

AD-A065 621

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS  
AUSTRIA'S AND SWITZERLAND'S SECURITY CONCEPT.(U)  
MAY 78 A H RADAUER, H A SCHLUP

F/G 15/3

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 OF 2  
AD  
AO 95921



14-820701-04 ✓

**LEVEL**

③  
NA

ADA0 65621

⑥ AUSTRIA's and SWITZERLAND's  
SECURITY CONCEPT

⑨ Final rept.

DDC  
RECEIVED  
MAR 9 1979  
REGULATED

26 C

DDC FILE COPY

Study Project USACGSC  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

⑩ H.  
Adolf Radauer LTC  
~~Section 4~~  
Hans A. Schlup MAJ  
Section 4

⑫ 114p.

⑪ May 1978

This document has been approved  
for public release and sale; its  
distribution is unlimited.

037 260

79 03 06 054 4B

TABLE OF CONTENT

<u>1. Introduction</u>	page	1
<u>A. AUTHORS</u>		1
<u>B. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY PROJECT</u>		1
<u>C. SUPPOSITIONS</u>		1
<u>2. Common Aspects of the two Countries</u>	page	2 to 6
<u>A. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION</u>		2 to 3
<u>B. TERRAIN NATURE AND CLIMATE</u>		4 to 5
<u>C. STATUS OF THE NEUTRALITY</u>		6
<u>D. DEFENSE CONCEPT</u>		6
<u>3. Particularities of the two countries</u>	page	7 to 96
<u>I. AUSTRIA</u>		7 to 56
<u>A. GEOGRAPHICAL &amp; GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS</u>		7 to 23
<u>B. NEUTRALITY</u>		24 to 26
<u>C. OVERALL DEFENSE SYSTEM ( ODS )</u>		27 to 32
<u>D. ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION WITHIN ODS</u>		32 to 37
<u>E. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES</u>		33 to 43
<u>F. READINESS &amp; MOBILIZATION SYSTEM</u>		43 to 45
<u>G. AREA DEFENSE CONCEPT</u>		46 to 54
<u>H. CIVIL DEFENSE</u>		55
<u>I. FINAL REMARKS</u>		56
<u>II. SWITZERLAND</u>	page	57 to 96
<u>A: CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AREA</u>		57 to 60
<u>B. CONCEPT OF THE GENERAL DEFENSE</u>		61 to 69
<u>C. ROLE OF THE ARMY WITHIN THE GENERAL DEFENSE</u>		70 to 72
<u>D. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY</u>		73 to 80
<u>E. READINESS &amp; EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		81 to 89
<u>F. CIVIL DEFENSE</u>		90 to 96
<u>4. Final Statements</u>	page	97

A P P E N D I X

- Table of references connected with AUSTRIA
- Table of references connected with SWITZERLAND
- MAPS of AUSTRIA & SWITZERLAND
- Original texts of Constitutional Laws about ODS + AUSTRIA

ACCESSION for	
NTIS	White Section <input type="checkbox"/>
DDC	Buff Section <input type="checkbox"/>
UNANNOUNCED	
JUSTIFICATION	
BY	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES	
Dist.	SPECIAL <input type="checkbox"/>
A	

79 03 06 054

## 1. Introduction

### A. AUTHORS

- LTC GS Adolf H. Radauer  
Austrian Army
- MAJ GS Hans A. Schlup  
Swiss Army

Students at the US Army Command and  
General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth; Class 1977/78

### B. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY PROJECT

The US doctrine of a future war is oriented toward the Central European battlefield almost exclusively. The consequences of that doctrine are weapon developments, organization tailoring and objective oriented exercises and training. NATO countries' abilities play an important role. In between those NATO countries are AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND. Their location is of great interest concerning the strategical situation of Western Europe.

Being aware of the fact that these two neutral countries are not mentioned in a satisfactory way during the courses at the USACGSC, LTC Radauer and Major Schlup decided, in accordance with their military counselors, to write this paper with the intention to offer additional readings used during the exercise of the European Setting or the NATO lesson.

### C. SUPPOSITIONS

(1) The differences of the two countries what the history, the development of the neutrality, and the military system is concerned makes a specific exposition of their essential aspects by the two authors necessary.

(2) One very important prerequisite for the understanding of the Austrian part of this paper is the student paper written by MAJ P. Koman, Austria, 1974. It presents "The Strategic Role of the Neutral Austria in Central Europe". This paper emphasizes the historical background of the current situation of the Austrian Army and the attempt to adjust it's mission and organization to current requirements.

(3) It must also be mentioned that no such paper like the "Swiss Concept of General Defense" about Austria's security exists yet. The articulation of the Austrian concept in this paper is based on unofficial publications with the exemption of the Overall Defense Concept which is based upon laws.

(4) The user of this paper must be aware of the fact that translation of sources in the German language are not officially approved.

(5) Many ideas and considerations demonstrate the personal opinion of the authors.

(6) Although the paper does not include classified material, it's use should be limited to the USACGSC.

2. Common Aspects of the two Countries

A. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION (Figure 1)

Austria and Switzerland form the real Central Europe. They share common borders with Germany (D) in the north and with Italy (I) in the south. Inbetween the two countries the small unarmed principality of Liechtenstein is located.

Austria shares the border with three communist countries (Figure 2) Czechoslovakia (CS), Hungary (H), and Yugoslavia (YU). This means 859 km of common border with WAPA countries and 366 km with a communist, but block-free country. Consequently, about 50 % of Austria's territory is adjacent to countries with communist systems while the other 50 % are directed to western democratic nations.



Figure 1




Figure 2 Specific Location of Austria

Switzerland borders in the west upon France (F). In opposition to Austria, Switzerland is surrounded by western democratic states only.

Together with Yugoslavia, France and Spain (E), Austria and Switzerland form a non-allied belt throughout Western Europe. (Figure 1)

The geographical location of Austria and Switzerland is of great significance. These two countries form a neutral barrier which prevents north-south military movement through Western Europe. This neutral barrier lies for the main part within the zone of influence of NATO so that it would certainly affect NATO, but would not have the same effect on the Warsaw Pact. When one takes into account that France is not militarily integrated within the NATO there is a divide right through this organization from SALZBURG to the Atlantic Ocean. <sup>1)</sup>

1) Dr. Mario Ducic: "Austria's Strategic Position"; The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal by West of England Press; Publishers, Ltd.  
1. West Street, Tavistock, Devon, England.

## B. TERRAIN NATURE AND CLIMATE

### (1) Terrain Nature

Austria and Switzerland belong to the mountain countries. A significant part of both countries is covered by the Alps with average heights of 9,000 to 12,000 feet. While a spur of the Bohemian Massive extends into Austria, a part of Switzerland is overlapped by the Jura. These two terrain features are of similar character mostly covered with forests, sometimes of rolling nature, but suddenly interrupted by steep slopes; average heights of 2,000 to 3,000 feet. Between the Alps and the Bohemian Massive, respectively the Jura we find the Danube Valley in Austria and the Mittelland (called "Lowland") in Switzerland, both running generally east-west. Another common terrain aspect is the existence of a great number of lakes and rivers leading normally into the main streams within the two countries. (Figure 3)

With some exceptions, the terrain nature of the two countries does not favour extended armor operations. As a result, it can be expected that hostile actions within Austria and Switzerland would run their courses in a mechanized/infantry type battle, which may offer some advantages to the defender.

### (2) Climate

The two countries have similar weather conditions. Due to their position, they partake of the four main climatic regions of Europe; the northern, western, southern and eastern European. This means that their climate is influenced by them, though the great difference in altitude within the countries produce a number of regional and local climates—plains, valley, lake, mountain slopes and summit climates. This is expressed, too, in the variety of vegetation, particularly in the mountains. The weather is determined mainly by the continuous fluctuation between areas of high and low pressure, bringing in their wake both periods of fine and of bad weather. When there is an area of low pressure in the north, the prevailing wind is westerly (mainly in summer); when there is an area of high pressure to the north, the wind is easterly or northerly, appreciated in summer as a bringer of fine weather, blowing in winter as a piercingly cold wind. While in summer temperatures may reach 30° Celsius, the average temperatures in winter are around 0° Celsius in the lower regions. Snowfall effects mainly the mountain zone because most of the passes are normally closed for traffic from October/November to May/June. In the Lowlands the depth of the snowcover is seldom more than 10 to 20 cm and does not remain for a long period of time, but the soil is normally frozen from December to February.

The climate effects military operations mainly by the changing conditions of the traffic situation on ground as well as in the air.




Figure 3 Main Terrain Features of Austria and  
Switzerland



### C. STATUS OF THE NEUTRALITY

The status of the neutrality of both nations is based on the same principles, <sup>2)</sup> strict neutral behaviour in international issues, non-allowance of joining any block system or of stationing foreign forces on their territories, and the obligation to defend the neutrality by means of arms. But it is also to mention that if the neutral countries are involved in a war, then they are no longer bound to their neutrality and those foreign policy and military limitations associated with this status. In such a case, they are free to collaborate militarily with the opponent of the aggressor. <sup>3)</sup>

### D. DEFENSE CONCEPT

The main effort of the security policy and the strategic measures of both countries is concentrated on dissuasion (inoffensive deterrence). Dissuasion is the strategic posture, using all instruments of the nation, aimed to the objective to persuade a potential opponent not to initiate an armed conflict. <sup>4)</sup>

The military defense of Austria and Switzerland is based on the principle of the area defense. This concept is tailored toward the limits of the defense capacity of a small state. The countries see the realization of this concept within the scope of their Overall/General Defense Concept.

Another common aspect is a rather limited strategical goal. Both countries try to avoid decisive battles in order to channelize and wear off the enemy strength based upon a staggered defense. The goal is to ensure the survival of the population and nation and, therefore, to sustain as much territory as possible, but to preserve sovereignty over at least a part of the country.

---

2) Dr. Hanspeter Neuhold "Rechtliche und Politische Aspekte der dauernden Neutralität Oesterreichs"; Oesterr. Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Österreichischen Landesverteidigung, Seite 21

3) Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland; June 27th, 1973; Article 714

4) Ibid; Article 423

### 3. Particularities of the two Countries

#### I. AUSTRIA

##### A. GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS

(For better understanding use map of Austria, ANNEX B)

##### (1) Geopolitical Location

The entire length of Austria from east to west is 600 km while the smallest distance from north to south is only 30-50 km in the west, it increases to 200-250 km in the east. This makes an entire size of 84,000 km<sup>2</sup> and again causes geopolitical problems because the bottleneck of the neutral barriers lies within Austrian territory, which easily could invite a foreign power to exploit this geopolitical weakpoint as well as to protect Austria against this exploitation by another foreign power. Both aspects would not be within Austrian's interests according to it's neutral status.
















The geopolitical location of Austria leads clearly to the fact that Austria is of great importance where lines of communication and flank security are concerned. It's economical potential, natural resources, such as oil, steel and other ores, etc., and industries are not of such importance to cause a country to violate the sovereignty of Austria.

Therefore, the following geographical description will emphasize these lines of communication and describe the different parts of the country and how they apply to military defense.

##### (2) Geographical Regions

The description will not only follow geographical patterns but also take military aspects such as trafficability, defensibility and unity of the region into consideration. Geographical information such as climate, cover, temperature etc. can easily be found in any geographical reference and will be mentioned only for understanding military considerations.

Austria can be divided into -

- a. Alpine region    1
- b. Alpine foreland including Danube River valley     2
- c. Basin of Vienna, Graz and Klagenfurt     3
- d. Bohemian Massive     4



a. Alpine region

It is characterized by mountains of the Central Alps with heights of around 6,000-12,000 feet.

Three fifths of Austria is covered by this region.



The treeline lies at about 2,000 m. This is where regular settlement ends, but alpine lodges along tourist and climbing paths can be found.




The main lines of communication are along the river valleys inbetween the mountains with an average altitude of about 600-800 m, mostly rather narrow; no wider than about 2 km or less.

The main valleys run east-west and are connected with passes inbetween at 1,000-1,400 m elevation. They contain the main communications such as roads and railways as well as the main settlements.

From west to east there are -

KLOSTER Valley leading from the Rhine Valley, which is the boundary to Switzerland, toward the ARLBERG PASS, the connection with the INN Valley in which the capital of Tyrol, INNSBRUCK, is situated.

Before the Inn Valley bends toward north the GERLOSS PASS is the connection to the SALZACH Valley which leads into the ENNS Valley over the LUEG and HANDLING PASS. The Enns Valley is connected with the MUR-MUERZ-Valley by the SCHOBER-PASS. The Mur- and Muerz rivers constitute the entrance into the alpine region from the east in general.



This line of connection as shown above is the only main route through the entire alpine region east to west. It is a vital area within Austria because it can be defended and also its entrances favor the defender. Mechanized movement is limited and the terrain is defensible, even outnumbered.

South of this line the chain of the Central Alps creates a natural borderline with only a few axis of approach, which are: ( see picture above )

1. BIELER HOEHE (about 2000 m ) the least important axis of entrance in this part. Limited trafficability even in summertime.
2. INN River Valley, narrow and accompanied by steep mountains favors defensive measures, until it becomes a main valley near Landeck-village.
3. RESCHENSCHNEIDEN (1,508 m ) narrow and steep road leading into the INN valley with the same characteristics as 2.
4. TIMMELSJOCH ( 1,927 m ) trafficable in summertime only, easy to defend.

- 5 BRENNER PASS (1,372 m): Main route into the INN Valley from the south. It contains Autobahn (highway) as well as railroad and demands heavy effort of fortification and defense.



It is trafficable the whole year through. Although the Brenner Pass Valley leading into the Inn Valley is interrupted by relative steep and narrow terrain steps it is useable by tanks off the road in great portions. In spite of the adjacent mountain slopes make a breakthrough very difficult because of the option to fortify them by long range antitank positions in great depth and the use of effective obstacles and demolitions along the valley.

- 6 BIRNLUECKE (2,669 m) not trafficable even for trucks. Only important for envelopment operations. From here on the main chain of the Central Alps is leaving the Austrian borderline and the entrance into the Alpine region only can be achieved by throughpassing of Austrian territory which will be described later.

Anyway, The inner Austrian entrances into the Alpine region in the south are the valleys, leading to the following passes:

- 7 FELBER TUNNEL. This crossing is a road only conducted through a narrow valley and through a 8 km mountain tunnel which easily can be interrupted by engineers beside of fortifications.
- 8 GROSSGLOCKNER. A mountain road over a 2,576 m high pass. Not capable for mechanized movement.



Only along the road mechanized movement would be possible to a certain extend but very vulnerable by air, or ground attacks of light infantry forces.

- 9 TAUERNTUNNEL. A railroad tunnel of 12 km through the Alps which could be utilized by mechanized forces as well. But the access to the tunnel is difficult.
- 10 RAUSTARTER TAUERN PASS is a pass for wheeled traffic only. Its access leads through a narrow valley favourable for defense.
- 11 TAUERN PASS. A road crossing that pass which is capable for all kind of traffic. The terrain beside the road limits the use of Armed Forces in a great degree.

The importance of the above entrances are also their flank position to any movement along the edge of the Alpine region. The next entrances into the Alpine region are already the MUR and MUERZ River Valleys which again favour the defender assuming the use of fortifications, prepared demolitions, and preplanned obstacles.

North of the central line of communication the terrain features are different than in the south. The Central Alps change into limestone, called Northern Limestone Alps. They are not quite as high as the Central Alps but the heights are more barren and even the slopes become steeper and often rocky. The main entrance into the Alpine region from west the east are (see picture page no. 11 again):

- 12 LECH River Valley leading over the EHRENBERG KLAUSE (998 m) into the valley crossing the border near GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN and leading over the FERNPASS (1,209 m) into the INN River Valley. This route contains good natural obstacles as well as it favours a delay by fortifications and obstacles.
- 13 SCHARNITZER KLAUSE (964 m) contains road and railroad but is a steep and narrow access into the basin of INNSBRUCK in which the BRENNER PASS from the south leads to.
- 14 ACHEN PASS again is a narrow and steep access into the INN River Valley allowing limited mechanized approach.
- 15 INN River Valley. Main entrance into the western portion of the Alpine region. It is a broad valley of approximately 2 km - 5 km width. Many windings of the river, which is an obstacle itself, combined with partially steep and rocky walls on both sides of the valley, as well as built-up areas, establish reasonable natural obstacles and many possibilities of a strong defense operation along the valley.
- 16 KOESSEN Valley and STEIN Pass both leading into the SALZACH Valley. The rough terrain of the adjacent terrain and the narrowness of the valley favour a defense very much.
- 17 SALZACH Valley is also a main entrance into the Alpine region but it ends in between very narrow and steep limestone walls in the vicinity of LUEG which make a passing very difficult.

18  
19  
20  
21  
22




From the Salzach River Valley on the entrance into the Alpine region again are leaving the Austrian borderline and can be approached only by passing through Austrian territory. The importance of these entrances beside of their defensible terrain features is their flank position to any movement along the Danube River Valley and the Alpine Foreland.

The main entrances are :

- 18 The basin of BAD ISCHL in continuation the POETSCHEN PASS (992 m). This approach again passes many narrow and steep vallies very favourable for fortifications and defense.
- 19 STEYR Valley, leading into the ENNS Valley is an important axis of approach, but can be easily defended from the narrowness of KLAUS on.
- 20 ENNS River Valley itself is another route into the Alpine region but from KASTENREITH on the terrain again is very favourable for defense.
- 21 Several axis are leading into the basin of MARIA ZELL and continue toward the MUERZ River Valley. The terrain is in general already lower as in the west but still channalising any movement. Compact woods are accompanying the valleys which favours the defender.
- 22 The MUERZ Valley itself can be reached across the SEMMERING PASS (995 m) only, which is a reasonable natural obstacle again. Any fortifications especially along routes for envelopments reinforce the value of that pass eminently.

The Alpine region is easily defined by it's natural limits as described above. It only contains one strategic route through Austria which is from north to south generally through the INN River basin in vic of INNSBRUCK.

The Alpine region is a natural, defensible basis area from which the defense of the entire country has to be sustained and reinforced.



b. Alpine Foreland including Danube River Valley



This region of Austria is dominated by the Danube River. It is a natural waterway connecting east and west across Austrian territory. The Danube River Valley is a historical avenue of approach accompanied by rolling hills in the south, the Alpine Foreland and relative steep and difficult slopes falling down to the riverbank from the Bohemian Massive in the north.



The river is not fordable. It's waterspeed is relative high from 2 to 5 m /sec with a width of 250 to 500 m. The river is navigable in it's full length through Austria with two international ports - LINZ and VIENNA which can not be closed in cases of national emergency without severe international consequences. Shiploads ~~there~~ can not be checked without violating international laws or constituting international commissions which would be a time consuming procedure if danger is expected. 19)  
Preplanned actions have to be coordinated in advance.

Mechanized movement east-west or vice versa across the accompanying Alpine Foreland south of the Danube is possible within a width of about 10 to 20 km. But it can be delayed along natural obstacles such as TRAISEN, ERLAUP, YBBS, ENNS and TRAUN River which allow fortified positions and prepared strong points in both directions. Any movement along this region would also demand considerable forces to protect the flank against the entrances into the Alpine region in the south as well as against river crossing operations from the north.

