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This interim technical report on Contract No. N00014-77-C-0135 presents an analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the volume and the project of which it is a part. Chapter 2 explains the methodological strategy used to identify 386 international crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the period 1946-1975. Chapter 3 presents brief descriptions of the crises. Chapter 4 analyzes the evolving character of Soviet crisis management, while Chapter 5 discusses the incidents in the context of

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other developments in the international system and in Soviet affairs over the period 1946-1976, Appendix A evaluates reliability and validity and compares the list of Soviet crises with previous ARPA-sponsored crisis lists, Appendix B presents technical information concerning the coding schemes employed in the project, while Appendix C provides comparisons of the major U.S. crisis data bases to support the analysis presented in Chapter 5.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RESEARCH STRATEGY

This report provides an analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience from 1946 to 1975. A unique methodological strategy has been developed to identify the Soviet crisis management experience. This research strategy has been developed to meet two criteria:

- Identification of crisis events as perceived by Soviet observers in order to obtain a Soviet perspective on the Soviet crisis experience.
- Development of the Soviet crisis experience data base in a form compatible with previous data dealing with U.S. crises developed by CACI for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to allow for indepth comparisons of the crisis management experiences of the two superpowers.

Analysis shows the limitations that Western approaches to the practice and management of international crises have for the analysis of Soviet experience. Notable problems include fundamental differences between Soviet and Western approaches to political-military subjects, differences in the style of crisis management practiced by the Soviet Union and the position from which it has approached international events, and data limitations. Because of these problems, Western-style analytical approaches should not be applied directly to the analysis of the Soviet crisis experience.

Instead, a new analytical approach has been developed in which Soviet sources are used to identify Western-style crises. The application of this research strategy to a varied set of Soviet source materials produced a data base of 386 foreign crises of concern to the Soviet Union

over the period 1946-1975. Brief descriptions of these situations are presented in Chapter 3.

ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CRISIS EXPERIENCE

The postwar evolution of Soviet crisis management is traced in three ways:

- Examining the relative frequency of crisis characteristics over time for all 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union.
- A comparison of the set of 386 crises with a subset of 73 relatively higher Soviet involvement cases.
- A comparison of both Soviet crisis sets with U.S. crisis characteristics.

The periods used to trace the evolution of Soviet crises over time are based on the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and an examination of trends in the frequency of crisis concerns. Emphasis is given to the periods defined by the 22nd and 23rd Congresses (1961-1971), in which crises were unusually frequent, and to the most recent period (24th Congress, 1971-1975), which was characterized by a lower relative frequency of events.

Some of the findings from the analysis of the entire set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union are:

- The previously cited variation in the frequency of crisis concerns across Party Congress periods.
- The broad geographic scope of Soviet crisis concerns (while the Soviets may not have conducted U.S.-style operations in some regions, for example, Latin America, events in these theaters were of concern to them).

- An increase in the relative frequency of Middle Eastern events and a decline in the relative frequency of crises involving the Soviet homeland and Eastern Europe (with the latter probably due, in part, to the settlement of the Berlin question).
- Consistently low levels of strategic confrontation.
- An increase over time in the frequency of interstate conflicts.
- Relatively steady levels of threat to Communist parties, movements, and regimes in the crises.
- A not unexpected increase in Soviet in-theater military crisis management capabilities during the incidents.
- An increase in the frequency of mixed crisis outcomes (both positive and negative) in recent years.

A subset of 73 cases was identified in which one or more of three attributes were present: threatening verbal behavior, Soviet military forces within the crisis theater, and combat operations by Soviet troops. These relatively higher involvement cases differ from the rest of the 386 crises of concern in the following ways:

- Crises in the subset of higher involvement cases are more likely to occur in key geopolitical regions and to involve interstate (rather than domestic) events.
- Events in the subset are more likely to involve threats to the well-being and/or survival of Communist parties, regimes, and movements.
- Such events are more likely to occur in regions in which the Soviets have in-theater military crisis management capabilities.
- Higher relative involvement cases include proportionately more large power-large power crises.
- Higher relative involvement crises tend to have proportionately more favorable and mixed outcomes.

The comparison of the 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union and the subset of 73 higher relative involvement cases with the record of postwar U.S. crisis operations reveal a number of points:

- A greater focusing of the higher involvement Soviet cases (in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) than was found in either U.S. crisis operations or the entire set of 386 Soviet cases.
- General congruence between the 73 higher involvement Soviet cases and the U.S. operations for the relative occurrence of threats to national interests.
- A very low level of actual strategic confrontation in all of the data bases.
- A remarkable similarity in the duration of crisis activities across all three comparison groups.
- A tendency for Soviet crisis objectives to be somewhat less status quo ante-oriented than is true for U.S. crisis operations.
- A pattern of many more mixed outcomes for the Soviet Union than was true for the United States.

The final sets of analyses pertain to the international context within which Soviet crisis concerns were formed during the postwar period. A review of U.S. postwar crisis behavior was used to set the stage for later comparative analysis and to identify potential correlates of Soviet crisis concerns. This review identified four concomitants of U.S. crisis behavior: the state of the strategic balance (as perceived in the West), Soviet conflict toward the United States, the level of conflict throughout the world, and U.S. involvement in limited wars.

A contextual analysis of the frequency over time of Soviet crisis concerns showed that these concerns shared almost three-quarters of their variance in common with other factors. These include the later CPSU Congresses, Soviet perceptions of the correlation of global forces, Soviet conflict

toward the United States and the People's Republic of China, Chinese conflict toward the Soviet Union, Soviet expressions of tensions regarding Soviet-U.S. relations, the frequency of U.S. crisis operations, and the level of conflict throughout the world.

Three conclusions are drawn from this contextual analysis. First, U.S. crisis operations and Soviet crisis concerns have substantially different correlates. Only two of the factors correlated with U.S. crisis behavior (Soviet conflict toward the United States and the level of conflict throughout the world) also show appreciable relationships with Soviet crisis concerns. Second, the results provide support for the research strategy used to identify Soviet crisis concerns. The Soviet crisis data base is not idiosyncratic. Instead, it shows appreciable relationships with other facets of postwar international relations. Third, while the analysis cannot support causal inferences, the results do suggest that the factors outlined in the previous paragraph are likely to be relatively more important elements to consider in attempts to account for the pattern taken by Soviet crisis concerns during the postwar period.

RESEARCH STRUCTURE

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Interim Technical Report and the Soviet crisis project. Chapter 2 presents the research strategy employed to identify crises of concern to the Soviet Union, while Chapter 3 briefly describes the 386 crises identified using this methodology. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of Soviet crisis management since World War II, and and Chapter 5 locates the Soviet crisis experience within the broader context of postwar international relations. The final chapter outlines the remainder of the project, which involves the coding and analysis of crisis management problems, actions, and objectives for a subset of 100 crises and the development of a computerized executive aid to assist U.S. crisis planners and decision-makers.

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

This report presents an analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience from 1946 to 1975. It is part of a project sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA/CTO) as part of its Crisis Management Program. This chapter provides an overview of the ARPA/CTO Crisis Management Program and CACI's research within this Program, a summary of CACI's Soviet crisis project, and an outline of the remainder of the report.

THE ARPA CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Four of the major classes of products that have been produced within the ARPA Crisis Management Program are:

- Computer-based decision aids that can be employed in national and major command-level operations centers during crisis management activities and provide better crises indications and warning.
- Data bases on the changing character of U.S. crisis management operations, including crisis characteristics, the actions that the United States has employed in these incidents, the objectives it has pursued, and the crisis management problems encountered.
- New quantitative methods for crisis advance warning, monitoring, and management.
- Reports summarizing
  - U.S. crisis management activities from 1946 through 1976,
  - The typical problems encountered in crisis management,

- Current opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and
- Research gaps in planning for better national security crisis management.

Wide-ranging research has been directed toward each of these areas by ARPA since 1974. Initial work through 1976 was directed toward certain basic research themes that are prerequisites for effective technology development in the social sciences. Characteristic of this type of research were CACI's attempts to inventory past U.S. crises (CACI, 1975) and to identify the major patterns of problems encountered in past U.S. crises (CACI, 1976).

By 1976, however, a corner had been turned in the research needs for crisis management. Significant new information had been developed that was directly applicable to producing user-oriented, computer-based aids to

- Assist defense operations centers in identifying what indicator and warning patterns signal the onset of a crisis and
- Develop option generation and evaluation aids to assist crisis managers after the crisis has begun.

CACI'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

CACI's efforts within the Crisis Management Program contribute to four classes of research products:

- Computer-based decision aids applicable to national and major command centers during crisis management activities.
- Data bases on the changing nature of crises, problems likely to be encountered, the types of objectives sought, actions taken, and the results achieved.

- Novel quantitative methods for analyzing U.S. and foreign crisis experiences.

- Substantive reports summarizing the problems of crisis management, the opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and research gaps in the field of planning for better national security crisis management.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among these various classes of products in ARPA's Crisis Management Program. CACI's initial attempts to reconceptualize crises and to develop an inventory of U.S crises began in FY75 (CACI, 1975). These efforts were continued and expanded during FY76 in CACI's major assessment of the background characteristics and problems encountered in a sample of U.S. crises between 1946 and 1975 (CACI, 1976).

Analysis during FY76 indicated three major directions for additional research. First, one tangent of the research (Shaw, et al., 1976) identified terrorist-induced crises as a growing area of concern. Subsequent analyses have identified research and development gaps in this area (CACI, 1977a). Second, the need to reduce crisis management problems by determining the most effective set of actions for different crisis contexts and policy objectives was identified. Accordingly, CACI's efforts during early FY77 focused on examining the relationship between U.S. crisis actions and policy objectives and developing a prototype computer-aiding system for crisis managers that incorporates these empirical relationships (CACI, 1977b). During FY78 this prototype system was developed into CACI's executive aid for crisis managers (CACI, 1978a). The executive aid provides national security planners with ready access to data concerning U.S. crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems over the span 1946-1976. The design characteristics of this aiding system (described in CACI, 1978b) allow planners to have ready access to these data in the course of searching for precedents when planning for ongoing or anticipated crises.



Figure 1. Research Efforts and Research Products

CACI'S SOVIET CRISIS PROJECT

CACI's current analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience entails a number of tasks and subtasks.

- Develop an inventory of Soviet crisis management activities covering the 1946-1975 time frame.
- Identify and collect data on the characteristics of these events to show the nature of Soviet military crises.
- Select (in consultation with the COTR) a subset of these crises for inclusion in more detailed coding and analyses.
- Analyze this subset of the crises to identify
  - Crisis environments that may affect the occurrence of problems in crisis management,
  - Problems encountered by the Soviet Union in crisis management,
  - Soviet actions and objectives, and
  - Some of the general results of these crises.
- Add these data to the executive decision aid system previously developed by CACI (1978a) for analyzing U.S. crises.

The results of this project will provide U.S. national security planners with the most comprehensive data bases (and associated analyses) dealing with Soviet crisis behavior and crisis concerns ever produced. Moreover, this information will be presented in a form (a highly user-oriented computer executive aid) that will facilitate access to the data. This will allow crisis managers and planners to conduct better reviews of past crises (both Soviet and U.S.) in the course of considering action options for ongoing or contemplated crises.

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

Substantial progress has been made on the project. A review of Soviet sources identified 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the period 1946-1975. Using both Soviet and Western sources, the basic characteristics of these 386 incidents have been coded. In consultation with ARPA/CTO a subset has been selected for more intensive coding and analysis. This second coding effort is near completion.

This report focuses on the 386-case data base. Chapter 2 explains the methodological strategy used to identify these crises. Chapter 3 presents the list of crises. Analyses of the crises are reported in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 discusses the incidents in the context of other developments in the international system and in Soviet affairs over the period 1946-1975. Chapter 6 outlines activities for the remainder of Fiscal 1978. Appendix A evaluates reliability and validity and compares the list of Soviet crises with previous ARPA-sponsored and other crisis lists. Appendix B presents technical information concerning the coding schemes employed in the project. Finally, Appendix C presents a comparison of the major U.S. crisis data files to support the U.S.-Soviet comparisons conducted in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFYING THE SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research strategy employed by CACI to identify the Soviet postwar crisis management experience. The application of this strategy has produced a set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the period 1946-1975 and data on the characteristics of these incidents (this set of cases is presented in Chapter 3).

Two criteria were used in developing this methodological strategy. First, to the extent feasible, crises should be identified as perceived by Soviet observers in order to obtain a Soviet perspective on the Soviet crisis experience. In order to adequately account for and (eventually) forecast Soviet crisis management behavior, it is essential to deal with Soviet perceptions of crises that prompt and are correlated with Soviet actions.

The second criterion was that, to the extent practicable, the Soviet crisis experience data base should be developed in a form compatible with previous data files dealing with U.S. crisis behavior developed by CACI for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) (CACI, 1978a). Meeting this criterion would allow for indepth comparisons of the crisis management experiences of the two superpowers.

These two criteria presented a major analytical dilemma for the project, since Soviet and Western approaches to crises and crisis management differ substantially. Reconciliation of the two partially conflicting criteria formed the core of the research strategy.

The sections of this chapter deal with

- Western approaches to crises and their limitations for the analysis of Soviet crisis behavior,

- Soviet approaches and the problems they pose for analysis,
- The means used to reconcile the two criteria, and
- The research strategy:
  - Operational definition and treatment of special cases and
  - Sources employed to identify crises of concern to the Soviet Union.

WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF CRISES

Major Approaches

Each of the three major recent projects dealing with U.S. crisis operations during the postwar years, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), CACI, and Brookings efforts, has employed a different definition of "crisis." In the CNA International Incidents project (Mahoney, 1977b), U.S. crises were defined as

- Any actions taken by the National Command Authorities involving the U.S. Armed Forces,
- In conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United States,
- Other than in the course of general or limited war,
- And with the exception of a few categories of operations (such as humanitarian relief efforts),
- That were reported at a given level in the U.S. political-military policy process.

In this approach, events were considered to be "critical" (crises) if they were highlighted in important service-level and national-level documents, for example, the Operational Summary of the National Military Command Center, the yearly histories produced by each Unified Command, and fleet command histories.

CACI's research (1976) on U.S. crisis operations defined "crises" as instances of extraordinary military management. The formal definition of a "crisis" was

> A period of increased military management activity at the national level that is carried on in a sustained manner under conditions of rapid action and response resulting from unexpected events or incidents that have occurred internationally, internally in a foreign country, or in the domestic United States and that have inflicted or threatened to inflict violence or significant damage to U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities.

Further refining this definition, each incident identified as a crisis had to meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) direct involvement of U.S. military forces in the incident; (2) a military decision on the incident required or made; (3) any subsequent military involvement of U.S. forces; (4) an existing threat of violence or significant damage to U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities; or (5) the need for rapid military action and response. Moreover, instances of humanitarian assistance or military action during a war (such as Korea or Vietnam) after commitment of U.S. forces were not included in the crisis listing. Once these criteria were established, an inventory of incidents since 1946 that met the definition was developed.

The Brookings project (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) focused on political uses of the U.S. Armed Forces.

> A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

The criteria used to identify events in these three recent projects share one major factor in common: all use organizational processes within the U.S. Government to identify crisis events. The projects differ, however, in terms of the type of organizational process examined. The CNA effort employed a source-based definition, with the occurrence of references to incidents in certain types of official U.S. documents used as the mechanism for case identification. The CACI and Brookings efforts, on the other hand, employed event-type definitions involving extraordinary U.S. military management activity (CACI) or certain types of actions and intentions on the part of the U.S. National Command Authorities (Brookings).[1]

In their focus on organizational processes, these three projects differ from two prevailing approaches to the identification and analysis of crises in the Western academic literature. In one of these approaches (Hermann, 1972) an intraactor definition is used, with situations considered to be crises if they entail threats to one or more important goals of a state, allow only a short time for decision before the situation is significantly transformed, and occur as a surprise to decision-makers.[2] Hermann's definition focuses on the perceptual perspective of national decision-makers, a perspective that is very difficult for researchers to capture, even with access to classified materials. The other major academic approach (McClelland, 1972) focuses on interactor factors, with crises being defined in terms of unusual manifestations of the interflow of activity between nations.

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[1] These two approaches were also implicitly source-based in terms of the materials that were available to the two research teams.

[2] Recently there has been a tendency for researchers using an intraactor definition to omit surprise as one of the definitional characteristics, since nations may deliberately attempt to provoke a crisis (for example, Michael Brecher's informal remarks at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 1976).

Limitations of Western Approaches

These Western analyses of crises have produced a body of research that is both analytically rich and policy relevant. However, despite the merits of this research, some major problems occur when these Western approaches are applied to the analysis of Soviet crisis behavior. The reasons for these problems are

- Fundamental differences between Soviet and Western approaches to the analysis of social phenomena in general and political-military factors in particular,
- Differences in the positions from which the Soviet Union and the United States approach crisis management,
- Differences in policy style between the Soviet Union and major Western powers,
- The limited access which Westerners have to data concerning Soviet crisis behavior, and
- Various forms of direct and indirect bias that can affect Western analyses of Soviet behavior.

The first problem is that Soviet analyses of international politics, national security policy, and international crises (along with all other Soviet analyses of social phenomena) differ markedly from those commonly found in the West.[3] These differences are far more subtle, and significant, than simply the use of Marxist-Leninist terms and concepts in Soviet analysis. The most obvious and directly relevant difference is that Soviet authors do not distinguish between "political" and "military" factors in the way in which U.S. analysts customarily do. (This difference is considered in detail in the next section of the paper, which focuses on Soviet approaches to the analysis of crises.)

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[3] Obviously, all Western analyses are not alike. Some Western Marxian analyses share many of the structural emphases found in the Soviet studies cited. The distinction being made is, however, valid for the body of Western crisis management literature being considered.

On a more basic level, Soviet analyses tend to be less "event," episodic, and incident-oriented than is true in the West. Instead, Soviet analysts, using what they refer to as a "dialectical" approach, tend to focus on contextual/systematic factors (the relations that sets of events have with one another) and with longer-term trends and processes (for example, Gantmann, 1972). This emphasis on clusters of factors and longer-term perspectives often leads to the classification of events in terms of "stages," which are long in duration and broader in scope than comparable "crisis events" in Western data files (for example, Yukhananov's (1972) analysis of the stages in the Southeast Asian conflicts since World War II).[4]

The second problem pertaining to the use of Western approaches to analyze the Soviet crisis management experience has to do with the markedly different positions from which the two superpowers approached crises during the postwar period. The United States emerged from the Second World War with substantial, general purpose military forces suitable for far-flung crisis operations, an undamaged economy capable of supporting further military construction, and a vast network of contacts with the preponderance of non-Communist nations and colonies. The Soviets, on the other hand, were devastated during the war. While militarily victorious, their economic base was substantially damaged, and their forces were not structured for distant crisis operations. Moreover, due to both their own policy miscalculations (Stalin's two-camp theory) and Western policies, the Soviet Union was largely isolated from contacts with other nations, particularly what would become the newly independent nations of the Third World.[5]

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[4] A common criticism in the Soviet scholarly literature is that Western analyses employing quantitative techniques tend to focus on too narrow a range of concerns and thereby miss the systemic context which influences behaviors, for example, Melikhov's recent (1977) review of U.S. quantitative international relations studies employing factor analysis.

[5] Stalin's two-camp theory discounted the independence of the former colonies, making them less than attractive targets for social contacts (Zimmerman, 1969).

This difference in positions had two impacts on the Soviet crisis management experience. The first was that the Soviet Union had proportionately less in the way of resources to devote to the construction of "crisis managing" forces in the early postwar years (for example, general purpose naval forces). More significantly, their relative isolation presented them with a different set of crisis management policy problems than were faced by Western nations. While Western nations faced the problem of marshalling forces to support allied nations or factions, particularly in the Third World, the Soviet Union had to develop its contacts in order to gain allies among the newly independent states. These differences in position in all likelihood affected the types of crisis management practiced by the two superpowers.

A third reason why it is difficult to analyze Soviet crisis management behavior from Western analytical perspectives is that the Soviet Union has employed a somewhat different style of crisis management policy than has been used by major Western nations. These differences in style pertain to both the military policy instruments that the Soviet leadership has elected to build and the ways in which these instruments have been employed.

Since World War II the Soviet Union has placed less emphasis in its military acquisition programs on developing projection forces (particularly naval projection forces) than has the United States.[6] During the postwar period the Soviet Navy has had very limited amphibious and seaborne air capabilities.[7] While the absence of these forces during the early postwar period could be partially accounted for on the basis of the

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[6] This contrast is emphasized by the fact that the navy has been the most frequently employed force in U.S. crisis management operations (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976).

[7] The Soviet naval infantry force was only reformed (following the postwar dissolution) in the 1960's; its current strength is approximately one-tenth that of the U.S. Marine Corps.

impact of the Second World War, the persistence of these gaps in Soviet crisis management capabilities is the result of implicit and explicit resource allocation decisions by the Soviet leadership.[8]

The Soviet Union has also been much less prone than Western states such as the United States to employ its armed forces actively in political roles (military aid excepted) in areas that do not border on the homeland or its immediate periphery (in the Soviet case the Soviet Union proper and Eastern Europe) (Hamburg, 1977). This policy style has even extended to relatively inocuous forms of political-military activity, such as naval port visits, which did not begin in the postwar era until 1953 and did not become even relatively frequent until the mid-1960's, two decades after the end of the war (MccGwire, 1975).

A number of nonexclusive factors might account for the different ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union have approached crises. One is that the Soviets may have a different view of the appropriate mix of policy instruments to employ. In his analysis of the role of military force in international relations, General Kulish notes concerning military presence that

> The problem of military presence, similar to any other large military-strategic problem, is first of all an economic and political problem and only thereafter does it become a military problem. If we view the problem of Soviet military presence in this light, then we immediately note that the USSR is following a policy that is basically different from the American plan. It has its own historical, economic, and geographic peculiarities which, distinct from those of the USA, will not allow it or require it to maintain a military presence in remote regions of the world (1972: 102).

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[8] There is some evidence that the Soviet leadership during the late Stalin era intended to construct a Western-style general purpose force navy with attendant projection/crisis management capabilities and that this set of policies was deliberately reversed following the death of Stalin (Herrick, 1968).

A similar logic may be employed by the Soviets in crisis management situations, leading to a less active military diplomacy (again, with the exception of military aid) and a greater relative mix of nonmilitary policy instruments in Soviet political-military diplomacy.

A second factor that might account for the differences in Soviet crisis management policy has to do with the concern expressed by Soviet authors about the dangers of crisis escalation. This concern involves the increased tendency for the largest global powers to become almost immediately involved in international incidents, the strong "uncontrolled element" which exists in modern international crises (for example, the actions of allied states which might not be completely controllable by superpowers), and the obvious danger that a crisis might lead to nuclear war (Zhurkin, 1975). Zhurkin also notes that the participants in international crises may provoke domestic crises within their own nations, as happened in France in the early 1960's due to the Algerian crisis.

On the basis of an analysis of Soviet military writings, Jones (1975) argues that the Soviets are quite concerned with the potential negative domestic ramifications that might follow from Soviet involvement in foreign wars. In fact, a case has been made that one reason behind apparent Soviet reluctance to commit its armed forces beyond its immediate sphere of control (that is, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) is the fear of the impact that such exposure might have on the military personnel involved (as exemplified by the Decembrist revolt and by Stalin's brutal treatment of Soviet personnel involved in the Spanish civil war (Ulam, 1968: 245) and, more recently, those who became prisoners of war during World War II (Medvedev, 1973: 467-469)).

These differences in crisis management policy style have direct implications for analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience. In analyzing U.S. crisis operations, events of major concern to the United States can be identified on the basis of overt military operations that are conducted in conjunction with these crises. Such approaches have

been successfully employed in the Brookings, CNA, and CACI U.S. crisis projects. When analyzing the Soviet crisis management experience, on the other hand, this approach will not suffice since the Soviets do not always make an overt military response (by choice or out of necessity) to all crises of concern to them. The problem is not that the Soviets have fewer crisis concerns than major nations in the West. In their writings the Soviets are quite direct about expressing their interests even when they do not carry out a Western-style military crisis response in conjunction with the crisis. As a consequence, to capture the crisis events of concern to the Soviet Union in the postwar period, a new approach must be fashioned that is responsive to the different perceptions and style of crisis management employed by the Soviet Union.

