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
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

**SINO-SOVIET INVOLVEMENT
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
THE ELEMENT OF MUTUAL COMPETITION**

Peter W. Colm
Karl F. Spielmann

June 1977

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In the early period, Moscow tended to emphasize grandiose aid projects for radical governments in Africa, such as those of Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, while Peking tended to stress assistance to African insurgencies often to the detriment of its diplomatic objectives. With the fall of Khrushchev and the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in China, both Moscow and Peking curtailed their African involvement. (although China proceeded with construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway). The current phase of Sino-Soviet involvement in Africa began in the early 1970's, when Peking entered the UN and emerged from its Cultural Revolution isolationism. China established (or reestablished) diplomatic relations with most African countries and initiated an economic aid program that became much more comprehensive than that of any other country. Chinese policy was driven in part by its ideological aspiration to leadership in the Third World, and in part by an effort to find allies against Soviet expansionism, the threat of which is perceived in Peking in global/political as well as strategic/military terms. Renewed Soviet interest in Africa at about the same time may have been stimulated in part by the increase in Chinese activity, but direct Soviet interests were also involved such as Moscow's requirement for support facilities for naval and air activities in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. The ideological element was also important. At a time when Moscow was making compromises elsewhere in the furtherance of detente, Africa became useful to the Soviet leadership as an arena in which the continuing revolutionary vigor of the Soviet system could be demonstrated without excessive risks.

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I

INTRODUCTION

In analyzing the involvement of China and the U.S.S.R. with countries in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the 1950's, one must consider a bewildering list of factors to account for various aspects of Chinese and Soviet activities in an area that historically had been of minimal concern to either country (aside from a traditional Tsarist interest in Ethiopia and a record of occasional maritime trading expeditions from China to East Africa during the Ming dynasty).

Soviet and Chinese interest in Africa was aroused when the newly independent African states suddenly became numerically important, particularly in the United Nations; when some of them were gripped by turmoil that seemed to Peking and Moscow to contain a revolutionary potential; and when several African regimes headed in a radical direction that appeared to be compatible with Chinese or Soviet policies. Sino-Soviet competition also played a role; the emergence of independent black African countries coincided with the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute. An additional factor may have been that after the passing of colonialism, the West was not deeply committed in Africa. Africa has therefore been seen by Peking and Moscow as a place where each can expand its influence at the expense of residual Western interests or at the expense of the other, with relatively little risk and seemingly without much need to compromise other policies, such as détente.

Chinese and Soviet economic and geopolitical interests make up another set of factors that must be considered. Trade with Africa has not been important overall to the economy of either China or the U.S.S.R. However, in some cases the specific

resources of certain friendly African countries may be important (such as the bauxite of Guinea to the U.S.S.R.); in other cases, trade with China or the U.S.S.R. has grown to considerable proportions (for example, China's trade with Tanzania). Nevertheless, it is difficult to justify the depth of Chinese or Soviet involvement in Africa on economic grounds, since expensive aid programs have been required to establish and maintain economic influence in particular countries. Geopolitical considerations may be more important, especially in the most recent period. Soviet aid programs have increasingly focused on countries such as Somalia, Angola, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), and, most recently, Ethiopia, that can provide air and naval facilities for Soviet forces operating in the Indian or South Atlantic oceans. China has established an impressive chain of influence across central Africa, through the construction of the railway from Tanzania to Zambia and through its relationship with Zaire. However, the importance of geopolitical factors should not be exaggerated, particularly since both China and the Soviet Union have learned that influence in Africa is obtained at high cost and more often than not is transitory.

Peking and Moscow have been able to exercise policies in sub-Saharan Africa ranging from revolution to trade and diplomacy, but it is important to note that Africa did not thereby become a major theater of Sino-Soviet competition. The Chinese or Soviet interests at stake in Africa are not comparable with those at stake in Europe, along the Sino-Soviet border, in the Middle East, or in Northeast, South, and Southeast Asia. Initial Chinese or Soviet involvement in a particular African situation is explainable less by vital policy concerns than by the opportunities that Africa presented, particularly for low-risk operations. This is not to deny, however, that Chinese and Soviet involvement in time created some important interests, because of the commitment of resources and prestige and because of the element of Sino-Soviet competition. Moreover, because

of the general radicalization of African politics in the 1970's, Peking and Moscow have come to perceive African opportunities as increasingly promising.

A list of the factors that, in various combinations, have played a role in Chinese and Soviet involvement in African affairs would suggest that the two countries have approached African issues in a more random fashion than has actually been the case. The governing element in Chinese and Soviet formulation of policies in Africa is the ideological factor. Ideology has been a relatively prominent consideration, possibly because other Chinese and Soviet interests were not at stake, and therefore there was less need to compromise ideological purity to the concerns of state to which it is sometimes vulnerable. Also, ideology has been particularly important in all aspects of the Sino-Soviet split, which was evidenced in divergent ideological formulations long before it became obvious in other areas.

The importance of ideology as a legitimizing factor for authoritarian Communist regimes should not be underestimated. China has almost no established process for effecting political change, such as that involved in the Cultural Revolution or in the succession to Mao Tse-tung, except the test of ideological loyalty to the currently accepted version of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." The U.S.S.R. also depends on ideology as a political mechanism, and Soviet influence among other Communist movements hinges on maintaining Moscow's image as a major, if not the major center of Communist orthodoxy.

While the Sino-Soviet alliance was intact, Moscow was willing to let Peking claim that the ideology of the Maoist revolution in China was of particular relevance for the underdeveloped world. However, once the Sino-Soviet split became evident, Moscow was no longer willing to let Peking's pretensions pass without challenge, even in regard to an area like Africa where vital Soviet interests were not involved. Thus,

Moscow and Peking both attached importance to finding in various African situations support for their own particular ideological formulations or material to rebut the other's accusations--e.g., Moscow's support for "armed struggle" in Southern Africa as refutation of Peking's charges of "revisionism." Africa in addition provided a means to illustrate the ideological dimension of domestic factional disputes, particularly for China (e.g., in the Cultural Revolution) but to some extent also for the U.S.S.R. (as at the time of Khrushchev's fall). Both countries have also used their African involvements to illustrate ideological orthodoxy at times when elsewhere ideology has been compromised to other concerns of state. Examples are Moscow's militancy in Angola at a time of détente politics in Europe, and Peking's renewed propaganda emphasis on radical liberation movements at a time when the new Hua Kuo-feng regime stressed pragmatism in domestic and international affairs.

While both countries have emphasized ideological concerns in their African activities, there have been some marked differences. Ideology is a more pervasive element of Peking's actions than Moscow's, almost all of it discernible in the form of simplistic Mao quotes rather than the kind of dialectical analysis published by various Soviet research institutes. The Chinese emphasis on ideology and Peking's requirements for reciprocity from her African clients have not been constant, but rather seem to have had an inverse relationship to more conventional diplomatic concerns. Generally, both the U.S.S.R. and China have held up their own experience as a "model" for African clients, but while the U.S.S.R. earlier tended to stress the developmental side of its model, China stressed the more militant and revolutionary aspects; to some extent these positions have more recently been reversed. (It should be added that, as reflected in Africa, neither model has much historical verisimilitude.)

The present study seeks to isolate the competitive factor in Chinese and Soviet activities in Africa and to view that factor from the vantage points of Moscow and Peking. The ideological element will inevitably be stressed, both because of the importance of that element in the Sino-Soviet dispute and because each country has chosen to demonstrate in Africa the vitality of its version of the common legitimizing creed.

II

EVOLUTION OF GOALS AND POLICIES: THE SOVIET POSITION

Compared to other regions of the world, Africa has historically been an area holding relatively little interest for the Soviet Union. Taken by itself, this might support the notion that, events in Angola notwithstanding, the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to perceive Africa as an area of great significance in the future. On the other hand, one might with equal justification therefore regard the U.S.S.R.'s Angolan involvement as being particularly ominous, signalling a different Soviet assessment of Africa's future importance. A look at some of the details of the overall Soviet assessment is clearly in order before any judgment on future Soviet attitudes can be made.

A. THE EARLY PERIOD

For all intents and purposes, Africa was beyond the pale for Tsarist Russia. Over the years Tsarist foreign policy and security concerns were overwhelmingly continental in emphasis, with an understandable primary focus on Europe. To the extent that Tsarist Russia was concerned with those areas of the globe that later came to be included under the rubric "Third World," attention was limited basically to countries on Russia's periphery.

The North African states bordering on the Mediterranean might conceivably have attracted Tsarist Russia's attention, had she ever succeeded in becoming a power in the Mediterranean. But the "straits question" with Turkey was never resolved in a way that would have permitted Russia to acquire that status. Africa south of the Sahara was of even less interest, despite

the fact that by the late 19th century it was the scene of extensive colonization efforts by the Western powers.¹

In most major respects, the Communist successors to the tsars endorsed Tsarist geopolitical priorities until well after World War II. To be sure, Lenin and other Communist theoreticians had called attention to the fact that the colonial areas of the world were deserving of attention, since they supposedly were crucial to the economic health of the capitalist West. However, while Communist movements were built up to try to exploit this weakness, in the overall context of Soviet foreign policy activities the effort thus expended was hardly considerable. And where Soviet activity was more extensive--e.g., in China, beginning in the 1920's--the results were somewhat of a mixed blessing, even before Mao achieved power in 1949.

Africa took a back seat even to this relatively low-priority effort to oust the imperialists from their colonies. With certain minor exceptions, such as the Communist Party of South Africa, there were no real Communist movements worthy of the name, and the economic class basis necessary to sustain such

¹It might be noted, however, that just as ideological concerns were to give the Soviets at least some interest in Africa, so too what minor Tsarist interest there was was basically ideological in nature. From time to time under the tsars, a little attention was paid to Ethiopia as the home of the ostensible coreligionists of the Russian Orthodox church--the Coptic Church. Just prior to World War I, however, Russia opened a permanent mission in Addis Ababa--the only Russian mission in Africa. None of this really adds up to any substantial Tsarist security interest in Africa, although some interest of this sort can be adduced to help explain even the relatively small Russian concern with Ethiopia (given its location) in the latter half of the 19th century, after the Suez Canal was opened by Russia's principal imperialist "competitor"--Great Britain. For an interpretation which stresses this interest, see Edward Thomas Wilson, *Russia and Black Africa Before World War II* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1974).

movements was even less apparent than in certain Asian states.² This latter local deficiency combined with the comparatively higher priority the Soviets accorded to ousting the Western imperialists from their Asian holdings to make Africa (particularly Africa south of the Sahara) of almost negligible interest from a Soviet foreign policy standpoint.

The period of Soviet foreign policy activities up to the mid-1950's can thus be characterized as one in which specific ideological concerns seem not to have conflicted in any substantial way with other Soviet interests and objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. The area was apparently not regarded as promising enough in terms of revolutionary prospects to prompt serious Soviet involvement. And there were no discernible interests or objectives stemming from a specific ideological concern that would have prompted such involvement.

B. THE KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD

In the mid-1950's a turning point occurred in Soviet policy toward the Third World. Indeed, this turning point was mainly the acknowledgment of the idea that there was a Third World to be dealt with. Up to this point, the Soviets viewed the

²That at least some perfunctory attention was paid to Africa in this period is also seen in such developments as the creation (under the tutelage of the Soviet-led Communist International) of a Negro International in 1930. Such Communist activities as were under way were nevertheless sharply curtailed beginning with the "Popular Front" period of Soviet diplomacy in the late 1930's. This curtailment, which basically persisted through World War II, was brought about by a Soviet concern to propitiate the Western colonial powers because of the Nazi threat. After the war, with the Comintern disbanded, tutelage of the revolutionary movements in Africa (such as they were) was placed in the hands of the French and British Communist parties. And their efforts met with a notable lack of success.

See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet Union and Africa," in *The Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, Roger Kanet, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), p. 52.

colonial areas of the world in the context of a Manichean perspective. On the one hand there were the Western industrial states, the bastion of capitalism, whose economic decline was postponed by their exploitation of colonial areas. On the other hand there was the Soviet Union and, by the late 1940's, the rest of the socialist camp. When colonies were freed under Communist movements, they would join the socialist camp. Until then, however, they were included in the imperialist camp.

This point of view was expressed most explicitly by Andrei Zhdanov in the late 1940's, and it basically worked to inhibit Communist exploitation of the end of colonial rule in many key areas. Refusing to countenance the idea that non-Communist nationalist movements could really be at odds with the imperialists, the Soviets refused to acknowledge India's independence, for example. Although independence was still some years away for the African colonies, this attitude was nevertheless discernible in the Soviet view that such nationalist leaders as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta were stooges of the British.

The official departure from the two-camp thesis occurred in 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress, when Khrushchev promulgated the notion of a "vast zone of peace" encompassing the socialist camp and the "peace-loving peoples of Asia and Africa." In fact, however, the Soviets had already taken steps indicating their cognizance of the significance of Third World nonalignment. Soviet backing of (or perhaps, more correctly, acquiescence in) the Bandung Conference in 1955 (the first large gathering of Afro-Asian leaders), the Soviet-prompted Czech arms deal with Egypt, the beginning of Soviet support for the Arab states (versus Israel) in the United Nations, and the famous Khrushchev-Bulganin Asian tour all immediately preceded the line put forth formally at the Party Congress.

It is important to note, however, that this new policy was implemented much more slowly in Africa south of the Sahara than in other Third World areas like the Middle East and Asia.

Of course, this was quite understandable in part because independence had not yet been achieved by many African states. However, longstanding Soviet ideological suspicions still seemed to inhibit Soviet policy. Ghana's achievement of independence under Nkrumah in 1957, for example, initially met with Soviet skepticism.

The true watershed in Soviet policy toward Africa per se probably occurred with Guinea's attainment of independence in 1958. Sékou Touré's sharp break with France and subsequent appeal to the Communist bloc for aid prompted the Soviets to regard Guinea as the "model" African state. However, the Soviets still showed some ambivalence in their approach to Africa in the late 1950's as more and more African states began to attain independence.

Particularly in view of recent Soviet activities in Africa, indications of a Cuban connection to Soviet African policies at this time are particularly notable. One analyst has argued that Soviet estimates of the chances for a non-Communist leader eventually to bring his country into the Communist camp were shaped by evolving Soviet views of the Cuban situation.³ According to this interpretation, Soviet concern during the first year or so after Castro came to power in January 1959 that Castro's socialist but avowedly non-Communist takeover might provide a tempting alternative revolutionary model for the Third World prompted the Soviets to reaffirm the importance of Communist parties in Africa. One indication of this concern was the founding in the fall of 1959 of a journal to help promote the specifically Communist revolutionary line in Africa. With the worsening of Cuban-U.S. relations in 1960 and a concomitant strengthening of Soviet ties with Cuba, the Soviets took a more positive view of Castro's "model" as being capable of serving, rather than competing with, Soviet revolutionary ambitions in Africa.

³Ibid., p. 56.

By late 1960, the Soviets had evolved a new concept, arguing that non-Communist leaders could start their countries down the Communist path and, in fact, that local Communists were in no position to play this role. Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were the first African states regarded as falling into this new category of "national democratic" regimes. (Congo [Brazzaville] was later added to the list.) Delegates from these states were among the first non-Communist Party representatives to attend a Soviet Party Congress (the 22d Congress in October 1961), and all three of their rulers received Lenin Peace Prizes.

Castro's public espousal of Marxism-Leninism in December 1961 seems also to have reinforced Soviet (or at least Khrushchev's) hopes that Soviet aims could be furthered through leaders like Keita, Nkrumah, and Touré. Castro in fact was specifically identified as a model for such leaders to emulate.⁴ Quite possibly the Soviets' lack of success with more bellicose approaches--such as the ill-fated backing of Lumumba in the Congo in the early 1960's--also reinforced this tendency to focus on countries like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.⁵ In any event, by 1963 the concept of a revolutionary democrat was formulated, giving the leaders of these states additional revolutionary credentials. At the same time, it might be noted, the Soviets did not entirely neglect the other African states not regarded as progressive. By the end of the Khrushchev period they had, for example, established diplomatic relations with several other African states and had made economic aid commitments to what

⁴Ibid., p. 58.

⁵It has been argued that even in the Congo crisis (or crises), the Soviet position was more one of bluster and propaganda posturing to score points against the "imperialists" (especially on behalf of Lumumba, whom the Soviets lionized after his death) than substantial material support to combatants. See Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-African Relations* (London: Central Asian Research Centre Publication, 1974), pp. 166-69.

were at the time "nonprogressive" states such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Senegal, and Uganda.⁶

In determining what role the ideological factor played in Soviet policy toward Africa during Khrushchev's tenure, several considerations are germane. First, when strictly construed, the ideological factor would seem to have been of negligible significance, in that Soviet activities in this period were basically characterized by the same dismissal of indigenous Communist efforts as in the preceding period. When the ideological factor is viewed somewhat more loosely, however, it does seem to have mattered. While the Soviets were aware that hewing closely to longstanding ideological precepts (e.g., the key role of Communist movements) would have confined the U.S.S.R. to playing a minimal role in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, they nevertheless were by no means as pragmatic and flexible as they might have been.

Distinctions were made between "progressive" and "non-progressive" regimes and movements, and the Soviets devoted the lion's share of their attention to the former--most notably Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Soviet policies toward their favored clients also had a notably ideological cast. Economic relations in trade and aid, for example, were shaped less by a sober economic calculus aimed at securing a decent economic return for the U.S.S.R. and promoting the economic health of the client than by an apparent desire to exhibit Soviet largesse and to promote the ideologically desirable growth of the state sector,

⁶The Soviets in fact made their largest single economic aid commitment to Ethiopia in this period (1959) reflecting perhaps some appreciation of Ethiopia's "strategic" location. However, from an ideological standpoint, the Soviets cast a jaundiced eye on Ethiopia throughout the sixties; many of the projects agreed on in 1959 went uncompleted, and after the Soviets made their first military aid commitments to Somalia (Ethiopia's long-time rival) in the early 1960's, the Ethiopians were basically wary of Moscow. Ibid., p. 42.

in the apparent hope of pushing the client economy more quickly down the socialist road.⁷

It is also useful to note in this regard that those Soviet objectives distinct from ideological concerns in evidence in this period were basically diplomatic, aimed broadly at enhancing the image of the Soviet Union as a global power and, perhaps more narrowly, intended to help the U.S.S.R. eventually break the grip of the West on the United Nations. Nevertheless, relations with nonprogressive states were basically low key. Moreover, even in those states where the Soviet ideological bias might have acted to reinforce other presumed Soviet objectives, the Soviets did not gain very much. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, Guinea denied the Soviets landing rights (for Soviet planes bound for Cuba) at the Conakry airport that the Soviets themselves had earlier improved to accommodate jet aircraft.

If it is possible to identify and distinguish a discrete ideological factor shaping Soviet policies toward Africa in this period, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the legitimizing function of the ideology was important in giving this factor some weight. In this regard, Khrushchev's effort to deal with the broader ideological challenge posed by China is probably significant. Although Chinese perspectives on Africa are treated elsewhere, several points should be noted here. The Chinese--particularly Mao--focused on ideological matters in general (for which they had some claim to credentials superior to Khrushchev's) in the late 1950's as a means of trying to pressure the U.S.S.R. to pursue the interests of the Communist bloc

⁷Soviet and Chinese aid policies are described in some detail in Chapter IV of this study. Changes in the Soviet approach to trade and aid that indicate ups and downs in the role of the ideological factor are well discussed in Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Countries," in Kanet, *The Soviet Union and Developing Countries*, pp. 215-37.

more boldly. Moreover, Chinese assertions of the special relevance for the Third World of the Chinese revolutionary model began to take on a much more competitive tone than had been the case earlier.

That Khrushchev took these challenges very seriously, and that he saw the basic threat from China in this period mostly in ideological terms is suggested by his responses. For example, he mounted strenuous efforts to rally other Communist parties and governments to read the Chinese out of the bloc. And he persisted in these efforts, despite the fact that they proved counterproductive by giving various Communist powers more leverage--more autonomy from the U.S.S.R.--than they otherwise could have achieved. At the same time, Khrushchev tried to demonstrate to the Third World that the U.S.S.R. was still very much the standard-bearer of a living revolutionary creed. His strong espousal of Soviet backing for so-called wars of national liberation is a prime example of that effort.

In this context, the attention paid to the progressive regimes of Africa and the successive gestures made to buttress their radical credentials are particularly understandable. It may have been, as was suggested earlier, that the Soviets were keeping one eye on the evolution of the Castro regime, gauging the eventual Communist potential of the African regimes. But it seems highly likely that the broader Chinese ideological challenge gave Khrushchev a strong incentive to give these regimes (and perhaps Castro as well) the benefit of the doubt. Especially in a setting where prospects for several bona fide Communist revolutions were hardly bright, success in transforming African nationalists into Communists would serve to demonstrate (a) that Khrushchev was a bold ideological innovator in his own right, and (b) that the U.S.S.R., not the P.R.C., had found the correct path for guiding the footsteps of the Third World to Communism. The Sino-Soviet competition thus affected Soviet involvement in Africa somewhat indirectly. The dispute

would seemingly have affected Soviet policy toward the so-called progressive states regardless of whether the Chinese were directly involved with those states. (As a matter of fact, the Chinese did have diplomatic relations with, and provided economic aid to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.)

