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THE SHRINKING BATON. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP.(U)
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
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
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THE SHRINKING BATON: FUTURE CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP



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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

⑨ Military issues research
memos

⑥ THE SHRINKING BATON.
FUTURE CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP.

by

⑫ 44 p.

⑩

Anthony L. Wermuth

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
FOREWORD

This memorandum explores some future challenges to leadership in several contexts, military and other—great challenges rooted in shifting dynamics of war and changing social contexts. The function will still have to be performed, but perhaps followership will have to be analyzed more thoroughly in order for leadership to function. Some of these challenges will lessen the differences in status between leader and led, attributable to spreading education and political participation; others will introduce such factors as due process, diverging organizational goals, and changing concepts of work. Still other powerful forces include decline in acceptance of paternalism, and of the great man syndrome, the ambivalence of spreading manipulative techniques, and the decline of discipline in education and private life in general. Some of these are healthy trends for society; some are not; most make it difficult to achieve acceptance of leaders. One difficult yet healthy social trend is decreasing legitimacy of authoritarian methods, coupled with increasing democratization.

Perhaps the most difficult thing for a leader to do in the future will be for a bad leader to deceive anybody.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the authors' professional work or interests.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. ANTHONY L. WERMUTH joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. He holds masters' degrees from Columbia University in English and from George Washington University in international affairs and a doctorate from Boston University in political science. A West Point graduate, Dr. Wermuth's military assignments over 32 years in the Regular Army included brigade command; Assistant for Central Europe, (OASD, ISA); and Military Assistant (Public Affairs) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spent seven years on the West Point and US Army War College faculties. Following military retirement, he served for seven years as Director, Social Science Studies, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. He has contributed many articles on civil-military affairs to professional journals.

Armed forces leaders have always required two sets of virtues: one consists of skills and attitudes useful in battle, the other of skills and attitudes useful in coping with the larger social and technological environment. . . .

The history of military education has been a tug-of-war between two images: one conceives of the soldier as a fighting man, the other as a manager. The claims of the manager are now pressed vigorously. . . . Yet it is just as obvious that those other virtues are not obsolete. So the tug-of-war continues. . . .

The width of the gap should not be exaggerated since earnest efforts are made to bridge it from both sides, but it is never wholly closed.

- L. I. Radway, 1970*

*Lawrence I. Radway. "Recent Trends at American Service Academies." Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Ed. *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971, pp. 10-11.

And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

- William Butler Yeats

THE SHRINKING BATON: FUTURE CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP

The future is certainly uncertain in a multitude of ways. It appears, for instance, that most of us are going to spend most of our lives in organizations, but many changes in organizations are occurring within our sight, while others occur beyond our immediate awareness. Within organizations, the nature of leadership will doubtless evolve in several directions. What will constitute successful future leadership is not quite likely to prove capricious, but some aspects seem more unpredictable than they used to. Some leadership tenets will remain enduring, but we are not quite sure which ones.

Focused on the impacts brought about by change as it acts on the function of leadership, this discussion primarily addresses impacts upon internal institutional dynamics, and even more particularly, upon external dynamics. The institution addressed most of the time is the military, but many dynamics cited from that context are directly transferable to other American contexts of leadership. For, as with all other major institutions, the general modern environment impinges upon the military context far more weightily than it used to.

Leadership is, of course, an ageless challenge, the subject of reflection by ancient warriors and historians. In his study of different kinds of communities, Robert Nesbit found the military to be the oldest in human experience, saving only the community of kinship; it is

likely that no other social institution has devoted as much time and effort as the military to conscious study and practice of leadership. Every military library's catalog has several full card drawers identifying its extensive holdings on that subject. At its best, military leadership has produced numerous exemplars of humanitarian interaction, fierce protection of the common trooper, courage, competence, love, and sacrifice.

To be sure, the military context possesses certain uniquenesses, some in kind, some in degree. More than most social institutions, it is a closed system—some would say “close-minded system,” but that would not be accurate or fair. It is plagued by the need to maintain something of a split personality.

On the one hand, in constant readiness for commitment to war-fighting, it is constrained to maintain pervasive conformity in order to maximize its impact via coordinated, disciplined teamwork.

On the other hand, as technology breaks through idiosyncratically in one field of weaponry or another, in the unexpected here or the unpredictable there, in this year or the year after next, the nature of future warfare cannot be predicted; for any intelligent prediction becomes outdated as soon as issued.

Of course, nuclear exchange as one method of warfare has become imaginable but unusable. The superpowers co-star in a mirror ballet, each grimly reacting to the other, neither able to achieve demonstrable and undisputed ascendancy over the other. Yet, in groping for intimations about the course of nuclear war, we are not totally devoid of precedent, for what such precedent as exists may be worth. For we now have experienced a period of over 30 years, during which, despite crises and confrontation, no possessor of nuclear weapons has opened the frightful Pandora's box.

As for war that is less than nuclear, that Great Beast lurks everywhere, slouching on the edge of our expectations towards some unknown battlefields, invalidating yesterday's predictions today; and we cannot know when, or where, or under what conditions, or in what form or guise, he will appear.

Consequently, the military institution must cultivate conformity and, in other aspects, eschew conformity—that is, to keep its mind open to constant change, to pay careful heed to critics and innovators—not only technologists and political analysts, but also management theorists, organization specialists, and social scientists of various expertise.

Thus, as military leaders reach higher levels of their institution, they must resolve ever more demanding requirements for both conformity and innovation, for firm commitment to painstaking teambuilding yet also openness to change, for tough reiteration of tested systems yet also willingness to learn anew, to give alternatives a hearing.¹

Turning more firmly to the subject of leadership, we are reassured selectively; some of these insights are not new—many things we have known about leadership are confirmed over and over. On the other hand, as in other fields, leadership has been found by intensive modern scholarship to be not as simple a concept as it was once thought to be.² We learn that several traditional beliefs about leadership are myths that require discarding or correction. We learn that leadership is a complex concept, with pluralistic subconcepts, and with some not-well-understood nuances and ambivalences.

We learn, for example, that there is no fixed cluster of traits that make invariably for successful leadership, but that different clusters of traits work better in different contexts. As we suspected, a leader with physical prowess, for example, tends to be more influential among groups of young people; but intellectual prowess and integrity are more influential among mature groups. We are learning that a strong factor in leadership can still be simply whatever authority is *conferred* institutionally on the leader, regardless of the leader's personality or performance and regardless of the leader's conviction that his success is attributable to his charm, virtue, or other sterling personal quality.

A frequent element of leadership effectiveness in the past has been fear; social change in modern contexts, such as the gaining of confidence through increased education, has diminished the incidence of fear—at least, fear of personal punishment; but various other kinds of fear remain, though often vague and subtle.

We learn that the leader is not invariably the element of transcendent importance in group task achievement but that the most important elements are four: the leader, the led, the group task, and the situation or circumstances. No doubt, it was different when the designated or elected leader was the only person in the group who could read or write, or when he could be recognized a mile away as a member of an elite; in contrast, the modern situation is often such that not only the leader is entrusted with a group mission, but that *all* members of the group are charged with a mission or task in common. And as we probe further into "inner space," one suspects that there is much more to be learned about leadership.

Underwriting the great attention paid to leadership by the military profession is the preeminent challenge to leadership posed by lethal combat. It is probably the most difficult task among human relationships to order, persuade, command, lead, drive, or otherwise influence a group of men to act against all human instincts, by projecting themselves into lethal environments for abstract causes. To be sure, the leader must project himself, and each man must in no less degree project himself. This is not to say, of course, that life offers no other circumstances of danger or no other challenges to self-preservation; for there are well-known kinds of work that are highly dangerous (one thinks of steelworkers on skyscrapers, miners, rescuers in heavy seas and in polar areas, disarmers of bombs, etc.). But it is likely that no more dangerous environment exists on earth over time than the battlefield of high-intensity war, because of the large numbers of men at risk, the sustained duration of risk, and the overt scale of risk.

