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MID-RANGE PLANNING AND PROGRAMING AT THE
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1978

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) MID-RANGE PLANNING AND PROGRAMING AT THE U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVER Final Report 9 June 78
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBE
7. AUTHOR(s) Robert D. Shadley, MAJ, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TA AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE 9 June 78
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 80
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRA SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC in part fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and Ger Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Planning; programing

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

See reverse.

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 **1473** EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

It is essential for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center to plan 2-5 years in the future in order to ensure fully integrated and funded programs are a reality in the future.

The author identifies 45 circumstances which, if they exist within an organization, may preclude effective planning. By surveying the principal mid-range planners at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), reviewing organization goal/objective statements, and reviewing formal documented plans, it was determined which of these 45 circumstances exist.

The principal conclusions reached with regard to goals/objectives are: (1) All organizations within CAC have goals/objectives; however, (2) these goals/objectives are not placed in hierarchy by priority, and (2) mission activities require more guidance from higher management in order to develop goals/objectives.

The main conclusions reached vis-a-vis actual planning are: (1) There is very little mid-range planning being done; (2) The planning which is being done is primarily mechanical, and too short-ranged; and, (3) Better coordination of plans is needed.

It is also found that: (1) Planning is not inhibited by the CAC organization structure, and (2) turnover of personnel is a problem if action is not taken to "phase" the replacement cycle.

The author identifies the reasons for these problems and makes several recommendations which, if implemented, will alleviate the problems identified.

6 MID-RANGE PLANNING AND PROGRAMING AT THE U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER

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Final report 9 June 1978   9 Final rept.

12 89 p.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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78 08 11 028

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate_____Robert D. Shadley, MAJ, USA_____

Title of thesis_____Mid-Range Planning and Programing at the

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Director, Master of Military Art and Science.

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General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
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ABSTRACT

It is essential for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center to plan 2-5 years in the future in order to ensure that fully integrated and funded programs are a reality in the future.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purposes of this thesis and associated research are to:
(NOTE: This thesis is not an evaluation of the Department of
Defense's Planning, Programing and Budgeting System)

● Develop the general circumstances which preclude effective
planning and programing.

● Relate these general circumstances to the U.S. Army
Combined Arms Center (CAC) and identify specific problems associated
with mid-range planning and programing at CAC.

● Develop conclusions and make recommendations for alleviating
problems.

Chapter 1 Outline

This chapter contains: an introduction to planning and
programing; a review of basic definitions; a brief discussion of
the missions, functions and organization of CAC; a review of CAC's
position in the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programing
and Budgeting System (PPBS); and, the problem statement, method-
ology, restrictions/limitations, and format associated with this
thesis research.

1

<u>Planning and Programing (An Overview</u>)

What is Planning? The answer to this question is found in numerous publications on the subject of management and organization theory.

> . . . . planning is the managerial function of determining in advance what a group should accomplish and how the goals are to be attained. . . . planning contributes to effectiveness because all details of work and their relationships are worked out in advance. . . .Planning enhances ultimate cooperation.[1]

> From an organizational viewpoint, planning is concerned with (1) setting organizational goals or objectives, (2) forecasting the environment in which objectives must be accomplished, (3) determining the approach by which the goals and objectives are to be accomplished.[2]

> Planning coordinates the activities of the organization toward defined and agreed upon objectives.[3]

> It is fair to generalize, however, that most leaders of private and public organizations consider planning a dynamic tool--a tool for producing desired changes in an organization's structure or manner of operations.[4]

With regard to planning within the Department of the Army (DA),

planning

> addresses the development of the defense policies and military strategy for the attainment of national security objectives and determines the force objectives, force capabilities and resources required for the execution of Army roles and missions in support of the objectives and strategy. Estimates of threats to the national security objectives are prerequisite to the development of the strategy and force objectives. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. Planning also includes the assessment of risks associated with programs which do not achieve force objectives and the development of guidance for the accomplishment of military tasks with the military capabilities attained. The Army planning system also addresses current force capabilities and thereby provides a basis for contingency planning by appropriate major commands.[5]

Therefore, it can be seen that planning is:

- A primary function of management;

- Directed toward accomplishment of goals/objectives;

- Dynamic;

- A management tool;

- Forward looking; and,

- A basic ingredient in organizational effectiveness and

efficiency.

What is programing? The term, programing, as used within the

DA, is used to define the

> . . . . translation of Office of the Secretary of Defense
> (OSD) planning and programing guidance into a comprehensive
> and detailed allocation of forces, manpower and funds for a
> five-year period.[6]

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) defines

programing as:

> . . . . that activity which is devoted to the development
> and maintenance of a TRADOC three-year resource and workload
> program. It includes the systematic decision process for:
> establishing objectives; defining and selecting alternatives;
> developing workload programs; developing resource require-
> ments to support approved workload programs; distributing and
> controlling resources; and effecting changes to the approved
> three-year program.[7]

Mr. Raymond E. Kitchell, formerly with the Bureau of the

Budget, states:

> . . . programing is the crucial link which provides the
> transition from the basic purpose and long-range goals of an
> organization into detailed courses of action and makes
> available the necessary resources at the appropriate time
> to achieve desired end results.[8]

Therefore, programing is the process by which resources

(people, time, money and facilities) are determined and time-phased

to accomplish plans.

Definitions

Planning and programing, in the general sense, are defined as above; however, there are other definitions relevant to any discussion involving these two terms.

- **Organization**: "A structured process in which persons interact for objectives."[9]

- **Policies**: "General statements that guide decision making."[10]

- **Procedures**: "The need for procedures arises when the organization wishes to achieve a high degree of regularity in a frequently recurring event. A procedure provides a narrower, more specific guide to action than a policy."[11]

- **Rules**: "Specific statements of what may or may not be done."[12]

- **Objective** (managerial): "The intended goal which prescribes definite scope and suggests direction to efforts of a manager."[13]

- **Goal**: For the purposes of this thesis the terms goals and objectives are used interchangeably.

- **Mid-range planning**: The definition of the time frame referred to as mid-range varies according to source document from 2-5 years to 2-10 years. For the purpose of this thesis, mid-range is considered as the 2-5 time frame.

CAC Organization, Mission and Functions

The organizational structure of CAC and Ft Leavenworth is as shown in Figure 1-1. As can be seen from this chart, there are five major components of the organization which are involved in mid-range planning: (1) the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA); (2) the Combined Arms Training Developments Activity (CATRADA);

(3) the Command and General Staff College (CGSC); (4) the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB); and, (5) the garrison.

The Combined Arms Center and Ft Leavenworth has the following mission:

a. Integrate, and coordinate with associated schools, other functional centers and other services as necessary, the development and dissemination of combined arms concepts, doctrine, and training management practices as they apply to functional areas of combat, combat support, command, control, and communications for organizational echelons of brigades, divisions, and corps in the conduct of the air/land battle.

b. Provide the specialized correctional treatment, care, training and custodial supervision necessary to prepare military prisoners for return to military duty with improved attitudes or return to civilian life as better citizens.

c. Perform those installation missions assigned by HQ TRADOC (Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command).[14]

The Combined Arms Center and Ft Leavenworth has the following functions relative to the above stated mission:

a. Provide instruction for officers of the Active Army and Reserve Components, worldwide, so as to prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at brigade and higher echelons.

b. Determine system requirements for managing effectiveness of the Army through development of concepts, doctrine, organizational material requirements within the combined arms functional areas, primarily by means of integrating the product from associated schools and other TRADOC centers.

c. Determine combined arms training requirements associated with systems acquisition cycle and coordinate/ integrate the development and dissemination of improved doctrine, techniques, devices, and management practices for training of combined arms units, commanders, and staff.

d. Execute those responsibilities necessary to insure that the correctional treatment, care, and training is performed in accordance with the governing regulations.

e. Provide administrative and logistical support to active army units and activities, USAR and ROTC/NDCC, tenant and satellite activities and other military department or government activities as prescribed in regulations, directives and agreements.

f. Execute assigned missions as directed by HQ, TRADOC, to include current operations and emergency plays.[15]

The principal resource managers within CAC are the program directors which are comprised of:

- Executive Officer, CACDA

- Secretary, CGSC

- Commandant, USDB

- Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA)

- Director of Industrial Operations (DIO)

- Director of Plans, Training and Security (DPT/SEC)

- Director of Facilities Engineering (DFAE)

- Commander, Data Processing Field Office (DPFO)

- Chief, Program Management Office (PMO), CATRADA

- Chief, Housing Management (HSG MGT)

- CAC Management Information Systems Officer (MISO)

- Comptroller

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation (AC/S, PPE) is the principal advisor and assistant to the Commander, CAC on all matters relating to management of resources. This includes overall staff supervision of planning and programing for CAC.

Planning, Programing and Budgeting System

In the United States, the Department of Defense has become famous for its advancement of the art of planning; former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's much-discussed planning - programing - budgeting cycle, introduced early in

the 1960's was one of the departments many achievements in this respect.[16]

The preceding statement reflects the opinion of most writers in the field of management. The Department of Defense (DOD) has indeed made significant advancements in the areas of planning and programing. The following statement summarizes the evolution of a planning, programing, and budgeting system within the United States government:

Planning-Programing-Budgeting Systems (PPBS) have been widely used in government since 1965, when President Johnson stipulated the PPBS format for all federal agency budgets. He presented details of the plan in a news conference, as follows:

Under this new system each cabinet and agency head . . . will define the goals of their department for the coming year, and once these goals are established this system will permit us to find the most effective and least costly alternative to achieve American goals.

This program is designed to achieve three major objectives: it will help us find new ways to do jobs faster, to do jobs better, and do jobs less expensively. It will ensure a much sounder judgment through more accurate information pinpointing those things we ought to do more of, spotlighting those things we ought to do less.

