

AD-A070 555

CALIFORNIA MILITARY DEPT SACRAMENTO OFFICE OF POLICY--ETC F/G 5/9
THE UNITED STATES ARMY'S TOTAL FORCE PROGRAM. (U)
JUL 77 H P HOLEMAN, J R YEO, J J ORTA

UNCLASSIFIED

1 OF 1
AD
A070555



NL

		<p>END DATE FILMED 8-79 DDC</p>											

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
The United States Army's Total Force Program,		Final Report	
6. AUTHOR(s)		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
Herbert P. Holeman, Ph.D. James R. Yeon, J.D. Jesse J. Orta		NA	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
California Military Department (Special Projects) Office of Policy & Legislative Liaison (CANF-SP) 2829 Watt Ave., P.O. Box 214405, Sacramento 95825		NA	
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
NA		NA	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE	
Office of the Commanding General State Military Forces, Military Department 2829 Watt Ave., P.O. Box 214405, Sacramento 95825		1 Jul 1977	
13. NUMBER OF PAGES		13. NUMBER OF PAGES	
35		35	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)	
NA		UNCLASSIFIED	
15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)			
This document has been approved for public release; its distribution is UNLIMITED			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
Approved for public release. Its distribution is unlimited			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
Total Force, One Army, Reserve Components, National Guard, Militia, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Reserve Forces, Reserve Missions, Readiness, Mobilization, Cost Effectiveness of Reserve Components, Training of Army Reserve Components, Army Affiliation Program, Domestic Action, Disaster Operations, Army Community Relations, Organizational Effectiveness of Reserve Components			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
Study evaluates the Total Force programmatic concept as applied to Reserve Components of the United States Army and suggests ways in which improvements can be made. Study format consists of two sections. The first section defines the Total Force Concept in terms of planning and implementation. The second section presents recommendations for ways of overcoming shortfalls in planning and implementation of the Total Force Program.			
California Military Dept, Sacramento, office of Policy and Legislative Liaison.			

AD A 070 555

DDC FILE COPY

DDC
RECEIVED
JUL 3 1979
R
D



EDMUND G. BROWN, JR.
Governor

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
STATE MILITARY FORCES - MILITARY DEPARTMENT
2829 Watt Avenue - P.O. Box 214405
Sacramento, California 95821



AUTOVON 466-6605
(916) 920-6605

THE UNITED STATES ARMY'S TOTAL FORCE PROGRAM

BY

LTC HERBERT P. HOLEMAN, Ph.D.

MAJ JAMES R. YEO, J.D.

MAJ JESSE J. ORTA

A Research Study of the

SPECIAL PROJECTS SECTION (CANF-SP)

Office of Policy & Legislative Liaison

California Military Department, *Sacramento, CA*

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist.	Avail and/or special
A	

1 July 1977

DDC
RECEIVED
JUL 3 1979
D

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Abstract	ii
- Table of Contents	iii
I. Applying the Total Force Concept to the Army Force Structure	
A. Planning Considerations	
1. The international level of Total Force planning impacts on United States forces structures	1
2. Interservice and Intraservice interests impact on planning the Army's Total Force	2
a. Total Force planning among the services requires meeting their needs collectively as well as individually	2
b. Total Force planning within a service -- the Army and its Reserve Components	3
c. The role of the Reserve Component in the Total Force structure can only be evaluated in terms of the mission of the reserves.	4
(1) Strategy of Readiness for reserves	4
(2) Quality of reserve forces	5
(3) Cost-effectiveness criteria for reserves	7
B. Implementing the Total Force Concept -- Affiliation Program as a principal means of implementation	8
C. The role of the Guard as a Department of State Government	10

II. Recommendations to Overcome Shortfalls in Applying the Total Force Concept	13
A. Recommendations for Overcoming Shortfalls in Total Force Readiness	
1. The Reserve Components must be managed from the perspective of their participation in the NATO Short-War scenario	14
<p>The Short-War -- 'Come as you are war' scenario obviates the need for realworld, practical realignments of Reserve Component management and organization.</p>	
2. Train the Reserves in areas of the world where they are likely to be deployed	15
<p>Upon mobilization, delays in Reserve deployment will adversely affect their usefulness, and must be eliminated.</p>	
3. Use of National Guard Battalions to round-out Active Army Divisions is an inappropriate management technique	16
<p>The bifurcated role of the National Guard demands reevaluation of the hybrid division concept</p>	
B. Recommendations for Overcoming Shortfalls in the Quality of Reserve Forces.	17
1. Emphasize training in subject areas in which we now suffer the greatest deficiencies in comparison to potential adversaries	18
<p>Warsaw Pact soldiers far exceed the level of training of their American counterparts especially in such critical areas as nuclear, biological (NBC) operations and electronic countermeasures (ECM)</p>	

2. Restructure Reserve Component missions to facilitate their effective and timely mobilization 19
Capability improvement can be achieved by unifying control of similar forces where feasible and cost-effective
 3. Upgrade the viability of Guard Divisions to respond to the strategy which they support 20
Quick and error free mobilization capability is a reality that we must achieve
 4. Resolve equipment deficiencies and inconsistent policies which put the Reserves at a disadvantage 21
Stop using the defense production system to recoup balance of payment deficits
 5. Put an end to those policies which cause Reservists to be treated patronizingly by the Army, the Pentagon and even the Congress 23
Policies based on double standards for application to Active and Reserve Components are inconsistent with the increased responsibilities given the Reserves in the Total Force and One Army concepts
- C. Recommendations for Cost-Effective Use of Reserves. 24
1. Let the Reserves operate those training facilities where they can prove themselves to be more cost-effective than using active forces 24
Reserve Components are cost-effective and have proven that they can attain a better track record than the active components
 2. Alter training doctrine to take advantage of laser assisted training technology and other cost-effective methods 25
Laser technology holds the key to increased training proficiencies and savings

3. The special needs of the State must be considered in assigning Total Force missions to the National Guard. 25

The Guard is cost-effective and provides social action as well as support to emergency and disaster operations

- (a) Governor's Guidelines - "It is very important to take those institutions with a local base, and give them as much encouragement, as much latitude, and as much recognition as we can. I see in the National Guard,.. a community militia that rises out of the communities and neighborhoods of this Nation will not only be prepared but will have the kind of esprit de corps without which all of the arms and weapons and electronic gear will not be adequate to sustain any challenge to our position in the world. 25
- (b) Community Militia -- a new approach to State service by the Guard 27

III. CONCLUSIONS 31

V. Bibliography

3. The special needs of the State must be considered in assigning Total Force missions to the National Guard. 25
- The Guard is cost-effective and provides social action as well as support to emergency and disaster operations
- (a) Governor's Guidelines - "It is very important to take those institutions with a local base, and give them as much encouragement, as much latitude, and as much recognition as we can. I see in the National Guard,.. a community militia that rises out of the communities and neighborhoods of this Nation will not only be prepared but will have the kind of esprit de corps without which all of the arms and weapons and electronic gear will not be adequate to sustain any challenge to our position in the world. 25
- (b) Community Militia -- a new approach to State service by the Guard 27
- (c) Implications for the future. Involving people with the Guard -- the key to "Double Duty" from the defense dollar 31
- "The moment is here, the time is now for the National Guard to take its rightful place as part of not only the defense of this Country, but also to include citizen's efforts, whether they be National disasters, or local projects of importance. There is no reason for the disconnection." This is the Total Force.