And while personal risk is most often taken as the overwhelmingly repellent feature of the battlefield, another repellent three-part feature usually accompanies the danger, also in full measure: filth, fatigue, and misery.

Thus, it seems perfectly natural that when we think of leadership in a military context, we immediately think of leadership in battle, in combat, amid the flame, fog, and firepower. It is good that we usually do so, lest we become casual about the high entry price into war and battle, usually paid by the few of the best—those few who are willing to suffer and to shield with their bodies the great masses of fellow-citizens, for whom they feel some responsibility and who all benefit from their rare deeds.

In the most recent centuries, the tenets of treatment and leadership of troops have become more enlightened. Still the course of enlightenment has been an uneven one, proving both easiest and most difficult to realize in constitutional democracies. I am certainly not implying that everything previously learned about leadership must be unlearned in the future. So long as men are required to do lethal battle at the behest of their societies, a leader who is selfless, just, competent, vigorous, and understanding will usually do well, whether elected, appointed, or self-emergent.

In addition, outside of dangerous environments, practically all other group efforts require some kind of leadership, though often called by other terms such as command, management, direction, supervision,

performance of the executive function, stewardship, and others. The military institution embraces on the same occasions and circumstances for appropriate exercise of leadership/management as all other social institutions. And as the "tooth-to-tail" ratios in military units decline, a larger and larger proportion of leadership challenges in the military take on the same dynamics as those in nonmilitary institutions.

Thus, while acknowledging that new knowledge is correcting us and enlightening us further on the nature of leadership in battle, and without implying that combat leadership will become easier to exercise, this paper is addressed primarily to the contexts of military leadership outside combat—that is, to the same evolutionary dynamics affecting nonbattle—military management, leadership, direction, command, supervision, and so forth—as are affecting all other institutions.

Contrary to past practice, the military now is only one contemporary arena in which leadership styles are studied intently. There is much concern with the nature of modern leadership in commerce, business, industry, the professions, academia, and social institutions of all kinds.

Outside the military, the results are something less than impressive. Much exhortation and rhetoric are expended today endorsing "the human side" of leadership, in industry and elsewhere; there is token acknowledgement and discussion everywhere, much as fads and gossip make the rounds of the cocktail circuits. But even many of the most eloquent current spokesmen for "people" do not understand what is really happening, and have no intention of modifying their own well-practiced styles of taking precedence among and over other people when they can. Some of them will get away with it, depending upon age or personal standing in their organization or community. Eventually, many will be forced to reform or be cast into outer darkness. And, despite its advanced status in the study of leadership, there will continue to be more than a negligible need for modernization even in the military institution.

THE ACCUMULATING BACKGROUND OF CHALLENGE

In numerous ways profound and subtle, various stages of what constitutes effective leadership are undergoing metamorphosis. Some changes involve fragile nuances; others will affect more forthright interrelationships.³

For example, there will be endemic but variable tension between the individual and his work, between him and his organization. How

these tensions will be expressed within the military organization can only be partially guessed at; and since more or less the same demands as in the past will recur on actual battlefields, it will take great ingenuity on the part of the military institution to devise variable procedures to adapt to the ethos generally prevailing at any future time toward, on the one hand, the unique milieu of battlefields and, on the other, the management context.

Most of the following discussion involves much speculation but little prediction. When is "the future" of what I speak? 5 years? 10 years? 15? 20? Let us say, shortly before or after the year 2000.

I speak of trends. Trends naturally appear to be *trending*, to be *leading* somewhere. But some current trends may not ever extend very far; they may peter out, or they may go too far. They may generate a conquering countertrend. Of course, some aspects of any projected environment may never come to pass. Some, I hope, never do; for if the worst of them were to be realized, it seems to me that they could only exist in a distorted society. In sum, we should be wary of wedding ourselves to any particular expectation, for some outcomes have a way of astounding us upon their arrival.

Sometimes a modest anecdote, concerning affairs far from battlefields and great institutions, provides an impressive measure of passing social change. One such anecdote concerns the proprietor of a general store, Alan Dillard, in rural Virginia. The Postal Service closed 246 small post offices in 1976, including the small one in Mr. Dillard's store. For 90 years between them, his father before him and he had kept their store open 6 days a week year round in order to keep the US mail serviced. Mr. Dillard had never had much in the way of vacation. "I went 40 years," he said, "before I used one day of sick leave."⁴

As the current cliché goes, they don't build them that way anymore! In an age of hedonism and narcissism, we are boggled and somewhat baffled. What did this man do for *himself*? How could any service or institution be said to merit such commitment? What set of principles concerning his relationship to his community had he relied on to maintain direction through modern social hurricanes?

To fortify some basis for unhurried measurement of change and challenge, we need a philosophical framework. Dr. Willis Harman, of the Stanford Research Institute, has developed a broad, blunt, explanatory analysis of the major forces brooding over us and challenging us.⁵ His analysis seems to me plausible, and not too pat. I use it, realizing that if it is reliable, each of his main premises contains

profound implications for the exercise of leadership in the societies dimly foreseen over the horizon.

Harman says there are four dilemmas inherent in industrial society, some probably insoluble:

- The growth dilemma: There are high costs either to continuing or to terminating growth; we need growth, but it appears that we cannot live with some of the unavoidable consequences of it.

- The control dilemma: In complex societies, technological innovation needs guidance; but we shun like the plague any kind of centralized control. Why is guidance needed? Because all contemporary technological problems have resulted from *past* technological successes. On the same point, another prominent scientist and futurist, Dennis Gabor, says:

The most important and urgent problems of the technology of today are no longer the satisfactions of primary needs or of archetypal wishes, but the reparation of the evils and damage wrought by the technology of yesterday.⁶

- The third of Harman's dilemmas involves distribution: "There is no suitable mechanism," he says, "or even philosophy, within the industrial system, for redistribution," equitable or otherwise. "The market system does not of itself include consideration for severe inequities in distribution, just as it does not consider either the welfare of future generations or the present costs to society and the environment."⁷ If all earthlings were consuming and polluting at current American rates, the planet could not support them. Harman offers an ominous prediction, to the effect that our failure to find sophisticated ways for sharing of resources will prove, in the end, more costly than not sharing.

- Finally, the work-roles dilemma: Industrial society so far has, with relatively few exceptions, been unable to provide an adequate number of meaningful social roles, other than holding a job, being married to someone holding a job, or studying in preparation for a job. About 25-35 percent of our people cannot find a place among these roles; a person unemployed for any reason is more and more regarded as a person having nothing to offer society. And this situation will get worse. Margaret Mead has commented:

The unadorned truth is that we do not need now and will not need later much of the marginal labor—the very young, the very old, the very uneducated, and the very stupid.⁸

Willis Harman sums up:

The basic system goals that have dominated the industrial era, and that have been approached through a set of fundamental subsystems, have resulted in processes which end up counteracting human ends.⁹

Now, in order not to confine all our insightful eggs within one conceptual basket, I cite two views that are different from Dr. Harman's, though not necessarily in conflict with his. Nevertheless, though these views may be considered to be more optimistic than Harman's, they are (if valid forecasts) also predictive of substantial likely ferment in the evolution of the future general environment of leadership.

The first expresses the expectations of an unidentified "top corporation executive" toward the characteristics required of future managers:

High level of education; minimum loyalty to company; concern with maximum authority as individuals; desire for social concern by business; rejection of authoritarianism; interest in the whole environment; decreasing sense of tradition; individualistic dress and grooming; open, direct communication; acceptance of 'feelings' as essential data.¹⁰

Harvard Professor of Business Administration George C. Lodge offers these forecasts about the same general environment:

The new ideas are all around us: harmony between man and nature, individual fulfillment as part of an organic social process, a right to survival and income, a sharp distinction between consumer desires and community needs, the role of the state as vision-setter and planner.

