AD-A051 161 ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS F/G 5/4
BLACK PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA: CAUSES AND RESULTS.(U)
JAN 78 R S LOCKWOOD

UNCLASSIFIED NL

| OF |
AD
A051161



END
DATE
FILMED
4 -78
DDC

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER (6)	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. (2)
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE *(and Subtitle)*: Black Progress in the Political Arena: Causes and Results.	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED: Final 30 Jan 78
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) (10): R. S. Lockwood, Ph.D, J.D. Major (P), US Army	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) (9): Final rept.,
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS: Student at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS: US Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATSW-CD-P (11)	12. REPORT DATE: 30 Jan 78
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES: 27
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS *(if different from Controlling Office)* (12) 29p.	15. SECURITY CLASS. *(of this report)*: UNCLASSIFIED
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of this Report)*

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)*

N/A

DDC RECEIVED MAR 14 1978 F

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Student study project at CGSC 1978.

19. KEY WORDS *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

20. ABSTRACT *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

The author shows how black leadership has been instrumental in inducing white majority to sustain a political climate favorable to black social, economic and political progress. The paper focuses almost exclusively on the political participation of blacks as the basis for progress in all areas.

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

037260

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)* AB

(2)

BLACK PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA: CAUSES AND RESULTS

by R. S. Lockwood, Ph.D, J.D.

Major (P), US Army

January 1978

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper, originally prepared as a lecture, was developed as a resource for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Department of Command, for use in its course entitled "Institutional Discrimination." While the paper does not address specifically the problems of discrimination within the Army, it is intended, rather, to show the breadth of black progress in areas of government where discrimination can best be remedied, as well as the means of access to those seats of power.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to make this very small contribution to the course and the problem that it treats. Many of the materials used in the preparation of the essay were developed for courses which I taught at the U.S. Military Academy, and as Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Graduate Faculty, University of Kansas.

I am further indebted to Mr. Martin Chapman whose assistance with University of Kansas library procedures greatly facilitated my research. Also, a special debt of gratitude goes to LTC John A. Kochenour, who suggested the theme, and who authored the course for which this paper was prepared.

While the paper was written with the intention of liberating the reader from the jargon of the political science discipline, I accept full responsibility for any ambiguities or other pains endured by the reader.

INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty years, the black community of the United States has dramatically increased its influence on the political process and, relatedly, enhanced its ability to control its own destiny. This brief paper will address the black role in the political arena and conclude with an appraisal of its future direction.

As a minority racial segment in a predominately white society, even a well-organized, funded, and highly articulate black movement needs some cooperation, encouragement, and sustaining support from white majority elites. Inasmuch as there are only seventeen blacks among 535 members of Congress, for example, well below the numerical parity derived from their 12 percent proportion of the population, the need for the white majority endorsement becomes painfully self-evident.

That there has been black progress at the levels presented in the evidence to follow, suggests a highly supportive political climate. One might suggest that the post-reconstruction era precedent, when black electoral dominance in the South led to white majority amendments to state constitutions that effectively disenfranchised blacks, could again materialize. However, the rebuttal argument need only point to the considerably more profound changes worked on the American political culture since the mid-1950's, as well as the equally significant changes in state and Federal constitutional relationships. It is the depth of change, and the new political system parameters that sustain black political progress.

SIGNIFICANT CAUSES OF

BLACK POLITICAL PROGRESS

To be sure, the black community itself has been responsible for most black progress. The impetus was provided by Brown vs. the Topeka Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all of which were realized through persistent pressure on the courts, the Congress, the President and on the very sources of discrimination in the society at large. But these events reflected, above all, the courageous acts of black leaders as well as the active and supportive roles of millions of other blacks whose determination energized their white allies in the era of the civil rights movement. This same trend persists today where black pressure on the country's vital policymaking institutions compels the attention of the white majority to the intrinsic immorality of racial discrimination, and to the support of a political climate favorable to progress.

Looking at some of these events in greater detail, the Supreme Court's momentous Brown decision in 1954,[2] which outlawed school segregation, triggered a movement that continues to present. All forms of institutional discrimination in both the public and private sectors were challenged. Further, state laws denying blacks equal access or legal protection gradually fell although the complete implementation of the spirit of the Brown decision was obstructed not only by individual citizens, but by institutions, including some lower level Federal courts.[3] While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 weakened southern resistance to the integration of public accommodations, as of 1975, there were twice as many all black schools in the North as in the South.[4]

But the Civil Rights Act was especially unsuccessful in the area that concerns us here: black voter registration and political participation. In 1963 the Commission on Civil Rights found that state registrars in 100 selected southern counties failed to register properly qualified voters.[5] Title I of the Civil Rights Act therefore addressed this problem forbidding the rejection of qualified applicants. While the Act led to an immediate increase in black suffrage of up to 50% in southern states such as Florida, North Carolina and Tennessee, other areas of the South resisted change until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.[6] The new law forbid all types of tests and authorized the replacement of local registrars with Federal voting examiners.[7] The black registration rate surged by approximately 50% in the so-called "examiner counties," where Federal examiners operated, adding more than 1 million black voters in the six-year period from 1964-1970.[8]

