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ENGINE/AIRFRAME/DRIVE TRAIN
DYNAMIC INTERFACE DOCUMENTATION

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APPLIED TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY POSITION STATEMENT

This report provides the details of a program that is part of a larger effort designed to provide a complete report of past and present engine/airframe/drive train dynamic interface problems. The problems of vibration-related interface compatibility in engine/drive system installations are usually complicated by the inherent coupling of the three major multi-degree-of-freedom systems: engine, airframe, and drive train. The result of this effort is a report documenting dynamic interface problems associated with the OH-4A, Model 206, Model 309, the YAH-63, and the 214B. The ultimate benefit will be the accumulation of data that will eventually lead to a solution of generic problems of this type.

This report is one of five reports resulting from engine/airframe/drive train dynamic interface documentation efforts funded by the Applied Technology Laboratory, U. S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories (AVRADCOM). The related reports and their final report numbers are: Boeing Vertol, USARTL-TR-78-11; Hughes Helicopters, USARTL-78-12; Kaman Aerospace, USARTL-78-14; Sikorski Aircraft, USARTL-TR-78-13; and Bell Helicopter, USARTL-78-15.

Mr. Allen C. Royal, Propulsion Technical Area, Technology Applications Division, Applied Technology Laboratory, served as Project Engineer for this effort.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of this program was to survey Bell Helicopter Textron past and present experiences as related to gas-turbine-powered helicopter engine/airframe/drive train dynamic interface problems as part of an overall Government effort to define specific areas in which future research funding should be placed to develop improved design, analytical <i>over</i>		

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and test methods to ensure helicopter dynamic compatibility.

Thirteen dynamic interface problems have been documented with a detailed discussion, solutions considered and/or applied, and identifiable shortcomings. Recommendations are made for future research funding in five specific areas. The appendixes provide the detailed documentation for each of the dynamic interface problems.

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PREFACE

The work presented in this report was performed by Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) under Contract DAAJ02-77-C-0045 for the Applied Technology Laboratory, U. S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories (AVRADCOM), Fort Eustis, Virginia.

This is an extension of previous efforts to define the specific areas in which research funding should be placed in order to develop improved design, analytical, and test methods to ensure dynamic compatibility of the engine, drive system, and airframe. Previous efforts are found, in part, in USAAMRDL TR's 74-47¹, 74-85², and 74-87³.

The study was conducted in two stages. First, a review of previous experience related to past and present gas-turbine-powered helicopter engine/airframe/drive system dynamic interface problems, including internal and external noise, was conducted. Second, coordination with the engine manufacturers was then conducted to ensure completeness of detail for the specific problems selected for documentation.

The program was implemented under the technical direction of Mr. Allen C. Royal of the Technology Applications Division, ATL. Principal Bell Helicopter Textron personnel associated with this contract were Messrs. B. D. Downs (Propulsion), W. W. Riley (Drive Train), B. D. Edwards (Acoustics), and R. W. Balke (Dynamics). Mr. H. W. Hanson was the BHT Project Engineer.

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INTRODUCTION

Previously, the development schedule of a new helicopter often encountered delays due to both anticipated and unexpected dynamic compatibility problems associated with vibration, oscillatory loading, and/or stability. Although progress has been made in both the prediction and the solution of many of these problems, development programs of present-day helicopters continue to incur significant schedule delays - and thus unacceptable cost increases - due to dynamic problems. Additionally, dynamic problems sometimes develop in the field, possibly due to an accumulation of flight time on the components, or due to a design change that has been introduced.

Vibration and oscillatory loading problems are largely related to rotor harmonic excitations, the magnitude thereof, their proximity to the system natural frequencies, and the associated damping characteristics. Stability problems may occur due to numerous and varied reasons. Particular attention must be given to the coupling associated with the combining of two or more components or systems, each having its own set of uncoupled natural frequencies and response characteristics. When combined, the inertial and geometric coupling effects may cause frequency shifts resulting in significant changes in vibratory response or reductions in damping which could lead to instabilities.

One area wherein the dynamic interface problems are of concern is that of the engine/airframe/drive train. This problem is somewhat compounded by the fact that both the engine and airframe manufacturer have a detailed familiarization with the characteristics and requirements of their own design, but inadequate knowledge and appreciation for the characteristics and requirements of the other design or the characteristics of the coupled system. It is further compounded by the fact that the types of analyses used are often unique in assumptions, methodology content, and format of presentation.

Additionally, there is sometimes a lack of test techniques wherein the data can be compared directly to that of the system analysis.

It is therefore desirable to identify the specific areas in which research funding should be applied in order to develop improved and compatible design, analytical, and test methods to ensure dynamic compatibility of the engine/airframe/drive train.

The objectives of this study were:

1. To identify helicopter engine/airframe/drive train dynamic interface problems.
2. To coordinate with engine manufacturers to ensure completeness of detail.

The general problem areas which were investigated are categorized as:

1. Steady state dynamic loading
2. Transient dynamic loading
3. Component installation resonances
4. Stability
 - a. Supercritical shafting
 - b. Classical torsional stability
5. Engine governing accuracy
 - a. Transient power excursions
 - b. Transient speed excursions
6. Noise

For selection of problems to be presented, most emphasis has been placed on recent problems (documentation material more readily available), and those of a generic nature (problems of an inherent nature normally associated with engine/airframe/drive train applications, as opposed to those problems dealing with a new type of interface situation).

The body of the report summarizes the problems, solutions, and shortcomings. Recommendations are made for future research funding. The appendixes describe each individual problem.

It is endeavored in each appendix to define the problem, describe the solutions considered and/or applied, and define the final solution or, alternately, the adjustments made to accommodate the problem. Additionally, each appendix defines, where appropriate, the shortcomings in design guides, analytical capability, and test methodology.

SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS

Previous BHT experience related to gas-turbine-powered helicopter engine/airframe/drive train dynamic interface problems was reviewed.

Thirteen problems were selected for documentation as summarized in Table 1. These are presented in chronological order by year, identified by helicopter model and type of aircraft (whether military or commercial), generically classified, and briefly described.

The first column of Table 1 assigns a problem identification code which is used throughout the report. A separate appendix having the same letter designation code provides the detailed discussion of each problem.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTED ENGINE/AIRFRAME/DRIVE TRAIN INTERFACE PROBLEMS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Model</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Problem description</u>
A	1962	OH-4A	Mil Obs/ Prototype	Generic	Classical drive system torsional instability
B	1963	OH-4A	Mil Obs/ Prototype	Generic	Excessive engine and fuse- lage vibration at engine-to- transmission shaft speed
C	1967	206	Commercial/ Production	Not generic	High-frequency engine noise in aft cabin area
D	Early 1972	309	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Generic	Engine installation resonance
E	Mid- 1972	309	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Generic	High transient drive system loads following engine throttle chops
F	Mid- 1974	YAH-63	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Generic	Shaft dynamic loading on engine
G	Mid- 1974	YAH-63	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Generic	Installed vibration in excess of engine limits
H	Late 1974	YAH-63	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Generic	Destructive shaft whirl of 20,000 rpm engine-to-trans- mission driveshaft
I	Mid- 1975	YAH-63	Mil Attack/ Prototype	Military only	IR blower driveshaft failure

TABLE 1. - Concluded

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Model</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Problem description</u>
J	Mid-1975	YAH-63	Mil Attack/Prototype	Nongeneric	Failure of tail rotor and accessory drive gearbox mounts
K	Mid-1975	YAH-63	Mil Attack/Prototype	Generic	Poor governing and excessive transient rotor droop
L	Late 1975	YAH-63	Mil Attack/Prototype	Generic	Excessive torsional loading of the drive system during engine overspeed trips
M	Early 1976	214B	Commercial/Production	Nongeneric	Hydraulic system noise

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

A brief summary of the solutions considered, designed, analyzed, and/or tested for each problem is provided in Table 2. In some cases solutions were adopted into the design; in other instances program development was discontinued before alternate solutions could be fully evaluated and no solution was achieved.

The letter designation code in the first column of Table 2 refers to the problem identification code previously assigned in Table 1.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS CONSIDERED AND APPLICABILITY

Item	Problem/Solution	Extent of application			
		Consideration only	Design	Analysis	Test Adopted
A	Torsional stability:				
	- Signal deadband	X	X	X	X
	- Signal hysteresis	X	X	X	X
	- N ₂ flyball coupling		X.		
B	- T/R driveshaft damping	X	X	X	X
	Engine vibration at shaft 1/rev:				
	- Soft mount engine	X		X	X
	- Balance shaft	X		X	X
C	- Redesign shaft support	X		X	X
	Excessive cabin noise:				
	- Soundproofing	X		X	X
	- Engine change-out			X	X
- Soft mount engine	X		X	*	
- Modify engine gearbox	X		X	**	

* Awaiting certification

** Awaiting engine manufacturer test results

TABLE 2. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Problem/Solution</u>	<u>Extent of application</u>			
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test Adopted</u>
D	Engine mounting resonance: - Add lateral dampers to engine mounting		x		x
E	High transient drive system loads: - Soft tail rotor drive-shaft coupling - Overrunning clutch in tail rotor drive system	x			
F	Shaft dynamic loading on engine: - Analyze coupling forces - Evaluate calculated forces			x	x
G	Installed vibration in excess of engine limits: - Revise engine mountings - Change pylon geometry - Change main rotor mast length		x	x	x

TABLE 2. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Problem/Solution</u>	<u>Extent of application</u>			
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test Adopted</u>
H	Destructive shaft whirl:				
	- Change coupling material		x		x
	- Hoop stress determination				
	- Change centering spring design	x			x
	- Improve coupling balance	x			x
	- Stiffen coupling support cone			x	
	- Preload bearings		x		x
	- Reverse coupling design		x		x
	- Change type of coupling		x		x
	- Change shafting interface clamp-up		x		
	- Redesign to subcritical system			x	
	- Change coupling tooth profile		x		x
	- Add external shaft damper (elastomeric)				x
	- Incorporate squeeze-film damper in input quill support bearings		x		x

TABLE 2. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Problem/Solution</u>	<u>Extent of application</u>			
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test Adopted</u>
H	Destructive shaft whirl:				
(Cont)	- Change shaft support bearing to triplex		x	x	x
	- Lubricate threaded joints		x	x	x
	- Add double pilots to spline joints		x	x	x
	- Stiffen shafting		x	x	x
	- Change design to add nose reduction gearbox		x	x	x
	- Change coupling grease seal design		x	x	x
	- Change coupling radial clearance		x	x	x
	- Index components		x	x	x
	- Tighten tolerances		x	x	x
	- Dynamically balance components		x	x	x
I	IR blower shaft failure:				
	- Revise pilot rotor brake release procedure				
	- Add accumulator to brake actuation hydraulics				

TABLE 2. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Problem/Solution</u>	<u>Extent of application</u>			
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test</u> <u>Adopted</u>
J	90° gearbox support failure:				
	- Add soft mount under one support				x
	- Add braces				x
K	Accessory gearbox support failure:				
	- Revise strut mount location				x
	- Change mounting stiffness				x
	Poor governing; excessive transient droop:				
L	- Modify fuel control/governor				
	- Reduce control linkage hysteresis				
	Excessive torsional loading due to overspeed trip:				
	- Revise overspeed trip system checkout procedure				

TABLE 2. - Concluded

<u>Item</u>	<u>Problem/Solution</u>	<u>Extent of application</u>			
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test Adopted</u>
M	Hydraulic system noise:				
	- Soundproofing		x		x
	- Vibration isolation	x			
	- Change to different pump design	x			
	- Reduce pressure oscillations		x		x

IDENTIFICATION OF SHORTCOMINGS

In the conduct of this study, a number of shortcomings have been identified. These may be deficiencies in:

1. Design guidelines
2. Design details
3. Analytical procedures and methods
4. Test procedures and methods

or a combination thereof. These shortcomings are briefly summarized in Table 3.

The shortcomings listed are consistent with the time period in which the individual problem was encountered. Significant advances have been made over the past years in many of these areas. Where appropriate, additional information has been provided in the comment column.

The letter designation code in the first column of Table 3 refers to the problem identification code previously assigned in Table 1; the dash number is a counter to indicate the number of shortcomings identifiable to each specific problem.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF SHORTCOMINGS IDENTIFIED IN
ENGINE/AIRFRAME/DRIVE TRAIN TECHNOLOGY

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
A-1	Lack of a nonlinear analysis with which to evaluate trade-offs between stability, governing accuracy, and transient response	Significant improvements have been made in this area.
A-2	Lack of acceptance criteria for helicopter drive system stability and oscillatory amplitudes	
B-1	Lack of knowledge of the spring rate effect of ball bearings and the probability of the spring rates of the free-wheeling and output shaft support bearings controlling the engine-to-transmission shaft natural frequencies	Shaft critical frequencies were calculated from the classical equations for shaft bending of a rigidly supported shaft.
B-2	Lack of knowledge and availability of analytical methods and/or computer programs with which to calculate the bearing spring rates	Significant improvements have been made in this area, but confidence is lacking for low bearing load conditions.
B-3	Lack of knowledge and availability of balancing techniques for a 6000 rpm floating shaft	Significant improvements in dynamic balancing techniques have been made since this time.
C-1	Lack of knowledge of elastomeric properties for the proper combination of noise reduction/dynamic stiffness characteristics	Methodology often results in trial-and-error procedures.

TABLE 3. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
C-2	Lack of analytical methods and/or of measured data to accurately determine exact source of noise generation in a geared drive train	Propagation of noise through aircraft structure can be reduced to some extent.
D-1	Failure to analyze the engine mounting system to account for the effects of localized airframe flexibility	Dampers were added as an interim fix but were not considered acceptable for a production configuration.
E-1	Lack of available analysis and/or computer program with which to compute the transient loading of the drive train	Significant improvements have been made in this area.
E-2	Lack of design procedures which would require that the system be designed and stressed for discrete transient drive system loadings, in general, or at least for a high-speed throttle chop	BHT general design factor of 1.5 for dynamic loads is not sufficient.
E-3	Initial lack of experience relating to which parameters control the dynamic loading: e.g., backlash, spring rate, frequency, torque decay rate, magnitude of initial torque	

TABLE 3. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
F-1	Lack of measured data and/or analytical methods with which to accurately predict the shaft chocking forces and misalignment moments - particularly for the shaft torques, misalignment angles, chocking angles, and frequency thereof related to a 20,000 rpm design	Data extrapolated from UH-1 coupling data obtained in early 1960's at 6000 rpm; no unbalance data available.
F-2	Lack of definition on the engine installation drawing of the dynamic or oscillatory loading limits and the effect of these oscillatory loads upon the mean limits	Engine manufacturer evaluated BHT data and acknowledged acceptance.
G-1	Inability to accurately predict the main rotor induced dynamic loads at the engine mounts, and/or the input drive-shaft dynamic loads on the engine	Significant improvements in the prediction of rotor excitations have been made in the last 1½ years.
G-2	Lack of an efficient ground vibration test methodology which was directly relatable to the analytical methods used (in this case NASTRAN)	Rigorous analytical/test correlation of the engine mounting system was not performed.
H-1	Inadequate design guides and design criteria for high-speed and super-critical shafting	AMCP 706-201 ⁴ was not released until after the initial design was completed.

4. ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOK, HELICOPTER ENGINEERING, PART ONE: PRELIMINARY DESIGN, AMC Pamphlet No. 706-201, Headquarters, U.S. Army Material Command, Alexandria, Virginia, 30 August 1974.

TABLE 3. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
H-2	Lack of driveshaft coupling design capable of transmitting the required torque and accommodating the required misalignment and chucking	Repeated discussions with Bendix, Lord, Kaman, and others indicate no couplings of practical size, weight, and cost other than crown tooth adequate for requirements.
H-3	Lack of definition of crown tooth coupling chucking forces and misalignment moments at the design, torque, speed misalignment angles, and chucking amplitudes and of how the magnitude changes with shaft unbalance	Data extrapolated for UH-1 coupling data obtained in early 1960's at 6000 rpm; no unbalance data available.
H-4	Lack of balance criteria for high-speed shafting	Range of potential unbalance with minimum and maximum tolerances was accomplished; no definition of design requirement available.
H-5	Lack of test data and correlation with analysis of bearing spring rates as a function of rotational speed, radial load due to gear loading, and/or shaft unbalance	Analysis available to compute spring rates, but confidence in correlation at low radial loads is lacking.
H-6	Lack of adequate experience/criteria for joint stability of high-speed shafting	Experience factors apparently available in engine industry; needed by AVM's.

TABLE 3. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
H-7	Lack of data on lubricated threads versus dry threads for joint stability	Experience factors apparently available in engine industry; needed by AVM's.
H-9	Lack of coupling grease seal for 20,000 rpm shaft with high misalignment and chucking requirements	Grease dam was used as interim measure, but new seal needed for production.
H-9	Lack of centering device design for crown tooth coupling operating at 20,000 rpm with high chucking requirements	Centering device eliminated as interim measure; no problems encountered.
H-10	Lack of data on 'internal' or rotating system damping produced by greased crown tooth coupling for the applicable operational parameters	Internal damping is mechanism of supercritical nonsynchronous shaft whirl instability; need more test data.
I-1	Lack of design criteria requiring that the drive system, or at least the accessories, be designed and analyzed for specific transient loading conditions	BHT uses a design factor of 1.5 to cover dynamic loading.
I-2	Lack of an accumulator in the brake hydraulic system which would slow down the rotor brake release rate	
I-3	Lack of prescribed pilot operating procedures for rotor brake release	Revised procedures to a prescribed slow rate of release of rotor brake.

