
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UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered) READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM CONT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG 1. REPORT NUMBER Dec. 18. 1 9 -0 7 PE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED TITLE (and Subulte) THE NATURE AND MISSION RELATEDNESS Final (Aug., 1977 -OF BACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN Dec. 1978) 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER THE NAVY . 10 9 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(.) 7. AUTHOR( .) Robert D./O'Connor, Ph.D. ONR # N00014-77-C-0613 154 PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Behavior Design, Inc. NR 170-860 P.O. Box 20329 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73156 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE December, 1978 Organized Effective Research Programs 13. NUMBER OF PAGES Office of Naval Research (code 452), 55 Arlington VA MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. Tol this report 154. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abetract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Race discrimination Morale Sex discrimination Loyalty Behavior patterns Productivity Combat readiness Sabotage ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse elde if necessary and identify by block number) Intensive interviews and observations were conducted by experienced, high level psychologists, to assess the nature and mission-impact of race and sex discrimination in the Navy. Sampling contexts were determined by concensus of active naval commanders' definitions of factors crucial to combat readiness. Pervasive discrimination was found, seriously threatening mission capabilities. DD 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED S/N 0102-014-6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered) 510

THE NATURE AND MISSION RELATEDNESS OF RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAVY

prepared by

R. D. O'Connor, Ph.D. December, 1978

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (abstract)

After convening a select group of Navy commanders to determine the situations and behaviors most essential to combat readiness, an intensive study of <u>race and sex discriminatory practices</u> impacting on readiness was undertaken.

Interviews and observations tapped the experiences of military and civilian personnel at all levels and in all branches of the Navy, nation-wide. Only "critical" people in "critical" situations were studied. Respondents were selected at random within each of those contexts navy commanders had deemed most crucial to readiness. Findings described the nature and scope of missionrelated discrimination in considerable detail.

Contrary to the comfortably complaisant beliefs of many Naval executives, race and sex discrimination were deemed rampant throughout the ranks. Disillusion, apathy, hatred, violence, sabotage and a complete lack of respect for the "chain of command" were common in many of the experiences reported. Many nonwhites and women and some whites appear to be totally disillusioned and prepared to react in the face of (as they see it) a grossly bigoted Navy.

Among other conclusions, the clearest predicts a greatly reduced ability to function under wartime conditions, due primarily to the inequities, perceived and real, imposed upon nonwhite and female sailors.

Suggestions and recommendations urge immediate interventions, studies and training programs which might interrupt the race/sexrelated decay of naval capabilities.

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#### INTRODUCTION

## Background

Early in 1977 the Navy's Human Resource Management (HRM) people faced a series of problems regarding the future of race relations training and related program development. An apparent lull had followed the stormy years of riots, demonstrations and assorted racial "outbursts" of prior years. Navy commanders were tired of add-on "social philosophy" programs, and many informal discussions with training and EO personnel suggested that much of the Navy's upper echelon was convinced that racism had been cleansed from the service. Program evaluators, including this writer (O'Connor, 1977a), had argued that the Navy's race relations "training" wasn't training at all and had little if any measurable benefit.

The most basic criticism leveled at past and ongoing race relations efforts also explained command level indifference toward the program. No one had taken (or had) the time to identify and legitimize the targets of race relations training in the Navy. If asked "Specifically, what do you want me to do or not do, and why?" instructors were hard put to answer in any sort of practical or military fashion. In the absence of clear, observable and meaningful objectives, hazy and hypothetical constructs, "cultural awareness" and sensitivity became the basic objectives of the program. For the most part, this resulted in mildly annoyed patronization on the part of whites, increased frustration and bitterness on the part of nonwhites<sup>1</sup>, a window-dressing level of command support, and no substantive change.

This "Ho-Hum" attitude was neither the fault of an unconcerned admiralty nor an incompetent Human Resource Management team, but more directly the result of grasping for antiquated and esoteric social science straws in the face of pressures and time constraints generated under sensational and politically volatile conditions. In predictable fashion, the day-to-day realities of race discrimination were denied, overlooked, rationalized and, by default, fostered in the wake of a "training program" which was never intended to address the issues head-on and in a militarily relevant manner.

### Purposes of the Study

In the simplest terms, this study was designed to answer the question "Do we have a problem?" Such a basic and (in view of prior studies) apparently redundant question might raise a few eyebrows, especially given the standard response ... "We must have a problem, because we've got a program to fix it!" More specifically, the study addressed the question of race, and to some degree sex discrimination as follows "If race/sex discrimination exists, what does it look like, how pervasive is it, how important is it to the Navy's mission, and how might it be altered?" This is a very elaborate question, which cannot be fully answered in a single study. The research approach therefore was exclusionary (conservative). Avoiding the esoteric and the conceptual, this approach sought only to identify the universe of observable, overt race/sex discriminatory behaviors with sufficiently high frequency, impact (felt), and job relevance to seriously threaten the Navy's mission. Assessment contexts were restricted such that almost any finding would be worthy of systematic attention, and virtually all findings might be included in the development of a more pragmatic intervention program. Use of the term "critical instance" was intended in this utilitarian sense. The data collected here may be generally interesting from the standpoints of social reform and social science, but more cogently comprise a minimal description of the race/sex discriminatory events that are clearly the Navy's business.

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#### METHOD

### Determination of Readiness Factors

Combat readiness, the Navy's top priority, can be measured in a variety of ways. Since the present study sought to focus exclusively on that "narrow band" of race/sex discrimination phenomena which directly impede combat readiness, the first step was to define such a context. Instead of the more common "broad brush" identification of any and all forms of discrimination followed by speculation as to the relevance of each form, this design approached the question in reverse.

Ten of the Navy's top commanders recently (one year or less) returned from command of fleet or squadron units within the air, surface and subsurface forces, were convened in a "brainstorming" session held in Washington (August, 1977). With the aid of professional facilitators, and based upon their considerable experience, these commanders discussed and categorized the "people-related" factors determining combat readiness.

By consensus, a set of behaviors (classes of behavior) and behaviorally referenced characteristics was established as most essential to readiness:

Peer rapport and cohesiveness Respect for command Competence (in critical job skills) Morale (motivation to do a good job) Cleanliness Ability to work under minimal supervision Discipline Attendance Obedience Communication

Key environments in which these essential behaviors should be displayed were defined in terms of day-to-day on-board

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situations, training situations, and ship yards (repair and supply situations). Especially critical roles were then identified and organized into four clusters corresponding to upper, middle and line management, and non-managerial positions with responsibilities central to readiness.

