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OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: "A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE"

by

Lieutenant Colonel George R. Iverson
AGC



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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"A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE"

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel George R. Iverson

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U.S. Army Military History Institute

March 6, 1978

VIGNETTES OF MILITARY HISTORY NO. 92

Contributed by Colonel Donald P. Shaw

THE GOLDEN AGE

Unhappy memories of career "mangement" done by the assignment policies of the "old" branches and the alleged horrors of the current Officer Personnel Management System have fueled many a cocktail hour. Most of these conversations end with reverence being expressed for some unidentified golden age of branch omniscience. If there was ever such a period, it existed, for the combat arms at least, from 1920 to 1942, when their Chiefs ran those branches like feudal baronies.

The National Defense Act of 1920 gave the Chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry, Coast Artillery, and Field Artillery the personnel management functions familiar to today's officers. The Chiefs were also charged with the development of tactical doctrine, broadly defined, for their respective arms. The single-mindedness of the branches soon made them nearly equal in power to the Chief of Staff himself. The opposition of a single branch Chief could interfere with the desires of the Chief of Staff; the resistance of several could produce a force that only the most determined Chief of Staff would test.

Branch power is illustrated by General Douglas MacArthur's decision, as Chief of Staff, to disband the Army's first permanent mechanized force in 1931. That independent force had been founded by MacArthur's predecessor, General Charles Summerall, because he thought it was the best means of advancing mechanization in the Army. The force had barely had time to demonstrate the gross inadequacies of its equipment when MacArthur broke up the unit and returned its parts to their traditional branches. While there were many complex factors in this decision, the Army's own 1937 review of MacArthur's order found "the underlying reason for the War Department change in policy...was really a desire to compensate the conflicts between branches. The easiest way out seemed to be to throw the whole problem... back into the previous status...." In short, mechanization was given back to foot infantry and horse cavalry! Branch opposition to mechanization, among other problems, led to the creation of the Armored Force in July, 1940. Such opposition, indeed, helped doom the branches themselves, which were merged into the Army Ground Forces in 1942.

In the personnel field the favor of the branch Chief was crucial to success. General Bruce Palmer, commenting on the power of the Chiefs during the 1930's, said, "Chiefs...were the Mama, Papa, Mecca...your whole future depended on those Chiefs! They ran everything." MG Ernest Harmon, an armored leader in World War II, gives an indication of the courage it took to buck the branch Chief. During an interview with the Chief of Cavalry in 1939, Harmon requested assignment to the new 7th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade. He was told that if he went "mechanized," he could "forget about any future favors or friendship in the Chief of Cavalry's office." Only the creation of the Armored Force--and the expansion and reorganization of the Army during World War II--saved the careers of many forward looking officers.

A golden age of assignments--and doctrine--may be on the horizon. No one is ready to say that what we have today pleases every interest. But even a brief backward glance shows that there have been worse systems.

SOURCES: R. F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*; D. P. Shaw, "MacArthur and Mechanization"; B. J. Palmer, Jr., and E. N. Harmon, *Mem. Memoirs*, MHI.

PREFACE

This study proposal was submitted by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the Army War College, stating that:

Modification of selected officer personnel management policies should desirably be accomplished in the light of previous personnel management systems. By obtaining a historical perspective, it many times becomes possible to view the future in terms of a continuum of progress. At the current time, a consolidated historical review does not exist.

The results of this study effort is just that, a "historical review" and by no means is it a detailed historical volume. An attempt has been made to develop a broad overview of "how we got to where we are at" in officer personnel management. The primary source of information contained in the chapters leading up to the introduction of OPMS II came from well-documented historical volumes and studies. However, the chapter on the development of OPMS, as it is known today, came from bits and pieces found in old filing cabinets in the Pentagon and MILPERCEN. Therefore, while it is believed that what has been presented herein is accurate, there could very well be some missing links that this writer is unaware of and it should be read in that light.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

By Chief of Staff Memorandum 65-32 dated 22 January 1965, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Director of Coordination and Analysis (OCSA), assisted by the Army staff, to undertake a re-evaluation of Army manpower and personnel management. The study directive placed particular emphasis upon development of the following objectives:

- a. Dependable and acceptable ways to determine personnel requirements.
- b. Procurement and career development procedures which will provide personnel in the proper grade structure and with training consistent with the requirements.
- c. Control procedures providing efficient distribution of personnel according to requirements and within established priorities.
- d. Techniques which place proper data in the hands of the decisionmaker to permit the assessment of trade-offs in personnel decisions. In short, the study is aimed at determining how the Army can best organize, administer and control its personnel resources to maintain itself in the highest possible readiness while continuing to build for the future.¹

While it is not the purpose of this introduction to discuss the findings and the historical summary of the Army Personnel Management System found in the final product of the above-cited study, it does serve as a benchmark and an appropriate beginning for a discussion of the historical development of officer personnel management. This particular study, which was completed in May 1965, identified several key milestones in the development of the total Army personnel management system for the period 1939 to the then current date of 1965. Perhaps somewhat obscure in these milestones,

but important to the understanding of officer personnel management as it is known today, is that "career management" was not officially instituted until 1948 when TM 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers was published. This Army Technical Manual as well as the others that followed will be discussed in some depth in later pages, but first a review of the earlier stages of officer personnel management is in order.

1919 and the Personnel System of the United States Army

Personnel management in the United States Army, in the modern sense of the word, began in World War I, but was generally neglected in the period between the two world wars. In the total World War I effort, with manpower resources fixed and requirements constantly expanding, the Army had perforce to develop a system for effective use of manpower.²

What the writer was referring to when he said that personnel management began in World War I was reference to perhaps the first documented Army Personnel Manual. The Personnel System of the United States Army was published in 1919 in two volumes: Volume I, History of the Personnel System; and Volume II, The Personnel Manual.

Forward to Vol I, History of the Personnel System 1919

The great world war differs from all other wars not merely in the number of individuals involved but even more in the number of technicians demanded. Because of the haste in creating the Army it was impossible to develop the experts and accordingly those already possessing such technical skills were, when properly assigned, of the greatest value to the new Army. The importance of personnel work was early recognized and the development of an adequate personnel system for the United States Army entrusted to a group of specialists who were

called by the Secretary of War, "The Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army" but who worked in the early days directly under my jurisdiction. The system worked out by this group is probably the most effective now in existence. Its purpose is (1) to secure a contented and efficient Army by placing each enlisted man where he has the opportunity to make the most of his talent and skill; (2) to commission, assign and promote officers on merit and (3) to simplify the procedure of discovering talent and assigning it where most needed.

In carrying out these purposes, various tools were constructed. Among such the following are noteworthy: Enlisted Men's Qualification Card; Commissioned Officer's Qualification Card; Trade Specifications; Oral Trade Tests; Picture Trade Tests; Performance Trade Tests; Personnel Specifications (Enlisted Personnel); and Personnel Specifications (Commissioned Personnel).

The Army is appreciative of this service and is pleased to record in the following chapters a history of the introduction of personnel work in the United States Army.

H. P. McCain
Major General, U.S.A.
Formerly, The Adjutant General³

Space in this paper does not permit a full discussion of these two volumes, but the identification of selected management tools and initiatives as pertains to officer personnel management in its very early stages deserves attention.

June 1918--The Need for Centralization

With the establishment of the Adjutant General's Department, the Quartermaster Corps, the Medical Department, and the Judge Advocate Generals Department, the Army had functionalized record keeping, logistics, health and sanitation and legal functions, but personnel management had never been recognized as a separate function.

The Infantry had no chief and no personnel section; artillery had a branch chief, but no personnel section; the Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Department, Ordnance Department, Coast Artillery and some of the smaller bureaus had separate personnel sections under the direction of their chiefs. Four of these branches of the service had assigned to their personnel sections a larger force of personnel managers and greater floor space than the Adjutant General's Department which kept the records of Infantry and Field Artillery in addition to the majority of the enlisted records of the entire Army. However, the most important need for centralization was that of functionalization in order that personnel policies could be administered on the same basis throughout the Army.

The Inspector General identified the need for centralization and so reported his findings to the Assistant Secretary of War under the heading of "Centralization of Personnel Sections of all Bureaus." A board was subsequently appointed to further investigate and make recommendations concerning the centralization issue. In its final report, the board supported the centralization concept and recommended the establishment of a centralized personnel division by the Adjutant General of the Army. On 26 August 1918, General Order No. 80 was published which outlined the duties of the General Staff and provided centralized personnel management as a function of the Operations Division in these words:

The duties of this division shall include cognizance and control of the following:

- (a) The recruitment and mobilization of the Army
- (b) The appointment, promotion, transfer and assignment of the commissioned personnel of all branches of the Army.

General Order No. 80 was followed by General Order No. 86 on 18 September 1918 which further described the functions of the Commissioned Officer Personnel Branch of the General Staff and is quoted in part:

1. In order to carry out the provisions of subparagraph b, paragraph 5, General Orders No. 80, War Department 1918, relating to General Staff duties which assigns to the Operations Division, General Staff, the appointment, promotion, transfer and assignment of the commissioned personnel of all branches of the Army, there is established the Commissioned Personnel Branch, Operations Division, General Staff which will be formed by consolidation of (a) the Commissioned Personnel Section, General Staff and (b) the Committee on Classification of Personnel of The Adjutant Generals' Office,* together with such additional officers of the General Staff Corps and clerical force as may be assigned to it from time to time.
2.
3. All staff corps and departments will hereafter submit requisitions . . . for the number and kind of officers needed for any particular organization or duty. . . . Recommendations for promotion will likewise be submitted to the Operations Division.
4. The commissioned personnel branches of the various staff corps and departments, as heretofore operated, are hereby abolished. . . . The commissioned personnel activities in the various staff corps and departments will thereafter be confined to the keeping of the necessary records to enable them to requisition, under the direction of their chief, such commissioned personnel as may be required.

*(The Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army originally consisted primarily of civilian educators from various colleges and universities. Upon transfer from The Adjutant Generals' Office to the Operations Division of the General Staff, several of the committee members were tendered commissions and the plan was to commission all of the members; however, with the signing of the armistice all commissioning came to an end. Additionally, upon transfer to the General Staff, the Committee and the majority of its associates constituted the Miscellaneous Section, Personnel Branch, Operations Division.

The Chief of the division, Colonel A. M. Ferguson, exercised general direction over all personnel policies and although not named as such, could be identified as the first Chief of Personnel Operations. After the armistice was signed, the Miscellaneous Section was transferred back to The Adjutant Generals' Office and became known as the Classification Division.)⁴

Early Management Initiatives

At the close of World War I the strength of the Army was about 3,500,000 men and 180,000 officers (WWII--8,266,370 men and 835,400 officers; Korea--1,594,690 men/133,900 officers; RVN--1,570,340 men/140,550 officers). An experienced French officer engaged in a study of the American mobilization remarked at that time:

I know you recruited 3,500,000 men in 18 months. That is very good, but not so difficult. But I am told also that although you had no officer reserve to start with, yet you found 160,000 new officers, most of them competent. That is what is astonishing and what was impossible. Tell me how that was done. . . .⁵

Out of the officer mobilization effort of World War I and as a result of the work by the Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army, two significant officer personnel management tools were developed and refined: The Officers' Qualification Card and the Commissioned Officers Rating Scale. After testing several versions of Qualification Cards for officers, the following letter (15 January 1918) from The Adjutant General was dispatched to the commanding generals of all divisions:

The first general rating of officers in your division, pursuant to the method stated in the printed instructions, will be as of February 1, 1918, and similar ratings will be made every three months thereafter. Intermediate ratings may be made if desired.

For the sake of uniformity, the use of Officers' Qualification Cards and the rating system in connection therewith is made obligatory in all divisions in the United States.

These cards will be filed at Division Headquarters and their confidential character preserved by all proper precautions. The system of index tabs affixed to the cards provides a simple method of quickly locating officers with special qualifications.

It is intended that this system will provide the information for the detail or transfer of officers to special duty or to other branches of the service, in accordance with their qualifications. It is intended also that the system shall result in the elimination or transfer of all officers in your division not fully competent for their duties. . . .⁶

A full discussion of the mechanics of the Officer Effectiveness Reporting System of World War I is not necessary here, but it is interesting to note the basis by which the rating scale was developed and how this early work found its way into several versions of the DA Form 67-series (OER Forms) used during the 1950-1970 timeframe. As quoted from the 1919 edition of the Army Personnel Manual:

Those who prepared the scale took into account the fact that human nature is hard to measure. It cannot be measured accurately by relation to any abstract standard of good and bad, for one man's conception of excellence differs widely from another's. A man cannot be compared with a number. He can only be compared with another man.⁷

The Officer Qualification Card soon became a key central management tool as did the first real efficiency reports used by the Army. These two documents served the Committee to develop a single list promotion plan. The single list promotion plan did much to remove old branch and arm jealousies and to improve morale.⁸

In concluding this brief discussion on officer personnel management initiatives during World War I, it would be misleading not to mention the fact that there were those who did not agree with all that was undertaken by The Adjutant General's Office and the Personnel Division. For example, when the Personnel Division of the General Staff assumed responsibility for all appointments of officers of all branches of the service, the critics complained that it removed all personal contact between the departments and the officer concerned. Some members of the staff corps further complained that being required to requisition for officers the same as supply officers were required to requisition soap or harness oil made the personnel system impersonal and not proper treatment of officers.⁹

NOTES

1. A Study of Army Manpower and Personnel Management, Vol. III, Systems Analysis Division, ODC&A, OCSA, May 1965.
2. Ibid., p. 3A-1.
3. The Personnel System of the United States Army, Vol. 1: History of the Personnel System, Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army, Washington, D.C., 1919 (Foreword).
4. Ibid., pp. 95-111.
5. Ibid., pp. 318-319.
6. Ibid., pp. 547-548.
7. The Personnel System of the US Army, Vol. II: The Personnel Manual, Washington, D.C., 1919, p. 252.
8. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, Washington, D.C., August 1954, p. 190.
9. Ibid., p. 198.