As was suggested earlier, one particular consideration that bears on any discussion of the ideological factor in Soviet and Chinese foreign policy is that for certain Communist leaders, ideological matters per se are a profession. Viewing the problem from this decision-making perspective highlights certain contradictions that cropped up during the Khrushchev period. Ideological concerns were quite important to Khrushchev, both in dealing with the overall challenge from the Chinese and in setting Soviet priorities in Africa. However, from the standpoint of certain professional ideologists in the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev's efforts threatened to undermine the ideology. Making it relevant to the Third World may have been regarded as one way of showing that the U.S.S.R. and its ruling party were the wave of the future. At the same time, however, diluting the ideology to achieve such relevance carried the danger that the ideology would be progressively corrupted in the U.S.S.R. itself. There is evidence that certain professional ideologists thought Khrushchev had gone too far in stretching the ideology to give revolutionary credentials to African regimes.⁸

⁸"There is evidence that even before Khrushchev was forced from power, several high officials, including Mikhail Suslov, the chief party ideologue, Boris Ponomarev, the party Secretariat member responsible for relations with non-bloc Communist parties, and Alexei Rumyantsev, then editor of the *World Marxist Review*, resisted Khrushchev's attempts to prod historical processes by manipulating ideology. Judging from their comments at the time, they doubted that any African regime merited the kind of ideological endorsement Khrushchev wished to extend." Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, W. R. Duncan, ed. (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 63-64.

The situation is different in the case of China, because it was Mao Tse-tung himself who was the (continued on next page)

C. THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN PERIOD THROUGH THE LATE 1960'S

In several major respects, the regime that succeeded Khrushchev sought to play down the ideological factor in Soviet foreign policy. In the broader context of Sino-Soviet relations the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership began to back off from ideological confrontation with the Chinese. This did not mean that ideological differences were no longer appreciated. It did mean that the Soviets realized they could not rally sufficient support to oust the P.R.C. formally from the socialist camp, and that continuing to try would only weaken the Soviets' hold on their remaining ideological allies.

In the African context, the decision to soft-pedal ideology was reflected in a policy of greater skepticism about the socialist pretensions of the African states on which Khrushchev had focused. It was also reflected in an active effort to cultivate state-to-state relations with more so-called non-progressive African states (Zaire, Uganda, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the latter effort indicated that the new regime was determined to "keep its hand in" in Africa, Africa south of the Sahara seems generally to have been accorded an even lower priority in Soviet foreign policy calculations than Khrushchev had given it. In 1965, for example, the U.S.S.R. extended no new economic credits to African states for the first time since 1958.⁹

What this suggests overall is that ideological concerns had been the most important stimulus to Soviet involvement in Africa. As of the mid-1960's there apparently were no particular

(cont'd) chief ideologist and who, in the decision-making process, would have on the one hand resisted dilutions of ideology for the sake of pragmatic diplomacy and who on the other hand was in the best position to make such adjustments when convinced they were needed--as in fact he did in formulating the "three worlds" thesis. See Chapter III, below.

⁹Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View," p. 65.

economic, diplomatic, or security reasons to encourage other than a relatively low level of Soviet involvement, once the ideological factor became less important.

Over the next several years Soviet policy toward Africa reflected the same basic disinterest in ideological confrontation. Moreover, despite the heavy and remarkable Chinese commitment to Tanzania that was represented by the Tan-Zam railroad project, the eruption of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966 had apparently decreased Soviet anxieties about Chinese rivalry in Africa generally.¹⁰ In fact, the Soviet attitude toward China in the late 1960's seems on the whole to have altered in ways that made Soviet competition with China in the Third World seem a less pressing concern.¹¹ Partly this was a consequence of the setbacks Peking had suffered in 1965, prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution, in backing the losing side in the Indo-Pakistan war and in the decimation of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Peking's largest Communist supporter, in the overthrow of Sukarno.¹² Partly it

¹⁰See Chapter III, Section A.4 and Chapter IV, Section B, especially p. 83.

¹¹Renewed Soviet concern with this competition was evidenced in 1969, however, as indicated in the Soviet effort to push the notion of an Asian collective security system. But it should be stressed that, as this very notion suggests, Asia, not Africa, was the focus of this concern. Moreover, in 1969, the Soviets pushed for a world Communist party conclave such as Khrushchev had tried to convene in the early 1960's, indicating a revival of the ideological concern with Peking. But whether the Soviets entertained any real hope that this conclave could serve to expel the Chinese from the Communist movement is open to question. In any event that aim, if it was one, was not achieved, and since 1969 the Soviets have made no serious further attempts along these lines.

¹²See pp. 63-64, below. Of course, Sukarno's overthrow was a setback for the Soviets too. The Soviets under Khrushchev had a heavy investment in Indonesia in the form of a number of large, expensive, and economically unsound projects. And even the political payoff expected of these projects came to nought when Sukarno's successors basically took a pro-West stance. The noticeable Soviet hardheadedness on (continued on next page)

was a consequence of the new basic focus on internal affairs that characterized the Chinese Cultural Revolution. And partly it was because in the context of the bizarre events of the Cultural Revolution, Peking may have appeared to the Soviets to be becoming more a military than an ideological problem. Soviet doubts about Chinese sanity and consequent willingness to avoid war (more than any sober assessment of Chinese capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.) would seem to have provided partial stimulus for the buildup of Soviet forces on the border with China that commenced in the mid-1960's.¹³

The late 1960's also witnessed other opportunities and problems for the U.S.S.R. that would seem to have reinforced a Soviet inclination to make sub-Saharan Africa a relatively low priority area. Even while Khrushchev had been pursuing a comparatively active policy toward both the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara, seeking to cultivate progressive regimes in both places, the Middle East had received relatively more attention. The Middle East got considerably more attention from the Soviets in the late 1960's, both before, but particularly after, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It was not until 1964, for example, that the Soviet Navy became a force to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean. And although the U.S.S.R. incurred

(cont'd) economic relations with African states in the late 1960's was doubtless reinforced by such bitter lessons as the Indonesian experience.

¹³Even though, as noted above, by 1969 the Soviets were again paying attention to Peking as an ideological competitor, Peking was still a major concern as a military problem as well. The Ussuri River border clash between the Soviets and Chinese took place in this year and in 1969 the Soviet buildup on the border with China also increased significantly. What is suggested by these events is that--as with the Asian collective security proposal--as of the end of the 1960's, the U.S.S.R. still had ample reason to focus on the China problem much more in the Asian context than in the African one.

costs in the 1967 Arab loss to Israel, replacing Arab military equipment after the war gave the U.S.S.R. an opportunity to strengthen its hold on its Arab clients.

Vietnam also testified to the fact that the Soviets were concerned with other areas of the world, where important interests were at stake and where substantial investments had to be made to sustain those interests. In comparison to the opportunities for enhancing Soviet global power offered by Africa, Vietnam was clearly a much more promising area. At a minimum, the survival of an established Communist state was at stake--not to mention the neutrality of that state in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At a maximum, the Soviet Union could hope that her superiority over the P.R.C. as a supplier of needed military equipment would win over Hanoi in the Sino-Soviet dispute and, above all, ensure that the U.S.S.R.'s principal global rival, the United States, remained pinned down in an enervating war. Africa in the late 1960's obviously neither placed comparable demands on the U.S.S.R. nor offered comparable opportunities.

Not only did events in the global arena help keep Soviet interest and involvement in Africa at a low level, events within Africa also basically reinforced this tendency. In February 1966, the Soviets suffered their first major setback in any of the progressive states that Khrushchev had so assiduously cultivated. Although as noted, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had already retreated from Khrushchev's excessive ideological claims on behalf of these states, they still enjoyed some measure of Soviet favor in comparison to other African states. Nkrumah's overthrow in Ghana therefore represented a clear setback. The economic unsoundness of Nkrumah's policies appears to have impressed more strongly on the Soviets the principle (which they were already beginning to incorporate into their economic relations with Africa) that the basic economic health of a client state had to have priority over attempts to propel its economy down the socialist path. In the wake of Nkrumah's overthrow,

the Soviets preached this particular lesson to their other favored clients, which by this time included Congo (Brazzaville) as well.

To some extent, Mali's Modibo Keita absorbed this principle while also striving to move down the socialist path.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Keita's efforts were given scarce attention by Moscow--one measure of the increasing lack of Soviet confidence in being able to reap many benefits by pushing progressive regimes. Ironically, Mali was much closer to meeting the high hopes that Khrushchev had held for progressive African regimes than it had been when Khrushchev was in power. Soviet retrenchment was further evidenced in the noncommittal attitude of the Soviets to Keita's overthrow in November 1968. A similar reaction initially followed Massamba-Debat's overthrow in Congo (Brazzaville) in September 1968.¹⁵ As will be described in some detail below, Soviet wariness in the late 1960's of being trapped into ideological overcommitments contrasts vividly with Moscow's current treatment of ideological pretenders in Africa, signalling an important shift in Soviet views on Africa in general and on the salience of the ideological factor in particular.

In rounding out this discussion of the evolution of the Soviet perspective on Africa through the late 1960's, a new, or at least more prominent factor in shaping Soviet policy deserves attention as well--sheer opportunism. Prior to the Nigerian civil war in 1967, Soviet relations with Nigeria were minimal. By any reasonably strict ideological calculus, the Soviets should have backed the "oppressed" Ibos against the "reactionary" central government. Yet, apparently estimating that the central government would emerge the victor, and seizing the opportunity to influence the central regime by furnishing military supplies

¹⁴Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View," p. 72.

¹⁵It was not until late 1969, when Congo (Brazzaville) became the Congo People's Republic, that the Soviets were willing to acknowledge clearly the new regime's "progressive" complexion.

that the West had expressed a reluctance to provide, the Soviets supported the Gowon central regime. (China, presumably goaded by the Soviet stance, publicly came out on behalf of the Biafrans, but there is little evidence that they gave any material support to the rebels.¹⁶)

Soviet activity in the Nigerian civil war has several implications. First, it suggests quite strongly that the Soviets had reached the point where they were not averse to seizing a golden opportunity, ideology or no. Ironically, the Soviet involvement also underscores the hold ideology had on Soviet policy toward Africa in preceding years. By almost any other standard--economic, diplomatic, or strategic--Nigeria should have figured as a first-priority target for the Soviets in Africa. In terms of population and GNP it is the largest and richest of the black African states. It has important oil resources as well as a harbor that would have been useful to the Soviet Navy. Yet the Soviets made no real attempt to woo Nigeria until the civil war.¹⁷ Even considering that Nigeria had not been too receptive to the Soviets earlier, this basic lack of effort is notable, and suggests the importance of Soviet ideological concerns as well as the relatively low priority of other concerns in shaping Soviet African policy, at least until the late 1960's.¹⁸ Finally, it is useful to note that the war

¹⁶See McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, p. 106.

¹⁷John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London: Chatto, 1972), p. 183.

¹⁸This bears on one of the arguments recently advanced to explain the apparent increase in Soviet involvement in Africa beginning with the Angolan civil war--namely, Soviet appreciation of the significance of African natural resources. It is, to be sure, argued that the Soviets are basically more interested in depriving the West of these resources than they are in securing these resources for themselves. And it is further argued that the Arab oil embargo following the 1973 Middle East war particularly encouraged this Soviet appreciation. Nevertheless, these views are rooted in basic Soviet ideological assumptions regarding the (continued on next page)

gave the Soviets a lesson in the importance of certain instruments of foreign policy--in this case, as in the Middle East after the 1967 war, the significance of military supplies.¹⁹

D. THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN PERIOD AFTER 1969

Soviet perspectives on Africa after the late 1960's were affected by two key developments: the onset of East-West détente, and Soviet "blue water" naval expansion, which introduced the strategic element into the U.S.S.R.'s African policy calculations. While it is difficult to determine precisely when either development occurred, late 1969 seems to be a useful date for our purposes. East-West détente may have gotten under way as early as the mid-1960's, but 1969 was notable for Chancellor Brandt's earnest Ostpolitik efforts and, of course, the initiation of SALT in November. By 1969 the Soviet Navy constituted a definite presence in the Indian Ocean; 1969 was also the year in which Soviet military aid to Somalia increased greatly.

1. Détente

Soviet assertiveness in the Angolan civil war in 1975-76 has been regarded by many as particularly ominous since, among

(cont'd) nature of Western industrial economies, the importance to these economies of "colonial" areas, and the like. If ideological predispositions are important in sensitizing the Soviets to the significance of African natural resources, it is curious, to say the least, that this was hardly discernible (except perhaps for the war in the Congo) in Soviet African policy in the Khrushchev years when the ideological factor was quite prominent. Soviet neglect of Nigeria is a case in point. A recent study that places heavy stress on the resource motive for Soviet involvement in Africa is Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow Over Africa*, Center for Advanced International Studies (Florida: University of Miami, 1976).

¹⁹The Nigerian civil war also provided a lesson in the use of proxy forces that was later evidenced by the Cuban role in the Angolan civil war. Egyptian pilots flew Soviet MIG's on behalf of the Nigerian central government in the war against Biafra.

other things, it contravened expectations regarding the restraining influence of East-West détente on the Soviets.²⁰ Indeed, with the exception of the Soviet backing of its Arab clients in the 1973 Middle East war, the U.S.S.R.'s Angolan involvement was regarded as the first major Soviet breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of détente. To some extent, the conclusion that therefore the Soviets have discounted détente in formulating their African policy seems perfectly justifiable. Insofar as détente represents a commitment by the Soviets and the West to minimize tensions in their relationships, Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war was an apparent violation of that commitment. And, as such, it raises understandable questions about the U.S.S.R.'s overall interest in maintaining a détente relationship with the West.

It is possible, however, to postulate a somewhat different interrelationship between détente and the U.S.S.R.'s African policy. If one bears in mind how significant the ideological factor is in Soviet foreign policy, it can be argued that Soviet assertiveness in the Angolan civil war was in part stimulated by Soviet détente relations with the West. In short, contrary to the usual view, the Soviets were heavily involved in Angola because of détente, not despite it.

It is not our intention here to weigh the costs and benefits of détente for the West, or to evaluate in any detail the major elements of Soviet détente policy. Nevertheless, it is necessary to outline briefly some of the key factors determining the Soviet perception of détente in order to explicate both its

²⁰See, in particular, the testimony of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, *U.S. Involvement in Civil War in Angola*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., January-February 1976; and U.S. House of Representatives, Report to the Committee on International Relations, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), especially p. 106.

implications for the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy and what this means for Soviet policy toward Africa in particular.

a. Détente and the Soviet Economy. The Soviets have persistently maintained that whatever détente may mean for East-West relations, it does not mean that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its ideological struggle with Western capitalism. This is not a ritual incantation, as can be seen by looking at some examples of the relationship between Soviet ideological concerns and détente.²¹ Indeed, a concern for the ideological underpinnings of Soviet rule may have helped precipitate Soviet interest in détente with the West in the first place. This concern is basically connected with the Soviet interest in securing Western technology and capital.

For most of its history the U.S.S.R. was capable of securing high rates of economic growth by relying on forced planning and the multiplication of the factors of production (e.g., capital and labor). Beginning in the 1960's, however, it became apparent that as the economy became more sophisticated, technological advancement and increased efficiency would be the keys to future economic growth, and that these could be achieved by making major structural changes in the economy.²² However, it was also clear that such changes could have unsettling political implications. The Soviet commitment to central planning, for example, is rooted in the idea that the Communist Party is the indispensable guiding force in Soviet society. The Soviets thus

²¹ See Adam B. Ulam, "Détente Under Soviet Eyes," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1976), pp. 145-59.

²² The new demands that confront the Soviet economy, as well as the difficulties the Soviets are encountering in trying to respond to these demands within the context of their established economic arrangements, are comprehensively examined in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 14, 1976).

may well be concerned that if they move away from central planning in order to allow market forces to stimulate the technological innovation that the economy badly needs, an important prop of the regime would be undermined. The collective farm system is also rooted in this ideological tradition. Accordingly, despite the particularly severe agricultural problems they face, the Soviets have given no hint whatsoever that they are willing to consider an alternative approach to organizing agricultural production.

Such ideological considerations, serving as they do the vested interests of the Party, appear to have encouraged the Soviets to find other ways to meet their economic needs. One such way is by securing Western technology and capital, and this is a key element of Soviet détente policy toward the West. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that, far from being an indication that the U.S.S.R. is gradually departing from its ideological heritage, Soviet interest in increased economic relations with the West, and hence détente, is rather an indication of how important the Soviet leaders continue to regard that heritage. It is therefore particularly significant that these contacts with the West are threats in their own right to the ideological underpinning of the Soviet state. The Soviet concern that ideology not be compromised by these contacts is discernible in various ways. Many Western observers, for example, have argued that inputs of Western technology and capital are likely to have only marginal curative effect on the ills of the Soviet economy unless the Soviets are willing to countenance some significant structural changes in that economy.²³ Yet it is precisely to avoid making such changes in the first place that the Soviets have turned to the West.

²³This point of view is most effectively argued in Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976).

There are, therefore, scant signs that the Soviets will implement measures to realize completely the benefits from Western economic inputs.

Even aside from the question of structural changes in the economy, Soviet ideological concern has worked to impair economic relations with the West. Apparently worried that increased ties with the West could make Soviet society particularly susceptible to Western political viruses, the Soviets cracked down on so-called internal dissidents concomitant with the onset of détente. But this caused concern with human rights issues in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, including the issue of the emigration rights of Soviet Jews, to surface in certain quarters and resulted in measures impeding East-West economic relations (most notably the Jackson-Vanik Amendment). And so far, the Soviets have been basically unwilling to go far enough in allaying this concern to allow maximization of Western economic inputs into the Soviet economy.

Indeed, at least some Soviet leaders may eventually decide (if they have not already) that to the extent that political "liberalization" of the U.S.S.R. is the price of Western economic inputs, it may make more sense to countenance the political risks of serious structural changes to the Soviet economy and rely less on Western inputs. (And in their view, it might make particular sense if real economic benefits from Western inputs could not be realized without making some serious structural changes anyhow.) In short, with respect to the significant economic aspects of East-West détente, Soviet ideological concerns, rooted in the vested political interests of the Soviet leadership, can be regarded as (a) contributing to initial Soviet interest in détente, (b) shaping Soviet policies to impede the full realization of economic benefits from détente, and (c) potentially prompting the Soviets to lose interest in détente.

b. Détente and Soviet Policy in Europe. The interaction of Soviet ideological concerns and détente is also discernible on other levels. Soviet détente policy toward the West has been implemented in the European theater as well as in the context of Soviet-U.S. relations. In fact, Soviet appreciation of the value of détente relations with the West may have been engendered in the late 1960's by the U.S.S.R.'s goals and interests in Europe. It made particular sense for the U.S.S.R. to project a benign image toward the Western Europeans in the late 1960's as a means of trying to capitalize on France's opting out of the NATO defense structure and to disarm or deflect the F.R.G.'s growing interest in Eastern Europe.

Without detailing the various Soviet efforts that grew out of this atmosphere, it is sufficient to note that they culminated in the campaign for the European security conference that was eventually held in 1975. Among other things, the Soviets apparently intended to use the conference to secure formal Western acquiescence to the validity of the U.S.S.R.'s East European sphere of influence, thus enhancing the security of the East European regimes (particularly in East Germany) and the Soviet hold over them.

However, the Soviets' insistence that strict limits be placed on East-West contacts, apparently because of their desire that the spread of Western ideological viruses in Eastern Europe (and the U.S.S.R.) be minimized, first jeopardized the conference itself and then proved counterproductive once it was held. The spotlight was on the very issue the Soviets would have preferred to keep in the background--human rights and human contacts between the East and the West. (And the Belgrade conference, to be held as a follow-on to the security conference, promises to keep this issue prominent.) Like the economic aspects of Soviet détente policy, the European security aspects have also been affected by Soviet ideological concerns.

In short, Soviet détente policy toward Western Europe, as exemplified by the campaign for the European security conference, was intended in part to serve the ideology by enhancing the stability of the East European regimes. But this ideological motive shaped Soviet détente policy in such a way that now new problems have arisen for these regimes.

c. Détente and Eurocommunism. One final example of the weight Soviet ideological concerns carry in regard to détente deserves mention. Just as these concerns have both prompted and complicated Soviet pursuit of détente on the state-to-state level in Europe, they have also affected Soviet relations with the major Communist parties of Western Europe. To the extent that the Soviet pursuit of détente helps make the U.S.S.R. seem more benign and less bellicose, it becomes less onerous--and less counterproductive politically--for such parties as the Italian and French Communist parties to be linked to Moscow. Over the years, these parties had suffered domestically from this identification, particularly when Moscow invaded one of its East European allies, as it did in 1956 (Hungary) or in 1968 (Czechoslovakia). It is not surprising, therefore, that these parties should have hoped that détente would improve their political fortunes. And it is not surprising that, from its perspective, Moscow would have seen such an improvement as a not-insignificant byproduct of a policy of détente toward Western Europe. In fact, new political vitality for these parties would serve the important ideological goal of demonstrating vividly that the Communist creed indeed was--as had long been claimed but never demonstrated--the wave of the future in the capitalist West.

Yet here too Soviet ideological concerns worked at cross purposes. In order to capitalize on the political opportunities afforded by détente, the most important Communist parties in Western Europe (the Italian and French) tried to impress on the Soviets the need to countenance some significant departures from

long-standing dogma. By early 1975, these parties had been increasingly discomfited by the Portuguese Communist Party's "revolutionary" pursuit of power which, by raising alarms in Western Europe, threatened their chances of portraying themselves as members of the "loyal opposition" in their own countries. But Soviet ideologists basically expressed approval of the Portuguese Communists' more doctrinaire line. The upshot was the phenomenon of Eurocommunism, born in November 1975 when the leaders of the Italian and French Communist parties issued a document committing themselves to, among other things, a continuing multiparty system in Italy and France and the preservation of freedom of the press.²⁴

While the U.S.S.R. has reason to appreciate the utility of the newly proclaimed position of the Italian and French (and subsequently the Spanish) Communist parties, Moscow's own ideological concerns clearly inhibit any wholehearted encouragement of Eurocommunism. Especially with the new problems that the human rights and human contacts issue pose for the stability of the East European regimes, the U.S.S.R. has particular reason to be reluctant to endorse the position that one can be a good Communist and support a multiparty system as well.

d. Implications for Soviet African Policy. The above considerations have some implications particularly relevant to our purposes. First, Soviet interest in détente should by no means be viewed as distinct from the Soviet leaders' vested interests in the Communist ideology as a legitimizing force in the U.S.S.R. In a number of respects détente has been viewed by the Soviets as serving not only important economic and security interests (particularly in Europe and in bilateral relations with the United States), but also important ideological interests.