Compliance with the new law was greatly facilitated by the certainty of prosecution for violations, and by the visible presence of Justice Department and other Federal officials in the region: in fact, Congress increased by 95% the appropriations of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division in 1966, most of which were devoted to aggressive registration enforcement.[9] While this event, along with the judicial and legislative acts covered, pointed to the creation of a political climate conducive to black progress, a climate maintained by the white majority at the constant prompting of the black minority, the black leadership must take credit for the actual grassroots level implementation of the registration drive. It was such informal or non-public organizations as the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Voter Education Project (VEP), and the personal influence of such leaders as Martin Luther King that managed the more than 500 voter registration programs in the South extant between 1966 and 1970.[10]

THE TREND TOWARD BLACK

GAINS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

Electoral Officeholding

In this section we will examine several indicators of positive and continuing gains by blacks in the political arena. We will first examine the dramatic increase in the number of blacks holding political office at all levels. After shifting to the significance of black candidacy and electoral participation for the Democratic party, we will turn our attention to several obstacles within and external to the party that could foreclose the total symbiosis. Finally we will review black invluence on President Carter and look at the instrumental value of the executive office and the congressional forum to black progress.

The narrowed focus of this short review of black electoral progress tends to omit the outcomes of this effort. If black influence at the polls is indeed as real as we suggest, then it ought to be reflected in material gains through the process that converts demands into enforcible policy. Establishing this vital linkage must await further lower-level research, of which this paper is merely a small part. Therefore, we will focus, minimally, on the likely capability of blacks to sustain current progress in sensitizing society to their particularized needs; this capability is implied in electoral gains.

Black entry into the political arena has been dramatic. The broad assault on the barriers to social progress is manifest in the numbers and types of elective offices, at all levels of government, gained by black candidates over a ten-year period through 1975. Table 1 reflects the distribution of black elected officials by region, as of 1973. While it is not surprising that nearly half of all elected positions were in the predominately black south, the rate of change from 1965 to 1975 is impressive, as shown at Table 2.

Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between the black

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION - 1973

	Black Elected Officials	Percentage
NORTH	579	22%
SOUTH	1,179	45%
MIDWEST	685	26%
WEST	178	7%
Total	2,621	100%

Source: Voter Education Projects, Inc.

population's stability in the South and the increase in black political office holding as suggested in comparing Tables 2 and 3, thus reflecting the impact of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which brought into the registered voter ranks unprecedented numbers of eligible blacks.[11]

TABLE 2

INCREASE IN BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS
IN ELEVEN SOUTHERN STATES* (% INCREASE)

1965 (%)	1970 (%)	1975 (%)
72 (N/A)	644 (900%)	1,560 (%)

* Ala, Ark, Fla, Ga, La, Miss, NC, SC, Tenn, Tex, and Vir

Source: Voter Education Project, Inc.

TABLE 3

Black Population in South 1940-1973 (%)

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1973
SOUTH	77	68	60	53	52

Source: US Bureau of the Census

But the real indicators of progress may lie in statistics reflecting the breadth of black electoral office holding. Table 4 amply demonstrates this fact: black officials held state or national offices representing all but seven states in 1975 while only five states had no elected black officials in any of the national, state or local office categories employed here. Most importantly, this table reflects the grassroots electoral successes of blacks on a nationwide basis. Further, it is significant that in the American political system, and given the structural constraint of the single-member constituency for most offices, which compels coalition candidacies, political influence--and aspirations--flow upward.

TABLE 4: BLACK SELECTED OFFICIALS, BY OFFICE, 1969 to 1975, and BY REGION AND STATE, 1975

[As of April, except as indicated. Five States had no Negro elected officials in 1975: Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. For composition of regions, see inside front cover]

YEAR, REGION, AND STATE	Total	U.S. and State legislatures [1]	City and county offices [1]	Law enforcement [2]	Education [3]
1969	1,185	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1970 (Feb.)	1,472	182	715	213	362
1971 (Mar.)	1,860	216	905	274	465
1972 (Mar.)	2,264	224	1,108	263	669
1973	2,621	256	1,264	334	767
1974	2,991	256	1,602	340	793
1975	3,503	299	1,878	387	939
Northeast	503	56	179	74	194
North Central	869	87	476	85	221
South	1,913	129	1,142	198	444
West	218	27	81	30	80
Ala	161	15	75	51	20
Alaska	5	1	1	–	3
Ariz	17	2	5	1	9
Ark	171	4	101	1	65
Calif	147	[4] 12	57	18	60
Colo	15	4	6	4	1
Conn	43	6	29	4	9
Del	14	3	9	–	2
D.C	20	[5] 1	12	–	7
Fla	87	3	70	6	8
Ga	168	[6] 22	101	8	37
Idaho	1	–	1	–	–
Ill	240	[6] 21	145	16	64
Ind	66	6	44	10	6
Iowa	13	2	4	1	6
Kans	35	6	16	1	12
Ky	59	3	39	7	10
La	237	9	114	34	80
Maine	4	1	2	–	1
Md	83	[6] 20	50	8	5
Mass	24	[7] 9	9	–	6
Mich	223	[6] 18	99	25	81
Minn	8	2	1	3	2
Miss	192	1	111	41	39
Mo	113	[5] 16	65	15	17
Mont	1	1	–	–	–
Nebr	4	1	1	–	2
Nev	7	3	1	1	2
N.H	1	1	–	–	–
N.J	142	7	67	–	68
N. Mex	3	1	2	–	–
N.Y	159	[6] 16	28	27	88
N.C	194	6	137	5	46
Ohio	146	[5] 12	94	13	27
Okla	68	4	43	1	20
Oreg	6	1	1	2	2
Pa	122	[5] 15	42	43	22
R.I	3	1	2	–	–
S.C	132	13	78	15	26
Tenn	96	[5] 12	70	6	8
Tex	150	[5] 10	61	9	70
Va	64	2	59	3	–
Wash	15	2	7	4	2
W. Va	17	1	12	3	1
Wis	15	3	7	1	4
Wyo	1	–	–	–	1

NA Not available. – Represents zero.