By consentual validation, the Naval "command view" of behaviors within roles and contexts most critical to combat readiness had been established, or at least closely approximated. Sampling and instrumentation proceeded such that only those race and sex discriminatory experiences which impacted upon these behaviors and contexts were tapped. The findings generated may, therefore, be considered relevant to combat readiness <u>by definition</u>, and certainly valid, pragmatic change targets by exclusion. Sampling

A stratified random sampling system (N=240) was designed such that proportional numbers of respondents would be observed and interviewed within the role and situational contexts discussed above, with representative numbers of air, surface, subsurface and shore personnel included. The stratification system also allowed for geographic variation and equal representation by race (white <u>vs</u> nonwhite) in the military subset and by both race and sex in the civilian subset.

Procedural, administrative and budgetary developments occurred during the course of the study necessitating minor alterations in the sampling system such that the final number of respondents in the formal interview procedures detailed below was 203. Due to the consistency of the data itself, successful adherence to random selection criteria, and the availability of corroborative data regarding sex discrimintion, the final sample size was considered sufficient from the standpoint of the study's purposes.

It might be noted here that the study's purposes were such that a relatively small, stratified and randomized sample coupled

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with an intensive, structured assessment procedure were seen as the most efficient and legitimate approach to the questions of nature, scope and impact at hand. While future studies (see recommendations) may be herein enabled to identify the Navy-wide incidence of race and sex discrimination, the present methodology allowed for strong statements regarding the universe and relevance of measurable race/sex events in the Navy.

#### Instrumentation

Based on a series of structured, behavior-specific, interview formats developed and validated in prior race/sex studies and training programs within federal agencies (O'Connor 1976, 1977b; O'Connor and Hall, 1976; O'Connor, Tucker and Uhes, 1974), and drawing on some closely related but less specific Navy studies (eg. Bayton, 1974) the Discrimination Incidence and Relevance Test (appendix 1) was developed. This format was designed to meet the purposes of the present study through open and closedended discussions conducted by trained, experienced, senior clinical psychologists. Under appropriate conditions of rapport and confidentiality, the format or interview guide facilitates identification of observable, behavior-specific race-sex discriminatory experiences within work contexts relevant to the Navy's prime mission, combat readiness.

#### Interviewers, Validity and Reliability

A total of 9 highly qualified professional (Ph.D.) psychologists, experienced in race/sex research and programs, were trained to administer the interviews. The five white, four nonwhite, six male, three female interviewers were matched (by race and sex) with respondents wherever possible for the purpose of increasing candidness of responses. The intended race/sex match (interviewer x respondent) was actually accomplished in about 80% of the

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interviews. No significant reporting differences accrued in the non-matched cases, due (probably) to the extensive cross-racial experience of interviewers assigned to cases wherein exact matching was administratively impossible.

While agreement across interviewers was virtually perfect on closed-ended items during training, variations in reporting were anticipated on open-ended items. For this reason, interviewers recorded responses <u>verbatim</u> on these items. Experienced, graduate level psychologists were trained and tested on interpretations (for categorization and magnitude scaling purposes) of open-ended items, with resulting inter-rater reliabilities ranging from 92%-100% in various paired scoring configurations (# of actual agreements ÷ # of possible agreements).

More sophisticated measures and questions regarding validity were not deemed appropriate since the stated experiences of respondents, held within contexts with predetermined relevance are face-valid insofar as the scope of the present study intended, the standard qualifications regarding self-reported data not withstanding. Whenever feasible, interviewers attempted to observe and record the actual occurance of reported discriminatory events. This was accomplished through reviews of recorded information and unobstrusive observation of mealtime, on-deck and recreational situations. Obviously this could not be done on a completely systematic basis due to the sensitive nature of many reports. Those reported events which did lend themselves to observation were validated in nearly every instance, however, suggesting a high level of credibility in the overall data pool. Consistent with earlier investigations employing the present format (O'Connor 1974), observed discrimination tends to match and often exceed the levels reported. Differences in reported vs observed discrimination are consistently in the conservative direction, that is, people tend to under-report rather than over-report. A detailed explanation of this effect would be

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speculative and out of context here. Suffice it to say that skepticism framed around suspicions of exaggerated reporting are generally refuted in these and prior findings.

#### Interview/Observation Settings

In the military sample (N = 147), interviews and observations were conducted on-board a variety of surface and subsurface vessels, in private offices, training rooms, research trailers, etc., wherever the selected respondents happened to be working. This procedure provided a broad range of situations in which to observe ongoing discrimination, and also served to minimize disruption and obtrusiveness. As with the civilian interviews (N = 56), which were all conducted in a small shipyard conference room, all interviews took place under strictly private conditions. In each case the interviewer and respondent sat facing each other across a small table in a locked room with no sound systems or telephones present.

#### RESULTS

The findings presented here are divided into two basic sets, the first set drawn from the military sample and the second set drawn from the civilian sample, since the latter set more directly addresses the issues of sexism as well as racism. Rather than an item to item report which strictly follows the flow of the interview format, the findings are also clustered in terms of the types of conclusions suggested, with redundant information either combined or deleted.

The <u>military sample</u><sup>2</sup> provided a view of race/sex discrimination most directly related to combat readiness on a day-to-day basis,

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although crucial problems in the design, maintenance, and supply areas, reported by civilians are of no small consequence. In the military sample, there were no major differences in the reports of senior <u>vs</u> junior personnel, except that lower ranking sailors tended to be more specific regarding race discriminatory behavior, and less enthused about the Navy as a whole. White senior officers appeared to be least aware of (or concerned about) racism as an issue of military relevance.

Substantial differences were, however, attributable to race. In response to the initial content question "In general, what are your thoughts about the issue of racial equality in the Navy?" open-ended responses were coded into a (1-5) scaled "inequity" score. On the average, nonwhites indicated "considerable" inequity (mean = 2.98) while whites indicated only some (mean = 2.15). A chi square test found the ratings to be <u>significantly different</u> by race ( $x^2 = 21.35$ ; df = 5; p<.001). While only 11 out of the total military sample (N = 147) indicated an absence of race inequity (7 whites and 4 nonwhites) the nonwhite group perceived race inequity as a substantially greater issue across all ratings. Sex differences were obviated in this (male) sample.

