WAR TERMINATION CONCEPTS
AND POLITICAL, ECONOMIC
AND MILITARY TARGETING

Final Report
March 1978

Technical Note
SSC-TN-4986-1

By: James E. Dornan, Jr. Charles H. Movit
    M. Mark Earle, Jr. Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr.
    Stephen P. Gibert

Prepared for:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

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SRI Project 4986

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intent, strategic consequences, capabilities, linkages, escalation, termination and target categories are examined in an LSO context. Soviet views on limited strategic war are appraised. Two scenarios, depicting hypothetical circumstances which might lead to using an LSO for war termination purposes, are described. An analysis of economic targeting for war termination is presented. Force posture implications are derived.
ABSTRACT

This report presents a conceptual framework for assessing the utility of limited strategic nuclear options for war termination. It proceeds from a basic assumption that the Soviet Union has initiated overt military hostilities against the United States or its allies which have sufficient momentum for extended conflict or rapid escalation to unrestricted nuclear war. The efficacy and implications of the United States employing a limited strategic nuclear response to terminate hostilities are examined. War termination concepts as they relate to U.S. official strategic thinking are considered. Concepts of thresholds, communicating intent, strategic consequences, capabilities, linkages, escalation, termination and target categories are examined in an LSO context. Soviet views on limited strategic war are appraised. Two scenarios, depicting hypothetical circumstances which might lead to using an LSO for war termination purposes, are described. An analysis of economic targeting for war termination is presented. Force posture implications are derived.

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either express or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the United States Government.

CONTRACTUAL NOTE

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FOREWORD

With the advent of strategic nuclear parity the problem of terminating superpower conflict short of mass destruction became increasingly critical. It is therefore increasingly necessary that options for war termination should be an integral part of the U.S. strategic doctrine and posture. This study contributes to that goal by extending and elaborating upon a 1973 effort to assess war termination options.¹

The study was prepared under the general supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, Mr. M. Mark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant Director, and Mr. Harold Silverstein, Special Assistant to the Director. Members of the project team were Mr. M. Mark Earle, Dr. James E. Dornan, Dr. Stephen P. Gibert, Mr. Charles H. Movit, and Mr. Arthur A. Zuehlke.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

¹ Barbara N. McLennon, M. Mark Earle, Jr., Sanford Baum, "War Termination Concepts and Strategic Nuclear Response Options," SSC-TN-8974-78, SRI/Stanford Research Institute (August 1973)
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I INTRODUCTION

A. Background

For many years strategic analysts, both in and out of government, have called attention to the problems involved in basing U.S. strategic policy solely upon the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). These problems became especially significant with the attainment by the Soviet Union of strategic parity with the United States. Since the Soviets achieved "rough parity" at about the same time that the Nixon Administration assumed office, it is not surprising that the new Administration gave high priority to the development of a new strategic posture. This was to take two forms: first, stepped-up arms control negotiations, which eventuated in the "codification of parity" at SALT I; and second, a search for a posture alternative to or supplementary of MAD, which resulted in the adoption of the "limited strategic options" policy. As explained by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the concept of limited strategic options was to be a more flexible policy, intended to provide a wider range of strategic choices for the United States in the event of a failure of deterrence. Adoption of an LSO posture would: (1) avoid the undesirable choice between capitulation and wholesale destruction on both sides; (2) enhance deterrence by increasing the credibility of a U.S. strategic response to aggression; (3) shore up the waning credibility of the U.S. strategic commitment among the NATO allies; (4) inhibit the Soviet Union from taking greater and more dangerous political-military risks; and (5) increase U.S. bargaining leverage in ongoing and future SALT negotiations.¹

The Secretary of Defense thus announced what was essentially a new direction in U.S. strategic policy. There was an explicit rejection of assured destruction as the sole basis for a U.S. strategic deterrent posture.

¹ J.R. Schlesinger, Press Conference before the Overseas Writers Association, Washington, DC, 10 January 1974 (mimeo).
Instead, a broad spectrum of flexible strategic options was to be made available in terms both of targeting and of the numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons to be employed, to include a variety of selective and limited responses appropriate for a range of political-military contingencies below the level of all-out war. The options were initially implemented through changes in the targeting of U.S. strategic forces; the possibility that the capabilities of the U.S. strategic forces to implement a limited strategic strike might be enhanced by means of the deployment of new, high-accuracy warheads was also raised.

While the U.S. assured destruction capability remains intact—indeed, it has been substantially augmented since 1969—today U.S. strategic force options encompass more than the former limited range of targets. It is now assumed that strategic strike options would include important enemy political, military and economic assets, especially those not co-located with urban populations. In the simplest terms, therefore, these 1974 strategic innovations sought broader deterrent and operational capabilities by providing increased emphasis on United States strategic force capabilities for:

- counterforce capabilities
- the importance of a strategic reserve
- escalation control
- economic targeting
- war termination

B. Objective and Approach

The objective of this study is to analyze the implications of U.S. limited nuclear strikes for terminating conflict with the Soviet Union. The study is based in part on a framework for analysis which was constructed in
1973 to assess war termination options. A basic difference is that the 1973 effort was based on a scenario which postulated a U.S. war termination response to a "limited USSR nuclear strike on CONUS."

This current effort has broader scope in that a limited U.S. nuclear strike is considered as a possible response to a wider range of possible Soviet actions. The report presents a conceptual framework for assessing the utility of limited strategic nuclear options for war termination. It proceeds from the assumption that the Soviet Union has initiated overt military hostilities against the United States or its allies of sufficient scope that an extended conflict and/or rapid escalation to unrestricted nuclear war are possible. The efficacy and implications of a United States utilization of a limited strategic response in order to terminate hostilities are examined. War termination concepts as they relate to U.S. official strategic thinking are considered. Concepts of thresholds, communicating intent, strategic consequences, capabilities, linkages, escalation, termination and target categories are examined in an LSO context. Soviet views on limited strategic war are appraised. Two scenarios, depicting hypothetical circumstances which might lead to using an LSO for war termination purposes, are described and an analysis of economic targeting for war termination is presented.

C. Definition of Terms

The following definitions are offered for the purpose of this report only. Other definitions which are critical to an understanding of the concepts developed here will be presented at appropriate places in the text.

1. **War Termination**: A cessation of overt hostilities which destroy or damage forces, populations, facilities or infrastructures.

2. **Limited Strategic Nuclear Options**: Strategic nuclear strikes executed under the positive control of central authorities preceded by a

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precise communication of the limited intent of the striker. Specifically, it is made clear that strikes will be against targets:

- carefully selected to produce a calculated effect
- the destruction of which would not jeopardize the adversary's national integrity or
- inflict large-scale destruction on central forces, cities, populations or essential infrastructures.
- the destruction of or impact upon which would have more than mere demonstrative value

3. Strategic nuclear strikes: Attacks with nuclear weapons which, by nature of their means of delivery, origin or principal target, have generally been considered to be instruments for the prosecution of general or "all-out" war.

It will be noted that war termination is distinguished from deterrence, which embraces an effort to inhibit hostilities before they commence. War termination is also distinguished from intra-war deterrence, the purpose of which is to inhibit escalation of hostilities during the conduct of war rather than to bring the military conflict to an end. It should also be observed that central to the definition of limited strategic nuclear strikes is that they exclude large-scale destruction of central forces, cities, populations or essential infrastructures. Large-scale is not a precise term and may mean different things in relation to central forces, vis-a-vis cities or population. In further definition, therefore, large-scale in terms of strikes by central forces is defined here as being an attack which may reasonably be interpreted as a disarming strike against central systems, or one which depletes the adversary's arsenal to the point where it perceptively impairs his capability to wage strategic war. In terms of cities, large-scale is further defined here as being the destruction of any urban complex which has a population of 100,000 or more, or which is an essential industrial, communication or valued cultural, ideological or spiritual center.
In terms of essential infrastructure, large-scale is considered to be the destruction of or incapacitating damage to central leadership (such as the Politburo) or damage to any facet of the economic base which would not be capable of recovering sufficiently to provide essential services for a period of 10 days or more.

D. Assumptions of the Study

- That Soviet Armed Forces have initiated overt hostilities against the United States, its territories or possessions, or its allies.
- That the hostilities have sufficient momentum so that they will almost certainly continue and possibly escalate to more serious warfare unless some positive initiatives are taken to terminate the conflict.
- That relative and absolute U.S.-USSR capabilities are as of the year of this report, 1978.
- That the U.S. objective is to terminate hostilities under conditions favorable to the U.S. and its allies with as little damage as possible to friendly forces, populations, institutions or resources.

1 There are many euphemisms which can be used to avoid coming to grips with the subject of mass civilian casualties in limited nuclear war, but to use them here would only be a disservice to the report. The authors proceed from the position that the loss of even one life can be a tragedy. However, in strategic analysis one must be prepared to accept the consequences of great numbers of casualties resulting from even limited U.S. nuclear strikes, particularly when they come about in response to a serious Soviet provocation.
II WAR TERMINATION CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES

The adoption of Limited Strategic Options (LSO) is the latest in a series of attempts to deal with the problem of rationalizing nuclear conflict. It is a recognition in policy terms that the possession of large arsenals of nuclear weapons by the superpowers makes strategic thermonuclear war possible, even if unlikely. Adoption of an LSO strategy also indicates the corollary belief that controlled nuclear conflict between the superpowers is not only vastly to be preferred to unrestrained nuclear war, but in fact is more likely. Finally, an LSO strategy leads obviously to a policy shift from a war-winning to a war-terminating conflict objective. Fundamentally, an LSO strategy is directed at the question of what to do should deterrence fail and superpower war ensue. Its purpose is to provide the National Command Authority (NCA) with an alternative to appeasement, capitulation or an all-out strategic exchange. Thus a fully developed LSO-War Termination strategy, replete with appropriate doctrine and incorporating relevant targeting concepts and perhaps new weapons systems, represents a major, indeed revolutionary, departure from the past. It is, therefore, incumbent that the implications of an LSO-War Termination concept be as fully elaborated as possible.

Clearly, it has not yet been widely recognized how significantly an LSO-War Termination strategy departs from the past, and the effort involved here can but suggest some of the more promising avenues to be explored in the future. This chapter contributes to the overall study by (1) reviewing the reasons why concepts and theories concerning the termination of nuclear war have remained seriously underdeveloped; (2) explicating the premises and assumptions that undergird a war termination strategy; (3) demonstrating the linkages between war termination concepts and the doctrine of limited strategic options; and (4) raising a set of questions that will need to be addressed in the future in order to establish a policy-relevant and operationally useful nuclear war termination strategy.
A. The Lack of Concepts and Theories

1. Historical Overview to 1945

Although the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War were outstanding exceptions, as a generalization it can be argued that wars subsequent to the establishment of the modern international state system (1648) up to the First World War (1914) were limited in character. Limitations were expressed in political objectives, in the conditions of peace imposed by the victors, in the numbers of active combatants, in the weapons employed, and in the restricted involvement of civil populations. Sharp geographical constraints, imposed by the level of military technology, also served to reduce the probability of transcultural conflict; thus shared value systems probably contributed also to limiting war. International law, especially the "law of war", moreover, reflected the view that wars should be limited; thus, concepts of belligerency, neutrality, contraband and reprisal were accepted because the international community could "tolerate" war.

Limited war concepts were dealt a near-death blow, however, in the twentieth century. Both the First and Second World Wars involved nearly unlimited destruction by huge warring forces, employing technologically advanced weapons and inflicting large numbers of casualties on the civil populations. Particularly in the Second World War, a conflict of values between the combatants acted to remove many traditional restraints in waging war. This ideological cleavage was a strong contributing factor to President Franklin Roosevelt's refusal to consider issues of war termination until military victory had been achieved and to the Allied decision to impose "unconditional surrender" on the Axis forces. Thus, for example, the United States acted in 1945 as if its principal problem was that of defeating Japan, when in fact the American leadership should have been considering how to avoid unnecessary casualties in futile battles after Japan had been to all intents and purposes eliminated as a military power. The real problem was how to terminate the war, not how to prosecute it. Failure to distinguish between the concepts "defeat" and "surrender"--and the lack of a theory of
war termination—led to the erroneous conclusion that the U.S. needed Soviet participation in the war against Japan, thus involving unnecessary political complications (and concessions to the USSR) at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.¹

2. The Emphasis on Deterrence

The experiences of the two World Wars should have led to a search for methods to limit wars and to establish theories of war termination. On the contrary, they produced the notion that wars were "naturally" unlimited in character. Thus the professional literature was concerned, not with limiting war or terminating it, but with preventing its occurrence. Particularly salient was the passage in what was probably the first significant theoretical work in the nuclear age: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."

² Although the idea of limited nuclear war was not dealt with extensively, to the extent that it was, it was dismissed: "The atomic bomb will be introduced into the conflict only on a gigantic scale. No belligerent would be stupid enough, in opening itself to reprisals in kind, to use only a few bombs. The initial stages of the attack will certainly involve hundreds of the bombs, more likely thousands of them."

³ The doctrine of "massive retaliation," put forward by Secretary Dulles in 1954, was an attempt to extend the concept of deterrence of nuclear war to deterring conventional and even subconventional war through the threatened use of atomic weapons. This concept quickly came under

¹ For a detailed discussion of the Allied failure to develop a war termination strategy in World War II, see Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 1958). Chapter six deals with the Japanese case.


³ Ibid., p. 88.
attack; however, the basic thesis that a nuclear war between the superpowers could best be deterred by the threat of a massive response has constituted the conventional wisdom in the thirty years since Brodie's work. In its modern form it is referred to as "mutual assured destruction" and is the accepted strategy of the majority of strategic thinkers in the United States today. As a recent work put it, the United States should "accept the proposition that our deterrent strategy rests on the threat of assured destruction...."¹

The dominant position which has been assumed in strategic literature by "pure deterrence" thinkers has resulted in two serious shortcomings in thinking about war termination. First, there has not been enough attention given to the fact that the post-Second World War assumption that all future wars would be unlimited has proved to be false.² In fact, all wars since 1945 have tended to be limited in objectives, numbers of participants, and (to a lesser degree) in weapons employed. Furthermore, geographical restraints (such as sanctuaries) have become the rule rather than the exception. This trend was evident as early as 1950 in the Korean War.