III. Appendicies

1. Bibliography

- (a) Published official reports and selected professional literature
- (b) Staff studies and military publications
- (c) General periodicals

2. Interviews conducted by Study Staff

3. CAL ARNG Staff participating in Study

I

APPLYING THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT
TO THE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

A. Planning Considerations

1. The international level of total force planning impacts on U.S. forces structures.

In its broadest sense, the "Total Force" approach to military planning integrates all appropriate resources for defense of the United States and its allies. In Hearings before the Ninety-Second Congress in February of 1972, Melvin Laird restated the concept in this fashion "In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World military and related resources--which we call "Total Force"--include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs."¹

The Army found that it has a requirement to apply the Total Force concept to its planning activities, and the METOFOR (Methodology for Total Force Concept) Study was initiated on 1 September 1972. The METOFOR Concept has been computerized and installed at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency where it is used in support of Army participation in Joint and National Military planning and in the development of Army views regarding such planning.

The system analyzes the military budgets and major missions forces of the U.S. and up to 24 of its allies. As called for in the Total Force Concept, the emphasis is on combined U.S./Allied planning. The basic planning functions encompassed by the system are resource analysis to define permissible country force structure trade offs, country and combined force determination to derive feasible country force structures and attainable combined forces, and force evaluation to provide comparative evaluation

¹Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, "FY 73 Defense Budget and the FY 73-77 Program", Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chap II & V of Total Force Concept, Department of Defense, 1973.

of alternative sets of combined forces derived under different planning assumptions.

In summary, Total Force is a lofty principle at the level described in the METOFOR Concept since no more or less than the defense of the Free World is involved and in which the U.S. military is the key. The METOFOR Concept provides the environment in which U.S. forces must plan to carry out their missions. The planning requirements which are implied by the Total Force Concept thus come to be applied among the U.S. services as well as within each of them.

2. Interservice and Intraservice Interests Impact on Planning the Army's Total Force.

a. Total Force planning among the services requires meeting their needs collectively as well as individually.

Total Force planning is concerned with the integration of U.S. Forces for the Total Force mission and allocation of responsibilities among the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and their reserves. This is the interservice level of Total Force planning. The opening statement of the DOD study "The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force" is exemplary of the interservice level of Total Force planning. The report states that "The 'Total Force' includes all the resources available to perform the various national defense missions. It includes U.S. active and reserve (National Guard and Reserve) component forces, civilians, and--in planning for contingency operations--appropriate forces of our allies. Total Force planning is not new for the United States; planning to make the reserve components a useful part of the Total Force is as old as the Republic."²

This is the level where the Total Force Concept appears controllable. Yet, there exists a parochialism among the services as they vie for the resources available to the Total Force effort. The result is diluted effectiveness as political power prevails in the development of strategies for deployment of U.S. general purpose forces.

One example is the retention of Marine Corps as a light infantry element of the Navy when there is a great need for infantry which can stand up to Armor attacks.³

¹ Lee G. Wentling, Jr., METOFOR II Methodology for Total Force Concept, General Research Corporation, Vol I Executive Summary, December 1974.

² Department of Defense, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 0800-00200, March 1974.

³ Stephen Canby, Adelphi Papers.

Another example is the DOD organization which created the current Secretariat structure. This organization was designed to guarantee the perpetuation of the interests of the individual services, much to the later chagrin of the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. Forrestal originally conceived the concept as Secretary of Navy to insure the Navy got its fair share. Later, as Secretary of Defense he was hamstrung by a dilution of power, to the detriment of his attempts to insure a viable armed force.¹

b. Total Force planning within a service--the Army and its Reserve Components.

Total Force planning at the intraservice level considers the integration of forces or the maximum utilization of its reserves by each of the services.

In the Army, the planning is done either in terms of "Total Force Policy" or alternatively the "One Army Concept".

The Total Force Policy was proposed in the early 1960's by Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.² Its objective was to maintain selected Reserve Forces which would augment active forces in meeting U.S. military commitments abroad. However, this concept was only used to a limited degree during the Vietnam War as the active forces were augmented primarily by draftees.³

But as the War drew to a close, the Nixon Administration strategy for defense again surfaced the Total Force Concept. As stated by General Westmoreland "The role of the Reserve Components becomes more important as the size of the active Army decreases. We will need to rely heavily on them in future emergencies."⁴

¹James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 1947, p. 163, see also Walter Millis, Arms, Men, and the State, 1958, p.184, see also Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal a Study of Personality, Politics and Policy, 1963, p.225.

²Comptroller of the Army, Staff Study on Reserve Realignment Staff Simplification, U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Army Directorate of Management, 29 July 1965.

³Junior H. Burkhead, The Revised Role of the Army National Guard in the Total Force Concept, Army War College, 2 November 1973.

⁴William C. Westmoreland, Posture Statement Presented to the 92nd Congress 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1971.

Thus with the added impetus of a zero draft environment and the prospect of a diminishing proportion of the GNP for military spending, the 1972 Department of Defense Budget Five Year Program was prepared. It included a plan to have National Guard and Reserves that are manned, equipped and trained to mesh on quick notice with active forces.¹

c. The role of the reserve component in the Total Force structure can only be evaluated in terms of the Reserves ability to accomplish their mission. The mission, in turn, is a factor of the strategy to be supported.

(1) Strategy of Readiness

"Succinctly stated, our strategy must be, and is, readiness," says the Army Chief of Staff. He also places the reserve components in the strategy of readiness by the following statement.

"The second part of this posture is to maintain our CONUS based reserve in a high state of readiness. In addition to providing deterrence and defense against direct attack on the United States, CONUS based forces constitute a strategic reserve to sustain our forward deployed forces in peacetime and rapidly reinforce them in wartime. That reserve, comprised of both Active Army and Reserve Components, also includes the forces necessary for commitment to protect U.S. interests in areas where there are no forward based elements. In view of the practical constraints on forward deployment, it is the readiness of this reserve which gives credibility to intent and the capability to accomplish our announced purposes. This requires that reserve to be well trained and capable of operating successfully on the sophisticated battleground of today. Of course, our strategic mobility assets, which are the necessary linkage between the CONUS base and forward deployed forces, must be capable of rapidly delivering the necessary reinforcements."

The reserves must be prepared to accomplish their mission in support of the strategy of readiness. The essential elements of this preparation have been set forth by the Army Chief of Staff as well as by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

¹ Melvin Laird, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 17 February 1972.

² Fred C. Weyand, General, Testimony Before the Defense Task Force, National Security Programs Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Second Session, 94th Congress, 2 March 1976.

General Weyand: "Today the first vital battles must be fought with whatever force is in being and ready. To a greater degree than in the past, our peacetime Army will be our wartime Army. It must be ready. both Active and Reserve Components."¹

Will Hill Tankersley: "The ever-expanding role we have assigned to the Guard and Reserve is a positive indicator that the Total Force Policy is a reality and not a myth. Reserve Component goals for the immediate future center on five key issues:

1. Assigning valid missions.
2. Providing modern equipment.
3. Instituting meaningful training.
4. Improving readiness capability, and
5. Establishing credibility."²

(2) Quality

The quality of forces is an integral factor in measuring an effective force structure. As evidenced by the Secretary of the Army in the following statement.³

"Quality is the sine qua non of successful mission performance. As a nation, we place a premium on quality. Because the word is often used and universally applied, its practical impact is easily overlooked. Quality is an objective of today's Army because it is the only practical way to offset partially the quantitative superiority of Soviet forces. Quality yields daily practical returns in other areas. High school graduates coming into the Army have a much greater chance of success during training. This lowers recruiting needs and training costs and, at the same time, provides higher levels of unit effectiveness. Quality equipment can significantly increase mission performance. Dramatic improvements and innovations in the quality of training have and will continue to enhance individual and unit proficiency, leadership and morale. Quality is not merely a slogan

¹Ibid., Pl 15.

