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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

by

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20 October 1978
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FOREWORD

This memorandum focuses upon the impact of the current problems of the Unified Command System on US national security. The authors review the conceptual basis of the system as well as the constraints that limit the scope of change. They conclude that because today’s strategic environment is much more dangerous, diffused, and subtle than was ever envisioned when the Unified Command System was adopted over 30 years ago, change is not only desirable but necessary.

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Major General, USA
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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

On September 20, 1977, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a "searching organizational review... so as to produce an unconstrained examination of alternative reforms in organization, management, and decision processes in the Department of Defense." This review focuses on three functional areas: the Defense Resource Management Structure, the Defense Management Structure, and the National Military Command Structure.

Although all have potential impact on the unified command system, the issue of National Military Command Structure specifically addresses the unified and specified commands. The Presidential memorandum raises serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the command structure for the conduct of war, for peacetime activities, and for crisis management. It notes that "during the Vietnam War, the Pacific Command had to be restructured so that the Theater Command could respond directly to Washington requirements." Concern is expressed regarding the capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide guidance, to review contingency plans, and to resolve differences between commanders regarding forces.1

The DOD organizational review could result in recommended changes to the unified command system. Even if this were not the case,
there are events that have occurred since the last comprehensive revision of the Unified Command Plan (June 1975) that may cause changes to be desirable. Among these are: the Panama Canal treaties with resultant impact on command arrangements for Latin America; the projected reductions in Korea which necessitate a review of command structures and relations in the Pacific; support required for US unilateral contingencies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf which raises issues connected with USEUCOM's current boundaries. Recent Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa has caused the attention of senior defense officials to be focused there and concerns have been raised regarding the ability of the current Unified Command structure to effectively respond to the region's problems.

However, before changes are made, the conceptual basis of the Unified Command system must be understood as well as the constraints which limit the scope of change.

**CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM**

Early in World War II, General George C. Marshall realized that the complexity of modern twentieth century warfare demanded that "there must be one man in command of the entire theater—air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation." The concept of placing the operational forces of two or more services under a single commander was dictated by the disastrous, dramatic failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941; and the concept was validated by the success of joint and combined operations during World War II.²

Unified Command worked best in the European Theater of operations where the US services had to act in concert with the British. Things did not work quite so well in the Pacific where the necessity for this common bond did not exist; in fact, the Pacific Theater was never unified under a single commander. Even the amphibious invasion of Japan could not bring the Army or the Navy to accept a unified command arrangement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose to organize along component command lines for the Japanese invasion, appointing General MacArthur to lead the land campaign and Admiral Nimitz to assume responsibility for the sea battle. The strategic bombing campaign conducted by the Army Air Force against Japan in the final months of the war further complicated the organizational picture. Despite the circumvention of the unified command concept in the
Pacific, it emerged from the war as basic US military doctrine, replacing the prewar concept of "mutual cooperation."

The major military order of business after World War II was to institutionalize the unified command concept. This, of course, required unification—but unification did not come easily. The Army favored a strong unification plan, believing it would fare better in a centralized defense establishment than it would were it required to compete against the more "glamorous" services with the Congress and the public. The Air Force was also in favor of centralization because it would be raised to the status of an independent service. The Navy, however, resisted centralization, principally because it feared control of the fleet by unified commanders of the other services who might not understand seapower. It also feared the loss of its air arm to the fledgling Air Force, and, to a lesser degree, the loss of the Marine Corps to the Army. In effect, the Navy was already unified with its own organic air force and army. For its part, Congress feared that unification would result in an undesired "Prussianization" of the armed forces. 3

What resulted from the National Security Act of 1947, which is the legal basis for the unified command concept, was confederation rather than unification. The amendments to the Act since then have in large measure been attempts to deal with the problems that resulted from this compromise solution.

The thrust of the changes to the Act and to the unified command concept throughout the years has been in the direction of centralization. The early legislative amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 served to consolidate power in the hands of the Secretary of Defense on the civilian side and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on the military side. Since 1958, the changes have been administrative rather than legislative, and have tended to dilute the power of the CJCS vis-a-vis the Secretary of Defense. For the most part, however, these changes did not fundamentally alter the unified command system, which is essentially the same system that emerged from World War II (see figure 1). 4

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

In view of President Carter's initiation of a fresh look at the organization of the National Security Establishment, it is appropriate to compare the strategic environment of today with that which obtained over 30 years ago when the unified command system evolved from World War II.
During World War II, the military objectives were clear: to defeat the armed forces of Germany, Italy and Japan—and to impose upon their governments the terms of unconditional surrender. The continental United States was the base from which US unified forces would be projected against the Axis Powers. In order to more effectively apply US and Allied military power, intermediate bases were established in Great Britain and North Africa. Later, Sicily, Italy and France became intermediate power projection centers along the two major avenues of approach into Central Europe. An Allied combined command and its associated US unified command was established on each of these approaches. In the Pacific, three similar power centers—Hawaii, Australia and China—resulted in three unified commands under the leadership of Nimitz, MacArthur, and Stillwell, all centered on the defeat of Japan.

Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, the geographic focus of the residual US military power in Europe remained on Berlin, albeit now against the Soviet military threat. But with the defeat of Japan, and in view of the relative weakness of China and the Soviet Union in the Far East, the US strategic focus in the Pacific became diffused, lacking both a specific and credible threat. Therefore, it is no accident that the unified commands bordering the North Atlantic have always been less complicated than those in the Pacific.

Other important changes have also taken place in the strategic environment. The international system has drifted towards multipolarity, in its political, economic and military dimensions. Advances in weapons technology, both nuclear and conventional, make this a much more dangerous world than it was a generation ago. The global proliferation of modern weapons has serious implications for US security assistance policy. Although politically monolithic communism has been fragmented by the defection of Yugoslavia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Eurocommunism, the USSR has so increased its military strength that today it claims strategic parity with the United States. The anticolonial revolutionary struggles seem to have peaked, but the West is now plagued by the pernicious political policies of the resource-rich developing countries of the southern hemisphere. The stability of the Third World is further endangered by the Soviet use of “proxy warfare.” All of these changes, as well as other compelling trends which will be discussed shortly, are straining a unified command structure that was created in a less equivocal era.

The increasing complexity of the strategic environment has resulted
in a broadening of the military missions assigned to unified commanders. They can no longer be concerned with only one aspect of operations against a single enemy (i.e., Nimitz generally fought the sea war against Japan, while MacArthur, from a different geographical perspective, fought the large scale land campaigns). Now the unified commander must be prepared to operate throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, from emergency evacuation of US nationals to the launching of nuclear weapons. Most importantly, however, US military commanders now defend the status quo, whereas three decades ago their political objective was to overturn it as it was represented then by the Axis Powers. Today’s US military commander emphasizes defense and deterrence; yesterday’s oriented on offense and warfighting. In sum, today’s security environment is much more dangerous, diffused, and subtle than was ever envisioned when the unified command system was adopted almost without debate after World War II.

COMPELLING TRENDS

In addition to the foregoing changes to the strategic environment, two compelling trends have influenced military organization in the postwar period—diffusion and centralization. As has been shown, the original unified or combined commands were not diffused with regard either to objective or threat. Each had a narrowly specified objective: a clear geographic course of action to achieve that objective; and an unambiguous signal when that objective was achieved. General Eisenhower was instructed to defeat the German armies by conducting military operations directed at the heart of Germany. It was understood that his objective would be achieved when Germany capitulated unconditionally. The allied combined command to achieve that end was relatively simple by today’s standards—as was the US unified command that was its nucleus.

Today, however, neither the objectives nor the threat can be so clear and so direct; therefore, a unified commander must maintain both the flexibility and the capability to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum. A CINCEUR must contemplate action from the North Cape to the eastern border of Iran; be able to operate throughout the Mediterranean littoral, and even concern himself about US security assistance matters in Africa, South of the Sahara. Not only is he involved throughout the spectrum of warfare, but he also must consider a wide range of potential threat scenarios, as well as a myriad of US
political objectives. Commanders in the Pacific must face problems that are no less diffused.

Centralization can best be illustrated by considering the original rationale for establishing unified commands and by the recent US command and control experience during crisis situations. The following statement appeared in the first Report of the Secretary of Defense in 1948:

...it was the policy to set up unified commands in selected areas containing elements of two or more services where possible hostile action might require such a single commander to react tactically to a threat without awaiting guidance or decisions from Washington. (emphasis added)

The original postwar idea was to decentralize execution of unified military operations. How has this notion worked in practice? The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, appointed by President Nixon to review defense organization, provided the answer when it noted in 1970 that:

...without exception, every crisis within the last decade that has involved the movement of forces has required both an ad hoc organizational rearrangement and ad hoc planning. [Vietnam, Cuba Missile Crisis (1962), Panama Riots (1964), Tonkin Gulf Crisis (1964), Congo Rescue Mission (1964), Dominican Republic Crisis (1965), Arab-Israeli War (1967).] 5

Nothing has happened since that appraisal which challenges the conclusion that, far from decentralizing command execution of broad policy guidelines, the unified command has become the conduit for centralized ad hoc control from Washington over even the most minute aspect of tactical execution. If anything, recent experience—Arab-Israeli War (1973), Mayaguez Incident (1975), Korean Tree Cutting Incident (1976), Lebanon Evacuation (1977) and the Ethiopian Evacuation (1977)—has served to corroborate its conclusion. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that in future crises, command and control will be exercised from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the commander in the field, regardless of the institutional intermediate command echelons. This factor must weigh heavily in any analysis of change to the unified command system.