CHAPTER II

BETWEEN THE WARS AND DURING WORLD WAR II

At the close of World War I there were about 180,000 officers on active duty. The prime effort was to demobilize and return to a peace-time Army and for the most part there were few new initiatives toward officer career management. The officer corps dwindled in numbers and in 1940 there were only 17,563 officers on active duty. The need for further officer education did, however, surface and make headway. The Army War College had been a functioning division of the War Department General Staff and The National Defense Act of 1920 expanded the education system by establishing the General Service Schools to include the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.¹ As for officer promotions between WWI and WWII, there were few. The Army experienced a reduction in grade to RA permanent grades and a single promotion list was established. Although there were only about 12,000 officers on active duty during this period, the lack of vacancies under the single promotion list system resulted in the professional officer who would spend the majority of his career in the same grade.²

From 1940 to 1942 the officer corps expanded rapidly from 17,500 officers to over 200,000 officers and rose to a high at the end of the war to about 835,000 officers. With the rapid expansion of the Army, there was great debate on the War Department reorganization and on 9 March 1942 the reorganization was approved which established three separate commands: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. Personnel functions

were largely decentralized to the dismay of many staff officers who believed that decentralization of functions had proved unsound. One G-1 staff officer is quoted as saying: "The real error in the Army reorganization of 1942 was depriving the War Department General Staff of an operating agency to handle (personnel) matters Army-wide in scope."³ Many of the officer personnel management problems identified during WWII have been well documented by the Office, Chief of Military History in DA Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel Replacement System in the US Army, 1954. Excerpts are quoted in part:

The Inspector General surveyed the officer situation in December 1943 and reported an excess of approximately 51,000 officers in the arms and services.

About half of the ASF officers had been in (replacement) pools 2-3 months. A large number were attending local schools or receiving training which The Inspector General regarded as makeshift in character and of value merely as a means of keeping people busy. It was apparent that officers who lacked qualifications and ability were collecting in the pools because they were not wanted in units. . . . Commanders who attempted to reclassify officers frequently found the procedure to cumbersome.

By the end of 1943, about 180,000 Reserve officers had been called to active duty; nearly 100,000 civilians had been commissioned directly; approximately 19,000 National Guard officers were in Federal status; and about 300,000 officers had received OCS commissions. The total 600,000 from civilian life who became Army officers outnumbered the 15,000 Regular Army officers 40 to 1. By 1 July 1943, the Army had almost reached the saturation point in officers of the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel. Instructions were issued which required 12 months in grade of lieutenant colonel prior to promotion to colonel and 9 months in grade of major prior to promotion to lieutenant colonel except for officers who demonstrated fitness for promotion

while in combat. Promotions were not to be made unless there were vacancies.

There were too many antiaircraft and field artillery officers and not enough infantry, armor and engineer officers. Improper distribution of branch was the principal difficulty

War Department officials said they did not expect General MacArthur to ask for officers from the Zone of the Interior; he had indicated he would meet his requirements by appointments in the field. Some officers in the Pacific had said that an outstanding platoon sergeant with 6 weeks or so of refresher training would make a better officer than could be expected from the United States.

In the European theater, by Dec 1944, about 1000 Infantry officers were being appointed each month, but that theater was still looking to the United States to train a considerable number of the officers it needed.

There seldom was any shortage in the total number of officers . . . , but there were many shortages in officers with special qualifications including company grade combat officers, medical officers and engineers.

The Officer Procurement Service was discontinued as a separate administrative agency 15 June 1945 and the functions it had performed were transferred to the Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces.⁴

When WWII ended there were some 835,000 commissioned officers on active duty. During the occupation years that followed, the officer corps strength dropped to 257,000 in 1946; to 127,000 in 1947; and finally in 1948, the officer corps strength fell to its lowest level of about 64,000.

The platoon, company and battalion commanders of WWII would rise to become the senior Army leadership of the future and although many lessons were learned with respect to organizational failures, little had been accomplished toward organized career management of the Officer Corps.

NOTES

Between the Wars

1. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel System in the United States Army, Washington, D.C., August 1954, p. 234.

2. Components of the Officer Corps, a Student Paper and Individual Research Sponsored by the CDC Combat Systems Group, Jackie D. Catt, MAJ, and Robert B. James, MAJ, March 1972, p. 1.

3. DA Pamphlet No. 20-211, pp. 257 and 263.

4. Ibid., pp. 319-328.

CHAPTER III
THE TRANSITION TO CAREER MANAGEMENT FOR
ARMY OFFICERS 1947-1970

Next to the OPMS Study effort of the early 1970s which eventually led to the adoption of the OPMS concept of management by specialty, the 1947-1949 time frame is probably the most significant period of development of career planning for Army officers. Not only did we see the first Army Technical Manual on Career Management for Army Officers published, but also the passing of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 which allowed greater flexibility in the proper management and promotion of commissioned officers.

Officer Personnel Act of 1947

As of this writing (April 1978) the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 still provides, in large part, the basis for promotion and management of officers in the Army. (The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act-DOPMA, now under consideration by the Congress, will replace the act of 1947.) To gain an understanding of the impact and importance of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, the statement of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, War Department before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate on 16 July 1947 is quoted in part:

Mr. Chairman, I think that no great argument would have to be presented to show that our promotion system has been unsatisfactory. Until we got to the grade of general officer, it was absolutely a lock-step promotion; and short of almost crime being committed by an officer, there were ineffectual ways of eliminating a man.

It is illustrated by the fact that the law requires at the present time that an officer that we consider unsatisfactory, if we have been unable to eliminate him by the so-called class B law, we are compelled to submit his name for promotion before we can submit anyone under him.

We came out of the war with relatively few of the men we had in the professional service before the World War. . . .

The Congress has given to us a bill allowing us to build up to a total of 50,000 officers. We want in the integration of those officers first to have a sound, solid system that will be sound and solid for some years to come, so that we may proceed to their advancement and promotion without the handicaps we have had in the past.

Specifically, we need to tell the young fellow who is coming in what his prospects are, how he stands, what he has to do, what standards he has to reach in order to go ahead.

Our present law . . . has compelled us since the war to put up numbers of men filling up the top grades with individuals that in certain instances would certainly never have been selected . . . therefore we have already got some in there we would not just want to have.

The Chairman: Right there General, before us this morning is a promotion list to be confirmed by this committee

General Eisenhower: That is correct sir. When those men go in they will serve a certain number of years before they come up for selection to the next grade, and then if not selected, they come under the provisions of this bill (the 1947 Act). We want to get it, therefore, just as quickly as we can so that we do not carry along this deadwood we know to exist.

. . . we have never succeeded in getting a bill that is positive in its action, in the elimination of the unfit and the bringing up of merit.

The one thing I want to impress upon you is the need for speed in getting it on the books. When it comes down to particular points, . . . things applying to general officers and so on, I tell you frankly, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make a fight about any of that. The principles of the bill and the handling of the Officer Corps are

the most important things to me. . . .

The general principle of the bill, just to outline it very briefly, is that each officer enters the Army at a young age, serves a certain number of years in the grades, and before going to the next grade is carefully checked all the way through to see whether he is eligible for going up to that higher grade. If not, he is eliminated after he has served a given number of years in each of these grades.

To repeat, the pressure is now pretty bad because we are filling up the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel in many instances with people we do not want.

It is interesting to note that the questioning of General Eisenhower that followed his opening statement centered around the issue of the selection of chiefs and assistant chiefs of the various branches, particularly the Corps of Engineers, and the forced retirement of officers at the height of their usefulness. Mention was also made by Senator Kilgore of West Virginia concerning some proviso in the law that would force promotion boards to select certain numbers of officers from the technical branches of the Army not just the combat arms; known today as "promotion by specialty."

Initial Steps Toward Career Planning

Not only was the Army attempting to change the promotion law in 1947, it was concurrently making plans to implement a program for administering career management of officers in support of the proposed law. On 29 May 1947, the Personnel and Administration Division of the War Department General Staff sent out for comment and review, to all Arms and Services, its proposed plan for Career Planning. The plan cited as its objective the careful integration

of each individual's desires by employing personnel where their abilities and aptitudes could best be used to accomplish the Army's assigned missions. The most difficult part connected with the Career Management Plan was seen as conveying to all officers a complete understanding of the program and securing their needed coordination and cooperation. Senior officer support of the program was sought also for them to accept the responsibility of training officers for positions of responsibility instead of seeking "by name" those officers who were already qualified. To support the career patterns being developed for commissioned officers, the field operating units were requested to make a job analysis of each position and to requisition personnel accordingly.

Coincident with the staffing of the proposed Career Planning Program, the War Department Career Management Branch was established which replaced the Central Officers Assignment Group. The duties decentralized to this branch were outlined as follows:

- a. To modernize assignment procedures and to resolve controversial assignment issues.
- b. To establish policies which will ensure that assignments are used to the maximum for the progressive training and development of officers.
- c. To establish broad assignment priorities and policies as guides for the personnel sections of the Arms and Services.
- d. In conjunction with the Arms and Services, develop necessary publications and records to facilitate proper career management and establish rules and methods of evaluation of individual efficiency reports.

e. The determination of qualifications of individuals for further schooling and key assignments controlled by the War Department.

f. To direct, for all officers, all permanent changes of station and transfers and details between the various Arms and Services.²

Each of the Arms and Services subsequently submitted its recommended career assignment patterns to the Career Management Branch and a year later TM 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers, was published. Personnel management, semi-centrally controlled, had been officially established for Army officers. The various staffs, arms and service relationships in the total concept of officer personnel management remained, however, somewhat disjointed throughout most of the following years until the establishment of the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).

Career Management Policies 1948-1972

Career management objectives during this period sought generally to channel an officer's career into various different types of jobs within the confines of his assigned branch. Career patterns developed in TM 20-605 (June 1948), although modified from time to time, remained as one of the key management tools until the introduction of OPMS in 1973. Unlike OPMS, extended or repetitive duty assignments in any single capacity during the first 20 years of service for an officer was to be avoided, although specialization was recognized as necessary in some cases. The general plan for

career development consisted of four phases (Infantry Career Pattern shown):

a. Junior officer period (0-7 years): Development of broad sound knowledge of basic branch by troop staff duty, rotated troop duty and attendance at Basic and Advanced Branch Schools.

b. Command and Staff period (8-14 years): Broadening of basic knowledge to include understanding of interrelation of all branches by troop command duty and attendance at C&GSC (50% of officers) and AFSC.

c. Field Grade Phase (15-21 years): Preparation for future high level staff and command assignments by attendance at AFSC and NWC or ICAF; duty on division or higher level staff and instructor duty with civilian components and service schools.

d. Final Career Management Period (21 years-retirement): To afford an opportunity for the very ablest of the officers to be tested in all the important qualifications of troop command and other positions of great responsibility. From this group of officers, the war leaders of tomorrow will be selected. (22 years-battalion commanders; 23 years-regimental executives or division staff; 24 years-regimental commanders, division chief of staff and Army Staff.)

Mismanagement of officer personnel was recognized in 1948 as a significant problem area that required correction by commanders at all levels (not too far different from the same situation in officer personnel management under OPMS-1978). A career management section of each branch could assign an officer for specific programed duty,

but beyond that it was recognized that the burden of carrying out personnel management within these assignments must be borne by and the responsibility of commanders at all levels. TM 20-605 was therefore not only a guide for career managers in Washington, but also a guide for commanders in the assignment and rotations of duties of officers assigned to their commands.³

TM 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers, June 1948, was superseded by Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 600-3 in 1956. There were few changes in the basic intent and language of the new pamphlet except to note that the career patterns were further refined, but the branch management concept still remained. The new edition did however recognize in more detail those officer MOSs that WAC officers were currently being utilized in (97 separate MOSs in all) and offered the listing as a guide to future utilization, pending further research in the broad field of Army officer utilization.⁴

Specialization was further recognized in the fields of intelligence, research and development, information, legislative-liaison, and comptrollership; however, all officers participating in specialization programs were subject to "branch qualification" tours through their twenty-first year of service in order to afford these officers equal opportunity for qualifying for military schooling on the same basis as other branch officers.⁵ This same Army policy applied to the formally recognized fields of specialization of aviation, atomic energy, logistics, and civil affairs. Branch qualification remained, however, uppermost in the Army's point

of view.

The military specialist of greatest value to the Army is primarily qualified in his basic branch and secondarily qualified in one of the specialist career fields. The officer . . . failing to remain qualified in his basic branch is usually of limited potential as a future senior Army commander.⁶

Command was likewise recognized as "the most important assignment that an officer could obtain (note the word obtain as opposed to receive as it is known today by "command selection") during his career."⁷

DA Pamphlet No. 600-3, Career Planning for Army Officers was modified and republished again in 1961, 1964, 1967, 1968, and 1970. However, the basic branch career patterns remained throughout these various revisions. With each revision, additional information was added such as promotion opportunity and additional special career programs. With regard to career patterns, it is interesting to note that in the 1964 edition, the following comment first appeared: "Studies are now being conducted at DA on the influence of functionalization on the branches and career patterns. However, the missions of the branches must continue to be performed in the foreseeable future."⁸ This same comment appeared in following editions of 1967, 1968 and 1970. To fully discuss the transition and changes in each of the editions of DA Pam 600-3 from 1948 to 1970 would really serve no real purpose except to note that officer personnel management had come a long way in 22 years as compared to the stagnation from 1919 to 1947, and there was much more to come.