²Will Hill Tankersley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Commanders Digest, Vol 17, No. 21, May 22, 1975.

³Martin R. Hoffman, Secretary of the Army, Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Second Session, 94th Congress the Posture of the Army, 3 February 1976.

and not only an objective. It must continue to be a way of life for the Army.

Mr. Chairman, as in the past, the success of our joint efforts in addressing the FY 1977 budget will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of the members of this Committee and the Army in achieving a common point of view on our national requirements. This Army must be a potent, credible deterrent. It must have the ability to go into combat as quickly as lift can be provided to move it to the combat zone. It must have the capability to win the first battle to which it is committed. Together with our allies, the Army must have the capacity to carry the fight to potential adversaries without the long mobilization periods on which historically the Nation has relied in time of crisis."

Consistent with the theme expressed by the Secretary, a DOD Total Force study group outlined specific objectives which address the need for quality in the force structure.¹

The Total Force Policy has had significant success in recent years in shaping American military forces. Further progress in the area of the reserves will continue to require that:

--We recognize that the needs of deterrence peacetime presence, and immediate response demand that major portions of the force be active.

--We identify essential missions within the capabilities of the reserves and within the constraints of the Secretary of Defense planning guidance.

--We assign these missions to the reserves, and demand good performance. If there is doubt about the reserves' capability to perform a mission, that capability should be tested before the mission is assigned.

---We continue to provide the reserves with modern equipment, and achieve a reasonable balance between the reserve structure and its equipment so that no forces are maintained for which there is no useful equipment, and no equipment is maintained for which there are no useful forces.

¹ Department of Defense Report, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, September 1975.

--We place greater responsibility on the active forces for improving training of the reserves.

--We integrate the planning and management of active and reserve component forces into a coherent whole.

(3) Cost Effective Reserves

(a) Each unit must be justified in terms of the strategy it supports and its readiness to respond to its dual mission.

(b) Criteria for Zero-basing of reserve units should simultaneously consider both readiness for federal mobilization, and responsiveness for State activation, without negatively affecting either mission. Only through such a program can we encourage and assure double duty for the defense dollar.

In order to meet their commitment to Total Force in terms of quality and responsiveness several policy guidelines essential to Total Force planning emerge. With reference to the Reserve Components of the Army, these guidelines require:

1. Appropriate missions for the Reserves which realistically support a viable strategy.

2. Management structures which are responsive to the requirement of the Total Force Policy.

¹⁵ Commanders Digest, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Vol. 18, No. 20, November 13, 1975, see also, Peter A. Pyhrr, Zero-Base Budgeting, John Wiley and Sons, 1975, chapter on DOD Budget Process, and, Donald N. Anderson, "Zero-Base Budgeting" How to Get Rid of Corporate Crabgrass", Management Review, October 1976.

3. Insuring that the Reserves have adequate manpower to accomplish the missions assigned to them.

4. Insuring that the Reserves have adequate training to accomplish the missions assigned to them.

5. Insure that the Reserves have the equipment and logistical support to accomplish the missions assigned to them.

B. Implementing Total Force Planning

Affiliation is currently the principal means for implementing the Army's Total Force.

As one of its Total Force actions, the Army has added three active divisions, for a total of sixteen (16) active and eight (8) reserve divisions. This was done with no increase in manpower, through support reductions in the active force and through use of reserve brigades as organic elements of some of the new divisions.¹

This expansion resulted in organizations which must, in fact, rely on Reserve Component manpower to provide full complements of troops. ²

The Army's method for carrying out the integration of reservists with active component units resulted from DOD's "Williamson Study", which recommended the establishment of the Affiliation Program. ³

¹ Edwin A. Deagle, U.S. Army Force Design: Alternative's For Fiscal Years 1977-1981, Staff Working Paper, Congressional Budget Office, Washington D.C., 16 July 1976.

² "Total Army Readiness, CDRS CALL, DA-PAM 360-829, Sep-Oct 76.

³ Department of Defense, Reserve Component Study (Williamson), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), July 1971 (unclassified summary). For a detailed analysis of the Hybrid Division Concept, upon which the Affiliation Program is based, see, Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior, Brookings Institution, 1975.

DOD has developed more specific terminology to implement the concept of affiliation which is defined as a program which is directed and funded to improve the readiness of selected Reserve Component battalions and brigades.¹ Reserve Component units are affiliated with active units in the following manner.

1. Round Out - Reserve Component units in this category are assigned to an active division with which they train in peacetime and deploy with on mobilization.

2. Augmentation - Reserve Component units in this category increase the combat power of the active Army divisions to which they are assigned. Augmented units train with their division and are expected to deploy with, or immediately following the active Army's mobilization.

3. Deployment Capability Improvement - Reserve Component combat and combat support units which must deploy early, but not as a part of an active Army division, are in this category. These units are assisted in training by either an active Army division or a like-type Army unit.

To date, 97 Reserve Component battalions are in the affiliation program which involves all 11 of the active Army Divisions based in the United States.²

The magnitude of the current reliance on affiliated reserve forces requires a fully trained, fully equipped and fully manned reserve component.

The commitments to integration of reserves in this or a similar fashion may be irreversible. Pressures to hold the line on defense spending, combined with a budgetary favoring of strategic weapons systems over general purpose forces combine to force the use of inexpensive reservists in place of active personnel.

¹ Thomas L. Avanti, LTC, Staff Paper on Affiliation Program, Ft. McPherson, GA, 29 March 1976. See Appendix A.

² Combat Ready Guard and Reserve, Commanders Digest, 22 May 1975.

C. The Role of the Guard as a Department of State Government.

In addition to the question of the National Guard's ability to carry out Total Force missions, there is yet another major factor to consider in addressing the Total Force Concept as it applies to the Guard. That factor is the role of the Guard as a department of state government. For, while federal mobilization is the Guard's most important mission, its most immediate mission is state service.

The use of the National Guard as an alternative force to confront the peacetime economic and social problems of today is a necessary consideration. The Guard cannot and should not be isolated from the social and economic forces that support it. Accordingly, the Guard in California, as elsewhere, routinely performs a wide variety of state missions, many of them on a recurring basis.

This special relationship requires that national defense needs must to a certain degree be balanced against the needs of state government in terms of structuring, manning, equipping, and training the Guard.

Before the Guard can undertake a significant role in social and economic projects, however, the following principles should be adhered to.¹

¹Hugh Henning, The Peaceful Uses of the Military Forces, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. XVII-XXV.

1. Military resources must be used as complementary and not as the primary means of development.

2. Use of existing military units should be emphasized with civilian replacement foreseen and planned for, creation of new military units to meet present situation should be discouraged.

3. Projects should be short-term adhoc functions which do not eventually replace the civilian effort.

4. Civilian organizations, both public and private, should be prime coordinators and wherever possible those requests by local communities that help develop their own resourcefulness and capacities should receive first priority.

