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
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31 JULY 1978

ACN 78047

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

(9) Military issues research memos

(6) # RED ARMY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

(12) 37 p.

by

(10) Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone
~~with~~
Captain Raymond Sturgeon

(11) 31 July 1978

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FOREWORD

This memorandum considers the role played by the Red Army as an instrument of functional integration of all Soviet non-Russian nations and nationalities. The author asserts that the Army appears to be effective in attitudinal integration of autonomous and smaller nationalities, but has had little effect in counteracting ethnic nationalism of major union republic nations. She concludes that although this failure in attitudinal integration does not seem to be at present an important variable in the combat effectiveness of Soviet armed forces, it is perceived as a weakness in the Army and in the society at large.

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

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RED ARMY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Our Army is brought up in the spirit of deep loyalty to the Socialist Motherland, to the ideas of peace and internationalism and to the ideas of the friendship of the peoples. This is where the Soviet Army differs from the bourgeois armies; this is why the Soviet people love their Army and are proud of it.

Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, reporting to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, February 24, 1976.

In the multiethnic Soviet society the Red Army (Soviet Armed Forces since 1938) is undoubtedly one of the most important instruments of national integration, but the model to which Soviet soldiers are assimilated is basically that of a Russian soldier. The still predominantly Russian character of the Soviet armed forces reflects the demographic realities (the Russians, in 1970, constituted 53 percent of the Soviet population), the military traditions of the Tsarist army that have continued strongly to influence the Red Army's character, and the qualitative hegemony the Russians enjoy in the Soviet political life and in the society at large.[1] In the Soviet theory and practice the Russians are considered to be "the leading nation," and the one organization where this is demonstrated most clearly is the Red Army.

The Red Army's ethnic base is wider than that of the old Imperial Army, which excluded 45 nationalities from the draft.[2] All the Soviet nations and nationalities (102 were listed in the 1970 Census) are subject to universal military service. Twenty one of them, in addition to the Russians, number more than one million people; of those the Ukrainians are the most numerous, with 40 million people and 17 percent of the Soviet population, followed by the Uzbeks and the Belorussians, each nine million strong (see Table 1).

Soviet military historians divide the *history of the Red Army* into three basic periods, four, if the prefederation period is counted:[3] a preliminary stage between the Revolution and the formation of the USSR; stage one between the military reforms of 1924 and 1938; stage two, started in 1938 which continued, roughly, until the mid-50's; and the current stage, which is said to have begun with the consolidation of the military might of the Socialist countries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, when the Red Army has assumed a new role, that of defending the "World socialist system." The accommodation of the ethnic factor in the military organization and indoctrination has been of importance at each stage.

Following the October Revolution, Red Army units were formed in Russian areas as well as on the territories of newly established non-Russian Socialist Soviet republics in the western borderlands: Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian-Belorussian and Estonian military formations came into being. But in the chaos of the Civil War and Allied intervention, these national formations, particularly in the Ukraine, concentrated on pursuit of their own national objectives, and by early 1919 the Bolshevik leadership concluded that an integration of military effort was imperative. Soviet sources quote a telegram by Lenin to the Ukrainian Soviet government, reproaching the Ukranians for "playing a game of independence," and ordering them to coordinate military activities with the Red Army command, even if this "temporarily weakens the military situation in the Western Ukraine."[4] An April Resolution of the Control Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks), (RKP(b)), called for an unconditional unity of action between the Soviet republics in the conduct of war. This was followed by a May 4 Resolution, instructing the Communist parties of the non-Russian republics to subordinate their military activities to the Russian Federation;[5] it directed that the territory of each republic should form a military district subordinated to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Russian Federation, and that republics should

TABLE 1. USSR. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
(according to the 1970 Census)

Ethnic Group	Absolute Figures (millions)	Percentage of the Total
USSR Total	241.7	100
Russians (1)	129.0	53.3
Ukrainians (1)	40.8	16.9
Uzbecks (4)	9.2	3.8
Belorussians (1)	9.1	3.7
Tatars	5.9	2.4
Kazakha (4)	5.3	2.2
Azerbaijani (2)	4.4	1.8
Armenians (2)	3.6	1.5
Georgians (2)	3.8	1.2
Moldavians	2.7	1.1
Lithuanians (3)	2.7	1.1
Jews	2.2	0.9
Tadzhiks (4)	2.1	0.9
Germans	1.8	0.8
Chuvashi	1.7	0.7
Turkmen (4)	1.5	0.6
Kirgiz (4)	1.5	0.6
Latvians (3)	1.4	0.6
Mordvinians	1.3	0.5
Bashkirs	1.2	0.5
Poles (1)	1.2	0.5
Estonians (3)	1.0	0.4
All Others	8.9	3.4

Source: *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda*, Moscow, 1973, v. IV.

Note: The 1970 Soviet Census enumerated 102 national groups, in addition to the "other" category. The Soviet Union is a federal state with 15 union republics: the national groups which have union republics are underlined above. Other national groups have lower level autonomous units: autonomous republics, autonomous regions, autonomous provinces, and autonomous districts, depending on size. Some major groups do not have an autonomous status: –Jews, Germans and Poles; either because they are dispersed (an autonomous unit created for the Jews in Eastern Siberia attracted only a few of them), or because they have their own state outside the USSR (Poles), or as a punishment for an alleged collaboration with the Germans in World War II (Germans and Crimean Tatars, the latter a part of the general Tatar group).

The key: (1) - Slavs
(2) - Caucasians
(3) - Baltics
(4) - Central Asians

place their military command structures under the orders of the Council.[6] Appropriate resolutions were passed by the governments of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian-Belorussian and Latvian Socialist republics in May,[7] and on June 1st the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Federation adopted a decree of political and military unity of the Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian-Belrussian Soviet Socialist republics, "for the struggle with world imperialism." The decree established a unified Red Army command and single agencies for recruitment and supply, and integrated the republics' national military formations into an overall operational and command structure of the RSFSR's Red Army.[8] In 1920-21 the system was extended to Turkestan and to Caucasus. In an exchange with Lenin in 1920, Mikhail Frunze—then in command in Turkestan—advised against a creation of a separate Moslem army and staff and recommended instead the formation of local regiments to serve along with Russian regiments in a single army. A similar principle was adopted in the Caucasian Federation in 1921.[9] It should be noted, however, that in Kazakhstan and in North Caucasus it was only in 1928 that the indigenous nationalities, previously exempted from the draft, were called into military service for the first time.[10]

