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
(6) ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES. TECHNICAL REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the outcomes of recent (1966-1978) U.S. and Soviet crises, focusing upon outcomes as defined in terms of goal achievement (or nonachievement). To establish a backdrop for the analysis of the crisis outcomes, the report begins with a survey of the attributes of recent U.S. and Soviet crises, including incidents that were of concern to both superpowers during the postwar period and the attributes of the most recent crises.

The remainder of the analysis focuses on crisis outcomes. Logically it can be divided into two parts. The first (consisting of Chapters 3, 4, and 5) develops the methodology used to assess outcomes. This strategy places primary emphasis upon the evaluation of outcomes in terms of Soviet and U.S. policy goals and their relative achievement at one and five year intervals after each incident.

Policy goals are identified through an analysis of primary source materials, both U.S. and Soviet. While no classified sources were employed, a very good case can be made that the general contours of policy objectives can be identified from open source materials, if only because they are used by each superpower as a communications medium. Chapters 4 and 5 present the sources used and the lists of goals derived (approximately 50 international policy aims potentially applicable during crises were identified for each superpower). While these goals span a variety of functional (for example, military-security, ideological, or economic) and regional categories, each could be sought during crises by the demonstration or application of military force.

The second portion of the study (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) applies the methodology to assess the outcomes of 100 U.S. and 157 Soviet political-military crises occurring from 1966 through 1978. The different crisis lists analyzed for the two superpowers reflect their differing concerns. The Soviet Union, for example, has had border crises involving China that have not been crises for the United States. In order to reflect the actual concerns of the superpowers, only the outcomes of crisis-relevant goals (of the total sets of approximately 50 aims identified for each superpower) are assessed. Had all aims been assessed in all crises, less meaningful results would have been produced (for example, the outcomes of economic goals in crises where economic factors were not at issue).

Throughout the analysis, care is taken to avoid over-interpreting the results. Given the complexity of the subject, and the differing aims of the two superpowers, it is not possible to produce a simple outcome score on the order of: "U.S. Eagles 24; Soviet Bears 21." At the same time, however, it is well within the limits of the data to identify some general trends and patterns that reflect the course (and relative sucesses and failures) of crisis management policy for both superpowers since the mid-1960's.

Moreover, care is taken in making causal inferences regarding the impact of the crises upon the outcomes. No a priori causal assumptions are made. Instead, separate analyses are conducted to evaluate the impact that the crises appeared to have upon the achievement (or nonachievement) of crisis-relevant goals. One of the findings produced by these analyses (based on correlations of moderate strength, which necessarily admit exceptions to the general case) is that the goals of the United States were more likely to be achieved when the impact of the crises upon the goals was minor, whereas the policy goals of the Soviet Union were more likely to be realized when the crises had a strong impact on the outcomes. Without overgeneralizing, this suggests that U.S. aims are more readily accomplished in noncrisis contexts and/or that the goals sought by the

United States are reinforced by other, noncrisis, influences upon the outcomes, while Soviet goals are more likely to be accomplished as a result of Soviet concern with, and engagement in, crises. This profile is consistent with the common depiction of the United States and the Soviet Union as pro and anti-status quo powers.

SELECTED FINDINGS

Superpower Crisis Goals

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued a wide variety of aims during crises. Approximately 2.5 Soviet goals and 4 U.S. aims were, on the average, relevant during the crises. The larger average for the United States could be due to either of two (nonexclusive) factors: the greater openness of U.S. society, which facilitates the identification of aims and interests, or the more complex policy interests of the United States, the more truly global of the two superpowers.

- Crisis goals (and their associated outcomes) were widely dispersed. In no case was any single goal relevant in even a third of the crises. Most goals were pertinent in 10 percent or fewer of the incidents. Superpower crisis interests are complex, and vary widely across crises.

- Not surprisingly, given that international political-military crises were being examined, the most common categories of goals for both superpowers were military aims. Both superpowers tended to have relatively positive outcomes associated with their crisis-relevant military aims in comparison to other categories of goals over at least the short term (one year postcrisis). This, in turn, leads into the next point.

- U.S. and Soviet crisis interests are far from being a zero sum game, in which the victories of one superpower (achievement of goals) correspond to the losses of the other. The aims pursued by the superpowers are far from being mirror images of one another.

- The differing characters of the aims pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union during crises are confirmed by

the use of a clustering methodology known as factor
analysis. The leading factors for the United States (which
account for the greatest proportions of variance in U.S.
goals) are: containment of Communism, support for indus-
trial democracies, and defense of strategic LDC's and U.S.
access. The corresponding leading factors in the Soviet
case are: support progressive regimes and movements, main-
tain Soviet/CPSU leadership, and defend fraternal socialist
countries. The divergences in aims are apparent from the
descriptions given to the leading factors.

- Homeland security was not a predominant crisis-related goal
  for either superpower. With a few exceptions (for example,
  the Jordan crisis of 1970 and the Middle East War of 1973),
  crises during the period 1966-1978 did not present situations
  in which the two superpowers might have escalated into direct
  conflict with one another. Homeland security for the
  Soviets, to the limited extent it was salient, involved to
  a large degree the security of Far Eastern regions of the
  USSR bordering on China.

- Individual European goals did not have high frequencies (the
  highest percentages in this regional category being 11 per-
  cent for the United States and 3.8 percent for the Soviets).
  This appears to reflect the stablization of relations be-
  tween the blocs in Europe, as represented in the accords on
  the status of Berlin and other issues which had been the
  focus of crises prior to the mid-1960's.

- Economic goals had modest salience for the United States
  and no apparent bearing on the crisis aims of the Soviet
  Union. Apparently international crises are not a common
  forum for the pursuit of such interests, apart from other
  functional or regional concerns.

Crisis Outcomes

As noted, simple numeric comparisons between U.S. and Soviet outcomes are
not possible because the superpowers pursue different aims in different
settings. Nevertheless, some significant general patterns of outcomes

can be discerned by focusing on goals with high (or low) outcomes relative to other aims pursued by the same superpower.

- In the U.S. case, three goals tended to be achieved at high relative levels over both the short (one year post-crisis) and long (five years) term:

  - Assisting LDC's in strengthening themselves militarily,
  - Reducing the chances of war with the Soviet Union, and
  - Promoting peace and peaceful resolution to conflict.

  While crises are only one of the fora in which superpowers pursue their aims, the consistency of these successful outcomes with the overall structure of U.S. international policy since the mid-1960's is, nevertheless, striking:

  - The first aim relates directly to the Nixon-Ford "Doctrine" (subsequently implemented as well by the Carter Administration) of assisting friendly LDC's to allow them to meet threats on their own to the maximum extent feasible.

  - The objective of reducing chances of conflict with the USSR ties directly to the policy of detente followed by the United States during this period.

  - The aim of promoting peace and peaceful resolution to conflict jibes very neatly with the common picture of the United States as a nation that attempts to maintain a stable, conflict-free world order and endeavors to settle conflicts once they do occur.

- The most favorable outcomes for the Soviet Union present similarly interpretable patterns. Over both the long and short term the Soviet Union was successful in:

  - Defending fraternal states (for example, those in Eastern Europe).

  - Assisting Asian Marxist-Leninist allies (principally the Democratic Republic of Vietnam).

  - Reducing what the Soviets perceived as an "encircling" NATO/CENTO threat.

  - Deterring China.[1]

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[1] Here as throughout the analysis, Soviet goals and actions are described as perceived and presented by the Soviets themselves, rather than in Western frames of reference.

Again these crisis-relevant goals can be related to broader policy trends. European relations between the WTO and NATO stabilized during the period since the mid-1960's, while CENTO's problems related to events in such nations as Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, and not necessarily to the efficacy of Soviet policy actions during crises. With substantial Soviet aid, the DRV won its war with the Republic of Vietnam. Finally, the Soviets were successful (from their own vantagepoint) in deterring the threat posed by China to the Soviet homeland, some minor border incidents notwithstanding.

● Although care is taken to avoid generalizations concerning overall policy achievements of the two superpowers relative to goal outcomes, findings do suggest that the Soviet Union (viewed from its own vantagepoint) tends to be more satisfied with the outcomes of its policy goals when compared to similar dynamics of the United States. Functionally, however, the "success-rates" of the two polities differ widely, again suggesting the non zero-sum nature of their international involvement.

● Comparison of the favorable outcomes for the United States and the Soviet Union brings out the disparateness of their concerns. While crises are but one arena in which policy is pursued, the patterns of outcomes found for both superpowers correspond relatively neatly to broader trends in international affairs since the mid-1960's. In the U.S. case, core concerns of detente, strengthening the military capabilities of Third World allies, and promotion of peace and peaceful resolution to conflict stand out. The Soviets, on the other hand, reflect a different set of concerns, involving the fraternal states, the DRV, and events on their borders, including the containment of China. The superpowers' greatest relative successes tended to occur in different domains of policy. Relative victory for one was not necessarily associated with a corresponding loss on the part of the other.

● Comparison of the least favorable outcomes for the two superpowers produces similiar conclusions to those generated by the comparison of the most favorable results. In each case, the Soviet and U.S. outcomes are far from being mirror images of one another. Instead, each has its own characteristic domains of relative successes and failures. In the U.S. case, the fall of the Saigon regime, difficulties in interallied relations, and economic factors tend to predominate among the negative outcomes. In the Soviet case, the problems encountered by Soviet-favored regimes and movements in the Third World and

special ideological status problems involving the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union stand out.

CONCLUSION

This report presents the first systematic analysis of the outcomes of
U.S. and Soviet crises from 1966 through 1978. The analyses presented in
this volume are designed to identify general trends and patterns in these
data. The information developed in this project has been deliberately
structured so that it can be used as a tool by crisis planners and decision-
makers. To this end, it is embodied in an executive aid for crisis decision-
makers (CACI, 1979d). This aid is a highly user-oriented database manage-
ment system that allows planners to focus upon their own specific concerns.
Moreover, the system is designed so that users can adapt it to incorporate
additional outcomes data (developed from either open or classified sources)
for use in their analyses. While a deliberate attempt has been made in the
development of the database and its analysis to avoid drawing normative
judgments concerning the "correctness" of either U.S. or Soviet goals, the
existence of the outcomes data (which are available to users through DARPA/
CTO's Demonstration and Development Facility) provides a diagnostic base for
the evaluation of various goals' achievement and thereby helps in the pro-
cess of selecting and evaluating crisis action options.

CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This report analyzes U.S. and Soviet crisis management experiences since World War II, with particular emphasis upon the outcomes of recent (1966–1978) Soviet and American crises. It is part of a project sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO) as part of its Crisis Management Program. This chapter reviews the DARPA/CTO Crisis Management Program and CACI's previous research within it, summarizes CACI's FY79 contributions to this program, and outlines the remainder of the volume. A companion volume (CACI, 1979a) analyzes the Chinese crisis management experience.

THE DARPA CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Four of the major classes of products produced within the DARPA Crisis Management Program are:

- Computer-based decision aids that can be employed in national and major command-level operations centers during crisis management activities to provide better crisis indications and warning.

- Databases on the changing character of U.S. and Soviet crisis management operations including crisis characteristics, the actions that the two superpowers have employed in these incidents, the objectives they have pursued, and the crisis management problems encountered, plus information regarding the characteristics of the crises of concern to the People's Republic of China since 1949.

- New quantitative methods for crisis advance warning, monitoring, and management.

- Reports summarizing:

    - U.S., Soviet, and Chinese crisis management activities and concerns from 1946 through 1976,
    - The typical problems encountered in crisis management,
    - Current opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and
    - Research gaps in planning for better national security crisis management.

Wide-ranging research has been directed toward each of these areas by DARPA since 1974. Initial work through 1976 was directed toward certain basic research themes prerequisite to effective social science technology development. Characteristic of this type of research were CACI's attempts to inventory past U.S. crises (CACI, 1975) and to identify the major patterns of problems encountered in past U.S. crises (CACI, 1976).

By 1976, however, a corner had been turned in the research needs for crisis management. Significant new information had been developed directly applicable to producing user-oriented, computer-based aids to:

- Assist defense operations centers in identifying what indicator and warning patterns signal the onset of a crisis, and

- Develop option generation and evaluation aids to assist crisis managers after the crisis has begun.

CACI'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

CACI's efforts within the Crisis Management Program contribute to four classes of research products:

- Computer-based decision aids applicable to national and major command centers during crisis management activities.

- Databases on the changing nature of crises, problems likely to be encountered, the types of objectives sought, actions taken, and the results achieved.

- New quantitative methods for analyzing U.S. and foreign crisis experiences.

- Substantive reports summarizing the problems of crisis management, opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and research gaps in the field of planning for better national security crisis management.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among these classes of products in DARPA's Crisis Management Program. CACI's initial attempts to reconceptualize crises and develop an inventory of U.S. crises began in FY75 (CACI, 1975). These efforts were continued and expanded during FY76 in CACI's major assessment of the background characteristics and problems encountered in a sample of U.S. crises between 1946 and 1975 (CACI, 1976).

Analysis during FY76 indicated four major directions for additional research. First, one tangent of the research (Shaw, et al., 1976) identified terrorist-induced crises as a growing area of concern. Subsequent analyses have identified research and development gaps in this area (CACI, 1977a). Second, a need was identified to reduce crisis management problems by determining the most effective set of actions for different crisis contexts and policy objectives. Accordingly, CACI's efforts during early FY77 focused on examining the relationships between U.S. crisis actions and policy objectives and developing a prototype computer-aiding system for crisis managers that incorporates these empirical relationships (CACI, 1977b). During FY78 this prototype system was developed into CACI's executive aid for crisis managers (CACI, 1978a). The executive aid provides national security planners with ready access to data concerning U.S. crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems between 1946 and 1976. The design characteristics of this aiding system (described in CACI, 1978b) allow planners to have ready

Figure 1. Selected CACI Crisis Management Program Research Efforts

access to these data in the course of searching for precedents when planning for ongoing or anticipated crises.

During FY78, significant research progress was made on two fronts. The Crisis Problem Analyzer project (CACI, 1978c, 1978d) expanded the database of cases coded for U.S. crisis management problems to 101 crises. This provided a richer set of precedents for crisis planners. Taking advantage of the more reliable statistical base provided by the expanded dataset, CACI analyses focused on the relationships between the characteristics of the crisis events and the types of crisis management problems most often encountered by U.S. decision-makers. A new executive aid module was developed that allowed users to examine the historical associations between types of crises (defined in terms of user-specified sets of descriptive attributes) and crisis management problems.

Crisis management is not a game of solitaire. At least one other actor is involved in every crisis. Accordingly, the second thrust of CACI's Crisis Management Program-sponsored research during FY78 (CACI, 1978e, 1978f) focused on the Soviet Union's crisis management experience, 1946-1975. In this research, Soviet sources were used to identify the political-military crisis events that were of concern to the Soviet leadership during the postwar period. Using a combination of Soviet and Western sources, the basic characteristics of 386 crisis events were coded; crisis problems, actions, and apparent objectives were coded for a sample of 101 crises. Analyses of these data revealed trends and patterns in Soviet crisis concerns and behaviors. Incorporation of these data into executive aid programs comparable to those previously produced for the U.S. allowed U.S. planners and decision-makers to have access to these data as inputs into their assessments of likely Soviet responses to crisis situations.

As shown in Figure 1, during FY79, CACI's Crisis Management Program research involves several related tasks:

- Updating the U.S. and Soviet databases through 1978, to provide planners with up-to-date information.

1-5

- Analysis of U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes (1966-1978), focusing on outcomes defined in terms of goal achievement.

- Development of the executive aids for crisis managers into the aiding system, including incorporation of the results of the other research thrusts being conducted during the fiscal year.

- Analysis of Chinese crises and their characteristics from the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949 through 1978.

This volume deals with the first three tasks (analyses of Chinese crises and their characteristics are presented in CACI, 1979a). Of these three, the assessment of crisis outcomes is the core, the first task feeds into it, and the third in large part follows from it.

OUTLINE

Chapter 2 establishes a framework of reference for the remainder of the analysis by treating two topics: the characteristics of recent Soviet and U.S. crises and comparative analysis of those crises of concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union during the postwar period. Chapter 3 introduces the core concern of the report by presenting the methodology employed to measure and evaluate the outcomes of recent (1966-1978) Soviet and American crises. The arguments presented in this section, notably the technical approach of defining outcomes in terms of goal achievement, set the limits for the remainder of the analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 present U.S. and Soviet policy goals. Chapters 6 and 7 analyze the outcomes of U.S. and Soviet crises, while Chapter 8 presents a comparative analysis of the two.

CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF TRENDS AND RECENT PATTERNS IN U.S. AND SOVIET
CRISES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on two issues: the attributes of recent Soviet and
American crises and the evolving characteristics of those crises of
concern to both superpowers since 1946. In addition to their obvious
substantive importance for an understanding of postwar superpower crisis
management behavior, these analyses also form a backdrop for the analysis
of recent (1966-1978) Soviet and American crisis outcomes to be presented
in the remaining chapters of the volume.

RECENT U.S. AND SOVIET CRISES

Defining and Identifying U.S. and Soviet Crises

Analysts attempting to identify and contrast the crisis management ex-
periences of the two superpowers encounter an immediate problem: U.S.
and Soviet decision-makers and analysts define and approach crises in
markedly different ways. In comparision to common U.S. cr other Western
practices, for example, Soviet commentators are likely to focus on
events that take place over longer periods of time and are invariably
political-military, rather than simply military, in character.[1] As a
consequence, in order to approach crises from the vantagepoint of each
superpower (in the hope of identifying perceptions that correlate with
and prompt crisis actions) it is necessary to tailor the methodologies
used to reflect these differences while still retaining enough

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[1] Differences between Soviet and Western approaches to crises and crisis
management are analyzed in detail in CACI (1978e), which also presents
the methodological strategy outlined in this section.

elements in common across the two to allow for comparisons. While this is a challenging task, previous analyses of Soviet (CACI, 1978e) and Chinese (CACI, 1979a) crises have demonstrated that it can be successfully done.

If only due to cultural familiarity, the U.S. case is the simpler one. CACI's technical approach (1976) focuses on organizational processes within the U.S. Government to identify those events which the United States treated as crises.[2] The formal definition employed was:

> A period of increased military management activity at the
> national level that is carried on in a sustained manner
> under conditions of rapid action and response resulting
> from unexpected events or incidents that have occurred
> internationally, internally in a foreign country, or in
> the domestic United States and that have inflicted or
> threatened to inflict violence or significant damage to
> U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities.

Each incident identified as a crisis met at least one of the following criteria:

- Direct involvement of U.S. military forces in the incident.

- A military decision on the incident required or made.

- Subsequent military involvement of U.S. forces.

- An existing threat of violence or significant damage to the U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities.

- The need for rapid military action and response.

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[2] An alternative approach to the definition and identification of crises commonly found in the political science literature involves the use of properties of events (intra- or interactor) to define incidents as "crises." The advantage of an organizational process approach is that it mirrors the policy processes of concern.

Instances of humanitarian assistance or military action during a war (such as Korea or Vietnam) occurring after the commitment of U.S. forces were not included in the crisis listing. Once these criteria were established, an inventory of incidents since 1946 that met the definition was developed, using a wide variety of open source materials.

When attention is turned to the Soviet cases, however, the problem of crisis definition and identification is considerably more complex. When dealing with Soviet crises, Westerners are "outsiders" facing a policy system that has far fewer "leaks" than that of the United States. Even more importantly, the Soviets (as noted previously) define the term differently from common Western practice, focusing on political-military rather than military events. Finally, the policy style adopted by the Soviet Union since World War II in reacting to what it defines as "crises" differs significantly from that practiced by the United States and other major Western powers. Out of a mixture of choice and necessity, in some instances the Soviets do not even conduct a token, symbolic military operation in response to events that are of obvious concern to them.

The analytical solution adopted in response to these problems involves the use of Soviet sources to identify Western-style crisis events, structuring Soviet perceptions and concerns within Western analytical frameworks. The Soviets are very well aware of the importance of communication before, during, and after crises. It is quite plausible to believe that they use their open-source literature to communicate their concerns to a wide variety of audiences, ranging from U.S. leaders to Communist parties in the Third World. The strategy adopted uses a review of Soviet materials to identify the basic cases (crises) involved in the analysis. Once identified, the attributes of these events are coded, using both Soviet and Western materials, to produce data comparable for that generated for U.S. crises.[3]

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[3] The credence that can be placed on Soviet communications is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3 and in CACI (1978e).

Like all compromises, this research strategy is by no means perfect. While comparable in form, the Soviet and U.S. crisis databases differ in focus, with the U.S. information dealing with more overt forms of extraordinary military management operations and the Soviet data reflecting crisis concerns (as opposed to operations alone). Given the nature of the problem, plus previous successful applications of this strategy, it appears, however; to be the best technical strategy available.

Given the character of the definition used, identification of U.S. crises was relatively straightforward. A wide variety of materials, ranging from official publications such as the Department of State Bulletin through the public press were examined to identify incidents and code their basic attributes.

As might be expected, the Soviet case was somewhat more complex. In the previous application of this strategy (CACI, 1978), extensive use had been made of Soviet books and pamphlets dealing with international affairs, including a number of works that specifically dealt with international political-military crises. Given publication delays, however, events during the years being updated (1976-1978) are under-reported in such media. As a result, heavy reliance was placed on two sources: Pravda the official Soviet party newspaper (using the invaluable Index to Pravda) and the Current Digest of the Soviet Press.[4] In searching through these sources, particular emphasis was given to events of the type that had been previously identified as being of concern to the Soviets during the periods of the most recent Party Congresses (the 24th Congress of 1971 and the 25th of 1975). These events included incidents involving:

- The security of the Soviet homeland and political system,

- Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and Mongolia,

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[4] The Current Digest is a Western source that provides a reasonably comprehensive survey of important Soviet media. The Index to Pravda is a reliable Western index that is only available since the late 1970's.

- U.S. and Chinese "imperialist" and "social imperialist" operations, particularly when occurring in critical regions such as the periphery of the Soviet Union itself or the Middle East, and

- Those instances in which the Soviets, through aid, demonstrations of force, or other nonverbal means, expressed particular concern with incidents.[5]

Soviet Crises

This section briefly describes the Soviet crisis data collected for 1976, 1977, and 1978 (Table 1) and compares these incidents with data for previous Soviet crises (CACI, 1978e).

Geographic Distribution. One of the most common assumptions by Western analysts about Soviet foreign policy has been that Soviet concerns are dominated by defense of the homeland, security of the Warsaw Pact states, and the stability of other bordering countries in Europe and Asia. The geographic distribution of 1946-1975 crises, reported in an earlier study (CACI, 1978e), showed that, in fact, most crises of concern to the Soviets were located in the Pacific/East Asia and Middle East/South Asia regions (see Table 2). The 1976-1978 data set is very similar in its geographic distribution.

There are, however, a number of interesting changes:

- There was a notable decline between 1976 and 1978 in events that occurred in the Americas and Europe (according to JCS categories),

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[5] The problem encountered here was similar to that faced by CACI researchers in their analysis of the Chinese crisis management experience (CACI, 1979a), which relied heavily upon a weekly publication: Peking Review. Whenever weekly or daily sources are employed, literally thousands of "events" can be identified. Hence, some sorting criteria need to be employed to render the data collection process manageable. In previous research on Soviet crises using this methodology (CACI, 1978a) Soviet books, statements at the United Nations, and other media served in this "sorting" role).

TABLE 1
Summary List of Soviet Crises
1976-1978

Crisis Number	Crisis Date	Crisis Name
387	760101-780615	Lebanese civil war.
388	760225	U.S. planes bomb Siem Reap, Cambodia.
389	760228	U.S., Thai forces attack Laos.
390	760314-760415	Egypt abrogates treaty with USSR.
391	760405-771113	Chinese succession crisis.
392	760618-760620	Cyprus: U.S. Marines land.
393	760723-760830	Aegean Sea crisis.
394	760906-761115	Lieutenant Belenko lands in Japan, is maltreated.
395	770310-770521	Revolt in South Zaire, foreign intervention.
396	770318-770319	Greece: Mass antigovernment/NATO protest.
397	770324-780709	Ethiopia battles for survival.
398	770400-770613	Anti-Soviet agitation in Japan re: Kuriles.
399	770527-770601	Attempted coup in Angola.
400	770500-999999	PRC continues war preparations.
401	770724-770727	Egyptian-Libyan border clashes.
402	771003-771020	Attempted coup in Bangladesh.
403	771120-771209	Sadat visits Israel.
404	780105-999999	Border clashes lead to fall of Pol Pot regime.
405	780110-999999	Civil war in Nicaragua.
406	780412-999999	Mongolia resists PRC pressure.
407	780427-999999	Afghanistan: Coup, insurgency.
408	780511-780517	Soviet soldiers violate PRC border.
409	780513-780616	Second Zaire invasion, intervention.
410	780610-999999	Sino-Vietnam conflict.
411	780621	Iranian helicopters enter USSR.
412	780626-780706	Coups, clashes in the two Yemens.
413	780813	Japan, PRC sign treaty; USSR unhappy.
414	780907-999999	Iran: Massive unrest, martial law.
415	781215-790101	U.S., PRC establish ties.

TABLE 2

Geographic Breakdown of Soviet Crises
(percentages[a])

JCS Regional Categories	386 Cases[b] (1946-1975)	101 Cases[b] (1946-1975)	New Data 29 Cases (1976-1978)
North America	1	1	0
Central, South America	16	8	3
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	13	16	10
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	11	15	7
Middle East, Northern Africa	21	23	21
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	13	12	21
Pacific, Eastern Asia (includes China)	24	24	38
Other, Multiple Regions, World (at the United Nations)	1	2	0
Geopolitical Areas (Soviet Perspective)			
Soviet Homeland	6	4	3
Germany/Berlin (East or West)	6	11	0
Primary Buffer Zone (Warsaw Pact States)	4	4	0
People's Republic of China	11	13	21
Border States	3	8	21
Middle East	21	26	21
Other	48	34	34

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[a] Because of rounding, percentages do not necessarily add up to exactly 100 percent.

[b] Based on Table 2, Chapter 5, in Analysis of the Soviet Crisis Management Experience: Technical Report (CACI, 1978e). This sample of 101 cases was selected for more intensive coding due to their greater relative importance and interest as illustrations of Soviet crisis actions, objectives, and problems.

- There was a similar decline in events for the Soviet
  homeland, Germany, and the East European buffer states
  (according to Soviet geopolitical perspective),

- There was a dramatic increase in the relative number
  of events for South Asia/Indian Ocean/Sub-Saharan Africa
  and Pacific/East Asia (JCS categories), and

- There was a similar increase in events related to the
  People's Republic of China and states bordering Soviet
  Union other than China and the Warsaw Pact buffer
  states (Soviet geopolitical categories).

General Crisis Descriptors. Table 3 compares general descriptors of 1976-
1978 crises with those from previous data sets reported in CACI (1978).
Although a three year period is not adequate for determining the stability
of trends, comparing the 1976-1978 crises to the earlier period indexes
several interesting potential trends:

- Domestic crises with dangerous implications for Soviet
  interests have increased in relative number whereas
  wars of national liberation, major uprisings, revolts,
  and insurgencies, which are not necessarily contrary
  to Soviet interests, have greatly decreased,

- An increasing percentage of crises were of international
  (rather than domestic) scope, however, the proportion in-
  volving actual (or potential) strategic confrontation
  greatly diminished,

- As a result of the steady growth of the projection capa-
  bilities of Soviet general purpose forces, the Soviet
  Union had moderate to substantial in-theater military
  capabilities for crisis management in an overwhelming
  proportion of the 1976-1978 crises (93 percent of
  cases compared to only 33 percent of the cases for
  1946-1975),

- Perhaps as a result of its more or less established
  equality with the United States as a superpower, the
  Soviet tendency during 1976-1978 crises was increasing
  to restore or preserve the status quo ante rather than
  to change the status quo ante.

TABLE 3
General Descriptors for Soviet Crises
(percentages)[a]

	396 Cases (1946-1975)	101 Cases (1946-1975)	New Data 29 Cases (1976-1978)
Crisis Characteristics			
Dangerous Domestic Trends/Events	8	9	14
Riot, Other Civil Disorder	9	2	7
Uprising, Revolt, Insurgency	12	6	3
War of National Liberation	4	1	0
Coup d'Etat	12	10	10
Structural Change/Dangerous International Trend/Events	10	15	14
Border Incident/Territorial Dispute	12	8	14
Foreign Intervention, Conflict Short of War	29	37	28
War	5	13	10
Scope of Crisis			
Domestic (excluding Soviet Union)	33	13	17
International	67	87	83
Strategic Confrontation?			
None	83	71	97
Potential	16	24	3
Actual	2	5	0
Threat to CP, CP/Movement, or CP Regime?			
No Threat	56	43	52
Well-Being, Activities Threatened	32	41	38
Survival Threatened	12	17	10
Level of Violence			
Nonviolent Events	36	42	34
Violent Events	64	58	66
Soviet In-Theater Military Crisis Management Capabilities			
Substantial	24	35	28
Moderate	9	23	45
Minor/Negligible	67	42	28
Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Supported Actors			
Uncodable/NA	15	11	21
Preserve Status Quo Ante	33	43	41
Restore Status Quo Ante	18	20	17
Change Status Quo Ante	32	27	21
Indifference (Both Ante)	2	0	0
Soviet Objectives with Respect to In-Theater Opposed Actors			
Uncodable/indifferent	13	10	20
Oppose Efforts to Preserve Status Quo Ante	30	16	24
Oppose Efforts to Restore Status Quo Ante	3	4	0
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	54	69	55
Crisis Outcome for Soviet Union			
Uncodable/indifferent	16	5	24
Favorable	22	29	21
Mixed	36	43	31
Unfavorable	26	24	24
Crisis Outcome for Soviet Allies			
Uncodable/indifferent	56	42	66
Favorable	11	15	10
Mixed	18	25	7
Unfavorable	15	19	17

[a] Based on Table 2, Chapter 5, in *Analysis of the Soviet Crisis Management Experience: Technical Report.*

<u>Crisis Actions and Objectives</u>. As shown in Table 4, during 1976-1978 there was a continuation of previously established trends for many Soviet crisis actions. Most notably, there were continuing declines in actions that involved:

- Drawing down military equipment from Soviet depots,

- Undertaking a new military mission, and

- Involving other nations in multilateral actions.

In contrast, there were continuing increases in actions that involved:

- Unilateral action by the Soviet Union, and

- Providing supplies from nonmilitary sources.

Also, some Soviet crisis activities, which had greatly diminished during the late 1960's and early 1970's, began to increase during 1976-1978. These include:

- Reaffirming existing political/military commitments,

- Fairly direct use of military forces to support political goals,

- Changing alert status of nonnuclear forces,

- Repositioning land forces, undertaking "show of force," military maneuvers, and military training, and

- Improving force readiness.

Between 1976 and 1978, several Soviet crisis objectives continuously declined in importance (see Table 5):

- Concern with restoring Soviet prestige,

- Restoring territorial integrity, and

- Denying military access.

TABLE 4

High Frequency Soviet Actions by Phase
(percent)

Soviet Actions	Phase I 1946-1965[a]	Phase II 1966-1970[a]	Phase III 1971-1975[a]	New Data 1976-1978
Employ diplomacy	94	89	81	79
Provide political/propaganda support	82	71	88	72
Draw down military equipment from Soviet depots	62	60	53	48
Lodge protest(s)	79	80	44	48
Support existing regime	56	57	66	34
Provide supplies from Soviet depots	62	69	47	52
Reaffirm existing political/ military commitment	68	40	44	48
Provide crisis-related military aid	59	43	41	41
Use of WP, CMEA to support political goals	44	46	44	28
U.N.-associated actions	62	31	31	28
Fairly direct use of military forces to support political goals	59	31	19	31
Accept a new military cost	56	29	13	14
Change nonnuclear alert status	53	37	6	10
Undertake a new military mission	50	17	13	10
Reposition land forces	47	9	6	10
Show of military force	47	29	9	21
Provide miltary maintenance assistance	47	31	28	45
Provide other military logistics assistance	47	29	22	41
Military maneuvers or exercises	41	17	6	17
Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment	41	31	38	31
Support antiregime CP or CP/ movement	41	23	50	14
Improve, maintain force readiness	68	40	9	14
USSR acts with two or more nations	50	46	31	24
Provide military advisory assistance	44	40	38	41
Provide supplies from non-military sources	41	40	38	48
Take no military action	32	43	69	66
Provide economic assistance	27	29	50	48
Provide other military training	38	29	44	45
USSR acts alone	29	31	41	52
Total number of crises	35	35	32	29

[a]
Based on Table 1, Chapter 7, in Analysis of the Soviet Crisis Management Experience: Technical Report (CACI, 1978e). Phases are based on Soviet party congresses.

TABLE 5

High Frequency Soviet Objectives by Phase
(percent)

Soviet Objectives	Phase I[a] 1946-1965	Phase II[a] 1966-1970	Phase III[a] 1971-1975	New Data 1976-1978
Contain opponents	85	74	97	79
Maximize Soviet prestige	85	77	84	79
Confirm or reestablish prestige	85	91	72	62
Support shift in correlation of forces in favor of Communism	79	66	84	41
Deny military access	77	63	66	55
Preserve regime from external threat	68	60	67	59
Deny political access	74	46	78	62
Alter balance of power favorable to USSR, allies, clients	68	63	53	69
Preserve secrecy	44	63	72	72
Avoid direct involvement	47	54	63	66
Preserve territory and/or facilities	53	31	25	48
Discover intentions or actions	53	34	59	21
Prevent spread of capitalism	50	29	88	55
Restore territorial integrity	44	23	16	10
Preserve, restore, improve alliance	44	29	44	28
Preserve buffer states	41	23	16	28
Restore prestige	53	40	31	28
Dissuade from a new policy	41	49	22	21
Protect legal and political rights	38	51	38	59
Induce adoption of a new policy	27	57	41	17
Neutralize/eliminate Western influence in Third World	38	54	78	52
Achieve recognition, equal status with United States as superpower	38	14	59	28
Support insurgency	15	23	41	34
Total number of crises	34	35	32	29

---

[a] Based on Table 2, Chapter 7, in Analysis of the Soviet Crisis Management Experience: Technical Report (CACI, 1978e).

These trends are consistent with growing Soviet military prestige and
equality with the United States. At the same time, there was a con-
tinuing increase in a number of Soviet crisis objectives such as avoiding
direct involvement in crises. The above trends correspond with the hy-
pothesis that as Soviet power has increased the Soviet leadership has
become more cautious and responsible in some of its international policy
behavior (Adomeit, 1973).

Soviet Crisis Management Problems. Table 6 presents data on Soviet Crisis
problems and compares the 1976-1978 set to the earlier data for the 1946
to 1975 period. The most interesting trends in the data are those that
reflect the steady growth in Soviet crisis management capabilities as
represented by the growth of the projection capabilities of Soviet general
purpose forces. In particular, this development is reflected by the
continuing decline of:

- Fear of encirclement by Western states,

- Concern for lack of military experience in crisis theaters,

- Inadequacy of action to solve crises,

- Constraints that limit action to friendly countries/
  environments, and

- Constraints imposed by the need for consideration of
  international relations.

Increasing Soviet capabilities and international responsibilities are also
reflected by two crisis problems that increasingly concerned the Soviet
Union:

- Involvement in multicrises, and

- Crisis actions being affected by emotional issues.

TABLE 6

High Frequency Soviet Problems by Phase
(percent)

Soviet Problems	Phase I 1946-1965[a]	Phase II 1966-1970[a]	Phase III 1971-1975[a]	New Data 1976-1978
Consideration of international relations	100	80	69	38
Interests of other M-L states involved	71	60	78	59
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	62	60	72	48
Multicrises	59	63	72	97
Action in hostile country (area)	53	54	75	69
Action in friendly country (area)	65	54	53	34
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	77	40	63	45
Soviet political/military involvement at outset	53	51	59	59
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	41	46	47	52
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	59	37	38	21
Threat to other key regions perceived (e.g. East Europe)	50	34	19	21
Action inadequate to solve crisis	44	29	28	10
Late Soviet political/military involvement	41	31	25	31
Fear of encirclement by Western states	41	20	13	10
Local CP's and movements threatened	41	23	53	31
Soviets have little military experience in crisis theater	41	11	9	0
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	82	63	16	48
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	71	51	22	45
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/solution	56	43	22	17
Constraints on military action	50	46	25	52
Sensitivity to criticism from other CP's, CP states	29	51	72	59
Situation develops over time before crisis level reached	29	43	69	55
Unique logistics/communications requirements	27	23	47	7
Total number of crises	34	35	32	29

[a] Based on Table 3, Chapter 7, in Analysis of the Soviet Crisis Management Experience: Technical Report (CACI, 1978e).

2-14

U.S. Crises

The purpose of this section is to briefly present the U.S. crisis data col-
lected for 1977 and 1978 (see Table 7) and compare them to the data for
earlier years. Since there were only a total of 10 crises for these two
years, the data cannot be considered a reliable indication of long term
trends.

Geographic Distribution. The 1977-1978 U.S. crises were primarily concen-
trated in two JCS regions, the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia/
Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 8). This represents a considerable shift
in the distribution of recent crises as compared to those of 1946-1976,
which were predominantly concentrated in the East Asia/Pacific and
European areas.

General Crisis Descriptors. Tables 9 through 11 present general descrip-
tors for the 1977-1978 U.S. crises as well as for the two other sets of
data that were collected in the earlier phases of the DARPA crisis manage-
ment program. A number of trends stand out over time when the most recent
data (1977-1978) are contrasted to the earlier data sets:

- The United States has continued to be directly involved
  in most crises,

- At the same time, however, the impact of the crises on
  U.S. interests have become increasingly neutral,

- There has been a bifurcation in the speed of crisis
  resolution: crises are most likely to be resolved in
  either over 30 days or within 7 days with very few cases
  falling in between (8 to 30 days),

- The rapidity of threat development in crises has increased,

- An increasing proportion of crises involve both political
  and military issues, and

- The number of crises requiring rapid reaction has declined.

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TABLE 7

Summary List of U.S. Crises
1977-1978

Crisis Number	Crisis Date	Crisis Name
315	770225-770227	Uganda: USN responds to Amin threats.
316	770307-770526	First Zaire invasion, Western intervention.
317	770424	Ethiopia closes U.S. bases, ends aid program.
318	770714	North Korea shoots down U.S. helicopter.
319	770723-780324	Somali-Ethiopian war.
320	780509-781227	Iran: Massive unrest, martial law.
321	780511-780616	Second Zaire invasion, intervention.
322	780516-781129	Ethiopian drive against Eritrea.
323	780910-780922	Nicaraguan civil war.
324	781118-781127	U.S. Congressman slain; Jonestown incident.

TABLE 8

Geographic Breakdown of U.S. Crises[a]
(percentages of crises in the period)

	290 Cases[b] 1946-1975	101 Cases[c] 1946-1976	New Data 10 Cases 1977-1978
East Asia and Pacific Area	27	25	10
Eastern Europe–Soviet Union	16	11	0
Western Europe, Mediterranean Atlantic	13	17	0
Central and South America	12	18	20
Middle East and North Africa	10	12	40
North America	10	0	0
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa	9	15	30
Multiple Regions[d]	2	2	0
Polar	1	0	0
Space	1	1	0

[a] Breakdowns using JCS regional classification.

[b] Based on Table 1 in _Planning for Problems in Crisis Management_ (CACI, 1976).

[c] Based on Table 2 in _Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management_ (CACI, 1978c). This sample of cases was selected in earlier analyses because it contains those incidents of greatest policy interest for an understanding of U.S. crisis management problems. In this sense, these are relatively more "important" or "interesting" cases.

[d] Code used where the crisis overlapped existing regions.

TABLE 9

General Descriptors for U.S. Crises:
Crises Response Characteristics
(percent)

Variables and Categories	290 Cases[a] 1946-1975	101 Cases[b] 1946-1976	New Data 10 Cases 1977-1978
U.S. Objectives			
Noninvolvement	8	5	10
Maintain/restore status quo	74	74	70
Change previous status	18	21	20
U.S. Response			
Noninvolvement	14	10	10
Mediation	4	5	10
Assistance	13	15	40
Direct participation	38	37	10
Confrontation	31	34	30
Speed of Crisis Resolution			
Within 7 days	34	23	20
Within 8-30 days	20	16	10
Over 30 days	46	61	70
Crisis Outcome			
U.S. objectives/interests advanced	33	41	0
U.S. objectives/interests unaffected	26	20	70
U.S. influence lessened	41	40	30

---

[a] Based on Table 2, Chapter 2, in Planning for Problems in Crisis Management (CACI, 1976).

[b] Based on Table 4, Chapter 6, in Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management (CACI, 1978c).

TABLE 10

General Descriptors for U.S. Crises:
Leading Indicators and Warning Variables
(percent)

Variables and Categories	290 Cases[a] 1946-1975	101 Cases[b] 1946-1976	New Data 10 Cases 1977-1978
Precrisis Activity			
Routine	29	26	20
Tense	47	43	60
Increased readiness	24	32	20
Duration of Precrisis Activity			
No warning	37	32	20
Less than 30 days	24	20	40
More than 30 days	39	49	40
Awareness of Crisis Possibility			
Anticipated	38	38	30
Uncertainty	26	28	40
Surprise	35	35	30
Speed of Threat Development			
Less than 7 days	57	47	80
More than 7 days	43	54	20

---

[a] Based on Table 3, Chapter 2, in *Planning for Problems in Crisis Management* (CACI, 1976).

[b] Based on Table 1, Chapter 6, in *Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management* (CACI, 1978c).

TABLE 11

General Descriptors for U.S.
Crises: Crises Involvement Variables
(percent)

Variables and Categories	290 Cases[a] 1946-1975	101 Cases 1946-1976	New Data 10 Cases 1977-1978
Between Two or More Large Powers[b]			
United States is a party	36		0
United States is not a party	2		0
Not applicable[c]	63		100
Between Two or More Countries, Including at Least One Large Country Other Than the United States			
At least one party vital to U.S. interests	4		0
None of the parties vital to U.S. interests	3		0
Not applicable[c]	92	No Data	100
Between the United States and One or More Small Powers			
Where another large power has vital interests	12		30
No other large power has vital interests	12		10
Not applicable[c]	75		60
Between Two or More Small Powers			
At least one party vital to U.S. interests	6		0
No parties vital to U.S. interests	2		0
Not applicable[c]	91		100

---

[a] Based on Table 4, Chapter 2, in _Planning for Problems in Crisis Management_ (CACI, 1976).

[b] The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, United Kingdom, France, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are considered "large powers" in this research.

[c] A number of the crises are domestic activities; others refer to only one type of involvement. Hence, a "not applicable" category has been included. Domestic incidents are not recorded. Thus, the totals excluding "not applicable" do not equal 100 percent even when summed across the different involvement types.

TABLE 12

General Descriptors for U.S.
Crises: Scope, Nature, and Timing
(percent)

Variables and Categories	290 Cases[a] 1946-1975	101 Cases[b] 1946-1976	New Data 10 Cases 1977-1978
Crisis Activity			
Domestic	18	11	20
International	82	89	80
Nature of Crisis			
Political	22	8	30
Military	37	33	0
Both	42	59	70
Threat to U.S. Interests			
No significant threat	31	24	30
Some threat	56	52	60
Severe threat	13	25	10
Strategic Implications			
Nonnuclear	98	95	100
Nuclear	2	5	0
Decision Time			
Rapid reaction required	64	58	30
	36	42	70
Duration of Crisis Activity			
Less than 7 days	36	23	20
Between 8-30 days	20	19	10
Over 30 days	44	58	70

---

[a] Based on Table 5, Chapter 2, <u>Planning for Problems in Crisis Management</u> (CACI, 1976).

[b] Based on Tables 2 and 3, Chapter 6, in <u>Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management</u> (CACI, 1978c).

Crisis Actions and Objectives. The recent data on U.S. crisis actions are similar in distribution to the data for earlier years (see Table 13). The most commonly employed action during crises continues to be diplomacy. Other crisis actions that have continued to be frequently used are:

- Reaffirming existing political/military commitments,
- Repositioning sea forces,
- Providing other military assistance, and
- Providing supplies from U.S. depots.

There were no commitments of forces to combat and redeployment of non-nuclear forces was infrequent during 1977-1978.

As shown in Table 14, between 1977 and 1978 the most common U.S. crisis objectives were:

- Preventing the spread of Communist influence,
- Protecting legal and political rights,
- Restoring peace, and
- Containing opponents.

Among these, the first trend experienced the most dramatic increase from 32 to 70 percent. This could indicate either a resurgence of concern with anti-Communism, perceptions of a possible recent Communist political/military offensive, or both. Among conspicuously absent or infrequent actions between 1977 and 1978 are:

- Restoring the military balance of power,
- Preserving or restoring readiness,
- Detering imminent attacks, and
- Improving/rectifying deterrence posture.

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TABLE 13

Selected U.S. Crisis Actions
(percent)

U.S. Actions	1956-1965[a]	1966-1976[a]	New Data 1977-1978
Commit land forces to combat	9	0	0
Commit sea forces to combat	4	2	0
Commit air forces to combat	4	4	0
Commit land support	19	15	10
Commit sea support	13	21	0
Commit air support	22	15	30
Reposition land forces	7	19	10
Reposition sea forces	24	15	30
Reposition air forces	17	23	10
Threaten nuclear forces	4	0	0
Redeploy nuclear forces	2	15	0
Change nuclear alert status	0	4	0
Threaten nonnuclear forces	19	11	0
Redeploy nonnuclear forces	31	30	10
Change nonnuclear alert status	13	6	10
Provide military advisory assistance	19	9	30
Provide training for combat troops	13	2	0
Provide other military training	6	6	30
Draw down equipment from U.S. units	0	4	0
Provide supplies from U.S. depots	31	26	50
Provide supplies from nonmilitary sources	7	11	50
Provide military maintenance assistance	6	2	40
Provide other military logistic support	19	11	40
Provide other military assistance	28	32	20
Employ diplomacy	70	77	90
Mediate a dispute	4	11	0
Threaten to or withdraw support	2	4	20
Advocate/support peacekeeping efforts	9	13	30
Improve scientific/technical capabilities	2	6	0
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment	33	28	40
Lodge protests	24	21	20
Other U.S. actions	7	6	0
Total number of crises	54	47	10

---

[a] Based on Table 8, Chapter 4, in Executive Aid for Crisis Management: Technical Report (CACI, 1978a)

TABLE 14

Selected U.S. Crisis Objectives
(percent)

U.S. Objectives	1956-1965[a]	1966-1976[a]	New Data 1977-1978
Deter imminent attack	15	11	0
Improve or rectify deterrence posture	28	21	0
Put down a rebellion	11	6	20
Restore a regime	2	0	0
Regain access to economic resources	2	9	10
Restore peace	33	21	60
Restore territorial integrity	15	13	20
Restore military balance of power	17	26	0
Restore readiness	4	6	10
Preserve readiness	15	34	0
Preserve peace	24	32	20
Confirm or reestablish prestige	26	38	30
Preserve territory or facilities	35	26	40
Preserve regime from external threat	41	26	50
Preserve regime from internal threat	30	17	30
Preserve, restore, or improve alliance	28	26	50
Protect legal and political rights	52	47	70
Induce maintenance of current policy	30	11	0
Dissuade from a new policy	20	26	20
Protect a military asset	44	34	20
Assure continued economic access	20	17	30
Preserve or regain control of sea	9	9	0
Preserve or regain control of air	6	11	0
Contain opponents	15	17	60
Prevent spread of war	20	19	20
Preserve lines of communication	11	15	20
Preserve balance of power	20	38	30
Prevent spread of Communist influence	31	32	70
Prevent nuclear proliferation	4	2	0
Insure self-sufficiency	4	0	0
Total number of crises	54	47	10

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[a] Based on Table 2, Chapter 8, in Executive Aid for Crisis Management: Technical Report (CACI, 1978a).

This pattern may reflect a 'stabilized' deterrence/balance relationship, at least insofar as crisis behavior is concerned.

Crisis Management Problems. Based on 1946-1976 data, CACI (1978a) concluded that the most common problems in U.S. crisis management are:

- Problems in crisis timing,

- System/procedural constraints on actions,

- Problems in crisis handling, and

- System-related delays in decision-making/actions.

As can be discerned from Tables 15 through 17, these problems persisted during 1977-1978 as well. Other frequent problems during this period, however, also included:

- Problems in the operating environment,

- Emotional/ideological issues involved in decision-making, and

- System/procedural constraints on actions.

COMMON U.S. AND SOVIET CRISES

Defining and Identifying Common Crises

As was noted in the preceding section of the chapter, some subtle differences exist between the data set of U.S. crisis operations and Soviet crisis concerns. At the same time, however, both focus on events of sufficient similarity to allow for meaningful comparison. The analyses in this section compare those crisis events that occurred in both the Soviet and U.S. datafiles. Where (as occurred in a number of instances) more than one U.S. "crisis" corresponded to a single Soviet "crisis" (or the reverse) cases were merged to produce a one-to-one mapping.

TABLE 15

U.S. Crisis Management Problems:
National-Level Decision-Making Problems
(percent)

	1946-1976[a]	1946-1953[a]	1954-1965[a]	1966-1976[a]	New Data 1977-1978
1. System-Related Delays in Decision-Making/Action					
Delayed decision on action	39	0	47	37	30
Delayed transmission of decisions/orders	5	0	2	9	10
Extensive interagency coordination required for action	55	56	53	56	10
Concurrence legally required for action	11	11	10	12	10
Referral to international agencies required	39	33	49	28	30
President involved as decision-maker	78	56	86	74	70
2. System/Procedural Constraints on Action					
Security/sensitivity issues	18	11	12	26	10
Constraints on military action	65	44	76	58	50
Consideration of U.S. domestic impact	29	44	25	30	70
Consideration of international impact	83	44	90	83	30
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	48	33	55	42	20
3. Legal Issues Involved					
Legality of proposed action is issue	32	11	35	33	10
Presidential approval legally required	12	22	10	12	30
4. Resources for Decision-Making/ Action					
Inadequate communications facilities	7	11	4	9	0
Inability to reinforce local units in time	14	11	14	14	0
Inability to provide additional logistical support	8	11	6	9	0
5. Intelligence Failures at Decision-Making Level					
Inadequate intelligence input	22	22	22	23	20
Delay in securing adequate facts	29	33	27	30	60
Failure to recognize import of information received	23	33	25	19	20
6. Emotional/Ideological Issues Involved in Decision-Making					
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	43	56	57	23	80
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	47	56	43	49	60
7. Interpersonal Factors in Decision-Making					
Multilingual problems	6	44	2	2	30
Press relations/public information are significant factors	49	33	45	56	60
Delay in contacting proper persons	3	0	0	7	30
Distracted attention due to multiple crises	10	0	8	14	0
8. Prolonged Crisis Problems					
Boredom	0	0	0	0	0
Fatigue	0	0	0	0	0
Frustration	10	11	6	14	30
Turnover of Key Personnel	5	11	2	7	0
9. Problems in Selecting Action Personnel					
Choice of commander and staff	10	11	12	7	0
Sudden call-up/dispatch of troops	28	22	27	30	40
Intermediate headquarters/chain of command problems	7	0	8	7	0
No clear lines of responsibility to a single commander	4	0	4	5	0
Loss or transfer of key personnel	4	11	4	2	0

[a] Based on Table 4, Chapter 3, in A Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management (CACI, 1979).

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TABLE 16

U.S. Crisis Management
Problems: Operational-Level Problems
(percent)

	1946-1976[a]	1946-1953[a]	1954-1965[a]	1966-1976[a]	New Data 1977-1978
10. Constraints on Operations					
Joint operation with language barrier	16	44	20	5	20
Action in friendly country/area	55	67	51	56	20
Action in hostile country/area	26	11	31	23	20
Delay in receipt of decisons/orders	10	11	6	14	0
Public relations/press censorship	17	22	10	23	30
Inadequate communications for operating forces	11	33	8	9	0
11. Physiological Problems for Operating Forces					
Fatigue	1	0	0	2	10
Lack of activity (boredom)	1	0	2	0	0
12. Information Failures by Operating Forces					
Fail to acquire adequate information in time	16	33	8	21	10
Act on inadequate/incorrect information	6	33	4	2	10
Delay/fail in transmission of information	9	11	6	12	0
13. Failures in Taking Appropriate/Timely Action					
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	24	33	25	21	0
Action inadequate to solve crisis	17	11	20	14	0
Forces inadequate to solve crisis	19	33	12	23	0
Fail to execute action in time	6	11	6	5	0
Inadequate local logistic support to accomplich objectives	20	22	22	16	0
Inadequate control of local forces	3	11	4	0	0
14. FORSTAT Problems					
Readiness of forces	32	11	27	42	10
Availability of forces (priority)	30	11	22	42	20
Choice of units	31	0	31	40	0
Availability of equipment	21	11	18	26	20
Availability of lift (sea/air)	17	11	18	16	50
Consideration of replacement requirements in deploying units	5	0	4	7	0
15. Problems in the Operating Environment					
Geography/terrain/climate	42	33	33	54	80
Distance to crisis area	39	33	27	54	70
Unique logistics/communications requirements	24	11	18	33	70
Need for additional/special intelligence	32	11	31	37	60
Security/sensitivity a factor	37	0	27	56	40

[a] Based on Table 5, Chapter 3, in *A Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management* (CACI, 1978c).

TABLE 17

U.S. Crisis Management
Problems: General Problems
(percent)

	1946-1976[a]	1946-1953[a]	1954-1965[a]	1966-1976[a]	New Data 1977-1978
16. General Problems in Crisis Planning					
No appropriate plans ready for crisis contingency	46	56	39	51	30
Contingency plans exist but are inadequate	21	0	29	16	10
Contingency plans exist but are not followed	14	0	10	21	0
17. General Problems in Crisis Handling					
Situation not recognized initially; action not timely	7	0	12	2	20
Situation recognized; actions inadequate	18	22	16	18	0
Crisis develops despite adequate actions	24	11	29	21	30
Overreaction to crisis	5	0	0	12	0
Late U.S. military involvement	41	44	53	26	50
U.S. military involvement at onset	51	56	41	61	20
18. General Problems in Crisis Timing					
Situation develops over time before crisis level is reached	39	22	39	42	20
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	45	33	45	47	60
Crisis occurs without warning	37	44	18	56	20
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/solution	26	33	16	35	30
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	28	44	33	19	30
Multiple simultaneous crises	45	22	51	42	100

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[a] Based on Table 6, Chapter 3, in A Crisis Problem Analyzer for Crisis Management (CACI, 1978c).