TABLE 3. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
J-1	Failure to analyze the installation to include the effects of local stiffness distribution of the airframe	
J-2	Lack of design procedures which require that the mounting of the gearboxes be designed and analyzed for specific dynamic loading conditions	Ballistic vulnerability redundant mounting criteria are in direct opposition to optimum design for reducing stress loads.
K-1	Inability of nonlinear torsional stability analysis to accurately predict drive system transient response characteristics for certain specific critical maneuvers	
K-2	Analysis does not account for range of permissible pilot techniques to accomplish the same maneuver	Need information on probable control input limitations (displacements and rates).
L-1	Engine overspeed trip switching frequency not compatible with drive system torsional natural frequencies	Possibility of incurring damaging drive system loads during an overspeed trip cyclic condition.
L-2	Lack of proper pilot operating procedures for functional checkout of overspeed trip system	Overspeed trip checkout procedures were revised to keep torsional oscillations at a minimum.

TABLE 3. - Concluded

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Comment</u>
M-1	Inadequacy of soundproofing materials to provide efficient noise reduction without prohibitive weight penalties	
M-2	Noise generated from high-frequency pressure pulsations in hydraulic lines not considered in design criteria of hydraulic system	Installed pulsation damper in high pressure hydraulic line from pressure pump.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Future Army research funding should be provided to accomplish the following:

1. Continued development of both analytical and test methodology to predict and verify the sources of transmission gearbox vibration and noise, including transmissibility and control to the fuselage structure. This program should be directed at application of the latest state-of-the-art methods, such as finite-element representation for gear and gearbox analyses, and rapid modal transfer function test techniques. Further, the study should evaluate problems associated with a specific design, analytically predicted improvements, test verification of the modifications, and, ultimately, flight-measured noise and vibration data to demonstrate the level of improvement actually attained.
2. Test verification of analytically predicted bearing spring rates as a function of bearing preload, reaction load, and shaft/rotor unbalance. This program should provide static and dynamic test data in a carefully controlled laboratory test setup which can be used for comparative correlation with existing analytical bearing spring rate programs. The results of this study should identify specific areas where analytical improvements are indicated, if any. After acceptable correlation is attained, the study should yield guidelines for design and analysis of future drive systems.
3. Development of a general-purpose program for the analysis of torsional stability, transient response, engine governing accuracy, and drive train dynamic loading to include flexible rotor effects.
4. Development of test methodology for rapid and accurate measurement of component (particularly engine) installation natural frequencies, mode shapes, and frequency response characteristics. This methodology should be compatible in data output format with analytical procedures (NASTRAN).

5. Analyses and tests on high-speed driveshaft applications to include evaluation of coupling designs, especially where coupling chocking amplitudes and/or misalignment angles are significant. This is of particular importance with the advent of the Advanced Technology Engine (ATE) which has power turbine shaft speeds of 30,000 rpm wherein supercritical shafting is likely to become a realistically unavoidable design criteria.

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APPENDIX A

CLASSICAL DRIVE SYSTEM TORSIONAL INSTABILITY

The OH-4A was the BHT entry into the Army's Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) competition of the early 1960's. This ship was powered by a single Allison (250 series) turbine engine.

During the design phase of the OH-4A helicopter, BHT obtained data from the engine manufacturer defining the engine and fuel control parameters suitable for a linear perturbation analysis about specified power conditions. The perturbation analysis conducted by BHT showed some potential drive system torsional instability problems. BHT then discussed this with the engine manufacturer and the fuel control manufacturer. BHT recommended several approaches to modification of the pneumatic governor/fuel control system and conducted studies on selected options. Considerations included: (1) the introduction of a dead band in the output governor pressure (P_G) signal; (2) hysteresis in the P_G signal; (3) a flexible, damped coupling to drive the governor N_2 flyball; and (4) a flexible, damped coupling in the tail rotor drive system.

Prior to the first ground run, no basic changes were made to the design. However, as a result of the analytical studies, alternate hardware was available.

During the initial ground run, the system exhibited a torsional instability when going onto the governor schedule. A number of fixes were attempted without success. Finally, sufficient accumulator volumetric damping was achieved by installing 72 inches of #10 flexible hose in the P_G line and the system became stable. The initial flight was made in this configuration.

Subsequent to the first flight, BHT and the engine and fuel control manufacturers pursued modifications to achieve acceptable stability without undue sacrifice of governing accuracy and/or transient response. On two occasions, approximately 3 months and 6 months after the initial ground run, a series of ground run tests were made to evaluate numerous control configurations. These configurations included P_G accumulators (hysteresis), P_G double check valves (dead band), governor input servo pressure (P_y) accumulators (hysteresis), governor gain, and combinations thereof.

Additionally, BHT analyzed the flexible flyball coupling (Figure A-1) and the flexible tail rotor driveshaft coupling. Both of these concepts were found to be analytically attractive

for drive system torsional stability improvement. However, incorporation of a flexible flyball coupling would necessitate requalification of the fuel control/governor system which was an unpopular option with the engine and fuel control manufacturers; therefore, the flexible tail rotor driveshaft coupling was selected as the better approach to pursue.

BHT designed, fabricated, installed, and tested an elastomeric coupling (Figure A-2) in the tail rotor drive system. Three coupling spring rates were evaluated. The nominal spring rate provided satisfactory frequency placement of the torsional modes and sufficient damping to stabilize a fuel control configuration that was otherwise unstable. These results correlated well with the stability analysis.

An important element in this area was that the analysis showed the baseline fuel control/governor system to be unstable when the tail rotor driveshaft was disconnected. A test was conducted on ground runs which verified this analytical prediction. Thus, the flexible coupling was designed such that, should the elastomer fail, the internal stops would permit the coupling to continue to transmit full torque.

Although the flexible tail rotor drive system coupling provided a satisfactory interim solution, there still existed such design deficiencies in this approach as elastomer fatigue life, temperature effects, and nonlinearity of the stiffness and damping characteristics.

Finally, the engine and fuel control manufacturers developed a set of back-to-back check valves which effected a ± 0.25 psi dead band in the P_G signal. This, along with accumulator volumes before and after the check valves, became the selected configuration.

The engines were delivered to three air vehicle manufacturers (AVM's), each having distinctly different rotor and drive system configurations. During the period of competitive evaluation this system was used successfully on all three aircraft.





Figure A-1. A flexible, damped coupling for the governor N₂ flyball.

Stiff

Nominal

Soft



(Three spring rate configurations shown)




Figure A-2. Elastomeric tail rotor driveshaft coupling.

APPENDIX B

EXCESSIVE ENGINE AND FUSELAGE VIBRATION AT ENGINE-TO-TRANSMISSION SHAFT SPEED

BHT developed the OH-4A helicopter as an entry into the Army's Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) competition. The OH-4A was powered by a single Allison (250 series) turbine engine with an output shaft speed of 6000 rpm. The engine was mounted on three bipods as shown in Figure B-1.

During ground run development tests, excessive high-frequency vibration was encountered. The frequency was determined to be 100 Hz or 1/rev of the input driveshaft. Magnitudes of 0.5 g were measured in the cockpit and were high enough to cause severe tingling of the facial tissues of the crew after only a few minutes of exposure.

Attempts at reducing this level included: (1) soft mounting the engine, (2) shaft balancing, and (3) redesigning the freewheeling unit and output shaft support at the engine takeoff.

Soft mounting of the engine was accomplished through the use of three Lord Kinematics rubber isolators, Part No. LM-405-1, modified by drilling out holes to soften the radial spring rates as shown in Figure B-2. These isolators were installed in the engine mounting system as shown in Figure B-3. This design modification did not satisfactorily alter the magnitudes or frequencies of the vibration.

Attempts to refine shaft balancing may have been ineffective because zero indexing of the shaft could not be maintained from one balance move to the next. This condition is indicative of shaft whirling due to bearing radial clearances.

Both the original and revised freewheeling unit and output shaft support designs are shown in Figure B-4. The revised design extended the gearbox case and provided substantially more bearing support, which precluded shaft whirling. This was found to be an acceptable modification to effectively reduce input driveshaft 1/rev vibrations to acceptable levels.




Figure B-1. OH-4A engine mount installation.




Figure B-2. Lord isolation mounts.




Figure B-3. Soft engine mount installation.





Figure B-4. Freewheeling unit and output shaft support installation.

APPENDIX C

HIGH-FREQUENCY ENGINE NOISE IN AFT CABIN AREA

Description of Problem

Cabin noise of the 206A, 206B, and 206L helicopters is characterized by a high amplitude pure tone at 5000 Hz. Since its frequency is within the most sensitive range of human hearing, this tone is highly annoying to passengers in the cabin. The spectral content of the 206B cabin noise is shown in Figure C-1. The dominant noise sources in the 206B are the engine and transmission, the relative locations of which are shown in Figure C-2. The noise is produced by vibrations set up in the engine output gearbox by a gear mesh of the output drive train. The engine is supported at three mounting points as shown in Figure C-3. Tests have shown that vibrations set up in the gearbox are transmitted through the engine mounting points, into the support legs, and into the aircraft structure. These vibrations then radiate into the cabin as noise.

Solutions Considered

Several approaches were taken to reduce this high-frequency noise, including standard soundproofing techniques, isolation of the engine from the airframe, and modification of the gearbox.

Soundproofing: Initial attempts at reducing this 5000-Hz tone involved the installation of extra soundproofing to the aft cabin walls, primarily in the hatbin bulkhead as shown in Figure C-4. This proved to have little effect even though a considerable amount of soundproofing was used. The standard soundproofing installed in these helicopters had reduced the amplitude of this noise spike as much as practical using soundproofing alone.

Engine Changeout: For specific customer complaints, the high-frequency noise was reduced by exchanging a high-noise engine with a normal one. Even though the 5000-Hz tone was associated with the engine output gearbox, the complete engine/gearbox assembly had to be replaced, since these two units were mated together at the engine manufacturer. The replacement engine was usually selected at random. Since the original engine generated higher-than-average cabin noise, the engine replacement usually resulted in a noise reduction. This was an effective solution, but it was obviously limited to specific complaints and did nothing to improve overall 206B cabin noise. It was also quite costly in terms of man-hours.

Elastomeric Engine Mounts: Since the 5000-Hz tone was caused by vibrations transmitting through the engine mounts and into the airframe structure vibration, isolation was introduced by incorporating an elastomer within the engine mounting assembly.

Two basic isolation concepts were considered. The first involved a replacement of each of the six engine support legs with a new leg made up of two concentric tubes separated by an elastomer. Each leg was built up as shown in Figure C-5, with no metal-to-metal contact between the inner and outer tubes but with through-bolts in oversized holes to provide a fail-safe feature in case of elastomer failure. The legs were installed on the aircraft as shown in Figure C-6. These mounts were installed in a flight test 206B helicopter, but no final evaluation was ever made regarding the noise-reducing capability of these mounts because they allowed excessive motion of the engine during initial ground tests. The engine went into a pitching motion at 70-80% N₂ RPM, producing excessive vertical motion to the pilot compartment. These mounts were not evaluated further. The concept itself may or may not be feasible, but the specific tube-in-tube mounts tested were not practical. The problem might not have occurred if a different elastomer were selected for use in these mounts.

A second concept of elastomeric engine mount was evaluated and was more successful. This second concept consisted of a steel/elastomer washer assembly placed at each of the three engine mounting points. Details are in Figure C-7(a). The washer assembly was installed as shown in Figure C-7(b), so that the engine gearbox vibrations imposed on the inner metal sleeve are separated from the airframe support legs which attach to the outer metal sleeve. Because the frequency of interest was so high (5000 Hz), only a small thickness of elastomer was needed to produce effective isolation. Flight test measurements were made with these elastomeric mounts installed to show the effects upon cabin noise. These tests show reductions in the 5000-Hz tone of as much as 10 decibels. Since this is a significant noise reduction, and since these types of elastomeric mounts involve relatively minor changes to existing hardware, the mounts are now undergoing qualification testing to allow them to be installed on a production basis.

Modification of Gearbox: Detroit Diesel Allison (DDA), the manufacturer of the C18, C20, and C20B engines, is aware of the noise problem associated with their gear train and is conducting studies to find the cause of the 5000-Hz vibration. These tests are currently in progress, with the following modifications being evaluated on an experimental basis:

1. Changing gear tooth profile
2. Adding mass to gear webs to change natural frequency

3. Changing number of teeth on gears
4. Adding stiffness to gearbox case

Joint Program: BHT and DDA are working cooperatively on this problem, exchanging data on gearbox noise and vibration as measured on the installed engine and in the test cell to reduce this engine noise problem. It is felt that this effort will result in an improved cabin noise signature in the 206-series helicopters.




Figure C-1. Cabin noise spectrum of 206B helicopter.




Figure C-2. Relative location of noise sources.




Figure C-3. 206B engine mount assembly.




Figure C-4. Schematic of 206B soundproofing treatment.




Figure C-5. Tube-in-tube engine support legs for vibration isolation.






Figure C-6. Installation of tube-in-tube engine support legs.



(a) Cross section of elastomer engine mount as installed.



(b) Exploded view of assembly.

Figure C-7. 206B elastomeric engine mounts for noise reduction.

APPENDIX D

ENGINE INSTALLATION RESONANCE

In 1971 BHT, under company funding, developed the Model 309 King Cobra helicopter as an advanced version of the AH-1G gunship. Two ships were built. The power plant for the initial design was a Lycoming T55 engine. One ship was later converted to a twin-engine configuration employing the Pratt and Whitney T400 engines and combining gearbox.

During initial ground runs of the ship with the original single Lycoming T55 engine, the aft end of the engine was observed to have abusive lateral vibration occurring at the main rotor 2/rev frequency.

In order to conform to the engine manufacturer's requirement for a nonredundant engine mounting system, the engine mounting arrangement consisted of a forward tripod on the left side of the engine, a forward bipod on the right side of the engine, and an aft vertical monopod.


In an effort to correct the lateral vibration problem, two viscous dampers were added to the engine. The left engine damper installation is shown in Figure D-1. Lycoming was consulted to determine the maximum permissible load which could be transmitted to the engine at the aft combustor flange damper attachment point. The damper links were then instrumented with strain gages and the level of damping was adjusted to maintain the loads below the designated limits.

Subsequent ground runs indicated that the dampers reduced the lateral vibration of the engine to an acceptable level to permit flight test of the air vehicle to proceed. This configuration was utilized throughout the remainder of the developmental flight test program.


Although the damper arrangement was satisfactory for the prototype air vehicle, Lycoming did not consider this a desirable engine mounting design for a production configuration.

During the latter stages of the Model 309 program, the decision was made by BHT to incorporate the Pratt and Whitney T400 twin-engine arrangement as a more attractive power plant configuration for the AEFA* testing and fly-off evaluation. Consequently, no further work was performed on the single-engine Lycoming installation.

*U. S. Army Aviation Engineering Flight Activity (AEFA),
Edwards Air Force Base, California.



Model 309 Ship No. 2 3-17-72
 Left hand engine damper installation. Viscous stabilizer bar damper is used. Link to engine is a tail rotor pitch link. Strain gage on link measures damper performance during flight. Bracket on engine picks up 4 bolts on the engine.



Model 309 Ship No. 2 3-17-72
 View of left side of engine showing viscous damper installed and throttle linkage.

Figure D-1. Left engine damper installation.

APPENDIX E

HIGH TRANSIENT DRIVE SYSTEM LOADS FOLLOWING ENGINE THROTTLE CHOPS

The BHT Model 309 King Cobra helicopter was developed in 1971 under company funding as an advanced version of the AH-1G gunship.

Preparatory to AEFA testing and a fly-off evaluation with the Sikorsky Blackhawk, BHT flight tests were conducted to obtain quantitative data. The Army had specifically requested that high-speed throttle chops be evaluated. BHT tests were conducted in a buildup fashion, gradually increasing speed. Measurement of the tail rotor drive system during these throttle chops showed excessive torsional loading. It became evident that high transient loads - in excess of the basic design capability - would be encountered at high speed and power.

Additionally, BHT conducted analyses of the drive system in an effort to better understand the cause of the high loads and to evaluate possible design changes which would minimize or eliminate the problem. The initial study established acceptable correlation between calculated and measured data as shown in Figure E-1. The analysis showed that the high torsional loads were closely related to the decay characteristics (initial to final torque, rate of decay, etc.) of the engine output torque. More detailed documentation of the analytical approach is provided in Attachment 1 to this appendix.

Several drive train design changes were considered in an effort to make the drive train more tolerant of engine torque oscillations.

A method of providing torsional damping was considered which involved installing a torsionally soft elastomeric coupling in the tail rotor drive train. The objective was to provide a means of absorbing torsional shock which would substantially reduce the torque excursions to well within the drive train capability.

Also considered was a torsional decoupling concept which involved installing an overrunning clutch in the tail rotor drive train. It was anticipated that the torque oscillations would be reduced to acceptable levels if the negative torque excursions could be eliminated.

The Model 309 program was subsequently terminated before any design modification hardware was produced. However, the analytical procedures developed under this program were later used in the initial design stages of the drive system for the Model YAH-63 prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter (see Appendix K of this report).

FLIGHT TEST DATA

Counter Number: 93
 Flight Number: 103A
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE
 TORQUE DECAY

HYBRID DATA




Figure E-1. Analytical correlation of measured data.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

HELL HELICOPTER COMPANY INTER-OFFICE MEMO

81:DB:j1-771
12 November 1973

MEMO TO: Mr. . . Hall*

COPIES TO: Messrs. J. Drees*, W. Jennings*, D. Kidd, L. Kingston*, R. Lynn*,
C. Moore*, E. Roseler*, C. Seibel*, Dynamics File,
ACF

SUBJECT: MODEL 309 TORSIONAL STUDIES

SUMMARY

Experience at BHC shows that the peak load in the tail rotor drive system usually occurs following a throttle chop and that these chops produce the highest loads when initiated from high power conditions. To investigate this phenomenon an analytical model of the Model 309 drive system was developed and programmed on the hybrid computer. Throttle chops were simulated and correlated to actual flight test results of the Model 309 helicopter.