River crossing operations north-south or vice versa are channalized to certain areas because of the difficult structure of the riverbanks. . . Assuming a demolition of the bridges and crossings along numerous power plants the main effort still would be in vicinity of these crossing sites because all natural avenues of approach to the river are leading toward them.

Main areas are ASCHACH, LINZ, ENNS which operational belong together, PERSENBEUG, MELK, KREMS and the area around VIENNA which already belongs to the basin of VIENNA with a complete different structure of terrain along the river.



19) This information can not be confirmed because necessary sources are not available at CGSC and would need special research.

The value of the Danube River as a natural obstacle can be increased by fortifications along potential crossing areas, demolitions and floodings by opening of the flood gates at the river plants. Vertical envelopments and assault operations therefore are most likely. Numerous areas are feasible especially in the Alpine Foreland.

The geopolitical importance of this region lies in its:

- trafficability east-west and vice versa
- flank position to NATO Forces and WAPA Forces as well
- large defense effort which possibly demands to trade space against time.

c. Basin of VIENNA, GRAZ und KLAGENFURT

Basin of VIENNA contains most of the industrial centers and almost half of the population of Austria. The center is the capital of Austria, VIENNA, with 1,7 Mill inhabitants.

The basin of Vienna is, in continuation of the Alpine Foreland, situated in the east of the country.




The capital is very much out of balance and causes severe defense problems. The basin itself is flat with heights of around 200 to 400 m. It is excellent trafficable by armored forces.

VIENNA

GRAZ

KLAGENFURT



The borders are unprotected and have no natural obstacles. Geologically the basin is mainly a part of the Hungarian plains as the picture shows. A defense along the borderline against an outnumbering mechanized enemy is almost impossible for a small country such as Austria and a reliable delay needs prepared and fortified positions to withdraw toward better terrain.

Basin of GRAZ. The terrain feature in the basin of GRAZ is not quite as bad for a defender as the basin of VIENNA. It consists of rolling hills inbetween 600 m and 2000 m which give good delay positions. Wooden hills are dividing avenue of approaches and constitute a permanent possibility to operate into the flank of a potential enemy.



Similar to the Alpine Foreland this area probably has to be used again for trading space for time. The borderline toward east is mainly unprotected by natural obstacles. Toward south natural protection of the borderline increases.

Basin of KLAGENFURT. It is mainly constituted by the DRAU River. It's connection to the GRAZ basin is a difficult passage across the KOR Alps (appr. 2,000 m). Only two capable roads leading east to west, the road across the PACK Pass (1,166 m) and WEINEBEN Road into the basin of KLAGENFURT. The basin itself is surrounded by the Southern Limestone Alps in the south which provide a natural borderline toward south with only a few crossings along steep and narrow valleys or mountain passes, such as:




- 1 TOBLACHER FELD along the DRAU Valley a relative good approach into or from Italy. Fortifications along the valley of the DRAU which does almost not allow envelopments, can favour the defender very much.
- 2 KREUZBERG SATTEL (1,638 m), PLOECKEN PASS (1,363 m) and NASSFELD (1,530 m) are all located in the KARNISCHEN HOCHALPEN and represent very limited crossings which are easy to defend.
- 3 TARVISIO and KANAL Valley, a main entrance again. Comparable to the Toblacher Feld (No. 1). It is a deep valley inbetween the mountain range of the KARNISCHEN Alps and the KARAWANKEN. Recent fortifications make this entrance into the KLAGENFURT basin a good defense position.
- 4 WURZEN PASS (1,730 m), LOIBL Pass (1,368 m) and SEEBERG SATTEL (1,278 m) are used by roads crossing the KARAWANKEN which is a limestone range with rough and steep valleys and heights of about 2,200 m. The terrain favours the defender.
- 5 LAVANT Valley again is a good entrance into the basin and demands considerable efforts of defense by fortifications and forces.

d. Bohemian Massive




This part of Austria mainly north of the Danube River is geologically very different to the Alps. It consists of granite, forming soft hills and smooth valleys with average heights of about 1,000 meters. It is characterized by dominating hills and dividing areas of dense forests. The terrain favours mechanized movement along open areas but also channalizing fortifications and preplanned and prepared killing grounds by the defender.




The general direction of axis of advance is north-south leading directly toward the Danube River. East-west movement is very much limited by the terrain.

**e. Strategical Routes**

As a result of the geomilitary evaluation of the different terrain features of Austria one will see very distinctly that the different regions of Austria facilitate mechanized movement differently and the borders, which are the borders of the Peace Treaty of ST. GERMAIN 1919 after World War I, provide different values of natural protection of the territory.



In perception of these geographical facts, Austria provides certain strategical routes. According to it's present geopolitical location inbetween two political block systems. These routes have a great historical tradition as well. Germanic tribes, the Romans, Napoleon, the Ottomans, the Germans and the Allied Forces 1945 beside of others used them. No matter what kind of vehicles they used.






Consequently to these strategic routes as well as to the geographical structure a central area can be created which is primarily without decisive importance to any aggressors since his objective is not the destruction of the entire Austrian nation, which is rather unlikely as long as current situations and tensions in Europe remain as they are. From this area beginning toward the border a military as well as a civil defense can be established to a great extent. The limitation is given by the desire of security of the population, the political will to defend, and economical capacity. The geographical facts favour the preservation of at least this part of Austria to give the government time and space to make decisions in political independence.

Forward of the Central Area an area of primary operational interest to enemy aggression can be distinguished followed by an area of secondary operational interest in which security operations would take place to secure operations in the areas of primary interest.

Graphically the geopolitical evaluation of the Austrian territory could be demonstrated by the following chart:<sup>20)</sup>



20) Gunther HOCHAUER; Raumverteidigung I. Oesterr. Militaerzeitschrift  
Heft 4/1973, page 299

**f. Purpose**

The purpose of this geopolitical analysis was to demonstrate the geographical and external political facts in which Austria is imbeded. They can not be changed by Austrian effort, but any defensive effort and preparation can be tailored according to the given geopolitical situation. Unfortunately 54 % of the entire population of 7,5 Mill. Austrians are living in cities outside of the central area. All vital industry centers are also located outside of this area.

This infrastructural displacement is not only caused by a gap of resources or bad living conditions in the central area, but also a heritage of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy where the entire current Austria as a heartland of the monarchy was located in the middle of the empire.

This geopolitical fact is also a severe point within all defense planning. It reaches from the location of Army barracks to the need of evacuation of governmental institutions, etc.

While Austria can become selfsufficient in main nutritions and about 98 % in oil products under war restrictions, their placement and stockpiling in advance is a main problem caused by geographical location.

Summarizing all geographical and geopolitical facts, Austria is characterized by

- a central area which favours the defender very much and lies outside of strategical routes of approach
- a prepositioned area of operational interest to any agressor which must be utilized for trading time for space and to wear down the agressor's power.
- disadvantage in location of population and economical resources as far as defense structure is concerned.

## B. NEUTRALITY

### (1) Historical Development

Different to the Swiss Neutrality the Austrian is only a little more than 20 years old.

It is the first time in history Austria ever tried to create neutrality, and the second time Austria made the attempt to survive in it's current geographical shape as a sovereign and independent state.

This has to be considered when judging about the defense readiness and willingness of the Austrian population today.

Everybody knows the great history and tradition of the Habsburg Monarchy in which the sun never set. Her heartland was current Austria.

People with influence in politics and journalism still personally remember the breakdown of the monarchy and the failure of the remaining country to turn into a republic. Those who never did believe in the possibility to survive of such a small country were right at this time.

1945, after the loss of the second World War in which Austria again was involved, these voices could be heard again. The situation was very bad. Austria was divided into four occupation zones, while Austria's capital, Vienna, was located completely in the Soviet zone. Each occupation force ruled a certain district and the center of the city was ruled by a "Allied Committee".

The most industrialized part of Austria was occupied by the Soviet Union about which the Soviets seized control according to the POTSDAM agreements in the summer of 1945. This included manufacturing plants which constituted about 30 % of the industry of the entire German-Austrian occupation zone and 95 % of the Austrian oil production was administrated and used by the Soviets. Austria also had to cope with over 600,000 displaced persons.<sup>4)</sup>

The economical and psychological situation of the population was bad. But at this time the Austrians probably created for the first time a very strong desire to regain independence and sovereignty and to avoid to be involved into international conflicts as well as to create narrow-minded internal conflicts again. The first intentions to a neutral status appeared.

On April 29th, 1945, already a first provisional government, headed by Karl RENNER, a Social Democrat, was established in Vienna and supported by the Soviet Union.

It's Proclamation of Independence amended May 1st, 1945, stated the reestablishment of the Democratic Republic of Austria in the spirit of the constitution of 1920.<sup>5)</sup>

The most important fact of the year 1945 was that this government was accepted by USA and UK as well as by the USSR. Therefore, a counter-government in the western zone of the country could be avoided.

In November 1945, general elections were hold in which a very distinct declaration toward a western democratical system was given by the entire population.

4) HARPER; Encyclopedia of the Modern World; Harper and Row, Publishers in New York, Evanston and London.

5) Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1945, ausgegeben 1. Mai 1945, 1. Stück, Nr. 1 und 2.

## (2) Austria's Way to Sovereignty and Neutrality

Austria was looking for a new status among the other European countries, which slowly but steadily were falling apart into communistic and free world countries. Very early it became obvious that Austria's status and its way to full sovereignty was connected with US and USSR interests and political tensions in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact was established in 1955, and NATO gained members as well.

A clever politic and the will of Austria to become neutral probably gave the overweight that USSR finally agreed to sign the State Treaty in 1955 as well as USA and UK.

The following development was fast:

In 1954 Austria officially announced its intention to become neutral for the first time in front of the conference of the secretaries of State of the four occupation forces. On April 15th, 1955, the "Memorandum of Moscow" was signed. It is the first international document certifying the neutrality of Austria in the pattern of the neutrality of Switzerland. The ice was broken and on the 15th of May, 1955, the Austrian State Treaty was signed and ended the Four-Power-Occupation and recognized Austria as an independent and sovereign state.

In October 1955, Austria's parliament consequently passed a constitutional law<sup>6)</sup> by which "Austria declares of her own free will her perpetual neutrality". The second section of this law stated that "in all future times Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military base on her territory".

The United States, the Soviet Union and a number of other countries have recognized Austria's neutrality, but it is not guaranteed internationally. The Austrian government insists that it alone is competent to define Austria's neutrality.

## (3) Interpretation of Neutrality

On October 26th, 1955, the last foreign soldier left Austria's soil and the first attempt to survive in a new and unknown status of neutrality started.

There were no serious doubts that the neutrality of Austria would be an armed one. Beside of the military force as a political instrument, the government was also aware of the fact that in spite of an Army Austria would have to make well balanced neutral politic to serve all intentions to stabilize the growing conflict between East and West in the best way. Doing so Austria increased her own security.

It was a very new experience being neutral inbetween two block systems consisting of countries who still might be suspicious against the former heartland of the monarchy or even against a former part of Hitlerite Germany. A new political image had to be established and the Austrians felt that they can make a contribution toward lessening East-West tensions - in the middle of which they are located - best through a constant exchange of businessmen, political leaders, students, cultural groups and ordinary

6) Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 26. Oktober 1955 über die Neutralität Oesterreichs.

tourists going to and coming from Eastern and Western Europe. Austria as a gateway to the Danube River Basin is uniquely qualified for this role.<sup>7)</sup>

This role makes the Austrian situation of neutrality different to Switzerland which only is surrounded by Western countries which all are accustomed to her neutrality for a long time.

The unique position of Austria and her need to establish a worldwide reliable politic was one reason to enter the United Nations Organization, already 1955 to increase international involvement as much as possible.<sup>8)</sup>

Vienna also is the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nation Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). It also was an alternate site of the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and is currently hosting the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Negotiations. The current Secretary General of the UN is Kurt WALDHEIM, a former Austrian Foreign Minister.

These all are attempts to increase security by neutral policy and balance of power. This kind of interpreting neutrality is rather different to the Swiss way. But beside of peaceful policy according to the geographical position of Austria, the establishment of a defense organization was started immediately after the State Treaty was signed.

#### (4) Summary

Summarising the development of the Austrian status and her attempts to make it reliable one must realize that Austria had only 20 years to develop her sense of neutral policy and the organization of her Army to create her security by dissuasion.

There was no tradition in neutrality and the tradition in the Army was the one of a multinational World War I Army at one side and the giant German Army on the other. Neither one could fit the demands of the new established Austrian Republic located inbetween two superpowers.

This has to be understood before one can understand the development of an overall defense system and the military component in it.

It also has to be understood that there are still certain limitations to the establishment of Austria's National Defense:

- The State Treaty prohibits the possession of "rocket driven ammunition", which limits Austria's Air Defense possibilities very much.
- There is still a mistrust against the capability of a small neutral country to defend it's territory against superpowers even among its own population.
- Austria has no neutral tradition like Switzerland and therefore any government has a hard time to provide sufficient money for Austria's defense system without losing votes.
- A long effort of mental education and information of the population is necessary.

7) Countries of the World and their Leaders; Third edition 1974

8) BMFLV, Abt. Bildung u. Kultur; "Zum 25. Jahrestag der Wiedereinrichtung der Republik Oesterreich"; Druck Urania, Fred Zaolnay Ges.m.b.H., Wien 1., Uraniastr. 4

(5) Conclusion

To overcome all the described limitations and the geopolitical needs of Austria determines her neutrality. It has to be done by emphasizing a policy of international involvement, balance, and reliability. But beside of that Austria is also very well aware of the need of a strong Army as the last tool to accomplish the political goal of the country to stay free and sovereign. Further sophisticated definitions and explanations about Austria's neutrality seems not to be necessary for the understanding of this paper.

C. OVERALL DEFENSE 9)

(1) Development

Immediately after the end of World War II, the provisional Austrian government made first, but fruitless, attempts to establish its own Army. But in June 1948 authority by the American High Commissioner was given to the Austrians for the provision of arms and appropriate training for a small contingent of Austrian Gendarmerie in the western zone of occupation only. By the time of the signature of the State Treaty this force had grown to a strength of some 7,000 men. It was organized into nine infantry battalions, three armored car companies, one engineer battalion and two signal companies. This was the basic element of the new Armed Forces in July 1955.

At the same time an Office for Overall Defense was set up in the Federal Chancellery. It was not yet an own Department of Defense but one section of the office of the chancellor. Although it was named Office for Overall Defense it managed military defense only.

Not earlier than one year later the Office for Overall Defense was reorganized into an independent Ministry of Defense, again concerned about fulfilling the military mission of defense only as stated in the Constitution Article 79 and in Armed Forces Law, § 2: 10)

The Federal Armed Forces (Bundesheer) have to

- protect the state borderlines
- protect the constitutional institutions of the country as well as reinforce law and order and
- assist in case of a disaster.

With the equipment given to the new Army by the departing Allied Occupation Forces, the military defense of the country could get started. The following years saw rapid progress in the construction of the Army. But the estimate of the political situation and threat conception in Central Europe in comparison to the small neutral Austria brought doubts about the effectiveness of the organization of the Army, as well as the structure of the entire defense system. It became more and more obvious that an overall defense system could not consist of a military component only. Civilian, economical and psychological components had to be integrated as well.

9) Umfassende Landesverteidigung in the sense of "Entire or Comprehensive Defense" of a nation which involves all elements of the state.


10) BMLV Zl. 3000-Präs B/74 Wehrgesetz und Oesterreichische Verfassung in der Verfassung von 1920; Leykam Verlag 1974

This was acknowledged already 1962, but the different departments (Ministerien) took care of their area of responsibility while the Department of Defense was responsible for the entire defense planning according to the Constitution without having the power to coordinate or push forward among equal departments. 11)

(2) Organisation and Mission

Not earlier than July 11th, 1973 a federal law was passed about "Coordination of the Overall Defense". 12) The result was a complete reorganisation of the responsibilities the defense system.

A Coordinating Board for Overall Defense was added to the Chancellor's Office which brought back the overall responsibility to the Chancellor, who is the chairman of the government as well as the chairman of the National Security Council. The priority of the politic was clearly pointed out. The four single components of the Overall Defense System (ODS) remained in the responsibility of the different departments but dominated by the political leadership of the country. The structure of the ODS since 1973 is shown on the following chart



11) Oesterr. Militaerzeitschrift, Heft 3, 1975, pg 236

12) Bundesministerengesets 1973, Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 389

ODS became officially recognized, dominated and coordinated by politicians. Additionally to the federal effort each province has its own OSD coordination committee acting to provincial initiative and federal mission as well. The military defense became one part of the ODS with no more importance beside of being the ultimate mean to accomplish a country's security goal.

The mission of the different sections of ODS are stated in a resolution of the government from February 28th, 1974. <sup>13)</sup>

Here only a short summary:

- Military Defense: Prepares and conducts the armed defense of the neutrality and sovereignty of the state.
- Civil Defense: Provides and prepares protection for the civil population and for vital institution of the state necessary to maintain the function of the government.
- Economical Defense: Makes provisions against all economical troubles caused by crisis or war.
- Psychological Defense: Takes all measures to develop and sustain the will to defend by all available means among the entire population.

This system is very similar to the Swiss system but it needed a long time to be formulated and issued as law, even there were already good examples in the neighborhood. The evolution of the legal basis of the Austrian ODS reached a rather final stage when the system of the overall defense became also included in the constitution 1975 as following: <sup>14)</sup>

Article 9a was added: <sup>15)</sup>

- "Austria confess herself to an Overall Defense System. Its objective shall be to beware permanent independence and unity of the State Territory by sustaining and defending the permanent neutrality. Included are the sustaining and defense of the constitutional institutions as well as the freedom of decision of the entire population against any external threat.
- The Overall Defense System consists of military, psychological, civil and economical defense including all other political means in peace and wartime.
- Every Austrian male citizen has to join the Army. Who is unable to fulfill this obligation has to do compensation duty. Details are defined by other laws."

Article 79 was changed to:

- "The mission of the Army is to accomplish all means of military defense."

The former mission to protect the borderlines only is more complete now. <sup>16)</sup>  
The protection of constitutional institutions and the assistance in case of disaster are still there.

<sup>14)</sup> See the end

<sup>13)</sup> See the entire resolution in ANNEX A II

<sup>14)</sup> See the addition in ANNEX A I

<sup>15)</sup> Translation is not authentic

<sup>16)</sup> Compare the former mission of the Army, page 27,



the fact Austria very early after the war started to enable to defend her democratic values and the regained freedom and dignity of decision and life, it took until 1975 before all the laws and considerations were ready to become law and could be used as a law. Although many of the procedures and organizations were executed much earlier, it was mostly done by good will and mutual interrelationships. A state based on laws and their legal enforcement needed more than good will.