List of Common Crises

Table 18 presents the list of 90 crises of concern to both superpowers. In order to make the task of describing the attributes of these crises more manageable, for the remainder of this chapter these crises are divided into three time periods:

- 1946-1955: a period that corresponds to the first phase of the Cold War (and the Stalin era) and includes many of the highly intense U.S.-Soviet crises such as Iran (1946), China (1946), Czechoslovakia (1948), Berlin (1948), Korea (1950), and Taiwan (1954).

- 1956-1965: a period that coincides with the second phase of the Cold War (Krushchev era) and includes many intense crises such as the Middle East (1956), Hungary (1956), Taiwan (1958), Berlin (1958), U-2 incident (1960), Congo (1960), Cuba (1961), Cuba (1962), Sino-Indian War (1962), Laos (1963), Tonkin Gulf (1964), Congo (1964), and the Dominican Republic (1965). This period also included the U.S.-Soviet missile race and competition in space exploration.

- 1966-1978: a period of relatively low superpower tension and few intense crises (Brezhnev period). In this period the Soviet Union overcame its great nuclear strategic inferiority to the United States and greatly increased its force projection capabilities through expansion and modernization of its general purpose forces. The major superpower crises of this period include the Middle East (1967), Czechoslovakia (1968), the Pueblo incident (1968), Sino-Soviet clashes (1969), Jordan (1970), the Indo-Pakistan War (1971), the Middle East (1973), Cyprus (1974), Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), and Iran (1978). With the exception of the 1973 Middle East War and, to some extent, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the crises of this period were generally far less dangerous (in terms of likelihood for a U.S.-Soviet war) than many of the incidents in the two earlier periods.

General Crisis Descriptors

Tables 19 and 20 present two series of general crisis descriptors for the common U.S.-Soviet crises. Table 19 is based on Soviet descriptors whereas

TABLE 18

List of Common Crises[a] -- Crises in Which
Both Superpowers Were Participants, 1946-1978

Crisis Number	Crisis Date	Crisis Name
1	1946	Soviet-Iranian disputes
2	1946	Greek civil war
3	1946	Chinese civil war
4	1946	Turkey rejects USSR demands to join in Dardanelles defense
5	1946	Status of Trieste
6	1946	Palestine -- Establishment of State of Israel
7	1947	Italian CP ousted from Government role -- riots
8	1948	CP assumes power in Czechoslovakia
9	1948	Costa Rica invaded by Nicaraguan based rebels
10	1948	Berlin blockade
11	1948	First Arab-Israeli war
12	1948	Cominform expels Yugoslovia
13	1949	Federal Republic of Germany created, Germany divided
14	1950	USSR downs U.S. bomber over USSR airspace - Latvia
15	1950	U.S. backs France in Indochina
16	1950	Korean war
17	1950	U.S. 7th fleet moves to Taiwan straits
18	1950	Puerto Rico nationalist uprising
19	1950	Yugoslovia tensions
20	1952	Burmese operations against KMT forces
21	1953	Workers riot in East Berlin
22	1954	Taiwan straits crisis
23	1955	Egyptian-Israeli tensions
24	1955	Costa Rica fights Nicaraguan based rebels
25	1956	Jordanian crisis -- continued Arab-Israeli conflict
26	1956	Mideast war; Suez canal crisis
27	1956	Gomulka assumes power in Poland
28	1956	Hungarian revolution
29	1957	Jordan survives dismemberment, ousts Egyptians
30	1957	Syria-Turkey dispute -- USSR supports Syria
31	1958	U.S.-Venezuela tensions (Nixon visit)
32	1958	Members of French military join Algerian revolt -- deGaulle returns
33	1958	Civil disorders in Lebanon -- U.S. Marines sent
34	1958	PRC shells Quemoy-Matsu-Taiwan straits
35	1958	Berlin crisis
36	1959	Sino-Indian border clashes
37	1960	U-2 incident
38	1960	Turkish military coup
39	1960	Congo crisis
40	1960	Cuba-U.S. tensions
41	1961	Bay of Pigs
42	1961	Dominican Republic crisis
43	1961	Berlin border crisis
44	1962	U.S. Cuban tensions
45	1962	U.S. sends troops to Thailand
46	1962	Cuban missile crisis
47	1962	PRC-India border war
48	1963	Civil war in Laos; U.S. 7th Fleet to Gulf of Siam
49	1963	Haitian crisis; conflict in Dominican Republic
50	1963	Cyprus troubles; Greece-Turkey war threat
51	1964	Panama Canal zone flag riots
52	1964	British put down African mutinies
53	1964	Coup in Brazil
54	1964	Tonkin Gulf incidents
55	1964	Congo: U.S. airlifts Belgian forces to Stanleyville
56	1965	Indonesia-Malaysia border conflicts
57	1965	India-Pakistan war
58	1965	Southern Rhodesian independence
59	1965	Dominican revolt; U.S. intervention
60	1965	New border incidents between Israel, Jordan, and Syria

(Continued)

Table 18
List of Common Crises
Continued

61	1967	Sino-Soviet border clash on Ussuri Island
62	1967	Six day war
63	1968	Czech crisis
64	1968	Seizure of USS Pueblo by North Koreans
65	1968	B-52 with four H-Bombs crashes near Thule Greenland
66	1968	FRG-GDR tension
67	1969	PRC-USSR border clashes
68	1969	Libyan coup
69	1970	Israeli-UAR conflict
70	1970	Jordan-Palestine guerrillas-Syria conflict
71	1970	U.S. general officers accidently land in Armenia
72	1971	Indo-Pakistani conflict; Bangladesh formed
73	1972	Sadat expels Soviet advisors
74	1973	October Middle East war
75	1974	Ethiopian emperor overthrown
76	1974	Military coup in Portugal
77	1974	Cyprus civil war; Turkish invasion
78	1975	USSR rejects U.S. trade deal
79	1975	U.S. ends aid; Turkey closes U.S. bases
80	1975	U.S. Mayaguez operation
81	1975	Civil war in Angola
82	1976	Lebanese civil war
83	1976	U.S. accused of bombing Siem Riap
84	1976	Egypt abrogates Soviet treaty
85	1976	The Aegean crisis
86	1977	First Zaire invasion, western intervention
87	1977	Ethiopian war
88	1978	Nicaraguan civil war
89	1978	Second Zaire invasion, Western intervention
90	1978	Unrest in Iran

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[a] Selected from 415 Soviet crises and 324 U.S. Crises for 1946-1978 (see also Tables 1 and 7).

TABLE 19

Frequency of Soviet General Descriptors for
Crisis Involving Both Superpowers,[a] 1946-1978

	Period 1 24 Crises 1946-1955	Period 2 36 Crises 1956-1965	Period 3 30 Crises 1966-1978
Crisis Location			
North America	0	0	1
Central and South America	3	11	1
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	5	2	4
Soviet Union and East Europe	6	5	6
Middle East and North Africa	3	7	9
South Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	1	6	6
Pacific and East Asia	6	5	3
Crisis Characteristics			
Dangerous Domestic Trends/Events	2	2	1
Riot, Other Civil Disorders	1	2	1
Uprising, Revolt, Insurgency	3	4	2
War of National Liberation	2	1	0
Coup d'Etat	2	3	2
Structural Change, Dangerous Trends/Events	3	0	3
Border Incident/Territorial Dispute	2	5	4
Foreign Intervention, Conflict Short of War	7	17	8
War	2	2	8
Scope			
Domestic	6	9	4
International	18	27	26
Strategic Confrontation			
None	16	28	23
Potential	7	7	6
Actual	1	1	1

(Continued)

Table 19
Frequency of Soview General Descriptors
Continued

Threat to CP, CP/Movement, or CP Regime

None	9	22	17
Well-Being, Activities Threatened	9	7	12
Survival Threatened	6	7	1

Level of Violence

Nonviolent Event	13	10	7
Violent Event	11	26	23

Soviet In-Theater Crisis Management Capabilities

Substantial	12	6	7
Moderate	0	1	15
Minor/Negligible	12	29	7

Soviet Objectives with Respect to In-Theater Supported Actors

Preserve Status Quo Ante	5	12	8
Restore Status Quo Ante	3	7	6
Change	13	12	10

Soviet Objectives with Respect to In-Theater Opposed Actors

Oppose Efforts to Preserve Status Quo Ante	8	11	8
Oppose Efforts to Restore Status Quo Ante	1	1	1
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	11	21	15

Crisis Outcome for the Soviet Union

Favorable	5	11	9
Mixed	5	14	13
Unfavorable	7	7	3

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[a] Crisis descriptors were coded for all 90 crises.

TABLE 20

Frequency of U.S. General Descriptors for
Crises Involving Both Superpowers,[a] 1946-1978

	Period 1 24 Crises 1946-1955	Period 2 36 Crises 1956-1965	Period 3 30 Crises 1966-1978
Precrisis Activity			
Routine -- not focused on ensuing or related events	8	8	8
Tense -- gradual escalation of focused activity	12	16	15
Increased Readiness -- activities focused on crisis	4	12	7
Duration of Pre-Crisis Activity			
None, Crisis occurs without warning	5	5	9
Short (<30 days)	11	12	7
Extended (>30 days)	8	19	14
Scope			
Internal or domestic	6	5	5
International	18	31	25
Nature of the Crisis			
Political	7	4	3
Military	10	9	8
Both	7	23	19
Duration of the Crisis Activity			
Short (<7 days)	3	7	6
Moderate (7-30 days)	10	3	5
Extended (>30 days)	11	26	19
Crisis Resolution			
Quick (within 7 days after peak)	2	6	7
Moderate (within 30 days after peak)	9	4	2
Extended (over 30 days)	13	26	21

(Continued)

2-34

Table 20
Frequency of U.S. General Descriptors
Continued

Crisis Outcome

Favorable to U.S. objectives and interests	12	14	14
No Change	6	10	5
Unfavorable to U.S. objectives and interests	6	12	11

Awareness of Crisis Possibility

Anticipated -- on basis of indications monitoring	8	12	12
Uncertain -- abnormal activity seen; meaning not clear	10	13	10
Surprise -- no forewarning of crisis	6	11	8

Threat to U.S. Interests

Low threat to U.S. interests	8	18	9
Moderate threat to U.S. interests	14	12	15
High threat to U.S. interests	2	6	6

Threat Timing

Rapid (<7 days)	11	15	14
Extended (>7 days)	13	21	16

Decision Time

Short -- rapid response required	11	19	12
Extended -- attention demanded but not quick response	13	17	18

U.S. Response, Participation

Noninvolvement	4	8	5
Mediation	2	3	2
Providing assistance (military or political)	8	6	9
Direct (U.S. personnel beyond advisor level involved)	8	11	8
Direct confrontation with other nation	2	8	6

(Continued)

Table 20
Frequency of U.S. General Descriptors
Continued

U.S. Objectives in Crisis Resolution

None	3	6	2
Maintain/restore status quo ante	15	24	21
Change previous status	6	6	7

Strategic Implications

Nonnuclear	24	34	28
Nuclear	0	2	2

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[a] Crisis descriptors were coded for all 90 crises.

Table 20 is based on U.S. descriptors. Since the two sets were coded separately from each superpower's vantagepoint, they may indicate different frequencies even when the crisis categories are the same descriptors.[6]

Comparing the frequency of crisis descriptors for the three periods -- 1946-1955, 1956-1965, and 1966-1978 -- reveals several interesting potential trends:

- Crisis locations have shifted and become concentrated primarily in the Middle East/North Africa, and South Asia/Indian Ocean/Sub-Saharan Africa,

- An increasing proportion of crises were of international (rather than domestic) scope, however, the proportion involving actual and potential strategic confrontation was very small over all three periods,

- Both superpowers have become predominantly interested in preserving or restoring the status quo ante rather than changing it,

- For both superpowers, the outcome of most crises continues to be either unfavorable or mixed rather than favorable,[7]

- For the Soviet Union, an increasing proportion of crises were in locations where its in-theater crisis management capabilities were either moderate or substantial (rather than negligible),

- For the United States, an increasing number of crises occurred with little or no precrisis activity and, correspondingly, most crises were not anticipated.

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[6] Missing data codes also have the same effect.

[7] Here, as throughout this section, it is important to recall that conclusions generalize only over the set of 90 common crises -- there are more than 300 crises in both the U.S. and Soviet databases.

Crisis Actions

Tables 21 and 22 present frequencies of Soviet and U.S. actions during crises that involved both countries. The six most common Soviet actions during crises were:

- Employing diplomacy,

- Lodging protests,

- Providing economic assistance,

- Drawing down military equipment from Soviet depots,

- Providing supplies from Soviet depots, and

- Acting with two or more nations.

Whereas, the six most common U.S. actions were:

- Employing diplomacy,

- Unilateral actions,

- Military intelligence collection,

- U.S. acting with two or more countries,

- Improving/maintaining force readiness, and

- Providing supplies from U.S. depots.

As can be seen, the crisis activites of both superpowers have a great deal in common. A significant difference is the greater U.S. tendency for unilateral actions, the incidence of which, however, declined from 42 percent during 1956-1965 to 36 percent during 1966-1978.

TABLE 21

Frequency of Soviet Actions During
Crises Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

Soviet Action Categories	Period 1 8/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 13/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Commit land forces to combat	2	1	3
Commit sea forces to combat	0	0	0
Commit air forces to combat	2	2	3
Commit support services (land)	2	3	5
Commit support services (sea)	0	1	0
Commit support services (air)	2	4	3
Reposition land forces	6	6	4
Reposition sea forces	2	4	9
Reposition air forces	5	5	8
Threaten nuclear forces as a deterrent	0	1	0
Redeploy nuclear forces as a deterrent	1	0	1
Change alert status of nuclear forces	2	0	0
Threaten nonnuclear forces as a deterrent	0	7	3
Redeploy nonnuclear forces as a deterrent	4	5	5
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces	6	8	11
Redeploy peacekeeping forces	0	0	0
Show of military force	6	6	12
Military blockade or quarantine	2	2	1
Isolated military contact	3	2	4
Military forces used in search and rescue	1	1	0
Military intelligence collection	0	0	0
Military intelligence dissemination to an ally	0	0	0
Military intelligence provided to an antagonist	0	0	0
Military maneuvers or training exercises	6	4	3
Improve, maintain force readiness	7	9	7
Covert military operation	2	2	5
Military intervention between combatants	1	1	0
Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment	4	6	10
Provide military advisory assistance	3	7	13

(Continued)

Table 21
Frequency of Soviet Actions
Continued

Provide military training for combat troops	3	6	7
Provide other military training	3	5	9
Drawdown military equipment from USSR units	5	10	18
Provide supplies from USSR depots	5	9	17
Provide supplies from non-military sources	4	7	10
Provide military maintenance assistance	4	6	11
Provide other military logistics assistance	3	7	10
Provide other mlitary assistance	3	6	4
Make POL/ECO commitment implying new military mission	0	1	2
Undertake a new military mission	6	8	6
Accept a new military cost	6	7	10
Modify an existing defense treaty	1	1	5
Modify an existing base rights treaty	0	0	2
Modify an existing status of forces agreement	0	0	4
Seek assistance in decision-making	2	3	2
Take no military action	2	1	14
Employ diplomacy	7	11	25
Mediate a dispute	0	2	6
Threaten to, or actually, withdraw support	2	0	6
Advocate/support peacekeeping efforts	1	5	4
Improve scientific/technical capabilities	0	0	2
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment	4	10	14
Lodge protest(s)	7	11	18
Other	0	0	2
USSR acts alone	1	4	11
USSR acts with one other nation	1	5	3
USSR acts with two or more other nations	5	4	16
United Nations involved	6	7	11
Military intervention in a Marxist-Leninist state	1	2	3
Cooperative intervention in a Third World state	0	3	8
Joint operation with other Marxist-Leninist state	3	0	3
U.N. Veto	3	2	5
U.N. resolution and/or amendments	4	5	6
U.N. speeches and/or letters	6	8	12

(Continued)

Table 21
Frequency of Soviet Actions
Continued

Support existing regime	3	9	14
Support anti-regime insurgent movement	2	1	9
Support anti-regime CP or CP movement	4	1	7
Provide political/propaganda support	7	12	19
Provide economic assistance	3	4	12
Provide crisis-related military aid	4	8	11
Fairly direct use of military forces	7	9	10
Use of WP, CMEA to support political goals	3	7	14
Use of international other organizations	4	0	5

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[a] The numerator indicates number of crises for which actions were coded and the denominator indicates the total number of crises that could have been coded.

TABLE 22

Frequency of U.S. Actions
During Crises Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

U.S. Action Category	Period 1 0/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 36/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Commit land forces to combat		2	0
Commit sea forces to combat		2	1
Commit air forces to combat		2	1
Commit support services (land)		5	2
Commit support services (sea)		2	3
Commit support services (air)		6	1
Reposition land forces		2	4
Reposition sea forces		8	7
Reposition air forces		4	6
Threaten nuclear forces as a deterrent		1	0
Redeploy nuclear forces as a deterrent		0	3
Change alert status of nuclear forces as a deterrent		0	0
Threaten nonnuclear forces as a deterrent		5	2
Redeploy nonnuclear forces as a deterrent		0	3
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces		3	3
Redeploy peacekeeping forces		2	2
Show of military force		10	8
Military blockade or quarantine		2	0
Isolated military contact		2	2
Military forces used in search and rescue operation		6	5
Military intelligence collection		7	12
Military intelligence dissemination to an ally		0	4
Military intelligence provided to an antagonist		0	0
Military maneuvers or training exercises	NO	0	0
Improve, maintain force readiness	DATA	10	10
Covert military operation	CODED	5	5
Military intervention between combatants		3	3
Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment		4	3
Provide military advisory assistance		3	5
Provide military training for combat troops		2	1
Provide other military training		0	3
Drawdown military equipment from U.S. units		0	1
Provide supplies from U.S. depots		7	10
Provide supplies from nonmilitary sources		1	8
Provide military maintenance assistance		2	5
Provide other military logistics assistance		5	8
Provide other military assistance		6	4
Make POL/ECO commitment implying new military mission		4	1
Undertake a new military mission		7	6
Accept a new military cost		10	8
Modify an existing defense treaty		2	1
Modify an existing base rights treaty		1	3
Modify an existing status of forces agreement		1	2
Seek assistance in decision-making		0	6
Take no military action		0	8
Employ diplomacy		16	26
Mediate a dispute		2	6
Threaten to, or actually, withdraw support		4	3
Advocate/support peacekeeping efforts		3	4
Improve scientific/technical capabilities		0	0
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment		8	9
Lodge protest(s)		6	6
Other		0	0
U.S. acts alone		8	15
U.S. acts with one other nation		6	4
U.S. acts with two or more other nations		11	11
United Nations involved		4	2

[a] The numerator indicates number of crises for which actions were coded and the denominator indicates the total number of crises that occurred.

2-42

Crisis Objectives

Tables 23 and 24 present frequencies of Soviet and U.S. crisis objectives that were coded for common crises from 1946 to 1978. The 10 most common Soviet aims were:

- Contain opponents,

- Deny military access,

- Neutralize Western influence in the Third World,

- Alter balance of power in favor of the United States,

- Support shifts in favor of Communism,

- Deny political access,

- Maximize Soviet prestige,

- Avoid direct involvement, and

- Confirm/reestablish prestige.

The 10 most common U.S. crisis objectives were:

- Preserve regime from external threat,

- Protect human life,

- Discover intentions or actions,

- Deny military access,

- Deny political access,

- Restore peace,

- Preserve balance of power,

- Prevent spread of Communism,

- Preserve/restore/improve alliance, and

- Protect legal and political rights.

TABLE 23

Frequency of Soviet Objectives During Crises Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

Soviet Objectives	Period 1 8/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 13/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Deter imminent attack	2	4	3
Improve or rectify deterrence posture	4	3	4
Put down rebellion	1	3	1
Restore a regime	1	2	1
Regain access to economic resources	1	1	1
Restore peace	4	3	8
Restore territorial integrity	6	6	7
Restore military balance of power	0	0	3
Restore readiness	0	1	0
Preserve readiness	5	3	3
Preserve peace	3	3	4
Confirm or reestablish prestige	7	10	19
Preserve territory and/or facilities	6	6	12
Preserve regime from external threat	4	11	14
Preserve regime from internal threat	3	4	6
Preserve, restore, or improve alliance	6	5	10
Protect legal and political rights	5	4	16
Induce maintenance of current policy	0	1	2
Dissuade from a new policy	4	1	11
Protect a military asset	1	3	7
Support a new government	1	1	5
Induce national reorientation	2	0	11
Induce adoption of a new policy	5	2	12
Bring about the fall of a regime	4	2	7
Support insurgency	1	1	9
Deny political access	7	8	20
Deny military access	8	9	21
Assure continued economic access	5	1	5
Preserve or regain control of the sea	1	0	0
Preserve or regain control of the air	1	1	1
Deny success to terrorists or hijackers	0	0	0
Protect human life	1	0	1
Provide sanctuary or asylum	1	0	2
Support critical negotiations	3	1	1
Discover intentions or actions	4	7	12
Prepare for alternative missions	4	2	7
Support efforts by the United Nations	1	5	3
Contain opponent(s)	6	10	24
Prevent spread of war	4	4	6
Preserve line of communications	3	3	8
Regain technical advantage	0	0	1
Restore prestige	4	5	6
Preserve balance of power	0	2	2
Prevent spread of Communist influence	4	3	18
Prevent nuclear proliferation	0	0	1
Insure self-sufficiency	1	0	5
Avoid direct involvement	5	5	19
Preserve secrecy	4	4	21
Preserve elite power system within the USSR	0	1	3
Preserve buffer system	6	3	5
Preserve unity of international Communism	5	1	4
Prevent reemergence of Germany as a major power	2	2	1
Contain PRC expansion	0	1	5
Avoid isolation	3	2	6
Maximize Soviet prestige	8	8	19
Support shifts in favor of Communism	6	10	20
Neutralize Western influence in the Third World	2	6	21
Achieve recognition as a global superpower	1	8	12
Prevent U.N. from taking independent action	3	3	4
Alter balance of power favorable to USSR	6	7	21

[a] The numerator indicates the number of crises that were coded and the denominator indicates the number that could have been coded.

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TABLE 24

Frequency of U.S. Objectives During
Crises Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

U.S. Crisis Objectives	Period 1 0/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 25/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Deter imminent attack		5	3
Improve or rectify deterrence posture		6	2
Put down rebellion		4	5
Restore a regime		1	0
Regain access to economic resources		1	3
Restore peace		13	10
Restore territorial integrity		5	5
Restore military balance of power		6	5
Restore readiness		1	1
Preserve readiness		3	4
Preserve peace		6	5
Confirm or reestablish prestige		7	6
Preserve territory/facilities		8	7
Preserve regime from external threat		10	13
Preserve regime from internal threat		8	8
Preserve/restore/improve alliance		5	10
Protect legal and political rights		12	8
Induce maintenance of current policy		9	3
Dissuade from a new policy		4	7
Protect a military asset		9	7
Support a new government		5	2
Induce national reorientation		3	6
Induce adoption of a new policy		3	5
Bring about the fall of a regime	NO	2	1
Support insurgency	DATA	1	1
Deny political access		12	11
Deny military access		14	9
Assure continued economic access		5	4
Preserve/regain control of the sea		3	3
Preserve/regain control of the air		2	2
Deny success to terrorists/hijackers		1	3
Protect human life		15	13
Provide sanctuary or asylum		3	4
Support critical negotiations		5	8
Discover intentions or actions		4	12
Prepare for alternative missions		7	8
Support the United Nations		3	3
Contain opponent(s)		4	8
Prevent spread of war		5	6
Preserve line of communications		2	2
Regain technical advantage		0	0
Restore prestige		4	5
Preserve balance of power		4	10
Prevent spread of Communism		9	11
Prevent nuclear proliferation		0	1
Insure self-sufficiency		0	0
Avoid direct involvement		2	5
Preserve secrecy		0	1

[a] The numerator indicates number of crises for which objectives were coded and the denominator indicates the total number of crises that could have been coded.

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Based on their 10 most common crisis objectives, it appears that the United States is somewhat more reactive than the Soviet Union in crisis situations. In other words, the Soviet Union appears to try, during crisis situations, to exploit the opportunities available to it for the purpose of maximizing its prestige and shifting international forces in favor of itself and world socialism. This view is consistent with the Western image of the Soviet Union as an aggressive power. However, it is also consistent with the Soviet leadership's public interpretations of its foreign policy in international crises. Obviously the Soviet interpretation is quite different from the Western view. The Soviet image of their crisis policy is one that sees the capitalist countries as the initiators of crises but, even so, maintains that the socialist countries retain the initiative during crises due to their historically correct foreign policy tactics and strategies. In the Soviet view, even though the capitalist countries are the aggressors their aggressions are based partly on the increasingly weak strategic position resulting from the shift in "correlation of forces" against them. In short, Soviet commentators see themselves as engaged in a policy of active defense in crisis management behavior (Grechko, 1976).

Crisis Problems

Problems encountered by the Soviet Union and the United States during common international crises are presented in Tables 25 and 26. The most frequent crisis problems for the Soviet Union were:

- Consideration of international relations,

- Simultaneous multiple crises,

- Entanglement in ideological issues,

- Sensitivity to criticism from allies,

- Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks,

- Soviet political-military involvement at the outset,

TABLE 25

Frequency of Soviet Problems Encountered
During Crises Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

Soviet Problem Categories	Period 1 8/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 14/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Constraints on military action	2	8	15
Consideration of Soviet domestic impact	4	3	6
Consideration of international relations	7	12	24
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	7	12	17
Inability to reinforce local units in time	0	2	2
Inability to provide additional logistic support	1	2	3
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	6	8	18
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	5	4	16
Multilingual problems	0	1	5
Delay in contacting proper individuals	1	0	0
Action in friendly country (area)	6	9	13
Action in hostile country (area)	6	5	16
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	3	8	14
Action inadequate to solve crisis	4	3	7
Forces inadequate to solve crisis	1	4	2
Failure to execute action in time	0	0	2
Inadequate logistic support	0	1	2
Inadequate control of local forces	2	4	6
Nonavailability of transportation (sea/air)	3	6	4
Geography, terrain, climate	2	5	8
Distance to crisis area	3	6	13
Unique logistics/communication requirements	0	4	8
Crisis develops despite substantial actions	1	7	4
Overreaction to crisis	1	0	1
Late Soviet involvement at outset	2	4	7
Soviet political-military involvement at outset	6	8	17
Situation is slow developing	0	3	14
Situation develops over time; crisis is sudden	8	10	14
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/solution	5	8	7
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	7	6	17
Simultaneous multicrisis	6	7	23
Perceived threat to homeland	2	3	10
Perceived threat to key regions	5	3	11
Fear of Germany	4	2	1
Fear of encirclement by Western states	5	4	4
Sensitivity to criticism from allies	1	3	18
Other Marxist-Leninist states involved	6	7	14
Opponents include Marxist-Leninist states	2	2	7
Joint operations with other Marxist-Leninist states	3	1	1
Local CP's and movements threatened	4	3	9
Local CP's and movements fail to follow Soviets	1	1	1
Local CP's and movements oppose Soviets	1	0	5
Little military experience in crisis theater	3	6	1

[a] The numerator indicates the number of crises for which problems were coded and the denominator indicates the total number of crises that could have been coded.

TABLE 26

Frequency of Problems Encountered by the
United States During Crisis Involving Both Superpowers, 1946-1978

U.S. Problem Categories	Period 1 6/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 26/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Delayed decision on action	1	15	12
Delayed transmission of decisions/ orders	0	1	3
Extensive interagency coordination required for action	4	16	14
Concurrence(s) legally required for proposed action	1	2	3 .
Referral to international agencies (U.N., NATO, OAS) required	2	13	10
President involved as decision-maker	5	22	17
Security/sensitivity issues	0	2	7
Misperception of constraints	0	2	1
Constraints on military action	5	19	16
Consideration of U.S. domestic impact	2	7	11
Consideration of international relations	5	23	23
Proposed action produces domestic policy conflict	2	9	4
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	2	14	11
Legality of proposed action is an issue	2	8	6
Presidential approval legally required	2	3	4
Inadequate communication facilities	1	2	1
Inability to reinforce local units in time	1	3	2
Inability to provide additional logistical support	1	1	1
Inadequate intelligence input for decision-makers	2	5	6
Delay in securing adequate facts	2	6	11
Failure to recognize import of information received	3	7	5
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	5	13	11
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	3	13	13
Multilingual problems	3	0	4
Press relations/public information significant factors	1	11	20
Delay in contacting proper individuals	0	0	3
Distracted attention due to multiple crises	0	3	4
Boredom	0	0	1
Fatigue	1	0	0
Frustration	1	1	4
Turnover of key personnel	1	0	0
Choice of commander and staff	0	3	0
Sudden call-up/dispatch of troops	2	7	9
Intermediate headquarters/chain of command	0	2	1
No clear lines of responsiblity to a single commander	0	2	0
Loss or transfer of key personnel	1	0	0
Joint operation-language	3	4	2
Action in friendly country (area)	4	12	10
Action in hostile country (area)	3	6	5
Delay in receipt of decision/orders	1	1	2
Public relations/press censorship	1	2	6
Inadequate communications for operating forces	3	2	3
Fatigue	1	0	0

(Continued)

Table 26
Problems Encountered by U.S.
Continued

U.S. Problem Categories	Period 1 6/24 Crises[a] 1946-1955	Period 2 26/36 Crises[a] 1956-1965	Period 3 30/30 Crises[a] 1966-1978
Lack of Activity-boredom	0	0	0
Fail to acquire adequate information in time	2	2	6
Act on inadequate/incorrect information	2	1	0
Delay/fail in transmission of information	0	1	2
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	3	6	7
Action inadequate to solve crisis	2	5	3
Forces inadequate to solve crisis	2	5	3
Fail to execute action in time	0	2	1
Inadequate local logistical support to accomplish objectives	3	7	2
Inadequate control of local forces	1	2	0
Readiness of forces	2	7	6
Availabilty of forces (priority)	1	5	7
Choice of units	0	9	8
Availability of equipment	2	6	7
Availability of lift (sea/air)	2	4	4
Consideration of replacement requirements in deploying units	0	1	1
Geography-terrain-climate	5	6	10
Distance to crisis area	2	7	11
Unique logistics/communications requirements	2	3	9
Need for additional special intelligence	1	6	13
Security/sensitivity a factor	0	5	12
No appropriate plans ready for crisis contingency	3	12	8
Contingency plans exist but are inadequate	1	8	5
Contingency plans exist but are not followed	0	4	6
Situation not recognized initially; action not timely	0	2	0
Situation recognized; actions inadequate	2	4	5
Crisis develops despite adequate actions	1	5	5
Overreaction to crisis	0	0	2
Late U.S. miltary involvement	2	16	10
U.S. military involved at onset	3	7	5
Situation develops over time before crisis level is reached	3	8	13
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	1	14	15
Crisis occurs without warning	3	1	9
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/solution	1	6	11
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	2	7	7
Multicrises	1	13	11

[a] The numerator indicates the number of crises for which problems were coded and the denominator indicates the total number of crises that could have been coded.

- Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict,

- Crisis actions affected by emotional issues,

- Action in hostile country/area, and

- Constraints on military action.

The 10 most frequent problems for the United States during common crises were:

- Consideration of international relations,

- Consideration of press/public relations (domestic),

- Presidential involvement in decision-making,

- Constraints on military actions,

- Situation develops over time but the crisis is sudden,

- Situation develops over time before crisis level is reached,

- Crisis action affected by emotional issues,

- Need for additional/special intelligence,

- Extensive interagency coordination is required, and

- Delayed decision on action.

Although there is considerable similarity between these lists of U.S. and Soviet crisis problems, the differences are notable. The most obvious differences are consideration of press/public relation for the United States and ideological considerations for the Soviet Union. Interestingly, both superpowers appear to be greatly constrained by the problem of consideration of international relations, reflecting the reality that, for both, crises are but one of the fora in which a multiplicity of objectives are sought.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CRISIS OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth the research methodology employed to identify and assess the outcomes of recent U.S. and Soviet crises (1966-1978). The remaining sections of this volume, and of this component of the project, are direct reflections of this research strategy.

It is not surprising that most crisis research to date (as shown in the review of Parker, 1976) has focused on the characteristics of crisis situations and the processes by which nations engage in crisis management (for example, actions undertaken and problems encountered).[1] Moving from the objective attributes of crises to an assessment of their outcomes introduces a range of analytical questions that are intrinsically much more difficult.

The assessment of crisis outcomes involves much more than simply determining if nations achieved one or a limited set of goals in a single crisis. Nations pursue a multiplicity of short- and long-term goals in crises. Only a fraction of these aims are represented in their goals in any single incident. At the same time, the outcome of a crisis can affect a wide variety of national goals and interests, over both the long- and short-term, including interests that might not have been regarded as being at stake during the opening crisis phase. An additional difficulty is that it is never easy to identify organizational goals, much less assess their achievement, when dealing with very complex organizations such as the policy apparatuses of the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the policy goals pursued by states often resist clarifying analysis because

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[1] See Daly (1978) for a review of DARPA's Crisis Management Program and associated research projects.

they are not easily recognizable. Hence, goals must often be inferred.
Analysts, as a result, must employ precise and explicit methods. If they
do not, they risk "proving" whatever they are predisposed to believe as
data potentially evidential of goals are so abundant and extensive that
they can be structured to yield virtually any interpretation (Rosenau,
1969: 169).

Despite the obvious difficulties posed by question of crisis goals and
outcomes, it is important to assess them in an objective and systematic
manner. Without rigorous outcome assessments it is impossible to move
beyond descriptive analyses of crisis situations, actions, and problems
to determine what types of actions are efficacious in particular contexts.
Outcome assessments are prerequisites for the development of more effec-
tive types of crisis management.[2] Moreover, such analyses have potential
diagnostic payoffs for policy makers in that they can reveal the "success
rate" of various goals' achievement and thus help meet the challenges
of exploring alternative crisis policy objectives.

The three sections of this chapter develop the research strategy used to
assess the outcomes of recent Soviet and U.S. crises. This strategy
emphasizes the assessment of outcomes in terms of goal achievement (or
nonachievement).

The first section provides a base for some of the most distinctive aspects
of the methodology (for example, the emphasis on goal-related outcomes and
the employment of a fairly complex ensemble of potentially relevant goals
for each superpower) by reviewing previous attempts to evaluate nations'
policy performances. The review focuses upon national policy performances
rather than upon the more directly focused topic of policy performance
during crises because of the relative paucity of systematic, data based
analyses dealing with the more narrowly defined issue.   There are some

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[2] Additionally, knowledge of outcome assessments will inform an under-
standing of the more "objective" aspects of crises: their characteris-
tics, problems, actions, and so forth. Better knowledge of each part
of a crisis enhances an understanding of the whole.

striking convergences in the best recent literature that cut across what would otherwise appear to be divergent bodies of research. These convergences are incorporated in the research strategy employed in this project for the assessment of crisis outcomes. This portion of the presentation helps to delineate the nature of the analytical problem being addressed and shows why a research strategy using a small number of easy to measure, nonjudgmental variables is not the most effective course.

The second section identifies some of the more general conceptual and methodological questions involved in any attempt to assess the outcomes of superpower crises, for instance: What roles do goals play? How can differences between Soviet and U.S. perspectives be accomodated? What credence can be attached to open source materials?

The final section, building directly on the preceding two, presents the research strategy adopted for the assessment of Soviet and American crisis outcomes over the period 1966-1978.

ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONS' POLICY PERFORMANCE

Recent attempts to evaluate nations' policy performances share two features: an emphasis on goals as an essential element in the evaluation process and a recognition of the complexity of the performance outcomes assessed. This stress on goals and complex outcomes holds both for analyses that attempt to formally evaluate national policy performances as well as for those that have been based on models of national policy processes that incorporate goal achievement outcomes into their explanatory schemes. Prominent examples include research on artificial intelligence as applied to international relations (Bennett and Alker, 1977); attempts to apply cognitive mapping techniques to interpret the perceptual processes of national decision-makers and analysts (Axelrod, 1976; Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble, 1979); analyses of the psychological process that go into outcome evaluation assessments (Mlotek and Rosen, 1974); and attempts to

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develop and apply formal evaluation schemes for the assessment of conflict situations (Butterworth, 1978; Dowty, 1974; Hannah, 1972; Holsti, 1966).[3]

Artificial Intelligence Models of International Relations

Emphasis on goals and complexity are two of the hallmarks of the artificial intelligence modeling approach to the analysis of international relations and national decision processes (Bennett and Alker, 1977, is a good recent example of this approach). The cybernetic approach to analysis found in the artificial intelligence literature is, in part, a response to the limitations of other approaches to modeling inter- and intrastate policy processes that, while capable of representing unchanging policies, do not allow the entities modeled to engage in such elementary processes as learning and adaptation.

One way in which artificial intelligence approaches incorporate adaptive behaviors into their models of national decision-making processes is by defining these processes in the terms set by the formal theory of organizations (for example, Cyert and March, 1963). In this theory, a nation/organization attempting to solve a problem/achieve a goal is postulated to engage in a number of basic processes:

- Quasiresolution of conflicts: large complex issues are subdivided into smaller problems, and each of these smaller problems is assigned to a subcomponent of the organization specializing in that type of issue, much as national policy bureaucracies are subdivided into functional and regional subsections.

- Uncertainty avoidance: decision rules are employed that stress short-run feedback and avoid attempts to predict other actors' behaviors.

- Problemistic search: solutions are sought only when problems are brought to the organization's attention; an attempt is made to find solutions as similar as possible to those used in the recent past.

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[3] Only representative examples of each of the tendencies in the literature are cited here and examined below.

- __Organizational learning__: goals, rules used to guide perception, and the types of solutions chosen are altered as a function of experience.

In the actual practice of modeling, these elements are incorporated in precedent-based models. A simplified representation of how such a model operates is:

- A policy problem or opportunity is identified, using a set of rules that identify problems and opportunities in the modeled nation's environment.

- Using previously set criteria, the central aspects of the problem are identified, including the goals whose achievement are affected.

- Based on the specification of the problem situations' elements and the relevant goals, the organization's history is searched to identify previously successful strategies (What actions achieved these goals in similar circumstances?).

- Action is then taken and the results of the action, in terms of an outcome in which goals are achieved or not achieved, are recorded.

- The outcome of the actions then serves as feedback, which modifies the probability that that particular mix of actions will be selected to achieve the same set of goals in similar types of situations in the future.

Even in this very simplified representation, it is evident that this approach to modeling is far more complex than many of the more common multiple regression-based procedures that estimate one unchanging set of parameters to account for an organization or nation's behaviors over a broad range of situations and goals. It is also apparent that goals and goal achievement play a central role in this process (compare Deutsch, 1966).

Over the next decade, artificial intelligence approaches to modeling nations' policy performances are likely to become increasingly common for

two reasons. The first is the intrinsic analytical attractiveness of the modeling assumptions employed, which stand out even in the brief sketch given above. Put simply, it is reasonable to assume that national leaders draw upon precedents in their definition of problems and selection of actions to achieve goals (May, 1973) and that these leaders modify their actions, at least in part, as a function of their success or failure in achieving goals in specific types of situations.[4] Because they are capable of capturing these types of adaptive behaviors, artificial intelligence models are especially suited for the analysis of policy outcomes. Second, experience to date suggests that such models do a fairly good job of reproducing the performance of nations (Bennett and Alker's (1973) analysis of the Latin American nations involved in the 19th century War of the Pacific is, once again, a case in point).[5]

Cognitive Mapping

The cognitive mapping approach to the analysis of decision-making shares with artificial intelligence modeling an emphasis on goals and complexity as central elements in the explanation of national policy performances. Cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976) is based on a set of fairly simple assumptions:

- National policies are selected and implemented by leaders.

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[4] Deutsch (1966: 182) reminds us that the word "government" is derived from the Greek root meaning the art of steersmanship. Put simply, the same underlying concept is reflected in the double meaning of the word "governor" as a person with political administrative control and as a mechanical device controlling the operation of an engine. Each implies the importance of guiding the "unit" toward a goal based on past and present performance.

[5] The current limitations on the use of these techniques are in large part technical -- there is no SPSS for the AI community. Validation problems posed by the sheer complexity of the models are another limitation.

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- Like all other people, leaders act on the basis of perceptions, assumptions, and objectives.

- Leaders' belief systems encompass immediate and longer-term policy objectives, beliefs concerning events in the international environment, and policy options (alternative courses of actions).

- In order to produce consistent policies, leaders' belief systems have linkages. Cognitive maps attempt to elucidate these linkages to show how leaders relate events to policy alternatives and goals.

In research conducted to date, leaders' cognitive maps have been identified in two ways: documentary analysis (for example, Axelrod's (1976) analysis of British decision-makers' discussions of the Persian question following the First World War) or through open-ended interviews (for example, Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble's (1979) interviews with U.S. Middle Eastern policy advisors on the National Security Council, and within the Departments of Defense and State).

For our present purposes, three findings from this body of research are of particular relevance. The first is that when applied in practice, the procedures of cognitive mapping appear to work on a wide variety of leaders and problem situations. Furthermore, the cognitive maps produced provide plausible reconstructions for the mixes of actions selected by leaders.

A second point, exemplified in the research of Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble (1979) on the impact of the 1973 Middle East war on the belief systems of U.S. policy analysts, is that belief systems tend to be resilient. As might be expected given cognitive psychology (compare, the review of Steinbrunner, 1974), planners tend not to make major alterations in their world-views, even in response to seemingly dramatic events. Rather, such officials react to new information by fitting it into pre-existing cognitive structures with little or no adjustments. This

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suggests that leaders' goals may have considerable stability over reasonably short periods of time, such as the 13-year horizon involved in the present project's assessment of national goals and crisis outcomes.

Finally, analysis to date suggests that planners and leaders have extremely complex sets of beliefs. Instead of having "neat" belief systems with strong hierarchical structures, in many instances their conceptual orders have a proliferation of elements without strongly perceived interconnections, (for example, Axelrod, 1976). This is not a surprising finding. It is, for example, consistent with Cyret and March's (1963) concept of quasiresolution of conflicts presented in the preceding review of artificial intelligence models, in that problems (belief system elements) are highly decomposed. It does, however, suggest that any realistic picture of a national leaderships' ensemble of goals is likely to contain a relatively large number of elements (goals) with few interconnections among them and that the elements (goals) of relevance are likely to vary widely across crises.

Analysis of the Psychological Process of Performance Evaluation

Mlotek and Rosen (1974) have produced a highly innovative analysis of the psychological factors that enter into assessments of national policies. While their subjects were undergraduate college students rather than national leaders, their results provide some of the best insights available concerning the dynamics of the assessment process.

Mlotek and Rosen were concerned with students' assessment of the costs of the Vietnam war. Cost-tolerance (the dependent variable) was computed as the summed total of subjects' scores on five scales assessing cost-tolerance in terms of the cost of the war to the nation in money; combat deaths; policy costs (for instance, unpopular stances in the United Nations that lose international support for the U.S.); costs to each individual in terms of additional taxes, inflation, and wage controls; and costs in terms of personal commitment (being drafted and sent to Vietnam, and so forth).

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Three independent variables were employed. An evaluation dimension dealt with attitudes pertaining to the Saigon regime, the Vietcong, the rationale for U.S. involvement in the war, American national interests, and other salient aspects of the conflict situation. A cost dimension addressed both the real and opportunity costs of the involvement, once again as expressed in subjects' responses to attitude survey questions. The final dimension concerned expectations of policy outcomes and the subjects' evaluations of the likelihood of a U.S. victory in the conflict.

These three predictors -- evaluations, costs, and expectations of policy outcomes -- were related to cost-tolerance assessments in two ways. The first was a standard multiple regression equation, in which the three accounted for 30 percent of the variance in cost-tolerance. The second was a more complex equation in which the three predictors were combined in a utility calculation ((evaluations x expected outcomes) - costs). When regressed on the utility score produced by this formula, 58 percent of the variance in cost-tolerance could be accounted for.

The importance of Mlotek and Rosen's research for present purposes concerns less the actual beliefs of American undergraduates in 1971 as the general processes involved in the evaluation of policy outcomes. What stands out in their analysis is the complexity of the students' assessments of the Vietnam war. No fewer than five cost-tolerance dimensions and three dimensions of predictors were identified and differentiated. Moreover, the three predictor factors were best related to the criterion of cost-tolerance when combined in a utility formula rather than when treated independently. When students dealing with a classroom problem treat policy performances in such a complex manner, one can begin to gain some insights into the even greater levels of complexity that are likely to be involved in the deliberations of national leaders and planners faced with a multiplicity of complex issues.

Formal Evaluation Schemes for the Assessment of Conflict Outcomes

There have been three major recent attempts to analyze the outcomes of international conflicts:

- Holsti's (1966) pioneering investigation of the resolution of conflicts from 1919-1965,

- Dowty's (1974) study of the efficacy of great power guarantees in peace settlements since 1815, and

- Butterworth's (1978) analysis of the post-World War II experience of five international organizations in the management of international disputes.

Since these studies deal with crises, along with wars and other types of interstate conflicts, they provide some of the best methodological guidance available for the present attempt to evaluate the outcomes of recent Soviet and American crises.

The first study in the series (Holsti, 1966) in many ways exemplifies the major methodological attributes of the set. In his analysis, Holsti was concerned with a very narrow type of outcome: the ways in which international conflicts involving the threat or use of force ended since 1919. Six categories of conflict outcomes were developed and differentiated by Holsti in his theoretical argument:

- Avoidance: voluntary withdrawal by one or more parties from the bargaining/conflict situation,

- Conquest: victory through decisive use of force,

- Submission-Withdrawal: one party yields to another's threats,

- Compromise: both sides to the dispute agree to a partial withdrawal of their initial objectives, positions, demands, or actions,

- Award: use of third parties to arbitrate or adjudicate the conflict, and

- **Passive Settlement**: while there is no immediate resolu-
  tion to the conflict, over time the parties attribute
  at least partial legitimacy to the status quo.

These categories proved sufficiently robust to support Holsti's analysis
of the types of settlement procedures used in the set of conflicts ana-
lyzed and also served the same role in Hannah's (1972) analysis of war
termination from 1914-1965.

The most striking aspect of these categories for our immediate methodo-
logical purposes is that they require the use of judgment. The analytical
distinction between avoidance and submission, for example, depends largely
on a coder's assessment of contextual information about the dispute and
the actions and reactions of the parties involved in the conflict. This
employment of judgmental variables is even more striking when we recall
that Holsti is dealing with (quite appropriately for his purposes) a
very narrowly defined outcome likely to represent only a fraction of the
crisis-related goals of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

A similar emphasis on the use of judgmental variables is present in
Dowty's analysis of the effectiveness of great power guarantees and
in Butterworth's (1978) investigation of the crisis management functions
of international organizations. The latter incorporates such judgmental
factors as the likelihood that a conflict would have abated within three
years without any external intervention and the likelihood of the dis-
appearance or spread of a conflict had international organizations not
become involved.

GENERAL CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE ASSESSMENT
OF OUTCOMES

Like all other organizations of sufficient interest to warrant serious
analysis, national policy bureaucracies are complex.[6] This complexity

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[6] The discussion in this section, particularly the components dealing
with complex organizations, are derived in large part from the arguments
developed by Mohr (1973), Simon (e.g., 1969) and Cyret and March (1963).

raises a number of issues that need to be resolved before one can develop reliable and valid assessments of policy outcomes, such as the superpower crisis outcomes that are the subject of the present project. This section briefly presents some of the more significant problems. In most instances the solutions to these problems are deferred until the next section, which presents the project's research strategy. For convenience, the conceptual and methodological questions are grouped under two headings: problems that follow from the character of national policy apparatuses as complex organizations, and those posed by the bureaucratic politics paradigm and potential value bias.

Complex Organizational Processes

The major analytical problems falling within this category concern the two different "directions" in which the policy apparatuses of the United States and Soviet Union constantly face, the variegated sets of goals sought by both nations, and the interdependencies between goals and outcomes.

Following Mohr (1973), an argument can be made that any organization always faces in two "directions." At the same time it seeks to have an impact on its external environment (for example, transitive goals), and it seeks to maintain and increase its own capacity to affect external events in the future (for example, reflexive goals). This dual orientation has some significant implications for any assessment of the external policies of nations. In many instances, major defense and international policy goals are likely to be at least partially instrumental in character. Nations seek to acquire and retain foreign bases, for example, because of the instrumental value these bases might serve in affecting events abroad rather than for their own intrinsic value (viewed in and of themselves, bases are often as much of a liability as an asset). Similar arguments could be made for a wide variety of other external policy goals pursued

by both superpowers.[7] In the ongoing course of policy, many "outcomes" are both ends in themselves and the means for achieving future ends.

Recognition of this dual orientation has some direct implications for any attempt to catalog and assess policy outcomes. Given the Janus-faced character of superpower policy, it is necessary to develop a set of crisis outcomes that denotes various stages on the chain of ends and means. In some cases the most important "outcomes" of a crisis (in the eyes of the evaluating superpower) may lie outside of the immediate crisis theater.[8] Indeed, in some cases the most significant outcomes may be internal to the superpower itself. For example, Jones (1975) has argued that one of the major factors inhibiting large scale commitments of Soviet forces in distant conflicts is the Soviet leadership's fear of the domestic political repercussions that might follow from an unpopular foreign involvement. In their writings, the Soviets have been quick to point out such repercussions of French involvement in Algeria and U.S. involvement in Vietnam, presenting analogies that are not likely to be missed by astute Soviet readers (CACI, 1978e).

The second aspect of the complexity of organizational processes within both the United States and the Soviet Union that raises difficulties for analysis is the sheer range of interests pursued by both actors. One illustration of this range is provided by Blechman and Holt (1971) who, relying on only one State Department publication, were able to differentiate almost 50 distinct, operationally measurable aspects of U.S. "interests" abroad. Each of these goals could readily be subdivided using

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[7] See Chapters 4 and 5 for discussions of U.S. and Soviet policy goals.

[8] A recent example of such an outcome for U.S. crisis behavior is the United States' dramatic use of military power during the Mayaguez crisis which seems to have been designed, in part, to signal to audiences beyond Phnom Penh U.S. will and military strength after the collapse of Saigon (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976).

additional functional or regional criteria. There is no reason to expect that Soviet goal structures will be any less complex. Indeed, at least in the realm of ideological goals and interests, the Soviet structure is likely to be more involved than that of the United States.

Once again the analytical implications of this type of complexity are fairly direct. Any realistic assessment of crisis outcomes in terms of goals needs to include a broad sampling of those superpower interests that might be involved in a crisis.

The third factor that needs to be considered is the interdependency between goals and outcomes. As Mohr contends (1973), along with intent, outcome is one of the essential elements involved in organizational goals.[9] Outcomes have an obvious relationship, bordering on tautological, to goals in any assessment of an organization's goal structure and performance.

Less immediately obvious, but essential for later purposes, is the other side of interdependency. Just as goals are obviously related to outcomes, so are outcomes (including crisis outcomes) dependent upon goals. Any attempt to develop performance assessments for nations not taking this linkage into account would be critically flawed since it would, in effect, be evaluating a nation's achievement of an outcome where that outcome/ goal set might not have been involved, at least from the vantagepoint of the nation being assessed.

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Problem of Value Bias

The analytical problems posed by the bureaucratic politics paradigm and the problem of value bias can be posed succinctly, leaving their resolution to the next section. In the case of the bureaucratic politics paradigm (elaborated in Allison and Halperin, 1972) the difficulty has to do with

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[9] In fact, Mohr (1973: 472) defines a goal as "an intent to achieve some outcome."

the salience, particularly to policy audiences who spend a good deal of their day to day existences involved in bureaucratic politics, of an explanatory model of national policy that places primary emphasis upon the interplay of bureaucratic interests and actors as the determinants of national policy. This model of the policy process stands in direct opposition to the "unitary rational actor model" of policy, in which decision-makers have a high degree of latitude to specify and adjust goals and actions. Given that this project's methodology focuses on goals, a purposeful form of behavior that fits most naturally (at least at first glance) into the unitary rational actor model, the problem posed by the bureaucratic policies paradigm is fairly obvious.

The problem of value bias (Hendricks, 1976) in the identification and assessment of crisis outcomes is both simple and difficult to overcome. Its simplest component is the evaluation of outcomes themselves. It is by no means difficult to avoid drawing normative conclusions in the course of such evaluations; one can simply focus on the state of affairs as it exists, postcrisis. More difficult problems to overcome pertain to the selection of outcomes to measure and the selection of indices for these outcomes. Given the wide variety of outcomes that could be assessed, and the existence of multiple (and not necessarily congruent) indicators for each, it is apparent that bias could easily creep into the analysis in the form of selective attention to a limited range of outcomes and outcome measures.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This section outlines the research design employed to identify and evaluate the outcomes of recent Soviet and American crises. Some of the major components of this design are developed in succeeding chapters and appendices, with Chapters 4 and 5 presenting the rationales for the sets of goals/outcomes selected for the United States and the Soviet Union and Appendices A and B providing a detailed codebook for each of the outcome variables. The argument in this section is divided into two parts. The

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first focuses on the advantages of a goal-based approach to the assessment of crisis outcomes. The second presents the research design and the key assumptions that figure in it.

The Advantages of a Goal-Based Approach to the Assessment of Outcomes

In this project, the outcomes of superpower crises from 1966 through 1978 are assessed in terms of goal achievement -- the extent to which either the United States or the Soviet Union satisfied those of their self-defined national interests involved in each of the incidents.

