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US Security Interests in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland

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About the Cover: The national emblem of the Polish People's Republic is the White Eagle. The eagle has symbolized Polish nationhood since the founding of Poland in 966 A.D.

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UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE CASE OF POLAND

(10) By

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CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

FOREWORD

Soviet domination in Eastern Europe over the past three decades is perceived as so firmly entrenched that Western strategic thinking concerning that area of the world appears to have stagnated. Recent events, such as the Helsinki accords, tend to reinforce the view that the United States is reluctant to try to exert influence toward change in the area. This thought-provoking monograph, however, suggests possibilities for improving the US security position in Eastern Europe.

The author is a professional Marine officer whose research is grounded in his personal service in, and intimate knowledge of, Eastern Europe. Colonel Daniel M. Duffield's study focuses on a key country of the region—Poland. A brief review of Poland's history as a bridge between East and West, with emphasis on the events that shaped post-World War II Poland, provides the reader with background for assessing the factors militating for and against change in modern Poland.

While acknowledging the existence of imposed "socialist unity" factors acting to draw Poland into closer integration within the Soviet bloc, the author points to other factors which favor change toward the Western model; he discusses the political, economic, and cultural "contradictions" which have existed for some time in Poland. Most importantly, the author contributes to the national security dialogue by making specific suggestions for judicious exploitation of these contradictions.



R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

PREFACE

The reader should understand from the outset that the monograph following is a commentary resulting from the efforts of a professional military officer to arrive at some pertinent conclusions about the future of Eastern Europe as it affects and is affected by the United States. This commentary is not without bias, and for that reason it should be read not as a scientific assessment of fact but rather as the brief of an advocate.

The bias comes from the author's own experience in Eastern Europe where one cannot help but sense the Soviet presence, even in Yugoslavia and surely more in the client states. Very much a part of that presence is the ideology—an alien thing which these vital, generous people seem to wear as an ill-fitting suit, too heavy to be comfortable in summer and too threadbare to be warm in winter. Whereas, as one of my colleagues here has suggested, the Russians may have the regime they deserve, the peoples of Eastern Europe have endured somewhat paler copies of that system for more than three decades.

Whatever historical imperatives of the moment led to present conditions in Eastern Europe, the tensions today between government and citizen seem to produce an inherent instability which can only lead to change. What kind of change and when it will occur are, for the author, questions of vital interest to this country even if they cannot be answered precisely by a responsible observer. The problem then becomes one of examining the situation in perhaps the most important nation in the Soviet system in Eastern Europe—Poland. The object: to determine what forces can influence change in Poland and how the United States can promote its own vital interests in that nation.

It would be inappropriate to subject the reader to an extensive roll-call of acknowledgements, but some warrant mention. My seniors in the Marine Corps made it possible for me to devote a year to this project while trusting my judgment to use that time to best advantage pursuing a subject of my choice. The past and current Presidents of the National Defense University approved and encouraged my efforts. Ambassador Francis T. Underhill, Professor Richard F. Staar, and Colonel John C. Scharfer, USMC (Ret.), reviewed and commented on my final draft. Finally, my colleagues in the Research Directorate provided invaluable criticism and advice without which the task would have been doubly difficult.

Washington, DC
July 1977

DANIEL M. DUFFIELD, JR.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Colonel Daniel M. Duffield, Jr., is currently serving as Commanding Officer, 3d Division Support Group, 3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. In 1976 and 1977 he was a Senior Research Fellow in the Research Directorate, National Defense University. He graduated in 1952 from Princeton University with a BA degree in history and later that year was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. Since then he has served in a variety of command assignments as well as in operational, plans, and intelligence staff billets, including 2 years as Assistant Naval Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Extension Course and the National Security Management Course of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE CASE OF POLAND

I

POLAND AND COEXISTENCE

> Poland must cease to be a wall protecting Europe from Russia and become a bridge between Russia and Germany.
>
> Karol Radek[1]

The importance of Poland derives from its role in the current relationship between the Soviet Union and the West which has been defined variously as "detente" or "coexistence." The former term has come to have great appeal in the West because it seems to signify a longed-for relaxation of previous cold war tensions and implies a common effort to resolve East-West differences. The writer proceeds from a contrary assumption based on the Soviet definition of the term "coexistence." Although renouncing offensive general war as an instrument of state policy because of its potential cost to all parties in the nuclear age, Soviet authorities from Khrushchev on have emphasized the competitive, even antagonistic, aspect of coexistence.[2] In this context, Soviet objectives in Europe, however defined and categorized by Western analysts, reduce themselves to the proposition of the growth of Soviet power vis-a-vis the West. A major element in that power is continued hegemony in Eastern Europe. Thus the growth of Soviet power must incorporate enhancement of Moscow's authority in the region in which Poland occupies the key strategic position.

Lying on the North European plain between Russia and Germany, Poland throughout its thousand-year history has been cast in the role of both buffer and bridge between the powerful nations on its flanks. The nature of the role has been largely determined, not by the designs of the Poles, but by the relative strengths of Germany and Russia. After the three partitions of the late 18th century the Polish State was eliminated except for its brief reinstitution as the Kingdom of Poland under Napoleon. Nevertheless, the Russian area of Poland was considered by the 19th century Tsars as the western march of their empire, beyond which lay the growing power of Hohenzollern Germany. In the event of *Drang nach Osten,* the first to feel the blow would be the hapless Poles who provide depth to the Tsars' defenses of the Russian homeland.

In the period from the onset of World War II, Poland has served as a buffer for the Soviet Union in much the same way as for the Tsarist empire. Stalin's price for noninterference in Hitler's war against the West was the occupation of the eastern third of what was then the Polish Republic. His claim for protection of his war-ravaged nation extended yet farther west in the closing stages of World War II, a claim accepted by his new allies without serious dispute even though it involved shifting Poland's eastern and western borders. In the latter instance, this involved the accession by Poland of territory not rightfully under its rule since the Middle Ages. As a result of the wartime agreements, Poland still serves as a military buffer for the Soviet Union, a role whose importance in reality has declined despite Soviet efforts to keep it alive by periodically raising the spectre of German revanchism.

There is another aspect of the protection of the Soviet Union involving Poland as a buffer. Here, Stalin's wartime allies took issue with him, albeit unsuccessfully, even though they agreed with his requirement for military protection. The Soviet concern was, and is, ideological security, the need not only to have a dependent ally on the western border of the Soviet Union, but the requirement that the ally—or buffer state—be ruled by a communist government subservient to Moscow.[3] First arising at Yalta when the Red Army was already in position to assure the outcome, the issue was not resolved until 1948 when Stalin's agents took complete charge of the Polish government, as they did in the other Eastern European states. Although the degree of subservience to Moscow is less than in Stalin's time, by any measure, Poland continues to provide what could be characterized as a defense in depth for the Soviet Union against liberalization along Western lines.

Stalin thus preempted the use of Poland as a buffer, denying its service to the West in that role in either the military or ideological aspect. Twice since World War II there have been opportunities to involve Poland as part of a larger military buffer zone in Central Europe. The Rapacki Plan envisaged Poland as part of a "nuclear-free" zone, while the current Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) negotiations postulate the ultimate withdrawal of nonnational forces from essentially the same area. In both cases the price for Western security has been deemed unrealistic, and the Rapacki proposal is history while the MFR talks languish.

Given the ultimate goal of Soviet coexistence policy, Poland's role as a bridge is potentially more dangerous to the West than its continued existence as a buffer protecting the source of Soviet power. Poland is not simply astride the Soviet military line of communications to

Germany; its territory makes up a communications zone indispensable to the Soviet Army in maintaining pressure on the West. The other way in which Poland acts as a bridge is political. A communist government in Poland has done more than provide a kind of ideological security for the Soviet Union. The Polish regime in effect serves to advance communism into Central Europe, a goal since Lenin's day, and provides the geographic base for expansion of the ideology farther to the west.

The question arises whether the West can in time reverse the Polish role so that Poland becomes, rather than a device to promote Soviet coexistence objectives, a true bridge between East and West across which traffic moves in both directions. Over the years evidence has accumulated suggesting that the possibility is realistic and should be examined. Western leaders as different as DeGaulle and Brandt took steps in that direction, demonstrating that the Western response to coexistence need not be limited by a defensive outlook which, among other things, requires acceptance of the East European status quo as immune to change. Were the United States to do nothing to influence the outcome, forces have been at work which will lead to change in Poland. There is on the one hand the Soviet effort enunciated in the Brezhnev doctrine to draw Poland and the other East European client states more closely into the Soviet system. Set against this policy are the characteristics of the Polish nation which tend toward greater Polish autonomy than is now the case.

To appreciate the scope of policy alternatives available to the United States in dealing with Poland, it is necessary to review the situation in three aspects: the changes in Poland occuring from World War II to the present; that part of coexistence policy devoted to strengthening the Soviet position in Poland as well as the rest of Eastern Europe; and those elements in the Polish nation tending to work in opposition to Soviet designs. Based on this assessment, the contention is that the United States can, over time, first check Soviet attainment of its goal in Poland and then work toward an evolution of the Polish situation favorable to the West. The policy means which suggest themselves are not those involving a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Under those circumstances the United States must be at a disadvantage in the foreseeable future. Instead, the means available should work to reinforce those factors in Poland tending to weaken the Soviet tie and strengthen the nation's historic orientation toward the West. In effect, the policy should seek to turn the coexistence strategy against its authors and move the competitive arena eastward. The means can be both political and economic, but the goals are political alone and seek to end the era in which the Soviet Union has tried to use the Polish bridge exclusively to project its power west.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Marian K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 90.

2. For examples of Soviet views on coexistence during and after the Khrushchev period, see *Kommunist*, January 1961, and *Pravda*, October 25, 1964, as cited in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), fn. p. 100. Soviet objectives under coexistence are discussed, for example, in Richard Pipes, ed., *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1976) and in "Detente: An Evaluation," *Survey* 20 (Spring-Summer 1974): 2. Richard Lowenthal elaborates on "antagonistic coexistence" in his "The Long Strain of Coexistence," *Survey* 22 (Summer-Autum 1976): 97.

3. The concept of ideological security is attributed to Richard Lowenthal by J. F. Brown in *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1975), p. v.

PREWAR AND POSTWAR BOUNDARIES OF POLAND

II

IN RETROSPECT

> With the Germans we will lose our freedom; with the Russians we will lose our soul.
>
> Edward Smigly-Rydz[1]

> Every base has its corresponding superstructure . . . If the base changes and is eliminated, then its superstructure changes and is eliminated after it. . . . The superstructure is generated by the base but this by no means signifies that it merely reflects the base . . . On the contrary, having put in an appearance, it then becomes a most active force which contributes vigorously to the formation and consolidation of its base (and) takes all steps to assist the new order to drive the old base and the former classes into the dust and liquidate them.
>
> Josef Stalin[2]

Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the last President of republican Poland, was noted neither for his statesmanship nor his literary ability. Yet, his words on the eve of World War II succinctly, almost poetically, convey the traditional Polish fear of Russian domination as threatening the foundation of Polish nationality in a way that German power could not. For his part, Stalin rationalized the technique by which Soviet power sought to achieve the result contemplated by the Polish leader. The history of modern Poland demonstrates that both men were wrong.

The Polish state overrun by Hitler's panzers in 1939 had been in existence just 20 years. Hardly an idyllic country, its industry was underdeveloped and its peasantry, the vast majority of the population, generally impoverished, particularly in the eastern third of the country. Its policies had been dominated until his death in 1935 by the charismatic but arbitrary Pilsudski at the head of a group of military comrades who undertook to continue his policies after his death. Outside the Pilsudski clique, political life in Poland was at best unrewarding for the right and hazardous for the left. Failure to establish constitutional democracy and durable parliamentary practices was doubly dangerous for the Poles. It denied them internal strength in a situation where their increasingly powerful neighbors to the east and west with some justification, considering the ethnographic issues, challenged the validity of their respective frontiers with Poland.

