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
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Research Memorandum 75-9

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**CRITERION PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF
LEADERSHIP AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS
IN SMALL COMBAT UNITS**

Ronald G. Downey, Paul J. Duffy, and Samuel Shiflett



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LEADERSHIP AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS
IN SMALL COMBAT UNITS.

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CRITERION PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF LEADERSHIP AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS IN SMALL COMBAT UNITS

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CRITERION PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF LEADERSHIP AND UNIT EFFECTIVENESS IN SMALL COMBAT UNITS

→ The investigation of leadership processes normally requires the identification of various system outcomes which are potentially related, either directly or indirectly, to the exercise of leadership. Indeed, without such a specification of system outcomes, it is impossible to speak about leadership effectiveness.¹ In previous research, leadership measures have often focused solely on the personal traits, attitude structure, or the behavioral repertoire of the formal leader. These measures have not always been related, either concurrently or predictively, to other important concepts such as individual and unit performance, subordinate job satisfaction, and work group morale. The present paper presents the development of several measures of these concepts which may be useful in the investigation of leadership effectiveness. ←

OBJECTIVES

As a preliminary procedure in a larger research program concerning leadership effectiveness in small military units, a pool of evaluative items was assembled that was applicable in the situation under investigation. The only guideline used in the generation of these items was that there be a representative sampling of items for the domains of performance, job satisfaction, and morale. There was no limit on the number of items for each concept, nor were there restrictions on items tapping other system outcomes. The research staff refined, restructured and culled the items until the somewhat reduced pool of suitable items was selected for the study.

After the data were gathered, it was necessary to reduce the various criterion items to the smallest, most cohesive set of scores reflecting the underlying dimensions evaluated by the items. The summary scores from the data reduction analyses would then be used as the final criterion measures for the larger leadership study.

METHOD

The larger research project was conducted in conjunction with a two week field training exercise of the 12th Special Forces Reserve Group (Airborne).² The scenario of the exercise called for individual Special

¹ Stogdill, R. M. Handbook of leadership. New York: Free Press, 1974.

² The authors wish to express their gratitude to Robert H. Sulzen for his aid in initial planning and coordination of the data collection, and for his insightful comments based upon field observation of the training exercise. The cooperation of the 12th Special Forces Reserves command and personnel is gratefully acknowledged. Also, special thanks are due Robert E. Ingraham for his professional services in the development of the research instruments.

Forces detachments to infiltrate an area, link up with the guerrilla group in the area, train the guerrillas, and conduct several combatlike operations in concert with the guerrillas. Data were gathered both prior to and on completion of the exercise; only a part of the post-exercise data is relevant to the purpose of this paper. The data reported here were gathered from four independent sources: detachment members, guerrillas, evaluators, and controllers. These sources are described below.

Detachment members: Usable data were collected from 275 men, a return rate of approximately 95%. The 275 men were assigned to one of 23 detachments;³ each detachment was composed of a commanding officer, an executive officer, and various enlisted military specialists.

Guerrillas: The guerrilla roles were filled by other military reservists also fulfilling their annual requirement of two weeks of training. Guerrilla groups were typically composed of 10-30 members with an officer as their chief or leader. Data were gathered from 346 guerrillas.

Evaluators: As part of the procedure of the exercise, an officer was assigned to each detachment with the job of evaluating the performance of that detachment. Such evaluations were made for the purpose of headquarters review and are not included in the present report. Evaluators were also requested to respond to the research instrument, and 20 evaluators completed the questionnaire.

Controllers: Each detachment was also assigned another officer whose function was control of the training in the field. Nineteen controllers completed the research instrument. Neither the evaluators nor the controllers participated directly in the activities of the exercise.

The research instrument to which all four sources responded was virtually identical for each, except that the instrument administered to the external sources (guerrillas, evaluators, and controllers) contained fewer items (38) than the one administered to the detachment members (50). Specifically, those items dealing with individual job satisfaction and with self-evaluated performance were administered only to the detachment members. The detachment member instrument is referred to as the Post-FTX Questionnaire (PFQ) and is included as Appendix A; the external source instrument is referred to as the Special Evaluators Questionnaire (SEQ) and is Appendix B.

The response formats of the items were of two major types. One type was the 5-point Likert scale of agreement, extent, or amount. These items were generally of an individual job satisfaction or individual performance nature. The other type of response format was 3-5 point specifications

³ Note: 24 detachments were involved in this project; data from one of these detachments were not used in this report.

of varying levels of the aspect identified by the item. An example of this type of item is:

Following airborne infiltration the detachment assembled:

- (1) rapidly and effectively
- (2) with reasonable speed and accuracy
- (3) after a short period of confusion
- (4) after a period of gross disorganization and a serious loss of time.

All items were completed in the field at the conclusion of the exercise.

ANALYSIS

Items from the PFQ and the SEQ (data were combined from the external sources) were each subjected to a principal axes factor analysis using the Jacobi method with unities entered as the communality estimates.⁴ Resulting factor structures were then rotated by the varimax method.

The selection of the final factor solution in each analysis was based upon a combination of three criteria: (1) the point at which eigenvalues showed little further decrement; (2) the point at which loss of items due to small or cross-factor loading was minimized; and (3) the clearest interpretability of the solution.

Scale scores were computed for each individual from both sources (internal and external) by summing the items defining the factors in each analysis. Mean scale scores were then computed within each detachment for the detachment member source and the guerrilla source.