NOTES

The Transition to Career Management

1. Officer Personnel Act of 1947, Hearing on H.R. 3830, US 80th Congress, 1st session, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1947, pp. 1-3.
2. Career Planning, Personnel and Administration Division, War Department General Staff Letter to All Arms and Services, WDGPA-O, 353 Career, 29 May 1947.
3. TM 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers, Department of the Army, June 1948.
4. DA Pamphlet No. 600-3, Career Planning for Army Officers, Washington, D.C., 15 October 1956, pp. 53-54.
5. Ibid., pp. 54-60.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Ibid.
8. DA Pamphlet No. 600-3, Career Planning for Army Officers, Washington, D.C., June 1964, p. 23; June 1967, p. 23; November 1968, p. 7-1; August 1970, p. 7-1.

CHAPTER IV

A REVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE SUPPORTING THE OFFICER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH 1961

World War I--1961

Neither the Act of 14 February 1903 establishing the General Staff Corps nor the National Defense Act of 1916 which established the War Department General Staff fixed the responsibility for personnel matters in any one specific agency. Prior to 1903, personnel matters were the responsibility of the Adjutant General and the heads of the various bureaus. Between the creation of the War Department General Staff in 1916 and the close of World War I, personnel matters were handled by various divisions of the staff. As discussed earlier, they became reasonably well established, however, in the Operations Division of the General Staff.

After World War I, the personnel operating functions returned to the Adjutant General and the bureau heads while the Operations Division was charged with policy formulation only. In 1921 the War Department General Staff was reorganized and the Personnel Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was created.¹

After the War Department reorganization of 1942, management responsibilities were largely decentralized to the three major commands--AGF, AAF and ASF operating under policies set by the War Department. In theory, the G-3 determined the requirements by major command and the G-1 developed Army-wide personnel policies. In practice, however, operation of Army-wide personnel policies was exercised by the ASF Director of Personnel and The Adjutant General's

office under direction of the ASF Commander.² (The problems encountered in officer personnel management during this period were discussed in an earlier section.)

War Department Circular No. 138, 1946, established the Office, Director of Personnel and Administration of the General Staff and was assigned General Staff responsibility as the military personnel manager of the Army. The Director was designated as the primary adviser and assistant to the Chief of Staff, for administrative matters and for matters relating to manpower as a whole and to military personnel as individuals throughout the Army. With regard to career management, he was responsible for establishing policies, plans and procedures for career guidance and the supervision of officer assignments, transfers and details.³

Responsibilities with regard to officer career management were spelled out in Special Regulation No. 11-10-30 (Army Program No. 3), dated 28 December 1951. Program No. 3, the Execution, Review and Analysis of the Military Personnel Program, came under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (then directly subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration. At this point in time there were only two Deputies to the Chief of Staff--one for administration and one for plans). Responsibilities for the execution of the Personnel Program were broken down as follows:

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was responsible for overall implementation of the program to include the development, coordination and implementation plans and formulation of policies pertaining to officer career management.

b. The Adjutant General was the prime operator in administration and officer career management. He was responsible for the career management of all combat arms and Adjutant General Corps officers and maintained the personnel records for all officers. Under the staff supervision of The Adjutant General, the following organizational elements of the Army Staff/Special Staff were responsible for the career management of officers of their respective branch of service: The Provost Marshall General, The Judge Advocate General, Chief of Finance, Chief of Chaplains, The Surgeon General, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Transportation, The Quartermaster General, Chief Chemical Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Engineers and the Director of the Women's Army Corps.⁴

The Hewes account of the reorganization efforts of the Post-Korean Army vividly addresses the internal Army staff struggle over the career management of officers, particularly technical service corps officers. Lt General Williston B. Palmer, the new G-4 argued his point and requested greater authority over personnel, including general officers, in the technical services.⁵ His chief opponent on this issue was Maj General Robert N. Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 who proposed removing career management functions from the technical services and placing it within the G-1 along with the management of combat arms officers. The chiefs of the technical services all disagreed with the G-1 concept and in addition it was contrary to the Davies Committee's recommendation that technical service career management be placed under the authority of a proposed Supply Command.⁶

Lt General Palmer was later to become the Vice Chief of Staff and on 3 January 1956 under change 13 to Special Regulation 10-5-1, the Army Staff was reorganized into three Deputy Chiefs of Staff-- Personnel, Military Operations and Logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel was assigned the direct supervision over the Adjutant General, the Chief of Chaplains, the Provost Marshal General, and the Chief of Information and Education. The Technical Service Chiefs remained, but under the control and supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Efforts to centralize the career management of officers had failed. Under the authority of AR 10-5 published on 22 May 1957, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel was charged with the responsibility in the formulation of policy and supervising the execution of officer career management. However, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had authority over the technical staffs and under that jurisdiction had responsibility for developing and supervising a single, integrated career management system for technical service corps officers. By delegation of authority from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Technical Service Chiefs exercised authority over the career management of officers of their respective service.⁷ AR 10-5, Organization and Functions of the Army, was republished on 5 May 1961; however, the personnel management responsibilities of the DCSPER, the DCSLOG and the technical services remained unchanged and officer career management continued to be fragmented among several agencies and the once powerful Adjutant General had personnel management responsibility for only AGC officers and the record keeping function only for others. With the

later establishment of MILPERCEN, he would turn over that function also.

Although a complete reorganization of Department of the Army and in particular the personnel management and operating functions were on the horizon, the basic objectives of career management and guidance for Army officers remained "To develop a highly competent officer corps to serve in positions of progressively higher responsibility in the event of a national emergency," and the primary policy for development was "The rotation of assignments in various types of duties between CONUS and oversea commanders to develop a broadly trained officer."⁸

Project 80--October 1961

In James E. Hewes' book From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963, Hewes addresses the OSD Project 80 Study in Chapter X as "The End of a Tradition,"⁹ and rightly so, for with the approval of the Project 80 recommendations, sweeping changes in command and Army Staff functions would be made to include the elimination of the offices of five of the chiefs of the technical services and the transfer of most all officer personnel management functions to a new organization called Office of Personnel Operations.

The prime target of Project 80 was not personnel management systems reorganization, but rather it addressed as its central question the functionalizing of the logistics system and the technical services. Nor was the Project 80 Study initiated from within

the Army, it was the brainchild of Secretary of Defense McNamara and although the Army was allowed to conduct its own study, the guidelines for the study were provided by the Office, Secretary of Defense. Under the terms of reference issued, OSD identified the fact that there had been no major study of overall Army organization since 1955 and that in the meantime significant changes in the Defense environment had taken place particularly as a result of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958.¹⁰ Army Secretary Stahr appointed the Deputy Comptroller of the Army, Leonard Hoelscher, as the project director and he in turn selected a group of some fifty officers and thirteen civilians for the study effort.¹¹ Study groups were established for each of the following study areas: (1) Headquarters, DA, (2) Continental Army Command, (3) Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Technical Services, (4) research and development, (5) the reserve components, and (6) personnel functions.¹²

In evaluating the then current personnel system, the study group found a lack of positive direction as it appeared that direction of the system was diffused within HQ DA. The overall effort was broken down into functional areas within ODCSPER resulting in a series of parallel efforts rather than a single integrated effort. It was also found that in addition to the duplication of effort in ODCSPER, there was overlap and duplication within and among the General and Special Staff agencies. Priorities for programs had not always been fully agreed upon and many separate and short-range objectives were often pursued. The study group also found that the Army staff was unnecessarily engaged in personnel operating

functions to the detriment of directing.¹³

Proper officer career management was also seen by the study group as requiring modification in staff responsibilities and relationships. The study group cited the following conditions to exist to the detriment of the officer corps as a whole:

a. An organizational anomaly was the location of the Officer Assignment Division (OAD) in ODCSPER and the relationship of OAD to the Technical Service career officers. OAD contained three career divisions (combat arms) responsible for the management of about one half of the officer corps and staffing of OAD tended to reflect this direct relationship. In contrast, the officer career branch of each Technical and Administrative Service was located in the office of the appropriate Service Chief. When OAD was a division of TAGO, the career management offices of the Technical Services were linked organizationally to TAGO, but when OAD was moved to ODCSPER, the organizational link was lost.

b. It was further observed that there was little effort by OAD to adjust officer requirements, perhaps because of the feeling that OAD had little directive authority over the other career branches. As a result, some inequities in assignments existed. It was cited for example that Infantry Lieutenant Colonels were getting the lion's share of short tours to fill "branch immaterial" positions as opposed to sharing these requirements with other than combat arms officers.

c. Most damaging of all was the observation that a "sense of oneness" was lacking in the Army Officer Corps. Most frequently this condition was attributed to separate assignment offices in OAD and

the Technical Services. With the overall policy and career planning staff elements in OAD manned largely by combat arms officers led to the conclusion that the problems of officers of other branches were not fully considered. In point of fact, however, it appeared that career planning for Infantry, Armor and Artillery officers was less developed organizationally than was the case in the technical service career branches.¹⁴

The bottom line of the study groups' efforts in reviewing the entire personnel system was to recommend the creation of one special staff agency to handle all personnel operations. The Office of Personnel Operations headed up by a three-star general and not the same individual as the DCSPER. The DCSPER would retain policy responsibility for officer career management, but operations would be transferred to OPO except for personnel functions of The Surgeon General, The Judge Advocate General, and the Chief of Chaplains. OPO would be manned with personnel having backgrounds in the various general and special fields which would help to ensure that adequate attention be given to the needs of scientific and technical officers. The creation of OPO was seen as the key to any major action to achieve greater unity in the Army.¹⁵

In making these recommendations, it was fully recognized that officers were accustomed to dealing on an extremely personal basis with "their branch," but it was intended that career management of the entire officer corps would be raised to a degree of effectiveness which characterized the best of the existing branches. The group noted that it was very important that the emotional arguments

associated with the branch system not obscure the strengths inherent in consolidating these groups in OPO. It was expected that officers of all branches would serve in OPO and that career planning would reflect the officer corps at large and that requirements would be allocated so as to adjust inequities in assignments. As a major feature of the consolidation, career planning would be aimed at the development of combat arms officers at the same degree as it had been for the Technical Service Corps officers.¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

Organizational Structure

1. Special Regulations No. 10-110-1, Organization and Functions, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C., 19 July 1949), pp. 1-2.
2. A Study of Army Manpower and Personnel Management, Volume III, Systems Analysis Division, ODC&A, OCSA (Washington, D.C., May 1965), pp. 3A-1--A3-4.
3. SR No. 10-110-1, pp. 2-3.
4. Special Regulation No. 11-10-30, Army Programs, Execution and Review and Analysis of the Military Personnel Program (Washington, D.C., 28 December 1951), pp. 5-7.
5. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963, James E. Hewes, Jr., Center of Military History, US Army (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 229.
6. Ibid., pp. 231-232.
7. Army Regulation 10-5, Organization and Functions of Department of the Army (Washington, D.C., 22 May 1957).
8. Department of the Army, Manpower Program for FY 1958 (Washington, D.C., 17 August 1956), p. 7.
9. Study of the Functions, Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army, OSD Project 80 (Army), Part I (Washington, D.C., October 1961), pp. I-iii--I-iv.
10. Ibid.
11. Hewes, p. 319.
12. Project 80, Part I, p. I-xiii.
13. Project 80, Part VI, Personnel Functions (October 1961), pp. VI-36-37.
14. Ibid., pp. VI-37--VI-39.
15. Project 80, Part I, p. I-157.
16. Project 80, Part VI, p. VI-71.

CHAPTER V
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN OFFICER
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Following the hasty approval of Project 80, plans were put in motion to activate OPO by 1 July 1962. Major General S. R. Hammer was appointed Chairman of the OPO Planning Group and on 8 June 1962 the OPO activation plan was submitted, but not without problems. With regard to personnel management related functions heretofore performed by TAGO, a memorandum of understanding was approved by the Chief of Staff which allowed the retention of many administration functions within TAGO. There were also several personnel spaces to be transferred to OPO which at the time of activation were still being contested by other claimant organizations.¹ Sources and transfer of spaces to OPO from staff agencies are shown at Annex A; grade and branch breakout of OPD is shown at Annex B; initial organizational structure of OPD is shown at Annex C. Other than the once powerful Technical Service Chiefs having lost their direct influence over officer career management, the big loser in the OPO activation deal was the Adjutant General, and in effect ended his reign since WWI as the personnel operator for the Army. TAG lost 626 personnel spaces to OPO and also lost the proponentcy of over 300 personnel-related regulations, circulars and other related publications to OPO.²

Nonetheless, OPO was activated with portions located in the Pentagon and the majority of the Officer Personnel Directorate located in the Tempo ABC Complex.

