impossible for them to meet and which implies no recrimination, either for them or for their husbands, likewise will be needed. The life of an Army wife is no longer the reflection of the life her husband has chosen; it is one she chooses for herself.

In terms of the total military family, intensifying specialization of the officer, increasing scarcity of funds to pay for relocation, and the military advantages of decreased personnel turbulence argue for fewer and less disruptive family moves. Greater residential stability would reduce the stress on the military family, as well. The time well may have come to bring these competing considerations to a mutually beneficial accommodation by reducing the number of military family moves.

Blacks in the Army

Military service of American Blacks extends back almost three and one-half centuries.²⁶ Blacks have fought in every American war except for the one fought with Mexico and including all the colonial wars. They were included in organized recruiting efforts during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil War; although

during and following the latter war, Black soldiers were assigned only to segregated units.²⁷

Blacks responded enthusiastically to draft calls during both World Wars, but it was the prospect of their resistance against a new draft law following World War II which prompted desegregation of the Armed Forces. Facing a hotly contested presidential election, in which the Black vote was critical, and the threat of Black non-violent disobedience of the newly enacted Selective Service Law, President Harry S. Truman desegregated the Armed Forces by executive order in 1948.²⁸

In the Army's case, integration was resisted strongly by its uniformed and civilian leaders until practical necessity for troops to replace Korean War casualties in the front lines forced integration of many of the Army's combat units by late 1951. "By the end of 1954 segregation had been officially eliminated from the internal structure of the active military forces..."²⁹

"...[T]he Army's greatest sin, during the 1960's, was probably one of complacency rather than the actual fostering of discriminatory practices."³⁰ By this time, the Army was committed officially as an organization to equal opportunity for Blacks, but its efforts were decentralized, mostly crisis related, and often ineffective. This was complicated by widespread racial unrest in the civilian population, which, not surprisingly, became manifest in the Army.

In 1969, the Army Chief of Staff ordered a "...detailed analysis of potential problems which could negate much of the Army's past accomplishments in racial harmony and impair its ability to accomplish missions..."³¹ Programs were to be developed to deal with problems identified by the assessment.

Out of this analysis grew the Army's Race Relations and Equal Opportunity Program, as it has evolved until the present. The newest tools of the program are the Department of the Army Affirmative Actions Plan, approved by the Army Chief of Staff in June 1971; and the advent, in 1975, of annual, comprehensive assessments of all aspects of the plan. Directed at practices and conditions which contribute to racial discord within the Active Army and its Reserve Components, the plan outlined 128 actions to be taken and placed specific responsibilities for its implementation on commanders and supervisors at all levels.³²

Numbers of Blacks in the Army have increased markedly in the 1970's. The figures in Table III-4 illustrate.

Table III-4³³

Black Content of the Army

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>OFFICER</u> <u>%</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u> <u>%</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u> <u>%</u>
CY 1970	3.4	3.4	13.5
CY 1971	3.7	4.2	15.6
CY 1972	3.9	4.5	17.5
CY 1973	4.2	4.8	19.9
CY 1974	4.6	5.0	22.5
CY 1975	4.9	4.8	22.8
CY 1976	5.7	5.4	24.7
CY 1977	6.1	5.9	26.4

During this same timeframe, numbers of Black general officers and colonels, for example, increased from 1 and 71, respectively, in calendar year 1970, to 13 and 184, respectively, in calendar year 1977. Complete distribution figures follow:

Table III-5³⁴

Distribution of Black Officers by Grade

	<u>CY 70</u>	<u>CY 71</u>	<u>CY 72</u>	<u>CY 73</u>	<u>CY 74</u>	<u>CY 75</u>	<u>CY 76</u>	<u>CY 77</u>
GEN	1	3	9	12	12	13	12	13
COL	71	78	86	103	127	149	171	184
LTC	684	690	650	639	610	550	569	579
MAJ	1193	1084	1008	927	848	836	829	790
CPT	1628	1754	1500	1283	1448	1382	566	1663
1LT	734	599	519	488	565	624	765	855
2LT	332	210	247	475	483	672	926	1172

As impressive as a few of the figures are in Table III-5, the promotion situation for Blacks will require continued monitoring for some time to come. For example, selection rates for promotion to captain, Army of the United States, for Blacks lagged behind those for Whites by 7.8 percent in 1975, by 9.5 percent in 1976 and by 5.8 percent in 1977. For promotion to major, AUS, the Black selection rate exceeded the rate for Whites slightly in 1975 and 1976, but it fell behind again in 1977 by 17.4 percent. Selection rates to lieutenant colonel also were lower for Blacks than for Whites, while rates for the rank of colonel were slightly higher for Blacks, or about even.³⁵

Continuing attention will need to be paid to the overall number of Black officers, as well. As Table III-5 shows, steady improvement has been made in the numbers of Black lieutenants commissioned in recent years. However, the number of Black officers still falls short, proportionately, of what is needed to demonstrate to a growing Black enlisted population that the Army offers a career of equal opportunity to all races.

The Strategic Studies Institute predicts that, while there will be a decline of 21 percent of the 18 to 24 year age group of all races by 1995, Blacks and other minority races of the same ages will remain stable at about 4.5 million persons. Thus, the Black and other minority proportion of the population 18 to 24 years of age will grow from 15 percent in 1980 to 19.3 percent in 1995.³⁶ One might infer from that prediction that the proportion of Black enlisted members can be expected to remain at least as high as it is now, or increase somewhat. In either case, the requirement for Black officers in proportional numbers to the Black enlisted population is likely to remain a high priority through 1995.

Women in the Army

Women first began serving with the Armed Forces in a uniformed capacity when the Army Nurse Corps was established in 1901, although they served then without full military status, equal pay, or equal benefits. In World War II, a turning point was reached in participation of women with the Armed Forces, when about 350,000 women (officer and enlisted) served in the four services.³⁷ In December 1944, for example, members of the Women's Army Corps numbered 90,191 (5,852 commissioned and 26 warrant officers, and 84,313 enlisted women),³⁸ slightly less than the total strength figure projected for all Army women in 1983 (90,548).³⁹

As a result of the 1948 Women's Armed Services Integration Act, women were provided Regular status, and the following strength ceilings were adopted: Enlisted women would not exceed 2 percent of total enlisted strength and women officers (excluding nurses) would not exceed 10 percent of the number of enlisted women.⁴⁰

November 1967 marked enactment of legislation (PL 90-130) which made several significant changes in the status of military women. Statutory limitations were removed which resulted in permitting women officers to hold permanent ranks up through colonel (captain) and to achieve general (flag) officer status. The law also removed length of service restrictions which had dictated earlier mandatory retirement for women, as well as the 1948 strength ceiling.⁴¹

Army women were the first to achieve general officer rank as a result of PL 90-130. The Director, Women's Army Corps and the Chief, Army Nurse Corps were promoted to brigadier general on 11 June 1970.⁴² Currently, there are two women general (flag) officers each in the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and one in the Marine Corps. Of these services, however, only the Army has yet to select a woman for promotion to general officer status through the promotion board process.⁴³

Utilization of women Army officers has diversified greatly since the early 1970's. All commissioned officer specialty codes are now open to women except 11 (Infantry) and 12 (Armor), and only five specialty skill identifiers and one additional skill identifier remain closed to them: Cannon Field Artillery; Short Range Air Defense Artillery; Combat Aviation Officer (women may have this specialty, but may not be assigned to pilot a helicopter in an attack role); Combat Engineer and Unconventional Warfare Officer (SSI); and Aerial Scout (ASI). For the warrant officer military occupational specialties, only the Attack Helicopter Pilot and Short Range Air Defense System Technician MOS are closed to women.⁴⁴ Further liberalization in this area will require statutory change and the change of certain Army policies. The root of the issue, of course, is whether or not women should be engaged in combat.

The decision to increase the number of women in the Army and to expand their utilization in a variety of career specialties was a direct consequence of the decision in the early 1970's to end the draft. It was clear almost from the outset of the volunteer Army that strength goals would not be reached without a much greater use of the large population of qualified women in the labor force of the private sector. Liberalizing trends already underway in the general society relative to suitable roles for women played a part in Army thinking, but the primary factor in increasing the number of Army women was Army need.

Department of the Army projections indicate that women officers will comprise 10 percent of the Army commissioned officer strength and 7.7 percent of the Army warrant officer strength by 1983.⁴⁵ These figures are in marked contrast to 4.4 percent for women commissioned and .05 percent for women warrant officers in 1970,⁴⁶ and are reflective of a dramatic shift in Army thinking about the utilization of women in its uniformed ranks.

Even more dramatic, however, are predictions by the Strategic Studies Institute that "...The observed trend toward increased female participation in the military will stabilize [in the 1985-1990 timeframe] at approximately 20 percent of the force, and combat roles will be opened to women."⁴⁷ The SSI prediction is prompted, in part, by their projection that the 18 to 24 year age group will decline in numbers by 21 percent from 1980 through 1995.⁴⁸ Thus, women probably will be needed even more by the Army.

Implications

Changes in the contemporary Army environment have significant implications for the Army's future on two levels:

- First, the sheer weight of the number and substance of the changes, cumulatively, implies an inexorable dynamism which is somewhat awesome in its own right.

- Second, the changes, individually, imply effects in the long term which may influence the fundamental character of the Army itself.

Each of these levels of implication merits separate discussion.

Cumulative Effect

Changes occurring in the military environment today have the cumulative effect of rendering unfamiliar many of the previously familiar aspects of the character of the Army institution. As commonplace as such an observation may seem, it is important to the subject of officer commitment.

To speak of being committed to an unfamiliar organization is a contradiction in terms. The organization must be known to the individual member--he must have "learned its ropes," have found compatibility with its values, have identified personally with it--before he can or will commit himself to it. The net effect of pervasive, protracted fundamental change within an organization is that there is little of the familiar, the predictable, about the organization to which its members can attach their commitment.

In the case of the Army, the theory is perhaps more extreme than the reality. Nevertheless, change is relatively pervasive in the Army today, much of it fundamental; and this state of flux probably will not subside for some time to come. Yet, there are institutional characteristics which must remain immutable, if the

Army is to survive as an effective servant of the American people. These same immutable characteristics are necessary to the Army officer corps as its focus and as a basis to which individual commitment of its members may be attached. In the profession of arms, there must be, then, the exquisite tension between those characteristics of the Army which change to remain current and those characteristics of the Army institution which endure unchanged.

Among the characteristics which must endure are the following:

- A clear sense of purpose and direction for the Army and its work.
- The unconditional obligation of the Army officer to serve his Nation and its people.
- Adherence to high and explicit standards of performance by each Army officer, so that he serves dependably and well.
- Adherence to an explicit body of professional ethics, which is reflective of, and fitting for, the American Judeo-Christian ethic and the national moral heritage.

Unfortunately, none of the foregoing four characteristics has been addressed by the Army for its officer corps in clear, comprehensive, explicit terms; and therein lies the dilemma. At a time perhaps unique in Army history, when pervasive, protracted fundamental change is coming to be viewed as a spreading institutional sickness by many Army officers, those enduring precepts to which they should cling are without clarity for many and without substance for some.

Individual Effects

In the Army officer's contemporary professional environment, probably the three most potentially debilitating issues today are the trend toward fragmentation of the officer corps; the perceived increasingly "occupation-orientation" of Army life and work; and the perceived inadequacy of the Army's unwritten ethical code.

In the first instance, the section on "Professional Pluralism" earlier in this chapter offers one approach toward enhancing the professional cohesion of the officer corps. Whether or not it proves to be a correct approach, other contributing approaches must be explored, as well. A new, contemporary basis for the professional brotherhood of Army officers must be found, which recognizes and accommodates contemporary realities.

Similarly, new philosophical reinforcements are needed for the Army career as a "calling," rather than an occupation. Unfortunately,

little organized thought has been given by Army officers to this issue, except nostalgic yearnings for the "good old days." Those days, if they ever existed, are gone forever. Young officers, in particular, will benefit from some clear and profound thinking in this area. They have few ties to the past and little recollection of those "good old days."

In the case of military professional ethics, the Army, surprisingly and notwithstanding the ethical trauma of recent years, continues to suffer the lack of an articulated Army code and ethical system. If the climate for ethical decisions seemed cloudy in the past, there is little likelihood for more clarity in the future. The Army is too big and too complex; its mission too critical to national survival; and the times too unprecedented in American history; to place vague reliance on an implicit, three-word code which is neither universally accepted nor uniformly understood by Army officers.

In the Army officer's work environment, changing values and increasingly complex tasks already have signalled the need for new management styles, less structured task activities, and more flexible organizational structures. In partial response, the Army is embarked upon an organization effectiveness program which increasingly is being applied throughout the Army. What these trends foretell for the battlefield environment still is being sorted out, as Army officers gain increased experience with new techniques. It is clear, however, that unequivocally autocratic leadership and management methods have lost their utility, as a practical matter.

In the societal environment, the issue of most profound implication confronting the Army today is the extent to which women are to be employed throughout its structure. Other issues of equal importance--full integration of racial and ethnic minorities, recognition of the military family as an essential element in the equation of officer effectiveness, and others--require careful, balanced, and continuing emphasis. But of them all, only the issue of women soldiers flies so thoroughly in the face of classic Western societal norms. Two contending philosophies are at the crux of the controversy: On one side, are traditional and strongly-held, cultural values which define the role of armed national defender solely in terms of men. On the other, rising expectations of women contend that anything short of full integration into society of them as a group diminishes each of them individually as a person. When the consideration of Army personnel requirements is added to the controversy, it defies quiet, reasoned resolution even more.

The purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the complexity and pervasiveness of change within the Army today and its potential impact on officer commitment. In the final analysis, the thread missing

through it all is the thread of transition. Transition implies movement from one state or condition to another. To Army officers, not knowing what the Army, both as an institution and as a profession, eventually will be like probably is the most disquieting issue of all.

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CHAPTER IV. ASSESSING THE STATE OF OFFICER COMMITMENT IN THE ARMY TODAY

For the purposes of this paper, commitment is defined as the state of being bound emotionally and intellectually to pursue, through striving for the highest standards of performance possible, a certain course or goal.

As Chapter I indicated, when the term commitment is applied to Army Officers, and the perspective with which they view their Army service, commitment represents more than passive loyalty to the Army. If committed to his Service, the Army officer will demonstrate--

- a strong desire to remain a part of the Army;
- a willingness to exert high levels of effort on behalf of the Army;
- a definite belief in, and acceptance of, the basic values and goals of the Army (while still being willing to criticize and question specific actions of the Army when necessary); and
- a deep concern about the fate of the Army.

It is useful here, also, to recall that portion of Chapter I which pointed out that all experiences in the life and work of an Army officer have an effect on the commitment of that officer. Axiomatically, the stronger the commitment, the more it needs nourishment; the more susceptible it is to being undermined. This is particularly true in the case of the highly effective officer, whose continued, strong commitment is so important to the Army. The very characteristics and talents and dedication which, in combination, result in his effectiveness also are those which cause him to expect as much of the Army as he expects of himself.

It is a reasonable assumption that most people who accept Army commissions or warrants do so because they see an Army future which is compatible with the future images they have of themselves. The potential for commitment of these people tends to be high from the start. Their commitment tends to become real if or when their expectations of compatibility are confirmed. Each experience along the way will tend to build the confirmation--or the reverse.

So, with the foregoing in mind and to the extent possible, Chapter IV provides a general assessment of the state of officer commitment in the Army today.

Situation

Two points need to be made at the outset of this discussion.

- At present, there is no valid way of knowing what is the state of Army officer commitment in 1978.

- In the absence of valid information to the contrary, it should be assumed that there is cause for concern relative to the state of Army officer commitment in 1978.

Why No Way of Knowing?

Why is there no valid way, presently, to know what is the state of Army officer commitment in 1978? The first, and perhaps most important, reason is that the area of organizational commitment is one which social scientists seem to have ignored until relatively recently. Perhaps other aspects of human behavior have been given higher priority; or, perhaps few researchers have found valid ways to address commitment scientifically. Whatever the reason, applicable scholarly writing and studies are difficult to find.

Lyman W. Porter points out that available social science evidence provides little meaningful guidance about how commitment does or does not develop over time. He also observes that, while there has been some commitment research by Guildner, Glaser, and others, most of it focuses on particular types of employees.¹ The Army Research Institute, for example, sponsored construction of an ROTC/Army career commitment model, which is enlightening about some of the characteristics of commitment growth among junior officers. While the model is not a measurement or assessment tool, it may offer some scientific basis for further research in the assessment area.²

The second reason why there is no valid way, presently, to know what is the state of Army officer commitment in 1978 is that there is no institutionalized Army system designed to make routine, scientifically valid assessments in the area of officer commitment. The relative lack of research on which to base such a system certainly helps to explain why there is no system. But another, partial explanation may be the unfortunate traditional tendency of large organizations, such as the Army, to react on a continuing basis—to crisis-manage—until the evidence of need to routinize becomes overwhelming.

Why Assume Concern?

The following discussion addresses the second point made in the introduction to the "situation" section of this chapter: In the

absence of valid information to the contrary, why should it be assumed that there is cause for concern relative to the state of Army officer commitment in 1978? Because to do otherwise would involve unreasonable risk.

First, it is useful to remember that it is the very capable officer whose commitment is most important to the Army. His expectations for himself and for the Army are high; and, in some personally perceived way, the Army must succeed--and he must have contributed to the Army's "success"--before he can succeed.

He probably is a well-educated officer by most frames of reference. Research findings described elsewhere in this paper suggest that, the younger the individual and the higher his education level, the more reluctant he is to give up control over his personal life and the more he wants to avoid entangling bureaucracy, all other variables held constant. The point being illustrated here is that commitment of the very capable officer can not be assumed even in the "best of all possible worlds."

That caution introduces the second point: Realizing that today's times fall somewhat short of qualifying as "the best of all possible worlds," how may these times be described? Is there a second caution arising out of certain contemporary conditions in the officer's environment? It probably would be unwise to assume an answer other than "yes."

Consider a few examples alluded to in earlier chapters of the relative instability of contemporary conditions: The general disquiet in society today and the apparent shifts in values and life styles; the changes in the military professional environment and the serious concern as to the efficacy of professional ethics in the Army; pressures on the military family and signs of changing expectations of military wives; rising expectations of minorities and women; and the changing work environment.

There are other signs. The "erosion of benefits" issue and the continuing pressure on the Army to do more with less, perhaps beyond the point where the conscientious officer believes he has sufficient resources and time to do a good job. The steadily increasing complexity of almost everything having to do with the Army. The average officer cannot help but wonder on occasion whether or not the Army remains in control of its affairs.

Another sign:

The typical organization member [today], all other things being equal, is likely to exhibit de-creased commitment to any single organization. There would seem to be no escape from the fact that

naturally-occurring events in the larger society--over which the organization has little or no control--will result in the loosening of ties between individuals and organizations...³

In sum, it would be unwise to assume other than that there is cause for concern relative to the state of Army officer commitment in 1978.

Some Research Findings

The Officer Education and Training Survey

The Officer Education and Training Survey, a questionnaire survey, was mailed by RETO to a random sample of commissioned and warrant officers in November 1977. Of the approximately 14,500 commissioned and 3,200 warrant officers receiving the survey, 7,800 commissioned and 1,500 warrant officers responded. In addition to completion of the question portion of the survey, respondents were afforded opportunity to comment narratively, as well. About 2,400 commissioned and 1,100 warrant officers provided narrative comments. Although the survey was not designed to assess officer commitment, the following results of categorizing and summarizing a random sample of officer comments (300 commissioned and 200 warrant) provide limited perspective in the commitment area.

- Satisfaction with and Commitment to the Army.

(a) Within this category, 22 percent of the commissioned responses included a comment concerning commitment to the Army. Of this group, more than half (56%) were evaluated as "individual-oriented," rather than oriented to the Army. Among the warrant officers, only 12 percent included a comment relative to their commitment, and 70 percent of these were "individual-oriented."

(b) Responses also were classified in terms of the level of frustration, as evidenced by the open-ended responses. Nineteen percent of the commissioned officers responded on this dimension, and 69 percent of those reflected either frustrated and critical attitudes, or completely frustrated attitudes, toward the Army career system. Only 8 percent did not appear critical. Ten percent of the warrant officers were coded as frustrated.

(c) The data were analyzed in terms of the respondent's view of the Army's organizational structure (the Army viewed as a corporation contrasted to a fraternal organization). Nineteen percent of the commissioned officers responded in this manner. Of this group, 81 percent commented on the corporate features of the Army that they disliked. Although fewer warrant officers included such a comment (9%), the proportion expressing dislike of the corporate features was very similar. Very few commissioned officers (4.5%) commented about the quality of leadership and supervision that they had experienced, but those who did respond were overwhelmingly negative. Even fewer warrant officers commented on this point, and again the comments were mainly negative.

● Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS).

(a) Responses concerning OPMS were coded for comments about goals, implementation, objectives, system focus, and rewards. Seventeen percent of the commissioned officers made a comment concerning the relationship between OPMS goals and the system as it is implemented; 94 percent of them felt that the system does not support the goals. Ten percent of the commissioned officers commented about the focus of the OPMS system, and the responses are split as to whether the system is too generalized or too specialized. Sixty-two percent of the commissioned officers thought that the system is too generalized. Many respondents (15%) criticized the OPMS for rewarding "yes" men and "ticket punching."

● Career Progression Inequities

(a) Four types of career progression complaints surfaced in the responses to the open-ended question. These concerned promotions, selection for schools, OER, and the opportunity to attend graduate school. The response frequencies were:

	<u>Commissioned Officers</u>	<u>Warrant Officers</u>
Promotions	17.5%	12.1%
School Selection	11.2%	10.0%
OER	9.2%	4.7%
Graduate School Opportunity	6.5%	0.8%

(b) Complaints in the promotion category produced significant objection to the "up or out" requirement; in the Army schools category, the opinion that selection was a

"ticket punch" rather than a verified requirement; OER as inadequate vehicles for the administrative weight they attain; and graduate school as poorly correlated with defined Army needs, rather, as opportunity for post-Army career.

• Assignment/Counseling.

(a) In general, both the commissioned and warrant officer comments showed a very small percentage that felt that progression opportunities were hurt because of specialties that hampered promotion. A very small percentage commented about administrative slippage in assignments. However, 19.5 percent of the commissioned and 20.5 percent of the warrant officers commented about assignment/counseling policies, and, in both groups, the comments were overwhelmingly negative. Of those who commented, 93 percent of the commissioned and 97 percent of the warrant officers said that the policies were poor.

(b) In terms of the execution of the assignment/counseling system, 17 percent of the commissioned and 21 percent of the warrant officers were found to have comment. Again the trend is that most respondents--99 percent of the commissioned and 100 percent of the warrant officers--had a complaint about the execution of the system. Very few responses indicated a complaint about personnel in the assignment counseling system. Six and two-tenths percent of the commissioned and 3.4 percent of the warrant officers indicated negative experience with counseling personnel. Even fewer responses indicated that poor information about their career had been received.

• Training.

(a) The most obvious conclusion concerning training is that there is not enough of it. Ten and five-tenths percent of the commissioned and 21 percent of the warrant officers said that they needed more training. Some responses concerned the training that they had received in military schools. Eleven percent of the commissioned and 6 percent of the warrant officers made comments relative to the amount of specialization apparent in the training that they had undergone. Sixty-nine percent of the officers thought that the training should be more specialized, while the percentage for the warrant officers was even higher (91%).

(b) Of those commissioned and warrant officers who commented about on-the-job training (8% of the commissioned and 7% of the warrant officers), most wanted more on-the-job training (OJT). Although relatively few responses included a comparison between Army training and OJT, those that made such comparisons felt that OJT was of more utility.

(c) A number of responses indicated that they had not used their training in their job. Eight and seven-tenths percent of the commissioned and 7.4 percent of the warrant officers made this comment. Although most responses were not directed toward the timeliness of Army training, 7.0 percent of the commissioned and 6.6 percent of the warrant officers felt that training was offered to them either too early or too late in their career. A common suggestion from the warrant officers was for a specific orientation program at the time of appointment, and more frequent military school training.

● Civilian Education.

Eighteen percent of both commissioned and warrant officers commented on the value of civilian education. Nearly 64 percent of the commissioned and 83 percent of the warrant officers considered civilian education valuable. However, while accepting the value of the education, these respondents felt the emphasis placed on civilian education was overstressed for promotion purposes. Comments from 12 percent of commissioned and a similar percentage from warrant officers revealed a difference of opinion. For example, of the commissioned officers responding, 68 percent felt civilian education was overemphasized, while only 38 percent of the warrant officers thought civilian education was overemphasized. Many of the warrant officers who felt civilian education was underemphasized felt the Army should offer encouragement to complete a bachelor degree. Some commissioned officers specified that the issue was not whether there should be more education, but how to find time in their long and exhausting work schedule that could be spared for either resident or nonresident educational purposes. Several recommended strongly that a regular time be set aside, perhaps on a monthly basis, for professional growth. During this time, officers would have the opportunity to discuss their mutual problems with each other, and to learn how to deal with them better.

- Specific Warrant Officer Reactions.

A number of comments specific to warrant officers were coded only for them. Nine percent mentioned that they thought that their assignment is inconsistent with their rank. Five percent felt that a secondary MOS assignment degrades their primary skill. Some (8.2%) complained that they are not always viewed as a "real" officer, and 6.8 percent said that there is too little distinction between the warrant officer ranks.

- Contingency Table Analysis.

(a) In order to assess relationships between some of the comments, contingency tables were constructed to investigate whether some remarks were related to others. It was hypothesized that remarks in different specific areas were made by the same individuals. For instance, it was discovered that most (87.5%) of the "individual-oriented" officers also responded about the "bad corporate" features of the Army. Although most of the complaints about promotions were made by the "individual-oriented," the percentage is not that high (62%), while school selection complaints showed a slightly lower percentage (61%). But in respect to complaints about the opportunity to attend graduate school, 83 percent of those complaints come from the "individual-oriented," rather than from Army-oriented respondents.

(b) The same type of analysis was done comparing those who thought the assignment/counseling system policies are good with those who thought they are bad. Looking at those who thought that OPMS objectives should be changed, contingency table analyses revealed that 98 percent of those who thought OPMS objectives should be changed also thought that the assignment/counseling policies were poor. Such a relationship is not presented as a "surprise" finding, but confirmatory of the criticism of OPMS. This same group also represented 93 percent of those who complained about the timeliness of Army school selection. Those who complained about the timeliness of Army schooling also tended to think that the corporate features of the Army are bad. And those who thought that Army schooling was not timely also said that they did not use their training in their job.

(c) Contingency table analysis revealed that those who said that the assignment/counseling policies were poor also said that implementation of OPMS is not

supportive of its goals.

• Conclusions.

(a) Through the Officer Education and Training Survey, a representative sample of commissioned officers and warrant officers were given an opportunity to express their feelings and concerns about some key issues in their military career. Thirty-one percent of the officers commented about those topics on which they felt strongly. The majority of the comments could be classified as critical of some aspect of the Army system of education and training, but less than twenty percent expressed overall dissatisfaction with the Army.

(b) Interpretation of these data, together with the conclusions, should be tempered by the knowledge that what was analyzed was an open-ended question that solicited (1) an expansion or explanation of previous answers, or (2) comments about things not asked in the questionnaire. Many were one of a kind and, therefore, meaningless for tabulation purposes. Additionally, there is no way to know the feelings of the 59 percent who offered no comments on the questionnaires they returned or of the group (almost half) who did not return the questionnaire they received.

(c) The questionnaire itself generated comments from 18 percent of the commissioned officers and nearly that percentage of the warrant officers. Although 26 percent of the officer respondents stipulated that the questionnaire was useful, it should not surprise anyone that most of the other comments were negative. This type of question, at the end of the questionnaire, probing a sensitive area of social experience, is bound to draw negative responses. Therefore, one generalization which may be made from this analysis is that most areas of responses--OPMS, training, education, etc.--were mentioned by about 40 percent of those who responded with comments, and represented less than 20 percent of the questionnaires returned.

(d) Of the seven broad categories of career concerns, the areas that are mentioned most frequently are OPMS and the assignment/counseling system. Many warrant officers said that more training is desirable. Civilian education is thought to be valuable; but the commissioned officers felt that civilian education should not have quite as much emphasis placed on it, and the warrant officers felt they need more than the system allows. A very small proportion (3% commissioned,

1.6% warrant officers) mentioned that they planned to leave the military.

The following tables and paragraphs, to the extent possible, elaborate on some of the foregoing findings, employing responses to the questionnaire (coded) portion of the Officer Education and Training Survey.

TABLE IV-1-A							
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)							
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Primary Specialty							
(Percent Dissatisfied)							
	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)
Chosen	13	11	7	5	5	2	7
Given	12	10	7	5	5	3	7

TABLE IV-1-B					
Warrant Officers					
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Primary MOS					
(Percent Dissatisfied)					
	WO1 (%)	CW2 (%)	CW3 (%)	CW4 (%)	ALL (%)
Chosen	8	10	6	3	7
Given	1	5	5	4	4

Tables IV-1-A and B show the proportion of respondents at each rank who indicate dissatisfaction with primary specialty or MOS, whether voluntarily or involuntarily assigned. It can be seen, in the case of commissioned officers, that the higher the rank, the higher the level of satisfaction. This also is somewhat apparent in the case of warrant officers, except for the WO2 anomaly. Whether or not the primary specialty or MOS was voluntarily assigned appears to make little difference in the commissioned officer responses, whereas some difference can

be seen for the warrant officers.

Of the small number of warrant officer respondents who indicated dissatisfaction with their primary designation, the less satisfied are the aviation group. Eighteen percent of the aviation group, compared to eight percent of the nonaviation group, said that they were dissatisfied with their primary MOS, regardless of how it was assigned.

TABLE IV-2-A						
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)						
Primary Specialty Training Opportunities						
(Percent "yes, adequate")						
2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)
52	63	72	73	76	83	71

TABLE IV-2-B				
Warrant Officers				
Primary MOS Training Opportunities				
(Percent "Yes, adequate")				
WO1 (%)	CW2 (%)	CW3 (%)	CW4 (%)	ALL (%)
37	46	46	60	48

Tables IV-2-A and B provide a distribution of responses by rank to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are adequate training opportunities available so that you can become competently trained in your primary specialty/MOS?" With both commissioned and warrant officers, the percentage of "yes" answers increases with rank. For commissioned officers, the range of "unsure" responses shows a high for second lieutenants (14%) and a low for colonels (4%). Similarly, the lowest proportion of "no" replies comes from colonels (4%), with the greatest proportion coming from second lieutenants (33%).

Among aviation warrant officer respondents, there is almost a perfect numerical split between those who agreed that adequate training opportunities are available for each MOS and those who either disagreed or were uncertain. Aviation warrant officers were more likely than the nonaviation group to answer in the affirmative (53% to 43%), while nonaviation warrants assumed a more negative posture (36% to 26%). The same proportion in each group (20%) said they were uncertain.

TABLE IV-3-A							
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)							
Estimate of Primary Specialty Professional Development							
Response	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)
Well prepared	25	39	53	59	66	75	55
Somewhat prepared	55	46	38	34	28	21	36
Somewhat unprepared	15	11	6	5	5	4	7
Not prepared at all	6	5	3	1	1	1	3

TABLE IV-3-B					
Warrant Officers					
Estimate of Primary MOS Professional Development					
Response	WO1 (%)	CW2 (%)	CW3 (%)	CW4 (%)	ALL (%)
Well prepared	52	69	86	93	75
Somewhat prepared	41	29	12	6	22
Somewhat unprepared	6	2	1	1	2
Not prepared at all	1	1	1	1	1

Tables IV-3-A and B show the distribution of responses to a question which asks respondents to estimate the present level of their professional development in their primary specialty/MOS. The majority of commissioned officers believed they are well-prepared at their present level of professional development. Nine out of ten commissioned respondents believed they are either well-prepared (55%) or somewhat prepared (36%). Comparison by rank indicates that the higher the rank, the more positive the evaluation. Three times as many colonels (75%) as second lieutenants (25%) selected the "well-prepared" judgment. Similarly, commissioned officers of lower ranks were much more inclined to judge their level of professional development as being in the "somewhat prepared" category. Only one out of 10 (10%) of all commissioned officers felt that they were either somewhat or not prepared at all in their primary specialty.

Ninety-seven percent of warrant officers responding believed themselves to be well or somewhat prepared in their primary MOS at their present level of professional development. As with commissioned respondents, the higher the rank, the more positive the evaluation in the case of the "well-prepared" response. No significant differences in response were found between the aviation and nonaviation groups.

TABLE IV-4-A							
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)							
Current Assignment							
Current Assignment	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)
Matches primary specialty training	61	61	40	28	24	26	37
Matches neither previous experience nor specialty training	23	22	21	20	20	15	21
Matches previous experience, not specialty training	6	10	15	18	31	40	19
Matches alternate specialty training	3	4	13	23	21	15	15
Student, patient, in transit	6	3	11	11	4	3	8

TABLE IV-4-B					
Warrant Officers					
Current Assignment					
<u>Current Assignment</u>	<u>WO1 (%)</u>	<u>CW2 (%)</u>	<u>CW3 (%)</u>	<u>CW4 (%)</u>	<u>ALL (%)</u>
Matches previous experience and MOS training	34	33	34	38	36
Matches primary MOS training	41	34	27	15	30
Matches previous experience, not MOS training	11	8	10	9	9
Serving in a commissioned officer position	4	7	9	12	8
Matches neither previous experience nor specialty training	5	7	8	7	7
Matches additional MOS training	2	7	7	5	6
Student, patient, in transit	4	4	3	3	4

Tables IV-4-A and B provide responses by rank to the question: "Which statement best describes your current assignment?" In most instances of commissioned officers, there is not a positive fit between primary specialty training and current assignment. When both primary and alternate specialties are considered, however, there is a positive fit in a majority of assignments (52%). Not surprisingly, as commissioned officers rise in rank, there is a steady and marked decline in the fit between primary specialty training and current assignment (61% of the lieutenants and about 26% of the colonels). There is somewhat of a corresponding increase in the fit between alternate specialty and assignments as ranks increase, although it drops significantly for colonels.

A similar trend is found when the question asked deals with the fit between primary specialty training and assignment immediately preceding the current assignment. One-third of all commissioned officers (33%) reported that the previous assignment matched primary specialty training; 14 percent said that the previous assignment matched neither training nor experience; 12 percent noted that the previous assignment matched experience, but not training; and the remainder (11%), felt that the previous assignment did match alternate specialty training. (Remaining respondents selected the transient, patient, student response.)

Two-thirds of the warrant officers believed that their current duty assignment matched either their primary MOS training (30%) or their previous experience and MOS training (36%). Only seven percent believed that there was no fit between current assignment and previous experience and MOS training.

Two differences of limited magnitude exist: First, nonaviation warrants, more so than aviation warrants, rated the fit between previous experience/MOS training and current duty position as being appropriate (34% to 29%). Conversely, aviation respondents, more so than nonaviation respondents, saw a positive relationship between additional MOS training and current duty position (13% to 3%).

The following paragraphs reflect certain officer expectations, as recorded by the Officer Education and Training Survey.

TABLE IV-5-A						
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)						
Rank Expectations						
Expected Rank	Current Rank					
	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)
Major	13	10	14	14	-	-
Lieutenant Colonel	25	28	39	42	36	-
Colonel	37	35	32	35	54	78
General Officer	25	28	15	9	10	22

TABLE IV-5-B				
Warrant Officers				
Rank Expectations				
Expected Rank	Current Rank			
	CO1 (%)	CW2 (%)	CW3 (%)	CW4 (%)
CW2	8	14	-	-
CW3	26	26	22	-
CW4	66	61	78	100

Tables IV-5-A and B show relationships between current rank and the highest rank respondents expect to attain, given normal career progression. The majority of commissioned officers (56%) expected to attain the rank of colonel or general officer. A little less than one-fourth of all lieutenants expect to attain general officer status.

A major contrast between aviation and nonaviation warrant respondents is found when rank expectations are examined. More than eight out of ten (85%) of the aviation group expect to achieve the CW4 rank. Such is the case for only two-thirds (66%) of the nonaviation group. Almost twice as many of the nonaviation group (25%) expect to achieve the CW3 level, as compared to 13% of the aviation group.

Tables IV-6-A and B show responses by rank to the question "Do you plan to make the Army a career (that is, 20 or more years)?" Seven percent of all commissioned respondents answered with some degree of certainty that they do not plan to make the Army a career. Another 13 percent have yet to make a definite career decision. The large majority (80%) expect to make the Army their career. As would be expected, the lower the rank of the commissioned officer, the more likely a "no-decision" response. It is of some note that more than one in ten (13%) of all company grade respondents indicated that they do not plan an Army career; 25 percent of all field grade respondents stated that they plan to retire at 20 years.

Among warrant officer respondents, those in aviation MOS were somewhat more likely to report that either they do not plan on making the Army a career or that they are uncertain of their future career plans. Combining those who said that they do plan on making the Army a career, but are undecided

TABLE IV-6-A							
Commissioned Officers (OPMS)							
Career Expectations							
<u>Response</u>	<u>2LT</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>1LT</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>CPT</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>MAJ</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>LTC</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>COL</u> <u>(%)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>(%)</u>
Yes, but undecided when I will retire	20	21	30	34	30	14	28
Yes, plan (or will be required) to retire at 20 years	7	9	30	38	18	1	24
Yes, plan to retire after 26 years or more	7	8	8	10	22	76	16
Have made no career decision	40	39	16	1	-	-	13
Yes, plan to retire after more than 20, but less than 26 years	3	3	6	16	29	8	12
No, do not plan an Army career	22	21	9	2	-	-	7

TABLE IV-6-B					
Warrant Officers					
Career Expectations					
Response	WO1 (%)	CW2 (%)	CW3 (%)	CW4 (%)	ALL (%)
Yes, but undecided when to retire	42	33	23	21	29
Yes, plan to retire after 26 years or more	15	18	34	59	28
Yes, plan to retire at 20 years	11	25	23	5	19
Yes, plan to retire after more than 20 but less than 26 years	18	16	19	15	17
Have made no career decision	14	7	1	-	5
No, do not plan an Army career	2	2	-	1	1

as to when they will retire; those who have not made a decision; and those who do not plan on making the Army a career; the following differences are noted: aviation: 43 percent; nonaviation: 32 percent.

Although only seven percent of commissioned and one percent of warrant officers responded that they do not intend to make the Army their career, 24 percent (commissioned) and 19 percent (warrant) of the two groups, respectively, indicate that they do not intend to stay in the Army beyond 20 years of service.

Other Army-wide Information

The data in Table IV-7 was gathered from three special, Army-wide surveys; the data in Table IV-8, from Army Quarterly Sample Surveys. Of particular note in the first table is that a significant number of responding officers believed that a military career has fewer favorable conditions than do most civilian careers. It should be remembered, however, that the most recent of these data are more than a year old. The second table shows a steadily declining rate of job satisfaction among those responding from February 1974 through August 1977.

TABLE IV-7							
Commissioned and Warrant Officers							
Favorableness of a Military Career							
Question: "Do you believe that a military career has more or fewer favorable conditions than most civilian careers?"							
"Fewer"	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)*
March 1976	33	43	40	40	35	33	39
August 1976	44	41	44	51	37	29	44
February 1977	44	41	43	48	38	32	42
(* Includes warrant, as well as commissioned, officers. Separate figures for warrant officers no longer are available.)							

TABLE IV-8								
Commissioned and Warrant Officers								
Job Satisfaction								
Question: "Everything considered (such as rank, experience, and length of service) how satisfied are you with the job you now hold?"								
"Satisfied"	WO (%)	2LT (%)	1LT (%)	CPT (%)	MAJ (%)	LTC (%)	COL (%)	ALL (%)
February 1974	82	73	80	82	82	87	95	82
February 1975	74	78	74	78	80	80	91	78
February 1976	76	75	72	76	77	82	85	77
February 1977	72	69	72	75	74	76	80	74
August 1977	69	69	70	73	72	78	82	73

Tables IV-9 and 10 are somewhat different than the other tables in this chapter. They display, in matrix form, a synthesis of comments, rather than statistical data. While the comments were selected for inclusion as objectively as possible, these two tables essentially are subjective, and as such, are without scientific validity in the technical sense. They are included merely to add an additional dimension to the reader's overall perception of officer attitudes. Notes accompanying each table describe the source and the timeframe of the included comments.

Implications

In the preceding pages of this chapter, an attempt has been made to provide as much relatively current data and information as is available to illuminate the general area of officer commitment. The presentation admittedly is unscientific and, therefore, cannot be subjected to scientific analysis. Nevertheless, it is believed that the preceding pages, when considered together, provide generally valid overall impressions of some of the attitudes of Army officers today.

ARMY MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT REPORT*

TABLE IV-9

Item of Interest	Report No. I 1 October 1975	Report No. II 1 November 1975	Report No. III 2 January 1976	Report No. IV 31 March 1976	Report No. V 9 July 1976	Report No. VI 14 October 1976	Report No. VII 23 January 1977
Army as an institution	no specific comment	committed to Army, but not to perceived elements of Army life	identifies strongly with institution aspect of Army; torn between institution and day-to-day realities	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment
Job satisfaction	overall steady decline since 1974; increasing only in combat units	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment
Personnel administration	too big, too complicated, too unfair	many programs, policies, procedures, unfair, unproductive, or negative in application	majority of current policies, programs, & procedures unfair, unproductive, or negative in application	no specific comment	no specific comment	personnel administration system needlessly complex, unstable, unresponsive; each new change is "short notice" a "quick fix" without regard for changes' impact on other parts of system; system viewed as unstable and vacillating	personnel and system needlessly complex, unstable, unresponsive; each new change is "short notice" a "quick fix" without regard for changes' impact on other parts of system; system viewed as unstable and vacillating
Does Army take care of its own?	not holding true	individual powerless to do anything about proliferation of policy changes	feels victimized by forces beyond his control; feels powerless	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment
Ability of Army to control Army affairs	individual sense of powerlessness to prevent major disruptive changes	"someone" is engaged in concerted effort to turn Army into simply a place to work	"someone" is trying to turn Army into simply a place to work	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment
Specific areas of concern	lack of discipline one of greatest personnel problems in Army	promotions O&A career policies and ticket punching RIF	promotions RIF O&A career policies and ticket punching personnel administration	promotions O&A benefits budget constraints on tel, education, & personnel programs	promotions RIF career policies and ticket punching	some "calming" of emotional reaction to pay and benefits issues	O&A, and while rating promotions
Career orientation	no specific comment	many changing career plans from 30-year to 20-year retirement	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment	no specific comment
Overall attitude toward Army	trend line up generally from 1974 and improving slowly; "wait and see"	"wait and see"	increasingly skeptical of changes in system; new policies expected to be worse than old ones	slight upturn in outlook; "troubled" attitude weakening slightly	rising sense of optimism; beginnings of a "turn around" apparent	little change; slowly rising trend still evident	general slow "turn around"

*The purpose of the Army Management Assessment Report was to focus on that important Army segment level which, in terms of general guidance, shaped and defined decisions made at a lower level. Admittedly unscientific, the report was a subjective, narrative description, using a generalized in-army-wide survey and impressions of field attitudes gained by various means by Department of the Army (primarily staff agencies and passed along to the report's author. This management was defined in the report arbitrarily by rank: for commissioned officers, from lieutenant colonel; for warrant officers, the chief warrant officer rank; and for enlisted men, staff through master sergeant. Entries in Table IV-10 are either quotations from the report concerned, or paraphrases.

*Table IV-10 was compiled from information contained in memoranda for a Headquarters-Army, 3 July 1977, subject, "Survey on Officer Attitudes." A joint meeting was a special session of the Organization Effectiveness General Office Committee called to discuss officer attitudes by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the memorandum contained information prepared by the major commands' representative at the session and were prepared using information submitted by the commands. No indication of the frequency of the observations is included, presumably each was representative as it could not have been included be remembered that the information was requested; pure observations may have been than could have been if the information had been provided spontaneously.

PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, OFFICER ATTITUDES (MOTIVATORS) **

TABLE IV-10

FACTORS	Job Dissatisfaction	Personnel Management System	Uncertainty	Financial	Blocked Personal Goals	Status	Change in Institutional
EXTENSION MOTIVATORS ANALYST OFFICERS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Poor leadership at unit level -Insufficient delegation of responsibility -OTA orientation of senior officers -Award not commensurate with performance -Long hours -Resistance to innovation by senior officers -No room for mistakes -Job requirements below expectations -Lack of trust -Incompetence by senior officers -Agreement--look good vs. be good--by in & his commander -Perception that system can't be changed from bottom -Ability doesn't count -Crisis management approach; e.g., short response on 10-1000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Branch unrelated assignments, particularly initial assignments -OTA system criteria irrelevant--sets the wrong people -No control over destiny -OTA all important & meaningless as a management tool -OTA unfair & arbitrary -OTA--ticket punching -Unhealthy competition -No freedom to fail--"you bet your bars" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Inability to "visualize" career progression -Perception that assignment system is capricious -Lack of consideration of personal desires by MILITARY -Loss of benefits -Fear of RIF/passover/ or out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lack of better pay/promotion opportunities in civilian life -Unavailability of housing in high cost areas resulting in relative deprivation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Inability to pursue advanced education -Inability to use civilian education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Army has a bad press image -Government officials have decreasing attitude toward Army 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Elimination of time (promote time that Army another job & or a way of it)
EXTENSION MOTIVATORS OFFICERS, MAJOR IN BRIEF AT 20 YEARS OF SERVICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lack of challenging job -Lack of rewards -Blaming vs. problem-solving orientation -Lack of opportunity for recognition/achievement except for golden few -Lack of moral leadership from O-6's, who use's confrontational or give them accurate information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Good jobs given to junior officers with "right" tickets instead of more experienced officers who haven't attended SAC or end battalion -Ticket punch system told you know that you are through; once a hurdle is passed, no chance to go on -OTA--MILITARY -Impact of early OTA -Lack of consideration of personal desires in assignment -Promotion clouded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Loss of benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Unemployment opportunities at 20 which disappear at 30 -Honorary rewards too low after 20 years of service -Loss of benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Unrealized potential -Family considerations, desire for roots, high school aged dependents -Promotion to O-6/O-10 looks less attractive as knowledge of personal sacrifices required becomes known -PCS policy over 20 disruptive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lack of support for Army by elected and appointed officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Perception that succeed on off must compromise own values can

Available evidence supports the observation that attitudes of officers generally toward the Army have improved since 1974, when some of the data shown in this chapter were first recorded. There are, nevertheless, important indications of a reservoir of general frustration and dissatisfaction remaining among an unknown, but perhaps large, number of Army officers. This frustration and dissatisfaction may have been stored over a period of years among older officers, so that they now are less and less willing to "give the Army a chance to solve its problems gradually" on a number of issues. To some extent, on the other hand, younger officers are not receiving the initial challenge and careful attention which is so important to the socialization process of their early Army years. They become, therefore, highly susceptible to any disenchantment they may perceive among older officers.

It is important to understand that some of the indicators of officer attitudes employed earlier in this chapter (and, for that matter, throughout the Army) are limited in their usefulness and, at times, even misleading. For example, intentions to leave the Army prior to career completion and evidence of job dissatisfaction are valid negative indicators, taken in the proper context. Intentions to complete careers or evidence of job satisfaction, conversely, are not necessarily positive indicators. There are strong reasons why a person would attempt to complete his career, although he dislikes it, or would be satisfied with his specific job and dislike the organization of which the job is a part.

There may be many officers who were committed strongly to the Army at one time, but are no longer, although they still wear the uniform. In the intervening period, they may have succumbed to the cumulative effect of many small frustrations, of many small indignities, of many small compromises, of many small disappointments; until now they are in the Army, but not of it. They have changed from "Army-oriented" to "individual-oriented" members.

An unknown number of such officers, doubtless, makes up a part of the population who is unhappy about perceived "unfair assignment policies," for example. These officers perceive the "assignment policy" to be unfair because it is inconsistent with what they want for themselves specifically, not because it is unfair in terms of overall officer equity. So, the indicator accurately shows a negative attitude, but inaccurately records the reason for the negative attitude. The real reason is a long period of growing alienation, not the assignment policy.

The point to be remembered here is that officers whose attitudes are recorded in statistical data tables as favorable toward the Army may not hold favorable attitudes, in fact; and officer attitudes recorded as unfavorable may be unfavorable for reasons other than those recorded.

With the foregoing paragraphs in mind, important impressions from the first section of this chapter follow.

- Perceived shift of Army from an institution--a "calling"--to merely a job.

- Lack of respect and trust toward more senior officers by officers junior to them.

- Almost universal disenchantment with the perceived impersonality of personnel systems and personnel administration generally.

- Perceived inability of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) to demonstrate that real progress has been, and is being made toward its full implementation.

- Perceived career progression inequities (e.g., promotions, school selections, officer evaluation reporting, assignments, and the "ticket-punching" syndrome).

- In the case of Tables IV-3A and B, an indication of a significant number of commissioned officers who do not believe themselves to be "well prepared" in their primary specialties and a lesser number of warrant officers who believe similarly with respect to their primary MOS.

- In the case of Table IV-8, the steadily declining (since 1974) percentage of commissioned and warrant officers who are satisfied with their jobs.

If the foregoing is, in fact, a reasonably accurate description of officer attitudes on several important subjects, the implications are reason for apprehension for the Army's immediate future and are even more ominous for the decades between now and the end of this century. While improvement in some areas of Army life and work are underway already, other conditions of the military environment are likely to get worse in the future, not better. The situation is a little like inflation. If the answers are thought to be unaffordable now--in the 1970's--they will be even more expensive in the 1980's and 1990's.

To return to the two assertions earlier in this chapter:

- Apparently, the assumption has been confirmed that there is cause for concern regarding the state of Army officer commitment in 1978.

- Because, currently, there is no valid way of assessing the relative strength of Army officer commitment, policies should be avoided which require a high level of commitment to be effective.

Bibliographical Notes (Chapter IV)

1. Lyman W. Porter, "The Pep Talk and the Dodo Bird," from a paper presented at the Leadership Workshop conference, U.S. Military Academy, 25-27 June 1969.
2. J.J. Card and W.M. Shanner, Development of a ROTC/Army Career Commitment Model (Palo Alto, CA: American Institutes for Research, 1976).
3. Porter, op.cit.

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The effectiveness of the American Army in carrying out its wartime or peacetime missions--under varying kinds and degrees of stress and in continuous compliance with the will of the American people--is directly related to the state of education, training, and commitment of its members.

