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DA PAM 550-9-1 CHINA: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE. 1978 EDITION

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ERRATA SHEET FOR DA PAM 550-9-1 CHINA:  
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DA PAM 550-9-1 CHINA: An Analytical Survey of Literature, dated  
2 January 1978 is to be corrected to read as follows:

page iii, 2nd paragraph "...It is based on *unclassified*  
publications (friendly and unfriendly) located on the open shelves  
of The Army Library, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pentagon..."



*"The More We Sweat In Peace  
The Less We Bleed In War"*

*—Chinese Proverb*



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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
FOREWORD

Over five years have passed since the first visit of a serving US President to the People's Republic of China. Since that time much has been accomplished to establish a framework for a new Chinese/American relationship. A comprehensive understanding of developments regarding China is essential to dealing with the challenges of that relationship.

China's central location in Asia, immense area and population, and legacy of cultural superiority have given it a dominant role in Asian affairs. Of currently modest economic strength, China's extensive natural resources portend a growing interest in foreign trade during the next decade. China's military strength, based on an increasing strategic nuclear capability and a population rapidly approaching the one billion mark, commands widespread respect. As one of the two claimants to world Communist leadership, the direction of Chinese foreign policy under the post-Mao leadership is of vital interest to the US.

This bibliographic survey of literature on China has been prepared by research analysts of the US Army Library. Last published in 1971, this publication updates that list of reference materials. It should provide a useful tool for contemporary research on China and its peoples.

E. C. MEYER  
Lieutenant General, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Operations and Plans





## ANALYSTS' NOTE

↓ This unclassified analytical survey of literature was prepared at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army.

✓ It is based on classified publications (friendly and unfriendly) located for the most part on the open shelves of the Army Library, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Pentagon.

✓ The titles included in this publication were selected from a vast number of books, periodical articles, studies, and documents, which in their totality present a rounded picture of China—both on the Mainland and on the Island of Formosa.

✓ The first edition in this series on China was published in 1961. The present edition is the fourth in the series, and covers the period 1971-1976. The information appearing in the manuscript is supported by appendixes comprised of charts, tables, and maps.

✓ No effort has been made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent an official endorsement of the views expressed. ←

The research analysts of the Army Library gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of various specialists in the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Commerce, and the Department of Army. Special acknowledgment is extended to T. N. Dupuy Associates, Dunn Loring, Virginia, for permission to reprint extracts from their Almanac of World Military Power.

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HEADQUARTERS  
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WASHINGTON, D.C., 2 January, 1978

# CHINA: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE, 1978 EDITION

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# CHINA: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE, 1978 EDITION

## PART I

### THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (COMMUNIST CHINA ON THE MAINLAND)

(See Also Part III and Appendixes)

#### A. An Assessment of Trends and Prospects

CHANGE AND MODERNISATION IN INDIA AND CHINA, by O. S. Marwah, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 7, no. 2 (October-December 1974) 131-301.

"The governments of India and China monitor the lives of almost half the world's people. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that events in the two countries will have a considerable influence on the future of the world. The impact may come in consequence of Indian and Chinese experiences with differing political structures. It may flow from the potential or actual productivity that, over time, such masses of human beings routinely connote. It may result from the secular development of manpower skills on an immense scale. As two persistent societies with strong innercentric zeitgeists, India and China could manifest revived perceptions of their 'legitimate' roles in the international system. On the negative side, widespread turmoil due to civil violence or starvation could occasion dangerous instability and interventions by the great powers. The same could also spill into the regions in which the two countries are situated. Whatever the possibilities—and there are others—it is apparent that Indian and Chinese 'futures' carry more than vicarious significance for the world's peoples. It is of interest for scholars, therefore, to see that their comparative analyses of changes occurring in India and China are grounded in some systematic premises and criteria."

CHINA AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY, ed. by Ian Wilson. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973. 304 p.

"Wide-ranging . . . essays from a 1972 conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Subsequent developments in Japan, Australia, The U.S. and China, however, have put all predictions in doubt and drastically widened the parameters of possibility."

CHINA: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, ed. by D. Bing. New York, Longman, 1975. 237 p.

"From the proceedings of the First New

Zealand Conference on Chinese Studies at the University of Waikato, these short papers cover a wide variety of subjects—aesthetics to agriculture."

CHINA IN 1975, by John Bryan Starr, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 1 (January 1976) 42-60.

This review of 1975 for the People's Republic of China covers domestic politics, the economy, and foreign relations.

CHINA, ONE STEP FURTHER TOWARD NORMALIZATION, by Carl Albert and John Rhodes. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 10 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, House Document.)

CHINA, QUARTER CENTURY AFTER FOUNDING OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 91 p. (Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print.)

CHINA'S ROLE AS WORLD LEADER: WILL CHINA REPLACE WESTERN LEADERSHIP, by Arnold J. Toynbee, in *Current*, no. 165 (September 1974) 55-58.

"Who is going to inherit the West's ascendancy in the world? . . . We must look for the West's heir in Eastern Asia, in some community capable of coping both with the legacies of the West and with the perennial problems of an agricultural society—in short, a community capable of starting a new chapter in the history of mankind. It is China whose credentials as the West's potential heir are most worth examining."

CHINA—THE RISING CHALLENGE, by Anthony M. Paul, in *The Reader's Digest*, v. 107, no. 641 (September 1975) 105-110.

"Analyzes China's changing relationships within the community of nations—and attempts to chart the path this . . . country is likely to follow in the years ahead." See *The Reader's Digest*, June 1975, for the first part of this article.

CHINA'S WEST IN THE 20TH CENTURY, by Bruce J. Esposito, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 1 (January 1974) 64-75.

"The increasing importance of China's

West—the province of Sinkiang—suggests the need for a survey of its strategic military aspects, its economy, population and history.”

THE CHINESE VIEW OF THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, by John Cranmer-Byng, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 53, (January/March 1973) 67-79.

“The object of this article is to examine changing Chinese attitudes to their place in the world from a Chinese historical and intellectual perspective, in order to provide a basis for anticipating developments in the future attuned more to a Chinese than to a western point of view. The question immediately arises whether such a perspective is in any way relevant to the recent theory and practice of international relations in the People's Republic of China, and what insights, if any, such a perspective may provide for discussing the future.”

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Maj. Monte R. Bullard, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 9 (September 1972) 64-81.

“The purpose of this article is to isolate, clarify and analyze Chinese internal and foreign policy trends in the hope that it might contribute to our understanding of China now and in the future.”

HAS CHINA CHANGED, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 10 (Spring 1973) 73-93.

“The editors of *Foreign Policy*, addressed the following question to several recent visitors to China, most of whom have had a long-time interest in that country . . . Every recent visitor to China, and particularly those who knew China before 1949, has remarked on the orderliness of the country, on the great courtesy with which visitors are received, on the apparent calm of the country, and so on. A picture is emerging for Americans of a rational and orderly country, determined to make internal progress while showing the outside world a ‘civilized’ face. There is no reason whatsoever to doubt this picture. However, it stands in sharp contrast to the picture of China which filtered out in the mid-1960's, when we read of distinguished men being brutally treated, of a continual turmoil in the streets, in the universities, and within the bureaucracy. Then, Americans saw China as the very essence of a country gone mad, and the Yellow Peril seemed very real to many people. This remarkable reversal of American perceptions is no doubt a reflection of a genuine reversal within China itself. Scholars and analysts have already devoted much thought to the question of how this reversal took place. But what about the deeper questions that must surround such an astonishing event? What is the impact of such a change on the people of

China? How do they look back on their recent past? How can a country go through such a rapid change? And—above all—can a country which changed so fast change again? Are we being permitted to view China at the gentle end of a swinging pendulum, or has something deeper taken place?” The replies of the following are presented: Joseph Alsop, Jack Chen, John K. Fairbank, Jonathan Mirsky, Hugh Scott, John S. Service, and Susan Shirk.

JUXTAPOSING PAST AND PRESENT IN CHINA TODAY, by Wang Gungwu, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 61 (March 1975) 1-24.

“For this paper, . . . I shall confine myself largely to attempts to re-explain events in history and shall use these attempts to explain changing Chinese perceptions about the past and what it can do to serve the present.”

NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Col. John E. Coon, in *Parameters*, v. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1972) 18-21.

“A brief analysis of the aspirations most likely to influence Peking's policy makers in the foreseeable future.”

PEOPLE'S CHINA: 25 YEARS, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 5 (September-October 1974) 1-38.

“October 1 of this year marks the 25th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. With the experience of a quarter of a century to go on, it now seems both possible and appropriate to reflect on the continuities and changes in China under Communist rule. To what extent has Chinese society undergone fundamental alterations over the last 25 years, and to what extent have traditional institutions, behavior, and modes of thinking persisted, whether in their old guises or in new incarnations? What impact has Communist power had on any changes that have occurred? That is, to what degree has the regime managed to shape society according to its own vision, and to what degree has it found itself a prisoner of larger historical forces? Assessing the continuities and changes is no mean task. Not only can analysts disagree about the amount of change observable, but they can also differ on how to approach such an evaluation. For example, they may adopt a variety of standards against which to measure the continuities and changes—a distillation of the essence of Chinese culture across the ages, China at the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, China in the 1930's prior to Japanese invasion, China on the eve of the Communist takeover in 1949, etc. They may likewise choose to look at the broad spectrum of Chinese life or to focus on a specific segment of it.” Contents: “Fu-Chiang” and Red Fervor, by Lucien Bianco; A



View from the Village, by Mark Gayn; A Radical Break with the Past, by Edward E. Rice; The Pattern of Politics, by Juergen Dames; Shrinking Political Life, by L. La Dany; The Economy—Same Path, New Pace, by Audrey Donnithorne; and Continuities in Change, by Krishna P. Gupta.

THE WORLD AND CHINA, 1922-1972, by John Gittings. New York, Harper and Row, 1974. 303 p.

"Gittings, China correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, has written an . . . analysis of the long-term continuities in Chinese foreign policy. His principal theses: when nationalism and socialism conflict, national goals win out; when domestic and foreign constraints conflict, foreign predominate; when Mao and other leaders debate, Mao is victorious."

## B. Government, Party, and Politics

### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS, ed. by Chalmers Johnson, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970. 368 p.

"Some 12 specialists tackle in their respective essays the problem of defining, identifying and measuring political and economic change in the world's 14 communist nations [including USSR]. Part of their effort is to work toward more appropriate theoretical models in dealing with communist regimes."

THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF CHINA, 1949-1972, by Jurgen Domes. New York, Praeger, 1973. 258 p.

"A . . . short history of Chinese government politics since the Revolution. Professor Domes views the Cultural Revolution as a success for the military only, a drastic defeat for the genuine Maoist Left, and an ironic victory for Liu-ist bureaucratic rationality, moderation and order."

### 2. Communism and the Communist Party

#### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

CHINA IN 1975, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 3 (May-June 1975) 1-19.

"Early 1975 brought some major developments in the People's Republic of China. For the first time in nearly a year and a half, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee met in plenary session, and shortly thereafter the first National People's Congress since 1965 took place. This Congress approved a new State Constitution to replace that of 1954. The following two articles explore the meaning of these events and their aftermath. Mr. Lieberthal looks at the implications of what occurred for the internal political situation in China, and Mr. Hsueh analyzes the character of the new Constitution." The Internal Political Scene, by

Kenneth Lieberthal; and the New Constitution, by Chun-tu Hsueh.

CHINA—THE POLITICS OF REVOLUTION AND MOBILIZATION, by Victor C. Falkenheim, in *DYNAMICS OF THE THIRD WORLD: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE*, ed. by David E. Schmitt. Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, 1974. pp. 266-313.

One of the aims of this chapter will be to describe the Chinese model of political development. China in Revolution—Politics As a Dependent Variable; Mobilization and Development—Politics As an Independent Variable; and Assessment of the Chinese Approach to Political Development.

CHINA'S DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE, ed. by Michel Oksenberg. New York, Praeger, 1973. 227 p.

"This . . . collection of essays suggests that Maoism most notably teaches a belief in the possibility of radical change and a commitment to the humanization of bureaucracy."

COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM: THE SOVIET, CHINESE, AND YUGOSLAV MODELS, by Gary K. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Co., 1976. 463 p.

Ideological Forces; Cultural Background and Historical Setting; The Revolutionary Years; The Ideological Setting; The Party, Leadership, and Competition; Political Processes; Building the Communist Man; Strategies of Economic Development; Foreign Policy and International Affairs. With selected bibliographies.

A FACTIONALISM MODEL FOR CCP POLITICS, by Andrew J. Nathan, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January/March 1973) 34-66.

"The purpose of this paper is to delineate and argue for the applicability of a 'factionalism' model of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite politics."

MAOISM VERSUS KHRUSHCHEVISM: TEN YEARS, by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 385 (September 1973) 102-105 plus.

"Of the two Communist antagonists, the Soviet Union continues to achieve the greater successes. This is natural, since it commands . . . not only . . . great military power . . . but the vast supplies of energy materials and industrial raw materials that give it major importance for industrialized countries. Thus in economics, its chosen field of competition, the U.S.S.R. occupies a notably more favorable position than China."

REFLECTIONS ON THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, by Chang Kuo-Sin, in *Asian Affairs*, (November/December 1973) 80-90.

"Analyzing the Chinese Communist Party's Tenth Party Congress, held in Peking during August 1973, Mr. Kuo-Sin observes that the emphasis was overwhelmingly on internal—i.e., intra-Party—affairs rather than on China's international concerns. Specifically, the Congress' function was to repair the damage to the Party's infrastructure caused by Lin Piao's 'ambitionism' and 'betrayal' in 1971. In fact, says Kuo-Sin, the surprising delay in convening the Congress was due to the unexpected extension of the 'witch hunt for Lenists—a sort of McCarthyism in reverse.' Mao Tse-tung felt that while he might have the strength to impose his will on a nation, he might not be strong enough to control his successor. The Congress' use of the 'unity and victory' theme, constituting the fourth repetition of this theme since Mao assumed power, indicates something of the real state of affairs. The Party that has conquered and united the world's most populous country, says Kuo-Sin, has not managed to achieve a desirable unity and victory within itself. Mao's attempts to remedy the situation and incorporate his own politics into the constitution have become increasingly obvious. All members in any way associated with Lin Piao were ousted from the Party's reconstituted Central Committee, another example of Mao's obsession with purges which have long been a major element of his 'perpetual revolution.' An unexpected move, however, was the reinstatement of numerous veteran Party members who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Another outstanding point in the unity and victory theme was Chou En-Lai's reference to Mao's oft-repeated theory that revolution is the 'irresistible historical trend,' and idea usually linked with Mao's continual warning on the danger of another world war . . . The Congress' . . . surprising development was the announced phenomenal increase in Party membership from a reported 17 million in 1969 to 28 million. If true, it would seem to indicate an unprecedented relaxation in Party admission procedures. Such an assumption, in turn, gives rise to speculation about diluted ideological dedication and revolutionary fervor. Previous Chinese leaders feared just such developments. If, Kuo-Sin concludes, the 11 million new members are inadequately dedicated ideologically, the consequences could be erosion of the Revolution and a change in the nature of Chinese communism."

*b. Ideological and Doctrinal Aspects*

THE CHINESE MIND: A PROBING AND EXPLORATION, by Clyde B. Sargent, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 5 (January 1972) 41-49.

"Mao Tse-tung cites the prime importance of 'people power' in any international power equation

and chides the United States for its overemphasis on materialism. Historical characteristics that dominate the Chinese concept of 'people power' are group orientation, hierarchical patterns in interpersonal relations, the supreme role of ideology, and perceptions of superiority. These attitudes grafted upon Mao's perceptions of Marxism are creating a new Chinese mind."

HISTORY AND WILL: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT, by Frederic Wakeman, Jr. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. 392 p.

"That Maoism is not simply Marxism is apparent. But what else is it? And how was it developed? These questions of intellectual history are investigated in a . . . treatise whose topics range from Wang Yang-ming to Immanuel Kant and whose data include Mao's annotations in his old schoolbooks as well as the strategy and tactics of his political campaigns."

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, ed by Chalmers Johnson. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1973. 390 p.

"Does ideology grow out of experience? Or is experience guided by ideology? Crucial questions, not only for the leaders of ideological movements but for scholars who study this leadership. These ten papers provide some enlightening discussions."

'PEOPLE'S WAR': VISION VS. REALITY, by Hammond Rolph, in *Orbis*, (Fall 1970) 572-587.

"When Lin Piao, designated successor to Mao Tse-tung, published his 1965 article entitled 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!' there was worldwide speculation on the future role of Maoist revolutionary warfare and the 'people's war' thesis in international affairs. Lin Piao considered Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war to be of value not only to Chinese efforts but to the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed nations. Today's Chinese media claim that people's wars are 'victoriously developing' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, although the internal weaknesses of these areas make them attractive targets for revolutionary insurgents, they have produced relatively few successful Maoist-type wars. It is important to remember that Mao's concepts include political and psychological facets as well as guerrilla action. The three stages of Mao's people's war—armed struggle, liberation of contested areas, and establishment of a people's government under communist leadership—were successfully advanced in China because historical circumstances were conducive to their development; but this does not necessarily hold true for other countries. In order for the Maoist doctrine to be fully applicable, these



essential elements must be present: (1) a powerful cause springing from indigenous sources; (2) solid organization and unity of purpose in the country's Communist Party; (3) inability of the country's existing government to counter an insurgent threat; (4) existence of geographic and demographic features conducive to guerrilla warfare; and (5) a source of outside support and sanctuary for insurgents. In addition, fortuitous outside events—such as the Japanese collapse in 1945 which was advantageous to China—are extremely useful . . . The future place of the Maoist revolutionary war concept in world affairs is unpredictable. Much will depend on the degree of emphasis it receives from Mao's successors and on China's future relations with those countries which offer potential for acceptance of revolutionary ideas. It is also possible that China's current strategy and foreign policy away from the revolutionary concept. However, the same factor could boost China's confidence in promoting revolutionary war in those areas nearest its borders and in which its strength could be most effectively used. The greatest factor in determining the future of Maoist revolutionary strategy will be China's decision whether to concentrate on internal development and modernization or on Mao's mission of establishing a new order in the world."

*c. Communist Elites*

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, by Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales). Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1972. 398 p.

"Edgar Snow's ex-wife, . . . journalist herself, updates her 1937 'Red Dust' interviews with expanded biographical material on the individuals who were to become China's new elite."

ELITES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1972. 672 p.

"Who gets what, when, how? That's the political question. To answer it, using only biographical dictionaries published by foreigners, smuggled newspapers, old telephone books and personnel directories, is the task of the . . . sinologist. And then he must ask: Why these men and not others? and Who's next?" This book deals with China's elites, based on such research.

A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY FACTIONALISM, 1949-1973, by William Pang-yu Ting, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 10 (October 1975) 896-910.

"Factionalism among the elite of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been the subject of debate and controversy among students of Chinese politics ever since the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The core of this debate is the disagreement among scholars over what is the main,

underlying referent of factional loyalty within the PLA organization . . . This paper endeavors to find a compromise between these two apparently opposing views of PLA factionalism. Conceptually, we will try to demonstrate the following. First, old field army association may still be a valid explanatory tool to explain PLA factional strife at the central level, but not at the regional level. Second, the central and regional PLA elites may represent two distinct elite systems characterized by differences in promotion, recruitment procedures and degrees of system stability (terms to be defined later). Third, the central PLA elite system as a whole exhibits traits that may be tentatively described as a cybernetic system."

*d. Claim to World Communist Leadership*

CHINA: RATIONALIZING THE DEMONIC. THEORETICAL, APPROACHES TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST WORLD VIEW, by Jay H. Ginsburg, New York, Vantage Press, 1972. 153 p.

"The author . . . examines the way in which the 'superego' of traditional China 'was destroyed, selectively desymbolized, and a new one established in its place, legitimized and maintained . . .' He also provides a description of the Chinese-*Weltanschauung* and a 'cybernetically based model of the Chinese closed belief system with regard to the Peking government's view of international relations and world forces'."

CHINA'S POLICY OPTIONS, by Robert E. Rogers, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 8 (August 1974) 3-11.

"Since the ending of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's, domestic dissonance and fractionalism within the Chinese leadership over policy issues have been largely muted. Simultaneously, the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the self-appointed ideological champion of Marxist-Leninist revolution in the world appears to have gradually decreased. The reassertion of Chinese nationalism has been both causal and derivative of the Sino-Soviet split and of the principal threat which China now faces: possible overt military attack, including nuclear strikes, from the USSR. With a more stabilized domestic political base, but weak economic and military capabilities to confront the USSR alone in a war, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have initiated a revisionist foreign policy of seeking international support, primarily through detente with the United States, but also among the smaller powers of the third world against both the Soviet Union and the United States. The new orientation in Peking's foreign policy is tending to reduce the scope of China's earlier global ideological con-

cerns to those of pragmatic national self-interest at the Asian regional level. The policy includes greater political and economic accommodation, increased trade and state-to-state diplomacy, and a growing appearance of flexibility in China's external relations, notably in the United Nations. A significant question in regard to the future stability of the Asian region is whether the new policy pursued by China is a long-term commitment or merely a tactical shift which may be reversed at any time. Two significant aspects of Chinese foreign policy—nuclear armaments and the economy—will have particular bearing on the policy options China will follow."

PEKING AND WORLD COMMUNISM, by Joseph C. Kun, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 6 (November-December 1974) 34-43

"Chinese interest in establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) as something of a *primus inter pares* among the countries of the developing world has been widely recognized by Western observers of the Communist scene, but these observers now tend to question the sincerity of Prague's (and, indirectly, Moscow's) expressions of serious concern about alleged Chinese attempts to establish Peking as the center of the Communist movement. A variety of changes that have taken place in China's internal and foreign policies during the last decade appear to have effectively excluded such a possibility. The Chinese leadership, which in the early 1960's may have entertained illusions about setting up a rival Communist movement with Peking as its coordinating center, seems to have abandoned that plan entirely. This article will explore in depth the present circumstances and the factors that have produced them."

#### *e. History*

CHINA, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER, 1917-1972, by Richard C. Thornton. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973. 403 p.

"Thornton's work emphasizes the attempts by outside forces to influence the Chinese Communist movement. Thus Roy, Borodin, Mif, Neumann are more prominent in its origins than Mao; Acheson and Vincent more responsible for its military victory than Chiang or Lin Piao; and Russian, American and Japanese geopolitical pressures more likely to determine the nature of future policy than internal debate."

A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1921-1949, by Jacques Guiller-maz. New York, Random House, 1972. 477 p.

"As a diplomat in Peking in the 1930's and the 1940's, this author has drawn on many experiences and his personal acquaintance with many of the leaders of the revolutionary movement to

write an authoritative history of the Chinese Communist Party down to its victory over the Nationalists in 1949. In addition to a full bibliography that cites both Western and Chinese sources, the book contains over forty photographs."

THE VLADIMIROV DIARIES—YENAN, CHINA: 1942-1945, by Peter Vladimirov. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1975. 538 p.

[Peter Vladimirov (1905-1953) was the senior Soviet political advisor to the Chinese Communist Party in the dual capacity of Comintern liaison officer and TASS News Agency correspondent at the CCP headquarters in Yen-an. He later served as Soviet consul-general in Shanghai during 1948-1951 and, just prior to his death, as Ambassador to Burma.] "Originally published in the USSR several years ago, this work offers unique insights into Mao Tse-tung's final consolidation of power during the 'Cheng Feng' ideological campaign of 1942-1945. It also exposes a long-standing Soviet practice of employing its diplomats and journalists on intelligence-gathering missions abroad, even to friendly communists governments and parties. For the current time period, Vladimirov's journal illustrates the high quality of Soviet propaganda in its ideological struggle with Maoist China. A considerable complement of academic works by Soviet Sinologists, as well as a number of 'first-hand' accounts by former Soviet politico-military advisors to both the CCP and the Nationalists and by ex-Comintern agents to the CCP and pro-Soviet Chinese Communists in exile, have appeared over the past decade. Without exception, both the academic works and the memoirs have consistently reflected the anti-Maoist focus of Soviet propaganda . . . Vladimirov's diary may be a bit too sophisticated for general readers, but it is a boon to students of Sino-Soviet affairs and China specialists alike for its perspectives on the CCP during the key years just prior to the Civil War of 1946-1949. While the current anti-Maoist line is apparent throughout, it is also true that Vladimirov was a highly-skilled Soviet observer for that time. Consequently, the work does much to show that the Sino-Soviet conflict had origins much earlier in time and deeper in mistrust than is popularly estimated in the West."

#### *3. Power Struggles*

##### *a. Miscellaneous Aspects*

CHINA ERUPTS, in *Newsweek*, v. 87, no. 16 (19 April 1976) 38-40.

"Not even a nationwide campaign of pro-government demonstrations last week convinced anyone that China would be immune to future turmoil once Mao Tse-tung passed from the scene. The violence in Tien An Men was cloaked in mystery. It seemed to be an open clash between the country's



two loose ideological blocs, the pragmatic moderates and the Maoist radicals, but China specialists in the West disagreed over who had touched it off or why . . . The Politburo's action was equally ambiguous. The radicals won a clear-cut victory with the ouster of First Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, a protege of Chou En-lai who has been denounced by the radicals as a 'capitalist roader.' But no other moderates were purged, and one key ally of Teng's, Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien, re-emerged in public after a three-month absence in what was widely understood as a conciliatory gesture to the moderates. . . . For the immediate future, the political shifts seemed unlikely to produce dramatic changes in China's policies. Chinese officials went to some lengths in meetings with Westerners last week to stress that the cornerstones of Peking's foreign policy—rapprochement with the U.S. and Japan and a continued hostility toward the Soviet Union—would not change. But the long-term prognosis may not be quite so soothing to America."

THE CHINESE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, by Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 2 (March-April 1974) 1-13.

"Recent developments in China point to two unmistakable conclusions. The first is that the spirit of the Cultural Revolution has not been extinguished; the second, that the leadership at the top remains unstable and tension-ridden. With respect to the first, it is clear that while the massive campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is not a second Cultural Revolution in the sense of rampaging Red Guards, uncontrolled and violent factional strife, paralyzed government and party hierarchies, and military rule, the campaign has nevertheless reinvigorated Cultural Revolution policies in the cultural, educational, and—to a lesser extent—economic realms. The controlled, disciplined movement now under way in China may, in fact, conform to what Mao originally intended in 1966, before the Cultural Revolution escaped his control and turned into a purge of bureaucrats by mobs that were partly out of hand and partly manipulated from above. Regarding the second, the spectacular return of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the rise of Wang Hung-wen to the third spot in the party hierarchy, the transfers of military commanders, the continual shifting around of individual leaders in officially-released photographs—all are signs of persistent uncertainty. More important indications are the large number of unfilled positions at the center and in the provinces and the failure, as yet, to convene the long-postponed National People's Congress. One suspects a continuing struggle over the positions involved. While this much seems

relatively clear, the reasons for the staying power of the Cultural Revolution and the continued instability at the top are a great deal more difficult to pin down. Indeed, observers may differ even on how to go about explaining these phenomena. As will be seen below, there are a number of valid perspectives from which to analyze them. This paper will examine the current struggles from a somewhat broad and historical perspective. More specifically, it will probe the two following questions: What is the makeup of the political spectrum in China today—not necessarily as the Chinese might describe it, but as seen by Western observers? And how does this perspective shed light on the current situation?"

THE NEW ANTI-CONFUCIAN CAMPAIGN IN CHINA: THE FIRST ROUND, by Peter R. Moody, Jr., in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 4 (April 1974) 307-324.

"The attention of students of Chinese affairs has been attracted by the attacks on Confucius and defenses of the traditionally deplored Legalist school of thought which began a few weeks prior to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, particularly since these discussions took place in an atmosphere of generally intensifying political debate. The scholarly consensus seems to be that these discussions represent a leftist attack upon the position of Chou En-lai."

NEW TREMORS IN CHINA, by Victor Zorza, in *Atlas*, v. 22, no. 11 (November 1975) 9-13.

"Signs of a power struggle, worker unrest, and Russophobia" in *Communist China*.

POWER STRUGGLE ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND; THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION, by James C. H. Shen, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v. 41, no. 17 (15 June 1975) 516-620.

"I view with considerable misgivings the recent spate of news accounts, analyses, columns and editorials in the American news media regarding the Fourth National People's Congress held in Communist China in January, with its quota of misguided interpretations, erroneous assumptions, fallacious judgments and misleading conclusions. The mere fact, however, that the People's Congress finally took place after many years of unexplained deferment was significant in itself—but significant in what ways? What did the People's Congress portend? Did it mean, as some on-the-spot correspondents claimed, the 'virtual retirement' of Mao Tse-tung? Did it mean, as inferred by some columnists, that the People's Congress ushered in 'an era of unity' after a decade of 'Cultural Revolution' turbulence? Did it mean, as virtually unanimously certified, 'a victory for the moderates' under Chou En-

lai? Or, did it portend the 'warning power' of Chiang Ching and her faction of 'Radicals?' Today, in my talk, I shall try my best to answer these important questions, and through them, give you my version of what occurred at the People's Congress and the meaning of the new Constitution and the various other decisions adopted by the People's Congress."

THE SURGING ANTI-MAO AND ANTI-COMMUNIST TIDE ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND—AND THE CHAOS THERE REVEALED BY A SECRET DOCUMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, by Olive Du, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 1 (January 1975) 31-36.

"Intelligence organization in the Republic of China recently obtained from the Chinese mainland a secret document of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee. Designated as Chung Fa No. 21, the document exposed chaos on the Chinese mainland with such facts as industrial recession, transportation bottleneck, boycott of communist cadres, against the campaign of criticising Confucius and criticising Lin Piao, and the change of this campaign into an anti-Mao and anti-communist movement by the people. The document Chung Fa No. 21 (1974), released by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, was entitled 'A Circular from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Holding of Revolution and Promoting of Production.' . . . The document was dated July 1, 1974. Facts revealed by this document are summarized."

TENG TAKES CENTRE STAGE, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 4 (23 January 1976) 24-28.

"After two years as Chou En-lai's stand-in, Teng Hsiao-ping has taken a centre stage in Peking's political hierarchy. But who is Teng? And what problems, if any, will the stocky politician face in the wake of Chou's death? Leo Goodstadt reports."

- b. *Mao's Cultural Revolution: Its Dynamics And the Aftermath*
- (1) *Miscellaneous Aspects*

(LI)—AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED BY AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS, by Lt. Comdr. Richard M. Gabryelski. Newport, R.E., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An assessment of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, its background, origins, character, and implications for future Sino-American relations. The background, origins, and character of the Cultural Revolution are traced and discussed with the intent of providing a balanced

understanding of the nature and functioning of the Chinese Communist state. Some of the theories which purport or attempt to explain the origins, nature and functioning of the Cultural Revolution are examined; however, the primary attempt has been to provide a balanced view of the place of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the history and practice of the Chinese Communist Party. The manifest instability of the Chinese Government and its highest levels is the lesson which must be learned from the Cultural Revolution, and would argue for great caution in any future Sino-American relations."

AUTHORITY, PARTICIPATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA: ESSAYS BY A EUROPEAN STUDY GROUP, ed. by Stuart R. Schram. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1973. 350 p.

"Eight essays gauge the Cultural Revolution as not merely a power struggle but as a genuine social and cultural revolution. Factory management, educational life, local 'politics'—all are significantly different, and the difference is in the direction of democracy."

CHINA IN FERMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, ed. by Richard Baum and Louise B. Bennett. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1971. 246 p.

"This collection of articles and documents provides perspectives on the origin, progress and aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Included are contributions by Lin Piao and the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China relating to the Cultural Revolution. There is also a short chronology of events from 1957 to 1970."

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA, ed. by Thomas W. Robinson. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. 509 p.

"Five members and consultants of the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation discuss various aspects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: power, policy and ideology; Marxist theories of policymaking and organization; Chou En-lai's activities and position; the Foreign Ministry and foreign affairs; and events in the agricultural and rural sphere."

THE DYNAMICS OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL COALITION, by Chong-Do Hah, in *World Politics*, v. 24, no. 2 (January 1972) 182-220.

"The greatest convulsion in Chinese politics since 1949, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, has subsided. The Ninth National



Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in April 1969, seems to have been one of the final steps in consolidating the fruits of the revolution. It involved, above all, an unprecedented scale of upheaval in the party leadership and the party organization . . . The main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by systematically analyzing and interpreting the dynamics of the revolution on the basis of a framework for analysis of political coalitions."

**MAOISM IN ACTION: THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION**, by C. L. Chiou. New York, Crane, Russak, 1974. 176 p.

"Outline-history detailing the events of the last decade in China. It contains contrasting theories of their interpretation and the ideologies that inspire the theories, and offers a view of events that sees Mao as neither inspired ideological hero nor power-hungry politician, but something in between."

**MAO'S REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE**, by Richard H. Solomon. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972. 604 p.

"This study of China and her twentieth-century revolution employs techniques of social science analysis . . . to come to an understanding of the Chinese revolution on Chinese terms. In the Preface, written in the summer of 1970, Professor Solomon, of the University of Michigan, states that the events during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's helped 'to confirm one of the basic assumptions behind this study: that of the endurance of the traditional culture in the revolutionary era as an impediment to efforts to promote rapid social change. Mao himself evidently saw the revolution as vulnerable to the resurgence of traditional patterns of behavior and social values as they endured in the personalities of the Chinese 'masses' and individual Party leaders. In what seems likely to be the last great political battle of his career, Mao appears determined to preserve his influence on the course of China's revolution by removing from power leaders opposed to his policies, and by attempting to institutionalize his 'thought' in new organizations of political power'."

**MAO'S WAY**, by Edward E. Rice. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972. 596 p.

"The author, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Consul General in Hong Kong, traces the course of Mao's Cultural Revolution from the . . . vantage point of an analyst of political tactics. Of the future, he concludes that its course will be conservative and its leadership will be the army."

**RADICALS AND RADICAL IDEOLOGY IN**

**CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION**, by Parris H. Chang. New York, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, 1973. 103 p.

"Traces the developments leading up to the 1966 revolution, describes the political machinations of the movement, and profiles the major participants."

**THE REVENGE OF HEAVEN: JOURNAL OF A YOUNG CHINESE**, by Ken Ling. New York, Putnam, 1972. 413 p.

"The pseudonymous author, a student leader in the Cultural Revolution who fled China when the military reasserted control, depicts a world of cruel and unpredictable factional conflict."

#### (2) *The Aftermath*

**BEFORE AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION**, by Frederick C. Teiwes, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 58 (April/June 1974) 332-348.

"A three-week tour of China, comprising visits to two factories, two communes, the Shanghai docks, four universities, a teachers' college, an urban residential area, a May 7 Cadres School and a children's palace, as well as discussions with county cadres in Linhsien and municipal cadres in Sian, provides a slender basis for confident generalizations, especially as this was my first visit to China and pre-Cultural Revolution comparisons for specific institutions are dependent on the recollections of my hosts. Nevertheless, I gathered a considerable amount of information which allows some tentative judgments on several key areas—leadership and personnel, Party and administrative organization, administrative centralization/decentralization, and remuneration policies. I shall also examine three 'new born things' which have been vigorously defended in recent months—educational reform, the programme of sending educated youth to the countryside, and May 7 Cadre Schools—to see what changes they represent from pre-Cultural Revolution policies."

**CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE UNRESOLVED SUCCESSION CRISIS**, by Franz Michael, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 315-333.

"The Cultural Revolution appears to have been the most momentous and extensive phase—so far—in Mao Tse-tung's struggle to assert his power and policy over the Chinese communists. This struggle has continued ever since Mao assumed his leading position at the Tsunyi conference in 1935 and later in Yen-an days. What distinguishes the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from the many previous purges within Chinese communism is not only its size, the number of victims and the violence accompanying it, but also the shift of target from the realm of personalities to the fun-



damental institutional structure of communism: the Communist Party. To understand the post-Cultural Revolution phase in China it is essential to recall some of the factors that led to this extraordinary—even unique—move by a communist leader to tamper with the chief ingredients of Lenin's recipe for communist revolution and power control; i.e., Mao's decision to place himself above the basic doctrinal concepts of Marxism-Leninism by challenging the role of the party as the vehicle of historical truth."

CHINA 1974: A NEW COURSE?, by Franz Michael, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 125-129.

"How . . . [the new upheavals, the ideological debacle, the tug of doctrinal war, the new mini-cultural] revolution will be institutionalized is still unclear. The question of China's future has not yet been answered. Can Mao's continued revolution be reintroduced 10, 20, or 30 times, to a utopian ending?"

CHINA RETURNS, by Klaus Mehnert. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1972. 322 p.

"An account of China after the Cultural Revolution by a German political scientist who has spent several years in China and similar lengths of time in the USSR and the United States, and whose most recent visit to China was in 1971 when he traveled through fourteen of that country's twenty-nine provinces. In the first section, he records his impressions of China, based on contact with the people. He then draws some conclusions regarding Chinese political, economic and social dynamics; describes the consequences of the Cultural Revolution; and provides introductions for sample documents from the mass of directives, homilies and other types of cultural propaganda now pouring from the presses of the Chinese People's Republic."

CHINA'S LOST GENERATION: THE FATE OF THE RED GUARDS SINCE 1968, by Miriam and Ivan D. London, in *Saturday Review/World* (November 1974).

"The Londons discuss Mao Tse-tung's once politically potent Red Guard and the aftermath of its calculated destruction. From 1966 until 1968, the young of China's cities enthusiastically swarmed to Mao Tse-tung's call for a 'cultural revolution.' These youths became the pawns in a strategically planned campaign against the late Liu Shao-ch'i. The indoctrinated children, believing the revolution's purpose was to void the old society in order to build a new one, destroyed the Communist party apparatus and shut down secondary schools and universities, while intimidating and physically abusing (even killing) teachers. Despite official pleas to 'grasp the revolution and promote production,' factory

operations were halted and production limited as rival factions evolved. Even by 1967, when they began to realize the deceitful purpose of the cultural revolution, their enthusiasm was not deterred. They were children wielding adult power, never perceiving that this power spree would forfeit their own future. Millions of previously docile students became obsessed with obtaining power for their own factional groups via protest and violence . . . In order to diminish the threat posed by the rebels, Mao began, in the Fall of 1967, to use previously restricted military force to recapture stolen weapons; in 1968, he ordered the youth back to the schools to 'carry out the revolution' there. The 'Facing-the-Four-Directions Office' was then created to disperse the students. Its title derived from the basic areas in which they were to be employed: rural villages, border areas, mines and industry, and basic social units such as hospitals and stores. The purpose was to break up factional rivalries, dreams of higher education, technical training or future betterment were over . . . These banished 'little generals' of the Red Guard now wait impatiently to follow any power source that will release them from their rural 'imprisonment'."

CHINESE IDEOLOGY AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by Merle Goldman, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 68-69 plus.

" . . . There has been no resolution of the underlying tensions that have persisted since the Cultural Revolution between those who advocate ideological methods and those who advocate economic methods to achieve China's modernization. China is once again at a crossroads . . ."

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CHINA'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL ORDER, by Byung-joon Ahn, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 58 (April/June 1974) 249-285.

"Since her traditional empire collapsed China has experimented with many political institutions. After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) imposed a revolutionary one-party regime, the pattern of political order has shifted from one form to another. Intra-Party conflicts preceded these shifts, of which the Cultural Revolution represented the culmination. But in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution another shift is taking place, so it too has raised a series of important questions about Chinese politics."

CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN CHINA, by Charles Bettelheim. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974. 128 p.

"Contentends . . . that the Cultural Revolution in China began the process of transforming an age-old

pattern of division of labor into a newer pattern in which workers are also drawn into the tasks of management."

**MILITARY REGIONS AND PROVINCIAL PART SECRETARIES: ONE OUTCOME OF CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION**, by Gordon Bennett, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1973) 294-307.

"During the Cultural Revolution, 'Party life' (tang ti sheng-huo) was temporarily interrupted when leading members of Communist Party organizations at all levels were called (or 'dragged') out to defend themselves against the criticisms of revolutionary mass factions. As these issues were resolved, new coalitions formed and Party organs were carefully restructured to reflect the new distribution of power. The analysis here is of the 158 secretaries and deputy secretaries elected by the new provincial committees of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 4 December 1970 and 24 August 1971. It yields some unexpected findings."

**PARTY, ARMY AND MASSES IN CHINA: A MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH**, by Livio Maitan. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1976. 373 p.

"...—Criticism of the Chinese revolution-in-progress . . . Maitan perceives inherent contradictions in the path being followed by China's revolutionary architects, especially in the encouragement of 'popular democracy' at the same time that control is being securely maintained by the party and state leadership. The cult of Maoism, in particular, comes under severe attack for its suppression of all meaningful participation by the masses."

**POLITICAL REHABILITATION OF CADRES IN CHINA: A TRAVELLER'S VIEW**, by Parris H. Chang, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1975) 331-340.

"When a memorial service was held in Peking on 14 December 1972 for the deceased Teng Tzu-hui, member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly Vice-Premier and Director of the Party's Rural Work Department, among those present to pay their last respects were a dozen or so veteran cadres making their first known public appearance for several years. Likewise, some 30 ranking civilian and army officials appeared publicly for the first time since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at a Peking reception given by the Ministry of Defence on the eve of Army Day, 31 July 1972. These men were among the victims of the Cultural Revolution—they were accused of a variety

of serious political crimes, humiliated in public, and dismissed from their posts in the Party, government, or army. However, their appearance in public now, even on such purely ceremonial occasions, serves to indicate that they have been restored to good political standing. Some of them have already been assigned to new posts, but the present positions of most others have not yet been revealed."

**TWELVE MILLION SCHOOL GRADUATES SETTLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE**, in *Peking Review*, no. 2 (9 January 1976) 11-13.

"Twelve million school graduates have gone to live in the countryside since the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. This is a fruit of the Cultural Revolution and a victory for the Chinese youth movement in upholding Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."

c. *The Fall of Lin Piao*

**THE ANTI-LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN: ITS MEANING AND PURPOSES**, by Parris H. Chang, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 10 (October 1974) 871-886.

"There is no question that the campaign 'to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius' is a manifestation as well as a product of political conflict within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—conflict which has been gathering momentum since the Party's Tenth Congress, held in August 1973. To better understand the campaign and the political struggle, it is necessary to analyze the issues of contention in the CCP leadership and identify the participants in the conflict."

**THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP CRISIS: DOOM OF AN HEIR**, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 863-879.

"In this article we will explore all issues that could have brought on the confrontation between Lin Piao and his associates in the central military machine plus a minority of supporting regional military leaders, on the one hand, and the coalition of the old administrative and diplomatic cadres, the majority of the regional commanders, and the remnants of the Cultural Revolutionary Left, on the other hand. But first we will review the course of developments that resulted in the downfall of the Lin Piao group."

**THE FALL OF LIN PIAO**, by Philip Bridgham, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 55 (July/September 1973) 427-449.

"It is now nearly two years since, according to the official Chinese account, Lin Piao died in a fiery plane crash in Mongolia following an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mao Tse-tung and seize power in China. In the interim, Peking has attempted to explain this bizarre episode both to its



own people (by means of a number of secret Party documents, many of which have become available in the West) and to the outside world (by means of an official statement and discussions with foreign statesmen and the foreign press). Although there is much about this episode which remains unclear to the outside observer, an attempt will be made in the discussion which follows to explain (as the personal view of one observer) what has come to be known as the Lin Piao affair."

THE POLITICS OF LIN PIAO'S ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP, by Ying-Mao Kau and Pierre M. Perrolle, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 6 (June 1974) 558-577.

"In this article the events and issues concerning the Lin Piao case will be examined in terms of general patterns of political-military relationship and military coups. Then additional long range implications of the political events of 1970-1971, as we are able to reconstruct them, will be raised."

WHO KILLED LIN PIAO?, by Charles J. V. Murphy, in *National Review*, (8 June 1973) 625-634.

"... Reconstructs the strange circumstances of the death of China's former Defense Minister, Lin Piao... Believes that the US can best exploit the new power relationship between China, the Soviet Union, and the US if it understands the events in China which led to this situation... The Cultural Revolution inadvertently made the army a governing force and created a rift between Lin and Mao over national policy. Murphy speculates that the struggle between military and revolutionary factions in the government became crucial when Mao's suspicions were aroused that his protege, Lin, had no intention of returning the dominant power to the party's civilian arm, let alone to him. Lin, disenchanted with the failure of the Cultural Revolution, committed himself to the belief that China should present itself as 'the revolutionary model' before the world. He believed that revolutionary movements across the world would be offended if Nixon was given the red-carpet treatment. Although Lin agreed with Mao and Chou En-lai that the USSR was a greater danger to China than the US, he differed with them on tactical questions of just how flexible to be in ending China's diplomatic isolation and resuming relations with non-communist countries. Murphy further speculates that Lin was determined to capture Mao, seize control of the country and regenerate the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, Lin's scheme had the support of the Soviet Union, with the promise of 'temporary nuclear protection.' Mao's purge of Lin's generals in 1970 snuffed out Lin's hope for a new revolution, his claim to succession, and his control over the military. By 1971, Mao and Chou En-lai were moving toward rapprochement with the UN and the US, a policy not

in tune with Lin's mold of thought. On September 13, 1971, some 160 miles within the Outer Mongolian frontier, a British built Trident jet, destined for Irkutsk, USSR, with nine passengers, attempted a forced landing and crashed. First reports maintained that all aboard had perished and the bodies were unrecognizable. Since that time mystery has surrounded the fate of Lin Piao and four of his top confidantes, including his wife. In November of 1971, Chou En-lai released his own version of the hapless escape: 1) There was no doubt about Lin's presence in the Trident. 2) The reason for Lin's escape was his engagement in conspiracy to make himself head of state. 3) An 'accidental' factor in the flight abroad resulted in his subsequent death. Murphy infers that Lin Piao probably did not plan a general revolt and planned only a palace coup. One-third of the 300 senior generals and admirals in the Chinese armed forces subsequently vanished without explanations, apparently purged as participants in a 'conspiratorial clique.' In addition, the top echelons of the Politburo have seen 13 of their 29 members become non-entities..."

#### d. The Fall of Teng Hsiao-Ping

HOW THE MASSES LEARNT TO HATE TENG AND LOVE HUA, in *The Economist*, v. 259, no. 6921 (17 April 1976) 39-40.

"An inside view of how China is suddenly organized to be unanimously behind its new prime minister."

RADICALS' LAST STAND, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 11 (12 March 1976) 13-14.

"The radicals have never moved so fast. With indecent haste, only two months after the funeral of Premier Chou En-lai, they have managed to reduce Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping from China's most powerful man to its most vilified personality. Temporarily at least, they have the upper hand. With the 'moderate' officials rehabilitated since the Cultural Revolution deprived of Chou En-lai's protection, the radicals, centred around Chairman Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, are making their last stand. The reason for their haste is obvious. Outnumbered and outgunned by Teng's supporters, they know they can only hope to succeed while Madam Mao can speak with her husband's proxy, Mao, a frail 82, has already suffered one stroke and has problems with his speech."

TENG TAKES A BACK SEAT FOR HUA, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 8 (20 February 1976) 12-14.

"The four-week interval between Hua Kuofeng's nomination by the Communist Party caucus as China's Acting Premier and its announcement to the world saw the orderly develop-



ment of a major ideological campaign designed to boost the country's agriculture and improve bureaucratic efficiency."

VICTORY FOR THE LEFT (CHINA), in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 16, (16 April 1976) 8-9.

"The Politburo leftists have pulled it off at last. Late on April 7 they were able to announce the Central Committee decision agreed to by Chairman Mao Tse-tung to strip Teng Hsiao-ping of his posts of Vice-Chairman of the Party and Deputy Premier, and replace him officially by Hua Kuo-feng. Hua also becomes First Vice-Chairman, which makes him second only to Mao. The sole doubt lingering in the triumphant leftist mind must be whether Hua will continue to be their man now that he has been given so much power. Teng, after being groomed for three years by the late Chou En-lai for the premiership, was kindly allowed to keep his Party membership 'to see how he behaves in the future'."

#### 4. Leaders and Leadership

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE CHANGING LEADERSHIP IN CHINA, by Robert S. Elegant, in *Current*, no. 171 (March 1975) 57-60.

"Communist China has just thrown the rascals in. All but three of the 39 ministers of the country's new cabinet were denounced a few years ago as criminals and traitors. The reasons for the abrupt change are the recent history of China and the character of Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The mesmeric figure of Mao, a rich farmer's son with a patchy formal education, dominated China's 'proletarian movement' for exactly four decades. It was January 1935, when he asserted his supreme power at the rigged Tsunyi Conference of the Communist Party's Central Committee. It was January 1975, when he was removed from all effective power and stripped of most personal prestige by a Central Committee conference and the Fourth National People's Congress in Peking. The 81-year-old Mao did not attend those recent meetings, perhaps because he knew they were rigged against him."

THE FIRST LADY OF PEKING POLITICS, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 1 (2 January 1976) 26-27.

"Chang Ching is Mao Tse-tung's fourth wife; it is her second marriage (her previous husband rose to ministerial rank after the Chinese Communist Party's victory in 1949). Now 60, she arouses fierce debate among foreign observers who see her as a sinister radical in Peking palace politics. At home, she is even more controversial—at the height of her fame in 1966-67, constant warnings were issued by

national leaders against elements who sought to slander her."

THE LONG REVOLUTION, by Edgar Snow. New York, Random House, 1972. 269 p.

"The last notes of the journalist who, more than any other, has explained China to the world. These interviews (with Mao and Chou in 1970), political sketches and travel jottings are . . . the same . . . as their predecessors."

THE OLD GUARD WITHERS AWAY, by David Bonavia, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 93, no. 29 (16 July 1976) 18-19.

"The 'Grim Reaper' visited China's Politburo once again on July 6, carrying off the 90-year-old grand old man of the Chinese Revolution, Marshal Chu Teh. A former warlord and cured opium addict, Chu Teh was one of the leading military commanders of the Chinese Communist Party from 1927 until 1954, and his contribution was in its own way as important as that of both Mao Tse-tung and the late Chou En-lai. His death is the latest in a series which has thinned out the ranks of the 'gerontocracy' to the point where the word has almost ceased to be applicable any more in China."

POLITICAL PROFILES: WANG HUNG-WEN AND LI TEH-SHENG, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 57 (January/March 1974) 124-131.

"The spectacular rise of Wang Hung-wen, who was elected as second Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 and now officially ranks number three in the Party hierarchy behind only Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the first Vice-Chairman, Chou En-lai, has aroused a great deal of speculation. The biographical sketch . . . is an attempt to consider, and answer where possible, some of the questions raised about his personal and political background . . . Another promotion to the top ranks of the leadership during the Tenth Party Congress was that of Li Teh-sheng, who has become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and one of the five Vice-Chairmen of the Party. Although Li's rise to political prominence was neither as fast nor as spectacular as that of Wang Hung-wen and has not received much attention in the western press, his inclusion in the small group of China's top leadership may have greater political consequences. For one thing, Li's latest promotion demonstrates the efforts of the radicals in Mao's inner circle to co-opt supporters and allies among the military leaders and to extend their base of power into the military."

POWER AND POLICY IN CHINA, by Parris H. Chang. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975. 270 p.

"A study of Chinese politics, emphasizing the leadership's relative moderation, openness, and flexibility in decision-making, as compared to other communist governments."

b. *Mao Tse-Tung, 1893-1976*

CHAIRMAN MAO, THE EXORCIST, by Alexander Ross, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 12 (19 March 1976) 10-13.

"While not yet as chaotic as the Cultural Revolution, the present campaign against 'capitalist roaders' conjures up foreboding pictures of what might still be if the radicals and moderates have a showdown. Behind the scenes, the ageing Mao Tse-tung appears to be pulling the strings, throwing out secret directives in his own unique style, trying to put to rest—once and for all—China's 'monsters and demons.' Mao is, from past experience, an exorcist extraordinaire, having had to deal with those Party faithfuls whose line did not quite coincide with his own."

CHINA AFTER MAO, in *Newsweek*, v. 88, no. 12 (20 September 1976) 30 plus.

"Mao Tse-tung was one of the towering figures of this century, and his death last week, though long anticipated, was a watershed event. In a ten-page report, *Newsweek* focuses on the impact that Mao's passing may have on China and the rest of the world. Columnist Joseph Kraft contributes an exclusive eyewitness account from Peking, and the magazine's veteran China watcher, Sydney Liu, describes Mao's physical decline in the last months of his long life. The news stories are accompanied by a text-and-photo biography of China's legendary leader."

MAO AND CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION, by Stanley Karnow, New York, Viking, 1972. 592 p.

"Who was Mao? What did he want to achieve and how far has he succeeded in attaining it? No other political leader in recent history excites so much interest, and about no other leader is so little known to satisfy that interest."

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: MAO, THE PARTY, AND THE PEASANT QUESTION, 1962-66, by Richard Baum, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975. 222 p.

"Mao's struggle with the . . . tendency toward conservatism and corruption among officialdom was desperate but, in the long run, possibly unavailing, the author suggests, because the human tendency to self-interest is endemic. This study clarifies the tactics of that struggle, from the first conflict with Liu to the last-ditch appeal outside the Party which became the Cultural Revolution."

c. *Chou En-lai*

DEATH OF CHINA'S POLITICAL GIANT, by Thomas Robinson, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 4 (23 January 1976) 30-34.

An obituary of Chou En-lai, 1898-1976.

5. *The Media and the Political Process*

COMMUNICATIONS AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA, by Alan P. L. Liu, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. 225 p.

"In assessing the role the mass media play in promoting national integration in Communist China, the author points out that it reflects three objectives: structural integration (between the party and the Media), developmental integration (close coordination 'between the stages of economic development that China went through from 1949 to 1966 and the changes of content in the mass media'), and the linkage of the media with face-to-face communications. He considers the third function a major innovation of the Chinese communists because it enables them to overcome regionalism, illiteracy and the lack of a common language."

METHODS OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY, by Michel Oksenberg, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 57 (January/March 1974) 1-39.

"Why does the Chinese communication network assume its particular form? What are its origins? How effective is the system? What new insight does the study yield into the nature of the Chinese political process? Clearly, this article cannot explore all these questions exhaustively. What I propose to do, therefore, is to give a brief overview by describing how each type of communication works, considering their interrelationships, discussing the variations, and, in the concluding section, evaluating the significance of my findings."

6. *Succession: China After Mao*

AFTER MAO WHAT? ARMY, PARTY AND GROUP RIVALRIES IN CHINA, by J. P. Jain, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1975. 276 p.

"This book discusses . . . the question of political control over the People's Liberation Army, the interaction between the party and the PLA, the role of the Army, the problem of regionalism, the many aspects of 'leadership' in the Chinese context, and the present state of group rivalries within the Chinese leading echelons. The author presents new insights on trends for the future, which are highly relevant to the post-Mao era." With appendixes, tables, charts, and select bibliography.

CHINA AFTER MAO, by Anthony M. Paul, in *The Reader's Digest*, v. 106, no. 638 (June 1975) 119-123.

"Explores the physical resources and



limitations of China today." See The Reader's Digest, September 1975, for the second part of this article.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION: WAITING FOR MAO TO DIE?, by Franz Michael, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 65-67 plus.

"The most important basic factor facing us in the Communist world is the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict . . . Domestic conflict . . . appears to continue under the surface [in Communist China]. And with the age and obvious decline of Mao Tse-tung, the moment of truth may be at hand. If conflict leads to inner division, the opportunity for Soviet intervention may be near. This may be the opportunity for which the Soviet Union is waiting—the political opportunity in which military force could be used as a leverage of power."

CHINA'S MILITARY, by Parris Chang, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 101-105 plus.

"As the linchpin of the Chinese political system, Mao, at 80, is precariously holding the pieces together . . . Without an arbiter of Mao's stature, the future Chinese leadership will experience more conflict. Under such circumstances, the PLA may again be thrust into the political arena . . ."

HEIRS APPARENT: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN MAO DIES?, by Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973. 236 p.

"A . . . survey of the often seemingly anonymous second-rank power-holders in China. The Bloodworths' best-bet prediction is an alliance of civilian pragmatists and military professionals which will swing the country away from Maoism toward the sensible and conservative heresies of Liu Shao-chi."

(LI)—MAO'S SUCCESSION: WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, by Maj. Karl S. Smith. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 71 p. (Research Study.)

"This study examines the problem within the People's Republic of China that will occur when Mao Tse-tung dies and his successor is chosen. This work also makes certain limited predictions of future events that may occur based upon historical precedent. U.S. foreign policy will indeed be affected by the selection of Mao's successor, but primarily within the confines of Congressional appropriations. The study concludes that no one person will be named who will succeed Mao and that whomever is elected or accedes to the Chairmanship of the Party will have only two characteristics. He will be a

Chinese and he will be or have been a general in the People's Liberation Army."

(LI)—THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AFTER MAO TSE-TUNG. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1974. 114 p. (Professional Study.)

"China today is the most populous country in the world and is increasing her position in the world arena of power and influence. As the world moves from a bi-polar power position to one that is multi-polar, there is great interest in what course the People's Republic of China (PRC) will choose after the demise of Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of this great nation. It is the object of this report to examine the political environment, the economic structure, and the military strength of China today with the purpose of speculating about her future role in the world scene."

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CHINA, by Thomas W. Robinson, in *World Politics*, v. 27, no. 1 (October 1974) 1-38.

"There are at least four approaches useful in predicting what will happen in China after Mao. The 'environmental approach' stresses that the Chinese setting—physical, cultural, economic, and international—will govern the courses taken by political actors. The 'personality approach' is the opposite, stressing that people, not their surroundings, will determine succession politics. The 'societal approach' postulates that it is society (defined as the social environment, including influences from Chinese culture, history, and the structure and operation of Chinese social-political-familial-economic institutions) that is the operationally significant variable. Finally, the 'politics approach' assumes that politics itself is the central concern of Chinese life, necessitating a search for general 'rules' of politics in China to project the future. These approaches and their implications are each examined in detail, with the conclusion that none is adequate of itself to explain post-Mao politics in China. By combining them, however, it is possible to periodize developments after Mao. Four stages are envisaged. An initial stage would last about three months, during which a collective leadership would form. A second, transitional phase, possibly lasting several years, would be marked by the advent of major policy questions not solvable by Maoist precedent. A third phase would see the emergence of a new leadership, probably operating on a factionalist model. Finally, a fourth stage would be defined after China has returned to normal, 'gotten over' Mao's death, and when events are no longer viewable in terms of 'succession politics'."

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHINESE



SUCCESSION, by Morris Rothenberg. Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami, 1975. 32 p. (Center for Advanced International Studies, Occasional Papers in International Affairs.)

"In Moscow's view, . . . China's complex and nationally divided society lacks the strong, cohesive leadership necessary to consolidate the party and guide the country through the transition period following Mao's death. The Soviets, citing historical power struggles, e.g., between professionals, regional factions and family clans, perceive the potential revival of warlordism and local separatism as contributing to the disintegration of a collective leadership. Moscow believes that China's army has traditionally provided the route to power through armed conflict. Even with the divisiveness following Lin Piao's disgrace and the presence of local and regional power bases, the military remains strong in the Chinese Communist Party's central bodies and economic management. Rothenberg depicts the army's role as being inflated by an emphasis on war preparations, rising Chinese nationalism and Sino-Soviet border disputes. China's main unifying force is its conflict with Moscow. The Soviets, seeking extensive changes in Sino-Soviet relations, are encouraged by China's domestic problems and conflict over Sino-US relations. Moscow views Sino-US relations as a divisive issue among Mao's possible successors, with already-existing problems involving Taiwan, a US-PRC rivalry in Japan and Chinese support of various foreign 'extremist' movements. The Soviet Union foresees the possible downfall of China in the weakness of its working class, a desire for rapid growth, exaggerated nationalism, excessive military aspirations and its myopic focus on Mao's leadership. During the transition, the Soviet Union will most likely probe for accommodation with China by settling border disputes through peaceful means and creating a joint anti-US pact. By fostering peaceful coexistence demonstrating the US weakness and lack of will to aid its allies, Rothenberg predicts, the Soviet Union will be able to influence Peking's new leaders. If the Soviet offers are rejected, then Moscow will continue its attempt to isolate China."

UNCERTAIN PASSAGE: CHINA'S TRANSITION TO THE POST-MAO ERA, by A. Doak Birnett. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1974. 387 p.

"With the aid of some social science and some speculation, the . . . China-watcher predicts: a succession crisis; emergence of a collective leadership, Maoist formally, pragmatic in fact; a strong, increasingly professional military holding the trump cards in Chinese politics; continued economic growth with increasing pressure on Maoist values;

activism and moderation in a foreign policy dominated by a defensive concern for security."

WHO AFTER MAO?, by Mark Gayn, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 51, no. 2 (January 1973) 300-309.

"The crisis of succession . . . makes the present stability seem less enduring. What men or groups will take over in Peking? Will they be moderates or radicals? At what pace, and how, will they want to lead China into the dangerous tomorrow? Will they turn to isolationism, in which they can settle their domestic problems (as Mao did in 1966-69), or will they fling wider the gates to the outside world, which can provide the means for China's dramatic leap into the twentieth century? And if they finally choose the latter course, will they turn to Japan, the United States or the Soviet Union as their principal partner? . . . But the crisis of succession cannot help but create uncertainty—for China's own elite as for the major foreign nations seeking rapprochement with China. Remarkable progress has been made in establishing contacts since the 'Spring of Ping-Pong' in 1971. But can the United States, Japan or West Germany be certain that the arrangements now being made will be observed by the younger policy-makers who will replace the old guard? Will these men view the Soviet Union with the relentless hatred of the present leaders? And, finally, how much of the present policies, and of Maoism itself, will survive the passing of the magnificent Old Revolutionaries?"

### C. Military Posture

#### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE BALANCE OF TERROR, by Russell Spurr, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 19 (7 May 1976) 26-28.

A review of the military power of the various Asian countries, including both Chinas.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN CHINA, by Angus M. Fraser, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 70-74.

The author assesses Communist China's military posture (the army, air force, navy, nuclear forces, improvements and trends, armament potential) and states: "It is inconceivable that Peking could arrive at a position in which it would have the sheer physical power to dominate the U.S.S.R. or the United States."

#### 2. National Defense and Security

CHINA'S DEFENCE BURDEN, by Sydney H. Jammes, in *Survival*, v. 18, no. 1 (January/February 1976) 18-22.

"Recently a number of Western observers have noted what appears to be a slowdown in the

Chinese defence effort. In the article . . . [the author] . . . analyses the decline in Chinese defence spending and weapons procurement and suggest that it is a product of the Lin Piao affair and the pressures for spending in other areas. The article is included in a compendium of papers released by the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress . . . China: A Reassessment of the Economy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 July 1975."

**CHINA'S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: ITS INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**, by Parris H. Chang, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 10 (October 1975) 49-55.

"Does a 'military-industrial complex' exist in the People's Republic of China? If so, what does it consist of? How and through what channels does it take part in the deliberations of China's national security policy? To what extent has it affected the national security policy output? This article is a preliminary attempt to examine these questions."

**CHINA'S SECURITY OUTLOOK; PAST AND FUTURE**, by K. Subrahmanyam, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 8 (August 1975) 63-76.

"Whenever a nation develops into a major power, it also develops a sense of insecurity. The only exception to this in history is perhaps the United States which is protected by the Atlantic and the Pacific on two sides and by the relative weakness of all the other states in the Western Hemisphere. The development of a new nation into a major power necessarily entails modification of the international status quo, and consequently the concerned nation has to cope with the inertia of the international system and the general hostility of the existing powers. Viewed in this light, China's sense of insecurity from the day the People's Republic was proclaimed was understandable. Further aggravating this sense of insecurity was the US intervention in the civil war and the Chinese leadership's perception of the latent Stalinist hostility to the rise of China as a power . . . Looked at from any point of view, over the long term, China's security outlook is fraught with grave uncertainties if the Chinese leadership is to persist in its present course."

**COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER**, by Yuan-li Wu. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. 53 p.

"An analysis of Communist China's prospects and policies and their implications for US interests." Contents: The Chinese Domestic Scene; and International Implications of Peking's Defense and Foreign Policies.

**THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE CHINESE THREAT**, by Col. Angus M.

Fraser, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 100, no. 2 (February 1974) 18-25.

An estimate of the military strength of the People's Republic of China as presented by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Congress in their annual assessment. "While . . . China's nuclear weapons program poses no immediate threat to the US mainland, the Chinese have deployed, or can deploy, missiles capable of incinerating many important Asian targets and . . . a major part of metropolitan Russia."

**PEKING: BEEFING UP THE GREAT WALL**, by Russell Spurr, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 25 (18 June 1976) 26-29.

"The Chinese armaments industry has been subjected to the same external and internal pressures which have shaped national policy over the past decade. Fear of a threat from the United States and the later recognition of a more immediate Soviet menace lead to dispersal of defence plants away from the coast and from Manchuria. The break with Moscow also deprived Peking of invaluable military technology and fostered increased self-reliance. The idea that China was capable of producing its own weaponry became particularly fashionable during the Cultural Revolution but was later modified under objections from the professionals who knew the extent of China's weakness no matter what strategy was adopted to repulse a Soviet invasion. Political arguments over the tactical role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), doubts about China's ability to achieve anything approaching parity with the Soviet Union, and sheer lack of economic resources have since frustrated or slowed down the more ambitious plans for military modernisation, with the prestigious exception of development of a nuclear deterrent and, to a lesser extent, a ballistic delivery system."

**SECURING CHINA'S DEFENCES**, by Clare Hollingworth, in *The World Today*, v. 31, no. 12 (December 1975) 506-516.

"China, who recently celebrated the twenty-sixth anniversary of Communist rule, has also strengthened party control over the military apparatus. But there is a continuing debate over the role of the armed forces and past and future defence strategy, especially in relation to the Soviet threat."

### *3. Military Balance*

**A FRESH LOOK AT HOW US POWER STACKS UP AGAINST RUSSIA, CHINA**, in *US News & World Report*, v. 78, no. 9 (3 March 1975) 55-56.

"American, Soviet strategic forces are about equal," says the Pentagon—but the picture changes when it comes to armies, navies, air arms . . . China



is no immediate threat to the US with strategic nuclear weapons. But its huge Army poses a danger to US allies throughout Asia . . . [A] chart . . . shows how key forces of the three powers compare, as presented to Congress in annual military-posture statements by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high officials. The defense leaders described the picture in . . . detail."

