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
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EAST EUROPE AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: THE QUESTION OF RELIABILITY

MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

Roger E. Kanet

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EAST EUROPE AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: THE QUESTION OF RELIABILITY

by

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FOREWORD

This memorandum was presented at the Military Policy Symposium sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute and held at the US Army War College in October 1977. Under the general theme of "Warsaw Pact and European Security," each paper focused on a significant issue affecting the United States and NATO.

This memorandum considers the question of the ability and willingness of the East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to support Soviet decisions that require the commitment of WTO military forces. The author addresses the question in the areas of the political leadership, the military leaders, and the troops in the field as well as from the perspective of maintaining internal stability within the WTO area itself versus offensive or defensive operations against NATO. He concludes that any independent action on the part of WTO members is highly unlikely either in an internal or external conflict.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the Military Policy Symposium.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the endorsement of the College, Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. ROGER E. KANET is Professor of Political Science and a member of the Russian and East European Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. His recent publications include *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World* (co-edited with Donna Bahry, 1975); *Soviet and East European Foreign Policy: A Bibliography* (1974); *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nation* (edited, 1974). In addition, his articles on Soviet foreign policy, Soviet–East European relations, and related topics have appeared in a number of scholarly books and periodicals. During academic year 1978-79 he is working on a project dealing with integration in Eastern Europe and its implications for East–West relations made possible by financial support received from the American Council of Learned Societies and the University of Illinois.

EAST EUROPE AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: THE QUESTION OF RELIABILITY

Although East-West relations have improved substantially during the 1970's and most students of international affairs would consider the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) members quite remote, the mere fact that Warsaw Pact forces exist and that their strength continues to expand significantly are matters of major concern to the West. Defense expenditures in all of the WTO countries[1] more than doubled from 1965 to 1976, although as a percentage of gross national product they remained relatively stable in most countries and even dropped in several of them.[2] As virtually every Western analyst who has dealt recently with the question of relative East-West military capabilities has noted, in terms of conventional military factors–including manpower and weapons systems–NATO is far inferior to the WTO. In an official report issued by NATO in early 1976 it was argued that Warsaw Pact forces could overrun Western Europe before NATO could even use tactical nuclear weapons.[3] In a more recent report that appeared in the *NATO Review* it was claimed that the

> Warsaw Pact, and especially Soviet, military capabilities continue to improve at a disturbing rate. This is particularly evident in the across-the-board qualitative improvements resulting from deployment of

newer, more effective weapons systems and equipment and the continuing development of even more advanced systems. Improvements in command, control, communications and infrastructure, as well as increased experience from such things as extended naval and air deployments, are also contributing to this.[4]

However, although the evidence for the continuing expansion of the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact states, including the smaller East European members, is clear, the question of the reliability of East European members in a conflict situation also arises. As was evident in 1968, when the Romanians not only did not participate in the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, but also condemned their allies for the intervention, serious political differences have existed among the WTO members. It is likely that such differences might arise again in the future and would raise doubts about the reliability of military forces from individual East European countries in particular circumstances.

The purpose of the present discussion is to examine both the meaning of the term reliability in the context of the WTO and conditions under which that reliability might be called in question. It should be noted at the very outset that the major perspective taken will be from the point of view of the Soviet Union—i.e. the extent to which the Soviets can expect their WTO allies to support them and to fulfill their political and military commitments. Obviously no conclusive answer can be given to this question. The best that can be hoped for is to lay bare some of the factors that are likely to influence the behavior of the East Europeans, so that educated guesses might be made.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Warsaw Treaty Organization was created in May 1955, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, in part as a response to the entry of West Germany into NATO and in part to legalize the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania after signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Over the course of the past two decades the WTO has performed a number of different military and political functions for both the Soviets and their East European allies. On the military side it has assisted the Soviets in developing a system of defense against any possible attack from the West (or of attack against the West) by adding to Soviet military capabilities those of the East European alliance partners and legitimizing the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops

in Central Europe. In 1976, for example, of the total of 1,333,000 WTO troops stationed in Eastern Europe—excluding the Soviet Union—almost 800,000 were non-Soviet and of the total of 27,435 tanks in the region, approximately 16,000 belonged to the armies of the allies of the Soviet Union. Although in peacetime most of these troops are under local control (except in the GDR), in the event of a military conflict all would come under the direct control of the central WTO command (i.e. Soviet command). It is clear from these figures that, of total WTO military power in Eastern Europe, the contribution of the smaller members of the alliance is substantial and adds significantly to the overall military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Needless to say, the WTO forces could be used for an attack on Western Europe as well as for the defense of the member countries against a possible Western invasion.

Besides the importance of the alliance for either defensive or offensive operations against NATO, the second important military purpose of the WTO has been to serve as a mechanism for continued Soviet control over the countries of Eastern Europe. Along with regular political ties and the high degree of economic dependence of the East European countries on the USSR, the fact that their military organizations are under the control of the Soviet Union provides the Kremlin with a very effective tool for influence in Eastern Europe. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops in four of the countries adds to the ability of the Soviets to dominate the area. Examples of the use of either Soviet troops or those of the alliance as a means to support Soviet interests have included the suppression of the 1956 revolution in Hungary, the pressure brought against Poland at the same time, and, more recently, the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The alliance system and the presence of Soviet troops gives the Soviets an effective veto against domestic or foreign political developments that they oppose.

Besides the direct military-security functions of the Warsaw Pact, the alliance also plays a major role in Soviet efforts to fulfill more political goals. Along with a variety of other mechanisms—such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the regular political consultations among members of the governing political elites of the European Communist states—the WTO helps the Soviets to provide a united front in dealing with the West and with the developing countries. Probably more important, however, is the role of the WTO in facilitating the accomplishment of the Soviet goal of an integrated Communist community.

Table I

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION ARMED FORCES, 1976

	Ground Forces Personnel	Divisions[a]	Tanks	Security Forces Personnel	Navy Personnel	Air and Air Defense Personnel	Aircraft[b]
Bulgaria	125,000	6(5)[c]	2,200	16,000	11,000	33,000	320
Czechoslovakia	140,000	10(5)	3,300	20,000	---	57,000	760
USSR	70,000	5(2)	1,800	---	---	---	---
GDR	105,000	6(2)	3,115	65,000	16,000	34,000	441
USSR	370,000	20(10)	7,500	---	(80,000)[d]	---	1,100
Hungary	75,000	6(1)	1,475	70,000	---	24,000	220
USSR	60,000	4(2)	1,500	---	---	---	350
Poland	210,000	15(5)	3,775	100,000	25,000	90,000	1,050
USSR	38,000	(2-3)	700	---	---	---	350
Romania	140,000	10(2)	2,070	35,000	11,000	34,000	400
USSR	---	---	---	---	(50,000)[e]	---	---
TOTAL	1,333,000	82(37)	27,435	306,000	193,000	272,000	4,991

[a]Armored divisions, included in the total, are indicated in parentheses.

[b]Combat aircraft.

[c]Figures in parentheses refer to Bulgarian tank brigades, not divisions.

[d]Soviet Baltic Sea fleet, estimated allocation.

[e]Soviet Black Sea Fleet, estimated allocation.

SOURCE: Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 3rd edition. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977, p. 232; based on John Erickson, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels. Washington: 1976, p. 88; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1976-1977. London: 1976, pp. 8-14.

For the East European countries, the alliance system has also performed a number of functions, although one may question the continued importance of some of them, at least for certain of the countries. First, there has been the support that the presence of the Red Army provided for political systems imposed upon hostile populations. Although the Communist regimes of the WTO countries are by no means popular, over time most of them have developed a sort of *modus vivendi* with their populations and, moreover, the domestic control organs—the police, militia, border guards, and military—would appear quite adequate to deal with most domestic disturbances. This development has lessened the significance of the Red Army as a mechanism necessary to keep East European governments in power.