The final problems in using Western approaches to analyze the Soviet crisis management experience involve the limited access that Westerners have to data concerning Soviet crisis behavior and the various forms of direct and indirect bias that can affect analyses. Soviet authors and spokespersons are notoriously reticent and secretive concerning all aspects of Soviet military behavior, including military operations during crises (Newhouse, 1973; Leitenberg, 1974). While the Soviets do publish works dealing with their major foreign policy actions and with postwar international crises, the volume and quality of material available are substantially less than that available to U.S. researchers in the Western open-source crisis literature. Foreign students of the Soviet crisis management experience can never be "insiders" in the way that was true for analysts working on the major U.S. crisis projects. An effective research strategy must take this difficulty into account.

Finally, some obvious problems arise when Western sources, such as those employed in the major U.S. crisis projects, are used to identify the Soviet crisis experience. Western media, government publications, and academic analyses never cover all events taking place in the world; only some of the news is "fit to print," given policy and public interests

existing in a given country at a given point in time. As a result, there is a real danger that any analysis which relies primarily on Western source materials may not capture the true images of Soviet crisis behavior as seen by Soviet eyes. To cite one example (which is elaborated in Appendix A), Soviet commentaries on crisis events pay much less attention to border and transit events such as those associated with West Berlin prior to the 1970's than is the case in Western sources. Similarly, few Western sources express Soviet concerns regarding the repression inflicted on minor Marxist-Leninist and other leftist movements in the Third World as vividly as is found in Soviet media (for example, a special section of the Documents and Resolutions of the 25th Party Congress is devoted to the fate of such movements in Latin America and other Third World regions).[9]

SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF CRISES

Soviet analyses both resemble and differ from Western studies in the approaches they take to the analysis of crisis management behavior. An effective research strategy for the identification of the Soviet crisis management experience must take both factors into account.

This section deals with three aspects of Soviet analyses. In the first two, differences from Western approaches are emphasized, while the third highlights similarities. The three aspects are

- The way in which Soviet authors link "political" and "military" subjects and, in so doing, avoid making common Western distinctions between the two factors;
- The various ways in which the Soviets define the term "crisis";

[9] Moreover, to the extent that perspectives on Soviet crisis behaviors, as filtered through the medium of Western sources, are desired, the most directly relevant sets of precedents for U.S. planners (U.S. crises involving the Soviet Union) are already partially available in existing U.S. crisis data bases (for example, CACI, 1978a).

- A fairly recent development, the Soviet crisis management literature, which both emulates and interprets comparable Western studies.

The Soviet Approach to "Political" and "Military" Subjects

To the average American, steeped in a tradition of a more or less explicit separation of war from peace and military from civilian, the common temptation is to assume that such an arrangement, in part if not entirely, can safely be projected onto other political cultures. In the case of the Soviet Union, the available evidence points to different picture.

In Lenin's eyes war was indeed as Clausewitz had defined it, namely, "simply the continuation of politics by other (that is, violent) means" (Lenin, Collected Works, cited in Byely, et al., 1972). However, this was not sufficient. To be meaningful, the idea of war, being -- like all other socio-historical phenomena -- subject to the laws of Marxism-Leninism, had to be placed in its proper context, that is, the class struggle. Furthermore, it was held that war "is first and foremost a continuation of domestic [rather than foreign] policy," since the latter expressed "the class structure of society most directly" (Byely, et al., 1972).

Since the struggle against the opponents of historical inevitability and human progress by definition must continue on all fronts (note Brezhnev's recent, angry rebuff to Giscard's suggestion to stop the production of hostile propaganda), detente is, in effect, full-scale "political" or "competitive war" limited only by a mutual recognition of the counterproductive nature of open, armed conflict, that is, that which the West understands as war. The result is an at least partly deliberate fostering of an asymmetry of understanding as to the nature of war and peace (aided more or less unwittingly by a Western predilection for misperceptions).

An ideological view of war and the military as being a seamless, integral subset of total national policy is reflected both in the basic nature of Soviet society and in the apportionment of roles and responsibilities within the Soviet party/government structure. As Odom (1976) implies, Russian society has, through force of internal and external circumstances, had to adopt many of the characteristics of military social structure -- to include rigid, explicit hierarchy; military and military-type titles; and a plethora of uniforms. The revolution of 1917 powerfully reinforced this broad tendency by superimposing on it a political philosophy demanding an even higher degree of hierarchical subordination as well as a total mobilization of all national resources -- spiritual, cultural, physical, and financial -- to be dedicated to unremitting combat against a surrounding host of enemies, both domestic and foreign. However, it was not just the active opponents of the new order that had to be dealt with; the indifferent masses, and even many of the faithful, had to be galvanized to accept and work for sudden, radical change -- the utopian elements in Marxism thus serving to "add to the pressures for total control" (Rothman, 1970).

Both MccGwire (1977) and Mackintosh (1973) clearly point out the basic reality that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has total responsibility for the articulation and implementation of overall national policy by "all of the organs of the Soviet state, including the military organ" (MccGwire, 1977: 53). In institutional terms this means that the Politburo determines basic general policy, which is then carried out by a series of executive and watchdog hierarchies (for example, Higher Defense Council, Ministry of Defense, various economic and administrative ministries, the KGB, the CPSU). Once again an important socio-cultural difference intrudes; due both to "multi-hat" responsibilities of the ruling elite (often referred to as an interlocking directorate) and to deliberate overlapping of missions, the degree of functional separation of purview within the system is considerably less and less clear than found, say, in a comparable Western polity. As Odom

(1973) notes, the military is, then, most accurately described as "an administrative arm of the party, not something separate from and competing with it."

This unification of "political" and "military" factors is carried forward in Soviet defense analyses. For example, in a major analysis of the balance of power, Tomashevsky (1974: 73) explicitly asserts that the balance cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of military factors. In his view, economic, political, ideological, and "moral" factors are equally integral in the balance of power or correlation of forces.[10] Similarly, Proektor notes (1972: 43) that "international conflicts contain two aspects which are inseparably connected to one another -- a political and a military aspect."

This Soviet analytical practice has direct bearing on the analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience. In a sense that is not true in the West, it is fair to say that the Soviets have not had (in their eyes) any "military" crises since World War II. Instead, they have been involved in what they would term (again using Tomashevsky's (1974) terminology) "military-political" and "military-strategic" events. Political-military events are the elements involved in the Soviet crisis management experience.

Soviet Definitions of Crisis

Soviet analyses also differ from Western studies in the ways in which the term/concept of "crisis" is defined. When dealing with political and political-military affairs, Soviet authors tend to use the term "crisis" in three senses. The most basic of these is the "general crisis of capitalism." This term refers to the major change in the international political environment brought on by the 1917 Bolshevik coup d'etat. The success of the revolution "divided the world into two irreconcilably

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[10] Used in this sense, "moral" refers to domestic morale and support for the regime and Soviet international prestige.

warring camps," one, the socialist [that is, Marxist-Leninist], seen as inexorably rising, the other, the capitalist, seen just as assuredly as fading, dying, and doomed to destruction (Aleksandrov, et al., 1940).[11]

The second definition, identified as "governmental crisis," appears to be almost identical to Western usage with respect to cabinet crises in European parliamentary systems, wherein a parliamentary vote of no confidence or serious interministerial conflict effectively halts all governmental action above the routine level. Again, by definition, such crises are restricted to the "bourgeois system" (Aleksandrov, et al., 1940: 437).

A more sophisticated Soviet attempt to come to terms with the idea of crisis is found in Zhurkin (1975), who defines international crisis or conflict as a "direct, immediate political dash between states" and as "exhibiting a tendency to grow (sometimes rather quickly) into a military conflict" (Zhurkin, 1975: 13). He goes on to note that crises are "the result of a sharp, explosive intensification of contradictions in the international arena. Such conflicts are frequently preceded by local crisis situations brought on by aggressive and reactionary forces, as was the case, for example, with the Saigon regime at the end of the 1950's through early 1960's or Israel in the summer of 1967" (Zhurkin, 1975: 14).

To be fully understood, Zhurkin's definition must be supplemented by his views as to the causes behind such international crises. Predictably, Zhurkin holds that, whatever their type, "major international conflicts do not arise by accident; rather they come about as the result of conscious acts of aggression" [never, naturally, on the part of the Soviet Union, its allies, or clients]. "The basic groups of contradictions

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[11] Although Aleksandrov, et al.'s Political Dictionary is now nearly four decades old, it has yet to be replaced. While a document of the Stalin era, virtually the entire current Soviet leadership was raised, educated, and achieved major career advancement under Stalin, and many of the central concepts of that era, such as the general crisis of capitalism, continue to be employed in Soviet analyses (for example, Afanasyev, et al., 1974).

which traditionally give rise to the overwhelming majority of contemporary international conflicts," according to Zhurkin, include the following:

- "The main contradiction of the present epoch, that between socialism and capitalism."
- "The contradictions between imperialism and a national liberation movement, which imperialism attempts to decide to its advantage through the help of colonial forces deployed against the liberation movements."
- Contradictions "among imperialist powers."
- Contradictions "between imperialism and developing nations."
- Contradictions "among independent developing nations of the 'Third World.'"

In his footnote to the above list, Zhurkin explains why "local politico-military conflicts can arise between" certain "chauvinistic and nationalistic" regimes and "socialist states" (that is, between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union); "however," he points out, "such a development of events is a historical exception" (that is, falls outside the otherwise all-encompassing concepts of Marxist-Leninist doctrine).

A final point of interest is his assertion that while, "on the whole, there are many reasons for the existence of basic international conflicts," ..."only as the result of interference (either direct or indirect) on the part of one or more major imperialist powers do local conflicts begin to threaten peace" either in the local conflict area or on a global scale (Zhurkin, 1975: 15).

In sum, then, it can be concluded that, from the Soviet point of view,

- Crises arise from contradictions (that is, basic conflicts) in the fabric of international politics,

- They can arise between opposed ideological systems or among capitalist powers and Third World nations,

- They are never accidental but always deliberately provoked, and

- The Soviet Union and its allies by definition never have crises and never start crises (to cite Aleksandrov, et al. (1940: 654), "The USSR is the only country in the world which knows no crises," and Brezhnev (1977), "It is a question, obviously, of the crisis afflicting the capitalist countries. Neither the Soviet Union nor the other socialist countries experience crises").

The Soviet Crisis Management Literature

The Soviet crisis management literature is a relatively recent phenomenon.[12] This body of research differs from earlier Soviet studies bearing on crises in that it consists of the first attempts at a systematic study of international conflicts (and crises) in the Soviet scholarly literature and in that it explicitly analyzes (and, to some extent, emulates) Western crisis management literature. Soviet analyses in this literature contain some striking similarities to Western analyses in their treatment of communication and signalling in crises and in their evaluation of attempts to formally model international conflicts.

One of the key concepts in the Western crisis literature has been the central role played by signalling (particularly signalling involving the "language of deeds" or movements of armed forces) in crisis interactions (for example, George and Smoke, 1974). This emphasis on intracrisis communications has direct counterparts in the Soviet crisis management literature. For example, Gantmann (1972) calls attention to such factors as the tendency for crises to bring the two superpowers into contact with

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[12] The major works in this literature to date are Zhurkin and Primakov (1972), Zhurkin (1975), and Kulish (1972). The introduction to Zhurkin and Primakov (1972) states that is is the first systematic analysis of its type in the Soviet scholarly literature.

one another even if they were not initially involved in the crisis, communication during crises through the actions of armed forces, and the use of negotiations (one form of institutionalized communication) to mitigate or limit ongoing crises and conflicts. In the same vein, Gromyko (1972a) presents a detailed Soviet analysis of superpower communications during the Cuban missile crisis.

This recognition of the importance of signalling and communications is important for present purposes because it suggests (without necessarily proving) that the Soviet Union may also recognize broader forms of crisis signalling and communications that are required to allow antagonists to make predictions about one another's behavior. Major powers have traditionally attempted to make such signals (an example is the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, which allows other major powers to anticipate a forceful U.S. reaction to any attempts to intervene in Latin America). It is possible that the Soviets may use their open literature to index their principal concerns (that subset of crises of particular interest to them) to both foreign and domestic audiences.

A related development of interest, which is found in both the Soviet crisis management literature and, more generally, throughout the Soviet social science literature, is a sympathetic attitude toward attempts to model political phenomena formally through techniques such as factor analysis and regression (for example, Melikhov, 1977; Fedorov, 1975; and Osipov and Andreyenkov, 1974). While the Western efforts reviewed by these authors are criticized for their "bourgeois" theoretical bases and their failures to consider the systemic aspects of behaviors, particularly the complex interdependencies which political, military, and sociological variables have with one another, there is, nevertheless, a genuine interest in and sympathy toward these more formal techniques. This sympathy also extends to the development of systematic machine-readable data bases. In his review of the use of forecasting methodologies in U.S. foreign policy, Kokoshin (1975) singles out the

development of computerized "information banks" by U.S. analysts as an area deserving attention from Soviet scholars.

The significance of this analytical trend for this project is direct. It suggests that the present attempt to develop a systematic data base dealing with Soviet crisis management behavior that will be embedded in the form of a computerized decision aid is consistent with Soviet analytical emphases and hence that the style of analysis to be employed does not do violence to Soviet analytical perceptions.

RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO CRITERIA

The two criteria employed in developing the research strategy to identify the Soviet crisis management experience are

- To identify crises as perceived by Soviet observers in order to obtain a Soviet perspective on the Soviet crisis management experience, and
- To develop the Soviet crisis experience data base in a form compatible with previous data files dealing with U.S. crisis behavior developed by CACI for ARPA to facilitate comparative analyses of the crisis management experiences of the two superpowers.

These two criteria conflict to some extent because of the differences between Soviet and Western approaches to the analysis and management of crises outlined in the preceding sections.

The research strategy developed in response to these criteria is to use Soviet sources to identify Western-style crises. This strategy employs elements from both the Soviet and Western approaches outlined previously. Major elements taken from the Western perspective include the following:

- The treatment of crisis events as discrete episodes (in contrast to the Soviet tendency to often focus on longer-term crises which, in some cases, span decades).

- A focus on negative events (viewing crises as turning points, Soviet authors would focus on both negative and positive events; examples of the latter would include major Soviet accords with Western nations which have settled outstanding Cold War issues such as the status of Berlin).

- The definition of crisis events in terms of their actual or potential negative impact on political-military values or interests (one of the three defining elements of crisis employed by Hermann (1972)).

- The employment of an organizational process (citation of an incident in a Soviet source) to identify cases, much as CNA's International Incidents project used official U.S. source materials to identify Navy and Marine Corps crisis operations (since Soviet sources are both approved and published by party and governmental bodies, publication constitutes a form of organizational process in a way that is not true for the Western open-source literature).

Major elements taken from the Soviet perspective include

- A focus on political-military rather than simply military events,[13]

- The use of a case identification criterion (appearance in a Soviet source) that takes into account differences between Soviet and U.S. crisis management styles and positions by not focusing exclusively on the overt operations of military forces,

- The recognition accorded in the Soviet crisis management literature to the need for crisis communications by examining explicit (open-source) Soviet communications, and

- The avoidance of implicit and explicit Western biases by the use of Soviet sources.

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[13] However, in that our approach does include the Soviet Union as an actor involved in crises, it is inconsistent with Zhurkin's (1975) usage of the term.

Like all compromises, this research strategy is by no means perfect. While comparable in form, the Soviet and U.S. crisis data bases developed by CACI will differ in focus, with the U.S. information dealing with more overt forms of extraordinary military management operations, while the Soviet definition deals with crisis concerns. However, given the nature of the problem, it is the best technical solution available.[14]

Since Soviet materials are being used to identify crises of concern to the Soviet Union, it is necessary to address the inevitable questions that arise concerning their reliability. As noted previously, Soviet writings have been noted for their reticence concerning Soviet military activity. Moreover, these materials can include propaganda and outright mendacity. Given these problems, which are real difficulties, can we place any reliance on Soviet sources?

The answer to the question is a qualified yes, qualified in terms of their use. Soviet sources will be employed to identify events of concern to the Soviet Union. Given the recognition on the part of Soviet authors of the importance of intracrisis communications (which potentially can be generalized to broader forms of communication concerning crisis concerns) to signal to domestic and foreign audiences their self-perceived crisis interests, and the character of many of the Soviet works in question as explicit attempts to communicate with Western and domestic Soviet audiences (all of the Soviet writings used are open-source materials),[15] the research team believes the sources are adequate

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[14] Moreover, in the analysis to follow, attention will be specifically focused on the subset of Soviet crisis concerns that involved either threatening verbal behavior and/or operational activity by Soviet military forces within the crisis theater. This subset more closely resembles the set of U.S. operations collected in CACI's U.S. crisis project than does the entire set of Soviet crisis concerns cases.

[15] Moreover, to better capture explicit Soviet attempts to communicate their concerns to Western audiences, particular emphasis has been placed on materials that have been translated into Western languages by the Soviet Union.

to the task of identifying those events (of all postwar crises) that were of particular concern to the Soviet Union.

This deliberately limited use of the Soviet sources ameliorates and/or eliminates many problems that would otherwise arise. The question of censorship is not a concern. Indeed, insofar as it ensures better consistency between Soviet writings so as to better present the "party line," it works to the benefit of the project. Similarly, any attempts by Soviet authors to misrepresent Soviet actions during a crisis are irrelevant, since Western sources are also used (both as cross-checks and as independent sources of information) in coding variables. Finally, there is no reason to be concerned with the extent to which the sources capture the "true" beliefs and positions of the top Soviet leadership. Barring certain forms of literature such as science fiction, the Soviets do not casually publish books and articles. The body of work that has been published has significance and import simply by virtue of having been published.

DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Definitions

Based on the preceding analysis, crises of concern to the Soviet Union are defined as

- Events involving foreign nations (both internal and international),
- Involving conflict (violent or nonviolent), significant trends, and "structural" changes which might negatively affect Soviet political-military interests,
- Which are cited in certain classes of Soviet sources.

The first term in the definition identifies the geographic scope of the crisis concerns. Crises that are internal to the Soviet Union have been

excluded because there appear to be no data sources (either Soviet or Western) which provide a reasonably systematic and consistent account of such incidents.

The second term lists the three generic types of events that are of interest. The first are violent and nonviolent conflict events. The second set includes dangerous trends and turning points that the Soviets call attention to in their writings (for example, West German remilitarization). The third category encompasses what the Soviets see as significant "structural" threats, for example, the formation of NATO and other "aggressive" and "anti-Soviet" alliances.

The final term refers to the sources used to identify the crises of concern to the Soviet Union. These materials are described at greater length below.

In employing this definition to identify Soviet crisis concerns, four significant exceptions and elaborations were made. The first has to do with the use of Western sources. Publishing inevitably involves delays between the completion of a manuscript and the publication of a book or article. This creates a problem for the project in the later years of the survey since some of the relevant Soviet source materials have not yet been printed.[16] In response to this problem, Western sources were used as a supplemental source of data in the years 1973-1975. Cases identified in this fashion are clearly marked in the list of Soviet crisis concerns presented in Chapter 3. Western sources employed included The New York Times, Facts on File, Deadline Data, Keesing's, the Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and existing data files dealing with U.S. crises produced by CACI (1978a),

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[16] It should be emphasized that this is only a relative problem. Some of the sources (for example, the International Affairs chronology of significant foreign events, and the Party Congress materials) go through 1975. Coverage in the Soviet materials is fairly good through the October war of 1973.

Brookings (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976), and the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1978a).

The second elaboration pertains to the treatment of Southeast Asian/Vietnamese war and Middle Eastern events. As might be expected there is a good deal of material on these subjects in the Soviet sources reviewed. While these sources tended to be very consistent in their categorization of the major events (for example, the June 1967 war), there are inconsistencies between sources in the treatment and categorization of periods of lesser tension (for example, the prolonged "War of Attrition" between Egypt and Israel in the early 1970's). In response to this problem, particular emphasis was given to Yukhananov's (1972) analysis of conflict in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia since World War II and to two Soviet works on Middle Eastern affairs: Nikitina's The State of Israel, A Historical Economic and Political Study (1973) and (no author) The Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World (1975). Use of these volumes in this manner reduced the number of overlapping references to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern incidents.

A third elaboration involves "continuous" crises. During the postwar period, the Soviets have perceived a number of more or less continuous crises, for example, U.S. plans over a number of years to form a Multilateral Nuclear Force that could have included West Germany (Steinbruner, 1974), which the Soviets saw as a particularly significant danger to their political-military interests. When faced with crises of this variety, an attempt was made to use the periods of peak concern identified in the Soviet sources to structure these events into more discrete crises.

The final elaboration concerns the need to interpret Soviet sources. The Soviet authors of the sources used to identify crisis concerns did not intend for their materials to be used to support a crisis management experience data base. As a consequence, the writings are often unclear as to the exact starting and termination of the events and other facets

of the crises. One consequence is that the dates for the incidents are less hard and fast than is the case for comparable crises in CACI's U.S. crisis operations data base (CACI, 1978a). In a few cases, references in the Soviet sources were so vague as to preclude identification of a specific crisis (for example, Astafyev and Dubinsky's citation (1974: 119) of Peking's attempts to stir up disagreements between the Bahutu and Batutsi tribes in Burundi and Rwanda, which is of little use given the continuing series of conflicts between these two tribes during the post-war period). In less extreme cases Western materials were used, in an adjunct role, to locate the focus and boundaries of incidents.

Sources

Six sets of Soviet sources have been used to identify the foreign crises of concern to Soviet decision-makers over the period 1946-1975:

1. Soviet statements in the United Nations.
2. The Soviet crisis management literature.
3. Soviet "State of the World" messages.
4. Soviet texts dealing with international events.
5. Khrushchev's memoirs.
6. Soviet chronologies.

The Soviet Union regards the United Nations (particularly the Security Council) as a major forum for presenting its views and as an important medium for crisis diplomacy (Zhurkin and Primakov, 1972). A detailed analysis of all UN Yearbooks published since 1946 captures this aspect of Soviet concern with foreign crises.

In recent years Soviet scholars at the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute of World Political Economy have produced a small crisis

management literature that is comparable in many respects to that found in the West. This literature has not been translated into English by the Soviet Union, but the major texts are freely available, in Russian, to Westerners. The survey of Soviet sources includes the three major works in this category.

The Soviet Union has a formal policy planning cycle that coincides with the CPSU Congresses. At each Congress since World War II there has been an assessment of the Soviet international position that has included a consideration of the international crises which occurred in the period between Congresses. All postwar Congresses are included in the data base.

The Soviet Union publishes a large number of books, many of which deal with international affairs. In some, but by no means all, cases the Soviets translate these works into English and arrange for their sale in the West. These works are major Soviet inputs into an ongoing "dialog" between East and West in which the Soviets attempt to present their perceptions of world affairs to foreign audiences. The catalogs of the two major outlets for Soviet books in the United States were obtained, and all titles that appeared to deal in any way with events of interest were ordered.

Khruschev's memoirs are another form of Soviet communication to the West. On the one hand, they are clearly not official publications and were not translated for foreign distribution by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, given the sheer volume of material that was provided to Western publishing houses, the prominence of the author, and some of the "editorial" changes in the transcripts which occurred prior to their arrival in the West, there may have been informal acquiescence in their publication on the part of the Soviet leadership. As a result, they are included in the survey.

Finally, the survey includes chronologies of Soviet foreign policy actions and international events published in English by the Soviet Union. Other chronologies found in Soviet texts were also employed. The specific source materials used in this and the other categories are listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Soviet Sources

Soviet Statements in the United Nations

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1973. New York: United Nations.

Soviet Crisis Management Literature

KULISH, V.M. (1972) Military Force and International Relations. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House (JPRS, 58947, 8 May 1973).

ZHURKIN, V.V. (1975) The USA and International Political Crises. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka (Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, No. 658, 29 July 1975).

_____ and YE. M. PRIMAKOV (1972) International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka (JPRS Translation 58443, 12 March 1973).

