


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
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DETERMINING THE NEED FOR
A UNIFIED COMMAND ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
IN PACOM

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A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by

JOHN S. ELLISON, MAJOR, USA
B.S., University of Illinois, 1964
M.B.A., Lehigh University, 1974

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20. ABSTRACT

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The thesis evaluates the historical evolution of service components from World War II through the post Vietnam period. The role of a service component in joint doctrine is explored, as is the organization and functions of the US Army Pacific, the US Army CINCPAC Support Group, the US Pacific Air Force, and the US Pacific Fleet. Functional analysis of these headquarters provides the basis for discussion of further change.

The study concludes that unified command Army service components have historically performed primarily logistical and administrative functions, and are no longer necessary. It recommends that 1) joint doctrine be revised to eliminate service components, 2) military departments be tasked to provide a service headquarters to exercise command over operational forces, and 3) staff support functions of a service component be absorbed by a restructured unified command headquarters. ↗

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the indi-
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the doctrinal requirement for a unified command service component. The historical and descriptive methods are used in this case study of Pacific Command service components. Although the functional approach predominates, comparative analysis is used as well as a descriptive survey to determine the attitudes of officers that have served in the unified command structure.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The National Security Act of 1947 established a national security structure based upon World War II experience, technological advances, and the perception of growing tension in the international system. Although frequently reorganized and improved, the national military structure has remained essentially as directed in the 16 December 1946 implementing instructions.¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and methods of command and control have also changed little. Yet, over the past 30 years technological innovations resulting in increased strategic and tactical mobility, as well as battlefield lethality, have reduced considerably the available reaction time for national command authority decision making and implementation. The statement to Congress by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States Military Posture of FY 1978² clearly stated that the possibility of armed conflict, ranging from general war to isolated terrorist activities and politically motivated incidents, has not diminished; and conflicts of the future will occur without adequate warning and will be of a short, violent nature. Moreover, it is also generally recognized that fiscal constraints increasingly complicate our ability to respond in a crisis by imposing resource limitations on reserve forces and stocks utilized to offset the effects of strategic and tactical shortfalls. In brief, lack of timely warning and resource limitations necessitate that the national military structure possess a rapid and efficient command and control system within a simple organization to facilitate decisions and their implementation.

Since 1947, civilian and military interest has focused on the organization of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments. Few scholars or professional military writers have examined the efficiency and effectiveness of the unified command structure in supporting the national command authority. The recent disestablishment of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the Army service component to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and its replacement by U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) to fulfill the residue functions, has resulted in considerable debate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its unified commands. There exists a significant segment of the military community which questions the efficacy of this act.

The validity of current joint organizational doctrine in requiring an Army component of a unified command is the subject of this study.

Problem Statement

The purpose of this study is to identify and evaluate the functions of a unified command Army service component and to determine whether a valid requirement exists to alter the existing organizational arrangement for a component command or similar element.

The sub-problems are:

1. To determine the functions of an Army service component that are unable to be fulfilled by other existing organizations.
2. To determine what functions of an Army service component require a uniservice organization and cannot be fulfilled by another

existing organization.

3. To determine if USACSG fulfills the essential functions of a service component.

4. To determine the causes for organizational change of the Army service component in the Pacific, the result of which was the disestablishment of USARPAC and the establishment of USACSG.

5. To determine the implications on strategic planning and operations of elimination of the Army service component in PACOM.

6. To determine alternate methods for accomplishment of the necessary missions of an Army service component in PACOM.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis: An Army component command fulfills strategic planning and operational functions which require a uniservice organization in the theater, thereby contributing to national security.

Hypothesis: The USACSG possesses insufficient assets to fulfill the functions of a service component in PACOM, thus reducing the national command authority's ability to implement strategic policy.

Definition of Terms

Terms in this study will be used as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces; and can be found in Appendix A.

Certain other terms to be used repeatedly in the study are defined at this point to facilitate understanding.

Essential Functions: Those tasks or responsibilities of an

organization that are necessary for CINCPAC to accomplish the objectives of US policy and to maintain US national interests, as defined by the JCS.

Unified Component Command (unified service component): The service component command directly subordinate to a unified command.

Limitations of the Study

First, direct inferences cannot be made about any component command other than the Pacific Command Army service component. This study's conclusions are valid only for this command which is the research vehicle. On a more generalized level of abstraction, certain inferences may be drawn for other component commands.

Second, since most literature on this subject is classified, great reliance has been placed upon voluntary responses to a survey from personnel involved with USACSG and USARPAC. These responses may not be completely accurate because of the time lapse since the change from USARPAC to USACSG.

Assumptions

The study rests on the following assumption: The responsibilities and functions of all PACOM service components (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are of a similar nature, thus allowing comparison.

Methodology and Organization

This study examines and evaluates the doctrinal requirement for a unified command service component. The researcher has utilized both

the historical and descriptive methods focusing on a case study of the Army component command in PACOM. Although the systems or functional approach predominates, comparative analysis is used with respect to the alternatives for an Army service component and its performance relative to other service components in PACOM. The historical research is based on government documents as the primary sources, supplemented by unofficial publications. A descriptive survey is used to determine the attitudes toward service components of officers who have served or are serving in the unified command structure.

The study presents a basis for analysis of current joint doctrine in Chapter II by examination of the historical development of the Pacific unified command structure and an evaluation of its ability to support the national command authority. Chapter III examines the doctrine upon which unified and subunified component commands are based and describes the two organizations that have been used by the US Army in PACOM. Further, the disestablishment of USARPAC is examined to develop some implications of further change. Finally, the other PACOM service components are addressed as a basis for comparison in the next chapter. Chapter IV compares USACSG to USARPAC and the other service components and addresses the implications of further changes in PACOM. The findings of this analysis provide the basis for Chapter V containing a summary, conclusions, and recommendations.

Value of the Study

Since there exists little scholarly and professional military literature on the role of a unified service component, this study will

provide the basis for further research. In this period of fiscal constraints, it is essential that advance management and organizational concepts be used to insure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness at the lowest cost. The requirements for rapid decision making and execution merely accentuates the need for an effective and efficient organization. This study provides a point of focus and a rationale by which in-depth study can be initiated to improve joint doctrine in this area.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the unification of the armed forces debate preceding the Korean War, there has been little critical examination of joint organizational doctrine. Few studies have been found that are related to the subject of Army component organizational structure in PACOM. Other than the Army Historical Series on World War II and the Korean War, there is but one study that examines the organizational development of the unified command structure in various theaters of operation.¹

Historically, doctrine for the conduct of a theater of operations was developed as early as 1914, but was not implemented until World War II. The Pacific structure evolved around two primary factors. The first was General Douglas MacArthur's struggle against the Japanese, and the second was the sea environment which resulted in the pre-eminence of amphibious warfare. Complicating this development was service rivalry that caused division of the Pacific along service lines which placed the JCS in the role of the single unifying headquarters in the Pacific Theater.²

In March 1942, the Pacific was organized into areas by the United States with the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff. The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), commanded by General MacArthur, was organized as a combined and joint command, and a US Army theater.³ It superseded the American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command (ABDACOM), the first combined theater organization of the Pacific in World War II. The other, the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz, was also a joint command but additionally

functioned as a US joint theater headquarters.⁴ Neither command had significant participation from services other than the commanders, and both operated under the control of each commander's respective military department which functioned as executive agents for the JCS.⁵ The simple original organization is at Figure 1.

During the first six months of the war organizational development was disorganized, the result of service negotiation, and reflected the problems in the Pacific between the service forces.⁶ Organizational evolution was continuous, complicated, and difficult to explain in the short historical summary presented here.⁷

MacArthur took command of SWPA in April 1942. In addition to allied forces, it was composed of the US Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), and the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), formerly the US Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The SWPA included Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and all the Netherlands Indies except Sumatra.

The US Army Services of Supply was established in early 1942 to handle theater logistical support. In February 1943, USAFFE was re-established to relieve GHQ, SWPA of administrative and logistical duties which could be delegated. USAFFE comprised the Sixth US Army, Fifth US Air Force, the US Army Services of Supply Southwest Pacific Area (USASOS), USAFFE Special Troops, and Headquarters, USAFFE. It assumed all functions and supervised all activities of US Army forces in SWPA except that GHQ, SWPA, retained control of the combat employment of US Army units.⁸ The organizational relationships are shown in Figure 2. USAFFE performed as a theater army headquarters similar to

PACIFIC ORGANIZATION, JULY 1942⁹




Figure 1

PACIFIC ORGANIZATION, SUMMER 1943¹⁰




Figure 2

a current component command. Although armies were added to USAFFE, its organizational structure remained essentially the same throughout the war.

The POA was responsible for the remainder of the Pacific Ocean except for the coastal waters off Central and South America. The POA was divided into three subordinate commands; the North, Central, and South Pacific Areas. Unlike General MacArthur who was prevented from directly commanding service forces, Admiral Nimitz was not only Commander in Chief (CINCPAC), POA, he also commanded the Pacific Fleet, the Central Pacific Area, and, initially, the North Pacific Area (See Figure 1).¹¹ US Army Forces were assigned in the POA to either the Hawaiian Department (later reorganized as the US Army Forces, Central Pacific) or US Army Forces, South Pacific. These headquarters served primarily logistical and administrative purposes while Admiral Nimitz or his subordinates exercised operational control over the combat employment of the forces.¹²

Toward the end of the war, during planning for the attack on Japan, service rivalry in the Pacific and Washington, D.C. resulted in dismantling the unified command structure that had evolved through rejection of General MacArthur's proposal by the JCS to establish uni-service commands and operate through cooperation.¹³ The resulting organization is shown in Figure 3. Thus, CIPAC, SUPAC, was replaced with CIPAC, Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), and in April 1945 it absorbed USAFFE. In June 1945, USASOP was replaced by US Army Forces Western Pacific.