An effective Army officer may be described as one who is trained in the skills he needs to accomplish his mission competently; one who is educated in the knowledge and insights necessary for successful mission accomplishment within the context of broader organizational goals; and one who is committed to do his duty faithfully and well. Commitment helps assure that reasonable return is received for investment in education and training. Reciprocally, adequate and relevant education and training reinforce and enhance commitment.

The broad area of officer commitment is one which generates frequent discussion. Sometimes it is called officer fulfillment; other times, officer motivation or job satisfaction. But whatever it is called, it is a nebulous issue and, more often than not, an emotional one. Army policy makers and individual Army members, as well, seem to have difficulty coming to grips with it, although few are ignorant of some of the signs when commitment is lacking. Only in recent years has an attempt been made at the policy level even to monitor some of the general commitment indicators.

Out of these recent monitoring efforts, however, have come clear signs that the Army has reason to be concerned about the commitment of its officers. There is reason to believe that some officers, maybe many officers, are frustrated or even dissatisfied with their Army careers. There is also reason to believe that a number, perhaps a significant number, have little trust that the Army remains capable of meriting the confidence and commitment of its officers. Some improvement has been noted in the last 2 or 3 years, but a worrisome residue of discontent and estrangement apparently remains.

To compound the problem, social scientists only recently have begun to study the commitment phenomenon and are frank to say that they know little about how an organization can elicit commitment from its members. Moreover, because commitment derives from experiences intensely personal to the individual concerned, it is difficult to generalize findings from applicable empirical research across the members of a particular population.

Nevertheless, there are some important aspects about organizational commitment which are known and understood, and which can be employed to the Army's benefit. Further, the difficult decades awaiting the Army in the remainder of this century impel it to muster whatever information it can to address the issue of officer commitment. No one would be so naive as to suggest that policies and programs initiated now would be more than a start, but a start is what is needed.

The Army needs to pinpoint staff responsibility for commitment policies and programs, develop a system of commitment assessment, and a system to weigh the impact on commitment of policy decisions. More must be known about the values and goals of individual Army officers, now and in the future. Conversely, the Army must make certain that the organizational values and goals it is signalling to its officer corps are those values and goals it espouses. Particular attention must be paid to the early years in which a new Army officer becomes socialized and in which he begins to achieve intrinsic success. Most of all, there must be clear emphasis from the top that officer commitment is essential to the Army; combined with extensive and continuing efforts to give the officer corps as much information as is available about officer commitment from a human behavior standpoint. These are some of the possible, practical, and affordable actions which, as a start, can and should be taken. Assuming conscientious and sincere effort, the extent to which a program of officer commitment addressal bears fruit will depend on how much can be learned after the program has been institutionalized. This, then, is the spirit in which the following conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Importance of Commitment to Officer Effectiveness

Commitment is one of a triumvirate of interdependent and coequal determinants of officer effectiveness, the other two of which are education and training. More than mere passive loyalty to the Army, it involves--

- a strong desire to remain a part of the Army;
- a willingness to exert high levels of effort on behalf of the Army;
- a definite belief in, and acceptance of, the basic values and goals of the Army (while still being willing to

criticize and question specific actions of the Army when necessary); and

- a deep concern about the fate of the Army.

Commitment of an Army officer to his Service implies an informal, but understood, contract between the two parties. There is, therefore, the obligation of the Army, as one party to the contract, to demonstrate its commitment to the officer, as well. In so doing, the Army must--

- deal fairly with the officer as a person, and make every honest effort to satisfy his needs and goals;
- be open about what its organizational values and goals are, and hold to them consistently throughout its functioning;
- insist upon a professional climate in which the officer can believe in, trust, and be proud of his organization, of his contribution to it, and of the leaders senior to him;
- be explicit about what is expected of him in terms of performance standards, provide him the opportunity to prepare himself to meet these standards, and evaluate his performance honestly and objectively, in a way that contributes to his professional growth; and
- demonstrate to him that he is a valued and valuable Army member.

Recommendation #1:

Place direct, explicit emphasis on officer commitment at every Army level, with the primary and initial thrust coming from the top leadership of the Army.

The early Army years of the young officer are particularly critical to his socialization. While not contrived or manipulative, they should take into full account the experiences the young officer will have and the effect on him of these experiences. If his initial education and training are inadequate to give him the confidence he needs, the potentially important first duty assignment will be an ineffective socialization experience. If he is not permitted to learn, first hand, and to internalize the pivotal values and norms of the Army during that period, it is unlikely that he ever will. If the job he is given is

not sufficiently challenging to him that it stretches his new capabilities to the utmost, he may come to believe that mediocre performance is all the Army expects of him. And, if the peer and senior role models within his immediate horizons are flawed in some way, he may be flawed, as well.

Recommendation #2:

Place special emphasis, in terms of socialization, on the quality of early experiences of each new Army officer, to include his basic education and training, his first duty assignments, and the people who will be his role models during this period.

Recommendation #3:

Identify and assemble into a cohesive, usable body of military professional knowledge at least the following: Military standards and ethics, military history and tradition, military roles and missions, public service aspect of military profession, self (internal) regulation aspect of military profession, tradition of the practice of military science as a calling.

To realize the full implications of eliciting and keeping commitment of individual officers, especially the very capable ones, it is necessary to remember that all real-life, Army situations have the potential of producing one, or both, of the following effects:

- obstruction of the level of commitment of an individual officer from reaching its full potential; or, detraction from an already high level of commitment; or,
- erosion of the belief of an individual officer that the Army is worthy of, or capable of meriting, the officer's commitment.

Recommendation #4:

Require that a formal assessment of the impact on officer commitment accompany each recommended change of personnel policies and procedures to the decision maker.

At present, there is no valid way of knowing with reasonable certainty what is the state of Army officer commitment; no scientifically valid Army system to monitor and assess officer commitment. (See recommendation #5). In the absence of such assessment capabilities, reasonable prudence recommends that it be assumed that there is need for periodic positive reinforcement of Army officer commitment.

Recommendation #5:

Until such time as a system of commitment assessment is established (See recommendation #9), assume that there is need for periodic positive reinforcement of Army officer commitment when deciding whether or not to change or establish personnel policies or programs.

Importance of a Stable Professional
Environment to Officer Commitment

The sheer weight of the number and substance of changes in the Army today tends to have the cumulative effect of rendering unfamiliar many of the previously familiar characteristics of the Army as an institution, a profession, and a place to work. The debilitating effect of such a climate on officer commitment should not be underestimated.

Yet, there are certain Army characteristics which must remain immutable, if the Army is to survive as an effective servant of the American people. These same immutable characteristics are necessary to the Army officer corps as its focus and as a focus to which individual officer commitment may be attached. There needs to be a conscious sorting out by the Army of those aspects which must change to remain current and those aspects which must endure unchanged.

Among the characteristics which must endure are the following:

- a clear sense of purpose and direction for the Army and its work;
- the unconditional obligation of the Army officer to serve his Nation and its people;
- adherence to high and explicit standards of performance by every Army officer, so that he serves dependably and well; and

- adherence to an explicit body of professional ethics, which is reflective of, and fitting for, the American Judeo-Christian ethic and the national moral heritage.

Recommendation #6:

Develop the following philosophical writings for direct provision to each member of the officer corps:

- Army values and goals (mission, professional, qualification, ethical).
- Army ethical system construct (to include at least the following three components: the ultimate principle toward which the efforts of the profession and its members are to be directed, the values to be employed in pursuit of the ultimate principle, and the ethical system within which the values are to be employed to make value choices and decisions).

Recommendation #7:

Institute a system of explicit military professional standards, which are keyed to several important points of an Army officer's career. (This recommendation appears elsewhere in detail in RETO recommendations.)

Recommendation #8:

Encourage and reward internal, written argumentation within the officer corps on such subjects vital to the survival of the Army as fragmentation of the officer corps, the Army as a "calling" or an occupation, professional ethics, social changes within the Army community and within the Army work environment, and the Army of the future.

Importance of Commitment Assessment

As important as it is, there is no way of knowing with any reasonable certainty what is the state of Army officer commitment in 1978. The Army lacks an institutionalized system for addressing officer commitment. Although scientific research in this area is somewhat meager, when one considers the trauma of the times through which the Army is passing, it has been remiss in not capitalizing on what research is available and in developing its own.

Recommendation #9:

Develop and implement a scientifically valid system to monitor, measure, predict, and influence commitment of Army officers. Such a system should have at least the following components:

- Capability to monitor and to anticipate broad societal (American and Army) trends (e.g., value shifts) having an impact on commitment.
- Capability to ascertain values of Army officers.
- Capability to articulate/focus Army values and value system.
- Capability to monitor/measure state of officer commitment on a regular, continuing basis.
- Capability to monitor the impact on commitment of promulgation of individual Army policies and practices. (See recommendation #4)
- Capability to contribute in nontraditional ways to officer socialization.

Addressal by the Army of officer commitment currently is reactive, sporadic, fragmented, and without a coordinated Army policy basis. Although logically a part of the human resources development policy area of responsibility, commitment has not been assigned as a specific area of policy responsibility. To achieve a coordinated, effective program of commitment enhancement, such a specific assignment of policy responsibility is necessary.

Recommendation #10:

Assign specific responsibility for policies and programs to monitor, measure, predict, and influence commitment of Army officers to the human resources development element of the Department of the Army Staff. (See recommendation #9)

Importance of Looking to the Future

The rate of value change has accelerated to the extent that major shifts in the value system of a society now are apparent

within the span of a single lifetime or less. Value change research is part of a growing interest in futurology found among advanced societies throughout the world, to include the private business sectors of these societies. The Army needs to be able to predict with reasonable validity what people will be like, and what values they will hold, 2 to 3 decades hence.

Recommendation #11:

Develop a capability to monitor and to anticipate broad societal (American and Army) trends (e.g., value shifts) having an impact on commitment. (See recommendation #9)

Program Development Concept

The first step in establishing a program to address the area of officer commitment is, of course, to assign staff responsibility for policy and programs. Since officer effectiveness, of which officer commitment is an important part, closely relates to organizational effectiveness (OE), there is some justification to expand the OE staff responsibility to include officer commitment. Were this not deemed practical, the staff responsibility should be assigned elsewhere within the general human resources development area, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. The human resources development element so designated would be responsible for the taskings and general supervision associated with accomplishing the actions outlined in the remainder of this chapter.

Soon thereafter, several actions should be undertaken concurrently, probably under the authority of a Chief of Staff Memorandum, with the objective of producing the following results within the 10 to 14 months following:

- Joint development, by the Army War College and the Army Research Institute, of a Department of the Army pamphlet containing a strong endorsement and emphasis from the Army Chief of Staff; providing to the officer corps in simple, narrative style why and how the Army intends to address officer commitment; and explaining each officer's role with respect to contributing to the commitment of officers junior to him. The pamphlet's approach should be as practical and down-to-earth as possible.

- Institution of a requirement that "commitment impact statements" accompany major personnel policy recommendations to decision makers.

- Development, perhaps by a specifically qualified civilian firm under contract with the Army Research Institute, of a scientifically valid system to monitor and assess the state of officer commitment on a regular basis. Such a system probably should include at least an actual measurement device (e.g., survey) and identification of indicator-type data for routine collection and analysis (e.g., voluntary retirements). System design also should provide for periodic officer commitment assessment reporting to the Department of the Army staff and to major Army commanders.

During the second year, again probably under the authority of a Chief of Staff Memorandum, the following activities should be undertaken concurrently, with completion planned for the following 10 to 14 months.

- Development, by the Office, Chief of Chaplains, the Army War College, and the Command and General Staff College of an Army ethical system construct.* It should include at least the following three components: the ultimate principle toward which the efforts of the profession and its members are to be directed, the values to be employed in pursuit of the ultimate principle, and the ethical system within which the values are to be employed to make value choices and decisions. Resident and exportable instructional materials for the construct should be developed, as well.

- Development, by the Training and Doctrine Command and the Army War College of a philosophical monograph series outlining and explaining Army values and goals (mission, professional, qualification, and ethical) and their interrelationships. The series probably would be published as Department of the Army pamphlets and probably would require review for needed updating every five years or so.

- Development, by the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College, of a scheme to encourage professional writing and argumentation within the officer corps on subjects vital to the Army as an institution and as a profession. Such a scheme might include, for example, an annual series of writing awards and an annual, double issue of Military Review, in which a good cross section of the best writings were published.

* An illustration is outlined in the final chapter of the following Student Research Report: Mary Ruth Williams, Is "Duty, Honor, Country" Enough? (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1975 [unpublished]).

During the third year, again probably under the authority of a Chief of Staff Memorandum, the following actions should be undertaken concurrently and completed during the 10 to 14 months following.

- Publication, by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, of an Army regulation establishing policy, programs, and procedures in support of officer commitment.

- By Training and Doctrine Command; the Office, Chief of Military History; the Army War College; the Command and General Staff College; and the Military Academy: identification and assembling of at least the following into a cohesive, usable body of military professional knowledge: military standards and ethics, military history and tradition, military roles and missions, public service aspect of the military profession, self (internal) regulation aspect of the military profession, tradition of the practice of military science as a calling. Resident and exportable supporting instructional materials should be developed, as well.

- Development, by the Army War College, the Army Research Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute of a capability to monitor and to anticipate broad societal (American and Army) trends (e.g., value shifts) having a potential impact on officer commitment.

By the fifth year, the foregoing implementation actions should have been completed and all recommendations outlined earlier in this chapter incorporated in these actions. Additionally, the following should be happening routinely:

- A continuing program of education for the officer corps, as new information and data about officer commitment are developed.

- Resident or nonresident instruction in Army ethics and the Army ethical system at every major officer education and training level.

After the moderately labor-intensive initial, five-year period, the program of officer commitment addressal outlined on the preceding pages of this chapter is intended to be relatively modest in its use of personnel and other resources. It would rely heavily upon gathering, monitoring, assessing, and reporting information; and upon keeping the officer corps informed as more becomes known about the behavioral aspects of organizational commitment.

Further, it would place heavy reliance upon the professionalism of the officer corps to employ such information to elicit and to enhance the commitment of its individual members. In the final analysis, only individual officers themselves, mindful of the best interests of national security and determined to act accordingly in every phase of their official and professional areas of responsibility, can demonstrate to their officer colleagues that the Army merits the commitment of its officers.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX N

OFFICERSHIP

1. PURPOSE. To review the nature of officership and its relationship to selected societal traits and values, and to systems that impact on officer attitudes (i.e., assignments, selections, evaluations, training and education).

2. DISCUSSION. The review, made in early study phases, culminated in observations and recommendations of a policy nature which were considered in later work, and many of which were incorporated in other annexes. For this reason, not all the recommendations listed below are carried forward to the main report. The review is included at Appendix 1 to this Annex. It provides background information on some of the philosophical concerns that guided the Study Group.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Service in the Army must be reaffirmed as a way of life, a calling, and not just a job.

b. All "systems" must assist and not detract from inculcation of officership.

c. Consider the socialization of officers and their families which takes place in resident military schools as a factor when deciding the timing of such experiences at proper intervals in a career.

d. Resist change for change sake.

e. Examinations, if part of the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) system, should be criterion referenced go-no-go. MQS results should be reported separately and not become a block to be checked in the Officer Efficiency Report (OER). (See Annex D).

f. All selection boards should be given access to OER's of current and two preceding grades only.

g. Consider a reversal of the trend to greater centralization of selections.

h. Cause the primary specialty to be truly primary, the alternate to become secondary (see Annex R).

i. Have a single career manager to advise each officer on professional development (i.e., manager for his primary specialty) (see Annex R).

j. Highlight the role of the commander in developing his subordinate officers (see Annexes D and R).

1 APPENDIX

1. The Army Environment and Its Impact on Officership

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

THE ARMY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON OFFICERSHIP

TO ANNEX N

OFFICERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

"Officership" is not easy to define. One might begin by listing the collection of traits and values which collectively characterize what an officer is. Successful prioritization, distillation and synthesis, would then lead to the core of what constitutes officership. Yet a succinct but sufficiently broad statement of the core of officership--such as "Duty-Honor-Country" -- would be too general for our purposes or would leave out many important traits and values.

A definition of officership must include an ability by the officer to use his tools expertly. But technical competence, oriented as it is on tools, varies from officer to officer and from one historical period to the next. It is certainly not the underlying fabric, the very soul of officership.

With this distinction in mind, the philosophical and profound question -- What is an officer? -- posed by General Goodpaster as central to the RETO mission may be interpreted as an exhortation: Preserve, reinforce and enhance the fabric of officership; do not limit yourselves to well-meaning but soulless initiatives.

How then do we address officership in the broader sense of the very soul and fabric of the officer corps?

Even to ask such a question is not in vogue. It is not popular in today's resource oriented and cost-benefit driven environment to address these "fuzzy" ideas. Admiral Denton, commenting on new aspects of US Navy Training and Education, perceives a societal trend away from ideals that started some time after 1958.^{1/} He identifies values and commitment as being the well spring of all else:

^{1/} RAND Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr. Memorandum for the CNO, subject: Leadership Aspects of Navy Education and Training; comments on. 31 Oct 77.

"The old [philosophy] stressed values from which it was assumed would flow in natural sequence: motivation, intense application in study and training, development of necessary skills, loyalty, and, of transcendent importance, the combat application of those skills with the requisite degrees of perseverance and unlimited willingness to self-sacrifice. The new deals only with the identification and inculcation of "skills" and is devoid of any treatment of values." (1/, page 2)

In consonance with this view, it is necessary to define officership and then the systemic framework necessary to impart and reinforce those values and ideals that constitute officership, adding technical competence as one of the ingredients

Yet, it is not essential to proceed in such rigorous order. In fact, an oblique approach may be more practical and productive, if we root our investigation on "what is" rather than in some theoretical conception of "what might be."

Following this approach, we should take the pulse of the officer corps with respect to officership, identify system characteristics that may underlie weaknesses detected, if any (e.g., inculcating the wrong values), and try to recommend system changes that are in the right direction with respect to strengthening officership.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Prior to taking the pulse of the officer corps, it may be useful to recall some traits and values that pervade our society and which may shed some light on aspects of current and potential systems. If there is disharmony between the "system"^{2/} and deeply held values or traits, several potentially deleterious results may ensue. Some of these include frustration, unconscious subversion of the intent of the system, "lip service," dysfunctional behavior, adoption of wholly unintended values, lack of commitment and alienation from either the Army or the society at large (if the Army imparts a radically different value system from that of the society).

^{2/} By "system" it is meant the collection of all systems that impact on officers and officers attitudes and hence on officership (i.e., assignments, selections, evaluations, training and education).

Parenthetically, it may be added that the danger of alienation is significantly lesser with universal military training - - but that's another issue altogether.^{3/}

The American societal values we wish to highlight are the following:

Egalitarianism. Although we espouse egalitarianism we only adopt its trappings. In reality we know, accept and demand elitism but conceal that from ourselves. It is, however, an enlightened elitism which is "earned" as opposed to one that is not. Our culture is replete with legends that enshrine the entrepreneur who succeeds in carving out an empire. The emphasis is on succeeds as we shall see below. It is class mobility that is really valued, not either egalitarianism nor elitism. But because the elite position or privilege must be earned, the elite take pride and pains to minimize their "eliteness" and emphasize their humble beginnings, and hence the "earned" quality of their eliteness.

Meritocracy. As pointed out above, success is a goddess pursued with frenzy in our society. It is success that provides the privileges or rewards available. But more than that, success often becomes an end in itself. The meritocracy which rewards success, when coupled with the perceived egalitarianism and mobility, produces a sense of failure for anyone who is not progressing towards success. More importantly however, because ours is a meritocracy, it is results and performance that count - - not how hard you played the game but who won.

Education. Education is highly valued, to an amazing degree compared to many other societies - - and education-for-all to the highest level possible. Nevertheless, this drive is tempered by acute dislike for the intellectual. This apparent paradox can be understood in relation to the remarks made above with respect to the importance of success and performance. Intellectual performance and "success" can only be understood by other intellectuals. Therefore, the society at large is impatient with intellectuals as a group - what have they produced?; what is the tangible result of their ivory tower labors?; what is the utility of their abstractions? The highly diploma'd intellectual who can also achieve political, economic or organizational power is admired but not because of the diplomas alone. These are only credentials which are given scant value of themselves unless the individual

^{3/} For a discussion of dangers of alienation see Menard, Orville D. "Remarks on 'Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations'" in Civil-Military Relations, Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 77-84.

can perform. Credentials may be necessary but are certainly not sufficient for rising in the meritocracy.

Pragmatism. The above values, when combined, have given rise to a pragmatic approach to life. Don't tell me if the solution follows all the dictums prescribed; does it work?

COMMITMENT

We choose to take the pulse of officership by using commitment as a surrogate. Officership is not readily measurable, commitment is more so.

Figure 1 illustrates that commitment forms a triad with education and training. However, it does not convey the importance of commitment. Zimmerman of Harvard says that "there is no correlation between entrance exams, student performance and success." Goodman of Carnegie Mellon, speaking about the Assessment Center findings, said that "success depends less on ability than on motivation and interest." (See Annex J).

These findings suggest that Figure 1 does not adequately explain or portray the dynamic interdependence which must be understood to assess the importance of commitment expressed by the last quote above.

Commitment is closely related to motivation and fulfillment.

But what motivates an individual? The following is a summary of an essay by Rollo May.^{5/}

As contrasted to other beings, man has consciousness of self which is the basis for his ability to conceptualize.


This ability leads to a concept of self identity which is perceived in relation to others and is based on one's capacity for feeling, for action, for becoming.

Thus, while the central need of all organisms is to fulfill their potential, man's central need is to fulfill his potential along his own conception of self.

Deprivation of the fulfillment of such self-perceived potentialities is tantamount to losing one's identity, to ceasing to be a person, and is most feared.

The joy of fulfillment of these potentialities is the goal of life.

^{5/} "The Experience of Becoming a Person" by Rollo May



ARE THESE CRITICAL?

FIGURE 1. OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS

This concept is at once deceptively simple and profound. It does not say that people always act selfishly. It says that one is continually driven to fulfill the potentialities implicit in one's self-perceived identity. Thus, individuals who see themselves as honorable, altruistic, or as willing to give their lives for a cause, will behave honorably, altruistically, or will give up their lives in sacrifice of selves. A coarser self-image will yield coarser motivation. Most, if not all, motivation theories are unified by this concept.

This concept is a crucial foundation to fulfill the Army's need for officership. If the correct self conception is not nurtured by everything the Army does so that it pervades the institution, then the institution won't be healthy and may even die. "Carrots and sticks" are not adequate because the "carrot and stick" wielder cannot always be there, especially when it may really count as the difference between victory or defeat. It is best if we carry our own "carrots and sticks" by internalization of the correct self-image for we are our own harshest judges and we can't fool ourselves as easily as someone else.

In addition, the concept is significant because it exposes the potential harm by well meaning but non-supportive actions. If money is used as an inducement as contrasted to compensation, the value fostered is that monetary rewards constitute an acceptable and desired drive. When officers are asked to fill out the backs of checks to be cashed the image being fostered is that they cannot be trusted. People become what they sense they are expected to, and actions speak louder than words in transmitting institutional values.

The essence of our inner drives then is to continually strive to become more of one's idea of what one is.

There are two parts to this, the becoming or fulfilling aspect, and the identity itself which is constantly being reinforced and expanded.

To discuss these two aspects please refer now to Figures 2 and 3.




FIGURE 2. MOTIVATION WHEEL




FIGURE 3. NO COMMITMENT

Figure 2 expresses some intricate and delicate relationships, to wit:

- Commitment is itself fulfilling as one more closely approximates one's idea of officership.
- Commitment spurs to apply oneself to education and training in those areas perceived as necessary to fulfill one's identity.
- Commitment can be choked off by the frustration of inadequate education and training or lack of mission accomplishment.^{6/}
- Education and training can also be fulfilling as one perceives to become more of what one believes oneself to be.
- Mission accomplishment itself also leads to increased fulfillment.
- The satisfaction of mission accomplishment can be choked off by incongruous institutional rewards.
- Institutional rewards of course also satisfy.^{7/}

Figure 2 highlights the significance of commitment. Without it, one won't learn and won't accomplish the mission. Without it, success becomes identified with institutional rewards and a closed loop is formed between satisfaction and institutional rewards (see Figure 3). Under these conditions individuals, clever that they are, rather than seeking to accomplish the mission with the least effort possible, seek instead to obtain the reward with the least possible effort. But, the individual cannot completely deceive himself and since most of us are somewhat idealistic in our conception of self identity, the reward in this case -- though he seeks it -- is hollow, intrinsically unsatisfying. He then demands greater institutional rewards (incorrectly diagnosing his unfulfilled need) and the institution grants it, sooner or later, not recognizing his unstated needs which will go on being unfulfilled.

What does all of this have to do with the review of education and training of officers?

6/ Mission accomplishment is significantly satisfying especially in view of the societal value attached to success as discussed earlier, if one's idea of success is mission accomplishment.

7/ However, the satisfaction is hollow if it isn't congruent with one's conception of one's identity or one's success.

Much, in our view, because of our proper focus on the Army's requirements (which we read MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT) and the interwoven relationship among education and training and commitment, and the systems for officer assignments, evaluations (to include some of our options on examinations), and all selections.

Let's proceed then with taking the pulse of commitment (officership).

TAKING THE PULSE

In taking the pulse of the officer corps with respect to officership, as noted earlier, it is not our intent to measure either "officership" or "commitment" and pronounce it either acceptable or lacking. The idea is to identify attitudinal trends or symptoms that may shed light on systemic weaknesses which detract from rather than enhance commitment.

Three sources were used.

(1) The results of the 22 June 1977 Organizational Effectiveness General Officer Steering Committee which held a special session on officer attitudes at the request of the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (HQDA DCSPER).

(2) A series of seven reports from September 1975 through January 1977 prepared by the Office of the Director of Human Resources Development on assessment of midlevel Army leadership from data obtained in the HQDA DCSPER survey program.

(3) RETO's officer survey.

The following observations are derived from a review and analysis of these extensive documents, and constitute a distillation of perceived generalized symptoms.

1. STABILITY & CHANGE

There appears to be an undercurrent of uneasiness about too much change in too short a time. The officer corps is suspicious of change. The officers appear to be waiting for "the other shoe to drop." They are simply not convinced that the changes have all been in the Army's best interest. It is this suspiciousness which is troubling in this trend, since it implies a certain alienation with the leadership. This may be the result of repeated attacks on benefits of recent years coupled with a realization of the inability of the Army as an institution to articulate its particular needs to the national decisionmakers. The human need of Army members for

stability is particularly acute, because as individuals they surrender control for their lives and therefore need institutional stability as a foil for such lack of individual control. When continual changes erode faith in the stability of the institution, everything is possible and there's no longer a rock to anchor oneself to.

2. SERVING IN VERSUS WORKING FOR

More and more the Army is a place to work rather than a way of life. The use of comparability as the rationale for better pay has this unfortunate corollary. As the institutional reward (promotion/pay) becomes more and more identified as the goal, the closer the officer corps begins to approximate the motivation model of Figure 3 instead of Figure 2. Thus, paradoxically, better pay and the substitution of it for discontinued benefits has an undermining effect on commitment. The Army becomes just a job. And a job is just that, a day's pay for a day's work. The only commitment left is to secure higher pay or promotion and the higher pay and perquisites.

3. TAKING CARE OF ITS OWN

There is an undercurrent that the adage that "the Army takes care of its own" is no longer true. It is of no avail that the leadership of the Army does all it can to do so. The perception is "all it can" is not sufficient. This too adds to the perception of the Army as just a job. Thus, there is additional pressure for the individual to feel that he is left to his own devices. A union begins to be thinkable as a means to organize political pressure for the benefit of the members. One gets closer to Figure 3. . . The faith that the institution does take care of its own is critical for commitment. Through it the individual is psychologically freed from preoccupation with satisfying lower order levels in his hierarchy of needs, allowing his conception of self to rise to higher levels. Commitment by the institution begets commitment by the individual.

4. GUIDANCE VOID

Officers perceive a void in career/development guidance. The commander in the field cannot give guidance. He no longer can help as well as he once could because,

(a) he may not be as familiar with OPMS as he should be, and,

(b) even if he were, career development under OPMS is still not well defined;

(c) he may not be familiar, from experience, as to what a particular officer with his primary specialty but one of many other alternate specialties should endeavor to do;

(d) he cannot assist the officer in many cases as assignments and centralized selections are less susceptible to manipulation in the field.

The officer may sense that he cannot get much better guidance from his career managers either, because there are now two of them, each with perhaps at times conflicting ideas of what his personal career requirements are. Furthermore, their ability to "manage" is more and more circumscribed by more hurdles (e.g., PCS constraints), less of a function in selections, and reduced flexibility by greater demands to match the dehumanizing precision of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems. The ultimate result is that the individual again feels bereft of someone who cares and can guide him as an individual. Thus we have the paradox of a dedicated, concerned Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) which is increasingly perceived as impersonal and mechanical. (The branch system was different because the officer and his commander identified with each other, and the officer had a single individual in the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) who managed his career as a whole and not in fragmented pieces.) We are not advocating a return to branches, but are highlighting the urgency of satisfying the need of the officer to feel he has someone who knows, cares and can guide him.

5. EARLY FAILURE SYNDROME

The increased number of sieves that an officer goes through in a career has generated increased concern with that career as opposed to faithful and dependable service or performance; an increased concern that we have labeled the Early Failure Syndrome. These sieves are due to increased centralized management and selections. We are not talking about the lists which are the publication of the results of the sieves, but about the sieves themselves. They are quality indicators. They are also an explicit institutional statement of benchmarks that embody the institutional values. As such, individuals who fail to achieve one of these benchmarks have a tendency to consider themselves failures. Their conception of self is either adjusted downward, or worse, they imagine the Army as failing to recognize their true worth and therefore become demotivated if not disaffected. This is especially true in the climate of the Inflated Officer Evaluation Report (OER) system. Late bloomers are thus forced to wilt before having a chance to bloom. Motivation is crippled as the officer "knows" that he does not stand a chance to "succeed" in a race where success has always bred success in "snowball" fashion but which now is even more difficult by his being labeled a "failure" by omission from selection. The publication of the lists makes his nonsuccess even less palatable by publicizing it, but it is the

institutionalization of the sieves (a necessary by-product of centralization) that gives rise to the Early Failure Syndrome.

6. THE HEIGHTENED EXPECTATION RATCHET

The converse of the Early Failure Syndrome is the Heightened Expectation Ratchet. Because the benchmarks are there, explicitly established and given central importance by the centralized mechanics of selection, the individual sees a road map to the very top. He then shifts his focus from success (mission accomplishment) to "success" (making the benchmarks). Thus commitment is eroded and substituted by concentration on the institutional rewards. The benchmarks generate pressures for repeated rapid changes of assignments resulting in much speeded superficial experience and transitoriness. Furthermore, his conception of self-identity begins to be inflated as he focuses, much too soon, through the road mapped by the benchmarks, to higher and higher levels. His expectations are heightened as he achieves some of the benchmarks with the ultimate result of a greater sense of failure, frustration and bitterness the higher he ultimately misses one of the benchmarks.

7. EROSION OF THE ROLE MODEL

Officership ultimately rests on its perpetuation through role modeling. The officer's self-image is inculcated and developed through a long process which is truly never ending. This self-image is crucial since as the earlier quotation from Rollo May indicates, it is the self-image that provides inner drive to fulfill that image. Role modeling plays a key role in development of an officer. The inability of the commander to give career development guidance to subordinate officers makes him a less credible model. Another factor is the speed and transitoriness already mentioned and which discourages more than a superficial impersonal relationship, between a commander and his subordinate officers. In addition, as younger officers perceive the "system" as fostering careerism and concern with success (institutional rewards) they may become disenchanted with their superiors as models. If their experience indicates that the malaise is sufficiently widespread, they then become disenchanted with the institution that permits these officers to survive, let alone progress. They then leave the service (and these may be the very ones we want to keep); decide to change the system someday, when they have the power to do so; or succumb to emulating the more adept players of the careerism game in which case, if they learn the game well, they become part of the cancer themselves, ready to infect others. The situation may not be as desperate as portrayed here, but the point is made that role modeling has been undermined in its key developmental function.

8. COMMANDER/TRAINER UNDERMINED

The commander's responsibility in the development and training of his officers has been undermined by the circumstances described above coupled with the problems of the OER system. The centralization of selections for more and more benchmarks has accelerated and given increased impetus to the inflationary trends in the OER system. The built-in need for use of the subjective OER as an objective tool for repeated selections makes the commander overly cautious not to "kill" an officer. The pressure he feels to inflate a report is not alleviated by the remoteness of the selection process. He does not "feel" his role as a "selector" and therefore his need to discriminate, only to protect (or occasionally to purposely weed someone out). The remoteness of the selection, and the transitoriness of association, having dulled his sense of responsibility to develop and train his officers, his responsibility is made more difficult by the inflation itself. He has difficulty giving forceful guidance one day and an inflated report the next. In any case, his role as a trainer/developer of officers is made doubly difficult by the albatross of the OER system.

INFERENCES

Some of the inferences we wish to draw from the preceding discussion may seem to be somewhat outside the scope of our RETO Charter. Not so, however, if one views education and training as including the imparting to an officer all he needs to be an effective officer to include officership as well as skills.

1. The Army needs to reaffirm itself unequivocally, as constituting a way of life, a profession, a calling and not a job. Without such reaffirmation as a key broad policy guiding other policies, commitment and officership - - indeed "Duty-Honor-Country" - - are doomed with what could be viewed as potentially tragic consequences for our nation. This reaffirmation is necessary because this is not now official policy. The 1970 Gates Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force recommended primary reliance on monetary incentives and implied the downgrading of values like "Duty-Honor-Country." There is, however, a world of difference between providing adequate remuneration to a committed service member, and buying the services of an uncommitted one. The drive to achieve a volunteer Army through monetary inducements may have wreaked incalculable harm to officership. Unfortunately, although we know it is the Army's policy to consider service as a way of life, the commitment this implies was not articulated in the "Total Army Goals" of 21 September 1977. This 13 page document expresses Readiness, Human, Materiel, Strategic Deployment, Future Development and Management Goals. There are four sections

one might expect to address commitment to values. Two flirt with commitment but, disappointingly, it turns out to be commitment to excellence not to such values as "Duty-Honor-Country." Substantially more eloquent were the remarks of the Chief of Staff of the Army before the Military Compensation Commission on 21 December 1977, an address which is laced throughout with the crucial importance of not permitting service in the Army to be perceived as a job instead of a way of life. The Secretary of the Army has likewise echoed the same theme in many forums.

2. All "systems" must assist and not detract from the inculcation of officership. At face value this seems a motherhood statement. However, it can have significant impact if the primacy it accords to inculcation of officership is in fact followed. It means that one must be prepared to accept the nonachievement of some other goals (e.g., centralization of some functions) if to do so tends to detract from officership inculcation. It means ultimately that if resources are lacking, the Army must be prepared to redistribute them so as not to compromise in the acceptance of less than adequate quality of officership even if it means an apparent sacrifice in quantitative combat power, for in fact the quality of officership has a multiplicative effect on combat power.

3. There needs to be a respite from continued rapid change. Any change must be overly deliberate to insure that it is truly essential. If possible we may even take a step back from some of the changes that do not seem to be achieving the results intended when instituted, rather than changing the change.

4. Success needs to be refocused on performance. This is a particularly significant necessity. It is the pragmatic concentration on results, one of our national traits, that has given our forces the edge in battle. It fosters the maintenance of the objective. It has given us a healthy disrespect for "school solutions" and for the "perfect plan." Our soldiers and officers are innovative and take over if need be. These are additional reasons that support this inference. Others were given earlier with respect to the potential harm to commitment when institutional rewards become a substitute for performance as measures of success.

5. The Army must take care of its own. Not only must the Army resist erosion of benefits to avoid the psychological damage (even if adequate compensation is substituted therefore), but it must also avoid the semblance of eroding, or of readiness to consider eroding benefits itself. Furthermore, it needs to show overt compassion for those who, not lacking commitment, fail to measure up or make honest mistakes.

6. There is a need for better and comprehensive officer career development guidance by the institution. An officer needs to have only one and not two career managers to advise him at the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).

7. The Commander's role in training and developing his officers must be reinforced. That this is one of the commander's most important tasks must be clearly understood, perhaps even institutionalized. It can be argued that it is the most important task he has since his own ability to generate unit readiness depends on it. His role in inculcating officership is crucial. He must be a role model as well. His role as "selector" must be reinforced and the OER system malaise needs to be ameliorated to allow him to render candid evaluations.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS

1. The Chief of Staff should reaffirm and the institution must express by deeds that the Army is a way of life and not a job. To do this every effort must be made that moves the institution from Figure 3 back to Figure 2. The other recommendations are framed to assist in this regard. In addition, the Army should avoid using expressions or rationales which, without meaning to do so, imply that the motivating or developing of officers is a matter of personal reward and punishment, monetary inducements or just preparing for a "job".

2. Current resident military schools should assist in inculcating officership by bringing the students together at key points in their career. This is a function that may very well be one of the most important they perform. The developing of self-identity is accompanied by anxieties and self-doubts. The interchange that takes place in resident military schools coupled with the guidance from the school administration is reassuring and fosters the necessary refocusing for the growth of such identity. In addition, it heals the wounds of an officer who may have been exposed to a superior who is poor as a role model, by the realization that he is not the norm and that there are far better model examples in the Army. Reassurance and identification and even commitment are needed by the families as well to support the concept of the Army as a way of life. These factors must be kept in mind when considering resident versus nonresident instruction, timing of resident phases at proper intervals in a career, TDY versus PCS and the needs of those not now going to the USACGSC.

3. Changes in Army policies must be as few as possible. They must be articulated so as to reaffirm long standing tenets as much as possible, and to minimize the appearance of wholesale change.

4. The question of examinations and qualification deserve special treatment. If instituted, several careful caveats need to be provided. They should not become additional sieves. Passing examinations must not be allowed to become substitutes for performance. Production of the school solution or the perfect doctrinal plan must not be allowed to subvert the maintenance of the objective. Diagnostics must be prevented from becoming credentials. We must be mindful of our national traits with respect to credentials and performance. The thirst created by the OER mess for objective discriminators poses an ultimate threat of potential misuse of diagnostic exams. The OER problem is addressed in point 5 below. If the OER system is not made less severe, a report early in the career which declares the officer inadequately qualified will stigmatize him, even if he ultimately becomes eminently qualified at more senior grades. In such a case the military qualification standards system, instead of a positive motivator, will become a stick and contribute to the Early Failure Syndrome and to lack of commitment and disillusionment. The pitfalls along the path of these two issues are many and deep, and require carefully constructed bridges to surmount them because they cannot be avoided.

5. The OER system cannot be made objective. It must remain subjective. In the end, that is what an evaluation is. Attempts by boards to consider objectively someone else's subjective statements is fraught with innumerable dangers for potential injustices. The more so in view of its unforgiving nature -- a less than complimentary comment is recorded forever and it may be that a captain determines who will not be promoted to general two decades later. We all know that. That's why we inflate OERs. The fallacy, however, is not the form used and changing it won't help. The fallacies are twofold. First, that more and more key decisions have been centralized and depend on the system. The resulting pressure to inflate could be attacked by either diminishing the number of key decisions (thereby also alleviating both the Early Failure Syndrome and the Heightened Expectation Ratchet), or by accepting the unthinkable and decentralizing some of these decisions. (After all, who could best interpret his subjective evaluation than he who wrote it if it were possible to decentralize it to that level.) Perhaps even the old branch-generated Order of Merit Lists (OMLs) were in fact better since the man was better known in his totality to the manager. Some imaginative efforts are needed in this area. The second fallacy is the lasting impact of the permanent reports. Here perhaps acceptable modification of the system could be instituted. Boards could be given the reports for the period covering the present and two preceding grades (or a set number of years) and only the job description for earlier assignments. After all, it is the more recent performance that should be significant. Young

officers need to be able to make honest mistakes as part of the learning and development process. This would be part of the compassionate understanding approach the Army should adopt in taking care of its own. Obviously, we are not advocating that gross infractions be countenanced. But a more forgiving OER system could ultimately resolve the OER inflation problem with healing effect in the officership and commitment difficulties we are facing. RETO implications include the caution already mentioned on inclusion of examination/qualification data in OERs without these or similar changes in the OER system.

6. Increasing MILPERCEN's ability to give comprehensive career guidance by being a single point of contact may be accomplished by many schemes. Perhaps OPMS needs to be modified (take half-a-step back?) to cease to insist on dual specialties and in the maintenance of equal qualification in both. Without going all the way back to branches, it may be that an officer could be asked to have a primary and a secondary (not alternate) specialty. He would always be managed by his primary specialty manager. He might switch primary specialties (and obviously switch managers), perhaps he may even have more than one secondary specialty in cases of closely allied or transferable skills. But his career would always be managed by a single entity who would tell him what his career pattern and development should be. This change would admit what is a fact (i.e., that the alternate specialty is secondary). It also would be in consonance with fostering increased depth of expertise in the primary specialty and the need to phase an officer from development to utilization type of assignments as he matures. It would allow greater flexibility than today's dictum of dual specialization in both development (e.g., cryptologists might have no secondary at all) and utilization (e.g., release from rigid utilization rates for qualification). All these have RETO implications in qualification and utilization of the trained resources.

7. RETO should forcefully highlight the need to re-emphasize the commander's role in training and developing his officers. Our recommendations should include consideration of initiatives so that he (and every officer under him) perceives this as one of his missions as commander. Perhaps we can begin at the beginning by considering the following: Have each lieutenant serve for an initial period of "developmental service" (say a year or better) until promotion to first lieutenant, with a troop unit (reinstating a modified detail with troop instead of combat arms) under a "development coach" -- his company commander. During this period the company commander would give him frequent coaching -- reports on officership development -- say at quarterly or even monthly intervals. These coaching reports would not be sent anywhere and would be privy only to the commander and the lieutenant. Upon completion of this internship, the lieutenant would be transferred and begin his OER service. The commander would be rated in the performance of this mission as on his other missions. The

second lieutenant would be promoted upon the specific recommendation of the captain and indorsed by the battalion commander. This approach alleviates the lasting impact of early errors; impresses both the lieutenant and the captain with the commanders training/development responsibilities; teaches both to be better evaluators; highlights the inculcation of officership; enhances the officership of the captain as well, making him aware of his position as a role model; and impresses the captain with his direct role as "selector."

CLOSING COMMENTS

This Appendix, unfortunately, does not answer the question, "What is an officer?" We fall back on "Duty-Honor-Country" as encompassing the answer. The Appendix does address the question of "officership" in a manner suited to the RETO Charter in consonance with the view that officership is much more than skills, as we all know, and that there are systemic requirements that must be fulfilled even as we concentrate on the more easily definable and measurable skills. The questions of the utility or of the need for a broad education is important in its own right as shown in Figure 1. It is also somewhat related to commitment. The development of the enlightened concept of self that needs to be nurtured to provide inner guidance for growth and fulfillment -- indeed for an understanding of all the values embodied in "Duty-Honor-Country" -- cannot take place without an adequately broad education that keeps pace with the expansion of that self identity. But that is another subject.^{8/} We remain convinced that there is a critical overriding need to arrest and reverse the current trend towards the idea that service in the Army is just a job, even if the price is abandonment of a volunteer army. The alternative is no army at all and perhaps no nation either.

^{8/} The following is quoted from General Goodpaster's "Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations", an essay in Civil-Military Relations by Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Wash, D.C., 1977, pg. 46.

"The effective command of complex military units and organizations remains as much an art as a science. Development of the capacity for exercising command effectively is advanced by studies ranging from history and the understanding of the human condition to ethics and the psychology of leadership, before the processes of decision, the capabilities of weapons, the elements of alliance relationships, the thought patterns, culture, and doctrine of possible opponents, and the whole gamut of professional military knowledge are even broached."

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX O

ASSESSMENT CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE OFFICER EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this portion of the study is to examine the need for an assessment program that supports the proposed officer education and training system.

2. OBJECTIVE. The objective of the assessment program is to provide a learning experience aimed at increasing the officer's understanding of his strengths and weaknesses. Such an experience will facilitate the officer's personal and professional development thereby leading to a greater long term professional contribution.

3. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS. The assessment process may take several forms. It may be a formal assessment center or development laboratory or it may be rather rudimentary and consist of administering and interpreting relatively simple pencil and paper instruments.

a. The full assessment center or development laboratory is frequently a one week session with a group. This is usually preceded by self-administered tests. In the group exercises the assessee is presented a wide variety of ill-structured situations which are faced daily by executives. During the course of the exercise the assessee is observed by a team of highly skilled assessors who record the assessee's performance, action, reaction, and overall ability to cope with the complex forces which impact on organizations from within and without. Concurrently, each participant is receiving impressions and gaining insights to the personal and professional qualities of his associates. These impressions are recorded and later fed back in the form of peer ratings. At the completion of these exercises the assessee is given an extensive counselling feedback session. All learning instruments administered at the center and before are interpreted and the assessee is provided with his profile.

b. In other cases, the program may consist only of the administering of pencil and paper instruments from which the assessee receives feedback designed to provide personal insights in areas such as interpersonal relations, problem solving ability, likes and dislikes, leadership style and ability to conceptualize.

c. The results of these programs may be used in differing ways. In some cases, results are provided the assessee's organization for use in determining where that individual best fits and what his potential performance may be in positions of increasing responsibility. In other cases, the results of the process are provided only to the assessee for his personal and professional development.

d. In all cases, data from individual learning instruments can be anonymously synthesized into a composite that represents the profile of the Army officer at various ranks. Given this composite profile the officer being assessed can then compare his specific profile with the Army profile for that rank and specific learning instrument to see how his responses compare to that of other officers of similar grade and experience.

4. SCOPE. This Annex addresses four aspects of assessment: precommission screening, assessment at mid-career, assessment of senior field grade officers, and development of senior executives. The salient features of each and how they form a system which interfaces with the officer education and training system are shown in Figure 1.

a. The current ROTC precommissioning system is characterized by a total lack of any initial measurement of aptitude, motivation, physical fitness, and leadership potential. This lack of initial measurement and the resultant entry of some unqualified personnel to ROTC contributes to high attrition during the early years of the program and in some cases, the commissioning of marginally adequate individuals. As a result, a system of screening prospective candidates through a process of medical, physical, academic, and leadership exams is proposed. A detailed discussion of the proposal is found at Annex C, Precommissioning.

b. No assessment currently exists at the mid-career point which is a key juncture in an officer's career where immense value can be gained through the effective use of pencil and paper learning instruments. These can provide the officer with a greater depth of understanding of his strengths and weaknesses in such areas as interpersonal relations, leadership, problem solving and the ability to conceptualize. At the same time, the assessment will provide the officer assistance in planning his future personal and professional growth and development.

c. A limited assessment and executive development program currently exists for senior field grade officers attending the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) and the National Defense University (NDU). At the USAWC a pilot program will be fully implemented in AY 1979-80. This program will consist of two pencil and paper assessment instruments that deal primarily with one's orientation toward other people. These instruments are self-scored and self-evaluated insuring total confidentiality. The student will use these instruments as well as the results from other diagnostic instruments to prepare a workbook in which he outlines his goals for the remainder of the year. This process is designed to provide the student with an indication of his strengths as well as his areas of marginal competency thus aiding him in formulating a plan of study. At the completion of AY 1979-80 this program will be evaluated to determine areas requiring modification or expansion in succeeding years. At the NDU, a pilot program of a similar nature is being conducted for a limited number of students in AY 1978-79. In AY 1979-80 this program will be expanded to encompass all students. At the completion of AY 1979-80 the program will also be evaluated to determine areas requiring modification or expansion.

d. Recommendations for a senior executive development program are based on a review and analysis of the Army's past experience in this area. This analysis highlights the need for a developmental process at the executive level that takes special cognizance of the requirement for these officers to perform in positions of high responsibility that require constant dealings in unstructured situations often in areas of marginal personal expertise. The study focuses on the need for a developmental program that uses both pencil and paper instruments and group interaction to provide an assessment and further development of the officers ability to deal with ill-structured situations, leadership style, interpersonal relations, ability to conceptualize, and goal setting. This formal development program provides the officer with insights for personal and professional growth as well as providing the Army, through a report submitted by the individual officer, information of assistance in future career planning and assignments.

5. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Precommissioning Screening, See Annex C.
- b. Assessment Concept for Mid-Career Development, Appendix 1.
- c. Executive Development Laboratory for Newly Selected Brigadier Generals, Appendix 2.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Precommissioning

(1) That the United States Army move immediately to develop further the medical, physical fitness and mental assessment center concept for full implementation during FY 81.

(2) That the Department of the Army (DA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPER), begin work to develop guiding directives and regulations for program management of assessment centers.

(3) That HQ Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) be tasked to develop the Leadership Laboratory for Assessment Center use described in Annex C.

(4) The Army Research Institute be charged to identify or develop the interview and paper/pencil instruments for determining motivation and interest in the military profession for precommissioning candidates.

(5) That all commissioning program applicants be processed through the Assessment Centers to aid respective selection process and establish comparative norms.

b. Assessment Concept for Mid-Career Development.

(1) That DA conduct a 2-year pilot test of the assessment concept at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (USACGSC) regular course and the battalion and brigade precommand courses and designate TRADOC as program proponent.

(2) That ARI identify or develop the actual pencil and paper learning instruments to be used at the USACGSC regular course and battalion and brigade precommand courses.

(3) That ARI assist TRADOC with the evaluation of the program.

c. Assessment Concept for Senior Service Colleges.

(1) That the USAWC conduct the assessment program as planned in AY 1979-80.

(2) That the USAWC program be evaluated at the completion of AY 1979-80.

d. Executive Development Laboratory for Newly Selected
Brigadier Generals.

(1) That DA ODCSPER select the assessment organization to conduct the pilot development laboratory and develop the assessment plan to include the size and composition of assessment groups, specific dates for assessment, coordination with the Assessment Center staff and administrative details.

(2) That ARI assist ODCSPER in developing a format for use in preparation of a letter report to the CSA by participants in the development laboratory.

(3) That DA ODCSPER conduct pilot development laboratories for brigadier general designees in FY 1979 and FY 1980.

(4) That ARI assist DA ODCSPER with evaluation of the program.

2 Appendixes

1. Assessment Concept for Mid-Career Development,
2. Executive Development Laboratory for Newly Selected Brigadier Generals, with 2 Inclosures.