RESULTS

The rotated factor loadings for the PFQ items are presented in Table 1. Loadings greater than .40 were used to define which items to include in a scale score and, using this selection criterion, four scales were identified as Unit Performance, Job Satisfaction, Leader Effectiveness, and Group Cohesion. More complete descriptions of these scales are given in Figure 1. Two additional scales containing one item each, labeled Individual Performance and Individual Effort, were defined on an a priori basis as evaluative aspects worthy of separate research interest. These scales are also defined in Figure 1.

⁴ Cooley, W. W., and Lohnes, P. R. Multivariate procedures for the behavioral sciences. New York: Wiley, 1962.

Table 1

FOUR FACTOR SOLUTION FROM THE PFO ITEMS

Scale Items Content ^a	I	II	III	IV
1. ^b Explanation of the mission and its purpose	.38	.17	.01	.03
2. ^b Briefbacks of mission	.23	.02	.05	.09
3. ^b Evasion and escape plan	.13	.02	.07	.03
4. Detachment assembly after infiltration	.60	.07	.05	.01
5. Accounting of personnel and equipment	.50	.13	.04	.08
6. Security measures - drop zone	.52	.07	.08	.00
7. ^b Escape routes and rallying points	.22	.14	.28	.24
8. Guerrilla and detachment linkup	.55	.16	.12	.04
9. Guerrilla and detachment Relationship	.57	.04	.10	.06
10. Guerrilla Chief and detachment Commander linkup	.60	.07	.11	.01
11. ^b Installation and usage of radio	.36	.11	.02	.05
12. Guerrilla training program	.56	.14	.20	.24
13. Resupply plans	.47	.19	.32	.17
14. Security - other phases	.57	.03	.17	.15
15. Performance up to and including resupply	.50	.17	.23	.19
16. ^b Raid plans	.32	.13	.28	.18
17. Raid effectiveness	.41	.10	.33	.10
18. Ambush plans	.35	.04	.43	.11
19. Ambush effectiveness	.31	.05	.56	.01
20. Overall effectiveness - preparation	.47	.24	.19	.03
21. Overall effectiveness - infiltration	.57	.01	.07	.12
22. Overall effectiveness - linkup	.61	.02	.04	.07
23. Overall effectiveness - security	.57	.11	.26	.21
24. Overall effectiveness - Guerrilla training	.65	.09	.24	.20
25. Overall effectiveness - raid	.35	.29	.25	.24
26. Overall effectiveness - ambush	.45	.05	.43	.08
27. Overall performance Commander	.09	.09	.84	.10
28. Commander's effort	.07	.12	.79	.09
29. Commander's skill with people	.03	.07	.82	.02
30. Appropriateness of jobs assigned by CO to me	.04	.13	.48	.22
31. Superior performance recognized by commander	.19	.07	.67	.20
32. Enjoyment of FTX	.04	.60	.03	.09
33. Conditions/encourage hard work	.08	.69	.04	.04
34. Sense of accomplishment from FTX	.14	.83	.11	.02
35. Degree of improvement from training (FTX)	.23	.66	.19	.10
36. ^c Individual's job performance	.13	.18	.18	.26
37. ^c Individual's job effort	.37	.28	.18	.20
38. Job satisfaction	.27	.43	.32	.19
39. Challenging job	.07	.65	.17	.15
40. Staying in Special Forces Reserves	.06	.65	.08	.15
41. Sharing of common goal	.11	.28	.08	.72
42. Detachment members friendly	.07	.08	.12	.81
43. Detachment members trust each other	.16	.02	.14	.78
44. Detachment members help each other	.02	.04	.15	.82
45. ^b Detachment welfare above individual	.13	.06	.03	.30
46. Work harder to make up for slack	.21	.12	.01	.41
47. Proud of own detachment	.01	.52	.12	.32
48. ^b Detachment was a team	.06	.29	.30	.36
49. Detachment never lost sight of goal	.24	.28	.20	.66
50. Detachment excel. sit. for leader influence	.11	.29	.09	.23

^aComplete items are presented in Appendix A.^bItems not used due to low factor loadings.^cEach of these items were defined as a scale. They are the only individual item criterion scores.

- I. Unit Performance - This scale contained seventeen items on the detachment's performance during the FTX with the exception of the planning and preparation and the ambush and raid.
- II. Job Satisfaction - This scale contained eight items dealing with detachment-member perceptions and feelings about the work, a sense of accomplishment, a challenge, pride in the group, enjoyment, and staying in the Special Forces.
- III. Leader Effectiveness - This scale contained six items, four of which deal with the commander performance and the remaining two with performance during the raid and ambush.
- IV. Group Cohesion - This scale contained six items dealing with common goals, friendly and trusting situation, and helpful people.
- V. Individual Performance - This was a one-item scale of the individual's estimate of his own performance.
- VI. Individual Effort - This was a one-item scale of the individual's estimate of the effort he expended on his job.

Figure 1. PFQ scale names and definitions.

Table 2 contains the rotated factor loadings for the SEQ items. Loadings greater than .45 were selected for inclusion in a scale, and the resultant seven factors were identified as Morale, Early Mission Effectiveness, Mission Effectiveness, Esprit, Mission Support Effectiveness, Leader Effectiveness, and Effectiveness of Plans and Preparation. Complete definitions for each of these factors are presented in Figure 2.