Policy goals were identified by examining primary source materials. In the case of the United States, the sources consulted included the records of Presidential press conferences, Presidential papers and memoirs, and publications issued by the Departments of State and Defense.[10] For the Soviets, Soviet Party Congress materials, books published by the Soviets dealing with international affairs, and statements in the Soviet press were employed (Chapters 4 and 5 present both the U.S. and Soviet sources in greater detail).[11]

In the course of reviewing these materials, a deliberate attempt was made to outline the major dimensions of external policy bearing on national security interests, as presented in the writings of both superpowers. Essentially, an attempt was made to identify all of the major external policy goals that occurred with some frequency in the sources reviewed and might be affected by international political-military crises.

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[10] In addition, some of the standard American foreign and defense policy textbooks were also reviewed, for example, Spanier (1977). These texts are often very close in orientation to national policy and have the advantage of presenting detailed depictions of some of the goals, as is shown in the discussions in Chapter 4.

[11] In a few policy arenas, where the Soviets are notoriously reticent concerning their actions and objectives, supplementary Western materials were also used, as is detailed in Chapter 5.

In many cases the source materials also suggested the appropriate indices to assess goal achievement. Reflecting the structure of policy in both nations, both functional (for example, ideological, economic, military) and regional goals were identified for both superpowers. Consistent with the complex character of superpowers' self-defined national interests, the goals included some instrumental aims (for example, certain access and military capability variables) in addition to goals whose outcomes are most appropriately assessed in terms of events occurring in foreign nations (for example, the survival of friendly regimes and parties).

In other words, the analytical scheme sought to utilize the entire range of goals expressed by the relevant superpower as a template for comparison against actual crisis policy behavior.[12] Therefore a crisis could be assessed relative to its consequences or outcomes in terms of the payoffs and costs incurred by a state during it. No effort was made to grade or pass judgment on the actual objectives sought by either the USSR or U.S. during the crises analyzed, although the frequency of goal achievement has obvious policy prescriptive value in that it allows for the assessment of goal reinforcement, redirection, and reversal.

The use of a broad ensemble of Soviet and U.S. goals has a number of advantages. The first is that it helps to locate the crisis management activities and concerns of the superpowers within the broader ranges of Soviet and American policy and interests. Crises, while important, are only a part of the picture; the more general goals of the two superpowers cut across all aspects of it.

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[12] This strategy is similar to those employed by Cottam (1967, 1977) and George and Smoke (1974). Also, it is similar to the social psychological use of "comparison levels" as standards against which actors evaluate the "attractiveness" and satisfaction level of relationships (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959: 21).

Second, the use of a broad range of goals derived from each nation's public statements answers the obvious question of why some outcomes are assessed in preference to others in the course of developing performance assessments for Soviet and U.S. crises. The value bias problems that would arise if researchers' judgments, rather than the statements of national leaders, were used to specify outcomes, are avoided in this manner. Naturally, one can question whether either superpowers' leadership is completely forthright in its statements concerning its goals and objectives. Without attempting to settle this question in any final sense, we think the answer to the question is a qualified yes. Both superpowers are aware of the importance of public communications, particularly in crisis management (CACI, 1978e). While neither is likely to say everything that is of concern to it, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the core self-defined interests of each state are communicated through the media we have examined.[13] Public signals of the type examined in this project have significance and import simply by virtue of being public statements concerning self-defined national interests.[14]

Focusing on a broad range of goals, any one of which might be involved in any given crisis, rather than upon a narrower range of interests, also has a number of analytical advantages. Most obviously, it allows us to keep "score" from the perspective of the relevant superpower. This is done by assessing the relevance of each goal in a particular crisis and evaluating outcomes only for those aims relevant in that specific incident. By doing this, the outcome assessments match the actual range of superpower concerns during the incidents instead of evaluating the outcomes in terms of the set chosen by an outside observer.

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[13] See Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussions of this point for both the United States and Soviet Union.

[14] The Soviets are particulary constrained in this regard, as they attempt to "sell" their "line" to a host of foreign Marxist-Leninist parties and movements.

By the same token, the initial determination of the relevance of each goal (and attendant outcome assessments for that aim) provides valuable information concerning the ways in which different types of superpower interests vary across crises and various categories of crises. The inclusion of important values that may not be frequently challenged during recent crises serves an important role by presenting an opportunity for the identification of low threshold threats to those values. Finally, a goal-oriented approach lends itself to subsequent aggregation and disaggregation in analysis (for example, by combining outcomes in given functional categories such as military-economic national security interests).

The data collection phase of this project generated outcomes data based on the ensembles of superpower goals identified in Chapters 4 and 5. These are termed crisis specific outcomes because the subset of situationally relevant superpower goals varies radically across crises. Because they concern complex policy outcomes, these variables are assessed judgmentally.[15] Because of the importance of these judgments, unusual care was taken in the codebooks (Appendices A and B) to show how these judgments are generated. The codebook entry for each crisis specific outcome moves from general to particular, beginning with a generalized statement of the superpower goal the performance of which the outcome indexes. Next follows the outcome assessment scale that is used to code the variable, followed, at the most specific level, with the set of measures or indices consulted in the course of assessing the outcome. As a reflection of the primary source materials used to identify the goals, and in order to capture some of the "flavor" of each superpower's self-defined interests, each crisis specific goal is discussed from the perspective of the superpower holding it.

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[15] The reliability, validity, and general analytical utility of judgmental variables in such roles has been demonstrated in previous DARPA-sponsored research dealing with crisis behavior (for example, CACI, 1978e), and the operations of military forces (CACI, 1978g). Appendix C discusses the reliability and validity of these data in greater detail.

Research Design

Sequentially, the identification and analysis of crisis outcomes involves
the following stages:

1. The identification of Soviet and U.S. policy goals from
   primary source materials.

2. The specification of types of evidence that are to be
   used as the basis for judgments concerning the achieve-
   ment of each goal (relying upon primary source materials).

3. The development of crisis outcome scales for the assess-
   ment of goal achievement.

4. As the first step in the coding process, a determination
   of the relevance of each goal/outcome set in each crisis
   (once again, relying upon primary source materials to the
   extent possible).

5. The coding of the crisis-relevant outcomes plus the gen-
   eral outcome variables.

Crisis outcomes are coded at 1- and 5-year intervals to capture both the
short- and medium-term effects and correlates of the incidents. The 1-
year interval was selected as a commonly used short-term effects interval.
The 5-year interval used for medium term effects is of approximately the
same length as the longest formal policy cycles found in both superpowers
(the 4-year administrations in the United States and the 5-year cycle of
of Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).[16]

Analysis of the crisis outcomes variables focus on both causal and con-
comitant relationships between these outcomes and other factors. Given

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[16] The crisis specific outcomes are also structured to reflect another
type of short term/medium term distinction. For the most part, the goals
and outcomes included in the functional categories (military, economic, and
ideological) tend to have longer periods of validity than those grouped
under regional headings, which are more subject to change in response to
the evolution of events in each region.

the complexity of international politics, it would be unreasonable to expect to find a large number of clear-cut decisive causal effects with the crises being the only direct influences upon the outcomes, particularly over a 5-year span. During the coding process, the strength of the causal linkages that appear to have existed between the crisis relevant outcomes and the crises are coded. These additional judgmental variables, presented in Appendices A and B, provide the most practical assessment available of the strength of the linkage between putative cause (crisis) and effect (outcome).

The crises analyzed for both the United States and the Soviet Union over the period 1966-1978 (see Table 1 at the end of this chapter) are updated versions of data sets developed by CACI for the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO) (1976, 1978e). Both consist of events in which the superpowers have indicated by either physical or verbal actions their particular concern with these events out of the myriad of postwar crises. (CACI, 1976 and 1978e and Chapter 2 explicate the operational definitions used to identify these cases in greater detail.) In the case of both the United States and the Soviet Union, 1966 stands as a threshold denoting the beginning of a new phase in crisis management activities. In the case of the U.S., 1966 was a breakpoint year (Mahoney, 1978), with the average number of crises being considerably higher before that point and lower afterwards. In the Soviet case, it is likely that the increase in the crisis activity of the Soviet Navy, which formally began with the June War of 1967, was the result of policy deliberations concomitant with the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 (McConnell and Dismukes, 1979).

Reliability and validity are approached in several ways. The primary factor contributing to the validity of the approach adopted is the use of Soviet and American statements to identify the goals whose outcomes are to be assessed. Reliability was maintained by intercoder reliability checks, comparisons of the coding of the same outcome across crises (particularly similar crises), and comparisons of similar cases. While a deliberate

3-21

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expect to find a large number of clear-cut decisive causal effects with
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be assessed. Reliability was maintained by intercoder reliability checks,
comparisons of the coding of the same outcome across crises (particularly
similar crises), and comparisons of similar cases. While a deliberate

attempt was made to generate outcome scales including as many as seven
values, these scales were collapsed, as required, to enhance the reli-
ability of the research, as is the standard practice in psychometric
research from which such scales originate (Summers, 1970).

In the analysis of superpower goals and outcomes, the assumption of a
"unitary rational actor" criticized by students of bureaucratic politics
is not being made, (compare the critique of Allison, 1971). Instead, we
make a less demanding set of assumptions. It is assumed that both super-
powers are adaptive organizations seeking to achieve goals in fairly stable
environments. We assume that over a reasonably short period of time there
is some consistency of intent in these actors' aims -- an assumption that
we feel has been confirmed by our review of the primary source materials.
While this approach does not capture the interplay of bureaucratic pro-
cess, that interplay is largely irrelevant to our purposes.[17]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the goal-oriented way in which the outcomes of
recent (1966-1978) Soviet and American crises are being assessed in this
project. The following chapters elaborate this sketch, with Chapters 4
and 5 presenting and explaining U.S. and Soviet policy goals over this
period. Succeeding chapters (6 through 8) analyze these data.

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[17] The bureaucratic politics paradigm tends to be most persuasive when
policy is viewed over very short periods of time from the perspective
of those within the bureaucracy. Viewing policy over the medium term,
greater degrees of consistency of purpose are often evident. Over even
longer terms, for example, 30-year periods, structural and contextual
factors begin to have more evident salience.

TABLE I

Summary List of U.S. Crises, 1966-1978[a]

Crisis Name	Crisis Date
H-Bomb lost in B52 crash over Spanish coast	660117-660000
France withdraws its forces from NATO	660221-660701
Cuban alert after Guantanamo Bay incident	660527-660600
PRC accuses U.S. of bombing Chinese territory	660915-660919
Sino-Soviet confrontation	670125-670214
Middle Eastern June War ("Six Day War")	670605-670611
"USS Liberty" attacked by Israelis	670608
USAF plane shot down over Hainan Island	670626
PRC downs two USN jets over Chinese territory	670821-670823
U.S. troops withdrawn from France	660630-670000
North Korean commandoes attack South Korean "Blue House"	680121
U.S. B-52 with four H-bombs crashes near Thule, Greenland	680122-680128
Seizure of USS Pueblo by North Koreans	680123-681222
U.S. resumes arms sales to Jordan	680214-680328

(Continued)

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[a] Only international crises' outcomes are assessed in this component of the research and included in this table.

Table 1
Summary List of Crises
Continued

North Koreans cross DMZ to ambush U.S.   680414
Army truck

East Germans restrict Berlin travel; allies   680612-680729
protest

U.S. jetliner forced down in Kuriles (USSR)   680701-680702

Cambodia holds U.S. soldiers for ransom   680717

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia   680716-681016

President Johnson warns USSR against further   680830
aggression in Eastern Europe

Allies warn USSR on any action against West   680900-680917
Germany

USN destroyers cruise Black Sea; Soviets   681209-681212
protest

Japan demands return of Okinawa   691121-720515

Anti-U.S. rioting in Instanbul   690214-690216

U.S.-Peru fishing and trade dispute   690214-690521

West Berlin access sealed for two hours;   690301-690307
allies protest

Sino-Soviet border clashes   690302-691020

Navy EC-121 shot down by North Koreans   690415-690421

U.S. destroyer and Australian ship collide   690602
during SEATO maneuvers; 74 killed

Operation "Red Hat" -- movement of toxic   690722-700818
munitions

North Koreans down U.S. helicopter; return   690817-691202
crew

(Continued)

3-24

Table 1
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Philippines seek U.S. base right revisions	691014
U.S. agrees to move AFB from Libya	691223-700300
Syria-Jordan crisis	700210-700927
U.S. Embassy in Manila attacked	700218
Columbia Eagle mutiny	700314-700408
North Korea claims U.S. spy ship sunk	700605
U.S. general officers land in Soviet Armenia	701021-701110
Lithuanian seaman tries to defect	701123-701221
U.S.-Ecuador fishing dispute	710118-710127
Soviet harassment of U.S. newsman	710125-710127
Helicopter seizure in Phnom Penh; U.S. retrieves	710127-710127
PRC seated in the U.N.	710910-711115
India-Pakistan war over Bangladesh	711122-720110
U.S. freighter sunk by Cuban gunboat	711215
U.S. Congressman expelled from USSR	720114
Soviet ships bombed in Haiphong harbor	720416
French nuclear tests	720625
Sadat expels Soviet advisors	720718-720805
U.S. breaks off talks with Micronesia over independence	721007
Libya attacks U.S. C-130	730321-730530

(Continued)

Table 1
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Middle Eastern "October/Yom Kippur" War	731006-731024
Arab oil embargo	731017-731122
DEFCON 3: U.S. worldwide alert	731021-731025
Uganda (Idi Amin) orders USMC out of country	731029-731108
Panama Canal negotiations	731127-780616
Unrest in Ethiopia	740226-741128
Nixon accuses EEC of cooperating with Arabs on oil embargo	740315
Military coup in Portugal	740425-740713
India explodes nuclear device	740518
Cyprus civil war/Turkish invasion	740715-740730
USSR rejects U.S. trade agreement	750114
U.S. ends aid, Turks close U.S. bases	750205-750726
Turkish Cypriots proclaim state	750213
Operation Eagle Pull - U.S. evacuation of Cambodia	750411-750412
Evacuation of Saigon	750416-750430
Cambodia seizes Mayaguez	750512-750514
Anti-U.S. demonstrations in Laos	750515-750627
India: Gandhi proclaims state of emergency	750626-770321
Angolan civil war	751110-751231
Sadat abrogates treaty with USSR	760304-761104

(Continued)

Table 1
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Morocco, Algeria clash over Spanish Sahara	760112-000000
Cambodia alleges U.S. bomb raid	760225-760229
Thailand orders U.S. bases closed	760320-760720
Greece threatens U.S. base rights treaty	760325-760415
Lebanon: civil war, Syrian troops, U.S. evacuation	760331-760620
Panama Canal talks lead to new treaty	760424-770907
NATO response to Warsaw pact buildup	760521-000000
Aegean sea crisis	760723-760830
U.S. deploys naval, air forces to oppose threat in Kenya	760710-760807
Second U.S. evacuation from Lebanon	760720-760727
U.S. naval ships deployed to oppose threat to Tunisia	760726-760801
Korea: Panmunjom tree crisis	760818-760906
Soviet pilot defects to Japan with MIG-25	760906-761007
U.S. Navy loses Tomcat fighter from aircraft carrier, retrieves	760914-761111
France withdraws troops from West Germany	761008-761118
North Korea proposes new peace treaty	761009
U.S.-Philippine base talks lead to new U.S. aid program	761204
Uganda: USN responds to Amin's threat	770223-770301
First Zaire invasion, Western intervention	770307-770526

(Continued)

3-27

Table 1
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Ethiopia closes U.S. bases, ends U.S. aid program	770423-770528
North Korea shoots down U.S. helicopter	770713-770716
Somali-Ethiopian war	770723-780324
Iran: Massive unrest, martial law, Shah goes into exile	780509-790200
Second Zaire invasion, Western intervention	780511-780616
Ethiopian drive against Eritrea	780516-781129
Nicaraguan civil war	780910-790700
Guyana: U.S. Congressman slain; Jonestown incident	781118-781127

TABLE 2

Summary List of Soviet Crises, 1966-1978

Crisis Name	Crisis Name
Progressive coup in Syria	660223
Nkrumah ousted in military-led coup; MI6, CIA implicated	660224
Final break between CPSU and CCP	660229-660505
GDR diplomats, families harassed in PRC	660429-660829
Maoists split Angolan Revolution Party; Unita leaves MPLA	660499
Military coup in PRC (GPCR); anti-Soviet hysteria	660501-690101
USSR accuses Nicaragua of fostering attacks on Cuba	660624
Illia ousted in Argentinian coup; general strike	660628
Italy-Austria Alto-Adige dispute	660723-691130
USSR protests U.S. provocations against Soviet ships in DRV	660805
Chinese abuse Soviet citizens; provoke riots abroad	660820-661299
Congo-Portuguese dispute	660921-671115
PLA units arrive in Pamirs, begin reconnaissance exercises	661099
Chinese detain, harass Soviet vessel Zagorsk in Darien	661208-661228
Battles along Israeli-Syrian border	670109-670299

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Chinese riot in Red Square	670125
Peking: Chinese beseige Soviet embassy, abuse Soviet, NSWP	670126-670213
USSR warns FRG about neo-Nazis (FRG claims)	670128-670424
Sino-Soviet border clash on Ussuri Island	670299
Nationwide strikes in Argentina	670301
Abortive Maoist uprising in Cambodia	670402-670913
USSR protests Israeli attack on Syria in the vicinity of Lake Tiberias	670407-670411
CIA-engineered coup in Greece	670421
Eritrean revolt: PRC backs rebels	670499
USSR protests U.S. naval presence in sea of Japan	670513
UNEF withdrawn from Sinai, dispute over straits of Tiran	670518-670604
Nigerian civil war	670530-700115
USSR protests U.S. bombing of Soviet vessel Turkestan in DRV	670602-670605
June 1967 war	670605-670718
PRC meddles in Burma with disastrous results for CP	670626-680899
June War aftermath: Soviet aid, PRC accusations	670699-670902
U.S. intervenes in Congo, argues with allies	670705-671105
USSR objects to FRG extraordinary laws	670720

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Cyprus: New clash; USSR accuses U.S.,   670730-671201
imperialists retreat

Chinese attack Mongolian embassy, abuse   670809-670810
personnel

USSR protests PRC mistreatment of Soviet ship   670812-670820
Svirsk

Sharp increase in Korean border incidents, USSR   670817-671199
criticizes

USSR protests USAF bombing of Soviet vessels in   670822
DRV

Israeli DD Eilat sunk, Sovmedron moves into   671021-671027
Alexandria

USSR warns FRG not to question WWII outcome   671021-671208

French military intervention in Central   671117
African Republic

Israeli forces attack Jordan   671121-680501

UK departs Aden but continues military   671199
presence on peninsula

Unsuccessful coup in Algeria   671214

USAF planes bomb Soviet vessel in Haiphong   680104

USSR, WP counter threat in Czechoslovakia   680105-680821

USSR accuses NATO over Cyprus intentions   680105-681210

Pueblo crisis   680123-681223

U.S. B-52 crashes in Greenland   680210

USSR criticizes neo-Nazi activities in FRG   680224-680529

USSR acuses U.S., UK over Persian Gulf aims   680304

(Continued)

3-31

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Massive class conflict in France	680322-680617
Chinese board Soviet ship in PRC port	680403-680404
Portuguese aircraft bomb Zambian villages	680406
GDR imposes new travel restrictions to West Berlin	680509-680824
PRC delays Soviet shipments to DRV	680629-690814
Iraqi coup brings Bakr to power	680717
Peruvian coup brings anti-imperialists to power	686003
Military coup in Panama	681012
Chou claims anything expectable from USSR	681030
Coup in Mali, PRC involved	681119-681120
USSR opposes UK oppression in North Ireland	690104
USSR condemns new Israeli aggression	690228-690802
Sino-Soviet border clash on Damansky Island	690302-690315
UK intervention in Anguilla	690319
Ninth CPC congress; USSR declared enemy number one	690401
Strikes, demonstrations in Italy	690409-690411
French intervene in Chad	690418-720901
Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt-Al-Arab	690419
Dutch intervention in Curacao	690531
UK-Spanish confrontation over Gibraltar	690608-691003
War between El Salvador and Honduras; U.S. at	690624-710423

(Continued)

3-32

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

PRC border incursion near Semipalatinsk fault	690504
USSR protests PRC armed provocations on Goldinsky island	690708
USSR protests PRC border violation near Zhalanshkol	690813
Israel blamed for Al Aosa mosque fire	690830
U.S. organizes military coup in Bolivia	690901
Coup in Libya overthrows monarchy	690901
USSR protests new Israeli military provocations	690919-691127
PRC claims conflict with USSR a state issue	691008
USSR accuses U.S. of claiming right to intervene in Lebanon	691026-691031
NATO lowers nuclear threshold	691111
USSR supports Guinea in spat with Portugal	691202-691222
USSR denounces Israel, pledges to support Arabs	700217
USSR opposes NATO efforts to own Cyprus	700218-719999
Coup in Cambodia; Lon Nol comes to power	700318
U.S. coup plot thwarted in Chile	700325-700330
U.S., RVN invade Cambodia; new phase	700430
USSR claims Israel pressuring Arab neighbors	700715-700808
U.S. fails to prevent Allende coming to power in Chile	700909-701028
PRC: Lin Piao downfall leads to PLA purge	700913-701001

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Jordanian civil war; Israeli-Egyptian tension   700920-701014

USSR denies U.S. claim of Soviet Latin American   701004
threat, Cuban sub base

U.S. aircraft violates Soviet airspace near   701022
Leninakan

Guatemala: State of Siege, repressions   701113

Portuguese raid on Conakry, Guinea   701121

U.S., RVN, Thai intervention in Laos   710130-710499

PRC press abuses USSR, hints lack of cooperation   710318
re: VN

Indo-Pakistani conflict; Bangladesh formed   710423-711217

U.S., allies conspire in overthrow of Bolivia   710819-710822
government

USSR supports Zambia in dispute with South   711006-711012
Africa

Greek ultimatum to Cyprus rejected   710211

PRC envious over Soviet arms aid to NVN, VC   720402-720606

Israeli raids on South Lebanon   720621

Soviet advisers expelled from Egypt   720718

U.S. air raids make PRC more helpful in VN   720899

Israeli air attack on Syria and Lebanon   720908-720916

U.S. ends direct participation in VN war   730127-750430

Uruguayan president turns on leftists   730627-731201

Military coup in Afghanistan   730707

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Military coup ousts Allende in Chile	730911
Peron turns on progressive forces	730925
October Middle East War	731003-731114
U.S. announces new strategic doctrine	740110
USSR, PRC expel one another's diplomats	740119
Iraq accuses Iran of aggression	740210-740699
Ethiopian emperor overthrown	740226
Kurdish revolt in Iraq; Iran helps rebels	740311-750322
Soviet helicopter down in PRC; crew held, released	740399-751227
Revolution in Portugal	740424-751127
Turkey invades Cyprus	740715
USSR rejects U.S. pressure, trade pact	750114
Turkey closes U.S. bases	750213
Yugoslavia boycotts CP conference, accuses USSR	750408-751112
U.S. Mayaguez operation	750512-750514
U.S. warns North Korea against invasion	750519
USSR warns Japan over PRC Treaty	750617
Angolan civil war	750715
Lebanese civil war	760101-780615
U.S. planes bomb Siem Reap, Cambodia	760225

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

U.S., Thai forces attack Laos	760228
Egypt abrogates treaty with USSR	760314-760415
Chinese succession crisis	760405-771113
Cyprus: U.S. Marines land	760618-760620
Aegean sea crisis	760723-760830
Lieutenant Belenko lands in Japan, is maltreated	760906-761115
Revolt in South Zaire, foreign intervention	770310-770521
Greece: mass antigovernment/NATO protest	770318-770319
Ethiopia battles for survival	770324-780709
Anti-Soviet agitation in Japan re: Kuriles	770400-770613
Attempted coup in Angola	770527-770601
PRC continues war preparations	770500-999999
Egyptian-Libyan border clashes	770724-770727
Attempted coup in Bangladesh	771003-771020
Sadat visits Israel	771120-771209
Border clashes lead to fall of Pol Pot regime	780105-999999
Civil war in Nicaragua	780110-999999
Mongolia resists PRC pressure	780412-999999
Afghanistan: coup, insurgency	780427-999999
Soviet soldiers violate PRC border	780511-780517
Second Zaire invasion, intervention	780513-780616

(Continued)

Table 2
Summary List of Crises
Continued

Sino-Vietnam conflict	780610-999999
Iranian helicopters enter USSR	780621
Coups, clashes in the two Yemens	780626-780706
Japan, PRC sign treaty; USSR unhappy	780813
Iran: massive unrest, martial law	780907-999999
U.S., PRC establish ties	781215-790101

CHAPTER 4.   UNITED STATES POLICY GOALS

INTRODUCTION

This is the first of two chapters detailing the political-military pol-
icy goals of the United States and Soviet Union respectively. As
discussed in the methodology strategy presented in Chapter 3, the identi-
fication, classification, and operationalization of these goals play
a crucial role in the assessment of crisis outcomes in terms of goal
achievement -- the methodological strategy presented in Chapter 3.

It is by no means easy to compare Soviet and U.S. goals. American re-
searchers have a natural bias toward the latter. In response to this
tendency, very deliberate attempts have been made to approach the goals
of both superpowers from the perspective of "outsiders." Primary source
materials (Soviet and American) have been extensively used to identify
the declaratory aims of each power. This results, necessarily, in a
certain stylistic "tone" in each chapter. In the interest of later com-
parative analyses, however, this approach is essential.

Substantively, an understanding of goals is crucial for a comprehension
of American policy. As a "superpower," the United States by definition
must show special and detailed concern for its preferences and principles
within the international milieu in which it acts. The actual coherence
of its political-military policy in many respects reflects the internal
consistencies of the goals and objectives it pursues. Therefore, exam-
ination of U.S. policy goals allows analysts to evaluate individual pol-
icies as well as the more holistic designs the United States has for
the world. Indeed, the way a country, particularly a superpower, speci-
fies its goals reflects its world view and describes its ideal world
order.

IDENTIFYING U.S. GOALS: SOURCES AND RESEARCH PROCEDURES

The world view of the United States is complex, dynamic, and not easily categorized. Phenomena such as the liberal democratic tradition,[1] geographical size and location, cyclical historical periods,[2] executive-congressional relations,[3] public opinion,[4] and the media[5] are but a few of numerous variables that scholars suggest help shape American political-military policy. Instead of deductively focusing on a small number of variables taken from previous studies, in compiling and categorizing the international policy goals of the United States the research design *focused on primary source materials of American decision-makers.* These sources were content analyzed for specific references to U.S. policy goals and objectives. Table 1 presents the complete list of sources consulted in the compilation of U.S. international policy goals for the years 1966-1978. As the subheadings of Table 1 suggest, these sources fall into several general categories:

- American statements in the United Nations,

- State of the Union addresses,

---

[1] For example, see Hollander and Skard (1968) for a historical analysis of ideological developments in the United States and their effect on U.S. policy.

[2] See Klingberg (1952, 1979) for creative analyses concerning cyclical trends in American foreign policy "moods" and their policy implications.

[3] Wilcox (1971) is a good overview of the effects of the Congress, the Executive Branch, and their interaction on U.S. policy.

[4] After 30 years of public opinion research, the data on public attitudes toward U.S. international policy have reached mountainous proportions and have served as the database for numerous studies. For example, see Almond (1950); Scott and Wilthey (1958); Deutsch and Edinger (1959); Rosenau (1963); and Mueller (1970, 1971).

[5] Cohen (1963) presents a seminal study of the media's impact on international policy.

TABLE 1

Source Materials for the
Compilation of American Policy Goals, 1966-1978

American Statements in the United Nations, 1966-1970

Provisional Verbatim Records of the General Assembly, 1966-1978.
New York: United Nations.

Presidential State of the Union Addresses, 1966-1978

Department of State Bulletins: Washington: U.S. Government

Volume 54, Number 1388: 150-155 (Johnson, 1966)
Volume 56, Number 1440: 158-163 (Johnson, 1967)
Volume 58, Number 1493: 161-163 (Johnson, 1968)
Volume 60, Number 1545:   89-91 (Johnson, 1969)
Volume 62, Number 1598: 145-147 (Nixon, 1970)
Volume 66, Number 1702: 141-151 (Nixon, 1972)
Volume 68, Number 1757: 217-219 (Nixon, 1973)
Volume 70, Number 1808: 157-169 (Nixon, 1974)
Volume 72, Number 1858: 133-137 (Ford, 1975)
Volume 76, Number 1963:   97-101 (Ford, 1977)
Volume 79, Number 2023:   1-2   (Carter, 1978)

Presidential Books, Memoirs, and Biographies

CARTER, J. (1976) Why Not the Best? New York: Bantam Books.

JOHNSON, L.B. (1971) The Vantage Point. New York: Popular Library.

NIXON, R.M. (1970-1973) U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Volumes I-IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

State Department Materials

Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy (1966-1979).

ROGERS, W. (1973) United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1972) United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1971) United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government.

Continued

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

Defense Department Materials

BROWN, H. (1978) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY79.
    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

CLIFFORD, C.M. (1969) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
    FY70. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

LAIRD, M.R. (1972) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY73.
    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1971) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY72.
    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1970) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense FY71. Wash-
    ington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

McNAMARA, R.S. (1968) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
    FY69. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1967) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY68.
    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1966) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY67.
    Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

RICHARDSON, E.L. (1973) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
    FY74. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

RUMSFELD, D.R. (1977) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
    FY78. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

_____ (1976) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY77. Wash-
    ington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

SCHLESINGER, J.R. (1974) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
    FY75. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

International Relations Scholarly Journals

Foreign Affairs (1966-1978).

Foreign Policy (1970-1978/79).

Continued

4-4

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

Miscellaneous Scholarly Materials

BLOOMFIELD, L.P. (1974) In Search of American Foreign Policy.
    New York: Oxford University.

BUTTERWORTH, R.L. (1976) Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-1974:
    Data With Synopses. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.

Department of Defense (1971) The Pentagon Papers. Boston: Beacon.

FERRELL, R.H. (1975) American Diplomacy. New York: Norton.

FULBRIGHT, W.J. (1972) The Crippled Giant. New York: Vintage Books.

GEORGE, A.L. and R. SMOKE (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign
    Policy. New York: Columbia University.

_____ (1971) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boston: Little,
    Brown.

HALBERSTAM, D. (1965) The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random
    House.

HALPERIN, M.H. (1971) Defense Strategies for the Seventies. Boston:
    Little, Brown.

HEAD, R.G. and E.J. ROKKLE (eds.) (1973) American Defense Policy,
    3rd Edition. Baltimore: John Hopkins University.

HOFFMANN, S. (1968) Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American
    Foreign Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill.

KENNAN, G.F. (1967) Memoirs. Boston: Little, Brown.

KISSINGER, H.A. (1969) American Foreign Policy. New York: Norton.

_____ (1966) The Troubled Partnership. New York: Anchor Books.

_____ (1957) Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper
    and Brothers.

KOLKO, G. and J. KOLKO (1969) The Limits of Power. New York:
    Harper and Row.

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

NATHAN, J.A. and J.K. OLIVER (1976) United States Foreign Policy and World Order. Boston: Little, Brown.

SCHURMAN, F. (1974) The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry Into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. New York: Pantheon.

SPANIER, J. (1977) American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 7th Edition. New York: Praeger.

STOESSINGER, J.G. (1976) Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power. New York: Norton.

- Presidential books and memoirs,

- State Department bulletins and reports,

- Annual reports of the Secretary of Defense,

- Prestigious international relations journals, and

- Miscellaneous scholarly materials.

While no single source can be viewed as definitive, taken as a set these materials are as authoritative as any unclassified sources can be for the identification of U.S. policy goals.[6] This does not mean, however, that they are free of weaknesses. Many of the individual sources used have internalized or institutionalized systematic biases. For example, the Defense Department materials, as would be expected, primarily focus on more narrowly defined military-security issues and goals and often neglect broader political-military concerns. On the other hand, public speeches (such as the State of the Union and addresses before the United Nations) and State Department materials concentrate on more general ideological goals and political-military and economic objectives. Thus, in many respects the parochial nature of one source is offset or neutralized by one of the other sources used. To guard against systematic

---

[6] Although no classified sources were used in the compilation of U.S. policy goals, the primary sources used were considered both analytically and theoretically adequate for the research aims of this project. Literally tens of thousands of pages of official U.S. Government documents, position papers, and transcripts of news conferences and speeches by key U.S. decision-makers were systematically surveyed (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the research methodology). Such a survey, complemented with review of scholarly perceptions of U.S. international policy behavior, would intuitively appear more than adequate for the identification of U.S. goals. Moreover, a strong argument can be made for the exclusive use of unclassified sources because the vast majority of U.S. goals are articulated repeatedly by U.S. decision-makers in the public media in an attempt to gain the approval and support of U.S. public opinion. Furthermore, the transmission of policy goals and views through the public media is often a way of communicating with one's adversaries and allies within the international system (McClelland, 1966; Deutsch, 1966).

biases possibly inherent in any of the sources, once a "possible" goal
was identified it was thoroughly checked against other sources for content
validity (Kerlinger, 1973: 458). Although a judgmental exercise, it was
viewed as theoretically adequate and essential because U.S. policy-makers
have a tendency to reiterate policy objectives often in an effort to gain
public approval and support. Goals that had a low appearance frequency,
especially if they were mentioned in only one type of the general source
categories, are not included in the analysis. The assumption is that
such goals are either low priority items on the international agenda of
the United States or primarily a reflection of bureaucratic parochialism.

A more problematic characteristic of some of the sources was their un-
systematic presentation style, forcing "between the lines" inferences of
relevant policy goals. Moreover, the vast majority of primary sources
were void of any conceptual foundation other than general ideological
underpinnings. Instead of systematically reviewing each of the individual
objectives of American political-military policy as they relate to more
general American policy pursuits, the usual descriptive method was to
present a series of near, past, or present international policy concerns
and the methods used to secure them. In itself, there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with this presentation style. Indeed, it reflects the
traditional administration and deployment of resources by the institutions
of American political-military policy. Policy-makers often have a ten-
dency to "muddle through" successive incremental policies toward some
desired objective (Lindblom, 1959: 86). Moreover, truly shared assump-
tions and objectives do not require constant repetition. One major task
in compiling our list of American policy goals, however, was to inte-
grate individual decision-makers' inferences from primary source material
to form a mosaic of general American policy pursuits for the relevant
time period. Thus, conceptual frameworks presented in scholarly publica-
tions were extensively consulted in order to integrate individual policy
pronouncements into general U.S. policy designs (see Table 1).

U.S. POLICY GOALS

Table 2 presents the compiled list of dominant American international
policy goals for the years 1966 to 1978. The goals are grouped into
nine main categories (Figure 1). The first three -- ideological,
military-security, and economic -- contain long-term goals. These goals
have been strongly held to one degree or another by all postwar admini-
strations and correspond to what Harold and Margaret Sprout (1957) call
the "psychological" environment of policy or the circumstances constantly
sought and perceived in an almost objective way by American policy-makers.
Hence, these goals represent the general policy orientation or ultimate
national designs of the United States vis-a-vis the international system.
These long-term, issue-oriented goals reflect the core values of the
society and its leaders and can be conceived of as basically invariant
over time and space. The pursuit of these goals, in addition, often tends
to be fraught with polemics, complexities, and ambiguities (Holsti, 1972).
Nevertheless, their general orientation and intensity promote these goals
as the basic principles of U.S. international policy and in a large degree
become articles of faith that are accepted uncritically (Modelski, 1962).
Such phenomena as the Monroe Doctrine, containment of Communism, manifest
destiny, sovereignty, and so forth, suggest basic foreign policy interests
and goals that at one time or another were held sacrosanct by the Ameri-
can public (Holsti, 1972: 137). The other six categories of goals relate
to geographical, area-specific phenomena and thus have a more limited
focus (not necessarily more limited in terms of time but rather in geo-
graphical scope). What follows is a discussion of U.S. policy goals
identified by our research. Because of the importance of the long-term
issue-area goals, relatively more space is devoted to their discussion
than the geographical goals.

IDEOLOGICAL GOALS

The tradition of American international policy is founded on an image of
the United States as a "new protean society based on the ideas of the

4-9

TABLE 2

Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978

Ideological

1. Support democratic values and countries.

2. Promote peace and the peaceful resolution to conflict.

3. Advance global welfare and human rights.

4. Support international law and international organizations.

5. Ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States.

Military Security

1. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions.

2. Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe, Japan).

3. Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's.

4. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. overseas maritime interests.

5. Maintain/increase military capability for "show of force" and demonstrating ability to intervene in overseas conflict arenas.

6. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and U.S. citizens in foreign countries.

7. Assist friendly or neutral developing countries in strengthening their military capability for regional stability purposes.

8. Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends.

9. Deter hostile military influence expansion.

U.S. Economic Goals

1. Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests and relations.

Continued

4-10

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

2. Support international economic order/system compatible with U.S. economic interests.

3. Promote the stability of international commodity prices and supplies.

4. Promote the economic development of Third World non-Communist countries.

U.S. Goals Toward Communist States (Particularly the USSR and PRC)

1. Reduce chances of war with major Communist states.

2. Reduce chances of war with the USSR.

3. Contain/restrain/deter the expansion of Communist influence.

4. Encourage "polycentrism" within the Communist world.

5. Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states.

6. Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and the PRC.

7. Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR.

Goals Toward Europe

1. Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe.

2. Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with countries of Western Europe.

3. Work for the economic stability and the economic, military, and political integration of Western Europe.

4. Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe.

5. Improve relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

U.S. Goals Toward Asia

1. Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR (1960's).

Continued

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

2. Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia
   (1960's).

3. Promote the stability of and maintain defense forces for protecting
   Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan.

4. Support the stability of other non-Communist Asian countries.

5. Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia (1970's).

6. Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan.

7. Promote economic development/stability in non-Communist developing
   Asian countries.

U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East

1. Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East.

2. Guarantee Israeli security.

3. Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East.

4. Promote/support political stability in the Middle East.

5. Promote economic stability/development of countries in the Middle
   East.

6. Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the
   Middle East.

U.S. Goals Toward Latin America

1. Promote economic stability/development in Latin American countries.

2. Continue/strengthen American economic presence in Latin America.

3. Keep Latin America free of external "hostile" aggression and influence.

4. Promote democratic institutions in Latin America.

5. Promote/support the political stability of Latin American countries.

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

<u>U.S. Goals Toward Africa</u>

1. Promote peaceful transition of African countries to independence
    (1960's).

2. Promote economic stability/development in African countries.

3. Increase/promote U.S. economic relations with African countries.
Continued

4. Promote democractic institutions in Africa.

5. Promote/support non-Communist political stability in African countries.

6. Promote security of Cape route and other major sea lines of communi-
    cation around Africa.

7. Promote better diplomatic relations with Africa.

Figure 1. Major categories of U.S. Policy Goals

Enlightenment" (Wilcox, 1976: 36).[7] This ideological tradition can be traced to the very beginnings of U.S. history. In 1630, for example, at the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop spoke of America's peculiar relationship to the world, saying, "the eyes of all people are upon us. . .we shall be made a story and a byword through the world. . .we shall be a City upon a Hill."[8] Such a self image based on ideological underpinnings has, in part, lead to an international policy that has been moralistic and crusading in tone while at the same time often isolationist:

- It expresses confidence that isolation need not diminish U.S. influences.

- It reveals a conviction that separation from, or involvement in, the world is a matter of choice rather than necessity.

- It suggests a unique American destiny, yet a sense of being in the vanguard of a universal destiny.[9]

Such an ideology, reinforced by America's geographical isolation and scepticism of the traditional, conflict-laden, and secret diplomacy of the old European order, contributed to a low international profile for the United States during the 18th and 19th centuries. It was not until after World War II that the United States found itself uncomfortably at the center of the international system. Yet even after firmly establishing itself as the most powerful state in the world, its international policy maintained strong ideological underpinnings that can be traced to earlier times.

7

For an exhaustive analysis of this image and the effect it has had on the "style" of American foreign policy, see Hoffman (1968), Morgenthau (1951), and Spanier (1977).

8

Quoted by Lord (1976: 677).

9

Lord (1976: 677-678).

Spanier suggests that present American foreign policy attitudes are characterized by:

> A high degree of moralism and missionary zeal stemming from
> the nation's long consideration of itself as a unique and
> morally superior society....Moralism in foreign policy thus
> reflected the awareness and pride of a society that believed
> it had carved out a better domestic order, free of oppres-
> sion and injustice (Spanier, 1972: 325).

Obviously, ideology cannot explain all U.S. goals and international poli-
cies, yet at the same time its importance should not be overlooked. Ideo-
logical assumptions often serve as the foundation of global images and in
the case of the United States these images have played a dominant role in
developing the structures and priorities of U.S. international goals and
actions (Halperin, 1974: 11-25). Even former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, whose diplomacy was structured around the "deideolization of
foreign relations" focusing instead primarily on balance of power notions
(Schlesinger, 1979: 511), found it necessary at times to reiterate U.S.
policy's basic ideological underpinnings.

> Our efforts to define, preserve, and enhance respect for
> the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of inter-
> national cooperation. We Americans, in the year of our
> bicentennial, are conscious and proud of our own traditions.
> Our founding fathers wrote 200 years ago of the equality
> and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals
> of liberty and democracy have become the universal and
> indestructible goals of mankind (U.N. (1976) 32, 18: 185).

As indicated in Table 2, the five major ideological policy goals identified
were:

- Support democratic values and countries,

- Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict,

- Advance global welfare and human rights,

- Support international law and international organizations,
  and

- Ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States.

4-16

As is readily apparent, despite their depiction as "ideological" aims for
the purposes of this survey, each of these goals potentially has a very
direct bearing on U.S. military policy. It is easy to envision both
historical and hypothetical instances in which the use of American armed
forces (in addition to other policy instruments) might be required to
accomplish these ends. (Similar linkages to U.S. military policy will
be apparent for all of the clusters of national goals reviewed in this
chapter).

Support Democratic Values and Countries

The preservation and protection of democractic values and countries has
been a principal declaratory thrust of American foreign policy. Since
World War II the protection of democractic social orders as a policy
rationale has been aimed primarily at the perceived threats presented
to democracy from the two major Communist powers -- the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China. While the United States has viewed
itself as champion of freedom, self-determination, constitutionalism,
and pluralism, the *Soviet Union and China* have been viewed as the world's
primary advocates of a command economy, centralized control, and the
subjugation of the individual to the state.[10]

Hence, the ideological goal of safeguarding democracy has helped the
United States assume the role of the global leader of anti-Communist
forces.[11] Communism is perceived as diametrically opposed to the advance-
ment of democracy in a zero-sum way. In fact the two roles are perceived
to go hand-in-hand and their importance to American international policy
has been clearly demonstrated by empirical analysis (Holsti, 1970).

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[10] These attitudes are elaborated in the discussion of U.S. goals toward
Communist states later in this chapter.

[11] Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles were perhaps the ultimate examples
of American decision-makers who followed this logic, but the "Cold War cru-
sade" and idealism also marked the foreign policy of Presidents Nixon
and Ford and is the dominant assumption of the new "Cold War idealists"
personified by Senator Moynihan, for example, see Moynihan (1978).

The importance of these roles is clearly suggested by Halperin (1974: 11-12) when he presents the following set of shared "global images" that he argues have decisively shaped the <u>totality of U.S. policy</u> from the onset of the Cold War until quite recently:[12]

- The preeminent feature of international politics is conflict between Communism and the Free World.

- Every nation that falls to Communism increases the power of the Communist bloc in its struggle with the free world.

- The surest simple guide to U.S. interests is opposition to Communism.

- Soviet intentions toward Western Europe are essentially expansionist. So, too, are Chinese intentions in Asia.

- The main source of unrest, disorder, subversion, and civil war in underdeveloped areas is Communist influence and support.

- The United States has the power, ability, responsiblity, and right to defend the free world.

- The expansion of Communist influence must be resisted through collective defense.

- Concessions made under pressure constitute appeasement.

- Coalition governments are inevitably taken over by the Communists.

- Military strength is the primary route to national security.

- The United States must maintain military superiority over the Soviet Union, including the ability to destroy the Soviet Union after a Soviet first strike.

---

[12]

This list, as Halperin (1974: 12) admits, is oversimplified but it is useful in that it illustrates the sort of "common denominator from which more refined perceptions" of U.S. policy derive. The majority of goals identified by our research seems to have direct linkages to one or many of these "images."

The Promotion of Peace and Peaceful Resolution to Conflicts

Like the support of democracy, this goal is at least partially declara-
tory. One could argue that this ideological goal has often been contra-
dicted by specific U.S. policy actions. American intervention in South-
east Asia, covert action against Allende's Chile, and recent Congressional
findings and hearings concerning alleged CIA assassination attempts
against foreign leaders are cases in point. Many apparent contradictions
concerning this goal are due to the complex nature and definitional/con-
ceptual controversies surrounding notions of "peace." For example, by
the promotion of peace does one mean simply the quest for an absence of
military conflict or the absence of war accompanied by certain structural
"preconditions" for peace such as the absence of hunger, ignorance, and
poverty? Stanley Hoffmann, in criticizing the often stated goal of Nixon
and Kissinger of an "honorable peace" and a "stable structure of peace,"
points to the conceptual confusions surrounding these objectives when he
suggests that:

> The ritual, incantatory assertion of our search for a
> "stable structure of peace" tells us very little of sub-
> stance. At most, it indicates a vague, sound set of
> "philosophic" hunches, which neither amount to a genu-
> ine "fresh vision," nor account for all those tactical
> moves, or omissions, that are in flat contradiction with
> the stated goals (Hoffmann, 1973: 3).

Nevertheless, the search for peace, particularly if defined as an absence
of war, permeates U.S. international policy decision-makers' declarations.
Absence of conflict is especially important, as would be expected, in
American policy statements concerning regions of the world viewed as stra-
tegically vital to the national interest. Few observers would dispute,
for example, that a major objective of American policy has been the main-
tenance and enhancement of the security of strategically "crucial areas"
stretching from northern Norway to the Aleutian Islands. But this long-
standing foreign policy objective cannot be thoroughly realized in a
hostile world, so goes the argument, unless a peaceful, American-favored,

status quo exists in these areas. Hence, a major foundation of American foreign policy is based on policies of "collective security" among the U.S. and its allies and friends aimed at guaranteeing the peace, territorial integrity, and independence of areas such as Western Europe, the Middle East, northeast Asia, and Africa.[13] The promotion of peace based on a strong military posture and deterrent capability is no anomaly in American foreign policy.[14] President Carter reflected the general policy tendencies of all postwar Presidents when he argued before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1977 that:

> Peace will not be assured until the weapons of war are finally put away. While we work towards that goal nations will want sufficient arms to preserve their security. The United States' purpose is to ensure peace. It is for that reason that our military posture and our alliances will remain as strong as necessary to deter attack (U.N., 1977, 32/18: 4-5).

Promotion of Human Rights

The domestic legislation and practices of the United States, for the most part, put it in a relatively good position to champion the third ideological goal -- the promotion of human rights around the world. Often, however, the commitment to human rights is more moral than legal and at times vague (Van Dyke, 1970: 105). Then again, this tends to be a characteristic of the majority of American ideological policy goals or, for that matter, most ideological goals. It must be remembered that any benchmark by which one examines ideological goals must necessarily be subjective in nature. The important point seems to be that, at least in a perceptual way, the promotion of human rights has been high on the policy agenda of American decision-makers. Although all administrations stressed this goal to one degree or another, examination of primary source materials as expected showed that the Carter Administration, especially

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[13] See the discussions concerning U.S. policy goals in these various regions.

[14] See the discussion concerning U.S. military-security goals.

during its first year in office, gave it the greatest relative emphasis. "The basic thrust of human affairs," President Carter stated in his address before the United Nations in 1977, "points to a more universal demand for basic human rights."[15] Or as he stated before a NATO meeting in May of 1977:

America's concern for human rights does not reflect a desire to impose our particular political or social arrangements on any other country. It is, rather, an expression of the most deeply felt values of the American people. We want the world to know where we stand....We will continue to express our belief not only because we must remain true to ourselves but also because we are convinced that the building of a better world rests on each nation's clear expression of the values that have given meaning to its national life. (Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1977: 599).

Since World War II, U.S. actions in regard to the advancement of human rights have been basically symbolic. They include: ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other treaties, membership in international organizations that promote human rights, promotion of foreign aid projects, and encouragement of the expansion of the United Nations for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, the United States has pledged support for various U.N. resolutions condemning and sanctioning regimes, such as Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, that have grossly violated basic human rights. Yet, at the same time the United States has pursued and expanded cooperative relations with governments of the authoritarian right (Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Chile) and of the authoritarian left (for example, Yugoslavia). This contradiction reveals, in part, the tension between ideological and other types of aims. The choices are often very unpleasant.

A nation's fundamental interest must be self-preservation, and, when national security and promotion of human rights [come] into genuine conflict, national security [has] to prevail. (Schlesinger, 1979: 519).

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[15] As quoted in Bull (1979: 460). For an excellent discussion of Carter's human rights policies, see Schlesinger (1979: 503-526).

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Moreover, while the United States has emphasized and promoted individual human rights (for example, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties; freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press), it has paid relatively less attention to collective rights and economic and social rights such as freedom from hunger, poverty, and ignorance. This relative stress on "classical" human rights factors at times creates tension for U.S. relations with the Third World countries that emphasize economic/distributional goals (Bull, 1979: 460).

Support for International Law and Organizations

The ideological goal of American support of international law and organizations has generally been one of the more prominent declaratory goals of U.S. decision-makers in the period since the mid-1960's. Statements such as, "the rule of law in a world beset by global problems must of necessity be a matter of priority" (Nixon, 1973: 212) were expounded fairly frequently. In practice, however, the relevance and importance attached to this goal has varied markedly across situations. For example, in situations involving expropriation of the property of American multinational firms, it has had high salience.

Although officially promoting the United Nations, the last decade has seen the United States' view of this organization change drastically. During the early Cold War period, the U.S. had virtual control over the United Nations. Consequently, America strongly promoted U.N. activities at that time, such as the utilization of peacekeeping forces in conflict arenas. With the emergence in the early 1960's of the Afro-Asian/Third World majority in the U.N., however, the United States at times became disenchanted with the organization. This was especially prevalent during Daniel Moynihan's tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.[16]

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[16]
    See Moynihan (1978).

Ensure U.S. Prestige and Dignity

The last ideological goal consistently found in the writings and public
pronouncements of American foreign policy decision-makers was: "ensure
the prestige and dignity of the United States." Unlike some of the
previous ideological goals, whose pursuit at time appear more symbolic
than substantive, this goal appears to be consistently "sought." One of
the main substantive components of this objective is maintenance of the
United States' image as a solid trustworthy alliance partner. American
decision-makers between 1966 and 1978 constantly reiterated their com-
mitments to the United State's alliances, treaties, and friends. Indeed,
such commitments are a major requirement of a wide range of deterrence
policies followed by the United States (George and Smoke, 1975: 4).
Former Secretary of State William Rogers refers to this phenomenon when
he suggests that:

> Doubts about our ability to fulfill our security commitments
> would adversely affect our alliances, discouraging our allies
> from strengthening their contribution to the common defense.
> Our adversaries might conclude that they could resort to the
> threat or use of force to settle differences (Rogers, 1972:
> 76).

As with its relationship with policies of deterrence, the goal of ensur-
ing the United States' prestige and dignity is seldom an end in itself.
Rather, it is usually one of the instruments by which the United States
seeks other objectives. For example, American prestige and dignity have
often been used, particularly during the Cold War, to prove to develop-
ing countries that Western democratic systems deserved their support
rather than rival Communist systems. More recently, many have argued
that the United States' experience in Vietnam was an excellent example
of the United States trying to uphold its prestige and dignity and avoid
embarrassment. Once President Johnson realized that the U.S. was "over-
committed," these observers argue, he proceeded to escalate the war not
only to avoid defeat but also to avoid tarnishing America's global image

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and reputation. Indeed, once this dynamic was institutionalized, it was not only the American client, South Vietnam, who was at stake; rather it was the United States itself (Nathan and Oliver, 1976: 374). Henry Kissinger made a related point concerning the United States and Vietnam when he wrote:

> The commitment of five hundred thousand Americans settled the issue of the importance of Vietnam for what is involved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige" they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness (Kissinger, 1969: 112).

No matter how abstract and exaggerated terms such as "prestige," "dignity," and "integrity" are in decision-maker's statements concerning international affairs, they are as real and as important to the relations of nation-states as they are to individuals in their relations with others (Morgenthau, 1973: 74).

MILITARY-SECURITY GOALS

The more narrowly defined military-security goals of the United States are even more integrated and interdependent than the ideological goals just discussed. All of these goals concern enhancing and promoting the continued survival of the United States, for this has to be the utmost value sought by decision-makers. Since World War II, the major concern has been the avoidance and deterrence of thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union. Thus, the United States has found it necessary to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to defend its immediate territorial integrity and the territory and interests of allies and friends who might be threatened by "nuclear blackmail." Richard Nixon, writing in 1973, echoed to

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one degree or another the statements of all recent Presidents when he sug-
gested that:

> Deterrence of war is the primary goal of our strategic pol-
> icy and the principal function of our nuclear forces. Thus,
> our objective continues to be:
>
> - To deter all-out attack on the United States or its
>   allies,
>
> - To face any potential aggressor contemplating less
>   than all-out attack with unacceptable risks, and
>
> - To maintain a stable political environment within
>   which the threat of aggression or coercion against
>   the United States or its allies is minimized (Nixon,
>   1973: 182).

Hence, the central objective of U.S. strategic policy has been to deter
nuclear attack on and nuclear coercion of the United States and its allies.
This objective has required as a minimum that U.S. strategic forces, even
after absorbing an all-out nuclear first strike, be able to inflict an
unacceptable level of damage on its enemies. In addition, it has been
assumed that the United States must maintain an overall military capabil-
ity that can meet any level or type of enemy attack with a deliberate and
credible response (strategies of flexible response, forward defense, and
multiple level deterrence).

The United States' nuclear policy has revolved around a "TRIAD" of forces
-- ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bom-
bers -- each of which presents different problems to a would be attacker.
This nuclear TRIAD is complemented by theater nuclear capabilities and
conventional forces. The military-security goals of the United States
presented in Table 2 recognize these different types of forces and capa-
bilities and focus them to more specific objectives.