The OPO concept of operation would last for the next 10-plus years and although there were refinements in basic officer career management policies (too numerous to discuss in this paper), the branch assignment and management system remained essentially unchanged. Within the branch system of management, all contact was not lost with the remaining technical service chiefs as one might have thought, as there was still an informal sort of agreement that they would still be consulted from time to time on management actions.³

Within the officer branch assignments system, each branch office was organized to handle assignment actions for the different grade groups by a different assignment officer or set of officers. Each career branch would select and assign individual officers to fill validated requirements. It was in this process that an attempt was made to put the "personal" into "personnel."⁴ Thus here, at the final level of individual assignment action, there was room to consider each case as a separate and distinct problem and to take into account the particular facts that make each officer unique. Officers with initiative made their preferences and career plans clearly understood by their branch assignment officers. This knowledge and point of contact with branch was cited by DCSPER to be crucial in career management and in the satisfaction with assignments received.⁵

THE STUDY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE US ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER (MILPERCEN)

In June 1964, the military departments came under pressure to reduce the number of activities in the NCR. As a result, the DCSPER

directed that a detailed plan be developed for the movement of OPO to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The project was assigned the nickname "BEST MAN." In 1969 the Staff Management Division of OCSA conducted a functional manpower survey of ODCSPER, OPO and TAG and recommended the establishment of a Military Personnel Command. In 1971, the Parker Panel in another study also recommended the consolidation of personnel functions into an organization to be called the Army Personnel Center. The "BEST MAN" project and the 1969 OCSA Survey recommendations were never implemented and the Parker Panel recommendations were disapproved by the Chief of Staff. The MILPERCEN concept was addressed again in 1971 by SMD, OCSA stating "the OPO of today is not a total personnel operations agency. . . ." And again in 1972 the Comptroller of the Army Study-Analysis of Class II Activities of the Army Staff recommended the Personnel Center concept (Project 11). As a result of the COA Project 11 Study, on 14 June 1972 the Chief of Staff directed the DCSPER to develop a time-phased plan to establish a Personnel Center.⁶ The Army Personnel Center (TAPCEN) Study Group was subsequently formed and their completed study was submitted in September 1972 as FOUO "Close Hold." On 11 January 1973, General Order No. 1 was published which established MILPERCEN effective 15 January 1973. The Hoffman Complex was selected as the new site for MILPERCEN and a time-phased plan was accomplished for the movement to that location with most elements closing and operating by the summer of 1973. A breakout of initial transfer of spaces is shown at Annex D. Elements of OPD moved to MILPERCEN almost in total without much organizational structure change and officer career management would be

unaffected for the near future although there were other studies underway on this subject which are discussed in the following section on "The Move to OPMS."

NOTES

1. Activation Plan, Office of Personnel Operations, HQ DA, Washington, D.C., June 1962, p. C-1.
2. Ibid., pp. F-3 - F-12.
3. Interview with senior civilian at MILPERCEN, April 1978.
4. Army 75 Personnel Concept, Volume XIV (Washington, D.C.: ODCSPER, August 1970), pp. F-1-21.
5. Ibid., pp. F-1-22.
6. Report of the Army Personnel Center Study Group, September 1972 (originally marked FOUO-"Close Hold"), pp. 4-9.

CHAPTER VI

THE MOVE TO OPMS

As was indicated earlier in this paper, the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the institutionalizing of Officer Career Planning and Management in 1948 were perhaps the most significant milestones in officer personnel management since the term had first come into existence in 1919. Although through the intervening years there had been several studies and refinements made in management systems, the primary changes that evolved were in fact structural changes in "who" managed rather than in the "how" officers were to be managed and utilized. Some will argue with this writer, but the evolution of the "who" concept of officer personnel management and administration saw the professional personnel managers, the Adjutant General Corps, all but removed from the entire system at the departmental level, but left them in charge of the system in the field Army. The "who" concept of management had reached its ultimate peak with the establishment of MILPERCEN and the Army would now turn again to the "how" approach.

The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) as we know it today was really an outgrowth of one of the most tragic and institutionally damaging incidents that the Army has ever endured. The My Lai incident and the results of the subsequent investigation caused the Army Chief of Staff to direct the Army War College to study the state of professionalism in the officer corps.¹ The tasking letter is at Annex E.

The findings and recommendations of the US Army War College Study on Military Professionalism submitted to the Chief of Staff

on 30 June 1970 are of such significance to the historical account of "why OPMS?" that they have been included in this perspective at Annex F. Upon reading the recommendations, it should be noted that no specific recommendation was made with regard to what officers know OPMS to be today, as that was to come later.²

INITIAL STEPS AND STUDY

In a memorandum dated 16 October 1970 to the DCSPER (LTG Walter T. Kerwin, Jr) the Chief of Staff (GEN W. C. Westmoreland) issued his guidance on improving Army professionalism. In his guidance memorandum he cited that "the Army War College study on professionalism suggests that our present officer personnel system creates an officer corps which tends to become a group of jacks of all trades and masters of none." He addressed the needs of the Army, but also the individual officer's abilities and desires. The concept of specialists vs. commanders and the equality of foreseeable promotion and schooling opportunities was seen as major improvement areas.³ As quoted in part from his guidance memorandum the Chief of Staff outlined his guidance on priorities:

The first task is to examine our policies and procedures with respect to command assignments. We must seek to achieve higher quality and greater stability in command I want to identify our field grade officers best suited to command, to designate them explicitly as such. . . .

. . . Perhaps our commanders at company level should be majors. Promotion boards for lieutenant colonel and colonel might designate on the promotion lists those officers selected for command.

A review of the command system above . . . will force us to address our policies for encouraging and permitting specialization. . . .

I would like this matter of specialists to be addressed separately from, but in full consideration of, our command assignment policy. . . . it may be necessary to redesign or add to our specialist programs. . . .

. . . I would like the DCSPER to provide to me as soon as possible the following:

- a. An estimate of the number and relative percentage of officers who would command under several alternative tour length policies.
- b. Procedures for identifying and selecting officers best suited for command.
- c. What the effect would be of designating majors as company, battery and troop commanders, with captains being designated as executive officers.
- d.
- e. An estimate of the impact on specialist programs of selectively programming officers into consecutive specialist assignments, except for occasional branch materiel familiarization and perhaps associate course type schooling.
- f. What programs might be expanded or newly created (such as Army historians or project managership) to improve both mission accomplishment and officer career satisfaction.
- g. An assessment of possible or necessary realignment of our branch structure and schools system in conformity with the new management philosophy. Consideration should be given to appropriate advanced civil education for technical specialists in lieu of attendance at CGSC and SSC. Successful graduation from CGSC might appropriately comprise credit for either battalion or brigade command.
- h. An estimate of the effect on our promotion system of a guaranteed "promotion slice" for specialists.
- i. An estimate of what policies we can change within current laws to eliminate those officers of all ranks, both RA and Reserve, who are marginally effective.⁴

In response to the Chief of Staff's tasking memorandum, the DCSPER established an OPMS Steering Committee on 21 October 1970 and on 29 October 1970 the DCSPER responded back to the Chief of Staff outlining his "line-limited line-specialist" concept to the Chief

of Staff.⁵ The study of OPMS was initially code named TOPSTAR and by DCSPER memorandum of 7 December 1970, Army Staff agencies were tasked to participate in the study.⁶ The study effort was further expanded and a timetable was established for completion of field staffing by 31 December 1971.⁷ The study progressed well on the modifications to the current system, but there were splits within DCSPER on basic conceptual differences on the categorization as line or limited line by MOS.⁸ The DCSPER was scheduled to brief the Chief of Staff on progress of the OPMS study and although the fears would be dispelled, there was concern in OCSA that there were some hard issues that may be generalized and that Chief of Staff guidance on these specific issues needed to be smoked out early.⁹

The first cut at OPMS (OPMS I) was completed and forwarded to the field on 25 June 1971. The contents of OPMS I will be discussed in detail in the following section.

NOTES

1. HQ Department of the Army letter, subject: The Officer Personnel Management System, AGDA(M) DCSPER-CSD, dated 25 June 1971.

2. US Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 30 June 1970).

3. Chief of Staff Army Memorandum to LTG W. T. Kerwin, Jr, DCSPER, subject: Guidance on Improving Army Professionalism, 16 October 1970, p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. HQ DA, ODCSPER Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Chief of Staff Guidance on Improving Army Professionalism, dated 29 October 1970.

6. HQ DA DCSPER Memorandum to Army Staff Agencies, subject: The Officer Personnel Management System for the Army (TOPSTAR), dated 7 December 1970.

7. CSM #71-126, OPMS, 2 April 1971.

8. CSA Office Memorandum, Officer Career Management Studies, 21 January 1971.

9. OCSA Memorandum, subject: Officer Career Management Studies, dated 21 January 1971, FOUO HOLD CLOSE

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGINAL OPMS PLAN (25 JUNE 1971)

Following the DCSPER's initial concept plan presented to the Chief of Staff on 29 October 1970, an in-house DCSPER study group was formed to develop a new concept for officer personnel management. This group's efforts were guided by a Steering Committee composed of directorate heads of ODCSPER and representations from special staff agencies under the general staff supervision of the DCSPER. (Initial members of the Steering Committee consisted of the Director of Military Personnel Policies; Assistant, The Adjutant General; Deputy Surgeon General; Deputy Chief of Chaplains; Assistant Judge Advocate General; Chief of Office of Personnel Operations; Director of Individual Training; Director of Procurement and Distribution; and Director of Plans, Studies and Budget.) The OPMS Plan was completed and forwarded to the field for comment on 25 June 1971. The forwarding letter identified that the guiding philosophy of OPMS was to:

1. Improve the professional climate of the officer corps.
2. Identify early and develop carefully officers most qualified for command.
3. Allow for specialization in some technical areas without undue restriction of promotion and schooling opportunities.
4. Provide a satisfying career for that large segment of the officer corps who are neither commanders nor specialists.

The letter requested that field commanders obtain the widest possible reaction from the officer corps as a whole and to report

conflicting views where they represented a consensus of a significant segment of the career officer population. Comments on the plan were to be forwarded to the DCSPER by 23 August 1971.¹ Consolidated field comments in summary revealed:

1. A conservative attitude toward change. OPMS was too much change in too short a time.
2. Revision of the concept was necessary to accommodate the recommendations received.

Although field comments were extremely helpful and enhanced the development of a revised concept, the original objectives of OPMS were critical to increased professionalism and were retained in the revised concept. Those objectives were:

1. Increase professional competence.
2. Improve productive competition.
3. Provide greater career satisfaction.²

The original OPMS Plan was well over 200 pages in length and while a detailed discussion of that plan is not necessary for the purpose of this paper, a brief outline of some of its major provisions may be appropriate to gain an insight into some of the management thinking of that time as a comparison to what eventually evolved as we know OPMS today. The plan was divided into eight sections: Professionalism, Grade Structure, Career Management System, Promotion System, Officer Evaluation System, Counseling Training System, Titular Heads, and Implementation Plan.

Professionalism

The purpose of addressing this issue was to establish the professional and personal standards and goals for the Officer Corps. However, after a lengthy discussion of the issue, about all the plan proposed was that the following definition of military professionalism be adopted and included in the US Army Dictionary of Military Terms:

The Army Professional

The Army professional has sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic. He has taken this oath without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion aware of the lasting obligations and responsibilities it imposes upon him. The Army professional seeks the attainment of excellence through education, experience and personal dedication. He is characterized by fidelity and selfless devotion to duty. He possesses great skill, extensive knowledge and is willing to abide by established military ethics and promote high standards. His performance is tempered by sound judgment, compassion and understanding. The Army professional conducts his personal affairs so as to be free from impropriety and acts with candor and integrity in all matters. He recognizes the special trust and authority vested in him and accepts the charge to guide and inspire those under his authority to support the Constitution and to serve honorable in times of peace and war.

Grade Structure

An optimum grade structure for OPMS was defined as a hypothetical grade structure which can be used as a design goal and modified to meet policy changes. A single component officer corps also became an integral part of optimum grade structure design and was so proposed under the study plan. (a) Grade Structure Guidance: To be workable, a career group must (1) consist of sufficient numbers to

endure loss ratios from a single year group, therefore the number of such career fields should be held to a minimum; (2) have grades balanced to enable an attractive promotion opportunity. The ideal ratio is one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, three majors, five captains and seven lieutenants; and (3) distributed proportionately throughout a service spectrum so a balanced grade structure results from normal losses and promotions.

(b) A Single Component Officer Corps: Title 10 of the US Code fixed a ceiling on the Regular Army officer strength at 49,500 (not including nurses and medical specialists). The Army approach had been to avoid reaching its authorized RA content. During hearings on the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 the Army presented its plans to avoid reaching its authorization until 1973. There were many reasons for this approach. The Army was giving up its Air Forces and the total officer strength was due to fall to about 65,000 in 1945. There were simply no plans to maintain an Army in excess of 600,000 or an officer corps in excess of 70,000. The 49,500 RA content was, therefore, envisioned to meet the Army's needs. The objective was to build a balanced structure in a slow methodical manner until retirement losses from the rapid promotion rate period of WWII made room for new accessions each year. As a result, the Army had to be extremely selective on RA integration--so selective in fact that unless an OTRA officer met the quality standards of the top 50% of the RA Corps, he did not stand a chance on integration. A study on the dual vs single component system had been under way for several years; however, the RVN buildup had delayed further progress.

With the RVN phase down then in progress associated with the change in strategy to accomplish future emergency build-ups through mobilization, caused the study group to pursue the single component concept. The plan cited these advantages:

1. The dual component system is complicated and difficult to manage.
2. A single component system would remove all real or imagined discrimination; enable each officer to develop to his potential; create a system wherein only the best survive and instill a higher degree of professionalism and pride in the profession of arms.
3. A single component system would enable the Army to equate long-term needs with resource development.
4. It would simplify the US Code governing officers.
5. It would enable baseline force strengths to be established by law.

The basic philosophy that should guide the officer corps of the future, the study stated,

. . . . is that no officer, irrespective of procurement source, has an inherent right to tenure unless he is best qualified. A one component officer corps is therefore a goal of OPMS. . . so long as a dual component system exists in any system, a significantly lower state of professionalism will surely result.

Career Management System

In broad terms, the study plan proposed the following management system:

- a. Officers are to be managed by their basic branch, with commander/staff officer distinction made within each branch for

those branches or groups of related branches that do not possess career fields which are common to all branches of the group.

b. For those branches or groups of related branches that possess career fields which are common to all branches of the group:

(1) Officers pursuing branch material career fields to be managed by the career branch concerned.

(2) Officers pursuing career fields which are common to related career branches to be centrally managed within a centralized management agency.

(Within (1) and (2) above, distinctions would be made between the management of commanders and staff officers.)