ASSESSMENT CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE OFFICER EDUCATION

YEARS OF SERVICE				
0	1	10	12	14
MOS SYSTEM			CAS ³ / USACGSC	BN/BDE PRECOMMA
PRECOMMISSIONING	FUNCTIONAL COURSES		ASSESSMENT FOR ALL MAJORS	
ASSESSMENT SCREENING FOR ALL POTENTIAL CANDIDATES	N O		• Assessment done in conjunction with above resident courses	N O
• Collocated with USAREC, AFES Stations	A S S E S M E N T		• Uses relatively simple pencil and paper instruments	A S S E S M E N T
• Serves all accession sources			• Focuses on individual likes and dislikes, interpersonal relations, management styles, and problem solving and conceptual ability	• Assessment done in conjunction with precommand co
• Four components -Medical Exam -Physical Fitness Exam -Motivation-interview and pencil and paper instrument -Leadership potential simulation device			• Uses group interpretation and feedback	• Uses more sophisticated pencil paper instruments
			• limited individual counselling	• Focuses on interpersonal relationship management ability, leadership style, and ability to conceptualize
			• Results are confidential	• Uses individual counselling and feedback results
<u>USE</u> Establishes data base for derivation of norms. Sponsoring agency; e.g., USMA, ROTC use as appropriate in their selection process			<u>USE</u> • Individual uses for personal and professional development • Develops Army profile	<u>USE</u> • Individual use for personal and professional development. • Develops Army
			0-6	

FIGURE 1

CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE OFFICER EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

YEARS OF SERVICE

12	14	23
	BN/BN PRECOMMAND COURSES	SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE
	FUNCTIONAL COURSES	SENIOR EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT
done tion resid- : vely ill : his- er- cla- ge- s, and ving ual ability interpre- feedback individual : confidential : uses for ad professional my profile	<p>ASSESSMENT FOR ALL CENTRALLY SELECTED COMMANDERS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment done in conjunction with precommand courses Uses more sophisticated pencil and paper instruments Focuses on interpersonal relations management ability, problem solving ability, leadership style, and ability to conceptualize Uses individual counselling and feedback sessions Results are confidential <p><u>USE</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual uses for personal and professional development. Develops Army profile. 	<p>ASSESSMENT FOR ALL PROMOTABLE COLONELS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment done when selected for Brigadier General Uses attendance at sophisticated development laboratory Uses pencil and paper instruments, extensive simulations, group exercises Focuses on ability to deal with ill-structured situations, innovativeness, ability to conceptualize, leadership and management styles, and interpersonal relations Extensive personal feedback counselling Results are confidential. <p><u>USE</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual uses for personal and professional development. Individual provides written report to CSA Develops Army profile.

FIGURE 1

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

ASSESSMENT CONCEPT FOR MID-CAREER DEVELOPMENT

TO ANNEX O

ASSESSMENT CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE OFFICER EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

1. BACKGROUND.

a. As part of the RETO effort a study was undertaken to determine the need and advisability of using the assessment concept at the mid-point in an officer's career and prior to battalion and brigade command. That is, during Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC).

b. The use of assessment for personal and professional development in conjunction with intermediate level schooling can be of substantial value. This is the 10-12 year point in the officer's career and he has sufficient military and life experiences to make the assessment meaningful. At the same time, it is early enough in the officer's career that he can benefit from and initiate change based on the profile of himself as revealed by the assessment process. Following this educational experience the officer will enter management and other high level staff positions and thus require a broadening of skills and abilities to deal with problems that are somewhat less structured than those to which he previously has been exposed. The form of assessment at this level must be relatively simple because of the large number of officers involved. It should be aimed at measuring the officer's motivation/interest patterns, his relationships with others to include interactions with subordinates, superiors, and peers, and it should provide a measure of the officer's managerial and problem solving abilities. At the battalion and brigade command selection point, the officer has had a greater range of military and life experiences and the much smaller number of officers permits a more sophisticated assessment approach. These officers would benefit from the insights that can be gained on styles of leadership, interpersonal relations, managerial abilities, and the ability to conceptualize and deal with unstructured situations.

c. Insights, such as outlined above, can be gained through the use of relatively simple paper and pencil learning instruments. Stated simply, these learning instruments are paper documents containing a series of questions each of which has multiple answer possibilities. There are no right or wrong answers, only an honest answer of how one would react or feel in response to the specific question asked. These type instruments also contain a means of scoring responses so that an informative profile, or statement, emerges which characterizes the behavioral practices used by the individual. Thus, a learning instrument is intended for use in a behavioral training experience with the resulting data or profile being provided directly to the officer. Instruments are constructed in such a way that they yield standardized and objective information about one's feelings, attitudes and behavioral practices. They act as a catalyst which can help the individual to bridge the gap between intellectual understanding and actual behavior change.

2. Discussion.

a. As part of this study effort, RETO representatives reviewed many types of pencil and paper learning instruments commonly used to provide a profile of one's motivation/interest patterns, style of leadership and management, nature of interpersonal relations, ability to conceptualize and to handle stress. The purpose of this review was to determine if a relatively simple form of assessment could be found to provide the mid-career officer with a profile that would be of use for self-evaluation leading to further personal and professional development. The review disclosed that a wide variety of such instruments exist and that through the use of four or five an individual can be provided an adequate profile which, while rudimentary, will assist him in his own program of development. As an example of the type learning instruments being considered, the Myer-Briggs Type Indicator can be obtained from Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. 577 College Avenue, Palo Alto CA, 94306

b. For mid-career assessment and development the process would then consist of the administration of selected learning instruments to provide the officer with an appraisal of his behavior patterns in a variety of situations. This approach to learning has several advantages. Because of personal involvement generated in completing the instruments, feedback sessions, either group or individual, can be lively and meaningful experiences for the officer. This is in contrast to other forms of behavioral theory instruction where the student is simply a passive listener. Such instruments provide tools which trainers can use easily and inexpensively with large

groups. The actual method of using learning instruments varies. One such method is to mail out the instruments prior to course attendance and require that they be completed prior to arrival. Another method is to complete the instruments as an integral part of a resident program. The most common and preferred method is to complete the instruments as a home-work requirement while in residence. The time associated with completing the instruments varies from 15 minutes to 2 hours per instrument and thus valuable contact time is not wasted on a process requiring no external guidance. Once the instruments have been completed a group presentation is normally given to explain the theory behind each instrument. Instruments are then scored in accordance with provided instructions. Upon completion of scoring, interpretive handouts are provided and a feedback session is usually conducted. Interpretation of instrument results may be accomplished on a one-on-one basis, in small groups, or in large assemblies where the assessor discusses general interpretations and scoring patterns against which the officer can compare his results. Of these methods, the latter obviously requires the fewest number of assessors. However, experience has shown that in all cases some individual professional counselling assistance should be made available to any officer who is uncertain of the correct interpretation or is otherwise troubled by his resultant profile. Therefore, when this method is used, time must be made available for individual counselling sessions conducted on a confidential basis for those who need it. Application of this form of assessment in CAS³/USACGSC would require a minimum of one qualified assessor and about 4 hours of curriculum time.

c. In the case of battalion and brigade command selectees, the same process of completing the instruments could be used. With the now programmed institution of a command development week into the precommand courses, the assessment process could be easily accommodated. Fewer participants would be involved and these would have broader leadership and management experience, as well as increased familiarity with assessment theory. Therefore, for these courses, a more sophisticated process suggests itself comprising some 6-8 curriculum hours.

d. Presently, the USACGSC is studying the feasibility of implementing a management development week as an integral part of the regular course curriculum. The proposed CAS³/USACGSC assessment concept would be supportive of and complementary to this week and could be implemented simultaneously with it.

e. The Army Management Engineering Training Activity (AMETA), currently conducts a managerial assessment orientation seminar. This 3-day program is not aimed at producing assessors or counsellors but rather orienting managers on the assessment concept. This involves providing managers and executives with information concerning the knowledges, skills and methods useful and available to effectively assess candidates for managerial positions. AMETA is willing to provide this course in residence at Fort Leavenworth on a one time basis for 10-12 managers. The cost would be nominal -- \$200 to \$300 total to cover the cost of Temporary Duty (TDY) for AMETA personnel.

f. As a long range developmental project the use of computer technology may show promise. Specific pencil and paper learning instruments can be computer programmed along with the "type" profiles commonly associated with the specific instrument. The officer could take the instrument by answering questions as they appear on a cathode ray tube (CRT) display. The computer would then compare the resultant profile with those "type" profiles in memory and provide a written interpretation. This process has the advantage of individual anonymity while at the same time being able to accumulate data for a group profile. Given this type data base, the officer could then compare his profile to that of a typical "Army major" which would be made available by the computer as it synthesizes all profiles into one composite.

g. Due to the great number of instruments currently in use and the subtleties involved in each, the selection of the specific learning instruments to be used in the envisioned program must be done by professionals competent in assessment theory and technology. Consultation with the Army Research Institute (ARI) indicates that this entire approach is feasible and that ARI possesses the required professional competence to design the program, select the appropriate learning instruments and to evaluate the results as the program evolves.

3. Proposed Pilot Assessment Concept

a. The pilot assessment concept for CAS³/USACGSC could be implemented in three phases:

1.) Phase I - Preparation 1 October 1978 to 30 March 1979. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) be designated as program proponent. TRADOC in conjunction with ARI, research the assessment process, develop assessment plan to include specific instruments to be used, method of administration and interpretation. Staff training program to commence for program

managers and assessors.

2.) Phase II - Conduct of Assessment, 1 April 1979 to 30 September 79, for existing USACGSC regular course; CAS³ to be added upon implementation. Dates are notional. Actual dates based on time required for program planning. Instruments would be mailed out or otherwise completed as homework. About 4 hours of curriculum time would be required for scoring/feedback, interpretation and discussion.

3.) Phase III - Evaluation 1 October 1979 to 30 March 1980. TRADOC in conjunction with ARI conducts thorough evaluation of program to date to determine its overall value and potential. Specific instruments must be analyzed to determine its overall value and potential. Specific instruments must be analyzed to determine suitability. Those found to be unsatisfactory would be replaced at this time. The evaluation process would be continuous.

b. The assessment concept for battalion and brigade precommand courses could also be implemented in three phases:

1.) Phase I- Preparation 1 October 1978 to 30 March 1979. TRADOC be designated as program proponent. TRADOC in conjunction with ARI determine assessment plan. The process is the same as described above. Program initially applies to existing combat arms precommand program. Assessment program would be expanded to encompass combat support and combat service support when those programs are implemented.

2.) Phase II - Conduct of Assessment 1 April 1979 to 30 September 1979. Dates are notional, actual dates are based on time required for program planning. Assessment instruments would be mailed out to command selectees as part of the proposed precommand self-study packet. Command selectees would arrive at USACGSC and participate in a 6-8 hour scoring and feedback session as part of the command development week.

3.) Phase III - Evaluation 1 October 1979 to 30 March 1980. TRADOC in conjunction with ARI conduct thorough evaluation of program to date. Process to be followed is identical for that of USACGSC.

4. Cost Impact.

a. Based on a review of the sample literature the pencil and paper instruments cost between \$3 and \$5 each. To achieve the desired result will require four or five instruments or a total cost per student of between \$15 and \$20.

1.) For the CAS³/USACGSC assessment, the total cost for 2,690 students per year at \$20 = \$53,800.

2.) For the precommand course the cost for 594 students per year at \$20 = \$11,880.

b. In addition there is a cost associated with initial faculty training. Consultation with ARI indicates that the most cost effective method is to hire an individual who already possesses the requisite expertise. This individual can then run an in-house training program.

5. Recommendations.

a. That the concept be approved.

b. That TRADOC be directed to develop the pilot program for implementation in FY 1980.

c. That the Army Research Institute be charged to identify the specific pencil and paper instruments for use in the pilot program and assist TRADOC in planning and evaluating the program.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 2

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY FOR
NEWLY SELECTED BRIGADIER GENERALS

TO ANNEX 0

ASSESSMENT CONCEPT IN SUPPORT OF THE
OFFICER EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

1. Background.

a. Part of the RETO charter was to determine if a requirement exists for some form of continuing education/ update training for general officers. In pursuit of this issue, over 50 general officers of all grades and representing a cross section of the Army, in terms of "type" assignments, were interviewed by RETO representatives. Opinions and attitudes were varied on the principal issue; however, nearly all generals interviewed made the point in one way or another that the most critical aspect of effective performance on the part of general officers is that of matching the "type" general officer to the "type" duty position for which he is best suited.

b. In 1972, 12 brigadier general designees participated as assessees in a development process which was conducted at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro, NC. A listing of the 12 participants is attached as Inclosure 1.

c. A group report on the results of the assessment of brigadier generals was prepared by Douglas S. Holmes, Ph.D., Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), a copy of which is attached as Inclosure 2. Of significance, the report identified three separate "type" managers among the brigadier general designees.

d. During the course of this portion of the RETO study 9 of the 12 (75 percent) brigadier general designees who were assessed in 1972 were contacted telephonically by a RETO representative. The purpose of these personal contacts was to obtain the assessees' views, after a period of almost 6 years from the date of their experience, on the immediate and lasting value of such process, and to obtain their views and recommendations on future application of

the development laboratory for newly selected brigadier generals.

e. Two of the older, most prominent, and highly reputable civilian organizations in the field of executive development are: Development Dimensions, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA (with offices in Washington, D.C.), and the Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, NC. Representatives of both organizations were contacted personally by RETO representatives to obtain their views on potential application of the development process for newly selected brigadier generals, and to obtain cost estimates from the organizations.

f. RETO representatives sought the counsel of present Director of Human Resources, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPER), who participated as an observer in the 1972 assessment of brigadier general designees. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain the Director's views on potential applications, overall value, and possible impact of conducting a development laboratory as part of the transition from field grade to general officer.

g. The issue in question is: Would it be beneficial for newly selected brigadier generals, as part of their transition from field grade to participate in a 5-day development exercise at a development center as soon as practicable after the promotion list is published and, if so, should the assessment results be made available to the Office Chief of Staff Army (OCSA) and become an additional factor in the decision-making process for general officer assignments and long-range management?

2. Description of the Executive Development Process.

a. Grappling with complex (and not wholly rational) systems whose problems are often beyond their control, is the daily diet of most high level executives. Most executives operate in an atmosphere which can be best described as frenetic; the unexpected is ordinary, ill-structured problems predominate, and subordinates are simply one of many critical factors contributing to their effectiveness. Executives generally spend as much of their time with nonsubordinates (peers, colleagues, etc.) as with subordinates. At the highest levels of organizations, they often spend much of their time with outsiders. The nature of the managerial position is a reactive one. Executive level managers spend their days assimilating, sifting, and responding to fragmented, varied, and brief inputs. They suffer a constant overload of information of which they retain perhaps 1/100th. Leaders and their groups are embedded in complex, contradictory,

organizational systems which are both rational and irrational, subjective and objective, random and purposive, cognitive and affective.

b. The development center endeavors to catch the phenomenon of an infinite variety of ill-structured situations which are faced daily by executives. Participants (assesseees) in this process are observed by a team of highly skilled observers who record the assessee's performance, action, reaction, and overall ability to cope with the complex forces which impact on organizations from within and without. Concurrently, each participant is receiving impressions and gaining insights to the personal and professional qualities of his associates. These impressions will be recorded and later fed back to his associates in the form of peer ratings.

c. Six weeks prior to the program, participants are mailed a battery of personality, interest, and leadership measures which are completed and returned to the development center at least 4 weeks prior to the beginning of the program. These data serve as part of the information used to formulate the overall development program and to give the participants both group and individual feedback.

d. Other developmental features of the program include the study of a creative leadership model, decisionmaking and decision-making styles, using group resources, funneling applied creativity, the importance of peer feedback, and goal setting.

e. The program concludes with a private feedback session with a staff member and a review of assessment videotapes. In the feedback session, the entire test battery is interpreted and a computer printout of the assessment ratings is discussed. The staff member helps the participant organize this information into a meaningful personal profile. Specific observations are given in a descriptive, nonevaluative manner. The consultation focuses on clarifying questions and stresses the usefulness of the information in making personal and work-related decisions.

3. Discussion.

a. Development centers can act as a powerful stimulant to management development, providing self-insight into problem areas and identifying possible development actions. Of the nine general officers interviewed regarding their assessment experience of 1972, all but one (89 percent) cited this aspect of the assessment process as being most beneficial to them. Further, they stated that the experience had a lasting impact on their perspective of themselves and conditioned the manner in which they interacted with other people.

b. The development center process can increase the accuracy of both the initial selection of potential executives and/or identifying those executives who possess the inherent characteristics which complement specific types of positions. More than 100 large and small organizations are presently using the assessment process for these purposes. Some of the users include American Telephone and Telegraph, (AT&T) International Business Machines, (IBM), Standard Oil, as well as government agencies to include the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Aviation Association (FAA), and others. Over 1,000 organizations are actively implementing various applications of these methodologies for many purposes.

c. This study did not develop the concept of using the development process for purposes of selection beyond the precommissioning entry level. However, the assessment process appears to have considerable potential for application in the areas of general officer assignment and long-range management. In view of the importance the Army's general officers attach to assigning the right "type" officer into the various kinds of general officer billets, and considering the striking similarity among officer efficiency reports, especially among front-running lieutenant colonels and above, it would be beneficial for the Chief of Staff Army (CSA), ODSPER, and General Officer Management Office to have access to information which would, as a minimum, categorize each newly selected brigadier general by "type."

d. Dr. Holmes, in his group report of the original 12 brigadier generals (Inclosure 2), identified 3 different types of individuals among the brigadier general designees. Over the long haul, differences among types would appear to be important to organizational outcomes. Dr. Holmes described the 3 types as follows:

(1) "The dependable, cautious, managerial type." His strengths lie in his high-level capabilities, his dedication to mission accomplishment, and his dependability or predictability. His weaknesses lie in his relative lack of unpredictability, (i.e., a lack of innovativeness in areas situationally appropriate but not required by a recognized organizational need) and his relative lack of people-relating concern and effectiveness in role situations other than those whose outcomes are strongly determined by role-authority. About 50 percent of the brigadier general designees were so categorized.

(2) "The outgoing managerial type." In general, the special strength of outgoing managerial types lies in

their ability "to get things done" quickly and efficiently. They often are action-oriented individuals with a strong respect for facts and lots of "know-how." Their special weakness frequently lies in their failure to perceive more deeply and more complexly the possibilities inherent in leadership situations which may make them unusual. About 25 percent of the brigadier general designees were so categorized.

(3) "The potentially creative managerial type." He is characterized by an active, independent mentality that values curiosity and exploration, that often leads to perceiving more possibilities in a situation than are necessary to merely get through it and on to the next one, and that behaviorally is expressed by innovativeness in a wide range of areas. Frequently this type, if motivated to maximize self-expression, avoids conformity behaviors and may appear to rebel against institutionalized authority, presumably in the interests of maintaining self-independence and freedom for exploration and innovativeness. None of the brigadier general designees assessed appeared to be motivated to maximize self-expression at the cost of serious role inappropriateness, but about 25 percent of them appeared to have combined a creative predisposition with a well-practiced and internalized role as typical Army officer.

e. This study considered three alternatives regarding the release of assessment data compiled on newly selected brigadier generals during the assessment process.

(1) No release of assessment results except to the individual concerned. This was the case with the 1972 experience. In this case, the assessment process is purely developmental in nature and, according to 89 percent of previously assessed brigadier general designees, is highly beneficial and has a lasting impact on the assessee. When questioned on the release of individual assessment data to the OCSA for the purpose of factoring the information into the decision-making process for general officer assignments, five of the nine (56 percent) counseled against such a practice. It was their view that it would be perceived as a threat by the assessee and would likely cause him to condition his responses to questions on the various test instruments and thereby distort the results. Moreover, they counseled that, during simulation exercises, some participants would tend to role play in an artificial manner rather than allow their inherent personal qualities to surface.

(2) Release of the assessment results on a highly confidential and controlled basis to the OCSA for subsequent use in the assignment/management process. Civilian industries

and institutions as well as certain government agencies routinely receive assessment data on their personnel and use it for selection and placement purposes. Four of the nine (44 percent) previously assessed general officers favored the release of assessment results to the OCSA for use in the assignment/management process. Generally those in favor of releasing the data suggested that it would be difficult or impossible for an individual to go through the entire developmental process without disclosing his true nature. Moreover, they contended that if the newly selected general officer felt unduly threatened by the process and disclosure of the results to the OCSA, perhaps the wrong man had been selected for elevation to general officer. Basically, however, this group was of the opinion that the quality and character of officers selected for promotion to brigadier general is such that they would recognize the value of using assessment results to promote better utilization of general officer resources and accept it.

(3) Provide the detailed assessment results to the assessee and, on the basis of that assessment together with other factors which warrant consideration, allow the assessee to indicate to the CSA in a personal report the type duties and assignment for which he believes he is best suited. It is envisioned that the designated DA proponent for brigadier general development would, in conjunction with the development laboratory, design a standard report format to be completed by the assessee. Although not as "pure" as (2) above, this alternative would serve to reduce the "threat factor" and possibly would result in a more reliable assessment and therefore a more accurate profile of the assessee. Additionally, it would be much more palatable to the officers concerned.

f. The Director of Human Resources, ODCSPER, indicated to the RETO representatives that the concept of an development laboratory for newly selected brigadier generals has merit. He could foresee possibilities for extending the utility of the assessment data far beyond the range of the concept presented herein. Also, he envisioned possible variations to the developmental process which, in time, would promote a transition of the process from a civilian assessment center to one that is conducted in-house by the Army, perhaps in conjunction with the Brigadier General Designee Conference. The Director agreed, however, that the first step should be a relatively uncomplicated one with the outcome of the first year or two evaluated and used as an experience base for subsequent modification of the program.

g. After considerable deliberation between RETO personnel and staff representatives of CCL and Development Dimensions, Inc., it was concluded that either organization could produce an executive development program for newly selected brigadier generals which, along with other factors, e.g., actual history of past performance, would be of assistance to the decisionmaker in placing the right man or "type" man into the right category of executive position.

h. Initially, the main concern expressed by Assessment Center personnel centered around the fact that their simulations were not modeled on military situations and that it would require rather extensive research into the world of generalship to develop appropriate simulations. This point was discussed at some length and it was mutually concluded that such research and modeling might be well worth the long-term effort. However, for the near-term (1979-80), the many similarities which are inherent in most positions of executive leadership (regardless of professional field) would favor the use of existing materials, e.g., psychometric tests and existing simulations, to conduct a trial run or pilot test of the program. Such an approach would involve a minimum investment on the part of both the organization and the Army, and if either party concluded that the program proved to be of insufficient value, it could be concluded at that point. On the other hand, if such a pilot program pointed toward a greater value if expanded through the commitment of additional resources, a like decision could be made at the appropriate, future time.

i. In addition to the utility of the laboratory for management development and placement, a number of other advantages could accrue to the Army from such a program.

(1) In recent years; significant progress has been made in the technique of personnel assessment. The reliability, validity, and credibility of the assessment process as a useful management tool is becoming widely recognized. The Army will be in a position to take maximum advantage of the process if (but only if) its top level executives (general officers) are knowledgeable of, and committed to, the concept of assessment. As with any other concept, without the sanction of executive level management, it will go nowhere. Therefore, by introducing newly selected brigadier generals to the concept, within a time frame of from 5 to 10 years a sufficient number of the Army's managers will have had the opportunity to experience the process and assess its potential for application as a personnel management tool on a much broader scale within the Army.

(2) Once the program is underway, it would provide a valuable data base for research into a special category of executive leadership -- the Army general officer.

(3) Recognizing that even with the most complete data which could be made available on general officers, their limited numbers alone will not accommodate the assignment of "General Perfect" into a particular duty position in many instances. However, if such data were available on a considerable number of general officers, it would be possible on frequent occasion to complement the characteristics of a particular major general, for example, by assigning as his deputy or assistant a brigadier general whose qualities or abilities are dissimilar enough to increase the effectiveness of the overall management team.

4. Proposed Concept.

It is envisioned that the development laboratory concept for newly selected brigadier generals could be implemented in three phases.

(1) Phase I. Preparation, 30 June 1978 to 31 March 1979. DA proponent designated. DA proponent selects assessment organization, develops assessment plan in collaboration with assessment contract, designs standard format for assessee report to CSA, and prepares for CSA signature a letter to each newly selected brigadier general which explains the purpose and requirements of the program.

(2) Phase II. Assessment, April 1979 to April 1981. (Dates are notional depending on timing of selection board and publication of promotion list.) In accordance with the assessment plan, the development center staff dispatches a battery of tests to each assessee 6 weeks prior to the time he reports for assessment. Assessee complete test instruments and return them to the assessment center 4 weeks prior to reporting for assessment. Newly selected brigadier generals report to the assessment center IAW the assessment plan. (Participants can be accommodated in groups of 10, 12 or 18). Development laboratory activities are completed in 5 working days. Participants forward their personal assessment report to the CSA.

(3) Phase III. Evaluation, May 1980 to March 1981. DA proponent conducts thorough evaluation of two iterations of the program to determine overall value, potential (if any) for expansion, and develops appropriate recommendations regarding the future of the program.

5. Cost Impact.

a. RETO representatives obtained informal estimates from both CCL and Development Dimensions, Inc. Cost estimates for the full program range between \$1,500 and \$2,250 per individual, with CCL coming in with the lower of the two estimates.

b. Cost estimates include an individual assessment report for each participant, a group report, and estimates for TDY expenses.

c. Annual costs for 40 attendees would range from \$60 to \$90 thousand.

6. Comparison.

a. Both assessment organizations have a good reputation

b. The advantages of CCL are its lower cost estimate, previous experience with the 1972 assessment of Army brigadier generals, and a complete assessment laboratory and staff office complex. A disadvantage of CCL is its location, i.e., outside the Washington, D.C. area.

c. The principal advantage of Development Dimensions, Inc., is its capability to perform the assessment in the Washington, D.C. area. This becomes especially advantageous if the assessment process is to be an integral part of the Brigadier General Designee Conference. The disadvantages of Development Dimensions are the absence of a collocated executive development laboratory and staff office complex and a higher cost estimate which is largely attributed to the higher cost area of Washington, D.C.

7. Recommendations.

a. Department of the Army approve and implement the concept for the assessment of newly selected brigadier generals as outlined in paragraph 4 above.

b. The first assessment of the pilot program (1979-80) be conducted by CCL, not as an integral part of the Brigadier General Designee Conference.

c. The second assessment of the pilot program (1980-81) be conducted by Development Dimensions, Inc., as an integral part of the Brigadier General Designee Conference.

2 Inclosures

1 - Assessment Participants, Center for Creative Leadership, 1972

2 - A Report on an Evaluation of Twelve Brigadier General Designees

ASSESSMENT PARTICIPANTS, CENTER FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP, 1972

MG John F. Forrest

BG Robert D. Stevenson, USA, Retired

MG William A Patch

MG Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr.

MG John C. Faith

MG John W. McEnery

BG Richard J. Eaton, USA, Retired

BG George D. Eggers, Jr., USA, Retired

MC Hugh F.T. Hoffman

*BG John A. Maurer

*LJ Jack R. Sadler

*MG John J. Koehler, Jr.

*Not interviewed by RETO

Inclosure 1

0-2-I-1

E-X-T-R-A-C-T

A REPORT ON AN EVALUATION OF
TWELVE BRIGADIER GENERAL DESIGNEES

Douglas S. Holmes, Ph.D.

Center for Creative Leadership
Post Office Box P-1
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November, 1972

Inclosure 2

0-2-II-1

SUMMARY

This report presents our evaluation of twelve Brigadier General designees. The report is relatively long because we felt that it was important to document our findings comprehensively.

There are only a few "messages" in the report because we encountered few surprises. The Brigadier General designees we evaluated are a highly capable group of leaders. Organization-wide implications, suggested by our assessment findings, are largely the same as those communicated in our earlier report based on our evaluation of a group of battalion commanders.

In this report, Brigadier General designees are compared to sample groups of battalion commanders and corporation executives. In addition, three types of Brigadier General designees are identified. Over the long haul, differences among types would appear to be important to organizational outcomes.

In a final section, major impressions and implications are discussed.

THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS AMONG THE BG DESIGNEES

When we evaluated the group of eleven battalion commanders, we discovered that between 50% and 85% of them could be categorized as a particular type of individual. The "typical battalion commander," to be called "the dependable, cautious, managerial type," or the type of individual whom we described in the Battalion Commanders Report, is a highly capable, competent individual who enacts a standardized leadership role quite effectively. His strengths lie in his high-level capabilities, his dedication to mission-accomplishment, and his dependability or predictability. His weaknesses--to a large extent the reverse side of a coin--lie in his relative lack of unpredictability, (i.e., a lack of innovativeness in areas situationally appropriate but not required by a recognized organizational need) and his relative lack of people-relating concern and effectiveness in role situations other than those whose outcomes are strongly determined by role-authority.

Our trained observers, when independently asked to identify those among the BG designees who are properly categorized as the same type of individual as "the dependable, cautious, managerial type," were unanimous in their judgment that between 40% and 60% of the BG designees should be so categorized.

About half of the group of BG designees are substantially different than "the dependable, cautious, managerial type." The purpose of this section is to describe two other types of individuals among the BG designees. Both types of individuals described are representative of about 20-25% of the BG designees evaluated. In addition, the types described have been observed among the 20 or so Army officers previously evaluated (including individuals among the battalion commanders group), which gives us added confidence that this type exists in sufficient numbers among Army officers to be worth considering. We are definitely not, however, suggesting that we possess adequate information concerning the relative percentages of types of individuals who are Army officers. Both the small numbers of officers evaluated and their lack of random selection preclude making accurate generalizations about percentages.

A Way In Which The Three Types Differ Only Slightly

In the Battalion Commanders' Report (p. 2), we described "personality" as consisting of self plus roles, with "role" referring to what is public and more directly observable (e.g., the role of Brigadier General, the role of Army officer, the role of leader). The differences among the three types of individuals identified are largely in the area of "self" rather than role. That is, the role part of personality for each of the three types

is mostly the same, namely, "high-ranking Army officer." As described in the Battalion Commanders' Report, the role of Army officer--which is well-defined to begin with, and is learned and continually rewarded over the entire period of adult life--is internalized and learned to a high degree of perfection. This results, by definition, in a large degree of "sameness" of personality of successful Army officers. It should be noted that the "sameness" of personality is so only when the Army officer is compared to individuals who have internalized other roles, such as doctor, artist, or businessman. "Same" and "different" are relative rather than absolute concepts, and their meaning depends on the points of comparison which are used.

The point here is that the three types of personalities identified differ primarily in terms of internal experience and potential for external behavior, rather than in terms of actualized differences in enacting leadership roles. Over the long-run, internal differences in personality would be expected to lead to substantial differences in the outcomes of performance. In the short-run, outcomes of leadership performance of the three personality types might be quite similar due to the heavy contribution to leadership situations of a common, well-defined role. Stylistic differences might exist, and might reveal the presence of self-differences, but the primary thrust of task-oriented leadership behaviors would be expected to be of the same "standard" nature, thus producing the same outcomes.

THE OUTGOING MANAGERIAL TYPE

This type of individual is unquestionably more interested in the world around him than in what's taking place inside of himself. On the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, he would be expected to be categorized as a rational problem-solver who is interested in being in charge of activities. Excerpts from the Myers-Briggs test manual describe him well:

The extraverted thinker uses his thinking to run as much of the world as may be his to run... He organizes facts, situations, and operations well in advance, and makes a systematic effort to reach carefully planned objectives on schedule. He thinks everybody's conduct should be governed by logic, and governs his own that way so far as he can.

He enjoys being an executive, and puts a great deal of himself into such a job. He likes to decide what ought to be done and to give the requisite orders. He abhors confusion, inefficiency, half-way measures, and anything aimless and ineffective....

On personality tests, our sub-group of this type of individual among the BG designees scored considerably higher than average on measures of expressing control over the behavior of others (FIRO-B), being enthusiastic and happy-go-lucky (16 Personality Factors Test), need for achievement (Edwards Personal Preference Schedule), and being efficient intellectually (California Psychological Inventory). They scored at the average for the group on a measure of flexibility (California Psychological Inventory). They were at the average for the group of BG designees

in terms of intellectual ability scores (Terman Concept Mastery Test and Shipley Institute of Living Scale) and scored average or below on a measure of creative intellectual abilities (Remote Associates Test). They also scored less in the self-actualizing direction than the average for BG designees. Finally, on the Leadership Opinion Questionnaire, they definitely favored initiated structure over consideration in their attitudes towards leadership behaviors.

On behavioral measures, those categorized as outgoing managerial individuals were rated high in personal forcefulness and oral communications skills. In leaderless group discussions, they were active participants who frequently led the discussion, analyzed the problem, offered good ideas, etc. In structured roles, they communicated equally well to subordinates, peers, and superiors. They appeared to be better at organizing, analyzing, deciding, etc., than they were at increasing the performance of their subordinates, scoring below the average for the BG designees and considerably below their own personal average on measures of motivating subordinates, building morale, and delegating authority.

Relatively better performances by those categorized as outgoing managerial individuals occurred in roles observed at an earlier time during the week, even though their absolute level

of performance did not decrease. For example, peer measures relating to leadership ability were higher early in the week than at the end, although they always were above average for the group of BG designees. The reason for the relative decline in performance is a common one in assessment (or, for that matter, non-assessment) situations: Outgoing individuals create a better first impression than introverted individuals and are apt to be over-evaluated unless this is taken into account as an assessor bias or the assessment period is sufficiently long to permit more introverted individuals to display their abilities.

In general, the special strength of outgoing managerial types often lies in their ability "to get things done" quickly and efficiently. They often are action-oriented individuals with a strong respect for facts and lots of "know-how." Their special weakness frequently lies in their failure to perceive more deeply and more complexly the possibilities inherent in leadership situations which may make them unusual.

THE POTENTIALLY CREATIVE MANAGERIAL TYPE

This type of individual may either be relatively more interested in the world around him or in what's taking place inside of himself. Either way, he is characterized by an active, independent mentality that values curiosity and exploration, that often leads to perceiving more possibilities in a situation than

are necessary to merely get through it and on to the next one, and that behaviorally is expressed by innovativeness in a wide range of areas. Frequently this type of self, is motivated to maximize self-expression, avoids conformity behaviors and in line with this, may appear to rebel against institutionalized authority, presumably in the interests of maintaining self-independence and freedom for exploration and innovativeness. As previously mentioned, none of the BG designees assessed appeared to be motivated to maximize self-expression at the cost of serious role inappropriateness but about 25% of them appeared to have combined a creative pre-disposition with a well-practiced and internalized role as typical Army officer.

On psychological tests, individuals categorized as potentially creative managerial types of individuals score strongly in the intuitive direction (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator). This indicates a greater degree of openness to the potential richness of inner experience as it applies to leadership situations. It would be expected from this that such individuals would see relatively more possibilities in leadership situations and simultaneously, both would be in a better position to innovate in situations and a worse position to easily move on to the next situation.

Individuals in this category scored considerably higher than the average BG designee on an intelligence measure (Terman Concept

Mastery) and a creative ability measure (Remote Associates Test; with one exception, an individual who scored far below average because of the particular way in which he approached the test). Scores on intellectual efficiency and flexibility (California Psychological Inventory) were also considerably higher, as were scores related to being enthusiastic and happy-go-lucky (16 Personality Factors Test) and need for achievement (Edwards Personal Preference Schedule). On the Personal Orientation Inventory, they scored more in the self-actualizing direction than the average BG designee. On the Leadership Opinion Questionnaire, when compared to middle managers, they favored consideration over initiating structure. (This finding, incidentally, is remarkable. All individuals in this category, and, among the BG designees, only individuals in this category, favored consideration over initiating structure.)

On behavioral measures, all individuals in this category were rated above the average for BG designees on personal forcefulness, self-objectivity, and quality of decisions. They all were rated below the group average on their effectiveness at presenting an oral report to a small group. In related situations, they were rated as seeking more approval or feedback from peers concerning what they were saying. Our interpretation is that these individuals, because of an active, intuitive, explorative mode of

thinking, have learned to optimize their contributions, in a group by seeking more than the usual amount of group guidance concerning the greater than usual frequency of avenues for exploration that they open up. In leaderless group discussions (LGDs), where the above phenomena were demonstrated most clearly, individuals categorized as potentially creative scored higher than average for the BG designees on an item measuring the degree to which the individuals influenced other participants, but lower than average on all other group dynamic measures obtained in the situation such as "led the discussion," "clearly defined the problem," "effective in saying what he wants to say," etc.

In structured role performances, individuals in this category performed their best in the least structured role. In most roles, their performance was remarkably close to the group average. In fact, compared to the other BG designees and corporate executives, individuals in this category clearly showed less variability of role performance. On theoretical grounds we would predict the exact opposite, namely, that more creative individuals should display more variability in role performance because their role performance would be relatively more determined by self- than by situational-inputs. A likely hypothesis for less variable performance by potentially creative individuals is that the individual has over-learned his role and over-controls his performance in order to avoid the negative consequences associated with permitting

performance to swing all the way to an ineffective level as judged from a short-term perspective. It should be noted that our finding concerning the smaller than expected degree of variability of performance by individuals in this category accurately characterizes individuals in this category whom we have assessed, but is based on too small a sample to generalize to the population of potentially creative officers in the Army.

On behavioral measures obtained during structured role situations, these individuals were seen as communicative at or above the average level in situations where preparing a talk was not involved. In gathering and presenting data in informal briefings, these individuals appeared to be aware of more possibilities and to see relationships which were less clearly related to the data, as viewed logically, but were as valid as the other analyses offered.

It should be noted that the types of individuals identified as potentially creative have a special problem in getting their ideas accepted in most organizations. Although the quality of their ideas and decisions may, on the average, be exceptionally high (as is the case with the BG designees being discussed), the acceptability of many of their ideas and potential decisions may be low. It should be recognized that these individuals are constantly faced with the problem of having "unacceptable" ideas that

potentially may be of great worth to the Army. We are all familiar with examples of good ideas that were too far ahead of their time, of the natural resistance to change that exists in most organizations, of the need to prepare people to accept new ideas, etc. The BG designees whom we are discussing appear to work hard at paving the way for acceptance of their ideas: they listen well to other points of view, they seek feedback concerning their ideas, they incorporate into their idea what they learn from others, and they don't push "losing" causes. If associates of these individuals provide a climate which encourages thinking and talking about "ideas", the organization is less likely to underutilize one of its valuable resources.

The Three Types Compared

As previously suggested, each of the three types of individuals have learned a common role, or sets of role behaviors and role attributes (i.e., "personality traits," as perceived by others in a leadership situation). All of the BG designees are highly motivated, intelligent, competent men. Thus, in many leadership situations, they would be expected to perform in many of the same ways. Differences in leadership outcomes would be determined by situational circumstances and by individual differences in levels of abilities, but not by differences in approaches, goal-setting, etc.

However, in terms of the self part of personality, clear differences in performance in some situations would be expected. The outgoing managerial type would most naturally perform best in situations requiring exertion of strong leadership control and a rapid, energetic, well-organized processing of activities required for mission accomplishment. The potentially creative individual would most naturally perform best in situations where discovering the best ways to proceed is a major part of the problem, rather than proceeding full-speed ahead along well-defined pathways. The dependable, cautious, managerial type can be counted on to do what is required. He is perhaps a bit more of a "bureaucrat" or "organization man," in a deeply rooted sense, and a bit more cautious or inhibited than is the case with the other two types.

Some of the flavor of the difference in outcomes for the Army that might be expected from the differences between the dependable, cautious, managerial type and the potentially creative type are illustrated in Table 4. All responses included in Table 4 are reported verbatim. Responses from the more outgoing type of individual are not included because we could not do so while fully protecting the anonymity of each individual evaluated.

An interesting finding is that both of the minority types of individuals--the outgoing and the potentially creative--per-

performed better in the Assessment Week than the majority type of individual. Their peers (civilian and military) agree with this finding: 80% of the "minority types" were ranked in the top half on the "Liked to Work With" form, and all were in the top third on the "Prediction of Leadership Ability" form. Because of the small number of individuals involved, we cannot generalize this finding as a behavioral expectation for a large group of Army officers or BG designees, but it does raise two interesting questions:

1. Is it more difficult for forceful, outgoing individuals and potentially creative individuals to be promoted to general officer than for other types of individuals?
2. Do forceful, outgoing individuals and potentially creative individuals make superior leaders in the Army?

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

1. PURPOSE. The Annex describes the requirements for developing the component of the Officer Professional Development system which is primarily educational in nature. It discusses the need to structure 12 fields of learning under the general heading of Professional Military Education (PME). It also undertakes a new analysis of each of these fields, and asks for the proponenty, command guidance, administrative support and resource management that will meet officer learning requirements in the future.

2. SCOPE. Future Requirements in Professional Military Education, Appendix 1, discusses new requirements for officer education and suggests methods for meeting these requirements. The graduate schooling aspects of PME are analyzed in Appendix 2 and foreign language requirements are outlined in Appendix 3. Appendix 4, Professional Ethics, and Appendix 5, Military History, present analysis of two principle fields as examples of the type of analysis needed in all 12 fields of PME.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Professional Military Education:

(1) The Office of Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) appoint a "Steering Group for Professional Military Education" whose purpose is to draft regulations for the establishment of PME as a distinct component of Officer Professional Development. These regulations should state the concept, purposes, and subject-matter scope of PME and provide for the command guidance, administrative support, and resource management necessary to sustain PME programs.

(2) A separate and distinct DA staff element (division level suggested) be established to handle all matters relating to Officer Professional Military Education.

(3) A program be established for continuing research and analysis by competent specialists, whose purpose is to develop learning materials in each of the PME fields.

(4) Revisions of DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Utilization, include appropriate requirements in

Professional Military Education.

b. Graduate Level Education:

(1) Improvement be made in identification of requirements through task analysis of all duty positions; analysis and clustering of tasks within OPMS specialties.

(2) Improvement be made in the justification of requirements through application of task analysis data.

(3) Improvement be made in the depiction of the way graduate degree holders are employed by the Army, through better labeling of duty position degree requirements; identification of cross substitutability of degrees in duty assignments; showing employment of degree holders against requirements in all reports to Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress.

(4) A priority system be established for full funding of schooling to meet the expanded degree requirements, and for fill of graduate degree duty positions with degree holders.

(5) More and better guidance be provided to field commanders on the identification and justification of graduate level educational needs, and on the employment of degree holders.

(6) Requirements be defined and developed for less-than-degree graduate education, and course packages developed to satisfy those needs.

c. Foreign Languages.

(1) Officer foreign language requirements be documented.

(2) Testing procedures be updated to include testing for speaking ability.

(3) Officers who do not take the tests or who fail to achieve a grade of R2/L2/S1 be decertified.

(4) Additional skill identifier be assigned to officers who achieve "3" or better in two of the skills and at least "2" in the third.

(5) Development of language maintenance packets be accelerated.

(6) ROTC scholarship recipients be encouraged to include 2 years

of foreign language study in their undergraduate curriculum.

(7) Self-paced foreign language electives be established in Army schools.

(8) Current command language programs be continued.

5 Appendixes

1. Future Requirements in Professional Military Education.
2. Graduate Level Education of Army Officers.
3. Foreign Languages and U.S. Army Officers.
4. Professional Ethics (To be published).
5. Military History (To be published).

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

TO ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

BACKGROUND. The recommendations contained in the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Study calls for higher levels of officer learning throughout the 1980's if the Army is to perform its missions in the 1990's. These higher levels are demanded by the worldwide knowledge explosion being generated by technological and societal change and, within the Army environment, by changing concepts of the use of military force for resolving problems of a political and social nature.

Much of the new learning will be handled by the training process, which assists the officer trainee in learning technical skills and knowledge so that he can become qualified as proficient in performing a task. Through better task analysis and more concentration of officers in specializations, it is hoped that the new learning load can be better distributed throughout the officer corps.

Part of the new learning requirement does not focus on task performance, however. It calls for the development of values and insights, and the capacity to analyze, conceptualize and to make sound judgments in a variety of fields which transcend specialization and specific tasks. The learning process for these goals is an educational process, often defined as "assisting one to develop mentally and morally."

The training process and the educational process are sufficiently different that they call for differing learning objectives; for example, the acquisition of mechanical skills is usually considered to be a training process, while the acquisition of analytical skills or ethical insights calls for an educational process. The distinction is important because each process calls for differing methods of instruction, amount and kind of student evaluation, extent of research and writing, and faculty/student ratios. Figure 1 outlines these differences. The educational process is more dependent on formal resident instruction in which a specially educated faculty member

SOME CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRAINING
& EDUCATION.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LEARNING PROCESS

SUBJECT MATTER TO BE LEARNED

AMOUNT & TYPE OF FORMAL INSTRUCTION

QUALIFICATIONS OF FACULTY

AMOUNT & KIND OF EVALUATION OF STUDENTS

TIME IN CLASS VS. INDIVIDUAL STUDY

FACULTY/STUDENT RATION

AMOUNT OF RESEARCH & WRITING

Figure 1

leads seminar discussion and guides individual study based on the talents and interests of each student.

In the past, the Army has used a variety of approaches in meeting the educational needs of the officer. First, it has developed its own educational capability in certain institutions by assembling faculty, resources, appropriate mission statements, and component student bodies. The principal effort has been at the U.S. Military Academy, whose traditional function has been "to provide education equivalent to that of the best colleges and universities." The Army has created pockets of educational competence in certain service schools (and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments) — places where the mission calls for teaching such subjects as management, languages, or strategic studies. The singular disadvantage of the Army's current program of in-house education is its exclusiveness; such education is not available to the vast majority of Army officers.

The Army's second approach has been to rely on civilian colleges and universities to conduct programs that educate selected officers. This has been particularly true at the graduate level, for the Army has not created a graduate college as have the other military services. The Army also relies on the ROTC program in civilian colleges to provide general education to the baccalaureate level for 80 percent of its newly commissioned officers. This has the disadvantage of not being able to tailor curriculum to meet military need.

The third approach has been to conduct the educational process by using the resources, time and personnel that have been marshalled in the service schools for the training process. In some cases this has worked well enough. But, more often, the effort to train officers in leadership, management, military history, professional ethics, military law, national defense policy, and effective writing has been poorly rated by student and faculty alike. The survey conducted by RETC finds that many officers are disappointed with service schools. The failure to meet their expectations about the educational process is one of the sources of their disappointment.

A Program for Professional Military Education.

If the Army is to support the officer corps with a better opportunity to meet new educational requirements in the years ahead, it will have to undertake a more systematic approach to providing the command guidance, the administrative structure, the theoretical foundation, the faculty, the resources, the methods, and the officer time, that inhere in a quality educational process. The Army should also exploit this process to improve officer motivation and commitment, to bind the officer specialization system together in a unified professional corps, and to set high professional standards.

It is the thesis of this paper that these ends can be accomplished through developing a systematic program of Professional Military Education (PME) as a component of the broader Officer Professional Development system envisioned by the RETO study.

The singular characteristic of such a program would be competence in promoting the full range of learning objectives, not just in the straightforward acquisition of knowledge and skills, but also in the more elusive insights and values which the officer must derive for himself. Figure 2 outlines the scope of these learning objectives and suggests the varieties of learning methods associated with them.

The substance of PME is recognizable in most of its present forms. Figure 3 suggests titles for 12 fields under the general headings of "Traditional" and "Developing". The latter has grown in importance in the Army's recent responses to changing times, some not sufficiently developed to be more than a yearning to make progress. Analysis of these fields will show that they share certain characteristics, such as their appropriateness for nearly all officers, regardless of branch or specialty, which gives them a mark of advancing professional cohesiveness as well as professional knowledge. In some cases, these fields can set professional standards and can be developed to provide the motivation and commitment to meet higher professional standards. They can also provide a bridge of understanding and trust to the civilian community -- the universities, the press, and the government agencies.

As will be discussed later, the development of these fields calls for extensive research and writing in the future. It will also call for the command guidance, the administrative structure and the resource management that are appropriate to a long-term educational program.

The variety of purposes for a sound PME program is outlined in Figure 4. Perhaps none of these purposes is more important than that of assisting officers to prepare themselves for the future years when their training in current doctrine and technology has been outmoded by constant change, and they must rely on the processes, the insights, and the ability to make sound judgments in situations previously unknown to them.

Analysis of the Professional Military Education Requirement.

The RETO Study calls for increased emphasis on officer education in each of the major levels of Officer Professional Development. Before the officer is commissioned it is anticipated that he will have completed at least two courses in five of the traditional fields

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

KNOWLEDGE. Information, data, facts, theories, concepts. The factual basis of any course of learning. Answers question: "What should I know?" May be achieved by many learning methods. Highly perishable.

SKILLS. An ability which can be developed; not necessarily inborn; manifested in performance, not merely in potential. Developed by learning to manipulate factual knowledge. Answers question: "What should I be able to do?" Categories:

- (1) Information-retrieval skills -- reading, research hearing.
- (2) Communication skills -- writing, speaking, conferring.
- (3) Technical skills -- performance within a specific activity, e.g., mapreading, marksmanship.
- (4) Human skills -- the ability to work effectively as a group member and to build cooperative effort within a team -- leadership skills, counseling.
- (5) Analytical and conceptualization skills -- problem-identification, problem-solving, decision-making, planning, making estimates of the situation, synthesizing, inducing, structuring, systems analyzing.

INSIGHTS. Ideas and thoughts derived internally from an ability to see and understand clearly the nature of things. Necessary part of making judgments, of deciding, of "putting it all together," "of being aware," of wisdom, far-sightedness. Answers question: "What does this mean? What is important in this situation?" Cannot be taught directly, but can be induced by well-educated faculty, using appropriate teaching methods. Generally, a product of education rather than training.

VALUES. Convictions, fundamental beliefs, standards governing the behavior of people. Includes attitudes towards professional standards such as duty, integrity, loyalty, patriotism, public service. "Take care of your men," "accomplish your mission." Answers question: "What do I believe? Where do I draw the line?" Values, like insights, must be derived by the individual if they are to have meaning; may be derived, induced or precipitated by knowledge about values, their importance to professionalism, and the statements of others about personnel commitment to values.

FIGURE 2

The Fields of Professional Military Education

The Traditional Fields:

Military History

Leadership

Management

Military Law

National Security Affairs

Communications Skills: Writing, Speaking,
Languages

The Developing Fields:

Professional Ethics

Armed Forces and Society

Art of Command

Battle Simulation (Wargaming)

Land Warfare

Analytical and Conceptual Skills

FIGURE 3

Purposes of Professional Military Education

- to assist officers in acquiring the knowledge, skills, insights and values customarily associated with the educational process.
- to assist 12 officers in becoming more expert in some 12 fields of learning most closely associated with the military profession.
- to provide the learning that is common to all officers regardless of specialty designations, and there by enhance the cohesiveness and corporateness of the military profession.
- to set high standards of professional conduct and to inspire officers to live by these standards,
- to provide a bridge of common understanding and trust between the civilian community and the military profession in areas of mutual concern.
- to guide the research, writing, and intellectual exchange needed to advance the excellence of professional military education,
- to provide the command guidance, administrative structure, and resource management essential to sustaining a long-term program in officer education,
- and, overall, to provide the officer who is well-trained in current doctrine and technology, the additional capability to make sound judgments in the unknown future that is being produced by rapidly changing times.

