LEVEL III

Executive Summary

MAILED FIST, VELVET GLOVE:

SOVIET ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

by

Stephen S. Kaplan

The Brookings Institution

with

David K. Hall
Paul Jabber
Roman Kolkowicz
Colin Legum
Thomas W. Robinson
Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Michel Tatu
Donald S. Zagoria
Janet D. Zagoria
William Zimmerman

Sponsored by

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

September 1979

The Brookings Institution

1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20036 / CABLES: BROOKINST / TELEPHONE: (202) 797-6000

September 10, 1979

Dr. Stephen J. Andriole, Director
Cybernetics Technology Office
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Dr. Andriole:

This report is submitted in compliance with the provisions of Contract N00014-77-C-0479 between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Brookings Institution. The terms of the contract do not provide for review by independent scholars, for revision in response to this review, or for final editing associated with formal publication. Review, revision, and final editing are required prior to any publication by the Brookings Institution. Until this process is completed, the report is subject to revision.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce MacLaury

B. K. MacLaury
President

AD73951

Corrected Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) (6) Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Executive Summary	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Technical Report 1 July 1977 — 30 September 1979 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Stephen S. Kaplan, (15)	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) N00014-77-C-0479, ARPA Order-2820
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS ARPA Order No. 2820 Amend.No. 3 Prog. Code 7W10
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS (11) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 1400 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209	12. REPORT DATE 30 September 1979 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 18 (12) 25p.
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy 800 North Quincy Street Arlington, Virginia 22217	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

~~Recommended for public release; governmental distribution to be determined by DARPA/CTO.~~

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

Fred A. Koether 19 SEP 1979

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

FRED A. KOETHER,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22209

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

(10) Stephen S. /Kaplan David K. /Hall
Paul /Jabber, Roman /Kolkowicz
Colin /Legum

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

armed forces as a political instrument, coercion, conflict, confrontation, crisis, decisionmaking, effectiveness of force, empirical analysis, force structure, foreign policy, international politics, international relations, national security, political-military affairs, Soviet Union, use of force, USSR.

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This study was conducted in order to determine the historical record of the use of Soviet armed forces as a political instrument since the Second World War; to gain an understanding of the USSR's readiness to use military power in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and the willingness of Soviet leaders to accept risks in doing so; to evaluate the utility of political-military operations to Soviet interests and foreign policy goals; and to realize the implications of this Soviet behavior for U.S. interests and American foreign and defense policies. Addressed finally is the subject of circumstances which

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-LF-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

406 128

JOB

might lead the USSR to use armed forces as a political instrument in the future.

Soviet armed forces were used as a political instrument, as defined, on 187 occasions between June 1944 and June 1979. Soviet military units were used coercively in 155 or roughly four-fifths of these actions. In the remaining 32 operations, cooperative political-military diplomacy was practiced. Two-fifths of the total number of incidents took place between 1967 and 1979.

Soviet armed forces were an uncertain means for achieving specific political objectives abroad. The occurrence of positive outcomes in incidents and their retention for at least a few years varied greatly with contextual circumstances and with how Soviet military power was utilized. The realization of favorable outcomes of a broader quality important to Soviet interests also was problematic.

As a discrete political instrument, Soviet military power was little short of a flop when it was used in specific instances to intimidate regimes not to the Kremlin's liking in Eastern Europe. To reverse political change in this region, military suppression and its accompanying rewards and costs were necessary. Moscow did achieve its operational objectives vis-à-vis Peking in the 1969 crisis with China, but many months of military activity elapsed first and the Kremlin finally had to raise the possibility of waging nuclear war. By going to such extremes to purchase a secure border with China in the short term, a dynamic extremely prejudicial to Soviet security and global interests in the long term was set in motion.

Cautious and subtle coercive Soviet diplomacy in response to situations of U.S.-involved conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the Vietnam War were more fruitful. In these affairs, U.S. behavior did conform to the objectives of Soviet political-military activities. In each of these actions the use of Soviet armed forces was extremely prudent and had very limited goals, however. The Kremlin's care to delimit sharply its objectives and use of force to coerce the United States during conflicts in Northeast and Southeast Asia, if successful in meeting restricted goals, was received poorly by fraternal communist nations threatened by the United States and whose allegiance Moscow was concerned to retain.