A second serious shortcoming resulting from the emphasis on strategic deterrence (and concomitantly on mutual assured destruction) has been the failure to develop a complete theory of controlled nuclear conflict.³ While the concept of controlled nuclear conflict is not coterminous with the concept of nuclear war termination, the concepts are closely linked. This study expressly links them by evaluating the utility of limited strategic options for war termination.

³ For one of the very few studies of this subject, see Richard B. Foster, et al., Washington, "Study of Possible Soviet Strategy of Controlled Conflict," SSC-TN-3510-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (June 1975). Especially relevant for this study are chapters 4 and 6.
3. **The Problem of Evidence**

A very serious impediment to the development of a theory of nuclear war termination is the problem created by the lack of experience with the use of nuclear weapons in war. Since these weapons have not been utilized in war since the employment of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, any theory which purports to furnish guidelines to the National Command Authority, whether concerned solely with limited nuclear options or with their instrumental utility for war termination, cannot be tested until it is too late to know whether it is of value. Of course, the charges concerning the lack of an empirical base and of the use of purely deductive methods of reasoning have been made also with regard to nuclear deterrence theory.\(^1\) Deterrence theory, however, does not necessarily have to suffer from these defects. Unlike most past approaches to war termination, it might be possible, by reasoning from plausible analogues, to construct "conditional" deterrence theories which are operationally useful.\(^2\)

**B. The Assumptions of Nuclear War Termination Strategy**

For reasons discussed previously (the emphasis on deterrence as opposed to strategic nuclear warfighting and the problem of the lack of empirical data), there is no full-scale systematic study of nuclear war

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1. For a rather destructive (in the sense that he does not offer reasonable alternatives) critique of deterrence theory, see Phillip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Schocken Books), 1968. Green maintains (p.v.) that the analysts who established deterrence theory created a body of thought "usually inapplicable to the important questions of national policy and political judgment. These are beyond the grasps of scientific techniques. And thus, the attempt to apply the inapplicable can only produce a false science, a pseudo-science...."

temination. Not only has there been little analysis of the problem; it is also apparent that both U.S. doctrine and scholarly acceptance of it have acted as a most serious impediment to the development of theories of controlled nuclear conflict. This results from a widespread belief that any reduction in the horror of nuclear war will make its outbreak more probable. Thus the prevailing thinking has followed what Herman Kahn refers to as the apocalyptic model, postulating the inevitability of "insensate" or "spasm" warfare once nuclear weapons are utilized at all. Such a war will be the opposite of controlled and will result in firing weapons until all are expended or until civilization is destroyed. ¹

While it is often acknowledged that the doctrine of assured destruction both is morally repugnant and does not address the problem of what to do if deterrence fails, it is still held to be the most desirable course:

Consideration of the three alternatives to MAD leads to the conclusion that critics of the present approach have not offered technically viable or even theoretically preferable choices.... A limited nuclear war would not only be destructive but would raise the real danger of escalation to all-out war. Given current and projected technology, MAD appears to be more stable.... ²

Despite these misgivings, there have been developed several assumptions as to the requirements of a limited (or controlled) nuclear war and of war termination. These are as follows:

1. **Objectives and Goals**

A consensus exists that limited nuclear options and a nuclear war termination strategy are incompatible with the classical notions of military victory or unconditional surrender. If one side confronts the other with

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² Ibid., pp. 261-262.
"excessive" demands, then the confronted adversary is highly unlikely to accept warfare limits. A war termination strategy presupposes, therefore, that nuclear strikes (a) wreak finite rather than extensive damage; (b) do not result in unacceptable population losses; (c) do not seriously erode the warfighting capabilities of the attacked state; and (d) do not threaten the viability of the state as a political entity. Basically, the options exercised are intended to restore the status quo ante bellum; it cannot be expected that objectives much beyond this can be accomplished if the war is to be kept limited.

2. **Target Avoidance**

Closely related is the idea that limited nuclear options should not be directed against: (a) large population centers; (b) the National Command Authority; (c) command, control, and communications facilities whose destruction would impede the implementation of restraint by the enemy; and (d) high-value targets in general. Selected targets should be of sufficient value to demonstrate will, resolve and commitment but, at the same time, should signal a desire to terminate. Thus LNOs are a form of "political communications" or "nuclear bargaining" to set the conditions of peace.

3. **Relationship to Escalation**

Should the Soviet Union (the only state which seems a likely candidate at this point) initiate a substantial conventional conflict with the United States, and should the American response be a limited nuclear strike, then one can postulate four possible outcomes: (a) Soviet escalation beyond the level of the U.S. LNO; (b) Soviet response at approximately the same level (a "tit-for-tat" attack); (c) Soviet deescalation to a "limited probe" level; and (d) war termination initiated by the Soviets. Clearly, the objective of the U.S. decision to exercise the LNO would be a Soviet decision to terminate or (second-best) to deescalate the conflict so that a political settlement short of extensive destruction could be
achieved. It should be emphasized, however, that while the often-made assumption that the Soviet response to a U.S. LNO would be escalation should be rejected, there is no way of knowing empirically what choice the Soviets would make. Soviet statements, indeed, suggest that escalation would be their course of action. Thus it should be stressed that an LNO strategy for war termination carries considerable risk. It is not only possible but perhaps even likely that it may result in escalation and not termination. This fact does not vitiate the theory but it does suggest that the nature, character, doctrine and objectives of the enemy must be taken into account. The NCA of State A might escalate while the NCA of State B might terminate. It is certainly the case, as Secretary Schlesinger stated, that previous strategic doctrines (and certainly MAD) "neither contained a clear-cut vision of how a nuclear war might end or what role the strategic forces would play in its termination." Whether, however, his corollary conclusion that LNOs might be able "to bring all but the largest nuclear conflicts to a rapid conclusion before cities are struck" is warranted is certainly an open question.

C. Limited Strategic Options and War Termination Linkages

Theories of limited nuclear war are not new—Secretary of Defense McNamara, for example, while stressing mutual assured destruction in his posture statements after 1965, had earlier put forward his "city avoidance" concepts. One of the purposes, of course, in maintaining invulnerable

1 When Secretary Schlesinger testified about LNOs before a Senate subcommittee in March 1974, Senator Fulbright asked the Secretary whether The Soviets would respond to U.S. use of an LNO with a nuclear attack. When Schlesinger answered that they might, Senator Fulbright's remark was "sure they would." Of course, there is no certainty that the USSR would do so. (See U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Hearings 4 March 1974).

2 Soviet views on limited nuclear conflict and war termination are presented in Chapter III of this study.

forces was to be able to withhold them for so-called intrawar deterrence purposes. And the Nixon policy of "strategic sufficiency" specifically argued the need for developing flexible options to permit U.S. strategic forces to be used in controlled and limited ways. Three reasons were offered for acquiring flexible strategic options: (1) to provide the United States with the capacity to initiate limited strikes in certain circumstances, such as a massive Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe; (2) to be able to respond in kind to Soviet use of limited nuclear strikes; and (3) to be used for damage limitation purposes.¹

Although the justification for acquiring LNOs did not specifically argue the case for a war termination strategy, it was an obvious corollary. And, of course, SALT I not only codified parity but mutually assured destruction as well (at least for a time), thus making escalation control essential. Thus, in view of the already high (and clearly increasing) levels of Soviet strategic power, if American strategic weapons were to be perceived by the USSR, by the NATO allies and by the United States itself as having a deterrent value of some sort across a spectrum of possible Soviet provocations, then these weapons would have to be designed and programmed for use in a manner which would "bear some relation to the provocation". Furthermore, the use of U.S. strategic forces should "have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility of restoring deterrence."² War termination finally had become an official part of U.S. doctrine. It was an acknowledgement that the damage levels to the United States to be expected in the event of a Soviet-American conflict had increased and were increasing, despite the SALT negotiations. Further,

¹ Kahan, op. cit., p. 160.
despite reassuring talk, it was also a tacit acknowledgement that SALT had not reduced the chances that a Soviet-American conflict would occur.¹

It would appear evident that LNOs and war termination will remain linked concepts in U.S. policy unless: (a) NATO matches or exceeds Soviet conventional forces capability; or (b) the United States returns fully to the strategic concept that anything which might reduce the terror of thermonuclear war inevitably increases the probability of its occurring. Both of these (and especially the first) are unlikely.² Hence, it is probable that the United States strategic posture will remain that of assured destruction, albeit "hedged about" by flexible options and at least a primitive doctrine of war termination.

D. **Toward a Nuclear War Termination Strategy**

1. **The Need for a War Termination Posture**

Although, as will be discussed below in Chapter III, Soviet published views indicate that the USSR rejects the concept of controlled nuclear conflict, in fact the Soviet arsenal has now acquired a "surplus" of weapons which make it quite feasible for Moscow to develop its own flexible nuclear options. While it might be possible to argue that prior to 1974 the Soviets did not have a "strategic surplus," the entry into Soviet inventory of a new generation of MIRVed missiles (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) suggests that the Soviets have the capability, if not yet the doctrine, to employ LNOs against the U.S. and NATO.³

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¹ Of course, détente advocates (and Secretary Kissinger) would deny this proposition.

² Although there were reports early in 1977 that the Carter Administration was considering modifying the Nixon-Ford posture on limited nuclear options, these reports appear to have been false.

Accordingly, Moscow might adopt a strategy of war termination of its own to settle a conflict on favorable terms to itself. This possibility certainly affirms the need for the U.S. both to continue the development of LNOs and to further refine war termination doctrine. In regard to U.S. strategic inventories, as with the case of the USSR, "surplus" weapons beyond assured destruction are in the inventory or are expected to be available in the foreseeable future. This is particularly true if the cruise missile is added to the U.S. arsenal.

For both the U.S. and the USSR, of course, some of the "surplus" in an actual nuclear war would be absorbed by system unreliabilities, air defense, counterforce measures, intrawar deterrence and withholding of forces in reserve to deter "third party" initiatives. Nevertheless, both U.S. and Soviet forces, unless sharply reduced in SALT II (an unlikely event), will remain large enough under most conceivable circumstances not only for assured destruction purposes but to perform LNO missions. And, of course, since LNOs would not be used in conjunction with but in lieu of high-level counterforce and countervalue attacks, mutual Soviet-U.S. capabilities to pursue an LNO-War Termination strategy will remain. This suggests not only that a war termination strategy is desirable but that the weapons acquisition process is driving both powers in that direction in any event.

2. Doctrinal Requirements for a War Termination Strategy

It is clear, then, that the United States has or shortly will have redundant capabilities permitting the use of LNOs for a war termination strategy; what is lacking is the development of doctrine. Extensive treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Several principles should be noted here, however, as essential to the development of such a doctrine. These are:

- Full recognition of the linkage between LNOs and war termination
- Rejection of the artificial distinction between deterrence and war fighting and thus less concern that LNOs will increase the probability of nuclear war.

- Acceptance of the idea that limited nuclear war is not inherently more improbable than other limited wars.

- Rejection of the concepts of "unconditional surrender," "the only object of war is victory," and other such notions.

- Acceptance of the idea that, however "unthinkable," nuclear war might occur; hence the United States must not "put all its eggs in a deterrence basket."

- Undertake a full and complete study of nuclear war termination, a subject now only dimly understood and which, astonishingly enough, has largely escaped the thinking of most nuclear strategists.

The difficulties of developing an operationally useful theory of war termination should not be minimized. Almost any efforts along those lines, however, could not fail to improve the present state of the art.

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1 This suggestion, of course, is directly counter to the arguments put forward by Herbert Scoville, "Flexible Madness?" Foreign Policy (Spring 1974). Scoville states that an aggressor "might be more prone to risk it (nuclear war) if he thought that the United States would be more likely to respond in a limited manner rather than with a devastating attack" (pp. 173-174). It is equally true, however, that an aggressor might be more prone to risk nuclear war if he thought the United States would not respond at all (since in the absence of LNO's the only response would be an all-out strike which would be followed by an all-out attack on U.S. cities). On balance, it appears (to this writer at least) that the argument weighs in favor of LNOs, which of course is the position taken by former Secretary Schlesinger.
3. Operational Concepts for War Termination

Specific targeting concepts will be considered below. However, it is useful to suggest here certain operational concepts which appear to be necessary to utilize LSOs for war termination purposes.

a. Communicating Will and Intent

An LSO exercised for the purposes of war termination is a political act intended to communicate two separate but related messages to the enemy. These are, first, that the United States has the will to fight, not just a conventional but a nuclear conflict. This communication has become especially necessary since the USSR achieved strategic parity. Should there be a Soviet nonnuclear provocation not directed against U.S. territory, the exercise of an LSO may be required to demonstrate the credibility of extended deterrence. Obviously, in those cases where the USSR launched limited nuclear strikes first (especially if such attacks were directed against American territory), it goes without saying that an LSO response by the U.S. would be required.