... The old idea of individualism is largely a useless antique. For the majority of Americans a sense of fulfillment and happiness will derive from their place and participation in a purposeful, organic, social process; their talents and capabilities should be used to the fullest, and they should have maximum involvement in the decisions by which the process is conducted and directed.

... The costs of neglect are real. It is all too likely that worker malaise and discontent will bring increased pressure for wage increases which companies may well grant, hoping that money will buy satisfaction, and thus productivity, when in fact it won't.

... Paternalism won't work because there is no father and there are no children. There is only a collection of human beings with different

capabilities who are needed to perform different functions. And how they are organized is something upon which they must generally agree. Perhaps the workers should select the manager, in some cases.

... Whatever the techniques, this transition will place a serious burden on existing management. In many instances, managers may in fact be deciding whether or not to relinquish their own jobs and authority in the name of a more efficient and useful collective.¹¹

These provocative perceptions will challenge leadership on many scales, from grand to minuscule. Whether societies will gain or lose confidence that their leaderships can cope with, not merely drift with, these dilemmas will probably have a good deal to do with future success, or lack of it.

SOCIALIZATION

One source of legitimation of authority, of social homogeneity, religion, has greatly declined in influence throughout Western society. Among a number of indicators is the decrease in numbers of Roman Catholic clergy; the *National Catholic Reporter* asserts that there is a 64 percent drop in the number of young men studying in seminaries.¹² However, the full extent and meaning of decline is ambiguous; for organized religion still attracts many adherents. It appears to be a fact that, as campus bookstores report, few college students today read the Bible.¹³ Some observers say that the only two versions of Western theology found palatable by large numbers in this generation are Tolkien's simplistic "good-versus-evil" scenarios of life among the Hobbits, and the whole amorphous movement variously described as "evangelical" or "charismatic," or "mystic."

Dozens of other major changes, combining and recombining to form revised environments for leadership, are occurring all the time. Here are a familiar few that seem significant:

- Population explosion: In the 22 years until 2000, world population will increase by more than 2 billion people, adding almost half as many as inhabit earth right now.
- The general *pace* of disruptive change continues to accelerate.
- Incipient breakup appears to threaten many fundamental patterns of social life: education, professions, lifestyles, work habits, leisure roles, and forms of social exchange.

These are but a few of the important areas. Some particular social institutions, such as marriage, appear to be undergoing bombardment;

but others, such as the family, are under attack but appear to be surviving in reasonably good health and, despite changes, will probably continue to do so.

A number of other social developments appear to harbor grave implications for future leadership. One is the possibility of advanced behavior control, via a number of potential channels: chemistry, or electricity prodding the brain, or possibly, in the more distant future, ESP or thought projection. There are ominous overtones here, of transition from efforts to *motivate* people, in the sense of mobilizing their volition, to efforts to *manipulate* people,¹⁴ in the sense of causing them to act in certain ways, with or without their volition. In passing, one can hardly avoid suspecting that a good bit of the *current* general uneasiness is apprehension over the increasing means for being manipulated in various ways, from advertising and the media of advocacy, to hypnosis and man-machine symbiosis.

Onrushing technology will continue to contribute to the dilemma of leadership. Will competence in technology be enough for future leaders? A couple of decades ago, the British novelist and scientist C. P. Snow deplored in his well-known little book, *The Two Cultures*, the widening gap between, on the one hand, the physical sciences, and on the other, the social sciences and humanities.¹⁵ His cautions have not been universally heeded. For instance, in a recent issue of the *Naval Proceedings*, a Navy captain pointed out that after World War II, Rear Admiral James Holloway, Jr., father of the famed Holloway Plan, pressed for including plenty of liberally educated ROTC graduates among naval officers. It happens that he also fathered the 1974-78 Chief of Naval Operations, who in 1978 approved program changes that made Navy ROTC available, almost exclusively, to *hard science* majors.¹⁶

Harvard psychologist Harry Levinson commented on executive leadership across the board in all kinds of organizations, as illustrating Snow's gap between "two cultures:"

... many executives have engineering, scientific, legal, or financial backgrounds. Each of these fields places a heavy emphasis on cognitive rationality and measurable or verifiable facts. People who enter them usually are trained from childhood to suppress their feelings, to maintain a competitive, aggressive, nonemotional front. They are taught to be highly logical, and they seek to impose that kind of rationality on organizations.

As a result, they simply do not understand the power of people's feelings. They are like tone-deaf people who, attending an opera, can understand the lyrics but cannot hear the music. . . .¹⁷

Turning to potential areas of change and challenge affecting future military leadership, we discern three principal foci appropriate for study: the social environment from which young Americans will enter the Army in the future; the young Americans themselves—their attributes, values, and attitudes; and the internal Army environment of missions, objectives, and requirements.

These three contexts harbor a number of areas that seem vulnerable to change. After touching on them, I should like to select for brief recognition several forces that may provide especially inscrutable and perhaps intractable challenge to Army leadership.

In speculating on the chances for reasonable success in leading the American servicemen of the future in peace or war, one is necessarily dependent upon forecasts about the kind of young person who will be produced by American society at that time. To be sure, in pluralistic America, a variety of types will continue to be turned out; but I refer here to the *prevailing* orientations of American youth, whatever they may be.

It is trite to forecast that many social and cultural changes at work in *all* societies, especially democracies, will produce future military recruits oriented in some ways sharply different from the recruits of the past. Many of them, perhaps most, will continue to prove well balanced and well disposed, amenable to leadership. But not as many as the nation used to count on.

What processes of socialization and politicization will future recruits have undergone? What principles will have been emphasized in their bringing up, and what principles belittled? What will be their habits of work? Their characteristic performance under physical and emotional stress? What will be their attitudes towards themselves, their parents, their country, and authority figures in general? Will they give much attention to discharging responsibilities and obligations, as well as to demanding rights and privileges?

Without overdoing gloomy prospects, we are discomforted by certain trends. Literacy is deteriorating badly; the Scholastic Aptitude Test scores nationwide have declined steadily for 15 straight years, and no one is sure why this is happening. New York City now mystifies many observant minds by insisting that to receive a high school diploma, a student must be able to read at 9th grade level and to do 8th grade arithmetic.

Teenage pregnancy and cohabitation rates (sanctioned and informal) continue to rise; it is a depressing fact that half of all teenage

marriages now end in divorce. Associated with the general rise in overt sexual activity, one might be moved by current social and judicial rulings to speculate whether or not, in a decade or two, the military will be forced to take in homosexuals.

What personal traits will be accentuated in future family life? As for partial parenting, one specialist estimates that 45 percent of children born in 1976 will have lived with only one parent for some part of their lives before reaching 18.¹⁸

Critic Tom Wolfe has labeled the 1970's "The ME Decade," reflecting the waves of narcissism that have engulfed many young (and old) Americans.¹⁹ Like Narcissus of mythology, the modern practitioner is said to be moved only by self-love, by grandiose expectations of personal omnipotence, by inability to return affection to anyone else. He is encouraged by many other sources; for example, one department of the Federal Government sponsors messages interspersed like commercials on children's TV programs; one recent message, contradicting the wisdom of the ages in the orientation of children, repeated this assurance: "The Most Important Person in the World Is You."²⁰

Two UCLA psychiatrists say that the issues of children's rights are moving from "outside radical" to "central" position; they predict that children's rights may come to transcend the legal distinction between "adult" and "minor."²¹ The rights most likely to emerge are said to involve these issues:

- The child's right to independent counsel in divorce and custody proceedings;
- The right to medical care without parental consent;
- The right to select and pursue educational opportunities without reference to parents' wishes;
- The right to freely choose one's religion, appearance, and lifestyle, independent of parents' desires.

Radical educational critic John Holt adds: "The child's right to engage in sexual exploration and play is a right not legitimately deniable to anyone under 18 or 16 or 12."²²

Such individualism,²³ or permissiveness, or elevation of children's autonomy, will certainly contribute to shaping values and attitudes of those young recruits who enter the disciplined world of the military. Young people with such orientation will certainly challenge military leadership at various times and places.