5. Units either selected or volunteering for a given project should be trained and oriented to not only the particular task, but to the socio/economic conditions surrounding the groups to be serviced. Existing Guard or reserve units in an area can carry out at least one and possibly several community projects. A project might include construction of a needed neighborhood service center or recreation center by the engineers, special medical or dental screening clinics by doctors and dentists, or a special food service and nutritional program by the Quartermaster. This activity would begin to establish a new image for the Guard by providing a highly visible, good-faith effort.

6. The selected activities should combine wherever possible, the objective of success and accomplishment of the task with a concomitant increase in the individual Guardsmen's talents and productivity. The skills and abilities of the members of the National Guard can be used in community-oriented activities such as developing recreational facilities, rehabilitation and weatherization of low-income housing and establishing and upgrading community garden projects, or any number of worthwhile and needed activities. Skill training requirements of the Guard can be met while working on such projects.

7. On-the-job training of the civilian participants should be encouraged in order to develop self-help mechanisms.

Careful consideration must be given to each project in order to ensure that on-going public sector responsibilities are not infringed upon or supplanted.

Another consideration in structuring the Total Force is the use of the National Guard as a state military force. In California, State Military Forces can provide military support in three broad categories of state missions:

1. Military Support to Civil Authority during civil disorders.

2. Military Support to Civil Authority during natural disasters such as floods, fires and earthquakes.

3. Military Support to Civil Authority for special missions.

4. Following are some capabilities of the State Military Forces:

Search and Rescue

Fire Suppression Support

Evacuation of Personnel

Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization

Emergency Housing and Feeding

Traffic and Crowd Control

Engineering Support

Protection of Lives and Property

Communication Support

Airlift of Personnel and Equipment

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

II

RECOMMENDATIONS TO OVERCOME SHORTFALLS IN APPLYING THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

Increasing criticism is being leveled at the caliber of the reserves to respond to the call, particularly the call to provide up to 1/3 of the fighting power of the U.S. Army Forces at home. The political decision to fight the Vietnam War with draftees rather than with reservists is seen by some as another derisive gesture which at best casts a shadow on the reputation of leaders who while pointing out the quintessence of reserve participation in Total Force, invariably express their lack of faith in the equipment, training and manning levels of the reserves in relation to their ability to respond.

In 1972, the early days of the Total Force Concept, the Secretary of Defense said:

"For many years we have talked about achieving a true combat ready status for our National Guard and Reserve. Considerable progress has been made, but by no means enough.¹

By 1975, progress was still slow,

"Equipping the Guard and Reserve is a continual challenge. Draw-downs on equipment resources to support Middle East, Vietnam, and other requirements have diminished programmed and potential equipment resources for the Guard and Reserve. Ground-to-air and antitank weapons, nonexistent.²

As of 4 March 1976, it was the official policy of the Secretary of the Army that

"Reliance on Reserve Component units for round-out of four active divisions is another example of shortfall risk.³

¹Melvin Laird, op. cit.

²Will Hill Tankersley, "Combat Ready Guard and Reserve", Commanders Digest, Vol 17, No. 21, American Forces Press Service, Arlington, VA., 581/573/S-61, 22 May 1975, p. 9.

³"Future Direction of the Army", Command Comment, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, 1976, p.D-3.

A. Recommendations for Overcoming Shortfalls in Total Force Readiness.

1. The Guard and Reserves are not being managed from the perspective of their participation in a short war NATO scenario.

a. Analysis of the problem:

If the U. S. Army today were to commit some of its active divisions to combat somewhere other than Europe, it would be necessary to rely on the Reserve Components for Tactical support and to defend against a surprise attack against NATO.¹

Politicians, strategists, and doom sayers alike point out the Warsaw Pact's ability to launch a surprise attack against which NATO is particularly ill-prepared. Thus, such an attack looms as a likely strategy, opposed to a long buildup to an east-west European war.² Accordingly, this tactic leads inevitably to the realization that the first battles of such a war would be decisive. At the very least the first battles would irrevocably readjust national boundaries.

Defense planners explain their lack of responsiveness to these probabilities in terms of feeling that planning and resources cannot be exclusively geared to the possibility of a "Short Warning" attack by the Warsaw Pact.³ Nevertheless, reserve forces that are prepared to participate in a Short Warning -Short Duration War, can also be prepared to respond to long range commitments. The reverse may not be true however.

b. Recommendation:

Redirect the management structure of the Department of Defense, particularly at the Secretariat level, to insure the reserves have a recognizable place on the military system cognizant of the importance of their role, particularly as it applies to the use of reserves as early deploying forces in a NATO

¹Will Hill Tankersley, "Combat Ready Guard and Reserve", Commanders Digest, Op. Cit., p.10

²Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Senators Say NATO Poorly Prepared for Short-Warning War", Army, March 1977, pp. 42-44, See also, James H. Polk, General Ret., "The New Short War Strategy", Strategic Review, 1975, p. 52, and Fred Weyand, Op. Cit. P. 15

³John W. Finney, "Two Senators Ask Shift in Strategy for NATO:", New York Times, p.9, 15 November 1976. See also, Seven Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce Incentives: Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength." Orbis, Op. Cit., and "Strategic Mobility and the Reserves . . ." "Technological Service Corporation study , August, 1976

scenario. With reference to this need, it is appropriate to again evaluate the role of the Lieutenant General Commands of the U.S. Continental Armies in the management structure of the reserves. Even though in 1973, there was a re-organization of our U.S. based force structure, there is some question whether the decision to retain these Army Commands was made with the benefit of available management analysis tools now in use by the Department of Defense.¹ Moreover, had such resources been applied to the decision to keep these headquarters, they may not now be justifiable in terms of cost effectiveness and the expanding capabilities of FORSCOM. The Readiness Regions together with the Active and Reserve Component Headquarters, already available, certainly provide the most cost-effective alternative.

2. The effectiveness of Reserves in a short war scenario can be adversely affected because of the failure to train and orient them in areas of likely deployment.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Only recently has training doctrine been changed to specifically identify the tactics, capabilities, and limitations of Warsaw Pact forces. In the event of a short war NATO scenario, any delay in deployment of reserves for purposes of orientation will adversely affect their usefulness.

Israel fights and wins its wars largely with reserve units which routinely train in areas of likely deployment.

Company and battalion size units of the British Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) regularly train with their active service.

b. Recommendations:

Train the reserves in areas of the work where they are likely to be deployed to meet U.S. commitments abroad. Train them in close association with active units.

Key personnel of early deploying Reserve Component units should have firsthand knowledge about the terrain, weather, and the feel of the land in which they would be operating.

Early deploying units with essential overseas contingency missions should be required to conduct realistic "hands-on" mission-oriented OCONUS training in areas of potential overseas deployment if they meet requirements established by Department of the Army.

¹ U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, "Army Management and Combat To Support Ratio", Jan 1975, p. 39.

3. Use of National Guard Brigades to round-out active Army Divisions is an inappropriate management technique.

a. Analysis of the problem:

The adoption of the concept of hybrid divisions arises out of the expedient of the Army to create 16 divisions from 13 without the funding required to support the three additional divisions on an active basis. It might be assumed that the reserve elements will be phased out as rapidly as possible on the basis that they are ineffective, and could not deploy with their affiliated divisions because of excessive mobilization times and because of training and equipment deficiencies.

The hybrid configuration ignores the bifurcated role of the Guard as a federal armed force and as the State Militia for the 50 states.

