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Master's Thesis

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RECRUITING THE BLACK CADET

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22 May 77

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Arthur C. Hester

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63 p.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this research effort was to determine the effectiveness of the United States Military Academy's minority recruiting program, and recommend steps to improve it. My interest in this project was sparked by a request from Colonel Manley E. Rogers, USMA's Director of Admissions and Registrar.

The paper is primarily concerned with measures designed to increase black enrollment. This restriction allowed me to keep the project to manageable size. The effort was further restricted by the mere fact of being located quite some distance from West Point. This factor caused some generalizations when specifics would have been preferred.

Lastly, the opinions expressed in this paper are solely my own and no official endorsement is expressed or implied. I thank all those who assisted me in this effort, especially Bob Dockum, my research advisor, and my wife Mae who provided invaluable criticism, encouragement, and typing assistance.

April, 1977




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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, AND REFINEMENTS

Introduction

Goal. "The goal of this program is to increase the number of ethnic minority cadets so that the ethnic distribution in the Corps of Cadets is commensurate with the national population."¹

Policy. This statement, in refreshingly direct terms, reflects the goal of the United States Military Academy's Equal Admissions Opportunity Program (EAOP). The Academic Board, the major policy body at West Point, officially adopted this minority recruiting program in 1972. Their approval was significant because it institutionalized a program that had been in effect since 1968. It was the culmination of the efforts of many individuals and represented a significant change in direction for West Point.

Progress. The EAOP, which was adopted with an air of optimism in 1972, was experiencing a certain degree of difficulty by the summer of 1976. Although the number of minority cadets in an entering class had increased from 17 in 1968 to

¹Equal Admissions Opportunity Program (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1972).

158 in 1976, there had been little appreciable increase since 1973 when 139 minority cadets were admitted.² This discrepancy was especially evident when considering the number of entering black cadets which was 82 in 1973 and 62 in 1976.³ In absolute numbers, the EAOP policy statement quoted earlier implies an admission goal of approximately 200 minority cadets each year. In spite of commendable efforts to date, it is obvious that this goal is far from being achieved.

Statement Of Purpose

Purpose. The purpose of this research effort is to critically examine the EAOP, determine its effectiveness, and recommend measures that will assist the Military Academy in achieving a student body that is ethnically comparable to the American society. From the very beginning, the intent was to develop specific, feasible recommendations that could increase minority input without adversely affecting the institution's academic credentials. Consequently, it was recognized early in the process that the outcome of this research effort will be more evolutionary than revolutionary.

Refinements

Limitations. This general purpose was refined by limiting the research to an examination of the EAOP and its relat-

²Minority Representation at the USMA (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 10 January 1977).

³Ibid.

limiting to the black student. There are deficiencies in this restriction, of course, but blacks are the largest ethnic minority group and differences between it and other minority groups, at least in the context of this study, are the exception rather than the norm. Recommendations to increase black enrollment which result from this research can, with slight modification, be effectively used with other ethnic minority groups.

Methods. West Point does not exist simply in and of itself. Its purpose is "educating and training professional officers for the Regular Army."⁴ It was this special relationship with the Army that caused West Point to develop a minority recruiting program. Therefore, a basic approach utilized early on in this research effort was to examine those factors that affected the development of the EAOP. In that regard, a brief look at the history of the American military, concentrating on the role of the black soldier seems appropriate. Similarly, a perspective of the historical role of the Military Academy must be developed. Once again, emphasis was placed on the impact of blacks on that role. These two historical developments, along with a detailed examination of the EAOP, form the research's descriptive phase. It is followed in turn by an analytical phase which leads to the research's conclusions and recommendations.

Assumptions. An important aspect of this research effort

⁴1926-1927 Catalog (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1926), p. 3.

was the assumption that the Military Academy was still committed to the EAOP as expressed in the 1972 policy statement. It was further assumed that resources will continue to be committed to achieving the representative goal. Lastly, no significant difference was assumed between an ethnic minority group and a racial minority group. Although the difference between the terms was understood, the wholesale substitution of one term for another in statistical data has blurred their individual distinctions. Therefore, the term 'ethnic minority group' was used throughout this study to identify a population that differs measurably from the general population in racial-ethnic status."⁵

Definitions. As with any other institution, a study of the Military Academy will necessarily include terms which are not easily understood by individuals not familiar with that institution. The following is a list of some of the more common terms and their associated meanings:

- Nomination- Authorization by a legal source to compete for admission to West Point. Legal sources include the Vice President, members of Congress, and the Department of the Army.
- Appointment- An offer of admission from the Military Academy.
- Candidate- An applicant who has received a nomination.
- SAT- Acronym referring to the Scholastic Aptitude Test. This test, or its commonly accepted

⁵U.S. Armed Forces Minority Officer Procurement (Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, Va, October 1975), p.11.

equivalent the ACT, is required of all applicants.

-ACT- Acronym referring to the American College
Testing Assessment Program. (see SAT above).

CHAPTER II

THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES

In your troubles you have made us citizens...
[The Negro] has been a citizen just three times in the history of this government, and it has always been in times of trouble. In times of trouble we are citizens. Shall we be citizens in war, and aliens in Peace?¹

Frustration. This eloquent expression of the black man's frustration was delivered by Frederick Douglass at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society in April 1865. Although his speech was primarily concerned with voting rights, he brilliantly illustrated the inconsistent relationship that has characterized the service of blacks in the armed forces.

Background. Even as Douglass spoke, black men were serving America on the battlefield just as they had even before the young Republic was born. "The first man killed in the American Revolution was black. When Paul Revere rallied the minutemen to Lexington and Concord, negroes were among the first to respond to his call."² The service of blacks

¹ Carlos R. Cortes et al., (Eds.), Three Perspectives on Ethnicity in America (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1976), p. 92.