The use of PPBS in government has its roots in the wartime control system of the War Production Board of 1942. The Bureau of Reclamation, the Court Award, and various studies by the Rand Corporation extended the early use of PPBS in the federal government. As early as 1924, the basic features of PPBS--(1) define objectives, (2) define programs essential to achieving objectives, (3) identify resource needs by specific types of objectives, and (4) analyze available alternatives-- were used by General Motors.[17]

The U.S. Army's Planning, Programing and Budgeting System

objectives are:

to articulate the strategy; size, structure and equip the force; set programing priorities; allocate resources; and ensure readiness of the total force. The Army PPBS meets the objectives by providing for an orderly progression for national security objectives through strategy, the development of force requirements, the derivation of force structure and

programs under specified fiscal and manpower constraints to budget preparation, execution and review.[18]

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Resource Management System inputs to and is impacted upon by the Army's PPBS, and CAC, as a subordinate command of TRADOC, inputs to and is impacted upon by the TRADOC Resource Management System which

> provides a systematic management process for the planning, development, presentation and justification of resource requirements to support accomplishment of an approved workload program. The system provides the means for developing alternative ways of accomplishing TRADOC missions. It is also the means for managing the implementation and execution of the approved resource and workload program and includes the distribution, control, accounting for and reporting and analyzing the utilization of command resources.[19]

The TRADOC Resource Management System encompasses three years:

(1) The program year.

(2) The formulation year.

(3) The execution year.

The primary vehicle by which TRADOC provides initial resource requirements to Department of the Army (DA) is the TRADOC Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) which

> provides DA with TRADOC resource requirements for input to the annual POM submission to DA. In addition to providing resource requirements, the PARR portrays the way TRADOC plans to allocate resources based on DA projected workload, course of action necessary to operate within the DA guidance level and associated impacts.[20]

Planning and Programing Challenge at CAC

At the installation level, in general, most of the resource management activities are associated with the budget execution and formulation years of the three-year program. The installation, by not planning at least one year in advance of the three-year program, is:

● often reacting instead of taking positive action to integrate requirements for resources.

● having little influence on the PARR; therefore, fully integrated and funded installation programs may not be a reality. This challenge is summarized in the following statement.

> Planning brings a higher degree of rationality and order into the organization than would be present without planning. Without planning a manager is forced to _react_ to situations or problems. Planning permits a manager to _act_ with initiative and to create situations to the organizations advantage.[21]

In 1977, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center took one of the first steps within TRADOC to establish a system which is forward looking in order to ensure the effective and efficient planning and programing of resources and requirements by developing and publishing the Combined Arms Center Planning and Programing Guidance Memorandum (CACPPGM). The CACPPGM contains TRADOC and overall CAC goals, goals of subordinate organizations, and guidance for planning and programing; it also provides for the consolidation of formal plans as annexes to the basic document.

The Problem

The problem which this thesis addresses is: The CAC is not effectively performing mid-range planning and programing.

The basic hypothesis of this research is: It is possible to evaluate the circumstances which preclude effective planning and programing and to identify problems associated with mid-range planning and programing at CAC.

Methodology

The research for this thesis is conducted in phases:

● Phase I. A review of the literature on management and organization to develop the general circumstances which preclude effective planning and programing.

● Phase II. A survey of CAC planners and review of planning actions to identify mid-range planning problems at CAC.

● Phase III. Draw conclusions from survey and make recommendations for alleviating problems identified.

Restrictions and Limitations

This thesis does _not_ attempt to evaluate the PPBS. The functions of planning and programing are essential to any organization; however, they are made highly visible within DOD by the very existence of a formalized PPBS.

This thesis does _not_ address planning and programing in "troop units".

This thesis does _not_ investigate the detailed planning process used within each individual CAC activity.

Thesis Format

This thesis contains four chapters:

● Chapter 1. Introduction.

● Chapter 2. Circumstances which Preclude Effective Planning and Programing.

● Chapter 3. Results and Discussion of Survey of CAC Planners.

● Chapter 4. Conclusions, Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Study.

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                      │   Deputy Commanders     │
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                      │     Chief of Staff      │
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| 205th MP DET | 245th EngrDET |

TENANT UNITS:

    Data Processing Field Office (DPFO)
    Medical Department Activities (MEDDAC) (Health Svc Cmd)
    USA Communications Command (USACC) Ft Lvn Det
    USA CIDC 6th Region (USACIDC)   Property Disposal Office (PDO)
    USA SP Security Det (ACSI-DA)   Satellite Units (USA-USAR-USANG)
    92ND MI BN (PROV)   Interservice Supported Units
                             (USAF, USN, USMC)

FIGURE 1-1. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth
              Organization Structure

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END NOTES - CHAPTER 1

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21. _Op. Cit._; Hicks; p 268.

CHAPTER 2

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRECLUDE EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND PROGRAMING

Introduction

In order to determine the circumstances which preclude effective planning and programing, it is important to review the "classical" approaches to planning; that is, the "textbook how". An understanding of what "should be done" provides the basis for determining the condition, factors, etc.—circumstances—which make it difficult to develop effective plans and to program resource requirements to accomplish the plans.

Chapter 2 Outline

This chapter contains a discussion of: (1) planning as a function of management; (2) the relationship of programing to planning; (3) circumstances involving goals/objectives; (4) circumstances in the area of planning/programing; (5) circumstances which involve the functions of management that are related to planning; and, (6) circumstances which are relatively unique to a military organization.

Planning as a Function of Management

Planning was briefly discussed in chapter 1; however, in order to establish a framework within which circumstances can be developed, an understanding of planning as a function of management is essential. The literature is replete with discussions of planning. The following

1

comments are characteristic of these discussions and are presented to
emphasize the importance of planning in the management process.

Herbert G. Hicks and C. Ray Gullett, writing in The Management
of Organizations, specify six functions of management:

- Creating,

- Planning,

- Organizing,

- Motivating,

- Communicating, and

- Controlling.

With regard to the relationship among these functions, Hicks and
Gullett state:

> The sequence of a manager's function begins with creating.
> However, because he or she is involved with projects in
> various stages of completion, all six functions are performed
> simultaneously in a typical day.[1]

However, the importance of planning vis-a-vis the other functions is
emphasized by Hicks and Gullett in their principle of management
entitled "Primacy of Objectives and Planning":

> Formulation of objectives is a prerequisite if the organi-
> zation is to accomplish its goals in an orderly, rational
> manner. Planning is the process by which objectives are
> formulated and approaches are selected for accomplishing
> objectives. First, ideas, concepts, products, or services
> are conceived or created. Planning must precede organizing,
> motivating, communicating, and controlling in the sequence of
> managerial functions. Therefore, objectives and planning are
> primary concepts for rational management.[2]

The preceding quote summarizes creating, the step preceding
planning, as "ideas, concepts, products, or services are created".[3]
The function which follows planning, organizing, is defined as:

. . . usually the next function performed after planning. Organizing is concerned with (1) determining the specific activities that are necessary to accomplish the planned goals; (2) grouping the activities into a logical pattern, framework, or structure; and (3) assigning the activities to specific positions and people.[4]

Another author, Henry H. Albers, in his book Management: The Basic Concepts, lists four functions of management:[5]

- Planning,

- Organizing,

- Directing, and

- Controlling.

Albers defines each of these functions as follows:

  • Planning is concerned with the determination of organizational objectives and the procedures and methods that will be necessary to achieve them. The result is policies designed to channel the behavior of managerial and other personnel in particular directions.[6]

  • Organizing involves the development of a structure of interrelated managerial positions in accord with the requirements of planning. Planned responsibilities are allocated to the persons who occupy these positions. . . .[7]

  Directing is concerned with carrying out the policies that result from planning. . . .[8]

  Controlling determines whether everything is going in accordance with the policies developed through the planning process. . . .[9]

Albers goes on to state, with regard to the relationship among the above functions, that:

  The logic of the management process is that particular management functions are performed in a sequence through time. Planning comes first, then organizing, which are followed by directing and controlling. . . . There may be significant departure from this sequence idea in actual practice. . . . Changes in the organizational structure are often made without regard to particular plans.[10]

George R. Terry, writing in <u>Principles of Management</u>, also cites four functions of management:

> • <u>Planning</u> to determine the objectives and courses of action to be followed.[11]

> • <u>Organizing</u> to distribute the work among the group and to establish and recognize needed relationships and authority.[12]

> • <u>Actuating</u> the members of the group to carry out their prescribed tasks enthusiastically.[13]

> • <u>Controlling</u> the activities to conform with plans.[14]

Terry goes on to state, with regard to the sequence of functions, that:

> In actual practice, these four fundamental functions of management are inextricably interwoven and interrelated; the performance of one function does not cease entirely before the next is started.[15]

William A. Shrode and Dan Voich, Jr. present three general functions of management in their book entitled <u>Organization and Management: Basic Systems Concepts</u>:

> • <u>Planning</u> is future oriented and involves prediction of events and levels of uncertainty, the design of work and organizational configurations, and commitment of resources to be used in future operating periods.[16]

> • <u>Implementation</u> deals with current operating problems and activities involved in carrying out plans through the direction and motivation of peoples.[17]

> • <u>Control</u> involves expost evaluation of activities and includes adjustment to plans, objectives, decisions, and organizational and work system designs.[18]

From the above discussion, it can be seen that planning is:

• a widely recognized "basic" function of management.

• one of the first things which is done in the management process.

• interrelated with other functions of management.

● involved with the establishment of goals and objectives.

