

OF   AD A073886		1	- -near Jointe North	enere 2005- enere		STREET.				点封 遷
					generation.	The second secon				
					Transcomme Marine and Anna a	The second secon				
				And American (M. 1997). The American (M. 1997			A state of the sta	No. of the second secon		
					lanar."	The second secon		Timere Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria	a de la constante de la consta	L.





7

UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

FORE COMPLETING FORM ENT'S CATALOG NUMBER OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED IRMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER IACT OR GRANT NUMBER() RAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK & WORK UNIT NUMBER() I 2 8 4 12 8 4 14 1 14 1 14 1 14 1 14 1 14 1 14 1
RMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER ACT OR GRANT NUMBER() AAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK & WORK UNIT NUMBERS (2) 814, (2) 844, (2) 844,
ACT OR GRANT NUMBER()
AAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK a WORK UNIT NUMBERS 12 844 12 844 MT OMME MATOMATING IASSIFIED
12 8 1 F. (ay 1979 ER OF PAGES Drox 74 RITY CLASS. (of this report) ASSIFIED
12 814. (ay 1979) ER OF PAGES Drox 74 RITY CLASS. (of this report) ASSIFIED
LAY 2079 ER OF PAGES D'OX 74 RITY CLASS. (of this report) ASSIFIED
ASSIFIED
ASSIFIED
TATEMENT A
if the Army should d other force develop- hould the functions a study of Army taff, selected general interviews with

A

# SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PASE(The Date Entered)

that the Army needs to improve its manpower management and improve the career programs of those personnel employed in this function. These improvements can be best made in the Comptroller organizations at HQDA, MACOMS and installations.

	sion For		1
NTIS	GRA&I	T	-
DDC TA		F	1
Unanno	unced	H	1
Justif.	ication		1
Бу			1
Charles of the second second	and and a state of a state of a state of	-	1
Distrib	ution/		Party in the second sec
Availa	bility C	sepo	1
A	vail and/	07	
ist	special	ur.	
ΛΙ	1		
HI	1	1	
NI	1	1	
		1	

the state of the s

## UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Date Entered)

- An ad some the

# 11 MAY 1979

# MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AT CONUS INSTALLATIONS: WHO SHOULD MANAGE AND WHY?

and the same of the state of the second state

and the second se

by

Colonel David L. Pemberton, Inf Colonel John H. Kraus, FA Lieutenant Colonel Ted V. Cooper, FC Lieutenant Colonel James T. George, Inf

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

## USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

# MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AT CONUS INSTALLATIONS: WHO SHOULD MANAGE AND WHY?

# A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel David L. Pemberton, Inf Colonel John H. Kraus, FA Lieutenant Colonel Ted V. Cooper, FC Lieutenant Colonel James T. George, Inf

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Jones, Jr., Inf Study Adviser

US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 11 May 1979

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication and it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency. いいいのであるというという

AUTHOR(S): David L. Pemberton, COL, Inf; John H. Kraus, COL, FA; Ted V. Cooper, LTC, FC; James T. George, LTC, Inf; William E. Jones, Jr., LTC, Inf (Study Adviser)

 TITLE: Manpower Management at CONUS Installations: Who Should Manage and Why?

 FORMAT: Group Study Project

 DATE: 11 May 1979
 PAGES: 73
 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

The basic objective of the study was to determine if the Army should have a uniform policy for the management of manpower and other force development functions at CONUS installations; and if so, how should the functions be managed and who should do it. Data were gathered by a study of Army documents, interviews with general officers on the DA staff, selected general officers and their staffs assigned to MACOMs, and other interviews with personnel assigned to selected CONUS installations. A DA approved questionnaire was used to survey 105 CONUS installations. Major conclusions were that the Army needs to improve its manpower management and improve the career programs of those personnel employed in this function. These improvements can be best made in the Comptroller organizations at HQDA, MACOMs and installations.

であることである

# PREFACE

The Group Study Project was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Military Studies Program. This research paper was prepared to determine how manpower should be managed at CONUS installations and by whom. The four authors did the study because of their experience at installations and their perception of needed improvements in the management of manpower and the other Force Development functions. The authors express their deep gratitude and appreciation to all personnel who gave liberally of their valuable time by providing personal interviews and completing survey instruments.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT       11         PREFACE       111         CHAPTER I.       INTRODUCTION       1         Purpose       1         Statement of the Problem       1         Authority vs Responsibility       2         Scope       3         Study Group Participants       3         II.       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY       5         Conclusions       6         Recommendations       8         III.       METHODOLOGY       9         IV.       ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE       13         Questionnaire Analysis       14         V.       RESULTS OF VISITS       27         General       27       General       27         Views Expressed by Interviewees from       33       33         Results of DA Visits       32       33         Results of Installation Visits       33       33         Results of Installation Visits       33         VI.       COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS.       43         VII.       CONCLUSIONS       47         VIII.       RECOMMENDATIONS       54
CHAPTER I.       INTRODUCTION       1         Purpose       1         Statement of the Problem       1         Authority vs Responsibility       2         Scope       3         Study Group Participants       3         II.       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY       5         Conclusions       6         Recommendations       8         III.       METHODOLOGY       9         IV.       ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE       13         Questionnaire Analysis       14         V.       RESULTS OF VISITS       27         General       27         Views Expressed by Interviewees from       33         Results of DA Visits       33         Results of Installation Visits       33         Results of Installation Visits       33         Querview       35         VI.       COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS       43         VII.       CONCLUSIONS       47         VIII.       RECOMMENDATIONS       54
Purpose1Statement of the Problem1Authority vs Responsibility2Scope3Study Group Participants3II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGYIV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIREQuestionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITSResults of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies33Results of Installation Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Statement of the Problem1Authority vs Responsibility2Scope3Study Group Participants3II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGYIV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIREQuestionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITSCeneral27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS.43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Authority vs Responsibility2Scope3Study Group Participants3II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGYIV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIREQuestionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITSQuestionnaire Analysis27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS.43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Authority vs Responsibility2Scope3Study Group Participants3II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGYIV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIREQuestionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITSQuestionnaire Analysis27Results of DA Visits27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Scope3Study Group Participants3II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYConclusions5Conclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGYIV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIREQuestionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITSQuestionnaire Analysis27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Study Group Participants311.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY5Conclusions6Recommendations8111.METHODOLOGY9IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
II.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY5Conclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGY9IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits33Results of Installation Visits35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Conclusions6Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGY9IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Recommendations8III.METHODOLOGY9IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
III.METHODOLOGY9IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
IV.ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE13Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Questionnaire Analysis14V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
V.RESULTS OF VISITS27Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from27Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Results of DA Visits27General27Views Expressed by Interviewees from28Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
General27Views Expressed by Interviewees fromTwo or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Views Expressed by Interviewees from Two or More Staff Agencies28 2
Two or More Staff Agencies28Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency32Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
Views Expressed by a Single Staff Agency
Results of MACOM Visits33Results of Installation Visits35Overview35VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONSVII.CONCLUSIONSVII.RECOMMENDATIONSCOMMENDATIONS54
Results of Installation Visits
Overview
VI.COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS.43VII.CONCLUSIONS47VIII.RECOMMENDATIONS54
VII. CONCLUSIONS
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOOTNOTES
APPENDICES A. List of Personnel Visited at Department
of the Army
B. Letter to Installations with Questionnaire 58
C. List of Installations Mailed Questionnaires 59
D. List of Headquarters and Installations
Visited with Personnel Interviewed 62
E. Bibliography
F. Distribution

### CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Fragmentation of manpower management functions has occurred throughout the Army. The situation is especially acute at CONUS installations where large percentages of operating budgets are required to fund the civilian workforce. Additionally, as recently stated by several senior Army managers-the most pressing dilemma currently facing the Army is manpower, and more particularly, the continuing directed reduction of civilian manpower spaces. In the face of declining manpower assets the search for greater efficiency becomes even more important. Considerable debate exists for the combining of the total Force Development function with the financial management function under a single resource management concept for increased efficiency. Different organizational and staffing arrangements for this common function compounds the issue.

のないであるという

### PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to determine the optimum uniform policy for the management of manpower at installations.

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the most effective and efficient policy of staff responsibility for the manpower management function at installation

level. During the STEADFAST reorganization of the major Army commands in the early 1970s, Department of the Army allowed two different types of organizations for managing funds and manpower. TRADOC was organized with a Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM), who was responsible for both funding and manpower management functions. Conversely, FORSCOM retained the old CONARC style Comptroller who was responsible for funding, while manpower management was assumed by DCSPER Force Structure (Development) retained under DCSOPS. Today, TRADOC installations generally operate with the DCSRM concept, while FORSCOM has gone to a form of local commander option. Currently several major FORSCOM posts have combined manpower with the Comptroller. (In some cases it is called a Director of Resource Management (DRM)). Other FORSCOM installations have manpower under the G3/DPT, G1/DPCA or some other mix, including the Comptroller. USAREUR and DARCOM installations are largely under the DCSRM concept. The specific objective to be examined during the course of the study is to determine what organizational element(s) should be responsible for both funding and manpower functions.

### AUTHORITY VS RESPONSIBILITY

In conducting the study, the question of authority and responsibility for the management of these functions was considered. This issue was surfaced many times by personnel who believed that if a staff section had responsibility for structuring the force, they must also have commensurate authority over manpower management and other force development functions. In their view, force structure and manpower management are inseparable. The study group acknowledges the requirement to have authority commensurate

with responsibility. The group also believes that at installation level, the commander is the one possessing both responsibility and authority. It is the commander who has ultimate responsibility to insure that the mission is accomplished by all staff officers and not the sole responsibility of a single staff officer. The commander receives the assigned mission and the necessary resources to accomplish it, not individual staff directorates. Accordingly, the study has been focused on the manner in which a commander may allocate these resources to his staff for the most efficient and effective utilization for accomplishing the mission.

### SCOPE

In recognition of current Department of the Army reorganization efforts and strong evidence of the MACOMs desired flexibility, the thrust of this study was purposely limited to CONUS installation level. To gain added perspective, however, the study group interviewed key personnel at Headquarters DA and several MACOMs.

# STUDY GROUP PARTICIPANTS

Study Group participants possessed a total of 27.5 years experience in resource management/comptrollership type endeavors. Upon graduation from the USAWC, all four members are being assigned to Specialty Code 45 (Comptroller) positions. Participants profiles are as follows:

NAME	RANK	BASIC BRANCH	YRS RM EXP	NEW POSITION
David L. Pemberton	COL	INF	10.2	Dep Cmdr for Opns, US Army Admin Ctr, Ft Harrison, IN
John H. Kraus	COL	Arty	3.0	DRM, Ft Sill, OK
Ted V. Cooper	LTC	FI	11.3	Dir RM Dept, US Army Admin Center, Ft Harrison, IN
James T. George	LTC	INF	3.0	Office of the Comptroller of the Army, Wash, DC

### CHAPTER II

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study, "Manpower Management at CONUS Installations: Who Should Manage and Why," was conducted under the aegis of the Military Studies Program, US Army War College.