Supplementing adult crime, various environments appear tolerant

of juvenile misdemeanor and crime. In a 3-year nationwide survey of 6,700 elementary, intermediate, and high schools, by the National Institute of Education, 31 percent of American schools reported "serious to moderately serious" problems with crime. One of every ten schools is broken into monthly, with great loss. Besides physical attacks (200,000-600,000) annually on students, over 5,000 teachers each month are physically assaulted at a rate of serious injury five times that of student victims.²⁴

Even so, it is believed that only a small percentage of school crimes are reported to police, and that conditions in suburban schools are even worse than in cities. Still, most estimates of school-crime costs reach \$100-200 million annually, some much higher. Some campuses are literally dangerous. In February 1978, even prestigious Harvard issued special whistles to all women at Harvard, to summon help, especially at night.²⁵

The knowledge of how to commit crimes is frequently disseminated by TV and other organs of the media, and arguments approving or excusing such activities are becoming ubiquitous. Dr. Samuel Tochelson, after studying criminals closely for 14 years, concluded that the core criminal begins antisocial behavior at a very early age, rejects whatever parental love is proffered, is basically a solo operator and, considering himself superior, has few or no normal relationships with others. In any event, of significant portent for the future of leadership, it is notable that between 1970 and 1975, as in prior periods, the American age-group with the highest arrest rate was the 15-17 year group.²⁶

Cheating is widespread in schools and colleges. Retail stores report losing \$8 billion per year to shoplifters and store employees (of all ages).²⁷ All in all, American society harbors a number of subcultures in which antisocial behavior is cultivated and from which deviants emerge to challenge leadership destructively in most social institutions.

THE RECRUITS

Thus, not only the participants in crime, but also other young Americans who gain or witness social approval for hedonistic behavior, are able to arrive at the threshold of maturity with weak and pliable moral codes, some with convictions that it is immoral to hold anyone accountable for his own behavior. After such a "growth stage," military leadership will doubtless find it difficult to strengthen weak traits of character, if any.

The physical characteristics of American youth will change somewhat, no doubt altering various interrelationships with other age groups. We are aware that the proportion of population aged 14-24 will decline, while the 24-35 group will increase (as well as the elderly).²⁸ Thus, as the proportion of the non-wage-earners grows (both the elderly, increasing in numbers yet tending each year to retire earlier, and the young and young adults, stretching out the span of early dependence), the working and tax producing sector will contract while supporting more and more fellow citizens in the other age sectors. Active duty troops of all ranks may join with others in the wage-earning sector to challenge leadership by declining to bear disproportionate burdens of support for both young and old.

Puberty has arrived about four months earlier each decade since the turn of the century; if this trend continues, tensions may be further exacerbated with parents and other authorities by intensifying demands for still earlier youthful autonomy.

More and more, it appears that a primary policy for obtaining suitable young people for the armed forces will be dependence on self-selection—the tendency of persons who adjust most readily to military service to make *themselves* available by volunteering. There will always be some youths who like soldiering and who are good at it. But will there be enough of them? In view of the coming decline in population of the youth sector, the answer is: probably not.

Increasingly, technological civilization will continue to pose conflicts. The military will find itself inevitably in sharper competition with other institutions in society. The United States is trying to pull off a feat unprecedented in history: to maintain armed forces of about 2.1 million, without conscription. To do so, in 1977, the military, according to a Congressional Reference Service study, are having to recruit one out of every 5.6 18-year olds, but in 1987 will have to recruit one out of every 4.6 18-year olds.²⁹ Thus, it seems quite likely that the Army is not going to get quite enough of the most desirable male recruits in the future years.

Due largely to this forthcoming need, in fact, and not primarily to the “thunderings” of say, Women’s Lib, the log-jams restricting legitimate aspirations are being cleared away at last, opening access for women and minorities to the armed forces. In addition, it seems quite likely that the aggregate roles of the civilians in the military establishment will grow.

No doubt, the Army and the other Services will want to preserve

their youthful character, supporting such practices as "up and out," early retirement, and separation subsidy. Thus, the military will have to cope with a paradox which will involve attracting suitable recruits and persuading the ablest recruits to reenlist, while arranging that the less able leave after one enlistment and return to civil life. The military is likely to enhance its chances of success in coping with this paradox if the Services do not view with indifference the outcome of returns to civil life; instead, they will probably help themselves by becoming known to extend vigorous efforts, like the Army's "apprentice" program, to help returnees in finding civil jobs.

Various technological advances may require changes in familiar Army responses, large and small. Changing spans of work hours may demand several work groups, or crews, to duplicate or extend each other's work—perhaps something like the Blue and Gold crews now assigned to each POLARIS submarine.

Two schools of expectation exist about the potential effects on equipment brought about by onrushing technology: the "graduate engineer" school, and the "chimpanzee" school. The former holds that weapons and equipment will steadily become so complicated that only graduate engineers will be able to operate them. The second school, on the other hand, with less support, holds that automation and other simplifications of complexity will make jobs easy enough for chimpanzees to handle.³⁰ Which is likely to be right? At this stage, we do not know; but the implications for leadership are apparent, either way.

A prediction related to the "graduate engineer" expectation is that the elimination of menial and low IQ tasks will, in general, move the *general* level of ability required by the armed forces *up*.

Numerous other changing factors affecting leadership are being recognized, some newly perceived, some familiar but receiving increased emphasis: for example, the role of first-born sons (significant, but mixed); the price of determined individual independence (isolation, loneliness); the decline of the Great Man Syndrome (to be discussed later); intellectuality (no connection with leadership); age-group (the trend is toward younger leadership); and occupational mobility (increasing in frequency outside the military). Another interesting concept related to modern leadership is contract theory, holding that there is created between an organization and its members a contract, partly explicit, partly implicit. The leader stands at the interface, obligated to both parties. The organization has many ways to articulate

its understanding of the contract, whereas the individual member has few. Tension arises when the organization insists that, as in the past, its interpretation is always the "official" one, which must govern.³¹

Leisure time in the general work force is increasing in ways which the Services cannot avoid emulating, while the work week will doubtless continue slowly to decline, perhaps vainly increasing the organization's expectations that all its members will perform like workaholics on its behalf. In other channels, certain groups will doubtless pressure the military organization to provide internal avenues for dissent, whereas, of course, the traditional military organization has not given much thought to providing avenues for dissent. These trends will distract from concentration on the military job by even the most firmly committed members.

Many of the social and other changes affecting work, leisure, and life-styles, as suggested above and elsewhere, will influence some increasing numbers of comparable jobs in military and civil lives so that they come to resemble each other. Many youths entering the armed forces will bring with them civilian youth values, attitudes, and practices that will, even discounting exaggerated expectations, readily establish themselves in military environments. While the two environments are not likely to become identical, the often-expressed exhortations of military leaders that military service must not become "just a job" are probably fruitless. Beyond the relatively limited number of self-selected devotees of military life, the armed forces will have to compete as one kind of job against other jobs more or less on equal bases of comparison.³²

As an *Army Times* editorial put it:

We expect that, much as the military chiefs deplore the prospect, military service in the future will become more like a career in the private sector, with a fixed wage, a modest incentives package, and few of the intangibles which service people have come to expect.³³

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT

One ancient characteristic of organizations that is being eroded steadily is secrecy. Leaders, commanders, and managers at many levels can no longer issue fiats and make arbitrary decisions concerning subordinates and expect successfully to avoid giving adequate explanations. Various internal decisions, previously made anonymously, arbitrarily, or cryptically, must now be laid on the table and at times

undergo close scrutiny by attorneys, investigative boards, grievance committees and courts, and especially by the persons affected.

An accompanying effect on some leaders will be an increase in accountability, as the opening of records to subordinates will also open some records to superiors, and to their review of detailed accounts of some decisions. In turn, the prospect of superordinate review of past decisions and reopening of closed books may intimidate or alienate some free-wheeling leaders unaccustomed to *post hoc* review and audit.

