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S. Enders Wimbush

March 1978



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I. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Great-Russian nationalism in the USSR is the result of complex and varied stimuli, ranging from often incomprehensible and difficult to analyze examples of personal soul searching, to more collective efforts at national re-evaluation and spiritual renaissance, to outright external threats to the viability of the Russian nation itself. Elsewhere I have written a more complete study of contemporary Russian nationalism--on which I shall draw liberally for the present paper--in which I pay considerable attention to this entire spectrum of stimuli and Russian responses to them.¹ In the present study, I shall concentrate on one part of this spectrum, on current Russian responses to different kinds of threats and provocations of Soviet non-Russians. I shall argue that, in many cases, these threats and provocations are the result of unique Soviet political, ideological, and economic conditions. Therefore, the Russian response to them--characterized by a new Russian national self-awareness and even a new Russian nationalism--is *sui generis*, not simply the resurgence of an ongoing, unchanging, and unalterable Russian nationalism from centuries past. I shall identify these stimuli, describe the resulting Russian nationalist themes and their political corollaries, and evaluate the possible impact of Russian nationalism on the regime's need to mobilize large numbers of Soviet citizens to meet state goals. Finally, I shall consider the potential effects of Russian nationalism on future Soviet multinational stability.

¹See S. Enders Wimbush, "Great-Russians and the Soviet State: Real Dilemmas of Ethnic Dominance." in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), forthcoming.

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II. NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT: CAUSES AND CATALYSTS

It has been argued that Lenin sought to avoid alienating Soviet minorities in the first years of the Bolshevik seizure of power by any means, including placing considerable restraint on those Russians who were convinced that this revolution was intended to establish Russian power in the non-Russian borderlands. Stalin's position on minorities and on Russian nationalism is much less ambiguous. He worked to defuse and liquidate actual and potential non-Russian nationalist movements and to create a climate of repression in the Soviet borderlands which native nationalists could challenge only at their own peril. Non-Russian nationalist communists in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Ukraine were liquidated systematically and their movements dispersed with considerable violence. The volatile nomadic Kazakhs were made sedentary at great human cost. Entire ethnic populations were deported during World War II for their real or alleged anti-Soviet activities or pro-German inclinations. Native Communist Party organizations were purged regularly of their "bourgeois nationalist" elements. By these means and others, Stalin's regime had worked to eliminate any real threat to Russian dominance.

Concomitantly, Stalin encouraged Russians to think of the Soviet Union as their own state, and of the Russian nation as possessing undisputed dominance within that state. This tendency gained momentum during the Great Patriotic War when it became necessary to mobilize Russians to defend the motherland. Stalin's victory toast to the Great-Russian people in 1945 signaled important concessions to the Russian nation for the sacrifices it had made in wartime. Importantly, these concessions included some doctrinal changes in the relative standings of Soviet nationalities: Russians were to become the undisputed *primus inter pares*. The theory of "lesser evil"--by which the Russian conquest of the border peoples was declared to be less of a catastrophe than the alternative of being conquered by Britain, Persia, or Turkey--was jettisoned at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952, in favor of the concept of "greater good." According

to the latter idea, Russian conquest was not simply the best of a bad situation but a positive godsend: because of it, backward, primitive societies were exposed to the civilizing influences of Russian culture. This dramatic shift of emphasis was punctuated by newly re-written histories of the non-Russian peoples, in which native national heroes such as Shamil and Kenesary Kasimov--who formerly had been lauded officially as progressive freedom fighters--were attacked as reactionary because they opposed the Russian advance into their territories.² The national epics of Soviet Muslim nationalities, which earlier had been praised as the purest examples of native art, were condemned as retrograde and anti-Russian.³ At the same time, Russian status was upgraded to that of *starshii brat*, the "elder brother" who was responsible for leading less-civilized siblings out of the wilderness.

Through these policies and because of his leadership during the war, Stalin enhanced his stature as a truly Russian leader in the eyes of the Russian population, leaving no doubt about his ability or willingness to deal with troublesome and untrustworthy non-Russians in the Soviet borderlands. At the time of his death in 1953, there was nothing in the Soviet political spectrum which could be identified as a dissident Russian nationalist movement. Generally it was assumed--rightly or wrongly--that the regime by this time had coopted Russian nationalism.