BYKOV, O.N. (1972) "International Conflicts and the Imperialist Partnership," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

GANTMAN, V.I. (1972) "The Types, Content, Structure, and Phases of Development of International Conflicts," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

GROMYKO, A.A. (1972) "The Caribbean Crisis," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

_____ (1972) "The 'Crisis Diplomacy' of the Imperialist Powers," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

PCHELINTSEV, YE. S. (1972) "Current International Legal Means of Settling Inter-State Conflicts," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

PRIMAKOV, YE. M. (1972) "The Near East Conflict," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

PROEKTOR, D.M. (1972) "International Conflicts and Imperialism's Current Military Strategy," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

YUKHANANOV, YU. A. (1972) "The United States Aggression in Indochina," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

Continued

Table 1
Soviet Sources
Continued

ZHURKIN, V.V. (1972) "The Policy of Imperialism -- The Basic Source of International Conflicts and Crises," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

_____ (1972) "On the Role of the Soviet Union in the Struggle to Eliminate Hotbeds of War and to Strengthen International Security," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

_____ and V.A. KREMENYUK (1972) "The Indo-Pakistan Conflict of 1971," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

Soviet "State of the World" Messages

Documents and Resolutions, Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Various Dates, 19th through 25th Congresses, 1952-1976). Moscow.

Soviet Texts

ABOLTIN, V., et al. (1971) Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

ARBATOV, G. (1973) The War Of Ideas In Contemporary International Relations. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

ASTAFYEV, G.V. and A.M. DUBINSKY (1974) From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism, The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

BASKAKOV, E. and Y. KORNILOV (1975) Soviet-American Relations: New Prospects. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

BELOKOV, A. and V. TOLSTIKOV (1957) The Truth About Hungary. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

BORISOV, O.B. and B.T. KOLOSKOV (1975) Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945-1973, A Brief History. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

BREZHNEV, L.I. (1975) The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

BRUTENTS, K. (1972) A Historical View of Neo-Colonialism. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

Continued

Table 1
Soviet Sources
Continued

BYELY, B., et al. (1972) Marxism-Leninism On War and Army. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

DENISOV, Y. (1972) U.S. Imperialism In South-East Asia. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

GROMYKO, A. (1968) The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

GUSEV, K. and U. NAUMOV (1976) The USSR, A Short History. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Institute of the Staff of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1972) Problems of War and Peace. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

KIRSANOV, A. (1975) The USA and Western Europe. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

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CHAPTER 3. CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION, 1946-1975

CRISIS LIST

Using the methods and sources presented in Chapter 2, 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union were identified over the period 1946-1975. These incidents are listed in Table 1. To capture some of the "flavor" of these events as described in the original Soviet sources, the material included in this table has deliberately been written from a Soviet perspective.

TABLE 1

Major International Crises of Concern to the Soviet Union, 1946-1975
(As Seen Through Soviet Eyes)

Crisis Number	Date	Events
001	451110-490622	Indonesian war of national liberation against Dutch.
002	460119-460501	India: Uprisings in Indian armed forces; part of Indian struggle for national liberation.
003	460119-541202	Soviet-Iranian disputes involving Soviet forces in Azerbaijan, Soviet-Iranian economic issues, Iranian repression of democratic forces within Iran, and border issues.
004	460121-470123	Greece: British forces attempt to suppress progressive forces.
005	460204-460216	Soviets press for removal of French forces from Syria and Lebanon; final forces leave by year's end.
006	460221-	West attempts to use economic incentives and sanctions to influence Soviet policy.
007	460305	Churchill's Fulton "Iron Curtain" speech -- a major signal in the West's movement toward "Cold War."
008	460316-491001	Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army, with substantial Soviet assistance, successfully conduct revolutionary war of liberation.
009	4603-461009	Turkey: United States supports reactionary regime in its internal and external conflicts.
010	460604-	Trieste: The Soviet Union supports Yugoslavia in its territorial dispute with Italy.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
011	460701	The United States conducts its first peacetime atomic tests; this is a major event denoting the initiation of U.S. "atomic diplomacy."
012	460900-461000	South Korea: Popular uprisings against U.S. imperialism.
013	460900	Burma: General strike conducted as part of national liberation movement.
014	461202-470401	Germany: Despite Soviet protests, the United States and the United Kingdom sign an agreement leading to the economic merger of their zones of occupation in Germany; major violation of Potsdam agreements.
015	461219-500508	Initial phase of French colonial war in Indochina.
016	470110-470523	The Soviet Union supports Albania during its dispute with the United Kingdom and other nations concerning passage through the Corfu Straits.
017	4701-4702	Anti-republican conspiracy fails in its attempts to restore bourgeois-landlord rule in Hungary.
018	470207-480515	Conflict in Palestine involving British, Israeli, and Arab Palestinian forces.
019	470228	Taiwan: Unsuccessful popular uprising against KMT regime.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
020	470312-501115	Truman Doctrine proclaimed by the United States -- denotes a new phase in U.S. involvement in both Greek and Turkish affairs; an intensification of the "Cold War" and of U.S. involvement in the Greek civil war.
021	470331-	Madagascar: Popular uprising against French colonial rule.
022	4703-4710	Uprising against regime in Paraguay suppressed with U.S. assistance.
023	4704-471021	Chile: The United States launches political offensive against progressive forces; Chilean Government turns to the right, breaks with Chilean CP, arrests CP's leaders, breaks diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
024	470505	French Communist Party loses its role in the French Government, in large part due to U.S. pressures.
025	470530	As a condition for U.S. aid, the Italian Communist Party is removed from the Italian Government; like the previous event, part of a general U.S. anti-Communist offensive in Western Europe.
026	470605	The United States adopts Marshall Plan; this plays a major role in U.S. attempts to gain economic domination in Western Europe and to use economic policy as a means of affecting Soviet policy.
027	470820-470910	The Soviet Union gives public support to Egyptian demands for the removal of British forces from Egypt and the Sudan.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
028	470917-491003	South Korea: The United States extends its influence in, and control of, events; the Republic of Korea begins to rearm, with U.S. aid.
029	470930	With the active support of U.S. and British intelligence agencies, reactionary forces in Rumania unsuccessfully plot to overthrow the government.
030	471020-481230	Conflict between India and Pakistan concerning Kashmir.
031	480126-480129	Rioting and cabinet crisis in Iraq prompted by a proposed treaty with the United Kingdom lead to a new government and rejection of the treaty.
032	480219-6209	Yemen: The Soviet Union opposes British operations and political intrigues that affect the interests of Yemen.
033	480223-480306	London Conference: Western powers begin, despite Soviet objections, to create the Federal Republic of Germany.
034	480225-480614	The resignation of 12 cabinet members occurs as part of a reactionary putsch attempt with ties to Western powers; the effort fails and a progressive regime takes over in Czechoslovakia on 14 June.
035	480301-481224	Costa Rica: Civil war and intervention by U.S. mercenaries.
036	480317	The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux nations sign the Treaty of Brussels; this new alignment is not in the interests of the Soviet Union.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
037	480401-480623	Early stages of the Berlin crisis involving border controls and checkpoints between the Western- and Soviet-controlled sectors of Germany.
038	480409	Popular uprising against the regime in Colombia.
039	480515-490720	First major war between Israel and Palestinian and Arab forces.
040	480616-5708	Malayan war of independence against British colonial rule.
041	480623-490504	Berlin crisis: Responding to the extension of currency reforms to West Berlin by the Western Powers (an act which endangered the economy of the Soviet sector of Germany), controls were placed on access to West Berlin.
042	480628-	Sharp deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations; Tito adopts non-internationalist course.
043	480718-480721	Bolivia: Leftist and liberal elements triumph in uprising; right-wing Villarroel regime ousted.
044	480730-480818	Eastern European regimes reject British, French, and U.S. bids for access to the Danube River.
045	4807	Italy: Following the wounding of Italian CP leader/theoretician Togliatti by a neo-fascist (and the mass protest strike involving millions of workers that followed this incident), right-wing forces launch counteroffensive that ends with Italian accession to the Marshall Plan.
046	481016-54	Armed national liberation struggle in the Philippines.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
047	490320-490323	Israeli forces violate ceasefire agreements, seize territory in the Sinai, including the area that is later developed into the port of Eilat.
048	490404	NATO treaty is signed, marking a new stage in the "Cold War."
049	490430	Czechoslovakia: The United States and other Western nations support a bourgeois coup attempt that fails following an unsuccessful raid on an arsenal.
050	490907-491001	The Federal Republic of Germany is proclaimed; the Soviet Union disclaims all responsibility for the division of Germany thus effected by the Western powers.
051	491001-500214	Responding to a request from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union deploys air force units to protect Shanghai from KMT air attacks.
052	49-6209	Border conflicts between Yemen and British-occupied territory on the Arabian peninsula.
053	500108-	Ghana: General strike, boycott, demonstrations in support of national liberation struggle.
054	500320	Israeli forces occupy Bir Kattat in the demilitarized zone, withdraw following protests.
055	500411	U.S. bomber violates Soviet airspace along the Baltic coast; Soviet air defenses halt this illegal penetration.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
056	500425	The United States, France, and Great Britain sign the Tripartite Declaration; this leads to the unrestricted supply of arms to Israel and Arab States; part of a policy of supporting anti-Communist regimes in the region.
057	500508-540721	Indochina: Major increase in U.S. aid to France initiates a new phase in the war.
058	500614-500615	Peru: Revolt in Arequipa by progressive forces is quickly crushed.
059	500625-530727	Korean War: The Soviet Union provides logistical support to the People's Republic of China and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the request of the PRC, Soviet air units are moved to Manchuria to protect industrial centers.
060	500627	President Truman orders the U.S. 7th Fleet to prevent attacks on Taiwan; this marks a major shift in U.S. policy regarding the defense of the KMT regime.
061	501030-501101	U.S. troops suppress uprising in Puerto Rico.
062	510228-510301	Uprisings in Peru fail; leadership of outlawed Peruvian People's Party arrested.
063	5107	Gomulka, four associates removed from leadership in Poland, largely due to Stalin's actions.
064	511004-520213	Soviets protest French policies in Morocco.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
065	511016-511105	Egypt: Major clashes against British occupation occur in Ismailia and Port Said; over 500 Egyptians killed and wounded.
066	511021-511124	Western states propose creation of Middle Eastern Command -- an anti-Soviet military bloc; the Soviet Union denounces this as an aggressive action directed against it and its allies.
067	511109-511214	Yugoslavia uses the United Nations as a forum to raise the issue of the threats it perceives from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states.
068	511122	The Soviet Union asks the U.N. General Assembly to consider the issue of U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of Eastern European nations; part of this issue involves the U.S. Mutual Security Act.
069	5112-580617	Tunisian national liberation struggle: General strike, demonstrations, violence as French fire on demonstrators.
070	520125	Barracks revolt of soldiers on Cyprus (unsuccessful).
071	520310	Cuba: Military coup conducted with U.S. backing; Batista regime established.
072	520409-520412	Nationalist revolution overthrows military junta in Bolivia.
073	520526-540830	Efforts by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany to form the European Defense Community in violation of the Postdam Agreement.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		The Federal Republic of Germany agrees to join on 29 May 1954. Crisis passes with French Embassy's failure to ratify agreement on 30 August 1954.
074	520723	Anti-imperialist national revolution in Egypt; leads to withdrawal of British forces from Suez Canal Zone.
075	520726	Revolutionary uprising against Batista's regime in Cuba.
076	5207-5509	The United States uses diplomatic pressure, direct acts of aggression (carried out by Israeli extremists), and economic pressures in an attempt to draw Egypt into a pro-Western alliance.
077	5209-5212	Burmese troops conduct operations against KMT forces in Burma.
078	521120-600112	Colonial war of British imperialists against the national liberation struggle of the Kenyan people.
079	521122-521123	Iraq: Riots lead to fall of government, election reforms; British Legation and USIS office are major targets for rioters.
080	530208	Peru: Unsuccessful anti-regime strike in Arequipa; leaders of opposition arrested.
081	530325-531208	Burma: Soviet Union supports regime, opposes presence of KMT units in northern Burma.
082	530617	Berlin: West German revanchists, with U.S. support, attempt counter-revolutionary putsch in East Berlin

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		in the hope of starting a country-wide revolt within the German Democratic Republic; Soviet action crushes this effort.
083	530617-5309	Riots occur in seven Polish cities, initiating a period of domestic political problems in Poland.
084	530709-560302	Progressive nationalist forces in Morocco conduct national liberation struggle against French rule.
085	5310	British troops conduct aggression in Kuwait.
086	540127-540706	U.S. intervention suppresses anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in Guatemala.
087	540331	Soviet proposal to join NATO rejected by West, indicating that the Western powers have rejected both the spirit and the letter of the Potsdam Agreement and that NATO is an anti-Soviet alignment.
088	540520	U.S. imperialists overthrow the lawful government of South Korea.
089	540529-550820	Thailand unsuccessfully requests the United Nations to send a peace observation team in response to its reports of border incidents.
090	5405-5409	Chile: Domestic disorders, including a general strike, supported by progressive forces, including Chilean CP.
091	540903-550405	Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Soviet Union protests U.S. aggression against the People's Republic of China and U.S. actions against merchant ships on the high seas; the

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		People's Republic of China protests the signing of the U.S.-ROC defense agreement; the People's Republic of China adopts more flexible policies toward the United States and Republic of China in late March-early April.
092	540908	SEATO formed, an anti-Soviet group.
093	540908-540910	Over Soviet objections, the United States succeeds in placing the issue of the Soviet shoot-down of a U.S. P-V-2 on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.
094	5409	U.S. leaders give serious consideration to joint U.S.-UK-French action in Indochina but finally elect not to send combat forces.
095	541023	The United States, the United Kingdom, and France sign Paris Agreements on West German remilitarization, membership in NATO; in response, the Soviet Union annuls its 1944 treaty with France.
096	541101-620319	France launches a punitive colonial war in Algeria. The United States helps to finance French operations and puts pressure on Algeria by withholding food deliveries. Soviet aid plays a major role in the victory of the national liberation forces.
097	550104-550128	Egypt interferes with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.
098	550116	U.S. mercenaries conduct aggression against Costa Rica.
099	550116-550514	The Soviet Union fails to head off implementation of the Paris

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		Agreements, under which the Federal Republic of Germany would be remilitarized and allowed to join NATO. As a defensive measure, the Soviet Union and other regional states form the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
100	550120	One-day unsuccessful uprising in Guatemala involving a mutiny by leftists at the Aurora military base.
101	550224-551103	Formation and signing of Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), an anti-Soviet group.
102	550301-550330	Israeli ceasefire violations criticized.
103	550401-580805	Armed struggle of Cypriots against British colonialism.
104	550416	Pressures placed on Syria to have it join in a military alliance with Turkey and Iraq; Syrian concern with Turkish hegemony in region.
105	550504-550604	Colombia: Peasant uprisings.
106	5505-7109	Britain, acting in concert with the Sultan of Muscat, intervenes in Oman, opposes national liberation forces, has border incidents with Saudi Arabia.
107	5506-600101	French forces conduct a colonial struggle against progressive elements in Cameroon.
108	550701-550710	General strike in Chile.
109	550822-550905	Israeli forces violate ceasefire, occupy positions that will later serve as springboard for Sinai offensive in 1956.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
110	550916	Peron ousted in Argentina.
111	550925-700430	Struggle for Cambodian independence enters second phase, characterized by border clashes with neighbors.
112	550927	The Egyptian Government acts boldly to end the Western monopoly on arms supplies; purchase agreements signed with Czechoslovakian Soviet Socialist Republic and Soviet Union.
113	551026-601220	Struggle for Vietnamese unity and independence enters new phase; Republic of Vietnam proclaimed on 26 October.
114	551213-560119	Israeli forces carry out attacks near Lake Tiberias.
115	5512-6304	New phase in Laotian struggle for unity and independence; internal civil war.
116	560109	U.S. Secretary of State Dulles promises to work for the "liberation" of peoples in Eastern Europe.
117	560213-560417	Jordanian Crisis: The Soviet Union expresses concern regarding the presence of Western military forces in the region and the possibility of Western intervention.
118	560628-560630	Poznan: Polish workers strike and demonstrate, demand withdrawal of Soviet troops; the Soviet Union concerned with potential break in Polish-Soviet relations.
119	560726-561028	Suez Canal nationalization crisis: Imperialist states put pressure on Egypt.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
120	560801	Honduras: Unsuccessful uprisings led by Captain Santos Osorto Paz against dictatorial regime and supported by liberal and Communist forces.
121	561018-561021	Poland: Gomulka is released from prison and assumes power; disorders continue but main danger to Soviet interests passes.
122	561027-561110	Hungarian revolution by counter-revolutionary forces.
123	561029-561108	"Triple Aggression": British, French, and Israeli forces attack Egypt.
124	5610-561125	Large-scale demonstrations and riots in Iraq, related to Suez crisis.
125	561102	Kuwait: Uprising against British rule.
126	561109-5704	After having been checked in the Suez crisis, Israel refuses to withdraw from the occupied territories; the United States encourages and supports this behavior; bowing to Soviet pressures and world opinion, Israel finally evacuates.
127	561117-591021	The Soviet Union supports the People's Republic of China in its annexation of Tibet.
128	561130-590101	Civil war and victory of national liberation movement in Cuba.
129	570105	The United States adopts the Eisenhower Doctrine, by which it claims the "right" to use its armed forces against any state in the Middle East

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		whose internal or foreign policies are not to U.S. liking.
130	5702	Anti-Soviet demonstrations and riots occur in Sian, China.
131	570302-580819	The United States instigates rebellions in Indonesia; when these efforts fail, the United States makes a major shift in policy and provides aid to the Sukarno regime.
132	570327-570127	The Soviet Union interprets the FRG Bundestag resolutions as empowering the FRG Government to acquire missiles and nuclear weapons; the Soviets warn the Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire such weapons.
133	570419-570525	Jordanian crisis: Jordan represses patriotic forces; United States invokes Eisenhower Doctrine and deploys Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean.
134	570510	Rojas Pinilla dictatorship overthrown in Colombia.
135	5705	Anti-Soviet elements within the People's Republic of China plan provocations on the occasion of Voroshilov's visit to Kwangchow.
136	570816-	Soviets support Indonesian claims to West Irian.
137	570903-571230	Soviets support Syria in Syrian-Turkish crisis.
138	580101	Formation of European Economic Community damages trade relations between Socialist states and members of the Community, a significant event because trade relations play a

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		major role in the process of normalizing relations between states.
139	580123	Perez Jimenez dictatorship overthrown in Venezuela.
140	580220	Sudan accuses Egypt of massing troops in border regions; the Soviet Union avoids taking sides in this dispute.
141	5803	Peasant movement formed in Venezuela; peasants seize large estates; regime adopts ambivalent stance with respect to peasant movement.
142	5803	British suppress popular uprising in Nyasaland (Malawi).
143	580513-580520	U.S. forces prepare to intervene in Venezuela in response to civil disorders.
144	580513-581013	Right-wing members of the French military, upset over reverses in Suez and Algeria, join Algerian settlers in revolt.
145	580518-580624	Serious civil disorders in Lebanon.
146	580714-580821	Coup overthrowing monarchy in Iraq leads to crisis involving Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey; imperialist forces intervene in Lebanon and Jordan.
147	580823-581025	Offshore islands crisis between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
148	580905	Major shift in PRC policies -- Great Leap Forward, people's communes, increase in great power ambitions, Chinese nationalism. Policy failures lead to anti-Soviet hysteria.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
149	580929-590826	French impose economic sanctions against Guinea; Soviets assist Guinea with credit agreements.
150	581114-590928	Berlin crisis: Western states reject Soviet proposals for normalization of status of Berlin; NATO states back FRG claims; West Berlin serves as a center of subversion.
151	58-59	PRC: Mao angrily refuses to allow the Soviet Union to build communications stations on Chinese territory, even in exchange for shared use of Murmansk.
152	590104-590106	Congo (Zaire): Popular uprising against dictatorial regime.
153	590530-5908	Nicaragua: Unsuccessful uprisings against dictatorial regime.
154	5906-6006	Chinese leadership provokes conflict with Indonesia over the question of overseas Chinese residing in the latter nation.
155	590828-591120	Sino-Indian border clashes.
156	591212-600429	Unsuccessful uprising, armed struggle against dictatorial regime in Paraguay.
157	591216-	Soviet Union initiates strong public opposition to South African rule in Namibia.
158	600112-601109	Burma: Anti-government, secessionist elements gain strength; serious armed uprising.
159	600118	Cameroon: French troops intervene on behalf of local regime.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
160	600427	Rhee dictatorship overthrown in South Korea.
161	600401-611201	PRC leadership publishes Long Live Leninism, a major doctrinal break with Soviet Marxist-Leninist theory; initiation of open ideological struggle with Soviet Union/Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
162	600501-600615	Soviet air defenses down U.S. U-2. Incident was staged by elements in the United States opposed to U.S.-Soviet summit conference. In the aftermath of this incident, the Soviet Union adopted a new policy toward such overflights involving more active countermeasures; this leads the United States to end these operations.
163	600527	Menderes regime overthrown in Turkey.
164	60-	Chinese provoke border conflict near Buz Aigyar sometime during summer 1960.
165	600630-601215	Initial phases of the Congo crisis involving Western and U.N. intervention.
166	600706-610105	United States engages in economic warfare against Cuba, makes threats against Cuba.
167	600716	Soviet specialists withdraw from the People's Republic of China.
168	6007-	Albanian Government adopts deviationist line.
169	600905-610727	Second phase of Congo crisis: Reactionary military coup and civil war.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
170	601011-601125	The Soviet Union warns the Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire nuclear weapons and of its concern with German remilitarization.
171	601113	Unsuccessful uprising in Guatemala.
172	601118	French paratroops intervene to aid pro-French regime in Gabon.
173	610315-	The Soviet Union opposes continued Portuguese colonial presence in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.
174	610411-640804	New phase in Vietnam's struggle for independence and unity. U.S. involvement in the conflict increases, the guerrilla struggle intensifies.
175	610416-610423	U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba.
176	610530	Crisis in Dominican Republic following death of Trujillo.
177	610619-610620	French aggression in Bizerte, Tunisia.
178	610701-611019	Iraq-Kuwait crisis.
179	610707-611119	Berlin crisis: West German press campaign threatens German Democratic Republic, subversion from the West intensifies; as a defensive measure, the German Democratic Republic (with support from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies) constructs new border controls; after some standoffs between Western and GDR/Soviet forces, the crisis abates in December.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
180	610825-610909	Quadros resigns as President of Brazil; after overcoming some opposition from military circles, Goulart becomes President.
181	611114-611217	Crisis in the Dominican Republic involving the United States.
182	611218-611220	Indian liberation of Goa.
183	6112-62	PRC: From the end of 1961, the People's Republic of China conducts an open anti-Soviet propaganda campaign; thousands of border violations in this period.
184	620216-621219	CIA-organized disorders provide United Kingdom with pretext to deny independence to Guyana.
185	620222-620323	Cuba complains in the United Nations that the United States is threatening an invasion.
186	620225-620825	Indonesia conducts military operations against Dutch colonialism to effect reunion of West Irian with Indonesia.
187	6202-6203	Cyprus: General Grivas secretly returns; pressure on Cypriot Government to remove leftists from regime increases; with Soviet support, Cypriot regime maintains independence.
188	6203-6311	Iraq: Internal civil war between Arabs and Kurds.
189	620422-6206	PRC: Sixty-seven thousand illegally cross Sinkiang border into Soviet Union; period of massive rioting against non-Han Chinese minorities in Kuldja, Sinkiang, China; People's