In retrospect, it seems almost inevitable that operational centralization would follow the administrative and logistical centralization as soon as communications would permit the NCA to effectively control forward deployed military forces. The system has
evolved (or devolved?) from one in which the World War II unified commanders had maximum latitude in conducting military operations into one in which President Ford, during the Mayaguez Incident, reportedly made a decision that a particular pilot should not fire on a particular boat. Today, the command system is best described as one which allows centralized management of common functions, permits joint planning, but demands unified execution, often under the direct control of the NCA.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE**

It seems clear that the international conditions that existed at the time that the unified command system was developed no longer exist, although the need for centralized management, joint planning and unified execution is still valid. While change to the Unified Command System is indicated, the precise nature of this change is not readily apparent. In addition to the shift to multipolarity in the international strategic environment and in the way that Presidents choose to command and control military forces during times of crises, there are other significant factors to be considered. Among the more important of these are the domestic political environment, fiscal and legal considerations, technological and institutional constraints and various strategic factors.

The goal of organizational change, particularly in the highly politicized, bureaucratic environment of DOD, is to devise a reorganization scheme that will hopefully make the national security structure more efficient and effective, without making any of its subelements worse off. This difficult goal is easier to state than to achieve. One of the factors that makes this so is the difficulty of determining when a change is, in fact, an improvement. The unified command system is particularly unwieldy in this respect because of its lack of specificity in expressing the multiple goals of its individual commands.

The highly predictable Service department resistance to any new organizational patterns which may be in conflict with old institutional values not only limits the scope of organizational change that may be made, but also introduces a high degree of subjectivity into the entire process of determining the relative worth of any particular organizational change. Often the stated reason why a particular change may be unsatisfactory to a given department bears little relation to the
Figure 1. Current Unified and Specified Commands

**SPECFIED COMMANDS**

1. Aerospace Defense Command (ADC)
2. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
3. Military Airlift Command (MAC)

**UNIFIED COMMANDS**

1. US Readiness Command (USREDCOM)
2. US Southern Command (USOUTHCOM)
3. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM)
4. US European Command (USEUCOM)
5. Pacific Command (PACOM)

Criteria for Establishing a Unified Command. When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unity of effort:

1. A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Services, and necessitating single strategic direction.
2. Any combination of the following when significant forces of two or more Services are involved:
   a. A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force.
   b. A large geographic area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operation therein.
   c. Necessity for common utilization of limited logistic means (UNAAF 30222).
actual rationale. While parochial Service views might not “sell” in the highly politicized joint arena, frequently they are the unstated driving force behind resistance to change.

Another problem is the ambiguity that has come to surround the definition of combatant command. In 1975, one Service took the position that USREDCOM, composed of US Army and Air Force general purpose forces but without a geographic responsibility did not meet the “combatant” requirement demanded of a unified or specified command. Yet, in 1977, the Military Airlift Command, composed primarily of noncombatant transport aircraft units and without geographic responsibility was established as a specified command—presumably showing how far the definition of combatant command could be stretched.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Any organization, military or civilian, must also consider certain management principles such as clear chain of command, span of control, organizational layering, grade structure, and line to support ratio, etc. Not as self-evident, but nonetheless important, are the political, economic, or strategic factors that influence military organization.

Both the functions and organization of the unified commands are constrained by the domestic US political environment. Any reorganization that could be perceived as increasing the probability of US intervention in Africa, South Asia or Latin America would probably be unacceptable. It would raise the specter of the United States returning to what many may perceive to be an undesirable role as world policeman or a revision to the cold war doctrine of containment.

International treaty arrangements, the perceptions of foreign governments and world opinion all serve to influence US command arrangements. In some instances, changes cannot be easily made since they would require changes in alliance structure. As Michael Howard points out:

NATO strategy and the NATO force structure has taken so much labor to construct—it is the result of such agonizing disagreements, such precarious compromises—that no senior NATO official cares even to contemplate proposals for its alteration. Even to suggest them is to be branded as irresponsible.
It is even difficult to deploy US forces from an alliance area to support a unilateral US contingency, as the experience of the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 indicates.

