


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
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PREFACE

This report was prepared by the 467th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic), an Army Reserve unit based at Gainesville, Florida. The 467th MID is assigned the mission of supporting the US Army War College in the preparation of studies and analyses of strategic military significance. Operational training guidance is provided by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

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SUMMARY

The occasionally-strident rhetoric by which Third World leaders establish their nations' allegiance to radical movements and membership in the Third World is often interpreted as symptomatic of threats to American security interests. Is this interpretation correct?

In his examination of Jamaican politics and public policy, the author suggests that such a conclusion is premature. He cites contrary evidence which suggests that symbolic rhetoric flourishes within states which concomitantly display economic and international policies characterized by moderation, economic pragmatism, and a firm understanding of the dynamics of real politics. He notes that the bilateral face of such a nation's policy supports the contention that verbal excesses manifest less a threat than might otherwise be perceived.

Closer inspection of the political world of Jamaica supports an even more significant conclusion: the rhetorical flourishes can only be translated into actual dangers with great difficulty because the environmental context in which the nation's politics operates, delineates, and confines actual diplomatic and economic operation. Characterized by an institutionalizing party system, quiescent mass, charismatic leadership, conservatizing labor movement, administratively-oriented bureaucracy, and confining geopolitical realities, Jamaica's capacity to mobilize to meet the goals intrinsic in its rhetoric is absent. Unless extraneous forces were to dramatically overwhelm its domestic context, Jamaica's foreign policy is confined by the state's own internal limitations.

Such circumstances as these significantly reduce the scope of the threat such nations pose to American security interests and permit some diplomatic behaviors that might be unthinkable were not the internal constraints on each state's policy recognized. When American policy makers recognize this, they can at little cost support such states' need to dramatize their aspirations and membership in the Third World. They can permit economic interests to cooperate in developments which strengthen such states' infrastructures, reinforcing their conservatism. They can conclude that such states pose a reduced threat to American security interests and, perhaps, can adopt a low profile strategic policy which will little damage and might enhance American goals.

JAMAICA: RADICALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN - THE ILLUSORY THREAT TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS

I. Introduction.

Jamaica, an island nation in the Caribbean, has been the subject of news reports which suggest that its government is assuming a radical direction: its Prime Minister ventured to Cuba and expressed his solidarity with the Third World; *Sixty Minutes* focused on Jamaica's gun laws and gun courts, decrying the violence which generated them and the basic violations of human rights they represented; and, for a period of years, US-Jamaican relations were strained after the American ambassador was accused of interfering in Jamaica's internal affairs. Do such events endanger American interests in the Caribbean? Portend a period of instability in American-Jamaican relations? Suggest the emergence of radical alliance strung across the Caribbean: Cuba-Jamaica-Guyana? Cumulate as a threat to American security interests? The problem is complex. Other developments suggest that these signs of distress in Jamaica's domestic and international politics reflect the dynamics of a state trying to balance its economic and political needs. For example, Jamaica has purchased its local bauxite deposits, entered into economic consortia with other circum-Caribbean states, displayed a pragmatic orientation in its international economic dealings, and embraced Rosalynn Carter as emissary of the American President and as a symbol of America's increased concern for the underdeveloped world.

Jamaica has developed a two dimensional foreign policy. It consists of a display of sympathy for radical movements and third world development and an operational foreign policy characterized by economic pragmatism. However, its capacity for radical movement which imperils American interests is limited. At this time, its leadership is restricted in its political movement by the constraints on its actions imposed by the island's history, social order, economy, party structure, bureaucracy, trade union movement, politics and geographic location. Unless unpredictable events alter this environment, Jamaica will remain a poor country, without hope of change, and the actual range of viable political alternatives will remain narrow. Its politics will remain expressive and symbolic, unable to deliver many tangible rewards to its citizens because of the demographic poverty of Jamaica's economy, landscape, and citizenry. While its politics may be redistributive, any actual changes will negatively affect few (who, because of the state's history, are white or brown) and only marginally affect many.