Failures were not unknown in the third world and the USSR did not obtain, as a result of coercive diplomacy on behalf of allies there, positions of standing able to withstand serious differences of interest. And too, the ramifications of incidents to which the United States, China and European NATO nations were attentive included serious debits. Nevertheless, outcomes related to Soviet operational objectives in the third world were by and large positive in the short term and were retained over the next several years. Soviet military units served particularly well in coercing antagonists of third world allies of the USSR.

Invariably the USSR used military power with great deliberation, and particular circumspection was exhibited when the United States was an actor. In the third world, where essential Soviet security interests were not at risk, as compared with crises in Europe and along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet military units were orchestrated prudently and in some instances with great subtlety, illustrating considerable understanding of local sensibilities.

SOVIET ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

ARPA Order Number	2820, Amend. No. 3/29 April 1977/ Program Code 7W10
Contract Number	N00014-77-C-0479
Contractor	The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
Effective Date of Contract	1 July 1977
Expiration Date of Contract	30 September 1979
Principal Investigator	Dr. Stephen S. Kaplan (202) 797-6000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY*

Although the most important functions of Soviet armed forces are to deter aggression against the USSR and to defend the Soviet homeland, military power has also been a critical instrument of Soviet foreign policy. It has been a means of expanding and preserving authority in Eastern Europe and influencing other communist regimes; responding to actions by the United States, American allies, and China that the USSR perceived as threatening its security; and obtaining favorable relations with the new nations that emerged from former colonial empires.

As the Kremlin has become more confident of the USSR's military security, the significance of Soviet armed forces as a tool of diplomacy has increased. Three decades ago Soviet military diplomacy, as a function of the deployment and reach of the Red Army and its air support, extended not far beyond the periphery of the Soviet Union. Today that diplomacy is backed up by a blue water navy, the ability to move airborne units and large volumes of military cargo intercontinental distances by air, and a wide range of nuclear armaments.

In the past dozen years, Soviet armed forces were used to suppress political change in Czechoslovakia, to threaten China, and to constrain the behavior of neighbors such as Rumania and Japan. Moscow placed more than 20,000 military personnel in Egypt to provide that nation with air defense against Israel; Soviet air force, naval, and airborne units played important roles in the 1973 Middle East war; Soviet naval forces were active in the 1970 Jordanian

---

* Revised.

crisis and in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war; and Soviet air and naval operations influenced the outcomes of the 1975-76 civil war in Angola and the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Soviet military men also participated in civil wars in Yemen, Sudan, and Iraq, and Soviet naval vessels were on the scene during the 1973 cod war between Great Britain and Iceland, the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the 1979 China-Vietnam conflict, and little-noticed internal crises in Somalia, Sierra Leone, and other nations. These episodes encompass only a portion of the discrete uses of military units to reinforce Soviet foreign policy during this period.

The use of armed forces as an instrument of Soviet diplomacy is a subject of substantial interest. Yet despite a great deal of debate, the analytical record is shallow. Previous examinations focused on theory, individual case studies, one branch of the Soviet armed forces, or a narrow period of time. Few substantive analyses have examined questions of concern to policymakers.

The aims of this study are four: to determine the historical record of discrete political-military operations by Soviet ground, sea, and air forces since the Second World War (that is, to identify and describe the political context of incidents and related uses of Soviet armed forces); to gain an understanding of the USSR's readiness to use military power in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and its willingness to accept risks in doing so; to evaluate the utility of coercive diplomacy to Soviet interests and foreign policy goals; and to assess the implications of this behavior for the interests and the foreign and defense policies of the United States. Considered finally are circumstances that might lead the USSR to use armed forces as a political instrument in the future.