It is noteworthy, but not surprising that nonwhites view the Navy as less equitable than do whites. Somewhat surprising and perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that only 30 respondents (22 whites and 8 nonwhites) indicated less than a scaled score of 2. This means that 78% of the total sample consider the Navy at least somewhat race-biased in one way or another. As will be discussed below, this high proportion includes a considerable number of whites who perceive "reverse" race inequity in the ranks.

In response to the general question regarding the issue of sex equality in the Navy, whites indicated a mean inequity score of 2.85 and nonwhites a mean of 2.51, both groups indicating considerable inequity. In this case, there were no significant race differences ( $x^2 = 6.48$ ; df = 5; p>.3,n.s.). Again, the vast majority of all respondents (80%) saw considerable inequity (by

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sex) in the Navy.

In a more specific behaviorally-oriented set of questions, respondents were asked to indicate instances of race or sex discrimination from their own personal experience.<sup>3</sup> These questions were designed to elicit elaboration, details and situational specifics, as well as the "Potpourri of race/sex discriminatory behaviors" shown in appendix 2. Questions here were phrased such that respondents tended to select a single highly memorable event which was either race or sex discriminatory. Given these artifactual constraints it is nevertheless interesting to note that 99 personal experiences with discrimination were reported by 47 white respondents and 136 by 58 nonwhite respondents, even though they were artifactually prompted to detail only one instance. Again, the vast majority reported (in this case from direct experiences) race/sex inequities. Of the 226 reported instances, only 19 were sex discriminatory, while the remaining 207 met the definition of race discrimination. This proportion changes dramatically and expectedly in the civilian sample, due to the presence of women on the job, and in the sample.

The reports above were offered in response to an open-ended but behavior-specific set of questions. Some respondents, (especially whites) are unable to extract discriminatory events from their experiences in an undirected context. Thus the 98 respondents who offered no race/sex determined response here could easily be misconstrued as a sizeable group who have not experienced discrimination in the Navy. This is clearly not the case, however, since findings from the more restricted presentation of examples of discrimination (presented below) indicate that nearly 99% (200) of these respondents have had some level of experience with race or sex discrimination in the Navy.

The <u>types of discrimination</u> reported can be sampled from the potpourri (appendix 2) and the more detailed list of 12-critical

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instances shown in appendix 3. The total set of responses to the initial series of open-ended questions were also coded into general impact-types. The rate of occurance and perceived importance of each type is presented below:

Type of impact of race discrimination		of events g this imp		Perceived import of this type impact (mean on 1-5 scale)					
	White	Nonwhite	Total	White	Nonwhite	Total			
Destroyed communication or chain of command	60%	49%	54%	3.3	3.8	3.6			
Reduced motivation to serve well	10%	40%	26%	3.2	2.9	3.0			
Reduced performance	18%	9%	13%	0.6	0.8	0.7			
Caused resignation from Navy	4%	2%	3%	0	0	0			
Increased absenteeism	2%	0	1%	5.0	0	5.0			
Incapacitated a vessel	2%	0	1%	3.0	0	3.0			

In these analyses, decreases in communication, and obedience were the most prevailant outcomes of race discrimination, with reduced motivation and decreased productivity ranking second and third. The reader will note that nonwhites were four times as likely to report reduced motivation as were whites; and that whites were twice as likely to report reduced productivity as were nonwhites. This latter category was also deemed unimportant, as were the few resignations cited. While there were relatively few instances of sex discrimination in the experiences related by military men, it is interesting to note that the 19 instances were said to have had only two types of impact, reduced performance was cited 60% of the time. This reversed trend suggesting that sex discrimination may have more overt performance consequences than race discrimination appears to be born out in further analyses (below).

Responding to a structured set of options regarding the impact of the race discriminatory events reported in the above discussion, the following proportions were cited:

Type of impact of race discrimination	White	Nonwhite	Total
Morale problems	14	36	50
Reduced efficiency	13	22	35
Reduced productivity	15	18	33
Loss of loyalty	4	10	14
Absenteeism	2	6	8
All Impacts (total)	48	92	140

Since each of these impact types were offered to respondents in forced-choice (yes or no) fashion, the relative standing of each type may be viewed as a more accurate, while perhaps less salient, reflection of reality. The rankings do not differ substantially from those noted earlier, however. Again nonwhites' morale (motivation) losses due to discrimination were cited much more often than whites'. The additional questions and responses which preceded presentation of the "menu" of <u>types of discrimination</u> yielded redundant results supportive of the above analyses, and are not reported here.

Having in most cases, established a free-flowing discussion with respondents reflecting carefully on their daily experiences, the predetermined "menu" of discriminatory events was presented in 'yes, no' fashion. Each respondent was asked whether or not he had been personally involved<sup>4</sup> in each type of discriminatory event on the menu, one item at a time, how often it occured if it did, and what level of importance he would assign to the event. The menu itself was comprised of the most common classes of discriminatory behavior found in prior research. Results are summarized on the next page.

The chart on page thirteen reflects the percentage of the total sample who had experienced each type of race discrimination, and the frequency and importance scores reported by that percentage of the total group. The reader will note that "racial jokes" was the most frequently experienced class of discriminatory behaviors reported, on the part of whites and nonwhites, but that both groups rated this class least important.<sup>5</sup> A similar finding holds for the second most commonly experienced type, social segregation, deemed most frequent of all (nearly always occurs) by both groups but relatively unimportant.

These two classes appear to be obvious change targets from a standpoint of frequency of occurance, despite the inverse relationship with importance scores (see asterisks). In any case they should not be viewed as representative. The negative correlation does not hold for the rankings of all classes of discrimination, even for whites where there appears to be such a trend ( $r_s = -0.28$  n.s.).