These are the keys to Jamaican politics: political action that seeks to stimulate economic growth and the redistribution of economic capital and, coincidentally, enhance the emotional and psychological sense of independence and self-control of its citizens. Expressive actions foster the latter; practical behavior endeavors to the former. As a consequence of the nation's limited political future, Jamaican activity will not materially alter American policy in the Caribbean between 1978 and 1990.

II. American Interests in the Caribbean.

For 15 years after the Cuban Revolution, American foreign policy in the Caribbean region was predicated on isolating Cuba, maintaining leadership in the circum-Caribbean, and neutralizing the area's revolutionary potential. This policy implemented the pacific interests of the region's resident European powers who, during the early years of the decade, lost control of their larger island-states and wanted to exit as gracefully as possible. It was also consistent with the interests of many of the leaders of the new nations, who with some exceptions, understood the limitations of their states and were unsympathetic to Castro's regime. Ironically, few have realized the presence of these complementary sets of interests.

The intensity of the US concerns in the Caribbean is mixed. In general, the circum-Caribbean basin is of less economic significance to the United States than the United States is to the nations of the region. The United States exports only a small proportion of its goods to the region but the region's states export 41 percent of their goods to the United States. In an era of intercontinental missiles and major strategic weapons systems, the "soft underbelly" of the Caribbean is of little strategic concern; defense of the Panama Canal is of greater emotional and political concern than it is of military importance. However, symbolically the area is of primary concern, for it historically has been a region of American dominance.

In this context, America's concern about developments in Jamaica is symptomatic of apprehension regarding the strength of its oversight of the region's politics. During the ensuing two decades, while the capacity of the United States to intervene actively or impose economic sanctions on problem governments is reduced, it will be reliant on moral suasion as a force for influencing the course of politics in the Caribbean. In general, however, the preservation of America's dominance will be determined by the

leaders of Caribbean states in their decisions to reject or acknowledge the American presence. The choices they make will reflect the dynamics of the politics of their particular states.

This inability of the United States to completely predetermine the strength of America's dominance does not diminish the significance of its preservation. Dominance defines the psychological dimensions of international relations. As those influences which define powerful nations' areas of interest weaken, the psychological context of politics changes, nations define their interrelationships, and strategic balances shift. After Cuba's revolution, America's dominance in the Caribbean was undercut. The hemispheric imposition of an economic and diplomatic embargo and the strength of America's intervention in the Dominican Republic reestablished it within parameters which isolated Cuba and limited Soviet penetration. The psychological strength of the American dominance will further recede if another Caribbean state challenges this area. As Jamaica is less like Cuba and more like its other insular neighbors, its departure would seriously affect the Caribbean's psychological state and the nature of America's influence.

III. Basic Demographics of Jamaica.

Jamaica is the third largest island (4224 square miles) and fourth most populous nation (2.0 million) in the Caribbean region. It was discovered by Columbus in 1494 when he found an island sparsely populated by Arawak Indians. Its population is chiefly of African and European descent. As an after-effect of long colonial rule, Jamaican society is finely segmented by skin coloration and socio-economic status.

Jamaica's economy has been weak for more than 100 years. The British took Jamaica as a colony from Spain in 1655 and operated a plantation economy on the island until the mid-nineteenth century. The plantation economy deteriorated after the emancipation of slaves in 1834 and the disruption of trade routes during and after the American civil war. Jamaica languished into the twentieth century, receiving only small stimuli from agriculture exports, minimal industrialization, marginally developed extractive industries, and the development of tourist facilities.

Currently, Jamaica has a trade deficit of more than \$176.1 million; a labor market of 800 thousand; an unemployment rate of more than 22 percent; underemployment of approximately 58 percent; a gross domestic product of \$1.6 billion; and a per capita income of \$660.

Jamaica's resources are being strained by its sustained population growth and the unpreparedness of its citizens for participation in a modern economy. Its citizens are engaged primarily in agriculture (26.9 percent) and manufacturing (13.4 percent) pursuits. Agriculture is both subsistence and industrial. Forty five percent of the arable land is in 300 large parcels of more than 500 acres, 70 percent of all holdings are subsistence, averaging less than five acres per household. There is little likelihood of significant agrarian reform because of scarce land, high population growth, and poor terrain.