The second purpose in exercising an LSO is to communicate U.S. intent to limit the nuclear exchange. For that reason, targets will need to be chosen which convey unambiguously a U.S. desire to limit damage and to terminate on acceptable terms.

b. Identification of Thresholds

A very important operational requirement for war termination is the identification of conflict "thresholds". A threshold may be defined as a decision point where (1) the attacked side may respond at the same level and scope of conflict intensity, or (2) the attacked side may respond by escalating the intensity or scope of response, or (3) the attacked side may respond by deescalating the intensity or scope of response. Subsequently, the initiator of the attack is confronted with the same three choices.
It is useful to distinguish "vertical thresholds" from "horizontal thresholds". A vertical threshold is a decision point where the level and intensity of conflict (in terms of weapons employed) may be increased or lowered. A horizontal threshold is a decision point where the scope of conflict (in terms of targets attacked or geographical limits observed) may be expanded or contracted. If, for example, the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact forces attacked NATO with conventional forces only, a NATO response using tactical nuclear weapons would be crossing a vertical threshold. If the war continued but was limited geographically to Western Europe, a decision to strike the Soviet homeland (or a Soviet decision to attack U.S. territory) would involve crossing a horizontal threshold. Should, therefore, the U.S. respond to a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe by an LSO against the Soviet homeland, it would be a "double escalation" on the part of the United States since it would involve both vertical (from conventional to nuclear) and horizontal (from the immediate theater to Soviet territory) expansion of the conflict. This example suggests the need to consider carefully LSO utilization in terms of threshold crossings rather than only in terms of targets attacked and levels of damage inflicted. Indeed, the identification of thresholds and their linkage with targets is one of the most critical tasks for war termination.

c. Recognition of Enemy Response

A third operational problem concerns the correct interpretation of the enemy's response to the exercise of an LSO. It will become (unfortunately) quite evident if the adversary responds to an LSO without restraint. At the other end of the spectrum, it will be obvious if the adversary does not answer an LSO with a nuclear response. Between these two extremes, however, lies the problem of determining what the enemy is communicating by his restrained attack and assessing future courses (both military and political) of action. This suggests that limited nuclear conflict may be attended by frequent pauses in military action so that political assessments can be made.
d. **Linking Punishment with Inducements**

The employment of an LSO is a coercive approach to war termination. Specifically, it may be regarded as "Type II Compellance", in Schelling's terminology, that is, an attempt to compel an enemy to undo something he has already done. "Type I Compellance", which involves attempting to compel an enemy to do something he has not yet done, may be an easier act. Although, of course, there is no empirical data on this point, logically it would seem that "Type II Compellance" is quite difficult to accomplish successfully. Since the use of an LSO for war termination falls into the "Type II Compellance" category, it would seem extremely useful to couple an LSO strategy with a "persuasive strategy", that is, by offering inducements as well as coercion for war termination. Thus, deterrence would be seen as one element in a broader strategy intended to influence opponents in desirable ways.¹ This involves persuading the enemy that it is in his own self-interest to terminate a conflict. For such an approach to be successful, it is not enough to know the enemy's objectives and goals. It will also be necessary, both for a coercive and a persuasive strategy, to have a complete comprehension of the enemy's political culture and of his likely responses to both threats and inducements. In short, a holistic, culturally differentiated approach to war termination should replace the simplistic, threat-oriented, culture-free deterrence concepts hitherto dominating American strategic thinking.

e. **War Initiation**

Important operational considerations for a war termination strategy flow from the form and context in which the adversary launches

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¹ For a discussion of the value of pursuing an inducement as distinct from a coercive strategy, see George and Smoke, op.cit., Chapter 21. Unfortunately, however, the analysis is not developed within the context of a war termination or LSO strategy.
the conflict. Clearly, it will be easier to terminate if the objectives of the adversary are limited. Also, of course, a wider range of options will be available if the adversary shows restraint in his opening attacks and imposes either vertical or horizontal limits on his strategy and tactics.

f. Allied Relations

A final operational consideration concerning the utilization of LSOs for war termination purposes is the requirement to coordinate policy with U.S. allies to make certain that they do not convey contradictory signals to the adversary. This requirement suggests the need, after the U.S. has an agreed-upon war termination doctrine, to have it (or a like policy) accepted as NATO doctrine as well. It is not necessary at present to consult allies outside the NATO structure.

The operational considerations noted here clearly do not exhaust the subject. Rather, they suggest it is not sufficient to have a doctrine or strategy of war termination but that such a policy must be linked firmly to targeting concepts. These are considered in Chapter IV of this report.
III SOVIET VIEWS ON WAR TERMINATION

The question of precisely how the military and political decision-makers of the USSR conceive of war termination is not easily answered. Little meaningful evidence exists either in the statements of authoritative Soviet spokesmen or in the wealth of officially sponsored literature on military doctrine and strategy to suggest that conceptually, at least, the USSR has advanced much from the notion that war termination will occur as a result of successful warfighting and the complete defeat and destruction of enemy forces. These sources display, however, a number of clear themes which reveal Soviet views on the nature and characteristics of future war, the means and preparations required to wage it successfully, the scale and scope of the conflict, the consequences of the conflict, and the assumption that the USSR and socialism will emerge victorious.

Another category of evidence which must be considered in addressing the question of Soviet views on war termination is the record of Soviet military behavior. The behavior of the USSR in wartime does reflect examples of Soviet war termination through means other than conclusive military victory.

Soviet war termination actions in three important military conflicts prior to World War Two reveal both different techniques of ending hostilities and, perhaps more importantly, different goals from that of total military victory which motivated the USSR in the Second World War. While these conflicts differed both in their scale and potential consequences to Soviet national security from the grave threat of the World War Two German attack, they nevertheless involved substantial numbers of troops and sustained, high-intensity combat. In all three cases—the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Khalkhin Gol "War", and the Finnish Winter War—hostilities were concluded through means other than the decisive defeat of the adversary by Soviet forces.
The first example, Brest-Litovsk, was a case in which the fledgling Bolshevik government found no reasonable alternative to concluding a highly unfavorable treaty (effected on 3 March 1918) with the Central Powers. Although Trotsky had sought to prolong negotiations with the German Army via his formula of "no peace, no war" in view of serious disagreement among the Bolshevik leadership as to the means and propriety of concluding a peace with an "imperialist" power, a new German offensive in mid-February proceeded unopposed and Lenin's demand that the German terms be accepted was agreed to shortly thereafter. Brest-Litovsk was a case in which the Bolsheviks were forced by the clearly-superior military power of the adversary to accept a highly unfavorable peace settlement. The relentless advance of the German Army threatened the collapse of Bolshevik rule in Russia. Although Lenin expected the Socialist Revolution to break out imminently in Germany and render the treaty moot, the terms of the treaty are worth noting, for they reveal the almost desperate desire of the Bolsheviks to terminate the war short of their complete defeat in traditional manner of land warfare. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ceded to Germany all of Poland, the Baltic states, large areas of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Finland, as well as a section of Transcaucasia on the Turkish border. This "peace" cost the Bolshevik government some 1,300,000 square miles and 62 million people of what had formerly been the Russian Empire, and brought the "front" of a potential future war to close proximity with what was then the capital, Petrograd (Leningrad).

The eight-year undeclared war with the Japanese is another interesting case replete with war termination actions short of general war and conclusive military victory. The Sino-Japanese "War" began in earnest in July 1937 with the Japanese assault on the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping, China. Shortly thereafter, Stalin concluded a nonaggression pact with Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist government and began military assistance to the Kuomintang via Sinkiang Province which continued until the massive German attack on the USSR in 1941. In June 1937, Soviet-Japanese skirmishes occurred along the Amur River, the frontier between
the USSR and China's then Japanese-controlled Manchurian province, which had been renamed Manchukuo. A year later, in July 1938, a serious engagement between Soviet and Japanese forces occurred in the Far Eastern territory of the USSR, the battle of Changkufeng Hill, located near Lake Khasan and the Soviet-Manchurian-Korean border. Then in May of 1939, a series of large-scale engagements involving numbers of infantry and armor began at Nomonhan, in the Khalkhin Gol region near the Manchurian-Outer Mongolian border. In this conflict, neither adversary was motivated by a desire for all-out war, and perhaps out of a desire to impress upon Japan the cost of aggression in the Soviet Far East, the USSR met all Japanese military probing actions with stiff resistance. In the termination of this undeclared war, exogenous political and diplomatic factors apparently were important. Soviet-Japanese hostilities were halted by means of a truce effected on 16 September 1939, and the next day, Soviet forces entered Poland, taking up an invitation of Von Ribbentrop of 3 September, consistent with the secret provisions of the earlier Hitler-Stalin Pact. Later in April 1941, the USSR and Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact. The settlement of the Soviet-Japanese conflict was no doubt furthered in large part by the German desire that the Japanese effort be concentrated on the British Empire in Southeast Asia, and more generally by the political consequences of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

The Russo-Finnish War, or "Winter War," as it is often called, is one example of war termination through means other than the conclusive military defeat and occupation of an adversary in general war. In 1939, Stalin went to great lengths to improve the defensive posture of the Soviet Union, and in addition to upgrading the Soviet Armed Forces, efforts were made to secure large tracts of territory in regions contiguous to the USSR. This entailed the establishment of Soviet military bases and quartering of Soviet troops in the three Baltic states, which led to the eventual absorption of these territories into the USSR. Finland was also included in Soviet designs, for under control of an
enemy, its close proximity to Leningrad presented an even greater threat than did the Baltic countries. The Soviets began negotiations with the Finns in October of 1939, demanding leasing rights for Soviet naval bases within Finland and the moving of the Soviet-Finnish frontier on the Karelian Isthmus further away from Leningrad (then a mere 20 miles). In return, the Soviets proposed granting Finland a large area of the desolate territory of Soviet Karelia, on the Finnish eastern border. An exchange of territory was considered acceptable by many Finns, but the demand for military bases was rejected as a thinly masked attempt (as was the case in the Baltic) by the USSR to recover territories lost in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Finland's refusal to acquiesce in Soviet demands led to an invasion by Soviet forces on 29 November 1939. Originally predicted to be a brief campaign of a few weeks, the Winter War lasted nearly four months; and despite a considerable Soviet numerical superiority in forces (20 Soviet divisions versus 15 Finn), the USSR suffered enormous casualties. As in the previous example of the Soviet-Japanese conflict, political and diplomatic forces external to the combat arena exercised an important role in the termination of the conflict. The League of Nations voted to expel the USSR for its aggression against Finland, and the very strong public reaction in the United States exercised an important influence, for improved U.S.-Soviet relations were during this period very much a part of Stalin's foreign policy. More significant, perhaps, in the minds of Soviet decisionmakers was the thinly veiled Anglo-French plan for intervention on behalf of the Finns. This threat to escalate the conflict, involving the Western powers directly in a war with the USSR, placed in jeopardy the fragile arrangements the Soviets had concluded with Hitler, and raised the specter of another situation like that of Munich 1938, wherein the USSR found itself isolated and the Western powers colluding against it with Germany. Thus, despite the successes of the new February Soviet offensive which breached the Mannerheim Line, the USSR decided against overrunning and occupying Finland, offering
terms for peace which permitted its independent existence and sovereignty. In the Peace Treaty concluded in March 1940, the USSR obtained the explicit objectives they had demanded from the Finns initially—the ceding of the Karelian Isthmus and some border territory to the USSR, and the acceptance of Soviet air and naval bases on Finnish territory.

These foregoing three cases indicate that the USSR has on several occasions terminated conflict through means other than military victory in the traditional manner. They also indicate the important role in such cases of factors not immediate to the conflict itself—the strategic military environment in general, the intervention or threat of intervention by other states, and the existing web of political and diplomatic arrangements with other nations, whose maintenance might be threatened by the war termination mode of total victory.

Some restraint must be exercised in generalizing from these past Soviet experiences and forming propositions about current Soviet views on war termination. Since Soviet forces have not been engaged in major and political decisive military conflict since World War II, evidence of past war termination actions has limited utility for the task of projecting Soviet behavior in the future.

The utility of the historical record is further eroded by the significant changes which have occurred in the national capabilities of the USSR and its role in the international system since World War II and, perhaps more importantly, by the advent of nuclear weapons, the immense strategic arsenals of the superpowers, and the threat of general nuclear war. Therefore, to the historical record must be added other, more recent evidence of the Soviet outlook on war—the rapid growth in size and capabilities of Soviet strategic and theater forces.
For more than a decade the armed forces of the Soviet Union have been undergoing a conspicuous expansion and modernization. Evident as a trend in all branches of the service are deployments of improved systems: The strategic rocket forces have recently fielded a new generation of MIRV-capable ICBMs, and are apparently nearly ready to test at least four more advanced systems; the ground forces have been broadly upgraded in quality and quantity with SP artillery, forward air defense, CBR-capable armor and command and control systems; and the Soviet Navy has been transformed from largely a coastal defense force of limited range and strategic utility, to an effective "blue water" force with global reach.

This development of Soviet military capabilities has been a long-term, relatively constant, and increasingly costly program. Defense expenditures weigh heavily upon the Soviet economy, and forecasts of the future growth potential of the Soviet economy indicate that the opportunity costs of an increasing defense budget will be substantial during the 1985-1990 period as the aggregate growth rate slows given the investment demands of the agricultural, industrial, and consumer sectors. In the past, Soviet leaders have accepted the limited growth of consumer-related sectors, preferring to maintain and increase the commitment of scarce resources to heavy industry and defense, but political considerations may make continued severe restrictions on the growth of these sectors less feasible into the 90s.

In any case, the military buildup continues apace despite the fact that the USSR has not had to contend with an increasing military threat from the West. NATO's strictly defensive posture has been obvious in both its doctrine and force structure. Moreover, the United States chose to freeze the level of its strategic forces and permitted the USSR to gain parity, on the assumption that this would facilitate arms control negotiations and the "capping" of the perceived "arms race." At the same time, the "relaxation of tensions" between the West and
the USSR led to "improvements" in relations as codified in SALT, the Helsinki Agreement, etc. Yet these events have not slowed the USSR's commitment to expanding its military capabilities. The USSR has long sought military superiority over the West and, since the emphasis given by Khrushchev to expanding the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces in the early 1960s, has made great and successful strides in that direction.

Currently, the USSR and Warsaw Pact possess an overwhelming military superiority in the European theater, particularly in the Central Front region. Soviet theater forces, specifically those of the GSFG in East Germany, are poised for a blitzkrieg-like assault across Europe. Soviet military writers envision that a future conventional and/or nuclear war in Europe will be a short campaign marked principally by the following features:

- mobility and high speeds of combat operations
- concentration of superior forces only in the decisive place and at the decisive time
- rapid breakthrough
- penetration and dispersal into the depth of the opponent's defense
- bypass and encirclement of enemy strongpoints and populated areas
- destruction of bypassed points.

At the strategic level, the development and deployment by the USSR of larger and more accurate MIRV-capable ICBMs has led to increasing Western speculation that this trend, unless reversed, will result by

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the early or middle 1980s in a Soviet capability for a viable, preemptive counterforce strike against the U.S. land-based deterrent. The Soviet force posture and force structure, when considered in conjunction with Soviet military doctrine, strategy and tactics, may serve as a useful indicator of Soviet thinking as to the most probable course of future military conflict, and the means they have chosen to terminate it.

Thus, two basic sources of evidence are available for the task of determining Soviet views on war termination: the record of past and present behavior noted above, and the body of published literature and statements of authoritative Soviet decisionmakers. Both of these sources of data must be treated with care, for they suffer from certain limitations. As previously mentioned above, it is unwise to generalize about likely Soviet behavior in the future solely on the basis of a number of long-past examples. Other caveats must be kept in mind when examining Soviet statements and the relevant military literature. Since Soviet leaders and authoritative writers do not specifically address the concept of war termination per se, Soviet views must be inferred from this data. Yet these sources are, in the main, heavily infused with ideological symbols, and serve in varying degrees as instruments of propaganda aimed at the West. Such public statements and published literature also are designed for the political indoctrination of the Soviet armed forces and civilian populace. Yet bearing these caveats in mind, useful evidence of Soviet perceptions may be culled from this material.