ANALYTICAL MODEL

For this study, the drive system is considered as a series of lumped rotational inertias connected by torsional springs as shown in Figure 1. The principal inertias are the main rotor, main transmission, engine, and tail rotor. The principal springs are the main rotor mast, transmission input shaft, and tail rotor driveshaft. Engine aerodynamic torque was used as a driving function and decay characteristics thereof were varied.

The main rotor and tail rotor torques required were calculated as a function of main rotor collective pitch. The logic used to set the tail rotor pitch is shown schematically in Figure 2. The basic equation and the constants used are given in Table I. The values for the constants are derived in Enclosure 1. The Model 309 flow diagram used for implementation on the hybrid computer is shown in Figure 3. The results are presented herein. Studies are continuing in order to determine practical means of reducing the peak torque loads. The resulting loads were found to be dependent on the power setting prior to the throttle chop, the amount of backlash in the drive system, and the rate at which the engine torque decreased. A 1000 in-lb torque loss was assumed for accessory load.

PROGRAM INPUTS

For each correlation case, the main rotor and tail rotor collective settings were adjusted so that the steady state torque approximated the flight test steady state values. Both of these settings were held constant during the throttle chop. The engine mast torque decay rate was adjusted to give an engine torque decay rate close to that shown in the flight test data.

*w/o enclosures

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

Page 2

81:DB:j1-771

The amount of backlash in the gears was set equal to 160 percent of the nominal (print callout) value. This setting yielded the best correlation for both trace character and peak values. Table II lists the calculated parameters (both raw and engine output speed referenced) and the values actually used in the analysis if the two differ. One of the parameters altered is the tail rotor driveshaft spring rate, KTR. It was lowered 25 percent from the calculated value so that the torsional frequency of the tail rotor would be closer to the measured value. This modification brought the character of the hybrid tail rotor torque curves more in line with those of the flight test data.

RESULTS

Table III shows the steady state values for main rotor, tail rotor, and engine torques from the hybrid analysis compared with test data.

Table IV gives the measured torsional frequencies and the hybrid frequencies. The higher main rotor frequency for the calculated case is probably due to the coupling effects of the main transmission torque restraint and lateral pylon rocking mode which were not considered in the analysis.

Figures 4 to 9 show the compared data. Figure 10 shows the actual and calculated positive and negative tail rotor torque peaks for each power setting.

CONCLUSION

The analytical model and technique are adequate to predict the peak load characteristics provided the engine decay rate is well defined. For future designs, the possibility of obtaining these decay characteristics data from engine test cell work should be explored.

D.B.

Doug Brister
Doug Brister
Dynamics Group
Ext. 2886/2889

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E





Figure 1. Lumped Drive System Representation

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E



*Constants C_1 through C_{13} are listed in Table II, and defined in Enclosure 1.

Figure 2. Tail Rotor Collective Setting Logic Schematic.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E




Figure 3. Model 309 Hybrid Flow Diagram.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

TABLE I

Equation	Constant
Main Rotor Aerodynamic Damping	
$Q_{MRA} = [C_1 \theta_{MR}^3 + C_2 \theta_{MR}^2 + C_3 \theta_{MR} + C_4] N^2$	C ₁ 1.0314 E -3
	C ₂ - 4.4915 E -2
	C ₃ 7.7408 E -1
	C ₄ - 4.3620 E 0
Tail Rotor Collective Setting	
$\theta_{TR} = C_5 T_{TR}^3 + C_6 T_{TR}^2 + C_7 T_{TR} + C_8$	C ₅ 1.7329 E -4
	C ₆ - 5.5716 E -6
	C ₇ 1.3496 E -2
	C ₈ 1.2331 E 0
Tail Rotor Aerodynamic Damping	
$Q_{TRA} = [C_9 \theta_{TR}^3 + C_{10} \theta_{TR}^2 + C_{11} \theta_{TR} + C_{12}] N^2$	C ₉ 9.5203 E -6
	C ₁₀ 6.1796 E -4
	C ₁₁ - 1.5726 E -3
	C ₁₂ 1.3626 E -2
Tail Rotor Thrust Required	
$T_{TR} = Q_{MRA} / C_{13}$	C ₁₃ 8.3
Power Turbine Aerodynamic Damping	
$Q_{EA} = C_{14} N^2$	C ₁₄ 0.09589

NOTE: N is percent rpm

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

TABLE II

Parameter	Raw Value (in-lb-sec ²)	Actual Effective Value (in-lb-sec ²)	Modified Effective Value (in-lb-sec ²)	Percent Of Original Value (%)
<u>INERTIAS</u>				
I_{MR} (Main Rotor)	72886	39.22	Same	100
I_{XM} (Transmission)	1	.2425	Same	100
I_{PT} (Power Turbine)	8.037	1.949	Same	100
I_{TR} (Drive Train)	55.6	.8049	Same	100
<u>Torsional Springs</u>				
	(in-lb/rad) $\times 10^6$	(in-lb/rad)	(in-lb/rad)	
K_{MR} (Main Rotor Mast)	2.02	1089	1250	115
K_E (Engine)	2.0	2,000,000	Same	100
K_{TR} (Drive Train)	.0196	2740	2060	75
<u>Other</u>				
	(rad)	(rad)	(rad)	
C_{15} (Backlash)	.0856	.23	.368	160

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

TABLE III

DATA POINT	ENGINE DELTA TORQUE		MAIN ROTOR MAST TORQUE		TAIL ROTOR MAST TORQUE	
	MEASURED (%)	CALCULATED (%)	MEASURED (in-lb)	CALCULATED (in-lb)	MEASURED (in-lb)	CALCULATED (in-lb)
124 Knot	54	52	229,000	224,000	2000	2380
141.5 Knot	62	60	269,000	260,000	2300	2480
146.5 Knot	67	67	300,000	300,000	2600	2800
150 Knot	68	70	319,000	310,000	3120	3300
153 Knot	73	74	340,000	334,000	3500	3700
155.5 Knot	77	77	369,000	370,000	3720	4000

TABLE IV

TORSIONAL NATURAL FREQUENCY

	FLIGHT TEST	HYBRID MODEL (modified effective values)
Main Rotor	2.68	3.22
Tail Rotor	9.1	7.5



ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA



Counter Number: 83
 Flight Number: 107D
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE TORQUE DECAY



HYBRID DATA



ENGINE DELTA TORQUE



MAIN ROTOR MAST TORQUE



TAIL ROTOR MAST TORQUE




Figure 4. Data Set I - 124-Knot Power Setting.



ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA



Counter Number: 84
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 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE TORQUE DECAY



HYBRID DATA



ENGINE DELTA TORQUE



MAIN ROTOR MAST TORQUE



TAIL ROTOR MAST TORQUE




Figure 5. Data Set II - 141.5-Knot Power Setting.



ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA



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 Flight Number: 107D
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE TORQUE DECAY



HYBRID DATA



ENGINE DELTA TORQUE



MAIN ROTOR MAST TORQUE



TAIL ROTOR MAST TORQUE




Figure C. Data Set III - 146.5-Knot Power Setting.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA

Counter Number: 92
 Flight Number: 108A
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE TORQUE DECAY

HYBRID DATA




Figure 7. Data Set IV - 150-Knot Power Setting.



ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA



Counter Number: 93
 Flight Number: 108A
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE
 TORQUE DECAY



HYBRID DATA



ENGINE DELTA
 TORQUE



MAIN ROTOR
 MAST TORQUE



TAIL ROTOR
 MAST TORQUE




Figure 8. Data Set V - 153-Knot Power Setting.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

FLIGHT TEST DATA

Counter Number: 94
 Flight Number: 108A
 Ship Number: 2503
 Date: 5-27-72

POWER TURBINE
 TORQUE DECAY

HYBRID DATA




Figure 9. Data Set VI - 155.5-Knot Power Setting.

ATTACHMENT I TO APPENDIX E




Figure 10. Comparison of Measured and Flight Test Tail Rotor Torque Peaks

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

ENCLOSURE 1 - DERIVATION OF CONSTANTS

- I Engine Aerodynamic Damping Equation
- II Main Rotor Aerodynamic Damping Equation
- III Tail Rotor Aerodynamic Damping Equation
- IV Tail Rotor Thrust Required Equation
- V Tail Rotor Collective versus Thrust Required Equation

I. Engine Aerodynamic Damping Estimation

The aerodynamic damping associated with the Model 309 was assumed to take the form of

$$Q_{EA} = C_{14} N^2$$

where the terms are defined as

- Q_{EA} = the engine aerodynamic damping in in-lb torque
- N = the percent rpm
- C_{14} = a constant term

The constant C_{14} is derived by assuming the aerodynamic damping of the engines to be equal to 10 percent of the engine torque at 100 percent rpm setting. Since at 100 percent rpm

Model 309

- Engine HP = 2000
- RPM = 13148

$$Q_E = \frac{(63025)(2000)}{13148} = 9589.1 \text{ in-lb}$$

Since the damping is assumed = 10 percent

$$Q_{EN} = 958.9 \text{ in-lb @ 100% RPM}$$

So, the constant C_{14} term can be found by

$$Q_{EA} = C_{14} N^2$$

$$C_{14} = Q_{EA} / N^2$$

$$C_{14} = \frac{958.9}{(100)(100)} = 0.09589 \text{ in-lb/\%}$$

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

II. Main Rotor Aerodynamic Damping

As with the engine, the main rotor aerodynamic damping was assumed to be a function of the percent rpm squared.

$$Q_{MRA} = C_{MR} N^2$$

where the terms are defined as

- Q_{MRA} = the main rotor aerodynamic damping
- N = the percent rpm
- C_{MR} = a constant term that varies with main rotor collective setting

At any particular main rotor setting, a corresponding value for C_{MR} can be found if the Q_{MRA} for 100 percent rpm is known.

$$C_{MRA} = \frac{Q_{MRA}}{(100)^2} = 1 \times 10^{-4} Q_{MRA}$$

This data is available from flight tests for the 309. Table E1 contains this data, along with the C_{MR} value for each data point.

In order to convert from HP to C_{MR} values, note that

$$Q_{MR}' = \frac{(63025)(HP)}{N_{MR}}$$

and

$$N_{MR} = \frac{N_{MR}}{100} N$$

But, referencing to engine system,

$$Q_{MR} = \frac{N_{MR}}{N_E} Q_{MR}'$$

then since

$$\begin{aligned} C_{MR} &= \frac{Q_{MR}}{N^2} \\ &= \frac{N_{MR}}{N_E} \frac{(63025)(HP)}{\left[\frac{N_{MR}}{100} N \right]^2} = \frac{6302500 \text{ HP}}{(N_E)(N^3)} \end{aligned}$$

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

where

N_E = RPM of engine
 HP = horsepower absorbed by the rotor

Using this equation and the 309 parameters yields

Model 309

$$\begin{aligned} N_E &= 13148 \\ N &= 100\% \text{ (for data used)} \\ C_{MR} &= \frac{(6302500)(HP)}{(NE)(N)^3} \\ &= \frac{6302500}{(13148)(1 \times 10^6)} \text{ (HP)} \\ &= (0.47935 \times 10^{-3})(HP) \end{aligned}$$

The C_{MR} and collective setting values for each model were curve fit to the third degree equation

$$C_{MR} = C_1 \theta_{MR}^3 + C_2 \theta_{MR}^2 + C_3 \theta_{MR} + C_4$$

The constants are listed in Table I in the memo.

TABLE E1		
Model 309		
Collective Setting θ_o	Power HP	C_{MR}
14	1050	0.50299
15	1300	0.62280
16	1560	0.7474
17	1850	0.8863
18	2170	1.0396
19	2500	1.1979
20	2950	1.4074

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

III. Tail Rotor Aerodynamic Damping

Again, the damping was assumed to be of the form

$$Q_{TRA} = C_{TR} N^2$$

where

- Q_{TRA} = the tail rotor aerodynamic damping
- N = the % rpm
- C_{TR} = a constant term that varies with tail rotor collective setting

As with the main rotor, a value for C_{TR} corresponds to a fixed collective (tail rotor) setting. Model 309 data is available from flight tests. This data is given in Table E2, along with the calculated C_{TR} .

As with the main rotor, the data is in terms of absorbed HP and is converted to C_{TR} value as follows:

$$Q_{TR}' = \frac{(63025)(HP)}{N_{TR}}$$

and

$$N_{TR} = \frac{N_{TR}}{100} N$$

Referencing to the engine system

$$Q_{TR} = \frac{N_{TR}}{N_E} Q_{TR}'$$

Then with

$$C_{MP} = \frac{Q_{TR}}{N^2}$$

$$= \frac{N_{TR}}{N_E} \frac{(63025)(HP)}{\left[\frac{N_{TR}}{100} N\right]^2} = \frac{(6302500)(HP)}{(N_E)(N^3)}$$

where

- N_E = RPM of engine
- HP = horsepower absorbed by the tail rotor

Again using the 309 parameters yields

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

Model 309

$$N_E = 13148$$

$$N = 100\%$$

$$C_{TR} = \frac{(6302500)(HP)}{K_E N^3}$$

$$= (0.47935 \times 10^{-3})(HP)$$

The C_{TR} and collective setting values for each model were curve fit to the third degree equation

$$C_{TR} = C_9 \epsilon_{TR}^3 + C_{10} \epsilon_{TR}^2 + C_{11} \epsilon_{TR} + C_{12}$$

The constants are listed in Table 1 in the memo.

TABLE E2
Model 309

Collective Setting ϵ_o	Power HP	C_{TR}
- 4	60	0.0297
- 2	36	0.0179
0	28	0.0140
2	28	0.0140
4	36	0.0174
6	54	0.0272
8	86	0.0461
10	138	0.0691
12	206	0.100%
14	288	0.1385

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

IV. Tail Rotor Thrust Required

The inclusion of the tail rotor collective logic makes necessary the calculation of the tail rotor thrust required to counterbalance the main rotor torque. This is found by

$$T_{TR} = \frac{Q_{MRA}}{L}$$

where

- T_{TR} = thrust of tail rotor
- Q_{MRA} = main rotor torque
- L = length from main rotor to tail rotor

Also, since Q_{MRA} is an engine referenced value and T_{TR} is non-referenced the equation is modified to be

$$T_{TR} = \frac{Q_{MRA}}{L} \cdot \frac{N_E}{N_{MR}}$$

so that

Model 309

$$\begin{aligned} C_{TR} &= \frac{Q_{MRA}}{346.75} \frac{13148}{306} \\ &= \frac{Q_{MRA}}{8.09} \end{aligned}$$

*In memo, the constant in each of the above equations is referred to as C_{12} where

$$T_{TR} = \frac{Q_{MRA}}{C_{13}}$$

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

V. Tail Rotor Collective versus Thrust Required

In order to complete the logic sequence, the tail rotor collective setting for a given required tail rotor thrust was necessary. The data, collective versus thrust, for the Model 309 is derived from flight tests. This information is in Table E3. The equation was of the form

$$\theta_{TR} = C_5 T_{TR}^3 + C_6 T_{TR}^2 + C_7 T_{TR} + C_8$$

where

θ_{TR} = tail rotor collective setting

T_{TR} = tail rotor thrust

C_N = constant terms

*The constants are given in Table E in the body of the memo.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX E

TABLE E3

Model 309

Thrust Lb	Collective Setting
-400	-4.0
-300	-3.5
-200	-2.5
-100	-1.5
0	0.6
100	2.0
200	4.4
300	5.4
400	6.3
500	7.0
600	7.8
700	8.2
800	8.8
900	9.6
1000	10.2
1100	10.8
1200	11.4
1300	12.0
1400	12.6
1500	13.2
1600	13.8
1700	14.2
1800	14.6

APPENDIX F

SHAFT DYNAMIC LOADING ON ENGINE

BHT, under Contract DAAJ01-73-C-0741(P40), developed a prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter, the YAH-63, powered by twin General Electric 700-GE-T700 engines with 20,000 rpm output shaft speeds. The air vehicle vibration criteria dictated a high degree of rotor force attenuation, which for the BHT two-bladed main rotor design necessitated use of the focal pylon/nodal beam isolation systems resulting in relatively high pylon pitch, roll, and vertical oscillatory motions. To accommodate these pylon motions required an input driveshaft coupling design capable of relatively large misalignment and chucking motions.

BHT has evaluated many coupling designs over the years, including a Bendix diaphragm coupling and the Kaman Kaflex coupling. For the YAH-63 program BHT investigated several other coupling designs as described in Reference 5 (also see Appendix H of this report). The combined requirements in this application of rotational speed, torque, misalignment, and chucking apparently exceed the capability of most couplings. Thus, the BHT design employed crown tooth gear couplings like those currently used on all BHT helicopters in the field today.

During the proposal effort and prototype design stage of the YAH-63, BHT and General Electric engineering personnel discussed the various interface considerations. One area of particular concern, identified by both parties, was the steady state and transient loading of the engine through the engine-to-transmission shaft.

One problem encountered was that the initial engine installation drawing defined only static load limitations at the power takeoff pad. There were not specifications to define the oscillatory loading or the combinations of steady and oscillatory loading allowed.

The second problem was that no data were available to BHT to define the chucking forces and misalignment moments for crown tooth gear couplings operating at 20,000 rpm. BHT had only

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5. Oradat, F. R., Hanson, H. W., and Alexander, R. M., DEVELOPMENT OF SUPER-CRITICAL SHAFTING USING CROWN-TOOTH GEAR COUPLINGS, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 299-909-004, Fort Worth, Texas, 15 January 1976.

limited data on shaft chucking forces as a function of misalignment angle, torque, and chucking amplitudes at speeds up to 6000 rpm (Reference 6) but no data on shaft moments generated by coupling misalignment.