Not only are there obvious potential conflicts between federal training requirements imposed by the affiliated division commander and state emergency missions; under a partially mobilized status the Guard units have a responsibility to State Area Commands and there is always the peacetime shuffling of money and manpower by the National Guard Bureau to add instability to the situation.

Recent doctrinal guidance given to both active and reserve commanders participating in the affiliation program stresses the importance of their absolute cooperation to gain a measure of success with this program. It is suggested that this is a tenuous basis, as opposed to traditional direct command relationships, on which to place such a critical program as the capability of the U.S. Military to respond to its commitments.

b. Recommendation:

Round-out and augmentation unavoidably place too many constraints on the use of Guard forces to perform state missions and on the ability of the Guard to complete timely mobilization. Of the Total Force affiliation programs, only Deployment Capability Improvement (DCI), emphasizing increased active component support for Reserve Component operations offers viable and acceptable possibilities.

B. Recommendations for Overcoming Shortfalls in Quality of Reserve Forces.

1. We now suffer training deficiencies in comparison to potential adversaries.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Recent information and developments by the Warsaw forces indicate that our survival on the modern battlefield demands total NBC readiness.¹ Threat doctrine reveals the fact that chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) capabilities/operations are tailored to fit the offensive and defensive battlefield concepts.² Moreover, many new vehicles in the Warsaw Pact, such as the BMP and T-62 are designed for combat in a CBR environment.³ Organizations and equipment need not be withdrawn from battle for decontamination. Organic CBR defense units are employed with units down to the frontline to move with the advance and provide mobile protection and decontamination facilities.⁴ Within the Warsaw Pact supply system, the order of priority for supply and resupply is:⁵

- (1) Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons systems and munitions.
- (2) Conventional weapons systems and munitions.
- (3) Petroleum oil lubricants & products.
- (4) Other military and support equipment.
- (5) Food.

¹FM 30-40, Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces, p.6-103 through 6-111, Project Status Update, M-55 Direct Fire Trainer, Tanks & FA, Cbt Arms Trng Board (CATB) 1 November 1974. TC-17-12-6, Field Mini-Tank Range Complex, USAARMS, 24 Nov 1975.

²HQ, Sixth US Army Ltr; NGB Defense Readiness, Presidio of San Francisco, 30 August 1976.

³FM-21-40, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense, 17 May 1971, p. 2-1.

⁴FM 30-40 Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces, p.6-103, through 6-111.

⁵M1101-5, Discussion Booklet on Soviet Tactics, C&GSC, p.5-VI-7.

We know that within the Warsaw Pact established priorities for the employment of Electronic Warfare are: destruction, deception and jamming. Warsaw Pact forces accept the NBC environment as a likely part of the battlefield. They take full advantage of their protective clothing and decontamination equipment, and know that they are better prepared because they are better equipped and practice defensive measures in all phases of training.¹ They actively employ jamming and deception as electronic countermeasures (ECMO), and

- (1) Have the capability of jamming radio nets by spot, sweep or barrage jamming.
- (2) Will jam a hostile radio net.
- (3) Will employ rope and chaff delivered by artillery and aircraft to jam radars and noncommunication devices.
- (4) Possess the capability to conduct electronic deception operations against both radio and noncommunications emitters.

b. Recommendation:

Emphasize training in subject areas in which we now suffer the greatest deficiencies in comparison to potential adversaries. The conduct of dynamic training through the concepts of opposing force (OPFOR), SCOPES, THREAT and Realistic (Real Train) training can be effectively realized with the numerous training systems and items of equipment now in use. Some of these systems are identified on page 25. Make them available to all units.

2. Reserve Components can be neither effectively nor timely mobilized if needed.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Even though the Viet Nam experience showed that the types of mobilization plans used by the CONUS armies to activate the limited reserves that were called up were inadequate, little has been done to cure the defects that arose (including changing Mobilization Stations and refusing to honor security clearances.)

¹FM 30-40 & M/R1103, Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces, p.6-115.

²TC 30-4, Motorized Rifle Regiment, 15 June 75, p.25., Army RB-30-4, The Enemy Force, Command & General Staff College, 1 July 1975, p.3-8 through 3-11.

It is a well-quoted but (in this case) unused principle that an untested plan is, like a useless plan--no plan at all.

A true Total Force policy which actually portrayed the timely use of Reserve Components would insure that these reserve troops could be quickly brought up to speed, rather than considered to be a shortfall risk.

b. Recommendations:

Restructure reserve component missions, recognizing both the most important mission, preparation for federal mobilization, and the Guard's most immediate mission -- state and local service.

Improve the capability of Reserve Components to mobilize. This can be done by merger of the Army Reserve into the National Guard, where feasible and cost effective, in order to:

a. Provide for the combat power of the Reserves to be located within the National Guard.

b. Insure that support units are transferred to the Guard where the service provided would be of substantial value in case of local emergency assistance.

The special needs of the state must be considered in assigning the National Guard Total Force Missions.

3. The eight Reserve divisions cannot now expeditiously and efficiently respond to an immediate mobilization requirement.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Reserve Components need division headquarters to insure promotional opportunities and for administration and control, however, the concept of mobilizing the division to fight immediately as a unit is anachronistic.

It would take four to six weeks of training after mobilization to complete division training over and above the training of the component parts of the division.

¹Pate, Robert I. LTC, U.S. Army Reserve Components Peacetime Assessment and Management to Meet Mobilization Requirements, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, DDC AO 14181, 22 May 1976. See also, Pelton, John Dew, COL, "Reserve Component Readiness in 192 Hours per Year?" Student Essay, U.S. Army War College, DDC, ADA021817, 17 October 1975, and, "Problems of Implementing Reserve Component-Active Army Augmentation/Affiliation", General Research Corporation, April 1974.

b. Recommendations:

Upgrade the viability of the Guard to insure its usefulness on short notice.

Introduce the "Short War" into the planning for utilization of reserves.

Revise mobilization procedures to insure quick error free mobilization.

Restructure combat units to insure quick error free deployment.

Eliminate hybrid units and instead train Guard units in Battalion configuration under Division control.

Plan to deploy as battalions.

Plan around constraint of lift.

Plan around constraint of bottlenecks at NATO Assembly points.

4. Reservists do not have organic equipment to allow them to deploy even under optimum conditions.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Many of the modern anti-armor weapons crucial to a European encounter where Warsaw tanks significantly outnumber allied tanks are unavailable for training by reservists.

(1) Only 40% of reserve components meet equipment-on-hand readiness objectives.¹

(2) Equipment shortages in branches of CAL ARNG include Armor, Infantry, Artillery, Signal, Engineers, Aviation, and Medical.²

¹"Total Army Readiness", CDRS CALL, DA Pam 360-829, Department of Defense Sep-Oct 1976, p.3.

²Freeman, John R., LTC, Logistics Officer, Logistics Div., ARNG, NGB Conversation, 227-4478 AVN, see also, Glashan, Rolfe, A., LTC, Chief, Facilities and Requirements Branch, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau, an interview, Washington, D.C., 21 October 1976, and, Glossop, M. Supply Management Office, Logistics Div., ARNG, NGB, Interview 227-4904 AVN.

b. Recommendations:

(1) Resolve equipment deficiencies and inconsistent policies which put the reserves at a disadvantage.