Programing as Related to Planning

The way the term "programing" is used within the DOD. is

somewhat unique to the government vis-a-vis the "classical" or "text

book" definition. Kitchell provides an excellent description of

programing:

> The second of the purpose-directed types of planning goes
> under many names and descriptions, but may be simply defined
> as those processes which concern the translation of strategy
> and broad goals into definitive objectives, policies,
> directives, and work programs to be accomplished within a
> specific time schedule. As such, programing is the crucial
> link which provides the transition from the basic purpose
> and long-range goals of an organization into detailed courses
> of action and makes available the necessary resources at the
> appropriate time to achieve desired end results.
>
> Even though often synonymous with intermediate-range
> planning, more likely than not in practice program development
> will be concerned with the maximum time span under consideration
> and, consciously or otherwise, will also attempt to deal with
> strategic questions. Common practice appears to have the
> programing process include not only short-range planning but
> also a time horizon usually four or five years into the
> future with somewhat less detail. When there is no strategic
> input, the current projects or programs are usually projected
> outward with their phase-out and new starts also being
> considered. This approach, although useful as a starting point
> and as a means for projecting the consequences of current
> decisions, assumes that the overall present direction of an
> organization is adequate to deal with the future—often a
> dangerous pitfall.
>
> The function of program development, different from that
> of either strategic or operational planning, is to provide a
> basis for management control, i.e., assuring that resources
> are obtained and used both effectively and efficiently in the
> accomplishment of an organization's objectives. It is
> carried out within the framework and premises established
> by strategic planning. Among the principal tasks of programing
> are:

(a) Formulation of the objective. This is the translation
of broad goals into definitive and integrated objectives which
provide the direction and criteria for planning, measurement,
control, and evaluation.

(b) Monitoring changing conditions. Programs are developed
with certain implicit and explicit assumptions, technical and
otherwise, about the environment in which the programs will
operate and the needs that are to be met. The assumptions
about the environment critical to a plan's effectiveness must
be monitored to determine what effect any variances noted may
have on objectives, plans, requirements, and so forth.

(c) Evaluation of alternatives. Systems analysis (including
cost-benefit, cost-utility, or cost-effectiveness analyses) is
an important part of the programing process. It provides data
on the possible courses of action to select, the probable
consequences, and the trade-off values. Quantitative and
qualitative criteria are developed both for choice and
evaluation purposes.

(d) Translation into action programs. At this stage decisions
on objectives and courses of action are translated into directives
and work programs within both a specified time and a given
allocation of resources.

Whereas strategic planning is apt to involve mainly staff
with top management, program development is most likely to
involve the line with top management. In Government, middle
management usually plays the crucial role, e.g., bureau chiefs
provide the nexus between political and operating management.[19]

Therefore, it can be seen that programing is in essence a part

of what writers in the field classify as planning.

Circumstances- Category I: Goals/Objectives

In 1912, Harrington Emerson published The Twelve Principles of

Efficiency. His first principle was "a clearly defined ideal".

Emerson's "ideal" is synonymous with "goal" or "objective". Emerson

stated the benefits of first establishing goals or objectives as:

If all the ideals animating all the organization from top
to bottom could be lined up so as to pull in the same
straight line, the resultant would be a very powerful effort;
but when these ideals pull in diverse directions, the
resultant force may be insignificantly positive--may, in fact,
be negative.[20]

26

If every manager would formulate his own ideals, promulgate them throughout the plant, post them everywhere, inoculate every official and every employee with them, industrial organizations could attain the same high degree of individual and aggregate excellence as a base-ball league.[21]

The writings of Emerson are typical of most writings in the fields of organization theory and management---the focus is on industrial and educational organizations. However, the parallel between industry and the military with regard to the functions of management is recognized by most writers in the field in discussions of the universality of the function of management. The first step in military planning is mission analysis. What is the objective or goal? What are the specified and implied tasks?

Therefore, the first circumstance may be expressed as:

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-A

Lack of goals/objectives.

The literature is filled with page upon page of principles of goal setting, management by objectives, and do's and don't's for the establishment of goals and objectives.

Before proceeding with a discussion of goals and objectives, it is necessary to understand management by objectives (MBO).

George S. Odiorne states in his book Management by Objectives that:

> . . . the system of management by objectives can be described as a process whereby the superior and subordinate managers of an organization jointly identify its common goals, define each individual's major areas of responsibility in terms of results expected of him, and uses these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contributions of each of the members.[22]

The DA in general and CAC in particular do not manage by objectives in the purest sense of MBO; however, the army does establish goals. The six major goals established by the army in September 1977 are:

● Prepare the Total Army for rapid transition to combat, fully capable of performing its wartime mission.[23]

● Provide the Total Army with highly effective and morally responsible military and civilian personnel capable of performing reliably in war; provide quality of life support for our soldiers and their families and require from them reciprocal dedication to service.[24]

● Develop, field, and maintain a balanced war-fighting and sustaining capability.[25]

● Improve army deployment capability to move forces as scheduled in order to increase early availability of combat power.[26]

● Improve army equipment and concepts to exploit new technology.[27]

● Manage and utilize existing and programed resources more effectively. Strengthen the army's resource justification process.[28]

The TRADOC and CAC goals and objectives are derived from these goals. The Fiscal Year 1979-1981 (FY 79-81) CAC goals are:

● Manage and utilize existing and programed resources more effectively and efficiently. Strengthen the CAC's resources justification process.

● Establish a procedure and organization to develop combined arms force structures that help optimize combat potential.

● Insure integration of combat material development actions so as to maximize total force effectiveness.

● Formulate and integrate combined arms, joint and combined operational concepts and doctrine.

● Promote and improve combined arms development, training, and training techniques by sponsoring, monitoring

or participating in appropriate exercises, experiments and studies. Insure activities adequately interface to support this team effort.

● Improve the quality of combined arms training in TRADOC schools and in units.

● Establish the Combined Arms Research Library as the primary information exchange facility for combined arms.

● Improve the CGSC student learning environment and quality of instruction.

● Implement the approved recommendations of the Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study.

● Provide up-to-date ADP technological support to CAC/Fort Leavenworth activities. Increase the use of automated systems in support of educational and administrative requirements.

● Improve and increase the quality of life programs offered to the CAC/Fort Leavenworth population.

● Improve formal and on-the-job training for all military and civilian employees to increase efficiency.

● Improve accountability, care, maintenance, and public and personal use of all real, historic, TO&E, and TDA property.

● Improve the physical environment of our work centers.

● Upgrade security programs, inspections, procedures, and supportive actions.

● Continue to monitor and improve upon safety awareness programs and correct safety-related deficiencies with all available resources.

● Monitor and improve upon energy conservation programs at all levels, and continue to seek alternate fuel sources consistent with current technology and availability.

● Provide a safe secure environment for inmates which promotes the work ethic through self-supporting programs.[29]

The question is: Do the goals and objectives established foster effective planning and programing? To answer this it is necessary to review the "characteristics of good goals and objectives".

Terry states his "Principle of Objectives" as:

Objectives are basic in management and a prerequisite to
the determining of any course of action; they should be (1)
clearly defined, preferably quantified, and measurable,
(2) realistic in that they are attainable with some reach or
difficulty, and (3) understood in that they are specific and
known by all members of an enterprise affected by them.[30]

This principle leads to the development of five more circum-

stances:

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-B

Goals/objectives are not
clearly defined.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-C

Goals/objectives are not
quantifiable and measurable.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-D

Goals/objectives are not
realistic.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-E

Goals/objectives are not
specific.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-F

Goals/objectives are not
understood and known to
members of organization.

Terry goes on to relate the following about setting objectives:

They (objectives) serve best and stand a better chance of
being fulfilled when the following considerations are taken
into account:

1. Objectives should be the result of participation by those
responsible for carrying them out.

2. All objectives within an enterprise should support the
overall enterprise goal.

3. Objectives should have some reach.

4. Objectives should be clearly stated and realistic.

5. Objectives should be contemporary as well as innovative.

6. Objectives established for each management member should
be limited in number.

7. Objectives should be ranked according to their relative
importance.

8. Objectives should be in balance within a given enterprise.[31]

Therefore, the following additional circumstances may be

deduced:

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-G

Lack of participation in estab-
lishing goals/objectives by those
responsible for carrying them out.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-H

Subordinate goals/objectives do
not support overall organizational
goals.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-I

Goals/objectives are too innovative.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-J          │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      There are too many goals/     │  │
│  │      objectives.                   │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-K          │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      Goals/objectives are not placed │
│  │      in a hierarchy by priority.   │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-L          │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      Subordinate goals/objectives are │
│  │      not balanced and mutually      │  │
│  │      supportive.                   │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Hicks and Gullett discuss "characteristics of organizational objectives":

1. Organizational objectives are structured in a hierarchy.

2. They reinforce individual objectives, and vice versa.

3. They are--or should be--compatible with individual objectives.

4. Higher level, superordinate objectives contain subordinate objectives and can be accomplished effectively only through cooperation.[32]

This leads to another circumstance, not previously stated:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ┌───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-M          │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  │      Organizational goals are neither │
│  │      reinforcing of nor compatible with │
│  │      individual goals/objectives.  │  │
│  │                                   │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The above two examples from the literature on what goals and objectives should be or do are typical of the "do's" of goals/objectives setting. What are the "don't's"? Odiorne cites "some common errors in goal setting" made by managers:

- "Failing to allow for their own biases". This leads managers to set goals based on perception rather fact.

- "Confusing cause and effect."

- "Omitting key facts."

- "Generalizing from bad samples."