Further pressures on the state arise from its increasing urbanization. While Jamaica is still primarily a rural place, 26.0 percent of its citizens now live in the Kingston metropolitan area. Its overall urban population increased from 33.6 percent to 41.4 percent of the nation's total between 1960 and 1970.

Despite a 25 year effort to stimulate growth and provide an infrastructure for economic gain, Jamaica remains poorly developed. It has 4000 miles of paved roads and 205 miles of rail lines; 42.5 telephones/thousand; and a daily newspaper circulation of 151,000. Its literacy rate is 82 percent. Inflation has accelerated from 2.9 percent (1960-65) to more than 20 percent (1973-75). Its economic prospects are poor, based on its resources. They have not improved significantly since independence.

Jamaica, a British colony until 1962, received its first self-governing responsibilities in 1944. This developed 5 years after the large scale civil unrest of 1937-39 and was less related to this turmoil than to broader social and political movements in the British Empire.

Jamaica has never had a well-developed nationalist movement and, since its independence was rather easily achieved, a sense of national identity was not forged during a sustained battle for freedom; its political institutions are a relatively recent development. The chief political forces of Jamaica are its major political parties; the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP), organized by A. Bustamante; the People's National Party (PNP), formed in 1938 and led by Norman Manley from 1939 to 1968, and by his son, Michael Manley, since 1969; and its labor unions.

IV. Jamaica's Political Framework.

Jamaica's politics are characteristically dominated by two institutionalized parties, well-organized labor unions which penetrate and constrain party action, mass participation focused on charismatic leaders who, in turn, are also the major parties' leaders. These forces meld into a context which limits the possibility of

significant change in the nation's political direction. Other possible devices for radical mobilization—the bureaucracy, the military, leadership style, ideology, and international intervention—also operate with a conservative rather than a mobilizing effect. It is in the symbolic relationship of party—union—mass-leader that the constraints on political change which could affect the conduct of American foreign policy in the Caribbean are best illuminated.

V. Party Organization in Jamaica.

The Jamaican two-party system has the potential to constrain radical policy shifts. Although it is not yet completely institutionalized, it contains the basic labor and economic interests who contest for the control of Jamaica's government. The parties' institutionalization has not been completed because they are reactive to their sponsors, A. Bustamante of the Jamaican Labor Party and the Manleys, Norman and Michael, of the People's National Party. The dominance of the JLP between 1963 and 1972 and of the PNP since 1972 reflects these parties' leaders' capacities to attract mass support. In each instance, the leader has symbolized and summarized mass attitudes and aspirations, with the party providing institutional and mobilizing capacities. However, the parties are shells, filled by a leader who defines the style and substance of politics, and attracts mass support.

As the parties are institutionalized, the mass will shift its attachments from the leader to the organization. This situation of weakly institutionalized parties is not a permanent feature of Jamaican politics. What Weber identifies as the "routinization of Charisma" is occurring. Routinization involves the transmission of political attachments from individuals to institutions. The JLP has maintained its voting strength since Bustamante's retirement. It received 75 percent of the vote in 1976 and is solidifying its middle-class and rural support.

At the same time, institutionalization is incomplete. After years in power, the JLP has had difficulty adjusting to an opposition role in politics. While it is defining its opposition to Manley's policies in programmatic ways, *Latin America* reports that the JLP has been linked to political violence.¹

The JLP's role definition is incomplete and the two-party system remains inadequately institutionalized, if one presumes that legitimate opposition will respect the regime of the state and contest for control in structured elections, not use irregular channels and devices to undercut constitutional order, as its support of violence suggests.

The PNP also has its institutionalization problems. Its programs, policies, and bases of electoral support are tied to Michael Manley and his politics of style rather than substance. Manley delivers visible rewards to his mass constituency through trips to Cuba, speeches on the need for equitable treatment to all Jamaicans, and specific references to democratic socialism. He constrains more radical actors by identifying strongly with Third World politics, Cuba, and wars of national liberation. And he reassures more urban interests with the actual moderation and gradualism of his economic policies and sponsorship of controls on social violence.

