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11 May 1979

NEW INCENTIVES FOR ENLISTMENT IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jim R. Joy, USMC

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the Department of Defense and Veterans Administration cooperate in proposing legislation to replace the current contributory Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP) with a program that would provide in return for a two-year enlistment and four years in the reserve: a tuition benefit of up to \$1,000 per semester for 8 semesters and a training/education benefit of \$225 per month for 36 months. The proposed program would be jointly funded by the Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration at an annual cost of \$600-700 million. The author opines that important ancillary benefits of the program are marked reduction of first-term attrition and revitalization of the reserve force and further that major cost savings as a result of first-term attrition reduction have the potential for underwriting much of the cost of the proposed program.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER


NEW INCENTIVES FOR ENLISTMENT IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jim R. Joy
US Marine Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
11 May 1979



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction. The study proposes new enlistment incentives designed to revitalize the All-Volunteer concept. The study is based on the hypothesis that job training and educational benefits are the most attractive enlistment incentives for the youth of the 1989-90's and that foreign military experiences in regard to job training and educational benefits have potential for application as incentives for the US All-Volunteer force.

Background. The current and projected recruiting situations are examined in view of the decreasing teenage manpower pool. The competition for the high quality enlistee will become more intense in the 1980-90's as the 18-year-old population decreases by 15 percent. During the immediate future (FY 79-80), the Department of Defense projects a non-prior service recruiting requirement of over 350,000.

Study Methodology. Data is collected through a literature review and interviews conducted with both US and foreign military and civilian officials. Conceptual quantitative models are developed and a preferred alternative proposed.

Why Personnel Enlist in the All-Volunteer Force. Several studies are examined that consistently rate job training and educational benefits as the most attractive enlistment incentives for both the active and reserve components. Although higher pay and cash bonuses are more attractive to the undereducated and disadvantaged, job training and education benefits are more attractive

to high school seniors, higher mental groups, and college-bound personnel.

US Experiences with Job Training and Educational Benefits as Enlistment Incentives. The US has had virtually no experience with job training as an enlistment incentive. The US experience with Project Transition is examined but it is noted that Transition was designed for the undereducated and disadvantaged to prepare those individuals for return to civilian life and was not an enlistment incentive program. The GI bill has long been considered an enlistment incentive program; however, the current Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP) has been a major failure, because of its contributory nature, and has not been a success as an enlistment incentive.

Foreign Military Experiences with Job Training and Educational Benefits as Enlistment Incentives. Canadian, British, Israeli, and West German programs designed to assist separating servicemen in their preparation for return to civilian life are examined. The West German program of pre-separation job training and post-service training/educational benefits is chosen as a model for the development of a program for the US All-Volunteer force.

Conceptual Approaches for Solution of the Recruiting Problems of the US All-Volunteer Force. Four alternatives are developed using the West German experience as a model. Alternative #1 would provide for a three-year enlistment and three years in the reserve, six months pre-separation vocational/educational training followed by post-service tuition and training/education benefits.

Alternative #2 is a modification of Alternative #1 in that the pre-separation training phase is modified to provide a "front-load" option for those scoring in the lower ranges of acceptable mental categories. Such an approach would require individuals in this category to successfully complete a six-month pre-service remedial education program as a precondition to acceptance for active service. Such training would take the place of pre-separation training that would be retained for higher mental group categories. Alternative #3 is a two-year enlistment with four years in the reserve and eliminates any pre-separation training from the program but provides a post-separation tuition benefit of up to \$1,000 per semester for 8 semesters and a training/education benefit of \$225 per month for 36 months. Alternative #4 also a two-year enlistment and four years in the reserve, eliminates both the pre-separation training and tuition benefit from the basic alternative but provides an enhanced training/education benefit, increased from \$225 to \$400 per month for 36 months.

Preferred Alternative. Alternative #3 is proposed as the preferred alternative. The proposed program would provide a maximum combined tuition and training/education benefit of \$16,100 for two years active service and four years in the reserve. The proposed maximum benefit compares favorably with the Vietnam-era maximum benefit of \$13,995 and \$5,400 under the current VEAP if the serviceman contributes the maximum of \$75 per month for 36 months while on active service.

Conclusions/Recommendations. It is concluded that the proposed program has the potential, at an annual cost of \$600-700 million to be jointly funded by DOD/VA, for revitalization of the active All-Volunteer force and of equal importance the restoration of the viability of the reserve component. Important ancillary benefits are possible major reductions in first-term attrition rates and other costs that will assist in underwriting the cost of the proposed program. It is recommended that the DOD/VA propose legislation to replace the current VEAP with the proposed program.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to examine new enlistment incentives for the All-Volunteer Force. The study is based on the hypothesis that educational benefits and job training are the most attractive enlistment incentives for today's youth, and that foreign military experiences in this regard have potential for application as incentives for the US All-Volunteer Force.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study is based on:

A review of existing literature.

Interviews with US military, legislative, and executive officials.

Interviews with Israeli, Canadian, British, and West German military officials located in Washington, D.C.

Interviews with Israeli and West German students at the US Army War College, Class of 1979.

A field trip to the Federal Republic of Germany for discussions with officials associated with that government's Vocational Advancement Service Act.

PLAN FOR ANALYZING DATA

Research results were analyzed to determine:

The parameters of the current and projected recruiting problem for the All-Volunteer Force.

Why personnel enlist/would enlist in the All-Volunteer Force.

The value of job training for post-service employment as an enlistment incentive.

The value of educational benefits as an enlistment incentive.

Results of foreign military experiences with job training and educational benefits, for post-service employment, as enlistment incentives.

Potential for application of foreign experiences as enlistment incentives for the US All-Volunteer Force.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The paper is organized as follows:

Chapter I is the introductory chapter.

Chapter II deals with the background surrounding the current and projected recruiting problem for the All-Volunteer Force.

Chapter III identifies the parameters of the current and anticipated recruiting requirement.

Chapter IV examines why personnel enlist/would enlist in the All-Volunteer Force.

Chapter V recounts the history of the current VA educational benefit as an enlistment incentive.

Chapter VI reviews the US experience with job training for post-service employment.

Chapter VII examines foreign military experiences with job training and educational benefits for post-service employment.

Chapter VIII provides a closer look at the West German experience.

Chapter IX proposes several conceptual approaches as solutions to the recruiting problem.

Chapter X is a summary of study conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Most military and defense officials agree that in order to meet manpower requirements for the total force in the 1980-90's, that in addition to reducing current unsatisfactory rates of first term attrition, that we must either reinstate the draft, or develop new enlistment incentives for the All-Volunteer Force.

Further, it is generally agreed that the All-Volunteer concept has been marginally effective in attracting adequate numbers of qualified applicants for the active force; however, the concept has been a major failure in maintaining a viable reserve force, in a time when a strong reserve plays an indispensable role in national strategy. The situation will of necessity worsen dramatically in the 1980-90's as the teenage manpower pool shrinks.

This paper is designed to briefly examine the environment and the demographics in an effort to develop new enlistment incentives that may attract high quality applicants and thus revitalize the All-Volunteer concept.

Bureau of Census projections reveal that the number of 18 year olds will be some 15 percent below the 1977 level by 1985.¹ (See Figure 1.)

The Secretary of Defense in his Defense Report for FY 79 noted that the size of the youth population will begin to decline in 1980: that by 1985 the number of 18 year old males will be

MALE POPULATION ESTIMATES

<u>Year</u>	<u>18 Year Olds (000)</u>	<u>Percent Change from 1977 18 Year Olds</u>	<u>18-24 Year Olds (000)</u>	<u>Percent Change from 1977 18-24 Year Olds</u>
1977	2,143	-	14,420	-
1978	2,138	- 0.2	14,596	+ 1.2
1979	2,171	+ 1.3	14,757	+ 2.3
1980	2,130	- 0.6	14,838	+ 2.9
1981	2,098	- 2.1	14,864	+ 3.1
1982	2,070	- 3.4	14,786	+ 2.5
1983	1,979	- 7.7	14,615	+ 1.4
1984	1,874	-12.6	14,345	- 0.5
1985	1,822	-15.0	14,028	- 2.7
1986	1,783	-16.8	13,641	- 5.4
1987	1,805	-15.8	13,319	- 7.6
1988	1,850	-13.7	13,079	- 9.3
1989	1,895	-11.6	12,914	-10.4
1990	1,736	-19.0	12,679	-12.1
1991	1,643	-23.3	12,450	-13.7
1992	1,609	-24.9	12,230	-15.2
1993	1,648	-23.1	12,089	-16.2
1994	1,626	-26.1	11,911	-17.4
1995	1,657	-22.7	11,730	-18.7
1996	1,707	-20.3	11,553	-19.9
1997	1,774	-17.2	11,595	-19.6
1998	1,856	-13.4	11,810	-18.1
1999	1,934	- 9.7	12,136	-15.3
2000	1,987	- 7.3	12,475	-13.5

SOURCE: US Census Bureau: Series P-25, No. 704, "Population Estimates and Projections," Series II, July 1977.

Figure 1

about 15 percent below the FY 77 level; and that the number of 18 year olds will continue to decline until the mid-1990's.² (Eighteen year old female population will decline at similar rates.)

Notwithstanding a potential increase in high school graduation rates to 75.7 percent by 1986, the decline in the total number of 18 year olds is so significant that the number of 18 year olds who are high school graduates is expected to decline. Between 1977 and 1986, the number will decline from 3.2 million to 2.7 million. If there is no increase in the high school graduation rate during the 1986-90 period, the total number of high school graduates will decline further to 2.6 million by 1990. The number of non-graduate 18 year olds is also expected to decline from 1.1 million in 1977 to .8 million by 1990.³

It is obvious that youth intensive activities will be engaged in severe competition for the high school graduate, as well as the non-high school graduate in a shrinking youth environment, assuming no major changes in the number of unemployed teenagers. New enlistment incentives are required if the military is to favorably compete with industry and other activities for the limited pool of high quality youth expected in the 1980-90's.

The alternatives to acquiring adequate quantities of quality male applicants, with or without some form of national service, is to increase the intake of women and lower mental group male applicants. Secretary of Defense Brown alluded to the latter possibility in his 1979 Annual Report when he stated: "If we do have recruiting shortages during the 1980's, we could

vary enlistment standards to increase the number of eligible recruits."⁴

The accession of increased numbers of lower mental group applicants is viewed with serious concern by most defense officials. The general argument is that individuals in the lower mental group category cannot be effectively employed in an age of sophisticated weaponry and equipment. Also, individuals from the inner city are considered less disciplined, "street wise," and poor risks for productive military service.