² Phillip T. Proctor, A Guide to Negro History in America (Doubleday and Company, Garden City, 1968), p. ix.

during the early phases of the Revolutionary War was especially noteworthy. Peter Salem, a Massachusetts black, fought at Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill. The service of Salem Poor, another Massachusetts black, "was so exceptional as to warrant a petition on his behalf to the General Court signed by fourteen Massachusetts officers."³ Unfortunately, "the early use of Negro soldiers did not continue; within ten months after Lexington and Concord a pattern of exclusion had developed."⁴

Revolutionary War. It soon became clear to George Washington and the Continental Congress, however, that there was not enough white manpower to successfully win the war. In addition to the concern over manpower, the Congress was motivated by the fact that the British were successfully recruiting blacks with promises of freedom. Therefore, "the Continental Congress on January 16, 1776, at Washington's request"⁵ removed restrictions which had kept free blacks from serving in the Continental Army. As the war wore on, manpower requirements became even more critical and, eventually, even black slaves were surreptitiously permitted to serve. The Revolutionary War was this country's first integrated war. During the course of the war, some 5,000 Negroes served in the colo-

³ Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution, (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1961), p. 11.

⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

⁵ Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces (Fredrick A. Praeger, New York, 1968), p. 7.

nial forces and fought side by side with whites in almost every engagement, north or south, land or sea.⁶

Exclusion. This exalted status quickly ended, however, with the achievement of victory. The country then became primarily concerned with establishing itself as a nation, and one of its earliest endeavors was the refinement of overt discrimination in the North and slavery in the South. "In 1792, Congress barred Negroes from joining state militias, and in 1798 the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, prohibited Negroes and mulattoes from entering the Navy or Marines."⁷ The absence of a threat to the nation effectively removed any consideration for continued black service.

War of 1812. The War of 1812 rapidly changed this situation. As in the Revolutionary War, the resort to blacks was forced upon an unwilling America by the critical demands of manpower. Although blacks participated in most of the campaigns, their most notable achievements occurred in the numerous sea battles and at the Battle of New Orleans. It is estimated that over 100 black sailors fought in Admiral Perry's squadron at the Battle of Lake Erie in 1814. "On his report of this battle Perry spoke most highly of the conduct of the black men to whose presence he had formerly objected."⁸

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

⁸ The Negro Soldier (Negro Universities Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1970), p. 73.

Battle of New Orleans. The Battle of New Orleans was particularly noteworthy because it established several patterns that were followed in later years. For the first time in the nation's history, blacks were organized into separate units. Andrew Jackson, despite substantial opposition from local whites, organized and armed two battalions of black soldiers. These battalions had white officers and each black soldier was promised "the same bounty in land and money now received by the white soldiers of the United States, namely one hundred and sixty acres of land."⁹ Although 500 blacks participated in this battle, there is sufficient historical doubt to indicate that few, if any, of these soldiers actually received the promised acreage.

Mexican War. The end of the war resulted in the usual release of all blacks from military service, except as cooks and servants. The Mexican War presented little real danger to the United States as a whole, and as a result only a handful of blacks participated in this war. Basically blacks were barred from serving in either the Army or Navy from 1835 until the Civil War.¹⁰

Civil War. Although slavery was one of the primary issues of the Civil War, blacks were not allowed to serve in either army during the first two years of the conflict. The Confederate position of black inferiority would not tolerate

⁹ Ibid., p.77.

¹⁰ Stillman, op. cit., p.10.

the idea of arming slaves. In the North, President Lincoln was motivated by the political desire of bring the rebel states back into the union. By 1863, however, the manpower demands were such that blacks were at last allowed to enlist. "Eventually, 163 colored federal regiments and two state regiments were formed, which consisted of 178, 985 men."¹¹ After 1863 black soldiers participated in all major campaigns and made a vital contribution to the North's manpower-intensive strategy of unconditional surrender. In addition to armed service, hundreds of thousands of blacks served in the Union Army as common laborers. It is estimated that over 450,000 blacks served the Union as soldiers or sailors from 1863 until the war's conclusion in 1865.

Post-Civil War. After the Civil War, the Republican Party made a bid for black support by establishing four black regiments in the Army. This step formalized the separate but equal policy established during the War of 1812 and was to remain basically unchanged until the Korean War. In spite of their segregated status, these units made valuable contributions to the American society. Their exploits on the western frontier have been extolled in both book and lyric. Thirteen black soldiers were awarded the Medal of Honor for extraordinary heroism during the various Indian wars.¹² An-

¹¹ Idem.

¹² Irvin H. Lee, Negro Medal of Honor Men (Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1967), p. 128.

other contribution, especially important to the black community was the fact that "retired infantry and cavalry sergeants were often leading spirits Negro community life."¹³

Spanish-American War. Approximately thirty black sailors were serving on the battleship Maine when it was blown up in Havana Harbor. In addition to the four Regular regiments, another twelve black regiments were formed for the Spanish-American War. Congress also authorized the commissioning of 100 black lieutenants.¹⁴ The 9th and 10th Cavalry's service in Cuba was exceptional. These units received nationwide publicity for assisting Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders at San Juan Hill. One member of the Rough Riders indicated that "if it had not been for the Negro cavalry, the Rough Riders would have been exterminated."¹⁵ Ironically, Roosevelt, as president in 1906, dismissed three companies of the black 24th Infantry without a fair inquiry as a result of racial incidents in Brownsville, Texas.¹⁶

World War I. The military service of blacks in World War I differed little from that of the Spanish-American War. "Under Selective Service, 3 million Negroes were registered and 350,000 were inducted, but the conditions that confronted

¹³ Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, 1966), p.4.

¹⁴ Stillman, op. cit., p.11.

¹⁵ Irvin H. Lee, op. cit., p.97.

¹⁶ Stillman, op. cit., p.12.

them in the military were humiliating."¹⁷ The largest racial issue of the war concerned the service of the two black divisions, the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions, which were deployed to France. The 93d Division, made up primarily of National Guard regiments, was assigned by regiments to various French units and was cited on numerous occasions for valor. The 92d Division, made up principally of draftees, fought as an entity. These two divisions' "employment and conduct produced a fog of reports, rumors, and legends which grew and changed with the passage of time."¹⁸ Generally, white officers felt that the 92d Division had failed in combat and blamed this failure on the fact that the division was black. Blacks tended to blame the division's poor performance on lack of leadership by the division's white officers and humiliations suffered under segregation. Eventually, almost 405,000 black troops, including 1300 officers, served in this war to end all wars.¹⁹

World War II. The controversey which surrounded black service in World War I determined the nature of black service in World War II. Numerous studies of the use of blacks had been done between the wars and the military planned, and basically utilized, black manpower in the same manner as it had in World War I. During the war, blacks were organized

¹⁷ Idem.