The interwar boundaries of the Polish state, generally described at Versailles in 1919 and formally defined by the Treaty of Riga in 1923, produced a historical anomaly that satisfied none of the parties involved. The new state conformed neither to the Piast tradition of the Middle Ages nor the later Jagellonian concept of statehood. The Piast state, a more compact ethnic whole, with a unitary government ruling the peoples of the Vistula, Warta, and Oder watersheds, had evolved into the Jagellonian federation of Poland and Lithuania, not ethnically united and exercising loose control over an area which for a time included the Ukraine as far east as Kiev, while the Germanic princes claimed the Oder lands to the west. Pilsudski was essentially Jagellonian in outlook, pressing his claim to the former eastern lands by invading the Ukraine in 1919 only to be forced back by the Red Army whose overextended force he then defeated a year later in a series of battles northeast of Warsaw. At this point the Riga negotiators settled on a Polish-Soviet frontier east of the Curzon Line along the Bug River, claimed by the Soviets, but short of Pilsudski's objectives in the east. The settlement here meant that much of eastern Poland was populated by non-Polish peoples, notably Ukrainians and Byelorussians, although the major cities, Wilno and Lwow, were largely Polish. At the same time, the nation's western frontier, giving access to the Baltic in accord with Allied commitments at Versailles, now encompassed a sizable German minority as part of the old Piast lands became Polish once more. The Soviet foreign minister, Chicherin, comtemplating the result characterized the new Poland as "a provisional entity" which either had to expand, or "be reduced to narrowest ethnographic limits."[3]

Whereas the boundaries of interwar Poland were determined in part by the efforts of the Poles themselves, the configuration of the postwar nation was decided by the major wartime allies. More precisely, the shape of modern Poland was Stalin's creation, attended without significant demurrer by Churchill and Roosevelt. As such, the important changes reflected Soviet interests. For the most part, the present eastern boundary follows the Curzon Line, permitting the Soviet regime to acquire control of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian peoples who lived outside prewar Soviet boundaries. In the west, the establishment of the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish frontier served Stalin's purposes by depriving Germany of one-fifth of its prewar territory and moving the forward edge of the Soviet defensive system to some 30 miles from Berlin. However, the recasting of Poland's frontiers had the effect of enhancing Polish unity and economic potential, which at best could have been of only indirect benefit to the Soviet Union. By transferring Polish refugees from the prewar eastern territories to the new lands in the west largely vacated by the former German majority, Poland

achieved greater ethnic unity than ever before in its history with an estimated 98 percent of its population now made up of native Poles.[4] Considering some 200 miles of Baltic seacoast, including three major ports, and all of the industrial region of Silesia within its new boundaries in place of the underdeveloped rural areas of the east, Poland had a sound basis for economic resurgence after the war.

While Western leaders in general acknowledged, and to a degree anticipated, Stalin's concept of postwar Poland's geographic configuration,[5] the allies parted company on the issue of who would rule Poland. Its foreign policy orientation to the east could be accepted; a communist-dominated government could not. Yet, for Stalin the Polish buffer must be both geographic and ideological. The problems facing Stalin in achieving this goal were major and numerous. He had, first of all and most obviously, to repel the German onslaught and then occupy Poland in the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive. Lest this seem a truism, it should be noted that Stalin's moves to adjust the Polish situation to his desires were begun in earnest only when the tide turned in his favor early in 1943. Second, democratic political power had to be eliminated. Third, he had to create a communist political faction.

The basis for a democratic government more liberal but equally as nationalistic as the Pilsudski regime existed in wartime Poland despite the horror of Nazi occupation. The underground government has been characterized as the most widespread and best organized of the wartime resistance movements in Europe. It maintained close ties with the exile government in London, and when the occasion demanded, was well enough armed to sieze control of Warsaw with little outside assistance and hold it for 2 months in the face of German counterattacks.

On the other hand, when the war began there was no Polish communist party either native or exile. Stalin himself had seen to that. The origins of the communist movement in Poland go back to the 19th century, and its history includes such notables as Roza Luxemburg and Feliks Dzierzynski. Nevertheless, for reasons that can only be surmised but which may have involved both internal and external political designs, Stalin in 1937 during the purges simply eliminated the Communist Workers Party of Poland, then resident in Moscow after its explusion from Poland by Pilsudski. The Polish party leadership was executed or sent to the labor camps where most of them died, and the party's name was deleted from the rolls of the Comintern.[6]

From this unbalanced position, Stalin fashioned a political group that achieved complete control of the Polish scene within 5 years. The

native Polish talent was provided by men such as Bierut and Gomulka who, fortunately for Stalin and themselves, were in Poland during the Stalinist purge, confined in many cases in Pilsudski's prisons. A group called the Union of Polish Patriots was formed in the Soviet Union, while Gomulka was one of the founders of the Polish Workers Party in occupied Poland. After changes in identity the Union of Polish Patriots, now the Committee of National Liberation, was installed in Lublin after the city was seized by the Soviet Army in the summer of 1944. By then the Polish Workers Party had joined its small group of resistance fighters with the far larger underground army of the democratic shadow regime. Here Stalin made the coup that tipped the balance irrevocably in his favor. As his armies reached the east bank of the Vistula, through his liberation radio station he urged the leaders of the underground army to join the offensive against the Germans. Faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to husband their strength for eventual resistance to the communists, possibly with assistance from the Western allies, or to sieze Warsaw and present the advancing Soviet forces with a fait accompli, the underground leaders with the concurrence of the London exile government chose the latter course. As is well known, the Soviet Army simply held on the east bank for the entire 2 months of the uprising, which in purely military terms provided them at no cost a bridgehead on the far shore from which to continue the offensive.[7] Furthermore, Stalin obstructed frantic allied efforts to resupply the underground army by air. When it was over in early October, the heroism of the Polish people had been reaffirmed, and the opposition to Stalin's political control of Poland was shattered.

As the war drew to a close in 1945, the National Liberation Committee at allied insistence was changed into a so-called Provisional Government of National Unity with representation from the exile London government including the prewar Peasant Party leader, Mikolajczyk. However, even this pro forma coalition was short-lived, and by mid-1947 Mikolajczyk had fled to the West after an election in which by coercion and intimidation the Polish Workers Party and its allies won over 80 percent of the vote. A year later the Stalinist consolidation of power was complete. The Socialist Party under its leader Cyrankiewicz, who had mastered the arts of survivorship and accommodation at the hard Nazi school of Auschwitz where he was confined during the war, joined the Polish Workers Party under its new name as the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). The only important opposition group, the Peasant Party, was splintered, its left faction disappearing in the PUWP, and its moderate elements continuing at communist sufferance as a powerless rump group. Finally, in 1948 and 1949 the PUWP itself was purged of those deemed unreliable, the most

important casualty being Gomulka. Leader of the "native" faction of the party, Gomulka was obviously a man with too much integrity to adopt the Moscow line without challenge, and had the effrontery in the leading Polish theoretical journal to subscribe to what became the Tito heresy of "separate roads to socialism."[8] In 1948 such a man could not be tolerated. Accordingly, Gomulka was dumped from the leadership and later placed under house arrest. His Polish comrades spared him a worse fate by refusing to bring him to trial despite Soviet pressure to do so. He was to wait 8 years before he was called again to serve the party.

In the 5 years Stalin lived after the consolidation of communist power in Poland, the country was, if independent in name, a Soviet dominion in fact. The Poles, even PUWP loyalists, were entrusted with little practical authority. Soviet officers served in all echelons of the armed forces whose chief was a Soviet marshal, Rokossovsky, Polish-born but a Soviet citizen and commander of the Soviet armies in Poland during the 1944 counteroffensive.[9] The Ministry of Interior and the secret police were under the charge of a former NKVD officer of Polish extraction,[10] and their ranks too were filled in great numbers by Soviet security personnel. The Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw was, in effect, Stalin's viceroy who transmitted Moscow's guidance and with whom local decisions had to be cleared.[11] The economy was developed on the "extensive," autarkic pattern suited perhaps to the Soviet Union with its vast resources but not amenable to a country with Poland's limitations compounded by severe wartime destruction. The Soviet Union complicated the resource problem still further by denying Poland about 95 percent of its postwar reparations from Germany and directing the export of Polish industrial goods to specified East European countries at prices far below the world market. In the case of the so-called "tribute coal" the price paid by the Soviet Union did not cover the cost of rail transportation from Silesian mines to its destination in the Ukraine. The net loss to Poland from all of these transactions cannot be precisely measured, but estimates place the figure near $2 billion.[12] As in the rest of Eastern Europe, the period saw a concerted effort to produce a "base" reflecting its Stalinist "superstructure."

The Stalinist system could not long survive him. His death released currents in Eastern Europe which in Hungary led to true revolution and in Poland to a sharp rise in national autonomy and a corresponding decline in overt Soviet control. In both countries the crisis came in October 1956. In Hungary the Soviet reaction was armed repression. In Poland the Soviet leadership grudgingly acquiesced when it became apparent that the national leadership had not lost control but merely altered course.

The year 1956 saw the growth in exponential degree of a broadly based Polish protest against the Stalinist system. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in January and his acknowledgement of the previous year of the validity of Tito's "separate road" concept added a new dimension. If the Soviet leaders had a different vision of the future than did Stalin, surely Poles were entitled to reassess their own situation. The intelligentsia, even previously devout communists, challenged what were clearly the dehumanizing aspects of Polish life—repression of opinion, the drabness of life in a forced draft industrial state, and the loss of identity with Polish tradition.[13] Economists meeting in Warsaw under government sponsorship used the occasion to criticize centralized direction of the economy and recommend greater reliance on market conditions in economic planning.[14] Finally, the industrial working force, angered by unrealistic production norms, the ineptness of local managers, and the scarcity of consumer goods, took to the streets, first in Poznan in June and later in other industrial centers including Warsaw itself. To compound the growing instability arising from widespread protest, the PUWP found itself leaderless at a critical juncture. Bierut, who stage-managed the Stalinization of Poland and then demonstrated his acumen in adjusting to the post-Stalin thaw, died in March. His replacement, Ochab, had Moscow's confidence initially but was unable to prevent the growing split between Stalinists and their more liberal party colleagues.

In this situation, which reached crisis proportions in October, Gomulka was recalled from domestic exile and took charge. He was the only choice. He credentials as a communist were unimpeachable, making him acceptable to all but the most confirmed Stalinists and, importantly, to the Soviet leadership as well. His program of liberalization, by responding to national sentiment, made him acceptable to the nation at large, which remembered as well his courageous defiance of Stalin at the apogee of the latter's power.

The history of Gomulka's regime, lasting some 14 years, is an account of growing conservatism, a gradual turning aside from a boldly chosen path. His acceptance by both party and nation grew cold as he showed neither the organizational skill to mold the party in his own image nor the dedication to national goals to compel him to pursue them in the direction he began. Perceived as a national communist in 1956, he reached the stage where his continuance in office could be managed only with Soviet support. When it was withdrawn, he fell. The entire story has been summarized in the term "recompression."

At the outset, Gomulka placed the Polish party in a position

between the Polish nation and the Soviet leadership, as the advocate of national grievances against Soviet domination. He was able to negotiate the withdrawal of most Soviet forces and the conditions under which the remainder would continue to be stationed in Poland. As written, this agreement could serve well as a model status of forces accord with expressed safeguards against intervention in Poland's internal affairs and assurances of agreement by both parties as a condition for deploying or otherwise changing the status of Soviet forces in Poland.[15] At the same time, Gomulka won the right to send home the thousands of Soviet military officers and security officials and return the armed forces and security services to Polish control. Rokossovsky was accordingly "relieved" of his post as Minister of Defense, gave up his seat on the PUWP Politburo and departed. Thus ended overt Soviet control of and participation in defense and internal security affairs, a Stalinist vestige that has not been reintroduced.

Gomulka's political programs attempted to maintain party authority while relaxing the bounds of political expression. The old Stalinist rules were set aside almost overnight in 1956, but then were gradually reinstituted in somewhat different guise as Gomulka perceived a continuing challenge to party dominance. Literary journals, permitted at first to publish a wide variety of opinion generally critical of party policy, were either closed or pressured to tone down their critical content. Procedures in the *Sejm* or Polish parliament were changed to permit open debate on proposed programs and the introduction of legislation by individual members. Although these rules have remained in effect, the party has been increasingly careful in selecting reliable candidates to stand for election, even for those seats in the nonparty blocs which make up some 40 percent of the membership. The industrial workers who demanded and got the right in 1956 to participate in enterprise management through the medium of Workers' Councils found that right to be short-lived. By 1958 the role played by the Workers' Councils had been assigned to the trade union organization which, in classic communist style, serves not as a forum for important discussion but rather as a "transmission belt" for party policy. Finally, within the party hierarchy the men who favored the liberal approach, many of them old colleagues of Gomulka, found themselves eased out of responsible positions dealing with matters such as the economy and public education. In such cases their replacements were conservatives, often veterans of the Bierut period. In all these aspects of political life, what windows Gomulka opened in 1956 he found himself driven to close within the next 10 years.