U.S. Defense of Europe

In addition to the goal of maintaining sufficient military capabilities to
directly defend its own territorial integrity, maintaining military capa-
bilities for defending Western Europe is perhaps the United States' second
most important international policy commitment.[17] Actually these two
goals are not easily separated. This defense strategy again depends on
both nuclear and conventional deterrence. Both the U.S. and NATO poli-
cies have been aimed at denying the Soviets and/or any Warsaw Pact coun-
try the ability to control or coerce Western Europe through aggression.
Just as the United States has its TRIAD of forces in its own direct de-
fense, it maintains a TRIAD of forces to defend Western Europe. The
overall American strategy in Western Europe has been governed largely
by the treaty obligations of NATO. This basic strategy (Rumsfeld, 1977:
35) can be summarized as:

- Maintain military deterrence capability for defending
  Western Europe,

- Promote the cohesion of NATO,

- Encourage major European contributions to NATO and
  ensure their complementarity and effectiveness,

- Encourage the collective strengths of Western Europe
  to be able to resist Soviet pressures and influence,
  and

- Seek to reduce tension in East-West military rela-
  tionships in Europe (for example, Berlin, MBFR, and
  so forth).

Although its relations with its NATO allies have not been free from major
disagreements over military strategy, few could suggest a more important

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[17] See the discussion of the United States' foreign policy goals toward
Europe later in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of this re-
lationship.

region of the world for American foreign policy. Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown recently reaffirmed its importance when he wrote:

> A goal of the highest priority for this administration is to
> ensure stability in the vital European region....The task is
> challenging and difficult. But we are determined to strive
> for a stronger and more rational NATO defense posture, with
> greater interoperability and standardization of armaments.
> (Brown; 1978: 23).

U.S. Defense of Japan

While American security relationships with Japan lack the historical and
cultural importance of those with Western Europe, the preservation of
U.S. military capabilities for the defense of Japan is a key American
policy goal. The American-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty is a major
factor in American policy.[18] This alliance is viewed as central
to the security of northeast Asia and America's position in the Pacific.
The fundamental U.S. security objectives vis-a-vis Japan are:

- Ensure Japanese security against a Soviet and/or
  Chinese nuclear attack,

- Defend (or at least help defend) Japan against con-
  ventional attacks as outlined by the Mutual Security
  Treaty,

- Encourage Japan to "shoulder large responsibilities"
  for Asian regional security (Nixon, 1970: 54), and

- Help Japan build up its military capabilities to
  defend itself but encourage close consultations, com-
  patibility and complementarity between military doc-
  trines and forces (Rumsfeld, 1977: 39).

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[18] See also the later discussion of United States' foreign policy goals
toward Asia.

U.S. Defense Policy and the Third World

In addition to maintaining capabilities for the defense of U.S. territorial integrity and that of other major industrial democracies (primarily Western Europe and Japan), the United States, for the years 1966-1978, also sought to maintain or increase its capabilities to defend strategically important less developed countries (LDC's) (for example, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Saudi Arabia, and so forth).

A core dynamic of this objective has been based on the perceived necessity of containing the aggression and expansion of both the Soviet and Chinese versions of Communism that are perceived to threaten the Third World countries.[19] In fact, the United States has traditionally viewed the Third World as a battleground between Communism and the Free World.

If the military capabilities of the United States were not so devoted, the argument goes, Communist expansion could endanger American survival. Hence, a series of treaty commitments make clear the objective of defending strategic Third World countries from Communist aggression (for example, the Rio Pact and CENTO). Moreover, as a matter of general policy, the United States has been willing to directly use its military capabilities to preserve the status quo from the radical shifts of Communist expansion. The two most costly examples of this, of course, are the U.S. experience in Korea and in Southeast Asia.

In general terms, according to our examination of primary source materials, the goal of defending strategically important LDC's can be reduced to the following military objectives:

- Maintain/acquire military bases and/or access to military facilities,

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[19] See the discussion of U.S. foreign policy goals toward Communist states.

- Help sustain regional cooperation and balances of power that will preserve the independence of U.S. friends,

- Deter hostile aggression while seeking political resolutions to conflicts (for example, Vietnam and Korea),

- Help non-Communist LDC's to strengthen their military capabilities by supplying financial and material assistance,

- Maintain access for the U.S. and its allies to vital lines of communication through important areas,

- Prevent the expansion of Communist or Communist-supported radical influence, and

- Defend major neutral countries (for example, India and Yugoslavia) against hostile attack.

One final aspect of LDC security that deserves mention is the U.S. assumption that underdevelopment and political instability are interrelated and that these phenomena often have international repercussions. According to this view, underdevelopment with its associated poverty often leads to frustrations that the United States views as easily exploitable by Communist penetration. Thus, internal Third World problems have on occasion spilled over into the external arena as the United States or its allies have attempted to counteract Communist penetration of these power vacuums. The most obvious examples of such events are: Southeast Asia (1962-1975), the Congo (1960), the Pakistan/Bangladesh war (1971), Angola (1975), and Ethiopia (1977). For this reason the United States has not only helped friendly LDC's to strengthen their military capabilities against external threats and for regional stability purposes, but has also assisted friendly or neutral LDC's in developing their internal paramilitary and police forces. Foreign aid programs have often been sold to Congress and the American public as vital aspects of the fight against domestic instability. One objective here is to help LDC's deter any internal conflict before it has a chance to escalate and possibly lead to a confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.

One final military-security goal of American foreign policy has been to maintain the capabilities needed for defending U.S. citizens and commercial interests abroad. The two key dynamics of this goal, as evidenced by analysis of primary source materials, are:

- Maintain/increase the capability for rescuing American citizens and properties from hostile groups, and

- Maintain the capability for punitive reprisals against groups or countries threatening American citizens and properties.

The four most spectacular recent examples of U.S. commitment to this goal were the April 1975 events in Saigon, the Mayaguez operation, the Lebanon evacuations of 1976, and the evacuation of Iran in February 1979. In all of these instances, the planning of American operations gained the attention of top foreign policy decision-makers.

ECONOMIC GOALS

While the United States is no longer the predominant economic power it was during the immediate postwar years, it must still be considered by all standards the leading global economic power. Although some states exercise more economic influence in certain regions, none comes near the United States in terms of the breadth and intensity of its economic linkages around the world. Consider, for example, that in 1978 alone the United States exported $143 billion worth of goods and services representing over 7 percent of U.S. GNP and imported $183 billion (IMF, 1979: 36-37). Moreover, American citizens and corporations own substantially more than these amounts in foreign assets.

The reasons for this immense economic power can be attributed not only to America's overall economic size, vigor, and stability but also to the fact that the United States was the only major power to emerge from World War II with its economic base and industrial sector intact. The

early postwar years saw the United States account for half of the non-Communist world's economic output and the vast majority of international investment. Moreover, it possessed a nuclear monopoly, had considerable support in the newly created United Nations, and its prestige and moral authority were at a peak. Therefore, it was not surprising that the U.S. became the driving force in the creation of the postwar international economic order. It wanted this system to be based on institutions and policies that would prevent the explicitly competitive "beggar thy neighbor" foreign economic policies that characterized the 1930's. The three most important institutions created were the:

1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that codified the rules of conduct for international trade,

2. International Monetary Fund (IMF) designed to promote the stabilization and liberalization of international monetary transactions, and

3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which was to help provide needed capital to support developing countries.

These organizations were later joined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created to help coordinate policies among the individual countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Together these economic institutions helped promote American economic interests by making the dollar the world's primary reserve and key transaction currency. The postwar international monetary system, which was devised at Bretton Woods in 1944, served the United States and the international system well for over a quarter of a century. This period was characterized by rapid and sustained economic growth and stability. But, finally in the early 1970's U.S. balance of payments deficits, global inflation, and a wide variety of economic problems led to the collapse of the "Bretton Woods System" and the creation of new rules of conduct for international trade and monetary affairs. The role of the dollar as the world's reserve currency was redefined and the United States gradually lost part of its dominant position.

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The United States still remains the world's single greatest economic power, but phenomenal growth rates in Japan and Europe have altered its relative standing. Primary and secondary source materials for the years 1966-1978 revealed four general economic goals pursued over this time period by the United States (see Table 2):

1. Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests and relations,

2. Support international economic systems and processes compatible with U.S. economic interests,

3. Promote stability of international commodity prices and supplies, and

4. Promote the economic development of Third World non-Communist countries.

Accomplishment of each of these aims can entail the operations of U.S. military forces.

The first economic goal is obvious and noncontroversial considering that the United States is the world's major international economic actor and market. Within the structure of U.S. capitalism, the Government has played an active role in expanding American foreign markets, helping U.S. firms gain contracts abroad, promoting U.S. trade and investment, and so forth. Moreover, the United States has actively pursued policies to improve the means by which U.S. firms adjust to foreign economic competition. Tariff and quota agreements have been two major strategies followed to protect less competitive firms and promote more competitive ones.

Other key dynamics of the U.S. foreign economic goal of supporting the expansion and performance of its commercial interests and relations, revealed through policy primary sources, are to maintain/increase U.S. economic growth, promote a favorable balance of trade, dispose of U.S. agricultural surpluses overseas, protect against the impact of economic crises

abroad, promote a stable U.S. dollar, and discourage the uncompensated expropriations of U.S. firms.

The second general economic goal of American policy -- support international economic systems and processes compatible with U.S. economic interests -- is again self-evident. As suggested above, the postwar international economic system, to a large extent, has been a basic reflection of the economic wants and needs of the United States. It continues to support GATT, IMF, IBRD, and OECD, the key international economic institutions. A second major aspect of this goal revolves around promotion and support for the expansion of liberalized trading policies. Feeling that it has a comparative advantage in many economic sectors, the United States has traditionally fought against economic barriers and obstructions that would block the free flow of goods and capital across national borders. The 1930's and its intense economic rivalries and conflict proved to be a bitter experience for the United States. But such a general policy has not inhibited it from retaliating against countries that are following trade policies perceived to unfairly impede U.S. exports in the world market. In fact, the Nixon administration submitted trade legislation in 1969 that gave the President new authority to counter the actions of countries following "unfair" trade policies.

The realization of global economic interdependence has made the promotion of international economic growth and cooperation, especially among the world's industrial democracies, an additional salient characteristic of an international economic order compatible with American interests. As William Rogers suggested in 1972:

>Bilateral approaches are no longer sufficient to handle the growing agenda of common political and economic concerns. A substantially higher level of worldwide coordination and cooperation is required among Japan, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States if we are to solve common trade and monetary problems, continue the rapid expansion of the world's economy, and assist in the growth

of the developing world....No longer can any of us satisfac-
torily think solely in Asian terms, in European terms, or in
North American terms. For the health and strength of us all
we must think and act in terms of us all (Rogers, 1972:
XIII).

The 1970's have witnessed how events and policies in other countries can
profoundly effect the well-being of the United States. Inflation and
unemployment, for example, cannot be viewed as isolated national phenom-
ena. The domestic economic trends in any one of a number of countries
have a direct and real influence on the U.S. economy. Similarly, the
dynamic exchange rate of the U.S. dollar depends as much upon the deci-
sions and the flow of capital investments by non-Americans as by any
policy made in Washington. The increasingly interdependent nature of
the world economy has made economic relations and economic power more
political.[20]

The last two general economic goals of American foreign policy -- promote
the stability of the price and supplies of international commodities and
promote the economic development of non-Communist Third World countries
-- are primarily directed at U.S. relations with the Third World.

Although commodity price and supply stability is important to economic
relations in the developed world, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and 1974
explicitly focused future American attention concerning commodity price
and supply stability to a large extent on the Third World. Interest here,
of course, primarily concerns the supply of Middle Eastern oil. The
United States and the rest of the industrial world runs, quite literally,
on oil and the Third World, especially the Persian Gulf, has the vast
majority of the worlds' known oil reserves. The promotion of an unin-
terrupted flow of oil, the discouragement of raw material cartels, and
policies aimed at stockpiling certain raw materials or finding alterna-
tive sources are additional key dynamics to this goal. The last decade
has seen the traditional relationship between suppliers and consumers

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[20] For example, see Diebold (1972: 18-36).

of petroleum radically, and probably irrevocably, altered. The goal of stabilizing raw material prices and supplies is an aim that most likely will continue to hold the attention of American policy planners.[21]

The last general economic goal that permeates the writings of American decision-makers for the years 1966-1978 is that of promoting Third World economic development. Considering that the gap in wealth between the United States and most Third World countries is getting larger rather than smaller, this goal has been viewed by many, particularly Third World observers, as basically declaratory. Bergstein (1973) for example notes that the United States devotes a smaller fraction of its national product to development aid than most other industrialized Western nations. At the same time, however, development policy has played a prominent role in U.S. policy since the mid-1960s, and was a major focus during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that some type of development policy is required by the United States to hopefully help offset hostile Third World nationalism and associated threats to a number of vital interests of the United States. Such a strategy was surely followed during the Cold War.

GOALS TOWARD THE MAJOR COMMUNIST STATES -- THE SOVIET UNION AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Relations with the major Communist states have been the dominant theme of American foreign policy since World War II, so dominant, in fact, that a close examination of the goals of American foreign policy presented in Table 2 will reveal few goals that are not associated in some degree to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union (USSR) and People's Republic of China (PRC).

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[21] For competing U.S. strategies toward natural resources and the Third World, see Bergstein (1973, 1974-75) and Krasner (1974).

As suggested earlier, the Soviet Union is perceived to represent the basic challenge to the "American way of life." This threat exists (in part) because the USSR is the only country in the world other than the U.S. with the capabilities to conquer Europe and Asia. Moreover, it is the only country that poses a serious and real threat to the United States. De Toqueville's prediction of a world eventually dominated by American and Russian (Soviet) power has been realized, at least in part. But as discussed earlier, it is not merely the power capabilities of each country that has resulted in their highly competitive and at times conflictual relations. Rather, much of this must be attributed to the ideological nature of their rivalry. At its center has been the doctrine of containment -- a policy aimed at both the USSR and PRC. Indeed, containment has been the basic U.S. orientation toward the Communist world. As mentioned earlier, the essence of this policy has been based on a global alliance system and American deterrence of perceived Communist aggression. The basic objective of such policies and alliances is to create inhibitions against the Soviets using their strengths in ways that jeopardize U.S. interests or those of its allies. Furthermore, over time the U.S. has attempted to channel Soviet energies in more positive directions.

The character of this containment has changed over the years just as the basic global political configurations and balance of power have changed. The military strategy followed during the 1950's, for example, which placed great reliance on the strategic nuclear capacity of the United States, was referred to as "massive retaliation." This strategy basically suggested that any hostile aggression against the United States would be countered by prompt nuclear punishment. The early 1960's saw the development of a new doctrine of "flexible response" as the Soviets began to first seriously counter American nuclear capabilities. This doctrine placed less emphasis on a nuclear response to threats while suggesting that the United States had to be prepared to fight a wide variety of wars from all-out nuclear exchanges to counterinsurgency operations. Present strategy is more difficult to classify because it recognizes a wide variety of dynamics that were not operable in the 1950's and 1960's.

By the end of the 1960's, the United States switched to a policy of "detente" toward both the Soviet Union and China. The basic principles of this policy are:

- Avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of war by reducing military tension,

- Engage in negotiations in an effort to resolve outstanding issues,

- Build rational relationships with potential adversaries,

- Encourage constructive collaboration on such international problems as arms control, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and so forth, that affect the mutual national security interests of the U.S., USSR, and PRC,

- Continue to deter unilateral Soviet or Chinese efforts to exploit local conflicts to their advantage, and

- Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states.

Speaking before the United Nations in 1975, Henry Kissinger summarized this policy by suggesting that:

> In recent years, the bipolar confrontation of the last generation has given way to the beginning of dialogue and an easing of direct conflict....We shall firmly defend our vital interests and those of our friends. But we shall also never lose sight of the fact that, in our age, peace is a practical necessity and a moral imperative. We shall pursue the relaxation of tensions on the basis of strict reciprocity. We know the differences between posturing and policy; we will not encourage the belief that anyone can benefit from artificial tensions. We are deeply conscious that we owe it to future generations not to be swayed by momentary passions (U.N., 31, 11: 180).

U.S. detente policies recognize that the international system has become more complex than the clear-cut bipolar relations that existed during the Cold War. But the focus of detente must still be viewed as an attempt to maintain American-Soviet balance and, therefore, an essential continuity

with past policy. In the 1950's and 1960's the United States, in pursuing a balance of power, felt compelled to justify policy in terms of a crusading ideological style that was often inflexible (Halperin, 1974). This new policy recognized that all sides had something to gain from cooperation. By establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, Moscow's bitter rival, Peking could be used to provide Moscow with an incentive to act with greater restraint (Spanier, 1977: 263). Likewise, the U.S. could, therefore, be more flexible in its policies toward the Communist world and try to gain agreements and advantages with both regimes while remaining inflexible about preventing additional Communist expansion. As Secretary of Defense Brown (1979: 23) has suggested, "effective relations with the People's Republic of China are important...because China is a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union."

Clearly, such a strategy is only operable as long as the USSR and the PRC do not exist in a monolithic Communist world. The two major Communist powers locked again in close alliance would pose a different class of policy problems for the United States. For this reason, an additional goal of American foreign policy evidenced in Table 2 is the encouragement of "polycentrism" within the Communist world. The disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance must be viewed as one of the most significant events of the postwar era for American foreign policy. Indeed, closer rapprochement between the Soviets and Chinese would undoubtedly have a profound effect on U.S. foreign policy. Policies of detente and co-existence must be viewed in the American case to be intimately linked at least historically to the Sino-Soviet split.

REGIONAL GOALS

This section summarizes recent U.S. goals in five regions: Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Discussing the goals toward each of these regions separately is not meant to suggest that the region-specific goals of American policy are independent of one another. On the contrary, policies and goals in one region are often inextricably

related to policies in another. Separate discussion of each region is
utilized only to facilitate the overall discussion of American policy.

U.S. Policy Goals Toward Europe

Europe is the core area of American international policy and through the
years the United States has been strongly committed to these oldest and
closest allies. For Western Europe since World War II, the United States
has been the sole source of military security and the ultimate provider
of economic security as well (Walt, 1979: 572). American-European rela-
tions, however, have not been free of tension and disagreement. In the
early 1960's, French President DeGaulle led a major political assault on
the U.S. position in Europe and recent years have seen some potentially
ominous cracks in the Western alliance at least in the eyes of some U.S.
observers. During the late 1960's and early 1970's the United States
was preoccupied with the war in Southeast Asia and its relations with
the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. In Europe, the United
States seemed to some observers to have lost its sense of priorities.
Major strains resulted in NATO. Moreover, many European leaders accused
the United States in the early 1970's of placing U.S.-Soviet detente
before the interests of Europe (Stoessinger, 1976: 138). Eventually,
Kissinger in 1973, called for a "New Atlantic Charter" and announced
the "Year of Europe" in an attempt to shore up some of the leaks in
trans-Atlantic relations. But the Middle Eastern war of October 1973
and the domestic Watergate crisis halted Kissinger's design for all prac-
tical purposes and American-European relations continued to be troubled.

The last decade has also been marked by increased economic tensions be-
tween the United States and Europe. Economic competition has widened
between the two areas while individual governments have failed to hold
down inflation and unemployment. Protectionist trade policies and the
creation of trading blocs have further dampened relations.

President Carter, however, has recently placed more emphasis on America's relations with Europe. This has lead some observers to posit that Carter has repaired some of the damage done by the neglect of his predecessors, especially in the economic area where he has sought closer consultation and collaboration between the United States and Europe (Bull, 1979: 446). Even though the years 1966-1978 have seen some troubled times in the relations between the United States and Europe, the maintenance of a stable and secure Europe must still be considered vital to American policy as the U.S. continues to carry the responsibility for defending that area. No matter what future controversies unfold in these relations, the U.S. will remain a European-oriented society with a European set of values, interests, and expectations.[22] Former President Nixon, writing in 1973, summarized the U.S. view of Europe succinctly when he wrote:

> The alliance between the United States and Western Europe has been a fundamental factor in the postwar era. It provided the essential security framework for American engagement in Europe and for Western defense...and it was the principal means of forging the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of tension and confrontation (Nixon, 1973: 76).

Five general U.S. foreign policy goals toward Europe were identified from the review of primary source materials. They are:

1. Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe,

2. Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with Western Europe,

3. Support the economic stability and the economic, military, and political integration of Western Europe,

4. Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe, and

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[22] See Kaiser (1973).

5. Improve relations between the United States and Eastern
    Europe.

The first three identified goals have already been commented on. The
foreign policy goal of promoting the stabilization of conflict areas in
Europe primarily concerns U.S. policies directed at the Soviet presence
in Eastern and Central Europe. Especially relevant has been the promo-
tion of Western access to Berlin which has been a major friction point
in East-West relations during the postwar period. Other key dynamics
of this goal relate to the promotion of peace and stability along NATO's
southern flank (Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey), U.S. support (starting in
the late 1960's) of policies initiated by West Germany to improve its
relations with Eastern Europe, and the promotion of detente between the
Soviet Union and Western Europe. The quadripartite accords on Berlin
were one of several major milestones in this process.

Finally, improving U.S. relations with Eastern Europe has been a major
policy imperative. Although recognizing Eastern Europe as within the
Soviet sphere of influence, major strides have been taken toward this
goal since the early 1970's. Both Presidents Nixon and Carter visited
this region in an effort to promote broader relations. In recent years
the U.S. has sought ways to expand its economic, scientific, technolog-
ical, and cultural contacts in Eastern Europe. Moreover, in the 1970's
the United States has reaffirmed its cordial relations with Yugoslavia,
perceived as the area's most important nonaligned country.

U.S. Foreign Policy Goals Toward Asia

Research reveals seven general foreign policy goals pursued by the United
States relative to Asia for the year 1966-1978:

1. Avoid direct military confrontation with the PRC and
    USSR,

2. Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and
    influence in Asia (1960's),

3. Promote the stability of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan and maintain the forces needed for protecting them,

4. Support the political stability of other non-Communist Asian countries,

5. Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia (1970's),

6. Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan, and

7. Promote the economic development and stability of non-Communist developing Asian countries.

These goals, like so many other U.S. regional objectives, primarily involve America's view of and relationships with Communist states.

The 1960's and early 1970's were marked with the long and costly U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian war. In 1968, U.S. commitment to the defense of South Vietnam from Communist North Vietnam involved 550,000 troops and weekly combat deaths averaging nearly 300. Finally, in April 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese army marking the collapse of an ally in whom the United States had invested so much in energy and resources.

Although theories abound to explain the reasons for the Vietnam experience, for our purposes it suggests that the containment of Communist aggression and influence in Asia must be viewed as an important goal of American foreign policy.

The 1970's have witnessed dramatic changes in U.S. policy pursuits in Asia. The single most dramatic change (or series of events) has been the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China which on New Years Day 1979 resulted in establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Several factors in the 1970's made Sino-American reconciliation possible after two decades of intense hostility and isolation. The disappearance of the

radicalism of the Chinese cultural revolution, Sino-Soviet border disputes, and the U.S. Vietnam war negotiations all contributed to the reconciliation in one way or another. A dominant factor contributing to these new relations, however, must be viewed as the effect they have on isolating Soviet influence in Asia (Ulam, 1979). Hence, the U.S. goal of containing Soviet expansion in Asia in the 1970's has, in part, been based on America's new China policy.[23] Presently, the only firm area of Soviet influence in Asia is Vietnam, which has joined the Soviet-promoted CMEA and in 1978 concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR. The United States has a vested interest in inhibiting the expansion of further Soviet influence in the area.[24]

Moreover, the reconciliation of Sino-American relations in the context of Sino-Soviet disputes has explicit strategic implications for the U.S., as suggested by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld:

> The United States continues to seek more normal relations....
> We cannot wholly ignore the PRC for purposes of force plan-
> ning....U.S. force planning cannot ignore the existence of
> the substantial military buildup that has occurred on the
> frontiers of the PRC, or the history of border clashes be-
> tween the USSR and the PRC since 1969. The extent to which
> this situation should affect the defense posture of the
> United States, broadly defined, requires continuing review
> (Rumsfeld, 1977: 22).

The second most important object of American Asian policy is Japan. Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1960's has resulted in dramatic increases in Japanese-American economic interdependence. This can be seen in enormous increases in Japanese exports to the U.S. that have had

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The Shanghai communique between the United States and China states that the two countries share common concerns that the world remain free from "hegemony" -- the Chinese keyword for Soviet political and military domination.

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See the discussion of U.S. goals toward the Communist states and military-security goals of the United States.

a serious effect on U.S. balance of payments deficits and have provoked American countermeasures. On the other hand, Japan has important strategic implications to America's Asian policy, and, as a Western-style democracy has unique political kinship. The United States has continued to guarantee Japan's security against hostile threats. However, it has also encouraged Japan to "shoulder larger responsibilities" for the political-military security of Asia. This could be evidenced in the goals put forth by the "Nixon Doctrine."

The United States also continues to hold a number of treaty alliances in Asia. Through bilateral and multilateral agreements the United States, to one degree or another, has become the guarantor of the security of many non-Communist Asian nations from Japan and Korea around the rim of Asia and southward to Australia and New Zealand. Against this background, the United States has served as a principal source of military and economic assistance in the area.

U.S. Policy Goals Toward the Middle East

U.S. Middle Eastern policy, for the years 1966-1978, was very dynamic and dominated by its close relationships with Israel, the strategic importance of the area, and the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf. In general terms these concerns can be summarized by the following goals pursued by the United States in the region:

- Promote an end to conflicts in the Middle East,

- Guarantee Israeli security,

- Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East,

- Promote/support political stability in the Middle East,

- Promote the economic stability and development of friendly and neutral countries in the Middle East, and

- Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East.

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While recognizing the strategic location of this area, the traditional primary focus of American attention in the region has centered on the 30 years of conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Since its creation as a state, Israel and the United States have had close relationships. Much of this stems from widely shared American beliefs that the U.S. has a special obligation to the security and survival of Israel. After the 1967 war and until 1973, the United States sought to guarantee the regional military superiority of Israel. This policy of the first Nixon administration saw Israel's role as an adversary of Soviet client states in the area. After 1973, however, basic American policy changed. Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy in the area after the October 1973 war virtually shut out the Soviet Union from the peacemaking process. Moreover, in 1972 President Sadat expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt and later abrogated the major Soviet-Egyptian treaty. The waning of Soviet influence in the area and changes in U.S. economic interests drastically affected the context of U.S. relations and policy.

These factors, together with increased Arab confidence and the substantial power displayed by several Arab oil-producing states during the 1973-1974 oil embargo proved to the United States that the Cold War considerations that drove U.S. policy in the 1960's and early 1970's were no longer viable.

Moreover, U.S.-Egyptian relations were greatly improved in the early 1970's while the United States took a new, vigorous diplomatic role as peace mediator. Eventually new understandings were developed with Egypt and Syria and the U.S. scored a major diplomatic victory in arranging the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, which split Arab solidarity, enhanced Israel's security, and further diminished Soviet presence in the area (Wilcox, 1976: 51). Hence, the United States found itself gaining influence in the Arab world, without losing its special relationship with Israel. The United States further distinguished itself as a peacemaker after Egyptian President Sadat's historic trip to

Israel in 1977. In 1978, it scored a dramatic success in the September
Camp David agreements. Finally, in April of 1979 Israel and Egypt signed
a peace treaty in Washington securing, at least for the time being, the
U.S. goal of promoting an end to conflict in the area.

As suggested earlier, oil also has to be considered a key dynamic of Amer-
ican policy in the Middle East. In fact, the stability of the Persian
Gulf region and American access to its oil reserves has great importance
to the global balance of power and the economic well-being of the indus-
trial world (Campbell, 1979: 613). In the past the United States has
tried to preserve these interests by promoting the stability of the tra-
ditional regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. In fact, these two countries
have been keystones to American policy in the area and major sources of
Western oil. Moreover, both President Nixon and Ford saw these countries
as the source of regional stability. The recent events in Iran that led
to the downfall of the Shah most likely will have profound repercussions
on American presence in the Persian Gulf area and may very well be a major
dynamic in the future global balance of power. Such an area, where the
interests of the major power converge, will continue to play a major role
in international political, economic, and military affairs and will con-
tinue to be high on the agenda of U.S. policy.

U.S. Goals Toward Latin America and Africa

> Over the past 4 years, our interest has been focused on, and
> our energies dedicated to, a number of supremely important
> tasks in the world arena....The time and concentration that
> have gone into these complicated but absolutely crucial
> efforts have produced allegations that we were neglecting
> other problems, other areas, and especially other friendly
> nations. In Latin America this feeling has been particu-
> larly widespread, and it is quite understandable (Nixon,
> 1973: 115).

As the above statement suggests, the United States has often been criti-
cized by the developing countries of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa

for its lack of policy attention. Indeed, other than recent modest dip-
lomatic attempts aimed at stabilizing conflicts in southern Africa and
rhetoric concerning Soviet and Cuban interaction in Africa, neither
black Africa nor Latin American has been a major focal point of American
international policy since President Kennedy's Latin American policies
concerning the Alliance for Progress. This has especially been true in
Latin America where the last decade has seen American promotion of the
Panama Canal Treaty in 1977 and little else in the way of major policy
initiatives. Nevertheless, primary source materials reveal numerous pol-
icy statements concerning both Latin America and Africa. Because rela-
tively little action has been taken to secure these goals, many can be
considered basically declaratory. The goals of the United States in
these two areas (see Table 2) can be summarized as:

- Promote the economic development and stability of Latin
  America and sub-Saharan Africa,

- Promote/support the political stability of friendly
  regimes in Latin American and sub-Saharan Africa,

- Promote democratic institutions and human rights in these
  two areas,

- Continue/increase American economic presence in Latin
  America and sub-Saharan Africa,

- Promote better/positive diplomatic relations in Latin
  America and sub-Saharan Africa,

- Keep Latin America free of external "hostile" aggression
  and influence,

- Promote a peaceful transition to independence for African
  countries, and

- Promote/enhance the security of the Cape Route and other
  major sea lanes of communication around Africa.

In a relative sense, sub-Saharan Africa has received more attention by
American political-military decision-makers than Latin America. This has

been especially true during the Carter administration where former U.N. ambassador Andrew Young helped to improve the U.S. image and influence in black Africa.[25] Probably the most important recent breakthrough in U.S.-African relations has been the recent reconciliation between Africa's leading nations, Nigeria and Tanzania, both of which had been hostile toward many U.S. policies.

Still, the majority of U.S. policy attention has been focused on conflict areas such as Angola and the Horn of Africa where Soviet and Cuban activities have taken place. Hence, in many respects, one could argue that Africa only becomes salient to U.S. military policy in the context of the East-West struggle. The U.S. has traditionally viewed Africa, and for that matter all LDC's, as arenas in its ongoing superpower competition with the USSR. Indeed the United States has tried to pursue positive bilateral relations, support political and economic development, and promote self-reliance and independence but not in a fashion comparable to other regions of the world.

The same dynamics basically hold for Latin America as well. Few observers would suggest that the last decade has witnessed much of an active U.S. policy in the region. Other than isolated incidents, the attention of American foreign policy-makers are focused on areas that are perceived as having a more immediate payoff in the global balance of power and superpower rivalries. Most recently, the Nicaraguan civil war captured the eyes of U.S. decision-makers.

CONCLUSION

This chapter does not purport to have identified and commented on all policy goals relevant to U.S. international policy. A deliberate attempt has been made, however, to outline the major dimensions of external policy affecting U.S. interests, as presented in the writings and speeches of

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  Washington Post, August 17, 1979: 11.

U.S. decision-makers. Essentially, a systematic attempt was made to
identify most if not all of the major external policy goals occurring with
some frequency in the primary sources reviewed that might be affected by
international policy-military crises. The actual *validity and salience*
of the goals identified will be discussed in greater detail in the analy-
ses in Chapters 6 and 8.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses Soviet policy goals. The first section examines
the general orientation of Soviet political-military policy as revealed
in Soviet writings. The next two sections describe the sources and
methodological strategies employed to identify and classify Soviet goals.
The final (and longest) section discusses the crisis-specific goals that
later serve as the focal point for the analysis of crisis outcomes (in
Chapter 7). To illustrate Soviet perspectives, portions of the discussion
in this chapter are deliberately written from a Soviet vantagepoint.

ORIENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY

Soviet writers see their international policy as having several Marxist-
Leninist characteristics that set it apart from the bourgeois policies
of capitalist countries. These distinctions include:

- A working class orientation that gives a socialist
  character to state political-military policy,

- A democratic and humane orientation that lifts Soviet
  external policy above narrow nationalist and chauvin-
  istic tendencies,

- A peaceful orientation that encourages mutually bene-
  ficial cooperation between socialist and nonsocialist
  countries and averts war and nuclear holocaust,

- A scientific orientation that enhances the creative
  character of its international policy and allows proper
  adjustment to changes in the international scene, and

- A theoretical orientation that enhances the ideologi-
  cal unity of socialist societies and strengthens the
  prestige of Marxism-Leninism (see Ovsyany et al., 1975;
  Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1976; Brezhnev, 1973 and 1976).

In contrast, Soviet writers view the external policy of capitalist coun-
tries as controlled undemocratically by ruling circles for the benefit
of the small capitalist class. This policy is seen as exploitative of
working classes in the capitalist countries. In addition, developing
countries are seen as being exploited by capitalist countries through
imperial, colonial, and neocolonial relationships (see Marushkin, 1975;
Panfilov et al., 1972; and Brezhnev, 1976).

The Principal Objective of Soviet External Policy

Soviet writers see the external policy of any socialist country as an
instrument in the service of the international socialist community. More-
over, they see Soviet policy as having a disproportionately greater role
to play than other socialist countries because of the greater resources
of the Soviet Union and its role as the first socialist state. Thus,
the Soviet's principal international policy objective is:

> To secure the most favorable external conditions for the
> building of socialism and Communism (Ovsyany et al., 1975:
> 12).

In the short run this objective requires united struggle for the survival
and consolidation of the world socialist community. Soviet writers inter-
pret this as material, political, and ideological support for Communist
parties, socialist countries, and other progressive movements such as na-
tional liberation groups. In the longer run, Soviet international policy
seeks to achieve more abstract goals of worldwide "peace, freedom, secur-
ity, social progress, and socialism," (Ovsyany et al., 1975: 12). As
would be expected, the distinction between general/long-term goals and
more specific/immediate goals is somewhat arbitrary, but, wherever it
can be identified, it provides a useful analytical framework for study.

General/Long-Term Goals

Soviet general/long term goals are very wide ranging with their scope in-
creasing as the Soviet Union's capabilities, interests, and activities

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increase. On the one hand, such goals are often abstract, vaguely defined, and not attainable in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, goals such as survival of the Party and the State are straightforward and perennially of major importance. In both instances though, these long term goals tend to focus on contextual/systemic factors that have dialectical significance. This emphasis often leads to the classification of events in terms of "stages" (CACI, 1978e).[1] Some of the most commonly cited Soviet goals include:

- Defend "the first socialist state,"

- Support the proletarian movements for socialism,

- Support national-liberation movements (even when led by bourgeois-democratic groups),

- Work toward elimination of the capitalist system,

- Prevent thermonuclear war,

- Promote "peaceful coexistence,"

- Strengthen the "world socialist system,"

- Promote the economic independence of LDC's,

- Promote the unity of the "world socialist system,"

- Strengthen relations with fraternal countries and their Communist and Workers parties,

- Promote economic mutual assistance and cooperation among socialist countries,

- Promote socialist development through investment in science and technology,

- Frustrate imperialist aggressors' plans by maintaining a strong world socialist system and taking firm actions,

- Promote peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation as the foundation for the relations between socialist and capitalist countries,

[1] For example, see Yukahanov's (1972) analysis of the stages in the Southeast Asian conflicts since World War II and associated Soviet goals.

- Support elimination of the colonial system's remnants,

- Support the present day liberation movement that has begun to grow into a struggle against feudal and/or capitalist exploitative relations,

- Assist states (even small and weak nations) steering toward the building of socialism,

- Strengthen the economic and defense potential of the USSR and the socialist community,

- Strengthen international support for peace and prevent imperialist reaction from pushing peaceful competition into a world nuclear conflict, and

- Support U.N. peacekeeping efforts.

The above list is far from exhaustive. There are many other likely Soviet goals that are seldom mentioned by Soviet writers or are only stated in vague terms. Nevertheless, the list includes most of the basic general/long-term goals. Most potentially missing goals tend to be more specific or deal with military subjects, an area in which Soviet writers tread gingerly.

SOURCES FOR SOVIET GOAL IDENTIFICATION

The Soviet goals in this study were obtained chiefly from primary sources.[2] That is, most goals are based on speeches and writings of Soviet leaders, academicians, and journalists. Western sources were used mainly to fill some of the gaps on sensitive political issues, such as Soviet military policy, that Soviet writers tend to avoid. The vast majority of the sources used can be summarized by the following categories:

- Books published and distributed in the Soviet Union,

_____

[2] The utility of such primary sources for the analysis of Soviet external policy has already been demonstrated in CACI (1978e). Basically, primary sources are assumed to present the valid perspectives of Soviet policy makers. Such a perspective is crucial for crisis outcome analysis based on relevant Soviet goals (see Chapter 3 for an indepth discussion).

- Books published in the Soviet Union mainly for over-
  seas distribution,

- Speeches at the CPSU Party Congresses,

- Soviet daily newspapers and other periodicals,

- Soviet radio broadcasts (transcripts monitored by the
  West),

- Speeches by Soviet diplomats at the United Nations,

- Western press coverage of the Soviet Union,

- Western academic studies of the Soviet Union,

- Unclassified works on the Soviet Union by the U.S.
  military-security community, and

- Anti-Soviet literature published in the West.

The degree of goal consistency over time and among different Soviet
sources was found to be quite high. Consistency of Soviet sources with
the works of well established scholars of Soviet affairs (such as Diner-
stein, 1968; Ulam, 1974; and Simes, 1977) was found to range from low to
fairly high depending on the issue area.[3] But there was no agreement in
any issue area between Soviet sources and the more propagandistic Western
anti-Soviet writers.

APPROACH TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF SOVIET GOALS

The approach used to identify Soviet goals consisted of five steps:

1. Soviet writings and speeches were examined to identify
   Soviet goals from their own perspective,

2. Soviet goals identified by Western Soviet scholars were
   examined for their consistency with the general Soviet
   foreign policy goals identified in the preceding step,

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[3] The disagreements generally are greater over how goals are implemented
by the Soviet leadership than over what the major goals are.

3. Selected goals were taken from the works of Western scholars of Soviet affairs to fill the gaps for some issue areas, such as military goals, which Soviet writers cover incompletely (Newhouse, 1973),

4. Soviet foreign policy behavior since the 1917 Revolution was examined to check the consistency of goals and infer additional goals from Soviet historical actions, and

5. Western anti-Soviet literature was examined to obtain a critical perspective for reviewing the above goals. (In most cases, however, this exercise proved of little value.)

The final set of identified goals was organized under five issue areas and seven geographic/regional areas:

1. The issue-related or functional goals included:

    - Ideological goals,
    - Interparty affairs,
    - Domestic stability,
    - Military goals, and
    - Economic goals.

2. Regional/geographic goals were:

    - Goals toward the capitalist countries,
    - European goals,
    - Goals toward the Third World,
    - Asian goals,
    - Middle Eastern/South Asian goals,
    - African goals, and
    - Latin American goals.

Thus, there is a total of twelve goal sets. Each consists of a number of major goals (usually three to five) and generally each major goal encompasses several more specific related or associated goals. Frequently, the latter are instrumental goals formulated in order to implement the

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more general goals. Therefore, each of the more specific goals may be relevant to more than one general goal.

Problems In Identifying Soviet Goals

The most serious potential problems in dealing with Soviet goals result from Soviet secrecy including possible misinformation and Western anti-Soviet propaganda. The combination of these two problems complicates attempts at separating fact from fiction. The approach taken in this study involves accepting Soviet writers' and policymakers' own views of their goals and supplementing these with some of the Soviet goals identified by more objective (nonpropagandistic) Western students of Soviet affairs. In general, the goals reflect Soviet leaders' perceptions of their world policy. In other words, they do not reflect the view of the Western anti-Soviet writers.[4] Some of the common criticisms of taking such an approach are:

1. It is not known whether Soviet leaders and writers "tell the truth" about their goals. They may hide their real intentions and in fact tell the public only what suits them.

2. Soviet public goal statements are designed to deceive the West, their own people, their Communist allies, or world public opinion.

3. Soviet leaders have a history of publicly emphasizing their peaceful intentions while secretly harboring more sinister, aggressive goals such as world conquest.

4. Soviet leaders pay little attention to goals but are opportunists who seek to expand their power wherever the West shows weakness.

5. Soviet goals obviously are world conquest and Communization. Everything else they say is meaningless propaganda.

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[4] However, the major goals can sometimes be interpreted to reflect anti-Soviet views.

In defense of the approach taken in the present study, it can be stated
that all nations have to state most of their major goals publicly in
order to transmit correct signals to their allies and friendly forces
and, in many instances, their potential adversaries. To do otherwise
would create misinformation and lead to future difficulties in communi-
cating with friends and foes. From a communications standpoint, inter-
national politics is a contest between accurate information and uncer-
tainty. Governments that are effective in their communications should have
more effective foreign policies (McClelland, 1966: 134). The most obvious
self-defeating aspect of creating misinformation about one's national goals
is that coordination of policies with friendly groups in other countries
will become increasingly difficult as time passes.

Furthermore, even if Soviet leaders' publicly stated goals since 1917
have been mere propaganda, surely each succeeding leadership generation
should find it more difficult to behave inconsistently from those goals
without creating domestic popular discontent and friction in Soviet rela-
tions with fraternal parties and friendly regimes in other countries.
From the Soviet perspective, it can be argued that long-term education
(foreign and domestic) through public statements is far too important
to be sacrificed for the short-term expediency of deceiving adversaries
through public misinformation about Soviet goals. This is not to say,
however, that the Soviets are completely explicit about each of their
goals. The point, rather, is that publicly articulated Soviet goals are
likely to identify many of the events and processes whose outcomes are
of concern to the Soviet leadership.

MAJOR SOVIET GOALS

Table 1 presents the list of twelve goal sets and the major goals in each
set. (The more specific goals can be seen in the detailed list presented
in the last section of this chapter.) Subsequent discussions of these
goal sets vary in length, with more attention being given to functional
(as opposed to region-specific) aims and to those areas in which the
greater amounts of Soviet source materials exist.

5-8

TABLE 1

Major Soviet Goal Sets
(49 goals)[a]

Ideology

1. Support Marxist-Leninist ideology
2. Maintain ideological unity of the fraternal Communist countries
3. Maintain/enhance ideological leadership of CPSU
4. Support other progressive ideologies

Interparty Affairs

1. Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's
2. Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs
3. Give support to CP's in capitalist countries
4. Give support to CP's in developing countries

Domestic Stability

1. Maintain/restore domestic stability
2. Oppose external interference in Soviet domestic affairs
3. Maintain/restore stability of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union

Economic

1. Increase economic capacity of Soviet Union at a rapid pace
2. Increase economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries
3. Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries
4. Assist economic independence of LDC's

Military

1. Defend the first socialist state against external threat
2. Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)
3. Support progressive and democratic forces abroad
4. Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces

Goals Toward Capitalist Countries

1. Reduce chances of war with the United States and NATO
2. Increase mutually beneficial exchanges
3. Press the anticapitalist ideological struggle

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[a] Written from a Soviet vantagepoint

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

Europe

1. Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states
2. Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany
3. Promote the unity of fraternal socialist parties in Europe
4. Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation
5. Promote peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation with nonsocialist European countries

Goals Toward Third World Countries

1. Defend fraternal socialist countries in the Third World
2. Defend progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries
3. Support economic independence of LDC's
4. Increase Soviet international prestige (among LDC's)
5. Contain Chinese influence among LDC's

Asia

1. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against USSR
2. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against fraternal socialist countries
3. Support/defend fraternal socialist countries against other external threats
4. Develop alternative transport routes to the Trans-Siberian railway
5. Undermine the legitimacy of China's territorial claims
6. Support progressive governments and countries with socialist orientation
7. Support peaceful relations with Asian countries

Middle East/South Asia

1. Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to the Soviet Union
2. Support progressive and socialist oriented governments in the region
3. Support progressive and democratic movements in the region
4. Support economic independence of countries in the region
5. Secure Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean

Africa

1. Defend/support countries proclaiming intention of building socialism
2. Support other progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

3. Support economic independence of African countries
4. Increase Soviet influence/prestige among African countries
5. Contain Chinese influence among African countries

Latin America

1. Defend/support Cuba against external threats
2. Avoid direct military confrontation with the United States and OAS
3. Encourage independence of Latin American countries from the United States
4. Increase solidarity among progressive and democratic forces
5. Increase Soviet influence/prestige in Latin America

Issue Related Goal Sets

The five issue-related goals are the most basic or elemental Soviet aims and largely determine the general thrust of Soviet international policy. They include ideological, interparty, domestic, military, and economic objectives. Below, each goal set is briefly discussed and placed in the proper (Soviet) perspective.

Ideological Goals. It is not uncommon for Western Soviet area experts to overemphasize the role of ideology and at the same time attribute Soviet "expansionism," for instance, in the Middle East, to such nonideological factors as the character and objectives of Peter the Great! Soviet writers' polemical style reinforces some Western scholars' tendency to overrate the role of ideology in general discussions of Soviet international policy. Lack of access to information on Soviet policy making processes, however, often leads Western scholars to fall back on historical and other nonideological factors in explaining specific instances of Soviet foreign policy behavior.[5]

Based on Soviet writers' discussions, the two most important external ideological goals of the Soviet Union appear to be:

1. Supporting the development of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a dynamic, practical doctrine for building socialism and Communism, and

2. Maintaining the ideological unity of the fraternal socialist countries in the face of the reactionary designs of capitalist and bourgeois elements.[6]

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[5] For a critical evaluation of ideology's role in Soviet foreign policy, see Adomeit (1973: 15-20). For general Soviet views on this issue, see Gililou (1975), Sanakoyev and Kapchenko (1976), and Ovsyany et al. (1975). Brandon (1979) presents one of the few Western accounts of Soviet decision-making processes.

[6] Soviet sensitivity on these issues can be seen in Gililov (1975), Sladkovsky (1972), Silin (1975), Momjan (1974), and Marushkin (1975).

In addition, an examination of Soviet history shows that, under Lenin and the post-Stalinist regimes, the Soviet Union has given considerable support to other progressive ideologies and groups such as the national liberation and peace movements.

A major sensitive point in the area of Soviet ideological goals is the question of the rank or status of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Soviet Government among other CP's and fraternal socialist countries, respectively. As the first socialist, Marxist-Leninist country and, therefore, the first country to have had to interpret Marxist-Leninist doctrine for practical application under extremely threatening conditions, Soviet leaders feel they deserve a certain degree of respect from other socialist countries and CP's. Moreover, appreciation is due to the USSR for its sacrifices during the "Great Patriotic War" (WWII) and the postwar Soviet military umbrella that has, in the eyes of the Soviets, proved beneficial for the growth and consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist socialist community. Thus, the Soviet Union sees itself as being the leading, most influential element of the fraternal socialist community and as having always carried the major burden of developing and defending socialism.[7]

The Soviet regime, however, is very sensitive to charges of domination and "diktat" by other Communist countries and parties. When under such attacks, they have generally defended the Soviet Union as the banner bearer of socialism in the sense that historically it was the first socialist state and the first to have had to practice building socialism by interpreting what then were untried Marxist-Leninist doctrines. This interpretation emphasizes the historical role of the CPSU and Soviet Union and deemphasizes their present leadership aspirations among the socialist countries. Soviet leaders see their party's present formal status as being "equal" to that of other CP's. Their informal national status is seen

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[7] See Krushchev's speeches in defense of the Soviet ideological role at the 20th CPSU Congress.

as being greater than other socialist countries by the virtue of their larger economic and military capabilities, but they claim they seek no special privileges on the basis of these resources.

In practice, however, the Soviet Union and CPSU have at times deliberately exercised control over other CP's through instruments of power such as military force, financial assistance, party organization, infiltration, and terror. Iron fist tactics were most prevalent during Stalin's leadership and were greatly reduced after his death. The degree to which the CPSU now controls or influences other CP's and socialist countries varies by case. Their influence over the Chinese, Albanian, and Yugoslav parties is minimal at best. Their influence upon most well established West European CP's is probably not very high and exercised mainly through financial assistance (Revel, 1978). On the other hand, their control over the Mongolian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian CP's and Governments is considerable though the exact degree is subject to wide ranging estimates. It is worth noting that two East European members of the Warsaw Pact -- Poland and Rumania -- have been increasingly independent of CPSU and Soviet policies. In fact, Seyom Brown (1974: 45-65) suggests that greater polycentrism (desatellization) within the Communist world is a dominant "new force" of world politics.

The Soviet Union's ideological leadership of the socialist world probably could not be maintained peacefully if it did not demonstrate moral and material support for "progressive and democratic movements" around the world. Soviet leaders probably would like to support all Marxist-Leninist and other progressive movements around the world that are not unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. However, there are major perceived constraints including:

1. Limited financial resources available for such operations,

2. Limited military capacity,

3. The danger of reaction by capitalist and imperialist major powers possibly leading to war, and

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4. The danger of repressive reaction by capitalist and bourgeois elements in the region where the Soviet aid is targeted possibly leading to the destruction of the groups the Soviet Union is trying to aid.

Historically Soviet leaders have shown very high restraint in supporting progressive and democratic movements beyond their border areas in tangible terms. It was, therefore, natural that when China began to move away from the Soviet ideological leadership it increasingly attacked Soviet lack of support for world progressive movements as a major ideological deviation.

Interparty Affairs. The interparty goals of the Soviet Union are closely related to her ideological goals. Primary interparty goals relate to maintaining Soviet leadership and world socialist unity. Secondary goals involve maintaining some degree of influence among Communist parties (CP's) in the nonsocialist countries of the Third World and capitalist nations.[8]

Although Soviet writers generally avoid ascribing a leadership role to the Soviet Union or CPSU in external policy making for the socialist camp as a whole, the implication is present in much of their writing. For instance, they emphasize the innovative role of Lenin and the CPSU in the prewar years and seldom fail to mention the central role of the Red Army during the post-World War II period in defending the socialist world against the aggressive and reactionary policies of the capitalist West.[9]

The Soviet Union also attaches great emphasis to maintaining socialist unity through disciplined, united stands of fraternal parties (that is, Communist parties) against the capitalist countries. Soviet writers

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[8] Soviet writers generally ignore these issues. (See, for instance, Gililov et al., 1975.) Therefore, these goals are mainly inferred from Soviet international policy behavior and writings of Western experts on Soviet affairs.

[9] See Kovalenko et al. (1977), Voroshilo (1971), and Marushkin (1975).

generally avoid discussing interparty disputes and tensions or, for that matter, other embarrassing topics. The Soviet leadership has generally tried to maintain interparty unity while maintaining the CPSU's leadership of the parties. When the two have become incompatible, the leadership aspiration has been relaxed slightly but never enough to allow major deviations such as the 1956 Hungarian counterrevolution or Czechoslovakia's reformism. Such policies have tended to have short-term payoffs for the Kremlin as it has gained by preventing runaway pluralism. In the long run, however, these gains may be far outweighed by the further depreciation of Soviet legitimacy throughout the world Communist movement along with the intensification of anti-Soviet nationalism (Brown, 1974: 49).

The growing independence of West European CP's and some East European parties (such as the Rumanian, Polish, and Yugoslavian CP') appears to be associated by design with another interparty development: the gradually increasing support of the CPSU for progressive movements in the Third World. Therefore, the latter may be, in part, a policy to compensate for the loss of influence among East European CP's. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, very often the progressive movements in the Third World turn against Communist parties with greater energy than the worst examples among the capitalist groups.[10]

Domestic Stability. The great sensitivity of Soviet leaders to any form of domestic instability and external interference cannot be overstated. These are reflected, respectively, by their emphases on "discipline" and their strong reactions to Western human rights policies, which they see as a smokescreen for tampering with the Soviet Union's Communist construction.[11]

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[10] The most recent example is the Baath Party in Iraq, which began mass execution of Iraqi Communists in 1978 and forced most party leaders to flee the country in 1979.

[11] See the speeches at the 1976 CPSU Party Congress.

The importance of maintaining domestic political stability to the Soviet leadership has its roots in the early, tumultuous history of the formation of the Soviet state, the national diversity of the country, and the Marxist-Leninist concept of discipline. The great value placed on national discipline has historically been reinforced by the October Revolution, the Civil War, collaborationism among certain ethnic groups during the Second World War, and the external exploitation of nationalistic ferment during the Cold War.

The cataclysmic birth of the Soviet state, during which the central government headed by the small Bolshevik party was faced with internal as well as external enemies, has framed most Soviet attitudes toward domestic stability. The tasks that faced the Soviet leadership during those early years included, first and foremost, establishing and maintaining discipline in the party, the bureaucracy, and the army under the complete control of party leaders.[12] Then, using these instruments, the leadership was faced with accomplishing three major goals in order to establish domestic stability:

1. Repulse and crush the counterrevolutionary "White" forces,

2. Restore central control over the non-Russian nationalities in the territories of the former Tsarist Empire, and

3. Eliminate intervention and interference in Soviet affairs by foreign powers and neighboring countries.

For the most part these goals were accomplished by the mid-1920's but the price paid in terms of lives and economic dislocations was huge. The great costs of restoring order during the early years of the Soviet Union is probably a major reason why domestic stability became the sine qua non of Soviet policy. Jones (1975), for example, argues that the

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[12] See Voroshilov (1971), Kovalenko et al. (1977), Zenushkina (1975), and Marushkin (1975).

Soviets are quite concerned with the potential negative domestic ramifi-
cations that might follow involvement in foreign wars. In fact, a case
has been made that one reason behind apparent Soviet reluctance to commit
armed forces beyond its immediate sphere of control (that is, the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe) is the fear of the impact that such exposure
might have on the military personnel involved as exemplified by the De-
cembrist revolt, and by Stalin's brutal treatment of Soviet personnel
involved in the Spanish civil war (Ulam, 1968: 245) or who became pri-
soners of war during World War II (Medvedev, 1973: 465-469).