Any attempt to array these data across classes in terms of priorities must first address the issue of differences by race (ie. "who's scores?"). The reader might note, for example, the

Type of race discrimination	% pers	sonally	involved	Me	an fre $(0-3)$	equency	(0-10)				
	W	NW	Total	W	NW	Total	W	NW	Total		
Racial jokes/slurs	68	64	66*	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.9*		
Inadequate training or training opportunity	22	29	25	2.2	2.6	2.5	5.6	5.7	5.7		
Biased promotion	18	32	24	2.3	2.6	2.5	6.5	5.3	5.8		
Biased job assignment	20	38	29	2.6	2.6	2.6	5.2	5.3	5.3		
Biased performance ratings	15*	40*	27	2.1	2.4	2.3	7.7*	5.8	6.4*		
Oversupervision	15	29	22	2.2	2.6	2.4	4.8	4.9	4.8		
Undersupervision	12	21	16	2.4	2.4	2.4	5.8	5.1	5.6		
Unusual or excessive reprimands	16	23	20	2.4	2.7	2.6	5.3	4.7	5.0		
Lower opportunity for awards	8	26	17	2.6	2.6	2.6	5.6	5.1	5.4		
Restricted social interaction	46	58	52*	2.9	2.8	2.8*	3.8	4.2	4.0*		
Disproportionally high # of one group in undesireable jobs	31	33	32	2.5	2.9	2.7	5.3	4.3	4.8		
Biased administration of military justice system	22	23	22	2.0	2.7	2.4	5.7	5.4	5.6		
Lack of respect for superiors	24	41*	33	2.6	2.6	2.6	5.5	4.4	4.9		
Lack of confidence in superiors	22	34	28	2.5	2.6	2.5	7.1	5.1	5.8		
Tokenism	24	47*	35	2.3	2.4	2.4	5.1	5.1	5.1		
Insubordination	23	37	30	2.3	2.3	2.3	6.7	5.2	5.7		
Absenteeism especially high among particular groups	19	16	18	2.2	2.4	2.3	5.1	5.7	5.4		

W = White NW = Nonwhite

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proportions of whites <u>vs</u> nonwhites who experienced biased performance ratings, lack of respect for rank, and tokenism (asterisks). Nonwhites indicate that disproportional assignment to 'junk jobs' is the most common occurrance while whites see seven other classes as equally or more common. A comprehensive array of change or problem definition priorities will necessarily incorporate other factors and should be addressed by navy planners and program designers. The utility of these data will depend upon the interpretations chosen, the conceptual framework adopted, eg. does a low level of reported experience mean low incidence or unknown incidence and low recognition ("awareness")? The open-ended data in this study suggest the latter.

One <u>can</u> glean from the above analysis that in addition to racial jokes/slurs and social segregation, there are at least eight classes of race discrimination that are reportedly experienced by at least 20% of white respondents and higher proportions of nonwhites, and that all of these classes are reported to occur frequently. It is also clear that with the exception of the above two classes <u>all</u> other classes are viewed as changeworthy (important). More specific conclusions as to priorities, sources and change strategies will likely have to rely more heavily on the data reported elsewhere in this report.

Sex discrimination was indeed noted by respondents in the military sample, but due to the absence of women in the sample (and on jobs) a separate array of the civilian sample is more insightful in that regard. In passing, however, the proportional ordering of sex-based discrimination (cited more than 3 times) will be shown:

- 1. Tokenism
- 2. Lack of respect for superiors
- 3. Biased job assignment
- 4. Insubordination
- 5. Social segregation
- 6. Lack of confidence in supervisors

In many cases, particularly those citing sex bias, these reports are reciprocal $^{6}$ , eg. men lacking confidence in women and vice-versa.

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A discussion of the differences noted in the order of sex  $\underline{vs}$ race discriminatory events will follow presentation of data from the civilian sample. Since much of the data from this smaller sample parallels rather exactly, the findings already reported, only those findings which differ or embellish will be detailed. The "menu" data will be displayed, since the confined nature of the data may be ordered statistically and have the validity characteristics mentioned earlier. The reader should bear in mind that appendices 2 and 3 were drawn from the total sample, as was the following chart depicting stereotypes or advancement inhibiting beliefs about women in the Navy:

Stereotype		Numbe	r of C	itings	
	WM	NWM	WF	NWF	Total
Uncontrollable sex urges negate possibility of sex-integrated ships	14	5	1	0	20
Women lack job experience	14	4	0	0	18
Women are too weak	8	4	0	0	12
Women can't handle emergencies	3	3	0	0	6
Monthly cramps necessitate absenteeism	3	2	0	0	5
Women are too emotional	2	2	0	0	4
Women are incompetent	2	0	0	0	2
Women are "duty shirkers"	1	1	0	0	2
Children cause women to quit	1	0	0	0	1

WM = White male

NWM = Nonwhite male

WF = White female

NWF = Nonwhite female

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While this array is by no means a systematic representation of sex stereotypes in the Navy, it bears reflection since the comments were to some extent unsolicited and did occur with the above noted frequencies. A final point of interest is that no nonwhite women and only one white woman offered any stereotypic comment, suggesting a peculiarly male need for education along these lines. In this context, however, responses to items 16 indicated that virtually all men <u>and</u> the majority of white women would prefer to work for a man. This finding is neither detailed nor emphasized here because the sex-related question confounds stereotypes with the real absence of experienced women in the Navy. The same is partially true in terms of respondents' race preferences in question 16, although whites did indicate a preference (for a white boss) in the majority of cases, while nonwhites generally opted for no racial distinctions.

In the civilian sample<sup>7</sup>, a major difference was apparent from responses to the general questions regarding race/sex inequities. The total sample rated race inequity, mean = 3.2 ("considerable") and sex inequity, mean = 2.8 ("considerable"). The significant race difference found in the military sample did not occur. Apparently whites in this sample agree with nonwhites as to the magnitude of racism, and they observe more of it than did military This "agreement," however is clearly due to the greater men. proportion of civilian whites who were referring to race discrimination in favor of nonwhites ("reverse discrimination"). No significant differences occured by race or sex in this sample, but again it was clear from the more specific questions that whites were often referring to "reverse discrimination" as were men with regard to "reverse" sex discrimination.

In all open-ended responses, civilians cited nearly the same classes of race discrimination as did military personnel, but generally did so with greater emphasis, with noticeably greater

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bitterness, and with greater emphasis on advancement-related discrimination, and overt, often violent retaliation. The number of race discriminatory events cited in response to open-ended questions cannot be meaningfully compared across samples because of the artifactual determinants mentioned earlier, principally the presence of women on the job and in the sample. Respondents, male and female, tended to choose <u>either</u> race or sex discrimination as their prime focus. Appendices 2 and 3 incorporate findings from the civilian sample.

The following chart depicts "menu" findings from the civilian sample only in terms of sex discrimination, since, again, the race discrimination findings were highly redundant with the chart shown on page 13, except that "importance" ratings and frequency scores were significantly higher for all forms of discrimination as is evident in the sexism chart on the next page.