- "Failing to allow for normal fluctuations."[33]

Odiorne also lists twenty of the most common errors found in a study of the goals of 1,100 managers:

1. The manager doesn't clarify common objectives for the whole unit.

2. He sets goals too low to challenge the individual subordinate.

3. He doesn't use prior results as a basis for using intrinsic creativity to find new and unusual combinations.

4. He doesn't clearly shape his unit's common objectives to fit those of the larger unit of which he is a part.

5. He overloads individuals with patently inappropriate or impossible goals.

6. He fails to cluster responsibilities in the most appropriate positions.

7. He allows two or more individuals to believe themselves responsible for doing exactly the same things when he knows that having one responsible party is better.

8. He stresses methods of working rather than clarifying individual areas of responsibility.

9. He emphasizes tacitly that it is pleasing him rather than achieving the job objective which counts.

10. He makes no policies as guides to action, but waits for results, then issues ad hoc judgments in correction.

33

11. He doesn't probe to discover what program his subordinate proposes to follow to achieve his goals. He accepts every goal uncritically without a plan for its successful achievement.

12. He is too reluctant to add his own (or higher management's) known needs to the program of his subordinates.

13. He ignores the very real obstacles that are likely to hinder the subordinate in achieving his goals, including the numerous emergency or routine duties which consume time.

14. He ignores the new goals or ideas proposed by his subordinates, and imposes only those which he deems suitable.

15. He doesn't think through and act upon what he must do to help his subordinates succeed.

16. He fails to set intermediate target dates (milestones) by which to measure his subordinates' progress.

17. He doesn't introduce new ideas from outside the organization, or permit or encourage subordinates to do so, thereby freezing the status quo.

18. He fails to permit his subordinates to seize targets of opportunity in lieu of stated objectives that are less important.

19. He is rigid about not scrapping previously agreed-upon goals that have subsequently proved unfeasible, irrelevant, or impossible.

20. He doesn't reinforce successful behavior when goals are achieved, or correct unsuccessful behavior when they are missed.[34]

Shrode and Voich summarize these twenty errors into two categories:

1. Nature of objectives—lack of clarity, nonchallenging, nonsupportive of larger goals, and inflexibility in response to changing conditions.

2. Manner of development of objectives—inadequate participation by subordinates, nonintroduction of higher management ideas, and unclear specification of responsibilities and definition of tasks.[35]

Finally, additional circumstances may be developed:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                     │
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-N        │
│                                     │
│      Goals/objectives are not flexible │
│      in response to changing conditions. │
│                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                     │
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-O        │
│                                     │
│      Higher management does not provide │
│      sufficient guidance to subordinates. │
│                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                     │
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. I-P        │
│                                     │
│      Responsibilities and tasks are not │
│      defined.                       │
│                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Circumstances--Category II: Planning/Programing

As stated in the preceding paragraphs, planning involves more than merely establishing goals/objectives. Terry states:

Planning is the selecting and relating of facts and the making and using assumptions regarding the future in the visualization and formulation of proposed activities necessary to achieve desired results.[36]

Therefore, circumstances can be developed which relate to the process of planning which follows the initial establishment of goals and objectives.

According to Terry:

Determining the scope and content of the planning and organizing for the work are probably of greatest concern. In this connection, it should be recognized that the first several attempts to formulate a plan may require what appears to be an excessive amount of time and extra work. But a definite start must be made. Even though imperfect, there must be a beginning if the planning is to be done. And one should not expect perfect results from the first one or two sets of plans.[37]

35

Thus, it may be seen that taking the first step is often the most difficult part of establishing an effective planning function within an organization.

> CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-A
>
> Persons charged with planning do not feel that the time and effort required to plan and the resultant product are worth it.

Terry goes on to list five characteristics of planning:

1. Planning includes personal or organizational identification (how the plan is to be implemented, and by whom).

2. Planning relates to conditions of relative certainty and uncertainty. (with regard to conditions of relative uncertainty) . . . much planning today is made for actions which take place in an environment conditioned by an increasing complexity and interdependency of difficult variables.

3. Planning is intellectual in nature (basically mental work).

4. Planning involves the future (try to look ahead).

5. Planning is pervasive and continuous (all levels plan and it's never-ending).[38]

And, he states several principles relating to planning:

1. Principle of planning: To accomplish a goal most effectively, adequate planning, or mental effort, should take place before the doing, physical effort.[39]

2. Principle of facts and planning: To design an effective plan, it is necessary to obtain all the available pertinent facts, face the facts, and in the plan include the action that the facts dictate.[40]

3. Principle of ethics: Proper ethics in management requires a manager to be honest with himself and with society, and to deal with others just as he would like to be dealt with.[41]

4. Principle of commitment: The time period covered by planning should preferably include sufficient time to fulfill the managerial commitments involved.[42]

From the preceding statements of characteristics and principles, the following circumstances evolve:

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-B

How the plan is to be implemented is
not stated.
```

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-C

Who will implement the plan is not
stated.
```

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-D

Planners do not "plan for unplanable"
(i.e., uncertainty).
```

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-E

Planners are "mechanical" and do not
expend required amount of "mental
effort".
```

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-F

Planning is too short range thereby
precluding covering time required to
fulfill commitments.
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-G         │
│                                      │
│  Planning is not conducted at all    │
│  levels necessary.                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-H         │
│                                      │
│  Planning is not continuous (Once a  │
│  document is written, planners regard│
│  their task completed).              │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-I         │
│                                      │
│      Actions precede planning.       │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-J         │
│                                      │
│  Sufficient information is not       │
│  collected to develop facts and      │
│  assumptions.                        │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│        CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-K         │
│                                      │
│  Planners do not consider ethical    │
│  aspects of planning.                │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

This last circumstance leads, logically, to a discussion of the human side of planning. David W. Ewing writing on the "obstacles to the human side of planning" groups the "obsessions and preoccupations that have led planners to neglect the 'people' aspects of planning" into five categories:[43]

1. "Bloodless criteria." Planners devote most of their time and effort to the physical side of planning (facilities, budgets, etc.) and neglect such aspects as employee training and superior-subordinate relations.[44]

2. "Other-directedness." Planners become obsessed with the external environment and tend to treat external factors as "givens". Little or no effort is made to change the external environment.[45]

3. "Human Engineering approach." Ewing feels that:

Sometimes planning has gone wrong, not because it was oblivious to the human side, but because it approached the human aspects in the wrong way. The most common error of this sort is that people can be 'engineered' or that there is a 'science' of marshaling enthusiasm and cooperation.[46]

4. "The Blueprint Fallacy." This error involves the planner who considers that the "proposed program fixes the future".[47]

5. "Errors of Definition." Planning is often defined in neat terms which often (if not always) neglect to consider the human element.[48]

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-L

Failure to consider the human aspects of planning.

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-M

Failure to reorganize that plans do not "fix the future".

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-N

Failure to adjust to the external environment and/or fail to change the external environment, when possible.

Another human element is the informal organization which exists within the formal structure.

The organization planner is under obligation to learn as much as he can about existing formal and informal channels of communication and working patterns.[49]

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-O

Failure to consider informal channels
of communication.
```

According to Hicks and Gullett:

Once objectives have been set, the environment in which they are to be accomplished should be forecast. Forecasting is important because of the impact environmental forces have on goal accomplishment; the environment must be capable of supporting the objectives the organization has set.[50]

Effective management requires that plans be revised and the efforts of the organization be re-directed whenever a new plan will better serve the interests of the organization and its members.[51]

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-P

Failure to forecast the environment
in which plans cover.
```

```
CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-Q

Flexibility is not provided for in
plans.
```

Plans are often complex and therefore confusing. To overcome this, planners should consider time-phasing of plans.

By using phasing, a complex plan can be reduced to a simple series of actions, each one of which is easily understood and effectively handled.[52]

40

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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-R        │
│                                      │
│   Complex plans are not time-        │
│   phased.                            │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

There is a definite sequence in the development of plans within an organization.

Because lower levels tend to derive their plans from the plans of higher levels, higher-level plans must be set <u>before</u> lower-level plans are established.[53]

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-S        │
│                                      │
│   Higher level management does not   │
│   develop plans in advance of lower  │
│   levels.                            │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

There are several ways plans can be developed:[54]

1. Manager does all his own planning.

2. Manager plans but uses suggestions from subordinates.

3. Manager provides the broad plan, and subordinates fill in the details.

4. Subordinates do planning and submit their plans to the manager.

Each of the above procedures has inherent advantages and disadvantages, and each may work well. The key point is that there must be a procedure for detailing who does the planning.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-T        │
│                                      │
│   Who does the planning is not clear.│
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Peter F. Drucker, writing in <u>Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices,</u> states that:

> What is crucial in strategic planning is, first, that systematic and purposeful <u>work</u> on attaining objectives be done; second, that planning start out with sloughing off yesterday, and that abandonment be planned as part of the systematic attempt to attain tomorrow; third, that we look for new and different ways to attain objectives rather than believe that doing more of the same will suffice; and finally, that we think through the time dimensions and ask 'when do we have to start work to get results when we need them'.[55]

This results in the following circumstance:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                      │
│       CIRCUMSTANCE NO. II-U          │
│                                      │
│  Too much emphasis is placed on how  │
│  things used to be done.             │
│                                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
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<u>Circumstances--Category III: Other Functions of Management</u>

Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell state in <u>Management: a Book of Readings</u> that:

> . . . organization is concerned with activity-authority structure of an enterprise. It is thus the grouping of activities necessary to attain enterprise objectives and the assignment of each grouping to an executive with authority necessary to manage these activities.[56]

In the classical sense, organization follows planning; therefore, if the organization is fixed prior to the establishment of goals/objectives and the preparation of plans, then the planner may be frustrated or confined in goal setting and plan development.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                      │
│       CIRCUMSTANCE NO. III-A         │
│                                      │
│  Organization structure is fixed prior│
│  to setting goals and developing plans.│
│                                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

42

An essential ingredient of effective management is coordination which is a responsibility of managers. Goals/objectives and related plans of subordinate activities must be coordinated "to accomplish synchronized effort of subordinates."[57]

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. III-B

Plans are not coordinated among and with activities of the organization.