An empirical relationship utilizing available data extrapolated to the torques, speeds, and coupling diameter was formulated to estimate the forces and moments occurring on the 20,000 rpm YAH-63 floating driveshaft. Based on these empirical data, BHT supplied GE with the maximum values expected for output shaft chucking loads. Testing of driveshaft load actions and coupling reactions during the YAH-63 development program provided further empirical data refinements, somewhat reducing the required output shaft loading envelope. Table F-1, taken from Reference 7, shows an example of the coupling force and moment data which was transmitted to GE. GE in return reviewed these data, evaluating the effect on the output pad thrust bearing and the engine case, and ultimately accepted the BHT values as compatible with the T700 engine design. No design changes were made and no further action was taken.

Appendix G of this report describes the YAH-63 T700 engine installation vibration characteristics and notes that the fore-and-aft engine accelerations at the main rotor 2/rev frequency may be due to the driveshaft axial chucking forces.

During this study, it became evident that such factors as coupling radial clearance, tooth profile, shaft unbalance, type and amount of grease, and high centrifugal field (rpm and diameter) would have very significant effects on these forces and moments. Thus, for future designs with stringent vibration requirements, further research is needed to define these parametric effects.

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6. Puckett, J. D., RESULTS OF INPUT DRIVESHAFT CHUCKING FORCE INVESTIGATION ON UH-1 DRIVESHAFT, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 55865M-12, Fort Worth, Texas, 15 December 1965.
 7. Hanson, H. W., and Oradat, F. R., DRIVE SYSTEM ANALYSIS, APPENDUM A: 409-140-025 INPUT DRIVESHAFT INSTALLATION CRITICAL SPEED ANALYSIS, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-940-001, Fort Worth, Texas, 17 November 1975.

The effects of these forces and moments impact upon:

1. The engine output pad thrust bearing capacity and other engine components.
2. Engine mount loading.
3. Vibratory engine environment relative to the installation limits (Appendix G).
4. The transmission input quill design.
5. The capability of the rotor/pylon isolation system to function as designed, thus impacting on crew comfort and component reliability.

TABLE F-1. 20,000 RPM OUTPUT SHAFT COUPLING MISALIGNMENT AND CHUCKING REACTION CAPABILITY AT THE MAIN ROTOR PYLON 2/REV (9.6 HZ) FREQUENCY

G's	Speed % V _H	Amr ± IN.	Misalign, deg		Time Percent	Shaft HP	Torsional Force lb		Radial Force lb		Moment lb-in.		Friction Coeff.
			Min	Max			Mean	± Osc	Mean	± Osc	Mean	± Osc	
ENGINE COUPLING													
1	0	.106	.467	.615	33.00	725	26	11	3	0	45	3	.018
1	0.6	.246	0	.503	4.95	500	119	116	7	4	93	93	.195
1	0.7	.219	.351	.844	14.12	594	39	31	5	1	64	18	.040
1.25	0.7	.275	.478	1.011	3.69	594	33	31	4	1	57	13	.032
1	0.8	.373	0	1.273	10.25	850	187	190	10	7	151	151	.194
1.50	0.8	.361	.622	1.831	2.84	350	35	49	4	2	61	29	.029
1	0.9	.288	.687	1.298	10.69	1200	45	36	6	2	80	20	.023
1.75	0.9	.507	.966	2.733	8.68	1200	41	70	5	3	73	47	.028
1	1.0	.317	.897	1.639	8.80	1355	45	41	5	2	79	24	.021
1	1.2	.409	.971	2.100	2.98	1355	45	56	5	3	80	36	.024
1.8	0.6	.362	0	1.301	0	1000	202	205	14	14	165	165	.181
1.8	0.6	.393	0	1.354	0	1150	257	253	20	15	209	209	.231
2.12	0.9	.043	0	2.95A	0	1355	100	100	2	7	86	86	.071
TRANSMISSION COUPLING													
1	0	.100	.700	1.016	93.00	725	20	12	3	0	35	5	.015
1	0.6	.246	.451	1.350	4.95	500	27	31	7	4	46	17	.023
1	0.7	.219	.517	1.267	14.12	594	27	27	5	1	47	15	.027
1.25	0.7	.275	.678	1.641	3.69	594	24	33	4	1	42	17	.027
1	0.8	.373	.703	2.013	10.25	850	31	48	10	7	54	28	.026
1.5	0.8	.301	1.035	3.762	2.80	850	22	47	4	2	38	24	.020
1	0.9	.288	1.017	2.133	10.69	1200	30	38	6	2	52	33	.017
1.75	0.9	.507	1.601	4.106	8.68	1200	22	61	5	3	38	31	.025
1	1.0	.317	1.389	2.740	8.80	1355	25	41	5	2	45	23	.014
1	1.2	.409	1.535	3.432	2.98	1355	24	51	5	3	43	29	.015
1.8	0.6	.342	0	1.329	0	1000	195	196	11	14	159	159	.174
1.8	0.6	.372	0	1.354	0	1150	247	243	17	17	201	201	.194
2.12	0.9	.788	0	2.856	0	1355	648	689	47	47	558	558	.458

APPENDIX G

INSTALLED VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF ENGINE LIMITS

BHT, under Contract DAAJ01-73-C-0741 (P40), developed a prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter, the YAH-63. The RFP required a twin-engine installation using T700-GE-T700 engines, GFE-supplied. An isometric view of the engine installation is shown in Figure G-1.

To evaluate the coupled interaction between engine mounting frequencies and elastic engine bending modes, combined with both rigid and flexible input driveshaft modes, BHT conducted a NASTRAN analysis of the engine installation during the proposal effort of the program (Reference 8). Bending and torsional stiffness distributions for the T700 case, as well as the weight distribution for the basic engine, were provided by GE. The analytical model is shown in Figure G-2.

Later, during the contract development program, the analytical model was refined to include influence coefficient type information provided by GE, which defined engine case localized structure stiffness from the engine centerline to the mount attachment points, and for the engine output shaft bearing support.

Engine mounting frequency parametric studies were initially conducted by simultaneously varying the spring rates of the fuselage mounting points to determine the minimum acceptable values for fuselage structure design requirements. Later, mounting spring rates were determined from the fuselage 3-D NASTRAN model (References 9 and 10) and used in the engine simulation.

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8. ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER SYSTEM, SUBSTANTIATING TECHNICAL DATA: STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-199-006, Fort Worth, Texas, 15 February 1973.
 9. Cronkhite, J. D., and Hanson, H. W., PRELIMINARY AIR VEHICLE VIBRATION REPORT FOR THE MODEL YAH-63 HELICOPTER, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-930-003, Fort Worth, Texas, November 1974.
 10. Brunken, J. E., PROTOTYPE AIR VEHICLE VIBRATION ANALYSIS FOR THE MODEL YAH-63 HELICOPTER, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-930-019, Fort Worth, Texas, February 1976.

Paralleling this effort, GE obtained mounting data from BHT and conducted a similar analysis using the VAST structural analysis computer program.

Both the BHT and the GE analyses predicted no serious problems except for two rigid body engine mounting modes near the main rotor 4/rev frequency at 18.4 Hz. The BHT and GE analytical results are compared in Table G-1.

Further parametric studies conducted by BHT indicated that stiffening of the aft engine mount outboard support structure would improve the frequency margin relative to 4/rev and would require approximately 1 pound of added weight.

The concern and the available fixes were discussed by BHT and GE engineering teams. It was decided that no structural changes would be made prior to acquiring flight test data, but that GE would monitor engine vibrations during developmental testing at BHT.

Subsequently, as a part of the joint engine interface document, a preliminary shake test was conducted by GE on the T700 installation in the YAH-63. The purpose of the test was two-fold: to define the natural frequencies of engine-mounted accessories, and to define the engine installation mounting frequencies.

Toward the end of the YAH-63 development program, BHT conducted a total system vibration test (Reference 11) which further documented the measured engine installation mounting frequencies.

Both the GE and the BHT vibration tests showed no significant problems related to engine-mounted accessories. The measured engine mounting frequencies are compared in Table G-2.

As a further requirement of the YAH-63 contract, an engine vibration and stress survey and an engine vibration demonstration (Reference 12) were conducted by BHT to define the induced engine vibration and stress environment for all speeds and power conditions of the helicopter operational envelope. The results of the tests showed the predominant engine vibrations

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11. Killion, S. W., and White, J. A., TOTAL SYSTEM VIBRATION SURVEY FOR THE YAH-63 ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-909-009A, Fort Worth, Texas, 28 June 1976.
 12. Killion, S. W., ENGINE VIBRATION AND STRESS SURVEY AND ENGINE VIBRATION DEMONSTRATION FOR THE YAH-63 ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-909-008B, Fort Worth, Texas, 25 June 1976.

to be, in general, in the 2/rev axial and 4/rev lateral directions. Although some vibration levels exceeded the GE specified engine installation limits (exceedances were less than 8% of the design flight spectrum), the corresponding stress levels were low. Thus, the engine installation was considered acceptable for the GCT air vehicle configuration and flight envelope for AEFA testing and fly-off competition.

As a result of the engine vibration analysis and tests conducted by both GE and BHT, GE proposed new engine installation vibration limits as summarized in Table G-3. None of the measured engine vibration levels exceeded the proposed limits. These new proposed engine vibration limits were submitted to the Army SSEB* for approval as an acceptable contractual deviation.

Just prior to the fly-off competition, BHT conducted static tests on the aft engine mount outboard support structure, then added a strut brace (Figure G-3) and repeated the test. The load-deflection results (Figure G-4) showed that the addition of the strut increased the mount vertical stiffness by a factor of approximately four. Although some improvement was made, this change did not bring the engine vibration levels within the current installation limits. However, this failure to achieve acceptable levels may have been (to a significant degree) caused by a combination of main rotor induced 4/rev of nominal to moderately high levels combined with a strong main rotor mast lateral bending mode near 4/rev. Frahm absorbers mounted on the pylon were used to partially absorb these vibrations, thus reducing the transmissibility to the fuselage and ultimately to the engines. Stress levels in the engine mounts were significantly reduced by these methods to obtain the desired mount life characteristics such that additional efforts to further reduce engine vibratory levels were curtailed. The AEFA flight tests conducted by the Army were flown with this revised mount support structure.

Meanwhile, during the proposal evaluation, the Army rejected the proposed change in engine vibratory limits, presumably on the basis that this would give BHT an unfair advantage in the overall competition evaluation.

For the production aircraft, BHT plans called for improved pylon isolation characteristics, accomplished by changes in main rotor pylon geometry and mast height, resulting in

*U. S. Army Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB).

reduced 2/rev and 4/rev engine excitation amplitudes. The aft engine mount was also to be redesigned (Figure G-5), combined with additional airframe backup structure stiffness increases, to provide the additional dynamic stiffness requirements in both the lateral and vertical directions necessary to raise the first natural frequency of the engine installation significantly above the main rotor 4/rev frequency to preclude excessive induced engine vibration.

The YAH-63 program was subsequently contractually terminated and the anticipated results due to proposed design changes were never confirmed.




Figure G-1. YAH-63 engine installation.

IR suppressor




Figure G-2. NASTRAN model of engine and engine mounting.

TABLE G-1. COMPARISON OF BHT AND GE ANALYTICALLY PREDICTED ENGINE INSTALLATION NATURAL FREQUENCIES

	BHT analysis	GE analysis	GE analysis	BHT analysis
First Engine Installation Mode	Elastic engine on mount springs 19.2 Hz	Elastic engine on mount springs 17.5 Hz	Rigid engine on mount springs 19.1 Hz	Rigid engine on elastic airframe 17.0 Hz
Second Engine Installation Mode	21.5 Hz	19.7 Hz	21.3 Hz	18.6 Hz

TABLE G-2. COMPARISON OF BHT AND GE MEASURED ENGINE INSTALLATION NATURAL FREQUENCIES

	GE	BHT
First Engine Installation Mode	Preliminary shake test 15.9 Hz	Total system vibration survey 17.5 Hz
Second Engine Installation Mode	19.1 Hz	---

TABLE G-3. CURRENT AND PROPOSED ENGINE VIBRATION LIMITS

Measured parameter (direction)	Vibration limits (in./sec) frequency band				Steady state exceedance time limit (sec)		
	(0-50 Hz) Steady state	Tran- sient	(25-50 Hz) Steady state	Tran- sient		(50-800 Hz) Steady state	Tran- sient
Vertical/Lateral Axial	5.0	7.0	N.A.	N.A.	2.5	3.5	5.0
	2.5	5.0	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	5.0
<u>Current vibration limits</u>							
Vertical/Lateral Axial	7.0	14.0	3.5	7.0	2.5	3.5	10.0
	3.5	6.0	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	10.0
<u>Proposed vibration limits</u>							

N.A. - Not Applicable





Figure G-3. Aft engine mount strut brace modification.




Figure G-4. Aft engine mount load-deflection data.




Figure G-5. Proposed design modification of aft engine mount.

APPENDIX H

DESTRUCTIVE SHAFT WHIRL OF 20,000 RPM ENGINE-TO-TRANSMISSION DRIVESHAFT

Advancements in the state of the art of turbine engine technology led to the development of the 1500 shp Advanced Technology Engine (ATE) for helicopters: the General Electric 700-GE-T700 engine. During the preliminary design phase of this program, the competing engine manufacturers obtained inputs from the various AVM's. One question was with regard to the desired output speed. The majority of the requests were for high output speed on the order of 20,000 rpm. One rationale for the choice of a high-speed output was that of delivering power from the engine at high speed and combining all speed reduction into a single gearbox for weight and cost savings. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not fully evaluated in terms of dynamic considerations of vibration and stability.

In early 1973, BHT submitted a proposal to the Army as an entry into the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) competition and was awarded a contract for the development program.

The approach of a high-speed output, coupled with the AAH vibratory limits for crew comfort and component reliability, and the selected vibration isolation system, resulted in a floating shaft employing crown tooth couplings (see Appendix F).

The combination of these requirements compounded some design deficiencies and resulted in destructive shaft whirl. A significant slippage of the development program schedule - and, no doubt, a significant impact on cost - resulted.

Attachment 1 to this appendix traces the shaft development program from initial design, design changes contemplated, design modifications explored by analysis, design, fabrication and testing, and finally to the final configuration. The significant highlights of the program are presented in the following paragraphs.

For the proposal (Reference 8) BHT conducted a NASTRAN analysis to evaluate the coupled interaction between engine mounting frequencies and elastic engine bending modes, combined with both rigid and flexible modes of the engine-to-transmission input driveshaft.

After receipt of the Phase 1 contract, BHT refined the analysis to include detailed design parameters and engine bearing spring rate data provided by GE. Similarly, GE obtained shaft dynamic parameters from BHT and conducted a parallel analysis which was submitted to BHT. Both analyses showed two rigid body drive-shaft modes, one at the engine end in the proximity of 10,000 rpm and one on the transmission end near 15,000 rpm. Both analyses also showed the transmission end mode to have significant deflection occurring on the support bearings and within the input quill shafting.

Shortly after the completion of these analyses the input shaft coupling test was initiated on the 409-140-033 driveshaft design. The first shaft failure occurred at approximately 14,000 rpm during the first run-up. Subsequent development tests resulted in five additional failures of the shaft assembly.

The first failure, wherein the female coupling disintegrated, initiated an intense investigation and development program to develop a satisfactory shaft design.

Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of this development program for BHT was the investigation into the mechanism of nonsynchronous shaft whirl instability. Since the shaft bending modes showed acceptable margins above the shaft operating speed, whirl instabilities of the rigid body shaft modes had not been considered previously in terms of a supercritical installation.

Many references were studied to gain an insight into the nonsynchronous whirl phenomenon. All references concurred that the mechanism of nonsynchronous whirl instability comes about due to the internal friction in a supercritical rotating system. With a floating shaft/spline tooth coupling design, the rigid body shaft modes can produce this internal sliding friction which can become quite high and, in fact, nonlinear with higher friction at higher coupling misalignment angles. Another potential source of internal friction in the shaft design is clamped joints and shrink fits.

With the supercritical shaft instability mechanism thus identified, it was important to achieve a balance in the amount of external damping to control the shaft displacement and transmitted force. A squeeze-film damper was found to be an effective method of supplying significant external damping in the fixed system. It serves both the purposes of reducing one-per-rev response to shaft unbalance when traversing system natural frequencies and damping nonsynchronous whirl for supercritical shaft operation.

BHT engineers developed a prototype squeeze-film damper design which was laboratory tested to evaluate and establish the final design parameters necessary for the particular requirements of the YAH-63 driveshaft installation. The success of these tests led to a squeeze-film damper design which could be integrated directly into the bearing support of the transmission input quills. Only the transmission end was developed since there was already a squeeze-film damper for the engine end power turbine shaft in the nose of the T700 engine. Concurrent with the squeeze-film damper development was a concentrated effort to improve the stability of the driveshaft assembly clamped joints and shrink fits. Significant design considerations are summarized in Table H-1.

The final shaft design, designated the 409-140-025-1, was then submitted to excessive endurance laboratory testing before installation into the air vehicle. After installation, the displacement response of the couplings was monitored in real time during ground runs and flight tests using a real-time spectral analyzer. No indication of shaft nonsynchronous whirl was noted.

In conclusion, the supercritical 20,000 rpm input shaft operating under fairly large coupling misalignment and chucking criteria produced a severe design environment, both from vibration and stability viewpoints. The failures encountered during the shaft development program pointed out the need for very fine balance control in tolerances and assembly procedures, stable clamp-up joints, and sufficient external damping for vibration and stability control. It is questionable from the data whether the damper was needed once the balance control and joint stability features were refined. However, it is unquestionable that the damper helped reduce vibration levels due to transiting rotating system resonances, instilled confidence in the design, and made the supercritical input shaft a viable design option for helicopters. More detailed documentation of the BHT supercritical driveshaft development program can be found in Reference 5.