It is obvious that a government which depends upon the democratic will of the entire population is not willing to force unpopular measures to force the overall defense in the danger of losing votes and power. Therefore it took almost 25 years to inform the population and formulate a viable system which can be executed.<sup>17)</sup> This is a distinct weakpoint of a democratic country but the great advantage is that finally an overwhelming majority of the entire population agrees and supports a decision in spite of different political parties and different interests.

### (3) Threat Formulation

Hand in hand with the evolution of the Overall Defense Structure the formulation of the threat against Austria progressed. According to the threat Formulation published in a Federal Swiss Security Report 1973, Austria also reformulated her threat conception.

In this study a very short summary will be sufficient because of the similarity to the Swiss concept and the intensive description in a report paper done at USACGSC by Major P. KOMAN, 1974.<sup>18)</sup>

According to the development of the political scene, especially the increasing threat by terrorists, Austria included a threat conception in relative peacetime which was not formulated yet. Therefore the difference differs between

#### Active Peace

Each permanent effort to maintain peace and stability has to be included. It includes all elements of the Overall Defense System and the ability to apply them at the right time in the right way. (Preparation) so includes

Efforts to establish good external relationship and reliability. (Overall Security Policy)

When spoken it means all efforts to

satisfy the desire of security of the population

provide all available means to respond to the needs of a higher threat level

make the population aware of the existence of a threat and their integration into the entire system.

Richard BAYER; Berichte sur Wehrpolitik, Oesterr. Militaerzeitung, Heft 4, 1976

P. KOMAN; "What is the military strategic role of the neutral Austria in Central Europe; Student Paper written in 1974 at USACGSC Ft. Leavenworth. Library No. N-8224.1070 Jan 10th, 1975

#### Case of Crisis

is defined as a crisis outside of Austria with considerable international tension and danger of conflicts involving Austria.

Internal tensions, subversive activities and terrorism within the country can accompany the threat. Measures have to be taken to avoid the involvement of Austria and to sustain relative peace and to be prepared to gear into a higher level of threat.

When the military defense is concerned portions of the Alert Forces might become employed already and preparation of mobilization might start.

#### Case of neutrality

It occurs when, especially through a war in the neighborhood, Austria as a permanent neutral country or Austria's security and sovereignty is threatened. The threat must be stronger and more obvious as in the case of crisis. In this case the country will be aware of violations of the neutrality by ground or air forces. False bombardments may occur as well as effects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons even when they are not employed on Austrian territory. Small battles among two belligerents on Austrian territory may happen. Refugees from foreign countries and foreign workers still in the country can have a tremendous impact on the economical situation. The involvement of the entire Defense System is obvious. Partial mobilization of Territorial Forces beside the Alert Forces will be necessary if not an entire mobilization.

#### Case of Defense/Aggression

It occurs in case of an aimed military attack against Austria or over Austrian territory. All available means of Overall Defense have to be used, the mobilization of the entire Armed Forces will take place. 19)

The definition of four different levels of threat enables all components of the Overall Defense Concept to plan in advance and to automatize the alert system according to the estimated threat.

#### (4) Summary

The culmination of the threat against Austria can be summarized in the following war objectives

- occupation of vital areas to put pressure on the Austrian government. (Limited objective against limited forces)
- nuclear extortion or limited nuclear employment to put pressure on the Austrian government and to weaken the defense will of the population
- occupation of vital military strategic areas for use against third nations (use of strategical routes by limited forces).
- occupation of the entire country in an isolated action or during a change of the status quo in Europe (includes the danger of an escalation to another world war).

19) Oesterreichische Militärzeitschrift Heft 12/1974, pg 46, in which the threat formulation in 3 cases was edited.

The most likely threat is considered to be the attempt to use Austrian territory as an operational basis against a third state. Each aggressor might try to reach this operational basis in a surprising and rapid success which would minimize the international reaction as well as the Austrian possibilities and achieve most momentum of surprise against the third state.

The geopolitical position of Austria opposing both military bloc systems makes a perfect system of mobilization most necessary because of almost no reaction time in case of an aggression. Therefore the political and military awareness of the population and the possibility for the government to shift the status of readiness from lower to higher makes a mobilization in time most likely and is very important.

The Overall Defense System is based on two pillars:

- establishment of security and balanced relationships to all parts of the world by integration into international organizations, mutual economical efforts and neutral diplomacy
- deterrence by armed forces within OSD, which utilize all available means and would consist of combatants according to international law, and the rest of the entire population.

The overall goal of the OSD is to make an entrance into neutral Austrian territory so expensive and time consuming that other options to achieve an aggressor's goal outside of Austria would be favorable..

#### D. THE ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE OSD

(1) According to the change of the constitutional mission of the Army and the integration of the military defense in an Overall Defense System divided in 4 phases, the mission of the Army also became more specified. Political and military leaders as well became aware of the fact that the employment of the Army not necessarily means the employment against the invasion of even two super powers at once but also needs to be a more flexible instrument against minor threats. Therefore the mission of the Army became defined according to the cases: <sup>20)</sup>

##### In the time of Relative Peace

- to consolidate the image of the Army and their capability of employment,
- to prepare for mobilization and employment,
- to increase interoperability within other organizations such as police, civil defense organization, fire guard, red cross etc. for mutual assistance on order,
- to delegate parts into the United Nation Organization according to special missions as a peace keeping force,
- to respond to political needs as a force in being immediate and after mobilization in entire strength (flexible response to the variety of threats)

20) Lehrgruppe ULV; Beiträge zur Österr. Landesverteidigung LVAK, Wien, Februar 1975.

The mission is published in the 389th Federal Law 1973, edited August 7th, 1973

Case of Crisis

- to sustain sufficient mobile Alert Forces
- to concentrate Alert Forces in critical areas well in advance
- to monitor and secure the Austrian borderlines as necessary
- to be prepared for mobilization of additional forces in critical areas

Case of Neutrality

- to concentrate additional forces in keyzones by partial mobilization
- to maintain sovereignty of airspace
- to be prepared for total mobilization
- to mobilize Army logistic systems
- to execute total mobilization on order.

Case of Defense/Aggression

- a) Additional to the missions in crisis and case of neutrality the military defense has
- to employ mobile forces and territorial based forces as well against any aggression with limited local goals
- b) Against an attack directed toward the entire state territory and nation the military defense has to
- defend the country by any available means beginning from the borderlines.
  - Utilization of terrain, obstacles and fortifications will help to sustain substantial elements of the Army in certain parts of the country to maintain the political and military control system and to make a reestablishment of the territory possible,
  - to activate the entire regional based defense system to pretend the enemy from achieving his operational goals within his time schedule
  - to continue the fight even in occupied portions of the country by assisting other elements within the Overall Defense System, or reestablish organized military resistance
- c) Against a surprising action without prewarning times legal and logistical measures have to be prepared which enable regional leaders to activate local military defense actions and limited territorial mobilizations without assistance of mobile Alert Forces.
- d) Without detraction from defending external enemy the Army also has to be able to reinforce and assist law enforcement against terrorism and to assist in cases of disaster.

So far the operational goals for the Austrian Armed Forces according to the official political and legal issues such as Constitution and Overall Defense articulated by the Coordinating Board at the Chancellor's Office.

(2) Armed Forces Law

To enable the Austrian "Bundesheer" (Federal Armed Forces of Austria) to accomplish its mission the Armed Forces Law also had to be renewed in a similar way as the Overall Defense System, of which the military defense by the Army is one part. The priority of policy above military defense is obvious and appreciated.

The current edition of the Armed Forces law is finally the compromise between political decisions and military needs which not always go together very easily.

While the military leaders since 1955 argued for more budget, longer duty and increasing reserve component by changing into a militia system, the Socialist Party of Austria won a national election by promising the young Austrians a shortening of their active duty service from 9 to 6 months for basic military training in 1971. This was the year the most important reformation of the Armed Forces Law, took place. This made the restructure of the Armed Forces necessary. The influence of an Army Restructure Commission brought several vital additions to the law, to that the change from a regular Army to a Cadre-Militia Army became possible.

On the one side a shortening of active duty time, on the other side the change to Militia with refresher exercises; no money, but more reservists the the reality the military leaders had to handle since 1971.

The legal basis to establish personnel for the Armed Forces since 1971 with minor additions in 1974 and 1976 is the Armed Forces Law which in summary expresses the following facts: 22)

a) Universal conscription:

Each fit male Austrian citizen has to join the Armed Forces Service. Exceptions are unfitness or reasons of conscience.

While the first exception is based on official medical examinations, the second reason has to be announced and stated by the conscript.

The reasons become proofed by an official commission consisting of all representatives of any official confession, psychologists, lawyers, governmental representatives etc. If the request becomes approved the draftee has to do unarmed substitutional service within a social institution for 8 months. No problem in reality appears at all.

The universal conscription lasts from 18 to 50 years.

Committed, noncommitted officers and technical specialists can/must serve until the age of 65.

When a reservist reaches 40 years and is still an enlisted man he gets dismissed from his reserve unit and cannot be obligated to do exercises any more beside of real mobilization.

b) Professional, active cadre:

To establish the professional skeleton of the Armed Forces one can become a professional committed or noncommitted officer in Austria.

The professional committed officer has to have Junior College graduation (Mittelschulmatura), voluntarily 12 months of Military Basic Training, and

22) Wehrgesetz in der Fassung der Bundesgesetzblätter No. 310/60, 221/62, 85/66, 96/69, 272/69, §84/70, 344/70, 272/71, 89/74 and Dr. P. CORIERI; "The new § 28 Austrian Armed Forces Law 1976" Truppendienst 15, Jahrgang/Heft 4

3 years of Military Academy training to become a second Lieutenant. The professional noncommitted officer has to complete regular basic training and cadre exercises, which will be explained later, to a certain extent. After he voluntarily obligates himself to 3 years of duty at least, and after he passes certain examinations he becomes assigned to the NCO-Academy for his third year of duty. When he passes the NCO Academy he gets promoted to a professional NCO, if he fails, he can stay as a professional soldier as long as his obligation lasts or he can quit the service.

c) Reserve component and reserve cadre

The military service (Präsenzdienst) consists of active duty (Grundwehrdienst) and reserve (Reserve).

The active duty lasts for 6 months of basic training and 60 days of refresher exercises for the lowest level of training.

This is general military service everybody has to accomplish. The way how it can be accomplished depends very much on the needs of the unit and therefore on the decision of the commander.

There are generally two ways of accomplishing the active duty:

- after 6 months of basic training the soldier can be released into reserve. Then he will be obligated to serve 30 days of refresher exercise within the following 5 years after the release, and the next 30 days within the following 8 years. The usual obligation therefore is 10 days of refresher exercise every other year for 13 years;
- within the 6 months of basic training the soldier can ask for permission to serve his 30 days of refresher exercise in immediate continuation of his basic training.

If there is a military need for these "8 months soldiers" on an individual basis the district command HQ gives the permission.

If there is a need for reservists to fill the unit every other year the permission will not be given.

Beside of this general military service the Army has the possibility to elect certain conscripts for reserve cadres based on skill, profession, residence and military need to establish the necessary militia cadre. This elected cadre is obligated to serve 30 to 90 additional days in cadre exercises depending on the function to which they are elected.

Committed Reserve Officers have to serve 12 months of voluntarily extended military basic training and 90 days of cadre exercises beside of 60 days refresher exercises.

Reserve cadre in other function (including Reserve NCO's) have to serve normally 6 months of basic training and 30 to 90 days additional cadre exercises beside of their 60 days refresher exercises depending on their function.

d) Alternatives to extended active duties are:

Voluntarily extended military service

If a draftee wants to serve longer than the legal obligation he voluntarily can do so. The extension can be from 3 months on to as many 6 months periods he wants, depending on the agreement of the commander. This extension does not eliminate the obligation of refresher exercises after being released into reserve.

Voluntarily weapon exercises

The exercises can be done by every reservist up to 10 weeks a year. It is an exercise which provides special training to the reservist, such as mountain training, command and control exercises, fieldgrade officer courses, preparation phase for the commanders before maneuvers etc. These exercises are especially announced to give every reservist the occasion to take part. They are specially paid and count on the promotion of the reservist.

This rather complicated looking but very flexible system of different exercises, depending on different needs of the militia, enables the Army to:

- provide basic training in either structured or unstructured units for every conscript,
- maintain the service of the infrastructure and equipment within the unit by "8 months soldiers",
- form and train reserve units during refresher exercises up to regimental level and theoretically higher,
- integrate reserve cadres into the reserve unit and train them together,
- reinforce professional cadre by reservists doing exercises.

Before 1976 all obligations to additional duty were based on volunteers. This did not work. The Army could not provide sufficient cadre to train and form units. Therefore the amendment of the Armed Forces Law 1976 was vital to the Army.

Anyway, it took until then to adjust the law in a way the future development of the Austrian Army was secured.

The construction of the Military Defense based on a practicable law within a well defined Overall Defense System could start.

e) Table of Active Duty ( overview )

- Reserve Component					
Age	Function	Basic Training	Refresher Exercise	Cadre Exercise	Total Days
18 to 40	Enlisted	180	60	-	240
	Corporal	180	60	2x15	270
	Platoon Leader	180	60	4x15	300
	Sergeant	180	60	6x15	330
	2nd Lieutenant	360	60	6x15	510
( further promotions depend on weapon-exercises )					

- Additional Active Duty ( voluntarily )

18 to 50	Weapon Exercises up to	70 days a year	70
	Extended Service up to	3 years	1080

- Professional Cadre

18-65	Committed Officer (2nd Lieutenant)	360 days basic training 3 years Military Academy	4 years
	NCO ( Sergeant )	180 days basic training 2 years extended service one of that is NCO- academy & training	2 1/2 years



## E. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

### (1) General

The organization of a nation's military is always dependent on political goals and the military mission to achieve those goals. With the concept of the Overall Defense System, the new formulated constitutional goal of the Army, and the Armed Forces Law 1971 the political framework was given to construct a new Army.

However, this made a change from the previous system necessary: Austria had to rely less on regular forces but more on reserves based upon a militia system.

In July 1973 an Austrian Armed Forces Headquarter was installed and took the role in command of all field formations and units, both active and reserve, including Air Force, which belongs to the Army too.

The creation of this HQ, which previously had only be envisioned in the case of emergency, brought to fruition an essential element of the current Army Restructuring Concept.

Before that the Army was commanded by various sections of the Department of Defense. For example operational planning was supervised by Section III, while logistical planning was done by Section IV. Both sections were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, a political function.

The single Army HQ now comes direct under the Ministry of Defense and is located in Vienna in peacetime. It exercises its function through its own command structure. The various defense and army academies, schools and administrative installations come directly under the Ministry of Defense, so that the Ministry, so to speak the Department of Defense, supervises while the Army HQ commands.

The main task of the HQ is: <sup>23)</sup>

- Command logistics and administration of its subordinate formations and units, both in peacetime and for operation.
- Operational planning
- Organisation, weapons and equipment
- Training for Operations
- Preparation for mobilization
- Allocation of military training areas and facilities
- Welfare.

The consistence of the HQ is very much the same as any military HQ. In order to meet the commitments above it was necessary to introduce a new military concept called "Army Restructuring Concept 1972" <sup>24)</sup>

23) Emil SPANOCCHI; "Austria's Defense Forces"; The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal; by West of England Press, Publishers, LTD.

24) Heeresreform 1972

(2) Organization

a) Alert Forces

They consist of two divisions under a Corps HQ. The first division (east), which already is in being, consists, beside of divisional troops, of three armed brigades. The division in the west which is not in present yet will consist of two infantry brigades and one armored brigade. The elements of the second Division are already existing but they are still under control of mobile Landwehr Brigade Commands while they already keep the status of readiness of an Alert Force. The strength of both Divisions is limited by law to a total of only 15,000 men. The reason why two divisions can be manned by that is that these divisions almost exclusively consist of command and control, combat and combat support units. For combat service support they will rely on the territorial infrastructure.

The Austrian Air Force is structured as a third Division in the status of an Alert Force under the command of the Army HQ. It includes fighter and helicopter wings as well as interceptors which are not available yet. It also has subordinated the airsecurity and radar systems and the necessary ground organizations. Although the Air Force Division is spread all over Austria it is central commanded by the Div. HQ.

Army assistance is done on request under OPCON. This centralized control is done for maintenance and supply purposes.

The divisions are manned in principle with professional soldiers and conscripts who volunteer to serve longer than 6 months.

The concept of Alert Forces is to have a formation ready at any time without need of general mobilization. In the event of an alarm units are ready to move to the threatened area and are available for security operations in general as a tool for crisis management before mobilization.

b) Landwehr

The main emphasis of the Austrian defense effort is based upon the "Landwehr". It is based on a provincial system and is under the command of a provincial military commander, the so called District HQ. Geographically the organization is as follows:

HQ I. Corps, GRAZ (East-Austria): with District HQ's Burgenland, Lower Austria, Styria.

HQ II. Corps, SALZBURG (West-Austria): with District HQ's in Upper Austria, Tyrol, Carinthia, Salzburg, Vorarlberg.

VIENNA District HQ: directly under Army HQ responsible for the territorial area of Vienna.

The military districts are conform with the appropriate provinces and correspond to the provincial government <sup>26)</sup> of the civilian administration, which facilitates the cooperation in the Overall Defense and Recruiting System.

---

26) Landesregierungen

Each province has two different kinds of Landwehr:

- Mobile Landwehr and
- territorial based Landwehr.

The Mobile Landwehr in peacetime represents the training units in which the military basic training for the entire Landwehr of a province is executed in one half of the year. This unit is regimental size in each military District.

The second half of the year this "training regiment" which is relatively heavily equipped with professional cadres, working as instructors, gets it's own reserve component for refresher exercises to train in it's war status as a mobilized brigade. Beside of that the regiment has to conduct the cadre exercises for it's own cadre and the one for the territorial based Landwehr of the region. It also assists the territorial Landwehr, territorial security companies, bunkerteams, logistical units etc. to execute their refresher exercises in a simulation of mobilization. The vehicles and special machines are provided by the regiment which in a mobilization would have to be done by civilian firms on the basis of the Emergency Law.

The training regiment is father and mother of the Landwehr in the province. It is the "active home" for all reservists.

The Territorial Landwehr in peacetime is almost not existent. After mobilization it consists of several battalions, light infantry, antitank heavy, very much tailored to the region in which they will fight. Even the reservists are normally recruited out of the region. Their logistical base are decentralized depots and civilian structures already existing. They include units to man the bunkers and fortifications and security forces to assist other organizations for reinforcement of law and order.

The only active part of the territorial Landwehr is one NCO per company and one Maintenance Team per District HQ to maintain the fortification.

The territorial Landwehr is a real militia. It will fight stationary and decentralized according to the Area Defense Concept explained later. It is generally very light equipped, therefore a cheap organization based on manpower, antitank weapons and knowledg of terrain, very effective against a mechanized enemy and no target for heavy weapons.

#### c) Army Logistic Units

The combat service support missions of the Alert Forces are mainly based on a CSS regiment in each Corps area. This regiment is in a "Semi Alert Force" status and needs mobilization for reinforcement. The Mobile Landwehr Brigades have their own CSS elements. Beside of that every District HQ has logistical units especially for transportation of ammunition and POL in a Landwehr status.