As a result, "all efforts to establish a single commander for the theater had failed, and even the unified commands set up in 1942 had




Figure 3


been abandoned under the pressure of events."¹⁵ During World War II, component commanders were established as separate headquarters to handle administrative and logistical matters for the theater commanders who retained control of combat operations directly to the Army combat forces. Admiral Nimitz served as the Navy component commander in his theater (and as area commander). However, General MacArthur was proscribed from doing so, in spite of his disagreement with the policy.¹⁶

After the Japanese surrender, AFPAC assumed occupation duties in Japan. In January 1947, AFPAC was deactivated and USAFFE reestablished to carry out the occupation mission. Simultaneously, the Far East Command (FEC) was established as a joint headquarters with responsibility for the Western Pacific. MacArthur commanded both FEC and USAFFE. USAFFE soon became a paper headquarters and, although not deactivated, was for all purposes non-existent.¹⁷ This reorganization was an element of the major structural changes initiated by the National Security Act of 1947 which also institutionalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff and created the Department of Defense. FEC was designated a joint command with responsibility for Japan, South Korea, the Ryuku Islands, the Marianas-Bonin Islands, and the Philippines. The attack on South Korea in June 1950 vastly increased the responsibilities of the FEC. Organized essentially as in 1947, its subordinate commands consisted of Eighth US Army (EUSA), the Ryuku Command (RYCOM), the Marianas-Bonin Islands Command (MARBO), the Philippine Command (PHILCOM), the Joint US Military Assistance Group-Philippines (JUSMAG-PHIL), US Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), and the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). The organizational relationships in the Pacific are shown in

Figure 4. EUSA exercised operational control over all US and allied forces in Korea with the exception of X Corps later. Ltg. Edwin Walker, CG EUSA, did direct the efforts of the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.¹⁸ Major changes in the organizational structure occurred, but had little effect on the combat forces. At the outbreak of hostilities, a joint/combined headquarters, GHQ United Nations Command (UNC), commanded by General MacArthur, was created in July 1950. This required the staff of GHQ, FEC, to function in a dual role as UNC and FEC. The major FEC commands also served as major subordinate commands of UNC. This organization remained throughout the conflict. In August 1950, the Japan Logistical Command (JLC) was organized under FEC to relieve EUSA of responsibility for Japan and the communications zone. This allowed CG EUSA to concentrate on conduct of the war in Korea. After the Chinese entered the war in December 1950, MacArthur gave the new EUSA commander, General Mathew Ridgeway, complete authority for combat operations. Not only was the previously exercised close supervision reduced, but finally all US forces in Korea were placed under EUSA command. Prior to this time MacArthur functioned as the senior Army commander with EUSA and X Corps as subordinates.¹⁹ (X Corps made the Inchon landing and then had responsibility for the Korean East Coast.) In October 1952, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (AFFE) was re-activated to relieve FEC and General Ridgeway, Commander FEC and Supreme Allied Commander, of all Army operations in Japan, allowing him to devote full attention to the Korean conflict. The resulting organization is shown in Figure 5.


In January 1953, UNC and FEC were reorganized to provide a more

FAR EAST COMMAND, JANUARY 1947 - JUNE 1950²⁰



* CG FEC also CG USAFFE
 ** From September 1950 - December 1950

Figure 4



* Executive Agent

Figure 5

effective joint staff to serve the major subordinate commands, EUSA, AFFE, NAVFE, and FEAF. By July 1953, when the Korean armistice was signed, FEC's geographical responsibilities had been reduced to include only Korea, Japan, and the Ryukus. A recently created theater headquarters, the Pacific Command (PACOM), had assumed responsibility for the remainder of the Pacific. FEC, however, remained a joint theater command equal to PACOM until 1957. The service commands in Korea functioned as service components and AFFE resumed the role of Army service component, replacing FEC which had performed service component functions throughout the conflict in the role of a theater Army headquarters.²²


During the Korean conflict, the Commander FEC functioned without a separate Army component headquarters, electing to perform that function himself. He retained operational control over Army ground forces and wore the hats of both theater commander and Army component commander.

Immediately after the Armistice, significant changes occurred and continued through July 1957. The result of these shifts was that the FEC was eliminated and the Pacific Command assumed its functions; thus, PACOM was a descendant not only of the POA but also of SWPA, FEC, and AFPAC. AFFE and EUSA were consolidated in South Korea and US Army Pacific (USARPAC) assumed the service component role in PACOM. This headquarters, established simultaneously with the deactivation of Army Forces Far East in 1947, thus became the theater Army command in PACOM.²³ This headquarters, co-located with PACOM in Hawaii, assumed command (less operational command) of all Army forces in the Pacific

and Far East on 1 July 1957. USARPAC commanded forces in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Vietnam, and Thailand. The organizational relationships can be seen in Figure 6. Subordinate elements of USARPAC in 1958 included EUSA, US Army Japan/IX Corps, US Army Hawaii, the 25th Infantry Division (Hawaii), and a military assistance advisory group (MAAG) in Thailand.²⁴ The introduction of US troops into the Republic of Vietnam in 1965 initiated the first combat test of Department of Defense doctrine on interservice cooperation and unified command. The US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), which developed from the original MAAG, was a subordinate unified command of PACOM. As such, its subordinates, the US Army Vietnam (USARV), US Naval Forces Vietnam, and 7th Air Force, became subunified component commands. The Commander of USMACV (COMUSMACV), General Westmoreland, reported to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) as a subunified commander. As the commander of USARV, he also reported to the commander of USARPAC which performed an administrative and logistical role. USARPAC possessed command (less operational command) over USARV but in fact exercised no direction over Army forces in Vietnam for other than administrative and logistical matters.²⁵ Operational command of Army forces was exercised by CINCPAC through COMUSMACV and through the two Field Force Commanders. The PACOM organization is shown in Figure 7. COMUSMACV exercised operational command through his service component commanders, US Naval Forces Vietnam, and the 7th Air Force. COMUSMACV exercised operational command over the combat forces through I and II Field Force (similar to Corps headquarters), the 5th Special Forces Group, and III Marine Amphibious Force which was tasked with a land


US ARMY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC

Before 1 July 1957



* Includes US Army Japan
 ** Includes IX Corps

Figure 6



After 1 July 1957

PACIFIC COMMAND STRUCTURE, 1953⁴⁷




Figure 7

combat mission. He also possessed command less operational command over Army forces as the Commander, USARV.²⁸ This organization remained essentially the same throughout the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and can be seen in Figure 8. In 1967, some discussion occurred relative to the elevation of USMACV to a full unified command.²⁹ Although this did not occur, it is worth noting that certain authors attribute the lack of a forceful drive for this status to Westmoreland's knowledge that senior Navy officers were opposed and that to request this status would damage his excellent relations with them. One author stated, "He cannot risk such alienation."³⁰ It is evident that the politics of interservice rivalry hindered the search for the best organizational structure through the limitation of alternatives.³¹ However, it appears from one study that although it would have been appropriate to appoint MACV as a unified command, the situation with respect to negotiations was too delicate to chance further escalation.³²

During the Vietnam conflict USARPAC, the unified command service component, served as an administrative and logistical support agency for the forces in the combat zone and the rest of the Pacific. It did not exercise any operational direction nor did the subordinate unified command Army component in Vietnam, USARV. As in both other conflicts examined, the joint command charged with prosecuting the war exercised direct operational command of his land combat forces without utilization of an Army service component.

Since 1970, the PACOM organizational structure has altered very little with the exception of the Army service component. By 1968, USARPAC found itself primarily a coordinating agency and logistical




Figure 8

* Except those who double as US troop unit commanders

supervisor for Army forces of the subunified commands in Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. This did not change significantly with US disengagement and redeployment from Vietnam. The increasing pressure for budgetary restraint and maximum combat power and the rapidly increasing cost of maintaining the force resulted in a realignment of the Army Pacific structure in 1974.³⁴ As a part of this realignment, USARPAC was disestablished. In its place, Department of the Army established a field operating agency to provide Army support to CINCPAC. This agency, US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG), assumed its role in the face of criticism by CINCPAC.³⁵ Indications are that it was an Army unilateral action. The Army headquarters for the Hawaiian Islands, US Army Hawaii, was redesignated US Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH) with responsibility for all forces and functions in Hawaii, Guam, Johnston Island, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific. One major general commands both USACSG and USASCH.

Historical examination appears to indicate that economy was one overriding principle of organizational development in all three wars, as demonstrated by the frequent use of commanders in dual roles. Also, it can easily be established that there is a historical precedence for theater Army headquarters possessing no tactical combat responsibilities. However, between the conflicts, the role of Army service components expanded as a result of increased opportunity to exercise command (less operational command) of Army forces.

CHAPTER III

ROLE OF A COMPONENT COMMAND

Congress, in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1953 which amended the National Security Act of 1947, has described the basic policy embodied in the acts concerning unified direction of the armed forces by stating:

"SECTION 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress...to provide for the establishment of unified and specified commands and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense...; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces..."¹

Implementation of this policy is directed in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub 2). This document establishes two channels of authority to forces assigned to a unified command. The Military Departments that provide forces are tasked to administer and support them. The commander of a unified command is to exercise "operational command" over these forces. In a unified command, a service component commander is assigned as the conduit for both channels. The component commander may be responsible to the unified commander in the operational chain of command and is responsible to the Military Department in the chain of command for all responsibilities less operational command. Operational Command (OPCOM) is defined as comprising:

"... those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command is exercised through Service component commanders or through commanders of subordinate forces... Operational command does not include matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. However, operational command includes directive authority necessary to coordinate logistic and administrative policies and procedures. The terms "operational command" and "operational control" are synonymous..."²

Although operational command is adequately defined in JCS Pub 2, there is no definition for the residual responsibilities remaining in the uniservice channel other than administrative control (see Appendix A) which is not used by any service or the JCS in this context. The US Army has chosen to call this residual "command less operational control."³ The unified commander, in addition to operational command, has directive authority in the field of logistics to provide common-servicing, joint-servicing, or cross-servicing agreements or assignments.⁴

Let us examine a unified command. The President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the JCS, exercises command of forces in a theater through a unified command. A unified command is under a single commander, composed of elements from two or more services and performs a broad continuing mission.

The unified command has a joint staff composed of members from each service with forces assigned. The unified commander is authorized to exercise operational command of assigned forces through a component commander, a subordinate unified (subunified) commander (approved by DOD), a uniservice force commander (approved by JCS), a joint task force commander (established by the unified commander), through attachment of one force to another, or directly to a specific operational force commander (under exceptional circumstance and with DOD approval). A unified commander may not normally act as a component or other subordinate commander.⁵ A service component, commanded by an officer of that service, consists of all personnel, units, organizations, or installations which have been assigned to the operational command of the unified commander. Additionally, other personnel, detachments, units, and organizations may be assigned in his service role. These elements usually contribute to accomplishment of the unified commander's mission. Component commanders are responsible for the following:⁶

- a. Preparation of recommendations for the unified commander on the proper employment of his component.
- b. Accomplishment of operational missions assigned by the unified commander.
- c. Obtain the unified commander's views concerning plans resulting from significant changes in logistic support, prior to implementation or final decision.
- d. Internal administration and discipline.
- e. Training in own service doctrine, techniques, and tactical

methods.

f. Tactical employment of the forces of his component.

g. Service intelligence matters.

h. Communication directly with the service chief on uni-service matters relating to administration, personnel, training (US and allied), logistics, communications, doctrine, and combat developments and other matters when of uni-service nature, such as uni-service responsible intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

i. Conduct of joint operations training for his and other services.

j. Selection and nomination of specific units for subordinate forces to meet the unified commander's operational requirements. These forces revert to component commander control upon dissolution.

k. Operation of the service logistic support system based on the unified command directive and appropriate departmental instructions.