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1974/75: CHINA, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 57, no. 12 (December 1974) 73-75.

Reviews the state of the following in Communist China's defense posture: nuclear weapons, conventional forces, deployment and command, bilateral agreements, GNP and defence expenditure, strategic forces, army, navy, and air force. For an updated review, see: The Military Balance 1975/76: China, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 58, no. 12 (December 1975) 77-78.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1975-1976. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1975. 104 p. (A publication of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.)

Provides the following information on the military balance of both Chinas, among other countries of the world: population; military service; total regular forces; GNP and defense expenditure; strategic forces; Army; Navy; Air Force.

#### 4. Army

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE CHINESE ARMY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: PAST, PRESENT, PROMISE, by Col. Jack L. Mohler, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 3 (March 1975) 58-66.

"Psychological warfare is a traditional weapon for Chinese commanders who, for centuries, have considered it an integral part of their battle plans. Sun Yat-sen included the study of political warfare in the military academy he established for the Chinese Nationalist Army. The concept of Political commissars as advisors to military commanders was added by the Russian Communists when they worked with the Nationalist Chinese after World War I. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has since carried on the system introduced to Chiang Kai-shek's forces to include exporting it to allies such as the North Koreans and North Vietnamese."

THE CHINESE RED ARMY: CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICS SINCE 1949, by Gerard H. Corr. New York, Schocken Books, 1974. 175 p.

"This . . . journalist's book, a popular account based on non-Chinese sources."

##### THE DYNAMIC OF THE CHINESE

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY: REGULARIZATION, 1949-1959, by J. Chester Cheng, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 5 (May 1974) 78-89.

"Among the most intriguing and complex problems confronting the student of contemporary affairs is the role of the military in the modernization of the developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The 'regularization' and 'revolutionization' programs of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 1949 provide the historian with an unusually attractive example of just such a process of modernization."

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND CHINA'S NATION-BUILDING, by Ying-Mao Kau. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973. 407 p.

"The author of this . . . collection of documents on the Chinese army . . . contends that despite continual temptations to Right and Left deviation, the Maoist model of military performance will last as long as the older generation retains power and as long as no other institutions are capable of doing the army's present jobs."

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY: COMMUNIST CHINA'S ARMED FORCES, by Angus M. Fraser. New York, Crane, Russak, 1973. 62 p.

"This work 'seeks to isolate and describe the military characteristics and capabilities that define the operational functions of the PLA,' in the process analyzing and balancing the PLA's strengths and weaknesses against Peking's perception of threats to its security. The author, a staff member of the Institute for Defense Analyses, concludes that China's military is 'directed most particularly to the defense of the realm against the looming threat of the Soviet Union'."

##### b. The Political Officer System

WHO IS THE COMMISSAR: POLITICAL OFFICERS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY, by Kenneth C. Cathey, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 3 (November 1971) 55-72.

"By examining in detail the Chinese political officer system—its origins, how it differs from the Soviet commissar system, and the role of the political officer both in the army as well as in the party—this informative article is aimed at clearing up Western misunderstandings which in the past have led to serious underestimations of Chinese military capabilities. Avoiding many of the shortcomings of the Red army's commissar arrangement, the Chinese political officers seem to have significantly contributed to the combat effectiveness of the People's Liberation Army."

##### c. History



THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES, Kenneth L. Whiting. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University, 1974. 91 p.

"... Traces the historical evolution of today's PLA (People's Liberation Army) from the first half of the nineteenth century to the present time, but concentrates on the years since the Nach'ang uprising in 1927, generally accepted as the birthday of China's modern Army. By the mid-1930s, Mao Tse-tung's Red Army controlled extensive areas in Southeast China, only to suffer extensive defeats by Chiang Kai-shek which resulted in the 6,000-mile retreat euphemistically called the 'Long March.' The Japanese invasion made it possible for the Red Army to return from oblivion. From 1937 to 1945, Mao allied himself with China's growing spirit of nationalism in the face of the common enemy. He emerged from the war with an Army strong enough to drive Chiang Kai-shek off the mainland and to take over the government of China. The Korean war was another fortuitous opportunity for Mao. His intervention in late 1950 won large-scale Soviet help for the Red Army so that, by the time that conflict ended in mid-1953, China had a modern military force. In the late 1950s, unhappy with the Soviet Union's reluctance to give him atomic weapons, Mao broke his ties with Russia and decided to go it alone. By 1964, the Chinese had fission weapons; by mid-1967, they had a fusion device; and today, they have a credible delivery capability. In fact, in all respects, China may well be considered the third strongest power in the world, complete with weapon systems, the research and development establishment to design them, the industrial complex to build them, and the strategic and tactical doctrine to use them."

(LI)—HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCES ON CHINESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT, by Maj. William Powell. Newport, R.I., *US Naval War College*, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"A topical survey and analysis of the historical and contemporary influences on the development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Frequently the PLA is viewed as a modern phenomenon of Communist rule, unrelated to Chinese historical and cultural experience. This concept is evaluated and tested to determine its validity. Concentrating on the period 1935-1970, this study examines parallels between classical and contemporary influences on Chinese military evolution. Topically, the influences of the revolutionary military model, strategy and tactics are examined. The paper finds significant relationship between classical military experience and contemporary PLA development. Contrary to western images of institutional antimilitarism and pacifism,

militant qualities and traditions within Chinese culture are revealed. It concludes that the revolutionary model continues to be the dominant influence on PLA development and the party still controls the gun."

#### 5. Navy

CHINA AFLOAT, by John R. Dewenter, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 4 (July 1972) 738-751.

A great deal of information has been published about the military strategy and forces of the People's Republic of China, some through official Chinese publications, much more through the writings of Western analysts. Most of this information concerns China's massive ground forces, with a respectable amount of coverage given to her air arm and even to her nascent nuclear missile forces. What about China's navy? ... There are several reasons why China's naval forces have received so little attention. The Chinese Navy has been dwarfed by the massive Chinese Army. The air force and navy combined comprise at most about 20 percent of China's military manpower. Secondly, the navy is just now beginning to get its 'head of steam.' Furthermore, it has heretofore maintained a low visibility, operating in waters close to its own shores from bases seldom if ever visited by foreigners, shunning traditional show-the-flag foreign port visits. It has been almost totally ignored in official Chinese press releases. Under this shroud of secrecy, information is simply unobtainable even by the increasing numbers of Western visitors to China."

(LI)—THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY—WHERE TO NOW?, by Comdr. Stanley J. Marks. Newport, R.I., *US Naval War College*, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"A broad look at the history of the Chinese Navy up to the Navy of the present Communist Chinese Government with a concurrent look at the National Interests/Objectives during the period. A rather more detailed discussion is included on the Chinese Communist Navy, as well as the Communist National Interests/Objectives that impact on the Navy for enforcement or support, in order to determine if the Navy will remain a coastal defense oriented force. The paper concludes that the development of a Soviet Blue Water Navy coupled with the claim the Communist Chinese have made to the Senkaku Islands Northeast of Taiwan suggest that a larger, more sophisticated Navy will be required in the future. This larger Navy will permit China to exercise her claim to the Senkakus as well as protect her extensive coastline from any attack."

(LI)—THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE NAVY, by Lt.

Comdr. Ralph Johnson. Newport, R.I., US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of the Chinese Navy and its ability to assist the People's Republic of China in reaching its national goals. One of the more visible facets of China's emergence on the world scene is its maritime activity. The history of the Chinese Navy is examined to ascertain the traditions of Chinese sea power. The P.R.C.'s internal conditions, industrial base, and maritime growth are surveyed to determine the prospects of Chinese sea power. The P.R.C. is building an impressive maritime and naval force that is in consonance with its national goals. The paper concludes that the P.R.C. will probably continue to build its maritime power and will concentrate on a defensive navy. The Chinese merchant marine is also likely to continue to grow and become a competitor on the world market."

THE MIDDLE KINGDOM GOES TO SEA: RED CHINA'S NAVY IS WORLD'S LARGEST, by Frank Uhlig, Jr., in *Sea Power*, v. 16, no. 3 (March 1973) 19-24.

"With good-sized fleets of submarines and coastal combatants and a strong force of shore-based aviation units, the Chinese Navy is designed more for protection than aggression."

THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC NAVY, by Lt. David G. Muller, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 28, no. 4 (Spring 1976) 32-51.

"The Communist Party and government leadership of the People's Republic of China have recognized that development of the Navy required its exemption from the political demands that have been placed on other branches of the People's Liberation Army. Lieutenant Muller describes how the party has exercised ultimate control over the Navy while the service has maintained only the outward appearance of continuing participation in the seemingly perpetual Chinese revolution."

THE PRC NAVY—COASTAL DEFENSE OR BLUE WATER?, by Bruce Swanson, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, (May 1976) 82-107.

"The Chinese Navy has been subordinate to the Army and 'wholly devoted to coastal defense,' . . . ever since the newly established Communist government gave control of its naval units to the Army's Military Region Commanders in 1950. A tentative Public Security Force for coastal defense and security for fishing was established later during the 1950s, and this maritime militia began working closely with the PRC Navy. During the 1960s, Lin Piao began producing technologically advanced submarines and surface combat vessels for China's Navy. Both he and the First Political Commissar of the Navy, Vice Admiral Li Tso-peng who was

responsible for the ship building program, were purged, however, during the Cultural Revolution. Afterwards, the Army regained a great deal of power and naval expansion was curtailed. According to Swanson, an increase in non-military tasks for soldiers, the growing rapprochement with the US, and a reallocation of funds from defense to consumer, agricultural and industrial needs, also contributed to the reduction in shipbuilding after Lin's downfall. Today, China's amphibious arm of the Navy is no longer an elite, marine contingent, and the naval air arm, with a negligible ASW capability, is strictly limited to coastal defense. However, Swanson surveys possible political changes which might alter China's limited naval policy. For example, China supports recognition of a 200-mile coastal economic zone, which includes vast oil resources requiring a short-range blue-water fleet for protection. Also, the possibilities of a rearmed Japan or a pact between Taiwan and the Soviet Union might alter China's present naval policy. The big question, suggests Swanson, is who will succeed Mao. Significantly, he notes, General Lo Jui-ching, who previously advocated naval expansion, reappeared in 1975, while the First Political Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Su Chen-hua, is a reinstated victim of the Cultural Revolution who may yet go the way of the ousted Teng Hsiao-ping. In any case, Swanson emphasizes, a change in leadership, coupled with the rise of aspiring young naval officers, may lead to policies that would take more advantage of the Navy's potential."

#### 6. Air Force

(LI)—THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE: BUILDUP—STATUS TODAY—OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, by Maj. Thomas R. Spears. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 64 p. (Research Study No. 1845-71.)

"The Chinese Communist has the third largest Air Force in the world today, yet does not possess an offensive striking force. This study considers and analyzes the Air Force's growth, doctrine, aircraft inventory, and industrial complex. The report concludes that the Chicom Air Force has little or no offensive potential, mainly due to an outdated doctrine, antiquated aircraft, and a backward industrial base. The study also indicates certain signs which may appear if Red China tries to rectify these ills."

#### 7. Role of the Military in Government and Politics

THE ARMY WAITS IN THE WINGS, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 12 (19 March 1976) 13-14.

"The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is still capable of playing a major role in the present power



struggle in China, but not as effectively as it might have done a few years ago. Immediately after the Cultural Revolution it looked as though the PLA was permanently transforming the State structure; the fall of Lin Piao and the deep divisions this revealed within the Chinese armed forces ended such speculation. The reassignment of Military Region commanders and the rehabilitation of veteran cadres further eroded the army's political influence."

**CHINA'S MILITARY: A GROWING POLITICAL FORCE**, by Ralph L. Powell, in *Air Force Magazine*, (June 1971) 43-47.

"China's military establishment is growing in political importance. The communist dogma that 'the gun must never be allowed to command the Party' has been severely strained, a development that may prove in the long run to be more important than Peking's achievements in nuclear technology. The military's influence has increased both in the Communist Party and in the machinery of government. China's massive, unified armed services, known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), include (1) the largest ground army in the world, 2,600,000 strong; (2) the third largest air force in the world; and (3) a relatively weak navy. All personnel are well trained and highly indoctrinated. All the armed forces were weakened by the withdrawal of Soviet military aid in 1960, but the air force, the most technical of the services, was hurt the most. It is only since the end of the Cultural Revolution that the armed forces have regained some combat effectiveness and renewed their modernization programs. But the greatest strength and the greatest threat of Communist China lie in its nuclear weapons, including the hydrogen bomb, developed in less time than either the Soviet Union or the US took. China's nuclear objectives are to achieve a deterrence against the present nuclear powers, to achieve great-power status, and to become a dominant factor in determining future developments in the Far East . . . China's nuclear capability might also permit it to blackmail its neighbors, as well as other areas not vital to the superpowers. This will depend somewhat for the next decade on whether or not the American people preserve their determination to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent to protect allies in vital areas . . ."

**THE CHINESE ARMY AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION**, by Ellis Jaffe, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 55 (July/September 1973) 450-477.

"It is possible to examine the overall trends which have marked the army's activities on the political scene since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and which will doubtless have a decisive impact on its future role. This article is an attempt

to examine these trends. It will focus on four areas: first, the PLA's intervention in politics, which brought it to a position of power at the end of the Cultural Revolution; second, the effects of this intervention on the army's role in politics, and on politics in the army; third, the consolidation of power by the army after the Cultural Revolution and its impact on military politics; and fourth, the fall of Lin Piao and his associates, and the implications of this purge for the army's political role. In examining these trends the emphasis will be on the army's role in the political power structure rather than on the broader question of its changing function in society."

**(LI)—THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES**. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University Institute for Professional Development, Directorate of Documentary Research, 1975. 91p. (AU-201-71-IPD.)

"The study begins with a brief chapter on the military heritage of China in an effort to point out that the oftquoted aphorism that 'one does not use good iron to hammer out nails nor good men to make soldiers' never really expressed the Chinese attitude toward the military. Then follows a description of the long struggle between the armies of the Kuomintang and those of the Chinese Communists, a struggle that lasted from 1927 until 1949. Once established in power, the Chinese Communist leaders were forced to rely upon the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the conquest and control of Tibet, in the Korean War, and in the present Sino-Soviet hostile relationship. The problem boils down to what is the proper role of the PLA in Communist China. This 'proper place' is complicated by Mao's role in the development and present status of the PLA. Mao, contrary to classic Marxist-Leninist doctrine, saw the peasant as the dynamic force in the Chinese revolution, and he built his strategy and tactics on that assumption. Furthermore, Mao, like Tito, put on the garments of nationalism to gain a mass following, and once in control, he insured obedience through the mechanisms of the Communist Party. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, however, Mao used the PLA, among other devices, to circumvent the Party apparatus, which resulted in a major role for the PLA. Since 1969 the Party has been busy trying to reduce the political role of the PLA. The study concludes with a description of the PLA today: its overall organization, its various operational and regional commands, and its nuclear capability, both actual and potential."

**THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION**, by Lt. Col. George K. Osborn, in *Parameters*, v. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1972) 22-27.



"Discusses the role of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the Political socialization of the Chinese people."

INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN MODERN CHINA, by Robert E. Bedeski, in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 237-256.

"This essay will examine some general aspects of the relationship between domestic politics in China and the external environment. In particular the following thesis will be explored: The Sino-Soviet dispute and a number of other external crises have undermined the credibility of Chinese communist ideology. This in turn has weakened the Chinese Communist Party's dominance of the state. The partial decay of party power has allowed the military to assume greater authority in state affairs in order to prevent chaos and to defend the country from external enemies should China's position further deteriorate. The army's ascendancy could be offset to a considerable extent, however, if Chou En-lai's current diplomatic offensive is successful and brings about a more peaceful setting for China."

MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS GENERALS, by Parris H. Chang, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 9 (September 1973) 19-27.

"One very conspicuous, major characteristic of Chinese politics since the 1960s is the increasing participation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China's political process. It is true that the PLA had been heavily politicized and had performed various nonmilitary functions in China's polity prior to the 1960s. Yet the new political roles assumed by the PLA since the 1960s are decidedly more important, and its intervention in Chinese politics has introduced a new power equation into the Chinese political system. Whereas the PLA acted more or less like a pressure group 'lobbying' the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to protect and enhance its corporate interests, the PLA-CCP relationship underwent subtle but significant qualitative changes in the first half of the 1960s. The PLA, under Lin Pia's stewardship, was transformed into the CCP's competitive institution as it became the object of national emulation after 1963 and rivaled the party in prestige and political ideological correctness. It also became Mao's instrument of power and used by Mao first to apply pressure on, and, then, attack the party bureaucracy."

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA IN THE 1970s, ed. by William W. Whitson. New York, Praeger, 1972. 390 p.

"This collection of eighteen papers on the structure and strength of the military and its political role in post-Cultural Revolution China is a

... contribution to an understanding of political dynamics in Peking. The writers maintain that the new military elite dictates both domestic and foreign policy and forecast continued domination of political commissars by military commanders, as well as the priority of conventional weapons and modernization over nuclear weapons production."

THE MILITARY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN CHINA, by Ralph L. Powell, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 97-102 plus.

"Points out that: 'If both Chairman Mao and Premier Chou live long enough in health and power, they may continue gradually to put the military in its place, but age is a determining factor. In any event ... the military has always been the ultimate bulwark of the regime and an arbiter of power in Communist China.'"

(LI)—MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN SUPPORT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY, by Lt. Col. Thomas M. Kauffman. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The objective addressed in this paper is the aptness of the People's Liberation Army to support the expressed foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. An examination of the historical events and controversies that have taken place within the development period of the People's Liberation Army is portrayed within the text of this paper. There have been periods of extreme opposition to political-military relationships in the past, as well as current generations, that affect the military preparedness of the People's Liberation Army. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that the military, under the leadership of Mao, has a marginal capability to support the foreign policy of China. It further states that if the passage of the reins of power from Mao to his successor is untroubled, at the end of a decade, the People's Liberation Army will have the capability to support a Chinese claim of strategic invulnerability."

(LI)—THE MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA FROM THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO 1971, by Maj. Robert H. Dietrich. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"A study of the influence of the military on the government of the People's Republic of China following the Cultural Revolution. The relationship of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Communist Party is examined in the light of intra-army factionalism and military involvement in the provincial and central organs of government. The Army will continue to be subjected to the dictates of the Communist Party because Mao Tse-tung still

controls the government. After a long period of internal disturbances marked by Army-Party rivalries, it is possible to deduce that present and near future policies will bear a strong resemblance to those of the past. The PLA will remain defensive in nature. Polemics with the U.S.S.R. probably will continue. Pursuit of a Chinese style of socialism will be expanded."

PLA AND THE CRISIS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, by A.H.S. Candlin, in *RUSI Journal*, v. 118, no. 1 (March 1973) 64-70.

"In mid-September 1971 a crisis broke in Peking which was at once, one of portentous gravity for the Chinese regime and also a matter for attempted concealment from the outside world . . . It was essentially connected with the status and the position of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) within the structure of the Chinese 'succession state' emerging from the vortex of the Cultural Revolution . . . After the chaos and widespread depredations of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA had been required to perform a special role of reconstruction and rehabilitation."

REGIONAL MILITARY POWER: THE AFTERMATH OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by Parris H. Chang, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 5 (May 1973) 80-94.

"As a result of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) starting in 1966, a number of significant, far-reaching changes have taken place in China's political system. Among these changes is the redistribution of power among groups and between central and local authorities. To be more precise, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has enormously expanded its political role at the cost of the party and the government, and the provincial authorities which are dominated by the military personnel have acquired a substantial degree of political and economic autonomy vis-a-vis the central leadership. How did these changes come about? What are the meanings of such changes? What is the nature of the central-provincial relationship? How does the central leadership control and elicit compliance from the provincial authorities? What resources are possessed and used by the provincial authorities to counteract the central control? What are possible courses of future development? These are the major questions dealt with in this article."

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE LAST DECADE, by Kenneth R. Whiting, in *Air University Review*, v. 25, no. 6 (September-October 1974) 3-24.

"Mao Tse-tung's famous aphorism, . . . that power flows from the barrel of a gun but that the party must control the gun, seemed more or less reversed in the last part of Cultural Revolution and

its immediate aftermath. Even today, after the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, the extent of the political power still in the hands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which holds the gun, is one of the more intriguing mysteries beguiling China watchers. This article is an attempt to provide a background for the present drama being played out in the People's Republic of China (PRC)."

(LI)—THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Commander George E. Thibault. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"A study to determine the nature of the People's Liberation Army role, and the extent of its influence over the civil sector of the People's Republic of China from 1965 to 1971. The role of the military in developing countries and the traditional role of the military in China are surveyed to establish comparative models. The progressive increase in direct military involvement in Chinese society since 1949, particularly in the areas of politics, education, and the economy, is examined in detail. The paper finds that military involvement, traceable to the Kuomintang of the 1920's, has increased slowly until the 1956-1969 Cultural Revolution when the People's Liberation Army took over complete control of the country to reestablish order. The military is now heavily represented on all levels of government and in key positions throughout the economy. It concludes that this increase in military influence will exert a stabilizing force which will permit China to solve her domestic problems and modernize at a more rapid rate."

(LI)—THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM, by Lt. Col. John T. Poisier. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1975. 90 p. (Professional Study.)

"A discussion of the role of ideology in the decision making process of the individual and an analysis of the communist Chinese political spectrum introduce a review of the historical development of the Chinese political system. Emphasis is placed on the political activities of the military leadership from 1950 to the end of the Great Leap Forward. Analyses of the Cultural Revolution and the Anti-Confucius Campaign, concluded by a review of the Fourth National People's Congress, held in January 1975, lead into the author's conclusions on the role and status of the Chinese military leadership in PRC politics. The report ends with the author's views on the likely course of events after the death of Mao Tse-tung."

#### 8. Strategy and Tactics

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

#### CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC



THOUGHT; THE STRATEGIC PREMISE OF PROTRACTED WAR, by Alexander Atkinson, in *RUSI Journal*, v. 118, no. 1 (March 1973) 60-64.

The author "attempts . . . to explain this aspect of Chinese insurgent strategy, quoting freely from the works of Mao Tse-tung, in the hope that this will contribute to the understanding of this special form of warfare."

CHINESE WAYS IN WARFARE, ed. by Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974. 401 p.

"A Harvard symposium of 1969 provides seven case studies in Chinese military history and an . . . introductory summation which stresses the Chinese insistence on the ends, not the means, of warfare: the goal is to change an opponent's mind; violence is not always the best technique."

MAO'S PROTRACTED WAR: THEORY VS. PRACTICE, by Lt. Col. John W. Woodmansee, Jr., in *Parameters*, v. 3, no. 1 (1973) 30-45.

"Examines Mao Tse-tung's theory of protracted war that had little effect on the expulsion of the Japanese from China."

*b. Psycho-Chemical Warfare*

PSYCHO-CHEMICAL WARFARE: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST DRUG OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WEST, by A. H. Stanton Candlin. New Rochelle, N.Y., Arling House, 1973. 540 p.

"Examining the current use of narcotics as a weapon in political warfare, this study focuses specifically on Chinese involvement in the world pattern of opium and narcotics trading and the impact of the international drug trade on the American public. Maps of each Chinese province and the 'golden triangle' of Southeast Asia show major areas of poppy cultivation, the location of heroin factories, and the routes by which drugs are smuggled around the world."

*9. Nuclear Capabilities*

CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER IN WORLD POLITICS, by Leo Yueh-Yun Liu. New York, Taplinger, 1972. 125 p.

"The author takes a . . . look at China's thermonuclear intercontinental capacity and sees these consequences: the vigor with which Chinese foreign policy goals are pursued will increase; the United States and the U.S.S.R. will accelerate their own programs to defend against two potential opponents rather than one; India probably, and Japan possibly, will feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons; alliances will break up as security guarantees are less credible."

CHINA NUCLEAR DRAGON, by Lt. Comdr. Scott Allen, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 6 (June 1972) 43-49.

"When Communist China detonated its first crude atomic bomb, Americans and Russians could smugly remind themselves that one bomb does not a stockpile make. But, that was eight years ago."

CHINA'S EVOLVING NUCLEAR DETERRENT, by Charles H. Murphy, in *Survival*, v. 14, no. 3 (May/June 1972) 122-128.

"How far has China progressed in building-up a credible nuclear deterrent? . . . [The author] . . . claims that China could acquire a limited but credible second-strike capability in five to seven years" Extracts from an article in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1972.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL STALLS THE SALT TALKS, in *Business Week*, no. 2329 (4 May 1974) 100.

"An impasse faces the U.S. in the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, largely because of Soviet fears over China's rising nuclear power. U.S. negotiators at SALT II now concede that there is practically no chance that the Russians will make any concessions while they feel threatened by the Chinese . . . China already has sufficient intermediate- and medium-range missiles, bombers, and fighter-bombers to block a preemptive first strike by the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chinese are expected to test a 5,000-mi. intercontinental missile later this year. Without a brake on China's nuclear arsenal, the Russians are not likely to go beyond the missile-limiting agreements of SALT I and actually agree to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons."

CHINA'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, by Michael S. Minor, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 6 (June 1976) 571-579.

"China's program of nuclear development can conveniently be divided into three separate phases. The first phase, from 1950-1958, is characterized by heavy Chinese reliance upon and cooperation with the Soviet Union for financial, military, and technical support. In the period from 1959 through 1963, China consolidated its efforts to become virtually self-sufficient in all phases of nuclear weapons research, development, engineering, testing, and production. The period from 1964 to the present is denoted by actual testing and deployment of nuclear weapons."

CHINA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND US REACTIONS IN THE "POST-DETENTE" ERA, by William T. Tow, in *Military Review*, v. 56, no. 6 (June 1976) 80-90.

"The United States is entering into its third century with a foreign policy precariously structured on an intricate and fragile concept of 'detente' with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) . . . However, the PRC has seemed to



recognize that the overriding issue now confronting both the United States and China is how best to check the rising tide of Soviet global strategic and political power . . . Clearly, the United States could best deal with the Chinese nuclear problem from a position of unquestionable strategic strength which would be more respected by the PRC. China should not be given the opportunity to decrease US influence in Asia by emphasizing the reality of US inability to guarantee the security of its Asian allies. US security should not be inextricably dependent on a questionable Soviet indifference to US military assistance buttressing Chinese defenses on the Sino-Soviet border. The Factors of uncertainty and of possible Chinese technological surprise are paramount risks in any US 'quasi-alliance' toward a nuclear China. The United States cannot afford to base its own strategic force assessments on calculations susceptible to these type of factors."

**THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY**, by Maj. Alfred K. Richeson, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 1 (January 1973) 13-32.

"The year 1972 may well become the date that future historians use to mark the re-emergence of China as a world power. During this year, the representatives of the People's Republic of China (PRC) occupied their seats in the United Nations, and President Nixon, by visiting Peking, signaled the beginning of a new era in Sino-American relations. As the world's attention is once more directed toward China, it is appropriate again to take note of the PRC's nuclear program. Many analysts have examined this program in an attempt to answer the question, 'What will be the Chinese nuclear capability in the future? Such an approach assumes that the Chinese will attempt to develop their nuclear capability to the maximum extent of their ability. However, I do not feel that this assumption is valid. It is my contention that the Chinese will continue to develop their nuclear force only to the extent that they are convinced that such capabilities will be useful—that strategy will determine capabilities. For that reason, I have chosen to emphasize Chinese nuclear strategy, rather than capabilities. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine the changes in Chinese nuclear strategy that have taken place since 1945 and to explain why these changes have occurred."

**FUTURE CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES**, by Maj. Alfred K. Richeson, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 2 (February 1973) 2-18.

"Many analysts have examined the Chinese nuclear program in an attempt to answer the question, 'What will be the Chinese nuclear capability in the future?' Such an approach assumes that the Chinese will develop their nuclear forces to

the maximum of their ability. However, I do not believe that this assumption is valid. It is much more likely that the Chinese will develop their nuclear capability only to the extent that they are convinced that such forces will be useful in the future. Therefore, before one can predict future Chinese capabilities, one must analyze future Chinese nuclear strategy and doctrine. Only then can one predict, with any accuracy, future Chinese nuclear capabilities. This approach is based on the assumption that strategy will determine capabilities. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to answer two questions. First, what will be the most probable Chinese nuclear strategy for the 1970s and 1980s? And, second, what will be the impact of that strategy on the rate and direction of the development of the Chinese nuclear capability?"

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHINESE POLICY**, by Harry Belber. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973. 37 p. (Adelphi Papers no. 99.)

The Context (Foreign Relations, Economics, Domestic Politics); The Force; The Strategy; Aims? (Deterrence, Arms Control, World Politics); Appendices (Chinese Fears of Soviet Attacks, China's Nuclear Weapon Tests, China's Earth Satellites).

#### 10. Military Education

(LI)—**THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN COMMUNIST CHINA**, by Maj. John A. Renner. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"This paper is an analysis of the military educational system in Communist China. Although there have been many studies of the People's Liberation Army, little attention has been given to the military educational systems which are essential to the professional and technological development of the officer corps. The greatly increased political power of the military in China makes it necessary for the United States civilian and military leadership to understand the impact of education on the thinking of the military elite. While the paper strives to deal mainly with the military educational systems for officers with the PLA, it has been necessary to include a brief historical overview of China's educational history to aid in understanding how the current systems developed. In addition, the impact of the military on the civilian educational institutions of China since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is discussed. The paper shows how the politicizing of the educational system has not only changed the institutional aspects of the PLA, but has reshaped the values, behavioral norms, career patterns and technical skills of a

significant number of individuals who at some point in their lives have come in contact with the military. It concludes that 'professionalism' will have to overtake 'politicalism' in the military schooling system if China is to truly modernize its armed forces and that the PLA will create a more secular, technically-specialized society in the long term."

#### 11. Military Intelligence

CCIS (COMMUNIST CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES), by David Harvey in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Digest*, no. 11 (1975) 14-16 plus.

The first of a two-part study of the Communist Chinese Intelligence Services. The second part appears in no. 12 and touches on current aspects of the CCIS.

#### D. Communist China and the World: Foreign Policy and International Relations

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

CHINA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, by Robert A. Scalapino, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 2 (January 1974) 349-385.

"Among the issues on which Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill differed, none was more pregnant with meaning for the future than their respective assessments of the coming international role of China. The American President saw China as a potential major power, a force that would bulk large in the postwar era, particularly in Asia. The British Prime Minister regarded China as an 'emerging society,' to use the vernacular of today, one certain to be beset by multiple internal problems for the foreseeable future and hence incapable of sustaining a consistent, forceful international position. In retrospect, one can say that vital elements of truth lay with both assessments, and from this fact stem the complexities of Chinese foreign policy today. At the outset, therefore, let us focus briefly upon those contradictory elements of power and weakness that give to China her unique qualities, and shape in such considerable measure Chinese attitudes and policies in the international arena."

CHINA AND THE CHINESE THREAT SYSTEM, by Arthur Huck, in *International Affairs* (October 1973) 617-623.

"After 20 years of groundless concern about a Chinese threat, . . . suggests that Western analysts would be well-advised to concentrate instead on the Chinese perception of threats to themselves and the possible dangers inherent in those perceptions . . . There appears to have been an important change in the Chinese threat system. Although Chinese foreign policy has not dramatically reversed itself, as the Nixon visit might suggest, it seems to be

placing more weight on the Soviet Union's 'imperialism,' betrayal of socialism' and 'aggressive' intentions under the guise of maintaining collective security. China insists that it has no intention of playing power politics or of becoming a super-power. Instead, its foreign policy is based on three 'antis': anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism and anti-equilibrium (i.e., a basic distrust of the traditional Europe balance-of-power approach to achieving peace). China's 'ideal' world consists of nation-states of different sizes, but all equal and all subscribing to 'peaceful co-existence.' The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia shocked Chinese leaders and caused them to review their Party policy on imperialism. The result was a renewal of emphasis on Chairman Mao's 'strategic plan' for dealing with imperialism: isolating the main enemy through tactical alliances with lesser enemies. Reassessments of the American imperialist threat in light of the Vietnam 'non-settlement,' and of the 'new Japan,' seemed to satisfy their requirements for establishing such tactical alliances . . . While he does not consider the present state of Sino-Soviet relations as overly threatening, Huck warns that if each of the two becomes convinced that the other is its primary enemy, miscalculations of their relative strengths could encourage disastrous military solutions. Moreover, while China does not favor balance-of-power arrangements, it may be pressured into supporting such arrangements and possibly even into fighting a war to preserve them, if it perceives the prevention of Russia's rise to world dominance as a necessity."

CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, by Shao-Chuan Leng, in *World Affairs*, v. 138, no. 4 (Spring 1976) 267-287.

"The People's Republic of China (PRC), with her great power potential and revolutionary regime, must be considered a key element in the ever-changing state of contemporary international relations. This paper attempts to discuss the PRC's role in the international system by examining her perception of world order, her global strategy and operational tactics, and her interactions with the established international rules and structure."

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, by Sydney D. Bailey, in *Contemporary Review*, v. 220, no. 1276 (May 1972) 225-230.

The author reviewing China's past and present policy, and projecting into the future, states that "President Nixon's visit to China symbolized the beginning of the third phase of China's emergence from isolation."

CHINA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY, by Michael B. Yahuda, in *The World Today*, v. 28, no. 1 (January 1972) 14-22.



"The main planks of Chinese foreign policy today are not essentially new. They can be traced at least as far back as 1954-55. The fundamental approach of the Chinese to the outside world and their understanding of the forces which shape the currents and tides of international affairs have not basically changed. What has changed is the international environment affecting China, the Chinese perception of new dangers as regards Japan, and the heightening of 'contradictions' in the capitalist world. These changes have come at a time when Chinese foreign policy makers (including the recently deposed highest level leaders) have been seeking to recover from the diplomatic nadir of the effects of the Cultural Revolution on foreign policy."

**CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE VICTORIES IN INDOCHINA**, by Michael B. Yahuda, in *The World Today*, v. 31, no. 7 (July 1975) 291-298.

"The triumph of the revolutionary forces in Indochina has been welcomed by the Chinese as of great historic significance. The events in Cambodia and South Vietnam are the first major victories for a People's War since those won by China herself in the 1940s and by the Vietminh in North Vietnam in the early 1950s . . . Regarding the international politics of East Asia, the humiliation of the United States, while welcome in a revolutionary sense, also poses problems to China in the immediate strategic and tactical senses. In the view of the Chinese leaders, the immediate dangers to China and to all independent and sovereign countries in the Asian Pacific arena come from the Soviet Union rather than from the United States. Thus Chinese leaders have long since dropped their opposition to the US presence in Japan and China's media have often defended new US naval deployments in the Indian Ocean as responses to the initial expansionist moves of the Soviet Union."

**(LI)—FACTORS INFLUENCING FUTURE PRC FOREIGN POLICY**, by Maj. Daniel T. Mattioli. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 36 p. (Research Study.)

"Attempts to determine the future foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have been speculative due to the fact that authoritative documents are not accessible. This study proposes that an examination of factors influencing PRC decision makers can provide an insight into likely courses of action that the PRC may pursue in the future. The factors considered are: (1) the permanence of the Sino-Soviet conflict; (2) continued US withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and (3) Japan's objectives in Southeast Asia. The conclusions drawn by this study show that these factors will be resolved in favor of the PRC. As a result,

the PRC is afforded the opportunity to pursue her objectives in a peaceful manner."

**NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by Lt. Col. James H. Buck, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 12 (December 1972) 25-37.

"This discussion is limited to national objectives in the foreign policy field."

**RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST: A CONTEMPORARY CHRONICLE, 1953-1966**, by Fred Halliday. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 360 p.

"A . . . selection of the late Isaac Deutscher's articles and essays on current affairs from 1953 to 1966."

**SALT: THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND**, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B. Rhineland. New York, Free Press, 1974. 361 p.

"Book on the SALT I accords, in which ten recognized experts explore all facets of SALT: the policy-making process in Washington and Moscow; the perspectives on SALT I as viewed from Europe, China and Japan; the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic arsenals and the details of the agreements; and the task ahead in SALT II and beyond. Glossary, bibliography and appendix."

## 2. Foreign Aid

**CHINA'S ECONOMIC AID**, by Wolfgang Bartke. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1975. 215 p.

"A monograph which lists all of China's foreign aid projects and briefly analyzes their impact. Most favored projects: textile mills, medical groups. Most favored recipients: Pakistan, Tanzania. General effectiveness: high."

**CHINA'S FOREIGN AID: AN INSTRUMENT OF PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY**, by John Franklin Copper. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976. 197 p.

*The Roots of China's Foreign Aid Diplomacy: China's Aid to Communist Bloc Nations, Asian Nations, Middle Eastern Nations, and African Nations. With tables and bibliographic note.*

## 3. Relations with Africa (Including Foreign Aid)

**AFRICA AND THE DEFENCE OF THE WEST**. Paris, Le Monde Moderne, 1975. 142 p.

A symposium in which is included throughout discussions of Communist China's interest and influence in Africa.

**CHINA AND AFRICA, 1949-1970; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by Bruce D. Larkin. Berkeley University of California Press, 1971. 268 p.

"This study describes Chinese activities in

Africa, but it is also an effort to explain how facets of Chinese foreign policy which appear to be contradictory to the outside observer may have been judged quite consistent by policy makers in Peking." Beginnings; The Chinese Presence in Africa; Economic Relations; The Enemy and Persistent Struggle; Disappointments and Setbacks; The Chinese Revolutionary Model; African States and Liberation Movements; Prospects and Probabilities. With bibliography.

CHINA IN AFRICA, by Peter Hess, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 23, no. 1 (April 1973) 24-25.

"During his trip to Africa in 1964 Chou En-lai summarized his country's Africa policy in a sentence which was later frequently cited: 'Africa is ripe for revolution.' A few years later, however, a definite change in Peking's strategy on the Dark Continent was already clearly evident. To a large extent China dropped its ideological criteria for action and since then has set about serving its own interests by maintaining good relations to governments of various political observance. Nowadays Peking makes as much effort with regard to 'conservatives' as to the 'moderates' and the 'radicals.' Close contacts are maintained to the 'feudal ruler' Haile Selassie, to the 'socialist' Nyerere and to the 'Marxist-Leninist' Ngouabi."

CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY: A STUDY OF TANZANIA, by George T. Yu. New York, Praeger, 1975. 200 p.

"The . . . Sino-Tanzanian alliance is viewed in the larger perspectives of Chinese goals in the Third World and the African role in international relations. Because China is becoming a major power center, this . . . study is valuable in charting Peking's behavior in one of its first overseas ventures."

CHINA'S POLICY IN AFRICA, 1958-1971, by Alaba Ogunsanwo. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1974. 310 p.

"Ogunsanwo, a lecturer in international relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria, follows the course of China's African policy between 1958 and 1971 and shows how the continent's place in China's overall foreign policy changed from one of peripheral to central importance. 'China's policy in Africa rapidly achieved a self-propelling and compulsive momentum [which] led to the undertaking to construct and finance the Tanzania-Zambia railroad—the largest single Chinese and indeed Communist aid project in Africa.' Professor Ogunsanwo points out, and China's desire to compete with the Soviet Union and the United States had much to do with this metamorphosis. China's strategy and tactics, her successes and failures, and

the ways in which international events affected Peking's policies toward the African nations are described in detail. Appendixes feature treaties signed with the Republic of Guinea, Ghana, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania."

CHINESE AID AND TRADE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, by Kieran Broadbent, in *Contemporary Review*, v. 216 no. 1248 (January 1970) 19-22.

"The decision to build three new Chinese radio transmitters in Zambia following the visit to Peking by Sikota Wina, Zambian Minister of Information, signifies further evidence of China's growing involvement in Africa and the revolutionary movements in Southern Africa and Rhodesia. China has already built two similar transmitters in Brazzaville and Tanzania which have been used to broadcast anti-Western propaganda and revolutionary theory to neighbouring states. The radio stations are only part of the invisible foothold China is gaining in Africa. Visible Chinese influence is evident with the growing number of stores selling Chinese goods and books and the increasing army of engineers and technicians arriving in Africa on various capital-aid projects . . . China's future position in Africa hinges on her capability of maintaining friendly relations with African states with hostile political systems . . . The time has come for Peking to make up for lost ground. The Chinese now have relations with nine African states south of the Sahara, compared with 12 in 1965. In this respect the railway and other projects are gambles that have to pay off."

CHINESE AID: ON THE RIGHT LINES, by Alan Hutchinson, in *African Development* (August 1972) 10-11 plus.

"Chinese concrete sleepers help to carry the £ 170m. 'Uhuru' railway from Tanzania to Zambia. It is the biggest-ever Chinese overseas aid project, but there are plenty of smaller ones dotted all over Africa . . . The overall importance that China attaches to its relationship with African countries is readily demonstrated by reference to aid figures (see table). Of total Chinese credits and grants made in the period 1954-71 to all developing countries, 14 African nations received just half, or \$1,112m. The greatest-ever Communist overseas aid project—the Tanzania Zambia railway—is being built in Africa, while over 90% of all Chinese aid technicians are located in African countries (the vast majority of them working on the railway)."

CHINESE AND SOVIET AID TO AFRICA, ed. by Warren Weinstein. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 290 p.

Of special interest is the following selected chapter of this book: Chinese and Soviet Aid to



Africa—An African View. With tables, figures, and map.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by Maj. William B. Guild. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1970. 62 p. (G955c, Research Study no. 0580-70.)

"Communist China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been actively attempting to gain political and economic influence in the Sub-Saharan area of Africa. In the majority of the Black African nations their efforts have initially been relatively successful but have not withstood the test of time. This study outlines the successes and failures of the communists and offers the reader a present day evaluation of the communist influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Research concludes that the communist currently have little influence in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa."

PEKING SHOWS ITS NEW AFRICAN LOOK, by Gilbert Comte, in *African Report*, v. 16, no. 3 (March 1971) 19-21.

How "learning from previous errors, Communist China turns to more flexible and sophisticated tactics in bid to win African support."

PEKING'S AFRICAN DIPLOMACY, by George T. Yu, in *Problems of Communism*, no. 2 (March-April 1972) 16-24.

"Among the foremost targets of the campaign of the People's Republic of China 'to win friends and influence people' in Africa have been the United Republic of Tanzania and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Indeed, the attention level of the Chinese press to the two countries, the extent and variety of Chinese aid and technical assistance projects, and other indicators all attest that China has assigned a high priority to relations with the two states. Moreover, China's ties with both have developed without interruption since it first set up formal links with them. Not even the Cultural Revolution disrupted the process. In short, it would be no exaggeration to say that Tanzania and the Congo (B) have constituted primary focuses of Chinese policy in Africa, and that there has been a high degree of consistency in Peking's policy and behavior toward both over the years. This article will analyze and compare these two important foreign-policy ventures of the Chinese in Africa. In doing so, it will seek to arrive at some assessments regarding the general character and quality of Chinese diplomacy."

THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND THE WEST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Colin Legum, in *Foreign Affairs*, v 54, no. 4 (July 1976) 745-762.

"Most American commentators have interpreted the Soviet intervention in Angola almost solely as an extension of Soviet cold war competition with the West into Africa. In this perspective the outcome in Angola has been viewed as a major gain for the Soviet Union against the West, with the Russians capitalizing on the American disadvantage in its years of support for Portugal. With the South African intervention against the Soviet-backed liberation movement, the Russians also scored an important 'diplomatic triumph' as the Organization of African Unity swing around to overwhelming support for the Soviet protege, against the Angolan leaders who had called in the South Africans. In all this the United States and the West were the big losers. While this interpretation contains some elements of truth, it is an inadequate framework for analysis of what actually happened in Angola and what may now be in immediate prospect for Rhodesia and Namibia. For it leaves out an extremely important element—the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China for influence in Africa. Only if this rivalry is given the emphasis it deserves can one understand the true nature of the struggle that is now taking place in Rhodesia, and, prospectively, future conflicts in Namibia and South Africa."

THE TANZAM RAIL LINK: CHINA'S "LOSS-LEADER" IN AFRICA, by Rosalyn J. Rettman, in *World Affairs*, v. 136, no. 3 (Winter 1973-1974) 232-258.

"The Tanzam Railway is the third largest foreign aid project ever undertaken—after the Aswan Dam and the Upper Volta Project. While these two larger projects received multilateral support, the Tanzam link is the largest aid project ever financed by a single nation. The railway represents a huge investment by the People's Republic of China—an investment of money, manpower, materiel, and national prestige. The hope-for return on this investment is a position of Third World leadership, and influence for China throughout Black Africa. For Tanzania and Zambia, the significance of the project is as much ideological as economic, for the completed railway will free Zambia from dependence on the White regimes of southern Africa. The economic and symbolic ramifications of the project thus extend beyond the boundaries of Africa and into the international sphere. Without minimizing the above statement, any analysis of the Tanzam Railway must be tentative and open-ended: first, because the project is presently in progress; secondly, because a great deal of information has not been revealed; and finally, because the financial success and ultimately the viability of the line is in large part dependent upon the price of copper in a fluctuating world market. For these reasons, judgments and conclusions must

be considered subject to modification by future events and the availability of pertinent information."

(LJ)—THE TANZAM RAILROAD: THE PRC IN AFRICA VERSUS UNITED STATES INTERESTS, by Maj. John G. Nettleton. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 109 p. (Research Study.)

"This paper investigates the effects of the Chinese supported Tanzam railway to determine the impact on US interests. The study describes US interests in Africa, analyzes China's African goals, discusses the development and progress of the railway and finally investigates the relationship of US interests in Africa to the influence China has won as a result of the Tanzam railway. The paper concludes that, although the benefits of the Tanzam will increase the prestige and influence of the PRC, no threat to the security of the free world is posed by China's support of the Tanzam railway."

#### 4. Relations with Europe

CHINA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, by W. B. Findorff, in *Aussen Politik*, (Second Quarter 1973) 210-216.

"... Since the cultural revolution, China has come to view Europe as a possible partner in the struggle between imperialism, symbolized by the US and the USSR, and revolutionary socialism, represented by China and, perhaps, Europe. Such a shift is consistent with China's new foreign policy goal: 'to see that China plays its part in shaping our world in a way commensurate with the country's historical and effective significance.' Economics is another reason for the Chinese interest in Europe. China sees Europe as one of the three most important industrial areas of the world, and conducts one-seventh of its total trade with individual European countries. Yet, this trade may be declining because of Chinese rapprochement with both Japan and the US. Findorff contends that if Europe wishes to expand or even retain its present level of trade, it must present a more consolidated approach to China. Thus far, Findorff maintains, China has initiated all of the motions to enhance Chinese-European relations. In view of its ideological world posture, China cannot feasibly make any additional overtures; it cannot send an ambassador to the EEC in Brussels, nor can it ask for preferred customs privileges from the EEC. Chinese support for an integrated Europe may even account for Soviet leader Brezhnev's recent less hostile reactions to EEC. Findorff urges that Europe reexamine and then revamp its posture to China, dismissing old prejudices and achieving a unified foreign policy that transcends merely mechanistic trade agreements and envisages the future global stature of both China and Europe."

CHINA'S POLICIES IN EAST EUROPE, by Anton Logoreci, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 118-120 plus.

"... The Chinese at last appear to have stumbled upon the fact that what most of the countries of East Europe have nowadays in common is a deep... resentment against the Soviet Union's cramping and ultimately suffocating interference in every aspect of their national affairs. Mao Tse-tung and his disciples hope therefore to make friends and influence people in Communist Europe... by aiding wherever possible the ceaseless search for national identity and freedom of action."

EUROPE AND THE NEW US POLICY TOWARD CHINA, by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 85-104.

"There is an objective geopolitical linkage between China and Europe: both are the principal neighbors of an expanding Soviet Union. China's emergence as a nuclear power has made this linkage strategically relevant, but until the early 1970's the prevailing opinion in Europe was that the rise of China would not produce any shift in the international balance of power before the end of the present decade. This assessment changed with the United States' diplomatic opening toward the People's Republic and President Nixon's trip to Peking. This major diplomatic event catapulted China into the role of a super-power sooner than the world had anticipated, and before China herself was ready to assume the role. While the future impingement of China on the world balance of power had been foreseen by Adenauer, de Gaulle and Macmillan even in the 1950's, few would have predicted that it would be the United States which would speed up the process."

THE PEKING-ATHENS CONNECTION, by Nicos E. Devletoglou, in *The Nation*, v. 221, no. 4 (16 August 1975) 106-108.

"China is currently mounting a massive campaign throughout Australasia, Japan, Canada and the Third World to establish the notion that Western Europe could soon prove powerful enough to make a decisive contribution to world peace. To the unconcealed amazement of both Russia and America, the Chinese go further, suggesting that by the year 2000 China and Europe—two of the world's oldest civilizations—could develop between them a functional axis capable of containing Soviet and American world power. Whether factual or fantastic, people in Europe are beginning to take this prospect seriously. Western European and Chinese leaders are today looking dispassionately at each other and at what suddenly appears to be a historic rapprochement between China and the European community, especially in the light of the massive recent British commitment to Europe... Greece..."



is somewhat unexpectedly becoming an important link in what the Chinese foresee as a special Sino-European relationship."

THE POLITICAL PURPOSES OF MAOIST DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE, by Wang Chien-hsun, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 10 (October 1975) 27-32.

" 'To unite with the third world' and 'associate with the second world' for 'the defeat of the first world' is the theory adopted by the Chinese Communists in world revolution. In recent years as the struggle between the Chinese and Russian Communists has been intensifying, the Maoists have placed their emphasis of external struggle on the isolation of Soviet Russia through international political maneuvers. The present diplomatic offensive launched by the Chinese Communists in Europe is mainly aimed at alienating the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia, and by collaborating with the United States, the Maoists hope that the U.S. military presence in Europe may serve as a leverage against Russia. A tendency has become apparent that the Maoists are focusing their attention in Europe. As the Maoists are improving their relations with European countries, a new struggle has started."

THE SINO-WEST EUROPEAN CONNECTION, by Maj. Alfred Biegel, in *Military Review*, v. 56, no. 1 (January 1976) 68-78.

"The Soviet Union is Peking's predominant national security concern . . . In assessing East-West trends, the Chinese factor casts a small shadow on the Western European horizon. An increasing number of European statesmen, however, now echo the theme reportedly stated five years ago by Chancellor Brandt. 'China may be far away but one day we can play the Chinese card . . .' After all, noted one European observer, 'China is the only world power to desire without reservation that Europe should become powerful.' . . . Although less dramatic than the Sino-American rapprochement, the increasing contact between China and the West Europeans over the past few years represents a visible shift in their foreign policies."

##### 5. Relations with Latin America

CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA: NEW TIES AND TACTICS, by Cecil Johnson, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1972) 53-66.

"One of the most intriguing aspects of the changing international outlook of the People's Republic of China is the resurgence of interest it has shown in Latin America since the beginning of 1970. The step-up of its activities on that continent seems to affirm the determination of a majority of the supreme policy-makers in the Chinese Communist Party to end the isolationist tendencies associated

with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969. Peking's new foreign policy also reflects a marked shift away from the dogmatic purism of the CPCPR years toward a more flexible stance that stresses the national interests of China over considerations of ideology. The present article will attempt to define the major elements of the new policy and to evaluate its impact on a number of target nations."

CHINA'S HOPES FOR LATIN AMERICA, by Richard Harris, in *Survival*, v. 13, no. 3 (March 1971) 94-95.

"Brief survey of the way China has viewed Latin America, as an area in which prospects for undermining the interests of the United States seemed bright with Castro's success in 1959 but have since disappointed. The author suggests that paradoxically the arrival in power by constitutional means of President Allende in Chile may offer new hope to Chairman Mao."

COMMUNIST CHINA & LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1967, by Cecil E. Johnson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. 324 p.

Commercial, Cultural, and Propaganda Activities; Ideological Framework for Chinese Foreign Policy; The Chinese Concept of People's War: A Comparative Analysis of the Chinese and Cuban Concepts of People's War; Sino-Cuban Relations; The Pro-Chinese Party of Brazil; The Pro-Chinese Parties of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia; The Pro-Chinese Parties and Movements of Other Countries. With bibliography.

LATIN AMERICA: HOW MUCH DO THE CHINESE CARE?, by S. Frederick D'Ignazio III and Daniel Tretiak, in *Studies in Comparative Communism, An Interdisciplinary Journal*, v. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 36-46.

"This paper examines Chinese interest toward Latin America over the period 1959-1970 by means of a quantitative analysis of the major Chinese international periodical *Peking Review*. The foci of Chinese interest varied during those years. Before the Cuban Revolution, the Chinese attempted to become familiar with Latin America by traveling to various countries there and by inviting Latin Americans of varying backgrounds to visit China. Concurrently, but independent of the success of the Cuban Revolution, China's relations with Latin America increased substantially. In certain respects, Chinese policy toward Latin America resembled that of the U.S.S.R., but unlike the Russians the Chinese encouraged Latin Americans to follow the Cuban example of launching rural-based armed struggles in various countries. During the period 1958-1964, for example, the Chinese engaged with some success in 'cultural diplomacy'

in Latin America: trade relations increased sharply; contacts with non-Communists of various persuasions first widened, then narrowed; and efforts were made to influence several governments (Brazil, Mexico, and Chile) to establish diplomatic relations with China."

**SUPPORT FOR JUST STRUGGLE OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES—CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE'S SPEECH AT PANAMA MEETING OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL**, in *Peking Review*, no. 12, (23 March 1973) 8-11.

"The U.N. Security Council held a meeting in Panama from March 15 to 21. This was the first meeting held in Latin America by the Security Council at the invitation of the Panamanian Government. The agenda included 'Consideration of measures for maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the (U.N.) Charter.' Addressing the meeting, General Omar Torrijos, Head of the Government of Panama, expressed the Panamanian people's determination to recover their sovereign right over the Panama Canal Zone. Representatives from more than ten Latin American countries reiterated in their speeches the stand of opposing imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and safeguarding their national independence, sovereignty and natural resources. Speaking at the March 19 meeting, Chinese Representative Huang Hua expressed firm support for the just struggle of the Latin American countries and peoples and for the patriotic struggle of the Panamanian Government and people to recover their sovereign right over the Panama Canal Zone . . . [Included] are excerpts of his speech."

#### 6. Relations with the Middle East

**CHINA'S NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN**, by Rosemary Foot, in *Contemporary Review*, v. 226, no. 1309 (February 1975) 100-104.

"When China and Iran established diplomatic relations on 16 August, 1971, the editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, said since World War II, the fewer contacts between the two countries were the 'result of imperialist obstruction and sabotage.' Ironically, their new relationship owes much of its advancement to a common fear of social-imperialism which has led China and Iran to a rediscovery of their common historical background and their common tasks for the future."

**THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST**, by T. C. Rhee, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 5 (October-November 1970) 70-74.

"The ever-growing military commitment of

the Soviet Union and the concurrent ties being cultivated between Peking and the Palestine guerrillas are gradually but surely transplanting the Sino-Soviet conflict into the region. This will not only complicate the crisis but dangerously reduce the precious flexibility of the Soviet Union—one element indispensable for any political solution. It is well at the outset to consider several factors to appreciate the serious implications of the Moscow-Peking rivalry in the Middle East. Firstly, while the Soviet Union at least politically recognizes the existence of Israel as a State, Peking does not. Secondly, if the Arab States still pay lip service to a political settlement under given conditions, the Palestine guerrillas (especially Yasir Arafat) show increasing signs of intransigence and now emphatically rule out any political settlement. Thirdly, while it is presumed that the Soviet Union is trying to avoid a major confrontation with the United States through Arab governments, the independent guerrilla organizations increasingly prefer the open-ended 'People's War' concept of the Chinese type. So do the Chinese, who do not share the same stakes as the Russians in the area. Fourthly, the guerrillas—possibly already linked to Peking—pose grave threats to the very existence of several of the key Arab States such as Jordan and Lebanon. Given the serious conditions of the Sino-Soviet disputes, these factors will have dangerous implications for the Middle East."

#### 7. China and the United Nations: Before and After Admission

**CHINESE DIPLOMACY AND THE UNITED NATIONS**, by Robert Boardman, in *Contemporary Review*, v. 219, no. 1268 (September 1971) 155-160.

"Recent months have provided even more than their usual quota of taxing questions about the motivations and objectives of Chinese diplomacy. From April 1966, China seemed immersed in her own problems . . . Developments over the past year or so stand out in sharp contrast. Diplomatic relations have been established with several countries, as varied as Canada, Chile, Italy and Kuwait . . . Behind the scenes, moreover, China's diplomats appear to have been active in many States, from Japan to the Holy See. How can we account for this explosion of Chinese interest in international politics? And what are likely to be its consequences in the future? In particular, does the present round of ice-breaking and bridge-building indicate a solution soon to the problems of Chinese representation in the United Nations?"

(LI)—AN EXAMINATION OF US OPPOSITION TO UNITED NATIONS' MEMBERSHIP FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Maj. Ray E. Stratton. Maxwell AFB,



Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 90 p. (Research Study No. 1915-71.)

"The US official policy of opposing admission of Communist China to the United Nations has not changed essentially in two decades. The recent trend of voting in the United Nations and diplomatic recognition of Peking by other nation-state indicates that Peking may soon be seated in the world body. This study investigates the major factors currently favoring and opposing Red China's membership in the United Nations. The study concludes that our present policy is not effectively serving US national interests and offers a general policy strategy to improve our international image and diplomatic position."

LOOKING AT THE 20-YEAR DEBATE OVER CHINA'S VOICE AT THE UN, by Marion A. Macpherson, in *International Perspectives*, (January/February 1972) 3-6.

"The question of Chinese representation has been a problem for the United Nations since the government of the People's Republic of China gained effective control over Mainland China and the Chinese Nationalists withdrew to the island of Taiwan, claiming, however, to be the sole legal government of all of China, a claim they continue to maintain . . . The representatives of the People's Republic of China, after 23 years of being in effective control of the Chinese mainland, now speak for China at the United Nations."

PEKING'S UN POLICY" CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, by Byron S. J. Weng. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972. 337 p.

"The admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations in the fall of 1971 marked the beginning of a new era in the evolution both of the world organization and of the Peking government. The determinants—domestic and foreign—which shaped Peking's attitude toward, and image of, the U.N. during the 1949-1970 period is . . . analyzed in this . . . background study. Professor Weng has examined the key events with commendable detachment and perceptiveness." With bibliography.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, by Samuel S. Kim, in *World Politics*, v. 26, no. 3 (April 1974) 299-330.

"As tested by the data provided during the first sixteen months of participation in the United Nations system, the PRC has proved to be neither a wrecker nor a reformer. On most issues, ideological predilection has not been a decisive determinant of the PRC's diplomacy in the United Nations. China has adopted the posture of a cautious and diligent apprentice, learning her new trade and bending her

crude ideological conceptions to the dictates of *Realpolitik*. However, the pragmatic pursuit of national interests is often concealed under the mantle of either legitimizing ideological dialectics or the principles and slogans appealing to the Third-World nations. The PRC's UN diplomacy reveals not only the basic goals and objectives, but also the means and methods of her new, vigorous, and imaginative foreign policy."

SECRETARY ROGERS DISCUSSES UNITED NATIONS DECISION ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 65, no. 1690 (15 November 1971) 541-547.

Transcript of a news conference held by Secretary of State Rogers at Washington on October 26.

UNITED NATIONS VOTES TO SEAT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 65, no. 1690 (15 November 1971) 548-555.

Statements made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on October 18 and 25 by U.S. Representative George Bush, a statement by Ambassador Bush issued on October 25, and the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on October 25.

(LI)—U.S. SPONSORSHIP OF RED CHINA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS: A PROPOSAL, by Lt. Col. Paul L. Wieland, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 25 p. (Professional Study no. 4476.)

"A brief sketch of U.S.-Red Chinese relations is followed by an analysis of the various diplomatic moves now available for the United States in order to improve U.S.-Red Chinese relations. In addition to recommending that all nonstrategic U.S. trade embargoes against Red China be dropped, the author proposes that the United States sponsor Peking's entry into the United Nations. The question of recognizing Red China is addressed, and the probable results of the U.S. policy change are examined."

#### 8. Relations with Asia

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

ASIA: HOW STAND THE DOMINOES? in *Newsweek*, v. 78, no. 13 (September 1971) 47 plus.

"The very fact that an American President is actively seeking a detente with the rulers of Communist China has wrought fundamental changes in the power balance of Asia. 'The Nixon visit,' says a Western diplomat there, 'means that we are seeing the removal of rigid lines between non-Communists and Communists, between the goodies and the bad-dies.' And with the possible exception of the prin-

cipals involved—the Americans and the Chinese—no one will be so profoundly and directly affected by this development as the nations of East and Southeast Asia. All ten of Southeast Asia's countries live in China's shadow. Three of them—North Vietnam, Laos and Burma—have borders with China. Two of them—Singapore and Malaysia—have huge populations of Chinese descent. Most of the countries have Maoist guerrilla movements, and four—North and South Vietnam; Laos and Cambodia—are directly positioned in Southeast Asia's war zone. Except for North Vietnam, all have lived directly or tacitly under the American umbrella. And now that this protective umbrella is being at least partially withdrawn, all of them are faced with major political readjustments. NEWSWEEK's Hong Kong bureau chief Maynard Parker last week completed an extensive tour of all the Southeast Asian lands outside the Indo-China peninsula . . . He reports on how these countries are adjusting to the new realities. In a companion piece, former U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball discusses the larger implications of the changing U.S. policy in Asia and the special impact of Mr. Nixon's China initiative on Japan."

BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA, by Christian Muller, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 20, no. 5 (August 1970) 12-23.

"Some time ago Christian Muller, a young member of the NZZ's [Neue Zürcher Zeitung] foreign affairs staff, was sent on an extended special assignment to Asia. His reports, which have been appearing periodically during 'recent weeks,' provide valuable insights into that troubled part of the world caught between the Indochinese tragedy and the growing might of a renascent China." The reports cover: Burma; Laos; Cambodia; Nepal; and the Himalayan Gateway to China.

CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS, by Richard Butwell, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 121-125 plus.

". . . China has assumed a new and more active role in the external politics of . . . [East, Southeast and South Asia], notes this specialist, who points out that 'That role is likely to grow and undergo further change in the years ahead'."

CHINA AND THE ASIAN-PACIFIC CHESSBOARD, by W.A.C. Adie, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 3, no. 3 (April 1975) 44-54.

"The author challenges the view of China as an inward-looking, quasi-pacifist State, and analyses Maoist tactics on the periphery of the Pacific, where Chinese efforts at subversion have taken many distinctive forms."

#### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON

CHINA'S NEW DIPLOMACY, by Brian Hook, in *Asian Affairs*, v. 61, Part II (June 1974) 135-143.

"When the United Nations voted to admit the Chinese People's Republic they achieved considerably more than the restoration of China's legal rights in that organization to the Government of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The outcome was to be of even greater significance beyond that world forum: viewed in historical perspective, it represented the successful culmination of a movement, the campaign for national self-strengthening that had gathered momentum over a century earlier . . . For those who have a special interest in the modern history of China this event and subsequent developments associated with it, such as the progressive withdrawal of American forces from East and South-East Asia, pose the question as to whether, or indeed to what extent, the new China will resume a traditional role in East Asia. In other words could the prospect of a pre-eminent China imply the revival of the traditional East Asian system of foreign relations in which a powerful 'People's Middle Kingdom' would, like its imperial predecessor, draw neighbouring States into a twentieth-century tributary relationship?"

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Hedley Bull, in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1971) 669-681.

". . . Believes that the struggle to maintain the balance of power in Asia is no longer between the U.S. and the USSR alone; it now also includes China. Since acquiring a nuclear capability, China has caused major policy shifts in many Asian and Pacific countries . . . Thus the three powers have attempted to develop an equilibrium; each fears an alliance of the other two, but avoids siding with either . . . U.S. policy has changed, Bull believes, because Vietnam has shown the Americans that they cannot rely solely on their military might to keep peace. Growing Chinese capabilities require a new interpretation of the role of the U.S. nuclear shield in protecting Asian nations . . . Middle-sized Asian powers are thus beginning to rely on friendlier relationships with all major powers, rather than on American force alone. They are seeking a balance of power which gives them security and they prefer diplomacy to war. India, for example, has found Russia willing to help it in its border dispute with China; on the other hand, the decreasing American influence in Asia has moved India to seek a settlement with China . . . Japan's development as a leading industrial nation has enhanced its position in Asian affairs. If it becomes a fourth great power in Asia, with a nuclear capability, the balance of power will be further confused. The process of finding and maintaining an



equilibrium would again throw Asia into a diplomatic frenzy. Rising nationalist feelings and the emergence of defense as a national priority seem to be leading Japan in this direction. Such a course would generate opposition from the rest of the world; however, Bull argues that Japan may not have to arm itself. He believes that, in the future, military power may not determine world leadership, in which case Japan's economic and diplomatic strength would be sufficient to label Japan a great nation..."

THE SINIC WORLD IN PERSPECTIVE, by Edwin O. Reischauer, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 2 (January 1974) 341-348.

"Christendom, Europe, or, more broadly, the Western world is customarily balanced with the Orient, the East, or more narrowly, Asia. This equation, however, is a false one. While the various lands of the West do in fact share a common historical tradition and in many cases similar cultural traits, Asia is divided into major cultural traditions as far removed from one another as from the West. There are vast psychological and cultural gulfs between the Arabic-Islamic world of West Asia and North Africa, the Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India and Southeast Asia, and the Sinic world of East Asia. But within each of these major cultural units there do exist psychological and cultural bonds in some ways comparable to those that unite the countries of the West. This article explores the nature and strength of these bonds among the countries of East Asia—that is China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam—and the degree to which these affect their present political and strategic relations with one another and with countries outside this cultural grouping."

TO ESTABLISH AN ASIAN AND PACIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 6, no. 2 (February 1971) 2-4.