The weak institutionalization of Jamaican parties and the over-reliance on strong leaders is not without its dangers. If the JLP stumbles into an opposition role predicated on violence, the constitutionality of the two-party order will be upset. Likewise with the PNP: if Manley is caught in the vice of his rhetoric and actions, he may disrupt his broad coalition. This would tend to polarize Jamaican politics by splitting off disaffected leftists, reducing Manley's center-left coalition, and reinforcing the restive rightists of the JLP. And if Manley is a radical, his actions will sunder his own coalition and polarize politics between a narrowed leftist faction and interests to the political right. The predictability of Jamaican politics is imprecise so long as personalistic and charismatic rather than institutionalized forces dominate partisan politics. With greater specificity as to the delineation of their roles, programs, organizational makeup, mobilization channels, and recruitment mechanisms, the parties will more actively confine political options. Meanwhile, the most significant constraint on the parties as mobilization and radicalizing devices is their link to the Jamaican labor movement.

VI. Trade Unions.

Trade unions affect the conduct of Jamaica's politics. The unions emerged prematurely; their presence was imported after the British model and they reflected ideologies based on and intrinsic to more complex economies. They arose not as a response to industrialization but as devices to funnel protests against poverty; the state's economy is too immature to carry independent trade unions but is sufficiently organized to combine labor and political action for economic gain. The Jamaican trade unions are the major organized interest groups in the nation and they are relatively stronger than the economic

infrastructure on which they are based would suggest they should be. Consequently, given the lack of countervailing political instruments, their strength is disproportionate. Their impact has been significant: they have imposed a conservative cast on Jamaica's politics by limiting the government's redistributive actions.

Jamaica has duplicated the political unionism characteristic of Britain, which means that unions are deeply involved in domestic politics. This has directed the demands of the society's best organized and most economically successful nonentrepreneurial groups into regular channels for articulation and response. The unions' direct access to the parties' leaders has channeled challenges to the monied interest of society which, in other places, might go undirected and result, instead, in political violence. Thus, the more extreme tensions which can arise from the politicization of unions as antagonists to middle- and upper-class interests has been precluded.

This beneficial, political co-optation has dampened the emergence of a class cleavage which divides the best-organized interests of society. At the same time, it has reduced the potential for uncontrolled political violence by depriving the unorganized mass of those leaders who can emerge from disaffected unions. Moreover, political co-optation has constrained the likelihood of social change because the unions' linkage to the political parties has constrained the radical demands of both. The unions emphasize the parochial concerns of their members rather than social reordering; the parties express their continued support for elections instead of promoting demands for revolutionary change. The integration of the trade union movement and Jamaica's party structure has channeled political demands, provided a mutual base for entrepreneurial interests and unions to preserve the existing party and economic structures, and dampened the possibility of large scale conflict by limiting the pool of political actors who can assume leadership roles in mass organizations or in instances of mass unrest.²

VII. Political Culture and Mass Mobilization.

Jamaican society responds to mass unrest by generating charismatic leaders who become spokesmen for public dissatisfaction. Before the emergence of a secular state, these episodes were accompanied by the emergence of messianic leaders, whose bases of legitimacy were religious rather than political. After sporadic episodes during the nineteenth century, the last large-scale period of messianism developed in the 1920's. It developed amid the turbulence caused in the colonial outpost of Jamaica by the disruption of World War I imposed atop an economic system which had been disintegrating since the mid-nineteenth century.

Messianism developed distinctively secular and political overtones during the 1920's. M. Garvey, A. Bedward, and S. Hewitt identified race as a defining factor of socio-economic life (presaging the political implications given race by the Manleys), articulated a platform which involved reform achieved through party and labor organization, and, as the other-worldly feature of their movement, they identified Africa as the ideal society. Garvey, Bedward, and Hewitt drew their legitimacy from African folk-culture, albeit heavily overlaid by a syncretistic Christianity. This combination was basically conservative and has provided a conservative framework for the emergence of Jamaica's subsequent charismatic leaders: Bustamante and Michael Manley.