Experience with the YAH-63 20,000 rpm shaft demonstrated acceptable performance and the system completed all Army tests successfully.

TABLE H-1. SUMMARY OF DESIGN CHANGES CONSIDERED

<u>Item</u>	<u>Design change/rationale</u>	<u>Consideration</u>		<u>Action</u>		
		<u>only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Adopted</u>
1	Change female coupling to more ductile material; may be too brittle		x		x	x
2	Conduct detailed analysis of Hoopes's stresses in female coupling	x				
3	Redesign or eliminate centering spring; may be unstable when compressed under centrifugal force		x		x	x
4	Remove scallops around flange of female coupling; improve balance		x		x	x
5	Stiffen cone adapter and increase cone angle; flexibility is contributing to low shaft critical speed		x	x	x	x
6	Preload duplex bearing supporting transmission input quill		x		x	
7	Change shaft design; invert to put female coupling on floating shaft and male coupling on quill shaft		x	x	x ¹	

TABLE H-1. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Design change/rationale</u>	<u>Action</u>				
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Adopted</u>
8	Change coupling design; eliminate crown tooth coupling		x	x	x ²	
9	Change method of clamping cone adapter to shaft; failure mode indicates flanged nut to be inadequate		x		x	x
10	Place shaft mode above 26,000 rpm by stiffening shafts and bearings; eliminate supercritical operation with low damping			x		
11	Change tooth profile and or tooth design of crown tooth couplings		x	x	x	
12	Add external damper using elastomeric shear pad; added damping would permit transition through critical speed				x ³	

TABLE H-1. - Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Design change/rationale</u>	<u>Action</u>				
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Adopted</u>
13	Add squeeze-film damper (SFD) behind duplex bearing supporting transmission input quill; SFD on engine end does good job of controlling response of first mode		X	X	X	X
14	Change duplex bearing supporting input quill to triplex bearing with light preload; stiffens support and reduces radial run-out		X	X	X	X
15	Lubricate threads of bolt clamping cone adapter to shaft; attempt to get best clamp-up possible				X	X
16	Add double piloted splines at cone adapter/quill shaft interface; provide improved stability, reduce radial run-out		X	X	X	X
17	Beef-up input quill shaft; stiffens adapter support		X	X	X	X

TABLE H-1. - Concluded

<u>Item</u>	<u>Design change/rationale</u>	<u>Action</u>				
		<u>Consideration only</u>	<u>Design</u>	<u>Analysis</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Adopted</u>
18	Add nose reduction gearbox, reduce shaft speed to 8000 to 10,000 rpm; eliminate supercritical operation relative to second mode		x	x		
19	Change guillotine seal to grease dam seal; eliminate possible nonsynchronous whirl of seal		x		x	x
20	Change radial clearance between male and female coupling; reduce radial run-out		x		x	x
21	Index components; reduce radial run-out		x		x	x
22	Tighten manufacturing tolerances; reduce potential unbalance, reduce radial run-out		x		x	x
23	Dynamically balance components; reduce unbalance forces		x		x	x

¹Shake test only

²Nonrotating static test only for evaluation of misalignment/torque capability

³Small-scale lab model only

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX H

HIGH-SPEED SHAFT DEVELOPMENT FOR HELICOPTERS

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Abstract

Advancements in the state of the art of turbine-engine technology led to the development of the 1500 shp Advanced Technology Engine (ATE) for helicopters. One objective, that of delivering power from the engine at high speed and combining all speed reduction into a single gearbox resulted in an output shaft speed of 20,000 rpm. This approach, coupled with the current helicopter specification vibratory limits for crew comfort and component reliability, and the selected vibration isolation system, resulted in a floating shaft employing crown tooth couplings on a recent Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) helicopter design.

This paper describes initial design and testing of the floating shaft, which resulted in coupling failures. Development of the final design configuration included critical speed and nonsynchronous whirl stability analyses, system nonrotating vibration tests, tightening of manufacturing and assembly tolerances, and the development of a squeeze film damper for the transmission input quill. Data from high-speed full-scale bench testing, laboratory testing of squeeze film dampers, NASTRAN frequency analysis, and a discussion of nonsynchronous whirl are presented. Actual operational experience with a developmental design is also described. This development program illustrated the importance of considering the effects of shaft rigid-body critical speeds as well as the classical shaft-bending critical speeds on response to unbalance and nonsynchronous whirl stability.

Introduction

During the preliminary design stages of the 1500 horsepower advanced technology engine, a survey of air vehicle manufacturers reflected a preference for a relatively high-speed power output shaft compared with that of the then existing helicopter engines. One strong rationale for this choice was to combine all or at least the majority of the gear reduction in one gearbox, thus permitting a weight and power

savings in the shafting, gearing, and gearboxes. This development led to the first production ATE: the 700-GE-T700 engine, with an output shaft speed of 20,000 rpm.

The first two helicopter design competitions using this engine, the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS), and the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), reflected a requirement that the dominant harmonic vibrations of crew and equipment areas must be less than $\pm 0.05g$ up to cruise velocity (V_{CR}).

The Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) entry in the AAH competition utilized a two-bladed semi-rigid rotor. To isolate the rotor forces from the fuselage in order to meet the vibration requirements, the BHT-developed NODAMATIC system, Reference 1, which combines a focal pylon for isolation of inplane forces and a nodal beam for isolation of vertical forces, was chosen. The isolation system configuration is shown in Figure 1. The use of an isolation system between the main transmission and the airframe, and the selected location and geometry of the dual engine inputs combined with the prescribed motions of the transmission, dictated a shafting design which could accommodate large steady state misalignments -- up to 4 degrees for the forward coupling, and 2.5 degrees for the aft coupling -- combined with large axial chocking up to ± 1.13 inches.




Figure 1. YAH-63 Installation and Isolation System

Presented at the 33rd Annual National Forum of the American Helicopter Society, Washington, D.C., May 1977.

ATTACHMENT I TO APPENDIX H

Initial Shaft Design

The initial design, Figure 2, features a direct drive from engine to transmission using a 20,000 rpm floating shaft, and crown tooth geared couplings at each end to accommodate the required misalignment.




Figure 2. 20,000 RPM Shaft - Initial Design

The shaft was supported at the forward end by a female coupling supported by a flat-angle coned adaptor mounted to the quill shaft. The quill shaft in turn rotated on a set of duplex ball bearings and a roller bearing. At the aft end, the shaft was supported by the engine output module which incorporated a squeeze film damper.

The coupling and quill shaft details, Figure 3, included a centering spring and a guillotine grease seal. The cone adaptor was attached to the quill shaft through a single-piloted spline and a bolt clamp-up. The female coupling was made of nitrided M50 steel, and approximately .001-inch radial clearance was provided between the male and female couplings in order to permit the desired misalignment. Lubrication of the duplex ball bearings in the transmission was provided by centrifuging oil from inside the quill shaft, through a passage to the bearings. Static balance of the shaft was permitted.




Figure 3. Quill and Coupling Detail - Initial Design

Although most of these design features are used for 6000 rpm shafts, when operating at the same horsepower at 20,000 rpm, the centrifugal force (CF) is increased by a factor of 11.1 and the torque is decreased by 0.3 resulting in an increase in the CF/torque ratio by a factor of 37. This increases the possibility that the male coupling may not rotate concentrically within the female coupling.

Initial critical speed analyses by BHT and GE were in good agreement. The BHT analysis showed the first mode at 169 Hz to be a rigid body shaft mode with deflections at the engine support shaft and bearings.

The second mode, at 263 Hz, consisted of rigid body shaft motion and bending in the transmission quill shaft with deflections in the quill support bearings. The third mode, at 724 Hz, involved classical shaft bending but placement was such as to provide satisfactory margins above the overspeed limits. These mode shapes are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Natural Frequencies, Mode Shapes - Initial Design

Drive System Test Rigs

To develop the drive system, BHT built two regenerative rigs. The first, a coupling test rig, was designed to develop the input shaft male and female couplings. It had the capability to provide steady shaft misalignment, and oscillatory shaft misalignment and chucking at approximately 5 Hz, while applying up to full torque and operating up to 26,000 rpm.

The second, a bench test rig, included two power input shafts driven through individual gear speedup boxes into the main transmission, a main rotor shaft loaded through the regenerative loop, and accessory and tail rotor drive shafting loaded by a dynamometer.

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Shaft Failures Encountered

During the initial run-up to the coupling test rig, while increasing the shaft speed to approximately 14,000 rpm, the first shaft failure was encountered. Subsequent development tests resulted in five additional failures of the shaft assembly, four on the coupling development rig and one on the bench test rig.

The first failure, wherein the female coupling disintegrated, initiated an intense investigation and development program to develop a satisfactory shaft design.

Investigative Actions

Early attempts to determine the cause of failure, including monitoring of subsequent tests, were thwarted due to insufficient instrumentation to measure shaft motions and gearbox accelerations. Also, initial static shake tests failed to confirm the analyses.

Therefore, the investigations following the first two failures centered primarily on coupling material defects, improper material application, column buckling of the centering spring, and load distribution of the female coupling. Additionally, the critical frequency calculations were refined to include the engine and engine support structure and to better represent the cone adaptors.

Parametric studies were made to determine the controlling parameters and the design changes required to place the first mode above 26,000 rpm. Typical results, shown in Figure 5, indicate the bearing spring rates and the cone adaptor stiffness required. However, because of the military requirement for both long component life and for 30-minute run-dry capability, the preload necessary to obtain the desired bearing stiffness could not be obtained.

Alternate design approaches were developed and some were fabricated and tested. An inverted coupling design, Figure 6, was fabricated and subjected to shake tests. The first mode frequency was significantly increased but did not place it above operating speed.

A nose reduction gearbox, Figure 7, was designed to provide a 10,000 rpm shaft. However, the reduction in shaft length resulted in unacceptable coupling misalignments while difficulty was encountered in getting the first mode involving the reduction gearbox above operating speed.




Figure 5. Component Stiffness Requirements for a Subcritical Shaft Design




Figure 6. Inverted Coupling Design Driveshaft Installation






Figure 7. Nose Reduction Gear Box Driveshaft Installation

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A number of coupling designs involving leaf springs or multiple plates in a cruciform arrangement as shown in Figure 8 were studied. These required a centering device which could also react the chucking forces which were to be taken on a sliding ball spline. Tests were conducted which demonstrated that the leaves could withstand the steady and oscillatory misalignment and withstand the static torque without excessive stresses. However, no acceptable centering was found, and the ball spline failed to perform as required.



DETAIL A

Figure 8. Thomas Type Single and Multiple Leaf Coupling

The forces due to permissible unbalance were determined which led to dynamic balancing of all components or subassemblies.

Shake tests were repeated with torque applied and correlation with analyses were significantly improved. Apparently, the clearance in the coupling and bearings resulted in impact damping until light torque was applied. As torque was increased to higher values, a corresponding increase in natural frequency was obtained. Thus, the effect of bearing loading on bearing spring rates was carefully evaluated and discussed with bearing experts.

One failure apparently occurred due to the failure of the bolt head which provides clamp-up of the cone adaptor to the supporting shaft.

Finally, one failure was recorded using accelerometers on the bearing supports and proximity probes on the shaft. These data, Figure 9, clearly showed the occurrence of a subharmonic whirl. With these new results, studies were now directed to the mechanism of nonsynchronous whirl instability. Since the shaft bending mode showed an acceptable margin, whirl instabilities of the rigid body shaft modes had not been considered previously.




Figure 9. Traces of Bench Test Shaft Failure

Whirl Instability Investigations

Many references, such as 2, 3 and 4, on the phenomenon of nonsynchronous whirl were studied to gain an insight into this problem. These references all conclude that the mechanism of nonsynchronous whirl instability comes about due to the internal friction in a rotating system. The rigid body shaft modes of this development design can produce the "hysteretic" type of internal friction, described in Reference 5, at the crown tooth couplings. The mode shapes presented in Figure 4 show the relative angular misalignment of the shaft and input quill portions of the coupling. This relative motion is what produces the internal friction. Another potential source of internal friction in the design is clamped joints and shrink fits.

Shaft Dynamics

The dynamics of a shaft spinning on an axis has been treated extensively in many texts and papers, but shaft vibrations due to unbalance and the mechanism of shaft whirl instability are repeated briefly here to clarify the particular problems encountered during this development program. Unbalance in a shaft causes the shaft to respond at the rotational frequency and introduces a one-per-rev vibration into the fixed system and a steady load in the rotating system. The control of the amount

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of unbalance, the external damping in the fixed system, and the location of the natural frequency with respect to the rotational frequency determine the level of this response. For a single-degree-of-freedom system, the response is shown in Figure 10. The important aspects are to keep the shaft response within geometrical and stress limits and minimize the force transmitted to the structure.




Figure 10. Amplitude Ratio Versus Speed Ratio for Various Amounts of Viscous Damping for an Inertial Driving Force

The vibratory forces transmitted to the support structure are the sum of the spring forces due to shaft displacement and damper forces due to shaft velocity. This force transmissibility is shown in Figure 11, which shows the transmitted force to increase with damping in the supercritical region. For supercritical operation, it is therefore important to achieve a balance in the amount of external damping to control the shaft displacement and transmitted force.




Figure 11. Transmissibility Ratio Versus Speed Ratio for Various Amounts of Viscous Damping for an Inertial Driving Force

Internal damping is the cause of potential shaft whirl instabilities. The direction of the internal friction force, whether it is a driving or damping force, is dependent on the magnitude and direction of the whirl or precession frequency relative to the shaft rotational frequency. Four cases can be considered: (1) forward precession and supercritical, (2) forward precession and subcritical, (3) backward precession and supercritical, and (4) backward precession and subcritical. Considering a shaft with splined crown tooth couplings, the relative frequency in the rotating system is that at which the shaft appears to wobble in the coupling. This is expressed as:

$$f_w = \omega - \Omega \quad (1)$$

where:

f_w is wobble frequency, positive in direction of Ω

ω is whirl frequency, positive in direction of Ω

Ω is shaft rotational frequency

Figure 12 shows how this relative wobbling frequency produces relative velocity between the shaft coupling and support quill spline teeth resulting in a friction force couple about an axis in the plane of the rotating mode shape. For the condition of forward precession and supercritical operation, the relative wobble frequency, according to equation 1, is opposite the shaft rotational frequency. Therefore, with forward whirl the splines on the leading side of the coupling, referenced to the whirl direction, are sliding together while those on the trailing side are sliding apart. This then produces a moment which is in the direction to increase the tangential whirl velocity of the shaft, thus providing the mechanism for whirl instability.




Figure 12. Mechanism of Instability

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The other three combinations of precession direction and subcritical or supercritical operation produce relative wobble frequencies which result in the spline teeth sliding together on the trailing side of the coupling referenced to whirl direction. This results in a damping or stabilizing force. References 2 and 4 give good treatments of this whirl phenomenon.

With a floating shaft/spline tooth coupling design to allow for shaft misalignment and chucking, this internal sliding friction due to modal displacements can become quite high and in fact nonlinear with higher friction at higher coupling angles.

Supercritical (Squeeze Film Damper) Design

A squeeze film damper (SFD) is an effective method of supplying significant external damping in the fixed system. It serves both the purposes of reducing one-per-rev response to unbalance when traversing system natural frequencies and damping nonsynchronous forward precession whirl for supercritical operation. References such as 6 through 8 give detailed information on SFD theory. Basically, when a portion of a thin film of oil between two cylinders, one attached to the fixed system and one to the rotating system, is displaced, the hydrodynamic pressure is increased to move the oil to the portion of the journal now having more volume. As shown in Figure 13, this is very similar to an orifice-type damper as oil is forced through the portion of the journal having minimum radial clearance. This 'orifice' moves around the circumference as the rotating system whirls. This increase in pressure exerts a force back on the inner cylinder out of phase with the radial velocity thus becoming a damping force.




Figure 13. Principle of Squeeze Film Damper

This thin journal of oil can be under pressure to increase its effectivity and can be used in conjunction with retainer (cage) springs between the cylinders. One of the cylinders can be rotating (squirrel-cage type) or both fixed with a set of bearings isolating the rotating and nonrotating parts.

Due to the chucking forces associated with frictional forces within the coupling and pylon motion, squirrel-cage or finger-type damper cages could not be used. Therefore, Bell engineers developed a design using a flanged cylinder concept, as shown in Figure 14, which provided adequate column strength and a section of reduced thickness adjacent to the flange to provide the necessary flexibility.




Figure 14. SFD Research Test Rig

Laboratory tests of the SFD were conducted in the rig, shown in Figure 14, which was designed to simulate the shaft and coupling stiffness and mass characteristics. Tests of this prototype damper, although conducted with minimal instrumentation, were successful, showing a high degree of damping when oil was introduced. Additionally, tests with coupling mass unbalance simulated did not significantly increase the whirl motion. The results of these tests are shown in Figures 15, 16 and 17 for various oil film thicknesses.

The success of these tests led to a design which could be integrated directly into the bearing support of the transmission input quills as shown in Figure 18. A spin test rig was developed as shown in Figure 19 to evaluate and establish final design parameters in terms of damper cage spring rate, diametral clearance, and oil pressure, and to compare the effects of duplex and triplex bearings. Only the transmission end was developed since there was already a squeeze film damper for the engine power turbine shaft in the nose of the T700 engine. Figure 20 shows the deflection of the damper cage due to applied load. These data are beneficial in establishing movement of the input quill shaft due to gear contact loads.