²⁴The development and implications of Eurocommunism are examined in Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism," *Problems of Communism* 26 (1), pp. 1-20.

Détente can serve these ideological interests to the extent that it can (a) enable the Soviets to avoid making substantial structural changes in the Soviet economy, (b) work toward achievement of Western recognition of the legitimacy of the East European regimes, and (c) help secure Communist successes in Western Europe.

Second, Soviet ideological concerns have also complicated the pursuit of détente and the realization of these benefits. This has been evidenced by the clampdown on dissidents in the U.S.S.R., Soviet obstinacy on the East-West human contacts issue in connection with the European security conference, and Soviet insistence on the continued and universal relevance of certain ideological precepts that has made it more difficult for the West European Communists to improve their image.

In assessing the significance of these considerations for Soviet policy toward Africa in recent years, it should be recalled that as of the late 1960's ideological concerns were downplayed by Moscow in regard to its African policy, and Soviet involvement in Africa was also at a comparatively low level. The onset of détente with the West has made ideological considerations a more prominent factor in Soviet foreign policy calculations, both in general and with regard to Africa. Just as the Chinese challenge there in the late 1950's and early 1960's had the effect of bringing ideological concerns to the fore in the Soviet calculus, and especially in the calculus of Khrushchev, détente may be having a roughly equivalent effect in the 1970's. And while the Soviets may not attach as much weight to the Chinese ideological challenge now as Khrushchev did in the past, détente's accentuation of Soviet ideological concerns is likely to make the Soviets more sensitive to this challenge now than they were in the late 1960's.

It is particularly significant for present purposes to understand both that détente serves important Soviet goals and that the Soviets also regard ideological concerns as important

enough to allow such concerns to impede the achievement of Soviet détente aims. When the pursuit of détente carries built-in challenges to the continued relevance of the legitimizing creed of the Soviet state, a special incentive is created for the Soviet leaders to demonstrate that their revolutionary ideology is still alive and well. They have in fact sought to make this demonstration in the European setting and in their bilateral relations with the United States. But in that context such a demonstration conflicts quite sharply with the pursuit of détente. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, that the Soviets would be particularly attracted to other areas in which to show that their revolutionary credentials are still valid. And in the 1970's, Africa may have come to be regarded by the Soviets as one such area.

It is important, of course, not to overstate the case for viewing Africa in this light. Even should all of Africa adopt Communism under Soviet tutelage, this would hardly obviate the ideological concerns the Soviets have at home or in the European setting. Nor, as the Western reaction to Soviet involvement in Angola demonstrated, can the Soviets hope to keep their efforts in Africa from conflicting with their détente aims. And furthermore, it can hardly be contended that ideological incentives alone have prompted recent Soviet assertiveness in Africa. Other Soviet concerns, as will be noted, have encouraged such actions as well.

For the present, however, it seems reasonable to argue that détente itself may well have given Africa new significance in Soviet eyes as an area to demonstrate the vitality of the legitimizing creed of the Soviet state. In this regard, Soviet assertiveness in Africa would hardly contradict the Soviet commitment to détente. Indeed, to the extent that it helps the Soviets sustain their ideology while pursuing détente, the opportunity to demonstrate the vitality of the ideology in places like Africa may, paradoxically, help sustain Soviet

interest in détente. Whether it helps sustain Western interest as well is, of course, quite another matter.

2. Soviet Blue Water Naval Developments

Besides détente, other developments have also provided new incentives for Soviet involvement in Africa. Perhaps the most important of these has been the growth of a Soviet blue water naval capability. The very novelty of this capability (the Russian Navy traditionally had a subordinate military role confined basically to the several seas bordering directly on Russian territory) has prompted Western concern about Soviet international ambitions in general, irrespective of what it really represents in military terms. The manifestation of a Soviet blue water naval capability in two particular areas, however, has raised special alarm.

The Soviet Navy's appearance in the Mediterranean in 1964 became especially worrisome in light of ongoing and ardent Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Middle East by wooing so-called progressive Arab regimes. The appearance of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean in 1968 prompted special concern, given apparent British determination to withdraw from the Persian Gulf²⁵ and ongoing Soviet efforts to play an influential role in the Asian subcontinent.

a. Basic Developments. Before examining Soviet naval efforts in the Indian Ocean, it is first important to note Soviet interest in countries on the west coast of the African continent as well. It is reasonable to expect, for example, that as the Soviets seek to deploy increasingly to the South Atlantic, the significance of having potential port facilities

²⁵The British first publicized their decision to limit their "East of Suez" involvement in early 1968, and the first Russian naval vessels appeared in the Indian Ocean in March of that year. Geoffrey Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy," Adelphi Paper No. 87 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 11.

on Africa's west coast to support that presence will be enhanced.²⁶ Guinea, which has an excellent harbor at Conakry and where, despite some ups and downs, the Soviets have had long-standing relations, would appear to be one of the most logical choices.²⁷ Luanda and Lobito in Angola may also be regarded as useful sites for port facilities (if not bases) to serve a Soviet South Atlantic naval presence in future years. Furthermore, Soviet efforts to utilize the Conakry airport (albeit unsuccessfully) at the time of the Cuban missile crisis suggest that having support facilities for air surveillance of Western naval contingents in the South Atlantic would also seem to be increasingly attractive to the Soviets.²⁸

Soviet blue water naval capability became a factor in the formulation of Soviet goals and policies for Africa's east coast with the commencement of a Soviet naval role in the Indian Ocean in 1968. Several reasons have been adduced for the establishment of a Soviet naval presence there, including Soviet defensive concerns with respect to the U.S. sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) effort, the acquisition of influence in various areas on the Indian Ocean littoral, and interference with the commerce that provides vital Third World resources (particularly oil) to the developed countries of the West.

²⁶Paul Wohl, "Why Moscow's Eye Is on West Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 25, 1976, p. 5.

²⁷The Soviets apparently are already using Conakry Harbor for this purpose. (See W. H. Lewis, "How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa," in *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, Helen Kitchen, ed. [Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976], p. 290.) Soviet relations with Guinea have been on the upswing since 1970 and appear to have been influenced significantly by an attempted Portuguese seaborne invasion of Guinea in that year. The Soviets came to Touré's aid (belatedly) by "ordering a naval patrol off the Guinea coast." (McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, p. 63.) In this regard, the Soviets would seem to have been presented with a golden opportunity to pursue their naval interest in the South Atlantic (via Guinea) in 1970.

²⁸Guinea is also already providing these facilities for the Soviets. See Lewis, "How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa."

With regard to defensive concerns, it has been argued that Soviet attention to a developing SLBM threat from the Indian Ocean was first publicly manifested in a Soviet memorandum to the United Nations in 1964 that called for the establishment of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean as nuclear free zones.²⁹ The memorandum had no effect at the time, but it does suggest that basically the Soviets were trying to inhibit U.S. utilization of the Mediterranean and Indian oceans as launch areas. Subsequent Soviet naval deployments in both bodies of water can be regarded, at least in part, as similar attempts.³⁰

With regard to Soviet attempts to acquire influence on the Indian Ocean littoral, to the extent that particular Soviet naval facilities on the African coast contribute to the maintenance of a Soviet Indian Ocean presence, they can be regarded as in aid of this goal. How effective such a presence is in exerting influence is difficult to determine. Recent pronouncements by Admiral Gorshkov, the foremost Soviet Naval spokesman,

²⁹"The omission of the Northern Seas, the Atlantic, and the Pacific, suggests ... that the composers of the memorandum saw proposals in respect of them as unrealistic and in any event counterbalanced by the possibility of their use by Soviet nuclear weapon vectors against the United States, but wished to eliminate seas from which the United States could pose first-order threats to Soviet home territory without any countervailing Soviet capability being conferred." Jukes, "The Indian Ocean," pp. 8-9. Incidentally, arms control concerns with regard to inhibiting a superpower naval arms race in the Indian Ocean have been variously expressed over the years and at present this topic is on the agenda at least for bilateral discussion by the United States and the U.S.S.R.

³⁰It is worth noting in general that, to the extent the U.S.S.R. can be encouraged to increase its own reliance on SLBM's (vis-à-vis the more vulnerable ICBM's)--a step generally regarded as positive so far as the stability of the Soviet-U.S. mutual deterrence relationship is concerned--the U.S.S.R. can be expected to seek to establish out-of-area communications facilities to serve its SLBM force. Soviet efforts to secure such facilities may appear ominous as an indication of Soviet assertiveness in some Third World area but paradoxically they may have a positive aspect at the strategic nuclear level of Soviet-U.S. relations.

suggest a Soviet conviction that political payoffs can be achieved by some combination of showing the flag and gunboat diplomacy.³¹ There has also been at least one clear example of the Soviets trying to illustrate this conviction in the Indian Ocean. In April 1973, a Soviet naval task force visited Iraq with the apparent intent of demonstrating support for the Iraqi side in a territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.

However, there is little to suggest that this Soviet action had any effect.³² And the Soviet Indian Ocean presence had no effect in deterring Iran from claiming half of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran and some strategically placed islands in the Strait of Hormuz (Abu Musa and the Tumbs) at the opening to the Persian Gulf. To be sure, the apparent lack of success of the Soviets in wielding naval power in Persian Gulf politics should not be taken as a model for other Indian Ocean areas. Iran's capabilities and determination as a military power in the Gulf make it a special case. At the same time, however, the Gulf is probably higher on the list of Soviet priorities as a target area in which to try to exert influence than many other Indian Ocean littoral regions (including the African coast).

What would seem to make the Gulf especially important for the Soviets is also what has been adduced as the third major purpose behind the Soviet Indian Ocean presence: to interfere with the supply of Western resources, especially oil.³³ This purpose cannot be dismissed out of hand, if only because of

³¹See in particular, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, *Red Star Rising at Sea*, T. A. Neely, Jr., trans. (U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), and *The Sea Power of the State* (Moscow, 1976), passim.

³²Shahram Chubin, "Naval Competition and Security in South-West Asia," in *Power at Sea III: Competition and Conflict*, Adelphi Paper No. 124 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 23.

³³See, for example, Hahn and Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow*, pp. 45-48.

recent reminders of Western dependence on such resources. Yet it is difficult to construct scenarios that would explain how the Soviets can realistically hope to pursue this purpose. The importance of Middle East oil to the West (and Japan) can be cited to support the suggestion that the Soviets would seek to interfere with oil supplies--and is also precisely why the Soviets should appreciate the risks of such interference. Whether one is considering interdiction on the high seas, the closing off of so-called choke points, or even Soviet efforts to secure domination of the principal energy producers, the risks of war with the West would seem too high for the Soviets to contemplate such actions seriously.

b. The Horn of Africa and the Cape Route. These considerations are especially pertinent in viewing the impact of Soviet Indian Ocean naval developments on Soviet African policy because of Somalia's particular location on the Horn of Africa. Somalia is situated at a key choke point--on the Gulf of Aden, the entrance to the Bab Al Mandab-Red Sea-Suez Canal route to the Mediterranean. The Soviet desire to have an Indian Ocean naval presence may have been the general reason why the Soviets sought to have naval facilities in Somalia. The Soviets have apparently acquired several facilities for their own use in Somalia in order to maintain this presence.³⁴

It is not clear, however, to what extent Somalia's particular location has been a factor in determining the Soviet involvement. It may well have been that an opportunity factor, as much as anything else, contributed to the selection of

³⁴Soviet facilities in Somalia constitute the largest Soviet shore support element in the Indian Ocean area. They include a missile storage and handling facility for naval cruise and other tactical missiles, an airfield capable of handling large bombers, petrol-oil-lubricant storage facilities, two high frequency communications installations, and mooring facilities at Berbera.

Somalia for the recent pursuit of Soviet naval interests in the Indian Ocean. The coming to power of Siad Barre in 1969 led to a considerable boost in Soviet involvement in, and the provision of military aid to Somalia.³⁵ This suggests that while the Soviets may have been seeking naval support facilities among the littoral states generally by the late 1960's, events in Somalia (over which the Soviets apparently had little control) may have helped them settle on Somalia as the principal Soviet target on the African coast.

While Somalia's location at a key choke point may have influenced the original Soviet commitment somewhat, events in recent years have raised questions about Somalia's significance in this regard.³⁶ Somalia's location has enabled the Soviets to consider possible interdiction of Indian Ocean shipping into the Gulf of Aqaba (such as Iranian oil bound for Israel), but the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1967 war decreased its importance as a choke point. Although the canal was reopened in 1975, its closure accelerated the trend toward increasing use of supertankers, which are too large to navigate the canal in any event.³⁷

³⁵U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, *Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., p. 77. The Soviets had been providing substantial military aid to Somalia since the early 1960's. However, the change in regime in 1969 would seem to have resulted in a Somalia leadership generally more attractive to the Soviets and more desirous of a Soviet military presence.

³⁶Soviet support of the Ethiopian *dergue*, which jeopardizes the Soviet position in Somalia, of course raises this question even more starkly. Moscow may expect that because of Somalia's heavy dependence on Soviet aid, its position in Somalia can be maintained even while assistance goes also to Ethiopia. However, it seems more likely that the Soviets are deliberately gambling their military assets in Somalia against the much more important political gains to be made in Ethiopia.

³⁷In closing off the most direct transit route to the Indian Ocean for the U.S.S.R., the 1967 Middle East war impeded the Soviet pursuit of their interest in an (continued on next page)

The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the advent of the supertanker, and the not-unlikely prospect of a future closure of the canal in the event of another Arab-Israeli conflict have resulted, in the view of some analysts, in the Soviets' paying increasingly more attention to the Cape route.³⁸ This view has been reinforced by recent events in Angola and Mozambique. Soviet support of the winning side in the Angolan civil war and their subsequent deepening involvement in Mozambique could facilitate Soviet naval activities with respect to Cape route traffic, via the use of the ports of Luanda, Lobito (Angola), or Maputo (Mozambique). To what extent the desire to be able to threaten Cape route transit of resources (especially oil) to the West dictated Soviet actions in Angola and Mozambique is, however, far from clear.

In the first place, the Mozambique channel is a bit wide as far as choke points go (and can be circumvented, if need be, by simply sailing east of the Malagasy Republic). Second, the Soviets would be interested in having at least port use in Angola and Mozambique simply to facilitate their naval activities in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean generally. And finally, the risk element (with regard to an East-West conflict) that raises doubts about Soviet intentions to interdict shipping

(cont'd) Indian Ocean naval presence. At the same time, it made countries like Somalia more important to the Soviets in the pursuit of that interest--choke point considerations aside. For example, with the closure of the canal the Soviets could not take advantage of Mediterranean facilities (such as at Alexandria) to help support units in the Indian Ocean. While Somalia probably has come closer to acquiring the status of a Soviet "base" than other countries on the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf littoral, the Soviets have sought to gain at least port use in several countries (which is understandable enough given the ocean area to be covered). These include Vishakhapatnam (India), Basra (Iraq), Aden (South Yemen), Hodeida (Yemen), and anchorage facilities off Socotra.

³⁸Hahn and Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow*.

in the Persian Gulf and off the Horn of Africa obviously would apply to the Cape route as well.³⁹

In short, the evolution of Soviet blue water naval capabilities would appear to have provided new incentives for Soviet involvement in Africa on both the west and east coasts of that continent since the late 1960's. Guinea and Somalia are the most notable examples of these incentives at work, but Soviet involvement in Angola and Mozambique might also be partly explained in terms of Soviet naval interests. Moreover, one does not have to subscribe to some of the more alarmist notions of what the Soviets might try to do with their blue water naval capability to appreciate the reality of these interests. And due regard should be paid to the importance of plain opportunism in determining which African countries the Soviets have selected as likely spots in which to pursue their naval interests.

E. ANGOLA AND BEYOND: RECENT SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES

Particularly since 1975, when the U.S.S.R. made a major commitment to secure the victory of the MPLA in Angola, the pace and scope of recent Soviet involvement in Africa have been considerable. In addition to its involvement in the Angolan civil war, the Soviet Union has, for example, substantially increased its role in Mozambique, become an active backer of guerrilla forces operating out of Mozambique against Rhodesia, broadened its activities on the Horn of Africa to include Ethiopia, built upon its earlier backing of Uganda by replacing Amin's losses from the Israeli Entebbe raid, and, through Podgorny's diplomatic mission in spring 1977, sought to improve its standing in

³⁹It is also worth noting that it is somewhat contradictory to argue that the Soviets continue to be interested in Somalia (or Ethiopia) because of its "vital" choke point location and that at the same time the Soviets have come to appreciate the importance of the Cape route since the closing of the Suez Canal.

Tanzania and Zambia, two key states in the struggle against Rhodesia and states in which the Chinese have had the edge on Moscow.⁴⁰

1. New Elements in the Context of Past Policy

For present purposes, the details of these recent developments are less important than the broad Soviet motivations that can be identified behind them, viewed in the perspective of past Soviet policy in Africa. As of the late 1960's, it should be recalled, Soviet involvement in Africa south of the Sahara was at low ebb. While Soviet involvement in sub-Saharan Africa had never been substantial, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership had reduced even the rather modest and selective commitments that the Soviets had made during the Khrushchev years.

By the early 1970's, however, other forces were at work, the two basically new factors that appear to have had a bearing on Soviet African policy being Soviet blue water naval developments and the onset of East-West détente. The ability to use the Navy to acquire influence in Africa and, more importantly, the potential utility of certain African states in providing facilities for the maintenance of a Soviet naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans appear to have lent some African states a new importance in Soviet eyes--Somalia and Guinea, most notably.

The impact of détente on Soviet African policy seems both more amorphous and more complicated. From a Western perspective, the primary significance of détente should have been that the Soviets would be less tempted (rather than more) to be assertive

⁴⁰The Soviets may also have played a behind-the-scenes role in the efforts by Katangan insurgents against Zaire that commenced in spring 1977. These insurgents have been using Soviet arms and have been operating out of Angola, where the Soviet Cuban proxies remain. However, neither Soviet instigation of the "invasion" nor an identification of subsequent Soviet support of the invaders has been established.

in regions like Africa, where they and the West might come into conflict, thus undercutting détente and the broader mutual benefits it was supposed to provide. Yet it has been within the context of détente relations that the Soviets have gotten more involved in Africa than at any time in the past.

This interpretation of Soviet détente concerns as basically a mirror image of Western concerns neglects other important implications of détente for the Soviet Union. As evidenced domestically, in Soviet security conference politics in Europe, and in Soviet treatment of Eurocommunism, Soviet ideological concerns have both prompted and stymied the pursuit of détente. The ideological dimension of détente provides a basic impetus for Soviet assertiveness in Africa. At a time when a relaxation of tensions and increased contacts with the West pose fresh challenges to the ideology, the Soviets are particularly encouraged to demonstrate that the revolutionary creed underpinning the Soviet system is alive and well. Such demonstrations cannot be made easily in the main arenas of East-West relations without threatening to undo détente itself. In short, détente provides an incentive for the Soviets to seek successes in regions like Africa because the Soviets want both to secure the benefits of détente and preserve and strengthen the ideology that legitimizes the Soviet regime.

It seems obvious, however, that Africa is not exactly the ideal region for achieving ideologically significant foreign policy successes. It also seems obvious that Soviet assertiveness in Africa cannot avoid affecting the pursuit of détente negatively. Yet, relatively speaking, from a Soviet standpoint Africa has much to recommend it in both respects. In the first place, the end of Portuguese rule, the revolutionary potential in new challenges to the continuation of white rule in Rhodesia, Namibia, and even South Africa itself, the end of Haile Selassie's long reign, and the shakiness of many existing black African regimes have created a situation in which the Soviets might

realistically anticipate the exploitation of several genuinely revolutionary prospects.

Furthermore, the Soviets have a particular incentive to focus on these prospects, in light of obstacles or setbacks incurred in recent years in other regions. Although the loss of Soviet influence in the Middle East can easily be overstated, it seems clear that immediate prospects for significant Soviet foreign policy successes in that region seem less bright than they were just a few years ago. Soviet estrangement from Egypt, the demonstrated "autonomy" of their client, Syria, in the Lebanese civil war, their turn to the mercurial Qaddafi, and their visible support of the PLO (which would have embarrassed the Soviets in the recent past and still seems to, to some extent) all signify a serious setback for Soviet aspirations in the Middle East.⁴¹ On the Asian subcontinent, a primary arena

⁴¹For a discussion of recent Soviet policy in the Middle East, see Arnold L. Horelick, *Moscow's Rift with Sadat: Implications for Soviet Middle East Policy*, P-5666 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, May 1976), William B. Quandt, *Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War*, R-1864-15A (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, May 1976), and Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the PLO*, Adelphi Paper No. 131 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1976).

Whether Sudan should be treated in the context of Soviet Middle Eastern policy or Soviet policies south of the Sahara is an open question. Nevertheless, until the end of the 1960's, Soviet relations with Sudan were not very good, reflecting in part Moscow's willingness to let its aspirations for the Sudanese Communist Party (the largest African Communist party) interfere with state-to-state relations. In 1970-71, Moscow was very active in Sudan, cementing relations with the new ruler Numayri, who was taking an active role in Middle Eastern politics in line with the U.S.S.R.'s Egyptian client. However, Numayri's persecution of local Communists after an abortive coup in July 1971 led to a breakdown in Soviet-Sudanese relations (and, simultaneously, an improvement of Sino-Sudanese ties). Relations have been basically cool at best since then and of late have deteriorated even further, with an expulsion of Soviet advisors (after another abortive coup in 1976) occurring in spring 1977.

for demonstrations of the Soviet role in the Third World, the Indian government that replaced the Gandhi regime in spring 1977 has shown signs of being less pro-Soviet than its predecessor, thus at least raising questions about how successful the Soviets can hope to be in that area.