Throughout most of the Cold War period the countries of Eastern Europe did view a potentially revanchist West Germany as a threat to their own security. This was especially true for the GDR, whose very existence was not recognized by either the Federal Republic or its major Western allies. For Poland, also, the refusal of West Germay to recognize the postwar territorial changes represented a serious challenge to Polish security. However, with the lessening of overt East-West hostility in the last decade and West Germany's official recognition of both the Oder-Neisse boundary and the existence of the GDR, the East European fear of an "expansionist" Germany has been mitigated. The need, therefore, for Soviet defense support and of the WTO has been lessened accordingly.

As A. Ross Johnson has noted, during the 1960's the Soviets had begun to place more confidence in the role of their East European allies and Soviet military planning had placed increasing importance on the East European contribution to military preparedness.[5] In the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion, during which the Romanians refused to participate and some other East Europeans reportedly cooperated only with reluctance, the Soviets reemphasized the role of Soviet troops in the area. Between 1967 and 1976 five additional Soviet divisions were present in Central Europe (all in Czechoslovakia) and the overall firepower of Soviet forces was substantially improved and expanded.

However, the modifications in the organizational structure of the WTO which went into effect in 1969 actually responded to East European desires for greater influence within the organizations. Formally—and in peacetime—at least, the creation of the Committee of Defense Ministers as the supreme military consultative organ, the designation of national deputy ministers of defense as deputy WTO

commanders under the Soviet commander-in-chief, the establishment of a military council, and a number of other modifications all grant to the East European states an increased official role in the decision-making structure of the alliance.[6] However, in the event of hostilities, this structure would apparently be bypassed and East European troops would be subordinated to local Soviet commanders and controlled directly by the Soviets—not through the WTO channels.

THE QUESTION OF EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY RELIABILITY

Even though it is obvious that the East European contribution to the WTO's military strength is substantial, the question of the reliability of that contribution in a conflict situation arises. In spite of three decades of anti-American and anti-Western propaganda, the United States and the West in general continue to be viewed favorably by a substantial portion of the population of most of the East European countries. In addition, there have already been several major examples of various types of conflict between the Soviets and one or more of their allies.[7] The most important of these, however, occurred more than 20 years ago in Hungary, when not only did the Hungarian military prove to be unwilling to resist a popular uprising, but portions of it supported the local population against Soviet intervention. It must not be forgotten, however, that in 1956 the Communist regime in Hungary was barely a decade old and that the officer corps lacked the political indoctrination that characterizes the leadership of East European armies today.

More recently, the refusal of Romania to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the open hostility within Czechoslovakia to the arrival of Warsaw Pact troops were other indications of the incompatibility of some Soviet goals with those of their allies and the potential unreliability of members of the alliance in certain circumstances.

In the following pages we shall view the reliability of Eastern Europe from the standpoint of the Soviet Union—i.e. the ability and willingness of the East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to support Soviet decisions that require the commitment of WTO military forces. In raising the question of East European reliability it is essential to clarify a number of important issues. First of all, are we referring to the behavior of the political leadership, the military leaders, or the troops in the field? Secondly, are we speaking of actions taken to maintain internal stability within the WTO area itself or, rather, of

offensive or defensive operations against NATO? Such other factors as the duration of the commitment and the domestic measures required to fulfill the commitment would also be important to determine the probable response of the WTO members.

The question of East European reliability at the political level is probably the most important of the issues to be raised. As is most clear from the events surrounding the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia–but also in the disagreements between the GDR and the USSR in the years immediately preceding the former's entrance into the international diplomatic arena in 1972-73–there have been issues that have seriously divided the Soviets and some of their allies. East European leaders are well aware that the outbreak of hostilities in the center of Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would likely result in the virtual devastation of much of both Eastern and Western Europe. It is likely that East European leaders would attempt to play a moderating role in a crisis situation between the United States and the Soviet Union that would prevent the outbreak of open military hostilities. This would be especially true if the leaderships of individual East European countries viewed the source of the conflict as something of no direct significance to their own national interests–e.g. a Soviet-US confrontation over developments in the Middle East or in Africa.