The problem perceived by the study group was that HQDA has no uniform policy on who will manage manpower and other force development functions at CONUS installations. In fact, a myriad of managerial organizational arrangements exists. It appeared that the lack of a uniform policy by HQDA was an anomaly since end strength reductions in civilian manpower is a major problem in the Army today. The focal point was: "should the Army have a uniform policy and if so, why and what should the policy be with respect to how the functions would be managed?" The research methodology included a review of regulatory guidance, personal interviews with general officers on the DA staff, general officers and other staff officers at MACOM, and principal staff officers at selected CONUS installations. In addition, a DA approved survey instrument was used to collect the opinions of appropriate managers at 105 CONUS installations. The methodology was considered to have a high degree of validity and reliability due to the interest and enthusiasm in the study expressed by all personnel interviewed. In addition, the response to the survey instrument was an impressively high 85.7 percent. The data gathered by the research

methodology were analyzed in detail. The analysis produced 18 conclusions and 6 recommendations. The conclusions and recommendations have been discussed in detail in Chapter VII and VIII, respectively. They are listed below in abbreviated form:

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The Army does a poor job of managing manpower.

2. Installations want a standard policy for the management of the force development functions, but not a standard organization.

3. Survey results indicate that the most desired organizational arrangements for the management of the force development function at installations, in order of preference, are:

- under the comptroller/DRM

- no preference, or felt no optimum could be designed
- separate directorate under the commander
- total function under the G3/DPT, with the comptroller responsible for dollars only
- majority of the functions under the G3/DPT with the comptroller responsible for dollars and manpower

4. Comptroller personnel are consistent in their beliefs that they should manage the force development function.

5. G3/DPT personnel are divided in their beliefs on who should manage the force development function.

6. The right people in the right job will make any organizational arrangement work.

7. The force development function must be managed in its totality.

8. A single manager for funds and force development results in improved resource control, coordination and efficiencies of funds, manyears, and authorized space allocations.

9. A single manager for funds and force development creates a perception of too much power and influence in a single manager.

10. The Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) is an effective vehicle for managing manpower and dollars at installations.

11. Manpower Management Analysts training and the Manpower Management Career Program lack uniform direction (military and civilian). and the second second

12. The benefits for installations from Manpower Surveys are of limited value considering the time and effort put into them.

13. The manpower management reporting system is complicated, redundant and requires extensive documentation and manhours.

14. The CSGPO-78 report is of little value to the installations and causes excessive effort in preparation and reconciliation to other reports.

15. Manpower Management publications appear conflicting, confusing and some are obsolete.

16. Comptroller/Director of Resource Management (DRM) have sufficient knowledge in mission matters to perform total Force Development functions.

17. Under the current system, excessive coordination is required.

18. The title "DCSRM/DRM" is nondescriptive of the functions performed.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DA develop a policy which acknowledges that the Force Development function is a Comptroller function at installation level.

2. DA promulgate a policy which requires all CONUS installations to employ the Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) to manage all manpower aspects of the Force Development function in addition to dollars.

3. DA assign responsibility for manpower management training and all career development to the Comptroller of the Army.

4. DA develop a comprehensive training program for manpower management for military and civilian personnel from the journeyman to the professional level, similar to the existing Comptroller career field. 5. DA and MACOMs, as appropriate, take immediate action to improve the management of the manpower function by:

a. Eliminating on-site manpower surveys.

b. Eliminating the CSGPO-78 report.

c. Eliminating duplication in manpower and financial management reports.

d. Simplifying and consolidating existing manpower publications.

e. Exploring methods and standards applications, Project REFLEX, and statistical derivation as alternate methods to verify manpower needs.

6. DA eliminate the title DCSRM/DRM throughout the Army and require the use of the title, Comptroller.

### CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

The study methodology consisted of personal interviews with selected members of the Department of the Army staff, the mailing of a questionnaire approved by Department of the Army to CONUS installations, visits to selected major command headquarters and some of their subordinate installations, and background research of applicable Department of the Army publications. Throughout the study, individuals were told that their responses would be kept in strictest confidence. The study team believed this anonymity was necessary to obtain answers free of peer or boss/ subordinate pressures.

The study team visited selected members of the DA staff early in the study effort to obtain their opinions on whether Department of the Army should adopt a standard organizational policy at CONUS installations for the management of manpower and funds. Personnel interviewed are listed in Appendix A. These individuals were selected because of their past or current experience in managing the Army's financial and manpower resources. All have had extensive experience in these fields.

The majority of the data for the study was obtained by the use of a questionnaire approved by Department of the Army. The questionnaire consisted of 25 questions in three sections. Section I was administrative;

Section II basically addressed military/civilian manpower management and Section III addressed primarily the management of the Force Development function. Individuals were asked for their candid remarks on the organizational structure at CONUS installations for these functions. The cover letter for the questionnaire requested it be completed by principal staff officers who had responsibility for manpower management and financial management. Copies of the cover letter and questionnaire are at Appendix B. Input was also received from budget and force development officers.

Questionnaires were mailed or given to 105 installations, activities, depots, arsenals and other miscellaneous activities (hereafter referred to as installations) of the following Major Commands (MACOMs): US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) US Army Health Services Command (HSC), US Army Communications Command (ACC), and also to the Superintendent, United States Military Academy. The number of installations and headquarters mailed or given questionnaires are:

MACOM	INS	TALLATIONS
FORSCOM		22
TRADOC		17
DARCOM		24
HSC		37
ACC		2
USMA		1
OTHERS		2

### TOTAL 105

A complete listing of the installations is at Appendix C.

Ninety of the 105 installations responded to the questionnaire for a response rate of 85.7 percent (an installation was counted as responding if one response was received). Of the ninety installations responding, 202 different individuals completed the questionnaire for an average of at least two responses from each installation. The positions of the personnel responding were as follows:

#### TOTAL 202

The grade level for the majority of civilian responses varied between GS-11 and GS-15; the ranks of the majority of military responses varied between 04 and 06.

The study team also visited three MACOM headquarters and 14 other installations. The three MACOM headquarters visited were FORSCOM, TRADOC and DARCOM. Installations visited were: six TRADOC installations, five FORSCOM installations, two DARCOM installations and the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. At each installation, discussions were held with the personnel responsible for manpower and financial management. At the time of the visit, the installations had completed the questionnaire so study team members could explore further the resonses made by the individuals to the questionnaire. A complete listing of the headquarters and installations visited and the personnel interviewed is contained at Appendix D.

Background research of appropriate publications was also completed to determine DA policy and guidance for the organization of CONUS installations to manage manpower and financial resources. A listing of publications reviewed is at Appendix E.

The state of the s

.\*

### CHAPTER IV

### ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRES

The major effort of the study group consisted of the use of a questionnaire approved by Department of the Army. The questionnaire consisted of 25 questions asking for the individual's current and past experience in managing manpower; whether the individuals had perceived any problems that their installations were having in managing the function; and, further how should the Army manage this function. The questionnaire had three sections. Section I was administrative in nature; Section II addressed primarily military/civilian manpower management; and Section III addressed primarily the management of the total Force Development function.

たいたいというと

Questionnaires were mailed or given to all CONUS installations and selected MACOM headquarters. A copy of the questionnaire with its cover letter is at Appendix B. The cover letter requested that the questionnaires be completed by principal staff officers who had responsibility for manpower management and financial management. The cover letter with questionnaires was addressed to the Commander of the installation and did not contain an attention line. Therefore, the Directorate at each installation that was assigned the action for the questionnaire was determined by each installation and not by the study authors. This point is noted because the preponderance of responses received from the installations were from Comptroller personnel.

Study authors analyzed each question of all 202 responses. In this analysis, each response was placed in one of four categories--Comptroller personnel, DPT/G3 personnel, DPCA personnel, or Others. The particular MACOM under which the installation operated was also noted. The analysis was able to determine how Comptroller personnel, DPT/G3 personnel, DPCA personnel, or Others believed, as a group, and by MACOM, how the functions should be managed. In the analysis to each question that follows, where any reference is made to Comptroller, DPT/G3, DPCA or Other personnel, it means that personnel in these offices are expressing their opinions, not necessarily the principal director.

During the analysis it became succinctly clear that respondees were influenced not only by the way the installation was organized and the philosophy of that installation, but were also influenced by the way the MACOM was organized and the philosophy of the MACOM. For example, installations operating under TRADOC, which has a Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, heavily favored the Director of Resource Management (DRM) concept while the majority of FORSCOM installations, that are not organized under a DRM, heavily favored the split arrangement.

### QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS

### SECTION II

1. Do you believe there is a uniform DA policy on Manpower Management responsibilities at CONUS installations? 21 YES 172 NO

89.1% of the responses indicated that there was no DA uniform policy of Manpower Management existing within CONUS installations. The majority of those that felt a uniform policy did exist were from DPT/G3 organizational elements.

 At your installation, Manpower Management is a responsibility of: (circle one)

- a. DPCA 26 b. DPT - 85
- c. COMPT 68
- d. Other (specify) 15

Except for TRADOC, the response revealed that there is a wide variance in the organizational element responsible for the Manpower Management function at CONUS installations thereby confirming the fact that there is no uniform DA policy. Health Services Command responses usually referred to their MEDDACs only, not to the installations.

 At your installation, the principal financial manager is called the: (circle one) " etcaria

- a. Comptroller 162
- b. Director of Resource Management (DRM) 27

c. Other (specify)

At all installations and activities the principal financial manager is designated by the title Comptroller or Director of Resource Management.

4. Have you had any experience where the installation manpower function was under a staff officer other than the Comptroller/DRM? (Either in your present or any previous assignment.) <u>170</u> YES <u>25</u> NO

(If answer is yes, continue on with Question 5, Section II; if answer is no, skip Questions 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (Section II) and continue with Question 10 (Section II).

These statistics indicate that 87.2% of those personnel responding to this question have had experience at some organizational level where the manpower function was managed by other than the Comptroller/DRM. This broad base of experience should be considered carefully in reviewing responses to questions 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

5. What staff officer had responsibility for the manpower function?

a. DPCA - 73
b. DPT - 121
c. Other (specify) - 17

The number of responses exceeded the number of questionnaires returned because of multiple answers resulting from respondees' experience at several different installations. A few respondees indicated that manpower management was handled by a separate staff agency reporting directly to the Command Group.

The majority of those responding indicated experience where the manpower function was the responsibility of someone other than the Comptroller/DRM.

 Did you notice or perceive any problems this arrangement caused? 113 YES 55 NO

Please comment here, as required.

Generally, Comptroller personnel felt there had been a lack of coordination and insufficient expertise within the manpower management spectrum. Conversely, most DPT/G3 personnel believed the system worked properly. Coincidentally, 21 Comptroller personnel perceived that this arrangement created no problem while 20 DPT/G3 personnel stated that it did cause problems.

7. Did you consider this arrangement efficient and effective for staff sections to coordinate with two resource managers on issues affecting the allocation, reallocation or reduction of funds, manyears and manpower authorizations? 72 YES 100 NO

Please comment, as appropriate.

Comptroller personnel felt that there was duplication of effort, lack of expertise, and excessive coordination was required which resulted in inefficiency.

Conversely, DPT/G3 personnel who answered "no" felt that one resource manager resulted in greater efficiency. Those DPT personnel answering "yes" felt that it provided objectivity, logic of authorizations driving dollars, checks and balances, and that coordination between staff sections would be required regardless of the organizational arrangement used to manage manpower.

8. In accomplishing effective management of the installation's money and manpower resources, this arrangement (split responsibility) resulted in:

a. Harmony - 45

b. Mild conflict - 81

c. Substantial conflict - 20

d. Differences reconciled by Chief of Staff/Commander - 35

Only 24.8% of the respondees indicated that a harmonious relationship existed at organizations where split responsibility existed. The remainder of the responses indicated some degree of conflict with the majority of substantial conflict and differences reconciled by the Chief of Staff/ Commander responses coming from Comptroller/DRM personnel. 9. How often was it necessary for the Chief of Staff or Commander to reconcile financial management problems associated with manpower?