A unified commander may establish a subordinate unified command (subunified command) with the approval of Secretary of Defense. A subunified command has functions and responsibilities similar to a unified commander, but for his sub-area of the unified command area. The general organization of a subunified command and headquarters is also similar to a unified command. Its components have the same relationship to the unified command service components as they have with the military departments. They possess responsibilities similar to the unified service components. A type organization indicating relationships is at Figure 9.

TYPE UNIFIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION




Figure 9

Army doctrine for the service component is found in FM 100-15 (TEST).⁸ The Army component command of a unified command is the theater army. Its mission is to organize, equip, train, and provide US Army forces to support the requirements of the unified command. This document differentiates between war and peacetime relationships; the joint publications do not. During war, the theater army (component) commander is to exercise command over all Army forces, less operational control of elements retained directly under operational command of the unified commander. During peace, the theater Army (component) commander normally exercises command, including operational control (command), of all Army forces in the theater except Army air defense artillery, US Army Communications Command elements, and US Army Security Agency elements.⁹ The functions of a theater Army are divided into two categories: support of unified command plans, and service component support. In the first category the commander is responsible for Army plans and forces to accomplish the unified commander's plans for the following:¹⁰

- a. Land combat
- b. Intelligence
- c. Psychological operations
- d. Civil affairs operations
- e. Unconventional warfare
- f. Theater air defense
- g. Cover and deception, and electronic warfare operations
- h. Special ammunition support
- i. Combat service support to other services and allies

The service component support functions are:

- a. Internal administration and discipline
- b. Training in Army doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
- c. Enemy prisoner-of-war and captured US Army personnel policy and planning
- d. Employment of forces placed under OPCOM of the theater Army by the unified commander
- e. Combat service support to Army forces in the theater

Although joint doctrine specifies that the unified commander has operational command of Army forces assigned to the theater, Army doctrine makes the condition dependent on war or an emergency. The concept provides for the unified commander to assume operational command of corps and other designated combat and combat support forces to accomplish the theater mission or to transfer operational command to a designated headquarters such as a subordinate unified command or joint task force. In an unusual situation, the theater Army (component) commander might be given an operational responsibility for all Army forces. In peacetime, the theater Army commander is responsible for the direction and coordination of Army intelligence activities in the theater as directed by the theater (unified) commander; whereas in war, the unified commander may assume operational command of selected Army intelligence elements. The theater Army is tasked to exercise operational command of the theater Army communications command (TACCOM) for installation, maintenance, and operation of theater communications. The theater Army command also possesses a theater Army support command (TASCOM) which is to exercise overall

control of combat service support operations. The theater Army commander reports directly to the Army Chief of Staff on uni-service matters.¹¹

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) is geographically the largest command. The Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) is responsible for an area of 85 million square miles and forces from all three services. The Pacific theater extends from the west coasts of North and South America through the Indian Ocean including South Asia. The PACOM mission is to assist in accomplishment of US military policies and strategy in the Pacific Ocean, to defend the United States from attack throughout the area, and to provide security assistance to friendly nations in the theater.¹² Additionally, CINCPAC acts as the US military representative to the Australia, New Zealand, and United States mutual defense pact, the Manila Pact, and the US and Korea, Japan, and Republic of China Treaties. CINCPAC also is the chief US military planner for the defense of these areas. PACOM has had from two to four subordinate unified commands and two or three service components during the past 15 years. During the conflict in Vietnam, PACOM had the following subordinate commands: US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, US Forces Korea, US Forces Taiwan, and US Forces Japan. Each subunified command had three service components. Additionally, PACOM possessed the following service components: the US Army Pacific, the US Pacific Fleet, and the US Pacific Air Force. The organization is shown at Figure 7. The PACOM structure remained essentially as shown until the termination of the conflict in Vietnam.

USARPAC, the Army component in the Pacific, originally functioned

as a direct theater Army. Prior to 1953, it commanded all Army forces in the Pacific. The creation of the subunified commands, US Forces Korea and US Forces Japan, significantly altered this role. USARPAC's post 1953 organizational relationship with the other Army forces in the Pacific can be seen in Figure 10. This headquarters did not command combat forces for they were all assigned to subunified commands. It appears that its major role was to provide service support and to act as a terminal for uni-service matters in the Pacific. Additionally, it appears to have played a key role in Army force deployments to the Republic of Vietnam. Available unclassified documents indicate that USARPAC performed many functions. Significant specific functions were:¹³

- a. Military mapping of the theater
- b. Military theater communications
- c. Search and rescue in specified areas
- d. Civil assistance in the US and trust territories
- e. Administration of Army Reserve Components
- f. Maintenance of combat readiness in assigned forces
- g. Air defense support to the Pacific Air Force
- h. Participation in the Military Assistance Program (currently called security assistance)
 - i. Psychological warfare in the theater
 - j. Military intelligence and counterintelligence in theater
 - k. Support of Army agencies and other services in the Pacific
 - l. Conduct of military exchange and training programs with allies

US ARMY ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC, 1963¹⁴




Figure 10

m. Logistical support of Army forces in the Pacific and other services as directed by CINCPAC.

Generalized functions, derived from various unclassified sources are:

- a. Planning for all assigned missions and functions
- b. Coordination and supervision of operational missions assigned by CINCPAC
- c. Logistical support of Army forces and other services as directed by CINCPAC
- d. Administrative support of assigned Army forces
- e. Training of assigned Army forces and other services as directed by CINCPAC
- f. Organization and assignment of Army forces for operational missions as directed by CINCPAC
- g. Intelligence processing and counterintelligence of uni-service nature or as directed by CINCPAC
- h. Controlling the employment of Army tactical forces in theater as directed by CINCPAC
- i. Command of Army forces not assigned to a subunified command or under operational command of CINCPAC¹⁵
- j. Preparation of recommendations for CINCPAC
- k. Staff support of PACOM through the preparation of studies, reports, and position papers
- l. Supervision of deployment of Army forces utilizing the strategic mobility system.

USARPAC retained these functions throughout the war in Vietnam, although their importance fluctuated. The decreasing commitment in

Vietnam resulted in a draw down of forces assigned to USARPAC.

The disestablishment of USARPAC and the substitution of US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) in lieu of a component command generated considerable controversy. The reason for the realignment has been described as purely a means to reallocate funds for more combat power from the Army force structure. In an attempt to develop a framework for the underlying restructuring rationale, a survey was distributed to be completed by officers from the following organizations:

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff	25 copies
b. USA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans	25 copies
c. CINCPAC	25 copies
d. US Army CINCPAC Support Group	25 copies
e. US Pacific Fleet	25 copies
f. US Pacific Air Force	25 copies
g. USA, Command and General Staff College	50 copies

The survey is at Appendix B. The survey methodology and results are at Appendix C. The respondents considered reduction of costs as the most important reason for disestablishment, while performance of functions other headquarters could perform was second. Strategic considerations were considered as the least important reasons. A summary of the responses is at Table 1. Written comments demonstrated a general consensus that the primary motivation was reduction of costs to allow the Army to field a 16 division force.

Reasons for Disestablishment of USARPAC

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Consensus</u>
To reduce costs	Important
Because functions can be performed by other headquarters	Undecided
To improve unity of command	Unimportant
To reduce public and Congressional criticism	Undecided
To increase importance of subunified commands	Unimportant
To emphasize European Theater	Unimportant
To reduce number of general officer billets	Undecided


NOTE: For complete data see Appendix C.

Table 1

USACSG possesses a twofold mission.¹⁶ First, it is to provide liaison, advice, and assistance to CINCPAC and the service components in PACOM on matters of interest to the US Army, and to act as the Army coordination authority in PACOM. Secondly, it is to assist CINCPAC in preparing plans and to prepare the Army supporting plans for areas that are not in a major Army command (MACOM). To accomplish this mission, USACSG is authorized direct coordination with all Army organizations stationed or represented in the Pacific, to include all Department of the Army (DA) staff agencies. USACSG comes under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, DA. The PACOM organizational structure and relationships in PACOM are portrayed in Figure 11. Figure 12 presents the Army relationships in the Pacific. As a result of the disestablishment of USARPAC, there is no single Army component in the Pacific; therefore, the command and coordination relationships are complex. PACOM exercises operational command of Army forces through the subunified commands and their Army components which are also MACOM's, reporting directly to DA. PACOM exercises operational command of Army forces not assigned to a subunified command through the Commander, USACSG. This occurs in spite of the specific statement that the Commander USACSG will "not be in the chain of command nor act as a component commander for US Army forces stationed in the PACOM area."¹⁷

USACSG also is the channel by which CINCPAC exercises operational command of the Army elements of the Defense Communication System (formerly TACCOM forces). USACSG is tasked to maintain the same staff relationship with CINCPAC as USARPAC provided, except for


UNIFIED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM 16



1. Also DA MACOM
2. Integrated in Hq UN/USFK
3. Under OPCOM of Cdr Korea Air Def Sector
4. FOA of Hq DA (DCSOPS)
5. Cdr Dual Hatted as Cdr USASCH
6. Integrated with Hq USARJ Cdr Dual Hatted
7. Army Command is exercised by Cdr USA FORSCOM, thus Cdr USASCH
8. Under OPCOM of I Corps C

Figure 11

US ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM¹⁹



1. Also Army component to subunified command
2. Integrated into UNC/USFK/EUSA
3. OPCOM Cdr, Korean Air Def Sector
4. Commander Dual Hatted
5. 29th Bde & 100/442 roundout to 25th ID
6. Under OPCOM of I Corps Group

Figure 12

those areas encompassed by a MACOM's operational command relationship with CINCPAC. USACSG's role with the MACOMs is to communicate directly with them to obtain information, advice, and recommendations necessary to accomplish assigned tasks.²⁰ USACSG has been assigned the following functions by DA:²¹