"To carry out the so-called 'Nixon doctrine'—the U.S. policy in Asia—the American government has started withdrawing its troops from Asia at an accelerated speed... The first difficult problem that may take place is the continuous deterioration of the war situation in Laos and Cambodia and the incessant expansion of Communist subversive activities in Thailand... The second difficult problem is: The reduction of the Communist military threat in South Vietnam is not entirely due to the decline of the Communist strength as understood by the United States. Rather, they pretend that their strength has shrunk in order to lure the United States into accelerating the withdrawal of its troops... The third difficult problem is: It is possible that once all American troops are pulled out from Southeast Asia and can no longer be sent back there, the Red Chinese will openly help the

Communists in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand launch an all-out attack in an attempt to seize all of Southeast Asia... Before the United States withdraws its troops, it should make the necessary deployments actively so that the free Asian countries can take over the responsibility of defending the security and peace of Asia."

#### b. Relations with South Asia

##### (1) Relations with India

ASIAN TRIANGLE: CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, by William W. Lockwood, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 4 (July 1974) 818-838.

"The uncertain power balance created in Asia after 1945 by the defeat of Japan, the eclipse of European imperialism, and the weakness of newly independent nations drew the United States into commitments across the Pacific far beyond its original intentions or its long-run interests and capabilities. With the reduction of those commitments now in progress, what will be the shape of Asia's future as it takes charge more independently of its own destiny? Abstracting from many complexities, this essay dwells upon the significance of the Asian triangle represented by China, the great land empire of East Asia; Japan, the industrial giant to the east; and India, the subcontinental realm southwest across the Himalayas. If Asia's destiny is to be decided increasingly by Asians, as it must be, then these three nations especially will dominate its future."

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, by Norman D. Palmer, in *Current History*, v. 61, no. 361 (September 1971) 148-158.

"Some forty per cent of all of the people in the world live in China and the two major South Asian states of India and Pakistan. From a demographic point of view, there can be no question that special importance has to be attached to the interrelationships of the first and second largest concentrations of population anywhere on the globe. From a political point of view, China, India and Pakistan are sometimes said to form an 'Asian triangle,' occupying a central place in the evolving patterns of Asian politics. 'China's relations with the South Asian states have been relatively complex because of the many levels of policy being served and the highly differentiated way in which the various countries have been seen by Peking.' In recent years, China has been too preoccupied with internal problems and with relations with the Soviet Union and other higher priorities in foreign policy to give much attention to relations with India and Pakistan; but there can be no doubt that South Asia is a target area for China in her overall relations with the states of non-Communist Asia and the Third World."

THE CHINESE CALCULUS OF DETERRENCE: INDIA AND INDOCHINA, by Allen S. Whiting. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975. 299 p.

"Whiting combs through recent Chinese Military history in search of the underlying principles of action, and finds Chinese policy to be rational; willing to use force but also willing to sacrifice military to political interests; concerned primarily with China's territorial integrity; and stable over time."

THE FULCRUM OF ASIA: RELATIONS AMONG CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE U.S.S.R., by Bhabani Sen Gupta. New York, Pegasus, 1970. 383 p.

"The author of this study offers it as an analysis of 'the theory and practice of international politics among the new nations.' His focus is 'the fulcrum of Asia'—the area where China, India, Pakistan, and Soviet Russia 'meet in friendship and enmity'." Contents: The Asian Triangle; The Soviets Arrive in South Asia; The Challenge of China; The Decade of Confrontations; Consequences of Confrontation; etc. "Confrontations and conflicts between China, India, and Pakistan as between other Asian nations have to be attributed at least in part to the territorial imperatives of their ruling elites. It may shock many Asians to recognize in the territorial imperatives of their national elites elements of imperialism, but it is mistaken to believe, as Asians and Africans mostly do, that imperialism has been a monopoly of the industrialized West. Several of the new nations in Asia are essentially empire-nation states; their ruling elites have inherited not only the empires left over by the European powers but also the latter's imperial strategies. China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia are, in fact, empire-nation states with imperial interests and perceptions governing their relationships with smaller national and subnational entities."

INDIA AND CHINA: ADVERSARIES OR POTENTIAL PARTNERS?, by Ashok Kapur, in *The World Today*, v. 30, no. 3 (March 1974) 129-134.

"China no longer sees India merely as a pawn in the Soviet game and both countries share apprehensions about super-power imperialism in the wake of detente."

INDIA AND NUCLEAR CHINA, by M. L. Sondhi, in *Military Review*, (September 1973) 28-40.

"According to Sondhi, India's military action in Bangladesh has brought about a reevaluation of its defense requirements in the light of some major new considerations: 1. The force levels needed to minimize the influence of the two superpowers; 2. The military capacity needed to deter or arrest con-

flict in neighboring areas; 3. China's nuclear capabilities; 4. The need for collaboration with neighboring countries for naval defense in the Indian Ocean; 5. The need for political flexibility in a strategic environment dictated by the increasing US-Soviet detente . . . Any future planning, he declares, must consider China's nuclear program. India sees Peking's nuclear capability supporting certain political objectives: a credible offensive option against India and Japan with mid-range missiles, and proof of its military superiority as an Asian power; a protection to deter a Soviet preemptive strike against China's nuclear complex in Sinkiang; and as an instrument to threaten intervention or escalation against Southeast Asian countries. In addition, China's status as the only 'nonwhite' nuclear power lends credence to its rhetoric in support of national liberation movements . . . India should reject any proposal to contain China, Sondhi asserts, and should instead emphasize the limits of its nuclear posture vis-a-vis China. In political terms, such an approach would allow India to take advantage of any opportunities that now exist for a movement toward a Sino-Indian detente . . ."

INDIA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION—A TRIANGULAR INTERACTION, by T. Karki Hussian, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 6, no. 1 (July 1973) 15-31.

"It is generally assumed that in large measure, it is the Soviet factor which has impeded the process of normalization in Sino-Indian relations. Within India itself, there are quite a few people who share this viewpoint. However the majority follows the official line which insists that Indo-Soviet ties in no way affect India's relations with China. On the other hand, till very recently the Chinese leaders have declared from time to time before foreign visitors that India's close links with the USSR, especially after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty invalidate any genuine desire on the part of its leaders to reconcile their differences with China. They have openly insinuated that India being in an inferior position to the Soviet Union could be used as a pawn of super-power politics to promote Soviet interests."

INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS, by William J. Barnds. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972. 388 p. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

"Civil war, the demands of East Pakistan for autonomy or independence as Bangla Desh, 10 million refugees, the tinderbox tensions between India and Pakistan, the wary stance of the major powers—to understand these unhappy developments of 1971, one needs insight into the past twen-



ty-five years in South Asia. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' is a comprehensive analysis of international relations on the Asian sub-continent. In assessing the roles the major powers have played there, the book re-examines American policy toward India and Pakistan and suggests guidelines for the future. Out of the legacy of colonialism, the struggle for independence from Britain, and the Hindu-Muslim antagonism that led to partition and the bitter Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan have fashioned their distinctive foreign policies and set the course of events since 1947. With the onset of the cold war, India's nonalignment, and Pakistan's search for allies and security, the outside powers found scope for their own contest for influence among one-sixth of the world's population. The United States became a military ally of Pakistan's while simultaneously trying to maintain good relations with India by assisting its efforts at modernization and development. The Soviet Union wooed India with economic aid and in other ways. China and India experienced a spurious friendship that deteriorated from sloganeering good will to acrimonious dispute over their borders. In the 1960s, the interrelations of the five powers changed kaleidoscopically. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and contrasting international responses modified India's previous stance. For Pakistan, the second Kashmir war in 1965 brought disillusionment with its military alliances, new and close relations with China, and the profound domestic discontent that is working itself out today. The Soviet Union has greatly enhanced its influence on South Asian affairs with economic and military aid, while the United States has in many ways been disengaging. America's policy on the sub-continent—past, present, and prospective—is carefully considered in terms of its interests, the regional conflict, the enormous development problems, and the defense of South Asia. The United States is critically . . . taken to task for errors and omissions of policy, but its positive contributions are fully recognized. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' . . . covers the setting, the exercise, and the inherent limitations of the roles of the five principal powers." With selected bibliography, maps, and tables.

INDIA: PAWNS IN THE HANDS OF TWO GREAT POWERS, by Joey Bonner, in *SAIS Review*, v. 16, no. 2 (Winter 1972) 9-19.

"China's dissatisfaction with the Sino-Indian border reached historic proportions when PLA forces clashed with Indian troops in the disputed areas in 1959, 1962, and 1963. Indeed, China's hostility toward India during this period has been serious enough to invoke the censure of other members of the socialist camp and to warrant a great

deal of scholarly reflection upon China's motives in maintaining such a military posture toward its southern neighbor . . . By examining in a circumspect manner the triangular Sino-Soviet-Indian relationship in circumspect manner the triangular Sino-Soviet-Indian relationship in its several facets during the period from 1949-63, this essay hopes to elucidate, from an uncommon perspective, China's reasons for repeatedly instigating provocative actions on the Sino-Indian frontier."

INDIA'S CHINA POLICY UNDER REVIEW, in *South Asian Review*, v. 4, no. 2 (January 1971) 107-110.

From Rakshat Puri—New Delhi—"For close on two years now, Indian politicians, press and public, following audible leads in government thinking, have been debating and reviewing India's relations with China: relations which had become frozen into a posture of hostility as a result of China's occupation of border territories considered Indian by New Delhi, the occupation culminating in the Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962. The disillusionment with and unfriendliness toward China among many Indian intellectuals, commentators and historians does not invariably arise from a dogmatic claim to the contested territories. It follows, rather, as they see it, from (i) China's refusal in effect to consider evidence on the boundary question as evidence is understood in law, and its attempt instead to force a decision by calculated humiliation of India; (ii) China's summary annexation of Tibet, with geopolitical consequences that have seemed to make stable Sino-Indian peace and friendship extremely difficult; and (iii) the growing conviction that China was hostile to India because of larger political designs and considerations, and that the boundary disagreement was a symptom of bigger political differences."

INDIA'S CHINA WAR, by Neville Maxwell. New York, Pantheon Books, 1971. 475 p.

"This . . . reconstruction of the diplomatic and military activity surrounding the Chinese punitive expedition of 1962 must be read by anyone concerned with international relations. Maxwell, 'Time' correspondent during the events he describes, has combined dogged research, analytic insight and descriptive skill to provide a picture of the border clash which will alter many preconceptions about the relative merits of the claims and blames of the two powers concerned."

INDIA'S CHINA WAR AND AFTER: A REVIEW ARTICLE, by Stephen P. Cohen, in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 30, no. 4 (August 1971) 847-857.

"Every war yields its own literary fallout, but none more than India's 1962 confrontation with

China across the frozen Himalayan wastes. The forces engaged in this war were fewer in number than in the subsequent conflict with Pakistan, but the political and military impact was greater, as attested—nine years later—by the ever burgeoning literature. This paper will examine some of this literature and the more important issues raised in various retrospective analyses; we shall also touch upon the 1965 conflict as it sheds light upon earlier events."

THE INDO-SOVIET-PACT; NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY, in *Atlas*, v. 20, no. 11 (December 1971) 36-38.

Reprinted from "The Mail," Madras—"The US-China detente may have seemed an enlightened diplomatic stroke in many circles, but dismay characterized the reactions in India. The world's largest democracy considers China its biggest threat, and the close American and Chinese relations with Pakistan add to Indian anxieties. India breathed more easily after the signing of the friendship pact with the Soviet Union in August, and a great impetus was given the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India. Hiren Mukherjee, 64-year-old British-educated lawyer and historian, member of Parliament from Bengal, and deputy head of the Communist Party of India, analyzes the implications of the Treaty for 'The Mail' of Madras."

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND CHINA, by S. K. Ghosh, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 5, no. 2 (October 1972) 248-258.

"This article discusses the subject under two broad headings—one, China as a factor contributing to the conclusion of the treaty in August 1971, and two, China's reaction to the treaty."

THE MAOIST WORLD SYSTEM: AND INDIA'S PLACE IN IT, by Mira Sinha, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 3, no. 3 (January 1971) 353-406.

"The effective initiative for a normalisation of relations between India and China, has come from Peking beginning with the enigmatic Mao smile of May last year. Since then, the overall pattern of China's diplomatic behaviour towards India (new cordiality in its diplomacy, a perceptible diminution of all its anti-Indian activities etc.) has demonstrated a Chinese desire to bring this about."

THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINESE STRATEGY AND TACTICS: THE CASE OF THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE, by Arthur A. Stahnke, in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 30, no. 1 (November 1970) 95-119.

"Most studies of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute have presented a chronological account from the initial incursions in the mid-1950's to the

outbreak of war in 1962, or have examined the relevant legal arguments found in the official correspondence to ascertain the validity of either party's case in international law. The analysis below will differ substantially, though not totally, from the approaches implied above. Here, the objective will be to determine the nature and extent of Peking's willingness to present her case against India within the framework of international law, or conversely, her propensity to offer nonlegal or extralegal justifications in support of her position on the boundary question."

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES, by S. P. Seth, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 2 (March-April 1974) 14-26.

"Except for a brief interlude of Sino-Indian cordiality in the mid-1950's, relations between the two largest and most populous Asian nations, over the past twenty-odd years have been marred by mutual distrust, tension, and occasional armed hostilities along disputed segments of their common frontier. In the last two years, however, there have been subtle indications of a change in atmosphere as a combination of factors has seemingly impelled both powers toward a more relaxed and constructive approach to the problems dividing them. The . . . article will endeavor to trace the beginnings of this change against the background of the earlier record of tension and conflict."

(LI)—SOVIET EXPANSION IN SOUTH ASIA, by Lt. Col. Charles C. Vogler. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 68 p. (Professional Study.)

"This research report is an analysis of the current geopolitical situation on the Indian subcontinent. A brief discussion of the historical origins of India and Pakistan is followed by a detailed analysis of both the Kashmir and Bangladesh regional disputes. The report then examines Soviet penetration of the region followed by a discussion of the countervailing Chinese influence. The report concludes with a discussion of the realignment which will follow the latest Indo-Pakistani war."

WAS NEHRU A WARMONGER? THE VILLAIN IN THE INDIA-CHINA WAR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PEKING, in *Atlas*, v. 20, no. 4 (April 1971) 19-21.

Translated from "Der Spiegel," Hamburg—"As Indira Gandhi herself put it, in something of an understatement: 'This book is damaging to my father's image.' Though not brought up directly as an issue in the national elections, Neville Maxwell's study of the 1962 Himalayan war between India and China has been the talk of Indian politics in recent months. At stake is Jawaharlal Nehru's reputation as an apostle of



non-violence. Maxwell, the London 'Times' correspondent in New Delhi until 1967, unearthed a top-secret document which suggests that it was Nehru not Mao Tse-tung who provoked the conflict over boundaries. Hamburg's 'Der Spiegel' and Girilal Jain in New Delhi's 'China Report' take opposing sides in the historical warfare over 'India's China War' (Johathan Cape, Ltd.: LONDON; Jaico Publ. House, BOMBAY)."

#### (2) Relations with Indonesia

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH BURMA AND INDONESIA, by Wayne Best, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 6 (June 1975) 473-487.

"This paper is an attempt to compare policy toward Burma and Indonesia and explain China's objectives as a major and revolutionary power in Asia, emphasizing developments in the post-Cultural Revolution period when the major aspect of Chinese foreign policy has been growing detente with the U.S. and continued hostility toward the Soviet Union. I will also briefly discuss the pre-Cultural Revolution policies of China in order to suggest to what extent Chinese policy since 1950 manifests consistent patterns which allow some kind of conclusion as to the general objectives and methods of the leadership."

(LI)—THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON INDONESIA, by Lt. Comdr. Robert F. Beckham. Newport, R.I., US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) influence on Indonesia is pursued primarily by an historical approach. Chinese influence on the overseas Chinese population, the Communist Party of Indonesia (KI), and official bilateral relations is traced in order to determine the magnitude and effect of the Chinese influence in each of these areas. The influence in each area was found to be great. The PRC influence on the Indonesian Government (Sukarno), and on the PKI, was such that Indonesia came very close to becoming a communist state. The overseas Chinese in Indonesia have been an extremely important factor in Indonesian internal affairs as well as a frequent and serious source of friction between the two countries studied. Although the PRC directed significant effort at influencing the overseas Chinese, the results obtained were not significant. The PRC must now hope that the new leadership in Indonesia will fail to alleviate chronic domestic problems and thereby alienate the masses. The United States must aid Indonesia in her drive for development."

#### (3) Relations with Nepal

NEPAL'S ROLE IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: 1949-1969, by Mira Sinha, in *The In-*

*stitute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 2, no. 4 (April 1970) 456-486.

"This paper will discuss China's relations with Nepal from the inauguration of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, for the two decades until 1969, in the context of the changing Sino-Indian relationship. A strictly chronological approach has been adopted in order to emphasize the interlinkage of these two relationships and to highlight the vastly changed nature of the role that Nepal was required to play before and after 1959—the year of no return in Sino-Indian relations. Since historical memories played a very important part especially in the politics of the first decade, a brief historical survey is necessary."

#### (4) Relations with Pakistan

CHINA AND PAKISTAN: DIPLOMACY OF AN ENTENTE CORDIALE, by Anwar H. Syed. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974. 259 p.

"Dr. Syed . . . analyzes the close relations that have developed between China and his native country since the early 1950s. Although the entente may have sprung principally from a mutually perceived threat of India, he argues that the Sino-Pakistan relationship has arrived at the point where it is no longer dependent on the existence of a common enemy. Chapters cover the influence of Indo-Pakistani superpower relations on Pakistan's relations with China; the first decade of Sino-Pakistani relations; the border and air-travel agreements of 1963; the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965; Sino-Pakistani relations after the Tashkent Declaration; prospects for future relations; and notes toward a theory of Pakistani foreign policy. Biographical sketches of Pakistani leaders and a chronology from 1955 to 1972 are appended."

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, by Norman D. Palmer, in *Current History*, v. 61, no. 361 (September 1971) 148-158.

"Some forty per cent of all of the people in the world live in China and the two major South Asian states of India and Pakistan. From a demographic point of view, there can be no question that special importance has to be attached to the interrelationships of the first and second largest concentrations of population anywhere on the globe. From a political point of view, China, India and Pakistan are sometimes said to form an 'Asian triangle,' occupying a central place in the evolving patterns of Asian politics. 'China's relations with the South Asian states have been relatively complex because of the many levels of policy being served and the highly differentiated way in which the various countries have been seen by Peking.' In recent years, China has been too preoccupied with

internal problems and with relations with the Soviet Union and other higher priorities in foreign policy to give much attention to relations with India and Pakistan; but there can be no doubt that South Asia is a target area for China in her overall relations with the states of non-Communist Asia and the Third World."

**THE FULCRUM OF ASIA: RELATIONS AMONG CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE U.S.S.R.,** by Bhabani Sen Gupta. New York, Pegasus, 1970. 383 p.

"The author of this study offers it as an analysis of 'the theory and practice of international politics among the new nations.' His focus is 'the fulcrum of Asia'—the area where China, India, Pakistan, and Soviet Russia 'meet in friendship and enmity'." Contents: The Asian Triangle; The Soviets Arrive in South Asia; The Challenge of China; The Decade of Confrontations; Consequences of Confrontation; etc. "Confrontations and conflicts between China, India, and Pakistan as between other Asian nations have to be attributed at least in part to the territorial imperatives of their ruling elites. It may shock many Asians to recognize in the territorial imperatives of their national elites elements of imperialism, but it is mistaken to believe, as Asians and Africans mostly do, that imperialism has been a monopoly of the industrialized West. Several of the new nations in Asia are essentially empire-nation states; their ruling elites have inherited not only the empires left over by the European powers but also the latter's imperial strategies. China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia are, in fact, empire-nation states with imperial interests and perceptions governing their relationships with smaller national and subnational entities."

**INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS,** by William J. Barnds. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972. 388 p. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

"Civil war, the demands of East Pakistan for autonomy or independence as Bangla Desh, 10 million refugees, the tinderbox tensions between India and Pakistan, the wary stance of the major powers—to understand these unhappy developments of 1971, one needs insight into the past twenty-five years in South Asia. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' is a comprehensive analysis of international relations on the Asian subcontinent. In assessing the roles the major powers have played there, the book re-examines American policy toward India and Pakistan and suggests guidelines for the future. Out of the legacy of colonialism, the struggle for independence from Britain, and the Hindu-Muslim antagonism that led to partition and the bitter Kashmir dispute, India

and Pakistan have fashioned their distinctive foreign policies and set the course of events since 1947. With the onset of the cold war, India's nonalignment, and Pakistan's search for allies and security, the outside powers found scope for their own contest for influence among one-sixth of the world's population. The United States became a military ally of Pakistan's while simultaneously trying to maintain good relations with India by assisting its efforts at modernization and development. The Soviet Union wooed India with economic aid and in other ways. China and India experienced a spurious friendship that deteriorated from sloganeering good will to acrimonious dispute over their borders. In the 1960s, the interrelations of the five powers changed kaleidoscopically. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and contrasting international responses modified India's previous stance. For Pakistan, the second Kashmir war in 1965 brought disillusionment with its military alliances, new and close relations with China, and the profound domestic discontent that is working itself out today. The Soviet Union has greatly enhanced its influence on South Asian affairs with economic and military aid, while the United States has in many ways been disengaging. America's policy on the subcontinent—past, present, and prospective—is carefully considered in terms of its interests, the regional conflict, the enormous development problems, and the defense of South Asia. The United States is critically . . . taken to task for errors and omissions of policy, but its positive contributions are fully recognized. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' . . . covers the setting, the exercise, and the inherent limitations of the roles of the five principal powers." With selected bibliography, maps, and tables.

**MOSCOW AND BANGLADESH,** by Bhabani Sen Gupta, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 2 (March-April 1975) 56-58.

"In March 1974, the last two of eleven Soviet minesweepers which had been engaged in harbor-clearing operations in the shipping channel of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar left the waters of Bangladesh. The ships were part of a 20-unit fleet sent by the Soviet Union two years earlier, at the request of the new People's Republic of Bangladesh, to clear ports in the strategic Bay of Bengal of the mines and sunken ships left in the wake of the Republic's tumultuous birth in 1971. In two years, the Soviet fleet had salvaged 17 vessels, ranging from a 15,000-ton freighter to small coastal ships and barges—and what is more, it had carried out the entire operation free of charge. Yet, when the last of the Soviet ships left four months ahead of schedule, the Bangladesh government seemed more relieved at their departure than grateful for their services,



while Soviet representatives were reportedly in a state of some aggravation. According to Calcutta's leading newspaper, *The Statesman*, some Bangladesh officials had begun to feel 'rather uncomfortable' about the 'prolonged presence' of the Soviet force, surmising that it might be one reason for China's continued refusal to recognize the new republic and maintaining that the Russians were using Chittagong as a 'foothold' for keeping watch on the Indian Ocean."

**THE SINO-PAK RELATIONS: A PROBE INTO THE PAST DECADES**, by M.S. Dahiya, in *U.S.I. Journal*, v. 105, no. 438 (January-March 1975) 20-27.

"When Pakistan joined the military alliance sponsored by the Western powers in the early 50s, it was observed in certain American circles that 'this nation is solidly committed to the camp of free nations in the cold war.' But the juxtaposition of some compulsions on the part of Pakistan and China's own designs in South Asia brought the two countries nearer. Since the main aim of Pakistan in joining these alliances was to build herself against India for the very purpose of settling the Kashmir dispute by force, and since her permanent allies could not provide military assistance up to its expectations, the foreign policy makers in Pakistan decided in favour of a stronger orientation towards the communists bloc. In view of the fact that in the early 60s both India and China began to look at each other with jaundiced eyes, the Pakistani leaders found a fertile ground in Peking to achieve their objectives. China responded favourably and as such the horizontal relationship maintained by the 'Bandung spirit' culminated into the vertically growing friendship."

**(LI)—SOVIET EXPANSION IN SOUTH ASIA**, by Lt. Col. Charles C. Vogler. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 68 p. (Professional Study.)

"This research report is an analysis of the current geopolitical situation on the Indian sub-continent. A brief discussion of the historical origins of India and Pakistan is followed by a detailed analysis of both the Kashmir and Bangladesh regional disputes. The report then examines Soviet penetration of the region followed by a discussion of the countervailing Chinese influence. The report concludes with a discussion of the realignment which will follow the latest Indo-Pakistani war."

**WHY IS CHINA SUPPORTING WEST PAKISTAN? A REVOLUTIONARY SOUL ON ICE**, in *Atlas*, v. 20, no. 7 (July/August 1971) 43.

Reprinted from "Far Eastern Economic Review," Hong Kong—"Among the more puzzling aspects of the bloody, decimating war between the

Bengalis of East Pakistan and Yahya Khan's military regime in West Pakistan is China's avowed support of the latter. It is perhaps understandable, from a political point of view, that Peking is in no hurry to help its old rival India in coping with the millions of refugees pouring over the border from East Pakistan. But according to this . . . editorial in Hong Kong's . . . weekly, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Chou En-lai's pledge of support against India is a sign that the world's most revolutionary nation has 'jettisoned' its soul."

**(5) Relations with Sri Lanka (Ceylon)**

**SINO-CEYLONESE RELATIONS**, by J. P. Anand, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 3, no. 3 (January 1971) 325-352.

"Britain transferred power to Ceylon in 1948 and she continued to maintain close relations with Britain. The ruling United National Party (UNP) was anti-communist in its orientation. She, however, recognized Communist China on 5 January 1950 following Britain's decision to do so. At the same time, Ceylon terminated her relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan. Sino-Ceylonese relations can best be discussed in . . . broad phases: 1950-56; 1956-65; 1956-70."

**(6) Chinese Communization of Tibet**

**(LI)—THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS APPLICATION IN TIBET**, by Maj. Johnson E. Penneywell. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The Chinese Communist realized as early as 1931, that over fifty nationality minorities existed in mainland China. These minorities constitute six percent of the population of China and occupy over 60 percent of her land area. Cultural and traditional differences between the minorities and the Han Chinese led to racial hatred and bitter relations. To establish control and win the loyalty of minority people, the Chinese Communists developed a minority policy which constitutionally provided regional autonomy, emphasizing equally and non-discrimination. However, implementation of this policy in Tibet included a major sinification program with mass migration of Han Chinese from crowded cities, attacks on religious leaders, genocide of Tibetan males, and forced marriage between Han Chinese males and Tibetan females. Events such as the Hundred Flowers, the Rectification Campaign, and the Great Leap Forward increased hostility and contributed to the start of open warfare between Tibet and China. There is strong resistance to Chinese domination of Tibet. Guerrilla bands continue to operate in various parts of Tibet today. The intensity of the Tibetan

resistance is a possible source of exploitation by a neighboring government hostile to the Chinese Communist regime."

(LI)—THE CHINESE COMMUNIZATION OF TIBET, by Lt. Col. Evan L. Parker, Jr. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An examination of the Chinese Communist process in forcing the Chinese version of socialization upon the Tibetans. The historical perspective is surveyed to illustrate the political nature of the Tibetan society and the methods which the Chinese used to establish control over the governmental structure. The attitudes and policies of the Indian government are examined to gauge their effect upon China and Tibet. Various Chinese Communist Policies are studied to determine their effects upon the communizing process in Tibet during the first decade of Chinese occupation and domination. Some of the policies were specifically developed for Tibet and other national minorities areas, while other were domestic policies applicable to China as a whole."

*c. Relations with Southeast Asia*

*(1) Miscellaneous Aspects*

CHINA AND ASEAN: THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTH EAST ASIA, by Victor C. Funnell, in *The World Today*, v. 31, no. 7 (July 1975) 299-306.

"The fashion for normalizing relations with China begun by the Americans in 1972 is one that has been fully accepted by the countries of South East Asia over the past three years . . . Malaysia has eagerly pointed the way. Singapore and Indonesia still drag their feet. Thailand prefers a practical, step-by-step solution, while the Philippines has mounted a diplomatic spectacular, involving members of the Presidential family. These, of course, are the countries forming the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a grouping that has shown some signs of vitality as a regional organization and which now has a permanent secretariat in Jakarta. Their thinking on China is of particular interest, since they have been the ones most closely aligned with the West; they also happen to have political systems that are more or less open to inspection, where policies form the subject of continuing dialogue and debate."

CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA: THE NEW PHASE, by V. C. Funnell, in *The World Today*, v. 28, no. 8 (August 1972) 334-341.

"China's interest in the smaller nations on her periphery is a function of her major concern to exclude other big powers from the area; for their part the Asian countries feel more threatened by internal subversion than by overt aggression from outside."

(LI)—CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN PERSPECTIVE, by Lt. Col. Nicholas J. Donelson. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1974. 65 p. (Professional Study.)

"Recent changes in the international politics of Southeast Asia introduce a discussion of the People's Republic of China general policy objectives. A description of the Chinese road through Laos, and Peking's relations with Laos, Cambodia and Thailand follows to provide the background for Chinese involvement in the area. A review of recent Russian, Japanese and American activities in the region completes the setting from which the author identifies Peking's future objectives and the impact of the recent political changes. The author sees a shift to a quadrilateral balance of power which will be welcomed by the Southeast Asian nations."

CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, by Jay Taylor. New York, Praeger, 1974. 384 p.

"A . . . recapitulation of published data on Chinese policy in Southeast Asia in the 1960s . . . From the Deputy Chief of the Political Section in the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong."

CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE 1945, by C. P. Fitzgerald. New York, Longman, 1974. 110 p.

"A China scholar considers the patchwork puzzle of Southeast Asia and the place of Chinese policy in its future. Of the alternatives—Balkanization or Finlandization—he prefers the latter."

CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA—THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL, by Melvin Gurtov. Lexington, Mass., Heath Lexington Books, 1971. 234 p.

"Examines the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign policy and the relations between Peking and three Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Cambodia and Burma. He stresses the . . . fact that 'China's policy choices concerning relations with governments and antigovernment movements in the three countries have been heavily influenced by American policy in the Indo-china area.' 'China's support for revolution in Southeast Asia becomes perfunctory whenever local governments are willing to demonstrate their friendship toward Peking by avoiding excessive dependence on American (or Soviet) support'."

(LI)—CHINESE HEGEMONY AND SINO-ORIENTED INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Lt. Comdr. Charles Metzler. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"Unlike many of our allies, the United States



has not carried on extensive diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. This presents our diplomatic and military corps with a two decade hiatus of pertinent U.S.-Chinese experience. In order to deal effectively with the Chinese, a macroscopic exposure of the major themes which influence Chinese traditional methods of dealing with foreign nations and specifically Southeast Asia is instructive. Specifically, this paper examines the ancient ethnic philosophies and modern methods of obtaining and solidifying a suzerain status which contribute to Chinese ethnocentrism and her perceived sense of superiority. China's suzerain status and ethnocentrism were severely affected by intervention during the nineteenth century. The ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reigniting of the Chinese image of superiority contribute to the attempts by the PRC to establish a suzerain-vassal status in Southeast Asia under the guise of insurgency. As a consequence, the nations of Southeast Asia have become a testing ground for China's insurgency movement. This paper examines China's efforts in re-establishing her influence in Southeast Asia."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA ON THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, by Victor C. Funnell, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 3, no. 4 (July 1975) 20-27.

"As her economy grows, and with her prodigious population, it will become harder to deny China a pre-eminent role in Asia, similar to that now enjoyed by the United States in the western hemisphere, or by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe . . . The relationship most markedly and most relevantly awaiting definition today is that between the ASEAN countries and China."

THE FUTURE OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Frank N. Trager, in *Military Review*, v. 50, no. 1 (January 1970) 3-16.

"Mainland Southeast Asia has been a target area for Peking in earlier dynasties, and Communist China under Mao Tse-tung has been no exception. Peking, frequently said to have conducted a 'cautious' foreign policy, has not been cautious in Asia. It has proceeded to gobble up Tibet, to incite North Korea, to attack India, and again to threaten it in the Pakistan-India war of 1965. During the 'Cultural revolution,' China has been active in violating its treaties and downgrading its 'friendly' relations with Burma and Cambodia while openly supporting a so-called war of 'national liberation' in the former. It has fomented strife in Thailand by energizing the Communist Party of Thailand. It has given support to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Communists in their attacks on the Lao Provinces of Phong Saly, Sam Neua, and Xieng Khouang. It has supplied North Vietnam with

materiel and about 50,000 specially trained engineering and artillery troops. A political victory for Vietnamese Communists in the Republic of Vietnam—that is, a coalition government 'imposed' on Saigon—would help free them to weaken Laos and Cambodia, add to the dangers of Thailand and Burma, and, of course, irreparably weaken the Republic of Vietnam."

INDOCHINA: SEA OF TROUBLES, in *Newsweek*, v. 83, no. 4 (28 January 1974) 37.

"200 miles off the coast of Vietnam in the middle of the South China Sea, a flotilla of Chinese warships led by a guided-missile destroyer engaged a South Vietnamese naval force last week in a fierce duel. When it was all over, two warships lay on the bottom of the ocean, more than 150 crewmen were lost and Saigon and Peking were hinting at a larger war . . . The trouble began when twenty Chinese fishermen went ashore and planted a flag on a tiny uninhabited island in the Paracel Archipelago, which is claimed by both sides . . . The sudden interest in the Paracels stems not from the islands' only proven resource-guano-but from dreams of oil. Both China and South Vietnam are hoping to find vast oil deposits under the South China Sea."

THE PRC AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Leslie R. Marchant, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 4, no. 1 (October 1975) 15-21.

"An account of the impact of new foreign policy contradictions, and Peking's new tactics designed to resolve these."

SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN THE EARLY '70S, by Marie-Luise Nath, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 3, no. 1 (October 1974) 11-22.

"Progressive US military withdrawal from South-East Asia will intensify the already severe 'Cold War' competition in the area between China and the USSR. For the countries of the region, national and regional security questions will become accordingly more complex. The US has an obligation—and a new capability—to work to reduce the consequent tensions in the region."

TOWARDS REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by R. W. Bradford, in *Army Journal, Australia*, no. 252 (May 1970) 15-25.

"The security of South-East Asia is at once a critical and controversial problem. It is critical because the countries of this broad area are endangered by a wide range of threats to their stability and security, threats which arise out of their own internal weaknesses and the external pressures of subversion and conventional attack—and in the future there will be the problem of confronting a nuclear armed China. It is con-

troversial because of the serious disagreement about the best way to defend the area. The support of external powers in a front line and guarantor role is at present essential to the security of the indigenous countries, and, in the absence of a regional security alliance, is likely to remain so for some time . . . . The proposed British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971 and the likelihood of an American withdrawal from the Asian mainland in the post-Vietnam era indicate that the future responsibility for the internal security of the South-East Asian region will rest with the indigenous nations alone. These nations will then have to solve their intramural problems collectively, for to remain as individual nations would be to encourage the endemic threats that have played havoc with the security of the region for the last twenty years. It is against the background of these threats that the ability of the South-East Asian nations to develop a regional cohesion must be assessed." The author concludes that "ASEAN is the only regional arrangement that appears to have the potential to meet . . . threats." With short bibliography.

#### (2) Relations with Burma

BURMA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA SINCE 1962, by Robert A. Holmes, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 45, no. 2 (Summer 1972) 240-254.

"This article presents a description and analysis of Burma's policy toward China since General Ne Win came to power. Since many of the developments in Burma-China relations during the Ne Win era are a direct result of earlier events, it is necessary to begin with the 1960 Border Agreement and the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression."

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH BURMA AND INDONESIA, by Wayne Best, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 6 (June 1975) 473-487.

"This paper is an attempt to compare policy toward Burma and Indonesia and explain China's objectives as a major and revolutionary power in Asia, emphasizing developments in the post-Cultural Revolution period when the major aspect of Chinese foreign policy has been growing detente with the U.S. and continued hostility toward the Soviet Union. I will also briefly discuss the pre-Cultural Revolution policies of China in order to suggest to what extent Chinese policy since 1950 manifests consistent patterns which allow some kind of conclusion as to the general objectives and methods of the leadership."

THE SINO-BURMESE RIFT: A FAILURE FOR CHINA, by Robert A. Holmes, in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 211-236.

"Most scholars who have written about the Sino-Burmese dispute of 1967 have argued that Peking's attempt to export the Cultural Revolution,

even to nations with which China had previously had cordial relations, was its major cause. The split occurred ostensibly over anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon—in response, be it remembered, to Maoist demonstrations by overseas Chinese students encouraged by the Chinese Embassy. In reality it was the final incident in a long series of failures to extend Chinese influence into Burma and induce this neutralist state to identify with and support Chinese foreign policy. Within Burma, China had found that its presence was being restricted and its influence reduced to a minimum. In denouncing Burma's 'persecution' of the Chinese and declaring its hostility toward the Burmese government, Peking was revealing that it had failed to attain its goals. It is this writer's belief that China's frustration over the lack of success of its policy vis-a-vis Burma led to the actions precipitating the Sino-Burmese rift."

#### (3) Relations with Laos

COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE CONFERENCE ON LAOS, by Chae-Jin Lee, in *Military Review*, v. 50, no. 2 (February 1970) 24-36.

Condensed from the original, published in *Asian Survey*, July 1969. "The direction of Communist China's approach toward Laos has often been influenced by changes in the balance of politics in Vietiane. Just such a development took place in August 1960 when Captain Kong Le, an obscure parachute commander, staged a successful coup d'etat overthrowing the pro-US government of Premier Tiao Somsanith and General Phoumi Nosavan. As Kong Le declared a neutral foreign policy, the Chinese seized this fortuitous opportunity to denounce the US presence in Laos and to attempt to enhance their influence there. They promptly endorsed Kong Le's efforts and encouraged him to form a broad united front with the Pathet Lao against Phoumi Nosavan's right-wing groups. As soon as neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma was reinstated as Premier in September, Premier Chou En-lai sent him a congratulatory message hoping that China and Laos would establish and develop friendly, peaceful relations. After rejecting Premier Souvanna Phouma's overtures for national unity, Phoumi Nosavan organized a 'New Revolutionary Committee' at Savannakhet under the titular leadership of Prince Boun Oum and pledged to fight against Kong Le. Even though the United States recognized Souvanna Phouma's government, it attached great importance to this beginning of a 'revolution' at Savannakhet and gave military assistance to Phoumi Nosavan's troops through channels in Thailand. The ambiguity of the US position inevitably increased Souvanna Phouma's suspicions and, in effect, drove him toward the Communist embrace. In the face of



Phoumi Nosavan's growing military activities during October and November, Souvanna Phouma concluded a series of political agreements with Prince Souphanouvong and the Pathet Lao in order to accept economic and military assistance from Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi . . . On 24 April, the Soviet Union and Great Britain reached agreement on three measures leading to the 'International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Laotian Question.' Indeed, from December 1960 to April 1961, there gradually emerged a tacit understanding among the major powers with regard to the general formula for a negotiated settlement in Laos: An international neutralization of Laos to be supervised by the International Control Commission. A coalition government to be composed of three rival factions under Souvanna Phouma's premiership . . . In a sense the Geneva Conference marked an attempt to resolve one aspect of the Sino-American conflict in Southeast Asia. The Chinese scored a considerable diplomatic victory. They forced the United States to accept the withdrawal of its military advisors and SEATO's protective umbrella from Laos, to agree to the reduction of the commission's power, and to acknowledge the coalition government with Pathet Lao representation . . . At Geneva, the Chinese maintained a remarkable degree of outward unity and coordination with Moscow and Hanoi in order to defend common interests and denounce Western proposals. But they could not always conceal their subtle differences with Moscow in diplomatic tactics and strategic calculations vis-a-vis Laos and the United States . . . To solve such difficult issues as SEATO's role and military integration, the Chinese relied on the decisions among the Laotian groups which they could manipulate more confidently than the Geneva Conference itself."

**COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LAOS: A CASE STUDY, 1954-1957**, by Chae-Jin Lee. Lawrence, University of Kansas, Center for East Asian Studies, 1970. 161 p. (Research Publication no. 6.)

Contents: The Chinese Communist conception of Laos; The Chinese policy of peaceful coexistence: China and the first Geneva formula on Laos. The Bandung 'spirit' and Sino-Laotian relations. Peking and the peaceful unification of Laos; The Chinese policy of assertive pressure: Collapse of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Assertive approaches toward Laos. The United Nations presence and its effects; The Chinese policy of negotiations at the second Geneva conference: A prelude to the Geneva conference on Laos. Chinese positions and tactics at Geneva. Evaluation of the second Geneva formula; The Chinese policy of reappraisal after the Geneva conference: Development of the second Geneva for-

mula. Gradual erosion of a 'neutralized' Laos. Reorientation of Chinese policy in Laos. Laos, the Vietnam war, and the Chinese cultural revolution; Evaluation and implications."

**INDOCHINA—ONE-UPMANSHIP**, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 16 (20 October 1975) 49-50.

A note on the rivalry existing between China and the USSR in their relations with Laos. For instance: "The Chinese, who had already pushed a road from Yunnan province into northern Laos, recently agreed to extend it 80 miles to Luang Prabang." Peking and Moscow have worked out a deal with Royal Dutch/Shell to give the Laotians gasoline.

#### (4) Relations with North Vietnam

**COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WAR**, by David A. Raymond, in *Asian Affairs*, (November/December 1974) 83-99.

"... The perception that China's antagonism toward the Soviet Union exceeded that toward the US, Raymond contends, helped facilitate both US disengagement from Vietnam and establishment of neodiplomatic relations between the US and Communist China. Reviewing China's long-term approach to Indochina, Raymond says it was characterized by caution in dealings with the US, distrust of Soviet power, and wariness over the limitations of influencing revolutionary allies such as North Vietnam . . . As China entered its Cultural Revolution Moscow seized the opportunity to erode Chinese influence in Hanoi. In 1968 China suffered a major policy defeat when North Vietnam agreed to negotiate without further preconditions. Unable to ignore the changing international climate, in 1969 China indicated its willingness to discuss 'coexistence' with the US and its desire to have a voice in settling the Vietnam war. As a step in that direction, China officially recognized the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, thus acknowledging the separation of North and South. This was closely followed by a series of US policy changes designed specifically to improve relations with China. In 1970 China took advantage of Prince Sihanouk's overthrow to increase its political influence in Indochina at Russia's expense by offering Sihanouk a government-in-exile in Peking. In addition, China dispatched ambassadors to the 'revisionist' communist capitals of Eastern Europe and indicated an interest in joining the United Nations, which it had formerly stigmatized as a 'tool of imperialism.' Assessing the possibility of better relations with the US, China reasoned that: the Soviet Union had become more of a threat to Chinese security; the US was also concerned with the rise of Soviet military power; further support of North Vietnam's hegemony over Indochina might

not benefit China in view of Moscow's influence; continued division of Vietnam might serve to maintain China's influence; and both nations shared an interest in checking the influence of Moscow and Hanoi throughout the area . . . China's rapprochement with the US substantially influenced North Vietnam to accept a peace settlement which fell short of its maximum war aims . . ."

IMAGE AND REALITY IN INDOCHINA, by Harrison E. Salisbury, in *Foreign Affairs* (April 1971) 381-393.

"Examines the history of Indochina for the past 30 years, pointing out many instances where the involved nations misjudged each other's actions and motives. At no time was there greater misperception than in the 1965-66 period when the US was constantly escalating the war. The US image of Vietnam at that time is unclear. Sometimes Washington seemed to regard Hanoi as an instrument of Chinese policy, and occasionally as an intransigent native communist movement. As for North Vietnam, Salisbury says Hanoi officials told him that they regarded the US as replacing France in the area and that the huge war effort was for the benefit of the capitalists who wished to exploit the natural resources of Vietnam. The Chinese told Salisbury that they saw the US escalation as an opening move in an all-out assault on China, with the collaboration of Moscow. At this same time, Moscow feared that the Chinese would involve them in a war with the US—a fear that spurred them to give some assistance to the US in the search for peace. By 1969 both the Chinese and Soviets had changed their perception of Vietnam, tending to view it as a 'front' in their own growing confrontation, rather than as a US-Vietnamese confrontation. For this reason China opposed the Paris peace negotiations, fearing such a move would lead the US and USSR closer to detente. Moscow, on the other hand, favored negotiations, believing the end of the war would be a blow to Chinese communist movements. The wide differences among the communist powers were evident in the Cambodian events of 1970. The Chinese used the coup to sponsor a summit of the Indochina communist movements in support of Sihanouk. The Russians, excluded from the meeting, snubbed Sihanouk, maintained relations with the Lon Nol government, and insisted that their satellites do the same. Moreover, they blamed the Chinese for the US action in Cambodia and Vietnam on the grounds that China had failed to form a 'united front' against US aggression. Salisbury fears that distortion between image and reality has by no means run its course in Indochina . . ."

PEKING AND INDOCHINA: THE PER-

PLEXITY OF VICTORY, by Sheldon Simon, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 5 (May 1976) 401-410.

"The April 1975 victory of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA)—sandwiched between comparable denouements in Cambodia and Laos—has been greeted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) with barely disguised perplexity. While publicly applauding the great changes in Southeast Asia as an example of the validity of Mao's 'peoples war' doctrine, China remains concerned over both the strategic and political implications of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) success, particularly during a period in which Peking's leaders prefer to focus inward on problems of economic growth and leadership succession. Peking's concern centers on two issues: (1) whether a unified Vietnam, with two potential client states in Laos and Cambodia, will move outward beyond Indochina to foment and support other insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, thus establishing itself as a rival source of revolutionary support to China; and (2) whether as a price for the continuation of large-scale economic and military assistance Hanoi agrees to align with the Soviet Union against China on either or both political and military issues."

PEKING, HANOI, AND GUERRILLA INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Justus M. van der Kroef, in *Southeast Asian Perspectives*, no. 3 (September 1971) 1-67.

"How have mainland China and North Vietnam performed in world affairs over the past two decades? What are some of the main directions of their current policy? In the monograph . . . Professor Justus M. van der Kroef attempts to deal with one important aspect of the latter question. His essay is an exhaustive examination of the dimensions of Peking's and Hanoi's ongoing support for Communist-led insurrections and revolutionary wars in all the countries of Southeast Asia. In his . . . compilation of the facts, no single exhibit is perhaps entirely persuasive. But the cumulative weight of his evidence is overwhelming." Partial contents: Introduction; Burma and Thailand; Indochina; Malaysia and Singapore; Indonesia and the Philippines; etc.

THE RAID, by Benjamin F. Schemmer. New York, Harper and Row, 1976. 326 p.

The full story of the extraordinary top-secret mission to rescue 61 American POWs in a prison compound 23 miles from Hanoi. The helicopter-borne raid by American raiders who dropped on Son Tay prison in November 1970 was considered by many in the United States as a fiasco, because the would be rescuers found the prison empty of prisoners. However, the author does not agree and



describes the benefits accrued to the U.S. to POWs held by North Vietnam, and the effect the raid had on Communist China and its relations with North Vietnam. With photos.

**SHOWDOWN OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA?**, by Joseph Alsop, in *Reader's Digest*, v. 107, no. 644 (December 1975) 137-142.

"As North Vietnam steps up its march, in alliance with Moscow, will Peking risk a major confrontation with the Soviet Union to try to stop it?"

(5) *Relations with Thailand*

**BANGKOK AND THE DOMINO THEORY**, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 19, no. 10 (January 1970) 17-18.

"Seni Pramoj, leader of the weak opposition in Thailand, recently declared that in the course of its history his country has always bent with the wind like a flexible bamboo pole, without breaking, and must continue to remain elastic in hope that no storm will develop. Since the beginning of the American withdrawal in Vietnam, Foreign Minister Thanat Koman has been even more concrete in his statements. He points to the fact that, during the colonial epoch, Thailand successfully maneuvered between Britain and France in order to retain its traditional independence. But when communism threatened to overrun all of Indochina the Thais let the Americans into the country, since the USA was the only power available which seemed in a position to check the rapidly growing menace from Hanoi and Peking. Now, he says, for reasons of their own the Americans have decided to pull in their horns in Asia and this will create a power vacuum into which something else must flow. But the prospect of finding substitute allies is not very comforting. The Chinese colossus is acting in a manner half reflective, half aggressive. Nevertheless it is possible that Thai generals have their lines out to realists of a very difficult political shading in Peking. The Chinese minority in Thailand is large, well integrated and has even provided the country with a number of prominent ministers. In other words, there are family ties which reach across the frontier. At the same time the Thai Chinese are the capitalistic element in the country and are certainly not anxious for a change along socialist lines."

**DIPLOMACY OF ADAPTABILITY: THAILAND'S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA**, by Maj. Stephen I. Alpern, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 3 (March 1974) 85-93.

"The Nixon Doctrine has become catalyst for a Thai reassessment of the premises and direction of its own foreign policy. This reassessment aims at re-emphasizing Thailand's traditional flexibility in dealing with foreign powers and redefining its role

in the emerging context of Asian power relationships, a context in which Communist countries might play a more influential role than in the past . . . While the post-Vietnam War power configuration in Southeast Asia remains unknown, current Thai leadership is likely to move closer to an accommodation with the People's Republic of China while, at the same time, maintaining ties with the Soviet Union and the United States. The objective is to achieve friendlier relations with China through a regional policy of accommodation, thus enhancing Thai security while at the same time, assuring continued independence in internal affairs."

**THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC [INCLUDING THAILAND] ON SOUTH ASIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN, 1972-1984**, by James McGarry & Daniel Trethak. Falls Church, Va., Westinghouse Corp., Center for Advanced Studies & Analyses, 1971. 42 p. (ASA Monograph No. 7.)

"This monograph . . . explores the major considerations likely to shape the changing balance of power and policies of the major powers in the Indian Ocean area. It concentrates upon policy alternatives respecting this area available to Japan, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Indonesia. One of the most timely values lies in its insights respecting the essential stability of the balance of power in the Indian Ocean area, resulting both from the large number of major states with influence in the area and the limited degree to which military actions of any one in this area can essentially modify the structure of the power balance."

**SINO-THAI RELATIONS**, by Thomas A. Marks, in *Asian Affairs*, v. 61, Part III (October 1974) 296-310.

"When examining the history and probable course of Sino-Thai relations there are four major areas which will compose the issue: (1) Chinese foreign policy and the Chinese perceptions of the Thai role in any external threat to the PRC; (2) Thailand's estimates of its own security needs and the motivations of the PRC and other neighbouring States such as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV); (3) the course of the Thai majority's relations with its ethnic Chinese minority; and (4) Thai and Chinese views of the future role to be played by the United States in Asia."

**THE STRATEGIC LAND RIDGE: PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH THAILAND, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND INDONESIA**, by Yuan-Li Wu. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 97 p.

"Wu sees the four countries of the subtitle as forming the arena for a quadrilateral great-power confrontation."

*d. China and the Indian Ocean*

THE BIG THREE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by R. M. Paone, in *Sea Power*, v. 18, no. 8 (August 1975) 28-34.

"PRC, USSR Fight for Supremacy While US Seeks 'Reasonable Balance' . . . The objectives and the nature of the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC in the Indian Ocean Heartland, as well as the interaction of their policies, are of particular interest in today's shrinking world, and are likely to thoroughly test the probability of the old adage that neither the 'West' wind nor the 'East' wind (China) shall prevail over the East African peripheral."

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN IMBROGLIO: AN INDICATOR OF THE NEED FOR A GESTALT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF PEKING'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, by Leslie R. Marchant, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 3, no. 1 (October 1974) 23-41.

"The Chinese Communists are essentially ideologues. Their whole course of policy is directed towards achieving the ends of their ideology, in some way, sooner or later . . . The low-key tone which Chinese Communist officials have been using for their pronouncements on the Indian Ocean problem, compared with their high-key treatment for areas such as Indo-China, could well be taken to indicate that Peking either is not very interested or involved in the Indian Ocean, or that other areas and problems merit more attention in Peking."

(LI)—THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Wing Comdr. Alaister G. L. Hutchison. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 74 p. (Professional Study.)

"General remarks drawing the background to the current situation in the Indian Ocean area. An assessment of the degree and importance of Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea leading to the significance of this penetration vis-a-vis political influence in those areas and further Soviet expansion. An analysis of the increasing Soviet and Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean area and the problems to the defence of the Free World created. The increasing Strategic significance of South Africa and Australia and the steps taken by these countries in the light of Communist infiltration. The study concludes with an examination of the initiatives which could be taken by the West to counter Soviet influence in the region and leads to the suggestion of the setting-up of a maritime alliance involving interested nations."

*9. Relations with the Third World*

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD, by

Devendra Kaushik. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1975. 95 p.

From Socialist to Maoist China; The "Third World" in Peking's Strategy; The Ideological Network of Maoism—An Exercise in Myth-Making; Peking's Policy in Action—Sell-Out of "Third World" Interests; etc.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD, by Bruce Larkin, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 75-79 plus.

" . . . Just as China maintains a tension at home between stability and change, so she prizes a dynamically stable outcome in the international sphere . . . The strongest theme in China's current third world policy is 'to change the old international economic order and build a new one . . . The new international rules will be the embodiment of a new stability—a dynamic stability—in which the majority of states, the less developed states of the third world, select the terms of stability and exchange. It is impossible to predict the extent to which China will achieve her objectives, but any success will be due to initiatives of third world states and complementarities between Chinese and other aims, not because China somehow steers the third world. But even achieving the advantages of complementarity will require an astute Chinese political stance."

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD, by Peter Van Ness, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 106-109 plus.

"Though it is too early to be certain, events of the past four years may constitute a threshold in China's relations with the third world. Third world nations are responsive to the example of a self-reliant China and inspired by China's courage in confronting the world's great nuclear powers."

(\*)—COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD, by Edward Taborsky. New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1973. 500 p.

"An overall exposition and analysis of communist strategy in and toward the Third World. While emphasizing Soviet strategic doctrine and practice, the author pays attention to the contributions of Communist China, Eastern Europe, and, where appropriate, Yugoslavia and Cuba. Separate chapters are devoted to participation in national democratic revolutions and fronts, fostering the class struggle and building up the proletariat, the mission of the local communist parties, utilizing the peasantry, the role of the bourgeoisie in communist strategy, exploiting the economic weapon, pursuit of cultural diplomacy, and the employment of violent methods, including guerrilla warfare."



RUSSIA, CHINA, AND INSURGENCY, by Lt. Comdr. John H. Norton, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 23, no. 2 (October 1970) 53-68.

"Deals with Communist theory, strategy, and tactics in relation to insurgency, and it includes consideration of the divergent approaches to this subject taken by the Soviet Union and Communist China. Rather than replying separately to each of the specific questions contained in the syllabus, the author chose to respond collectively to four of the installment's seven questions. In so doing, he composed a provocative essay in which he analyzes the role that ideology plays in Soviet and Chinese Communist policy and the impact that it has had on the 'Third World' to the detriment of the United States. The author feels that any attempt to assign the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare solely to a conspiratorial international Communist movement ignores the relevance of this ideology to the Third World and limits conceptually the means of dealing with this complex situation."

SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD, ed. by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York, Praeger Publisher, 1975. 232 p.

"Alvin Rubinstein has selected essays to 'provide up-to-date analyses of Soviet and Chinese influence in strategically important Third World countries and regions'."

#### 10. Relations with Albania

(LI)—ALBANIA: PRC FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE, by Edward P. Cutolo. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An investigation of the role Albania plays in the People's Republic of China's relations with the countries of the world, with particular interest given the Soviet Union and the USA as protagonists. A historical analysis explores the political, diplomatic, economic, ideological, psychological, and military aspects of the Sino-Albanian relationship. Additionally, some high impact/low cost techniques employed by China as it operates out of this foothold into the Third World, Latin America, and the West are examined. In this regard mutual interests of Albania and the PRC which frame the relationship are viewed, in order to determine how these interests are nurtured and supported by their continuing interaction. The Sino-Albanian relationship is found to be strengthening with the passage of time, and no significant change is foreseen in the near term. However, if in the case of a major shift in world power Albania should perceive a shift in her allegiance conducive to her interests, she would again exercise her traditional tactic of realignment while the major powers are more seriously occupied."

THE SINO-ALBANIAN FRIENDSHIP, by Nikolavs A. Stavrou, in *World Affairs*, v. 134, no. 3 (Winter 1971) 234-242.

"Beginning with the early 1960s, a close friendship was fashioned with Communist China. This essay focuses upon the Sino-Albanian relationship and considers the impact upon Albania's traditional foreign policy and upon relations among communist states. In its historical context the Sino-Albanian friendship must be viewed as a by-product of the policies initiated at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the emergence of polycentrism as a key factor influencing international relations. The unusual friendship between the giant and the pygmy of the communist state system grew stronger as relations between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated. By the time of the 22nd CPSU Congress (1961), Albania had become the outcast of European communists and the darling of China."

#### 11. Relations with Canada

THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS BETWEEN CANADA AND CHINA: A STATUS REPORT, by M.D. Copithorne, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 48, no. 2 (Summer 1975) 230-237.

"Revolutions are usually violent and in this violence, foreigners are rarely immune from some degree of personal or material injury. The Chinese revolution that led to the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 was no exception nor were the Canadian property interests in China at the time . . . Canada has concluded claims settlements with a number of East European states, specifically, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. With regard to the People's Republic of China, Canada is also well along the path to settlement of its outstanding claims, and it is the purpose of this article to review their background and current status."

THE TRUDEAU VISIT TO CHINA; SHOWING CANADA NO CARBON COPY OF U.S., A KEY GOAL IN PEKING, by Claude Turcotte, in *International Perspectives*, (January/February 1974) 7-12.

An attempt to assess the "lasting results of Prime Minister Trudeau's trip to the People's Republic of China." The trip accorded talks for exchange plans and provided an avenue of using Canada as a stepping-stone to the United States. The trip also provided a look at China whose "Society's values . . . seem to mirror 'quasi-mystical' Chinese ideal."

#### 12. Relations with Japan

ASIAN TRIANGLE: CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, by William W. Lockwood, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 4 (July 1974) 818-838.

"The uncertain power balance created in Asia after 1945 by the defeat of Japan, the eclipse of European imperialism, and the weakness of newly independent nations drew the United States into commitments across the Pacific far beyond its original intentions or its long-run interests and capabilities. With the reduction of those commitments now in progress, what will be the shape of Asia's future as it takes charge more independently of its own destiny? Abstracting from many complexities, this essay dwells upon the significance of the Asian triangle represented by China, the great land empire of East Asia; Japan, the industrial giant to the east; and India, the subcontinental realm southwest across the Himalayas. If Asia's destiny is to be decided increasingly by Asians, as it must be, then these three nations especially will dominate its future."

**CHINA AND JAPAN: DIFFERENT BEDS, DIFFERENT DREAMS**, by Walter LaFeber, in *Current History*, v. 59, no. 349 (September 1970) 142-146 plus.

"How far Sino-Japanese trade relations can stretch depends in large part upon China's internal political situation. The Japanese were heartened that as the Cultural Revolution quieted, Chou En-lai apparently gained control of China's diplomatic apparatus. Tokyo believed it could work out a long-term policy with Chou. The Chinese view of such a policy, however, depended not only upon Chou's ascendancy, but also upon four other Japanese policies' . . . No nation is more acutely aware than Mainland China of the Nixon Doctrine and its implications for Japan. This awareness is creating a paradoxical, deep-rooted shift in Sino-Japanese relations. On the one hand, trade between the two nations booms; on the other hand, the Japanese are concerned about Chinese nuclear weapons, and Peking lashes out bitterly at Tokyo's many diplomatic and commercial successes in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Siberia and Okinawa. China is especially sensitive about the growing Japanese military establishment."

**CHINA AND JAPAN—EMERGING GLOBAL POWERS**, by Peter G. Mueller and Douglas A. Ross. New York, Praeger, 1975. 218 p.

This study is published in cooperation with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. "Its conclusion: Japan and China, both three-quarter-powers, need each other more than they need conflicts between them. Limited rapprochement is the likely pattern for the future, with the Chinese side wielding somewhat greater influence."

**CHINA & JAPAN; PAST AND PRESENT**, by M. I. Sladkovsky. Gulf Breeze, Fla., Academic International Press, 1975. 286 p.

Ancient China and Japan; China and Japan to the Mid-Nineteenth Century; China and Japan Between the Western Powers; Approaching the Twentieth Century; Japanese Imperialism Threatens China; The War in the Pacific, 1941-1945; The Search for Democracy and Social Rights, 1945-1949; The Divergent Societies; and China and Japan in the Sixties.

**CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS: RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND JAPAN**, ed. by Francis O. Wilcox. New York, Praeger, 1974. 103 p.

"In four papers based on the 1973 Herter Lectures at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the authors focus on China's emergence as an Asian power and her relations with the three other powers with Asian interests. Particular attention is paid to her impact on the Asian balance of power, as well as to prospects for cooperation and conflict in that region, the consensus being that relatively moderate behavior on China's part may be a key factor in promoting the stability of the Pacific Basin."

**HEADS, MAO WINS**, by Kim Woodward, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 71, no. 8 (20 February 1971) 26-27.

"As China moves in with force on the international scene, Japan is struggling to avoid being landed on the losing side. And it is clear that sitting on the fence is no longer an insurance."

**HOW CHINA AND JAPAN SEE EACH OTHER**, by Chalmers Johnson, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 4 (July 1972) 710-721.

"Over the past century the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor. Because both the two present-day societies have roots in classical Chinese civilization—only a 'heritage' for each today—Chinese and Japanese politicians before World War II often argued that there was a special binding relationship between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic and moral civilization derive from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive and active today. Perhaps because of this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, the enormous misunderstandings, wars, threats and depredations that have characterized Sino-Japanese relations for a century have tended to take on the ferocity of a family or civil feud. Even though well-educated Chinese and Japanese can learn each other's language rather easily, it is doubtful whether any two peoples in the



twentieth century have approached each other with more profoundly misleading stereotypes."

**JAPAN AND CHINA: FROM WAR TO PEACE, 1895-1972**, by Marius B. Jansen. Chicago, Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1975. 546 p.

"The history of Japan and China in the twentieth century, beginning with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and ending with the Peking agreement of 1972 between the two countries, normalizing their relationship . . . An . . . account of the changing patterns of history as each country has evolved, using largely modern sources as a background for his account of the economic and political trends that have led China to rapprochement with the United States and Japan to become a leading power in the Far East."

**JAPAN AND ITS MAINLAND NEIGHBOURS: AND END TO EQUIDISTANCE?**, by William J. Barnds, in *International Affairs* (London, v. 52, no. 1 (January 1976) 27-38.

"The speed with which Japan has normalised its relations with the People's Republic of China and the rapid expansion of Soviet-Japanese economic relations, coming in the wake of the troubles between Japan and the United States in the early 1970s, raise a series of questions as to whether a basic shift in Japan's foreign policy is occurring. Is Japan moving away from close ties with the United States and towards closer links with its giant mainland neighbours, the Soviet Union and China? If so, might geographic and cultural proximity lead Japan to move much closer to Peking than to Moscow, and how would Soviet leaders react to such a development? To what extent have recent developments been the result of Japanese initiatives, and to what extent the result of ad hoc Japanese responses to the moves of other powers? The answers to these questions, and thus the resulting pattern of relations between Tokyo, Peking and Moscow, will depend upon the interaction of four major factors."

**THE JAPAN-CHINA-USSR TRIANGLE**, by Sheldon W. Simon, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 47, no. 2 (Summer 1974) 125-138.

"At the fulcrum of northeast Asian international politics rests Japan. Originally the target of, and justification for, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan currently finds herself the object of political and economic courtship by both estranged communist powers. Tokyo's ability to maneuver between and to take advantage of their conflict has been enhanced by the loosening of its military ties to the United States as well as the latter's own detente policy inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, which presaged American support for a new balance of power policy for Asia in which China would play a legitimate role. The purpose of this ar-

ticle is to describe the economic and security parameters of the new Japan, China, Soviet relationship and to project their implications for East Asian stability. It is important to stress at the outset that both Russian and Chinese interest in Japan is a combination of Tokyo's positive attractiveness to each as an economic partner and unattractiveness as a potential political ally to the other side. Hence, both Moscow and Peking are employing economic incentives to forestall the establishment of a Japanese political relationship with the other."

**JAPAN'S ASIAN DIPLOMACY ENTERING A NEW STAGE**, by Soji Konno, in *The Mainichi Newspapers New Japan*, v. 22 (1970) 127-130.

Devotes a portion of the article on the Sino-Japanese relations. "It is urgently necessary for Japan to establish a definite policy toward Communist China. In his policy speech at the National Diet on January 27, 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said that Japan will widely open the door to Communist China. His statement was interpreted as suggesting that the Government was about to adopt a new and flexible policy toward Peking. In the course of subsequent Diet discussions, however, the Government reaffirmed its intention to maintain its original principle to 'separate politics from economy' as far as the policy toward Communist China is concerned."

**JAPAN'S NEW CHINA POLICY**, by Futz Steck, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 19, no. 11 (February 1970) 17-18

"The resumption of Sino-American talks has given added stimulus to the thoughts of Japanese planners concerning a new China policy. Hints concerning the need for a positive approach to Peking, which Premier Sato let fall during and after the election campaign, have been interpreted by the Foreign Ministry as an assignment to study the basic problems of Sino-Japanese relations and to make concrete proposals. Up to now there has been no reaction from China to Tokyo's announced intentions. But there has been from Taiwan."

**JAPAN'S NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA**, by Haruhiro Fukui, in *Current History*, v. 68, no. 404 (April 1975) 163-168 plus.

"Two and one-half years after the normalization of their relations, Peking and Tokyo appear to be steadily and successfully adjusting themselves to the new rules of the diplomatic game."

**THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-JAPANESE AIR SERVICE RESUMPTION**, by Yang Shung-tang, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 7 (July 1975) 8-10.

"On April 20, 1974, the Tanaka government of Japan signed a civil aviation agreement with the Chinese Communists . . . Minister Shen . . . declared

that the government of the Republic of China had decided that the China Airlines would, as of that date, cease all its operations on the Sino-Japanese air route, and meanwhile, no aircraft of the Republic of China would fly over any Flight Information Region (FIR) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) under the control of Japan, and likewise, no Japanese aircraft would be permitted to fly over the FIR and ADIZ under the control of the Republic of China. The air service between the Republic of China and Japan, then, was suspended."

THE POLITICS OF JAPAN'S CHINA DECISION, by Yung H. Park, in *Orbis*, v. 19, no. 2 (Summer 1975) 562-592.