Austria does not have arsenals with civilian employees to store mobilization equipment and weapons in the way Switzerland has. Therefore training weapons and equipment have to be used for mobilized units and active Army. Enlisted have to store and maintain those weapons and equipment. This is a great disadvantage and costs many hours which would be better used for training.

d) The total strength of the organization 25)

aa) Total Armed Forces

Active Duty: 12,300 regulars  
25,000 conscripts  
Mobilization strength: 150,000

bb) Alert and Semi Alert Forces 10,000 regulars  
23,000 conscripts

4 mechanized brigades each comprising

1 tank battalion  
2 mechanized battalions  
1 Artillery battalion  
1 HQ & CSS battalion

2 Infantry brigades each comprising

3 Infantry battalions  
1 Artillery battalion  
1 HQ & CSS battalion

1 Command battalion

5 Signal battalions

1 Sig Inf battalion

3 ADA battalions

3 Independent tank battalions

3 Heavy Arty battalions

3 Engineer battalions

3 CSS regiments & other elements

(Not all units are at full strength, some elements need still mobilization. These units are ~~not~~ <sup>named</sup> by "Semi Alert Forces".)

cc) UNO Forces 850 regulars and reservists

1 Company and 1 Field Hospital in Cyprus UNFICYP

1 Battalion in Egypt U.N.E.F.

1 Battalion in Syria U.N.D.O.F.

25) According "The military Balance" 1977 and "Austrian Defense Forces";  
The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal by West of England Press,  
Publishers, Ltd., 1, West Str., Tavistock, Devon, England.

- dd) Militia 112,000 mobilization designees  
690,000 reservists without designation but committed.

Mobile Landwehr

- 8 Training regiments in peacetime, after mobilization  
beefed up to  
8 Reserve brigades each consisting of  
3 Infantry battalions  
1 Artillery battalion including ADA  
1 HQ, CS and CSS battalion

Territorial based Landwehr

- 16 regiments and 4 battalions distributed among  
8 regional District Commands  
(this part has to be developed further on, to a strength  
of 300,000 designated reservists)

- ee) Air Force 2,300 regulars  
2,000 conscripts

- 1 Division integrated into the Army, consisting of  
2 fighter regiments  
1 helicopter regiment  
1 radar regiment  
1 HQ battalion

maintenance element and ground organization including ADA

- ff) Para Military Forces 11,250 Gendarmerie

e) Equipment

aa) ARMY

- 320 MBT, M47 and M60  
120 armored tank destroyers (Kürassier; Austrian product,  
Laser rangefinder)  
470 APCs (Saurer; Austrian product, 20 mm machine gun)  
130 M-2 105 mm and M-1 155 mm howitzers  
38 M 109 155 mm self propelled howitzers  
18 Praga 130 mm multiple rocket launchers  
490 mortars from 80 mm to 120 mm  
240 85 mm anti-tank guns

Every soldier is equipped with the STG 58 automatic rifle  
which can shoot single or automatic fire and from which a  
90 mm anti-tank grenade can be launched.

Every soldier also can be equipped with a 66 mm LAW.  
Numerous recoilless anti-tank weapons beginning from the  
10,6 cm gun to the portable "Carl Gustav", which is similar  
to the US Dragan, are integrated into the organization.

bb) Air Force

38 fighter bombers SAAB 105E  
2 short Skyvan and several small fixed wing airplanes  
70 helicopters AB 204B, AB 206B, Alouette II/III,  
OH-13H, and S-65 OE  
400 Antiaircraft guns 35 mm Z/65 Super Bat, 40 mm 55 and  
57 Bofors and 20 mm Oerlicen.

(3) Budget

The military budget of Austria is 0,53 billions US-Dollar <sup>26)</sup>  
this is 3,8 % of the entire budget and 1,12 % of the GNP.  
Austria spends 70,05 US Dollar per capita and year for military defense.

F. THE READINESS OF THE ARMY AND THE MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

(1) Readiness in personell and equipment

Different levels of readiness have to be distinguished in the mixed Cadre-Militia System of the Austrian Army.

Alert Forces and Forces similar to alert (Semi Alert Forces)

The operational goal is to have these forces ready every single moment to meet immediate objectives. Currently this goal only can be accomplished with parts of the Alert Forces but will increase with the number of soldiers serving "voluntarily extended active duty". 60 % of the 29 alert battalions meet the standard of immediate readiness. <sup>27)</sup>

The other 40 % are accomplished by using only those soldiers who want to serve all 8 months in one portion instead of doing refresher exercises. They are estimated as combat ready after 6 months of basic training and accomplish the rest of their active duty (2 months) in minor combat functions within the Alert Units as filling personell. By phasing the day of entrance into the service from brigade additional elements within the Alert Units become combat ready. Still missing personell is kept in "readiness leave" <sup>28)</sup> after discharge from active duty for another 3 months.

According to the Armed Forces Law § 16 a reservist in "readiness leave" has to report any move to his responsible Command which lasts longer than 3 days. The utilization of all given measures makes it possible to have the missing 40 % ready within 12 hours.

100 % of weapons and equipment is ready and 80 % of the necessary tonnage for CSS is available immediately which is sufficient to meet the first requirements. <sup>29)</sup>

26) Same source as footnote 25). 1 US-\$ = 17,- Austrian Shillings

27) Army Commander General E. Spannocchi in "1978 wartet viel Arbeit auf uns"; Der Soldat, Nr. 1 - Jänner 1978

28) Beurlaubtenstand

29) Same source as

Landwehr

The two types of Landwehr, mobile and territorial based, have generally the same degree of readiness. Both need mobilization to be able to accomplish their combat mission.

The professional cadre has a mobilization designation which is not necessarily identical with the current function and has to mobilize to the designated unit as well as the reservist. The single soldier has his personal equipment at home and is responsible for maintenance and readiness. Heavy equipment and weapons are in decentralized depots as well as ammunition.

Missing vehicles have to be mobilized by specialized territorial commands in the same way as the personnel. Every vehicle owner has a designation for his car in the case of mobilization already in peacetime.

Because of more active cadre and more existing equipment (training units) the mobile Landwehr is still faster to be mobilized than the territorial based Landwehr. But after accomplishing the following targets there will be no difference any more.

- Strictly territorial principle for designation of reservists
- decentralized depots for weapons and heavy equipments
- mobilization of "key- personnel" in advance.

Logistic units:

The degree of readiness for logistic units depend on the kind of Forces they belong to, either Alert Force status or Landwehr status.

Summarizing, the status of readiness the Austrian Army reaches by mobilization meets international standards as long as experts talk about 3 days of prewarning time, at least before a war in Central Europe can be started militarily. <sup>30)</sup>

(2) Mobilization System

Since mobilization of an Army also can be used as a policy of dissuasion and not to fill missing personnel or equipment only, the system has to be very flexible.

The Austrian system is based on distinguishing certain groups, so mobilization can be done partially or time phased for special purposes in different ways for each group individually.

For example:

a) By function

- Commanders
- key functions
- signal personnel
- C & C personnel
- CSS personnel

30) "Soviet Threat in Central Europe"; Strategic Seminar at CGSC 1978

b) By status

- Alert Forces
- mobile Landwehr
- territorial Landwehr
- etc.

c) By branches

- Engineers (for disaster assistance)
- Security (for internal law and order reinforcement)
- Logistic
- etc.

d) By region

- all units of a certain region
- all engineers of a certain region
- etc.

Each group and subgroup is indicated on the mobilization order which every designated reservist gets when he leaves active duty and keeps at home. In case of mobilization the proclamation through public communication means (public mobilization) or by special letters (silent mobilization) just has to announce these indications and every reservist knows what to do while the degree and purpose of mobilization is veiled in public.

For example:

"All soldiers with red mobilization orders No. 108 report in immediately". This could mean all soldiers of the province of STYRIA belonging to the bunker team ALPHA are to be mobilized, if red means STYRIA and 108 is the bunker team ALPHA. The mobilization order furthermore contains the place the reservist has to report in and other necessary advises. The system is practiced often as a reservist returns to active duty for refresher exercises and beside of that usually maneuvers start with a simulated mobilization. Therefore the level of experience what to do in case of mobilization of the simple reservist in Austria is rather high. The codes of mobilization groups and the designated people who belong to are computerized and in the nearer future it will be possible to mobilize automatically by computers according to preprogrammed actions. Even telephoncalls to key commanders and functions within the entire Overall Defense System can be done by computers.



### G. AREA DEFENSE CONCEPT

In accordance with the given facts such as

- Geopolitical Location
- Status of Neutrality
- Will to stay independent
- Overall Defense System
- Organizational basis for a militia
- Current military environment around Austria

the population could expect a reliable military defense concept.

After the big change in 1972 <sup>31)</sup> and the establishment of an Army mainly based on a militia, the military leaders became aware of the fact that Austria never will be able to build up a conventional highly mechanized and sophisticated Army with less active duty time and even less money. To resist a potential enemy or even parts of it the old doctrine of position or mobile defense was not applicable.

To fulfill the political goal of

- security by dissuasion in peacetime
- and defense in case of aggression, the Army had to find a new doctrine.

#### (1) Goal of the Concept

This new concept is not only a military concept but a concept of the defense of the country by all available means organized and coordinated in the Overall Defense System involving the entire population and using the entire scale of policy. All efforts have to be focused on demonstrating the will to maintain Austria's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

After diplomacy and negotiation fail to keep peace the Army is the "ultimo ratio" of the policy. The military defense concept therefore has to guarantee that any military aggression against Austria can be immediately answered by appropriate military actions.

The military preparations have to be oriented toward the worst case of aggression. This includes the management of minor threats automatically. The Army has to bestablish strength, doctrine and reliability already in peacetime which demonstrates to any possible aggressor how risky, time- and force consuming an attack against or through Austria would be.

All effort has to be focused on reaching the highest possible level of dissuasion.

#### The goal is

- high price of entrance (need of remarkable enemy forces to enter the country and to be able to advance in a reasonable speed).
- high price of stay (need of remarkable enemy forces to occupy and secure at least operational important areas and the difficulty to calculate the duration of the operation because of decentralized resistance)

However, dissuasion is the most important part of the peacekeeping strategy of the Military Defense Concept of Austria.

31) Shortening of active duty and the results of the Restructuring Commission, the legalisation and coordination of the Overall Defense System and the new formulation of the Army's mission in the constitution as explained in previous chapters.

(2) The threat

The threat against the neutral Austria is defined by

- geographical and geopolitical location of Austria
- the presumed object of an opposing force operation
- the kind of doctrine an aggressor would and could use.

a) Geographical and geopolitical location

The location inbetween the field of tension of two pact systems, the neutral strategical avenues of approach through Austria and her Basic Area in a rather dissuasive alpine region is thoroughly analyzed in chapter 3. 1 (a) of this paper.

Additionally to this conditions it is assumed that a nuclear war would overtask a small country like Austria and only passive measures against a direct or indirect involvement shall be taken. 32)

b) Operational object of an aggressor

According to the geographical and political situation one can distinguish two different operational objects of an aggressor

- operational goal is located outside of Austria but an avenue of approach is leading through Austrian territory (throughpassing and partial occupation)
- operational goal is within Austria (entire or partial occupation)-

Both objects can be correlated as well.

(c) Aggressors doctrine

In order to accomplish an early success the aggressor will advance along the main avenues of approach to seize this areas which are important for his operations as soon as he can. He will have absolute air superiority and use highly mechanized and superior forces. In a first phase he will adempt to destroy our own Air Force and surveillance system by airstrikes or even subversive actions. His advance will be accompanied by air assault operations.

According to this doctrine we distinguish two zones: 33)

- zones of main threat which are operational zones toward which the main effort of the enemy will be directed.

In case of threat from the north or east it is  
Danube River valley including Alpine Foreland  
the Basin of GRAZ and VIENNA.

In case of a threat from southeast it is  
the basin of GRAZ and KLAGENFURT including NUR and MURZ River valley.

In case of a threat from the west it is  
- TYROL, the western Alpine Foreland, including the Danube River valley. 34)

32) HeinsKOSAK; "Abhaltung oder Verteidigung", Oesterr. Militärzeitschrift  
Heft 2/1976

33) see also the natural regions of Austria in chapter 3. 1 (a) pg

34) Günther HOCHAUER; "Die Raumverteidigung (I)" Oesterr. Militärzeitschrift  
Heft 4/1973

- Zones of minor threat are zones aside the main axis of approach. Therefore the enemy will either not attack immediately or can only afford less forces. Vienna woods, Bucklige Welt south of the Leitha River or the Central Area of Austria would be such zones.

(3) Terrain

Any operation will be effectively influenced by the terrain. A research of how the Austrian territory effects a mechanized attack had a surprising result: 35)

Only 10 % of the terrain of military importance permitted armed movement without limitations. These zones are called "TANK-ZONES". The rest of the terrain permits mechanized movement only along roads and favors infantry (INFANTRY ZONES) or it is a mixed type in which limited tank movement is possible, interrupted by terrain which is unfavourable for mechanized advance (INFANTRY-TANK-ZONES).



35) Wilhelm FIGL; "Folgen für die Gesamtarmverteidigung." Student Research Paper, Austrian General Staff College No. 00209/1977

a) Tank-Zones

In tank zones the limited mechanized forces of the Austrian Army will not be able to defend against attacking enemy with absolute air superiority. The only "slow down effect" against enemies advance will be achieved by static measures such as prepared blocking and obstacles systems coordinated with fortified positions and mutual fire support.

b) Infantry-Zones

have decisive importance when the attacking enemy can not avoid them in order to achieve his tactical goal. Mechanized units will be able to move along the roads leading through the infantry zone only but they will be very channalized with open flanks. In order to employ and secure his forces he will be forced to fight dismounted and to use vertical envelopment actions to open the needed line of communication which is at least time consuming and time will be most important to any enemy operation. However, infantry zones can be defended by light infantry, antitank weapons and blocking positions along the roads.



c) Infantry-Tank-Zones

are mixed zones which still allow full mechanized movement but channalized to certain avenues of approach which limits the size of the attacking force.

To defend these zones mechanized and infantry forces reinforced with antitank systems are necessary.

Sufficient depth of the battle area and prepared positions are suppositions to employ infantry forces. Their reinforcement by mobile mechanized counterattack and antitank units is necessary.

Because of the air threat the size of counterattack units will be limited to battalion sized combined arms units to avoid movement of larger units and to have short distances and more flexibility.

(4) Intention of the Austrian Military Defense System <sup>36)</sup>

is to

- fight from the borderline of Austria on
- secure operational areas of importance among the entire country
- defend key areas in zones of main threat
- continue the battle even in penetrated or enveloped areas
- defend as much central areas as possible to provide a basis of survival for political decisions and constitutional institutions
- initiate actions to regain lost territory.

(5) Tactical procedures

The effect of the Area Defense System is based upon the defense of the entire Austrian territory through a possibly long and hardly to calculate period of time.

Decisive areas in the full depth of the state territory are secured by forces including their logistical bases well in advance according to a preplanned and prepared basic employment and a flexible system of mobilization. <sup>37)</sup>

This will avoid greater movements in times the Army could be destructed by enemy's Air Force already.

The defense will be conducted in three different procedures according to terrain and operational purpose:

- Area protection
- Keyzone Combat
- Basic Area Defense

a) Area Protection (Raumsicherung)

It is the employment of territorial forces in favourable and tactical important terrain to delay the enemy's advance, to destroy enemy elements by attacking his flanks and rear, and to control areas which are not attacked or already bypassed.

It is important to avoid unprotected movement of larger units and to pretend the unlimited use of the terrain by enemy forces.

The initial employment of the forces has to be accomplished before the attack against Austria starts.

36) Commandant of the Austrian Army, Emil SPANNOCCHI; "Grundlagen unser Wehrdektrin", Armeekommando Informationen 11. Nov. 1973

37) Dr. Karl SCHÖLLER; "Raumsicherung -Führungs- und Einsatzgrundsätze", Truppendienst, Zeitschrift für die Ausbildung in Bundesheer, Heft 2/1977

The Area Protection consists of

- Temporarily Limited Defense (zeitlich begrenzte Verteidigung)
- Pursuitive warfare (Jagdkampf)

Favorable terrain along axis of advance are reinforced by fortifications and preplanned obstacles. This system of blocking positions in depth will be defended for limited time to slow down the speed of the attack and to force the enemy to dismount and start envelop element.

This enables the employment of Pursuit Forces (Jagdkampfkraefte) against assembling or split up elements of the enemy inbetween two phases of combat. They avoid decisive combat in order to disturb and weaken the enemy but maintaining their own combat strength. They operate in small units out of infantry zones comparable to guerillas.

The pursuitive warfare is a special element of the area protection system. It is directed against flanks and rear elements. They utilize their knowledge of terrain, their prepared and decentralized installations, and the support of the population according to the Overall Defense System. The pursuitive warfare can be achieved by

- attacks with limited objective
- ambush and raid
- defense of blocking positions
- feints, demonstrations, diversions and others.

It is a very low profile warfare of relative cheap infantry units, equipped with antitank weapons which are no air or nuclear target because of their decentralized, mobile and changing employment.

They try to find the enemy in times and locations that are favorable to them instead of being found.

In case of increasing tension of enemy penetration the forces withdraw to adjacent areas of less pressure. If enemy leaves cleared zones of minor interest they will become reoccupied by pursuitive forces to hold enemy forces and to disturb his lines of supply.



Organization, equipment, armament, command and control, support and service support of pursuitive forces in area protection mission need intensive preparation in peacetime. The employment is only possible with soldiers and leaders born, living, and trained in the region they will fight in, supported by their own population.

Beside of these pursuitive forces as regular part of the area protection system the higher command level can employ special forces as well to conduct special command missions.


The tactical purpose of an area protection is not to prevent a penetration but to weaken the enemy and prevent the unlimited control of an area.

b) Key Zone Combat (Kampf um Schlüsselzonen)

The battle in a key zone is fought to prevent an enemy's penetration. It only can be conducted in a terrain favourable for defense. Key zones are defined from higher command level and also prepared for defense already in peacetime. They are in areas of main threat and have to be held in order to prevent the enemy from accomplishing it's mission in sufficient strength, right location and time. Different Key Zones do not have to be coordinated among each other.

Key Zone Combat consists of

- Defense of Key Areas
- Counterattack
- Security Operations in certain parts of the key zone



Key positions



Counterattack



secured terrain

Key Areas are fortified battle areas defended against all directions. They are independent from each other. Their control is the key to further advance along an avenue of approach. Therefore they will be a main target of the enemy. This makes heavy fortification, armament, and deceptive actions very important.

Counterattacks are conducted against enemy penetrations inbetween Key Areas. They are conducted by mechanized forces out of decentralized assembly areas within the secured terrain. Concentration of air protection will be necessary to move counterattack forces toward preplanned counterattack or killing grounds.