The recompression in Polish political life had its parallel in the vital area of economics. Here Gomulka's concern for party authority com-

pounded his lack of expertise in economic affairs. He seems to have been uncomfortable with theory and unwilling to accept rationalization of the economy if the measures recommended by Polish economists risked infringement of party control. Furthermore, the economic planners themselves could not agree on specific measures to be taken. Summoned by Gomulka early in 1957 to develop a plan for the economic reform, they divided themselves into those who felt that centralized economic planning could be made to work efficiently and those who proposed what amounted to "market socialism." Neither group's view prevailed. The central planners could not overcome the objection that their program would perpetuate a Stalinist economy. The adherents of market pricing stood accused of abandoning socialism in favor of a capitalist economy.[16] The compromise chosen permitted some decentralization of management but retained basic pricing controls at the highest level. In addition, Gomulka dropped the previous regime's collectivization drive but made no effort to increase investment in private agriculture in such badly needed commodities as mechanized equipment and fertilizer. In effect, the new rules of the economic game were inflationary and could produce neither real growth nor stability. By 1959, after a poor harvest, things began to come apart. Wages had risen as managers oversubscribed wage plans. Meat was in short supply because of the poor harvest as were consumer goods because of overinvestment in heavy industry. Fearing a replay of the 1956 riots, Gomulka changed his party specialists in economic affairs, bringing back many of those who were in charge before 1956. For the next 10 years the performance of the Polish economy was the poorest in Eastern Europe, with the lowest growth rate and a negligible increase in real wages.

The decade of the 1960's, in which Gomulka turned away from both political and economic reform, also saw an increasing challenge to his authority within the party from three separate groups, each with a base of support in the nation as a whole. The liberals or "revisionists" drew heavily on the students and intelligentsia who remembered October 1956 and resented what they considered Gomulka's repudiation of the "Polish way" to socialism. The conservatives or "Partisans" cultivated, and in fact ran, the national veterans organization and controlled the security services as well. The economic "pragmatists" tended to be based in specific regions of the country, professed little interest in the ideology, but relied instead on practical regional solutions to regional problems, thereby winning the support of managers and workers alike.

Of the three opposition elements, Gomulka successfully dealt with only one—the revisionist faction. Leading revisionist theoreticians,

despite solid party credentials, were denied the right to publish, were eased out of party bodies, or both. Under pressure from the Partisan group and apparently with the tacit consent of the pragmatists, Gomulka authorized[17] the anti-Zionist campaign of 1967-68. Ostensibly derived from the official party policy against Israel, stemming from the Israeli victory over Arab forces in the 1967 war, the campaign featured acts of intimidation and official coercion directed against Poland's small Jewish minority. The unsavory memories of Tsarist and Nazi pogroms were stirred up, including the canard that his religion alone prevented a Jew from being a loyal Polish citizen. Specific targets were many of the leading revisionists who happened to be Jews. At about the same time, early 1968, the Warsaw students demonstrated in protest against the closing of a patriotic play by the authorities because of its anti-Russian overtones. These demonstrations were roughly handled by the police, resulting in arrests not only of student participants but of sympathetic faculty members as well. By the middle of 1968 the revisionist group was quiet, its literary voices gagged, its leading student supporters in jail, and its political leadership discredited and out of office.

Having countenanced the repression of the relatively weak liberal wing of the party, Gomulka now faced the Partisan faction which apparently tried to isolate him within the party in late 1968. He overcame this challenge primarily because of strong support from the Soviet hierarchy. Although his regime began with a showdown with Khrushchev, Gomulka from the beginning made it clear to the Polish people that his program would fail without Soviet support.[18] As the years passed, Gomulka assumed the role of one of Moscow's most reliable allies. He took the Soviet side in the dispute with Mao Tse-tung, backed Soviet policy in the Middle East, especially after the 1967 war which he turned to his advantage in domestic politics, and finally, in his actions in the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis, played an important part in the Soviet decision to intervene. In each case it could be argued that Gomulka's position did not conform to Polish national or even party interests. A more moderate stance short of open opposition to Moscow would have been more in accord with his stated position in 1956. But the Soviet leaders seem to have accepted Gomulka, 1968 version, as a true believer and backed him against the Partisans whose conservative views had less appeal because of their distinct nationalist coloration. As a result, at the PUWP Congress in November 1968, Gomulka for the first time was able to form a clear majority of his own men in the Politburo and Secretariat.

The year 1970 did not begin as a year of transition in Poland. Gomulka's position within the party seemed stronger than it ever had

been, thanks to the Soviet Union which acknowledged his previous support by awarding him the Order of Lenin on his 65th birthday in February. His declining prestige with the Polish nation seemed revivified by his successful negotiations with the German Federal Republic which resulted in recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's legitimate western boundary. Only the skeptical could point out that even here Gomulka seemed to follow the Soviet lead after its own positive response to the FRG *Ostpolitik.*

Despite Gomulka's outwardly secure position at the end of 1970, his credit with his party and his country had in fact run out. In late December, shipyard workers in the Baltic ports demonstrated against new wage and price regulations which threatened to freeze, or even cut, take-home pay while raising prices on consumer goods and food, particularly meat, by as much as 30 percent. The demonstrations quickly turned violent and led to ransacking and burning local party headquarters. As in 1968 against the students, the government used force, including army units, to stop the disturbances, thereby aggravating what was already a serious problem. Worse still, sympathy demonstrations and strikes broke out in other industrial cities, including Warsaw, during the first 2 months of 1971.

At this point with his leadership on the line, Gomulka became ill and was unable to defend his actions at the PUWP Central Committee meeting hastily called to deal with the crisis. Even had he been present he might not have survived. His absence surely prevented his continuing in office. As it was, his opponents took to the floor and assailed his policies against the objections of only a few of his supporters, the rest of whom apparently said little. With the support of the Partisans, Gierek, the foremost pragmatist, was named First Secretary and assumed direction of Poland's future.

The change in regime at the end of 1970 has importnat similarities with the 1956 crisis and equally significant differences. The sum of these comparisons tells much about the direction and distance over which Poland had moved in the intervening 14 years. Most important among the similarities in terms of rapid stabilization of the situation was the ready availability of an alternative leader who had broad support within party councils and in the nation at large. Gomulka's record as a wartime resistance leader and his defiance of Stalin provided him backing among the nation and was an important factor in party judgments. Gierek was seen both in and outside the party as a tough, capable administrator who made Silesia the only important success on Poland's economic scene. These qualities in both men bore on the

second important similarity, the economic crisis. Gomulka, author of the "separate road" theory in the Polish context, was the man to take charge of changing a Stalinist economy to one more responsive to Polish needs. Gierek, the proven manager, was ready and able to straighten out the system which was bearing down too heavily on workers and consumers without the usual justification of overall success in industrial development. Finally, both men, when their times came, proved acceptable to the Soviet Union. Gomulka in 1956 successfully demonstrated that his opposition to Soviet authority was not in principle, but rather in degree, that he was in fact a loyal communist, and that his proposed reforms were similar in spirit to those under consideration in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. This is not to say his arguments would have been as persuasive with the Brezhnev leadership, but they passed muster in 1956, especially in contrast to the truly radical program of the unfortunate Nagy in Hungary. In Gierek's case the Soviet leaders seem to have accepted the Polish events as a fait accompli with no implications for a decrease in party authority or shift in relationships with the Soviet Union. They simply changed their bet from Gomulka, now suddenly an obvious loser, to a stronger, younger contender who was the apparent winner. In the land of the "unperson" such things become a matter of course.

The differences between 1956 and 1970 revolve around the matter of national content. As perceived by the Polish people, the 1956 situation was "we"—the Poles—against "them"—the Russians. The historic currents of antipathy to the Russian overlord ran strong, even in the party itself. The 1970 events did not uncover this nationalistic strain. The focus of the opposition was on the party hierarchy; the problems were seen as internal, albeit serious enough to send the workers into the streets. This fundamental difference was reflected in the absence of a clearcut factional dispute in 1970 as there had been in 1956 between Stalinists and the more liberal group which eventually prevailed. Furthermore, the intelligentsia, who tend to be more sensitive to national tradition, sat out the 1970 protest in contrast to the leading role they played in 1956. Admittedly, after their battering in the 1968 controversy over anti-Zionism, the writers and students may have been wary of becoming involved, but the attitude seems to have been one of wait-and-see. Finally, the initial Soviet reaction to events in 1956 was, to say the least, one of disapproval, whereas in 1970 they seem to have been satisfied to certify the winner. As noted earlier, Khrushchev came around to support Gomulka, but the initial response was a strenuous effort to maintain the status quo. Gomulka's achievement in 1956 was to convince the Polish people that he would improve their lot while eventually assuring Khrushchev that the change could be encompassed within mutually tolerable limits.

In short, the direct sponsorship of the party by the Soviet Union as its agent in Poland was the issue of 1956 and was protested by the nation and, increasingly, by elements within the party itself. In 1970, Soviet sponsorship and support were, while real, not glaringly apparent. The party, because of its inherent deficiencies, was seen to be the cause of such down-to-earth hardships as the high coast of meat. Therefore, it was up to the party to correct the situation. There was no longer a Soviet scapegoat. For this reason, the 1970 challenge of the workers was more fundamental to party authority and accordingly more dangerous than that in 1956, because the margin for error was reduced.

True to his reputation as a man who could get things done, Gierek moved quickly, backed by his new mandate to get the Polish economy on track. The price rise protests continued even after he took office, but he was able to cut back on meat prices and announce a freeze on further changes, primarily because of a hard currency loan from the Soviet Union.[19] This got him over his immediate problem, and he moved to longer-range objectives. His economic program was keyed to the consumer, and early decisions changed investment ratios, heretofore heavily weighted in favor of the producer goods sector of industry. Wages were allowed to rise as greater authority in this area was delegated to industrial managers. To provide the initial surge of consumer goods required to keep prices in balance, he turned to the West for imports, at the same time liberalizing export procedures. To improve agricultural production, the practice of compulsory state deliveries was abandoned, thereby allowing individual peasants to move all of their products into the open market. In addition, Gierek increased agricultural investment funds and extended national health services to cover the rural population. Although these measures did not comprise a real reform of the national economy, they produced immediate results as national income and real wages increased markedly over the first 5 years of the Gierek regime. Nonetheless, as will be seen, fundamental problems remain.

The second factor in Gierek's program stood in sharp contrast to a fundamental failing in Gomulka's leadership. In his 14 years as party leader, Gomulka never really ensured his institutional base by exerting absolute control over the composition of the party hierarchy. He seemed to rely on his prestige to carry the day in intraparty disputes rather than reducing any potential opposition to token representation. That this placed a severe handicap on his ability to govern is illustrated by the rise of the Partisan faction in the late 1960's. Gierek had no such illusions. Armed with the initial success of his economic measures, he rebuilt the Politburo and Central Committee to his liking. The Partisan

leaders fell from the Politburo and Secretariat first, followed by the few pro-Gomulka holdovers. The latter group included the nimble Cyrankiewicz, whose facility in choosing the winning team deserted him at the last. The new party leadership as a group were young pragmatists whose experience was almost entirely derived from the postwar development of the country and whose newfound prominence was owed entirely to Gierek.

The third element in Gierek's program had as its objective the assertion of tighter party control over various aspects of national life. Chief among these measures was the reconstruction of public administration which put party representatives clearly in charge at even the lowest level, streamlined the administrative process by removing one echelon and, not the least important, made it difficult for a regional political baron to establish a power base from which he could challenge central authority. Because Gierek himself had enjoyed such a position during Gomulka's regime, he must have been aware of its potential threat to his own newly assumed leadership. In any event, the traditional regional organization of province-district-locality lost its middle layer. The number of provinces and separately organized major cities more than doubled while the number of local entities was reduced by nearly 60 percent. In each of the provinces and local units the party chief became, ex officio, the head of the People's Council. Before this change the People's Councils had elected their own chairmen, and, with membership running well over half from outside the party, the councils, particularly at the lowest level, had quasi-democratic legitimacy which Gierek summarily terminated. To round out the overt party-government connection Gierek had himself named Chairman of the Council of State, the titular head of state position, not held by the party leader since Bierut's day. In these, and related but less sweeping measures, Gierek has certified that, as he has said, "the (party) directs and the government implements."[20]

Despite Gierek's carefully worked out program and its initial success in the crucial economic sector, supplemented by foreign achievements such as improved relations and expanded trade with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, certain aspects of party policy have met popular resistance. Price rises in 1974 and 1976 led to demonstrations in several cities, not on the 1956 or 1970 scale, but serious enough to result in jail sentences in the 1976 instance. On one important issue public resentment forced Gierek to give ground. The problem arose when, in 1975, the draft of the revised national constitution was published. As written, the revision seemed to many to express an unwarranted degree of Polish allegiance to the Soviet Union

and attribute publicly a dominant role to the party. Regardless of the realities of the Polish situation, the nation at large resented their expression in the constitution. Seeing the scope of this protest, conveyed through nonviolent means such as parliamentary debate and articles in otherwise docile journals of opinion, the party leadership softened the offending paragraphs, and a revised draft was passed by the parliament.

With this necessarily general review of the recent Polish past it should be clear that Poland has not thus far lost "her soul" as Smigly-Rydz feared. Neither has the Stalinist base-superstructure relationship been perfectly realized. At the same time, present social and political relationships are not frozen. Rather, they show a potential for considerable instability because they involve fundamental antipathies which cannot be permanently repressed or disregarded. It is necessary then to discuss the potential for change in Poland.