Among other conclusions which may be drawn from the results on page 18, is support for the "double whammy" effect wherein nonwhite women experience the greatest level of discrimination. The excessive scores for nonwhite women stand out even among these generally extreme scores. Since the overall scores for general race inequity were even higher for racism than sexism in this sample, the reader might just imagine the magnitude of import scores for race items on the "menu," but such imagination is not necessary because the frequency and import scores shown were calculated for "race or sex" on each item, while the proportion who experienced each class of sex discrimination refers only to sex discrimination reported, consistent with the purposes of this study.

Women clearly (and significantly) indicate more experience with sex discrimination than do men, although the differences are probably attributable more to "consciousness level" than they were in the earlier discussion of race discrimination reports. Asterisks indicate some of the more compelling findings displayed below.

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Absenteeism especially high among a particular group	Insubordination	Toketuism	Lack of confidence in superiors	Lack of respect for superiors	Biased administration of military justice system	Disproportionally high number of one group in undesireable jobs	Restricted social interaction	Lower opportunity for awards	Unusual or excessive reprimands	Undersupervision	Oversupervision	Biased performance ratings	Biased job assignment	Biased promotion	Inadequate training or training opportunity			Type of Sex Discrimination
. 00	8	31	31	8	15	0	0	00	15	00	15	B	23	46	7	W		% I
0	13	13	0	0	0	19	0	19	0	13	13	19	19	25	13	NW	Men	ers
4 *	10	2	14	4*	7*	10	°.	13	10	ы	14	21	21	32	10	H		Personally
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	28*	14	8	36	7	8	7	8	21	43	23	36	43	36	50	NW	Women	Involved
4	15	15	19	33*	4*	8	4*	19	15	မ္သ	30	26	3	37	41	Ч	en	ved
3.0	2.3	2.8	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.0*	2.3	3.0	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.8	3.0	W		Mea
2.7	2.8	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	NW	Men	n Fre
 2, 00	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	H	1	Mean rrequency
N. 0	3.0	2.6	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.7	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.7	3.0	W		(0-3)
3.0	2.8	2.3	2.8	3 3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.9	NW	Women	Uccura
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5.0	0 9.0	8.0	9 10	0 10	10		3 9.2	69.2	9.5	5 10	5 10	6 10	0 9.6	3 9.2	0 9.3	I NW	Mem	Me
0	.0 8.5	09.	0 9.4	9.5		7.663*7.7*	.2 9.2	2 9.4	.5 9.8	9.8	9.5	9.8	.6 9.0	00	38.8	VT		Mean I
	.5 10	9.08.8	10	5 10	10* 1C	3# 7.7	.2 0*	.4 10	.8 10	8 10	5 10	8 10	0 9.0	.7 9.8		W	-	Import
.4 10	0 9.8	8 8.0	0 9.3	0 9.2	0 10	7* 9.2	00	0 10	0 10	0 9.8	0 9.5	0 10	.0 10	.8 10	10 10	NW	Women	lean Import (0-10
0 8.7	8 9.9	0 8.4	3 9.7	2 9.6	0 10	8.3	3*5.0*	0 10	0 10	8 9.9	5 9.8	0 10	0 9.5	0 9.9	0 10	NT	3	)-10)

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Comparing classes of race <u>vs</u> sex discrimination, one finds the highest 1 ked class for race discrimination (excluding slurs which were not included in the sex discrimination "menu"), social segregation, was the lowest ranked class for sex discrimination, both in terms of occurrence and the importance women attributed to it. Absenteeism due to sex discrimination was also nearly nonexistent in the experience of all respondents and ranked least important of all by men, despite the stereotype suggesting otherwise. Training and promotion issues were uppermost in women's experiences. White men and white women ranked "concentration of women in menial jobs" lowest in importance, suggesting mutual adherence to this custom.

The civilian sample appears to be a "powder keg" of discrimination. It is this term and others like it that were often used in specific descriptions of the situation. The reader is cautioned, however, to reflect upon the general hesitancy of military personnel to reflect upon the more rigidly controlled circumstances surrounding them, before drawing comparisons.

<u>General judgments</u> were expressed throughout the total sample regarding the Navy-wide impact of race and sex discrimination. When asked whether race discrimination in the Navy increases the likelihood of sabotage, insubordination, violence, absenteeism, resignation or incompetence (independently) whites responded "yes" 60 percent of the time to each item, as did nonwhites 84 percent of the time. Reported effects of sex discrimination varied more and were fewer, with only 20% perceiving sabotage or violence as an effect of sex discrimination and 30% citing the other effects. Women cited all effects slightly, but not significantly more often than men.

<u>Race relations training</u>, while not directly the concern of this study, was briefly assessed in both samples. Only 6% of the civilian sample had been exposed to any sort of race (or sex) relations training. Among military respondents, 17% had received no training (12% of whites, 22% of nonwhites); 16% had completed only Phase I training (17% of whites; 17% of nonwhites); a few (6) had taken Phase II only; and 62% had completed both Phase I and Phase II (65% of whites and 58% of nonwhites). Some respondents may have undergone more training than reported, but were unable to remember the experience.

Of those who did indicate race relations training experience, 63% said they were made more aware of racism (71% of whites, 53% of nonwhites); 28% said their behavior became less racist (26% of whites, 40% of nonwhites); 11% said they became more racist (10% of whites and 13% of nonwhites); and 26% indicated no effects.<sup>8</sup>

Is <u>combat readiness</u> reduced by race or sex discrimination in the Navy? When asked these questions 65% said "yes" regarding race discrimination, as did 57% in reference to sex discrimination. Only 35% said "no" or failed to answer regarding either race or sex discrimination. Many respondents offered specific calculations as to readiness reductions caused by race/sex discrimination. Based on specific experiences, white shipyard supervisors estimated that ships under overhaul remained out of service 2-3 times longer than necessary due to the impact of discrimination, and that the quality of work performed was reduced by 40-60% for the same reasons. Nonwhite personnel from the military sample suggested that upwards of 50% (of their group) would either desert, refuse to fight or support the enemy in the case of war (depending on the adversary).

The data from this study appear to be unequivocal in terms of discrimination's impact on readiness. Even after the application of all conceivable qualifiers regarding the "softness" of selfreported data, sampling procedures, interviewer variation, and so on, the bottom line reappears. The weight of discrimination bears heavily on readiness. The specific nature of measurable, changeable discrimination has been described in detail sufficient for the task of navy planners and policy-makers.