Judge Jack B. Weinstein expressed a central principle in a recent ruling:

Drastic government actions of this nature that affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens cannot result solely from secret, informal negotiations conducted exclusively by a handful of government officials.³⁴

Thus, even in lesser administrative investigations, the ramparts of secrecy are retrenching. In the past, leaders seldom gave an account of the data they gathered and of their reasoning in reaching certain conclusions; now, records are more vulnerable to being opened, published, and questioned. Leaders must think twice about the possibility that their secret judgments and decisions may be later exposed for all to examine.

An interesting evidence of this trend is its effect in certain political contexts, such as Congress, where a number of members find it difficult to adjust to changed circumstances, such as the recent termination of the teller vote system in the House; previously, one could conceal one's vote on amendments, but now all votes are recorded and are eventually discernible.³⁵

A number of other changes in administrative procedures increasingly affect leadership. One development is the growth of emphasis on due process—the approval, or requirement, for legal representation of individual members during adverse proceedings involving retention, evaluation, demotion, and elimination.

Still another development is the testing of executive and managerial decisions in courts. In fact, it is beginning to emerge sporadically that even laws passed by legislatures are regarded by some segments of the public and bureaucracies as no better than of *potential* relevance, as tentative measures capable of being set aside until validated by courts. For that matter, many court decisions are regarded as ignorable or suspendable until they have been appealed to a succession of higher courts.

Still another challenge to leadership is gaining strength: the challenge of specialists. As executive and professional roles fragment and multiply, the success of the generalist leader depends more and more upon successful and supportive performance by several specialists. The specialist's expertise is indispensable in many instances, for the generalist cannot produce the same quality of input himself; the generalist is thus vulnerable to counterpressures from the specialist. One result is increase in importance of flexible and consensual styles of leadership.

It becomes clearer that the really *unique* activity of the armed forces is fighting in lethal combat. Those who participate constitute the dwindling proportions of fighters; the remainder perform all the other activities that more and more resemble activities in civilian life.

Although there are a dozen more-or-less reasonable approaches to categorizing genuine armed forces fighters (i.e., the several approaches to "tooth-to-tail ratios"), one of the most illustrative approaches is to identify every person in the armed forces according to whether or not he occupies a combat MOS (Military Occupational Specialty). Using that criterion, it emerges that about 23 percent of the *uniformed* members of the Army are in combat MOS, 16 percent of the Navy, and 5 percent of the Air Force.³⁶ If one concedes that variations in leadership styles are appropriate to different military contexts, it appears reasonable that in the nonfighting contexts, leadership would most closely resemble not "command" but the executive direction, management, or supervision that characterize leadership in nonmilitary enterprises of great variety.

As the proportion of military forces engaging in combat declines in comparison to the proportion engaging in support (the aforementioned "tooth-to-tail ratio"), it has seemed to me for some years that consideration should be given to identifying two levels or areas of armed forces, termed loosely here the Fighters and the Supporters.³⁷ Such a move would provide contexts for quite different leadership styles.

Some of the figures above give hints about changing attitudes inside and outside the armed forces towards the fighting functions of the military. Another clue, or indicator, was furnished in February 1978, when the West Point class due to graduate in June 1978 selected Army branches in which to spend their careers. Prior to 1978, no matter what branches new lieutenants ultimately gravitated to, all graduates had to serve their first two commissioned years in combat arms branches; and

the "main line" to high command has always threaded itself firmly through the combat arms. However, many appointments over recent years indicate that high rank is attainable now via a number of specialist branches; in addition, in 1978, for the first time, cadets were permitted to select and start out in noncombat branches. No fewer than a third of the nearly 1,000 selectors chose the noncombat branches³⁸—an outcome that contains, in my opinion, several implications pertaining to the future exercise of military leadership.

What might such implications be? I hesitate to project them too forcefully; for they deserve more probing analysis than I have been able to give to them. In addition, I hesitate to provide an opportunity to infer that West Point cadets are somehow exercising peculiar values by these choices. However, I will suggest two implications that further experience may validate. One is that one may not need to follow "main lines" to the top anymore—that numerous specialties may either open numerous alternative routes to the top or may open careers that appear more attractive than those of the main line. A second implication may involve assessment of the "main line" as being too demanding, too debilitating, too much of a rat race; so that certain talented persons, who in the past might have opted for leadership roles, now seek and accept only moderately demanding leadership roles or reject leadership roles altogether as being not worth the price.

Another challenge to future military leadership is the need for the military to understand and to cope with the media, which are proliferating in complex technology and demanding unique influence as the preeminent social institution entitled to judge and call to account all other social institutions—as being, in fact, practically a branch of government itself. Certainly, as demonstrated conclusively by Peter Braestrup's *Big Story*, the military has experienced one-sided press coverage of various aspects of the Vietnam War.

The way school busing was handled shows the kind of media challenge involved. Certainly, in some American communities, there was much opposition to busing as a means to break down de facto segregation of school children; but there were also areas of support for busing. On the critical first day, violence erupted in only one or two cities, while busing and integration were accomplished peacefully elsewhere, all over America. TV concentrated its coverage on those few locations of violence. Immediately, there arose a nationwide impression that *all* Americans opposed busing so much that violence would be the inevitable outcome of busing attempts; and a number of subsequent

national policies, and outbreaks of violence, rested on that impression.³⁹

Evidently, 75 percent of Americans now get *half* their news from TV, and 50 percent of Americans get *all* their news from TV.⁴⁰ Military leadership needs to give considerable thought to ways and means of keeping the American people informed of its activities—honestly, fully, and accurately, without enduring distortion, or suffering harmful commission or omission, by media.

Still another challenge from the press and its satellite activities will grow: their improving capability to “package” candidates and messages, essentially to project an “image” of a person, an image that may be dramatic but phoney, not an accurate representation. One aspect of falseness has been helpfully skewered by the novelist John D. McDonald: “Integrity is not a search for the rewards of integrity.” Defective but ambitious leaders may be able to exploit the availability of “masks” and other forms of image. It may become more difficult for genuinely competent leaders to be recognized in a welter of image-building. The challenge may exist at lesser levels, as well as at the national political stage.

This latter area of potential conflict will probably result in the sophistication of ploys, protests, and other devices by which pressure group members learn to deal with leaders whose alleged superior competence comes into question. One form is possible unionization of the armed forces, a subject of considerable fascination in its own right; but one which we shall bypass in this paper. In a nutshell, I consider it quite unlikely that the armed services committees of the Congress will ever permit unions to gain a foothold in the American military establishment.

In any event, subordinates will probably become not *unwilling* but *less* willing to suppress or sacrifice their interests for other interests which, they are assured, are more important than their own. One can sense declining readiness to respond automatically at the risk of one's life to such an order as “Do it because I said so.”

One might envision some situations, even on battlefields, in which even tactical decisions might be questioned because of differences in perception of the tactical risks and costs involved and, possibly, because of misgivings about the quality of the leader's competence. A few occasions of minor combat refusal occurred in Vietnam, and they may occur again. (I am specifically *not* referring to such intolerable practices as fragging, nor even to incidents properly labeled “mutiny,” but to less serious circumstances which prove vulnerable to conflicting judgments.)

CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP

The contexts of stress are also changing so as to make it possibly more difficult to apply leadership and enforce discipline. One searches for alternative approaches with which to increase the understanding of change. Interesting conclusions were reached a few years ago, for example, by the director of the Los Angeles County's Sheriff's Academy (after many years of imitating the military emphasis on stress training), to the effect that nonstress training produced superior results for *his* purpose.⁴¹ Whether the results would be adaptable to the military context is unknown, but they appear to be worth looking into.