ENDNOTES

1. Cited in Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 39.

2. Cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 105.

3. Material for this paragraph, including quote by Chicherin, drawn largely from Hans Roos, *A History of Modern Poland* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 47-97.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

5. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973*, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 352-354.

6. The 1937 purge of the CWPP is described in both Marian K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 149-154; and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 433.

7. Those with lingering doubts about the use of the Soviet Army as a political instrument should read General Eisenhower's evaluation of the *military* value of the Warsaw bridgehead based on his personal observation of the site in 1945; Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948), p. 177.

8. Gomulka's crime in Stalin's eyes must have been capital. Challenging the ideology and not simply Soviet direction of it, he attacked revolution, single-party control, and total state control of the economy as unnecessary in the Polish context; discussed in Richard Hiscocks *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss?* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 113-118.

9. The number of Soviet officers serving in the Polish armed forces until 1956 has been put at 17,000 in Richard F. Staar, *The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 2d ed. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1971), p. 231. This number would represent about half the officer corps at that time.

10. Stanislaw Radkiewicz, who escaped the Pilsudski regime and served in the NKVD 1931-1941; one of the first casualties of the post-Stalin "thaw," he lost his post as Minister of Security in 1954 and his Politburo seat in 1955; Oscar Halecki, ed., *East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Poland* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 530.

11. Brzezinski, *Soviet Bloc*, p. 118.

12. Soviet Union postwar economic demands on Poland are spelled out in greater detail in Halecki, *Poland*, pp. 258-261, 463-464, and Hiscocks, *Poland*, pp. 128-129.

13. The most notable single statement to this effect was Adam Wazyk's *Poem for Adults*, discussed in Hiscocks *Poland*, pp. 176-177. For English translation see Paul E. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 40-48.

14. The Second Congress of Economists, June 7-10, 1956 was marked by intense discussion of Poland's economic ills in which theoreticians with solid party credentials, e.g., Lange, Lipinski, Brus, and Bronislaw Minc, mounted a far-ranging attack on the Stalinist system; see John M. Montias, *Central Planning In Poland* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 266-268.

15. Joint Soviet-Polish communique listing basic elements of the agreement in Zinner, *National Communism*, pp. 312-313.

16. Montias, *Central Planning*, pp. 272-307, goes into detail on the opposing views summarized here and the resulting compromise embodied in the so-called "Theses" which found their way into law and regulation during 1957-1959.

17. The intraparty pressures leading to the anti-Zionist campaign cannot be described in detail here. Even if space permitted, it would be difficult to judge Gomulka's motives, although the writer does not believe the campaign could have proceeded over his opposition. See, for example, Dziewanowski, *Communist Party*, pp. 296-301.

18. See, for example, Gomulka's address to the citizens of Warsaw, October 24, 1956, in Zinner, *National Communism*, pp. 270-277. Adam Bromke has characterized the Gomulka approach as "the triumph of political realism" in *Poland's Politics*, pp. 86-103.

19. The cause-and-effect relationship of the Soviet loan and the eventual price reduction is discussed in Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Economic Approach," *Problems of Communism* 21 (September-October 1972): 22-23.

20. Quoted in Richard F. Staar, "Poland: The Price of Stability," *Current History* 70 (March 1976): 103.

III

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE: "SOCIALIST UNITY"

> . . . in the present conditions, far from diminishing, the need for unity and the closest cooperation among socialist countries has become even greater. Today we require unity, cooperation and joint action chiefly in order to accomplish more quickly and effectively the tasks of developing socialist society and building communism . . . .
>
> Leonid Brezhnev[1]

> The dynamic development of the countries of the socialist community and the tightening of links between them raise the strength and heighten the position of the entire socialist community. The community's power and ideological unity, the close cooperation between its member countries, in particular with its leading power—the Soviet Union—are the basic guarantees of success of each of our peoples.
>
> Edward Gierek[2]

For the purpose of this discussion, change in Poland is related to the fundamental question of change in the present degree of autonomy of the Polish state. In this instance the word *autonomy* is preferred to *independence.* It would seem that autonomy gets to the heart of the problem of Poland's future, whereas independence does not. In every legal respect Poland is an independent state fully in charge of its own future. As we have seen, legal independence in the case of Poland is not synonymous with the complete autonomy normally associated with national sovereignty. The difference seems more than semantic. Soviet authorities describe a nonindependent entity as an "autonomous republic." In so doing they avoid the connotation of independence, which is certainly not meant to be inferred, but preserve the fiction of self-control in the word "autonomous" in a classic double-think exercise. For Poland the issue of change refers less to its legal independence, although conceivably that could change as it has in the past, and more to the degree of real control, or autonomy, that Poles in the future will experience.

In theory, Poland's future could be identified with either of two extreme cases relative to her orientation to the East or West. In the extreme orientation to the East, Poland, again theoretically, could be

absorbed in the Soviet Union as a Soviet Republic, as were the Baltic states in 1940. In such an absorption, the identity of the independent Polish state would be lost, regardless of what legal camouflage the Soviet Union might devise. Furthermore, given the disproportion of Soviet power vis-a-vis Poland we could assume that the concurrent loss of autonomy would be involuntary. To argue otherwise means accepting the future existence of a vastly different Soviet Union and Polish nation from what we know today.

At the other extreme, Poland could find itself absorbed in the Western community. In contrast to the first extreme case, an orientation to the West should strengthen and expand Poland's autonomy. There would, in this case, be the surrender of that degree of autonomy necessary to function in an interdependent world, for example, as a full member of the European Economic Community. But such loss of autonomy would be specialized and voluntary compared to the general, involuntary loss of autonomy in the previous instance. This outcome proceeds from an assumption that Western Europe does not at some future time permit the re-creation of a Hitlerian Reich or Napoleonic Empire.

Poland today finds itself then somewhere between a state of full autonomy as a member of the Western community and a nonautonomous existence as a Soviet republic. Its present position is, as we have seen for valid historical reasons, toward the Soviet end of the range between extremes. Despite some recent hopeful signs such as increased trade with the West, it is argued here that the tendency for change at present points to movement toward, but not necessarily as far as, integration in the Soviet Union. Further, it is argued that this tendency, as one would expect, is the result of Soviet policy. There are, of course, countervailing forces at work in Polish society which will be examined presently. For the moment, the requirement is to assess the thrust and development of Soviet policy.

The bases of a Soviet policy for the closer integration of Eastern Europe are partly historic insofar as they descend from the Tsarist requirement to secure the western frontiers of Russia, which then included large parts of the present East European border nations. Strengthening this historic Tsarist policy is the Soviet effort to impose ideological conformity over the same region as a means of doubling its ties to Moscow and of advancing the proletarian revolution beyond Soviet borders. It was not until final victory in World War II that the Soviet Union was able fully to implement its policy. Only then was the balance of forces in the region clearly weighted in its favor.

Stalin's postwar concept, as testified to by his actions in Eastern Europe, emphasized the direct tie of each state to the Soviet Union. By 1948 he had orchestrated the situation in each nation to achieve political uniformity and conformity to the orthodox Soviet view. Only Tito was outside the system and then primarily because he was cast out by Stalin as a nonconformist. Furthermore, this political community was isolated from the West at Stalin's direction. The reasons for his decision in favor of isolation are part of the argument between conventional and revisionist historians of the period and need not concern us here. The evidence is that such actions as the rejection of Marshall Plan aid by Poland and Czechoslovakia were at Soviet direction[3] and that their effort was to isolate Eastern Europe.

Paradoxically, the economic side of Soviet integration policy appeared to work at cross-purposes. On closer examination the pattern makes sense in terms of Stalin's objectives. The apparent paradox was that East European economic development in Stalin's time was directed toward both self-sufficiency or autarky and support of the effort to rebuild the Soviet economy. Whereas the demand to assist in Soviet reconstruction is clearly a step toward integration in the economic context, the autarkic development drive in each country related not to economic integration but rather to political orthodoxy. Based on Soviet experience, the orthodox communist leader was bound to proceed with a high-capital industrialization program under the so-called "extensive" concept in which all aspects of basic producer goods industries were built up simultaneously. Thus the industrialization of Eastern Europe proceeded, irrationally perhaps from the point of economic integration, but completely logically in the context of rigid ideological conformity.

The dual demand to support Soviet reconstruction and to industrialize fell on a region which was underdeveloped to begin with. The low prewar base was diminished yet further by wartime destruction and Soviet "removals," the postwar transfer of plant equipment and goods to the Soviet Union without compensation. The effect of all this, since Western aid was ruled out, was to create an economic dependence on the Soviet Union that promised to continue long after the end of Soviet dependence on Eastern Europe for assistence in reconstruction.

During this period the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON, came into being, ostensibly as a communist counterpart to the economic assistance effort in Western Europe led by the United States. In fact, at its inception COMECON involved primarily Soviet management of bilateral trade with the other member nations rather than multilateral trade among several members. In most cases the trade

was on a barter basis, and the exchanges tended to be valued below the world market and in favor of the Soviet Union. There was, of course, trade among East European states, but it too was largely bilateral, barter trade because no nation was able to finance a negative trade balance. All available capital was needed for industrial development.

However, COMECON was not the only means of control over the economic development of Eastern Europe. The interparty tie between each nation and Moscow ensured that basic concepts were uniform. More important, there was apparently detailed supervision in the development of national plans. The Six-Year Plan (1950-1955) in Poland, after being prepared in Warsaw, was altered substantially by Soviet economic planners, because the draft plan did not suit Soviet requirements.[4]

It may be asked why Stalinist integration policy did not envisage ultimate incorporation of the East European states into the Soviet Union. In the first place, there is no evidence that complete integration was not Stalin's ultimate goal, one which his death in 1953 denied him. Certainly there was a few anomalies in the system, such as the lagging Polish effort to collectivize, but in 5 years each country had been made over into something very like a miniature Soviet Union. Stalin's ambassadors in the various capitals were involved in day-to-day operations of the respective governments to which they were accredited. Soviet officers were integrated into national armies and, particularly important, the security services. In almost all cases, the party chief also headed the government, and after the local purges in 1947-1949, in which, for example, Gomulka was fired in Poland, these men were typified by their complete reliability and loyalty to Stalin. Finally, the isolation of the region was, for all practical purposes, complete. There were, however, two factors which could have given Stalin pause. For one, he may have been unwilling to make such a radical move in the face of Western opposition. He had, after all, annexed the Baltic states in 1940 when the West was in mortal danger of complete defeat by the Nazis and simply unable to prevent Stalin's act. There were no such preoccupations for the West 10 years later, and Stalin had no guarantee that annexation would not lead to war when he was still trying to recover from a near defeat. The other factor may well have been the cyclic recurrence of national problems within the Soviet Union, particularly acute immediately after the war in the Ukraine. It is not unlikely that at the time of his death Stalin believed it was neither desirable nor practical to add to his nationalities problem by absorbing nearly 100 million Poles, Hungarians, and other similarly fractious peoples. In effect, he may well have felt that the situation as it existed in 1953

provided the best of both worlds—lock-step loyalty without a magnified nationalities problem.

The Khrushchev era saw the end of the rigidity and isolation imposed on Eastern Europe by the Stalinist system and a consequent increase in the autonomy of the separate states. Nevertheless, Soviet policy on integration, at first seemingly relaxed, persisted through the employment of more sophisticated techniques suitable in an increasingly complex world. The "separate roads to socialism" concept embodied in Khrushchev's rapproachement with Tito in 1955 at first seemed to indicate a nearly complete uncoupling of the Stalinist system. Eastern Europe might ultimately resemble a confederation in which the lesser members duly acknowledged Soviet power but had considerable autonomy. Such was not to be. The Polish and Hungarian events together defined the tolerable limits. The authority of a ruling communist party was not to be challenged. Furthermore, despite easing the more objectionable Stalinist constraints, such as terror and overt Soviet presence within the national government, the Soviet party was to remain the acknowledged leader and guide at least in Eastern Europe. Within that context local parties were free to adopt local solutions to local problems, specifically in the economy, so long as the solutions could be bent to fit the ideology. On this basis, Gomulka could abandon Poland's halfhearted collectivization program and experiment with a degree of managerial decentralization, but he could not allow private peasants to accrue large farms competitive with the state farms or establish a market economy. Such programs would have been clearly outside the ideological pale because of their potential impact on central party control.

Within the new multipolar context, Khrushchev turned to different types of integrative devices than those favored by Stalin. If the integrative policy continued, there seems to have been an attempt to rationalize that policy in terms of the national interest of all parties involved and justify it to the outside world, particularly to the new nations as the West would likely remain skeptical. Despite this new face, the revised techniques still embodied central Soviet control and direction.