FIGURE 4

of PME: military history: written Communication Skills; a human behavior course in support of leadership development; management; or national security affairs. If officer is unable to complete all five courses before commissioning, then subsequent commanders are to see that they are completed in the early years of commissioned service. (Prior to completion of Military Qualification Standards (MQS) III). In addition, it is anticipated that the officer will have pursued a foreign language for at least 2 years.

The company grade officer is expected to continue his education, using perhaps 25 percent of his time in the basic course for further work in such areas as leadership and professional ethics; specific requirements are to be determined by future analysis. A new emphasis is to be placed on officer development by prescribing Military Qualification Standards (MQS) which must be met before advancement. Future analysis will determine the nature and scope of these requirements, to include directed reading of books in several of the PME fields.

Officer education at the field grade level will place emphasis on new requirements for management skills, analytical and conceptual skills, and more sophisticated learning about the art of command and the waging of land warfare in an era of highly lethal weapons and combined arms doctrine. In all, the forecast is for a relearning process at least three times in the career of a professional military officer.

These expectations call for new analysis in virtually all of the 12 fields of PME, to include the most traditional, Military History. Because it has been part of the curricula of military officers throughout the 20th century, Military History has been under continuing scrutiny for as long a period. In 1971 a major analysis of the study of military history was completed by HQ Department of the Army,* and in 1978 The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sponsored another broad review. Despite this emphasis, and despite the existence of such agencies as the Center of Military History in Washington, and the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, the History courses taught in Army service schools have diminished in recent years (generally attributable to the reduction in elective programs in the branch advanced courses), and the amount of study of history by Army officers appears to be quite small in comparison with that in other armies. The Soviet Staff College, for example, requires some 170 hours of military history -- 10 times as many hours as in the USACGSC.

*Department of the Army, Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Army Need for the Study of Military History, 1971.

To meet the requirements for officer learning of Military History in the 1980's, the following questions need to be addressed:

- Can authorities agree on the best foundation course or courses required for all officers, regardless of source of commission? What are the qualifications for faculty teaching these courses and what texts are most appropriate?
- What are the most acceptable methods for employing Military History for motivational and inspirational purposes in "military heritage" courses for new officers?
- What branch basic course experience is best suited for introducing new officers to their branch and for preparing them for continuing professional study of Military History?
- What format is needed to encourage and guide officers in reading Military History under the proposed directed reading program for company grade officers? What criteria should be used in the selection of history books for the program -- relevance to current need? Popularity? Time-proven? Contribution to learning in other PME fields? Literary value? Biographical? Historical novel?
- How is Military History best used in support of learning in other fields of PME, such as Art of Command, Land Warfare, Leadership, and National Security Affairs?
- What is an appropriate program for the schools preparing officers for field grade and senior positions? How should this relate to the commander's function to monitor the directed reading programs of his subordinates?
- What is the requirement for specially-educated faculty and staff who must prepare and conduct these programs on a continuing basis?
- What programs of research and writing in Military History are needed to provide the materials for new requirements?
- What is the appropriate structure for providing proponentcy, command guidance, administrative coordination, and resource management for the overall program in Military History?

These questions about Military History, and many more like them, must be answered in the near future if education is to be improved across the officer corps in the 1980's.

Many of the same questions apply to the other "traditional" fields of PME. The systematic study of military leadership, for example, has spanned two generations and continues to develop. New analysis is being directed away from the past focus on the individual as a leader, and towards organizational leadership, based on systems theory. The search for useful leadership doctrine will accelerate, creating new questions about the scope and nature of leadership education at all levels. Typical of these questions are:

- What is the best academic experience in human behavior for a future officer in order to support future learning in leadership at the basic course and later courses?
- What doctrine can guide leadership instruction in the Army?
- What is the proper relationship between instruction in leadership and that in Professional Ethics, Organizational Effectiveness, Human Relations, Art of Command, and Management?
- What is the essential background qualifications of a faculty empowered to teach Leadership?
- What is the proper mix of resident and nonresident instruction, of theoretical and practical instruction?

The Management field is also under continuing development, as is Military Law, where the question becomes one of keeping the officer corps abreast of changes and new conceptions of the rights and duties of the soldier and his superiors. The Management field's development is discussed throughout the RETO Report, particularly in Annexes I and J. National Security Affairs, the study of the application of military force to the resolution of the nation's foreign policy problems, has its strategic, political, and economic facets; this raises not only the question of the proper undergraduate exposure to national security affairs for future officers, but also how much study of history, political science, and economics is needed for continuing learning about the nation's strategic thinking.

Most criticisms of officer competence reflect a desire to see improvement in communications skills: however, it is difficult to find a coordinated effort. Schools and posts offer diagnostic testing and remedial or advanced instruction in writing. Speed reading

and typing courses are often available, depending on the local sensing of need for them. More systematic development would provide every officer the opportunity to have well-qualified counseling on writing improvement, both in schools and by correspondence instruction. Some U.S. Government agencies require all new junior managers to enroll in courses sponsored by private educational institutions. It is difficult to state what the Army does require at the present time. It is equally difficult to state what the Army requires of an officer in the speaking and writing of the language spoken by soldiers and civilians of his own society, that of his allies, or his potential enemies. Appendix 3 of Annex P analyzes this requirement for the future.

The "developing" fields of PME have generally been identified in recent years as separate fields of officer learning because of changing societal and technological conditions. Armed Forces and Society has a relatively long history of development by sociologists under the leadership of Professor Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago, who is responsible for creating the Inter-university Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Officer participation in this program has made the Army more aware of the issues involved in the raising and sustaining of military forces in American and selected foreign societies. As in Military History, there are journals, conferences, and officer programs of graduate education in this field. It continues to develop as an interdisciplinary study which focuses on some of the most difficult military issues such as national military service, military values and life styles, societal constraints and supports for the military, and military professionalism. Analysis is needed to rationalize this prolific field across the learning levels of military officers, and particularly to find a proper place in the system of Military Qualification Standards and directed reading, and in the preparation of senior officers for national policy roles.

Land Warfare was not identified as a distinct field of officer education as long as the separate subjects of tactics, weapons, communications, etc. sufficed to train the officer for command and staff functions in wartime. New technology, and particularly that which produced rising lethality of weapons on the battlefield, changed this concept and created a demand for new doctrine, expressed best in the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, Army Operations. As a tactical training device, this volume taught a new standard of war-time conduct for unit leaders on the battlefield. But it also raised a continuing question among professionals of what the new standard should be, in terms of relating tactics and weapons to strategy and national purpose. As in the development of air warfare and naval warfare, there is an educational aspect to the knowledge, skills, insights, and values involved in a study of Land Warfare, which includes joint

and combined operations, contingency and NATO terrain, corps and theater level jurisdiction, and nuclear and conventional methods. New analysis needs to ask how this field of study should be developed, in terms not only of the traditional wisdom of Clausewitz, but also the new suggestions of historians like John Keegan in his The Face of Battle (1977), and others who are now examining the parameters of modern land warfare.

Art of Command and Wargaming are fields of PME which exemplify best the demand for new analysis of traditional military expertise. A pressing concern among military leaders has led to the creation of precommand courses for those selected to lead battalion, brigade, and division level forces. The purpose is "updating," but the concern lies on the battlefield: given the modern communications systems, weapons lethality, electronic warfare possibilities, potential for nuclear and biological and chemical deployments, and a seemingly unending roster of similar innovations, how can a wartime commander best cope with the violence and unpredictability of the new battlefield? New analysis will be continuing, if it is to be effective, in an effort to understand, then describe, and finally educate officers to the new levels of required competence.

Battle simulation or wargaming is, perhaps, an extension of this analysis. If the new potential for computer assisted wargaming is to be utilized practically, it will be not only in the development of war plans and the testing of new doctrine, but also in the training and evaluation of future commanders. The art lies, however, in designing the methodology and the philosophical framework to advance the art. And, also, in the securing of educated personnel who can adapt the possibilities of new technology to, say, the doctrinal patterns of Soviet thinking in tactical and strategic operations.

In consequence of the U.S. Army War College Professionalism Study of 1970, the Army service schools undertook to increase the amount of coursework in Professional Ethics. Yet, in the Drisko Analysis of Professional military Ethics in 1977, nearly three-fourths of the officers surveyed called for an increased emphasis on instruction in ethics. They reflected doubt that all officers know the desired standards of ethical behavior, that the Army system of rewards and punishments is supportive of ethical behavior, and that the schools are doing as well as they should in correcting this situation. The problem lies beyond the schools. Professional Ethics is probably the least developed of the 12 PME fields, lacking an underlying philosophical base, a body of literature appropriate to school use, a faculty specifically educated and dedicated to the task, and the resources

necessary to respond to the challenges.

For these reasons, the questions that need to be addressed are more fundamental than those asked of history and the traditional fields. Professional Ethics needs analysis in terms of:

- What are the standards of ethical behavior expected of all officers? How should they come to know this? Is a written Code of Ethics needed? If so, what is it?
- How can officers learn to accept these standards as their own and then learn to act in accordance with these standards, even in the most severe circumstances?
- What should professional officers learn about commanding and setting policy for Army units so that the environment is most supportive of high ethical standards among all personnel?
- What should officers learn if they are to become better able to identify and resolve ethical issues at all levels? Can this be taught? Is undergraduate education in Philosophy and related humanistic studies a necessary foundation for later learning? If so, how much and what kind?
- Ethical problems exist in the field of Armed Forces and Society; e.g., under what circumstances is it right and under what circumstances is it wrong to draft citizens into the armed forces? Ethical issues exist also in the field of National Security Affairs; e.g., under what conditions is it right and wrong to initiate nuclear warfare? Ethical issues also exist in the field of Land Warfare: e.g., under what conditions is it right and wrong to use conventional weapons of great lethality against civilian populations? Should Army officers be asked to concern themselves with questions of this type? If so, at what level of education? What are the proper precommissioning educational foundations to support this learning? What is the full scope of these questions? What agency should have responsibility for developing this knowledge?

Just as communication skills can be taught through the educational process, so also can Analytical and Conceptual Skills be explained, exercised, and evaluated as the officer learns in the 12 fields of PME. In recent decades, the university faculties of Management studies have paid particular attention to developing the skills that allow those in authority to think and decide in a systematic manner. Included are techniques in modeling, estimating, problem identification, creative thinking, and data collection and organization. Among the insights to

be acquired are sensing the relationship of broad policies to detailed operations, identifying the meaningful relevant information in a mass of data; being able to consider all relevant views; and sensing the full range of alternatives and recommendations. Because of the developing nature of the skill acquisition field as applied to military usage, there is a requirement for the Army to establish and provide to officers its judgment of the best combination of necessary skills and how they can be acquired in a continuing program in PME learning.

Challenges and Responses in PME

The preceding brief analysis of the nature and scope of Professional Military Education ultimately asks; Who are the people who will develop the twelve fields, by researching, conferring, and writing materials for officers to study? Who will prepare the resident courses programs of instruction, give the lectures, lead the discussions, motivate the learners, evaluate the students, and provide feedback for program redesign? Who will translate this learning into nonresident modes, such as is needed in a directed reading program? Who will decide and direct what is to be done, and make the necessary coordination within the Army, and also with other government agencies and with the civilian community, especially the undergraduate and graduate colleges?

The bulk of this challenge will be carried out by the faculty members at each of the service schools, at USACGSC at the U.S. Army War College, and at the Military Academy; standards for this "Army faculty" are discussed below. In addition, selected staff officers will have to be designated to carry out program design in the Department of the Army and in affected major commands, especially TRADOC.

Most military forces designate a flag or general officer to be in charge of officer career development activities, such as the U.S. Navy's three-star Director of Naval Education and Training (DNET). Foreign counterparts, such as in Canada and the United Kingdom, often include within their scope of activities an officer examination system in educational matters, which has an influence on selection for higher schooling and promotion. If the U.S. Army is to move into educational programs which are included as "gates" for further advancement, the demand will increase for a general officer on a fulltime basis in this capacity.

Under present organizational structures, "DA Proponency" for PME would fall most logically under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). Of immediate need is a small steering group within ODCSPER, to which is given the authority to design and

obtain approval of policy for PME development and to draft regulations providing guidance to Army agencies who are tasked to carry out officer education and training programs in the 1980's. Such policy cannot be determined at a level lower than the Department of Army Staff because it requires coordination with policy on commissioning standards, specialty designations, assignments, promotions and schooling opportunities. An ODCSPER steering group for PME may find it convenient to establish an advisory panel of "PME proponents" for each of the 12 fields, who in turn would seek coordinated understanding of prominent participants in each of the fields.

The specially-educated members of the school faculties will, in the long run, develop the programs for PME. Policy should push this responsibility on them rather than rely on overextended staff officers to cope with a problem which is essentially one of a myriad of details. To do the job, however, 12 small faculties of superb qualification must be identified throughout the Army and then oriented and supported in the task.

Any person who purports to be an educator of military officers must be competent in one, or better both, of these two fundamental conceptions of the unique expertise of the military profession: How military force can be marshalled and applied usefully to the resolution of the nation's problems; and how new technology can be applied in the right manner to the needs of the nation's military forces. The military educator must have earned the academic credentials of all competent educators at the undergraduate and graduate levels, in an appropriate discipline and under the demanding tutelage of recognized educators.

A military educator in a military institution which awards a master's diploma should have a doctoral degree. A military educator in an institution which awards a bachelors' degree should have a masters' degree and at least 15 semester-courses at the graduate level; many should also have doctoral degrees. A military educator in a nondegree awarding institution, which includes most Army service schools, should have a masters' degree. These are the Standards of American Education. They are minimum faculty standards for PME fields and are achievable within the Army.

Why are these levels of education important for military educators? They are not needed by instructors whose sole function is to read a lecture script from a platform. They are needed however, if the educators are to answer questions based on theory and historical development of the field. They must be able to evaluate student work and counsel on the development of better skills. They must be able to create new programs, and to obtain new information and ideas from the experts in the civilian community. They must have the respect of students who expect their instructors to know more and be able to do more than they, the students, know and can do.

These educators must have the additional capability of relating their academic expertise to the real needs of the military officer and they must convince the military student that they know more about his future work than he does. Previous military experience is the most recognized method of acquiring these abilities. In rapidly changing times, however, more than old experience is needed. The educator must have a mindset -- a passion -- to probe for future military need. It was the paucity of forward-thinking military educators in service schools which caused students who would fight in Viet Nam to be sent there thinking in terms of World War II and Korean operations. When the strategy called for "search and destroy" missions in an area of operations, many S-3's continued to draw goose eggs on terrain objectives, and plotted the timely arrival at phaselines of units hastily making their way down march routes to fixed objectives.

In addition to meeting these academic and military requirements, the good educator volunteers to undertake his work, often knowing that he is taking time away from other professional pursuits. The Army personnel management system should nurture its ability to provide the schools with a junior faculty of educated and experienced officers who serve one tour in teaching others, and then return to their primary specialty work. For those who want to continue in an educator's role, or to return later to that role on a tenured basis, provision should be expanded within the specialty system of OPMS to permit this in numbers which meet the future Army needs for PME educators in faculties and staffs.

Army school commandants have the problem of securing the right mix of trainers and educators for their faculties. They also need academic administrators who are conversant with current training technology, the methods of criterion-referenced instruction, and the techniques of controlling training and educational resources. These are technicians and administrators -- not teachers. To secure this variety of talent, the commandants need a variety of programs which can match their projected personnel needs with qualified assets who are available when needed. At the present time the programs for obtaining educators are haphazard and unsystematic, relying principally on word-of-mouth information and a great amount of luck in matching need with availability. Specialty Code 47, Education, is for the most part unused as a tool of management; many of the best qualified officers decline proffered assignments; and in some instances the commandants find that their student bodies have better academic credentials than their faculties.

The development of 12 fields of PME in the 1980's calls for new approaches to faculty-building, this, in turn, will produce increasing recognition that there is an "Army Faculty" whose members occupy

designated positions in the Army schooling system, and who frequently rotate among those positions and into special assignments on staffs, in research, and in exchange arrangements with other services and civilian agencies. Qualification standards will be used to insure quality control in the most demanding of jobs, and a Specialty Code and Specialty Skill Identifiers will be used to monitor specialization in the many fields of PME, as well as eligibility for promotion and selection for higher schooling. In order to meet certain requirements, this "Army Faculty" will include civilian experts and Reserve Component officers on active-duty tours. Annex Y of this Report further discusses faculty development.

The 1980's will see expansion of the debate over the need for an Army University, as one method of improving coordination of officer learning in PME. This university concept could follow the Air Force model of collocating those schools which are primarily educational in nature, or it could take the form of a loose federation of separate entities whose mutual interests are handled in concert. The outcome of the debate will be determined by the evolution of the three functions of the Army schooling system -- education, training, and doctrine development. The outcome will also depend on future decisions about costs, nonresident instruction, faculty development and the distribution of Army forces to posts and major commands throughout the United States and overseas.

Conclusion

Meeting increased officer learning requirements in the 1980's will call for a more systematic approach to that component of Officer Professional Development which is educational in nature. This can be provided by building programs for Professional Military Education whose purposes are outlined in Figure 4. The 12 fields of PME (Figure 3) will need continuing analysis, as illustrated for Professional Ethics and Military History in following appendices. New systems for building school faculties will be needed, as will new organizational structures for providing command guidance, administrative support, and resource management.

The development of Professional Military Education will not, however, be a massive exercise, such as is entailed in Army-wide task analysis of officer positions or in reclassification of large numbers of officers into new specialties. Rather, it is a quality-seeking exercise wherein standards are set for programs already in training. Much of the effort is substituting more highly qualified personnel into faculty and staff positions already established. The problem is manageable, awaiting command decision more than a vast allocation of new resources.

Recommendations.

It is recommended that:

1. The Department of the Army Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel appoint a "Steering Group for Professional Military Education" whose purpose is to draft regulations for the establishment of PME as a distinct component of Officer Professional Development. These regulations should state the concept, purposes, and subject-matter scope of PME and provide for the command guidance, administrative support, and resource management necessary to sustain PME programs.

2. A separate and distinct staff element (division level suggested) be established to handle all matters relating to Officer Professional Military Education.

3. A program be established for continuing research and analysis by competent specialists, whose purpose is to develop learning materials in each of the PME fields,

4. Revisions of DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development and Utilization, include appropriate requirements in Professional Military Education.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 2

GRADUATE LEVEL EDUCATION OF ARMY OFFICERS

TO ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

There is a tendency in this country to measure military strength by a headcount. To accurately interpret strength, you must look inside the number and see what kind of people fill the uniforms forming the ranks of the Army. The difference between the quality of our people and that of an aggressor may be the difference between victory and defeat.

A Guide to Army Philosophy
DA Pam 20-1, 22 January 1958

The budget cutter targeting on officer training and education does not take cognizance of the above truth. It attacks something which is difficult to defend under the budgeteer's rules of engagement -- that "if the Army need cannot be quantified, it is not an Army need." While many solid arguments have been advanced that increases in graduate level education for officers are called for, the issue continues to resist quantification. The issue of whether the benefits are worth the cost not only is a questioning of the value of higher education for the Army officer, it skirts the larger issue of whether indeed there is already an under-investment in such education.

Graduate education is an essential investment in the maintenance of a ready force at minimum costs required to support defense and foreign policy demands. The strong thrusts to make the Army less costly necessarily identify manpower as the largest component of the budget. Introduction of machines to reduce manpower needs causes the greater personnel reductions in the ranks of the less skilled, and simultaneously increases the skill level requirements of those who remain. It is now widely accepted that all officers should be college graduates, and that all enlisted ought to be high school graduates. These were accepted goals before the decline, in the last decade, of the real standards which those two levels purport to represent. The last decade has continued the trend to higher levels of technical sophistication of hardware, its support, and its employment. The concomitant time compression of the battlefield greatly increases the need for leaders who have the prior education and training to prepare them to make quality decisions more rapidly.

We are probably nearing the time when it will be appropriate to demand that those wanting to reduce the educational levels of the officer corps justify the reductions on the grounds that such education is not needed, rather than the obverse situation. Before we reach that stage some cleaning up of our procedures is needed. We need, for example, to better demonstrate that the educational assets that we now have are being adequately employed. We need to improve our identification of graduate degree needs, and our needs for graduate education short of a degree. When that is done we have to develop efficient but less expensive (to the budget) means of fulfilling those needs. This paper will address the foregoing points.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

The services follow DOD guidance and link degree requirements to specific billets. Commanders in the field submit justification for positions they believe must be filled by holders of graduate degrees to achieve optimum performance. These requests pass through major commands for recommendations, and then to DA. The Army Educational Requirements Board (AERB) determines which positions to recommend for Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) validation. When validated, the degree requirements are measured against assets (degree holders of the appropriate grade with degrees in the identified discipline). Ideally an officer is assigned to the position. If there are insufficient assets, an officer is programmed for attendance at a university on a fully funded basis. To have sufficient assets to fill validated positions (given PCS constraints, short tour equity, other developmental assignments, etc) a factor of 2.4 is applied to all validated positions.

Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) is expected to assign officers coming out of the fully funded graduate degree program to an immediate utilization tour in a validated position. Reutilization tours in validated positions are desirable.

ADEQUACY OF EMPLOYMENT

In a report prepared 28 Feb 78 ODCSPER said that with assets of 18,127 it was able to properly fill 2,019 of the 4,618 AERB positions (Figure 1). The implication is that the investment in the graduate

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>POSITION MS or HIGHER</u>	<u>TRNG REQMTS</u>	<u>JAN 78 TOTAL ASSETS</u>	<u>PROPER FILL OF AERB POSITION</u>
HUMANITIES	354	850	844	209
BUSINESS	1,373	3,296	7,329	536
ENGINEERING	1,515	3,637	3,044	665
PHYSICAL SCI	311	746	956	162
SOCIAL SCI	921	2,209	5,833	427
LAW	<u>144</u>	<u>346</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	4,618	11,084	18,127	2,019

FIG 1

education of the other 16,000 is wasted, while our system leaves 2,600 positions unfilled. The implication is not wholly correct.* It is merely that we have defined ourselves into a position of appearing to be poor managers of our assets. We have narrow definitions of AERB positions. Though this narrowness assists in the justification of the fully funded program, it creates problems in showing utilization. With the 1,373 "Business" positions spread over 23 subdisciplines, it becomes difficult to get pure match-ups of subdiscipline assets-to-requirements. One can easily believe that a LTC with a masters in "Banking, Financing" could adequately fill a position calling for a LTC with a masters in "Controller-ship", and is probably doing so. But we do not show it as a position fill (figure 2).

The narrow definition is basically a good tool to use in the validation process. The avoidance of vagueness facilitates judgements for validation, and it uses terms which are meaningful to the academic community when the time comes to fully fund the degree for an officer to meet the requirement. That is to say, the substance of what is being done is sound, the form--the depiction of it--could be improved.

An Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD), Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) study on officer graduate education in 1972 showed 95% of officers surveyed felt that their advanced education was useful in their most recent jobs. Additional steps need to be taken to develop a category of positions that can qualify as "reutilization" jobs so that our statistics don't make us look so wasteful of educational investments. One method would be for the AERB to designate two types of positions as a result of its review: Positions validated for the acquisition of assets (fully funded education) and positions which, while not quite up to the full requirement of the first category, are close enough to warrant designation as reutilization tour jobs.

Nor is it an indication of poor management by ODCSPER/MILPERCEN. There is no control mechanism which would allow the Army to specify the degree that every officer attains, nor a method to prevent the acquisition of degrees not "needed" by the Army. Many of the 18,000 degree holders acquired their graduate education on their own time at little or no cost to the Army. The fact of their having graduate level education serves the Army in a fundamental way, though it may not satisfy the specific degree requirements validated by AERB process.

BUSINESS

CODE	TITLE	POSITION MS or HIGHER	EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS	JAN 78 TOTAL ASSETS	PROPER FILL OF AERB POSITION
BAA	Accounting, Auditing	29	70	60	6
BAD	Banking, Financing	4	10	34	4
BAE	Finance General	1	2	64	0
BAL	ORSA Business	175	420	390	71
BAH	Comptroller	249	598	213	149
BAN	ADPS Business	193	463	430	55
BAX	Business Administration	67	161	2435	28
BBA	Administration Public	4	10	1025	0
BBB	Personnel Management/Administration	33	79	273	9
BBB	Correctional Administration	1	2	6	0
BBL	Management Research Program	10	24	27	1
BBF	Logistics Management	207	497	282	69
BBG	Transportation & Traffic Management	30	72	172	9
BBK	Management Industrial	27	65	231	7
BBL	Management Aerospace	1	2	21	0
BBM	Church Management	8	19	2	3
BBN	Hotel & Restaurant Management	17	41	1	3
BBP	Procurement & Contract Management	142	341	188	49
BBS	Safety	2	5	2	0
BBT	Telecommunications Management	36	86	66	9
BBX	Management General	58	139	1085	26
BCX	Economics Business	2	5	23	1
BXX	Business General	77	185	299	37
	TOTAL	1,373	3,296	7,329	536

FIG 2

For example, recommendations from the field for graduate Comptrollership degrees may total 100. The AERB process may determine that because of level of responsibility, magnitude and diversity of functions, numbers of people supervised, etc., only 20 of the positions qualified for validation. That is, only 20 support a requirement to fully fund an officer to obtain the degree. The AERB process might also decide upon its analysis that an additional 50 of the 100 recommended positions come very close to qualifying for AERB validation--they meet perhaps 90 percent of the criteria. That allows a logical decision to designate these 50 positions for reutilization. The billets need the benefit of a holder of some graduate education, but not quite enough need to justify the \$35,000 expenditure for a fully funded degree program. This latter category should be kept more general in terms of academic discipline. If we continue with our all-or-nothing definitions, and do not develop the second category of utilization positions, we will not be able to retain the current levels of graduate education, let alone expand them to meet the growing needs of the Army.

GRADUATE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

In general, though DA OPMS Specialty Proponents are charged by regulation with a role in the process of generating and reviewing requirements for advanced degrees, little has been done. This is in part due to the unusually low priorities accorded by DA staff elements to OPMS specialty proponent actions, AR 600-101 makes DA Proponent Agencies responsible for, among other things,

. . .Assisting in the determination of specialty positions to be validated for graduate level education . . .Advising on specialty education and training needs and the impact of changes on meeting future Army requirements . . .Recommending appropriate graduate schools and curriculums for study in disciplines supportive of the specialty. . .

In its 14 March 1975 report, the TRADOC OPMS Task Group recommended that "The education/training proponent and DA staff proponent should jointly determine the qualitative educational requirements (in terms of courses) for graduate level education for each specialty and grade." DA Proponent Agencies have much work to do in that regard.

There are a couple of actions that an energized DA Proponent Agency might take: Provide information and guidance to field commanders to assist them in their submission of requirements for billets warranting holders of advanced degrees; Determine requirements for graduate level education that are appropriate to the specialty generally, i.e., the "specialty requirement" as contrasted with the "position requirement". Such requirements should be related to specialty qualification standards yet to be developed.

The RETO methodology of generation of duty position signatures expanded by TRADOC's duty position task analysis effort should be applied in ascertaining graduate educational needs. It is highly probable that when the methodology is expanded from duty module to tasks, then groupings of positions could be clustered around those common tasks which are appropriate subjects for graduate level education. It needs further confirmation, but initial information is that colleges and universities are so hungry for enrollments that many would design graduate course packages explicitly to meet Army needs (needs as identified by clustered signatures). Some course packages might be adequate for the award of a degree, but that would be more of an individual fringe benefit than an Army requirement. Nonetheless, the provision of a degree opportunity for active duty officers is a positive incentive to continued service, hence a positive value to the Army. Retention rates of degree holders is one aspect of graduate education that has been measured. The 1973 DOD study of Officer Graduate Education revealed significantly higher retention rates for officers with advanced degrees.

By using signature methodology and course packages, the above suggested AERB validation of reutilization positions could be expanded beyond those nominated by field commands. In addition to validating those specific positions, whole clusters of positions could be grouped for reutilization validation. We know generally that there is a direct correlation between proper utilization and job satisfaction; that job satisfaction is one of the great morale builders; that lack of proper utilization is one of the most bitter complaints of trained Army personnel. Expanded identification of utilization category positions is a potentially powerful management tool for job-satisfying assignments.

*Inclosure 1 provides a brief description of duty position signature methodology developed by RETO.

It is likely that the above would result in an increase in validated positions in the AERB process, and that it would create a new category of educational requirements short of a degree in some specialties. However, there will be an accompanying substantial improvement in the quality of the justifications as the result of better data inputs to the process.

MEETING ASSET REQUIREMENTS

Studies of officer graduate education generally conclude that a mixture of methods of generation of assets is appropriate: Accession of officers with advanced degrees; fully funded graduate school; VA/tuition assistance programs in support of off-duty courses; degree completion programs; and cooperative degree programs (USACGSC, SSC). The fully funded program is the most appropriate for "buying" degrees in shortage areas, as is now done.

The least expensive method of increasing graduate school educated assets is through accessions already holding advanced degrees. One way would be through the upward shifting of ROTC scholarships into postgraduate years as a part of the precommission education phase. The cost of the new officer with a graduate degree is the same as the cost of the ROTC lieutenant with a baccalaureate.

Since the major portion of the fully funded program cost is the pay and allowances of student officers, some reduction might be possible by requiring officers to do more off duty course work prior to full time studies. To be practical, however, such an alternative must be accompanied by more liberal course credit transfer policies on the part of degree granting institutions. Also, some scientific and technical degrees are difficult to take piecemeal.

If more responsibility for funding of graduate education is to be shifted to the officer by requiring him to invest in tuition costs, legislation should be sought to allow tax credit of some form for officers assuming that financial burden.

SUMMARY

An increase in Army validated graduate education needs will result from--

- + Employment of task analysis based duty position signatures
- + Greater involvement of DA Agency Proponents of OPMS specialties in providing assistance and guidance to field commands

* If the number of validated positions exceeded the ability to fund education, then a system of priorities, not unlike the DAMPL (Department of Army Master Priority List) would be needed to make best use of available resources, both findings of new degrees and assignments of degree holders.

+ The generation of specialty graduate level educational requirements additional to billet degree requirements.

These actions will also increase the quality of the justification for graduate education/degrees.

The establishment of a new category of positions validated for re-utilization tours will greatly improve our ability to manage our assets and to depict more realistic and favorable statistics on utilization. This in turn will permit amortizing the (average) \$35,000 investment in a fully funded degree over a much longer period than the usual three year initial utilization assignment.

Accessions of holders of advanced degrees should be increased. Care should be taken to limit accession of those with hard skill degrees to those who can be immediately utilized (because of knowledge decay rates). Most emphasis should be on accessing those with the so-called softer advanced degrees.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS


1. Improvements be made in identification of requirements through task analysis and clustering of tasks within OPMS specialties.
2. Improvements be made in the justification of requirements through application of task analysis data.
3. Improvements be made in the depiction of the way graduate degree holders are employed by the Army, through better labeling of duty position degree requirements; identification of cross substitutability of degrees in duty assignments; showing employment of degree holders against requirements in all reports to JVV, J13, and Congress.
4. establishment of priority system for full funding of schooling to meet the expanded degree requirements, and for fill of graduate degree duty positions with degree holders.
5. Provision of more and better guidance to field commanders on the identification and justification of graduate level educational needs and on the employment of degree holders.
6. Definition and development of requirements for less-than-degree graduate education, and development of course packages to satisfy those needs.

1 Inclosure

1. Information Paper

ARMY VALIDATIONS LESS AMEDD (1963 - 1977)

(OFFICER REQUIREMENTS)



NOTE: No Board Held in 1971
 No Board Held in 1975
 No Board Held in 1977

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Specialty Data Collection and Analysis

1. BACKGROUND. It was immediately obvious to us at the outset of our RETO efforts that we had to learn as much as possible -- and, for that matter, as quickly as possible -- about the Army's requirements for multitudinous skills. Yet, no data could be located to define Army needs for skills -- at least not with any reasonable precision. Thus, our data thirst could be slaked only by a reasonably massive and exceedingly rapid collection effort.

2. COLLECTION. After a brief pilot test, proponents for each OPMS specialty (and, later, for non-OPMS specialties) were tasked to analyze most Army positions with a view toward describing job components as well as the best method of acquiring job component skills. We took advantage of earlier ARI efforts to describe "duty modules" -- logical clusters of tasks -- for each position. DA, MILPERCEN, and the various training proponents participated in the effort, performing the gargantuan data collection task in just one month's time, completing it early in December.

3. ANALYSIS. Since individual positions may be thought of as unique sets of duty modules, we have chosen to call each position set a "signature", representing it as a single column matrix whose approximately 900 elements have values of either one or zero as a function of the presence or absence of each duty module. (See figure 1). A specialty signature is then simply the weighted sum of position signatures, the weighting having been associated with the frequency with which each position type occurs (See figures 2 and 3).

Recall, though, that each duty module has a best acquisition method associated with it. Thus, we are able to produce objective, replicable signatures together with training and education needs in a variety of groupings. Should these formulations prove as powerful as we now perceive them, we should go a long way toward removing the "gut feel" emotional defenses which now fare poorly when subjected to DOD and OMB dissection. Note some interesting signature combinations we can produce -- and compare:

- . By rank in each specialty
- . By SSI by rank in each specialty

INCLOSURE 1

P-2-I-1

- . By groups (Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support)
- . Command signatures
- . General Staff signatures (still under development)
- . and more.

4. USING THE DATA. Figure 4 is a decision diagram illustrating a possible method for using signature data as the starting point for testing one of many alternatives now being considered by RETO. The figure is, of course, only one example. Although we are well aware that subjective judgement and expert opinion must continue to be important, particularly in the articulation of possible alternatives and the rejection of illogical ones, we are nonetheless convinced that signatures will provide heretofore unavailable quantifiable support of officer education and training strategies.

5. DATA STATUS. Having built a case for position analysis power, it becomes important to describe our data status. As of this writing (25 January), all of the data base has been built, error card correction has been through a number of iterations, some data dump printouts have been produced, and BG John Crosby's programmers are on the verge of printing priority signatures (now scheduled on or before 31 January).

POSITION SIGNATURE





FIGURE 1

DO YOU KNOW WHAT
THEY CALL THE REAR
END OF AN ORSA?



P-2-I-4

SPECIALTY SIGNATURE

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^n W_i S_i$$

Weight by population in position type

position signature

FIGURE 2

EXAMPLE


$$S = \frac{15}{178} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} + \frac{3}{178} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} + \dots + \frac{13}{178} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} .8 & 0 \\ 1 & .02 \\ .3 & .3 \\ .1 & .1 \end{bmatrix}$$

——— IMPORTANT
 ——— "COMMON" DUTY MODULE
 ——— PROVIDE ONLY FOR A FEW
 ——— IMPORTANT

FIGURE 3

HYPOTHESIS: THERE IS AN
ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO CURRENT ADVANCE
COURSES



REVIEW OF OFFICER EDUCATION AND TRAINING

APPENDIX 3

FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER

TO ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

Army requirements for foreign language qualified officers are currently identifiable in 37 of the 46 OPMS specialties. Because of this and the great expense and time required to develop foreign language proficiency, it was decided early in RETO's effort to address the question of officer foreign language requirements and to assess the feasibility of requiring all officers to attain and maintain some foreign language proficiency.

With regard to the first issue, it will be shown that: 1) current foreign language requirements are grossly understated in authorization documents; and 2) although the number of officers currently carried as possessing foreign language capability appears adequate to meet stated requirements, the level of proficiency among many of these officers is suspect and in all likelihood is not sufficient. To remedy this situation, resolute action needs to be taken by DA.

On the broader issue of a foreign language for every officer, general recommendations of this paper include: 1) that the study of foreign languages -- of and by itself a valuable educational experience -- be strongly encouraged of all Army ROTC scholarship recipients; and 2) that only those officers trained in a foreign language against Army requirements be required to maintain their proficiency.

Current Army Requirements

PERSACS data reflects current Army requirements for officers with foreign language proficiency at 839. Figure 1 portrays these requirements by language and grade; Figure 2 shows requirements by language and OPMS specialty.¹ There are, however, many apparent shortfalls in officer foreign language requirements. For example, according to this data, Foreign Area Officer (FAO) total requirements for Arabic, Chinese and Russian are certainly understated (8, 5, and 6 respectively). There are six requirements for Russian qualified FAO's in Moscow alone. Likewise difficult to explain is a total of only 107 foreign language requirements for 1,168 validated FAO positions, including 139 attache and 254 military-political area specialist positions. Total requirements for only 5 Arabic, 2 Chinese and 11 Russian language qualified Military Intelligence officers must present a grossly distorted picture of the Army's needs. Of the 10 foreign languages considered to be the most important for military applications, 2 -- Chinese Cantonese and Rumanian -- have only one, two, and three requirements respectively. There is only one requirement for Serbo-Croatian, the official language of Yugoslavia. There are no requirements for Lithuanian, Latvian,

¹Figure 2 shows specialty 55 (Legal) as one of the OPMS managed specialties. This is incorrect, but since the 13 requirements for SC 55 cannot be discerned from Figure 1, SC 55 data is included in all analysis.

	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL	GEN	TOTAL	REMARKS
Amharic				1	1		2	
Arabic			16	15	4		35	Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Saudi
Burmese					1		1	
Chinese			3	1	3		7	Mandarin
Czech		2					2	
Dutch	4	5	2		1		12	
Finnish				1	1		2	
Flemish	8	5	1	1			15	
French	1	5	13	9	5	2	35	
Greek	11	15	1	2	2		31	
German	38	114	51	33	11		247	
Hebrew			2		1		3	
Hindi				2	1		3	
Hungarian					1		1	
Japanese		1	4	3	2		10	
Indonesian				1	1		2	
Italian	44	14	8	5	1		72	
Korean	12	2	5	7			26	
Kashubian					1		1	
Spanish	25	79	58	47	21	1	231	American, European, Creole
Norwegian					1		1	
Persian		1	2	1	1		5	
Polish		2			1		3	
Portuguese		2		4	2		8	Brazilian, European
Russian	5	2	10	4	1		22	
Serbo-Croatian					1		1	
Slovak				1			1	
Sotho			1				1	
Swedish				1	1		2	
Thai		1	18	7	1		27	
Turkish	10	3	2		1		16	
Urdu				1	1		2	
Vietnamese				1	1		2	
TOTALS	158	253	197	148	70	3	838	
Unspecified	9							

FIGURE 1

Officer Foreign Language Requirements by Language and Grade.
(Source: PERSACS, 20 Oct 77)

	11	12	13	14	15	21	25	27	28	31	35	36	37	41	42	45	46	47	48	49	53	54	55	56	64	67
Amharic																			2							
Arabic	2		1	2	3	1					2	3		2		1			8		3					1
Burmese																			1							
Chinese											1	1							5							
Czech												2														
Dutch			6	5															1							
Finnish																			2							
Flemish			2	12																						
French	1		3			1					3	6			2		1		12		1	1				
Greek			14	6							1			1					3							
German	11	1	59	36	1	5	4			7	19	61		1	1		1	1	9		10	8				
Hebrew												1							2							
Hindi																			3							
Hungarian																			1							
Japanese		1	1								3	3							2							
Indonesian																			2							
Italian	3		15	30	4						1	3	1		2				2		4	1				
Korean			14							1	2	2							4		2					
Kashubian																			1							
Spanish	84	7	8	1	5	3	4	2	1	4	4			10	11	1	1	19	16		1	15	2	6	2	1
Norwegian																			1							
Persian												3							1				1			
Polish												2							1							
Portugese	2														1				5							
Russian										5	6	2	3						6							
Serbo-Croatian																			1							
Slovak																				1						
Sotho	1																									
Swedish																			2							
Thai					1						1								8		2					
Turkish			11									1			1				2							
Urdu																			2							
Vietnamese																			2							
Unspecified							1				1		5													
Total	104	9	134	92	1	18	10	4	2	14	44	94	10	14	18	2	3	20	107	1	1	37	13	6	2	2

Figure 2. Foreign Language Requirements by Language and Specialty
(Source: PERSACS, 20 Oct 77)

37	41	42	45	46	47	48	49	53	54	55	56	64	67	70	71	72	73	75	77	83	91	92	93	95	97	Total	Remarks
						2																				2	
	2		1			8		3					1	2		1						1		1	1	35	See Fig 1
						1																				1	
						5																				7	See Fig 1
																										2	
						1																				12	
						2																				2	
																										15	
		2		1		12		1	1							1						1				33	+ 2 g.o.
	1					3										1	3					1	1			31	
	1	1		1	1	9		10	8					1								7	3	1		247	
						2																				3	
						3																				3	
						1																				1	
						2																				10	
						2																				2	
1		2				2		4	1							1		1			1	1	1	1	1	72	+1 g.o.
						4		2																		26	
						1																				1	
	10	11	1	1	19	16		1	15	2	6	2	1	1			1				5	14			1	230	+1 g.o.
						1																				1	
						1			1																	5	
						1																				3	
		1				5																				8	See Fig 1
3						6																				22	
						1																				1	
							1																			1	
						2																				2	
						8		2						1	2		1	3			4	4				27	
		1				2											1									16	
						2																				2	
						2																				2	
5																						1				9	
10	14	18	2	3	20	107	1	1	37	13	6	2	2	4	1	2	3	7	3	1	9	31	5	4	3	835	

Requirements by Language and Specialty
20 Oct 77)

2

Estonian, Ukrainian or Bulgarian. These are only a few examples which illustrate that, in short, the Army's foreign language requirements for officers cannot be determined from available data.

Foreign Language Qualified Officers

The records of approximately 10,000 officers show some indication of foreign language training or proficiency (of these, approximately 3,700 are in Vietnamese). Much of this data, however, is not current. Although AR 611-6 requires all personnel with foreign language training to be tested once every 2 years, experience shows that too often this does not occur. In short, a reliable picture of the number and quality of foreign language qualified Army officers cannot be determined from available data.

Army Linguist Personnel Study

The problem of unknown requirements and uncertain assets has been known for several years, having been documented repeatedly by various studies. In 1973 a Government Accounting Office GAO report "Need to Improve Language Training Programs and Assignments for US Government Personnel Overseas," identified this as a source of many short-falls in the number and quality of foreign language specialists throughout the government. In May 1975 a study of the Army's language needs (both officer and enlisted) was initiated. In January 1976, the results of that study were published under the title "Army Linguist Personnel Study (ALPS)." Findings of the ALPS included the following:

1. In general, overall linguist requirements have not been accurately determined and are not reported to DA in any form that gives a clear picture for proper personnel management.
2. Linguist positions are not always indicated in authorization documents.
3. Linguist assets on hand cannot be accurately identified because there is no functioning reevaluation system that permits identification of current skills. Most indicated linguist skill levels are far out of date because of lack of retesting, this causes available data to be nearly useless as a management tool.
4. Balancing of assets (uncertain) against requirements (unknown) is difficult [sic] at best.

The ALPS concluded with recommendations that DA correct this state of affairs and "publish and implement a broad Army Language Policy Statement."

To oversee the implementation of these and other recommendations, a Language Management Team was established at MILPERCEN. To date this team has been preoccupied, justifiably, with enlisted linguists. (Enlisted requirements comprise the overwhelming majority of total Army requirements; issues in this area involve recruiting, retention and other matters

which demand immediate attention.) Responses from the field to MILPERCEN's tasking regarding officer requirements, however, have been incomplete.

An absolute prerequisite to any meaningful Army language policy for officers is the determination of requirements and assets. This policy should, moreover, take into consideration at least two distinct categories of officers: those who will be called upon to serve in language-essential positions and those who will not.

Officer Foreign Language Specialists

The first of these two categories includes officer foreign language specialists -- officers who have been slated to fill positions calling for language skills and who, for the most part, are trained at Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Monterey, California. After providing nearly a year of training (courses in most of the critical languages run 51.6 weeks, including breaks) and making a healthy investment (average: \$30,000 for a captain over 4 years service), the Army should demand that the officer serve in more than one language related assignment. This will be possible, and the training cost-effective, only if the officer is managed under a system which insures that: 1) only the most highly motivated officers are selected; 2) the officers receive initial language related assignments, and frequent subsequent ones; and 3) the officer is provided with language maintenance packets such as are currently being developed at DLIFLC.

Not only is foreign language proficiency an expensive commodity which takes a long time to attain; in order to be maintained, prolonged frequent utilization is necessary. Foreign language proficiency is probably the single most perishable skill an officer can acquire. Frequent language related assignments, however, are not viewed as career enhancing for an officer. Thus, current management of officer language specialists under OPMS is almost a virtual guarantee the officer will lose whatever proficiency he initially attained.

Underlying the present assignment policy of officer language specialists appear to be two assumptions. The first is clearly expressed in an excerpt from the ALPS:

No complete answers to the utilization of officer linguist personnel have been uncovered by the study. With the many requirements placed upon the talents of the officer his language proficiency must be considered only as an additional factor in his assignments. OPMS appears to be the best control means to insure proper utilization and development of officer linguists. [Underscoring added-JRH]

The second assumption, which follows from the first, appears to be that OPMS Specialty 48 (FAO) is the vehicle by which foreign language specialists should be managed.

Both assumptions are incorrect. In the case of the first, if OPMS is to "insure proper utilization and development of officer linguists," then their foreign language proficiency cannot be considered "only as an additional factor" in assignments. Regarding Specialty 48, it was already pointed out above that there are only 107 foreign language positions for 1,168 validated FAO requirements. If foreign language requirements are so understated here, how can one expect officer language specialists to be developed in this specialty? Moreover, based on the above PERSACS data, validated foreign language requirements in FAO represent only 13 percent of the Army's stated needs (107 of 835). Should FAO, then, manage the language qualified officers in the other 36 specialties? Or should there be a separate foreign language specialty? The answer to both questions is "no".

Foreign Language Specialty. At first glance, it might appear that establishing a foreign language specialty is the answer to achieving proper career development for officer language specialists (e.g., frequent assignments leading to maintenance of proficiency, credit at selection boards, etc.). It is true that, even understated as they are, the total number of foreign language requirements (839) is greater than the total number of requirements in 26 OPMS specialties, including 15 basic entry specialties. In fact, there are more field grade language requirements (415) than total requirements for all grades in six OPMS specialties. The first difficulty is, however, that the foreign language requirements include over 40 languages. Some languages have only one or two positions. Consequently, no distinct career development patterns would be available to an officer in this specialty unless he were qualified in two or three languages. Figure 3 illustrates this problem within Specialty 48.

The second difficulty centers around the function of foreign language skills; they are almost always "tools" or "means" to achieving some other purpose. Officers would still be required to be competent in one or more other specialties. Although a foreign language specialty might serve as a tertiary specialty, it would be a specialty in name only. One must, therefore, conclude that a foreign language specialty is not a practical option.

An Alternative Proposal. Necessary visibility as a qualified foreign language specialist for assignment managers and promotion boards could be achieved by the award of a foreign language ASI (RU, CM, etc.) to those officers who continue to demonstrate (say, on an annual basis) that they have maintained their foreign language proficiency. An officer specialty and skill codes would be, for example, 115P54RU, 210041CM or 35SC484E.

In order to earn this ASI, an officer would be required to achieve a "minimum professional proficiency" grade ("3" in the Department of Defense

	SC 48 total	COL	LTC	MAJ	Remarks
Amharic	2	1	1		
Arabic *	8	4	2	2	See Figure 1
Burmese	1	1			
Chinese *	5	1	2	2	See Figure 1
Czech	0				
Dutch	1	1			
Finnish	2	1	1		
Flemish	0				
French *	12	4	4	4	
Greek *	3	1	1	1	
German *	9	3	4	2	
Hebrew	2	1		1	
Hindi	3	1	2		
Hungarian	1	1			
Japanese *	2	1	1		
Indonesian	2	1	1		
Italian *	2	1	1		
Korean *	4		2	2	
Kashubian	1	1			
Spanish *	16	8	5	3	See Figure 1
Norwegian	1	1			
Persian	1	1			
Polish	1	1			
Portuguese *	5	2	3		See Figure 1
Russian *	6	1	4	1	
Serbo-Croatian	1	1			
Slovak	0				
Sotho	0				
Swedish	2	1	1		
Thai *	8	1	3	4	
Turkish *	2	1		1	
Urdu	2	1	1		
Vietnamese	2	1	1		
Total	107	44	40	23	

Figure 3. Foreign Area Officer Language Requirements by Grade (Based on analysis of Figures 1 and 2)

* Probable grade distribution

proficiency grading system) in at least two of the following three language skills: reading, listening and speaking.² A grade of "2" would be required in the third skill.

This proposal differs from current practice primarily in the added requirement to have officers tested for speaking ability. The mechanical addition of the ASI should present few difficulties. As a signal to immediately identify officers with "up-to-date" professional proficiency, it would be well worth the effort.

Testing of all known foreign language trained officers today, using the criteria described above, will reveal the questionable state of Army officer foreign language capabilities. In fact, if the Army's foreign language requirements are ever reliably documented, and the officer assets genuinely evaluated, it is almost certain there will not be nearly enough qualified officers to meet peacetime requirements, let alone various OPLAN needs.

Summary. Apparently, the Army is no closer today than it has ever been to knowing its foreign language requirements for officers, or the state of current foreign language capabilities of the officer corps. The Army's perception of the role of officer foreign language specialists has resulted in the likelihood that very few officers have been able to maintain their language proficiency. The author has proposed a plan for determining the current status of officer foreign language capabilities and for more efficient management of those officers who are professionally qualified.

Foreign Language Study for All Officers

The second category of officer is the one which includes those who will not be assigned to foreign language-essential positions. Here it is appropriate to ask the question: "Should all officers be required to attain and maintain foreign language proficiency?" In a letter to RETO, one general officer wrote: "foreign language proficiency remains one of the fundamental requirements for the American Army officer which is seldom addressed in discussions of his education." Understandably so. Foreign language proficiency is seldom discussed in the general education of any Americans. It should be remembered that in most armies the value attached to knowledge of a foreign language is analogous to the situation regarding the value attached to a college degree or graduate civilian education. Where foreign languages are important in society, they are

² Army officers are not presently tested for speaking or writing ability, in spite of the fact that most of the positions for officers involve speaking with representatives of foreign armies. The number of officers requiring writing ability is so small that it is not a reasonable requirement for all officers. The requirement to interact with foreign officers, incidentally, rules out the possibility of using warrant officers.

important to Army officers. In the Canadian Army, for example, both French and English are required of field grade officers. In the British and continental European Armies, second and third languages are required of most officers.³

English being the Lingua Franca it is, the use of foreign languages by Americans (civilian and military) often is simply a gesture of good will. Few U.S. Army officers bring a foreign language proficiency in their "educational baggage" when they are commissioned. Moreover, English is the operational language of most U.S. and joint military activities. Although developing good will and rapport with Allied officers and local foreign representatives and populations is no small undertaking, there is no clear and discernible operational need for all U.S. officers to be proficient in a foreign language.