- a. Almost never 59
- b. Seldom 56
- c. Often 43
- d. Almost always 6
- e. Not known 2

68.7% of responses indicated the Chief of Staff seldom or almost never gets involved in reconciling these differences. 85.7% of the often and almost always answers came from Comptroller/DRM personnel. It would appear that most personnel responding to the question interpreted it to be a reconciliation of conflict whenever the Chief of Staff or Commander was normally involved in the decisionmaking process and this was not the intent of the question. We acknowledge the ambiguity of the question; therefore, no conclusions can be drawn from the answers.

10. Please state what you consider the principal advantages/disadvantages for the Comptroller/DRM to manage the manpower function?

The personnel answering the question gave numerous advantages and disadvantages for the comptroller to manage the manpower function. Only those that were listed at least 10 times are recorded here.

	Advantages	Frequency	of	Response
-	Having one manager for both manpower and dollars results in better control of resources		99	
-	Improves coordination and results in faster response when working with dollars and manpower		96	
	Increases efficiency in manpower and dollar mgt		23	
	No advantages		22	
-	Better resolution of conflict without bothering Chief of Staff or Commander		19	
-	More accurate reporting and reconciling on various reports	1	10	
-	Other advantages listed (less than 10 times each)		22	
	Disadvantages			
-	Gives comptroller too much power		51	
-	No disadvantages		46	
-	Loss of checks and balances by the Commander		32	
-	Loss of objectivity by not having another view point		28	
-	Comptroller lacks expertise		16	
	Comptroller may hide problems		15	
	Comptroller would be overburdened		12	
	Increases coordination between the G3 and Comptroller		10	
-	Separates manpower and force development actions		10	
-	Other disadvantages (less than 10 times each)	1.7	10	

11. Please state what you consider the principal advantages/disadvantages for a staff agency other than the Comptroller to manage the manpower function. (Please specify which staff agency.)

While respondees stated many advantages and disadvantages for this question, very few specified a specific staff agency.

Advantages	Frequency	of	Response
- None		65	
- Provides checks and balances		32	
- Force development function should be performed		23	
by the Staff having primary interest			
- Limits power of any one staff section		18	
- Operations must take lead to insure tactical		10	
mission accomplishment			
- Provides an opposing point of view and blocks		19	
potential conflict of interest. The same staff			
agency does not do manpower and dollars			
- Other advantages listed (less than 10 times)		44	
Disadvantages			
- Excessive coordination, manpower and administra- tion required.		48	
- Lack of total resource picture, i.e., overtime		34	
usage, average grade, reorganization, etc.			
- None		33	
- Distribution of resources without financial			
resources in balancecould result in 3679		16	
- Isolates manpower decisionmaking from dollar			
resources		13	
- Lack of sufficient expertise in PPBS		10	
- Other disadvantages listed (less than 10 times)		58	

The contraction of the second second second

12. At your installation, do you have difficulty obtaining timely information from the staff office responsible for manpower management? 36 YES 143 NO

The preponderance of those responding "no" indicated that they did not have difficulty because they were responsible for the function.

It was often stated that "personal ties make it work," not the organizational arrangement.

Those responding "yes" indicated that difficulty occurred during budget formulation and execution, or during preparation of the 78 report. Lack of proper staff coordination was the reason given most frequently.

13. Should the Army have a uniform policy/doctrine on the management of the manpower function? 136 YES 57 NO

The majority of those responding "yes" indicated that while a uniform policy is desired, local exceptions should be allowed. The policy should be initiated by DA and it should be simple and facilitate coordination.

Those responding "no" cite the need for the Commander to have flexibility in designing the organization.

14. Should all CONUS installations be organized identically to manage the manpower and funding functions? 91 YES 102 NO

Those responding "yes" indicated that installations should be organized identically to simplify the flow of policy and coordination. Many qualified their positive responses with the allowance for flexibility. Some also felt that it would promote professionalism in the manpower management career field.

Those responding "no" cite the need for the commanders' flexibility to respond to different missions, functions, and installation sizes. DARCOM installations were quite positive of the need for flexibility because of their unique requirements under the Army Industrial Fund. 「「「「「「」」」」

### SECTION III

15. The <u>total</u> Force Development function should be under the following staff officers.

a. Comptroller/DRM - 96

b. DPCA - 7

c. DPT - 41

d. Other (explain) - 53

86 of 126 Comptroller/DRM personnel responding felt that the function should be within the Comptroller/DRM organization whereas 20 of 40 DPT/G3 personnel who responded indicated the function should be under DPT. The other 20 felt the function should be someplace else. The preponderance of those who selected the response entitled "other" felt the function should be performed by a separate staff section under the command group or that the force development function be split with force structure/TOE under DPT/G3 and the remainder of the functions under the Comptroller/DRM.

16. Do you believe the Force Development function should be split between staffs? (e.g., TDA/TOE under DPT and Manpower Management under Compt/DRM) 36 YES 161 NO The overriding comment for the "no" answer is that the single manager concept is more efficient and requires less personnel. Fragmentation would result in increased staffing requirements. There was also a strong argument that the TOE and TDA management as well as the allocation of manyears are tied inseparably to the budget formulation and execution process. The "yes" responses indicated the Force Structure/TOE would be better if placed under the DPT/G3 with the Comptroller/DRM having the remaining functions.

17. It has been argued that the Comptroller/DRM should not have any part of the Force Development function because this arrangement deprives the Commander of a system of checks and balances in regard to resource management. 75 AGREE 124 DISAGREE

The answers to this question generally fell along functional lines. 86.4% of the comptroller personnel felt the commander was not deprived of checks and balances because he had other corrective means at his disposal such as inspections, review and analysis, and the PBAC. Conversely, 87.5% of DPT/G3 personnel agreed that this arrangement would give the Comptroller/DRM too much power and the commander required more than one source of information. The state of the state of the state of the

18. It has been argued that the Comptroller/DRM should not have any part of the Force Development function because of lack of expertise in mission matters. 38 AGREE 156 DISAGREE

The overwhelming answers disagreed with the statement. They indicated the Comptroller/DRM did have the expertise in mission matters, otherwise, he should not be in the job.

19. It has been argued that the Comptroller/DRM should have as a minimum the Manpower Management function because of the necessity for him to manage the manpower (manyears) and other dollars inherent in normal programing and budgeting. <u>109 AGREE</u> <u>92 DISAGREE</u>

The response was close in this case, but not inconclusive. Those agreeing felt strongly that dollars and spaces should be managed together, centered around the Budget Manpower Guidance (BMG) and the Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) system for credibility among program directors. Dissenters felt that the Comptroller/DRM was overly dollar-oriented, that end strength authorizations were more controlling than manyear dollars, and that the Comptroller/DRM would have too much power.

20. It has been argued that the management of manpower and manyears is inseparable and should be under one staff office. 126 AGREE 73 DISAGREE

74.8% Comptroller/DRM personnel and 34.1% DPT/G3 personnel agreed that the function was inseparable. 58.9% of all others also agreed. Major reasons stated were that dollars and people go together and are more efficiently managed under one staff office. Otherwise, excessive coordination is required for it to work. Of those disagreeing, respondees indicated that nothing is inseparable and split functions could work with proper coordination and effort. Other responses reiterated the dollar orientation of the Comptroller and the inherent manyear management done by the individual Program Directors.

21. In recognition of the tie-in with manyears, is it feasible to separate only the civilian manpower function from the Force Development function and place it under the Comptroller/DRM? 60 YES 138 NO

The majority of "yes" responses were from Comptroller/DRM personnel, however, a sizable number of "no" answers also came from this same respondee category. The majority of DPT/G3 personnel gave negative responses. The major reason for not splitting the function is that manpower must be managed in its totality. Fragmentation is considered bad in that it would require more personnel to perform the function. The total management idea was the most often and strongly expressed concern.

The second secon

22. In your opinion, which of the following Force Development responsibilities should be placed under the Comptroller/DRM?

- a. Total Force Development Function 83
- b. Military and Civilian Manpower Functions 21
- c. Civilian Manpower Functions 23
- d. None 71


81.4% of responding Comptroller/DRM personnel felt that they should have <u>some</u> manpower function. 54.3% of the Comptroller/DRM personnel also thought they should have the total force development function. The single resource managers concept, totality of functions, and the inefficiencies generated by fragmentation were major reasons for the above responses. Conversely, 18.6% of Comptroller/DRM personnel wanted none of the force development function. Reinforcing this view, 85.2% of DPT/G3 personnel responded that <u>none</u> of the force development functions should be under the Comptroller/DRM. Reasons were commander's need for system of checks and balances, too much power within Comptroller/DRM, and Comptroller/DRM should be restricted to dollar management.

23. What organizational structure would you establish for the optimum management of financial and Force Development functions at CONUS installations? (Please provide simple diagram.)

The following organizational charts depict the most preferred types of organizations proposed by respondees. The charts will also give a profile by positions and major command. Additionally, principal advantages and disadvantages will be listed for each.

The majority of the responses are covered by these charts. Not displayed in this study are a few preferred structures which had the force development split under several staff agencies, e.g., Compt, DPCA, and DPT. Three responses portrayed the Air Force type organization where one Deputy Commander for Resources Management controls the comptroller, manpower, logistics civilian personnel functions.

First Most Common Response--All Force Development Under Comptroller



State State State

Profile

Total Responses - 199 Nr. preferring this organization - 84 Percent of Responses (84 divided by 199) - 42.2

Responses by position: Comptrollers/DRM - 77 DPT - 3 DPCA - 1 Other - 3

TOTAL - 84

Response by MACOM: FORSCOM - 14 TRADOC - 29 DARCOM - 18 HSC - 21 OTHER - 2

TOTAL - 84

### ADVANTAGES

Single manager concept results in improved resource control over funds, manyears and authorized space allocations

Faster response to the Commander and facilitates coordination Increases efficiency in manpower and dollar management Manpower management would be brought into the PBAC Cuts overhead

### DISADVANTAGES

Concern over possibility of the loss of a vital check and balance system Possible adverse impact on career field for force development Deviation from traditional approach Viewed as a power play

### Second Most Common Response

Thirty two respondees did not provide an optimum organizational structure. An additional seven respondees actually stated that an optimum structure should not be established.

### Profile

Total Responses - 199 Nr. preferring this organization - 39 Percent of Responses - 19.6 Responses by position: Comptrollers/DRM - 26 DPT - 9 DPCA - 2


Other -2

TOTAL - 39

Responses by MACOM: FORSCOM - 12 TRADOC - 6 DARCOM - 10 HSC - 8 OTHER - 3

TOTAL - 39

Third Most Common Response FD Separate Staff under CMD Section



こう うちの うちの ころとう とうし

# Profile

Total Responses - 199 Nr. Prefering this organization - 24 Percent of responses - 12.0

```
Responses by Position:
Comptrollers/DRM - 4
DPT - 16
DPCA - 2
OTHER - 2
```

TOTAL - 24

Responses by MACOM: FORSCOM - 7 TRADOC - 0 DARCOM - 12 HSC - 4 OTHER - 1 TOTAL - 24


### Advantages

Provides checks and balance and two opinions Responsive to the commander As a separate office would not be subjected to any staff element interest

### Disadvantages

Two staff managers Increases span of control of Cdr Increases coordination requirements

> Fourth Most Common Response All Force Development Functions Under DPT/G3



\$ only

All Force Development & MY

# Profile

Total Responses - 199 Nr. Preferring this organization - 16 Percent of responses - 8.0

Responses by position: Comptrollers/DRM - 1 DPT - 13 DPCA - 0 OTHER - 2

TOTAL - 16

Responses by MACOM: FORSCOM - 5 TRADOC - 1 DARCOM - 0 HSC - 3 OTHER - 7

TOTAL - 16


# Advantages

Necessary for mission planning and mobilization Allows DPT/G3 to coordinate properly all aspects of strategic planning Insures commanders guidance is met

# Disadvantages

Increases coordination time

Fifth Most Common Response Dollars and MY under Compt/DRM all other FD under DPT



all other Force Dev

and a the considered as a

Profile

Total Responses - 199 Nr. Preferring this organization - 14 Percent of responses - 7.0

Response by position:

Comptrollers/DRM - 6 DPT - 7DPCA - 1 OTHER - 0

TOTAL - 14

Responses by MACOM:

FORSCOM - 7 TRADOC - 2 DARCOM - 1 HSC - 4OTHER - 0

TOTAL - 14

### Advantages

Allows DPT to determine mobilization and operational requirements and allows the comptroller to manage resources available

### Advantages

Manyears and funds would be together Provides checks and balances Keeps several interested agencies involved and talking to each other Does not make one staff agency too powerful

### Disadvantages

Coordination more difficult, takes time.