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and the Stalinist system, therefore, was received bitterly by many Russians. To many, Stalin was a truly Russian leader whose leadership had restored Russia as a world power and an imperial center, a leader who had incorporated many Russian elements into the official internationalist ideology. His death raised the spectre of a Russia without strong leadership; Khrushchev's

² Lowell R. Tillet, "Soviet Second Thoughts on Tsarist Colonialism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (January, 1964): 310-314.

³ See Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Crisis of the Turkic National Epics, 1951-1952: Local Nationalism or Internationalism?" *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, XVII, 2 & 3 (Summer and Fall, 1975): 463-474.

denunciation made many Russians profoundly suspicious of the new leadership and convinced many that Russia's prestige was likely to decline both at home and abroad. One of the first casualties of this attack, in fact, was the concept of the Russian "elder brother," a dogma Khrushchev seriously undermined when, at the Twentieth Party Congress, he referred to "the mutual distrust which existed among the peoples in tsarist Russia."⁴ This revelation instantly invalidated the whole notion of a "friendship of peoples" which Stalin's historians had labored so hard to make palatable.

Khrushchev heightened Russians' fears and their suspicions of the new leadership still further by re-opening the Soviet "nationality problem" for discussion and debate. In doing so, he emphasized the need to equalize rates of development and to provide equal opportunities for all Soviet nationalities. To many non-Russians, this suggested that they now were entitled to a greater share of the state's resources; to many Russians, it suggested that they would be called upon to make sacrifices for others as they had in the past. In addition, Khrushchev placed new stress on proletarian internationalism as the proper source of legitimacy and as a mobilizing tool. He elaborated this idea to include concepts of social transformation through rapid economic development-- "building communism"--and of the biological merger (*slivanie*) of all Soviet nations into a higher community--"the Soviet People." Rapid economic development, most Russians recognized, would bring them into unwanted contact with non-Russians, while, simultaneously, the scarce human and material resources of the Russian nation would be depleted for the benefit of others. The idea of biological assimilation promised further russification among non-Russians, but it also promised that the resulting Soviet culture--however much russified--would be more diversified ethnically and culturally than the Russian culture of Stalin's time. More immediately, this concept evoked distasteful images of mixed marriages and national degeneration.

⁴Quoted in Tillet, p. 315.

When Khrushchev proclaimed a "thaw" in literature and culture in the initial stages of his de-Stalinization efforts, non-Russians seized this opportunity to re-examine the conditions of their own national cultures and the relationship of these cultures to Russian culture. Many non-Russians concluded publicly that the doctrinaire interpretations which had been forced upon them in the past were in error and offensive. More new histories were written which challenged the concept of "greater good," and previously maligned national heroes like Shamil were elevated to their former level of veneration. Importantly, non-Russian historians began to contest openly the "progressive" impact of Russian culture on their own native cultures, suggesting that Russian culture really had done little to enhance what already were rich and complete cultural environments. Khrushchev initially encouraged these trends, although he later was to rescind this license considerably. Nonetheless, this pattern of non-Russian self-assertiveness has continued to the present time, and it even has taken an unexpected twist. Recently one bold Soviet scholar of Turkic origins claimed that the "greater good" equation should be reversed: benefits had flowed the other way. According to him, Russians had profited immensely from the Tatar yoke; Russian culture, including the Russian national epic, *The Lay of Igor*, he argues, had been inspired by and had borrowed heavily from Asian models.⁵

Russian concern about these developments has become more evident as some non-Russians have punctuated this self-assertiveness with open protest. Jews are demanding to emigrate. Large groups of minorities that had been deported to Central Asia during the war, such as Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks, have staged large protest demonstrations within earshot of large Soviet cities. Violent local disturbances have broken out in the Caucasus and in the Baltics. Irredentist claims have intensified, such as those of Soviet Moldavians. Ukrainians from different parts of the political spectrum have formed protest movements, both intellectual and militant. In Central Asia,

⁵ Discussion of a Book by Olzhas Suleimenov, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9 (1976), 147-154; as abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *CDS*), XXVIII, No. 5 (January, 1977) pp. 15-16.

native elites self-consciously have glorified and worked to consolidate their "nations," which the Russians had created decades earlier in order to impede the formation of pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic alliances against them. And in the non-Russian republics, Russians increasingly have been subjected to social discrimination and even violence, as well as to the more and more frequently and openly expressed native sentiment of "Russian go home!"