[1] County commissioners and councilmen, mayors, vice mayors, aldermen, and other.

[2] Judges, magistrates, constables, marshals, sheriffs, justices of the peace, other. [3] College boards, school boards, other. [4] Includes 3 U.S. Representatives. [5] Includes 1 U.S. Representative. [6] Includes 2 U.S. Representatives. [7] Includes 1 U.S. Senator.

Source: Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington, D.C., *National Roster of Black Elected Officials*, annual.

So that grassroots political office-holding tends to become an investment toward the cumulative aspiration of higher office. Indeed, looking at the level where most aspirations seem directed, the United States Congress, more than 40% of all U.S. Representatives and 44% of all Senators in each of three prior Congresses, the 90th, 92d, and 94th, had held lower-level or other political or public offices as a career.[12] Futher, more than 70% of all members of both houses of the 94th Congress have held lower level elected political office in one capacity or another, including service on a non-career basis.

From the table above we can depict a trend. At all levels, black office holders have increased in numbers more than threefold, with the greatest increases coming in city and county offices and in memberships on school boards. Not unexpectedly, the relatively short life of the 1965 Voter Registration Act, and the similarly short period during which black officeholding has surged, has not yet cumulatively produced great numbers of candidates for national and state level offices. Also, the higher the level of office, the broader and more diluted the constituency in some cases so that white political support for black candidates becomes more important. For example, five of the seventeen blacks in the 94th Congress were from constituences where blacks constituted anywhere from 3% to 47% of the state or district--e.g., Senator Edward W. Brooke, Republican of Massachusetts (3%); Ronald V. Dellums, Democrat of California (20%); Yvonne Burke, Democrat of California (39%); Barbara Jordan, Democrat of Texas (44%); and Harold E. Ford, Democrat of Tennessee (47%).[14]

At the same time, the numbers of blacks in elected law enforcement positions are also relatively small. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. Law enforcement positions include magistrates and judges, at one extreme, and police at the other. In the first case, elected judges will have long terms, often greater than six years, and are selected by broad judicial district constituencies. Also, they are almost all trained, experienced and politically active attorneys whose reputations precede their election. Besides the usual electoral barriers which blacks are just beginning to overcome, credentialism presents a problem: there are fewer than 30,000 practicing black attorneys in the United States.

At the other end of the law enforcement spectrum are sheriffs and police, those involved in the more coercive, or less normative functions. Police departments particularly are targets of civil rights and Federal agency attempts to racially balance police forces, or to exert civilian community monitorship over them. The black community in general, however, has long endured a hostile relationship with the police in virtually all regions and at all levels. Thus it is not likely that black participation in elective law enforcement functions will increase dramatically outside of predominately black communities seeking to control that particular instrument of order. And, of course, there tend to be relatively few elective law enforcement positions at the coercive end of the scale.

SIGNIFICANCE TO THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

The traditional preference of blacks for the Democratic party has not changed, although from 1968 to 1972 in the South, there appeared to be some embryonic black Republican developments. This trend abated

after 1972 and by the time of the 1974 Congressional elections, little evidence remained to assert a surge of black Republicanism anywhere in the nation.

Rather blacks seem to be clearly in the mainstream of political party developments and party support techniques. While the very future of the American two-party system seems endangered by an imbalance of interest in the Democratic and independent voter columns, the political party structure itself is not immune to a loss of influence derived from electoral reform, the increased use of primaries rather than caucuses and, perhaps most significantly, a clear preference among voters to vote for issues rather than for party labels.

These trends, coupled with state and local-level constraints on political party roles, may shape future black electoral techniques employed by candidates, although it will not necessarily affect the increasing number of black political candidates.

For example, since black candidates in white majority districts quite expetedly need maximum black participation in addition to white support, membership in the Democratic party has and no doubt will continue to elicit Democratic partisan support, at least among strong partisans. Blacks had evidently sensed the importance of party membership in this respect and, as shown below, were found to be among the most strongly partisan members of the party. But it is not simply the combined effect of New Deal social progressiveness and the party's civil rights record that make it especially attractive to the black candidate of the current era, it is also the organization available to him in his campaign as well as the party's electoral support at the polls.