- a. To represent DA in relations with Hq PACOM and the PACOM service components in Hawaii
- b. To perform as the DA executive agent and exercise operational command for CINCPAC over the Defense Communications Systems Army operating elements in the Pacific
- c. As the DA executive agent, to execute Army responsibilities and exercise operational command for CINCPAC over those Army forces not further assigned to Army components of subunified commands
- d. As the DA executive agent, to exercise directive authority for logistics of PACOM Army forces not addressed through subunified command channels
- e. To act as the CINCPAC executive agent for the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MCG) Center of the Intelligence Center Pacific (ICPAC)
- f. To act as the DA Coordinating Authority for Army matters of CINCPAC concern which transcend one MACOM area
- g. To execute Army planning responsibilities for areas not within the area of responsibility of a MACOM, and review plans prepared by USASCH for Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific
- h. To review plans pertaining to the PACOM area, as requested

by CINCPAC, and attempt to obtain resolution of problems as the DA coordination authority in the Pacific

i. To arrange and coordinate Army support for CINCPAC requirements which are outside of MACOM areas or transcend one MACOM in the following areas: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications and electronics, medical services, and security assistance

j. To provide DA policy information and coordinate Army requirements concerning Army aviation, civil affairs, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, air defense, and nuclear, chemical, and electronic warfare for areas outside of or transcending one MACOM

k. To provide information and advice on the readiness of Army forces not reporting through a subordinate unified command to CINCPAC

l. To coordinate Army participation in joint training and exercises outside of MACOM areas

m. To provide advice on Army doctrine and review service and joint doctrine as required

n. To provide DA logistic policy information on war reserves, supply, transportation, maintenance engineering, subsistence, petroleum, field service, and defense interservice support.

o. To provide DA communications and electronics policy, plans, programs, procedures, and concepts as required

p. To provide DA policy information concerning Army health care; to provide liaison, advice, and assistance to CINCPAC concerning health care in Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, the Trust Territories of the Pacific, and all areas outside of or transcending one MACOM to

CINCPAC; to act as the Army medical coordinating authority to CINCPAC and the service components; and to provide liaison and advice in preparation of medical plans to CINCPAC

q. To function as Operating Agency 82 for distribution of Security Assistance, Military Assistance Program (MAP) training and MAP funds throughout the Western Pacific

r. To provide liaison, advice, and assistance and have coordinating authority to include policy, plans, programs and procedures, concerning armed forces of participating foreign countries in security assistance programs in PACOM

It appears that functionally USACSG performs many of the same functions as USARPAC.

A brief examination of other service components in the Pacific appears beneficial to an overall understanding of component command concepts. US Navy component doctrine is primarily a function of the centralized operational command and control system utilized by the Navy. This system has operated with little change since the conclusion of World War II. The Secretary of the Navy administers the Navy Department through three offices. The first is the civilian assistant secretaries who administer the bureaus which provide for logistical administration of the Navy. The second is the Commandant of the Marine Corps who commands all Marine forces not assigned to the Navy operating forces. The third, and most important, is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) who supervises all Naval operating forces. These operating forces are organized into fleets, sea-going forces, and fleet marine forces. The CNO is responsible to the Secretary

of the Navy not only for supervision of these elements but also for determination of priorities for maintenance and construction, and direction of their overall activities.²² In PACOM, the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) is the Navy operating force and the Navy service component to CINCPAC. CINCPAC, in accordance with joint doctrine, exercises operational command over Naval forces in the Pacific through PACFLT. The CNO exercises command less operational command of the same forces through PACFLT.²³ A representative organization is at Figure 9. As can readily be seen, the Navy structure effectively insures centralized Navy control of all Naval operating forces.

The air forces are organized similar to the Army. The Secretary of the Air Force administers the department through the Air Staff which is headed by his principal adviser, the Chief of Staff. The staff provides policy guidance and support to the major air commands, both operating and support.²⁴ The major air commands report directly to the department, but the operating commands come under the operational command of either the JCS as a specified command or a unified command. The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is the major air command in the Pacific and the Air Force component to CINCPAC. PACAF exercises command over all air force organizations in the Pacific, including forces within subordinate unified commands. In the event of hostilities, the subordinate unified service components would be under the operational command of the subunified commander and would be augmented by PACAF. The Air Force, through this structure, maintains command less OPCOM of all forces through an intermediate command in the Pacific theater rather than have the subunified service components

report directly to Department of the Air Force as does the Army.

The evolution of PACOM and the current situation as described are complex. How adequate and effective is the structure? Does USACSSG as organized and tasked perform sufficient functions in PACOM to be economically viable? Examination of the PACOM structure will test the viability of our joint doctrine and provide tentative answers to these and other questions.

CHAPTER IV

ALTERNATIVES FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

Based on historical and empirical evidence, an evaluation of joint command and control organizational doctrine, and the Army elements fulfilling these requirements can now be completed. This analysis compares the US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) to the US Army Pacific (USARPAC), compares USACSG to the other PACOM service components, and develops organizational and strategic implications of further change.

First, let us compare USARPAC and USACSG with respect to their organizational relationships in PACOM, the functions performed by each, and their ability to meet the needs of CINCPAC in a crisis. The organizational relationships are displayed in Figures 7, 10, 11, and 12. The position of USARPAC offered an excellent system for problem resolution; one more suitable than the current organization. Problems that surfaced in a subunified command or military mission outside a MACOM, if not resolved to the satisfaction of the Army component commander or senior mission officer, could be referred to USARPAC for resolution at theater level. The limited authority of USACSG and the MACOM direct channel to DA may result in problems which cannot be solved in a subunified command, being unnecessarily referred to DA. It is conceivable and historically demonstrated that this occurrence would not be well received at CINCPAC. The appearance of a single military department performing functions of a component command and intervening in a theater may appear to the other service components as inappropriate and thus exacerbate service

rivalry. USARPAC provided a means for CINCPAC to rapidly execute decisions in areas outside the subunified commands where Army forces were deemed necessary; for example, due to its size a uniservice Task Force or joint headquarters element could easily be assembled. Although USACSG can theoretically accomplish this, there is a question as to whether it possesses the size and proper organization to effectively implement decisions requiring operational command or deployment of forces. On the other hand, USARPAC can be termed a redundant headquarters. In the late 1960's, with all Army forces assigned to one of the four subunified commands, USARPAC commanded only a few logistical units. It functioned principally as a coordinating agent and the Army representative to CINCPAC. This is essentially the role that USACSG now performs. Additionally, USARPAC as well as CINCPAC was sometimes bypassed during the Vietnam war. Ample evidence exists that COMUSMACV was not only managed by Washington, but that there existed little unity of command at any level.¹ In Washington many agencies, such as the CIA, AID, and USIA exercised authority over their elements in Vietnam either through elements in Hawaii or directly.² This situation of multiple lines of command extended down through CINCPAC into Vietnam where the ambassadors were either powerless to provide unity of command or declined the power when offered.³ A symptom of this problem can be seen in the organization for the air war, where COMUSMACV supervised the air war in South Vietnam while CINCPAC did so in North Vietnam.⁴ As a result of the rapidly improving communications capabilities, the President is able to bypass unified commanders and communicate

directly with the combat commands, thus increasing the rapidity with which to respond to critics and the Congress.⁵ The tendency toward centralized control, although feasible in a limited war, may not be possible or desirable in a general war or a two theater conflict. Therefore, this tendency must be resisted and adequate headquarters provided to handle decentralized operations such as occurred in World War II where national agencies conducted strategic planning and allocated resources, while the theater commanders planned and managed the conduct of the war within their areas of responsibility.

An examination of the functions performed by USARPAC and USACSG⁶ indicate that USACSG performs the same functions as USARPAC with one exception. A schematic of the two agencies' functions is at Table 2. The unperformed essential function is command less operational command of Army forces in the Korean and Japanese MACOMs. This responsibility was implicitly assumed by DA after USARPAC was disestablished. Coordination authority in the Pacific for multi-command matters is exercised by USACSG. The author's survey, presented in Chapter III, indicates that the respondents considered the most important functions of a service component to be 1) administrative and logistical support of forces, 2) conduct and supervision of strategic mobility movements, 3) liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces, and 4) planning. The least important functions were 1) coordination and supervision of operational missions, 2) command of forces, 3) liaison with other theater service forces, and 4) security assistance support to other nations. The respondents, however, when describing the functions of USACSG,

Functions Performed

<u>USARPAC</u>	<u>USACEG</u>
1. Planning	1. For areas outside MACOM
2. Coordination and supervision of operational missions	2. Exercise OPCOM over forces not in subunified command
3. Logistical support of forces	3. With directive authority for forces not in subunified cmd
4. Administrative support of forces	4. Same
5. Training of forces	5. Joint training coordination XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. Organization of forces for operational mission	6. Coordinate outside MACOM
7. Intelligence processing	7. Same as 2
8. Controlling employment of tactical forces	
9. Command of forces not in subunified command	3. As DA executive agent at PACOM
10. Preparation of recommendations for CINCPAC	9. As DA representative
11. Staff support of PACOM	10. Same
12. Supervision of deployment of Army forces	11. Supervise intransit Army forces in PACOM
13. Military mapping of theater	12. As CINCPAC Executive Agent
14. Military theater communications	13. As DA executive agent in PACOM
15. Search and rescue	14. Same
16. Civil assistance in US territory	15. Same
17. Administration of reserve components	XXXXXXXXXXXX
18. Maintenance of combat readiness of assigned forces	16. Information and advice to CINCPAC
19. Air defense support to PACAF	17. Coordinate outside MACOM
20. Participate in Military Assistance Program	18. Function as Operating Agency 32 in Western Pacific
21. Psychological warfare	19. Coordinate outside MACOM
22. Military intelligence and counter-intelligence	20. Coordinate outside MACOM
23. Support Army agencies in Pacific	21. Coordinate support
24. Conduct military exchange programs with allies	22. Coordinate outside MACOM
	23. Represent DA with other service components
	24. DA coordinating authority for matters that transcend a MACOM
	25. Coordinate CINCPAC plans in all of PACOM
	26. Coordinate Army support for CINCPAC for areas outside MACOM

Table 2

Relative Order of Function Importance

<u>Function</u>	<u>Service Component</u>	<u>USACSG</u>
Coordinate and supervise operational missions	12	13
Planning	5	1
Logistical support of forces	1	3
Administrative support of forces	2	9
Training of forces	11	15
Organize forces for operational missions	10	10
Intel processing	6	11
Control of employment of tactical forces	9	14
Command of forces	13	12
Prepare recommendations for unified commander	8	4
Staff support of unified cdr	7	2
Conduct and supervise strategic mobility movements	3	5
Liaison with other theater service forces	14	7
Security assistance support to other nations	15	8
Liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces	4	6

Table 3

indicated the most important functions to be 1) planning, 2) staff support for CINCPAC, 3) logistic support of forces (not administrative support), and 4) preparation of recommendations for CINCPAC. The least important functions are 1) command of forces, 2) coordination and supervision of operational missions, 3) control and employment of tactical forces, and 4) training of forces. A summary of the data is at Table 3. The survey results are at Appendix C.