¹⁸ Ulysses Lee, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

into segregated units, excluded from most meaningful jobs, and were used principally in support rather than combat roles.²⁰ By September 1944, black strength in the Army had reached over 700,000, or almost 9 per cent of total Army strength.²¹

Post-WW II. The five year period between World War II and the Korean War was one of the most important periods in the relationship between blacks and the military. After returning from fighting oppression overseas, most black servicemen were not willing to be oppressed at home. In addition to those blacks in the service who had changed, thousands of blacks had migrated from the South to work in factories in the North. They too had experienced better days and were unwilling to return to a pre-World War II racist society. The conditions were ripe for change.

Integration. One of the main reasons that blacks had suffered in the military was their lack of political power. The black voter did not become important in national politics until 1948. A close national election that year created the environment that dramatically changed the military-black relationship. Faced with the possibility of losing the election because of a probable revolt of black voters, President Truman on July 26, 1948, issued Executive Order 9981, which

²⁰ Stillman, op. cit., p. 23.

²¹ Ulysses Lee, op. cit., p. 415.

required equal opportunity in the armed forces regardless of race. This order, although far from perfect, ranks with the Emancipation Proclamation as far as military service of blacks is concerned.

President Truman's Executive Order did not in fact end segregation in the armed forces. Although the order was explicit, the military departments did not enforce it with much enthusiasm. In May 1950, some 60,000 Army personnel were still in segregated units.²² The bureaucratic nature of the military, and the reluctance of military leaders, had successfully stalled a Presidential order. It took the Korean War to get the process moving.

Korean War. The North Korean attack in June 1950 took the American military establishment by surprise. The American reliance on the atomic bomb, occupation duties, and the policy of containment, had combined to seriously deteriorate combat readiness of American forces in the Far East. The situation caused military leaders to view black manpower with a new perspective. This new attitude occurred not out of altruism but the very practical needs of efficiency, combat strength, unit uniformity, and the equality of opportunity for battlefield casualty.²³ As in other wars, the service of blacks in this war was marred by controversy. The war did,

²² Stillman, op. cit., p. 40.

²³ Idem.

however, effectively achieved the integration so long sought. By 1954, the Air Force and Marines were completely integrated, 96% of the blacks in the Army were in integrated units, and the Navy had achieved 60% integration.

Vietnam. The period between the war in Korea and Vietnam saw enormous changes in the American society. Most significantly was the emergence of the civil rights movement. The obvious changes caused in the society were not limited to the civilian segment. As in previous wars, blacks were well represented in Southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, many thought that blacks were overrepresented in the combat zones of this war.

Characteristics of Service. The role of the black man in this nation's military service has been surrounded by controversy for over two hundred years. The black man has always had to fight for the right to fight. His service has not been actively sought in any of American's wars, at least not in the initial stages of those wars. In most instances, blacks have labored in segregated units, commanded by white officers who did not even want to be in black units, assigned to menial and demeaning tasks, often treated worst than their country's prisoners of war. In spite of these obstacles, blacks have maintained a persistent desire to serve. Efforts to discredit his service have been numerous, yet the desire remains. The military, however reluctant, has been a vehicle to equality for black Americans in comparison to the rest of the American society.

CHAPTER III

THE BLACK CADET AT WEST POINT

Generally the treatment implied that there was a conspiracy at West Point, one which included not only the cadets and faculty but the army as a whole, to ostracize the Negroes. In point of fact there was no conspiracy, for there was no need for one. Prejudice against Negroes was neither higher or lower at West Point and in the Army than it was throughout the nation - which meant that it was high.¹

Reconstruction. James Webster Smith, son of former slaves from South Carolina, became the first black cadet at West Point in May 1870. Smith spent a turbulent four years at West Point but did not graduate. He was dismissed in 1874 for being deficient in natural and experimental philosophy.² Smith's cadetship, as well as those of the eleven other blacks who were admitted between 1870 and 1886, was part of the larger struggle that occurred in this country in the aftermath of the Civil War.

Black Political Power. Ulysses S. Grant won the presidency in 1868 with a majority of only 206,000 votes. Among those votes that he did receive, some 700,000 were estimated

¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966), p.233.

² Ibid., p.232.

to be from blacks.³ This factor of raw political power was a dynamic force in Reconstruction politics. One of the ways that Republicans had hoped to maintain this large bloc of black voters was to appoint blacks to West Point. One of the first to consider such a move was Benjamin F. Butler, a congressman from Massachusetts and a leader in the abolitionist movement. Butler initiated a thorough search for a suitable candidate, but the honor of appointing Smith to West Point fell to Solomon L. Hoge of South Carolina.⁴

Cadet Smith. James Webster Smith's cadetship was marred by discrimination from his very first day at West Point. When Smith presented his appointment papers to the commandant, he was waved away and several white cadets threatened to resign.⁵ During his four years at West Point he was the center of controversy, being tried by court-martial on two occasions. Smith was a pioneer in a hostile environment and suffered dearly as a result.

Cadet Flipper. Little is known of the two black cadets who immediately followed Smith to West Point, Henry A. Napier of Tennessee in July 1871 and Thomas Van R. Gibbs of Florida in July 1872.⁶ Both of these cadets were found deficient in

³ Thomas J. Fleming, West Point (William Morrow & Company, New York, 1969), p. 213.

⁴ Ambrose, op. cit., p. 272.

⁵ Henry O. Flipper, The Colored Cadet at West Point (Arno Press and The New York Times, New York, 1969), p. 313.

⁶ Black Cadets Admitted to USMA (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, undated).

mathematics and dismissed approximately 6 months after being admitted. Henry Ossian Flipper, admitted in 1877 from Georgia, managed to survive the hardships and became West Point's first black graduate on 15 June 1877.

The experiences of Cadet Flipper as opposed to those of Cadet Smith are significant in that they indicated the nature of the racism of that time. Flipper seems to have been better prepared academically and emotionally. He had learned to read as a slave, had benefitted from private tutors, and had attended Atlanta University before coming to West Point.⁷ The key difference, however, between Cadets Flipper and Smith was their respective attitude toward equality, especially social equality. Cadet Smith was the black militant of his time, proud, defiant and "instead of contenting himself with manfully meeting trouble when it came, he diligently and successfully sought it."⁸ Smith had a penchant for publicly airing his grievances, once receiving a reprimand from the Secretary of War for writing letters for publication.⁹ After his dismissal, Smith wrote that he "never asked for social equality at West Point,"¹⁰ but the tenor of his letters clearly indicate that he was not willing to accept its denial.