## DISCUSSION

The findings reported here provide a candid and highly focused snapshot of ongoing race/sex discriminatory behavior in the Navy. It is not a pretty picture, but rather a vivid array of entrenched race and sex biased systems and behavior patterns which reduce the likelihood of a totally cohesive, effective and combat-ready Navy to some considerable, yet to be determined degree.

Obviously, race and sex discrimination are not the only factors inhibiting readiness. It is rarely the case, however, that such a definable observable class of negative events may be so clearly and specifically related to such a major reduction in mission capabilities. In contrast to the general tone of recent studies and surveys conducted on a more psychometric, academic level and without benefit of intensive probing into the specifics of real-life discriminatory behavior (eg. standard HRM surveys and the 1978 VIA studies) the present study suggests a very serious and volatile state of affairs.

Consistent with the findings of Bayton's (1974) group interviews regarding racial discontent, the "deeper cut" represented here uncovers a subtle but alarming trend toward desparation on the nonwhite side and a renewed arrogance and self-righteousness regarding overt bigotry on the white side. In the late sixties, when the civil rights movement, related legislation, and the advent of EEO procedures, had begun to enhance the job and career opportunities of nonwhites, many whites were supportive of increased "minority" access to jobs (eg.O'Connor and Rappaport, 1970). On an almost voluntary basis, most white managers and supervisors, naval and otherwise, would admit to the behaviors, structures and systems restricting job and career opportunities for nonwhites, and to some extent women. Data from the present study indicate an explicit and massive move away from those attitudes (and related behaviors) of "guilt admission," grudging or otherwise. In the view of many whites interviewed, <u>the pendulum has swung too far</u>, subjecting THEM to "reverse discrimination," and flooding the ranks with unqualified hordes of nonwhite and female incompetents. Justifying their actions in such views as well as their interpretation of The Bakke Decision and their perception of a softening national policy regarding "minority rights," this segment of the white Navy is rather proudly taking an anti-nonwhite stand. For the first time in nearly two decades, a notable portion of the white Navy is unabashedly and actively opposed to the future progress of nonwhites. In a similar vein, much of the white male Navy appears actively, systematically and, in their view, justifiably opposed to the progress of women in the Navy.

Rather than an interesting historic aside, this finding stands as probably the most central and prescriptive outcome of the present study. Policy makers and program designers do not appear to have the luxury of an off-handed continuation of Phase I and Phase II semi-attention to race and sex discrimination in the Navy. It might be wiser to expend program funds on the purchase of internal riot-control equipment and studies of procedures for affecting an all male, white mercenary Navy. Perhaps a bit sensational to some, this statement underscores the complexity of the programming task uncovered in the present findings. The era of the late seventies, seen by many as a lull time in EO-related activity, may precede more than just a storm of the old-fashioned one-sided type.

Future program efforts must be more sophisticated in several ways:

1. Training must be redesigned as a tailored part of a larger, cohesive management control system complete with top level responsibility, rather than dangled about commands as a peculiar add-on exercise.

2. Training must focus primarily on the observable discriminatory behaviors identified here, according to their mission impact and frequency of occurrence since participant recognition of undesirable activities (and acceptable alternatives) is a prerequisite to

any sort of systematic control over those activities. 3. The "new" feature of training and other management procedures must be a resolution of the growing "reverse discrimination" phenomenon. Since much of this "feeling" or "mood" is based upon mythical favors extended to nonwhites and women, false perceptions may be directly disspelled through clearer command communication and demonstrations of the competence of previously restricted personnel. Where unfair advantages are indeed extended to nonwhites and women (recruitment excluded) it is usually the fault of supervisors' misinterpretations of EO policy and/or fear of poorly conceived compliance procedures. Much of this can be labelled mismanagement and included in revised supervisor training efforts.

4. Finally, the interrelation between training and other EO efforts must be clarified and unified. Presently, there is a training function (pers 62), and a compliance function (pers 61), neither of which systematically supports the other, either at a conceptual or practical level. Meanwhile the command structure and line management which should be responsible for and actively engaged in the process of building an equitable (and therefore more effective) Navy is prompted to ignore if not resist both functions.

A number of more specific recommendations follow below. The basic intentions of this study were to describe the nature and impact of ongoing race/sex discrimination in observable and relatively certain fashion. Quoting from an early statement of the problem: "One of the most crucial failures underlying the negligable yield of the Navy's EO/RR training and management efforts can be bluntly summarized as follows: The Navy has no data of substance upon which to base these efforts. Since there has been no research effort which specifically and empirically identifies what it is that people (and therefore systems) do which is racist, sexist and detrimental to the effective conduct of the Navy's business; it is impossible to answer the basic training and management question 'What is it that you would have me do differently, and why?' Hence the expense, confusion, backlash and other problems which inevitably relegate the program to window dressing status, regardless of the sincerity and effort put forth by Navy trainers and management

specialists. The basic information upon which programs to monitor, control, and prevent costly discrimination in Navy jobs would logically be based simply doesn't exist."

While there remain questions regarding navy-wide incidence, the optimal conditions and procedures for intervention and the future impact of the national "mood" regarding the pace of equal access programs, the basic picture of discrimination in the Navy has been presented here. Program planners may now present the picture to policy makers in hopes of generating a no-nonsense response to the growing and ever more complex problem of inequitable treatment and the ensuing losses in mission capability. Researchers, behavioral scientists and social designers may (hopefully) utilize portions of the present approach and/or the resulting tools for behavioral measurement of race/sex discrimination in a variety of beneficial contexts.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. As in most studies seeking a basic description of a previously undefined phenomenon, several questions of scientific and utilitarian interest have arisen here, suggesting a need for further research.
  - A. Does the "snapshot" of race/sex discrimination developed here represent the entire Navy? The present data provides a sound basis for a relatively brief paper and pencil survey designed to measure the navy-wide incidence of discrimination and its mission related consequences.
  - B. A similar instrument could now be designed as a working tool for command personnel. Either at entry into a new command or at periodic "climate check" points, navy commanders would be able to forsee and, with appropriate guidelines, control costly discrimination.
  - C. What kinds and levels of discriminatory experiences, will prompt people (and which people) to undertake totally

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unacceptable activities, such as sabotage, disloyalty, etc.? Battle situation simulations and behavior rehearsals could be designed to test a variety of peoples' (not necessarily naval personnel) behavioral responses to discriminatory experiences. Using the present data to insure navy-like relevance, this study would provide virtually irrefutable measures of discrimination's impact in the Navy, and a major contribution to social science in general.