Within Europe the question of the origin of the crisis might be important for the response of various East European governments. A crisis clearly initiated by West Germany, for example, would probably be most likely to elicit strong commitments from the GDR and Poland. However, a Soviet initiative to take advantage of a perceived weakness in Western Europe could conceivably fail to gain the support of Romania, or even Hungary.

Another factor might also play an important role in the strength of East European countries' commitment to common military action. Assuming a drawn-out limited war that did not escalate to the nuclear level, it is conceivable that domestic pressures might build up within one or more country to the point that the government would be forced to reconsider its continued military commitment to a common Warsaw Pact operation. In such a prolonged war it is probable that there would be serious dislocations for the local population, including scarcity of foodstuffs, transportation, etc. These could well exacerbate internal tensions within a country such as Poland that would make it extremely difficult for the regime to continue its commitment to a common military operation and, at the same time, maintain domestic control.

Were the target of Warsaw Pact operations to be one of the member countries—as occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968—it is clear from recent history that Romania, at least, might well refuse to participate, as it did 10 years ago. In addition, armed resistance by a "fraternal" Communist country to WTO intervention might result in serious reconsiderations on the part of the East European states. A similar situation might develop were the Soviet Union to request assistance from its allies in a combined military action against China. There has been evidence during the past decade of Soviet efforts to obtain political commitments from WTO members to common defense no matter what the source of the threat. To date, the Soviet Union has not been successful in obtaining from its WTO partners a general commitment to come to the military assistance of the USSR in case of a war with China.

It is crucial to reemphasize the speculative nature of the present discussion. Although it is clear that there are important security issues on which the WTO members do not always agree and that East European leaders can hardly be as optimistic about the eventual victory of the Warsaw Pact over NATO as are Soviet military theorists (given the fact that much of Central Europe might well be destroyed), it is extremely difficult to predict the behavior of the leadership of the six countries in case of a military crisis.

A second level at which the question of probable reliability can be posed relates to the armed forces themselves—both the officer corps and the troops. As we have already noted, there is general agreement that during the course of the last decade the military capabilities and combat readiness of the East European forces have improved substantially—at least those of the northern tier of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[8] During the course of the last two decades the level of military and political training required of the East European officer corps has presumably resulted in a military leadership that is committed to the position taken by the civilian decision makers. It is highly unlikely that the military would deviate from decisions made by the party and government in Eastern Europe. In addition, although one should not overestimate its effect, the regular contact with their counterparts from the Soviet army probably plays a role in ensuring the fulfillment by the military of commitments to the Soviet Union and the other members of the WTO.

Similar comments can be made concerning the troops themselves. There is no reason to believe that substantial numbers of WTO troops

would refuse to obey orders to engage in any of the types of military operations that were mentioned above. Only in the case of a conventional war—either against NATO forces or a WTO ally—is it conceivable that the opportunity might present itself for individual soldiers to resist orders.

In general, then, it would appear that the major source of potential problems for the Soviets in gaining East European support is most likely to come at the political level and not from within the military establishments themselves. This does not mean that such a likelihood is great, given the degree of dependence of most of the East European regimes on their Soviet allies and the means that the Soviets have to bring pressure to bear on Eastern Europe. As we have already implied, it is not possible to make any blanket statements concerning the probable loyalty of Eastern Europe toward the Soviet Union that would cover all countries and all circumstances. At best we can point to circumstances which might reduce the political reliability of individual countries.

Of all of the alliance members Bulgaria would seem to be the country which is least likely to come into conflict with the Soviets. Within Eastern Europe only the Bulgarians fail to share strong, historically-based anti-Russian attitudes. In addition, Bulgaria has none of the historical ties to the West, comparable to those of the Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles, that might moderate their support for Soviet action against the West. Throughout the postwar period, with virtually no exceptions, the Bulgarian government has viewed itself as a junior partner of the USSR, willing to follow the Soviet lead in virtually all questions. This policy has paid handsome dividends for the Bulgarians, for of the less-developed countries of the region, Bulgaria has received by far the greatest amount of economic support from the Soviets and has made the most substantial progress in creating a modern industrially-based economy. There exists virtually no evidence to support an argument that, in a conflict situation—either with the West or within the WTO community—the Bulgarians would fail to support Soviet policy.