The great value of internal stability to Soviet policy was further rein-
forced by the experiences of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic
War (WWII) and the Cold War, when external adversaries exploited inter-
nal Soviet weaknesses, particularly the nationalities problem.[13]

Military Goals. Soviet military goals are the most controversial sub-
jects treated by Western students of Soviet affairs. In addition to the
usual pro- and anti-Soviet groups of experts, hosts of pro- and anti-
military groups have staked their claims in this subject area. Since the
degree of Soviet threat to the West (and consequently the size of Western
military budgets) partly depends on Soviet military intentions, Soviet
military goals have been a subject of contention between supporters and
opponents of military spending in every major Western country.

In order to steer clear of the maze of claims and counterclaims about
Soviet military goals, the following approach was used in identifying
Soviet military goals:

1. Soviet military publications and speeches by military
   leaders were used to identify many goals, and

2. Known Soviet military actions since the Second World
   War were examined to infer additional goals consis-
   tent with those identified previously.

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[13] For Soviet sensitivity to their nationalities problem, see Marushkin
(1975), Zenushkina (1975), Shevtsov (1975), and Uvachan (1975).

None of the military goals are based on *Western analytical studies* (pro- or anti-Soviet). Since Soviet sources were used, the goals reflect a Soviet interpretation of their military policy. However, the individual military goals are not always inconsistent with anti-Soviet views. The anti-Soviet writers often begin with the same goals as identified in this study, but then interpret them differently than Soviet writers.

The Soviets view their armed forces as having an "internationalist duty." Of course, the primary task of the army is to defend Communist construction in the motherland, but its secondary tasks are internationalist and generally involve the defense of socialism's achievements abroad.[14]

The most important secondary task involves the defense of fraternal socialist countries, which under current definition involves all Communist countries except China and Albania. Among these, the defense of bordering countries in East Europe and Mongolia are the most important because of their close association to the defense of the Soviet Union itself and their linkages to the idea of the permanence of post-World War II Soviet borders.

Next to the defense of bordering countries comes the defense of other Communist allies: Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia (since early 1979), Cuba, and Yugoslavia. These defense priorities are closely followed by the defense of the neutrality of non-Communist Finland, Austria, and Sweden.

The Soviet Union's other internationalist military duties involve giving aid to other "progressive" and "democratic" forces abroad. These include socialist and national liberation movements and nations fighting for their economic independence from neocolonialism and imperialism. The major objective of this aid is to discourage and deter imperialist military intervention in the Third World and assist the armies of developing countries.

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[14] See speeches by Soviet defense ministers at various *CPSU Party Congresses* since the 1952 Nineteenth Congress. Also see Voroshilov (1971).

Economic Goals. The heavy emphasis of *Marxist-Leninist doctrine* on economic variables is clearly reflected in Soviet economic policy since the establishment of a stable socialist regime in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's. After the Civil War, Soviet economic planners formulated and implemented a number of medium-term economic plans with such concentrated energy that, by the late 1930's, the economy had fully recovered from the destructions of World War I, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War. Furthermore, they had started a major military industrialization that proved crucial in stopping the German conquest and rolling the German army back across the Balkans and East Europe to Berlin. These and subsequent economic plans shed a great deal of light on Soviet long-term economic goals.

These goals are similar to those of most countries: improvement of the economic capacity of the nation in order to improve welfare, defense, and future growth. Over most of its short history, the Soviet Union has translated its long-term economic goals into formal medium-term plans of generally five years' duration.

The major objective to Soviet economic policy is, "further construction of the material and technical base of Communism in [the Soviet Union]," (Kosygin, 1976: 112). Soviet ideologists' emphasis on both economic base and capacity is not coincidental. Soviet 5-year plans have always reflected this bias clearly by emphasizing heavy industries and extractive (natural resource) industries. In the later 1930's, the emphasis on heavy industries was partly justified as necessary for rapid expansion of the Red Army's fighting capacity. The bias has been present, however, even during periods of military demobilization. In more recent plans, Soviet production of consumer goods has been expanding more rapidly, but according to Western intelligence estimates production has been slower than had been anticipated because of a high resource allocation for the military sector.

The economic goals most directly related to Soviet major objectives are: rapid increases in the output of the economy that are usually analyzed

as requiring increased labor productivity; increased use of modern technology; improved efficiency in industrial management; more rapid exploitation of vast natural resources; and increased trade with other countries.

Soviet planners see trade expansion as serving their internationalist socialist duty to fraternal countries, improving detente, and helping them improve efficiency through greater specialization.

Soviet economic goals are ultimately dependent on the rate at which the economy's output (or income) increases. Soviet planners' emphasis on investment at the expense of civilian consumption is a reflection of their bias toward heavy industries and natural resource extraction. Their stress on research and development is closely associated with the Marxist-Leninist emphasis (some would say obsession) with "scientific" methods. This strategy of high investment, low present consumption, and overemphasis (by Western standards) on heavy industry, resource extraction, and research and development has been spectacularly successful. By the early 1950's, the economy had largely recovered from the horrendous devastations of World War II and was effectively transforming large segments of partially (or yet to be) industrialized regions of the Soviet Union, east of the Ural mountains, to fully industrialized societies. After extremely rapid growth during the immediate postwar years, the rate of growth of aggregated income/product (GNP) declined gradually but still remained high. The annual growth of real GNP was 5.8 and 5.1 percent during the 1950's and 1960's respectively (see Gomulka, 1977 and Central Intelligence Agency, 1977a).

By the late 1960's, however, the Soviet economic strategy had apparently run into difficulties. GNP growth slowed to about 4 percent. In the 1970's, Soviet economic planners began to substantially lower their sights, but still proved far more optimistic than actual experience warranted (see Central Intelligence Agency, 1977a, 1977b).

The future growth of the Soviet economy depends on successful implementation of projects in which Soviet planners and managers have been highly

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successful (such as heavy industries, resource extraction, building economic infrastructure, and scientific research) as well as progress in areas where they have been inefficient (such as large scale manufacture of mass consumer goods, efficient services industries, marketing, and distribution of goods and services). Since the 1960's the Soviet Union has been attempting to make progress in these areas through domestic innovation and limited imports of technology and managerial techniques from the West (see Central Intelligence Agency, 1977b).

The major Soviet economic goals identified for this study are:

- Increase the economic capacity of the Soviet Union at a rapid pace,

- Increase economic cooperation with fraternal social-ist countries,

- Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries, and

- Assist the economic independence of the developing countries (see Kosygin, 1976).

The first goal, which is by far the most important, primarily involves the domestic economy of the Soviet Union. The other three goals involve Soviet external economic relations. However, since Soviet leaders strongly believe in the mutual advantages of trade and economic specialization, external relations often have direct implications for domestic economic growth. Furthermore, in some cases external economic relations have become a costly burden on the Soviet economy (for example, Cuba and Vietnam).

It is important to bear in mind the element of "struggle" in Soviet economic policy. All Soviet economic goals are in part designed to promote socialism and Communism vis-a-vis capitalism, imperialism and, in relevant situations, feudalism. Soviet economic goals are primarily oriented toward the economic development of the Soviet Union and friendly (fraternal)

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socialist countries. Soviet economic policy is also directed, however, toward reducing the economic base (that is, markets) of capitalist countries. In practice, this policy involves encouraging the independence of developing nations' economies from neocolonialist relationships with capitalist countries, discouragement of "economic blocs" (such as the Common Market) that discriminate against Soviet goods, and encouragement of economic relations between socialist and capitalist countries.

Soviet economic goals toward the nonsocialist countries have historically been constrained by a number of factors. First, Soviet imports have been limited by shortages of hard currency because Soviet exports cannot increase as rapidly as potential imports. Second, the Soviet Union has been subject to discriminatory trade practices by other countries during most of its short history, and third, Soviet leaders appear ambivalent about allowing their economy to become dependent on outside economies. Although the deliberate isolationist practices of the first few decades of Soviet economic history were ended after the death of Stalin, Soviet leaders are very cautious in allowing rapid development of external linkages. Historically, it is clear, however, that the Soviet leaders have preferred a degree of self-sufficiency because of their wariness of far-reaching economic interdependence with capitalist states and international specialization (Pryor, 1963).

Regional/Geographic Goals

The seven regional/geographic goals of the Soviet Union are determined by the historical development of Soviet foreign relations with specific regions and countries as well as the five basic issue-related goals: ideology, interparty affairs, stability, military strength, and economic growth. The seven regional/geographic goals are often organized into two separate sets:

1. Goals oriented toward the capitalist industrialized countries that are sometimes broken down into three categories: Europe, U.S.A., and Japan; and

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2. Goals oriented toward developing Third World countries that are usually broken down into four categories: Asia, Middle East/South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In this study the seven regional/geographic goal sets are:

o Goals toward capitalist countries,

o European goals (includes NATO),

o Goals toward Third World countries,

o Asian goals,

o Middle Eastern/South Asian goals,

o African goals, and

o Latin American goals.

Goals toward the United States and Japan are generally covered by goals toward capitalist countries and NATO (that is, Europe). Goals toward the Third World countries are detailed in a general form as well as separately for each of the four Third World regions.

Goals Toward the Capitalist Countries. Soviet relationships with capitalist countries have been a major concern of Soviet leaders from the beginning of the Soviet state. From the Marxist-Leninist perspective this importance of capitalist countries has two sources:

1. Capitalism is the major adversary of socialism, and

2. Capitalist countries have been the only nations capable of destroying socialism through military aggression or, more recently, through worldwide nuclear destruction.

Soviet goals toward the capitalist countries are primarily determined by the Soviet Union's historical relationship with these states and the

more basic ideological, interparty, military, economic, and domestic stability goals. This historical relationship of the Soviet Union with the capitalist countries can be divided into seven stages:

1. The period of Soviet struggle against capitalist encirclement, 1917-1925;

2. The period of economic isolation from capitalist countries, 1925-1933;

3. The first period of limited interactions with capitalist countries, 1933-1940;

4. The period of military cooperation against fascism, 1941-1945;

5. The second period of capitalist encirclement, 1946-1953;

6. The second period of limited interactions with capitalist countries, 1954-1962; and

7. The period of increasing peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation, but continued ideological struggle, 1963-present.

During most of its history the major thrusts of Soviet policy toward capitalist countries have been:[15]

1. To reduce the chances of a worldwide war in which the capitalist countries unite against the Soviet Union to destroy the first socialist state,

2. To encourage capitalist countries to engage in trade and other "mutually beneficial exchanges" with the Soviet Union, and

3. To maintain the basic ideological struggle against capitalism and avoid the loss of socialist and Communist purpose as a result of capitalist inroads. (See Shershnev, 1978; Kirsanov, 1975; Nalin and Nikolayev, 1973; and Ovsyany, 1975.)

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[15] See the speeches of Krushchev and Brezhnev at various Party Congresses and Sivachev and Yakovlev (1979), Vladimirov and Teplov (1977), Arbatov (1973), Beryozkin (1969), and Tunkin (1969).

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The Soviet Union's desire to avoid war with capitalist countries has been the major factor behind its cautious and conservative foreign and military policies during most of Soviet history. The Soviet leadership has seldom encouraged "adventurist" policies.[16] Their advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" has not been inconsistent with their own interpretation of its meaning. Finally, Soviet leaders have generally tried to interpret their military actions as means of the last resort that should be used only when peaceful negotiations fail and then only if there is adequate military capability to assure a very high probability of success.[17]

Even in most "worst case" Western scenarios, Soviet military power has always been inadequate for successfully attacking major capitalist countries. Consequently, it is not surprising that the conservative Soviet leaders have perferred peaceful means of conflict resolution. Indeed, Soviet writers have strongly emphasized the value of peaceful coexistence during most of their history. It is unlikely that this line of argument has been purely Soviet propaganda or a hoax to catch the Western countries off guard.[18] Furthermore, even in a totalitarian society it is

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[16] Adventurism in Soviet terminology usually implies a tendency to act with inadequate means or attempting to act when the "correlation of forces" is unfavorable. It also may mean attempting to achieve too much too soon.

[17] Triska et al. (1964) identify three major themes in their "Western analysis" of Soviet behavior toward capitalist countries and especially the United States: first, the Soviets are relatively low risk takers in their foreign policy; second, the Soviets are conservative, cautious, deliberate, and unwilling to act unless they are relatively sure they will "win"; and, third, the Soviets act on capabilities rather than attitudes.

[18] The Soviet Union has also been much less prone than Western states such as the United States to employ its armed forces actively in political roles (military aid excepted) in areas that do not border on the homeland or its immediate periphery (in the Soviet case, the Soviet Union proper and Eastern Europe) (Hamburg, 1977). This policy style has even extended to relatively innocuous forms of political-military activity, such as naval port visits, which did not begin in the postwar era until 1953 and did not become relatively frequent until the mid-1960's, two decades after the end of the war (MccGwire, 1975).

unlikely that a propaganda line could be maintained for more than one generation without becoming a part of the real value system of the next generation. Soviet leaderships have shown far too great an appreciation for the impact of the spoken and written word on the Soviet people to consistently bombard them with the advantages of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries and then expect them not to believe in it.[19]

The anticapitalist ideological struggle of the Soviet Union has been generally peaceful. The Soviet leadership has been careful to emphasize that their peaceful policy toward capitalists is the most rational approach toward Communist construction at home and the growth of socialism abroad. Peaceful coexistence, they argue, discourages capitalist military adventurism and does not impede the hastening doom of the capitalist system. The rationale for this belief is dialectical in nature -- as long as there is peace, socialism inherently gathers strength while the economic base of capitalism shrinks.

There are certain limiting factors to the Soviet concept of peaceful relations with capitalist countries. Even if one assumes a very high Soviet desire for rapid expansion of mutually beneficial, peaceful relations with the major capitalist countries, the growth of such relations will be limited by the following factors:

1. Shortages of hard currency for importing goods and services,

2. The inferiority of the Soviet Union in many scientific and technological areas,

3. The closed nature of Soviet society compared to most major capitalist societies, and

4. Possible fears by the Soviet leaders that too much contact may lead to an infiltration of Soviet society by capitalism.

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[19] For a sampling of speeches on peaceful coexistence, see those made at Party Congresses since the 20th Congress. For more recent ones see Brezhnev (1979).

Goals Toward the Third World. Shortly after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union began to seek out potential friendly countries in the Third World. This policy was aimed at establishing broader diplomatic relations with nonsocialist countries and breaking out of the isolationism that Stalin's foreign policy and Western containment had imposed on the Soviet Union and her socialist allies. The first major breakthroughs came in the mid-1950's in relations with the "progressive" regimes of Indonesia, India, and Arab countries. These successes were reinforced by the establishment of the nonaligned group of nations that the Soviets saw as the first stage in the breakup of the Western containment policy. The popularity of nonalignment among Third World countries gathered momentum in the 1960's when many new nations gained independence from colonial powers. By the early 1970's the coalition of nonaligned countries was strong enough to finally bring about victory on an issue that had become a symbolic trial of strength between nonaligned countries and those Western nations that still held to some aspects of the containment policy. The issue was seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in place of Taiwan as the sole representative of the Chinese people in the fall of 1971.

Many Western analysts interpret Soviet policy in the Third World as opportunistic. Here the Soviet Union is viewed as constantly on the prowl to fill "power vacuums" with Soviet presence or accused of creating instability in order to "fish in muddy waters." Such interpretations generally ignore the historical Soviet policy positions toward a region. Opportunism implies no policy momentum and assumes far more flexibility in Soviet foreign policy than appears practical.

Soviet writers generally present the capitalist countries as the exploiters and opportunists in foreign policy. From their view, Soviet goals toward the developing countries (Third World) are determined by historical Soviet foreign policy experiences toward these countries as well as interactions of major Soviet goals in areas such as ideology,

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interparty relations, domestic stability, economics, and military affairs.[20]
In the early years of Soviet history the major thrust of Soviet policy
in the Third World involved supporting small, local Communist parties
or giving symbolic support to the liberation of colonial subjected peo-
ples. Currently, Soviet support for progressive and democratic groups
in the Third World appears to be growing in scope and intensity.

Simultaneously, Soviet support for socialist-oriented countries and re-
gimes proclaiming a Marxist orientation has been growing. To date, the
Soviet Union's support for Third World groups has been mainly concen-
trated in Indochina, Africa, and the Middle East. Latin American groups
other than the Cubans have received very little support and Southeast
Asian groups other than the Indochinese and Indonesians (prior to the mid-
1960's) have been largely ignored.

There are obvious economic, political, and ideological constraints on
Soviet support for progressive and democratic movements in the Third
World. These put varying limits on Soviet involvement in developing
countries that depend partly on Soviet stakes in each country or region.
Such constraints are likely to be low in inaccessible or hostile regions
and greatest among Third World regimes deemed most deserving of Soviet
assistance. For instance, an attack by China or capitalist countries
against a socialist Third World country is very likely to lead to Soviet
intervention. The likelihood increases in proportion to the proximity
of the fighting to the Soviet border and centers of Soviet military power.
There is little doubt that an attack against Mongolia would lead to direct
Soviet military involvement. A major attack against Vietnam would likely
lead to limited Soviet intervention, while, an attack against a Soviet
socialist-oriented ally, such as India or Iraq, would likely lead to
more limited involvement. Finally, an attack against a nonsocialist
friendly country such as Libya is unlikely to lead to any significant
Soviet direct action (military sales and aid excepted).

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[20] See Brutents (1972), Zhukov et al. (1970), Ulyanovsky (1974), Stainis
et al. (1976), Ovsyany (1975), and Sanakoyev and Kapchenko (1976).

In most cases, Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World is benign
and symbolic. The Soviet Union is quick to pick up popular causes that
do not harm Soviet interests, such as antiapartheid policy in Southern
Africa, political independence of colonial peoples, and economic independence
from the foreign monopolies and capitalists. The fact that these
causes may harm Western interests may not be coincidental, but the causes
are not purely opportunistic. At least at a symbolic level, Marxist-
Leninist doctrine is committed to humanist values that lend support
to these policies independent from their anticapitalist position. The
opportunism that Stalin and, more subtly, Lenin brought to Marxism may
have obscured its humanistic values, but the symbols remain and can be
used to attempt to elicit support for such popular causes particularly
among the Third World audiences.

A relatively recent Soviet goal toward developing countries has been the
isolation of Chinese influence. This began in the mid-1960's as relatively
peaceful competition for influence among liberation movements and
a controversy over strategy and tactics for fighting capitalism and imperialism.[21]
By the 1970's it had degenerated into an aggressive struggle
for the leadership of progressive movements in the Third World. The
Soviet view of this struggle blames all the problems on China's adventurism
and dogmatic unrealism that:

1. Led to setbacks for progressive movements in many
   Third World countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and
   Cambodia,

2. Created divisions among the world's progressive and
   democratic forces,

3. Finally, after two decades of extreme left policies
   created havoc in China and among her misguided
   allies, led China to turn to the extreme right, advo-
   cate reactionary policies, and align herself with the
   worst enemies of socialism.

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[21] For the Soviet view of the Sino-Soviet dispute see Sladkosky (1972),
Zhelokhovtsev (1975), Borisov and Koloskov (1975), and Feoktistov (1972).

Popular Soviet writers consider China to deserve no sympathy for deserting the socialist path. The more official Soviet view still holds that Chinese people are part of the socialist camp and, once the leaders of China abandon their extremism of right or left, they would be welcomed back to the socialist camp with open arms. Meanwhile, Soviet policy appears to be one of diplomatically isolating and militarily containing China in order to minimize her mischiefs in the Third World and deter her from military adventures against the Soviet Union and her allies. (See Sladkovsky (1972), Sladkovsky et al. (1975), Zhelokhovtsev (1975), Vladimirov and Ryazantsev (1976)).

Detailed Listing of Soviet Goals

In the following pages a detailed listing of Soviet goals is provided. Each goal set is preceded by a heading that describes an issue-related or regional/geographic goal set. Each goal set consists of a number of major goals and each major goal is accompanied by a set of more specific associated goals. The latter are indented in order to distinguish them from the general goals (which are underlined). All of these aims are crisis-specific goals whose relevance varies across crises.

TABLE 2

Detailed Listing of Soviet Policy Goals[a]

IDEOLOGICAL GOALS

1. Support Marxist-Leninist Ideology

    1.1 Oppose reactionary ideologies

2. Maintain/Enhance Ideological Unity of the Fraternal Communist Parties

    2.1 Oppose extremists of the right and the left

    2.2 Oppose narrow nationalism

    2.3 Support diverse development of socialism

    2.4 Avoid charges of dominiation of CP's or socialist countries

3. Maintain/Enhance Ideological Leadership of CPSU

    3.1 Maintain leadership in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine in foreign policy

    3.2 Maintain leadership in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine in domestic policy

    3.3 Maintain/enhance prestige of CPSU

4. Support Other Progressive Ideologies

    4.1 Support national liberation movements

    4.2 Support democratic tendencies of social-democratic parties

    4.3 Support peace movements in capitalist countries

INTERPARTY AFFAIR GOALS

1. Maintain/Enhance Leadership of CPSU in International Policy Making of CP's

    1.1 Oppose revisionist CP's

    1.2 Oppose adventurist CP's

    1.3 Support progressive movements

    1.4 Deter imperialist/capitalist adventures against CP's

    1.5 Oppose Chinese attempts to split the CP's

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[a] Goals are deliberately written from a Soviet vantagepoint.

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

2. Maintain/Enhance Unity of CP's in Foreign Affairs

    2.1 Allow for some national diversity in domestic policies among foreign CP's

    2.2 Maintain the unity of fraternal parties in foreign policy

    2.3 Oppose Chinese attempts to split CP's

    2.4 Oppose capitalist attempts to split CP's

3. Give Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries

    3.1 Support peaceful transition to socialism

4. Give Support to CP's in Developing Countries

    4.1 Give moral and financial support

    4.2 Oppose persecution of CP members by military/police forces

DOMESTIC STABILITY GOALS

1. Maintain/Restore Domestic Stability in the Soviet Union

    1.1 Maintain/restore domestic discipline (law and order)

2. Oppose External Interference in Soviet Domestic Affairs

    2.1 Oppose interference by bourgeois intellectuals from capitalist countries

    2.2 Oppose interference by governments of capitalist countries

    2.3 Oppose interference by social-democratic parties

3. Maintain/Restore Stability of Non-Russian Nationalities in the Soviet Union

    3.1 Maintain/restore stability among Moslem nationalities

    3.2 Maintain/restore stability among European nationalities

    3.3 Maintain/restore stability among Eastern nationalities (e.g., Mongols, Koreans, Chinese)

    3.4 Maintain/restore stability among the Northern nationalities

(Continued)

5-33

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

MILITARY GOALS

1. Defend the First Socialist State Against External Threats

    1.1 Avoid worldwide nuclear war

    1.2 Survive a nuclear attack

2. Defend the Fraternal Socialist Countries (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)

    2.1 Increase military cooperation with fraternal armies of social-
         ist countries

    2.2 Oppose militarism and foreign military bases in Finland,
         Austria, and Sweden

3. Support Progressive and Democratic Forces Abroad

    3.1 Assist national liberation movements

    3.2 Support countries fighting against imperialist domination

    3.3 Support forces fighting against white racism

    3.4 Support progressive Arab states against Israeli aggression

4. Increase the Prestige of Soviet Armed Forces

    4.1 Deter capitalist/imperialist adventurism

    4.2 Deter Chinese military adventurism against Asian Communist
         countries

ECONOMIC GOALS

1. Increase Economic Capacity of the Soviet Union at a Rapid Rate

    1.1 Increase investment in industry, manpower, and natural resources

    1.2 Increase investment in welfare of Soviet citizens

    1.3 Increase investment in defense forces and military industries

(Continued)

5-34

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

2. Increase Economic Cooperation with Fraternal Socialist Countries

    2.1 Increase trade and specialization among socialist countries

    2.2 Increase integration of economic plans among socialist
         countries

    2.3 Cooperate in resolving regional problems such as energy
         shortages

3. Expand Mutually Beneficial Peaceful Relations With all Countries

    3.1 Increase trade with capitalist countries

    3.2 Increase trade with developing countries

    3.3 Cooperate with other countries in solving international eco-
         nomic problems

4. Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

    4.1 Give economic credit for expansion of trade with developing
         countries

    4.2 Assist development of industries in developing countries

    4.3 Assist developing countries in exploration and development of
         their natural resources

    4.4 Assist developing countries in training and education of their
         technical manpower

    4.5 Oppose imperialist and neocolonialist domination of developing
         countries

GOALS TOWARD CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

1. Reduce Chances of War With U.S. and NATO

    1.1 Deter capitalist adventurism against fraternal socialist
         countries

    1.2 Encourage military detente with U.S. and NATO

    1.3 Discourage militarism and nuclear proliferation in Germany/
         Japan

    1.4 Encourage noninterference in internal affairs of socialist
         countries

(Continued)

5-35

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

2. **Increase Mutually Beneficial Exchanges with Capitalist Countries**

    2.1 Increase mutually beneficial trade with capitalist countries

    2.2 Increase selected cultural and scientific exchanges

    2.3 Increase practical science and technology exchanges

    2.4 Increase cooperation in resolving world problems (e.g., energy, oceans, environment)

3. **Press the Anticapitalist Ideological Struggle**

    3.1 Support CP's and progressive forces in capitalist countries

    3.2 Expose the aggressive nature of capitalism

    3.3 Expose the hollowness of revisions of capitalist ideology

    3.4 Reject capitalist concepts of convergence of the two systems

EUROPEAN GOALS

1. **Maintain/Increase Security of the East European Buffer States**

    1.1 Reduce sources of international tension in central Europe

    1.2 Promote arms reduction and dismantling of aggressive blocs in Europe

    1.3 Promote withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe

    1.4 Promote recognition of existing boundaries in Europe

    1.5 Promote recognition of East Germany by all governments

    1.6 Promote independence of West Europe from the United States

    1.7 Avoid inducing arms race mentalities in NATO countries

    1.8 Support a European collective security system

2. **Oppose Revival of Militarism in West Germany**

    2.1 Oppose nuclear weapon acquisition by West Germany

    2.2 Oppose stationing of NATO nuclear weapons in West Germany

    2.3 Encourage nuclear nonproliferation in Europe

    2.4 Discourage increased military spending by West Germany

    2.5 Discourage West German participation in overseas military adventures

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

3. Promote the Unity of Fraternal Socialist Parties in Europe

    3.1 Discourage anti-Soviet activities by Yugoslavia and Albania

    3.2 Promote normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and Albania

    3.3 Oppose narrow nationalism, regionalism, and Euro-Communism

    3.4 Oppose reformism among East European CP's

    3.5 Support further integration of CMEA and Warsaw Pact countries

4. Oppose Anti-Soviet European-Chinese Cooperation

    4.1 Oppose European military assistance for China

    4.2 Oppose anti-Soviet economic cooperation between Europe and China

5. Promote Peaceful, Mutually Beneficial Cooperation with Nonsocialist Europe

    5.1 Promote increase of trade with nonsocialist Europe

    5.2 Increase practical science and technology exchanges

    5.3 Increase selected cultural exchanges with nonsocialist Europe

    5.4 Increase cooperation in resolving regional European problems

GOALS TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD

1. Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in the Third World

    1.1 Deter capitalist/imperialist military intervention

    1.2 Deter Chinese military intervention against fraternal Third World countries

    1.3 Assist military development of fraternal armies

2. Defend Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist Oriented Countries

    2.1 Support national liberation in the developing countries

    2.2 Oppose colonial and white racist regimes

    2.3 Oppose capitalist/imperialist intervention

(Continued)
5-37

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

3. Support Economic Independence of Developing Countries

4. Increase Soviet International Prestige Among Developing Countries

    4.1 Increase Soviet aid, trade, and cultural contacts

5. Contain Chinese Influence Among Developing Countries

    5.1 Provide alternative support for countries subject to Chinese
         penetration

ASIAN GOALS

1. Deter/Oppose China from Military Adventurism Against the Soviet
    Union

2. Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against Fraternal
    Socialist Countries

    2.1 Increase the capability of Asian fraternal armies

3. Support Socialist Countries in Asia Against Other (Imperialist)
    Threats

    3.1 Increase the capability of Asian fraternal armies

4. Develop Alternative Transport Routes to the Present Trans-Siberian
    Railway

    4.1 Improve long-range air transport

    4.2 Improve security of Indian Ocean sea route

    4.3 Improve/expand the second Siberian rail route (BAM)

    4.4 Improve road transport in Siberia

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

5. <u>Undermine the Legitimacy of China's Territorial Claims Against Its Neighbors (except Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao)</u>

    5.1 Oppose China's territorial claims against the Soviet Union

    5.2 Oppose China's territorial claims against Vietnam and Laos

    5.3 Oppose China's territorial claims against India and Burma

6. <u>Support Progressive Governments and Countries With Socialist Orientation</u>

    6.1 Give material and moral support to progressive regimes

    6.2 Support mutual defense and friendship agreements

7. <u>Support Peaceful and Mutually Beneficial Relations With Nonsocialist Countries</u>

    7.1 Support Asian collective security system

    7.2 Support concepts of "nuclear free" and "peace" zones

    7.3 Increase trade and mutually beneficial exchanges

    7.4 Support nonaggression pacts with nonsocialist countries

<u>MIDDLE EASTERN/SOUTH ASIAN GOALS</u>

1. <u>Reduce NATO/CENTO Threats to the Soviet Union</u>

    1.1 Encourage dissolution of NATO/CENTO

    1.2 Discourage cooperation of regional governments with NATO forces

    1.3 Encourage peaceful relations with all countries in the region

    1.4 Maintain/improve relations with Malta and Cyprus

    1.5 Increase aid to neutral and friendly countries

2. <u>Support/Defend Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments in the Region</u>

    2.1 Give military support to Arab countries fighting aggression

    2.2 Give economic and moral support to Arab countries

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

2.3 Give moral and material support to the Palestine Liberation
Organization

3. Support/Defend Progressive and Democratic Movements in the Region

3.1 Support national liberation movements

3.2 Support the idea of a national homeland for Palestinians

3.3 Oppose Zionist expansionism

3.4 Oppose reactionary forces

3.5 Support Arab socialism

3.6 Support the right of Israel to exist

4. Support Economic Independence of the Region from Capitalist Countries

4.1 Support nationalization of foreign businesses

4.2 Support OPEC/OAPEC attempt to gain control of oil resources

4.3 Improve industrial base of countries in the region

5. Secure Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean

AFRICAN GOALS

1. Defend/Support Countries Proclaiming Intention of Moving Toward
Building Socialism

2. Support Other Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented
Countries

2.1 Support national liberation

2.2 Oppose colonial and white racist regimes

2.3 Oppose neocolonialism and economic exploitation

2.4 Oppose capitalist/imperialist intervention

3. Support Independence of African Countries

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

4. **Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige Among African Countries**

    4.1 Increase aid, trade, and cultural contacts

5. **Contain Chinese Influence Among African Countries**

    5.1 Provide alternative support for countries subject to Chinese penetration

LATIN AMERICAN GOALS

1. **Defend/Support Cuba Against External Threats**

    1.1 Defend Cuba against U.S. military intervention

    1.2 Defend Cuba against U.S. economic blockade

    1.3 Defend Cuba against reactionary Cuban exiles

    1.4 Provide support for progressive Cuban military actions overseas

    1.5 Increase/maintain the capability of Cuban military forces

2. **Avoid Direct Military Confrontation with U.S. (and OAS) in Latin America**

    2.1 Discourage provocative acts by Cuba against major U.S. interests

    2.2 Avoid deploying excessive military forces in Latin America

    2.3 Oppose excessive adventurism by Latin American CP's (support peaceful transition to socialism)

    2.4 Support normalization of relations between Cuba and U.S. (and rest of Latin America)

    2.5 Encourage acceptance of local CP's and socialist governments by Western Hemisphere countries

3. **Encourage Independence of Latin American Countries from the U.S.**

    3.1 Increase trade with Latin American countries

    3.2 Increase cultural and scientific exchanges

(Continued)

Table 2
Detailed Listing
Continued

    3.3 Assist the development of local armed forces

    3.4 Encourage dissolution of OAS and other anti-Soviet blocs

4. **Increase Solidarity Among Progressive and Democratic Forces in Latin America**

    4.1 Oppose anti-Communist fascist regimes in Latin America

    4.2 Expose torture and persecution of progressive elements

    4.3 Give financial and moral support to local CP's

    4.4 Give moral and material assistance to progressive governments

    4.5 Oppose China's anti-Soviet activities in Latin America

5. **Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige in Latin America**

    5.1 Support peaceful resolution of conflicts

    5.2 Support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America

CHAPTER 6.   U.S. CRISIS GOALS AND OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

This and the following chapters provide selective analyses aimed at un-
covering a number of the general patterns and characteristics of U.S. and
Soviet crisis goals and outcomes. The present chapter examines the case
of the United States while Chapter 7 is devoted to Soviet crisis goals
and outcomes.

The research strategy is based on the notion that crisis outcomes can be
analyzed from the perspective of policy goal achievement. For this reason
the first two sections of this chapter investigate the empirical patterns
of U.S. policy goals pursued in international crises. The first traces
the goals patterns of the United States for the relevant crises occurring
between 1966 and 1978 (see Table 1 in Chapter 3) while the second section
is devoted to a comparative analysis of the goals of the Vietnam period
(1966-1971) and post-Vietnam era (1972-1978). Central here is the assump-
tion that the Vietnam war and U.S. experience in Southeast Asia can be
viewed as a key watershed event for U.S. international behavior and ac-
cordingly should serve as an appropriate breakpoint for identifying
major shifts in U.S. policy. The third section complements the pre-
ceding analytical thrusts, examining U.S. crisis outcomes. The major
emphasis here is on the identification of the types of goals that are most
or least often achieved. The fourth section analyzes the actual impacts
that international crises have on U.S. goal achievement, and the final
section offers a number of general conclusions drawn from the chapter.

AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY GOALS

Goals Relevant to U.S. Crises

Table 1 presents the relative frequency and the percent of crises[1] in which a particular U.S. policy goal is directly related to the crisis involvement of the United States and/or most threatened by the crisis adversaries of the U.S.[2]

Therefore, the rank order of the goals[3] presented in Table 1 reveals the relative degree to which a particular goal is operationally relevant to international crises of concern to the United States between 1966 and 1978. For example, the goal of promoting peace and peaceful resolution to conflict was found to be the U.S. policy goal most frequently relevant (n=31 or relevant in 31% of the crises) and, therefore, most frequently pursued by the United States during international crisis.[4] Intuitively, this finding corresponds closely to the United States' view of itself as a prudent superpower dedicated to world order and conflict resolution.

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[1] The absolute frequency of a goals' relevance can be viewed as equal to the percent of crises (minus decimal point) in which the goal was relevant because 100 international crises were examined for the United States from 1966-1978. Domestic crises involving the U.S. military are deliberately excluded from the analysis.

[2] A goal was coded as a primary relevant crisis goal whenever data sources indicated that the goal was directly related to U.S. crisis involvement and/or threatened by the behavior of the major actors of the crisis. See CACI (1979c) for coding instructions and rules. Unless otherwise noted, all discussions in this chapter pertain to these primary goals.

[3] See Chapter 4 for discussions of individual goals.

[4] It must be remembered that in all instances the crises and their associated goals were coded from a U.S. policy-maker's vantagepoint. Hence, all findings are relevant only in terms of the actual policy pronouncements made by U.S. decision-makers. These pronouncements were validated whenever necessary, however, by comparing them to the actual behavior taken by the United States during the course of the crisis (see Chapter 3 on methodology).

TABLE 1

U.S. Primary Policy Goals Pursued in International Crises of Concern (n=100), 1966-1978

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant[a]
1	Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31
2	Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25
3	Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21
4.5	Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	20
4.5	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20
6	Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19
7	Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	17
8.5	Support international law	Ideological	16
8.5	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16
10	Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13
11	Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	12
13	Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11
13	Promote the stability and maintain defense forces needed to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11
13	Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11
15.5	Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10
15.5	Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10

(Continued)

6-3

Table 1
U.S. Primary Policy Goals
Continued

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant[a]
17.5	Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9
17.5	Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9
20.5	Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interests	Economic	8
20.5	Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8
20.5	Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8
20.5	Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8
24.5	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6
24.5	Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6
24.5	Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6
24.5	Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6
28.5	Advance global welfare and human rights	Ideological	5
28.5	Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe	Europe	5
28.5	Guarantee Israeli security	Middle East	5
28.5	Promote better U.S. diplomatic relations with Africa	Africa	5
31.5	Promote Western European integration	Europe	4
31.5	Support the stability of other (non-U.S. allies) non-Communist Asian countries	Asia	4
36	Support democratic values and countries	Ideological	3
36	Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states	Communist States	3
36	Improve relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe	Europe	3
36	Maintain U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East	Middle East	3
36	Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC	Communist States	3
36	Continue American economic presence in Latin America	Latin America	3

(Continued)

Table 1
U.S. Primary Policy Goals
Continued

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant[a]
36	Keep Latin America free of hostile aggression and influence	Latin America	3
41.5	Promote the stability of international commodity prices and supplies	Economic	2
41.5	Reduce chances of war with PRC	Communist States	2
41.5	Encourage polycentrism within the Communist world	Communist States	2
41.5	Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan	Asia	2
45.5	Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia	Asia	1
45.5	Promote democratic institutions in Latin America	Latin America	1
45.5	Promote the political stability of Latin America	Latin America	1
45.5	Promote the peaceful transition of African countries to independence	Africa	1

a Percentages column total does not equal 100 because more than one goal can be relevant per crisis.

6-5

The four next most frequently relevant U.S. policy goals are all related to military-security issues:

- Deter hostile military expansion (n=25),

- Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends (n=21),

- Maintain the military capability for defending strategic LDC's (n=20), and

- Maintain the military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad (n=20).

Table 2, which presents the frequencies of U.S. goal categories, reveals even more clearly the salience of military-security goals in international crises of concern to the United States. These goals were found to be crisis relevant nearly twice as often as ideological goals, ranked as the second most relevant (.74). This finding corresponds to previous CACI crisis research, which revealed that between 1966 and 1975 70.6 percent of U.S. crises could be described as either wholly or partially military in nature (CACI, 1976: 2-18). Moreover, this predominance of military-security goal crisis relevance reflects the operational definition of a U.S. "crisis" as meeting at least one of the following criteria:

1. Direct involvement of U.S. military forces in the incident,

2. A military decision on the incident required or made,

3. Any subsequent military involvement of U.S. forces,

4. An existing threat of violence or significant damage to U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities, or

5. The need for rapid military action and response (CACI, 1978a, 1978c, 1976).

TABLE 2[a]

Frequencies of U.S. Crisis Primary Goal Categories, 1966–1978

Categories' Rank Order	Category	Categories'[b] Average Relevance Per Crisis
1	Military-Security	1.44
2	Ideological	.74
3	Communist States (particularly the USSR and PRC)	.45
4.5	Europe	.33
4.5	Asia	.33
6	Middle East	.28
7	Economic	.19
8	Africa	.14
9	Latin America	.08
Totals		3.98

[a] Table based on data presented in Table 1.

[b] Since there are exactly 100 cases/crises, multiplying the values in this table by 100 (for example, 1.44 x 100 = 144) gives the frequency of the category's relevance.

Together Tables 1 and 2 reveal the following information:

- On the average, approximately 4 goals are relevant per U.S. crisis.

- General goal categories such as military-security and ideological issues are clearly more relevant to U.S. crises when compared to geographical region-specific categories suggesting that these categories transcend single geographical regions. This again seems to correspond to previous research that found a fairly equal distribution of U.S. international crises across geographical regions for the years 1966-1975 with East Asia and the Pacific area being most frequent (18.3 percent of the crises) (CACI, 1976: 2-9).

- Of the region-specific policy goal categories, those concerning Europe and Asia, traditionally the most important geopolitical regions to U.S. international policy, were found to be most relevant occurring on the average of .33 times per crisis.

- Goals concerning Third World regions, especially Africa and Latin America, were found operationally relevant in very few U.S. crises (n_s=14 and 8 respectively). This apparently refutes the common assumption that recent U.S. crisis behavior "usually" entails Third World issues.

- Goals concerning the major Communist state (particularly the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China) are still highly relevant to U.S. crisis behavior, ranking as the third most salient category. Specifically, the policy aim of containing the expansion of Communist influence, relevant in 17 percent of U.S. crises, continues to be a major U.S. crisis concern. At the same time the promotion of the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union ranks among policy goals most relevant to U.S. crises (relevant in 10 percent of the crises). These findings appear to suggest that while detente with the USSR was a real concern in a fair number of U.S. crises, at the same time the United States was not willing to allow the unfettered expansion of Soviet influence. Furthermore, these findings appear to reflect the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford "linkage" strategy toward the Communist world.

- Twenty-one policy goals were found to be relevant in 5 percent or less of the crises analyzed. Although the

concerns of these goals are diverse, a good number of
them are related to Third World countries and issues
giving further evidence of the lack of specific Third
World goal relevance, particularly for regional aims.

Table 3 presents those U.S. goals that were publicly articulated by U.S.
policy-makers (see Chapter 4) but were not found to be of primary rele-
vance in any of the crises analyzed. As with the findings reported above,
Table 3 illustrates the apparent lack of Third World goal relevance in
crises of concern to the United States. All 8 of these goals are directly
related to Third World dynamics. Of these, 6 concern the promotion (or
the lack) of economic development. Although it would be easy to cite
these data as evidential of U.S. disregard for Third World issues or the
call for a new international economic order, we would suggest a more
cautious evaluation. These data seem to basically suggest that our oper-
ational definition of a "crisis" is biased toward the "high" politics
of military-security issues (in fact, it is defined around such concepts)
(Morse, 1970) and away from the more subtle, often economic "low" political
"new forces" of world politics (Brown, 1974). In other words, observers
may be very correct in their assessment of basic U.S. neglect of Third
World issues and concerns (Bergstein, 1973, 1974, 1974-75), but our data
dealing solely with crises most likely will fail to reveal such patterns.
Indeed, as Table 2 indicates, economic goals were relevant in only 19
instances and 17 of these (89 percent) concerned the goals of supporting
an international economic order compatible with U.S. interests or sup-
porting the orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial
interests (see Table 1).

Both of these goals tend to reflect the grandiose questions of economic
systems and order and are thus not easily separated from issues of
military security. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973-1974 acutely revealed
the intensity to which such economic issues affect political and military
arrangements. It is not unduly surprising that, when the United States
began to feel the crunch of the oil embargo, then Secretary of State
Kissinger warned OPEC countries that the U.S. might be compelled to use

6-9

TABLE 3

U.S. Goals Reiterated by U.S. Policy-Makers But Not
Found to be Primarily Relevant to Crises of Concern to the United States

Goal	Category
Promote the economic development of Third World non-Communist countries	Economic
Promote the economic development/stability in Asian non-Communist LDC's	Asia
Promote the economic stability/development of Middle Eastern countries	Middle East
Promote the economic stability/development of Latin American countries	Latin America
Promote the economic stability/development of African countries	Africa
Increase/promote U.S. economic relations with Africa	Africa
Promote democratic institutions in Africa	Africa
Promote the security of the Cape route and other major sea lines of communication around Africa	Africa

military force to circumvent future actions "where there is some actual strangulation of the industrial world," (Business Week, January 13, 1975). This statement points to the fact that no major power today can maintain or expand its political and military security commensurate with its foreign policy objectives without the concomitant pursuit of economic security (Bergstein, Keohane, Nye, 1975: 35).

U.S. Goal Clusters

Having reviewed, albeit briefly, the overall frequencies of U.S. policy goals relevant to U.S. crises of concern for the years 1966-1978, we now turn to an examination of relevant U.S. primary clusters. Factor analysis techniques were used to identify goals that tended to empirically cluster together. As mentioned above (Table 1) certain policy goals were infrequently relevant to U.S. crises and should not be included in the factor analysis. Of the 55 goals originally identified as central to the international policy of the United States only 16 (29 percent) occurred in at least 10 percent of all the crises examined. These 16 goals were the only goals included in the factor analysis reported in Table 4.[5] Table 4 presents a five factor solution that explains 58.7 percent of the total variance. The following is an interpretation of each factor in terms of its highest loading variables (relevant variable loadings are blocked in Table 4 for each factor):

- Factor 1 - Contain Communism. (17.5 percent of variance). These goals loading on this dimension seem to

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[5] Principal components factor analysis was selected as the factoring model for two reasons: first, the relatively weak a priori theoretical priors available (for example, our limited expectations as to likely theoretical relationships and the complexity of relationships among the relevant policy goals make the major alternative (some member of the common factor analysis model school) less attractive; second, principal component analysis was used in previous CACI analyses of U.S. crisis behavior (1976, 1978e). Unities were used as initial communality estimates and the principal component solution was subjected to a varimax rotation.

TABLE 4

Factor Analysis[a] of U.S. Crisis Goals, 1966-1978

Goal[b]	Factor 1: Contain Communism	Factor 2: Support Industrial Democracies	Factor 3: Defend Strategic LDC's and U.S. Access	Factor 4: Support Stability of Allies	Factor 5: Support U.S. Prestige and Symbolic Values
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities	0.65	-0.13	-0.10	0.06	-0.34
Deter hostile military influence expansion	0.74	-0.02	0.20	0.22	0.08
Contain/defer the expansion of Communist influence	0.79	0.05	-0.03	0.14	-0.01
Promote the normalization of relation between the U.S. and USSR	0.41	-0.02	-0.27	0.32	0.32
Maintain/Increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (i.e. Europe and Japan)	0.02	0.77	-0.17	0.01	0.11
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests abroad	-0.29	-0.61	-0.27	0.18	0.03
Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	-0.30	0.69	-0.07	0.25	-0.09
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts	-0.11	0.52	-0.17	0.65	0.10
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategic LDC's	0.10	-0.05	0.84	0.10	-0.16
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. maritime interests	-0.41	-0.20	0.43	0.09	-0.02
Promote the stability of Asian allies and maintain/increase U.S. Asian military presence	-0.04	0.02	0.76	-0.08	0.25
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	0.24	-0.05	0.25	0.75	0.04
Help secure the regime stability of U.S. allies and friends	0.33	0.01	-0.04	0.61	-0.28
Support international law	0.03	0.15	0.03	0.11	0.74
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	-0.14	-0.22	0.07	-0.17	0.66
Maintain/increase military capability for "show of force"	-0.06	-0.26	0.30	0.07	-0.35
Percentage variance/factor	17.5	14.3	10.8	9.2	7.0

a Varimax rotated factor matrix, principal components, all factors have eigenvalues 1.00.

b This factor analysis was limited to those primary goals empirically identified as being relevant in at least 10% of U.S. crises (see Table 1).

be associated with U.S. policy aimed at containing
Communism throughout the Cold War and Vietnam era,
U.S. strategy was clearly aimed at deterring hostile
military influence (that is, Communist military influ-
ence), especially in the Third World, by granting
military assistance to strengthen allies and "stra-
tegically" located friends. More recently, the United
States has attempted to stabilize conflict arenas
in the Third World through mutual understandings
with the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of State
Kissinger, for example, conceived of detente as
a relaxation of tension along a broad front of mutual
involvements that could not be judged piece by piece.
They were "linked" together. Hence, detente was
tested and negatively affected in Africa when Kissinger
attempted to link Soviet behavior with the ultimate
success of the SALT II agreement and trade concessions
badly wanted by the USSR at the time (Stoessinger,
1976). Such a strategy is clearly evidenced by the
significant factor loading of the U.S. goal of promoting
the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union
on this dimension. The negative loading of the goal
to maintain/increase the military capability for
defending U.S. maritime interests most likely reflects
the United States' problematical view of recent Soviet
naval build-ups and adventures into the Indian Ocean,
which appears to occur apart from the previously men-
tioned aims.

- Factor 2 - Support Industrial Democracies. (14.3 per-
  cent of variance). Just as the containment of Communism
  has been a general policy to one degree or another of
  U.S. international behavior since World War II, so has
  the U.S. support for the industrial democracies of
  Western Europe (and Japan). In fact, close examination
  of Table 4 will reveal that this factor has signifi-
  cant loading variables that reflect U.S. policy
  toward the major industrial democracies across mili-
  tary (that is, maintain military capability for defending
  major industrial democracies), political (that is, main-
  tain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe),
  economic (that is, maintain military capability for de-
  fending U.S. commercial interests abroad, a type of con-
  cern that tends not to occur in Western European contexts),
  and conflict resolution domains (that is, promote the
  stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts).
  The diversity of goal types loading on this dimension
  is further evidence of the importance of Western Europe
  (and Japan) in the eyes of American decision-makers,
  especially during times of crisis.

- Factor 3 - Defend Strategic LDC's and United States'
  Access to Them. (10.8 percent of variance). Factor
  3 and its associated loading goals represents direct
  U.S. military action toward the Third World and, in
  particular, Asia where the United States has fought
  two costly wars (Southeast Asia and Korea) and still
  maintains a large number of troops. Whereas, Factor
  1 represents goals aimed at indirectly preserving
  U.S. interests in the Third World (that is, military
  assistance), Factor 3 can be viewed as those that
  are direct and active policy goals -- maintain mili-
  tary capability for defending strategic LDC's, and
  promote the stability of Asian allies and maintain/
  increase U.S. Asian military presence. These goals
  rely on access to these countries and this dynamic
  is represented by the third goal which loads on
  this dimension -- maintain military capability for
  defending U.S. maritime interests, which loads
  positively, as contrasted to its negative loading
  on Factor 1.

- Factor 4 - Support the Stability of U.S. Allies.
  (9.2 percent of variance). Factor 4 is a general
  dimension which seems to reflect the United States'
  desire for a stable status quo especially relative
  to its allies and friends. Previous research indi-
  cates that the U.S. has increasingly sought to
  maintain or restore the status quo through its
  direct participation in international crises (CACI,
  1976: 2-10) and this is again demonstrated in
  Table 4. All three of the relevant goals -- promote
  the stabilization of potential or realized European
  conflicts, promote peace and peaceful resolution
  to conflict, and help secure the regime stability
  of U.S. allies and friends are manifestations of
  the United States' desire for a stable, nonrevo-
  lutionary status quo.

- Factor 5 - Support U.S. Prestige and Symbolic Values.
  (7.0 percent of variance). The last significant
  factor relates to goals that are primarily symbolic
  in nature. The support of international law, ensuring
  the prestige and dignity of the United States, and the
  maintenance of "show of force" capabilities are all
  goals aimed at symbolically impressing other inter-
  national actors. This is not to suggest that these
  three goals are primarily operationalized to achieve
  objectives in such a way as to enable the U.S. to forego
  the actual employment of more concrete means of power
  or control (for example, military capabilities).

U.S. Secondary Policy Goals Pursued in International Crises

Up to this point we have limited our discussion to "primary" U.S. policy goals. Over the course of our research "secondary" policy goals were also coded as judged relevant for each U.S. international crisis. "Secondary" goals were defined as those policy goals that by themselves are unlikely to lead to American involvement in the crisis or which are only indirectly threatened by the crises (see Appendix A of CACI, 1979c). Hence, while not the primary reason for the crisis involvement of the United States, such goals cannot be ignored if we want to have a thorough understanding of U.S. crisis behavior and outcomes.[6]

Tables 5 and 6 present data concerning the relative frequencies of U.S. policy goals and goal categories that were found to be of secondary relevance during U.S. crises. It is noteworthy that the policy goal most often relevant (35 percent of the crises) is to ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States. For as Morgenthau (1973: 81-82) suggests:

> The policy of prestige has two possible ultimate objec-
> tives: prestige for its own sake or, much more fre-
> quently, prestige in support of a policy of the status
> quo or of imperialism. While in national societies pres-
> tige is frequently sought for its own sake, it is rarely
> the primary objective of foreign policy. Prestige is at
> most the pleasant by-product of foreign policies whose
> ultimate objectives are not the reputation of power but
> the substance of power (our emphasis).

In other words, such a policy seems to be the ultimate manifestation of a secondary goal and thereby, lends not only theoretical relevance to our data and findings but also content validity to our coding.

The next four goals, as was the case of primary goal relevance, are all of the military-security category. Table 6 reveals that this military

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[6] A goal was coded as being primarily relevant to a crisis whenever sources indicated that it was directly related to U.S. crisis involvement and threatened by the behavior of the major actors in the crisis. Primary crisis goals were coded for both the United States and the Soviet Union

TABLE 5

U.S. Secondary Policy Goals Pursued in
International Crises of Concern (n=100), 1966-1978

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant
1	Ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States	Ideological	35
2	Deter hostile military influence expansion	Military-Security	22
3	Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategic LDC's	Military-Security	20
4.5	Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	19
4.5	Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	19
6	Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	17
7	Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	13
8.5	Contain/deter the expansion of Communism	Communist States	12
8.5	Promote the normalization of relations with the USSR	Communist States	12
10	Support international law	Ideological	11
11	Support the stability of other (non-U.S. allies) non-Communist Asian countries	Asia	10
12	Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	9
14	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. overseas maritime interests	Military-Security	8
14	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and U.S. citizens abroad	Military-Security	8
14	Reduce chances of war with USSR	Communist States	8
15	Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe	Europe	7
16.5	Support international economic order compatible with U.S. economic interests	Economic	6
16.5	Promote the stability and maintain defense needed to protect U.S. Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	6
20.5	Support democratic values and countries	Ideological	5
20.5	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	5
20.5	Assist friendly or neutral LDC's to strengthen their military capability	Military-Security	5

(Continued)

Table 5
U.S. Secondary Policy Goals
Continued

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant
20.5	Promote/support political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	5
20.5	Promote economic stability/development in the Middle East	Middle East	5
20.5	Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East	Middle East	5
25	Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests and relations	Economic	4
25	Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	4
25	Promote better diplomatic relations with Africa	Africa	4
30	Advance global welfare and human rights	Ideological	3
30	Reduce chances of war with PRC	Communist States	3
30	Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states	Communist States	3
30	Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	3
30	Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	3
30	Keep Latin America free of hostile aggression and influence	Latin America	3
30	Promote democratic institutions in Africa	Africa	3
35	Promote the economic development of non-Communist LDC's	Economic	2
35	Promote Western European integration	Europe	2
35	Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia	Asia	2
35	Promote economic development/stability of non-Communist Asian LDC's	Asia	2
35	Guarantee Israeli security	Middle East	2
35	Minimize Soviet influence in Middle East	Middle East	2
35	Promote economic stability/development in Latin America	Latin America	2
35	Continue U.S. economic presence in Latin America	Latin America	2

(Continued)

Table 5
U.S. Secondary Policy Goals
Continued

Goal's Rank Order	Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant
35	Promote democratic institutions in Latin America	Latin America	2
35	Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	2
48	Promote Latin American political stability	Latin America	1
48	Promote the stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts	Europe	1
48	Improve relations between U.S. and Eastern Europe	Europe	1
48	Encourage polycentrism within the Communist world	Communist States	1
48	Promote the normalization of relations with the PRC	Communist States	1
48	Promote peaceful transition of African countries to independence	Africa	1
48	Promote the economic stability/development of Africa	Africa	1
48	Increase/promote U.S. economic relations with Africa	Africa	1
48	Promote the security of the Cape route and other major sea lines of communication around Africa	Africa	1

TABLE 6[a]

Frequencies of U.S. Crisis Secondary Goal Categories, 1966-1978

Categories' Rank Order	Goal Category	Categories' Average Relevance Per Crisis
1	Military-Security	1.15
2	Ideological	.71
3	Communist States	.4
4	Asia	.37
5	Middle East	.22
6	Europe	.14
7	Africa	.13
8	Economic	.12
9	Latin America	.1
Total		3.34

[a] Table based on data presented in Table 5.