Competitive Groupings: For all DA promotion/schooling boards, the following competitive groupings would replace APL Branches, chaplain, WAC and Medical Department groupings: combat arms (ADA, AR, FA, and IN); combat support arms (CE, MI, MP, and SC); materiel movement services (OD, QM, and TC); other OPD managed branches (AG, WAC), promotion quota, specialist corps-- promotion by quota; Special Branches (JAG, promotion by quota), Ch, promotion by quota), MC, DC, VC, MSC, ANC, and AMSC).

MOS Proponency: Under the ~~then~~ current system, the OPMS plan addressed the fact that within OPD, the branch was the primary item considered in deciding which branch fills personnel requirements, and while a requisition may call for a particular branch and MOS, the ultimate selection for the "face" to fill the "space" was

generally based upon officer availability within the branch rather than competency in the MOS. Under the proposed system it was stated that professional competence would be improved by identifying MOSs with a single branch or group of related branches and reducing the number of MOSs for which a given branch was expected to maintain officer expertise. The proposed plan recommended that MOS ~~proponency~~ be assigned in the following categories: Sole proponency; Group proponency; and Common proponency. There were, of course, several alternatives addressed under this subject, but there were two specific proposals that deserve special note.

1. Additional study was required to examine each MOS for validity, perhaps many could be consolidated. However, once verified, award of an MOS would be restricted to individuals in branches authorized that particular MOS.

2. Within OPO, career branch assignment officers would continue to come from the respective branches and may carry a duty MOS of 2210 (Personnel Management Officer), but officers other than AG could not be awarded MOS 2210 as either a primary or additional MOS. Further, within OPO, AG officers would be used whenever there is no clear-cut requirement for an officer of another branch.

Identification and Selection of Commanders and Staff Officers:

Up to this time, the personnel system did not provide for the early formal identification and development of commanders. The only system that came close to it was when an officer was assigned

to a major unit "branch command recommended," but there was no assurance that that officer would in fact be placed into a command position. In the proposed system, officers would be tentatively identified for command or staff development in the grade of major and formally designated in conjunction with promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel. By this procedure, OPMS seeks to avoid non-productive competition and "ticket punching." Promotion boards for LTC and COL would first select and designate as commanders those officers best qualified for further command development. Subsequent to those selections, the boards would then consider all remaining officers for promotion and development as staff officers.

Concept of Specialization:

a. The problem: Officers then participating in one of the eleven special career programs were expected to remain qualified in both their basic branch and their career program area by alternating assignments. However, management of the officer remained with the basic branch and in case of conflict in basic branch versus special career program needs, the basic branch requirement usually prevailed. Some of the special career programs were open to all branches, some to only selected branches. Some branches had clearly defined specialty career patterns while other branches did not.

b. The proposed system: the Specialist Corps (a new career management branch) would be added as a basic branch of the Army. Officers qualified in selected specialty areas could request and

be assigned to the Specialist Corps upon entry into active duty and would be assigned to positions within their specialty area throughout their entire career and would compete for promotion with only those officers within their specialty area. If volunteers proved to be inadequate to fill requirements, officers of other branches would be detailed for a period not to exceed three years to make up the shortage.

Management of Aviators:

At the time, aviators were authorized in ADA, AR, EN, FA, IN, MSC, MJ, MPC, SC, and TC. Officer aviators were managed by their career branches and were expected to remain fully branch qualified for ground assignments as well as for aviation assignments. Under the new system, all aviation positions would be designated as warrant officer positions unless there was a command/management responsibility that required a commissioned officer and commissioned officer aviators would be authorized only in those branches where true branch functions needed to be performed by an aviator. Army aviation would be phased out of ADA, EN, MP and SC. Within branches authorized aviators, the officer would be developed to achieve competence in both aviation and selected nonaviation assignments.

Management of Logisticians:

a. Background: Reorganization of the Army under Project 80 in 1962 removed materiel oriented missions from the technical services. In the same time frame, combat service support, under the COSTAR II and TASTA 70 concepts had been functionalized.

Within AMC, the logistics R&D, testing, procurement, and wholesale logistics functions had been organized generally along commodity lines. However, individual branches were no longer specifically associated with particular materiel commodities. Branch identity with supply and maintenance in the then 4000 series MOSs had almost disappeared. Additionally, there were requirements for a variety of skills, but there was no clearly defined path to produce Commodity Materiel Specialists, Multicommodity Materiel Specialists, Functional Specialists or Functional Generalists.

b. The study plan proposed two alternatives:

(1) Retain the present branches. Propensity for all 4000 series MOSs would be given to the Materiel and Movements branches. EN, CM, and SC officers would no longer fill 4000 series MOS positions and the Logistics Officer Career Program would be abolished. Within each branch, career patterns would be structured to permit development of either specialist or generalist. A true logistical generalist at the field grade level would be identified and managed centrally at the branch group level.

(2) The Parker Panel recommended the merger of the Chemical, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Transportation Corps to create a Logistics Corps. This approach was cited as being compatible with the career patterns developed for the existing branches and was seen as a feasible alternative.

The DCSLOG was designated to conduct further study on these two alternatives in order to fully support OPMS. However, as a separate recommendation, the study plan made firm plans to

abolish the existing Chemical Corps as a branch of the Army.

Senior Service College Eligibility and Selection:

OPMS visualized validation of positions requiring SSC graduates at the colonel level and the proposed supporting selection system required substantial modification.

Separate boards would be convened annually to consider eligible officers of each of the management groupings. If no validated positions existed within the management grouping, the officers so affected would be deferred and would be programed for SSC attendance upon selection for promotion to general officer. To provide for early identification of the most outstanding officers, selection boards would be directed to make their selections under the following guidelines:

- 50% of selections from secondary promotion zone

- 33% of selections from the primary promotion zone

- 17% of selections from officers on current promotion list to colonel.

Under the proposed system, officers would be provided three opportunities for SSC selection; first when eligible for secondary zone promotion to colonel; second when eligible for primary zone for colonel; and final consideration subsequent to selection for promotion to colonel.

Promotion System

The OPMS promotion system is contingent on the officer career management system described in the preceding paragraphs, and by

the fact that officer promotions have their basis in law. Any substantive changes must be preceded by legislative change to applicable sections of Title 10, USC. Under the proposed concept, officers in each of four career groups (combat arms, combat support arms, materiel and movements services, and other OPD branches) would compete only among officers in their respective groups. Selections for promotion and command would be as described in earlier sections. The attrition system associated with promotion envisioned annual continuation boards that would "select out" officers who do not remain qualitatively competitive with their contemporaries. (Officer Evaluation System and Counseling Training sections of the plan will not be addressed here.)

Titular Heads

CSM 71-126 dated 2 April 1971 (OPMS) established the need to investigate the titular branch chief concept whose functions would not include personnel management, but would rather emphasize morale, tradition and doctrine. At that time COPO branches did not identify a titular head for the branches nor did they coordinate personnel management actions with a particular agency other than the following branches which maintained informed links with agencies related to branch functions: EN-COE; MP-PMG; AG-TAG; WC-DWC; MI-ACSI, CG USASA and Intelligence Command. The study plan recommended that titular heads should be established at the branch/specialty level and should be identified from school commandants, field commanders, and heads of staff agencies as

best suited to carry out the functions of the branch or specialty concerned as indicated below:

School Commandants	- IN, AR, ADA, FA, OD, QM, TC
The Surgeon General	- AMEDD Branches
The Judge Advocate General	- JAG
Chief of Chaplains	- Chaplains
The Provost Marshal General	- MP
Chief of Engineers	- EN
ACSI	- MI
DWC	- WC
TAG	- AG
ACSC-E	- SIG
DCSPER	- Recruiting/Training
DCSLOG	- Logistics
AVICE	- ADP
CINFO	- Information
ACSFOR	- ORSA
CRD	- R&D
COA	- Comptroller

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF OPMS II

As a result of the conservative field reaction to the staffing of OPMS I, a revised concept for OPMS was developed and approved by the Chief of Staff on 5 January 1972 for further development and implementation.¹ The revised OPMS Concept Summary is at Annex G. On 23 January 1972 the DCSPER (Director of Military Personnel Policies) submitted for approval, by the Chief of Staff, proposed OPMS Career Fields and Specialties to be used as the basis for officer career development under OPMS and procedures for their identification in authorization documents, officer records and requisitions. Also included was an OPMS Milestone Schedule which is at Annex H. On 8 March 1973 the Chief of Staff approved the DCSPER recommendations, but with several exceptions to include that the term "career field" would not be used. Rather, groupings of specialties would be referred to by their common functional name, e.g., Intelligence specialties, etc.²

Although the Chief of Staff would later indorse the OPMS concept, General Abrams seemed to have had both specific and philosophical concerns about the OPMS concept and how it would be accepted by the officer corps. In the words of a senior action officer in DCSPER, as a result of a meeting with General Abrams on 2 March 1973, "the CSA is apparently assessing his options to approve or drop OPMS," and asked, "how far down the road we were in the execution of OPMS."³ This uneasiness on the part of General Abrams

was also perceived by the Commander of MILPERCEN which he outlined in a memorandum to the DCSPER on 2 March 1973.⁴ Some of those concerns are outlined below and are reflected herein not to undermine the OPMS concept and its adoption, but rather to show that the Chief of Staff of the Army gave very serious consideration to the concept over a considerable period of time before he approved it and indorsed it as "the blueprint for development of the Army's officer corps of the future."⁵

Concern: OPMS emphasizes officer specialization to a degree that compartmentalizes, fragments and undermines unity of the officer corps. . . .

Comment: OPMS does not create specialization and functionalization within the officer corps; it is now and has long been a fact of life and is becoming more so. Many branches have long been encouraging officers to develop needed secondary skills. What OPMS does is to recognize formally the need for soldiers with special skills . . . (and) developing officers with skills requisite to the Army's needs. . . .

Whatever our method or title of organizing and managing officers, we always must be conscious of maintaining the unity and broad mission orientation of the officer corps. This fact has always been in the forefront of the consciousness of the OPMS Steering Committee. . . .

Concern: OPMS will tend to be or become so rigid and inflexible that it will tend to force each officer into a narrow mold poured in Washington and will make more difficult developing officers who are willing and able to do the tough, unstructured jobs that must be done.

Comment: This is a real concern that has ever been in the minds of those of us who have worked on OPMS. We recognize that there will always be jobs to be done and positions to fill that do not fit neatly into a career field or specialty. . . . I believe it will be necessary constantly to maintain a close watch on the personnel manager to guard against his creating consciously or unconsciously a system that is so rigid and inflexible that it works to the detriment of the Army. But this is true now and in the future, with or without OPMS.

Concern: OPMS is so complex it will be unmanageable.

Comment: This, too, has been a matter of concern to those who have worked on OPMS. . . . One of the strengths of the OPMS working group and steering committee is that it has ample representation of those who will have to make OPMS work. . . . We also believe that ultimately, management of officers under OPMS may be more orderly, logically, and effectively done than under current conditions.

Concern: OPMS is essentially a composite of claims or interests of specialists' groups which subordinates the broad interests of the Army to narrow special interests and that OPMS was designed with inadequate consideration of the overriding broad interests of the Army.

Comment: . . . the broad interests of the Army have been predominant in the minds of those of us who have worked on the OPMS Steering Committee for the past 18-24 months. . . . Recall that what is now OPMS began with the work and findings of the Emerson Leadership Board and the Army War College Professionalism Study which identified certain flaws and weaknesses within the officer corps. . . . OPMS started, then, with the mission of strengthening and making more effective the US Army officer corps and hence a more effective Army. That broad mission continues to guide OPMS.'

Concern: OPMS is conceived as a grand design expected to anticipate and solve the Army's needs of the future, whereas mere humans cannot predict the future with certainty.

Comment: . . . most of those involved in OPMS share that same healthy skepticism about man's ability to plan his future. . . . We do not suggest that OPMS is prescient, perfect, or infallible. To do so would indeed be arrogant. We do believe that OPMS offers in a modest way a framework within which the Army can develop officers for the Army's needs in a more orderly, disciplined, systematic, and effective way than it now does.

Summary: The work that has gone into OPMS is good for the Army. This has been the most thorough study and analysis of the Army's officer needs and the officer corps since at least 1947. . . . OPMS is far more evolutionary than revolutionary; and with or without the title of "OPMS," we will probably undertake most of the programs and actions brought together under the aegis of OPMS.

OPMS is needed, but will succeed only if the officer corps, led by the Chief of Staff, understand its intent, believe in it, and give it their full support.⁶

OPMS APPROVED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF

DA Pamphlet 600-3, March 1974:

To Each Officer of the Army

The Officer Personnel Management System described in this pamphlet is the blueprint for development of the Army's officer corps of the future. This system will provide officers the opportunity to develop the professional skills that the leaders of tomorrow's Army will need.

I command this pamphlet to your study, but caution you to bear in mind that how well you do in the Army depends not on our system of management but rather on your individual efforts and dedication to service.

Creighton W. Abrams
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

OPMS in Operation

On 12 February 1976, the Chief of Staff asked "How does OPMS look to us now?" The DCSPER response was that OPMS was doing well, but there were two major areas that could cause problems. First, there was concern that the active support and acceptance by senior officers had not yet been fully achieved and secondly, that OSD initiatives regarding stabilization had the potential of handicapping OPMS efforts. Dual specialty development was just getting underway and there was some field apprehension. There were also some mixed emotions in the field with regard to the reorganization of OPD in the elimination of the branches.

The status of OPMS was again reviewed with the Chief of Staff on 31 May 1977. Cited as causing some difficulties were centralized battalion command selection (the non-select viewing himself as a failure) and the emphasis on reducing turbulence. As a follow-on to that meeting the Chief of Staff approved a MILPERCEN proposal to establish a group (OSAG) to monitor on a low-key basis future modifications to OPMS. OSAG efforts are still underway. The examination of officer education policies (Harrison Board) has been completed and is being staffed within HQ DA.