Table 1

SEVEN-FACTOR SOLUTION FROM THE SEQ ITEMS

Scale Item Content ^a	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
1. Explanation of the mission and its purpose	.19	.03	.01	.10	-.06	.5	<u>.25</u>
2. Briefbacks of mission	.34	.09	.35	.04	.15	.15	<u>.22</u>
3. Evasion and escape plan	.10	.51	.04	-.16	.10	-.12	<u>.71</u>
4. Detachment assembly after infiltration	.10	<u>.67</u>	.10	.11	.15	.20	.15
5. Accounting of personnel and equipment	.13	<u>.76</u>	.07	.01	.36	-.01	.17
6. Security measures - drop zone	.09	<u>.48</u>	.05	.15	.31	.34	.20
7. Escape routes and rallying points	.00	.44	.18	-.04	.18	.10	<u>.60</u>
8. Guerrilla and detachment linkup	.02	<u>.58</u>	.20	-.01	.21	.19	.25
9. Guerrilla and detachment Relationship	.50	.25	.08	-.09	<u>.50</u>	.11	.15
10. Guerrilla Chief & detachment Commander linkup	.15	.22	.14	-.10	<u>.51</u>	.15	.00
11. Installation and usage of radio	.05	.41	-.00	.05	<u>.58</u>	.09	-.02
12. Guerrilla training program	.18	.03	.19	-.04	<u>.55</u>	.45	.34
13. Resupply plans	.15	.21	.17	-.12	<u>.61</u>	-.02	.19
14. Security - other phases	.05	.55	.50	.02	<u>.51</u>	.26	-.01
15. Performance up to and including resupply	.21	.00	.21	-.01	<u>.70</u>	.21	.10
16. Raid plans	.11	.11	<u>.54</u>	.01	.29	.34	.42
17. Raid effectiveness	.10	.07	<u>.52</u>	-.15	.15	.02	.25
18. Ambush plans	.01	.12	<u>.55</u>	-.11	.51	.24	.33
19. Ambush effectiveness	.14	.18	<u>.74</u>	-.11	.05	.10	.04
20. Overall effectiveness - preparation	.44	.50	<u>.67</u>	-.04	.27	.20	.00
21. ^b Overall effectiveness - infiltration	.27	.47	.55	.05	.51	.19	-.02
22. Overall effectiveness - linkup	.29	<u>.64</u>	.53	.05	.15	.14	.03
23. Overall effectiveness - security	.17	.35	.17	.00	<u>.46</u>	.51	.05
24. Overall effectiveness - Guerrilla training	.59	.15	.20	.00	.53	<u>.47</u>	.14
25. Overall effectiveness - raid	.30	.09	<u>.71</u>	.05	.10	.22	.03
26. Overall effectiveness - ambush	.23	.11	<u>.75</u>	.04	.15	.20	.05
27. Overall performance Commander	.26	.19	.23	-.07	.25	<u>.72</u>	.00
28. Commander's effort	.21	.21	.20	-.05	.18	<u>.74</u>	.11
29. Commander's skill with people	.51	.22	.25	-.10	.25	<u>.67</u>	.11
30. Common goal	<u>.57</u>	.59	.15	-.18	.09	.25	.00
31. Detachment members friendly	<u>.69</u>	.25	.20	-.10	.04	.18	.20
32. Detachment members trust each other	<u>.77</u>	.10	.15	-.09	.08	.18	.14
33. Detachment members help each other	<u>.66</u>	.18	.25	-.10	.05	.25	.11
34. ^b Detachment welfare above individual	.40	-.11	.21	.55	.20	-.10	.04
35. Work harder to make up for slack	<u>.63</u>	-.07	.15	-.02	.27	.05	.02
36. Proud of own detachment	.18	.01	.04	<u>.50</u>	.02	.15	-.04
37. Detachment was a team	.17	-.21	.11	<u>.50</u>	.12	-.05	.15
38. Detachment never lost sight of goal	<u>.50</u>	.19	.15	-.11	.55	.25	.00

^a Complete items are presented in Appendix B.^b Items not used due to low factor loading or high cross factor loadings.

- I. Morale - This scale contained six items which dealt with attitudes toward the group, feelings of friendliness, trust, mutual help, and common goals.
- II. Early Mission Effectiveness - This scale contained five items on the detachment's effectiveness during the parachute drop, infiltration, and linkup phases of the operation.
- III. Mission Effectiveness - This scale contained seven items about the detachment's effectiveness during the raid and ambush operations.
- IV. Esprit - This scale involved two items dealing with the individual's feelings on being a member of the group and perceptions about the detachment working as a team.
- V. Mission Support Effectiveness - This scale contained eight items which dealt with the effectiveness of a variety of operations including guerrilla and detachment relationships, supply, security, and pre-raid/ambush effectiveness.
- VI. Leader Effectiveness - This scale contained four items, three of which were related to the commander performance and the fourth to guerrilla training.
- VII. Effectiveness of Plans and Preparation - This scale contained four items dealing with the effectiveness of the planning and preparation phases.

Figure 2. SEQ scale names and definitions.

Conceptual comparison between the factor structures in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrates that the pattern of unit outcomes perceived by both the internal and external sources were very similar, with the exception that the external sources perceived more facets of overall unit performance than did the detachment members themselves.

The individual scale scores for the detachment members were inter-correlated; the results are given in Table 3. Correlations ranged from a moderate (.47) to low (.13) degree indicating that the scales were, for the most part, measuring different detachment outcome domains. There was a tendency for the performance-related scales to be more highly intercorrelated with each other (.34 to .47) than with Job Satisfaction or Group Cohesion (.13 to .37).