"In the spring of 1970 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Dietman Yoshimi Furui, a leading advocate of Sino-Japanese detente, was severely reprimanded by his party for endorsing China's terms for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Not much more than two years later, in September 1972, Japan's new premier, Kakuei Tanaka, made the historic trip to Peking that resulted in Japan establishing diplomatic ties with China, largely on Chinese terms. Who was responsible for this dramatic turnabout in Japan's China policy? How was the decision arrived at? What roles did the various elements of the Japanese political system—LDP, opposition parties, business bureaucracy, press and public opinion—play in policymaking? How did each attempt to influence the government's stand on the China issue? Were the members of the ruling triad—the LDP, business and the bureaucracy—the primary participants in the decision-making? These are among the major concerns of this article."

PROSPECTS FOR A NEW SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP, by Gene T. Hsiao, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 60 (December 1974) 720-749.

"After 22 years of cold war confrontation, the People's Republic of China and Japan finally established diplomatic relations under the impact of the Sino-American detente. In bilateral terms, the rapprochement had the immediate effect of removing certain artificial political and financial barriers that had impeded the normalization of relations. It also promoted the normal interchange of visits and goods between the two countries . . . However, in international politics bilateral relations are often complicated by the interplay of the principal parties' domestic and foreign affairs on the one hand, and their individual relationships with third countries on the other. This is particularly the case in the Asia-Pacific region, where a new international order based on a four-power relationship of China, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union is emerging. Since each of these nations is affected by the development of relationships among the other

powers, the prospect of a Sino-Japanese relationship will not be determined solely on the basis of their bilateral interests. It will also be affected by their mutual relationship with other countries."

(LI)—A SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC ALLIANCE, by Lt. Comdr. Gordon E. Scott. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The purpose of this paper is to determine if there is sufficient basis for the People's Republic of China and Japan to form an economic alliance. Included is a brief history of Japan and China especially as their past relates to early economic development and contact between the two nations. Japan is viewed as a country that needs to import raw materials and natural resources, especially oil in order to sustain the export market upon which her economy is based. China's development since the Communist take-over in 1949 is covered with comments on the effects of The Five Year Plan. The Great Leap Forward, and The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. China's present commerce in world trade is taken into account. Tables showing trade and resources for both countries are incorporated in the text. The author reaches the conclusion that a Sino-Japanese economic alliance would provide valuable advantages to both countries based on several points of compatibility none of which requires giving up sovereign rights or ideological ideals."

(LI)—SINO-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR U.S. STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1975-1985, by Maj. Lawrence M. G. Enomoto. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 98 p. (Research Study.)

"The Sino-Japanese normalization of 29 September 1972 marked the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. This study examines the relations between China and Japan before and after World War II. It also investigates United States relations with China and Japan according to political, economic, military, and psychological considerations. From these historical and topical examinations of the United States, China, and Japan, are derived some conclusions and recommendations affecting U.S. strategic planning in the Western Pacific during 1975-1985."

THE SINO-JAPANESE RAPPROCHEMENT: A RELATIONSHIP OF AMBIVALENCE, by Gene T. Hsiao, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 57. (January/March 1974) 101-123.

"The Nixon administration's new China policy has had many political repercussions in the world, among the most important being the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. From a long-term point



of view, such a rapprochement would, of course, have occurred regardless of the Nixon policy. As early as 1951, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida made the realistic remark: 'Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbour. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers. Nevertheless, the timing of the rapprochement and its ramifications in international affairs are both significant subjects for analysis. Three questions are pertinent: to what extent did the Nixon policy influence Japan's decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.)? How was the rapprochement actually achieved? And what has happened since the Chou-Tanka joint statement of 29 September 1972? In this article, I intend to discuss each of these questions in turn.'

(LI)—SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: A NUCLEAR JAPAN AS CATALYST TO CHANGE, by Lt. Comdr. Thomas L. Nelson. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"This study is an analysis of the Sino-Japanese relationship in light of the prospect of a fully defensive and offensive nuclear capability in Japan. The study includes a limited appraisal of present Sino-Japanese relations and then selectively views available facts to present possible reactions between the two countries should Japan join the elite nuclear club. While no firm prediction can be drawn resulting from a nuclear Japan, it is obvious that serious changes in Sino-Japanese relations would surely follow. Because the United States is lessening its involvement in the Far East, the possibility of a more independent Japan and a Sino-Japanese detente seems realistic. United States foreign policy must reflect these potential areas of concern or run the risk of being stampeded by events over which it will have lost the power of control."

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS—AN ANALYSIS, by Gregory Clark, in *Australian Outlook*, v. 25, no. 1 (April 1971) 58-68.

"The state of Sino-Japanese relations can be described quite simply. Both Peking and Tokyo claim to be the victim of the other's hostile behaviour. Both sides insist that it is the other side which blocks any move towards better relations. In seeking to establish who, if anyone, is right . . . [the author looks] first at the historical record of Sino-Japanese relations and then . . . [tries] to assess how Tokyo and Peking actually judge the many factors involved in their relations must begin with the fact that it is Tokyo, rather than Peking, which refuses diplomatic recognition. Tokyo, moreover, maintains diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese

regime in Taipei. The refusal of recognition by one government for another is usually seen as an unfriendly act; the unfriendliness is compounded if recognition is given to a rival government."

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE THE RAPPROCHEMENT, by Hong N. Kim, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 7 (July 1975) 559-573.

"It is the purpose of this study to examine recent Japanese-Chinese relations with the emphasis on the analysis of the factors which have conditioned Japanese-Chinese relations since the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations on September 29, 1972."

TOKYO AND PEKING—BUSINESS AND POLITICS, by Bora Mirkovic, in *Review of International Affairs, Yugoslavia*, v. 22, no. 498 (5 January 1971) 28-30.

"Will Japan be the last of the big allies of America to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China? The question is a pertinent one, as Italy and Canada have already established relations, and a number of other countries have announced their intention of doing so (Belgium, Austria, etc.). Of the total number of 15 NATO countries, 7 already maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, during the recent balloting in the United Nations on the question of representation for China and expulsion of the Taiwan regime, a majority of member-countries of the world organization voted to seat the PR of China. Against this background, one might well ask what Tokyo's intention along these lines are? Whether relations between China and Japan are good or bad is something that reflects importantly not only on Asian relations, but on the broader context of world affairs. In Asia, the nature of these relations affects a number of important spheres—diplomatic-political, economic and military-strategic."

WHY CHINA IS GETTING SCARED OF JAPAN—AGAIN. AND OLD FEUD HEATS UP, in *Atlas*, v. 20, no. 2 (February 1971) 40-42.

"It may not be news that booming, capitalist Japan is hardly a favorite of the Communist Chinese. But a sudden surge of anti-Japanese propaganda in the closing months of 1970 gave evidence that Peking has now put Japan on the top of its blacklist, a place in recent years reserved for imperialist America and revisionist Russia. Antedating the world's uneasy reaction to the Mishima suicide, the Peking Review ran a blast aimed at the so-called 'remilitarization' of Japan, reprinted in a shortened version . . . In [an] adjoining box, a direct reaction to the Mishima affair—also from Peking Review—as proof that Tokyo has evil designs."

13. *China's Interest in the Mongolian People's Republic*

(LI)—SINO-SOVIET STAKES IN MONGOLIA, by Lt. Col. Henry H. Covington. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 70 p. (Research Study.)

"This study investigates the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet interest in the Mongolian People's Republic. Brief consideration is given to actual and potential Chinese and Soviet social, economic, and political interest in Mongolia; however, the author assumes the reader's primary interest is focused on Mongolia's military significance to Russia and China. In addition to general background information on the Mongolian People's Republic, the study includes a military terrain analysis of the Mongolian landmass and analyzes Mongolia's strategic and/or tactical value to either China or Russia in the light of three hypothetical attacks, launched through and adjacent to the territorial boundaries of Mongolia."

THE CONFLICT INTERACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1950-1970, by Andres D. Onate, in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 18, no. 4 (December 1974) 578-594.

"China scholars believe that increases in the levels of internal conflict have historically led the Chinese to seek foreign policies conflict. Until now, this generalization has not been empirically challenged. Data were collected on nine measures of domestic conflict and twelve measures of foreign conflict, over 21-year period, 1950-1970. The results were mixed. While the principal finding of a moderate relationship did lend some support to the historical generalizations relating foreign and domestic conflict in the People's Republic of China, a second finding—foreign conflict predicted better to domestic conflict—was contrary to our hypothesized expectations. Thus, on the basis of the tentative findings, we would be justified in reformulating the traditional conflict model and proposing that the key toward understanding the relationship between foreign and domestic conflict in the PRC is not only its domestic conflict, but also the foreign conflict initiated by or directed toward the Chinese."

14. *Relations with the Philippines*

ASIA—A NEW TRIPOLAR BALANCE, in *Time*, v. 105, no. 26 (23 June 1975) 37-38.

"Marcos' first trip to the Middle Kingdom . . . was . . . strange . . . Marcos, long an ardent anti-Communist, has for years ruthlessly suppressed Communist rebels in the Philippines. Only a few years ago, he was being castigated in Peking as a reactionary lackey of American imperialism. For the Philippines, recognition of China was an inevitable

coming to terms with one of Asia's dominant powers, following the final American exit from Indochina. China, for its part, skillfully turned the occasion into a showpiece for an assertive display of anti-Soviet diplomacy."

15. *Relations with the United States (See also II-G-2)*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ANTI-HEGEMONY FORMULAS IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, by Joachim Glaubitz, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 3 (Marcy 1976) 205-215.

"In February 1972 China and the U.S. agreed in the Shanghai Communique on several principles that should govern their future relations. One of these principles specifically refers to Asia, stating that 'neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.' In this so-called hegemony clause two intentions are expressed: (1) the renunciation of hegemony by both signatories; and (2) the rejection, by third countries or a group of countries, to strive for hegemony. The Asia-Pacific region to which these principles refer is geographically defined neither in the Communique nor anywhere else. The Shanghai Communique is the first bilateral statement of political principles which includes a hegemony clause."

(LI)—AT THE CROSSROADS: A NEW CHINA POLICY, by Lt. Col. Ray E. Stratton. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1974. 134 p. (Professional Study.)

"This paper outlines the events which shaped US attitudes and foreign policy toward China since the end of World War II. It presents some of the most important determinants of Chinese foreign policy, both current and historical, and discusses some of the more vital foreign policy issues affecting Sino-American relations. Future problem areas facing US policy-makers are presented and discussed. The author then calls for a fresh approach to American-Chinese relations completely divorced from previous policy. The characteristics of a proposed new China policy are offered, including some short-range strategy steps to implement it. The study concludes with an assessment of the prospects for success of the new approach to Sino-American relations."

BRINGING OUR CHINA POLICY DOWN TO EARTH, by Lucian W. Pye, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 18 (Spring 1975) 123-132.

"At a time when the mood of America is to be suspicious of the designs of government, it is ironic that China policy, long the most suspect, is now the



only policy immune to questioning. From the pinnacles of leadership to the attentive public, all are anxious to bask in bliss and avoid hard thinking about what should come after all the Mao-tai toasts and smiles of good will. If history is a guide, this is not a good thing. In the past we have gone through many cycles of China policy, all of which began in an ebullient mood, followed by a phase of myth-building. But when the strains of reality produced dissonance, we moved into a period of both recrimination among ourselves and distrust of the Chinese . . . Unfortunately, the first cracks in America's current euphoria about China are ominous: those who are the quickest to say that all is not well in U.S.-Chinese relations are already blaming other Americans and prophesying that if Washington would only fully 'normalize' our relations with Peking and abandon our diplomatic ties with Taipei, all potential problems in our relations with nearly 900 million Chinese would evaporate. Possibly there is merit in such a proposal, but not when stated in moralizing terms; and, regretfully, a debate on such grounds would only postpone the hardheaded analysis which is necessary to establish what should be the realistic quid pro quos upon which U.S.-Chinese relations should be founded. We are, therefore, in danger of sliding into a new era of myth and moralization about China and of failing again to discover the practical considerations upon which enduring relations might be built."

**CHINA AND AMERICAN POLICY,** REPORT OF HENRY M. JACKSON, AUGUST 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 5 p. (93d Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Committee Print.)

**CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS: RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND JAPAN,** ed. by Francis O. Wilcox. New York, Praeger, 1974. 103 p.

"In four papers based on the 1973 Herter Lectures at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the authors focus on China's emergence as an Asian power and her relations with the three other powers with Asian interests. Particular attention is paid to her impact on the Asian balance of power, as well as to prospects for cooperation and conflict in that region, the consensus being that relatively moderate behavior on China's part may be a key factor in promoting the stability of the Pacific Basin."

**CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS,** by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 97-100 plus.

"China's attitude toward the United States has shifted since the President's visit in 1972, for

'multiple reasons.' The complex of American military alliances and military bases surrounding China on the sea side continues to be a potential threat to China's 'national security.' But the critical element in the equation is probably the all-too-evident weakening of the American strategic position as leader of the free world."

**CHINA PERCEIVED: IMAGES AND POLICIES IN CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS,** by John K. Fairbank. New York, Knopf, 1974. 245 p.

"The dean of American sinologists offers a miscellany of random thoughts: among others, that neither sentimentality nor the fascination of the exotic is a proper response to China; that we are more ignorant of China than China is of America, although the competition is a close one; that we need more China scholars."

**CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JANUARY-MAY 1975.** Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 44 p. (International Relations Committee Print.)

This Committee Print, which includes a section of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations, is updated monthly by the Congressional Research Services' Foreign Affairs Division of the Library of Congress. These are published each month in a cumulative edition for the period beginning January 1 of the current calendar year.

**MULTIPOLARITY, ALLIANCES, AND U.S.-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS,** by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 720-736.

"If alliances were fundamental to American policy in the recent past, what is their role in the international system of the 1970's? Do U.S. efforts to reach political accommodations with both the Soviet Union and China render less important the preservation of existing alliances? Can the United States, as the leading member of several alliances, prevent their erosion as it engages in new forms of diplomacy with powers against which the alliances were formed? Are alliances, as symbols of continuity in relationships among nations, compatible with foreign policies based on maneuverability and flexibility and betokening a less bipolar international system? How can existing alliances be updated or transformed, to make them more responsive to the major issues now facing their members?"

**THE NEW CHINA AND THE AMERICAN CONNECTION,** by John K. Fairbank, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 51, no. 1 (October 1972) 31-43.

"Foreigners approaching a North China

village in the early 1930s met the barking of ill-fed dogs and the stares of children covered with flies. Villagers had skin and scalp sores due to poor nutrition. Their inbred civility was that of peasants who were conscious of the guest-host relationship but ignorant of the outer-world. Typically their strips of dusty farmland had few trees and little water, which only came out of wells laboriously, bucket by bucket. The long years of Japanese invasion and Nationalist-Communist civil war down to 1949 brought no improvement in this essentially medieval situation. Today the dogs and the flies are one, rows of poplars and electric lines march across the flat North China landscape, electric pumps supply new irrigation ditches, and crops in the big fields are diversified and interplanted. The people seem healthy, well fed and articulate about their role as citizens of Chairman Mao's new China. Compared with 40 years ago the change in the countryside is miraculous, a revolution probably on the largest scale of all time. How did this happen and what are its implications for Americans?"

A "NEW" CHINA POLICY?, by Eldridge B. Duffee, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 97, no. 7 (July 1971) 18-23.

"It is becoming increasingly fashionable in academic and foreign policy circles to advocate a 'new' and 'realistic' U.S. policy toward Communist China. Such a revised policy of accommodation would make a significant impact on the role of the U.S. Navy in the Far East area, on the Western rim of the Pacific basin. But, before we . . . anticipate any reduction in tension between Peking and Washington, we should consider again the hard foundations of our present approach to the government of mainland China."

NEW CHINA POLICY, ITS IMPACT ON UNITED STATES AND ASIA, HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, MAY 2-17, 1972. Washington Government Printing Office, 1972. 310 p. (Foreign Affairs Committee, House.)

THE PATTERN OF SINO-AMERICAN CRISES: POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS IN THE 1950s, by J. H. Kalicki. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975. 279 p.

"Traces the pattern of Sino-American relations from Korea to the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 . . . [The author] finds, first, that crisis does not dull perceptions but sharpens them: Chinese and American policymakers deal with each other better under pressure; second, the nations can learn from crisis: what was a dialogue of the deaf in 1950

becomes almost accurate communication by the end of that decade."

PEKING AND WASHINGTON IN A NEW BALANCE OF POWER, by T. C. Rhee, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 1 (Spring 1974) 151-178.

"Skepticism about the seemingly rapid development of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States still persists. The repeated visits of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, the spectacular news surrounding President Nixon's summit in China, and the subsequent 'agreements' reached by the two governments—both announced and subtly implied—have failed to convince many people, including major political figures in both countries, that these activities represent a fundamental, long-term improvement in relations. Senator Goldwater states in all seriousness that he never heard President Nixon mention 'detente' in reference to Sino-American relations, and that in case of a war between the Soviet Union and China the United States could be embroiled on the Soviet side; meanwhile, in China mysterious and enigmatic attacks on Confucious, Lin Piao and Beethoven have led some Western observers to fear that the new moderation in Peking's foreign policy might be short-lived. Numerous questions are being posed concerning Peking-Washington relations, even as Kissinger assures Peking that the newly forged friendship with the Chinese will continue regardless of the particular occupant of the White House. On the other hand, while Peking is presumed to have made pledges to abstain from military solutions to disputes, suddenly a military conflict erupts over the Paracels in the South China Sea. Although acknowledging American ties, the PRC fulminates over 'imperialism and social imperialism' and a superpower conspiracy to dominate the world."

PROBLEMS OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING, by Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, April 1970. 95 p. (A report prepared for Department of State and Advanced Research Projects Agency. R-659-DOS/ARPA.)

"This study deals with a process—the development of long-term U.S. policy toward China. It recommends:—points of departure for moving policy in desirable directions.—Improved procedures for managing policy development. It does not chart a course over the long run."—Contents: Part One—Problems of Policy (Taiwan, Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, The United States and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Some Special Problems of Interacting with Peking). Part Two—Some



Problems of Governmental Decision-making (Problems in Developing Policy Relevant Information about China, Explorations Via Policy—Another Source of Information, Changes in Policy Development Procedures, A "China Objectives" Paper As a Device for Bureaucratic Self-Improvement).

REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Sung Hon Lee, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 5, no. 9 (September 1970) 17-20 plus.

Under the deteriorating cold war situation, the United States was obliged to adopt the containment policy in order to check the spread of Communism. Thus, the U.S. set up military bases around the Communist sphere and a series of collective defense systems such as NATO, ANZUS and SEATO came into being. Furthermore, the U.S. conclude bilateral pacts with a great number of nations in an effort to block the advance of Communism from Europe to Asia all along. In the deployment of this anti-Communist policy of the U.S. military considerations surpassed political considerations. Particularly in the Asian scene, the communization of mainland China and the outbreak of Korean War marked a decisive moment in causing the U.S. to shift its Asian policy." Background; ASPAC and Other Developments; Nixon Doctrine and Asian Response; Prospects of Regional Security Cooperation; etc.

REMAKING CHINA POLICY: U.S.—CHINA RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING, by Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. 138 p.

"An overview of the China policy of the United States which contains suggested approaches to the solution of several problem areas. The conclusion reached is that a 'one China, but not now' policy will best serve the interest of Sino-American accommodation."

REPORTS AND COMMENT: CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, by Ross Terrill, in *Atlantic*, (June 1973) 4.

"... Mao Tse-tung has usually formulated his foreign policies by deciding first who is China's main enemy and then building a united front of all possible forces to resist that enemy. For over 20 years he has considered the US as China's main enemy; his greatest short-term concern has been to prevent a US attack upon China, and his long-term concern has been to build a belt of nonhostile states around China's southeast doorstep. Now that the US is withdrawing from Indochina, however, China must reconsider its foreign policy for the 1970s. In 1969, the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist

Party adopted a 'dual adversary' policy toward the US and Russia, maintaining that the main confrontation in the world was between the two superpowers on one side and all those subject to their hegemonic policies on the other side. China considered independence as the key value to uphold against the superpowers; it was determined to lead those nations not allied with either and to champion independence against the 'aggression, interference, subversion, and bullying of the superpowers.' This opposition to the superpowers and support for national sovereignty has helped China to regain its own independence; enhanced China's national influence, making it a spokesman for the Third World and according it the power of a bloc leader while proclaiming hostility to blocs; and has helped to further break down the rigid Cold War alignments, benefiting both the smaller nations and world peace. However, Terrill notes, despite the continuance of China's 'dual adversary' policy, Russia seems to have gradually superseded the US as China's primary enemy and the determining issue in its foreign policy. By 1972 China was convinced that the US was a subsiding force in Asia and the Chinese press began emphasizing that Russia's social imperialism was even more deceptive and more dangerous than American imperialism..."

SINO-AMERICAN DETENTE AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS, ed. by Gene T. Hsiao. New York, Praeger, 1974. 319 p.

"Some . . . insights on the prospects opened up by the tentative Chinese-American rapprochement emerge from this 1973 collection of seminar papers."

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. A REPORT TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE BY THE SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 68 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Joint Committee Print.)

Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist party; U.S. Relations with the People's Republic of China; China's World Outlook and Strategic Priorities; Trade and Exchange; Domestic Developments in the PRC; State Organization of the People's Republic of China; Social Control; Human Development—Women, the Family, and Education.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE NEXT DECADE, ed. by A. Doak Barnett and others. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970. 249 p.

Includes the following chapters by various authors: The Political Trends in China—Today and Tomorrow; China and World Security; China's

Development, Trade, and the World Economy; On America's China Policy: Two Senators Speak (Jacob K. Javits and Edward M. Kennedy); Other Countries, Different Views; The United States and China: Policy Options for the Future; etc.

THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND ARMS CONTROL, by Ralph N. Clough and others. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975. 153 p.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Foreign Policy; China's Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Defense; China's Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control; U.S. Arms Control Approaches toward China; A U.S. No-First-Use Pledge; etc. With bibliography and appendix—Chinese Nuclear Capability.

"U.S. IS HALFWAY UP THE PATH" TO STABILITY WITH CHINA; INTERVIEW WITH ETIENNE M. MANAC'H, FORMER FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO COMMUNIST CHINA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 1 (7 July 1975) 64-66.

"From a career diplomat comes this highly personal appraisal of his six years in China—only now opening more doors to Americans. Mr. Manac'h was interviewed by Margaret Murray of the magazine's Paris bureau."

U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Yuan-Li Wu. New York, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975. 214 p.

"This is an . . . evaluation of United States policy in the Western Pacific, with a . . . chapter on the negotiations that brought about the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China."

THE VIEW FROM PEKING: CHINA'S POLICIES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN, by Thomas W. Robinson, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 45, no. 3 (Fall 1972) 333-355.

"With the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations, and the Nixon visit to Peking, it became apparent that Chinese foreign policy had entered a new stage, though still retaining elements reminiscent of the 1954-1958 era of 'peaceful coexistence.' But that policy is the product of a number of foreign and domestic factors, most of which are not within its control, and the enormous gaps in our knowledge of events within China make it abnormally difficult to evaluate the domestic political component. Furthermore, the situation that China faces in Asia is unique: never before has a strong China faced a strong Russia, a strong America and now an increasingly strong Japan. Thus, analogies with the past (whether the post-1949 or the post-1860 period) are not very help-

ful. Finally more than the usual number of elements are in flux: major perturbations continue in the Chinese leadership structure, just when Mao's period of rule seems to be drawing to a close; for the first time since 1945 there is great uncertainty as to the American commitment to the current security framework in Asia; and Japan, the increasingly tenuous grasp of the Liberal Democrats on the levers of power could lead to unprecedented changes in Japanese foreign and military policy. Together these make any analysis of Chinese foreign policy (to say nothing of prognosis) difficult and subject to momentary change."

#### b. Chou En-lai and Sino-American Relations

CHINA AND THE U.S.; SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER CHOU, in *Current*, no. 181 (March 1976) 42-47.

"Peking's official obituary described the death of Chou En-lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC), as 'a gigantic loss' to the party, the army and the nation; to the cause of China's socialist revolution and construction; and 'to the international cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, as well as to the cause of the international Communist movement.' The description was true to the man . . . Given his eminent role in China's foreign relations, his death led naturally to the question: What effect will his passing have on future Sino-American relations? To answer that question, one must first have an accurate perception of the nature of the present Sino-American relationship, and then deal with the matter within the context of the PRC's overall foreign policy."

CHINA: CHOU'S SHOPPING LIST, in *Newsweek*, (23 August 1971) 31-32.

"In the month since President Nixon announced that he would go to China, many observers have concluded that he would not be making the trip if certain agreements had not been reached beforehand . . . Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has gone out of his way to hint that most of the high hopes are, to say the least, premature. Nowhere was this attitude more evident than in Chou's five-hour interview with columnist James Reston, published last week in *The New York Times* . . . On the most immediate issue in this shopping list—China's seat in the United Nations—Chou was adamant . . . In his recent statements, the Chinese Premier has seemed to be less worried by the U.S. than by another potential rival: Japan. Time and again in his recent meetings with Westerners, Chou has raised the specter of an economically powerful, aggressively militaristic Japan. To prove the point, visitors are often packed off to showings of Japanese war movies—clearly designed to keep the militaristic



image alive. (Reston was treated to a showing of 'Gateway to Glory,' the story of a Japanese naval cadet in training before World War II.)"

c. *China and the Nixon Administration*

CHINA: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND RICHARD NIXON, by Claude A. Buss. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1974. 118 p.

"A primer on China consisting of four chapters dealing in turn with Chinese history and communist policy, domestic affairs, foreign policy, and the United States and China since 1949. It is the author's contention that the change in Sino-U.S. relations which took place in the early 1970's 'came more from historical forces within China and within the United States than from the sagacity or will of the respective leaders'."

COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES—THE FIRST STEP, by Lt. Col. H. G. Summers, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 4 (April 1972) 54-60.

"It appears that the prospects of the United States and the People's Republic of China living together in peace are better today than they have been for the past 20 years."

IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW CHINA POLICY, by Gerhart Niemeyer, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 3 (Fall 1971) 809-817.

"'One cannot simply ignore the existence of 700 million Chinese.' For many, this assertion comprises all that is significant about the problem of recognizing one or the other government of China. The statement, however, has nothing to say about whether Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Kai-shek rightfully represents the 700 million Chinese . . . The choice between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek turns on the question of which should be recognized as the legitimate representative of China, rather than which can manipulate the larger number of Chinese . . . The new China policy of the U.S. government seems to stem from . . . [the] nineteenth-century *Realpolitik*. Its rationale runs somewhat like this: Both the Soviet Union and Peking have nuclear weapons. Their dispute, regardless of whether it should be considered fundamental or accidental, has engendered mutual fears of attack in both capitals, fears that must be treated as a major fact of world politics . . . If the United States can establish relations with communist-controlled mainland China, the move promises to restore a certain mobility which world politics has not known for a quarter of a century. A mere shift of diplomatic accent in the direction of Peking could so change the situation that, other things remaining equal, the United States could greatly improve not only its own position but also the prospect of a peace-promoting equilibrium in the world. If this

reasoning is valid, the new China policy must be called a stroke of genius; though success is not positively assured, it might be regarded as a distinct possibility."

A NEW US POLICY TOWARD CHINA, by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1971. 132 p.

"The prescriptions of this . . . book, published just after the table-tennis tour, became shortly thereafter the model for U.S. diplomacy in the matter."

THE PEKING SUMMIT AS OTHERS SAW IT, in *Newsweek*, v. 79, no. 10 (6 March 1972) 28.

The response of leaders of many regions of the world, including Southeast Asian response to President Nixon's visit to Communist China in February 1972.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHINA INITIATIVE: A CONFERENCE REPORT, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1972) 1206-1219.

"This report summarizes the discussion at the Conference on the Impact of President Nixon's Planned Visit to Peking, held in Philadelphia on October 2, 1971, and sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The discussion center on the President's China initiative and its impact on five related foreign policy issues. The topics are: (1) ramifications of the Peking visit and prospects for substantive results; (2) Japan's future role and U.S. relations with Asian allies; (3) The sino-Soviet conflict; (4) the balance of power in Asia; (5) the domestic political situation in the People's Republic of China; and (6) implications for U.S. strategy in the Pacific."

PRIME TIME IN CHINA—WHO PRODUCED THE CHINA SHOW?, by John Chancellor, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 7 (Summer 1972) 88-95.

"Richard Nixon was telling people during the 1968 Presidential campaign that an opening would have to be made to China, and one of his first orders to Henry Kissinger, early in 1969, was to move in that direction. Mao Tse-Tung and other Chinese told the late Edgar Snow in 1970 that Nixon would be welcome, and Snow reported publicly that a senior American advance-man could come and talk about it. In the summer of 1971 Dr. Kissinger had his famous tummy-ache in Islamabad, which allowed him to fly to Peking to set up the trip with Chou En-Lai. So it seems fair to say that the American President had made his mind up early in the game that a new China policy held a high priority, and that the Chinese leadership felt the same way. Was the China Show a contrivance, of benefit to the politicians who arranged it? It surely was . . . Chou En-Lai not only wanted the President's visit, but

saw to it that the visit got maximum exposure in China: and one might reasonably conclude that this was done for tactical political effect, since we know that China had gone through a political crisis in the autumn of 1971."

(LI)—THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AND MILITARY POWER, by Col. Lloyd J. Thompson. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College 1971. 29 p. (Professional Study no. 4462.)

"An overview of historical, political, and military considerations shaping United States military policy toward the Government of the Republic of China. A brief review of current conditions on Taiwan, identification of some trends, and projections of political and military policies within the context of the Nixon Doctrine for the Republic of China."

(LI)—THE ROLE OF THE US MILITARY IN THE PACIFIC UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE, by Maj. Robert L. Paul. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1975. 65 p. (P3241r—Research Study.)

"The concepts of the Nixon Doctrine, when applied to Asia, guide the US Military in countering the aggressive activities of the People's Republic of China. To support our national policy, the US Military maintains a nuclear shield in Asia and provides our Asian allies and friends military aid, management education, and emergency resupply of war materials."

THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, 1972, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 131-133.

"On February 21-27, 1972, President Richard Nixon visited the People's Republic of China and conferred briefly with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and at greater length with Premier Chou En-lai. A joint communique was issued at Shanghai on February 27. The full text."

THE UNITED STATES-CHINA POLICY, by Franz Michael, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 126-129 plus.

"In retrospect, the President's Peking initiative appears as a 'bold and brilliant' move which has led already to considerable gain for the United States position, and no apparent real losses. It has decreased the danger of sharper confrontation and has improved the chances for broader peaceful settlements."

U.S.—CHINA RELATIONS, by Laurence W. Levine. New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. 92 p.

"These essays, written in 1969-1971, probe the past and future of U.S.—Chinese relations. A

brief summary of China's modern history is followed by an in-depth analysis of President Nixon's decision to normalize U.S.-Chinese relations. The author believes that one major factor contributing to the President's decision was the prospect of new trade possibilities for the United States."

US-CHINESE DETENTE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S REHABILITATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Usha Makajani, in *Southeast Asia*, v. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1974) 713-739.

"The foundations of the Sino-American detente were laid with the inauguration of Richard Nixon as President. By 1971 China-watchers had begun to note a decline in the Sino-American mutual hostility. They observed that 'Chinese relations with the United States and Soviet Union seem to be at a point where China has more options open to it to improve relations concurrently with both superpowers than has been the case in sometime.' China chose only one option, viz., to foster a detente with the United States. The impact of this detente has been felt in China's relations with several countries. Antagonism with the Soviet Union and India has become accentuated. Prospects for a rapprochement between China, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and India, on the other, which had appeared likely if not very bright up to mid-July 1971, have had a severe setback. In the Indian subcontinent, a new power, Bangladesh, has arisen towards whom China's relations are still on terms of bitter hostility, mainly, one might say exclusively, because of China's own choice to align itself with Pakistan and dismiss the government and leaders of Bangladesh as stooges of India. The impact of the Sino-American rapprochement on Southeast Asia has not been as visibly traumatic as elsewhere. Nevertheless the absence of dramatic signs of impact should not lead us to believe that Southeast Asia is immune from the repercussions of the Sino-American detente."

#### d. China and the Ford Administration

DEPARTMENT OUTLINES DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Philip C. Habib, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 74, no. 1909 (26 January 1976) 106-109.

Statement "made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on December 17 . . . Before discussing the President's recent trip to Peking . . . [the author] outlines in general terms our relationship with the People's Republic of China. A fundamental goal of US foreign policy is to promote an international order of peace, justice, and prosperity for all. In pursuing this objective, our approach proceeds from the premise that peace de-



pend on a stable global equilibrium. Nowhere is this more important than in the Pacific, where the security concerns of four great powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—intersect, and where the United States has important interests and responsibilities. The normalization of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China is a crucial element in preserving this equilibrium. For over two decades our relations with this country, which represents nearly one-quarter of mankind, were based on hostility and mutual suspicion. Gradually leaders on both sides came to realize that this posture served the interests of neither country and was incompatible with the changes that had taken place in the world over the last 25 years."

FORD'S DUTY TRIP TO PEKING, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 22 (1 December 1975) 25-26 plus.

Among many other things, touches on Communist China's sensitivity to Soviet-American detente, and "to any sign of U.S. softening toward the Soviet Union."

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT PEKING DECEMBER 4, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 73, no. 1905 (29 December 1975) 926-933.

"There are three aspects of our relationship. There is the attitude of both the People's Republic and the United States toward international affairs. Secondly, there is the problem of the normalization of relations, and thirdly, there are the various bilateral arrangements that exist in such fields as trade, culture, and scientific exchanges. As has been pointed out in all of the toasts and all of the public statements, the basic concern of both sides—what has brought us together and what has sustained the relationship—is the perception of the international environment, and the greater part of our conversations here concerned the international situation. With respect to normalization, the Shanghai communique committed the United States to complete the process of normalization. This has been reaffirmed by the President here, both in public statements and toward the leaders of China."

*e. Sino-American Relations in Soviet Perspectives.*

AFTER VIETNAM DEBACLE WHERE U.S., CHINA GO FROM HERE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 1 (7 July 1975) 63-64.

"It's Peking's distrust of fellow Communists—in Moscow and Hanoi—that keeps U.S. foot in China's door. What next? Widening the crack."

(LI)—CAN THE GREAT TRIANGLE SURVIVE? PROSPECTS FOR THE US/PRC/USSR RELATIONSHIP, by Maj. James M. Labriola.

Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1975. 41 p. (Research Study.)

"Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. has suggested that a primary goal of United States foreign policy should be better relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union than either can maintain with the other. This study examines the feasibility of such foreign policy strategy by analyzing the potential for stability on each side of the Great Triangle. US/PRC, US/USSR, and PRC/USSR relationships are evaluated and analyzed by looking at five critical factors: the potential for ideological conflict, economic relations, military postures, international roles, and internal political influences. These factors are then used subjectively to assess the stability of each set of relations. Reservations remain about future internal developments in all three nations; however, in general, the study concludes that the US can maintain the balancing role within the Great Triangle as prescribed by Professor Pfaltzgraff."

CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS: POLICIES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, by Steven I. Levine, in *Political Science Quarterly*. (Winter 1975-76) 637-658.

"Since WW II, Chinese foreign policy has hinged upon China's triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the US. In the 1950s, . . . China was protected from a hostile American policy by the Soviet nuclear shield, but during the 1960s, China embraced a militant foreign policy to combat what it perceived to be Soviet American superpower collusion . . . According to Levine, China now believes that the world has shifted from a bipolar, cold war atmosphere to an 'increasingly multipolar international system' free of superpower domination. Its present foreign policy objectives are to neutralize Southeast Asia and Latin America, to support the Third World bloc, and to improve Sino-American relations. Peking also hopes to curb Soviet expansion by supporting NATO's efforts to check the USSR and encouraging an increased US presence in Europe and the Indian Ocean. Since the US disengagement from Southeast Asia, the moderate coalition in Peking no longer views the US as a direct threat to its security. Now, says Levine, China's hope is that its new friendship with the US will deter the Soviets in Asia, check Soviet-American entente, and destabilize relations between the US and Pacific nations. . . ."

CHINESE POLITICS AND AMERICAN POLICY: A NEW LOOK AT THE TRIANGLE, by Roger Glenn Brown, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 23 (Summer 1976) 3-23.

"The triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China remains

at the very heart of the foreign policy calculations of each country. But at least in the case of China, according to the . . . article, that relationship also plays a critical role in the internal power struggle. The author . . . traces the complex interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in the formative period between 1968 and 1972 when the contours of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle began to emerge. His analysis focuses on two major turning points which are still only dimly understood: the 1969 border crisis with the Soviet Union, and the fall of Defense Minister Lin Biao and most of China's top military leaders in 1971. He uses the insight gained to offer perspective on the unexpected eclipse of Teng Hsiao-ping earlier this year and to forecast in general terms the direction China's foreign policy will now take. The author's conclusions carry major implications for American foreign policy. They suggest that our present relationship with Peking may not be stable enough to survive the intensified power struggle which is likely to follow Mao's death. Time becomes more important, and hard choices on the status of Taiwan and relations with the Soviet Union become more urgent. Even if the presidential election year sees no movement in Sino-US relations, 1977 is almost certain to become a year of decision."

THE IMPACT OF DETENTE ON CHINESE AND SOVIET COMMUNISM, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 28, no. 2 (1974) 133-157.

"This essay will focus on the detente characterizing Washington's relations with Moscow and Peking from 1969 to the present. Each of these relationships is without precedent in the postwar era. The previous, short-lived detentes with the Soviet Union resulted in few substantive political or trade agreements that could reinforce and stabilize an improved relationship. Earlier negotiations with China, such as those conducted by the U.S. and PRC ambassadors to Warsaw, served mainly as devices for conflict control and did little to build a positive relationship. What factors, then, generated and sustained America's detente with the U.S.S.R. and China?"

THE MOSCOW-PEKING-WASHINGTON TRIANGLE, BY Harry Schwartz, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, v. 414 (July 1974) 41-50.

"Two major factors in the world scene must be considered in any analysis of current Soviet-American relations: (1) the United States and Western Europe are, today, at the nadir of their effective political, military and economic power; (2) the specter of war with the People's Republic of China is in the background of all Soviet Thinking. What has actually happened in the last few years is

a sort of competitive wooing of the United States by the Russians and the Chinese. Each country is worried that the United States will team up with the other: for, while the United States does not have the political will to do anything major on the world scene by itself, the combination of American technological power and either Chinese or Soviet political power raises the most awesome possibilities. Thus, the recent historic changes—including those accomplished by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger—have issued from the opportunities created by the Soviet-Chinese split. However, both in China and in Russia very real questions are being raised about the wisdom of the policy of the past. In view of this danger, in addition to the prospect of a major constitutional crisis in the impeachment and trial of the president of the United States, American foreign policy must be at maximum alert."

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, by Ian Clark, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 480-492.

"It required no special insight to predict that the Soviet Union would find the Sino-U.S. rapprochement disturbing: . . . The immediate significance of the Nixon pilgrimage to Peking, as far as Moscow is concerned, is that the United States has decided to bring China more directly into the play of a global balance beginning to swing in favor of the USSR. This is undoubtedly the basic Soviet perception of the calculations behind the new diplomatic status that the United States has accorded to China by way of the People's Republic's admission to the United Nations and the touch down of the Spirit of '76 at Peking airport. Moreover, as regards Soviet interests, accordance of this new status to China has been totally gratuitous. Such an interpretation is borne out by the nature of Soviet objections to the normalization of Sino-American relations. Ostensibly at least, the Soviets view the Sino-U.S. rapprochement within the context of the domestic and foreign policy crisis currently believed to be occurring in the United States."

THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES, by Harry G. Gelber, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 118-133.

"During the past decade the fluctuations in Sino-Soviet relations have become an important element in the global balance of power. As early as 1960 the unity of purpose and policy formerly thought to unite Moscow and Peking had clearly deteriorated. Since then their disputes have ranged from mild disagreements to armed clashes along their borders in Asia. This relationship and predictions about its future have greatly influenced the foreign and defense policies of Japan, the United States, the nations of South and Southeast Asia,



and perhaps even of countries in Europe and the Middle East."

THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES: AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS, by S. Sergeichuk. Washington, D.C., International Library, Book Publishers, 1975. 220 p.

"Authored under a pseudonym by a Soviet Sinologist who offers the official Soviet explanation for the gradual reversal in American attitudes toward Communist China. Part of this official explanation is that the United States planned to abandon Taiwan and cooperate with China in order to curtail Soviet military power, receiving in return a free hand in dealing with the United States problems in Asia, including Vietnam."

THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES, THE U.S.S.R., AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Winston Lord, in *The department of State Bulletin*, v. 74, no. 1921 (19 April 1976) 514-518.

Statement "made before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations on March 23 . . . Examination of one of the most critical subjects in foreign policy: the triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. Our relations with the world's largest country and with the world's most populous country are cardinal elements in our pursuit of a more secure and moderate international system. The Soviet Union possesses great industrial prowess and military strength. It is directed by leaders dedicated to developing Soviet power and enhancing Soviet influence. Aside from ourselves, only the U.S.S.R. has strategic capabilities and conventional forces with a global reach. It is thus at once our principal rival in a geopolitical contest and an inevitable partner if we are to help shape a more positive globe. There can be no higher imperative than insuring that the vast nuclear arsenals we each hold are never used—for the ensuing holocaust could engulf not only our two countries but civilization itself. Our own security and global stability hinge fundamentally upon the success of our endeavors to manage this relationship. China as well is a vast nation, with one-quarter of the world's population, a long and rich history, impressive economic potential, a growing nuclear capability, and substantial political influence. There can be no lasting equilibrium in Asia, and ultimately in the world, without China's constructive participation. Building a positive and durable relationship with that nation is at the heart of our international policy."

US-CHINESE MILITARY TIES?, by Michael Pillsbury, in *Foreign Policy*, (Fall 1975) 50-64.

"A US-Chinese military 'rapprochement' might be a good alternative in US foreign policy if US-Soviet detente breaks down, according to Pillsbury. Peking has called for the overthrow of the Soviet government, denouncing it as a capitalist state with greater imperialist ambitions than the US. Consequently, says Pillsbury, China may be seeking US military aid either in an effort to weaken US-Soviet detente, or to intimidate Moscow with the threat of guaranteed US military support in the event of a Soviet attack on Peking. The US could benefit from a new military agreement with China if it forced the Soviets to deploy more troops along the Sino-Soviet border instead of in Europe; and improved US-Chinese relations could add to world stability by deterring Soviet aggression on any front. Pillsbury cautions however, that US military aid should be limited to 'defensive or passive' military systems (such as reconnaissance systems and over-the-horizon radar), and to other areas which would maximize anti-Soviet utility and minimize adverse consequences to US policies. A Washington-Peking 'hotline' might be established as an early warning device against a Soviet attack, although Pillsbury questions whether the Chinese would believe such information. He also suggests that the US and China should exchange military representatives such as military academy delegations, defense attaches, and defense ministers, exchange intelligence information concerning the Soviet Union, and coordinate Allied military sales. Since 1949, when Washington first gave military assistance to Yugoslavia, the Soviets have viewed US foreign military assistance policies with alarm. Now, Pillsbury warns, the Soviets could react to US-China military ties by launching a 'pre-emptive attack on China before Western arms arrive.' In fact, the Soviets have let it be known that such a policy might ruin detente, besides which they have also warned that the US might have its own weapons turned against it by the emergence of anti-American leaders in China after Mao dies. Moreover, they note, a well-armed China might take greater military risks in future crises. Pillsbury concludes that the US must not risk ruining detente, nor should it provide Peking with an offensive capability that threatens US Asian allies. If these results can be avoided, however, he believes a US-Chinese defensive military alliance might contribute to a more peaceful international coexistence."

THE USSR, THE USA AND CHINA IN THE SEVENTIES, by Vernon D. Aspaturian, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 1 (January 1974) 50-63.

"In the course of 1970s, it will become increasingly apparent that the basic foundations of a post-Cold War international system are being laid. After more than 30 years of inconclusive general

conflict, marked by civil and local wars, domestic social convulsions and revolutions, eyeball to eyeball confrontations, an ever-spiraling arms race, and prolonged attempts unilaterally to impose conflicting, ideologically inspired visions of world order and justice upon the globe, the major actors in the international system have apparently decided independently that a new post-Cold War world order must be founded upon a fresh consensus which transcends competing and conflicting—not merely different—ideological and social systems. The emerging world order will not follow a war in which one group of powers emerges victorious and imposes its will upon another group, but will, rather, result from a nuclear stalemate and a stable balance of terror . . . Among the first casualties of the 1970s will be messianic foreign policies and global strategies, as the US and the USSR reduce their commitments and China and the other states expand their foreign policy horizons. The very concept 'global power' may become obsolete."

*f. Historical Aspects*

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA. THE HISTORICAL RECORD: 1949-1969, by Foster Rhea Dulles. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972. 249 p.

"An understanding of United States policy for the 20 years of the cold war is necessary for the student of Sino-American relations in the 1970's, and this book records the history of those years clearly and chronologically, from the victory of the Chinese Communists to the inauguration of the Nixon administration. Dulles reviews President Nixon's famous article in *Foreign Affairs* of October, 1967 (before his election), in which he declared that the United States 'must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. He concludes with a discussion of Nixon's changing and more conciliatory attitude toward China.'" With bibliographical notes.

AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO CHINA: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by Warren I. Cohen. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1971. 242 p.

"This history of U.S.-Chinese relations focuses on the American response to China and shows how the United States, as an Atlantic-centered nation, subordinated its China policies to more pressing demands in Europe and Latin America and generally pursued 'inept and foolish' policies toward China, especially toward Mao's regime."

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1948-71. New York, Praeger, 1972. 267 p.

"In part one, 'Breakthrough in 1971,' Morton H. Halperin discusses the impact of Nixon's China policy initiative on Asia, A.M. Halperin assesses

China's world outlook since the Cultural Revolution, and Donald W. Klein writes about the men and institutions behind Peking's foreign policy. Part two contains seventy-nine major documents relating to Sino-American relations since 1949, selected by MacFarquhar, who places them in historical and political perspective in seven introductory essays. In an epilogue, he relates the political struggle in China in late 1971 to the detente and examines the many obstacles that must be overcome before the two powers complete their rapprochement."

(LI)—SOME EFFECTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONTAINMENT POLICY ON CURRENT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by Maj. Thomas C. Foley. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis is made of the influence of the containment policy on Chinese-American relations. In tracing the development of the containment policy, the period 1949 to 1969 is examined from the perspective of both the United States and the People's Republic of China. Relations are found to be characterized by animosity, mistrust and mutual hostility. In surveying the period 1969 to 1971, the United States is seen as initiating a series of steps to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. An explanation of this change is sought. Emphasis is placed on the identification and projection of major forces at work in the international environment; the trends created by such forces; and the identification of the major challenges facing the United States. This paper concludes that a major reason for the reversal of the containment policy is that the United States decided that the costs outweighed the benefits of this policy, and the interests of the United States were no longer served."

THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND CHINA, 1945-1949, by Ernest R. May. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1975. 112 p.

"In form, this volume consists of a narrative and analytical historical essay (Part One), within which the author has identified by use of headnotes (i.e., Alternative 1, etc.) the choices which he believes were actually before the decision makers with whom he is concerned. Part Two of this volume contains, in whole or part, the most appropriate source documents that illustrate the Part One Alternatives. The Part Two Documents and Part One essay are keyed for convenient use (i.e., references in Part One will direct readers to appropriate Part Two Documents). The volume's Part Three offers users further guidance in the form of a Bibliographic Essay. From the climactic military victories of 1945 to the startling detente of 1972, a foreign policy question of high concern for many Americans involved the proper relationship of their nation to



China. Professor Ernest May reviews here the reasons for this preoccupation of Americans with China and the outworking of this concern in the formative years after World War II. His analysis and conclusions, based upon the most relevant and insightful documentary sources, open doors to the past through which history has brought us to our present relationships with mainland China." With bibliography.

**TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA**, by O. Edmund Clubb. 2nd ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972. 183 p.

"This . . . study . . . focuses on twentieth century China, although some background of 'Confucian China' is included.' The book concludes with an analysis of changing Sino-American relations and the shifting power balance in Asia. Although he does not discuss the actual visit of President Nixon to Peking, Clubb sketches in the background of Chinese and American policy goals in the light of which the Sino-American diplomacy of the 1970's will unfold. As he sees it, Washington has not as yet 'proceeded any great distance along the way toward satisfaction of Peking's fundamental desires. The major factor in the Sino-American relationship is the United States strategy of containing China by a ring of political alliances and American-manned bases, with Formosa constituting an important link in its 'West Pacific island defense chain.' For China, on the other hand, Formosa (Taiwan) is an integral part of China. As the two nations work out their new foreign policies, they will have to cope with the very real continuing differences between them, not the least of which is the continuing United States participation in the war in Indochina." With bibliography.

#### 16. *Relations with USSR*

##### a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

(LI)—**CAN THE GREAT TRIANGLE SURVIVE? PROSPECTS FOR THE US/PRC/USSR RELATIONSHIP**, by Maj. James M. Labriola. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1975. 41 p. (Research Study.)

"Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. has suggested that a primary goal of United States foreign policy should be better relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union than either can maintain with the other. This study examines the feasibility of such a foreign policy strategy by analyzing the potential for stability on each side of the Great Triangle. US/PRC, US/USSR, and PRC/USSR relationships are evaluated and analyzed by looking at five critical factors; the potential for ideological conflict, economic relations, military postures, international roles, and internal political influences. These factors are then used sub-

jectively to assess the stability of each set of relations. Reservations remain about future internal developments in all three nations; however, in general, the study concludes that the US can maintain the balancing role within the Great Triangle as prescribed by Professor Pfaltzgraff."

**"CHINA AND RUSSIA: THE 'GREAT GAME'**, by O. Edmund Clubb. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971. 578 p.

"Edmund Clubb, for twenty years a US foreign service officer in the Far East, has written a comprehensive history of Russian-Chinese relations, with main emphasis on their interaction since the middle of the nineteenth century. There are chapters on the Kuomintang period, the Kuomintang-communist civil war, the rise of Mao Tse-tung to power, and the origin and evolution of the Sino-Soviet rift. Clubb tends to the view that the Soviet Union and China will 'probably find compelling reasons to sustain a measure of collaboration in Asia,' that Japan and the Soviet Union will draw closer to each other, and that the United States will remain China's main foe in Asia."

**CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS: RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND JAPAN**, ed. by Francis O. Wilcox. New York, Praeger, 1974. 103 p.

"In four papers based on the 1973 Herter Lectures at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the authors focus on China's emergence as an Asian power and her relations with the three other powers with Asian interests. Particular attention is paid to her impact on the Asian balance of power, as well as to prospects for cooperation and conflict in that region, the consensus being that relatively moderate behavior on China's part may be a key factor in promoting the stability of the Pacific Basin."

**CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS: POLICIES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION**, by Steven I. Levine, in *Political Science Quarterly*, (Winter 1975-76) 637-658.

"Since WW II, Chinese foreign policy has hinged upon China's triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the US. In the 1950s, . . . China was protected from a hostile American policy by the Soviet nuclear shield, but during the 1960s, China embraced a militant foreign policy to combat what it perceived to be Soviet American superpower collusion . . . According to Levine, China now believes that the world has shifted from a bipolar, cold war atmosphere to an 'increasingly multipolar international system' free of superpower domination. Its present foreign policy objectives are to neutralize Southeast Asia and Latin America, to

support the Third World bloc, and to improve Sino-American relations. Peking also hopes to curb Soviet expansion by supporting NATO's efforts to check the USSR and encouraging an increased US presence in Europe and the Indian Ocean. Since the US disengagement from Southeast Asia, the moderate coalition in Peking no longer views the US as a direct threat to its security. Now, says Levine, China's hope is that its new friendship with the US will deter the Soviets in Asia, check Soviet-American entente, and destabilize relations between the US and Pacific nations . . ."

**CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JANUARY-MAY 1975.** Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 44 p. (International Relations Committee Print.)

This Committee Print, which includes a section on U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations, is updated monthly by the Congressional Research Services' Foreign Affairs Division of the Library of Congress. These are published each month in a cumulative edition for the period beginning January 1 of the current calendar year.

**CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY,** by Richard Lowenthal, in *Survival* (January-February 1972) 2-7.

"Lowenthal notes that Russia emerged from WW II as a world power second only to the US; and though a technological gap still exists between the two, Russia has since reached a state of overall parity with the US in armaments. It still maintains its East European empire despite numerous serious crises, but its Chinese ally has become a rival and potential enemy. Russia's foreign policy has adjusted to changing world situations, from imposing forcible transformations on society to gradually but determinedly increasing Russia's prosperity and power. Russia is interested in expansion but aware that the international system cannot be overthrown by worldwide revolution. Its claimed commitment to peaceful coexistence allows it to avoid nuclear war while continuing to promote limited conflict and maintaining its control at home and in Eastern Europe. Lowenthal believes Soviet long-term strategy toward China is basically defensive in that it aims to: (1) inhibit the growth of China's power by containing its influence in Asia, and (2) stabilize the Russo-Chinese border by military measures and, if possible, negotiated agreements . . . Lowenthal concludes that no rapprochement can be secure or complete in a fundamentally unstable world. Settlements between the US and Russia are hampered by the difficulty of negotiations about arms limitation and each side's desire to preserve its own security in the Middle East and Mediterranean. In

addition, recent American monetary actions may affect the Western Alliance and the ability of the nations concerned to conduct a common policy. If Western cohesion worsens, Russia can be expected to reevaluate its opportunities and priorities."

**CURRENT ASPECTS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON DETENTE AND WORLD TENSIONS,** by Norman Luxembury, in *World Affairs*, v. 138, no. 3 (Winter 1975-1976) 201-204.

"Almost two decades have now passed since the Moscow-Peking alliance began to break up. By 1961 the split had become open and the outside world realized the gravity of the disagreements. The alliance between the two had lasted some seven years, a period about half as long as the current hostility. Now, as 1976 begins, China is a country sealed only to the Soviet Union. For the nations of the Third World, China is not closed; for Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Japan, China is relatively open, and it is even opening somewhat for the United States. The remnants of Soviet influence and impact on China, from the short-lived alliance and the Soviet technological assistance of the 1950s, have virtually disappeared . . . In 1976, however, pragmatic and not ideological reasons are the main causes of the strained relationships between the two nations. From the official acts and statements of the Chinese leaders it has become apparent that the Chinese leaders have adopted a long-term pragmatic approach to foreign policy, and, consequently, domestic policy. This pragmatic approach is based on what the Chinese leaders regard as a realistic appraisal of the needs of China and not on the theoretical aspects of communism."

**THE FULCRUM OF ASIA: RELATIONS AMONG CHINA, INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE U.S.S.R.,** by Bhabani Sen Gupta: New York, Pegasus, 1970. 383 p.

"The author of this study offers it as an analysis of 'the theory and practice of international politics among the new nations.' His focus is 'the fulcrum of Asia'—the area where China, India, Pakistan, and Soviet Russia 'meet in friendship and enmity'." Contents: The Asian Triangle; The Soviets Arrive in South Asia; The Challenge of China; The Decade of Confrontations; Consequences of Confrontation; etc. "Confrontations and conflicts between China, India, and Pakistan as between other Asian nations have to be attributed at least in part to the territorial imperatives of their ruling elites. It may shock many Asians to recognize in the territorial imperatives of their national elites elements of imperialism, but it is mistaken to believe, as Asians and Africans mostly do, that imperialism has been a monopoly of the industrialized West. Several of the new nations in Asia are essen-



tially empire-nation states; their ruling elites have inherited not only the empires left over by the European powers but also the latter's imperial strategies. China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia are, in fact, empire-nation states with imperial interests and perceptions governing their relationships with smaller national and subnational entities."

THE JAPAN-CHINA-USSR TRIANGLE, by Sheldon W. Simon, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 47, no. 2 (Summer 1974) 125-138.

"At the fulcrum of northeast Asian international politics rests Japan. Originally the target of, and justification for, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan currently finds herself the object of political and economic courtship by both estranged communist powers. Tokyo's ability to maneuver between and to take advantage of their conflict has been enhanced by the loosening of its military ties to the United States as well as the latter's own detente policy inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, which presaged American support for a new balance of power policy for Asia in which China would play a legitimate role. The purpose of this article is to describe the economic and security parameters of the new Japan, China, Soviet relationship and to project their implications for East Asian stability. It is important to stress at the outset that both Russian and Chinese interest in Japan is a combination of Tokyo's positive attractiveness to each as an economic partner and unattractiveness as a potential political ally to the other side. Hence, both Moscow and Peking are employing economic incentives to forestall the establishment of a Japanese political relationship with the other."

THE MOSCOW-PEKING-WASHINGTON TRIANGLE, by Harry Schwartz, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, v. 414 (July 1974) 41-50.

"Two major factors in the world scene must be considered in any analysis of current Soviet-American relations: (1) the United States and Western Europe are, today, at the nadir of their effective political, military and economic power; (2) the specter of war with the People's Republic of China is in the background of all Soviet Thinking. What has actually happened in the last few years is a sort of competitive wooing of the United States by the Russians and the Chinese. Each country is worried that the United States will team up with the other: for, while the United States does not have the political will to do anything major on the world scene by itself, the combination of American technological power and either Chinese or Soviet political power raises the most awesome possibilities. Thus, the recent historic changes—including those accomplished by President Nixon and

Secretary of State Kissinger—have issued from the opportunities created by the Soviet-Chinese split. However, both in China and in Russia very real questions are being raised about the wisdom of the policy of the past. In view of this danger, in addition to the prospect of a major Constitutional crisis in the impeachment and trial of the president of the United States, American foreign policy must be at maximum alert."

MOSCOW'S OPTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD, by Vernon V. Aspaturian, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1972) 1-20.

"During the past four years there has been a dramatic transformation in the fortunes of Soviet foreign policy and a remarkable revitalization of Soviet decisiveness and self-assurance in foreign affairs. The Soviet leadership appears to have overcome much of its previous feelings of inferiority and inadequacy in facing up to the manifold issues that confronted it both as a global power and as the leader of an ecumenical revolutionary movement. Only in dealing with the Chinese do the Soviet leaders fail to exude the self-confidence they have acquired over the past four years and instead continue to betray signs of irresolution, uncertainty of purpose, and indecisiveness. There are good explanations for these distinctive Soviet postures in dealing with the West and with China, just as there was considerable warrant for the irresolution and demoralization that characterized the Soviet leadership in foreign affairs between 1961 and 1968."

MULTIPOLARITY, ALLIANCES, AND U.S.-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS, by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 720-736.

"If alliances were fundamental to American policy in the recent past, what is their role in the international system of the 1970's? Do U.S. efforts to reach political accommodations with both the Soviet Union and China render less important the preservation of existing alliances? Can the United States, as the leading member of several alliances, prevent their erosion as it engages in new forms of diplomacy with powers against which the alliances were formed? Are alliances, as symbols of continuity in relationships among nations, compatible with foreign policies based on maneuverability and flexibility and betokening a less bipolar international system? How can existing alliances be updated or transformed, to make them more responsive to the major issues now facing their members?"

RUSSIANS STUDIES OF CHINA; PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF SOVIET SINOLOGY, by E. Stuart Kirby. Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1976. 209 p.

"This book surveys . . . the recent massive

drive in the Soviet Union to revivify, reorganize and enormously extend Russian studies of China. These, like all other aspects of relations between the two countries, had suffered great damage under Stalin and fell into complete disarray during the open Sino-Soviet break since the late 1950s. The book considers the ideological and informational aspects and provides the first comprehensive account of current Russian studies on China, based on Soviet material not generally available. It traces the Soviet concerns in all fields of China studies: historical, cultural, economic and political, and their interconnections . . . Pre-revolutionary Russian scholars made major contributions to Sinology and efforts continued restrictedly under Lenin. Throughout Stalin's dictatorship this intellectual field suffered particularly from the oppressions which characterized that period in Russia. When the . . . break came between Peking and Moscow the Soviets lacked expertise and information on China. In the early 1970s, the USSR restarted Chinese studies and characteristically the reorientation expressly commanded by Mr. Brezhnev himself constituted a massive nation wide drive. This process, its outcome and significance a vital and hitherto unexplored aspect of a major world problem—is defined and assessed in this book, with comprehensive bibliographical and other references."

**SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE**, by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 114-117 plus.

"The Sino-Soviet relationship will probably not recover the intimacy it had in the 1950's, but it will perhaps prove steadier and more enduring." In discussing the underlying economics, the author concludes that "Although by Mao Tse-tung's dictum the previous order of the day was 'politics in command,' now at long last economics is in command."

**STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA AND JAPAN**, by C. G. Jacobsen, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 4 (Winter 1974) 1189-1214.

"Recent years have seen increased Western fascination with the shifting nature of the international body politic. New power constellations have been accepted, dissected, and sometimes invented. From a near-exclusion concentration on two international actors, there emerged a postulate of five major power conglomerates. Japan acquired the status of a dynamic third center of traditional power, ranking with the United States and a revitalized Western Europe. China gained acceptance to the strategic realm as a worthy interloper, a possibly decisive variable to the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation. But the sophisticated ac-

ceptance of nonmilitary factors encouraged a disregard for military facts as superficial as the military obsession had been primitive. And the fascination with the 'new' actors' relations with the United States has tended to obscure appreciation of what may constitute the most critical triangle, that of the USSR-China-Japan. The present analysis will focus first on Soviet strategic concepts and capabilities. It will then proceed to treat some of the geographic and historical influences on Soviet relations with China and Japan."

**THE USSR, THE USA AND CHINA IN THE SEVENTIES**, by Vernon D. Aspaturian, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 1 (January 1974) 50-63.

"In the course of 1970s, it will become increasingly apparent that the basic foundations of a post-Cold War international system are being laid. After more than 30 years of inconclusive general conflict, marked by civil and local wars, domestic social convulsions and revolutions, eyeball to eyeball confrontations, an ever-spiraling arms race, and prolonged attempts unilaterally to impose conflicting, ideologically inspired visions of world order and justice upon the globe, the major actors in the international system have apparently decided independently that a new post-Cold War world order must be founded upon a fresh consensus which transcends competing and conflicting—not merely different—ideological and social systems. The emerging world order will not follow a war in which one group of powers emerges victorious and imposes its will upon another group, but will, rather, result from a nuclear stalemate and a stable balance of terror . . . Among the first casualties of the 1970s will be messianic foreign policies and global strategies, as the US and the USSR reduce their commitments and China and the other states expand their foreign policy horizons. The very concept 'global power' may become obsolete."

#### b. *The Sino-Soviet Rift and Consequent Disputes*

##### (1) *Miscellaneous Aspects*

(\*)—**THE COLDEST WAR: RUSSIA'S GAME IN CHINA**, by C. L. Sulzberger. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974. 113 p.

"In this investigation of Sino-Soviet relations especially after the Lin Piao affair of 1972, Sulzberger concludes that while no Soviet military demonstration toward China is likely, Moscow is actively seeking to establish a pro-Soviet clique in China strong enough to compete for power after Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai pass from the scene. He also gives evidence of a post-Lin purge in China in response to the Soviet campaign. As in Sulzberger's other books, anecdotes and stories of the world's leading statesmen abound. The efforts of the United States to profit from the Sino-Soviet



dispute are examined in a chapter entitled 'Uncle Sam Joins the Game'."

(\*)—ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC: A STUDY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, AND COMMUNIST CHINA, by Robert Gwen Freedman. New York, Praeger, 1970. 192 p.

"Three case studies of attempts by Kremlin leaders to use economic weapons to threaten discontented clients. The experience with China is the most interesting. The author observes that in each case the Soviet Union escalated gradually, underestimated the capacity of the target country to resist successfully, and learned from its experiences."

(LI)—EVOLUTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT: A SUMMARY ACCOUNT. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University, Institute for Professional Development, Directorate of Documentary Research, 1975. 114 p. (AU-203-75-IPD.)

"This study is an attempt to summarize in handy form the main events in the gradual estrangement of those two Communist giants, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The first chapter covers the three centuries of Sino-Russian relations prior to the establishment of the PRC and the next three chapters deal with the events of the last twenty-five years. The study uncovers no new facts and contains no in-depth analysis; it is simply what its title indicates, a summary account of the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split."

MAO'S ROLE IN THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT, by Donald S. Zagoria, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 48, no. 2 (Summer 1974) 139-153.

"The first part of this article argues that throughout most of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, it has been divided into 'internationalist' and 'nativist' factions which have been more or less sympathetic to Moscow and that Mao Tse-tung had been rather consistently ranged on the 'nativist' side. This is not to say that the history of factionalism within the CCP can be neatly compartmentalized into pro- and anti-Soviet tendencies, but rather that at different periods the Party has been divided on basic questions of domestic and international policy affecting its relationship with Moscow and that at all or most of these crucial turning points, Mao has opted for a more independent policy. There has been, in short, an impressive consistency in Mao's 'Titoism.' The second part of the article tries to assess the factional conflicts now at work within the CCP in an effort to understand how these different factions may view relations with Soviet Union after Mao's death. In

sum, it rejects the deterministic interpretations of Sino-Soviet relations which assert that Russia and China are bound either to be united or to be in conflict because of some 'deep' historical, cultural, ideological, or geographic factors. These elements provide the background to Sino-Soviet relations but are not decisive. The decisive elements are political, and to understand these, it is necessary to probe into the numerous controversies at crucial junctures of CCP history over the past four decades."

(\*)—REALIGNMENT OF WORLD POWER: THE RUSSO-CHINESE SCHISM, by Oton Ambroz. New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1972, 2v.

"Dr. Ambroz . . . traces developments in Sino-Soviet relations, chronicles the struggle between these two . . . communist powers, analyzes the causes for it, shows how the Russians and Chinese have disliked each other for centuries on the popular and governmental levels, and assesses the impact of this rift on world affairs."

THE RED NAVY'S ROLE IN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, by J. K. Holloway, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 9 (September 1973) 18-24.

"The days of bombarding Chinese ports and 'patrolling' Chinese rivers are over; but the Soviet Navy can employ several low-key, low-risk gambits to psychologically harass Peking."

(LI)—THE RED RUPTURE: SINO-SOVIET, by Col. Arthur B. Carroll. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1970. 10 p. (Professional Study No. 3890.)