⁷ Flipper, op. cit., p. 11.

⁸ George L. Andrews, "West Point and the Colored Cadets," International Review (November, 1880), vol. IX, p. 379.

⁹ Flipper, op. cit., p. 292.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 299.

Cadet Flipper, on the other hand, was of a more accommodating nature. Flipper, whose interest in West Point extended back several years before his admission, was aware of Smith's difficulties through newspaper articles of the day. He went to West Point expecting to be mistreated.¹¹ He was mentally prepared for the worst, and when the worst did not occur, felt relieved. He took particular care not to repeat conduct which had caused Smith trouble.¹² The greater majority of this avoided conduct dealt with social equality. Flipper was ostracised socially and, in contrast to Smith, did not complain. For this, he was spared the brutality that Smith had suffered. In modern terminology, Cadet Flipper was an Uncle Tom. Yet, if he had not acquiesced, he probably would have been forced out as was Smith.

Retrenchment. Only two other young men of color were to join Henry Flipper as graduates of West Point in the nineteenth century. John H. Alexander and Charles Young, both from Ohio, graduated in 1887 and 1889 respectively.¹³ Of the other black men who appointed to West Point during this period, only Johnson C. Whittaker of South Carolina managed to stay longer than six months. Whittaker entered West Point in 1876 but was found deficient in 1879. He was subsequently allowed to re-

¹¹ Ibid., p. 135.

¹² Idem.

¹³ Black Cadets Admitted to USMA, loc. cit.

peat his junior year. In April 1880, Whittaker was found beaten and gagged in his room. A court of inquiry determined after lengthy deliberations that Whittaker had faked the attack. He was allowed, however, to remain at West Point before being eventually dismissed in 1882.¹⁴

When Henry W. Holloway of South Carolina departed in January 1887 after being deficient in mathematics, West Point was not to have another black cadet for over 30 years. This retrenchment at West Point was similar to events that occurred to blacks all across the country. The historic compromise of 1887, which traded a presidency for the removal of Federal troops from the South, spelled the end of black political power in the nineteenth century. Without this power, there was no need or desire for white politicians to appoint blacks to West Point.

Revitalization. If the lack of political power ended the presence of black cadets at West Point, then certainly the rebirth of black political power, albeit a small one, resulted in blacks being again appointed in the 1930s. "When Oscar DePriest of Chicago entered the U.S. House of Representatives in 1929, it had been twenty-eight years since the last Black American sat as a member of Congress."¹⁵ During the next 13 years, Congressman DePriest appointed seven out of the ten

¹⁴Fleming, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁵Mabel M. Smythe, (ed) The Black American Reference Book (Pre-
tice - Hall, inc, Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1976), p. 630.

young men who entered West Point, one of whom was Benjamin O. Davis who was to become the first black graduate in 47 years.

World War II, and years immediately following, saw a small but steady trickle of blacks to West Point. Three blacks were admitted in 1942, one or two in each of the succeeding four years, and five in 1947. Details of their experience are sparse, but it is apparent that little had changed in terms of white attitudes towards black cadets. Blacks were still required to room alone or with other blacks, and other forms of ostracism continued unchecked. "The presence of Negro cadets was not publicly acknowledged by the Corps unless absolutely necessary."¹⁶

Desegregation. The Truman Executive Order ending segregation in the armed forces was applicable to West Point as well. This order ushered in a ten year period that can best be described as temporal. First of all, blacks could not be formally ostracized to the same extent as in the past. Overt discrimination was a direct violation of the presidential order. Secondly, the number of black cadets increased significantly. Blacks were appointed to Military Academy each year in this period with the exception of 1948. Twenty-four blacks graduated during this period, raising the number of

¹⁶Larry R. Jordan and Joseph B. Anderson Jr., The Black Experience at West Point, 1870-1976, p. 10. (Unpublished Dissertation).

black graduates to the thirty-four.¹⁷

Silent Sixties. The civil rights movement which surged across the nation in the 1960s was late coming to West Point. The small number of black cadets at West Point did not affect their institution as deeply as their black counterparts were doing in the civilian world. Overt discrimination and ostracism had ended by this period and black cadets participated openly in most cadet activities. The price for this limited acceptance, however, was the submergence of their blackness. The system at West Point demanded conformity, and conformity meant white standards. In their desire for success black cadets generally looked at the black revolution from afar. Another thirty-six young men of color graduated during this decade.

Stormy Seventies. The EAOP was established during the late 60s, and the number of black cadets increased dramatically. In 1970, 40 blacks entered with the incoming class and by 1971, this number had risen to 54.¹⁸ Such large numbers of blacks increasingly strained the traditional West Point system. In addition to the numbers, the attitudes of these young men were more attuned to Smith than to Flipper as far as equality was concerned. Their frank expressions of black pride and demands for equality were particularly discomfoting

¹⁷ Black Cadets Admitted to USMA, loc. cit.

¹⁸ Ibid.

to the white majority. Each side has had to moderate its position in order to accommodate the other. These accommodations, which are painful on both sides, continue today.

Summary. Another 633 black young men and women have come to West Point since Smith's entrance in 1870.¹⁹ Smith was indicted by the system for pushing too hard for too much. He was naive enough to believe that his being admitted meant full equality. His dismissal basically set the pattern for survival which was successfully followed by Flipper and others. The ghost of Smith, however, has returned to West Point in the image of the black cadets of the 1970s. It remains to be seen if the reincarnated Smiths can move West Point closer to true equality.

¹⁹Black Cadets Admitted to USMA, loc. cit., and Human Resources Research Organization, U.S. Armed Forces Minority Officer Procurement. (HumRRO, Alexandria, Virginia, 1975)

CHAPTER IV

THE EQUAL ADMISSIONS OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM

The Admissions Process

General. Gaining admission to the United States Military Academy is no simple task. Few of the approximate 1400 individuals who ultimately gain admissions each year fully understand the complex system that they have successfully negotiated. Basically, an individual aspiring to attend West Point must be nominated by a lawful source and be legally, medically, academically, and physically qualified before being admitted. Not only must the individual be qualified, but depending on the type of nomination, he must be more qualified than his competitors.