Underlining these open protests and the spectre of instability or revolt in the Soviet borderlands, the 1970 Soviet census revealed that non-Russians are making large demographic gains, while Russians (and the other large Slavic nationalities of the USSR, Ukrainians and Belorussians) rapidly are approaching zero population growth. This census made clear for the first time that within several decades Russians will begin to suffer a decline in their absolute numbers if present trends continue; Soviet Muslim minorities, on the other hand, will continue to grow dramatically, raising the possibility that Russians may eventually become a minority population in their own country. More immediately, Soviet policy makers (it is reported that Gosplan was surprised by these censal data) were confronted with questions of resource allocation in a changing demographic environment, about the increasing competition between Russian and non-Russian elites for important positions, and about the possibility that Russian control of the borderlands could be diminished or lost. Thus, these censal data stimulated the discussion of Soviet society in national terms, a discussion which was initiated by the regime itself.

Important other stimuli and opportunities for expression contributed to an upsurge in Russian national consciousness, but for most Russians the new self-assertiveness among Soviet minorities was especially worrisome. Military conflict between Soviet and Chinese forces over disputed borders heightened this anxiety. All are aware that this border stretches for over four thousand hard-to-patrol miles and that any invading Chinese force which manages to penetrate the first layer of Russian border forces will find, not more Russians, but Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and other Asians whose allegiance to the Soviet state is problematic and who increasingly have been taunting

Russian *colons* with this fact: "Just wait till the Chinese come, They'll show you what's what!"⁶ Beginning in the early 1960s, Russians began to react to these various threats, discussing possible solutions in *samizdat*, frequently in the official press, and, like Solzhenitsyn, even in exile. It is to the theme of this discussion that I now turn.

⁶Igor Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation? The Nationalities Question in the USSR," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn *et al*, *From Under the Ruble* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 87.

III. THEMES OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

One of the most often repeated Russian responses to the implicit and explicit threats of non-Russians is a rejection of the claim that forced "internationalization" of the Soviet Union has been borne mainly by non-Russians. In the first place, argues Igor Shafarevich, a prominent member of the "democratic opposition" in Moscow, Russian culture was the *first* to be sacrificed to Soviet internationalism, at a time "when other nations were still being actively encouraged to assert their national identity." While minority cultures have been treated with caution and restraint, he concludes, Russian culture has been subjected systematically to violent attacks under the guise of suppressing "great power chauvinism." In fact, Shafarevich argues, attacks of this kind "amounted to nothing more than an invitation to stamp out any manifestation of Russian national consciousness."⁷ He concedes, as do Solzhenitsyn and others, that Marxism-Leninism aims for the "maximum destruction of all nations" and, therefore, this alien ideology should be scrapped in any case. It is not true, however, that non-Russians are its primary target: "Russians no less than others are its victims; indeed, they were the first to come under fire."⁸

Solzhenitsyn adds yet another poignant note to this argument. Russians, he contends, have no moral responsibility for what the Soviet system does to minorities in any event. Many minorities--and here Solzhenitsyn cites the revolutionary contributions of Jews, Latvians, and others--helped to bring the Soviets to power. "Did not the revolution throughout its early years have some of the characteristics of a foreign invasion?" he asks.⁹ This argument can be extended to Russia's historical enemies as well. "If those whom we

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁹ Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," in *ibid.*, p. 125.

hurt have previously hurt us," Solzhenitsyn explains, "our guilt feelings are not so hysterical, their guilt modifies and mutes our own." It is in this manner that he disavows any responsibility for the plight of the Crimean Tatars, referring to them as "remanants of the Golden Horde."¹⁰ Similar arguments have led some Russians to challenge the doctrinally required confluence of international and national in cultural affairs. Vladimir Soloukhin, a popular Russian writer asks specifically how it is possible for him to write for all peoples in an internationalist vein. He concludes that, as a Russian, it is better for him to write "of my own Russian nature, or my own Russian countryside, and of my own Russian people."¹¹