And, according to Kitchell:

> The common denominator of all effective planning . . .
> is that planning must be 'actionable', and, as such, must
> be an integral part of an organization's decision-making and
> managerial processes.[58]

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. III-C

Planning is not an integral part of organization decision-making and managerial processes.

Circumstances--Category IV: Military

The following circumstances may exist within CAC because of the considerations inherent to any army organization.

Planners may be reluctant to concern themselves with matters which involve accomplishment of tasks after they depart the organization because of pre-occupation with actions which are of immediate concern to their performance evaluation.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. IV-A            │
│                                          │
│   Too much emphasis on efficiency        │
│   reports.                               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The normal tour of duty at CAC for military personnel is three years. The constant turnover of planners may affect the organization to which they are assigned in particular and to inter-activity coordination in general.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. IV-B            │
│                                          │
│   Constant turnover of military          │
│   planners.                              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The phase of the PPBS of daily concern to program directors is budget execution and development. There may be an inordinate amount of time spent by planners on "bean counting".

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. IV-C            │
│                                          │
│   Pre-occupation with budget phase       │
│   of PPBS.                               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Regulations and standardized processes, while providing consistency, also may limit flexibility available to planners.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│         CIRCUMSTANCE NO. IV-D            │
│                                          │
│   Flexibility limited by regulation      │
│   and/or standardized processes.         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The military is in reality a "non-profit" organization in that yearly measurement of profits and losses on a balance sheet is not possible (as is the case in private business and industry).

CIRCUMSTANCE NO. IV-E

Lack of profit incentive.

45

END NOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. <u>Op. Cit.</u>; Hicks; p 190.

2. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 194.

3. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 194.

4. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 300.

5. Albers, Henry H.; <u>Management: The Basic Concepts</u>; John Wiley and Sons, Inc; New York, NY; 1972; p 30.

6. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 30.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 30.

8. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 31.

9. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 31.

10. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 31.

11. <u>Op. Cit.</u>; Terry; p 82.

12. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 82.

13. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 82.

14. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 82.

15. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 84.

16. <u>Op. Cit.</u>; Shrode; p 13.

17. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 13.

18. <u>Ibid.</u>; p 13.

19. <u>Op. Cit.</u>; Kitchell; pp 92-93.

20. Emerson, Harrington; "The First Principle: Clearly Defined Ideals"; In <u>Classics in Management</u>; Harwood F. Merrill, editor; American Management Association; New York, NY; 1960.

21. <u>Ibid.</u>

22. Odiorne, George S.; _Management by Objectives_; Pitman Publishing Corporation; Belmont, CA; 1965; p 55.

23. Army Pamphlet 360-837 (DA Pam 837); _Commanders Call_; Department of the Army; Washington, DC; Jan-Feb 1978; p 2.

24. _Ibid._; p 3.

25. _Ibid._; p 4.

26. _Ibid._; p 5.

27. _Ibid._; p 6.

28. _Ibid._; p 7.

29. Provided verbatim by Chief, Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation; Headquarters, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.

30. _Op. Cit._; Terry; p 41.

31. _Ibid._; pp 41-43.

32. _Op. Cit._; Hicks; p 243.

33. _Op. Cit._; Odiorne; pp 122-125.

34. _Ibid._; pp 125-126.

35. _Op. Cit._; Shrode; p 216.

36. _Op. Cit._; Terry; p 192.

37. _Ibid._; pp 285-286.

38. _Ibid._; pp 192-193.

39. _Ibid._; p 193.

40. _Ibid._; p 202.

41. _Ibid._; p 214.

42. _Ibid._; p 252.

43. _Op. Cit._; Ewing; pp 26-27.

44. _Ibid._; pp 27-31.

45. _Ibid._; pp 32-34.

46. _Ibid._; pp 34-36.

47. _Ibid._; pp 36-38.

48. _Ibid._; pp 38-42.

49. Brown, Fred R.; "Organization and Management"; In _Management_: _Concepts and Practices_; Fred R. Brown, editor; Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Washington, DC; 1967; p 28.

50. _Op. Cit._; Hicks; p 264.

51. _Ibid._; p 269.

52. _Op. Cit._; Terry; p 194.

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54. _Op. Cit._; Terry; p 279.

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56. Koontz, Harold and O'Donnell, Cyril; _Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions_; McGraw-Hill Book Company; New York, NY; 1955; p 208.

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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY OF CAC PLANNERS

Introduction and Methodology

  The methodology employed in determining which of the circumstances identified in chapter 2 exist at CAC, and to what extent they exist, involved:

  • Interviews of the planners.

  • Review of goals/objectives input by the planners to the CACPPGM.

  • Review of formal plans prepared as annexes to the CACPPGM.

  The first step in the interview of planners consisted of a standard questionnaire which obtained data on the extent of time expended on planning and on the relationship with higher levels of management.

  The second step of the interview process involved "face-to-face" interviews with the program directors, who, as noted in chapter 1, were considered to be the principal planners at CAC. The interview was conducted in a standard format:

  • The purpose of the interview and procedure which was to be followed were explained using a prepared statement which was read to the individual being interviewed.

  • Interviewees were questioned using written questions which were designed to elicit "yes" or "no" answers with regard to the existence of each circumstance.

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● When the circumstance was determined to exist, the interviewee was asked to "elaborate on that point" or to "explain how you feel about that".

● Responses were recorded on a standard data collection form.

Goals/objectives submitted as input to the CACPPGM were analyzed vis-a-vis the circumstances relating to goals/objectives, and this analysis was used to supplement and reinforce the information collected in the interviews. The same process was used in analyzing the formal plans submitted as annexes to the CACPPGM.

Orientation of Circumstances

The circumstances developed in chapter 2 can be further sub-divided within categories and ranked in relative order of importance. This further subdivision and prioritization is shown as follows:

Category	Sub-Category	Priority of Circumstance Within Sub-Category
I. Goals/Objectives	A. Product	1. Lack of goals/objectives.
		2. Goals/objectives are not placed in hierarchy by priority.
		3. Goals/objectives are not balanced and mutually supportive.
		4. Goals/objectives not clearly defined.
		5. Goals/objectives not quantifiable and measurable.
		6. Goals/objectives not specific.
		7. There are too many goals/objectives.

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Category	Sub-Category	Priority of Circumstance Within Sub-Category
		8. Goals/objectives are too innovative.
		9. Goals/objectives not realistic.
		10. Goals/objectives not flexible in response to changing conditions.
	B. Process	1. Higher management does not provide sufficient guidance to subordinates.
		2. Responsibilities and tasks are not clearly defined.
		3. Lack of participation in establishing goals/ objectives by those responsible for carrying them out.
		4. Subordinate goals/ objectives do not support overall organizational goals/objectives.
	C. People	1. Organization goals/ objectives not compatible with or reinforcing of individuals' goals/ objectives.
		2. Goals/objectives not known and understood by members of organization.
II. Planning/ Programing	A. Product (deficiencies in plan/ program content and imple- mentation)	1. How the plan is to be implemented is not stated.
		2. Who will implement the plan is not stated.
		3. Too much emphasis is placed on how things used to be done.

Category	Sub-Category	Priority of Circumstance Within Sub-Category
		4. Flexibility is not provided for in plans.
		5. Complex plans are not time phased.
	B. Process (deficiencies in developing plan)	1. Actions precede planning.
		2. Sufficient information is not collected to develop facts and assumptions.
		3. Higher level management does not develop plans in advance of lower levels.
		4. Planning is too short range thereby precluding covering time to fulfill commitments.
		5. Planners are "mechanical" and do not expend required mental effort.
		6. Planners do not plan for "un-planable" (i.e., uncertainty).
		7. Planning is not conducted at all levels necessary.
		8. Planning is not continuous.
		9. Failure to forecast the environment in which plans cover.
		10. Failure to adjust to the external environment or change it when possible.
		11. Who does the plan is not clear.

Category	Sub-Category	Priority of Circumstance Within Sub-Category
	C. Organizing for planning	1. Time & effort required to plan and resultant products are not worth it.
		2. Failure to consider human aspects of planning.
		3. Failure to recognize that plans do not "fix the future".
		4. Planners do not consider ethical aspects of planning.
		5. Failure to consider informal channels of communication.
III. Other Functions of Management	(no sub-category)	1. Organization structure is fixed prior to setting goals and developing plans.
		2. Plans are not coordinated among and with activities of organization.
		3. Planning is not an integral part of organizational decision making and managerial process.
IV. Military	A. Personnel	1. Too much emphasis on efficiency reports.
		2. Constant turnover of military planners.
	B. Administrative	1. Flexibility is limited by regulation and/or standardized processes.
		2. Pre-occupation with budget develop phase of PPBS.
	C. Other	1. Lack of profit incentives.

Chapter 3 Outline

        This chapter contains three sections:

   (1) Results summarized in tabular form in Figure 3-1.

The notation used in this table is defined as:

 = Circumstance exists within organization.

 = Circumstance exists to some extent within the organization.

 = Circumstance does not exist within the organization.

        (2) A discussion of results depicted in Figure 3-1.

        (3) Results tabularized by frequency of circumstance

occurrences in Figure 3-2.

NOTE: The circumstance priority numbering system developed in the preceding paragraph replaces the numbering order developed in chapter 2.