The establishment of an integrated command structure heavily dominated by the Russians introduced an element of ethnic conflict as the minorities resented the Russification imposed on them during army service. The problem came up at the 12th Congress of the RKP(b) in April 1923 in the context of over-all discussion of national relations, and was articulated most strongly by the Ukrainians. Mykola Skrypnik, one of the Ukrainian leaders, complained that the Army was "an instrument for Russifying of the Ukrainian and the whole non-Russian population,"[11] a complaint echoed by another Ukrainian delegate:

> . . . the Red Army is objectively not only an instrument for educating the peasantry in a proletarian spirit, it is an instrument of Russification. We transfer tens of thousands of Ukrainian peasants to Tula and force them to grasp everything in Russian . . . Here is the inertia of the Great Russian command structure; our top command is overwhelmingly Russian . . .[12]

The Congress' debates on the national problem (of which the Red Army question formed only a small part), resulted in a compromise which provided for safeguarding of national rights within the framework of overall Socialist unity and the promotion of the policy of *korenizatsiia,* which meant education and promotion of non-Russians in

all walks of life into positions of eventual equality. In reference to the Red Army the Congress resolved to increase educational work there "in the spirit of the development of ideas of friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet nations," and to take steps to organize national military formation "taking all necessary measures to secure full military preparedness of the republics."[13] A Central Committee resolution of June 1923 provided for translation and publication of political and specialized literature for the national military units in their languages.[14]

The formation of the USSR and the military reform of 1924 officially ushered the first stage in the development of a unified Red Army. Defense was placed under the All-Union jurisdiction; national military formations were continued under a unified command, in line with the decisions of the 12th Congress. The military reform included a 5 year plan of the formation of such units, to be organized on a pattern following that advocated by Frunze earlier.[15] In line with the policy of *korenizatsiia,* an effort was also made to train non-Russian officer cadres for service in territorial national regiments.[16]

There is no information on the extent of the implementation of the *korenizatsiia* policy in the armed forces, but the limited data on the ethnic composition of the officer corps (see below) indicate that, except in the case of the Ukrainians, little progress was made. The change in the political climate by the late twenties and the early thirties, the abandonment of *korenizatsiia* in favour of accelerated integration, and the renewed emphasis on the leading role, in the Soviet Union, of the Russians because they were "most progressive," were the key factors in the nonimplementation of the principle of national equality in the army as well as in other areas. While the national formations continued *de jure,* in practice the Russian hegemony continued.

The second stage in the development of the Red Army was ushered by the military reform of 1938. This abolished the national military formations and replaced them with the principle of individual recruitment *(kadrovyi printsip),* into ethnically-mixed Russian-language basic units.[17] The explanation offered for the change stated that, in view of the progress made in the construction of socialism, the national military units had become obsolete; all Soviet citizens served in the Red Army which was recognized by the working people as the defender of all the Soviet nations and nationalities, and overall cultural progress and voluntary study of the Russian language made it possible for

non-Russian recruits to serve in ethnically mixed Russian-language units. Moreover, the technical reorganization of the armed forces and the increase in international tensions made the continued existence of territorial units dysfunctional to the needs of defense preparedness.[18] Commenting on the disbanding of the national units in 1939 Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov, the USSR Commissar of Defense stated:

> The Red Army is the sole army of the Soviet state on a common and equal basis. For this reason the existence of separate, small national military formations, permanently tied to their own territory, contradicted the fundamentals of the Stalin Constitution and the principles of the extra-territorial recruitment of our army.[19]

The Red Army entered World War II with units newly reorganized on multiethnic basis, but in the heat of battle national formations were resurrected in some cases, because of "the urgent need to form battle worthy units in a short time."[20] These included two Kazakh Guard divisions, Latvian and Estonian infantry corps, the Georgian, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Tadzhik divisions, the Lithuanian and Uzbek infantry divisions, the Bashkii and Kalmyk cavalry divisions, and other national formations: these were composed "mainly of officers and men of one nationality."[21] At the same time a heavy emphasis on Russian patriotism in defense of the Motherland all but obliterated the "internationalist" appeal of the Soviet state. In retrospect the performance of national divisions in the war and heroism of individuals of various nationalities are much praised; but the Red Army also has had to cope with mass defections by non-Russians. With the end of the war the temporary national formations were disbanded and the Red Army returned to the 1938 principle of mixed units and individual recruitment. The October 12, 1967 military law, which reduced the length of military service from 3 to 2 years, also restated the principle of compulsory military service for all male citizens and the ethnically mixed basis for all units.[22] Military districts are drawn without regard to national republican boundaries and there are no provisions for local representation in their command structures.

The third period of development of the Red Army is said to have begun with its assumption of a new role as the defender of socialism not only within the USSR but for all the Socialist countries grouped within the Warsaw Treaty Organization:

> Following the emergence of the socialist world system and the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty political and military organization, the

> Soviet Army entered the third stage of its development. The Soviet Armed Forces have been confronted with new responsible missions. Today the task of defending socialism includes the defence of the gains not only of the peoples of the USSR, but of the other socialist countries as well.[23]

The assumption of the new role, the beginning of which is not dated precisely, began to be emphasized in late sixties and early seventies, following the 1968 Warsaw Pact troops' invasion of Czechoslovakia, and as a part of the new thrust toward the integration of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union on the basis of "proletarian internationalism."[24] In a general way its role now is reminiscent of the role played by the Russian Federation's army vis-a-vis the military formations of the other republics in the pre-1924 period. It may be worth noting here that the Soviet experience in the development of armed forces in a multinational state is considered by Soviet sources to be "of major significance for the strengthening of cooperation between the socialist countries on the basis of the Warsaw Pact."[25]

The role of the Red Army in furthering the goal of *national integration* is not only explicitly acknowledged but is also considered to be of primary importance, the emphasis which complements professional training. John Erickson observes that "preserving the army and the armed forces as a national-ideological school of the nation seems to be on a point of becoming almost counter-productive . . . "; he acknowledges, nevertheless, that the army's political role forms an essential part of an "Army-Party" compact.[26]

The party sees the army as the school of the nation, and political education, individual recruitment base, ethnically mixed units, and the training program, are all designed to mould the multiethnic manpower into a unitary product, a soldier imbued with the spirit of "Soviet patriotism," with undivided loyalty to the Soviet Union, to the party, and to the ideas of "proletarian internationalism" at home and abroad.[27] The value of such indoctrination for the Red Army's combat effectiveness is obvious; as one Soviet general put it, it serves "to knit soldiers together into a monolithnic combat group to be reflected in enhanced combat readiness."[28] The no less important byproduct is the educational and hopefully value-forming experience each conscript takes with him into civilian life after army service. This is particularly important in the case of non-Russians.

Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, describes the Soviet army as "a special kind of army in that it is a school that fosters feelings of brotherhood, solidarity and mutual

respect among all Soviet nations and nationalities."[29] Mixed units and individual recruitment programs are considered necessary for the success of integration efforts; and internationalist education is the key task to be carried out by the armed forces:

> The Communist Party has always considered, and still considers that the military units, mixed from the national point of view, are the basic organizational form of the armed forces, the form which follows from the international nature of the Soviet power. The mixed units are the best way to educate the personnel in the spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples.[30]

> The entire mode of life of the Soviet Army and Navy promotes cohesion and friendship among the fighting men of different nationalities. At the same time the internationalist education of the personnel constitutes one of the key tasks facing the commanders, political bodies, Party and YCL (Young Communist League) organizations in the units. Realization of the role played by the USSR today evokes in Soviet servicemen a feeling of legitimate patriotic pride, a readiness to defend their multinational Motherland . . .[31]

The potential recruit is first exposed to the integration impact of the military service in the one year of preinduction training. Established in 1967 as a substitute for the reduction in length of the military service, the preinduction training is carried out at the *rayon* (district) level at schools, factories and collective farms by regular army instructors (many of whom are in reserves) under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Defense. While formal political instruction is not included in the training, there is a strong emphasis on the so-called "military-patriotic education" (with the YCL prominently involved) and on elements of social control, such as discipline, and patriotism.[32] For non-Russian youths (educated in the local language schools) preinduction training may be the first exposure to instruction in Russian. The level of preinduction training, however, varies from area to area, and instruction in Russian in the national areas may not always be available.

The recruit really becomes immersed in the "international" environment with the moment of induction, when he enters, from a recruit depot onwards, the ethnically mixed Russian-speaking milieu. For a Russian the change is minimal, but a member of an ethnic minority, particularly if of peasant origin, finds himself in an alien environment and facing a loss of ethnic identity. By virtue of sheer numbers Russians form a majority in the mixed units, but other national group members find a few co-nationals there. The Russian

language is the working and the social language of the armed forces. This is logical as Russian is not only the majority language but also the Soviet *lingua franca,* and in the context of Soviet national relations it has always been considered the key instrument of national integration. Under the USSR Constitution the non-Russians have, in their national areas, the right to education, publications and cultural pursuits in their national languages; with Russian taught as the second language and in many cases learned badly or not at all (see Table 2.) But in the armed forces, where any concessions to ethnic autonomy ended with the reform of 1938, the Russian language is the sole medium "in which instruction and education in the Armed Forces are conducted," and is seen as "an important means of strengthening the international ties uniting Soviet fighting men."[33] All the military publications, from high level professional journals to unit newspapers and training manuals, are printed in the Russian language. The exclusive use of Russian places an additional burden on a minority soldier whose knowledge of the language is poor. Soviet sources report that such soldiers are being helped by their fellows;[34] but considering the known killing pace of basic training and additional time consumed for political indoctrination, the amount of such assistance, even if freely given, cannot be extensive. There are no indications that any formal instruction in the Russian language is provided for soldiers who need it.

The environment thus created is in itself a potent force for integration. This is then reinforced by extensive and all-pervading system of political indoctrination to which men and officers are exposed. The system is directed by the armed services Main Political Administration (MPA) and constitutes also one of the main responsibilities of the party and YCL organizations in military formations. Professional officer cadres also are supposed to assist. As Marshal Grechko has instructed the 1974 graduating class of military academies, one of their tasks—to be conducted under guidance of the party and the YCL—is to inculcate in the soldiers "the high communist principles, feelings of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and a constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism."[35] The national integration forms one of the main themes in the political education system. As a prominent Tadzhik scholar and propagandist, and an ex-high party official put it:

> **During their term of active service representatives of different peoples pass through an excellent school of internationalist education. The process of the nations drawing closer together is developing rapidly and tempestuously in the Armed Forces as in the country as a whole.[36]**

TABLE 2. USSR. FLUENCY IN RUSSIAN AND URBANIZATION OF MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS

	Percentage of Ethnic Groups Which Claim Russian As Mother Tongue	Percentage of Ethnic Groups Which Claim Fluency In Russian As A Second Language	Percentage Of Urbanization
Ukrainians	14.2	36.3	49
Belorussians	19.0	49.0	44
Moldavians	4.1	36.1	20
Azerbaijani	1.3	16.6	40
Armenians	7.5	30.1	65
Georgians	1.3	21.3	44
Kazakhs	1.6	41.8	27
Uzbeks	0.5	14.5	25
Tadzhiks	0.6	15.4	26
Turkmen	0.8	15.4	31
Kirgiz	0.3	19.1	15
Lithuanians	1.5	35.9	47
Latvians	4.6	45.2	53
Estonians	4.4	29.0	55
Tatars	10.0	62.5	55
Germans	30.0	59.6	46
Chuvashi	13.0	58.4	23
Mordvinians	2.3	65.7	36
Bashkirs	4.7	53.3	27
Ossetins	5.4	58.6	53
Jews	78.2	16.3	98
Poles	20.7	37.0	45

Source: As in Table 1. Pp. 9, 10, 20, 27 and 28.

Note 1. The Ossetins are a much smaller group in numbers (488,000 in 1970) but are included here because they are visibly present in the armed forces.
Note 2. USSR percentage of urbanization in 1970 was 56 percent.

There are three keynotes in the national integration theme. "Proletarian Internationalism" emphasizes the unity based in common working class consciousness of the Soviet peoples under the leadership of its vanguard–the Communist Party. "Soviet Patriotism" inculcates loyalty to the socialist Motherland, and "Friendship of the Peoples" formula describes an alleged process of the Soviet nations and nationalities "ever growing closer together," the process whereby their common features grow and particularistic features gradually disappear. These concepts have formed a steady diet in the military political education endeavours, but in the early seventies they began to receive an exceptionally strong emphasis, reflecting the party's perception of the growing problem of ethnic nationalism,[37] and in connection with the celebrations of three relevant anniversaries: the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union, Lenin's centenary, and the 25th anniversary of the victory in the "Great Patriotic War."

The Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted at the 50th Anniversary of the USSR specifically instructed the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Main Political Administrations of the Soviet Army and the Navy to issue orders to commanders, MPA units and party organizations to prepare a broad scale educational campaign and a program of mass political work in the armed forces designed to

> **further strengthen the friendship and fraternal relations among soldiers of all nationalities, fostering in them a pride in the achievements of our Motherland, and strengthening their sense of the community of socialist countries and their readiness to defend the revolutionary gains of the peoples.**[38]

Examples of national integration indoctrination campaigns may serve to illustrate the themes, the scope and the forms and methods used. In the Transcaucasus Military District, for example,[39] the plans for a campaign on the national integration theme were prepared by the District's Military Council and approved in a joint session between the MPA and the first secretaries of the three republics included in the District: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The topics of the campaign were Lenin's theory of national relations, the party's nationality policy, "achievements of fraternal Soviet republics in communist construction, the party's revolutionary, combat and labour traditions, and the people and the Army." In the course of the campaign officers were directed "to study Lenin's theoretical legacy systematically and in depth in order to acquire a profound Leninist understanding of the national

question and . . . . the meaning and purpose of the party's struggle for its solution." A number of garrisons held theoretical conferences on the subject. Indoctrination of soldiers and noncommissioned officers was carried out in political study groups, the main subject of which was "the theme of Friendship and Troop comradeship—the Most Important Military Tradition in the Soviet Armed Forces," as well as "questions of national relations and Leninist ideas of friendship among peoples." The campaign was not limited to internal activity within the military, but included also the local population in mutual interaction with military personnel. Throughout the District, meetings were held explaining to the soldiers the sources of unity between the three republics ("joint struggle by workers of the Caucasus in indissoluble friendship with the Russian workers"). Local veterans of the Communist movement addressed many of them. Lectures and speakers were exchanged between the military and the localities (units in Armenia heard 800 lectures by civilian speakers in 1969-70), and cultural personages of the republics addressed officers clubs. At the same time "hundreds of servicemen" gave talks in local enterprises, schools, and collective farms. Local press carried appropriate articles, and arts festivals were held by the military with the local artists.[40]

A similar campaign was also described in the Kiev Military District.[41] This was mapped in a series of conferences between the MPA and the Ukrainian party and YCL leaders. Its leitmotiv was "the ideal of Soviet patriotism and the internationalist duty to defend socialist achievements." Here also Lenin's theory of national relations was a subject of independent study. At thematic evenings dedicated to "friendship of the peoples" and achievements of the union republics, soldiers of appropriate nationality told others how their national areas "flowered" under the Soviet rule. One such evening featured nationalities of North Caucasus; another—a Chechen-Ingush, an Ossetin, a Belorussian and an Ukrainian. "Days of the Republics" were also held, when soldiers returning from short leaves at home addressed groups of their fellows. The study of Russian was given "a significant amount of attention," and special study groups were formed for soldiers who were not fluent in Russian. An interesting aspect of this campaign was that part of it was devoted to the new "internationalist" role of the Red Army. "A great deal of party attention" was directed at educating "privates and sergeants in the spirit of love and respect for peoples and armies of socialist countries," with special emphasis on the "essence of proletarian internationalism," on "propagandizing

experience gained in joint military actions waged by soldiers-internationalists," and on "the goals and tasks of the Warsaw Treaty Organization."[42]

Before proceeding to the evaluation of the impact the service in the Red Army has on the integration of non-Russians into the prevalent "Soviet" model within the army and in subsequent civilian life, it is useful to assess the extent to which the ethnic composition of the armed forces and its officer corps reflects the ethnic composition of the population. Self-perception in terms of relative standing is important in attitude formation and in the soldiers' willingness to identify themselves with the required model.

Hard data on the subject of the *ethnic composition* of the Soviet armed forces are rarely available, but projections can be made on the basis of the figures given and ethnic analysis of names. The Tsarist army was ethnically predominantly Russian, particularly in its officer corps, and, as noted above, excluded many subject nationalities from the military service. While some influx of minority recruits into Red Army units undoubtedly took place during the Civil War, by the end of it the army was still three-fourth Russian and 95 percent Slavic in ethnic composition: figures given for the end of the Civil War list 77.6 percent Russians, 13.7 percent Ukrainians, 4 percent Belorussians and 4.7 percent Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and others among Red Army personnel.[43] In 1972 Marshal Grechko reported that at the time of the formation of the Soviet Union (1924), the non-Russian army personnel constituted only 25 percent of the total, as compared with their 47 percent share in the total population.[44] No ethnic breakdown is available for the officer corps in the period, but at the beginning of the *korenizatsiia* campaign (where minorities were encouraged to enter officer schools), the Army-Navy schools in Petrograd had 2,354 cadets in training, of whom 83 percent were Russians, 4 percent were Ukrainians and 3 percent were Jews; with Latvians, Estonians, Poles and Germans each accounting for approximately 1 percent; the remaining 6 percent were Tatars, Bashkirs and others.[45]

No comparable figures are available for the current period. In view of the universal military service, however, it may be assumed that the ethnic composition of Soviet servicemen by and large reflects the ethnic composition of the population, particularly in the ground forces. Technical services are known to receive a higher proportion of educated youth, and thus their composition is undoubtedly biased in favour of the Russians and national groups which are relatively better educated

and more economically developed. No information is available on the NCO's, but there also a similar bias is likely to be present, enhanced also by the voluntary nature of enlistment.

The officer corps, by all indications, are heavily dominated by the Russian cadre, but include members of other ethnic groups, primarily other Slavs; Marshal Grechko himself was of Ukrainian ethnic origin. Recruitment into the officers corps requires high educational qualifications and fluent Russian, which exclude most members of some national groups, such as Central Asians. It is also voluntary and thus depends on attitudes: preference for a military career, perception of status and expectations of advancement. Ukrainians and Belorussians meet these criteria; also some Asian groups settled within the Russian Federation (RSFSR), who are relatively bilingual (see table 2), and have traditionally entered military service. These are represented in the officer corps: the Tatars, the Chuvashi, the Mordvinians and, among smaller groups, the Ossetins.

Figures for the non-Russian officers in the Army and the Air Force basic officer ranks *(osnovnaia massa ofitserov)* were given for 1943 (see table 3). Assuming that the total number of officers was an approximate half a million,[46] the figures indicate that during the war ethnic Russians constituted an approximate 90 percent of the officer corps. The other two largest groups were the Ukrainians (an approximate 5 percent) and the Belorussians (an approximate 0.2 percent). A similar ethnic breakdown for senior artillery officers for the same year (see table 3) (no figures are available for the total), also indicated that the Ukrainians and the Belorussians were the second and third group among officers. Thus during the war the Soviet officers cadre were overwhelmingly Slavs. Other nationalities listed included the Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, Mordvinians, Chuvashi and the Ossetins, in the artillery also Bashkirs, Moldavians and Kazakhs. The breakdown is interesting not only because of the groups included, but also for the omissions. With the exceptions of a few Kazakhs, there are no Central Asians (the Uzbeks were then the fourth largest national group in the population) and no Azerbaijani. The absence of the Balts is understandable, as the three Baltic republics were not part of the Soviet Union prior to World War II.