Other Russians have objected to another side of Soviet internationalism: the leadership's formula for social integration, whereby in the process of becoming more "internationalist" Soviet nationalities, including Russians, will "come closer together" (*sblizhenie*) and eventually "merge" (*slivanie*)--including biological assimilation--into a new "Soviet people." For many Russians, the final stage of this formula means more marriages between Russians and dark skinned non-Russians, leading ultimately to a "yellowing" of Russian society. Some explicitly Russian nationalist programs have warned that this "random hybridization" will lead to the "biological degeneration" of the Russian nation and the white race.¹² This racial theme even has its proponents in the official press. One Russian scholar has argued that *ethnos*--the intangible "essence" which distinguishes ethnic groups from one another--is biologically determined. Therefore, he concludes, mixed marriages lead eventually to a genetic deterioration in the progeny; ultimately this deterioration leads to a decline of the political states and social institutions which the children of mixed marriages will constitute. In this scholar's view, national assimilation equals national suicide.¹³

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132

¹¹ Vladimir Soloukhin, *S liricheskikh positsii* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 104-105.

¹² *Arkhiiv samizdata*, Vol. 11, document No. 590.

¹³ V. I. Kozlov, "On the Biological-Geographical Conception of Ethnic History," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12 (1974): 72-85; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 20, pp. 1-5.

Not only do Russians object to mixing biologically with non-Russians, they object to supporting them economically as well. Some look upon many minorities as possessing an ersatz nationhood, that is, one which could not stand on its own without supports--academies of science, literary languages, and other newly created cultural traditions and national territories--which cost Russians dearly. Moreover, many Russians complain, territorial divisions in the USSR do not correspond to ethnic distribution, leaving large concentrations of Russians in other, officially non-Russian republics where they are the objects of both official and personal discrimination. This problem should be rectified, they claim, by redrawing republic boundaries to augment the size of the RSFSR, at the expense of republics with heavy Russian concentrations, such as Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, the Ukraine, and the Bashkir, Tatar, Mordovian, and Karelian ASSRs. Still other Russians argue that the Russians have made the Soviet state what it is and the existence of Soviet minorities possible; therefore, Russians should be free to exploit this empire for their own enrichment.

Of primary concern to most Russians is the future allocation of resources for projects which offer the Russian nation no immediate or long-term return. Thus, the continued development of minority economies is viewed as wasteful and foolish, if not dangerous. In the first place, some Russian nationalists argue, minorities might choose to use their new-found economic power to challenge Moscow. In the second, minorities appear to be ungrateful for these Russian sacrifices and, therefore, are deserving of no further expenditures. And in the third, these scarce human and material resources are desperately required to develop Russia's own underdeveloped regions, namely the Russian North and Siberia. Solzhenitsyn, among others, has directed a strong plea to the Soviet leadership to transfer its attention to these areas because they may be the last refuge for Russians against outside pressures, including the inevitable restiveness of growing minorities.¹⁴ Most Russians recognize that solutions

¹⁴ Alexandre Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 27.

to the problem of resources cannot be postponed indefinitely. Debate on these questions is certain to be sharpened by the already crucial deficits in the size of the Russian labor force--which may necessitate the mobilization of large numbers of Central Asians to labor in the RSFSR--and by impending energy shortages, which promise to force the regime to reconsider not only its energy benevolence toward Eastern Europe but probably its developmental strategy for Soviet minorities as well. It is also certain that Russian nationalists will enter these debates.

The political corollaries which follow from and accompany these views on culture, race, and economics are varied. One important range of disagreement is between Russians who advocate a consolidation of the Russian nation--a "little Russia"--and those who advocate an empire. Those who support the first position argue that Russia should be reconstituted on those territories which are historically Russian or which now are inhabited mostly by Russians. Non-Russians should be allowed to go their own way, and Russia's resources should then be used only for Russia's own development. Those who support the idea of a greater Russian Empire differ about how minorities should be treated. Many in this group are classical imperialists and would repress self-assertiveness by minorities. Russian dominance would be strengthened in every possible way. Others--who might be called "liberal nationalists"--argue that minorities should be accommodated in a loose federal system. Non-Russians would receive real rights much like those now promised in the Soviet Constitution but which are non-existent in practice, including the right to secede from the federation. These rights would carry with them certain obligations, however, namely the responsibility of paying a fair share for defense and development. Thus the "liberalism" of these Russian nationalists is really a function of their nationalism: these political arrangements would free Russians of many of the expensive obligations they now bear for other peoples.