The purpose of the mutual influence of key area defense and counterattack is to channalize an enemy advance in preplanned directions so all prepared defense measures can be applied most effective.

c) Basic Area Defense (Verteidigung des Basisraumes)

The Basic Area is an area of minor threat, defined by it's geographical location, it's defensible terrain and the direction for which an aggressor's threat can be expected.

Even when portions of the Austrian territory will be occupied the Basic Area has to be defended by all available means. In order to achieve this object the Basic Area has to be fortified and prepared along the geographical entrances and in the depth as well. All defense installations have to be manned very well in advance to prevent prephased air assault operations against evacuated governmental and service support installations.

The defense of the Basic Area will be conducted as

- defense of key areas and
- area protection.

The defense of the entrances into the basic area will be conducted adjacent to the avenues of approach in great depth to prevent a deep penetration. The defense will be reinforced by withdrawing forces from areas forward of the basic area.

Inbetween the entrances Area Protection Forces are employed against surprising penetrations and air assault operations.

Within the basic areas mechanized and airmobile Army reserves are ready to be employed as reinforcement of vital areas or counterattack forces against larger airborne operations. The coordination and continuation of the Overall Defense will be conducted out of the basic area enabled by the military defense actions.

(6) Employment of Air Force

The mission has to be according to the operational goal of the Area Defense System.

This is

- Air surveillance and interception
- Air defense
- Close Air Support
- Reconnaissance, Transport, and Liaison.



The achievement of these missions is based on

- a) maintainance of combat strength by
  - dislocation of units to prepared fieldbases in time
  - protecting measures to minimize the effect of an enemy's attack
  - frequent change of positions and bases of operation
- b) maintainance of a small infrastructural bases in case of external air assistance.

#### (7) Employment of Communication Systems

The communication system in the Area Defense as well as in the Overall Defense is based on independent territorial nets within the entire state territory.

Connecting points to other State Nets and Control Centers are located in the Basic Area and secured by security forces.

Mobile signal units for the purpose of communication to mechanized units, HQ's of key zones and protected areas etc. are integrated into the territorial net. FM and AM communication generally overlaps wire communications. The utilization of other nets are coordinated by the Overall Defense.

#### (8) Logistic

The preplanned use of the civil logistical infrastructure by the Army is one important element in the Overall Defense System. The decentralization of many supply points, independent from central CSS operations, enables the Army to fight even out of already bypassed regions. The preparation of the supply points can be done in peacetime already according to unchangeable conditions based on terrain analysis within the Area Defense and Command and Control.

#### (9) Final Remarks

The Area Defense Concept is a plan which will enable even a technically inferior army to fight against any enemy with a great chance to survive and to fulfill it's mission within the goal of a neutral country. The Concept is based on territorial units (Landwehr), as backbone of the Austrian Cadre-Militia Army. To make the Concept reliable and effective the employment of at least 300,000 trained, equipped, and designated reservists are necessary according to the character and the demand of the terrain. This means to double the current mobilization strength. To do so is a political decision. The military side of the house established the organizational base for it and the operational concept for it's employment. The Army trains, equippes, and plans toward a step after step realization of the overall strategical goal of dissuasion.

## H. CIVIL DEFENSE

The Austrian Civil Defense as another element within the Overall Defense Concept has to provide sufficient protection of the civil population and vital institutions of the state necessary to maintain the function of the government.

It is subordinated to the Department of Internal Affairs, therefore it is outside military responsibility. To describe the situation of the Civil Defense System would be beyond the frame of this paper.

But the Civil Defense is most important to enable Austria to play her role as a neutral country even in case of an armed confrontation in Central Europe.

Beside of the priority of political decisions in emergency, the protection of the population is the supposition for the willpower of a population to fight either as a regular soldier or as an other member of the threatened society.

The Civil Defense in Austria is not developed sufficiently yet. The obligation to build shelters in public buildings for example is no federal law yet. If one is built (a few are) it is done voluntarily. Some provincial governments although amended laws to obligate public builders and private one as well to spend a certain percentage of the costs of the building for the construction of a shelter. The government supports those efforts with certain tax benefits.

This provincial initiatives will force the federal government to take centralised measures soon.

Concurrently less than about 30 % of the population would be protected. (Including protection rooms without filtersystems)

Fortified command shelters for regional governments and coordinating and command boards of the ODS are mostly prepared and finished.

A very well trained and effective Red Cross Organization, an excellent professional and volunteer Fire Guard, and other civil organizations among the entire country would beef up the Federal League for Civil Defense which is the framework of the Civil Defense Organization in peacetime.

However, the basis for further development exists.

## I. FINAL REMARKS

Although the single chapters finish with summarizing overviews, final remarks about the overall picture of Austria's Security Concept seems to be necessary in order to avoid wrong impressions.

The defense effort of Austria is not satisfactory yet. However, since early 1970, the logistic basis to establish a well balanced concept of dissuasion is developing. The military is aware of the priority of policy within the decisionmaking process of a nation. Nevertheless, it is the armed forces limited power which gives insufficient background for a reliable concept beside of the fact that the civilian population has almost no protection in case of a war.

This is the reason why open discussions about Austria's Defense Concept are still going on.

While the concept in theory becomes more and more adjusted to a realistic and effective system for a small country such as Austria, the political realization is still behind.

The following demands have to be pointed out and need solutions:

- utilisation of the entire reserve available for the militia
- introduction of middle and long range ground guided missile systems to reinforce the antitank warfare
- reinforcement of air force and AD to accomplish observation and interception within Austria's airspace
- protection of vital institutions and population by establishing an effective Civil Defense Organisation
- sufficient provisions for stockpiling of raw material, energy and food
- further decentralization of supply.

What effort would be sufficient to achieve Austria's goals in case of a conflict in Europe nobody can tell.

However, Armed Forces are the one most aware of a possible threat therefore they probably always demand more as they can get. To find a well balanced solution inbetween security need and other demands of the population again must be within the responsibility of the politicians. The democratic discussion about is healthy and should continue.

## II. SWITZERLAND

### A. CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AREA

#### (1) Geography <sup>38)</sup> (See also page 60 a thru 60 e)

The length of Switzerland from east to west is about 240 km and from north to south (Basle - Tessin) approximately 220 km. Switzerland is divided into three main areas (Figure 4):

- The Alps which cover the central and southern part, approximately 60 % of the total area.
- The Lowlands (the "Midlands") which cover about 30 % of the area.
- The Jura located in the northern and western part of the country, which cover approximately 10 % of the area.




Figure 4 Main Areas of Switzerland

The Alps. While the Swiss Alps possess some 18 summits with more than 4,000 m (about 12,000 feet) of altitude (highest point 4,634 m, Dufourspitze), the mean altitude is about 1,700 m. The mountain region is characterized by the longitudinal valley of the Rhone River (south-western part of the country and the Rhine River (eastern part of the country),

<sup>38)</sup> "Switzerland"; Kümmerly+Frej, Geographical Publishers, Berne - Edition 1977, 8th year

forming an east-west axis through the Alps and by the valley of the Reuss and Ticino River, creating a north-south axis. The pivot of these four valleys is formed by the massif of St. Gothard. The main communications across the Alps, open for traffic during the whole year, are (Figure 5) :

- from north to south:

San Bernadino Road tunnel (length 6,6 km) (A)

St. Gothard pass road (length 27 km) (B)  
(an additional road tunnel with four lanes through the St. Gothard will be available in the early 80)

Lötschberg - Simplon railroad tunnel (length 14,6 + 19,8 km)(C)

Great St. Bernard road tunnel (length 5,8 km) (D)

- from east to west:

Oberalp pass railroad (E)

(in a few years, the Furka railroad tunnel will be completed) (F)



Figure 5 Main Communications through the Alps

The military importance of the alpine area is substantiated by its natural obstacle value and by the existence of the north-south transportation network which has a strategic importance for Central Europe.

The Jura. In contrast to the Alps, the Jura consists of medium ranges of mountains and hills with a mean altitude of about 750 m (highest summit 1,679, Mont Tendre). Parallel chains of mountains with transverse gorges ("bottle necks") make up the southern and central part, flattening off in the northwest into rolling plateaus. The northern Jura is characterized by chains of huge table mountains.

Roads and railroads in this region run east-west as well as north-south, but, being affected by the nature of the terrain, are often forced to change direction and to wind through narrow gorges.

The military value of the Jura is in its significance as a terrain barrier between the Swiss borderline and the Lowlands.

The Lowlands. Main terrain features of the Lowlands are low hills (often wooded) and numerous lakes and rivers. The mean altitude is slightly less than 600 m. This part contains the most important agglomerations, economic centers and traffic networks of the country. (Figure 6 and 7)




Figure 6 Density of Population (1970)

In addition to this, the Lowlands form the landbridge of the Middle European axis running from Austria through Western Germany into eastern and southern France. (See Figure 3)





Figure 7 Industry and Energy Economy

Consequently, the Lowlands are of utmost military importance for Switzerland. Comparable to the alpine region and the Jura, the Lowlands, which will become the most likely battlefield, represent the least natural obstacle value. However, the continuous extension of residential areas and economic centers restricts the cross-country mobility, and, therefore, increases the defense factor of this part of the country. In addition to this, a number of rivers, which run in a right angle to the Lowlands axis, provide some obstacles. (Figure 5 and 6)

THE ALPS  
\*\*\*\*\*







THE JURA  
\*\*\*\*\*



THE LOWLANDS  
\*\*\*\*\*





## B. CONCEPT OF THE GENERAL DEFENSE

### (1) Preliminary remarks

Based on the report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland, the Federal Parliament passed the so called "Concept of General Defense" in June 1973. This concept states the spiritual and moral principles on which Switzerland has decided to defend herself and outlines clearly the means and methods that have to be applied for reaching the security goals. The report was worked out on the background of Switzerland's system of federalism and her regime of direct democracy, especially with regard to her status of neutrality.

The "Concept of General Defense" begins with a short analysis of the general politico-military situation, followed by a description of the objectives of the security policy and analysis of the present and future threats Switzerland sees herself being faced with. The strategic goals and the definition of the main strategic tasks are derived from the comparison of the objectives with the threats. The concept then describes Switzerland's strategic means and the formulation of the concrete tasks assigned to the different general defense instruments. This is followed by an examination of the problems that may arise in implementing a general defense policy and how they can be solved within the limits of democratic legitimacy.

This defense concept is based on a number of existing governmental reports, messages and studies and draws heavily from experiences gained from high level military and national defense exercises. For a better understanding of the Swiss security policy, some of the most important aspects will be interpreted hereafter.

### (2) Guiding principles of the Swiss security policy

a. Objectives. Article 2 of the Federal Constitution prescribes the purpose of the Confederation as to preserve the country's independence, to maintain internal peace and order, to protect freedoms and rights of their citizens, and to further their general welfare. Thus the overall goal of the Swiss nation is to preserve peace in independence.

b. Threats. The strategic conduct of Switzerland's defense is the result of the confrontation of her security objectives with the threats to which they are exposed. A realistic evaluation shows that such threats are still possible and some of them already exist. The report throws the following menaces into relief:

- the existence of weapons of mass destruction;
- subversion and terrorism;
- the presence of huge, combatready traditional military means in Europe;
- psychological warfare.

This threats could arise at the following four levels of conflict:

- state of relative peace;
- indirect warfare;
- conventional war;
- war with the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

Futhermore, the possibility of blackmail has to be taken in mind at each level.

The different levels of conflict are defined as follows (para 31 of the Concept of General Defense):

" . The state of relative peace

Today, peace does not correspond to the ideals and conditions usually associated with it. The general situation is characterized by continous confrontations, also in those cases where there is no open employment of force.

The danger of a breach of international agreement is always present. The collective security system envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations has not been allowed to become effective, particularly because of the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the security council, who have veto rights. Today's state of relative peace is to a great extent due to the fact that the two superpowers neutralize each other. The balance of fear, maintained only by the mutual threat of annihilation, is not stable. It can be jeopardized by the excessive armaments efforts of one side, by technological breakthroughs as well as by irrational actions. It is for these reasons that many states are forced to remain in a kind of permanent state of mobilization.

Under the protection of this relative balance of forces, powers and groups of powers attempt to enlarge their spheres of influence through political, economical, propagandistic and psychological pressures. The one-sided control of raw material markets and the routes of transportation, as well as certain concentrations and structural changes within the economy, could have serious repercussions for us in case of a crisis.

. Indirect warfare

Conflicts are increasingly being waged by indirect means, with the goal of influencing, weakening and finally overcoming the opponent through political, psychological and terrorist means. The use of military force is foreseen - if at all - only within the framework of a guerilla war. This type of warfare takes advantage of the increasing vulnerability of the modern state with its numerous vital facilities, (such as power-utilities, communication, transportation and information facilities etc.). Those who resort to this kind of warfare, whether they act in the interest of a foreign power, a foreign ideology or out of anarchistic motives, take advantage of the frictions existing within a society, as well as of all forms of political and social malaise of certain population groups.

By attempting to break-up the existing liberal order through the paralysis of the public institutions, facilities and the democratic processes by way of defamation, intimidation and the employment of force, they hope to be able to realize their goals.

. Conventional war

In the so-called conventional war - whether it be a local or a general conflict - the traditional weapons, which are continuously perfected, are employed.

Even though the danger of an escalation to nuclear war has today an inhibiting effect upon the decision to start a conventional war, such wars are frequent. They cannot be excluded within the European context. Their effects would be disastrous.

. War with weapons of mass destruction

The employment of weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological and chemical weapons) in a conflict cannot be excluded as long as any power possesses these weapons. Fear of retaliation, as well as ethical and legal scruples inhibit their employment. However, in case of a conflict, there is always the danger that the escalation process could lead to their employment or that one side would want to use nuclear weapons in the hope of gaining a major advantage, however short-lived that may be. Also, a limited nuclear war, limited with regard to the quantity and calibre of weapons employed, would already have devastating effects.

. Blackmail

The possibility of blackmail exists at each level of conflict, taking advantage of the opponent's fear of the threatened actions. Blackmail is particularly effective in those cases where it cannot be countered with the traditional political and military means.

Blackmail acquires a particular dimension if it is exercised by nuclear powers. The authorities of the state against which the blackmail is directed could be put under intense public pressure and be forced to make decisions of such a magnitude as to be without historical parallel. Nuclear blackmail not only threatens the loss of many human lives and property, but also the destruction of the nation and its people under certain circumstances.

There is always the possibility that blackmail attempts are based upon mere bluff. By standing firm and by taking appropriate political measures, valuable time for effective counter-measures can be won, because the blackmailer will undoubtedly be confronted with international reactions and would also for other reasons most likely be willing to carry out his threat only gradually.

The four levels of conflict are characterized by those methods and means which would, at each level, be predominantly employed. During large confrontations, the parties to the conflict will try to combine these methods and means, acting simultaneously in a direct and indirect manner.

Not even the most powerful states have absolute freedom of action, finding their limits above all within the constraints of the international balance of forces and, in certain cases, through restraints of a political-psychological kind, which can manifest themselves through world public opinion as well as on the domestic scene."

c. Flexible Reaction. The capacity to institute and maintain a state of readiness appropriate to the particular situation or threat at the right time constitutes the major strategic problem of the responsible authorities. (It is beyond question that a continuous state of readiness to counter all possible threats can be upheld, especially for a small country like Switzerland). It is the prerogative of the Federal Council to carefully weigh the security policy objectives according to the level of the conflict at which a potential threat is perceived:

- In the state of relative peace and in the case of indirect attacks, the preservation of the freedom of action in the interior and the protection of human lives and property has priority.
- In the case of a conventional attack, Switzerland is above all interested in the preservation of her freedom of action towards the exterior, the protection of the population, and the defense of the national territory.
- In case of war, aimed at the destruction of the country, first priority is accorded to the survival of the nation.

It will be easier to react according to a specific situation if there is unanimity among all levels and organs within the state taking part in the safeguarding of the security policy goals. Therefore, the "Concept of General Defense" states the following six strategic cases, specifically relevant for Switzerland (para 412):

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| - NORMAL CASE                | means: State of relative peace                    |
| - CRISIS CASE                | " State of increased tension or serious disorders |
| - NEUTRALITY PROTECTION CASE | " Open conflicts in Europe                        |
| - DEFENSE CASE               | " Military operations against Switzerland         |
| - CATASTROPHE CASE           | " Events resulting in great damages               |
| - OCCUPATION CASE            | " Occupation of parts of the country              |

The various main strategic missions differ fundamentally with respect to the type of threat and the strategic cases. In para 42 of the "Concept", these strategic missions are illustrated as follows:



" . General defense in the state of relative peace

The general defense efforts during the state of relative peace raise primarily constitutional and political problems. In the case of serious danger brought about by ideological-psychological subversion, the undermining of the economic system, or even by open disturbances, appropriate counter measures must be planned. However, interventions by the authorities must be exclusively based on the constitution and on the existing legal order. The principle of proportionality is to be applied here with particular care.

Furthermore, the information of the Federal Chambers and of the public concerning the security policy consequences of certain political actions and social developments in order for them to be included in the opinion-making process, is one of the permanent tasks assumed by the Federal Council.

It is also important to take appropriate security measures and preparations for the different steps of a possible conflict escalation.

Our traditional neutrality is of great significance in times of relative peace, providing the basis for our good offices and for our active foreign policy. The neutrality and the basic principles of our security policy should be continuously explained abroad.

. The preservation of peace and crisis management

The increasing interdependence of all nations, the danger of the spreading of far-away conflicts to the own continent, but also humanitarian motives have caused small states to be more active than in the past in actions that help preserve peace as well as in the domain of crisis-management. Switzerland can make its contribution here through diplomatic means, through its good offices and through the support of all other measures which contribute to a decrease in tensions and to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes. Peace and conflict research activities constitute a part of these efforts.

As much as we would wish to concentrate our efforts on these activities, we must continue to face the realities. A small state can make only a small contribution here, taking into account the gravity of the task. A great danger for a small state consists in the dissipation of his forces. Therefore, our efforts may not be limited only to such activities.

. Keeping out of war through defense readiness (Dissuasion)

The main emphasis of our security policy and our strategic measures must be on dissuasion. Dissuasion is a strategic posture which should persuade a potential opponent not to initiate an armed conflict, by convincing him of the disproportion existing between the advantages gained from an attack on the country and the risks entailed.

The risks which a potential aggressor must be made to perceive consist in the loss of prestige, military forces, war-potential and time, as well as as running counter to his ideological, political and economic interests.

In the light of these threats, against the gravest of which not even the greatest material efforts can guarantee complete security, it is clear that the prevention of war enjoys the highest priority in the security concept of all states.

War can be prevented through deterrence, political measures and defense readiness.

Deterrence consists of the credible threat of retaliatory measures. This presupposes the capability and the will to destroy vital targets in the opponent's homeland after having absorbed a first strike. Such a strategic posture is beyond our capacity.

Examples of political measures are the attempt to influence the intentions of a potential aggressor in order to make clear to him the advantages of sparing our country and, in the case of an open conflict involving third powers, to bring about the recognition of our neutrality by all belligerents.