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


Figure 15. SFD Test Data, Film Thickness 0.004 Inch, 4 GM-Inch Unbalance




Figure 16. SFD Test Data, Film Thickness 0.006 Inch, 6 GM-Inch Unbalance, Bearing Preload: 300 Lb




Figure 17. SFD Test Data, Film Thickness 0.008 Inch, No Unbalance




Figure 18. Squeeze Film Damper Design




Figure 19. Spin Test Rig




Figure 20. Damper Static Deflection Test

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There was some concern about gear contact wear patterns due to this floating input shaft, but no problems were encountered. The results of the spin test rig for various oil film thicknesses are shown in Figure 21, 22 and 23. The procedure was to install significant unbalance, more than expected in service, on the couplings and sweep shaft speed up to 20,000 rpm and back to zero with the oil pressure set at zero. The oil pressure was then applied and the rpm sweep repeated. The displacement response of the coupling was recorded and compared with and without oil pressure. The film thickness of .010 inch showed to be better than .006 inch or .012 and was therefore chosen as the design value. Oil pressures above approximately 30 psig showed no significant improvement in damping.




Figure 21. Spin Test Rig Results, Film Thickness .006 Inch




Figure 22. Spin Test Rig Results, Film Thickness .010 Inch




Figure 23. Spin Test Rig Results, Film Thickness .012 Inch

Final Design

To diminish face and radial run-outs and joint instabilities, double piloted splines, a stiffened cone adaptor, jam grease seals, improved clamp-up, indexed parts, and tightened manufacturing tolerances were incorporated into the final design as shown in Figures 24 and 25. Also each component was dynamically balanced.




Figure 24. 20,000 RPM Shaft Design




Figure 25. Coupling Detail - Final Design

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Additionally, static tests on the adaptor clamp-up method, with and without lubricated threads were conducted. A typical plot of the deflection of the adaptor under radial shear load is presented in Figure 26 showing the joint instability of the early design. To check joint stability of the final design, a test was conducted at GE wherein the engine end adapter and output quill assembly were spun up to operating speed several times with unbalance added. Each time the assembly was disassembled and reassembled with the face and radial runout at each joint checked with no significant changes noted between runs. The natural frequencies for this final design are shown in Figure 27.




Figure 26. Load Deflection Curve Showing Joint Instability Under Simulated C.F. Loading




Figure 27. Natural Frequencies, Mode Shapes - Final Design

Flight Tests

To continue transmission and bench test development, and ultimately flight tests with minimal schedule slippage, a back-up shaft design was provided. This shaft system used 3.1-inch pitch diameter couplings of the Model 206A/B helicopter which limited tests with this shaft to 1000 hp per shaft with 2.5 degrees of misalignment (steady state), and a maximum of ± 0.26 inches chucking. The use of this shaft was substantiated by extensive endurance testing in the coupling and bench test rigs.

To permit ground run and flight tests of the air vehicle to proceed, the nodal beam was clamped down, thus eliminating vertical isolation and oscillatory misalignment. It did successfully permit continued testing until the full-capability shaft was available. Although this shaft had supercritical rigid body modes also, no problems were encountered. This shaft did, however, have smaller diameter couplings and no joint instabilities, both of which reduced unbalance loads. Also, the lower horsepower and oscillatory misalignment reduced the internal friction which was the cause of nonsynchronous whirl instabilities.

The final design shafts were then installed and the nodal beam was unlocked for final flight testing. The production balance procedure and tolerance controls of the final shaft design, along with the SFD operation on the resonances, allowed engines and/or shafts to be changed with low vibration levels obtainable. Typical response plots for a full rpm sweep are shown in Figure 28. The amount of external damping added by the SFD did not create high vibration levels for supercritical operations.




Figure 28. Air Vehicle Installed Vibration Levels

The displacement response of the couplings was monitored in real time during ground runs and flight tests using a real time spectral analyzer. The nodal beam

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stops were gradually opened to their operational limits and no indication of the nonsynchronous whirl was noted.

Conclusions

The supercritical 20,000 rpm engine output shaft coupled with the NODAMATIC pylcn isolation system produced a severe design environment both from a vibration and stability viewpoint. The illustrated test point failures obtained showed the need for very fine balance control in tolerances and assembly procedures, stable clamp-up joints, and sufficient external damping for vibration and stability control. It is questionable from the data whether the damper was needed once the balance control and joint stability features were refined. However, it is unquestionable that the damper helped reduce vibration levels due to transiting rotating system resonances, instilled confidence in the design, and made the supercritical input shaft a viable design option for helicopters. Experience with the YAH-63 20,000 rpm shaft demonstrated acceptable performance and the system completed all Army tests successfully.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the many designers, analysts, and technicians at BHT who have contributed to this paper through their work on this high-speed shaft development program. This paper is a summary of all their efforts.

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APPENDIX I

IR BLOWER DRIVESHAFT FAILURE

BHT, under Contract DAAJ01-73-C-0741(P40), developed a prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter, the YAH-63. The RFP required an Air Management System (AMS) to provide an air supply for an infrared radiation suppression system. The AMS consisted of a ducting assembly charged by a high volume axial flow blower (the IR blower). The power for the IR blower was provided at a takeoff pad on the accessory drive gearbox and transmitted to the blower by a driveshaft assembly. A view of the installation is shown in Figure I-1.

The IR blower driveshaft assembly was designed so that a torsional overload condition would fail the shaft in a manner that was both predictable and controlled. The purpose of this designed-in failure mode was to protect the remainder of the accessory gearbox drive train from torsional overload in the event of blower damage.

Tie-down testing of the prototype aircraft included evaluations of various starting and stopping procedures. It was discovered that a starting procedure involving a quick release of the rotor brake could impose a transient torsional load into the IR blower drive train that exceeds the driveshaft shear section capacity. The shear section would fail due to simple shear overload without the driveshaft inflicting additional damage on the drive train or surrounding structure.

An investigation was conducted to define the dynamic properties of the system.

The mass moment of inertia of the IR blower/driveshaft assembly was determined. It was found that an acceleration from zero to 100% speed in something less than 2 seconds would be required, in addition to normal blower loads, to fail the shear section. It was clear that simple drive train acceleration could not have caused the failure.

The IR blower/driveshaft assembly torsional natural frequency was determined to be approximately 30 Hz. No coincidences were found to exist between the torsional natural frequency and any normal operational frequencies. It was concluded that torsional resonance, by itself, could not cause the failure.

The driveshaft was instrumented to measure torque and the actual torque values were measured under various operating conditions. Figures I-2, I-3, and I-4 are representative

IR blower torque versus time plots for three operating conditions: normal operation, rotor brake release, and rotor brake application.

In Figure I-2 (normal operation), it can be seen that the torque varies at the system torsional natural frequency, resulting in a low-amplitude beating resonance. Since no fatigue evidence or failures were observed, the conclusion was verified that simple torsional resonance did not cause the driveshaft failures.

Study of Figures I-3 and I-4 revealed the transient torsional loads resulting from rotor brake operation. Note that in both figures, a large amplitude torsional oscillation occurs at the system torsional natural frequency which lasts for several cycles when no failure occurs. Note also that the transient load oscillation due to rotor brake release at zero rpm (Figure I-3) lasts longer and exhibits larger amplitude excursions than the transient oscillation resulting from brake application at 30% speed (Figure I-4). The reduced response of the system to brake application at 30% speed was believed to be due to the inherent aerodynamic damping provided by the blower during operation.

It was concluded that the driveshaft shear section failures were due to a combination of events and conditions peculiar to the YAH-63 engines and drive train. The 700-GE-T700 engines, GFE supplied, could be started with the drive train locked using the rotor brake. The engines also utilize a torsionally soft power turbine shaft for torque measurement purposes. The combination of significant starting torque, mechanical windup through the drive train, and gear backlash resulted in a torsional impact type load being applied to the IR blower/driveshaft assembly. In the absence of aerodynamic damping, the torsional natural frequency of the IR blower/driveshaft assembly was impact excited every time the system bounced across the backlash while the drive train was accelerating. It was concluded that the shear section would fail when an additive combination of resonant and impact torques occurred. The resulting high instantaneous net torque would then fail the shear section.

Several methods were available to prevent this type of failure. The rate at which the pilot released the rotor brake was found to be significant. The chatter of the IR blower/driveshaft assembly could be reduced significantly by slowly releasing the brake pressure, as opposed to "dumping" the brake pressure. In order to reduce dependency on proper pilot technique, a modification to the brake hydraulic system was proposed that would provide a controlled release of the braking pressure.

The program subsequently was contractually terminated and the proposed modifications were never implemented.

View looking right




Figure I-1. IR blower driveshaft installation.




Figure I-2. Time-history of IR driveshaft torsional loading during normal operation.




Figure I-3. Time-history of IR driveshaft torsional loading for a locked drive system rotor brake release with engines operational.




Figure I-4. Time-history of IR driveshaft torsional loading for a rotor brake application at 30% rpm.

APPENDIX J

FAILURE OF TAIL ROTOR AND ACCESSORY DRIVE GEARBOX MOUNTS

BHT, under Contract DAAJ01-73-C-0741(P40), developed a prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter, the YAH-63. A tail rotor gearbox was created to turn the drive train 90 degrees and transmit the tail rotor loads to the airframe. An accessory drive gearbox was created as a mounting pad for the APU and to provide power takeoff pads for the aircraft accessory and auxiliary systems. Front and side views of the tail rotor gearbox installation are shown in Figure J-1. Front and side views of the accessory drive gearbox installation are shown in Figure J-2.

Both gearboxes were designed to be mounted on the airframe utilizing four attachment points (each) as shown in Figures J-1 and J-2. Four attachment points were used on the tail rotor gearbox to provide structural redundancy in the event of ordnance damage in compliance with RFP survivability requirements. The four attachment points used on the accessory drive gearbox were the minimum required to provide proper support.

For both gearboxes, the mounting schemes were analyzed under flight and crash loads to determine the load sharing distributions. Also, the tail rotor gearbox load sharing distribution was determined for the condition of one mount point missing and limit flight loads. All margins of safety were determined to be positive and acceptable.

Early in the YAH-63 Ground Test Program, both the tail rotor gearbox and the accessory drive gearbox suffered fatigue failures at mount points.

The tail rotor gearbox experienced failure of leg "A" (Figure J-1) due to bending fatigue. The failure consisted of a fatigue crack which started in the area of point "B" (Figure J-1) and propagated across the leg until visually detected by routine inspection. The crack origin was found to be in an area of transition from machined to as-cast surfaces. Strain gage instrumentation was installed and the actual dynamic load sharing distribution was determined. It was found that the actual load sharing distribution did not agree with the predicted distribution. The variance between the actual and the calculated distributions was believed to be a result of an unequal local stiffness distribution in the airframe and, to some extent, the flexibility

characteristics of the tailboom. This conclusion was supported by the fact that the actual load distribution was improved by the use of a soft mount (elastomer) assembly installed between the subject leg and the airframe. Due to installation envelope limitations, the soft mount stiffness could not be adjusted sufficiently to provide an optimum load distribution. It was decided that the best solution for the prototype aircraft would be to provide an additional load path in the form of a strut assembly (Figure J-1). The strut assembly served to share the loads imposed on leg "A," and acceptable stress levels were experienced for the duration of the prototype development program. Design changes for both the tail rotor gearbox and the tailboom structure were proposed for the pre-production phase of the aircraft development program. The design changes included relocation of machined surfaces, shortening and thickening of the gearbox legs, and redesign of the airframe structure to provide a more uniform stiffness distribution at the mount points. The program subsequently was contractually terminated and the anticipated results due to design changes were never confirmed.

The accessory drive gearbox experienced a fatigue crack type failure of the case wall immediately adjacent to boss "A" (Figure J-2). Only one such failure was experienced, during ground tie-down testing. It was determined that the stiffness characteristics of the airframe mounting hard points were not as anticipated. The firewall structure did not provide sufficient moment resistance and the elastomer bushings were too soft in the axial direction. Subsequent distortion of the load-sharing distribution resulted in excessive structural loads at the area of failure. A redesign effort, focused on the mounting scheme, resulted in the selection of a satisfactory hard point location on the airframe which could be tied by a strut to boss "A". Additionally, the elastomer bushings were replaced with much stiffer bushings. Upon reconfiguring the prototype aircraft, no additional failures or distress were observed. No further design changes were proposed for the pre-production development phase of the program.

It was apparent that the design analysis performed was in error. Factors contributing to the analysis inaccuracies included assumptions concerning actual airframe stiffness characteristics, and inaccurate prediction of both the tail rotor loads and the forces due to main rotor pylon motions as transmitted by the tail rotor driveshaft gear couplings (see Appendix F of this report for discussion of gear coupling chocking and misalignment loads). Additionally, the requirement for a redundant mounting system to reduce ballistic vulnerability conflicts with that of a design configuration for low mount attachment loads.




Figure J-1. Tail rotor gearbox installation.




Figure J-2. Accessory drive gearbox installation.

APPENDIX K

POOR GOVERNING AND EXCESSIVE TRANSIENT ROTOR DROOP

From the installation of the first turbine engine at BHT in the mid-1950's to about 1969, torsional stability analyses conducted at BHT were linear perturbation analyses about a few selected power conditions. Although these analyses could be used with reasonable accuracy to achieve stability, no means other than actual helicopter ground and flight tests were available to evaluate the effects of control parameter changes upon governing accuracy and/or transient response.

It has been the procedure at BHT since about 1969 to conduct transient nonlinear analyses on each new helicopter developed. This type of analysis permits not only a check of torsional stability, but also permits (with certain limitations) an evaluation of governing accuracy and transient response. Thus, a degree of optimization is achieved.

In early 1973, BHT entered a proposal into the Advanced Attack Helicopter competition. During the proposal effort BHT conducted a nonlinear transient analysis of its entry, the YAH-63 helicopter with the GE T700 engine installed, as documented in Reference 8. This analysis was similar to one conducted for the UTTAS proposal (Reference 13). It was conducted on the Group 04 engine control configuration.

BHT was awarded a Phase 1 development contract and subsequently requested that GE update the control configuration data. This data was provided to BHT in November 1973, and another update was received in February 1974. BHT then updated its nonlinear analysis.

As required by contract, BHT submitted linear stability analysis and concurrently conducted transient nonlinear analysis. Additionally, both BHT and AEFA testing was conducted. Further amplification of the most significant details follow.

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13. Shipman, D. P., PRELIMINARY TRANSIENT RESPONSE AND TORSIONAL COMPATIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 240/220 ENGINE, GOVERNOR, ROTORS, AND DRIVE SYSTEM, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 240-909-001, Fort Worth, Texas, April 1972.

To meet the contractual requirements, which were to provide a linear analytical model of the drive train, engine, and control in accordance with ADS-9, BHT requested linear data from GE. This data was received and a report (Reference 14) was then submitted by BHT to the Army in July 1974.

In January 1975 GE submitted data to BHT for control system transient performance. On June 10, 1975, GE submitted to BHT further slight changes in the then-current G07 electronic control unit (ECU) and P07 hydro mechanical unit (HMU) configuration released for production. These changes were made based on:

1. Initial field testing of current configuration ECU's and HMU's which revealed excessive transient power turbine speed changes during flight maneuvers involving load changes.
2. UTTAS test results wherein a small (less than 1% N_p), low-frequency (0.3 cps) oscillation during operation at low power was noted. This low frequency oscillation was traced to a slight opening/closing of the starting bleed valve which was corrected by a change to the valve.

To improve rotor "droop" out of autorotation, N_p overshoot, and slow N_p recovery, the ECU and HMU were thus modified. GE requested of BHT at this time that:

1. Additional ground test vehicle (GTV) running, with the prototype ECU's, be accomplished to further confirm system stability.
2. The BHT computer simulation be re-run, based on these latest modifications, to determine that the resulting changes appear satisfactory.
3. A meeting be established to review the results of the BHT and forthcoming GE stability and transient analyses to confirm that, "To the best of our abilities, no potential problems exist."

In July 1975 GE submitted an update of the control and rotor system transient and stability analysis based upon the then-current G07 and P07 control changes as transmitted in

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14. Killion, S. W., MODEL 409 ENGINE/ROTOR TORSIONAL COMPATIBILITY, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-909-007, Fort Worth, Texas, 30 July 1974.

June 1975. Excerpts of this data are provided as Attachment 1 to this Appendix.

In September 1975 the configuration of the HMU increasing the acceleration fuel flow was re-identified as P08 HMU.

In December 1975 BHT submitted to the Army a test plan (Reference 15) for an engine/airframe compatibility survey and demonstration. This plan was subsequently revised at the request of the Army. The survey and demonstration were conducted and the results are presented in Part II of Reference 15.

The report concludes, in part: "The torsional stability characteristics demonstrated acceptable damping under all conditions tested. Significant N2 droop occurred during rapid jump takeoffs and during recoveries from autorotation to power. This may be reduced somewhat by pilot control technique."

During this development stage GE was investigating a further modification to the control system allowing for a nonlinear control gain to improve the transient droop condition, later to be identified as the G09 control. However, this latest modification could not be fully qualified before the scheduled AVM fly-off competition. Both AVM's used the same T700 G07 controls during the AEFA evaluation.

At the completion of the AEFA testing, the Army forwarded to BHT test data regarding transient response characteristics for information and evaluation. Additionally, the SSEB required additional clarification/rationale relating to the AEFA testing pertaining to "poor rotor speed control during maneuvering flight" and "excessive transient rotor speed droop when rapid power application from minimum power conditions were conducted (i.e., quick stops)." Further, the SSEB requested a "torsional stability analysis per ADS-9A with T700 G09 ECU necessary for evaluation."