Combat, with its critical emphasis on survival-contingent-on-discipline, provides powerful built-in incentives toward disciplined, orchestrated performance responsive to the leader. Yet, one might wonder whether the internal imperatives of fearful crises, such as combat, are the *real* triggers of disciplined response, rather than formula or habit exclusively. One observes surgical teams, for example, and the support organization of NASA during a manned space mission, symphony orchestras, corps de ballet—all responding to the “crisis demands” of performance without the assistance of total habit, or total conditioning for years in all-waking-hours systems. There is possibly no more highly synchronized, complex, split-second discipline exhibited by any large human group than a first-class symphony orchestra, composed of persons who are, most of the time, individualists and “prima donnas” of all kinds; yet, under the conditions and demands of performance, they concede all to discipline and conformity. To be sure, combat requires *sustained* discipline; but at least partially new perspectives on the leadership involved may be appropriate for study.

Kurt Lewin's study of authoritarian leadership showed that exclusively authoritarian group leadership has a somewhat disintegrating effect on group structure. He perceived such leaders as always taking the initiative in starting new paths for subordinates, as normally issuing commands without explanations, as introducing changes in work patterns without consultation with those affected, as criticizing subordinates without constructive suggestions for alternative behavior, and so on. Members of groups under authoritarian leadership *tend* to develop greater aggressiveness toward one another, to pick scapegoats, to take lesser interest in group tasks, and to work individually and isolated, rather than forming a harmonious team. Once the group makes a group decision, however, the accepted goal usually overrides personal tastes.⁴²

In various analyses of the old concepts and recurrent lists of leadership traits, Elton Mayo, Ralph Stogdill, Alvin Coons, and T. O. Jacobs were among those who established that the search to identify a set of universal and invariably successful traits of leadership was a futile search.⁴³ Many other studies proved valuable, such as the theory of social exchange, and of Theory X and Theory Y, developed by George Homans⁴⁴ and Douglas MacGregor.⁴⁵ George England at Minnesota produced studies showing that differing group values existed among different professional groups, and that primary values often differed among organizations, leaders, and members. For example, employee welfare and social welfare were found to be the operative values of union leaders; but employee welfare was found to be a weak value for industrial managers, while for the latter the value of most importance was profit maximization.⁴⁶

Other attitudes and capabilities are changing and being articulated more forcefully within the armed forces, and are almost certain to exercise influence on future leadership. One of the most significant is the accumulation of indicators that the time may have come for the armed forces to study the desirability of narrowing or dissolving the gulf between the statuses of officer and enlisted man or woman, in favor of a continuous ladder of grades, as in industry, with perhaps some internal categories (similar to "managers," "foremen," "supervisors," or "wage-scale employees," or "blue collar workers"), but without the chasm that has traditionally existed in the military.

In earlier centuries, officers came exclusively from the noble class, and later from the small educated class. The masses of troops were illiterate peasants, serfs, or peons—sometimes referred to by their leaders as "the scum of the earth." The gap between officers and men was unbridgeable. But the world has turned over since those times. Few vestiges remain, and few analogies are valid; and the continued maintenance of that dividing gap conflicts with the strong trend toward increasing democratization that is especially characteristic of America.

It is a supportable premise that many noncommissioned officers today are better equipped in professional skills than all but a few officers were a century ago. A colonel at Fort Eustis recently concluded after a test of E-9's (Senior Master Sergeants) that they make excellent commanders of training companies, if they have had extensive troop experience and if they are carefully selected, and if the law were changed to authorize them to administer pay and Article 15's.⁴⁷ To be sure, one test is hardly enough to base a revolution on; but there is undeniably a worthy case here for further assessment.

Donald L. Harlow, who was the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force from 1969 to 1971, has been for some years the chief lobbyist in Washington of the Air Force Sergeants Association. Enlisted men, he says, will no longer tolerate the wide gap between their lifestyle and that of officers:

The individual today wants freedom of choice. He doesn't want to be in the controlled military environment that we took for granted when I was in the service. He doesn't want to be told where to live and where to eat. . . . One of the things that AFSA members want is equity. They want the Congress to apply the rules equally to the officer and enlisted corps.⁴⁸

An observer writes that, in his meetings with members of Congress and officials of the Department of Defense, Harlow has said that what enlisted people really want is equity; "give them equity and they'll forget about unions. . . ."⁴⁹ How widespread are these attitudes, and how deeply held, are not precisely discernible; but they suggest evolving dynamics for future leadership.

Another factor of change seems to me to presage possibly greater influence on future military leadership than we can foresee: women in the armed forces. I would not ascribe the infusion of women solely to successful intimidation of national officials by representatives of Women's Lib. As indicated earlier, the military will be in warmer competition for talented human power, especially brainpower, in the future. Since the greatest unexploited pool of brainpower in any society is not in any minority but in its women, all major social institutions that require talent and brainpower in large numbers are looking ahead, anticipating a dearth of men. Consequently, one foresees an imperative for heavy recruitment of women and minorities. We readily predict a small but steady increase in women mayors, governors, and members of legislatures, and in female presence in courts, executive departments, and military academies. We see more women doctors and lawyers, and even priests and ministers. Where it will all end, as *Time* magazine used to say, knows God.

But we are free to make guesses, or extrapolate from facts. Does anyone argue that the entry of women in the military has not already affected leadership in certain ways? Columbia professor Eli Ginzburg (and Chairman of the National Commission for Manpower) calls the flood of women into the work force, "the single most outstanding phenomenon of our century."⁵⁰ The root-causes are many, highly complex, and interesting; unfortunately, we do not have time here to investigate them.

The movement has its ambiguities; it is clear from careful surveys that the more militant tactics of Women's Lib enjoy at best only marginal support among American men *and* women. Still, by the year 2000, there will be two women to every man in the over-75 bracket—a remarkable situation. Do we know the full effects of the entry of women into the military, into this particularly male-bonded society? Hardly, for we are only in the earliest stages of this Great Experiment. Some important questions obtrude. How will relationships change further when about 10 percent or more of the colonels and generals in the Army are women? What implications exist for compressed wartime training of, say, 40 combat divisions out of a cadre Army that is heavily female?

A number of external observers, who have no intention of living in foxholes themselves, are enthusiastic about putting women into combat; but, apparently, not many of the women who are most likely to be involved are eager to get into it. And women in the Navy indicate, by samplings showing votes of 2 to 1, that most of them are not at all anxious to put to sea.⁵¹

One major trend, with numerous ramifications related to future leadership, perhaps the most important of all, is the inexorable worldwide movement toward democratization. Senator Moynihan, while US Representative at the United Nations, declared that there were no more than 27 or 28 genuine democracies in the world. Yet even in developing and totalitarian states, selectively and sporadically, more democratic practices continue to receive high approval.

An "included" trend in democratization is education. About 1955, the world changed from majority-illiterate to majority-literate. As people become better educated, wherever they are, they develop more confidence in their own judgment; they intend, wherever possible, to exert a voice in their own government. Previously ignored layers of national citizenries thrust themselves upward to participate in decisions that will affect them.

Elites, of course, feel menaced when this occurs. Max Ways wrote of this development in his book *Beyond Survival*, about 20 years ago:

The primary division of politics is not between any kind of right or left, but between ruler and ruled. In the past century of general political upheaval, this relationship has altered more than any other. For better and worse, ruler and ruled have drawn closer together into an intimacy for which no precedent can be found since primitive political society.⁵²

Alexis de Tocqueville, in his great perceptive work on America, expressed the view that the real uniqueness of the United States resided in its passion for equality. Many observers have since noted the conflict between the values of liberty and equality; unquestionably, both stand high in American values. If liberty stands alone at the top of the American hierarchy, equality nevertheless stands very high also. Thus, further democratization does not mean the end of *all* elite status for leaders; but it does presage considerable modification of elite autonomy.