TABLE 5

Party Identification by Race, 1968

	Black	White
Strong Democrat	55.7%	16.1%
Weak Democrat	28.9	24.8
Independent	10.1	31.0
Weak Republican	.7	16.1
Strong Republican	1.3	10.5
Others	3.4	1.4

Source: Frank L. Sorauf, Party Politics in America, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1972), p. 149

Looking at local elections, where black electoral successes are numerically impressive, one notes that in 60 percent of all cities in the United States with populations of more than 5,000 persons, election regulations disallow party labels on the ballot. There the black Democratic candidate will have to develop a campaign scenario that acquaints fellow partisans with his party preferences while at the same time taking these additional actions: assure maximum racial minority turnout; shape issues so as to appeal to those potentially supportive forces that prefer to ignore party labels; and, among other more common voter targeting practices, subdue Democratic party organizational support to functions which will not be offensive to independents and even Republicans, especially if the latter party is in the majority in a given district. In effect, these techniques are not at all different from those that would be employed by any other candidate, regardless of color; but the critical difference for the black candidate is that he must make race a basis for black electoral support, as Kennedy used religion as a drawing card for the Catholic vote, on one hand, while attempting to make it inconsequential in soliciting the non-black vote. This type of postulative "schizophrenia" is not without inherent dangers, quite similar to those of any candidate who attempts to attract one group of voters by adjusting his campaign platform incrementally although not necessarily irreversibly away from another group.

Figure 1.

Party Identification according to Region, Race, Religion, and Education, 1952 and 1972



Source: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

It would seem then that as black participation in the Democratic party continues to grow, and if the party partisans accept black candidacies at face value, then the party will be a useful springboard to offices at all levels of government. As shown in Figure 1, blacks are the only continuous input into the Democratic party at a time when all other groups are moving to different forms of partisan and non-partisan identifications. In the North, blacks continue to be more partisan toward the Democratic party than any other goup while, at the same time, represent one of the least independent classifications. As Table 6 would suggest, these trends would be appropriately useful for black candidates since southern locales tend to be predominately Democratic while large cities maintain their traditional Democratic flavor. The problem then remains one of race: to what extent have blacks been accepted into the Democratic party?

TABLE 6: Party Identification by Region and City Size, 1974

	Republican	Democrat	Independent
REGION			
East	27%	43%	30%
Midwest	24	39	37
South	18	49	33
West	24	47	29
CITY SIZE			
1 million	24	46	30
500,000-999,999	18	46	36
50,000-499,999	18	48	34
2,500-49,999	28	41	31
2,500, rural	27	42	31

Source: Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 112, Oct 74, p. 28

IMPACT OF BLACK MEMBERSHIP ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The continued influx of blacks into the Democratic party has not been without problems. However, it remains to be determined if changes in the traditional membership profile of the party have resulted from the

black influx or as a result of a backlash by white segments of the party who reject party espousal of programs that perceptibly threaten them. In any event, it seems fair to say, by way of a working hypothesis, that it is a combination of both, and by way of corollary, that it will not necessarily threaten the potential success of black political candidates carrying the Democratic battle standard.

A brief review of the literature on the topic clarifies these assumptions. A 1970 study showed, for the first time, northern majority resistance to the rate of integration.[17] This resistance was coupled with growing urban crime and the related unrest scenario--all of which were associated with a media promotion of a minority black super-militancy.[18] While the white and most of the black communities were pleading for "law and order," an issue quickly sensed by the Nixon 1968 campaign as electorally advantageous, the Democratic administrations of Johnson and, to a much lesser extent, Kennedy, were seen as allies of the black super-militants. Clearly, the issues of racial injustices and law and order were distinctly different, but objectivity suffered at the hands of charged emotions and perceptions, many of which were artifices generated by media promotion of problems with blurry dimensions of severity--e.g., the black super-militancy movement was distinctly less widespread than suggested.[19] As one study found:

> People literally "see" things differently, depending on the attitudes and values that they bring to the media. Thus any "bias" contained in a message can often be distorted or ignored by the recipient of the communication.[20]

Not surprisingly, whites holding a racial bias, regardless of partisanship, would use media sensationalism to reinforce their prejudices. This was especially useful to the Republican party's "crime in the streets" issue in 1968. But it also contributed to Democratic disunity which materialized in a Wallace candidacy and Nixon's success among racial conservatives of both parties and in all regions in the same election.[21]

Together with increased black party leadership at local levels as well as in the national Democratic convention where the numbers of black delegates continue to increase, and black influence on the issues or platform of the party, it appears that inherent racial attitudes among whites could be a very real factor in determining their strength of allegiance to the party and, of course, its candidates. This factor no doubt accounts for the success of Wallace-type demagoguery--Wallace won more than half of all white United Automobile Worker (UAW) members in the 1972 primary, despite the UAW's traditionally liberal stance personified by the late Walter Reuther.[22]

Finally, Richard L. Rubin of Columbia University suggests that the impact of hardened racial attitudes may indeed undermine Democratic unity, as perceived in Figures 2 and 3 below:[23]

Figure 2 - Racial Attitudes[a] by Religion, Region, and Party Affiliation[b]



Source: Abstracted from 1968 Survey Research Center data

[a] Whites only, regions are U.S. Census Bureau definitions.

[b] Scores are group median scores on racial liberalism scale. Midwest sample sizes: Democrats (162), Republicans (121), Independents (113), Catholics (98), Protestants (338). East sample sizes: Democrats (138), Republicans (95), Independents (93), Catholics (151), Protestants (181).