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CIRCUMSTANCE	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DPCA	DIO	DPT/SEC	DFAE	DPPO	HSG MGT	MISO	COMPT
DESCRIPTION													
IA. GOALS/OBJECTIVES: PRODUCT													
1. Lack of goals/objectives.													
2. Goals/objectives are not placed in hierarchy by priority													
3. Goals/objectives are not balanced and mutually supportive.													
4. Goals/objectives not clearly defined.													
5. Goals/objectives not quantifiable & measurable.													
6. Goals/objectives not specific.													
7. There are too many goals/objectives.													
8. Goals/objectives are too innovative.													
9. Goals/objectives not realistic.													
10. Goals/objectives not flexible in response to changing conditions.													

FIGURE 3-1. SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY

CIRCUMSTANCE / DESCRIPTION	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DRCA	DIO	DPT/SEC	DFAE	DPPO	HSG MGT	MISO	COMPT
IB. GOALS/OBJECTIVES: PROCESS													
1. Higher management does not provide sufficient guidance to subordinates.	■		■	■		◣						◣	
2. Responsibilities & tasks are not clearly defined.	◣								■	◣	◣		
3. Lack of participation in establishing goals/objectives by those responsible for carrying them out.													
4. Subordinate goals/objectives do not support overall organizational goals/objectives.													
IC. GOALS/OBJECTIVES: PEOPLE													
1. Organization goals/objectives not compatible with or reinforcing of individuals' goals/objectives.				◣			◣						
2. Goals/objectives not known & understood by members of organization.			◣										

CIRCUMSTANCE / DESCRIPTION	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DFCA	DIO	DPT/SBC	DFAE	DPFO	HSG MGT	MISO	COMPT
IIA. PLANS/PROGRAMS: PRODUCT (DEFICIENCIES IN PLAN CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION)													
1. How the plan is to be implemented is not stated.													
2. Who will implement the plan is not stated.													
3. Too much emphasis is placed on how things used to be done.													
4. Flexibility is not provided for in plans.													
5. Complex plans are not time-phased.													
IIB. PLANS/PROGRAMS: PROCESS (DEFICIENCIES IN DEVELOPING PLANS/PROGRAMS)													
1. Actions precede planning.													
2. Sufficient information is not collected to develop facts and assumptions.													
3. Higher level management does not develop plans in advance of lower levels.													
4. Planning is too short range thereby precluding covering time required to fulfill commitments.													

CIRCUMSTANCE	DESCRIPTION	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DFCA	DIO	DPT/SEC	DFAE	DPPO	HSG MGT	MISO	COMPT
5.	Planners are "mechanical" and do not expend required mental effort.		■							■		■	■	
6.	Planners do not plan for the "un-planable" (i.e., uncertainty).			■	■									
7.	Planning is not conducted at all levels necessary.					■		■						■
8.	Planning is not continuous.			■										
9.	Failure to forecast the environment in which plans cover.												■	■
10.	Failure to adjust to the external environment or change it when possible.													
11.	Who does the planning is not clear.						■							
IIC.	PLANS/PROGRAMS: ORGANIZING FOR PLANNING													
1.	Time & effort required to plan and resultant products are not worth it.													
2.	Failure to consider human aspects of planning.													
3.	Failure to recognize that plans do not "fix the future".													

CIRCUMSTANCE	DESCRIPTION	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DPCA	DIO	DPT/SEC	DFAE	DPPO	HSG MGT	MISO	CONFT
4.	Planners do not consider ethical aspects of planning.													
5.	Failure to consider informal channels of communication.													
III.	OTHER FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT													
1.	Organization structure is fixed prior to setting goals and developing plans.			■	■	■								■
2.	Plans are not coordinated among and with other activities of organization.			◣		■		◣		◣		◣		
3.	Planning is not an integral part of organizational decision making and managerial processes.											◣		
IVA.	MILITARY: PERSONNEL													
1.	Too much emphasis on efficiency reports.	■			■	■	◣				■			■
2.	Constant turnover of military planners.										■	■		

CIRCUMSTANCE / DESCRIPTION	CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DFCA	DIO	DPT/SBC	DFAE	DPFO	HSG MGT	MISO	COXPT
IVB. MILITARY: ADMINISTRATIVE													
1. Flexibility is limited by regulation and/or standardized processes.		█	█	█	█	█	█	█	█			█	█
2. Pre-occupation with budget development phase of PPBS.													
IVC. MILITARY: OTHER													
1. Lack of profit incentive	█								█	█	█	█	█

Discussion of Results

I. <u>Goals and objectives</u>

A. <u>Product</u>

1. <u>Lack of goals/objectives</u>

(Exists __0__ Somewhat __2__ Does not Exist __11*__)

<u>NOTE</u>: A tally of the number of organizations is shown for each circumstance. An * is used to denote where the CAC planner's (Chief, Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation) results place.

The DPCA is basically a "people-oriented" organization which focuses on support to the post population. With a yearly turnover of students, which comprise the bulk of population, instances have occurred where mid-long range goals have been drastically changed or eliminated. For example, a current goal is the improvement of soccer fields. Two years ago there was little emphasis on soccer in the youth activities area.

The DIO feels that, since this is a service organization, goals are driven from the "mission side of the house"; therefore, goals are driven by the requirements placed on the organization.

2. <u>Goals/objectives not placed in hierarchy by priority</u>

(Exists __5*__ Somewhat __3__ Does not Exist __5__)

This circumstance exists throughout CAC, even in those organizations where it is perceived that it does not exist. Priority is implied in the order in which they are listed in the CACPPGM; however, a definite priority is lacking.

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3. Goals/objectives are not balanced and mutually supportive

(Exists__2*__ Somewhat__3__ Does not Exist__8__)

      In all cases, where this circumstance was found to exist, the varied nature of the organization's sub-activities precludesmutual supporting goals in total. For example, the DPCA is charged with administering the alcohol and drug abuse program while at the same time the installation club system's principal profit center is the sale of alcoholic beverages. Balance is difficult because sub-activities compete for diminishing resources. Without priorities balancing is difficult to impossible.

4. Goals/objectives not clearly defined

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__5__ Does not Exist__8*__)

      The USDB has undergone five studies in the past year, and, as a result, the goals and objectives have not stabilized to the point where they can be considered clearly defined.

      The Comptroller has not reduced all of that organization's goals to writing in sufficient detail.

      The DPFO internally developed goals are clearly defined; however, the goals provided from higher headquarters are not.

      CATRADA and DIO goals are defined in detail overtime; however, at present, the goals/objectives are not as clearly defined as the planners would like.

5. Goals/objectives not quantifiable and measurable

(Exists 2*__ Somewhat__3__ Does not Exist__8__)

      The overall CAC goals are, by the very nature of the level of management at which developed, broad in scope and not quantifiable

and measurable in all cases.

The Comptroller goals/objectives need refinement in order to become quantifiable and measurable. This is related to comments under preceding circumstance.

In the models area of CACDA's mission, goals/objectives are difficult to quantify.

The product of CGSC is a trained officer student, and as a result it is difficult, for example, to quantify and measure the goal of producing an officer trained to perform on battalion and higher staffs. Officers are measured vis-a-vis classroom performance through testing, but academic testing does not measure on-the-job performance during the 9 or so years following graduation.

The Chief of Housing Management feels that "Comptroller assistance" is needed to help quantify that organization's goals and objectives.

6. Goals/objectives not specific

(Exists___0___ Somewhat___5*___ Does not Exist___8___)

In the organizations where this circumstance exists to some extent, the same general comment applies. The goals/objectives provided and/or developed by higher headquarters are not as specific as internally developed goals/objectives and therefore require refinement.

7. There are too many goals/objectives

(Exists___2___ Somewhat___0___ Does not Exist___11*___)

This circumstance exists within CACDA and CATRADA, two of the principal "mission activities", as a result of varied nature of organization mission.

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8. Goals/objectives are too innovative

(Exists___0___ Somewhat___2___ Does not Exist___11*___)

  As a result of recent studies of the USDB, several old-standing concepts of USDB operations have been changed, and the internal organization feeling is that some goals/objectives are too innovative.

  With regard to the DPFO, there is some difficulty in achieving goals/objectives as a result of the conservative nature of higher headquarters; therefore, a few goals/objectives (e.g., networking among 3 sites) may be considered too innovative at this time.

9. Goals/objectives not realistic

(Exists___0___ Somewhat___0___ Does not Exist___13*___)

  All goals/objectives were determined to be realistic.

10. Goals/objectives not flexible in response to changing conditions

(Exists___0___ Somewhat___0___ Does not Exist___13*___)

  All organizations feel that their goals/objectives are flexible.

B. Process

1. Higher management does not provide sufficient guidance to subordinates

(Exists___4*___ Somewhat___2___ Does not Exist___7___)

  This circumstance was found to exist at the CAC and 3 of the 4 mission activities levels. Generally, guidance is provided in the form of tasking to refine guidance and feed back to higher headquarters. This severely handicaps the mission activities in the development of totally viable goals/objectives and in the formulation of plans and programs.

2. <u>Responsibilities and tasks not clearly defined</u>

(Exists__1__ Somewhat__3*__ Does not Exist__9__)

     The Deputy DFAE feels that is the weakest point within his organization. The other three activities, where this circumstance exists to some extent, feel that responsibilities and tasks need to be more clearly defined; action is under way to make the necessary changes.

3. <u>Lack of participation in establishing goals/objectives by those responsible for carrying them out</u>.

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

     Participatory management is practiced within all organizations.

4. <u>Subordinate goals/objectives do not support overall organizational goals/objectives</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

     Since subordinate activities participate in goals/objectives development and development is primarily "bottom-to-top", subordinate goals/objectives support overall organizational goals/objectives.