Because Soviet statements and published sources on military doctrine and strategy are heavily colored by Marxist-Leninist ideology, it is important to recognize the role which ideology plays in shaping Soviet perceptions and, consequently, Soviet behavior. The concepts, values, and theories of Marxism-Leninism, while not in themselves providing a guide to action, nevertheless operate as a perceptual filter, through which all new information must pass and be interpreted in the mind of
the decisionmaker. Other concepts, values, theories, and images based on personal learning and national experience, culture, and history complement the ideological components in the mind of the Soviet decisionmaker and combine to form his cognitive structure, or belief system. This belief system, in its broadest sense, is the Soviet Weltanschauung. Western misunderstanding of this belief system and the role it plays in Soviet behavior is fraught with serious consequences. In the past, a popular interpretation of Soviet behavior, known as "the end of ideology," asserted that Marxism-Leninism was not the motivating force behind Soviet actions; rather the leaders of the USSR, being "prudent and practical" men, were guided by a philosophy of "realpolitik" and/or by the exigencies of the moment. Ironically, while these notions and others such as "convergence" were enjoying some currency in the West, Soviet leaders clearly and persistently gave evidence in both word and deed of their commitment to unrelenting competition between the two world systems and their unshakeable belief in the ultimate victory of socialism.

This victory is a strategic aim of the Soviet Union, fostered and supported by Marxism-Leninism, tempered by experience in a world of hostile nation-states, propelled by a militarized economy and the inertia of an immensely bureaucratic party-state apparatus. The USSR, embarking in earnest on its program of expanding and modernizing its military more than a decade ago, made fundamental decisions regarding the allocation of resources for the long-term struggle with the West. While all realms of competition--political, military, economic, social, ideological, scientific-technological--are carefully orchestrated in Soviet strategy, the military might of the USSR provides a firm foundation and remains the final arbiter of the national destiny of the Soviet Union.

It is thus essential that the content of the Soviet world view be identified, and its implications for Soviet perceptions and behavior understood. A review of its central features is valuable as a guide
to the context in which the Soviets view war termination, and, because of the inertia of the belief system and the influence it exercises on perceptions, understanding its content is critical to any effort to project Soviet behavior in conflict scenarios in which Soviet war termination actions might be pursued short of, or in avoidance of, general nuclear war. To briefly illustrate, Soviet responses to the application of a U.S. limited nuclear option (for example, a severely limited attack on Soviet military or economic targets designed to effect "Type II Compellance," demonstrating U.S. will and resolve and aimed at persuading them to cease and reverse an undesirable military action underway in the European theater) will be conditioned by many factors of both a subjective and objective nature. The subjective realm concerns the Soviet perceptual process—how they perceive and understand the actions and intent of the United States (image of the adversary), and how they perceive the role and purpose, capabilities and opportunities, threat to and vulnerabilities, etc., of the USSR (self-image). These images of the adversary and the self are combined and incorporated in the Soviet belief system. Examples of objective factors likely to condition Soviet responses include the geophysical environment of the theater, the force posture and deployments of adversaries, the USSR's economic viability, and longer-term capabilities of the Soviet system to survive and recover from nuclear war.

For several reasons, the subjective factors noted above are perhaps more important in determining Soviet behavior than objective, material factors. Images of the external world and a self-image based on experience and cultural heritage are formed over a long period of time, and are normally reinforced by events on a continuing basis. Therefore, the Soviet image of the United States has changed little over time. Moreover, perception is not a process whereby the mind receives photograph-like images of reality, but rather is highly selective, so that incoming data is more readily retained and understood when it fits preexisting
images. Soviet decisionmakers thus "see" what they want to "see." If the preexisting image of the United States "saw" the capitalist superpower as possessing sufficient power to constitute a high threat to the USSR and included an expectation of, for example, preemptive attack, it seems unlikely that Soviet decisionmakers would perceive the hypothetical INO as one stage in a controlled conflict scenario, but rather as the first stage in a general nuclear war.

Recognizing at the outset that Soviet views on war termination must be largely inferred from the available evidence, this discussion will first address some of the key components of the Soviet world view. These component images, many of an ideological origin, describe the political-military context in which Soviet views on war and war termination develop. Moreover, it is through the cognitive "filter" of this belief system that Soviet decisionmakers perceive, evaluate and determine their nation's course of action on a daily basis in anticipation of or in response to actions of the U.S. and events in the external environment. This same belief system would provide Soviet leaders with the framework upon which they would rest their evaluation and selection of military and other responses to the exercise of limited nuclear options by the United States.

Three broad concepts subsume many of the important component images of the Soviet belief system and world view. The essential elements of these three concepts, the competition between two systems, the correlation of world forces, and peaceful coexistence or detente, will be briefly described in the following pages. Then, in the interest of addressing the Soviet concept of war more specifically, several key features of Soviet military doctrine will be presented. In this discussion, evidence pointing to Soviet expectations concerning future military conflict with the United States will be stressed, including observations on Soviet preparations for general nuclear war. Here, too, attention will be paid to Soviet concepts of the political utility of strategic nuclear weapons and their potential role in the struggle between the two social systems.
Finally, the publicly expressed views of Soviet decisionmakers on the possibilities and consequences of limited war will be noted, along with a brief review of Soviet remarks on the "Schlesinger options" or limited nuclear options.

A. Key Concepts of the Soviet World View

1. Nature of the Competition Between the Two World Systems

The Soviet leadership perceives the world as divided into two opposing social systems: capitalism and socialim. Derived from the traditional Marxist-Leninist logic of events, reinforced by the historical, geographical, and cultural heritage of Imperial Russia, and tempered by the experience of the Soviet state as a powerful actor in world politics, this perception of the world posits a life-and-death struggle between the two systems, the outcome of which is predetermined by the objective forces of history. In such a view, there can be no compromises on fundamental issues and certainly no indefinite maintenance of the status quo. Rather, it is believed that as a result of the struggle between two systems—and only as a result of the active role of "progressive forces" in this struggle—socialism will attain victory over capitalism. The struggle, as perceived in Moscow, is not reducible to a single arena of competition, but rather is a multidimensional conflict. It encompasses conflict in the political, social, and economic, as well as the military, ideological, and scientific-technical spheres. The degree to which the struggle is to be pursued in any one sphere is dictated by assessments of the overall world correlation of forces and the specific correlation of forces displayed in a particular region or nation-state.

In the Soviet view, consistent with the dynamics of social change, (themselves governed by immutable laws), the resulting antagonism between the two world systems of capitalism and socialism has become the basis of contemporary international relations:
...The main contradiction determining the foundations of present-day international relations remains between the two social systems.¹

An authoritative Soviet observer of the United States, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the United States and Canada (IUSAC), asserts that contradictions between the two social systems and the current struggle in the macropolitical arena cannot be ameliorated via "convergence" of the opposing social systems, or resolved in any way other than the emergence of socialism as the basis for a new world order:

Here the crucial point is that essentially it is an antagonistic struggle which leads not to any reciprocal drawing together or even fusion of the two systems, as is maintained by the "exponents" of the "convergence" theory, but to the victory of the most advanced system, socialism, and to the subsequent reorganization of all international relations in accordance with the laws of life and the development of the new society.²

The antagonistic struggle between the two social systems is perceived to be a fundamental and all-embracing feature of our epoch:

Mankind has entered the last third of our century in a situation marked by a sharpening of the historic struggle between the forces of progress and reaction, between socialism and imperialism. This clash is worldwide and embraces all the basic sphere of social life: economy, politics, ideology and culture.³


² Arbatov, op. cit., p. 35.

³ International Meeting of Communist and Worker's Parties (Moscow, 1969), Prague, p. 11.
According to Soviet analysts, major changes are underway in the competition between the two world systems—a shift in the world "correlation of forces" in favor of socialism, and a sharpening of the contradictions of capitalism. A leading Soviet academician, N. Inozeratsev, Director of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), discusses this point, again from the perspective of the Soviet world view:

...the turnabout taking place in international relations has deep foundations: It is linked with the natural laws governing the class and social changes taking place in the world, and with the requirements of the development of production forces; and it is taking place under the vigorous influence of the active and purposeful policy of the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community...¹

2. Correlation of World Forces²

Present-day Soviet analyses of international affairs consistently assert that a substantial shift has occurred in the correlation of world forces in favor of socialism. This qualitative change in the course of world events is said to have occurred at the beginning of the 1970s. The calculation of the correlation of world forces, which denotes the relative alignment of the two opposing social systems, takes into consideration a broad range of economic, military, political, and international criteria. The contemporaneous shift is identified as having occurred in conjunction with the Soviet attainment of strategic parity. This shift is alleged by Soviet authors to have compelled the United States and other capitalist nations to

¹ N. Inozemtsev, "At a New Stage in the Development of International Relations," Kommunist, 13, September 1973 (Moscow), pp. 89-103.

² For a detailed analysis of this concept see Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Concept of the 'Correlation of Forces'," SSC-TN-4383-1, SRI/Stanford Research Institute (May 1976).
abandon their policy of acting "from a position of strength," and to enter into "an era of negotiations":

Recognition of Soviet-American parity in the area of strategic arms filled a particular place in the process of the West's realization of our day's international realities and the corresponding corrective amendment of the political course with regard to the socialist countries...

The realities of the nuclear age, the growth of the might of world socialism, and the inability of the United States, despite its attempts for a quarter of a century, to attain "strategic superiority" over the USSR ultimately brought American leaders not only to acknowledge a "nuclear deadlock," but to accept the idea of maintaining a "strategic equilibrium" with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual agreement and to see new forms of interrelations between the two powers.¹

Another Soviet writer, from the Institute of the United States and Canada (IUSAC) and a specialist in strategic military affairs, sharpens this point even further:

To sum it up, the balance of world forces had further shifted in socialism's favour by the early 1970s as evidenced, for example, by the attainment of Soviet-American nuclear and missile parity and the awareness by the USA of its limited possibilities to influence diverse events in the world by means of military forces. This made the U.S. ruling class start a "reappraisal of values" and acknowledge the need "to reconcile the reality of competition between the two systems with the imperative of coexistence."

As a result of this reappraisal, the United States switched over from the policy of confrontation to a policy of negotiations with the USSR and other socialist countries.²

² G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10 (October 1975), p. 38.
Thus, in the Soviet view, the attainment by the USSR of strategic nuclear parity with the United States had a decisive impact on the world correlation of forces and moved the main competition between the two systems away from direct military confrontation and towards the socio-economic, political-military, and ideological arenas.¹ The advance of the Socialist community, headed by the USSR, is further hastened by the decay of the West, a most important aspect of which is the "general crisis of capitalism," presently said to be in its most severe phase since the 1930s. The present crisis, Soviet writers assert, grips all aspects of capitalist life. Thus, even if capitalism partially recovers from its present situation, its general trend is toward disintegration.

It is the current Soviet view, then, that an assessment of the broad range of world forces, both military and nonmilitary in character, yields the inescapable conclusion that the correlation or alignment of these factors favors the USSR and world socialism. This process, in its current phase, is seen to be unidirectional and ongoing. As one author puts it, "the general trend has been the steadfast growth of the forces of socialism, and the growth of the economic might, defensive might, and international prestige of the community of countries which took the road to socialist construction."² In this respect, the Soviet assessment of the world correlation of forces reinforces the long-held Marxist belief that history is moving along a predetermined course toward the inevitable worldwide victory of socialism.


3. **Peaceful Coexistence and Detente**

Lacking the means after the Bolshevik Revolution successfully to provoke revolution in capitalist societies, Lenin forced the CPUSSR to adopt a policy of "peaceful cohabitation" with the West. The cornerstone of this policy entailed the avoidance of direct conflict with the West, while enhancing "Soviet power" and military capabilities for an ultimate, and decisive, clash. Under Stalin, "peaceful cohabitation" was replaced by "peaceful coexistence," which emphasized that the "peaceful" phase of the systemic conflict would last longer than originally expected. During the 1950s, further modification of the Soviet line postulated that war between the two systems might be avoided because the overall correlation of world forces was constantly becoming more favorable to the cause of socialism. This revision was articulated by Khrushchev in his thesis that war with the capitalist world was no longer fatalistically inevitable, prompted in part by the acknowledgement that nuclear war would wreak devastation on both societies.

Soviet spokesmen assert that in recognition of the shift in the world correlation of forces in favor of the USSR and socialism, the capitalist states were forced to accept peaceful coexistence as the guiding principle of international relations and, therefore, were compelled to pursue detente and a "relaxation of tensions" with the socialist states.

Under the present Brezhnev regime, the policy of "relaxation of tensions" has been defined to mean that victory over capitalism will be secured through aggressive competition encompassing all realms, excluding direct military confrontation. Peaceful coexistence remains an offensive strategy and a weapon of struggle with which to undermine the West. "Peaceful coexistence," stated a Soviet author, "is essentially a class policy conducive to the strengthening of the position and prestige of the socialist countries, while undermining the aggressive
imperialist forces and narrowing their opportunities for plotting against the cause of peace and social progress."¹

The present-day manifestation of the general Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence is the policy of detente. Under detente, or "relaxation of tensions" to use the preferred Soviet terminology, both sides are said to be committed to avoid nuclear war. Relations in all other areas are viewed in terms of conflict and competition. At the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev described detente, the most recent stage in peaceful coexistence, as a means of conflict:

Detente does not in the slightest measure abolish, and cannot abolish or alter, the laws of class struggle... We make no secret of the fact that we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction.²

B. Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet military doctrine is a highly specific, well-formulated body of principles common to both the Soviet armed forces and the CPSU. Its content is broadly infused with political and ideological concepts, and is quite consistent with the theories, images, concepts and values which combine to form the Soviet world view discussed earlier.