24. Should the Army have a uniform policy/doctrine on the management of the Force Development function? 149 YES 44 NO

The overwhelming consensus was that there should be a uniform DA policy for the management of the Force Development function, but the policy should allow local command flexibility for organizational structure.

25. Should all CONUS installations be organized identically to manage the Force Development and funding functions? 95 YES 96 NO

Analysis of this question reveals the evenly divided controversy apparent in these functions. Furthermore, no preponderance of personnel of any responding staff agency voted either way. The majority of the negative responses strongly indicated the need for local commander flexibility based upon his mission. Positive responses listed reasons for standardization as being less confining, garnering savings in dollars, effort, and personnel, and making communications for MACOM's easier.

#### CHAPTER V

#### RESULTS OF VISITS

#### Results of DA Visits

<u>General</u>. Although the study was geared to CONUS Installation level, prior to surveying and visiting the field, the study group felt that it was essential to gain the perspective of those members of the DA staff who are most directly involved in the programing and budgeting of manpower and dollars. During research for this study, the following key individuals were interviewed at HQDA: LTG John R. McGiffert II, Director of the Army Staff, OCSA; LTG Richard L. West, Comptroller of the Army; LTG Robert G. Yerks, DCS, Personnel; MG Homer S. Long, ODCSPER; MG Thomas U. Greer, Director of Management, OCSA; MG Maxwell R. Thurman, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, OCSA; Mr. James Leonard, Deputy Comptroller of the Army

いたいのであるというとう

While there were differences of opinions on what staff element at various echelons should have responsibility for managing manpower, there was a definite consensus that the function has been managed poorly in the past. The real problem in their view is not so much who should be responsible for manpower management but how it can be handled with greater efficiency.

The general officers and Mr. Leonard were interviewed primarily to gain their current perspective while occupying top level Army management positions. It should be noted, however, that all have had extensive experience in manpower management at other than Headquarters, Department of the Army. The study was conducted on a nonattribution basis. Readers

are cautioned not to associate views expressed with the positions of the personnel interviewed, because in many cases no correlation exists and erroneous conclusions could be drawn.

VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INTERVIEWEES FROM TWO OR MORE STAFF AGENCIES

1. Manpower has been managed poorly in the past

The general consensus from all those interviewed was that the Army has done a poor job in managing manpower in the past. Some of this poor management can be attributed to the organizational structure which has been established and the split of responsibility among various staff agencies. Difficulty has arisen in relating spaces and dollars, spaces and faces, and faces and dollars. Audit trails for manpower have been virtually nonexistent and machine systems for manpower reporting have been inefficient. The time lag between obtaining an authorized space and the filling of that space has been excessive both for military and civilian personnel. One estimate given was that it takes at least 18 months to authorize a space and two years to get a person on-board. Civilian spaces and faces follow a similar pattern. The problems we have had in managing manpower has been reflected in the inability to justify adequately requirements before Congress as well as the complicated manpower reporting system that has been in effect. Training of our manpower management analysts has also been done poorly because no one school or staff agency has had proponency for this training.

2. We need a system for necessary output (readiness) based on personnel inputs which will justify requirements to Congress.

The measurement of output based upon personnel inputs was described as a critical need which is now lacking in the management system. Until a system is developed which can articulate to Congress and OSD that a given number of manpower spaces will result in a specific amount of understandable readiness output, the Army will fall short of its requirements. There is no meaningful marginal analysis in the present system. The Army does not adequately justify manpower requirements. We go before the Congress and "wring our hands" when justification is demanded. Therefore, we will continue to suffer manpower and dollar losses until we develop an improved system.

Installation Commander should be given flexibility in organizational design.

There was a strong view expressed by many interviewees that the commander should have flexibility in developing his organization. The organization developed by the commander should be one which serves the commander's style and contributes to mission accomplishment. It should not be an organizational design for the convenience of the installation staff. Therefore, one installation commander may prefer to organize along certain lines while another installation commander may prefer some entirely different structure.

4. Civilian and military manpower management can be split out from Force Development.

There is strong feeling that operations staffs should plan, control, and manage force structure--particularly TOE development and changes. Other manpower aspects of the Force Development function could be placed under

another staff--either the Comptroller/DRM or DCSPER equivalents (DPCA, Deputy for Admin, etc). Management of civilian manpower--as a minimum-under the Compt/DRM was advocated. Conversely, an equal number of interviewees wanted civilian manpower under the DPCA. General consensus, however, was that despite whatever was split out, force structure should be with the DCSOPS--or DPT type staff at installation level.

5. No one school or staff agency has total proponency for training manpower management analysts.

Views were expressed concerning the lack of any single school or staff agency proponency for the training of both military and civilian manpower analysts, and the impact this has on the career development and career management of these personnel. While there are courses conducted at ALMC and AMETA, they were not considered to be of the scope, depth or complexity required to develop manpower managers, Staff proponency for training, if properly assigned, would lead to improved qualifications of manpower analysts, promote mobility and career development among these personnel and contribute significantly to improving manpower management within the Army.

6. DPCA should have manpower management at the installation.

Spaces and faces can be managed more efficiently if made the responsibility of a single staff agency. They form a logical linkage which has not been recognized until recently. At DA, an approved "Long Study" recommendation transferred manpower management from DCSOPS to DCSPER in recognition of that logic. People and spaces are inseparable.

Manpower management does not work well under operations because it is a "bean counting" exercise. The operations officer is not a bean counter but the DPCA is. Therefore, this arrangement should prevail from DA to the installations.

7. DRM should have manpower management at the installation level.

The DRM concept for installations received considerable support from the interviews. The primary linkage for proper management of resources seemed to be end strength, allocations, manyears and dollars with the controlling document being budget manpower guidance. Such an arrangement would contribute to the proper management of the Army's current critical resources-dollars and manpower--by promoting increased effectiveness and efficiency. There is no requirement for DA or MACOM's to mirror the installations.

8. There should be a DRM at major command level.

Two different staff agencies believed there should be a DRM at MACOM level to facilitate coordination. If the DRM has both dollars and manpower it is easier for the installation to coordinate with one person rather than two because of the close linkage between dollars and manpower. It is more critical for the installations and MACOM to be organized alike rather than DA and the MACOM.

The Army is far more sophisticated in financial management than manpower management. The majority of those with analytical skills are on the comptroller staff.

Force structure does not fit into the manpower equation. Civilian and military manpower can be efficiently separated from TOE force structure. The comptroller, with responsibility for TDA, is better qualified to justify civilian and military manpower to support TOE units. Justification of manpower to Congress remains one of the Army's critical problems.

# VIEWS EXPRESSED BY A SINGLE STAFF AGENCY (MINORITY)

1. No need for the installation organization to mirror DA for manpower.

The belief that the installation did not have to mirror DA was because of the difference between the focus of the two organizations. The primary focus of DA is responding to three levels i.e., the Secretary of the Army, DOD and to Congress which is considerably different from the installation responding to one level i.e., the MACOM. Further, DA is more policy oriented and needs the organizational structure to support this policy role, while the installation is more operations oriented. Each needs the organizational structure that best meets its primary mission. Since there is such a variance between installations, an organizational structure like DA might not be appropriate for any particular installation. Flexibility for the installation commander is more important to meet individual mission pecularities rather than having a standard organizational structure from DA to the installation.

語というというというと

2. DCSRM concept should be at all levels.

This view expressed the idea that the Army should have a standard policy and organization for resources management at all levels. This arrangement would facilitate coordination up and down the chain of command, promote efficiency in justifying resource requirements and improve the quality of the reporting system with respect to the use of these resources. A DCSRM/DRM concept would provide each commander

with an "Honest Broker" and remove from the commander a large measure of the requirement to arbitrate seemingly constant parochial views.

3. If the Army is ever able to quantify standards, it will require a DRM.

The Army requires a system to relate input resources to output readiness. Such a system will have to determine standards which will allow the Army to quantify its output in terms of the quantification of its input. While there are serious problems in developing a quantifiable system, when it is developed and operational, the system will drive the Army to DRM organizations at installation level, and if not a DRM per se, at least a "mini-DRM." The system will operate only with a single manager who will be responsible for justifying the input in terms of the expected output.

# Results of MACOM Visits

The three MACOM's visited were FORSCOM, TRADOC and DARCOM. There was considerable support at these MACOM's for the "DCSRM concept" in that it was believed this concept provided the most effective and efficient structure to manage properly the limited resources made available. There was a consensus, however, that the title Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources Management or Director of Resource Management is a misnomer in that that staff officer does not--and should not--manage all resources, e.g., facilities, equipment, and military personnel Army appropriations.

The perceived advantages of the "DCSRM Concept" are:

- provides single manager concept
- facilitates program budget formulations
- manpower and dollars are balanced
- facilitates trade-offs (manpower vs controls)

- provides a better capability to reduce resource problems

- manpower requirements are always visible
- DCSRM is an "Honest broker" as the organization has no program to manage
- provides for integrated budget manpower guidance (BMG)

The perceived disadvantages of the "DCSRM Concept" are:

- no interface with spaces and faces

- requires a very close interface with operations personnel.

- perception of other staff members of too much power vested in one individual

There was concern expressed over the lack of direction for career development, training and management of both military and civilian personnel assigned to the manpower career field. It was felt that the "DCSRM Concept" would provide a better structure to alleviate this critical weakness in the manpower career field. In this regard, one major command, has negotiated a contract with Syracruse University for a 6-week course in manpower management.

There was some limited perception at the MACOM's that the "DCSRM concept" vested too much power in one staff officer. If this happened, it is the commander who is at fault and not the staff officer. It was also stated succinctly that the "DCSRM concept" provided objectivity and was the Commander's "Honest Broker."

Two of the three MACOM's felt that the installations should mirror the MACOM organizations, while one MACOM felt that it could operate efficiently and effectively without the mirror image. The Force Development personnel at one MACOM felt strongly that the Force Development function at installations should be a DPCA responsibility.

There was a consensus at the MACOM's that the "78" report was of little or no value and should be eliminated. The manpower reporting system is too complex, time consuming and requires the use of too many people to make the required reports. The reporting system needs to be streamlined and simplified.

Some interviewees of one MACOM also felt that Project REFLEX was an improvement over the traditional manpower management system and stated that it whould be implemented Army-wide.

# Results of Installation Visits

<u>Overview</u>. During the course of the study, six TRADOC, five FORSCOM and two DARCOM installations were visited. In addition, the United States Military Academy was visited. The purpose of the visits was to obtain first hand information on the perception of how to manage manpower and the total force development function at installation level, and to explore further some of the responses installation personnel had made when completing the questionnaire. The interest in the study by MACOM's and installations generated more requests for visits to installations than could be accommodated because of the time and budgetary constraints.