The Historical Record

A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Using this definition, 187 incidents were found in which Soviet armed forces were used as a political instrument between June 1944 and June 1979. Soviet military units were used to coerce foreign actors in 155, or roughly four-fifths, of these actions. In the remaining 32 incidents military units were used only to improve or reinforce relations with another nation. Figure 1 presents the annual frequencies of these two different types of military diplomacy--termed coercive and cooperative, respectively--for the years 1944-78.

At the end of and immediately after the Second World War, Soviet military power was used in adjacent areas in Europe and Asia to expand Soviet hegemony and to help establish communist regimes loyal to the USSR. Periodically thereafter--particularly in response to eruptions of independent behavior in Eastern Europe--the Kremlin turned to the military to defend these gains. Armed forces were also used frequently in pursuing security objectives in Europe, especially in Central Europe after the immediate postwar expansion until Stalin's death, and after the restoration of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe in 1956-58 until the Cuban missile crisis. The subsequent deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict turned the Kremlin's attention toward Asia. After the early 1960s, the only coercive Soviet political-military operations of any consequence outside Eastern Europe that directly served

Figure 1. Numbers of Coercive and Cooperative Incidents Each Year, 1944-78.



important USSR security interests were pointed at China. Soviet military activities aimed at the third world first occurred after the 1956 Suez crisis, but it was not until the 1967 war in the Middle East that the USSR used its armed forces to affect developments in the Middle East, Africa, and southern Asia.

When using the military to underpin its foreign policy, the Kremlin turned most frequently to ground units, which were used in about three-fifths of the 187 incidents. Land-based ground units were used in 105 incidents; ship-based infantry, whether army or naval troops, were rarely used. Ground units alone were employed in one-third of the incidents and participated in combined operations with either air or sea units in 34 and 8 actions, respectively, and with both forces in 9 operations.

Air units were used in 80 incidents, though infrequently alone. Combat elements--fighter or bomber units--played a part in almost one-third of the incidents and in almost three-fourths of the operations that used aircraft. The other most frequently used aircraft were transport planes.

Although the Soviet navy was utilized less frequently than ground and air units, naval units were used alone in 43 incidents--less often than ground units, but more often than air units alone. When the navy was called upon, surface warships of cruiser, frigate, destroyer, or escort classes were almost invariably used--they played a role in four-fifths of the operations in which naval vessels participated. Although the Soviet purpose was coercive in three-fourths of the incidents in which naval forces were used, warships also were the principal tool of cooperative Soviet military diplomacy, having been used in three-fifths of such incidents.

In what context did the most substantial displays of coercive Soviet military power occur? To answer this question, a subset of incidents was

examined that included only large combined operations, defined as actions in which two of the following three forces participated: a ground force larger than one division; a combat air unit larger than one regiment; a naval force consisting of more than five surface combatants. Soviet political-military operations meeting these criteria were conducted in 28 of the 155 coercive incidents and may have been conducted in another 16 episodes.

More than four-fifths of these 44 actions were directed at Europe or contiguous territories in Asia, and three-fifths of the total occurred before Stalin's death in 1953. The latter actions were intended largely to expand Soviet authority in Europe toward the end of and immediately after the Second World War. Other operations during this decade were designed to defend new positions and to influence the Western allies' policies toward Germany. The difference between these early operations and more recent ones lies in the prominence after Stalin's death of actions to maintain Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, the need beginning in the 1960s to respond to threats presented by China, and Soviet willingness in the late 1960s and early 1970s to become militarily engaged in the Mediterranean area.

On a number of occasions, particularly during the Khrushchev era, Soviet leaders verbally raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons against foreign nations, but in only one instance were data found confirming that the USSR raised the alert status of the forces presumably included in its plans for strategic nuclear attack. There was no evidence to suggest that the USSR redeployed its strategic units during a crisis. Nor was any clear association found between either of two indicators of the strategic nuclear balance and the annual number of Soviet coercive actions or incidents in subcategories that were examined. This is true of the entire period since the Second World War, as well as of the post-Khrushchev era, which was

considered independently. Although it might have made a difference that Soviet strategic inferiority was gradually replaced by strategic parity, each small change in this direction did not seem to lead to more frequent Soviet political-military activity.