(2) Stop using the defense production system to recoup balance of payment deficits while prime tanks, tactical radios, and even tactical missile systems are being sold on foreign arms markets.¹

5. Reservists are shortchanged on individual basis in every category of preparation and morale from training and equipment to financial compensation.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Although the Reserves have been given the responsibility of providing a major portion of the combat power of the U.S. Army, they are not taken seriously as an equal component nor are the reserves apportioned a responsible quantity of the available resources to accomplish the assigned tasks. The following are specific examples:

(1) The recent pay raise was allocated in such a way that all active duty personnel received a 4% pay raise while their parttime counterparts received only 3%.

(2) The active Army is authorized to purchase television advertisement and radio time for recruiting; this is not so for the National Guard. In fact, federal budget allocation to recruit each new soldier in the active Army is \$655. For the Guard it is \$181.²

(3) Active Army enlisted personnel with certain critical military occupational specialties can receive a bonus of up to \$10,000 for reenlisting, a member of the Guard does not receive a reenlistment bonus.³

¹McArthur George, "S.E. Asia Becomes Market for Arm Sales", Los Angeles Times, 16 January 1977, see also, "Foreign Military Sales A Growing Concern", Report to the Congress, Comptroller General of the United States, ID-76-51, 1 June 1976, and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, a Working Visit, Washington, D.C., 21 October 1976.

²Carlson, Theodore, Major, Recruiting and Retention Officer, Military Dept, State of Calif, an interview with Thrasher, Robert, LTC, 15 Oct 76, Sacramento, CA and subsequent interview with Stevens, Jack, LTC, Chief, Recruiting and Retention Branch Personnel Division, National Guard Bureau, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 22 October 1976.

³Ibid.

(4) Double standards also appear in training site construction. For the active Army soldier, 90 square feet of barracks space is authorized and for the Guardsman, 57 square feet. Active Army barracks are air conditioned, barracks for Guardsmen are not. In the active Army officer personnel are authorized 360-460 square feet and officers of the Guard 113-160 while E7, E8 and E9 personnel are authorized bachelor enlisted quarters, Guardsmen in these grades are not.¹

(5) Every facet of military activity seems to continue this pattern of dual standards. Loss, damage, or destruction of federal property resulting in a Report of Survey in the active Army is governed by the rule of "gross" negligence. The rule of "simple" negligence is applied to Guardsmen.² The active services maintain revolving stock fund accounts for such items as repair parts, clothing, and equipment. The Guard must rely on a fixed allotment for these items.

(6) Other areas involving different standards include active Army aviators who can apply time flown in any type of aircraft towards meeting their requirements while Guard pilots can apply civilian aircraft flight time only if the aircraft flown is of the same type and specific model. In fact, aviator currency requirements for active Army pilots are considered accomplished after the pilot has flown 500 hours, and requires only an orientation flight every 90 days. The Guard pilot, on the other hand, regardless of the number of hours he has flown, must still fly one hour every month to maintain currency.³

(7) Even the in-service benefits available to both active and reserve members always have some restriction, such as flying space available on military aircraft. Active service members can fly globally with dependents while reservists are restricted to CONUS, without dependents.

¹Glashan, Rolfe A., LTC, Chief, Facilities and Requirements Branch, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 21 October 1976, Washington, D.C.; DOD Construction Criteria Manual 4270-1m, para 3-3, NGR 415-10.

²Glossop, Marvan, Supply Management Officer, Logistics Division, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 19 Oct 76, Washington, D.C.

³Flockhart, James F., Colonel, Army Aviation Officer, J-3, Military Dept., State of Calif., an interview with Thrasher, Robert, LTC, 23 Sep 76, Sacramento, CA, para 2-17 AR 95-1 and NGR 95-1.

(8) At the conclusion of an officer's career in the active Army, separation is mandatory for officers under the age of 60 below the rank of Major General. In the Guard, officers in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or below or officers with 28 years of commissioned service are separated at age 53.

(9) Finally, following twenty years of service, a member of the active Army draws an immediate annuity and his dependents are eligible for benefits and pay. After twenty years of service, a member of the reserve components cannot draw an annuity until his 60th birthday and his dependents are not eligible for benefits or pay if death occurs prior to age 60.¹

(10) Benefits for active duty forces and their dependents are broad and for the most part complete. They include unlimited PX and commissary privileges, medical services, use of all post facilities, space available travel, and when the time comes, immediate retirement pay regardless of the age of the retiree. There are excellent survivor benefits available for widows and children and they retain all their previous benefits on the death of their sponsor.

(11) By comparison, benefits for reservists and their dependents are slim. Exchange and commissary privileges are extremely limited and difficult to collect, use of post facilities (swim pools, Class VI stores, etc.) is not permitted. On many posts reservists are even denied membership in NCO and officer clubs. A reservist or Guardsman is not eligible to collect any retirement benefits until he or she becomes 60, no matter how many years have been served.²

b. Recommendations:

Put a stop to those policies which cause reservists to be treated disparately.

Institute a universal identification card for all members of the Total Force and integrate qualified dependents into the identification card system.

These actions alone would constitute a tremendous step in implementing the Total Force concept.

¹Kauffman, Robert R., Major, Officers Branch, Personnel Division, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 19 October 1976, Washington, D.C.

²Army Times Magazine Reservists & Guardsmen Also Serve - How First-class Service Families Get Second-class Treatment, May 2, 1977, p.14.

C. Recommendations for Cost-Effective Use of Reserves.

1. Operation of training facilities by active components is not always cost-effective when compared to the track record of some Reserve Component operations.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Recently in a letter to representative Charles W. Wiggins, Department of the Army reported that the California Army National Guard currently operates Camp Roberts and Fort Irwin, California, at up to 40 percent less than it was costing the active Army to provide the same training facilities for the Reserve Components.¹

b. Recommendation:

Let the Reserves operate those training facilities where they can prove themselves to be more cost-effective than using active forces for the same purpose.

2. The current means for the maintenance of individual proficiencies, especially in gunnery/weapon firing tasks, while accomplishing the mission, are not cost-effective.

a. Analysis of the problem:

Firing live/service ammunition is the most effective means of teaching marksmanship/gunnery tasks; however, given the constraints of time, money and facilities it is not cost-effective. Training doctrine must be altered to continue development and use of efficient and cheaper technology-assisted training. Technological advances allow for the use of smaller caliber, yet compatible, weapons to economize and enable the Guard to train on shorter firing ranges, thus economizing on land use.

Laser technology is a cost-effective substitute for using live ammunition. It economizes on ammunition and increases weapons system life while improving the individual soldier's proficiency.

¹Bruce R. Harris, LTC Chief, Plans and Operations Division, Office Chief of Legislative Liaison DA-OSA, 7 March 1977.

Several of these systems are already in production, for instance:

MAGLAD: Marksmanship and Gunnery Laser Device.

MILES: Multiple integrated laser engagement system.

LES: Laser Engagement system.

VES: Vehicle engagement system.

MTS: Moving Target Screen.

M-60 MGL: Machine Gun Laser.

M-5: Direct Fire Trainer - Tank and Artillery.

b. Recommendation:

Alter training doctrine to take advantage of laser assisted training technology and other cost effective methods, and make them available to all Reserve Component units that need them. Laser technology holds the key, to reduced costs and more efficient training in this field.¹

3. The special needs of the State must be considered in assigning Total Force missions to the National Guard. The Guard is cost-effective and provides social action as well as support to emergency and disaster operations.

a. Governor's guidelines:

"I have been taking a particular interest in the Guard, at least insofar as it affects California, because I think within its tradition and within its potential the Country has something it ought to be developing and it isn't developing enough. I see in the Guard a couple of things that are very important to me and I think are very important to the Country.