Nevertheless, the opinion persists that all officers should attain and maintain at least elementary proficiency in a foreign language. This opinion may be based in part on the experience of many senior officers who have felt inadequate in their dealings with Allied and other foreign officers. Another plausible explanation for this opinion is that the lack of qualified American foreign language specialists in appropriate positions continues to place the U.S. Army in a bad light. Since official contact with foreign military representatives usually reveals the presence of a large number of English speaking foreigners, senior American officials are quite justified in expecting their aides and staffs to have some facility in the appropriate foreign language.

The solution, however, is not to be found in requiring all Army officers to have foreign language proficiency, but rather it can be found in the first part of this paper — namely, properly identifying the requirements and effectively training and assigning officer foreign language specialists.

The great expense and time required to attain and maintain practical proficiency in a foreign language, especially when most officers would be starting from 'scratch', would create a tremendous burden for officers who have little likelihood of using the language and little genuine encouragement from commanders and supervisors. Add to this the fact that the need cannot be demonstrated, and it becomes clearly unrealistic to expect all officers to maintain a foreign language proficiency. To establish such a policy with full knowledge that it is unrealistic would be unfair to the officer and the Army. To fail to accept that it is unrealistic is to reveal a lack of appreciation for the immensity of the problem. Furthermore, such a policy would continue to obscure the true officer foreign language requirements.

³ The ability of foreign officers to speak more than their native language is overrated. For example, there are very few highly qualified officer speakers of English in the entire Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. This in spite of foreign language training in elementary and high school and the great emphasis placed on English in Soviet military schools.

The "Study" of Foreign Language

That is not to say officers should either be foreign language specialists or forget about foreign language altogether. Even if proficiency is not attained, or is lost, the "study" of foreign languages does provide certain residual benefits. From contact with a foreign language and the study of a foreign culture, a student quickly learns that other people often have different perceptions of reality. Just as mathematics teaches or illustrates logical thinking, foreign languages illustrate the 'illogical' thinking of foreigners. Foreign language study is, thus, one of the most direct routes out of our ethnocentric cocoon.

This broadening experience is significant enough to warrant establishing a requirement that all officer aspirants include in their undergraduate curriculum a minimum of 2 years foreign language study as a prerequisite for commissioning. Foreign language study deserves to be placed in the same light as many other disciplines which add to the general education of officers. Not all officers who study mathematics become mathematicians, nor all who study history-historians.

Although foreign language study at the undergraduate level seldom results in any practical proficiency, an Army requirement for such study might provide a more reliable base from which to later make selections of qualified and interested officers who are motivated enough to subject themselves to the rigors of foreign language learning and maintenance.

As desirable as such a requirement might appear, however, the demands placed on undergraduate students in many technical disciplines are so stringent as to make such a requirement impractical. Indeed, inclusion of a foreign language requirement might limit the number of high quality men and women who would apply for Army scholarships. Further, it should be pointed out that the Army officer of the future will find it more and more important to be 'fluent' in man-made languages such as FORTRAN and COBOL.

After commissioning, opportunities should be provided for all officers to begin, or continue, foreign language training. Even elementary ability in the local foreign language brings a sense of accomplishment and enjoyment for anyone in an overseas assignment. Education centers, "Gateway" and "Headstart" programs provide these opportunities. They should not be viewed, however, as substitutes for meeting the true Army officer foreign language requirements.

Conclusions

The present situation — the Army not knowing what the foreign language requirements for officers are, and not having an up-to-date assessment of officer foreign language capabilities — stems directly from lack of emphasis on the importance of foreign language skills for officers. An undetermined, but large, amount of money has been wasted, as have been the time and talents of many officers. Many key language-essential positions have been filled with officers who have not had sufficient foreign language proficiency. To simply "encourage" all officers to attain and maintain foreign language proficiency has not been, and will never be, a satisfactory Army policy. It is unrealistic in the first

place and not cost-effective in the second place. A policy which requires all officer foreign language specialists to maintain a certain degree of proficiency can meet the needs of the Army satisfactorily only if position requirements are documented, assignments are more carefully managed and regulations enforced.

Over and above the question of proficiency, foreign language study is a valuable educational experience and should be encouraged for all prospective officers. Because of the personal rewards and the positive attitudes toward the United States fostered by military personnel attempting to speak local foreign languages, command sponsored foreign language programs are a useful adjunct to military life. However, they are in no way a substitute for programs designed to meet Army requirements.

The recommendations listed below are aimed at meeting the need for officers who require a high degree of foreign language proficiency and for supporting the study of foreign languages by a large number of officers, other military personnel, and their dependents.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that:

- a. Officer foreign language requirements be documented,
- b. Testing procedures be updated to include testing for speaking ability.
- c. Officers who do not take the tests or who fail to achieve a grade R2/L2/S1 be decertified.
- d. Additional skill identifiers be assigned to officers who achieve "3" or better in two of the skills and at least "2" in the third.
- e. Development of language maintenance packets be accelerated.
- f. Scholarship recipients be strongly encouraged to include 2 years of foreign language study in their undergraduate curriculum.
- g. Self-paced foreign language electives be established in Army schools (From Basic Course to Senior Service School).
- h. Current command language programs be continued.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 4

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

TO ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

(To be published)

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 5

MILITARY HISTORY

TO ANNEX P

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR ARMY OFFICERS

(To be published)

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX Q

RESERVE COMPONENTS

1. PURPOSE. This Annex outlines the impact of the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) recommendations on the Reserve Component's (RC) officer corps. Those aspects of training and education that require modification or development of additional RC options are included at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

2. DISCUSSION. With the "Total Army" of the future in mind, RETO has proposed a new total officer professional development system. Sufficient shortcomings and inefficiencies have been uncovered in present education and training programs to warrant change or modification. New and pending challenges on the officer demand a new, total system approach to professional development for all officers, whether they choose to serve in the Active or Reserve component. RC officers maintain a vested interest in the RETO system, for their careers and educational milestones must be, as closely as possible, "carbon copies" of those pursued by their Active Component counterparts. Individuals charged with the responsibility to staff and implement RETO recommendation for change must acknowledge the limitations and constraints existing in the Reserve Component environment. Each requirement or training opportunity developed should provide additional options from which the RC officers may select to insure their professional development, upward mobility and mobilization/deployment capability. The current officer development programs, with built-in RC options, have served well the education and training needs of the RC officers. The proposed RETO system may cause some initial turbulence in personnel and career management; however, adequate testing and phased implementation should minimize any adverse impact on career planning and present new and greater opportunities for enhancing the RC officer's professional development.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS. Based on proposed revisions to the officer professional development system and rationale developed in Appendix 1 to this Annex, recommend that:

- a. Applicants for Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate School (BIOCC) and Officer Candidate School, Reserve Component (OCS-RC) be required to process through the proposed Assessment Centers. (See Annex C, Precommissioning)

b. That Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) graduates programmed for Active Duty for Training (ADT) be identified as early as possible and that their RC unit assignment be confirmed and announced.

c. RC options of OCS-RC and Army National Guard Officer Candidate School (ARNG-OCS) continue until adequate numbers of quality officers can be produced from ROTC and other programs.

d. RC options of Officer Basic Course, Reserve Components (OBC-RC), at the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer and Signal Schools be continued. The United States Army Reserve (USAR) School course and the nonresident instruction (NRI) mode should also be continued.

e. National Guard Regulations (NGR) and Army Regulations (AR) be changed to reflect the new promotion criteria .

f. Educational requirements for promotion to the grade of major be satisfied by completion of the 120-hour pre-Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) nonresident instruction and successful completion of the 6-hour examination.

g. Educational requirements for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel be satisfied by completion of the CAS³ course or the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) course.

h. RC option to attend resident functional Advanced Courses be continued and dedicated spaces be allocated.

i. A Military Qualification Standards (MQS) system be developed for the RC officer. (A quality control measurement system should be the product of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in coordination with Chief, National Guard Bureau, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Army Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center and U.S. Armed Forces Command.)

j. Each course of instruction be analyzed and a status on mobilization (M-Day) be determined, with contingency plans made to continue, eliminate, reduce or expand the course.

k. All new course development or present course modifications be accomplished with RC options developed concurrently.

1. RC officers be required to attend courses developed for captain, lieutenant colonel, and colonel command selectees with the following modifications:

(1) Attendance to be allowed when necessary during command tenure.

(2) RC chain of command to have exemption/waiver authority when absolutely necessary.

(3) Options of nonresident instruction (NRI), split course, resident/nonresident, and USAR school courses be developed where possible.

(4) Reserve Component unique course content be incorporated into command courses attended by RC officers where possible.

1 Appendix

1. Reserve Component Officer Professional Development, with
2 Inclosures

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TO ANNEX Q

RESERVE COMPONENTS

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Appendix is to depict the Reserve Component (RC) education and training environment and the implications of the Review of Education and Training (RETO) system on RC officer professional development.

2. BACKGROUND

a. With the end of Selective Service, the Reserve Components are the only option available for augmenting the Active Army quickly in the event of a national emergency. Contingency planning for the European scenario depends heavily upon the ability of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) to reinforce and support Active Forces rapidly; therefore, they constitute a crucial element of our total mobilization potential. To be useful, the RC Troop Program Units (TPU) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) must be highly trained and maintain high standards of readiness. To discharge their responsibilities, the Reserve Components must be:

- (1) Capable of rapid mobilization and deployment.
- (2) Equipped for operating in a modern battlefield environment, and;
- (3) Able to attract and retain quality personnel.

b. The degree of reliance on the Reserve Components in the "Total Force" is reflected in their portion of the "Total Army" shown below:

- (1) 54 percent of Ground Forces.
- (2) 45 percent of Army Aviation.

- (3) 57 percent of Special Forces.
- (4) 52 percent of Infantry and Armor battalions.
- (5) 58 percent of Field Artillery battalions.
- (6) 67 percent of Tactical Support (Medical, Engineer, Transportation, Military Police, Military Intelligence).

3. THE RESERVE COMPONENT ENVIRONMENT

a. Reserve Component officers operate in a unique military environment. They are the nation's citizen/soldiers, rooted in a community setting, who don the uniform for short periods of time throughout the year. The RC officers' primary tie is to home, family and occupation in a particular setting; serving as "part-time" soldiers to be ready, professionally, if national events result in mobilization. Because the reservists' position in the military force structure is so different from that of the Active Army officer, educational needs take on different shapes and forms to meet Army and individual requirements.

b. The Reserve Component officers are truly a national resource. They are found in more than 4,500 units located in all 50 States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Guam. They train in armories or training centers in over 4,000 communities. Many IRR officers continue to participate even while living abroad, particularly in Europe. The RC officer population now totals 149,359.

c. Pursuit of mandatory education and training courses, as developed and presented by the Army school system is difficult for the Reserve Component officer. The primary difficulty rests in the time required to attend the resident mode of each course. However, the problem has been recognized and a series of options has been developed as follows:

- (1) A nonresident instruction (NRI) program.
- (2) A resident/nonresident combination program.
- (3) A shorter (reduced in time) resident course.
- (4) A part-time drill/resident mode conducted by the USAR school system.

d. The options listed above are granted equal credit in the officer professional development process and are culminated with a course completion diploma. Availability of these options is the "Total Army" approach to officer education which acknowledges the uniqueness and constraints in the Reserve Component environment. Completion of selected school courses, representing educational levels, is mandatory for the Reserve Component officer. Course completion is a key feature in the personnel management system (e.g., assignment, promotions, retention). A great number of officers would find it impossible to pursue a career in the RC if they had to meet all educational levels by attending resident courses.

e. The ARNG has no centralized management system like the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). Rather, each State is charged with the responsibility for officer career management. The USAR, on the other hand, is in the process of implementing a centralized OPMS for TPU and IRR officers under the supervision of the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC). By the very nature of the citizen/soldier's environment RC officers are restricted primarily to the generalist as opposed to the specialist career pattern. Upward mobility in their grade structure is controlled by position vacancy, school completion, and minimum time-in-grade. They have no authorized/funded civilian education programs to support their military education or career pattern. Their civilian occupations/trades/professions may or may not complement their military assignments. If military assignment and geography support a specialist track, they are not likely to have the chance to pursue a secondary or alternate specialty. Due to the dynamics of the system the officers, more than likely, will have to change their primary specialty at least twice during their career to take advantage of promotion or assignment opportunities.

f. Military education levels are mandatory milestones or "gates" for the Reserve Component officer to be considered for promotion. The levels and grades are as follows:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>UP TO GRADE OF</u>
Officer Basic	Captain
Advanced Course	Major
USACGSC	Lieutenant Colonel
	Colonel

NOTE: There is no mandatory requirement for senior service college attendance.

g. Due to the constraints of the citizen/soldier environment, the following guidelines for school course evaluations were considered:

- (1) More is not necessarily good.
- (2) Longer is not necessarily better.
- (3) If it must be taught, it should have a nonresident and/or a USAR school option.
- (4) If it must be taught, can a shorter, reduced-hour course be developed for the Reserve Component officer?
- (5) If training or education is planned with industry or by selected civilian schooling, an alternative must be developed for the RC officer who currently has no authorized or funded opportunity for like education/training options.

h. If one believes in our national policy of "first reliance" on the Reserve Components in any future contingency; that a future conflict will require a "come as you are" Army to protect our national interest or survival; and, that there is validity in the theory of "win the first battle or lose the war;" then the requirement for a highly motivated, well-educated officer corps of both components is critical.

4. THE CURRENT RC SYSTEM

a. Newly commissioned officers for the RC are accessed from the following precommissioning programs:

- (1) Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC)
- (2) Officer Candidate School (OCS)
- (3) Officer Candidate School, Reserve Components (OCS-RC)
- (4) Army National Guard OCS (ARNG-OCS)
- (5) Direct Commission Program

A varying number of ROTC graduates are selected each year for a tour of approximately 90 days Active Duty for Training (ADT) and are subsequently assigned to duty with the USAR (in TPU or the IRR), or with the ARNG to an appropriate unit vacancy by the Adjutant General of the State concerned. ARNG officers assume a dual status

in and obligation to the Federal and State Government when they accept an ARNG commission in addition to their Reserve Commission. The Branch Immaterial OCS at Fort Benning allocates reserved spaces for RC officer candidates, whereas the OCS-RC and ARNG-OCS are direct input programs designed specifically for the Reserve Components. Additionally, personnel possessing certain professional qualifications receive direct commissions in the Reserve Components' Army Medical Department, Judge Advocate General's Corps and the Chaplains Corps in accordance with NGR 600-100, AR 135-100 and AR 135-101.

b. Reserve Component educational requirements for promotion up to the grade of captain are now achieved by completion of one of the following basic courses:

- (1) Specialty Basic Course (minimum 12 weeks).
- (2) Officer Basic Course Reserve Component (OBC-RC), a 4-week course at the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer or Signal Schools.
- (3) Officer Basic Course, USAR school option.
- (4) Officer Basic Course, Nonresident instruction (NRI) option.

c. Educational requirements for promotion to the grade of major are met by completing one of the following advanced courses:

- (1) Specialty Advanced Course (minimum 26 weeks).
- (2) Officer Advanced Course - Reserve Components (OAC-RC) - 12 weeks at either IN, AR, FA, EN or SC School.
- (3) Officer Advanced Course (OAC) - USAR school course.
- (4) Officer Advanced Nonresident course.

d. The current U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer programs include:

- (1) Resident Course (42 weeks).
- (2) RC Resident Course (18 weeks).
- (3) USAR school (six phases with three two-week ADT periods).
- (4) NRI (16 subcourses having 250 credit hours).

e. Senior Service College (SSC) programs are:

- (1) U.S. Army War College (USAWC) - 42 weeks.
- (2) USAWC Corresponding Studies Program - a resident/nonresident program conducted over a 2-year period.
- (3) National Defense University (NDU).
 - (a) National War College - 42 weeks.
 - (b) Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) - 42 weeks.
 - (c) ICAF-NRI (4 subcourses having 225 credit hours).

f. Inclosure 1 depicts current RC options for professional development in chart form.

5. RETO revisions to the officers professional development program are summarized as follows:

a. Precommission Program:

- (1) A test of a 2-year ROTC program.
- (2) A test of a College Graduate/OCS program.
- (3) A test of a Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) program.
- (4) Continuation of the 4-year ROTC program pending test outcome.
- (5) Continuation of OCS with possible increased output.
- (6) Continuation with no change to the United States Military Academy.
- (7) Selective and limited use of direct commission.

The proposed 2-year ROTC program will have a positive effect on the Reserve Components, in that it will increase the base from which RC units receive newly commissioned officers. The Platoon Leaders Course and College Graduate OCS programs recommended as test alternatives are aimed specifically at filling a critical shortage of junior officers in troop program units, and in the Individual Ready Reserve upon completion of an initial ADT period.

b. BASIC. Expansion of Officer Basic Course (OBC) from 14 to 19 weeks tends to widen the gap between Active and Reserve basic course lengths, and may well require extension of the OBC-RC resident course from the present 4-week course to at least 6 weeks. In addition, the NRI mode of instruction will require revision and a longer period for completion by correspondence or USAR school. However, the advantage of having better trained officers entering RC units outweighs the disadvantages of extending the OBC.

c. ADVANCED. The Officer Advanced Course changes include:

(1) Reshaping of the advanced course from a standard permanent change of station (PCS) training vehicle for all officers to a temporary duty (TDY) option.

(2) Realignment of formal advanced course training into a multidimensional training experience including:

- (a) Unit/assignment experience.
- (b) On-the-job training (OJT) (formal and informal).
- (c) On-the-job evaluation (OJE) (skill certification).
- (d) Nonresident instruction (NRI) (required/optional).
- (e) TDY functional courses, to include a short course (4-5 weeks) for company/battery/troop command designees.
- (f) Unit schools.
- (g) Self-study/reading.

In lieu of the Officer Advanced Course, alternatives proposed that include a 5-week command course, a 4-week staff school, or a selected specialty course are attractive options for the Reserve Components. Shorter courses permit Reserve officers to attend resident modes more readily and can be converted to nonresident correspondence or USAR school courses. Shared responsibility and involvement of Reserve unit commanders in the professional development of subordinate officers is desirable and career enhancing. Care should be exercised in course of instruction (COI) development to assure that unique Reserve problems and command requirements are not overlooked, i.e., recruitment, retention, personnel and other administrative recurring actions not required in the Active Component. Utilization of the advanced course as a gate for promotion to the grade of major in the RC will no longer be feasible.

(3) Establishing a Pre-Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) nonresident course of 120-hour credit equivalent culminated by a 6-hour end-of-course examination. This is to be a prerequisite for resident attendance at CAS³. The CAS³ for all RC majors and provisions for a select group of majors to attend the resident phase, USACGSC or the nonresident phase by correspondence will affect the RC in terms of promotion criteria, nonresident training, and exposure to Active Army education programs. In lieu of advanced course completion as a gate for promotion to major, the pre-CAS³ nonresident program and successful completion of a 6-hour examination will be used as a basis for promotion to major, as well as qualification for the CAS³ resident course. Successful completion of CAS³ will be used as a basis for meeting the education requirements for promotion to LTC and COL. A shortened resident phase of 9 weeks will permit approximately 288 RC officers, annually, to attend a resident course with Active Army officers. Although some 200 RC officers now attend a shortened form (4 1/2 months) of the resident USACGSC course, a better understanding of Army field operations will be gained by the CAS³ course attendee. Provision for a nonresident and USAR school mode will permit sufficient course modes for RC officers. In addition to CAS³, 10 officer spaces will be allotted to RC at the USACGSC resident course. The nonresident USACGSC mode will also be available to selected officers.

d. SENIOR OFFICER. Senior officer professional development under the RETO recommendations include a battalion/brigade command designee course and increased wargaming and land warfare contentation.

6. RESERVE COMPONENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING OPTIONS. Adoption of RETO programs will require that the following options be continued, modified and/or established to insure that viable education and training opportunities are available for the RC officer:

a. PRECOMMISSION.

(1) The Reserve Component Officer Candidate School, which currently produces some 400 officers each year through 2 classes at Fort Benning, may need to be continued. That school is one of the primary means of "upward mobility" within the Reserve Components for qualified enlisted personnel. As a matter of fact, the program may require considerable expansion in the years ahead if the expected ROTC production level of 10,000 officers is not met by 1981.

(2) The ARNG-OCS, operating facilities across the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, annually provides some 1,500 officers to the ARNG and, in recent years, between 100 and 200 to the USAR. Although that production level (1,500) does not meet current ARNG requirements, it is the highest number of persons that

can be matriculated through OCS without lowering established standards. National Guard officials have stated that they need a minimum of 4,500 officer accessions annually to meet requirements. With OCS production added to current ROTC-ADT production (1,700 officers will be assigned to ARNG and USAR in the summer of 1978), aggregate officer accessions will remain short of the total Reserve Component requirements. Hence, there is added importance to a program which consistently produces officers from within the ARNG community.

b. BASIC

(1) Establishment of an expanded Officer Basic Course (OBC), which may add several weeks to the present program, will increase the need for other course options. The RC officer's career is greatly influenced by his/her first formal military schooling. The need for other basic course options become more critical when one recognizes that the young officers are at a critical stage in life: the early formulative stages of a civilian career, married life, social life style and a military citizen/soldier avocation. Each of these elements may well be in competition for time and priorities. Many find that a prolonged absence to pursue one of the competing elements exclusively is unacceptable. A key aspect of mobilization is the legal limitation that precludes the overseas deployment of an officer who has not completed the basic course, therefore, it is all the more vital that early completion of the basic course be accomplished to insure that the officer is deployable.

(2) To maximize the opportunity for basic course completion, the following course options should be made available:

(a) Continuation of OBC-RC at the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer and Signal Schools. This option provides resident exposure for those individuals who can only attend a residence course for a short time.

(b) Revision of the USAR school OBC option. This mode of instruction gives the officer an opportunity to receive basic course training/education in a "school setting" with the advantages of instructor/student relationship and student-to-student interface.

(c) Development of a quality, comparable NRI course. This option of totally self-paced home study is critical for a large number of RC officers who cannot leave other commitments for resident training, or devote the specific evenings and annual Active Duty Training periods required by the USAR school option.

(d) Continuation of reserved RC spaces in the revised basic courses which will permit those officers, who are available, to pursue the full resident course. The interface between the RC officer and officers from other commissioning sources is beneficial to all concerned.

c. ADVANCED

(1) Elimination of the traditional PCS resident advanced course and establishment of short TDY courses and other less formal training experiences will put a stress on the RC officer who does not normally have the opportunity to engage in a supervised OJT/OJE program. Presently, the advanced course provides the middle of three (basic/advanced/USACGSC) educational gates for a RC officer. Each gate is mandatory and is a prerequisite in the promotion system. The basic course is required for promotion to 1LT/CPT, the advanced course to MAJ, and USACGSC to LTC/COL. Elimination of the formal advanced course will require a substitute system for RC officer training/education/evaluation in the 10 or more year period between the basic course and a field grade officer development school. Educational opportunities that enhance the RC officer's capabilities may take the form of:

(a) Short tour TDY courses (including precommand or staff courses).

(b) Field commander skill certification.

(c) USAR school courses.

(d) Optional or mandatory NRI courses.

(e) OJT evaluation.

(f) Unit/Post/Installation schools.

(g) Civilian schooling.

(h) Self-teaching/reading.

(2) Qualification standards should be evaluated as to their adaptability to the RC officers and the part-time environment in which they perform. Development and attainment of prescribed standards must take the form of:

(a) Commander skill certification.

(b) OJT evaluation.

(c) Self-study validation.

(d) Selected or special NRI courses.

(3) The company grade officer development approach to training and education is critical to the Reserve Component officer. It eliminates a formal school course that provided a basic mid-career training experience and a mandatory course as a promotion prerequisite. The career time span in this phase is so long (10-12 years) that some assurance must be built into a system of evaluation to provide a means for each officer to increase his knowledge, skill, effectiveness, and most importantly his mobilization capability and potential.

(4) The problem of replacing a lost education gate (Advanced Course) as a promotional prerequisite is resolved by use of the Pre-CAS³ extension course as the promotional gate for the grade of major.

d. STAFF COLLEGE. Major reorientation of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College educational role requires revision of the RC officers exposure to his last formal educational gate. To complete this requirement, the RC officer should have the following options:

(1) The 42-week resident USACGSC course (14 RC spaces per class -- one per section).

(2) The USACGSC NRI course (200 RC spaces).

(3) The 9-week Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) (288 RC spaces in 4 classes per year).

(4) The CAS³ NRI course (unlimited enrollment).

(5) The CAS³ conducted by the USAR school (unlimited enrollment).

e. SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE.

(1) Reserve Component officers will continue to compete for limited resident course spaces as the:

(a) U.S. Army War College - 16 spaces (8 ARNG and 8 USAR).

(b) National War College - 2 spaces (1 ARNG and 1 USAR).

(c) Industrial College of the Armed Forces - 2 spaces (1 ARNG and 1 USAR).

(2) The Reserve Components should continue to receive approximately 50 percent of the limited spaces (250 students annually) in the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Program. This is a 2 school-year program which has two, 2-week Active Duty for Training periods.

f. GENERAL OFFICER CONTINUING EDUCATION.

(1) The informal education system for RC general officers should continue thru:

- (a) Self-study.
 - (b) Refresher courses (resident/NRI).
 - (c) Duty on boards, study groups, committees.
 - (d) Major command (MACOM) refresher courses (e.g., DIV/BDE).
 - (e) Management conferences.
 - (f) MACOM seminars/conferences.
 - (g) NATO orientation tours (Europe).
 - (h) Senior Reserve Component Officer Course (SRCOC) at USAWC (annually 32 RC GOs).
 - (i) Field Training Experience (FTX), Command Post Exercise (CPX), Joint Training Exercise (JTX) involvements.
- (2) Formal courses or programs developed for Active Component general officers should permit RC general officers to attend by invitation or reserved spaces.

g. The proposed RC options discussed above, are shown in chart form at Inclosure 2.

7. TRANSITION TO WAR. Mobilization implications of the proposed RETO education/training system presupposes activation of RC units and members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Expansion of the officer population at all grades will necessitate education and training system changes that impact on Reserve and Active Component officers. The changes are summarized as follows:

a. PRECOMMISSION. Changes to precommissioning programs will influence mobilization only in a protracted war. Major recommendations include dissolution of the ROTC program, rapid expansion of branch oriented OCS, and direct commissions for anticipated shortages of doctors, lawyers, dentists, chaplains, and engineers. Another alternative for rapid expansion during war-time includes the immediate commissioning of first classmen at the United States Military Academy and all other cadets upon completion of their third year of study. These programs are similar to the officer accession methods used during World War II.

b. BASIC. Transition to war will require that the basic course at each branch school be reduced initially to 12 weeks or less, and prepare for an initial surge of RC officers ordered to active duty and OCS graduates who have not completed the basic course. Within a period of approximately six months the basic course can be disestablished by transferring the essential basic course content to OCS and other precommissioning programs.

c. ADVANCED. Company command level courses will be shortened to a 2-3 week course, Reserve modes of instruction disestablished, and only combat essential TDY functional courses will remain. Soon after declaration of a national emergency, all courses developed solely for peacetime duties will be disestablished.

d. STAFF COLLEGES. Mobilization impact of the proposed field grade options indicates a need to expand output from the CAS³ course, reduction of the course length and a possible increase in the work-week from the current 34 to 48 hours. CAS³, in its expanded form, should serve the staff training needs of the newly activated officer. USACGSC will continue to be used to fill the Army's need for high order staff skills.

e. SENIOR STAFF SCHOOL. Increased wargaming and land warfare orientation at the U.S. Army War College will better prepare RC officers for peacetime and mobilization utilization. Further, the USAWC will establish a short (4-6 week) mobilization course for senior and general officers. By concentrating on the combat needs of the Army, the battalion/brigade precommand course will be shortened from a 4-week peacetime environment type course to 2 weeks.

2 Inclosures

1. Current RC Options
2. Proposed RC Options

Inclosure 1

Q-1-I-1

RESERVE COMPONENT

TRAINING/EDUCATION OPTIONS

CURRENT

<u>PRECOMMISSION</u>	<u>BASIC</u>	<u>ADVANCED</u>	<u>STAFF COLLEGE</u>	<u>SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE</u>
BIOCC*	OBC*	OAC*	USACGSC-4*	SSC
OCS-RC*	OBC-RC*	OAC-RC*	USACGSC-RC 203*	USAWC-16*
ARNG-OCS*	OBC-USAR School *Unlimited	OAC-USAR School *Unlimited		NWC-2*
ROTC-ADT	OBC-Extension *Unlimited	OAC-Extension *Unlimited	CGSC USAR School *Unlimited	ICAF-2*
Directed Comm			USACGSC Extension- *Unlimited	USAWC-NR-120&

* = RC Spaces

RESERVE COMPONENT

TRAINING/EDUCATION OPTIONS

	<u>PROPOSED</u>			<u>SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE</u>
	<u>PRECOMMISSION</u>	<u>BASIC</u>	<u>ADVANCED</u>	<u>STAFF COLLEGE</u>
	SAME AS PRESENT	Expanded OBC*	Functional Courses*	USACGSC-14*
	PLUS -	REVISED OBC-RC*	Precommand and Prestaff courses*	USACGSC Extension-200*
	Platoon Ldrs Courses (PLC)**	OBC-USAR School*	Pre-CAS ³ NRI	CAS ³ -288*
	2-YR ROTC*	OBC-NRI	Personal/Job Experiences	CAS ³ USAR School Unlimited*
	College Grad/ OCS**		NRI Local Schools Exams Command Influences	CAS ³ Extension Unlimited*
				PRESENT
				AS
				SAME

* = RC Spaces
** = Test Programs

nclosure 2

Q-1-II-1

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX R

MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS

1. PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Annex to review other systems that impact on the development of officers and their utilization. Certain aspects of these systems cannot be considered in isolation from the training and education system. Conversely, the adequacy and success of the training and education system rest on its compatibility with the policies and procedures for managing the trained resources - the Army officers.

2. GENERAL. The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) did not assume that current officer management policies could continue any more than the current training and education practices. RETO focused on the Army requirements and derived a training and education system that satisfies those requirements. In the process of determining the requirements, and reviewing each specialty -- as discussed separately in this report (see Annex X) -- it became obvious that to fulfill Army requirements implied the consideration of certain improvements or changes in the management of officers as well as in ways and means to train and educate them. The areas of interest include the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Evolution, Promotions, Commander Management, and Proponency.

3. OPMS EVOLUTION. The proposed RETO system is consistent with and supportive of OPMS. Even so, some evolutionary change in OPMS could lead to increased efficiency in education, training, assignment, and utilization of Army officers. Many of these changes are related to specific specialties. The highlights are discussed in Annex X with specialty specific details in the appendices to that Annex. Other areas of a more general nature are discussed below.

a. The study was hampered by significant problems in position coding in The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS). Thus it was/is difficult to determine requirements for each specialty. This difficulty is compounded by the varying criteria used by field commands in coding positions. Consistent and accurate coding of positions is a prerequisite to plan and conduct the training and education of officers in the right numbers and to manage and assign them properly afterwards. The Study Group considered of particular importance the coding of

positions not only by primary specialty but also by Specialty Skill Identifier (SSI) and by secondary specialty as well. Only such coding can provide a rationally analytical approach to solution of the algorithm involved in determining the training/education load, conducting the training/education and utilizing the trained/educated officers. It therefore follows that (1) more precise coding guidance needs to be developed and disseminated, (2) a one-time review of coding of all positions is needed, and (3) officers should be assigned by SSI, consistent with career development needs.

b. There are officer positions that do not require the incumbent to be of any particular specialty. They require simply an officer of the given grade. These specialty immaterial positions should be coded with a code not now used for any extant specialty. Another code should be devised to identify combat arms specialty immaterial positions to replace code 11X, whose use should be discontinued.

c. The dual specialty concept of coequal specialties under DPMS appears to require some fine tuning. The equality of primary and alternate specialties is probably never achieved from an education and training point of view. An officer is probably never equally expert in both fields. He enters the Army and spends most of the first 8 years of service developing expertise in his primary specialty. As he continues to develop beyond this point, his expertise in the alternate specialty progressively increases -- a result of training, education and experience. Ultimately he may make his most significant contributions to the Army in his alternate specialty. If so, his level of expertise in his primary specialty has probably decayed to a lower level than that of another officer who makes his most significant contributions in his primary specialty. Therefore it appears that it is more nearly true that every officer will have a specialty in which he has a secondary expertise and interest. The primacy of one of an officer's specialties needs to be recognized for other reasons as well. As discussed in Appendix 3 of this Annex, and in Annex N, the primacy is necessary to provide a psychological home with which the officer can identify and a focal point from which he can seek developmental guidance. The fictitious equality implicit in the current policy and system fragments this function today. The result is bewilderment on the part of an officer with potentially conflicting advice from two career managers; the ability of the career managers to advise only on segments (usually the next assignment) of his career; and, a sense of being cast

adrift and bereft of anyone who cares when the officer cannot find long range career development assistance. For these reasons, the study group recommends that the primacy of the primary specialty be affirmed, and that the other be secondary specialty/ies. The primacy of the primary specialty gains additional significance with the adoption of other RETO recommendations such as USACGSC selection by specialty quotas discussed elsewhere in this report, and promotion by specialty floors discussed in paragraph 4 below and in Appendix 1 to this Annex.

d. In consonance with the discussion of the preceeding paragraph, combat arms specialties 11, 12, 13, 14, and 21 Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and Engineer should be permitted as secondary specialties (Engineer is already permitted as a secondary specialty).

4. PROMOTION BY SPECIALTY FLOORS. The ultimate purpose of a training and education system is to prepare and develop officers to perform their duties adequately at the appropriate grade level in furtherance of the Army mission/s. Implicit in this purpose is the need to match assets to requirements, and this inescapably demands a promotion system that is driven by Army requirements. This rationale reaffirms the traditional promotion philosophy based on two points:

- Future Potential - not reward for past performance.
- Best Qualified.

a. When combined these two points translate to selection of the best qualified to fill the requirements at the next grade. This led the Study Group to conduct a statistical analysis of requirements by specialties and by grades, the result of which was the subconclusion that a variable promotion opportunity is inevitable, philosophically correct, and acceptable. Varying promotion opportunity can be and should be compensated for, to some degree, by recoding and reallocation of specialty immaterial positions (see paragraph 3b above), by using minimum floors rather than hard quotas for each specialty, and by judicious use of the "utilization rate" in setting the minimum floor for each specialty. In view of the very reason for recommending this system, the boards must be given the discretion to not meet a floor when insufficient officers are found fully qualified to serve at the next grade in a given specialty. Conversely, the boards should be empowered

and encouraged to recommend specialty changes as appropriate, and to recommend retention-in-grade when in the best interests of the Army.

b. The analysis found at Appendix 1 also considered other issues including OPMS, the generalist/specialist dichotomy (see also paragraph 7 below and Appendix 4), the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), mobilization and application by grade. The system recommended should be instituted now for promotions to colonel and for promotions to lieutenant colonel when legally feasible. It should not be instituted for promotion to major because most captains will have had little experience in their secondary specialties (where the floor might be more applicable or useful), and because there is still time to develop the expertise of those selected through the best qualified process without minimum floors.

5. COMMANDER MANAGEMENT. The professionalism and quality of the commanders is so crucial to the combat power of a military force, that its importance can hardly be emphasized enough. In the U.S. Army we centrally select only the very best for battalion and brigade commands. The importance of command is such that successful command has become a virtual prerequisite for selection to attend a senior service college and for promotion to colonel. (See statistical data in Appendix 2 to this Annex.) Although many argue that this is not surprising since the different boards are selecting the same officers on the basis of being the "best", serious concerns remain that the current procedures:

- may be weeding out late bloomers before they have a chance to bloom,
- are nonselecting out some talented officers not suited for command, but whom the Army needs, and
- demotivate the nonselected.

a. The selection process is inextricably linked to the length of the command tour. We have had shorter tours before, but today's tour length of 18 months in the Continental United States (CONUS), 24 months in Europe, and 13 months in Korea appears too short from several aspects:

- It has created a nouveau carpetbagger who breezes in, makes no waves, suboptimizes short-term solutions and defers decaying problems to his successor.

- It has undermined the commander as a role model for his subordinate officers not giving either enough time to get to know the other.

- It affects most insidiously the troops we have now stabilized while retaining revolving-door command tours, and who brace for the revolutionary changes that accompany a change of command.

- It is of the exact duration to couple command and promotion selection with the attendant unhealthy motivation/demotivation as one becomes a prerequisite for the other. (See Annex N.)

b. Shorter tours would solve this last problem, but would exacerbate the others. A tour of significantly longer duration would resolve all these problems. The argument against a longer tour usually rests on two points (1) expansion/mobilization needs, and (2) the demotivation of the nonselected officers.

(1) Expansion. Vietnam was fought with shorter command tours and no mobilization. The success of World War II was not attributable to short command tours either before or during the war. With longer and repetitive command tours, seasoned and skilled battalion commanders would become brigade commanders turning over their battalions to battle tested captains and majors. The latter would be the best as chosen by a commander who has gotten to know them.

(2) Demotivation. Demotivation would be avoided by the decoupling of command selection and promotion. Many who seek command as a "gate" even though they do not want it, would be freed from this compulsion and be able to turn their efforts to their specialty fields with gains for the Army. The selection process itself can be devised so that it minimizes demotivation in the harmonization of individual and Army needs as discussed below.

c. Two alternatives were considered for the management of commanders, a Specialty, and an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). The creation of a Command Specialty was discarded because although command skills were found common to all specialties, a significant portion of the duty modules are uniquely associated

with the type of unit commanded. A command ASI on the other hand is consistent with the definition of ASI (DA Pamphlet 600-3) and has the following advantages:

- Early identification (company grades) in time to groom the officers awarded the ASI.

- Selection of compatible secondary specialties.

- Decoupling of commandship and advancement, allowing those without the ASI to concentrate on skills other than command and just as critically needed by the Army at senior grades.

- Assists expansion by constructing the pyramid with enough officers to fill mobilization needs at the next level.

- Controls competition since all with the ASI will not get commands but will compete for promotion in the primary and secondary specialties.

d. The Study Group believes that a 3-year command tour duration should be adopted in conjunction with the creation of a command ASI as described above. (See Appendix 2.)

6. DA PROPONENCY FOR OPMS SPECIALTIES. The Officer Survey indicated a high degree of dissatisfaction by the officer corps with facets of OPMS related to assignments and the paucity of long term career development information and guidance. This dissatisfaction reflects problems identified by the Study Group in its data collection effort. They can be broken into three broad areas:

- Diminishes identification of officers with their specialty/ies as a result of the coequality of the dual OPMS specialties assigned.

- The inadequacy of staffing within the Department of the Army (DA) Staff to perform the DA proponent responsibilities outlined in AR 600-101.

- The streamlined organization of the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) along grade lines and the lack of an organizational structure that facilitates the performance of functions related to career-long professional development.

a. With the introduction of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the concept of coequal dual specialties was introduced. This duality provided the flexibility necessary to cope with the practical impossibility to utilize all officers throughout a normally progressive career in positions related to one specialty. To attempt to do so is impossible due to changing requirements of the specialties from grade to grade in ways totally unrelated to normal promotion progression; due to overseas rotational problems; and also due to the cushion or margin needed in each specialty to compensate for (1) officers assigned out of their specialty but fulfilling bona fide Army requirements (specialty immaterial positions Transients, Hospital and Students (THS) account) and (2) for changes in requirements as a result of either peacetime force changes or of wartime mobilization. The problem was more acute for combat arms officers who as senior officers would serve most often out of their specialty due to lessened requirements at those grades in their specialty. The duality concept provided structure to what was already a fact before OPMS - that officers would frequently serve outside their primary specialty. However, it structured such out-of-primary service to be in a single other specialty, repetitively, rather than in a variety of fields, to permit the officer to deepen his expertise in that other, alternate, specialty, and to allow him to serve equally well in both fields. To cause this to happen, the system made the alternate specialty both required and coequal. It is these last two features that detract from the needed psychological identification with his specialty and his receipt of adequate long term professional development guidance (as discussed in paragraph 3c above). In addition, the required aspect of the duality actually hinders the maintenance of his skills in those specialties which, because of dynamically changing doctrine or technology, require repetitive assignments to update and maintain skills. The coequal aspect of it spawned an organizational structure at OPMD unsuited for fulfilling the primary goal of OPMS as will be discussed below. Both of these aspects should be changed. The primacy of the primary specialty should be affirmed as discussed in paragraph 3c above (this implies that alternate specialties would become secondary, that combat arms specialties would be allowed as secondary specialties, and that changing to a new primary would be more commonplace.) In addition, deviation from the requirement for dual specialization should be permitted for some specialties where there are clear requirements for officers in the senior grades that would allow promotion opportunity and high utilization.

b. Within the DA Staff, proponenty for specialty career development, education and training is assigned to staff elements rather than specific individuals. This has resulted in generally inadequate staffing to perform these functions. The elements tend to place these responsibilities on action officers, at the LTC level or below, who may or may not be members of the given specialty, who may be responsible for several specialties (in one case 17 specialties), and who have other primary duties requiring their attention. In addition to being unable to perform the functions envisioned by AR 600-101, this organizational scheme, by its "faceless" nature, adds further to the identity problem described in preceeding paragraphs. This key responsibility should be assigned to an individual general officer in order to vest him with both visibility to the field, and with the requisite authority (in terms of CSR 10-5 "monitorship") to oversee the coordination of those doing the training and those making the assignments. To assist these general officer proponents in this additional duty, they should have officer assistants working full time on specialty proponent matters such as Army Educational Requirements Board (AERB), position and overall career development, but leaving solutions to the training and education proponent and the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) working in coordination. This option explored in Appendix 3 to this Annex, would require 17 officers to assist the general officer proponents, in addition to the Specialty Committees encouraged by AR 600-101.

c. The purpose of OPMS is to enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the officer corps (DA Pam 600-3). Although this implies that the achievement of professional expertise should be given primary attention, the organization of OPMD focuses its management on grade and not on specialty. This organization is efficient in filling Army requirements at each grade. However, this illusory efficiency suboptimizes in the short range to the detriment of long range Army requirements. The institutional interest has been lost that existed earlier in managing the education, training and assignments of lieutenants and captains in a way to best develop the majors and lieutenant colonels of tomorrow. In addition, the lack of adequate and credible long-term career guidance has shifted the attention of the officers, to an unhealthy degree (see Annex N), to the results of selection boards as yardsticks for career development. Indeed, even assignment officers admit taking their cues from board result. The result is careerism (in a pejorative sense) to the long term detriment of the officer corps and the Army. For all these reasons the Study Group

proposes consideration of two organizational changes to foster achievement of the primary purpose of CPMS, and to avoid tempting the modification of the primary purpose to achieve some secondary supporting goal. The first of these changes is a reorganization of OPMD along specialty lines vice grade lines. The second change is to charge a directorate, other than OPMD, with responsibility for professional development of officers (from OPMD) and enlisted men (from the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, EPMD). Each specialty would have a section headed by a colonel in the directorate. Other details of these two changes are also in Appendix 3 to this Annex.

7. SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS. The Study Group reviewed the sometimes voiced issue of the relative importance of either "specialists or generalists" to the Army. This issue recurs in several of the areas studied. The Study Group concluded that it is a false issue. It is not an "either-or" issue. The Army needs both. As increasing technology places demands for more and more of an officer's available time to be devoted to development and maintenance of his specialty related skills, he will become more of a specialist. The Army cannot function without his services. Yet, regardless of the level of technology achieved, the Army will also require adequate expertise in various fields to be able to integrate and direct the efforts of the specialists. There is a place in, and a need by the Army for both specialists and generalists. (See Appendix 4 to this Annex.)

8. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. OPMS Evolution. It is recommended that:

- (1) More precise guidance for coding individual positions by specialty, by SSI and by specialty pairs be provided to the field.
- (2) A one time review of every position coding be conducted as soon as possible after issuing the guidance.
- (3) Requisitions and assignments be made in accordance with SSI requirements rather than simply specialty codes.
- (4) The use of Specialty Code 11X to designate combat arms specialty immaterial be discontinued and replaced by a number not now used for any extant specialty; and, that another code be created for specialty immaterial positions.

(5) The current principle of equality between primary and alternate specialties be modified to reflect that most officers should have a primary and a secondary specialty.

(6) Specialties 11, 12, 13, 14, and 21 - Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, respectively, should be permitted as secondary specialties.

b. Promotion by Specialty Floors. It is recommended that the Army adopt a system of promotion by specialty floors, and that:

(1) Floors be established for promotion to colonel for all specialties, considering:

- requirements,
- assets,
- attrition, and
- the resulting utilization rate;

and weighted by:

- mobilization,
- number of eligibles, and
- the cost of hard skill training and education.

(2) Selection boards be required to meet specialty floors only if sufficient qualified officers are found.

(3) The system be extended for promotion to lieutenant colonel when legally feasible, but not to major and below.

(4) Selection boards be required to recommend changing an officer's primary or secondary specialties in appropriate cases.

(5) Selection boards be permitted to recommend retention-in-grade when in the best interest of the Army.

c. Commander Management. It is recommended that:

(NOTE: these Study Group recommendations with respect to Commander Management were disapproved by the Chief of Staff, Army on 13 April 1978. They are included here for completeness of the report, but do not appear in the Implementation Plan of Annex A).

(1) Command tours of duty be extended to a minimum of 3 years as quickly as possible without undue turmoil in the pool of currently serving and already selected commanders at the lieutenant colonel and colonel level.

(2) An ASI for commanders be created.

(3) Volunteers for the command ASI be selected from the group of previously successful company commanders at the captain level.

(4) Those officers awarded the command ASI be managed so that they are developed in compatible secondary specialties and with the necessary schooling, assignments and counseling that best support their future assignment as commanders.

(5) Command selection boards be continued with fewer selections to account for the longer tours.

d. DA Proponency for OPMS Specialties. It is recommended that:

(1) DA Proponency be strengthened by:

- designating general officers, by name, as "heads" for each OPMS specialty,

- providing "monitorship" authority to each of the specialty proponents (general officer head of an OPMS specialty),

- assigning lieutenant colonel action officers full time to each specialty or logical grouping of specialties to assist the general officer proponent.

(2) OPMD assignments divisions be organized into three divisions; Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms and Combat Service

Support Divisions, with a subordinate section headed by a colonel for each OPMS specialty. The sections to manage the careers, in a long-term basis, of all officers up to and including the grade of colonel who possess the given specialty as a primary specialty.

(3) A MILPERCEN directorate, other than OPMD, be given professional development policy responsibility for officers and warrant officers (vice OPMD) and for enlisted members (vice EPMD).

4 Appendixes

1. Promotion by Specialty Floors
2. Commander Management
3. OPMS Specialties - DA Proponency and Specialty Primacy
4. Specialists and Generalists

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

PROMOTION-BY-SPECIALTY FLOORS

TO ANNEX R

MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS

INTRODUCTION-

The development of a comprehensive and coherent training and education system for the Army focuses on providing officers capable of performing their duties at the appropriate grade level. Therefore the promotion system has to be examined for compatibility with officer development. This Appendix examines Promotion-by-Specialty (PBS) to include the need for it, options, advantages and disadvantages, and procedures. The Appendix is based on data from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) and the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), the data collected by the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), the RETO Officer Survey and interviews with three general officers with past or present experience in the personnel area (LTG Gard, MG Putnam, MG Williams). A summary of each of the interviews is at Inclosures 1, 2, and 3. The Appendix recommends policies and procedures to be adopted by the Army.

PROMOTION PHILOSOPHY-

The current promotion philosophy by the Army is based on two points:

- Future Potential - not reward for past performance.
- Best Qualified.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM-

Up to 1977.

Although when combined, the above two points imply selection of the best qualified to fill the requirements at the next grade, in practice this did not necessarily obtain.

***** CPT TOFFLLNI DAPC-OPP-0-00325-BU04


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
SPECIALTY	DESIGNATIONS	SIMULATION AVERAGE			ASSET SUMMARY			GRADE - COLONEL			TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	REQUIREMENTS / ASSETS	UTILIZATION INDEX AVERAGE
		TOTAL	POTENTIAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	POTENTIAL	TOTAL	UPWARD GRADE	UPWARD GRADE	TOTAL			
11	13	903	301	0	0	0	0	0	0	381	52	13.7	
12	10	339	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	118	20	13.0	
13	21	603	118	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	15	11.1	
14	5	237	78	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	21	10.7	
15	12	316	212	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	67	12.7	
21	7	155	147	0	0	0	0	0	0	41	45	11.3	
22	2	141	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	78	10.8	
23	1	51	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	15	11.3	
24	2	108	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	53	68	10.8	
25	7	180	174	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	30	11.3	
31	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	76	12.7	
32	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	54	80	10.8	
33	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	15	11.3	
34	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	31	10.7	
35	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	108	168	10.8	
36	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
37	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
38	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
39	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
40	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
41	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
42	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
43	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
44	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
45	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
46	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
47	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
48	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
49	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
50	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
51	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
52	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
53	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
54	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
55	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
56	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
57	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
58	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
59	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
60	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
61	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
62	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
63	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
64	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
65	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
66	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
67	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
68	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
69	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
70	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
71	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
72	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
73	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
74	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
75	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
76	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
77	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
78	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
79	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
80	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
81	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
82	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
83	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
84	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
85	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
86	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
87	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
88	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
89	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
90	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
91	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
92	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
93	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
94	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
95	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
96	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
97	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
98	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
99	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
100	4	174	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	168	264	10.8	
TOTALS		9045	119	3906	3110	0	0	0	0	3110	3110	100	

↑

Table 3.- Utilization Rates - Colonel

UTILIZATION RATE





STRONGLY
ACREE

ACREE

NO
OPINION


DISAGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

DON'T
KNOW

Table 6.-
OFFICER SURVEY RESPONSES


Question # 78. Selection boards
use alternate specialty qualifi-
cation; if designated, as a
criterion for promotion.



STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NO OPINION DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE DON'T KNOW

Table 7.-
OFFICER SURVEY RESPONSES

Question # 72. Specialty "qualification" is easily defined.



- Despite the emphasis on future potential, boards have a natural tendency to gage future potential by past performance.

- Best qualified criteria often was based on "quality" indicators that favor the "generalist." (USACGSC, Command).

- The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was too young, and board members had a natural proclivity to select in their own image.

Whatever the reasons, a number of specialties were underaligned at different grades. Tables 1, 2 and 3 illustrate these underalignments at the ranks of MAJ, LTC and COL. An underaligned specialty is one with a utilization rate of more than 0.67 (requires more than 2 out of 3 assignments in that specialty - no time for alternate utilization). At the grade of COL, with heavy utilization the rate should be no higher than 0.85.

Several questions in the Officer Survey addressed the current board processes. The responses to the questions discussed below, are displayed graphically in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7.

The preponderance of the officer corps (64%) does not believe that only the primary specialty has any real importance in career advancement. (See Table 4). However, as shown in Table 5, 49.4% thought that qualification in the primary specialty is one of the criteria used by selection boards. Even so, as high as 33% either did not know (24%) or had no opinion (9%).

With respect to the alternate specialty (Table 6), only 25.2% believe selection boards consider qualification as a criterion for promotion; 29.8% do not believe that boards consider it; and 45% either do not know (30%) or have no opinion (15%). Rather than a cynical view of boards, this response may indicate a recognition of the difficulty of defining (and thus determining) what constitutes "qualification." In this respect, as shown in Table 7, a full 84% of the officers believe qualification is not easily defined.

There are no significant variations by grade on these opinions. These perceptions further confirm that the promotion philosophy either is not practiced or at least the officer corps does not perceive it to be practiced by boards.

The 1977 AUS COL Board

In 1977 the AUS COL Board was granted additional spaces to promote a certain minimum number of officers in underaligned

specialties provided they could be found among the grey files. An amendment to the instructions to the board listed 27 under-aligned specialties in which a potential additional 165 promotion spaces could be added to meet the minimum requirement in these specialties. (See Inclosure 4 for the minimum requirements prescribed).

The board used 34 additional spaces. Selections exceeded the minimum requirement in 20 specialties, matched it in 4, and failed to meet it in 3.

Presumably then, the minimum number required was provided in at least 20 of the 27 specialties by the first phase of the board and without recourse to the additional spaces. In as many as 7 specialties the board used the additional spaces. (The actual number selected, over and under by specialty are also shown in Inclosure 4).

A quota-by-specialty system was considered as an option in leading up to the process actually used. The "floor" system described above was selected rather than a quota, among other reasons, because a quota system may have precluded any selections in the 5 overaligned specialties shown in table 8 below.

Table 8

Overaligned Specialties

13 - Field Artillery
14 - Air Defense Artillery
28 - Instructional Technology
and Management
88 - Highway - Rail Operations
92 - Supply Management

In retrospect, the system used was much preferable over a quota-by-specialty system inasmuch by using the best qualified first phase of the sequential process, the board met or exceeded the floors of most of the specialties of concern, many of them by a substantial margin as shown below in Table 9.

Table 9

Specialties with "Floors" Exceeded
by Substantial Margins
in First Phase Selections

	<u>FLOOR</u>	<u>SELECTED</u>	<u>MARGIN</u>
35 - Tactical/Strategic Intelligence	3	42	+39 (1,300%)
42 - Personnel Admin & Admin Mgmt	6	28	+22 (366%)
45 - Comptroller	1	29	+28 (2,800%)
48 - Foreign Area Officer 1/	22	41	+19 (86%)
71 - Aviation Materiel Mgmt	3	12	+ 9 (300%)
73 - Missile Materiel Mgmt	1	5	+ 4 (400%)
75 - Munition Materiel Mgmt	2	7	+ 5 (250%)
77 - Tank/Ground Mobility Materiel Mgmt	1	7	+ 6 (600%)
87 - Marine and Terminal Operations	1	7	+ 6 (600%)
91 - Maintenance Management	3	24	+21 (700%)
92 - Supply Management 2/	10	37	+27 (270%)
95 - Transportation Management	3	14	+11 (367%)
97 - Procurement	4	24	+20 (500%)

1/ Varies by Geographic Area.

2/ More significant when referring back to Table 8.

One of the observations from Table 9 is that the best-qualified process of the first phase may in fact favor specialties in which the quotas would be small due to small requirements - the more so the larger the group of contenders from which the selections are made.

Lest Table 9 be misinterpreted, it is necessary to point out that the floors were established at the level which would keep the utilization rate at 0.85 or lower. Thus, the margins shown do not necessarily constitute an "excess." There is no way to assess the situation in these specialties without considering existing assets, requirements and attrition.

Guidance for 1978 Boards.

It is anticipated that pending approval by the Chief of Staff, Army, the 1978 boards will continue to use the process described above, with guidance on underaligned specialties extended to the LTC board to the extent permitted by law. (OTJAG has determined that the minimum floors allowable at COL, are precluded by law at LTC and below).

PROMOTION-BY-SPECIALTY (PBS)-

Need.

It is obvious that the officer corps exists to fulfill the needs of the Army. In addition, in view of the focus of the promotion philosophy on future potential and best qualified, it follows that the selection process must advance officers in sufficient numbers and of the right specialties to fill the requirements at the next grade. The board's selection process must take into account the requirements at the next grade. It is this linking of the selection to requirements which is labeled Promotion-by-Specialty (PBS), perhaps loosely, with the actual process to be determined in the rest of this paper. With this definition in mind, PBS is needed for the reasons stated below.

- Promotions must be driven by the Army's requirements.
- Personnel managers cannot manage without a linkage between promotions and requirements.
- At a lesser level of importance, the only truly manageable and equitable system is one geared to requirements, a system which all officers can understand and accept (albeit grudgingly).
- A system based on requirements reduces the unhealthy pressure of ticket punching and quality cuts which are more available to some than to others.
- Although not driven by OPMS, such a system would reinforce OPMS.

Variables.

The variables that must enter into any PBS system include, for each specialty:

- Requirements
- Assets
- Attrition
- Utilization and Utilization Rate

Other Factors.

Other factors which must be kept in mind and which complicate PBS include:

- Dual Specialties
- Mobilization
- Specialty Immaterial Positions

- Coding Problems
- Changing Requirements
- Force Structure Changes
- Promotion Capability dictated by the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA)
- Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
- Up-or-Out
- "Quality" Distribution
- The Generalist/Specialist Issue
- Youth of OPMS
- Promotion Flow Desirable for Viability of Specialties

Many of these factors are self-evident and not all of them will be discussed separately in the following discussion.

Major Hurdle.

The major hurdle that must be surmounted in PBS is that the requirements vary by grade among specialties.

The requirements by grade and by specialty projected to 780930 are shown in Table 10.

Table 10
PERCENT PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY

REQUIREMENTS					PERCENT PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY FROM LOWER GRADE TO GRADE INDICATED ^{1/}			
COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	LT	MAJ	LTC	COL	COL
11 IN	301	672	976	2156	46	70	53	46
12 MA	92	336	452	1017	45	74	29	
13 AD	110	439	756	1957	39	57	27	27
14 AD	37	210	340	682	31	42	18	18
15 AD	49	213	605	1474	41	35	23	23
21 IN	212	766	628	1276	49	74	65	45
25 CDE	42	162	370	923	40	43	34	
26 PM	41	130	137	227	60	45	32	33
27 CDE	47	116	184	169	100+	44	42	
28 JPM	16	42	97	121	49	71	38	
31 MP	53	220	370	970	61	73	29	24
35 PM	42	205	560	828	64	44	36	
36 PM	22	102	284	244	54	30	22	32
37 PM	41	117	414	302	71	53	35	35
41 PM	170	588	777	1277	77	60	30	28
42 AD	54	220	500	865	56	45	24	35
43 CDE	5	15	60	81	76	35	35	35
44 PI	10	75	132	192	69	25	17	33
45 CAMP	01	192	172	95		72	42	
46 PM	20	111	102	106	100+	25	25	25
47 AD	106	277	211	304	100+	34	34	34
48 PM	67	313	341	333	100+	92	53	53
49 OCS	47	170	276	171	67	15	15	15
51 AD	174	284	207	240	100+	42	42	42
52 AD	24	67	61	15	100+	43	43	43
53 AD	44	205	314	304	55	27	27	27
54 PM	270	334	344	220	100+	43	43	43
70 PM	90	300	90	10				
71 IN	20	75	110	445	27	64	57	
72 CDE	15	54	84	133	63	50	34	
73 MA	10	56	60	148	41	72	63	
74 CH	8	75	93	272	30	81	114	54
75 AD	12	92	145	203	57	63	45	43
76 AD	4	13	17	70	22	76	31	
77 TC	10	36	48	350	74	75	58	
81 PM	6	20	40	61	66	60	30	
82 PM	8	24	51	56	91	57	28	
83 PM	5	31	51	62	52	61	16	
84 PM	3	27	60	140		36	17	
87 PM	7	33	49	112	44	67	27	
88 PM	3	23	46	108	24	67	13	
91 PM	20	237	389	270		61	60	
92 PM	20	219	769	403	77	67	37	
93 PM	15	104	93	66	100+	74	41	
94 PM	37	145	173	150	79	59	3	
97 PM	45	112	124	140	90	72	3	
300 343 1255 1976 1989					61	70	37	
DOPMA					80	70	50	

1/ Ignores attrition beyond a steady state.
Assumes equal time-in-grade at each grade.

Table 10 also shows what are called percent "promotion opportunity" to the grade shown. These are nothing more than the number of positions at the grade shown as a percent of the number of positions at the next lower grade. This computation ignores three of the four variables, i.e., assets, attrition and the utilization rate. It also ignores that each officer holds two specialties, and assumes a steady state in which time-in-grade is the same at CPT, MAJ and LTC (as it would be under DOPMA). The brackets shown in the lower section recompute the "promotion opportunity" if certain specialties were to be grouped in different ways. We will return to this later. At the moment it is sufficient to note that even after such groupings, promotion opportunity to COL varies from 18 percent for Air Defense to 62 percent for Research and Development.

Thus, any PBS system must contend with and accept, or compensate for these differences. One way to compensate for these differences is to code all Specialty Immaterial (SI) positions as SI (say SC:00) and to allocate these positions among the specialties so as to even out as much as possible the promotion opportunities. Taking Infantry as an example, refer to Table 11 for computations and definitions of terms.

Table 11

Infantry Reallocation SI Positions

GRADE	PERSACS AUTHORIZED POSITIONS REQUIREMENT 1/	TAADS AUTHORIZED POSITIONS TYPE OF POSITION					ESTIMATED SPECIALTY IMMATERIAL (SI) POSITIONS	
		C	R	S	A	TOTAL	LOW 2/	HIGH 3/
MAJ	996	515	99	54	123	791	177	382
LTC	693	292	186	24	76	578	100	215
COL	381	89	177	38	48	352	86	115

$$\frac{4}{\text{PO}_{\text{COL}}} = \frac{381}{693} = 55\% \quad \text{PO}_{\text{LTC}} = \frac{693}{996} = 70\%$$

$$\frac{5}{\text{PO}_{\text{COL}}} = \frac{381 - 86}{693} = 43\%$$

$$\text{PO}_{\text{COL}} = \frac{381 - 115}{693} = 38\%$$

1/ The PERSACS and TAADS totals differ due to factoring and probably also due to SI positions. Position types from RETO Specialties Review:

C = Core - (Requires day to day use of specialty expertise).

R = Related - (Draws on specialty knowledge, skills and experience).

S = Special Staff - (Not directly related to specialty; out of organizational mainstream).

A = Army Wide - (Not related at all; supports overall operation of the Army).

2/ Low = S + A

3/ High = PERSACS AUTH. - (C + R)

4/ PO_{COL} = Promotion Opportunity at COL without SI allocation.

5/ PO_{COL} , $\text{PO}_{\text{COL}}^{\text{"}}$ = Promotion Opportunity after allocation of low and high SI estimates, respectively.

If the high estimate for SI positions are reallocated to other specialties at the COL level only, the PO_{COL} can be reduced to 38% which is essentially at the Army wide average of 37%. However, whereas in this case no reallocation is made at the LTC level (the $PO_{LTC} = 70\%$, the Army average), in other cases reallocation at the LTC level would counter the reductions achieved at COL level).

Three other problems remain with this process. First, the high PO_{LTC} shown in Table 10 are mostly for advanced entry specialties where the requirements are probably for hard positions. For example, in Comptroller where $PO_{LTC} = 100\% +$, there are no S and A positions. Therefore SI reallocations would not help to level PO_{LTC} there (i.e., reduce PO_{LTC} to 70%); would not make SI positions available for specialties with low PO_{LTC} ; and, probably would not be desirable to do so. Second, it is probably not desirable to reallocate SI positions from Infantry to the extent shown in Table 11. It may even be that many of these positions are not truly SI but at least require a combat arms officer. And third, although an exhaustive study has not been made, it can be concluded that sufficient SI positions are not available for reallocation to bring specialties to near the Army average of 37% at COL - Infantry is rich (probably richest) in SI positions and by reallocation of the high estimate of SI positions (unacceptable), it is barely brought to the Army average.

This entire process ignores the PO in the alternate specialty of every officer.

The major hurdle then, is that varying requirements by grade and specialty cause a PBS system fully geared to requirements to have different promotion opportunities.

PBS Through Hard Specialty Quotas

In a PBS system fully geared to requirements by hard quotas in each specialty there are two options to permit an adequate promotion flow:

- To vary the zone of consideration while keeping promotion opportunity relatively the same (with some compensation through judicious SI positions reallocation).
- To allow different promotion opportunity while keeping zones of consideration constant (with some compensation through judicious SI positions reallocation).

1. Variable Zone of Consideration-

The first option would lead to fast and slow moving specialties. The Canadian Army, uses a similar system. However their "classifications" (specialties) are broader than our OPMS specialties (although not quite

so broad as our earlier branches), and their officers have only one classification. Even though they compensate to some extent by allocating hard and "any" (SI) positions, in their system:

- Infantry and Artillery officers lag their contemporaries 2 years in promotion to MAJ;
- Infantry and Artillery officers lag Armor in promotion to LTC by 2 1/2 years, lag others by 3 1/2 years;
- Fast and slow moving classifications differ as much as 5 years in promotion to COL.

This option (different zones of consideration for different specialties) has such potential for harm to the officer corps that it is considered unacceptable and will be discarded from further consideration. Among the potential problems are:

- Contemporaries would diverge on rank as an accident of specialty.
- Strong pressures would rise for specialty changes with potentially large swings from year to year as assets change. (Canadian classification changes are rarely permitted).
- Fickle specialty change swings would not enhance education and training - result: pressures to preclude specialty changes. (But if a specialty is overaligned, changes would serve the Army's interest).
- Officers would have different zones of consideration in their two specialties.
- Promotion in one specialty would have an unbalancing effect on the other specialty. (Difficult if not impossible to manage selection process).
- This option would tend to move OPMS to single specialty officers at lower and lower grades.
- It would create demotivation, divisiveness, disension.

2. Variable Promotion Opportunity-

The second option cannot be discarded because of the variation in promotion opportunity alone. Variations in promotion opportunity are in tune with the focus of the philosophy of promotion on future potential to

meet the Army's needs. Such variations have always existed. If articulated without apology by the Army they will be acceptable to the officer corps, even if distasteful to some, especially in view of the duality of specialties possessed by each officer.

In addition to the judicious reallocation of SI positions, some adjustment to level promotion opportunity can be made by grouping some specialties for promotion consideration. Some of the possible groupings are shown in Table 10 already discussed. It may be argued that some groupings of specialties are desirable anyway due to the narrowness of some of the current specialties and the normal broadening of an officer as he progresses in maturity and experience, as well as the merging of the managerial functions common at the higher grade levels. The specialty signatures could be used in a follow-on effort beyond RETC to determine the logical groupings. However, even after a grouping of specialties has taken place promotion opportunities will vary more or less as shown in Table 10.

This option however, is undesirable because of the hard quota aspect of it.


Hard quotas by specialties, especially at the grades of MAJ and LTC, may be unworkable.

- Requirements are not that precise and fluctuate constantly. (The precision this would require can be characterized as measuring a football field with a micrometer).
- Requirements will only match promotion capability by accident since the latter are determined by OGLA.
- Force structure changes will also detract from attempting to be too precise.
- Promotion in some specialties will be precluded from time to time leading to stagnation and management problems.
- Hard quotas will lead to separate specialty boards. (This could be said to throw the Army back into the dark ages - promotion by technical services and branches were abandoned years ago for good and sufficient reasons).
- Separate specialty boards are both unworkable and too expensive.
- Promotion based on one specialty would have an unbalancing effect on the other specialty. (Difficult if not impossible to manage selection process.)
- Hard quotas would tend to move OPMS to single specialty at lower and lower grades. (Promotions based on hard quotas would create pressures for high utilization in the specialty under which promoted.)

The officer survey asked the degree of agreement of the respondents with the statement: "Promotion boards should promote by specialty quotas." The replies are displayed in Table 12.

TABLE 12

OFFICER SURVEY RESPONSES



Whereas 28% agreed with the statement, 55% disagreed. (22% of the 55% strongly disagreed.) There were minor discrepancies from these percentages by grade. When tabulated by specialty, however, even though the sample was not statistically valid for many specialties, there are several specialties that more or less agreed with the proposition. Most of the specialties which could be said to agree (26, 27, 37, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 72, 73, 93) include some that were either not underaligned (26, 44, 49, 51), or whose minimum floors were exceeded in the first phase (27, 46, 48, 73) of the 1977 AUS COL Board. Therefore a selection-by-hard-quotas based on Army requirements may not have helped increase promotions in these specialties and in fact may have decreased them. It appears the statement in the Officer Survey may have been interpreted by some as if it had said "Promotion boards should promote by specialty quotas established with equal promotion opportunity for all." Since the ground rules being considered in this option (variable promotion opportunity based on need) were not clearly established, no valid conclusions on its acceptability can be drawn from the survey. However, the primacy of Army needs is such a basic concept (already in use at both enlisted and General Officer level), that the officer corps would accept it.

Nevertheless, the disadvantages of hard quotas as discussed earlier (irrespective of officer opinion), are so serious that this second option is also discarded. Its workability is tenuous at best for marginal gain. It would represent a radical change that may later have to be discarded and in this sense would be detrimental to the morale of the officer corps.

PBS through Minimum Floors

Another way to achieve PBS is to establish "minimum floors" for underaligned specialties.

This system has been largely discussed in the section above describing the 1977 AUS COL Board. It avoids most of the disadvantages of the hard quota system discussed in the previous section. In addition, it has the following advantages. The system:

- Readily conjugates the four variables that any PBS system must take into account:
 - o Requirements.
 - o Assets
 - o Attrition
 - o Utilization Rates
- Does not need massive recoding effort of SI positions.

- Seeks reallocation and leveling of promotion opportunity through variations of the utilization rate in the process used to compute the minimum floors.
- Recognizes dual specialties under OPMS and is not subject to unbalancing during the selection process.
- Adaptable to current board processes without trending to separate specialty selection boards.
- Can be readily influenced by decision makers as needed or desired.
- Recognizes the needs of the Army without potential for stifling officer corps.
- Has already proven to be workable in its first mutation.
- Can be used on only seriously underaligned specialties, or across the board. (But see section on DOPMA below.)
- Supportive of OPMS without creating pressures for trending to single specialty development.
- Can be instituted more or less stringently at different grades.
- Is sensitive to requirements across grade plates.
- Leaves door open for modification into PBS-by-hard-quota, if desired, as more experience is gained.

RECOMMENDED PBS SYSTEM-

For these reasons, the Army should adopt PBS-through-minimum-floors on a routine rather than an exception basis.

In addition the PBS system should have the following features:

- A philosophy of selection by best-qualified and future potential as at present.
- Minimum floor to be met only if sufficient fully-qualified individuals are found from which to select the best qualified.
- Two step process:
 - 1) Selection of all fully-qualified officers.
 - 2) Selection of best qualified with cognizance of minimum floors.
- Board to be given minimum floors for all specialties. (Not additional quotas. See also section on IOPMA below.)

- Minimum floors to be derived by using a utilization rate weighted with appropriate factors to recognize

- o Mobilization needs
- o Number of contenders
- o Investment cost in hard skill specialists.

- Boards to be required to recommend specialty changes for highly rated performers who have been out of their specialties for substantial periods of time. These officers may be concurrently selected for promotion if best qualified in specialty to which recommended and if the officer in question concurs with the change.

OTHER ISSUES

DOPMA

Under DOPMA, promotion must be based on best-qualified system. There can be no separate quotas unless the specialties so treated are consistently addressed from year to year instead of from time to time. These reasons give rise to the above recommendations on minimum floors for all specialties, and a preliminary step to determine those fully-qualified from which to select the best-qualified.

Application by Grade

The provisions of current laws preclude this system from being implemented now at the grades of LTC and below. If DOPMA passes as currently written, these restrictions disappear. The question then remains as to how should this system be applied and to what extent at each grade.

- COL: At this grade, the recommended PBS-by-minimum-floors should be implemented immediately. This system is an extension of what has already been done. (This process mirrors the system used to select General Officers).
- LTC: At this grade, in view of current provisions of law, the boards should be given as precise a guidance as possible without requiring boards to meet minimum floors. As soon as law permits, the recommended PBS-by-minimum-floors should also be implemented fully at this grade.
- MAJ: When considered for promotion to this grade most CPTs will have had little experience in their alternate specialty, where the floor might be more applicable or useful. There is still time to develop the expertise of those selected through the best qualified process without minimum floors. For this reason minimum floors should not be prescribed for promotion to this grade even when passage of DOPMA permits this to be done.

Up-or-Out.

Up-or-Out should be retained, but made more flexible. It is part of DOPMA and there appears to be no necessity for attempting to change these provisions of DOPMA. This mechanism to weed out marginal performers without need to show cause is considered necessary. However an inflexible Up-or-Out can lead to incongruous actions (e.g., releasing past-over aviators while accessing and training others to meet shortfalls). In cases requiring retention-in-grade, it may be possible to do so: by resorting to a fully-qualified but not best-qualified mechanism if permissible under DOPMA (this requires an OTJAG interpretation and opinion that should be requested now); by utilization of the Secretary of the Army authority (if still retained after DOPMA); or by seeking a case by case exception.

Generalist/Specialist Issue.

The generalist/specialist issue is a false dichotomy. All successful generalists, as a rule, should all be specialists in at least one or two areas (as now institutionalized by OPMS). (OPMS made it possible to plan and control the areas in which specialization would take place in accordance with Army needs). That successful generalists should also be specialists is reflected in the selection process for General Officers. The recommended PBS-by-minimum-floors permits and encourages broadening within the framework of OPMS, while recognizing the need for officers to achieve the level of expertise needed to fulfill the requirements of the Army.

Specialty Changes.

Specialty changes should be permitted and indeed encouraged when the needs of the Army are well served (i.e., from an overaligned to an underaligned specialty). This should be particularly applicable in the case of an officer who, through no fault of his own, finds himself having been repeatedly utilized (fulfilling Army requirements) in fields out of his own. The boards are well equipped to fulfill the role of signalling the officer when this is to his and to the Army's best advantage. The recommended system provides for this.

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS-

The Army should:

- Adopt a system of PBS through minimum specialty floors,
 - o Now at the grade of COL.
 - o When DOPMA passes at the grade of LTC.
 - o Not at the grade of MAJ.

- Prescribe minimum floors for all specialties and weighted to consider,
 - o Mobilization.
 - o Contender pool per specialty.
 - o Investment cost in hard skill specialists.
- Constitute boards as at present, to receive floors in initial IOI, and to meet floors only if sufficient fully-qualified officers are found.
- Require boards to recommend specialty changes in cases as appropriate.
- Allow boards to recommend retention-in-grade when in the best interest of the Army.

4 Inclosures

1. Key points by LTG Gard
2. Key points by MG Putnam
3. Key points by MG Williams
4. Minimum Specialty Requirement
(CY 77, COL Board)

KEY POINTS MADE BY LTG GARD

- Promotion philosophy based on potential is correct but not followed in practice by boards to the extent it should.
- Promotion should be by following system:
 - MAJ - board selects based on potential.
 - LTC - board told specialties with shortages.
 - COL - board asked to select based on potential but also given minimum floors on shortage specialties.
 - All promotion selections to insure selectees are fully qualified regardless of shortage.
- Quotas by specialties should not be used. Requirements cannot be that precise.
- Specialty expertise and potential is more important than "whole man concept" in meeting Army's needs.
- When appropriate, boards should recommend specialty changes of selected officers.
 - Separate specialty boards are not workable and not needed.
 - Command should not be a specialty.
 - Up-or-out should be retained.

Inclosure 1

R-1-I-1

KEY POINTS MADE BY MG PUTNAM

- Do not depart from current promotion focus on potential.
- The generalist-specialist dichotomy is a false one because all successful generalists are specialists in at least one or more areas. Boards can and do recognize this. G.O. are selected/promoted this way.
- Promotions should not be by specialty or specialty quotas.
- Boards should be influenced only in the case of a serious problem (i.e., shortage specialties).
- Army should not go further than shortage-specialty quota at COL and guidance at LTC.
- Present 3-panel board system is adequate and as expensive as we can afford.
- High performers out of specialties for 10 to 14 years perhaps should be given other specialties.
- An officer should serve in his specialties at every grade level.
- Up-or-out should be retained.
- Officers in dead-end specialties should be retrained and reclassified consistent with individual desires and Army needs.
- Command should not be a separate specialty.
- Stand firm, instead of less we need more training and education in peacetime.

Inclôsure 2

R-1-II-1

KEY POINTS MADE BY MG WILLIAMS

- Look at G.O. selections/promotions which select specialists.
- Use shortage-specialty quotas at COL only.
- Give guidance at LTC and MAJ.
- Special procedures in unique cases such as FAO.
- Have no separate specialty boards.
- Do not permit a year group to diverge in promotions as a result of specialty.
- Do not allow system to cause officers to spend their career narrowly utilized in one specialty.
- Retain the up-or-out system.
- Command should not be a specialty.

Inclosure 3

R-1-III-1

MINIMUM SPECIALTY REQUIREMENTS

1. The guidance provided by this appendix to the Colonel, AUS, APL, CH and JAGC letter of instruction (LOI) is to be applied to your selection process after you have selected the maximum number of officers authorized by your LOI.

2. Listed below are those specialties which have been identified as requiring the minimum number of selectees listed by the specialties. Many of these specialty requirements will have been met by the selectees you have already identified. From the remainder of files which were one or more panel selects, you are tasked to identify those officers who have designated specialties which correspond with specialty requirements not yet filled. By revoting these files, you are to determine those officers you deem qualified for promotion. Up to 15 percent of your additional selections may be from the secondary zone. The board is cautioned that qualification for promotion must include, at this point, only those officers who are true specialists as evidenced by their demonstrated expertise and past assignments in that specialty for which selection is being made. You are hereby granted an additional number of selection quotas equal to the officers thus selected. These officers will be integrated with your initial list of selectees when the board's results are forwarded for approval.

<u>SPECIALTY</u>	<u>MINIMUM REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>SELECTIONS 1/ ACTUAL</u>	<u>MARGIN</u>
21 - Engineer	38	38	
27 - Communications-Electronics Engineering	4	5	+1
31 - Law Enforcement	13	13	
35 - Tactical/Strategic Intelligence	3	42	+39
37 - Cryptology	24	22	-2
42 - Personnel Administration and Administrative Management	6	28	+22
43 - Club Management	2	1	-1
45 - Comptroller	1	29	+28
46 - Public Affairs	8	9	+1
48 - Foreign Area Officer	22	41	+19

ASI

4A - Sub-Saharan Africa

4

1/ These two columns have been added to show board results.

Inclosure 4

R-1-IV-1

	<u>MINIMUM REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>MARGIN</u>
4C - West Europe	4		
4F - Southeast Europe	5		
4H - Iran	1		
4K - Latin America (less Brazil)	1		
4L - Brazil	1		
4N - Korea	1		
4Q - South Asia	1		
4R - Southeast Asia	2		
4S - Thailand	2		
71 - Aviation Materiel Management	3	12	+9
72 - Communications-Electronics Materiel Management	2	2	
73 - Missile Materiel Management	1	5	+4
75 - Munition Materiel Management	2	7	+5
76 - Armament Materiel Management	3	3	
77 - Tank/Ground Mobility Materiel Management	1	7	+6
81 - Petroleum Management	1	3	+2
82 - Food Management	1	3	+2
83 - General Troop Support Materiel Management	1	4	+3
86 - Traffic Management	1	2	+1
87 - Marine and Terminal Operations	1	7	+6
88 - Highway and Rail Operations	1	3	+2
91 - Maintenance Management	3	24	+21
92 - Supply Management	10	37	+27
93 - Logistics Services Management	6	4	-2
94 - Transportation Management	3	14	+11
97 - Procurement	4	24	+20

R-1-IV-2

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 2

COMMANDER MANAGEMENT

TO ANNEX R

MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS

Command is important! So fundamental is this axiom, so universally accepted, so often stressed that no self-respecting soldier can deny it, no officer refute it, no military historian ignore it. We eulogize superb commanders, score inept ones. We have become so convinced, in fact, of command importance that we take great pains to centrally select only the very best for command assignments at battalion and brigade levels. 1/

Selection for command and subsequent successful command performance create an aura which is not easily dispelled. Only battalion command experienced combat arms officers can expect to be chosen for senior service college (SSC) and even combat support and combat service support officers know that battalion command greatly enhances their SSC chance. 2/ When promotion time rolls around, the successful ex-battalion commander once again has the edge. Indeed, 95 percent of all colonels of specialties within the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) responding to the recent officer survey (conducted as part of the Review of Education and Training for Officers -- RETO), indicated they have had battalion or brigade command experience. The situation in the combat arms was even more striking. More than 98 percent of all combat arms OPMS colonels indicated they have commanded at battalion level or higher.

But perhaps we shouldn't be surprised by such statistics. After all, if we begin by selecting the best commanders in the first place, we ought to expect to see the same ones popping up on later selection and promotion lists. Or so the argument goes. Yet, there is a nagging fear that perhaps prior command

1/ "Very best", in theory, refers to those who have demonstrated the greatest potential for further command; though in practice, the "best commander" is chosen because he is the "best officer."

2/ A recent briefing by LTC Jim O'Connell, Officer Systems Analysis Group (OSAG) included the observation that 100% of the combined arms officers selected for SSC in AY 1977-78 had battalion command experience. And more than 90 percent of all selectees, including non-OPMS specialties, had commanded at battalion level.

selection has become a self fulfilling prophecy, a "better than nothing" discriminator for future boards faced with the alarming prospect of having to choose the best several files from a group of virtually indistinguishable files.

There is genuine concern within the officer corps -- and especially its senior leaders 3/ -- that our current system may be deficient in a number of ways:

- o We may be weeding out some late bloomers before they even get a chance to blossom.

- o There is a clear need for talented individuals whose skills may not lend themselves to command excellence but whose skills are nonetheless needed in positions of high responsibility. So we may be nonselecting some valuable assets for promotion on the basis that they had never commanded, rather than on the basis of Army needs. We may, in fact, use the wrong reason not to promote the right people!

- o We may be prematurely demotivating some extremely competent officers by signalling them through command lists devoid of their own names that there is a dead end in their future.

How do you resolve such concerns without destroying the command importance axiom?

One approach would be to shorten command tour lengths, offering maximum opportunity to all. Such a move could avoid the weedout of late bloomers, offer a command seasoning chance to the skilled assets whose other talents we really need, and minimize the number of officers demotivated by nonselection. At the same time, it would create a pool of experienced commanders. Concerns about mobilization or even expansion could be assuaged, for trained leaders would be available within minutes of balloon-rise.

But we have tried shorter command tours before. Never mind whether the motivations were different during the Vietnam era. The fact is the Army did have an official policy of abbreviated command tours. And that explains much about the fact that 95 percent of the serving colonels have had battalion or higher command experience. Perhaps because of the perception that command experience is virtually the only road to success and the strong desire to keep the road open for as many as possible, we even

3/ RETO has conducted a number of general officer conferences in which concern about promotion/selection issues has been a recurring theme.

now hold to relatively short 18 month tours for LTC and COL commanders in the Continental United States (CONUS), and 24 in Europe. Command at company level is normally even shorter in duration. 4/ Canada is the only other nation whose Army we have studied with comparably short command tours. And Canada has already made the decision to change hers. 5/

Just because others do it differently, though, is no reason for change. On the other hand, it is a very good reason indeed to examine our way of doing things. And our system fares poorly when exposed to examination:

- o We may have created a nouveau carpetbagger who breezes in, makes no waves, suboptimizes in favor of short term solutions, and defers decaying problems long enough to escape responsibility for them until their stink gets the attention of the new commander.

Our command selectee who wants to get ahead grabs the brass ring easily, for in an era when the maximum efficiency report score is the median, not making a mistake is just as good as doing a top-notch job. Ticket neatly punched, our erstwhile "very best" officer may have learned a whole lot more about getting ahead than about responsible command.

- o We may have inadvertently diminished the value of the commander as a role model, for we allow little time for his subordinates to learn from him. And the relatively short command tour makes it difficult for even the dedicated commander to develop his charges, particularly his junior officers. Somehow introduction of our new OPMS has depersonalized career development. Branch career managers no longer exist in the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) and some commanders who ought to be counselors for their juniors profess not to understand -- or worse, to even believe in -- OPMS. Symptomatic of the subordinate development malaise is the strong perception in the officer corps that the primary responsibility for an officer becoming "specialty-qualified" lies with the officer himself (48.5%) or his assignment officer (27.3%) or the training system (19.0%). Only 2 percent of the respondents to the RETO Officer Survey chose the "rating officer."

4/ Although there are significant variations from one specialty to another as well as geographically, the Officer Systems Analysis Group (OSAG) provides guidance to the field reflecting an average tour length of less than 18 months if most CPTs are to get an opportunity to command.

5/ Information provided by MG St. Aubin, Canadian Armed Forces, during a 10 February discussion with RETO representatives.

o Perhaps the worst impact of a short term command policy is on the enlisted soldier. At the very time we move toward more stability for individual troops, we perpetuate revolving door command. Because it all flows downhill, the beleaguered "CI" bears the burden of turmoil. A commander has a kind of leverage and the fulcrum is always close to him. Thus, even a small local policy change at the top is magnified by intervening multi-level filtration, embellishment, and interpretation before the lowly soldier feels its effects. In a sense, there is no such thing as a "small change" in local policy for the private. The most he can hope for is a small reduction in the frequency with which chaotic disorder is introduced.

o The perceived coupling between command selection and subsequent promotion is clearly a demotivator. And the current solution may be exactly wrong. Now we select roughly the same percentage of officers for command as for promotion. If we selected many more for command (e.g., by shortening command tours to 6 months) or far fewer (e.g., by lengthening command tours to 3 or 4 years), we could in fact decouple command selection from promotion. For the reasons already offered, extremely short command tours would be inimical to the Army's best interests. Longer ones need to be examined further. If longer tours did exist, though, it would follow that visible and significant numbers of needed and talented officers could be promoted without passing through the magical command "gate."

Some would argue that frequent turnover of commanders is necessary for the rapid expansion capability we have demonstrated so effectively in wars past. Yet, we fought our least successful war in Vietnam with revolving door commanders and with minimal mobilization. Our success in World War II certainly cannot be ascribed to rapid command turnovers prior to December 1941, for we maintained only a small highly professional core of officers; and commanders moved with far less frequency than they do today. Professionalism served us well then and its importance has never diminished. At a time when winning the first battle is an absolute must, we ought to be pounding our collective fists on the tables of organization and equipment as well as distribution and allowances, demanding longer -- and for some, perhaps, repetitive -- command tours. By the time we get to the third or the fifth or the tenth battle, the seasoned, skilled, professional battalion commanders will take charge of the brigades and the right people for command of battalions will rise from the group of battle tested captains and majors. And they'll be the right people because their professional commander knows his officers well enough to choose the best from their ranks. (See Inclosure 1 to this Appendix.)

Longer may be better, but only if the right people do the commanding. Clearly, then, there is a need to examine selection and management of commanders. But commander management is a sensitive issue.

Indeed, when queried about a commander management alternative, the officer corps was split almost down the middle on whether or not such an alternative should be implemented. (See Figure 1). While no overwhelming majority appeared in any sub-group, it is worth noting that the more senior the respondent, the more adamant was his opposition to the idea. And even within any rank, there was a tendency toward stronger opposition on the part of specialties outside of the combat arms.


But the fact that the issue is a sensitive one is all the more reason that it should not be ignored. If there is a better approach to the commander problem than the one we now follow, we simply must devote more careful attention to harmonizing that approach with individual desires. Even so, Army needs must be satisfied first.

COMMAND AS A SPECIALTY

One oft-offered alternative to the current command selection process is the creation of a command specialty. The underlying assumption in such a proposal is that the position of commander in a military unit calls for more or less the same skills and duties as the position of commander at the same rank in any other type of military unit. If such an assumption is correct, it should follow that an armor battalion could just as well be commanded by a LTC of artillery provided he possesses the quintessence of commandship. And if the assumption is correct, creation of a command specialty could provide for selection (in the 8th year, perhaps, to be consistent with other OPMS specialties) of individuals who had already proven their commandship skills at the company/battery level. They could be earmarked early for special care and they could be schooled, groomed, and nurtured as commanders. The troops would always be led by experts and the good officers not in the command specialty could devote their energies and their talents to the pursuit of other important Army goals. Of course, there is the disadvantage that creation of such a specialty smacks strongly of elitism -- a word which has almost become anathema in the officer corps.

Since the arguments for command as a specialty clearly rely upon the assumption of command uniqueness described above, the assumption should be tested. RETO's massive data collection efforts provide the Army with its first opportunity to raise the

FIGURE 1: The Army was split on the question of whether commander management -- with repetitive tours for some -- should be implemented. Even so, the COL's were most opposed.



argument from the level of intuition, "gut feel", and professional opinion to one based on quantitative data. In short, RETO analysis permits examination of the degree of commonality which exists between commanders in one current OPMS specialty and another.

The approach relies upon comparison of commander signatures ^{6/} at the same rank in various specialties. The rank of LTC was chosen since that is the first one at which significant numbers of commanders are required after the 8th year of service (or after demonstration of talent for command at the company/battery level). Table I provides illustrative common and unique duty modules in some selected specialties. Table II illustrates the relative degree of "uniqueness" of any LTC command signature in the selected specialties. Based on the Tables as well as more extensive review of all specialties, it may be concluded that a significant portion of the commander's duty modules (clusters of tasks) are uniquely associated with the type of unit he commands. Stated another way, the signature analysis reinforces the argument that an effective commander must have certain specialty related technical skills in addition to his ability to lead men, develop subordinates, and exercise common command duty modules.

The assumption upon which the command specialty alternative rested having been refuted, the alternative is rejected.

COMMAND AS AN ADDITIONAL SKILL INDICATOR (ASI)

The duty module analysis above clearly demonstrated that there are enough unique specialty related duty modules to demand that aspiring commanders be well grounded in their basic entry specialties. Nonetheless, the analysis also reflects the intuitively obvious fact that there is much about command that is common to all commanders across specialty lines. Designating command as an Additional Skill Indicator (ASI) might permit the Army to capitalize on that commonality. DA Pamphlet 600-3 defines ASI:

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) -- An identification of specific skills which are required to perform the duties of a position, but are not related to any one particular specialty. Also, an identification of the additional skills possessed by an officer.

^{6/} The signature concept has been described in detail in other RETO papers. Basically, it is a system for describing the relative frequency with which various clusters of tasks (duty modules) are required in groups of positions (where a group of positions, for example might be all command positions at the O5 level in the infantry specialty).

Table I. ILLUSTRATIVE DUTY MODULES FOUND IN LTC COMMAND SIGNATURES IN SELECTED SPECIALTIES (X INDICATES REQUIREMENT)

DUTY MODULE NUMBER	DUTY MODULE TITLE	11 IN	12 AR	13 FA	21 EN	31 MP	35 TAC/STRAT INTEL	75 MUNITIONS MAT'L MGMT
A003	Exercises Military Command Auth	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
A008	Directs, Coordinates, Supervises a Staff	X	X	X	X	X	X	
B002	Performs Personnel Management Staff Functions	X	X	X	X	X	X	
C006	Performs Intell Staff Functions concerning ground recon & surv	X	X				X	
H002	Plan & Control combined arms operations	X	X					
U001	Direct & control employment of IN or AR maneuver	X	X					
FF021	Coordinates & conducts NBC functions & training at unit level	X	X	X	X	X		
BB063	Direct & control field artillery tactical operations			X				
EE002	Direct & control portable bridging				X			
CC221	Control/Participate in law enforcement operations					X		
C160	Commands MI units						X	
FF012	Coordinate material production or procurement activity for a major project or program							X

NOTE: 1. This table is provided for illustrative purposes only. It is not a complete tabulation of LTC Command duty modules, but it does show the type of duty modules common to command in any specialty as well as the type of duty modules unique to one or a few specialties. In a complete tabulation for 11 specialties (including all those above), a total of 119 different duty modules occurred in the LTC command signature of one or more specialties.

2. Some adjustments were made to data as submitted by proponents to permit consistent comparisons across specialties.

TABLE 11. A MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE UNIQUENESS OF LTC COMMAND DUTY MODULES IN
SELECTED SPECIALTIES

PERCENTAGE OF DUTY MODULES IN A SPECIALTY COMMON TO:	11 IN	12 AR	13 FA	21 EN	31 MP	35 TAC/STRAT INTEL	75 MUNITIONS MAT'L MGM
All other specialties in the sample	6	10	23	23	50	15	14
Most other specialties in the sample (70% to 90% commonality)	8	14	23	25	34	22	10
Many other specialties in the sample (40% to 60%)	4	6	9	8	-	10	10
Few other specialties in the sample (10% to 30%)	52	70	8	8	-	38	41
No other specialties in the sample	31	-	33	33	17	15	27
Total percentage of relatively unique duty modules. (Percent- age shared with 30% or less of other specialties in the sample).	83%	70%	46%	41%	17%	54%	68%

NOTE 1. The total sample size for this tabulation included eleven specialties.

If the common command duty modules are viewed as specific skills not related to one particular specialty, the designation of command as an ASI would not be inconsistent with OPMS. This alternative offers many of the same advantages as the preceding one. In particular,

- o It would identify commanders at the company grade level in sufficient time to prepare them for later LTC/COL command, allowing maximum time for schooling, grooming, and nurturing. And an ASI can be awarded at any time (as opposed to the normal 8th year window for alternate specialty 7/).

- o There is also time to ensure that prospective battalion and brigade commanders are trained in optimum alternate specialties best suited to the Army's needs. MG Hixon, of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), recently suggested that certain advanced entry alternate specialties are particularly well suited for commanders. (He cited 41, 35, 54, 92, 91, and 49). Whether the Hixon list is correct or complete is beside the point. If the reader accepts the fact that some specialties are best for commanders to hold as alternates, it follows that the Army should optimize the number of senior commanders with the correct alternate specialties rather than passively accept pleasant surprise or teeth-gnashing resignation when the command list is published.

- o Perhaps the most important advantage of awarding the ASI early is that a significant portion of the officer corps can devote its attention to the pursuit of excellence in other sorely needed endeavors. The demotivating effects of the current system will be short circuited provided the longer tour length approach permits decoupling of battalion command from SSC or COL selections.

The ASI approach has merit in the context of expansion/mobilization, for it ensures a steady state pyramidal structure containing more than enough motivated professional commanders at each level to move with confidence into command at the next higher level.

- o Not every captain who is awarded a coveted command ASI will ultimately get his own battalion, nor every successful battalion commander a brigade. But if command is an ASI rather than a specialty, even the commandless commander can compete for promotion in both his primary and alternate specialties.

7/ The eighth year window is not necessarily inviolate, for exceptions do exist (e.g., Specialty 15 Aviation, is awarded upon completion of flight school). Even so, complexity within OPMS should be avoided unless no reasonable alternative exists.

Just as the alternative of a command specialty rested on an assumption (later proven false), so too does the ASI case rest on a foundation which must be examined. How can the Army identify the future commanders at company level -- just after successful company command -- with any degree of assurance that the "very best" commanders will eventually command battalions and brigades?

It seems we have come full circle back to the earlier observations that we are uneasy even now about whether the "right" people are being command selected at the LTC level where, ostensibly, we know far more about them. Our mortal lack of omniscience and our great compassion for fellow officers are sharply silhouetted by the flow of our professional pride in knowing we can and will make quick, honest, life-and-death decisions based on far less information when we have to.

But the decision to pick a group of really good company commanders for further development is easier by far than later trying at the LTC level to choose the best among equals in the cold blue light of the microfiche reader. Just after company command, the issues are clearer. Either the officer commanded well and wants to be groomed for future command or not. Plenty of time lies between getting an ASI and putting green tabs next to silver oak leaves.

So the Army should award many more command ASI's at the CPT level than will be needed at higher levels. Weeding out can occur naturally with primary zone nonselection for MAJ or LTC being reason enough to lose the ASI. By the same token, an officer should be allowed to opt out without prejudice. Military qualification standards including performance certification, and experience in selected positions, should be tailored for the command ASI officers. By the time battalion command selection occurs, the board (if one is needed at all) has far better data on a smaller population from which to choose. And once a command is awarded, the tour length should be at least 3 years, preferably 4. Only relief for cause or clear military necessity are proper reasons for curtailment.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army's future needs for a well-rounded professional officer corps will be enhanced if commanders are recognized early and schooled, groomed, and nurtured for future higher level commands; and if talented officers who will never command perceive reasonable opportunity to achieve their full potential. To accomplish these goals, the Army should:

o Begin to extend command tour lengths to a minimum of 3 years. Achieve the 3-year goal as quickly as possible without undue turmoil in the pool of currently serving and already selected commanders at the LTC and COL levels.

o Create an ASI for commanders.

o Select volunteers for the command ASI from the group of previously successful company commanders at the CPT level.

o Manage those awarded the command ASI in a way that ensures the Army's needs for optimum alternate specialties for commanders are best served and that ensures future schooling, assignments, and counseling support command concentration.

o Continue command selection boards, but choose fewer annually to account for longer tours.

o Publicize new procedures and rationale for the officer coms.

1 Inclosure

1. Meeting Mobilization Requirements when Command Tours Lengthen

MEETING MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS

WHEN COMMAND TOURS LENGTHEN

1. The OPMS requirements for commanders, as determined by RETO data collection and analysis, are shown in Table I.

TABLE I. OPMS Requirements

RANK	TOTAL POSITIONS	TOTAL COMMAND POSITIONS	COMMAND AS % OF TOTAL
CPT	17590	3599	21%
MAJ	10587	530	5%
LTC	7462	950	13%
COL	2908	369	13%

2. Assumptions -

a. If expansion is directed,

(1) 100% of the commanders currently commanding remain available as commanders.

(2) 50% of those with prior command experience can be made available for command at the same or higher levels. (Accounts for attrition, other important jobs to be filled by command experienced personnel).

b. If ASI's are awarded to commanders, the ratio of ASI carrying CPT to MAJ and MAJ to LTC should be the same as that of LTC to COL. (Produces a pyramid which at least satisfies command requirements at each level as well as a reasonably large pool from which to select commanders for the next level).

Inclosure 1

R-2-I-1

c. If ASI's are awarded, the preparation for future command would begin at CPT level so that senior CPT's would be well grounded in MAJ level command, senior MAJ in LTC level command.

d. The time in grade at the rank of CPT, MAJ, and LTC will be about five years.

3. Considering all OPMS specialties, the current command tour lengths average twenty months at the LTC and COL levels.

4. Table II illustrates the number of officers at each rank available for command at that rank or the next higher one in the event of major force expansion. Table III shows requirements under alternative expansion programs.

TABLE II. Availability of Qualified* Commanders in the Event of Expansion

	TOTAL COMMAND POSITIONS (From Table I)	CURRENT SYSTEM (20 Month Tour Avg.)		THE ASI APPROACH (36 Month Tour Avg.)	
		Total Pool (In Command or Command Experienced)	Available in Expansion (100% in Cmd plus 50% remain- der of Pool)	Total Pool (In Command or Command Experienced or MAJ who got ASI as CPT)	Available in Expansion (100% in Cmd plus 50% remain- der of Pool)
CPT	3699	11097	7398	11087	7398
MAJ	530	1590	1060	4078	2304
LTC	950	2850	1900	1585	1268
COL	369	1107	738	616	492

*"Qualified", for purposes of this analysis, includes:

- (1) All currently in command.
- (2) All officers with successful command experience at their current rank.
- (3) MAJ's who were awarded a command ASI as CPT and who have been trained, tested, and certified as command competent.

TABLE III. Command Requirements Under Alternative Expansion Programs

MAJOR FORCE EXPANSION PROGRAM	REQUIREMENT FOR COMMANDERS AT THIS RANK			
	CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL
1. Current Command Req't	3699	530	950	369
2. 50% Increase in CMD Req't	5549	795	1425	554
3. 100% Increase in CMD Req't	7398	1060	1900	738
4. 150% Increase in CMD Req't	9248	1325	2375	923
5. 200% Increase in CMD Req't	11097	1590	2850	1108

5. Table IV distributes "Qualified" officers to fill command requirements. Note that the proposed system (ASI for commanders, three year command tour) can support even the 200% expansion alternative.

TABLE IV. Meeting Expansion Requirements by Filling at Required Rank or at Next Lower Rank (Provided "Qualified" ^{1/} Commanders are Used).

	50% Increase			100% Increase			150% Increase			200% Increase		
	04 CMD	05 CMD	06 CMD	04 CMD	05 CMD	06 CMD	04 CMD	05 CMD	06 CMD	04 CMD	05 CMD	06 CMD
Requirement	795	1425	554	1050	1900	738	1325	2375	923	1590	2850	1108
Current System Would Fill With												
CPT							925			1590	(260) ^{2/}	
MAJ	795			1050			400	660			1050	
LTC		1425			1900			1715	185		1530	370
COL			554			738			738			738
Command as ASI and 3 Yr Tour System Fills With												
CPT							559			1484		
MAJ	795	219		1050	978		766	1538		105	2198	
LTC		1206	62		1022	246		837	431		652	616
COL			492			492			492			492

^{1/} See footnote for Table II

^{2/} Requirements that cannot be met with "qualified" officers

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 3

OPMS SPECIALTIES DA PROPONENCY AND SPECIALTY PRIMACY

TO ANNEX R

MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS

I. A LOOK AT THE NEEDS:

Two undesirable side effects of our first approaches to implementation of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) have proven significant. One was the loss of perceived identification between the officer in the field and those managing his career. The other was a loss of the total career view in the management of individual professional development. The first is of substantial morale concern. The second holds important implications for the training, education, and professional development of all Army officers.