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Event
		Republic of China accuses Soviet Union of serious subversive activities.
190	620430-620501	Ne Win coup in Burma; Burma announces that it will adopt Socialist policies.
191	620510-6206	Uprisings in Venezuela, including incidents at garrisons in Carradians and Puerto Cabello.
192	620512-620701	U.S. forces land in Thailand.
193	620904-621108	Caribbean Crisis: The Soviet Union preserves the independence of Cuba.
194	620918-620923	Armed clashes between opposing military groupings in Argentina.
195	620920-621127	Sino-Indian border war.
196	620926-700523	Yemeni civil war.
197	6209	Chinese authorities allow the harassment of Soviet citizens in Harbin, Manchuria; the Soviet Union closes its consulates in Harbin and Shanghai.
198	621015-630501	Acting in response to a request from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union permits 46,000 persons to leave Sinkiang for Soviet Central Asia.
199	621029	Cameroon: Local Leftist movement follows Chinese advice and adopts extremist tactics; movement is destroyed by regime as a result.
200	621227-630115	Congo (Zaire): Armed clashes between government forces and Tshombe's gendarmerie; arrest of Gizenga.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
201	630113	Military coup in Togo.
202	630130-671129	British forces battle national liberation movements in Aden/South Yemen.
203	630208-6311	Right-wing Baathists seize power in Iraq, initiate reign of terror against Iraqi Communists, war with Kurds.
204	630408	The Soviet Union objects to NATO plans to create a Multilateral Nuclear Force.
205	630410-721012	Senegal-Portuguese colonies border disputes.
206	630419-710130	New phase in Laotian struggle for national independence; the United States provokes and supports a right-wing coup to prevent normalization of the Loatian situation.
207	630420-630423	Jordanian Crisis: Cabinet falls over the issue of relations with Egypt, large-scale rioting; United States conducts naval operations in Eastern Mediterranean to support regime.
208	630423-720327	Revolt in Southern Sudan; People's Republic of China backs separatists.
209	6305-6306	Domestic conflict in Haiti and conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
210	630614-630714	People's Republic of China makes open break on 14 June with publication of new Chinese political platform; Chinese diplomats in the Soviet Union attempt to distribute propaganda, leading to their expulsion

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		exchange of protests between the two regimes.
211	630712	Ecuador: Arosemena ousted in coup.
212	630731-630901	Sino-Soviet talks break off, People's Republic of China openly opposes nonproliferation treaty, openly attacks Soviet Union.
213	630815	Congo (Brazzaville): Fulbert Youlou regime overthrown.
214	6308-	Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute. Soviets support Somalia (10 November arms agreement). Chinese attempt to stir up territorial quarrels.
215	6309	In response to Chinese provocations against its personnel in Sinkiang, the Soviet Union closes its consulates in that region. During 1963-1964, more than 100,000 Chinese were involved in approximately 4,000 border incidents.
216	631015-631101	Algeria-Morocco border war.
217	631118	Aref assumes power in a coup in Iraq, acts to normalize situation, particularly with respect to the Kurds.
218	631222	French forces intervene on behalf of the regime in Niger.
219	6312-6710	Somalian-Kenyan border disputes; Peking attempts to stir up territorial quarrels.
220	640101-640811	Cyprus crisis.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
221	640109-640112	Panama Canal riots.
222	640121-640217	Arab-Israeli dispute over Israeli plans to divert the waters of the Jordan River.
223	640123	British intervention in East Africa.
224	640219-640220	Gabon: French paratroops land and help President M'Ba to put down pro-U.S. putsch.
225	640225-640822	PRC-Soviet border talks resume and are then broken off; China refuses to continue dialogue. During the same period, China staged numerous border incidents on its Mongolian frontier, indicating that it no longer accepted the 1962 delineation; most Chinese technical workers withdrawn from Mongolia in this period.
226	6402	PRC: Mao publicly refers to the Soviet Union as an enemy of the People's Republic of China.
227	640304-640727	Venezuela charges that Cuba is supporting subversive movements.
228	640401-640402	Reactionary military coup in Brazil.
229	6404	Rumors spread in China that the Soviet Union is about to break diplomatic relations and declare war.
230	6404-640505	China attempts to have the Soviet Union excluded from the 2nd Afro-Asian Summit Conference.
231	640709-640715	Italy: The CIA supports a right-wing coup attempt aimed at suppressing anti-U.S. forces in Italy;

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		General DeLorenzo, Prince Bourghese implicated.
232	640711	The Soviet Union warns the West German Government against attempts to acquire nuclear armed missiles; warns the United States and other NATO nations that the Soviet Union would take strong actions if the Multilateral Nuclear Force is formed.
233	640801-640918	PRC: Mao publicly claims that China has well-justified claims to large portions of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern and Central Asian provinces.
234	640805-	With the Tonkin Gulf raids, a new phase in Vietnam's struggle for national unity and independence.
235	640903-650107	Malaysian-Indonesian border conflicts.
236	640920-650526	Unsuccessful popular uprisings against ruling military junta in Bolivia.
237	641012-641014	Niger: The People's Republic of China urges the Sawaba Party to resort to armed uprising; Sawaban efforts in this vein lead to the total suppression of the party.
238	641016	The People's Republic of China conducts its first nuclear explosion.
239	641105-641121	Sino-Soviet dispute: PRC delegation visits Moscow, makes unreasonable demands; on its return, China begins to make embittered attacks on the Soviet Union; Sino-Soviet

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		border tensions arise; China advises the Soviet Union to return the Kuriles to Japan.
240	641124-641125	United States airlifts Belgian forces to seize Stanleyville in the Congo (Zaire).
241	6411	French troops support regime in Central African Republic.
242	641214	The United Kingdom forces Japan to leave office in Guyana.
243	650115-6601	Disorders in Burundi, including murder of prime minister. Later incident traced to Tshombe and U.S. Embassy. U.S. ambassador expelled in January 1966.
244	650119-650120	Warsaw Treaty meeting condemns proposed establishment of NATO Multilateral Force because it will give West Germany access to nuclear weapons.
245	6501	Chinese public statements indicate that the People's Republic of China has no intention of fighting anyone unless China itself is attacked; shows lack of support for Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
246	650207-	United States initiates bombing of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Soviet delegation visits Hanoi, agrees to provide military aid. First major U.S. ground forces arrive in South Vietnam in March. Major Soviet aid agreements with Democratic Republic of Vietnam concluded in April.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
247	6502	Soviet Union appeals to People's Republic of China to provide additional assistance in transporting Soviet aid to Democratic Republic of Vietnam; People's Republic of China refuses.
248	650304	Chinese students in Moscow harass Soviet demonstration in front of U.S. Embassy in Moscow; Chinese attempt to smuggle propaganda literature into the Soviet Union.
249	650409-660111	Indo-Pakistani war: Soviet mediation at Tashkent.
250	650421-	Soviets oppose Rhodesian regime.
251	650428-	U.S. forces intervene in the Dominican Republic.
252	6504	China: People's Republic of China steps up border incidents, 12 major border violations involving 500 Chinese reported during 15 days in April; China advances new territorial claims against the Soviet Union.
253	650527-6507	New border incidents involving Israel, Jordan, and Syria.
254	650619	Algeria: Ben Bella ousted by military coup; Boumedienne assumes power.
255	6507-6511	Cyprus crisis.
256	650806	In a Vietnam war related incident, U.S. Air Force planes buzz and attack a Soviet vessel on the high seas.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
257	650930-	Indonesia: Elements of the Communist Party of Indonesia participate in extremist coup attempt; failure of coup leads to reign of terror.
258	6510-661113	Continuous armed incidents along Israeli Syrian border.
259	660223	Syria: With the help of the working masses, a coup overthrows the ruling dictatorship; progressive regime assumes power.
260	660224	Ghana: Coup supported by U.S. and British intelligence services overthrows Nkrumah regime.
261	660229-660505	The People's Republic of China rejects an invitation to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This signals the final break between the two on party matters, the key link between Socialist countries.
262	660429-660829	German Democratic Republic envoys and families stationed in the People's Republic of China are subjected to attacks and harassment.
263	6604	Angolan liberation struggle: Maoists split revolutionary party; UNITA pulls away from MPLA.
264	660501-690101	PRC: Military coup occurs in China; referred to by Maoists as "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The coup leads to assaults on the Chinese Communist Party and other organizations within China. Anti-Soviet hysteria increases; Soviet Union declared to be "Enemy No. 1."

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
265	660624	The Soviet Union accuses Nicaragua of fostering armed attacks against Cuba.
266	660628	Coup ousts Illia in Argentina, general strike.
267	660723-691130	Italian-Austrian confrontation over Alto-Adige. Violent acts committed in Italy by ethnic dissidents. Italy accuses Austria of failing to take action to stop dissidents and blocks Austrian entrance into EEC.
268	660805	The Soviet Union complains about new U.S. provocations against Soviet merchant ships in Haiphong, DRV.
269	660820-6612	Soviet citizens in China subjected to abuse; mutual expulsion of students; Soviet Embassy abused; Chinese attempt to organize anti-Soviet riots in foreign nations.
270	660921-671115	Dispute between Congo (Zaire) and Portugual; Congo charges that Tshombe opposition forces are operating out of Portuguese Cabinda; Portugal charges that Congo has allowed the Portuguese Embassy in Congo to be abused.
271	6610	PRC: People's Liberation Army units arrive in Pamir border region and begin photo reconnaissance of Soviet territory, threatening exercises.
272	661208-661228	PRC: Chinese detain and harass Soviet vessel Zagorsk in Darien.
273	670109-6702	Battles along Israeli-Syrian border.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
274	670125	Chinese nationals riot in Red Square.
275	670126-670213	Siege of Soviet Embassy in Peking; the Soviet Union recalls the families of Soviet diplomats from China; departing Soviet citizens subjected to abuse; nationals of other WTO states and Mongolia also abused.
276	670128-670424	The Soviet Union informs West Germany that it expects the Federal Republic of Germany to suppress neo-Nazi movements within West Germany and that the Soviet Union disputes the "right" of the Federal Republic of Germany to claim to speak for all Germans; similar messages sent to major Western powers.
277	6702	Sino-Soviet border clashes, for example, over an island in the Ussuri River.
278	670301	Nation-wide strikes in Argentina.
279	670402-670913	Cambodia: Maoists instigate left-wing rebellion in an attempt to extend the Cultural Revolution; this effort fails and leads to the withdrawal of Cambodian Embassy personnel from Peking.
280	670407-670411	Israel attacks Syria near Lake Tiberias; Soviets protest.
281	670421	CIA instigates Colonel's coup in Greece as part of master NATO plan.
282	6704	Eritrean revolt in Ethiopia; Peking supports separatists.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
283	670513	The Soviet Union protests concerning the unlawful and dangerous actions of U.S. naval vessels in the Sea of Japan.
284	670518-670604	Prelude to the 1967 war: Withdrawal of U.N. Enforcement Force and Straits of Tiran passage disputes involving Egypt and Israel.
285	670530-700115	Civil war in Nigeria; United States and France aid Biafra; United Kingdom supports Nigeria; Soviet Union supports lawful Nigerian regime.
286	670602-670605	Soviet protests concerning U.S. Air Force bombing of Soviet vessel Turkestan in Cam Pha, DRV.
287	670605-670718	June War: Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Iraq.
288	670626-6808	Burma: Chinese Embassy provokes demonstrations, riots; Burman-Chinese relations deteriorate; PRC aid to rebel movements within Burma leads to disaster for local Communist Party.
289	6706-670902	Aftermath of June war: Continuation of Israeli provocations; Soviet aid to Arab States; People's Republic of China attempts to provoke U.S.-Soviet naval clash; People's Republic of China accuses Soviet Union of fearing the United States.
290	670705-671105	Congo (Zaire): Insurgency and U.S.-organized evacuation operations; new tensions arise between the United States and its major Western allies over their failure to participate in the evacuation effort.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
291	670720	The Soviet Union objects to West German Bundestag extraordinary laws as violations of the Potsdam Agreement.
292	670730-671201	Cyprus: New junta in Athens and U.S.-backed enosis plans lead to new clashes between Greek and Turkish communities; the Soviet Union denounces these new attempts to make Cyprus into a NATO base; imperialists retreat.
293	670809-670810	PRC: Abuse of Mongolian diplomatic personnel; ambassador's car overturned, set on fire; hoodlums invade Mongolian Embassy.
294	670812-670820	PRC: Provocations committed against Soviet ship Svirsk in Darien.
295	670817-671167	Soviet criticism of United States on Korean issue; period of sharp increase in border incidents between the two Koreas.
296	670822	Soviet Union complains concerning the bombing of Soviet vessels in DRV harbors.
297	671021-671027	Following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Egyptian forces, Soviet Navy ships move into Alexandria.
298	671021-671208	The Soviet Union warns the Federal Republic of Germany and the major Western powers concerning the sharp increase in neo-Nazi activity within the Federal Republic of Germany.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
299	671117	French troops intervene in Central African Republic.
300	671121-680501	Israeli forces attack Jordan; period of provocations along Israeli borders.
301	6711-	Even after its evacuation from Aden, British forces maintain a military presence on the Arabian peninsula and carry out violent actions.
302	671214	Unsuccessful anti-progressive coup attempt by General Zbiri in Algeria.
303	680104	U.S. Air Force planes bomb Soviet vessel in Haiphong (SS Pereslavl-Zelesski); Soviet Union complains and threatens to take protective measures.
304	680105-680821	Anti-Socialist counterrevolutionary elements attempt to take Czechoslovakia away from other Socialist nations; fraternal assistance of Soviet Union, other WTO states counters threat.
305	680105-681210	Cyprus: The Soviet Union accuses the West of planning to convert Cyprus into a NATO nuclear rocket base.
306	680123-681223	Pueblo Crisis: Democratic People's Republic of Korea and United States.
307	680210	In conjunction with the crash of a U.S. B-52 carrying H-bombs in Greenland, the Soviet Union warns the United States concerning dangerous, provocative flights of nuclear armed bombers near Soviet borders.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
308	680224-680529	Neo-Nazi activities within West Germany criticized by the Soviet Union.
309	680304	The Soviet Union accuses the United States and United Kingdom of attempting to form a military bloc under their auspices in the Persian Gulf.
310	680322-680617	France: Massive class conflict, first case of this gravity in years; general strike, upsurge of mass revolutionary movement.
311	680403-680404	Armed Chinese board Soviet vessel in PRC port and seize its captain; latter released after sharp Soviet protests; ship was carrying materiel to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
312	680406-	Portuguese forces attack villages in Zambia.
313	680509-680824	Berlin Crisis: Provocations by FRG regime; neo-Nazi's barred from Berlin by German Democratic Republic; in response to the passage of extraordinary legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany and attempts to extend it to West Berlin, the German Democratic Republic introduces news passport and visa regulations for West German visitors.
314	680629-690814	The People's Republic of China delays shipments of Soviet supplies to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
315	680717	Coup in Iraq, Bakr replaces Aref.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
316	681003	Coup in Peru. New anti-imperialists revolutionary regime takes power.
317	681012	Military coup in Panama.
318	681030	PRC: Chou En-Lai publicly states that anything, to include an attack on China, could be expected from the Soviet Union.
319	681119-681120	Coup in Mali, Keita socialist regime ousted, in part because of perceptions of "Chinese threat" - PRC actions in Mali.
320	690104-	British oppression in Northern Ireland opposed by Soviet Union.
321	690228-690802	The Soviet Union condemns new acts of aggression by Israel in the Middle East.
322	690302-690315	Sino-Soviet border incident: Armed Chinese incursion onto Damansky Island leads to exchange of fire; Soviet border guards drive the Chinese back across the border; 31 Soviets killed in action; Soviet Embassy in Peking under siege.
323	690319	British intervention in Anguilla.
324	690401-	PRC anti-Soviet course enters a new phase with the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution ends; Chinese propaganda emphasizes need to prepare for war; the Soviet Union is declared to be China's foremost enemy.
325	690409-690411	Major working class demonstrations and strikes in Italy signify an intensification of the general crisis of capitalism in the West.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
326	690418-720901	French troops intervene on behalf of regime in Chad.
327	690419	Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt-al-Arab.
328	690504	The Soviet Union protests concerning the incursion of Chinese soldiers into Soviet territory near Semipalatinsk.
329	690531	Dutch intervention in Curacao.
330	690608-691003	British-Spanish confrontation over Gibraltar. Spain cuts off Gibraltar's links with mainland. Spanish and UK fleets move to vicinity of Gibraltar.
331	690624-710423	U.S. imperialists provoke war between El Salvador and Honduras in order to step in and play mediator.
332	690708	The Soviet Union protests armed provocations by the Chinese on the Soviet section of Goldinski Island in the Amur River.
333	690813	The Soviet Union protests deliberate Chinese aggravation of the situation on the border near Semipalatinsk; several groups of PRC soldiers violate border near Zhalanashkol.
334	690830	Israelis blamed for fire in Al Aksa mosque.
335	690901	Bolivia: Military coup organized by U.S. intelligence.
336	690901	Coup in Libya overthrows monarchy.
337	690919-691127	The Soviet Union protests new Israeli military provocations.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
338	691008	For the first time, the PRC leadership officially states that their conflict with the Soviet Union is a state (and not simply party) issue.
339	691026-691031	The Soviet Union expresses its concern about the course of events in Lebanon. The Soviet Union claims that statements coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon are equivalent to a U.S. claim to intervene in Lebanon.
340	691111	NATO makes policy shift, lowers nuclear threshold, claims that a "distinction" exists between the territory of the Soviet Union and of Soviet allies.
341	691202-691222	The Soviet Union supports Guinea during its border disputes with Portugal.
342	700217	The Soviet Union denounces Israeli air raids near Cairo, pledges to continue aid to Arab States.
343	700218-71	The Soviet Union calls attention to new attempts by international reaction to aggravate the situation in Cyprus, attempts to overthrow Cypriot regime and to turn Cyprus into a NATO base.
344	700318	Coup in Cambodia brings Lon Nol to power; the People's Republic of China rejects joint socialist action in response to this event.
345	700325-700330	Chile: U.S. coup plot is thwarted.
346	700430-	Invasion of Cambodia by U.S., South Vietnamese troops; first large-scale

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		international political crisis of the 1970's; marks a new phase in the struggle of the Cambodian people for freedom from foreign domination.
347	700715-700808	The Soviet Union claims that Israel, with U.S. encouragement, is increasing its pressure on neighboring Arab States.
348	700909-701028	Chile: U.S. coup plot to prevent Popular Unity Front from coming to power is thwarted.
349	700913-701001	Downfall of Lin Piao in China leads to purge of People's Liberation Army, factional fight between two anti-Soviet groupings.
350	700920-701014	Civil war in Jordan and tension between Egypt and Israel. Soviet Union criticizes U.S. fleet movements. Soviet Union denies U.S. charges that it is violating "understandings" regarding Suez Canal ceasefire.
351	701004	The Soviet Union denies the validity of U.S. propaganda concerning alleged Soviet "threats" to the Western Hemisphere and alleged Soviet efforts to create a permanent nuclear submarine base in Cuba.
352	701022	U.S. aircraft violates Soviet airspace near Leninakan (near Turkish border).
353	701113-	Guatemala: State of siege declared, mass arrests, many deaths, repression of progressive movements.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
354	701121	Portuguese colonialists conduct commando raid on Conakry, Guinea, in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Guinean leaders and establish a pro-imperialist regime.
355	710130-7104	Invasion of Laos by U.S., South Vietnamese, and Thai forces.
356	710318	Editorials in PRC press abuse Soviet Union, hint that China will not cooperate with the Soviet Union on Southeast Asian issues.
357	710423-711217	Indo-Pakistani conflict, Bangladesh formed.
358	710819-710822	Bolivia: United States reacts to normalization of ties between Bolivia and the Soviet Union by establishing an economic boycott and aiding a military coup. New regime starts anti-Soviet campaign. Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina assist the United States.
359	711006-711012	The Soviet Union supports Zambia during its border disputes with South Africa.
360	720211	With U.S. encouragement, the Greek Government presents an ultimatum to Cyprus demanding that the latter submit to NATO dictation. Makarios, supported by the Soviet Union, successfully rejects Greek demands.
361	720402-720606	The People's Republic of China shows a lack of enthusiasm over the National Liberation Front offensive in Vietnam because of its envy concerning heavy Soviet arms deliveries to the Democratic

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		Republic of Vietnam and liberation forces that make the offensive possible.
362	720621	Israelis carry out piratic raids on South Lebanon.
363	720718	Expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt (oblique references in Soviet sources[a] appear to refer to this event).
364	7208	U.S. air raids (including bombing of Chinese ships) and mining campaign in Tonkin Gulf lead to greater Chinese cooperativeness in getting Soviet military aid through to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
365	720908-720916	Using the events in Munich as a pretext, Israeli aircraft attack Syria and Lebanon.
366	730127-750430	U.S. involvement in the Indochina war comes to an end. New phase in struggle of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos initiated as United States continues to provide aid to nonprogressive forces.
367	730627-731201	Uruguay: President Bordaberry dismisses Congress, ending constitutional government; initiates period of intense repression against progressive forces within Uruguay; all Marxist parties banned on 1 December.
368	730707	Afghanistan: Military coup overthrows monarchy.

[a] This case is also extensively cited in Western sources, for example, Rubinstein (1977).

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
369	730911	Military coup overthrows Allende in Chile.
370	730925-	President Peron begins campaign of repression against progressive forces in Argentina.
371	731003-731114	October Middle East war.
372	740110	New U.S. strategic targeting doctrine announced.[b]
373	740119	The Soviet Union protests concerning the treatment of its diplomatic personnel in China; the Soviet Union and China expel selected members of one another's diplomatic missions.[b]
374	740210-740674	Iraq accuses Iran of aggression.
375	740226-	Ethiopia: Feudal emperor overthrown; important political and social changes take place in Ethiopia. Conflict within Ethiopian provinces; Eritrean separatist movements opposed by new regime.
376	740311-750322	With support from Iran, Kurdish forces in Iraq revolt.[b]
377	7403-751227	Soviet helicopter brought down in China; despite Soviet protests, Chinese hold crew; China releases crew in December.[b]
378	740424-751127	Revolution in Portugal ends one of the last fascist regimes; Soviet Union supports progressive forces, including local Communist Party.
379	740715-	Turkish troops invade Cyprus. Soviet Union defends Cyprus, demands

[b] Cases taken from Western sources.

Continued

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

Crisis Number	Date	Events
		withdrawal of foreign troops. NATO crudely intervenes in internal affairs of island.
380	750114	Soviet Union rejects trading agreement with United States; United States interferes with normalization of relations between the two states by attaching political conditions to the agreement.[b]
381	750213	Turkey closes U.S. bases.[b]
382	750408-751112	Yugoslavia boycotts 1975 Conference of European Communist Parties, during the period of the Conference accuses the Soviet Union of violating previous agreements and of having ties to pro-Soviet dissident elements within Yugoslavia.[b]
383	750512-750514	U.S. Mayaguez operation.[b]
384	750519	U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger warns North Korea against an invasion of South Korea, makes nuclear threats.[b]
385	750617	The Soviet Union warns Japan not to do anything that might damage Soviet-Japanese relations, with reference to a possible Japanese-Chinese treaty.[b]
386	750715-	Angolan civil war.

[b] Cases taken from Western sources.

Continued

CHAPTER 4. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides selected analyses of crisis descriptor variables dealing with the basic attributes of the 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union and Soviet actions that occurred in conjunction with these events. The results presented are the product of interim analyses. One hundred of these cases are being more intensively coded for crisis management problems, actions, and objectives. The additional research required for this intensive coding will provide additional information concerning the crisis descriptor characteristics.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first traces patterns in the descriptor variables over time to show the evolving character of Soviet crisis concerns and crisis management activities. The second section provides a comparison of all 386 events with a subset of 73 crises. This subset consists of higher relative Soviet involvement cases in which the Soviet Union did one of three things in conjunction with the crisis events: engaged in threatening verbal language, engaged in physical actions (short of combat) while Soviet military forces were within the crisis theater, or engaged in combat. This subset is closer to the intuitive Western notion of a major crisis response than is true for the entire set of 386. The final section compares both the set of 386 crises and the subset of 73 relatively higher involvement cases with some of the aggregate patterns revealed in previous analyses of U.S. crisis characteristics (CACI, 1976).

TRENDS IN CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS

Frequency of Crisis Concerns

Since 1946 the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union has varied considerably over time (Figure 1). While the relative frequency of these incidents is only one limited aspect of Soviet crisis concerns (the events vary along many dimensions), some significant conclusions can be drawn from these patterns. Major modalities in Figure 1 include

- A moderately high number of events in the immediate postwar years (1946-1948),
- A drop in the relative frequency of crises during the remainder of the Stalin era (1949-1953),
- A peak in 1955,
- Relatively high numbers of events in the periods following the 22nd (1961-1965) and 23rd (1966-1970) Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), including the peak year of the entire 30-year span (1967), and
- A drop in the frequency of incidents during the period between the 24th and 25th Party Congresses (1971-1975).