The Utility of Force

Have armed forces been an effective instrument of Soviet diplomacy? Of what significance were variations in the orchestration of Soviet coercive diplomacy? To answer these and related questions, a number of cases were examined in depth by specialists who addressed a single set of detailed questions. The analysts and the incidents they studied are as follows:

Investigator	Incidents
Michel Tatu	Hungarian Revolution (1956) Poland's "October" (1956) The Prague "Spring" (1968)
Thomas W. Robinson	Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969-78)
William Zimmerman	Korean War Vietnam War
Donald S. Zagoria and Janet D. Zagoria	Seizure of the Pueblo (1968) Shooting down of the EC-121 (1969) Murder of U.S. officers in the Korean DMZ (1976)
Paul Jabber and Roman Kolkowicz	Arab-Israeli war (1967) Arab-Israeli war (1973)
Alvin Z. Rubinstein	Egypt-Israel conflict (1970) Air support of Sudan (1970) Air support of Iraq (1974-75)
David K. Hall	Ghana's seizure of Soviet trawlers (1968-69) Portuguese attack on Guinea (1970)
Colin Legum	Civil war in Angola (1975-76) Ethiopia-Somalia war (1977-78)

The case studies show that, when used as a political instrument, Soviet armed forces were an uncertain means for attaining specific objectives abroad. The occurrence of positive outcomes and their retention for at least a few years varied greatly with the circumstances and with how Soviet military power was used. Favorable outcomes related to broader Soviet interests than the immediate incidents also were problematic.

As a discrete political instrument, Soviet military power failed almost consistently when it was used specifically to ensure subservience to the USSR and socialist orthodoxy in Eastern Europe. The Poles stood up to the Khrushchev leadership in October 1956 and were not compelled to reform their leadership or to hand power over to a Soviet-allied faction within the Polish communist party. Nor did the deployment of Soviet units in Budapest during the first phase of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution or the slow buildup of forces and actions early in the second phase compel dissident workers and students to terminate their rebellious behavior and be contented with a promise of reforms. Alexander Dubcek and his associates in Czechoslovakia might have allowed the Prague Spring to proceed more rapidly without surrounding Soviet military power, but a series of political-military actions orchestrated by Moscow in the spring and early summer of 1968 did not stop developments abhorrent to the USSR.

Similar experiences resulted from Soviet operations against East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The East German riots in 1953 were not ended by shows of force or by bolstering the will of the East German authorities but finally, as in Hungary, by violent suppression. Nor was Tito coerced by Stalin's direction of military pressure against Yugoslavia, or Nicolae Ceausescu by demonstrative actions ordered by the Brezhnev leadership. Like Gomulka and Dubcek, both Tito and Ceausescu apparently limited the

independence of their behavior according to their perceptions of the danger of full-scale Soviet military intervention, but this was little related to discrete uses of the military by the Kremlin. The Kremlin's greatest and most immediate political-military achievement was the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was not resisted violently.

Moscow did achieve its operational objectives in the 1969 crisis with China, but only after many months of military activity climaxed by the threat of nuclear war. The USSR obtained a bare minimum after exerting maximum force short of war. By going to this extreme to gain a secure border with China in the short term, a course extremely prejudicial to Soviet security and global interests in the long term was entered upon. Cautious and subtle coercive Soviet diplomacy in response to U.S. involvement in conflict on the Korean peninsula and in the Vietnam War was more fruitful. In these instances, U.S. behavior conformed to the objectives of Soviet political-military activities. In each instance, however, the use of Soviet armed forces was prudent and its goals were limited. The Kremlin's caution in restricting its objectives and use of force to coerce the United States in these conflicts in Northeast and Southeast Asia, though successful in meeting narrow goals, was poorly received by the communist nations threatened by the United States whose allegiance Moscow was anxious to retain.

Failures were not unknown in the third world. As a result of coercive diplomacy on behalf of allies there, the USSR did not obtain positions capable of withstanding serious differences of interest. Incidents in which the United States, China, or European NATO nations had interests included unfavorable side effects. Nevertheless, most of the outcomes related to the Soviet operational objectives in the third world were positive in the short term and the gains were retained for the next several years. Soviet military units were particularly successful in coercing antagonists of the USSR's third world allies.