There is no information on ethnic composition of the junior officers in the post-war period. Some approximate guesses can be made on the basis of a social origin survey of a sample of 1,000 junior lieutenants, lieutenants and senior lieutenants, carried out by the Army newspaper,

TABLE 3. USSR–SOVIET ARMY OFFICERS: Ethnic Breakdown, 1943

Ethnic Group	Basic Officer Ranks	Senior Artillery Officers
Ukrainians	28,000	6,000
Belorussinas	5,305	1,246
Armenians	1,079	240
Tatars	1,041	173
Georgians	800	129
Chuvashi	405	-
Mordvinians	383	99
Ossetins	251	-
Moldavians	-	49
Kazakhs	-	25
Bashkirs	-	22

Source: Col. P. Rtishchev, "Leninskaia natsional'naia politika i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil," *Voennoistoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 6, June 1974, p. 7.

Krasnaia Zvezda, in 1969.[47] This reveals that 82.5 percent of the lieutenants came from the factory and office workers' families and only 17.5 percent from the collective farms, and that one in four had a higher education. Urban social origin of the majority indicates a bias in the sample in favour of more modernized nationalities. Of the sample's national origins it is said that it included members of 30 nationalities; those listed include all of the union republics' national groups, except the Turkmen.[48]

Ethnic characteristics of senior officers are never discussed, but an analysis here is made easier because lists of general officers are frequently available. In most cases names indicate the bearer's ethnic origin.[49] Four representative samples were used here to estimate ethnic origin of the Soviet Armed Forces' High Command: a list of all the "generals of the Army" appointed between 1940 (when the rank was established), and 1975 (59 names), a list of general officers–members of the 1974 USSR Supreme Soviet (55 names), a list of general officers who were promoted, decorated, died, or travelled abroad in Soviet delegations in 1975 and the first half of 1976 (42 names), and a list of general officers, members of the CPSU leading organs between 1952 and 1976 (100 names). Inevitably some individuals appear in more than one sample. Among the generals of the army 91 percent were Slavs (60 percent Russians, 20 percent Ukrainians, 4 percent Belorussians, 7 percent Slavs who could have been members of either group and including two Poles) and 9 percent were of non-Slavic origin (two names were Turkic, two Jewish).[50] Ninety-five percent of general officers, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were of Slavic origin (80 percent Russians, 15 percent Ukrainians), 5 percent were of other ethnic origins.[51] The 1975-76 sample revealed a similar breakdown: 95 percent Slavs and 5 percent non-Slavs; the latter two individuals, one an Armenian, another of Germanic origin.[52]

The military contingent in the CPSU leading organs comprised the Who's Who of the Soviet Armed Forces' professional-political elite in the last 25 years. It included ministers and deputy ministers of Defense, commanders in chief of the services, commanders of most military districts, heads of main political administrations in the key services and a few distinguished veterans such as marshals Voroshilov and Budenny. Ninety-six percent of this group were Slavs, an estimated 78 percent Russians and 18 percent Ukrainians, Belorussians and Poles. Only four individuals (4 percent), were ethnically non-Slavs, among them Marshal Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, an Armenian, two officers of

probable Jewish origin, and one with a Germanic (Jewish?) name (see table 4).

As shown in the above analysis, the Red Army's high command is composed almost exclusively of Slavs, mostly Russians. The Ukrainians and Belorussians, and the few others who "made it," are, for all practical purposes, Russified. All the evidence also indicates that the Slavs have a higher share in general officers corps than in the population at large. This is not surprising if, in addition to their weight in the population, one considers traditions of military service which go back to Tsarist times, and their relatively high degree of urbanization and educational standing. Members of other groups present also reflect their group's degree of assimilation, relative economic standing and attitudes. Among those absent, or at least invisible, one should note Central Asian Moslems (20 million strong in 1970) and members of the Baltic nations which, while small, stand the highest in the Soviet Union on the scale of education and economic development. Also, with a few exceptions, there are no Jews.

In the evaluation of *the impact* the Red Army service has on the national integration of military personnel it should be noted that the problem does not arise in the case of ethnic Russians who form the backbone of the service. In a very real sense it is "their" army in traditions, organization and over all *esprit des corps.* For them, the thrust of the indoctrination on the theme of the "friendship of the people" (as distinct from general political indoctrination which is not the subject of this paper) is designed to develop the sense of accepting the non-Russians as comrades-in-arms and to imbue them with a sense of responsibility for helping minority members to become good Soviet soldiers, i.e., to carry out their "leading role" in the Soviet "fraternal family." It is difficult to judge how effective this is. The concept of "Soviet patriotism" presents no special problems to a Russian soldier as it is largely equated with the old concept of Russian patriotism and loyalty to Mother Russia.

In discussing the impact on other ethnic groups a distinction should be made among members of the professional cadre–officers and NCO's–and ordinary servicemen. The professional cadre–men who voluntarily chose military career as a profession–have already made a conscious decision to integrate on entering the service, and to pay the price of Russification necessary for advancement in what is still basically a Russian army. On the face of available evidence this seems a fair assumption. Their integration into a prevalent model largely a *fait*

TABLE 4. SOVIET ARMED FORCES. GENERAL OFFICERS, MEMBERS OF THE CPSU LEADING ORGANS, 1952-76

CPSU Leading Organ	Slavs		Non-Slavs	Total
	Russians	Other		
Central Committee:				
members	35	41	23	41
candidate members	36	102		46
Central Auditing Commission:				
members	7	4	24	13
Total	78	18	4	100
	96			

1. Two Ukrainians, two probable Ukrainians.
2. Eight probable Ukrainians, two Poles.
3. Marshal Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, Tret'yak, Ivan Moiseyevich.
4. Dragunsky, David Abramovich, Kreizer, Yakov Grogor'evich.

Note: Secretary General, L. I. Brezhnev is not included, notwithstanding his new title of Marshal of the Soviet Union (May, 1976).

Source: *The Composition of Leading Organs of the CPSU (1952-1976)*, compiled by Herwig Kraus. Supplement to the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin.

accompli, this group will not be further considered in this section.[53] It might be added here, however, that the officer cadre (excluding the officers in the MPA) (like professionals in general) tend to resist fine points of ideological indoctrination and to resent the time consumed by political education in the service. There is some evidence also that the younger officers, like educated Soviet youth in general, tend to be more cynical and more questioning toward the official party line, and in some cases may be vulnerable to appeals by civil rights–national dissidents.[54]

The effect the Army service has on the integration of non-Russian servicemen should be assessed in two different aspects: first, in their functional integration; secondly, in a change of their national attitudes. In terms of functional integration the question to ask is to what extent military service enhances a non-Russian soldier's ability to function effectively in an integrated environment inclusive of the facility to use the Russian language, the ability that, after the service, makes him socially and geographically mobile. In terms of attitudes it is important to assess to what extent the service undermines ethnic nationalism, develops the man's identification with the goals of the political system and his loyalty to the Soviet Motherland. In both cases the impact differs for members of different groups, depending on cultural background and the degree of assimilation.