The German Democratic Republic has generally been viewed as one of the Soviet Union's most faithful supporters within the Eastern bloc. With the exception of the period prior to the improvement in GDR-West German relations, when the government of Walter Ulbricht opposed the expansion of ties between other WTO members, including the Soviet Union and the West Germans, the GDR has generally

followed the Soviet position on all international issues. However, unlike the Bulgarians, the East German population is generally hostile to the Russians and to the visible military presence of the Soviet Union. In addition, the attraction of their richer relatives to the West—an attraction that has become more visible in recent years through the regular visits of West Germans in the East and the impact of West German television—continues to fuel dissatisfaction among substantial portions of the population. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to support the assumption that such attitudes would weaken the East German government's commitment to the Soviet Union in case of a conflict. The fact that the East German military is directly integrated into the Soviet command structure is a factor that would also mitigate the GDR's ability to deviate from Soviet policy. In 1968 the GDR was among the Soviet Union's most willing, even enthusiastic, supporters in suppressing reform communism in Czechoslovakia. Of all of the smaller Communist states, the GDR probably relies most heavily on continued Soviet support because it alone is faced with the problem of an existing, and attractive, alternative political unit—West Germany—that can attract the loyalty of its citizens. This makes the Soviet-GDR tie a matter of continuing importance to the East German leadership.

Hungary, although invaded and crushed by its eastern neighbor in 1956, has shown a remarkable degree of independence over the course of the past decade—especially in the sphere of the domestic economy. Unlike the Czechoslovaks in 1968, however, the Hungarians have not challenged the primacy of the Soviet political model which calls for the continued dominant role of the Communist party. In Hungary anti-Russian attitudes are both deep-seeded and strong. However, although the Hungarians have initiated major domestic economic changes during the past decade, there has been no indication of Hungarian deviations in foreign affairs. For example, there is no evidence of Hungarian enthusiasm in crushing the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968. Nevertheless, Hungarian troops did participate in the occupation. It is likely that in a future crisis within the WTO, or in a crisis with the West, that Hungary would probably support the Soviets, rather than run the risk of Soviet retaliation. However, given the basic Western orientation of most Hungarians and the probable impact of the increasing contacts between Hungarians and Westerners, it is at least conceivable that Hungary might waiver in its support for Soviet action against the West, especially if it were not the result of a Soviet response to an initial Western attack.

During the 1970's Czechoslovakia has usually been considered as one of the Soviet Union's most faithful supporters—not only on questions of domestic policy, but also on foreign policy issues. Yet, as has been evident ever since the suppression of the 1968 reform movement and the removal of the Dubcek leadership, the country is deeply divided along conservative and liberal political lines. Even though there has been little opportunity for the expression of attitudes hostile to the Soviets, it is to be expected that such attitudes are prevalent within Czechoslovak society—and within the military establishment. However, in a conflict situation within the WTO, Czechoslovakia, as Hungary, is likely to support the Soviet position rather than risk the consequences of Soviet anger. In an international conflict it is also unlikely that Czechoslovakia would refuse to support the Soviet Union.

Poland is in a category quite different from the countries that we have discussed to this point. Anti-Russian attitudes are probably stronger in Poland than in any other East European country. In addition, during the course of the past 20 years Poles have shown on at least three occasions that they are willing to run risks of Soviet anger. Yet it is questionable whether Poland would attempt to follow an independent policy in the event of a crisis in which the WTO was involved. In 1968, for example, even though developments in Czechoslovakia attracted substantial support among the Polish population, Polish troops participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the event of a future crisis within Eastern Europe it is likely that Polish troops would once again be involved. Should a conflict with NATO break out, it is also probable that Poland would be involved—especially if West Germany were responsible for initiating the conflict.[9]

The situation in which the Soviets might be presented with the greatest problem in Poland would be one in which the Soviets intervened in domestic Polish politics. It is highly unlikely that the Poles would respond with the passive resistance that characterized Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is even possible that Soviet military intervention in Poland might meet with active resistance, even on the part of the military.