Table 4

INDIVIDUAL PFQ SCALE SCORE INTERCORRELATIONS
(N = 115)

Scales	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Unit Performance	-					
2. Job Satisfaction	.31	-				
3. Leader Effectiveness	.42	.26	-			
4. Group Cohesion	.57	.55	.52	-		
5. Individual Performance	.40	.31	.34	.63	-	
6. Individual Effort	.47	.18	.45	.21	.45	-

For the purpose of correlating scale scores from different sources, the three external sources (evaluators, controllers, guerrillas) were treated separately, and the detachments were used as the unit of analysis. Results are presented in Table 4 which is arranged in a multimethod-multimode matrix format,⁵ where the associated n's range from 17-24 detachments due to missing data. Intercorrelations between scales within a source are given in the small triangles along the diagonal. Correlations between sources are given in the squares off the diagonal. Relationships between corresponding scales from different sources are inclosed in parentheses.

The intercorrelations among SEQ scales present no discernable pattern either within a source or when compared across external sources. Furthermore, like-scale correlations (in parentheses) across external sources were in general low, not statistically significant, and lower than between-scale correlations within an external source. For the detachment members (internal source), there was a tendency for the Unit Performance to be associated with Group Cohesion and Individual Effort. There was also some tendency for self-reported Individual Performance to be associated with Job Satisfaction, Group Cohesion, and Leader Effectiveness. Self-reported Individual Performance and Individual Effort were moderately associated with each other.

⁵ Campbell, D. T., and Fiske, D. W. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multimethod-multitrait matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 1959, 66, 81-105.

Table 4

CRITERION SCALE SCORE INTERCORRELATIONS

EVALUATORS							CONTROLLERS							GUERRILLAS							DET. MEMBERS					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	
2	26																									
3	40	64																								
4	52	52	71																							
5	55	53	55	75																						
6	37	72	82	85	75																					
7	85	39	19	34	28	27																				
1	(18)	29	45	36	25	52	20																			
2	08	(45)	27	47	30	45	13	67																		
3	00	04	(40)	41	30	55	01	85	53																	
4	-11	45	62	(37)	29	64	-22	76	37	77																
5	08	15	15	22	(33)	20	-37	-13	-15	00	23															
6	01	07	17	43	09	(32)	10	75	78	74	50	-16														
7	07	43	28	56	41	55	(04)	26	66	10	21	28	25													
1	(20)	39	28	32	50	45	18	(71)	44	65	64	-13	34	13												
2	-13	(41)	20	51	47	43	-02	45	(49)	39	36	14	19	67	44											
3	07	24	(38)	60	52	62	-02	77	38	(81)	66	16	54	25	66	76										
4	10	22	22	(35)	52	48	14	29	19	34	(26)	09	11	40	50	75	70									
5	-07	33	-03	31	(36)	26	21	06	05	-05	01	(-01)	-00	46	20	59	21	62								
6	09	45	46	67	69	(69)	03	52	30	52	57	25	(30)	35	61	81	88	82	42							
7	-19	52	33	41	35	49	(-24)	58	66	51	46	04	45	(55)	44	43	60	49	10	57						
1	(10)	(24)	(36)	42	44	56	03	(64)	(46)	(59)	60	06	44	20	(67)	(54)	(74)	45	09	69	34					
2	-14	77	40	(35)	33	56	06	-01	43	06	(47)	08	17	19	31	23	11	(08)	16	32	46	27				
3	10	59	30	32	(37)	47	35	-18	04	-09	21	(06)	-27	22	13	49	15	33	(36)	40	03	31	66			
4	-31	10	05	24	38	(28)	18	31	08	28	24	-26	(31)	19	30	46	31	40	38	(44)	09	30	32	37		
5	-23	55	36	60	51	53	-11	24	29	44	42	19	38	29	-07	58	45	33	44	53	08	28	47	51	46	
6	-25	11	24	22	08	35	03	88	38	80	65	-37	65	05	48	51	68	26	11	49	16	66	14	20	44	35

SEQ

1. Early Mission Effect.
2. Mission Effect.
3. Mission Support Effect.
4. Morale
5. Esprit
6. Leader Effect.
7. Planning Effect.

PFQ

1. Unit Performance
2. Job Satisfaction
3. Group Cohesion
4. Leader Effect.
5. Individual Perf.
6. Individual Effort

Comparison of the three external sources with the internal source (three lower squares) reveals that the evaluators demonstrated the least amount of convergence with detachment members, with r ranging from .10 to .69 and the mean $r = .29$. The guerrillas provided the greatest degree of convergence with detachment members, with like-scale correlations ranging from .03 to .74, and a mean r of .50. In general, performance-related scales fared somewhat better on the criterion of convergence than did the totally subjective domains of Morale, Esprit and Job Satisfaction. Specifically, there was a fair degree of convergence for three of the controllers' and guerrillas' performance-related scales with the detachment members' Unit Performance scale, and there was some agreement between guerrillas and detachment members regarding Leader Effectiveness. Although controllers' evaluations of Morale tended to relate to the units' Job Satisfaction, there was no relation between their evaluation of Esprit and detachment ratings of Group Cohesion. Similarly, guerrilla ratings of Morale were unrelated to detachment ratings of Job Satisfaction, and the Esprit and Cohesion scales converged very weakly.

CONCLUSIONS

Evaluative data on the processes and outcomes of a field training exercise were gathered from four distinct sources: the detachment members themselves and three sources external to the detachments. These data were factor analyzed both for the internal source and for the combined external sources. The major difference between the factor structures was that the external sources viewed performance as multidimensional compared to the unidimensional evaluation of the detachment members.