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15. Giesen, G. L., ENGINE/AIRFRAME COMPATIBILITY SURVEY AND DEMONSTRATION FOR THE YAH-63 ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER, Bell Helicopter Textron Report 409-993-008B, Fort Worth, Texas, 28 June 1976.

BHT responded with Reference 16, excerpts of which are found in Attachment 2 to this Appendix. The analysis evaluates stability with the G09 controls, shows correlation with AEFA test data, and evaluates the effects of hysteresis. One deficiency was identified, that of excessive hysteresis in the rotor control system. This was more pronounced on one particular ship and led to a correlation error between measured and analytical data. The analysis further demonstrated that the G09 control would substantially reduce the rotor speed droop to values well within the design objective limits for the YAH-63.

The YAH-63 program was subsequently contractually terminated before sufficient measured data could be evaluated to fully confirm the analytical predictions for the T700 G09 control performance.

In conclusion, both BHT and GE conducted transient nonlinear analyses and were in good agreement with each other. Each analysis gave slightly conservative results - as desired - with regard to measured stability data. However, there were shortcomings in the analyses in their ability to accurately predict transient response characteristics for some types of maneuvers. Those conditions include:

1. Transitions from autorotation to power
2. Transitions from power to autorotation
3. Stabilized autorotation
4. Jump takeoffs
5. Quick stops
6. S-turns

One problem in predicting transient maneuvers is that a wide variety of pilot techniques are used and the same pilot may execute the same maneuver twice in such a manner as to obtain significantly different results. This suggests that information is needed on the control inputs (displacements and rates) and the combination or sequence thereof which bound the probable limits so that the analyst has some tractable numbers of conditions which can be used to evaluate both the norm and the extremes.

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16. Kamat, H. V., YAH-63/T700/G09 ECU TORSIONAL STABILITY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS, Bell Helicopter Textron Report presented to U. S. Army Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), Fort Worth, Texas, 4 November 1976.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX K

On July 28, 1975, GE transmitted to BHT an updated T700 transient analysis. This update was based on UTTAS flight testing and computer simulation which identified some areas where improvements could be made. The transients were run using then-current T700 engine and control simulation - the (G07) ECU and the (P07) HMU LDS schedule changes, Figures 1 and 2, respectively - plus the latest aircraft simulation available at GE.

A list of the thirteen transients evaluated are shown in Table I. The simulation data for these transients are included herein, Figures 3 through 15 of this attachment. Scaling on these figures has been intentionally removed as information is proprietary to the engine manufacturer.

The figures occur in pairs where "A" is engine one in a twin-engine helicopter, and "B" is engine two. Generally, engine one is a nominal engine, while engine two is purposely made not nominal. This gives two unequal engines as would be expected for a twin-engine installation. The N_p reference for engine No. 2 is not set at 100% as part of the engine inequality. This is the reason that many of these transients seem to want to run at 100.5% N_p . The figures titled "UEQ ENG" were run with unequal engines.

Table II shows the key to the scales on the figures. The timing of the load changes can be determined from the BETA curve which appears on all of the figure "B"s.

Note: Figures 1 and 2 intentionally omitted. Information proprietary to engine manufacturer.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX K

TABLE I. LIST OF TRANSIENTS

1. 2-second load burst and chop, 380 hp to 3072 hp to 380 hp
2. Twin-engine throttle burst - GI to fly at flat pitch
3. Single engine failure from 1500 hp
4. ECU failure at 1000 hp
5. ECU failure at flat pitch
6. 1-second load chop - 2500 hp to 1500 hp - without moving LDS and collective
7. 1-second load chop - 1000 hp to autorotation - without moving LDS and collective
8. 2-second load burst autorotation to 830 hp
9. 2-second load burst autorotation to 1500 hp
10. 2-second load chop, 1500 hp to autorotation
11. 1-second load chop and burst, 2000 hp to 1500 hp to 2000 hp
12. N_p reference change:
 - 100% to 95% in 2 seconds
 - 95% to 100% in 1 second
13. Cyclic excitation at rotor resonance

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX K

TABLE II. ABBREVIATIONS

PCNT	% rotor speed as measured at the gearbox
PCNMR	% rotor speed as measured at the main rotor
PCNTR	% rotor speed as measured at the tail rotor
WFM	Fuel flow - pph
TRQP	Power turbine torque - ft-lb
T4.5 EL	Cockpit indication of T4.5 - °R
PCNP	% N_P
PCNG	% N_G
PASA	Power available spindle angle - deg
BETA	Load demand spindle angle and collective

NOTE:

PCNP1 % N_P engine #1 and

PCNP2 % N_P Engine #2, etc.

PCNT (or PNCMR) and PCNP1 will run superimposed until the needle splits in autorotation. The needle split is noted by a difference between PCNT (or PCNMR) and PCNP.

ATTACHMENT 1 TO APPENDIX K




Figure 3A.

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


Figure 3B.

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


Figure 4A.

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


Figure 4B.

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


Figure 5A.

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


Figure 5B.

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


Figure 6A.

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


Figure 6B.

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


Figure 7A.

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


Figure 7B.

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


Figure 8A.

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


Figure 8B.

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


Figure 9A.

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


Figure 9B.

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


Figure 10A.

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


Figure 10B.

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


Figure 11A.

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


Figure 113.

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


Figure 12A.

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


Figure 12B.

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


Figure 13A.

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


Figure 13B.

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


Figure 14A.

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


Figure 14B.

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


Figure 15A.

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


Figure 15B.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

1

YAH-63/T700/G09 ECU TORSIONAL STABILITY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

This report is prepared in response to the SSEB request for additional clarification in the YAH-63 Propulsion Factor Technical Negotiations with regard to the following:

Areas of Clarification

4. AAEFA test experienced:
 - a. poor rotor speed control during maneuvering flight, and
 - b. excessive transient rotor speed droop when rapid power application from minimum power conditions were conducted (i.e., quick stops). Should relate to T700 engine control improvements.
8. Torsional stability analysis per ADS-9A with T700 G09 ECU necessary for evaluation. GE indicates previous design characteristics furnished Bell were to investigate transient droop, and not suitable for torsional stability analysis.

The analysis described herein was conducted by the BHT Structural Dynamics Group and the Scientific and Technical Computing Group. The discussions regarding design changes were coordinated with the Power Plant Group.

Note: Figures 12 through 16 intentionally omitted. Information proprietary to engine manufacturer.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

2

CONTROL HYSTERESIS AND 'STICTION'

The engine/airframe compatibility report, Reference 1, covering the tests conducted at BHT, concludes that:

Significant N_2 droop occurred during rapid jump take-offs and during recoveries from autorotation to power...

which substantially agrees with the AAEFA test results, and recommended that:

The fuel control/governor be evaluated in order to improve the droop characteristics.

It is BHT's understanding that the YAH-63 rotor speed droop is somewhat greater than other AVM's. Two areas which may affect this characteristic are:

1. the fuel control response characteristics, and
2. hysteresis or lost motion in the control linkage to the engine load demand spindle (LDS).

Since Item 1 is common to all AVM's, i.e., all are using the G07 controls during Phase 1 GCT, the control hysteresis was considered suspect and was, therefore, evaluated in detail. It was determined by measurement of LDS angle versus collective pitch that an amount of hysteresis, although small, did exist on Ship 22002 while that on Ship 22003A was significantly greater.

BHT has also reviewed the information supplied by Reference 2, included herein in Addendum I, which shows evidence of apparent 'stiction' in the LDS control system.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

3

ANALYSIS

BHT conducted a nonlinear analysis of the YAH-63 helicopter with the preliminary T700 G09 ECU parameters provided by GE, Figure 1 and Table I.

The analysis evaluated the following:

1. The rotor speed transient droop characteristics for rapid power applications from minimum power conditions, such as might occur in quick stop maneuvers and evaluated the effect of hysteresis in the LDS versus collective pitch schedule. The droop of the G09 ECU was compared with the G07 ECU, Reference 3.
2. The torsional stability of the combined engine, rotor, drive system, and fuel control system.

The analysis was based on:

1. preliminary T700 G09 ECU parameters provided by GE,
2. YAH-63 drive system and rotor inertia parameters defined by the Phase 2 proposal and modified by all applicable EOC's and PDV's, and
3. LDS angle versus collective pitch angle hysteresis measured on Ships 22002 and 22003A.

The method of representing the LDS angle hysteresis is shown in Figure 2.

Note: Figures 1 and 2 and Table I intentionally omitted.
Information proprietary to engine manufacturer.

RESULTSComparison of G07 and G09 Control Transient Droop Characteristics

For idealized control linkage (no hysteresis), the transient rotor speed droop of the preliminary G09 control was compared with that determined for the G07 control in Reference 3.

For these cases, the helicopter was trimmed and the rotor speed set at 100 percent rpm. Ramp inputs of duration from 1 to 5 seconds were applied originating at a collective setting for minimum power and leveling off at 50, 70, and 90 percent of the transmission limit power of 2791 horsepower.

For this baseline case, the schedule of LDS versus collective angle are as shown in Figure 3.

The results are shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, significant reductions in rotor speed droop, on the order of 2 percent for a 2 second ramp, are obtained.


Effect of Hysteresis


The hysteresis of the main rotor blade root collective angle versus LDS angle was measured on each the left and right engines on Ships S/N 22002 and S/N 22003A on 13 September 1976 at Edwards Air Force Base. These data are shown in Figure 5 for Ship 22002 and in Figure 6 for Ship 22003A. Note that for Ship 22003A, the hysteresis for both engines is on the order of 10 degrees LDS while Ship 22002 hysteresis for both engines is on the order of 3.5 degrees LDS angle.

The simulated hysteresis for Ship 22002 is shown in Figure 5 which, except for the extreme collective values, gives reasonable approximation. The simulated hysteresis for Ship 22003A is shown in Figure 6, which again gives a reasonable approximation.

For Ship 22002, the results of the hysteresis evaluation are shown in Figure 7 which compares the G09 ECU with idealized control linkage to that obtained with the simulated hysteresis.


The effect of this hysteresis loop moderately increases the droop by as much as 1.0 percent for a 2 second ramp time. For ramp times of 1 second or more, the trend was toward increased droop.







ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

Figure 5. Ship #22002 Control Hysteresis.







ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

13

For Ship 22003A, the results of a similar evaluation are shown in Figure 8. The effect of this hysteresis loop significantly increases the droop values and these values are higher than those for Ship 22002. For example, in this case, the increase in droop due to hysteresis was on the order of 3.5 percent for a 2 second ramp time.

Experience has indicated that in addition to the droop magnitude, the duration of the droop beyond the normal rotor limits can affect the opinion of the pilots. Therefore, the duration of the droop below -5% was computed for various power recovery conditions considering the no-hysteresis, Ship 22002 hysteresis, and Ship 22003A hysteresis configurations. These results are tabulated in Table II. Generally, the duration of the droop below -5% is directly proportional to the power recovery and inversely proportional to the collective input ramp time.


The poor rotor speed control during maneuvering flight was observed to occur in the computer simulation, as shown in Figure 9. The steady state rotor speed set error for a specific collective setting increased with increasing LDS angle hysteresis. When collective maneuvers were executed, the speed set error from initiation to completion of the maneuver increased with increasing hysteresis.

A summary of the calculated rotor speed droop of Phase 1 aircraft with the G07 controls with that of the Phase 2 aircraft with the G09 controls and the engine control production design variance are compared in Figure 10. Data pertaining to the droop values for G07 ECU combined with the simulated Ship 22002 hysteresis and Ship 22003A hysteresis is discussed in a later section.

Torsional Stability of G09 ECU

The torsional stability of the preliminary G09 ECU control parameters were evaluated for a power sweep from 40 to 100 percent of transmission limit power. The results are shown in Table III and compared with the values obtained for the G07 controls, Reference 3.

The effect of the LDS angle hysteresis on stability was checked and found to be zero, as would be expected. However, it was noted that the magnitude of collective stick motion had to be increased to obtain the same magnitude of response.



ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF DURATION OF ROTOR DROOP BELOW 95% N_R

RAMP TIME (SEC)	DURATION OF ROTOR SPEED BELOW 95% - SECONDS								
	50% Power Recovery Hysteresis			70% Power Recovery Hysteresis			90% Power Recovery Hysteresis		
	None	#3	#2	None	#3	#2	None	#3	#2
1	0	1.00	0	0.73	1.50	0.9	1.5	1.90	1.60
2	0	0.50	0	0	1.30	0	0	1.70	0.50
3	0	0	0	0	0.75	0	0	1.30	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.70	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0




Figure 9. Collective Acceleration Traces Showing Rotor Speed Error as a Fraction of Hysteresis.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

17





Figure 9. (continued)

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

Figure 10. Comparison of Rotor Droop for Phase 1 and Phase 2 Airvehicles
(2 Sec Ramp, Minimum to 90% Power)



ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

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TABLE III. TORSIONAL STABILITY OF
GROUP G09 ECU CONTROLS

Power Level %	Damping at the first torsional mode		
	No Hysteresis	Ship #22002 Hysteresis	Ship #22003A Hysteresis
20	2.303	2.158	1.982
40	2.032	2.058	1.954
60	2.002	1.967	1.918
80	1.985	1.973	1.905
100	1.952	1.995	1.823

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

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CORRELATION WITH GE ANALYSIS

A study was made of the rotor speed droop versus the LDS angle hysteresis for a 2-second ramp from minimum to 2000 SHP.

These data are in good agreement in both magnitude and trend with the results of a similar analysis conducted by GE using the G07 controls, also shown in Figure 11. This figure shows that for a reduction of hysteresis to 50% of that measured on Ship 22002 a reduction in droop of 0.7% can be achieved for this maneuver.

The traces supplied by GE are shown in Figures 12 through 16.




Figure 11. Comparison of BHT/G09 ECU with GE/G07 ECU Analyses

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CORRELATION WITH AAEFA TEST RESULTS

To establish the effect of LDS angle hysteresis for Group 07 controls used on Ship 22002 and 22003 flown at AAEFA, a linear extrapolation analysis was conducted using incremental droop values for G09 ECU controls and LDS angle hysteresis. The analysis included the following:

1. Establish incremental droop due to hysteresis based on Figures 7 and 8 for Ships 22002 and 22003A.
2. Add this incremental droop to the droop values obtained from Reference 3 and establish droop values including hysteresis for G07 controls for Ships 22002 and 22003A.

These results are shown in Figure 17 and were used for constructing Phase 1 and Phase 2 droop estimates shown in Figure 10.

A study of the traces from Reference 2, found in Addendum I, show the collective motions to roughly approximate a ramp of from 1.5 to 2.0 seconds.

From Figure 17 (see shaded area), it is found that for collective ramps to 50 and 70 percent power in one-half second, the droop below 100 percent N_R varies from 8.0 to 10.0 percent, respectively, while for a two second ramp, the droop varies from 6.8 to 8.8 percent, respectively. The two traces obtained on Ship 22003A, from Reference 2, show a droop below 100 percent N_R of 8.2 and 8.8 percent for a recovery to approximately 55 percent of transmission power limit. (Note data points plotted on Figure 17.)




Figure 17. Correlation of Droop Data of Extrapolated Group 07 Including Hysteresis with AAEFA Test Data

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

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DESIGN OBJECTIVES

To clearly establish a design objective, previous experience on a number of BHT helicopters was reviewed and in particular, transient rotor speed droop conditions which were considered unacceptable. Emphasis was placed on AH-1 experience.

Additionally, the BHT YAH-63 project pilot was questioned as to what transient droop would be considered acceptable.

As a result of these actions, a design objective was established. This design objective included a maximum of 5 percent rotor speed droop (as shown in Figure 7) for

1. 2 second collective ramp from minimum to 2000 shp, and
2. 3 second collective ramp from minimum to 2500 shp.

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PLAN OF ACTION

BHT Engineering has defined a number of alternate methods by which the control hysteresis and 'stiction' can be eliminated. After careful review of these, and an evaluation in terms of cost, complexity, and reliability, a plan of action was developed.

This action is

1. to execute the design changes shown on the applicable PDV, Addendum II, and
2. in the event that tests conducted in Phase 2 to critically evaluate these characteristics, with these PDV changes incorporated, do not result in a satisfactory solution, an alternate mechanical design will be made.

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CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The G09 ECU will substantially reduce the rotor speed droop from that obtained with the G07 controls.
2. The G09 ECU demonstrates torsional stability margins essentially the same as those obtained with the G07 controls.
3. For the G09 ECU, the hysteresis in LDS angle of the magnitude (19 degrees) measured on Ship 22003A substantially increases the rotor speed droop over the no-hysteresis case for ramp times of 2 seconds or more, while magnitudes on the order of 3.5 degrees as measured on Ship 22002 resulted in much less droop.
4. The analysis demonstrates that significant LDS angle hysteresis can account for the poor rotor speed control experienced during maneuvering flight.
5. The results of this analysis on the G09 ECU show similar results to those of similar and independent GE analysis on the G07 controls.
6. The results of this analysis are in substantial agreement with the AAEFA test data and demonstrate that the pilot comments relating to stability and controllability characteristics evaluated on Ship 22003A are probably not directly applicable to Ship 22002.
7. Potential solutions to the LDS angle hysteresis problem involving other than mechanical means result in increasing complexity and concern regarding reliability, while acceptable droop characteristics can be shown with small improvements in hysteresis which are achievable with mechanical systems.
8. The Phase 2 YAH-63 helicopter equipped with the T700/G09 ECU and with the LDS angle hysteresis from Ship 22002 is shown by analysis to give a 3.6 percent droop for a 2 second ramp from minimum to 70 percent power and 3.5 percent droop for a 3 second ramp from minimum to 90 percent power (as shown in Figure 7). These values are well within the design objective limits. These droop values will be further reduced with improvements in LDS hysteresis in Phase 2.