The morale aspects have been adequately documented. Reports from the field to the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) reflecting mid-level leadership attitudes have for the past two years been explicit on the subject. For example:

"...OPMS was instituted to solve a problem in career management of officers. To implement OPMS required a reorganization of MILPERCEN. That reorganization required the disestablishment of Branches, the perceived "home" of each officer. And it was this action, more than anything else, which caused the mid-level leader to react negatively to OPMS."

The foregoing report also notes that the field's impression of the personnel system is that there is no one in charge and no apparent goal for the system--a system that treats with a Lieutenant Colonel rather than a "Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry (or Armor, or AG, or Signal Corps)."

The officer survey conducted as part of the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) shows similar strongly felt concerns. The surveys of officers and warrant officers had

an open ended question allowing those surveyed to expand on questions asked in the survey, or to comment on any issue of their choosing. Those free responses have been analysed for RETO by the Army Research Institute (ARI). Thirty-one percent of the survey respondents expressed views on those topics about which they felt strongly. These covered about seven broad categories of career concerns, the two most frequently mentioned being OPMS and the Assignment/Counseling system.* Of those commenting on the relationship of OPMS goals and the system as it is implemented, 94% felt the system does not support OPMS goals. Among those offering expanded comments, (19.5% of the officers, 20.5% of the warrants) 93% of officers and 97% of warrants said Assignments/Counseling policies were poor. Even larger numbers (99% and 100%) complained about the execution of the Assignment/Counseling system.**

Some officer dissatisfaction may exist even within MILPERCEN. In a recent organizational effectiveness (OE) session at OPMD the idea was broached that assignments divisions should be restructured. It was suggested that instead of by-grade divisions, the structure should resemble the Specialty Development Branch of Professional Development Division--that is, separation by Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms, and Combat Service Support Arms, and Combat Service Support specialties. The argument against this is that the by-grade structure was established to make it easier for the personnel managers--to make their task of dealing with the dual specialty requirement simpler.

On a day-to-day functioning basis, OPMD grade level assignments officers work in relative isolation one from the other (this is not intended as criticism, rather the result of workload and structure). While company grade assignments officers may frequently coordinate with majors' assignments officers, they have little contact with LTC and COL assignments officers, i.e., there is not sufficient cognizance applied to the progression aspects of a specialty. This is pertinent, since one function of assignments officers is to "...provide valuable

*The survey was mailed to 14,500 officers. There were 7,800 responses, of which 2,400 included narrative comment. ARI used generally accepted analysis techniques to derive the data found above.

**There is a discernable difference in attitude among officers who had the experience of having their career managed by a Branch, and those who did not. The latter do not express dissatisfaction as often. But then, their "career" has to date been managed by a Branch within Company Grade Assignments Division of the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD).

and realistic counseling and guidance to individual officers on their professional development planning" (DA Pam 600-1, p. 4-1). To adequately provide good advice they need to know what is happening at each grade level, not merely the next one up. Colonels' assignments officers are in a position where they might, if they had more contact, observe and make recommendations on the lower level inputs to the colonel rank through knowing what position duty requirements are, and where training/education/OJE shortfalls lie.

Returning for a moment to OPMS basics:

The OPMS philosophy is founded on the proposition that the Army has a need for large numbers of officers who are specialists in given fields. Ancillary to that proposition is the need to develop that specialization through supporting education, training, and assignments. Development of a specialist is not a short term activity. It literally spans an officer's career. That being the case, there is a solid need for a personnel management system which takes as its spectrum of activity the full career in each of the OPMS recognized specialties, a system which is designed to achieve the purpose and objectives of OPMS:

The purpose of the Officer Personnel Management System is to enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the United States Army Officer Corps.

The objectives of the Officer Personnel Management System are--

- a. To develop officers in the right numbers and with the right skills to satisfy Army requirements, taking maximum advantage of the abilities, aptitudes, training, and interests of the individual officer.
- b. To assign officers according to the Army's needs and the individual's competence and desires.
- c. To improve the motivation, professionalism and professional satisfaction of the officer corps through a disciplined dual specialty professional development system. (DA Pam 600-3)

It is clear that the thrust of the foregoing purpose and objectives is toward specialty qualification. How, then, do we best organize to achieve that purpose, those objectives?

A good start is to keep the objective in focus, to create an organizational structure which by its own nature fosters achievement of system primary goals, one that doesn't require constant or even frequent supervisory pressure to keep it targeted. The organizational structure should not be such that it tempts modification of OPMS primary goals to ease the accomplishment of secondary supporting goals. In allegorical terms, the selected organization should not tempt the administrative tail to wag the operational dog.

There is an interrelationship of training/education with on-the-job experience, i.e., assignments in the pertinent specialty at appropriate times. The existence of separation of functions and the needs for efficiency imply the necessity for an authoritative voice for each specialty in the Army to assure that this interrelationship is properly considered; that a systematic management effort is applied to the professional development of Army officers. We are not as yet as strong on the life cycle management of our people as we are of our hardware.

The current organization is somewhat fragmented with OPMD, MILPERCEN, responsible for assignments by specialty within grade, and for "professional development;" the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)* responsible for individual training within the specialties; ODCSPER with Army staff responsibility for both; and with field units increasingly more responsible for individual skill acquisition and maintenance. DA specialty proponenty is assigned to staff elements rather than to specific individuals, and these elements tend to place responsibility for proponenty actions on a staff officer at the LTC level or below as an additional duty. Performance by the DA staff agency proponents is spotty--a few are reportedly doing well, most are not.

The necessary implementing directive for Department of the Army (DA) proponenty exists in the form of a mission type order to the DA staff agencies: AR 600-101 tells each staff head what he is responsible for, not how to organize nor how to accomplish the missions. The AR could be strengthened in several ways:

a. Designation of the Principal Staff Officer as proponent rather than the "office" as proponent.

*TRADOC is the training and education proponent for most specialties.

b. Suggest, in the regulation, that in addition to Specialty Proponent Committees, heads of the staff elements are encouraged to name a General Officer as designated proponent for each specialty or appropriate grouping of specialties.

c. Task the DA proponent with "monitorship" of the OPMS specialties for which he is proponent.

d. Adjust the specialty proponent assignments so that:


1) Combat Army proponenty is with ODCSOPS vice ODCSPER.

2) Foreign Area Officer (Specialty Code (SC) 48) is with OACSI vice ODCSOPS, since nearly all FAO assignments are intelligence related.

The Proponenty system involving the DA staff is basically sound in theory. Though it has not yet begun to work well, the outlook is good, as the stimulus of the IPR raises the interest level of the staff regarding proponenty actions. An authoritative nudge from above would accelerate the process of giving continuing proponenty actions the needed priorities within the staff elements.

Since MILPERCEN manages specialties by grade, and the DA staff element proponent is for the moment faceless, the only remotely visible proponent at the head of a specialty is the Commandant of the School having responsibility for education and training in that specialty. In almost all cases the Commandant is far removed, both organizationally and geographically, from the center of action on the totality of officer professional development. If such a center exists--and fragmentation suggests it may not yet--it is in Washington. Being incohesive and fragmented, there is no visible principal with whom officers in the field can identify, as in years past when there was a General Officer chief of each Branch, or later a colonel as head of each Branch in Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD). Our indications are that this situation has adverse morale effects on officers in the field--they feel cut adrift, as it were, with by-grade assignments officers in inadequate substitute for Branch heads, and DA staff element proponents are unrecognized, even unknown entity. But beyond morale and emotional reasons, officers do not have adequate long range development guidance now.

CURRENT OPMD




PERSONNEL
MANAGER

- WHO IS HE?
- WHAT DOES HE KNOW ABOUT MY SPECIALTY?
- WHY IS MY "PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICER" NOT OF MY SPECIALTY?
- IS MY ASSIGNMENTS OFFICER OF MY SPECIALTY?
- DO THESE PERSONNEL MANAGERS KNOW THE DUTY REQUIREMENTS OF MY SPECIALTY BY EXPERIENCE OR ONLY BECAUSE THEY MAY HAVE READ THE TOE/TDA?
- WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO CAREER MANAGEMENT?



Figure 1

Most officers think of their Branch and/or specialty as of more fundamental importance and interest to them than is the grade in which they happen to be serving at the moment. This is particularly true if the officer considers himself a professional. Placed on a matrix, the most important axis to the officer and to the Officer Personnel Management System is the vertical axis. The horizontal is the most important to the assignments manager.



II. APPROACHING A SOLUTION:

There is no single pathway to OPMS objectives. Indeed the unilinear approach to personnel management becomes at least as much a problem as a solution. It is not very rational to be so wedded to consistency that policies designed to cope with excess Combat Arms field grade officer assets must be applied to professional development of all officers. There is room for different treatment which does not become unequal or preferential treatment. If there is an Army need for some Combat Arms field grade assets than requirements (current ratio is 2.4:1), it does not necessarily follow that personnel management procedures designed to cope with that unique situation need be applied to all officers, e.g., to require that all officers have a dual specialty. In fact there is solid justification for the opposite: To eliminate the requirement for a second or alternate specialty for some officers. It is rational as well to change the current "Alternate Specialty" from its equal status with "Primary Specialty" to one of secondary status; to allow the Combat Arms officer to change his primary specialty and thus hold Infantry, Armor, or Artillery as a secondary specialty at some time in his career.

Some officer specialties are demanding enough that it is not really in the Army's interests to, as a matter of policy, remove

the officer from the field for development of a secondary or alternate specialty. An officer in a field that is marked by changing doctrine or technology could, for example, find that a three year tour away from his specialty greatly degrades his capabilities. Non-specialty related assignments have the disadvantage of generating a need for re-training, whether it be resident or OJT, besides the fundamental diseconomy of depriving the Army of an expert for three years. Conceivably, some requirement in the specialty field still exists, to be filled by some less-than-best-expert officer. A situation such as this used to be called mal-assignment--something to be generally avoided, but occasionally acceptable when the Army needs were sufficiently crucial.

The questions to be answered are: Does the Army have sufficient need for the flexibility that the additional (alternate or secondary) specialty provides the personnel manager--a need so great that it must make it a requirement for all officers? Are the gains in personnel assignments flexibility worth the cost of assigning a highly skilled officer to a position requiring him to perform in a lower order specialty in which he is less skilled? (Example: A cryptologic lieutenant colonel serving in an Operations/Force Development position)*.

ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT OPMS

Two principles of organization need be kept in mind in reorganizing to support OPMS. The first is that effectiveness demands that the structure of an organization be designed so as to foster achievement of the system primary goals first, and subordinate supporting goals second, i.e., keeping the mission in focus. The primary thrust and goal of OPMS is specialty development and improved officer performance thereby. A secondary supporting goal is an austere manned "efficient" organization to manage officer development and assignment. OPMD assignments divisions are structured to accomplish the latter. (Organizing assignments by grade supports the personnel management supporting goal of making it easier to manage assignments in dual specialties.) What is needed, of course, is an assignments structure which supports the OPMS specialty development goal. Support to the primary goal is accomplished by putting assignments responsibility in an element identified by specialty, irrespective of grade.** The frequently encountered statement

*As of 18 Nov there were insufficient numbers of LTC having cryptology (SC 37) as primary specialty. There were more than twice as many Operations/Force Development (SC 54) LTCs than were required: 634 required, 4 holding SC 54 as primary, 1503 holding SC 54 as alternate.

**By changing the dual specialization requirement to one of a primary and secondary specialty, much of the rationale for the current OPMD assignments organization evaporates.

that this would be "a step backward to Branches" is not an argument, and only clouds the issue of whether By-Grade or By-Specialty assignments better supports OPMS goals, and the needs of the officer corps. Without such an organization it is nearly impossible to answer the officer's question, "Who is my career manager?" except to say, "You are!"

The second principle is similar: That the structure should not be such that it tempts modification of primary goals to ease the accomplishment of secondary supporting goals. This danger now exists, with responsibility for officer professional development policy, and responsibility for filling officer requisitions, both being in the same directorate of MILPERCEN. Comments among action officers that "assignments drive the system" are strong indicators that consideration ought to be given to placing professional development responsibility in another directorate. This was an issue in 1973 when MILPERCEN was reorganized. The case for putting professional development in Personnel Management Systems Directorate (PMSD) (to be with evaluations and occupational development) is probably stronger now under OPMS specialization than it was in 1973.

In the past we had Branches which fostered officer development in the "specialties" of the time, i.e., the various branches themselves. The Branches were interested in personnel management which spanned a 20-30 year career. There was a built-in institutional interest in addressing the education, training and assignments of lieutenants in a way to best develop majors and lieutenant colonels of the future. There was a policy echelon which was removed from the assignments echelon responsible for professional development and the interrelationship of education, training, and assignments.

Over the years those structures were eliminated with the result that OPMD is the fundamental holder of responsibility for professional development policy formulation for specialties (in Professional Development Division), and assignments by grade. There is no identifiable credible element holding responsibility for total career management--considerations spanning the 20-30 years of service of the professional Officer Corps. It certainly cannot be said that the Chemical Corps Major in Professional Development Division, or the part time LTC in OACSI can perform such a role for all Military Intelligence (MI) officers. That is the structure today.

To the officer corps in the field the career manager is non-existent, and what does exist is mostly faceless, or perhaps

even worse, lacking in prima facie credibility, e.g., the DA proponent action officer for all combat arms being a Signal Corps officer working part time at such tasks and located in ODCSPER.

The needed organizational structure must focus on the OPMS specialties to integrate and assure the professional relevance of the education, the training, and the assignments of officers. It must be manned by people who are competent in the specialty for which they have responsibility. It must have, in addition to competence, credibility with the officer corps.

THE SPECIALTY PROPONENT


In approaching alternatives to the current system one can first look at the appropriate locus for the principal or proponent of a specialty or grouping thereof. In the past we've seen the locus at DA with the Branch Chiefs, and later the Branches of OPD. To some extent the Branch Schools were the locus.

Three of the potential alternatives for proponency (MILPERCEN, the DA staff, and ODCSPER) carry the strong advantage of being in Washington. A fourth which has been suggested (TRADOC Branch School Commandants) has the significant disadvantages mentioned above--organizational and geographic separation from the center of action. Organizationally the schools have little to do with assignments--a key element of professional development--and hence are not in a good position to affect actions in the interest of either the individual or the Army. The schools are at the wrong level of the organizational hierarchy to function as effective proponents.


MILPERCEN as the location of the proponents has one of the same disadvantages as the schools: At the wrong place in the organizational hierarchy to effectively integrate the relationship of training/education with assignments.

ODCSPER, while vested with the Army staff basic function of officer professional development, does not now have the functional diversity in its staffing to adequately perform the role of proponent for each specialty or specialty grouping. Such could be assigned, though, in the form of a Proponent Directorate composed of colonels representing each specialty. It would not be necessary to have a colonel for each specialty however. Logic would dictate that the non-branch related OPMS specialties could be covered by a colonel of one of the combat arms who held the specialty as an alternate, e.g., SC 49, Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA), and that the specialties which are branch


PROPOSED OPMD



**SPECIALTY
CAREER MANAGER**



**ASSIGNMENTS
OFFICER**



**PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER**



I SEE:

- MY IDENTIFICATION WITH A SPECIALTY.
- A "FACE" ON CAREER MANAGEMENT.
- CONFIDENCE IN PERSONNEL ACTIONS ADDED.
- ADDED SPECIALTY COMPETENCE TO PERSONNEL ACTIONS.
- PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACROSS GRADE LINES.
- NO SHIFT TO A NEW SET OF ACTORS IN A NEW ELEMENT UPON PROMOTION - CAREER MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY.

Figure 2

related could be covered by one colonel from that branch. Assuming that the colonels are to be the action officers, the personnel requirements would be about 17 colonels, their director, and adequate clerical support. A notional allocation is as follows:

COLONELS BY BRANCH	SPECIALTIES FOR WHICH RESPONSIBLE
Inf	Inf (11), ORSA (49)
Inf	Public Affairs (46)
Armor	Armor (12), R&D (51)
Armor	Aviation (15)
FA	FA (13), ADP (53)
FA	Education (47)
ADA	ADA (14), Opns Force Dev (54)
Engr	Engr (21), Atomic Energy (52)
Chem	Chem (74)
MP	Law Enf (31)
Sig	SC 25, 26, 27, 28, 72
MI	SC 35, 36, 37 and FAO (48)
FI	Fin (44), Compt (45)
AG	Pers Adm (42), Pers Mgmt (41) Club Mgmt (43)
ORD	SC 73, 75, 76, 77 Maint Mgmt (91)
QM	SC 81, 82, 83, 92 Procurement (97) Log svc Mgmt (93) Logistics Mgmt (70)
TC	SC 71, 87, 88, 86, 95

DA proponentcy, spread functionally over the Army staff, while at a good organizational level to be effective, has had to assume this role largely as an additional duty. To work well, an individual should be designated as proponent; an individual with stature adequate to make him "visible" to officers in the field, and of sufficient rank to be heard. This implies a General Officer. The proponent needs the authority to require the coordination of those doing the training and those making assignments. He does not need, nor should he have, directive authority (in terms of CSR 10-5 "monitorship" functions would be adequate. Inclosure 1). The Proponent probably needs an officer assistant working full time on AERB actions and on problem identification, leaving solutions to TRADOC and MILPERCEN working in coordination. Such problems could be both general in nature (applicable to the entire specialty) and specific (pertinent to the individual). The DA proponent has a role in the validation process for graduate level education in the Army Educational Requirements Board (AERB) system. This role needs to be increased. Proponents should be providing more information and guidance to field commanders. Proponents should be staffed to do what is required of them by the regulation which designated them (AR 600-101).

There are currently about 25 officers devoting at least some of their time to proponentcy actions. With the initiatives that will probably stem from the RETO Study's effects on education and training in the Army, and with revitalization of the DA OPMS Specialty Proponentcy regulation, the full time staff needed to support the General Officer proponents would likely be about 17 officers:

- 1 action officer per Combat Arm (total 5)

- 1 action officer per Combat Support Arm (total 4)

- 1 action officer per Combat Service Support Service (total 5)

- 1 action officer for Aviation (SC 15)

- 0.5 action for R&D/Procurement

- 0.25 action officer for each of the following SC

- o Public Affairs

- o Education

o Operations Research/Systems Analysis (GRSA)

o Automatic Data Processing (ADP)

o Atomic Energy

The foregoing are in addition to the Specialty Committees encouraged by AR 600-101.

There is an inter-relationship of training and force structure between and among the enlisted, warrant officer, and officer personnel categories. Usually all these categories receive training at the same TRADOC school for their related specialties; as Army personnel authorizations and structures change there is a need for continuing evaluation of the relationships between the categories (For example, should certain tasks at the company level be performed by an NCO, a WO, or a LT?) Whatever decisions are taken can affect the professional development patterns of each of the categories. In other words, a systems approach to personnel professional development, with the system being the specialty from lowest to highest grade, can be of value to the Army. Among other benefits, this would foster more coherent actions on such problems as education (both in-service and at civilian schools); Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) changes (so that we don't, for example, have the spectacle of merging two enlisted MOSs while leaving the related WO MOSs separate); adaptation to new hardware and doctrine related to the specialties, and consequently to the education and training components of professional development for all grades. It would align MILPERCEN actions with the systems approach in these matters followed by TRADOC's Combat Development process.

III. ALTERNATIVES:

ALTERNATIVES INVOLVING THE ARMY STAFF ARE:

1. Colonels in a Proponent Directorate of ODCSPER
Inclosure 3.

2. General Officer proponents at various locations on the DA staff, as additional duty, with full time LTC assistants
Inclosure 4.

ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE MILPERCEN STRUCTURE:

1. Professional Development.

a. Establish a new directorate with responsibility for professional development of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members with a colonel heading each "system". (Inclosure 5)

b. Assign professional development responsibility to the existing Personnel Management Systems Directorate or a new directorate, relieving OPMD and the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD) of their policy roles in professional development Inclosure 6.

c. As in a above, less responsibility for enlisted professional development.

d. As in b above, less responsibility for enlisted professional development.

2. OPMD Assignments Divisions.

a. Organize assignments into three Divisions; Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support. Subordinate to each Division a section for each OPMS specialty or grouping of specialties appropriate to each Division. Divisions headed by colonels, specialty sections headed by colonels.(Inclosure 7.)

b. As in a above, but eliminate the Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support Division level, and elevate each specialty to Division status reporting directly to Director OPMD.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. DA Proponent: Alternative 2, General Officer proponent with full time assistant. (Inclosure 4.)

b. MILPERCEN structure, Professional Development: Alternative 1b, transfer of professional development-policy responsibility from EPMD and OPMD to PMSD or a new directorate. (Inclosure 6.)

c. MILPERCEN structure, OPMD Assignments Divisions: Alternative 2a, Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support Divisions with subordinate specialty sections. (Inclosure 7.)

d. Reorient dual specialization from equal qualification in two specialties to a system of primary and secondary.

7 Inclosures

1. Extract from CSR 10-5
2. Proposed change to AR 600-101
3. DA Proponency Organization (under ODCSPER)
4. DA Proponency Organization
5. Professional Development Directorate Organization
6. Personnel Management System Directorate
7. Reorganization of OPMD

3.

* * *

c. Monitorship functions (Monitor). In matters of great importance justifying an organizational monitoring element, these functions monitor Army Staff and other activities in systems, projects, and processes that cut across existing basic functional alignments. Personnel monitored may include certain personnel who have been formally dedicated to work continuously on a particular system, project, or process or to give its problems a high priority. When monitorship reveals that objectives, policies, or performance are inadequate, the monitoring agency will provide assistance and advice and continue monitorship until corrective action is taken by the Army Staff elements. Monitorship does not assume primary action except in unusual situations.

* * *

Inclosure 1

R-3-I-1

APPENDIX **PROPOSERS** **FOR OPMS SPECIALTIES**


Specialty Name, Numerical Designation and Proponent

Air Defense Artillery	14	DCSOPS
Armament Materiel Management	76	DCSLOG
Armor	12	DCSOPS
Atomic Energy	52	DCSOPS
Automatic Data Processing	53	AAD
Aviation	15	DCSOPS
Aviation Materiel Management	71	DCSLOG
Chemical	74	DCSOPS
Club Management	43	TAG
Combat Communications—Electronics	25	DCSOPS
Communications—Electronics Engineering	27	DCSOPS
Communications—Electronics Materiel Management	72	DCSLOG
Comptroller	45	COA
Counterintelligence HUMINT	36	ACSI
Cryptology	37	ACSI
Education	47	DCSPER
Engineer	21	CE
Field Artillery	13	DCSOPS
Finance	44	COA
Fixed Telecommunications Systems	26	DCSOPS
Food Management	82	DCSLOG
Foreign Area Officer	48	ACSI
General Troop Support Materiel Management	83	DCSLOG
Highway and Rail Operations	85	DCSLOG
Infantry	11	DCSOPS
Instructional Technology and Management	28	DCSOPS
Law Enforcement	31	DCSPER
Logistics Management	70	DCSLOG
Logistics Services Management	93	DCSLOG
Maintenance Management	91	DCSLOG
Marine and Terminal Operations	87	DCSLOG
Missile Materiel Management	73	DCSLOG
Munitions Materiel Management	75	DCSLOG
Operations and Force Development	54	DCSOPS
Operations Research/Systems Analysis	49	DCSOPS
Personnel Administration and Administrative Management	42	TAG
Personnel Management	41	DCSPER
POL Management	81	DCSLOG
Procurement	97	DCSRDA
Public Affairs	46	CPA
Research and Development	51	DCSRDA
Supply Management	92	DCSLOG
Tactical Strategic Intelligence	55	ACSI
Tank, Ground Mobility Materiel Management	77	DCSLOG
Traffic Management	86	DCSLOG
Transportation Management	95	DCSLOG

TAGO 10A

Inclosure 2

R-3-II-1



Inclosure 3

R-3-III-1


Inclosure 4

R-3-IV-1

DA STAFF


GO	GO	GO.....GO	GO	GO
11	12	13	93	95
				97

NOTE: 45 GENERAL OFFICERS WITH ADDITIONAL DUTY AS DA
PROONENT FOR ONE (OR MORE IN CERTAIN CASES)
SPECIALTIES. GOS IN STAFF ELEMENTS AS SET OUT
IN AR 600-101.




Inclosure 5

R-3-V-1




*Each section includes all enlisted, warrant officer and commissioned officer grades.



Inclosure 6

R-3-VI-1



*Each section includes all grades of warrant officers associated with that specialty and all commissioned grades from 2LT to COL.

Inclosure 7

R-3-VII-1

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 4

SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS: A LOOK AT THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS

TO ANNEX R

MANAGEMENT OF OFFICERS

The purpose of this paper is to define and discuss the relationship between officer specialists and officer generalists and to demonstrate, on the basis of current and projected requirements, the need for both in the Army of the 1980's and 1990's.

The Need for Specialization

The need for specialization in today's technologically dominated world is just that: a need. Specialization is an outgrowth of the proliferation of knowledge which has become (and continues to become) so widespread that, in order for an individual to achieve technical competency sufficient to operate in today's modern organizations, relatively narrow training and extensive experience are necessary. Gone forever are the days of the "Renaissance man" and the "Universalgenie." Even Karl Marx, whose work reportedly required some thirty years of almost daily use of a London library, could not today undertake to build a credible universal ideology without a large staff of specialists in at least philosophy, economics, history, law, sociology and computerized information systems.

Knowledge begets technological advances, which in turn beget more knowledge--both technological and general. Separately and together they have a dramatic impact on the organization and dynamics of society. The increasing rate of this cyclical process has captured the attention of many writers in the last decade. But, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. points out (Newsweek: July 6, 1970), the accelerated velocity of history was recognized even in 1909. The American historian, Henry Adams wrote at that time:

The world did not just double or treble its movement between 1800 and 1900, but measured by any standard known to science--by horse-power, calories, volts, mass in any shape--the tension and vibration and so-called progression of society were fully a thousand times greater in 1900 than in 1800.

Two of the many books and articles which document the increasing rate of change, as well as the proliferation of knowledge and its impact on society are Zibgniew Brzenzinski's Between Two Ages and Alvin Toffler's Future Shock -- both published in 1970. From a Brzezinski footnote (p 23) we get the following statistics:

By 1966 an estimated 30 million books had been published; by 1980 the projected number is 60 million. By 1969 an estimated 100,000 scientific journals a year in sixty languages were being published, a figure which is doubling every 15 years. [More than 50,000 journals are now available to the Army Library-]

According to Brzezinski (p 23), the "torrential outpouring of published reports, scientific papers and scholarly articles, and the proliferation of professional journals make it impossible for individuals to avoid becoming either narrow-gauged specialists or superficial generalists." Toffler (p 157) cites a zoologist who complains of spending "25 percent to 50 percent of my working time trying to keep up with what's going on." The only way to get a grip on the ever increasing volume of knowledge, according to one oceanographer cited by Toffler (p 157), is to "declare a moratorium on publications for ten years."

Toffler portrays the rate of knowledge advances and technological change by dividing the last 50,000 years of man's existence into 800 lifetimes, each of 62 years length. From this come the following facts:

- 1) The first 650 lifetimes were spent in caves.
- 2) Only during the last six lifetimes did masses of men ever see a printed word.
- 3) Only during the last four lifetimes has it been possible to measure time with precision.
- 4) Only in the last two lifetimes has anyone anywhere used an electric motor.

But, perhaps, most telling:

- 5) The overwhelming majority of all the material goods we use in daily life today have been developed within the present, the 800th lifetime.

Toffler (p 13) quotes the eminent economist and social thinker, Kenneth Boulding, as saying: "I was born in the middle of human history...Almost as much has happened since I was born as happened before." Many, maybe all, generations have believed they were at the crossroads in the evolution of civilization. The point here, however, is that in terms of pure volume of information and major events, our children--certainly our grandchildren--will feel much the same as Boulding.

Specialization as the most efficient means of the division of labor has been recognized for some time. Today it is the only way to achieve technical competence in many fields of endeavor. Specialization results inevitably from the combination of the proliferation of knowledge and the inherent limitations of man to assimilate knowledge. Put another way, in order for an individual to become expert (or sometimes even proficient) in a field of endeavor, that field must be narrowed to match the capabilities of the individual.

The Need for Officer Specialists

The Army has not been immune to the great advances in knowledge nor the changes in technology taking place in society. Kurt Lang (in Janowitz, The New Military, 1964, p 79) points out:

Technology has created new career fields, and the division of labor in the military--given the number of personnel involved--is probably more complex than any other institution, with the possible exception of space exploration.

This creates new, more intense demands on the military with regard to both specialists and generalists.

The terms "specialist" and "generalists" connotate many different things to various individuals, which leads to confusion in discussions on the subject. Such confusion might be minimized if one accepts the fact that both terms are relative. An officer can be more or less a "specialist" or a "generalist." In fact, the largest number of Army requirements are for officers somewhere between true specialists and true generalists.

The following definitions of "specialist" are used in this paper:

A specialist is an officer whose training, education and utilization are geared to the need for applying a narrowly defineable body of subject matter expertise in the performance of his duties -- to the exclusion of much other information previously required of Army officers.

A true specialist is an officer whose training, education and demonstrated performance identify him/her as an in-depth expert in the subject matter of that specialty field.

Most junior officers (in both combat and non-combat arms specialties) are specialists. True specialists, however, tend to be found in the upper ranks of the non-combat arms specialties.

Underlying OPMS philosophy is the acknowledgement that, although a certain degree of specialization had become increasingly important within the Officer Corps for many years, the systemic pressures (command, promotion, "up or out" policies, etc.) which derived from a traditionalist view of the Officer Corps had served to discourage the development of high quality officer specialists in the numbers necessary to meet the needs of the Army.

Establishment of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was a dramatic step toward recognizing the need for institutionalizing specialization in the Officer Corps. In addition to providing alternative career fields for many combat arms officers at the field grade level, the philosophy of OPMS explicitly acknowledges that some officers must be trained in relatively narrow fields and utilized repetitively in related assignments in order for the Army to have an Officer Corps prepared to meet the challenges of the present and future. The following excerpts from DA Pam 600-3, Part I, Chapter 1, clearly define this aspect of OPMS philosophy:

Changing technology results in changing skill requirements in the force structure, with resulting changes in the number, type and education of officers needed to satisfy the needs of the Army. The increasing complexity of Army jobs, the greater length of time required to master the knowledge associated with such jobs, has required greater specialization to develop competence. [Underscore added]

Whatever else OPMS may stand for, it is clear a premium is placed on technical competence among Army officers. This technical competence can be translated into simply "knowing your job." Knowing one's job today, however, requires more (in some cases much more) specialization than ever before.

Promotion, rightly or wrongly, is the most visible sign of success in the Army. Consequently, promotion results are the most effective signal to the Officer Corps at large as to what the Army values or does not value. It is for this reason that recent promotion boards have been instructed to consider officers by other than traditionalist standards. Cited below are excerpts from instructions to the 1977 promotion board for colonel:

In a broad sense, OPMS represents a shift from a traditional value system within the Officer Corps to a system which is in line with the contemporary needs of the Army and the individual. Although the full transition to OPMS will take several years, it is essential to extend its logic immediately into the promotion system.

Highly capable officers must be perceived as progressing through specialist fields to positions of increasing responsibility if the total requirements of the Army are to be met.

Whereas in the past, a generalist philosophy prevailed, the thrust of career development today focuses on specialization...In some cases, the needs of the Army require the officer to receive specialized education and repetitive assignments to the same type duty position at increasing levels of responsibility so as to achieve a high level of professional proficiency.

[Underscore added]

Finally, as is well known, specific specialties were designated for reconsideration by this board. Moreover, given the new quota, the promotion board was cautioned "that qualification for promotion must include, at this point, only those officers who are true specialists as evidenced by their demonstrated experience and past assignment in that specialty for which selection is being made."
[Original underscore]

In recognition of the need for the development of specialists, OPMS established 46 separate career fields. The 14 Branches were subdivided into 46 Specialty Codes (SC). The SC's were further subdivided into 133 Special Skill Identifiers (SSI). An even more specific delineation of Army specialist needs is made by the designation of Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI), many of which are not linked to a specific SC or SSI.

The following examples are intended to illustrate the need for a significant number of true specialists:

A Strategic Signals Intelligence Officer requires high utilization in SSI 37B in order to attain and maintain the expertise needed to perform in 37B positions as a colonel. (There are 111 field grade requirements in 37B.) The job requirements for an Area Intelligence Officer (36B) resemble neither those of 36A nor of any other military intelligence SC/SSI. They are so unique that many officers are placed in "excepted service" -- taken out of the mainstream and dedicated exclusively to 36B work. (There are 100 field grade requirements in 36B.) For Foreign Area Officers (SC 48), the critical designator is the ASI representing the geographic area in which the officer must attain expertise. Training, education and experiential requirements for developing expert FAO's are long and expensive. (There are 428 field grade requirements for FAO's--107 of them for colonels.)

Many of the over 500 field grade positions listed above require true specialists. There are, doubtless, many more such true specialist positions in other specialties.¹

Summary. In order to develop technical competence, most officers must become specialized early in their careers. The need for in-depth expertise in some specialties makes it necessary for a substantial number of officers to be trained, educated and repetitively assigned within relatively narrow specialty fields. By all indications, the number of new specialties and true specialists will need to increase in the Army of the future. All

¹Regarding ASI's alone, there are some 20 which require extensive training and repetitive assignments in narrowly defined areas (see AR 611-101). The author was able to tentatively identify nearly 6,000 validated requirements (including those for FAO) for OPMS managed officers with these ASI's.

successful officers in the future Army, however, regardless of their ultimate career positions, will possess varying degrees of specialized expertise.

The Need for Generalists

There continues to be a need for the generalist who can properly plan the efforts and integrate the results of an organization to function properly within the larger context of society. Considerable interaction with other organizations (and their oftentimes conflicting interests) is necessary. This requires skills of an organization's leaders which differ significantly from the skills of specialists.

The Need for Officer Generalists

Officer generalists are needed, as they always have been, to command combined arms units and to manage staff organizations or specialty fields. There are varying levels of management, however, so that not all generalists are equally "generalized." For convenience of discussion, the following definitions are used to delineate two rather distinct types of generalist:

Functional generalist--An officer whose primary efforts are aimed at managing several related specialties (within one specialty field). For example, an officer who manages SC's 25, 26, 27 and 72 (Signal); or SC's 35, 36 and 37 (Intelligence); or SC's 81, 82, 83 and 92 (Logistics) is a functional generalist within his/her specialty field. There are many general officer positions which call for functional generalists.

Generalist--An officer whose primary efforts are involved in the management of more than one specialty field. For example, a manager of logistics, intelligence and personnel administration is a generalist. An installation manager is a generalist. Most commanders, at least above company level, are generalists. DA staff members may be specialists, functional generalists or generalists. One might even say that a true generalist is an officer whose training, education, experience and demonstrated performance in positions of wide ranging responsibilities identify him/her as an expert in the planning and integration of all arms and services. The very highest positions in the Army call for true generalists.

The technical nature of many jobs today puts a great burden on managers. Toffler (p 140) points out that "solid state physicists, computer programmers, systems designers, operations

researchers and engineering specialists are assuming a new decision making function." General George Blanchard, in responding to a RETO question regarding the needs of generalists, wrote:

The point is, that the scientist has advanced the state of the art to the extent that unless decision makers at all levels understand the situation, they'll make poor decisions regarding both the employment and actual need for the equipment. Problems occur because the decision maker isn't equipped to provide the direction needed. Consequently, the technician takes over and goes in the direction he wants--this is totally wrong.

To hope that all technicians can be sufficiently broadened, or that managers can become subject matter experts in all their managed specialty fields is not realistic. It underestimates the demands placed on both the specialist and the generalist.

Technology and specialization have influenced the number and type of generalists required in the Army of tomorrow. First, there will be fewer generalists, since more officers must become specialists. Secondly, generalists of tomorrow cannot be "Jacks of all trades, but master of none;" they must be sufficiently competent to know the capabilities and limitations of their personnel and equipment. Thirdly, they must learn to use the most recent management techniques and methods. Finally, they must know and be able to operate in the external environment, whether that environment includes Congressmen, Office of Management and Budget staffers or NATO Allies.

Implications of Specialization for the Army

Specialization has several implications for the development and management of the Officer Corps.

Dual Specialties. The stated OPMS policy that each officer is "to gain and maintain proficiency in a primary and alternate specialty" is inconsistent with the need to develop true specialists in some specialty areas.² As was pointed out above, qualification even within one OPMS specialty (SC 36) is often extremely difficult. This is probably true in some other specialties. In response to :

²DA Pam 600-3, states: "Army requirements for certain specialties may demand deviations from a balanced dual development concept." Nevertheless, the requirement for two specialties still remains.

RETO question on dual specialization, the Infantry School wrote:

Technological advance rates mitigate against the maintenance of dual expertise without the need for constant updating. (It is too narrow a view to link technology to hardware alone -- all fields of knowledge are increasing exponentially.) Three years absence can equate to reversion to the novice status for one who was previously an expert.

Although some SC's are functionally related and all officers should be encouraged to develop expertise in as many areas as possible, it should not be at the expense of losing technical competence in one's primary specialty. This is particularly critical for officers who will be called upon to perform as true specialists.

There is a need, however, to develop alternate specialty expertise for many combat arms officers. For example, at present, there are 11,513 combat arms field grade officers to meet 4,858 validated requirements. This is a ratio of 2.37 assets for each requirement. Non-combat arms assets do not meet the needs of field grade requirements. Here we have 14,671 officers and 18,848 validated requirements -- a ratio of .78:1.³ What this means is that many highly qualified combat arms officers run out of jobs at the field grade level, while many non-combat arms field grade requirements go unfilled. Ostensibly, this imbalance is corrected by designating an alternate specialty for all officers. This solution is, however, only the first step in insuring highly qualified officers are managed to meet the needs of the Army. Designation of alternate specialty by "government issue" can become too easily a paper drill resulting in the appearance that the Army's needs have been met.

It must be remembered that one of the underlying tenets of specialization is the need for technical competence among our officers. Consequently, measures must be taken to insure the officer is trained (or already possesses sufficient expertise) in his/her alternate specialty. To do otherwise is unfair to the officer, his/her subordinates and is damaging to the mission. It might be more appropriate to designate an alternate specialty earlier in an officer's career, thus giving him/her more time to acquire at least a minimal level of qualification in that specialty.

³ Figures for assets are based on primary specialties (PERSACS a/o 780930).

Next step could be to award the alternate specialty once the officer had demonstrated some level of qualification. Finally, if it appeared an officer were going to be continually assigned in his/her alternate specialty, the original primary/alternate relationship could be reversed -- a 1141 officer would become a 4111.

Tour Length. As pointed out above, experience is an important factor in developing and maintaining expertise. Consequently, since specialized expertise has become recognized as career enhancing by OPMS philosophy, two or three years tours may no longer be viable in some specialty fields. The situation may be exacerbated (but not necessarily) by shifting of officers from position to position during the course of one tour.

"Up or Out" Policy. Although there are other factors to be considered vis-a-vis the present "up or out" policy, it is certainly inimical to the long term development of expertise in some specialty areas within the Officer Corps. Many highly motivated and proficient majors, for instance, have been involuntarily separated from active duty because of the present policy. It would be advantageous for the Army, and more humane to the individual officers (and to those junior officers who are intimidated by such a policy) to provide some mechanism for retaining in grade selected qualified officers who have not been promoted.

Professional Commitment. There is a close correlation between civilian occupations and many officer career fields. In this respect, the Officer Corps can be viewed as a "federation of military related professions." Specialization tends to foster a professional commitment to one's specialized career field rather than to the Army as a whole. A similar phenomenon is seen in the civilian sector, where allegiance to one's profession takes primacy over allegiance to one's organization. There is, therefore, a need to provide, wherever and whenever practicable, integrative experience for officer specialists so that they learn how their specialties and those of other officers are combined to meet the needs of the Army. This suggests an even more acute requirement for periodic professional resident courses where officers of all specialties meet in an academic and social atmosphere.

External Environment. Alluded to above in the section on generalists was the problem of the external environment. In-depth specialization decreases the adaptability of officers to these outward forces. Since all generalists in the

(both civilian and military) will come from the ranks of specialists, there may be a need to "unlearn" some of the habits which made them successful specialists. Generalists may have to be taught to conceptualize, to prioritize and to learn other new, sometimes radically different management skills. This need is, potentially, a critical area for concern as the pendulum necessarily swings in the direction of specialization. The number of generalist-managers may be fewer in the Army of the future, but their talents will be stretched to the limits.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, more intensive specialization of the Officer Corps will prove beneficial to the Army as long as provisions are made to develop a large number of functional generalists and a small number of true generalists. Specialization is necessary if the Officer Corps is to achieve and maintain technical competence in a technological and information overloaded world. Specialization in the Army mirrors specialization in civilian society and, therefore, increases the prospects for a wide cross-section of American youth to combine rewarding careers with service to their country in the Profession of Arms.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

ANNEX S

AVIATION PROGRAM

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Annex is to summarize the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), review of the training and education requirements for officer aviators with primary emphasis on Specialty Code (SC) 15, Aviation, and to make recommendations for the future. The attached Appendix provides the more detailed discussion of the RETO review.

2. DISCUSSION.


a. Traditionally, ground duty has been viewed as a requirement to insure that officer aviators retain their close association with their basic branch entry specialty to ensure close ties between the Army's aviation units and the ground units they support. RETO has also concluded that ground duty in their entry specialty for most company grade aviators, especially for the combat arms aviator, is essential to ensure that the officer is fully qualified as an Army aviator. Aviation qualification is discussed further in the attached Appendix, the RETO proposed Military Qualification Standards (MQS) system is presented in Annex D and the field grade officer training and education system to include the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) proposal is described in Annex E.

b. On 15 May 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCoS) approved the Aviation Specialty 15 Special Task Force (STF) developed professional development guide (Inclosure 3 to attached Appendix) which fully supports the RETO recommendations. Integrating the STF guide with the RETO proposals, produces the notional SC 15 career pattern shown below (page S-2).

(1) A minimum of 1 year in a qualifying entry specialty assignment would be required for the officer to achieve certification prior to entry into flight training with the exception of Aeronautical Evacuation Officers (SC 67J) and Aviation Management Officers (SC 71)

(2) The SC 15 officer would be required to achieve qualification in both his entry specialty and aviation. The skills verified by the lieutenant during ground duty will not only build close ties with the combined arms team but will assist greatly in providing the skills required as a small unit aviation leader.

Figure 1. Notional Career Pattern - SC 15, Aviation



* FURTHER SPECIALTY DEVELOPMENT AS REQUIRED.

(3) The lieutenant would be tracked into the flight school mission track and hence, aviation assignments closely related to his entry specialty and complete aviation MQS II during his first assignment in aviation.

(4) Department of Defense (DOD), guidance and longtime Army policy states that the obligation period should be spent in an operational flying assignment. This career pattern reflects this guidance.

(5) With an annual flight school training output of 550 SC 15 officers, about one-fourth of the captains would be available for qualifying entry specialty assignments at any one time by the mid, to late eighties.

(6) The field grade years would be devoted to alternating aviation and entry specialty assignments with some officers pursuing further specialty development as required. An Aviation Company Commander's Course would be required to fully prepare commanders.

c. RETO has concluded that with some "fine tuning", SC 15 can continue to meet the Army's aviation needs and should be retained as a specialty as discussed in the attached Appendix.

d. A major problem area with the aviation program and SC 15 in particular is the projected aviator short-fall in the 1980's. This applies not only to company grade officers but aviation warrant officers as well. Both the STF and RETO have recommended and the VCSA has approved an increase in the flight training rate to an annual output of 654 officers (550 for SC 15) and 808 warrant officers by the end of FY 81. RETO fully recognizes the need to increase the warrant officers training rate but has only addressed the rationale for increasing the commissioned officer training rate in the attached Appendix. Without the increased training rates, full qualification as a ground oriented Army aviator will not be possible in the 1980's.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The RETO recommendations in the area of officer aviation training and education, discussed in more detail in the attached Appendix, are summarized below.

(1) Routinely assign officers to initial flight training after a minimum of 1 year in qualifying assignments in accession specialty aligned with Armor, Infantry, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Signal, Transportation and Military Intelligence branches. Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and Aviation Materiel Management officers would continue to attend initial flight training after completion of their basic course.

(2) Retain aviation as a specialty, but routinely place officers into the initial flight training mission track and hence, aviation units closely related to their entry specialty.

(3) Establish a clear pattern of ground duty requirements for aviators. This would include 100 percent of the combat support and combat service support officers returning to one assignment in their entry specialty as a captain. For combat arms aviators, depending on the needs of the Army and the individual's desires, as many as possible must be returned to ground duty in their entry specialty for full specialty qualification. Those who don't receive a qualifying assignment would be kept closely associated with their entry specialty through attendance at the RETO proposed specialty company commander's course and one or two less-than-90-day Special Duty/Temporary Duty (SD/TDY), specialty qualification/validation assignments with their entry specialty units.

(4) Establish a plan to preclude the projected field grade overages in the 1980's due to the overstrength 1966-70 year-groups.

(5) Scrub the Army Authorization Document System (TAAD'S) documents to determine the positions that require only flying skills with no officer managerial or leadership skills and convert these to aviation warrant officer positions. (Approximately 80-100).

(6) Because of the difficulty in managing the aviator's career, the pressure for increasing utilization in aviation, and the very limited time available for qualifying assignments in entry specialties, as a matter of normal policy, company grade aviators should be excluded from Army-wide support assignments to the maximum extent possible. The aviator must pull his "fair share" of these assignments within aviation such as the branch immaterial positions which comprise about 10 percent of the SC 15 company grade structure.

(7) Increase training rates starting in FY 80 to allow enough SC 15 captains and majors to insure entry specialty qualifying assignments for full aviation qualification. It appears that the training rate for SC 15 will have to be increased by about 169 officers per year. This would require the total aviation officer initial entry training output to be raised from 465 (FY 80) to about 654 annually. (This includes approximately 84 students as presently programmed and a projected increase of 20 to support SC's 67J and 71).

b. Implementation of the above RETO recommendations will require intensive assignment management. A system which provides the status of all SC 15 assets on a timely, periodic basis must be developed. Further, a meaningful dialogue must be maintained between the manager and proponents. All facets of the individual aviation program - entry training, assignments, utilization training to include such topics as the interaction of the aircrew training manual requirements and the flying hours program, - must be tied together so an attractive, viable, and productive career pattern is attained and maintained.

1 Appendix

1. SC 15, Aviation.

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

APPENDIX 1

SC 15, AVIATION

TO ANNEX S

AVIATION PROGRAM

1. INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this Appendix is to summarize the RETO review of the training and education requirements for Specialty Code 15, Aviation, and make recommendations for the future.

2. BACKGROUND: When Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was established, aviation was initially retained as a skill integral to 35 OPMS specialties. After extensive study by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Office, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (ODCSPER), the VCSA made the decision in September of 1975, to establish aviation as an advanced entry specialty. Some supporting rationale for establishing the specialty was that it "facilitated compliance with the legislative intent of the Aviation Career Incentive Act (ACIA) of 1974, reduced the negative impact of what amounted to a three-track OPMS system for rated Army officers, and reduced the existing perception among Army aviators that a career in aviation may be detrimental to career development and advancement."

One of the events which focused attention on the management of Army aviators was the enactment of the ACIA in 1974. The intent of the ACIA was to:

- Achieve a more equitable distribution of flight pay.
- Attract and retain aviators in flying service.
- Gain an optimum return on the training investment (implied by the legislation).

The ACIA requirement to serve in an operational flying position for 6 out of the first 12 years of aviation service to meet the first gate (continuous incentive pay through 18 years aviation service), as an example, should not be viewed as just a requirement to warrant flight pay for the individual. The period while in flight training applies toward the gate requirement for the aviator. Therefore, the Army is being required, after training, to use this expensive resource

operationally for only 44 percent of the first 12 years of the officer's flying service. Even without the ACIA any less utilization of this highly trained resource would have to be questioned from a cost effectiveness standpoint.

The key elements in the establishment of aviation (SC 15) as a specialty were:

- Aviation, established as an advanced entry specialty would be designated as either the officer's primary or alternate specialty in his 8th year of service.

- Field grade aviator requirements would be used to determine the number of officers placed into the specialty. The number of requirements would preclude all aviators from having the specialty.

- Aviators would be initially trained and assigned in their basic entry specialties. Officers would enter flight school between their 24th and 60th month of commissioned service.

- Officers would enter flight training from those basic entry specialties aligned with Armor, Infantry, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Signal, Transportation, and Military Intelligence branches.

Exceptions to the 24-month entry point into initial flight training are made for:

- AMEDD officers (SC 67 J, Aeromedical Evacuation Officer.)
- SC 71, Aviation Materiel Management officers.
- Officers returning from short tours.
- Officers required to fill school quotas.

On 8 September 1975 by Information Memorandum the Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), was informed that "The creation of an aviation specialty is not a panacea; however, it accomplishes the following:

- a. Provides for the aviator a management system and a career pattern comparable to that for other officers.

- b. Enhances the perception that aviation duty is career enhancing, thus encouraging quality officers to enter aviation.

c. Provides a mechanism for increasing the utilization of aviators selected for the specialty.

d. Permits each aviator to know where he stands insofar as his future development and utilization in aviation are concerned.

e. Enables each aviator to concentrate his professional development in two specialties, as contrasted to the current system of two specialties and the aviation skill."

Officers (other than SC 67J and SC 71) have aviation SC 15 designated as their alternate specialty upon graduation from flight school. They are then evaluated along with their year-group contemporaries in their 8th year of commissioned service to determine their formal specialty combination. SC 15 may be designated as either primary or alternate at this point.

Upon completion of initial flight training, the officer presently incurs a service obligation of 3 years. This obligation period for all initial flight training graduates will be extended to 4 years effective October 1978.

3. DISCUSSION: RETO's findings concerning the aviation specialty are divided into the following three major areas: aviation assets vs. requirements, aviator qualification requirements, and the aviation skill versus specialty question.

a. Aviation Assets vs. Requirements. Most of the discussions concerning the status of how well SC 15 is meeting the needs of the Army center around the question of numbers. Such comments as: "There are too many aviators now," "there aren't enough field grade requirements in the specialty," "we're going to be short CPT's in 1980," or "the training rate is too low" are often made concerning the specialty structure.