The formal Soviet policy process centers on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congresses. Held at 5-year intervals in recent years, these Congresses are major milestones for the review, formulation, and implementation of domestic and foreign policy. As a consequence, it would not be surprising to find that the frequency of Soviet crisis concerns varies according to the periods demarcated by these Congresses, as shown in Table 1.

From 1946 through 1961, the period of the 19th through 21st Congresses, the average number of crises of concern to the Soviet Union was relatively level. There was a marked increase in the average number of



FIGURE 1. YEARLY FREQUENCY OF CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION

TABLE 1

Distribution of Events by Party Congress

Duration (years)	Congress Period	Marker Date[a]	Absolute Number	Average Number of Crises
7.0	Prior to 19th	(451100-521005)	77	11.0
3.4	19th	(521005-560213)	40	11.8
2.9	20th	(560214-590126)	35	12.1
2.8	21st	(590127-611016)	28	10.0
4.4	22nd	(611017-660328)	81	18.4
4.3	23rd	(660329-710329)	95	22.1
4.8	24th	(710330-751213)	30	6.3
	(1946-1975)			(12.8)

[a] Year, month, and date. The 1946 data include one case that began in 1945 and continued into 1946.

events during the periods following the 22nd and 23rd Congresses (1962-1970). During this time the Soviets appear to have perceived relatively more challenges to their political-military interests (and possibly more opportunities as well -- the Soviet Armed Forces began to be employed in more active political-military roles during this period).[1]

The sharp decline in 1971-1975 appears to be more than simply an artifact of the publication dates of source materials; the sources reviewed give good coverage until 1973-1974 (the October war and Cyprus crises). In 1971 there is a concomitant qualitative shift in the Soviet International Affairs chronology that covers the entire 30-year span, with a marked decrease in the number of events reported that might negatively affect Soviet political-military interests after 1970. Moreover, in 1971-1972 there was a leveling off, followed by a downturn in Soviet naval operations worldwide (Westwood, 1978). It is conceivable that the 1971 shift might reflect greater confidence on the part of the Soviet leadership. Many of the types of events that caused concern in earlier years are no longer common problems (for example, colonialism issues and the status of Berlin). Perhaps more significantly, in the 1970's the United States began to accord greater recognition (through the SALT negotiations and other means) of the superpower status of the Soviet Union (for a Soviet perspective, see Zhurkin, 1972a). This might have led to lessened relative concern on the part of Soviet leaders.

Trends in Crisis Characteristics

On the basis of the time series patterns presented in Figure 1 and Table 1, the 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union can be divided into four phases against which the evolution of Soviet crisis concerns can be traced (Table 2). During the first phase, the average number of

[1] For example, the first major crisis management operation of the Soviet Navy during the June war of 1967.

TABLE 2

Phases in Soviet Crisis Concerns

Phase	Dates	Party Congress Periods	Number of Crises
1	January 1946–October 1961	From the end of World War II to the 21st Congress[a]	180
2	October 1961–March 1966	22nd Congress	81
3	March 1966–March 1971	23rd Congress	95
4	March 1971–December 1975	24th Congress	30

[a] This set includes one case that began in 1945 and continued into 1946.

crises of concern during the periods demarcated by the Party Congresses was relatively even. The second and third phases capture the higher average annual levels of concern during the 22nd and 23rd CPSU Congresses. The final phase involves the lower level of concerns evidenced since the 24th Congress.

Table 3 presents the distribution of the 386 events (by percentages) in terms of geographic focus. The table shows the distribution of the crises of concern by both Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) region and by geopolitical locale (proximity to the Soviet homeland). Some of the more notable points in Table 3 are the

- Breadth of Soviet crisis concerns across the regions, even in the earliest period (while the Soviets may not have conducted Western-style crisis operations in regions such as Latin America, events in these areas were nevertheless of concern to them),
- Increase after 1966 in Middle Eastern events, and

TABLE 3

Geographic Focus of Soviet Crisis Concerns by Period[a]
(percentage)

	1(1945-1961)	2(1961-1966)	3(1966-1971)	4(1971-1975)	5(1946-1975)
Region					
North America	1.7	0.0	1.1	3.3	1.3
Central, South America	17.8	17.3	13.7	13.3	16.3
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.8	8.6	14.7	13.3	12.5
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	12.8	11.1	10.5	6.7	11.4
Middle East, Northern Africa	24.4	14.8	21.1	20.0	21.3
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	8.3	23.5	11.6	16.7	13.1
Pacific, Eastern Asia	21.1	24.7	26.3	26.7	23.6
Other, Multiple Regions, World (at the United Nations)	1.1	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.8
Geopolitical Area					
Soviet Homeland	2.8	13.6	7.4	3.3	6.2
Germany/Berlin (East or West)	7.8	2.5	6.3	0.0	5.7
Primary Buffer Zone (Warsaw Pact States)	6.7	0.0	1.1	3.3	3.6
People's Republic of China	7.2	12.3	15.8	10.0	10.6
Border States	2.2	0.0	4.2	13.3	3.1
Middle East	21.1	16.0	23.2	26.7	21.0
Other	52.2	55.6	42.1	43.3	48.4

[a] Because of rounding, percentages do not total to exactly 100 percent.

- Decline during the latest period (1971-1975) in the relative frequency of events involving the Soviet homeland and Eastern Europe, probably in large part due to the settlement of the Berlin question.

Table 4 shows the types of parties involved in the crises by period. These categories are based on the typologies employed in CACI's previous research on the characteristics of U.S. crises (CACI, 1976). Examination of the table shows that there are few clear trends, apart from a gradual increase after 1966 in the proportion of incidents that involve both the Soviet Union and small powers.

Some of the general characteristics of the 386 crises are presented in Table 5. Reviewing the general character of the crisis events of concern to the Soviet Union (as presented in Table 5), it can be seen that there was a general decline over time in the relative frequency of revolts, uprisings, and wars of national liberation (no doubt reflecting the successful course of decolonization during the 30-year period), a lessened relative focus on civil disorders in the 1971-1975 period, and a rise in the relative frequency of concern with interventions and conflicts short of war in the same time frame. Other salient trends include

- A shift in the scope of events involving a higher percentage of interstate incidents over time,
- A consistently low level of strategic confrontation over all periods, with a marked variation in potential confrontations over the spans,
- A steady level of threat to Communist parties (CP), movements, and regimes,
- Some increase in the relative frequency of violent events since the pre-1962 period, and
- A not unexpected increase in Soviet in-theater military crisis management capabilities during the incidents.

Table 6 deals with Soviet crisis objectives and outcomes. Focusing on the most recent (1971-1975) period, it can be seen that the predominant

TABLE 4

Crisis Participants by Period
(percentage)

Crisis Participants[a]	1(1945-1961)	2(1961-1966)	3(1966-1971)	4(1971-1975)	5(1946-1975)
Two or more large powers, one of which is the Soviet Union	40.0	39.5	42.1	36.7	40.0
Other	60.0	60.5	57.9	63.3	60.0
Between two or more nations including at least one large country other than the Soviet Union:					
At least one party vital to Soviet interests[b]	0.6	3.7	3.2	3.3	2.0
No party vital to Soviet interests	18.9	18.5	15.8	16.7	17.8
Other	80.5	77.8	81.0	80.0	80.2
Crisis between the Soviet Union and one or more small powers	10.6	4.9	16.8	20.0	11.6
Other	89.4	95.1	83.2	80.0	88.4
Crisis between two or more small powers:					
At least one party vital to Soviet interests[b]	0	0	0	0	0
No parties vital to Soviet interests	5.6	9.9	6.3	10.0	6.9
Other	94.4	91.1	93.7	90.0	93.1

[a] Soviet involvement is defined in very general terms. For the purposes of these comparisons, the Soviets are said to have been involved in a crisis whenever their verbal or physical actions went beyond simply noting the existence of the crisis events. This is a more general definition of "involvement" than will be employed later in this chapter to identify the "high relative involvement" crises. All of the "high relative involvement" cases are included in this larger set.

[b] Soviet vital interests are defined in terms of the presence or absence of threats to the well-being or survival of Communist parties, movements, and regimes during the incidents.

TABLE 5

Crisis Characteristics by Period
(percentage)

Crisis Characteristics	1(1945-1961)	2(1961-1966)	3(1966-1971)	4(1971-1975)	5(1946-1975)
Dangerous Domestic Trends/Events	7.2	4.9	9.5	10.0	7.5
Riot, Other Civil Disorder	8.3	7.4	12.6	0.0	8.5
Uprising, Revolt, Insurgency	16.1	12.3	5.3	6.7	11.9
War of National Liberation	8.3	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.4
Coup d'Etat	8.9	16.0	14.7	10.0	11.9
Structural Change (Shift in Alignment, Formation of Alliance), Dangerous International Trend/Events	12.8	9.9	6.3	10.0	10.4
Border Incident/ Territorial Dispute	7.2	16.0	16.8	10.0	11.7
Foreign Intervention, Conflict Short of War	28.3	24.7	28.4	40.0	28.5
War	2.8	6.2	5.3	13.3	4.9
Other	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3
Scope					
Domestic[a]	38.9	35.8	22.1	20.0	32.6
International	61.1	64.2	77.9	80.0	67.4
Strategic Confrontation					
None	78.9	91.4	80.0	93.3	82.9
Potential	20.0	6.2	18.9	3.3	15.5
Actual	1.1	2.5	1.1	3.3	1.6
Threat to CP, CP/ Movement, or CP Regime					
No Threat	56.7	59.3	51.6	56.7	56.0
Well-Being, Activities Threatened	27.2	28.4	41.1	36.7	31.6
Survival Threatened	16.1	12.3	7.4	6.7	12.4
Level of Violence					
Nonviolent Events	41.1	38.3	26.3	33.3	36.3
Violent Events	58.9	61.7	73.7	66.7	63.7
Soviet In-Theater Military Crisis Management Capabilities					
Uncodable	1.1	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.8
Substantial	22.2	19.8	27.4	33.3	23.8
Moderate	0.6	1.2	24.2	30.0	8.8
Minor/Negligible	76.1	79.0	48.4	33.3	66.6

[a] Within a nation other than the Soviet Union.

TABLE 6

Objectives and Outcomes by Period
(percentage)

	1(1945-1961)	2(1961-1966)	3(1966-1971)	4(1971-1975)	5(1946-1975)
Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Supported Actors					
Uncodable, N/A	13.9	18.5	14.7	20.0	15.0
Preserve Status Quo Ante	27.2	34.6	40.0	40.0	32.9
Restore Status Quo Ante	12.2	23.5	24.2	16.7	17.9
Change Status Quo Ante	45.6	21.0	18.9	23.3	32.1
Indifference (Both Bad)	1.1	2.5	2.1	0.0	1.6
Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Opposed Actors					
Uncodable	2.8	8.6	6.5	13.3	4.1
Oppose Efforts to Preserve Status Quo Ante	41.1	18.5	22.1	16.7	29.8
Oppose Efforts to Restore Status Quo Ante	2.8	3.7	1.1	3.3	2.6
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	43.3	63.0	62.1	63.3	53.6
Indifference (Both Bad)	10.0	6.2	11.6	3.3	9.1
Crisis Outcome for Soviet Union					
Uncodable	0.6	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.8
Favorable	23.9	25.9	15.8	23.3	22.3
Mixed	27.2	34.6	48.4	50.0	35.8
Unfavorable	28.3	33.3	17.9	23.3	26.4
Indifferent	20.0	6.1	15.8	3.3	14.8
Crisis Outcome for Soviet Allies					
Uncodable	57.2	49.4	62.2	53.3	56.4
Favorable	13.3	13.6	2.1	13.3	10.6
Mixed	15.0	17.3	23.2	20.0	17.9
Unfavorable	14.4	19.8	12.6	13.3	15.0
Indifferent	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.3

Soviet objective has been to support in-theater actors in preserving the status quo ante and to resist the attempts of other in-theater actors to change the status quo.[2] Turning to a global assessment of outcomes, it can be seen that there is a tendency for more mixed outcomes in the case of the Soviet Union and no clear trends for the allies (actual or tacit) supported by the Soviet Union in crises of concern.[3]

Finally, Table 7 differentiates the crises of concern to the Soviet Union in terms of Soviet involvement. "Higher relative involvement" crises are those in which one of three attributes was present: threatening verbal behavior from Soviet spokespersons, physical actions (short of combat) in conjunction with the presence of Soviet military forces in the crisis theater, or combat involving Soviet forces.[4] Because of these characteristics, these cases are more consonant with Western definitions of major crises than is true for the entire set of 386 events. Given the dispositions of Soviet forces during the 30-year period, many of these cases involve Eastern Europe, West Germany, and the People's Republic of China.[5] The most interesting point in Table 7 is the slight increase in the

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2 The status quo ante is defined as the situation the day before the crisis. Crises often involve both regional and extraregional actors. These measures deal solely with in-theater actors who are supported or opposed by the Soviet Union.

3 These outcome assessment measures are summary and somewhat coarse. They have to do with the overall favorableness of the results of the crisis and the postcrisis situation from a Soviet vantagepoint. The term "Soviet ally" is preferable to the commonly employed term "client," which can have undesirable implications concerning Soviet influence on the nations supported by the Soviet Union in crises.

4 In some of the Sino-Soviet border incidents, determination of whether combat took place is difficult. This does not cause problems for the present analysis since these cases are covered under the second of the three criteria.

5 Moreover, as is generally true for all of the crisis descriptor variables, the ongoing intensive coding of crisis actions, objectives, and problems will help to refine the codings, particularly for the threatening verbal behavior index.

TABLE 7

Relatively Higher Involvement Cases by Period
(percentage)

Type	1 (1946-1961)	2 (1961-1966)	3 (1966-1971)	4 (1971-1975)	5 (1946-1975)
Relatively Higher Involvement Cases	18.9	13.6	23.2	20.0	18.9
Other	81.1	86.4	76.8	80.0	81.1

frequency of these relatively higher involvement cases in the period of the 23rd Party Congress (1966-1971).

ANALYSIS OF HIGH SOVIET INVOLVEMENT CRISES

Introduction

In the previous section, 73 cases involving either threatening verbal behavior from Soviet spokespersons, physical actions (short of combat) in conjunction with the presence of Soviet military personnel in the crises theater, or combat involving Soviet forces were designated as "high involvement" crises for the Soviet Union. These cases resemble U.S. crisis operations of the sort captured in the major U.S. crisis projects to a greater extent than is true for the entire set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union. This section provides a brief aggregate comparison of these cases with the entire set of 386 events. Aggregate frequences are presented in Table 8.

Several interesting points may be observed in each comparison in Table 8. When contrasted to the entire set of 386 crises of concern, the subset of 73 higher involvement cases

- Tended to be located more frequently in key geopolitical regions (the Soviet homeland, Eastern Europe, and the Germanies),

TABLE 8

Selected Crisis Descriptors
(percentage)

		386 Crises	73 Higher Involvement Crises
Regions			
1	North America	1.3	0.0
2	Central, South America	16.3	2.7
3	Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.5	6.9
4	Eastern Europe and Soviet Union	11.4	43.8
5	Mideast, Northern Africa	21.3	21.9
6	Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	13.1	6.9
7	Pacific and Eastern Asia	23.6	17.8
8,9,0	Other	0.8	0.0
Geopolitical Location			
1	Homeland	6.2	19.2
2	Germany/Berlin	5.7	13.7
3	Warsaw Pact	3.6	12.3
4	People's Republic of China	10.6	8.2
5	Border States	3.1	4.1
6	Middle East	21.0	21.9
7	Other	49.7	20.5
General Description			
0	Dangerous domestic trends/ events	7.5	5.5
1	Riot, other civil disorder	8.5	5.5
2	Uprising, revolt, insurgency	11.9	2.7
3	War of national liberation	4.4	1.4
4	Coups	11.9	5.5
5	Structural change	10.4	11.0
6	Border incidents/territorial disputes	11.7	21.9
7	Foreign interventions, conflict short of war	28.5	34.2
8	War	4.9	12.3
9	Other	0.3	0.0
Scope[a]			
Domestic		32.6	12.3
International		67.4	87.7
Strategic Confrontation			
None		82.9	57.5
Potential		15.5	35.6
Actual		1.6	6.8
Threat to CP's, CP Regimes			
None		56.0	34.2

Continued

Table 8
Selected Crisis Descriptors
Continued

	386 Crises	73 Higher Involvement Crises
Well-being, activities threatened	31.6	42.5
Survival threatened	12.4	23.5
Level of Violence		
Nonviolent	36.3	43.8
Violent	63.7	56.2
Soviet In-Theater Crisis Management Military Capabilities		
Substantial	23.8	54.8
Moderate	8.8	19.2
Minor/negligible	66.6	26.0
Crisis Participants[b]		
Two or more large powers, one of which is the Soviet Union	40.0	72.6
Other	60.0	27.4
Between Two or More Nations, Including at Least One Large Country Other Than the Soviet Union:		
At least one party vital to Soviet interests[c]	2.0	0.0
No party vital to Soviet interests	17.8	0.0
Other	80.2	100.0
Crisis between the Soviet Union and one of more small powers	11.6	27.3
Other	88.4	72.7
Crises Between Two or More Small Powers:		
At least one party vital to Soviet interests	0.0	0.0
No parties vital to Soviet interests	6.9	0.0
Other	93.1	100.0

[a] Within a nation other than the Soviet Union.

[b] The crisis participant categories are those employed in CACI (1976), modified to fit the available Soviet data.

[c] Soviet interests are defined in these comparisons in terms of threats to Communist parties, movements, and regimes. If one of these three is challenged, Soviet interests are said to be involved.

Continued

Table 8
Selected Crisis Descriptors
Continued

	386 Crises	73 Higher Involvement Crises
Soviet Objectives - In Theater-Supported Actors		
Uncodable	15.0	2.7
Preserve Status Quo Ante	32.9	31.5
Restore Status Quo Ante	17.9	34.2
Change Status Quo Ante	32.1	30.1
Indifference	1.6	0.0
Soviet Objectives - In Theater-Opposed Actors		
Uncodable	4.1	2.7
Oppose Efforts to Preserve Status Quo Ante	29.8	20.5
Oppose Efforts tc Restore Status Quo Ante	2.6	4.1
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	53.6	69.9
Indifference	9.1	0.0
Outcomes for Soviet Union		
Uncodable	0.8	0.0
Favorable	22.3	35.6
Mixed	35.8	46.6
Unfavorable	26.4	17.8
Indifference	14.8	0.0
Outcomes for Soviet Allies		
Uncodable	56.4	32.9
Favorable	10.6	15.1
Mixed	17.9	35.6
Unfavorable	15.0	16.4
Indifference	0.3	0.0

- Were more likely to be international rather than domestic in scope,
- Included proportionately more incidents in which there were potential strategic confrontations and slightly more actual confrontations,
- Were more likely to involve threats to the well-being and/or survival of Communist parties and regimes,
- Tended to occur in areas in which the Soviet Union had substantial in-theater military crisis management capabilities, no doubt due, at least in part, to the more intense geopolitical focus of the 73 events, and
- Tended to involve more large power-large power confrontations and more cases involving the Soviet Union and a small power.

In terms of Soviet objectives concerning nations and other actors in the immediate crisis theater, Soviet motives in the subset of 73 cases tended to be clearer and to involve proportionately more cases in which the Soviets attempted to assist actual and/or tacit allies to restore the status quo ante and to oppose efforts to change the status quo. Finally, outcomes of the 73 crises in the subset tended to include more favorable and mixed results than was true for the entire set of 386 crises of concern.

COMPARISON OF SOVIET WITH U.S. CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS

Introduction

This section provides selected comparisons of Soviet and U.S. crisis descriptors. Information on U.S. crisis characteristics is taken from a previous report (CACI, 1976), which presents data on 289 U.S. crisis operations over the period 1946-1975. The comparisons presented in this section deal solely with crisis characteristics; crisis management problems, actions, and objectives will be the subjects of further comparisons after the completion of the intensive coding phase of the project. In the comparisons, attention is directed both to the entire set of 386 crises of

concern to the Soviet Union and to the subset of 73 events with relatively higher Soviet involvement. The latter events more closely resemble Western crisis operations than the former.

Comparisons of Soviet With U.S. Characteristics

Table 9 presents the comparisons (in percentages) of the three crisis sets for selected sets of crisis characteristics. Descriptors reviewed included geographic focus, crisis participants, threats to interests, strategic confrontations, the duration of crisis activity, and crisis objectives and outcomes.

The geographic breakdowns presented in Table 9 show similar patterns of broad dispersion in both U.S. crisis operations and in the total set of Soviet crisis concerns. However, while the total set of Soviet crisis concerns is widely dispersed, the subset of higher involvement cases is more narrowly oriented, with over 40 percent of the cases involving Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland.

In terms of crisis participants, all three data bases are similar in that few cases involve two small powers in confrontation with one another or two large powers (apart from the superpowers). The patterns of U.S. operations and all Soviet crisis concerns are similar insofar as large power-large power confrontations are concerned; the subset of 73 crises differs in having a greater relative frequency of this type of incident. In terms of superpower-small power crises, the subset of 73 Soviet cases resembles the pattern taken by U.S. crisis operations more than is the case for the entire set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union.

For the remaining crisis characteristics, salient patterns include

- General congruence between the 73 higher involvement Soviet cases and the U.S. operations for the relative occurrence of threats to national interests,

TABLE 9

Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Crisis Characteristics
(percentage)

	List of 386 Soviet Crises	73 Cases of High Soviet Involvement	U.S. Crisis[b] List (289 cases)
Geographic Breakdown			
North America	1.3	0.0	9.5
Central, South America	16.3	2.7	11.9
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.5	6.9	13.2
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	11.4	43.8	15.9
Middle East, Northern Africa	21.3	21.9	10.2
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	13.1	6.9	8.5
Pacific, Eastern Asia	23.6	17.8	26.8
Other, Multiple Regions, World	0.8	0.0	4.1
Crisis Participants[a]			
Two or more large powers, one of which is the Soviet Union	40.0	72.6	35.6
Other	60.0	27.4	64.3
Between Two or More Nations, Including at Least One Large Country Other Than the Soviet Union:			
At least one party vital to Soviet interests[a]	2.0	0.0	4.5
No party vital to Soviet interests	17.8	0.0	3.1
Other	80.2	100.0	92.4
Crisis between the Soviet Union and one or more small powers	11.6	27.3	25.0
Other	88.4	72.7	75.0
Crisis Between Two or More Small Powers:			
At least one party vital to Soviet interests	0.0	0.0	6.2
No parties vital to Soviet interests	6.9	0.0	2.4
Other	93.1	100.0	91.4
Threat to Protagonist Interests (for Soviet Union: threat to CP's, CP/movements, or CP regimes)			
No threat	56.0	34.2	31.0
Some threat	31.6	42.5	56.4
Severe threat	12.4	23.5	12.5

[a] Soviet interests are defined in these comparisons in terms of threats to Communist parties, movements, and regimes. If one of these three is challenged, Soviet interests are said to be involved.

[b] In this table, "U.S." should be read in place of "Soviet" for the descriptions of variables whose percentages are given in the final column.

Continued

Table 9
Comparison of Characteristics
Continued

	List of 286 Soviet Crises	73 Cases of High Soviet Involvement	U.S. Crisis List (289 cases)
Strategic Confrontation			
No (for Soviet Union: none or potential only)	98.4	93.1	97.9
Yes	1.5	6.8	2.1
Duration of Crisis Activity			
Less than 7 days	38.3	37.0	36.0
Between 8 and 30 days	10.6	11.0	20.0
Over 30 days	41.0	41.1	43.9
Uncodable	10.1	11.0	N/A
Objectives			
Noninvolvement (for Soviet Union: N/A, indifference, and other)	17.1	4.1	8.0
Preserve/restore status quo	50.8	65.7	74.4
Change status quo	32.1	30.1	17.6
Crisis Outcome for United States or Soviet Union			
Favorable	22.3	35.6	32.5
Unfavorable	26.4	17.8	41.2
Other (for Soviet Union: uncodable, mixed, indifference)	51.3	46.6	26.3

- A very low level of actual strategic confrontations in all of the data bases,

- A remarkable similarity in the duration of crisis activities across all three comparison groups,

- A tendency for Soviet crisis objectives to be somewhat less status quo ante-oriented than is true for U.S. crisis operations, and

- A similarity in the percentage of favorable crisis outcomes for the U.S. operations and the set of 73 higher involvement Soviet cases and a pattern of many more mixed outcomes for the Soviet Union than was true for the United States.