The respondents perspective as to the importance of service component functions are in consonance with historical evidence as to missions and responsibilities. From the foregoing, one must conclude that functions pertaining to the support of forces and operational missions are the most important for a service component. Whereas, those pertaining to relations with the unified command and the other service forces are relatively unimportant. USACSG is perceived by the survey respondents as performing functions which are considered less important for a service component. With the exception of logistical support, all of the more important USACSG missions are to support CINCPAC. This is reinforced by the CINCPAC support mission statement of the Group. Because the agency fulfills all service component functions except one, and its more important functions are those which are relatively unimportant for a service component, one could deduce that a service component is not necessary.

As a result of the survey, there appears to be some essential functions to be performed by an Army element collocated with CINCPAC. These functions are those that support the unified headquarters. Functions relevant to support of forces and support of operational

missions may be accomplished at other locations. Perhaps the most critical function to examine is deployment of Army forces outside a MACOM where no joint command and control structure exists. This question of deployment and employment of a contingency force outside of a MACOM must be rigorously analyzed.

In a crisis, CINCPAC requires immediate advice, planning, and logistical support coordination from the service that supplies the contingency force. The element performing this role must have the capability to coordinate for and support the force during both deployment and employment. Additionally, the responsible service must develop an effective command and control structure whether the contingency force is a uni-service or joint task force. The element performing this role must not necessarily be located with CINCPAC but could be the tactical headquarters of the contingency force. Immediate advice, planning, and coordination for an Army force, however, must be provided by an element collocated with CINCPAC. The principal issue is how command, either operational command and/or command less OPCOM, and support of the force can most effectively be achieved.

For a joint task force with a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, command and control is relatively simple for either CINCPAC, a service component, or USACSG.⁷ As a uni-service force or a force without the JCSE, lack of effective multi-mode command and control systems may drastically reduce effective command and support of a contingency force. Creation of a subunified command and assignment of adequate signal units will

take considerable time. Until this or another structural arrangement is completed, existing headquarters and facilities must be capable of effective command, control, and support. Unless immediately adjacent to the area of contingency force employment, MACOMs will be of little help. This problem is one which must be planned for through assignment of adequate resources on a continuing basis to the agency that will control a uni-service or joint task force. If currently assigned Defense Communications Agency elements in the Pacific can support only CINCPAC, Army communications elements must be assigned to the Army element performing component functions. Support of a contingency force should, theoretically, not be a problem as a result of the Direct Support System which provides logistical support from the US Army's logistic MACOM directly to the contingency force.³ The primary logistical requirement at theater level is coordination with CINCPAC and the other services. Logistical problems can be solved with the logistical directive authority that currently exists in USACSG or a similar element. Analysis indicates that USACSG performs in large measure the same functions as USARPAC, occupies essentially the same position in the organizational structure, and can exercise operational command of a contingency force with appropriate command and control system support. Logistical support can be provided by the US Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH) which was created from elements of USARPAC and US Army Hawaii. USASCH, a headquarters of considerable size, is responsible for the significant Army logistical facilities in the Central Pacific.

Comparison of USACSG with the other PACOM service components is

not, as I have found, in and of itself a particularly useful exercise. Besides each service component reflecting its own bias concerning command and service rivalry, the forces of each service operate differently and possess service-peculiar requirements which must be provided for by its component headquarters. This is particularly true of the Navy. Although each component's functions and relationship within the organizational structure are similar to the Army concepts, the operation of the forces is very different. Naval forces, as previously described, operate as autonomous entities and only provide support to a subunified command, joint task force, or other commands. Autonomy is vigorously defended by the Navy on the basis of the need for theater flexibility and the uniqueness of the service forces. The Navy service component has as its primary responsibility command of its operating and support forces. The Air Force service component also retains command of its operating and support forces. The basis for this arrangement is flexibility of response. Forces in a subunified command are provided only in support, although during the Vietnam conflict operational command was exercised. This arrangement allows for responsive firepower that can be rapidly shifted and was developed during World War II as an outgrowth of strategic bombing. This centralization, also used in the Korean War and Vietnam, resulted in a lack of flexibility and responsiveness to the tactical ground force commander, and may result in inadequate air power for the front-line forces at times when it is critically needed.⁹ Air Force doctrine does provide for assignment of forces to subunified and joint task force commanders under operational control.¹⁰ Air

Force concepts for utilization of its unified command service component lie between that of the Navy, which historically has given the service component an operational mission, and the Army which has not.

The current Army structure in the Pacific appears to be adequate for normal peacetime operations. The critical question, however, is whether this structure is sufficient to handle an emergency like the Pueblo incident or a crisis such as deployment of a contingency force or the conduct of a general war in the theater. Although these questions are beyond the scope of this study, it appears that the current organizational structure may be inadequate for handling these situations if they should occur outside a MACOM's area of influence. CINCPAC, to handle a crisis, can look either to its components or to a subunified command for forces. The latter is unlikely since their forces are fully committed. Securing forces from the Navy and Air Force can occur rapidly since those component commanders do exercise command over all forces in the Pacific. Coordination for currently assigned forces would remain in theater. If Army forces were necessary, the situation would be quite different. The Army Pacific reserve, the 25th Infantry Division located in Hawaii, is under the operational command of CINCPAC through USACSG. The division, however, is under the command less OPCOM of US Army Forces Command through USASCH.¹¹ The structure is shown in Figures 11 and 12. Although assigned to PACOM, the division is under the daily control of FORSCOM. It is reasonable to assume that prior to employment of this unit, concurrence would have to be obtained from the JCS who would request

concurrence of the only common Army command, DA. This process would take considerable time. It is doubtful that CINCPAC would consider use of an Army force because of this when he has Marine forces assigned to PACFLT. Another problem area which would be affected by change is that of security assistance. Current concepts call for the Army component command to exercise the responsibilities of the Army coordinator and operating agency for security assistance in the Western Pacific. This responsibility necessitates liaison, advice, and assistance to the armed forces of foreign countries (e.g. New Zealand, Taiwan). As a result of the disestablishment of USARPAC and the subsequent compression of the USACSG grade structure, coordination with the foreign countries is undoubtedly handled by officers of lower rank than previously and by personnel with other responsibilities. This, coupled with the US disengagement from Southeast Asia, has evidently created concern on the part of foreign governments as to the support that could be expected from the US.¹² This perceived reduction in interest has already initiated some realignment within the Pacific and unless the perception is altered, may result in the loss of strategically important allies, resources, and facilities. The loss of forward bases could seriously reduce US capability to execute military strategy in the Pacific through limitations on logistical support and strategic mobility operations. As a policy of increasing importance and impact, considerable weight must be given to adequate security assistance support in any structural changes in PACOM.

Organizational change in joint doctrine has been recommended by

several studies. One such study critically examined the existing structure of unified and subordinate unified commands with a case study of Korea.¹³ Oriented primarily on the US Air Force, the examination was based on a Congressional subcommittee's criticism of the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents in Korea. The subcommittee was critical of the slow response times of the command and control structure, the poor intelligence sensitivity at all levels, the lack of contingency plans, and the lack of widespread knowledge on US force availability. The study concluded that existing multiple paths of operational control significantly detracted from unity of effort, and the organizational structure has reduced PACOM's ability to effectively accomplish its mission. The study's author found that "the existing command and control structure is complex with multiple layers of command...and unable to meet the emergency requirements of the President. It is fragmented...exhibits little unity of effort...and possesses an area far beyond its capability."¹⁴ His recommended solution was a reorganization involving 1) elimination of the option for a unified command to exercise operational command through a component commander, 2) establishment of four subunified commands sharing geographic responsibility for all of PACOM, and 3) establishment of a clear cut chain of command and reduction of redundant headquarters. Accomplishment would be achieved through one of two proposals for PACOM reorganization. The first was to eliminate the PACOM component commanders and place all forces in the Pacific under one of the four new subunified commanders. Service representation on the PACOM staff would be through each service

assigning a deputy commander with a small staff. The second proposal was to retain greatly reduced component commands to support PACOM with the newly created four subunified commands formed from existing elements (including service components). The study, unfortunately, did not adequately address financial constraints or the political realities of inter-service cooperation, nor did it address the need for component commands.

Another study examined the Army command and control structure in unified and subunified commands.¹⁵ This study was a historical survey to determine the appropriate number of control echelons between Department of the Army (DA) and combatant forces. The study showed that unity of command, although declared important in every war, has never been completely implemented. The National Security Act of 1947, which formalized the JCS, provided for the unified structure of today and allowed creation of subunified commands on an as required basis. PACOM, due to its size, immediately received these commands while retaining its service components. Through a somewhat tortuous analysis of Army FM 100-15, JCS doctrine, and historical records, the study concluded that Army Groups and Theater Armies confuse Army logistical, administrative, and command and control systems. Therefore, these elements should be eliminated to increase doctrinal compatibility with the current role of the Army in support of unified commands. Other conclusions were that doctrine for US Army command and control between DA and combatant forces did not materially change since the Civil War and that the concepts in Korea do not coincide with those of the Army or those employed in the

remainder of PACOM. He further concluded that the unified and sub-unified command concept is valid and that the command and control structure for RMI adequately supported active combat without a Field Army Headquarters.

The author's arguments, although well prepared, are somewhat misplaced. The question of Army command and control of theater operating forces is not the relevant issue for, "...the mission of the Army is to develop land forces for sustained combat, while the unified commands under the Secretary of Defense direct and control operations."¹⁶ The most important finding from this study is that theater armies no longer serve a vital purpose in the structure and confuse the management of forces.

The question of whether a service component is necessary for a unified command was addressed in the author's survey. The respondents indicated a service component was necessary because it performs functions other headquarters cannot and provides service representation in the unified command headquarters. Written comments also supported the necessity for having service components. The most often mentioned reason was to insure Army representation in the unified command. When responding to questions concerning the necessity of USACSG, respondents indicated that the agency was necessary for the same reasons. The most frequently mentioned comment supported the requirement for a service component and the USACSG because they provided on-site representation in PACOM. The results of the survey are at Appendix C.