Russian nationalists also disagree about how power is to be organized in a future Russian state. The few "liberal nationalists" would give a voice to minorities. But most Russian nationalists call

for more authoritarian solutions. Some, often called neo-Slavophiles, advocate rule by a few based upon spiritual values enshrined in Christian teaching. For them, the Russian Orthodox Church once more would become a dominant influence in the Russian state. Other authoritarian nationalists--often called neo-Stalinists because of their propensity for unequivocal dictatorial decision-making backed by force--argue that a strong man is needed at the head of the Russian state. Some of these Russian nationalists look to men like General Skobelev, the conquerer of southern Turkestan and the man responsible for the genocide of the Tekke tribes of the Mari Oasis, as a model Russian leader.¹⁵ Still others point to Ermak, the conquerer of Siberia; to Dezhnev, one of the explorers of Kamchatka; or to Erofei Khabarov, one of the first Russians to fight the Chinese and a man who is remembered for terrorizing his victims and burning them alive.¹⁶ Needless to say, Stalin and his kind of strong, militarist, centralized authority are sorely missed by these Russian nationalists.

¹⁵ *Arkhir samizdata*, Vol. 21, document No. 1013.

¹⁶ Viktor Chalmayev, "Neizbeznost," *Molodaia gvardia*, No. 9 (1968): 259-289.

IV. REGIME RESPONSES TO RUSSIAN NATIONALIST DEMANDS

The regime clearly is not prepared to meet the extreme demands of Russian nationalists regarding the problem of Soviet minorities. Soviet internationalism in cultural affairs remains in force. Marxism-Leninism has not been jettisoned. There have been no structural changes in the basic organization of the Soviet polity, neither toward a "little Russia" nor toward an expanded Russian empire. No wholesale repression of minorities has taken place. Moreover, those Russian nationalists who have spoken out on these issues--such as the *Veche* group--have been arrested and sent to work camps or, like Solzhenitsyn, sent into exile. In the leadership itself, known Russian nationalists have come under fire, symbolized by the sacking of A.N. Shelepin, a noted hardliner, from all positions of influence and authority.

On the other hand, while the regime's responses to certain issues now seem to be only tentative or ambiguous, it has expressed interest, if not concern, over many of the issues that fuel Russian nationalist debates. For example, the regime quietly dropped the "merging" half of its formula for social integration and replaced it with less objectionable code-words. The new formula, which aims Soviet citizens toward a state of "full unity" (*polnoe edinstvo*) but not toward biological homogenization, stresses that the new Soviet man will retain his ethnic distinctions even in the final communist utopia.¹⁷

¹⁷ How far the Soviet leadership has backtracked on the issue of *slivanie* can be seen in a recent statement by the leading Soviet demographer S. I. Bruk on the pages of *Istoriia SSSR*: "Censal data refute the erroneous opinion that when a mixed marriage involves a member of an ethnic group, the other partner is always a Russian." First, it should be noted that Bruk places Russians outside the category of ethnic group, where we can only speculate. But more importantly, it is not unlikely that the "erroneous opinion" of which Bruk speaks is none other than the concept of *slivanie* itself. In fact, it is impossible to determine from *published* censal data the truth or error of Bruk's assertion. Data on mixed marriage in the Soviet Union always have been imprecise--they are reported by the total number of mixed marriages per republic and not by the specific ethnic

If he is to remain ethnically distinct, however, the regime has begun to express its concern that a disproportionate number of the "new Soviet men" likely will be non-Russian and Muslim. Thus, the regime has moved cautiously to counter the runaway birth rates among Central Asians and other Soviet Muslims in two ways. First, it has exhorted young Russians to reproduce more, suggesting that those who fail to have more than one child are of questionable patriotism. It even has been suggested in the official press that the quality and quantity of offspring could be improved and infant mortality reduced if "drunken conception" could be prevented, an obvious reference to the high rate of alcoholism among Russians and its possible contribution to the low Russian birth rate.¹⁸ Second, it has initiated a debate in academic and professional circles about the feasibility of differentiated rates of birth control in the USSR according to republic and region.¹⁹ Third, the regime has made known its intent to engage more Muslim women in the work force, which, it believes, will curb the desire of these women for more than three children.²⁰