Bustamante and Manley have secularized the messianic experience in Jamaica; in Weber's term, they are charismatic leaders whose attachments by the mass are activated in personalistic and direct rather than universal and indirect actions. In Bustamante's case, this cleaving of mass sentiment arose from his visible forays around the island, climaxed by his legitimizing incarceration and release. He established the BITU (Bustamante Industrial Trade Union) and the Jamaican Labor Party as secular institutions to hold his followers. One must speculate that Bustamante was aware of the utility of arrest as a political tactic, given the concurrent activities of Gandhi and the exercise of *satyagraha* in India.

For Manley, the task has been made personally easier by the visible presence of his father in Jamaican politics for 30 years and the availability of his father's political apparatus—the People's National Party—and its attached labor organization (be it the National Workers' Union, the Trade Union Congress, or some other named device). However, it has been made more difficult for Manley because the masses, since the early emergence of Bustamante, have supported the more conservative political coalition.

Bustamante's coalition consisted of black/peasant Jamaican rural classes and unionized urban groups. Bustamante's nonideological political program, if it can be called such, of economic and business development, gradualism, and capitalism appealed to the particular interest of his trade union base and did not threaten the socio-conservatism of the rural peasantry. It did not, however, contain the capacity to actively mobilize the latter's vested concerns for land redistribution.

By visibly calling for more radical and progressive political and economic activity, Manley has used "Marxism" as a secular religious force with direct economic meaning to draw support from dislocated urban and disenfranchised rural workers. As a consequence, Manley has diminished the importance of the urban middle-class supporters who were his father's and broadened his electoral base. At the same time, his "Marxism" has attracted the society's ideologues who demand more radical change. This coalition of Manley's is not without weak points: if it becomes aggressively radical, actions may have to replace words and Manley's ability to control its divergent impulses may be threatened. In the meantime, Manley serves as the articulate and demonstrative leader of Jamaican society's downtrodden, a role for which his suitability is uncontested because Bustamante's successors have been unable to establish themselves as mass leaders. Manley and Bustamante exemplify the link of mass—party—union-leader in Jamaica.

VIII. Political Limitations on Violence.

Bustamante and Manley have captured and controlled the masses' interests by voicing their concerns for their constituents' well-being. With their concerns recognized, if not always acted upon, the masses have generally been quiescent. The value of their attachment has served as a great symbolic reward. It has dampened some of the social and economic tensions which affect the island. Both leaders have successfully managed to circumscribe Jamaica's constituency for mass turmoil.

While delineation has not completely eliminated violence in Jamaica, it has defined its scope and shortened its duration. It has done this by limiting the capacity of those disenfranchised, aroused, or disturbed, who act outside of the trade unions or parties, to activate supporters. Nevertheless, political violence has occurred sporadically. Its meaning is not only that usually associated with such actions: dissatisfaction leading to disruption; it also reflects the strength of the political arrangement which has led to the nascent institutionalization of the two-party system.

Nonpolitical violence has long been a recurrent feature of Jamaican life; this is common in many states where political penetration is limited, and reflects socioeconomic difficulties rather than political problems at the level of the state. It is a common problem in nations where national penetration is limited and other, local enforcement mechanisms apply. Banditry in Mexico and warlordism in Southeast Asia are other manifestations of this phenomena.

Large-scale political violence directed at the state and intended to force a change in the nature of the state has been a problem to some degree in Jamaica. There were periods of disruption from the 1920's to the 1950's which threatened the polity, but they were contained by messianism, the emergence of the trade union movement, and the organization of parties. Jamaica did not experience mass mobilization by violence prior to independence. Recent efforts to curb violence through stringent criminal laws, which have been much publicized, reflect an effort to control social brigandage—as such, they exemplify the state's effort to extend its hegemony over force, which is within the contemporary prerogatives of states—and political frustration—as such, an indication of dissatisfaction by those currently in opposition to the regime. That the government's reaction to this outbreak of political unrest has been so mild indicates the regime's legitimacy and capacity to deal with an opposition which has not yet accommodated the complete role of an opposition.