Although Soviet support is appreciated by its allies in the third world and access to military facilities and closer political relations might be gained, such gains depend on a continued identity of interests and harmony of strategies for the achievement of mutual objectives. The links between Moscow and third world capitals do not run deep; close relations and Soviet gains are conditional. "What have you done for me lately?" is more relevant than "What did you do for me in the past?" once a third world leader perceives the USSR as overbearing or unsupportive. In this context, a decline in dependence on the USSR for national or regime security is a prescription for a reversal in relations. Moscow thus was best able to preserve good relations when governments were especially insecure and isolated from other sources of support, when it confined itself to helping a regime retain power rather than undermining it or redirecting its policies, and when the demands made upon the USSR continued to be acceptable. In short, the status of the Soviet Union typically was not that of imperial overlord but that of guest worker. One qualification, however, is that nations, or at least regimes, sometimes find the support they receive to be necessary and can see no option except dependency for considerable periods of time.

The Tailoring of Soviet Political-Military Operations

Invariably, Moscow used military power with great deliberation. In Eastern Europe shots were fired by Soviet troops only in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in November 1956 after an earlier intervention and withdrawal. Coercive (as opposed to suppressive) military behavior was not

coupled with any violent action; instead, warnings and threats were coupled with attempts at discussion and negotiation. Violence occurred periodically along the Sino-Soviet border, but Chinese territory was not seized and held, deep penetrations were not made, and engagements were carefully limited. As in the case of intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Marshal Grechko's ultimatum to Prague in early 1969, threatening to use nuclear weapons against China in 1969 was preceded by a full half-year of lesser coercion and attempts at more traditional diplomacy. Particular circumspection was shown when the United States was an actor.

In the third world, where, in contrast to Europe and northern Asia, Soviet security was not so directly at stake, Moscow used military power effectively and with subtlety, demonstrating an ability to minimize damage to its interests abroad while applying its capabilities incisively. In general, Soviet leaders were adept at relating their use of force to some standard of legitimacy; they timed their introduction of military means well and showed good sense in the types of forces called upon; and they were careful not to gloat over successes. They preferred a naval presence, covert tactical air assistance, logistical support, and the use of Cuban combat formations to the open deployment of their own military units in third world nations. They recognized the virtue of creating new political facts as opposed to the risks of issuing ultimatums. The case study analyses suggest that, for the most part, Kremlin directors used Soviet armed forces not recklessly and not clumsily but with prudence and sensitivity.

When Soviet armed forces were used unilaterally in the third world, Moscow remained aware of the risk of inducing U.S. military intervention. The air defense of Egypt, providing Guinea with naval support in 1970, the

air support of Sudan and Iraq in the early 1970s, the threat after Israel failed to observe the cease-fire during the October War, and aid to Ethiopia in 1977-78 occurred either when the United States took strong exception to the behavior of the target of Moscow's coercion or when the action was based on the principle of defending national sovereignty, which Washington was loath to oppose. The support given Sudan and Iraq, moreover, was kept at a level that remained deniable, and the U.S. political reaction was carefully observed before and during Moscow's actions on behalf of Egypt and Guinea in 1970, Angola in 1975-76, and Ethiopia. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter were not disposed, or unable, to take military action in these instances on behalf of Israel, Portugal, the FNLA/UNITA forces, and Somalia. Visits to Guinea before and to Nigeria after the passage of Soviet warships through Ghanaian waters in 1969, and the fact that this naval presence was not overtly linked to Ghana's holding in custody two Soviet trawlers and their crews, illustrated the Kremlin's understanding of regional sensibilities.