Figure 2 suggests that, in the East, Catholicism exerts a greater influence on racial conservatism than does membership in the Democratic party. We can conclude conversely that internal party conflict over racial issues and programs would foster defections by Catholics in the East. Rubin asserts further that the mass migration of Catholics to the suburbs has not generated a weakening of party ties, thus strengthening the impact of racial as opposed to socio-economic issues on Catholic loyalty. In the mid-West, racial issues do not have the same strength as does that independent variable where applied to eastern Catholic Democrats, as manifest in Figure 2.[24]

If racial attitudes affect the membership loyalties of such a traditionally supportive Democratic party segment as Catholics, what impact does race have on the loyalty of another major, party segment: unions? Figure 3 suggests that union defection from the Democratic party in the East is not as likely as it is in the mid-West where all depicted groups fell well below the racial ideological standing of unionists in the East. Indeed, the earlier example of UAW desertion of

Figure 3 - Racial Attitudes[a] by Union Membership, Region and Party Affiliation[b]



Source: Abstracted from 1968 Survey Research Center data

[a] Whites only, regions are U.S. Census Bureau definitions.

[b] Scores are median scores on racial liberalism scale. Midwest Sample Sizes: Union (112), Non-Union (293), Democrats (162), Republicans (121), Independents (113), East Sample Sizes: Union (109) Non-Union (228), Democrats (138), Republicans (95), Independents (93).

the Democratic party candidate in the 1968 presidential election seems to corroborate empirically this theory. Yet there is a sufficiently significant difference between unionist and Democratic racial ideology in the East to suggest that, minimally, short-term cleavages in the party could occur over racial issues. The strength of that potential threat must, however, await a test.

BLACK DEMOCRATS AND THE PRESIDENCY

Black Democrats compete with other party elites for influence, a factional diffusion not uncommon to most western-style political parties. To be sure black influence has grown commensurately with their political mobilization and organizational skills, which in any interest group influence contest can account for gains disproportionate to the relative size of the population segment represented by the group. Northern style black street leadership, more violent than that found in the South, has given way to black participation in the institutionalized political arena as the best route to the objective musicalized by the theme of the Jefferson's television program where blacks "finally get (their) piece of the pie."

Blacks are now competitive with union influence on the presidency of Jimmy Carter, as we will see. The evolution of real black influence in the party's presidential selection process can be traced to the McGovern-Fraser committee which in 1972 opened the convention to a real role for black delegates.[25] Although there is considerable factionalism among black leaders themselves, both in and out of political office, the potential political power implicit in the broad array of black leadership compels the attention of all serious presidential contenders. McGovern probably failed to sense both aspects of this problem, hence his somewhat intellectualized, ideological platform made little sense to rank-and-file black voters interested in bread-and-butter socio-economic and effective civil rights programs. The McGovern campaign appeal therefore extended to a small minority comprised of predominately white anti-war and rights activists, fringe interests, youth and intellectuals predominately from the comfortable middle class. These groups had little in common with the great bulk of either unionists or working class blacks.

By 1972 and through the Congressional elections of 1974, the black strategy improved, however slowly, to the point that alliances were forged with former McGovernite supporters in the leftist wing of the party. It would seem that whereas the "new politics" wing of the party gained ideological satisfaction from the "affirmative action" democratization of the party, blacks quickly sensed and exploited their opportunity to extend the mandatory quota thru to policy-making activities. By the time of the 1974 Democratic party mini-convention in Kansas City, even like-minded members of the overwhelmingly white Women's Caucus had become an ally of the black putsch for greater party influence. That blacks have had such a strong impact on the selection of both the 1972 and 1976 presidential candidates is ample evidence of their success in converting rhetoric to effectiveness.

Carter, specifically, is known to be heavily indebted to black voters who gave him approximately 90 percent of their 6.6 million votes.[26] As shown in Table 7, Carter was actually a white minority candidate, but won 83 percent of the black vote, suggesting that without black support, large urban center in the East, as well as the whole South might have been lost to Ford.

But organized labor, too, has a debt to settle with Carter, and one which will be equally commanding of his attention. The return to the Democratic column after giving majority support to Nixon in 1972 was dramatic. Further the in-kind support provided by union members offset statutory financial limitations placed on cash contributors and probably provided the margin for success in such electorally critical states as Pensylvania, Ohio, New York and Wisconsin. But the essence of Carter's commitment to the black leadership will be tempered by such environmental constraints as the economy, the world situation, the disposition of the Congress and the ability of the president to hammer out compromises meaningful to such other political creditors as labor. For example, although abolition of the minimum wage law would help reduce black teenage unemployment, that act would be opposed bitterly by organized labor and their allies in Congress.