affiliation of the partners--because it was necessary to paint a good face on *slitianie*, even though it is well known that the incidence of marriage between Russians and non-Slavs is very low. Thus, the published data were meant to give the impression that Russians were inter-marrying freely with non-Russians, when the data actually represented marriages between, for example, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, Ukrainians and Belorussians, Russians and Ukrainians or other likely combinations. Bruk's revelation that a Russian is not always "the other partner" can be seen as an explicit refutation of this misrepresentation, if not a reassurance to Russians that their society is not "yellowing." (See S. I. Bruk, and M. N. Goboglo, "The Development and Interaction of Ethnodemographic and Ethnolinguistic Processes in the Soviet Union at the Present Stage," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4 (1974): 26-45; in *CDSP*, XXVI, No. 43, pp. 10-12.

¹⁸ Zory Balayan and Viktor Kazmin, "Children of the Carnival," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 24, June 11, 1975, p. 13; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 46, p. 16.

¹⁹ B. Urianis, "Demographic Policy in the Modern World," *Mirovaia ekonomika i meshdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 5 (1975); in *The Soviet Review*, XVII, No. 2, (Summer 1976): 99; R. Galetskaya, "Social and Economic Problems of the USSR's Population," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 9 (1974): 155-157; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 9, p. 9.

²⁰ R. Galetskaya, "The Areas of Demographic Policy," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8 (1975): 149-152; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 45, pp. 15-16.

Although the new Soviet Constitution did not re-draw republic boundaries to make some, namely Russian, territorial boundaries conform to Russian ethnic distribution, as some observers thought it might, nonetheless the regime has tentatively but not publicly suggested elsewhere that this kind of alteration conceivably could take place as part of broader *economic* reforms. Recently, spokesmen for the regime have noted the diminishing significance of republic borders, stressing that the redrawing of some would improve economic rationalization. Such a re-drawing, they insist, now is made feasible, if not logical, by the changed ethnic composition of certain republics.²¹ Kazakhstan would seem to be the most likely candidate for such measures.

The new Constitution also failed to make special provisions for the dominant status of the Russian nation or to strip minorities of the symbolic guarantees which the 1936 constitution had afforded them. On the other hand, it did not offer minority nationalities anything new in the way of guarantees or elaborate their specific rights under Soviet law beyond what already had been defined in 1936, despite the efforts of "federalists" in the government to write in just such provisions.²² This, then, can be interpreted as a victory for "anti-federalists" in the regime--a position often associated with Russian nationalists--who believe that minorities need be guaranteed nothing because they are minorities.

The regime has responded to minority restiveness forcefully and with little hesitation. At the leadership level, the First Secretaries of Georgia, Armenia, and the Ukraine have been purged in recent years for their inability to control local nationalism. Local unrest, in the Baltics and in the Caucasus, has been dealt with sternly. Demonstrations in the borderlands by recalcitrant deported minorities such as Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks have been dispersed with considerable violence. The pattern of installing Russians as Second Secretaries in the republics has been renewed. Campaigns stressing

²¹V. Kistanov, "The Leninist Nationalities Policy and Economic Regionalization in the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (1972): 56-65; in *CDSP*, XXV, No. 9, pp. 1-4.

²²See, Grey Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies*, XVII, 4 (April, 1967): 458-81.

the vigilance of the Soviet Border Forces (*Pogranichnaia voiska*) have been intensified, as if to ward off in advance any potential Chinese meddling. All of these measures are certain to please Russians--and especially those Russian *colons* who live in the borderland republics--who have become increasingly uneasy about the possibility of real ethnic unrest on Russia's periphery.

Moreover, the regime has attempted to evoke important Russian national symbols and images in order to heighten Russian self-awareness and to accommodate better national awareness that already exists. It has permitted a public, albeit limited, rehabilitation of Stalin--who for many Russians and for many non-Russians is the ultimate symbol of Russian resolve and willingness to deal forcibly with unruly minorities--and a lively discussion of his positive qualities as a leader of the Russian nation in wartime.²³ And in the recently completed anniversary celebration of the Soviet victory over German Fascism, the special contributions of the Russian nation to the defense of the Soviet state were extolled widely.