Further change to the structure in PACOM appears necessary to

insure adequate support to CINCPAC, responsiveness in a crisis, and support of national security assistance objectives. Additionally, joint doctrine for command and control in a unified command must be revised to provide a flexible yet economical means to support the theater and exercise required command in all situations. The evidence suggests the following findings:

a. The Army service component/theater army has historically not performed an operational or tactical mission but rather provided staff support to the unified command and administrative and logistical support to the operating force commander.

b. Joint doctrine, which requires a service component for a unified command, does not provide adequate flexibility for situations where a component command is merely performing a staff support role.

c. Current Army logistical doctrine negates the requirement for a theater headquarters to perform logistical support functions other than coordination.

d. US Army CINCPAC Support Group is performing the same functions and has the same organizational relationships as the US Army Pacific, less command over Army forces in the Pacific subunified commands.

e. Missions, functions, and force requirements of the operating forces of the various services are dissimilar, indicating that the requirement for all to provide the same type of interface with a unified command may be uneconomical, ineffective, and not allowing the services to provide the best support to the National Command Authority.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Historically, unified command service components have performed administrative and logistical support functions. Unified commanders have exercised operational command of Army combat forces either through a subordinate unified command or directly to the combat forces headquarters. The unified command structure evolved as a result of service rivalries and the personal desires of the senior commanders involved. The contributions of Generals MacArthur, Ridgeway, and Westmoreland, and Admirals Nimitz and Sharp are well documented. The effect of more recent commanders is less widely known. The disestablishment of USARPAC created conflict in the Pacific which rivaled that of World War II. The proposal to eliminate the Army service component sparked debate in the Pacific, the military departments, and the JCS Joint Staff.¹ Although concerned, the Joint Staff avoided the issue, even though there was a question as to the legality of the action. The other services argued against the proposal in the belief that it would result in a demand for elimination of their component headquarters. The CINCPAC, Admiral Noel Gayler, and his staff argued strongly against the move because it would create additional strategic planning and direction problems regarding Korea.

The problems surfaced or became more pronounced after disestablishment, but resulted from the special command situation in Korea, and the differences in opinion on strategic direction between the CINCPAC and his subunified commander of US Forces Korea, General Richard Stillwell. Stillwell occupied two additional positions. One

was that of the United Nations Commander reporting to the President, as the UN executive agent, through the JCS. The second was that of Commander, Eighth US Army. General Stillwell was very adept at using his various roles to secure the guidance he desired, which irritated Admiral Gayler. The disestablishment of USARPAC reduced CINCPAC's means of control and complicated his ability to coordinate, since now only one of the three command channels terminated in Hawaii. CINCPAC viewed and utilized USACSG as a component headquarters in many instances relating to Korea. This placed the DA field agency in a very sensitive position which at times resulted in friction and the unnecessary elevation of problems to DA.

Command changes at CINCPAC and in Korea in late 1976 did much to resolve the friction. General John Vessey, who assumed command in Korea, and Admiral Maurice Weisner, who took over CINCPAC, developed a rapport and flow of communications that significantly improved strategic planning in the Pacific. It is clear that the personalities and service rivalries have contributed greatly to the problems in developing an appropriate command and control structure in the Pacific.

Joint doctrine has changed little in the last 25 years, while service technology and organization theory have expanded to the point where certain concepts in JCS Pub 2 may have outlived their usefulness. USARPAC performed few essential functions in its later years. With the advent of the Direct Support System and centralized administration, even the more important service component functions are no longer essential. The fact that USARPAC was disestablished and DA is

capable of handling administration and logistical support directly with the MACOMs, strongly suggests there is no longer a requirement for a service component.

USACSG's primary role is as an Army support element to PACOM. Although it is tasked with essentially the same functions as USARPAC, the survey responses indicate the more important functions are those that support CINCPAC. Support of the unified headquarters has increased in importance as a function and currently appears to be a predominant responsibility. Appropriate reorganization of the Army structure could provide for adequate assumption of all USACSG missions other than those related to support of CINCPAC. For example, security assistance support, liaison with allies, and strategic mobility movements could be assumed world wide by DA field agencies in CONUS. Examination and comparison with other service's component commands contribute little to determination of the necessity for an Army service component.

Service representation in the unified command headquarters will remain a prime reason for retention of component commands or similar agencies unless all services disestablish their components simultaneously. Service rivalry is too significant a factor in this issue.

Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions have been derived:

- a. Joint doctrine, as set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, requires thorough, in-depth analysis by the JCS and military departments to update the concepts with current technological and organizational developments in the services.

b. Joint doctrine, in JCS Pub 2, does not adequately delineate command relationships of theater forces by avoiding discussion of the residual responsibilities beyond operational command.

c. Joint doctrine, in JCS Pub 2, does not provide for the development and evolution of unified or subunified commands in time of war. This would result in such commands being established on an ad hoc basis, as is the historical precedent, thus increasing the probability of development of inappropriate command and control relationships.

d. Army unified command service components have historically served primarily an administrative and logistical role which has been reduced greatly in importance through recent technological and organizational developments.

e. Army unified service components (theater armies) are no longer necessary to support unified command missions (administrative and logistical support of forces, etc.) for these functions can be performed by other agencies. The residue functions which pertain to support of the unified commander can be eliminated if all service components are simultaneously disestablished.

f. An Army component command is not necessary to fulfill strategic planning and operational functions in theater, for these functions can be adequately performed by MACOMs and a small planning group working within the unified command headquarters.

g. USACSG possesses the ability to fulfill the functions required of a service component in PACOM. However, these missions are not necessary and could be accomplished by a small service team assigned to Hq., PACOM.


In view of the preceding analysis and the subsequent conclusions, the following recommendations are provided as a framework for further study and discussion:

a. Joint doctrine should be revised to eliminate all unified command service components, and their functions should be assumed by a reorganized CINCPAC and service agencies deemed appropriate by the military departments.

b. Joint doctrine should be revised to allow a unified commander to exercise operational command only through a subordinate unified command, a joint task force, or a uni-service command (service task force). This eliminates the component command from the operational command chain.

c. Military departments should be tasked to provide a service headquarters to exercise operational command and command less operational command over service forces assigned to a subunified command or in another area within the unified command. An Army headquarters so tasked should be a MACOM, be located with the service forces he commands (not necessarily located with the unified command headquarters), and would act during planning, deployment and employment as a contingency force headquarters subordinate to a subunified command, a joint task force, or the unified command as a uni-service command. This headquarters would be similar to a field army; however, as a result of current centralized administrative and logistical concepts, these functions would be less important than previously. The resulting unified command structure is illustrated in Figure 13.

PROPOSED UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE



1. Army MACOH

Figure 13

d. The organizational structure of a unified command headquarters should be revised to include a staff liaison section from each service, headed by a general officer of appropriate rank who would be an assistant deputy commander of the unified command. This section should be a field agency from the military department empowered to coordinate uni-service matters within the unified command, while the MACOMs reported directly to DA. The liaison section would be equally important as any single staff section.

e. The unified command should be tasked as the single agency to conduct and supervise strategic mobility movements (deployments), security assistance support, and liaison with allied organizations and forces. Elimination of component commands coupled with direct assignment of the above functions would assist greatly in improving unity of command and reducing confusion in the theater. Service support of these tasks could be performed by service agencies in the United States.

f. Joint doctrine should be developed and appropriate units tasked to provide the nucleus or cadre for a new unified command, subunified command, or joint task force headquarters. These elements should be prepared for deployment in any theater. The US Readiness Command (REDCOM) would be an appropriate headquarters to task with this responsibility. Services could also task subordinates to provide portions of the headquarters. The function of strategic mobility movements could also be assigned to REDCOM, on a world wide basis. This would provide a permanent headquarters for all unified commands and the JCS to coordinate with on a priority basis.

g. Joint doctrine in JCS Pub 2 should be revised to fully discuss the responsibilities, concepts, and limitations of the residual tasks beyond "operational command"; whether they are termed "command less operational control," or "administrative control."

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Establishment of Unified Commands in Pacific Areas," JCS Message, 16 December 1946.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1978: Statement of Chairman JCS Before Congress, 20 January 1977.

CHAPTER II

1. Ney, Virgil, Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, Alexandria: Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations Inc., 1967.
2. Morton, Louis, Pacific Command, US Air Force Academy, .1961, p. 14; Morton, Louis, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Washington: Department of the Army, 1962, p. 250.
3. Ney, Evolution, p. 45; Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 195, 242, and 244.
4. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 232 and 249; Morton, Pacific Command, p. 7 and 8.
5. Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, p. 250.
6. Command and Employment of Military Forces, Montgomery: USAF Air War College, February 1952, p. 5; Morton, Pacific Command, p. 8-10.
7. Excellent presentation of the development is in Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years; analysis of the development is found in Morton, Pacific Command and Morton, Louis, "Command in the Pacific: 1941-45," Military Review, Vol. 41, December 1961, p. 76-88.
8. Ney, Evolution, p. 50.

9. Morton, Pacific Command, p. 30.
10. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 254, 404, and 409.
11. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 249, 251, and 254.
12. Ibid, p. 257-263, 485-490; Morton, Pacific Command, p. 20.
13. Morton, Pacific Command, p. 25-27; Morton, Command in the Pacific, p. 37; Smith, Robert R., Triumph in the Philippines, US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Washington: Department of the Army, 1963, p. 16.
14. Morton, Pacific Command, p. 31.
15. Morton, Pacific Command, p. 28.
16. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 251.
17. Ney, Evolution, p. 55 and 64; Schnabel, James F., Policy and Direction: The First Year, US Army in Korean War, Washington: Department of the Army, 1972, p. 47.
18. Ney, Evolution, p. 57.
19. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 307.
20. Ney, Evolution, p. 54 and 58; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 43; Operational and Administrative Channels in Far East and Pacific Commands, Washington: War Department, 6 February 1947, p. 4.
21. Ney, Evolution, p. 65 and 69.
22. Ibid, p. 64 and 70.
23. The Highlights of Reorganization, July 1957-June 1958, Ft. Shafter: US Army Pacific, 1958, p. 74.