Footnotes

Development of OPMS II

1. DAPE-MPC, Fact Sheet, subject: The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), LTC Buckley, 18 February 1972.
2. DAS Summary Sheet, DAPO-OPD-RP (Major Bishop), subject: OPMS Career Fields and Specialties, dated 23 January 1972.
3. DAPE-MPO, Memorandum for Record of OPMS Discussion with CSA 2 March 1973.
4. HQ USAMILPERCEN, DAPE-ZA, Memorandum for the DCSPER, subject: General Abrams' Reaction to OPMS Briefing, dated 2 March 1973.
5. DA Pam 600-3, March 1974, Foreword: To Each Officer of the Army, by Creighton W. Abrams, General USA, Chief of Staff.
6. HQ USAMILPERCEN, op. cit.

CHAPTER IX

OPMS FOR THE 1980s

One of the study objectives submitted by the DA DCSPER was to project the officer personnel management system into the 1980s. It would be completely presumptuous on the part of this officer to attempt such a thing, as there are actions ongoing at Department of the Army level to do just that. I will, however, offer some observations that perhaps may be worth some consideration.

I suspect that one of General Abrams' concerns about OPMS, that of unmanageability, could or has come to pass. Just consider some of the officer management limitations that have been imposed upon the system: distribution of former battalion commanders; distribution of SSC and C&GSC graduates (based upon "fair share," not requirements by position); distribution of officer quality by thirds; command tour lengths; stabilization constraints, cuts in training funds; LTC and COL command selections and programing. These are but a few of the management actions that must be considered by MILPERCEN that ultimately affects each officer while at the same time he is attempting to become "dual qualified" under OPMS with no real vertical structure at DA to assist him. If he is lucky enough to get promoted from CPT to MAJ, his record is passed to "Majors Division" as a numbered specialty for further assignment. When the Chief of Staff originally approved OPMS as a concept, he stated that it would be good for the Army, but also indicated that a viable branch organization should be maintained. However, for

some reason, it was decided that in order to make OPMS work, the branches had to be disestablished and a sudden reorganization in OPD in May 1975 did just that. I am not suggesting a return to a true "branch system"; but I am suggesting a return to some sort of branch affiliation and strong vertical management structure within the OPMS management system at MILPERCEN. Without it, the managers will have lost contact with the officer corps.

The primary concern of the officer corps when OPMS I was first fielded was that it was too much change too fast; after all, it took nearly 30 years just to ease out the technical branch chiefs and to centralize officer personnel management. The move to OPMS was a big step for the officer corps to accept and for the most part, I believe it has been accepted. Likewise, I suspect that to support the OPMS concept, the officer corps will also accept "promotion by specialty" if it is accomplished with solid requirements data that officers can understand, have confidence in, and can plan their careers by accordingly, and not change every year.

Although the officer corps better understands OPMS today and generally accepts it, I also sense an uneasiness--not with OPMS as a system, but with the sometimes lack of candor or credibility in the system as applied to officers as individuals.

OPMS was a big change for the officer corps--three Chiefs of Staff put their necks on the line for it, thinking that it would be good for the Army. However, with major issues such as DOPMA and the President's Pay Commission pending, I would certainly move very cautiously in making any changes to OPMS now, to include the

Harrison Board recommendations. I suspect that the overwhelming response to the OSAG survey is an indication of officer interest in GPMS. The results should be interesting and paid attention to, for those who will make the final decisions rose to success by another system.

SOURCES OF SPACES IDENTIFIED FOR OPO

	<u>Concurred in Spaces</u>	<u>Disputed Spaces</u>	<u>Total</u>
DCSPER	298		298
TAG	626*	0	626*
ACSI	0	2	2
DCSLOG	9	5	14
GRD	0	3	3
CINFO	0	4	4
DCSOPS	0	0	0
TIG	0	0	0
PMG	9	6	15
FIN	12	1	13
GML	14	18	32
ENG	50	22	72
ORD	61	3	64
QM	43	10	53
SIG	37	18	55
TSG	1	2	3
TC	36	4	40
TOTAL	1196	98	1294

*Includes 149 Field spaces and 42 authorized overstrength.

OFFICER PERSONNEL DISCREPANCY
OFFICER GRADE/BRANCH DISTRIBUTION


BRANCH	BRANCH MATERIAL*				BRANCH MATERIAL				TOTAL			
	COL	LT COL	MAJ	TOTAL	COL	LT COL	MAJ	TOTAL	COL	LT COL	MAJ	TOTAL
AG		1	1	2	2	5	2	9	2	6	3	11
PS		3	2	6	1	5	7	13	2	8	9	19
AR	1	6	4	11	1	11	17	29	2	17	21	40
AT	1		1	1	2	1	3	6	2	1	4	7
CH			3	3	3	4	6	13	4	6	9	19
EN	1	2	1	4	2	1	3	6	2	1	4	7
FI			7	7	3	13	14	30	5	22	21	48
IN	2	9	1	12	1	2	4	7	2	2	5	9
MP	1		1	2	2	4	10	16	2	6	12	20
OD		2	2	4	2	4	4	10	2	5	5	12
CH		1	1	2	2	4	6	14	2	6	9	19
SC	1	1	3	5	3	5	8	13	4	4	10	16
TC		1	2	3	2	3		1	2	1		1
WC						1						
TOTAL	7	26	28	61	24	59	84	167	31	85	112	228
TOTAL GENERAL OFFICERS												5
TOTAL WARRANT OFFICERS												5
BRAND TOTAL												230

* ALL "BRANCH MATERIAL" POSITIONS ARE DESIGNATED "BRANCH PREFERRED"

Office of Personnel Operations

OFFICER PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE (17B 81-652-91)

GPO RECAP	
OFF	23
ENL	9
CIV	41
TOTAL	73



ANNEX C

MILPERCEN MANPOWER INITIAL AUTHORIZATION

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>MILPERCEN</u>			
FROM:			
OPO (Dept '1)	493	758	1251
OPO (Field)	41	215	256
PERSINSCOM	301	565	866
PDSC	1		1
TAGO	40	327	367
ODGSPER	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL MILPERCEN	877	1866	2743
<u>FIELD ACTIVITIES</u>			
Enlmt Elig Activity	3	29	32
Enl Eval Center	47	143	190
Pers Info Activity	4	6	10
DA Mil Pers Mgt Tm	30	2	32
Pers Data Spt Center	154		154
AGPERCEN	<u>45</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>253</u>
TOTAL FIELD	283	388	671
GRAND TOTAL	1160	2254	3414

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

18 April 1970

SUBJECT: Analysis of Moral and Professional Climate in the Army

Commandant
United States Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

1. Several unfavorable events occurring within the Army during the past few years have been a matter of grave concern to me. These have served to focus attention on the state of discipline, integrity, morality, ethics, and professionalism in the Army.
2. By no means do I believe that the Army as an institution is in a moral crisis. However, these incidents have emphasized the need for a thorough review of certain areas and practices within the Army, and an analysis may indicate that prompt, corrective actions are necessary.
3. To ensure that an analysis of the moral and professional climate is conducted with the utmost thoroughness and mature perspective, I am assigning the task to you. Using selected members of your own staff, faculty, and students, I should like you to determine if we have problems in these or related areas, and if so, how we might correct them.
4. In making your study, I should like particularly to have developed an "Officers Code." If feasible, it would serve as a concise, easily understood reference by which an officer would be guided in his daily performance of duty. It would also serve to make him aware of the value and need for unquestioned integrity, as well as be a guide for recognizing and contending with compromising pressures. The "Officers Code," as I envision it, would not be a substitute for regulations, directives, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Its only purpose would be to guide officers in exercising their authority and performing their duties.
5. The study is to be conducted basically by your people, as I have mentioned, but I should like it to incorporate the views of junior as well as senior officers. To facilitate this, I suggest you contact

SUBJECT: Analysis of Moral and Professional Climate in the Army

the commandants of the Command and General Staff College and the service schools at Benning, Sill, Knox, Eustis, and Hamilton and request that they convene a selected small group of officers with varied experience from the advanced courses to address the central issues affecting discipline, professionalism, integrity, ethics, and morality in the Army. The opinions of the faculty members and students will provide information from a wide cross section of ranks and experiences. I have informed the CG CONARC and the Chief of Chaplains of this study and the fact that you and your staff will deal directly with the commandants of the six schools.

6. I should like the results by 1 July 1970. . . .

/s/ W. C. Westmoreland

/t/ W. C. WESTMORELAND

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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PART III - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. THE PREVAILING PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE. (See Annex B, Findings and Discussion, for further elaboration and tabular data.)

1. Attitude toward Professionalism.

The officers who provided information for this study were an impressive group. There is good reason to believe that they represent an important section of that part of the Officer Corps which will provide the key leadership in the next decade. Especially reassuring for the future was the vigorous, interested, intelligent outlook of the captains and junior majors--individuals who had been commissioned in the past three to seven years. They reflected as a group a deep commitment to the ideal of Duty-Honor-Country. They were intolerant of others--be they subordinates, peers, or seniors--who transgressed. They were insistent that the inept, dishonest, or immoral officer be eliminated from the Service. The junior officers did not question--either in seminar, personal interview, or on the questionnaire responses where their anonymity was guaranteed--the traditional, essentially authoritarian mode of the military organization, or its vital and unique responsibilities which could result in an officer's accomplishing a particular task at the cost of his life. They were frustrated by the pressures of the system, disheartened by those seniors who sacrificed integrity on the altar of personal success, and impatient with what they perceived as preoccupation with insignificant statistics.

2. The Characteristics of the Climate.

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a. General. There is a significant, widely perceived, rarely disavowed difference between the idealized professional climate and the existing professional climate.

b. The Ideal and the Existing Climate. The idealized climate is characterized by: individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information. It is epitomized in the words, Duty-Honor-Country. The existing climate includes a wide spectrum of performance. Some performance conforms closely to the ideal. But a widespread, officially condoned or institutionalized portion of the performance of individuals varies significantly from the standards that the Army espouses as an organization, and that the officers subscribe to as being the proper standards for their personal behavior. As a result, the existing climate includes persistent and rather ubiquitous overtones of: selfish behavior that places personal success ahead of the good of the Service; looking upward to please superiors instead of looking downward to fulfill the legitimate needs of subordinates; preoccupation with the attainment of trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices that injure the long-term fabric of the organization; incomplete communications between junior and seniors which leave the senior uninformed and the junior feeling unimportant; and inadequate technical or managerial competence to perform effectively the assigned duties. A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in the complexities of his

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duties--engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates. The junior officer bears a particularly heavy part of the burden. He is the executor of command decisions and bears the brunt of the burden of executing simultaneously and flawlessly all the policies conceived by all the echelons above him.

The following are representative remarks extracted from the narrative comments of questionnaires. (Additional extracts from narrative comments are included in Appendix 1, Anecdotal Input to Annex B.)

These are from officers at various posts.

CPT: . . . overemphasis on zero defects. . . .
Commanders must realize that mistakes are human,
. . . they should be used as lessons learned and
not vehicles for destroying an individual.

LT: I have observed that the willingness of an
officer to assume responsibility for his own plans
and actions seems to vary inversely with rank up to
the rank of general. While obviously a gross
generalization, this behavioral pattern is consistent
with . . . cover your ass.

CPT: . . . reluctance of middle grade officers to
render reports reflecting the true material readiness
of their unit. Because they and their raters hold
their leadership positions for such short periods,
they feel that even one poor report will reflect
harshly upon their abilities.

CPT: . . . fear in the subordinate of relief and
a bad OER if he admits that his unit is less than
perfect or he is presenting a point his superior
doesn't want to hear. . . . The subordinate must
have the integrity to 'tell it like it is' in spite
of fear for his career, etc., while the superior
owes it to his subordinates to help him as much as
possible as opposed to the attitude of 'you get it
squared away or I'll get someone who will' over a
one-time deficiency. . . . It takes a great deal

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of personal courage to say 'the screw up occurred here' rather than passing the blame down to a lower level. The only solution would again be the development of personal integrity and moral courage. . . . Perhaps an emphasis on these traits as opposed to the sledgehammer of, 'you screwed up once and now it will haunt you forever on your OER.'

CPT: In other words, the CO who allows his subordinates to make certain mistakes in order to increase their proficiency and ability even though it makes the CO look bad is the officer zapped by the OER. Reduce this . . . by effective leadership.

CPT: Military personnel, primarily career types, are too concerned with promotions, efficiency reports, and conforming to the wishes of their commander. . . . Many times a good soldier is . . . treated unfairly by his superiors for maintaining high standards of professional military competence.

CPT: Too many officers place the value of a high OER over the welfare of their men. . . . The Army should select men for command positions who have some backbone and who care about the unit and the men more than they care about their career. Relieve officers who fail in these areas. . . . Too many officers will go to any means to receive a high OER.

COL: Endless CYA exercises create suspicion and distrust on the part of juniors for the integrity and competence of their superiors. . . . 'Buck passing' has always been a problem, but reluctance to accept responsibility at high level is increasingly evident, as viewed by the juniors.

COL: Across the board the Officer Corps is lacking in their responsibilities of looking out for the welfare of subordinates.

COL: Chaotic conditions in the Army permit unprincipled officers to work undetected.

COL: We appear to live in an environment which does not tolerate less than total success, with the result that delegation of authority to subordinate levels cannot be accepted since the commander cannot afford to be 'smeared' by the taint of even possible failure. Subordinates reared in such an environment can do no more than perpetuate . . . this practice . . . it is a trend which needs to be reversed before the initiative of the junior officer is completely subverted.

COL: Everyone is afraid to make a mistake with someone always looking over his shoulder. . . . Authority and ability are diluted at every level. . . .