Intercorrelations of scales constructed from these factors demonstrated some evidence of convergent validity, particularly for the guerrillas and the detachment members. Several interpretations can be offered for these findings. First, this could be due to the fact that the guerrillas' scores were averaged across more than one individual, whereas the controllers' and evaluators' data were gathered by only one observer from each detachment and were therefore less likely to be stable and reliable. Also, performance-related scales from the guerrillas and detachments showed more satisfactory convergence than did process-related scales. Finally, the average degree of convergence with the internal source (detachment members) demonstrated by the external sources seemed to vary with the amount of "psychological distance" or actual involvement of the external rater in the field exercise activities. Thus, ratings by the guerrillas, who worked very closely with the detachments, show the greatest amount of convergence with detachment ratings. Evaluators, who were completely uninvolved observers assigned by the higher headquarters, showed the least amount of convergence with detachment members. Overall, evidence of discriminate validity was poor. Campbell and Fiske's criterion⁶ of a meaningful level of convergence

⁶ Campbell and Fiske, 1959, op. cit.

is moderately satisfied for performance-related scales if evaluators' ratings are excluded, but subjective ratings of morale and satisfaction provide only marginal support for convergence. Therefore, the interpretation based on psychological distance appears to be more compelling.

In spite of the fact that the scales do not separate neatly into psychometrically clean factors, they do appear to tap several important outcome domains for the situation under consideration. The best estimates of the performance-related dimensions are those derived from detachment members (internal source) and from the guerrillas (external source). However, the overall weak convergence of process-related variables suggests that, lacking additional evidence, the internal ratings of the detachment members themselves are likely to be the most valid estimate of this highly subjective domain. The evidence also suggests that the evaluators' data and to a lesser extent the controllers' data should not be used as criteria of unit performance and leader effectiveness since they fail to provide adequate support for the three primary validation criteria proposed by Campbell and Fiske.

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APPENDIX A

POST-FTX QUESTIONNAIRE
12th SPECIAL FORCES

Purpose

This is the second part of the research program the 12th Special Forces have been selected to participate in to assist the Department of Army in its study of performance and leadership factors. Once again a variety of information is requested and you are asked to give honest, straightforward answers in all cases. The individual answers and information you provide are for RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY and will not be subject to administrative review nor made part of any official records. The information you provide will be kept confidential and your identity will remain anonymous.

Instructions

Specific instructions are given for each set of questions; read them carefully. Use the pen or pencil which has been provided to you along with the questionnaire. Cross out or erase any answer you wish to change, but mark all answers clearly in the space indicated--there is no separate answer sheet. In most cases it will not be necessary to go back to a set of questions--do not go back unless the instructions tell you to do so. Answer every question. In most cases there is no right or wrong answer because you are asked to give your observations and opinions. Place all comments on the blank sheets provided at the end of this survey. Work rapidly, and thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

The following questions deal with the preinfiltration phase of the FTX. Circle the answer which best describes what took place.

- 1) An explanation of the mission and its purpose was:
 - (1) given to all personnel
 - (2) given, but did not reach all personnel
 - (3) not given.
- 2) Briefbacks were to take place to insure absolute understanding by every team member. Briefbacks:
 - (1) took place and included all personnel
 - (2) took place, but did not include all personnel
 - (3) never took place.
- 3) If the mission had to be aborted during infiltration, an evasion and escape plan was:
 - (1) drawn up and presented to all personnel
 - (2) drawn up, but did not reach all personnel
 - (3) never drawn up.

The following questions deal with the infiltration and linkup phases of the FTX. Circle the answer which best describes what took place.

- 4) Following airborne infiltration, the detachment assembled:
 - (1) rapidly and effectively
 - (2) with reasonable speed and accuracy
 - (3) after a short period of confusion
 - (4) after a period of gross disorganization and a serious loss of time.
- 5) Once the detachment was organized, all personnel and equipment:
 - (1) were accounted for, followed by a quick exit from the drop zone
 - (2) were presumed to be accounted for, followed by a quick exit from the drop zone
 - (3) were accounted for, but exit from the drop zone was slow
 - (4) were not accounted for and exit from the drop zone was slow.
- 6) Regarding security after leaving the drop zone, the proper security measures were:
 - (1) taken during movement to and upon arrival at the guerrilla camp
 - (2) taken during movement but not upon arrival
 - (3) taken upon arrival but not during movement
 - (4) not taken during movement or upon arrival.

- 7) To deal with aggressor attacks, avenues of escape and alternate rallying points were:
 - (1) determined and made known to all personnel
 - (2) determined, but this information did not reach all personnel
 - (3) not determined.
- 8) Following airborne infiltration, the linkup between the guerrillas and the detachment was:
 - (1) efficient and cooperative
 - (2) efficient even though there was some lack of cooperation
 - (3) slightly inefficient due to a lack of cooperation
 - (4) not manageable.

The following items deal with organization, communication, execution of tasks, and so on. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

- 9) Regarding the relationship between the operational detachment and the guerrillas:
 - (1) a good working relationship was established
 - (2) although some conflicts existed, these did not seriously impair the working relationship
 - (3) the conflicts which existed seriously impaired the working relationship
 - (4) it was impossible to establish a good working relationship.
- 10) The detachment commander and the guerrilla chief:
 - (1) were able to develop agreements on command relationships and security systems
 - (2) had some difficulty reaching such agreements, but this did not seriously impair their effectiveness
 - (3) had difficulty reaching such agreements and this seriously impaired their effectiveness
 - (4) were totally unable to reach such agreements.
- 11) Regarding the installation and usage of the radio equipment:
 - (1) the radio was properly set up on time and communications were established between the detachment and the SFOB
 - (2) the radio was properly set up and communications were established but only after a delay
 - (3) the radio was properly set up on time but communications were never established
 - (4) the radio was never properly set up and communications were not established.