The Party and the political leadership of the USSR are said to occupy a central position in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine:


The leading role in the creative development of our military thought and in all military construction belongs to the Communist Party. It was also brilliantly manifested in the development and implementation of contemporary Soviet military doctrine.\footnote{S. N. Kozlov, \textit{Spravochnik Ofitsera} (The Officer's Handbook), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971 (trans. U.S. Air Force, Foreign Technology Division, AD733-207, 26 October 1971, p. 108).}

Thus, current Soviet military doctrine is "the political course of the party" and the state in military affairs:

It is the expression of state military policy and the directive of political strategy-military strategy which represents the genuine union of policy and science in the interest of the defense of the country and entire Socialist Commonwealth against imperialist aggression.\footnote{Ibid., p. 112.}

As official policy, Soviet military doctrine is formulated by and disseminated by the highest decisionmaking echelons of the CPSU.\footnote{See Harriet Fast Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine, Its Formulation and Dissemination," SRI-TN-8974-27, SRI/Stanford Research Institute (17 June 1971).}

According to the Officer's Handbook (Spravochnik Ofitsera), 1971 edition, the CPSU Central Committee exercises an important role in the management of military affairs in general:

The Central Committee of the Party plans the main trends in the development of the technical equipping of army and navy and the supplying of the troops with all types of modern weapons and combat equipment; it determines a reasonable proportionality in the development of the types of Armed Forces and combat arms; it
works out Soviet Military Doctrine; it selects and assigns the leading military cadres; it works out and implements the principles for the training and education of the personnel, and it is concerned about raising the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops.\footnote{Kozlov, op. cit., p. 25.}

With regard to military doctrine, Colonel General N. A. Lomov, a former department head at the Academy of the General Staff and a prolific and authoritative writer on military affairs, observed that "the formulation of Soviet Military Doctrine is accomplished under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, under its direct control, on the basis of the theoretical and methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism."\footnote{Colonel General N. A. Lomov, \textit{Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs}, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1965, p. 41.} This fact is further emphasized in the writings of Major General N. M. Kiryayev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. Soviet Military Doctrine, in the words of General Kiryayev:

...elaborated on the basis of the guiding decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet government, and the data of military science, represents a system of views on questions of the military defense of our country and the whole socialist camp from imperialist aggression.\footnote{Major General N. M. Kiryayev, \textit{The CPSU and the Buildup of the Soviet Armed Forces}, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1967, p. 407.}

The concept of military doctrine is constantly referred to in Soviet military writings and, given the concreteness of the concept for Soviet military personnel, it comes as no surprise that the definition of the concept varies little from publication to publication. In general, military
doctrine is seen by the Soviets to reflect the socio-economic, political, and historically conditioned aspects of a nation-state, and the nature of its foreign and domestic policy. Military doctrine thus is formulated under the influence of several factors, including the state's political goals, its views on war, class relations and social structure, its domestic and foreign policy, and its economic and military capabilities.¹

In his authoritative work, *Military Strategy*, 3rd Edition, 1968, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy describes military doctrine as:

...expression of the accepted views of a state regarding the problems of political evaluation of future war, the state attitude toward war, a determination of the nature of future war, preparation of the country for war in the economic and moral sense, and regarding the problems of organization and preparation of the armed forces, as well as of the methods of waging war. Consequently, by military doctrine one should understand the system of officially approved, scientifically based views on the basic fundamental problems of war.²

Similarly, the definition offered in the Officer's Handbook, 1971, stresses the nature, goals and preparation for war:

Military doctrine is a system of guiding views and principles of a state on the character of war under specific historical conditions, the determination of the military tasks of a state, the armed forces, and the principles of their construction, and also the

¹ Kozlov, op. cit., p. 110.

methods and forms for the solution of all these tasks, including armed conflict, which issue from the goals of the war and the socio-economic and military-technical capabilities of a country.¹

For the Soviets, military doctrine has two aspects: political and technical. The political aspect basically concerns the nature, causes and consequences of a future war. The technical aspect refers primarily to the means, scope, and military aspects of a future war. The section below sets forth the basic political and technical propositions of Soviet military doctrine along with the main features of Soviet ideology and the present and future orientation of the doctrine as a set of guiding principles. From these principles, insights may be derived and propositions inferred as to the Soviet expectations concerning future war, and the means and modes by which it might be terminated.

The political aspect of Soviet military doctrine encompasses the following considerations:²

- Capitalism-imperialism is by nature aggressive and materialistic. All capitalist wars are, therefore, predatory and unjust. By definition all socialist wars are defensive and just.

- Soviet pursuit of military superiority is necessitated by the aggressive, militaristic nature of capitalism, for given the opportunity, capitalism-imperialism would strike, seeking to destroy socialism.

¹ Kozlov, op. cit., p. 109.

• Of all possible contemporary wars, the main danger is presented by general nuclear war which the imperialists, among whom the foremost is the United States, may be preparing to unleash upon the Socialist Commonwealth of Nations, and in particular the USSR.

• In Soviet military doctrine the main issue pertains to the problems of preparation for and conduct of a world nuclear missile war. At the same time the possibility of conducting combat operations by conventional means is also considered.

• The basic and determining feature of nuclear missile war is its class and political content, and the political goals of the warring sides.

• In light of the socio-political content of war and the current determining world correlation of forces, a new world war will have a clearly expressed class character. The aggressive imperialistic bloc will be opposed by the powerful coalition of socialist nations.

• A new war, regardless of whether it is started by the imperialists with an attack directly upon the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth or as the result of the imperialists unleashing a local conflict affecting the vital interests of the socialist camp, will inevitably become a world war. This war will be a decisive clash of the two opposed systems—capitalist and socialist.

• War between capitalism and socialism would be a total, systemic conflict, a total war encompassing all realms—political, military, socio-economic, ideological, and scientific-technological. All resources of the state will be mobilized in the defense of the socialist homeland.

• Under the contemporary conditions of world social development, Soviet Military Doctrine accepts the possibility of averting war between two social systems. But at the same time there exists another possibility—the inception of a destructive world war.

The military-technical aspects of Soviet military doctrine include the following main propositions:
A new world war, as a consequence of the means employed, will inevitably be nuclear. The nuclear weapon will be the chief means of destruction, and the basic means of delivering it to the target will be rockets of different types. At the same time, however, conventional armament will be employed by the armed forces along with nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and tactical nature.

A future war will inevitably assume an intercontinental character due to the use of the nuclear rocket as the chief means of destruction.

In light of the contemporary means of armed struggle and the unprecedented destruction which may be delivered by a surprise nuclear rocket attack, a future war may be short and swift.

Soviet military doctrine does not exclude the possibility of protracted war.

Soviet military doctrine has an offensive character, but the offensive nature of this doctrine has nothing in common with the aggressive, predatory military doctrine of the U.S., which reflects the criminal goals and policy of the capitalist ruling class. Rather, if the USSR is attacked, it will conduct the war the enemy has imposed on it in the most offensive manner.

Considering the features of contemporary armed forces and the colossal increase in their firepower, Soviet military doctrine prescribes a flexible organization of the armed forces and combat arms to correspond with the most varied conditions.

A new and important problem of contemporary war is the increasing lack of distinction between front and rear, for combat operations can be initiated simultaneously in both areas. Nuclear missile, chemical and bacteriological strikes by enemy missile forces and aviation, as well as air strikes with conventional weapons, are probable. The landing of enemy airborne troops in the rear is possible, in connection with which breakthroughs by large enemy tank and mechanized forces may also occur. Therefore, the rear should be prepared for defense against all these threats.

Important tasks are assigned to civil defense, in regard to its basic task of protecting the population from nuclear strikes, rapidly furthering uninterrupted operation of enterprises and organs of control and supply, and, with the aid of army units, combating enemy elements which have broken through to the rear.
The political and military-technical aspects of Soviet military doctrine have important implications for future Soviet behavior in the realm of military affairs. This is because of the prescriptive and predictive content of the doctrine. It incorporates important features of Soviet ideology in its set of guiding principles as well as a detailed appraisal of the characteristics and nature of war fought by contemporary means. As doctrine—the official policy of the party and military hierarchy—it provides a common standard, and a solid theoretical foundation and vantage point, from which Soviet military analysts and decisionmakers may interpret and explain actions and events in the external world. Under such circumstances, Soviet military doctrine would exercise influence on the perceptions of and, hence, the responses of Soviet decisionmakers confronted by, for example, the exercise of limited nuclear options by the United States. The emphasis in the foregoing principles of Soviet military doctrine is on general nuclear war, postulated as total and systemic in nature, involving the mass exchange of ICBMs between the USSR and United States. The main issue, then, for the Soviets concerns the problems associated with preparing for, and successfully waging, such a war. This, therefore, necessitates the drive for military superiority over the United States, and a full commitment to civil defense and to a war-survival policy.

Should deterrence fail—and Soviet military doctrine indeed provides explicitly for general nuclear war—the Soviet armed forces are charged with the mission of ensuring the timely destruction of the adversary and, in particular, of his means to attack and devastate the USSR. This mission requires the use of disarming strikes, or "protective preemption" of the adversary, not to be confused with a full-scale, "bolt-from-the-blue" surprise attack.

Soviet writers assert that even in a full-scale nuclear war, the USSR is anticipated to emerge victorious, and Western notions as to the mutual and complete destruction of both adversaries are castigated.
There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war. The peoples of the world will put an end to imperialism, which is causing mankind incalculable suffering...

...if the imperialists unleash a new world war, the toilers will no longer tolerate a system which subjects people to devastating wars. They will mercilessly and irrevocably sweep capitalism from the face of the earth. Of course losses may be extremely high in this decisive clash between two opposing forces. Much, however, depends on the activeness of the masses. The more vigorously and resolutely they oppose the actions of the aggressor, the less damage will be inflicted on civilization.¹

This theme of victory in general nuclear war has been present in Soviet political and military writings for some time. It is more recently, given the growth of Soviet strategic power and the evident interest of the USSR in civil defense and war-survival preparations, that these assertions of Soviet victory assume greater importance:

Under present conditions, when there has arisen the threat of wide use of means of mass destruction, and first of all of nuclear-missile weapons against the entire territory of the country, the preparation of the country's rear for defense against means of mass destruction has become, without a doubt, one of the decisive strategic factors ensuring the ability of the state to function in wartime, and in the final analysis, the attainment of victory in war.²


The foregoing survey of Soviet military doctrine reveals little evidence that at present the military and political decisionmakers of the USSR envision a limited nuclear war with the United States. Their views of war as well as the posture, structure, and tactics of the Soviet armed forces, all indicate preparation for general nuclear war, whose outcome will be the decisive victory of the USSR and socialism. The ongoing Soviet concern with civil defense, expressed in elaborate hardening and dispersal of military and industrial targets, coupled with evacuation plans for the population, supports the notion that the USSR is preparing to survive and win a general nuclear war.

Soviet views on the possibilities and consequences of limited war are worth noting. Basically, they emphasize the theory that the growth in Soviet military capabilities has led the "imperialist" states to pursue localized and limited regional wars, because they are less dangerous than direct action against the USSR and its socialist allies. The Soviets assert nonetheless that the threat of escalation into superpower conflict is everpresent, and that the scope and scale of limited conflict is difficult to control:

Growth in the power of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries led to a failure of this strategy, dissipated the myth of the military superiority of the U.S.A., and left the imperialists with no hopes for victory in a world nuclear missile war. They began to understand that our armed forces can destroy any aggressor who dares unleash a world nuclear missile war, even under conditions most unfavorable to us. This led the imperialist leaders to revise their strategic concepts, and to create the "strategy of flexible response." This strategy provides for the conduct not only of a world nuclear missile war, but also—and perhaps primarily—limited wars with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.¹

Another Soviet writer further adumbrates this argument, emphasizing the threat of escalation inherent in such limited wars:

The exceptional danger of a thermonuclear war compels aggressive imperialist circles to resort to limited, local wars as a less risky means of implementing aggressive policy. The doctrine of limited wars, which is officially recognized in the NATO nations, is on the one hand a result of the imperialists' fear of a possible nuclear war, and on the other hand, constitutes an attempt to adapt this type of war to the needs of aggressive policy.

...There exists no insurmountable barrier or solid wall between a limited war and a world war. Each local adventure contrived by the imperialists in some part of the world carries within itself the danger of escalation into a world conflagration, becoming as it were the detonator of a world war.1

Perhaps the most authoritative of Soviet works on military doctrine and strategy, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy, further asserts that dangers of escalation are inherent in limited war:

Various limitations are mostly forced and conditional. A limited war is fought with a tremendous danger of escalating into general war, especially if tactical weapons are used.2

It is within this framework of views on limited war and limited nuclear war that Soviet writers responded negatively to the public articulation of the "Schlesinger Doctrine." The proposals were attacked

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in the same fashion as the past U.S. policy of "flexible response" and the "city avoidance" counterforce approach. It was observed as early as 1969 that,

To lull the vigilance of the peoples, the U.S. militarists are discussing the possibility of limiting a nuclear war...The deliberate falsehood of these assurances is easily exposed. The propaganda of "limited wars" is intended to pacify public opinion, to accustom people to the thought that nuclear war is possible. At the same time, all talk about confining nuclear strikes only to military objectives is intended to camouflage the plans for a preemptive war (first strike) against the socialist countries.¹

More recently, Soviet spokesmen have ardently rejected the concept of controlled nuclear warfare. In July 1974, Colonel V. V. Larionov commented on the "imperialist circles' formula of 'controlled' limited nuclear war," with its "regulation of the methods of war and the fixing of rules for waging it," and referred again to the prospect of escalation to general war, observing that "perfectly understandably, the Soviet Union resolutely opposed this approach to the problem."²

The journal SShA of the Institute of the United States and Canada (IUSAC) carried an article shortly thereafter condemning limited and controlled nuclear war involving strategic weapons:

Many Pentagon strategists essentially do not wish to change their military-political principles and are continuing to seek ways and opportunities to use nuclear weapons...However, the possibility of unleashing a "small" and "painless" nuclear missile

¹ Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, op. cit., p. 100.

skirmish and keeping it within safe limits is a myth which in no way corresponds to the realities of nuclear war.¹

This theme has been pursued consistently in Soviet military writings. More contemporary writings emphasize the threat of escalation inherent in limited nuclear war and reaffirm the belief that the concept of controlled nuclear conflict and selected targeting really is a camouflage for U.S. designs for preemptive attack on the USSR:

The assertion made by supporters of "limited" nuclear war that it could be kept within preplanned limits and made "controllable," is altogether false. Every clear-headed person knows that any war unleashed by an aggressor and involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons—even if those weapons were used in limited numbers and against "selected targets"—is fraught with the genuine threat of escalation and development into a strategic (universal) nuclear war with all its fatal consequences.

...As can be seen, the "counterforce strategy" was aimed at developing strategic nuclear forces and at maintaining them at a level of combat readiness which would enable the United States to deliver a preemptive nuclear strike and achieve victory on that basis. That was its essence.