None of this, of course, adds up to the possibility that the Soviets would write off such areas. It does suggest, however, that to the extent that they are frustrated in such regions, Africa is likely to look more attractive as a candidate for Soviet attention.⁴² The souring of Soviet-Middle East relations after the 1973 Yom Kippur War may already have had such an effect.⁴³ Moreover, the 1973 war itself doubtless

⁴²This does not mean that the Soviets would necessarily be less active in Africa if the prospects for securing further advances in other regions were bright. The various opportunities that have been presented to the Soviets in recent years in Africa plus the advantage the area appears to hold for making advances with less risk of superpower confrontation than some other regions would probably incite some considerable Soviet involvement in any event. Yet it does seem likely that the intensity of Soviet involvement in the Middle East in the late 1960's contributed somewhat to the relative neglect of sub-Saharan Africa by the Soviets at the time, as earlier noted. And it also seems likely that subsequent frustrations in the Middle East also helped divert Soviet attention to sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the connection between Soviet behavior toward Middle East developments and Soviet behavior toward sub-Saharan developments has also on occasion been quite direct. The Soviets' turning to Qaddafi, for example, after rebuffs by Sadat of Egypt led to the establishment of a Libyan conduit for Soviet military supplies to Uganda. However, as quite recent events have shown (e.g., the Moroccan and Egyptian support of Mobutu in the fighting in Zaire in the spring of 1977 and the Arab efforts to woo Somalia away from the U.S.S.R.), various Middle Eastern states have also come to realize that two can play the game of linking Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan policies.

⁴³Inasmuch as Sadat had expelled the Soviet military advisors in 1972, there was obviously some souring of Soviet-Egyptian relations even before the Yom Kippur war.

served to point up another comparative advantage of Africa over the Middle East. The chances that direct East-West confrontations will result from local conflicts in Africa seem to be generally less, given the greater Western (and particularly American) security commitments in the Middle East.

The use of Cuban proxies in the Angolan civil war also suggests that the Soviets are sensitive to the problem of avoiding the kind of involvement that would be most likely to escalate into a confrontation of the superpowers. There are probably a number of reasons for the relatively new, more visible Cuban role in Africa. Castro's own aspirations to carve out a niche for himself as a Third World leader and Soviet (and Cuban) appreciation of the combat effectiveness in Africa of even a relatively small contingent of well-trained personnel no doubt figured in decisions regarding the use of Cuban troops. But it also seems reasonable to argue that the Soviets understood that use of Cuban troops would help keep the U.S.S.R. at one remove from a direct combat role, and thus help minimize the risks of escalation.

2. The China Factor

The role of Sino-Soviet rivalry in shaping Soviet African policy in recent years should be considered in the context of the above considerations. The U.S. opening to China in the early 1970's doubtless strengthened Soviet incentives to pursue a policy of détente with the West. However, détente itself, rather than the China factor per se, would seem to be responsible for the kinds of ideological concerns the Soviets have recently been expressing domestically and in their relations with European countries. In Africa, by contrast, the China factor appears more germane to such ideological concerns even if détente has basically given rise to them. If détente has provided a broad impetus for the U.S.S.R. to seek revolutionary successes in Africa, then the U.S.S.R. has reason to be particularly concerned with China as a revolutionary competitor.

Of the several reasons that can be cited to explain the decline in Soviet interest in Africa in the late 1960's, the diminished significance of the Chinese revolutionary challenge must surely be one of the most important. The Chinese revolutionary challenge became less significant for two reasons: because the Soviets put less emphasis on ideological concerns generally, both in their bilateral relations with China and in adopting policies toward Africa; and because the Cultural Revolution and China's consequent domestic orientation simply made China less active in Africa as a whole (with, however, the notable exception of the Tan-Zam railroad project).⁴⁴

It has been argued that after the Cultural Revolution China managed to acquire a rather strong position in Africa, a position of which the Soviets were aware. The strength of this position was evidenced by the growth of Chinese "influence" both with established governments in Tanzania and Zaire and with various insurgent groups.

With the exception of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC-in-exile), all the major liberation movements appear to have found it easier to work with the Chinese than with the Russians. This was notably the case with the Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Rhodesia, and SWAPO of Namibia.... [And with respect to Angola] given the strong Chinese position already established with two of Angola's liberation movements (the Zaire-backed Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA]) as well as with the Zaire government, the cards were heavily stacked in the Chinese favor at the end of 1974.⁴⁵

⁴⁴China, to be sure, still tried to keep its hand in elsewhere, coming out on the side of the Biafrans in the Nigerian civil war--presumably in large part because of the large and active role the Soviets assumed in backing the central government.

⁴⁵Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1976), pp. 748-49. Another author has noted that by the summer (continued on next page)

On the basis of the above-quoted statements alone, it is tempting to explain the subsequent Soviet decision to make a major effort in Angola (and, later, relatively large-scale efforts elsewhere in Africa as well) solely in terms of Soviet comprehension of China's chances to register some notable revolutionary successes. But this knowledge might not have mattered nearly so much, if, by about 1974, détente and Soviet setbacks in the Middle East had not made it important for the U.S.S.R. to counter with some revolutionary successes in Africa.⁴⁶

Because the Soviets decided to make a major commitment to secure the victory of the MPLA, they overshadowed the Chinese in Angola. Building on their Angolan success, they have subsequently gotten an edge on the Chinese in Mozambique as well. The Chinese, not the Soviets, were the external backers most important in bringing Machel's FRELIMO to power in the first place.

(cont'd) of 1974, the Soviets had in fact cut off their aid to the MPLA faction in Angola and only resumed aid in the fall of that year after the rival FNLA faction received large shipments of military supplies from the P.R.C. (See John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* [April 1976], p. 413.) It is noteworthy, however, that at this point Soviet military supplies were still rather modest compared with the massive supplies the Soviets later provided in 1975. This suggests that, while the China factor may have helped stimulate the Soviet involvement that eventually led to an MPLA victory, as of late 1974 it was evidently not regarded by the Soviets as so strong a stimulus as to override Soviet concerns with other factors--i.e., whether the MPLA would hang together as a viable liberation movement; how the West and particularly the United States would react to a larger Soviet role; and how the black African states would react to such a role.

⁴⁶It can be argued, for example, that in the late 1960's similar Chinese strengths would have been much less likely to have prompted the Soviets to make major efforts on behalf of African revolutionary movements. Even leaving aside the cultural revolution and its effects in allaying Soviet concerns with China as an ideological competitor in the Third World, the Soviets were downplaying ideological concerns generally and particularly in Africa, and were well occupied with the prospects of making gains in the Middle East.

But Chinese aloofness from the Angolan civil war (once the Soviets got deeply involved) and the Soviet advantage as an arms supplier (both to Mozambique itself and to insurgents operating out of Mozambique against Rhodesia) have thus far apparently eclipsed China's original contribution to Machel.

3. Basic Significance of New Elements

Soviet activity in Angola, Mozambique, and countries on the Horn of Africa in the very recent past underscores the new elements in Soviet African policy. Both on the state-to-state and the party-to-party level, the Soviets appear to have made more active commitments in Africa than in earlier years. Doubtless building on the precedent that has been established in Soviet relations with major clients in other regions (Egypt, Iraq, and India), the Soviets have signed treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia (1974), Angola (1976), and, most recently, Mozambique (1977). In addition, the Soviets have countenanced--indeed, encouraged--the Marxist-Leninist pretensions of the leaders of all three countries.

Perhaps more than anything else this encouragement signals that the basic impetus behind recent Soviet involvement in Africa is ideological. Even more so than in the Khrushchev years, the Soviets are apparently willing to relax their definitional standards in Africa (since by no stretch of the imagination do these countries meet even the most minimal criteria of Marxism) in order to demonstrate, as Khrushchev also tried to do, that the U.S.S.R. is still the bearer of a vital and relevant revolutionary creed.⁴⁷

⁴⁷How professional Soviet ideologists have viewed this relaxation of standards is an open question. The skepticism that greeted Khrushchev's similar action in the early 1960's in granting revolutionary credentials to Guinea, Ghana, and Mali (see p. 16) was evidently based on the idea that, in lowering standards to secure ideological gains in places like Africa, there was a danger that standards would eventually become corrupted in the U.S.S.R. as well. (continued on next page)

There are doubtless other important elements that must be taken into account in evaluating how this ideological impetus will affect future Soviet activity in terms of the countries the Soviets focus on, the risks they are willing to take, and so on. China's particular competitive threat in various countries, the Soviet ability to use Cuban proxies, the suitability of certain countries for serving nonideological purposes (such as to support Soviet naval interests), the effectiveness of using Soviet military supplies to acquire influence in various settings are all factors that should be taken into account. And sheer opportunity, such as the Soviets were presented with in Nigeria in 1967, in Guinea and Somalia in the early 1970's, and in Angola in 1975 (at least in terms of not having to contend with a major Western response there) will presumably matter as well.

In pointing to a basic ideological impetus, heavily nurtured by détente, behind much of the recent Soviet activity in Africa, we do not mean to suggest that the Soviets have worked out, much

(cont'd) It is thus one measure of the significance the Soviets attach to the goal of demonstrating that the U.S.S.R. is still the home of a revolutionary creed that they have been willing to relax their standards in Africa in the very recent past, even more so than in the Khrushchev years. Perhaps they believe now that playing fast and loose with basic ideological tenets in Africa is not that likely to have negative effects on the Soviet regime. In this regard, it might be noted, Soviet laxness on ideological matters in Africa contrasts vividly with Soviet conservatism on these matters in Europe--as is shown by the Soviet policies that have given rise to Eurocommunism. This conservatism could, at the very least, help deprive the U.S.S.R. of the benefits of any successes the Eurocommunists might achieve. Presumably the Soviets took this harder line in Europe because they knew that ideological flexibility in that arena could more directly and negatively affect ideology in the U.S.S.R. (and Eastern Europe as well). In addition, the Soviets have had no Chinese competitor to contend with in Europe. The prospect of China successfully exploiting revolutionary possibilities in Africa in the mid-1970's would have given the Soviets a particular incentive to be ideologically flexible in that setting.

less that they are abiding by, some master plan. Indeed, recognizing the relevance of Soviet ideological concerns is important in keeping us from subscribing to more alarmist interpretations of what the Soviets are up to or what they can hope to achieve. Since it is otherwise difficult to comprehend why the Soviets should now be so active in an area where they (and the West) have had no truly significant economic, political, or security interests over the years, it is tempting to find the answer in grandiose (and even fantastic) Soviet ambitions such as bringing the West to its knees by depriving it of vital natural resources located in Africa or cutting off the supply of resources (i.e., oil) that transit the waters around the continent. Moreover, as Nkrumah, Keita, Ben Bella, Sadat, and others have reminded the Soviets in the past, even considerable Soviet influence in a client country does not guarantee results, regardless of the scope of the intent.

It is appropriate in this regard to round out the present discussion by pointing to events on the Horn of Africa, where the Soviets could wind up being their own worst enemy. As earlier noted, the Soviets took advantage of developments in Somalia to secure an apparently significant position of influence there that aided them in maintaining an Indian Ocean naval presence. Somalia has been the location of the largest support facility for that presence.

The Soviets may be capable of preserving their position in Somalia while also attempting to obtain influence over Somalia's neighbor--and enemy--Ethiopia. But the Soviets clearly risk their position in Somalia by doing so. Why, then, should they make the attempt? It is doubtful that the Soviets believe that removing the U.S. presence from Ethiopia is worth the risk (although that would be one gain for them). It is also doubtful that they believe Somalia is already lost to the recent wooings of the Saudis and Sudanese.

The *dergue* (Ethiopia's ruling group), which replaced Haile Selassie, has been making appropriate Marxist-Leninist noises, and the Soviets have apparently been encouraging them to do so. It would seem, therefore, that the Soviets' basic impetus here is the same ideological concern that appears to have been behind much of their African policy in recent years.⁴⁸ In this instance, however, responding to it could well cost them an ideological setback in Somalia, as well as the loss of what is perhaps their most important security investment in Africa thus far.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Quite possibly it has been strongly augmented by the China factor in this case, since the Chinese have had a larger role in Ethiopia than the Soviets in the recent past.

⁴⁹The word "investment" should be underscored here. The Soviets have spent more in Angola (in military supplies) than they have thus far in Somalia and they may hope to register some specific security gains from it--such as naval support facilities at Luanda or Lobito. Thus far, however, the large expenditure in Somalia seems much more directly tied to such security objectives in the form of the substantial Indian Ocean naval support facilities the Soviets have already acquired there.

III

EVOLUTION OF GOALS AND POLICIES: THE CHINESE POSITION

A. MAOISM

In considering the Chinese position, it is first of all relevant to describe China's basic ideological posture, Maoism. Maoism developed for the most part while the Chinese Communist movement was severely isolated from the external world: in Northwest China during the war years, when the Chinese Communists were blockaded by both the Japanese and Nationalist Chinese, and during such episodes as the Cultural Revolution--a period of turning inward. However, all of the various Maoist formulations were subsequently adapted and reinterpreted to constitute the Chinese revolutionary model that Peking particularly prescribes for Africa and other Third World regions.

Maoist ideological formulations, as developed and applied in China and subsequently reflected in policy toward Africa, were designed to interpret and legitimize four aspects of Chinese history and policy: the Communist struggle to seize power in China; the Communist effort to transform China into a socialist society; the development of China as a modern nuclear world power; and China's opposition to the U.S.S.R. Peking has maintained that its ideology has particular applicability beyond China itself for the "colonial and semicolonial" world, or, in the current jargon, for the Third World. However, Peking's ideology, strictly speaking, applies only to the struggle for power of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement in an underdeveloped country and the subsequent Socialist development of that country. The formulation that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is to be adopted

together with the injunction that the Communist Party must always control the army, and is by no means a general endorsement of military coups. Similarly, various Maoist formulations regarding the "united front" apply to a class coalition led and controlled by the Communist Party, normally in a situation of "armed struggle," and not to any other type of coalition.

Maoist ideology since 1949 has had a strong element of (non-Marxist) nostalgia for the period when the Chinese Communists were struggling for power, particularly the years of the Long March and of World War II. Consequently, once in power the regime was enjoined by Mao to practice "continuing revolution" to guard against any lapse into comfortable bureaucratism or undue emphasis on stability and the standard of living. The same nostalgia is reflected in theoretical statements about international relations, which stress the role of war and revolution, echoing the earlier emphasis on armed struggle as the path to domestic political power. For example, Peking's formulation in 1965 that the world proletarian revolution is to be accomplished through the encirclement by the rural areas of the world (the underdeveloped countries) of the cities of the world (the developed countries) was based on an explicit analogy with the strategy the Chinese Communists say they followed during the Japanese war in China.¹ Similarly, when Peking was rationalizing the new Chou En-lai-Kissinger strategy of détente with the U.S., it did so in part by recalling a Mao Tse-tung article initially designed to rationalize the Communist Party's postwar negotiations with the Kuomintang.²

¹Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War: In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan," *Peking Review* (September 3, 1965). Although Lin was subsequently declared to have been a "capitalist roader," his formulation continues to be accepted by Peking.

²See "Grasp the General Trend of Historical Development," *Peking Review* (July 28, 1972).

The initial ideological justification for Peking's anti-Soviet posture is mainly the Maoist demand for continuous revolution after the establishment of Communist power. The Soviets, Peking charges, have become revisionists, capitalists, and neo- (or "social") imperialists because they failed to heed this Maoist injunction. Chinese ideological pronouncements trace this aspect of Maoism back to the 1942 Rectification (Cheng Feng) movement in Yen-an in which Mao asserted his authority within the Party over a rival group of Soviet-trained Communists.

Peking's current posture as a self-proclaimed member of the Third World and one that will never seek "superpower" status or "hegemony" can be reconciled with the conventional Marxist class viewpoint only by analogy to the domestic history of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maoist party, early in the Japanese war, began to describe itself as the leading element of the coalition of working and peasant classes with progressive (or "patriotic") elements within the bourgeoisie (termed the "national bourgeoisie"). Similarly, China now aspires to leadership of the Third World (analogous to the peasantry and proletariat), and at the same time claims to have common interests also with many countries of the "second world" (the industrialized countries of Europe and Japan) that are taken to be analogous to the national bourgeoisie since they simultaneously practice and suffer from exploitation. Going even further, in its policy toward the United States Peking now sees certain parallels of interest with one of the superpowers, because of the much greater perceived threat from the other. (The Sino-U.S. détente is taken to be analogous to the united front with Chiang Kai-shek himself during the Japanese war.)³

³The foregoing analysis originated in Peking's concept of the "intermediate zones," put forward by Peking's *People's Daily* after Chou En-lai's extensive trip in 1963-64 to Africa and after Peking had obtained French diplomatic recognition. These zones were described as follows: "Independent countries and those striving for independence in (continued on next page)

The rigorousness with which Peking has applied its formulations to specific situations has varied widely, as periods of ideological dogmatism alternated with much more flexible pragmatic phases in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The ideology itself provides for a range of interpretations, particularly of the concepts of the united front and the Third World, which can be defined broadly or narrowly as the tactical situation requires. Flexibility is facilitated also by Peking's tendency to reduce complex ideological concepts to simple Maoist "sayings" that can be made to apply to a variety of tactical situations. (The latter practice has had the considerable incidental advantage of creating responsiveness to Maoism among nonideological radical movements that find Maoist slogans much more appealing than turgid dialectics.)

B. CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD AFRICA UNDER MAO

1. Early Radicalism

Sino-Soviet differences over ideological questions can be traced back to the 1940's and stemmed initially from questions of how broad a class coalition should be constructed to support

(cont'd) Asia, Africa, and Latin America may be called the first intermediate zone.... The whole of Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and other capitalistic countries ... may be called the second intermediate zone.... While the ruling classes are exploiters and oppressors these countries are themselves subject to US control, interference, and bullying. Therefore they want to free themselves from US control. They therefore have something in common with the socialist countries...." (*People's Daily*, January 21, 1964, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* [18], p. 241.) Current versions of this thesis would, of course, refer to a threat from both superpowers and, for Africa, a particularly grave threat from the U.S.S.R. ("the other superpower which styles itself the 'natural ally' of the Third World" but which is carrying out "infiltration, intervention, subversion, and aggression...." as a Peking representative put it in the UN General Assembly, December 3, 1976. FBIS, *P.R.C.*, December 6, 1976, p. A-3; Peking New China News Agency [NCNA], December 4, 1976.)

the Communist-led revolution, what importance is to be attached to armed struggle as opposed to parliamentary or other legal efforts, and how much originality should be attributed to Mao Tse-tung in regard to these formulations. When the Peking government was established, these issues were important to the new Chinese leadership; at first Moscow chose not to contest openly Chinese aspirations to the special status of ideological leader to the colonial and semicolonial world. This led some observers to conclude (probably mistakenly) that Peking and Moscow had actually agreed on a division of labor. Peking's position was first proclaimed at a meeting of the Communist-front World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) convened in Peking in November 1949, only a month after the Peking government was inaugurated. At the opening session, Liu Shao-ch'i stated, without contradiction from Soviet delegates present, that

the course followed by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the course that should be followed by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.... If the people of a colonial or semi-colonial country have no arms to defend themselves they have nothing at all. The existence and development of proletarian organizations and the existence and development of a national united front are closely linked to the existence and development of such an armed struggle. For many colonial and semi-colonial peoples, this is the only way in their struggle for independence and liberation.⁴

Peking's radical position was a reflection of Moscow's Zhdanov, or two camps thesis that permitted no middle ground between Communists and the U.S.-led "imperialist" bloc. This set the tone for China's refusal to recognize any of the newly

⁴Quoted in Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

independent states of South and Southeast Asia as genuinely liberated and for its support of armed insurrections in all of these countries. China's support for insurgencies in many Asian countries continues to this day, despite the establishment of state-to-state relations with most of the countries involved, and Liu Shao-ch'i's militant statement of 1949 still echoes almost daily in Peking commentaries on southern Africa--even though Liu Shao-ch'i was purged a decade ago as a "capitalist roader" and even though the two camps doctrine has given way in Peking to the much more flexible "intermediate zone" or "three worlds" concept. However, in 1949-50 it did not occur to Peking to extend its doctrines to Africa, which was remote from China's experience and where there were no "national liberation movements" that met the criteria that had been established. (In fact, although Moscow refers to several African regimes as "socialist" and has entered into party-to-party relations with the ruling parties of Angola and Somalia, Peking has made no comparable concession. While aiding many diverse groups under a united front strategy, the Chinese have recognized no sub-Saharan radical African regimes as "socialist" or even "progressive."⁵)

⁵Peking even tries to make a virtue out of its aloofness. In a review of African developments in 1976, Peking charged that "The more the two superpowers intensify their rivalry for hegemony over Africa, the harder they will try to undermine the unity among African countries. In this respect, the acts of Soviet social-imperialism are all the more despicable. It openly classifies certain African countries as 'progressive' and the others as 'reactionary,' in an attempt to sow suspicion or hostility between them. It has even manipulated the non-African country which acted as its mercenary in the Angolan war [Cuba] to convene a 'conference of African progressive countries' in a mean attempt to disintegrate the Organization of African Unity, undermine African unity, and sap the African fighting will." (continued on next page)

2. Bandung

Peking's neglect of African issues continued into the next phase of Peking's ideological development. About 1953, in the course of the Korean war, the Asian strategy of immediate armed insurrection was abandoned as largely a failure, the insurgencies (except in Vietnam) having been driven into remote jungle areas of Southeast Asia. The new Communist line emphasized peaceful coexistence. For Peking this meant a concerted drive to achieve diplomatic influence through bilateral contacts with Asian countries and at governmental conferences such as the Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina in April-July 1954 (which led to the first Indochina truce agreement), the Asian-African meeting at Bandung in April 1955, and the series of Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks beginning in Geneva in August 1955. Since the strategy emphasized government-to-government contact, colonial Africa tended to be as much ignored as in the earlier period. There were numerous elements of competitiveness (although no direct conflict) with the U.S.S.R. in China's coexistence policy at this time; these were expressed more on the diplomatic than ideological level. The coexistence phase provided an opportunity for Chou En-lai to exercise his particular genius, repeating on a world scale the kind of united front politics in which he had specialized in China's domestic context. Chou's personality tended to overshadow comparable

(cont'd) From an NCNA commentary, "Tempestuous Storm Sweeps the African Continent," Peking, NCNA, December 27, 1976, in FBIS, *Daily Report*, PRC, December 28, 1976, pp. A-21 to A-24.