Nomination. To become a cadet, each applicant must obtain a nomination from a member of Congress or from the Department of the Army.¹ Each member of Congress is authorized five cadetships and may nominate up to ten individuals for each cadetship vacancy that he may have.² This prerequisite is required by public law and is the primary reason

¹1976-1977 Catalog, loc. cit., p.19.

²Ibid., p.20.

that West Point has avoided a parochial student body over the years. The Secretary of the Army controls approximately 300 cadetships each year and may nominate up to ten eligible individuals to compete against each of these vacancies. There are numerous other legal and administrative requirements for a nomination. Each young American interested in attending West Point, however, is generally eligible for at least four nominations.

Legal, medical and physical requirements. Prospective cadets must be American citizens at time of enrollment, be 17 to 22 years of age by July 1 of year admitted, be unmarried, and be trustworthy, emotionally stable, and motivated.³ Medically, each candidate is required to pass a medical examination in order to prove that he is in good physical and mental health. Physically, the applicant must demonstrate that he has above-average strength, endurance, and agility. Each applicant is required to take a physical aptitude examination in order to prove that he has these qualities.

Academic. The most difficult hurdle for admission to West Point is the academic requirement. Generally, each applicant is required to have an above-average high school or college academic record, perform well on the American College Testing (ACT) Assessment Program or the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and be favorably recommended by individuals who

³Ibid., p. 19.

can judge the applicant's character and academic potential.⁴ Over the last several years, 70% or more of each entering class ranked in the top fifth of their high school class.⁵ Acceptable performance on the ACT or SAT has been similiarly demanding.

Development of the EAOP

Impetus. The EAOP resulted basically from the strong tides of societal unrest which were sweeping the nation in 1968. The army had indicated earlier an intention to increase the number of minority officers. This action stemmed from racial unrest in the Army, particularly in Vietnam, and political pressure from the increasingly larger representation of minority groups in the Congress.⁶ A committee was established at West Point with the specific task of implementing "the Academy's policy of offering equal opportunity for admission to all regardless of race, color, religion or national orgin."⁷ A black Army captain was assigned to the admissions staff in the fall of 1968 to implement this new recruiting program.

Growth. The basic guidance of the EAOP was to increase the number of minority cadets at West Point, but to do so

⁴ Idem.

⁵ Trends in Admission Variables Through the Class of 1977 (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, April 1974), p. 24.

⁶ Letter from LTC Cornell McCullom, Jr., U.S. Army, February 4, 1977.

⁷ William L. England, "Equal Admissions Opportunity, "Assembly (Spring, 1974), p. 6.

"without lowering or changing the standards of USMA."⁸ Within this rather broad guidance, operating policies were developed as required. No numerical quotas were implied or established during this period.⁹ Most efforts were directed towards attracting the qualifiable candidate. As the program developed it soon became obvious that this approach would not produce the number of minority cadets desired. Subsequently, efforts were made to induce sufficient awareness and change in the system and those operating it to accommodate the minority candidate."¹⁰ The program continued to operate in this manner until the summer of 1972 when the number of Equal Admission Opportunity Officers was increased from one to two.

Institutionalization. The change in personnel in 1972 provided an excellent opportunity to rejuvenate the EAOP. One area of attention concerned the degree of institutional commitment. The creation of the EAOP in 1968 was basically an administrative action. Although the major policy groups at West Point were aware of the program, and supported it, there was no formal institutional endorsement. The lack of a formal charter was interpreted as a weakness in the program structure, and one of the first major projects undertaken in 1972 was to develop such a charter. This effort resulted in an EAOP policy statement which was formally adopted by the

⁸ McCullom, op. cit.

⁹ Idem.

¹⁰ Idem.

Academic Board that summer. The charter firmly established the philosophy, scope, and goal of the program.

Results. Appendix A depicts the results of the EAOP through the Class of 1980 which entered West Point in 1976.¹¹ It should be noted that the Class of 1973 was the first group to be affected by the EAOP. The number of blacks in this class was a five-fold increase over the number in the previous class. Of particular interest is the fact that over 80% of the 634 blacks that have attended West Point were admitted after the establishment of the EAOP. Obviously, this program has succeeded in significantly increasing the number of black cadets.

Features of the EAOP

Communications. One of the prime tasks of the EAOP from its inception was "communicating with minority group communities and their young men about the advantages of the West Point education and leadership training."¹² This requirement existed simply because there was little historic relationship between West Point and minority communities. The image of West Point in the minority community was precisely what West Point had been over the years - a military academy for whites occasionally attended by token blacks. The pronouncement of an equal

¹¹ England, op. cit., and letter from Cpt Ralph B. Tildon, U.S. Army, January 25, 1977.

¹² Equal Admission Opportunity Program (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.).

admissions opportunity policy did little to change this view, basically because that was supposed to have been the official policy all along. These facts, along with numerous others,¹³ had combined to create an indifferent attitude about West Point in the black community. The communications aspect of the EAOP was, and still is, an effort to change this apathetic attitude into a positive one.

This communications effort is pursued through a variety of means. Each year, "members of the Equal Admissions Staff visit cities with large ethnic minority populations speaking with high school students, counselors, and other faculty members and with members of local community in an effort to "spread the word" about the USMA Equal Admissions Opportunity Program."¹³ Other direct communications include a minority cadet visitation program, a staff and faculty visitation program, and utilization of reserve officers to represent USMA in their local community. Indirect communications methods include mailing programs, participation in educational conferences and conventions, and development and distribution of USMA literature that appeals to minority as well as majority audiences.

Identification. Concurrent with the communications aspect of the EAOP is the function of identification. Identification of minority students occurs in a variety of ways.

¹³Minority Representation at the USMA (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., January 19, 1977), p. 2.