The readiness to defend our country includes the visible determination and material capacity to withstand an enemy attack, even if the most powerful means are employed not only against the army but also against the population. This readiness must have first priority. Our goal in continuously improving our defensive measures is the dissuasion of an attack against Switzerland.

We employ the term "dissuasion" for our efforts to prevent our involvement in a war through our defense measures and defense readiness.

Dissuasion is not uniquely a military task, but presupposes also a far-reaching capacity for endurance on the part of the population and the authorities. Naturally, those elements which a small country can employ in its favor do not weigh heavily, but they can affect the potential aggressor's calculations in such a way as to dissuade him from attacking.

A dissuasive effect can be attained only on the basis of strong efforts in the military and civilian spheres. Not to undertake these efforts would be tantamount to leaving Switzerland from the outset without protection from any incursion or attack. Our policy of neutrality would lack credibility already during a crisis. Insecurity, coupled with the feeling to be at the mercy of events, would have the gravest repercussions for the internal and external state of our national community.

Since the establishment of our federal state, Switzerland has renounced the use of force in backing its demands vis-à-vis other states. At the same time, no doubt has been left concerning Switzerland's determination and capability to defend herself. This basic posture is in accordance with our policy of dissuasion which, adapted to our means, constitutes the most credible element of our strategy.

#### . Conduct of war

If our strategy of dissuasion fails and our country becomes involved in an armed conflict or is directly attacked, the goal of our strategy is to ensure the survival of the population and nation through military means. It will not be a question of symbolic resistance, but of a strong and forceful defense. Each opponent must be prevented with all our means at our disposal from using our territory and our strategic routes and from submitting our people to his will. Active defense and damage-limiting measures, military striking power and the endurance capacity of the population have to complement each other here.

Type and strength of an attack can differ; we must therefore be prepared for local incursions, for a pure air war or for a combined air/ground war with or without the employment of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Our commander-in-chief will decide, on the basis of the instructions from the Federal Council, how to employ our military forces in the most optimal way in each of these situations.

Our defense will be aimed at yielding the least part of our territory, also in the case where the opponent is militarily far superior to us. If he succeeds in occupying big parts of our country, we have to exploit all possibilities to continue our resistance with the rest of the forces at our disposal in these areas which would provide the most advantages for a protracted resistance. This resistance is not only important as a manifestation of our will to defend ourselves and to assert our national legitimacy; it can also lead to success over the long term, as some examples prove.

. Damage-limitation and the securing of survival

Effective damage-limitation as well as the protection of the population have the same strategic significance as military operations. Situations could arise in which, given today's capabilities, part of the population or the whole population could be destroyed. In such cases, measures to secure the survival of the population would have priority.

. Resistance in occupied territory

The occupation of the country may not lead to an end of all resistance. In such a case, an opponent must not only be made to expect passive rejection but also active resistance. The certainty of this resistance is another important element of our strategy of dissuasion.

Armed resistance against the occupying power will be subject to the constraints imposed by international law concerning the participants and the conditions of the employment force. Such resistance cannot be organized in advance to the same extent as the military and civil defense. All opportunities to create favorable conditions for taking up active resistance should be taken advantage of at the earliest possible time.

Passive resistance also will have a positive influence on the morale of the population. Both types of resistance against an occupying power are elements of the Swiss strategy. Their objective, the liberation and restoration of our liberal and independent national community, is in accordance with our general strategic objective. Obviously, these two forms of resistance can never take the place of a high degree of military preparedness, because their dissuasive effect is too small and would become effective only after an occupation.

. Overlapping areas

It is possible that the different types of threats can occur simultaneously, leading to an overlapping of the strategic cases. Therefore, we must be in a position to resolve our strategic main missions under certain circumstances simultaneously as follows:

- Defensive measures during times of peace; measures aimed at the preservation of international peace and security and contributions to crisis-management; measures aimed at keeping our country out of a war;

- Conduct of military operations; damage-limiting measures and measures to ensure the survival of the population; resistance in occupied territory;
- Damage-limiting measures and measures to ensure the survival of the population; resistance in occupied territory.

It is not possible to withstand all the possible threats by means of a sole instrument of defense. This complex and difficult task can be mastered only through the employment of the whole array of means at our disposal."

d. The strategic Means.

In order to satisfy the main strategic conditions, Switzerland employs the following means:

Means:

Main Tasks:

- Diplomacy (foreign policy)

- . secures the existence of the state on the international law plane
- . represents the political principle of armed neutrality in the international relations
- . ensures the flow of goods from abroad
- . strengthens the general confidence in methods of peaceful conflict resolution through appropriate actions
- . is available for good offices and initiatives in order to help reduce tensions
- . prepares the ground for the participation in humanitarian actions
- . makes a contribution toward the achievement of the defense goals in case of war

- Civil Defense

- . makes all the necessary preparations for the protection, rescue and care of the civilian population
- . assures, together with the army, the war economy organization and further civilian services, the survival of the greatest possible part of the population after a direct or indirect attack with conventional, nuclear and chemical weapons

- Economy and Finances (Alimentation, Agriculture, Industry, Circulation, Energy, Financial Potential)

- . contribute to the credibility of the defense readiness through all-encompassing supply preparations for the army and the civilian population
- . supplement and shift the stocks at each opportunity

Means:

- Economy and  
Finances (Continu-  
ation)

- Information,  
Psychological  
Defense and State  
Security

Main Tasks:

- . make the necessary preparations to guarantee the arrival of imported goods
- . make preparations to help in solving technical problems under difficult circumstances and particularly during enemy action
- . assure even in times of peace the recruitment, information and training of its militia organs
- . work toward the goal of the maintenance of economic relations with the exterior and towards economic self-sufficiency in areas vital for survival and war efforts of the country during crisis or neutrality-protection case
- . employ in a crisis, a neutrality-protection case or in case of an attack the scarce economic means at all levels in such a way as to attain the best possible result with regard the endurance and survival of the people
- . make clear the will to defend the country and all measures to that effect at home as well as abroad
- . inform the population during a crisis, a neutrality-protection case or in case of an attack about those facts and measures which are important for survival
- . provide that the voice of the government is heard at home and abroad, that means that its intentions and actions become known and that the psychological warfare activities of enemy will be countered
- . take countermeasures against actions directed towards the country and conduct a balanced policy of control in the neutrality-protection case and in case of an attack

C. THE ROLE OF THE ARMY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF GENERAL DEFENSE

Para 541 of the "Concept" reads: "The Army is the most powerful element at the nation's disposal for the implementation of the strategy. It alone can effectively oppose an armed attack. It is intended to oppose any attack and to prevent an aggressor from attaining his objectives."

Based on this statement, the following principle tasks are assigned to the Army:

The Army makes its contribution to keep the country out of war by

- making it clear to each potential opponent in a credible way in times of peace, and particularly during a neutrality case, that in case of an attack against the country, the opponent must expect a high loss of personnel and material, destruction and other actions aimed at rendering unusable all those installations and infrastructural elements which could aid him, as well as very time-consuming operations
- making it clear to each potential opponent that he cannot achieve a "fait-accompli" with a surprise occupation of the country, because the Swiss people have the will and capacity to immediately take up a sustained defense
- dampening the hopes of any potential opponent to be able to reach his goals within a short time and with acceptable sacrifices

In case Switzerland is involved in a military conflict the Army will

- defend the territory starting at the border
- prevent the opponent from reaching his operational objectives
- preserve Swiss sovereignty over at least a part of her territory

Should the large units of the Army cease to exist as effective fighting formations, then, there will be recourse to guerilla-warfare in order to prevent the opponent from gaining complete control over the occupied territory and to prepare for the liberation

To the extent that its main mission allows, the Army helps the civilian authorities.

Referring to these tasks and corresponding with the strategic cases the Army has to make sure that

- in the normal case

equipment, training and defensive preparations are provided to such an extent that any potential opponent, in spite of material superiority, is convinced of being faced with significant problems in dealing with this Army

- in view of a crisis case

a thoroughly prepared system of mobilization permits to develop maximum readiness very quickly;

- in the neutrality protection case

enough forces are deployed and appropriate precautions are taken in order to protect the Swiss territory as well as the air space against violations;

- in case of military operations against the country

the forces are ready, starting at the border, to carry out an aggressive defense based upon well prepared operation plans and taking advantage of existing fortifications and destruction preparations in order to inflict the opponent the maximum losses of personnel and material and to maintain as great a part of the territorial integrity as possible;

- in the occupation case

the remaining elements continue to fight in terms of guerilla warfare by exploiting their knowledge of the country and based upon an appropriate training in peace-time;

- in the catastrophe case

special forces are available to assist the civil authorities and civilian population to mitigate damages.

The Army, being the most powerful among the different strategic means of Switzerland, there is no doubt, carries relatively the greatest dissuasive weight. Thus the preservation and increase of the military strength is of vital importance for Switzerland. The reinforcement of the Army's fighting capacity not only enhances its chances in case of a military confrontation, but will also have an impact on a potential opponent's calculations as to the costs entailed in an attack of the country; therefore, reducing the possibility of armed aggression.

However, all strategic elements have to be organized according to their tasks and have to be employed in a synchronized and coordinated way. (Figure 8). It is necessary to make optimal allocation of forces, taking into consideration the different aspects of the threat as well as the availability of means and training facilities.




Figure 8 The Elements of the Security Police and their Interdependency 39)

39) Abteilung für Adjutantur Dienststelle Heer und Haus; "Die Rolle der Armee im Rahmen der Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz"; table F 1



D. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

(1) The militia system and the training in the Army 40)

As it is known, the Swiss Army is based on a militia system which may be unique in the world, a system which has been in existence for centuries, and has become a part of the way of life of the Swiss citizen.

Every male Swiss citizen is liable for military service. Only physical or mental incapacity exempts the Swiss males from compulsory military service. On an average almost 80 % of the conscripts are declared fit for service, 10 % are able for complementary (auxiliary) service, and 10 % are unsuitable. As a result, the Army can rely on a rate of more than 30,000 recruits each year. During a day's recruitment the conscripts are assigned to whichever branch is considered most suitable, taking into account their wishes, their professional calling, and the needs of the Army. In their twentieth year, the conscripts are called to report for a four-months period of basic training school within their specific branch. Each recruit training school is normally composed of three to six companies from the same branch. Such a school is under the command of a professional officer (Colonel or LTC), while for one to two companies there is an instructing officer (Major or Captain) assisted by one to three professional technical NCO's. The company commanders, the company HQ, the platoon and squad leaders are all reservists completing their obligatory period of education in order to "earn their stripes". At the end of the basic training school the soldier is assigned to a unit according to his branch. Being equipped with his personal weapon, ammunition, uniform and other personal items (he takes this equipment at home and is responsible for maintaining it until his discharge from the Army at the age of fifty) he is asked for the following training and individual duties (expressed in days):

see page 74 ./

---

40) Denis Borel; "A look at the Swiss Army", translated digest of "Aperçu de l'armée suisse", 1971, in Revue Militaire Suisse, September 1972.

Army group	Age group	Soldiers and Corporals			Plt Leaders (Lt/First Lt)		
		Training courses within the unit	Individual equipment inspection	Individual marksmanship training	Training courses within the unit	Individual marksmanship training	Technical courses
ELITE (first-line troops)	20 to 32	■ 8 x 20 (23)	■ 14 x 1	■ 22 x 1	■ 12 x 24	■ 22 x 1	■ 2 x 13
LANDWEHR (supplementary reserve)	33 to 42	■ 3 x 13 (16)	■ 14 x 1	■ 22 x 1	■ 5 x 16	■ 22 x 1	■ 5 x 6
LANDSTURM (territorial reserve)	43 to 50  (for off to 55)	■ 1 x 13 (16)	■ 14 x 1	■ 22 x 1	■ 4 x 16	■ 22 x 1	■ 3 x 6

The figures in brackets refer to Corporals

To meet the requirements of the cadre positions of the Army, at the end of the recruit school, a soldier who has been judged suitable is selected for advancement. This candidate attends a one-month NCO school and is then promoted to corporal, but he will not have accomplished his education before having completed the entire recruit school as a squad leader. A Corporal can become a sergeant after attending several refresher courses.

A corporal who meets the desired standard is sent to the officer training school for four months. After the successful completion of this school, he is promoted to the rank of lieutenant. This is followed by a service as platoon leader in an additional basic training school of four months. After five years in grade, he will be promoted to first lieutenant. After two years as a first lieutenant, he is eligible for promotion to captain. To be promoted to captain, a first lieutenant must attend a three-week weapon school, a four-week central school and serve as a company commander in a recruit training cycle.

As a captain, he will command and administer a company. A selected captain who completes a four-month staff course is eligible for service with the general staff.

After eight years, a captain may be selected for promotion to major, and then, if he successfully completes special training, becomes a battalion commander. Subsequent promotions to lieutenant colonel after seven years as major and to colonel two years later depend upon individual ability and vacancies.

According to the above described military duties, a Swiss conscript has to spend the following days of service all together:

Military Service	Soldier	Corporal	Sec Lt	Captain	Major	Colonel
1st recruit school (as recruit)	118	118	118	118	118	118
NCO school	—	27	27	27	27	27
2d recruit school (as corporal)	—	118	118	118	118	118
Officer school	—	—	118	118	118	118
3d recruit school (as platoon leader)	—	—	118	118	118	118
Weapon school	—	—	—	20	20	20
Central school I	—	—	—	27	27	27
4th recruit school (as company commander)	—	—	—	118	118	118
Shooting school	—	—	—	—	6	6
Central school II	—	—	—	—	27	27
5th recruit school (part) (as bn commander)	—	—	—	—	27	27
Shooting school	—	—	—	—	—	14
Central school III	—	—	—	—	—	27
Duties according to table on page	248	284	528	454*	454*	454*
<b>T o t a l</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>547</b>	<b>1'027</b>	<b>1'118</b>	<b>1'178</b>	<b>1'219</b>
* this means the minimum days to be spent by these ranks						

The training in schools takes place in and around barracks with intervals of duties on firing ranges and in the field, whereas the annual refresher courses are carried out in all parts of the country. Local authorities are obliged by law to provide billets for the troops and the Army has the right to use public and private land as training areas and shooting ranges.

By evaluating the Swiss militia system and the concept of training, some of the most significant advantages are noteworthy. First, the centuries-old tradition of compulsory military service and the execution of most of the military duties within the local sphere create an intimate alliance between people and Army to an extent unknown in other countries. Second, by the obligation to report to military duties at frequent intervals (refresher courses, equipment inspections, marksmanship training) and by many voluntary activities, the conscript remains fully conversant with military matters throughout a period of thirty years of his life. Third, thanks to the fact that the cadre has to rise from the ranks, each NCO and officer knows the sphere of his subordinates in terms of practical experiences. However, these advantages are opposed to the problem existing in the relative short duration of the schools and courses. The proceeding technology and the increasing sophistication of weapons and equipment seriously challenge cadre and organization in reaching the training objectives.

(2) The organization of the forces

a. General Organization. The defense forces comprise an overall strength of about 620,000 men and women (about 10 % of the total population), not including mobilization reserves. These forces are composed of the following branches of service: 41)

- . Infantry (more than 40 %)
- . Mechanized and Light Troops (about 10 %)
- . Artillery (slightly less than 10 %)
- . Air Forces and ADA Troops (slightly less than 10 %)
- . Engineer and Fortification Troops (more than 5 %)
- . Signal Troops (less than 5 %)
- . Medical Troops (more than 5 %)
- . Veterinary Troops (less than 1 %)
- . Supply, Maintenance and Transportation Troops (less than 10 %)
- . Passive Air Defense Troops (about 5 %)

41) Paul Huber, Peter Gasser, Ernst Wetter; "Sicherheitspolitik und Armee, Eine Dokumentation"; Bd. 1, Kap. Aufgaben und Organisation der Armee; Verlag Huber Frauenfeld, Auflage März 1977

Beside these branches of service there are duty branches like

- . Territorial Service
- . Ammunition Service
- . Military Police
- . Postal Service
- . Military Law
- . Religious Welfare
- . Spiritual Welfare
- . HQ Clerks
- . MC Protection Service

The difference between the branches of service and the duty branches is that the duty branches have no proper recruit schools; the members of these duty branches are converted from the different branches of service.

b. Arming and Equipment

The main arming and equipment encompasses: \*\*)

- . 350 Aircraft (Hunter, Mirage, and in the near future F5-E "TIGER")
- . 800 Tanks (Swiss tank 61/68, Centurion)
- . 1000 APC (M113)
- . 900 Arty Guns (105 mm cannon and howitzer T, 150 mm howitzer T, (not included 155 mm howitzer M109 SP) are several hundred guns of fortress arty)
- . Several thousand Mortars (81 mm and 120 mm)
- . 2000 AT Weapons (BANTAN BB65 missiles, 90 mm AT guns 50/57, (in the near AT gun 58 106 mm recoilless) future there will be several hundred DRAGONS available)
- . 2000 Heavy Machine Guns
- . 2000 ADA Weapons (20 mm and 35 mm twin cannon, BLOODHOUND 2 guided missiles)
- . 20,000 LAWs (83 mm rocket launcher)
- . Several million mines

\*\*) Ibid 41) ; page 123-124


The individual is equipped with the automatic assault rifle SIG type 57, 7,5 mm, which will also fire antitank rockets.

c. Organisation of the forces for the purposes of the deployment.

The forces are disposed as follows:

see page 79 ./

3 FIELD ARMY CORPS




each Field Army Corps comprises:

- 1 Mechanized Division
- 1 Field Division
- 1 Frontier Division
- 1 Territorial Unit (about div-size)
- x numbers of Frontier Brigades


Composition of a Division:

- 3 Inf/Mech Inf or Tank Regts
- 1 Recon Bn
- 1 - 2 Arty Regts
- 1 ADA Bn
- 1 Engr Bn
- 1 Signal Bn
- 1 Med Bn

1 MOUNTAIN ARMY CORPS



AVIATION and ADA TROOPS



the Mountain Army Corps comprises:

- 3 Mountain Divisions
- 1 Territorial Unit
- x numbers of Frontier Bdes
- x numbers of Fortress Bdes
- x numbers of Redoubt Bdes

the Aviation and ADA Troops consist of:

- 1 Air Force Brigade
- 1 Airfield Brigade
- 1 Anti-Aircraft Brigade

Remark:  
The personal strength of a Div is about 15,000.

**d. Leadership**

In peacetime, the Swiss Army does not have a commander-in-chief. Under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, the following heads take part in conducting the Army:

- Director of the Federal Military Administration (General Secretariat)
- Chief of the General Staff
- Chief of Education
- Chief of the Armaments and Technology Procurement Group
- Commanders of the 3 Field Army Corps and the Mountain Army Corps
- Commander of the Air and Anti-Aircraft Troops

To help him execute his duties, the Chief of the Federal Military Department has two organizations at his disposal: the Management Staff (Leitungsstab) and the Committee for National Military Defense (Kommission für militärische Landesverteidigung).

The "Leitungsstab" is primarily an advisory committee, but is also responsible for coordination on the department level. The Chief of General Staff, Chief of Education, Chief of Armaments and Technology Procurement Group and the Director of the Federal Military Administration, all belong to this organization.