C. <u>People</u>

1. <u>Organization goals/objectives not compatible with or reinforcing of individuals' goals/objectives</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__11*__)

     All planners at CAC consider the human aspects of setting goals; however, the two organizations where this circumstance does exist to some extent base this perception on 1 or 2 types of actions. The DIO is looking for efficiency in operations, and, as a consequence, reduction in personnel is not compatible with the individual's goal of

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continued employment. Some instructors may feel an assignment in CGSC is not as conducive to promotion as duty in a troop unit.

2. <u>Goals/objectives not known and understood by members of organization</u>
(Exists__0__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__12*__)

The CATRADA goals/objectives are known by members of the organization; however, understanding of importance and application is lacking to some degree.

II. <u>Planning/Programing</u>

A. <u>Product</u> (Deficiencies in plan/program content and implementation)

1. <u>How the plan is to be implemented is not stated</u>
(Exists__3__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__9*__)

CACDA and CATRADA develop broad plans and delegate the task to subordinate activities to provide details.

The deputy DFAE tied this into circumstance II-B-2 above and considers this a major problem area.

The Chief, Housing Management recognizes this shortfall and is taking action to correct it.

2. <u>Who will implement the plan is not stated</u>
(Exists__2__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__9*__)

This circumstance is related to circumstance II-A-1 above with regard to CATRADA, DFAE, and HSG MGT. Within the USDB there is overlap among the sub-activities charged with implementing plans.

3. <u>Too much emphasis is placed on how things used to be done</u>
(Exists__2*__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__9__)

The feeling that too much emphasis is placed on how things used to be done is shared by the Comptroller and the CAC planner. These two people have an overall view of CAC.

The feelings within CGSC and DPFO are based primarily on the people in the organization.

4. Flexibility is not provided for in plans

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__12*__)

CATRADA flexibility is somewhat limited by resource limitations; however, this does not seriously impact on their planning.

5. Complex plans are not time phased

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__11*__)

Both CATRADA and HSG MGT feel that some plans should be time-phased, and they are working to do this.

B. Process (Deficiencies in developing plan)

1. Actions precede planning

(Exists__11*__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__0__)

This circumstance was found to exist in all organizations within CAC. The principal reason cited for this is the occurrence of day-to-day, short-time fuse actions.

Referring to circumstance II-B-6, planners, for the most part, feel they plan for the unplanable; therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that planning should include planning for day-to-day actions which are not part of an overall, clearly defined plan. This, however, is not the case.

2. <u>Sufficient information is not collected to develop facts and assumptions</u>

(Exists__6__ Somewhat__4__ Does not Exist__3*__)

CAC, CACDA, and CATRADA planners have sufficient information to plan. This is interesting in light of circumstance I-B-1 (higher management does not provide sufficient guidance to subordinates). While guidance received is limited as to overall goals, information is available to plan. Therefore, plans are based on general guidance and details provided "back up the chain".

CGSC lacks guidance and information to plan; however, the USDB gets details as to goals but little information to develop plans.

The other organizations are dependent, to a large extent, upon mission activities for information necessary to plan. Coordination is essential for the "service activities" of CAC to plan for support requirements.

3. <u>Higher level management does not develop plans in advance of lower levels</u>

(Exists__3__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__9*__)

The consensus is that higher level management tasks subordinate organizations to develop plans and submit them back to higher level management for approval.

4. <u>Planning is too short-range thereby precluding covering time required to fulfill commitments</u>

(Exists__8*__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__3__)

This is a major problem within CAC as evidenced by the occurrences of this circumstance.

The Commandant of the USDB is replaced every 18 months since it is a "command slot".

CACDA's activities are driven, to a large extent, by the material acquisition process which is plagued by long lead times and changing requirements.

Activities feel that resource constraints limit length of time for which plans can be developed.

5. <u>Planners are "mechanical" and do not expend required mental effort</u>
(Exists__4__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__7*__)

The DPFO, CGSC, and DPT/SEC are the only organizations below CAC headquarters level with a planning element/activity. In the other organizations the program director and budget analyst are the "planning team". The planning process is mechanized with regard to CACPFGM input and formulation of standardized plans (such as the CAC Five-Year Automatic Data Processing Plan).

6. <u>Planners do not plan for the "un-planable" (i.e., uncertainty)</u>
(Exists__1__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__11*__)

The CGSC feels that ability to plan for uncertainty has been severely restricted by decreases in resources which have resulted in the elimination of reserve resources (manpower in particular).

The DIO feels that, as a service organization dependent upon mission activities for workloading, ability to plan for uncertainty is limited.

The findings in this area are interesting considering findings under circumstances II-B-1 which was discussed in a preceding paragraph.

7. <u>Planning is not conducted at all levels necessary</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__2__ Does not Exist__11*__)

The Commandant, USDB feels that subordinate planners do not utilize senior non-commissioned officers within the organization.

The Comptroller feels that additional planning must be done within the Internal Review and Audit Division.

8. <u>Planning is not continuous</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist__12*__)

Chief, PMO, CATRADA feels that planning is somewhat sporadic within that organization.

9. <u>Failure to forecast the environment in which plans cover</u>

The Comptroller feels there is a lack of knowledge of DA impacts on future financial environment.

The CACMISO is very dependent upon future requirements of CAC for management information support. Lack of knowledge of these requirements makes forecasting difficult.

10. <u>Failure to adjust to the external environment or change it when possible</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

All planners feel that they take appropriate actions to change the environment (resource limitations, regulatory restrictions, etc.); however, all expressed the caveat that every action has not been totally successful in effecting change.

11. <u>Who does the planning is not clear</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

The CAC planners are the Chief, Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation and the 12 program directors. The 12 program directors utilize their budget analysts and heads of subordinate activities as the internal planners and/or planning element (if one exists).

C. <u>Organizing for planning</u>

1. <u>Time and effort required to plan and resultant products are not worth it</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist_12*__)

There is a feeling within DPCA that, while the time and effort required to plan is worth it, once documents, such as the CACPPGM, are published they are tabled and not referred to. While this is the only organization explicitly stating this position, it appears that this feeling, particularly with regard to the CACPPGM, is shared by several other planners at CAC. This reaction to the CACPPGM refers to the document prepared in FY 77 as the initial publication of memorandum.

2. <u>Failure to consider human aspects of planning</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist_13*_)

This circumstance was not found to exist in any organization within CAC.

3. <u>Failure to recognize that plans do not "fix the future"</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*_)

This circumstance was not found to exist in any organization within CAC.

4. <u>Planners do not consider ethical aspects of planning</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

     This circumstance was not found to exist in any organization within CAC.

5. <u>Failure to consider informal channels of communications</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__13*__)

     All planners within CAC make extensive use of informal channels of communications.

III. <u>Other Functions of Management</u>

1. <u>Organization structure is fixed prior to setting goals and developing plans</u>

(Exists__3__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist__10*__)

     CGSC planning is constrained by an organization which restricts flow of resources.

     The span of control of the Commandant, USDB is too broad (11 subordinate activity heads).

     The fixed organization decreases the flexibility of the Comptroller.

2. <u>Plans are not coordinated among and with other activities of the organization</u>

(Exists__2__ Somewhat__3__ Does not Exist__8*__)

     The three service organizations (DIO, DFAE, and HSG MGT) feel that developers of plans in other organizations do not coordinate their plans with them.

Two of the four mission activities see coordination as a problem area.

3. <u>Planning is not an integral part of organizational decision making and managerial processes</u>

(Exists___0___ Somewhat___2___ Does not Exist_11*__)

This circumstance exists at lower levels of management within CATRADA.

Chief, HSG MGT sees this as a weak spot, and action is under-way to correct this circumstance.

IV. <u>Military</u>

A. <u>Personnel</u>

1. <u>Too much emphasis on efficiency reports</u>

(Exists___2*___ Somewhat___0___ Does not Exist___11___)

This is a perceived problem at the CAC and CGSC levels.

2. <u>Constant turnover of military planners</u>

(Exists___4___ Somewhat___1___ Does not Exist___8*___)

This is a problem within DPFO due to personnel rotation cycle. The Commander has initiated action to correct this.

The major problem within the USDB is the rotation of commanders every 18 months.

Instructor turnover within CGSC presents problems in planning courses.

B. <u>Administrative</u>

1. <u>Flexibility is limited by regulation and/or standardized processes</u>

(Exists___7___ Somewhat___5___ Does not Exist___1*___)

The general feeling, below CAC headquarters level, is that regulations/standardized processes limit flexibility. This is consistent with attempts to change external environment which are not totally successful (circumstance II-B-10).

2. <u>Pre-occupation with budget development phase of PPBS</u>

(Exists__0__ Somewhat__0__ Does not Exist _13*_)

While this circumstance was found not to exist, the fact that the CACPPGM tasking occurred during the same time frame as budget development this fiscal year results in emphasis being placed on budgeting to the detriment of in-depth development of organizational goals and objectives. This phenomena is an indicator of a general lack of treating time as a resource.

C. <u>Other</u>

1. <u>Lack of profit incentive</u>

(Exists__4*__ Somewhat__1__ Does not Exist _8_)

At CAC headquarters level and in some service activities it is felt that if the profit incentive existed planning would be deemed more important.

<u>Table of Frequency of Occurrence of Circumstances</u>

The numbers which appear in Figure 3-2 are based on assigning a value of:

- 1 for "exists".
- $\frac{1}{2}$ for exists to some extent ("somewhat").
- 0 for "does not exist".

CAUTION: The numerical scores developed should not be used to compare or rank order organizations as to their performance. The numbers themselves are "unitless" and are shown only to develop conclusions with regard to relativity of circumstances.