- 12) If mission operations were to be carried out as planned, a training program for the guerrillas had to be established. The training program:
- (1) was efficient (quickly established, covered the essential procedures and plans, etc.) and effective (actually prepared the guerrillas for mission operations)
 - (2) was inefficient to some extent, but ultimately effective
 - (3) was efficient, but failed to prepare the guerrillas for mission operations
 - (4) was inefficient and ineffective.
- 13) One of the tasks during the organization and buildup phase of the FTX was to prepare plans for the reception and disposition of resupply. Before the resupply operation began:
- (1) everyone knew their responsibilities and were ready to carry them out
 - (2) particular functions or responsibilities were not specified but everyone was prepared to do what needed to be done
 - (3) everyone knew their responsibilities but were not ready to carry them out
 - (4) no one knew who was supposed to do what and no one was adequately prepared for the operation.
- 14) The security measures planned for the training program, the resupply operation, and the other situations:
- (1) were appropriate for the particular situation and were carried out as planned
 - (2) were not the most appropriate plans, but security was still maintained
 - (3) were appropriate, but were not carried out as planned
 - (4) were not appropriate and security was not maintained.
- 15) Regarding performance up to and including the resupply mission, the detachment:
- (1) did what needed to be done and did it with efficiency, unity, and determination
 - (2) did better than most Army units could have done
 - (3) did what needed to be done although there was nothing extraordinary about the performance
 - (4) did okay, but the performance was not something to be extremely proud of
 - (5) failed to meet even the most minimal expectations of a unit in such a situation.

The following questions deal with the combat situations. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

16) The plans for surveillance of the raid target were:

- (1) initiated well in advance of the raid and communicated to all personnel
- (2) not initiated well in advance but were given to all personnel
- (3) initiated well in advance but were not given to all personnel
- (4) not initiated well in advance and did not reach all personnel.

17) Regarding the actual raid:

- (1) every man knew his mission and efficiently carried it out
- (2) not all the men had a particular mission but the raid was effective
- (3) every man knew his mission but all did not succeed in carrying it out
- (4) none of the men had a particular mission and the raid was ineffective.

18) The plans for surveillance of the ambush site were:

- (1) developed well in advance of the ambush and communicated to all personnel
- (2) not developed well in advance, but were given to all personnel
- (3) developed well in advance, but did not reach all personnel
- (4) neither organized well in advance nor presented to all personnel.

19) The ambush was:

- (1) carried out according to plan and was successful
- (2) successful even though the attack plan was not followed
- (3) carried out according to plan but was unsuccessful
- (4) not carried out according to plan and was unsuccessful.

The following questions deal with the overall effectiveness of the various phases of the FTX. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

- 1) In general, to what extent was the mission preparation phase of the FTX effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 2) In general, to what extent was the infiltration phase of the FTX effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 3) Overall, to what extent was the linkup following airborne infiltration effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 4) Overall, to what extent were the security operations carried out by the detachment effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 5) In general, to what extent was the training program for the guerrillas effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent

6) Overall, to what extent was the raid effective?

- (1) to a very great extent
- (2) to a great extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a little extent
- (5) to a very little extent

7) In general, to what extent was the ambush effective?

- (1) to a very great extent
- (2) to a great extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a little extent
- (5) to a very little extent

The following questions concern the operational detachment commander's performance. Circle the answer you believe is best.

1) I believe the overall performance of the detachment commander during the FTX was:

- (1) excellent
- (2) better than most commanders could have done
- (3) neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally bad
- (4) not as good as most commanders could have done
- (5) very poor

2) The amount of effort the detachment commander expends on the job is:

- (1) 100%; he gives it all he has
- (2) greater than most commanders put out
- (3) about average
- (4) less than most commanders put out
- (5) very small

3) In general, I believe the detachment commander's skill in dealing with people is:

- (1) excellent
- (2) better than that of most commanders
- (3) about average
- (4) worse than that of most commanders
- (5) very poor

4) The jobs my detachment commander assigns to me are:

- (1) those I can do best
- (2) those I can do better than many others
- (3) neither those I do best nor least appropriately
- (4) those I can do less appropriately than many others
- (5) those I can do least appropriately

5) When a man's performance of his duties is superior or when he does much more than required, the detachment commander makes a point of recognizing it.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

The following questions deal with your thoughts and feelings about the job(s) you perform during the FTX. In each case, circle the answer which best describes your thoughts or feelings.

1) To what extent do you enjoy performing the actual day-to-day activities and duties of the FTX?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

2) To what extent do the people, policies, conditions, etc. encourage you to work hard?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

3) To what extent do you gain a sense of accomplishment from the day-to-day activities of the FTX?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

- 4) To what extent do you feel the training you are receiving improves your ability to perform your duties?
- (1) to a very little extent
 - (2) to a little extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a great extent
 - (5) to a very great extent
- 5) The quality of my job performance:
- (1) exceeds that of most individuals
 - (2) while not excellent, is very high
 - (3) is neither very low nor very high
 - (4) while not terrible, is very low
 - (5) is lower than that of most individuals
- 6) The amount of effort I expend on the job is:
- (1) 100%; I give it all I've got
 - (2) greater than most individuals put out
 - (3) about average
 - (4) less than most individuals put out
 - (5) very small
- 7) My overall job satisfaction is:
- (1) extremely high
 - (2) high
 - (3) neither high nor low
 - (4) low
 - (5) extremely low
- 8) To what extent do you find your present job is challenging?
- (1) to a very little extent
 - (2) to a little extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a great extent
 - (5) to a very great extent
- 9) Indicate on the scale below what your thoughts are about staying in the 12th Special Forces Reserve after your current obligation is fulfilled:
- (1) will leave
 - (2) not sure, but will probably leave
 - (3) undecided
 - (4) not sure, but probably will stay
 - (5) will stay

The following questions deal with what took place between individuals in the detachment, what the individuals thought about having been a member of the detachment, and so on. In each case, circle the answer which best describes what you believe took place.