1. Spaces and faces.

Installation personnel were specifically asked if spaces and faces had to by managed together. A wide diversity of opinion existed on the subject. A few installation personnel indicated that keeping the two together would be helpful similar to the early 1970s' arrangement. Several installations said they had manpower management under the DPCA and in effect spaces and faces were married. However, after the CONUS Installation Management Study and the STEADFAST reorganization, manpower management was moved to G3/DPT or the DRM and the split occurred. The majority of the installation personnel questioned said spaces and faces did not have to be managed together because they are not being done so today, except for DA. The DRM or G3/DPT are managing the spaces while the CPO manages the faces. Since the two are not merged now, why change it?

Several installations indicated that spaces are managed by the Program, Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) just as dollars are. These installations believed this was the most effective arrangement and provided the "Honest Broker" for the commander as well as a system of checks and balances.

2. Manpower surveys are not worth the effort put into them at installation level.

Force Development and Comptroller/DRM personnel echoed the above view almost unanimously. Most individuals felt that DA Pam 570-551 and AR 570-3 are outdated, ineffective, laborious, and make-work type instruments. The biggest complaint was the lack of timeliness in the entire manpower survey system. Secondly, the installation personnel largely believe that the surveys are after the fact exercises used to validate pre-determined cuts in manpower spaces. The majority also believe that if surveys are necessary, alternative methods of analysis--such as methods and standards or a system similar to requirements budgeting be used. Furthermore, requirements type management versus authorizations was unrealistic, inflationary, and the least pragmatic way to run an operation.

3. Mirror image from installation level to Department of the Army.

Installation personnel had differences of opinion on whether the installation should be organized the same as the MACOM and/or Department of the Army. A few installation personnel indicated the organizational structure should be the same from DA to the installation; others indicated the installations should be organized like its MACOM; and a third group believed it was not necessary for the installations to mirror either the MACOM or DA.

Those personnel, which were few in number, who wanted a standard structure from DA to the installation believed this arrangement would facilitate coordination and minimize the chance of getting conflicting guidance through different channels.

The remaining installation personnel interviewed, which represented the majority, were split equally on the installation mirroring the MACOM they are under and those who felt the installation did not have to mirror the MACOM. Those who wanted a standard structure between the MACOM and installation said it would improve the flow of communications. Several times they had gotten conflicting guidance through two different channels. Similar organizations would also help installation message center personnel who would route message traffic to the same office at the installation which sent it at the MACOM. Those who did not think a mirror image was necessary between the MACOM and installation believed lack of uniformity could be solved by more detailed coordination. These personnel would prefer the installation be given the flexibility to organize to meet their individual mission pecularities.

and the second second

4. Organizational flexibility.

Personnel of several installations stressed the need for the authority to tailor their organizations functionally to meet local needs. Every installation is somewhat different from any other. Since missions change as well as personnel, commanders should be free to adjust to changing environments. Personalities also play an important part in the assignment of functions. If local flexibility did not exist, opportunities to enhance efficiency may be missed.

Management at the installation is different from DA or MACOM's. There is no need for installations to mirror image MACOM's or DA. Uniformity of DA policy is the requirement, not uniformity of organizations.

5. G3/DPT priorities.

A division or Corps G3 is kept busy with training management, operations planning and force structure planning. When he is "dual-hatted" as the DPT as well, he has less time to devote to either function. When these functions are prioritized, G3 functions come first and DPT functions get whatever time may be left. Comments were made to the effect that the G3 had little time for force development matters but could handle MTOE/TDA changes with additional staffing.

語にない

The major concern was that the G3/DPT has too many functions to manage manpower in the most efficient possible manner.

6. Training and career development.

Comptroller/DRM personnel said that Force Development people need more and better training. Force Development personnel stated that Comptroller/ DRM people need more and better training in manpower management. (Such opposing views appear to echo the DA Staff observations.) The ALMC and AMETA courses need to be expanded and lengthened. Most 343 series management analysts complained that they had to learn manpower management on the job. Also, at some posts, the numerous TOE/TDA changes, couples with meeting report suspenses, took up too much time for actual analysis or hard core management of manpower to really take place. Additionally, some 343 series analysts serving in DRM positions stated that they did not have a centralized career progression network like those in the other comptroller series.

7. Location of Force Development function at installations.

Installation personnel also varied in their views when asked what staff agency should manage the Force Development function at the installation. A minority group felt the total Force Development mission should be in the Director of Personnel and Community Activities in order to match spaces with faces. Another minority group said manpower management should be separate from personnel management. A larger group, but still not a majority, believed that Force Development should not be split and civilian manpower management should not be separated from Force Development but must be managed as a total package.

Those installations that have Force Development managed by the G3/DPT and dollars managed by the Comptroller believed the arrangement was efficient because detailed coordination was performed by all interested staff agencies. Personalities can also make the system work if the operators are comfortable working with each other. Conversely, if personalities were dissimilar these individuals indicated that coordination between the Force Development personnel and dollar personnel would be more difficult. A general consensus existed among these personnel that changes for the sake of change are bad.

There was a majority opinion among installations visited that the Army needs a single manager at the installation level for managing dollars and manpower. All Comptroller personnel who were operating under a Director of Resource Management concept believed the Force Development function should be under the DRM. They felt that this arrangement was the only way to efficiently and effectively manage these two resources.

A majority opinion was also expressed by both Comptroller and Force Development personnel that the Force Development function could be performed under any staff agency if the proper coordination was performed and the right personalities were in the jobs. This is evident since Force Development used to be under the G1/DPCA during the early 1970's.

8. Reports.

A consensus of interviewees was that the 78 Report is of limited value to the installation and requires too much effort in manpower resources. Many stated that they never used it. Others advocated for its elimination. Most argued that DA and MACOMs can obtain necessary manpower data from the 218 Reports, ATRM-2, AFCO-2, and other budget manpower guidance requirements. Most often expressed views were: the overall reporting systems for manpower is too complicated; duplication and redundancy are caused because of similar data appearing on the 78 Report, 218 Report, ATRM-2, AFCO-2, FAPABS, BMG, IFS, and Resource Contracts; personnel savings could be garnered via some standardization of reports and/or policy; reports are too lengthy; and reports are not understood by most of the staff <u>and</u> many of the manpower staff who actually prepare them. (The latter point reinforces the need for better schooling.)

9. Project REFLEX.

Strong support was received from the installations that participated in the DA Project Resources Flexibility (Project REFLEX) Test. Under this test, dollars were the driving force and the installations did not have manyear or end strength constraints. Additionally, the installation were not subjected to manpower surveys. The installations managed themselves like profit centers in business. All of these factors

caused the installation to highly support the project. The elimination of manpower surveys alone saved the time an installation would normally spend in preparing for the survey as well as assisting the survey team during the survey. This fact is consistent with another comment made by installation personnel that manpower surveys are not worth the effort. Allowing the installation to operate as a profit center is consistent with a view expressed by a general officer on the DA Staff during the study team's visit to DA.

Project REFLEX at some installations also allowed the installation to change civilian personnel authorizations on the TDA. One installation visited, that was not a Project REFLEX post, expressed a view similar to this. That installation preferred they be given bulk allocations of authorizations and allow them to determine where they should be placed. They felt this type of management is necessary during a period of decreasing civilian end strengths and changing mission requirements. 「日本」の語言語になった

10. DRM Concept is a power play with too much action in one staff agency.

This view was not an overall predominant finding, but was more so a general consensus among Force Development personnel who were not in a DRM organization. The proverbial argument was lack of checks and balances for the Commander. Comptrollers, on the other hand, felt the DRM concept was the trend for the entire Army to follow. (The questionnaire analysis generally followed the same pattern and parochial views.)

11. Doctrine.

Most personnel visited believed that the Army should have a standard policy for manpower management. In addition, many felt that the policy

should be for all of the Force Development functions. Both Comptroller/DRM and Force Development personnel stated that the lack of uniformity is hurting the Army, as well as career development. Many again tied in the lack of a concerted training effort in manpower management by the Army as a strong adjunct of any standard policy. Local commander flexibility was also desired--which could fit organizations to any standard MACOM or DA policy.

12. Program, Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC).

Research revealed that while most installations have a PBAC, there is no DA requirement for the installation to use it for managing manpower. There was clearly a lack of any uniformity among installations in defining the functions of the PBAC. Some installations used the PBAC as a management tool to control dollars and the total Force Development function, while other installations used it only infrequently to control the distribution of dollars. Those installations that use the PBAC to manage dollars and manpower believe strongly that this tool was the most efficient way to manage these two functions. The view was continually stressed that the PBAC enhances credibility, provides rapid coordination and a system of checks and balances, and keeps the command informed better on both dollars and manpower matters.

## CHAPTER VI

# COMMENTS ON PERTINENT PUBLICATIONS

"In 1951 the responsibility for control of military and civilian manpower was assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Gl. Among the responsibilities assigned were supervision of the utilization of military and civilian manpower throughout the Army, the development of staffing and performance standards, the conduct of manpower surveys, the determination of civilian personnel requirements, and the allocation of military and civilian manpower spaces. In 1965, these staff responsibilities were transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development."<sup>1</sup> During the reorganization of the Army staff, when ACSFOR was disestablished, these functions were again transferred being split between DCSOPS and DCSPER. Subsequently, the responsibility was recently given totally to DCSPER as a result of "<u>A Study of Resources Management on the Army Staff, 14 July 1978</u>." The common tenet expressed by those who strongly support this reorganization is that "spaces and faces" must be managed together to optimize efficiency in manpower management.

a state and the second

To illustrate the ambiguity of certain regulatory guidance, AR 5-3 (Installation Management and Organization) states that the Comptroller or Director, Resource Management function encompasses, ". . . budgeting and programming, finance, accounting, disbursing of public funds; auditing and, optionally when as a Resource Management organization as approved by the MACOM commander, manpower management or Force Development. . . . "<sup>2</sup>

Conversely, the same regulation states that within the Directorate of Plans and Training, "typical functions are. . .force development. . . .<sup>3</sup> Study research revealed that it was atypical rather than typical for the G3/DPT to be assigned the manpower/force development functions. TRADOC is a total exception. DARCOM and HSC use a mixture of organizations, and the ACC usually has a separate staff office to handle the function. Most FORSCOM installations are using the G3/DPT model but even some of these installations use a DRM concept. In most cases, and all the commands throughout CONUS, personnel felt that the Commanders needed maximum flexibility in designing their organizations, irrespective of the regulations. AR 5-1 (Army Management Doctrine) basically supports this view which reads ". . .Commanders and staff officers will select, from the many management techniques available, the ones that provide the highest payoff toward increasing productivity, reducing costs, providing better service and achieving more efficient resource utilization.<sup>14</sup> (Emphasis added).

This general authority contained in AR 5-1 above appears contradictory to AR 5-3 which states, "Installation Management structures will be standardized by type (Type A, B, C and D). Exception to the standard type MACOM organization may be granted by MACOM Commanders. Exceptions will be rare, being granted only for the most compelling reasons and information copies of approved exceptions will be forwarded to HQDA. . . . "<sup>5</sup>

The DA policy prescribed in AR 570-1 states that, "Suballocations of manpower are made by Major Army Commands to successive echelons of command. Necessary coordination will be accomplished at all levels of command to insure that civilian manpower allocations and fund availability are properly

aligned."<sup>6</sup> One of the major complaints at installation level was that excessive coordination is required to align resources regardless of the staff office responsible for manpower and Force Development. A major dilemma exists in trying to create a proper alignment of dollars, end strengths and manyears and because of this dilemma the manpower management function is suffering.