24. Ney, Evolution, p. 75.
25. Eckhardt, George S., Vietnam Studies, Command and Control 1950-1969, Washington: Department of the Army, 1974, p. 50-53; Ney, Evolution, p. 75; CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, Report on the War in Vietnam, Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1968, p. 101.
26. The Highlights of Reorganization, July 1957-June 1958, Ft. Shafter: US Army Pacific, 1958, p. 3.
27. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, Report on the War, p. 111.
28. Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 55, 56, and 58; Ney, Evolution, p. 76; CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, Report on the War, p. 101.
29. Witze, Claude, "The Case for a Unified Command: CINCSEA," Air Force, Vol 50, January 1967, p. 23-29; Jones, Paul D., "The Case Against CINCSEA," Air Force, Vol 50, October 1967, p. 104-103; Recommendations which include a unified command for a future CINCSEA are in Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 86.
30. Ney, Evolution, p. 82.
31. Kinnard, Douglas, The War Managers, Hanover: University Press of New England, 1977, p. 56.
32. Thayer, Raymond E., A Unified Command for COMUSMACV(U), Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 17 February 1969, p. 59.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
33. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, Report on the War, p. 102.
34. Plan for Reorganization for the Military Headquarters in the Pacific, Washington: Department of Defense, 1 March 1975, p. 1; Unified Headquarters Staff Paper, Washington: Department of Defense, 30 October 1973, p. 1.
35. Discussions with members of USARPAC/USACSG who served during the 1974-1975 time frame expressed a great deal of criticism at the Army for its action.

CHAPTER III

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Pub 2, October 1974, p. 3.
2. Department of the Army, Larger Unit Operations, FM 100-15 (TEST), March 1974, p. 2-1.
3. Ibid, p. 2-2.
4. See Appendix A, Definitions.
5. The Atlantic Command CINC is the only so authorized commander.
6. JCS, Unified Action Armed Forces, p. 49.
7. FM 100-15 (TEST), p. 2-2 to 2-4.
8. Ibid, p. 3-1.
9. Ibid, p. 3-1.
10. Ibid, p. 3-3.
11. Ibid, p. 3-1.
12. Powers, Patrick W., A Guide to National Defense, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, p. 124.
13. Crosby, L. A., Trip Report to USARPAC, Ft. Leavenworth: USACGSC, 17 May 1960, p. 6.
14. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, Report on the War, p. iii and 102; Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 32; Crosby, Trip Report, p. 5.

15. Significant evidence exists in recent publications concerning the conflict in Vietnam that USARPAC was bypassed in many instances for all but the most mundane reports and decisions. This will be discussed in Chapter IV.
16. Department of the Army, Operations and Functions, United States Army CINCPAC Support Group, AR 10-49, 28 January 1975, p. 1.
17. Ibid, p. 5.
18. DA Operating Instructions for US Army Forces Stationed in the Pacific (U), Washington: Department of the Army, 22 July 1977, p. J-1-1 (SECRET).
19. Ibid, p. J-2-1.
20. The matter of who will assign these tasks is not addressed. As will be seen in Chapter IV, CINCPAC has used this to force USACSG to perform functions beyond its assigned role.
21. Operations and Functions, USACSG, p. 2.
22. Powers, A Guide to National Defense, p. 162.
23. Ibid, p. 162; Chapter 3, USACGSC, Reference Book 110-2, Navy and Marine Corps, 1 July 1977, refers to this as "administrative command" on page 3-1.
24. Powers, Guide to National Defense, p. 179; "Enclosure 1 'PACAF History CY 76'," Letter, SUBJECT: Request for Information of Major John Ellison, Hickam AFB: Headquarters US Pacific Air Forces, 5 April 1973, p. 1 and 8.

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1. Kinnard, Douglas, The War Managers, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977, p. 55.
2. Thompson, W. Scott and Donald D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam, New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1977, p. 139.

3. Ibid, p. 187.
4. Minard, The War Managers, p. 50.
5. See Chapter III.
6. See Chapter III.
7. US Army Command and General Staff College, Selected Readings in Tactics, Contingency Force Operations, RB 100-2, Vol. III, Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August 1977, p. 4-1.
8. Department of the Army, Combat Service Support, FM 100-10, Washington: Department of the Army, April 1976, p. 9-4.
9. Head, Richard G., "Doctrinal Innovation and the A-7 Attack Aircraft Decision," American Defense Policy, John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford Jr. (Eds), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977, p. 411; Smith, Perry M., "The Role of Doctrine," American Defense Policy, Endicott and Stafford, p. 403.
10. Powers, Patrick W., A Guide to National Defense, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, p. 180.
11. 25th Infantry Division, CINCPAC/CSG/USASCH/25th INF Div Cmd Relationships, Schofield Barracks: 25th Infantry Division (TLOP-PL), 11 November 1974, p. 3.
12. Clough, Ralph N., East Asia and US Security, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 235-239.
13. Brown, Gerald T., Command and Control in the Pacific, Maxwell AFB: Air War College, 1974.
14. Ibid, p. 36.
15. Sachs, William H. Jr., The United States Army Command and Control Structure in a Unified/Subunified Command, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1969.

Dr. Weirley, Russel F., History of the United States Army, New York:
Macmillan Company, 1967, p. 550.

CHAPTER V

1. Discussion of problems occurring during the USARPAC disestablishment period is based on personal interviews with officers who were members of the JCS Joint Staff and Department of the Army during that period, written comments made on the author's survey, and most particularly officers who were assigned to USACSG in 1976-77.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions from Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, dated 10 January 1974, are reproduced to facilitate understanding of this thesis.

administrative control - (DOD, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB)
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters, such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
See also control; operational command; operational control.

command - (DOD, IADB) 1. The authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over his subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. 4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position.
See also... (p. 74)

control - (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB) 1. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the

activities of a subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations or both have been or will be determined. (DOD, IADB)

3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations. See also administrative control; operational command.

command and control - (DOD, IADB) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of his mission. (p. 74)

coordinating authority - (DOD) A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more services, or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority. (p. 89)

directive - (DOD, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB) 1. A military com-

munication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. 2. A plan issued with a view to placing it in effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. 3. broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure. (p. 109) (Directive authority not defined in JCS Pub 1).

Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff - (DOD) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to whom they have assigned responsibility and delegated authority, which would otherwise be exercised by them collectively, to carry out for them certain of their duties. (p. 127) [Executive agent not further defined in JCS Pub 1.]

Full command - (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB) The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. (NATO, SEATO, CENTO) It follows that no (NATO) (SEATO) (CENTO) commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to (NATO) (SEATO) (CENTO), assign only operational command or operational control. (p. 144)

operational command - (DOD, IADB) Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units

through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (DOD) (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and subunified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 United States Code 124).) (p. 234)

operational control - (HATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADE) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (p. 239)

APPENDIX B



APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

1 March 1973

As a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, I am preparing a thesis for the Master of Military Arts and Science Degree. As an integral part of the research, I would like to develop a consensus of attitudes and opinions of officers concerning the nature and role of a service component headquarters to a unified command.

The methodology for this task is utilization of an attitudinal survey incorporating the Likert Scale. Enclosed you will find 25 copies of the survey with a cover letter for each respondent. The letter and survey instructions provide a full explanation of the survey's objective and intent. The results of this research will be included in my thesis to be published by the college in June 1973 at which time it will be available to you.

I would appreciate distribution of the survey to a representative sample of officers assigned to your headquarters. Distribution by grade should be equivalent to the percentage of each rank assigned to your headquarters. Upon completion of the survey, each officer may mail the questionnaire directly to me in the self-addressed envelope enclosed with the questionnaire.

Thank you for your prompt attention.

Sincerely,

John S. Ellison
John S. Ellison
Major, US Army



Return to: Major John S. Ellison Approved For Distr To: 50

Section 17


Class Director

1 March 1973

Dear Fellow Officer,

I wish a few minutes of your time for assistance in an analysis of joint doctrine pertaining to the unified command structure in a theater of operations.


As a US Army Command and General Staff College student, I am conducting research to determine the need for a service component headquarters to a unified command. The research vehicle is the Army component in the Pacific. Enclosed is a survey which will provide a data base regarding the nature and role of a unified command service component. Current joint doctrine requires a component headquarters to a unified command from each service. Previous analysis was limited to whether such a headquarters possessed an operational mission. Although this criteria is certainly important, other functions may be just as important.

As a result of your experience and knowledge concerning the subject, I would appreciate your assistance in completing my research. Frank completion of the survey statements will allow development of an all service and grade rationale concerning the need for a unified command service component. Your response will provide a background for use in evaluation of joint doctrine for theater command and control structure.

The survey is anonymous and provides sufficient latitude for subjective discussion, if you determine a need. It should take no more than 15 minutes of your time. Additional comments, however, would be appreciated. The results of this research will be made available to you and the military community by the college in June 1978.

Upon completion of the survey, place it in the self-addressed envelope for return by 1 April 1978. Thank you for your prompt attention.

Sincerely,


JOHN S. ELLISON
Major, USA

APPROVED FOR DISTRIBUTION


Deputy Commandant

DETERMINING THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED
COMMAND SERVICE COMPONENT

The purpose of this survey is to determine the attitudes and opinions of personnel who have served or are serving in a joint or associated headquarters concerning the need to have an Army component headquarters in the Pacific Command.

For each of the following statements, please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement by circling an appropriate response code from the following attitudinal scale.

SA = Strongly Agree
A = Agree
U = Undecided
D = Disagree
SD = Strongly Disagree

Each statement should be evaluated as a separate entity. Although some answers may appear to be contradictory, they are not and this concern should be ignored.

The survey is in four parts, A through D. At the conclusion of each part, a subjective question elicits opinions or comments which were not addressed by the statements.

PART A

This portion is to be completed by officers who have served in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a unified command, a subunified command, a component headquarters to a unified or subunified command, or in a military department position that involved direct interaction with a joint headquarters. The following questions concern the functions of a service component. Based on historical evidence these functions are defined as 1) planning, 2) coordination and supervision of operational missions, 3) logistical support of service forces, 4) administrative support of service forces, 5) training of service forces, 6) organization of forces for operational missions, 7) intelligence processing, 8) controlling the employment of tactical forces, 9) command of service forces, 10) preparation of recommendations for the unified/subunified commander, 11) staff support of the unified/subunified headquarters, 12) strategic mobility system movements, 13) liaison with other service forces, 14) security assistance support, and 15) service liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces.