The Commander of the Air and Anti-Aircraft Troops takes part when problems concerning his domain are considered. The "Kommission für militärische Landesverteidigung", and advisory committee as well, deals with questions of how to fashion general military matters. Members of this committee are: the Chief of General Staff, Chief of Education, Chief of Armaments and Technology Procurement Group, Commanders of the four Army Corps and the Commander of the Air and Anti-Aircraft Troops.

As soon as an extended component of the Army is called to active service, then, the Supreme Commander (General) is elected by the Federal Assembly. He commands the whole force and is directly responsible to the Federal Council.

Since 1815, the Swiss Army has been led by four Generals:

- General Dufour during the Civil War of 1847 (Sonderbundskrieg) and the Neuenburger Conflict in the winter of 1856/57 when Switzerland was threatened by Prussia;
- General Herzog during the German/French Wars of 1870/71;
- General Wille during the First World War 1914-18;
- General Guisan during the Second World War 1939-45.

**e. Peculiarities.**

Certain duties concerning the Army are not carried out by the conscripts, but by permanent civil servants. Major tasks accomplished by this civilian personnel are the maintenance and administration of the equipment in arsenals, the transportation means in car pools and the installations of the Air Force. The ratio of conscripts versus civilian employees is 31 : 1.



**E. THE READINESS AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY**

**(1) The Readiness**

Political and economic reasons apart, the militia system does not allow Switzerland to maintain a standing Army. With the exception of the crews of the reconnaissance air squadron who are professional pilots, it is purely a citizen Army. Being able to alert the forces in time in order to meet any threat is one of the key elements of the Swiss defense policy and, at the same time, a convincing factor of the strategy of dissuasion.

A thoroughly prepared mobilization system allows Switzerland to mobilize more than 600,000 conscripts within 2 to 4 days.

As mentioned before, the conscripts are called to military duties in frequent intervals and have a close association with their units which may extend over a period of more than 10 years. Owing to the fact that they maintain the major parts of their personal equipment at home, they have no problems to meet a mobilization call very quickly even in case of a surprise. The intimate alliance between people and Army allows the Army to take advantage of the civilian infrastructure for the purpose of the mobilization organization to a large extent. A modern logistical infrastructure including adequate initial reserves and a well prepared war economy form the backbone of the mobilizing forces. Detailed plannings and preparations of the mobilization organization as well as corresponding training on all levels of the Army, including public and civilian agencies, have brought this system to a high degree of perfection.

However, the mobilization of the whole strength of the Army may not always be the necessary solution in a particular situation. Therefore, the Army must also provide a system of tailored mobilization plans appropriate to different levels of threat. This principle of proportionality needs special care by the responsible heads of the Army, first, to give the civil authorities flexibility to react, and secondly, to gain as much preparation time as possible in view of a general mobilization of the forces.

The Army has to make every effort to assist the Federal Council in perceiving and evaluating feasible threats, and to propose adequate solutions. One element which contributes to this objective is the FLORIDA system. This semi-automatic air warning and directional system allows for early evaluation of the aerial situation within the range of the radar stations and a review of the position with regard to the appropriate air defense means available. In addition, FLORIDA helps to warn the civilian population. 42)

Finally, the question may arise whether Switzerland could be hampered in mobilising her forces in case of a surprise attack. This is unlikely, apart other factors, thanks to the well decentralized and ideally protected military infrastructure of which a large part is protected underground.

42) Edo Flieger- und Fliegerabwehrtruppen; "Swiss Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Troops"; May 1971

In addition, Switzerland's unique system of civil defense (which will be mentioned in more detail later) will contribute.

In summarising it can be said that the Swiss Army - although there are no standing forces - has the capability to institute and maintain a state of readiness appropriate to a particular situation or threat at the right time with adequate means. However, with the ever shortening warning time to be expected, constant efforts have to be taken to adjust the degree of preparedness according to altered assumptions.

## (2) The Deployment of the Forces

### a. Principles.

If all efforts of dissuasion should fail and Switzerland becomes involved in hostilities, then, the Army has to take over the main burden of ensuring the survival of the population and of the nation. In that event, three main possible enemy threats could be assumed:

- . In a war with a third power, foreign forces might try to cross Swiss territory. In this case, an attack is likely to take part in one main direction, only.
- . In the context of a campaign involving all of Europe, an aggressor might leave Switzerland first untouched and try to conquer the country at a later stage of the war, only. In such a case the Army will have to deal with concentric attacks, launched from different directions.
- . Finally, it seems conceivable that Switzerland, after a hostile power has accomplished the encirclement of the country, might constantly be threatened with the enduring uncertainty of an attack. This would mean that the Army will be faced with the problem of maintaining a permanent state of readiness and safeguarding the neutrality protection.

In the report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the concept of the military defense (June 6th, 1966), the following guidelines are formulated for the commitment of the Army:

"With reference to its mission and character, the Army maintains a defensive combat on the operational level aimed at the following goals: -

- 1) to canalize an attack and to wear out the enemy by means of staggered defense zones;
- 2) to separate the advance echelons of the enemy from his support bases. This will be achieved by the air force trying to screen the combat zone and by the ground forces endeavouring to cut off reinforcements and provisions through counterattacks, assaults and raids;
- 3) to destroy enemy forces which have penetrated into the defense zone or been air-landed by counterattacking them with mechanized forces supported by the air force."

Our ability to carry out what is demanded in the first goal is ensured by the numerical strength of the Army with more than 600,000\* trained conscripts and the advantages of knowing the terrain. This is augmented by not less than 2,000 permanent devices for blowing up roads and communications, and by fortifications. The second goal requires active and determined fighting on the tactical level. This will be accomplished by infantry units in cooperation with armor forces with the objective of forcing the enemy, in so far as possible, to fight an infantry battle or of attacking him where terrain and visibility will provide the advantage of surprise. To successfully meet the third goal it is necessary to bring up armor forces at the critical place and time. This means that the positions of readiness for these formations are thoroughly planned and that they can dispose of air cover at the decisive moment. Based on these suppositions, the Swiss Army applies the tactic of "ABWEHR" (Repulsion) to conduct the battle. The "Abwehr" is a battle-form consisting of defense and attack with the objective to dominate a given area. The question is to parry an attack and to destroy penetrated opposing forces. If this plan does not succeed, then, as a minimum, the enemy must be repulsed or be prevented from breaking out of the battle area (Abwehrraum). The "Abwehr" consists of three main elements: defensive positions, mobile forces and fire support (Figure 10). While infantry units fight from prepared strong points and blocking positions in order to stop and destroy enemy forces, mobile elements (mechanized units, and infantry units in favorable terrain) conduct ripostes and counterattacks. Fire support by artillery, air force and ADA gives the "Abwehr" the desired cohesion.

\* See Figure 9, page 84




Figure 9 Military Density in Europe / Number of soldiers (ground forces) per square kilometer ..)

Scheme of the Swiss tactical concept of "Abwehr" 43)




Figure 10.

43) Schweizerische Armee, "Truppenführung, (TF 69)"; R. gl. 51.20; Merkblatt 51.20/I, page 17

**b. Deployment**

How does the Swiss Army apply the tactical concept of the "Abwehr" on the operational level with respect to the terrain and the organization of the forces ? 44)

The three Field Army Corps are committed in the border zone, Lowlands, and partially Pre-Alps (Figure 11). Accordingly, the different units are located and tasked as follows:

- The Frontier Brigades are individually tailored for the battle in the border zone. As operational blocking forces they have to prevent a speedy breakthrough by the enemy in the direction of the Lowlands and to make it difficult for him to link up with possibly air-landed forces in the interior of the country. The Frontier Brigades take advantage of a well prepared permanent combat infrastructure consisting of fortresses, bunkers, shooting-positions, demolition devices, and obstacles as well as of stockpiled supplies. Compared with the previously described tactical concept they represent the static element of the corps within the border zone.
- The Frontier Divisions form the mobile element within the border zone, but they may also be committed elsewhere. However, their primary mission is to fight in concert with the Frontier Brigades against a penetrating enemy. This type of division allows the Corps Commander to concentrate forces on the most likely avenues of approach within the border zone.
- The Field Divisions fight in the operatively essential areas of the Lowlands. Their favored zones are those which would not attract the employment of enemy nuclear weapons and restrict the mobility of the enemy's advance. The outfit of these divisions with two tank battalions allows the Division Commanders to fight, at least partially, a mechanized battle. The Field Divisions unite both the static and the mobile element what permit them to conduct the "Abwehr" to a certain extent by their own.
- The Mechanized Divisions, comprising 2 Mech Regts and 1 Mot Inf Regt, are used to defeat enemy forces which penetrated or are air-landed into the combat zones of the Frontier and Field Divisions. The actions of these mechanized units are best employed against enemy forces being held in place by the Frontier or Field Divisions. Usually, a Mechanized Division will not be committed as a whole, but divided into combined arms groups deployed over the corps area or attached to Field and Frontier Divisions.

44) Schweizerischer Bundesrat, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der militärischen Landesverteidigung (vom 6. Juni 1966)"

The composition of the Field Army Corps provides all ground forces necessary to apply the "Abwehr" in its proper sense and to accomplish what is anticipated in the guidelines of the concept of the military defense.




Figure 11 Combat Zone of the three Field Army Corps and the Mountain Army Corps 45)

The Mountain Army Corps is committed in the Alps and in the southern and southeastern portion of the border zone (Figure 11).

- The Frontier Brigades of this Corps perform the same function as the Frontier Brigades in the Field Army Corps.

- The Fortress and Redoubt Brigades are operational blocking units. They demarcate the most important areas which pass through the mountain area and provide the prerequisites for the timely employment of the Mountain Divisions. For their battle, they utilize an extended system of permanent defensive installations.

- The Mountain Divisions are the mobile forces of the Mountain Army Corps. The expanse of the alpine region and its subdivision into compartments induce these divisions to fight an independent battle. The character of the terrain requires special training and equipment for the mountain units.

The composition of the Mountain Army Corps, with a total of 17 separate Brigades and 3 Divisions, allows it to apply the principle of the "Abwehr" based primarily on a infantry battle.

45) DS-Serie "Bürger und Soldat - Volk und Armee", Nr. 3; "Deppelstab"; Sonderausgabe März 1976

The Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Troops fulfill, within the framework of the overall defense concept, the following tasks: 46)

- . Warning of the population and the Army in case of air threats
- . Protection of the neutrality in the air
- . Defense of the Swiss air space
- . Maintaining of the air supremacy in the event of an attack
- . Harassment of enemy forces
- . Conducting air reconnaissance
- . Providing close air support for the ground forces.

These forces perform their missions based upon a unique underground disposition and a modern early warning and directional system (FLORIDA). While air attacks within a range of 3,000 m are parried by ADA guns, the air force and the BLOODHOUND missiles protect the air space beyond this range. However, the main mission of the air force remains the fighting of ground targets.

For the ultimate in quick reaction, the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Troops are the most powerful means that the Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army has at his disposal. It allows him to apply the concept of the "Abwehr" on the army level by using the Army Corps and the Anti-Aircraft units as combined static/mobile instruments and the Air Force as the fully mobile component.

The mission of the Territorial Service is twofold. On one hand, it supports the Army in terms of combat service support, medical and transportation service, requisitioning of needed items, administration of PW camps, and in different other ways. On the other hand, it provides assistance to civil authorities and the populace by passive air defense units, medical and transportation service, administration of refugee camps, and other kind of support.

The Territorial Zones (units) represent the connecting link between the Army and the civil authorities and population. To support the Army with everything it needs for living and fighting, the tailored combat service support units of the Territorial Zones utilize a well developed infrastructure spread throughout the country. Based on this infrastructure a dense net of supply points is deployed. In no case will units have to go more than 20 km in order to be supplied by a supply point.

#### c. The protection of the neutrality

During the course of belligerencies in the neighborhood, Swiss territory may be violated inadvertently, but it is also conceivable that a potential opponent may intentionally conduct these actions to test the will of Switzerland to defend her neutrality.

---

46) Ernst Wetter, Fernand Rausser, "Flieger und Flab im Einsatz";  
Das Buch der schweizerischen Luftverteidigung; Walter-Verlag AG,  
Olten



Initially, Switzerland will attempt, through political measures and the execution of a reinforced frontier-guard service, to clearly indicate that she is determined to really protect her neutrality. Should these means fail, army units in adequate strength, will settle violations on the ground while the air force and anti-aircraft troops will counter infringements in the air. This visible determination and readiness is the final attempt to dissuade a potential opponent from attacking the country. However, the employment of those forces must not lead to an untimely attrition of units which will be essential for the real defense of the country.

Note: Switzerland has successfully accomplished the mission of protecting her neutrality for more than 150 years. As an example, during WWII the Army had to deal with more than 6,000 violations of the air space and about 77,000 foreign soldiers had to be interned. 47)

d. Summarizing remarks

When we look at all these missions and functions to be performed, the Swiss Army is confronted with some problems.

- . First, a small country like Switzerland does not have the unlimited sources and physical capabilities to do everything that would be desirable.
- . Second, a democratic and federalist system demands a very thorough dealing and treatment of military matters in order to get the support and agreement by the populace, the members of the parliaments, and the authorities, as the Americans well understand.
- . Third, the pure militia system asks for essential sacrifices by the whole population, but, especially, by the members of the cadre of the Army who have to spend a good deal of their freetime to ensure organization, training and readiness of the units as well as goodwill for the Army.
- . Fourth, being aware of the fact that the Army will have to fight in her own country and most likely in that portion of Switzerland which comprises the majority of the population, the people must be persuaded that they will not be exposed unprotected to war effects.

Many of these problems are counterbalanced by the fact that the Swiss military system is anchored and sustained by the people, and particularly by the well developed civil defense which causes the vast majority of the population to be both, concerned and sympathetic toward the needs of the Army.

47) General H. Guisan; "Bericht an die Bundesversammlung über den Aktivdienst 1939-1945"; Bd I.

AD-A065 621


ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS  
AUSTRIA'S AND SWITZERLAND'S SECURITY CONCEPT.(U)  
MAY 78 A H RADAUER, H A SCHLUP

F/G 15/3

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 of 2  
AD  
A065621



END  
DATE  
FILMED  
5-79  
DDC

## F. THE CIVIL DEFENSE

### (1) Guiding Principles

In article 551 of the "Concept of General Defense" it is stated:

" The strategic importance of a well planned and organized civil defense lies in the assurance of the survival of the population against threats associated with modern warfare. The physical endurance as well as the morale of the civilian population will be considerably strengthened if the protection, rescue and care of the civilian population is just as carefully and comprehensively planned as the conduct of military operations and the functioning of the war economy organization. By being able to extend civil defense protection to a big part of the population we can prevent massive flights of refugees, panic, and therefore increase the effectiveness of the other defense measures.

Civil defense makes an important contribution to dissuasion by increasing the chances for survival and therefore strengthening the capacity to endure. It constitutes the only effective measure for the protection of the civilian population against the effects of attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The higher the degree of protection of the civilian population, the better the government will be able to resist attempts at blackmail."

These principles, together with the two laws of the Civil Defense of 1962/63 and the "Civil Defense Concept" of 1971, constitute the skeleton for Switzerland's civil defense.


### (2) Responsibility and Organization

With respect to the federalist system of Switzerland, the three levels of the public affairs, the Federal Government, the Cantons, and the Communities share the responsibility for the civil defense. While the Federal Council exercises superintendence over the civil defense matters, the Cantons watch over the execution of the laws and regulations, and the disposition of the means. The Communities carry the main responsibility for the realization of the civil defense measures.

According to the above mentioned civil defense laws, the communities have to provide a civil defense organization. The structure of such an organization looks as follows:

see page 91 ./

Structure of Civil Defense Organizations48)



48) Bundesamt für Zivilschutz, "Zivilschutz Konzeption 1971", Seite 7

**(3) Constructions and Equipment**

Usually, the structural and material measures of a community comprise

- . Command Post (a)
- . Public Shelter Installations
- . Protected Medical Aid Stations and Hospitals
- . Fire Fighting Equipment
- . Pioneer Equipment
- . Communication Facilities
- . Warning Systems
- . Life Saving Equipment (e.i. protection masks)
- . Emergency Food

When new houses are constructed or existing houses are significantly reconstructed and these buildings include cellar installations, the private owners are obliged to provide shelters. The additional expenses resulting from this obligation are partially compensated by the authorities.

**(4) Liability to Civil Defense Service and Education**

All male Swiss citizens who are not liable to military service are obliged to spend civil defense service from the age of 20 to the age of 60. The conscripts, having completed their compulsory military service by age (50 or 55 for officers) belong another 10 or 5 years respectively to the civil defense organization. Female citizens (over 16 years old) are called up to volunteer for the civil defense.

Civil defense service consists of basic training courses to a period of 5 days, special courses for chiefs and specialists to a period of 12 days, and annual refresher courses of 1 to 2 days.

**(5) Stage of Development 48) 49)**

At the end of 1974, Switzerland's civil defense organization had reached the following stage of development:

**- Shelter Places**

- . 2,9 million shelter places with ventilation devices and a degree of protection of up to 3 atmospheres overpressure.
- . 1,8 million shelters without ventilation devices. These figures correspond to a rate of about 70 % of the whole population (6,5 mil) (Figure 12). It can be assumed that an additional rate of 300,000 sheltered places will be available each year.

---

Ibid 48

49) Paul Beurer, Peter Gasser, Ernst Wetter; "Gesamtverteidigung und Armee, Eine Dokumentation", Bd. 1, chapter "Zivilschutz"; Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld

Percentage of population




Figure 12 Evolution of the Shelter Place Capacity

- Installations

- . More than 700 Command Posts
- . About 350 Assembly Rooms for operational detachments
- . More than 800 Medical Aid Stations and Hospitals
- . More than 65,000 Patient Places

- Number of local Civil Defense Organizations (as of the end of 1975)  
Number of communities




Figure 13 Evolution of the local Civil Defense Organisations

- Personnel Strength

. 420,000 people (including 23,000 females)

- Expenses




Figure 14 Annual Expenses for the Swiss Civil Defense



(6) Summarizing Remarks

Aside from Sweden, Switzerland has the most remarkable civil defense organization and installations in the world. It will meet the challenges of a feasible future war which will most likely expose the civilian population to war effects to a much larger extent than the Army. (Figure 15) In the interest of economy, the units of the Army use the local civil defense installations for the performance of their refresher courses during peacetime.




Figure 15 Relations of Casualties between Soldiers and Civilians

#### 4. FINAL STATEMENTS

The evidence of the strategical importance of Austria and Switzerland is given by their geographical location. The Alps, including the nodal points of the north/south lines of communication and representing a natural line of cultural separation, played their role throughout the history and will keep their importance in the future. Therefore, it is beyond question why the European Powers in the past and the World Powers of today always have been and will be mostly interested in the security of this area. In addition to the separating feature of the Alps between Central and Southern Europe, the area of the Danube Valley and the Vienna Basin represent a most significant linking center inbetween Germanic and Slavonic Culture which even now-a-days plays an important role in the interaction of the European Peoples.