Project 100,000 is the Department of Defense's most recent experience with the performance of marginal men in the military. Project 100,000 received its name from its goal of accepting 100,000 men per year who were formerly rejected from military service because of mental and physical standards that were previously considered disqualifying. Under this program, men who scored as low as the 10th percentile of the AFQT were acceptable for military service. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced Project 100,000 in an address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 23, 1966. The stated purposes of the program were:⁵

Broaden the opportunities for enlistment, thereby reducing draft calls.

Broaden the manpower pool subject to the draft.

Upgrade the qualifications of disadvantaged youth to prepare them for more productive civilian lives.

The Department of Defense was convinced that the training and experience these men would receive would not only make them

satisfactory servicemen, but would also prepare them for more productive careers when they returned to civilian life.

Although considered a sociological success, Project 100,000 was extremely unpopular within the military. Complaints from most commanders centered around the inordinate amount of time required to deal with this group of individuals with higher disciplinary and attrition rates.

Utilization of marginal men in the military did not originate with Project 100,000. During World War II (and before) individuals with physical and mental limitations were inducted into the military. World War II commanders also complained they were getting too many men in the lowest mental category. The Department of the Army then arbitrarily decreed that the top half of that category would henceforth be classified in the next higher category. Commanders practically ceased their complaints, although they were getting the same number of low quality men as before--but now only half as many were designated as being in the lowest mental category.⁶

A psychological ploy such as the foregoing has little prospect for success in the 1980-90's. The technology of the battlefield is vastly different from that of the 1940's and requires an individual with a solid basic education.

Congress noted their concern regarding the ability of the services to attract adequate numbers of quality recruits, when in the FY 79 Authorization Bill the Senate Armed Services Committee stated:⁷

The committee continues to be concerned over the ability of the active military to attract sufficient numbers of high quality recruits. Attrition rates have risen sharply so that about 40% of enlisted personnel now fail to complete their first term--mostly for failure to meet minimum behavior or performance standards.

Given the strain necessary to attract the current numbers of recruits and the larger incremental costs of increasing force levels, it should be clear that the All Volunteer Force is a peacetime concept that is not now providing sufficient numbers of reserve personnel and would be hard pressed to provide additional numbers of active recruits should the national security require an expansion of current active force levels. The current inactive Selective Service System could only begin to provide draftees in limited numbers for initial assignment to units 7 months after mobilization--a period so long as to raise serious questions about our capabilities for an intense war with little warning.

The committee feels alternatives to the current structure of the All Volunteer Force need to be explored. The committee requires that the Secretary of Defense submit, by 31 December 1978, a study assessing the costs and consequences of alternatives to current policies.

The Committee of Conference reinforced the Senate request with the following comment in their FY 79 report on the Defense Authorization Bill:⁸

The conferees are concerned about the current and future status of the All Volunteer Force and endorse the language in the Senate report which suggests that the Department of Defense examine the possibility of alternatives to the All Volunteer Force. . . .

The conclusions of the Department of Defense study were:⁹

(No serious consideration was given to new enlistment incentives for the All-Volunteer Force.)

The AVF has provided the military services with a full-strength active force of a quality equal to or superior to that achieved under the draft. The cost of this policy has been close to that projected in 1970 by the Gates Commission.

Although Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserve Components have been able to meet Congressionally authorized strengths, the Army National Guard and Reserve have sagged. A number of programs are being tested or have been adopted to increase both the strength and readiness of Army reserve components.

The pool of trained individuals with a military obligation able to meet mobilization manpower needs has shrunk since the end of the Vietnam War. Current levels of the IRR and other pools such as military retirees are probably not sufficient to meet immediate requirements for individual replacements in a major war. A variety of programs are under active consideration that would increase the level of resources in this important area.

A rapid mobilization of the civil sector medical community is needed to absorb the high casualty workload during the early phase of a major war in Europe. The DOD and civilian agencies must develop plans to provide this capability.

A more responsive standby draft is needed to provide manpower in case of a major protracted war in Europe. In considering a wide range of alternatives to the AVF, the study group recommends that systemic improvements be made in the standby SSS.

The results of this study do not support a return to peacetime conscription for either the active force or the reserves.

A national service program should not be based on military manpower needs, but rather on the needs of the youth of the nation and the cost relative to other national objectives. However, if a decision is made to move to national service, the military manpower requirements need to be considered in designing and implementing that plan.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. US Census Bureau: Series P-25, No. 704, Population Estimates and Projections, Series II, July 1977.
2. Harold Brown, FY 79 Posture Statement, p. 326.
3. US Congress, Congressional Budget Office, National Service Programs and their Effects on Military Manpower and Civilian Youth Problems (Budget Issue Paper for FY 79), January 1978, p. 42.
4. Brown, p. 331.
5. US Department of Defense, Project 100,000, New Standards Program, 1 July 1977, p. 1.
6. US Department of the Army, Marginal Man and Military Service, December 1965, p. 5.
7. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for 1979, pp. 101-102.
8. US Congress, Conference Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for 1979, p. 49.
9. US Department of Defense, America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, 31 December 1978, pp. 186-187.

CHAPTER III

DIMENSIONS OF RECRUITING PROBLEMS

In an examination of potential enlistment incentives, it is necessary to determine the dimensions of the current and projected recruiting problems. As previously stated, the services have essentially been achieving recruiting objectives for the active force. This success has in large measure been the result of an expensive recruiting effort, increased numbers of women accessions and the intake of more than the desired numbers of Mental Group IV applicants. One of the major problems is the extreme first term attrition rates that the services are plagued with.

The Department of Defense report of FY 78 recruiting results are outlined in Figure 2.¹

FY 78 Enlisted Accessions (All Sources)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>% of Objective</u>
Army	137,000	134,000	98
Navy	92,700	87,000	94
Marine Corps	41,000	41,000	100
Air Force	<u>69,300</u>	<u>69,300</u>	<u>100</u>
DOD Total	340,000	331,300	98

FY 78 Enlisted Accessions (Non-Prior Service)

	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>FY 77 (Actual)</u>
Men	281,000	273,000	97	356,400
Women	37,400	38,300	102	31,200

FY 78 Enlistments of Women, Compared with FY 77 Enlistments

<u>Service</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>% of Total</u>	
	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 77</u>
Army	17,500	15,000	14	9
Navy	5,800	4,800	7	5
Marine Corps	2,300	1,600	6	3
Air Force	<u>12,700</u>	<u>9,900</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>14</u>
DOD Total	38,300	31,300	12	8

Figure 2

The intake of non-prior service Mental Group IV applicants within the Army was 10.5 percent in FY 78; however, of more significance is the combination of Mental Group IIIB and Mental Group IV's which totaled 48.7 percent.² FY 77 totals were approximately the same as FY 78.³ (See Figure 3.)

The Department of Defense recruiting plans for FY 79 and FY 80 are depicted in Figure 4.


RECRUITING STATISTICS
COMPARISON
FY 74 - FY 78

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Total Accessions (% of Objective)	199,196 (100.6)	208,915 (102.1)	193,024 (100.2)	180,718 (99.2)	134,428 (98.1)
NPS Males (% of Objective)	166,798 (97.8)	165,610 (98.8)	164,291 (100.1)	153,434 (100.3)	101,512 (97.4)
NPS Females (% of Objective)	15,446 (109.5)	19,070 (117.0)	15,884 (99.9)	14,964 (100.4)	17,517 (99.5)
PS Personnel (% of Objective)	16,952 (127.5)	24,235 (117.1)	12,849 (102.0)	12,320 (86.2)	10,399 (103.0)
<u>TOTAL HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES</u>					
NPS (M) #	77,839	89,883	91,310	86,228	74,566
%	46.7	54.3	55.6	56.2	70.0
NPS (F) #	13,371	16,901	14,233	13,453	16,820
%	86.6	88.6	89.6	89.9	96.0
NPS Total #	91,210	106,784	105,543	99,681	91,386
%	50.1	57.8	58.6	59.2	73.7
<u>MENTAL CATEGORIES (NPS) (%)</u>					
I	3.6	4.6	5.3	4.0	3.9
II	27.5	30.3	27.6	21.1	22.4
IIIA	21.4	22.7	21.9	20.6	25.0
I-IIIA	52.5	57.6	54.8	45.7	51.3
IIIB	29.7	32.4	37.6	45.2	38.2
IV	17.8	10.0	7.6	9.1	10.5
BLACKS (NPS)	27.2	23.0	24.4	29.4	34.3
Two-Year Term (NPS)	22.1	16.7	0.6	(not used)	
Three-Year Term (NPS)	69.3	68.8	73.6	75.5	70.4
Four (+) Year Term (NPS)	8.6	14.5	25.8	24.5	29.6

Source: DGSPERS, Department of the Army, 30 March 1979.

Figure 3

ARMY TOTAL ACTIVE ENLISTED NPS ACCESSIONS (FY 1977)



Source: US Department of Defense, America Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Force, 31 December 1978.

Figure 3 (Continued)

Active Force Enlisted Accessions
(In Thousands)

<u>Service</u>	FY 77 <u>Actual</u>	FY 78 <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 80 President's Budget</u>	
			FY 79 <u>Plan</u>	FY 80 <u>Plan</u>
<u>DoD</u>				
All Sources	410.8	331.7	372.9	378.4
PS	23.3	19.8	22.6	24.6
NPS Total	387.5	312.0	350.3	353.8
NPS Male	356.4	273.7	306.8	305.9
(MHSDG)	(240.4)	(205.5)	(223.0)	(222.3)
NPS Female	31.2	38.3	43.5	47.9
<u>Army</u>				
All Sources	180.7	134.4	164.4	165.4
PS	12.3	10.4	12.1	12.0
NPS Total	168.4	124.0	152.3	153.4
NPS Male	153.4	106.5	132.4	131.5
(MHSDG)	(86.2)	(74.6)	(87.6)	(85.8)
NPS Female	15.0	17.5	19.9	21.9
<u>Navy</u>				
All Sources	109.5	87.0	92.3	98.9
PS	8.0	6.7	7.1	8.4
NPS Total	101.6	80.3	85.2	90.5
NPS Male	96.8	74.5	77.2	80.4
(MHSDG)	(69.0)	(56.5)	(58.7)	(61.1)
NPS Female	4.8	5.8	8.0	10.1
<u>Marine Corps</u>				
All Sources	46.9	41.0	47.0	42.6
PS	1.9	1.4	2.2	1.7
NPS Total	45.0	39.6	44.8	40.9
NPS Male	43.5	37.3	42.5	38.6
(MHSDG)	(30.0)	(27.5)	(31.9)	(30.0)
NPS Female	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.3
<u>Air Force a/</u>				
All Sources	73.6	69.3	69.2	71.5
PS	1.1	1.3	1.2	2.5
NPS Total	72.5	68.0	68.0	69.0
NPS Male	62.7	55.3	54.7	55.4
(MHSDG)	(55.2)	(46.9)	(44.9)	(45.4)
NPS Female	9.9	12.7	13.3	13.6

LEGEND: All Sources = NPS+PS
PS = Prior Service

NPS = Non-Prior Service
MHSDG = Male High School Diploma
Graduate

NOTE: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

a/ Air Force MHSDG Plan in FY 79-FY 80 based on 82% of NPS Male Objective.