1. The most important function of a service component is coordination and supervision of operational missions. SA A U D, SD

2. The most important function of a service component is planning. SA A U D SD
3. The least important function of a service component is logistical support of forces. SA A U D SD
4. The least important function of a service component is administrative support of forces. SA A U D SD
5. The most important function of a service component is training of forces. SA A U D SD
6. The most important function of a service component is organization of forces for operational missions. SA A U D SD
7. The least important function of a service component is intelligence processing. SA A U D SD
8. The least important function of a service component is controlling the employment of tactical forces. SA A U D SD
9. The most important function of a service component is command of forces. SA A U D SD
10. The most important function of a service component is preparing recommendations for the unified commander. SA A U D SD
11. The least important function of a service component is staff support of the unified commander. SA A U D SD
12. The least important function of a service component is the conduct and supervision of strategic mobility movements. SA A U D SD
13. The most important function of a service component is liaison with other service forces in the theater. SA A U D SD
14. The most important function of a service component is security assistance support to other nations. SA A U D SD
15. The least important function of a service component is service liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces. SA A U D SD
16. An Army service component headquarters to a unified command is necessary to support of the unified command system in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
17. Service component headquarters to unified commands are necessary to support of the unified command system. SA A U D SD

18. A service component in the Pacific performs functions which could easily be accomplished by the Pacific Command Headquarters, subordinate unified commands, or other service headquarters in the Pacific.

SA A U D SD

19. A service component in the Pacific is necessary to insure service representation in the Pacific Command Headquarters.

SA A U D SD

OPTIONAL SHORT ANSWER QUESTION:

20. A service component in the Pacific is (unnecessary/necessary) because

This portion is to be completed by officers who have served in any headquarters described in PART A sometime during the period 1 January 1973 through 31 December 1975. These questions pertain to the disestablishment of the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) which occurred 31 December 1974. If you have not served in these headquarters or this time period, go to PART C.

1. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to reduce costs for the Army. SA A U D SD

2. USARPAC was disestablished primarily because it accomplished functions which could be performed by other existing headquarters. SA A U D SD

3. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to improve unity of command through simplification of the chain of command. SA A U D SD

4. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to reduce public and Congressional criticism. SA A U D SD

5. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to provide more support for joint doctrine through increasing the importance of the subunified commanders. SA A U D SD

6. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to provide increased emphasis to the European Theater. SA A U D SD

7. USARPAC was disestablished primarily to reduce the number of general officers in the Army structure. SA A U D SD

OPTIONAL SHORT ANSWER QUESTION:

8. USARPAC was disestablished because (for additional space use back of page).

This portion is to be completed by officers who have served in a headquarters described in PART A sometime during the period 1 January 1975 through the present. These questions pertain to the US Army CINCPAC Support Group and its performance of a service component's functions. If you have not served during the stated period, go to PART B.

1. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is planning. SA A U D SD
2. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the coordination/supervision of operational missions. SA A U D SD
3. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the administrative support of Army forces in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
4. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the logistical support of Army forces in the Pacific with non-assigned elements. SA A U D SD
5. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the training of Army forces in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
6. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the organization of Army forces for employment in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
7. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is intelligence processing. SA A U D SD
8. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the controlling of employed tactical forces in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
9. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the command of Army forces not subordinate to a subordinate unified command in the Pacific. SA A U D SD
10. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the preparation of recommendations for CINCPAC. SA A U D SD
11. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is staff support to CINCPAC. SA A U D SD
12. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is the conduct and supervision of strategic mobility system movements in the Pacific. SA A U D SD

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ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS F/G 15/3
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13. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is liaison with other service forces in PACOM. SA A U D SD

14. The most important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is security assistance support to other nations. SA A U D SD

15. The least important function of USA CINCPAC Support Group is service liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces. SA A U D SD

16. USA CINCPAC Support Group is necessary to insure Army representation in the Pacific Command Headquarters. SA A U D SD

17. USA CINCPAC Support Group performs functions which could easily be accomplished by the Pacific Command Headquarters, subordinate unified commands, or other service headquarters in the Pacific. SA A U D SD

OPTIONAL SHORT ANSWER QUESTION:

18. USA CINCPAC Support Group is (necessary/unnecessary) because

This portion is to be completed by all officers.

1. Grade _____ (O-3, etc.)

2. Service _____ (Navy, etc.)

3. Years in service _____

4. Years served in the following:

- a. JCS _____
- b. Military Department _____
- c. Unified Command Headquarters _____
- d. Subunified Command Headquarters _____
- e. Service Component Headquarters (Unified) _____
- f. Service Component Headquarters (Subunified) _____
- g. Other(explain) _____

5. Years served in PACOM:

- a. Unified Command Headquarters _____
- b. Subunified Command Headquarters _____
- c. Service Component Headquarters (Unified) _____
- d. Service Component Headquarters (Subunified) _____
- e. USA CINCPAC Support Group _____
- f. Other(explain) _____

6. Staff section in which served(reference questions 4 and 5)
(Check appropriate block):

- a. Personnel _____
- b. Intelligence _____
- c. Operations _____
- d. Logistics _____
- e. Plans _____
- f. Communications _____
- g. Other(explain) _____

7. Occupational Specialty(Primary/Alternate) _____

8. Comments(see back of page):

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

SURVEY DATA

The survey at Appendix B was prepared using the Likert Scale which is a technique for summation of ratings widely used in management science and the social sciences.¹

The respondents were asked to evaluate each statement and indicate the extent of agreement or disagreement. After receipt of the survey, the researcher applied a numerical rating to each response. The scale was from 1 to 5 with the response indicating very unimportant or very unnecessary receiving the lowest value and very important or very necessary receiving the highest. The data was coded and transferred to punch cards for batch processing. The results were tabulated using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,² a computer program maintained at the USA Command and General Staff College. The program calculated the mean, mode, median, variance, standard deviation, and range for each question. The results of the survey tabulation are presented in the following tables.

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2. Nie, Norman H., et. al., SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970.

A. IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL SERVICE COMPONENT FUNCTIONS

Scale: 5 - Very Important
 4 - Important
 3 - Undecided
 2 - Unimportant
 1 - Very unimportant

Functions	<u>Importance of Functions</u>			
	<u>For a service component</u>		<u>For USACSG</u>	
	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode
1. Coordinate and supervise operational missions	2.860	2.0	2.348	2.0
2. Planning	3.500	4.0	3.712	5.0
3. Logistical support of forces	4.470	5.0	3.439	4.0
4. Administrative support of forces	3.840	4.0	2.813	4.0
5. Training of forces	3.010	2.0	2.182	2.0
6. Organization of forces for operational employment	3.050	4.0	2.742	2.0
7. Intelligence processing	3.390	4.0	2.712	4.0
8. Control of employment of tactical forces	3.130	4.0	2.242	2.0
9. Command of forces	2.750	2.0	2.667	2.0
10. Preparation of recommendations for unified commander	3.180	2.0	3.318	4.0
11. Staff support of unified commander	3.220	4.0	3.591	4.0
12. Conduct and supervision of strategic mobility movements	3.720	4.0	3.242	4.0
13. Liaison with other theater service forces	2.650	2.0	3.091	4.0

14. Security assistance support to other nations	2.400	2.0	2.813	2.0
15. Liaison and representation to allied organizations and forces	3.610	4.0	3.242	4.0
Number of respondents to this part	<u>100</u>			<u>66</u>

B. NECESSITY OF A SERVICE COMPONENT OR REPRESENTATIVE AGENCY TO A UNIFIED COMMAND

Scale: 5 - Very necessary
 4 - Necessary
 3 - Undecided
 2 - Unnecessary
 1 - Very unnecessary

Need by Purpose

Purpose	<u>Service component</u>		<u>USACSG</u>	
	Mean	Mode	Mean	Mode
1. Army headquarters needed to support unified command system in PACOM.	3.670	5.0	---	---
2. Service headquarters needed to support unified command system in PACOM.	3.860	4.0	---	---
3. To perform functions other headquarters cannot.	3.730	5.0	3.909	4.0
4. To provide service representation in PACOM headquarters.	3.410	4.0	3.652	4.0
Number of Respondents to this part		100		66

C. IMPORTANCE OF REASONS FOR DISESTABLISHMENT OF USARPAC

Scale: 5 - Very important
 4 - Important
 3 - Undecided
 2 - Unimportant
 1 - Very unimportant

Reasons	Importance of Reasons	
	Mean	Mode
1. To reduce costs	3.509	4.0
2. Because functions can be performed by other headquarters	2.945	4.0
3. To improve unity of command by simplification of the chain of command	1.891	2.0
4. To reduce Congressional and public criticism	2.855	2.0
5. To increase importance of subunified commands	1.709	2.0
6. To emphasize the European Theater	2.055	2.0
7. To reduce number of general officers in Army	2.636	2.0

Number of respondents

55

D. PROFILE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

Characteristics	Respondents	Mean	Mode	Range
1. Grade (O-1 to O-10)	99	4.960	5.0	4-6
2. Service	99	-	-	-
- Army	(32)	-	-	-
- Air Force	(10)	-	-	-
- Navy	(5)	-	-	-
- Marine Corps	(2)	-	-	-
3. Years in Service	99	19.556	19.0	10-32
4. Years in JCS	30	1.867	1.0	1-4
5. Years in Military Dept	48	2.604	2.0	1-8
6. Years in Unified Cmd Hq	33	2.576	1.0	1-6
7. Years in Subunif Cmd Hq	13	1.722	1.0	1-3
8. Years in Unified Service Component Hq	21	2.190	1.0	1-5
9. Years in Subunified Service Component Hq	13	1.615	1.0	1-3
10. Years in Other Associated Hq	25	2.680	3.0	1-8
11. Years in PACOM Unified Cmd Hq	20	2.400	2.0	1-5
12. Years in PACOM Subunif Cmd Hq	19	1.368	1.0	1-3
13. Years in PACOM Unified Service Component Hq	13	1.538	1.0	1-3
14. Years in PACOM subunified Service	14	1.286	1.0	1-3
15. Years in USACSG	21	1.905	2.0	1-3
16. Years in PACOM Other Associated Hq	28	3.036	1.0	1-8

17. Staff section in which served most	96	-	-	-
- Personnel	(6)	-	-	-
- Intelligence	(10)	-	-	-
- Operations	(33)	-	-	-
- Logistics	(20)	-	-	-
- Plans	(18)	-	-	-
- Communications	(6)	-	-	-
- Other	(3)	-	-	-

18. Occupational Specialty	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
- Personnel	3	11
- Intelligence	8	9
- Operations	6	31
- Logistics	17	13
- Plans	0	1
- Communications	7	1
- Other	6	20
- Combat Arms	<u>43</u>	<u>0</u>
Number of Respondents	95	86

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