...It is next to impossible to view the concept of "selective targeting" with its principal scenario—"limited" nuclear war—as anything but an attempt by the Pentagon to "legitimize" the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict situation, and to do this on terms advantageous to the United States.²

As has been presented in the previous discussion, much evidence of the Soviet view of war, revealed in Soviet military doctrine, the posture, capabilities and tactics of currently deployed Soviet forces, as well as the published views of military theorists, suggests an overriding concern for and preparation for general nuclear war with the capitalist states. The Soviet world view and Marxist-Leninist ideology further support the notion that the USSR foresees a decisive war which will terminate the competition between the two social systems in favor of the USSR. In addition, public statements and writings by Soviet spokesmen have long and consistently rejected the concept of limited war, and limited nuclear war particularly. Yet, in the past, prior to the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and status as a world superpower, the USSR revealed pragmatic behavior in terminating conflicts short of general war and military victory through the traditional means of defeating and occupying the enemy. Though conditions have changed dramatically in the contemporary period, it would be unwise to exclude fully the possibility that the USSR would participate in controlled nuclear conflict, in the interest of terminating that conflict short of general war, should it be deemed in the Soviet interest to do so. Given the emphasis placed on warfighting rather than deterrence in Soviet doctrine and force posture, however, and should existing trends toward the expansion of Soviet strategic capabilities continue unabated, it is possible that whatever incentives now exist for war termination in a controlled conflict mode will be further eroded.
IV ECONOMIC TARGETING AND WAR TERMINATION

In the discussion and debate surrounding former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's enunciation of the doctrine of limited strategic options, economic targeting was considered by most analysts to be a viable instrument in the design of such options. Economic targeting for limited nuclear warfare and ultimately for the objective of war termination short of general nuclear war presents both advantages and apparent disadvantages for the U.S. strategic planner. In view of the purposeful and limited nature of an LSO, the accomplishment of effective economic targeting with maximum utility for this strategy is a complex task which includes the consideration of a number of interrelated tangible and intangible factors.

In the discussion below, an effort is made to present an approach to the task of economic targeting for limited strategic options with the objective of war termination. This treatment seeks to deal systematically with the procedure for establishing economic target criteria, the design of target sets and the pairing of appropriate target sets with response options. In addition, as part of a brief analysis of leadership perceptions and likely responses in the Soviet context, some of the advantages and drawbacks of economic targeting for an LSO strategy for war termination are noted.

A. General Target Categories and Characteristics

Examining the composition, physical characteristics and end-uses of the production of Soviet economic sectors, four distinct yet interrelated categories suggest themselves. For the purposes of this analysis, these categories are chosen to establish classes of potential Soviet economic targets with similar characteristics and potential target values:
• defense
• heavy industry
• infrastructure
• other.

The sectoral breakdown employed here corresponds to that of the "material flows" in SRI's econometric model of the USSR (see Figure 1).¹

The Defense Industry represents, for the most part, machine-building and metalworking enterprises (MBMW) whose principal production activity consists of supplying military hardware or inputs for military hardware, and which thus receive the highest priority in Soviet resource allocation decisions. It is assumed here that key installations for the defense production process are dispersed and hardened.

While in the other target categories there exist analogous installations which are currently devoted to the production of durable goods for civilian end-uses, it is to be expected that in a period of high mobilization prior to or during war these installations may be more properly considered as part of the defense sector, e.g., tractor assembly plants cum tank assembly plants. The analysis, however, would not be altered by expanding the scope of the defense category through postulating such additional capacity, since this added capacity would possess basic characteristics similar to the Defense Industry itself.

Heavy Industry enjoys the highest priority in Soviet resource allocation to civilian industry. This category includes a significant portion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Target Category</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Heavy Industry</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Machine-Building and metal working (for defense purposes)¹</td>
<td>• chemicals and petrochemicals²</td>
<td>• transport and communications</td>
<td>• construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• coal products</td>
<td>• domestic trade</td>
<td>• agriculture</td>
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<td>• construction materials</td>
<td>• government and services</td>
<td>• forest products</td>
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<td>• electro-energy</td>
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<td>• paper and pulp</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• machine-building and metal working (other than defense)</td>
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<td>• soft goods</td>
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<td>• metallurgy</td>
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<td>• processed foods</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• petroleum products</td>
<td></td>
<td>• industry not elsewhere classified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Subsectors of machine-building and metal-working include among others:

- precision instruments
- construction machinery and equipment
- transportation machinery and equipment
- automotive equipment
- bearings
- electro-technical machinery and equipment

² Subsectors of chemicals and petrochemicals include:

- abrasives
- aniline dye products
- basic chemistry products
- mineral chemistry products
- paints and lacquers
- organic synthetic products

rubber and asbestos products
synthetic fibers
synthetic resins and plastics
synthetic rubber
other chemicals

Figure 2  ECONOMIC TARGET CATEGORY BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
of the machine-building and metalworking sector, metallurgical enterprises, power generation, the processing of petroleum and coal products, construction materials, and chemical and petrochemical production. This category is characterized by very large installations, often concentrated in complexes encompassing interrelated industrial activity. Some hardening of these installations must be assumed given their importance both for their inputs to the defense industry and for their potentially vital contribution to both warfighting and postattack recovery needs of the USSR.

While the elements of the Soviet economic infrastructure, including transportation, communications, distribution, administration and services, are vital in insuring critical material flows in the economy, their physical and organizational characteristics require their separate categorization vis-a-vis the high-priority industrial sector. The components of the infrastructure sectors are widely dispersed throughout the economic regions of the USSR. The relative size of the installations ranges from mid to small scale. Individual units are redundant and highly substitutable within geographical limitations (especially communications, and to a lesser extent transportation systems). Once again it is assumed that high-priority state, military and civil defense/emergency command and control networks have been hardened. It is also assumed here that hardening measures in this case are effective; the redundancy of these systems further reduces their vulnerability to attack.

The fourth category, designated "other" in Figure 1, encompasses the remaining sectors of Soviet economic activity. While differing greatly in forms of activity, these sectors nevertheless share a relatively low priority in relation to the other categories and/or represent potentially low target value. This is due to the size or physical characteristics of the installation, to the ability to stockpile pre-war output, or to the generally peripheral importance of these industries in a "stripped down" war economy (for example, luxury goods, consumer durables, highly processed food, and newsprint). Some of the important sectors in the "other" category include:
Construction (while this activity is vital in adding or restoring industrial capacity, the targeting of mobile construction equipment, skilled labor, etc., is not feasible).

Agriculture (a dispersed and easily reconstitutable activity, at perhaps a lower, but assumedly sufficient, level of production).

Light industry (much of this activity is of secondary importance to the economy, particularly in an emergency situation).

Food industry (in an emergency situation, requirements for food processing could be reduced to a bare minimum, and strategic stockpiling of food further reduces the importance of this sector).

Forestry (though important for cellulose and construction materials, the highly dispersed and duplicative nature of this industry renders it a low-priority target).

Mining (much of this industry's resources are located underground and effectively hardened by natural circumstances).

B. The Criteria for Target Value Assessment

Two general sets of criteria, corresponding to the characteristics inherent in the target and the role of the target in the economy, can be ascribed for an assessment of target value. Specific parameters of individual target characteristics can be generalized for analytical purposes to apply to categories of targets, and an in-depth approach would make such a generalization from an appropriate sampling of individual targets in each category.

The first set of criteria, the inherent characteristics of the targets themselves, may serve as a set of indicators describing the vulnerability of the target when paired with the parameters of strategic nuclear weapons employment (i.e., number of warheads, yield, height of burst, etc.). These criteria include the following:
• The terrain, location and geophysical circumstances of the targeted installation.
• The installation's design and structural features.
• The physical layout, size and scale.
• Hardening and civil defense measures instituted.
• Potential for collateral damage to population and adjacent assets.

These criteria permit an assessment of an individual target's vulnerability to attack; however, they are not sufficient to permit an evaluation of the target's economic value and/or its priority among any given set of targets. For a translation of this analysis to the higher mode of categories, the added target parameters of dispersal and colocation with other select targets must be incorporated as well.

In addition to the target vulnerability, the characteristics describing the role of the target in the economy must be assessed in order to derive the value of the targeted installation or category. Among the criteria which describe the economic value or "economic profile" of any given target are the following:

• The volume of deliveries to priority end-users (e.g., defense, heavy industry, etc.).
• Critical linkages and capacity constraints (substitutability factors and intra- or interindustry relationships).
• Technological level of production (age of capital stock, sophistication of processes, complexity of assembly lines, etc.).
• Lead time required for construction of new production capacity (e.g., nuclear power generation requires a longer startup period than a cement plant).
C. Economic Targeting—The Assessment Process

The procedure for selecting a spectrum of economic target sets useful and consistent for a variety of policy parameters (guiding the determination of limited strategic response options) entails five stages of assessment alternating between aggregate (category) and micro (installation) levels of analysis (see Figure II). The first step in the process involves establishing basic target categories with an appropriate breakdown of economic sectors (as the foregoing discussion has accomplished in an overview fashion). Having established the desired economic target categories, the next step entails the sampling of representative sets of installations within these categories and the application of the criteria of vulnerability and economic profile to determine their value as targets. Generalizing from the derived values of representative target sets, the third step in the procedure sets out targeting priorities both among and within (i.e., of subcategories) target categories. The assignment of priorities will be determined both by the characteristics of the targets (i.e., their vulnerability and economic profile) and by the specific purposes of the target planner in selecting a given strategic nuclear response. This design is necessarily influenced by the planners’ anticipation of desired and undesired Soviet reactions to the destruction (or threatened destruction) of target sets.

The fourth step in the process concerns the actual selection and design of target sets which are to be evaluated for appropriateness to a spectrum of response options. This involves returning to the micro level of analysis to deal with the parameters of specific installations which are candidates for the target set, in accordance with the criteria of vulnerability and economic profile set forth above. The fifth step is the aggregation of the potential impact of destroying the individual targets in the various sets and thus assigning values to target sets with utility for the formulation of appropriate response options.
Figure II  ECONOMIC TARGET ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
For reasons more fully explained in the next section, this target assessment procedure is designed for limited strategic nuclear options in which a limited number of weapons are employed (making a total system impact assessment, which proceeds basically on an aggregate level, analyzing widespread destruction, infeasible). The analysis here must accommodate itself to the express goal of war termination, and it is, therefore, assumed that real damage to the Soviet economy in the envisioned limited strategic option scenarios will be marginal at best. It is understood that the purpose of these nuclear options is to communicate to the adversary the will, resolve, and intentions of the United States. Thus Soviet elite perceptions of this communication are critical to the war termination process and, therefore, to the design of the response option.

D. The Linkage of Targets and Response Options

At the outset, it should be understood that the objective of designing nuclear options must encompass a number of dimensions transcending the target set values determined by direct economic impact and vulnerability. Soviet perceptions concerning the purpose and scope of the attack and, more importantly, the intentions of the attacker are critical considerations in the design of options with utility for war termination. Merely assessing the vulnerability of a given group of targets gives no insight as to probable Soviet reactions, nor does estimating the possible economic cost which would be exacted by destroying a given target, given the marginal nature of the impact on the economy and the possibility that Soviet attitudes towards the damage may significantly differ from the preattack through the transattack periods. At least three other dimensions associated with the destruction of a given target set must be considered. These include the following:

- Criticality of damage to sensitive targets, i.e., the role of the destroyed capacity, as viewed by the Soviet leadership, in specific economic programs associated with the particular state of emergency.
The leadership's perceptions may, of course, vary according to the level of conflict (conventional clashes, limited nuclear exchange, paralysis of external economic relations, etc.).

- Collateral damage associated with the destruction of specific target sets (population destruction, disruption of transport and communication networks, damage to adjacent assets other than those in the target set). Collateral damage to adjacent military facilities, for example, may provoke Soviet responses other than those anticipated from destruction of the target set, thus blurring the boundaries between strictly economic and counterforce targeting.

- Number and yield of weapons employed in destroying the target set. The characteristics of the weapons employed are important factors influencing the perception by the adversary of the scope and purpose of the attack and must be consistent, therefore, not only with the requirements imposed by the target set but also with the aims of the response option; i.e., careful tailoring of weapons effects and target set design will help to reduce the likelihood of adversary misperception and unanticipated reactions.

The assignment of values to economic target sets, then, must involve the formulation of "value vectors," the elements of which correspond to these five, and possibly still other, dimensions. In summary, the design and selection of target sets and their evaluation is considerably more complex than an assessment of the economic profile and target vulnerability and includes a subjective consideration of the adversary's perception along a number of axes, including those suggested above.

The generation of target sets and the calculation of their value, therefore, must be guided by the whole range of considerations taken into account by the strategic planner as he designs a limited nuclear response. Within the framework of the five-step procedure outlined above, the initial target sets arrived at should be evaluated according to their appropriateness for specific nuclear options envisioned by the planner. Given the multidimensional nature of the value of a given target set (in terms of the potential reactions of the adversary), the target assessment process should be pursued iteratively with feedback from the strategic planner entering at Step 4 (see Figure III). Once a range of nuclear options has been
Figure III  THE LINKAGE OF TARGET SETS TO RESPONSE OPTIONS
determined with respect to purpose and intensity, a spectrum of target sets can be generated to correspond to that range. Alternative permutations and combinations of target sets can serve to provide a one-to-one pairing of target sets and options, the derivation of alternative options within the prescribed range, or the transcendence of the initial range of options.

E. Targeting, Adversary Perception and Behavior

Target set selection, design and the pairing of the targets with response options, should consider, as has been indicated, those factors which will influence Soviet reactions to the limited nuclear attack. A generalized treatment of these factors takes into account the following:

- Soviet perceptions of the attack's characteristics—criticality of damage (sensitivity of targets); collateral damage; and number and yield of weapons employed. It should not be assumed that Soviet leaders would possess complete knowledge in making their assessment, particularly in a short decisionmaking time frame.

- Soviet decisionmakers' understanding of the pattern of events preceding the attack—the international political situation, U.S.-Soviet interactions preceding the attack, and the specific events associated with the conflict at hand.

- The depth of the Soviet commitment to its objective and related course of action which provoked the U.S. nuclear attack—this is to include Soviet resolve, risk calculus, etc.

- Soviet estimate of the intent, will and resolve of the United States and the significance of the attack.

- Soviet expectations as to U.S. behavior following a Soviet response to the initial U.S. attack—i.e., will the Soviet response be followed by an additional, and possibly escalatory, attack by the United States.