Figure 4 OASD(MRACL)MPP/ACR
Revised 28 February 1979

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of Defense, News Release, 6 December 1978, p. 2.

2. US Department of the Army, Recruiting Statistics Comparisons FY 74-FY 78, 30 March 1979.

3. America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, p. 27.

CHAPTER IV

WHY PERSONNEL ENLIST IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

During the 1968 presidential election campaign, one of Richard Nixon's campaign promises was the elimination of the draft and the establishment of an all-volunteer armed force. Following his election, President Nixon moved quickly to fulfill his promise by forming a Task Force to make recommendations concerning the implementation of the all-volunteer force concept. The elimination of the draft was a very popular issue related to the internal strife over the unpopular war in Vietnam.

Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates chaired the All-Volunteer Armed Forces Task Force which was made up of a cross section of American society. The method of operation adopted by the Task Force was to solicit recommendations from the services and other interested agencies, as to what types of programs were necessary to make military service more attractive and the all-volunteer concept feasible.¹

Literally hundreds of recommendations were considered. They were generally centered around, higher pay, better living conditions, more educational opportunities, and improved working conditions.

The all-volunteer concept was implemented in 1970 with higher pay being the only major change.² Thus the country had changed to an all-volunteer force with only increased pay to make service life more attractive. True, new barracks have been built, and

there have been some minor changes in service policies that have resulted in the elimination of early reveilles, musters, short haircuts and the requirement for carrying liberty cards, but the sum total of the situation is that we have gone to an all-volunteer armed force without any major or innovative change, other than increased pay. The Gates Commission recognized that increased pay was not the solution to all of the problems concerned with attracting youth to the all-volunteer force:³

Pay is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary motivating force for joining or remaining in the military services. A sense of duty, a desire for adventure or travel, society's esteem for military service, a desire for training, the quality of military life and the general conditions of military service--all effect individual's decisions. Some of these non-pecuniary factors are beyond the control of the services. Others, however, can be controlled, and the Commission is recommending a number of changes in military manpower procurement and management practices to improve the non-monetary conditions of military life and thereby help increase the attractiveness of military careers. These steps will contribute to the attainment of an all-volunteer force, but are not sufficient in themselves. Military compensation in the early years of service is now so low that it will not sustain an all-volunteer force of the quality desired. Until that condition is corrected, an all-volunteer force cannot be realized. . . .

One question to be answered is how important is pay as an enlistment incentive? Or, is increased pay the solution to attracting increased numbers of high quality recruits?

The Congressional Budget Office opines that a 1 percent change in military pay relative to civilian wage rates produces a 1 percent change in enlistments of high school graduates.⁴ The Gates Commission used a 1.25 percent pay elasticity in 1970 to find the pay necessary to recruit an all-volunteer force.⁵

Unfortunately pay raises are extremely expensive, a raise of only 1 percent in 1978 would cost approximately \$200 million.⁶ Thus a 10 percent increase in enlistments could cost as much as \$2 billion. Of course, the major costs of pay raises are for the career force, with only a small percentage going towards attracting the first term enlistee. Thus, pay increases are not cost effective enlistment incentives and generally attract lower quality applicants.

Numerous studies have concluded that the major attraction to military service is job training and educational benefits. Several surveys conducted by the Department of Defense support the contention that education and training opportunities have a strong appeal to youth.⁷ Training and education are important to youth because they tend to enhance their future marketability and potential earnings in the civilian labor market. Conclusions of several studies follow.

1971 STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE ARMY
BY OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION

Respondents were asked to look over an incentive listing and pick the one single item most important to them. In these terms, maintenance of individuality (24 percent) and guaranteed job after four years service (22 percent) clearly attracted the most responses. Pay, an important issue in most research, came out as a consideration of secondary importance (8 percent).⁸

1971 STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE ARMY
BY OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION

Concluded that the Army offered two basic appeals to young men, self-fulfillment and training.⁹ (Teaches a trade, provides job training for civilian life, offers educational opportunity such as working toward a high school diploma.)

1973 STUDY COMPLETED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BY THE AIR FORCES HUMAN RESOURCES LABORATORY

Found that post-service enlistment incentives such as post-service employment assistance, post-service college/technical training benefits were consistently rated above bonuses as enlistment incentives.¹⁰

1974 STUDY COMPLETED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BY THE AIR FORCES HUMAN RESOURCES LABORATORY

Found that at the end of the 12th grade, respondents rated one incentive high above all others, "the government agrees to pay for four years of college." This was selected by a margin of four to one over the next ranked incentive, "military pay comparable to civilian pay."¹¹

1974 STUDY COMPLETED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BY THE AIR FORCES HUMAN RESOURCES LABORATORY

Found that the single most frequently endorsed incentive to enlist in the regular force was a fully paid college education. This incentive appealed to the 16-17 year old target segment of the youth population (including higher aptitude high school

students) and shows no racial differences. In contrast, a \$3000 enlistment bonus was less frequently endorsed, was more popular among low aptitude high school students, and had higher appeal for non-whites than whites. Further, the single most frequently endorsed incentive to Reserve/National Guard affiliation was educational benefits.¹²

1979 STUDY COMPLETED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BY THE US ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER

Based on a survey of first term enlistees, conducted in the spring of 1977, found that GI educational benefits were identified as the most important enlistment reason for each of three "initial plans" subgroups. (These subgroups were made up of: (1) those who planned to serve only one enlistment (about 33 percent); (2) those who enlisted without any concrete plans about the Army (about 40 percent); and (3) those enlisting intending to make the Army a career (about 20 percent). The second most important enlistment reason was "to learn a skill/trade to use in civilian life."¹³

1979 STUDY COMPLETED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH GROUP

Found that enlistment incentives that were most appealing were cash bonuses and education benefits:¹⁴

All in all, while cash bonuses increases have wide-spread appeal, educational assistance appears to have particular appeal to the following target markets: negatively propensity individuals, high school seniors, high mental quality index individuals, and whites.

In the Secretary of Defense report to Congress on the All-Volunteer Force (the report Congress asked for in comments on the FY 79 Authorization Bill), increased educational benefits were noted as being consistently identified as enlistment incentives that would significantly increase the likelihood of enlistment.¹⁵ It is interesting to note, however, that this finding did not have any importance attached thereto in the study's conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. US Government, Report of the President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force, February 1970, p. iii.
2. Melvin R. Laird, FY 71 Posture Statement, pp. 3-5.
3. Report of the President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 49.
4. US Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of Defense Manpower (Budget Issue Paper for 1977), January 1977, p. 135.
5. Report of the President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 180.
6. Costs of Defense Manpower, p. 97.
7. Public Sector Research Group, Market Facts: Youth Attitude Tracking Study (Study Prepared for US Department of Defense), January 1977, p. 17.
8. Opinion Research Corporation, Reaction of 17-21 Year Old Males, Not in College, to Enlistment in the Army (Study Prepared for the US Department of the Army), July 1971, pp. 74-75.
9. Opinion Research Corporation, Attitudes and Motivation of Young Men Toward Enlisting in the US Army (Study Prepared for the US Department of the Army), May 1971, pp. 3, 21a-21b.
10. US Air Forces Human Resources Laboratory, Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service (Study Prepared for the US Department of Defense), 15 June 1973, pp. 42-47.
11. US Air Forces Human Resources Laboratory, Young Men and Military Service (Study Prepared for the US Department of Defense), January 1974, pp. 47-50.
12. US Air Forces Human Resources Laboratory, Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in a Zero-Draft Environment (Study Prepared for the US Department of Defense), February 1974, pp. 31-50.
13. US Army Military Personnel Center, Job Satisfaction, Unit Morale and Reenlistment Intent/Decisions for Army Enlisted Personnel, March 1979, pp. v, 6-7.

14. Public Sector Research Group, Market Facts: Youth Attitude Tracking Study (Study Prepared for US Department of Defense), February 1979, p. 163.

15. America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, pp. 272-273.

CHAPTER V

HISTORY OF THE VETERANS EDUCATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Prior to 1 January 1977, the GI bill provided a broad based non-contributory educational incentive for enlistment. Since the 1st of January 1977, new recruits have been eligible to participate in a contributory educational assistance program, the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP). To participate in VEAP, the serviceman allots a minimum of \$50 per month (up to max of \$75 per month), from his basic pay. To this amount the Veterans Administration adds \$2 for each \$1 allotted by the serviceman. Thus, in a 3 year enlistment the serviceman may contribute a maximum of \$2700 (\$75 per month X 36 months), which when added to the \$5400 provided by the Veterans Administration, provides an overall benefit of \$8100. This amount is then disbursed to the veteran in 36 equal monthly payments during his pursuit of college or other training. If after service the veteran decides not to use his educational benefit, he can withdraw his contribution, but not that of the VA. If the serviceman reenlists after his initial term of service, benefits are carried forward until such time as the serviceman finally separates, or the serviceman's contribution could be withdrawn after the completion of six years service, if he decided to remain in the service and not utilize educational benefits when separated.