CATEGORY / PLANNER		CAC	CACDA	CATRADA	CGSC	USDB	DRCA	DIO	DPT/SEC	DFAE	DPPO	HSG MGT	MISO	COMPT	TOTAL
I. GOALS/OBJECTIVES	PRODUCT	3½	3	4	1½	1½	1	1½	1	½	1½	½	½	2½	22½
	PROCESS	1½	1	1	1	0	½	0	0	1	½	½	½	0	7½
	PEOPLE	0	0	½	½	0	0	½	0	0	0	0	0	0	1½
	SUB-TOTAL	5	4	5½	3	1½	1½	2	1	1½	2	1	1	2½	31½
II. PLANNING/PROGRAMING	PRODUCT	1	1	3	½	½	0	0	0	2	½	1½	0	1	11
	PROCESS	2	4	4	4	4	2	2½	1½	3½	2	3	5½	4½	42½
	ORGANIZING FOR PLANNING	0	0	0	0	0	½	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	½
	SUB-TOTAL	3	5	7	4½	4½	2½	2½	1½	5½	2½	4½	5½	5½	54
III. OTHER FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT		0	0	1½	1	2	0	½	0	½	0	1	0	1	7½
IV. MILITARY	PERSONNEL	1	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	6½
	ADMINISTRATIVE	0	½	1	1	1	1	½	1	1	½	½	½	1	9½
	OTHER	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	½	1	1	0	1	4½
	SUB-TOTAL	2	½	1	3	2	1½	½	1	1½	2½	1½	½	3	20½
TOTALS		10	9½	15	11½	10	5½	5½	3½	9½	7	8	7	12	113½

FIGURE 3-2 FREQUENCY OF RESULTS SUMMARY

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Conclusions

The results of the review of the literature (Chapter 2) and
the results of the survey of CAC planners (Chapter 3) lead to several
conclusions.

1. **Program directors are the principal planners.**

The initial assumption made in Chapter 1 that the program directors are
the principal planners (along with the Chief, Plans Division, Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation)within CAC
was found to be valid. Only three organizations (DPFO, CGSC, and DPT/SEC)
have planning elements; therefore, the "planning team" in most organi-
zations is the program director and the budget analyst.
NOTE: This does not mean that, in those organizations in which the
Commander is not the program director, commanders at CAC do not plan.

2. **All organizations within CAC have goals/objectives.**

There has been significant progress made in the past eighteen months
with regard to formalizing and documenting over-all CAC goals/objectives
and goals/objectives of subordinate organizations. This statement is
not intended to infer that goals/objectives did not exist eighteen
months ago; instead, it is intended to illuminate the progress which
has been made to improve management of resources at CAC. This progress is
due, primarily, to the emphasis placed on resource management by the
Commander, CAC; the establishment of the Office of the Assistant Chief

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of Staff, Plans, Programs and Evaluation; and, the formulation of the Combined Arms Center Planning and Programing Guidance Memorandum.

3. However, as can be seen from Figure 3-2, approximately 30% of the problems in the planning area at CAC are in area of goals/objectives. The major problem area is the product; that is, the goals/objectives developed. Over two-thirds of the deficiencies are related to the actual goals/objectives developed.

4. The two problem areas which require immediate attention are:

a. Goals/objectives need to be placed in hierarchy by priority. Prioritizing goals/objectives is essential to sound management in general and planning and programing in particular. For example, within CGSC, if the goals of training a student to command a battalion and training a student to employ new weapon systems are not prioritized, then the planning and programing for the utilization of limited resources is complicated. If goals/objectives are given equal priority, planning cannot be effective vis-a-vis resource management and blanket actions, such as "salami slicing funds", are used instead of prioritized resource allocation.

b. Mission activities require more guidance from higher management in order to develop goals/objectives.

Sufficient information is made available to mission activities to plan; however, guidance as to specific TRADOC/DA priority, goal/objective, etc. to develop the activities' goals/objectives is often lacking.

NOTE: These are the two most prominent problem areas in the area of establishment of goals and objectives. This does not mean that the

other circumstances are not important; however, they are generally "organization unique" which can be resolved through "local" initiatives. The lack of priorities and guidance cuts across all levels to some extent and is due to the inter-related operations of the mission activities and the impact of mission performance on service activities and vice versa.

5. With regard to mid-range planning, almost one-half of the total deficiencies noted (54 of 112½) are in the area of planning/programing. <u>The major problem area is the process</u> used to develop plans and programs (42½ of 54 deficiencies). The five circumstances contributing the vast majority of the problem are:

    a. <u>Actions precede planning</u>.

    b. <u>Sufficient information is not collected to develop facts and assumptions</u>.

    c. <u>Higher level management does not develop plans in advance of lower levels</u>.

    d. <u>Planning is too short-range thereby precluding covering time required to fulfill commitments</u>.

    e. <u>Planners are "mechanical" and do not expend required mental effort</u>.

6. The reasons for these problems in the planning area are a direct result of:

    a. <u>Not treating time as a resource</u>. The time available to both management and workers is fixed--there are only twenty-four hours in the day. Crash projects, multiple sources of guidance, several actions

due in a short period of time, etc. force planners, either consciously or subconsciously, to subordinate planning to day-to-day management. Managers must recognize that time spent on planning is time well spent and that subordinates need time to plan.

b. <u>Planning actions are confounded with budget actions</u> (e.g., CACPPGM actions due in same time frame as budget preparation), and

c. <u>Planners are also the budgeters</u>. These two factors force the CAC planners to place emphasis on short-range resource management (budget execution and development) to the detriment of mid-range planning.

d. <u>Planners receive tasking from multiple sources</u>.

e. <u>With the exception of mission activities, sufficient planning information is not available (or acquired) to plan</u>.

7. An interesting conclusion drawn from this research is that <u>planning is not inhibited by the CAC organization structure</u>. The organization provides the necessary flexibility to utilize resources (primarily personnel).

8. With regard to military peculiar problems, the circumstance which contributes to almost one-half (9 of 20½) of the deficiencies found in this area is: <u>Flexibility is limited by regulation and/or standardized processes</u>.

9. Another interesting conclusion in the military peculiar area is: <u>Turnover of personnel is a problem if action is not taken to "phase" the replacement cycle</u>.

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10. In summary the major problem areas are:

     1. The actual goals/objectives developed by the planners.

     2. The process by which plans and programs are developed.

     3. Flexibility is limited by regulations and/or standardized processes.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

● A strong CAC planning element be maintained at Headquarters, CAC to monitor actions, to ensure compatibility with goals/objectives and plans, to continue CACPPGM process, to ensure CAC-wide coordination of plans, and to review resource allocation.

● The CACPPGM development process be time-phased to preclude conflict with budget preparation and to allow for more effective allocation of the planners' time.

● All actions contain statement as to impact on resources and plans. (See figure 4-1 for proposed change to CAC Form 802).

● Planners specifically identify regulations/standardized processes which inhibit planning flexibility and seek command emphasis, if necessary, to effect the desired changes.

● Subordinate activities report status of tasking from multiple sources to the appropriate commander at regularily scheduled staff meetings so that action can be taken by the Commander, if required, to reduce the negative impact on planners' time, organizational goals/objectives and plans.

● Organizations use the Combined Armed Center Management Information System (CACMIS) data as a record of unplanned actions to

serve as basis for planning for unplanned actions. (It is recognized that it will take 2-3 years to develop this data base,but CACMIS is one source which provides an indication of actual versus planned person-hours).

● Work continue to refine organization goals and improve mid-range planning.

● Current emphasis placed on planning and programing by Commander, CAC be continued with subsequent commanders.

● Department of Resource Management, CGSC prepare and conduct instruction on goal-setting, planning and programing for CAC planners.

Suggestions for Future Research

● It would be extremely beneficial to develop a procedure whereby resource utilization could be related through individual projects, tasks, and functions to organization goals. This would facilitate relating resource budget and execution to an overall goal.

● A study of regulations by student study projects to determine which are limiting to the planning process and what actions can be taken to change or eliminate these regulatory restrictions would assist in alleviating limitations on flexibility.

● A study of each organization within CAC to evaluate internal planning would contribute to the knowledge of problem areas and facilitate correction of internal deficiencies which impact on the overall CAC organization.

● Since the Combined Arms Center has characteristics similar to a large university organization, a study of the CAC organization by consulting faculty members, who are employed by large universities,

would add a new dimension to studies previously conducted by "military organization experts" (e.g., the Engineer Study Group).

• The impact of the eighteen month command tour of duty on resource management should be studied to determine if consideration should be given to extending the length of the tour of duty of the Commandant, USDB to two years.

DECISION PAPER

OFFICE/SYMBOL	SUBJECT/ACN:	SUSPENSE DATE	DATE

THRU: (No change)

TO: (No change)

1. <u>PURPOSE</u>: (No change)

2. <u>DISCUSSION</u>: (No change)

3. <u>CONCLUSIONS</u>: (No change)

4. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>: (No change)

5. <u>RESOURCES AND PLANNING IMPACT</u>:

    a. <u>Resource</u>   <u>FY 78</u>   <u>FY 79</u>   <u>FY 80</u>

        (1) personnel

        (2) funds

        (3) material

    b. Goal/objective: change_____ added_____ deleted_____

    c. Plan to which this action relates:_____

6. Name and telephone number of action officer.

COORDINATION

AGENCY	CONCUR/NONCONCUR	DATE	AGENCY	CONCUR/NONCONCUR	DATE	AGENCY	CONCUR/NONCONCUR	DATE
STAFF			CACDA			CGSC		
USDB			CATRADA			OFFICE APPROVAL		
						BR/SECT		
						DIV/COM		
						DIR/DEPT		

COPIES FURNISHED:

APPROVED: DISAPPROVED: DATE:

FIGURE 4-1. PROPOSED CHANGE TO CAC & FT LVN FORM 802

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