Further conflict emerges when reviewing DA Pamphlet 570-551 which states the Force Development division of the G3/DPT, at all (A, B, C, D) types of installations. "Plans and supervises the execution of manpower programs and policies and maintains Army authorization documents at the installation. Directs the evaluation and control of the organizational structure of the installation and subordinate units and reviews and evaluates all proposed organizational and equipment changes. Advises Commander and staff on force development matters. Operates the manpower control program of the installation. Develops and maintains the organization and functions manual of the installation and evaluates and acts on requests for organizational changes. Maintains established staffing standards, guidelines, and yardsticks to assist in the development of recommendations for changes to staffing guides. Responsible for all organizational matters related to unit classification and change of status, and develops the organizational data required for publication of appropriate general orders."7

With respect to manpower surveys, DA Pamphlet 570-4 states that the "purpose, via onsite appraisal is to determine minimum numbers of manpower spaces required to accomplish the mission. The appraisal is based on

policy, approved missions, organizational structure, physical layout, facilities, operating methods, work measurement standards, procedures, workload and characteristics of the work force."<sup>8</sup> The reaction of personnel in the field to this overview of manpower surveys was that it "sounded good." In reality a survey is negative management used to validate already established manpower reductions. There was a consensus that other methods could be used more effectively, e.g., methods and standards techniques which are being used in limited areas such as in FORSCOM motor pools. There was almost complete agreement at visited installations that the time and effort expended during preparation for and conduct of the surveys were not worth the effort.

でにいいたいとうとう

The general consensus resulting from the review of appropriate Department of the Army Publications is that many of these instruments are obsolete and conflicting. This consensus was also expressed by personnel at the installations during on-site visits. Use of these regulations has caused considerable dissatisfaction because of a lack of uniformity in guidance and policy for manpower and Force Development functions. Questionnaire respondees and on-site interviews largely supported this view. These personnel also felt strongly that DA and MACOM had published too many regulations with reporting requirements which were excessive, duplicative, and costly in terms of manyears of effort.

# CHAPTER VII

#### CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions drawn from this study were primarily derived from responses to the questionnaire and personal interviews. In many instances the field visits validated the responses to the questionnaire. During the course of these visits, however, personnel often mentioned other subjects that were not addressed in the questionnaire. Where appropriate, conclusions were also drawn from these discussions. Additionally, the review and analysis of existing pertinent publications supported some of the conclusions. Many more conclusions could have been drawn, but only the most germane are listed in the study. A short paragraph after each conclusion generally refers the reader to a substantiating portion of the study.

1. The Army does a poor job of managing manpower.

Manpower management has been managed inefficiently. Long time lags exist between space authorizations and space fill. Processing documentation and changes, and preparing numerous, voluminous reports require excessive and lengthy manyears of effort. Manpower responsibility at HQDA has been shifted several times since 1951 (See Chapter VI). Adding to this dilemma, has been a drastic reduction of military end strengths over the past 10 years and a continuing reduction of civilian end strengths of which the latter purportedly is a major Army problem today. Many comments made during interviews and comments made on the survey instrument corroborated this conclusion.

2. Installations want a standard policy for the management of the Force Development function but not a standard organization.

Uniform policy is desirable; existing regulations are ambiguous, confusing and often outdated. Standard organization is not desirable--Commander needs flexibility because missions, functions and sizes of installations are all different; each installation is unique. Questions 13, 14, 24, and 25 and personal interviews support this conclusion.

3. The most desired organizational arrangements for the management of the Force Development function at installations, in order of preference, are:

a. Under the Comptroller/DRM.

b. No preference or felt no optimum could be designed.

c. Separate directorate under the Commander.

d. Total function under the G3/DPT, with the Comptroller responsible for dollars only.

e. Majority of the function under the G3/DPT with the Comptroller responsible for dollars and manyears.

This conclusion is supported by responses to question 23. Of 199 responses, 177 listed one of the above five answers. The remaining 22 responses indicated other miscellaneous arrangements.

 Comptroller personnel are consistent in their beliefs that they should manage the Force Development function.

Question 23 provides data for this conclusion, 77 of 84 comptroller personnel believed the Comptroller should manage the total Force Development function.

5. G3/DPT personnel are divided in their beliefs on who should manage the Force Development function.

Question 23 provides data for this conclusion. G3/DPT personnel were divided as follows: Three said Comptroller should manage; nine made no comment on who should manage; 16 thought a separate office should be established under the Commander; 13 believed they should manage the total function; and seven said they should manage the function except for manyears which should be managed by the Comptroller. No majority for any arrangement exists.

「「「「「「」」」、「「」」、「「「」」「「「」」」」

 The right people in the right job will make any organizational arrangement work.

Responses to question 23 and interviews with some personnel support this conclusion; personalities do play a role even though organizations are normally not built around personalities. Conversely personnel admitted that no organizational arrangement will work if the wrong personnel are in the job.

7. The Force Development function must be managed in its totality.

A single manager for Force Development is more efficient and requires less personnel; split functions increase staffing requirements. Overwhelming responses to question 16 favor the single manager concept. Responses to question 21 also favor keeping the civilian manpower function with Force Development.

8. A single manager for funds and Force Development results in improved resource control, coordination and efficiencies of funds, manyears, and authorized space allocations.

Overwhelming responses to question 10 and comments by personnel interviewed support this conclusion. For question 10, 99 respondees believed one manager resulted in better resource control; 96 more said it improved coordination; and 23 others believed it increased efficiency.

9. A single manager for funds and Force Development creates a perception of too much power/influence in a single manager.

This perception was expressed in some questionnaire responses and by some individuals during interviews. The biggest disadvantage listed for a single manager in question 10 was the "too much power/influence concept." Question 11 responses also provided this comment. the lot and the second state

10. The Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) is an effective vehicle for managing manpower and dollars at installations.

The PBAC, when properly used, provides the Commander a system of checks and balances and becomes the "Honest Broker." Installations who used the PBAC were overwhelmingly in favor of this system. It enhances credibility, provides rapid coordination and keeps the command better informed. It eliminates the too much power or influence syndrome and allows all directors to compete for and defend their resources. The PBAC was the most often expressed efficient way to manage these two functions.

11. Manpower management analysts training and the manpower management Career Program lacks uniform direction (military and civilian).

Manpower management analysts opportunity for further schooling and training is lacking; many have received their training on-the-job;

and the courses offered at ALMC and AMETA are not of the scope, depth or complexity which are required to develop high level manpower managers. These views were repeatedly expressed by manpower management analysts at installation level. These individuals believed their opportunity for training and advancement was far below the opportunities for Comptroller management analysts. While a career intern program currently exists for civilians, there is none for military managers.

12. The benefits for installations from manpower surveys are of limited value considering the time and effort put into them.

Installation personnel expend many manmonths of effort prior to, during, and after manpower surveys; yet results are seldom timely. These surveys are perceived as a form of negative management applied to verify predesignated reductions. This conclusion was overwhelmingly supported by both Comptroller and Force Development personnel at installations; no one believed the efforts were worth the benefits derived. というない。この時に周辺になどとな

13. The reporting system is complicated, redundant, and requires excessive documentation and manhours.

Similar data appears in one form or another on the CSGPO 78 Report, 218 Reports, ATRM-2 and AFCO2 Reports. Multiple reports require excessive coordination, effort, and documentation to insure agreement. Many installation personnel supported this conclusion.

14. The CSGPO 78 Report is of little value to the installation and causes excessive effort in preparation and reconciliation to other reports.

This conclusion was supported unanimously by installation personnel; all stated they derived little benefit from the report; many believed they could manage efficiently without it. Often a full manyear was required for preparation and reconciliation. Most believed that other reports and feeder information provided adequate manpower information.

15. Manpower management publications appear conflicting, confusing and some are obsolete.

Field visits and a review of publications supports this conclusion. Personnel interviewed, who work with these documents, believed these publications were outdated, inefficient, laborious, and make-work type instruments. Chapter VI illustrates several obvious ambiguities, and inconsistencies.

いいたのでないというという

16. Comptrollers/Directors of Resource Management (DRM) have sufficient knowledge and expertise in mission matters.

Comptrollers/DRM, as a principal director, is knowledgable and has the expertise in mission matters. The conclusion was overwhelmingly supported by the responses to question 18.

17. Under the current system, excessive coordination is required regardless of who manages the Force Development function.

During this period of decreasing civilian end strengths, more and more time is spent in coordinating Force Development functions. More coordination is required when the PBAC does not get involved in manpower management. This conclusion is supported by questionnaire respondees and field visit interviews.

18. The Title "DCSRM/DRM" is nondescriptive of the functions to be performed.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management or Director of Resource Management is a misnomer because resources also include facilities, equipment and the MPA appropriation. This conclusion was supported by questionnaire respondees and interviews during field visits.

「「日本」の「日本」の「日本」」

# CHAPTER VIII

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. DA develop a policy which acknowledges that the Force Development function is a Comptroller responsibility at installation level.

2. DA promulgate a policy which requires all CONUS installations to employ the Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) to manage all manpower aspects of the Force Development function in addition to dollars.

a section of the

3. DA assign responsibility for manpower management training and career development to Comtroller of the Army.

4. DA develop a comprehensive training program for manpower management for military and civilian personnel from the journeyman to the professional level, similar to the existing Comptroller career field.

5. DA and MACOMs, as appropriate, take immediate action to improve the management of the manpower function by:

a. Eliminating on-site manpower surveys.

b. Eliminating the CSGPO-78 Report.

c. Eliminating duplication existing in manpower and financial management reports.

d. Simplifying and consolidating existing manpower publications.
 e. Exploring methods and standards applications, Project REFLEX, and statistical derivation as alternative methods to verify manpower needs.

6. DA eliminate the title <u>DCSRM/DRM</u> throughout the Army and require the use of the title, Comptroller.

54

a superior Torie to Martin South of the martin of the same

# FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, <u>Department of the Army Pamphlet 570-4</u>, p. 1-1.

2. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-3, p. A-1.

3. Ibid.

4. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-1, p. 3.

5. <u>AR 5-3</u>, p. 3-1.

6. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 570-4, p. 4-1.

7. US Department of the Army, <u>Department of the Army Pamphlet</u> 570-551, p. 2-169.

8. <u>AR 570-4</u>, p. 2-1.

# APPENDICES

- A. List of Personnel Visited at Department of the Army
- B. Letter to Installations with Questionnaire
- C. List of Installations Mailed Questionnaires
- D. List of Headquarters and Installations Visited with Personnel Interviewed

Color State

「「ない」というという

E. Bibliography

F. Distribution

# APPENDIX A

# PERSONNEL VISITED AT DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Lieutenant General John R. McGiffert II, Director of the Army Staff Lieutenant General Richard L. West, Comptroller of the Army Lieutenant General Robert G. Yerks, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Major General Thomas U. Greer, Director of Management, OCSA Major General Homer S. Long, Jr., Director of Manpower, Plans and Budget, ODCSPER

Major General Maxwell R. Thurman, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, OCSA

122.24

Mr. James J. Leonard, Deputy Comptroller of the Army



#### APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY US ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

9 February 1979

-

SUBJECT: Resource Management Study

CONUS Installations

1. The purpose of the attached questionnaire is to survey the field on the basic issue of whether there should be a uniform DA policy for manpower management responsibility at CONUS installations. AR 5-3 authorizes MACOM commanders to assign responsibility as desired. Consequently, the Operations or Personnel Officer has responsibility for manpower management at some installations, while the Comptroller controls dollars from which manpower authorizations must be separated. In other instances, manpower is the responsibility of the Comptroller as the Director of Resource Management.