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When senior officers let their personal ambitions show through in their actions and decisions, this weakens ethical standards throughout that portion of the Officer Corps who know of this

Many, many young officers who realize that personal ambition and not the long range good of the organization is the 'why' of certain decisions leave the Army. Hence, example tends to keep in the Army those who are willing to follow that example.

COL: It appears to me that we want only to impress people with what we do right . . . with a result that reports are shaded and do not reflect the true state of an organization. . . . I feel that many senior officers need exposure to modern concepts of personnel management, communication techniques, motivation, and the need for self-actualization that young officers . . . possess.

COL: Officers do not know their own jobs well enough and . . . they are afraid that if they delegate authority to subordinates, . . . they themselves will suffer . . . the present day commander looks upon his command tour as a mechanism to help him get ahead provided he does not rock the boat or make waves As a result, subordinates are not being properly developed and there is a general feeling among junior officers that seniors are untouchable, unapproachable, unreasonable, and constantly looking for mistakes A commander who takes a genuine interest in the welfare and the training of his subordinates is getting rarer, indeed. . . . I continue to be impressed by the potential and desire of officer candidates who are being commissioned.

COL: Many of these young officers are exceptional and in my experience come much closer to the 'ideal' than did junior officers in the period 1945-1955 It appears the greatest single factor working against the ideal is excessive career competition among upper and senior officers. At Battalion Commander level this problem becomes acute and continues from Battalion to Brigade to Division The below zone promotion scheme should be reconsidered (I had one to O-6). Better would be a higher passover rate and no below zone promotions The capable, ambitious officer must be protected from himself but more importantly the junior officers and FM beneath him [them] must be protected.

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MAJ: I am concerned with honesty--trust--and administrative competence within the Officer Corps. . . . Command influence impairs calling a 'spade a spade.' . . . One of my raters exemplified the subject concept His primary interest was 'No. 1'; everything else (including the welfare of the command) was handled on a 'two-faced' basis. He would 'bleed' his troops dry to make a good impression--then stab his subordinates in the back when they were no longer useful I'm not attempting sarcasm, but the concept of 'getting your ticket punched' has gone too far.

It is of more than passing interest to note how these themes recur in allied literature. In May 1970 several officers from the USMA class of 1966 who were resigning were interviewed by the USMA Office of Research. Included in the preliminary draft of a paper summarizing the interviews were the following:

Their first complaint was based on the perception of senior officers, particularly colonels and lieutenant colonels who were in command positions, that as a result of the 'system' the latter officers were forced to abandon their scruples and ignore the precepts of duty and honor; and if necessary to lie and cheat in order to remain successful and competitive

A second complaint was that no one had shown any real interest in them, their careers, in their opinions. Without exception, each of the [ten] resignees states that this interview was the first time that any senior officer had ever sat down and talked with them as opposed to talking at them.

This theme--of a senior not listening--permeated the seminar sessions conducted at the schools by the USAWC study group. Many officers, including those up to the grade of lieutenant colonel, expressed the view that the seminar sessions conducted by the USAWC teams were the first time their opinions had ever been solicited by their seniors.

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Many of the junior officers stated that it was not ultimately important whether or not their individual recommendations were placed into effect because they did not presume to understand all of the big picture. Of vital importance to them was the fact that a senior officer would or would not give them a chance to express their views, including bad as well as good news.

Another interesting by-product of the seminars conducted with the younger officers was the reaction of the USAWC team members. They were impressed with the insight, energy, maturity, and outlook of the captains and majors particularly. And some of the team members felt that had they been somehow exposed to the barrage of unfiltered, straightforward perceptions of the junior officers a few years ago they would have done a better job as battalion commanders.

It is also noteworthy that the conditions described both in the written narrative and the seminars are practically identical to parts of the situation revealed by the Franklin Institute Study and published in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-20, Personnel--General: Junior Officer Retention, dated August 1969.

c. The Elements of Imperfection. Variance from the ideal was perceived by and attributed to officers of all grades. The more senior the officer, the less he perceived variations from the ideal. The junior officers were perceived by all grades including their own as departing slightly more from ideal standards than were senior officers. The senior officers were held more responsible for everyone's deviations because they play such an influential part in the design

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and operation of the system. Hypocrisy in a junior officer is often perceived as an individual aberration; hypocrisy in a senior officer is perceived as a basic flaw in the system. The poor example of senior officers--in matters of ethics and technical competence--was a recurring theme, particularly in the qualitative data.

Officers of all grades indicated that there was a greater deviation from ideal standards in "professional military competence" (referred to within this paper as "technical competence," meaning the aspects of proficiency in assigned duties) than in "ethical behavior." In attempting to construct a paradigm that would refine the cause-effect cycle, it became apparent that ethical behavior and technical competence are tightly interlaced. (See Figure III-1, p. 22.)

3. Determination of the Causal Factors.

a. The Interdependence of Apparent Cause and Effect. Early in the study two preliminary findings became clear: the subject of professionalism is all-encompassing, and the entire spectrum of Army activities and officer duties must be examined in order to get anything close to an accurate view; and the cause-effect ingredients are so intermixed and circuitous as to defy separation of one from the other. These two findings are especially significant when formulating and implementing corrective actions. For example, whether the misuse of statistical indicators is a cause of dishonest reporting or simply an effect of incompetent or inexperienced management is unclear. What is clear is that the misuse of statistical indicators is part of a much

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larger puzzle that includes such things as inexperience stemming from rapid personnel turnover (much of which the Army imposed on itself), a quest for a perfect record, and increasingly complex technical environment, and the existence of data processing equipments.

Inaccurate reporting--rampant throughout the Army and perceived by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7--is significant and representative of the interdependence of a number of factors. First, it is a logical by-product of data processing technology: the need to quantify progress and compare efficiency, the need to allocate scarce resources, the tendency to apply the "commercial ethic" which equates success with measurable output, and the desire to make decisions at the highest possible level where more of the complete picture can be appreciated--where political or fiscal nuances can be viewed in better perspective. Second, it is a result of our failing to recognize the importance of the non-quantifiable variables in a valid equation of personal or organizational success. This is particularly true of barely perceptible environmental changes which can be tolerated day by day, but which accrete to counter-productive forces over the long haul. While giving lip service to the Army's being "people oriented," we have in fact rewarded the non-people part of the equation.

Statistical indicators deserve particular attention because they are present as a factor in so many of the perceived variances between the ideal and the operative standards. They represent a crutch on which the inexperienced or transient commander can lean in judging his own or his subordinates' progress. Being incomplete, but the

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focus of attention because they are measurable over the short term period, they can cause a diversion of effort from substantive matters to trivial or symptomatic indicators. They are susceptible to manipulation and frequently go unchallenged because of lack of time and technical competence along the chain of command, or because of a fixation on good news without regard for fact. The generation and analysis of these "indicators" create a force within the institution that is self-perpetuating: thus commanders and staff officers live for peripheral success indicators such as the comparative DR figures, the savings bond scores, and the reenlistment rate. We then generate organizational eroding procedures and incidents, all done under the guise of "mission accomplishment" or the "can do" spirit. Still, two relevant points should be mentioned which were made clear by many of the respondents:

Statistical indicators are legitimate management tools and should not be disregarded summarily. It is their misuse, not their existence, to which there is loud objection.

The "can do" spirit is indispensable in a military unit. Mission accomplishment is the reason for being. However, not all short term missions may be worth the sacrifice of people, sweat, loyalty, or other precious commodities. The "can do" spirit must be tempered with unselfish good judgment and sometimes held in abeyance.

b. Schematic of the Cause-Effect Cycle. The diagram on the next page (Figure III-1) shows one concept of the flow of cause and effect.

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POSSIBLE CAUSE-EFFECT CYCLE




Figure III-1

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A basic cause appears to be the striving for personal success. Such striving is desirable within bounds, and is an expected trait among the type of aggressive, dynamic, goal-oriented competitors the Army attracts and relies upon. Therefore, the solution to uninhibited and unethical adventurism for personal gain must be to structure the reward system and educate the executors of the system so that personal ambitions are kept within bounds. This is not done by directing an officer to submit honest reports. It is done by setting realistic goals that can be met by reasonable, dedicated people, whose methods and attitudes can be monitored by superiors who have the experience and expertise to be able to recognize inaccurate reports when they see them. It is done by building mutual trust and confidence, and loyalty that comes from being in one assignment long enough to be able to recover from mistakes; and to have genuine concern--as a practical matter--about the impact which expedient methods will have on the unit next year. As one captain wrote in his questionnaire, "Loyalty applies to personnel on both ends, and is based on mutual respect and trust. Loyalty cannot be developed in many occasions in today's Army because of the rapid movement of personnel. . . . True loyalty among men is not developed overnight." As these remarks correctly illustrate, there is direct interrelation between officer assignment policies and the enhancement of an optimum professional environment. And other interrelationships--between material readiness, post work details, selection board actions, service school graduation standards, and many others--all contribute to the climate. It is their

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total impact--the "system"-- that drives much of the actual ethical standards of the Officer Corps. Some will fight the system, and survive, on opposite ends of the scale: the incorruptible idealists and the ethical/moral bums. But because most are carried along by the operating system of reward and punishment, it is the modification of that system which appears to be a primary key to improving the professional climate in the Army. As custodians of the "system," it is again to the senior officers that one must turn for viable solutions.

c. Areas Requiring Examination. Findings of this study indicate that at least three factors which may contribute to unethical behavior need close scrutiny:

(1) The Unrealistic Demand for Perfection. Faultless performance may be a suitable immediate goal for production line workers who have routine tasks or for skilled technicians who have nearly infinite time. For those who deal with complex organizations, changing missions, and people of various aptitudes, perfection or "zero defects" is an impossibility. It is a simplistic approach that appeals to few people on the working end of the organization. It is especially unappealing to those who take things seriously, who want to accomplish their mission, and who are prone to report the truth. It is antithetical to the Army's proclamation that it is people-oriented. Pressures to achieve unrealistic goals, whether imposed by design or generated through incompetence, soon strain the ethical fiber of the organization.

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(2) The Method of Evaluating Officers. Findings of this study cast doubts that our present method of efficiency ratings is adequate. The basic assumptions of the evaluative process as well as the mechanics of the system have questionable validity. That the rating system is operated by humans and thereby imperfect is not the point. One point is whether or not the system of having only a superior's evaluation of an officer's performance recognizes realistically the nature of human relationships. With all the imperfections in the professional climate that this study and other studies reveal, the present system of ratings that emphasizes "efficiency" instead of perhaps "efficiency plus the quality of the man" seems to be part of the problem and of little help in the solution. The battalion commander who as one captain described in a discussion group " . . . had always his mission in mind and he went about performing that mission with the utmost proficiency. His mission was getting promoted . . . " frequently fools the boss but rarely fools his peers or his subordinates. Peer or subordinate input, inserted so as not to disturb unduly the chain of command, should be examined. A second point to ponder is whether or not a performance-evaluating system in a large organization can be expected to discriminate between those top quality people sufficiently so they can be placed in any reliable numerical order. The present system purports to do that--in selection for general officer in particular. Perhaps after a certain plateau is reached, the Army must admit publicly that chance and the personal preference of selection boards are the only real discriminators.

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(3) The Essentiality of Command or High Level Staff. The perceptions of the group of officers queried during this study left no doubt but that we have created a climate in which "doing certain jobs" takes precedence over developing expertise. It apparently has been some time since the Army questioned the assumption that a wide variety of assignments, including command at every possible grade level, is the most desirable career pattern for officers of the combat arms. The implications of this assumption are so far-reaching that possibly no single personnel management concept--save that of the uninhibited quest for the unblemished record--has more impact on the future competence of the Officer Corps

d. The Role of External Forces On the Contemporary Professional Climate.

Doubtless many factors outside the control of the Army helped to set the stage for our toleration of expedients and less-than-optimum techniques. Some of these might be: the knowledge and technological explosions that made the practice of management more complex; data processing technology that permitted--if not demanded--centralized control of expensive resources; a prolonged period of marginally-funded force levels where over-extended manpower was substituted for new equipment or for inadequate O&M funds; and a number of important and sensitive missions--Berlin buildup, Cuban crisis, and parts of the buildup and conduct of the Vietnam War--where getting the job done quickly was the thing that mattered most.

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However, neither singularly nor grouped together do these appear to be prime causative factors of those conditions within the Army's professional climate which represent deviations from ideal standards. These external events did not present the Army with such unremitting and constraining pressures as to demand exterior perfection regardless of the importance of the mission, or the means used to get the job done. There is no externally imposed rationale for the seemingly prevalent uninhibited quest for personal success at almost any price. There was no outside force that directly caused the isolation of senior officers; no obvious excuse for the seeming penchant for rewarding those who don't "rock the boat."

The military is not immune from the intrusion of parts of the changing value system of society. Indeed, the intense competition for promotion, the preoccupation with maintaining an image of personal success, and the interest in accumulating a pile of statistical evidence of efficiency are commonplace in the world of American commerce. These facts of life were considered in both the design and execution of the study.

However, these larger trends, as well as more transitory ingredients of societal change such as the anti-war, anti-establishment movements, did not appear to be primary causative factors to such a degree that they were truly consequential in this assessment of the professional climate. One can draw this conclusion from three portions of the data base. First, the young officers who are most directly affected by recent societal changes still profess to accept the

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traditional ideal of Duty-Honor-Country. They also complain with seeming sincerity about any deviations they see between ideal and actual standards. Also, and consistent with the outlook of the stereotype of the better informed and somewhat skeptical youth of today, the junior officers are prompt to criticize substandard performance. And some of them, according to their own perceptions, are willing to accommodate to the norm of the group even though the norm be less than ideal. Second, the military has not lately changed its traditional ideal standards and there was no suggestion put forth from the officers queried that it should. Third, the system which touts "zero defects," "ticket punching," and preoccupation with "measurable trivia" that most officers seemed concerned about was devised by senior officers, not by junior officers. If recent trends from the outside have affected directly the value scale of senior officers, the mechanism for such change did not surface during this study. One must therefore conclude that there appears to be little justification for blaming the bulk of the imperfections extant in our profession on the general trends which some sociologists discern in our society or which plague the outside world in general.