[b] Since there are exactly 100 cases/crises, multiplying the values in this table by 100 (for example, 1.44 x 100 = 144) gives the frequency of the category's relevance.

category again is clearly the most relevant, but the differential between the military-security category and ideological goals (the second most relevant category) is not as vast as experienced for U.S. primary goals (see Table 2). Likewise, little change is witnessed in either the rank order or frequency between the relevance of primary and secondary categories of goals.

Table 7 presents some interesting data concerning, among other things, the percentage of times a goal is of primary relevance relative to its overall relevance (frequency of primary crisis relevance plus secondary crisis relevance). An initial examination of the data presented in this table reveals the following:

- When relevant to crises, goals concerning Europe (that is, promote the stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts and maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe) are nearly always of primary relevance. This finding gives yet further credence to the proposition that Europe is the key geographical region of the United States' international policy because when goals concerning this region are relevant seldom are they of secondary importance. In fact, when such goals are relevant they appear to hold primary attention on the agendas of U.S. policy-makers.

- Of the 12 policy goals that when relevant, are more often primary than secondary (that is, goal percentage of primary relevance is equal to or greater than 50 percent) 7 or 58 percent are in the military-security category.

- The two most frequently relevant goals (primary plus secondary goal relevance) are both from the ideological goal category -- ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.

_____

(for an analysis of the latter's goals, see Chapter 7). The "secondary" or more tangential crisis goals were coded for the U.S. as an experiment, taking advantage of the greater volume of source materials available regarding U.S. (as opposed to Soviet) crisis aims and interests. This greater volume of source materials is also the reason why more can be said about the patterns (such as the factors presented in Table 4) that are discovered about U.S. goals, because more of the inner workings of the U.S. policy process are revealed in open source materials. While "secondary" goals made up the experimental portion of the analysis of U.S. goals, in the Soviet case (see Chapter 7, below) an experimental application of an expanded 7 point outcome coding scale (with extremely high and extremely low values) was made. Chapter 7 discusses the results of the latter experiment. For both superpowers, what are termed "primary" goals are the major focus of interest in this analysis.

TABLE 7[a]

Frequency of *U.S. Crises Goals' Primary Relevance Relative*
to Overall Goal Relevance (Primary Plus Secondary Relevance), 1966-1978

Goal[b]	Goal Category	Overall Goal Relevance (primary plus secondary) (n)	Goals' Percentage of Primary Relevance
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts	Europe	12	92
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe	Europe	13	77
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	28	71
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	16	69
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	24	67
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	48	65
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	29	59
Support international law	Ideological	27	59
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	22	59
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	47	53
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	*Military-Security*	40	52
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	40	50
Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	22	45
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	22	41

(Continued)

Table 7
Frequency of U.S. Crises Goals' Primary Relevance
Continued

Goal[b]	Goal Category	Overall Goal Relevance (primary plus secondary) (n)	Goals' Percentage of Primary Relevance
Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	31	38
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	54	35
Support the stability of other (nonallies) non-Communist *Asian countries*	Asia	14	29

[a] Table based on data presented in Tables 1 and 5.

[b] Goals in this table are limited to those relevant as primary or secondary goals in at least 10 percent of crises.

("relevant" in 54 percent of all crises) and promote peace
and peaceful resolution to conflict ("relevant" in 48
percent of all crises).

- Five policy goals were found to be more frequently of second-
  ary than primary importance and hence indicate goals that
  either are:

    1. Unlikely to be seriously challenged in crises,

    2. By themselves unlikely to lead to
       U.S. crisis involvement, or

    3. When threatened by a crisis usually
       threatened in an indirect fashion.

  These goals are:

    1. Promote the normalization of relations
       with the USSR,

    2. Contain the expansion of Communist
       aggression and influence in Asia,

    3. Maintain military "show of force" capa-
       bilities,

    4. Ensure the prestige and dignity of the
       U.S., and

    5. Support the stability of non-Communist
       Asian countries that are not allies
       of the U.S. The reasons why these policy
       goals are most often of secondary relevance
       when relevant at all is an interesting
       question that goes beyond the purview
       of this research.

Table 8, which is a factor analysis of U.S. policy goals of secondary rele-
vance to U.S. crises of concern, is the last analytical effort to be pre-
sented concerning secondary crisis goals. The cumulative percentage of
variance explained by the four factor solution equals 59.2[7] and the
following goal dimensions emerge:

- Factor 1 - Support the stability of U.S. allies through
  the containment of Soviet Communism (21.8 percent of
  variance).

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[7] As in the factor analysis presented in Table 4 and in all subsequent
presentations of factor analyses, only dimensions with eigenvalues of
1.0 or greater are presented.

TABLE 8

Factor Analysis[a] of U.S. Secondary Goals, 1966-1978

Goal[b]	Factor 1: Support the Stability of U.S. Allies and Deter/Contain the USSR	Factor 2: Oppose Communism in Asia	Factor 3: Maintain Ability to Defend Strategic LDC's	Factor 4: Support U.S. Prestige and Symbolic Values
Promote peace and the peaceful resolution to conflict	0.70	-0.14	0.20	-0.01
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	0.60	0.11	0.03	-0.18
Deter hostile military influence expansion	0.75	0.18	0.10	0.05
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	0.67	0.29	-0.09	0.24
Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	0.36	-0.31	-0.38	0.17
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	0.10	0.66	0.24	-0.17
Support the stability of non-Communist Asian countries	0.06	0.84	-0.15	0.19
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategic LDC's	0.22	0.14	0.72	-0.16
Maintain/increase military capability for "show of force"	-0.04	-0.07	0.78	0.12
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.80
Support international law	0.01	-0.07	-0.05	0.73
Percentage variance/factor	21.8	14.9	12.2	10.3

[a] Varimax rotated factor matrix

[b] This factor analysis was limited to those secondary goals empirically identified as being relevant in at least 10 percent of U.S. crises (see Table 5).

- <u>Factor 2 - Oppose Communist aggression in Asia</u> (14.9 percent of variance).

- <u>Factor 3 - Maintain ability to defend strategic LDC's</u> (12.2 percent of variance).

- <u>Factor 4 - Support U.S. prestige and symbolic values</u> (10.3 percent of variance).

A comparison of this factor analysis with a similar factor analysis of U.S. primary goals (Table 4) suggests few major changes in the resulting clusters. The only significant change is that while the dimensions "contain Communism" and "support the stability of U.S. allies" were two separate factors in the primary goal factor analysis, these two dimensions seem to collapse into one factor in the secondary goal analysis.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY GOALS RELATIVE TO TWO PERIODS -- VIETNAM AND POST-VIETNAM

On January 23, 1973 Henry Kissinger and Le Doc Tho, in an anticlimactic ceremony, initialed a document that was to bring peace to Indochina. Although this document did not bring the intended peace, it represented the United States' disengagement from Vietnam for all practical purposes. There is little doubt that this disengagement represents a major watershed in the history of the United States' international policy and for this purpose and others, it was felt that January 1973 should serve as a dividing line from which to do comparative analyses between the two periods. Inituitively, one would expect analytic differentials to emerge between the crisis goals of these two periods -- Vietnam (1966-1972) and post-Vietnam (1973-1978).[8]

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[8] The exact time periods utilized were: Vietnam Period (1 January 1966 to 23 January 1973) and post-Vietnam Period (24 Januáry to 31 December 1978). From this point onward, attention in the analysis focuses solely upon primary crisis-relevant goals.

Although the disengagement from Vietnam represents an epochal event for the United States, the actual time periods selected for the comparative analysis have additional theoretical and methodological significance:

- During the early 1970's, the Nixon administration was vigorously pursuing a detente with the Soviet Union and a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Such dynamics represent basic shifts in U.S. policy toward the major Communist states.

- Observers argue that the early 1970's for the United States represents a major policy shift from "Ideolpolitik" to "Realpolitik." The basic point here is that Vietnam left the U.S. disillusioned with anti-Communism as the driving rationale for U.S. global involvement. Whereas, before Vietnam the nation could be mobilized to stop apparent Communist agression; after Vietnam, the concern became how to avoid engagement in further overseas conflicts (Spanier, 1977: 260).

- Earlier research into U.S. crisis management used similar dividing lines (CACI, 1978c, 1976), hence a continuation of this research strategy was viewed as adding the comparability of the research with past endeavors.

- Research into Soviet crisis goals and outcomes (see Chapter 7) utilized a similar strategy by dividing its two phases using the 24th Party Congress (March 1971) as the boundary. (Hence, the two emerging periods were: January 1966 - March 1971 and April 1971 - December 1978).

- Methodologically, the chosen time periods add to interperiod comparability because 51 international crises of concern were analyzed for the Vietnam period while 49 were analyzed for the post-Vietnam period.

Tables 9 and 10 compare the changes in the relevance of U.S. policy goals and goal categories, respectively, for the two periods. As shown in Table 9, the goal of promoting/supporting non-Communist African stability had the greatest positive change between the periods (and Africa was the

TABLE 9

Changes in U.S. Crisis Primary Goals' Relevance
From Vietnam Era (1966-1972) to Post-Vietnam Era (1973-1978)[a]

Goal	Goal Category	Frequency of Goals' Relevance in Crises of the Vietnam Era (percent)	Frequency of Goals' Relevance in Crises of the Post-Vietnam era (percent)	Goals' Change in Percentage of Crises Relevant
Promote/support non-Communist African *political stability*	Africa	0	16.3	+16.3
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	15.7	26.5	+10.8
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's strengthen their military capabilities	Military-Security	5.9	16.3	+10.4
Support international economic order compatible with U.S. economic interests	Economic	3.9	14.3	+10.4
Promote better diplomatic relations with Africa	Africa	0	10.2	+10.2
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to *conflict*	Ideological	27.5	37.7	+10.2
Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	5.9	14.3	+8.4
Promote/support Middle Eastern political stability	Middle East	2.0	10.2	+8.2
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and U.S. citizens abroad	Military-Security	17.6	22.4	+4.8
Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests	Economic	5.9	10.2	+4.3
Promote the stability of international commodity prices and supplies	Economic	0	4.1	+4.1
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized European conflicts	Europe	9.8	12.2	+2.4
Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe	Europe	3.9	6.1	+2.2
Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East	Middle East	2.0	4.1	+2.1
Keep Latin America free of hostile aggression and influence	Latin America	2.0	4.1	+2.1
Promote peaceful transition of African Independence	Africa	0	2.0	+2.0
Promote democratic institutions in Latin America	Latin America	0	2.0	+2.0
Promote Latin American *political stability*	Latin America	0	2.0	+2.0
Maintain/increase military capability for "show of force" in overseas conflicts	Military-Security	11.8	12.2	+0.4
Promote normalization of relations with USSR	Communist States	9.8	10.2	+0.4
Support Western European integration	Europe	3.9	4.1	+0.2
Support the stability of non-Communist Asia	Asia	3.9	4.1	+0.2
Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	5.9	6.1	+0.2
Maintain/increase *military* capability to defend U.S. territorial integrity and possessions	Military-Security	5.9	6.1	+0.2

(Continued)

Table 9
Changes in U.S. Crisis Primary Goals' Relevance
Continued

Goal	Goal Category	Frequency of Goals' Relevance in Crises of the Vietnam Era (percent)	Frequency of Goals' Relevance in Crises of the Post-Vietnam era (percent)	Goals' Change in Percentage of Crises Relevant
Deter hostile military influence expansion	Military-Security	25.5	24.5	-1.0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13.7	12.2	-1.5
Guarantee Israeli security	Middle East	5.9	4.1	-1.8
Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states	Communist States	3.9	2.0	-1.9
Continue American economic presence in Latin America	Latin America	3.9	2.0	-1.9
Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia	Asia	2.0	0	-2.0
Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	9.8	6.1	-3.7
Reduce chances of war with PRC	Communist States	3.9	0	-3.9
Encourage "polycentrism" within the Communist world	Communist States	3.9	0	-3.9
Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan	Asia	3.9	0	-3.9
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	11.8	6.1	-5.7
Advance global welfare and human rights	Ideological	7.8	2.0	-5.8
Support democratic values and countries	Ideological	5.9	0	-5.9
Promote the normalization of relations with PRC	Communist States	5.9	0	-5.9
Improve relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe	Europe	5.9	0	-5.9
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategic LDC's	Military-Security	23.5	16.3	-7.2
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. overseas maritime interests	Military-Security	19.6	12.2	-7.4
Contain/Deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	21.6	12.2	-9.4
Promote the stability of and maintain defense forces for defending Asian allies	Asia	15.7	6.1	-9.6
Reduce chances of war with USSR	Ideological	13.7	2.0	-11.7
Support international law	Ideological	23.5	8.2	-15.3
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	29.4	8.2	-21.2

* Vietnam era Crises (1966-1972) n=51; Post-Vietnam era Crises (1973-1978) n=49

TABLE 10

Comparison of U.S. Crisis Goal Categories Between Two Time
Periods -- Vietnam Era (1966-1972) and Post-Vietnam Era (1973-1978)

Goal Category	Period I Vietnam Era (1966-1972)		Period II Post-Vietnam Era (1973-1978)		Category's Relevance (per crisis) Average Change From Period I to Period II
	Category's Relevance Frequency	Category's Relevance Average Frequency per Crisis (percent)	Category's Relevance Frequency	Category's Relevance Average Frequency per Crisis (percent)	
Military-Security	71	1.39	73	1.49	+0.10
Ideological	48	0.94	26	0.53	-0.41
Communist States (particularly USSR and PRC)	32	0.63	13	0.26	-0.37
Asia	25	0.49	8	0.16	-0.33
Europe	15	0.29	18	0.37	+0.08
Middle East	13	0.25	15	0.31	+0.06
Economic	5	0.10	14	0.29	+0.19
Latin America	3	0.06	5	0.10	+0.04
Africa	0	0.00	14	0.29	+0.29
TOTALS	212	4.15	186	3.80	-0.35

fifth ranking goal category in terms of change across the two time periods). During the Vietnam period this goal was not once relevant in U.S. crises, whereas during the post-Vietnam period it was relevant in 16.3 percent. This finding appears to mirror the international realities and policy of the United States for the years 1973-1978. For example, Table 1 in Chapter 3 suggests the interest of the U.S. in crises occurring in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Kenya, and Zaire during the later time period, whereas, during the Vietnam period nc U.S. crises involved African actors. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a new importance attributed to Africa by U.S. policy. Surely, some of this interest must be viewed as a reflection of U.S.-USSR competition in Africa (for example, Angola, Ethiopia-Somalia) but few observers would argue that Africa in 1979 holds the same status in the eyes of U.S. policy-makers that it did in 1969. The Kissinger trip to black Africa in 1976 and President Carter's 1977 trip is further evidence of a new interest in African events by the United States.

Table 9 also supports the notion that the two periods have witnessed a major U.S. policy shift from Ideolpolitik to Realpolitik. The following goals all lost relative crisis relevance from the first to the second period:

- Promote the stability of and maintain defense forces for defending Asian allies (-9.6).

- Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influences (-9.4).

- Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategic LDC's (-7.2).

- Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia (-5.7).

- Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia (-2.0).

- Deter hostile military influence expansion (-1.0).

The following goals are among those that increased in relative crisis
relevance during the post-Vietnam period:

- Assist friendly or neutral LDC's strengthen their mili-
  tary capabilities (+10.4).

- Promote normalization of relations with the USSR (+0.4).

What this seems to suggest is that during the Vietnam period the United
States was willing to directly attempt to deter Communist aggression (es-
pecially in Asia) but after disengagement from Vietnam the U.S. was rela-
tively more interested in indirectly assisting important LDC's (that is,
the Nixon Doctrine) while promoting detente with the Soviet Union. These
findings are consistent with the proposition that the U.S. has recently
become less willing to directly engage itself against Communist expansion
while it promotes detente with its superpower rivals.

Further changes that have occurred between the two time periods in
respect to U.S. policy goal crisis relevance (see Table 9 and 10) are:

- Ideological goals such as "ensure the prestige and dig-
  nity of the U.S." (-21.2) and "support international law"
  (-15.3) and the ideological goal category were the
  biggest losers as far as crisis relevance is con-
  cerned. This points to the fact that the United States
  is now much less willing to get involved in crises to
  support symbolic values and interests -- a possible conse-
  quence of U.S. experiences in Vietnam.

- Goals concerning Asia, as would be expected, have lost
  crisis relevance to a greater degree than goals con-
  cerning any other geographical region.

- The goal "reduce chances of war with the Soviet Union"
  has been much less relevant in the post-Vietnam period
  (-11.7) suggesting that the chances of war between
  the U.S. and USSR during an international crisis has
  decreased while detente between the two superpowers has
  increased.

- Economic goals have become twice as relevant to U.S. crises during the post-Vietnam period when compared to the earlier era. This differential reflects U.S. concern with major international economic dislocations that have occurred frequently since the OPEC embargo of 1973.

- The relevance of the goal categories of Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America have changed little over the two time periods suggesting few major U.S. policy drifts toward these regions at least in terms of crisis goal relevance. It should be pointed out, though, that the Middle Eastern goal of the promotion of Middle Eastern political stability has gained substantial crisis relevance (+8.2) during recent years. The most recent spectacular crisis concerning this goal was, of course, the fall of the Shah of Iran which generated substantial U.S. concern and interest.

- Finally, on an average fewer goals were found to be relevant per crisis in the post-Vietnam era when compared to the Vietnam period (4.15 to 3.80). The reason for this phenomenon is unclear, but it may signal a more narrow focusing of U.S. crisis behavior in the later time period.

Table 11 highlights additional comparisons between the Vietnam and post-Vietnam periods. Table 11 compares the "leading" factors or dimensions that have eigenvalues equal to 1.00 or greater. Hence, the table suggests that the factor analysis of the policy goals relevant for crises of the Vietnam era is a 5 factor solution (which explains 64.3 percent of the cumulative variance) while the factor analysis of the policy goals relevant for crises of the post-Vietnam era is a 7 factor solution (which explains 74.0 of the cumulative variance).

The fact that more independent dimensions were found for the post-Vietnam period (7) as compared to the former time period (5) suggests that our earlier proposition concerning a more narrow focus or purpose during the latter time period appears incorrect. On the contrary, the factor analysis of U.S. policy goals relevant during post-Vietnam crises clearly

TABLE 11

Comparison of Strongest Loaded Factors and Their Variables for the
Factor Analysis[a] of U.S. Policy Goals Across the Crises of Two Distinct Time Periods

Factor No.	Period I, 1966-1972 (Vietnam Era, n=51)			Period II, 1973-1978 (Post-Vietnam Era, n=49)		
	Factor Name	Factor Variables	Factor Loadings	Factor Name	Factor Variables	Factor Loadings
1 (strongest)	Promote International Peace Through the Containment of Communism	Contain Communism	0.84	Promote Peace and Stability in Western Europe	Support European Conflict Resolution	0.88
		Secure Allies Regime Stability	0.76		Maintain Cooperative Ties With W. Europe	0.87
		Deter Hostile Military Expansion	0.75		Promote Peace	0.48
		Reduce Chances of War with USSR	0.67		Defend Industrial Democracies	0.47
		Promote Peace	0.65			
2	Defend and Maintain Access to Strategic LDC's (especially Asian LDC's)	Defend Strategic LDC's	0.73	Support U.S. Economic Interest	Support Favorable International Economic order	0.93
		Maintain Military "Show of Force"	0.63		Support U.S. International Commercial Expansion	0.92
		Maintain Maritime Defense	0.62		Maintain Maritime Defense	0.42
		Defend Asian Allies	0.52			
3	U.S. Asian Interest	Contain Communism in Asia	0.83	Containment and U.S. Middle Eastern Interest	Promote Middle Eastern Political Stability	0.78
		Avoid Asian Conflict with USSR and PRC	0.78		Contain Communism	0.70
		Deter Hostile Military Expansion	0.44		Deter Hostile Military Expansion	0.62
					Strengthen Military of Friendly LDC's	0.50
4	U.S. Symbolic Interests	Support International Law	0.70	Defend and Maintain Access to Strategic LDC's (especially African LDC's)	Defend Strategic LDC's	0.88
		Ensure U.S. Prestige	0.68		Maintain Maritime Defense	0.55
		Defend Asian Allies	0.55		Promote Cooperation with Africa	0.44
5	Foreign Economic Defense	Defend U.S. Foreign Commercial Interests	0.83	U.S. LDC's Interests	Secure Allies' Regime Stability	0.91
		Defend Industrial Democracies	-0.57		Strengthen Military of Friendly LDC's	0.54
6	--			U.S. Relations with USSR	Promote Detente with USSR	0.91
					Promote African Political Stability	0.66
					Deter Hostile Military Expansion	0.59

(Continued)

Table 11
Comparison of Strongest Loaded Factors
Continued

	Period I, 1966-1972 (Vietnam Era, n=51)			Period II, 1973-1978 (Post-Vietnam Era, n=49)		
Factor No.	Factor Name	Factor Variables	Factor Loadings	Factor Name	Factor Variables	Factor Loadings
7	--			Foreign Economic Defense	Maintain "Show of Force"	0.70
					Defend U.S. Foreign Commercial Interests	0.54

a Varimax Rotated factor matrix limited to those goals relevant in at least 10 percent of the relevant crises.

suggests a _more_ complex U.S. international policy. Table 11, however,
presents additional evidence for the following propostions:

- There is no clear ideological goal dimension in the post-
  Vietnam era comparable to the 4th Factor found in the
  pre-1973 period. This supports the earlier contention
  that in recent years considerations of Realpolitik (as
  opposed to symbolic concerns) has become more prevalent
  in U.S. policy.

- Whereas U.S. Asian interests represented an indepen-
  dent factor for the years 1966-1972, no such phenome-
  non was found for the years 1973-1978. Again, this
  implies the relative disinterest of the United States
  in Asia after its traumatic experience in Southeast
  Asia, with this inference being, once again, subject
  to the qualification that only crises (and not all
  policy fora) are examined here.

- The second leading factor for the post-Vietnam period --
  support U.S. economic interests -- is completely absent
  from the earlier time period. This suggests that crises
  concerning economic dynamics are taking on new and im-
  portant relevance for U.S. decision-makers.

In addition to these findings which add validity to previous findings and
propositions, the data presented in Table 11 also merit the following
salient observations:

- During the Vietnam period the U.S. policy of associat-
  ing international peace with the containment of Com-
  munism is distinctly evidenced. In fact, this factor
  is the leading dimension for this period's factor
  analysis accounting for 20.7 percent of the variance
  explained by the factor analysis.

- The promotion of peace and stability in Western Europe
  is the strongest loading factor for the post-Vietnam
  period (17.6 percent variance), again suggesting that
  the partnership that became "troubled" during the
  1960's and early 1970's has recently regained its once
  prominent position in U.S. international policy, at
  least during international crises of concern to the
  U.S.

● The years 1973-1978 witness an independent crisis
  policy concern of the Middle East and especially the
  minimization of Soviet influence in that region.
  This may reflect U.S. concern that the Soviet Union
  has recently attempted to make up some of its lost
  ground in the Middle East after Sadat expelled the
  Soviets from Egypt in July 1972.

● U.S. policy concern for strategic LDC's is found to
  be relevant for both time periods, though stronger
  during the Vietnam period.

EXAMINATION OF U.S. CRISIS OUTCOMES

Our major objective in this section is to compile a "batting average" of
U.S. crisis outcomes by assessing the success-rate of the United States
in achieving its goals.

As reported in CACI (1979c), the outcome of each crisis was coded by as-
sessing the change in state of all goals relevant to a crisis both 1 year
after the crisis (short-term outcomes) and 5 years after the crisis (long-
term outcomes).[9]

Table 12 presents the raw data frequencies over the short and long term
for all goals relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined.[10]
As can be inferred from the table, outcomes were coded for the United
States over a 5-point scale[11] with scales representing:

1. Change in the goal's variable state in a direction
    highly favorable to the United States.

_____

[9] CACI (1979c) presents a comprehensive codebook that reports the kinds
of data utilized and questions asked during the outcome analysis (that is,
outcome assessment question) for each U.S. policy goal.

[10] All of the remaining analysis tables in this chapter are limited to
those primary goals that were relevant in more than 5 percent of the
crises analyzed (47 percent of the goals). Although 5 percent relevance
is an arbitrary threshhold it is theoretically justifiable in that goals
occurring with less frequency are apparently not often threatened

TABLE 12

Outcome Distribution for U.S. Policy Goals Relevant
To International Crises of Concern to the U.S., 1966-1978 (n=100)

Goal[a]	Goal Category	Frequency of Goal Relevance (percent)	Short-Term Outcome[b] (Goal's State Change)					Long-Term Outcome[c] (Goal's State Change)				
			Favorable +2	+1	No Change	Unfavorable -1	-2	Favorable +2	+1	No Change	Unfavorable -1	-2
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31	1	10	15	5	0	4	10	4	4	0
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25	1	0	13	9	2	2	5	2	4	3
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21	0	6	7	7	1	2	5	2	2	1
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	20	1	1	13	4	1	1	4	5	3	2
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20	0	4	15	1	0	0	2	7	3	0
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19	0	1	13	5	0	0	3	6	7	1
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist Countries	17	1	3	5	7	1	4	3	1	4	1
Support international law	Ideological	16	0	2	11	3	0	1	6	6	3	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16	0	1	12	3	0	0	0	10	3	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (West Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13	0	0	7	6	0	0	0	4	6	0
Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	12	1	1	9	1	0	1	1	3	3	0
Promote the stabilization of potential or resolved conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11	0	1	7	3	0	3	2	3	1	0
Promote the stability and maintain defense needed to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11	0	0	8	3	0	0	1	5	2	0
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11	0	7	3	1	0	1	2	0	1	0
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10	0	1	3	6	0	0	1	1	6	0
Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10	0	2	6	2	0	1	3	1	2	0

(Continued)

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Table 12
Outcome Distribution for U.S. Policy Goals
Continued

Goal[a]	Goal Category	Frequency of Goal Relevance (percent)	Short-Term Outcome[b] (Goal's State Change)					Long-Term Outcome[c] (Goal's State Change)				
			Favorable +2	+1	No Change	Unfavorable -1	-2	Favorable +2	+1	No Change	Unfavorable -1	-2
Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9	0	1	2	6	0	0	1	2	4	0
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9	0	0	5	4	0	0	1	1	3	1
Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interest	Economic	8	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	4	2	0
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8	0	4	4	2	0	1	7	0	0	0
Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8	1	3	4	2	1	1	0	0	2	5
Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8	0	1	3	4	0	0	0	2	2	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6	0	0	5	1	0	0	0	4	1	0
Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6	0	0	4	2	0	3	2	1	0	0
Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6	0	2	3	4	0	3	1	0	2	0
Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6	0	1	4	1	0	0	3	1	0	0
TOTALS			6	52	181	94	7	28	63	73	67	14

[a] Includes only goals empirically identified as relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined.

[b] Outcome values: (+2) major favorable change in status of the goals; (+1) moderate favorable change in the status of the goal; (-1) moderate unfavorable change in the status of the goal; (-2) major unfavorable change in the status of the goal.

[c] Long-Term outcomes not coded for the years 1976-1978, that is, where the "long-term" has yet to occur.

2. Change in the goal's variable state in a direction
   moderately favorable to the United States.

3. No significant change in the goal's variable state.

4. Change in the goal's variable state in a direction
   moderately unfavorable to the United States.

5. Change in the goal's variable state in a direction
   highly unfavorable to the United States.

Hence for example, Table 12 reports the following outcome information for
the goal "promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict" over the
short term (1 year after the crisis):

- In one instance the goal's state changed in a fashion that
  was highly favorable to the United States.

- In 10 instances the goal's state changed in a fashion
  that was moderately favorable to the United States.

- In 15 instances no short-term change was witnessed
  for the goal. (Note, however, that for cases in which
  the status quo was at least marginally acceptable to the
  U.S., this might be a satisfactory outcome from a U.S.
  vantagepoint.)

- In 5 instances the goal's state changed in a fashion
  that was moderately unfavorable to the United States.

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by crises of concern to the United States. (This is not to say, however,
that these goal are not important to general U.S. international policy.)
Moreover, goals relevant in 5 percent or less of the examined crises do
not allow us to compile a very accurate "batting" or achievement average
because of the extremely small n. For example, comparing the goal
achievement average of a goal only relevant twice and successfully
achieved once (success average of 50 percent) with a goal relevant in 36
crises and successfully achieved 17 times (success average of 47 percent)
is not very meaningful.

[11] CACI (1979c) presents a comprehensive codebook that reports the kinds
of data utilized and questions asked during the outcome analysis (that is,
outcome assessment question) for each U.S. policy goal.

● In no instance did the goal's state change in a fashion that was highly unfavorable to the United States.

From Table 12 the following conclusions can be drawn[12]:

● Only 6 goals were identified that changed in a highly favorable fashion over the short term and in each case in only one instance.

● To promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict was the goal with the highest frequency (10) of moderately favorable change over the short term.

● The goals "promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict" and "maintain/increase the military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad" were the most "stubborn" goals over the short run not changing significantly 15 times.

● "Deter hostile military expansion" changed in a moderately unfavorable way more often than any other goal over the short term (nine times). This goal was also the only goal to change over the short term in a highly unfavorable way (two times).

● The goals "promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict" and "contain/deter the expansion of Communist influences" changed more often in a highly favorable way relative to U.S. interests (4 times) than any of the other policy goals over the long term. The former goal also changed more frequently than any other in a moderately favorable way (10 times).

● "Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests" was the most stable goal over the long term, not significantly changing in 10 instances.

● Finally, the goal to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East was the most frequent goal

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[12] Obviously, outcomes are only coded for goals that are relevant to a particular crisis.

changing in a highly unfavorable way for the United States.[13]

Tables 13 and 14 take the new data frequencies presented in Table 12 and present an average outcome statistic that controls for variations in the gross frequencies of goal's crisis relevance. In other words, in Table 13 an average goal outcome was calculated by summing across all of its outcomes after each was weighted according to its assumed value (that is, +2 for highly favorable changes; +1 for moderately favorable changes; 0 for no change; -1 for moderately unfavorable change; and -2 for highly unfavorable change).[14] Therefore, if goal's outcomes change in a direction that is looked upon in a favorable way by U.S. policy-makers or that closely mirrors the national interest of the United States (as perceived and stated by U.S. policy-makers) we can assume that the goal's outcome assessment rate is increased. Tables 13 and 14 yield the following information:

- The United States' total average outcome equals -0.13 for short-term goal outcomes. This can be interpreted as meaning that for the years 1966-1978, 1 year after a crisis the chances are that the direction of change of the goals relevant to the average crisis has changed

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[13] This finding is somewhat misleading because it is, in the most part, a reflection of the Soviet influence gained immediately after the 1967 Six-Day war and neglects recent gains in U.S. influence because long-term goals were not coded for the crises occurring during the years 1976-1978 (five years had not elapsed at the time of the coding). Therefore, a number of Middle Eastern crises, including Sadat's abrogation of Soviet treaties in March of 1976, that resulted in the minimization of Soviet influence were recorded as missing data. This also explains why the total frequencies for short-term outcomes (and impacts) do not equal the total frequencies of long-term outcomes (and impacts).

[14] Hence, the short-term average outcome for the goal "promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict" was calculated:

$$\frac{[1 \times (2)] + [10 \times (1)] + [15 \times (0)] + [5 \times (-1)]}{31} = 0.23$$

In all cases the larger the average the more favorable the goal outcome for the United States. The potential range is from 2.00 to -2.00.

TABLE 13

Average Outcomes for U.S. Policy Goals Relevant to
International Crises of Concern to the U.S., 1966-1978[a] (n=100)

Goal[b]	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant	Average Outcome[c] Short-Term (1 year after)	Average Outcome[c] Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change[d] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Outcome
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31	0.23	0.64	+0.41
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25	-0.44	-0.06	+0.38
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21	-0.14	0.42	+0.56
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	20	-0.15	-0.06	+0.09
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20	0.15	-0.08	-0.23
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19	-0.21	-0.35	-0.14
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist Countries	17	-0.23	0.38	+0.61
Support international law	Ideological	16	-0.06	0.40	+0.46
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16	-0.12	-0.23	-0.11
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13	-0.46	-0.60	-0.14
Maintain/increase military "show of force"	Military-Security	12	0.17	0.00	-0.17
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11	-0.18	0.78	+0.96
Promote the stability and maintain defense need to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11	-0.27	-0.12	+0.15
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11	0.54	0.75	+0.21
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10	-0.50	-0.62	-0.12
Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10	0.00	0.43	+0.43

(Continued)

Table 13
Average Outcomes for U.S. Policy Goals
Continued

Goal[b]	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant	Average Outcome[c] Short-Term (1 year after)	Average Outcome[c] Long Term (5 years after)	Net Change[d] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Outcome
Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9	-0.55	-0.43	+0.12
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9	-0.44	-0.67	-0.23
Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interest	Economic	8	-0.75	-0.33	+0.42
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8	0.50	1.12	+0.62
Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8	0.12	-1.33	-1.45
Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8	-0.37	-0.25	+0.12
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6	-0.17	-0.20	-0.03
Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6	-0.33	1.33	+1.66
Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6	0.00	0.75	+0.75
Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6	-0.33	0.83	+1.16
		TOTALS	-0.13	0.10	+0.23

[a] Table based on data presented in Table 12.

[b] Includes only goals empirically identified as relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined.

[c] Outcome average = $\sum_{n=1}^{i}$ outcome values/number of crises.

[d] Net change = Long-term outcome average - short-term outcome average.

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TABLE 14

Average Outcomes by Category for U.S. Policy Goals
Relevant to International Crises of Concern to the U.S., 1966-1978[a]

| | | Average Outcome[b] | | Net Change |
Goal Category	Category's Average Relevance per Crisis	Short-Term (after 1 year)	Long-Term (after 5 years)	Short-Term to Long-Term Average Outcome
Military-Security	1.44	-0.10	-0.05	+0.05
Ideological	0.74	0.03	0.26	+0.23
Communist States	0.45	0.11	0.61	+0.50
Europe	0.33	-0.33	0.12	+0.45
Asia	0.33	-0.35	0.15	+0.50
Middle East	0.28	-0.04	0.00	+0.04
Economic	0.19	-0.65	-0.38	+0.26
Africa	0.14	-0.37	-0.25	+0.12
Latin America[c]	0.08	N/A	N/A	N/A

a Based on data presented in Table 12.

b Average outcome = $\sum_{n=1}^{i}$ outcome values/number of crises
number of goals in category .

The larger the average the more favorable the goal outcome for the United States.

c No Latin American category goals were found to be empirically relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined.

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in a way perceived as mildly unfavorable by U.S.
decision-makers. Put simply, the United States' goal
outcome "batting average" is not very high over the
short term. Over the long term, however, the success
rate or "batting average" of the typical goal equals
0.10 or, in other words, the chances are that the
direction of change of a particular goal (its outcome)
is likely to be perceived in a slightly
favorable way by U.S. decision-makers. This dynamic
of short-term nonachievement but long-term achieve-
ment of U.S. policy goals relevant to crises of
concern to the United States is a key finding of our
present research. The net change of the average
outcome (+0.23) suggests that international dynamics
have a tendency to occur shortly after crises that
inhibit U.S. policy goal attainment, but this is a
momentary phenomenon that is more than equalized
over the long term (5 years after the crisis). The
old cliches that "patience is a virtue" and "things
have a tendency to eventually work themselves out"
seem to be very apt for the general patterns of U.S.
policy goal outcomes. Note, however, that there is
an element of "comparing apples and oranges" here,
since all goals are weighted equally, something
which policy-makers are unlikely to do in practice.

- The goals with the two most favorable average out-
comes are "assist friendly LDC's strengthen their
military" (0.54) and "reduce chances of war with the
USSR" (0.50). The former goal has gained significant
relevance in recent years, seemingly reflecting the
operationalization of policies consistent with the
"Nixon doctrine," while the latter goal's relative
relevance has dropped off significantly since the
adoption of U.S. policies of detente toward the
Soviet Union.

- The goals with the two least favorable short-term
average outcomes for the United States are both of
the economic category -- "support orderly U.S.
foreign economic expansion" (-0.75) and "support an
international economic order compatible with U.S.
economic interests" (-0.55). Moreover, both of
these policy goals have negative average outcomes
over the long term. This negative outcome average
for economic goals is highlighted by the fact that
relative to other goal categories, the economic
realm clearly has the most negative (unfavorable)
average outcome (see Table 14). This dynamic
holds for both the short and long term. Both, how-
ever, were relevant in less than ten percent of the
crises -- an important qualification.

- The two goals with the most favorable long-term outcomes both deal with questions of U.S. conflict avoidance -- "avoid direct military confrontation with the PRC and/or USSR in Asia" (1.33) and "reduce chances of war with the USSR" (1.12). This finding most likely reflects U.S. military disengagement from Asia and attempts at the relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

- The two goals with the most unfavorable long-term outcomes are "minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influences" (-1.33)[15] and "contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia" (-0.67).

- The general goal category with the most favorable outcomes is that of Communist States. This category's short-term average equals 0.11 while its long-term average is 0.61.

- The military-security goal category, the category most frequently relevant to crises of concern to the U.S., has slightly negative outcome averages for both the short term (-0.10) and long term (-0.05). But these averages are so slight that for all practical purposes one could argue that the goals of this category on the average are fairly stable.

- The regional category with the highest or most favorable average outcome over the short term is the Middle East (-0.04). The Asian goal category has the highest long-term average (0.15).

- The African regional category clearly has the lowest average outcome among the regional categories suggesting, as many observers have argued, that U.S. African policy is fraught with ambiguity.

Table 15 summarizes some of the most interesting outcome data. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this table in conjunction with the others is that the United States experienced mixed outcomes as far as goal achievement is concerned. Whereas the U.S. scored on the average,

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[15] This finding is somewhat misleading because it is, in the most part, a reflection of the Soviet influence gained immediately after the 1967 Six-Day war and neglects recent gains in U.S. influence because long-term goals were not coded for the crises occuring during the years 1976-1978 (five years had not elapsed at the time of the coding). Therefore, a

TABLE 15[a]

Summary of Selected Data: Outcomes of U.S. Policy Goals
Relevant to International Crises of Concern to the United States, 1966-1978

Average Short-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of outcomes for entire goal set: 0.54 to -0.75)

Goals With the Most Favorable Average Outcomes	Category	Score[b]
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen military	Military-Security	0.54
Reduce chances of war with USSR	Communist States	0.50
Promote peace/conflict resolution	Ideological	0.23
Maintain "show of force" capability	Military-Security	0.17
Defend U.S. foreign commercial interests	Military-Security	0.15
Minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influence	Middle East	0.12

Goals With the Least Favorable Average Outcomes		
Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	Economic	-0.75
Support compatible international economic order	Economic	-0.55
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe	Europe	-0.50
Defend major industrial democracies	Military-Security	-0.46
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	-0.44
Contain Communism in Asia	Asia	-0.44

Average Long-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of outcomes for entire set: 1.33 to -1.33)

Goals With the Most Favorable Average Outcomes		
Avoid Asian military confrontation with USSR and/or PRC	Asia	1.33
Reduce chances of war with USSR	Communist States	1.12
Promote peace in the Middle East	Middle East	0.83
Promote European conflict stabilization	Europe	0.78
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen military	Military-Security	0.75
Promote political stability in Middle East	Middle East	0.75
Promote peace/conflict resolution	Ideological	0.64

Goals With the Least Favorable Average Outcomes		
Minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influence	Middle East	-1.33
Contain Communism in Asia	Asia	-0.67
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe	Europe	-0.62
Support compatible international economic order	Economic	-0.43
Ensure prestige of the U.S.	Ideological	-0.35
Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	Economic	-0.33

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[a] Table based on data presented in Table 13.

[b] The larger the score the more favorable the goal outcome for the United States

slightly unfavorable results over the short term, longer-term dynamics
have a tendency to more than equalize the original negative results.
Furthermore, the United States can expect goals relating to major Com-
munist states (USSR and PRC) and ideological phenomena to result on the
average in favorable outcomes, but goals relating to economics and Africa
to turn out for the worse. In conclusion, our initial observations con-
cerning the tables presented in this section suggest that in general terms
the United States is fairly successful in achieving favorable outcomes in
East-West issues. Considering that these issues have dominated U.S. in-
ternational policy since World War II (and, therefore, have become routin-
ized) this is not overly surprising. On the other hand, the United States'
goals concerned with the more complex, subtle North-South (that is, Africa)
and economic dynamics have not been favorably achieved on a very regular
basis. Rather, outcomes concerning these goals usually result in such a
way as to be perceived unfavorable by U.S. decision-makers.

Crisis Impact on U.S. Policy Goals

In addition to coding the outcomes of goals relevant to crises both over
the short and long terms, the estimated impact of the crisis on the rele-
vant goal's outcome was also coded. The impact of the crisis on a goal's
outcome is a measure of the degree to which the change in the variable
state of the goal can be directly linked to the dynamics of the crisis.
In other words, it measures the direct causal effect the particular crisis
had on the goal. Hence, a U.S. policy goal outcome which was coded 1 year
and 5 years after the crisis in which it was relevant can have a variable
state shift over these time periods that may or may not be attributed to
actual crisis events. The outcome of the policy goal does not assume any
crisis impact on it. Rather, all it assumes is that the goal was indeed
threatened or related to the reasons for U.S. crisis involvement.

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number of Middle Eastern crises, including Sadat's abrogation of Soviet
treaties in March of 1976, that resulted in the minimization of Soviet
influence were recorded as missing data. This also explains why the total
frequencies for short-term outcomes (and impacts) do not equal the total
frequencies of long-term outcomes (and impacts).

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The impact of the crisis on the outcome of the goal was coded according to the following 5-point scale[16]:

1. Very low - insignificant or nonexistent causal linkage.

2. Moderately low - weak causal linkage.

3. Moderate - moderate causal linkage with many possible exogenous factors.

4. Moderately high - strong causal linkage with several moderate exogenous factors.

5. Very high - complete (or near complete) and powerful direct causal linkage.

Table 16 attempts to answer questions about the relationships between U.S. policy goal outcomes and the impact of crises on these goals relevant to international crises of concern to the United States (1966-1978).[17]   The correlation matrix presented in the table suggests that:

- There is a moderately strong positive correlation (r=.57) between long-term (after 5 years) and short-term (after 1 year) policy goal outcomes. In other words, those goals that were significantly affected 1 year after a crisis in a particular way are also usually affected in the same way 5 years after the crisis. Hence, goals appear to change incrementally in one direction over time.

- There is also a moderately strong positive correlation (r=.78) between long-term and short-term crisis impacts on goal achievement. Hence, the odds are that goals that have been affected by a particular crisis after 1 year are likely to be affected by it 5 years after the crisis.

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[16] See CACI (1979c) for explicit coding instructions for this variable.

[17] As evidenced in Table 16 the perceived crisis threat to U.S. relevant policy goals was also coded, but for our purposes we are more interested in the relationships of impacts and outcomes.

TABLE 16

Correlation Matrix[a] of U.S. Policy Goal Threats, Outcomes, And Impacts for International Crises of Concern to the United States

Variable Number	Variable	Variable 1	Variable 2	Variable 3	Variable 4	Variable 5
1	Perceived Threat to Goal	--				
2	Short-Term Goal Outcome[b]	0.22	--			
3	Long-Term Goal Outcome	0.11[c]	0.57	--		
4	Short-Term Crisis Impact on Goal Achievement	0.45	0.21	-0.12[b]	--	
5	Long-Term Crisis Impact on Goal Achievement	0.28	0.19	0.19	0.78	--

a Pearson correlation coefficients (r)

b Outcomes and impacts are scored such that high numbers index unfavorable outcomes and high levels of impact.

c Correlations not significant at .001 level (n's): Threat (n) = 398; Short-Term Outcome (n)=398; Long-Term Outcome (n)=295; Short-Term Impact (n)=398; Long-Term Impact (n)=295.

- Finally, and most important to our present discussion, there is a weak relationship between goal outcomes and crisis impact on those goals for both short-term impacts and outcomes (r=.21) and long-term impacts and outcomes (r=.19). This important finding suggests that crises over both the short and long term have modest impact on U.S. policy goal outcomes. This relationship or correlation is positive suggesting, although weakly, that crises having a low impact on a U.S. policy goal usually result in an outcome viewed as favorable or positive by U.S. decision-makers. Likewise, crises that have a high causal impact on a U.S. policy goal usually result in an unfavorable or negative goal outcome. Obviously, these conclusions must be viewed as tentative because of weak correlation. On the other hand, this weak relationship between outcomes and impacts suggests that U.S. policy goals have "lives" of their own distinct from any major influence of crisis events. Therefore, U.S. policy goals and their successful or unsuccessful achievement are influenced by numerous noncrisis exogenous factors. To answer the question of why some policy goals are achieved while others are not requires analyses that go beyond the mere examination of U.S. crisis behavior.

Table 17 presents raw data frequencies of both short- (1 year after crisis) and long-term (5 years after the crisis) impacts on the achievement of individual U.S. policy goals. The column totals of Table 17 suggest 68 percent of the impacts over the short term were either very minor or minor while 86 percent of the long-term impacts were either very minor or minor. These findings are not surprising given the information presented in Table 17.

Of the individual goals and crisis impacts on them, Table 17 yields the following information:

- The goal to ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States had the highest frequencies of both short-term minor impacts (11) and long-term minor impacts (17).

TABLE 17

Impact of International Crises of Concern to
The United States 1966-1978 on U.S. Goal Achievement

Goal[a]	Goal Category	Percent of crises relevant	Short-Term Impact					Long-Term Impact				
			very minor or none 1	minor 2	moderate 3	strong 4	very strong 5	very minor or none 1	minor 2	moderate 3	strong 4	very strong 5
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31	8	9	6	6	0	12	4	4	2	0
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25	10	5	6	4	0	11	2	2	1	0
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21	4	8	5	3	1	8	1	2	1	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LOC's.	Military-Security	20	8	5	4	3	0	8	5	2	1	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20	8	8	4	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19	11	6	2	0	0	17	2	0	0	0
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	17	3	8	4	2	0	8	2	3	0	0
Support international law	Ideological	16	6	6	2	2	0	10	3	2	0	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16	8	5	3	1	0	10	3	0	1	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (West Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13	4	5	1	3	0	5	5	0	0	0
Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	12	7	2	2	1	0	6	1	1	0	0
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11	4	3	3	1	0	6	3	0	0	0
Promote the stability and maintain defense need to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11	7	4	0	0	0	7	1	0	0	0
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11	0	6	6	1	0	1	1	2	0	0
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10	3	5	4	0	0	5	3	0	0	0
Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10	4	3	3	0	0	4	2	1	0	0

(Continued)

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Table 17
Impact of International Crises of Concern to U.S.
Continued

Goal[a]	Goal Category	Percent of crises relevant	Short-Term Impact					Long-Term Impact				
			very minor or none 1	minor 2	moderate 3	strong 4	very strong 5	very minor or none 1	minor 2	moderate 3	strong 4	very strong 5
Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9	2	4	1	1	1	5	0	1	1	0
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9	5	4	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interest	Economic	8	2	2	1	1	0	3	0	2	1	0
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8	3	4	1	0	0	4	1	0	0	0
Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8	2	3	4	0	2	4	0	2	0	2
Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8	0	3	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6	2	3	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	0
Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6	5	1	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0
Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6	1	1	3	1	1	3	1	2	1	0
		TOTALS	117	111	70	35	4	168	44	26	4	0

a Includes only goals empirically identified as relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined.

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This suggests that the success or failure of U.S. international prestige is not very reliant on U.S. crisis behavior. Rather, such a symbolic goal is affected by numerous noncrisis exogenous factors.

- The goal most often affected by U.S. crises over both the short and long term is "promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict." This suggests, as would be expected, that the United States is often concerned with conflict escalation and resolution and that crises (being events that often threaten the peace) affect these phenomena.

Tables 18 and 19 represent calculations aimed at digesting the material presented in Table 17, first by arriving at an "average impact" by individual U.S. policy goals and then by goal categories. Once again, an "apples and oranges" problem is apparent, since goals are unlikely to be weighted equally by U.S. leaders. Because of their complexity, Table 20 summarizes the more important data. The key observations of these tables are:

- The total average short-term impact across all goals equals 2.10. This suggests that crises have a moderately weak causal influence on goal outcomes. The total average long-term impact across all goals equals 1.52 meaning that, on the average, the impact lies between a very low and weak causal impact. The net change in average impact from the short term to the long term suggests that initially weak impacts get even weaker with the passage of time.

- The three goals most affected over both the long and short term are "support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion," "promote non-Communist African political stability," and "assist friendly LDC's to strengthen their military."

- The Asian goal category is by far the category least affected by U.S. crises (average = 1.35). Moreover, the three least affected goals over the short term are all goals related to U.S. Asian interests. This clearly suggests that noncrisis exogenous variables are extremely important in any causal explanation of U.S. policy goal outcomes relative to the area.

TABLE 18[a]

Average Impact of International Crises of Concern
To the United States 1966-1978 on U.S. Goal Achievement

| Goal | Goal Category | Percent of Crises Relevant | Average Impact[b] | | Net Change Short-Term to Long-Term Average Impact |
			Short-Term (1 year after)	Long-Term (5 years after)	
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31	2.71	1.82	-0.89
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25	2.16	1.56	-0.60
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21	2.48	1.67	-0.81
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	20	2.10	1.73	-0.37
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20	1.80	1.08	-0.72
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19	1.53	1.00	-0.53
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	17	2.29	1.61	-1.13
Support international law	Ideological	16	2.00	1.47	-0.53
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16	1.75	1.23	-0.73
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (West Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13	2.23	1.50	-0.73
Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	12	2.25	1.37	-0.88
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11	2.09	1.33	-0.76
Promote the stability and maintain defense need to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11	1.36	1.12	-0.24
Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11	2.72	2.25	-0.47
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10	2.10	1.37	-0.73
Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10	1.90	1.57	-0.33
Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9	2.44	1.71	-0.19

(Continued)

Table 18
Average Impact of International Crises of Concern to U.S.
Continued

Goal	Goal Category	Percent of Crises Relevant	Average Impact[b]		Net Change Short-Term to Long-Term Average Impact
			Short-Term (1 year after)	Long-Term (5 years after)	
Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9	1.44	1.00	-0.44
Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interest	Economic	8	2.75	2.16	-0.59
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8	1.75	1.00	-0.75
Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8	2.62	1.71	-0.91
Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8	2.75	2.00	-0.75
Maintain/Increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6	1.83	1.60	-0.23
Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6	1.17	1.00	-0.17
Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6	2.50	1.50	-1.00
Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6	2.66	1.83	-0.34
		TOTALS	2.10	1.52	-0.34

[a] Table based on data presented in Table 17.

[b] Impact scores: very minor or none=1; minor=2; moderate=3; strong=4; very strong=5.

TABLE 19[a]

Average Impact by Category of International Crises of Concern to the United States 1966–1978 on U.S. Goal Achievement

Goal Category	Categories Average Relevance per Crisis	Average Impact Short-Term (1 year after)	Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change Short-Term to Long-Term Average Impact
Military-Security	1.44	2.10	1.50	-0.59
Ideological	0.74	2.08	1.46	-0.62
Communist States	0.45	2.06	1.43	-0.63
Europe	0.33	2.09	1.35	-0.74
Asia	0.33	1.35	1.07	-0.28
Middle East	0.28	2.60	1.94	-0.66
Economic	0.19	2.59	1.92	-0.67
Africa	0.14	2.75	2.00	-0.75
Latin America[b]	0.80	--	--	--

a Based on data presented in Table 16.

b No Latin American category goals were found to be empirically relevant in more than 5 percent of the crises examined

-- not applicable

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TABLE 20[a]

Summary of Selected Data: Impact of International
Crises of Concern to the United States 1966-1978 on U.S. Goal Achievement

Short-Term (1 year) Impact of Relevant Crises on U.S. Policy Goals
(Range of impact for entire goal set: 1.17 to 2.75)

Goals Most Affected	Impact[b]
Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	2.75
Promote non-Communist African political stability	2.75
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen their military	2.72
Promote peace/conflict resolution	2.71
Promote peace in the Middle East	2.66
Minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influence	2.62

Goals Least Affected	
Avoid Asian military confrontation with USSR and/or PRC	1.17
Promote defense of Asian allies	1.36
Contain Communism in Asia	1.44
Ensure the prestige of the U.S.	1.53
Defend U.S. foreign maritime interests	1.75
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	1.75

Long-Term (5 year) impact of relevant crises on U.S. Policy Goals
(Range of impact for entire goal set: 1.00 to 2.16)

Goals Most Affected	
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen their military	2.25
Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	2.16
Promote non-Communist African political stability	2.00
Promote peace in the Middle East	1.83
Promote peace/conflict resolution	1.82
Defend strategic LDC's	1.73

Goals Least Affected	
Ensure the prestige of the U.S.	1.00
Contain Communism in Asia	1.00
Reduce chances of war with the USSR	1.00
Avoid Asian military confrontation with USSR and/or PRC	1.00
Defend U.S. foreign commercial interests	1.08
Defend Asian allies	1.12

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[a] Table based on data presented in Table 18.