Social Groups and the Presidential Vote, 1972 and 1976
(in percent)

TABLE 7

	1972		1976	
	Nixon	*McGovern*	*Ford*	*Carter*
Party				
Republicans	94	6	89	11
Independents	66	34	52	48
Democrats	42	58	20	80
Ideology				
Liberal	31	69	26	74
Moderate	69	31	47	53
Conservative	87	13	70	30
Occupation				
Professional/managerial	68	32	57	43
White collar	63	37	49	51
Blue collar	61	39	41	59
Union Households				
Members	57	43	38	62
Nonmembers	67	33	52	48
Community				
Cities over 500,000	42	58	40	60
Suburbs–small cities	63	37	47	53
Rural: 5,000 and less	71	29	53	47
Religion				
Protestant	69	31	54	46
Catholic	60	40	45	55
Jewish	37	63	32	68
Race				
White	70	30	52	48
Black	13	87	17	83
Other	32	68	18	82
Sex				
Male	68	32	48	52
Female	62	38	48	52
Age				
18–21	46	54	51	49
22–29	55	45	44	56
30–44	66	34	48	52
45–59	68	32	52	48
60 and over	71	29	52	48
Income [a]				
(Under $5,000)				
Under $8,000	57	43	38	62
($5,000–$10,000)				
$8,000–$12,000	62	38	43	57
($10,001–$15,000)				
$12,001–$20,000	67	33	50	50
(Over $15,000)				
Over $20,000	69	31	62	38
Region				
East	59	41	48	52
Midwest	61	39	51	49
South	72	28	46	54
Far West	61	39	53	47

[a] Figures in parentheses are income categories for 1972.

SOURCES: For 1972, the election survey of the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan; for 1976, *New York Times*, 4 November 1976, p. 25. In both years regional data are based on the actual vote. In Gerald Pomper, The Election of 1976 (New York: McKay, 1977), p. 61.

But the increasing importance of blacks to the total presidential vote for Democratic candidates is better displayed in Table 8. It is worthy of note that a steady proportional increase of the black coalitional segment continues in the face of an irregular and leveling

TABLE 8: Black vs. Union Percentage of Total Democratic Vote: 1952-1976 Elections

Year	Blacks	Union Members
1952	7%	38
1956	5	36
1960	7	31
1964	12	32
1968	19	28
1972	22	32
1976	26	32

Source: Computed from Bureau of Census data.

labor share. Secondly, higher black commitment, as shown in Table 7, means that only 3 million more unionists than blacks supported the Democratic ticket in 1976. If their level of loyalty continues, black influence will begin to challenge that of labor with increasing power. Finally, both Republican and Democratic leaders, since the mid-seventies have been receptive and actively solicited more black participation in party affairs at all levels of the system.[27]

BLACKS IN CONGRESS

In an era in which substantial black influence can be exerted on both a Democratic president and overwhelmingly Democratic Congress, as suggested in Table 9, it would seem that the time for pushing black equality has finally arrived. Although there is a strong correlation between Presidential success with respect to his legislative program and the presence of a majority of the same party in Congress, the 95th Congress is heir to the reforms of a recalcitrant 94th Congres, itself rooted in the increasing independence of three prior Congresses from presidential dictates. Yet it would seem that black leadership in Congress could develop issues which would foster harmony between the two institutions while reinforcing the appeal of both to the black electorate. Unfortunately, the problem is more easily stated than remedied.

Black leadership in Congress is neither complete, legitimated by all black leaders outside thereof, nor always cohesive as a voting bloc.

TABLE 9

Presidential Success and Congressional Majorities

Administration	*Years*	*Success (percent)*	*Congress*	*Party House Majority (percent)*	*Party Senate Majority (percent)*
Eisenhower (R)	1953–54 *	85.9	83rd	R, 50.8	R, 50
	1955–56	72.5	84th	D, 53.3	D, 50
	1957–58	69	85th	D, 53.5	D, 51
	1959–60	58.5	86th	D, 66	D, 65
Kennedy (D)	1961–62 *	83.2	87th	D, 60.4	D, 65
	1963 *	87.1	88th	D, 59.3	D, 68
Johnson (D)	1964 *	88	88th	D, 59.3	D, 67
	1965–66 *	86	89th	D, 67.8	D, 68
	1967–68 *	77	90th	D, 56.7	D, 64
Nixon (R)	1969–70	75.5	91st	D, 55.8	D, 57
	1971–72	70.5	92nd	D, 58.6	D, 54
	1973–74	55	93rd	D, 56	D, 57
Ford (R)	1974	58.2	93rd	D, 56	D, 57
	1975–76	57.4	94th	D, 67	D, 61
Carter (D)	1977–78 *	?	95th	D, 67	D, 62

* Designates years in which Congress and President are of the same party.

SOURCE: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 34 (30 October 1976): 3092; idem 30 (11 November 1972): 2952, 2958; idem 32 (9 November 1974): 3064, 3068; and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972*, p. 366.

But the roots have been implanted that can provide a foundation for the expansion of black influence in Congress. In the first instance, the existence of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) legitimizes the black membership as a symbolic sub-system of the institution of Congress. Although it has been criticized as self-seeking, and its leadership overtly repudiated in certain parts of the black community, the need for a "swing" bloc capable of bargaining for black issues is readily evident. However, in a setting where the CBC constitutes only 4 percent of House membership, or well below the 44 memberships that would provide numerical parity with black proportional representation, and with little opportunity to secure more seats, the situation compels our attention back to the opening theme of this paper: that white cooperation is critical to black progress.[28]

In dealing with Carter, the CBC has developed an agenda of priorities which asserts on appropriate occasions. Not surprisingly, the dominant theme is economics, and the leading issue black employment. The Hawkins-Humphrey bill (H.R.50, S.50), which compels government maintenance of unemployment levels below the 3 percent mark, ultimately fell to Carter's adjusted budgetary goals which eschewed the bill as too expensive. While the bill did not get through the first session of the 95th Congress, a compromise has been forged which would seem suitable to the CBC since it would give priority to black youth unemployment.[29]

Other priority issues with the CBC include voter registration expansion, a ban on chrome imports from Rhodesia, and low-cost energy which is depicted as particularly punishing for low-income blacks.