IX. Mass, Party, Union, and Leadership.

Mass, party, and union revolve around distinctive leaders, and these leaders define the potential of Jamaican politics. Manley and Bustamante practice a politics which combines rhetorical flourishes for the public and pragmatic economic programs intended to foster improvement in the state's economy. For the masses, both have conveyed emotion-laden platitudes designed to strengthen their sense of self-worth. Neither has combined this with a radical economic policy. As yet, their leadership style limits radical tensions without actually delivering radical rewards. The persistence of this pattern is a matter for speculation. As yet, the symbiotic balance of mass—leader—party—union constrains radical departures for Jamaica.

X. Economic Policy and the Bureaucracy.

Other factors reinforce Jamaica's political conservatism. The chief among these is the parlous state of Jamaica's economy, which provides international actors with leverage in the nation's politics and to which its bureaucrats have been inadequately responsive.

The weakness of Jamaica's economy has been its leaders' primary concern since independence. Even before this, the British sought to stimulate growth through tourist development, exploitation of bauxite

reserves (ironically, capital rather than labor intensive and less a stimulus than anticipated), agrarian and industrial development, and internal improvements. These efforts were continued by Bustamante and Manley. Recently, the economy deteriorated further as a result of price increases for foodstuffs, industrial products, and petroleum and its derivatives. Inflation has severely strained the capital market and trade balances. Resurgent emigration has increased the export of professional and skilled workers, further draining internal development capacity and increasing the marginal cost of production.

The need to formulate policies to overcome the burdens these circumstances impose has taxed the capacity of an administrative bureaucracy not noted for its ability to formulate and implement policies responsive to pressing social needs.¹ Jamaica's bureaucracy reflects its members' class backgrounds and, perhaps more damaging yet, the British tradition of bureaucracy, which involves service and implementation rather than the development and effectuation of new programs and policies. Prime Minister Manley's use of a National Suggestion Box expresses the symbolic and demonstrative definition of Jamaican politics and the poverty of national ideas, and it undercuts the development of a policy-oriented bureaucracy. Unless something alters the membership or attitudes of Jamaica's bureaucracy, it will not serve as a mobilizing device.

XI. Economic Dependence as a Constraint.

The power that the weakness of Jamaica's economy gives its trade partners to influence the direction of Jamaica's politics is perhaps a more serious constraint on any radicalization of the nation's politics than is a conservative bureaucracy. Jamaica's economy is dependent on trade. Its partners can affect its political postures.

Most of its trade is with the United States, Latin America, and with Western European countries. Any abrupt shift in economic policy risks disrupting these relations. The sensitivity of the economy to political relations is exemplified by its reactions to three diverse incidents: the sharp drop in tourist revenue concomitant to a well-publicized increase in domestic violence; the government's repeated efforts to attract foreign capital; and its need for repeated loans to bolster an economy suffering from oil shock and sluggish growth. Recovering from the damage of these actions has necessitated a moderation in the practice, if not the tone, of Jamaican politics. For Manley to maintain his Third World credentials as he was making the deals necessary to secure the monies needed to deal with his economic crises, he exchanged visits with Castro and accepted Cuban advisors. At the same time, Manley has reinforced the visibility of his commitment to a mixed or capital rather than a Marxist economy by purchasing American bauxite concessions and cooperating with Mexico and Venezuela in economic development efforts. These actions suggest a practical foreign and economic policy which accommodates the world in which Jamaica exists.

XII. Confederation as a Constraint.

Another constraint on Jamaican movement is confederation, which historically involves intense economic, and sometimes political, cooperation with other Caribbean states. Confederation limits a state's political movement because any such coordination of multinational efforts involves some consensus on basic issues. For Jamaica, which is currently one of the more leftist Caribbean states, this means it must trade off some of its radicalism for the sake of confederation. This quid pro quo limits the radicalism of the state of matters which do not affect its co-confederationists. Manley and the Peoples' National Party have historically favored confederation and continue to support such efforts. This posture has its costs and benefits. In mid-1976, as the Jamaican economy was suffering a substantial capital deficit, Manley met with E. Barrow of Barbados and E. Williams of Trinidad-Tobago. Manley needed a loan of \$10 million to solve a reserve deficit. He received a \$7 million loan in exchange for a pledge which recognized the need for stability and some common formulation of a foreign policy which did not violate the interests of the collaborative states. The cost of such cooperation, and of confederation, is greater moderation in Jamaican foreign policy.