[a] Very minor or no impact=1; minor impact=2; moderate impact=3; major impact=4;
very major impact=5.

- U.S. goals concerning U.S. economic interests and policy desires in Africa are relatively most affected by crises to the United States.

- The four most frequently relevant goal categories -- military-security, ideological, Communist States, and Europe -- are also, with the exception of Asia, those whose goal categories were found to have the least average impact due to crises.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

The crucial difference between the approach used in this chapter and that more customarily employed in assessing the international affairs of the United States was the systemic effort expended in identifying detailed, explicit perceptions on a crisis-by-crisis basis of U.S. goals, progress made toward their achievement (outcomes), and the relative impact on the latter of each crisis as it moved toward denouement and produced causal ripples among related crises. Granting the limitations of using only unclassified sources, the research results presented in this chapter bid fair to be of more than routine practical value to policy-makers and analysts in and out of the Government. The following inferences can be drawn with respect to the crisis experience of the United States since 1966 from the data presented in this chapter:

- The methodology and sources employed appear to have provided ample information of sufficient reliability. Moreover, the consistency of findings obtained reinforces validity of the research approach and design.

- Of the categories of goals examined, military-security goals were found to have the highest frequency of crisis relevance while goals concerning U.S. policy in the Third World were least frequently relevant.

- Goals concerning U.S. relations with the major Communist states (USSR and PRC) were found to be a very relevant category to the United States' international policy

particularly goals concerned with containing the expansion of Communist influence and promoting detente with the Soviet Union.

● Only 16 U.S. policy goals (or 29 percent of the total examined) were found to be relevant in at least 10 percent of the crises analyzed.

● Five major goal clusters resulted from factor analysis of the goals relevant in at least 10 percent of the crises. These factors related to the following goal clusters (or dimensions) -- contain Communism; support industrial democracies; defend strategic LDC's and U.S. access to them; support the stability of U.S. allies; and support U.S. prestige and symbolic values.

● "Ensure U.S. prestige and dignity" was found to be the U.S. policy goal with the greatest secondary relevance to U.S. crises of concern thereby validating the apparent symbolic nature of many of the secondary goals.

● A major finding resulting from the comparative analysis of U.S. policy goals relative to the Vietnam and the post-Vietnam periods suggested that the latter period has witnessed the increased relevance of Africa as a policy interest and the apparent policy shift from direct confrontations to contain Communism to indirect containment policies and detente. Moreover, recent years have seen the United States less willing to get involved in crises concerning primarily symbolic and ideologic dynamics -- a phenomenon much more prevalent during the Vietnam time period.

● The United States' goal outcome average is not very high over the short term. Indeed, its outcome "batting average" was slightly negative. Over the long term, however, the U.S. is relatively more successful in achieving its policy goals.

● The individual U.S. policy goals with the highest achievement rates over the short term are "assist friendly LDC's strengthen their military" and "reduce the chances of war with the Soviet Union." The goals with the least favorable outcome average are both economic -- "support orderly foreign expansion of U.S. commercial interests" and "support an international economic order compatible with U.S. economic interest."

- The overall inference drawn from the outcome analysis
  was that, in general terms, the United States has been
  fairly successful in achieving favorable outcomes
  relative to goals relating to East-West issues, but
  relatively unsuccessful with goals involving North-
  South and economic dynamics.

- Finally, our research suggests that international
  crises of concern to the United States have limited
  impacts on U.S. policy goals. To thoroughly analyze
  U.S. policy goals and their relative achievement
  numerous "non-crisis" exogenous variables must be
  considered.

CHAPTER 7. SOVIET GOALS AND OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

Any analytical effort attempting to provide comprehensive coverage of
Soviet goals must face a series of basic methodological questions.

- What source or sources can and should be used to compile
  these goals?

- If Soviet sources are used, can they be believed and, if
  so, to what extent? In other words, how can a researcher
  distinguish genuine expressions of national aims from
  bombast and propaganda?

- If non-Soviet sources are used, how can one be certain
  that the identified goals are comprehensive and accurate?
  To what extent are such materials colored by ethnocentric
  bias? How can proper allowance be made for these consi-
  derations?

As remarked in Chapter 3, it was decided based on previous success to
continue applying the two-fold approach of using Soviet-source materials
to identify crises as the term is understood in the West (CACI, 1978e).
In order to remain consistent with this principle, identification of
Soviet goals had to be accomplished by screening Soviet publications.
This sidestepped the hazards associated with cultural bias, but left to
be addressed the whole problem of believability of Soviet public state-
ments.[1]

Unfortunately, Western students of Soviet affairs are far from sharing a
consensus about the credibility of openly published Soviet materials.

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[1] The Soviet sources employed are listed in Chapter 5.

The natural response of the U.S. Government to this is to validate and supplement these materials with information obtained through intelligence collection. However, with certain exceptions, this additional material must be evaluated for the truth of its content as well, which still leaves the question of what can and should be believed.

Essentially, all political systems, including the Soviet, must develop and articulate national goals if they are to function with adequate efficiency and consistency. Furthermore, all systems need to communicate some, if not all, of these goals beyond the narrow confines of the top policy-making echelon to important audiences, domestic and foreign. While it is no surprise that differences are to be noted both in the manner and emphasis of such communication -- what is said to the faithful will natur- ally differ from what is transmitted for consumption by one's foes -- a minimum of overall consistency among all goal communication can and should be expected.

With respect to the Soviet system itself, there is abundant evidence that its leadership is desirous of communicating something about its perceptions, values, and aims to audiences within the Soviet sphere of control and beyond. Evidence for the latter is the trouble and expense routinely incurred in translating, publishing, and distributing materials to foreign audiences. Of this material, some by its very nature is much more likely to be policy relevant than others. Utterances specifically attributable to Soviet leaders, particularly those promulgated in the course of conducting major public Party or government functions, stand the highest chance of including important expressions of Soviet goals. This leaves only the question of accuracy. As noted above, students of Soviet affairs are forever disputing whether what we are being told is what the Soviet leaders really believe or is it only what they would have us believe they really believe.

For the purposes of this study, it makes no significant difference whether or not we are being told the "truth," either in whole or in part. In

either event, those outside the narrow circle of Soviet policy-makers --
and this includes the great majority of the masses and lower-level
functionaries within the Soviet sphere of control and sympathizers abroad
as well as the USSR's opponents in the West and elsewhere -- are forced
to respond to Soviet pronouncements based on their best estimates as to
what is meant by what was said. Thus, if the differential between what
is said and what the Soviet leaders really had in mind is too wide, the
Soviet leadership will run a very high risk of being misunderstood in
more than one direction at once -- by friend and foe alike. To the
degree that this hazard is understood by Moscow, and it appears that they
are indeed sensitive to this issue, it serves as a real brake on a too
free exercise of creative imagination or efforts at "desinformatsiya."
Even if a major effort is mounted to mislead an audience (an excellent
example of this is the steady propaganda campaign to persuade the Soviet
people how much worse it is everywhere abroad), the task of maintaining a
"big lie" in a persuasive manner is mountainous, and feasible only if the
"big liar" has control over competing sources of information and inter-
pretation. This is, of course, impossible for the Soviets outside their
sphere of control (and not notably successful inside it).

A second reason why possible Soviet offical mendacity as regards goals
is not unmanageable is that the study team's research design includes an
extensive examination of actual Soviet crisis behavior, a highly practi-
cal means of validating or refuting any public pronouncements, however
official the source or circumstances. Moreover, in the area where "sins
of omission" were most likely (Military Goals), supplementary Western
materials were also consulted as detailed in Chapter 3.

AN EXAMINATION OF SOVIET GOALS

Table 1 shows the relative frequency with which Soviet goals drawn from
Soviet sources could be identified in international crises of concern
to the Soviet leadership from 1966 through 1978. Thus, this table could

TABLE 1

Soviet Policy Goals Relevant to International
Crises of Concern to the USSR, 1966-1978 (n=157)

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2
Support progressive and democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8
Support progressive and socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	ME/South Asia	17.8
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	ME/South Asia	11.5
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8
Defend the first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2
Maintain/enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9
Maintain ideological unity of the fraternal Communist countries	Ideology	7.6
Support/defend fraternal socialist countries against other external threats (for example, non-PRC)	Asia	7.6
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from the U.S.	Latin America	7.6
Deter/oppose China from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4
Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)	Military	6.4

(Continued)

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Table 1
Soviet Policy Goals
Continued

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to the Soviet Union	ME/South Asia	6.4
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	Third World	5.1
Secure Soviet naval access to Indian Ocean	ME/South Asia	4.5
Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states	Europe	3.8
Press the anticapitalist ideological struggle	Capitalist Countries	3.2
Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany	Europe	3.2
Contain Chinese influence among LDC's	Third World	3.2
Increase Soviet influence/prestige among African countries	Africa	3.2
Support other progressive ideologies	Ideology	2.5
Reduce chances of war with U.S. and NATO	Capitalist Countries	2.5
Contain Chinese influence among African countries	Africa	2.5
Support Marxist-Leninist ideology	Ideology	1.9
Give support to CP's in developing countries	Interparty Affairs	1.9
Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation	Europe	1.9
Increase Soviet international prestige (among LDC's)	Third World	1.9
Support economic independence of ME/South Asian countries	ME/South Asia	1.9

(Continued)

Table 1
Soviet Policy Goals
Continued

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Give support to CP's in capitalist countries	Interparty Affairs	1.9
Develop alternate transport routes to Trans-Siberian railway	Asia	1.3
Defend/support countries proclaiming intention of building socialism in Africa	Africa	1.3
Defend/support Cuba against external threats	Latin America	1.3
Maintain/restore domestic stability	Domestic	0.6
Oppose external interference in Soviet domestic affairs	Domestic	0.6
Maintain/restore stability of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union	Domestic	0.6
Increase mutually beneficial exchanges	Capitalist Countries	0.6
Support economic independence of LDC's	Third World	0.6
Deter/oppose China from military adventures against fraternal socialst countries	Asia	0.6
Support progressive governments and countries in Asia with socialist orientation	Asia	0.6
Avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S. and OAS	Latin America	0.6

[a] Because more than one goal could be identified as being relevant in a number of the crises examined, this column sums to more than 100 percent.

be said to measure the extent to which these aims were actualized on the world stage in the form of "crisis management," whether through direct Soviet initiation of crises, support rendered to ideologically compatible, non-Soviet "forces of progress," reaction to perceived threats to a desired status quo, or more or less concerned observation of events from the sidelines.[2] An initial examination of the data presented in this table revealed:

- A high degree of articulated Soviet concern with defending and supporting socialist, socialist-oriented, democratic, and progressive regimes and movements, especially in the Third World.[3]

- A picture of the role of the Soviet military as a policy tool, that is, for supporting progressive forces abroad; building up the image of the USSR as a superpower; and defending the Soviet homeland, East European buffer zone, and other appropriate fraternal socialist regimes (for example, Cuba). Of the groups of goals examined, military goals had the highest average frequency (16.8 percent).

Table 2 shows the results of subdividing the goals listed in Table 1 by type (that is, functional and geographic), by Soviet role played (direct actor/arena versus supporter of other actors), and by the nature of each goal (conservative, anti-status quo, or a combination of the two/other). Among the more interesting observations that can be made from this table are:

- The USSR presented an image of itself as being far more a direct actor in its own right than a behind-the-scenes supporter of other actors on the world stage. Of the direct-actor type goals noted, the great majority were conservative in nature, that is, preoccupied primarily with hanging onto an existing status quo (71 percent).

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[2] In the course of considering Soviet crisis perceptions and behaviors, it is important to bear in mind that the aims listed in Table 1 are also pursued in non-crisis venues.

[3] Here as elsewhere in this volume, terms like "progressive" are employed as used by the Soviets.

TABLE 2

Soviet Policy Goals Relevant to International Crises
of Concern 1966-1978 by Type and Frequency of Occurrence (n=157)

| | USSR Directly Involved (Actor/Arena) | | | | | | USSR Supports Other Actors | | | | | |
| | Conservative | | Anti-Status Quo | | Both/Other | | Conservative | | Anti-Status Quo | | Both/Other | |
	Number of Goals	Average Frequency	Number of Goals	Average Frequency	Number of Goals	Average Frequency	Number of Goals	Average Frequency	Number of Goals	Average Frequency	Number of Goals	Average Frequency
Functional Goals												
Military	2	8.3	1	24.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	26.1
Ideological	1	7.6	0	0.0	2	5.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.5
Interparty Affairs	2	7.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	1.9
Total Functional	5	7.9	1	24.8	2	5.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	8.1
Geographic Goals												
Third World	3	13.2	1	1.9	0	0.0	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
ME/South Asia	1	6.4	0	0.0	1	4.5	1	1.9	1	11.5	1	17.8
Asia	3	5.1	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6
Latin America	2	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	7.6	0	0.0
Africa	2	1.9	1	3.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	10.8
Total Third World	11	6.1	3	2.1	1	4.5	2	1.3	2	9.6	3	9.7
Capitalist Countries	1	2.5	1	3.2	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Europe	3	3.0[a]	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total West	4	2.9	1	3.2	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Domestic (USSR)	3	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	NA		NA		NA	
Grand Total	23	5.2	5	4.0	4	6.9	2	1.3	2	9.6	7	8.8

[a] Includes opposing PRC activities in Europe.

● With respect to those goals of a supportive nature,
  most of them are mixed in nature, that is, partaking
  of both defensive and offensive character (64 percent).

Table 3 shows the relative frequency of Soviet goals by category. Note
the especially high relative number of times military goals were identi-
fied as relevant in the set of crises examined. Not surprisingly, the
Third World, and especially those countries in the Middle East and South
Asia, were the most heavily represented of the various world regions.

As already implied in Table 3, there were a number of goals publicly
described by the Soviet sources examined as being of concern to them but
not identified as relevant to any of the crises analyzed. Table 4 shows
the ten Soviet goals meeting this criterion. Among the inferences that
could be drawn from this are the following:

● The great majority of these goals are incompatible with
  crisis-type events being nonconflictual in nature. The
  most likely exception to this is Soviet interest in
  undermining the legitimacy of Chinese territorial claims,
  whether against the USSR itself, Soviet friends like India
  and Vietnam, or the other major Soviet rival for influence
  in Asia, Japan.

● In no case did the USSR perceive itself to be involved in
  or concerned with international crises of a wholly economic
  nature (for example, the oil embargo of 1973).[4] This is
  not to say that the USSR has not suffered any significant
  economic crises of its own since 1966 (the disastrous crop
  year of 1975 being one well-known example). Such events,
  whatever their frequency, have been deliberately under-
  represented in the crisis database assembled due to the
  lack of reliable, comprehensive data sources, leading to
  a specific decision not to collect information on domestic
  Soviet crises. With respect to the international scene,

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[4] They were, however, most concerned with the political-military and
regional ramifications of this crisis. Also note that economics is used
in a Western sense here, which is narrower in scope than some Soviet
usages.

TABLE 3

Summary by Category of Soviet Policy Goals Relevant to
International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)[a]

Category Rank Order	Category	Frequency of Category Relevance	Average Category Relevance per Crisis
1	Military	106	0.68
2	Third World	66	0.42
2	Middle East/South Asia	66	0.42
3	Ideology	33	0.21
4	Interparty Affairs	29	0.19
5	Africa	28	0.18
6	Asia	27	0.17
7	Latin America	15	0.10
8	Europe	11	0.07
9	Capitalist Countries	10	0.06
10	Domestic Stability	3	0.02
11	Economic	0	0.00
	TOTALS	394	2.52

TABLE 4

Soviet Policy Goals Expected But Not Found Relevant to International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)

Goal	Category
Increase economic capacity of Soviet Union at rapid pace	Economic
Increase economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries	Economic
Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries	Economic
Assist economic independence of LDC's	Economic
Promote peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation with non-socialist European countries	Europe
Undermine legitimacy of China's territorial claims	Asia
Support peaceful relations with Asian countries	Asia
Support economic independence of African countries	Africa
Increase solidarity among progressive, democratic forces in Latin America	Latin America
Increase Soviet influence/prestige in Latin America	Latin America

Soviet economic concerns, like those of a more purely politico-military nature, have tended to be long-term (for example, the current crisis of capitalism, which started with the Bolshevik coup d'etat of 1917 in Petrograd and is perceived as still going on). On the tactical level, Moscow has consistently sought to avoid being affected negatively by, or being held responsible for, major economic conflict (such as the 1973 oil embargo) or the economic woes of various states, blocs, or regions (such as the ongoing North-South controversy). As the USSR continues to move away from its earlier obsession with preserving autarchy, as the finite nature of certain key raw materials or products increasingly runs afoul of rising world demand, and as pressing internal needs continue to wear away ideological blind spots among Third World leaders, however, the Soviet ability to remain safely out of the international economic fray will inevitably be seriously eroded.

In regional terms, the Asian-oriented goals of undermining the legitimacy of China's territorial claims and supporting peaceful relations with Asian nations tended not to occur -- at least not in crises. The relative quiescence of Latin American affairs since the mid-1960's (at least in terms of crisis events in which the Soviets played an active role) is reflected in the low frequencies found for the goals of increasing solidarity with progressive forces in that region and increasing Soviet prestige and influence in the theater. In the latter regard, it is important to recall that Cuba has not been subjected to any major new threats to its existence and well-being since the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, well before the mid-1960's initiation of the present survey of crisis outcomes.

In Table 5, factor analysis was applied in an attempt to identify consistent groupings of Soviet goals within and across goal categories. From this effort can be elicited several identifiable Soviet concerns:

- Supporting various progressive regimes and movements abroad,

- Defending the power and position of the USSR itself, especially within the socialist camp,

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TABLE 5

Factor Analysis[a] of Soviet Goal
Relevance to Selected Types of Cases, 1966-1978

Goal	Factor 1: Support Various Progressive Regimes, Movements Abroad	Factor 2: Maintain Soviet/ CPSU Leadership	Factor 3: Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries	Factor 4: Defend Progressive Movements, Especially in Africa	Factor 5: Defend USSR, other Socialist Countries	Factor 6: Reduce NATO/ CENTO Threat
Support progressive, socialist countries in ME/South Asia	0.84	-0.01	-0.13	-0.21	-0.01	-0.07
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	0.83	-0.05	0.09	0.18	0.10	-0.04
Defend progressive regimes/movements, socialist oriented states	0.78	-0.10	-0.08	0.46	0.08	0.02
Support progressive/democratic movements in ME/South Asia	0.77	-0.06	-0.11	-0.23	0.05	0.18
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	-0.07	0.86	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.00
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign affairs of CP's	0.15	0.79	-0.04	-0.04	-0.00	-0.07
Support Marxist-Leninist ideology	-0.17	0.77	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
Maintain ideological leadership of CPSU	-0.08	0.72	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.04
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	-0.01	-0.07	0.90	-0.01	0.07	-0.04
Defend fraternal socialist countries	-0.04	0.08	0.87	-0.04	0.06	-0.03
Support progressive socialist African regimes	-0.06	-0.12	-0.13	0.90	0.11	-0.09
Defend the first socialist state against external threats	-0.24	-0.20	-0.23	-0.42	0.56	-0.31
Encourage independence of Latin American states from U.S.	-0.11	-0.18	-0.08	-0.12	-0.80	-0.22
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	0.33	-0.17	0.16	0.12	0.46	-0.13
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	0.01	-0.10	-0.07	-0.07	0.05	0.94
Percentage variance/factor	19.7	15.6	13.6	8.3	7.2	6.7

a Varimax rotated factor matrix; only factors with eigenvalues > 1.00 are displayed.

- Preserving Communist rule wherever it has been estab-
  lished,

- Preserving progressive regimes in Africa, and

- Defending the Soviet homeland itself, both as a core
  interest in which the prestige of the Soviet armed
  forces plays an obvious role and with reference to the
  'encircling' NATO and CENTO alliances.

As can be seen from the exceptionally clear sorting (note the differences
between the loadings enclosed by rectangles and the other data in each
column), the above inferred goals sets are strongly supported statisti-
cally. Further, they are highly consistent with the data displayed in
Table 2.

Of special interest is the consistently high concern shown across all
six factors for defending the USSR from external threats. This is con-
sistent not only with the views of Soviet analysts of politico-military
affairs (for example, Grechko, 1977; Ryabov, 1976; Ovsyany, 1972; and
Byely, 1972) but also, by inference, with Western scholars such as
Holloway (1979), Larson (1978), Edmonds (1975), and Ulam (1974), a cir-
cumstance that tends to reinforce the credibility of the goal extraction
and crisis coding process used in this study.

Finally, it is interesting to note two cases of negative loading, one in
Factor 4 and one in Factor 5. This suggested that the Soviet leadership
allowed itself to become involved in African adventures, in defending
various progressive regimes and movements abroad, in trying to weaken
and/or eliminate the U.S. presence in Latin America generally only when
they felt that the Soviet homeland and buffer zone were adequately secure
from external (or internal) threat. Given the lack of a specifically
identifiable Cuban factor, the relationship revealed by the negative
loading for Factor 5 may imply definite limits to Soviet willingness to
bear risks involving either the safety of the homeland or Soviet super-
power prestige (based predominantly on the power and image of its military
establishment) for Castro's benefit. This inference must be qualified,

however, by the contextual reality that since the mid-1960's (indeed, since the resolution of the Missile Crisis in 1962) the Cuban homeland has not faced a major threat.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET GOALS BY PERIOD

Based on experience and insights derived from earlier research into Soviet crisis management (CACI, 1978e), it was felt that Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congresses once again should be used as dividing lines between succeeding phases of Soviet crisis management experience. Since only two Congresses, the 24th and the 25th, took place during the period being examined (the 23rd occurring virtually at the very beginning of the survey in March 1966), these were examined for possible analytical utility. For a variety of reasons, it was decided to divide the period into only two phases, using the 24th Congress (March 1977) as the boundary.

The early 1970's was a watershed period in a number of important respects. During these years the confluence of a series of important factors, both internal to the Soviet system and exogenous, resulted in a major altera-tion in the nature and manner of East-West relations. Among the events occurring or beginning at this time were:

- The accession to power of Willy Brandt with his new Ostpolitik,

- The ouster of the rigidly anti-Western Walter Ulbricht in East Germany,

- The series of treaties on Berlin, Polish-German bound-aries, and the like and the initiation of the processes leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- the Helsinki Accords -- and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. Although causal relations are not entirely clear, the above acts accompanied a basic shift in Soviet East-West concerns from an earlier preoccupation with European security, ter-ritorial issues, and the acquisition of international status toward a more direct interest in the state of the Soviet economy and what the West could do to alleviate its more pressing problems. To be sure, Moscow was still worried about status -- that is, about preserving its newly

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gained position as a global superpower -- and continued
to grasp at perceived opportunities, such as Angola or
Ethiopia, as they appeared, but the low level of crisis
concerns (only 5 for 1971 as compared with 30 for 1967,
the peak year for the 33-year period examined) could not
be attributed soley to an accidental coincidence of
circumstances outside Soviet control.

Tables 6 and 7 show the results of separate factor analysis of Soviet

goals for the two periods: 1966-1971 and 1971-1978. As with the data

shown in Table 5, goal sorting by loading level was gratifyingly neat.

In order to simplify comparison between the two, a separate table, Table

8, was assembled. It displays the explicit shifts in expressed Soviet

foreign policy concerns starting in about 1971. Some observations:

- There is less prominence in the second (post-1971)
  period for the aim of keeping the various Communist
  parties in line, whether in foreign policy or ideo-
  logical orthodoxy (the CP status factor slips from
  first to third in terms of relative variance).

- The Chinese threat has shifted away from the Soviet
  border (third factor, 1966-1971) to the Third World
  arena, especially Africa (second factor, 1971-1978).

- Support of progressive, democratic regimes and move-
  ments and enhancement of Soviet military and, therefore,
  superpower status, has become more important in terms
  of factor order, while defense of the USSR itself has
  declined. (Support for progressive forces is the first
  factor in 1971-1978 versus the second factor in 1966-1971;
  defense of the Soviet homeland moves from third to fifth
  in relative factor rank.)[5]

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[5] Once again, it is crucial to recall that these analyses deal with
Soviet crisis management behaviors and perceptions. On a continuing,
day to day basis, it would be hard to argue that any goal takes prece-
dence over the defense of the Soviet homeland itself. The important
point here is the relative decline of this goal's salience in crises of
concern to the Soviet Union.

TABLE 6[a]

Factor Analysis of Soviet Goals for Period I: 1966-1971

Goal	Factor 1: CPSU Status, Unity of CPs	Factor 2: Support Progressive Forces, Especially in Middle East/South Asia	Factor 3: Defend USSR, Especially versus PRC
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	0.94	-0.01	-0.03
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign affairs of CP's	0.90	0.02	-0.04
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist countries	0.79	-0.14	-0.05
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	0.78	-0.07	-0.06
Support progressive, socialist-oriented countries in ME/South Asia	-0.01	0.95	-0.05
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	-0.06	0.77	-0.11
Support progressive, democratic movements in ME/South Asia	-0.10	0.76	-0.02
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist Third World states	-0.08	0.72	-0.19
Deter, oppose PRC adventurism in Asia against USSR	-0.08	-0.11	0.92
Defend the first socialist state against external threats	-0.09	-0.12	0.91
Support, defend fraternal Asian socialist countries against threat	-0.05	-0.02	-0.05
Defend fraternal socialist countries	0.08	-0.06	-0.07
Support progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries in Africa	-0.11	-0.13	-0.23
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	-0.18	0.09	0.17
Encourage independence of Latin American states from U.S.	-0.18	-0.23	-0.29
Maintain, increase security of E. European buffer states	0.02	-0.12	-0.12
Percentage of variance/factor	21.2	17.4	11.6

(Continued)

Table 6
Factor Analysis of Soviet Goals
Continued

Goal	Factor 4: Defend Fraternal States, Especially in Asia	Factor 5: Africa, Soviet Military Prestige	Factor 6: East European Buffer
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign affairs of CP's	-0.04	-0.04	0.01
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist countries	-0.05	-0.07	0.06
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	0.13	-0.09	0.01
Support progressive, socialist-oriented countries in ME/South Asia	-0.10	-0.09	-0.02
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	0.24	0.30	-0.09
Support progressive, democratic movements in ME/South Asia	-0.09	-0.21	0.04
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist Third World states	-0.10	0.50	-0.06
Deter, oppose PRC adventurism in Asia against USSR	-0.06	0.00	-0.04
Defend the first socialist state against external threats	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03
Support, defend fraternal Asian socialist countries against threat	0.90	0.02	-0.08
Defend fraternal socialist countries	0.87	-0.02	-0.09
Support progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries in Africa	-0.21	0.80	-0.03
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	0.21	0.50	-0.13
Encourage independence of Latin American states from U.S.	-0.13	-0.45	-0.49
Maintain, increase security of E. European buffer states	-0.00	-0.16	0.88
Percentage of variance/factor	10.3	8.5	6.5

a Varimax rotated factor matrix; only factors with eigenvalues > 1.00 are displayed.

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TABLE 7

Factor Analysis of Soviet Goals for Period II: 1971-1978

Goal	Factor 1 Support Progressive states/movements	Factor 2 Contain PRC, Support Progressives in Africa	Factor 3 CPSU Ideological Leadership, Support CPS	Factor 4 Defend Fraternal Countries
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	0.83	0.08	0.21	-0.07
Support progressive, democratic movements in ME/South Asia	0.80	-0.17	0.06	-0.15
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist Third World states	0.78	0.37	0.18	-0.03
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	0.65	-0.11	0.07	0.37
Support progressive, socialist-oriented countries in ME/South Asia	0.59	-0.18	0.22	-0.13
Contain PRC influence in Africa	-0.01	0.90	-0.02	-0.04
Support progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries in Africa	-0.01	0.85	-0.06	-0.03
Contain PRC influence in Third World	-0.06	0.77	-0.01	-0.05
Support other progressive ideologies	0.25	-0.05	0.89	-0.04
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign affairs of CP's	0.14	-0.07	0.87	-0.07
Support CP's in developing countries	0.21	-0.04	0.77	-0.00
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	0.31	-0.19	-0.35	-0.21
Defend fraternal socialist countries	-0.06	-0.06	-0.04	0.93
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	-0.10	-0.06	-0.03	0.92
Defend the first socialist state against external threats	-0.05	-0.09	-0.06	-0.08
Deter, oppose PRC adventurism in Asia against USSR	-0.10	-0.05	-0.02	-0.03
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist countries	-0.11	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	-0.11	-0.05	-0.02	-0.09
Encourage independence of Latin American states from U.S.	-0.20	-0.12	0.04	-0.09
Support, defend fraternal Asian countries against threat	-0.20	-0.15	-0.03	0.21
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	-0.14	-0.08	0.07	-0.07
Percentage Variance/Factor	18.8	12.1	10.1	9.0

(Continued)

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Table 7
Factor Analysis of Soviet Goals
Continued

Goal	Factor 5 Protect USSR ESP From PRC	Factor 6 CP Unity	Factor 7 Support for Asian/ Latin American States	Factor 8 CPSU Leadership
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	-0.10	-0.09	-0.09	0.10
Support progressive, democratic movements in ME/South Asia	-0.08	-0.07	0.18	-0.14
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist Third World states	-0.14	-0.11	-0.02	-0.14
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	-0.14[a]	-0.06	-0.01	0.22
Support progressive, socialist-oriented countries in ME/South Asia	-0.02	-0.05	0.12	-0.19
Contain PRC influence in Africa	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.04
Support progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries in Africa	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.01
Contain PRC influence in Third World	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.02
Support other progressive ideologies	-0.03	-0.01	0.09	-0.04
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign affairs of CP's	-0.07	-0.04	0.14	0.24
Support CP's in developing countries	-0.04	-0.03	-0.31	-0.11
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	-0.23[a]	-0.12	0.12	-0.02
Defend fraternal socialist countries	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.00
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	-0.10	-0.07	0.10	-0.10
Defend the first socialist state against external threats	0.88	-0.05	0.06	-0.06
Deter, oppose PRC adventurism in Asia against USSR	0.86	-0.05	0.03	-0.02
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist countries	-0.06	0.88	0.04	-0.04
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	-0.06	0.88	0.04	-0.04
Encourage independence of Latin American states from U.S.	-0.15	-0.13	-0.88	-0.13
Support, defend fraternal Asian countries against threat	-0.26	-0.27	0.44	-0.37
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	-0.11	-0.01	0.10	0.90
Percentage Variance/Factor	8.3	6.9	5.7	5.0

[a] Varimax rotated factor matrix; only factors with eigenvalues > 1.00 are displayed.

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TABLE 8

Factor Analysis of Soviet Goals: 1966-1978
Comparison of Most Strongly Loaded Variables by Period

Factor No.	Period I 1966-1971	Period II 1971-1978
1 (strongest)	Unity of CP's in foreign affairs, ideology CPSU leadership in foreign affairs, ideology	Support, defend progressive/democratic forces, movements, regimes, socialist states in Third World, especially ME/So. Asia Prestige of Soviet military
2	Support progressive/democratic forces, regimes, movements in Third World, especially ME/So. Asia	Support, defend regimes, movements in Africa Contain PRC influence in Third World, especially in Africa
3	Deter PRC incursions against USSR in Asia Defend USSR	Support progressive ideologies CPSU leadership in foreign affairs Support Third World CP's Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR
4	Support, defend fraternal countries in East Europe, Asia	Defend, support fraternal socialist countries in East Europe, Third World
5	Support progressive/democratic regimes, in Africa, Third World Prestige of Soviet military Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	Defend USSR Deter PRC incursions against USSR in Asia
6	Maintain, increase security of East Europe Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	Unity of CP's in foreign affairs, ideology
7	--	Encourage Latin American independence of U.S. Defend fraternal Asian countries against threat
8	--	CPSU leadership in ideology Support, defend fraternal Asian countries against external threats

- To segregate negative loadings, all Soviet goals so
  loaded have been enclosed in rectangles. This means
  that each goal marked in such a fashion was noticeable
  for its nonrelevance to crises for which the other goals
  clustered together were identified as coincident Soviet
  concerns. The most frequent of these goals was Soviet
  interest in encouraging Latin American independence of
  the United States, once again highlighting the singular
  character of this region for Soviet policy since the
  mid-1960's, as contrasted to other Third World sectors
  such as Africa or Asia.

CRISIS OUTCOMES

At this stage in the analysis the study team was able to get noticeably
closer to "bottom line" concerns, since there are and must be real limi-
tations as to what can be learned from examination only of articulated
Soviet goals. By looking at outcomes, some notion of relative "batting
averages" can be developed.

Table 9 shows both short- and long-term outcomes of international crises
of concern to the Soviet leadership during the entire period examined
for Soviet goals identified as being relevant for at least 5 percent of
the crises examined (since these goals are apparently of the most concern
to the Soviet leadership during this period, primary attention during
outcome analysis was directed toward this smaller subset). From this
table the following inferences can be made:

- Over the short term (1 year after the crisis ended), an
  overwhelming percentage of crisis-relevant Soviet goals
  were unaffected either favorably or otherwise (83.5
  percent); however, the ratio of favorable to unfavor-
  able outcomes (40: 13) suggests that the USSR did not
  do too badly.

- Over the long term (5 years afterwards), fewer goals
  overall were relevant (246 as compared with 321), a
  logical effect of the passage of time and the expect-
  able introduction of factors other than the individual
  crises themselves (such as other, later crises). Of
  those crisis outcomes that remained relevant, however,

TABLE 9

Outcome Distribution for Soviet Policy Goals Relevant to International Crises of concern to the USSR (n=157)

Goal	Category	Frequency of Goal Applicability (percent)	Short-Term Outcomes[a] Favorable 3	2	No Change	Unfavorable 1	2	3	Long-Term Outcomes[a] Favorable 3	2	1	No Change	Unfavorable 1	2
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2	1	2	41		5			1	3	26	5	2
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1	11	2	26		4			5	13	6	6	
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8	11	4	37		2				10	19	1	
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	17.8	4		22		2		1	6	17	1		
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	11.5	1		17				1		11			
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8	1		16				2		11			
Defend first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2	1		15					8	3			
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9			14					7	6			
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9			14					5	7			
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP	Ideology	7.6	2		10						6			
Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	Asia	7.6	1	3	8				1	3	2			
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	7.6			12					1	10			
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0	1	3	6			1					1	
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4	3	2	10				1	6				
Defend fraternal socialist states (and European neutrals)	Military	6.4			5				2	4	2			
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	6.4			7				1	3			1	
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	5.1			8				1	4				
TOTALS			0	6	34	268	11	1	1	4	22	72	132	14	1

[a] Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of the crises examined.

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a distinctly smaller percent (53.7) were adjudged by
the study team to have had no appreciable effect on
the furtherance of important Soviet goals. Instead,
there is an obvious shift toward changes favorable
to Soviet interests, as evidenced by the new outcome
ratio (49: 8).

- Given the extent of Soviet concerns with maintenance
of that status quo perceived as desirable (see
statistical evidence in Table 2), it is important
to keep in mind that a significant percentage of
outcomes coded in Table 9 as "no change" may in
reality be favorable from the Soviet point of view.

The weakness of the measurements made above is that they fail to take
into account variations in how well, or how badly, these Soviet goals
were furthered. As a result, it was felt necessary to make additional
calculations allowing for differential weighting of individual goal out-
comes (essentially, values of 3, 2, and 1 were assigned to the three
levels of favorable outcomes, 0 to no change, and -1 through -3 to un-
favorable outcomes and an overall average was determined). The results
of these calculations are shown in Table 10. Given this method of compu-
tation, the higher the positive number (for example, 1.78) the more fa-
vorable the overall outcome, and vice versa (for example, -0.03).[6]

In Table 11 averages were calculated to determine how each category of
Soviet goals came out over both short and long term. Given the complexity
of this series of tables, a special summary table was compiled showing

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[6] Note that the scale used in the assessment of Soviet outcomes has seven
values (ranging from extremely high through extremely low) in contrast to
the five point scale (very high to very low) employed in Chapter 6 to
assess U.S. outcomes. The two "extreme" values were included in the Soviet
scales in the anticipation that more extreme values would be obtained for
the Soviet Union than for the United States. In the actual application of
the scales (Table 9) only 6 extreme scores were coded. While few in num-
ber, these extreme cases are displayed in Table 9 and subsequently because
of their substantive interest. On the other hand, because these six out-
comes amount to only 1 percent of the total number of outcome variables
presented in Table 9, their extremity has little practical impact on the
statistics presented.

TABLE 10

Average Outcomes for Soviet Policy Goals Relevant
To International Crises of Concern to the USSR (n=157)

Goal	Category	Frequency of Goal Applicability (percent)	Average Outcome[a] Short-Term (1 year after)	Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change[a] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Outcome
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2	-0.02	-0.11	-0.09
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1	0.17	0.47	0.30
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8	-0.03	-0.23	0.26
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	17.8	0.07	0.28	0.21
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	11.5	0.06	0.08	0.02
Support other progress regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8	0.06	0.15	0.09
Defend first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2	0.06	0.72	0.66
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9	0.00	0.54	0.54
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9	0.00	0.42	0.42
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	Ideology	7.6	0.17	0.33	0.16
Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	Asia	7.6	0.42	1.57	1.15
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	7.6	0.00	0.09	0.09
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0	0.18	1.62	1.44
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4	0.00	0.25	0.25
Defend fraternal socialist states (and European neutrals)	Military	6.4	0.80	1.78	1.70
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	6.4	0.30	1.25	1.23
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	5.1	0.00	0.86	0.86

a. Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of the crises examined.

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TABLE 11

Average Outcomes by Category for Soviet Policy Goals
Relevant to International Crises of Concern to the USSR (n=157)

Goal Category	Average Frequency of Goal Category Relevance (percent)	Average Outcome[a] Short-Term (1 year after)	Average Outcome[a] Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change[a] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Outcome
Functional				
Ideology	8.4	0.08	0.46	0.38
Interparty Affairs	7.4	0.0	0.35	0.35
Military	26.9	0.20	0.56	0.36
Economic	0.0	--	--	--
The USSR				
Domestic Stability	0.8	--	--	--
The Developed World				
Capitalist Countries	2.5	--	--	--
Europe	2.8	--	--	--
Third World				
General	16.8	-0.02	0.09	0.11
Asia	6.9	0.46	1.50	1.04
Middle East/South Asia	16.8	0.11	0.22	0.11
Africa	7.1	0.06	0.15	0.09
Latin America	3.8	0.0	0.09	0.09

a Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of crises examined.

-- not applicable

those Soviet goals that did the best and those that turned out worst from the Soviet viewpoint (see Table 12). Some of the most salient patterns include:

- Over the short term, military-type goals suffered the widest range of success with the more urgent concerns (for example, system survival and defense of the status quo) being the most successful. On the other hand, efforts to enhance Soviet military prestige or defend ideologically compatible politics farther afield were noticeable for their overall lack of success. This may simply reflect Soviet caution and/or the pecking order of acceptable risk levels. The high score for defending Communist states in Asia during 1966-1978 is an obvious reference to the events in Southeast Asia, in which the USSR played a moderately important role behind the scenes. Soviet credit for reducing the NATO/CENTO threat is somewhat more problematic, since reduction of this threat came about also from exogenous factors such as Turkey's shift of alignment as a result of the Cyprus problem.

- Over the long term, a noticeable increase in degree of favorable goal outcomes can be seen, with Soviet success in defending the status quo in East Europe, along the Soviet-Chinese border, and elsewhere in Asia accounting for the highest individual goal outcome scores. In looking at the other extreme, it would seem that Soviet policies and world events overcame short-term problems with Soviet military prestige, but that attempts to defend progressive regimes and movements in the Third World were just not panning out. Blame for this state of affairs would not seem to be as attributable to Soviet policy failures as much as to the ephemeral nature of the supported politics themselves.

CRISIS IMPACT ON SOVIET GOALS

In an effort to gain a better understanding of the relationship between Soviet goals and crisis outcomes, the study team evaluated the impact each crisis outcome had on those Soviet policy goals deemed at least

TABLE 12

Summary of Selected Outcomes of
International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)

Average Short-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of Outcomes for Entire Set: 0.80 to -0.03)

Most Favorable Average Outcomes	Category	Score[a]
Defend fraternal socialist states (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)	Military	0.80
Support, defend fraternal socialist Asian states against external threats	Asia	0.42
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	0.30
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	0.18
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	0.17
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist states	Ideology	0.17
Most favorable category goal: Asia	--	0.46

Least Favorable Average Outcomes		
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	-0.03
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Third World	Third World	-0.02
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	0.0
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	0.0
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	0.0
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	0.0
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	0.0
Least favorable category goal: Third World, general	--	-0.02

Average Long-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of Outcomes for Entire Set: 1.78 to -0.11)

Most Favorable Average Outcomes		
Defend fraternal socialist states (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)	Military	1.78
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	1.62
Support, defend fraternal socialist Asian states against external threats	Asia	1.57
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	1.25
Most favorable category goal: Asia	--	1.50

Least Favorable Average Outcomes		
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Third World	Third World	-0.11
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	0.08
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	0.09
Support other progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Africa	Africa	0.15
Least favorable category goals: Third World, general	--	0.09
Latin America	--	0.09

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[a] The larger the positive number the more favorable and vice versa.

marginally pertinent to the crisis in question. Table 13 shows the distribution over both the short and long term of such impact observations:

- The decline in crisis impact on Soviet goals over time as reflected in the increase of the percentage of goals not affected by crisis outcomes from short to long term -- 34.9 percent to 45.8 percent -- is expectable, due to the increased opportunity for the introduction of exogenous factors.

- On the other hand, the percentage of moderate or stronger outcome impacts on Soviet goals over the long term is higher than for the short term (31.2 percent versus 18.4 percent respectively). The implications of this highly interesting anomaly are not entirely clear. It may mean, for example, that when a particular crisis really pushes a Soviet goal along -- in whichever direction -- it tends to engender momentum, in which a series of other circumstances, some of which may be other crises, also participate. The causal connection among the members of this set of events and/or circumstances may be much more definite than the above statement suggests, especially in view of the fact that the coding effort upon which this conclusion is based was directed at establishing causal connections between the goals and outcomes examined.

Tables 14 and 15 present calculations aimed at digesting the material in Table 13, first by arriving at an average impact by individual Soviet policy goals and then by consolidating the latter by goal categories. Again, because of their complexity, it was necessary to summarize the more important data from each in another table (see Tables 15 and 16). Observations:

- On the whole, the impact of the crises examined on Soviet policy goals of most concern (to repeat, those identified as relevant in more than 5 percent of the crisis set) was minor (scale range: 1 = none, 2-3 = minor, 4 = moderate, 5-6 = strong, 7 = complete).

- Over the short term, Soviet goals most affected included those concerned with defense of the status quo and supporting ideologically compatible politics abroad especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Those

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TABLE 13

Impact of International Crises of Concern to the
USSR 1966-1978 On Soviet Goal Accomplishment (n=157)

Goal	Category	Frequency of Goal Applicability (percent)	Short-Term Impact[a] None 1	Minor 2	Moderate 3	4	Strong 5	6	Complete 7	Long-Term Impact[a] None 1	Minor 2	Moderate 3	4	Strong 5	6	Complete 7
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2	15	16	5	4	4	4	5	24	8	2	14			3
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1	11	11	6	3	6	2	2	17	5	4	12	1		1
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8	16	16	5	1	3	2		23	5	1	11			
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	17.8	9	8	2	3	3	1		12	7	6	3			
Support progressive democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	11.5	5	9	2	1	1	1		10	2		6			
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8	8	7	1		1			12			4	1		
Defend first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2	7	6	3	2				5	2	2	5	2		
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9	3	5	3		2			6	4	1	2	1		
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9	2	5	3	3				7	4		3			
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	Ideology	7.6	2	5	2	2				1	1	4	3			
Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	Asia	7.6	6	1	1	1	1			3	1	1	5	1		
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	7.0	1	4	5	2				3	1	1	3			
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0	11	1						3	1	1	4	1		
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4	4	2	5	2		1		1	5	1	2	1		
Defend fraternal socialist states (and European neutrals)	Military	6.4	4	1	1	1	1	1		5	1		4			
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	6.4	5	3	1	1				3	1		1			
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	5.1	2	2	2	1	2		1	5	1		1			
TOTALS			112	104	46	23	18	12	6	147	51	22	88	9		3

[a] Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of the crises examined.

TABLE 14

Average Impact of International Crises of Concern to
The USSR 1966-1978 on Soviet Goal Accomplishment (n=157)

Goal	Category	Frequency of Goal Applicability (percent)	Average Impact Short-Term (1 year after)	Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change[a] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Impact
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2	2.61	2.20	-0.41
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1	2.49	2.01	-0.48
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8	1.85	1.97	0.12
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	17.8	2.79	2.00	-0.79
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	11.5	2.22	2.00	-0.22
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8	1.77	1.94	0.17
Defend first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2	1.75	2.81	1.06
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9	2.43	2.14	-0.29
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9	2.29	1.93	-0.36
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	Ideology	7.6	2.50	2.83	0.33
Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	Asia	7.6	2.08	3.25	1.17
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	7.6	1.16	1.33	0.17
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0	2.55	3.00	0.45
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4	2.50	2.77	0.27
Defend fraternal socialist states (and European neutrals)	Military	6.4	2.70	2.30	-0.40
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	6.4	2.10	3.00	0.90
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	5.1	2.88	2.09	0.88

[a] Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of the crises examined.
Impact Scores (from Table 11): None=1, Minor=2-3, Moderate=4, Strong=5-6, Complete=7

TABLE 15

Summary of Selected Data Impact of International Crises of
Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 On Soviet Goal Accomplishment (n=157)

Soviet Goals Affected by Crises over Short Term (1 year)
(Range of impact for entire set: 1.16 to 2.88)

Goals Most Affected	Impact[a]
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	2.88
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	2.79
Defend fraternal socialist states (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)	2.70
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	2.61
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	2.55
Category goal most affected: Third World, general	2.65

Goals Least Affected

Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	1.16
Defend first socialist state against external threat	1.75
Support other progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Africa	1.77
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	1.85
Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	2.08
Category goal least affected: Latin America	1.16

Soviet Goals Affected by Crises over Long Term (5 years)
(Range of impact for entire set: 1.33 to 3.25)

Goals Most Affected

Support, defend fraternal socialist countries against external threats	3.25
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	3.00
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	3.00
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist states	2.83
Defend first socialist state against external threat	2.81
Category goal most affected: Asia	3.13

Goals Least Affected

Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	1.33
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	1.93
Support other progressive regimes, and so forth, in Africa	1.94
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	1.97
Category goal least affected: Latin America	0.66

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a None=1, Minor=2-3, Moderate=4, Strong=5-6, Complete=7

TABLE 16

Average Impact by Category of International Crises of
Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 on Soviet Goal Accomplishment (n=157)

Goal Category	Average Frequency of Goal Category Relevance (percent)	Average Impact[a] Short-Term (1 year after)	Average Impact[a] Long-Term (5 years after)	Net Change[a] Short-Term to Long-Term Average Impact
Functional				
Ideology	8.4	2.46	2.46	0.00
Interparty Affairs	7.4	2.38	2.26	0.12
Military	26.9	2.32	2.31	-0.01
Economic	0.0	--	--	--
The USSR				
Domestic Stability	0.8	--	--	--
The Developed World				
Capitalist Countries	2.5	--	--	--
Europe	2.8	--	--	--
Third World				
General	16.8	2.65	2.18	-0.47
Asia	6.9	2.30	3.13	0.83
Middle East, South Asia	16.8	2.48	2.18	-0.30
Africa	7.1	1.77	1.94	0.17
Latin America	3.8	1.16	0.66	0.50

a Includes only goals coded as relevant in at least 5 percent of the crises examined.

-- not applicable

least affected included encouraging Latin American independence from the United States, defending the Soviet homeland, supporting favored regimes and movements in Africa, and increasing the prestige of the Soviet armed forces. The problem faced in assessing the implications of the above is that the all-important question of direction of crisis outcome influence on any one goal (whether favorable or otherwise) is not specified. Thus, for instance, a minimal influence on a Soviet Latin American goal may simply reflect a lack of Soviet effort to achieve same, while a similar low level of influence on defense of the USSR may indicate a low level of perceived threat to the Soviet homeland among those crises where such a goal was at least partially relevant, and, therefore, a correspondingly low level of Soviet effort was needed to insure that this goal was met.

- Over the long term, Soviet goals most affected centered around defense of the status quo, whether territorial or ideological, suggesting that the Soviets got good long-term results in those areas that counted most. Those goals most impervious to influence through the action of international crises as they occurred during the period examined included encouraging Latin American independence of the United States, CPSU foreign policy dominance over other Communist parties, events in Africa, and the prestige of the Soviet armed forces. Once again, the lack of long-term influence may be due to a low level of Soviet effort (for example, Latin America); on the other hand, it may reflect a Soviet inability to exert leverage (for example, over other Communist parties).

CORRELATING SOVIET GOAL THREATS, OUTCOMES, AND IMPACTS

One further analytical effort was directed at seeing what useful insights could be derived from a cross-comparison among perceived threats to Soviet goals, goal outcomes, and crisis impact on goal achievement. The results of these computations are shown in Table 17. From this the following can be noted:

- The only two substantial correlations that stand out were between short- and long-term crisis impacts and outcomes. This suggests that the flow of events following the set of crises examined remained generally consistent

7-34

TABLE 17

Correlation Matrix of Soviet Goal Threats, Outcomes, and Impacts for International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)

Variable Number	Variable	Variable 1	Variable 2	Variable 3	Variable 4	Variable 5
1	Perceived Threat to Soviet Goals	--				
2	Short-Term Goal Outcomes	-0.09	--			
3	Long-Term Goal Outcomes	-0.06	0.58	--		
4	Short-Term Crisis Impact on Goal Achievement	0.18	-0.17	-0.05	--	
5	Long-Term Crisis Impact on Goal Achievement	-0.01	-0.10	-0.21	0.44	--

7-35

in direction, that is, that if things looked good to
the Soviet leaders a year after the end of a particular
crisis, they were inclined to continue to look good,
if not somewhat better, four years later.

- The only other information to be elicited from Table
17 was the modest negative correlation between short-
term goal outcomes and impacts and a similarly nega-
tive correlation between long-term goal outcomes and
impacts.[7] In ordinary terms this means that crises
*tended to have the most apparent impact on goal
achievement when the outcomes were negative*; corres-
pondingly, highly favorable crisis outcomes (from
the Soviet vantagepoint) tended to be associated with
lower relative levels of impacts. This pattern is
consistent with the common view of the USSR as a moder-
ately anti-status quo power.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analyzed the extent to which the Soviet Union achieved
its goals in the long and short term outcomes of international crises
from 1966-1978.[8]

Of the categories of goals examined, one of the most interesting was
that pertaining to the Soviet military. To reiterate the main findings:

- Military goals were the most frequent of all categories
(26.9 percent),

- The chief military concern, defense of the homeland,
was the only goal to be reflected substantially in

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[7] The negative correlation is based on the coding scales used to score
outcomes and impacts. Both were 1 to 7 scales, with the most favorable
outcome and the largest amounts of impact coded with the value of "7."

[8] In reviewing the results of the analyses, one caveat bears repetition.
This study deals with only one form of political-military activity:
crisis management. Different relative priorities and performances are
quite possible if Soviet goal achievement in other spheres of political-
military activity were to be examined.

all factors in the factor analysis of goal relevance
for the entire period,

- Military goals showed the widest dispersion of short-
  term outcomes and, over the long term, the single
  most favorable outcome, and finally,

- Military goals showed the widest dispersion of crisis
  outcome impacts on Soviet policy goals over the short
  term.

These characteristics are displayed graphically in Table 18, which supports
some additional observations:

- As already suggested, the data assembled by the study
  portray the role of the Soviet military (at least in
  the realm of goal domains) in the Soviet policy
  process. What differentiates this portrayal from
  similar statements in more traditional commentaries
  on this role (for example, Strategic Survey 1976:
  3) is that the findings in this study are based
  on a comprehensive statistical analysis of Soviet
  official pronouncements and actual crisis experience.

- As also implied, frequency of goal articulation, or
  even goal relevance to crises experienced, does not
  necessarily equate to Soviet goal priorities in an
  absolute sense. Crises are but one type of policy
  arena. Thus the ranking of the four goals shown,
  even though ordered by descending frequency of goal
  relevance to crises, does not match fundamental
  Soviet military goal priorities. These priorities
  probably would rank #3 in first place, followed by
  #4, and then by the other two in an unclear sequence.
  Assuming the accuracy of this absolute ordering, a
  glance at Table 18 reveals a much lower success
  rating for the most urgent Soviet military goal both
  in the short and the long term than might possibly
  be expected. As noted earlier, this may be due to
  a significantly lower perceived threat level to
  the Soviet homeland (as a matter of fact, most of
  the cases involving threats to the USSR were border
  clashes with the PRC, few of which were perceived
  as being potentially serious).

As a final note, one of the most intriguing research opportunities made
accessible by the database on Soviet goals, crisis involvement, and

TABLE 18

Summary of Soviet Military Policy Goals for International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)

Goal	Goal Frequency (percent)	Average Outcome[a] (Positive = Favorable)		Average Crisis Impact on Goal Accomplishment[a] (None=1; Minor=2-3)	
		Short-Term	Long-Term	Short-Term	Long-Term
1. Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	26.1 (2nd of 43)	0.17 (5th of 17)	0.47 (8th of 17)	2.49 (8th of 17)	2.01 (10th of 17)
2. Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	24.8 (3rd of 43)	-0.03 (17th of 17)	0.23 (13th of 17)	1.85 (14th of 17)	1.97 (14th of 17)
3. Defend the first socialist state against external threat	10.2 (7th of 43)	0.06 (10th of 17)	0.72 (6th of 17)	1.75 (16th of 17)	2.81 (5th of 17)
4. Defend fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)	6.4 (15th of 43)	0.80 (1st of 17)	1.78 (1st of 17)	2.70 (3rd of 17)	2.30 (7th of 17)

outcomes data assembled by this and earlier, related studies (CACI, 1978e and CACI, 1976) is the chance to get a better and more reliable understanding of those aspects of the Soviet foreign policy process where the USSR is most likely to be vulnerable. Although some basic research has been done in this area (for example, Clayberg, 1977), too little has been known about the details of Soviet concerns or outcome assessments of the multiplicity of Soviet interactions on the world stage. Now, however, many of these data, at least at the unclassified level, are available for further analysis of this crucial topic, and provided to the policy community through the outcomes module of the executive aid for crisis management.