VEAP provides some educational benefits to the veteran, however, these benefits are significantly less than those under

the old GI bill. For example, a single veteran attending school full time for the maximum of 45 months allowed under the old GI bill would receive about \$14,000 in educational assistance. A married veteran with one dependent would receive over \$16,500. Under VEAP the veteran would receive a maximum of \$5400 in benefits, plus his contribution of \$2700. In addition, VEAP benefits are not available until the servicemember has completed his initial term of service. Furthermore, a first termee who wishes to participate in off-duty tuition assistance programs must not only allot a minimum of \$50 per month to VEAP but must also contribute to any in-service tuition assistance program in which he participates.¹

The lack of acceptance of VEAP is vividly displayed by recent statistics released by the Veterans Administration.² Since the program was inaugurated in January 1977, only 46,000 servicemen have chosen to take part in this newest GI Bill program (27,446 Army, 15,012 Navy, 2,712 Marines, 881 Air Force, and 368 Coast Guard).

The foregoing results may be contrasted with the results of the former GI Bills even though they were primarily aimed at assisting the draftee. The Veterans Administration reports that the participation rate under the 1966 Bill was higher than either of its two predecessors, with 7.2 million veterans and service personnel, or 65 percent of those eligible, having taken some form of training.³ Under the original World War II bill, 7.8 million out of 15.4 million eligible, or 50.5 percent, used benefits.

The rate was 43.4 percent for the Korean Conflict bill, when 2.4 million of the 5.5 million eligible trained under this popular program. A greater number of those trained under the Vietnam bill used benefits for college courses than the other two programs-- nearly 58.7 percent compared to 50.7 percent for Korean Conflict veterans and 28.6 percent for veterans of World War II.

The Department of Defense is currently examining the utility of an enhanced GI Bill program as an enlistment incentive.⁴ The Department of the Army has been authorized to conduct a test of a 2 year enlistment that would provide the serviceman with an additional \$2000 contribution by the service to the VEAP educational benefit, as an enlistment incentive. Thus, a serviceman could contribute \$50-75 per month, the Veterans Administration would provide \$2 for each dollar contributed, and the service would add \$2000. This allows the serviceman in the two year option with the VEAP, and the enhancement, to accumulate up to \$7400 for educational expenses.

Unfortunately, the real question, one which won't be answered by the Army test, is the utility of a non-contributory educational benefit when compared to the current contributory program. As evidenced by the previously cited Veterans Administration statistics, today's serviceman generally lacks the foresight (or the income) to allot \$50-75 per month toward his future education.

The Department of Defense recognized the value of educational benefits as an enlistment incentive when in 1976 they endorsed the current VEAP Bill as the replacement for the expiring Vietnam

era GI Bill. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in his Annual Report to Congress:⁵

. . . the prospective loss of GI educational benefits for new enlistees (are) expected to have an adverse impact on our ability to recruit high potential personnel. . . .

Army recruiting commanding general Major General Eugene P. Forrester, provided additional evidence when he stated that the educational benefits provided by the GI Bill are needed by the services to attract "quality prospective recruits." General Forrester advised that the pending loss of the GI bill would be "a serious blow to recruiting and would have (a) particularly adverse effect on quality. . . ."6

The VEAP Bill was sponsored by the Veterans Administration in 1976 as part of an overall revision of Veterans benefits to replace the Vietnam era Bill of 1966. The revamped educational benefits were proposed by the administration, and enacted by Congress, as a major money saving measure. The VEAP bill would prove much less expensive than its predecessor, but as experience has shown, it has also been much less accepted by the serviceman and has been of limited benefit as an enlistment incentive.

It is difficult to understand how all concerned seriously overestimated the value of VEAP as an enlistment incentive. It is apparent from the legislative history of the bill that Congress was influenced by the writings of Moskos and Janowitz. The authors, when faced with the elimination of the GI bill, recommended a contributory program.⁷

A desirable feature in such an arrangement would be a system in which contributions by service personnel would be matched by the Veterans Administration.

The proposed system was strongly supported by various educational and veterans associations. The American Council on Education advised:⁸

If it is the will of Congress that the program (GI Bill) be modified at the present time, the new program which would be established by your amendment (Amend. No. 2005) to S. 969 seems to offer a constructive way to help meet the needs of servicemen and veterans, as well as the military.

The Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) testified:⁹

We believe the advantages which accrue to the individual veteran, in terms of increased opportunities, higher income, and greater self esteem from post-secondary education or training alone, merit the consideration of a GI Bill. We also believe advantages accrue to society as a whole from the veterans having increased educational levels. . . . It is also the PVA's position that the current educational entitlements . . . must be viewed as readjustment benefits. . . . PVA feels the Post Vietnam Era Veterans Assistance Act . . . is a very imaginative and feasible program to ensure the continuation of education and training benefits for future veterans. . . . The proposed program has PVA's wholehearted endorsement.

The American Legion testified that they:¹⁰

. . . supported a strong national defense and a program of attracting qualified men and women into our Armed Forces--both of which would be aided by an educational assistance program designed to stimulate enlistments in the Armed Forces.

The National Association of Concerned Veterans testified:¹¹

. . . a fine piece of legislation . . . the GI Bill is an investment, not a give-a-way program . . . it has long been the position of NACV to continue the GI Bill.

The American Veterans of World War II, Korea and Vietnam,
(AMVETS) stated:¹²

As per the mandate of our 32nd National Convention held recently in Philadelphia, AMVETS is in full concurrence with chapter 32--The Post-Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. This new innovative direction brings about a well-defined distinction between wartime and peacetime benefits. The fact that the peacetime serviceman must contribute toward his future education further adds to that distinction. . . .

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. America's Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, p. 273.
2. US Veterans Administration, Press Release, 24 April 1978, pp. 1-2.
3. US Veterans Administration, Press Release, 21 June 1978, p. 1.
4. US Department of Defense, Press Release, 28 December 1978, p. 1.
5. Donald Rumsfeld, FY 77 Posture Statement, pp. 324-325.
6. US Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976, Legislative History of PL94-502, Veterans Education and Employment Act, p. 5286.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 5290-5291.
9. Ibid., p. 5291.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

JOB TRAINING AS AN ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE¹

The United States military has had little or no experience with job training for post-service employment as an enlistment incentive; however, several foreign countries have had extensive experience in variations of such a concept. Within the United States, post-service job training has generally been considered as contrary to service objectives of reenlisting high quality servicemen.

The one US precedent for in-service job training for post-service employment, was the Department of Defense TRANSITION Program, initiated by the Johnson Administration in 1968. TRANSITION, however, was not designed as an enlistment incentive. In fact, the program was aimed at assisting those individuals who were not generally suited for continued military service.

TRANSITION was primarily designed to assist the undereducated and disadvantaged individual who had been drafted and was about to return to civilian life without a marketable skill. The objectives of the program were to provide counseling, occupational training and job placement, to make the transition back to civilian life easier. The program was started by President Johnson, who was concerned about a million servicemen a year returning to civilian life during a period of high unemployment and general unrest in the inner city and the disadvantaged community.

TRANSITION called upon both the public and private sectors to assist the returning serviceman, in addition to the normal services of the Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration. The major contribution of the Department of Defense (actually the military services) was release of the service member from his military duties to participate in counseling, job training, and placement assistance.

The typical TRANSITION program found counseling and normal service educational services being provided by the service through their education program. Occupational training was provided by a variety of non-military resources. This aspect of the TRANSITION program was probably the most significant sociological benefit of the program. For the first time in our military's history, non-military agencies, other than the Veterans Administration, were actively involved in providing job training and other assistance to the separating serviceman. The Post Office Department actively sought the returning veteran, as did the Department of Interior for service in their Environmental Protection Agency. The Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare established training programs on or near military installations, funded under the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA). MDTA was the forerunner of the current Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Several unions and trade associations served as trainers with nationwide programs funded under MDTA, included were the International Carpenters Union, the Bricklayers Union, the National Association of

Homebuilders, the Cement Masons Union and the Portland Cement Association.

Private industry such as Ford Motor Company, Goodyear, B. F. Goodrich and many others were also actively involved in providing job training on the military installation with private sector funding. These types of programs were typically provided by private industry with the military providing a classroom or other training facility.

Job placement in the TRANSITION program was provided by a variety of resources, the service education office, the training agency, and the state offices of the United States Employment Service.

TRANSITION lasted approximately four years. Allegedly, it was the victim of the Government Accounting Office (GAO), because the program was without a statutory basis. Congress was reportedly unhappy that Department of Defense funds were being spent on a program for which they had not specifically been authorized. However, the facts of life are that TRANSITION was killed from within. From the start it had been an unpopular program with the military services who felt they were involved in a social welfare program that detracted from the accomplishment of their primary mission, which at that particular time was focused on the war in Vietnam. Additionally, it was unpopular with the career military man, and the higher educated or skilled first term enlistee. TRANSITION was not designed to assist them, it was hard for them to justify in their minds a program should be offered to one

military man, and not to another. Especially when often times the undereducated, disadvantaged individual who was allowed to participate in TRANSITION, had been a disciplinary problem, or an unmotivated, low achiever. Lastly, TRANSITION was victimized by many trainers in a manner that was common in Job Corps and many other manpower programs. The trainer was willing to provide the training when funded with MDTA or other funds, but their requirement to also assist in the job placement function, was a major failure.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. This chapter is based on personal experiences of the author who served as a Project Officer on the TRANSITION program in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) during the period June 1968-June 1971.

CHAPTER VII

FOREIGN TRAINING AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS THAT WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE POTENTIAL FOR APPLICATION AS INCENTIVES FOR US ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

At least four foreign countries have major job training and education programs for separating servicemen. The programs in Israel and West Germany have been in existence since 1960. The Canadian Government initiated a similar program in June of 1968, and the British have had such a program since 1918.

ISRAELI PROGRAM¹

The Israeli military is made up of 164,000 personnel, 123,000 of which are conscripts. The Israeli Government program of preparing service personnel for more productive civilian careers is the foreign system that most closely resembles the former US TRANSITION program.

Although all service personnel are eligible for the Israeli program, emphasis is placed on individuals from developing areas, new immigrants and personnel from large families or who are otherwise socially or economically deprived.

It is a voluntary program, conducted during both duty and off-duty time during the last three months of active service and three months following separation.

Both the in-service and post-service phases are fully funded. Responsibility for funding is shared by the Ministries of Defense and Labor. Hard to reach individuals receive intensive counseling

and testing by highly qualified contract psychologists under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor. Routine and group counseling sessions are conducted by personnel of the Ministry of Defense. As a minimum, personnel attend seminars where they receive briefings on educational and job opportunities.