There is little doubt that the Army service has a major impact on functional integration of non-Russians. It breaks down their ethnic insularity and exposes them to contacts with the Russians and other national groups on a daily basis. It also, willy nilly, forces them to acquire at least a rudimentary working knowledge of Russian. Many tend to settle in urban-industrial areas after military service, and there is evidence that some marry Russian girls and/or leave their national area altogether. The denationalization impact of the army service on non-Russian conscripts, particularly the Ukrainians, is decried by a Ukrainian national dissident:

> **Now we cannot even speak of minimal safeguards for the most elementary national interests of Ukrainian youth (as well as for the youth of other Republics) in the Army. Millions of young Ukrainian men come home after several years' service nationally disorientated and linguistically demoralized and become in their turn a force exerting an influence for Russification on other young people and on the population at large. Not to mention that a considerable number of them do not return to the Ukraine at all. It is not hard to imagine how tremendously damaging all this is for national development.[55]**

Western experts also agree that the integration impact of the Army is strong even in the case of Central Asian Moslems, the least assimilated group among non-Russian nations:

> it is the army which is the principal instrument of the russification of the Muslims . . . Military service is for many young Muslims, and particularly those coming from the country, their first direct contact with foreigners. For some it is the only chance they have of becoming acquainted with the Russian language, of which previously they knew nothing. Sometimes it is a decisive experience which affects a Muslim's whole life by breaking down the cultural barriers separating him from the Russians.[56]

At the same time, given the universal character of military service and the many years in which it has been operating, the impact, as revealed by statistics of urbanization, bilingualism (see table 2), settlement patterns and intermarriage seems rather small. The incidence of interethnic marriages is growing, but is largely confined to urban areas and is still rather low.[57] The ethnic settlement pattern in 1970 reveals that with the exception of the Russians, and to a lesser extent Ukrainians and Belorussians and diaspora nationalities, only a fraction of the population of major national groups reside outside their national republics and even those tend to remain in their contiguous areas.[58] In the case of major ethnic groups, the bilinguals still only rarely exceed more than a half of their total numbers. In terms of linguistic assimilation in 1970, 13 million non-Russians declared Russian as their mother tongue (14 percent of the non-Russian population).[59] Given the period of time passed since the Revolution this can be seen either as a great achievement, or as a rather meager result of a sustained effort of more than 40 years, depending on a point of view. Undoubtedly the army service has played an important role in the popularization of the language. On the evidence of Soviet ethnographers, the army service ranked third, behind Russian-language schools and work contacts, as the factor instrumental in the learning of the Russian language by non-Russians.[60]

The impact of army service and its political education program on ethnic attitudes is more difficult to assess. It would be unrealistic to expect that a national conditioning developed from childhood can be overcome in a period of from 2 to 3 years. This seems especially unlikely in the environment where, despite lip service to "fraternal Soviet family of nations," the Russian fact hits a non-Russian soldier squarely in the face, and under the exposure to indoctrination which is as crude as it is endlessly tedious, and by its very repetitiveness and

fictitious assertions tends to be counterproductive. Soviet sources include references to nationalist and religious prejudices in the service (the latter most frequently applied to Moslem soldiers), and manifestations of "nationalist conceit." Commanders are said to underestimate or ignore harmful nationalistic prejudices among servicemen,[61] and it is admitted that nationalist survivals continue to exist in "the minds of some people," with the blame assigned to the "imperialist propaganda" and "right" and "left" opportunism.[62] A Soviet lieutenant colonel, very aptly, called the Soviet Army "a mirror of contemporary Soviet society," a statement which perhaps best reflects the limits of the army impact on attitude formation:

> In the general conditions of the social environment in which Soviet troops live and serve there are examples of the social and class distinctions inherent in our society; differences in the standards of organization and discipline of the representatives of the two allied classes of workers and collectivized peasantry, differences between manual workers and those doing brain work, and also special national traits.[63]

In the Soviet society at large the evidence is strong that ethnic nationalism has been growing among union republic nations; at the same time a trend towards assimilation into the surrounding Russian majority has been noted among most national groups with area of settlement within the RSFSR, and among diaspora groups.[64] Both trends seem to be reflected in the Red Army in the visibility of the national groups in the professional cadres, and in the apparent impact (or lack thereof) military service has on their integration into the Soviet society. Evidence available is inadequate to draw any definitive conclusions, but it seems that, with one significant exception, the army service has little impact on the national integration of groups, among whom ethnic nationalism is on the increase, but that it is a potent factor in furthering integration of groups which are already on an upward assimilation curve. It can be hypothesized further, that, in the case of unassimilated and least modernized national groups, functional integration promoted in the period of military service may actually serve to strengthen the ranks of their national elites which have acted as spokesmen for the new ethnic nationalism, as in the case, particularly, of the Moslems of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

The one significant exception are the Slavs,–Ukrainians, Belorussinas and Poles,–the first, the most numerous, and the most important among the non-Russian ethnic groups in the Soviet Union.

Because of the close cultural affinity to the Russians, the Slavs are highly vulnerable to Russification, the vulnerability of which the Ukrainians particularly are very much aware, as seen in statements quoted above. For the Slavs the Red Army service seems to be a powerful factor in furthering their integration into the Soviet society and indeed in their Russification, both in functional and attitudinal terms, as seen in their visibility in the officer corps and in the command structure. Among the Slavs the Ukrainians are a special case, not only because of their numbers. The Ukraine, more than any other of the Soviet republics, has experienced, in the post-World War II period, a strong upsurge of ethnic nationalism and in recent times (as also in the twenties), has been the focus of the ethnic conflict in Soviet national relations. At the same time, however, outside their republic, they are assimilating to the point that they are second only to the Russians in promoting Soviet national integration among other ethnic groups.

In the case of other major union republic nationalities little evidence exists that the Red Army service has played any role in their attitudinal integration; Georgians and Armenians and the three Baltic nations are all historical nationalities with a strong sense of separate national identity and all have shown signs of growth of ethnic nationalism. For them, also, the functional integration role of the army service is less important, because they all have high educational quotient and relatively high degree of economic development (Latvians and Estonians stand the highest on the Soviet scale). The two Caucasian groups, particularly the Armenians, are visible in the officer corps, (as they are also in the All-Union service), but there is little evidence of their denationalization. The Baltic nations--probably because of their small numbers as much as because of their attitudes--are not visible. For Central Asian Moslems and the Azerbaijani, the army service is very important in terms of functional integration, as mentioned above, but it seems to have had no impact on their attitudes, and indeed may, in the long run, contribute to the growth of ethnic nationalism in their republics, by facilitating the transition of Moslem youth from the insularity of their villages to their republic's political arena. Their absence from the officer corps, despite their significant share in the Soviet population, seems to be the function of cultural attitudes as much as their still relatively low level of modernization.