4. Possible Impact of the Climate on the Future of the Army.

The existing climate includes a hardy potential for improvement in that there is public acceptance of the traditional ideals of the professional soldier, and an apparently genuine dissatisfaction with imperfections. However, the present climate does not appear to be self-correcting. The human drives for success and for recognition by

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seniors, sustained if not inflamed by the systems of reward and management which cater to immediate personal success at the expense of a long term consolidation of moral and ethical strength, would appear to perpetuate if not exacerbate the current environment. Time alone will not cure the disease. The fact also that the leaders of the future are those who survived and excelled within the rules of the present system militates in part against the initiation of any self-starting incremental return toward the practical application of ideal values. It is impossible to forecast future institutional climates with any degree of reliability. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to state as consequences of the present climate: it is conducive to self-deception because it fosters the production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection; it is corrosive of the Army's image because it falls short of the traditional idealistic code of the soldier--a code which is the key to the soldier's acceptance by a modern free society; it lowers the credibility of our top military leaders because it often shields them from essential bad news; it stifles initiative, innovation, and humility because it demands perfection or the pose of perfection at every turn; it downgrades technical competence by rewarding instead trivial, measurable, quota-filling accomplishments; and it eventually squeezes much of the inner satisfaction and personal enjoyment out of being an officer.

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PART V - RECOMMENDATIONS

A. GENERAL.

The variables addressed in this study are human value systems and individual motivations. Defects in the existing professional climate defy simplistic solution. These recommendations, therefore, are not presented as a panacea. Nevertheless, each of the items listed appears to warrant consideration. They are grouped in three categories and identified as being: recommended for implementation soonest (RFI); recommended for implementation in some form on a trial basis (ITB); or recommended for further study to determine feasibility and practicability (RFS). The rationale, feedback system, and pertinent remarks for each recommendation are included in Table V-1. Specific recommendations are listed under broad headings but each recommendation has ramifications which cover other parts of the solution spectrum.

B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of this study by means such as:

a. Sending this report, or appropriate portions of it, suitably indorsed by the Chief of Staff, to key general officers in the Army. (RFI)

b. Including the subject of professional ethics in the curricula of the service schools, using appropriate sections of this study as part of the background material. (RFI)

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c. Including the substance of this study as a topic for the next Army Commanders' Conference. (RFS)

d. Developing, through use of suitable professional agencies, a written questionnaire which focuses on officer value systems. Administer the questionnaire over a period of years at the Advanced Courses, USACGSC, and USAWC to generate a data base, assess trends, and keep the issue of individual and group values alive. (RFS)

2. Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers by means such as:

a. Providing instruction in individual and group communications at USACGSC and USAWC.

b. Removing wherever possible statistical competition or fixed quotas within organizations (bond and fund drive competitions, OCS/USMA applicant quotas); and resorting wherever practicable to the "pass-fail" system of formal rating without numerical scores for organizational inspections or tests. (CMMI-TPI-AGI-ORI ratings, etc.) (RFS)

c. Eliminating Junior Officer Councils except for those groups of officers who are in student or essentially transient status. (RFS)

3. Outline standards for counseling of subordinates by means such as:

a. Providing instruction on counseling subordinates (defined in the broad sense of providing aid and guidance across the whole range of professionalism through personal communication of ideas and attitudes) at the Advanced Courses and the USACGSC. (RFS)

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b. Publishing a suitable text, possibly in Department of the Army Pamphlet format, outlining the need and explaining the methods for counseling subordinates and permitting them to participate in the dialogue. (RFS)

4. Provide continuing motivation for the competent and facilitate elimination of the substandard performers by means such as:

a. Providing to outstanding colonels (perhaps 10 percent of those retiring in any year group) at retirement, a promotion to brigadier general ("Tombstone Promotion"). (Have a Department of the Army selection board make the list of promotees.) (RFI)

b. Simplifying the administrative procedures for elimination of officers from the Service. (RFS)

c. Having promotion boards also serve as screening boards for candidates for elimination from the Service. (RFS)

d. Upgrading the academic challenge at Advanced Courses and eliminating from the Service those who fail to meet reasonable academic or traditional ethical standards. (RFS)

5. Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example by means such as:

a. Taking immediate disciplinary action against officers who violate ethical standards. Facilitate this by simplifying judicial procedures as appropriate. (RFI)

b. Providing each officer upon commissioning with a hard-bound copy of a special text which will include The Armed Forces Officer, the Officer's Creed, a message from the Chief of Staff, and other

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appropriate documents which set enduring standards of professionalism.

(RFI)

c. Establishing uniform standards for those practices which now are subject to interpretation and vary between units or posts, and which are amenable to Army-wide policies. (The recent haircut standard prescribed by Department of the Army is one example of a step in the right direction.) (RFI)

d. Promulgating an Officer's Creed which will serve to highlight and summarize the ethical standards of the Officer's Corps. (Attached as Inclosure 2.) (RFI)

e. Providing for attendance at special short courses at branch schools and the USACGSC for selectees to brigadier general to enhance their skills relevant to communication with junior officers as well as to ensure their currency on technical matters. (The example of these brigadier general selectees is especially meaningful in determining the value systems of the professional climate.) (RFS)

6. Focus on the development of measurable expertise by means such as:

a. Including acceptable completion of a written examination on common and branch material subjects as a prerequisite to attendance at the USACGSC or equivalent schools. (RFS)

b. Including an additional commissioned grade--such as senior captain--between the present O-3 and O-4 grades. Modify the TOE grade levels so that this grade would be authorized for the commander of company size units. (RFS)

c. Encouraging initiative and learning by experience through public recognition that human activities are not susceptible to complete

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statistical measurement, that mistakes in training are expected, and that--while perfection may be a long term goal--the concept of "zero defects" is not applicable to all aspects of management. (RFS)

7. Revise certain officer assignment priorities and policies, to include policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours by means such as:

a. Assigning all lieutenant colonels and colonels to TOE command positions by name from OPD after suitable OPD selection board action. (RFI)

b. Placing higher priorities for assignment of USACGSC and SSC graduates to service schools, training centers, and ROTC staffs; and spreading the concentration of talent now in Headquarters, Department of the Army out to the field. (RFI)

c. Requiring commanders to submit a letter of explanation--after the fact--whenever a commander is removed prior to his completing the prescribed minimum tour. (All command assignments will be made by OPD.) (RFI)

d. Making stability in command positions at battalion and brigade level first among assignment and military education priorities. (OPD will not reassign battalion or brigade commanders before completing a prescribed minimum tour unless relieved for cause by the local commander. Continuity in command will take precedence over attendance at any military school for which the officer is selected. His schooling will be deferred without prejudice.) (RFI)

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e. Removing from the optimum career patterns for combat arms officers the requirement that to advance rapidly in grade they must command both at battalion and brigade level as well as serve on high level staffs. (This permits longer command tours, while still giving equal advancement opportunity to officers specializing in other areas of vital importance not associated with tactical operations or high level staff.) (RFI)

f. Reducing to a minimum, or eliminating entirely for all grades below O-6, the "nominating" of officers for assignments and the honoring of "by name" requests. (RFS)

8. Revising the officer evaluation system by means such as:

a. Including as a supplementary input to officer efficiency files the results of peer ratings. These ratings would be compiled from periodic solicitations by mail from Headquarters, Department of the Army of comments from selected officers (none of whom would be serving in the same organization at the time of solicitation) on those contemporaries with whom they have served in past assignments. Integrate the peer evaluations with the ratings of the rater and indorser. (ITB)

b. Reassessing as a matter of continuing priority all facets--including basic assumptions--of the system of officer evaluation, including: the role of the efficiency report in making assignments; the possible role of the indorsing officer as an evaluator of the rating officer as well as an evaluator of the rated officer; the weight and nature of the indorsing officer's comments and entries when his duties obviously preclude intimate knowledge of the rated officer;

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and the possibility of designing different efficiency report forms for different officer grade level groupings (such as one rather concise form for O-1 through O-3, another form for O-4 and O-5, one for O-6, and one for general officers). (RFS)

9. Revise the concept of officer career patterns by means such as:

See other items.

10. Revise promotion policies by means such as:

a. Eliminating or modifying the "secondary zone" promotion so that the opportunity for accelerated promotion of certain officers is retained but the "5 percent" aspect is omitted by extending the "primary zone," reducing the rate of selection, and omitting the "secondary zone." (Provisions will remain for retaining on active duty in grade those officers who are competent but who are not suited for further promotion.) (RFI)

b. Returning the authority for promotion to captain to Headquarters, Department of the Army; and phasing back to the pre-Vietnam time in grade requirement for promotion to captain. (RFI)

c. Enacting and announcing a policy that selection boards for brigadier general will send partial lists of a group of final candidates for selection to students at USACGSC and USAWC for comments. The total list would be 3 or 4 times the size of the authorized number of selectees. Each student would--anonymously and holding his list in confidence--mark one of five possible responses beside each name: "I do not know this colonel well enough to give my opinion, or I do not want to express my opinion; I know this colonel and he would make a superb general officer; I know this colonel and I would concur in his selection for general

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officer; I know this colonel, and I wouldn't have much confidence in him as a general officer; I know this colonel and he should never be promoted to general officer." These results would be compiled and returned to the president of the selection board for such use as he sees fit. (ITB)

d. Ensuring that promotion boards receive comprehensive instructions which are compatible with announced policies of career pattern and assignment priorities, and which do not in effect validate "ticket punching" as the unique route to rapid promotion. (RFS)

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OPMS CONCEPT SUMMARY

OPMS represents the Army's reaction to changing attitudes and goals among the younger career officers. The concept is directed toward the achievement of management procedures which will best utilize an officer's technical skills, aptitudes, interests and desires and is applicable to all officers except AMEDD and chaplains. JAG officers will continue to be managed by the Judge Advocate General Corps. Major changes in the revised concept are as follows:

1. Centralized Designation of Officers at LTC and COL Level: - DA boards will be convened annually to evaluate records of officers selected for promotion to LTC and COL and designate these officers for continued command, functional or specialized development. Officers will be individually advised of their status.

a. Command positions for which troop leadership is of paramount importance will be restricted to officers designated for continued command development and the number of officers so designated will be closely related to projected requirements. Major commanders will be advised of command designated officers who are available for assignment to troop command positions and once assigned these officers will remain in command for 18 - 24 months unless promoted or relieved for cause.

b. Officers designated for continued functional or specialized development will concentrate on acquiring expertise in their previously chosen staff or specialty area.

2. Dual Track Development: Officers will be developed under a dual track concept to acquire proficiency in a primary and a secondary skill area. Officers must identify primary and secondary skill areas prior to promotion to Major and be proficient in these areas prior to promotion to LTC. Assignments and education will be controlled when required to foster this development. In most cases, an officer's primary skill will be his basic branch qualifications, while his secondary skill will be in either a staff functional area such as operations or personnel or in one of the special career program areas. After promotion to Captain; however, selected officers will be permitted to designate a staff or specialty area as their primary skill and will then follow assignment patterns designed to emphasize development of functional or specialized skills. These officers will retain their branch qualifications as their secondary skill. Following promotion to LTC and COL, officers will be designated for continued command, functional or specialized development as indicated above.

3. MOS Proponency: MOS which are clearly branch material will be designated exclusively to the appropriate branch, i.e., Infantry branch will be sole proponent for MOS 1542, Infantry Unit Commander. MOS for principal staff positions, such as S2/G2 and S4/G4 positions

will be designated for joint proponentcy by the branch of the unit concerned and that career branch primarily concerned with the functional area, i.e., an Infantry battalion S2 position will be designated to Infantry and MI, while the S4 position will be Infantry and one of the logistics services branches.

4. Management Groupings: Consideration is being given to grouping branches for management purposes. The initial proposal for the composition of these management groupings is as follows:

- a. Combat Arms: AD, AR, FA, IN.
- b. Combat Support Arms: CM, EN, NI, MP, SC.
- c. Logistics Services: OD, QM, TC.
- d. Administrative Services: AG, FI.

5. Promotion System: The system will be as prescribed in current statutes, e.g., on a fair and equitable basis with selection based on ability and efficiency with due regard to seniority and age and the best qualified officers on each of the current promotion lists, e.g., APL, WAC, CHAP, will be selected for promotion. The current system; however, will be revised to include modifications in the instructions to boards and expanded board membership. Instructions to boards will emphasize the whole man concept with major emphasis on primary skill area performance. Instructions will contain information on shortfall in certain fields and boards will consider these requirements in determining who is selected for promotion. Board members will be selected from related branches in numerical relation to strength in the zone, e.g., 55% combat arms. The revised promotion system will emphasize the essentiality of different career patterns to the Army's mission accomplishment and give credence and visibility to career progression in all career fields.

OPMS MILESTONE SCHEDULE

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Implement OPMS for Colonels	July 1972
Approve Career Fields and Specialties	January 1973
Publish Career Planning Pamphlet	1st Qtr FY 74
Begin Implementation for Lieutenant Colonels	1st Qtr FY 74
Convene Lieutenant Colonel Troop Command Selection Boards	2nd Qtr FY 74
Begin Implementation for Majors and Senior Captains	3rd Qtr FY 74
Complete project for identification of career fields and specialties in authorization documents requisitions, and officer records	End FY 74
Commence assigning officers under OPMS	July 1974
Execution of Information Plan	Continuing
Development of Supporting Management Systems	Continuing
Study of Education and Training Requirements	Continuing