Under the Israeli program, emphasis is placed on upgrading the individual educational level while he is in the service, followed by vocational skill training. Additional service obligation is not incurred as a result of participation in the program, but if the individual enters a course which extends his service tour, he is obligated to remain on active duty until the course is completed. Vocational training is conducted by other governmental agencies and private industry.

Placement is accomplished during the last four to six weeks of active duty. Placement officials visit all the larger Army installations. Thus, the service member is relieved of the obligation to go to the Government Employment Office.

The Israeli Government considers their program of value not only to the individual, but also to the government. It results in relatively no unemployment for the separating serviceman, plus it assists the country in settling underdeveloped areas of the country.

CANADIAN PROGRAM²

The Civilian Employment Assistance Program was instituted by the Canadian Government in June 1968 to assist military personnel about to be discharged or retired for civilian life.

All personnel are eligible for the counseling benefits of this program. Retirees with at least 20 years service are eligible for training, if needed, upon completion of his service tour.

The program is voluntary and is conducted during offduty hours during the serviceman's career. Courses are provided by outside agencies at the individual's own expense. Upon retirement, 20-year soldiers are eligible for up to twelve months of training.

Counseling is provided all personnel. Career personnel can start the counseling and testing process as early as 5 years prior to their retirement. This counseling is provided by a base Personnel Selection Officer located at each military installation. During the last 12 months of the individual's service, he is referred to the Manpower and Immigration Service counselor. Additional tests and guidance as necessary, are provided and the individual is registered for post-service training or placement.

Training during the serviceman's career is conducted during offduty hours by outside agencies. Participation is at the individual's own initiative and expense. Upon completion of the service tour, retirees may participate in full time academic or technical training of up to 12 months duration. Training costs and living allowances are furnished by the government. Training offered includes academic upgrading and technical training which covers the entire spectrum of the employment market, from meat cutting to computer programming. Approximately 1600 individual courses are available throughout the year.

Canada Manpower (equivalent of US Department of Labor) finances all training programs and provides training allowances. (In addition to retirement benefits which after 20 years are 40 percent of base pay.) Training allowances are:³

Single Student	\$68 per week, if living away from home
One Dependent	\$82 per week
Two Dependents	\$90 per week
Three Dependents	\$100 per week
Four or More Dependents	\$109 per week

A living away from home allowance of \$33 per week is provided for married personnel maintaining a home away from the training location. Personnel are transferred to the training site at government expense following retirement.

Two new formal training programs conducted by colleges have recently been established. Project Loyalist is an accelerated formal training program at Loyalist College of Applied Arts and Technology, Belleville, Ontario. This program, jointly sponsored by Canadian Manpower, Department of National Defense and the Ministries of Colleges and Universities, recognizes the retirees military background (primarily from the combat arms) and offers courses in six subject areas. The serviceman can receive a two-year college diploma in one year.

Project Dogwood is a new program similar to Loyalist, offering a business administration program to servicemen retiring in British Columbia. Capilano College conducts the training in this program, which also leads to a two-year diploma in one year.⁴

In addition to training and education programs, major emphasis is placed on job placement for individuals with service acquired skills that are readily transferred to civilian employment. Employment information bulletins are provided to all military installations on a regular basis, and private employers in the area of the installation who desire military personnel, make their requirements known to the base Personnel Selection Officer. The prime placement responsibility rests with the Manpower and Immigration Service. Once entered by the Manpower counselor, the individual remains on the active roster until satisfactory employment is obtained. The Manpower and Immigration Service maintains a nationwide employment system.

BRITISH PROGRAM⁵

The British Resettlement Service is administered by the Directors of Education in each of the armed services. The program is designed to assist both officer and enlisted personnel departing the service with their adjustment to civilian life.

Regular personnel of all ranks who have completed at least three years of honorable service are eligible for the program.

The program is voluntary and seeks to:

Advise personnel on both problems and opportunities they will find upon return to civilian life.

Provide the individual with meaningful academic or technical skill training needed for productive adjustment.

Assist the individual with securing job placement.

Initial screening and counseling is accomplished at the individual's unit. This counseling is followed by a Resettlement Board interview six months prior to discharge. Attendance at these boards is compulsory. Boards advise the serviceman on pre-release training, aspects of resettlement, and provide a link with employment finding agencies. The career boards use this opportunity to also stress the advantages of continued military service.

A variety of training opportunities are available to members of the British Armed Forces. Free off-duty education at education centers and civilian academic institutions is encouraged throughout the serviceman's career. In addition, a maximum of 28 days full-time pre-release training is available at a resettlement center or civilian on-the-job training site during the last month prior to separation.

All personnel may apply for training and will be permitted to participate if they can be spared from their military duties. Priority for training spaces are allocated on a basis of length of service.

Training is normally conducted at a resettlement center, however, if no suitable course is available, 28 day courses may be arranged with civilian firms. Generally the serviceman makes personal contact with the firm to arrange such training.

Upon release from active duty the individual can enroll in various work release courses administered by the Ministry of Labor for periods from six to twelve months.

Placement assistance is available from numerous military installations and the Ministry of Labor. Assistance to the Resettlement Program by various trade unions and professional organizations eases job placement problems for British service personnel.

WEST GERMAN PROGRAM⁶

The West German Government enacted the Vocational Advancement Service Act, by Federal Law in 1960, as the primary social benefit provided men on extended active duty. Its objective is to provide an incentive for military service. Currently, the German armed forces are made up of approximately 50 percent conscripts and 50 percent enlistees, or "soldiers of time."

The German program is a voluntary program, primarily for the "soldiers of time," individuals serving for six to fifteen years of active service.

Counseling is accomplished by civilian counselors who generally have 14 years of formal schooling plus additional practical experience and training. Counseling begins approximately three months after entry on active duty and continues throughout the serviceman's tour of duty. It is provided at one of 36 Vocational Service Centers by traveling counseling teams.

Vocational training and educational upgrading are offered with emphasis on vocational trades and crafts. Courses are conducted both on and off post during off-duty time. This training commences early after entry on active duty. It culminates with full time training, with no military duties at a service vocational or trade school, on a full time basis, at the end of the serviceman's enlistment. Training may be continued in private and public schools after the end of the service tour to further prepare the individual for the future job or profession.

A summary of training benefits based on service time is depicted in Figure 5.

Under the program the individual is examined and certified as he moves progressively through the various skill levels of skilled, journeyman, and master craftsman.

Other ministries and leading commercial organizations participate in this expanding program.

Placement and follow-up is a continuing process. Governmental agencies and commercial organizations maintain liaison with the Vocational Advancement Service and monitor participation, progress, and separation dates of participating individuals. The services do not follow-up to ensure the individual is actually placed in a job.

Servicemen who obtain employment at the end of their service tour and require no post-service training are entitled to a lump sum equalizing or "mustering out" pay. Rates are outlined in Figure 6.

Summary of Training Benefits Based on Service Time

<u>Time in Service</u>	<u>General Training at End of Service (While on Active Duty)</u>	<u>Post-Service Training</u>	<u>Training Benefits (90% Pay)</u>
6 Years		12 Months	12 Months
7 Years		12 Months	12 Months
8 Years	12 Months	18 Months	18 Months
9 Years	12 Months	18 Months	18 Months
10 Years	12 Months	18 Months	18 Months
11 Years	12 Months	18 Months	18 Months
12 Years	18 Months	36 Months	36 Months
13 Years	18 Months	36 Months	36 Months
14 Years	18 Months	36 Months	36 Months
15 Years	18 Months	36 Months	36 Months

Figure 5

Mustering Out Pay

For Soldiers

Less than 4 yrs service	1½ x last month's pay
4-7 yrs service	4 x last month's pay

For Non-commissioned Officers

Less than 3 yrs service	3 x last month's pay
3 yrs service	8 x last month's pay
4 yrs service	8 x last month's pay
5 yrs service	8 x last month's pay
6 yrs service	10 x last month's pay
7 yrs service	10 x last month's pay
8 yrs service	12 x last month's pay
9 yrs service	12 x last month's pay
10 yrs service	14 x last month's pay
11 yrs service	14 x last month's pay

Figure 6

CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

1. Interview with Major Eli Cohen, Office of the Defense Attache, Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C., 19 December 1978.
2. Interview with Captain William Cranston, Office of the Defense Attache, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 18 December 1978.
3. Department of National Defense, Canada Manpower and Loyalist College, Planning Your Second Career? Have You Considered Project Loyalist?, p. 9.
4. Civilian Employment Assistance Programme (Canada), A Plan for Your Retirement, p. 3.

Interview with Colonel D. J. Brewster, RMC, Office of the Defense Attache, British Embassy, Washington, D.C., 18 December 1978.
6. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Hans Wassenbect, Office of the Defense Attache, Federal Republic of Germany Embassy, Washington, D.C., 19 December 1978.

CHAPTER VIII

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE¹

Although the Israeli, Canadian, and British efforts to assist their separating servicemen are commendable, their programs would appear to have minimal potential for application as enlistment incentives for the US All-Volunteer Force.

The Israeli program, limited to three months of pre-separation and three months of post-separation training, and the British program, limited to 28 days pre-separation training would serve as enlistment incentives for the undereducated and lower mental group categories in the US enlistment environment; however, neither would be adequate to attract required numbers of high quality applicants.

The Canadian program provides a one-year post-service training program for 20-year retirees, and therefore is not considered as an enlistment incentive for the non-careerist.

The West German program has several aspects that appear worthy of closer examination. The program features benefits that are similar to those that have been identified in various US Department of Defense studies as the type of enlistment incentives required for the All-Volunteer Force--namely, job training and educational benefits.

Before a closer examination of the West German experience, it is advisable to compare the West German and US economies and military over the past few years.¹ (See Figure 7.)