Moscow has also explicitly noted this difference in the Chinese and Soviet view of radical African regimes. For example, in August 1975 the journal *Kommunist* carried a lengthy article entitled "The Maoist Regime at the New Stage," in which Peking is accused of making "deliberately vague Maoist assessments--lacking in class definition" and of attempting to "discredit the idea of the socialist orientation of the developing countries and the noncapitalist path of development." (Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report*, USSR, September 24, 1975, pp. C-1 to C-28.)

efforts by Soviet leaders, particularly since Chou represented an Asian country whereas the Soviet leaders represented what many Asians took to be a European country. However, China's contacts with sub-Saharan Africa at this time remained minimal and indirect. Peking established contact with Egypt at Bandung, and subsequently opened first a trade office and then (in May 1956) an embassy in Cairo. Various African nationalist movements also maintained representation in Cairo, thereby providing Peking with its first direct--but still limited--exposure to black African issues.⁶

3. Turn to the Left

In 1957-58 Peking once more made a sharp turn to the left, resulting in an ideological stance for the 1960's that resembled 1949-50 more than it did Bandung. Since these were also the years when the first black African colonies achieved independence (peaceably, for the most part, and therefore out of step with Peking's radical postulations), it was perhaps inevitable that Peking's first steps in black Africa would be faltering ones. Peking's leftward turn arose in part from domestic considerations but in part also from China's appraisal of the world balance of forces after Moscow's sputnik and missile tests. Mao was in Moscow in November 1957 and proclaimed that the "east wind is prevailing over the west wind," suggesting that the Communist camp take greater risks than Moscow was willing to assume in order to achieve its goals. From that beginning, the Sino-Soviet dispute became more and more open and irreconcilable as the years progressed. Insofar as black Africa was concerned, Peking was critical of Moscow's acceptance of the radical pretensions of some new African governments, such as those of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.⁷ At the same time, Peking began

⁶See Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa 1949-1970* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971), Chapter 2.

⁷China's criticism of Soviet aid to "bourgeois" regimes was focused particularly on Moscow's (continued on next page)

to disregard the inadequate Marxist-Leninist credentials of various radical African nongovernmental movements, and charged that Moscow was underestimating the revolutionary potential of nationalism in the underdeveloped world.

The first concrete expression of Peking's position was the Chinese support of the National Liberation Front in Algeria. Peking's first break with Moscow's diplomacy came when China, unlike the U.S.S.R., formally recognized the insurgent Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria in 1958. In regard to black Africa, Peking tended to vacillate. On the one hand, as countries became independent, Peking sent emissaries and attempted to gain diplomatic support for its UN membership. On the other hand, Peking sought out and assisted revolutionary movements, thereby actually undermining its own diplomatic efforts (see below). In the 1960-61 Congo crisis, Peking was very critical of the initial Soviet support of the UN Security Council action. Peking recognized the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville and blamed the U.S.S.R. for the catastrophic defeat of that regime. Thereafter, Peking continued to support various Congolese dissidents based in Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi, and Ghana--with the result that the Kinshasa government remained firmly aligned with the Republic of China on Taiwan until after Peking's entry into the UN. Some of the Congolese dissidents received weapons and training in China after having been denied Soviet support (for example, Pierre Mulele, who led a short rebellion in Kwilu Province in 1964 and whose movement revealed very specifically the influence of the style of Maoist

(cont'd) allocation of resources to aid in the construction of the Aswan High Dam, in January 1958. It is interesting that a decade later Peking did not discourage favorable comparisons of its own major aid project, the Tan-Zam railway, with the Aswan Dam.

guerrilla warfare practiced during the Chinese revolution).⁸ In Cameroon, Peking followed a similar policy. It aided the nationalist movement, the Union de Populations du Cameroun (UPC), as did the U.S.S.R., but unlike the U.S.S.R. it continued its relationship with the UPC even after Cameroon became independent in January 1960 and after Chou En-lai had made an unreciprocated overture of recognition. China continued to train Cameroonian dissidents in China and to provide other forms of support, thereby ensuring the pro-Taiwan orientation of the Yaounde government. During these same years Peking also initiated contacts with liberation movements from the Portuguese African territories. In 1960, when Khrushchev called for a UN resolution to support immediate independence for colonial territories in Africa, Peking discounted the UN's capabilities and instead called for "armed struggle." Numerous delegations of "freedom fighters" from Portuguese territories were received in China, and Peking began to give small amounts of aid and training to insurgent movements, particularly in Angola. Peking's dabbling in insurgency had mostly negative effects in Africa, but presumably fulfilled in some other way the need for an ideologically militant foreign policy at a time when China's leaders were accusing the Soviets of making too many compromises.

It was against this background that Chou En-lai's visit of December 1963 to February 1964 to 10 African countries, half of them sub-Saharan, took place. Although Chou's safari was primarily diplomatic in nature, it had ideological overtones that prevented the trip from being the kind of triumphal tour

⁸Ogunsanwo, in *China's Policy in Africa*, quotes from Mulele's writing to demonstrate this Maoist flavor (p. 175). The same volume also quotes a lengthy analysis of the Congolese revolutionary situation, in terms of the Maoist ideology outlined in this section, taken from what was at the time a classified Chinese news commentary intended for military use (Chester Cheng, ed. *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army* [Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution, 1966], pp. 103-104).

that Chou's earlier trips to Asian countries had been. Chou's trip came at a time when "a strong psychological impulse toward a more revolutionary approach [appeared] to exist within the Chinese Communist Party."⁹ Chou's references to the "excellent revolutionary prospect" in Africa tended to be understood in newly independent but still politically unstable countries as needlessly inflammatory, to say the least. In fact, Chou's original itinerary had to be curtailed because rebellions had broken out in East Africa (Zanzibar, Tanganyika, and Kenya) and Chou's disavowals of any Chinese link to these rebellions was rendered less credible by the general tone of Chinese commentary, as well as by the history of Chinese involvement with insurgents in the affected countries and elsewhere.

China's natural ideological affinity for militancy received some additional encouragement during the latter half of the 1960's. The most important boost was a result of Peking's relationship with Sukarno's Indonesia, which at the time was strategically the most crucial target for the expansion of Chinese ideological influence. In the course of Sukarno's "confrontation" with Malaysia, a virtual Pyongyang-Peking-Hanoi-Djakarta axis had developed, supplemented by Peking's very strong influence within the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). When Sukarno, piqued at the seating of Malaysia on the Security Council, withdrew Indonesia from the UN in January 1965, Peking supported his action and his call for a rival "revolutionary" world organization. As a consequence, Peking largely abandoned its effort to gain diplomatic support in Africa for its own entry into the UN. Instead, Peking diplomacy focused almost entirely on gaining support for an Indonesian-proposed second Bandung conference, to be held in Algiers--without Soviet participation. Peking's militant mood survived even a series of shattering defeats that in ordinary times might have led to a

⁹W. A. C. Adie, "Chou En-lai Safari," *China Quarterly* (18).

reappraisal of Chinese ideological strategy. However, in that atmosphere of exceedingly sharp Sino-Soviet polemics, a rational review of foreign policy was hardly possible.

The defeats suffered by China included the abortive Indonesian Communist coup attempt of September 30, 1965, which was to lead to the fall of Sukarno, the annihilation of the PKI, and, thereby, the loss of virtually all of China's assets in Indonesia. The Chinese and Indonesian-proposed Algiers conference had also aborted, largely because of the overthrow of the Ben Bella government in June 1965. Peking also experienced several diplomatic setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa, in each case due to a change of regime that led to the removal of pro-Chinese factions.¹⁰ The most galling of these was the overthrow of the radical Ghanaian regime of President Kwame Nkrumah while he was actually on a state visit in Peking. Peking was also expelled from Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic, and the Chinese chargé in Kenya was asked to leave. In all these cases allegations of Chinese "subversive" activities were made. The best documented of these came from Ghana, where the Chinese had operated training camps for "freedom fighters" from various African countries, but presumably these activities were conducted at the request of the Nkrumah government.¹¹ The allegations were encouraged and exploited by Taiwan propaganda, in hopes of affecting the UN representation question. However, it is clear that Peking's militant ideological posture once again,

¹⁰These diplomatic setbacks are discussed in terms of their African factional background in Larkin, *China and Africa*, Chapter 6.

¹¹The U.S.S.R. reportedly also conducted training activities for insurgents, but this aid ceased in 1962, leaving only the Chinese advisors. See Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 162, and McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, p. 51.

as at the time of Chou En-lai's trip to Africa, made plausible the charges about Chinese activities in Africa.¹²

4. Cultural Revolution

China's Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, resulted in a considerable boost for China's militant international ideological stance, even though the Cultural Revolution was a domestic political movement accompanied by a substantial contraction of Peking's foreign relations. All of China's chiefs of mission in Africa south of the Sahara were recalled to Peking during the Cultural Revolution, leaving only Ambassador to Egypt Huang Hua (the present Foreign Minister) at an African post. The sub-Saharan posts were thus left in charge of junior and often very radical officers, who in any case were under great pressure to take extreme ideological positions because of the news and directives coming from Peking. By 1968, Peking had diplomatic relations with only 13 of the 41 then-independent countries in Africa; of the 13, 8 were south of the Sahara (Guinea, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Congo [Brazzaville], Mali, and Zambia), and relations varied from cordial to stiffly formal. Peking publicly welcomed this situation, disclaiming interest in the UN and stating that severance of relations with reactionary regimes would simply make it easier for China to support

¹²When Chinese diplomats and aid teams were expelled from various African countries, it was natural for the governments concerned to cite Peking's self-proclaimed record of militancy. However, the real reasons for the Chinese expulsions are more complex. In some cases, the Taiwan regime itself was in contact with dissident factions which, when they came to power by coup, repaid their sponsors by expelling the Peking Chinese. It has even been suggested that some military factions disliked the Chinese simply because of experiences gained while serving in Indochina as part of the French forces. See Alan Hutchison, "China in Africa," *Round Table* (259), pp. 374-71.

revolution in the countries affected.¹³ In addition, the situation made it natural for Peking to focus its attention on a few key countries, particularly Tanzania.

Peking's actions during the 1960's thus reflected a combination of ideological and diplomatic factors. China was urging the U.S.S.R. to follow an aggressive, militant course, and was also arguing the general applicability to the underdeveloped world of the Chinese revolutionary model, which at the time was interpreted to mean that power should be seized by armed struggle. Peking's predilection for backing African radicals was coupled at times with what was either faulty intelligence or simply bad luck, leading China to back the losing party--an action that further identified China with dissidence and rebellion, as did the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

5. Kissinger-Chou En-lai Diplomacy

Although China's domestic politics continued to be embroiled in radicalism until after Mao's death, on the foreign policy side a new phase had already begun with the Kissinger-Chou En-lai contacts of 1971. Renewed Chinese emphasis on diplomacy and state-to-state contact was stimulated both by the African

¹³See Hong Kong U.S. Consulate General, cited in Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa*, p. 192. It is necessary to note that despite Peking's militant statements concerning armed struggle in the Third World, propaganda support was given explicitly to only a very limited number of African revolutionary movements. Peter Van Ness, in *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, noted that in 1965 Peking gave public support to revolutionary movements in 23 countries, only 4 of which were in Africa (Congo [Brazzaville] and the Portuguese territories of Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique). However, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, Van Ness notes that four additional revolutionary movements were added to Peking's list: those in Rhodesia, South-west Africa, Spanish Guinea, and the Cameroon (the latter renewing for a brief period propaganda support that had been given some years earlier and then dropped). Van Ness does not take into account Peking's assistance in training "freedom fighters" in Africa and in China from some additional countries, as revealed for example in Ghana in 1966. See Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970).

countries' response to Chinese entry into the UN, and by the coincidental marked radicalization of African politics in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo. Most African countries broke relations with Israel and Taiwan at about the same time and established or reestablished relations with Peking; also, insurgency as advocated by China became increasingly respectable in Third World forums because of the merging of the anti-Israel and anti-South Africa factions of international politics. Peking consequently could maintain its ideological position and at the same time practice conventional diplomacy in a way that had not been possible earlier. The Chou En-lai-Kissinger phase of Peking's foreign policy involved some ideological adjustments to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. was now the main threat and that there were some overlapping interests with the United States (and not merely with the "intermediate zones," as previously postulated). However, the adjustments did not affect Peking's view of Africa, toward which it continued to express a high degree of militancy, albeit now focused on the white regimes of South Africa rather than on all the nonradical regimes, as before. (If Peking's words did not change much, some of its actions changed considerably; this will be taken up in the next chapter.)

C. THE POST-MAO PERIOD

The factional struggle that brought Hua Kuo-feng to the fore as the successor to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung appears to have revolved principally around domestic issues. The continuity of strategy in the Third World has been underscored by Peking in a number of commentaries summarizing the significance of Mao Tse-tung's ideology outside of China. For example, one such article, entitled "World's People Praise Chairman Mao's Immense Contributions,"¹⁴ is typical in its reaffirmation of three decades of Chinese Communist ideology. The article states that the

¹⁴*Peking Review*, January 7, 1977.

"victory of the Chinese revolution was an encouragement to the militancy of the Asian, African, and Latin American people in their struggle for liberation" and that "the oppressed nations and oppressed people of the world have come to realize through their own experience that the road of armed struggle pointed out by Chairman Mao is the only road to their liberation." The article cites the people of Algeria, who "fired the first shot in the war against French colonial rule," fighters in Latin America, and in the jungles of "some" Southeast Asian countries, Palestinian guerrillas, and the "freedom fighters in Zimbabwe and Namibia." Mao's three worlds thesis is cited as having been found absolutely correct by "revolutionaries in many countries."¹⁵ A further "indelible" Mao contribution is the fact that he "initiated the struggle against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the center," thereby "pushing human history forward." Mao is also given credit for personally initiating and leading the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," thereby solving the "problem of combating and preventing revisionism and continuing the revolution by integrating theory with practice." (The article quotes a Colombian Maoist journal as stating that Mao for the first time solved these problems, "the Great Lenin [having] passed away before solving these questions.")

The militant tone of Peking's current comments on Third World affairs, of which the foregoing extracts are typical, is

¹⁵ "Revolutionaries in many countries describe the following analysis of Chairman Mao as absolutely correct: The two super-powers--the Soviet Union and the United States--who belong to the first world are the biggest international oppressors and exploiters in the contemporary era and the source of a new world war; the developed countries of the second world oppress and exploit the third world countries, while at the same time they are oppressed, exploited, controlled, and intimidated by the superpowers; oppressed and exploited by colonialism and imperialism, the numerous third world countries are the main force in opposing imperialism, hegemonism of the two super-powers in particular."

in contrast to a much more pragmatic approach to domestic affairs, which is being buttressed by the publication for the first time of a speech given by Mao in 1956 in which he discussed in relatively moderate, if somewhat Stalinist terms the problems of China's industrialization, of the regime's drive against counterrevolutionaries, and of learning from the negative as well as positive aspects of the Soviet experience. In regard to African affairs there is no comparable moderation in the ideological summaries, except that Peking avoids specifics that might offend black African regimes or potentially friendly political groups. Peking's lists of revolutionary organizations and "Marxist-Leninist" (that is, Maoist) parties that have sent messages of condolence on Mao's death and congratulations on Hua Kuo-feng's accession included no African revolutionary groups, other than the above-mentioned vaguely identified "freedom fighters" in Zimbabwe and Namibia. However, messages from individual black African governments were specifically acknowledged, suggesting Peking's current awareness of the desirability of separating ideology and diplomacy.

It is necessary to note a further qualification in Peking's stance. While ideological discussions since Mao's death, and particularly since Hua Kuo-feng's assumption of power, have tended to catalog and reaffirm the formulations developed by Mao Tse-tung, Peking's strongest emphasis in foreign policy statements is devoted to warnings concerning the special threat represented by Soviet actions. These warnings, addressed to Western Europe and Japan as well as the Third World, seem to be more important than the desire to collect Third World endorsements of Mao's "armed struggle" doctrine. For example, Peking welcomed a high-level delegation from Liberia, a country with the closest links to the United States and one where Taiwan has for over a decade conducted a successful technical assistance program, but also one that because of its

pro-American orientation is suspicious of the U.S.S.R.¹⁶ Speeches delivered by Peking spokesmen who greeted the Liberian delegation gave no hint of Peking's previous appraisal that countries like Liberia were in a neocolonial relationship to the United States and therefore not to be taken seriously as independent states. Rather, the new Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, praised Liberia's independence, adding a particular warning against

the superpower that styles itself a "natural ally" of the African people [which] is scheming to ... disrupt the unity among the African states and among the national liberation movements, attempting to ... carry out infiltration and expansion, vainly attempting to take over the positions of old-line colonialism. This superpower's ferocious features as social-imperialism have been discerned by more and more countries and people....¹⁷

Peking's current moderate mood is discernible in the fact that African visitors are apparently not required or expected to echo the strong anti-Soviet line (although a few have been persuaded to refer vaguely to opposition to "hegemony"); otherwise, Peking's expressions of concern at the Soviet threat reflect no moderation.

¹⁶Contrary to the usual practice, the Liberian visit did not terminate with an announcement that diplomatic relations were being established. However, such an announcement was made after a delay of some weeks, suggesting some problems possibly relating to the status of the Taiwanese agricultural assistance projects. *Washington Post*, February 23, 1977.

¹⁷See "Liberian Goodwill Delegation Visits China," *Peking Review* (January 21, 1977).

IV

POLICY INSTRUMENTALITIES

The foregoing chapters have discussed the evolution of Soviet and Chinese goals and policies in Africa, stressing the ideological component and the relationship of both countries' African activities to their global involvement. This chapter will describe in more concrete terms how these broad, ideologically influenced policies were implemented by each country in terms of diplomacy, economic assistance, and military assistance. The final two chapters summarize some noteworthy differences between Chinese and Soviet foreign policy styles, and pinpoint some trends that have important implications for U.S. policy.

A. DIPLOMACY

Establishing diplomatic relations with African states became important for both the U.S.S.R. and China during the 1960's because of the number of African colonies that were achieving independence. In 1945 only Liberia, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Egypt were independent, and by the end of the 1950's only six more states had been added to the list: Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, Ghana, Libya, and the Sudan. But in 1960 17 more states achieved independence and today there are 51 independent states in Africa; excluding 7 in North Africa, 44 can be considered sub-Saharan. The process is virtually complete and only a few additional territories, such as Namibia (Southwest Africa), are considered likely to

achieve independent status.¹ Like other major powers, the U.S.S.R. and China wanted to be represented diplomatically in as many states as possible, if only to keep an eye on each other and on the European powers. In addition, the proliferation of states entering the United Nations raised the prospect of defeating the "voting machine" the United States had maintained through its influence with Latin American delegations (before the emergence of the African nations, the states of Latin America were the largest bloc in the UN). This point was apparent early to Moscow, which refused to consider U.S. suggestions for limiting the influx of ministates into the UN. It was apparent also to China, whose entry into the UN could have taken place many years earlier if greater support for Chinese representation could have been developed in the African bloc.

The diplomatic record of Moscow in sub-Saharan Africa can be summarized briefly, because Moscow operated in Africa with little handicap, with the occasional exception of the usually temporary expulsion of a blundering diplomat or diplomatic mission. Neither the United States nor China lobbied

¹The number of presently and potentially independent states would be higher if the South African "bantustan" plan, whereby a number of black "homelands" will be given autonomous status in a loose confederation with the Republic of South Africa, were internationally accepted. The most viable of these states, the Transkei, was declared independent in October 1976, but achieved no international recognition, not even by the somewhat similarly situated Kingdom of Lesotho. Neither Peking nor Moscow is likely to risk offending all other black African states by taking the initiative to enter into relations with the Transkei or other "homelands," even though this could open a channel of influence among blacks in South Africa. For Peking the issue may be foreclosed if Taiwan proceeds with a reported plan for a modest technical assistance program for the Transkei.

against Soviet diplomatic representation in Africa, which is now nearly universal.²

In the case of China the story is more complex. The Chinese conflict between ideology and diplomacy was more apparent to the newly independent African states, and the United States was lobbying strongly against a Chinese diplomatic presence through most of the 1960's. Furthermore, the Taiwan-based Republic of China developed an effective African program including an innovative agricultural technical assistance program out of which grew a remarkable degree of rapport between numerous African countries and Taiwan. This rapport persists even today in a few African countries.³ Peking had to compete with this U.S.-assisted Taiwan diplomacy, since both Chinas insisted that neither would be represented in a country where the other had a diplomatic or technical assistance mission. (On the formal diplomatic level, there was no comparable competition with Moscow, which maintained its missions regardless of which China was represented in a given capital.)

Peking's ideological and diplomatic handicap resulted in China's isolation throughout the 1960's both because of its exclusion from the UN and limited diplomatic contacts, and through its exclusion from Communist-sponsored front organizations. On the diplomatic side, U.S. and Republic of China

²Sub-Saharan states where the U.S.S.R. is not represented diplomatically, in addition to South Africa, are Gabon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland. See Table A, "Soviet Political Relations with African States" in McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*.