The caucus itself has become increasingly sensitive to the need for compromise since many of its members are from white majority districts as depicted in Table 10.

TABLE 10

The Congressional Black Caucus

Member	Began Service	Age	Blacks in District
Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D Mich.)	1955	54	65%
Robert N. C. Nix (D Pa.)	1959	71	65
Augustus F. Hawkins (D Calif.)	1963	69	59
John Conyers Jr. (D Mich.)	1965	48	70
Louis Stokes (D Ohio)	1969	52	66
William (Bill) Clay (D Mo.)	1969	46	54
Shirley Chisholm (D N.Y.)	1969	52	53
Ronald V. Dellums (D Calif.)	1971	41	20
Ralph H. Metcalfe (D Ill.)	1971	66	88
Parren J. Mitchell (D Md.)	1971	55	74
Charles B. Rangel (D N.Y.)	1971	46	58
Walter E. Fauntroy (D D.C.)	1971	44	72
Yvonne Brathwaite Burke (D Calif.)	1973	44	39
Cardiss Collins (D Ill.)	1973	45	54
Barbara C. Jordan (D Texas)	1973	41	44
Harold E. Ford (D Tenn.)	1975	32	47

According to one source, the virtual relegation of civil rights and discrimination type issues to the bureaucratic, institutional processes of the Justice Department, HEW and the EEOC, has made the job of the CBC somewhat more difficult in realizing its economic priorities.

In effect, says Parren Mitchell, it is more difficult to redistribute power.[30] Or equally difficult to redistribute wealth which, as the rest of Congress knows, is taking power or wealth from whites.

But there have been some nominal successes. For example, in 1973, the CBC was able to provide a swing vote for a farm bill that, among other things, renewed subsidies for such important southern crops as rice and cotton, crops that are also beneficial to southern black employment. In exchange for this support, southerners backed the CBC in its ultimately successful effort to raise the minimum wage level to $2.30 in 1976.[31]

Throughout the 94th Congress, the CBC has forged working relationships which suggested increasing ability to work effectively in successive Congresses, as evident in the forthcoming Hawkins-Humphrey bill compromise discussed above. Phillip Burton, chairman of the Democratic caucus in the 94th remarked that: "On balance, blacks are wiser pragmatists than their white political counterparts. They're more result oriented."[32]

Finally, the comparative youth of CBC members, the relative security of their seats in the House, and the recent Congressional reforms which have brought short-term black members into the inner power circles of key committees, have led to a restructuring of the CBC in a way that promises an intrinsic capability to remain abreast of and respond quickly to priority CBC issues. Table 11 reflects the relativity of the CBC subcommittee structure as it is keyed to black priorities, and the expertise of the CBC subcommittee member based on his House committee role. This type of oversight program, as it matures and exercises, can transform the black member's expertise into a genuine source of power not only for the black community but for the House committee also, thus doubly rewarding the member vis-a-vis his Congressional internal and constitutional functions.

TABLE 11

Caucus Subcommittee Assignments--94th Congress, 2nd Session

Congresspersons	CBC Subcommittee	House Committee
Burke	Democratic Party/ Congressional Affairs, Women's Issues	Appropriations
Chisholm	Education	Rules
Clay	Labor Management Rel.	Education and Labor; Post Office and Civil Service
Collins	International Relations	International Relations; Government Operations
Conyers	Criminal Justice	Government Operations; Judiciary
Dellums	Defense Policy	Armed Services; District of Columbia
Diggs	International Relations	District of Columbia (Chair); International Relations
Fauntroy	Housing; Civil and Political Rights	*Banking, Currency & Housing*; District of Columbia
Ford	Tax Reform/Health Care and Aging	Ways and Means
Hawkins	*Juvenile Delinquency*	Education and Labor; House Administration
Jordan	Government Operations	Government Operations; Judiciary
Metcalfe	Panama Canal	Interstate & Foreign Commerce; Merchant Marine & Commerce
Mitchell	Minority Enterprise	Budget; Banking, Currency & Housing
Nix	International Relations	International Relations; Post Office & Civil Service (Chair)
Rangel	Public Assistance	Ways and Means
Stokes	Health, Education & Welfare	Appropriations; Budget

CONCLUSION

The theme of this paper has been that the black leadership has been instrumental in inducing a white majority to sustain a political climate favorable to black social, economic and political progress. This paper focused almost exclusively on the political participation of blacks as the basis for progress in all areas.

The roots of black success lie in the judicial and legislative exertions of the fifties and sixties. But their creation was fostered by black determinism, and their instrumentalism sustained by an enlightened and aggressive black leadership both in and out of political office. Collectively, their activity coupled with a sympathetic community of white political elites constitute the political climate of black progress.

Symptomatic of black progress has been the trade-off of the techniques of the civil rights era--marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, for participation in the institutions of politics. Black political officeholding, especially in the South, but in virtually all but a handful of states, has exploded. Most significantly, blacks are securing their "investment" in higher office aspirations through an impressive expansion in grass-roots political activities. As white attitudes change and as black electoral sophistication increases, it can be speculated that black candidates may achieve surprising success even among majority white constitutents.