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

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REFERENCES

1. BHT Report 409-993-008B, "Engine/Airframe Compatibility Survey and Demonstration for the YAH-63 Advanced Attack Helicopter"
2. Letter from U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command, St. Louis, Mo., DRSAB-PDAO, 0374-RF-0241, to Mr. Glenn Corliss, Bell Helicopter Textron, dated 28 October 1976.
3. BHT Report 409-909-031, "Torsional Compatibility Analysis of the YAH-63 Helicopter and GE-700 Engine with Group 07 Controls"

ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

ADDENDUM I

EXCERPTS FROM ARMY LETTER DRSAV-PDAO, 0374-RF-0241



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY AVIATION SYSTEMS COMMAND
PO BOX 209, ST. LOUIS, MO 63166

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DRSAV-PDAO

0374-RF-0241

28 OCT 1976

Mr. Glenn Cordts
Bell Helicopter Textron
PO Box 482
Fort Worth, TX 76109

Dear Mr. Cordts:

The following DTI test data, provided by AEFA, is forwarded herewith for your information and evaluation.

- a. Figure B-117 - Limits of Cyclic Control Travel
- b. SCAS Authority
- c. Figures B-118 thru B-124 - Control System Characteristics
- d. Figures B-15 thru B-19, B-54 & B-55 - Control Positions in Trimmed Forward Flight
- e. Figures B-21 thru B-25 - Collective Fixed Static Longitudinal Stability
- f. Figures B-26 thru B-30 - Static Lateral-Directional Stability
- g. Figures B-38 thru B-41 - Low-Speed Forward & Rearward Flight
- h. Figure B-126 - Lateral Acceleration
- i. Figures B-59, B-79 thru B-84 - Maneuvering Stability
- j. Figures B-125 - Vertical Displacement
- k. Figures B-137 & B-138 - Vertical Displacement Time Histories
- l. Figures B-130 thru B-132 - Summary of Controllability



ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

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
DREAV-PDAO
Mr. Glenn Cordts

0374-RF-0241
28 OCT 1976


- m. Figures B-85 thru B-88 - Longitudinal Control Response and Sensitivity
- n. Figures B-89 thru B-92 - Lateral Control Response and Sensitivity
- o. Figures B-93 thru B-96, B-129 & B-136 - Directional Control Response & Sensitivity
- p. Figures B-139 & B-140 - Longitudinal Short Period Response
- q. Figure B-141 - Longitudinal Long Period Response
- r. Figures B-133 thru B-135 - Engine Failure
- s. Figure B-143 - Quick Stop

The attached data will be used by the AAH SSEB as an aid in evaluating the capabilities of your Phase 2 proposal, and will be adjusted as appropriate to reflect proposed changes between your Phase 1 prototype and Phase 2 design.


Sincerely,


HAROLD L. MABREY
Contracting Officer


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As stated




ENGINE RESPONSE
QUICK STOP MANEUVER



ENGINE RESPONSE




ENGINE RESPONSE
ECU LOCKOUT TEST



ATTACHMENT 2 TO APPENDIX K

ADDENDUM II
PRODUCTION DESIGN VARIANCE

46

		<h2>PRODUCTION DESIGN VARIANCE</h2>	
Code Ident. No. 97499			
DRAWING NUMBER		WBSE	P O
409-060-700		24AMACO	A213
			SERIAL NO
			24AMACO-
DRAWING TITLE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTALLATION-POWER PLANT			
REASON FOR VARIANCE			
TO REDUCE HYSTERESIS			
VARIANCE DESCRIPTION			
REVISE JACKSHAFT, BULKHEAD AND CLAMPING			
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION			
<p>(1) INCREASE STIFFNESS OF 409-060-702-1 JACKSHAFT ASSEMBLY.</p> <p>(2) INCREASE STIFFNESS OF 409-030-510 BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY IN THE AREA OF SUPPORT FOR THE JACKSHAFT ASSEMBLY.</p> <p>(3) REVISE CLAMPING SCHEME FOR CABLES.</p> <p>(4) INVESTIGATE ALL BULKHEAD ATTACH POINTS FOR FRICTION, BINDING, ETC.</p> <p>(5) INVESTIGATE FORCES REQ'D TO ACTUATE ENGINE MOUNTED FUEL CONTROLS.</p> <p>(6) UPDATE INSTALLATION DRAWING TO AGREE WITH ABOVE CHANGES.</p>			
ESTIMATED ENGINEERING BUDGET		PRODUCTION WEIGHT VARIANCE	
DESIGN GROUP 200 Hrs		DEVELOPMENT _____	
STRESS _____ CHECK _____		PRODUCTION _____	
WEIGHTS _____ OTHER _____		VARIANCE _____	
TOTAL MANHOURS _____			
ORIGINATING GROUP	GROUP ENGR	PROJ. ENGR	
POWER PLANT			
PREPARED BY	WEIGHTS		
A. BADGETT 2 Nov 76			

APPENDIX L

EXCESSIVE TORSIONAL LOADING OF THE DRIVE SYSTEM DURING ENGINE OVERSPEED TRIPS

BHT, under Contract DAAJ01-73-C-0741(P40), developed a prototype Advanced Attack Helicopter, the YAH-63, powered by two T700-GE-700 engines.

One feature of these engines is an electronic-mechanical overspeed trip mechanism integral to each engine which prevents excessive power turbine overspeeds in the event of an electronic control unit (ECU), fuel control, or shafting failure. When an overspeed trip occurs (at 111 percent N_p per engine specification), the fuel flow is cut back until power turbine speed reduces (to approximately 110 percent N_p), at which time the overspeed trip resets and power turbine speed can increase again as demanded.

To ensure that the overspeed trip device was functioning properly, a check feature was provided. This feature as incorporated in the helicopter consisted of two overspeed trip test circuits (one for each engine) which were used during the normal cockpit check procedure during ground run-up and prior to flight. The initial BHT procedure for this check was described as follows:

1. Test to be performed on single engine. If both engines are operating, only engine being tested to be providing power, other engine will have speed reduced to ground idle.
2. Operate Engine No. 1 at flat pitch rotor speed of 102 percent. Then manually initiate the engine overspeed trip. Observe for several cycles of gas generator speed oscillation before releasing overspeed trip test circuit.
3. Repeat test with Engine No. 2.

Table L-1 lists seven instances of engine overspeed trips encountered during BHT development of the YAH-63 where sufficient data exists for documentation. Five of these overspeed trips were intentional test conditions. The other two overspeed trips occurred inadvertently, one during flight and one during ground run. In all cases the engine overspeed trip system functioned exactly as the engine manufacturer intended. The most significant of these overspeed trip instances have been summarized in the following figures.

Figure L-1 shows a single-engine overspeed trip sequence which occurred after a power recovery from autorotation. The ship was being flown from the gunner's station and a misrigging of the throttle linkage inadvertently caused the No. 2 engine ECU governor to go into the "lock-out" mode when the pilot engaged the engine throttles for the power recovery. This condition ultimately led to an Engine No. 2 overspeed trip. The pilot sensed the abnormal condition and took appropriate corrective action without endangering the flight.

Figure L-2 gives the sequence of a single-engine overspeed trip test showing how a multiple overspeed trip can cause amplification of drive system loads.

Figure L-3 shows amplification of drive system loads when both engines have multiple overspeed trips simultaneously.

Figure L-4 shows a single-engine overspeed trip sequence encountered during a twin-engine ground run at 110 percent N_p design test speed.

Figure L-5 shows the unstable characteristics of the drive system loads if an engine overspeed trip is allowed several cycles. Damaging loads were not attained in this test because of the initially low power setting of the engine. Note how each successive overspeed trip cycle amplifies the drive system load.

The single-cycle overspeed trip data show how the first two drive system torsional natural frequencies, 3.2 Hz and 6.2 Hz, are transiently excited as a result of the sudden power demand change. Each of these torsional natural frequencies exhibits desirable damping characteristics such that a single transient excitation response is normally short-lived. However, the frequency of switching of the overspeed trip system (on at 111 percent N_p , off at 110 percent N_p) for multiple overspeed trip cycles is such that the initial transient load does not have sufficient time to decay before the next transient excitation is encountered, thus resulting in more amplification for each successive overspeed trip cycle producing an unstable divergent condition.

Additionally, a GE analysis of an ECU failure is presented in Appendix K, Attachment 1, of this report. This analysis clearly shows the high transient torques which may be encountered during such an engine overspeed condition.

Based on the unstable characteristics of the drive system response as encountered during the multiple overspeed trip tests, and because of the high drive system transient loads

developed due to the sudden power demand changes, the overspeed trip system checkout procedure should not require multiple overspeed trip cycles. In order to keep the magnitudes of the torsional oscillations to a minimum during checkout of the overspeed trip system, in concurrence with recommended procedures by GE, the BHT operational check procedures were modified to be:

1. To keep engine power at a minimum, test to be performed with both engines operating, equally sharing torque, driving the rotor at 102 percent flat pitch.
2. Engine No. 1 overspeed test circuit should be energized and then broken as soon as a decrease is observed in N_G .
3. Ascertain that both engines have returned to equally sharing torque.
4. Repeat test with Engine No. 2.

This revised overspeed trip system checkout procedure proved satisfactory in preventing excessive drive system loads during the test and was used for the remainder of the YAH-63 development program.

So long as the ECU governor is in normal operation, the only condition which might realistically cause an engine overspeed trip to occur at 111 percent N_p would be a sudden and drastic loss of power required, such as an input driveshaft failure. For this situation the overspeed trip will activate once to cut back fuel flow, giving the ECU governor the extra response time necessary to have fuel flow limited down by the time the overspeed trip resets at 110 percent N_p , thus allowing the engine to coast down to flight idle speed through normal ECU governing for a zero power required condition.

In the event of an overpower condition resulting from an ECU governor failure, or during ECU governor lock-out, the possibility still exists for multiple overspeed trip cycles, possibly resulting in damaging drive system torsional load oscillations. However, in this case the pilot should observe the high rotor rpm warning light on the console and be able to take corrective action by backing off on the engine throttle, thus alleviating the multiple overspeed trip cycling condition.


Although the overspeed trip system was acceptable for the prototype testing of this aircraft, a production type installation should require more compatibility between the engine

overspeed trip system and the aircraft drive system to prevent the possibility of multiple overspeed trip cycles causing damaging drive system oscillatory torsional loading. This condition might be made more stable by simply decreasing the switching frequency (upper N_p to lower N_p limits) of the overspeed trip system to allow additional time for each transient condition to decay.

The YAH-63 program subsequently was contractually terminated such that further investigations of the overspeed trip system were never accomplished.


TABLE L-1. CHRONOLOGY OF DOCUMENTED ENGINE OVERSPEED TRIPS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Fig. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>N_P at O/S Trip #1</u>	<u>O/S Trip #2</u>	<u>O/S Trip Cycles</u>	<u>Test Cond.</u>
10-9-75	L-1	Engine #2 overspeed trip after power recovery from autorotation, had ECU in lock-out mode.	Flt. Idle	111%	1	No
10-28-75	L-2	Engine #2 overspeed trip test.	92%	102%	2	Yes
1-5-76	L-3	Twin-engine simultaneous overspeed trip test.	102%	102%	2	Yes
1-6-76	L-4	Engine #1 overspeed trip during twin-engine ground run at 110% N _P design test speed.	111%	110%	1	No
4-6-76		Engine #1 overspeed trip test.	102%	Off	1	Yes
4-6-76	L-5	Engine #1 overspeed trip test, at low power.	102%	Off	4	Yes
4-6-76		Engine #2 overspeed trip test.	102%	102%	1	Yes



- ① Engine No.1 ECU governor senses that Engine No.2 is supplying all power requirements; therefore Engine No.1 N_p has been governed down to flight idle.
- ② Pilot is unaware that misrigging of throttle linkage has inadvertently put Engine No.2 in ECU lockout; that engine, now operating at full power, is providing sufficient power during autorotation power recovery.
- ③ After autorotation power recovery, power required is reduced, engine still operating at full power overspeeds, O/S trip activates at 111% N_p .
- ④ O/S trip resets at 110% N_p .
- ⑤ Pilot senses abnormal condition and is able to throttle back to maintain a stable flight condition before taking the appropriate corrective action which is to place Engine No.2 back into ECU governing.

Figure L-1. Single-engine overspeed trip after power recovery from autorotation.



- ① Engine operating at 102% N_p when O/S trip test circuit is engaged by pilot which causes O/S trip activation. (With test circuit engaged, O/S trip activates above 100% N_p and resets at 99% N_p .)
- ② O/S trip resets at 99% N_p , ECU governor schedules more power to maintain the original 102% speed setting.
- ③ O/S trip activates again at 100% N_p .
- ④ O/S trip resets again at 99% N_p , ECU governor schedules more power to maintain the original 102% speed setting.
- ⑤ O/S trip test circuit released by pilot due to increasing tail rotor drive system loads resulting from second O/S trip cycle.

Figure L-2. Single-engine overspeed trip test, two trip cycles.





Figure L-3. Twin-engine simultaneous overspeed trip test, two trip cycles.



- ① Both engines, operating at 110% N_p design requirement, equally sharing power required.
- ② Engine No.1 O/S trip activates due to wind gust (wind gust provides additional lift-less power required, ECU governor response time from 110% N_p not fast enough to prevent the 111% O/S condition).
- ③ Engine No.2 ECU governor begins scheduling more power attempting to meet sudden additional torque requirement.
- ④ Pilot senses abnormal condition, begins throttling back both engines.
- ⑤ Engine No.1 O/S trip resets at 110% N_p .
- ⑥ Engine No.1 ECU governor senses that Engine No.2 is now supplying all power requirements; therefore Engine No.1 N_p continues to coast down, supplying no torque.

Figure L-4. Single-engine overspeed trip encountered during twin-engine ground run.




Figure L-5. Single-engine overspeed trip test, low power, four trip cycles.

APPENDIX M

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM NOISE

Description of Problem

In early production 214Bs, cabin noise was judged to be excessive. Noise data was taken in the cabin and the sources were identified with their characteristic frequencies. The measured spectrum shape is shown in Figure M-1. These data showed that both hydraulic systems were causing excessive noise, the upper pump generating noise at 832 Hz and the lower pump generating noise at 787 Hz. Discrete frequency tones at these frequencies and their harmonics caused a highly annoying cabin noise signature.

The hydraulic system noise was being transmitted to the cabin by the pressure oscillations (ripple) in the hydraulic lines. These oscillations were set up as each piston in the hydraulic pump passed the pressure port. Since the lines were clamped to the airframe structure, a sounding-board effect was set up, forming an efficient radiator for the hydraulic system noise.

Solutions Considered/Action Taken

To reduce the hydraulic system noise in the 214B cabin, several potential solutions were considered including standard soundproofing techniques, vibration isolation of the hydraulic lines, and modification of the hydraulic system to reduce the pressure oscillations.

Soundproofing

Extra soundproofing was added where possible, especially in the area of the cabin bulkheads near the clamping points of the hydraulic lines. However, this addition of soundproofing soon became prohibitive from a weight standpoint; also as soundproofing blankets became heavier and more bulky, the attachment, sealing, and handling problems became excessive. Figure M-2 shows 214B cabin noise level reduction as soundproofing was added. The point of diminishing returns was soon reached where the addition of substantial soundproofing weight produced little noise reduction. The noise levels of the other noise sources decreased with the extra soundproofing, but hydraulic system noise remained relatively unchanged, making it even more of a noticeable source.

Vibration Isolation

Isolation of the hydraulic lines from the cabin structure was considered but never implemented. It was judged that a new clamping arrangement at every line attachment point would be an excessive design effort. Limited action was taken in that the hydraulic reservoir was isolated from structure during tie-down testing of a Model 214 helicopter. No improvement in hydraulic system noise was noted.

Replace Hydraulic Pump

Consideration was given to installing a new hydraulic pump with random-spaced cylinders as a means of distributing the sound energy over a broad frequency range, rather than having a discrete tone. No off-the-shelf pump was found with this random spacing, although two pump manufacturers (Vickers and Abex) expressed opinions that such a pump could be built on a prototype basis. No action was taken.

Reduce Pressure Oscillations

A fourth, more successful approach to reducing the hydraulic system noise was to reduce the pressure pulsation in the hydraulic lines. BHT had recently completed a program to evaluate several devices designed to smooth hydraulic flow. One of these devices, the pulsation damper shown in Figure M-3, was installed in each of the hydraulic systems of the 214B, reducing the pressure ripple by a factor of 5. One pulsation damper was installed in the pressure line of each hydraulic system, upstream of any clamping points. The installation is shown in the sketch of Figure M-4 along with a trace of the pressure oscillation before and after installation. Hydraulic system noise was reduced because the pressure ripple had been reduced. Figure M-5 shows the noise data taken before and after the pulsation dampers were installed. A noise reduction of as much as 12 decibels was achieved in the hydraulic pump frequencies and their harmonics.

Adequacy of Solution

The solution was considered adequate, and the pulsation damper units are now being installed on production 214B and 212 helicopters to reduce cabin noise. Figure M-6 shows a prototype pulsation damper installed in a 212. The units weigh only about 2 pounds each, are relatively inexpensive, and require no maintenance. The reduction in cabin noise levels is deemed to be worth their installation.




Figure M-1. Cabin noise - standard hydraulic system before installation of pulsation damper.

Relative noise level, db




Figure M-2. Effect of soundproofing weight upon cabin noise level.

QUIET HYDRAULIC SYSTEM




Figure M-4. Installation of pulsation dampers with insert showing pressure ripple reduction.




Figure M-5. Internal noise - quiet hydraulic system with pulsation damper installed.




Figure M-6. Prototype installation of pulsation damper on Model 212 helicopter.