Some students are identified when they write USMA for information concerning admissions. Other students are attracted by the numerous cadet and officer speakers who visit minority schools and communities. West Point also purchases mailing lists from the College Entrance Examination Board and the American College Testing services.¹⁴ These services allow West Point to specify criteria which not only identifies the student as a member of a minority group, but one who has also attained specific academic credentials as well. Potential candidates are also referred directly to West Point by alumni groups, retired and active military personnel, and secondary school counselors. This large effort to identify outstanding minority students has demonstrated tremendous growth. The Class of 1972, which was not affected by the EAOP, had less than 50 black students who expressed enough interest in West Point to become full-fledged candidates for admission. The class of 1980 had over 500 black students in this category.

Recruitment. Despite popular belief, not all young men who come to West Point do so because of a boyhood dream to be cadets. Many cadets in each class are actively recruited. Most individuals in this category are pursued because of their athletic ability, others because of academic and/or leadership ability. Administration of the EAOP requires a large degree of recruitment, primarily because of two factors. The first

¹⁴Idem.

of these involves the earlier discussed lack of credibility. West Point must demonstrate repeatedly its desire for increased minority enrollment. The Equal Admissions Staff spends considerable time assuring, and reassuring, minority candidates as they progress through the complex admission process. The second factor involves competition. The simple fact of the matter is that there are limited numbers of minority students who have the requisite medical, educational, and physical attributes required by West Point. One USMA study, completed in 1973, estimated that the number of black high school seniors who meet the prima facie requirements was less than 1200.¹⁵ Even among this select group, only a small percentage are interested in attending a service academy. In this era of numerous minority admissions programs, the competition for these students is extremely high. These factors demand a vigorous recruiting program.

Evaluation. Perhaps the most important responsibility of the Equal Admissions Opportunity Officer in the early stages of the program involved evaluation of minority candidate. USMA's evaluation process is straight-forward, rigid to a degree, yet flexible enough to accommodate exceptional cases. The evaluation system had for years allowed exceptions to be made for athletes and other non-minority candidates with exceptional strength. In the early years of the EAOF,

¹⁵England, op. cit.

"whenever it was necessary to do this for a minority candidate, all attributed it to the fact that he was a minority rather than to the fact that he too had compensating strengths which merited consideration to off-set weaknesses."¹⁶ This type of attitude fostered itself time and time again in accusations that standards were being lowered for minority applicants.

In April 1976, the responsibility for evaluating minority candidate records was taken from the Equal Admissions Staff as a sole responsibility, and dispersed among the geographic area admissions officers.¹⁷ This change resulted from a desire to make equal admissions a matter of routine operations for all admissions personnel. The effect of this organizational change remains to be seen.

¹⁶McCullom, op. cit.

¹⁷Planning for the Admission Cycle for the Class of 1981
(U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 23 April 1976).

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE RECRUITING ASPECT

The Candidate Pool

Size. During its formative stages, the goal of the EAOP was simply to increase the number of minority cadets. It was felt that this goal could be achieved without unusual difficulty due to the belief that there was sufficient numbers of minority students who were both capable and desirous of attending West Point. Initially, the EAOP was an outstanding success, enjoying a five-fold increase in the number of black cadets in its first year of operation. The next year, however, there were indications that the assumptions about the size and quality of the pool of prospective black candidates were in error. The relatively stable number of blacks admitted during the 1960-1972 time period is representative of the fact that the recruiting system, black candidate pool, and admissions procedures had reached a virtual balance.

Evaluation. The publication in 1971 of Fred E. Crossland's Minority Access to College provided some enlightenment to the candidate pool question. Crossland asserted that minority students score about one deviation below the mean of the rest of the population on academic aptitude and achieve-

ment tests.¹ This deficiency, if accepted as truth, severely restricts the number of qualifiable minority students available to selective institutions, such as West Point, whose students traditionally score well above the national mean on standardized tests. Crossland's work was one of the principal sources used in the 1973 USMA study which concluded that less than 1200 black Americans could be expected to successfully pass all of West Point's prima facie entrance requirements.

There is, however, a major inconsistency between Crossland's book and the USMA study. Crossland estimated the size of the 1970 black freshman class to be 132,000.² The USMA study estimated the number of first time enrolled black males for the fall of 1973 to be 50,000.³ Although there are undoubtedly differences in definitions in the two works, it is unrealistic to believe that black males represented less than 40% of the black freshman population in 1970, and made no apparent growth during the next three years.

Growth. The latest census data indicates that the pool of potential black cadets is large and increasing. In 1975, there were 1.33 million black males between the age of 17 and 21. This figure represents a 20% increase over the corresponding figure in 1970. By 1980, the black population in

¹ Ired E. Crossland, Minority Access to College (Schocken Books, New York, 1971), p. 59.

² Ibid., p. 10.

³ England, op. cit., p. 7.

this age bracket is expected to number 1.44 million, an increase of 8% over the 1975 figure and 32% over the 1970 figure.⁴ Of special significance to these increasing numbers is the fact that the percentage of black male students within a given age bracket enrolled in school compares favorably with the percentage of white males students in the same age bracket. For example, in October 1974, 90.1% of black males between the age of 16 and 17 were enrolled in school. The comparable figure for white males of the same age group was 88.2%. Eighteen and 19 year old black and white males were 46.1% and 54.5% enrolled respectively.⁵ Obviously, the black population in the USMA interest bracket has increased significantly since the 1973 study.

Academic Potential. As stated earlier, Crossland's assertion that minority students score about one standard deviation below the mean of the national population severely limits the number of prospective minority students for highly selective institutions. Crossland provided little evidence to support this position. It appears that the primary support for his argument was taken from the results of qualification tests given to Army Draftees. The performance of minority students, particularly black students, on standardized tests has been a

⁴Fact Book on Higher Education (American Council on Education, Washington, First Issue/1976), p. 76.11.

⁵Digest of Education Statistics (Department of HEW, Washington, 1975), p. 8.

controversial issue in education circles for quite some time. Numerous studies have been done in this area, but few have attempted to generalize their findings as did Crossland. The College Entrance Examination Board, one of the largest testing organizations, does not compute group performance on a racial basis as a matter of policy.⁶ Crossland's lack of firm supportive evidence in this highly sensitive area makes his assertion suspect.