CHAPTER 5. SOVIET CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Most analyses of crises focus on single incidents or involve a comparison of a handful of major cases. While such studies can be extremely useful, this type of analytical emphasis automatically excludes some major aspects of crisis behavior, such as emerging patterns and trends and the interconnections that crisis operations and concerns have with other facets of East-West competition. These can only be analyzed by reviewing a large number of cases in conjunction with these other factors.[1] Analyses of U.S. crisis behavior have shown that these operations exhibit clear patterns in the period since World War II and have varied in accordance with changes in other central aspects of interbloc relations such as Soviet-U.S. strategic parity (Mahoney, 1978).

This chapter deals with the context within which Soviet crisis concerns have occurred since 1946. The first section reviews previous research dealing with the context in which U.S. crisis operations have occurred since World War II. It then uses these findings to suggest factors (for example, superpower strategic parity) that might have influenced and/or been influenced by Soviet crisis concerns and sets the stage for comparisons of the Soviet and U.S. crisis management experiences. The second section uses these and other factors to analyze how Soviet crisis concerns have fit into larger frameworks or structures of relations during the postwar period (for example, the structures of East-West relations and Soviet-Chinese competition).

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[1] The crisis literature has recently been reviewed for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) by Parker (1976). One of the major reasons why CACI (1976) developed a definition of "crisis" that focused on extraordinary military management activities instead of the traditional "great crisis" emphasis focus was to allow for the analysis of trends in crises over time.

REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON U.S. CRISES IN CONTEXT

Mahoney (1978) examined 215 separate U.S. political-military crisis operations conducted over the period 1946-1975.[2] These data were elicited from a major ARPA-sponsored study (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) conducted at the Brookings Institution. The 215 operations were instances in which the U.S. Armed Forces

- Engaged in some physical action(s),
- At the direction of the U.S. National Command Authorities,
- In order to influence events abroad, either by taking direct action (short of war) or by establishing a presence targeted at specific nations and events.

The Korean and Vietnamese wars were excluded from the data base.

These 215 operations differ from one another along many dimensions. At the same time, however, each shares the common characteristic of being a case in which the U.S. Armed Forces were used for political-military ends. As a consequence, it is reasonable to presume that each operation was based on the same type of organizational processes within the U.S. National Command Authorities: the identification of a crisis "problem" or "opportunity," the selection of the armed forces as one of the appropriate policy instruments to use in dealing with the situation, and the implementation of a crisis operation. As a result, the relative frequency of crisis operations over time provides a <u>partial</u> perspective on

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[2] Since the purposes of this section are to identify factors that might have influenced and/or been influenced by Soviet crisis concerns and to set the stage for a comparison of Soviet and U.S. crisis behavior, the results from the analyses of only one of the three major U.S. crisis data bases are presented here. Appendix C provides a brief comparison of these three data files produced by CACI, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and Brookings.

the incidence of U.S. political-military operations and of the propensity of U.S. leaders to use the armed forces as policy instruments.

It is not a simple matter to relate these operations to the context of the postwar international environment. Not enough theoretical work has been carried out in the fields of defense analysis and international relations to allow for the development of strong model specifications of the type required for many types of formal causal inference. Instead of searching for the "causes" or causal consequences of U.S. crisis operations (which is beyond the state-of-the-art), the most that can be done in this area is to identify significant modalities -- trends and patterns in crisis operations and other factors of significance (such as Soviet-U.S. strategic parity).

A literature review (Mahoney, 1977b) suggests that four factors are of particular relevance for an understanding of the context within which U.S. crisis operations have taken place:

- The state of the strategic balance between the superpowers.
- Soviet-U.S. interactions.
- The amount of conflict occurring throughout the world.
- U.S. involvement in limited wars since 1946.

The frequency of U.S. crisis operations will be elicited from Blechman and Kaplan's (1976) study.[3]

The Soviet-U.S. strategic balance can be indexed by a four-value-ordinal variable based on an interpretation of Goldmann's (1974) analysis of the postwar strategic competition (Table 1). In this scheme a low number ( )

[3] This U.S. crisis data base has been selected for presentation here because it presents the strongest effects. The relationships between these four factors and the frequency of U.S. operations are reviewed in greater detail in Appendix C.

TABLE 1

Goldmann East-West Tension Levels

Phase	Period	Level of "Objective" Tension in the Strategic Balance (1= low tension)
I	1946-1947	(3)
II	1948-1956	(2)
III	1957-1965	(4)
IV	1966-1975	(1)

indexes a low level of "objective" tension in the balance. In Goldmann's assessment the most balanced (and least tense) period has been the phase of mutual second strike capabilities (parity) since the mid-1960's. The next most stable/least tension phase was 1948-1956, when only the United States possessed the capacity to attack the other superpower's homeland with a major strategic strike. This is followed by the period in which neither superpower had significant nuclear forces. Finally, the period with the most "objective" tension was 1957-1965, when both superpowers had counter-homeland nuclear capabilities, but where the United States had a significant lead over the Soviet Union. Parity (achieved sometime during the mid-1960's) ended this imbalance. (Subsequently this variable will be cited as the strategic balance.) (See Table 2, Row 1.)

The behavioral dimension of Soviet-U.S. relations can be indexed by an event data measure of Soviet conflict behaviors directed toward the United States over the period 1948-1973. This measure is taken from the Azar-Sloan (1975) event data file and deals primarily with verbal behaviors. (See Table 2, Row 2.)

Most U.S. political-military operations involve actual (or perceived potential) conflict in the Third World. This facet of the international

TABLE 2

Correlations: Frequency of U.S. Crisis Operations[a]

Variable	Correlation
Strategic Balance	.74
Soviet Conflict Behaviors Toward the United States	.38
Frequency of Conflict Throughout the World	.49
U.S. Involvement in Limited Wars	-.34

[a] N = 30 for all pairs except those involving Soviet-U.S. conflict behaviors because no observations are available for the years 1946-1947 and 1974-1975 on that index. The use of significance tests with data that are not a sample from a population is controversial. The 0.05 level (one-tailed) for all coefficients except those involving Soviet-U.S. behaviors is 0.30; for these cases the level is 0.32. All statistics are computed using the pair-wise deletion option of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program package.

environment will be measured by a frequency index based on a data file developed by Edward E. Azar. The file contains major domestic and international conflicts: coups and other irregular regime transfers, border incidents and wars, and major domestic disturbances.

U.S. involvement in limited wars will be reflected by a dichotomous variable. For the Korean war, this variable takes on positive values for the years 1950-1953. For the Vietnam/Indochina war, the positive values begin in 1965 with the introduction of large numbers of U.S. military personnel into Vietnam. The end of the limited war commitment in the Southeast Asian theater is set in 1970. While one can argue for other termination dates (for example, 1972 and 1975), a 1970 endpoint is consistent with the Blechman-Kaplan data base. From early 1965 through the end of 1970 there are no U.S. political-military operations in the file

that involve the core states of Southeast Asia. In 1971 such operations begin to appear. While U.S. involvement in the theater certainly continued after 1970, it is consistent with the data base being employed to index a shift in the character of this involvement in 1970. The correlations between the frequency of U.S. crisis operations and the other four factors are given in Table 2.

U.S. crisis operations fall into a pattern that is shared, to varying degrees, by the other elements. Moreover, these are reasonable relationships. The signs of the correlations are intuitively interpretable. U.S. crises operations were more likely when

- The strategic balance was in phases that were more conducive to tension,
- The level of conflict in Soviet behaviors increased,
- The amount of conflict throughout the world increased, and
- The United States was not involved in a limited war.

The final step in relating the operations to their structural context involves determining the fit between the operations and the other four factors, taken as a set, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Because of the weak specifications involved in this analysis, attention will be confined to the R^2 value[4] and the fit between actual and estimated values, as presented on the following page and in Figure 1.

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[4] Computed using the SPSS pair-wise deletion option due to the four missing values for Soviet-U.S. behaviors. For the residual analysis the equation was reestimated omitting these variables to estimate values for the first and last pairs of years. The two equations had nearly identical summary statistics, not a surprising finding in light of the presence of multicollinearity and the relative dominance of other factors in the correlation matrix.



Figure 1. Actual and Estimated Number of Operations

$R = .84$ $R^2 = .70$ $F = 12.6$

Standard deviation of residuals = 2.7

Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.94

Two points stand out in this analysis. First, it is apparent that there is a good fit between the pattern taken by U.S. crisis operations since 1946 and the set of contextual factors. The operations share better than two-thirds of their variance in common with the other elements; the standard deviation of the residuals is not a bad estimate; and the estimated curve reproduces, in essence, the most prominent features of the crisis operations frequency curve, notably the "peaking" in the late 1950's and early 1960's followed by a sharp decline in 1966. Postwar U.S. crisis operations take on patterns that are quite similar to those taken by other significant facets of East-West relations and international affairs.

Second, this analysis shows four classes of factors that might also be relevant for explaining Soviet crisis concerns:

- The state of the strategic balance.
- Soviet-U.S. interactions.
- The level of conflict throughout the world.
- U.S. involvement in limited wars.

SOVIET CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

Factors Bearing on Soviet Crisis Concerns

The review of U.S. crisis analyses and the Soviet studies literature suggests a number of factors that might have influenced, and been influenced by, Soviet crisis concerns. As was true in the review of the U.S. studies in the previous sections, any analysis of the similarities of patterns taken by these factors and the list of crises of concern to the Soviet

Union is subject to two caveats. The first is that the relative frequency of these events over time is only one limited aspect of Soviet crisis concerns. The second is that, because of the limited amount of research performed to date in this area, no attempts to uncover "causal" patterns can be supported. The most that can be done is to search for similarities in patterns as indications of the broader contexts into which Soviet crisis concerns might have fallen in the postwar period.[5]

The analyses in this section will follow the format used in the previous section: an initial presentation of potentially relevant factors, followed by a correlation analysis to observe bivariate pattern similarities, and a final multivariate comparison of patterns. Two general classes of factors will be related to the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns. The first set pertains to the Soviet Union itself and includes indicators of the formal Soviet policy process, Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States, West Germany, and China, and Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance.

Chapter 4 shows that the frequency of Soviet crisis concerns varies in accordance with the cycles traced by the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Dichotomous indicators indexing the

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[5] This lack of strong theoretical priors is taken into account in the regression analyses performed in this section. The relationships between the factors and Soviet crisis concerns are likely, in most cases, to be ones in which influence moves in both directions. However, in the absence of strong a priori specifications of equations, the use of more powerful forms of regression that can capture such interactive effects is impractical because the coefficients of such equations cannot be interpreted in the absence of these priors. Similarly, there is no good solution to the problem of correlations between predictor factors (multicollinearity) except the use of the priors, which are not available. As a consequence, the regression analysis will focus on the pattern-matching components of ordinary least squares regression (the simplest, most robust, and best understood model of regression) -- R^2 and residuals. This methodological response to the problem of incomplete specifications is detailed at greater length in Mahoney (1977b).

years encompassed by these Congresses will be used to capture this aspect of the Soviet policy process:

- 1946-1952 (from the end of World War II to the first postwar Congress)
- 1953-1955 19th Congress
- 1956-1958 20th Congress
- 1959-1961 21st Congress
- 1962-1965 22nd Congress
- 1966-1970 23rd Congress
- 1971-1975 24th Congress[6]

Three major Soviet crisis antagonists identified in Chapter 3 are the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the People's Republic of China. Soviet conflict toward these nations (primarily verbal actions) are indexed using the Azar-Sloan (1975) event data base, which is used in the previous section to measure Soviet conflict toward the United States.

In his analysis of contemporary international conflicts, Zhurkin (1975)[7] identifies four stages in the evolution of "imperialism's" policies. The first stage, from the end of the 1940's through the mid-1950's, coincided with the beginning of the Cold War and what he sees as preparations by Western states for an attack on the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist countries. The second stage (the latter half of the 1950's) saw a rapid strengthening of Soviet military power, which made threats of war an ineffective strategy for the imperialists. During the 1960's imperialism tried a new tack, shifting the center of gravity of its struggle against

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[6] To avoid a sense of false precision (the implication that shifts in Soviet policy occur precisely at the date of the Congresses), the dates of the Congresses have been used to delineate complete years.

[7] Zhurkin is Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada and the most prominent Soviet specialist on U.S. crisis behavior.

the world Socialist system to the Third World and conducting operations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia behind the strategic shield provided by U.S. forces. The 1970's saw a new phase, with the further strengthening of Soviet power as the most important change responsible for this shift.

As is common in Soviet analyses of international relations, Zhurkin does not focus solely on the strategic balance and/or other purely military factors in delineating these stages. The Soviet conception of the "correlation of forces" encompasses more than is entailed by Western concepts of the balance of power or strategic balance (for example, Tomashevsky, 1974). However, we can use these stages, which have been formulated by a very senior Soviet analyst, to provide an approximation of a "strategic" balance measure that is somewhat analogous to the indicator of the nuclear balance used in analyzing U.S. crisis behavior in the previous section. Four dichotomous indicators will be used for this purpose to index the years cited above.[8]

In an unpublished analysis, Kjell Goldmann of the University of Stockholm has analyzed major power relations from 1950 through 1975. Using official government statements, Goldmann has computed mean tension levels for the major power dyads, for example, mean tension in U.S. statements concerning the Soviet Union. To index this perceptual/psychological dimension of Soviet behavior over the period, Goldmann's scores for Soviet tension concerning the United States will be employed.[9] The final Soviet factor to be considered will be changes in national leadership, with dichotomous indicators representing the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev/Brezhnev-Kosygin eras.

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[8] The use of dichotomous or "dummy" variables to index periods in this fashion is explained in Cohen (1968).

[9] These data, provided by Professor Goldmann in a seminar presentation conducted at CACI on 5 April 1978, deal with the entire range of Soviet-U.S. relations. A similar data set dealing only with European affairs is presented in detail in Goldmann (1974).

The second class of factors consists of items that are not Soviet behaviors, perceptions, or aspects of the Soviet policy process. Many of these factors were presented in the earlier analysis of U.S. crisis behavior and need not be discussed extensively. Their inclusion here facilitates comparison of the Soviet and U.S. crisis experiences. The items to be considered are the frequency of conflict throughout the world, the frequency of U.S. crisis management operations, conflict behaviors directed by the United States, West Germany, and the People's Republic of China toward the Soviet Union, articulated U.S. perceptions relating to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Western perceptions of the strategic balance, and U.S. involvement in limited wars (Korea and Vietnam).

The frequency of domestic and interstate conflicts was indexed using the Azar measure discussed previously. The frequency of U.S. crisis operations was measured using two major ARPA-sponsored projects conducted by the Brookings Institution (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) and CACI (1978a). The Azar-Sloan event data file was used to assess conflict behaviors directed toward the Soviet Union. The unpublished Goldmann perceptions data base discussed previously was used to measure U.S. perceptions of tension in relations with the Soviet Union. The strategic balance measure used in analyzing U.S. crisis behavior will be employed to assess the nuclear relationship as perceived in the West. A dichotomous indicator will be used to index U.S. involvement in limited wars.

Table 3 presents the correlations of these Soviet and non-Soviet factors with the yearly frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. Two important conclusions may be drawn from Table 3. First, a large number of factors (predominantly Soviet) have appreciable correlations with the pattern taken by Soviet crisis concerns over the 30-year period. Rather than being idiosyncratic events, Soviet concerns with critical international events during the postwar period varied over time in ways that were similar to the patterns taken by 11 other factors.

TABLE 3

Correlation of Factors With Soviet Crisis Concerns

Soviet Factors	Correlation With Frequency of Soviet Crisis Concerns, 1946-1975[a]
CPSU Congress Periods:	
Prior to 19th	-.22
19th	-.04
20th	-.04
21st	-.12
22nd	.39
23rd	.47
24th	-.48
Soviet Conflict Behavior Toward:	
United States	.50
West Germany	.22
People's Republic of China	.37
Goldmann, Soviet Expressions of Tension Toward the United States	-.42
Zhurkin, Phases in Strategic Balance:	
1946-1955	-.16
1956-1960	-.11
1961-1969	.65
1970-1975	-.45
Leaders:	
Stalin	-.22
Khrushchev	.18
Brezhnev-Kosygin	.02

[a] Underlined correlations are $\geq .30$ and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Continued

Table 3
Correlation of Factors With
Soviet Crisis Concerns
Continued

Non-Soviet Factors	Correlation With Frequency of of Soviet Crisis Concerns, 1946-1975
Frequency of Conflicts Throughout World	.54
U.S. Crisis Operations:	
CACI	.25
Brookings	.35
Conflict Behaviors of Major Nations Toward the Soviet Union:	
United States	-.38[b]
West Germany	.04
People's Republic of China	.41
Goldmann, U.S. Expressions of Tensions Toward the Soviet Union	.13
Strategic Balance (Western Views)	.15
U.S. Involvement in Limited Wars	.19

[b] The sign of this correlation is anomalous, associating high levels of U.S. conflict toward the Soviet Union with lower levels of crisis concern on the part of the Soviet Union. While this could be interpreted as a plausible relationship (with received hostility from the United States causing the Soviet Union to focus its concerns on a narrower range of topics), there is a strong possibility that the relationship is artifactual. A comparison of the time series for Soviet conflict toward the United States and U.S. conflict toward the Soviet Union suggests that the former presents a perspective that is more in harmony with traditional interpretations of postwar superpower relations. For example, the Soviet-to-U.S. series has a peak in conflict in 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis, which the U.S.-to-Soviet series lacks. Because of the anomalous sign, this variable will be excluded from subsequent analyses. Apart from this case, all signs of the significant correlations are intuitively interpretable, for example, those of the Goldmann tensions variable, which is scored with low values reflecting high levels of tension.

The second noteworthy point is that, of the four factors shown to be correlates of U.S. crisis operations in the first section of the chapter (the frequency of conflict throughout the world, Soviet conflict toward the United States, Western perceptions of the strategic balance, and U.S. involvement in limited wars), only the first two are also appreciably correlated with the pattern of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. U.S. crisis operations and Soviet concerns with international events have different correlates in the postwar period.

Eight of the 11 correlates of Soviet crisis concerns are Soviet factors. The first three pertain to the Soviet policy process and are indicators for the periods following the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses. The next two variables are Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States and the People's Republic of China (interestingly, neither Soviet conflict toward West Germany nor German conflict toward the Soviet Union shows an association above the 0.30 threshold). The remaining Soviet factors have to do with Soviet expressions of tensions concerning Soviet-U.S. relations and Soviet perceptions of recent phases in the correlation of forces between East and West.

Of the non-Soviet factors, only three have relationships above the 0.30 threshold: Azar's index of the frequency of domestic and interstate conflict throughout the world, the Brookings Institution index of the frequency of U.S. crisis operations during the postwar period, and Chinese conflict behavior toward the Soviet Union.[9]

Of the set of 11 factors that have appreciable correlations with the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns, two subsets are closely related: the indicators for the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses and Zhurkin's phases

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[9] The difference in correlation between the Brookings and CACI U.S. crises lists is apparently due to different patterns of coverage in the first postwar decade. The correlation between the Brookings and CACI lists is 0.56 for 1955-1975, but only 0.32 for the entire 30-year span. Appendix C compares these data bases in greater detail.

in the strategic/correlation of forces balance. Both subsets consist of dichotomous indicators that demarcate subperiods. In some cases these subperiods are almost identical, for example, Zhurkin's last phase in the correlation of forces (1970-1975) and the span covered by the 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971-1975). A comparison of the multiple correlations of the two subsets with the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union shows that the two subsets account for approximately the same amounts of variance (45-55 percent), with the Party Congress indicators being somewhat superior.[10]

In the interests of parsimony, and in order to reduce the degrees of freedom problems posed by a set of 11 predictors and only 30 "cases" (years), the Zhurkin indicators were removed from the analysis. The Party Congress indicators were used to index both formal phases in the Soviet policy process and the recent changes in the perceived correlation of forces that are concomitants of these phases.

Removing the Zhurkin correlation of forces/strategic variables, nine factors remain:

- Indicators for the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Party Congresses.
- Soviet expressions of tension concerning the United States.
- Frequency of conflict throughout the world.
- Frequency of U.S. crisis operations.

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[10] Together the three Party Congress indicators and the two strategic phases variables account for 59 percent of the variance in the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. The Party Congress indicators by themselves account for 55 percent of this variance and the two strategic/correlation of forces variables 45 percent. The two strategic variables add only 4 percent to the variance accounted for by the Party Congress measures, while the latter add 14 percent to the variance accounted for by the former.

- Conflict behaviors directed by the People's Republic of China toward the Soviet Union.
- Soviet conflict toward the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The results of regressing the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union against these nine factors are shown below.[11] Figure 2

$$R = .85 \qquad R^2 = .73 \qquad F = 4.29$$

Standard deviation of residuals = 4.2

Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.37

compares the actual frequency of the Soviet crises with the frequency that would be estimated on the basis of these nine factors. The multiple regression results show that there is a good fit between the pattern taken by the crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the 30-year period and the aggregate pattern of the other factors. The equation shows that almost three-quarters of the variance in the crises was in common with variation in the other factors. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates a modest degree of negative autocorrelation.[12]

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[11] Regression results are computed using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS.

[12] As noted previously, due to multicollinearity (correlations between the nine predictor factors) and because of the weak theoretical "priors," it is not possible to produce reliable structural parameter estimates and/or to apportion "influence" among the predictors. Analyses of subsets of the predictors indicate that it is possible to account for as much as 70 percent of the variance (with even less autocorrelation) in Soviet concerns with as few as four predictors (for example, the indices of the periods after the 23rd and 24th Party Congresses, Soviet conflict toward the United States, and Chinese conflict toward the Soviet Union). However, given the limits of what can be done (due to weak specifications and multicollinearity), it is not possible to state that these predictors (or any other subset) are the only "important" influences among the set of nine factors.



FIGURE 2. FREQUENCY OF CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION

The fit between the pattern of the crises noted in Soviet sources and the aggregate pattern estimated on the basis of the other factors is confirmed in Figure 2. The estimated and actual frequencies of crises of concern are very close in the early Cold War years (1946-1954). The estimates then miss a peak in Soviet concerns in the mid-1950's and return on track in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The estimated curve catches the general rise in the frequency of events of concern to the Soviet Union during the periods following the 22nd and 23rd Party Congresses (1961-1970), but falls short of capturing the peaks, especially in 1967, the year with the highest number of events of concern. The fit between the actual and estimated curves then becomes quite close for the most recent years (1971-1975).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has examined the international and domestic contexts within which U.S. crisis operations were conducted and Soviet crisis concerns formed over the period 1946-1975. The first section reviewed research on U.S. crisis operations. It was shown that these operations varied in accordance with the level of conflict throughout the world, U.S. involvement in limited wars, Soviet behaviors toward the United States, and phases in the strategic balance (as perceived in the West). This review provided support for the attempt to conduct a multiple-case contextual analysis of Soviet crisis concerns and identified predictors to be used in the comparison of Soviet and U.S. crisis management experiences.

The second section focused on Soviet crisis concerns as revealed by a review of Soviet sources. It showed that the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union varied according to a number of factors: the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses (and recent phases in Soviet perceptions of the correlation of global forces, which were highly correlated with these Congress periods), Soviet behaviors toward the United States and the People's Republic of China, Chinese behaviors toward the Soviet Union, Soviet expressions of tension regarding Soviet-U.S. relations,

the frequency of U.S. crisis operations, and the level of conflict throughout the world.

Three major conclusions concerning Soviet crisis concerns can be drawn from these analyses. First, U.S. crisis operations and Soviet crisis concerns have substantially different correlates. This is evidenced by the fact that only two of the four major correlates of U.S. crisis operations were also appreciably correlated with the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns (the indices of the level of conflict throughout the world and Soviet conflict, primarily verbal behavior, toward the United States).