³A total of 23 sub-Saharan countries received Taiwanese aid missions for varying periods beginning in 1960. At present about five countries still host such missions. For a survey of Taiwan's programs, including an eyewitness report by one of the present authors, see J. A. Yager, N. N. White, and P. W. Colm, *The Republic of China as a Source of Technical Assistance to Other Countries*, IDA Paper P-882, May 1972.

efforts prevented Peking's supporters (led by Albania and later Cambodia) from assembling a voting bloc that could defeat U.S. parliamentary maneuvers designed to continue Peking's exclusion from the UN and other international organizations. Peking failed to gain the diplomatic recognition of most Asian and African states, despite its claims of special ideological affinity with them, until after China's isolation was ended by its admission to the United Nations.⁴ Even French recognition of Peking in 1964 did not cause the expected landslide of recognition by francophone African states, nor did Chou En-lai's 1963-64 African safari help much. In fact, due to the ideological and other factors mentioned in the preceding chapter, Peking lost diplomatic ground in the next two years even though additional countries were becoming independent.

In regard to the various Communist-supported front organizations, Soviet efforts caused Peking's standing to decline in such groups as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), with which Peking finally broke in March 1967. Peking's reciprocal efforts to exclude Moscow from such organizations were largely futile, and Peking's strong lobbying for a second Bandung conference without Soviet participation ended when the proposed Algiers conference aborted in 1965, as has been mentioned. The Chinese

⁴When Taiwan was expelled and Peking admitted to the UN in October 1972, after previous U.S. policy became untenable due to the Kissinger-Chou En-lai contacts, 14 sub-Saharan countries supported the procedural formula designed to maintain Taiwan's representation, against 13 countries that supported Peking. Only when the procedural effort failed were Peking's supporters for the first time able to gain the vote of a majority of sub-Saharan countries (17, as against 14 for Taiwan). Once the UN decision was accomplished, most African countries hastened to establish relations with Peking, but early in 1977 there were still seven sub-Saharan countries that had failed to do so: South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mauritius, and Angola--plus Libya in North Africa.

consequently maintained a number of Sino-African front organizations in rump form with headquarters in Peking (such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), but none of these had much impact in Africa.⁵

Given its generally poor record in both diplomatic and Communist front relationships, Peking attempted to break out of its isolation in Africa (as elsewhere) by utilizing the informal and relatively nonpolitical "people's diplomacy," in the form of numerous exchanges of delegations and traveling troupes of all kinds, including visits to China by whatever African personages were amenable, from chiefs of state to freedom fighters and dissident politicians. This activity was moderately successful since it established some ideological rapport (the groundwork for the more successful formal diplomacy of the 1970's), and created the illusion both in Africa and within China itself that China was less isolated than was in fact the case. For example, political figures even from minor African countries visiting China received prominent publicity in Peking and audiences with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai at times when Peking had difficulty in persuading more significant world statesmen to attend its May Day, National Day, and similar functions. Many Chinese citizens no doubt drew the conclusion from the attendant ceremony that great powers were involved in what were actually visits by minor figures from insignificant countries. The reason for the relative success of Peking's people's diplomacy was that the proscription of any "two Chinas" situation was followed less rigorously than in formal diplomatic proceedings. Peking was willing to engage in exchanges with countries that had similar contacts with Taiwan, although it normally did not welcome visitors who had previously visited Taiwan. (Since much of

⁵See Larkin, *China and Africa*, pp. 140-42.

Peking's activity in diplomatic and pseudodiplomatic areas was in competition with Taipei, it should be noted that Taiwan probably outdid Peking during some years even in the field of people's diplomacy, and that the citizens of Taiwan also were misled about the significance of some of the countries whose leaders they were encouraged to cheer.)

Peking devoted substantial resources to its people's diplomacy and continues to do so. Furthermore, a visit to China is for most Third World figures intrinsically more impressive than one to the U.S.S.R. (as it seems to be for Americans, also). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that on balance China gained much from its people's diplomacy in the competition with the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. conducted its own version of people's diplomacy, facilitated by the existence of diplomatic relations in almost all African countries and by the absence of competition from Taiwan and the United States. It is noteworthy that few of the African visitors to China were willing to take public positions on questions at issue between Peking and Moscow while in China. They were willing to listen to Chinese warnings about Soviet "hegemonistic" ambitions in Africa, but in return they confined themselves to vapid praise of the "great helmsman" and of China's "self-reliant" economic progress. As likely as not, the visitors would turn up in Moscow during the next tourist season.

B. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Economic assistance has been an instrument of Soviet and Chinese policy from the beginning of their involvement in Africa. Economic assistance has been used, at various times, to facilitate diplomatic relations, ideological identification, and trade, and--more recently in the case of the U.S.S.R.--to get access to support facilities for the Air Force and navy. Economic aid has inevitably been used to gain an advantage in the Sino-Soviet competition and ideological dispute.

During the first decade after World War II, economic assistance from Communist bloc states was granted to other Communist regimes. China received Soviet aid under various agreements negotiated during the 1950's, beginning with a \$300-million loan granted in February 1950. China's experience as an aid donor dates from 1953, when North Korea began to receive Peking's economic help. Subsequently, Peking granted aid also to Eastern European countries, particularly Albania, and to the other Asian Communist regimes in Outer Mongolia and North Vietnam.⁶ Some of the practices of this period have been transferred directly to Africa. The U.S.S.R. has often specialized in Africa in the kind of Stalinist-developmental projects emphasizing large-scale industrial projects (invariably in the governmental sector) that were typical of earlier Soviet assistance to China and other bloc countries. China similarly has transferred to Africa some of its experience with the Asian Communist states (particularly Outer Mongolia) with infrastructure projects, such as highways and railroads, built using large numbers of Chinese laborers under semimilitary discipline. Furthermore, China has applied the lessons it learned as a recipient of Soviet aid. Peking has neglected no opportunity to warn African recipients about the clumsiness and attached conditions that sometimes characterize Soviet economic aid, and at the same time the Chinese have tried, apparently with some success, to create for themselves the contrasting image of a disinterested and sophisticated aid donor in Africa. Peking's slogan in adapting to the abrupt termination of Soviet aid to China in 1961 was "self-reliance," and the Chinese have somehow persuaded many Africans that Chinese economic assistance, even on the scale granted to

⁶For estimates of Peking's early aid to other Communist countries, see Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966), table on page 162. The same volume also describes Soviet aid to China during the 1950's.

Tanzania, is consistent with self-reliance whereas aid from more developed countries, and particularly the U.S.S.R., undermines that concept (Peking sympathetically points out that Africa "suffered" immeasurably from superpower aid before the advent of Chinese aid).

Systematic Communist-bloc aid to non-Communist countries dates from the post-Stalin Bandung period of Sino-Soviet competition in the underdeveloped world. Although Peking rather obliquely indicated some reservations about Soviet generosity toward "bourgeois" regimes (such as in 1958 when Moscow undertook to finance the Aswan High Dam for Egypt), generally Chinese and Soviet aid programs ran parallel (as they still do in many countries). Regardless of any ideological reservations, Peking usually accompanied diplomatic recognition of new African states with grants of economic assistance, as did Moscow. The first new sub-Saharan African country to be recognized was Sékou Touré's Guinea in 1958, which received at the outset two gifts of rice from China, in 1959 a Soviet loan of \$35 million, and in 1960 a Chinese loan of \$25 million when Touré became the first new African head of state to make a formal tour of China (following two trips to the U.S.S.R.). Similarly, diplomatic recognition of Mali by Moscow and Peking in October 1960 was followed in February 1961 by a \$30-million Chinese loan and in March by a \$44-million Soviet loan. Ghana became independent in March 1957 and established relations with the U.S.S.R. in January 1958 and with China in July 1960; numerous economic aid agreements followed, beginning with a \$40-million Soviet credit in August 1960 and a \$20-million Chinese credit in August 1961. Somalia was another early aid recipient. Recognized in 1960 by both Peking and Moscow, the first Soviet loans (\$53 million) were made in June 1961 but the first Chinese loan did not materialize until August 1963 (\$20-million loan and \$3-million grant). Some other early recipients of Soviet aid, however, were omitted

from Peking's largesse. The Sudan received various forms of Soviet economic aid starting in 1960 or thereabouts, but no Chinese aid was granted until 1970 (however, the Sudan benefitted from extensive trade relations with China throughout the 1960's). Ethiopia, Moscow's earliest diplomatic partner in Africa and a very early recipient of aid (\$100-million credit in July 1959), did not recognize Peking until December 1970 and therefore received no Chinese aid until an \$84-million credit was agreed on in October 1971, at the time of Emperor Haile Selassie's visit to Peking.⁷

During the early period, until about 1964, more African countries received Soviet aid than Chinese, and Soviet projects were much larger and more spectacular, particularly in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. However, the Chinese had active trade relations with many other African countries and Chinese aid programs were not insignificant even where Moscow predominated. China's tendency to be more selective about aid recipients during this period was in part due to fiscal constraints caused by severe economic problems in China and in part due to China's much more limited range of diplomatic relationships (Peking, unlike Taipei, being unwilling to grant aid in the absence of diplomatic relations).

Many of the tales of early Soviet blundering in African aid programs (such as the story of a shipment of snow plows to Guinea) are apocryphal;⁸ nevertheless, the grandiose style of Khrushchev's aid programs, which heavily emphasized construction of large industrial facilities and often piled project upon project, even though earlier loans had not been drawn upon and construction on earlier projects not completed, resulted in

⁷Data in this chapter are drawn largely from Wolfgang Bartke, *China's Economic Aid* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1975); McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, and Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World*, 1975, ER-76-10372U (Washington, D. C.: CIA, July 1976).

⁸See William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York, N. Y.: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 67.

landscapes littered with economic white elephants. For example, when Communist-bloc projects were halted in Ghana after Nkrumah's fall from power in 1966, many projects became derelict and were shown to be useless and wasteful in Ghana's economic situation. Since China's early aid programs were much more modest and many of the credits and grants simply financed imports of Chinese consumer goods, Peking avoided much of the reputation for sponsoring badly planned aid projects.

When Khrushchev fell from power, Soviet aid programs were substantially scaled down and a much more careful effort made to suit the scope of the project to the requirements of the local economy or to specific Soviet policy aims, such as access to raw materials or naval and air facilities.⁹ China also became less active in Africa shortly thereafter, as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution. However, previously--during Chou En-lai's 1963-64 African safari--the Chinese had formulated eight principles of economic assistance, which still do much to determine the image of Chinese aid in the underdeveloped world. During this period, while Peking and Moscow were deemphasizing African programs, China did continue with the planning and implementation of the Tan-Zam Railway, a project that exceeded in magnitude all other aid projects in Africa, and where a special effort was apparently made to conform to Chou's eight principles and thus solidify the image that Peking wanted to project in Africa. The eight principles are as follows:

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. Through such aid the friendly new emerging countries gradually develop their own national economy, free themselves from colonial control and strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in the world. This is in itself a tremendous support to China.

⁹See Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Relations with the Developing Nations."

2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions.

3. The Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.

4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance step by step.

5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so the recipient government may increase their income and accumulate capital.

6. The Chinese Government provides the best quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.

7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques.

8. The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.¹⁰

¹⁰The eight principles were set forth by Chou En-lai in Accra on January 15, 1964. The English version is quoted in George T. Yu, *China and Tanzania: A Study* (continued on next page)

To what extent these principles have actually distinguished Chinese from Soviet projects is difficult to establish, but China undoubtedly has earned a favorable reputation in Africa for not attaching undue conditions to its aid, for the simple life-style of its technical personnel, and for the generous terms of its loans.¹¹ However, there has also been some criticism. For example, Chinese consumer goods imported to finance the local costs of various projects have been said to be competitive with domestic manufactures and sometimes of poor quality.¹²

A comparison of the total aid commitments made by the U.S.S.R. and China through 1965, reflecting the early years of emphasis on African affairs, indicates a substantial initial Soviet

(cont'd) in *Cooperative Interaction* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 46-47. The importance Peking continues to attach to the principles is indicated by the fact that they are cited as among Chou En-lai's major achievements in the recent campaign to apotheosize Chou. See "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs," *Peking Review* (January 28, 1977).

¹¹The U.S.S.R. early in its history as an economic aid donor established the principle that interest would be charged on loans. China at first followed the Soviet lead, and charged interest on some early loans to Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. As the Sino-Soviet split developed, China began to criticize interest as a capitalist device. In 1964, the interest on the earlier loan to Ceylon was cancelled, although in the same year a small (\$500,000) 2.5% interest-bearing loan was negotiated with Tanzania. Otherwise all Chinese loans have been interest-free. Furthermore, Chinese loans usually defer repayment for a period of 5-10 years and provide for a repayment period of 10-30 years, with most loan agreements specifying 10-year deferral and 30-year repayment schedules. Soviet credits normally are for 12 years at 2.5%. (Of course the U.S.S.R. and China, in addition, offer grant aid in certain cases.) See Bartke, *China's Economic Aid*, table 6, page 17, and Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid," in Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 375.

¹²See Yu, *China and Tanzania*, pp. 44-45, and Larkin, *China and Africa*, p. 143.

advantage. The value of Soviet aid commitments to sub-Saharan countries totalled over twice the value of China's, and the U.S.S.R. was ahead of China in every country except Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Zambia, and the Central African Republic. The Chinese lead in Tanzania in 1965 was still a very narrow one that would have been eliminated if Eastern European aid commitments were counted on the Soviet side. The Central African Republic--from which China was shortly to be expelled because of charges of subversion--and Zambia had received only very modest Chinese aid commitments, but no Soviet aid. (It should be noted that sub-Saharan Africa is the area in which Peking carried on its most intensive aid operations. If the scope of consideration were enlarged to include all of Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia, and the U.A.R., the value of Soviet aid committed through 1965 would have been found to total more than four times that of China.) Table 1 indicates the sums involved in these early aid commitments, excluding military assistance and aid commitments from Eastern European countries.¹³

Beginning in 1965, the U.S.S.R. adopted a much more selective policy toward making aid commitments to Africa, and China, because of the Cultural Revolution, also drew back from making major new commitments. The main exception for China was the commitments and disbursements that continued to be made to Tanzania and Zambia, principally in connection with the agreement of September 5, 1967 whereby China undertook to construct and finance (with a 25-year interest-free loan) the \$400-million 1,000-mile Tanzania-Zambia Railway. The Tan-Zam Railway project became the largest foreign aid project in Africa, and placed China well in the lead in the Sino-Soviet aid competition, even though the number of countries continuing to receive Chinese aid had contracted sharply.

¹³ Military aid will be considered in the next section.

Table 1. CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA THROUGH 1965^a (In millions of U.S. dollars)

U.S.S.R. Spent More in:			China Spent More in:	
	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.	P.R.C.	U.S.S.R.
Ethiopia	102.0	--	Cen.Afr Rep.	4.0
Ghana	82.0	42.0	Congo(Brazz.)	25.2
Guinea	61.0	26.5	Tanzania	44.4
Kenya	44.4	18.0	Zambia	0.5
Mali	61.0	19.6		--
Senegal	7.0	--		
Somalia	52.0	21.6		
Sudan	22.0	--		
Uganda	16.0	15.0		
Total Sub-Saharan Africa:			U.S.S.R.	498.4
			P.R.C.	216.8

^aExcluding military assistance and aid from Eastern European countries.

Source: Data from Table 3, p. 49, in Yu, *China and Tanzania*; Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, p. 206; and Milton Kovner, "Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less-Developed Countries," in Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Profile of Mainland China* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 612.

By 1969, a new phase in the aid competition was starting. As the Kissinger-Chou En-lai diplomacy ended China's long period of diplomatic isolation, it became routine for China to accompany the establishment of diplomatic relations with any African country with an agreement for economic assistance. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. again began to back up ideological approval of certain African regimes with sizeable aid programs. As a result of Peking's new universal approach to foreign aid, as well as the magnitude of the Tan-Zam project, and of Moscow's much more selective approach, Peking's aid total in Africa came substantially to exceed that of Moscow. In 1972, Peking's aid already exceeded Moscow's in 20 sub-Saharan countries (10 of these received no Soviet aid), whereas Moscow was ahead in only

6 countries (all of which also received Chinese aid).¹⁴ The most recent data (1975) indicate that Peking now leads in 23 countries and Moscow in 8. The cumulative sums involved are indicated in Table 2, which again excludes aid from Eastern European countries and military aid.

The figures in Table 2 give cumulative totals of aid commitments. It is usually difficult to establish at what rate loans and grant commitments were actually disbursed; clearly in many cases there were long delays and some relatively early commitments remain unexpended. Nevertheless, the trends are generally valid as an indication of the relative magnitude of Chinese and Soviet aid to specific countries.

The disproportion between Chinese and Soviet economic aid becomes much greater if one considers only new commitments. In fact, recent trends would soon lead to a situation where debt service obligations will catch up with Soviet (and East European) disbursements in many countries. New Chinese commitments, on the other hand, have climbed to unprecedented amounts, as Table 3 indicates.

It is difficult to establish both what it is that Moscow and Peking have bought with their substantial expenditures in economic assistance over the past two decades and why present patterns of Chinese and Soviet activity diverge so widely. The purposes listed at the outset of this chapter--diplomatic relations, ideological identification, trade, access to military support facilities, and the Sino-Soviet competition itself--can explain specific grants of aid at particular times, but they do not explain the high cumulative totals.

The current very selective and relatively modest Soviet aid program seems to be focused on countries that are ideologically relatively congenial to the U.S.S.R., that can provide raw materials needed by Soviet industry, and that could provide

¹⁴See Bartke, *China's Economic Aid*, Table 8.

Table 2. CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA THROUGH 1975^a (In millions of U.S. dollars)

China spent more in:			U.S.S.R. spent more in:		
	P.R.C.	U.S.S.R.		U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.
Burundi	20	--	Ethiopia	104	84
Cameroon	71	8	Ghana	93	42
Cen.Afr.Rep.	4	2	Guinea	200	77
Chad	50	10	Kenya	48	18
Congo (Brazz.)	25	14	Mali	86	68
Dahomey	44	--	Nigeria	7	3 ^b
Equat. Guinea	10 ^c	1	Somalia	153	133
Gambia	17	--	Uganda	16	15
Guinea-Bissau	17	1			
Malagasy Rep.	66	--			
Mauritania	85	4			
Mauritius	35	--			
Mozambique	59	--			
Niger	51	2			
Rwanda	22	1			
Senegal	49	9			
Sierra Leone	30	28			
Sudan	82	64			
Tanzania	331	20			
Togo	45	--			
Upper Volta	60	--			
Zambia	279	6			
Zaire	100	--			
Total Sub-Saharan Africa:			U.S.S.R.	877	P.R.C. 1,992

^a Excluding military assistance and aid from Eastern European countries.

^b CIA does not give a dollar figure for Chinese aid, but indicates that a small Chinese aid program has been operating since 1974. According to Bartke, China granted Nigeria a \$3-million loan in November 1972 and initiated planning for an agricultural development project in February 1973.

^c CIA does not give a dollar figure for Chinese aid, but Bartke estimates that China granted a loan of \$10 million in 1971, and McLane indicates that the Chinese aid program appears to be much more active than the Soviet program.

Source: Data from Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*, Table 8, p. 32. See also Bartke, *China's Economic Aid*, and McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*.

Table 3. NEW CHINESE AND SOVIET AID COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (In millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.
1969	135	10
1970	7	454
1971	27	285
1972	--	177
1973	10	335
1974	5	217
1975	63	150

Source: Table XI-4, in Kitchen, *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, and (for 1975) CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*.

facilities for Soviet air and naval units. (Whether they will do so under specific conditions is, of course, another question--Sékou Touré's refusal to grant the Soviets landing rights at the airfield in Conakry during the Cuban missile crisis being a case in point.) If these purposes explain Soviet aid programs in the major recipient countries, they still do not explain why the U.S.S.R. has seemingly abandoned the economic assistance field to the Chinese in so many other countries.

On the Chinese side, the puzzle is even more complex. One observer has commented that "scholars have speculated about Chinese purposes without producing what seem to [him] to be convincing explanations." This observer notes that the commitments appear to be serious, since disbursements are rapid; that China now has more bilateral aid programs in Africa than does the United States; and that its aid is less concentrated. He points to the substantial share received by Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire, leading to theories about a Chinese "copper policy"; those three countries, plus Somalia and Ethiopia on the strategic Horn of Africa account for about half the Chinese aid commitments. However, a number of "singularly unstrategic"

West African countries--Upper Volta, Chad, Benin, and Togo--also have been granted Chinese aid, perhaps only to supplant Taiwan's influence in that region.¹⁵ Clearly, a monumentally expensive railway project is not required to gain access to Zambian copper, nor has the competition with Taiwan meant much since Peking has been admitted to the UN and clearly won the diplomatic race. Furthermore, the reliability of the influence that China has purchased is open to much question, as is illustrated, for example, by China's present isolation on the Angola question. Even China's client states, Tanzania and Zambia, have reconciled themselves to the Soviet-Cuban assisted MPLA victory in Angola, leaving China in the company of the United States and South Africa as one of the few states that have not recognized the Luanda regime.¹⁶

There clearly are unexplainable aspects of Peking's economic aid strategy as well as Moscow's. Whether a more persuasive rationale emerges when the Chinese and Soviet economic aid programs are viewed in the broader context of overall Chinese and Soviet activities in Africa is discussed in Chapter V.

C. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Over the years Peking and Moscow have both used military assistance to give substantial and competitive expression to their ideological alignments and strategic interests in Africa. However, while economic aid commitments were almost invariably publicized, military aid commitments usually were not.

¹⁵Kitchen, *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, p. 362.