"It is very important to take those institutions that have a local base and give them as much encouragement, as much latitude and as much recognition as we can. I see in the

¹ TRADOC Ltr, The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES (LES)), see also, Project Status Update, M-55 Direct Fire trainer, Tank & FA, Cbt Arms Trng Board (CATB) 1 November 1974, and, TC-17-12-6, Field Mini-Tank Range Complex, USAARMS, 24 November 1975.

National Guard of the fifty states that kind of diversity ... that was certainly in former times the very cutting edge of not only our defense, but important leadership aspects of our own communities. A community militia that rises out of the communities and neighborhoods of this Nation will not only be prepared but will have the kind of esprit de corps without which all of the arms and weapons and electronic gear will not be adequate to sustain any challenge to our position in the world.

"... Many of our institutions are losing contact with the people who must support them in the final analysis, and we are finding that this is not only in the military, we are finding it in police, judges, politicians, and universities. We are finding an erosion of respect for authority and the only way to try to reverse that trend is to reinvigorate the connection between people and any given institution.

"In this State we are now studying the potential of opening up store-front recruiting efforts. Trying to involve people in the urban areas that have not been part of the Guard. Redoubling our efforts to recruit women and others who have been left out of the major thrust of recruitment to try and make the Guard as representative of the State as possible. We are pretty good at earthquakes, we are good at floods, but there are a lot of other problems in the community. A lot of other projects that the State Guard could participate in. Not only to just be good citizens, but so that people know that you exist. It calls for some ideas that may seem a bit unorthodox, but I really believe that no institution can survive long unless it is grounded into the minds and hearts of people across the neighborhoods of this Country.

"I want you to know that I definitely pledge my support, and I have brought up the subject with the President when I talked to him and others in Washington.

"The moment is here, the time is now for the National Guard to take its rightful place as part of not only the defense of this Country, but also to include citizen's efforts, whether they be National disasters, or local projects of importance. There is no reason for the disconnection.

" I will be sending General Schober back to Washington to advocate your cause insofar as California can. Because the institutions we have for which the military is one, have got to reconnect with the people so that those who serve do so with the confidence of the people who pay the bills and provide the basic support." 1

b. Community Militia -- a new approach to State service by the Guard.

Community Militia is a project integrating the resources of the California Guard with those of the community and the State Employment Development Department (EDD) , in order to:

Instill within the Guard a highly developed sense of community service by expanding the community services already performed and by attracting and utilizing recruits who, after a period of training, will serve their communities.

Train Guardsmembers in skills that are needed in the civilian business community.

Using the services of EDD, link a recruit with a sponsor in the business community who will guarantee that recruit employment, after acquisition of skills, for at least one year.

STAGE I - RECRUITING

The Guard & EDD will acquaint the candidate with the training and employment opportunities available under this program. This stage should begin the process of instilling in the recruit a sense of the Guard's community responsibilities. At the very least, the recruit should be aware that he or she will be expected to use skills acquired in the Guard in the service of his or her community.

Considerations - the information given to the candidate must be complete, current and factually accurate. If the type of schooling or employment desired by the recruit is unavailable or not feasible for that particular person, he or she should be made aware of this.

STAGE II - ENLISTMENT (2-8 DAYS)

Guard and EDD representatives will assist the recruit in identification of skills and choice of training. This stage will also provide an opportunity to spot educational deficiencies and provide remedial training. Vocational Education can provide the funds necessary for this.

Assistance will be provided to the recruit in getting through the enlistment process, e.g., processing of paperwork, transportation to medical facility for physical examination, ect.; and preparation for the qualifying examination.

¹Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor, speech to Adjutants' General Association of U.S., 18 May 1977, San Diego, CA.

STAGE III - POST-ENLISTMENT/PRE-TRAINING (1½ to 6 MONTHS)

This stage represents the interim period between the time the person is enlisted and the time he or she begins federal basic and advanced skills training. It may last from 1½ to 6 months.

Those in this group with no prior service, are required to attend eight weekends of duty within a 6-month period.

During this stage, enlistees ordinarily do not have uniforms. Every effort is made to instill a sense of belonging to the new recruit.

All enlistees in the Community Militia program attend drills during this period. It is during this period that the recruit is oriented to traditional military customs and prepared for life at the basic and advanced skills training centers. This is also the period during which the recruit can be taught his or her role as a member of the Community Militia. He or she will be made completely familiar with the kinds of community service functions performed by the Guard and informed of his or her responsibilities in that regard.

RECOMMENDATION

A commitment by the Army to support enlistment through the Community Militia will provide for reassociation of the individual in society with Army as an institution.

STAGE IV - BASIC/ADVANCED TRAINING

Basic training lasts four months and consists of the standard combat training, e.g., shooting, running up hills, back down again, deep knee bends, etc. After basic, the enlistee goes to the advanced training school of his choice. This may take him or her into another state.

Some recruits are lost to the Regular Army at this stage because the Army is prepared to offer fulltime, as opposed to parttime employment.

STAGE V - RETURN FROM TRAINING

At this stage, the recruit should be ready to be hired by his civilian employer-sponsor. The recruit now takes his place as a fully employed productive member of society as well as having a vital part time mission in the National Guard of the United States.

(c) Implications for the future. Involving people with the Guard -- the key to "Double Duty" from the defense dollar.

The Community Militia project is one example of where the Guard can perform a dual mission. One role is that of an agency in the service of the Nation's defense; another role is that of an agency in the service of the community. As previously stated, this approach is based on the belief that no institution can survive long unless it is grounded into the fabric of the community. There is much work to be done in the community, and where the Guard can contribute in a manner consistent with its contribution to the Total Force mission, is a subject which must be explored. Potential areas in which the Guard may provide support to other departments of state government are presently being studied in California. These include the following:

- Air Quality surveillance.
- Bilingual, bicultural education.
- Work experience education in conjunction with local community colleges.
- Emergency public information and education.
- Cleanup and abatement.
- Fire and rescue mutual aid planning, training and augmentation.
- Communication support and equipment.
- Assistance to the State emergency broadcasting system.
- Dam evacuation planning and operations.
- Radiological monitoring.
- Migrant services assistance.
- Public employment program participation.
- Fish and wildlife protection.
- Insect control and eradication.
- Health and nutrition training.
- Pesticide contamination and residue testing.

Plant quarantine training and enforcement.
Environmental radiation control.
Hazardous waste management.
Water sanitation control.
Farm worker health services assistance.
Infectious disease education and assistance.
Furnishing of road escorts for emergency transport.
Abandoned vehicle abatement.
Historical facilities improvement.
State beaches and parks support.
Parachute drop zone inspection.
Community airport development assistance.
Physical environmental impact inspections.
Highway safety assistance.
Off-system and rural highway road patrol.
Oil spill cleanup assistance.
Flood control assistance.
Levee maintenance inspection - water quality
measurement.

CONCLUSION,

Total Force planning must take a new direction to insure that the reserves are used to their maximum to achieve cost savings while guaranteeing that the commitments of the U.S. military will be met.

Reserves can operate at a lower cost than active counterparts. However, they cannot be expected to attain the level of proficiency they are not properly allocated a reasonable share of the Total Force resources.

Because irrevocable commitments have been made in reliance upon reserve manpower, there is no choice but to insure the potential for adequate response of the reserve forces of the U.S. military by providing appropriate leadership and management, funding, resources, motivation, training and equipment and the ability to acquire appropriate manpower.