In the economic area, as he was wont to do, Khrushchev in 1962 unrolled a widely ambitious scheme. His plan was to set up within COMECON a "supranational" planning authority which would be charged with developing a COMECON economic plan incorporating all the national plans of the separate states including the Soviet Union. The Leninist image of the hungry man "absorbing" the bread must have occurred to all the East European economists when this proposal was

unveiled. After some 15 years of autarkic development and directed trade with the Soviet Union, each nation was, in effect, to become part of the Soviet Union's current five-year plan. However logical such a plan might have been when all of Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union was prostrate after the war, in 1962 the various national economies had developed to the degree that Khrushchev's plan was an affront. Because the COMECON charter allowed a single nation to veto a Council proposal, Khrushchev's plan was shelved when Romania objected. Hence a Soviet device to protect its interests against action by the majority of the lesser East European states was used to scuttle supranational planning for the time being.[5] But the thrust of the Soviet policy had been clear and was to be taken up again under Khrushchev's successors.

The other major Soviet policy device addressed military security and political control. This was the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Here there was no procedural out for the East European states as existed in COMECON. At Soviet direction they entered into an ostensibly defensive alliance countering NATO and, more importantly, a rearmed West Germany. The effect of the Warsaw Pact was to mirror NATO in that it established a Political Consultative Council, involving heads of government, and a Joint Command. Thereby the Soviet Union opened up formal channels for the directed coordination of external political as well as military affairs. The direction by the Soviet Union was particularly evident in the military area because the Soviet Marshal Konev was designated the first WTO commander, and his successors have all been Soviet officers.

With the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the links between the Soviet Union and its East European clients became formal and official at three levels: head of government, economic, and military. The overall effect of the Khrushchev years had been to move the East European nations along the autonomy range away from Stalinist integration but not very far toward the degree of autonomy enjoyed by states in the West.

The current Soviet leadership under Brezhnev has given evidence of a new approach to the integration of Eastern Europe. Now reduced with the defection of Albania, out of reach and unimportant, to six states, the Soviet clients have experienced new and different pressures to conform. These pressures on the part of the Soviet Union have been exerted in an increasingly polycentric world where Moscow's ideological leadership has been renounced by Peking and challenged by the Eurocommunist policies of the major nonruling parties in the West. At

the same time, the Soviet Union has found itself forced to break its economic isolation from the West to satisfy the needs of modern industrial development. These factors have demanded that the Soviet Union be as certain as possible of its foremost clients. Yet the policy of integration of Eastern Europe needs to be more sophisticated, more complex if it is to succeed. There is evidence that this is the case and, further, that the policy has resulted in some success, with the result that movement along the autonomy range is not toward liberalization as it was to some degree during the Khrushchev era, but instead trends toward integration.

The Brezhnev effort seeks to strengthen two sets of relationships in Eastern Europe: relations between the Soviet center and the client states and those among the client states themselves. The ideological vehicle on which this policy moves is proletarian internationalism. This thesis has been developed and pronounced by the Soviet Union to redefine the relationship of communist states with Moscow and among each other. Its practical effect is to skirt the ideological mine field of "separate roads to socialism" laid down by Tito, Gomulka, and others and sanctioned by Khrushchev. Its thrust, accordingly, is centripetal rather than centrifugal and forms an important part of the after-the-fact justification of the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

A vital part of the Brezhnev policy has been to ratify the postwar boundaries in Eastern Europe. This effort has two effects. First, it settles the line of division between the Soviet Union and its clients on the one hand and the rest of Europe on the other. Second, it settles the boundaries between East European states themselves. Of particular importance here are the border between Hungary and Romania, the Oder-Neisse line, and the western boundaries of the Soviet Union; but to some degree almost every other international border within Eastern Europe changed after the war. The result of this effort, of course, is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the agreement signed in Helsinki in 1975.

As did Khrushchev, the present Soviet leadership has used the WTO and COMECON as important integrative devices. The Soviet control over the WTO was subject to its most serious overt challenge in 1966 when the Romanians proposed, among other things, that the post of joint commander be rotated among the Pact nations.[6] The solution to the problem raised by this demand was embodied in the Soviet counter-proposal to expand the role of Pact coordinating bodies at the policy and operational levels. The new staff alignments were not finally put in effect until 1969 and resulted in the formation of a Council of Defense

Ministers and a Military Council. The former body is advisory to the Political Consultative Council, the latter to the joint commander. East European officers continue to serve as titular deputy chiefs of staff to the Soviet chief of the joint staff. This bureaucratic rejiggering provides the appearance of greater participation of the East European states in the WTO policy, command, and staff processes. However, the central flow of authority remains safely in Soviet control with the added benefit of opening new channels for interdependent action among the client states. The basis of this interdependence is found not only in the WTO structure but in the underlying network of bilateral mutual security treaties among all the member states including the Soviet Union.[7]

Probably the most convincing evidence in assessing the control of the WTO exercise by the Soviet Union can be found in its structure and equipment. Not only does the Soviet army provide the commander and, as a practical matter, the entire joint staff, it also takes sole responsibility for the combat service support organization and the air defense function. Nuclear warheads and most nuclear delivery systems except some short-range battlefield types are Soviet-controlled. Finally, the equipage of East European forces in the WTO lags roughly one generation behind that of frontline Soviet units. Ironically, Soviet reequipping of Syrian and Egyptian forces after the 1973 Middle East war provided those armies with newer equipment types, particularly tanks and air defense missilry, than those in service at the time in East European armies.[8]

The Brezhnev integration policy in economic affairs has relied heavily on vitalizing COMECON, an effort that began in earnest about 1971. Soviet concern at that time seems to have centered on three factors.[9] First, the economic measures taken by the various East European regimes, while difficult to categorize as reforms, had a disruptive impact on the East European community. For the most part, national economic programs had not been coordinated within the COMECON group and tended to degrade the system of bilateral trade connections. Second, there was the growing power of the EEC, then due to expand to 14 nations, including associates. Third, was the increasing momentum of detente. Taken together these factors could fragment COMECON and replace its internal ties by the historic Western trading connections most of the East European states had before World War II. The Czechoslovak case in 1968 gave proof, among other things, of the seriousness of this potential change in its impact on Soviet hegemony.

The solution could not ignore the importance of trade with the West. Stalinist isolation was long obsolete. Instead, the effort was,

through COMECON, to establish interdependence formally and thereby strengthen existing ties. The details were worked out over the period 1971 to 1975 and ratified by the member states at the 29th Council Session in Budapest. All member states approved procedures to develop a COMECON economic plan. Unlike the Khrushchev concept of supranationalism, the new procedures involved planning measures of interstate economic cooperation only. Each nation would continue its own national planning effort and would likewise continue to coordinate its separate plan with the other COMECON states. Also, for the first time within the COMECON framework the East European states agreed to capitalize 10 joint venture projects in the Soviet extractive industries that provided them the bulk of their raw material resources.[10]

These changes seem designed to encourage East European economic interdependence in several important areas. In the first place, the East European states had generally concluded that they could not afford the autarkic "extensive" development pattern forced on them by Stalin, despite its ideological certifiability. The alternative "intensive" pattern, in which the nation capitalizes its economic strengths and relies on external trade to balance economic requirements, seemed far more suitable in their situations. Yet in the Soviet view, these possibly divergent national plans had to be complementary among the East European states. If not coordinated, there was a distinct danger that over time they would be more compatible to Western national economies. Moreover, the coordination of development planning at both COMECON and national levels could be expected to rationalize and probably expand intra-COMECON trade. For the Soviet Union this would mean some relief from the role it had long played as an export market for Eastern Europe's surplus production. Finally, the East European nations would now have a capital stake in some of the Soviet industries on which they relied for raw materials. In theory, the new program would lead to a more efficient, closely aligned East European economic community operating at less cost to the Soviet Union.

Under Brezhnev we have seen the careful development of a policy aimed at closer integration of the Eastern European nations among themselves and with the Soviet Union. The policy is realistic at least in its attempt to adjust for the complexities of the international scene. The question of its ultimate objective cannot be answered with certainty, but the direction in which the policy leads seems clear. Further, that direction or conscious tendency seems to have been carefully defined again by Soviet leaders and theoreticians over the past decade. A part of this redefinition is the Brezhnev doctrine, which justified armed intervention in Czechoslovakia on the basis that each communist

state has the right to intervene in the affairs of another communist state which threatens to depart from what has been termed the "socialist commonwealth." The ramifications of this assertion caused a sensation apart from the Czechoslovak context because it would appear the doctrine could rationalize Soviet pressure on China or Yugoslavia or, outrageously, Polish action against the Soviet Union. Plainly, this range of interpretation was not intended, although parts of it may well have been meant to be so inferred.

Nonetheless, the matter did not rest with the Brezhnev doctrine. The complete policy, as enunciated in theoretical journals and Soviet party congresses, is keyed to Lenin's term "proletarian internationalism." In its 1970's version proletarian internationalism is used to describe relations between communist states as similar to those between nationalities in the Soviet Union.[11] Whether one cares to interpret that picture in terms of the Soviet Constitution or in the light of present reality does not matter. The legal context is voluntary; the reality is coercion. Either way, the association is far closer and far more subordinate to central power than the normal relationship between independent, truly autonomous states. The terms of the association even appear to fall short of deccribing the autonomy usually seen in member states of a commonwealth.

Another aspect of the policy seems to be its implication that closer association among communist states will be sought in all areas, but specifically in political, economic, cultural, and foreign policy matters. The measures taken within the WTO and COMECON frameworks demonstrate this goal. Added to this is the concept of irreversibility, which has honorable communist antecedents, specifically that the measures being undertaken will contribute to the momentum inevitably producing still closer integration of the communist states, and particularly the present East European client states, and the Soviet Union.[12] The theoretical answer to questions about communist states such as China and Yugoslavia would likely be that their integration is, over the longer run, likewise inevitable, while the East European clients are much closer in time to integration because the necessary integrative links have been long established and are fulfilling their doctrinal function.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, " 'Socialist Internationalism' and Eastern Europe–A New Stage," *Survey* 22 (Winter 1973): 43.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 54-55.

4. Oscar Halecki, ed., *East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Poland* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), P. 354.

5. J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 126-130.

6. The evolution of the WTO organization structure in the period 1966-1970 is described in greater detail in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 296-308, 489-498.

7. The bilateral treaty structure is also important as a backup set of alliances to promote "socialist unity" should the Soviet Union deem it necessary to scrap the WTO. By contrast, the NATO nations have no such fallback position. For further discussion, see Malcolm Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, Adelphi Paper No. 58 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), pp. 18, 25; and J. F. Brown, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1975), p. 42.

8. Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change," *Problems of Communism* 24 (September-October 1975): 15.

9. Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "East European Integration: Comecon," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Joint Committee Print (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 97.

10. J. F. Brown, *Relations–Soviet Union and Allies*, p. 38.

11. Rakowska-Harmstone, "Socialist Internationalism," p. 38.

12. See discussion of the "Triumph of Socialism," *Ibid.*, p. 40.

IV

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE: POLISH "CONTRADICTIONS"

> Between Polonism and Slavonism there is a complete and ineradicable incompatibility. . . .The Poles . . . are in truth not Slavonic at all; in terperament, in feeling, in mind, and even in unreason, they are Western, with an absolute comprehension of all Western modes of thought.
>
> Joseph Conrad[1]

> Below the surface, social and cultural changes are indeed at work, of which those which can be seen are not necessarily the most important. But the "Superstructure"–Soviet Russian Imperial domination–has not changed. It does not merely demand, like its many historical predecessors, that its vassals should place the Empire's security before their local interests. It insists on the national humiliation of the vassal peoples, and thereby creates national resentments which renew themselves again and again.
>
> Hugh Seton-Watson[2]

As noted previously, two principal sets of forces are at work in determining the future of Poland. Countering the thrust of Soviet policy to integrate Eastern Europe more closely and bind the entire region more tightly to the Soviet Union are pressures within Polish society. These pressures, if acceded to by the regime in Poland, would lead, directly or indirectly, to greater autonomy for the Polish state. The problem becomes one of describing these forces and their sources of influence. There is no thought of trying to describe a complex issue by applying a handy label like nationalism, or perhaps using a more sophisticated but limited concept such as ethnocentrism, even though both contribute to these forces. Because the Marxist-Leninist usage is descriptive, if normally reserved for analysis of a capitalist society, we can categorize these forces as *contradictions.*

The contradictions in Polish life are related to the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the present regime. In effect, it is an inverse but not an absolute relationship. The range and intensity of contradictions can increase, and as they do, we would say that the degree of true legitimacy decreases accordingly. In the opposite case, if true legitimacy were high, then the contradictions would be diminished. Allowing for the

imperfectness of human institutions, true legitimacy can never be absolute, and some measure of contradiction will persist even in a state with genuine and widespread popular support. Nevertheless, seeking to increase true legitimacy becomes an important task for a regime seeking to perpetuate itself, the Polish communist regime as any other. This effort, if fairly carried out in Poland, should involve three broad areas of national life: the political, where the demands placed on the regime center around participation and response; the economic, where the demands involve efficiency and return; and the cultural, where the issues are national identity and Western orientation.