A constrained budget and a congressional concern for the “tooth to tail” ratio result in a requirement to provide overriding and compelling rationale for any change that increases the size or number of headquarters. At the same time, organizational changes which decrease either cost or manpower would probably be quickly accepted. Thus, there is a danger that the drive to constrain current budgets could be pursued without adequate regard for potential organizational deficiencies.

The unified command must be compatible with the regional strategic environment in which it exists. The regional strategic environment includes such things as the geostrategic importance of the region, its military geography, the existence of US security commitments there, as well as the general political stability of the area. This latter aspect is especially important. For example, when Sub-Saharan Africa was relatively stable under colonial rule, US strategists were not too concerned with the region. However, independence was predictably accompanied by political instability leading to an increased awareness of and interest in the area by military planners. When the Soviet Union began to expand into Africa, US interest grew even more. This interest obviously creates a potential for military involvement, which in turn generates a possible command and control requirement.

It is axiomatic that a military organization will orient on the terrain and threat. The organization, strategy and structure of a given force is a reflection of the nature of the terrain and the threat which it faces. Organization is, therefore, largely influenced by the nature and scope of military operations that it may be called upon to perform. The difference between USEUCOM, which must be prepared to fight a predominant land battle and LANTCOM, which is almost exclusively a naval command, is apparent. The requirements of coalition warfare, with which US military planners are slowly coming to grips, further impacts on military strategy and unified commands.

Enhancing the trend towards centralization are the technological advances in communications and data processing of the past 25 years that have enabled commanders and military managers to control not only geographically separated units, but which have also increased their ability to control multifunctional organizations. Furthermore, the
continued evolution of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) has permitted the NCA to cross command boundaries or to bypass intervening commands. This capability will continue to have a significant impact upon traditional military command doctrine. Moreover, the basic security interests of the United States require that command and control be exercised from the highest levels to insure that international crises do not escalate uncontrollably in the nuclear era. At the same time, the possibility of simultaneous crises overloading the centralized decisionmaking authority requires the continued existence of decentralized commands.

In considering more indirect or creative approaches to organization, one is constrained by bureaucratic inertia. All bureaucracies are based on stability and routine and because of this resist innovation and change. Organizational changes, like strategic concepts, are usually compromise positions—lowest common denominators—to which all agencies can agree. Because of this bias for consensus, these changes often do not go far enough. Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has usually been reluctant to open the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to change because of the concern that it could result in dysfunctional battles between the Services as they attempt to stake out positions. Only role and mission battles have proven to be more divisive. Thus, it can be anticipated that suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however well-meaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of perhaps even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests.

It is enlightening to note that, in the postwar history of the unified command system, it is an aberration whenever significant forces of the Navy are “chopped” to Unified Commands that are commanded by officers of another Service. The Army has not wholly escaped this bias either. Separate or subordinate unified commands under Army command are organized whenever significant Army forces are committed in a Navy theater of operations. Also, arrangements are often developed that will allow an Army subunified commander direct access to the JCS, effectively bypassing the Navy Unified Command (e.g., MAC-V). While the Air Force at first seems free from this inclination, closer examination reveals that it jealously guards its strategic nuclear forces from the command of other Services. It has
been willing to "chop" tactical forces to Army and Navy Unified Commanders, but it reserves its strategic mission to itself providing thus the principal rationale for maintaining the Air Force as an independent Service.

CHANGE IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

That the unified command system has problems is clear. Originally unified commands were established to wage war in a distinct geographical area, focused on a clear threat, with a finite objective; today's strategic environment is more complex than that. The twin forces of diffusion and centralization have significance for any reorganizational proposal, as do the several constraints which affect unified organizations and delimit the viable alternatives. The problem boils down to a choice between a total overhaul with all its political liabilities and organizational dissention, on the one hand, or a continual process of incremental changes to the current organization on the other.

While a comprehensive solution might be more satisfying in the long run, pragmatically it appears that only marginal or incremental changes will be possible. The obscurity accorded the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel in 1970 attests to the validity of this view. Although some of the suggestions considered below may appear to be too far-reaching to be accomplished in a single step, they do establish organizational goals for the future which can be attained incrementally. These changes will be discussed under the three major categories: centralized management, joint planning and unified execution.

Centralized Management.