Comparison of West German and US Economies and Military

1978 Population

<u>United States</u>	<u>West German</u>
219 million	61.4 million

Comparative Strength of Armed Forces (000's)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	2,130	2,087	2,088	2,069
West German	495	495	489	490

Strength of West German Armed Forces by Service (1978)

Army	336,200
Navy	36,500
Air Force	106,200

Gross National Product (Billions)

	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>
United States	1,412	1,528	1,706	1,890
West German	385.4	388.8	441.6	508.6

Defense Spending (Billions)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	88.9	91.0	104.2	113.0
West German	16.1	15.2	17.1	21.3

Per Capita Expenditures for Defense (\$'s)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	417	423	480	517
West German	259	242	271	335

Defense Expenditures as % of GNP (%)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	6.1	5.9	5.4	6.0
West German	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.4

Figure 7

Defense Expenditures as % of Government Spending (%)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	23.8	23.8	22.7	23.0
West German	24.4	23.5	23.9	22.9

Unemployment (Millions)

	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
United States	8.5	7.7	7.0	6.0
West German	1.1	1.0	1.0	.9

Figure 7 (Continued)

The West German military is presently made up of approximately 236,000 conscripts (48 percent) and 254,000 enlistees (52 percent). These figures are significant for two reasons. First, conscripts receive approximately DM160 (\$88 US) per month as compared to an enlistee monthly salary of approximately DM1000 (\$555 US). Secondly, the number of enlistees is restricted because of budgetary reasons, i.e., it is much less expensive to initially engage a draftee than an enlistee. Long term cost effectiveness is optimized with approximately 50 percent draftees, even though the term of service for conscripts is only 15 months.

It is interesting to note that in an effort to further reduce costs, the West German Government will soon introduce a program where only the field uniform will be issued to conscripts--only enlistees will be issued the dress uniform. Conscripts will be allowed to wear the dress uniform if purchased at their own expense.

In view of the limit on enlistees and the relatively low unemployment rate in West Germany, it is difficult to assess the value of the Vocational Advancement Service program as an enlistment incentive; however, West German officials, both military and civilian, stress that it is a valuable enlistment incentive and is emphasized in recruiting efforts.

The Vocational Advancement Service Act--commonly referred to as the "Soldiers Law"--has been a part of German law for nearly 20 years. Basically, the program provides "Soldiers of Time" with opportunities to further their education and prepare for a civilian vocation, through a combination of: Offduty education

while on active duty; full-time attendance at Vocational Advancement Service schools while on active duty; and full-time attendance at various educational/vocational institutions following separation from military service, during which time the trainee receives a training allowance equaling 90 percent of former military pay (in addition to tuition-free training).

As previously mentioned, the amount of training a "Soldier of Time" is entitled to, is based on his length of service. As indicated in Figure 8, enlistees with less than six years service are entitled to no full-time training while on active duty, but are entitled to two semesters (one year) of free training following separation from active duty (plus 90 percent of former monthly pay for one year).


A serviceman who has served a minimum of 12 years is entitled to 18 months of full-time training at a Vocational Advancement Service school while still on active duty, followed by three years of free training after separation from the military (plus 90 percent of former monthly pay for three years). Thus, a 12-year "Soldier of Time" actually spends 10½ years in a military unit, then is assigned to a school unit for the last 18 months, and for 12 years service, receives 12 years full pay. Following separation from the service, he receives three years free training and three years pay at 90 percent of active-duty rate.

The Vocational Advancement Service Act is administered within the West German Ministry of Defense (MOD) by the Social Division. The Social Division is a completely civilian arm of the MOD. It

Umfang der Bundeswehrfachschul- und Fachausbildungszeiten

für SaZ 6-15 (vgl. auch Seite 35-38)

Extent of the MOD Trade School and Trade
Development Times for Service 6-15 Years



Source: Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.

Figure 8


is responsible for 30 Vocational Advancement Service schools located throughout Germany. The schools are located either on or near the local military installation. (See Figure 9.) The local school is administered by a Headmaster and staffed with teachers from the Vocational Advancement Service. The Headmaster works in close cooperation with the local military commander, but is not under his command.

Typically, servicemen are assigned to in-service training during their last months of active duty. This permits the losing military unit to obtain a replacement for the trainee assigned to school and reduces personnel turbulence in the unit. The trainee is assigned to a school that will best enable him to start the road to desired vocational/educational objectives. The location may be near his current duty station or may be located in another part of the country. Regardless of the location, the serviceman is relieved of all military duties and assigned to a training unit during this period, vice a regular line unit. If required to be transferred to another duty station for training, such transfer is at government expense. During the training period, the trainee is billeted and subsists in military facilities, wears the military uniform for training, and is subject to normal military discipline.

The key to the pre-separation training is the counseling program that ensures the serviceman is being assigned to a training or educational program consistent with educational background and vocational objectives. A student who has completed the equivalent of the US high school could commence preparation for college level

Die Bundeswehrfachschulen der Wehrbereiche I-VI

The MOD Trade Schools
in Regions I-VI



Source: Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.

Figure 9

work or could immediately commence vocational training. While the serviceman with less than the equivalent of a US high school education might commence work to complete high school level education, followed by vocational or college level training.

It should be pointed out that throughout the serviceman's career the opportunity is available to participate in a full range of off-duty education programs (classroom and correspondence) designed to upgrade the individual's educational level. Therefore, hopefully a minimum of time can be devoted to basic education prior to commencement of vocational or higher education.

Figure 10 outlines the various courses taught at each of the 30 Vocational Advancement Service schools.

The current budget for the in-service phase training under the Vocational Advancement Service Act amounts to approximately DM30 million (\$16.5 million US). Of this amount, approximately DM15 million goes for salaries of teachers and administrators and DM15 million for administration (operations and maintenance). Not included in the above figures are the military salaries of the trainees. The annual training load is approximately 10,000 trainees, thus to obtain the real cost of the in-service phase it would be necessary to obtain the average grade level of the trainee, X 10,000 trainees, plus the previously stated DM30 million.

Approximately 60 percent of separating "Soldiers of Time" who are entitled to pre-separation training actually participate in such training. It is completely voluntary. Some servicemen opt

An welcher Bundeswehrfachschule findet Ihr Lehrgang statt?

Bemerkung: Über die Durchführung der an den Bundeswehrfachschulen ausgebrachten Lehrgänge entscheidet der Bedarf. Änderungen sind daher möglich. Soldaten, die sich für eine Schule entscheiden, an der mangels einer genügenden Zahl von Bewerbern oder wegen sonstiger Gründe die angeführten Lehrgänge nicht durchführbar sind, werden an die nächstgelegenen Schulen verwiesen. Die derzeitige Planung sieht an den Schulen der einzelnen Wehrbereiche folgende Lehrgänge vor:

At which MOD Trade School is your course conducted?

NOTE: The conduct of classes is based on demand. Changes are possible. Insufficient demand for a course will require the rescheduling of the applicants to the next course. For proper planning note the conduct of courses at the various location.

Wehrbereich I

Bundeswehrfachschule Flensburg	Vb-G-M-T-S
Bundeswehrfachschule Hamburg	Vb-G-T-HT-W-HW-S-HS-M-V-H
Bundeswehrfachschule Kiel	Vb-G-T-HT-M-V
Bundeswehrfachschule Neumünster	Vb-G-T-M-V

Wehrbereich II

Bundeswehrfachschule Braunschweig	Vb-G-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Bremen	Vb-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule Göttingen	Vb-M-S
Bundeswehrfachschule Hannover	Vb-G-M-V
Bundeswehrfachschule Münster	Vb-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Nienburg	Vb-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule Oldenburg	Vb-T-HT-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Wilhelmshaven	Vb-G-S-HS-M-V

Wehrbereich III

Bundeswehrfachschule Hamm	Vb-G-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Essen	Vb-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule Köln	Vb-G-T-HT-W-HW-S-V-H-FE
Bundeswehrfachschule Münster	Vb-G-S-HS-W-M-V

Source: Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.

Figure 10

Wehrbereich IV

Bundeswehrfachschule Gießen	Vt-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule Kassel	Vb-G-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Koblenz	Vb-G-T-HT-M-V-Vk
Bundeswehrfachschule Mainz	Vb-G-M-FB

Wehrbereich V

Bundeswehrfachschule Karlsruhe	Vb-G-M-S
Bundeswehrfachschule Tauberbischofsheim	Vb-G-M
Bundeswehrfachschule Ulm	Vb-G-T-HT-M-V
Bundeswehrfachschule Weingarten	Vb-G-M-T

Wehrbereich VI

Bundeswehrfachschule Amberg	Vb-G-M-S
Bundeswehrfachschule Bad Reichenhall	Vb-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule Kempten	Vb-G-M-T
Bundeswehrfachschule München	Vb-G-T-HT-W-HW- S-HS-M-V-H
Bundeswehrfachschule Regensburg	Vb-G-T-HT-S-HS- M-V
Bundeswehrfachschule Würzburg	Vb-G-M

KEY

G	Fundamental/Basic
M	Certificate of entry level
T	Technical (tech/voc)
W	Economic (tech/voc)
S	Social pedagogics (tech/voc)
HT	Technical (prof school)
HW	Economic (prof school)
HS	Social pedagogics (prof school)
V	Correspondence course management
H	College board exam
VG	Preparatory course for professional school
Vk	Preliminary courses
FE	Teacher training
FB	Business management

Figure 10 (Continued)

for post-service training only, others have a job waiting and decline both pre-separation and post-service training.

Post-service training of "Soldiers of Time," although administered by the Vocational Advancement Service, is conducted in civilian vocational and higher education institutions. The Vocational Advancement Service maintains 36 offices throughout the country to assist the former serviceman in pursuing his training/education program. These offices are staffed by well-trained counselors who work with the former serviceman to ensure that his training/education objectives are both realistic and achievable.

Extensive effort is expended to ensure that each former serviceman enters training for a profession for which he is well suited, and of equal importance, into a career field with a good future.

The current budget for post-service training is DM85 million (\$47 million US). This figure includes the cost of training plus the cost for 90 percent transition pay. Also included are moving costs to obtain post-service employment, job hunting expenses, and a salary subsidy paid to employers for six months as a bonus for hiring a former serviceman. Thus, if a former serviceman was hired at a salary of DM500, for the first six months the Vocational Advancement Service would pay DM250 and the employer would pay DM250.

Currently 92 percent of the separating servicemen who are entitled to post-service training under the Vocational Advancement Service Act participate in some type of training.

During the past 10 years, some 100,000 servicemen have participated in the active-duty phase of the Vocational Advancement Act training, about 10,000 per year. No formal studies have been conducted to determine the number of former servicemen who are presently serving in jobs related to their Vocational Advancement Act training; however, a high degree of correlation is reported by West German authorities. Minor fluctuations in the civilian unemployment rates have had minimal effect on the numbers of servicemen participating in training; however, during periods of higher unemployment more servicemen participate in both pre-separation and post-separation training and those participating in post-separation training, tend to remain in training slightly longer.