2. We have received approval to distribute the questionnaires directly to your command. We request the questionnaires be completed by principal staff officers who have responsibility for manpower management and financial management. Although the budget officer may not be a principal staff officer, one should be completed by that person.

3. Your support of this survey effort is essential to its success and will be appreciated.

l Incl as DAVID L. PEMBERTON Colonel, Infantry Class of 1979

# INTRODUCT ION

Fragmentation of the responsibility for Financial Management and Manpower Management functions has occurred throughout the Army. The situation is especially acute at CONUS installations where large percentages of operating budgets are tied to civilian manpower spaces of the various activities and agencies functioning there. Considerable debate prevails for the combination of the Manpower Management function (and in some instances, the total Force Development function) with the financial manager under a single resource manager concept.

A study is being conducted by selected USAWC students who will try to determine if the Department of the Army should adopt a standard organizational policy at CONUS installations for the management of manpower and funds. As a part of this study, you are requested to answer the questions which follow. The first section of the questionnaire is administrative in nature; the second section addresses primarily military/civilian manpower management; and the third section addresses primarily the total Force Development function. This questionnaire solicits your candid remarks on what the organizational structure should be at CONUS installations for these functions. The study team will then attempt to determine the most effective and efficient policy of staff responsibility for Manpower Management and other Force Development functions at CONUS installations.

#### SECTION 1

1. Please provide the following information:

Name	
Your Position	A CARLES AND A CARLES AND A SHEET OF A SHEET AND A
Your Rank/GS Grade	
Your Branch of Service	the second france of the second s
Telephone number*	

(\*There is a possibility we may need to contact you at a later date regarding this subject.)

2. Please return the questionnaire NLT 23 Feb 79, to COL David L. Pemberton, Box 144, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. Your identity and the data provided by you will be held in the strictest confidence.

SCN: DAPC-MSF-S-79-4

## SECTION II

1. Do you believe there is a uniform DA policy on Manpower Management responsibilities at CONUS installations?

#### YES

NO

2. At your installation, Manpower Management is a responsibility of: (circle one)

- a. DPCA
- b. DPT
- c. COMPT
- d. Other (specify)

3. At your installation, the principal financial manager is called the: (circle one)

- a. Comptroller
- b. Director of Resource Management (DRM)
- c. Other (specify)

4. Have you had any experience where the installation manpower function was under a staff officer other than the Comptroller/DRM? (Either in your present or any previous assignment.)

YES

NO

(If answer is yes, continue on with Question 5, Section II; if answer is no, skip Questions 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (Section II) and continue with Question 10 (Section II).

5. What staff officer had responsibility for the manpower function?

- a. DPCA
- b. DPT
- c. Other (specify)

6. Did you notice or perceive any problems this arrangement caused?

YES

NO

Please comment here, as required.

7. Did you consider this arrangement efficient and effective for staff sections to coordinate with two resource managers on issues affecting the allocation, reallocation or reduction of funds, manyears and manpower authorizations?

YES

NO

Please comment, as appropriate.

8. In accomplishing effective management of the installation's money and manpower resources, this arrangement (split responsibility) resulted in:

- a. Harmony
- b. Mild conflict
- c. Substantial conflict
- d. Differences reconciled by Chief of Staff/Commander

9. How often was it necessary for the Chief of Staff or Commander to reconcile financial management problems associated with manpower?

- a. Almost never
- b. Seldout
- c. Often
- d. Almost always

10. Please state what you consider the principle advantages/disadvantages for the Comptroller/DRM to manage the manpower function?

a. Advantages

b. Disadvantages

11. Please state what you consider the principal advantages/disadvantages for a staff agency other than the Comptroller to manage the manpower function. (Please specify which staff agency.)

a. Advantages

b. Disadvantages

12. At your installation, do you have difficulty obtaining timely information from the staff office responsible for manpower management?

NO

NO

NO

...

state of the second

e Children

YES

Please explain, if appropriate.

13. Should the Army have a uniform policy/doctrine on the management of the manpower function?

YES

Please comment, as appropriate.

14. Should all CONUS installations be organized identically to manage the manpower and funding functions?

YES

Please comment, as appropriate.

# SECTION III

15. The total Force Development function should be under the following staff officers.

- a. Comptroller/DRM
- b. DPCA
- c. DPT
- d. Other (explain)

16. Do you believe the Force Development function should be split between staffs? (e.g., TDA/TOE under DPT and Manpower Management under Compt/DRM)

\_\_\_\_YES

Please explain.

17. It has been argued that the Comptroller/DRM should not have any part of the Force Development function because this arrangement deprives the Commander of a system of checks and balances in regard to resource management.

AGREE

DISAGREE

DISAGREE

NO

Please comment.

18. It has been argued that the Compt/DRM should not have any part of the Force Development function because of lack of expertise in mission matters.

AGREE

Please comment.

19. It has been argued that the Compt/DRM should have as a minimum the Manpower Management function because of the necessity for him to manage the manpower (manyears) and other dollars inherent in normal program budgeting.

# AGREE

DISAGREE

Please comment.

20. It has been argued that the management of manpower and manyears is inseparable and should be under one staff office.

AGREE

DISAGREE

And the state of the state of the

Please comment.

21. In recognition of the tie-in with manyears, is it feasible to separate only the civilian manpower function from the Force Development function and place it under the Compt/DRM?

YES

S. B. B. S. C.

NO

Please comment.

22. In your opinion, which of the following Force Development responsibilities should be placed under the Comptroller/DRM?

a. Total Force Development Function

b. Military and Civilian Manpower Functions

c. Civilian Manpower Functions

d. None.

Please comment.

23. What organizational structure would you establish for the optimum management of financial and Force Development functions at CONUS installations? (Please provide simple diagram.)

a. Advantages.

b. Disadvantages.

24. Should the Army have a uniform policy/doctrine on the management of the Force Development function?

YES

NO

NO

The love of the second of the

Please comment.

25. Should all CONUS installations be organized identically to manage the Force Development and funding functions?

YES

Please comment.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION

# APPENDIX C

# List of Installations Mailed Questionnaires

### FORSCOM

Headquarters, FORSCOM Fort Amador, Canal Zone Fort Bragg, NC Fort Campbell, KY Fort Carson, CO Fort Devens, MA Fort Drum, NY Fort Hood, TX Fort Indiantown Gap, PA Fort Lewis, WA Fort McCoy, WI

## TRADOC

Carlisle Barracks, PA Fort Belvoir, VA Fort Benning, GA Fort Bliss, TX Fort Dix, NJ Fort Eustis, VA Fort Gordon, GA Fort Harrison, IN Fort Jackson, SC Fort McPherson, GA Fort Meade, MD Fort Ord, CA Fort Polk, LA Fort Richardson, AK Fort Riley, KS Fort Sam Houston, TX Fort Shafter, HI Fort Sheridan, IL Fort Stewart, GA Presidio of San Francisco

Fort Knox, KY Fort Leavenworth, KS Fort Lee, VA Fort Leonard Wood, MO Fort McClellan, AL Fort Monroe, VA Fort Rucker, AL Fort Sill, OK

## DARCOM DEPOTS

Anniston, AL Corpus Christi, TX Letterkenny, PA New Cumberland, PA Red River, Texarkana, TX Lexington Blue Grass, KY (satellited on Red River) Sacramento, CA Seneca, Romulus, NY Sharpe, Lathrop, CA Sierra, Herlong, CA Tobyhanna, PA Tooele, UT Navajo, Flagstaff, AZ (satellited on Tooele) Pueblo, CO (satellited on Tooele) Umatilla, Hermiston, OR (satellited on Tooele) Fort Wingate, Gallup, NM (satellited on Tooele)

#### DARCOM (Continued)

US Army Armament Research and Development Command, Dover, NJ US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ US Army Missile Materiel Readiness Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL US Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command, St Louis, MO Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD Dugway Proving Ground, UT Pine Bluff, AR Picatinny Arsenal, NJ Rock Island Arsenal, IL Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ Watervliet Arsenal, NY White Sands Missile Range, NM

# HSC

Headquarters, Health Services Command

Medical Centers - Brooke, Fort Sam Houston, TX Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fort Gordon, GA Fitzsimons, Denver, CO Letterman, Presidio of San Francisco Madigan, Fort Lewis, WA Tripler, Oahu, HI Walter Reed, Washington, DC William Beaumont, El Paso, TX

# Installations

Fort Detrick, MD

Fort Leonard Wood, MO

## US ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES (MEDDAC)

Fort Belvoir, VA	Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Benning, GA	Fort George G. Meade, MD
Fort Bragg, NC	Fort Monmouth, NJ
Fort Campbell, KY	Fort Ord, CA
Fort Carson, CO	Fort Polk, LA
Fort Devens, MA	Fort Riley, KS
Fort Dix, NJ	Fort Sheridan, IL
Fort Eustis, VA	Fort Sill, OK
Fort Hood, TX	Fort Stewart, GA
Fort Huachuca, AZ	Fort Wainwright, AK
Fort Jackson, SC	Redstone Arsenal, AL
Fort Knox, KY	United States Military Academy, NY
Fort Leavenworth, KS	
Fort Lee, VA	

# USACC

Headquarters, United States Army Communications Command

A the second and the

Fort Ritchie, MD

SUPERINTENDENT, USMA, WEST POINT, NY

TWO MISCELLANEOUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES

#### APPENDIX D

## List of Headquarters and Installations Visited With

## Personnel Interviewed

# HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY FORCES COMMAND

Brigadier General R. A. Holloman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER)

Brigadier General T. E. Anderson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller (OCSCOMPT)

Colonel H. Brown, Deputy DCSCOMPT

LTC S. O'Neal, Budget Analyst, DCSCOMPT

LTC J. L. Pike, Chief, Utilization Branch, Manpower Mgt Div, DCSPER

Mr. H. Moore, Deputy Budget Officer, DCSCOMPT

Ms. B. Cambra, Management Analyst, Manpower Mgt Div, DCSPER

Mr. G. Royal, Management Analyst, DCSCOMPT

Mr. W. Childworth, Dep. Manpower Mgt Div, DCSPER

#### HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

Brigadier General M. W. Noah, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Mgt (DCSRM) Colonel J. Kistler, Chief, Standards and Survey Office, DCSRM Colonel C. H. Reding, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Mgt Mr. R. Benson, Deputy Chief, Force Development Division, DCSRM Mr. Z. Molnar, Operations Branch, Force Management Division, DCSRM Mr. N. West, Chief Operations Branch, Budget Division, DCSRM 

## HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND

Major General E. J. DeLaune, Jr., Comptroller Mr. P. E. Clements, Deputy, Resources and Programs Division, Comptroller Mr. G. E. Tastmeyer, Chief, Force Development Division, DPTFD.

#### CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA

LTC R. M. Gifford, Comptroller

## DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UT

Mr. Carl G. Miller, Comptroller Mr. John A. George, Chief Management, Review and Analysis

# FORT BENNING, GA

Major General W. J. Livsey, Commanding General Mr. G. Heberling, Director for Resource Management (DRM) Major S. Farris, Deputy (DRM) Ms B. Ennis, Budget Officer, DRM Mr. C. MacDonald, Chief Force Development Division, DRM

#### FORT BLISS, TX

Colonel A. W. McDaniel, Comptroller LTC D. L. Hudson, Deputy Comptroller Major W. D. McCance, Chief, Force Management Division Mr. L. O. Sambrano, Chief, Program Budget Division Mr. T. C. DeLoach, Installation Accountant Mr. T. J. Williams, Cost Analyst Mr. F. W. Garcia, Chief, Internal Review Div. Mr. G. E. Goodloe, Jr., Chief, Mgt Analysis Div.