XIII. Jamaica and the Radical Caribbean.

Jamaica has balanced its economic co-optation by the Caribbean's more conservative states with economic, trade, and expressive acts of solidarity with more revolutionary states. On a limited level, Jamaica has worked with Mexico and Venezuela in the development of alumina processing facilities. However, it is in its dealings with Cuba that Jamaica has elevated the expressive dimensions of international statecraft. The nations' relationship maximizes the use of available resources and minimizes the actual cost to both states. Jamaican-Cuban relations are characterized by the transfer of training teams

and technicians, medical exchange visits, rural development activities, and diplomatic exchanges. These activities symbolically spotlight Cuban-Jamaican relations and elevate the image of cooperation above that intrinsic in the cost of such efforts. For the Cubans, these actions are inexpensive, involving human rather than monetary resources and utilizing the experience gained in social engineering since 1959. Cuba can assist Jamaica in improving its citizens' lives at little cost and with high expressive content. Politically, Jamaica's leaders gain through identification with Cuba and its citizens gain whatever improvements result. This style of interchange is relatively inexpensive, using few economic resources and many human ones. Neither state can afford an extensive investment in the other. But there is considerable evidence that the hundreds of Cuban technical personnel in Jamaica are capitalizing on their presence to propagandize the Jamaican masses.

XIV. Conclusion.

What does this mean for Jamaica and for American policy? Practically, the next two decades hold little for Jamaica unless some broader developments envelop the Caribbean and sweep Jamaica into some dramatically altered context. The conservatism of the state, its poverty, and its increasing political institutionalization weigh heavily against any significant change. Demographically, Jamaica remains a poor island with bauxite as its principal valuable resource. Internally, it is evolving into a state wherein political quarrels are played-out in the contest between two institutionalized parties. Externally, its economic alliances with the more conservative Caribbean states are balanced by expressive acts of allegiance with Cuba. This spectrum of relations suggests a balancing act which provides practical economic benefits and the appropriate revolutionary symbolism. If this construct of Jamaican politics is correct, then developments in Jamaica are unlikely to affect American military policy in the Caribbean basin.

ENDNOTES

1. *Latin America* (London), 11 February, 14 May, 25 June, 2,9,23 July, 12 November, 1976.
2. A similar argument on the conservative impact of unions in Jamaica is made by Cil Johnson, "Political Unionism and the Collective Objective in Economies of British Colonial Origin," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October 1975, pp. 365-80.
3. C.E. Mills and Paul D. Robertson, "The Attitudes and Behavior of the Senior Civil Service in Jamaica," *Social and Economic Studies*, pp. 311-43, and Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Leaders*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946.

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face of such a nation's policy supports the contention that verbal excesses manifest less a threat than might otherwise be perceived. Closer inspection of the political world of Jamaica supports an even more significant conclusion: the rhetoric flourishes can only be translated into actual dangers with great difficulty because the environmental context in which the nation's politics operates, delineates, and confines actual diplomatic and economic operation. Characterized by an institutionalizing party system, quiescent mass, charismatic leadership, conservatizing labor movement, administratively-oriented bureaucracy, and confining geopolitical milieu, Jamaica's capacity to mobilize to meet the goals intrinsic in its rhetoric is absent. Unless extraneous forces were to dramatically overwhelm its domestic context, Jamaica's foreign policy is confined by the state's own internal limitations. Such circumstances as these significantly reduce the scope of the threat such nations pose to American security interests and permit some diplomatic behaviors that might be unthinkable were not the internal constraints on each state's policy recognized. When American policy makers recognize this, they can at little cost support such states' need to dramatize their aspirations and membership in the Third World. They can permit economic interests to cooperate in developments which strengthen such states' infrastructures, reinforcing their conservatism. They can conclude that such states pose a reduced threat to American security interests and, perhaps, can adopt a low profile strategic policy which will little damage and might enhance American goals.

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