While the estimate and anticipation of probable Soviet responses must be largely influenced by the conflictual context (e.g., a Soviet conventional attack on the FRG) and specific chain of events which might culminate in the execution of a U.S. limited nuclear option, the characteristics of the attack inherent in the choice of the target set are a
major consideration. Given the danger of escalation and the objective of terminating the conflict short of general nuclear war, the choice of targets in the USSR is a critical factor in determining the course of a limited nuclear exchange, ranging from the catastrophe of total war to effective limitation and cessation of hostilities (see Figure IV for a depiction of possible Soviet reactions to U.S. nuclear response to a Soviet military initiative).

Communication of purpose through target selection, for one or a series of nuclear responses, is a particularly complex and critical instrument in achieving the goals of altering Soviet behavior and terminating the conflict. Economic targeting in a strictly limited nuclear attack can be an effective vehicle of communication, offering both flexibility and certain advantages not inherent in political or military targeting. For example, since a limited nuclear strike on economic targets would not threaten the economic viability, political control or immediate defense capabilities of the USSR, its escalatory potential may be less than a strike on political or military targets. Economic targeting has utility for a demonstration of resolve, via a wide range of possible targets which might meet the requirements of various specific options. Through careful target selection, differing shades of purpose and intensity can be communicated to the adversary. Such variations in target selection, guided by the purpose of the nuclear option, might include, for example, the following:

- The selection of targets limited to a single important industry, e.g., petroleum refining. In the initial attack, only a small percentage of the refining capacity would be destroyed. Should subsequent attacks be deemed necessary, damage to this sector would incrementally approach critical dimensions, yet throughout the exchange, successive strikes would continue to demonstrate the essentially limited purposes of the attack.

- Dispersed targeting across several industries—in this mode, successive strikes on economic targets are possible without approaching critical damage levels which threaten the viability of the economy.
SCENARIO 1:

Figure IV  SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON FRG

Objective: Blitzkrieg War - disarm, seize, and occupy FRG
Targeting of economic installations with special political significance, i.e., those which are identified with leadership figures or recent high-priority campaigns—for example, the Kama Truck Complex, the Kursk Metallurgical Works, or the most costly and impressive sections of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (railway).

It must be noted here, however, that despite the advantages of economic targeting for limited nuclear options, there are some serious drawbacks as well. The damage imposed by the number and yield of weapons consistent with a limited strike may not be sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from their course of action which incurred the attack. Any attack on a scale threatening Soviet economic viability, if such a level of destruction were deemed necessary, would likely be perceived by the Soviets as a major attack, escalating the conflict and seriously reducing the possibility of termination short of general nuclear war. Though economic targeting may provide considerable leeway for shaping the scope and intensity of limited nuclear strikes appropriate to an LSO strategy, the set of intangibles associated with accurately anticipating Soviet reactions remains a serious problem. Secondly, in considering the use of economic targeting for limited strategic options, U.S. planners must recognize that the United States is inherently more vulnerable to the application of this technique than the USSR. Because of heavy concentration of industry, colocation of facilities, and contiguity of urban populations in the United States, a Soviet counterstrike involving the same number and yield of weapons employed in the implementation of the initial U.S. LSO would produce far greater destruction in the United States than in the USSR. Finally, any estimate by U.S. planners of Soviet perceptions, evaluation, and reactions to the strike would be largely speculative. The assumptions about Soviet behavior inherent in the LSO strategy appear to be at variance with the public expressions of Soviet leaders on the expected course of nuclear war. In the absence of convincing evidence of a Soviet willingness to accept or accommodate the LSO "rules of the game," such a strategy is clearly fraught with considerable risks.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss some of the problems associated with the possible U.S. use of limited strategic options to achieve war termination in a conflict involving the United States and the Soviet Union. Two conventional conflict scenarios are developed, one for Central Europe, the second for the Middle East. The postulated time of the first is the very near future, with basically the same balance of forces and capabilities between the United States and the USSR as exists today. The postulated time of the second is the very recent past (1973). Advantages and disadvantages of the use of the LSO within the context of these scenarios will be discussed. Conclusions will be developed through a deductive exercise. Both scenarios are brief. Central Europe and the Middle East have been selected because of the central importance of Europe in U.S. foreign policy and the great potential for conflict in the Middle East.

A. War in Europe

The circumstances described in this scenario raise problems which are vital in any consideration of U.S. security policy. Europe is still considered America’s first line of defense, and NATO is still the linchpin of European security. The MC 14/3 strategy of flexible response, which relies so heavily on conventional forces to deal with any Warsaw Pact attack, is becoming more and more suspect as Pact forces improve in numbers, quality and readiness of forces vis-a-vis the NATO allies. The willingness of the Alliance to employ presently deployed theater (tactical) nuclear weapons in its own defense, on its own territory, is considered questionable by many analysts. Even more doubtful is the likelihood that the United States would respond to a Pact invasion of NATO's CENTAG area with a massive nuclear assault on Soviet territory.
The vulnerability of the Alliance tactical nuclear weapons and their storage sites is no secret. The superior Pact-to-NATO tank ratio in Northern and Central Europe (20,500 to 7,000 at present, and steadily increasing in favor of the Pact)\(^1\) is a serious concern for NATO commanders. While the reliability of the Pact allies is not proven, the responsiveness of the political councils of the Alliance in making critical defense decisions is also uncertain.

The litany of NATO worries concerning the defense of Europe could be substantially extended. However, the point is that the threat or use of limited strategic options either to deter Soviet aggression or to terminate hostilities once they begin becomes an important alternative for the United States given the erosion of confidence in other defenses, both conventional and nuclear. The importance of the LSO option under these conditions was highlighted by Dr. Schlesinger in Congressional testimony when he cited conflict in Europe as being the "one preeminent"\(^2\) circumstance which might warrant the exercise of an LSO.

1. General Situation

The time is near future. NATO has received some indication that the Warsaw Pact may be contemplating a major military initiative, but the signs are ambiguous. Berlin has been quiescent for so long that its former role as the principal *causa vera* of an East-West war is dormant. East Germany, claiming provocation by the West, has

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\(^2\) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Army Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, second session, 4 March 1974.
announced that the entire city has reverted to the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviets simultaneously have announced that they have relinquished their jurisdiction over East Berlin to the GDR and demanded both that the Western Powers do likewise in the Western portion of the city and that they withdraw all military forces. The three NATO allies demur, and their military forces in the city are quickly isolated and neutralized by vastly superior combined GDR-USSR forces. Allied casualties are limited. All of Berlin falls under the effective control of the GDR.

NATO intelligence reveals that Soviet forces at the Pact-NATO borders, which were at 75 percent manning level, are being brought up to strength through a partial mobilization. Over a 10-day period, more than 100,000 reinforcing troops are airlifted into positions while additional movements of troops westward by rail and road are in evidence. The Soviet Northern Fleet and Mediterranean Squadron are fully deployed. Toward the end of the 10-day period, nearly 100 Soviet submarines begin passing through the various North Atlantic gaps and moving south and west; at least two dozen of these appear to be Yankee and Delta class SSBNs.

NATO thus has ample military intelligence indicating the probability of a major Soviet military initiative, but for a variety of reasons an effective, coordinated Alliance political response is not forthcoming. The United States deploys two brigades to the FRG and U.S. forces begin to activate pre-positioned equipment, but most NATO allies counsel patience. The Scandinavian and Benelux nations are particularly outspoken in urging Washington to avoid precipitous action; the British Labour government, while not opposing some reinforcement of the CENTAG area as a show of determination, urges immediate consultations with the USSR to end the crisis. Opinion in the FRG is divided. Leftist and radical groups organize meetings and demonstrations which draw substantial crowds. While some government
leaders and spokesmen for the opposition CDU-CSU urge a strong NATO stand, SPD leader Egon Bahr demands that Prime Minister Schmidt fly to Moscow for talks. Responding to urgent public and private pleas from the President of the United States and West European leaders, President Brezhnev denounces NATO defense preparations as "revanchist warmongery" and a "serious threat to the security of the peace-loving peoples of the Socialist Commonwealth"; he demands that U.S. reinforcement of Europe cease and offers to begin talks on "new arrangements for all-European security" in two weeks' time. A Western summit conference meets in Washington to consider Brezhnev's statement, but reaches no agreement on an appropriate response.

Thus the 10 days' effective warning time is not fully exploited by the Alliance. NATO commanders of course move to General Defense Positions and organize defenses. An all-out Soviet assault on Western Europe begins. Notwithstanding NATO preparations, the Warsaw Pact forces, attacking behind lead Soviet divisions employing rocket, tank and artillery forces in continuous round-the-clock blitzkrieg operations, penetrate deep into West Germany. From the Kola Peninsula the Soviets occupy the greater part of Northern Norway, and also make limited advances in Southeast Europe through the Gorizia and Thrace gaps. The most serious penetrations come in the Central Region, however, where the attack is concentrated on the North German Plain with what appear to be secondary efforts through the Fulda Gap and Hof Corridor. Offensive operations in the Nuremberg and Munich areas appear to be holding attacks. The Soviets withhold nuclear attacks; NATO allies have not as yet employed theater nuclear weapons and there is substantial resistance to their use emanating from the NATO Council. During the first day of operations, NATO antitank forces were extremely successful in destroying about 25 percent of the enemy armor in the 35 attacking Pact Divisions, and some Soviet units become bogged down as they attempt to move through heavily populated areas on roads filled by
fleeing civilians. Nevertheless, by day four the Pact has reinforced and made such gains that SACEUR informs the Council that he expects the enemy to reach the Rhine (effectively severing all major U.S. lines of communication) by day six. French forces in the FRG, still uncommitted, are withdrawn into defensive positions in France.

2. Special Situation

Upon receipt of the SACEUR forecast of additional major Soviet advances, the debate within NATO on the use of theater nuclear weapons increases. There is serious doubt that the badly damaged command and control structure of NATO forces can manage and control nuclear forces as effectively as the political authorities desire once release is given to employ these weapons. NATO theater nuclear weapons have been prime targets of the Pact air interdiction effort, and NATO capabilities, while still formidable, have been reduced substantially. FRG authorities emphasize the point that, except for deep interdiction attacks on third-echelon Soviet units massing to the rear, any resort to theater nuclear weapons at this point would result in massive collateral damage in West Germany. In this context, several European leaders raise the possibility of using U.S. strategic weapons in a limited mode as an alternative to a theater nuclear war in Western Europe. The possibility of the use of an LSO strategy had also been discussed within the U.S. National Security Council on days two and three, and contingency plans were developed. Now, faced with the possible destruction of the U.S. forces in Europe and the defeat of allied forces throughout the theater, and confronted with allied resistance to the use of theater nuclear weapons in Western Europe to stop Pact forces, the President acquiesces in the communication of an LSO threat to the USSR and the execution of such a threat should the Pact not agree to terminate hostilities. Specifically, the United States communicates to the Soviet leadership (as well as to Soviet allies and to the United Nations) that if their attack in all sectors
is not stopped within 24 hours, and if withdrawal is not begun within 48, limited strategic strikes will be executed which will be designed to:

- Destroy significant numbers of Soviet ground forces and military equipment deployed opposite the Sino-Soviet border.
- Destroy 45 percent of the Soviet total electric power generating capacity.
- Avoid collateral damage to Pact infrastructure cities and populations to the greatest extent possible; it is pointed out, however, that some such damage would be unavoidable.

The U.S. threat (which is communicated through the United Nations to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies) further emphasizes that:

- No nation's national survival will be put into immediate jeopardy by U.S. exercise of the LSO.
- Execution of the threatened strikes will be closely controlled by central U.S. authorities.
- No Soviet strategic weapons will be targeted in the initial U.S. strikes.

3. Analysis

The U.S. initiative hypothesized here obviously has the limited objectives appropriate for employment of an LSO. Communicating the limited intentions of the strategy is not, of course, merely a function of the clarity with which the United States expresses its objectives, but also depends upon the willingness and/or capability of the Soviets to accept the U.S. pronouncements as genuine. This suggests that the nature of U.S. intentions would be more clear (and credible) if an LSO strategy had been formally adopted and publicly espoused as an alternative by both the U.S. and NATO leaders far in advance of any outbreak of hostilities. If the United States and NATO could avoid
surprise in the application of the LSO, deterrence in general, intrawar deterrence, and war termination efforts would all be enhanced.\(^1\) If the maximum value is to be gained from this strategy it should thus be carefully enunciated by U.S. National Command Authorities and incorporated into the NATO strategy.\(^2\) Before the advent of hostilities, however, the enunciation of a possible LSO option for the U.S. need not be completely explicit. There are benefits to be derived from intentional ambiguity and strategic nuances. In declaring war termination LSO objectives during war, however, the threat of a strike to coerce an adversary should be explicit, for uncertainty and surprise could promote uncontrolled escalation rather than an end to hostilities.

The level of damage threatened by the United States in this scenario appears to be appropriate. Given the immediate Soviet prospects for military victory in Western Europe, the destruction of a substantial segment of the Soviet electrical generating capability is not believed to be too severe a punishment. The Soviet prospects for military victory in this scenario, on the other hand, are too promising to expect the USSR to relinquish them unless the threat of retaliation is significant.

The scenario illustrates the impact which third parties could have on the use of an LSO. It does not seem inconceivable, given a conflict in Europe, that by day four of a Soviet combined arms attack NATO would have few options remaining other than a U.S. LSO, and that such would be the preferred alternative of a substantial segment of the West European leadership. To suggest that NATO conventional forces

\(^1\) There was substantial discussion and official espousal of this strategy during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. There has been very little public discussion of LSOs during the Carter Administration, although the strategy has by no means been rejected. See, e.g., Charles Mohr, "Carter Orders Steps to Increase Ability to Meet War Threats," The New York Times (26 August 1977).

\(^2\) There are ample reasons, however, for the United States not to advocate or acquiesce in formalizing the LSO concept within the rubric of MC 14/3.

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might be incapable of stopping such an assault is to understate the problem. Theater nuclear capabilities could be substantially reduced by virtue of the Pact's early concentration of its interdiction efforts upon allied nuclear forces, and the confidence of the NATO decisionmakers in their capability to control theater nuclear war with a badly damaged NATO C³ system could be so eroded that they would be reluctant to grant release authority to SACEUR or his subordinate commanders. One of the few remaining options to bring about a termination of the conflict on terms not unfavorable to NATO would be the LSO. The bonus of avoiding the nuclear devastation of Western Europe would also be a boon to the Europeans, but might provide little solace to the United States, which would have to expect possible Soviet retaliation in kind. Third party reactions outside of the NATO-Pact area (India, China, etc.) would be a negligible concern.