For the Polish regime, and specifically the Polish party, the central problem is that as legitimation—the process of gaining legitimacy—succeeds, the centrifugal forces at work on the party's central direction and control of Polish life grow stronger. The Leninist pattern of democratic centralism threatens to become unstuck, and the expressed direct concern of the Soviet Union rises accordingly. As an example of how serious the situation can become, Polish party leaders, and those of any other East European party, need only reflect on the events of the "Prague spring." Then, Dubcek and his supporters courageously embarked on a course of true legitimation that affected all three factors in Czechoslovak national life and, moreover, dealt directly with the basic issues in each factor. The outcome is well remembered and has the effect of driving the Polish party to exchange true legitimacy for what is in reality the artificial or manufactured legitimacy of Soviet support. This latter is, as we have seen, now cloaked with reworked doctrine of proletarian internationalism.

The political aspect of legitimacy from which arise specific contradictions involves popular participation in the regime and the sense of responsiveness to popular aspiration generated by it. This could be loosely described as the democratic process, which has a significant part in the Polish heritage. Although Poland never developed sound parliamentary institutions in modern times, much of its earlier history was as an elective monarchy. Furthermore, the electorate by contemporary standards was broadly based, going beyond the confines of a small aristocratic elite to encompass a much larger group—the *szlachta*—or landed gentry. In England, by contrast, the comparable social group did not really exercise political influence until Cromwell's time.

Against this historical background, it can be seen today that the political gains in participation and response resulting from the 1956 crisis were important to the Polish people. At the same time, it can be fairly said that the specific measures comprising these gains have been either reversed or allowed to wither during the two decades intervening.

As noted earlier in describing Gomulka's "recompression" after 1956, the Workers' Councils which sprang up spontaneously before and during the October transition soon were changed. Originally intended to provide workers a voice in factory management, the newly won privilege was often abused, resulting in arbitrary challenges to otherwise sensible management programs designed to implement the beneficial aspects of Gomulka's initial economic reforms. Worse still from the party's viewpoint was that the Worker's Council as a body was often not subject to party influence in the particular enterprise. The party's response to this problem was to establish Factory Councils in which the workers' representation was assumed by the national trade union organization. Thereafter, democratic centralism reasserted itself over time in the industrial enterprises. As we shall see, the urban workers' lack of real participation in formally recognized channels did not deny them political power.

Another participatory device, this one available to the peasants and finally brought under party control by Gierek, was the People's Council. Existing in the hierarchy of governing bodies from the state down through province and district to the village, People's Councils at the local level were important because their chairmen were elected by the Council whose membership was usually at least half nonparty. The Local party chief was a member, but his election as Council chairman was not assured. The problem basically was not in the Council's democratic procedures but in its effectiveness. Too often Council requests were denied at higher levels where the party was clearly in charge, and the local unit would fail to secure investment funds or fertilizers, in short supply to begin with, for its area. In the end, Gierek's regime changed the laws on local administration, put the party chiefs in charge of the Councils ex officio, and reduced their number by nearly 60 percent.

Although the procedures by which industrial workers and the rural population participated in local decisionmaking in factory and village have been nullified, the procedures for national parliamentary elections still offer these groups a voice, however muffled. Gomulka's election law provided for more candidates to appear on local lists for election to the *Sejm* than there were seats available—roughly on a 3-to-2 ratio. The lists themselves were stacked in favor of the party so that voters could not delete all the party candidates and still turn in valid ballots. Nevertheless, some party candidates could and did fail to win elections. Furthermore, nonparty candidates such as those of the Catholic *Znak* faction of five members were unfailingly returned to their seats, usually with higher percentages of the vote than the party

candidates or those from the puppet Peasant and Democratic parties. What remains today, with careful party control over the designation of candidates, is more than a plebiscite but still far less than a free ballot. It should be noted, however, that there is enough flexibility in the arrangement for it to work in the direction of greater democratic participation as it did in the first election under Gomulka.

Furthermore, at the national level the *Sejm* procedures from Gomulka's day onward have been structured to provide for debate on government programs and the introduction of bills by individual members. Again, these devices are carefully controlled by the party, but they provide maneuver room for the party to give ground to popular pressure, as recently as 1975, for example, in the debate over the revised constitution.

Outside the formal political processes, popular dissent has had in the past two sources—the intelligentsia and the industrial workers. The 1956 protests were successful in part because both groups spontaneously and simultaneously raised the basic issue of greater autonomy for Poland. Subsequently, the intelligentsia have sponsored protests which had no influence on policy but were instead supressed. Because they make up a small minority of the population and are concentrated in the larger cities with major universities such as Warsaw and Cracow, the intelligentsia's efforts to make their influence felt on political issues can be readily controlled to the degree the party sees fit.

The industrial workers, on the other hand, present a major problem for the regime. Now comprising over half the population and, in theory at least, the shock troops of "People's Poland," the workers lost their participatory role in management and, coincidentally, the right to strike by 1958. At the same time, their influence within the party structure is disproportionately small.[3] Their political outlet is in the streets of Poland's major industrial centers, used in 1970 to effect a change in national leadership and again in 1975 and 1976 to effect a change in government policy. Unlike 1956, the basic issues have been economic in this decade; but the political device has worked. There is no evidence that it will not work in the future.

The economic side of the legitimation process involves the issues of efficiency and return. As considered here, the issues are separate though related. By efficiency is meant the overall rationality of the system, the degree to which input and output are in balance. This is essentially the manager's view of the economic system or, put another way, the view from above. On the other hand, there is the consumer's view, his basic

interest in what the system provides in the way of goods and an adequate wage with which to buy them. In Poland, despite the effort normal in the Communist regime to rationalize those priorities that impinge on consumer interests as calling for national sacrifice, there are fundamental questions about both efficiency and return raised respectively by managers and consumers.

The issue of efficiency does not lead to the question in Poland *whether* to have government ownership of production but *how* that ownership should function. In other words, a socialist economy is acceptable, whereas a command economy is challenged. Prewar Poland had a larger part of its industrial capacity under national control than any other East European nation, is a socialist tradition had been established.[4] But under the postwar regime, Stalinist industrialization on the "extensive" pattern led to overemphasis on quantitative output to boost national income resulting in overly large inventories and, with quality deemphasized, goods that were unsaleable even in domestic markets. Despite excessive costs, the period saw a rapid increase in industrial capacity.

By the late 1950's, the need was seen for balance in the economy to replace raw growth. Agriculture, largely in the private sector, was underfunded as were consumer industries. Furthermore, it was necessary to modernize in the producer goods sectors as well as maintain growth, even though the emphasis there was changing to the "intensive" pattern. The pressures for decentralization of economic control that arose during this period originated from two sources. The economists generally concluded, although they differed as to degree, that economic balance could be achieved by making the economy less sensitive to central control and more responsive to market forces. The managers, in effect, though not formally, urged that they be given a freer hand in investment planning, to include wage determination, instead of being driven by centrally directed production quotas.

A Western socialist nation, with a higher degree of true legitimacy than Poland, could have acceded to these demands and still reserved to itself state ownership and powerful economic controls such as tax policy, wage and price regulation, monetary policy, and the like. In Poland, as in other communist countries, this degree of control falls far short of political requirements. Neither the ideology nor the practical requirement to maintain party authority will permit it.[5] At the same time, the regime realized that the command economy had gone as far as could be reasonably expected in promoting growth. Change, but within tolerable limits, was indicated. With political considerations dominant,

the choice was clear. Market forces were beyond party influence, but managers could be fired. Hence, the Gomulka economic liberalization responded partway to the managers' urgings but little, if at all, to the recommendations of the economists.

The basic dilemma facing Gomulka continues today. Gierek's regime is more programmatic and less given to ill-considered, ad hoc solutions, but the fundamental twin recommendations of the economists and managers have not been responded to in full because of the inherent derogation of party authority. Substantial gains in industrial production on the intensive pattern and improvements in consumer goods availability have been realized, thanks to a surge in trade with the West. Nevertheless, the Polish economy, like its East European counterparts, lack the resilience to cope with the dangers of worldwide inflation, the special problems of energy resources, or the cost of continuing modernization beyond what can be subsidized by Western credits which now total some $8 billion.[6]

The consumer's return from the Polish economy is low and threatens to remain so for a variety of reasons. As the basic inefficiency of the economy persists, so must the requirement to devote a disproportionate share of resources to the capital goods sector to meet national goals. The share for consumer goods and agriculture thus remains low. Then too, being largely protected from market forces and hemmed in by planning restrictions, enterprises of all kinds, but particularly in heavy industry, have neither incentive nor latitude to cut costs by increasing per capita productivity, which remains below Western standards and lags behind some other East European nations. Thus, the factors are present to generate inflationary pressures. The regime has countered these pressures by making more consumer goods available through imports from the West, but this tends to be treatment of the symptom, not the disease, and even then only possible by accruing an increasingly unfavorable hard currency trade balance.

Further fueling inflationary potential is the situation in agriculture where the party is faced with the problem of raising total production even as it contemplates a decline in farm population. Again, the problem, as in industry, centers around a requirement for a marked increase in per capita productivity—more wheat from fewer peasants on a fixed amount of land. The recent party decision to push collectivization to the 20 percent level promises little improvement. The socialist sector has contributed a share of the product about evenly proportional to its share of the land although benefiting by a far larger proportion of

investment for fertilizer and mechanization. The private sector, despite recent relief from regulation and improved social services for the peasant, still works land divided into submarginal plots. Thus, mechanization is difficult, even if more investment funds were available for it. Nor is the individual peasant too small to encourage mechanization. Ironically then, Poland, which has resisted full collectivization, has no political or economic benefit to show for it. The result is that the country is marginally self-sufficient. In good crop years consumer demand can be met. In years with poor harvests shortages occur, driving up prices. The most recent instances were in 1974 and 1975, contributing to the decision to raise food prices and thus to the resulting workers' protests.[7]

A major area of consumer dissatisfaction is housing. Faced with the need to rebuild wartime urban destruction as well as house new workers in rebuilding and expanding industry, the postwar regime was behind at the outset. Neither of its successors has caught up, and the housing deficit continues, aggravated now by the requirement to replace much of the poorly constructed postwar housing.

All of these problems for the consumer relate back to the industrial workers' protests discussed earlier in their political contexts. Although his protest was a political act, the worker was objecting to lack of efficiency and return in the economy, emphasizing deficiencies in return. The worker, unlike the economist or the manager, was not asking that the system be changed, only its output for him. Nevertheless, because of the deficiencies inherent in Poland's economy, the worker in effect joined the economist and the manager in defining the changes required. The party, despite minor adjustments at home and pursuit of Western trade opportunities, cannot comply without risking its central position in Polish life.

Legitimation from the cultural standpoint must address the issues of national identity and Western orientation. Of all of the Polish contradictions, those with the greatest potential to reverse the tendency toward Soviet integration are bound up in these two issues. As Conrad's words at the head of this section point out, an inherent part of Polish nationality is its Western orientation and tradition. At the same time, these forces involve the greatest intangibles, and there is no way to measure them, save to assert that in the end they may constitute the last barrier to complete integration in the Soviet Union. If so, they may not suffice against the use of force just as they have been inadequate in the past to prevail against Tsarist and German power.

The Polish party is not unaware of these latent forces and caters to them by playing down communist symbols such as the red star and, even in Stalin's time, refusing to put up monuments to the Soviet leader similar to those to be seen on prominent display in other East European states. However successful these and other measures might be, they do not seem to suffice because of the gulf that separates rulers from ruled is in large part a function of doubts about the "Polishness" of the national leadership.

The single greatest repository of national tradition is the Catholic Church. Its basic rejection of the Soviet orientation has both national and religious bases. Thus, its position is internally consistent and acceptable across Polish society even by members of the party. Its religious aspect sets Christian teaching against Marxist materialism, and by national heritage it is opposed to Russian expansionism. While the former factor is self-evident, it must be understood that the Church's national credentials are almost as unchallengeable. The Catholic tradition of resistance to foreign oppression reaches back into the Middle Ages in its record of leading crusades against the Turks and is symbolized by the shrine at Czestochowa commemorating an incident in the war against Sweden in the 17th century. That tradition alone might not have survived until modern times had it not been reinforced by the Church's effective participation in the resistance against the Nazi occupation for which the Church suffered as did its parishioners.