Figure 11 contains summary statistics, provided by the Social Division MOD, concerning post-service Vocational Advancement Service Training for the past 18 years.

The West German program is relatively small because of the limited numbers of servicemen separating between their 6th and 15th years of service. Most enlistees separate before completing six years of service and those remaining beyond six years generally stay on to retire; however, the program is a model for what can be done to assist separating servicemen in their preparation for return to civilian life.

Summary of Post-Service Vocational Advancement Service Training

Advice to Soldiers in Professional Matters (Consultations)

<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
1.2 million	125,000	1.3 million

Servicemen Attending Various Courses (Participants)

<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
213,000	6,300	220,000

Correspondence Courses Completed (Participants)

<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
51,000	817	52,000

Certificates Issues in Specialized Courses

<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
1.3 million	74,000	1.4 million

Types of Exams Completed

	<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
Final exam in non-academic profession	24,000	3,300	27,000
Advanced training exams	4,500	600	5,000
Other specific exams	61,000	8,800	70,000

Figure 11

Professions Entered by Soldiers Completing Post-Service Training

	<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
Craftsman	21,200	2,700	24,000
Technician	18,400	1,000	19,000
Engineer	6,300	500	7,000
Commercial	22,000	2,200	24,000
EDP	6,000	200	6,000
Health Services	5,200	700	6,000
Teaching	1,400	300	2,000

Certificates for Entitlement for Employment in Public Service

	<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
Discharge with entitlement for public service employment	32,400	3,600	36,000
Certificate for employment as civil servant issued	1,700	300	2,000
Certificate for employment as government employee issued	6,000	1,300	7,000

Funds Expended for Vocational Advancement Service

	<u>1960-76</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
In million DM	466.1	68.6	534.7

Figure 11 (Continued)

CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

1. Interviews with Regierungsdirektor Oswald Hutzler, Social Division, Vocational Advancement (Vocational Training) Section, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Germany, and Oberstudienrat Gerd Eberlein, Social Division, Vocational Advancement (General Training) Section, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, Germany, 21 March 1979.

2. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1974-1979.

CHAPTER IX

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES AS SOLUTIONS TO ANTICIPATED RECRUITING PROBLEMS FOR THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The review of existing literature on the subject of enlistment incentives for the All-Volunteer force reveals that job training and educational benefits provide the most promise for attracting high quality applicants. However, in addition to the above mentioned enlistment incentives, there is growing support for return to the two-year enlistment which is not only an attractive incentive for enlistment, but also should provide a significant reduction in first-term attrition rates.

The Department of Defense has several initiatives underway that are designed to test the utility of the two-year enlistment; however, none of the tests are tied to an attractive educational benefit package.

Although there are added costs to the Department of Defense budget as a result of two-year enlistments, as opposed to longer enlistments, these additional costs should be offset by substantial savings in the form of reduced first-term attrition.

The Congress estimates current first-term attrition at about 40 percent.¹ The Department of Defense estimates non-high school graduates attrition at about 50 percent and the high school graduate at about half that, or 25 percent.² Thus, a 20 percent reduction in first term attrition (20 percent of 140,000=28,000), would reduce annual recruiting requirements from 350,000 to

322,000. Figuring an annual cost of \$10,000 per serviceman this would result in a cost savings of \$280 million.

Professor Moskos in testimony before Congress has recently recommended a return to the two-year enlistment, along with a return to post-service educational benefits similar to the GI bill of World War II. As part of a program to revitalize the All-Volunteer concept, he stated:³

One step would be a two year enlistment option (the term of the draftee) to be restricted to the combat arms, low-skill shipboard duty, aircraft security guards, and labor intensive jobs. The quid pro quo for such assignment would be post-service educational benefits along the lines of the GI Bill of World War II. A college education or vocational training in exchange for two years in the combat arms formula would be a means to attract highly qualified soldiers who can learn quickly, serve effectively for a full tour, and then be replaced by similarly qualified recruits. Because there would be no presumption of acquiring civilian skills in the military, the terms of such short service would be honest and unambiguous, thus alleviating a major source of post-entry discontent in the All-Volunteer force. The added costs of post-service educational benefits would, at least in part, be balanced by lower attrition, reduced recruitment outlays, the end of combat arms bonuses, and, most likely, fewer dependents of lower ranking enlisted personnel.

The range of alternatives that might be developed in the areas of job training and educational benefits is extensive, perhaps ranging from in-service job training similar to the West German model, to a fully funded college education. However, proposed alternatives must be tempered to ensure acceptability to the military and affordability to the nation. A discussion of some alternatives that would appear feasible, follows:

Alternative #1: Pre-separation Training plus Post-separation Tuition and Training/Education Benefit for Three-Year Enlistment and Three Years in Reserve. This alternative would feature pre-separation vocational or educational training similar to the West German model, followed by post-separation tuition and training/education benefits of the VA GI bill type. Servicemen who served a minimum of three years would receive six months pre-separation vocational/educational training. In addition to entitlement to pre-separation training, each individual would be entitled to: up to 36 months of VA training/education benefits; and, a maximum of eight semesters tuition benefit of \$1000 per semester. Unlike the West German model, pre-separation training would be conducted utilizing existing vacancies in military courses or in private or public schools located near a military installation. Individuals would participate in training during the last months of their military service, and would have the option of attending available military courses or private/public institutions located near a military installation. Individuals would be entitled to transfer at government expense to attend desired training provided government billeting and messing facilities were available at that location. Individuals with dependents would not be entitled to move their dependents to the training location at government expense, but would be entitled to move them to a post-service location, if desired.

Post-separation training would be accomplished in private and public institutions of the veteran's choice, in a manner similar to the Vietnam era, and other, GI bills.

The primary advantages of such an alternative, when compared to the West German model, is the fact that existing training institutions are utilized for the pre-separation training. No new schools or courses would be established, rather existing vacancies in military and civilian training institutions would be utilized, thereby increasing the productivity of such activities.

The proposed alternative should prove acceptable to the military in that once an individual commenced pre-separation training, the losing command would be entitled to a replacement.

The major costs of such a proposal would be of four types. First, the cost of the individual's salary during the pre-separation training phase, or stated another way, the cost of the salary of his replacement. Second, would be the costs of the pre-separation training; although there would be no costs for the use of vacancies in military courses, there would be costs for non-military courses. Third, would be the costs of the post-separation tuition benefit; and, lastly would be the costs of post-separation training/education benefits.

Some cost estimates follow, assuming 200,000 separtees per year, upon completion of three years active service. This figure is based on 322,000 non-prior service accessions with 38 percent first-term attrition.

Pre-separation Training Military Compensation Costs.

200,000 separtees @ \$419 per month = \$84 million X 6 months = \$504 million.

Pre-separation Training Tuition Costs. Assuming 200,000

separtees, 10 percent of whom attend military courses, with the balance attending non-military courses. 180,000 separtees X 6 month tuition cost of \$1,000 = \$180 million.

Post-separation Training/Education Benefit Costs (VA

Type Benefits). Assuming 200,000 separtees @ 65 percent participation rate and utilizing the benefit of the current VEAP with the VA/DOD providing the full benefit of \$225 per month. (Vice the former contributory program.)

The assumed program participation rate of 65 percent is based on the VA's experience with the Vietnam era GI bill. The VA in their FY 79 and FY 80 budget estimates predict that the average training/education benefit to be paid to the Vietnam era veteran will be \$1,998,⁴ although the maximum annual entitlement is nearly \$3,500 (about 57 percent of the maximum entitlement will be paid). A 60 percent utilization rate has been utilized in computing cost estimates in the proposed alternatives. 130,000 trainees X \$225 per month X 12 months = \$348 million X 60% = \$209 million (VA/DOD would budget this amount during each year of the serviceman's active service to provide the predicted benefit utilization).

Program costs are figured on the annual contribution required by VA/DOD to place in trust to provide the predicted benefit for the serviceman following his separation from active

service. Thus for each year of active service (three years), VA/DOD would place 1/3 of the predicted benefit utilization in trust.

Costs of training/education benefits discussed above and costs of the tuition benefit discussed in the following paragraph, to be shared by DOD/VA on an equitable basis to be determined through negotiations between those agencies. It is considered appropriate that DOD contribute to the program because of the strong enlistment incentive nature of the program. VA costs will undoubtedly increase substantially over the current VEAP costs because of the very low participation rate in that program. The VA FY 80 budget estimate for VEAP is but \$9 million.⁵

Post-separation Tuition Benefits. Would provide tuition benefit of \$1,000 per semester for maximum of eight semesters for training/education. Veteran would be entitled to the maximum benefit of \$1,000 per semester or the actual cost of tuition if the cost was less than \$1,000 per semester. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare estimates that the average cost for college room, board, and tuition in 1979-80 is \$1,834 in public institutions and \$3,864 in private. They predict that these costs will raise to \$1,975 and \$4,176 by 1985-86.⁶

Assuming 200,000 separtees @ 65% participation rate = 130,000 trainees. 130,000 trainees X \$2,666 annually = \$347 million X 60% = \$208 million (VA/DOD would budget this amount during each year of the serviceman's active service to provide the predicted benefit utilization).

Summary of Alternative #1 Costs

DOD pre-separation compensation	\$504 million
DOD pre-separation training	\$180 million
VA post-separation training/education benefit	\$209 million
VA post-separation tuition benefit	<u>\$208</u> million
Total	\$1.10 billion

(Plus incidental costs for trainee travel, counseling, etc.)

Alternative #2: Front Load Approach to Pre-separation Training. A modification to Alternative #1 would be to provide remedial education at the onset of military service for those individuals who scored in the lower ranges of acceptable mental categories. Such training would be in lieu of pre-separation training and would not be at the option of the trainee, but in fact would be a pre-condition to enlistment.

Such a concept would require the individual to complete a six-month pre-military service remedial education program, at a non-military training institution, prior to attendance at basic military training.

This program would be attractive to the lower spectrum of the potential enlistee population in that it would provide an opportunity for many of those to serve, who previously would not successfully complete basic training because of educational difficulties. Such an alternative should be acceptable to the military because of probable reduced attrition rates and the increased potential of the lower mental group applicant during his military

service; however, the program might result in a slight increase in the intake of lower mental group applicants. The success of the program and the completion rate of the pre-service training phase.