"Some of the basic difficulties between Russia and Red China are reviewed in the light of the history, culture, geography, race, and national interests of the two nations. The depth and severity of these differences coupled with modern weapons poses to each so serious a threat from the other as to make stable relations most difficult. The author suggests that these two giants are bound in an inextricable dilemma and foresees war between them as the most likely outcome."

RUSSIA AND CHINA: CONTROLLED CONFLICT, by Richard Lowenthal, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 3 (April 1971) 507-518.

"It is now eleven years since an ideological dispute between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties burst into the open on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, and almost eight years since the pattern of world affairs became definitely 'triangular' with the open break between the two leading communist powers. Since then, the view of some Western dogmatists that personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung for the control of 'world communism' was the only

cause of the rift was plainly refuted as it continued after Khrushchev's fall; but at the opposite extreme, forecasts about tension between the two communist giants building up steadily toward nuclear war appear hardly more plausible at the present time. What events have tended to show so far is rather the persistence of controlled conflict between Moscow and Peking, with the ups and downs of crisis and relative detente familiar from other great-power conflicts of the nuclear age. A new wave of speculation has been generated in recent months by the efforts at a normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations and the subsequent revival of bitter polemics over the Polish December crisis, by the shifts in the Chinese party leadership since the end of the cultural revolution; and by the approach of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. These may justify one more attempt to analyze the factors underlying this strange relationship and its possible impact on the future."

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, by Philip J. Jaffe, in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, v. 5, no. 4 (Spring 1976) 41-45.

Highlights of its history; and prospects for its future.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE; AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLEMICS, by Alfred D. Low. Cranbury, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976. 364 p.

Roots and Theories; From Unequal Partnership to "Friendship and Alliance," 1917-1956; The Seeds of Disagreement, 1956-1959; The Development of the Dispute, 1960-1962; The Open Conflict, 1962-1963; The "Cold War" Continues, 1963-1964; "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," 1964-1965; From the "Cultural Revolution" to Military Conflict, 1965-1969; Peking's Reversal of Isolationism—The Soviet Response, 1969 to the Present; Selected Bibliography.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION, by Harold C. Hinton, in *Orbis*, v. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 25-46.

"The only major powers that are at all likely to go to war with each other in the near future are the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It is practically certain that were they to do so on a large scale the outcome, whatever its exact shape, would include a defeat for China, a serious destabilization of the Far Eastern balance, and a material setback to American interest . . . Underneath this calmer surface, the Sino-Soviet confrontation remains as serious as ever in its potentialities. Indeed there are reasons to regard the 1974 and 1975 military campaigning seasons as one of the most tense and dangerous periods since 1969. It may be, therefore, that the United States should do

more than it has done so far to promote its interests with respect to the Moscow-Peking confrontation."

## (2) *Is Sino-Soviet War Inevitable: Pro and Con*

THE 1945 SOVIET MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN: A MODEL FOR SINO-SOVIET WAR, by Maj. Michael E. Ekman, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 27, no. 1 (July-August 1974) 81-89.

"Relations between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China have the potential for violence. Given the expanding nature of China's nuclear capability and the perceived threat this expansion represents to the Soviet Union, one can easily recognize the pressure on the Kremlin to act while the situation is still of manageable proportions. Should this hostility break into open warfare, it is reasonable to predict that the strategy of the Soviet Army will follow a pattern similar to that which proved successful in their 1945 campaign against the Japanese in Manchuria. However, an expected short and decisive conflict similar to the 1945 model is unlikely and could begin World War III."

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: HOW SOON?, by Dennis Chaplin, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 119, no. 3 (September 1974) 55-57.

"There are fears in China that 1974 or 1975 could be the critical phase of relations between herself and the USSR, a phase which could mean the outbreak of the major hostilities which have been threatening to descend upon the 6,500 km long frontier since the end of the 1960s. The bloody conflicts of the Ussuri and in Sinkiang in 1969 marked a level of escalation far removed from the previous minor skirmishes, fisticuffs, obstructionism and slanging matches representative of a difference of opinion. As China becomes stronger in terms of nuclear capability, the likelihood of a conflict for territorial gain (or territorial revision in Chinese eyes) becomes more realistic. The author's recent discussions with Chinese students on the question of an impending conflict indicate very real fears over this and the following article gives expression to the Communist Chinese attitude to the confrontation. As well as increasing its military presence in eastern Europe to keep NATO and the occasionally recalcitrant satellite states in check, the USSR is currently also expanding its military striking power on the border with China. Since the Ussuri and Sinkiang encounters, the Soviet Army has increased its frontier divisions from 16 to 49, providing a manpower concentration of 483,000 well-trained and equipped troops who are evidently there for purposes other than reinforcing the customs control."

## THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: IS WAR



INEVITABLE?, by Roger E. Kanet, in *Current History*, v.65, no. 386 (October 1963) 145-149 plus.

"Explores the Soviet-Chinese relationship . . . For the remainder of the 1970's, it is unlikely that Soviet-Chinese relations will improve significantly, unless China or the Soviet Union is willing to compromise on the major issues which divide them. However, given the consequences of a nuclear exchange, it is highly improbable that the two will resort to war."

(LI)—US RESPONSE TO A SINO-SOVIET ARMED CONFLICT, by Maj. Arthur S. Dervaes III. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 77 p. (Research Study.)

"The modern relationship and the degree of tension existing between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been of considerable interest to analysts throughout the second half of this century. Within the past five years, the United States has played an integral role in this relationship, forming a great power triangle. This study examines the current Sino-Soviet relationship and determines the potential for violence between them resulting from their unresolved boundary dispute. An assessment is made of the new era of US relations with the Soviet Union and China and its impact upon a US response to possible Sino-Soviet hostilities."

WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, by Harrison Salisbury. New York, Norton, 1969. 224 p.

"Although China and the USSR have in theory been allies since 1949, relations between the two have been consistently hostile. Since the 17th century, they have disputed the Asiatic heartland consisting of Mongolia, Manchuria, Siberia, Central Asia, Tibet, and North China, which is crucial for control of the Asian continent. China currently claims some 55 million square miles of this area, which is held by the USSR. According to China, it wishes to wipe out past injustices; in fact, it needs this land in order to feed its ever-growing population. The Sino-Soviet disagreement over communist ideology dates from 1927. The tensions between the two nations were aggravated by the Korean War and by 1962 the dispute became public. The USSR and China have now reached a point where they are both ready to consider war. The USSR, convinced that China will use nuclear arms, is prepared to use nuclear weapons against China. Its missile and rocket forces in Mongolia and Siberia can strike at China's nuclear facilities. The USSR is prepared to concentrate its forces against industrial centers and ports, China's nuclear capability, and centers of resistance and control. The USSR believes that such an attack would force China to surrender within two weeks. China, on the other hand, believes that its army can defeat the

USSR. A nuclear attack, even one killing 300 million, would leave China with 500 or 600 million people who, trained for conflict and sacrifice and having little to lose, could defeat the Russians in a hand-to-hand war in which Russia's technical superiority would be of no help. The Chinese have the manpower and morale to fight a long war with the USSR. The US is the only power strong enough to prevent such a war or influence its result," and Mr. Harrison describes by what means.

### (3) Territorial Issues and Disputes

CONFLICT ON THE USSURI: A CLASH OF NATIONALISMS, by Harold C. Hinton, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1971) 45-59.

"The armed clashes which took place between Soviet and Chinese border troops on a small disputed island on the USSURI River boundary between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969 unquestionably marked the most serious escalation to date of the conflict that has been going on between the two major Communist powers ever since the late 1950's."

SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE, by S. K. Ghosh, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 7, no. 3 (January-March 1975) 303-337.

"One of the most important causes of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the resultant tension has been the territorial disputes, between the two countries, arising from a series of nineteenth century 'unequal treaties' imposed on a weak China by the imperialist Czarist Russia . . . Prospects for lessening of tension on the Sino-Soviet border, and for that matter an improvement in the overall Sino Soviet relations, remain as they were before the Chinese came out with their recent proposals for solving the border problem."

(LI)—THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE: A CASE OF CONTINUING CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS, by Comdr. Alan W. Crandall. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The border between Russia and China has been the subject of increasing harangue and conflict in the last decade. Border geography has a large influence on the national interest and security of any country, and, therefore, a significant effect on its policies. This paper examines the present conflict in terms, first, of the geographical stage on which it is cast, and then reviews the history of the confrontation between the two actors, in order to determine the nature of the present dispute and to assess the implications for the future. The schism over ideological differences and the ethnic and cultural conflicts are not discussed in detail, though they

surely contribute to the problem. The conflict is found to be over 300 years old, and is particularly bitter today because much of Russia's expansion into Asia was at the expense of a decaying Chinese Empire. Now a resurgent China in the 20th century is strongly irredentist. With the border issues between China and Russia unsettled, and the competition between them for leadership of not only communism, but also the third world, the border is concluded to be the focal point of tension for many years to come."

(LI)—THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY, by Maj. Jerry R. Bedingfield. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 59 p. (Research Study.)

"The Sino-Soviet rift is one of the most important developments in the history of international relations. What used to be a two-headed communist monolith is now a divided camp with violent disagreements over ideology and their common borders. The seriousness of the dispute can be seen in the 1969 Ussuri River incident. This study examines the causes of the border dispute, speculates on its future and discusses its impact on United States foreign policy. The report concludes that the Sino-Soviet dispute will continue and offers interesting possibilities for a forward-looking United States foreign policy."

(LI)—SINO-SOVIET BORDER ISSUES, by Comdr. Thomas C. Layton. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The limited journalistic focus on the relatively recent events has obscured the historic nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In this thesis, the author views the border dispute to have originated from three main sources: historic Soviet encroachment on traditionally Chinese areas of influence; ideological differences; and Chinese internal unrest. Chairman Mao Tse-tung of China is found to have successfully fitted these three volatile ingredients together under the guise of Chinese nationalism. As a result, the Soviet Union has been forced into border negotiations, the internal unrest of the Cultural Revolution has calmed, and China's ideological position may have been improved in the eyes of the Third World. The border dispute itself is viewed as expression of nationalistic self-righteousness in the struggle for the leadership of world communism."

(LI)—THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: JAW-JAW OR WAR-WAR IN THE 1970'S, by Gp. Capt. Kenneth A. C. Wirdnam, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 21 p. (Professional Study no. 4270.)

"The underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute are examined from the differing viewpoints of the two nations and the chances of reconciliation are discussed. The author next considers the border fighting which occurred in 1969 and suggests some underlying motives. There follows an examination of the factors influencing both countries' outlook on a Sino-Soviet war, and the study concludes with a forecast of the pattern of relations during the next ten years and some factors which could favourably affect them."

THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, by Tai Sung An. Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1973. 254 p.

"In this analysis of the origins and implications of the current rivalry between the Soviet Union and China, Professor An discusses historical factors and then probes the ideological and geopolitical considerations that led to open conflict in the 1960's, notably along the Ussuri River in 1969. Perhaps his most valuable contribution is his informed speculation on the possibility of a major Sino-Soviet war in the 1970's: he believes such a conflict is unlikely, but proceeds to describe both the probable course of such a war and its implications for international affairs."

(LI)—US RESPONSE TO A SINO-SOVIET ARMED CONFLICT, by Maj. Arthur S. Dervaes III. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 77 p. (Research Study.)

"The modern relationship and the degree of tension existing between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been of considerable interest to analysts throughout the second half of this century. Within the past five years, the United States has played an integral role in this relationship, forming a great power triangle. This study examines the current Sino-Soviet relationship and determines the potential for violence between them resulting from their unresolved boundary dispute. An assessment is made of the new era of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China and its impact upon a U.S. response to possible Sino-Soviet hostilities."

(4) *Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia and the Middle East*

CHANGING SOVIET POLICIES AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Robert C. Horn, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 493-526.

"This study's primary purpose is to analyze these changing Soviet and Chinese policies and the resurgent competition between the two powers in Southeast Asia from 1965 through mid-1972, basing the analysis on a prior consideration of Moscow's



goals in the area and the intertwining of national and regional (endogenous) and international (exogenous) determinants that have led to the changes. The major theme is that Moscow's policies, successes and failures from the late 1950's through 1965 were determined largely by the role of China and that this has continued to be the case, if less directly, since 1965. Moreover, since 1969 the Soviet-Chinese competition has intensified, and 'escalation' appears to be the likely prognosis."

(LI)—EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET SPLIT ON VIETNAM WAR, by Maj. Frank W. Curtis. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1970. 56 p. (Research Study No. 0365-70.)

"This study analyzes the separate interests that Moscow and Peking have in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and whether the Sino-Soviet split may affect the war in Vietnam and influence the Government in Hanoi. The study concludes that the conflict between Russia and China has had little effect on the war and the Hanoi leadership. Conversely, the war and the independent line held by Hanoi has widened the split. The study also concludes that a single, strong leader will replace Ho Chi Minh, and the present pro-Moscow—pro-Chinese factions will depolarize under his leadership."

THE EMERGING SINO-SOVIET CONTEST IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Donald E. Nuechterlein, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 3, no. 2 (Janua. v 1975) 11-19.

"Indonesia—representing nearly half the population of South-East Asia, dominating the strategic waterways between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and possessing potentially large resources of oil—holds the key to the future pattern of Power relations in South-East Asia, Professor Nuechterlein writes. He suggests that this country should be brought into a new relationship with the People's Republic of China, Japan, Australia and the USA, so as to counter the growing common danger of Soviet political domination of Asia."

(LI)—MANCHURIA: A CATALYST FOR CONFLICT, by Comdr. Richard Weber. Newport, R.I., US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The study reported by this paper is an analysis of Manchuria and its strategic importance to China. The analysis emphasizes the development of Manchuria from 1890 to 1971. The development of railways, industrial base and agriculture are discussed in detail. The conflicts of interests between China, Russia and Japan within Manchuria are analyzed with particular emphasis placed on how each of these countries added to the development of Manchuria and what each hoped to gain

from these developments. The border conflicts between 1890 and 1971 are discussed, including the most recent clashes in 1969, between the Chinese and the Soviets along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers in Manchuria. The border conflicts and their relationship to the 'unequal treaties' as seen by the Chinese are analyzed. The ideological differences between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union are not discussed. The paper finds that Manchuria is of such significant strategic importance to China and the Soviet Union that armed conflict is possible in the future if either nation considers that her territorial integrity or national interests are threatened. The paper concludes that United States involvement in Manchuria has been limited, but the potential of future conflict between China and the Soviet Union in Manchuria, and the proximity of such a conflict to United States military power in the Western Pacific and in Japan, is a matter of concern to United States policy makers."

THE MOSCOW-PEIPING STRUGGLE OF 1975 IN ASIA, by Tsai Tsai-wen, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 11, no. 3 (March 1976) 23-28.

"As early as in 1953 when Mao Tse-tung drafted his 'Platform for World Revolution,' he said: 'Asia is our first target of present time; radical policy will see a remarkable gain in Asia.' He continued: 'We shall give the largest possible assistance to the comrades and friends in Indochina . . . After Indochina is liberated, the revolution in Burma, Thailand and Indonesia will automatically become ripe and Malaysia will be in our grasp.' This indicates that from the very beginning the Chinese Communists have listed Asia as their first target of world communization. It is noteworthy that more than 20 years later today, the target remains unchanged."

RED GIANTS BATTLE OVER ASIA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 71, no. 12 (20 September 1971) 42-45.

"Military aid . . . trade pacts . . . subversion. These are only some of the weapons in a potentially explosive rivalry for dominance in South Asia [and elsewhere]. James N. Wallace of 'U.S. News & World Report' toured the area for an on-the-scene report of what's at stake." He reports where Russia and China vie for supremacy. For instance, "Russia is offering new economic aid to Burma."

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, by T. C. Rhee, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 5 (October-November 1970) 70-74.

"The ever-growing military commitment of the Soviet Union and the concurrent ties being cultivated between Peking and the Palestine

guerrillas are gradually but surely transplanting the Sino-Soviet conflict into the region. This will not only complicate the crisis but dangerously reduce the precious flexibility of the Soviet Union—one element indispensable for any political solution. It is well at the outset to consider several factors to appreciate the serious implications of the Moscow-Peking rivalry in the Middle East. Firstly, while the Soviet Union at least politically recognizes the existence of Israel as a State, Peking does not. Secondly, if the Arab States still pay lip service to a political settlement under given conditions, the Palestine guerrillas (especially Yasir Arafat) show increasing signs of intransigence and now emphatically rule out any political settlement. Thirdly, while it is presumed that the Soviet Union is trying to avoid a major confrontation with the United States through containing the regional crisis within manageable limits by working through Arab governments, the independent guerrilla organizations increasingly prefer the open-ended 'People's War' concept of the Chinese type. So do the Chinese, who do not share the same stakes as the Russians in the area. Fourthly, the guerrillas—possibly already linked to Peking—pose grave threats to the very existence of several of the key Arab States such as Jordan and Lebanon. Given the serious conditions of the Sino-Soviet disputes, these factors will have dangerous implications for the Middle East."

**THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN SOVIET EYES**, by Harry Gelman in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 145-149 plus.

"How has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union changed in the 1970's? What is the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union? . . . Analyzing the Sino-Soviet conflict, [the] article notes that 'the rivalry of the national and state interests of the two countries . . . has grown more crude and naked, and is steadily expanding everywhere on the political, economic, and military level'."

**THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA**, by G. W. Choudhury, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 4, no. 2 (January-March 1976) 9-16.

"The author, a former member of the Pakistan foreign service, analyzes the impact of Russo-Chinese rivalry in the region, focusing especially on Soviet attempts to 'sell' their Asian collective security plan."

**SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**, by Dick Wilson, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 5 (September-October 1974) 39-51.

"No one power . . . can entertain the ambition to 'unify' the region under its own aegis; all that the three (including the U.S.) can aspire to is to main-

tain the balance among themselves and allow Southeast Asia to be a buffer zone in which no one is predominant. This description still applies basically to the present state of international rivalry in Southeast Asia, but the general curtailment of U.S. commitments in Asia has tended to sharpen competition between the other two members of the triangle . . . This article will explore the current dimensions of the rivalry, the factors that favor the one or the other power in waging it, and its likely shape in the future."

17. *China and International Law: Implications for Foreign Policy*

**CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY**, by Suzanne Ogden, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 49, no. 1 (Spring 1976) 28-69.

"In their study of international law, sovereignty, and the state system, Chinese Communist writers and statesmen differ fundamentally from the dominant tradition of Western political and legal theory, which attempts to base general conclusions on valid first principles (ontological and epistemological), so that the conclusions are generally valid over many years and for most if not all nations. The Chinese assume that the formulations of political and legal theory should be wholly subservient to the needs of the Chinese state. Whatever value these formulations have as truth derives from their foundation in Marxist doctrine. Their truth, however, is less important than their usefulness, and this is gauged by how well they serve to justify the objectives of China's foreign policy. This set of basic assumptions leads to several somewhat overlapping aspects of the Chinese study of these basic political concepts, each aspect constituting a significant part of their formulations. Clearly their methodological assumptions profoundly affect their conclusions."

**CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES**, ed. by Jerome Alan Cohen. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972. 417 p.

"Aspects of Chinese foreign policy involving international law—notably disputes with Russia, Japan and India, as well as cases dealing with foreign diplomats and foreign organizations. Cohen and his collaborators conclude that China's approach to the law, like that of other countries, is pragmatic, not principled."

**CHINESE TREATIES: THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER**, by Gary L. Scott. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana, 1975. 312 p.

"A quantitative study of Chinese treaty-making behavior leads to the conclusion that the



People's Republic follows the normal practices of the status quo powers in its international obligations, and regards treaty commitments no less seriously than do more ideologically conservative nations."

**LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF ATTITUDES AND PRACTICE**, by James Chieh Hsiung. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972. 435 p.

" 'To what extent,' asks the author, 'does Communist China, armed with a militant ideology, accept the existing rules of the game in international relations?' To answer his question he examines Communist Chinese attitudes toward international law, the international law of peaceful coexistence, differences with the Soviet Union over proletarian internationalism, territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, sovereignty and self-determination, law relating to diplomatic relations, practical use of international law, the law of treaties and treaty compliance, recognition practice, and the pacific settlement of disputes. The author . . . argues that in some regards China has charted an independent course, breaking with the guidelines set by the Soviet Union and eschewing ideology when Chinese interests might be served by more pragmatic decision-making."

**LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA & SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW**, ed. by Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1972. 387 p.

"Nine contributors, including the editors, analyze the policies of the People's Republic of China in regard to international law and the problem of a universal system, the law of the sea and outer space, the status of Taiwan, the dispute with the USSR, diplomatic privileges and immunities, arms control, the United Nations, and peaceful coexistence and its correlation with proletarian internationalism. Six appendices and selected bibliographies from Chinese, English and French language materials are included."

**THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS 1974 AND GENEVA 1975**, by Herman Zivetz, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 28, no. 1 (Summer 1975) 55-71.

"A review of the key elements that determine maritime strength—naval forces, overseas trade, merchant tonnage, and fishing, for example—would indicate that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has the potential to be a third superpower. However, the position taken by the PRC at the Law of the Sea Conferences in Caracas and Geneva and her unwillingness to compromise on even minor

points are not consistent with this potential and represent instead the more radical and disruptive line favored by certain Third World nations. While much of this attitude can be attributed to China's self-perception as spokesman for the Third World, it also demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Chinese to forego the apparent advantages of an international convention on the law of the sea in favor of flexibility in future diplomacy."

**THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES**, by Hungdah Chiu. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972. 178 p.

"Since the PRC has not yet acceded to the 1969 Vienna Convention governing the interpretation and application of treaties, the author maintains that it is essential for other nations conducting relations with China to be aware of how the PRC has chosen to execute the 2,000 treaties to which it has become a party. Relying heavily on Chinese sources, his analysis covers the communist regime's theory and practice in regard to treaties through 1969."

#### E. Economic Aspects

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

**BASIC DATA ON ECONOMY OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by George Driscoll. Washington, Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, 1972. 39 p. (OBR 75-047.)

**BASIC DATA ON ECONOMY OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY]**, by John Phipps and JeNelle Matheison. Washington, Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business Administration, 1974. 39 p. (OBR 74-21.)

**CHINA'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY**, ed. by Bryant G. Garth. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 222 p.

Contents: China and the World Economy—An Introduction; The International Political Economy and Chinese Politics; 'Self-Reliance' Revisited—China's Technology Dilemma; Chinese Perceptions of Social Imperialism and Economic Dependency—The Impact of Soviet Aid; International Effects of China's Population Situation; People's China and the World Energy Crisis—The Chinese Attitude Toward Global Resource Distribution; China and Off-Shore Oil; Recent Developments in International Financial Policies of the People's Republic of China; China's Major Trading Partner—Japan Dependent; China, Lump Sum Settlements, and Executive Agreements.

**CHINA'S MODERN ECONOMY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**, ed. by Dwight H.

Perkins. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1975. 344 p.

"This collection of papers maintains "that Chinese historical experience and the Chinese cultural value system have facilitated economic growth—on the mainland, with its revolution, and equally in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Taiwan without one."

CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY: A TRAVELER'S REPORT, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 110-114 plus.

"Mao has demonstrated that it is possible to run a big but not very complex economy without economics and economists. He has also shown that it is feasible to conduct the business of society by relying on a network of political cadres, an implanted ethic of service to the community, fear, pride of achievement, pragmatism, and some common sense."

THE CHINESE ECONOMIC MODEL, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 80-84 plus.

"The Chinese economic model rests on a precarious balance of power between China's contending and contentious leadership factions. The balance is made possible by the unifying force of Mao's personality and Chou En-lai's diplomatic, wound-healing abilities."

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN MAINLAND CHINA, HEARINGS, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, JUNE 13-15, 1972. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972. 148 p. (Economic Joint Committee.)

MAKING A LIVING IN CHINA, by Lloyd G. Reynolds, in *The Yale Review*, v. 63, no. 4 (June 1974) 481-497.

"Our group of five university economists saw four cities in China in October 1973 as guests of the Department of Political Economy at Nankai University, Tientsin. The objective, in our view was intensive discussions with factory managers, planning officials, and university teachers . . . Distaste for the political climate, however, should not lead one to deny the solid economic accomplishments. There is no reasonable doubt that most Chinese are considerably better off in material terms than they were in 1949. They are also better off than the average Indian, Pakistani, or Indonesian. Nor is there any reason to doubt that living standards in China are rising, slowly but persistently, over the course of time. Full employment, avoidance of inflation, elimination of extreme poverty, reduction of income inequality—these are [some of the] accomplishments."

RECENT TRENDS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY, by Thomas G. Rawski, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January/March 1973) 1-33.

"The past 15 years have been eventful ones for the Chinese economy. They have seen an ambitious attempt at economic acceleration decline into agricultural crisis, a major reversal of the direction of economic policy, agricultural recovery and resurgent economic momentum. These years have brought major changes to the Chinese economy: whole new industries have appeared; official policy towards such diverse areas as education, income distribution, regional dispersion of industry and economic specialization has shifted repeatedly; the organization of agricultural production has also changed."

## 2. *An Appraisal: Problems and Prospects*

AN APPRAISAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMY IN 1974, by Lee Ruen-hwa, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 3 (March 1975) 40-44.

"The Chinese Communists have boasted of their industrial and agricultural growth and disclosed some new construction projects almost every year since the start of the 'great cultural revolution,' but during 1974 they have seldom mentioned major industrial construction projects and even avoided any mention of the production of important industries. A comprehensive study of the Chinese Communist economy shows that of its agricultural production in 1974, except a slight increase in food supply, the outputs of such crops as cotton, edible oil and sugar were all in a decline as compared with 1973 . . . Productivity in agriculture and industry, therefore, showed no or very little increase. As further development of productivity depends on maintenance of and increase the current productivity, the increase of 1975 production will be facing much difficulties."

CHINA, REASSESSMENT OF ECONOMY, COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975, 737 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Economic Joint Committee Print.)

CHINESE TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES: IS THE PRC A STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE?, by Yuan-li Wu, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 880-894.

"Because of (a) the Sino-Soviet dispute, (b) the Chinese perception of an imminent Soviet military threat and (c) U.S. perception of the outward manifestations of Soviet hostility toward Peking, U.S. policymakers seem to have, in their own minds, ascribed to the PRC a balancing role on the Soviet Union's Far Eastern front. This balancing role, the



same policymakers may have hoped, is to help bring about a SALT agreement, prepare the ground for future reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe, and offset the preponderance of the USSR's conventional power on its Western front under conditions of acknowledged U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity. Perhaps such a view of U.S. strategy and of the sequential steps taken to implement it is at once too simplistic and too grandiose. It is not always a simple matter to differentiate good planning from opportunism or to distinguish both from post hoc rationalization. But the single fact that the United States envisages Peking as a balancing force vis-a-vis the Soviet Union cannot be gainsaid. This article will examine some of the assumptions implicit in envisaging such a role for Peking. A fundamental question is whether in view of the economic and technological capabilities of mainland China, the PRC can be expected to become a major economic power able and willing to contribute to global, as well as regional, stability. A second question is whether Peking's economic and technological capabilities will enable it to acquire a nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (and eventually, of course, also against the United States), so that a multipolar balance will materialize and can be maintained, again in the interest of world and regional peace."

**ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CHANGE IN CHINA: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE**, by Alexander Eckstein, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1973) 211-241.

"The central theme to be explored in this article is that the sharply fluctuating pattern of development in the 1950s and 1960s can best be understood as the product of a continuing confrontation of ideology and scarcity in China. Scarcity, in turn, is a function of interacting demand and supply forces. In the Chinese context, demand is to a considerable extent shaped by ideology. Ideology provides the framework for the definition of economic policy, objectives, targets, and programmes and the elaboration of a development mix. On the other hand, basic factor endowments and the level of technology prevailing in the economy condition production capacities and the ability to supply goods and services. With a given state of factor endowments and technology, the more demands ideology places on the economy, the greater will tend to be the state of scarcity."

**A HUNGARIAN VIEW OF CHINA'S ECONOMY**, by W. Klatt, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1973) 341-344.

"So little detailed information on the Chinese economy is available, even in the present relatively relaxed atmosphere, that readers of *The China Quarterly* may well be interested to hear about the at-

tempt of Mr. G. Hidasi, an East European 'China-oriented economist,' to give his own account on the basis of data available to him. Mr. Hidasi published his findings last year in the journal sponsored by the Academy of Sciences in Budapest. In his paper, he not only gives his assessment of China's economic performance from 1952 to 1970, but even ventures to guess what things will be like by the end of 1975."

**THE OUTLOOK FOR CHINA'S ECONOMY**, by Kuan-I Chen, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 103-108 plus.

"The progress [China] has made in agriculture and industry in the past few years shows that the dynamics of self-sustaining economic growth have been in process. The economic planners can now begin to think in terms of maximizing growth instead of mere survival."

### 3. *Growth and Development*

**CHINA'S CHANGING MAP: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1949-71**, by Theodore Shabad. New York, Praeger, 1972. 370 p.

"The author, . . . [of] *The New York Times* Moscow Bureau, updates an . . . earlier work which . . . [is a] geographical and economic reference tool for the student of Chinese affairs."

**CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE INTERPLAY OF SCARCITY AND IDEOLOGY**, by Alexander Eckstein. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975. 399 p.

"Professor Eckstein here collects his essays on the Chinese economy over the last 20 years and adds a postscript based on a short first-hand exposure to Chinese society. The latter, he remarks, strengthened his impression of high morale and commitment to equality, but falsified none of his earlier attempts at long-distance Sinology."

**CHINESE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE**, by R. P. Sinha, in *The World Today*, v. 30, no. 1 (January 1974) 33-42.

"In purely economic terms China's record has not been outstanding, but developing countries—and particularly India—could learn from Mao's social policies."

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND INDIA: SOME CONDITIONING FACTORS**, by Barry Richman, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 45, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 75-91.

"Numerous studies have dealt with India's economic development in the last decade, a small but rapidly growing number with China's development, and only a handful with comparisons of both countries. Most of the comparative studies focus on the statistical aspects of economic performance. While I have also devoted much attention to such

quantitative indicators, I have at the same time analyzed a wide range of environmental conditions bearing directly on development. These include educational, socio-cultural, political, legal and economic factors and constraints. The present article provides a broad environmental analysis which makes use of a conceptual framework, on which I have been working for some time, for describing and explaining economic development and also for rating environments in a quantitative way. However, due to space limitations here I concentrate primarily on a qualitative assessment and do not present a quantitative analysis of the economic performance of India and China. It appears clear, however, from the available evidence that China thus far has achieved a significant lead over India in overall economic development—in both absolute and per capita terms."

(LI)—THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S GROWTH MODEL, by Maj. Adolph Moncivaiz. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 73 p. (Research Study no. 1345-71.)

"The Chinese growth model is more than a mere variant of the Soviet growth model. It consists of a fusion of Soviet and traditional Chinese doctrines. It encompasses the unique traditional Chinese characteristics and economies amidst a program of rapid industrialization. The study analyzes strategy, economic organization and methodology incorporated in the Chinese growth model. The Soviet (1928) and Indian (1951) growth models are discussed and compared as alternatives to the existing Chinese economy of 1950. Further, a brief overview is presented of Chinese resources, agrarian policies, industrial policies and Mao Tse-tung's rise to power. The study concludes that China faces paramount problems in meeting the demand for consumer goods."

#### 4. Agriculture

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

(LI)—AGRARIAN POLICY: CHINA'S CONSTRAINT TO GREAT POWER, by Maj. Jack T. Clark. Newport, R.I., US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of Mainland China's major agrarian policies from 1949 through 1971 and the impact of these policies on the Chinese peasant, agricultural performance, and China's quest to become a self-sufficient great power. The interaction of politics, ideology, economics, agrotechnology, and psychology is examined as it affects rural society in China. The analysis is structured to coincide with major political economic shifts in power within the Chinese Communist Party. China's continually fluctuating agrarian policy is found to be a

major constraint to the goal of becoming a self-sufficient world power. In the coming decades, China must greatly increase production to feed the ever growing population, provide for industry, and release labor for industrial expansion. Failure to do so will produce hardships and political instability in China and may well affect peace and security throughout the world."

AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COMMUNIST ASIAN COUNTRIES, REVIEW OF 1974 AND OUTLOOK FOR 1975. Washington, Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1975. 30 p. (Foreign Agricultural Economic Report 111.)

AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND CURRENT POLICY IN CHINA, by Kieran Broadbent, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 5 (May 1976) 411-426.

"China's stand on conservation and pollution is attracting increasing attention, especially since the Stockholm Conference in 1972. It is now generally held that current policy has opted not to follow the large-scale enterprise model of capitalist countries but instead has elected to develop an energy saving small-scale enterprise policy based on rural areas. The energy crisis of 1973 intensified interest in alternative forms of development and China now appears to be in a position to exploit international opinion on such topical issues as energy use, intermediate technology and conservation of the environment."

ALL-ROUND RICH HARVEST, in *Peking Review*, no. 1 (2 January 1976) 11-12.

"China reaped her 14th successive rich harvest last year and registered a marked increase in total grain output over 1974, also a year of rich harvest. Compared with 1962, output of major cash crops in 1974 showed notable increases: cotton, oil-bearing crops, sugar cane and sugar beet, bast fibre, tobacco and tea went up 3.5, 2.2, 5, 4.7, 4.5 and 2-fold respectively. This was followed by further increases last year. There also were new advances in forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations and fishery."

CHINA'S AGRICULTURE: INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, by Laurence J. C. Ma, in *Focus*, v. 25, no. 7 (May-June 1975) 1-11.

Traditional Patterns; Collectivization; The Private Plot; State Farms; Technological Changes—Water Conservation—Introduction of Mechanization—Chemical Fertilizers—Changing Cropping Systems; Future Prospects.

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN CHINA, 1950-



1970: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, by David Liden, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 6 (June 1975) 510-529.

"In this study an attempt is made to decipher and define the language used to describe grain harvests in order to demonstrate the amount and type of information actually being disseminated through this form of communication. To the extent that it is possible to identify a set of qualitative descriptions which can be shown to correspond with reported grain output during the 1950s, we will have evidence of a purposive and systematic vocabulary or code which when applied to the 1960s will help us to estimate output and understand subsequent policy making in a period when no official statistics were issued . . . It is not the purpose of this study to derive one more series of grain estimates for the 1960s, nor simply to illustrate how the descriptive language gets more positive as output goes up and vice versa. This is meant to be a political study in that I want to demonstrate the significance and utility of the descriptive words and phrases as they can be defined, weighted and ranked in such a way that the reader can understand the message being communicated in the media and thus be attuned to the possible policy implications. By demonstrating that the language describing grain output is both intentional and systematic, this case study will serve as an example of the efficacy of appreciating the strengths, weaknesses, intentions, and expectations of the Chinese political system through an understanding of the style and substance of its political discourse."

LAND REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, by Victor D. Lippit. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Science Press, 1974. 183 p.

"Economic development always depends on diverting funds from consumption to investment. This . . . work argues that land reform as practiced in China in the early 1950s offered a useful tool to accomplish such a saving, by shifting the agricultural surplus away from rent payments to landlords who consumed and into tax payments to a state which invested. The statistical data are . . . selected."

(LI)—MAINLAND CHINA'S AGRICULTURE: A BASE FOR DEVELOPMENT, by Comdr. Daniel J. Moss. Newport, R.I., US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The ability of Communist China to maintain economic momentum in the future depends heavily upon agricultural success. Agriculture must provide increased amounts of food for a growing population and furnish the major portion of exports to ex-

change for capital goods and technical assistance needed in the country's drive for industrialization. It is not an exaggeration to state that fluctuation in agricultural production and changes in rural policies and institutions profoundly affect the general well-being of the population, industrial production, budget revenues, retail and foreign trade and political stability of the country. The Communist regime is well aware that most of the important domestic and foreign policies are centered on agricultural performance and their ability to control the peasant population, socialize agriculture and simultaneously to raise output. Thus, agriculture is and will remain in the foreseeable future, a fragile base for the Communist Chinese thrust for 'Big Power' status."

A PRELIMINARY MODEL FOR GRAIN PRODUCTION IN CHINA, 1974, by Ben Stavis, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 65 (March 1976) 82-96.

"Claims by the Chinese authorities that annual grain production has been in the region of 250 or more million tons in the past few years have been greeted with scepticism by some foreign analysts. However, this level of grain production is now possible because of agro-technical change in 'high and stable yield' areas and regions with improved agriculture. Recent information released by the Chinese permits a fairly thorough description of the locations and extent of these regions of modernizing agriculture. The data are summarized here."

THE PRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS IN CHINA, by Kang Chao, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 64 (December 1975) 712-729.

"The production of chemical fertilizers has been one of the most successful industries in China in the past two decades. It has not only manifested a remarkable long-term growth rate but also avoided short-term fluctuations. During the crisis years of the early 1960s when virtually all industries suffered set-backs, the production of fertilizers managed to progress steadily. Its success is attributed to a number of favourable factors . . . Since this industry has been so successful, the Chinese authorities are relatively liberal in releasing data on its performance. These production statistics together with knowledge of the quantities of imported fertilizers as reported by China's trade partners enable one to make some general analysis of the current situation in the application of fertilizers in the country."

REVOLUTION: A NATION STANDS UP, ed. by Peter Seybolt. New York, Praeger, 1974. 158 p.

"This volume, part of the Praeger World Culture Series and the first of two intended books subtitled *Through Chinese Eyes*, is a collection of

writings largely by Chinese about the impact of the communist revolution on peasant life in China. It is designed . . . 'to broaden our perspective by presenting a Chinese view of China and the world'."

b. *The Commune System*

CHINA'S RURAL LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, by Benedict Stavis, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 4 (April 1976) 381-396.

"Ever since 1949, an important dimension of Chinese policy has been the transformation of rural society, first through land reform, then through the establishment of cooperatives, finally through the people's commune system with its three levels of ownership, the team, brigade, and commune, supplemented by a variety of state offices at the local level (credit cooperatives, supply and marketing cooperatives, tax offices, policy stations, etc.). Has this social reorganization contributed to or hindered the improvement of agricultural production and rural welfare? On the basis of comparative analysis, this paper argues that the social transformation of rural China has been conducive to improvements in productivity and welfare."

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE IN CHINA: CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES, by Byung-Joon Ahn, in *Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 34, no. 3 (May 1975) 631-658.

"The establishment of the Chinese rural people's commune in 1958 as a new political and economic organization has aroused considerable interest among observers. One important question in this regard has been the role the commune has played in China's modernization. Since China is committed to both 'socialist transformation and construction,' modernization in China involves two tasks: revolution and development. As for China's rural problems, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the commune as the best organization for achieving these two goals during its transition to communism. Yet the commune has undergone a series of changes as a result of interactions between the Party's revolutionary goals and its development requirements, presenting a microcosm of Chinese communism. This article is an attempt to account for changes and continuities in the political economy of the commune."

WHAT ARE THE PEASANTS DOING IN CHINA TODAY?, by Barbara Mututantri, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 14, no. 6 (1975) 15-20, v. 15, no. 1 (1976) 59-65.

"This is a story of a commune brigade . . . [and] the progress being made in China's communes today," . . . including life in the brigade, private plots, recreation and sports, housing, medical care

and welfare, political study and education, experimental plots, etc.

c. *The Tachai Movement*

PEKING AFTER CHOU: THE TACHAI TEST, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 7 (13 February 1976) 33-34.

"The first major test of Peking's authority after the death of former Premier Cho En-lai is just around the corner. Since October's national conference on revolutionising China's agriculture, marathon conferences have taken place across the country. The widespread applause for a campaign to transform the rural areas—mainly through mechanisation and greater use of power, fertilisers and chemicals—seemed spontaneous enough. Peking's task now is to find out how far fine talk has been turned into concrete action. The timing of this crucial test for the Government was fixed in October. Local officials were warned they would come under sharp scrutiny every six months. Not all areas managed to come up with plans for a farm revolution overnight, so some will escape the mass appraisal of the last half-year's work and prospects until April. But investigations on the drive to learn from Tachai—Mao Tse-tung's model farm community—and to double agricultural growth start this month."

SHANGHAI IN THE TACHAI MOVEMENT, by Rewi Alley, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 15, no. 1 (1976) 42-48.

"At the end of 1975, we came to Shanghai from Kwangtung, to make some notes on the role of Shanghai in the Tachai movement. We wanted to see what the ten agricultural counties in the municipality were or have been doing about it as a first priority, and then to try and make some estimate of another fact—what industrial Shanghai is doing to support the movement all over the country . . . We started out in Shanghai by making visits to vanguard agriculture communes and brigades in the various counties, finding that each had its own set of problems, which it is solving in the Tachai way."

SUCCESES AND PROBLEMS IN CHINESE AGRICULTURE, by Ernst Kux, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 25, no. 8 (November 1975) 8-9.

"In Tachai, the famous model village in Shan-si Province, a national agricultural conference was held at the end of September in which long-range plans were discussed for the development and rapid mechanization of agricultural production. The importance of the conference was underscored by the presence of such luminaries as Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, Chairman Mao's wife Chiang Ching and party ideologist Yao Wen-yuan, as well as leading



personalities from government, the party and the army . . . The national conference at Tachai illustrated the importance now being ascribed to the rapid development of modern agriculture in China and the expansion of its technological base. This is part of the country's great overall development plan for the period between now and the year 2000. Ideological campaigns notwithstanding, this vast scheme appears to have captured the imagination of the Chinese, who have already begun to labor toward its realization."

*d. Rustication Movement*

CHINA'S RUSTICATION MOVEMENT, by Parris H. Chang, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 85-89.

"As long as the rustication program continues, it will inevitably generate serious grievances and massive alienation in Chinese society; the advantages claimed for the program, from the point of view of the state, are precisely the factors that have generated popular discontent."

GO WEST YOUNG HAN: THE HSIA FANG MOVEMENT TO CHINA'S MINORITY AREAS, by June Teufel Dreyer, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 48, no. 3 (Fall 1975) 353-369.

"In a recent article in this journal Professor Jan Prybyla . . . noted a tendency among China's rusticated urban youth to prefer assignment to a nearby suburban commune, and to avoid at all costs transfer to more remote areas such as Sinkiang. Many, however, fail in this goal and are rusticated to remote frontier areas where most of China's ethnic minorities live. The present article attempts to appraise the effect of *hsia fang* (downward transfer) to minority areas, both on the young people and on the cultures and life-styles of the indigenous nationalities involved."

HSIA-FANG: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RUSTICATION IN CHINA, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 48, no. 2 (Summer 1975) 153-172.

"For almost twenty years, with occasional slight pauses, China has been implementing a policy which both in the depth of its human drama and the sheer size of the population movements has no precedent in the history of industrializing nations. From 1961 through 1963, some 20 million urban dwellers in China were sent down (*hsai-fang*) to the countryside in a mass movement of reverse migration. From 1969 through 1973 more than 8 million urban youths alone had been 'plunged into the battle to build a socialist countryside.' Some estimates put the number of urban youths rusticated during that time at between 10 and 15 million. The movement, which assumes different interrelated forms, has a variety of objectives."

*e. Role of Military*

(LI)—AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY, by Maj. Caryl G. Marsh. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 69 p. (Research Study.)

"A voluminous amount of literature has been published on the social and political influences of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese People's Republic (PRC). Numerous writings are available on the importance of agriculture as the economic backbone of the PRC. This study combines these two significant areas and analyzes the extent to which the PLA is involved in agriculture. First an examination is made of the non-military activities of the PLA, followed by a discussion of Chinese agriculture and then the PLA's contribution to the agrarian society is examined in detail. The study concludes that the PLA involvement can be categorized as farming for self-sufficiency, supporting the rural communes, and operating state-owned farms."

*5. Industry and Industrialization (See also Maps in Appendixes)*

THE CHINESE MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY: A REAPPRAISAL, by Robert Michael Field, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1973) 308-320.

"The machine-building industry covers a very wide field: rolling stock for railroads, blast furnaces for new iron and steel complexes, trucks and tractors for agriculture, bicycles, radios, clocks and thermos bottles for personal use, not to mention thousands of other commodities. An interest in any of these things or in more aggregate measures such as the volume of construction or the growth of industry, presupposes an interest in the machine-building industry. As it was put in the first Five-Year Plan, 'The machine-building industry is the key to the technological transformation of [the] national economy'."

CHINESE STEEL EXPANSION LAGS, by Paul Strauss, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 24 (11 June 1976) 111-112.

"The largest single Chinese industrial project likely to be finished during the next five years, a massive steel rolling and treatment complex in Wuhan, supplied by West Germany and Japan, is several months behind schedule. The complex, for which contracts worth US \$550 million were signed in 1974, is one of several imported plants with which China is having problems. Diplomatic sources say that some of the 13 large synthetic fertiliser plants purchased in 1973 are now behind schedule. A Japanese petrochemical plant near Shanghai has also been held up."

DEMOCRACY AND ORGANISATION IN THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE, 1948-1953, by William Brugger. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 374 p.

"A . . . study of the problems faced by the new Chinese leadership in restructuring work organization and authority after the Revolution. Brugger's book offers insights into comparative patterns of modernization, industrial democratization, and the effect of cultural differences on social forms."

INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND MOTIVATIONAL CHANGE: THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL WAGES SYSTEM, 1950-1973, by Peter Schran, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 10 (October 1974) 1014-1032.

"As part of their socialist transformation of China's economy during the years 1949-1956, the Chinese communists instituted a new wages system in the state operated sector of industry. This system, which embodied the socialist principle of 'distribution according to contribution' on the soviet pattern, was not meant to provide a permanent solution to the problem of industrial work incentive. Rather, its implementation was viewed as the first step on the road to communism which—according to Marx and all Marxists—will be characterized by 'distribution according to need.' . . . The new wages system, which emerged during the socialist transformation of industry, will be presented first; the tendencies of change from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will be indicated next; and the available evidence on the present system will be introduced thereafter. The conclusion will be devoted to an interpretation of this (unexpected) course of events, in the context of incentive policy generally."

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A NEW INDUSTRIAL POWER WITH A STRONG MINERAL BASE, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975. 96 p.

"Mining and metallurgy have had a long history in China, and resources there have always been considered promising. Under the People's Republic of China (PRC), a remarkable industrial renaissance is underway that should further gain momentum in the years ahead. Rapid development of minerals have not only brought the PRC prominence in industrialization, but also in world affairs. Chinese mineral developments, especially petroleum, have been increasingly in the news. Oil and gas may have great potential, but a very large coal industry is already in existence. The steel industry ranks fifth or sixth in the world. The PRC is also prominent in fertilizer, cement, and salt produc-

tion. The export metals are well known. Also, the country is buying heavily in nonferrous base metals. The need to know and the intense interest in the subject have prompted this study. The world significance of Chinese minerals is pointed out. The history of growth and PRC's mineral supply position are reviewed. Evaluations are made of policy considerations and regional and technical factors affecting mineral development. PRC's mineral trade and efforts to obtain equipment, supplies, and know-how are assessed. Specific reviews are made of major mineral sectors, including coal and power, oil and gas, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial minerals, and fertilizers and chemicals. The overall outlook is summarized." With illustrations and tables.

REVOLUTION PROMOTES PRODUCTION—FOURFOLD RISE IN A DECADE FOR SHASHIH'S INDUSTRY, in *Peking Review*, no. 8 (20 February 1976) 8-11.

"Lying on the middle reaches of the Yangtze River Shashih in Hupeh Province is a small city of 150,000 inhabitants. Its appearance has changed tremendously and its industry has developed at a faster rate than before the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. The city's total industrial output value has jumped 4.4-fold; the average annual progressive rate of increase is 16 per cent, with the rate reaching 18 per cent in the period of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Textile, chemical, machine-building, electronics and light industries all have attained a certain scale. The variety of products has steadily increased, quality has continually improved and money has reached advanced domestic levels. Since 1966 the city has provided the state with an accumulation six times the sum total of state investments and locally supplied funds during the period."

SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, (I) THE SYSTEM OF OWNERSHIP—A VISIT TO THE TALIEH HUGCHI SHIPYARD, in *Peking Review*, no. 16 (16 April 1976) 21-24 plus.

The first of a series of articles "on the progress scored under the guidance of the 'Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company' by some socialist state-owned enterprises of Luta, an industrial coastal city in northeast China." See also the following in succeeding issues of *Peking Review*: (II) Who Controls Leadership of the Enterprise?—A Visit to the Talieh Steel Plant, in no. 17 (23 April 1976) 18-22; (III) Workers Participate in Management—A Visit to Luta's Factories, in no. 18 (30 April 1976) 13-15; and (IV) Launching Vigorous Mass Movements—A Visit to the Talieh Locomotive and Rolling Stock Plant, in no. 19 (7 May 1976) 19-21 plus.



## 6. Maritime and Rail Transport

**BUILDING "RAILROADS ON THE SEA": CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS MARITIME LAW**, by Menno T. Kamminga, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 59 (July/September 1974) 545-558.

"The People's Republic of China has played an important role in the current discussion on the reform of the law of the sea. This is hardly surprising, since the struggle for marine resources offers a major testing ground for China's political philosophy. Thus, on the one hand, China will try to prove to the world that the Soviet Union and the United States are nothing but imperialistic superpowers trying to exploit and dominate the oceans exclusively for their own benefit; on the other hand, China will emphasize its own championship of the oppressed nations by supporting the claims of the Third World . . . Before examining China's attitude towards the law of the sea, it seems appropriate to devote a few words to its attitude towards international law in general."

**CENTRAL CHINA RAILWAY TRUNK LINE**, in *Peking Review*, no. 1 (2 January 1976) 12-13.

"The Chiaotso-Chihcheng Railway, a new important trunk line in central China running parallel to the Peking-Kwangchow Railway, was completed in 1970. This 753.3-kilometre-long railway line starts in the north from the coal centre of Chiaotso in Honan Province and ends at Chihcheng in Hupeh Province on the southern bank of the Yangtze River. It crosses the Lunghai Railway, a big east-west communications artery, at Loyang and links up with the Peking-Kwangchow Railway via several connecting lines at Chiaotso, Loyang, Paofeng and Hsiangfan."

**NEWLY BUILT AND EXPANDED PORTS**, in *Peking Review*, no. 1 (2 January 1976) 14-15.

"The last three years have seen China building 40 new deep-water berths able to dock vessels of 10,000 tons or more in the seaports of Talien, Chinghuangtao, Tientsin, Yentai, Tsingtao, Lienyunkang in the north and Shanghai, Whampoa and Chanchiang in the south. Some berths are for 10,000-tonners carrying coal, mineral ores and miscellaneous goods, some for 25,000-50,000-ton tankers, and others, the first of their kind in China, for container shipments and vessels transporting iron and steel."

**RED CHINA: THE NEW MARITIME SUPERPOWER**, by Irwin M. Heine, in *Sea Power*, v. 18, no. 2 (February 1975) 14-18.

"The People's Republic of China is making, without much fanfare, a determined bid to become a competitor on the world trade routes through mass shipbuilding in its own and foreign yards, through

ship-loosing, and through purchase of older ships on the international market."

## 7. The Monetary System and Fiscal Management

**CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA'S FISCAL MANAGEMENT**, by Nicholas R. Lardy, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 61 (March 1975) 25-60.

"The economic decentralization measures introduced in the late 1950s have long been viewed as a watershed in the economic and political evolution of post-1949 China. The most widely accepted interpretation is that these edicts transferred broad economic powers from the Centre to the provincial governments and that, as a result, the ability of the central government to control the allocation of the nation's economic resources was substantially impaired. This fundamental realignment in the internal balance of economic power is, in turn, viewed as having far-reaching implications for China's capacity for national economic planning and for a broad range of other important issues related to our understanding of China's developmental experience. The purpose of this paper is to advance specific empirical hypotheses to test whether such a fundamental realignment in fact occurred."

**THE CHINESE MONETARY SYSTEM**, by Pierre-Henri Cassou, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 59 (July/September 1974) 559-566.

"During a visit to China in June 1973, a group of young civil servants from the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, myself amongst them, had several interesting interviews, particularly with Han-lei and Wang Si-yl, two experts from the People's Bank of China, in Peking. This was, as far as I know, the first time since the Cultural Revolution that visitors have had the chance to gather official information on current Chinese monetary policy and on the role of the People's Bank in the economic life of the country. One can define the Chinese monetary and financial system by the following formula: the People's Bank, the sole autonomous financial institution, receives the deposits of private individuals, enterprises, people's communes and State departments, and it grants loans to enterprises."

**DEBATING THE ROLE OF MONEY**, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 1 (2 January 1976) 31-32 plus.

"China's bankers have won increased authority for 1976 after suffering from trying times over the past year. Their duties have been expanded to cover more direct responsibility for the country's overall economic management at every level as well as the generation of more foreign exchange—much wider responsibilities than bankers in other countries must shoulder. To make matters more difficult,

a debate has been in progress over whether China should even use such a capitalist device as money."

#### 8. Natural Resources

##### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, 1975, HEARINGS, PT. 1, EXECUTIVE SESSIONS, BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIORITIES AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, 94TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, JUNE 18 AND JULY 21, 1975. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 177 p.

CHINA'S COAL EXPORT POTENTIAL, by A. B. Ikannikov, in *Australian Outlook*, v. 27, no. 2 (August 1973) 179-190.

"There has been some speculation . . . about an imminent prospect of China becoming an exporter of coal, particularly to Japan. The speculation was triggered off by the establishment of diplomatic links between Tokyo and Peking. The links . . . would make the trade relations between the two even closer, and trade transactions easier."

CHINA'S ENERGY RESOURCES AND PROSPECTS, by Yuan-li Wu, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 407 (July/August 1975) 25-27 plus.

With respect to China's energy resources—"Internationally, Peking must seriously consider the desirability of allowing Western technology and capital to enter the country on a larger scale. Domestically, China must consider a wider range of alternatives in economic planning."

ENERGY IN CHINA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, by Vaclav Emil, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 65 (March 1976) 54-81.

"The Chinese media have been reporting an unending chain of overfulfilled quotas in coal mining, astonishing progress in oil-drilling, and an amazing growth of power-plant capacities; China's self-sufficiency in oil is being stressed repeatedly; oil products have been offered to some Asian countries for a 'friendship price,' while crude oil exports to Japan keep growing. These developments offer a timely opportunity to look at the current performance and the future potential of Chinese energetics in absolute terms, as well as in an international context."

HARNESSING CHINA'S RIVERS, in *Atlas*, v. 22, no. 4 (April 1975) 26-28.

This article excerpted from the Peking Review, in discussing how Communist China harnesses her rivers reports that "historic feats of flood control are credited to Chairman Mao."

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NEW INDUSTRIAL POWER WITH STRONG MINERAL

BASE, by Kung-ping Wang. Washington, Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975. 96 p.

Data and analysis; and with 3 maps.

##### b. Petroleum

##### (1) Miscellaneous Aspects

CHINA: IDEOLOGY, THEN OIL, by Peter Weintraub, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 25 (18 June 1976) 36-38.

"The latest evidence from Peking appears to put a damper on recent speculation that China's oil exports could be running at 50-100 million metric tons annually by 1980. Shipments of crude to the most important market—Japan—have been cut, and the official New China News Agency has revealed that production growth slackened in the first quarter of 1976—for the first time since China's oil industry began to attract worldwide attention several years ago. However, it is too early to conclude that the Chinese oil boom may be dying on the vine. The exploitation and disposal of Chinese petroleum, now as before, is inextricably bound up with economic, geopolitical and ideological considerations."

CHINA: THE NEXT OIL GIANT, by Selig S. Harrison, in *Foreign Policy*, (Fall 1975) 3-27.

"Citing new details on China's unexpected emergence as a major oil producer, Mr. Harrison speculates that, by drawing only minimally on its oil reserves, 'Peking appears likely to reach the current production level of Saudi Arabia by 1988 or soon thereafter.' As a result of recently disclosed preparations for offshore oil exploration, Harrison reports, Peking has spotlighted long-simmering disputes with Taiwan and South Korea over unexplored parts of the continental shelf believed to contain the most promising oil and gas deposits in the world. Reporting on previously unpublicized events, Harrison says the US faces a dilemma with explosive diplomatic implications. In early 1975, the White House and the State Department prevented American oil companies from drilling in disputed waters off the China coast. In the last three years, Peking has been quietly acquiring sophisticated French, American and Japanese equipment which will enable it to conduct surveys in waters where American oil companies hold concessions from Taiwan and South Korea. Despite 'scowls' from Peking and cautionary words from Washington, Taipei has encouraged these concession-holders drill in waters reaching close to Shanghai in the East China Sea, where Japan also has laid claims. In addition, Harrison notes recent figures of Chinese oil reserves and the political consequences of China's oil development. 'In a few short years,' he says, 'China will be able to signal its intentions in specific



areas with survey ships and rigs rather than gunboats.' He concludes, however, that there are some indications that China might resort to military action in response to unwelcome drilling in waters it considers its own."

**CHINA'S BOOTSTRAP OIL PRODUCTION**, in *Forbes*, v. 116, no. 6 (15 September 1975) 39 plus.

"Going it alone, Red China has become an important oil producer. But realizing its full potential may require cooperation with the West."

**CHINA'S NEW STATUS IN OIL**, in *Survival*, v. 14, no. 2 (March/April 1972) 75-77.

"US companies have been warned by the State Department that it would be inadvisable for them to pursue their offshore exploration plans near the Senkuku Islands, in waters claimed by Peking, as well as by Taiwan and Japan. There are reports that China itself is negotiating the purchase of three offshore oil rigs in the United States in order to start exploratory work in its continental shelf area, and a Chinese delegation interested in oil industry equipment . . . [was] to visit Canada . . . early in 1972. China's political activities in oil-producing countries often concentrate on the support of revolutionary movements . . . [However] Petroleum . . . plays only a minor part in China's own energy budget."

**CHINA'S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY; OUTPUT GROWTH AND EXPORT POTENTIAL**, by Chu-yuan Cheng. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976. 244 p.

The Development of the [Communist] Chinese Petroleum Industry; The Growth of Crude Oil Output; The Major Oil Fields; Reserves, Refineries, and Transportation; The Supply of Petroleum Equipment; The Importation of Petroleum Equipment; Contributions to the National Economy; The Potential of China's Trade in Oil; Summary and Appraisal; Selected Bibliography; and Tables, Figures, and Maps.

**OIL AND ASIAN RIVALS, SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND OIL CRISIS, HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 93D CONGRESS, 1ST AND 2D SESSIONS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1973-MARCH 6, 1974**. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 476 p. (Foreign Affairs Committee, House.)

**THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN CHINA**, by Tatsu Kambara, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 60 (December 1974) 699-719.

"Because the Chinese do not publish detailed industrial and economic data, the analysis of the petroleum industry is very difficult indeed. Its defence significance makes it additionally hard to establish a firm picture of the situation. Despite the speculative content of any article on the subject,

however, it seems worthwhile attempting to evaluate what information is available on Chinese oil because of the industry's growing domestic and international importance."

**THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by H. C. Ling. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 264 p.

"This . . . study finds the outlook promising for China as an exporter of petroleum. Principal constraints are transportation (pipelines to the north-east and northwest) and technology (offshore drilling rigs). Both are likely to be overcome with some form of international arrangement."

**THE PRC AS AN OIL EXPORTER**, by Yuan-li Wu, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 4, no. 2 (January-March 1976) 1-8.

"While Peking has approached several of its smaller neighbours (e.g., Thailand, the Philippines and Hong Kong) with offers of oil, it is not a little puzzling that it has not made an even greater effort to exploit its oil weapon. What indeed are the prospects for Chinese oil? Can mainland China really become as important an oil producer and exporter as Saudi Arabia or Iran in the foreseeable future?"

**THE QUANTITY OF OIL AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE**, by David Crook, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 14, no. 6 (1975) 7-14.

"The quantity of oil produced at Taching is inseparable from the quality of life there—a life quality crystallized in two of Mao Tse-tung's principles: 'Arduous struggle' and 'Rely on our own efforts' and in the oil driller Wang Chin-hsi—'Iron Man Wang'."

**THE RISE OF CHINA'S OIL INDUSTRY**, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 23, no. 9 (December 1973) 8-9.

"Twenty years ago China was regarded as a country poor in petroleum. In 1957, when China's first five-year plan expired, its crude oil production was only 1.4 million tons . . . During the years 1966-70 China's oil production reportedly rose by 30% annually. At the end of November 1972 a report in the Peking Review states that annual production of crude oil was nearly twenty-one times as great as before the Communist takeover."

**TWO NEW OILFIELDS AND A NEW CITY**, by Rewi Alley, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 14, no. 4 (1975) 9-21.

"Oil fields are no longer the rarity they were in China, when at the time of Liberation, the only one really producing much was that at Yumen in Western Kansu. Now they may be found in many parts of the country and the model for all industry to follow is the oil-field at Taching in Heilungkiang.

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The oil fields we discuss here are the relatively new ones at Takang on the coast, in the Tientsin municipality, and the one at Shengli by the Yellow River mouth in Shantung."

(2) *International Aspects*

THE CARTEL'S NEW COMPETITOR, in *Newsweek*, v. 96, no. 13 (29 September 1975) 69.

"Whatever their short-run success in ruling oil prices, the OPEC nations have a brand new long-term problem to worry about: the world oil cartel faces a fresh competitor. After centuries of poverty, famine, exploitation and general economic misery, China is emerging as the next great oil producer—with enough reserves to fuel its own industrialization and become a leading exporter as well. For the outside world, China's new role poses more questions than answers, and the questions have been posed with increasing urgency in recent weeks, most notably in a brace of articles in the quarterly *Foreign Policy*. Could a tide of Chinese oil disrupt the OPEC cartel and break world prices? Will the Chinese choose to hoard their new wealth, using most of it to build their own modern economy? Will Chinese oil become a diplomatic weapon, seducing oil-thirsty Japan away from Western alliances? And will the Chinese oil touch off dangerous territorial disputes in offshore areas?"

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN CHINA, by Jessica Leatrice Wolfe, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 6 (June 1976) 525-539.

"The spate of articles which have recently appeared in several journals have focused international attention on the petroleum industry in China. The debut of the 'energy crisis' in the early 1970s exposed the industrial world's dependence on Third World natural resources, specifically petroleum. Recognizing its vulnerability in the world market vis-a-vis its collective role as a major oil importer—a vulnerability painfully manifest in the spiraling inflation concomitant with escalating oil prices—the industrialized world renewed its fervor for oil exploration and development. Thus, it is not surprising that news of a burgeoning oil industry in China attracted the attention of not only corporate oil executives, but also geologists, politicians, economists, industrialists, academicians and, of course, 'China-watchers.' Despite the plethora of publications which have appeared recently, the literature on the Chinese petroleum industry reveals an increasing hiatus between the analyses of scientists and those of political, social and economic observers. The approach to the subject remains largely atomistic; each specialist—technicians and social scientists alike—presents an analysis of the petroleum industry without sufficiently accounting

for the context and the country in which that industry is developing."

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF OIL, by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 6 (June 1976) 540-552.

"China, which was once dependent on Soviet oil supplies, is being transformed into a regional oil power in East Asia and it is becoming a successful rival of the Soviet Union in the game of Asian oil politics. Soviet economic warfare encouraged the Chinese drive toward oil self-sufficiency and China emerged as a crucial factor affecting Japanese and American negotiations with the Soviet Union on Siberian oil development. China has strategic objections to the construction of the Tiumen oil pipeline close to its own border and its increasing sales of oil to Japan have been aimed at deterring Tokyo's involvement in any Siberian oil investment deal. While China's oil exports to Japan and other Asian states are rising, the Soviet Union is confronted with a growing oil squeeze due to its huge oil export commitments to East European states. Oil to non-communist states even declined in 1974 and, during the next decade, the Soviet Union's ability to be a major competitive force in Asian oil markets will be seriously strained."

9. *Foreign Trade*

THE CHINA TRADE, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 109-113 plus.

"... Barring sudden outbursts of collective exultation, China in the next ten years is likely to be an amenable trading partner, notes this economist, who warns that given the fact that the Chinese deal through the state ... while the United States deals by and large through individual business interests, a measure of United States governmental supervision and screening of the trade will be called for, if only to prevent private profit motives from running away with national security."

CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY, ed. by Alexander Eckstein. New York, Praeger, 1971. 330 p.

"On the premise that trade either can be an avenue for the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations or can take place in the absence of diplomatic relations, the authors examine the effects of the American trade embargo against China, issues regarding Chinese law and Sino-American trade, and the prospects for trade between the United States and China."

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE; A POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION APPRAISAL, by Lt. Col. Sidney Klein, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 6 (June 1972) 55-60.

"Since 1959, analyses of economic developments in China have begun with the statement that, since that year, the Peking Government has not issued sufficiently numerous economic data to permit accurate authoritative analyses of economic developments in China. In 1972, the tradition continues. As for the past 12 years, what we think we know about China's economy comes more from China's trading partners than from China itself. Data dealing with exports, imports, trade balances, terms of trade, financial arrangements, the direction and composition of trade, and so on continue to substitute, inadequately, for production, distribution, national income data and the like."

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE, 1971-85: A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN PRC HISTORY, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 11 (November 1975) 58-63.

"The period 1971-85 is likely to be, *ex post facto*, a critical juncture in the People's Republic of China (PRC) history, and very probably a critical juncture for the United States, Japan and East and Southeast Asia as well. Indeed, the economic posture of the PRC vis-a-vis the rest of the world may be hardly recognizable as compared to 1971. So strong a statement requires detailed exposition."

CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE: THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION, by Col. Sidney Klein, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 3 (March 1974) 55-59.

"The size, direction and composition of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) foreign trade, 1950-71, were analyzed in detail in my article 'China's Foreign Trade: A Post-Cultural Revolution Appraisal' *Military Review*, June 1972. It was concluded that, from 1950-1960, the PRC imported from the USSR a large number and wide variety of industrial machinery and equipment, including complete 'turnkey' type plants, and, in turn, exported economically innocuous agricultural products. After the Sino-Soviet rift manifested itself in 1960, the PRC altered its foreign trade policy and, from 1961 to 1971, imported most of its capital goods and advanced industrial technology from Japan and Western Europe. Again, these were paid for via exports of economically insignificant agricultural products. This article analyzes the latest data available—those for all of 1972 and the first quarter of 1973—and evaluates the US contribution to China's foreign trade."