The second second

FORT BRAGG, NC Colonel R. H. Allred, Comptroller Mr. T. Olver, Deputy Comptroller Ms D. Hope, Budget Officer

FORT CARSON, CO

Colonel R. R. Ambrosino, Comptroller Major(P) G. T. Hudgens, Assistant G3/DPT Mr. F. W. VanArsdale, Chief, Force Development Div. Mr. F. Vigil, Jr., Budget Officer

FORT EUSTIS, VA

Mr. R. K. Hutson, Deputy DRM Mr. S. Saway, Chief, Program and Budget Div Ms R. Blanics, Chief, Force Management Mr. C. Streker, Mgt Analysis Division

## FORT HOOD, TX

Colonel D. R. Palmer, G3/DPT Colonel P. J. Stelmachowitz, Comptroller LTC T. Brittain, Deputy G1/DPCA Ms B. J. Byrom, Budget Officer Mr. G. H. Robertson, Manpower Officer Mr. N. K. Farrell, Force Structure Officer

## FORT LEE, VA

Colonel W. R. Blakely Jr., Comptroller Major W. J. LaBaugh, MEDDAC Comptroller Mr. K. L. Williams, Budget Officer Ms. J. K. Harbaugh, Force Development Div

### FORT ORD, CA

Brigadier General J. A. Hemphill, Commander, CDEC Colonel John D. Hutton, Comptroller Mr. John W. Robinson, Deputy Comptroller Major John E. Bonner, Chief, Force Development Div Ms Elizabeth A. Kirby, Budget Officer Mr. S. L. Vridenberg, Manpower Mgt Analyst

#### FORT POLK, LA

LTC G. Hammond, Director for Resource Mgt (DRM) Mr. V. Eason, Deputy DRM Mr. J. McCaig, Chief Force Development Div, DRM Mr. J. Williams, Budget Officer, DRM

## FORT RUCKER, AL

Colonel W. Koehler, Director for Resource Mgt (DRM) Mr. D. Wright, Deputy DRM Mr. H. Flower, Chief, Force Development Div, DRM Mr. G. Broxson, Budget Officer, DRM

#### NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT

Colonel Billy Holland, Commander Mr. T. G. Knapp, Deputy Comptroller Mr. D. L. Sylvester, Chief, Force Development Div Mr. P. Schreiber, Budget Officer

USMA WEST POINT, NY

Mr. J. J. Smith, Asst DCS, Comptroller Mr. P. E. Delahunt, Chief, Program and Budget Div, Comptroller Mr. D. A. White, Chief, Mgt Analysis and Manpower Div, Comptroller 64

# APPENDIX E

# BIBI.IOGRAPHY

- 1. US Department of the Army. <u>A Study of Resource Management on the</u> Army Staff. Washington: 14 July 1978.
- US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 1-1</u>: The Army Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems. Washington: 25 May 1976.
- US Department of the Army. Army Regulation 5-1: Army Management Doctrine. Washington: 6 August 1973.
- US Department of the Army. Army Regulation 5-2: Comptrollers in the Department of the Army Field Establishment. Washington: 1 May 1969.

and the state of the

- 5. US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 5-3</u>: Installation Management and Organization. Washington: 26 July 1977.
- US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 5-4</u>: Department of the Army Productivity Improvement Program (DAPP). Washington: 27 April 1977.
- US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 310-49</u>: The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS). Washington: 10 June 1976.
- 8. US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 570-4</u>: Manpower Management. Washington: 17 November 1975.
- 9. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 37-4: Army Comptroller Handbook. Washington: April 1976.
- US Department of the Army. <u>Department of the Army Pamphlet 570-4</u>. Manpower Procedures Handbook. Washington: April 1974.
- 11. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 570-551: Staffing Guide for US Army Garrison. Washington: January 1972.
- 12. US Department of the Army. <u>Army Regulation 570-3</u>: Manpower Utilization Report Systems, CSGP0-78. Washington: March 1971.
- US Department of the Army. HQs XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft Bragg. <u>Study-Proposed Consolidation of Resource Management Functions</u>. Ft. Bragg, NC: 5 October 1977.

#### APPENDIX F

### Distribution

LTG John R. McGiffert II, Director of the Army Staff, HQDA, Washington, DC 20310 LTG Richard L. West, Comptroller of the Army, HQDA, Washington, DC 20310 LTG Robert G. Yerks, DCSPER, HODA, Washington, DC 20310 Mr. James J. Leonard, Deputy Comptroller of the Army, HQDA, Washington, DC 20310 MG Thomas U. Greer, Dir of Mgt, OCSA, HODA, Washington, DC 20310 MG Homer S. Long, Jr., Dir Manpower, Plans & Budget, ODCSPER, HQDA, Washington, DC 20310 MG Maxwell R. Thurman, Dir Program Analysis and Evaluation, OCSA, HQDA, Washington, DC 20310 MG E. J. DeLaune, Jr., Comptroller, HQ DARCOM, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333 BG T. E. Anderson ACofS Comptroller, HQ FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 BG R. A. Holloman, DCSPER, HQ FORSCOM, Ft McPherson, GA 30330 BG Max W. Noah, DCSRM, HQ TRADOC, Ft Monroe, VA 23651 Mr. George Heberling, DRM, Ft Benning, GA 31905 COL R. A. Allred, Comptroller, HQ XVIII Abn Coprs & Ft Bragg, NC 28307 COL W. Koehler, DRM, Ft Rucker, AL 36362 LTC G. Hammond, DRM, Ft Polk, LA 71459 LTC R. M. Gifford, Comptroller, HQ, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 Mr. Carl G. Miller, Comptroller, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT 84022 MG W. J. Livsey, Commanding General, Fort Benning, GA 31905 Colonel A. W. McDaniel, Comptroller, Fort Bliss, TX 79916 Mr. T. Olver, Deputy Comptroller, Fort Bragg, NC 28308 COL R. R. Ambrosino, Comptroller, Fort Carson, CO 80913 Mr. R. K. Hutson, Deputy DRM, Fort Eustis, VA 23604 COL P. J. Stelmachowitz, Comptroller, Fort Hood, TX 76544 COL W. R. Blakely, Jr., Comptroller, Fort Lee, VA 23801 BG J. A. Hemphill, Commander, CDEC, Fort Ord, CA 93941 COL Billy Holland, Commander, New Cumberland Army Depot, PA 17070 Mr. J. J. Smith, Asst DCS, Comptroller, USMA West Point, NY 10996 Commanding Officer, HQ, FORSCOM, Fort McPherson, GA 30330 Commanding Officer, 193d Infantry Brigade, Fort Amador, APO, NY 09834 Commanding Officer, Fort Bragg, NC 28308 Commanding Officer, Fort Campbell, KY 42223 Commanding Officer, Fort Carson, CO 80913 Commanding Officer, Fort Devens, MA 01433 Commanding Officer, Fort Drum, Watertown, NY 13601 Commanding Officer, Fort Hood, TX 76544 Commanding Officer, Fort Indiantown Gap, Annville, PA 17003 Commanding Officer, Fort Lewis, WA 98433 Commanding Officer, Fort McCoy, Sparta, WI 54656

Commanding Officer, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Commanding Officer, Fort Ord, CA 93941 Commanding Officer, Fort Polk, LA 71459 Commanding Officer, Fort Richardson, APO, Seattle 98749 Commanding Officer, Fort Riley, KS 66442 Commanding Officer, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234 Commanding Officer, Fort Shafter, HI Commanding Officer, Fort Sheridan, IL 60037 Commanding Officer, Fort Stewart, GA 31313 Commanding Officer, Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 Commanding Officer, HQ, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 Commanding Officer, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060 Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, GA 31905 Commanding Officer, Fort Bliss, TX 31905 Commanding Officer, Fort Dix, NJ 08640 Commanding Officer, Fort Eustis, VA 23604 Commanding Officer, Fort Gordon, GA 30905 Commanding Officer, Fort Harrison, IN 46216 Commanding Officer, Fort Jackson, SC 29207 Commanding Officer, Fort Knox, KY 40121 Commanding Officer, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 Commanding Officer, Fort Lee, VA 23801 Commanding Officer, Fort Leonard Wood, MO Commanding Officer, Fort McClellan, AL 36201 Commanding Officer, Fort Monroe, VA 23651 Commanding Officer, Fort Rucker, AL 36362 Commanding Officer, Fort Sill, OK 73503 Commanding Officer, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, AL 36201 Commanding Officer, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, TX 78419 Commanding Officer, Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA 17201 Commanding Officer, New Cumberland Army Depot, New Cumberland, PA 17070 Commanding Officer, Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, TX 75501 Commanding Officer, Lexington-Blue Grass Depot Activity, Lexington, KY 40507 Commanding Officer, Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento, CA 95813 Commanding Officer, Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY 14541 Commanding Officer, Sharpe Army Depot, Lathrop, CA 95330 Commanding Officer, Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, CA 96113 Commanding Officer, Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, PA 18466 Commanding Officer, Tooele Army Depot, Tooele, UT 84074 Commanding Officer, Navajo Depot Activity, Flagstaff, AZ 86001 Commanding Officer, Pueblo Army Depot Activity, Pueblo, CO 81001 Commanding Officer, Umatilla Depot Activity, Hermiston, OR 97838 Commanding Officer, Fort Wingate Depot Activity, Gallup, NM 87301 Commanding Officer, US Army Armament Research and Development Command, Dover, NJ Commanding Officer, US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ Commanding Officer, US Army Missile Materiel Readiness Command, Redstone

Arsenal, AL

67

Commanding Officer, US Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command, St. Louis, MO Commanding Officer, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005 Commanding Officer, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT 84022 Commanding Officer, Pine Bluff, Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR 71601 Commanding Officer, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ 07801 Commanding Officer, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL 61201 Commanding Officer, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, CO 80240 Commanding Officer, Yuma Proving Ground, Yuma, AZ 85364 Commanding Officer, Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, NY 12189 Commanding Officer, White Sands Missile Range, White Sands, NM 88002 Commanding Officer, Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234 Commanding Officer, Dwight D. Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, GA 30905 Commanding Officer, Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, Denver, CO 80240 Commanding Officer, Letterman Army Medical Center, Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 Commanding Officer, Madigan Army Medical Center, Tacoma, WA 98431 Commanding Officer, Tripler Army Medical Center, APO SF 96438 Commanding Officer, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 6925 16th St NW, Washington, DC 20012 Commanding Officer, William Beaumont Army Medical Center, El Paso, TX 79920 Commanding Officer, Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD 21701 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Benning, GA 31905 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Bragg, NC 28308 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Campbell, KY 42223 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Carson, CO 80913 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Devens, MA 01433 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Dix, NJ 08640 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Eustis, VA 23604 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Hood, TX 76544 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Jackson, 29207 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Knox, KY 40121 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Lee, VA 23801 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Leonard Wood, MO Commander, MEDDAC, Fort McClellan, AL 36201 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Meade, MD 20755 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Ord, CA 93941 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Polk, LA 71459 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Riley, KS 66442 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Sheridan, IL 60037 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Sill, OK 73503 Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Stewart, GA 31313

Commander, MEDDAC, Fort Wainwright, AK Commander, MEDDAC, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35809 Commander, MEDDAC, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 10996 Commander, HQ, United States Army Communications Command, Fort Huachuca, AZ Commander, Fort Ritchie, MD 21719 Superintendent, USMA, West Point Military Reservation, West Point, NY 10996