- 2. A working conference of BUPERS personnel should review existing resources, programs, and goals in terms of the intervention targets noted above.
- 3. Discriminatory events categorized in the Project Report should be prioritized in terms of their incidence and impact on readiness, the source of each category should be defined and the most likely points and types of interventions defined.
- An overall program strategy should be prepared, costed and made accountable in terms of responsibilities and follow-on measures.
- 5. A high level conference or other sign-off procedure should be conducted to insure top-level ownership and support.
- 6. Since some training program will undoubtedly result from this, and since a revision of Phase II training may be in order, a multifaceted training program should be developed and pilot tested. At least three separate target groups; top management, line management and rank and file naval personnel should be addressed in separate portions of the program.
- 7. The program(s) should be videotape mediated due to cost effectiveness and the need for visual presentation of this "illusive" phenomenon. Without videotape, film, or some other packaged modeling procedure, very few trainers can induce recognition of (identification with) such emotionally volatile behaviors as race/sex discrimination.
- 8. Existing and (if necessary) new navy trainers should undergo extensive training prior to working with the new materials, since they are likely to be substantially different in orientation, focus and (hopefully) importance.

- 9. All training and organizational development activities initiated here (pers 62) should be closely and carefully coordinated with the additional programs and concerns of the EO department (pers 61) and ideally with all other Navy department EO activities, both military and civilian.
- 10. The Navy should get out of the business of "general social reform." No facets or forms of the global racism/sexism phenomenon should be addressed other than those demonstrably relevant to the Navy's business, as indicated in this and other data.
- 11. All EO efforts, training, organizational development, policy formulation, etc. should be addressed from within general management functions and should become legitimized management responsibilities.
- 12. While the suggested efforts above include emphases on both race and sex discrimination, a separate and immediate effort should facilitate the successful entry of women now boarding ships for the first time. This effort should meet the stereotyped views and predictable reactions noted in the present study head-on, by way of education, competence demonstrations (live and/or videotaped), and a clear system of sanctions. The only circumstance wherein women might fail in their new roles is one where commands have failed to inhibit the predictably negative events noted in this report.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The term "nonwhite" refers to members of all groups not perceived as being white. Since the core ingredient in racism is color, other more euphemistic terms are avoided and census distincitions are ignored.

<sup>2</sup>In terms of demographics, the military sample (N = 147) consisted of 74 whites and 73 nonwhites, their age ranged from 18 - 48, and was normally distributed (by design) since equal numbers were selected from among four categories of rank (and therefore experience). Length of time in the Navy ranged from 1 - 26 years, with a median of 12 years. All respondents had been in their present job situation for at least six months (range  $\frac{1}{2}$  - 23 years, median 2 years), having ample time to experience race/sex related events.

<sup>3</sup>The "experiences of others" were told here as well as elsewhere throughout the interview, mostly for purposes of establishing response sets. Second hand findings are not reported here since they are questionable from a validity standpoint, and since they did not differ substantially in form.

<sup>4</sup>Respondents were also asked to indicate whether or not each type of discrimination was practiced by others. This was a clinical technique moreso than a measurement procedure. As expected the resulting frequencies were somewhat greater for each item, but are deleted here in favor of the more reliable and more conservative self-reports.

<sup>5</sup>Importance scores were extremely varied (eg. 20% of the nonwhites rated this class between 8 and 10, while 24% rated it zero). Such variation was common throughout the menu, suggesting that the mean importance rating was somewhat misleading, as is the case with any unusual distribution (bimodal) of scores. The reader might bear in mind this polarity of opinion when interpreting these scores. <sup>6</sup>Throughout the forced-choice segments of this study, both race and sex discriminatory events were reported and discussed from whatever perspective a particular respondent chose. For example, a given class of discrimination might be cited by 50 respondents, 25 of whom were referring to an interaction (of that type) which inhibits nonwhites, 15 may have referenced negative effects on whites, and 10 may have referred to mutual or complex effects. While each set of reports regarding the incidence of a given type of race/sex discrimination could be broken down into subsets by direction (particular race/sex effect referenced), it was felt that the present study's goals were better served by describing the overall incidence of each class of discrimination, without reference to directional particulars.

The open-ended segments offer support for the general conclusion that race discriminatory events most often (but not always) have negative effects on nonwhites, and that sex discriminatory events are more evenly detrimental to men and women, although somewhat moreso regarding women.

 $^{7}$ The civilian sample was comprised of 56 respondents, stratified by race and sex, with equal numbers (14) in each cell and stratified by job level groups (4) representing GS-1 through GS-16. The same time in service to the Navy, time in present job, and age ranges in the military sample were represented here.

<sup>8</sup>The reader is cautioned against overly positive interpretations of these reported training effects. Of the 63% who reported increased awareness, the vast majority referred to fatalistic acceptance of immutable race differences, "awareness" of racial shortcomings, or heightened sensitivity to the negative connotations of specific cross-race interactions...hardly a positive outcome. While 28% reported reductions in race discriminatory behavior (a positive outcome to the extent that such changes really occurred and were legitimately antidiscriminatory), the 11% reporting increased discrimination must be considered with special weighting in terms of counter-productivity effects and polarization.

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APPENDIX I

## Interview Format

# DISCRIMINATION INCIDENCE AND RELEVANCE TEST

## Introduction

Explain purpose, selection of respondents, establish rapport and confidentiality.

- A. Purpose is to gather imput for immediate and long term planning toward a management system which will eliminate race and sex factors from the conduct of naval missions, thereby enhancing not only equality, but morale, effectiveness and combat readiness.
- B. Your name has been <u>randomly</u> selected from lists of people whose jobs are especially critical to the Navy's basic mission. There are no assumptions regarding your race or sex attitudes or actions or anything like that involved here.
- C. All aspects of our discussion will be held in strictest professional confidence. No navy person, or computer, will have any access whatsoever to the identity of any respondent. We have taken great pains to ensure complete confidentiality.