Interest. A subject which receives considerable attention from college recruiters is the amount of interest among minority students in serving in the military. It is often speculated, based on the Vietnam War primarily, that black college potential youth have little desire to serve in uniform. Consensus on this subject is difficult, and until recently, little research had been done which could reliably measure this important factor. Recent surveys conducted by the University of Michigan have provided evidence that interest in the military among black high school seniors is much higher than expected. Thirty-one per cent of male black seniors surveyed indicated a likelihood of military service when asked what they would do if nothing stood in their way.⁷ This strong response among black youth was three times greater

⁶Statement by Mr. Steven Ivens, College Entrance Examination Board, Telephone interview, October 21, 1976.

⁷Letter from Mr. Jerald G. Bachman, Program Director, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, February 7, 1977.

than the comparable response among white students. This survey further indicated that most of those students responding in favor of the military have military career aspirations.

The Recruiting Objective

The Student. The bulk of West Point's minority recruiting effort is aimed directly at the student. The mailings made as a result of the student search services are the most obvious examples of this approach. Other forms include the visitation efforts of the Equal Admissions staff and the USMA liaison officers. Although these visits are often designed to influence guidance counselors and other school personnel concerning the value of a West Point education, considerable effort is spent identifying and then persuading the qualifiable black student to come to the Academy.

Another example of this direct approach is the minority oriented public relations program. In this program, minority cadets visit their home communities to make public relations appearances at high schools, radio and television shows, and other affairs.

Results. In spite of this large recruiting effort, the number of black candidates has decreased over the last four years. The number of black students who received nominations dropped from 646 in 1973 to 567 in 1976. Significantly, the total number of candidates grew substantially during the same

⁸Letter from Dr. Robert P. Priest, Office of the Director of Institutional Research, USMA, February 23, 1977.

period, increasing from 11,399 in 1973 to 16,961 in 1976.⁸ This disturbing trend occurred during a period when West Point was making its most determined effort to increase the size of the black candidate pool.

The Influencers. There are numerous factors which cause a college bound youth to select one college over another. Invariably, individuals close to the student, such as parents, friends and guidance counselors, have a large role in this process. A study of the 1976 freshman class at the University of Alabama indicated that the influence of these factors varies significantly by race. Friends had the strongest influence on white students' decisions, followed closely by parents, relatives, guidance counselors, teachers, and admissions office personnel. Among black freshmen, however, parents had the strongest influence, followed in order by friends, guidance counselors, teachers, and admissions office personnel.⁹

The Indirect Approach

Policy. The cumulative weight of the arguments developed in this analysis of West Point's minority recruiting efforts strongly indicate a need for a change in policy. Since parents have perhaps the major influence of black students' college plans, the recruiting effort should be directed towards influencing parents and other adult relatives. West Point has

⁹ A Profile of Black Students, The University of Alabama, 1976 (The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, 1976), p. 19.

some strong incentives that could sway this group. Adults particularly black adults, are vividly aware of the value of a quality education. This feature, combined with the fact that West Point has no tuition and offers an excellent career opportunity, can have a decidedly favorable impact on parents.

Activities. Adoption of an indirect policy would necessarily produce significant changes in recruiting activities. Obviously, the target group changes from student to parent and student. Direct mailings, such as the present student search program, would have to be modified. Campaigns to reach black parents through community and social settings would have to be devised and implemented. The efforts of Equal Admissions personnel and liaison officers also have to be redirected in line with the change in strategy.

The Recruiters. Perhaps the greatest change should occur in the use of black cadets as recruiters. Cadets can probably have a more profound effect on parents than they can on potential candidates. Similarly, cadets can probably have more influence with parents than admission personnel and other adult recruiters. What is required is a program which maximizes contact between parents of potential candidates and black cadets. USMA should have a community oriented public relations program rather than a school oriented program. Best use of black cadets could result from a summer program rather than the current Thanksgiving Day program. Selected black cadets could perform recruiting duty instead of training other cadets at West Point as they

do now. A four week recruiting effort in a community would produce a greater number of potential candidates than the present three-four day effort. These cadets might suffer slightly as a result of missing summer training, but adjustments could be made to overcome this deficiency. The benefits that would accrue to the institution as a result of a well organized summer recruiting program would be substantial.

Summary. In general, the increased recruiting effort has not produced the desired results. The basic recruiting problem appears to be direction rather than effort. The potential candidate pool is large and increasing, and a change in recruiting strategy could result in dramatic increases in black enrollment.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE EVALUATION ASPECT

The Process

General. Certainly no topic within the college admissions field stirs more controversy than the evaluation of minority students. Numerous studies have been conducted in this area, yet findings have been relatively sparse and extremely localized. The very legality of special admissions programs for minority students will soon be argued before the United States Supreme Court. Although the program employed at West Point has not resulted in lawsuits, the evaluation segment of the program is a matter of continuing concern.

The USMA System. The primary factors in the USMA academic evaluation system are high school rank and performance on the SAT or ACT. These factors are weighted and combined to produce a predictor of how a candidate should perform during his freshman year. The academic predictor is the most important determinant in the evaluation system. It constitutes 60% of the candidates overall evaluation, and is the primary reason for candidate disqualification. In 1976, almost 1700 of the 4000 active candidates found not qualified for admissions were disqualified academically.¹

¹Priest, loc. cit.

Academic Evaluation of Black Candidates. A USMA study completed in 1969 concluded that the academic evaluation system described above was "functional as an acceptable predictor of Negro academic performance."² This report cautioned, however, that its findings were based on the small number of black cadets in the Class of 1973. Additionally, the report indicated that the predictor was more accurate for white candidates than it was for black candidates. Thus, the report tentatively supported the "supposition that the most efficient predictor of Negro academic performance would be a specifically weighted formula based entirely on Negro grades."³

The average academic predictor for the 41 black cadets admitted in the Class of 1973 was lower than the overall class average. The scores of black cadets on the other two factors used in determining an overall score, leadership potential and physical aptitude, were higher than the class averages. Within the academic predictor itself, the high school rank factor for black cadets was higher than the high school rank factor of whites. Clearly then, at least for this particular year, the primary difference between black and white cadets as measured by the academic evaluation was standardized test performance.

²An Appraisal of the Use of CEER for Negro Cadets (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, March 1970), p. 11.

³Idem.