It is unlikely that these concessions by the regime will give any lasting satisfaction to Russian nationalists or even to those Russians whose concern has not yet been translated into explicitly Russian nationalist expressions; they may be portents of things to come, however. At the present time, the regime's concern for the current and future "nationality problem" is confined to academic discussion or to accommodating the heightened national consciousness among Russians. Thanks in part to the concessions discussed above, the rise in Russian self-consciousness and self-assertiveness has not yet taken the form of militant national protest it has among other nationalities,

²³ Examples include, Anatoly Yolkin, "My Love and My Pain," *Moskva*, No. 11 (1974): 214-218; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 11, p. 6, Yolkin is attacking Vadim Baranov's "Responsibility to a Theme," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, September 17, 1974, p. 2; in *CDSP*, XXVI, No. 39, pp. 9-10. Also, V. P. Morozov, "Some Questions of the Organization of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic War," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 3 (1975): 12-29; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 49, pp. 19-21; Anatoly Mednikov, "Many are Indebted to Them," *Literaturnoye obozreniye* No. 3 (1975): 22-24; in *CDSP*, XXVII, No. 34, pp. 13-14.

the kind of protest which might force the regime to make still further and more dramatic concessions. Instead, the picture is one of relative tranquillity, virtually free of violent or threatening outbursts. One can only speculate how long these concessions will suffice or how long this quietude will remain the norm.

V. RUSSIAN RESPONSES TO NON-RUSSIANS IN THE FUTURE

Russian nationalist attitudes concerning minorities could crystallize in several ways. External meddling in Soviet minority affairs could be one such catalyst, whether from Chinese propagandizing of Soviet minorities along the Sino-Soviet border, a new surge of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism in the Middle East which aims to include Soviet Muslims, or irredentist movements, such as present Rumanian claims on Soviet Moldavia or the potential claims of Iranian Azeri Turks and Turkmen on their Soviet counterparts, or vice versa. The event of war between the USSR and any neighboring state which has co-ethnics or co-religionists in the Soviet Union certainly will throw the relationship of Russians to their borderland populations into a new frame of reference.

The regime may be persuaded to mobilize Russians to counter internal threat as well. The "yellow tide" within Soviet borders to the east and south will continue to grow, encouraging non-Russians to become even more assertive of their own diverse ethnic claims. Ethnic strife between Russians and non-Russians will become more intense: in cities where already non-Russians enclaves have begun to cause some hostility among Russians, as Soviet demographers recently have noted; in important Soviet institutions, such as the Red Army, where some non-Russians already have called for the creation of national army units, where the draft pool increasingly will be filled from non-Russians, and where ethnic conflict between Russians and minorities already has been reported; and in the national republics, where in most cases Russians and non-Russians already are highly segregated, where competition between them for jobs and elite positions potentially is the most intense, and where instances of personal violence are likely to continue to multiply as these other conditions become less palatable for both sides. In Moscow, the debate over the allocation of scarce resources will become more pointed as the regime strives to allay incipient economic slowdown, labor deficits in Russian areas, and energy shortages. Should the leadership decide to continue allocating

important resources to non-Russians under these conditions, it is not unlikely that what have been described to date as "bread riots" in Russian cities will assume a much more nationalistic tone.

To complicate matters further, it is unlikely that the regime will renounce Russian nationalism, for the Russian population remains still the largest and best educated in the Soviet state. Moreover, the regime is searching for more effective mobilization instruments to achieve state goals. The "logic" of Marxism-Leninism, uncharismatic personalities, and the propaganda extolling the heroic struggle to build the communist utopia have failed to inspire large numbers of Russians; hence, the regime may choose to employ Russian nationalism as just such a mobilizing tool in order to fulfill its political and economic commitments. Any decision of this kind, as the regime knows, will have high opportunity costs. It is implausible that minority elites will sit idly by and watch a Russian nationalist movement exercise its zeal at their expense. This, then is the dilemma facing the Russian leadership: How to accommodate minority demands without alienating the Russian population; but also how to accommodate and control the resulting Russian nationalism and then to channel it for the fulfillment of state goals without permitting it a life of its own.