Black interest in the Democratic party continues. While there is some evidence that hardened racial attitudes among whites may generate some party disunity among traditional Democrats, such as unionists and Catholics at lower levels, national level influence of blacks has materialized in primary and general election victories for at least one president: Jimmy Carter. Yet, Carter's success has carried political debts--the black community, which provided the margin of success in the 1976 election, giving 83 percent of its vote to Carter, expects retribution which can conflict with the expectations of such other competitive political creditors as organized labor.

Finally, black political power, through still nascent, can be seen developing through the Congressional Black Caucus which is structured to secure the gains of twenty years of black pressure for change in the American political system.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Census of Population: 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1971), Vol I, Part B.

2. 247 U.S. 483; 349 US 294

3. See Kenneth N. Vines, "Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South," Journal of Politics, Vol 26, No. 2 (May 1964), pp. 337-57.

4. Time, 17 February 1975.

5. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Civil Rights, 1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 16, 37-50.

6. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Political Participation (Washington: GPO, 1968), pp. 12-13. Texas, too, joined the other three states cited on the periphery of the South in aggressively registering blacks prior to the Voting Rights Act. However, the exact increase is currently unknown although official interpretators believe it to be as high as that of the other three states mentioned.

7. Actually, Congress decided that prima facie discrimination existed in any county where less than 50 percent of the voting age public was registered or had voted in the 1964 presidential election. Thereafter only age, residence and criminal record were required for suffrage qualification. Finally, "examiner counties" were those where prima facie discrimination was alleged and where Federal examiners could be appointed to replace local registrars. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 8.

8. The counties affected were all of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and approximately 26 North Carolina counties. The statistics cited are derived from Political Participation, pp. 222-225.

9. H.R. Rodgers, Jr., and Charles S. Bullock, III, Law and Social Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 33.

10. "Voting Rights Act," Atlanta Journal, June 19, 1970, p. 18-A.

11. Whereas in 1960 only 29.1% of all blacks of eligible voting age, and 61.1% of all whites were registered to vote, by 1971 those figures had risen to 58.6% and 65.0%, respectively. At the same time, the following year, when a Presidential election took place, 52.1% and 64.5% of black and white voters respectively claimed to have voted on

a nationwide basis. No doubt the poll was poorly structured--i.e., we do not know what race, when or for what candidate the black or white voter voted--or that the respondents were less than truthful since voter turnout among eligible voters in the 1972 presidential race was approximately 55%, according to the Census Bureau and corroborated by studies done independently at the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

12. Robert S. Lockwood, Progress and Congress: "plus ca change...:" A Study of the 94th Congress (book forthcoming), p. 29.

13. New York Times, November 4, 1976.

14. Lockwood, passim.

15. Charles R. Adrian, Governing our Fifty States and their Communities, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972), pp. 122-123.

16. Angus Campbell and fellow researchers studying the 1960 campaign found that Kennedy positively caused the defection from the Democratic party presidential vote of church-going protestants while attracting most Catholics regardless of their religiosity. See Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966, chapter 5.

17. Richard M. Scammaro, Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 116.

18. See Dennis S. Ippolito, Thomas G. Walker and Kenneth L. Kolson, Public Opinion and Responsible Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Incl, 1976), pp. 64-65.

19. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 248, 260-70, passim.

20. Ibid, p. 65

21. In 1968, Nixon received 56% of the racially conservative vote in the East and 54% in the Midwest. In the South, Wallace dominated among racial conservatives.

22. Yankelovich Survey, New York Times, May 18, 1972, p. 18.

23. Richard L. Rubin, Party Dynamics (New York: Oxford Press, 1976), pp. 118-143.

24. Both Figures 2 and 3 were constructed by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center in 1968. The scale does not measure racism, but rather the conservative or liberal variance of the individual respondent's attitude toward black social and political objectives. This is important to our study since we contend that black progress is a function of issue formulation and programmatic (policy) materialization. Consequently, where the Democratic party ceases to be effective in this regard, blacks will look for a different vehicle--a trend which is not yet supportable with respect to the evidence currently available.

25. 483 of 3203 delegates to the 1972 convention were black. CQ Weekly Supplement, Vol XXX, No. 28 (July 8, 1972), p. 1642.

26. Gerald R. Pomper, The Election of 1976 (New York: McKay, 1977), p. 139.

27. In December 1975, the Democratic mini-convention in Kansas City and a Republican policy committee both issued highly supportive policy statements encouraging black membership in their respective parties. See Washington Post, 8 December 1975.

28. The same theme is sounded in Charles P. Henry, "Legitimizing Race in Congressional Politics," American Politics Quarterly, Vol 5, No 2 (April 1977), pp. 149-176. Even where racial gerrymandering has been allowed so as to preserve black majorities (as allowed by the Supreme Court in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey), it must be kept in mind that such actions are executed by predominately white state legislatures. See CQ Weekly, 12 March 1977, p. 449.

29. Specifically, the jobless level would be raised to 4 percent except for persons 20 years of age or over where the level is depressed further to 3 percent.

30. Congressional Quarterly Guide, Fall 1977, p. 59.

31. Ibid, p. 63

32. Ibid, p. 62