The estimated costs of the variation, or Alternative #2, would be approximately the same as the first Alternative. Pre-service training costs would approximate pre-separation training costs, although there would be a certain percentage of failures who would have to be replaced and recycled.

Alternative #3: Post-separation Tuition and Training/Education Benefit for Two Year Enlistment Followed with Four Years in the Reserve. This alternative would eliminate pre-separation training from the basic alternative because of the change from a two to three year enlistment, but would retain the tuition and training/education benefit.

Post-separation Tuition Benefit Costs. 130,000 trainees X \$4,000 annually = \$520 million X 60% = \$312 million (VA/DOD would budget this amount during each year of the serviceman's active service to provide the predicted benefit utilization).

Post-separation Training/Education Benefit Costs. 130,000 trainees X \$4,050 annually = \$527 million X 60% = \$316 million (VA/DOD would budget this amount during each year of the serviceman's active service to provide the predicted benefit utilization).

Summary of Alternative #3 Costs

Tuition Benefit	\$312 million
Training/Education Benefit	<u>\$316</u> million
Total	\$628 million

Alternative #4: Enhanced Post-separation Training/Education Benefit for Two Year Enlistment Followed with Four Years in the Reserve. This alternative would eliminate pre-separation training from the basic alternative and would also eliminate the post-separation tuition benefit; however, for a two-year enlistment it would provide an enhanced training/education benefit, increased from \$225 to \$400. It would increase post separation/training/education benefits from the current level of \$5,400 under VEAP for a three-year enlistment, to a maximum of \$14,400 under the proposed alternative for a two-year enlistment.

Summary of Alternative #4 Costs. 130,000 trainees X \$7,200 annually = \$936 million X 60% = \$562 million (VA/DOD would budget this amount during each year of the serviceman's active service to provide the predicted benefit utilization).

SUMMARY OF THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES

Alternative #1. Pre-separation training plus post-service tuition and training/education benefit for three-year enlistment.

DOD pre-separation compensation	\$504 million
DOD pre-separation training	\$180 million
VA post-separation tuition benefit	\$209 million
VA post-separation training/education benefit	\$208 million
Total	\$1.10 billion

Alternative #2. Front load approach to pre-separation training, cost estimates are same as Alternative #1.

Alternative #3. Post-separation tuition benefit plus training/education benefit for two-year enlistment.

VA post-separation tuition benefit \$312 million

VA post-separation training/
education benefit \$316 million

Total \$628 million

Alternative #4. Enhanced post-separation training/education benefit.

VA post-separation training/
education benefit \$562 million

Preferred Alternative. Alternative #3 is the preferred alternative. This alternative would provide a maximum combined tuition and training/education benefit of \$16,100 for 36 months for a 2-year enlistment (\$225 per month training/education benefit plus \$1,000 per semester for 8 semesters).

\$225 training/education benefit \$1,000 tuition benefit

X36 months

X8 semesters

\$8,100

\$8,000

= \$16,100

The combined maximum benefit of \$16,100 compares with a maximum training/education benefit of \$13,955 for a single veteran under the Vietnam era GI bill (\$311 per month for 45 months), and \$5,400 under the current VEAP if the veteran contributed the maximum of \$75 per month while on active duty for 36 months.

Although Alternative #3 is the preferred alternative, a combination of Alternatives #2 and #3 should be considered if it is desired to increase the intake of those individuals who fall in

the lower ranges of acceptable mental categories. In other words, Alternative #3 is designed to attract high-quality applicants, most of whom will successfully complete their enlistment and go on to college or vocational training. Alternative #2 is designed to attract that group of individuals who without pre-service educational upgrading would be poor candidates to successfully complete their first term, but with the six months remedial training are considered good prospects to complete the additional 30 months of required service. (Alternative #3 is a two-year enlistment with no in-service training; Alternative #2 is a three-year enlistment with the provision of six months remedial education prior to active service or six months vocational/education training at the end of enlistment.)

COST ESTIMATES

Utilizing the Vietnam era veterans experience regarding percentage of utilization (60 percent) and participation (65 percent), it can be predicted that under the proposed program the average annual benefit to be utilized would be approximately \$2,415, or about 60 percent of the maximum annual combined entitlement of \$4,050. (Cost estimates include costs for married veterans with dependents.)

The bottom line is that the proposed program has the potential for attracting a large number of high quality recruits who are good prospects for successfully completing their first term of enlistment. An important ancillary benefit of the program is a revitalization of

the reserve as the Ready Reserve would be filled with individuals leaving the service with a four-year reserve obligation.


How and when veterans use their training/education benefits can be predicted with considerable accuracy as a result of the VA's experience in that regard. For example, it can be predicted that most veterans will not move directly from the service into a training/education program. In fact, experience from the Vietnam era GI bill shows that only 15-20 percent enter training/education programs during the same fiscal year as separation. Almost an equal number commence training in the first fiscal year following separation.⁷ (See Figure 12.)

COST SAVINGS

It is predicted that the proposed program will result in substantial savings that may in fact offset the cost of the program. The potential for the largest saving is in the area of first-term attrition. With first-term attrition in the 40 percent range at the present time, this requires the recruiting effort to recruit 40 percent more personnel than actually required. The DOD-wide recruiting objective is currently 350,000 non-prior service accessions; this requirement would be only 210,000 if the 140,000 first-term attrition was eliminated.

The proposed program has the potential for reducing first-term attrition by as much as 50 percent, or 70,000 personnel. This would reduce the recruiting objective to 280,000 and would result in a major saving in recruit advertising and other expenses. Also,






**PERCENT OF VETERANS ENTERED TRAINING FROM
POST-KOREAN NET SEPARATIONS THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1977 ^{1/} ^{2/}**



^{1/} Includes no service personnel
^{2/} Percentages may not add exactly due to rounding off.
^{3/} Trainees shown as entering in FY 1967 include some who entered in June 1966 for the following FY's:
 Prior to 1965 - 1.8 percent
 1965 - 2.8 percent
 1966 - 2.8 percent

^{4/} The transition quarter is treated as an entire fiscal year.
^{5/} For those who separated during FY 1967 or earlier, this represents the percentage who entered during the first fiscal year that the GI bill was in effect. (See footnote No. 3).

FISCAL YEAR OF ENTRY AFTER SEPARATION ^{4/}

-  Same fiscal year as separation^{5/}
-  1st fiscal year following separation
-  2nd fiscal year following separation
-  3rd fiscal year following separation
-  4th and succeeding fiscal years following separation

Source: US Veterans Administration, FY 77 Informational Bulletin: Veterans Benefits Under Current Educational Programs.

Figure 12

figuring an average personnel cost of \$10,000 a reduction of 70,000 personnel would result in a cost savings of \$700 million annually in personnel and operation and maintenance costs.

Other areas that have the potential for substantial cost savings are: reduction in current enlistment bonuses paid for combat arms enlistments; reduction in dependent services required by a younger population; reduction in lost time, legal, and confinement costs as a result of a more disciplined population; and, reductions in travel and related costs due to the fact that the enlistee would generally only be required to serve at one duty station upon completion of basic training.

The foregoing cost savings would of necessity be reduced by any costs related to expansion of the training support base required by the change from three and four year enlistments to two year.

EFFECT OF PROPOSED PROGRAM ON REENLISTMENTS

An important question is what effect the proposed program would have on reenlistments? The answer to the question cannot be answered at this time; however, it is clear that reenlistment programs would have to stress the benefits of continued military service that includes in-service educational opportunities for those that desire to remain in the service but complete college or other training/education programs.

CHAPTER IX

FOOTNOTES

1. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for FY 79, pp. 101-102.
2. Interview with Mr. Fred Suffa of the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), 16 February 1979.
3. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Statement before Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, p. 8.
4. Veterans Administration, "Readjustment Benefits, Summary of Requirements," FY 79 Budget Estimate, p. 2-35.
5. Ibid.
6. US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Projection of Education Statistics to 1985-86, 1977, pp. 84-85.
7. US Veterans Administration, "Veterans Benefits Under Current Educational Programs," Information Bulletin for Fiscal Year 1977, March 1978, p. 26.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions have been reached as a result of the subject study and analysis:

New enlistment incentives are required to revitalize the All-Volunteer concept.

The most attractive enlistment incentives for the youth of the 1980-90's are job training and educational benefits.

The current contributory VEAP is not an attractive enlistment incentive.

The West German job training and educational benefit program for their "Soldiers of Time" is a model program that US programs should emulate where practical.

Alternative #3, outlined in the preceding chapter should be implemented by the DOE and VA. Proposed program costs are \$600-700 million, however, this figure would be reduced substantially by reductions in first-term attrition and other areas.

Adoption of Alternative #3 would not only solve the recruiting problems of the active force, but of equal significance will also restore the viability of the ready reserve.

Alternative #3 is chosen over Alternative #4 because of a significant increase in benefits at only a slight increase in costs. (Tuition benefit of \$1,000 per semester for eight semesters, plus a \$225 per month training/education benefit for 36 months, a

maximum combined benefit of \$16,100; as opposed to Alternative #4 which would provide only a \$400 per month training/education benefit for 36 months, a maximum benefit of \$14,400.)

Alternatives #1 and #2 were not chosen because of the nearly 25 percent cost increase over Alternative #3 and questionable attractiveness as an enlistment incentive (because of the three-year enlistment), Alternatives #1 and #2 would have provided, in return for a three-year enlistment, some form of in-service training plus the tuition and training/education benefits contained in Alternative #3.

Notwithstanding implementation of new enlistment incentives, selective service registration and classification should be reinstated at the earliest practical date. This action alone will serve as an "enlistment incentive" for some individuals, and more importantly will provide the ~~framework~~ for rapid mobilization in the event of such a requirement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

The DOD, in cooperation with the VA should propose legislation to replace the VEAP with a program that will provide for two years active military service and four years in the reserve:

A tuition benefit of up to \$1,000 per semester for a maximum of eight semesters.

Training/education benefits of \$225 per month for a single veteran for a maximum of 36 months.

Costs of the proposed program to be shared by the DOD and VA on an equitable basis to be determined through negotiations between those agencies.

The DOD should immediately embark on a recruiting campaign that stresses:

America stays strong with a strong military, and by providing an innovative post-service training and education program for those who have served their country but have chosen to return to civilian life, enabling them to rapidly assume productive post-service careers.

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