Second, the fact that the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns varies in accordance with the aggregate pattern estimated on the basis of nine other Soviet and non-Soviet factors lends support to the Soviet data base. In any data-generation effort there is always a danger that an apparently plausible research strategy will produce anomalous and/or idiosyncratic data that have no appreciable relationships with variables measuring other factors of concern. The regression results presented in the second half of the chapter show that this is clearly not the case for the Soviet crisis concerns data, whose frequency varied in accordance with such factors as the formal stages in the Soviet policy process, the correlation of forces (as presented in a Soviet source), Soviet expressions of tension regarding Soviet-U.S. relations, the level of conflict throughout the world, U.S. crisis operations, and the behaviors sent and received by the Soviet Union.

Third, and more speculatively, the analysis of the context within which Soviet crisis concerns have occurred since World War II provides some suggestive evidence concerning the factors that might have influenced (and been influenced by) these concerns and events. While causal arguments cannot be supported, the results do pinpoint types of factors (such as those reviewed in the previous paragraph) as being potentially more important for an understanding of the reasons why Soviet crisis concerns have taken certain patterns and flag other factors (such as Soviet interactions with West Germany) as being less likely influences.

CHAPTER 6. FUTURE RESEARCH

The remainder of the current research effort will have two principal thrusts:

- Intensive coding and analysis of crisis problems, actions, and objectives for a subset of the Soviet crises.
- Integration of the Soviet data bases into the executive aid for crisis decision-makers that was previously developed (CACI, 1978a) for U.S. crisis data bases.

INTENSIVE CODING

In consultation with ARPA/CTO, a sample of crises has been selected for intensive coding and analysis (Table 1). It is designed to reflect the Soviet policy process and to provide reliable statistical bases for comparisons across periods.

The 386 crises were divided into three sets with the years of the CPSU Congresses as the division points:

- 1946-1965 (19th through 22nd Congresses)
- 1966-1970 (23rd Congress)
- 1971-1975 (24th Congress)

Because the most recent cases are likely to provide the best precedents for U.S. crisis planners, the last two periods are oversampled. All 32 incidents in the 1971-1975 span are included, plus 34 cases from each of the other two periods to produce a set of 100 incidents.[1] In the phase covered by the 23rd Party Congress, emphasis has been given to cases involving the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's

[1] The percentages of cases sampled over the three subperiods are: 1971-1975 (100 percent); 1966-1970 (35 percent); 1946-1965 (13 percent).

TABLE 1

Crises Selected for Intensive Coding[a]

Date	Events
460119-460501	Soviet-Iranian disputes
460316-491001	Chinese Communist Party succeeds in Revolutionary War of Liberation
461202-470401	Germany: United States, United Kingdom agree to economic merger
470312-501115	Truman Doctrine proclaimed
470605	United States adopts Marshall Plan
480225-480614	Progressive regime takes over in Czechoslovakia
480515-490720	First major Israeli-Arab war
480623-490504	Crisis in West Berlin
480628-	Sharp deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations
490404	NATO treaty is signed
500625-530727	Korean war
511021-511124	West proposes creation of Middle East Command
530617	Attempted counterrevolutionary putsch in East Berlin
540903-550405	Taiwan Strait crisis
550927	Egypt ends Western monopoly on arms supplies
561027-561110	Hungarian revolution
561029-561108	U.K., French, Israeli forces attack Egypt
570327-570127	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire nuclear weapons
570903-571230	Soviets support Syria in Syrian-Turkish crisis
580714-580821	Crisis in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan and involving Turkey
580823-581025	Offshore islands, U.S.-PRC
580929-590826	French impose economic sanctions against Guinea
581114-590928	Berlin crisis: normalization proposed (free city)
600401-611201	PRC doctrinal break with Soviet Marxist-Leninist
600501-600615	Soviet air defenses down U-2
600630-601215	Initial phase of Congo crisis
610416-610423	U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba
610707-611119	Berlin: Western subversion and the Berlin Wall
620904-621108	Caribbean crisis
620920-621127	Sino-Indian border war
630614-630714	PRC open break with Soviet Union
640101-640811	Cyprus crisis
640805-	Tonkin Gulf raids
650409-660111	India-Pakistan war

[a] As is true throughout the project, crises are worded as they are seen through Soviet eyes, hence 610416-610423 is seen as "U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba."

Continued

Table 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding
Continued

Date	Events
660224	U.S., U.K.-backed coup ousts Nkrumah in Ghana
660501-690101	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
670126-670213	Siege of Soviet Embassy in Peking
670128-670207	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany about neo-Nazis
670421-	CIA-backed colonels' coup in Greece
670513	Soviet Union protests U.S. naval presence in Sea of Japan
670518-670604	Developments leading to Six-Day war
670530-700115	Nigerian civil war
670602-670605	Soviet Union protests U.S. bombing of Soviet ship in DRV port
670605-670718	Six-Day war
670626-6808	PRC activity leads to bad relations with Burma
670705-671105	U.S. evacuation operations in the Congo (Zaire)
670730-671201	New clashes on Cyprus
671021-671027	Sinking of Eilat; Soviet naval forces move to Alexandria
671021-671208	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany about revanchism, neo-Nazi activity
680105-680821	Cyprus: Soviet Union accuses West
680123-681223	Pueblo crisis
680224-680529	Increased neo-Nazi activities in Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin
680304	Soviet Union accuses United States, United Kingdom of attempting to form Persian Gulf bloc
680403-680404	Chinese board Soviet vessel, seize captain
680509-680824	Berlin: German Democratic Republic reacts to Federal Republic of Germany provocations
690228-690315	Damansky Island - Ussuri River crisis
690419	Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt-al-Arab
690901	Coup in Libya overthrows monarchy
691026-691031	Soviet Union chastises U.S. Embassy on Lebanon statement
691111	NATO lowers nuclear threshold
700217	Soviet Union denounces Israeli air raids near Cairo
700430	United States, South Vietnam invade Cambodia
700715	Alleged Israeli pressure on Arab States
700909-701028	U.S. plot in Chile thwarted
700920-701014	Civil war in Jordan
701004	Soviet Union denies U.S. propaganda about Soviet aims in Latin America, Cuba

Continued

Table 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding
Continued

Date	Events
701022	U.S. aircraft violates Soviet border near Leninakan
701121	Portuguese raid on Conakry, Guinea
710130-7104	U.S., allied invasion of Laos
710318	PRC press abuses Soviet Union
710423-711217	Indo-Pakistani conflict; Bangladesh
710819-710822	U.S.-backed military coup in Bolivia
711006-711012	Soviet Union supports Zambia
720211	Greek Government presents ultimatum to Cyprus
720402-720606	People's Republic of China envious of Soviet arms aid to Democratic Republic of Vietnam
720621	Israeli raids in South Lebanon
720718	Soviet advisers expelled from Egypt
7208	U.S. air raids, mining of Tonkin Gulf
720908-720916	Israeli air attack on Syria and Lebanon
730127-750430	Final phase of U.S. involvement in Vietnam
730627-731201	Uruguayan president represses leftists
730707	Military coup in Afghanistan
730911	Military coup ousts Allende in Chile
730925	Peron represses progressive forces in Argentina
731003-731114	October Middle East war
740110	New U.S. strategic targeting doctrine
740119	Soviet Union, People's Republic of China expel one another's diplomats
740210-740674	Iraq accuses Iran of aggression
740226	Military coup overthrows Ethiopian emperor
740311-750322	Kurdish revolt in Iraq
7403 -751227	Soviet helicopter downed in People's Republic of China
740424-751127	Revolution in Portugal
740716	Turkish troops invade Cyprus
750114	Soviet Union rejects trade agreement with United States
750213	Turkey closes U.S. bases
750408-751112	Yugoslavia boycotts 1975 Communist Party conference
750512-750514	U.S. Mayaguez operation
750519	U.S. Secretary of Defense warns North Korea
750617	Soviet Union warns Japan
750715	Angolan civil war

Republic of China, and the Middle East. During the earlier subperiod (1946-1965) stress was placed upon major East-West "Cold War" events, plus a few disputes between the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist states (Yugoslavia and China).

In selecting variables for intensive coding, an attempt was made to maximize comparability between the Soviet data base and the U.S. crises actions, objectives, and problems variables previously coded by CACI (1978a) by using the same variables. In some cases, particularly for crisis management problems, this was not possible. Some of the variables developed for the U.S. crises are not collectable and/or nonapplicable for Soviet crises. Moreover, additional variables had to be added to capture peculiarly Soviet aspects of Soviet crisis behavior and concerns (for example, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) relations with other Communist parties during the incidents). Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Appendix B present the variables employed in the intensive coding.

Once the intensive data base is assembled and checked, Soviet crises actions, objectives, and problems will be analyzed with emphasis on the clusters formed by these three types of crisis characteristics and the ways in which these factors have evolved over time.

EXECUTIVE AID FOR CRISIS DECISION-MAKERS

CACI's executive aid for crisis management (1978a) is a decision-aiding tool. Based on CACI research and analysis conducted for ARPA/CTO, the aiding system provides U.S. national-security planners with information concerning 307 international crises from 1946-1976. The aiding system is highly user-oriented and is designed to allow crisis planners to have ready access to data bases on past U.S. crises that can be used as precedents to inform their planning of options for current or likely future crises. The aid consists of three data bases.

- A file of 307 U.S. crises over the period 1946-1976 which provides descriptive information concerning U.S. military management during each incident and presents a general set of crisis descriptors.

- A sample of 101 U.S. crisis operations over the period 1956-1976 which focuses on U.S. actions and objectives during these operations.

- A sample of 41 crises involving the United States during the period 1956-1976 which presents the major crisis management problems encountered by the United States (this file is presently being increased to 100 cases to allow for more reliable statistical analyses).

In the next phase of CACI's Soviet crisis management project, the data bases on Soviet crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems will be added, as modules, to the executive aid system to produce a qualitatively more powerful planning tool. This will provide U.S. planners with ready access to this information in conjunction with the U.S. crisis data already present on the aid.

APPENDIX A. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

This appendix deals with the reliability and validity of the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union and the codings of the crisis descriptors obtained for these incidents. The first section deals with general reliability and validity issues. The second section compares the Soviet crisis concerns list with other crisis lists.

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Data are reliable to the extent that two independent coders would produce the same results (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). In the identification of the cases from Soviet sources and the coding of basic crisis descriptors from both Soviet and Western sources, reliability was maintained by means of a form of "confrontational" or "consensus" coding. The two principal coders in this phase of the project (one a Ph.D. with experience in analyzing Soviet crisis behavior, the other an M.A. in Soviet studies with a career background as a Soviet specialist in the U.S. Army) identified and coded cases independently. During conferences these two coders justified their decisions and reconciled differences. This approach to reliability was adopted because the coding process required a "mini-case study" to be made for each case. The independent duplication of these mini-case studies to produce a sufficient number of cases for more formal intercoder reliability checks was prohibitive.

Validity relates to whether measures accurately index what they are intended to measure (Caporaso and Roos, 1973). In the identification of crises, validity was maintained in two ways. First, Soviet sources were used to identify the crises of concern to the Soviet Union.[1] These open-source Soviet materials are a form of communication from the Soviet Union,

[1] As elaborated in Chapter 2, due to source coverage problems, Western sources were also used to code incidents in 1974 and 1975.

and communication is an essential part of crisis management. National leaders (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) need to inform other nations (and their own publics) about what issues and events concern them so that they can engage in effective bargaining and other forms of diplomacy. While there is no reason to believe that the Soviets tell everything that concerns them, it is reasonable to believe (as was argued in Chapter 2) that most of their "sins" in communicating are ones of omission rather than commission.

A second factor contributing to validity was the use of multiple categories of Soviet sources:

- Soviet statements in the United Nations.
- The Soviet crisis management literature.
- Soviet "State of the World" messages at Party Congresses.
- Soviet texts dealing with international events.
- Krushchev's memoirs.
- Soviet chronologies.

Use of multiple sources helps to counteract whatever biases might characterize any particular category of information.

COMPARISON OF CRISIS LISTS

Introduction

One of the most effective ways in which to validate a crisis list is to compare it with a similar list (for example, Mahoney's (1977a) comparison of the Brookings with Center for Naval Analyses U.S. crisis lists). In a strict sense, no such validation comparisons can be made for the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union. No other project has produced a comparable list using criteria similar to those employed here. As a

consequence, formal validation analyses involving either a one-to-one comparison of lists or comparisons of aggregate patterns cannot be performed.

It is possible, however, to gain some insight into the list of crises of concern to the Soviet Union (and into the Soviet views it embodies) by comparing it to some partially comparable data bases. These analyses delineate the specific patterns of perceptions and concerns found in the draft list and show how these patterns differ from the pictures traced by other data bases bearing on the subject.

In the interest of parsimony (and to provide for more rigorous comparisons) differences between lists receive much more emphasis than similarities. In the comparisons little concern is given to the ways in which different projects have categorized the same set of crisis events (for example, the issue of whether the Cyprus crisis of 1964 is one, two, or three events) (Mahoney, 1977a). Tabular presentations are adapted from the original source materials.

The data bases that will be compared with the Soviet list are

- The International Incidents project of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) (Mahoney, 1977a),
- Other CNA lists produced by Brad Dismukes (1977) and Anne Kelly (1977),
- Blechman and Kaplan's preliminary analysis (1976) of the employment of the Soviet armed forces for political purposes, and
- Major lists of U.S. crises produced by the Brookings Institution, the Center for Naval Analyses, and CACI.[2]

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[2] The purpose of this paper is not to provide a detailed comparison of the Soviet and U.S. crisis lists produced by CACI. Instead, the goal is to use elements from the U.S. crisis list (and other sources) to delineate the types of events covered in the draft Soviet crisis concerns data base.

In dealing with each of these sources, attention is confined to cases concerning Soviet crisis operations and/or Soviet-U.S. crisis interactions.

Comparison With CNA'S International Incidents List

The International Incidents project of the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1977a) produced a list of 99 Navy and Marine Corps crisis operations over the period 1955-1975. Table 1 presents the major[3] U.S.-Soviet crises contained in the Incidents data base; all are included in the CACI Soviet crisis concerns list.

TABLE 1

Soviet-U.S. Crises, International Incidents Project List

Principal Target	Response
Soviet Union	Post-Suez 11-12/1956
	Berlin 5-9/1959
	Berlin 8/1961-5/1962
	Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962
	Middle East War 5-6/1967
	Eilat 10/1967
	Jordan 9-10/1970
	Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972
	Middle East War 10-11/1973

Table 2 presents the major crises involving other Communist nations found in the Incidents data base.

[3] These are "major" Navy crisis responses in the sense that they are the cases in which the Navy's most significant projection force -- aircraft carriers -- was involved in operations involving the Soviet Union.

TABLE 2

Other Crises Involving Communist States,
International Incidents Data Base[a]

Principal Target	Response
PRC	Tachen Islands 2/1955
	PRC-ROC 7-9/1957
	Quemoy 6-12/1958
	PRC-ROC 7/1959
	Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962
	PRC-ROC 9/1963
DPRK	Pueblo 1-3/1969
	EC-121 4/1969
DRV	Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964
RGNUC	Mayaguez 5/1975

[a] As was the case in Table 1, only Navy responses involving carriers are included in this list.

The pattern of coverage between the two lists is mixed. Of six incidents involving the People's Republic of China over the period, the draft list includes three: Taiwan Straits, Quemoy, and the Sino-Indian border war. Three Sino-U.S. crises of lesser significance are not included in the Soviet list. One of the two crises involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is included (Pueblo); one (EC-121) is not. The Gulf of Tonkin incident involving the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Mayaguez crisis between the United States and Cambodia are present in both lists.

Comparison With Dismukes CNA List

Dismukes (1977) presents a listing of major employments of the Soviet Navy for political purposes since the Soviet fleet "went to sea" in 1967. While not all of these cases are "crises" in any sense of the

term, they do involve the Soviet armed forces and hence provide a useful comparison base, which is presented in Table 3.

Several significant patterns emerge when Table 3 is compared with the list of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. First, the CACI list contains correspondent events for all major Soviet naval crisis operations: the June 1967 war, the movement of Soviet naval combatants into Egyptian ports in late summer 1967, the October 1967 Eilat incident, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Portuguese raid on Guinea in 1970, the Bangladesh war of 1971, the Vietnam war, and the October 1973 war.

Second, the cases on the Dismukes list that do not have corresponding events on the Soviet crisis list fall into four categories:

- Mine clearing operations (Bangladesh and Suez).
- Exercises carried out in conjunction with other (political) events (Exercise Sever in 1968 and the maneuvers conducted at the time of the Cod war in 1973).
- Cases in which Soviet naval port visits and/or the positioning of Soviet naval units occurred at the same time as significant events in Third World countries: the 1969 Ghanaian fishing boats case, the Somali port visits of 1969, 1970, and 1972, the Sierra Leone case of 1971.
- The sealift of Moroccan troops in 1973 well prior to the October war.

The first category includes events that are not "crises" in any common usage of the term.

The second category contains two major fleet exercises. As is the case with all exercise activity, it is difficult to prove that these cases were focused on the political events that occurred at the same time (and/or to prove that they were not so focused).

TABLE 3

Employment of the Soviet Navy for Political Purposes, 1967-1974

Date	Episode
May 12-June 19, 1967	Surge deployment of 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and submarines to Mediterranean during the June War.
July 10-September 2, 1967	Soviet combatants led by a cruiser into Port Said and Alexandria.
October 27, 1967, to present	Combatants returned to Port Said and Alexandria following Israeli shelling of Port Suez in reprisal for sinking of Eilat.
July 1968	Exercise Sever in the Norwegian Sea.
February/March 1969	Small naval squadron off Accra during Soviet-Ghanaian negotiations on release of 2 Soviet trawlers, detained since October 1968. Squadron comprised 2 DDGSs, 1 SS, 1 AO. Presence of Soviet ships did not become public knowledge but almost certainly was known to Ghanaian officials.
December 1969	Soviet ships performed a series of port visits and steamed steadily off Somalia following assassination of the president and a bloodless military coup.
April/May 1970	Port visits of longer than customary duration and simultaneous calls in Somali ports during a period when Somalia reportedly felt itself (erroneously) threatened by an Ethiopian military move and by internal rebellion.
September/October 1970	Increased deployments into Mediterranean during Jordanian crisis.
December 11, 1970, to present	Almost continuous patrol by Soviet combatants along West African coast and in Conakry following Portuguese attacks (November 22, 1970) on Guinea. Significant presence by LST/LSM since January 1972.
May 18-23, 1971	Kashin visit to Freetown, Sierra Leone, during a period of domestic instability.
December 1971	Deployment of 2 anti-CVA task groups to the Bay of Bengal to counter presence of Enterprise task force.
January 24-February 6, 1972	Kynda and Kresta CLGMs present in Mogadiscio during period of coup rumors and coinciding with a visit of UN Security Council in Mogadiscio.
April 1972-June 1974	Major harbor-clearing and mineclearing operation in Bangladesh.
May-June 1972	Deployment of surface squadron and submarines to South China Sea in reaction to U.S. Linebacker operations.
March/April 1973	Sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria.
Spring 1973	Large-scale naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea at the peak of the U.K.-Iceland Cod War.
October-November 1973	Major augmentation of Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in connection with the October Mideast War; threatening behavior in the peaks of the crisis.
July-November 1974	Mineclearing operations in the Straits of Gubal.

The status of the cases in the third category is also somewhat ambiguous. Their nonoccurrence on the Soviet crisis concerns list may be due to a number of factors:

- Soviet sensitivities concerning their lower-level political-military operations in the Third World.
- Soviet perceptions that these were not "major" political-military crises/operations.
- Soviet perceptions that at least some of these events were not intended by them to be responses to specific problem events in the Third World.

Because of its timing in March/April 1973, well before the October war, the last event (the Moroccan sealift) is a somewhat marginal case. It is possible, however, that the absence of a correspondent entry on the Soviet list is due to the source coverage problems in the 1970's.

Comparison With Kelly CNA List

The final Center for Naval Analyses list of interest was produced by Anne Kelly (1977). Kelly's data base deals with politically oriented Soviet naval operations. As might be expected, there is substantial overlap between it and the Dismukes list examined in the previous section. As a result, attention is paid only to the eight cases on it, which were not discussed in the previous section. These cases are presented in Table 4.

Of the cases listed, three have fairly close referents on the Soviet list:

- Yemen (though the Soviet list's entry includes a broader span of events).
- The Bab el Mandeb (part of the final phase of the 1973 October crisis).
- Soviet submarine visits to Cuba in 1972 and 1974 (the list has an earlier entry for this prolonged set of incidents in 1970).

TABLE 4

Selected Examples of Politically Oriented Soviet Naval Operations

Year	Operation	Target
1972, 1974	Deployment of sub tender and ballistic missile submarines in Cuban territorial waters	United States/ Cuba
1973	Visit of Admiral Gorshkov and naval contingent to Iraq	Iraq/Kuwait
1973	Sealift of South Yemen troops	Oman, South Yemen
1973	Naval patrol in Bab el Mandeb during Arab-Israeli war and aftermath	Israel/Egypt
1974	Naval hydrographic ship masking as a civilian research ship visits Tunisia	Tunisia
1974	At-sea seizure, off Guinea, of fleeing rebels held and charged by Guinea in the assassination of leader Amilar Cabral	Guinea/PAIGC
1974	Continuing patrol off West Africa following independence of Guinea Bissau	Uncertain (at least Guinea)
1974	Intelligence collection ships on patrol in Straits of Hormuz	Iran/West

The remaining events resemble those seen previously in that they involve "conjunctions" of naval activities and on-shore events and not major crises.

Comparison With Brookings List

In their ARPA-sponsored study of the employment of the U.S. armed forces for political purposes, Blechman and Kaplan (1976) included one chapter that surveyed employment of the Soviet armed forces for political ends. Table 5 presents some of the cases cited in that chapter. The table excludes events that were not "crises" in any common usage of the term (for example, port visits not associated with crisis events ashore) and events having correlates on the Soviet crisis concerns list.

A number of the 46 events listed in Table 5 have already been examined in previous comparisons (for example, the post-1967 operations involving the Soviet Navy) and need not be reviewed in detail again. For the remaining events, the most striking feature is the relatively large number of incidents involving Germany (21 cases). These are generally traffic events involving transit to Berlin, apart from the major Berlin crises. Soviet attention, as reflected in the CACI Soviet crisis concerns list, focuses on the major Berlin crises to the exclusion of these incidents.

Comparison With Major U.S. Crisis Lists

ARPA has sponsored two major studies dealing with U.S. crisis operations by Brookings (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) and CACI (1977b). Together with CNA's International Incidents project (Mahoney, 1977a) these studies provide the most comprehensive data base available concerning U.S. crisis management operations in the postwar period. The comparisons in this section use an unpublished working paper produced at CACI that integrates these three lists.

TABLE 5

Selected Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1946-1975

Beginning Date	Target Nations	Action
January 1946	China	Occupation of Manchuria
1947	Austria	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
January 1947	Germany	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
January 1948	Germany	Interdict transit to Berlin
February 1948	Germany	Overflights
1950-1953	Germany	Sporadically harass traffic to Berlin
January 1951	Germany	Occupy two enclaves in Berlin
March 1951	Albania	Provide air defense assistance
August 1951	Czechoslovakia	Provide air defense assistance
August 1951	Germany	Maneuvers in area
June 1952	Austria	Harass U.S. occupation forces aircraft
September 1954	Germany	Harass air traffic
November 1956	Germany	Harass traffic
August 1957	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
January 1958	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
September 1960	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
September 1962	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
April 1963	Germany	Harass air traffic to Berlin
May 1963	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
October 1963	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
August 1964	Congo	Airlift arms
April 1965	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
April 1968	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
August 1968	Rumania, Yugoslavia	Mass troops
February 1969	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
February 1969	Ghana	Naval deployment
April 1969	Korea	Naval deployment (EC-121 incident)
October 1969	Germany	Harass air traffic
April 1970	Somalia	Port visit
October 1970	Germany	Maneuvers
December 1970	Guinea	Naval deployment
January 1971	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
January 1971	Sudan	Combat air missions
May 1971	Sierra Leone	Port visit
August 1971	Rumania, Yugoslavia	Manuevers
January 1972	Somalia	Port visit
April 1972	Bangladesh	Clear mines
May 1972	Vietnam	Naval deployment
1973	Yemen-Oman	Transport foreign troops
April 1973	Iraq, Kuwait	Port visit
April 1973	Morocco, Syria	Transport foreign troops
October 1973	Egypt, Syria	Airlift supplies, alert, naval deployment
1974	Guinea	Naval patrols
June 1974	Egypt	Clear mines
August 1974	Rumania	Maneuvers
September 1975	Norway	Missile tests

Table 6 presents the Soviet-U.S. crises present in the integrated list, with the exception of those cases having correlates on the Soviet crisis concerns list.[4] For convenience, Table 6 has five sections:

- Direct and indirect Soviet-U.S. confrontations.
- Ship incidents.
- Aircraft incidents.
- Border incidents.
- "Other" (miscellaneous) incidents.