Implications for U.S. Diplomacy

American interests sometimes suffered little or no damage from Soviet political-military operations, but on other occasions they were harmed--for example, by Moscow's gaining access to foreign military facilities, by the doubt cast on American readiness to firmly support allies and other friends, and by the restriction of economic and cultural relations between the United States and nations dependent on the USSR and its allies. Soviet actions also supported arguments for increased U.S. defense spending, led to shows of U.S. force to reassure anxious allies, and affected a broad spectrum of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

From time to time Soviet allies hostile to the United States or to nations having close relations with the West may be threatened by domestic adversity or by a situation of tension or conflict with a neighbor. U.S. policymakers may wish Moscow's ally to be weakened or even driven from power. If only local political and military forces are considered, this might be the prognosis. However, Soviet military capabilities afford decisionmakers in the Kremlin a means of preventing that outcome by taking military action on behalf of a friend, thereby making the friend more resolute and weakening the will of its antagonist. The target of Moscow's coercive effort may be a friend of the United States or of another nation in which the West has military, economic, or political interests. Moscow's rescue and support of the MPLA in Angola and of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia and its more recent behavior in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict might be considered in this light.

The United States finds it difficult, even if it has no such interests, to accept the USSR's use of armed force in pursuing its objectives. No matter what direct adverse impact the immediate controversy may have on U.S. interests, the successful demonstration of Soviet military power could lead to increased Soviet reliance on armed might to secure positions or achieve new objectives abroad. If allowed a clear field, the Kremlin might be more likely to intervene on behalf of clients, or at least to do so at an earlier stage. The resistance of third parties to Soviet objectives might also decline.

In the past, the United States, wisely or not, often reacted to local crises by alerting or deploying its projection forces, confident that the USSR could not respond militarily. Almost always the occasion was a threat to a

regime in power or to a nation that had close relations with the United States. U.S. decisionmakers not only were more strongly motivated than Soviet leaders; they also could rely on unchallenged U.S. conventional military capability in crisis areas and a strategic imbalance favorable to the United States. Even during its period of greatest relative strength, however, the United States rarely used its military units to unseat a Kremlin ally or to deny the sovereignty of a Soviet friend.

Such U.S. political-military operations have become more dangerous because the USSR is now able to bring military force to bear in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and may be strongly motivated to secure an ally or ensure that U.S. military power is not responsible for the downfall of a friend. And the United States may be forced to stand by and watch helplessly when a U.S. friend, having gone too far in attacking a Kremlin ally, finds itself coerced and even subjected to violence by Soviet military power. Thus in 1970 Soviet fighter pilots and missile crews in Egypt engaged in combat with Israeli aircraft, and Soviet warships acted to deter further Portuguese attacks on Guinea after an attack on Conakry. Although the United States may have little sympathy for its ally's position in such circumstances, it nevertheless stands to lose credibility and to foster a perception of greater Soviet power. At the same time, Moscow's ally may become increasingly dependent on the USSR.

Using U.S. military units to divert attention from a political misfortune when U.S. policymakers are unwilling to resort to violence makes little sense if it gives the USSR an opportunity to engage in counter military measures as a deterrent to U.S. military action. This occurred, for example, during the

1971 conflict between India and Pakistan. The impression conveyed may be not only that the United States is divided or unwilling to become embroiled in a local conflict, even when provoked, but also that the United States is more fearful of the USSR than the USSR is of the United States.

Extensive U.S. military intervention, including the use of firepower, has been contemplated most seriously when a valued friend has been attacked by a Soviet ally or subjected to severe domestic violence traceable to Moscow or to a nation closely allied with the USSR. Recognizing that U.S. policymakers are committed, the Kremlin has avoided superpower confrontation in such instances. Soviet leaders occasionally have probed, but the prospect of gaining a new advantage has not outweighed the risks of escalating a crisis to a level that could lead to war with the United States. The USSR may be particularly responsive to the early U.S. political use of force and to clear verbal signals given by U.S. leaders, insofar as such moves confirm Soviet expectations before the Kremlin or its ally becomes committed to escalation.

Past Soviet behavior has indicated willingness to stand by while an ally is "punished" for a transgression against another nation, including the United States, if the punishment is limited in severity and duration and the intent is not to seize the ally's territory or overthrow its regime. Clearly, the security of the USSR has counted for a great deal more in the Kremlin than any principle of fraternal solidarity or the particular interests of its friends. Attempts by allies to manipulate Soviet behavior have not worked at all well.