(LI)—CHINA'S RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, by Comdr. Riley D. Mixson. Newport, R.I. US Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of China's modern economic

growth (1949-1970), as interrelated to her development of international trade. The purpose of this paper is to determine China's potential for becoming an economic power, China's future trade patterns and their influence on the Chinese growth factor, and China's market potential for trade with the Western world. Trade analysis is restricted to free world countries as detailed statistics on China's trade with other Communist countries are not available. The role of aid in China's trade relationships is considered outside the scope of this paper. China is found to have developed a sound industrial-agricultural foundation for growth. Her people are highly motivated and self-sufficient in all respects. China's trade has been an important factor in sustaining the economy during period of adversity and has been largely nonpolitical in nature. China will import selected industrial items from the Western world but overall trade increases will be slight. Her future potential as an economic giant will depend upon population control, extensive development of natural resources, and control of internal revolution."

CHINA'S TRADE POLICY AND SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by Alexander Eckstein, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 54, no. 1 (October 1975) 134-154.

"In June 1971, a month before Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking, the United States lifted the trade and payments embargo that had been in effect on the Chinese People's Republic ever since 1949. The move followed a number of lesser measures of relaxation taken from 1969 onward, and of course set the stage for the Kissinger visit and President Nixon's trip in February 1972. In the Shanghai Communiqué, the two nations agreed 'to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.' Roughly four years after these dramatic events, it is a good time to take stock of the trade aspect of the Sino-American relationship. For it has followed a course few, if any, would have predicted in 1971."

CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE WEST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ed. by Arthur A. Stahnke. New York, Praeger, 1972. 234 p.

"Papers from a symposium of the Association for Asian Studies which suggest three main things about China's foreign trade: it is shaped more by economic than by political considerations; it is not highly important to the Chinese economy; and it can be manipulated to advantage only by the Chinese government."

CHINESE TRADE SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by Colina MacDougall, in *The World Today*, v. 28, no. 1 (January 1972) 23-29.



"Even in normal times foreign trade forms only a very small part of China's total economic activity. China is a huge country which obviously has to develop her own production. Furthermore, during and since the Cultural Revolution the Chinese have continually stressed the importance of 'self-reliance'. This has been modified since 1969 when their own economy improved enough for them to contemplate expanding imports, and since then they have returned (although very selectively) to purchases of capital equipment such as they bought in the early and mid-1960s. China's trade, basically, is a matter of exporting minerals and agricultural and light industrial products and importing more sophisticated manufactured goods and the raw materials she is short of. As her own industry has grown, requirements from abroad have become rather more specialized. Since her financial resources are limited by what she can sell, her hard currency is deployed very carefully over the items that will fill gaps she cannot easily bridge herself. Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, trade with Eastern Europe has fallen away (though 1971 saw some new contacts) and about 80 per cent of her total trade is now with non-Communist nations."

DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA [WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY]. Washington, Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business Administration, 1974. 32 p. (OBR 74-49.)

ISSUES IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, CURRENT INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT, TRADE WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Washington, Department of State, Office of Media Services, 1974. 4 p. (Publication 8666.)

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CHINA: IMPACT OF THE NIXON VISIT, by Alexander K. Young, in *The World Today*, v. 28, no. 8 (August 1972) 342-350.

"Japan's revised economic policy reflects her fundamental reassessment of relations with Washington after the shock of the Sino-American rapprochement . . . While he did not intend it, President Nixon's visit to Peking earlier this year had the effect of increasing Japan's trade with China. A comparison of the pattern of this trade before and after the visit reveals what the mass media in Tokyo termed 'a China trade avalanche'. Other factors have contributed to the boom, but the President's new China policy, which drastically changed the international politics of Asia and gave the Japanese a strong impression that the full resumption of trade between the US and China was imminent, has been the most important single factor."

TRADE: RESPONDING TO THE CALL

FROM PEKING, by Leo Goodstadt, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 2 (9 January 1976) 36-38.

"China's new trade drive is beginning to take shape. Exports will be a vital spin-off from the campaign to mechanise and modernise agriculture by 1980—principally through a network of rural manufacturing industry. The programme was announced last October as a key priority in the nation's development plans for the next five years. Now the provinces, which must carry out the agricultural revolution as well as produce the machinery and the increased exports are beginning to respond."

## F. Science and Technology

### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

CHINA'S QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGY, by William W. Whitson, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 22, no. 4 (July-August 1973) 16-30.

"Although foreign trade is only a small component of the Gross National Product of the People's Republic of China (China's exports are only about two percent of GNP), the importance of its role in national economic development has compelled the Chinese leaders to give special attention to that sector. Historically, China's choice of trading partners, as well as the makeup of her overseas trade, has frequently been governed as much by political factors, both internal and international, as by economic factors. Therefore, in the current context of burgeoning 'East-West' trade, it becomes pertinent to examine what those political and economic factors are and how they are likely to influence China's trade policies vis-a-vis non-Communist countries, especially with respect to the import of advanced industrial technology, which is of crucial importance to China's development. What considerations will constrain or encourage Chinese importation of foreign technology in the rest of the 1970's? And what influences are likely to condition Chinese choices among different types or levels of technology and among available non-Communist sources of supply?"

CHINA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY GROW APACE, in *Peking Review*, no. 8 (20 February 1976) 6-7.

"Spurred on by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, science and technology have made rapid progress in China. Following the orientation pointed out by Chairman Mao, the worker-peasant-soldier masses and scientific and technical personnel have achieved one new success after another thanks to persistent efforts to make scientific research serve proletarian politics and the workers, peasants and soldiers, combine it with

productive labour and carry out scientific research activities in an open-door way."

THE OPEN-ACCESS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN CHINA, by C. K. Jen, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 14, no. 3 (1975) 48-53.

The author states: "I visited China for forty-six days in the months of July and August 1974, almost exactly two years after my first visit in 1972. The interval between my two visits coincided very closely with the growth of the Criticize-Lin and Criticize-Confucius Movement, which reached a red-hot level at the time of my recent visit. In my own view, the present movement is the second wave of the Cultural Revolution as a succession of the first wave which was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In both waves, the role of education revolution has played and is playing a very prominent part in the whole movement. The educational revolution has in turn produced very visible effects on China's science and technology."

OPEN-DOOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH—ACHIEVEMENTS OF A SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, in *Peking Review*, no. 8 (20 February 1976) 4-5.

"Since the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, the workers, cadres and researchers of the Institute of Genetics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences have under the leadership of the Party taken class struggle as the key link, continually criticized the revisionist line in scientific research and persisted in the principle that scientific research should serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, peasants and soldiers and be integrated with productive labour. By carrying out open-door scientific research, they have completed a series of research projects, some of which are up to advanced world standards. This institute specializes in the study of the laws governing heredity and variation of living things and their application. Its research projects are closely linked with industrial and agricultural production, national defence construction and medicine. But, prior to the Great Cultural Revolution, owing to the influence of Liu Shaochi's revisionist line, its scientific research was divorced from proletarian politics, from production and from the workers and peasants. And only a few of their research items contributed to socialist construction."

SCIENCE AND THE OPEN-DOORS EDUCATIONAL MOVEMENT, by C. K. Jen, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 64 (December 1975) 741-747.

"I visited China for 46 days in the months of July and August 1974, almost exactly two years after my first visit in 1972. The interval between my

two visits coincided very closely with the growth of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, which reached an intense level at the time of my most recent visit. In my own view, the campaign was the second wave of the Cultural Revolution in succession to the first wave formed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In both, the educational movement or revolution has played and is playing a very prominent role and has in turn produced very visible effects on China's science and technology."

## 2. Aerospace Programs

CHINA REVIEWS AEROSPACE REQUIREMENTS, in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, v. 102, no. 22 (2 June 1975) 279 Plus.

"People's Republic of China is not expected to expand its imports of aerospace hardware appreciably over the next two years pending completion of the country's air transport system as part of a five-year plan. Over the past few years, following its break with the Soviet Union, China has committed large sums of foreign reserves to its import of capital equipment for the west."

CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM, in *Newsweek*, v. 87, no. 9 (1 March 1976) 65.

"China became the fifth nation into space—behind the Soviet Union, the U.S., France and Japan—on April 24, 1970, when it launched a 381-pound satellite that broadcast the song 'The East Is Red.' Eleven months later, a second satellite, about 100 pounds heavier, testified to the increasing power of Chinese launchers. But the real surge has come in recent months, with a series of satellites designed to monitor sensitive areas of the Soviet Union, including the Russian border with Mongolia, which has a heavy buildup of troops, as well as parts of central Russia and the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya, where a number of nuclear-test sites are located."

## G. Life in Communist China Today

### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE ASIANS; THEIR HERITAGE AND THEIR DESTINY, by Paul Thomas Welty. 3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970. 350 p.

The book attempts to give "some understanding of the social and economic environment in which most Asians live and of the various systems of thought which influence their approach to presentday problems, just as the thinking of people in a Western culture is influenced by their environment and traditions . . . 'The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis on this . . . task, while also giving the main outlines of geography, history, politics and government, for the main areas of Asia from



Pakistan round to Japan [and also including, among many others, both Chinas]."

CHINA NOW; AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY WITH READINGS, ed. by D. J. Dwyer. London, Longman, 1974. 510 p.

"Reviews the basic aspects of modern China . . . It covers the geographical, historical, socio-economic and political characteristics . . . Emphasis has been placed upon the . . . background to the Communist period and upon Communist policies and the dimensions of progress in development since 1949."

A CHINA PASSAGE, by John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973. 138 p.

" . . . Gives . . . account of his visit to China in September 1972 which was arranged by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Federation of American Scientists. He (along with Wassily Leontief, also from Harvard and James Tobin of Yale) was able to get 'a privileged view of the Chinese economic system.' While the author's impressions of Chinese life and work in Canton, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchow are incisive and often witty, they are essentially a journalistic account. The most penetrating portion of the book was written later, in Paris, and attempts to answer six questions dealing with the operation of the Chinese economic system: (1) What makes people work, which often employment being unavailable or toil unpopular, they don't? (2) What things, in consequence, do they produce? (3) With what organization? (4) In response to what guidance or in accordance with what plan? (5) For whose benefit? (6) With how successful a result? . . . In making the inevitable comparisons between the standard of living in China, as opposed to Russia, Eastern Europe, or the West Galbraith stresses that the Chinese economy sustains a far lower standard of living. But along with this lower standard goes a seemingly more effortless—and more egalitarian—economy. Galbraith concludes, 'The Chinese economy isn't the American or European future. But it is the Chinese future, and let there be no doubt; for the Chinese it works'."

CHINESE NATIONAL CULTURE, by Clyde B. Sargent, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 23, no. 9 (May 1971) 41-51.

"One's comprehension of the Chinese People's Republic can be strengthened by an understanding of four fundamental perceptions—Chinese perception of superiority, concepts of authority and obedience, the nature and power of people, and concepts of time. Of these the Westerner, especially Americans, will find the Chinese concept of time the most alien. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, 'In one hundred years, it will be even more difficult to

ignore China. No, we are not in any hurry. Time is our good ally'."

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CHINA, by Margaret Jones, in *Atlas*, v. 22, no. 9 (September 1975) 19-22.

This article deals with "law and order minus judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers."

DAILY LIFE IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA, by Maria Antoxielta Macciochi. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972. 506 p.

"An account of Chinese life as experienced by the author during her recent trip to China. As the first leader of a Western communist party to visit China and write a detailed study of the Cultural Revolution, she was accorded special opportunities by her hosts to travel widely, conduct many interviews, and collect a great volume of materials, observations and impressions."

800,000,000: THE REAL CHINA, by Ross Terrill. Boston, Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1972. 235 p.

"Terrill, an Australian journalist and Harvard scholar, distills his 1971 travel notes into a . . . picture of the flavor of life in the China of the table-tennis era. His reflections on the shaping of Chinese diplomacy and on the tensions in Chinese intellectual life are particularly insightful and instructive."

EVERYDAY LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA; UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Robert C. Byrd, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v. 41, no. 24 (1 October 1975) 738-745.

"A delegation of three Senators (Mr. Pearson of Kansas, Mr. Nunn of Georgia, and myself) and three Members of the House of Representatives (Mr. Anderson and Mr. Derwinski of Illinois, and Mr. Slack of West Virginia) and their wives left the United States for China at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs—an arm of the People's Republic of China—PRC—Government . . . The travel itinerary inside China was arranged solely by the PRC, but we saw a representative sample of rural and urban life and China geography. Of course, as could be expected, our conversations, in a limited 10-day visit, were confined only to discussions with dedicated followers of Maoist political theory—persons thoroughly committed to, and schooled in, Chairman Mao's ideological teachings . . . [The] impressive sights—both natural and man made—were not so interesting to me as a look at everyday life in Communist China."

SOCIALISM IN CHINA, by Wassily Leontief, in *Atlantic*, (March 1973) 75-81.

[The author is in the Economics Department at Harvard and is former president of the American Economic Association.] "On a recent trip to China, Prof. Leontief observed that, despite a lack of modern conveniences, no one is idle and the Chinese appear to be enjoying a 'decent, purposeful, and organized life, an equitable distribution of income and, for the time being at least, social harmony and peace.' Eighty percent of China's people live and work on huge agricultural communes, using hand-made wooden tools and occasionally a motor-driven water pump; electricity in rural regions appears to be the exception rather than the rule . . . The communes' purpose is to insure the best possible working conditions for several thousand families in a particular location. Equality and public well-being are primary factors in the Chinese way of life. The average per capita income is \$150-170 per year . . . Military conscription makes a large number of young men and women available to serve not only the needs of national defense but many other kinds of public needs. The three basic staples—rice and grain, cooking oil, and cotton cloth—are rationed. Each person receives 1-1½ pounds of rice per day and the cloth ration is the equivalent of two jackets, shirts or blouses, and two pairs of pants per year. China has a universal six-day work week, and all professional/managerial personnel in various institutions spend a part of every year doing manual labor in a factory or on a farm. The optional retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women; support of retired members is guaranteed by the communes when the members have no children to accept the responsibility. Schools are free and other public services carry minimal costs; for example, ten cents for a doctor's visit, fifty cents a day for a hospital stay . . . Leontief attributes the success of the Chinese system and the willing cooperation of the workers to the fact that the Chinese planners have not promised more than they have been able to deliver in meeting the basic needs of the entire population. However, he speculates, there may come a time when freedom of word and thought in China, presently nonexistent, will become more important than basic material needs to human progress and social advance. How Chinese planners will handle this possibility remains to be seen."

## 2. *The Myths and the Realities as Seen by Visitors*

CHINA: CASTING OFF THE MYTHS, by Norman E. Isaacs, in *Columbia Journalism Review*, (January/February 1973) 51-57.

"When Mr. Isaacs went to China last fall as part of a delegation of members from the American Society of Newspaper Editors, he noted significant differences between the Western and Chinese patterns of news coverage. For example, most of

China's news is reported on the basis of being 'useful' in keeping the government informed about such matters as a natural disaster, new industrial developments, or the success of farm communes in meeting their quotas. Chinese newspaper editors are members of China's Communist Party, serve on various central committees and know the party line. If they stray from that line they are sent to farm labor 'school' to restudy their positions while doing manual labor and learning to 'understand the masses.' The Chinese admit that the main task of their provincial newspapers is to do propaganda work among the people and to report the provincial situation. Much of the papers' contents consist of letters from citizens containing reports or complaints on particular situations, which are often investigated, and, in turn, reported to the appropriate government agency. In general, the function of China's newspapers is to learn what the masses want in the way of service from the Cultural Revolution, and to teach them of new developments; the combination is designed to accomplish Mao's goals of achieving stability and security for the average Chinese worker and of helping China to achieve modernization by its own efforts. Because of the secrecy which has surrounded Chinese events during past years, Isaacs believes that Western newsmen do not understand the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese way of life which has resulted from it, or China's press coverage of itself. Western correspondents in China feel hampered by the lack of reportable news. There are no government press conferences and few official statements; the correspondents are restricted to the Peking area and have no social contact with the Chinese except for press department officials, and this is usually at official functions. For the present, their sources of information are books and the conversation of the man in the street and foreign diplomats at official ceremonies. The privileged few American correspondents who have thus far visited China realize that they have been invited only because the Chinese Government is running a propaganda drive to gain support and sympathy for its maneuvers against the Soviet Union, and to sway US 'opinion-makers' to support China's efforts to regain sovereignty over Taiwan . . ."

CHINA DIARY, by Charlotte Y. Salisbury. New York, Walker and Company, 1973. 210 p.

"... Records her trip through China, largely avoiding political problems and concentrating on daily-living details. Some of her more instructive observations concern the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese educational system, and commune life . . ."

CHINA REVISITED: POLITE SMILES, A HOSTILE UNDERCURRENT, in *U.S. News &*



*World Report*, v. 79, no. 24 (15 December 1975) 18-20.

"Marvin L. Stone, Executive Editor of U.S. News & World Report, flew into Peking aboard President Ford's plane as a 'pool correspondent' representing news writers assigned to cover the President's mission. In the days following, Mr. Stone was able to break away from the official proceedings to become better acquainted with people in a country he had just visited during wartime duty as a naval officer in World War II. Mr. Stone cabled . . . [his] personal report from China on the eve of his departure."

CHINA THROUGH ROSE-TINTED GLASS, by Stanley Karnow, in *Atlantic* (October 1973) 73-76.

"... Offers an alternative perspective to the vast quantity of material Americans have been broadcasting from the People's Republic of China—a guide to use in judging future analyses of China. Since the 'rediscovery' of China by American news reporters in the 1970s, the US has seen a barrage of generally indiscriminating, idolizing news stories about China. Karnow, in an effort to alert the American public to the unstable tenor of the press stories, chronicles factors that seem to preclude unbiased reporting about China; even the Chinese chide the Americans for their uncritical eyes. The danger of the present vein of reporting is that such an unbalanced view can often be reversed, as it was during the Korean war, and America will again swing from idolizing to villifying..."

FOREIGNERS LEARN THE HARD WAY, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 93, no. 29 (16 July 1976) 22-23.

"David George is a Cambridge-trained expert on German literature (and author of a book on German tragedy) who has taught at Berkeley, California, and at the University of Kuala Lumpur. He and his wife, who are in their 30s, went to China in 1975 so that he could teach English as an employee of the Chinese Government. George was employed in a specialised institute in Peking, while his wife kept house in a small apartment at the Friendship Hotel, looking after their two young daughters. In March this year, George went on strike as a result of what he saw as unfair treatment and breach of his contract terms by the Chinese authorities, and in April he was permitted to leave the country. His experience is characteristic of that of a growing number of youngish, left-leaning Western intellectuals, who have tended to see China as the last stronghold of genuine Marxism. Many of them have been disillusioned by their contacts with the bureaucrats who are their main window on Chinese society, and with the rigorous ban on per-

son-to-person contact with the mass of Chinese peasants, workers and intellectuals."

THE IDEA OF CHINA: MYTH AND THEORY IN GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT, by Andrew L. March. New York, Praeger, 1974. 167 p.

"The author, professor of geography at the University of Denver, argues that the stock image of China in the European mind owes more to the Western need for a contrasting backdrop to define the European identity than to Chinese reality. His book is an . . . exercise in intellectual history and intellectual polemics."

MORE THOUGHTS OUT OF CHINA: THERE ARE WARTS THERE, by A. Doak Barnett, in *The New York Times Magazine*, (April 8, 1973) 36-37.

"... Americans have alternately viewed China as an aggressive colossus about to overrun Asia, a crippled giant facing internal chaos, and, presently, an admirable 'new China' attaining model status at home and superpower status abroad. Although the current image of China corrects past distortions, Barnett questions it as a sound basis for future realistic relations between the US and China. Barnett returned from his recent visit to China with a strong impression that China today is a country in transition, experimenting and adjusting in an interim between two great events, rebuilding its leadership and institutions in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and anticipating the post-Mao succession. The political mood differs on each social level; at the higher levels it is tentative and uncertain about the regime's structures and the men who will run them; at the lower levels it is normal, with Chinese workers busy and purposeful but orderly and subdued. Barnett was also impressed by China's continuity with its past. Although most slogans reflect the Cultural Revolution, a gap between rhetoric and policy is noticeable as the people now denounce both 'rightism' and 'ultraleftism.' Mao is still China's ideological sage, but there is evidence among working-level cadres that his cult has been muted; the people's prevailing mood is one of political relaxation, and though Mao's slogans are still popular there are few new ones and the oldest are disappearing . . . Barnett believes China is a developing nation economically and is progressing at a relatively moderate rate due to its problems. China's industrial progress has been the greatest and most visible, but there are fewer signs of dramatic industrialization than might be expected. Old buildings have purposely been allowed to deteriorate since emphasis is on new construction. Air pollution has become a problem, and use of modern transport vehicles has been reduced, as has use of heat and light in the interest of economy. Yet,

despite the economic austerity, one's main impression is not of tension or poverty but of general relation. Although salaries are low, so are the prices of basic necessities. The communes and elimination of extreme income differentials have reduced rural poverty, but whether they have also reduced incentive is difficult to judge. Changes in the area of education have brought the regime some of its greatest successes but some of its greatest failures, also. Expansion of basic education is rapidly raising the society's general level of knowledge and skills in a way that will support national development in the future . . . Concludes that China is now a 'proud nation pulling itself up by its own bootstraps, determined to solve its own problems its own way and moving toward a major role in world affairs, but it is also a country wrestling with great difficulties and facing many uncertainties.' The US should recognize not only China's progress but also its problems and realistically consider both in its efforts to restore ties between the two countries."

(LI)—THE US IMAGE OF THE PRC—IS IT ACCURATE?, by Maj. Warren H. Dunnington. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 64 p. (Research Study.)

"An adversary relationship had existed between the United States and the People's Republic of China since 1950. In 1971, this state of affairs started to turn. Along with a changed relationship the perspective of China was transformed from one in which the PRC was characterized as the yellow hordes to a country struggling for its rightful place in world affairs. The new view of China was the result of articles and books written by recent US visitors. The major conclusion of the study is that Peking controlled the entry of US citizens to insure that a favorable view of China would be reported to America."

### 3. Sociological Aspects

#### a. Miscellaneous Aspects (Including Law and Order)

CHINESE SOCIETY IN TRANSITION, by Chu-yuan Cheng, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 115-119 plus.

"In the future, Chinese society may be shaped more by a combination of nationalistic priorities and pragmatic goals than by the utopian ideals that Mao prescribed for China." Social Campaigns; Spiritual Transformation; Living and Working Conditions; etc.

INEQUALITY AND STRATIFICATION IN CHINA, by Martin King Whyte, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 64 (December 1975) 684-711.

"Vague and often somewhat contradictory impressions of equality and inequality in China abound. Some recent visitors to China have reported

that income differentials there have been reduced to nominal levels. At the same time the recurring themes of the class struggle and the dangers of revisionism alert us to the continuing conflict within China over the inequalities that still exist. In this paper I try to draw together the scattered pieces of information already available in order to examine, first, the kinds of inequalities that do continue to exist in China, and then the policies designed to affect the transmission of these inequalities over time and from generation to generation, or, in other words, stratification. Although the available information is not precise enough to permit any systematic comparisons with other countries, I hope to be able to arrive at some rough impressions of the extent to which the Chinese elite has been successful in producing a society with more equality and less stratification than is generally the case elsewhere."

LAW AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA, 2400 B.C. TO 1960 A.D., by Philip M. Chen. New York, Dunellen, 1974. 234 p.

"A professor at Tamkang College, Taiwan, interrelates the Chinese legal tradition, law in Confucian ideology, and the development and nature of Chinese socialist law and legal institutions in Chinese Maoist society. The central focus of his study is the degree to which contemporary mainland attitudes toward law are influenced by Chinese tradition and by the specific ideological outlook of the communist regime."

THE POLITICS OF HSIA-HSIANG YOUTH, by D. Gordon White, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 59 (July/September 1974) 491-517.

"This paper sets out to examine various aspects of the contemporary Chinese social system and their political implications by studying the social and political attitudes of a subgroup of Chinese society. The general area of interest is social stratification in China."

#### b. The Chinese Family

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FAMILY, by J. Bruce Jacobs, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 10 (October 1975) 882-891.

"The continuities with the pre-Communist past are more significant than the changes and that most of the changes had already begun to occur under the Nationalists before 1949 and are occurring in Taiwan today. In order to test this proposition, we examined four important aspects of the Chinese family—the lineage, family form, marriage, and ancestral worship."

SOCIALISM AND THE CHINESE PEASANT FAMILY, by Willaim L. Parish, Jr., in *Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 34, no. 3 (May 1975) 613-630.



"Though there have been in China since 1949 occasional deviations in the policy regarding family life, some ideals enunciated at the start of the revolutionary regime have remained constant. The dominant policy has been that the family should be retained and its strengths used. However, family commitments should not interfere with commitments to the state or the collective, and within the family feudal customs should be eliminated . . . In practice, reality has lagged behind the new ideal."

c. *The Role of Women in Chinese Society*

THE EMANCIPATION OF CHINESE WOMEN, by Shelah Gilbert Leader, in *World Politics*, v. 26, no. 1 (October 1973) 55-79.

"The emancipation of women is an important policy problem in China. The Communist Party seeks to free women by altering marriage customs, drawing women into the labor force, providing women with a new role and image, and by offering them a political role. Policy on women tends to be emphasized during mass mobilization campaigns; it is downgraded during periods of conservative economic planning. The goal of freeing women is subordinate to the priorities of economic growth and political development: women's progress has been sacrificed for these priorities. Liu Shaochi was criticized by Maoists during the Cultural Revolution for his conservative policies on women. But, after twenty years of nearly continuous effort, Mao admits that women have just begun to be liberated."

FROM CONFUCIAN OBEDIENCE TO PROPPING UP HALF THE SKY, by Ruth Weiss, in *Eastern Horizon*, v. 14, no. 2 (1975) 25-34.

"It would be a rewarding task to devote a whole monograph to a study of the background and history of all the deputies of the newly elected Fourth National People's Congress—of men and women alike, 72 percent of whom come from the labouring people and thus show that the working class truly leads in the new China. But to me as a woman who has spent the greater part of her life here and feels deeply rooted, it is even more gratifying to analyze the woman question in regard to membership in the new NPC, as well as in regard to the mass of women all over the country whom these 22 per cent of a total number of 2,885 deputies represent, then to cast a quick glance over the various spheres of China's endeavour where women today take their places with confidence and poise, and thence to think back on my early days in China in the old society, with a flashback to the role of women in China's history."

SEX BEHIND THE BAMBOO CURTAIN, by

Ann Landers, in *The Saturday Evening Post*, v. 247, no. 6 (September 1975) 33-34 plus.

"In the People's Republic of China women wear no cosmetics, no perfume, no jewelry, no lace underwear, chiffon nightgowns, tight-fitting sweaters, sheer blouses, or short skirts. These are considered 'fancy articles designed to entice males.' But the girls manage, just the same." This report is based on a trip to China by the author "to learn first-hand about sex—premarital, marital and extramarital."

WOMEN IN CHINESE SOCIETY, ed. by Margery Wolf and Roxane Witke. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1975. 315 p.

"Ten authors attempt to evaluate the . . . changes in the status of Chinese women over the last few decades, particularly in comparison with woman's place in pre-modern China and the Republic of China."

WOMEN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE OF CHINA, by Delia Davin, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 94-96 plus.

"Women have not won equality of opportunity in the affairs of rural society [in China]. But inasmuch as they can rise in it, at least they have more opportunity, and can continue the struggle."

d. *Education and Educational Reforms*

(LI)—A CONFLICT BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND EXPERTISE: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Gerald J. Roth. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1973. 105 p. (Professional Study.)

"Among the most important critical resources of the People's Republic of China are the highly trained scientists and engineers who lead China's research and development programs. Equally important is the educational system that develops these scientists and engineers. Scientific and technical education in the People's Republic of China has traveled a strange and erratic course. There has been, and seemingly continues to be, an almost constant state of conflict between political ideology and technical expertise in their educational system. The various stages of these 'red versus expert' conflicts, and their effects on China's past, present and future scientific and technical developments are discussed."

EDUCATIONAL REFORMS AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE CHINESE EVALUATION PROCESS, by Robert S. Wang, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 9 (September 1975) 758-774.

"The purpose of this paper is not to settle the

controversy regarding the success of the reforms per se since that would require deciding which were the 'correct' standards to apply in the evaluations. What I simply propose to do here is to examine the structure and method used by the Chinese to evaluate their own reforms. 'Evaluation' is used here to include the selection of standards as well as data gathering and analysis. Who were the evaluators? What standards and indicators did they use? How were the data gathered? How were they analyzed?"

**EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA [WITH BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE]**, by Robert D. Barendson. Washington, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, 1973. 52 p. (DHEW Publication OE-73-19102.)

**THE MAOIST EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION**, by Theodore Hsi-En Chen. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974. 295 p.

"Mao himself has said that the success of the Communist revolution depends upon the millions of dedicated Chinese, young and old; thus education is a major concern of the Communist state. Chen outlines in great detail the history and conduct of schools and colleges. He offers an overview of Chinese education and a . . . summary of the educational system."

**NOTES ON CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION: 1974**, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 62 (June 1975) 271-296.

"I travelled in China in February 1974 as a member of an academic group from the Pennsylvania State University . . . My report is divided into three parts: (1) I shall reproduce in summary form and without comment the information received in the course of briefing sessions, tours of the facilities, question-answer periods and interest group seminars . . . (2) I shall speculate on some of the socio-economic forces which, in my estimation, contribute to the present re-appraisal of China's educational philosophy and policy, and (3) give my reactions to what I saw, heard and experienced during many hours of meetings and tours."

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA'S UNIVERSITY RECRUITMENT SYSTEM**, by Alexander Casella, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 62 (June 1975) 297-301.

"During the Cultural Revolution, many of the attacks directed against the university system which prevailed till the spring of 1966 were aimed at the methods by which students were recruited. According to evidence gathered by western scholars and expounded by Chinese educational authorities, China's educational system was contributing to social stratification and was essentially elitist . . . The reconstruction of the university educational

system, which began in 1969, gave a practical content to the theoretical requirements which were to govern the creation of a 'socialist university'."

**REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION—ATTEND UNIVERSITIES, MANAGE AND TRANSFORM THEM**, by Kao Feing-lien, in *Peking Review*, no. 2 (9 January 1976) 13-16 plus.

"This is the second of three articles on the revolution in education at Shanghai's Tungchi University. The first article entitled 'An Example of Open-Door Education' appeared in . . . [the] last issue . . . The workers and other labouring people of China not only have priority in receiving an education, the leadership in education also must be put into the hands of the proletariat to make it fit in with the development of the socialist economic base and turn education into an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Commissioned by their own classes, the worker-peasant-soldier students attend the universities and help run and transform them by using Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought."

**TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA'S RURAL AREAS**, in *Peking Review*, no. 25 (18 June 1976) 11-13.

"The revolution in education has expedited the development of socialist educational undertakings in China's rural areas. Universal five-year primary school education has in the main been introduced all over the countryside, while a seven-year educational system (including junior middle school) has been effected in many areas and a nine-year system (including senior middle school) in some localities."

**VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE RECIPIENTS OF HIGHER ACADEMIC DEGREES IN THE U.S.S.R., 1962-1972**, by Zvi Halevy, in *Southeast Asia*, v. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1973) 339-346.

"The aim of the research on which this article is based was to establish how many Vietnamese and Chinese received higher academic degrees in the Soviet Union during a specified period. Besides its intrinsic interest, this information might be useful for two reasons: (1) it is important to see how aid of a more developed power to less developed countries can be influenced by politics, and (2) the extent of the aid furnished by a power to another, especially in an area such as advanced degrees may possibly tell us much about the potentialities and character of the development of the recipient power in the future."

*e. Population: Growth and Control*

*(1) Miscellaneous Aspects*

**CHINA'S POPULATION: GROWTH AND**



CONTROL, by Laurence J. C. Ma, in *Focus*, v. 26, no. 4 (March-April 1976) 9-14.

How It Grew; Marx versus Malthus; Official Policies; Mass Participation and Persistent Persuasion; Uncertain Results. (All concerned with the People's Republic of China).

CHINA'S POPULATION STRUGGLE: DEMOGRAPHIC DECISIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, 1949-1969, by H. Yuan Tien. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1973, 405 p.

"India and China both face massive problems of overpopulation. The first made little progress; the second, much. The difference . . . appears due to the political muscle behind the respective efforts."

PLANNED POPULATION GROWTH IN CHINA, by Kuan-I Chen, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 397 (September 1974) 120-124 plus.

"In the past three years, a number of specialists in the areas of obstetrics, medical chemistry, political science in the demographic field, family planning, and child care visited China to observe general health and family planning programs. Their first-hand reports provide new information."

THE POPULATION OF COMMUNIST CHINA, in POPULATION, by William Petersen. 3rd ed. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975. pp. 713-734.

Periods of Political-Economic Power (Establishment of Power 1949-52; First Five Year Plan 1953-57; The Great Leap Forward 1958-60; The Great Retreat 1961-65; Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-69; The Second Great Retreat 1970-?); Mortality; Fertility and Family Policy; Internal Migration and Urban Growth; etc.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT FERTILITY CONTROL IN CHINA, by Carl Djerassi, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 57 (January/March 1974) 40-62.

"Little is known about current contraceptive practice, family planning, and population growth in the People's Republic of China. Since so little is published by the Chinese themselves—virtually nothing since the mid 1960s—nearly all western literature on these topics comes from professional 'China-watchers' (primarily social scientists) and from occasional first hand reports of travellers."

#### (2) Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia

CHINA AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE: A STUDY OF PEKING'S CHANGING POLICY, 1949-1970, by Stephen Fitzgerald. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972. 268 p.

"In this . . . study of a complicated legal, social and political problem, the author finds evi-

dence that a cautious realism balances nationalism and revolutionary imperatives in at least this sphere of Chinese foreign policy."

THE INVISIBLE CHINA: THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Garth Alexander. New York, Macmillan, 1974. 264 p.

"This work is 'designed to show how our well-intentioned crusade for world democracy was deliberately turned, without our knowledge, into a racial battle against China, and to show how the overseas Chinese were made to play the central role in this disastrous deception.' He argues that the perennial threat of Chinese migration has throughout history taken the form of 'peaceful penetration' rather than belligerent expansion, and that the Chinese have been used as 'scapegoats for failed government policies and national disasters.' He uses as points of reference the Malayan emergency, the French Vietnam war, the Korean war, the American Vietnam war and the Taiwan question."

MINORITY GROUPS IN THAILAND, by Joann L. Schrock and others. Washington, Department of the Army, February 1970. 1135 p. (DA PAM No. 550-107, Ethnographic Study Series.)

"This book was prepared to provide military and other personnel with a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, and political practices of minority groups in Thailand. There are 18 chapters, covering 19 minority groups. Each chapter is a self-contained unit consisting of a descriptive report of a given group, suggestions for personnel working with that group, and a bibliography. The descriptive reports are based on openly published material and include comments by consultants knowledgeable in the area. Although the report contains the latest information available, there are some gaps and some of the material may be outdated." Contents: The Kui, The Vietnamese, The Chinese, the Khmer, The Lisu, The Lahu, The Lu, The Khmu, The Sham, The Meo, The Yao, The Haw, The Karen, The Kha, The Lawa, The Malays, The Mon, The Indians and Pakistanis. With 18 maps and 44 illustrations and short bibliography.

ONCE AGAIN THE FEAR, by Robert Norton, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 72, no. 2 (15 May 1971) 57-58.

"A student group in Phnom Penh has warned that unless Chinese characters are banned from public view, it will take matters into its own hands. For the Chinese in Cambodia, times may be changing. . . . The Chinese population's problem in Cambodia is classically Southeast Asian—holding economic power under native political control. And like other nations in the region, the problem is not

recent. Chinese have been migrating the area for more than a century, and are mostly Tiechieu, Cantonese or Hokkienese; they were helped by the French policy of double colonisation—introducing Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants into the economically sluggish areas of Indochina to revitalise and exploit local labour and assets . . . The Cambodian feeling toward the local Chinese is ambiguous. On one hand the Khmer admires the economic expertise, aggressiveness and prosperity of the local Chinese . . . On the other hand, situations in which the Khmer may feel exploited in his own country by a foreigner, can be explosive. This is a rather common occurrence through the Chinese proclivity for such professions as banking, moneylending and speculation, and as entrepreneurs, contractors, retail merchants, wholesale dealers and transporters."

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Niu Sien-chong, in *NATO'S Fifteen Nations*, v. 16, no. 4 (August-September 1971) 52-56.

"The Overseas Chinese (hua-chiao) in South-east Asia have a long historical background. Long before the discovery of America there were Chinese settlements in the Nanyang—the Chinese name for South-east Asia, means 'South Ocean.' In fact, no one really knows how long those Chinese communities existed in the area . . . The far from even distribution of the Overseas Chinese throughout South-east Asia is not surprising, because the migration was not planned but developed in response to opportunities. Today the main areas of concentration are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. These people came from South-east China, mainly from the Kwantung, Fukien, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi Provinces." Number and Influence; Culture and Organization; Red China's Strategy; Nationalists' Contribution; Singapore's Experiment; Future and Hope.

PEKING, KUALA LUMPUR AND THE CHINESE MINORITY IN MALAYSIA, by Goh Cheng Teik, in *South-East Asian Spectrum*, v. 2, no. 1 (January 1974) 36-44.

"China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-Ping reiterated at a National Day reception on 29 September the official line that the People's Republic welcomes moves by Overseas Chinese to adopt the citizenship of their host country. Roughly one-fifth of the estimated 15 million Overseas Chinese live in Malaysia and, with the prospective establishment of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations, Peking's attitude in practice to this sizeable minority will be carefully scrutinized by all South-East Asian countries."

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE

CHINESE COMMUNITY IN CAMBODIA, by W. E. Willmott. New York, Humanities Press, 1970. 211 p. (London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 42.)

"A field study of organized Chinese life in Cambodia, past and present . . . It relates its conclusions on the evolution of the structure of the Cambodian Chinese community to the evidence from other overseas Chinese communities, and moves on to a comparison between overseas Chinese social organizations and the organization of cities in China." With: a list of works cited.

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S CHINESE MINORITIES, by Mary F. Somers Heidhues. New York, Longman, 1975. 125 p.

"A . . . survey, filled with facts and figures . . . [on] the causes of anti-Sinicism, whether economic, political, or psychological."

THE TREACHEROUS PLOT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TOWARDS THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS SEEN FROM THEIR COLLABORATION WITH MALAYSIA, by Chen Yin, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 1 (January 1975) 21-26.

"At present there are more than 21 million overseas Chinese scattering all over the world, of them about 96.41% live in Asia and account for a large percentage in the population of their residing countries. For example, Singapore has a population of only a little more than two million, the Chinese there, totaling more than one and a half million, account for about 75%. The 3,555,879 Chinese in Malaysia form 34.1% of the population of 10,439,530. This indicates that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are playing an important role, both politically and economically. The Chinese Communists, therefore, have naturally spared no effort in seeking the support of, and trying to exploit, the overseas Chinese in Asia."

THE WEALTH AND POWER OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE, by Louis Kraar, in *Fortune*, v. 83, no. 3 (March 1971) 78-81.

"Millions of expatriate Chinese knit a strong web of commerce through South-east Asia, from Burma to the Philippines. They dominate the economic life of villages, cities, and even nations in a part of the world where the native populations, because of cultural attitudes and historic colonial policies, often lack the experience and lust for profit that the Chinese bring to business. In many of the countries where they operate, the Chinese must deal with political instability and corruption, and racial hostility that sometimes erupts into violence. Some hostility also springs from the envy of less successful local residents because the Chinese, by their very enterprise, often preempt the available



business opportunities. But as a group they survive and prosper, and many international banks and corporations find the overseas Chinese to be invaluable as managers and allies. Many of the most prominent members of this international expatriate community, some of whom are pictured in the accompanying portfolio, are men who have been driven from one country to another by war or xenophobia, and who have had to start all over again a new setting. This ability to build a new fortune in still another strange land is a telling testimonial to their extraordinary determination, and to their acumen."

#### f. Religion

**BUDDHISM UNDER MAO**, by Holmes Welch. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972. 666 p.

"The third volume of a . . . trilogy, detailing one more version of the conflict between 'God and Caesar.' Religions try to capture and use the state; states try to capture and use religion. All the complex, . . . and important consequences of this struggle in the Chinese setting are touched on."

**A POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION LOOK AT BUDDHISM**, by John and Sarah Strong, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April/June 1973) 321-330.

"Since August 1966, apart from the scattered reports of a few visitors, the western world has seen nothing substantial of Buddhism in China. In this field, as in many others, the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution brought an almost total eclipse. But today Buddhism is beginning to re-emerge. There are two principal signs of this: in Peking, the Chinese Buddhist Association is starting to function again; and, throughout the country, a number of Buddhist monasteries are once more open to visitors. In addition, there are numerous minor indications."

**RELIGIOUS POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA**, by Donald E. MacInnis. New York, Macmillan, 1972. 392 p.

"This volume contains a representative selection of published materials pertaining to religious policy and practice in the People's Republic of China since 1949. Nearly all of the 116 documents and excerpts reproduced here first appeared in the Chinese press. Although the Chinese Communist Party has never reversed its officially stated policy of 'freedom of religious belief,' most of the selections illustrate the ideological intolerance of religion as the 'opiate of the people' and the instrument of reaction, superstition, feudal oppression and foreign imperialist aggression which led to the total suppression of religious practice throughout China by the Red Guards in 1966. This is a . . . documentary source . . .

of religion in the modern world, of communist orthodoxy and of modern totalitarianism."

#### 4. Medical Services

**ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE MEDICAL SERVICES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by Tech-wei Hu. Washington, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences, 1975. 41 p. (DHEW Publication 74-672.)

With list of references.

#### 5. Press and Publishing

**CONTROL OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHINA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS**, by Alan P. L. Liu, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 10 (October 1974) 936-951.

"This paper will discuss only the control of foreign news in China. Furthermore we shall focus on news about the United States, for the differences between public (mass) and private (elite) communication in China manifest themselves most strongly over the information about the U.S. We shall begin with a simple content analysis of all news reports about the U.S. printed in the People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao), the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party."

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE PUBLISHING**, by Eugene Wu, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January/March 1973) 134-138.

"Discusses the current state of publishing in the People's Republic of China and the acquisition of Chinese-language materials by American libraries, with special reference to the factors which are likely to influence the future flow of materials from China."

#### 6. Nationalities Policy (Including the Language Problem)

**CHINA'S QUEST FOR A SOCIALIST SOLUTION**, by June Teufel Dreyer, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 5 (September-October 1975) 49-62.

As a socialist state, and one where the issue of Marxist orthodoxy is accorded a high degree of importance, the People's Republic of China has been at pains to 'solve' its nationalities problem in an appropriately socialist manner. The concrete measures advocated by Chinese policymakers to achieve this goal have spanned the entire spectrum described above, and there has been considerable tension between proponents of differing views. The following article will outline the shifts that have taken place in the Chinese Communists' minorities policy over the past 25 years and attempt to assess the respective merits of the different approaches in achieving the

classless, non-nationalistic society envisioned by Marx."

LANGUAGE: A CHANGE OF POLICY, by Alan Sanders, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 93, no. 29 (16 July 1976) 20 plus.

"Another change in China's policy towards its minority peoples appears to have taken place with the news that renewed demands have been made for wider Romanisation—use of the Latin alphabet—in place of traditional scripts. This contrasts with last years' calls for the promotion of spoken and written minority languages, and is being linked with the purge of Teng Hsiao-ping and the anti-rightist campaign."

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LANGUAGE REFORM, by Constantin Milsky, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January/March 1973) 98-133.

"Since 1966, there have been no articles in the Chinese press about language reform and no specialist journals to provide an alternative forum for discussion. In 1972, however, the Party's leading political publication, *hung ch'i* (Red Flag), carried in its April issue a letter on what had come to be seen as an almost taboo subject, by no less a personality than Kuo Mo-jo. This letter and its manner of publication are both of great interest. Language reform is clearly on the agenda for discussion once again and the letter enables one to look both at its more recent history and at its future development. Such is the importance of the letter that I have translated it in full and discuss it section by section (the text being distinguished by bold type), adding a commentary to each section, rather in the manner in which commentaries were added to classical Chinese texts."

SOVIET CRITICISM OF CHINA'S NATIONAL MINORITIES POLICY, by Stephen Osofsky, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 10 (October 1974) 907-917.

"The charge of 'Great Han' chauvinism has become a staple in the Soviet critique of Maoism. Whereas the main thrust of this charge is directed at Chinese pretensions to territories adjoining China, such as Outer Mongolia, parts of Soviet Siberia, Central Asia, the Sino-Indian Himalayan borderlands and even the lands of South East Asia which may at one time have fallen within Imperial China's sphere of influence, there has been increasing emphasis placed since the cultural revolution on the internal manifestation of Great Han chauvinism. This is in good measure due to the Sino-Soviet border situation in the wake of the much publicized 1969 border conflict and to the opportunity to agitate among the overlapping nationality groups common to the Sino-Soviet border regions, especially in China's strategic border

province of Sinkiang, with its huge non-Chinese population and crucial role as China's nuclear center. Soviet interest and designs on mineral rich Sinkiang well antedate the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949."

#### 7. Forced Labor Camps

PRISONER OF MAO, by Bao Ruowang (Jean Pasqualini) and Rudolph Chelminski. New York, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973. 318 p.

"In the euphoria of detente the millions inhabiting Chinese forced labor camps tend to be ignored . . . Here is a . . . familiar autobiographical reminder."

#### 8. China's Earthquake, 1976, and the Aftermath

CHINA'S KILLER QUAKE, in *Newsweek*, v. 88, no. 6 (9 August 1976) 30-31.

A report of the giant earthquake in Communist China and the resulting devastation.

CHINESE EARTHQUAKE LATEST IN A CHAIN THAT RAISES WORLDWIDE CONCERN, in *US News & World Report*, v. 81, no. 6 (9 August 1976) 18 plus.

"Rarely has a quake caused such havoc—destruction and agony on a scale that 'boggles the mind'."

#### H. China's Ancient and Contemporary History

THE AGELESS CHINESE: A HISTORY, by Dun J. Li. 2nd ed. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. 549 p.

"The second edition of Professor Li's survey history brings the text more nearly up to date, with some discussion of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the changing nature of international communism." With suggested readings.

CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION, by Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye. Boston, Little, Brown, 1972. 384 p.

"Introduction to the history and politics of contemporary China."

CHINA TODAY, by Nigel Cameron. London, Collins, Publishers, 1974. 128 p.

"This is an . . . illustrated, short history of China since the Communist victory in 1949." With bibliography.

THE CHINESE MACHIAVELLI; 3,000 YEARS OF CHINESE STATECRAFT, by Dennis & Ching Ping Bloodworth. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. 346 p.

"This book . . . draws on nearly 3,000 years of Chinese history for the victories and defeats in politics and war which give the Chinese general and statesman his mental reflexes and provide the traditional rules that govern his tactics and



strategy. Its object is, therefore, to tell the Western reader, often puzzled by Chinese moves on the diplomatic or military chessboard, what legacy of principles guides the minds even of Communist Chinese leaders. Why do they befriend right-wing European politicians out of office, rather than left-wing leaders in power? Why entertain Nixon while American planes were bombing North Vietnam? Within the framework of a chronological history that concentrates on the 'power game' and treats the social and cultural scene as a backdrop to it, the authors draw from China's long story the lessons that the Chinese have drawn themselves. In doing so, they review the great struggles for supremacy within China of the past, as related in records and in fictionalized accounts, and also China's experiences of 'foreign relations'—whether with the equally Chinese state next door, in the centuries B.C., or with the Huns, the Mongols, the British, the Russians, or the Japanese."

**DRAGON BY THE TAIL: AMERICAN, BRITISH, JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ENCOUNTERS WITH CHINA AND ONE ANOTHER**, by John Paton Davies, Jr. New York, W. W. Norton, 1972. 448 p.

"Born in China during the last days of the empire, the author served as an American diplomat in the midst of the Chinese-Japanese conflict; acted as a political adviser to General Stilwell during World War II; dealt with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung; and from the American Embassy in Moscow observed the end of the war against Japan and the beginning of what he had foretold—the communist conquest of China and the emergence in the Far East of a balance of power unfavorable to the United States. Two major themes weave through his narrative. One is the collapse of traditional China and the fusion thereon of a new, Communist China. The second is the American intrusion into East Asia, at first to trade with, enlighten and baptize the Chinese, open Japan and liberate the Philippines, and assume the role of an imperial power."

**THE FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA**, by Frederic Wakeman, Jr. New York, The Free Press, 1975. 276 p.

"From the beginnings of the Manchu rise to power in the sixteenth century to the republican revolution in the twentieth—this is a social history of change in China. What caused the many peasant rebellions in dynastic China? What was the actual status of the merchant class? What was the bureaucratic and political role of the local gentry? How did peasants, merchants, and gentry interact with European and Japanese imperialism? And how did this process end in the downfall of the imperial state? *The Fall of Imperial China* provides a . . . view of the internal sources of conflict and change which-

preceded the foreign intrusion of the nineteenth century. Combining . . . analysis and historical detail the author examines the character and meaning of the major events of social change in pre-modern China: the fall of the Ming and the rise of the Ch'ing dynasties, the Western invasion, the opium trade and the Opium War, popular uprisings and the foreign wars, the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Movement, and the Revolution of 1911. An . . . account of the domestic social conditions which influenced China's response to the coming of the West."

**READINGS IN MODERN CHINESE HISTORY**, ed. by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu. New York, Oxford University Press, 1971. 701 p.

"A book of readings designed as the companion to the author's text, *The Rise of Modern China*. Following, in the main, the organizational scheme of the text, Professor Hsu provides a cross-section of leading scholarship on modern China. In addition to . . . signed articles, he includes relevant portions of significant documents bearing on China, such as the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement."

**REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS OF MODERN CHINA**, ed. by Chun-tu-Hsueh. New York, Oxford University Press, 1971. 580 p.

"In this series of twenty articles . . . China scholars appraise the highest leadership of the three revolutions of modern China: the Taiping Rebellion, the Republican Revolution, and the communist movement. The general purpose of the volume is to show how strategic elites committed to China's domestic modernization and enhanced international status have supplanted leadership groups wedded to traditional values and institutions."

**THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-41: FROM MARCO POLO BRIDGE TO PEARL HARBOR**, by Frank Dorn. New York, Macmillan, 1974. 477 p.

"Combining personal experience and military scholarship, this account of the Sino-Japanese war treats every campaign and all important engagements, including air and naval, from the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident and the seizure of Peking to the second battle of Changsha in the autumn of 1971 and Pearl Harbor. The author a graduate of West Point who retired from the U.S. Army in 1953 as a brigadier general, was stationed in China as a language officer and assistant military attache from 1934 to 1938, and then as a military observer of the war."

**THE YENAN WAY IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA**, by Mark Selden. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. 311 p.

"A . . . history of the Chinese communist base

deeper and more enduring motive than nationalism; that the Yenan experience gave the later rulers of China a unique education in, and model for, government. These are only a few of the author's insights."



**PART II**  
**REPUBLIC OF CHINA**  
**(NATIONALIST CHINA ON FORMOSA)**  
(See Also Part III)

**A. Miscellaneous Aspects**

**THE ASIANS; THEIR HERITAGE AND THEIR DESTINY**, by Paul Thomas Welty. 3rd ed. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970. 350 p.

This book attempts to give "some understanding of the social and economic environment in which most Asians live and of the various systems of thought which influence their approach to presentday problems, just as the thinking of people in a Western culture is influenced by their environment and traditions . . . 'The Asians' . . . put its main emphasis on this . . . task, while also giving the main outlines of geography, history, politics and government, for the main areas of Asia from Pakistan round to Japan [and also including, among many others, both Chinas]."

**DISNEYLAND EAST**, by Arnold Abrams, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 68, no. 18 (30 April 1970) 18-20.

"The most striking thing about life in Taiwan is the contrast between economic expansion and political stagnation—the former fostered by enlightened liberal policies, the latter fashioned by heavy-handed oppression. These polarised forces have produced a society bordering on schizophrenia—a blend of boom town and police state with burgeoning trade and tapped telephones, conspicuous consumption and midnight doorknocks, nouveau riche and political prisoners. Add to this odd broth a national purpose—mainland recovery—to which most pay formal obeisance but in which few firmly believe; a 600,000-man military machine too big for Taiwan but too weak to retake the mainland; and a future potentially bright but dismally clouded at present. The result is Taiwan today, a sort of Disneyland East: a bizarre Asian enclave built on fantasy, backed by guns marked by far-sighted economics and myopic politics."

**TAIWAN AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION**, by George H. Quester, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 1 (Spring 1974) 140-150.

"The Republic of China . . . signed the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty on the first day it was offered, July 1, 1968, and ratified it on January 27, 1970. In the years since then, the world's interest in things Chinese has been focused mainly on the seating of the people's Republic of China (the Communist regime in Peking) at the United Nations in place of the Nationalists, and on the wave of nations switching their diplomatic recognition to the Peking government. Yet the legal gymnastics that have burdened the China-recognition problem may now complicate any effort to keep nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Taiwan regime—and the KMT may now have reasons to see such weapons."

**TAIWAN 1975: A YEAR OF TRANSITION**, by Peter P. Cheng, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 1 (January 1976) 61-65.

This review covers domestic developments for the year as well as external affairs.

**UNJAC IS THE ANSWER**, by Douglas Darby, in *Asian Outlook*, no. 9 (September 1970) 21-30.

"To speed up the establishment of an Asian Pacific Security Organization, an Australian, Mr. Douglas Darby M.P., proposes the immediate formation of an UNJAC Association consisting of the United States, Japan, the Republic of China, Australia and New Zealand."

**B. Whither Nationalist China**

(LI)—**THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN**, by Lt. Col. Richard E. Clark. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1973. 50 p. (Professional Study.)

"Reviews major factors influencing Taiwan's future including: United States' and Communist China's foreign policy concerning Taiwan; the political and economic situation on Taiwan; and the Taiwanese people. An analysis of these factors suggests that the time is right for a major change in Republic of China policy, but if the Nationalist Government on Taiwan does not rise to the opportunity its fate will be determined through inaction."

TAIWAN: PORTENTS OF CHANGE, by Sheldon L. Appleton, in *Asian Survey*, v. 11, no. 1 (January 1971) 68-73.

"If the events of 1970 are any guide, the seventies may turn out to be the crucial postwar decade for determining the future of Taiwan and its almost 15 million people. It is not that the power structure on Taiwan or the life of Taiwan's people changed in any fundamental way during 1970. It did not, although the island's remarkable economic growth continued to average about 8% annually and to provide opportunities for self-advancement to a good number of energetic and ambitious Chinese. The importance of the events of 1970 lay not in their present substance, but in what they portended for the years to come. This sequence of symbolic events can be said to have begun in the closing days of 1969, with the first 'national' elections held by the Kuomintang Government since its flight from the mainland. Less than 5% of the seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative and Control Yuans were at stake in this election." With brief selected reading list.

WHEN THE CRUNCH COMES, CAN TAIWAN HOLD TOGETHER? by Fox Butterfield, in *New York Times Magazine* (18 January 1970) 14-15.

"Taiwan may have to make radical domestic and international adjustments after Chiang Kai-shek's death. Conflict continues between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders who control the island's politics. Taiwanese now comprise 95% of the armed forces, but only a small fraction of the officer corps. However, they are gaining power in business and the civil service and are demanding more political rights. In addition, Taiwan must accommodate itself to a changing US China policy. US economic aid was terminated in 1965, military aid was drastically reduced in 1969, and the military advisory group in Taiwan will probably be phased out in the near future. There are no US combat troops or offensive weapons stationed on Taiwan, and 6,000 of the 8,000 American soldiers now there are scheduled for withdrawal when the Vietnam war ends. Even most of the Seventh Fleet has been relocated to meet commitments in Vietnam and Korea. These force reductions are bringing the US closer to negotiations with the Red Chinese who have always demanded withdrawal of American troops on Taiwan as a precondition to substantive Sino-American talks . . ."

### C. Government, Party, and Politics

#### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

TAIWAN IN TRANSITION: PROSPECTS FOR SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE, by Hung-mao Tien, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 64 (December 1975) 615-644.

"This article attempts to analyse the changing nature of Taiwan's Nationalist regime, the island's rapidly altering internal socio-political conditions and the various dissenting political forces, and then to explore the various courses of action likely to determine Taiwan's political future."

WARLORD POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE MODERNIZATION OF REPUBLICAN CHINA, by Lucian W. Pye. New York, Praeger, 1971. 212 p.

"A respect for the logic of power; sensitivity to changing circumstances; a delicate calculation of advantage coupled with a fundamentally conservative defensive orientation—these distinguishing characteristics of Chinese military diplomacy in a pluralistic world are highlighted in a historical case study which has unexpected relevance now . . . This study deals primarily with Chinese politics north of the Yangtze between 1920 and 1928."

#### 2. Kuomintang Party

THE KUOMINTANG: SELECTED HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1894-1969, by Milton J. T. Shieh. Jamaica, N.Y., St. John's University Press, 1970. 406 p.

"The Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalists Party) has been the dominant force in Chinese politics since the turn of the century; it was the primary group which organized to overthrow the Manchu regime and establish a republic and it was the ruling party on mainland China from the late twenties until 1949. Presently, the Kuomintang constitutes the governing party on Taiwan. Yet, notwithstanding the important role of the Kuomintang in Chinese politics, the party as a research area has been grossly neglected . . . The volume consists of fifty-four documents arranged in chronological order covering the Kuomintang's development from 1894 to 1969. A wide range of documents are included, beginning with the Inaugural of the Honolulu Hsing-chung Hui, 1894, to the Manifestos of the Kuomintang Platform, 1913, to manifestos of the Kuomintang's national congresses, 1924-1969, to selected speeches of President Chiang Kai-shek since 1950 and concluding with the Declaration of the Tenth National Congress, 1969. Though documents representing all major periods are included, certain periods of the party's development are given greater emphasis over others. This volume includes also a seven part appendix, containing a chronology of the Kuomintang's development between 1894 and 1969, an organizational chart of the party and other data; there is also a glossary."

#### 3. Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975

PRESEDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 4 (April 1975) 24-51.



An abridged biography.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HIS EXCELLENCY CHIANG KAI-SHEK, by Hiram Fong, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 4 (April 1975) 8-12.

"It was my high honor and privilege last week to participate as a member of the official U.S. delegation selected by President Gerald R. Ford and headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller in the funeral ceremonies in Taiwan conducted for the late President of the Republic of China, His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek, who died on April 5 at the age of 87. I am reporting today to my colleagues and to the American people on the journey we made half way around the world to pay tribute to the memory of a venerable leader whose life, philosophy, policies, and achievements played such an important role in the course of world history since the early 1920's."

4. *The Question of Succession and Chiang Ching-kuo*

CHIANG CHING-KUO AND TAIWAN: A PROFILE, by Tillman Durdin, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1975) 1023-1042.

"One of Asia's least known national leaders, Chiang Ching-kuo is an affable but steely Chinese who some day may determine what the United States can, or will, do about one of the most intractable problems it now faces—the ultimate fate of Taiwan. Strongly influenced by a communist education and the adoption of a Russian life style during twelve years as a young man in the Soviet Union, Chiang brings a strangely mixed, some feel an enigmatic, personality and background to an area sure to be a major Asian trouble spot in the years ahead. Today, at sixty-six, he is the new powerholder on the strategic island of Taiwan, having three years ago moved into leadership of the Chinese Nationalist government long dominated by his famous father, Chiang Kai-shek."

A QUESTION OF SUCCESSION, by Donald Shapiro, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 19 (7 May 1976) 22-23.

"When President Chiang Kai-shek died a year ago, the effect on internal politics in Taiwan was minimal. His elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, had been named Premier three years earlier and was able to consolidate authority during the Generalissimo's long illness. But since the 'Gimo's' death, observers here have begun to focus on the question of a successor. Indeed, some believe it could present the Nationalist Chinese Government with one of its most severe tests."

TAIWAN—SURVIVING WITH THE OTHER CHIANG, in *Time*, v. 105, no. 16 (21 April 1975) 36-37.

"Few people in Taiwan expected Chiang's passing to have much effect on the country's future. Real power had already been given to the Generalissimo's eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, 65, who became Premier three years ago (Vice President C. K. Yen, who succeeds Chiang Kai-shek as President, is expected to be little more than a figurehead). Chiang Ching-kuo is unlikely to change his father's adamant refusal to negotiate any kind of political settlement with the Communists in Peking. In other areas, though, he has proved to be a more flexible and perhaps even more popular leader than the iron-willed, authoritarian Chiang Kai-shek. He has diffused the force of a Taiwanese independence movement by encouraging native islanders, who make up 85% of Taiwan's population of 16 million, to join both the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the government."

5. *Self-Determination for Formosans*

(LI)—THE FORMOSAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN THE PERSPECTIVES OF 1972, by Lt. Comdr. Charles Dahlgren. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"Recent developments surrounding the Formosan problem are tied to their effect on the Formosan Independence Movement. National interests of the Asian powers have molded new attitudes and policies which are evaluated and projected into the future. The PRC's recent diplomatic successes indicate a more pragmatic approach in future foreign affairs. Japan will be drawn into closer ties with the PRC and will be forced to sever bonds with the ROC. The United States will militarily withdraw from Formosa to a 'nuclear shield' posture over China. The Soviet Union will attempt to increase its influence throughout Asia. The ROC's immediate future is dependent of U.S. military support and on economic agreements with the United States and Japan. Independence advocates have not secured any influential backing for self-determination on Formosa. Constrained by existing policies in Asia, the independence leaders' only feasible option is to support the ROC's policies while working for domestic reforms in Formosa. Time will be an essential ingredient leading to a final solution of the Formosan problem. Predictable United States impatience in waiting for a 'Chinese' solution poses the greatest threat to upset the emerging foundations for stability in Asia."

HERITAGE IN DISPUTE, by Jonathan Unger, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 71, no. 6 (6 February 1971) 18-19.

"Diplomatic reverses abroad have led to tighter internal control in Taiwan over potential dissent. The government has a fair chance of surviving the decade provided its economic boom does

not collapse, alienating completely the still resentful native Taiwanese from their immigrant rulers."

(LI)—IMPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATION OR SEGREGATION OF TAIWANESE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SINCE 1949. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of the integration or segregation of the Taiwanese in the Republic of China government since 1949, and the effects on U.S. diplomatic relations by examining the history of Taiwan, its occupation by foreigners and domination by the Nationalist Chinese government. The island has been the scene of international contention since early history. Taiwanese experience at the hands of powerful forces has been both oppressive and economically rewarding. Experience has shown the Taiwanese that they have been considered as secondary when internal political interests and international political decisions have been reached. Gaining prosperity while being exploited as passive participants in the shaping of their position in world affairs has led the Taiwanese to insist, more recently, on an equal share of representation in national government. Their hope is that they will be able to share in the shaping of their own future without interference from pressures imposed by 'outsiders' as in the past."

THE POLITICS OF FORMOSAN NATIONALISM, by Douglas Mendel. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970. 315 p.

"The Formosan independence movement, to the study of which this volume is devoted, has its origin in the celebrated February 28 revolution of 1947. It has since been carried on primarily by Formosan students in the United States, Japan, Canada, and Europe, with the first two countries as the main centers of activity. To date, the movement appears to have succeeded in bringing to the attention of Americans, hitherto accustomed to discussing the future of Formosa only in terms of Chinese Nationalist or Communist Governments, the existence of eleven million native-born Formosans who comprise the 'silent majority' of the island's total population. Nevertheless, it has yet to secure more than a very few overt supporters among Americans. Professor Mendel is one of such supporters. Between 1957 and 1964 he visited the island several times, but in recent years he was declared persona non grata by the Chinese Nationalist Government."

#### D. Armed Forces

THE BALANCE OF TERROR, by Russell Spurr, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 19 (7 May 1976) 26-28.

A review of the military power of the various Asian countries, including both Chinas.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1975-1976. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1975. 104 p. (A publication of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.)

Provides the following information on the military balance of both Chinas, among other countries of the world: population; military service; total regular forces; GNP and defense expenditure; strategic forces; Army; Navy; Air Force. (SEE ALSO: The Military Balance, 1976-1977.)

THE [NATIONALIST] CHINESE ARMED FORCES TODAY, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 5, no. 9 (September 1970) 37-41.

Constant Readiness and Daily Renovation—Current Defense Buildup; The Well-Trained Chinese Army; Armored Columns; Sky Soldiers; Three-Dimension Operations; Powerful Artillery; Ranger Training; Goodwill Cruise; Frogmen Units; Supply Convoy; Amphibious Operations; The Chinese Air Force; Air Rescue Units; Flight Training; The Combined Services Forces (CSF); etc.

THE OTHER CHINESE ARMY, by Michael D. Eiland, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 9 (September 1975) 87-92.

"In the mountainous area where the borders of Laos, Burma and Thailand meet, where national boundaries are ill-defined and national allegiances even less identifiable, a shadowy band of former Chinese Nationalist soldiers has held sway virtually lost to world notice for a quarter of a century. These remnants of the Eight and Twenty-Sixth Armies and the 93rd Division of the Kuomintang (KMT) Army have been an embarrassment and irritant to each of the three countries (and an occasional nuisance to Red China) since their retreat from Yunnan Province, China, during the last stages of the Chinese Civil War in 1949-50. Now based mainly in Thailand, they could conceivably pose a threat to that country's incipient rapprochement with Communist China if not once and for all put out of existence as an organized armed force."

PEKING-KMT AXIS, by Bob Norton, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 71, no. 1 (2 January 1971) 14-15.

"Probably the biggest anachronism in Asia is the truncated Ninety-third Kuomintang Division of Chiang Kai-shek now inhabiting sparsely populated areas of Laos, Burma and northern Thailand. Their presence—long considered a potential pretext for Chinese military incursions—has usually been ignored by the governments on whose soil they are squatting, in the vain hope that they will somehow vanish. Every so often, however, trouble develops in



the mountainous frontier region bringing into clear focus that there are still over 3,000 KMT troops within three days' march of China's sensitive Yunnan province. Last month in Thailand's mountainous Chiang Rai province bordering Laos, a two-day battle took place between KMT irregulars and local Meo tribesmen, leaving at least 27 of the Meo and 10 Chinese killed. Further clashes were expected to take place in the remote region and the nearby Thai Third Army was placed on full alert."