The gravity of the decisions which would have to be made by the U.S. National Command Authorities in such circumstances cannot be overemphasized. Once the decision to proceed with an LSO strategy is made by the President, he must be prepared to accept a retaliatory strike from the Soviet Union of equal or greater magnitude. He must therefore weigh the possibility of the loss of Western Europe against expected U.S. losses. On the other hand, either prior to retaliatory strikes on the part of the USSR or immediately after them, the Soviet leadership might suggest serious negotiations to terminate the conflict.

B. War in the Middle East

This scenario is an extension of an actual historical event—the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It postulates a Soviet intervention and a U.S. response—events which well could have taken place at the time. The Middle East in many respects remains the most likely place for a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation in the present period. The only significant change between the geopolitical circumstances of 1972-73
and those of today in the Middle East is the shared Arab-Israeli sense of exhaustion from one of the most devastating (in terms of military losses) 18 days of war in military history. The intense fighting produced estimated Arab losses of over 1,300 tanks, over 88,000 killed and wounded, and 368 fighter aircraft destroyed. For the Israelis, the losses were over 840 tanks, 120 aircraft, and 10,300 killed and wounded. (By comparison, in 12 days of war at El Alamein during the Second World War the total loss of Allied and German tanks was only about 44 percent of that of the 1973 war.) The intense destruction wrought by the Yom Kippur War has had such an impact on both Arabs and Israelis that it appears to have generated a mutual reluctance to renew such expensive and dangerous hostilities. It also gave new impetus to the search for political solutions to the very complex Middle East problems. It could have happened otherwise if the October 1973 Soviet-U.S. confrontation had escalated into open hostilities.

1. General Situation

On 6 October 1973, on the Hebrew religious Day of Atonement, a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack was launched against Israeli forces. The Arabs were spectacularly successful in the first few hours of the war. In the northeast, with Soviet military advisers positioned down to the battalion level, the Syrians recaptured much of the territory lost in 1967 in the Golan Heights. In the southwest, the Egyptians made a brilliant crossing of the Canal and captured the Israeli Bar-Lev defense line.

The Israeli air force, while still superior to the Arab air forces, was not as dominant as in previous Arab-Israeli wars because of the Israeli decision, principally on political grounds, not to preempt, and because of the increased effectiveness of the Arab air defense systems provided, organized and trained by the Soviets.
The Israelis' initial objectives both in defense and in counterattack were focused on the northeast, and within nine days they had substantially defeated the combined Syrian, Moroccan, Iraqi, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian forces in this sector, driving the Syrians back beyond the lines established in the 1967 cease-fire. On 10 October the Israelis started to move toward Damascus.

On 15 October the Israelis counterattacked across the Suez Canal through the boundary between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. SAM sites on the Egyptian side of the Canal were captured or destroyed, giving greater operational latitude to the Israeli air force. By 22 October, an effective Israeli combat force was on the West Bank, threatening the destruction of the Third Army east of the Canal.

During this phase the USSR became extremely active diplomatically. A Soviet message on 9 October to Algeria, urging President Boumedienne to support the Arab cause, was an early indication of Russian activity. (It appeared that initially the Soviets did not have great expectations for Arab success in the conflict. However, early victories by the Arab forces encouraged Moscow to give the Arabs more unstinting support.) An extensive Soviet air and sea lift of resupply equipment to the Syrians and Egyptians began on 10 October. The U.S. airlift of supplies and equipment to Israel commenced on 13 October. On 20 October the U.S. Secretary of State, after receiving an urgent message from Moscow, visited the USSR to discuss the bringing about of a cease-fire. During these negotiations the Soviet Union proposed a joint U.S.-USSR peace-keeping force to be deployed to the area. The United States rejected this proposal. A 22 October cease-fire was then negotiated, but it broke down immediately. On 24 October the Egyptians reiterated the request for a joint U.S.-USSR peace-keeping force. The Soviets informed the United States that if it did not accept the Egyptian proposal the Soviets would do so, unilaterally sending Russian forces into the Middle East. The United States responded by setting a DEFCON Three Alert worldwide.
2. **Special Situation**

(From this point forward the scenario departs from historical fact and develops a series of hypotheses.) Rather than the Soviet Union's accepting UN Resolution 340, which called for a multinational peace-keeping force excluding the U.S. and USSR, the Soviet government perseveres in its insistence on a Soviet "peace-keeping presence," thus substantially heightening tensions. On 24 October the Soviet Union begins to fly the lead echelons of four airborne divisions, deployed into Hungary prior to the DEFCON Three Alert, into Cairo. The Israelis begin an all-out assault on the Egyptian Third Army, which, faced with annihilation, surrenders en masse to the encircling Israeli forces. Having substantially reinforced its forces west of Suez and no longer concerned with the Thir. Army on its southern flank, two Israeli armored divisions and an armored brigade strike north along the axis of the Ismailia-Cairo road, apparently intending to capture Cairo, just 50 miles to the north. By 26 October, under Israeli air cover, the Israeli armored force is approaching the outskirts of Cairo. Seventy percent of the Soviet Union's four airborne division personnel are by now in Egypt, and two of those divisions are positioned along the main avenues of approach from the south into Cairo. The Israeli armored columns brush aside these lightly armed Soviet forces in a series of short engagements; the Israelis, apparently counting on U.S. support, have refused to acknowledge the political significance of the Soviet presence as a deterrent to further Israeli advances. The Soviets immediately begin a massive series of conventional airstrikes and naval SSM attacks against targets within Israel with the apparent objective of destroying Israeli air defenses. President Brezhnev announces that unless the Israelis agree to withdraw all their forces operating west of Suez, further attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets will follow. A U.S. Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier is struck and badly damaged by what is believed to be an SSM fired by a Soviet KYNDA-class cruiser.
The United States commenced mobilization on 26 October. The only U.S. forces in the area which are in a position to respond to the Soviet attack are several fighter squadrons deployed in Turkey, the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet and a Marine Amphibiou Brigade, also with the Sixth Fleet.

The Soviets are successful in their air campaign against Israeli targets and the tempo of their operations is increasing, with their ambassador to the UN implying that the final solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the elimination of the Israeli state. The Israelis, faced with the destruction of their urban-industrial infrastructure, directly appeal to the United States to intervene. The U.S. National Command Authorities respond by communicating a threat of an LSO to the Soviet Union should they persist in their attacks on Israel. The substance of the U.S. threat, should the Soviet Union not stop its air campaign against Israel, is that the United States would deliver limited nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union:

- Destroying Soviet targets comparable to those the USSR is destroying in Israel ("tit-for-tat" attacks), plus
- Destruction of 15 percent of the Soviet petroleum-producing facilities.

The United States emphasizes that:

- The United States will go to great extremes to insure the survival of the Israeli state.
- In these initial LSOs, Soviet strategic weapons will not be targeted.

3. Analysis

The scenario (like the first) stresses that the level of threat embodied in the LSO should approximate the level of importance of the objective in question to the U.S. and USSR. High-stake objectives
merit a high level of threat in the LSO; the rationale is that the threat must be sufficiently grave to offset the promise of reward should the adversary persevere successfully in his course of action. However, in this scenario the stakes are not comparable for the U.S. and the USSR. The political, economic and psychological implications of the destruction of Israel and the concomitant ascendency of Soviet influence in the Middle East would be a significantly greater loss for the United States than the destruction of Israel would be a gain for the Soviets. The magnitude of the LSO threat postulated for the Middle East scenario reflects this divergence of interests. Moreover, the Soviet interest in achieving the rather ill-defined objectives which might emerge under conditions postulated in the scenario probably would not merit extreme risk-taking by Moscow. For these reasons, it seems probable that the Soviet Union would find this LSO threat to be credible, and that the threat might be efficacious. The U.S. stakes would be sufficiently high to merit such drastic military initiatives, and there would be few other reasonable military alternatives available. As noted in the European scenario, the threat would be even more credible if the LSO strategy had been formally adopted and announced prior to the crisis as a possible U.S. policy option in certain contingencies.

An element not addressed in this scenario, however, which would be a basic consideration for U.S. policymakers, was the apparent Israeli possession of some 13 nuclear weapons in October of 1973. Some reports in fact indicate that these weapons were readied for use during the early stages of the war.\textsuperscript{1} Given the possible willingness of the Israelis to utilize nuclear weapons and the magnitude of the threat to Israel's survival postulated in this scenario, the possibility that Israel would threaten to use nuclear weapons against Cairo, against Soviet forces in Egypt or the Mediterranean, or even against the

southern regions of the USSR itself could not be dismissed by U.S. decisionmakers. It is possible that such an Israeli attempt at "coercive nuclear diplomacy" might force the United States, even in the absence of an initial U.S. desire to do so, to consider an LSO. That is, the United States might find itself compelled to preempt an Israeli nuclear threat (which it may not be able to control) by communicating a U.S. LSO threat (which it can).

Different domestic political considerations may present themselves in this scenario as well. It is possible that the U.S. Administration would have a more difficult time enlisting public support for an LSO in defense of Israel than in the defense of Central Europe. While, as previously stated, Europe is generally accepted as the frontier of American security, the U.S. commitment to the survival of Israel involves complex historical, ideological and emotional ties which are not evenly distributed throughout the structure of American society. It is possible that a substantial portion of the American public which would endorse and support an LSO in defense of Western Europe would not be prepared to do so in defense of Israel, particularly while Israeli forces were west of Suez. The possible impact of public opinion on U.S. policymakers in times of great crisis has not been effectively evaluated; however, the precedent of the Cuban missile crisis indicates that a president might be greatly concerned with the opinion of the American public in such periods of crisis.

In this Middle East scenario, the War Powers Act becomes an important consideration. In the European scenario the attack by the Soviets in the Central Region leaves little choice or room for debate, since the USSR has initiated war against the United States and its allies. Not so in the Middle East scenario, notwithstanding the damaging of a U.S. aircraft carrier. The intent of the War Powers Act clearly is to involve the Congress in the decision to commit U.S. armed forces to combat. The actual wording gives the President authority to commit
such forces to combat in "emergency" situations. Assume in the Middle East scenario that the President, citing the crisis as being an "emergency" situation, communicates the LSO threat to the Soviet Union without the explicit consent of Congress. Assume further that the Congress, citing Section 5(c) of the War Powers Act, by concurrent resolution, directs the President to withhold the delivery of any nuclear weapons as originally threatened.\(^1\) The strategy would thereupon become bankrupt.

The War Powers Act poses many legal, domestic political and national security problems where LSOs are concerned. The problems are particularly apparent in circumstances similar to this second scenario where U.S. forces are not engaged in ongoing hostilities, where there must be sufficient time allotted between communication of the threat and its delivery to permit a reaction by the adversary (but which also provides time to permit Congress to respond), and where American public opinion may be divided. The potential exists that the President may decide that he does not have the authority to deliver an LSO threat without creating a constitutional crisis of major magnitude. It would seem, therefore, that a prudent course for the President in this scenario would be to enlist the support of Congress prior to communicating an LSO threat. Whether or not the President could secure a Congressional guarantee of support for an LSO formally or informally could be a major factor inhibiting an LSO strategy.

4. Observations

Hypothesizing the U.S. use of an LSO in these two scenarios provides useful insights into the ramifications and complexities of the LSO

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\(^1\) Section 5(c) reads: "(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possession and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."
strategy when employed for the purpose of terminating hostilities. The scenarios highlight the restricted perspective of this study. The purpose of the LSO as discussed here is war termination—not deterrence, not war fighting, and not a response to the Soviet use of an LSO (all of which may be legitimate uses). The U.S. LSOs hypothesized here are classic examples of coercive nuclear diplomacy. The goal is to raise the stakes of conflict so high with the LSO threat, and yet not so high as to cause its credibility to be threatened, that it will compel the Soviets to reassess the value of achieving their objectives and then to terminate their aggression. Even with this limited goal in mind, it seems obvious that the advantages and disadvantages to be garnered from an LSO strategy are still highly dependent upon the scenario which is postulated. Soviet objectives, the role of third parties, the level of ongoing hostilities, the immediate purpose of the LSO and the psychological attributes of U.S. and Soviet leaders at the time are all important variables which could significantly affect the value of the strategy.

In both of these scenarios, third parties could exert substantial influence upon the U.S. choice of an LSO, but the nature of the influence suggested in each case is quite distinct. In the European scenario it was postulated that the third country influence resulted from the reluctance or inability of U.S. allies to employ theater nuclear weapons in Western Europe, thus prompting the U.S. decision to opt for an LSO. In the Middle East scenario, however, it was postulated that it was the possible Israeli willingness to employ nuclear weapons which helped prompt the U.S. decision. Both circumstances are contrived, but each is plausible, and demonstrates how differently one may view the LSO under differing circumstances.

Congressional attitudes and involvement as well as public opinion are likewise quite variable given the differing situations described here. In the European scenario, U.S. forces are in combat
under circumstances which probably include a declaration of war. In
the Middle East scenario, they are not. Public and Congressional support
for an LSO in circumstances described in the European scenario would
possibly be much more easily secured than for the circumstances described
in the scenario for the Middle East.

In the second scenario the question was raised as to the
authority of Congress to restrain the President from making good on the
threat should the threat not achieve desired results. The implications
of the War Powers Act for an LSO strategy in periods short of a formal
declaration of war cannot be ignored, although they are sufficiently
complex to preclude detailed examination here. It is less difficult
to make judgments about the effect upon the Soviet Union, U.S. allies
and the remainder of the world of a President conveying to Moscow so serious
a threat and then being unable to execute it. It would undermine the
whole fabric of the U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence, demonstrating
a lack of will to carry through on a limited scale what has been espoused
as a solemn national commitment on the largest scale.

The confidence and political security of the national leadership
of the United States and the Soviet Union would be an important consideration.
A President operating without a sound political base may not have the
requisite confidence to communicate an explicit LSO threat. An insecure
Soviet leadership might react in a completely unpredictable manner. These
are important elements involved in the issue of the degree of national
will which must be present before a nation can effectively employ or
respond to an LSO strategy.

In summary, even a cursory examination suggests that a great
deal of research and analysis is required before the requisite
for an LSO strategy for war termination may be adopted with any confidence
that this represents a correct course of action.
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