Future conflicts in the third world may erupt among nonaligned states, among unimportant or tenuous friends of the superpowers, or between actors of

which only one is closely identified with the United States or the USSR. Many Americans then may believe that local circumstances do not warrant the political use of U.S. armed forces, let alone violent intervention. Whether it is termed opportunism or pragmatism keyed to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the dictate of being a great power unconstrained by a pluralist political system, past Soviet political-military behavior indicates sensitivity to U.S. discord, uncertainty, and temerity about coercive diplomacy--witness the timing and nature of Moscow's military responses to the civil war in Angola in 1975-76, the seizure of the Pueblo, and perhaps, too, the 1977-78 conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Moscow has not emulated American restraint when that restraint has reflected a U.S. lack of willingness to become militarily involved rather than an interest in avoiding a confrontation with the USSR.

If the United States hesitates to give military support to an ally endangered by a Soviet ally, Moscow may refrain from taking military activity itself. The prudent course, after all, is to have a U.S. ally defeated by a Soviet ally with no risk of provoking a superpower military confrontation. But the Kremlin also has an interest in being on the scene and appearing at least partly responsible for the triumphs of its friends, as after the Pueblo was seized. If the United States is perceived to be unwilling to countenance violent conflict, Soviet military support of an ally on the offensive seems more likely.

"Linkage" may or may not be preferred as a foreign policy strategy, but to a considerable extent it is a political reality. The distrust occasioned by Soviet military interventions affects the conduct of U.S. negotiations

with the USSR, votes in the Congress on foreign policy and on defense issues to which Soviet behavior may be related, and relations between the United States and third nations of interest to the USSR. If it is difficult to be more precise about these effects and easy to say that other developments and elements of Soviet behavior also have been important, it is not difficult to be persuaded that the Soviet use of force in the 1973 Middle Eastern war, the Angolan civil war, and the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, as well as smaller and less noticed Soviet political-military operations, had an individual and cumulative effect on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Kremlin is aware that its political-military behavior has strained Soviet relations with the West, particularly with the United States. Certainly Moscow does not wish to endanger unnecessarily the framework of cooperation and negotiations entered into with the West in the late 1960s or push the United States and its NATO allies into making military decisions or adopting diplomacy adverse to the security of the USSR. This is a powerful constraint on Soviet political-military behavior.

The USSR also is highly sensitive to charges of neocolonialism and imperialism by third world nations. Concepts of sovereignty, territorial integrity, regime legitimacy, and other norms at stake in interstate and domestic crises may not themselves be the basis of Soviet behavior, but they are important to a large number of third world nations whose favor is important to the USSR. Hence, in addition to assessing Western interests and the risk of confrontation with the United States, the Kremlin wants to determine the attitudes of Afro-Asian nations whose view of intervention by outside powers may or may not have much in common with that of the West.

Soviet leaders will undoubtedly use armed forces again to reinforce their foreign policy. In some instances they may feel compelled to take this course, perceiving a grave threat to the security of the USSR or its global interests. The military also may be used to take advantage of favorable political developments; indeed, the Kremlin may precipitate opportunities for intervention. In deciding whether to mount discrete political-military operations, Soviet leaders and their staffs may be expected to engage in careful analyses of what might be achieved and what must be risked. By the same token, foreign observers seeking clues to future Soviet behavior might study the historical record of discrete Soviet political-military operations.

THE AUTHORS

Stephen S. Kaplan is on the staff of the foreign policy studies program at The Brookings Institution.

David K. Hall is assistant professor of political science at Brown University.

Paul Jabber is assistant professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Roman Kolkowicz is professor of political science and Director of the Center of International and Strategic Affairs at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Colin Legum is Commonwealth correspondent for The Observer.

Thomas W. Robinson is professor of international relations at the National War College, National Defense University.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Michel Tatu is Washington correspondent for Le Monde.

Donald S. Zagoria is professor of political science at Hunter College.

Janet D. Zagoria is teaching adjunct at Mercy College.

William Zimmerman is professor of political science at the University of Michigan.