¹⁶The limits of Chinese influence were revealed particularly in the case of Tanzania's assistance to the Soviet-backed MPLA in the Angolan civil war, including the passage of Soviet equipment for the MPLA through the port of Dar es Salaam. See Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola," *Strategic Review* (Summer 1976), particularly fn. 15, p. 9.

Furthermore, military assistance is difficult to tabulate because it has taken on many forms in Africa, including the presence of military personnel, conventional arms transfers (sales and grants), and training and advisory assistance (in the country itself, in neighboring countries, and in China and/or the U.S.S.R.). Aid has been given to recognized governments and a bewildering range of insurgent groups and freedom fighters. Military assistance includes aid given directly by Peking or Moscow and aid given by third countries such as North Korea, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia, acting on their own behalf, as "proxies" for a major Communist power, or possibly out of some combination of motives and direction. It is sometimes difficult to determine not only the aid donor, but also the aid recipient, as in the case of military assistance that has flowed into the Congo, Zambia, Tanzania, and Zaire, but was really destined for Angolan insurgents, or aid that is currently flowing into Mozambique for various Rhodesian guerrilla groups. Because of the problems involved we will not attempt a detailed description of Peking's and Moscow's total military activities in Africa, but will sketch only the outlines. Data will be drawn principally from material published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,¹⁷ and the International Institute for Strategic Studies,¹⁸ recognizing that even between these sources there are inconsistencies and contradictions.

Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly not as important strategically to various external powers as North Africa or the Middle East. Its importance depends principally upon the significance of the Horn of Africa to the security of shipping routes through

¹⁷U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975* (Washington, D. C.: ACDA, 1976), and CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*.

¹⁸The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1976-1977* (London: IISS, 1976).

the Strait of Bab al Mandab and the Red Sea, and of South Africa to the security of shipping around the Cape bypassing the Suez-Red Sea route, plus whatever significance may be attached to having African bases for aerial and naval surveillance of the South Atlantic and Indian oceans.¹⁹ Soviet military aid has in part been motivated by the foregoing strategic considerations, e.g., in Somalia and Guinea, where Soviet forces utilize facilities for operations that are unrelated or only remotely related to the interests of the host countries. However, even in these countries military assistance has a large political and ideological component and must in part be considered an adjunct to other Soviet activities, including economic assistance. In the special case of Angola, where Moscow has made its greatest African commitment of funds, materiel, and prestige, both directly and through its Cuban proxy, Moscow also seems to have strategic aims relating not only to Angola but to all of central and southern Africa. However, the political component appears to dominate most of the other Communist military aid programs and all of the Chinese programs.

Most African countries have accepted military aid to deal with the internal problems of dissidence, secession, and the danger of coups, and sometimes simply to build up the prestige of the ruler through a display of military pomp. A limited number of African countries in addition require military aid to deal with an external threat, because of territorial or tribal disputes--including external support for internal dissidents.

¹⁹The extent to which the strategic importance of sub-Saharan Africa is being exaggerated in various current studies will be discussed in the final chapter of this study. For a careful analysis of this question, see Laurence J. Legere, "The Significance of Africa in US Military Strategy," a background paper prepared for the National Policy Panel on Southern Africa, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy, established by the United Nations Association of the U.S.A., April 15, 1970 (issued as IDA Note N-753).

Of these, the most relevant currently (because Communist military aid is involved) are the disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and the Sudan, Zaire and Angola, and Uganda and its neighbors. Virtually no African country any longer faces a threat from outside the region, except through outside intervention in internal or regional disputes, of which possibility Angola provides the most flagrant example.

Chinese and Soviet military assistance to African countries has developed against a background of declining Western military involvement. When various African countries achieved independence, France in particular continued to maintain a military presence, with garrisons in Senegal, Chad, Madagascar, and Djibouti, and military aid missions in numerous other countries. The French presence had a stabilizing effect in a number of francophone African countries: Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Chad, Gabon, and Malagasy. However, most of the French military presence has been phased out and France has lost its African bases except for those at Dakar and Djibouti. France still has defense agreements with Gabon, Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo, and technical assistance or mutual facilities agreements with a number of other African countries.

Britain's military presence in post-colonial Africa, which began much more modestly than France's, has been almost completely terminated, as has Britain's former special defense relationship with South Africa. The United States had a communications base at Asmara, Ethiopia, which survived until May 1977 with a much reduced staff, but otherwise the U.S. military presence in sub-Saharan Africa has also been minimal. As late as 1975, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sudan, and Zaire were all receiving small amounts of military assistance, but mostly in the form of military training rather than materiel; in addition, Ethiopia was the recipient of a more sizeable (\$11.3-million) grant aid program.

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


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All U.S. grant military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa has now been phased out. However, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Zaire have benefitted from U.S. military credit sales programs (ranging from \$1.5 to \$5 million in 1975) and a few additional countries have participated in small scale military sales programs on commercial terms. (The attempted covert military assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola must be added to these programs.)²⁰ In addition to the programs mentioned above, some arms transfers from other Western countries also took the form of military sales on commercial terms, particularly from France, the U.K., and the F.R.G. Of these sales, those from France were the most substantial, particularly the ones to the Republic of South Africa.²¹

Communist military assistance in Africa should be evaluated against the foregoing background of sharply declining Western involvement. In the absence of sizeable Western programs, and given the very small size of virtually all African military establishments, the U.S.S.R. and China are able to gain considerable influence even where their military aid programs are of modest proportions. In addition, over the past decade a handful of countries have received what is, in African terms, substantial military assistance: Angola, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda from the U.S.S.R., and Tanzania from China. As Table 4 indicates, military aid has been a much more important policy instrument for the U.S.S.R. than for China--the opposite of the situation in the economic aid field. However, among the relatively few recipients of military aid, the radical regimes again are prominent--particularly those that have potential strategic significance, e.g., those

²⁰The foregoing is based primarily on Lewis, "How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa."

²¹See ACDA, *World Military Expenditures*, Table V.

Table 4. TOTAL ARMS TRANSFERS FROM THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA
FROM 1966 to 1975 (In millions of U.S. dollars)

U.S.S.R. spent more in:			China spent more in:		
	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.		P.R.C.	U.S.S.R.
Angola ^a	200	--	Burundi	2	--
Cen.Afr.Rep.	1	--	Cameroon	4	--
Equat.Guinea	5	--	Chad	1	--
Ethiopia	-- ^b	--	Congo	8	7
Guinea	42	6	Tanzania	68	-- ^c
Guinea-Bissau	5	--	Zaire	7	--
Mali	12	--	Zambia	4	4
Nigeria	70	--			
Somalia	134	--			
Sudan	65	7			
Uganda	54	--			
Mozambique	-- ^c	-- ^c			

^aFigure for Angola, representing deliveries in 1975, is taken from testimony by Henry Kissinger, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Hearings on Angola*, January 29, February 3, 4, and 6, 1976, p. 19.

^bSource gives no dollar figure for Soviet military aid to Ethiopia. According to data supplied by the State Department to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, "small amounts" of military assistance have been provided during the past 5 years by the U.S.S.R. See *Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, August 4, 5, and 6, 1976, p. 128. It is possible that Chinese aid to Ethiopia has also included some weapons. See David B. Ottaway dispatch from Addis Ababa, *Washington Post*, March 22, 1977.

^cSource gives no dollar figure for arms aid to Mozambique, nor for Soviet arms aid to Tanzania.

Source: ACDA, *World Military Expenditures*, Table V.

from which the U.S.S.R. has obtained or one day may want to obtain basing facilities and, for China as always, Tanzania.

The patterns revealed in the table are also reflected in the information available about Communist military technicians in Africa and African military personnel receiving training in Communist countries. In 1975 there were 2,600 military technicians from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe in all of Africa (including North Africa but excluding Egypt), whereas there were only about 1,100 from China--mostly in Tanzania. Similarly, over 2,300 military personnel from all of Africa (except Egypt) were in training in the U.S.S.R. with another 100 training in Eastern European countries, but only 600 were training in China.²²

These data cover only the period through 1975. Since then, arms transfers to the major recipients have continued at a very high rate, accentuating the patterns revealed earlier. The most important recent changes other than in Angola have been Ethiopia's termination of its military relationship with the United States and its turning to the U.S.S.R. for major arms aid; the increasing tension between the Sudan and the U.S.S.R., which resulted in the expulsion from Khartoum in May 1977 of the remaining 90-man Soviet military mission; and the sharp increase in number of military deliveries to Mozambique from the U.S.S.R.²³

The presence of large numbers of third-country military advisors and combat forces in a number of African countries adds an intriguing element to any consideration of Soviet and

²²CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*, pp. 4-5.

²³*The Washington Post*, May 19, 1977, and Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?*, published as a Committee Print by the House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Washington, D. C., May 8, 1977. The latter probably exaggerates the extent to which Soviet military aid to Mozambique and to Rhodesian guerrillas based in Mozambique has "edged out" the Chinese. See pp. 96, 99, 100.

Chinese military assistance. Small numbers of personnel from a number of countries have been involved at various times, but only the Cuban presence has grown to substantial proportions. According to one informed report, an estimated 12,000 Cuban troops remain in Angola; in addition there are about 300 Cuban troops in the Congo, over 300 in Guinea, over 100 in Guinea-Bissau, 300-400 in Equatorial Guinea, about 500 in Mozambique, and, reportedly, small numbers in Tanzania, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The functions of the Cubans vary. In Angola they have tactical as well as logistical, advisory, and training functions. In the other countries most are advisors and instructors for the host country's regular armed forces; in addition, in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Somalia they are engaged in training guerrilla groups. In Guinea, Cubans also serve as Presidential Guards.²⁴ If Cuban troops and training personnel are considered adjuncts to Soviet military programs in Africa, these figures further accentuate the trend revealed by the more conventional Soviet arms transfer and training programs, with the focus on the same selected countries.

On the military side, China is clearly outclassed by the U.S.S.R. and its Cuban proxy. Even in Tanzania, which has benefitted from China's only large military program in Africa as well as from China's major economic effort, significant amounts of Soviet and Cuban military aid and training are

²⁴Figures are taken from "Pax Cubana" in *The Economist*, May 7, 1977. Considerably higher totals were given in a report by James Nelson Goodsell in the *Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1977, p. 3, involving the same group of host countries: 8,000-15,000 in Angola; 1,500 in Somalia; 1,200 in Mozambique; 1,000-1,500 in the Congo; 300 each in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea; 200-600 in Tanzania. The figure for Angola was given as 11,000 by Henry Kissinger in the testimony previously cited. The U.S. State Department has given figures for the Cuban presence as follows: 10,000-15,000 in Angola; about 1,000 in the Congo; and a "few hundred" in Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Somalia, and Mozambique, plus about 50 in Ethiopia. *New York Times*, May 26, 1977.

beginning to appear, although much of it may actually be intended as aid for Rhodesian insurgents. It is interesting, however, to compare Table 4 with Table 2. In several cases, e.g., that of Guinea and Somalia for the U.S.S.R., and Tanzania for China, adding military to economic aid simply heightens the preponderance of one or the other country as an aid donor. Only in the case of the Sudan, where Chinese economic aid is ahead with a total of \$82 million to the U.S.S.R.'s \$64 million, does the addition of past military aid (U.S.S.R.-\$65 million; China-\$7 million) tilt the balance to favor the U.S.S.R. In other words, China remains far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the overall aid competition, even when Moscow's arms transfers are taken into account.

For the most part, military assistance can thus simply be considered as part of overall Sino-Soviet aid in Africa, particularly in those countries where military aid programs are modest in comparison to economic aid programs. However, in a few cases military aid has some special significance. This is true in Somalia and Guinea, where the U.S.S.R. has actually been provided with important military facilities and where Soviet forces are stationed. The fact that the Katangans invading Zaire were equipped with Soviet arms, even if the Soviet or Cuban role was otherwise minimal, raises obvious political issues for the pro-Western and pro-Chinese Mobutu regime, which has received only modest military aid from the United States, other Western powers, and China. The case of Ethiopia is also of particular interest, since Moscow is giving strong propaganda and ideological support and increasing amounts of arms to the left-wing military *dergue* that has been in control of the country since mid-1974. Ethiopia faces a serious military problem in the form of the insurgent Eritrean separatists who are supported by the Sudan, which in turn is a recipient of military and economic aid from China and, in the past, has received aid from the U.S.S.R. It also faces a serious irredentist challenge from Soviet-allied Somalia.

These are by no means the only situations in which Soviet-equipped or supported troops may challenge a neighboring regime. For example, tension has been increasing between Uganda, which is an important recipient of Soviet military aid, and its neighbors, particularly United States-supported Kenya and Chinese-supported Tanzania. The issues involved for Peking and Moscow in these situations vary. Ethiopia is more a Soviet than a Chinese problem, since Peking is much less committed ideologically to the Ethiopian regime and does not have what amounts to a virtual military alliance with Somalia. However, the challenge faced by Zaire is a Chinese problem since it could be for Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique an additional demonstration, after Angola, of the inadequacy of Chinese and U.S. support against Soviet- and Cuban-assisted insurgents.

V

THE ELEMENT OF COMPETITION IN SINO-SOVIET INVOLVEMENT
IN AFRICA: A BALANCE SHEET

As has been suggested by the foregoing analyses, mutual competition has by no means been the sole determinant of Soviet and Chinese policy toward Africa south of the Sahara over the years. By the same token, however, it has not been an inconsequential consideration. In drawing up a balance sheet on the significance of the element of mutual competition in Soviet and Chinese involvement in Africa, it is necessary to bear in mind that both Communist powers only got involved in Africa as the dispute between them was becoming more serious in the late 1950's. Accordingly, the significance of competition in shaping policy cannot be gauged by comparing these policies to their actions in the area when they were mutual allies. Indeed, it is probably not justifiable to attribute even the basic overall increase in their involvement in Africa mainly to the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute, for that involvement doubtless occurred in large measure simply as a consequence of the fact that most of the African states became independent at that time.

Gauging the significance of the element of mutual competition in Soviet and Chinese behavior toward sub-Saharan Africa is also complicated by other considerations. At first glance one is tempted to attribute a significant role to mutual competition in those cases where the Soviets and Chinese have both been providing economic or military aid to the same African state. Yet such an attribution could easily overstate the significance of mutual competition in some cases while glossing over it altogether in others. As has been indicated in the preceding discussion, in many instances the Soviets and

Chinese have focused on different clients and have favored use of different foreign policy instruments to woo these clients. Mutual competition may be a common element in Soviet and Chinese involvement in Africa, but it has not caused the very symmetrical action-reaction-counteraction behavior pattern one might expect. Any evaluation of its significance as a determining factor must occur in the context of asymmetrical behavior patterns revealing that China and the Soviet Union have used different means to obtain different ends at the same time.

Since the late 1950's, Soviet and Chinese involvement in Africa has basically gone through three stages. In the period up to the mid-1960's, both Communist powers became more involved; from the mid-1960's to the early 1970's, both cut back on their involvement; and from the early 1970's on, a new boost in activity occurred.

In part, these broad ups and downs in overall interest in Africa seem traceable to a response by each Communist power to the basic intensity of activity of the other. But in each period, each Communist power also had other reasons, besides competition, to be more or less involved in African affairs.

A. MUTUAL COMPETITION AND SINO-SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES FROM THE LATE 1950's TO THE MID-1960's

By the early 1960's, as mentioned above, the end of colonial rule in most of the African states south of the Sahara presented both Communist powers with an opportunity to gain new Third World supporters. And to some extent the two Communist powers had gotten to the point where they recognized the desirability of not predicating their chances in Africa on Communist revolutions in these states. Although both China and the U.S.S.R. thus had similar incentives for involvement in African affairs in this period, there were some differences in their respective goals. These goals were apparently basically diplomatic or broadly political in nature. Despite the fact that both the

U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. were involved in the crisis in the resource-rich Congo in the early sixties, it is doubtful that economic interests figured significantly in their behavior toward Africa, nor can any security interests be discerned there either. With respect to diplomatic goals, the U.S.S.R. sought basically to enhance its image as a global power and may have had particular reason to seek African supporters in the United Nations in order to weaken Western dominance of that organization. However, as a non-UN member Peking had even more reason to seek such supporters, particularly given Taiwan's presence as a diplomatic competitor on the African scene. (During the 1960's Taiwan established economic aid programs in 23 African countries.)

While its effect cannot be gauged precisely, the element of mutual competition would seem to have figured as an additional goal, important enough that both Peking and Moscow would risk undercutting their broad diplomatic goals in its pursuit. Peking's ideological challenge of Moscow's revolutionary credentials was particularly virulent in the early 1960's, thus making it highly likely that Khrushchev's particular focus on Guinea, Ghana, and Mali was due to the fact that the respective leaders of these states could be represented as having "revolutionary" (or at least socialist) credentials. Although the U.S.S.R. pursued its diplomatic goals elsewhere in Africa at the same time, that effort was generally low key and modest in comparison to the Soviet efforts on behalf of the aforementioned states.

Mutual competition would seem to have represented an inherently more complicated issue for Peking than for Moscow. As noted above, cultivating good state-to-state relations with as many African states as possible would seem to have been even more important to Peking than to Moscow. And Taiwan, not Moscow, was actually Peking's competitor in this attempt. However, the Chinese were also seeking to demonstrate the

uniqueness and superiority of their own revolutionary credentials, and for that reason focused on various insurgent movements in Africa.¹ Chou En-lai's famous "safari" in late 1963-early 1964, during which he felt obliged to stress Africa's "excellent revolutionary prospects," illustrated the difficulty of balancing diplomatic interests on the one hand and the goal of ideological competition with Moscow on the other.

On balance, we can draw the following conclusions about the significance of mutual competition in Soviet and Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan Africa in the period from the late 1950's to the mid-1960's:

- (1) Both countries pursued basically diplomatic (or broadly political) goals although, because of the combined UN-Taiwan factor, Peking probably had stronger diplomatic incentives than Moscow. Besides these diplomatic goals, neither Communist power had significant economic or security interests in Africa.
- (2) Even without the element of mutual competition, the U.S.S.R. would probably have been ideologically inclined to focus on regimes that had some socialist pretensions, and Peking would have been ideologically inclined to focus on insurgent groups. The mutual competition factor would seem, however, to have intensified these ideological urges, since at the time each was challenging the other's revolutionary credentials.
- (3) Because the Soviets were thus encouraged to focus on "progressive" countries, the mutual competition factor probably contributed to a weakened Soviet interest in pursuing diplomatic objectives more actively elsewhere in Africa. Because Peking was encouraged to focus on insurgent groups, the factor probably worked against Peking's efforts to compete diplomatically with Taiwan.

¹Just as Moscow held less stringent ideological standards for "socialist" regimes, so too Peking had more flexible standards for revolutionary groups.

- (4) For the most part, the mutual competition factor did not manifest itself in efforts by the Soviets and Chinese to concentrate on the same groups (or directly competing factions). The Soviets focused on established regimes; the Chinese focused on insurgent movements (which were trying to oust regimes other than those the Soviets backed most heavily).²

B. MUTUAL COMPETITION AND SINO-SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES FROM THE MID-1960's TO THE EARLY 1970's

Both Soviet and Chinese involvement in Africa diminished considerably during this period. However, the decline in the significance of their mutual competition at the ideological level was only partly responsible for this decreased involvement. Both Communist powers had particular reasons to give Africa less attention in this period.

In the case of China, diplomatic interest in Africa was undercut by Peking's decision in 1965 to abandon the effort to be admitted to the United Nations and back Sukarno's effort to establish a rival "revolutionary" organization instead. Although Sukarno's overthrow should have restimulated interest in Africa, commencement of the Cultural Revolution focused Chinese attention largely on internal affairs. Peking's diplomatic interests were further undercut by events in Africa itself. The particular stress that Peking was putting on revolutionary militancy at this time contributed to expulsion of the Chinese from Ghana, Burundi, Dahomey, Kenya, and the Central African

²It should be stressed that these are the basic focuses of Soviet and Chinese efforts. The Soviets, for example, did back insurgents in the Congo, as did the Chinese. And both the Soviets and Chinese backed insurgents in Cameroon. However, after independence was achieved, the Soviets supported the new regime in Cameroon while Peking continued to back a rebel faction that was trying to oust it. By the same token, China had diplomatic relations with, and provided economic aid to the key Soviet client states of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.

Republic. By 1968, Peking had diplomatic relations with only 13 African states. Against this backdrop, the Chinese nevertheless undertook the Tan-Zam railway project, the largest single aid effort (economic or military) either Communist power has ever mounted in sub-Saharan Africa.

The decline in Soviet involvement can be traced to several factors. Disenchantment on the part of Khrushchev's successors with his excessive commitments to the progressive regimes early in the period resulted in the Soviets' cutting back on their ideological, diplomatic, and economic commitments to these states. Sukarno's overthrow and the consequent failure of Soviet aid projects in Indonesia probably reinforced this Soviet skepticism. In addition, the Soviets had particular reason to concentrate on other areas of the world--the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. And with the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita in Mali, and Massamba-Debat in Congo (Brazzaville), the Soviets, like the Chinese, suffered setbacks in Africa itself. Just as the commitment to Tanzania (and Zambia) is the major anomaly in Chinese policy toward Africa in this period, so the commitment to Nigeria represents the anomaly in Soviet policy. Soviet support for the Nigerian central government in the civil war was most probably a result of Soviet opportunism, pure and simple.

Mutual competition in Africa appears to have become less important in this period. There were other much more important arenas in which to compete (e.g., North Vietnam) as well as other kinds of competition besides the ideological competition that had been reflected in the earlier Soviet and Chinese efforts in Africa. Both Communist powers had reason to be more worried about each other on the state-to-state and military level in this period. The bizarre events of the Cultural Revolution, especially in combination with the Chinese demonstration in October 1964 of a nuclear capability, doubtless increased Soviet concern about China as a potential military

threat. The resulting buildup of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border in turn doubtless unsettled the Chinese.