Finally, there is the case of Romania, the country with which the Soviets have had the greatest problems in the past 15 years—at least in the foreign policy field. For most of the past 10 years Romania has refused to participate actively in WTO maneuvers, although this refusal has been modified in recent years. At the time of the Czechoslovak

crisis of 1968, not only did Romania refuse to participate in the invasion, but its political leaders made public statements concerning their commitment to the defense of Romanian sovereignty in the case of a Soviet attack. It is likely that in future conflicts within the WTO area, Romanian participation would depend primarily on the decision of the Romanian leadership concerning the relevance of the crisis to Romanian interests. In a direct conflict between Romania and the Soviet Union, it is probable that the Romanians, as the Poles, would resist militarily.

IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS

As we mentioned at the outset, it is not really possible to estimate the reliability of East European forces in the event of military conflict with the West nor, for that matter, in crisis situations within the bloc. Actually the question of reliability in a NATO-WTO conflict assumes a conventional war in which land forces, tanks, and air power would be significant. Only in an extended war would the opportunities exist for an East European military to "defect." Whether an East-West military conflict would remain at the level of conventional weapons long enough for fissures within the WTO alliance to be exposed that might result in a withdrawal of East European support for the Soviets is a question that cannot be answered.

In general, the Soviets seem to have been successful in creating military establishments—or, in overseeing their creation—which are so tied to the Red Army, that the independence of action is highly unlikely. Even in conflict situations within the WTO alliance itself, it is highly unlikely that most of the East European countries would refuse to participate in bringing a recalcitrant ally back into line. Only in the case of a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and either Poland or Romania is it likely, in my estimation, that the Soviets would be faced with active military resistance.

ENDNOTES

1. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR.

2. See Thad P. Alton, Gregor Iazarcik, Elizabeth M. Bass, and Wassyl Znayenko, "Defense Expenditures in Eastern Europe, 1965-76," in John P. Hardt, ed., *East European Economies Post Helsinki: A Compendium of Papers* submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 270-1.

3. Summarized in *The Christian Science Monitor,* March 16, 1976, p. 2.

4. "Warsaw Pact Trends and Developments," *NATO Review,* No. 25, June 1977, p. 27.

5. See A. Ross Johnson, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability for the Soviet Union? (II)—The Military Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed., *The International Politics of Eastern Europe,* New York-Washington-London: Praeger Special Studies, 1976, p. 45.

6. For a discussion of the changes, see Johnson, *Ibid.,* pp. 47-50 and Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change," *Problems of Communism,* XXIV, No. 5, 1975, esp. pp. 2-10.

7. For an excellent discussion of conflicts within the WTO see Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution,* Cambridge, Massachusetts-London: The MIT Press, 1971.

8. See the discussion in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970,* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1970, pp. 471-485. See, also, *idem,* "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," in Richard Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe,* New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1976, esp. pp. 148-149.

9. I have been informed by Poles who have completed military service that a substantial amount of the political indoctrination to which troops are exposed is focused on the dangers of West German aggression and appeals to Polish memories of German atrocities in the Second World War. I have personally observed tours of young Polish (and Soviet) troops through the concentration camp in Oswiecim (Auschwitz) geared presumably to rekindling the hatred and fear of Germany—officially, West Germany, which is viewed as the sole heir of the Nazis.

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East-West relations; NATO; Warsaw Pact; Warsaw Treaty Organization; East European reliability

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This memorandum considers the question of ability and willingness of East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to support Soviet decisions that require the commitment of WTO military forces. The author addresses the question in the areas of the political leadership, the military leaders, and the troops in the field, as well as from the perspective of maintaining internal stability within the WTO area itself versus offensive and defensive operations against NATO. He concludes that any independent action on the part of WTO members is highly unlikely either in an internal or external conflict.

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