Two points stand out in Table 6. The first is that the set of direct and indirect Soviet-U.S. confrontations consists, for the most part, of relatively minor events. The major Soviet-U.S. crises (for example, Turkey and Greece in the late 1940's; the 1948, 1958-1959, and 1961 Berlin crises; the Cuban missile crisis; the 1967 war; the Jordanian crisis of 1970; the Bangladesh war; and the October war of 1973) are found on both the integrated U.S. crises and Soviet crisis concerns lists and hence are not included in the table.

CONCLUSIONS

Three points stand out in the comparisons of the Soviet crisis concerns list with the other major crisis data bases. The first is that the Soviet list includes most of the major postwar Soviet-U.S. crises identified in Western data bases. The most significant exception is the

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[4] Clearly the record of Soviet-U.S. crises provides the best base of precedents for U.S. crisis managers considering response options in crises involving the Soviet Union. Western perceptions of these events are fairly easy to obtain from these three projects. The existence of these projects and their data bases of Soviet-U.S. crises, as perceived in the West, is one of the major reasons why CACI's Soviet crisis project uses Soviet sources to obtain an alternative perspective on the Soviet crisis experience.

TABLE 6

Selected Soviet-U.S. Crises
(Brookings, CNA, and CACI Data Bases)

1. Direct and Indirect Superpower Involvement

Date	Event
5208 -	Security of Turkey
521021-521103	Allied authorities in Germany reject Soviet demands that anti-Soviet groups in West Berlin be disbanded.
620102-620405	Continued tensions over Berlin.
6312 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.
680830-	President Johnson warns the Soviet Union against further aggression in East Europe as rumors of invasion of Romania grow.
680917-680918	The United States, Britain, and France warn the Soviet Union that any effort to use military force against West Germany will bring "immediate" Allied response.[a]
710108-	Bomb explodes outside a Soviet cultural building in Washington, D.C.
7104 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.
720114-	U.S. Congressman expelled from Soviet Union.
7310 -7404	Indian Ocean. (Aftermath of October war)
7505 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.

2. Ship Incidents

510207-	The United States demands that the Soviet Union return at once 672 vessels loaned during World War II.
590226-	U.S. Navy boards a Soviet trawler off Newfoundland while investigating damage to five transatlantic cables. Novorossisk incident.
6205 -	Hostile Soviet naval activity in the Baltic.
650403-	The United States accuses the Soviet Union of dangerous harassment of U.S. naval operations on the high seas.
681209-681212	Two U.S. destroyers begin cruise in the Black Sea despite Soviet protest.
720416-	Soviet ships bombed in Haiphong Harbor.

3. Aircraft Incidents

500515-	Soviet Government charges in note to Iran that U.S. technicians are taking aerial photographs of Soviet-Iran frontier.
511124-	The United States charges that a U.S. Navy plane missing over northern Japanese waters had been shot down by Soviet fighter planes outside Soviet territory.

[a] Present on draft list, but as a May-August Berlin crisis.

Continued

Table 6
Aircraft Incidents
Continued

Date	Event
521003-	Two Soviet jet fighters harass a U.S. ambulance plane en route to West Berlin.
521012-521017	Soviet Government charges that a U.S. B-29, reported missing off Japan, violated Soviet territory and disappeared seaward when fired on by Soviet fighters.
521104-	Fighter plane with Soviet markings intercepted over Hakkaido Island, Japan, by two U.S. planes and escorted back to Soviet territory.
530216-	Two U.S. jets fire on two Soviet fighters over Hokkaido, force their withdrawal.
530317-530325	Soviet aircraft attack U.S. Air Force RB-50 on weather reconnaissance mission 25 miles east of Siberia.
530520-	Another Soviet jet flown to Denmark by Polish pilot.
530727-530731	Soviet Union charges that four U.S. fighters shot down Soviet passenger plane over Communist China.
530729-530731	United States protests shooting down of U.S. RB-50 over Sea of Japan.
540201-	United States shoots down Soviet jet fighter off Korean coast.
541107-	U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down over Japan.
550624-550708	Soviet planes shoot down U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over international waters in the Bering Straits area.
560710-	Soviet Government charges that U.S. aircraft recently violated Soviet air space in flights as deep as 200 miles within Soviet borders.
560716-	U.S. Government charges the Soviet Union with holding at least 10 crew members from two downed U.S. military aircraft.
580418-	United States rejects Soviet allegation of provocative nuclear bomber flights over the Arctic.
580629-	U.S. transport forced down by Soviet jet fighters near Yerevan in Soviet Armenia.
581016-	The Soviet Union charges U.S. military aircraft are flying reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory in the Far East.
590615-	U.S. Navy patrol plane damaged by MIG's over the Sea of Japan.
600524-	Soviet Army agrees to release nine U.S. airmen and their plane forced down in East Germany.

Continued

Table 6
Aircraft Incidents
Continued

Date	Event
600711-610125	Soviet Union states a missing RB-47 was shot down over Soviet territorial waters in the Arctic.
640128-640131	Soviet fighters shoot down unarmed U.S. jet trainer over East Germany.
640310-640322	Soviet air defense forces shoot down U.S. jet reconnaissance bomber that accidentally crosses into East German airspace.
641105-	Soviet Union threatens the safety of international flights by Western airlines in the East German air corridors en route to and from Berlin.
680702-	U.S. commercial airliner forced to land on Soviet island in Kuriles.
4. Border Incidents	
490709-490725	Soviet authorities close all zonal crossings except one to truck traffic bound for Berlin from West Germany.
500126-500218	U.S., British, and French commandants protest continued restrictions by Soviet authorities on truck traffic in and out of Berlin.
520630-	U.S., British, and French high commissioners in Germany renew protests to Soviet authorities against interference with traffic on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn by East German authorities.
521029-	Train carrying eight U.S. tanks to West Berlin is stopped at the border of the Soviet Zone by Soviet authorities.
600309-600402	Confrontations in West Germany and Berlin.
631011-631104	The United States protests strongly and repeatedly to the Soviet Union against the blocking of a U.S. military convoy by Soviet troops outside West Berlin.
5. Other Incidents	
510606-	United States demands that Soviet Government punish Soviet soldier who killed a U.S. corporal in Vienna.
510609-	U.S. Army forcibly removes 3-man Soviet repatriation mission from U.S. Zone to Soviet Zone in Austria.
640400-640410	The United States retaliates for travel ban on four of its embassy attaches in Moscow by restricting all Soviet military attaches in the United States to the Washington area.
701123-701221	Lithuanian seaman attempts to defect. Seeks asylum in the United States by boarding U.S. Coast Guard cutter. Coast Guard officers force him to return.
710125-710127	U.S. Embassy in Moscow protests against harassment of newsmen.

April 1969 EC-121 incident, and here the character of the Soviet operations suggests that they may not have regarded the event as a major crisis.[5]

Second, it is evident that the Soviets pay much less attention to ship, aircraft, and Berlin transit incidents than is the case in Western sources, as is shown most strikingly in the comparison of the Soviet crisis concerns list with the Brookings data base. A possible reason for this difference is that the Soviets may not consider such "military" incidents to be important unless they are clearly linked to more significant political events.

Finally, as was brought out most clearly in the comparisons with the Dismukes, Kelly, and Brookings lists, Soviet views differ considerably from those of Western observers when it comes to the treatment of some of the lesser incidents involving the Soviet Navy in the Third World. As noted previously, this could be due to any one of a number of factors: Soviet sensitivities concerning such operations, Soviet perceptions that these were not "major" crises or crisis operations, or (more speculatively) Soviet perceptions that at least some of the events in this category were not intended by them to be reactions to specific crisis events and/or significant crisis operations.

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[5] Moreover, the failure of the United States to take actions beyond a naval show of force in the 1968 Pueblo crisis might have suggested to the Soviet Union that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had little to fear from a U.S. response to the EC-121 shoot-down.

APPENDIX B. VARIABLES USED TO CODE SOVIET CRISIS BEHAVIOR

INTRODUCTION

This appendix presents the variables employed in CACI's Soviet crisis management project to measure Soviet crisis behaviors and concerns. There are four types of variables:

- Crisis characteristics
- Crisis actions
- Crisis objectives
- Crisis problems

Table 1 (Page B-3) lists the crisis characteristics variables, which are analyzed in Chapter 4.

Tables 2 through 7 (Pages B-5 to B-13) show the variables employed in the intensive coding of the sample of 100 Soviet crises. The cases included in the sample are presented in Chapter 6. As noted in that chapter, in order to maximize comparability between the Soviet data bases and the data files collected in CACI's earlier U.S. crisis management projects (CACI, 1978a), applicable indicators from the U.S. crisis research were used as the actions, objectives, and problems variables in the Soviet intensive coding. In addition, new variables were added to reflect peculiarly Soviet aspects of crisis actions, crisis objectives, and crisis management problems. Accordingly, each of the three types of variables collected in the intensive coding phase of the project is represented in two tables.

	Actions	Objectives	Problems
Variables Taken From the U.S. Crisis Project	Table 2	Table 4	Table 6
Special Soviet Variables	Table 3	Table 5	Table 7

To avoid reaching beyond the limits of the data, most of the variables (including all of the actions, objectives, and problems indicators) are scored in present/absent form.

TABLE 1

Soviet Crisis Characteristics

Basic Identifying Descriptors

- Identification code
- Name
- Dates of initiation and termination
- Location

Classification of Actors

- Nation
- Type (nation, movement, Communist Party, alliance, and so forth)
- Former colonial/dependent status, if any
- Nature (United States, West, People's Republic of China, Marxist-Leninist states, less-developed countries, Soviet Union, and so forth)
- Location (with respect to crisis, that is, internal, external, and so forth)

Arms Transfer Contacts

- Precrisis and postcrisis (10-year span overall)
- (Soviet Union, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, People's Republic of China, United States, United Kingdom, France, other Western)

Anticipation of Crisis

- Consistency with Marxist-Leninist ideology
- Indications, if any, as to degree to which crisis was expected

Crisis Characterization

- General Description
  - Key adjective (potential, actual, and so forth)
  - Essential nature (riot, coup, war, intervention, and so forth)
- Scope (domestic or international)
- Threat to Communist Party, Communist Party/movement, or Communist regime
  - Level of violence
  - Geopolitical location (with respect to Soviet Union)
  - Actors (extent of Soviet, other involvement)

Continued

Table 1
Soviet Crisis Characteristics
Continued

- Strategic confrontation, if any
- Duration of crisis (short to very long)

Soviet Union and Crisis Situation

- Soviet objectives with respect to in-theater supported set
- Soviet objectives with respect to in-theater opposed set
- Soviet in-theater military crisis management capabilities
- Soviet activities (verbal, physical)

Crisis Outcome

- For the Soviet Union (Soviet perceptions)
- For Soviet clients and/or allies (latters' perceptions)

TABLE 2

Action Variables From U.S. Crisis Management Project

Commit Land Forces to Combat

Commit Sea Forces to Combat

Commit Air Forces to Combat

Commit Support Services (Land)

Commit Support Services (Sea)

Commit Support Services (Air)

Reposition Land Forces

Reposition Sea Forces

Reposition Air Forces

Threaten Nuclear Forces as a Deterrent

Redeploy Nuclear Forces as a Deterrent

Change Alert Status of Nuclear Forces as a Deterrent

Threaten Nonnuclear Forces as a Deterrent

Redeploy Nonnuclear Forces as a Deterrent

Change Alert Status of Nonnuclear Forces

Redeploy Peacekeeping Forces

Show of Military Force

Military Blockade or Quarantine

Isolated Military Contact

Military Forces Used in Search and Rescue Operation

Military Intelligence Collection

Military Intelligence Dissemination to an Ally

Military Intelligence Dissemination to an Antagonist

Military Maneuvers or Training Exercises

Improve, Maintain Force Readiness

Covert Military Operation

Military Intervention Between Combatants

Airlift Personnel and/or Supplies and Equipment

Provide Military Advisory Assistance

Provide Military Training for Combat Troops

Continued

Table 2
Action Variables From U.S. Crisis Management Project
Continued

Provide Other Military Training

Drawdown Military Equipment From U.S. Depots

Provide Supplies From U.S. Depots

Provide Supplies From Nonmilitary Sources

Provide Military Maintenance Assistance

Provide Other Military Logistics Assistance

Provide Other Military Assistance

Make Political/Economic Commitment Implying New Military Mission

Undertake a New Military Mission

Accept a New Military Cost

Modify an Existing Defense Treaty

Modify an Existing Base Rights Treaty

Modify an Existing Status of Forces Agreement

Seek Assistance in Decision-Making

Take No Military Action

Employ Diplomacy

Mediate a Dispute

Threaten to, or Actually, Withdraw Support

Advocate/Support Peacekeeping Efforts

Improve Scientific/Technical Capabilities

Reaffirm Existing Political/Military Commitment

Lodge Protest(s)

Other

Soviet Union Acts Alone

Soviet Union Acts With One Other Nation

Soviet Union Acts With Two or More Other Nations

United Nations Involved

TABLE 3

Soviet Action Variables

Military intervention in a Marxist-Leninist state

Cooperative intervention in a Third World state

Joint operation with forces from another Marxist-Leninist state

U.N.-associated actions: Resort to veto

U.N.-associated actions: Resolutions and/or amendments

U.N.-associated actions: Speeches and/or letters

Support existing regime

Support antiregime insurgent movement

Support antiregime Communist or Communist Party/movement

Provide political/propaganda support

Provide economic assistance

Provide crisis-related military aid

Fairly direct use of military forces to support political goals

Use of Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to support political goals

Use of international organizations other than United Nations, Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

TABLE 4

Objectives Variables
From U.S. Crisis Management Project

Deter Imminent Attack

Improve or Rectify Deterrence Posture

Put Down Rebellion

Restore a Regime

Regain Access to Economic Resources

Restore Peace

Restore Territorial Integrity

Restore Military Balance of Power

Restore Readiness

Preserve Readiness

Preserve Peace

Confirm or Reestablish Prestige

Preserve Territory and/or Facilities

Preserve Regime From External Threat

Preserve Regime From Internal Threat

Preserve, Restore, or Improve Alliance

Protect Legal and Political Rights

Induce Maintenance of Current Policy

Dissuade From a New Policy

Protect a Military Asset

Support a New Government

Induce National Reorientation

Induce Adoption of a New Policy

Bring About the Fall of a Regime

Support Insurgency

Deny Political Access

Deny Military Access

Assure Continued Economic Access

Preserve or Regain Control of the Sea

Preserve or Regain Control of the Air

Continued

Table 4
Objectives Variables
From U.S. Crisis Management Project
Continued

Deny Success to Terrorists or Hijackers

Protect Human Life

Provide Sanctuary or Asylum

Support Critical Negotiations

Discover Intentions or Actions

Prepare for Alternative Missions

Support Efforts by the United Nations

Contain Opponent(s)

Prevent Spread of War

Preserve Line of Communications

Regain Technical Advantage

Restore Prestige

Preserve Balance of Power

Prevent Spread of Capitalist Influence

Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

Insure Self-Sufficiency

Avoid Direct Involvement

Preserve Secrecy

TABLE 5

Soviet Objectives Variables

Preserve elite power/political system within Soviet Union

Preserve buffer system (Eastern Europe and Mongolia)

Preserve, restore unity of (and Soviet preeminence within) International Communist Movement

Prevent reemergence of Germany as a major power

Contain PRC expansionism (ideological, political, economic, territorial)

Avoid isolation

Maximize Soviet and Soviet leadership's prestige

Support shift in correlation of global forces against capitalism in favor of communism

Neutralize/eliminate Western influence in Third World

Achieve recognition, equal status with United States as global superpower

Prevent U.N. Secretariat, and so forth, from taking independent action

Alter balance of power favorable to Soviet Union, allies, clients

TABLE 6

Problems Variables From U.S. Crisis Management Project

System/Procedural Constraints on Actions

- Constraints on Military Action
- Consideration of Soviet Domestic Impact
- Consideration of International Relations
- Proposed Action Produces Foreign Policy Conflict

Resources Inadequate for Decision-Making/Action

- Inability to Reinforce Local Units in Time
- Inability to Provide Additional Logistical Support

Emotional/Ideological Issues Involved in Decision-Making

- Crisis Actions Affected by Ideological Issues
- Crisis Actions Affected by Emotional Issues

Interpersonal Factors in Decision-Making

- Multilingual Problems
- Delay in Contacting Proper Individuals

Constraints on Operations

- Action in Friendly Country (Area)
- Action in Hostile Country (Area)

Failures in Taking Appropriate/Timely Action

- Action Inadequate to Prevent Crisis
- Action Inadequate to Solve Crisis
- Forces Inadequate to Solve Crisis
- Fail to Execute Action in Time
- Inadequate Logistic Support to Accomplish Objectives
- Inadequate Control of Local Forces

FORSTAT Problems

- Availability of Lift (Sea/Air)

Continued

Table 6
Problems Variables From U.S. Crisis Management Project
Continued

Problems in the Operating Environment

- Geography, Terrain, Climate
- Distance to Crisis Area
- Unique Logistics/Communications Requirements

General Problems in Crisis Handling

- Crisis Develops Despite Adequate Actions
- Overreaction to Crisis
- Late Soviet Political-Military Involvement
- Soviet Political-Military Involvement at Outset

General Problems in Crisis Timing

- Situation Develops Over Time Before Crisis Level Is Reached
- Situation Develops Over Time but Crisis Is Sudden
- Sudden Crisis With Prolonged Action/Solution
- Prolonged Crisis With Intermittent Peaks
- Multicrises

TABLE 7

Soviet Crisis Management Problems Variables

Perceptual/Psychological

- Threat to Homeland Perceived
- Threat to Other Key Regions (for Example, Eastern Europe) Perceived
- Fear of Germany
- Fear of Encirclement by Western States
- Sensitivity to Criticism From Other Communist Parties and Party States

Relations With Marxist-Leninist States

- Interests of Other Marxist-Leninist States Involved in Crisis
- Marxist-Leninist State Included in Set of Soviet Opponents in Crisis
- Joint Operations With Other Marxist-Leninist States

Relations With Local Communist Parties and Progressive Movements

- Local Communist Parties and Movements Threatened
- Local Communist Parties and Movements Fail to Follow Soviet Advice (Chile, Indonesia, and So Forth) and Suffer as a Result
- Local Communist Parties and Movements Oppose the Soviet Union

Transportation/Logistical Issues

- Soviets Have Little Military Operational Experience in Crisis Theater

APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION

Three major recent projects have attempted to identify and analyze the postwar military crisis operations of the United States (CACI, 1978a; Mahoney, 1978; Blechman and Kaplan, 1976). Each of the three employed a different definition for its subject matter.[1]

- CACI researchers focused on instances in which the United States engaged in extraordinary military management activity.
- Brookings researchers focused on political uses of the armed forces.
- CNA's International Incidents project focused on Navy and Marine Corps operations carried out in conjunction with foreign events.

Because of these differences in scope, there is no reason to expect that the three would produce identical lists of incidents. At the same time, however, their foci clearly overlap (all, for example, include the major postwar East-West clashes) and hence have at least partial comparability. Because the theoretical implications of the differences in definition and scope are not well understood, any differences among the three can, at most, serve a heuristic purpose. At the same time, the identification of common patterns and (more significantly) common relationships will provide us with greater confidence in research that utilizes these data.

This section is designed to serve as an adjunct to analyses presented in Chapter 5. The analysis begins by comparing the three data sets and then proceeds to a comparison of their relationships with other factors.[2]

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[1] The three definitions are presented and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

[2] The second analysis can be viewed as a weak form of construct validity (Bohrnstedt, 1970).

COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS DATA BASES

The Brookings and CACI data files cover the period 1946-1975. CNA's International Incidents project, by contrast, begins in 1955. This starting date was selected on the assumption that modern crisis diplomacy began in the mid-1950's, when the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the capacity to present credible nuclear threats to one another's homelands. The presupposition was that this mutual nuclear vulnerability set off the period since the mid-1950's from earlier eras of crisis diplomacy.

Reflecting this difference in temporal scope, Table 1 presents two sets of correlations, the spans 1946-1975 (for the Brookings and CACI files) and 1955-1975 (for all three data bases). Two CACI variables are presented, one for the complete data set (307 cases) and a second which excludes domestic (U.S.) operations, as well as a few other cases (for example, U.S. release of military bases in the West Indies in 1960 and the Independence of Micronesia in 1972) that have no counterparts in the other two data bases (274 cases).

The differences in correlations in the two periods are striking. The implication of these results is that the data files take on much more consistent profiles after 1955 than was true during the initial Cold War years of the late 1940's and early 1950's. This conclusion is supported by an examination of Figure 1, which plots the frequency of events in the CNA, Brookings, and "international crisis" version of the CACI data bases.

The differences between the pre- and post-1955 periods in Figure 1 are striking. With some exceptions (for example, the 1968 peak in the CACI series) the values in the later periods exhibit roughly consonant patterns. The contrary is true in the pre-1955 period.

TABLE 1

Correlations of U.S. Crisis Data Bases

	Brookings	CNA[a]	CACI (307)	CACI (274)
1946-1975				
Brookings	1.0	-	.32	.35
CNA		-	-	-
CACI (307)		-	1.00	.89
CACI (274)		-		1.00
1955-1975				
Brookings	1.0	.89	.56	.71
CNA		1.00	.51	.65
CACI (307)			1.00	.86
CACI (274)				1.00

[a] Since there are no pre-1955 values for the CNA indicator, cross-period comparisons of correlations cannot be made.



FIGURE 1. COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS PROJECTS

Table 2 carries the analysis of the three data bases one step further by comparing the relationships that they have with other factors. The factors selected are those presented previously in Chapter 5:

- The (perceived) state of the strategic balance in the West (Goldmann's "objective tension").
- Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States (Azar and Sloan, 1975).
- The frequency of conflicts throughout the world (based on Azar's work).
- U.S. involvement in limited wars (Korea and Vietnam).

A number of points stand out:

- The results for 1946-1975 are not consistent across the data bases.
- In marked contrast, with the exception of the limited war variable for the 307-case CACI data base,[3] there is much stronger consistency across crisis indicators in the 1955-1975 span.
- Moreover, the aggregate fit between the factors and the pattern taken by U.S. operations is consistently stronger for each data base in the post-1955 era.

On the basis of these analyses, two conclusions are warranted. The first is that all three data bases trace out roughly similar patterns in the post-1955 period and, perhaps more significantly, have similar patterns of intercorrelations with other factors. Second, the salience of the 1955 "break" lends support for (though clearly does not provide conclusive evidence for) the CNA project's emphasis on the importance of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers as a factor denoting a new phase in U.S. crisis management.

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[3] Domestic military operations conducted during the 1960's might account for this difference between the two versions of the CACI data base.

TABLE 2

Correlations of Four Predictor Factors
With U.S. Crisis Data Bases[a]

Dependent Variables, 1946-1975

CNA	Brookings	CACI (307)	CACI (274)	Factors
	.74	.27	.40	Strategic balance
	.38	.19	.18	Soviet conflict toward the United States
	.49	.31	.18	The frequency of conflict globally
	-.34	.30	.17	Limited wars
	.70	.32	.31	R^2

Dependent Variables, 1955-1975

CNA	Brookings	CACI (307)	CACI (274)	Factors
.72	.79	.42	.62	Strategic balance
.53	.43	.51	.49	Soviet conflict toward the United States
.56	.51	.41	.37	The frequency of conflict globally
-.25	-.28	.06	-.15	Limited wars
.84	.86	.64	.69	R^2

[a] Figures opposite factors are bivariate correlations.

[b] The CNA values begin in 1955, making a two-span comparison impossible.

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