The downgrading of ideological competition as an African policy consideration would generally appear to have been both more significant and more salutary for the Soviets. The declining importance of the element of competition did not noticeably alter China's militant stance in Africa. Indeed, this stance was quite in keeping with the dominance at the time of an extremely left-wing outlook in China itself. Thus, the Chinese in any event would probably have adopted the kinds of policies that eventually contributed to their diplomatic isolation in Africa.³

For the Soviets, on the other hand, the declining importance of ideological competition with Peking probably was beneficial, strengthening Soviet flexibility and pragmatism. Being less impelled to focus on states with presumed revolutionary (or socialist) credentials, the Soviets may have been more inclined to take advantage of opportunities in states that earlier they had ignored, Nigeria being the case in point here. The Soviets also avoided the kinds of economic commitments that they might otherwise have been more tempted to make and that had turned out to be quite wasteful in the past.

On balance, we can draw the following conclusions about the significance of mutual competition in shaping Soviet and Chinese goals and policies in Africa from the mid-1960's to the early 1970's:

³The element of competition was not totally lacking, however. Peking did back the Biafran rebels after Moscow backed the Nigerian central government in 1967, for example. This, of course, could have been merely a reflection of Peking's avowed commitment to insurgent movements that accorded with the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. But it seems likely that competition with the Soviets nevertheless had some bearing on Peking's actions.

- (1) Overall, both Communist powers were less motivated to pursue broad diplomatic goals in Africa. Peking and Moscow evidenced only a selective concern with economic or security goals in Africa in this period.⁴
- (2) The decline in Soviet interest seems largely attributable to initial skepticism regarding Khrushchev's earlier economic and ideological overcommitments, the subsequent overthrow of Nkrumah, Keita, and Massamba-Debat, and opportunities to pursue foreign policy gains in other Third World regions such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The decline in Chinese interest seems largely attributable to an initial disinclination to seek African supporters of Peking's UN membership, the subsequent turning inward associated with the Cultural Revolution, and setbacks in various African states. The element of mutual competition probably reinforced the basic tendency of both Communist powers to be generally less involved in African affairs by becoming a less important consideration for both of them.
- (3) In reinforcing the Soviet reluctance to pursue ideological goals in such states as Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville), the declining significance of mutual competition with Peking probably enabled the Soviets to be more pragmatic in determining their African policy. It thus probably encouraged them to capitalize on the opportunity to make a commitment to a politically significant but ideologically unacceptable state--Nigeria, in 1967. The diminished importance of mutual competition would seem to have had less effect on Peking's formulation of African policy. In the previous period, Peking responded to the Soviet challenge mainly by focusing on insurgent movements, even while it pursued its other (diplomatic) goals at the state-to-state level. The extreme left-wing domestic outlook of China

⁴In 1969, for example, the Soviets extended a credit to develop Guinean bauxite. And by 1975 one-half of the U.S.S.R.'s bauxite imports were coming from Guinea. (This was about 10 percent of the aluminum-bearing raw materials used by the Soviets.) See *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, pp. 672-74.

in the late 1960's would seem to have encouraged Peking to maintain (and perhaps even strengthen) this emphasis--notwithstanding Moscow's lower profile in African matters generally. (Where Moscow's profile was high, as in Nigeria, Peking showed some concern, attempting to compete by giving at least propaganda support to Biafra. But Moscow did not seriously try to compete with Peking where Peking's profile was high, as in Tanzania.)

C. MUTUAL COMPETITION AND SINO-SOVIET GOALS AND POLICIES FROM THE EARLY 1970's

Both Moscow and Peking expressed an upsurge of interest in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1970's that has continued through the present. Renewed concern with mutual competition partly explains this upsurge but, as in previous periods, other factors have also been significant in shaping Soviet and Chinese policies.

With the waning of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 and especially with the U.S. opening to China in 1971, Peking re-asserted its diplomatic interest in Africa. China's entry into the United Nations and the marked radicalization of African politics in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo (several African states broke diplomatically with both Taiwan and Israel at about the same time) facilitated Peking's renewed diplomatic efforts. These efforts were accompanied by economic aid programs which by the mid-1970's had resulted in Peking having a decided edge on the U.S.S.R. as an economic aid donor in Africa.

Peking also reaffirmed its "traditional" commitment to insurgent movements. This was congruent with the still quite radical Chinese domestic outlook and was less counterproductive than similar policies had been in previous years. Peking's ability to pursue "revolutionary" and diplomatic objectives in tandem may have been partly due to Peking's willingness to demonstrate its commitment to established black African regimes by giving them a substantial amount of economic aid. Tensions

between these objectives were doubtless partially minimized by Peking's focus on the white regimes as the main targets for insurgent activities. Building on contacts established previously, Peking has been characterized as having acquired by the early 1970's a strong position (stronger than that of the Soviets) with various insurgent groups attempting to overthrow white rule in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. And in countries such as Zaire, Tanzania, and Zambia, where the Chinese have demonstrated their greatest economic aid commitments, they can fairly effectively reconcile their diplomatic and revolutionary objectives.⁵

Peking's diplomatic and revolutionary offensives in Africa in the early 1970's may have partly stimulated a revival of Soviet interest in African affairs. But there were also other reasons for such interest. The growth in the Soviet blue water naval capability gave the Soviets some discernible security interests in Africa for the first time. The coming to power of a radical regime in Somalia in 1969 gave the Soviets an opportunity to pursue these interests on Africa's east coast. On Africa's west coast, longstanding Soviet ties with Guinea and the particular opportunity provided in 1970 to establish a naval patrol by capitalizing on Touré's fears of a seaborne invasion helped the Soviets pursue their naval interest in the South Atlantic.

⁵It should be noted, however, that in 1975, Kaunda of Zambia, presumably for domestic reasons, detained the military leadership of the main guerrilla force (ZANU) the P.R.C. has been backing. See *The Political and Economic Crisis in Southern Africa*, A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 16-17.

With respect to Peking's diplomatic efforts in the 1970's, in the cases of Tanzania and Zambia it built on earlier commitments; in the case of Zaire, diplomatic relations were established in 1972 and a large economic aid commitment was made in the following year. See McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, pp. 169-70.

By the mid-1970's, the new Soviet détente relationship with the West (with its implicit challenges to the vitality of the Soviets' revolutionary creed) and Soviet setbacks in the Middle East⁶ would appear to have prompted the Soviets to seek to make major foreign policy gains in Africa. The use of Cuban proxies helped minimize the risks of great power confrontation in an area where such risks were at any rate comparatively low. The result was the major Soviet effort in Angola in 1975-76, followed by an upsurge in Soviet backing for insurgent movements against Rhodesia, a determined effort to win over Mozambique, new diplomatic ventures in Tanzania and Zambia, new military aid commitments to Uganda, possibly behind-the-scenes prompting of the invasion of Zaire by Katangese insurgents, and new commitments to the ruling *dergue* in Ethiopia. The Soviets have been willing to make both ideological and military commitments (especially in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and recently Ethiopia) that surpass overall even the kinds of commitments Khrushchev made in the early 1960's to selected black African states.

It is particularly important to determine the significance of the factor of mutual competition in shaping Soviet and Chinese policies in this recent period. China's renewed involvement in African affairs in the early 1970's may have been broadly stimulated by concern with the Soviets, but the effect of the mutual competition factor is difficult to pin down in specific cases. Peking's interest in improving relations with the United States in the early 1970's probably exemplified a general conclusion that continued diplomatic isolation was not conducive to dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Thus, to the extent that Peking's particular interest in ending

⁶Whether Sudan should be classified as a Middle Eastern state or as part of sub-Saharan Africa is an open question. In any event, Sudanese cooperation with Egypt under Sadat in Middle Eastern politics has been notable and the Soviets have had substantial setbacks in the 1970's in Sudan as well as Egypt.

its diplomatic isolation in Africa reflected this broader concern, Peking's diplomatic offensive in Africa can be partly attributed to the mutual competition factor.

However, as Peking, not Moscow, was initially more active in Africa in this period, Soviet activities in Africa could hardly have prompted Chinese activities. In the case of Tanzania and Zambia the renewal of Chinese interest in African affairs was manifested in the effort to build upon previously established contacts and commitments. There is little to indicate that such action was prompted by Soviet competition.⁷

The situation in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique is similar. The Chinese had some Soviet competition, to be sure, but the Chinese effort was much more considerable than the Soviet one in the early 1970's. The Chinese here too were basically building on previous contacts and commitments rather than displaying a new interest because of prompting by the Soviets. Until 1975, the Chinese had given considerably more backing to their favorites in Angola than had the Soviets. And the Chinese, not the Soviets, were the principal external backers of FRELIMO in Mozambique during its drive to power.

In the case of Somalia and Guinea, where the Soviets were substantially involved early in the period under discussion, the element of competition may have affected Chinese policies more directly--at least to the extent of encouraging the Chinese to keep their hand in in these countries.

In general, the Chinese effort to keep their hand in seems basically to characterize Chinese policies in various countries subsequent to the Soviet push in Africa that began

⁷This also basically applies to Chinese policy toward Zaire in the sense that Peking was clearly trying to capitalize much more on Taiwan's diplomatic defeats in the UN (and then in Zaire and other African countries) in the early 1970's than to respond to any real efforts by Moscow there. Soviet relations with Zaire were not particularly strained at this point but they were low key. See McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, p. 168.

in Angola in 1975. This has been the case with respect to Chinese policies in Somalia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the insurgent movements directed against Rhodesia and Namibia. (In Tanzania and Zambia, previous heavy commitments have helped the Chinese do more than just keep their hand in, although the Soviets are now beginning to challenge them openly in these countries.) Whether the Chinese are banking on the Soviets going too far (and hence regard it as necessary only to be in a position to pick up the pieces), or whether the Chinese are aware of the Soviets' strong innate advantage as a military supplier, it is notable that Chinese activities in Africa have been more low key since the Soviets stepped up their activities in Africa in recent years.⁸

Inasmuch as the Chinese were originally more active than the Soviets in Africa in the early 1970's, it seems likely that mutual competition played a larger role in shaping Soviet policies. But here, too, various other considerations have been germane. For example, China did make sizeable economic aid commitments to Guinea and Somalia, but it is doubtful that Chinese aid was the major stimulus to the new Soviet concern with these countries in the early 1970's. Opportunity and the security interests resulting from the Soviet blue water naval capability appear to be much more significant factors. With regard to the U.S.S.R.'s recent efforts to woo Ethiopia, Peking's earlier activities in that country may have provided some stimulus. The basic Soviet effort in this case, however, seems to stem mainly from a desire to chalk up one more so-called Marxist regime to the credit of the U.S.S.R.--an urge that

⁸It is difficult to say what the Chinese have learned from the Angolan civil war. They basically opted out after the Soviets made their big commitment to the MPLA in its drive for power. Perhaps the Chinese appreciate that at least some minimal effort on their part is necessary to prevent the field being left almost entirely to the Soviets in other places as it was in Angola.

probably emanates basically from Soviet ideological concerns as a result of détente (and that augurs poorly for the Soviet position in Somalia, Ethiopia's neighbor and enemy).

Soviet efforts in Angola and Mozambique probably reflect the effect of the competitive factor somewhat more strongly. The Soviets did not mount a major effort on behalf of the MPLA in Angola in 1975 until after Peking increased its military commitment to the rival insurgent FNLA. And Moscow may well have had a strong incentive to woo the Machel regime in Mozambique because of Peking's earlier support of Machel in his drive to power. In both cases, however, Moscow also had other incentives: the desire, prompted by détente, to acquire "socialist" allies in Africa to prove the vitality of the U.S.S.R.'s revolutionary creed; a possible security interest in acquiring naval support facilities at Luanda, Lobito, and Maputo; and opportunism, as Angola in particular offered the chance of successful but relatively low-risk involvement.

The competition factor may also play a role in recent Soviet efforts to acquire influence in Tanzania and Zambia, since these countries have been favored clients of Peking. However, like Mozambique both of these countries are key states in the struggle against Rhodesia. Therefore it would make sense for Moscow to seek to increase its influence with them in any event, in order to enhance its role in determining the outcome of that struggle.

On balance, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the significance of mutual competition in shaping Soviet and Chinese goals and policies in Africa since the early 1970's:

- (1) Peking's renewed interest in Africa in the early 1970's does not seem to have been directly stimulated by Soviet efforts on the African scene. General interest in escaping from the diplomatic isolation of the Cultural Revolution period, in order better to cope with the basic Soviet threat, may, however, have indirectly prompted Peking to increase its involvement in Africa at the time. Since the big Soviet push

in Africa that commenced with the Angolan war occurred subsequent to China's renewed activism, the competition factor may have played a larger role in shaping Soviet policies--particularly in Angola and Mozambique and possibly also in Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia. In all these cases, however, the Soviets have also had other strong motives for involvement besides competition with Peking.

- (2) In responding to the Soviet push in Africa, the Chinese have basically settled for a relatively low-profile policy, keeping their hand in rather than seeking to match Soviet ideological or military commitments or (as was the case in Angola), leaving the field open to the Soviets. This would seem to indicate that mutual competition has not been a decisive consideration in shaping Peking's response.
- (3) Overall, the factor of mutual competition has affected Soviet and Chinese goals and policies in Africa since the early 1970's, but it has by no means been the sole or even the main determinant of these goals and policies. Opportunities on the African scene as well as broader global considerations seem to have been basically more important.

VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The analysis in this paper leads to three principal conclusions relevant to U.S. policy considerations.

First, sub-Saharan Africa is not an area where any vital interests are involved for either of the two contending Communist powers. Whatever Moscow or Peking may gain or lose from their competition in various African countries is not likely materially to change the strategic balance between the two.

Second, direct competition between Moscow and Peking has been evident in some instances, but is not the principal motivating force behind Soviet and Chinese activities in Africa. If there were no dispute, the two countries might still carry out many of the same programs.

Third, Soviet and Chinese operations in Africa are integral parts of each country's global posture, and in the global posture the Sino-Soviet dispute does figure as a major determinant. Moscow's détente relationship with the United States and hence its style of activism in Africa are heavily influenced by Soviet concern over all aspects of the China problem. Similarly, Peking's policy of rapprochement with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan owes more to the perceived threat from the U.S.S.R. than to any other single factor; Peking considers the Soviet threat to be global in nature and it takes the Soviet threat in Africa particularly seriously because of its aspirations to leadership and influence in the Third World.

The above points represent a balance between the two alternative interpretations offered in much of the literature on Africa. At one extreme, the size of Africa, its location, and its wealth

of resources have been cited to demonstrate Africa's importance and therefore the "menace" to the United States of Soviet or Chinese activities there.¹ This view stresses U.S. dependence on various African resources (we import from sub-Saharan Africa 38% of our petroleum imports, 27% of our coffee, 45% of our cocoa, 38% of our manganese and ferromanganese, 38% of our copper, and 41% of our chromite ore and ferrochromium--mostly from South Africa).² It also stresses the fact that critically important transport lanes pass around South Africa or through the Red Sea. At the other extreme, the Sino-Soviet dispute itself is overemphasized, making Moscow's and Peking's African operations seem to be part of some sort of ritualistic enactment of that dispute and therefore of not much concern to the non-Communist world.³

A realistic view of Africa invalidates either extreme.⁴ Africa's size and diversity make it unlikely that one outside power could gain a consolidated position of strength that would menace another outside power, even if the concept of "cutting" major lines of communication were strategically realistic in this modern age. The idea that Moscow (or Peking) could

¹For an example, see Hahn and Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow*.

²See Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 95th Congress, *Hearings on Rhodesian Sanctions*, February 9 and 10, 1977.

³For example, W.A.C. Adie has commented that "much of Peking's activity in Africa is simply meant to muster Africans as extras for a sort of super-colossal Peking Opera, full of sound and fury, in which Mao Tse-tung fights his Chinese battles all over again on the world-wide stage: just to prove that China, not Russia, 'shakes the world' and deserves proper respect." (W.A.C. Adie, "Chinese Policy Toward Africa" in Sven Hamrell and Carl Gosta Widstrand, eds., *The Soviet Bloc, China, and Africa*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

⁴See Legere, "The Significance of Africa."

somehow deny Africa's resources to the United States is also unrealistic. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 4 percent of U.S. foreign trade, but for the African countries commodity exports are critically important. A politically motivated embargo would be extremely difficult to organize, particularly if the motivation related to Soviet (or Chinese) rather than African objectives. In any case, for most of the commodities involved, alternate sources of supply could be developed.

There is no indication that either Moscow or Peking expects to establish in Africa a commanding position that would somehow represent a strategic threat to the other, or to the United States. Western speculation to that effect is probably stimulated not by a factual analysis but simply by the difficulty of otherwise explaining the magnitude of Soviet and Chinese programs in Africa.⁵ Classical concepts, such as cutting lines of

⁵The absence of such intent does not mean, however, that Moscow and Peking do not attribute to each other, sometimes in dramatic language, precisely such aims. See, for example, a commentary by Jen Ku-ping in *Peking Review* (May 13, 1977):

"The fresh offensive by the Kremlin to expand in Africa has revealed its greed for the continent's rich resources and its ambition to dominate the whole continent. It is also a component part of its global strategy and is geared to its overall plan of contending for Europe, the key point in its strategy. Moscow's expansion south of the equator is coordinated with its contention for hegemony in the Red Sea. Superpower rivalry in Africa is a 'peripheral war' in contending for Europe. The Kremlin's strategic aim there is to start on the underbelly of Africa, slice horizontally across the African continent, seize control of vital coastal sections, gradually squeeze out U.S. and other Western influences from southern Africa and control that region's strategic resources and the important strategic passageway from the Indian Ocean to Western Europe so as to cut the Western countries' vital supply line at any time, thereby getting a stranglehold on Western Europe. As a result, Soviet aggressive expansion has been opposed by numerous African countries and people and aroused anxiety in the Western world, particularly the West European countries which are gravely threatened. After the Soviet mercenaries invaded Zaire, West European countries like Belgium and France immediately gave Zaire support to fight back in resistance."

communication and even cutting central Africa itself in half (by means of the Chinese-constructed Tan-Zam railway) provide rationalizations for commitments of military and economic resources to Africa that are simpler and therefore more persuasive to some observers than the rationale based on global ideological and political considerations that underlies much of the analysis in this study.

A realistic view of Africa's strategic importance does not, however, mean that Africa is not important in the policies of Moscow and Peking, and for the United States. The link between Moscow's détente diplomacy and its military activism in Africa as treated in this paper constitutes a significant gap between the U.S. and Soviet understanding of the meaning of détente.⁶ Soviet activism has impressed the African states, and how specific countries react, by erecting defenses against Soviet encroachments or by accommodating to Soviet pressures, will be important to the United States. The current Chinese posture, moderation, does not conflict with the U.S. interests, even if China's motives differ from those of the United States. Peking has an ideological stake in Africa unlike that of other countries because of its self-proclaimed role as a leader of the Third World. As part of its policy of strategic rapprochement with the United States and the West, Peking hopes that a line of containment against the U.S.S.R. will somehow be constructed in Africa by the African states themselves, by the European countries with a stake in Africa (chiefly France), and by the United States. China does not directly confront Soviet military activism, but provides some military assistance and

⁶Even in studies that have called attention to the relationship between détente and recent aggressive Soviet African policies, these policies are viewed as being pursued *despite* détente, rather than as an ideological consequence of détente. See, for example, Congressional Research Service, *The Soviet Union and the Third World*.

commits substantial resources to economic programs wherever they are acceptable, against the possibility (for which precedents certainly exist in Africa) that the Soviet position, even so dominant a Soviet position as the one in Somalia, may one day crumble. On balance, Peking's present role is constructive, but the continuance of that role is by no means assured. If it appears to Peking that Soviet expansion in Africa cannot be contained, or if new factional shifts in Peking bring China's moderate policy in foreign affairs under attack, the Chinese could easily mount more direct challenges in Africa, for example by supplying weapons to selected countries or insurgent groups.⁷

The U.S. response to the competition for influence between the U.S.S.R. and China in Africa will have significance transcending that of the particular and often somewhat limited U.S. interests in individual African countries. Acquiescence in Soviet military activism could make U.S.-Soviet détente largely meaningless, and could encourage Moscow to use that tactic even more often. It could also undermine the U.S.-China détente, as well as Peking's currently relatively constructive posture in Africa.

It is doubtful that the Sino-Soviet dispute itself can be exploited to any great extent by the United States in an attempt to resolve African issues. Neither side can afford to become identified as an instrument of U.S. policy, even where interests for a time run parallel as they now do for the United States and China. Nevertheless, forthright diplomatic consultations with both sides about African problems can be helpful.

⁷That China has the capability to engage in a limited arms race is indicated by the history of Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan. China has been Pakistan's principal source of arms since 1965, and the total value of arms transferred by China to Pakistan from 1966 to 1975, as listed by ACDA--\$350 million--is exceeded only slightly by the total value of Soviet arms delivered to all sub-Saharan African recipients (except Angola) during the same period.

In the case of China, such consultations could give some substance to the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. There may even be times when Chinese approaches to African parties can be useful because of the widespread image of Maoist militancy. In all such contacts, Peking will be walking a narrow line: on the one hand, it will not want to give support to Soviet propaganda charges that it is "colluding" with the United States and other "racists"; on the other hand, it will also not want to assuage Soviet suspicions that Peking in fact is engaging in collusion with the United States and that this in turn could lead to some kind of Sino-American security relationship.⁸ In regard to the U.S.S.R., diplomatic consultations and the generally desirable U.S. posture of firmness should be aimed at convincing Moscow that African issues cannot be exempted from the mutual commitment to a relaxation of tensions that détente should represent, and that stabilization in Africa can be achieved without giving Peking an undue advantage and without compromising Soviet ideological imperatives.

⁸This point is elaborated by Michael P. Pillsbury in "Future Sino-American Security Ties: The Views from Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking," *International Security*, 1(4), pp. 124-42.