UNDERWAY WITH CHIANG'S NAVY, by William M. Powers, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 101, no. 1 (January 1975) 62-74.

Describes in text and with photos how "As it has for a generation, the Republic of China Navy continues to guard Taiwan's shores against a possible invasion by the People's Republic of China."

#### E. Economic Aspects

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF TAIWAN, 1966-72, by Chen Fu Chang, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 6 (June 1974) 546-557.

"The purpose of this essay is to analyze the development of Taiwan's balance of payments and its relation to the domestic economy in the period from 1966 to 1972—i.e., after the termination of the U.S. aid program in 1965."

THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE OF TAIWAN, by Niu Sien-Chong, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 4 (August-September 1970) 93-95.

"Despite all the handicaps to rapid development in any tropical and mountainous South-east Asian area, the economic progress in Taiwan since 1948 has been not only healthy but also speedy. It represents a clear example of positive development with material gains for the nation and its citizens, and serves as a model for other developing countries. It is not surprising that many foreign visitors to Taiwan extol its achievements; indeed, many free nations have begun to ask teams of Free China's experts for advice on the development of their economies." Agricultural Reform; Industrial Progress; Foreign Trade; American Aid; Planning and Growth; and Future Trends.

MODERNIZATION PROCESS IN TAIWAN: AN ALLOCATIVE ANALYSIS, by Yung Wei, in *Asian Survey*, v. 16, no. 3 (March 1976) 249-267.

"The purpose of this essay is to provide a preliminary examination of the modernization process on Taiwan by using an 'allocative model' as the basis of analysis. The paper is divided in three parts—a clarification of the meaning of 'allocative analysis' on modernization, followed by a

preliminary survey of the allocation of values in Taiwan in different sectors and at different stages, and finally some reflection on the implication of the allocation of values on Taiwan and the future of the modernization process of the Chinese polity on the island."

TAIWAN AFTER CHIANG KAI-SHEK, in *Current History*, v. 69, no. 408 (September 1975) 90-93 plus.

"So far, Taiwan has managed to survive and prosper in spite of her expulsion from the United Nations and the diplomatic desertion of erstwhile friends and allies . . . As long as most nations adhere to the present policy of recognizing one China in principle and dealing with two Chinese governments in practice, Taiwan will probably continue to be stable and prosperous country where 16 million people live in peace and relative contentment."

TAIWAN: PROTECTIVE ADJUSTMENT ECONOMY, by Peter P. Cheng, in *Asian Survey*, v. 15, no. 1 (January 1975) 20-24.

In reviewing the external affairs and domestic affairs the author states that "although Taiwan has become relatively relaxed about the diplomatic outlook, the economy has become a matter of concern because of the energy crisis, inflation and shortage of raw materials."

##### 2. Agriculture and Agricultural Policies

THE FORGOTTEN PROVIDERS, by April Klimley, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 71, no. 6 (6 February 1971) 20-22.

"In terms of feeding its population, Taiwan's agricultural policies have succeeded. But the farmer is increasingly a second class citizen, and the worst of the crisis is still to come."

(LI)—LAND REFORM ON TAIWAN: INCENTIVE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, by Lt. Comdr. James Lair. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"Land reform on Taiwan was the essential element in that country's remarkable economic growth over the last two decades. This paper traces the evolution of the term 'land reform' and how the Republic of China failed to realize the significance of the term on mainland China. The land reform program carried out by the Republic of China on Taiwan illustrates the social and economic results of a well-planned democratic land reform program. It is concluded that the Taiwan experience had several valuable lessons that could be adopted by developing countries."

##### 3. Labor

LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE IN REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN), prep. by Theodore Bleecker. Washington, Department of

Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972. 72 p. (BLS Report 404.)

With selected bibliography.

**PRESSURE ON WAGES IN TAIWAN**, by William Armbruster, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 93, no. 27 (2 July 1976) 72 plus.

"Taiwan's rapid economic development since the 1950s has been based on labour-intensive export industries such as textiles and electronics. Now, however, as the economy makes a strong recovery from the 1974-75 recession, the biggest problem is a shortage of manpower, or to be more exact, womanpower. Taiwan needs another 150,000 unskilled female workers. There is no overall shortage of women: According to the Economic Planning Council (EPC), 380,000 women who dropped out of the labour force during the recession would be willing to return to their jobs for higher pay and better working conditions. The average monthly wage for unskilled female workers is between US \$50 and US \$75."

#### 4. Industry and Industrialization

**INDUSTRIALIZATION IN TAIWAN: RECENT TRENDS AND PROBLEMS**, by Samuel P. S. Ho, in *Pacific Affairs*, v. 48, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 27-41.

"The past decade for Taiwan has been one of unprecedented economic growth. From 1963 to 1972, its real GNP increased at over 10 per cent a year and its per capita income more than doubled. For the first time growth was based not on its agricultural sector but on its burgeoning industries. From 1963 to 1972, industrial production, rising at a remarkable rate of 18.4 per cent a year, increased nearly five-fold. What was once a rudimentary manufacturing sector now produces nearly 30 per cent of the net domestic product, accounts for more than 90 per cent of exports, and employs one-quarter of the labor force. With industrialization, the volume of trade has expanded and exports have become diversified. Currently, approximately 40 per cent of Taiwan's GNP is exported and the total volume of its trade (exports plus imports), at nearly US \$8 billion, is larger than that of the Chinese People's Republic. However, even as Taiwan celebrated its achievements, it was shaken in 1974 by external events and the economy entered a period of grave uncertainty. The world-wide inflation, the raw material crisis, and the altered relationship with Japan and the United States (its most important economic partners) cast a heavy shadow over the Taiwan economy. This article reviews recent patterns of industrial development and then considers the economic problems now emerging in Taiwan."

**INDUSTRIALIZATION ON TAIWAN**, by Y.

S. Sun, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 5, no. 12 (December 1970) 32-36 plus.

I. Industrial Development of the Republic of China in the First UN Development Decade (1961-1970): Government Initiative; Coordinated Development of Agriculture and Industry; Orderly Development from Import-Substitution Industries to Export-Oriented Industries; Promotion of Savings and Encouragement of Investment; Creation of Industrial Estates; Development of Manpower; Achievement in Industrialization; Problems Encountered in Industrialization. II. Policies on Industrialization in the Second Development Decade.

**THE PHILIPPINES: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADE POLICIES, AND TAIWAN: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADE POLICIES**, by John H. Power and others. London, Oxford University Press, 1971. 324 p. (Published for the Development Center for Economic Co-operation and Development.)

"Both the Philippines and Taiwan suffered severe disruption to their economies in the Second World War. Since then, both have experienced rapid rates of growth of national product and manufacturing output, but growth rates in Taiwan have accelerated, and are now well ahead. Both countries protected their manufacturing industries by import quotas in the 1950s. In the Philippines, liberalization in the 1960s replaced quotas by tariffs, and left protection still high. Exports of manufactures were disappointing. By contrast, Taiwan, which received much more overseas aid, succeeded in encouraging a very rapid growth in its exports of manufactures. This book contains separate studies of the industrialization policies pursued in these two countries, which provide an interesting contrast in methods and performance. In the Philippines, it is hard to see how manufacturing can become a leading sector unless the bias in economic policy against exports is reduced. In Taiwan, economic aid has largely been dispensed with, and growth continues to be rapid."

**TAIWAN: STABILITY IS THE TARGET**, by William Armbruster, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92 no. 24 (11 June 1976) 108-109.

"The main aim of Taiwan's new Six-Year Plan (1976-81) is to develop heavy and capital-intensive industry to make the economy less vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets. Although the Plan calls for a lower growth rate than in previous years, gross domestic product (GDP) is still expected to grow at a healthy 7.5% annually during the period."

#### 5. Foreign Economic Relations

**CHINESE AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL TEAM IN PANAMA**, by Su Chao-



hung, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 5, no. 11 (November 1970) 47-49.

How the Republic of China's Agricultural and Technical Team has introduced "Agricultural Revolution to Double Panama's Farm Production."

DENMARK IN ASIA, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 72, no. 17 (24 April 1971) 25-54.

This special section deals with trade and relations as surveyed in the following articles: Denmark Enters the Seventies, Housing Asia in Danish; Financing Danish Foreign Trade; Investing in the Future; Food—A Maturing Market; From Ploughs to Pints; Denmark and the Region (Bangkok—Aid the Balance; Bombay—Efficiency Block; Colombo—Help from the Danes; Djakarta—Fraudulent Image; Hong-kong—Well Hatched; Kuala Lumpur—Viking Tenacity; Seoul—Lends Enchantment; Taipei—Licit Liaison; and Tokyo—Flavour of Romance).

ECONOMIC RELATIONS: TAIWAN LOOKS TO SAUDI ARABIA, by William Armbruster, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 92, no. 17 (23 April 1976) 147-148.

"Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, already ideological anti-communist allies, are forging closer economic links as well. High-level delegations from the two countries gathered on Taipei last month to discuss cooperation in trade, industry, finance, communications and agriculture. The main result was the signing of two separate loan agreements."

#### F. Sociological Aspects

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

SOCIAL CLASS AND RURAL-URBAN PATTERNING OF SOCIALIZATION IN TAIWAN, by Nancy J. Olsen, in *Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 34, no. 3 (May 1975) 659-674.

"Socialization is 'the process by which someone learns the ways of a given society or social group so that he can function within it.' Socialization occurs in many different groups and settings, but in all societies, the first and usually the most important of these is the family. . . The purposes of the . . . article are to demonstrate that the social structural viewpoint is a useful way to approach family socialization in Taiwan, to show that the patterns of social class and rural-urban differences that exist in Taiwan are similar to those found in other nations, and to explore some possible mechanisms that might link social structure to variations in Taiwanese family socialization."

THE SOCIALIZATION OF CHILDREN IN CHINA AND ON TAIWAN: AN ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS, by

Roberta Martin, in *The China Quarterly*, no. 62 (June 1975) 242-262.

"This essay attempts to describe and contrast the social and political norms which the governments of China and Taiwan encourage their respective citizens to adopt. It endeavours to highlight contrasts in the goals of socialization in the two societies, so different in their vision of the ideal Chinese polity, by examining the norms presented to children through elementary school textbooks."

##### 2. Education

EDUCATION IS THE WAY OF LIFE FOR FREE CHINA'S POPULATION, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 5, no. 1 (January 1970) 31-32.

"Nine years of free education will become universal in the Republic of China starting in 1976. Public junior high schools were opened to all elementary school graduates without examination in the 1968-69 school year. Before that only about 62 per cent of primary graduates went on to junior high. With the new program, 86 per cent of Taipei sixth grades and 70 per cent of those in the rest of Taiwan province entered junior high school. By 1976, seventh grade attendance is expected to reach 96 per cent for Taipei and 88 per cent for the rest of Taiwan. (The three additional years of schooling will then be made compulsory.)"

THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF TAIWAN'S COLLEGE STUDENTS, by Sheldon Appleton, in *Asian Survey*, v. 10, no. 10 (October 1970) 910-923.

"The currents of student activism that have spread through much of the world in the past several years have not yet reached Taiwan. Some explanations for this come readily to mind. The Chinese family system remains more closely knit than its Western counterpart. Students on Taiwan have every reason to believe that unacceptable expressions of dissent would be promptly suppressed, and might prove costly to their families as well as to themselves. Higher education on Taiwan is not a universal right, but a restricted and eagerly sought after channel to future status and advancement in a none too affluent society (average per capita annual income is somewhere in the neighborhood of \$250). It is rarely attained, moreover, without considerable familial sacrifice on the student's behalf. Today's college students on Taiwan have had to compete against odds every step of the way for the privilege of continuing their education."

#### G. Foreign Policy and International Relations

##### 1. Nationalist China and the United Nations (See also I-D-7)

ISOLATION'S INVENTORY, by William

Glenn, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 71, no. 2 (9 January 1971) 27-28.

"The question is no longer whether Taiwan will lose its UN seat, but what will happen when it does. Financially, it will feel the draught. But it's unlikely to turn into a political hurricane."

2. *Relations with the United States* (See also I-D-15)

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

AMERICA'S ASIA; DISSENTING ESSAY ON ASIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, ed. by Edward Friedman & Mark Selden. New York, Pantheon Books, 1971. 458 p.

"This book [with essays by various authors] explores the . . . interaction between American perceptions and American power, power in the making and unmaking of contemporary Asia . . . [The] focus is at once Asia and America." The essays also encompass to some extent specifically America's relations with Japan, the Korean War, Okinawa, and Taiwan.

"JOURNEY TO FREE CHINA," by Barry Goldwater, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 3 (March 1975) 18-24 plus.

"Senator Barry Goldwater, in his February 18 address to the U.S. Senate, called on the United States government to maintain official diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China as the legal government of China. Goldwater made the call after a thorough study of a report by his legal assistant, J. Terry Emerson, who visited Taiwan in January."

WE DO BESCHREI IT, by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 10, no. 3 (March 1976) 3-17.

"With the advent of spring, Anno Domini 1975, which is the sixty-fourth year of our Republic, it is meet and fitting for us to make a general assessment and examination of some of the aspects of events, significant or less significant, during the past year. The purpose of this examination is for a clearer understanding through an inductive process of sifting and the collation of reports of events and policies that have come out during the last quarter of 1974 in the United States. These events and policies will have their bearing on the future and will come into focus during the coming years—their effect salubrious or insalubrious, rehabilitating or debilitating, as they fall into place in the mosaic of the political and socio-economic scheme of things."

b. *Security Relations with the United States*

APPROACHING CHINA, DEFENDING TAIWAN, by Earl C. Ravenal, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 1 (October 1971) 44-58.

"The defense of Taiwan remains at the heart of the issue of China. The recent initiatives of

Peking and Washington, and the impending presidential visit, have inspired hopeful speculation. Discussion has centered on formulas for recognition and entry into the United Nations. Our alliance with the Republic of China on Taiwan has been given less consideration, and its implications are optimistically avoided. But our security relationship with Taiwan—in particular the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954—dictates certain diplomatic solutions and precludes others. Definitive choices will have to be made, and illusions of entertaining contradictory positions will have to be abandoned. If the consequences of our defense arrangement are not grasped, and the problems not deliberately resolved, the expectations that have been aroused may be unfulfilled, and the United States may proceed to underwrite a new order in East Asia that offers at best a tense military equilibrium and perpetual American involvement in the political evolution of the region. Two inquiries are in order: one into the logic, the other into the facts. The logic is that alliance with Taipei and relations with Peking are mutually exclusive. And the facts are that our military support is unnecessary for the immediate defense of Taiwan, and the island in turn is unnecessary for the security of the United States and its regional interests. Therefore, the military value of Taiwan is not a sufficient reason for upholding the indefinite partition of China. Yet the consequences of ending the alliance would be more significant than is generally appreciated, for it would not only signal abandonment of the containment of China but threaten the concept of collective security. Our defense relationship with Taiwan is integral to the question of recognizing the governments and states of China. Each diplomatic alternative has specific implications for the status of the treaty and the territory to be defended."

FOREIGN [U.S.] MILITARY SALES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FACTS. Washington, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, November 1975. 39 p.

Among the various information provided, some of the statistical tables include, among others, the following information for the Republic of China (Taiwan): military sales credit for Taiwan; military assistance for Taiwan; military training for Taiwan.

(LI)—UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1950-1970, EMPHASIZING ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC, by Col. David E. Hartigan, Jr. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An examination of United States foreign assistance to the Republic of China, 1950-1970, emphasizing the contribution that economic and



military aid programs have made to Nationalist China's security against external aggression. The purpose of the study is to expose the interrelationship of economic and military aid programs vis-a-vis, inter alia, their common objective of creating and maintaining a security establishment, within a stable political and economic environment, adequate to protect the Republic against the threat of aggression posed primarily, by the People's Republic of China. As a backdrop, the paper summarizes the assistance provided by the United States, et al., to China during the pre-Taiwan era, 1938 to 1949. In both narrative and tabular form—by program, program value and statutory instrumentality—the paper exposes the components of United States aid programs and their contributions to Nationalist China's security during the first twenty-one years of the post-mainland era, 1950 to 1970. The paper concludes that, in conjunction with an assured and continuing United States mutual defense guarantee, United States assistance was adequate to meet the Republic of China's unilateral security needs and to create a stable, viable economy."

UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD; REPUBLIC OF CHINA. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD, OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, PART 4, NOVEMBER 24-26, 1969, AND MAY 8, 1970. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1970. pp. 919-1146.

3. *The Two Chinas and the Question of Taiwan* (See also III-B)

CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, ed. by Hungdah Chiu. New York, Praeger, 1973. 396 p.

"The first part of this book deals with such topics as the history of Taiwan, its economic and political development, and the United States, China and the question of Taiwan in light of recent developments. The larger second section is a collection of documents, official and unofficial, from various sources, about the legal and political status of Taiwan."

(LI)—PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: ENDURING CLAIM TO TAIWAN, by Comdr. Donald J. Meyer. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of the factors relating to the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. This paper is in part a chronicle of facts focusing on historical events, and

describes how muddled thinking can lead to problems that last for generations. The examination of facts and their bearing on the problem are presented largely in a historical sense. The problem discussed in this paper has been considered in the perspective of Chinese history and politics. Following a brief summary of historical background, the current status of Taiwan is described including a summary of key political, military, economic and international relations bearing on the problem. Factors in favor of the PRC claim to Taiwan are presented along with rebuttals of discrediting factors. The relation of the fundamental Chinese concepts of time and unity are brought into the issue. The effect of current PRC and ROC leadership is speculated on, and what might be anticipated as the 'ancients' pass from the scene. Other heavily weighted factors in the analysis are the 1971 U.N. recognition of the PRC, and the growing rapprochement of the US and the PRC. The paper concludes that the mainland Chinese on Taiwan and the Taiwanese will reach some form of quasi-independent state. The PRC, in the meantime, will pursue her goal of reunification of Taiwan which can be expected to take place many years in the future. The establishment of a quasi-independent Taiwan is considered a steppingstone in this process toward reunification. The PRC move eastward to Taiwan is in progress. It is only a matter of time—Chinese time."

PRESIDENT YEN SEES NEW ERA IN ANTI-RED STRUGGLE, WARNS FREE WORLD TO BEWARE OF TRAP, in *Asian Outlook*, v. 11, no. 1 (January 1976) 3-5.

Full text of President Yen Chia-kang's New Year message issued in Taipei.

#### 4. *Relations with Japan*

JAPAN'S TAIWAN DILEMMA, by Joseph Z. Reday, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 3 (March 1972) 49-53.

"Taiwan is but one more important factor in America's overall strategy in the Pacific, but, to Japan, it is a vital interest, although not all Japanese seem to appreciate the fact."

#### H. History of the Republic of China

CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST; AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE HISTORY AND CULTURE, by Charles O. Hucker. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1975. 474 p.

The Formative Age, Prehistory-206 B.C.; The Early Empire, 206 B.C.-A.D. 960; The Late Empire, 960-1850.

THE DRAGON WAKES: CHINA AND THE WEST, 1793-1911, by Christopher Hibbert. New York, Harper & Rowe, 1971. 427 p.

"This . . . narrative of the principal events in the . . . history of China's relations with the West, from the . . . mission of Lord Macartney to Peking in 1793 to the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, provides the . . . reader with the historical background needed to understand the modern Chinese view of the Western powers."

STILWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, by Barbara Tuchman. New York, Macmillan, 1970. 621 p.

"Stilwell spent the major portion of his military career serving in China. As language officer, road builder, and military attache between 1920 and 1939, he gained an understanding of China which was clearer than that of most Americans. During World War II, he was assigned to open communications to China through Burma; and despite the British lack of interest and Chiang Kai-shek's determination to let the Americans do the fighting, he achieved his goal and proved, as he intended to, that the Chinese soldier could fight well under proper leadership. American policy during WW II was to prevent Japan from taking over China as well as to keep China in the war. During the early years of the war, Americans believed that Chiang Kai-

shek's government was a democracy and that Chiang was the only person capable of holding China together as a nation. The US failed to recognize that Chiang's government was anything but a democracy, that the idea of fighting efficiently was foreign to the Chinese who thought of war as a series of maneuvers in which ideally the enemy could be defeated without battle, and that Chiang's concern was not Japan but the communists. By 1944, the US was disillusioned with Chiang but could see no alternative and continued to give him support. In the final analysis, American policy with regard to China during WW II failed because there was no way to force an unwilling ally to fight."

TAIWAN; STUDIES IN CHINESE LOCAL HISTORY, ed. by Leonard H. Gordon. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. 124 p.

Taiwan and Its Place in Chinese History, by Leonard H. D. Gordon; The Rise of a Taiwanese Gentry Family, by Johanna M. Meskill; The 1895 Taiwan War of Resistance—Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power, by Harry J. Lamley; Late Nineteenth Century Land Tenure in North Taiwan, by Edgar B. Wickberg; and Taiwan and the Powers, 1840-1895, by Leonard H. D. Gordon.



### PART III

## THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

#### A. The Evolution of the Modern State of China: Nationalist and Communist

CHINA'S THREE THOUSAND YEARS: THE STORY OF A GREAT CIVILIZATION, by Louis Heren and others. New York, Macmillan, 1973. 252 p.

"A team of five China experts has assembled . . . a survey of China's history, cultural heritage, way of life, and world role. After a short introductory essay by Louis Heren, C. P. Fitzgerald treats of philosophy, religion, art, literature and learning; Michael Freeberne describes the land, people, economic growth and technological change; Fitzgerald returns to recount Chinese history from the prehistorical era to 1840; Brian Hook reviews the modern history of China to 1971; and David Bonavia examines China's role in the world today."

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN STATE IN CHINA: NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST CONTINUITIES, by Robert Bedeski, in *World Politics*, v. 27, no. 4 (July 1975) 541-568.

"The modern state is a theoretical concept and a historical phenomenon which can be examined as force, power, and authority. The foundations of the modern state in China were laid by the Nationalist regime in Nankin after 1927. The Kuomintang's efforts in unification and treaty renegotiation greatly facilitated the labors of the Communists when they came to power. State development since 1949 reflects Nationalist influence in constitutionalism, party role, status of the army, and even world outlook. If the Nationalist and Communist periods are viewed as a continuum, state evolution in modern China appears as a rough recapitulation of the European state's development."

JOURNEY BETWEEN TWO CHINAS, by Seymour Topping. New York, Harper & Rowe, 1972. 459 p.

"Topping was a correspondent from 1946 to 1949 in war-torn China, an Associated Press correspondent in Indochina in the early 1950's, a New York Times correspondent in Moscow, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, and is now that

newspaper's Assistant Managing Editor. In the spring of 1971, he visited Communist China, interviewed Chou En-lai, traveled extensively, and talked to many Chinese in various occupations. Utilizing his . . . experience and knowledge, he has written an eyewitness account of the collapse of the Nationalist Government, the birth of Mao's China, and the vastly changed country and people he found on his return in 1971. He also describes the collapse of the French Indochina empire and, in an epilogue, assesses the impact of President Nixon's visit to Peking."

LAW AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA, 2400 B.C. TO 1960 A.D., by Philip M. Chen. New York, Dunellen, 1974. 234 p.

"A professor at Tamkang College, Taiwan, interrelates the Chinese legal tradition, law in Confucian ideology, and the development and nature of Chinese socialist law and legal institutions in Chinese Maoist society. The central focus of his study is the degree to which contemporary mainland attitudes toward law are influenced by Chinese tradition and by the specific ideological outlook of the communist regime."

THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA, by Richard W. Van Alstyne. New York, W. W. Norton, 1973. 180 p.

"Surveys American relations with China and Japan during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, discussing the historical background, the American arrival in China and 'opening' of Japan, Chinese 'anti-foreignism' and America's 'yellow peril,' revolution and nationalism in China, the worsening of Japanese-American relations in the two decades before Pearl Harbor, and the Chinese communist revolution and takeover . . . Contains sixty-six illustrations . . . and a map."

#### B. The Two Chinas: An Assessment of United States Foreign Policy

AMERICA FACING TWO WAYS—TICKLISH TAIWAN, by John K. Fairbank, in *The New Republic*, v. 172, no. 9 (1 March 1975) 6-8.

"At least three interest groups are involved in Taiwan's unsettled future, the US being one of them. Our current policy formula is the Nixon-Chou Shanghai communique of February 1972—that Taiwan is part of China and its future is to be settled by the Chinese (and not by our intervention). The basis of the Peking-Washington rapprochement has been No Two Chinas. Yet within this framework (or bulging out of it) we still maintain the Washington-Taipei security treaty of 1954, and the Nationalist embassy in Washington still flies the flag of the Republic of China while Peking's liaison office acts more and more like an embassy in fact. Our policy faces two ways. Since the present *modus vivendi* can be expected to give way eventually to a new situation, it is high time we tried in our own minds to unscramble the various interests involved . . . Present-day Taiwan is the product of a century of Sino-foreign relations. Future peace and friendship between the Chinese and American peoples require that we outgrow the past and create new relations of equality and nonintervention. Future hopes, however, cannot be completely untied from present realities, which in turn have been inherited from past trends that may still possess great vitality. (If historians seem conservative, it is only because history unfolds with such appalling inertia!) How have the respective Peking, Taipei and Washington interests in the Taiwan issue come into being?"

(LI)—A CASE FOR A TWO-CHINA POLICY, by Lt. Col. Melvin T. Deschamps. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 16 p. (Professional Study No. 4318.)

"Central to any United States Asian policy for the past twenty years has been the question of what to do with and about Communist China. For these twenty years United States policy has been primarily to ignore it, seeming to hope and perhaps expect it would go away. This policy was born of moral and emotional considerations—moral because we did not like the totalitarian regime in Peking, and emotional because we supported the defeated Nationalists during the Civil War and fought the Chinese Communists in Korea. It now appears that it is time to give serious thought to changing our policy. Red China has not gone away. If fact, she has extended her control over mainland China and grown militarily to be a nuclear power. Any hope for peace in the Asian part of the world must include this nation of over 700 million people as part of the equation. Past containment and isolation policies have not worked. The Two China policy contained in this essay, while not unique, deserves consideration as an approach that might work."

CHINA AND TAIWAN: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES, by Robert W. Barnett, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 3 (April 1972) 444-458.

"Can Mao or the inheritors of Mao's authority entertain the possibility of some 'separateness' for any Chinese within his egalitarian One China world? The answer to this question will influence Peking's attitudes toward peaceful coexistence with Taipei, intellectual and cultural diversities at home, and possibilities for future organization of China's economic system. After a 20-year tradition of relentless mutual hostility, the 'recognition' by the United States of the People's Republic of China, implicit in Dr. Henry Kissinger's July 8-11 visit to Peking, produced a sudden and great need for diplomatic recalculation throughout the world. It was inevitable, thereafter, that the People's Republic of China be taken into Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. And now President Nixon's February conversations with Chinese authorities have focused attention upon what Washington and Peking can agree to do about Taiwan—with Taipei, Seoul and Tokyo, not to mention Moscow, New Delhi and Southeast Asian capitals, likely to perceive transcendent strategic implications in that transaction . . . The United Nations has settled the issue of representation: Peking represents China. The international community now turns to consideration of security in the Taiwan Strait. As seen from Peking, that issue relates to U.S. Commitments to and military presence on Taiwan, and to Japan's military potential which since the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communique on the Reversion of Okinawa, could be seen to be looming over the Taiwan Strait. However, another pressing issue has been largely ignored: the accommodation of the divergent economic purposes and systems which Peking and Taipei have pursued within their goal of One China."

(LI)—THE CHINA-TAIWAN TANGLE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING U.S. ASIAN POLICIES, by Maj. Ernest L. Jenkins, Jr. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 143 p. (Research Study No. 1040-71.)

"Untangling America's China-Taiwan policies and exploiting America's national interest possibilities afterward will demand extraordinary patience, forbearance, and ingenuity on the part of American policy makers. A well based awareness of the intermeshed problems must also be made known to the American public to gain its support for future changes in policy. American awareness and support can be achieved through public understanding of past and present American policies, actions, and attitudes toward China. This study provides this necessary understanding by historically investigating, systematically analyzing, and proposing logical conclusions for possible solutions to the problems in America's present China-Taiwan policy tangle."



(LI)—THE FATE OF FORMAOSA—AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, by Capt. Richard B. Mahon. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"The admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and the Security Council, and the concurrent expulsion of the Republic of China, attract an assessment of United States foreign policy with regard to Formosa. The author attempts to assess this policy. The historical and political backgrounds of the island are examined as is a history of United States post-World War II foreign policy relating to Formosa. The desire of the Nixon Administration to improve relations with the People's Republic of China, without an exchange of diplomatic recognition, creates a difficult political situation. The United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty is a cause of concern to the People's Republic. United States policy is assessed in light of possible alternatives and it is concluded that present policy presents the optimum and more workable solution."

(LI)—THE FEASIBILITY OF A TWO-CHINA POLICY, by Lt. Col Robert S. Bell. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1973. 31 p. (Professional Study.)

"This paper is a review of events which have frustrated several American Presidents in their attempts at promulgating US Foreign Policy toward China. It discusses the Wilson Era, paternalism of the Missionaries and the dogmatism of McCarthy Era, which, when used as a foundation for the Eisenhower period of containment and isolation of China, contributed little to a positive, pragmatic approach to China. After superficial attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, President Nixon is following the only path available—diplomatic recognition of one China governed from Peking. The paper acknowledges that the question is not the feasibility of a 'Two-China Policy,' but, rather, in what manner will the People's Republic of China allow the Republic of China (Taiwan Province) to function? It concludes that Taiwan will be allowed to exist, as does Hong Kong, for its economic and industrial advantages."

(LI)—IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW LOOK IN U.S.-CHINA POLICY AS IT RELATES TO TAIWAN, JAPAN AND RUSSIA, by Col. Harvey D. Williams. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"Mainland China, one of the world's great powers for most of the rise again. The Nixon administration has abandoned the 23 year-old U.S. policy objective of containing China and is now seeking to normalize relations between the two countries. The emergence of the new look in U.S.-

China policy will have a major effect on international affairs across the board. Of particular interest and importance will be the interaction between the United States, Taiwan, Japan and Russia. The scope of the paper if focused on an examination of precious U.S. relations, an assessment of current activity, coupled with an analysis of the implications of U.S.-China policy as it affects each of these three countries. The paper finds that Taiwan, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, will for some time have tense moments but remain essentially unchanged; Japan will play a bigger role in Asia, become more independent of the United States but will remain friendly; and Russia will face new constraints in its push for more power. It concludes that reduction of tension and improved U.S.-China relations will be a positive factor and lead stability to world order—provided the United States policy is directed with deliberation and caution."

INTERESTING TIMES FOR NATIONALIST CHINA, by James D. Hessman, in *Sea Power*, v. 16, no. 11 (November 1973) 18-23.

"Washington-Peking rapprochement contains hidden dangers for United States and Taiwan both . . . The warm winds of welcome from Red China may have nurtured a false euphoria as dangerous for the United States as for the Chinese people of offshore Taiwan."

JITTERY START TO A YEAR OF UNCERTAINTY, by William Glenn, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 91, no. 2 (9 January 1976) 12-13.

"It was inevitable that Taipei should be jittery when it was announced that US Ambassador Leonard Unger was departing for 'home leave and consultations.' The career diplomat, highly-regarded by the Chinese Nationalist Government, flew out only two weeks after President Gerald Ford's recent visit to Peking, leaving his deputy, Paul Popple, in charge. As the pessimists here saw it, Washington would not want Unger, a friend of the Nationalists, in place if it was about to deliver the sad news of impending full recognition of Peking. It would be better to have a charge d'affaires who could shrug and say the business was not his doing."

MAINLAND CHINA: THE VIEW FROM TAIWAN, by Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, in *Strategic Review*, v. 3, no. 3 (Summer 1975) 34-40.

"There were high hopes, following the visit of former President Nixon to Peking, of a major thaw in the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. It has not materialized. The reasons are many; some obvious, some obscure, but all are related to the power struggle that is going on in Peking. Recently,

General Krulak visited the Republic of China on Taiwan and, in a series of discussions with government leaders including the Premier and several cabinet members, procured a synthesis of view of the Peking scene."

A 1½-CHINA POLICY, by Joseph Lelyveld, in *The New York Times Magazine* (April 6, 1975) 15.

"Taiwan is regarded in many different ways among Westerners, particularly Americans: the last chapter in China's civil war, a piece of the 'Free World,' a strategic base, a victim of neocolonialism, an issue, a symbol, the next object representing US disengagement from Asia. Almost an afterthought, . . . is the acknowledgment that Taiwan is an island with a population of 16 million people who have established, for the most part, a stable and settled society. Whatever world opinion conjectures, it is this status which the Taiwanese want to maintain. Although no concrete admissions have been made, there are indications that they are thinking about the possibility of disclaiming sovereignty over the whole of China and establishing Taiwan itself as an independent nation. To all appearances, Taiwan views with little real concern the possibility of America's formal recognition of the People's Republic of China. The prevailing attitude seems to be one of confidence that the problem will somehow be resolved, and that, as long as their separate status and life-style can be maintained, the people of Taiwan don't much care. Implicit in this confidence is that fact that America's interests on Taiwan have not reinforced its tacit support of the 'one China' position. Notably, American trade with Taiwan has more than doubled since President Nixon first went to Peking, the number of American companies represented in Taiwan has jumped from 60 to 200 during the same period, and new loans from American public and private sources have substantially increased. Furthermore, US military disengagement has been conducted in 'so genteel and dilatory a fashion as to amount to a reassurance'; and the US has continued to authorize military credits for various weapon systems as well as continued support of the post-Korea mutual security treaty. Of course, if the US recognizes Peking, that treaty will lapse automatically, constituting a precedent which has 'ostensibly' caused a certain amount of debate in Pentagon and NSC circles. For its part, . . . Peking has hinted its impatience at US slowness in reconciling its dilemma over Taiwan, while Taipei has indicated its intention to maintain the existing agreements. Approximately 60% of Taiwan's population is too young to remember China's civil war; at least 90% of the people have never been to mainland China. Under the Premiership of Chiang Ching-Kuo, Ching Kai-shek's son, Taiwan has become a fairly independent although

. . . , strictly supervised society, focused on recovering the mainland. Within the past few years, however, emphasis has shifted to survival through development. Lelyveld believes that if secure, free ballots could be held, most Nationalists would vote to give up their dream of returning to the mainland. The question whether Taiwan will be left to itself. On this, most optimists believe the world situation will support the assumptions that Taiwan will not make a deal with Peking, and that China will seek a long-range peaceful accommodation rather than a military solution, although this determination could alter if Taiwan declares its independence. For this reason, Lelyveld believes, the U.S. is likely to encourage Taiwan to continue its anomalous existence as the Republic of China. The end result would constitute 'maximum ambiguity,' to disguise the unchanged status quo. In practical terms the situation would amount to 'one China, divisible, with trade and profits for all who seek them on Taiwan.'"

PEKING, TAIWAN AND THE USA—TRIANGLES HAVE THREE SIDES, by Ross Terrill, in *The New Republic*, v. 173, no. 18 (1 November 1975) 14-17.

"Since Peking and Washington came to a limited agreement on the principles of the Taiwan issue at Shanghai in February 1972, some people say Taiwan is a sleeping dog that should be let lie. But in the light of overall world politics this would be unwise. If there is today a kind of 'intermission' in US strategic thinking, the reason lies less in alleged weaknesses of America's democratic institutions, than in the fact that America's post-World War II supremacy has ended. Russian power rises all over the world and this changes the color of familiar landscape; it is not easy to get used to the chilly new geography. New ways are needed to counter Soviet power in an era when nuclear weapons are unlikely to be politically decisive, economic issues preoccupy most nations, alliances melt like butter in the sun, and social change is more likely in Europe than in Asia. A solid and many-sided tie between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of the best options on the market. The US-China link ought to be forged closer, first because it has over the past four years given pause to Moscow's hawks; second, because it has relaxed tensions in East Asia and given the small lands a chance to focus on problems of peace rather than those of war, third, because the people and traders of China and the US have an interest and a compatibility with each other. Taiwan is a stumbling block, yet it is not beyond the limits of strong leadership on both sides to finish the construction of solution—provided the idealism and rigidity that lie behind US 'commitments' to Chiang's Republic of China are



modified by a remembrance of history and a sense of future strategic need."

**POLICY ON "TWO CHINAS"; INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE BUSH, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 71, no. 12 (20 September 1971) 47-48.

"Is U.S. going to dump Nationalist China to get Red China into the United Nations? 'No,' says Ambassador Bush. In this . . . interview, he explains how the U.S. hopes to solve a major dilemma."

**TAIWAN AND AMERICAN POLICY: THE DILEMMA IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS**, by Jerome Alan Cohen and others. New York, Praeger, 1971. 191 p.

The proceedings of a conference co-sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, this volume examines the nature of American and Chinese national interest in Taiwan, the importance of Taiwan as a factor in U.S. foreign policy, and the major options available to the United States in its future relations with Taiwan and mainland China as a result of the new trends in Washington-Peking diplomacy."

**THE TAIWAN DILEMMA: ONE CHINA, DIVISIBLE?**, in *GREAT DECISIONS '76*. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1976. 39-41.

Discusses: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Taiwan; U.S. military support and our reduction in force; whose island is it; should there be an independent "Republic of Taiwan"; and what happens when the U.S. recognizes Peking?

**TAIWAN—HOW FUTURE OF A U.S. ALLY LOOKS NOW**, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 80, no. 3 (19 January 1976) 59-60.

"Its friends are few, and Communists close by a danger. Yet Nationalist China is confident. K. M. Chrysler of the Magazine's International Staff cabled this report on a nation that won't give up. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan—masters of political and economic survival—are confident they can weather for years to come the anticipated development of stronger ties between the U.S. and Communist China. . . . Now it is optimistic it can hang on even if the U.S. keeps downgrading relations with Taipei in favor of the Chinese Communists."

**(LI)—THE TAIWAN PROBLEM ENTERS A NEW ERA**, by Lt. Col. Tom J. Forster. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1973. 30 p.

"The author reviews the ultimate fate of Taiwan, the nature of the struggle with the People's Republic of China, and the impact on the balance of forces in the Pacific. This study explores the history of Taiwan, objectives of the People's Republic of

China, and Chinese policy and tactics to regain Taiwan. The study concludes that U.S. Pacific and Asian strategy for the future must accommodate the need for Japanese markets and defenses, and the destiny of final Chinese victory on Taiwan."

**TAIWAN, THE PRC, AND THE STATUS QUO**, by DeWitt S. Coppin, in *Sea Power*, v. 18, no. 4 (April 1975) 15-26.

"Much more than the tenuous 'rapprochement' with the Chinese Mainland is at stake in the current reappraisal of U.S. commitments to a beleagured and loyal Taiwan."

**THE TWO-CHINA POLICY**, in *The Nation*, v. 221, no. 20 (13 December 1975) 610-611.

"What is the administration's China policy? President Ford's latest jaunt seemed at the time he left to be largely symbolic, planned primarily with an eye to strengthening his domestic political image. By most accounts, the Chinese leadership, now somewhat in flux, is in no mood to negotiate beyond the 1972 agreements. What do Ford and Kissinger have in mind for the duration of the current Presidential term? . . . The Chinese have reason to doubt the administration's commitment to normalizing Peking-Washington relations. Kissinger and Ford know that the Chinese won't exchange ambassadors until the United States breaks its defense pact with the island that Peking regards as a Chinese province. And the Chinese probably are disappointed by the administration's failure to unfreeze mainland assets in America or to press for favorable trade status for the People's Republic."

**(LI)—"TWO CHINA POLICY IN TRANSITION": A VALID CHANGE IN U.S. DIRECTION OR AN INVITATION TO DISASTER**, by Maj. John V. Ello. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 83 p. (Research Study.)

"During the past twenty years, United States Asian policy towards China has undergone a series of changes. Taiwan remains the crucial question affecting eventual U.S.-China rapprochement and under the most recent U.S. policy change, the island is now to be considered as a question for resolution between the two contending Chinese factions only. This latest policy pre-supposes legal Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and makes no allowance for self-determination by the Taiwanese people. The purpose of this research study has been to assess the validity of this latest policy change. Special emphasis was placed on historical U.S. involvement and the substance of Taiwan independence. The major conclusion of the study is that while U.S.-China rapprochement efforts should continue, Taiwan's ultimate fate can only be legally decided within the charter provisions of the United Nations."

U.S. CHINA POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN, by William M. Bueler. Boulder, Colo. Colorado Associated University Press, 1971. 143 p.

"A history of U.S. relations with Taiwan from Truman to Nixon, and an analysis of the problem the U.S. commitment to Taiwan poses for U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. Researched and written before the announcement in July 1971 that President Nixon would visit Peking, the book contains U.S. policy options as they appeared at the time. The author devotes considerable space to an examination of the prospects for an independent Taiwanese state and the implications of such a development for U.S. policy."

(LI)—WHAT NEXT FOR TAIWAN?, by Lt. Col. Thomas L. Connelly. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 61 p. (Professional Study.)

"With the unprecedented expulsion of the Nationalist Republic of China from the United Nations, the question of the legitimate government of China has been answered in the eyes of international law. The question now is, what will be the eventual destiny of Taiwan. A review of the development of the two Chinas and the background of their leaders is presented. This is followed by an analysis of Communist China and the United States' foreign policies and their effect on Taiwan. This analysis leads to the author's prediction of the

immediate and long-range future of the island of Taiwan."

WOULD CHIANG FIND MAO AN UNACCEPTABLY STRANGE BEDFELLOW?, by William H. Overholt, in *Asian Survey*, v. 14, no. 8 (August 1974) 676-699.

"Future international relations in Eastern Asia, and future American policy in this region, will depend significantly on relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (GRC). Among the conceivable forms which the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan could take are: one dominated by military conflict; a stable one imposed by other powers; an unpredictable or oscillating one based either on a destabilized international situation or on domestic fluctuations in either country; a hostile but predictable one based on the present military stalemate and attainment of a political stalemate; one based on formal agreements between Taiwan and the mainland; or various combinations of these. This paper focuses primarily on the possibility of formal agreements between the PRC and either the Taiwan government or individuals or groups on the PRC and either the Taiwan government or individuals or groups on Taiwan. Within this possibility, the paper focuses on PRC ability to make convincing commitments to the GRC or to groups or individuals on Taiwan."



## PART IV

### SOURCE MATERIALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND REFERENCE

#### A. Reference Materials

##### 1. Miscellaneous Materials

**MODERN CHINA STUDIES IN-  
TERNATIONAL BULLETIN**, No. 8 (June 1974).

A bulletin published several times a year since 1970 listing the "current" post-graduate research being done on both Chinas covering various fields ranging from anthropology to economics, foreign relations, history, politics, religion, science, military affairs, etc. This publication is published by the Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University.

**A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CENTRAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT MEETINGS IN [COMMUNIST] CHINA, 1949-1975**, by Kenneth Lieberthal, in *International Journal of Politics*, v. 5, no. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1975) 3-322.

**TREATIES IN FORCE**. Washington, Department of State, 1976. 461 p.

A list of treaties and other international agreements of the United States in force on January 1, 1976, including, among many others those dealing with the Republic of China.

**WATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD; SELECTED STATISTICS**, comp. and ed. by Frits van der Leeden. Port Washington, N.Y., Water Information Center, Inc., 1975. 568 p.

With statistical information on both Chinas, among many other countries of the world.

**WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY, INCLUDING WORLD SPACE DIRECTORY**. Washington, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1973. 1358 p.

With some information on both Chinas, among others.

**WORLD MILITARY AVIATION; AIRCRAFT, AIRFORCES AND WEAPONRY**, ed. by Nikolaus Krivinyi and others. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1973. 224 p.

Includes the following information for both Chinas, among many other countries of the world: air force strengths; organization; major bases; equipment; etc.

**WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRADE 1963-1973**. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975. 123 p. (Publication 74.)

The information is provided for all the major countries of the world including both Chinas. Trends in World Military Expenditures; Developed and Developing Worlds; World Arms Trade; Relative Burden. With statistical notes and statistical tables.

**WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1974**, by Ruth Leger Sivard. New York, Institute for World Order, 1974. 30 p.

The information in text, chart, and table form includes data on both Chinas, among many others in the world.

**ZIMMERMANN'S WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES**, by W. N. Peach and James A. Constantin. 3rd ed. New York, Harper & Rowe, 1972. 575 p.

This book which contains numerous tables provides information on resources and industries of many countries of the world, including both Chinas.

##### 2. Atlases

**BRITANNICA ATLAS**. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1974. Various Paging. With maps on both Chinas.

**HAMMOND AMBASSADOR WORLD ATLAS**. Maplewood, N.J., Hammond Inc., 1971. 480 p.

Includes also geographic information on both Chinas.

**HAMMOND INTERNATIONAL WORLD ATLAS**. Maplewood, N.J., Hammond Inc., 1971. 192 p.

Includes also geographic information on both Chinas.

**1976 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE**. 107th ed. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1976. 669 p.

Includes, among many others, maps on both Chinas. The section on general world information includes: air line distances; altitudes of selected cities;

latest official population figures; gazetteer index of countries, regions and political divisions and world political information table; general index of foreign places and physical features; steamship distances; time chart; world facts and comparisons; and world physical comparisons.

OXFORD WORLD ATLAS. New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 1973. 190 p.

Ocean Maps; The Physical Environment; Topographic Maps; Urban Maps; and Thematic Maps. Both Chinas appear in many of the representations.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ATLAS. Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, 1971. 82 p.

Colored maps and charts.

THE TIMES ATLAS OF CHINA, ed. by P. J. M. Geelan and D. C. Twitchett. New York, The New York Times Book Company, 1974. 212 p.

"An all-inclusive atlas of the Middle Kingdom, featuring craftsmanlike maps and accompanying text in an oversize format. The atlas can be divided into three sections: (1) historical, economic and thematic maps (e.g., 'The Five Dynasties,' 'The Minority Peoples,' 'Agriculture,' 'Roads and Waterways'); (2) physical maps (e.g., 'North China Plan,' 'North-east China and Korea,' 'Sinkiang and Tibet'); and (3) provincial maps and city plans. The modern, simplified Chinese characters used in the People's Republic are employed in the administrative summaries, except for Taiwan, and the editors have adopted the Wade-Giles transcription system."

THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD. COMPREHENSIVE EDITION. New York, The New York Times Book Co., 1975. 223 p.

WORLD BANK ATLAS: POPULATION PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975. 30 p.

A series of tables providing this information for the various countries of the world, including both Chinas, among many others.

### 3. *Encyclopedias*

HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN WORLD; A CONCISE REFERENCE HISTORY FROM 1760 TO THE PRESENT, ed. by Richard B. Morris and Graham W. Irwin. New York, Harper & Rowe, 1970. 1271 p.

In two parts: a basic chronology, and a topical chronology. With information on many countries of the world.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS AND ISLANDS, ed. by An-

thony Huxley. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962. 383 p.

"In this volume some of these features are described: the major oceans, seas and islands, bays and straits, currents and depths, capes and coasts . . . There are more than 350 articles in the Encyclopedia, describing the most important seas, islands and other features. To supplement these articles there is a gazetteer with some 2,000 entries. Reference maps show the positions of the principal seas and islands. Numerous photographs demonstrate many aspects of sea and coast and human activities upon them. Finally, there is a comprehensive index."

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RIVERS AND LAKES, ed. by R. Kay Gresswell and Anthony Huxley. New York, Putnam, 1965. 384 p.

With illustrations and maps, accompanying dictionaries of rivers and lakes.

WORLD MARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS; ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA, ed. by Moshe Y. Sachs. New York, Harper & Rowe, 1971. 402 p.

A practical guide to the geographic, historical, political, social, and economic status of all nations, their international relationships, and the United Nations system. For each country the following information is provided; location, size, and extent; topography; climate; flora and fauna; population; ethnic groups; language; religion; transportation; communications; history; government; political parties; local government; judicial systems; armed forces; migration; international cooperation; economy; income; labor; agriculture; animal husbandry; fishing; forestry; mining; energy and power; industry; domestic trade; foreign trade; balance of payments; banking; insurance; securities; public finance; taxation; custom and duties; foreign investments; economic policy; health; social welfare; housing; education; libraries and museums; organizations; press; tourism; bibliography; etc. Includes such information for the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, among others.

### 4. *Handbooks*

AREA HANDBOOK FOR REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Frederick H. Chaffee and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1969. 435 p. [DA PAM 550-63.]

Contents: Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliographies; and Glossary.

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Helen A. Barth and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. 729 p. [DA PAM 550-60.]



Contents: Country Summary; Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliographies; Glossary; and Illustrations and Tables.

FLAGS OF THE WORLD, ed. by E. M. C. Barraclough. London, Frederick Warne & Co., Ltd., 1969. 284 p.

With 370 flags in full color (including The People's Republic of China); over 375 text drawings; and bibliography.

THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, 1972. New York, United Nations, 1972. 367 p.

A detailed collection of statistical tables including information on both Chinas, among many other countries of the world. See also 1973 supplement—published in 1974 by the United Nations.

NATIONAL ANTHEMS OF THE WORLD, ed. by Martin Shaw and others. New York, ARCO Publishing Co., 1976. 477 p.

Words (in Chinese and English) and music of the national anthems of both Chinas, among many others.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1975, ed. by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1975. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations, including those of both Chinas.

(\*)—WORLD COMMUNISM. A HANDBOOK: 1918-1965, ed. by Witold S. Sworakowski. Stanford, Stanford, University, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 576 p.

"This guidebook provides summary data on every communist party in existence during the 1918-1965 period and on such organizations as the Balkan Communist Federation, Cominform and Comintern, Communist Youth International, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Warsaw Treaty Organization, World Federation of Trade Unions, and numerous front organizations. Information on each party and organization includes a brief history, structure, membership, relationship to Soviet leadership, press organs, party congresses, and a bibliography." Includes information also on China, among many other countries of the world.

THE WORLD THIS YEAR 1973; SUPPLEMENT TO THE POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD—GOVERNMENTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1973, ed. by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1973. 184 p. (For the Council on Foreign Relations.)

"Presenting the salient facts about the world's political arrangements at the beginning of 1973, this volume continues the series of annual political surveys inaugurated by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1927." There are two major sections in addition to appendixes: Governments; and Intergovernmental Organizations. Under the first section the following are discussed, among many others: China (Current All-China Developments, People's Republic of China, Republic of China).

#### 5. *Who's Who in Communist China and Taiwan*

BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965, by Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. 2 v.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS WHO'S WHO. Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1970-1971. 2 v.

A DICTIONARY OF POLITICS, ed. by Walter Lacqueur and others. rev. ed. New York, The Free Press, 1973. 565 p.

"This dictionary, arranged alphabetically, has assembled over 3,000 entries and covers all the major nations and areas [including, among others, Republic of China (Taiwan), and the People's Republic of China] and alliances of the world, leading statesmen and politicians, important political ideas and concepts, and crucial events in world history."

DIPLOMATIC LIST. Washington, Department of State, May 1976. 132 p.

Provides listing of diplomatic corps for the Republic of China, among many others.

INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK AND STATESMEN'S WHO'S WHO, 1975. London, Kelly's Directories, 1975. Various paging.

With information on the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, among others.

#### 6. *Yearbooks (Miscellaneous Subjects)*

ANNUAL OF POWER CONFLICT 1971; A SURVEY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE, ed. by Brian Crozier. London, Institute for the Study of Conflict and National Strategy Information Center, 1972. 141 p.

Part I—"Survey of Conflict" considers revolutionary challenges throughout the world, the sponsorship of extremist movements, the interests served and successes and failures of the revolutionaries." Considers also, among others Non-Arab Africa. "Part II is concerned with the 'Political Balance,' on a world and regional basis [including Africa South of the Sahara]. Its primary

concern is with the waxing or waning fortunes of the great powers, or groups of powers. In each area, it attempts to assess whether events have served or disserved the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and so forth . . . The Appendices cover a wide spread background; the maps and charts show situations at a glance."

**THE ANNUAL REGISTER; WORLD EVENTS IN 1974**, ed. by H. V. Hodson and Verena Hoffman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1975. 580 p.

Part VII deals with events in South-East and East Asia, including information on Communist China and Taiwan, among others.

**BRASSEY'S INFANTRY WEAPONS OF THE WORLD, 1975**, ed. by Maj. Gen. J. I. H. Owen. London, Brassey's 1975. 323 p.

Infantry weapons and combat aids in current use by the regular and reserve forces of all nations, including the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, among others.

**CHINA, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, 1976**, ed. by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1976. 257-279.

A review of Communist affairs in Communist China during the year 1976.

**THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1975; A WORLD SURVEY, VOLUME II—AFRICA, THE AMERICAS, ASIA, AUSTRALASIA**. London, Europa Publications Limited, 1975. 1832 p.

For each country supplies information on location, climate, language, religion, recent history, government, defense, economic affairs, transport and communications, social welfare, education, tourism, statistical surveys, government, diplomatic representation, constitution, press, etc. Includes information on the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan), among many others.

**FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, ASIA 1975 YEARBOOK**, ed. by Christopher Lewis. Hong Kong, Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1975. 312 p.

The large portion of the book is devoted to surveys (politics, foreign relations, economy, finance, trade, agriculture, industry, etc.) of many countries of the world including both Chinas.

**JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 1975-76**, ed. by John W. Taylor. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1975. 796 p.

Provides information on aircraft of most

nations of the world, including, among others, the People's Republic of China.

**JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1975-76**, ed. by Capt. John E. Moore. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1975. 688 p.

With information on ships of the People's Republic of China.

**JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS 1975**, ed. by Maj. F. W. A. Hobart. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1974. 860 p.

"This book is the first to cover all infantry weapons likely to be met in use today. It deals with hand-held weapons such as pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns and machine guns; with grenades and mortars; and with those anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons used in infantry formations. This book gives detailed specifications and development history of all types of weapon. It does not confine itself to weapons in current production, although naturally more emphasis is given to the latest developments. There is comprehensive coverage of the firearms, grenades and specialised weapons employed by the Soviet Bloc and China as well as the NATO and uncommitted nations. The section on machine guns includes an appreciation of the new Russian GPMG family—the PK, and a description of the first home-produced machine gun from Red China. The information on rifles is presented so as to allow a comparison of American and Russian guns, and there is some discussion of the future programme in the USA. Information is provided on the functioning and characteristics of the Russian infantry anti-tank missiles, with an appreciation of how the Sagger affected the Yom Kippur War."

**JANE'S WEAPON SYSTEMS, 1976**, ed. by R. T. Pretty. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1976. 871 p.

With some information pertaining to both Chinas.

**JANE'S WORLD RAILWAYS AND RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS, 1976**, ed. by Paul J. Goldsack. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1976. 554 p.

With some information pertaining to both Chinas.

**MINERAL YEARBOOK, VOLUME 3; AREA REPORTS: INTERNATIONAL**. Washington, U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1976. 1193 p.

Of particular interest are the following chapters included in the Yearbook: The Mineral Industry of the People's Republic of China; and The Mineral Industry of Taiwan.

**PORTS OF THE WORLD 1974**. 27th ed. London, Benn Brothers Limited, 1974. 867 p.

Including those of both Chinas, among many other countries.



**R.U.S.I. AND BRASSEY'S DEFENCE YEARBOOK, 1975/76.** Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1975. 418 p.

Includes among many other articles: Sino-Soviet Relations, by E. Stuart Kirby. See also annuals for previous years.

**STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1974.** Twenty-Sixth Issue. New York, United Nations, 1975. 877 p. (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/2.)

Includes some information of an economic and social affairs nature pertaining to Communist China, among many other nations of the world.

**WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1975.** Stockholm, International Research Institute, 1975. 618 p.

The sixth issue of the SIPRI Yearbook continues the analysis of the world's arms races and the attempts to stop them. Among others, includes the following information on Communist China: military expenditure, indigenous weapon development, arms trade, receipt of arms and aid, nuclear weapon tests, disarmament agreements, strategic nuclear forces, etc.

**WORLD BANK/IDA; ANNUAL REPORT 1974-75.** Washington, World Bank/International Development Association, 1974. 144 p.

Includes information on the Republic of China, among other.

**WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '76, v. 22 (1976)** 126 p.

An annual review of international oil operations. The first part deals with special reports and area studies, including a world summary and review and reports on Communist China, among many others.

**WORLD RADIO-TV HANDBOOK, 1972, ed. by J. M. Frost.** 26th ed. New York, World Radio-TV Handbook, 1972. 384 p. [Continuing series.]

A complete directory of international radio and television, including that of both Chinas, among many other countries.

**YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1973. VOLUME 26.** New York, United Nations, Office of Public Information, 1976. 935 p. (?) (E.74.I.1.)

In this record of the activities of the United Nations for the year 1973, the activities related to both Chinas are included, among others.

**THE YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1975. VOLUME 29.** London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1975. 384 p.

This record of world affairs for the year 1975 includes information pertinent to both Chinas, among others.

**YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COM-**

**MUNIST AFFAIRS: 1975, ed. by Richard F. Staar.** Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 678 p.

With each passing year, the task of keeping abreast of changing developments in the Communist world becomes more difficult. This Yearbook, edited by Richard F. Staar, provides a comprehensive survey covering the calendar year 1974 of the organizational structure, internal development, domestic and foreign policies, and activity of Communist parties throughout the world. Includes, among many others: China (People's Republic), by Stephen Uhalley, Jr., which covers organization and leadership, domestic party affairs, and international views and positions.

## **B. Bibliography of Bibliographies**

### *1. Miscellaneous Bibliographies*

[BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in **AREA HANDBOOK FOR REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by Frederick H. Chaffee and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1969. pp. 417-432. (DA PAM 550-63.)

Recommended further reading on social, political, economic, and national security aspects.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in **AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**, by Helen A. Barth and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1972. pp. 639-701. (DA PAM 550-60.)

Social, political, economic, and national security aspects.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in **RUSSIAN STUDIES OF CHINA; PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF SOVIET SINOLOGY**, by E. Stuart Kirby. Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1976. pp. 173-201.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in **TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA**, by O. Edmund Clubb. 2nd ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.

**COMMUNIST CHINA; A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY**, by Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 253 p. (DA PAM 550-9.)

This bibliographic survey of literature includes citations of books, articles, and monographs on the following, among others: Global Ambitions and Objectives; China's Nuclear Threat—The Challenge to East and West; Military Posture; Communist China and the World—Foreign Policy and International Relations; etc.

**DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON ASIA; AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH**, comp. and ed. by Frank Joseph Shulman, v. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1975) 58 p.

Published for the Association for Asian Studies by Xerox University Microfilms.—The sec-

tion on both Chinas covers the period from ancient times through to the present.

INFORASIA, v. 2, no. 2 (April-June 1975).

This is the sixth issue of a quarterly bibliography, printed in Japan, providing information on new books and non-print resources in English related to Asia, produced in all countries of the world. The section devoted to China provides information on philosophy, religion, social science, language, technology, the arts, literature, and history.

MODERN CHINESE SOCIETY, AN ANALYTICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, ed. by G. William Skinner. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1973. 3 v.

V.1—Publications in Western Languages, 1644-1972 (13,057 entries); V.2—Publications in Chinese, 1644-1969 (11,215 entries); and V.3—Publications in Japanese, 1664-1971 (7,169 entries). Coverage limited to the domestic social structure, economy, polity, culture, etc.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AFTER MAO WHAT? ARMY, PARTY AND GROUP RIVALRIES IN CHINA, by J. P. Jain. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1975. pp. 259-268.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CHINA'S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: OUTPUT GROWTH AND EXPORT POTENTIAL, by Chu-yuan Cheng. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976. pp. 214-236.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLEMICS, by Alfred D. Law. Cranbury, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976. pp. 345-356.

[A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY—THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COOPERATION AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE], in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY; SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE. Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1976. pp. 472-474. (US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations. Committee Print.)

SOUTH ASIA AND THE STRATEGIC INDIAN OCEAN; A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF LITERATURE, by Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts. Washington, Department of the Army, 1973. 373 p. (DA PAMPHLET 550-15.)

Includes, among others, citations and abstracts of articles, books, and monographs on: the relations between South Asian countries and Communist China; South Asia and China's nuclear

bomb; China's interests in and policies concerning the strategic Indian Ocean; relations between India, Pakistan, and Nepal with Communist China; etc.

## 2. *Chinese Communism and the Chinese Communist Party*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1921-1949, by Jacques Guillermaz. New York, Random House, 1972.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM; THE SOVIET, CHINESE, AND YUGOSLAV MODELS, by Gary K. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Co., 1976. various paging.

## 3. *Foreign Policy and International Relations*

[BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE], in CHINA'S FOREIGN AID; AN INSTRUMENT OF PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY, by John Franklin Copper. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books. 1976. pp. 185-189.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CHINA AND AFRICA, 1949-1970; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, by Bruce D. Larkin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. pp. 249-256.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in COMMUNIST CHINA & LATIN AMERICA, 1959-1967, by Cecil E. Johnson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. pp. 305-312.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50-YEAR BIBLIOGRAPHY; NEW EVALUATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1920-1970, ed. by Bryon Dexter and others. New York, R. R. Bowker Co., 1972. 936 p. (Pub. for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Part Three, Section IV lists citations of books dealing with the following, among others: China—Pre-1911 Revolution; China—Republican Period—Kuomintang; Chinese Communism to 1949; and People's Republic of China.

## 4. *Communist China and International Law*

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHINESE SOURCES, comp. by Paul Ho. Washington, Library of Congress, Law Library, Far Eastern Law Division, 1972. 45 p.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHIES], in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ed. by Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1972.



5. *United States Policy Toward Communist China*

[BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY], in *THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND CHINA, 1945-1949*, by Ernest May. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1975. pp. 103-107.

[BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES], in

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA. THE HISTORICAL RECORD: 1949-1969, by Foster Rhea Dulles. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND ARMS CONTROL*, by Ralph N. Clough and others. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975. pp. 145-147.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **CENTRAL AND EAST ASIA ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY POWER, REGIONAL SURVEY**

[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army Ret., Col. John A. C. Andrews, U.S. Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes. 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.]



# CENTRAL AND EAST ASIA

## Regional Survey

### MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

This region comprises Mongolia, the Koreans, Japan, and China. Russian territories in East and Central Asia are excluded from this consideration; they are discussed in the section dealing with the Soviet Union as a whole. The discussion of China for political reasons is divided into two parts: that dealing with the People's Republic of China, which rules mainland China (including Tibet), and the Republic of China, which controls only Taiwan and a few minor islands off the coast of China.

This region includes some of the most densely populated and some of the most sparsely populated areas in the world. Dense populations are to be found in the river valleys of China and on the islands of Japan. Sparse populations eke out existence in the vast expanse of mountains north of the spine of the Himalayas, and in the broad deserts of the Gobi and Sinkiang.

The coastal and island regions have a monsoon climate quite similar to that found in South and Southeast Asia, although not so precisely patterned and predictable. Little of the monsoon moisture reaches the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, however, because of the intervening Himalayas to the south, and the mountains of China to the east.

### STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

China's access to the open sea is blocked to the south by the rimland states of South and Southeast Asia. To the east this access to open sea is also impeded, even though not so rigidly blocked, by the island chain extending from the southern tip of Kamchatka Peninsula to the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula.

China is not vulnerable from the lands to the south; there has never been a major successful overland invasion of East or Central Asia from that direction. However, China—like the rest of mainland East Asia—is vulnerable to invasion by seapowers controlling all or a significant portion of the chain of East Asian islands. This vulnerability, however, is to a large degree superficial because of the great difficulty which a maritime nation would have exerting military power inland through regions in which mountains and large rivers form serious military obstacles, and in which vast populations defy easy control.

To the north and west, however, there are fewer military

obstacles and smaller populations. In these areas the tides of conquest have often shifted rapidly and far. Usually these tides have reflected the extent to which the regime controlling eastern and central China could extend its power further inland. In some instances, however, exceptionally powerful Central Asian regimes (most notably that of Genghis Khan) have been able to seize the initiative from China in a positive manner, rather than merely as a reflection of Chinese weakness. Thus, until relatively modern times, the military history of East and Central Asia has been largely that of the fluctuations of power between China proper and evanescent—and usually nomadic—regimes of the lands to the north and west.

In the age of technology, however, the nomads of Central Asia suffered from insuperable disadvantages, and gradually succumbed to pressures of Russia from the north and west, and China from the south and east. More recently, the amazing technological progress of Japan, interrupted only briefly by defeat in World War II, has brought that island kingdom to a position of pre-eminent industrial power in the region, while still retaining a potential military capability that was to some degree evidenced in the Russo-Japanese War, in the various pre-1941 Japanese invasions of China, and even in its ill-fated aggressions of World War II.

The role of nuclear weapons in the area is increasingly important. Japan, with its high concentration of industry and population, is extremely vulnerable. The People's Republic of China, poised between the two nuclear superpowers, protects itself by conciliating one and by deploying its modest nuclear resources against the other in a way that threatens to permit some measure of effective retaliation.

### REGIONAL ALLIANCES

There is no major regional alliance relating to this area. There are, however, a number of relevant bilateral alliances and mutual security pacts, and there is in effect one major international alliance as a result of United Nations declarations and actions regarding Korea. The major alliances are listed below:

*United Nations Support for the Republic of Korea.* This stems directly from the United Nations Declarations of June 1950. Active combat participants in the Korean War were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France,

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Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. Non-combatant participants were: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden.

*Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance* (February 1950)

*Sino-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Treaty* (May 1960)

*Sino-North Korean Mutual Assistance Treaty* (July 1961)

*United States Bilateral Mutual Assistance Treaties* with: Republic of China (March 1955), Republic of Korea (November 1954), and Japan (January 1960)

*Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Treaty* (1936, 1946, 1966).

#### RECENT INTRA-AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Two of the three most important wars since the end of World War II have taken place in this region: the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. One other important but brief conflict took place along the frontiers of the region between China and India in 1962. It is perhaps significant that the People's Republic of China (Communist China) was involved in all three of these wars. A list of all recent major hostilities, or crises involving military operations in the region follows:

1963-date	Intermittent border violence along Sino-Soviet frontiers
1968	Seizure of USS <i>Pueblo</i> by North Korean naval forces
1969	North Korea downs US aircraft over Japan Sea
1973	Soviet Union intensifies intrusions into Japanese airspace; sends naval task force down Taiwan Strait
1974	January: People's Republic of China takes Paracel Islands from South Vietnam forces
1974	February: People's Republic of China takes position in Spratley Islands, also claimed by Republic of China and Republic of Vietnam



## **APPENDIX B**

### **ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES, SELECTED YEARS, 1938-85, INCLUDING COMMUNIST CHINA**

**(Statistical Table)**

[Prepared by Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S.  
Department of Commerce.]