Over 20 years ago, the Hoover Commission recommended centralized management of military traffic and transportation. The Blue Ribbon Panel recommended the creation of a Logistics Command which would include both the Military Airlift Command and the Military Sea Transportation Command, as well as the traffic and terminal management functions now performed by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Military Sea Transportation System and the Theater Traffic Management agencies. The persistency of this idea almost insures that it will resurface whenever the unified command system is reconsidered. Perhaps its time has come. If it has, an extension to include deployment planning would appear logical. However, this proposal would still face opposition from the
Service departments, particularly from the Navy and Air Force, which can be expected to guard against incursions into their last remaining powerful instrument of bureaucratic influence, that of resource allocation.

The security assistance function should be centralized in a CONUS-based agency reporting through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Security Assistance Agency, removed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, could provide the nucleus of the new agency. The character of security assistance has changed over the years. It has reoriented to emphasize foreign military sales and has been increasingly centralized at DOD level resulting in a degradation of the military input into security assistance decisions. Such an agency, reporting through the JCS, with cells established and collocated with each appropriate unified command, would be able to respond more effectively to the demands of security assistance.

Joint Planning.

One of the recurring arguments regarding the Unified Command System is whether or not it is necessary or desirable that every region of the world fall within the geographical limits of some unified command. Most of the regions of the world are now assigned to some geographical unified command for “normal operations.”

In considering the unassigned regions, the diffusion of responsibility—the lack of a single focal point for US military interests—is undesirable. However, many of the functions included under normal operations are unnecessary. Therefore, a new category termed “overwatch” has been developed to establish the degree of proponenty desired. Commanders assigned this responsibility for a region would provide the necessary degree of high-level attention and joint planning regarding US interests, much in the same manner CINCPAC currently provides for South Asia.

To align the Unified Command System with the current and projected realities of the strategic environment, US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) could be assigned overwatch responsibility for currently unassigned areas. If, in the future, it were decided to establish Central and South America as unassigned areas, USREDCOM could be given overwatch responsibility for them as well.

The establishment of joint planning cells for contingency operations at USREDCOM for each unassigned region would be included in the overwatch concept for unassigned areas. Plans would be submitted to the JCS for approval. These joint planning cells could
provide the nucleus of a Joint Task Force (JTF) staff, if it were necessary to conduct military operations in an unassigned area.

Unified Execution.

Unified execution demands the maintenance of unified commands in those areas of the world in which the United States is committed to a formal military alliance (i.e., NATO and Korea). These commands should be narrowly focused on the mission of the alliance. For example, US European Command (USEUCOM) should be given geographical responsibility only for those areas which fall within NATO's boundaries. However, a case can also be made to assign the northern tier NATO countries to LANTCOM because in war they would be more involved in the naval battle of the North Atlantic than in operations on the central front, although there is obviously a linkage between the two battles. USREDCOM would be given the responsibility for normal operations in any programmed contingency outside of NATO.

The establishment of a combined command in Korea in 1978 indicates the need for a similar alliance arrangement. However, the perceived vastness of the Pacific, the need to view the entire Pacific Basin as a strategic entity and the regional political relationships between the Republic of Korea and Japan preclude the immediate adoption of a separate or subordinate unified command for Northeast Asia.

Any changes in the unified command system relating to the execution of unified military operations must allow for the direction of even low-level military contingencies by the National Command Authority. It is a matter of importance that the organization, communications and doctrine to support this type of command relationship be formally created.

Another recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Panel that should be implemented is the formation of a Strategic Command. Naval strategic nuclear forces might be merged with SAC to form such a command, acknowledging the need for a single command authority and channel for control of all strategic retaliatory forces.

Changes to the Unified Command System must be embodied in changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It is recognized that no Chairman of the JCS ever desires to open the UCP to change because of the concern that it will trigger major parochial battles among the Services. Whether the liabilities of such a battle in a period of transition and uncertainty are exceeded by the advantages accruing from the changes is a decision that can only be made by the senior military leadership.
ENDNOTES


7. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides “...for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands...”. The Act does not define “combatant command.”


10. Ibid., p. 56.

11. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1, p. 208. Paraphrased, normal operations include: planning for and execution of operations in contingencies; limited war and general war; and cold war and military assistance activities. All of the above factors are based on an assigned geographical or functional area.
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# Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System

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## Abstract
This report examines the changes required in the Unified Command System necessitated by changes in the international security environment since World War II. It discusses the nature of the Unified Command System, and some of the constraints that limit the scope of potential change. The authors conclude that because today's strategic environment is much more dangerous, diffused and subtle than was ever envisioned when the Unified Command System was adopted over 30 years ago, change is not only desirable, but necessary.