CHAPTER 8.   COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. GOALS AND OUTCOMES

OVERVIEW

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet crisis
goals and outcomes from 1966 through 1978. The first section compares
the patterns of goals and outcomes developed separately for each super-
power in Chapters 6 and 7. It also presents some general considerations
bearing on the comparison of Soviet and U.S. crisis performances that
apply to both sections of the chapter. The second component of the
chapter moves the comparison of Soviet and American goal achievement
several steps further by relating crisis goal outcomes to the actions
pursued by the superpowers in these incidents, crisis management problems
encountered, and to their overall structures of objectives.[1]

COMPARISON OF SUPERPOWER CRISIS GOALS AND OUTCOMES

Introduction

Before any attempt is made to directly compare the crisis aims and per-
formances of the United States and the Soviet Union, some methodological
points need to be taken into account. While it is very tempting to
produce a simple quantitative score that represents the comparative per-
formances of the superpowers (U.S. Eagles, 24; Soviet Bears, 21), the
precision provided by such numbers would be illusory. Such simple

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[1] Appendix C in CACI (1979c) discusses the relationship between the data
on Soviet and U.S. goals developed in this volume and previously developed
databases dealing with the crisis objectives of both superpowers (for
example, CACI, 1978e). Put briefly, while both "goals" and "objectives"
deal with superpowers' aims during crises, the objectives tend to focus on
broader, overarching aims while the goals focus on more specific and con-
textual concerns.

comparisons cannot be made for a number of reasons. The first is that crisis management is not a simple zero-sum game, in which Soviet goal achievement always corresponds to U.S. nonachievement (and the reverse). Even when both superpowers are involved on opposite sides in the same crisis, they are quite likely to pursue different aims which are far from being simple mirror images of one another.[2] The "things" being counted, goals and their degree of achievement, are unique to each superpower, as they must be to represent the actual declaratory aims of the United States and the Soviet Union during the incidents.

A second reason why simple comparison scores cannot be produced has to do with the sets of crises themselves. In many of the 100 crises of concern to the United States from 1966-1978 the Soviet Union was not significantly concerned with the incident. The same is true for U.S. perspectives on many Soviet crises. Once again, each superpower has its own structure of concerns, reflected in the separate list of crises developed for it from either Western or Soviet sources.[3]

The final reason why simple score keeping is not possible has to do with the multiplicity of aims pursued by both superpowers during a typical crisis. The average crisis involved 2.5 Soviet goals and just under four American aims. Given multiple crisis objectives, it is highly unreasonable to presume that national leaders consistently give equal weight to each aim. While one can identify the declared aims of superpowers from open source materials, the relative weights to be assigned cannot be reliably assessed on the basis of such materials (indeed, in some cases, the weights might not be accessible short of psychotherapeutic techniques). Any system of simple, comparative crisis performance scores is, as a

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[2] One of the benefits of the detailed analyses of Soviet and U.S. goal ensembles in Chapters 4 and 5 was to illustrate the sheer "differentness" of the aims pursued by the two, quite disparate, superpowers.

[3] Focusing solely upon crises of concern to both superpowers would also not solve the problem, since any conclusions reached would generalize only to this hardly representative sample and not the entire sets of crises of concern to the superpowers since 1966.

consequence, critically flawed, since it would have to treat more and less salient aims as though they were equivalent.[4]

Crisis Goals

Table 1 lists, in decreasing order of frequency, the Soviet and U.S. goals that were found to be relevant in recent (post-1965) crises. While an almost bewildering amount of detail is presented, some general points stand out:

- There is a very broad dispersion of relevant goals across crises. In no case is any single goal relevant in even a third of either U.S. or Soviet crises. Moreover, even the moderately strong frequencies soon trail off, with a majority of goals being applicable in only 10 percent or less of the incidents.

- In the case of the United States, the first six goals are all functional (rather than regional) in character, pertaining to either military or ideological interests. In the Soviet case, the profile is more mixed, with the functional category of military affairs clearly being at the top of the heap but interspersed with a variety of regional concerns. Specifically Third World regional concerns come predominantly at the middle and bottom of the U.S. ranking.

- Homeland security is not a top ranking concern for the U.S. and is at 10.2 percent for the Soviets, reflecting the relatively stable pattern of relations that has ensued between the superpowers since the mid-1960s. While tensions have ebbed and flowed during this period, there have been few crises (the most prominent exceptions being the Jordan crisis of 1970 and the October War of 1973) that might have led to superpower-superpower conflict on a significant scale.

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[4] One final, and minor, problem is the use of a 7-point scale (with extremely high and low values) for the Soviets, in contrast to the 5-point scale employed for the U.S. Since only 1 percent of the Soviet outcomes score at either extreme, this objection could be easily overcome by collapsing values (or simply ignoring them, since so few goals are involved), were it not for the three more serious objections listed above.

TABLE 1

Comparison Between Soviet
and U.S. Policy Goals, 1966-1978

Soviet Policy Goals

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and socialist-oriented countries	Third World	31.2
Support progressive and democratic forces abroad	Military	26.1
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	24.8
Support progressive and socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	ME/South Asia	17.8
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	ME/South Asia	11.5
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	Africa	10.8
Defend the first socialist state against external threat	Military	10.2
Maintain/enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	8.9
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	8.9
Maintain ideological unity of the fraternal Communist countries	Ideology	7.6
Support/defend fraternal socialist countries against other external threats (for example, non-PRC)	Asia	7.6
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from the U.S.	Latin America	7.6
Deter/oppose China from military adventures against USSR	Asia	7.0

[a] Because more than one goal could be identified as being relevant in a number of the crises examined, this column sums to more than 100 percent.

U.S. Policy Goals

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Promote peace and peaceful resolution to conflict	Ideological	31
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	25
Help secure the regime stability of allies and friends	Military-Security	21
Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's	Military-Security	20
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and citizens abroad	Military-Security	20
Ensure the prestige and dignity of the U.S.	Ideological	19
Contain/deter the expansion of Communist influence	Communist States	17
Support international law	Ideological	16
Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. foreign maritime interests	Military-Security	16
Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe and Japan)	Military-Security	13
Maintain/increase military "show of force" capability	Military-Security	12
Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe	Europe	11
Promote the stability and maintain defense needed to protect Asian allies (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan)	Asia	11

[a] Percentages's column total does not equal 100 because more than 1 goal can be relevant per crisis.

(Continued)

Table 1
Soviet and U.S. Policy Goals
Continued

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]	Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	6.4	Assist friendly or neutral LDC's in strengthening their military capabilities for regional stability purposes	Military-Security	11
Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)	Military	6.4	Maintain strong cooperative ties with Western Europe	Europe	10
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to the Soviet Union	ME/South Asia	6.4	Promote the normalization of relations between the U.S. and USSR	Communist States	10
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	Third World	5.1	Support international economic order compatible with U.S. interests	Economic	9
Secure Soviet naval access to Indian Ocean	ME/South Asia	4.5	Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia	Asia	9
Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states	Europe	3.8	Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. foreign commercial interests	Economic	8
Press the anticapitalist ideological struggle	Capitalist Countries	3.2	Reduce chances of war with the USSR	Communist States	8
Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany	Europe	3.2	Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East	Middle East	8
Contain Chinese influence among LDC's	Third World	3.2	Promote non-Communist political stability in Africa	Africa	8
Increase Soviet influence/prestige among African countries	Africa	3.2	Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions	Military-Security	6
Support other progressive ideologies	Ideology	2.5	Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR in Asia	Asia	6
Reduce chances of war with U.S. and NATO	Capitalist Countries	2.5	Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East	Middle East	6
Contain Chinese influence among African countries	Africa	2.5	Promote political stability in the Middle East	Middle East	6
Support Marxist-Leninist ideology	Ideology	1.9	Advance global welfare and human rights	Ideological	5
Give support to CP's in developing countries	Interparty Affairs	1.9	Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe	Europe	5

(Continued)

8-5

Table 1
Soviet and U.S. Policy Goals
Continued

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation	Europe	1.9
Increase Soviet international prestige (among LDC's)	Third World	1.9
Support economic independence of ME/South Asian countries	ME/South Asia	1.9
Give support to CP's in capitalist countries	Interparty Affairs	1.9
Develop alternate transport routes to Trans-Siberian railway	Asia	1.3
Defend/support countries proclaiming intention of building socialism in Africa	Africa	1.3
Defend/support Cuba against external threats	Latin America	1.3
Maintain/restore domestic stability	Domestic	0.6
Oppose external interference in Soviet domestic affairs	Domestic	0.6
Maintain/restore stability of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union	Domestic	0.6
Increase mutually beneficial exchanges	Capitalist Countries	0.6
Support economic independence of LDC's	Third World	0.6
Deter/oppose China from military adventures against fraternal socialist countries	Asia	0.6
Support progressive governments and countries in Asia with socialist orientation	Asia	0.6
Avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S. and OAS	Latin America	0.6

Goal	Category	Frequency (percent)[a]
Guarantee Israeli security	Middle East	5
Promote better U.S. diplomatic relations with Africa	Africa	5
Promote Western European integration	Europe	4
Support the stability of other (non-U.S. allies) non-Communist Asian countries	Asia	4
Support democratic values and countries	Ideological	3
Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states	Communist States	3
Improve relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe	Europe	3
Maintain U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East	Middle East	3
Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC	Communist States	3
Continue American economic presence in Latin America	Latin America	3
Keep Latin America free of hostile aggression and influence	Latin America	3
Promote the stability of international commodity prices and supplies	Economic	2
Reduce chances or war with PRC	Communist States	2
Encourage polycentrism within the Communist world	Communist States	2
Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan	Asia	2
Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia	Asia	1
Promote democratic institutions in Latin America	Latin America	1
Promote the political stability of Latin America	Latin America	1
Promote the peaceful transition of African countries to independence	Africa	1

- Similarly, European goals do not have high frequencies
  (the highest U.S. frequency being 11 percent, the highest
  Soviet frequency, 3.8 percent), again reflecting the
  relatively stable character of interbloc relations in
  Europe during the period, at least in the domain of inter-
  national political-military crises. (This stability was,
  of course, institutionalized in the early 1970's by the
  accords on the status of Berlin).

- The economic functional category has modest salience for
  the crisis aims of the United States (highest frequency
  = 9 percent) and no apparent bearing on the crisis aims
  of the Soviet Union, suggesting that crises are not a
  common forum for the pursuit of economic aims, isolated
  from other functional or regional considerations.

A simplified picture of the frequency of crisis aims is provided in
Table 2, which shows the relative frequency of the general categories
(functional and regional) used to group the goals.

Not surprisingly, given that international political-military crises are
the object of inquiry, the military category has the highest average
salience for both superpowers. The difference in the average number of
goals relevant in Soviet (2.52) versus U.S. (3.98) crises could be at-
tributable to either of two factors: the more open character of U.S.
society, which makes the identification of goals a simpler (though far
from trivial) process or the more broadly dispersed interests of the
United States vis a vis its superpower rival. Given the types of goals
included in the set (for example, support for international law and in-
stitutions) the high relative salience of the "ideological" category
for the United States is not surprising.

Turning to the regional groupings, some additional patterns can be ob-
served:

- The higher relative salience of the Middle East/South
  Asia region for the USSR is probably attributable to
  traditional Soviet concern with events occurring on
  what it regards as part of the rimland of the Soviet
  homeland.

TABLE 2

Comparison between Soviet and U.S. Policy
Goal Categories – International Crises of Concern, 1966-1978

Category Rank Order	Category	Frequency of Category Relevance		Average Category Relevance per Crisis	
		USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.
1	Military	106	144	0.68	1.44
2	Third World	66	--	0.42	--
2	ME, So. Asia	66	28	0.42	0.28
3	Ideology	33	74	0.21	0.74
4	Interparty Affairs	29	--	0.19	--
5	Africa	28	14	0.18	0.14
6	Asia	27	33	0.17	0.33
7	Latin America	15	8	0.10	0.08
8	Europe	11	33	0.07	0.33
9	Other block states	10	45	0.06	0.45
10	Domestic stability	3	--	0.02	--
11	Economic	0	19	0.00	0.19
TOTALS		394	398	2.52	3.98

● Similarly, the higher average category relevance of the Asian theater for the U.S. is no doubt due, in large part, to American involvement in the Vietnam War during the 1960's and early 1970's.

● The relatively even average category relevances for Latin America reflect not so much Soviet activism in the region (at least in the form of traditional crisis management behaviors) as their concern for the fates of "progressive" nations and (more especially) movements in that area. Notable defeats were suffered by such movements in, among other nations, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, during the period covered by the survey.

● The disparity in the totals for the European region reflects the disparate types of goals included in each category; neither superpower saw serious challenges to the basic postwar division of that continent during the period reviewed.

● The "other bloc states" category for the U.S. reflects American attempts to deal with an increasingly multi-centric Marxist-Leninist world.

The final aspect of U.S. and Soviet goals to be examined has to do with their overall structure, as revealed through factor analysis. The factors identified for the entire time period (1966-1978) for the superpowers in Chapters 6 and 7 are:

United States	Soviet Union
1. Contain Communism	Support progressive regimes, movements abroad
2. Support industrial democracies	Soviet/CPSU leadership
3. Defend strategic LDC's and U.S. access	Defend fraternal socialist countries
4. Allied stability	Defend progressive movements, especially in Africa.
5. Symbolic goals	Defend USSR, other socialist states
6. --	Reduce NATO/CENTO threat

8-9

Several points stand out in this comparison of factors. The Soviet list leads with their concern for the fate of progressive movements and regimes abroad and the status of the USSR and the CPSU. The U.S. ranking, on the other hand, leads with the containment dimension, followed by defense of traditional allies, with LDC concerns ranking third in overall variance.

Turning to the factor analysis results for the most recent periods (the 1973-1978 post-Vietnam era for the United States and the post-1974 period since the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the USSR), other divergences are evident.

United States	Soviet Union
1. Promote peace and stability in Europe	Support progressive states/movements
2. Support U.S. economic interests	Contain PRC, support progressive movements in Africa
3. Containment and Middle East interests	CPSU leadership, support CP's
4. Defend access to LDC's, especially in Africa	Defend fraternal countries
5. U.S. LDC interests	Protect USSR, especially from PRC
6. U.S.-Soviet relations	CP unity
7. --	Support Asian, Latin American states
8. --	CPSU leadership

Once again, the differing nature of Soviet and American concerns stands out. As before, the first Soviet factor pertains to the Third World, while the priority attached by the U.S. to Europe is evident. Unique Soviet concerns with China and with issues involving Communist parties and the status of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are also evident.

Crisis Outcomes

For the reasons outlined in the chapter's introduction, it is impossible
to produce a simple "score" that reflects the relative extent to which the
United States and the Soviet Union achieved their goals during crises.
This does not mean, however, that all meaningful comparisons are ruled
out. It is well within the limits of the data to provide some more gener-
al comparisons of outcomes that are of substantive value, using both
relative rankings of outcomes and carefully qualified surveys of quantita-
tive scores. Tables 3 and 4 initiate this process by summarizing selected
outcomes for both superpowers.

Beginning with the favorable outcomes for the United States, some inter-
esting patterns emerge. Three goals tended to be achieved at high rela-
tive levels over both the short (1 year postcrisis) and long (5 years)
term:

- Assisting LDC's in strengthening themselves militarily.

- Reducing the chances of war with the Soviet Union.

- Promoting peace and peaceful resolution to conflict.

While crises are (as has been noted throughout the analysis) only one of
the fora in which superpowers pursue their goals, the consistency of
these successful outcomes with the overall structure of U.S. policy since
the mid-1960's is, nevertheless, striking. The first aim relates directly
to the Nixon-Ford "Doctrine" (subsequently implemented as well by the
Carter Administration) of assisting friendly Third World states in order
to let them meet threats on their own to the maximum extent feasible. The
objective of reducing changes of conflict with the Soviet Union ties
directly to the policy of detente followed by the U.S. during the period.
Similarly, the aim of promoting peace and peaceful resolution to conflicts
corresponds very neatly with the common picture of the United States

TABLE 3

Summary of Selected Outcomes of
International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978 (n=157)

Average Short-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of Outcomes for Entire Set: 0.80 to -0.03)

Most Favorable Average Outcomes	Category	Score[a]
Defend fraternal socialist states (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)	Military	0.80
Support, defend fraternal socialist Asian states against external threats	Asia	0.42
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	0.30
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	0.18
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	Military	0.17
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal Communist states	Ideology	0.17
Most favorable category goal: Asia	--	0.46

Least Favorable Average Outcomes

	Category	Score
Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces	Military	-0.03
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Third World	Third World	-0.02
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of CPSU	Ideology	0.0
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	Interparty Affairs	0.0
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	0.0
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	Interparty Affairs	0.0
Defend fraternal socialist states in Third World	Third World	0.0
Least favorable category goal: Third World, general	--	-0.02

Average Long-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of Outcomes for Entire Set: 1.78 to -0.11)

Most Favorable Average Outcomes

	Category	Score
Defend fraternal socialist states (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)	Military	1.78
Deter, oppose PRC from military adventures against USSR	Asia	1.62
Support, defend fraternal socialist Asian states against external threats	Asia	1.57
Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to USSR	Middle East/South Asia	1.25
Most favorable category goal: Asia	--	1.50

Least Favorable Average Outcomes

	Category	Score
Defend progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Third World	Third World	-0.11
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East/South Asia	Middle East/South Asia	0.08
Encourage independence of Latin American countries from U.S.	Latin America	0.09
Support other progressive regimes, movements, and so forth, in Africa	Africa	0.15
Least favorable category goals: Third World, general	--	0.09
Latin America	--	0.09

[a] The larger the positive number the more favorable and vice versa.

TABLE 4[a]

Summary of Selected Data: Outcomes of U.S. Policy Goals
Relevant to International Crises of Concern to the United States, 1966-1978

Average Short-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of outcomes for entire goal set: 0.54 to -0.75)

Goals With the Most Favorable Average Outcomes	Category	Score[b]
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen military	Military-Security	0.54
Reduce chances of war with USSR	Communist States	0.50
Promote peace/conflict resolution	Ideological	0.23
Maintain "show of force" capability	Military-Security	0.17
Defend U.S. foreign commercial interests	Military-Security	0.15
Minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influence	Middle East	0.12

Goals With the Least Favorable Average Outcomes

Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	Economic	-0.75
Support compatible international economic order	Economic	-0.55
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe	Europe	-0.50
Defend major industrial democracies	Military-Security	-0.46
Deter hostile military expansion	Military-Security	-0.44
Contain Communism in Asia	Asia	-0.44

Average Long-Term Crisis Outcomes
(Range of outcomes for entire set: 1.33 to -1.33)

Goals With the Most Favorable Average Outcomes

Avoid Asian military confrontation with USSR and/or PRC	Asia	1.33
Reduce chances of war with USSR	Communist States	1.12
Promote peace in the Middle East	Middle East	0.83
Promote European conflict stabilization	Europe	0.78
Assist friendly LDC's strengthen military	Military-Security	0.75
Promote political stability in Middle East	Middle East	0.75
Promote peace/conflict resolution	Ideological	0.64

Goals With the Least Favorable Average Outcomes

Minimize Soviet Middle Eastern influence	Middle East	-1.33
Contain Communism in Asia	Asia	-0.67
Maintain strong cooperative ties with Europe	Europe	-0.62
Support compatible international economic order	Economic	-0.43
Ensure prestige of the U.S.	Ideological	-0.35
Support orderly U.S. foreign economic expansion	Economic	-0.33

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[a] Table based on data presented in Table 13.

[b] The larger the score the more favorable the goal outcome for the United States

as a nation that attempts to maintain a stable, conflict free world order
(Barnet, 1973) and which endeavors to settle conflicts once they do occur.

U.S. outcomes that stand out (in relative terms) over the short term
alone include maintaining show of force capabilities, promotion of U.S.
commercial interests, and minimizing Soviet influence in the Middle East.
The absence of a longer-term impact of comparable magnitude for the com-
mercial factor may reflect nothing more than that crises are not one of
the major fora in which such interests are pursued. The absence of a
longer-term outcome of similar positive magnitude for the aim of lim-
iting Soviet influence in the Middle East is in part artifactual; the
"long term" has not yet occurred following apparently successful U.S.
initiatives in the region during the mid- to late 1970's.

Over the longer term, the United States was successful in avoiding Asian
conflicts with either the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union,
in stabilizing conflicts within Europe, and in promoting political stabil-
ity in the Middle East. Each of these longer-term outcomes corresponds
with other trends (detente with the USSR, the series of accords on the
status of Berlin and other issues in Europe, and the process of negotia-
tions following from the October War of 1973) that, no doubt, reinforced
the outcome in addition to the impact of the crises in question themselves.

The most favorable outcomes for the Soviet Union also present interpret-
able patterns. Over both the long and short term the USSR was successful
in defending fraternal states, (for example, those in Eastern Europe), in
assisting its Asian Marxist-Leninist allies (principally the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam), and in reducing what it saw as a NATO/CENTO threat.
European relations between the WTO and NATO substantially stabilized
during the period since the mid-1960's, while CENTO's problems related to
events in such nations as Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey and not necessarily to
Soviet policy actions. Finally, the Soviets were successful (from their
own vantagepoint) in deterring the threat posed by China to the Soviet
homeland, some minor border incidents notwithstanding.

Goals realized over the short term but which did not have extremely high
outcomes (in a relative sense) over the longer term included supporting
progressive/democratic forces abroad and promoting the ideological unity
of the Marxist-Leninist world. The short-term character of the former
probably is due to the nature of many of these regimes themselves as much
as Soviet actions (or inactions) during crises; authoritarian regimes in
the Third World do not have notoriously long half-lives. Ideological
unity has been an evasive objective of Soviet policy during the period
since the mid-1960's. Polycentricism within the Communist world has proven
to be a powerful long-term tendency.

Comparison of the favorable outcomes for the United States and the Soviet
Union brings out the disparateness of their concerns. While crises are
but one arena in which international policy is pursued, the patterns of
outcomes found for both superpowers correspond relatively neatly to
broader trends in international affairs during the period since the mid-
1960's. In the U.S. case, core concerns of detente, strengthening the
military capabilities of friendly or neutral Third World states, and
promotion of peace and peaceful resolution to conflict stand out. The
Soviets, on the other hand, reflect a different set of concerns in-
volving the fraternal states, the DRV, and events on their borders, in-
cluding the containment of China. The superpowers' greatest relative
successes tended to occur in different domains of policy. Relative vic-
tory for one was not necessarily associated with a corresponding loss
for the other.

Turning to the least favorable outcomes for the United States, three con-
cerns stand out over both the short and long term: promotion of economic
orders compatible with U.S. interests, maintenance of ties with European
states, and containment of Communism in Asia. The first may reflect
nothing more than the fact that most commercial interests are promoted
through noncrisis arenas and, to the extent that the goal becomes
salient within a crisis context, that it is in serious jeopardy. The re-

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lations with European states variable does not pertain to core national
security/stability of Europe issues but rather to intra-allied tensions.
The third outcome is the most easily interpretable; it is due to the
victory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its war with the Re-
public of Vietnam and coincident victories by Marxist-Leninist forces
in Laos and Cambodia.

Over the short term alone, relatively high negative outcomes tended to be
associated with one economic aim (foreign expansion of economic interests),
whose negative value may have the same explanation as that proposed for
promotion of economic orders above, and the defense of major industrial
democracies. (Note, however, that the outcome for the latter over the
longer term was not as negative, in relative terms, and that, even more
critically, the variable indexes the capacity to defend these states,
rather than their actual defense. Given the expansion of Soviet military
capabilities since the mid-1960's, this outcome is not altogether sur-
prising, nor due primarily (in all likelihood) to the few crises in which
this goal was relevant.)

Negative outcomes occuring over the long term included matters of prestige
and the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. As noted pre-
viously (in discussing the successful attainment of this aim over the
short term), this is an artifactual result. Because less than 5 years
have elapsed following some of the crises occurring in this theater, more
recent U.S. policies' outcomes are not completely represented.

Turning to the negative outcomes for the Soviets, it can be seen that over
both the short and long term, outcomes pertaining to the defense of pro-
gressive movements and nations in the Third World tend to predominate,
particularly in Latin America. Here the outcomes are, no doubt, affected by
the same short half-lives of many of these regimes, over and above the in-
fluence afforded by any Soviet crisis actions involving them. Over the
short term, the goals of enhancing the prestige of the Soviet armed forces

and of the CPSU's leadership (in both ideology and foreign policy) stand
out negatively, in relative terms.

Comparison of the worst outcomes for the two superpowers produces con-
clusions similar to those generated by the comparison of the most favor-
able results. In each case, the Soviet and U.S. outcomes are far from
being mirror images of one another. Instead, each has its own character-
istic domains of relative successes and failures. Looking at the negative
outcomes, in the U.S. case the fall of the Saigon regime, difficulties
with allied relations, and economic factors tended to predominate among
the negative outcomes. In the Soviet case, the problems encountered by
Soviet-favored regimes and movements in the Third World[5] and special ideo-
logical status problems involving the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
tend to stand out.

Table 5 completes the comparison of outcomes by presenting the average
outcomes for each of the major categories of superpower goals (functional
and regional). As before, simple score to score comparisons are not
possible. Instead, attention needs to be directed at general patterns.

Over the short term, the U.S. tended to have the greatest relative success
in the Communist states, ideological/symbolic, Middle East-South Asia, and
military categories. The Soviets tended to have the highest relative out-
comes in the military, Asian, and Middle East-South Asian categories.
Over the longer term, the "best" U.S. categories were those pertaining to
Communist states, Europe (with a dramatic increase in this category), and
Asia. The long term "leaders" for the Soviets were the military, ideo-
logical, and Asian sets.

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[5] It should be noted that the Soviet Union's interest in the fate of pro-
gressive movements and regimes in the Third World span the gamut of out-
comes, falling into both the most favorable and least favorable categories.
This apparent disparity is due to the nature of the varialbes being coded.
From a Soviet vantagepoint, the best results in the Third World have oc-
curred in the military domain. Western states are, for example, much less
prone to engage in direct military interventions than they were in the pre-
1966 period. At the same many of the regimes favored by the Soviets have
fallen, often for a host of reasons not necessarily linked to Soviet crisis
actions (or inactions).

TABLE 5

Crisis Outcomes by Category

Category	Average Category Relevance per Crisis		Short Term (1 year after)		Long Term (5 years after)		Net Change Short Term to Long Term Average Outcome	
	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.
Military	0.68	1.44	0.20	-0.10	0.56	-0.05	0.36	0.05
Third World	0.42	—	-0.02	—	0.09	—	0.11	—
Middle East, South Asia	0.42	0.28	0.11	-0.04	0.22	0.00	0.11	0.04
Ideology	0.21	0.74	0.08	0.03	0.46	0.26	0.38	0.23
Interparty Affairs	0.19	—	0.00	—	0.35	—	0.35	—
Africa	0.18	0.14	0.06	-0.37	0.15	-0.25	0.09	0.12
Asia	0.17	0.33	0.46	-0.35	1.50	0.15	1.04	0.50
Latin America	0.10	0.08	0.00	—	0.09	—	0.09	0.12
Europe	0.07	0.33	—	-0.33	—	0.12	—	0.45
Other Bloc States	0.06	0.45	—	0.11	—	0.61	—	0.50
Domestic Stability	0.02	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Economic	0.00	0.19	—	-0.65	—	-0.38	—	0.26

These aggregate patterns confirm previously identified profiles. Perhaps the most significant finding is the high relative standing of military outcomes for both superpowers. Once again, crisis management behavior is far from being a zero sum game. The short-term military goals of both superpowers tended to have highly favorable outcomes, relative to other categories of crisis aims. A second pattern of general interest is the positive signs in the net change columns. For both actors the passage of time coincided with more favorable changes bearing on crisis-relevant goals. This supports the initial analytical distinction between long- and short-term outcomes.

COMPARING U.S. AND SOVIET GOAL OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS

An important element of crisis management decision-making is understanding what actions, objectives, and problems are most likely to promote favorable and unfavorable goal outcomes in crisis environments for both the United States and Soviet Union. In this section, the actions, objectives, and problems data files developed in previous CACI DARPA-sponsored crisis research (CACI, 1978a, 1978c, 1978e, 1976) are cross-tabulated with outcomes data in an effort to identify the factors most associated with various U.S. and USSR goal outcomes. Before examining these data, a few methodological caveats need to be pointed out. In the tables to follow only the ten most frequent crisis actions, objectives, and problems, respectively, identified by previous CACI (1978a, 1978c, 1978e, 1976) research were utilized in the examination of crisis relevant goal outcomes. The utilization of this research parameter was found necessary to facilitate analysis because of the need for a minimum threshhold of information relevance and because of the sheer amount of data generated by our present research.

U.S. and Soviet Crisis Experiences: Actions

Tables 6 and 7 summarize what actions the two superpowers took most frequently in an effort to achieve their policy goals in a crisis-related

TABLE 6

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency U.S. Actions
Relative to U.S. Goals for International Crises of Concern to the U.S. 1966-1978[a]

MOST FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED U.S. ACTIONS[a]

U.S. Goals Associated With High-Frequency U.S. Actions	Number of Actions Meeting Selection Criteria[b]	Employ Diplomacy		Reaffirm Existing Commitments		Reposition Sea Forces		Provide Supplies		Reposition Air Forces		Lodge Protests	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crisis	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crisis	Average Outcome
Promote peace, conflict resolution	6	23	0.30	15	0.13	10	0.40	10	0.33	8	0.14	7	0.43
Deter military expansion of states hostile to U.S.	5	14	-0.36	11	-0.36	7	-0.14	9	-0.67	8	-0.25	--	--
Maintain ability to defend strategic LDC's	4	14	-0.07	9	0.11	--	0.00	--	--	8	0.00	--	--
Help secure stability of U.S. allies, friends	4	16	-0.13	13	-0.15	8	-0.50	11	-0.18	--	--	--	--
Strengthen military capability of friendly LDC's	3	9	0.44	7	0.71	--	--	9	0.67	--	--	--	--
Deter expansion of Communist influence	3	13	-0.15	9	-0.22	1	--	7	-0.71	1	--	1	--
Support international law, organizations	2	14	0.00	--	--	1	--	1	--	1	--	1	--
Maintain, defend industrial democracies	2	9	-0.56	9	-0.44	1	--	1	--	1	--	1	0.14

[a] Identified as being employed in seven or more crises.

[b] Only those U.S. goals were included where two or more U.S. actions were employed in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

[c] Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -2 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

TABLE 7

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency Soviet Actions
Relative to Soviet Goals for International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978

Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Actions	Number of Actions Meeting Selection Criterion[b]	MOST FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED SOVIET ACTIONS[a]							
		Employ Diplomacy		Provide Political/ Propaganda Support		Drawdown Soviet Military Equipment		Provide Supplies	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	10	33	0.18	30	0.20	29	0.21	39	-0.18
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	10	32	0.00	25	-0.40	24	0.00	24	0.00
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist oriented countries	10	39	-0.05	33	-0.09	30	0.00	33	-0.09
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	10	24	0.04	19	0.11	18	0.00	21	0.00
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	9	14	0.00	11	0.09	13	0.08	13	0.00
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	8	14	0.07	9	0.11	7	0.00	7	0.00
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	4	9	0.00	--	--	--	--	8	0.00
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	4	8	0.00	8	0.00	7	0.00	7	0.00
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	4	10	0.30	10	0.30	8	0.25	8	0.25
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	4	9	0.33	8	0.38	--	--	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries	3	9	0.44	9	0.44	7	0.57	--	--
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	2	9	0.22	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	2	12	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--
Defend first socialist state	2	10	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	2	7	0.28	--	--	--	--	--	--

(Continued)

Table 7
International Crises of Concern to USSR
Continued

| | MOST FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED SOVIET ACTIONS | | | | | | | |
| | Take No Military Action | | Lodge Protest(s) | | Support Existing Regime | | Provide Crisis-Related Military Aid | |
Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Actions	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	18	-0.06	22	0.23	29	0.21	22	0.36
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	22	0.00	23	0.00	23	0.00	17	-0.06
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist oriented countries	24	-0.04	28	-0.11	31	-0.07	27	-0.07
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	12	0.08	14	0.07	18	0.11	17	0.06
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	9	0.11	9	0.00	10	0.00	9	0.00
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	14	0.07	13	0.08	10	0.00	7	0.14
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	8	0.00	--	--	7	0.00	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	7	0.29	--	--	7	0.29	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	9	0.22	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	--	--	8	0.00	--	--	--	--
Defend first socialist state	--	--	13	0.00	--	--	--	--
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	--	--	10	0.20	--	--	--	--

(Continued)

Table 7
International Crises of Concern to USSR
Continued

MOST FREQUENTLY EMPLOYED SOVIET ACTIONS

Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Actions	Reaffirm Existing Commitment		Use of WP, CMEA to Support Political Goals	
	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	16	0.25	14	0.14
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	15	-0.07	11	-0.09
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist oriented countries	19	0.00	16	0.13
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	11	0.00	10	0.00
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	8	0.00	--	--
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	--	--	--	--
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	--	--	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries in Third World	--	--	--	--
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	--	--	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	--	--	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries	--	--	--	--
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	--	--	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	--	--	--	--
Defend first socialist state	--	--	--	--
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	--	--	--	--

a Identified as being employed in seven or more crises (during 1966-1978).

b Only those Soviet goals were included where two or more Soviet actions were employed in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

c Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -1 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

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atmosphere. In order to emphasize the more important data, a considerable
degree of selectivity has been employed (as noted above). The following
observations deserve mention:

- The United States experienced a noticeably wider degree
  of outcome fluctuation (0.71 to -0.71) than did the
  USSR (0.44 to -0.11) when relevant goals were cross-
  tabulated with high frequency crisis actions.

- For its part, the USSR resorted to a higher number of
  high-frequency actions (that is, did more things more
  often) than the U.S. Furthermore, the USSR's rough
  "batting average" of goal outcomes (that is, success
  ratio) was higher than for its superpower rival (see,
  Chapters 6 and 7). (As before, such comparisons of
  averages are only rough guides, since quite different
  goals' scores are being compared).

- Of the eight U.S. goals listed, only two were achieved
  with something approaching consistent success -- namely,
  "promote peace and conflict resolution" and "strengthen
  the military capacity of friendly LDC's." Of these, it
  is interesting to note that the overall U.S. success
  ratio for the latter goal was higher than that of any
  single Soviet outcome (recall, however, the preceding
  caveat).

- With respect to the Soviet Union, no less than nine of
  the goals listed were more or less consistently success-
  ful when cross-tabulated with actions. The most common
  patterns among these goals were the protection of the
  status quo and the support of progressive forces
  abroad.

- Of the actions examined, none proved to be invariably
  successful for the U.S. except for "lodge protest."
  In fact, in four cases -- diplomacy (2 actions), re-
  positioning sea forces, and providing supplies -- the
  record was particularly irregular.

- Moscow, on the other hand, experienced fairly consistent
  success with both diplomacy and its general military
  assistance program. Although the data in Table 8 seem
  to imply that Soviet efforts to influence a particular
  crisis by shipping arms or providing other crisis-
  related military aid led to more mixed results, this

may be more a reflection of lack of coder access to
classified crisis information than a measure of Soviet
effectiveness in responding to crisis events.

● Of special interest were those goals, both U.S. and
Soviet, which appeared to be resistant to the in-
fluence of crisis-related actions. For the U.S.,
these included maintain ability to defend strategic
Third World states and support international law
and organizations. For the USSR the percentage of
such goals was nearly identical to that of the United
States (0.25), with the more common themes including
defense of the Soviet homeland and the defense of other
Communist countries in the Third World on the one hand
and maintenance of Soviet/CPSU leadership in ideological
and foreign policy matters on the other. What is not
entirely clear are the reasons, if any, for this lack
of crisis action influence on goal outcomes. Several
possibilities present themselves, such as lack of sub-
stantial goal threat during the set of crises examined
(for example, to the safety of the Soviet homeland which
was not often perceived as challenged by the Soviets);
serious goal interest -- defined in terms of willingness
to take risks or expend major resources (for example,
maintain Soviet/CPSU leadership in ideological or foreign
policy matters); or the statistical effects of mutual
cancellation during the cross-tabulations by opposing
results among a series of pertinent crises.

U.S. and Soviet Crisis Management: Objective

By comparing broad, overall superpower aims[6] with crisis-specific outcomes
it was possible to derive some insights into the readjustment process of
fitting ideals to reality as practiced by both polities. Given much
higher occurrence of unfavorable outcomes for the U.S., this readjustment
was probably a more painful affair for the U.S. than for its major rival
(Tables 8 and 9).

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[6] Appendix C in CACI (1979c) discusses the relationship between the data
on Soviet and U.S. goals developed in this volume and previously developed
databases dealing with the crisis objectives of both superpowers (for
example, CACI, 1979e). Put briefly, while both "goals" and "objectives"
deal with superpowers' aims during crises, the objectives tend to focus on
broader, overarching aims while the goals focus on more specific and con-
textual concerns.

TABLE 8

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency U.S. Problems Relative
to U.S. Goals for International Crises of Concern to the U.S. 1966-1978

U.S. Goals Associated With High-Frequency Problems	Number of Problems Meeting Selection Criterion[b]	MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE U.S. PROBLEM CATEGORIES[a]							
		System/Procedural Constraints on Actions		System-Related Delays In Decision-Making Action		Interpersonal Decision-Making Factors		Emotional or Ideological Issues	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Promote peace, conflict resolution	10	23	0.22	19	0.26	19	0.32	15	0.00
Maintain ability to defend U.S. business interests abroad	9	13	0.22	11	0.27	9	0.22	7	0.14
Deter military expansion of states hostile to U.S.	8	19	-0.42	15	-0.33	15	-0.47	11	-0.54
Ensure prestige, dignity of U.S.	7	15	-0.20	10	-0.30	11	-0.18	9	-0.11
Maintain ability to defend strategic LDC's	7	12	-0.08	12	-0.25	10	-0.20	8	-0.25
Maintain ability to defend U.S. interests	6	12	-0.08	10	-0.20	10	-0.10	7	0.00
Support international law, organizations overseas	5	13	0.08	9	0.00	7	0.00	--	--
Maintain, defend industrial democracies	5	12	-0.50	9	-0.55	8	-0.37	7	-0.43
Help secure stability of U.S. allies, friends	5	14	-0.07	11	-0.09	9	-0.11	--	--
Deter expansion of Communist influence	4	15	-0.27	10	-0.40	10	-0.40	7	-0.43
Maintain cooperative ties with West Europe	4	10	-0.50	7	-0.43	8	-0.37	7	--
Promote conflict resolution in Europe	4	10	-0.30	7	-0.28	--	--	--	-0.28
Strengthen military capability of friendly LDC's	3	9	0.55	7	0.28	7	-0.43	--	--
Maintain ability for "show of force"	2	7	0.28	--	--	--	--	--	--

(Continued)

Table 8
International Crises of Concern to the U.S.
Continued

	MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE U.S. POLICY CATEGORIES									
	Problems in Crisis Timing		Constraints on Operations		Problems in Operating Environment		Problems in Crisis Handling		Problems in Crisis Planning	
U.S. Goals Associated With High-Frequency Problems	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Promote peace, conflict resolution	9	0.11	15	-0.13	9	0.00	13	0.08	9	-0.10
Maintain ability to defend U.S. business interests abroad	13	0.08	10	0.10	9	0.22	7	-0.14	9	0.00
Deter military expansion of states hostile to U.S.	8	0.00	8	-0.37	9	-0.33	9	-0.26	--	--
Ensure prestige, dignity of U.S.	13	-0.15	--	--	10	-0.20	--	--	7	0.00
Maintain ability to defend strategic LDC's	9	0.11	--	--	9	-0.11	8	0.12	--	--
Maintain ability to defend U.S. interests overseas	10	-0.10	--	--	8	--	7	0.00	--	--
Support international law, organizations	7	0.00	7	--	7	-0.14	--	--	--	--
Maintain, defend industrial democracies	--	--	9	-0.66	--	--	--	--	--	--
Help secure stability of U.S. allies, friends	--	--	11	-0.36	--	--	7	-0.28	--	--
Deter expansion of Communist influence	--	--	10	-0.50	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain cooperative ties with West Europe	--	--	7	-0.28	--	--	--	--	--	--
Promote conflict resolution in Europe	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Strengthen military capability of friendly LDC's	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain ability for "show of force"	9	0.33	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

a Identified as being applicable in seven or more crises (during 1966-1978).

b Only those U.S. goals were included where two or more U.S. problem categories were applicable in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

c Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -2 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

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TABLE 9

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency U.S. Objectives
Relative to U.S. Goals for International Crises of Concern to the U.S. 1966-1978

U.S. Goals Associated with High-Frequency U.S. Objectives	Number of Objectives Meeting Selection Criteria[b]	MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE U.S. OBJECTIVES[a]												
		Preserve Regime From External Threat		Protect Legal, Political Rights		Preserve, Restore, Improve Alliance		Preserve Balance of Power		Preserve Territory and/or Facilities		Protect A Military Asset		Prevent Spread of Communist Influence	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Promote peace, conflict resolution	7	15	0.26	12	0.42	15	0.40	12	0.33	9	0.33	--	--	12	0.42
Help secure stability of U.S. allies, friends	6	11	-0.27	8	-0.25	11	-0.27	9	-0.11	8	-0.12	--	--	14	-0.21
Maintain ability to defend strategic LDC's	5	8	-0.12	8	-0.37	7	0.00	--	--	9	-0.11	10	-0.30	--	--
Deter military expansion of states hostile to U.S.	4	17	-0.41	--	--	9	-0.66	8	-0.25	--	--	--	--	10	-0.70
Maintain, defend, industrial democracies	3	--	--	--	--	8	-0.50	7	-0.43	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain ability to defend U.S. interests over seas	3	--	--	11	0.00	--	--	--	--	7	0.00	10	0.00	--	--
Ensure prestige, dignity of U.S.	2	11	-0.09	14	-0.21	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	-0.12	11	--
Deter expansion of Communist influence	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	0.11	--	--	--	--	11	--

[a] Identified as being applicable in seven or more crises (during 1966-1978).

[b] Only those U.S. goals were included where two or more U.S. objectives were applicable in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

[c] Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -2 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

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- The goal outcomes for the U.S. were particularly
  unfavorable on the average when the following
  objectives were operable -- preserve regime from
  external threat or preserve, restore, improve al-
  liances. The unfavorable results concerning the
  latter goal most likely reflect the dynamics and
  aftermath surrounding French force withdrawal from
  NATO in 1966 and 1967 and the ill feelings expressed
  by some NATO members in regards to U.S. policy in
  Southeast Asia in the 1960's and early 1970's.

- A general examination of outcomes for high-frequency
  U.S. objectives (Table 8) suggests that while the U.S.
  was clearly unsuccessful in stemming its opponents'
  military expansionism and efforts to alter the balance
  of military power, it was notably effective in mini-
  mizing the use of military power by crisis actors as a
  crisis resolution tool. A number of exogenous factors
  contributed to this combination of circumstances;
  chief among these have been the Soivet determination to
  achieve equal status with the U.S. but possessing only
  one attribute -- its military -- on which it can rely
  for the purpose and a shared superpower desire to avoid
  the more hazardous types of military confrontation or
  other involvement. This is highly consistent with
  several other assessments of the Soviet world position
  and use of its military establishment (see, for example,
  Clayberg, 1977 and International Institute for Strategic
  Studies, 1976).

- As noted elsewhere, Soviet successes in crisis-related
  goal achievement tended to be concentrated in two areas:
  improving its own security and that of other, friendly
  Communist states and supporting the forces of progress
  abroad. The success record of the latter, however, was
  noticeably tempered by the poorer showing for Soviet
  interest in defending such progressive forces. This
  apparent inconsistency can be at least partly explained
  if one keeps in mind the real fragility of such "pro-
  gressive forces" -- whether pro-Soviet Third World
  regimes or movements not yet in power. Thus, if things
  had gotten to a stage where the USSR had to concern it-
  self about defending an embattled ally or client, the
  probability of a favorable outcome could not help but
  be much lower.

U.S. and Soviet Crisis Experience: Problems

Tables 10 and 11 present the results of cross-tabulating the problems most
frequently encountered by the two superpowers in trying to deal with
crises of concern (see CACI, 1978c, 1978e). Observations:

- In contrast to the comparative action and objectives
  versus outcomes data (Tables 6-9), favorable outcomes
  of crises associated with the most frequent Soviet
  problems were comparable to those for the U.S. (0.57
  versus 0.55 being the most favorable average outcome
  figures for each respectively). On the other hand,
  no such parallel is noted for unfavorable outcomes.
  This suggests that the U.S. experienced significantly
  more serious and influential problems in trying to
  achieve its foreign policy goals than did its Soviet
  counterpart, again subject to the qualification that
  quite different "things" (goals) are being compared.

- Of the types of goals least negatively affected by
  problems for the U.S., four were identifiable: maintain
  ability for show of force, support international
  law and organizations, promote peace, conflict re-
  solution, and defend U.S. business interests abroad.
  These seem to fall into the categories of low risk
  (for example, the U.S. show of force capabilities and
  international organizations) and limited U.S. influence
  (such as over the international political climate for
  conduct of trade). For the USSR, the percentage of such
  goals was expectably higher, with the least problem-
  affected goal outcomes centering on defense and security
  of the USSR and other friendly Communist countries and
  on maintenance of ideological unity. This is clearly
  a mixed bag combining low threat goals (for example, to
  the Soviet homeland), low risk Soviet successes (for
  example, support of Vietnam), and incompatible goal
  successes (ideological unity being attained at the cost
  of forfeiting much residual Soviet leadership over non-
  hostile Communist parties and regimes; see Shipler,
  1976).

- Although most of the high-frequency problems shown for
  the U.S. had mixed influence on goal-related crisis
  outcomes, constraints on operations followed by

TABLE 10

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency Soviet Objectives Relative
to Soviet Goals for International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978

Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Objectives	Number of Objectives Meeting Selection Criterion[b]	Maximize Prestige of USSR, Soviet Leadership		Confirm or Reestablish Prestige		Contain Opponents		Preserve Regime From External Threat	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	10	29	0.24	30	0.23	25	0.12	28	0.25
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	10	26	0.04	27	0.00	27	0.00	24	-0.04
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	10	31	-0.10	30	-0.07	28	0.00	28	-0.07
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	10	18	0.00	20	0.00	16	-0.06	18	0.11
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	10	9	0.11	7	0.00	9	0.11	8	0.00
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	9	12	0.00	12	0.00	12	0.00	9	0.00
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	8	9	0.00	8	0.00	7	0.00	10	0.00
Defend first socialist state	7	12	0.00	13	0.08	12	0.08	12	0.00
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	6	8	0.37	--	--	7	0.43	--	--
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	4	9	0.11	9	0.11	7	0.14	7	0.43
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	4	--	--	--	--	10	0.30	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	3	12	0.00	12	0.00	--	--	9	0.00
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	2	10	0.20	9	0.22	--	--	--	--
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	2	7	0.00	8	0.00	--	--	--	--
Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES[a]

(Continued)

Table 10
Crises of Concern to the USSR
Continued

	MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES							
	Deny Political Access		Support Shift in Correlation of Forces in Favor of Communism		Neutralize, Eliminate Influence in Third World		Deny Military Access	
Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Objectives	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	19	0.63	29	0.14	34	0.23	20	0.05
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	17	0.00	19	0.05	20	0.05	18	0.00
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	24	0.04	33	-0.03	40	-0.10	22	-0.04
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	13	-0.08	18	0.17	24	0.08	12	-0.08
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	9	0.11	14	0.07	14	0.07	8	0.12
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	8	0.00	10	0.10	15	0.07	--	--
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	9	0.00	8	0.00	7	.00	--	--
Defend first socialist state	7	0.00	--	--	--	--	8	0.12
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	7	0.29	8	0.50	8	0.50	8	0.12
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	7	0.14	7	0.29	8	0.37	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	--	--	11	0.00	11	0.00	--	--

(Continued)

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Table 10
Crises of Concern to the USSR
Continued

MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Objectives	Preserve Secrecy		Alter Balance able to USSR
	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	21	0.00	22
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	20	0.00	22
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	24	0.04	26
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	10	-0.10	11
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	8	0.12	8
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	9	0.00	10
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	--	--	8
Defend first socialist state	8	0.00	8
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	--	--	--
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	--	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	--	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	--	--	--
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	--	--	--
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	--	--	--
Encourage Latin American independence of *U.S.*	--	--	--

[a] Identified as being applicable in seven or more crises (1966-1978)

[b] Only those Soviet goals were included where two or more Soviet objectives were applicable in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

[c] Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -2 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

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TABLE 11

A Comparison of Outcomes for High-Frequency Soviet Problems Relative
to Soviet Goals for International Crises of Concern to the USSR 1966-1978

Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Problems	Number of Problems Meeting Selection Criterion[b]	MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE SOVIET PROBLEM CATEGORIES[a]							
		System/Procedural Constraints on Actions		Constraints on Operations		Emotional or Ideological Issues		Perceptual, Psychological Problems	
		Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome[c]	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	9	38	0.18	17	0.12	15	-0.07	13	0.00
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	9	31	0.00	20	-0.05	15	0.07	24	0.00
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	9	44	-0.05	25	0.00	18	0.11	17	0.06
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	8	26	-0.08	11	0.09	8	-0.13	8	0.00
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	7	10	0.10	9	0.22	10	0.20	9	0.22
Defend first socialist state	7	10	0.10	9	0.11	10	0.10	12	0.00
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	7	14	0.07	7	0.14	8	0.13	7	0.14
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	6	9	0.00	9	0.00	12	0.00	12	0.00
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	6	8	0.00	7	0.00	8	0.00	7	0.00
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	6	8	--	7	0.00	10	0.40	10	0.20
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	5	11	0.00	9	0.00	8	0.00	8	0.00
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	5	10	0.30	8	0.38	--	--	7	0.57
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	5	17	0.06	9	0.00	7	0.00	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries	3	10	0.50	--	--	--	--	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries in the Third World	3	8	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--
Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	3	11	0.00	7	0.00	--	--	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	2	--	--	7	0.43	--	--	--	--

(Continued)

Table II
Crises of Concern to the USSR
Continued

| | MOST FREQUENTLY APPLICABLE SOVIET PROBLEM CATEGORIES | | | | | | | | | |
| Soviet Goals Associated With High-Frequency Soviet Problems | Failures in Taking Appropriate, Timely Action | | Relations With M-L States | | Problems in Operating Environment | | General Problems in Crisis Timing | | General Problems in Crisis Handling | |
	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome	Total No. of Crises	Average Outcome
Support progressive, democratic forces abroad	21	0.24	24	0.00	22	0.05	17	0.12	19	0.21
Increase prestige of Soviet armed forces	19	0.00	14	0.00	22	0.00	17	-0.06	26	0.00
Defend progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented countries	26	0.00	14	0.07	27	0.00	21	0.05	19	0.05
Support progressive, socialist-oriented governments in Middle East, South Asia	14	0.07	--	--	10	0.10	15	0.00	10	0.10
Maintain ideological unity of fraternal CP states	7	0.00	8	0.25	--	--	7	0.29	--	--
Defend first socialist state	11	0.00	--	--	--	--	7	0.00	13	0.00
Support other progressive regimes, movements, socialist-oriented states	7	0.00	7	0.14	14	0.07	--	--	--	--
Maintain, enhance ideological leadership of USSR	9	0.00	10	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs	--	--	7	0.00	--	--	7	0.00	10	0.20
Deter PRC military adventures against USSR in Asia	8	0.13	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's	7	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Support fraternal socialist countries against other threats	--	--	11	0.36	7	0.14	--	--	--	--
Support progressive, democratic movements in Middle East, South Asia	8	0.13	--	--	--	--	9	0.00	--	--
Defend fraternal socialist countries	--	--	7	0.57	8	--	--	--	8	0.38
Defend fraternal socialist countries in the Third World	--	--	7	0.00	7	0.00	--	--	--	--
Encourage Latin American independence of U.S.	--	--	--	--	12	0.00	7	0.43	--	--
Reduce NATO/CENTO threat to USSR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

a Identified as being applicable in seven or more crises (during 1966-1978).

b Only those Soviet goals were included where two or more Soviet problem categories were applicable in seven or more crises (the initial selection criterion).

c Using a five-point score ranging from +2 (strongly favorable) to -2 (strongly unfavorable) controlled by number of applicable crises.

emotional or ideological issues seemed to be the most
troublesome. As far as the USSR was concerned, no
particular problem seemed to be all that much of a
headache, with only two: system/procedural constraints
on actions and emotional or ideological issues
having as many as two negative average outcomes.

CONCLUSION

As stated at the onset of this chapter, the precise quantitative compari-
son of superpower performances in international crises is a difficult, if
not impossible, task. Nevertheless, the qualified comparisons presented
suggest clearly that it is illusionary to view Soviet and U.S. outcomes
as mirror images of one another. The "success rate" of each differs with
the Soviet Union scoring more favorably more often when compared to the
United States subject to the qualification that different "things" (sets
of goals) are being compared. Moreover, the data presented indicate
that just as the two polities' relative outcomes and goals differ, so do
their actions employed, objectives sought, and problems encountered in
international crises. In sum, our analysis suggests that quick and
dirty generalizations concerning U.S. and Soviet crisis behavior is a
dubious task. Each has its own aims and characteristics which must be
analyzed in terms of contextual variables.

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This final technical report analyzes U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes over the period 1966-1978. Crisis outcomes are defined in terms of the achievement (or nonachievement) of goals by the two superpowers during crises. Goals are identified from primary source materials, U.S. and Soviet. This study presents the first systematic performance assessment of the recent crisis management behaviors of the two superpowers.

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