Most of the studies done in this area indicate that the use of standardized test scores in conjunction with high school performance is a much better selection measure than the use of high school performance alone. A recent study completed in California, however, concluded that the use of SAT results and high school performance for blacks could be detrimental to special enrollment efforts. Specifically, the report demonstrated that the use of SAT and high school performance factors resulted in reducing the number of students who would eventually fail in college, but also increase the number of individuals who would have passed but were rejected. In this study, 122 of the 279 black students accepted for admissions based on high school grade point average eventually failed. Of the 654 students rejected, 118 would have been successful. When SAT was added to the selection criteria, only 63 of the 133 admitted students failed. The number of false-negatives, however, had increased to 154.⁴ In this particular instance, the success rate declined with the use of SAT. But even if it had increased, it would not have produced the number of successes as did the first selection system. Perhaps the most damaging result of a particularly fine-screening selection system is the increase in false-negatives. These errors are especially detrimental to the black community.

⁴Roy D. Golden and Mel H. Widawski, "An Analysis of Types of Error in the Selection of Minority College Students," Journal of Educational Measurement (Fall 1976), Vol. 13, p.185.

Apparently, no thorough analysis has been conducted of the relative costs associated with the admissions of false-positives as compared to the rejection of false-negatives. Although West Point should attempt to minimize the number of black failures, it is imperative that the evaluation system not be so finely-tuned as to reject large numbers of candidates who might have been successful.

Another factor which theoretically reduces the number of black candidates is the failure of some black students to take the standardized tests in a timely manner. Even though the Military Academy habitually provides assistance to potential candidates who require this test, this special effort often appears to be an obstacle rather than an aid.

Qualification Rates. During each of the last four years, USMA has experienced a significant increase in the number of white candidates for admissions. This group, measuring a little over 10,000 in 1973, has grown to almost 16,000 by 1976. As indicated earlier, the number of black candidates has not matched this pace, declining from 646 in 1973 to 567 in 1976. During this same period, the average selection rate of white candidates was 10.4% of the white candidate pool. The similar figure for black candidates was 13.6%.⁵ Although a comparison of these selection rates alone cannot completely determine the true nature of the evaluation system, it does indicate a willingness on the part of USMA to go beyond its average selection rates for black candidates.

⁵Priest, loc. cit.

Summary. The evaluation system appears to be the least detrimental of the various factors affecting black enrollment. Although there are areas that could be improved significantly, generally the system is flexible enough to accommodate large numbers of black candidates. The primary cause for concern is the continued heavy reliance on standardized test results and an apparent unwillingness to take more chances with those candidates who do not meet conventional admissions standards.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Recruiting. ↘ The principal reason that the Military Academy has not achieved its black enrollment goal is its failure to increase the size of the black candidate pool. The number of black candidates has increased substantially since the establishment of the EAOP, but it is still not large enough to provide sufficient admissible cadets to satisfy the stated goal. → (Cont 48)

Recruiting, above all other factors, is the linch-pin to a successful special admissions effort. All of the conventional indicators point to an increasingly larger pool of potential black candidates. It can be logically expected that on the whole, these candidates will be better prepared academically than ever before. Since it appears that the supply is there, the key element becomes attraction. West Point offers sufficient educational and career incentives to attract its share of this market. The crucial factor is determining the proper recruiting approach which will yield the greatest benefit.

Measures taken in the last several years to increase the size of the black candidate pool have peaked. These efforts, most of which are of the direct approach variety

will not in and of themselves provide the numbers desired. Revising the recruiting effort, to include a change to an indirect recruiting strategy, should result in larger numbers of black students being attracted to West Point.

Evaluation. Although sound from a philosophical point of view, the use of a common predictor for both white and black candidates when separate predictors are probably better is not logical. The use of a common predictor should be the goal rather than the current means. The majority of evidence tends to indicate that different predictors will be fairer to both groups.

The adjustments that must be made by blacks coming to West Point is ordinarily much greater than that which must be made by white students. This adjustment adversely affects academic performance, especially during the first two years. Except for those cadets who win academic honors, the measure of success is not class standing on graduation day but being in the class on graduation day. Even if the last 10% of a graduating class is black, then the equal admissions opportunity effort will have been successful.

A firm determination of the validity of current standardized tests for black youth as compared to white youth exceeds the competency of this research effort. This question, however, has haunted the educational community too long. Enough blacks have attended West Point at this stage in history to provide a sufficient data base to determine whether or not the current evaluation system is as valid for

blacks as it is for whites. Keeping the adjustment factor in mind, the success criterion on which the academic predictor is based should be four year rather than first year academic average.

Cont'd
P. 45

In conjunction with this review, the evaluation system should be examined to determine if the employment of multiple factors, such as standardized test scores, causes an unusually large number of false-positives. The Military Academy should be primarily interested in achievers, those individuals who have successfully accomplished goals in a competitive environment. Academically, the best measure of this trait is high school rank. In this regard, high school rank should continue to be the dominant factor for evaluation.

Diffusing the responsibility for minority admissions among the geographic admissions officers at this crucial point in the program appears to be premature. This step should be taken only when the program is functioning smoothly and is relatively self-sufficient.

Recommendations

The following specific steps are recommended.

1. Adopt an indirect recruiting strategy with the major target group being both parents and students.
2. Align efforts of current recruiting assets to support an indirect strategy.
3. Utilize black cadets during the summer months in a home-town recruiting drive in black communities.
4. Conduct a thorough examination of the evaluation system to determine its effectiveness for black students.

5. Insure that high school rank continues to be the dominant factor in academic evaluation.
6. Base the success criterion on four year rather than first year academic average.
7. Make minority recruiting the sole responsibility of one branch/division in the Admissions Office.
8. Be willing to accept more true-negatives in order to reduce the number of false-positives.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: BLACKS ADMITTED TO WEST POINT

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1870	1	1952	1
1871	1	1953	2
1872	1	1954	3
1873	2	1955	2
1876	1	1956	2
1877	1	1957	2
1883	1	1958	1
1884	1	1959	4
1885	2	1960	2
1886	1	1961	6
1918	1	1962	4
1929	1	1963	3
1932	1	1964	10
1935	1	1965	15
1937	1	1966	8
1939	2	1967	8
1941	1	1968	9
1942	3	1969	45
1943	1	1970	40
1944	2	1971	54
1945	2	1972	52
1946	2	1973	82
1947	5	1974	81
1949	4	1975	86
1950	5	1976	52
1951	6		

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