THIS GUIDE IS INTENDED EXCLUSIVELY FOR USE BY HIGH LEVEL PROFESSIONALS TRAINED IN BEHAVIORAL SPECIFICATION PROCEDURES

# Demographics

Race	_					
Age	_					
Sex						
Rank						
Naval Community	(Most recent assigned for				ave been	
Air						
Surface						
Sub						
Shore						
Length of time in	n service					
Type of command	(functional)_					
Functional Title			(of	your	"present	job"
			min	. of	6 months	assigned)
How long have you	u been doing	this job?_				-
Interviewer						
Date of Interview	w					
Location and Fac	ility					

 During an average, normal work day, what do you do? What do you do (specifically) that you consider particularly important?

2. In general, what are your thoughts about the issue of racial equality in the Navy?

\_\_\_\_\_

-

1

\_\_\_\_\_

3. What about women in the Navy? (Generally)

4. We're going to be talking for an hour or so about problemic race and sex discrimination, which we define as: "Any difference in the behavior of persons or systems which is due to color or minority status or sex, that has an undesirable impact on either side, and occurs in a working context important to the Navy." This means we're talking about different treatment of people of other races or of opposite sexes. We're not talking about philosophy or ideas ... different behavior due to race or sex. For example:

Whites mights hold negative opinions of certain minority groups, resulting in misperceptions, prejudice, biases and what have you ... but most importantly ... they might tend to <u>assign</u> people of other colors and races to low level jobs, or, on the other hand, <u>behave</u> insubordinately toward their superiors if they are not white, and so on. This would be discriminatory <u>behavior</u>. If such behaviors occur on the job, they become important to the Navy ... these are the kinds of things we have in mind.

Other examples might reflect negative attitudes or unfair practices regarding <u>whites</u> and consequently behaviors which have a negative impact on whites. Biases regarding women might produce unfair treatment of women, or perhaps of men.

Any examples of different treatment due, in part at least, to someone's race or sex, from <u>either</u> direction, qualify for this discussion if they occur in any job-related context.

I need to be sure that I have made this clear. Give me an example of something which would be race or sex discriminatory in this context ... (expand upon definition and examples if necessary for clarity). 5. a. Tell me about any occurances you have experienced where race or sex has been a factor, impacting on your job or situation in any way.

1

 b. For each example: What happened? (What was the impact? Probe for impact upon morale, efficiency, productivity, loyalty, attendence, etc.)

c. If examples tend to be interpersonal <u>vs</u>. systemic <u>or</u> vice versa, ask about occurances of the other type.

.

6. Tell me about any such occurances which have happened to other people? Impact?

7. You told me that (from Item #1) During an average, normal work day, you do ... you do ... (specifically) that you consider particularly important. Now tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by your race? (hindered/ enhanced)

8. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the race of your superiors? (hindered/enhanced)

9. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the race of your peers? (hindered/enhanced) 10. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the race of your subordinates? (hindered/enhanced) 11. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by your sex? (hindered/enhanced) 

- 12. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the sex of your superior? (hindered/enhanced)
- 13. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the sex of your peers? (hindered/enhanced) 14. Tell me how your performance on these tasks is effected by the sex of your subordinates? (hindered/enhanced)

15. Have you ever been involved in or observed any of the following kinds of things? (Ask: About how often? giving "several times a day, once a week, monthly, yearly?" as a prompt toward specifity. And: How important? (where response is affirmative)

		Personally	others	freq.	import (change- worthiness)
Α.	Racial jokes				
в.	Inadequate				
	training or				
	training oppor-				
	tunity due to				
	race or sex				
c.	Race or sex				
	biased				
	promotion				
D.	Race or sex				
	biased job				
	assignment				
	(tasks)				
E.	Race or sex				
	biased				
	performance				
	ratings				
F.	Oversuper-				
	vision due				
	to race or sex				
G.	Undersuper-				
	vision due				
	to race or sex				
Н.	Unusual or				
	excessive				· ·
	reprimands				
	due to race				
	or sex				

Personally others

I. Inadequate recognition, lower opportunity for awards, citations, etc., due to race or sex

- J. Limited, segregated, or restricted social interaction due to race or sex
- K. Concentration of one group in undesirable job classification (specify group or groups)
- L. Biased administration of the military justice system due to race or sex (specify against whom)
- M. Being denied treatment and respect consistent with rank due to race or sex (what group or groups?)

import (change worthiness)

freq.

Personally others freq. import (change worthiness)

- N. Lack of confidence in supervisors due to race or sex (list specifics)
- O. Tokenism, putting someone in a visible job, just for window dressing, for show, due to race or sex
- P. Insubordination due to race or sex
- Q. Absenteeism being especially high among particular groups (specify groups)
- 16. a. If you had your "present job" and war was to be declared tomorrow ... in all honesty ... what kind of person, what race and sex, would you like to have for a CO? Why?

b.	What kinds of peers remember we are at war? Why?
c.	What kinds of subordinates?
17.	In your judgment, what if anything should be done, by whom, to change all this? (the race and sex factors we've dis- cussed)

- 18. In your judgment, does race discrimination in the Navy increase the likelihood of: Sabotage, insubordination, violence, abseenteeism, resignation, incompetence? (specify)
- 19. Does sex discrimination in the Navy increase the likelihood of: Sabotage, insubordination, violence, absenteeism, resignation, incompetence? (specify) Did you undergo Phase I and Phase II Race Relations Train-20. a. ing? (list which and when)

20. b.	Was it of any personal benefit to you? (if yes, specify)
01	
21. a.	Does race or sex discrimination in the Navy have an impact on the personal character of some groups? (expand if "yes")
21. b.	Does race or sex discrimination in the Navy have an impact on the competence of some groups? (expand if "yes")

Are we any less combat-ready because of race or sex factors? 21. c. How so? With regard to the kinds of things we have talked about, tell 22. me some things that have changed for the better, lately. . . 23. What is good about the Navy in terms of your life?

Thank respondent for candidness - recall confidentiality. ("I'd like to remind you that this information will be kept in strictest confidence.")

Complete the following immediately after interview: 24. Apparent validity----1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)

25. Additional interviewers comments upon validity, candidness, clinical notes, etc.

# Appendices 2 & 3

are omitted from general distribution copies of this report, since the particulars of race/sex discrimination were gathered for operational Navy purposes. Readers with scientific, program design or other legitimate purposes may request further details from the author by phone: (405) 341-2412 or mail: P.O. Box 20329, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73156.

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