In some important areas, Church and party views coincide. Both leadership groups profess concern over the materialism and rootlessness of modern Polish youth. Their position on how to correct this, of course, are diametrically opposed. On policy matters such as organization of the former German areas of the country, there was basic agreement that they must be fully Polonized, although the Church was not permitted by the Vatican to establish its own bishops in those areas until after the Polish-West German treaty of 1970.

These areas of mutual concern and essential agreement are outweighed by continuing differences on such matters as religious education and church construction. The Church has relinquished its prior right to conduct religious education in state schools but has succeeded in continuing instruction in its own facilities without interference. Construction of new churches is a matter of concern for the Church as new industrial areas expand, while the state's legitimate interest is to devote its effort to overcoming the housing shortage. Agreements made at various times to step up church construction have not been followed up, and the party continues to use the issue as an irritant.

To preserve its identity and institutions and thereby maintain in force for the Polish people a belief system outside Marxism, the Church consciously foreswore political activity in an agreement with the Bierut regime soon after the war.[8] But it speaks with authority on political issues to the three-quarters of the nation considered to be practicing Catholics. It does so with care, in cases where the issue is clearly bound to national identity. In its support for Gomulka in 1956, it came down on the side of the party in its effort to break from the Stalinist past. In the furor over the constitutional changes in 1975, it opposed them on the basis that they offend the true interests of the Polish nation. In both cases the Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, used the considerable authority of his person and position as spokesman for the Church's viewpoint.

The other voice raised on the issues of national identity and Western orientation belongs to the intelligentsia, a part they have played in Polish life since the 18th century partitions. An element of the intelligentsia presents itself as reflecting the lay Catholic viewpoint, but a larger number questions the communist system from a broader philosophical base. It reflects, perhaps more than does the Church, the view that Poland's Western orientation is antithetical to communism. The heart of its criticism is that Marxism, regardless of what it may have provided in the past, no longer gives answers to modern problems. The ideology is charged with being resistant to change on both the philosophic and institutional levels. This resistance is heightened by what the intellectuals characterize as the fear of the party to tolerate free discussion. By contrast, Western thought and institutions are seem as livelier, more flexible and tolerant, and therefore better able to adapt to the needs of modern society. [9] The problem for the party is that these views have surfaced over the past 20 years through the efforts of respected party thinkers of both the old and new generations. Men like Bienkowski and Lipinski had long been looked to as intellectual leaders, while others like Wazyk and Kolakowski were considered among its foremost young writers and thinkers.[10]

As we have seen, the party has been able to control the political aspect of intellectual protest thus far. However, its cultural roots run deep in Polish tradition, and by no measure has the party diminished its potential to articulate protest in the future. As it was for the Tsars, the party's fears must be the possible linkage between intellectual and industrial worker, the combination of critical thought, economic grievance, and raw political power that was brought together by a common goal in the summer of 1956 and could be in the future.

Any discussion of legitimation in its political, economic, and cultural aspects must turn to question the role of the ruling communist

party in accommodating or resisting such tendencies. In other words, in what way is the party likely to be an instrument for change? The legitimacy of the party was at its peak in 1956 when Gomulka returned to power. In fact, in his person he symbolized that legitimacy. The Gomulka coup succeeded because the party stood aligned for the moment with the Polish nation against a Soviet party whose hierarchy was divided against itself, whose self-confidence wavered under the impact of the anti-Stalin campaign. Even in such a condition, the Soviet leadership could react to the rejection of party leadership by the Hungarian people. But in Poland, party and people spoke with one voice, hat of Gomulka. At the same time, Gomulka was wise enough to acknowledge the importance of the Soviet connection to the Polish state. His definance was instead directed against the perversion of communism by Stalin that Khrushchev himself had taken under fire. Thus, Warsaw was saved while Budapest was attacked by Soviet tank armies.

As time wore on, Gomulka put his party in the position in which it now finds itself. While their techniques of leadership differed, first Gomulka and then Gierek realized that the true legitimation of their regimes would undermine the party's authority as the source of direction and control most aspects of Polish life. Moreover, the Brezhnev leadership to outward appearances is more solidly based than Khrushchev's was in 1956. Finally, since the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, there has been the increasing pressure of the Soviet integration policy. The effect of these factors has been to place the party in much the same position it was in during Bierut's regime. Unlike Bierut and Gomulka, Gierek initially won a measure of legitimacy by his measures to stengthen the economy. But a skeptic could point out that after 10 years of stagnation in the 1960's the Polish economy, given its own resources, could only improve. In any event, the Gierek economic palliatives did not constitute valid long-term solutions. That aspect of the party's legitimacy has certainly weakened and could decline still further.

The party then is between the Polish nation on the one hand and the Soviet regime on the other, a fundamentally untenable position over time because of the dilemma it imposes. The party's choices are mutually exclusive. It can respond more readily to the pressure for change embodied in the Soviet policy to integrate further Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The alternative is to become more truly legitimate by adapting to the contradictions in Polish life. Each course involves penalties that are only too clear in recent history. To respond to the Soviet pressure and resist the contradictory national pressures can

result in burned out party office buildings and the fall from power of the once well-respected party leader as it did in Poland in 1970. The alternative, true legitimation, has even more serious potential consequences, dangerous both to party and nation as Dubcek and the Czechoslovaks learned in 1968. For that reason, Gierek's party seems to have adjusted its position in the middle to favor the Soviet pressure and resist further the Polish contradictions. It is at best a precarious balance and must remain so until the pressure ceases from one side or the other.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Oscar Halecki, ed., *East Central Europe Under the Communists: Poland* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 226.

2. Quoted from Seton-Watson's "Reflections: 30 Years After," *Survey* 21 (Winter-Spring 1975): 42.

3. As of 1973, less than 40 percent of party membership claimed current ties with the urban working class. See Marian K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 325.

4. Halecki, *Poland*, p. 351.

5. For broader discussion on the relationship between economic decentralization and party authority, see Michael Gamarnikow, "Balance Sheet on Economic Reforms," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, Joint Committee Print (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 167; and John M. Montias, *Central Planning in Poland* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 3.

6. *New York Times*, 4 April 1977.

7. Adam Bromke, "A New Juncture in Poland," *Problems of Communism* 25 (September-October 1976): 5.

8. The so-called "modus vivendi" of 1950. For details, see Dziewanowski, *Communist Party*, p. 245. Discussed also in Richard Hiscocks, *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss?* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 162.

9. For an eloquent statement of the views summarized in this paragraph, see Leszek Kolakowski, "The Fate of Marxism in Eastern Europe," *Slavic Review* 29 (June 1970): 176-181. Kolakowski, regarded as one of the party's top young ideologues, emigrated to the West after the anti-Zionist upheaval in 1968.

10. Wladyslaw Bienkowski, an old colleague of Gomulka who served in party and government positions in the postwar regime and again after 1956, wrote a strong indictment of the gap between people and party, "The Driving Forces and the Inhibiting Factors of Socialism," which the party would not allow to be published in Poland (Dziewanowski, *Communist Party*, p. 295). Edward Lipinski, a liberal economist, helped lead the charge against Stalinist economics during the thaw (endnote 14, Chapter II), and is recently the author of "An Open Letter to Comrade Edward Gierek," *Survey* 22 (Spring 1976): 194-203. For information on Wazyk and Kolakowski, see endnote 13, Chapter II, and endnote 9, above, respectively.

V

THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLISH FUTURE

> The most grievous error that the Polish people could commit would be to attempt to overthrow the regime by force . . . such an attempt, doomed to be abortive in the face of overwhelming physical power, would give justification to the Soviet government to overrun Poland under the pretext of restoring order. This would render impossible, for many years, fulfillment of any hope for Polish independence.
>
> Arthur Bliss Lane[1]

> . . . while the tradition of despotism is as old as man's history, the idea of individual freedom, equality and democracy is new, totally revolutionary, and therefore as yet imperfectly realized.
>
> Robert F. Byrnes[2]

As we have seen, the Polish future lies along a range between two extremes: integration in the Soviet Union and absorption in the Western community. It was argued too that neither of the extremes, being absolute and opposed by historic countervailing tendencies, would probably be reached and that the important issue was then not destination so much as direction along the range. Finally, weighing the evidence it would appear that Poland is tending toward Soviet integration with the decrease in true autonomy that such a tendency implies.

From the United States point of view, this current tendency of the Polish nation is of abiding interest. The consequences of Poland's position should this tendency continue can be summarized briefly. First, to use part of an earlier analogy, Poland would in fact become a Soviet bridge to the West. By assuring achievement, on a more or less permanent basis, of their objectives in Poland, the Soviets would have a secure route to Western Europe. Hence, the potential military and political threat increases in the area the United States regards as holding paramount security interest. The long-range possibilities for Western Europe under this degree of Soviet pressure break down into two distinct sets, described here as fragmentation and consolidation. For Western Europe and the United States they are equally dangerous. Fragmentation of Western unity in the face of the Soviet Union would make each separate nation more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure supported by a secure forward military position in the center of Europe. In this

context, the word *domination* may describe precisely neither the Soviet objective nor the outcome, and for that reason should be handled carefully. But it is apparent that Soviet influence in the West would be stronger and that such an outcome could only be realized at the expense of Western autonomy and institutions. The consolidation of the West, with the United States surely involved, could reverse the present multipolar tendency in the world and lead ultimately to the bipolarity seen as unstable by many because it provides the framework for the "zero sum" outcome in which one side or the other must lose all.[3]

The foregoing is not an attempt to prophesy the history of the next 50 years but rather to generalize on the direction of the United States' and Western Europe's future should Poland's trend toward Soviet integration continue. That trend leads to what is, for the United States, clearly the least desirable outcome. The contrary trend, that toward absorption of a truly autonomous Polish state in the Western community, becomes the most desirable outcome for the United States. The advantages for the West in that instance are in part the reciprocals of the disadvantages occuring under its opposite. Poland becomes a bridge from the West to the Soviet Union, opening it to the influences of the liberal tradition it has resisted throughout its history as a state. Nor should it be overlooked that such an outcome strengthens the West in another positive way by making available to it the considerable energies and resources of the Polish nation. It can be argued that such an outcome does not constitute a realistic objective. However that may be, the outcome as defined remains valid as providing a desirable direction for change.

If the definitions of the possible outcome can be accepted, not as predicted alternative futures, but as the plausible limits of a range or spectrum of alternative futures, and if the most and least desirable limits are properly defined from the point of view of the United States, the problem becomes one of determining how the United States can influence the outcome. In other words, what are realistic objectives for United States policy?

Given the relative power of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States in Eastern Europe in general and, for our purposes, Poland in particular, it is well to recall Raymond Aron's definition of the "supreme alternative" in strategy as deciding whether "to win or not to lose."[4] Expanding on that dictum, Karl Deutsch has theorized that to lower the probability of an undesirable outcome requires the application of only a limited degree of national power. Hence, limited means

may well suffice to make an undesirable outcome, if not impossible, at least improbable. He goes on to demonstrate that if the national goal is to raise the odds in favor of a desirable outcome, a broader, perhaps disproportionate, application of means is necessary.[5] The military analogy of the cost of the offensive versus the cost of the defensive generally fits Deutsch's postulation. The defense (preventing or at least making improbable an undesirable outcome–loss of one's position) is less expensive in men and material in most cases than the offense (ensuring or at least making probable a desirable outcome–taking the opponent's position).

However, Deutsch does not raise the question whether the alternative decisions involved in his model are in fact mutually exclusive. It is really necessary to confine one's effort to rendering improbable an undesirable outcome and ignore the opportunity to raise the probability of a desirable outcome? The history of human affairs at any level provides contradictory evidence, much of which shows that there is such a force as momentum or inertia which is often irretrievably lost (prevention of the undesirable outcome) and then begins to flow in the opposite direction (ensuring the desirable outcome). In war the successful defense of a key position is often the prelude to a victorious campaign. For example, successful defensive battles in Stalingrade and Midway were preludes to eventual victories in Berlin and Tokyo Bay. The analogy may seem oversimplified, and certainly there were local reverses enroute to the successful outcome in each case. There were likewise events outside the framework of the campaigns themselves that had important influences on the outcomes. Nevertheless, one never knows whether an adversary, seemingly successful to that point, has in fact extended himself to the limit and, being checked, is not now vulnerable.

The point of all this is to question whether, in the case of Poland, United States policy need be limited to the effort necessary to make improbable the undesirable outcome of a continued trend toward Soviet integration. It may well be that the degree of additional effort, not only to arrest but to begin reversal of the trend, is within realistic limits. If nothing else, a policy configured with both ends in mind would better enable the United States to exploit factors outside the bilateral relationship such as a demonstrable, if not dramatic, increase in Western strength and unity of purpose or a power struggle within the Soviet leadership. In short, it seems not at all inconsistent for United States policy to have a specific, short-term goal and a more broadly stated long-term objective as well. As it applies to Poland, that policy should then be in the short term to arrest the tendency toward Soviet

integration (lowering the probability of the undesirable outcome) and over the longer term work to reverse that tendency and encourage the assimilation of Poland in the Western community (raising the probability of the desirable outcome).