In summary, the Red Army plays a significant role as an instrument of functional integration of all the Soviet non-Russian nations and nationalities and appears to be effective in attitudinal integration of

autonomous and smaller nationalities and, in part also, of the Slavic groups. But Army service seems to have had little effect in counteracting ethnic nationalism of major union republic nations. The fact that national integration in the armed forces is for all practical purposes synonymous with Russification may be a strong contributing factor to this failure.

Because of the relatively small size of nonintegrated groups (except Central Asian Moslems) and their absence in the officer corps (except the Ukrainians) this failure in attitudinal integration does not seem to be at present an important variable in the combat effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces, although in the long run it may become a major problem if Central Asian and Ukrainian nationalism continues to grow.[65] It is however, perceived as a weakness in the Army and in the society at large, and is a matter of major concern. In the armed forces this concern is reflected in the emphasis on integrated organization and training and in the importance attached to political indoctrination.

ENDNOTES

1. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XVI, No. 5, September-October 1967, pp. 16-26; Serweryn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 5, September-October 1964, pp. 45-52; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the U.S.S.R.," *Ibid.*, May-June 1974, pp. 1-22.

2. Col. P. Rtishchev, "Leninskaia natsional'naia politika i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil," pp. 3-9, *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 6, June 1974, p. 3.

3. Some sources count the preliminary period as stage one. In line with other sources, however, such as Col. A. Korkeshkin, "Strength of the Soviet Army," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 11, 1972, pp. 58-60, it was decided here to count as stage one the period beginning in 1924.

4. Rtishchev, p. 5.

5. I. Z. Zakharov, "Sovetskie Vooruzhennye Sily na zashchite natsional'nykh i internatsionnal'nykh interesov narodov SSSR," pp. 103-118, *KPSS-Organizator Bratskoi Druzhby Narodov SSSR*, Uchenye Zapiski Kafedr Obshchestvennykh Nauk Vuzov Leningrada; Istoriia KPSS; Vol. XIII, Leningrad, 1973, p. 5. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the RKP (b) stated that it was shown by experience that "the tendencies of the separate socialist republics to keep their military operations, inclusive of operational aspects, within their national boundaries, led, in practice, to repeated clashes between their local and national objectives and the military tasks of the Socialist Revolution as a whole," *Ibid.*

6. Col. N. Pankratov, "The Militant Union in the Making," *Soviet Military Review*, pp. 11-13, No. 9, September 1972, p. 12.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

8. Korkeshkin, p. 59, and Zakharov, pp. 106-107. It may be remembered that it was also in April 1919, at the 8th Congress of the RKP (b), that the party program established the principle of the unitary character of the party, denying autonomy to its branches based in national territories. The principle, which is still in force, provides that all the national branches of the party are subordinated to its Central Committee on the basis of democratic centralism.

9. Rtishchev, p. 5.

10. Zakharov, p. 110.

11. Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, p. 136.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Quoted in Zakharov, p. 108, also in Rtishchev, p. 6.

14. Rtishchev, p. 6.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Zakharov, p. 109.

17. The March 7, 1938 Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) (VKP(b)), and the Council of National Commissars of the USSR, provided that national units and formations, and military schools, be reorganized into All-Union units, and be staffed in extra-territorial manner, and that all citizens of national republics and provinces should be called for military service on the same basis as all other nationalities of the USSR. Quoted *Ibid.*, p. 111.

18. Rtishchev, p. 7.

19. XVIII Sezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b) Stenograficheskyi Otchet, 1939, p. 191. Cited in Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice,* London: The Bondley Head, 1967, p. 52.

20. Rtishchev, p. 8.

21. *Ibid.*, also Korkeshkin, p. 59 and Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Sluzhim Sovetskomu Soiuzu," pp. 7-25, in *Armiia Bratstva Narodov,* Moscow, 1972.

22. Rtishchev, p. 8; see also John Erickson, "Soviet Military Manpower Policies," pp. 29-47, *Armed Forces and Society,* Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1974, p. 35.

23. Korkeshkin, p. 60.

24. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Proletarian Internationalism–A New Stage in the Development of Eastern Europe," *Survey* (98), Spring 1976.

25. Rtishchev, p. 9.

26. Erickson, p. 43.

27. The meaning of "proletarian internationalism" is all-embracing; it postulates a unity based in the class principle which overrides ethnic, racial and other loyalties; this in turn postulates the acknowledgement of the leading role of the Communist party–as the vanguard of the working class–(in the Soviet usage, this means the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)), and the acceptance of the principle of democratic centralism, which is the party's operational principle. See A. K. Azizian, *Leninskaia natsional'naia politika v razvitii i deistvii,* Moscow, 1972.

28. Col. Gen. S. Kurkotkin (Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District), "In the Spirit of Friendship of Peoples," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 16, August, 1970, pp. 23-29.

29. Quoted in Col. K. Spirov, "The Soviet Army–A School of Internationalism," pp. 23-25, *Soviet Military Review,* No. 10, October 1974, p. 23.

30. Rtishchev, p. 4.

31. Spriov, p. 24.

32. Erickson, pp. 35-36.

33. Captain A. Skrylnik, "Our Strength is in the Friendship of the Peoples," *Soviet Military Review,* pp. 2-5, No. 7, July 1972, p. 5.

34. *Ibid.*, and Kurkotkin.

35. "Priem v Kremle v chest vypusunikov voennykh akademii," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* July 2, 1974, p. 1.

36. B. G. Gafurov, (an interview with) "Nations: Flourishing, Drawing Together," pp. 2-5, *Soviet Military Review,* No. 10, October 1972, p. 5. Gafurov is a noted historian, an ethnic Tadzhik, and, for 10 years (1945-56) was the first secretary of the Tadzhik Communist Party. Since 1956 he has been with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, acting as the leading Soviet representative in relations with the Third World.

37. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Recent Trends in Soviet Nationality Policy," N. T. Dodge, ed., *The Soviets in Asia,* Proceedings of a Symposium sponsored by the Washington Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, May 19-20, 1972, Mechanicsville, Md., 1972, pp. 7-17.

38. Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "O podgotovke k 50-letiiu obrazovaniia Soiuza Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik," pp. 3-13, *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, No. 5, 1972.

39. Kurkotkin.

40. Ironically one of them was an Armenian poetess, Sylva Kapoutikian, who has been under strong criticism for nationalist deviations.

41. V. I. Bukhalo, "Some Forms of International Education for Army Youth (Based on Materials from the Red Flag Kiev Military District 1966-1970)," *Ukrains'kyy Istorychnyy Zhurnal,* October 1974, pp. 58-65.

42. The "internationalist" theme in its application to relations between Socialist countries obviously is considered important in the Red Army's political indoctrination. A detailed program of lectures on the subject, for example, was discussed by Capt. A. Starovarov, "The Armed Forces of the Socialist States and their combat cooperation; a guarantee of the peace and security of the peoples," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 17, September 1970, pp. 61-68.

43. Korkeshkin, p. 59.

44. Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Armiia Sotsialisticheskaia, mnogonatsional'naia," *Krasnaia Zvezda,* December 17, 1972, pp. 1-2.

45. In December, 1923. Zakharov, p. 109.

46. It is reported that during World War II some two million Soviet officers were trained, at a rate of 400,000-500,000 annually, and that the rate of annual replacement equaled total annual input of new trainees, because of the extremely high casualty rate. Peter Kruzhin, "Soviet Military Colleges," *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,* Institute for the Study of the USSR, (Munich), No. 610, July 28, 1970. The figure of 500,000 was therefore used here as an approximate base figure for the officer corps in 1943. This, compared with data in Table 2, gives the figure of approximately 460,000 Russian officers, i.e., 92% of the total. The strength of the Soviet officer corps in the 70's was estimated at approximately 685,000 (20% of the armed forces of 3.4 million). See Herbert Goldhamer, *Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level,* Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1974, p. 11.

47. Col. F. Khaturin, Lt. Col. A. Shchelokov, "Lieutenants; Sociological Portrait," *Soviet Military Review,* No. 9, September 1969, pp. 2-7.

48. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussinas, Moldavians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Kazakhs, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijani, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Mordvinians, Chuvashi, Mari, Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Kabardinians, Ossetins, Komi, and others. *Ibid.*

49. Ethnic analysis of names is not an exact method but it has proved to be generally accurate. In most cases, ethnic origin can be deduced from a name, if given name, family name, and patronymic are included. The drawback of the method is that it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between names of related ethnic groups, as in the case of Slavic names (although some Ukrainian, Belorussina, and Polish names are quite distinct), or Turkic names. Slavic and Moslem names, however, are quite distinct, as are Armenian and Georgian names, Lithuanian names, and names of Germanic origin (the latter frequently in Latvia and Estonia).

50. The list in Peter Kruzhin, "Soviet Generals of the Army," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 89/75, February 28, 1975.

51. P. Kruzhin, "Predstavitelstvo Sovetskikh vooruzjennykh sil v Verkhovnom Sovete SSSR 9-go sozyva," *Radio Liberty Research,* No. 205/74, July 10, 1974.

52. Compiled from *Current Soviet Leaders; A Cumulative Guide to Officials and Notables in the USSR,* Oakville, Ontario, Canada, Vol. 2, No. 1 and 2, January 1, 1975-December 31, 1975, and Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1, 1976-June 30, 1976.

53. Within a narrower, more specialized, and more explicitly Russian setting the army professionals are a counterpart of party and state functionaries in the All-Union service, the "Feds" as it were, who run the USSR. This group is also heavily dominated by the Slavic (mostly Russian) element, and non-Russians among them tend to be Russified and, in some cases, to be "more Catholic than the Pope." As in the officer corps Ukrainians are second to the Russians also in this group, and it includes individuals of other ethnic origin who "made it" in the federal service. B. G. Gafurov, quoted above, is an example.

54. In May, 1969, the naval officers Gavrilov, Kosyrev and Paramonov were arrested by the KGB and accused of founding a "Union to Struggle for Political Rights in the U.S.S.R." See Peter Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union,* New York: American Heritage Press, 1972, p. 175.

55. Dzyuba, p. 137.

56. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union,* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 199-200.

57. Intermarriage between Slavs and between Slavs and Jews is fairly common, but it is less frequent between other groups and between them and Slavs. For Moslems, exogamus marriages are still quite rare. See Ann Sheehy, "Intermarriage in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 149/75, April 11, 1975.

58. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Itogi Vsasoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda;* Vol. IV, Natsional'nyi Sostav Naseleniia SSSR, Soiuznykh i Avtonomnykh Respublik, Kraev, Oblastei i Natsional'nykh Okrugov, Moscow, 1973, Tables 1-3, pp. 9-19.

59. *Ibid.,* Table 4, p. 20.

60. S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo, "Faktory rasprostraneniia dvuiazychiia u narodov SSSR," pp. 17-30; *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* 1975, No. 5, p. 25, and for Moldavia, Tables 7 and 8, p. 26. It should be noted that in most ASSR's the instruction in the native language is phased out by the 6th grade and is replaced, in higher grades, by instruction in the Russian language. This is not the case in the union republics where national language instruction in national language schools continues through secondary education.

61. Kurkotkin.

62. Rtishchev, p. 9.

63. Quoted in Yuri V. Marin, "Call for More Militant Patriotism Among Soviet Youth," *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,* Institute for the Study of the USSR, No. 536, February 18, 1969, p. 2. The quote is from Lt. Col. P. Proshutinskii, "The Social and Political Nature of Discipline," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 22, 1968, p. 44.

64. See George W. Simmons, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin,* Detroit University Press, 1977; also T. Rakowska-Harmstone, "Dialectics . . . ."

65. Central Asian Moslems and the Azerbaijani alone among the Soviet nationalities have the fertility rate exceeding 30 per thousand of population. See G. Baldwin, et. al., "Projections of the Population of the USSR and Eight

Sub-Divisions, By Age and Sex: 1973 to 2000," *International Population Reports*, US Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, Ser. P-91, No. 24, June 1975.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER ACN 78047	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) RED ARMY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Military Issues Research Memorandum 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE 31 July 1978 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 32
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Red Army; national integration; political education; denationalization; Russian indoctrination; attitude formation; ethnic nationalism.

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This memorandum considers the role played by the Red Army as an instrument of functional integration of all Soviet non-Russian nations and nationalities. The author asserts that the Army appears to be effective in attitudinal integration of autonomous and smaller nationalities, but has had little effect in counteracting ethnic nationalism of major union republic nations. She concludes that although this failure in attitudinal integration does not seem to be at present an important variable in the combat effectiveness of Soviet

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armed forces, it is perceived as a weakness in the Army and in the society at large.

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