We have already referred in passing to the decline of the Great Man, the Great Leader syndrome. In times of danger and crisis, people en masse will probably be more willing to defer again to leadership than they appear to be right now, but no doubt to leadership defined within certain limits more precisely than before. The long-familiar Great Leader system, at all levels, is passing. In past hierarchical systems, almost every Leader at every level was unquestionably accepted as all-wise and all-knowing, in knowledge and judgment and competence, superior to any and all subordinates in everything, and supported in commanding within a perimeter of people and things that was sometimes regarded as a personal fief. Often, the Great Leader was widely believed to be beloved by his troops. Subordinates were expected to indulge the whims, even the ego-trips, of persons in leadership positions. But, over time, too many leaders in all walks of life have been revealed as unworthy, as possessing clay feet and other alienating features.

We might suggest one likely outcome of conflict between the Great Man syndrome and spreading democratization. We might reconstruct an example of a not unfamiliar happening in both military and nonmilitary contexts. Let us imagine a large complex organization of an influential kind. The head of the organization suddenly resigns and departs, due to political or health pressures. After a pause, a new head is appointed and moves into the top position. Immediately, he demands of his institutional headquarters that a number of subelement chiefs and immediate office workers be replaced on the grounds that he is entitled to bring in and install "his own team." The careers, residencies, work satisfaction, and so on, of incumbents are to be disregarded, aborted, interrupted, and rechanneled, in order to satisfy the conviction that "new brooms" are *entitled* to sweep clean. There are several misconceived aspects of this practice; the worst is probably the disruption of the lives of people whose offense is that they are not

personally acquainted with the incoming Great Man. Encroaching democratization is eroding this practice, and we may expect that erosion will continue.

Much of the scaffolding surrounding the Great Man has been demolished, as democratic processes have spread and intensified, until we arrive at modern theories that hold that a leader will be unsuccessful to the extent that he is not open to counterinfluence attempts by subordinates.

In describing or visualizing the Leader and the Led, we often confine ourselves to envisioning two poles—a single person, a single Leader, on the one end, and on the other, the Led, one simple, monolithic, faceless mass. But the most difficult problems of future leadership will involve complex relationships within many layers and network nodes, between leaders and subordinate levels composed of many people who are themselves also leaders, and who are presumably well able to judge the quality of other persons' leadership.

In any event, with the dismantling of the scaffolding of protective assumptions, there will remain less automatic acceptance, less assumption that the Leader or the Organization knows best, or that both always hold first in their hearts every subordinate's best interests. They may; but in modern contexts, it becomes clearer that, often, they do not.

As one result, many (not all) arguments in the military arena over definitions of command, leadership, supervision, direction, management, and similar terms, are becoming sterile; for these functions increasingly overlap.

Leadership in the future will inevitably become more pluralistic. Without becoming chameleons, leaders will have to develop a repertory of leadership styles to fit different groups, tasks, and circumstances—as the current folk saying goes, providing “different strokes for different folks.”

Consequently, one can expect in the future renewed efforts to *refine leader selection procedures*, to give better assurance that the better (potential) leaders are being selected, and to hold them, in certain circumstances, more directly accountable. The Navy has used challenging tests of professional knowledge of senior officers; the Army has resisted the use of such tests, but will probably adopt some versions to assist in selection procedures.

Professor Harry Levinson offers a provocative assertion—that the bureaucratic system is touted as a device for achievement; but, he says,

it is actually a system for defeat, for it leaves one winner and many losers, only one success but many failures.⁵³ There is something in Levinson's charge; but bureaucratic structures will probably remain in *some* form until something better comes along to replace them. We have few signs yet of the approach of the *workable* replacement.

THE UNIQUE PORTION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

In the end, there is a limit to what concessions leadership can extend and still be leadership. Fundamentally, of course, it involves a role with two critical components: leadership and followership.

As validated by overwhelming human experience in thousands of prototype circumstances over millennia, the classic route to effective leadership passes through the preconditioning pupillary stage of followership. In these times, there are increasing pressures emergent to consider oneself qualified for leadership without first demonstrating competence in followership, or even to withhold any participation as follower behind any leader other than oneself.

But no one should expect to exercise leadership in every relationship in life. In some proportion of our activities, we are all followers. The central relationship cannot function effectively as an intensive tug-of-war. If followership is simply not forthcoming, reinforcing leadership in the same direction as the leader's effort, the most invigorating kind of leadership will act in vain. It may be that the more important study required in the future will be that devoted to followership.

As "total institutions," the armed forces may have faced (and overcome) the most difficult obstacles to enlightened leadership confronted by any social institution. The requirements for round-the-clock leadership of professionals and their families who work and live on the same base transcend the partial scope exerted by other work institutions concerned only with family principals and standard working hours. As large proportions of the armed forces live in neighboring civilian communities and *not* on bases, however, the total-institution character of the armed forces becomes diluted.

The American leadership style has emerged from decades of compromise, of trial and error, of fitting experimental styles to different people in different circumstances at different times. Its democratic aspects have moved other peoples to imitation, while it has retained and adapted an enduring core of adherence to standards of excellence.

In fact, despite all the hazards and challenges to leadership cited up to this point, it is still likely that we shall have to utilize much that is familiar, conventional, and enduring in the training of military leaders. If Willis Harman and others are right, forms of leadership will have to evolve that are less coercive, less authoritarian, somewhat more manipulative, more consultative, less autonomous. In efforts to influence the rising generation into meaningful patterns of behavior, military leadership, too, will have to evolve into something more patient, more consultative, more cooperative, more sensitive to the needs of followers.

When one attempts to distinguish between leadership of troops actually in battle and other leadership contexts, one realizes that in the armed forces, the battle is the payoff. This ancient challenge, monumental to begin with, has probably changed least among the military contexts of leadership. This enduring challenge is most demanding, of course, in the vicinity of the foxholes; to motivate ordinary men to do the unnatural thing—to go forward at the risk of life and limb into lethal, uniquely high-risk environments for some distant purpose said to benefit one's nation and to maintain the security of one's fellow citizens (of whom a sizable proportion may appear not to give a damn about the perils confronting the fighting man).

As I say, these challenges are ancient. In *Beowulf* and Xenophon, there appear moving passages of tribute to well-loved leaders. From the 4th Century comes an epigram that bespeaks the tenets of generations of the best military leaders: "You may pardon much to others, nothing to yourself." Yet, over centuries, many troops have suffered bungling, cruel, and indifferent masters, as well as the type reflected in the ambivalent advice of Sir Ralph Hopton in 1643: "Pay well, command well, hang well."⁵⁴

Most of the great leaders, the great captains, even in the days of peasants and slaves, attempted to bring out of their troops the good qualities that normally lay undisturbed, unsuspected, untouched inside their rough exteriors, despite their brutal lives. Douglas MacGregor raised many an eyebrow when he articulated his Theory Y, the conviction that most people did not need to be driven, but, if properly approached, *wanted* to work, to express themselves. Professor Henry Levinson recognized that new dynamics are arising as groups confront functions that must be performed; he has called the belief that people move only if manipulated by someone with a carrot and stick, "the

jackass fallacy." Napoleon penetrated the challenge effectively from another angle when he observed: "There are no bad regiments. There are only bad colonels." John Buchan put it even more astutely: "The task of leadership is not to put greatness into humanity, but to elicit it; for the greatness is already there."

Splendid leadership is not unknown in our own day, as countless instances attest in the records of American arms in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. One recalls the moving account by Ernie Pyle of bringing down from the mountains of Italy the body of Captain Henry T. Waskow:

'After my father, he came next,' a sergeant told me. . . . They stood around, and gradually I could sense them moving, one by one close to Captain Waskow's body. . . . Another man came. I think he was an officer. It was hard to tell officers from men in the dim light, for everybody was bearded and grimy. The man looked down into the dead captain's face and then spoke directly to him, as though he were alive. 'I'm sorry, old man.'

Then a soldier came and stood beside the officer and bent over, and he too spoke to his dead captain, not in a whisper but awfully tenderly, and he said, 'I sure am sorry, sir.'