1) The men shared a common goal.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

2) While off duty or during informal situations, the men were friendly and cooperative.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

3) There was a lot of trust between the men.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

4) The men were willing to help each other out when necessary.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

5) To what extent did the men place their own welfare above that of the detachment?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

6) If a man slacked off on his job, the other men were willing to work harder to make up for it.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

7) To what extent were the men proud to be members of the detachment?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

8) I never felt I was part of a team.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

9) Even when things got rough, the detachment never lost sight of its goals.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

APPENDIX B

SPECIAL EVALUATOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE
12th SPECIAL FORCES

Purpose

All individuals participating in the FTX with the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) have been selected to describe the performance of the individual operational detachments. This research program is being conducted by the Department of the Army to obtain information that will assist the Army in its study of performance and leadership factors. A variety of information is requested and you are asked to give honest, straightforward answers in all cases. The individual answers and information you provide are for RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY and will not be subject to administrative review nor made part of any official records. The information you provide will be kept confidential and your identity will remain anonymous.

Instructions

Specific instructions are given for each set of questions, read them carefully. You may use a pen or pencil. Cross out or erase any answer you wish to change, but mark all answers clearly in the space indicated--there is no separate answer sheet. In most cases it will not be necessary to go back to a set of questions--do not go back unless the instructions tell you to do so. Answer every question. In most cases there is no right or wrong answer because you are asked to give your observations and opinions. Place all comments on the blank sheet provided at the end of this survey. Work rapidly, and thank you for your cooperation.

1) Name: _____

2) Roster number: _____

3) I am: (check one)

(1) a controller

(2) an evaluator

(3) a member of the guerrilla unit

NOTE: For all of the following questions you are to evaluate the performance of the operational detachment. Answer all questions on the basis of how the operational detachment performed, not on the basis of how anyone else performed. If you do not have enough information to answer a particular question, then leave that question blank.

The following questions deal with the preinfiltration phase of the FTX. Circle the answer which best describes what took place.

- 1) An explanation of the mission and its purpose was:
 - (1) given to all personnel
 - (2) given, but did not reach all personnel
 - (3) not given.
- 2) Briefbacks were to take place to insure absolute understanding by every team member. Briefbacks:
 - (1) took place and included all personnel
 - (2) took place, but did not include all personnel
 - (3) never took place.
- 3) If the mission had to be aborted during infiltration, an evasion and escape plan was:
 - (1) drawn up and presented to all personnel
 - (2) drawn up, but did not reach all personnel
 - (3) never drawn up.

The following questions deal with the infiltration and linkup phases of the FTX. Circle the answer which best describes what took place.

- 4) Following airborne infiltration, the detachment assembled:
 - (1) rapidly and effectively
 - (2) with reasonable speed and accuracy
 - (3) after a short period of confusion
 - (4) after a period of gross disorganization and a serious loss of time.
- 5) Once the detachment was organized, all personnel and equipment:
 - (1) were accounted for, followed by a quick exit from the drop zone
 - (2) were presumed to be accounted for, followed by a quick exit from the drop zone
 - (3) were accounted for, but exit from the drop zone was slow
 - (4) were not accounted for and exit from the drop zone was slow.
- 6) Regarding security after leaving the drop zone, the proper security measures were:
 - (1) taken during movement to and upon arrival at the guerrilla camp
 - (2) taken during movement but not upon arrival
 - (3) taken upon arrival but not during movement
 - (4) not taken during movement or upon arrival.

- 7) To deal with aggressor attacks, avenues of escape and alternate rallying points were:
- (1) determined and made known to all personnel
 - (2) determined, but this information did not reach all personnel
 - (3) not determined.
- 8) Following airborne infiltration, the linkup between the guerrillas and the detachment was:
- (1) efficient and cooperative
 - (2) efficient even though there was some lack of cooperation
 - (3) slightly inefficient due to a lack of cooperation
 - (4) not manageable.

The following items deal with organization, communication, execution of tasks, and so on. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

- 9) Regarding the relationship between the operational detachment and the guerrillas:
- (1) a good working relationship was established
 - (2) although some conflicts existed, these did not seriously impair the working relationship
 - (3) the conflicts which existed seriously impaired the working relationship
 - (4) it was impossible to establish a good working relationship.
- 10) The detachment commander and the guerrilla chief:
- (1) were able to develop agreements on command relationships and security systems
 - (2) had some difficulty reaching such agreements, but this did not seriously impair their effectiveness
 - (3) had difficulty reaching such agreements and this seriously impaired their effectiveness
 - (4) were totally unable to reach such agreements.
- 11) Regarding the installation and usage of the radio equipment:
- (1) the radio was properly set up on time and communications were established between the detachment and the SFOB
 - (2) the radio was properly set up and communications were established but only after a delay
 - (3) the radio was properly set up on time but communications were never established
 - (4) the radio was never properly set up and communications were not established.