Any alternatives to cost effective reserves are unacceptable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Army Management and Combat to Support Ratio, U. S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Jan 1975, p. 39.
- Avanti, Thomas L., LTC, Staff Paper on Affiliation Program, Ft. McPherson, GA, 29 March 1976. See Appendix A.
- Brown, Edmund G. Jr., Governor, speech to Adjutants' General Association of U. S., 18 May 1977, San Diego, CA.
- Burkhead, Junior H., The Revised Role of the Army National Guard in the Total Force Concept, Army War College, 2 November 1973.
- Canby, Stephen, Adelphi Papers.
- Carlson, Theodore, Major, Recruiting and Retention Officer, Military Dept, State of Calif, an interview with Thrasher, Robert, LTC, 15 Oct 76, Sacramento, CA and subsequent interview with Stevens, Jack, LTC, Chief, Recruiting and Retention Branch Personnel Division, National Guard Bureau, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C., 22 October 1976.
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, FM 21-40, 17 May 1971, p. 2-1.
- Combat Ready Guard and Reserve, Commanders Digest, 22 May 1975.
- Deagle, Edwin A., U. S. Army Force Design: Alternative's For Fiscal Years 1977-1981, Staff Working Paper, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D. C., 16 July 1976.
- Discussion Booklet on Soviet Tactics, FM 101-5, C&GSC, p. 5-VI-7.
- Finney, John W., "Two Senators Ask Shift in Strategy for NATO:", New York Times, p. 9, 15 November 1976. See also, Steven Canby, "Damping Nuclear Counterforce Incentives: Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength." Orbis, Op. Cit., and "Strategic Mobility and the Reserves..." Technological Service Corporation study, August, 1976.
- Flockhart, James F., Colonel, Army Aviation Officer, J-3, Military Dept., State of Calif., an interview with Thrasher, Robert, LTC, 23 Sep 76, Sacramento, CA, para 2-17 AR 95-1 and NGR 95-1.
- Forrestal, James, Forrestal Diaries, 1947, p. 163, see also Walter Millis, Arms, Men, and the State, 1958, p. 184, see also Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal a Study of Personality, Politics and Policy, 1963, p. 225.

Freeman, John R., LTC, Logistics Officer, Logistics Div., ARNG, NGB Conversation, 227-4478 AVN, see also, Glashan, Rolfe, A., LTC, Chief, Facilities and Requirements Branch, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau, an interview, Washington, D. C. 21 October 1976, and Glossop, M. Supply Management Office, Logistics Div., ARNG, NGB, Interview 227-4904 AVN.

"Future Direction of the Army," Command Comment, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army, 1976, p. D-3.

George, McArthur, "S. E. Asia Becomes Market for Arm Sales," Los Angeles Times, 16 January 1977, see also, "Foreign Military Sales A Growing Concern," Report to the Congress, Comptroller General of the United States, ID-76-51, 1 June 1976, and American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, a Working Visit, Washington, D. C., 21 October 1976.

Glashan, Rolfe A., LTC, Chief, Facilities and Requirements Branch, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 21 October 1976, Washington, D. C.; DOD Construction Criteria Manual 4270-1m, para 3-3, NGR 415-10.

Glosson, Marvan, Supply Management Officer, Logistics Division, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 19 Oct 76, Washington, D. C.

Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces, FM 30-40 p. 6-103 through 6-111, Project Status Update, M-55 Direct Fire Trainer, Tanks and FA, Cmbt Arms Trng Board (CATB) 1 Nov 1974, TC-17-12-6, Field Mini-Tank Range Complex, USAARMS, 24 Nov 1975.

Harris, Bruce R., LTC, Chief, Plans and Operations Division, Office Chief of Legislative Liaison DA-OSA, 7 March 1977.

Henning, Hugh, The Peaceful Uses of the Military Forces, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. XVII-XXV.

Hoffman, Martin R., Secretary of the Army, Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Second Session, 94th Congress the Posture of the Army, 3 February 1976.

Ibid, p 1-15.

Kauffman, Robert R., Major, Officers Branch, Personnel Division, Army National Guard, NGB, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C., an interview with Thrasher, Robert C., LTC, 19 October 1976, Washington, D. C.

Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense, "FY 73 Defense Budget and the FY 73-77 Program." Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chap II & V of Total Force Concept, Department of Defense, 1973.

Laird, Melvin, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,
17 February 1972.

Ludvigsen, Eric C., "Senators Say NATO Poorly Prepared for Short-Warning War," Army, March 1977, pp. 42-44, See also, James H. Polk, General Ret., "The New Short War Strategy," Strategic Review, 1975, p. 52, and Fred Weyand, Op. Cit. P. 15.

Motorized Rifle Regiment, TC 30-4, 15 June 77, p. 25.

NGB Defense Readiness, Hq Sixth U. S. Army Ltr., Presidio of San Francisco, 30 August 1976.

Pate, Robert I., LTC, U. S. Army Reserve Components Peacetime Assessment and Management to Meet Mobilization Requirements, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, DDC AO 14181, 22 May 1976. See also, Pelton, John Dew, COL, "Reserve Component Readiness in 192 Hours per Year?" Student Essay, U. S. Army War College, DDC, ADA021817, 17 October 1975, and, "Problems of Implementing Reserve Component-Active Army Augmentation/Affiliation," General Research Corporation, April 1974.

Reserve Component Study (Williamson), Dept. of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), July 1971 (unclassified summary). For a detailed analysis of the Hybrid Division Concept, upon which the affiliation Program is based, see Martin Binkir, U. S. Reserve Forces: The Problems of the Weekend Warrior, Brookings Institution 1975.

Reservists and Guardsmen Also Serve - How First-class Service Families Get Second-class Treatment, Army Times Magazine, May 2, 1977, p. 14.

Staff Study on Reserve Realignment Staff Simplification, Comptroller of the Army, U. S. Office of the Comptroller of the Army Directorate of Management, 29 July 1968.

Tankersley, Will Hill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Commanders Digest, Vol 17, No. 21, May 22, 1975.

The Enemy Force, Army RB-30-4, Command and General Staff College, 1 July 1975, p. 3-8 through 3-11.

The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Commanders Digest, Vol. 18, No. 20, November 13, 1975, see also Peter A. Pyhrr, Zero-Base Budgeting, John Wiley and Sons, 1975, Chapter on DOD Budget Process, and Donald N. Anderson, "Zero-Based Budgeting" How to Get Rid of Corporate Crabgrass," Management Review, October 1976.

The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Department of Defense, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 0800-00200, March 1974.

The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Report, Department of Defense, September 1975.

The Multiple Intergrated Laser Engagement System (Miles (Les), TRADOC Ltr, see also, Project Status Update M-55 Direct Fire Trainer, Tank and FA Cmbt Arms Trng Board (CATB), 1 November 1974, and TC-17-126, Field Mini-Tank Range Complex USAARMS, 24 November 1975.

Total Army Readiness, CDRS Call, DA-PAM 360-829, Sep-Oct 76.

Wentling, Lee G. Jr., METOFOR II Methodology for Total Force Concept, General Research Corporation, Vol I Executive Summary, December 1974.

Westmoreland, William C., Posture Statement Presented to the 92nd Congress 1st Session, Washington, D. C. 1971.

Weyand, Fred C., General, Testimony Before the Defense Task Force, National Security Programs Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Second Session, 94th Congress, 2 March 1976.