Then the first man squatted down, and he reached down and took the captain's hand, and he sat there for a full five minutes holding the dead hand in his own and looking intently into the dead face. And he never uttered a sound all the time he sat there.

Finally he put the hand down. He reached over and gently straightened the points of the captain's shirt collar and then he sort of rearranged the tattered edges of the uniform around the wound, and then he got up and walked away down the road in the moonlight, all alone.⁵⁵

If we reflect successfully on leaders like Captain Waskow, who "carried in him a sincerity and a gentleness that made people want to be guided by him," we may recognize others able to pass along whatever is enduring in the best leadership we have known.

Vast experience of persons, groups, and nations supports the conviction that complex activities, especially collectivities, must accept some performance of a leadership function or fail. Many modern egalitarians resent the performance of a leadership function at any level. Despite the claims of experience, some assert that leadership roles can be dispensed with; on the other hand, not only those with experience but also the soundest theorists identify the leadership function as vital in dynamic associations.

This imperative can be illustrated by an empirical analogy from the experience of the eminent organization specialist, Douglas MacGregor, who described his personal struggle in moving from the role of eminent scholarly theorist at M.I.T. into the role of president of Antioch College:

Before coming to Antioch, I had observed and worked with top executives as an adviser in a number of organizations. I thought I knew how they felt about their responsibilities and what led them to behave as they did. I even thought that I could create a role for myself which would enable me to avoid some of the difficulties they encountered.

I was wrong! It took the direct experience of becoming a line executive and meeting personally the problems involved to teach me what no amount of observation of other people could have taught.

I believed, for example, that a leader could operate successfully as a kind of adviser to his organization. I thought I could avoid being a 'boss.' Unconsciously, I suspect, I hoped to duck the unpleasant necessity of making difficult decisions, of taking the responsibility for one course of action among many uncertain alternatives, of making mistakes and taking the consequences. I thought that maybe I could operate so that everyone would like me—that 'good human relations' would eliminate all discord and disagreement.

I couldn't have been more wrong. It took a couple of years, but I finally began to realize that a leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any more than he can avoid responsibility for what happens to his organization.⁵⁶

Granted significant differences between personal leadership of a university, leadership on lethal battlefields, and leadership of miscellaneous organizations, some aspects of the analogy may not be as far-fetched as they might appear to some. One instructive point is the inadequacy of the second-hand perspective; as MacGregor demonstrates, no amount of analysis of the leader's situation without direct experience of it can confer adequate understanding of its imperatives. Extended experience as a fellow-member and follower in formally organized collectivities, however, conveys to most people and to most political entities some idea of why some good and able person must fulfill the leader's role.

Special circumstances, such as armed combat, will repeat themselves from the past, and new circumstances will arise, in which leadership by coercion will doubtless prove indispensable. Similarly,

leadership by manipulation will prove appropriate in other circumstances. In all organizational frameworks, leaders will have to develop more extensive ranges of leadership styles to fit different groups seeking different objectives. Leaders dealing with subordinates who are themselves leaders will present special challenges—as a pope varies his style when dealing with cardinals, or bishops, or monsignori, or Jesuits, or parish pastors, or lay tycoons, or abbesses, or heads of various orders, or civil leaders, or heads of other religious congregations—the subtotals of whom steadily become larger as proportion of total membership.

But the largest change will probably result from steady democratization of all layers of organizations in which leadership is exercised.

THE CHALLENGE IS NOT INSUPERABLE

Professor Donald Michael insists that for most people, survival, security, belonging, and esteem are, as Maslow's hierarchy of needs assures us, more compelling goals than self-actualization.⁵⁷ At the time that the *Greening of America* waxed lyrical about the allegedly imminent radicalization and alienation of American youth, the Professors Berger issued a prediction that was more reassuring:

There is no reason to think that 'The System' will be unable to make the necessary accommodations. Should Yale become hopelessly 'greened,' Wall Street will get used to recruits from Fordham or Wichita State. Italians or Southern Baptists will have no trouble running the RAND Corporation.⁵⁸

In almost 200 years of experience, American military institutions and leaders have evolved appropriate, workable systems of leadership that changed with the times and rose to the need. While no solutions are proposed here, we have no indication that Americans will be unable to adapt successfully and exercise quality leadership, no matter how many challenges arise.

But effective as it may have been in the past, American military leadership must explore new ways and achieve new forms of cohesion and nuances of democratic direction. Further layers of elite consciousness will have to be peeled off; greater sensitivity to subordinate views will have to be developed; genuine interactive understanding between interests of leaders and followers will have to replace efforts to fake it, to pretend interest that one does not feel.

Persons who are temperamentally unable to project genuine concern for the interests of others are probably going to have a harder time making it.

ENDNOTES

1. Much of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs has benefited from the analyses by Air Vice Marshal John Downey and his colleagues in *Management in the Armed Forces: An Anatomy of the Military Profession*, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company (UK) Limited, 1977.

2. Two authoritative and comprehensive accounts of findings to date are provided by T. O. Jacobs, *Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations*, Alexandria, Virginia: Human Resources Research Organization, 1971; Ralph M. Stogdill, *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*. Professor Stogdill reports on about 2,300 sources, including some 60 journals.

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6. Cited by Robin Clarke, *Notes for the Future*, New York: Universe Books, 1976, p. 126.

7. Harman, p. 6.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

10. Cited by Donald Michael. *On Learning to Plan—and Planning to Learn*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1976, p. 292.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Cited by Nick Thimmesch. "Catholic Church: A Changed Role," *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1978, p. C7.

13. *Behavior Today*, February 28, 1978, p. 4.

14. Some observers hold that the Army style of social control has already largely changed from coercion to manipulation. See, for example, Lawrence B. Radine, *The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977.

15. C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

16. Edward N. Bouffard, Captain, USN, "ROTC: Quo Vadis?," *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*, July 1977.

17. Harry Levinson, "Asinine Attitudes Toward Motivation," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1973, p. 73.

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20. *Behavior Today*, February 6, 1978, pp. 5-6.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. Differences in perspective can be instructive. A writer on the Soviet school system quotes a Russian education specialist speaking to an American: "You keep talking about 'The Individual' . . . But what you call Individualism, we call Egotism." *Bookletter*, September 30, 1974, p. 10.

24. *Behavior Today*, January 23, 1978.

25. *Ibid.*

26. For example, in Harlem one 15-year old makes \$25,000 per year and

drives a \$12,000 Mercedes. A 12-year old robbed and beat an 80-year old woman, and killed her by throwing her downstairs. *Behavior Today*, August 29, 1977. In one exceptional case, a sentence of 25 years was meted out to one 14-year old convicted of the rape-murder of a 5-year old girl. *The Washington Post*, December 21, 1977, p. A-13.

27. "Shoplifting: Rage and Counter Actions," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1977, p. 35.

28. Bernard Rimland; Lieutenant Peter Young, "Sailor of the 90's." Paper presented to conference on "Navy Advance Planning for Industry." White Oak Laboratory, Silver Spring, Maryland, November 4, 1975.

29. Robert L. Goldich, "Military Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force." Issue Brief No. 1B77032, p. 4, Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, September 15, 1977. See also "The Pool Is Drying Up," *Army Times*, December 5, 1977, pp. 2, 23.

30. Rimland and Young.

31. US Department of the Army. *Leadership for the 1970's: USAWC Study of Leadership for the Professional Soldier*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, October 20, 1971.

32. For representative arguments, see, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?," *Parameters*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1977, pp. 2-9.

33. *Army Times*, August 8, 1977, p. 15.

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36. US Department of Defense, *Manpower Requirements for FY 1972 and 1973*.

37. For an early proposal along these lines, in greater but still limited detail, see Anthony L. Wermuth, "How Big Is Big Enough?," *Army*, July 1973. This concept will be further developed in future work by this author.

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42. Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, Eds., *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Methods*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1951.

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of *Organizational Performance and Human Effectiveness*. For Office of Naval Research. University of Minnesota, October 1970.

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53. Levinson, p. 76.

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