- 12) If mission operations were to be carried out as planned, a training program for the guerrillas had to be established. The training program:
- (1) was efficient (quickly established, covered the essential procedures and plans, etc.) and effective (actually prepared the guerrillas for mission operations)
 - (2) was inefficient to some extent, but ultimately effective
 - (3) was efficient, but failed to prepare the guerrillas for mission operations
 - (4) was inefficient and ineffective.
- 13) One of the tasks during the organization and buildup phase of the FTX was to prepare plans for the reception and disposition of resupply. Before the resupply operation began:
- (1) everyone knew their responsibilities and were ready to carry them out
 - (2) particular functions or responsibilities were not specified but everyone was prepared to do what needed to be done
 - (3) everyone knew their responsibilities but were not ready to carry them out
 - (4) no one knew who was supposed to do what and no one was adequately prepared for the operation.
- 14) The security measures planned for the training program, the resupply operation, and the other situations:
- (1) were appropriate for the particular situation and were carried out as planned
 - (2) were not the most appropriate plans, but security was still maintained
 - (3) were appropriate, but were not carried out as planned
 - (4) were not appropriate and security was not maintained.
- 15) Regarding performance up to and including the resupply mission, the detachment:
- (1) did what needed to be done and did it with efficiency, unity, and determination
 - (2) did better than most Army units could have done
 - (3) did what needed to be done although there was nothing extraordinary about the performance
 - (4) did okay, but the performance was not something to be extremely proud of
 - (5) failed to meet even the most minimal expectations of a unit in such a situation.

The following questions deal with the combat situations. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

16) The plans for surveillance of the raid target were:

- (1) initiated well in advance of the raid and communicated to all personnel
- (2) not initiated well in advance but were given to all personnel
- (3) initiated well in advance but were not given to all personnel
- (4) not initiated well in advance and did not reach all personnel.

17) Regarding the actual raid:

- (1) every man knew his mission and efficiently carried it out
- (2) not all the men had a particular mission but the raid was effective
- (3) every man knew his mission but all did not succeed in carrying it out
- (4) none of the men had a particular mission and the raid was ineffective.

18) The plans for surveillance of the ambush site were:

- (1) developed well in advance of the ambush and communicated to all personnel
- (2) not developed well in advance, but were given to all personnel
- (3) developed well in advance, but did not reach all personnel
- (4) neither organized well in advance nor presented to all personnel.

19) The ambush was:

- (1) carried out according to plan and was successful
- (2) successful even though the attack plan was not followed
- (3) carried out according to plan but was unsuccessful
- (4) not carried out according to plan and was unsuccessful.

The following questions deal with the overall effectiveness of the various phases of the FTX. Choose the answer which best describes what took place.

- 1) In general, to what extent was the mission preparation phase of the FTX effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 2) In general, to what extent was the infiltration phase of the FTX effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 3) Overall, to what extent was the linkup following airborne infiltration effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 4) Overall, to what extent were the security operations carried out by the detachment effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent
- 5) In general, to what extent was the training program for the guerrillas effective?
 - (1) to a very great extent
 - (2) to a great extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a little extent
 - (5) to a very little extent

6) Overall, to what extent was the raid effective?

- (1) to a very great extent
- (2) to a great extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a little extent
- (5) to a very little extent

7) In general, to what extent was the ambush effective?

- (1) to a very great extent
- (2) to a great extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a little extent
- (5) to a very little extent

The following questions concern the operational detachment commander's performance. Circle the answer you believe is best.

1) I believe the overall performance of the detachment commander during the FTX was:

- (1) excellent
- (2) better than most commanders could have done
- (3) neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally bad
- (4) not as good as most commanders could have done
- (5) very poor

2) The amount of effort the detachment commander expends on the job is:

- (1) 100%; he gives it all he has
- (2) greater than most commanders put out
- (3) about average
- (4) less than most commanders put out
- (5) very small

3) In general, I believe the detachment commander's skill in dealing with people is:

- (1) excellent
- (2) better than that of most commanders
- (3) about average
- (4) worse than that of most commanders
- (5) very poor

The following questions deal with what took place between individuals in the detachment, what the individuals thought about having been a member of the detachment, and so on. In each case, circle the answer which best describes what you believe took place.

1) The men shared a common goal.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

2) While off duty or during informal situations, the men were friendly and cooperative.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

3) There was a lot of trust between the men.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

4) The men were willing to help each other out when necessary.

- (1) strongly agree
- (2) agree
- (3) neither agree nor disagree
- (4) disagree
- (5) strongly disagree

5) To what extent did the men place their own welfare above that of the detachment?

- (1) to a very little extent
- (2) to a little extent
- (3) to some extent
- (4) to a great extent
- (5) to a very great extent

- 6) If a man slacked off on his job, the other men were willing to work harder to make up for it.
- (1) strongly agree
 - (2) agree
 - (3) neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) disagree
 - (5) strongly disagree
- 7) To what extent were the men proud to be members of the detachment?
- (1) to a very little extent
 - (2) to a little extent
 - (3) to some extent
 - (4) to a great extent
 - (5) to a very great extent
- 8) I never felt that the detachment was really a team.
- (1) strongly agree
 - (2) agree
 - (3) neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) disagree
 - (5) strongly disagree
- 9) Even when things got rough, the detachment never lost sight of its goals.
- (1) strongly agree
 - (2) agree
 - (3) neither agree nor disagree
 - (4) disagree
 - (5) strongly disagree