The best way to keep these areas out of the influence of one single power system, is to have them under neutral control and, if necessary, defended by means of arms through Austria and Switzerland. With the voluntary responsibility incurred by these two countries to achieve these common goals - and not only their national objectives - they obviously contribute to the overall security of Europe.

As it has been exposed in the previous chapters, Austria and Switzerland fulfill their security missions, each country individually by applying her means of neutral policy in full sovereignty, independence, and international responsibility. But, it also has to be pointed out that the resources and capabilities of small, self-reliant nations like Austria and Switzerland are not unlimited. For that reason, the efforts of these two countries made to remain reliable with their security concepts has to be recognized. According to their political status, the linking aspect of their location, and the variety of mutual interests the desire for close relationship is obvious.

Appendix

TABLE OF REFERENCES connected with A U S T R I A

Remark: The following table of references contains general background readings which are not necessarily mentioned in footnotes but support the authors opinion about the presented topic.

- AEBI, Alfred; "Sicherheitspolitik und Landesverteidigung in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich" Oesterreichische Militärzeitschrift Heft 4 1977
- BAYER, Richard Dr.; "Die Entwicklung der Oesterreichischen Umfassenden Landesverteidigung" Verlag Oesterr. Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Landesverteidigung, 1073 WIEN
- BMFLV, "Unser Staat im Scheinwerfer" Eigenverlag Heft 2, Zahl 316.568-BuK/66
- BMFLV, "Zum 25. Jahrestag der Wiedererrichtung der Republik Oesterreich" Druck Urania V.J. Ferd. Zsonay GmbH. 1970
- BMFLV, "Wehrgesetz" Zahl 3000 Präs-B/1974, Eigenverlag
- ERMACORA, Felix; "Oesterreichs Staatsvertrag und Neutralität" Frankfurt-Wien, 2. Auflage 1976
- FUJIMAKI, Shinpei; "The View on National Defense on the Austrians" BOEI ANTENNA, compiled by the Austrian Defense Agency no 195, Oct 1976
- GALE Research Company; "Countries of the World and their Leaders" 3rd edition 1974, Book Tower, Detroit 48226
- HANS, Josef; Director of the league of Civil Defense "Umfassende Landesverteidigung" Zivilschutz 7/8/1975
- HARPER & ROW; "Encyclopedia of the Modern World" 1st edition, 1970  
New York - Evanston - London; Library of Congress Catalog Card No 73-818779
- KOMAN, Peter; "What is the strategic role of the neutral Austria in Central Europe" USACGSC Student Paper March 1974
- KUNZEMANN, Werner Dr.; "Oesterreichs Neutralität" Druck Tyrolia INNSBRUCK
- LEHRGRUPPE ULV; "Oesterreich Schweiz Schweden, Gegenüberstellung sicherheitspolitischer Fakten" LVAK Arbeitsbehelf Heft No 6
- LEHRGRUPPE ULV; "Beiträge zur Österr. Sicherheitspolitik" LVAK Arbeitsbehelf Heft No 1
- MENDERSHAUSEN, Horst; "Territorial Defense in NATO' and NON-NATO Europe" Rand Corporation R-1184-ISA, Febr 1973
- NEUHOLD, Peter Dr.; "Rechtliche und politische Aspekte der dauernden Neutralität Oesterreichs" Oesterr. Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Landesverteidigung, 1073 Wien

Appendix

- PERNTHALER, Peter; "Umfassende Landesverteidigung" Springer Verlag ,  
Wien-NewYork 1970
- ROSEN M.H. & HEYMONT I.; "Review and Analysis of selected Foreign Reserve  
Systems" RAC (research analysis corporation) Sept 1972  
Mc Lean, Virginia 22101
- SCHULZ, Friedrich; "Entscheidung durch Verteidigung" Kampftruppen 6/1975
- SOCIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT; "Oesterreichische Sicherheit"  
Eigenverlag 1010 Wien No 41
- SOCIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT; "Die Reform des oesterr.  
Bundesheeres" Eigenverlag 1010 Wien No 3
- STAATSBUERGERLICHER UNTERRICHT, Handbuch; "Bereit für Oesterreich"  
Verlag Carl Ueberreither Wien-Heidelberg
- WEST of ENGLAND PRESS; Publishers Ltd.; "The Defense Forces of Austria"  
Army Quaterly and Defense Journal 1. West Street, Travistock  
England 1975

Additional Readings

in the following journals which contain articles related to the topic

- TRUPPENDIENST No 2 & 4 1977
- Oesterreichische MILITARZEITSCHRIFT No 4 & 6 1973
  - 1 & 4 1974
  - 3 & 5 1975
  - 1,2,4,6 1976
  - 3,4,5 1977
  - 1 1978
- INFORMATION FUR DIE TRUPPE No 3 1975
- WEHRKUNDE No 2 1971
  - 8 1975
- ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSSENPOLITIK No 3 1969
  - 5 1973
- INTERNATIONALE WEHRREVUE No 2 1977
- ARCHIV DER GEGENWART No 22nd June 1975

TABLE OF REFERENCES connected with S w i t z e r l a n d

- Abteilung für Adjutantur, Dienststelle Heer und Haus; Die Rolle der Armee im Rahmen der Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz. (Juli 1975)
- Beurer, Paul; Gasser, Peter und Wetter, Ernst; Sicherheitspolitik und Armee, Eine Dokumentation. (Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld, 1976, 2. Auflage März 1977)
- Borel, Denis; A Look at the Swiss Army. (Translated digest of "Aperçu de l'armée suisse" - D. Borel - 1971 - in "Revue Militaire Suisse" - September 1972, September 1973)
- Bundesamt für Zivilschutz; Zivilschutz Konzeption 1971.
- Doppelstab; DS-Serie "Bürger und Soldat - Volk und Armee", Nr. 3 (Sonderausgabe März 1976)
- Guisan, Henry; Bericht an die Bundesversammlung über den Aktivdienst 1939 - 1945, Bd. I. (Bundesarchiv)
- Kümmerly+Frey; Geographical Publishers, Berne, Switzerland 1977. (Edition 1977, 8th year)
- Kurz, H.R.; History of the Swiss Army
- Schweizerische Armee; Truppenführung (TF 69). (Regl. 51.20, gültig ab 10. April 1969)
- Schweizerischer Bundesrat; Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (Konzeption der Gesamtverteidigung) (vom 27. Juni 1973) (English translation by Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung, 3003 Berne, August 1976)
- Schweizerischer Bundesrat; Bericht des Bundesrates über die Konzeption der militärischen Landesverteidigung. (Vom 6. Juni 1966)
- Swiss Air Force And Anti-Aircraft Command; Swiss Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Troops. (May 1971)
- Wetter, Ernst und Rausser, Fernand; "Flieger und Flab im Einsatz, Das Buch der schweizerischen Landesverteidigung". (Walter-Verlag AG Olten, 1967)

# I. Verankerung der ULV in der Bundesverfassung

## Wortlaut des neuen Artikels 9a

Der Nationalrat hat beschlossen:

### Artikel I

Das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz in der Fassung von 1929 wird wie folgt geändert:

1. Nach Art. 9 wird folgender Art. 9a eingefügt:

„Art. 9a (1) Österreich bekennt sich zur umfassenden Landesverteidigung. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die Unabhängigkeit nach außen sowie die Unverletzlichkeit und Einheit des Bundesgebietes zu bewahren, insbesondere zur Aufrechterhaltung und Verteidigung der immerwährenden Neutralität. Hierbei sind auch die verfassungsmäßigen Einrichtungen und ihre Handlungsfähigkeit sowie die demokratischen Freiheiten der Einwohner vor gewaltsamen Angriffen von außen zu schützen und zu verteidigen.

(2) Zur umfassenden Landesverteidigung gehören die militärische, die geistige, die zivile und die wirtschaftliche Landesverteidigung.

(3) Jeder männliche österreichische Staatsbürger ist wehrpflichtig. Wer aus Gewissensgründen die Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht verweigert und hievon befreit wird, hat einen Ersatzdienst zu leisten. Das Nähere bestimmen die Gesetze

2. Art. 79 Abs. 1 bis 3 haben zu lauten:

„(1) Dem Bundesheer obliegt die militärische Landesverteidigung.

(2) Das Bundesheer ist, soweit die gesetzmäßige zivile Gewalt seine Mitwirkung in Anspruch nimmt, ferner bestimmt

1. auch über den Bereich der militärischen Landesverteidigung hinaus

a) zum Schutz der verfassungsmäßigen Einrichtungen und ihrer Handlungsfähigkeit sowie der demokratischen Freiheiten der Einwohner

b) zur Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung und Sicherheit im Inneren überhaupt;

2. zur Hilfeleistung bei Elementarereignissen und Unglücksfällen außergewöhnlichen Umfangs.

(3) Weitere Aufgaben des Bundesheeres werden durch Bundesverfassungsgesetz geregelt.“

3. Die bisherigen Abs. 3 und 4 des Art. 79 erhalten die Absatzbezeichnungen 4 und 5.

### Artikel II

Mit der Vollziehung dieses Bundesverfassungsgesetzes ist die Bundesregierung betraut



## II. Entschliebung zur ULV (Verteidigungsdoktrin)

Ausgehend vom Bekenntnis zur umfassenden Landesverteidigung, wie es im Gesetzesbeschluß des Nationalrates vom heutigen Tage betreffend ein Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz in der Fassung von 1929 durch die Einfügung von Bestimmungen über die umfassende Landesverteidigung geändert wird, zum Ausdruck kommt, ersucht der Nationalrat die Bundesregierung im Rahmen ihres Aufgabenbereiches dafür vorzusorgen, daß die umfassende Landesverteidigung der Republik Österreich nach folgenden Grundsätzen gestaltet wird:

1. Zur Verwirklichung der umfassenden Landesverteidigung leistet das österreichische Volk unter Bedachtnahme auf seine Möglichkeiten den erforderlichen Beitrag. Darunter sind neben der Erfüllung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht und der Zuverfügungstellung entsprechender finanzieller Mittel des Staates insbesondere zivile Schutzvorkehrungen und wirtschaftliche Bereitschaftsmaßnahmen zu verstehen. Zu diesem Zweck ist das österreichische Volk über Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und

Ziele der umfassenden Landesverteidigung ausreichend zu informieren.

2. Dem Bundesheer obliegt die militärische Landesverteidigung.

Das Bundesheer hat daher den Auftrag:

a) Im Falle einer internationalen Spannung oder eines Konfliktes mit der Gefahr einer Ausweitung auf Österreich jedem Versuch einer solchen Ausweitung zu begegnen, die Grenzen zu schützen und die Luft-hoheit zu wahren; hierzu sind je nach den Gegebenheiten aktive Verbände, Grenzschutzverbände und territoriale Sicherungskräfte im voraussichtlich gefährdeten Raum einzusetzen (Krisenfall).

b) Im Falle einer militärischen Auseinandersetzung in der Nachbarschaft durch den Einsatz der aktiven Verbände im bedrohten Gebiet und mobilgemachter Reserveverbände die Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität zu Lande und in der Luft zu ermöglichen; das

Eindringen fremder Truppen auf österreichisches Territorium ist zu verhindern, allenfalls übergetretene Teile dieser Truppen sind zu entwaffnen und zu internieren (Neutralitätsfall).

- c) Im Falle eines militärischen Angriffes auf Österreich den Abwehrkampf an der Grenze aufzunehmen, durch Mobilmachung die volle militärische Verteidigungsfähigkeit in kürzestmöglicher Zeit zu erzielen und allenfalls verlorengegangene Gebiete zurückzugewinnen (Verteidigungsfall).

Die Streitkräfte des Bundesheeres haben nach ihren Führungsgrundsätzen, ihrer Gliederung, Ausbildung, Ausrüstung und Versorgung dem defensiven Charakter ihrer Aufgabe Rechnung zu tragen. Sie sind so zu gliedern, daß auch im Frieden sofort einsatzfähige Verbände in angemessener Stärke verfügbar sind. Dazu gehören auch die erforderlichen Fliegerverbände sowie Einrichtungen für eine Luftraumüberwachung und ein technisches Luftaufklärungs- und Fliegerleitsystem, die den Aufgaben der Verteidigung und des Neutralitätsschutzes entsprechen; im Mobilmachungsfalle sind die Streitkräfte durch die Aufstellung von Verbänden des Reserveheeres auf die erforderliche Stärke zu bringen.

Im Frieden sind alle Maßnahmen vorzubereiten, die für eine unverzügliche und wirksame militärische Reaktion beim Eintritt eines der Bedrohungsfälle erforderlich sind. Zu diesem gehören insbesondere: die ständige Beobachtung der militärischen Lage, die rasche Mobilmachung von Reserveverbänden in personeller und materieller Hinsicht, eine auf Einsatzaufgaben ausgerichtete Ausbildung sowie Versorgungsvorkehrungen.

Unabhängig von diesen militärischen Aufgaben hat das Bundesheer auch die anderen Bereiche der umfassenden Landesverteidigung zu unterstützen.

3. Im Rahmen der geistigen Landesverteidigung soll das Verständnis der Bevölkerung für alle Bereiche der umfassenden Landesverteidigung ständig geweckt und verstärkt und gleichzeitig nach außen klar gestellt werden, daß das österreichische Volk bereit und in der Lage ist, auch unter Opfern und unter Aufbietung aller Kräfte seine demokratischen Freiheiten, die Verfassungs- und Rechtsordnung, die Unabhängigkeit und territoriale Unversehrtheit der Republik, die Einheit des Staatsgebietes sowie die Handlungsfreiheit unseres Landes zu schützen und zu verteidigen. Die Voraussetzung hierfür ist bereits in der Schule dadurch zu schaffen, daß die Ziele der umfassenden Landesverteidigung im Unterricht vermittelt werden.

4. Zum Schutz der Bevölkerung und zur Sicherung der Funktionsfähigkeit der staatlichen Einrichtungen ist im Rahmen der zivilen Landesverteidigung wie folgt vorzusorgen:

- a) Im Falle einer internationalen Spannung oder eines Konfliktes mit der Gefahr einer Ausweitung auf Österreich ist die Bereitschaft für das Wirksamwerden der für den Fall eines militärischen Angriffes auf Österreich und für den Fall einer militärischen Auseinandersetzung in der Nachbarschaft zu treffenden Maßnahmen zu erhöhen. (Krisenfall)
- b) Für den Fall einer militärischen Auseinandersetzung in der Nachbarschaft sind Maßnahmen zum Schutz gegen allfällige Auswirkungen dieser Kampfhandlungen auf österreichisches Gebiet zu ergreifen. Vor-

kehrungen für die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen und für die im Völkerrecht vorgesehene Behandlung der die Staatsgrenze überschreitenden Militärpersonen zu treffen und je nach der politischen und militärischen Lage das sofortige Wirksamwerden der für den Fall eines militärischen Angriffes auf Österreich zu treffenden Maßnahmen sicherzustellen (Neutralitätsfall).

- c) Für den Fall eines militärischen Angriffes auf Österreich sind die notwendigen Schutzvorkehrungen zu treffen, die der Bevölkerung unter Berücksichtigung der zu erwartenden Kriegseinwirkungen ein größtmögliches Maß an Sicherheit und Überlebenschancen gewährleisten; gleichzeitig sind die Funktionsfähigkeit der Gesetzgebung, der wichtigsten Organe der Vollziehung und sonstiger lebenswichtiger Einrichtungen sowie die Information der Bevölkerung sicherzustellen (Verteidigungsfall).

5. Im Rahmen der wirtschaftlichen Landesverteidigung sind zur Vermeidung von ökonomischen Störungen und zur Sicherung der Erhaltung der Leistungsfähigkeit der österreichischen Wirtschaft für Krisenfälle entsprechende Vorsorgen zu treffen.

Diese Aufgaben sind durch ein wirtschaftliches Krisenmanagement zu besorgen. Das Krisenmanagement hat sicherzustellen, daß im Falle des Eintrittes internationaler Spannungen sowie mittelbarer oder unmittelbarer Bedrohungen eine ausreichende Versorgung der gesamten österreichischen Bevölkerung mit lebensnotwendigen Gütern, die Bereitstellung der für die Verteidigung erforderlichen materiellen Mittel und die weitestgehende Sicherung der Arbeitsplätze gewährleistet sind.

Das wirtschaftliche Krisenmanagement hat alle erforderlichen Vorkehrungen zu treffen, damit es seinen Aufgaben gerecht werden kann. Insbesondere obliegen ihm:

Bevorratungs- und Produktionsprogrammierung, Aufbringungs-, Zuführungs- sowie Verteilungsvorsorgen, Bewahrung der Ernährungsbasis, Sicherstellung einer Energienotversorgung, Devisenbewirtschaftung, Maßnahmen zur Aufrechterhaltung der Außenhandelsverbindungen, Sicherung der für den Wirtschaftsablauf unumgänglich notwendigen Arbeitskräfte und Sicherung der Erhaltung der Arbeitsplätze mit dem Ziel weitgehender Erhaltung der Vollbeschäftigung, Flüchtlingsversorgung sowie Förderung der Haushaltsbevorratung.

Die Aufwendungen für eine Vorratshaltung sind entsprechend der Belastbarkeit der einzelnen Gruppen und Institutionen sowie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Leistungsfähigkeit des einzelnen gerecht aufzuteilen. Der Bund hat dazu einen der Bedeutung dieser Aufgabe angemessenen Beitrag zu leisten.

6. Die Bundesregierung hat in Zusammenarbeit mit den Organen der Länder und Gemeinden und mit allen nach ihrem Aufgabenbereich sonst in Betracht kommenden Einrichtungen vorbereitende Maßnahmen zur Verwirklichung der in dieser Entschließung dargelegten Ziele, insbesondere auch für den Fall zu treffen, daß Teile des Bundesgebietes vorübergehend oder längerfristig in den Besitz eines Angreifers fallen sollten.

7. Die vorstehend niedergelegten Zielsetzungen der umfassenden Landesverteidigung sowie Maßnahmen zu ihrer Verwirklichung sind im Landesverteidigungsplan zusammenzufassen, der vor Beschlußfassung im Landesverteidigungsrat zu beraten ist.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Austria and Switzerland's Security Concept		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final
7. AUTHOR(s) ITC Adolph Radauer, Austrian Army MAJ Hans Schlup, Swiss Army		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER N-82-14-1327 <i>see cover</i>
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Command and General Staff College Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) N/A
9. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Dept of Unified and Combined Operations ATZLSW-UC CGSC Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS N/A
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (If different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE May 1978
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 110
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Austria, Switzerland, Western Europe, Strategy and Planning, Central Europe.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The study examines the defense requirements of the states of Austria and Switzerland. An analysis of potential threats to the neutrality of each state focuses on hostile military efforts and how best to use the neutral country's social, economic, political and geographical characteristics to preserve the neutrality and sovereignty of each state. The authors proceed from the analysis of potential dangers to a discussion of the defense policy of each state. This discussion includes the structuring of forces as well as their possible deployment to preserve the integrity of the state. Both countries' militia policies		

*Over*



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

and personnel are discussed in detail. ↖

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)