Because of the large increase in aviator requirements during the Viet Nam buildup and the post-Viet Nam sharp decrement in aviation requirements, there are now more assets than requirements in all grades except lieutenant. This condition is shown by the comparative chart below.

COMPARISON OF SC 15 ASSETS AND PERSACS AUTHORIZATIONS

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>	<u>MAJ</u>	<u>LTC</u>	<u>COL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Authorizations (FY 78) (Dec 77 PERSACS run)	771	1,590	702	286	60	3,409
Assets (Nov 77)	224	2,653	1,592	974	231	5,674
Auth/Assets	3.44	.60	.44	.29	.26	.60

This comparison indicates a considerable shortage of SC 15 lieutenants, a good authorization/assets ratio for captains and majors, and more senior field grade assets than needed to meet SC 15 authorizations. However, to get the complete picture these assets and authorizations must be projected into the 1980's.

For the projection, the continuation rates for commissioned aviators at Inclosure 1 were used to age the SC 15 population. Additionally, 1 year of ground duty prior to flight school starting in 1980 was assumed, Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) authorizations were straightlined from 1985-90, and the 1979-83 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) training rates (SC 15 share) shown below were used. The resulting assets/authorization comparison is provided following the training rates.

SC 15 TRAINING RATES

	<u>FISCAL YEAR</u>					
	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83 → 90</u>
POM TNG OUTPUT*	154	299	381	381	381	381

* Only in POM through FY 83 - straight-lined FY 1984-90.

COMPARISON OF SC 15 PROJECTED ASSETS* AND AUTHORIZATIONS

	<u>END OF FISCAL YEAR</u>						
	<u>78</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>90</u>
LT Auth	771	897	913	977	1,004	1,004	1,004
Assets	<u>382</u>	<u>310</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>755</u>	<u>755</u>
Short/Over	-389	-587	-158	-222	-249	-249	-249
CPT Auth	1,590	1,625	1,612	1,664	1,682	1,682	1,682
Assets	<u>2,245</u>	<u>1,728</u>	<u>1,038</u>	<u>1,225</u>	<u>1,401</u>	<u>1,689</u>	<u>1,689</u>
Short/Over	+ 655	+ 103	- 574	- 439	- 281	+ 7	+ 7
MAJ Auth	702	699	693	702	705	705	705
Assets	<u>1,604</u>	<u>1,807</u>	<u>1,902</u>	<u>1,334</u>	<u>793</u>	<u>592</u>	<u>709</u>
Short/Over	+ 902	+1,108	+1,209	+ 632	+ 88	- 13	+ 4
LTC Auth	286	287	285	286	286	286	286
Assets	<u>849</u>	<u>866</u>	<u>984</u>	<u>1,328</u>	<u>1,585</u>	<u>1,297</u>	<u>898</u>
Short/Over	+ 563	+ 579	+ 699	+1,042	+1,299	+1,011	+ 612
COL Auth	60	60	59	59	59	59	59
Assets	<u>261</u>	<u>311</u>	<u>335</u>	<u>347</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>404</u>	<u>531</u>
Short/Over	+ 201	+ 251	+ 276	+ 288	+ 299	+ 345	+ 472
TOT Auth	3,409	3,568	3,562	3,688	3,736	3,736	3,736
Assets	<u>5,341</u>	<u>5,022</u>	<u>5,014</u>	<u>4,989</u>	<u>4,892</u>	<u>4,737</u>	<u>4,582</u>
	+1,932	+1,454	+1,452	+1,301	+1,156	+1,001	+ 846

*Assets projected using continuation model at Inclosure 1 and authorizations from Dec 77 run of the POM PERSACS straight-lining the 30 Sep 85 data through 1990. Authorizations include primary and secondary SC 15 positions as well as ASI 1X (non operational flying) positions not coded SC 15, 71, 51C or 67J.

This comparison indicates that the shortage of lieutenants will continue through the 1980's even with the programmed training rates and a change of policy to allow attendance at flight school after 1 year of ground duty (this will be discussed further below).

The present overage of captains quickly becomes a significant shortage in the mid-1980's and would still require fulltime utilization in aviation to meet aviation requirements in the late 1980's.

The overstrength year groups of 1966-70 (Viet Nam buildup) can be tracked through the major overage in the early 1980's, Lieutenant colonel overage in the mid-eighties, and colonel overage in the late eighties. This leaves fulltime utilization of SC 15 majors to meet aviation requirements by the mid-eighties.

To meet company grade requirements and allow time for dual specialty development under OPMS for captains and majors in the 1980's, the training rates for SC 15 must be increased. However, adequate company grade aviator assets to permit dual specialty development is only part of the need to increase the assets through increased training rates. It is essential that enough assets be made available to allow the opportunity for ground duty in the combat arms aviator's entry specialty for most captain aviator's. This assignment is needed to ensure that the officer is fully qualified as an Army aviator, SC 15, as discussed more fully below.

The training rate needed to sustain the force and meet the ground duty/dual specialty development requirement has been developed by the Aviation Special Task Force. At this point it appears that the SC 15 training rates will have to be increased by 169 students per year. This would require the total aviation officer initial flight training output to be raised from 465 (FY 80) to 654 annually. (This includes approximately 60 students as presently programmed and a projected increase of 16 to support SC 71 and 24 students programmed with a projected increase of 4 to support SC 67J).

The increase in cost associated with this training rate increase is shown below:

INITIAL AVIATOR OFFICER TRAINING RATE

	Intl Entry R/W Officer Output Per Year	Variable Cost*			
		\$ Million (77\$)			
		<u>MPA</u>	<u>OMA</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Rate In POM Starting FY 80	465				
Proposed Rate Increase	189**	5.19	4.91	.01	10.11
Proposed Sustaining Rate	654				

* Based on Force Estimate Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Army (OCA) data which reflects the OMA, MPA, and PA variable cost per Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course graduate of \$53,497.

** The rate increase includes an increase of 169 needed to support SC 15, an increase of 16 to support SC 71, and an increase of 4 to support SC 67J.

The increased training rate would result in the assets/auth comparison provided in the table below using the following assumptions:

1. That the continuation rates shown at Inclosure 1 are used to age the SC 15 assets.
2. That starting in 1980, a policy will be established requiring 1 year of ground duty prior to flight training (2 year average through 1979).
3. That authorizations for the 1985-90 time-frame are calculated based on "straight-lining" PERSACS authorizations.
4. That the FY 1979-83 POM training rates are used for FY 1978-79 (see page 4).
5. That the output from flight school for FY 1980-90 is based on the proposed training rate of 550 (SC 15 portion of 654) per year.

COMPARISON OF SC 15 PROJECTED ASSETS* AND AUTHORIZATIONS**

	END OF FISCAL YEAR						
	<u>78</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>90</u>
<u>LT Auth</u>	813	946	963	1,031	1,059	1,059	1,059
<u>Assets</u>	382	310	1,091	1,091	1,091	1,091	1,091
<u>Short/Over</u>	- 431	- 636	+ 128	+ 60	+ 32	+ 32	+ 32
<u>CPT Auth</u>	1,844	1,885	1,870	1,930	1,951	1,783 ⁺	1,783
<u>Assets</u>	2,245	1,728	1,038	1,522	1,937	2,446	2,446
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 401	- 157	- 832	- 408	- 14	+ 663	+ 663
<u>MAJ Auth</u>	772	769	762	772	776	776	776
<u>Assets</u>	1,604	1,807	1,902	1,334	793	592	902
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 832	+1,038	+1,140	+ 562	+ 17	- 184	+ 126
<u>LTC Auth</u>	300	301	299	300	300	300	300
<u>Assets</u>	849	866	984	1,328	1,585	1,297	898
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 549	+ 565	+ 685	+1,028	+1,285	+ 997	+ 598
<u>COL Auth</u>	62	62	61	61	61	61	61
<u>Assets</u>	261	311	335	347	358	404	531
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 199	+ 249	+ 274	+ 286	+ 297	+ 343	+ 470
<u>TOT Auth</u>	3,791	3,963	3,955	4,094	4,147	3,979	3,979
<u>Assets</u>	5,341	5,022	5,350	5,622	5,764	5,830	5,868
<u>Short/Over</u>	+1,550	1,059	+1,395	+1,528	+1,617	+1,851	+1,889

* Assets projected using 1 year of ground duty prior to flight training and a training rate of 550 starting FY 80.

**Authorizations include primary and secondary SC 15 positions and ASI 1X positions not coded SC's 15, 51C, 67J or 71 from the 1980-84 POM PERSACS, Dec 77 run plus THS account using a factor for each grade of LT-.055, CPT-.16, MAJ-.10, LTC-.05 to increase the authorization. COL authorizations were increased by 2 for THS.

+ THS factor for CPT reduced to .06 starting in FY 88 due to RETO recommendation reshaping CPT level (MQS III) Training.

The increased training rate reflected above would provide enough lieutenant assets to meet the authorizations by FY 82 and enough captains to allow ground duty for full specialty qualification by the late eighties.

Force structure modifications to bring authorizations more closely into alignment with assets are being studied by the DA staff to overcome the company grade shortfall projected for the early eighties and are not addressed in this paper. If FY 79 funds cannot be made available to increase the FY 80 output to 654, then the full increased output would be delayed until FY 81 causing a further delay in filling company grade authorizations. The resulting assets/authorizations comparison is shown below.

COMPARISON OF SC 15 PROJECTED ASSETS* AND AUTHORIZATIONS**
(Increased Training Rate Delayed Until FY 81)

	END OF FISCAL YEAR						
	<u>78</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>90</u>
<u>LT Auth</u>	813	946	963	1,030	1,059	1,059	1,059
<u>Assets</u>	382	310	986	1,091	1,091	1,091	1,091
<u>Short/Over</u>	- 431	- 636	+ 23	+ 61	+ 32	+ 32	+ 32
<u>CPT Auth</u>	1,831	1,885	1,869	1,930	1,951	1,782 ⁺	1,782
<u>Assets</u>	2,240	1,728	1,038	1,433	1,863	2,377	2,446
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 409	- 157	- 831	- 497	- 88	+ 595	+ 664
<u>MAJ Auth</u>	761	768	762	772	775	775	775
<u>Assets</u>	1,604	1,807	1,902	1,334	793	592	842
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 843	+1,039	+1,140	+ 562	+ 18	- 183	+ 67
<u>LTC Auth</u>	296	301	299	300	300	300	300
<u>Assets</u>	849	866	984	1,328	1,585	1,297	898
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 553	+ 565	+ 685	+1,028	+1,285	+ 997	+ 598
<u>COL Auth</u>	62	62	61	61	61	61	61
<u>Assets</u>	261	311	335	347	358	404	531
<u>Short/Over</u>	+ 199	+ 249	+ 274	+ 286	+ 297	+ 343	+ 470
<u>TOI Auth</u>	3,763	3,972	3,954	4,093	4,146	4,146	4,146
<u>Assets</u>	5,341	5,022	5,245	5,533	5,690	5,761	5,808
<u>Short/Over</u>	+1,578	+1,100	+1,291	+1,440	+1,544	+1,615	+1,662

*Assets projected delaying full 550 training rate until FY 81 (444 training rate in FY 80).

**See note on page 8.

+ See note on page 8.

As shown by the above projections, the number of field grade requirements may preclude all company grade aviators from having the specialty in the field grades. This may require limited designating out of SC 15 around the selection for major time-frame for the over-strength year-groups (some of which has already taken place). A definite plan must be established to preclude the projected field grade overages in the 1980's discussed above.

However, these field grade officers excess to the specialty needs are a valuable asset for the Army. It has been stated that "hedges, redundancy, and over-training in the combat specialties are not inefficiencies, but a necessary insurance policy expense designed to facilitate mobilization or some unanticipated expansion of the Army's base structure to meet a long-term, protracted conflict short of mobilization." This is certainly applicable to the field grade aviator who finds himself with fewer opportunities to serve in his aviation specialty at the high ranks. Nevertheless, the skills, knowledge, and professional aviation expertise this individual possesses can only strengthen his mission capability and potential as he serves in other specialty positions.

Although the SC 15 structure thins out in the senior field grades, this is not unlike the combat arms. SC 11, Infantry is more closely aligned with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) model but many of the combat arms immaterial positions are coded 11X and are included in the Infantry totals. The comparison of the grade structure is shown below.

COMBAT ARMS/SC 15, AVIATION GRADE STRUCTURE* COMPARISON

SC	PERCENTAGE					DOPMA
	11	12	13	14	15**	
COL	6	3	2	2	1	5
LTC	10	10	8	9	7	10
MAJ	14	14	14	14	19	20
CPT	31	31	37	28	48	30
LT	39	42	39	47	25	35

* Based upon 30 Sep 78 PERSACS Authorizations (December 1977 run).

** Based upon only primary SC 15 coded positions for comparison purposes.

From the position analysis conducted by RETO and the specialty proponents, approximately 100 company grade positions should be converted to warrant officer aviators since their duty titles reflect principally flying requirements with no management or leadership requirements. Applying this reduction (75 CPTs and 25 LTs) to the SC 15 structure and adding the SC 15 secondary position authorizations plus the ASI 1X (Non operational flying positions requiring aeronautical designation, skills, and knowledge) positions, the SC 15 grade structure would look like this:

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>	<u>MAJ</u>	<u>LTC</u>	<u>COL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Primary SC 15	746	1,432	593	205	45	3,021
Secondary SC 15	0	10	15	8	1	34
ASI 1X	0	73	94	73	14	254
TOTAL SC 15	746	1,515	702	286	60	3,309
GRADE %	22	46	21	9	2	

The above more complete picture of the SC 15 structure compares even more favorably with the combat arms specialties and the DOPMA model except in the grade of colonel. Certainly there is no requirement to create slots just for the sake of balancing the structure, but there would appear to be a need for more ASI 1X positions throughout the Army force structure than just 14 in the grade of colonel. To illustrate this point, the Aviation Special Task Force in comparing the Army's aviation program with the other services found the following interesting comparison concerning COL positions.

	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USA</u>
06 OPNL Flying Positions (FY 79)	528	80	171	17
Active Aircraft Inventory (FY 78)	7,156	1,171	3,630	8,866
Ratio 06/AC	1:14	1:15	1:21	1:522

In order to keep SC 15 requirements as low as possible, the TAADS documents should be completely scrubbed to determine the exact number of positions which should be converted to aviation warrant officer positions.

It is interesting to note that when procedures were being developed to establish aviation as a specialty in 1975, the planners recognized that it would probably require an aviation training output of around 550 per year to meet the aviation requirements through major and still provide time for dual specialty development and ground duty for full SC 15 qualification. The pressure by OSD to hold down training rates based on total (through 05) aviator strength has kept the number trained below this desired rate.

The latest OSD draft consolidated guidance continues to constrain the Army's ability to use its commissioned aviators to meet its requirements in specialties in addition to aviation. Parts of the draft guidance are summarized below:

- Services should minimize the assignment of pilots to non-flying billets.

- Flight training rates should be programmed at minimum levels required to balance total force mobilization aviation requirements (05 and below) with total force aviation inventories (05 and below) by the end of FY 84. However, training rates should not be reduced below the level needed on a phased basis to satisfy valid, peacetime requirements for the Active Force.

- Temporary one grade level substitutions should be used whenever necessary to fill inventory shortages in specific grades.

- Rated/designated aviators will be assigned to operational flying positions through their periods of initial obligated service.

b. Aviation Qualification Requirements. If the required number of officers can be trained to meet the Army's aviation needs, the next step is to insure that individuals are properly trained and educated to perform the many duties of the specialty. The officer is qualified at a particular grade when he possesses the combination of skills, knowledge, and experience necessary to be technically competent to perform in the most responsible and demanding jobs in SC 15 at that grade, and he is prepared for continuing personal and professional growth.

Qualification is achieved by various combinations of training education, and experience. Responsibility for qualification rests with the officer with assistance from assignment officers, the training proponents and commanders. To reach the qualification objectives for each grade, the officer must obtain the greatest possible benefit from each training, education, and experience opportunity and then supplement these with self study and nonresident instruction (NRI).

Each assignment in the aviation specialty contributes toward the SC 15 officer's qualification. TO&E aviation unit assignments normally provide the most rewarding experience/qualification opportunities; however, there are many other core jobs in aviation which can also lead to specialty qualification. (See Inclosure 2 for definition of core jobs.) Assignment officers must insure that an officer is not given repetitive TDA assignments, but is given the opportunity to serve in TO&E aviation troop assignments as well.

Prior to coming into the aviation program, the officer would be required to meet the RETO proposed Military Qualifications Standards (MQS) II requirements in one of the basic entry specialties indicated in paragraph 2 above. After learning MQS II skills in the basic course, and after validating and verifying these skills during an entry specialty assignment, the officer is well prepared for attendance at flight school. The types of assignments required in the specialties and the minimum time required for qualification at the lieutenant level are shown below. These requirements were established in conjunction with the training and education proponents for each specialty and RETO MQS analysts. (The specific MQS requirements must be based on the detailed front-end analysis being undertaken by TRADOC in its study).

<u>SC</u>	<u>MIN. TIME</u>	<u>TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>
11	1 Yr.	Plt LDR in INF Unit
12	1 Yr.	Plt LDR in Armor/Ground CAV Unit
13	1 Yr.	Asst XO, XO, FDO, FIST Chief, or FO in FA Unit
14	1 Yr.	AD Plt LDR or XO in AD Unit
21	1 Yr.	Plt LDR in ENGR Unit
25/26	1 Yr.	CE Plat/Det LDR, SIG Co XO, COMM CEN Off
35/37	1 Yr.	Core position in 35 or 37
86/87/88	1 Yr.	Core position in 86, 87, or 88

The current policy is to assign officers to flight school between their 24th and 60th month of commissioned service. The average entry is after the individual has completed about 2 years on ground duty. This policy allows only 6 months to 1 year utilization in aviation as a lieutenant creating a continual shortage of SC 15 lieutenants. This is illustrated by the percent shortage shown below:

SC 15LIEUTENANTS

FT 78 AUTHORIZATIONS	771
ASSETS (AS OF 18 NOV 77)	224
THS ACCOUNT (AS OF 18 NOV 77)	65
AVAILABLE ASSETS	159
SHORTAGE	612

Along with an increase in the training rates, the attendance at flight training after only 1 year of ground duty would greatly assist in reducing the SC 15 lieutenant shortage.

In addition to meeting the qualification standards for a lieutenant through the 1 year ground duty, the officer must successfully complete the Initial Entry Rotary Wing Aviator course (IERW) and complete a qualifying assignment in a core aviation position as a lieutenant.

When the IERW course is tracked to provide aircraft qualification and mission training in scout, utility, cargo or attack aircraft, training in addition to the IERW will not be required prior to unit assignment except to meet fixed wing requirements. Additional aircraft qualification training is now required in cargo or attack helicopters when the officer is programmed into one of these units.

To hold down training costs and insure SSI/ASI qualification at each grade, SC 15 officers should normally be assigned throughout their career to units requiring the aircraft skills they obtained when tracked through flight school. While there may be requirements to cross-train individuals to meet Army requirements, this should be kept to an absolute minimum. Additionally, the complexity of modern aircraft systems, their associated weapons systems, and employment tactics require intensive, repetitive assignments to maintain an individual's proficiency.

As part of the qualification equation at each grade, the officer must meet the requirements set forth in the Aircrew Training Manual for the type aircraft associated with his assignment. Additionally, he must complete the Aviator's Annual Written Examination, pass the annual Class II Flight Physical and Instrument Qualification Renewal, and complete ARTEP requirements when applicable.

In addition to the above requirements, the officer must serve in at least one core aviation assignment at each grade to achieve qualification. Representative core assignments are listed below by grade.

— Lieutenant core duty positions.

- Section leader - attack, scout, airlift, utility, surveillance sections.
- Flight operations officer - attack, air cav, medium helicopter, combat support, surveillance units.
- Aviation officer.
- Aviation safety officer.

— Captain core duty positions.

- Commander - HHC, aviation detachment.
- Platoon commander - attack, scout, medium helicopter, airlift, combat support, utility, surveillance platoons.
- XO - aviation company/troop.
- ATC platoon/detachment commander.
- Operations officer - staff; attack, air cav, medium helicopter, combat support, aerial surveillance units.
- Airfield commander/operations officer.
- Aviation staff officer - S1, S2, S4.
- Combat/training development staff officer.
- Aviation standardization officer.

— Major core duty positions.

- Aviation company/troop commander - attack, air cav, combat support, medium helicopter, aerial surveillance, ASA aviation units.

- ATC company commander.
- Bn XO - aviation battalions.
- Bn S3 - aviation battalions.
- G3 air.
- Aviation staff officers.
- Aviation safety officer.
- Combat/training development staff officer.
- Assistant TRADOC systems manager.

--- Lieutenant Colonel core duty positions.

- Aviation Battalion/squadron commander - attack, air cav, combat support, combat aviation, training battalions.

- ATC battalion commander.
- Airfield commander.
- XO, aviation group/brigade.
- Aviation staff officer.
- Division aviation officer.
- Combat/training development staff officer.

--- Colonel core duty positions.

- Aviation group/brigade commander.
- Airfield commander.
- Chief of Staff.
- President, aviation board.
- Director, training, training development, combat development directorates, and departments.
- Program manager.

In addition to the experience gained through assignment to a core job, some of which are listed above, there remains the question of ground duty after the grade of lieutenant. Ground duty, especially for combat arms, has traditionally been viewed as a requirement to insure that officer aviators retain their close association with their basic branch entry specialty to insure close ties between the Army's aviation units and the ground units they support. This close bond is even more important today as aviation units are fully integrated into the combined arms team for combat in future conflicts.

While the aviation warrant officer is the backbone of the pilot corps, the aviation commissioned officer provides the necessary unit command and staff expertise. These commissioned officers must possess the flying skills requisite to such duty. In addition, the commissioned officer aviator must serve as the "bridge" between the aviation and ground units. He must be a fully integrated member of the combined arms team. Consequently, he must understand fully the ground battle from the ground commander's perspective. One general officer has described the unique role of the Army aviator in this fashion:

A point that the authors of the new rules governing commissioned aviator assignments seem to be missing is that the commissioned Army aviator is a special breed of cat. Unlike his Air Force or Navy counterpart, his war does not center around the aircraft he flies or those he controls. Instead, his war is the ground battle into which the aircraft he controls must be interwoven if they are to be effective.

Another general officer stressed the importance of ground duty this way:

The criterion for the assignment of commissioned officers goes beyond the basic question of leadership position. Even more important is the fact that the commissioned officer aviator is taught and trained in how the Army fights so that he has a clear understanding of how aviation missions fit into the whole. Said in another way, the platoon leader of an attack helicopter platoon should have a thorough understanding of brigade tactics and should have a good understanding as well of how a division fights, what the artillery and mortars do, the relative contribution of tanks, TOW and Infantry.

The Aviation Special Task Force conducted a survey of 42 general officers concerning the need for ground duty as it applies to aviation qualification. Save but two respondents, they unanimously pointed out the vital need for ground assignments to insure qualification in the ground skills needed in aviation units.

When discussing what would happen if we were forced to eliminate the ground duty training experience, another general officer stated, "I don't care how much training you give an aviator or how many hours he's got in the cockpit, he'll never have the same feel for the situation as a man who has spent time on the ground."

From the specialty analysis conducted with the specialty proponents, RETO has found that many of the duty modules or general skills required by the officer aviator are also required by the combat arms officer. For example: Of the 12 duty modules required of an infantry platoon leader, 10 are required by a SC 15 lieutenant operating in related aviation units; of the 9 duty modules required of an Armor platoon leader, 8 are required by a lieutenant aviator. Therefore, the skills learned and verified by the officer during ground duty assignments should be fully exploited by routinely placing officers into the initial flight training mission track and hence, aviation units closely related to their entry specialty.

To keep the aviator fully qualified in his entry specialty the aviator captain must attend his specialty's precommand TDY course (RETO proposal) or a comparable functional course depending on the specialty. This course would then be followed by a qualifying assignment in the specialty to meet military qualification standards (MQS) III requirements.

All combat support and combat service support specialty aviators should be provided the opportunity at the captain level to return to their entry specialty for specialty development and qualification. These specialties are generally complementary specialties. (See Inclosure 2 for definition of complementary specialties.)

As indicated above, the combat arms aviator should remain closely ground combat oriented to provide the expertise needed in his aviation units. However, as shown earlier by the comparison of SC 15 and the combat arms force structure, assignments in the senior field grades are limited and not all combat aviators could be fully utilized as combat arms/SC 15 combination officers. Some of these officers will begin development in other specialties that are complementary to aviation during their senior captain and/or major years. Some of the complementary specialties which presently offer reasonable utilization patterns are shown below:

SPECIALTIES THAT COMPLEMENT SC 15

SC 31	Law Enforcement
SC 41	Personnel Management
SC 42	Personnel Administration
SC 51	Research and Development
SC 53	Automatic Data Processing
SC 54	Operations and Force Development
SC 93	Logistics Service Management

How many combat arms aviators would be programmed back to their basic specialty for full qualification as a captain? This is difficult to closely "pin down" since it is a function of positions, assets, time, PCS constraints, etc. Presently, approximately 21 percent of our major aviators are designated with a combat arms specialty primary and SC 15 alternate, and approximately 75 percent of the aviation positions are combat arms related.

In the future, as many captains as possible must be provided the opportunity for a qualifying (MQS III) ground assignment. This will depend on the particular combat arms year-group strength, available ground command assignments, aviator strength, and the individual's preference.

All combat arms aviator captains must remain closely associated to their entry specialty to provide the needed ground expertise and orientation required in today's aviation units. Those who do not or, are not able to obtain an MQS III qualifying assignment in their combat arms specialty must be kept closely associated with the specialty through attendance at the company commanders course and one or two special duty/TDY assignments, not to exceed 90 days each, to have the MQS III validated in a ground unit similar to the plan outlined in the RETO MQS III Annex. The aviator would be required to validate only those skills that would be needed in combat aviation positions. These would include the tactics, operations, and intelligence tasks. He would be validating many of the other areas in his own aviation unit to meet the aviation MQS III qualification requirements. The exact MQS III requirements must be determined from the TRADOC front-end analysis.

This concept would require intensive management and support from the unit commander involved as well as considerable effort by the individual. However, anything less could cause a proportionate drop in the proficiency of our officer aviators and a corresponding loss in total unit combat effectiveness.

Dual specialty developing assignments become less of a problem for major through colonel as long as the training rates can be increased. In fact, many of our aviators will be assigned to more assignments outside aviation than aviation assignments in the senior grades. The VCSA approved STF Career Development Pattern for SC 15 is attached as Inclosure 3 as a summary. The integration of the MQS system into this pattern is shown in Annex S.

One last point should be made about aviator qualifications. Because of the difficulty in managing the aviator's career, the pressure for increasing utilization of this costly trained resource in aviation assignments, and the limited time available for ground duty/alternate specialty development, company grade aviators should not be given Army-wide support assignments. The aviator will pull his "fair share" of these assignments within aviation such as some of the branch immaterial positions (10 percent of the SC 15 company grade structure).

c. Aviation Skill Versus Specialty Question. Everytime aviation is studied or even discussed, the question of whether aviation should be a skill or a specialty is raised. This part of the discussion will deal briefly with this issue.

As discussed above the specialty is a relatively new one. One of the reasons for establishing the specialty was to "reduce the (then) existing perception among Army aviators that a career in aviation may be detrimental to career development and advancement." How do those officers who have SC 15 designated as one of their specialties feel now?

A random sample survey of the officer corps, conducted by RETO in the fall of 1977, asked the officers if they were satisfied or dissatisfied with their primary/alternate specialty. Below are the percentages by grade of the officers who were satisfied with their specialty designation for the aviation specialty shown.

PERCENT SATISFIED WITH SPECIALTY DESIGNATION

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>	<u>MAJ</u>	<u>LTC</u>	<u>COL</u>	<u>ALL GRADES</u>
SC 15	95	94	92	81	78	90
SC 71	94	97	92	83	79	91
All SC	78	84	86	87	91	85

This clearly indicates that Specialty 15 officers on the whole are well satisfied with their designated specialty. Even with the overpopulation in the senior field grade ranks, better than three-fourths are satisfied with their aviation designation. This is a good indication of the acceptance of aviation as a specialty by the vast majority of the Army's commissioned aviators.

Another factor that strongly supports aviation as a specialty is the intensive management that is required to fully utilize and develop our commissioned officer aviators.

However, there are two major options which warrant discussion. The first is returning aviation to a skill status, but only in the specialties related to the accession branches from which the Army allows the majority of the aviators entry into the programs. The aviation skill would be considered an SSI in these specialties such as 12D, Armor aviator, 11D, Infantry aviator, etc. The other option is leaving aviation as a specialty but tracking the aviators more closely into units and assignments related to their entry specialty.

The aviation position breakout by accession branch shown below could facilitate either option.

AVIATION POSITIONS BY ACCESSION BRANCH*

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>TOTAL AVIATION AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>TOTAL SC 15 AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>COMPANY GRADE SC 15 AUTHORIZATIONS</u>
<u>COMBAT ARMS</u>	<u>60%</u>	<u>75%</u>	<u>76%</u>
Armor	33%	42%	47%
Infantry	16%	20%	18%
Field Arty	6%	7%	6%
Air Def Arty	1%	1%	1%
Cbt Arms Material	4%	5%	4%
<u>COMBAT SUPPORT</u>	<u>8%</u>	<u>11%</u>	<u>10%</u>
Engineer	1%	1%	1%
Mil Intel	3%	4%	4%
Signal	4%	6%	5%
<u>COMBAT SERVICE SPT</u>	<u>25%</u>	<u>5%</u>	<u>4%</u>
MSC (SC 67J)	4%	N/A	N/A
TC (SC 15)	4%	5%	4%
TC (SC 71)	17%	N/A	N/A
<u>BRANCH IMMATERIAL</u>	<u>7%</u>	<u>9%</u>	<u>10%</u>

* Based on 30 Sep 85 PERSACS Authorization Coding in Branch Column.

Some of the advantages and disadvantages of these two options are discussed below.

SSI SKILL (11J, 12D, etc.)

Advantages:

--- Entry specialty responsible for development of the officer throughout career--not "somebody" else's problem.

--- Recognizes that not all aviators can have a full career in aviation by having officers develop skills in two specialties.

--- Recognizes that aviation positions are found in a variety of specialties or specialty-related units.

--- Encourages assignment officers and commanders to place the aviator in a unit related closely to his entry specialty.

--- Allows development of entry specialty skills while assigned to aviation unit.

Disadvantages:

--- Would require another massive recoding of positions.

--- Would cause extensive turbulence for the commissioned officer aviators.

--- The officer would still be required to serve in the appropriate "ground" SSI within his specialty to achieve qualification as well as develop a third skill.

--- When previously designated as a skill, it was perceived as inequitable and would probably be so viewed again.

--- Treating aviation as a skill may not fully comply with the intent of the ACIA which states that "Aviation career incentive pay shall be restricted to ...officers who hold...an aeronautical rating or designation and who engage and remain in aviation service on a career basis." (Underlining added for emphasis.)

SPECIALTY ALTERNATIVE (15B11, 15C35, etc.)

Advantages:

--- Aviation officers appear to be satisfied with aviation specialty designations.

--- Would require little disruption of present system.

--- SC 15 meets the definition of a specialty in the sense that the specialty structure supports the development of qualified senior field grade aviation officers.

--- Provides a better structure for centralized management. Intensive centralized management is required to insure the proper qualifying assignments and career development needed to insure an integrated aviation force.

--- Assignments can still be tracked to fill entry specialty related aviation positions. Example: MI officers should routinely be assigned to MI aviation units requiring 15C35 or 15C37 skills. This makes the optimum use of the officers skills and further develops both in the process.

-- The Strategic Studies Institute points out that the Army of the 1990's is going to become an even more capital intensive force. Rather than equipping the man, the Army, like the Air Force and Navy, will more and more man the equipment. This can better be facilitated in aviation through a specialty to keep the officers fully qualified to operate and manage the ever more complex aircraft systems being introduced into the inventory in the 1980's.

-- Provides an aviation management system comparable to that for other specialties.

-- Recognizes the reality that in the near future aviators (especially company grade) will be required to spend a larger percentage of their time performing aviation duties.

Disadvantages:

-- Will not permit all company grade aviators in over strength year-groups to be designated aviation for the field grade years, thus requiring these officers to develop skills in a third area.

-- Those combat arms aviators not able to complete a full tour of ground duty at the captain level in their entry specialty will be required to develop a third specialty.

-- The perception may still persist that an aviation specialty is tantamount to the creation of an Army Air Corps.

--- Extended aviation duty may cause some officers to lose "branch" orientation.

These last two disadvantages can at least be partially overcome by the use of the TDY schooling and MQS validation periods in their entry specialty for those not returning for full specialty qualification.

On the whole, the above supports the continuation of aviation as a specialty. However, the aviator must be managed to track him into aviation assignments calling for his entry specialty or at least branch material positions whenever possible. This is not to say that an Infantry officer cannot serve in an attack company position or that an Armor officer cannot serve in a combat support aviation company position if required. As pointed out above, the RETO duty module analysis of the aviation positions shows that many of the same skills are required just as the Armor and Infantry platoon leader require many of the same skills. However, officers should routinely be trained in aircraft closely related to their entry specialty and

tracked into these units on a career basis in accordance with the needs of the Army.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: The recommendations made throughout the paper are summarized below:

a. Routinely assign officers to initial flight training after a minimum of 1 year in qualifying assignments in accession specialty aligned with Armor, Infantry, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Signal, Transportation and Military Intelligence branches. AMEDD and Aviation Materiel Management officers would continue to attend initial flight training after completion of their basic course.

b. Retain aviation as a specialty, but routinely place officers into the initial flight training mission track and hence, aviation units closely related to their entry specialty.

c. Establish a clear pattern of ground duty requirements for aviators. This would include 100 percent of the combat support and combat service support officers returning to one assignment in their specialty as a captain. For combat arms aviators, depending on the needs of the Army and the individual's desires, as many as possible must be returned to ground duty in their entry specialty for full specialty qualification. Those who don't receive a qualifying assignment would be kept closely associated with their entry specialty through attendance at the RETO proposed specialty company commander's course and one or two less-than-90-day SD/TDY specialty qualification/validation assignments with their entry specialty units.

d. Establish a plan to preclude the projected field grade over-ages in the 1980's due to the overstrength 1966-70 year-groups.

e. Scrub the TAAD's documents to determine the positions that require only flying skills with no officer managerial or leadership skills and convert these to aviation warrant officer positions. (Approximately 80-100).

f. Because of the difficulty in managing the aviator's career, the pressure for increasing utilization in aviation, and the very limited time available for qualifying assignments in entry specialties, as a matter of normal policy, company grade aviators should be excluded from Army-wide support assignments to the maximum extent possible. The aviator must pull his "fair share" of these assignments within aviation such as the branch immaterial positions which comprise about 10 percent of the SC 15 company grade structure.

g. Increase training rates starting in FY 80 to allow enough SC 15 captains and majors to insure entry specialty qualifying assign-

ments for full aviation qualification. It appears that the training rate for SC 15 will have to be increased by about 169 officers per year. This would require the total aviation officer initial entry training output to be raised from 465 (FY 80) to about 654 annually. (This includes approximately 84 students as presently programmed and a projected increase of 20 to support SC's 67J and 71.)

3 Inclosures

1. Continuation Rates -- Aviation (Commissioned Officers)
2. Definitions
3. Company and Field Grade 1985, Professional Development Guide

CONTINUATION RATES -- AVIATION (COMMISSIONED OFFICERS)

1. RATIONAL. The continuation rates scale below constitutes the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), Aviation Specialty 15 Special Task Force, and RETO Study Group agreed upon continuation rates for aviation commissioned officers. OPMD is continuing to collect attrition data on all specialties; however, this collection process has been in being for only a little over a year under the specialty system. Therefore, as additional historical data is compiled, it is anticipated that continuation rate changes will occur.

COMMISSIONED OFFICER AVIATOR CONTINUATION RATES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>FACTOR</u>
00-01	.998	15-16	.971
01-02	.987	16-17	.942
02-03	.929	17-18	.950
03-04	.902	18-19	.933
04-05	.866	19-20	.694
05-06	.919	20-21	.826
06-07	.949	21-22	.844
07-08	.959	22-23	.882
08-09	.968	23-24	.872
09-10	.953	24-25	.870
10-11	.920	25-26	.828
11-12	.953	26-27	.755
12-13	.961	27-28	.777
13-14	.958	28-29	.740
14-15	.891		

2. SOURCE. The first 5 years reflects the continuation rates for Regular Army officers. These rates are used to cover the aviation obligated service and provide for sufficient attrition upon termination of the initial service obligation. The 6th through the 29th year rates (factors) reflect the composite average continuation rates for the Army officer corps.

3. METHODOLOGY. The current assets (December 1977) were aged by year-group entering the chart at the appropriate years of service. The newly trained assets were aged by applying the first 5 years of the chart to the first 5 years of aviation service following flight school. After the completion of the initial obligation and the first year thereafter, the assumption was made that aviation officers continue at the same rate as the Army at large. Therefore, after the first 5

factors were applied the scale was entered at the point of projected officer service for the remainder of the years of service, i.e., if the officer had 2 years of ground duty prior to entering flight school, the proper entry point would be 08-09/.968 or if the officer had 1 year of ground duty the entry point would be 07-08/.959.

Inclosure 1

S-1-I-2

DEFINITIONS.

1. In the course of its analysis, RETO developed the following job (duty position) category definitions.

a. Core Jobs. Core jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that are at the heart or "guts" of a specialty and require the officer to perform tasks, on a day-to-day basis, that make use of this knowledge and expertise in the specialty. Therefore, core jobs are central to professional development in the specialty, i.e., they provide the skills and knowledge, through on-the-job training and experience on a daily basis, that are needed to build the officer's technical competence in the specialty at each grade level. As an example, for the Armor captain these jobs might be company command, bn staff, asst bde S3, service school instructor, combat/training developer, etc.

b. Related Jobs. Related jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that require the performance of tasks that draw on the knowledge, skills and experience from the specialty at that grade, but they do not normally require the officer to exercise these skills on a day-to-day basis. Related jobs do, however, serve to increase the officer's technical competence in the specialty while contributing to his professional growth. Examples might be reserve components advisor, specialty related training center positions, some DA/MACOM staff officers, readiness region positions, some installation staff positions, etc.

c. Special Staff Jobs. Special staff jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that generally do not relate directly to the specialty and may be somewhat out of the organizational mainstream but provide an opportunity to expose the officer at that grade to a perspective that he would not otherwise receive. The importance of these positions is that the officer gain a set of experiences that are beneficial to broadening his capabilities as an officer and hence, enhancing his usefulness to the Army. Examples of these jobs might be aide-de-camp, protocol officer, race relations officer, special study groups and projects, etc.

d. Army-wide Support Jobs. Army-wide support jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that are not related at all or only remotely related to the specialty. These are the jobs at each grade that enable the specialty to provide its fair share of officers for the overall operation of the Army. These positions are extremely important to the day-to-day performance of the Army's mission and to the officer's professional growth but do not contribute to building the officer's technical competence in the specialty. Examples of these positions might be ROTC PMS, some training center jobs, some installation staff jobs, recruiting duty, etc.


2. When looking at specialty pairs and comparing specialties RETO used the following definitions in the analysis.

a. Complementary specialties. Specialties that, when paired, function well together to derive the maximum benefit from an officer's skills and experience. Specialties may complement each other because of similar skills requirements. Two specialties may be complementary because the utilization rates or position requirements of one are the inverse of the utilization rates or position requirements of the other at the various grades. Certain accession specialties may pair well with an advanced entry specialty because it is a natural progression in that particular field. All of the above or combinations of the above should be considered when determining those specialties that complement a particular specialty.

b. Related Specialties. Specialties that require many of the same skills and knowledge. Complementary specialties are generally also related specialties, but the reverse statement is not necessarily true. For instance, if two closely related specialties both have few field grade position requirements then they probably would not be a compatible pairing and hence, not complementary.

Inclosure 2

S-1-III-1



FIELD GRADE 1985

[illegible]

- **FURTHER SPECIALTY DEVELOPMENT AS REQUIRED**
- **AVIATION CONTINUES TO BE AN ALTERNATE SPECIALTY**
- **LOSS OF AVIATION SPECIALTY QUALIFICATION WILL CAUSE**

REVIEW OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR OFFICERS

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Academic Year (AY) - A period normally encompassing two semesters or the equivalent. Ensuing vacation period or summer session is not normally included.

Active Components (AC) - Identifies that portion of the Army serving full-time duty in the Active military service of the United States.

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) - An identification of specific skills which are required to perform the duties of a position, but are not related to any one particular specialty. Also, an identification of the additional skills possessed by an officer.

Advanced Professional Development Course (APDC) - The electives program for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Air Force Institute of Technology/Logistics Support (AFIT/LS) - An advanced level school system maintained by the Air Force to meet service-related educational requirements. Logistical Support refers to the School of Systems and Logistics.

Alternate Specialty - A second specialty, in addition to an officer's primary specialty, which is designated at the completion of the officer's 8th year of Active Federal Commissioned Service for professional development and utilization.

Army Linguist Personnel Study (ALPS) - A study of the Army's language needs (both officer and enlisted) published in January 1976.

Army Medical Department Personnel Support Agency (AMEDDPERSA) - A field operating activity of the Office of The Surgeon General. PERSA executes the responsibility of The Surgeon General for AMEDD officer career management.

Army National Guard Officer Candidate School (ARNG-OCS) - Schools conducted by most states to produce commissioned officers for the Army National Guard.

Army-wide Support Jobs - Army-wide support jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that are not related at all, or only remotely related, to the specialty to provide its fair share of officers for the overall operation of the Army. These positions are extremely important to the day-to-day performance of the Army's mission and to the officer's professional growth but do not contribute to building the officer's

technical competence in the specialty. Examples of these positions might be ROTC PMS, some training center jobs, some installation staff jobs, or recruiting duty.

Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course (BIOCC) - One of the major sources of line officer accessions into the Army. Precommissioning training is provided without regard for branch or specialty.

Branch Related Specialty - A specialty whose principal functions are the responsibility of a particular branch established under AR 10-6.

Career Officer - An officer appointed in the Regular Army or a U.S. Army Reserve officer in voluntary indefinite status.

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) - A school to train all majors of the Active and Reserve Components for service as field grade staff officers with the Army in the field, in peace or war. Establishment of the school was recommended by the Review of Education and Training (RETO) Study Group.

Combined Arms Tactical Training System (CATTS) - A wargaming simulation used in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Committee on Excellence in Education (COE also COEE) - A blue ribbon ad hoc group convened to oversee education in DOD.

Complementary Specialties - Specialties that, when paired, function well together to derive the maximum benefit from an officer's skills and experience. Specialties may complement each other because of similar skills requirements. Two specialties may be complementary because the utilization rates or position requirements of one are the inverse of the utilization rates or position requirements of the other at the various grades. Certain accession specialties may pair well with an advanced entry specialty because it is a natural progression in that particular field. All of the above or combinations of the above, should be considered when determining those specialties that complement a particular specialty.

Computer Assisted Map Maneuver System (CAMMS) - A wargame simulation aided by automation is used for instruction and contingency planning.

Continuing Health Education (CHE) - Education designed to sustain the knowledge and skills of health care professionals. Usually short courses or job experiences required on an annual basis.

Control Specialty - A means to account and validate for officers by specialty. It is the specialty in which officers are requisitioned and assigned, against which they are accounted, and in which they join the organization which initiated the requisition.

Core Jobs - Core jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that are at the heart or "guts" of a specialty and require the officer to perform tasks, on a day-to-day basis, that make use of this knowledge and expertise in the specialty. Therefore, core jobs are central to professional development in the specialty, i.e., they provide the skills and knowledge, through on-the-job training and experience on a daily basis, that are needed to build the officer's technical competence in the specialty at each grade level. As an example, for the Armor captain these jobs might be company command, bn staff, asst bde S3, service school instructor, combat/training developer, etc.

Corresponding Studies Program (CSP) - The nonresident instruction provided by the U.S. Army War College.

Course of Instruction (COI) - A training management document which specifies the purpose, prerequisites, content, duration and sequence of instruction for formal resident and nonresident courses.

Decision Package Set (DPS) - A group of documents used to describe policy matters under consideration, provide an evaluation with alternatives and insure that various staff act in harmony or agreement in carrying out decision.

Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC) - Located at Monterey California, it provides language skills training for DoD personnel.

Dual Specialty Development - The concept of officer professional development and utilization in which the objective is for each officer to gain and maintain proficiency in a primary and an alternate specialty.

Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD also EPD) - An element of U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. EPMD executes DA responsibility for enlisted personnel management.

First Year Graduate Medical Education (FYGME) - All graduates of schools of medicine must spend their first year after graduation in an internship or its equivalent.

General Officer Management Office (GOMO) - An element of the Office, Chief of Staff, Army which provides management for O-6(P) and higher grade officers.

General Officer Orientation Conference (GOOC) - A course provided to officers selected for or recently promoted to general officer.

Graduate Medical Education (GME) - Post medical profession degree education provided in specialty (residency) or subspecialty. All medical school graduates spend their first year after graduation on Graduate Medical Education Year 1 (GME-1) previously known as internship.

Health Professions Scholarships Program (HPSP) - Program provides assistance to students enrolled in an approved school of medicine, osteopathy, veterinary medicine or optometry. Service obligation is incurred.

Independent Student Research (ISR) - A grouping of hours in the curriculum of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for individual study and contingency participation in study projects.

Instructional Television (ITV) - a means for presenting instruction to learners.

Master of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) - U.S. students of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course, upon application and acceptance participate in a degree granting program.

Method of Instruction (MOI) - The means for presenting instructional material to learners.

Military Education (ME) - The systematic instruction of individuals in subjects which enhance their knowledge of the science and the art of war.

Military Personnel, Army (MPA) - A category of funds consisting generally of individual pay and allowances.

Military Qualification Standard (MQS) - A systematic officer education and training program recommended by Review of Education and Training for Officers Study Group. MQS provides a framework for officer education and training that links resident schooling, self-study and on the job experience. MQS provides for orderly and progressive training and qualification for each officer.

National Defense University (NDU) - The National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces comprise NDU. Located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Naval Post Graduate School (NPCS also NPS) - An advanced level school providing graduate and baccalaureate degrees in various disciplines required by the U.S. Navy.

Nonresident Instruction (NRI) - Any training not conducted in residence including that provided through correspondence/extension courses developed and approved by a military service to meet a specific training requirement of that service for career development or skill acquisition/progression.

Officer Advanced Course-Reserve Components (OAC-RC) - An advanced course designed for presentation to Reserve Components officers.

Officer Basic Course-Reserve Components (OBC-RC) - A basic course designed for presentation to newly commissioned Reserve Component officers.

Officer Candidate School-Reserve Components (OCS-RC) - A precommissioning training program designed for Reserve Components.

Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD also OPD) - An element of U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. Specialty managers (assignment officers) and professional development officers execute the DA responsibility for OPMS managed officers.

Officer Professional Development - The development of the professional attributes and capabilities of the Army officer to meet the needs of the Army through planned assignments and schooling.

On-the-job-experience (OJE) - A training process whereby knowledge and skills are acquired through performance of duties.

Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) - A training facility located at Fort Ord, CA, part of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, which provides instruction in organizational effectiveness.

Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) - An automated program based on force structure and composition used for personnel requirements and estimates.

Primary Specialty - One of two designated specialties in which an officer will receive professional development and utilization.

Professional Development Courses (PDC) - The core of the curriculum for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is referred to as PDC.

Professional Development System (PDS) - A system for the development of professional attributes and capabilities of Army officers to meet the needs of the Army through planned assignments and schooling.

Professional Military Education - Education pertaining to the body of professional knowledge common to all Army officers, such as leadership, military history, management, etc.

Projected Specialty - The personnel manager's recommendation of the most appropriate specialty for an officer's next assignment which will be consistent with Army requirements and further the officer's professional development.

Related Jobs - Related jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that require the performance of tasks that draw on the knowledge, skills and experience from the specialty at that grade, but they do not normally require the officer to exercise these skills on a day-to-day basis. Related jobs do, however, serve to increase the officer's technical

competence in the specialty while contributing to his professional growth. Examples might be reserve components advisor, specialty related training center positions, some DA/MACOM staff officers, readiness region positions, some installation staff positions, etc.

Related Specialties - Specialties that require many of the same skills and knowledge. Complementary specialties are generally also related specialties, but the reverse statement is not necessarily true. For instance, if two closely related specialties both have few field grade position requirements then they probably would not be a compatible pairing and hence, not complementary.

Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) - The study group which conducted this study and prepared this report. The group was established in August 1977 within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army to develop policies and programs for professional education and training of officers which meet Army requirements and individual career development needs. The study was completed on 30 June 1978.

School Year (SY) - A period normally encompassing approximately nine months associated with longer permanent change of station courses. The year in which training is begun.

Senior Officer Preventive Logistics Course (SOPLL) - A course designed to provide senior officers refresher training in command management of logistics program.

Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance Course (SOPM) - A course designed to provide senior officers refresher training in command management of preventive maintenance program.

Specialty - A grouping of duty positions whose skill and job requirements are mutually supporting in the development of officer competence to perform at the grade of colonel in the specialty.

Specialty Education - Education pertaining to the knowledge and skills associated with an officer's primary or alternate specialty.

Specialty Skill Identifier (SSI) - An identification of specific position skill requirements within a specialty and the corresponding qualifications possessed by commissioned officers.

Special Staff Jobs - Special staff jobs are those jobs (duty positions) that generally do not relate directly to the specialty and may be somewhat out of the organizational mainstream but provide an opportunity to expose the officer at that grade to a perspective that he would not otherwise receive. The importance of these positions is that the officer gains a set of experiences that are beneficial to broadening his capabilities as an officer and hence, enhancing his usefulness to the Army. Examples of these jobs might be aide-de-camp, protocol officer, race relations officer, special study groups and projects, etc.

Special Study Projects (SSP) - A grouping of hours in the curriculum of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for individual and group projects.

Tactical Command Readiness Program (TCRP) - A program designed to insure that tactical commanders, O6 and above, are both current and competent in the application of doctrine and procedures governing the strategic deployment, tactical employment and sustainment of Army and supporting forces under combat conditions.

Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) - War games and simulations often assisted by automation are conducted without troops.

U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) - A major command of the Army providing research development, acquisition of material.

Uniform Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS) - A university organized under Department of Defense to provide a comprehensive education in medicine to select young men and women who demonstrate potential for, and commitment to, careers as medical corps officers in the Uniformed Services, Located in Bethesda, MD.