In determining the means to implement United States policy toward Poland, the essential elements are compatibility and indirection. Compatibility is used not in the sense of compatibility with United States goals worldwide, although that is of great importance, but compatibility in the relationship of policy means to both the short-term goals and long-term objective of the policy. Most to be desired are those measures which, if possible, work toward both. This qualification may not fit in every instance, and we may well be forced to choose between conflicting measures. If so, the urgency and importance of the short-term goal should govern.

If we can choose policy means in accordance with their degree of compatibility, we have no such luxury in the choice of direct or indirect means. As described earlier, the factors most responsible for Poland's tendency toward Soviet integration are Soviet policy and power. We have at our disposal no direct means to degrade Soviet power in Eastern Europe or to convince the Soviet Union to change its policy toward that region. To have intervened in an attempt to save the Hungarian anticommunist revolution or to have refused to sign the Helsinki agreement could serve as examples of such direct means. For valid reasons, consideration of which is outside the scope of this discussion, we did not resort to them. Nor can we expect to be able to offer a direct challenge to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future.

The means to implement the policy must then be indirect to fit within our national capabilities. This leads us to the alternative of supporting whatever factors tend to resist the tendency toward the undesirable outcome. As defined earlier, these countervailing factors are the Polish contradictions—the aspects of Polish national life that work against Soviet integration. To the degree these contradictions resolve themselves, the true legitimacy of the Polish regime is strengthened in place of the artificial legitimacy conferred by Soviet support.

In the selection of the means to influence change in Poland, the question of the desirability of violent change arises. In the present situation violent change, despite what initial promise it might hold, would seem to strengthen the probability of the undesirable outcome. In the first place, earlier violent or at least abrupt change in Poland

took place with a recognized alternative leadership ready to step in. Furthermore, that leadership in both 1956 and 1970 was ultimately acceptable to the Soviet Union, not, of course, without considerable recalcitrance in the 1956 case. At present, no one like Gomulka and Gierek in earlier times has appeared on the Polish scene. Gierek, in fact, has been particularly careful to screen from public view any possible candidates for such a role. Assuming then that the impetus for change would come from outside the party, the alternative leadership would likewise have to come from outside the party. This result could only guarantee Soviet intervention, the cost of which to Poland would surely be a leadership even more subservient to Moscow than is now the case. It is not inconceivable that such intervention would lead the integration process irrevocably beyond the point where the United States could still affect the outcome.

Because the United States probably cannot reap advantage from violent change and, further, because change of this character raises unacceptably high the probability of the undesirable outcome, the question becomes how, over the short term, to prevent it. It is a problem of immediate urgency not capable of being ignored. We have noted earlier the essential instability of the economy, the issue that brought the workers into the streets in 1970, and led to the somewhat less serious but still widespread demonstrations in 1976. In the economy, in turn, the most volatile element is agriculture, which as a whole is marginally able to support the nation and still provide the hard currency exports which must maintain present or achieve still higher levels if the current unfavorable trade balance with the West is to be kept under control. That balance cannot be reduced otherwise without limiting imports from the West of consumer goods and modern machinery needed if industrial productivity is to improve. The whole economic house of cards thus depends on agriculture which, being insufficiently modernized, is in turn overly dependent on good growing weather. It should be noted in passing that the Soviet Union is not immune from the same problem, but has fortified itself against the political consequences as the Polish regime has not.

The United States, then, should prepare to play a constructive role in propping the Polish regime before it gets into a situation from which neither the United States nor the Polish nation can realize any benefit. There was previously available a device suited to both the problem and the immediate solution. Public Law 480 from 1956 until 1966 allowed the United States to ship surplus agricultural commodities to Poland, payable in zloty which were to be retained to support other United States programs in Poland. However, through amendment, Poland was

dropped from the list of permissible recipient nations because of its material assistance to North Vietnam during the war in Southeast Asia. Whatever the soundness of the logic in 1966, it clearly is unwise to tie our hands in this way any longer unless we are more interested in exacting irrelevant, after-the-fact penalties than in arming ourselves to contend with the problem of heading off the undesirable outcome in Poland. Without such authority, the United States cannot exert influence to keep the regime from being threatened by violent change. With the authority, provided it is used in a timely manner, it may be possible to deal with potential instability before it becomes acute.

However effective agricultural assistance might be in dealing with near-term problems, over the longer period policy implementation should focus on supporting the contradictions in Polish life. These were categorized as political, economic, and cultural. Those in the political area, involving participation and response, may well prove difficult or unnecessary to influence. There is no apparent measure by which the United States can influence the Polish regime to restore the participatory processes annulled after their institution in 1956. This clearly is direct intervention in Poland's internal affairs. Nor need we add to the unofficial but real political power of the workers. There is, however, the intelligentsia, whose views are more vulnerable to being stifled by the government. In their case, the announced "human rights" policy of the Carter administration may have application. The Helsinki agreement and the President's position as stated in his speech to the United Nations in March 1977 both provide entry into this apsect of the problem.

The economic contradictions involve the issues of efficiency and return. The immediate question is whether we have not in fact responded to the requirement to support these contradictions by encouraging Polish trade with the West. It is attractive to think that we have, taking comfort from the fact that Polish-Western trade, not counting the United States' share, has quadrupled since 1970 while trade between the United States and Poland has quintupled.[6] However, foreign trade, whatever intangible benefits it may have in developing common interests and improving relations government-to-government, has, in the general sense, inherent limitations as a policy device. It cannot, in the first place, be demonstrated that foreign trade is a reliable instrument in securing specific political concessions, whatever its long-term political benefits might be. With the exception of the Public Law 480 change mentioned above and discussed as meeting a specific need, it would seem unwise to rely on foreign trade as a lever to achieve special immediate goals. Secondly, we should recognize the two funda-

mental disadvantages to Poland of trade with the West: its inherent imbalance and the convertibility problem. Poland's export markets are bound to remain limited for some time because Polish industrial goods are mostly not competitive in Western markets. Without a convertible currency, Poland must finance its unbalanced trade with the West by loans from Western sources. As noted before, these loans now total $8 billion, and the trade imbalance in 1975 alone was some $2.5 billion.[7] Thirdly, there is the risk that expanded Polish Trade with the West may have the effect of financing Soviet integration. We have seen how the Soviet Union, through COMECON, has taken steps to ease the cost of economic integration by requiring East European support for development of Soviet extractive industries, with heavy emphasis on petroleum, natural gas, and pipelines. As East-West trade in general contributes to the health of the separate East European economies, so it can provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to demand that its clients bear more of the burden of integration.

Keeping in mind the basic limitations of Polish trade with the West, we should also recognize that in specific areas economic relations can provide valid means to implement United States policy. The objective of our trade policy vis-a-vis Poland should not be volume for its own sake or even balance between imports and exports. What matters is how trade can have impact on certain aspects of the Polish economic contradictions. It may well be that for the most part, our trade with Poland already answers that need. If not, we should work toward its reorientation until it does.

The overall objective of our economic relations with Poland, and those of the West in general, should be to exert influence toward the rationalization of the Polish economy and its integration in the Western economic system. The objective is long term and the means of achieving it evolutionary. Description of specific initiatives would require a detailed examination of the Polish economy beyond the scope of this discussion. However, the areas of emphasis can be outlined.

Rationalizing the Polish economy is not to imply that it would no longer be socialist. Rather, the aim would be to encourage the forces pressing for decentralization of economic decisionmaking and greater reliance on market factors, both domestic and external. Trends in these directions, which tend to be parallel, should improve both efficiency and return with concurrent enhancement of legitimacy in the economic aspect. The groups in Poland who will carry this effort are the industrial managers and the private farmers who make up the large majority of Poland's agricultural work force. To enhance their position, trade and

related economic assistance should be aimed at modernization. For industry, this means not only replacement of plant equipment to improve per capita productivity, but adoption of modern management systems and techniques as well. Involved here should be both sales of equipment and training. Modernization of agriculture would seem a difficult task given the miniscule plots that account for a large proportion of agricultural acreage. However, expanded trade in light mechanized equipment and provision of improved plant strains and fertilizers, supported by agricultural assistance in the form of extension services, can lead to improved efficiency and higher yields. Similar programs have been successful over the years in several Asian nations without disrupting traditional landholding patterns. Trade in support of programs for rural construction and electrification can also make an important contribution to the overall goal.

The integration of the Polish economy into the Western economic system is a complex process and, if anything, more evolutionary in its progress than rationalization. Yet the two processes, one primarily internal, the other external, are interrelated. This development should in no way lead to a semicolonial relationship which the Polish nation quite rightly would reject out of hand. Poland's resources and size qualify it eventually for a position in the Western economic community similar to that of Sweden or Italy. Industrial modernization obviously plays an important part here; but after analysis, the modernization effort should give highest priority to those industries with the greatest potential for sales in Western markets. In view of the current concern in the West about energy resources, the Polish coal industry seems a prime candidate, in the area of advanced technology for coal gas production, for example. Modernization of this type will more readily enhance integration with the West if it is arranged on a joint venture basis which provides ties on the managerial and sales levels rather than simply providing equipment and training.

The other aspect of economic integration with the West is financial. Here the long-term goal must be convertibility of the zloty. Achieving full convertibility will be a complex evolution whose details cannot be considered here. The basic demands on Poland are that its overall trade account be in appropriate balance and that its foreign credit not be overextended. These become particularly difficult over the long period in which Poland must rely on imports from the West to modernize and expand its industrial base while its production of export goods for the West inevitably lag behind. One method of working to right the imbalance is by exertion of the strongest possible influence to increase Poland's foreign exchange invisibles. Hard currency payments to

Poland's large merchant fleet can be increased on our part if we are willing to relax regulations on exports that must be shipped on United States ships. Development of Polish tourist facilities by loan or joint venture, if properly publicized, will do much to encourage Western tourist traffic. Yugoslavia, among others, has used these devices to good advantage. Such actions together provide only a beginning along the path to convertibility, but an important beginning nevertheless.

The cultural contradictions involving the issues of national identity and Western orientation involve perhaps the most obvious policy means, yet these measures are by far the most difficult to assess in terms of effectiveness. Nonetheless, we must continue to make clear to the Polish nation through every possible device our great respect for its historic tradition and our conviction that its rightful destiny is as a member of the Western community. Of the groups on whom our policy should focus, the two most important are the intelligentsia and the students. (To say this is not to ignore the role of the Polish Church but rather to recognize the constitutional and institutional barriers which probably make infeasible anyting beyond the most general declaration of support.) We have already discussed in the political context the importance of the Helsinki agreement and the President's call to the United Nations, but there must be added the educational exchange program. In addition to training managers and technicians in the West as part of economic modernization, the program should be extended to include broad representation from among the intelligentsia and students in general; scholars, scientists, doctors, economists, and educators are especially important.

To some extent in the educational programs, but even more in the equally important cultural exchange program, one has the impression that an objective is numerical balance. If this is in fact the case, we need to consider the overall objectives of our policy. Were an imbalance to be weighted in favor of Polish groups, whether symphony orchestras or athletic teams, performing in the United States, we ultimately benefit because of increased Polish exposure to the West and higher Polish earnings against hard currency invisibles. Although possibly less desirable in degree, an imbalance weighted the opposite way offers greater potential for strengthening the Western image within Poland. At the risk of oversimplification, it would seem that the policy is frustrated only when the exchange is limited rather than expanded. The balance in the exchange should not be at issue.

A final point is to emphasize yet again that the elements of United States policy discussed above must seek an evolution in the Polish

situation. Aside from guarding against the unfavorable consequences of an attempt at violent change, the remainder of our policy could be evolutionary and, as such, contribute to raising the probability of the postulated desirable outcome. In some cases, primarily in the part of the policy dealing with modernization of the economy, the means also work toward limiting and then, hopefully, lowering the probability of the undesirable outcome. In all of this, while being alert to exploit temporary opportunities, we should build for the long haul. In no other way can we restore for Western benefit the Polish bridge.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted from Lane's *I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948), pp. 307-308.

2. Quoted in George Urban, "Cultural Exchange and Its Prospects: A Conversation With Robert F. Byrnes," *Survey* 20 (Autum 1974): p. 66.

3. For further discussion on the implications of bipolarity, see, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chapter VII; and Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, James N. Rosenau, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 325-335.

4. From *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 30.

5. See his "On the Concepts of Politics and Power" in Rosenau, *International Politics*, pp. 255-260.

6. US Department of Commerce, *Selected Trade and Economic Data of the Centrally Planned Economies*, September 1976, p. 47.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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