## UNCLASSIFIED

ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES\*  
SELECTED YEARS, 1938-85

May 1989

Midyear Population in Millions

Country	Present Boundaries										Midyear Population in Millions								
	1938	1945	1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	
Total Communist Countries	801	804	819	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,188	1,210	1,232	1,255	1,279	1,322	1,362
USSR	168.7	188.5	175.0	180.1	196.1	214.2	218.0	221.5	224.8	227.8	230.6	233.1	235.6	237.8	240.2	242.5	254.6	287.5	281.4
Eastern European Communist Countries	111.3	94.5	89.0	88.5	92.8	96.5	97.2	97.8	98.6	99.4	100.1	100.6	101.1	102.0	102.8	103.6	106.1	112.8	117.2
Bulgaria	6.2	6.7	6.9	7.3	7.5	7.9	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.8	9.1	9.3
Czechoslovakia	15.3	14.5	14.2	13.1	13.7	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.1	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.4	14.5	14.8	15.2	15.4
East Germany	28.1	16.6	17.9	18.4	17.8	17.0	16.9	16.9	16.9	17.0	17.0	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.2	17.4	17.6
Hungary	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.5	10.7	10.8
Poland	34.7	31.9	25.0	24.8	27.2	29.6	30.0	30.3	30.7	31.2	31.5	31.7	32.2	32.5	32.5	32.8	34.5	36.4	38.3
Rumania	19.8	15.6	15.7	16.3	17.3	18.4	18.6	18.7	18.8	18.9	19.0	19.1	19.3	19.7	20.1	20.4	22.2	24.0	25.7
Far Eastern Communist Countries	499	499	533	571	634	713	725	737	751	768	785	803	821	839	858	877	962	1,105	1,244
Communist China	476	476	510	547	611	686	698	709	723	738	755	772	789	806	824	843	944	1,081	1,185
North Korea	8.9	8.9	9.2	9.2	8.9	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.2	12.6	13.0	13.4	13.8	14.2	16.3	18.8	21.8
North Vietnam	13.7	13.7	14.2	14.7	14.9	16.0	16.4	16.8	17.2	17.6	18.1	18.5	18.9	19.3	19.7	20.1	22.2	24.5	27.2
Other Communist Countries	21.5	22.0	22.1	23.8	25.8	27.5	27.9	28.3	28.7	29.2	29.7	30.1	30.5	31.0	31.3	31.7	34.0	36.6	39.5
Albania	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3
Cuba	4.4	4.4	5.0	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.8	8.4	9.2	10.3
Mongolia	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.1
Yugoslavia	15.4	15.9	15.2	16.3	17.5	18.4	18.6	18.8	19.1	19.3	19.5	19.7	19.9	20.2	20.4	20.6	21.7	22.8	23.9
Total Communist Countries	801	804	819	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,188	1,210	1,232	1,255	1,279	1,322	1,362
Total NATO Countries	373	372	392	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	519	524	530	535	566	600	637
United States	130.0	130.0	140.5	152.3	165.9	180.7	183.8	186.7	189.4	192.1	194.6	196.9	199.1	201.2	203.6	206.0	219.4	235.2	252.9
Other NATO Countries	242.8	242.4	251.0	265.5	279.4	295.2	298.5	302.4	306.1	308.7	313.4	316.9	319.9	323.0	326.1	329.3	346.3	364.5	384.5
Belgium	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.6	8.9	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.7	9.8	10.1	10.4	10.8
Canada	11.5	11.5	12.4	13.7	15.7	17.9	18.3	18.6	18.9	19.3	19.6	20.1	20.4	20.8	21.2	21.6	23.7	26.0	28.5
Denmark	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.6
France	42.0	42.0	39.7	41.7	43.4	45.7	46.2	47.0	47.9	48.4	48.9	49.4	49.9	50.3	50.8	51.3	53.7	56.2	58.9
West Germany	39.8	39.8	43.8	47.8	50.2	53.2	54.0	54.8	55.4	56.1	56.8	57.5	57.7	58.0	58.4	58.7	60.5	62.3	64.1
West Berlin	2.7	2.7	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Greece	7.1	7.1	7.3	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.8	8.9	8.9	9.3	9.6	9.8
Ireland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Italy	43.6	43.0	45.0	46.6	48.2	49.6	49.9	50.2	50.6	51.1	51.6	52.0	52.4	52.8	53.2	53.6	55.6	57.8	60.0
Luxembourg	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Netherlands	8.7	8.7	9.3	10.1	10.8	11.5	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.1	12.3	12.5	12.6	12.7	12.9	13.0	13.8	14.6	15.4
Norway	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.4
Portugal	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.4	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.7	10.2	10.7	11.2
Turkey	16.9	17.1	18.8	20.8	23.9	27.5	28.2	28.9	29.6	30.4	31.1	31.9	32.7	33.5	34.4	35.2	39.9	45.1	51.0
United Kingdom	47.5	47.5	49.2	50.6	51.2	52.6	52.9	53.5	53.8	54.2	54.6	54.9	55.2	55.5	55.7	56.0	57.7	59.5	61.8
Total NATO Countries	373	372	392	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	519	524	530	535	566	600	637

\*These figures have been agreed to by interested agencies of the Government as representing accurate estimates for past dates and reasonable projections for future dates. Those for the Far Eastern Communist countries, however, are less reliable. The figures have been prepared by the Bureau of the Census of the US Department of Commerce, and any questions as to sources and methods used should be directed to the Chief, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, code 183, extension 38878. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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## **APPENDIX C**

### **PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BACKGROUND NOTES**

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[Washington, Department of State, November 1975 (Publication 7751).]

department of state \* november 1975

## OFFICIAL NAME: People's Republic of China

## GEOGRAPHY

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), located in eastern Asia, is the third largest country in the world in terms of total area (after the U.S.S.R. and Canada). It shares common borders with North Korea, the U.S.S.R.,

the Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, and North Vietnam. The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese Overseas Province of Macao are on the P.R.C.'s southern coastline.

Two-thirds of China's area is moun-

tainous or semidesert; only about one-tenth is cultivated. Ninety percent of the people live on one-sixth of the land, primarily in the fertile plains and deltas of the east.

The country lies almost entirely in the Temperate Zone. Only portions of the southernmost area—the Provinces of Yunnan and Kwangtung and the autonomous region of Kwangsi Chuang—are within the tropics. Monsoonal climate is a major influence, with summers hot and humid throughout much of the country and winters dry and unusually cool or cold for the given latitude. The concentration of rain in the summer frequently results in torrential downpours and is a major cause of the floods which often afflict China.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 3,691,502 sq. mi. (Urban: 15%).  
CAPITAL: Peking (pop. 7.6 million).  
OTHER CITIES: Shanghai (11 million), Tientsin (4 million), Canton (3 million), Shenyang (3 million), Wuhan (2.7 million).

## People

POPULATION: 920 million (1974 est.).  
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2% (est.).  
DENSITY: 243 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Han Chinese 94%; Mongol, Korean, Manchu, Uighur, Muslim, Chuang, Tibetan, and others. RELIGIONS: Atheist; declining numbers of Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and adherents of tribal religions. IDEOLOGY: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought. LANGUAGES: Standard Chinese, based on Peking dialect (official);<sup>1</sup> other principal dialects—Cantonese, Shanghai, Fukienese, Hakka. ADULT LITERACY: 50-55% (est.). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 55-60 yrs. (est.).

## Government

TYPE: Communist state. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: January 17, 1975. VOTING AGE: 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 21 Provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 3 special municipalities.

FLAG: Five yellow stars, one large and four small, located in the upper left corner of a red field.

## Economy

GNP: \$223 billion (1974 est.). 1952-74 GNP GROWTH RATE: 4.7%. PER CAPITA GNP: \$243 (1974 est.).

AGRICULTURE: Arable land 11%. Rural population 85%. Products—rice, wheat, corn, millet, cotton, sweet potatoes.

MAJOR INDUSTRIES: Iron and steel, coal, machine building, textiles, light industrial products, armaments.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, iron, petroleum, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, uranium, hydroelectric potential.

TRADE: Exports—\$5.9 billion (1974 est.): textile yarn and fabric, animals, meat, fish, clothing, fruits, vegetables, food grains, agricultural raw materials, iron, steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, light industrial products. Partners—Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, FRG, France, Italy, UK, US. Imports—\$6.7 billion (1974 est.): food grains, chemical fertilizer, machinery and equipment, iron, steel, nonferrous metals, complete plants, textile fibers. Partners—Japan, US, Canada, FRG, UK, Australia, France.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: approx. 2 jen min pi=US\$1.

ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED: \$3.5 billion (1956-74).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and most of its specialized agencies.

<sup>1</sup> Chinese names in this publication are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles method rather than the Chinese system of romanization, Pin Yin.





The national language of the P.R.C. is based on the Peking dialect of Mandarin Chinese. Other principal dialects include Cantonese, Shanghai, Fukienese, and Hakka. Chinese dialects are the only modern languages written entirely in nonphonetic ideographs. Some minority peoples in the P.R.C. have their own languages.

## EDUCATION

The expansion of education to support modernization became an urgent program of the P.R.C. beginning in 1949. It is estimated that at that time the 450 million people in China over 7 years of age averaged less than 2 years of education per capita. Enrollments quadrupled in the following 10-year period, reaching about 100 million and raising the number of years in school to about 3.5 per capita. By 1959 enrollment in primary schools was nearly universal, junior secondary enrollment was nearly universal in cities and nearby rural areas, while senior secondary and higher education enrollments were quite narrow and restricted. Educational advancement was by examination, with extreme competition for admittance to senior secondary and higher education. While standards suffered in the rapid growth from 1949 to 1959, they were noticeably improved in the 1959-66 period when the average number of school years reached about 5.5 per capita. In 1966 there were about 116 million students in the P.R.C.

As a result, a flood of graduates entered the labor market after 1959 and found the cities not expanding or providing the urban and industrial jobs they expected. A growing educated, alienated elite began to form, believing it was better trained and motivated to lead the revolution than the less educated old cadres who had led the guerrilla legions out of the backward rural areas.

The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" launched in 1966, a fundamental political and cultural upheaval, resulted in major changes in Chinese education, as well as in the party and the government. Schools and universities were closed for several years as activist Chinese youths,

known as Red Guards, became engaged in a movement to purge elements in the top leadership and remold the middle echelons of the bureaucracy. Millions of educated, urban youths were assigned to the countryside.

The new educational system, still being formed, provides for a universal 9-year primary-secondary curriculum for youths 7-15 years of age. The schools no longer will be operated by the central Ministry of Education but will be run and financed by local organizations—in the rural areas, by the communes; and in the cities, by the factories and neighborhood organizations. Teachers will be paid local wage rates, and curricula and costs will be shaped by local desires and needs. Virtually all secondary school graduates are to go to work at age 16, and candidates for higher education will be selected from those aged 18-25, as nominated by local work units throughout China on the basis of job performance and political attitudes. A very few outstanding students are being permitted to enter the universities directly from high school.

This system expands enrollments at lower grades while curtailing enrollments at higher levels, consonant with the need for more technicians and other mid-level personnel. Examinations are downgraded in importance, reducing the sense of elite status at higher grade levels and emphasizing the importance of ideological qualifications.

## HISTORY

China is among the oldest of the world's civilizations. The earliest evidence of Chinese civilization is set at about 1500 B.C. As with most ancient civilizations, China's beginnings are obscure, but under successive dynasties Chinese culture prospered and advanced to a point where achievements in literature, philosophy, art, and craftsmanship were among the highest attained by man.

The advent of Western ideas had profound consequences for traditional China. Weak in the scientific field and untouched by the industrial revolution, China was no match for 19th-

## TRAVEL NOTES

Chinese officials have said that general tourism cannot yet be encouraged, because facilities for visitors are limited. The Chinese have given visas, however, to groups and individuals in various fields of interest to them, such as education, journalism, medicine, science, and sports.

To apply for tourist travel to the People's Republic of China, US citizens should write to the China International Travel Service, Peking, People's Republic of China, sending a copy of the letter, if they wish, with a covering letter, to the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China, 2300 Connecticut Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008. In the letter state the purpose, proposed time, and duration of the visit and include biographic data.

US citizens do not need permission from the US Government to travel to the PRC. There is no longer a restriction on the use of a US passport for travel to that country. The restriction appearing in passports issued some time ago will be deleted upon request at any passport agency in the US or at any US embassy or consulate abroad.

century Western expansionism. A series of military and political humiliations at the hands of the West slowly awakened Chinese intellectuals to the need for drastic changes in the traditional society if China were to be preserved as an entity.

The process of change in a society structured by more than 3,000 years of civilization has not been an easy one, and China in the 20th century has been rent by political, economic, and intellectual chaos and revolution in its search for accommodation with the modern world.

## 20th Century

Recognition of China's inability under its Mandarin-Confucian system of government to deal either with internal difficulties or with foreign encroachments started a great ferment among China's intellectuals. Many liberals hoped to reform the Imperial system; others, like Sun Yat-sen, sought to overthrow it completely and establish a modern republic.



## **TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE P.R.C. (1974 est.)**

### **Transportation:**

*Railroads*—27,000 miles.

*Highways*—435,000 miles; about 25% all-weather, improved surface roads; about 25% improved earth roads; about 50% unimproved earth roads.

*Inland waterways*—105,000 miles; 25% navigable by steamer.

*Merchant Marine*—Average ship size about 16,000 DWT; total tonnage about 5 million DWT.

*Ports*—9 major ports; 10 secondary ports.

*Aviation*—85-90 domestic routes serving more than 70 cities; 7 international airports.

### **Telecommunications:**

*Telephones*—About 1 million in service.

*Television*—30 main stations; about 300,000 TV receivers.

*Radio*—150-250 AM stations; about 45 million receivers.

The Manchu Empire (Ch'ing Dynasty) was brought down by the revolution touched off on October 10, 1911, and in its place rose the shaky structure of the Republic of China. The new government barely survived the impact of World War I, which Japan used as an excuse to move into Shantung and to present China with a stringent list of demands. After the death in 1916 of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Republic's first president, the unstable government was all but shattered in the warlord era.

In the 1920's a new leader arose, Chiang Kai-shek, a protege of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang began pulling together pieces of a fragmented China. The Kuomintang (KMT)—Nationalist Party—was reorganized with the assistance of Soviet advisers. An increasingly uneasy association between the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Soviet advisers continued until 1927. Chiang then drove the Communists out of the KMT and out of the government. He destroyed most of

their party organization and virtually paralyzed their ranks throughout China. The Communist survivors fled to the mountains of Kiangsi in south-central China.

In their historic "Long March" of 1934-35 the Communists, driven out of the mountains by the KMT, retreated to Shensi Province in the northwest. Despite continued hardships, they reorganized their forces under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. The bitter struggle between the KMT and the CCP continued even while both sides were engaged in the war against Japan, finally culminating in the Communist defeat of the KMT forces in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek moved his KMT government and elements of the armed forces to the island of Taiwan. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was formally proclaimed.

The Communists assumed control of a country that had been exhausted by nearly a generation of conflict, war, and social upheavals; whose economy had been disrupted, with many of its industrial centers either damaged or destroyed; and whose people had become disillusioned by inflation and the inability of the government concurrently to solve China's economic problems and meet the political challenge of the Communists. As a result, many Chinese were ready for a change and willing to take a chance with any political organization that gave promise of establishing order and restoring the economy.

The Chinese Communist leaders initially proclaimed the objective of transforming a weak and traditionally backward China into a militarily strong, modern, industrial state. The economic progress of the Chinese Communists in the years of rehabilitation following 1949 was impressive. They succeeded in curbing inflation, restoring the transportation network, and rebuilding many of the industrial plants destroyed during World War II, although the strains of the Korean war created serious financial difficulties.

Between 1949 and 1966 the P.R.C. had a typically Communist government, similar to that of the U.S.S.R. The authority of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP-CC) reached into every phase of

Chinese life through an extensive organization extending down to the village and city block. Strong military and security forces supplemented the ranks of CCP members, who held key power positions in the state government apparatus and in the functional youth, labor, and women's organizations and thus exercised effective control over the entire country.

### **The Cultural Revolution**

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution changed this situation. Begun in the spring of 1966, this most massive, pervasive, and disruptive of all Chinese Communist political campaigns was the result of several interacting processes: (1) an attempt by Chairman Mao Tse-tung to purge and remold his party bureaucracy, which he felt had degenerated and was leading the country toward Soviet-style "goulash communism"; (2) Mao's effort to inspire and test a younger generation that had never experienced war or revolution; and (3) deep-seated and longstanding domestic and foreign policy disputes among the top leadership, many of whom increasingly questioned the applicability of Mao's revolutionary principles to the problems of administering a complex nation-state.

By the time the movement entered a consolidation phase in the summer of 1968, millions of CCP and government officials and ordinary Chinese had come under criticism, and the party structure was virtually shattered. Key political, economic, and military officials had been purged, including among others, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the CCP Secretary General and Vice Premier. The disruption engendered by the Cultural Revolution also led to extensive involvement by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the political and economic life of the country.

### **Developments Since 1968**

By the autumn of 1968 the Chinese leadership had become increasingly concerned with the excesses of the Red Guard groups throughout China. Efforts were made in the latter part of 1968 and in early 1969 to stabilize the domestic political situation. These ef-

forts culminated in April 1969 with the convening of the 9th National Party Congress which reinstituted formal party structures and reconstituted the Politburo and Central Committee of the CCP. Minister of National Defense Lin Piao was formally designated successor to Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Central Committee.

The dominant trend of the post-9th Party Congress period was one of moderation and stability in domestic and foreign policies.

Although the 9th Party Congress seemed to have formally ended the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, conflicting factions still existed within the CCP leadership. An important indicator of this continuing factionalism was the purge of Defense Minister Lin Piao in September 1971. According to Chinese accounts, Lin mounted an abortive coup against Mao and was subsequently killed in a plane crash while fleeing the country.

The 10th Party Congress, convened in August 1973, reaffirmed the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution and the policy line of the 9th Party Congress, although it denounced Lin Piao as a traitor. During the fall of 1973 a campaign was launched attacking the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius; and in early 1974 this was merged with a campaign attacking Lin Piao. The announced target of the campaign was backsliding from the objectives and policies of the Cultural Revolution. It was followed by a campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat—begun after the 4th National People's Congress held in January 1975—which exhorts the people to study theory in order to guard against the resurgence of "bourgeois tendencies." In August 1975 a new campaign was initiated to criticize the "capitulationist" aspects of the 14th century Chinese novel, *Shui Hu Chuan*.

In recent years the government has placed renewed emphasis on pragmatic policies and plans which were codified and endorsed by the 4th National People's Congress. Some, but by no means all, of the officials criticized and dismissed during the Cultural Revolution have been publicly reinstated, including Teng Hsiao-p'ing, now the ranking Vice Premier, Chief of Staff of

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the PLA, member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Vice Chairman of the CCP-CC.

## GOVERNMENT

A new national Constitution was adopted by the 4th National People's Congress on January 17, 1975, to replace the one promulgated in 1954.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>For the full text of the 1975 Constitution, see *China Reconstructs*, vol. XXIV, no. 3. Peking: 1975.

The new Constitution defined the P.R.C. as "a Socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat," whereas the previous document had theoretically sanctioned a multiclass and multiparty framework. The Chinese Communist Party's leadership role over the state organs is clearly delineated, in contrast to the 1954 Constitution which specified that the powers of state were to be shared between the National People's Congress, its Standing Committee, and the State Chairman. The latter position,



which had been vacant since Liu Shao-ch'i's effective dismissal in 1968, was abolished, and its authority as head of the armed forces was transferred to the Party Chairman. This measure, along with other new constitutional provisions, institutionally strengthens the preeminence of the party over the state.

The P.R.C.'s legal system, a complex amalgam of custom and statute, almost exclusively criminal rather than civil, was virtually suspended during the Cultural Revolution. It is now being revived. The highest judicial body is the Supreme People's Court, but many essentially judicial functions are entrusted to the Public Security organs. The new Constitution makes the courts accountable to the people's congresses at corresponding levels, and stipulates that the "mass line" is to be applied in both public security and trial work. Major counterrevolutionary cases are to be accompanied by mobilization of the masses for discussion and criticism.

#### **National People's Congress**

The National People's Congress (NPC) is constitutionally the P.R.C.'s highest organ of state authority. Its representatives are indirectly elected for a term of 5 years. NPC sessions are to be convened annually, although "when necessary, the session may be advanced or postponed." In practice the NPC has met rarely. The National People's Congress held in January 1975 was only the fourth and took place a decade after the previous one. The NPC serves to endorse nominations to the State Council (Cabinet), amendments to the Constitution, and state policy plans—all formulated by the Chinese Communist Party.

Executive responsibility for the state is vested in the State Council, whose members include the Premier, 12 Vice Premiers, and 29 Ministers. Headed by Chou En-lai since its inception in 1954, the State Council directs and coordinates a huge bureaucracy of ministries, commissions, and special agencies. In accordance with Mao's dictum that the government be streamlined, and also apparently to strengthen central control, a number of ministries have been consolidated.

#### **Chinese Communist Party**

The highest body of the Chinese Communist Party is the National Party Congress. The Congress elects a Central Committee, which in turn elects a Politburo as well as the Party Chairman and other top party leaders. The Politburo elects the Standing Committee; the most prestigious party body and the one with final decisionmaking authority.

The 10th National Party Congress in August 1973 elected a New Central Committee of 319 full and alternate members and adopted a new party constitution. The new constitution increased the number of party vice-chairmen from one to five. Chinese reports on the congress revealed that there are now 28 million party members in the P.R.C.

#### **Provincial Structure**

China's 21 Provinces are Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Heilungkiang, Honan, Hopeh, Hunan, Hupch, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Kansu, Kirin, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Lioaning, Shansi, Shantung, Shensi, Szechwan, Tsinghai, and Yunnan. The five autonomous regions—inhabited primarily by minority ethnic groups—are Kwangsi Chuang, Inner Mongolia, Nighsia Hui, Sinkiang Uighur, and Tibet. The three centrally governed municipalities are Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin. These are further subdivided into prefectures, counties, and municipalities.

The Revolutionary Committee emerged from the Cultural Revolution as the principal governmental organ at the provincial and basic levels. Originally referred to as an alliance of military representatives, cadres, and mass representatives, Revolutionary Committees are now described as an alliance of the young, middle aged, and old. This reflects a change in the composition of the Revolutionary Committees and their parallel Party Committees as the role of the military on the committees has lessened.

#### **Principal Government Officials**

##### **MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO:**

##### Standing Committee Members:

Mao Tse-tung—Chairman of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese

##### Communist Party (CCP)

Chou En-lai—Vice-Chairman of the CCP-CC; Premier, State Council  
Teng Hsiao-p'ing—Vice-Chairman of the CCP-CC; Vice Premier, State Council; Chief of Staff, PLA  
Wang Hung-wen—Vice-Chairman of the CCP-CC  
K'ang Sheng—Vice-Chairman of the CCP-CC  
Yeh Chien-ying—Vice-Chairman of the CCP-CC; Vice-Chairman, Military Commission CCP  
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao—Vice Premier, State Council; First Secretary, Shanghai Party Committee; Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Head, General Political Department, PLA  
Chu Te—Chairman, National People's Congress

##### Other Full Members of Politburo:

Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao Tse-tung)  
Liu Po-ch'eng—Vice-Chairman, National People's Congress  
Yao Wen-yuan—Second Secretary, Shanghai CCP; Vice-Chairman, Shanghai Provincial Revolutionary Committee  
Li Hsien-nien—Vice Premier, State Council; Minister of Finance  
Li Te-sheng—Commander, Shen-yang Military Region  
Hua Kuo-feng—Vice Premier, State Council; Minister of Public Security; First Secretary, Hunan Provincial CCP; Acting Chairman, Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee  
Wu Te—First Secretary, Peking CCP; Chairman Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Second Political Commissar, Peking Military Region; Vice-Chairman, National People's Congress; Secretary-General, 4th National People's Congress  
Ch'en Yung-kuei—Vice Premier, State Council; Secretary, Shansi Provincial CCP; Vice-Chairman, Shansi Provincial Revolutionary Committee  
Wei Kuo-ch'ing—Vice-Chairman, National People's Congress; First Secretary, Kwangsi Provincial CCP; Chairman, Kwangsi Provincial Revolutionary Committee; First Polit-

ical Commissar, Canton Military Region  
 Hsu Shih-yu—Commander, Canton Military Region  
 Ch'en Hsi-lien—Commander, Peking Military Region  
 Wang Tung-hsing—Director, General Office, CCP-CC  
 Chi Teng-k'uei—First Political Commissar, Peking Military Region

#### ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO:

Wu Kuei-hsien—Vice Premier, State Council; Secretary, Shensi Provincial CCP; Model Worker  
 Su Chen-hua—Deputy Commander, Navy  
 Ni Chih-fu—Secretary, Peking CCP; Vice-Chairman, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee; Chairman, Peking Trade Union Council  
 Sai Fu-ting—Vice-Chairman, National People's Congress; First Secretary, Sinkiang Provincial CCP; Chairman, Sinkiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee; First Political Commissar, Sinkiang Military Region

#### MINISTERS

Sha Feng—Agriculture and Forestry  
 Fan Tzu-yu—Commerce  
 Fang I—Economic Relations with Foreign Countries  
 Li Hsien-nien—Finance  
 Chou Jung-hsin—Education  
 K'ang Shih-en—Petroleum and Chemicals  
 Ch'iao Kuan-hua—Foreign Affairs  
 Yu Ch'iu-li—State Planning Commission  
 Li Ch'iang—Foreign Trade  
 Yeh Fei—Communications  
 Yeh Chien-ying—National Defense  
 Hua Kuo-feng—Public Security

#### OTHER OFFICIALS

Kuo Mo-jo—President, China Academy of Sciences  
 Keng Piao—Director, International Liaison Department, CCP  
 Chou P'ei-yuan—Vice President, China Scientific and Technical Association  
 Chou Ch'iu-yeh—Vice President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs  
 Ch'iao P'ei-hsin—General Manager, Bank of China

Yang Kung-su—Director, China Travel and Tourism Bureau  
 Chu Mu-chih—Director, New China News Agency  
 Wang Yao-ting—Chairman, China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade  
 Huang Hua—Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to U.N.; Member, CCP-CC  
 Huang Chen—Chief, P.R.C. Liaison Office in the U.S.; Member, CCP-CC.

The P.R.C. maintains a Liaison Office in the U.S. at 2300 Connecticut Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

#### ECONOMY

##### First 5-Year Plan

During the "rehabilitation" period of 1949, the P.R.C. organized and restored farm and industrial production and expanded fiscal controls and savings, enabling the inauguration of the first 5-year plan (1953-57). This plan was based on the Soviet model, which called for a rapid expansion of industry based on savings extracted from the agricultural sector. By the end of 1952 most sectors of industry had recovered or surpassed the pre-World War II production levels.

According to official Chinese data, net material product (a Soviet concept roughly equivalent to total industrial and agricultural production plus construction, transportation, and trade related to material production) showed an average annual growth of 9 percent during this period, reflecting mainly an 18 percent annual growth in industrial and handicraft output. China's economic growth rate managed to keep well abreast of the population growth rate—officially estimated at 2.2 percent as a result of the 1953 census—although the needs of the growing population clearly limited the capital available to finance the development effort.

The rapid rise in industrial economic output during the first 5-year plan was due primarily to two factors: Soviet aid and agricultural savings.

The whole development effort, in the end, rested on agricultural outputs and the savings derived from these surpluses. Massive amounts of invest-

ment for basic economic development were derived from the agricultural sector of the economy. The "socialist transformation" of agriculture was accelerated following the publication of the first 5-year plan in July 1955, which revealed that completion of the collectivization process was scheduled for 15 years. Collectivization was viewed as a method of mobilizing domestic resources for development and raising farm production without increasing state investment.

Poor harvests in 1956, however, meant that severe dislocations in investments, output, and trade occurred and were reflected in a general economic retrenchment by 1957. The outline of the second 5-year plan (1958-62), announced in the latter half of 1956, continued the goals and priorities of the first plan, with a slightly increased emphasis on agriculture. Through 1956 and 1957 Chinese planners studied means of translating rural labor surpluses into realized output, including proposals for decentralized administration and rural industrialization.

##### The "Great Leap Forward"

The second 5-year plan had barely gotten underway in 1958 when a new economic program termed the "Great Leap Forward" was launched. A key element of the new program was the establishment of communes throughout China. It was hoped that a campaign of "3 years' hard effort" would so raise investment, production, and savings as to create a rapid-growth economy. Policies of the "Great Leap Forward" included the construction of "backyard steel plants," deep plowing, ambitious water conservation projects, and development of rural industry. Urban population rose sharply as industries greatly expanded their labor forces. Cost controls and technical constraints were ignored as restrictive to the growth of labor employment.

Hopes for a leap in farm productivity were so high that the cultivated acreage allocated to food production was reduced by nearly 30 percent. This confidence in the productive power of the agricultural base was shattered when farm outputs dropped sharply in 1959 and fell further in



1960 under the additional influence of adverse weather. Compounding these domestic difficulties was the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet assistance and technicians in August 1960 due to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute. By late 1960 the "Great Leap Forward" was abandoned in practice.

#### **Readjustment and Upsurge**

A 5-year hiatus in planned development followed the "Great Leap," as Chinese planners launched an effort to restore balance and a soundly based productivity to the economy. This involved two programs termed "readjustment" (1961-63) and "upsurge" (1964-65). In the first period retrenchment policies curtailed investment, closed uneconomic enterprises, cut social expenditures, and expelled the surplus urban population to the rural areas, thereby reducing the urban population from 130 million to 110 million. In the rural areas commune administration was progressively decentralized, placing the accounting unit and production authority at the level of the "team" of 20-30 households and permitting increased scope for individual household production through private plots and free markets. Thus, the peasant was permitted to find his own way to restore farm productivity.

With good weather, there was a favorable harvest in 1962, and production turned upward in 1963. Having rationalized economic organization and developed domestic technology, the government was able to achieve a rapid recovery in production during 1964-65. In the cities, there was an upsurge in the efficiency and productivity of existing enterprises. In the rural areas, a substantial modernization program was begun, with the government again asserting its leadership through a sophisticated mixture of direct and indirect controls. Though private production activities were still permitted, the growth in farm output was now more dependent on communal agriculture utilizing increased fertilizer supplies, irrigation, and the provision of improved seeds.

During these periods development planning radically revised the Soviet model, which had been adopted in the 1950's. The planners abandoned the

goal of rapid, heavy industrialization and directed their attention to the dominant agricultural sector of the economy. Accordingly, until 1980 emphasis was to be on farm modernization, together with population control efforts, while industrial efforts would be aimed more at consolidating than expanding the industrial base, seeking a high level of efficiency, technology, and autarky.

#### **Third 5-Year Plan, Cultural Revolution, and Fourth 5-Year Plan**

While there was little debate over the planning assumptions, the end of the recovery period precipitated a struggle over the implementation of the plans. One leadership group—the followers of Liu Shao-ch'i then-Chairman of the P.R.C.—saw the problem as primarily a technical one, requiring the economic use of resources under a stable and rational party leadership. Another group—led by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the CCP—argued that the proposed austerity and great social change required revolutionary measures, involving guided social upheaval, universal involvement and commitment, imposed egalitarianism, and an end to the growing elitist pockets of privilege and bureaucratic stagnation.

By 1966 industrial production had reached a level nearly 70 percent greater than that of 1957. The year 1967 was the second year of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the ensuing struggle disrupted urban production, particularly from mid-1967 to mid-1968. The decline in industrial production was complicated by the disruption of the transportation system for the delivery of raw materials and the shipment of finished products.

Farm production was little affected and bumper harvests in 1967 and 1970 sustained stability through the third 5-year plan (1966-70). By late 1968 industrial production showed considerable improvement over 1967. Industrial growth averaged about 20 percent annually during 1969 and 1970, reflecting recovery effects, but in 1971 (the first year of the fourth 5-year plan) dropped to a more normal but still respectable growth pace of about 10 percent. From early 1969

through 1971 the stress in industry centered on the needs of agriculture.

The economic growth rate was around 8 percent during 1972 and 1973 but slowed to less than 4 percent in 1974. In 1975 the fourth 5-year plan ends. Premier Chou En-Lai, in his January 13, 1975, report to the NPC, stated that future planning for the economy would proceed in two stages. The completion of the fifth 5-year plan in 1980 is to mark the establishment of an "independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system" which will form the basis for a sustained drive to achieve the goal of placing China in the front ranks of the modern, industrialized nations by the end of the century. Recent P.R.C. statements have stressed that the economic order of priorities is agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry.

#### **Statistics**

As Chinese authorities have not published nationwide statistics in recent years, it has been difficult to make hard quantitative assessments of the Chinese economy. Nevertheless, rough unofficial Western estimates of production in key areas have been made. (See chart on page 9.)

#### **Trade and Aid**

Since 1960 the P.R.C.'s pattern of trade has shifted from Eastern Europe to non-Communist states in Western Europe and the Pacific. In 1960 some 70 percent of its trade was with the Communist bloc (mainly the U.S.S.R.) and 30 percent with the rest of the world. By 1965 this ratio had reversed itself, and about 80 percent of the P.R.C.'s trade is now with the non-Communist countries. A major portion of its purchases from the West during the past several years has consisted of large grain imports (4-8 million tons a year)—mainly from Canada, Australia, and the United States—to supplement domestic food supplies. In addition the Chinese have purchased high-technology industrial products, including a large number of complete plants.

Although itself a developing country, the P.R.C. has a continuing program of foreign economic aid. It has extended credits and grants to de-

# KEY STATISTICS

(estimates)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Industrial Output Index (1957=100) . . . . .	202	222	265	313	341	371	416	432
Production:								
Coal (mil. met. tons) . . . . .	190	205	258	310	335	356	377	389
Crude oil (mil. met. tons) . . . . .	13.9	15.2	20.3	28.5	36.7	43	54.5	65.3
Electric power (bil. kwh) . . . . .	45	50	60	72	86	93	101	108
Steel (mil. met. tons) . . . . .	12	14	16	17.8	21	23	25.5	23.8
Trucks (thous.) . . . . .	34	31	60	70	86	100	110	
Grain (mil. met. tons) . . . . .	230	215	220	240	246	240	250	255
Cement (mil. met. tons) . . . . .	14.2	17.4	19.6	19.8	23	27.5	29.9	31.6
GNP (1973 \$US bil.) . . . . .	141	142	157	179	190	197	217	223
Total Foreign Trade (current \$US bil.) . . . . .	3.90	3.76	3.86	4.29	4.72	5.92	9.88	13.7
Exports (f.o.b. \$US bil.) . . . . .	1.95	1.94	2.03	2.05	2.41	3.08	4.90	6.3
Imports (c.i.f. \$US bil.) . . . . .	1.95	1.82	1.83	2.24	2.31	2.84	4.98	7.4

veloping countries, with Africa and the Near East being the primary beneficiaries. These programs totaled about \$3.5 billion for the period 1956-74; about \$2.4 billion of this amount had been expended between 1970-74. Almost 60 percent of P.R.C. economic aid to developing countries in the 1970's has gone to Africa. Most Chinese aid commitments are to small projects, although the TanZam railway—connecting Lusaka, Zambia, with Dar es Salaam, Tanzania—is the most ambitious aid project ever undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the period 1970-74, in the wake of economic recovery and a new bid for world influence, the P.R.C. extended nearly \$1.2 billion in credits and grants to seven countries—Tanzania (\$277 million) and Zambia (\$262 million), mainly for the TanZam railway; Pakistan (\$250 million); Sri Lanka (\$114 million); Somalia (\$111 million); Zaire (\$100 million); and Ethiopia (\$84 million). Additionally, the Chinese have provided military equipment to Pakistan, Tanzania, and Zaire.

The P.R.C. also gives assistance to Communist countries. From 1968 to 1974 the P.R.C. was a major aid donor to North Viet-Nam. Other Communist recipients of military assistance have been North Korea, Albania, and Cambodia. Generally they have received infantry weapons and transportation equipment.

China's foreign assistance program has been cut back from the record level of \$710 million committed in

1970 to a 1974 amount of \$200 million.

## Agriculture, Industry, and Mineral Resources

Basically, the P.R.C. has an agricultural economy, although about 89 percent of the land is unsuited for agricultural purposes because of high altitude and other topographic or climatic conditions. Consequently, maximum yield must be obtained from the 11 percent of land that is arable (mainly in the east). Although intensive cultivation techniques already secure high yields of food per acre, China's main hope lies in substantially increasing these yields even further through improved technology. Because virtually all arable land is used for crops, there is limited animal husbandry in the country; however, the P.R.C. is the world's largest pork producer.

China is the world's largest producer of many important food crops, including rice, sweet potatoes, sorghum, soybeans, millet, barley, peanuts, and tea. Major industrial crops consist of cotton, other fibers, and various oilseeds. The portion of the industrial crop that is exported comprises a principal source of foreign exchange.

An expanding but inadequate manufacturing sector supplies the needs for capital and consumer goods. Major industries are iron and steel, coal, machine building, armaments, and textiles. Shortages exist in the manufacture of complex machinery and equipment.

The P.R.C. has extensive deposits of iron and coal. Other minerals include tin, tungsten, antimony, salt, and magnetite. There are substantial reserves of crude oil (estimated at about 3 billion tons) and natural gas. The P.R.C. produced about 65 million metric tons of petroleum in 1974, and production is expanding rapidly. Exports began in 1973 and are expected to increase considerably in the next few years, particularly to Japan. Refineries are located throughout the country near centers of production and demand.

## DEFENSE

The maintenance of a large military establishment, which absorbs about 10 percent of the GNP, places a substantial burden on the Chinese economy. The P.R.C.'s Armed Forces number about 3 million persons—over 80 percent ground forces. While the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is chiefly a land-based force, China has the world's third largest navy, composed largely of coastal patrol craft and a growing number of submarines and destroyers. China's air force is structured around fighter and interceptor aircraft.

Chinese strategic doctrine envisages that any major war will be fought primarily as a defensive, guerrilla conflict. The regular units of the PLA are backed by a civil militia of over 7 million persons. The PLA's capacity to wage major offensive operations is greatly restricted by limited logistical resources and transport facilities.



The PLA plays an important role in domestic politics. The disruption engendered by the Cultural Revolution led to the PLA's assuming increased domestic administrative functions. However, since 1971, as the Chinese Communist Party has reasserted its control, the PLA's role has been increasingly confined to purely military affairs.

China is divided into 11 military regions and further subdivided into 26 military districts which are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. Political control over the PLA is exercised by the CCP's Military Affairs Committee through a parallel, but interlocking, chain of command.

The P.R.C.'s nuclear weapons program, aided at an earlier stage by the Soviet Union, resulted in the detonation of a nuclear device at Lop Nor in western China on October 16, 1964. Since then the Chinese have conducted 16 additional tests, including one underground and four thermonuclear, while pushing development of a missile delivery system for such weapons. They have successfully deployed limited numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). There is evidence that the Chinese have been working on a limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, but the development appears to be in an early stage.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

The People's Republic of China seeks a distinctive world role within several geopolitical arenas. It has virtually achieved recognition as the major political (although not economic) power in Asia; it champions the developing Third World; and it is the world's most vigorous spokesman against "superpower hegemony."

A major goal of the P.R.C. since its inception has been to achieve international recognition for its authority as the Government of China including Taiwan. The 1970's have witnessed major breakthroughs for the P.R.C. with regard to this goal. The People's Republic of China assumed the China seat in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council in 1971 and has been

increasingly active in U.N. affairs. The number of countries that have established diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. has risen rapidly in the last few years to 104 at present.

The P.R.C. currently describes the world as being divided into three parts which "are both interconnected and in contradiction to each other." These consist of two "superpowers," the U.S. and U.S.S.R., depicted as "contending for world hegemony"; the developing countries of the Third World, "the main force combating colonialism, imperialism, and particularly the superpowers"; and, in between, the "second world" consisting of developed countries such as Japan and those of Eastern and Western Europe. The P.R.C. identifies itself with the Third World. It holds, however, that political and economic relations among all countries should be based on "the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." It declares its opposition to "the establishment of hegemony and spheres of influence by any country in any part of the world in violation of these principles."

In recent years, the P.R.C. has been increasingly concerned with countering Soviet world power. It has sought to encourage closer relations with other major powers, such as the United States, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe, to offset Soviet influence within the Asian region and internationally. However, sharp differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have not prevented the two countries from engaging in correct state relations, intermittent border negotiations, and limited trade.

## U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, American diplomats remained in China to see what the new government's attitude would be toward the United States. The new regime demonstrated no interest in an official American presence, however, and all

U.S. Government representation was withdrawn in early 1950. Any lingering hope of improving relations was ended by the Korean conflict. Partly because of the Korean conflict and the mutual antagonism it produced, there was little opportunity throughout the 1950's to improve relations, although some efforts were made. In 1954 bilateral contacts were instituted, first between consular officials at Geneva and then in 1955 at the ambassadorial level, again at Geneva and later at Warsaw, Poland. On September 10, 1955, the P.R.C. and the U.S. issued an announcement, agreed to jointly concerning the repatriation of nationals.

This was the only concrete arrangement reached by the two sides in the talks. But while these talks failed to produce important changes in the relations of the two nations, they at least served to give both governments a clearer understanding of each other's views on questions of mutual interest, such as reducing the hazard of war by miscalculation. The last session of the talks was held in February 1970.

In the late 1960's the U.S. Government began taking steps designed to relax tension between the United States and the People's Republic of China. These steps ultimately included the elimination of restrictions on the use of U.S. passports for travel to the P.R.C. and removal of the 20-year embargo on trade by permitting imports from the P.R.C. and authorizing exports on the same basis as to most other Communist countries.

On July 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon announced that he had sent his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to Peking for meetings with Premier Chou En-lai from July 9-11. Dr. Kissinger returned to the United States with an invitation from the Premier for President Nixon to visit the P.R.C.

Another trip to Peking in October 1971 by Dr. Kissinger paved the way for President Nixon's historic visit to the P.R.C. in February 1972. A joint communique was issued in Shanghai at the end of the President's visit (and is popularly known by the name of that city).<sup>3</sup> It noted that: "There are es-

<sup>3</sup> For the full text of the Shanghai communique, see the *Department of State Bulletin* dated Mar. 20, 1972.

sential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." The communique outlined a number of other agreed principles, which President Nixon described as a framework for our relations and a yardstick by which to measure each other's performance. These principles include:

- International disputes should be settled without the threat or use of force.

- Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interest of all countries.

- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to any efforts to establish such hegemony.

- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party nor to enter into agreements with the other directed at other states.

Both sides further agreed to:

- Expand exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism;

- Facilitate the development of bilateral trade; and

- Stay in contact through various official channels.

The two sides also reviewed the longstanding serious disputes between them. The P.R.C. stated that Taiwan is

a province of China, that the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair, and that all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from the island. The United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part, declared that it does not challenge that position, and reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With the prospect of such a settlement in mind, the United States affirmed the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan, pledging in the meantime to progressively reduce our military presence in Taiwan as tension in the area diminishes.

Since President Nixon's visit, both sides have pursued the normalization of their relations in accordance with the Shanghai communique:

- Many thousands of U.S. citizens have visited the P.R.C.

- Increasing numbers of U.S. businessmen have visited the semiannual Canton trade fair.

- U.S. trade with the P.R.C. rose from \$100 million in 1972 to more than \$800 million in 1973 and about \$934 million in 1974. Because of reduced Chinese purchases of U.S. grain, trade in 1975 will probably be at a level of around \$500 million.

- More than 50 exchanges have been facilitated by the two governments, including the 1973 visit of the Philadelphia Orchestra and the 1975 exhibition in the United States of the Archaeological Finds of the P.R.C. These exchanges have covered a broad range of cultural, scientific, and educational concerns. Other exchanges have been arranged directly between the Chinese and private American individuals and groups.

-Secretary Kissinger visited Peking for talks with Chinese leaders in June 1972, February 1973, November 1973, November 1974, and October 1975. During his visit in November 1974, it was agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.

-Liaison Offices were established in Peking and Washington, D.C., in May 1973.

President Ford summarized the U.S. position on normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China in his address before a joint session of the Congress on April 10, 1975:

"With the People's Republic of China, we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communique. Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-fourth of the human race. After two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, we have, in recent years, built a promising foundation. Deep differences in our philosophy and social systems will endure, but so should our mutual long-term interests and the goals to which our countries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai.

"I will visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and to accelerate our relations. . . ."

The White House announced on November 13 that President Ford would visit the P.R.C. December 1-5.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Chief, U.S. Liaison Office—George Bush

Deputy Chief—Harry E.T. Thayer

The U.S. Liaison Office in the P.R.C. is located at 17 Guanghua Road, Peking.



**APPENDIX D**

**PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA COMMUNIST PARTY**

**ORGANIZATION**

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[Reprinted From: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations. 29th Annual Report, 1973 Edition. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1973 (Publication 8732).]

## People's Republic of China

National Political Status: Before the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only was the largest Communist party in the world, but it also seemed to dominate all other sectors of national society to a greater extent than in other Communist-ruled states, including the Soviet Union. Party Committees existed in virtually every locality and institution in the nation, and party members were assigned to key leadership positions in all organizations--the government bureaucracy, the army, and mass organizations. This comprehensive system of interlocking directorates was designed to serve as the chain of command for the party leaders in Peking, and was supposed to ensure that the will of the party elite would predominate.

As the administrative structure evolved through the years, however, it became increasingly recalcitrant and unresponsive to directives from the top. Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung was particularly frustrated by the

massive, entrenched bureaucracies of the party and government which competed with him and among themselves in the implementation of policy.

To rekindle the revolutionary fervor of this regime and to strengthen his own position, Mao encouraged the creation of the Red Guards and supported their attacks on his own governing mechanism. Extensive dismantling of the party-government apparatus was accomplished in 1966 and 1967.

The constructive phase of the Cultural Revolution, the rebuilding and revitalizing of an administrative structure, proceeded very slowly. Revolutionary committees--or coalitions of military leaders, reeducated government and party officials, and representatives of such mass organizations as the Red Guards--were established in 1967-68 and have been administering the provinces since that time. Although originally regarded as temporary, revolutionary committees were subsequently designated as the permanent government organs at lower levels. In the past

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year there have been some indications that these revolutionary committees, in turn, may give way to People's Councils, a pre-Cultural Revolution form of government.

State ministries in Peking, the top of the government structure, have been functioning effectively for the past three years, but many ministers and vice ministers have not yet been identified. Pre-Cultural Revolution manpower levels and the number of ministries seem to have been reduced by about one-half, in line with Mao's dictum to streamline and simplify the government.

In 1971 the rebuilding of the CCP structure surged forward with the formation of party committees in all provinces; but in 1972 many military members of the new provincial party committees disappeared from sight, and their replacements have surfaced in only a handful of cases. Moreover, many party organs at lower levels have not yet been constructed. Progress also appears slow in the reconstitution of the party's auxiliary mass organizations--the Young Communist League, the Women's Associations, and the trade unions.

At the pinnacle of the party, the 25-member Politburo and the 279-member Central Committee were formally reconstituted at the April 1969 Party Congress. Many members of the two groups, however, became casualties of the 1971 purge of Lin Piao or have been removed due to other political vicissitudes.

Communist Party Membership: More than 17 million in 1961; present membership unknown.

Leading Party Figures and Positions:

MAO Tse-tung - Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee  
CHOU En-lai - Premier of the State Council and Member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Politburo

Principal Publications:

People's Daily (*Jen-min Jih-pao*) - daily newspaper



Mao Tse-tung  
Chairman, Central Committee  
Chinese Communist Party

Red Flag (*Hung Ch'i*) - party theoretical journal

Liberation Army Daily (*Chieh-fang Chun Pao*) - military newspaper

Areas of Communist Activity: The aftermath of the September 1971 Lin Piao affair appeared to be a major domestic concern of the Chinese leadership during 1972. Although heir-designate Lin was not attacked by name in official news media, the regime used scarcely veiled media attacks and widespread meetings to inform the Chinese masses of his treachery against Mao and his abortive flight to the Soviet Union. Peking also launched an extensive media campaign against "swindlers" and other hidden followers of Lin, but cautioned that all except a few hard-core Lin supporters should be reeducated, pardoned, and kept on in their jobs.

In a development probably related to Lin's fall, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was eased out of many of the civil functions that it acquired during the Cultural Revolution and was warned through the media to subordinate itself more effectively

to party control. PLA representatives on party committees were enjoined to be less highhanded and to practice "collective leadership" by bowing more to the will of their civilian colleagues.

Domestic policy shifts across the board in 1972 reflected a further retreat from Cultural Revolution extremism and continued the trend toward pragmatism evident since 1969. The "youth to the countryside" program was moderated, together with some of the more radical educational policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution. The compulsory three-year stint of farmwork for high school graduates was shortened in many areas and lifted entirely in others. Some students were allowed to enter college directly out of high school, and others were assigned directly to jobs in urban industry.

College entrance examinations, abolished during the Cultural Revolution, were reinstituted on a lim-



*Zhou En-lai, Premier  
State Council*

ited basis; as a result, many politically pure but poorly educated workers, peasants, and soldiers were replaced by candidates with better academic qualifications. Schools reoriented curricula away from Maoist political programs and toward academic pursuits. Colleges offered an increased number of basic theoretical courses, and again made use of foreign and pre-Cultural Revolution textbooks.

In the longstanding Chinese Communist Red-versus-expert controversy, the position of the experts improved during 1972. The regime initiated a large-scale movement to rehabilitate veteran administrators--in the political, economic, and other fields--who had come under attack during the Cultural Revolution. Technicians, scientists, and "intellectuals" were invited back to their old jobs. Some local broadcasts claimed that 90% of old cadres were again at work in the provinces. In Peking, several senior figures disgraced during the Cultural Revolution reappeared in public.

Probably the most important 1972 policy change for the Chinese city-dweller was the industrial wage increase, which is being implemented throughout the country. The first since 1963 and only the second since 1949, the increase may amount to as much as 10% and affects both civilian and military occupations. Although the actual pay increase benefits go chiefly to those employed prior to 1966--or before the Cultural Revolution--the measure seemed to be intended to lift morale for all in its implied commitment to a restored career service with regular promotions and rewards for seniority.

Notwithstanding the industrial wage rise, and efforts to increase material incentives to the peasants, Chinese economic growth slowed significantly in 1972, the second year of the current five-year plan. The decline stemmed mainly from adverse crop weather and from the nation's having reached capacity operation of industrial plant partly idled during



the Cultural Revolution. Farm output, stagnant in 1971, declined by 2-3% in 1972. The industrial growth rate, which had reached 18% in 1970 and had fallen to 12% in 1971, fell further in 1972 to 7-8%, reflecting the completion of industrial recovery. The total economic growth rate, which had fallen from 11% in 1970 to 5% in 1971, declined further in 1972 to about 3%.

The economic slowdown, partly anticipated and partly attributable to weather, produced no major shift in development strategy. Investment levels continued high, while foreign trade under a new expansionist policy grew by about 20% in dollar terms or about 10% in real terms. The lag in farm output has, however, resulted in contracts for record imports of grain in the 1972-73 grain year and a call for economy and equity in the rationed distribution of available food supplies.

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U.S.-North Vietnam agreement of October. The volume of Sino-U.S. trade rose significantly during the year, and the scientific and cultural exchanges envisaged in the Shanghai communique took place on a limited scale.

Sino-Soviet tensions continued throughout the year. Although there were no major border incidents, bilateral talks on frontier problems remained stalled, and Sino-Soviet polemical warfare ranged over virtually all fields of international relations.

Despite the weaker economic performance in 1972, continued significant economic growth seems assured during the current five-year plan under present investment levels. These development efforts should be adequate to secure long-run annual growth rates of around 3% in farm output and 5 to 10% in industrial output.

1972 was a successful year for Chinese foreign policy. President Nixon's visit in February and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, and many other nations during the year advanced the status of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a major power with recognized worldwide interests.

Peking reacted with expected displeasure to U.S. actions in Vietnam, but strongly endorsed conclusion of a settlement based on the nine-point

Peking's relations with India continued strained in the aftermath of the 1971 war in the subcontinent, and the first PRC veto in the United Nations was cast to prevent the admission of Bangladesh. The PRC's first full year in the U.N. was marked by growing self-assurance and professionalism, diatribes against the Soviets, and attempts to assume the role of spokesman for third-world countries against the U.S. and the Soviet "superpowers." Chinese state-to-state relations with smaller nations in general improved, while PRC support for insurgent movements was correspondingly toned down during the year.

**APPENDIX E**  
**CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

**[Chart]**

**(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)**



# CHINESE

## MEMBERS

An P'ing-sheng	Ch'en Yü*	Fan Te-ling	Keng Piao	Lin Li-yün (f)	Pai Ju-ping	Ting Sheng	Wang Kuei
Chang Ch'ih-ming	Ch'en Yün	Fang I	Ku Mu	Liu Chien-hsün	P'an Shih-kao	Ts'ai Ch'ang (f)	Wang Pi-ch'ang
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Ch'en Yung-kuei	Feng Hsüan	K'ung Chao-nien	Liu Chün-i	Pao-jih-le-tai (f)	Ts'ai Hsiao	Wang Shao-ch'ang
Chang Fu-heng	Chi P'eng-fei	Fu Ch'uan-tso	K'ung Shih-ch'üan	Liu Hsi-ch'ang	P'eng Shao-hui	Ts'ai Hsieh-pin	Wang Shu-ch'ang
Chang Fu-kuei	Chi Teng-k'uei	Han Hsien-ch'u	Kuo Hung-chieh	Liu Hsiang-p'ing (f)	P'i Ting-chün	Ts'ai Shu-mei (f)	Wang Shu-ch'ang
Chang Heng-yün	Chiang Ch'ing (f)	Han Ying	Kuo Ma-jo	Liu Hsien-ch'üan	Sai-fu-ting	Ts'ao I-ou (f)	Wang Tun-ch'ang
Chang Hung-chih	Chiang Hsieh-yüan	Hsia Pang-yin	Kuo Yü-feng	Liu Hsing-yüan	Su Chen-hua	Ts'ao Li-huai	Wei Feng-ch'ang
Chang I-hsiang	Chiang Li-yin	Hsiao Ching-kuang	Li Chen*	Liu Po-ch'eng	Su Ching	Ts'en Kuo-jung	Wei Kuo-ch'ang
Chang P'ing-hua	Chiang Yung-hui	Hsieh Chia-hsiang	Li Ch'iang	Liu Sheng-t'ien	Su Yü	Tseng Shao-shan	Wei Ping-ch'ang
Chang Shu-chih	Ch'iao Kuan-hua	Hsieh Ching-i (f)	Li Chih-min	Liu Tzu-hou	Sung P'ei-chang	Tseng Szu-yü	Wu Kuei-ch'ang
Chang Ta-chih	Chiao Lin-i	Hsieh Hsüeh-kung	Li Ching-ch'üan	Liu Wei	Szu-mai-ai-moi-t'i	Ts'ui Hai-lung	Wu Jan-fu
Chang T'ih-süeh*	Ch'ien Cheng-ying (f)	Hsien Heng-han	Li Fu-ch'un*	Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang	T'an Chen-lin	Tsung Hsi-yün	Wu Ta-shan
Chang Ting-ch'eng	Ch'ien Chih-kuang	Hsing Yen-tzu (f)	Li Hsien-nien	Lo Hsi-k'ang	T'an Ch'i-lung	Tu Ping	Wu T'ao
Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien	Ch'in Chi-wei	Hsü Ching-hsien	Li Jen-chih	Lu Jui-lin	T'ang Ch'i-shan	Tuan Chün-i	Wu Te
Chang Tsung-hsün	Chin Tsu-min	Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien	Li Jui-shan	Lu T'ien-chi	T'ang Chung-fu	Tung Ming-hui	Yang Ch'ang
Chang Wei-min	Chou Chien-jen	Hsü Shih-yu	Li Pao-hua	Lü Yü-lan (f)	T'ao Lu-chia	Tung Pi-wu*	Yang Te-ch'ang
Chang Yen-ch'eng	Chou Ch'un-lin	Hu Chi-tsung*	Li Shui-ch'ing	Ma Ning	Teng Hsiao-p'ing**	Wang Ch'ao-chu	Yang Yun-ch'ang
Chang Yün-i*	Chou En-lai*	Hua Kuo-feng	Li Shun-ta	Ma T'ien-shui	T'eng Tai-yüan*	Wang Chen	Yao Wen-ch'ang
Chao Tzu-yang	Chou Hsing*	Hua Lin-sen	Li Su-wen (f)	Mao Tse-tung	Teng Ying-ch'ao (f)	Wang Cheng	Yeh Chien-ch'ang
Ch'en Ch'i-han	Chou Hung-pao	Huang Chen	Li Ta	Mo Hsien-yao	T'ien Hua-kuei	Wang Chia-hsiang*	Yü Ch'iu-ch'ang
Ch'en Hsi-lien	Chou Li-ch'in (f)	Huang Hua	Li Ta-chang	Ni Chih-fu	T'ien Pao	Wang Hsiu-chen (f)	Yü Hui-yü
Ch'en Hsien-jui	Chu Chia-yao	Jao Hsing-li	Li Tesheng	Nieh Jung-chen	T'ien Wei-hsin	Wang Huai-hsiang	Yü Hung-ch'ang
Ch'en K'ang	Chu Mu-chih	Jen Szu-chung	Liang Chin-t'ang	Nien Chi-jung	Ting K'o-tse	Wang Hung-k'un	Yü Sang-ch'ang
Ch'en Mu-hua (f)	Chu Te	K'ang Sheng*	Liao Ch'eng-chih	Pa Sang (f)	Ting Kuo-yü	Wang Hung-wen	Yu T'ai-ch'ang
Ch'en Shih-chü	Chuang Tse-tung	Keng Ch'i-ch'ang					

2

# CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

## NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS

The 10th National Party Congress was held 24-28 August 1973 (1,249 Delegates)

### 10th CENTRAL COMMITTEE

**Chairman** Mao Tse-tung  
**1st Vice Chairman** Hua Kuo-feng  
**Vice Chairmen** Wang Hung-wen  
(in rank order) Yeh Chien-ying

### ALTERNATE MEMBERS

Wang Kuo-fan	Chang Chi-hui	Chu K'o-chia	K'ang Lin	Ma Li-hsin	Wang Chih-ch'iang
Wang Pi-ch'eng	Chang Chiang-lin	Chu Kuang-ya	Kao Shu-lan (f)	Ma Ming	Wang Ching-sheng
Wang Shou-tao	Chang Huai-lien	Fan Hsiao-chü (f)	Kuo Yao-ch'ing	Pai Tung-ts'ai	Wang Hsiang-chün (f)
Wang Shu-chen (f)	Chang Kua-ch'üan	Feng Chan-wu	Li Hua-min	P'an Mei-ying (f)	Wang Kuang-lin
Wang Shu-sheng*	Chang Lin-ch'ih	Feng P'in-te	Li Jih-nai	P'ei Chou-yü	Wang Liu-sheng
Wang T'ung-hsing	Chang Ling-pin	Hsiang Chung-hua	Li Shou-lin	P'eng Ch'ung	Wang Mei-chi (f)
Wei Feng-ying (f)	Chang Shih-chung	Hsiao K'o	Li Ting-shan	P'eng Kuei-ho	Wang Pai-te
Wei Kuo-ch'ing	Chang Szu-chou	Hsieh Chen-hua	Li Tsu-ken	Pu Ku-hsiang	Wang Te-shan
Wei Ping-k'uei	Chang Ying-ts'ai	Hsieh Chia-t'ang	Li Yüan	She Chi-te	Wang Ti
Wu Kuei-hsien (f)	Chao Feng	Hsieh Wang-ch'ün (f)	Li Yüeh-sung	Shen Mao-kung	Wen Hsiang-lan (f)
Wu-lan-fu	Chao Hsin-ch'ü	Hsü Ch'ih	Liao Chih-kao	Shih Shao-hua	Wu Chin-ch'üan
Wu Ta-sheng	Chao Hsing-yüan	Hsüeh Chin-lien (f)	Lin Li-ming	Sun Chien	Wu Chung
Wu T'ao	Ch'en Chia-chung	Hu Chin-ti (f)	Liu Chen-hua	Sun Yü-kuo	Wu Hsiang-pi
Wu Te	Ch'en Ho-fa	Hu Liang-ts'ai	Liu Ch'ün-ch'iao	Sung Ch'ing-yu	Wu Ts'ung-shu
Yang Ch'ün-fu	Ch'en P'ei-chen (f)	Hu Wei	Liu Hsi-yao	Sung Shih-lun	Wu Yü-te
Yang Te-chih	Ch'en Tai-fu	Huang Ch'eng-lien	Liu Kuang-t'ao	Sung Shuang-lai	Yang Chün-sheng
Yang Yung	Ch'en Yü-pao	Huang Chih-chen	Lo Ch'ün-ti (f)	Ta Lo	Yang Fu-chen (f)
Yao Wen-yüan	Cheng San-sheng	Huang Jung-hai	Lu Chin-lung	T'ang K'o-pi (f)	Yang Kuei
Yeh Chien-ying	Ch'i-lin-wan-tan	Huang Ping-hsiu (f)	Lu Chung-yang	T'ang Liang	Yang P'o-lan (f)
Yü Ch'ü-li	Chia-na-pu-erh	Huang Tso-chen	Lü Ho	T'ang Wen-sheng (f)	Yang Tai-i
Yü Hui-yung	Chiang Hua	Huang Wen-ming	Lu Ta-tung	Teng Hua	Yang Tsung (f)
Yü Hung-liang	Chiang Pao-ti (f)	Jen Jung	Lü Ts'ün-chieh (f)	T'ieh Ying	Yao I-lin
Yü Sang	Chiang Wei-ch'ing	Jou-tzu-t'ü-erh-ti	Lung Kuang-ch'ien	Ts'ui Hsiu-fan	Yao Lien-wei
Yu T'ai-chung	Ch'ien Hsüeh-sen	Juan Po-sheng	Ma Chin-hua (f)	Wang Chia-tao	Yeh Fei
	Chu Hui-fen (f)	K'ang Chien-min	Ma Hsiao-liu	Wang Ch'ien	

### POLITBURO

**Standing Committee**  
(in rank order, based  
on data prior to 7 April 1976)

Mao Tse-tung  
Wang Hung-wen  
Yeh Chien-ying

Chu Te  
Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao

### Members

Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao  
Ch'en Hsi-lien  
Ch'en Yung-kuei  
Chi Teng-k'uei  
Chiang Ch'ing (f)  
Chu Te  
Hsü Shih-yu

Hua Kuo-feng  
Li Hsien-nien  
Li Te-sheng  
Liu Po-ch'eng  
Mao Tse-tung

Wang Hung-wen  
Wang Tung-hsing  
Wei Kuo-ch'ing  
Wu Te  
Yao Wen-yüan  
Yeh Chien-ying

### Alternate Members

Ni Chih-fu  
Sai-fu-ting  
Su Chen-hua  
Wu Kuei-hsien (f)

### Organization Department

**Leading Member** Kuo Yü-feng

### United Front

**Leading Member**

PROVINCIAL-LEVEL

PARTY COMMITTEES

Urumqi

SINKIAN

TIBET

Provinces  
of the People's



# TIONS

- Wang Chih-ch'iang
- Wang Ching-sheng
- Wang Hsiang-chün (f)
- Wang Kuang-lin
- Wang Liu-sheng
- Wang Mei-chi (f)
- Wang Pai-te
- Wang Te-shan
- Wang Ti
- Wen Hsiang-lan (f)
- Mu Chin-ch'uan
- Mu Chung
- Mu Hsiang-pi
- Mu Ts'ung-shu
- Mu Yü-te
- Yang Chün-sheng
- Yang Fu-chien (f)
- Yang Kuei
- Yang P'o-lan (f)
- Yang Tai-i
- Yang Tsung (f)
- ao I-lin
- ao Lien-wei
- eh Fei



Provinces and Provincial Capitals of the People's Republic of China

## Organization Department

Leading Member Kuo Yü-feng

## United Front Work Department

Leading Members  
 Li Chin-te  
 Liu Yu-fa  
 Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang  
 T'ung Hsiao-p'eng

Foreign Intelligence  
 Higher Party School  
 Propaganda  
 Social Affairs  
 Women's Work

Young Communist League  
 Political Departments of  
 Agriculture and Forestry  
 Finance and Trade  
 Industry and Communications

No high-ranking officials have been identified in these departments since 1966.

## Ningsia CCP



Secretary K'ang Chien-min  
 Chao Ch'ien-min (f)

## Shensi CCP

1st Secretary Li Jui-shan  
 Secretaries Hsiao Ch'un

## Tientsin CCP

1st Secretary Hsieh Hsüeh-kung  
 2nd Secretary Wu Tai  
 Secretaries Chao Wu-ch'eng  
 Hsing Yen-tzu (f)



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**Inner Mongolia CCP**

**1st Secretary** Yu Tai-chung  
**2nd Secretary** Ch'ih Pi-ch'ing  
**Secretaries** Liu Ching-p'ing  
Pao-jih-le-tai (f)  
Teng Ts'un-lun  
Wu T'ao

**Kansu CCP**

**1st Secretary** Hsien Heng-han  
**Secretaries** Chin Yen-chang  
Mao Lin  
Nien Chi-jung  
Sung Ping  
Yü Kuei-min

**Kiangsi CCP**

**1st Secretary** Chiang Wei-ch'ing  
**Secretaries** Ch'en Ch'ang-feng  
Huang Chih-chen  
Mo Chun  
Pai Tung-ts'ai  
Wen Tao-hung  
Yang Shang-k'uei

**Kiangsu CCP**

**1st Secretary** P'eng Ch'ung  
**Secretaries** Hsü Chia-yun  
Wang Min-sheng  
Wu Ta-sheng  
Yang Kuang-li

**Kirin CCP**

**1st Secretary** Wang Huai-hsiang  
**Secretaries** Cheng Chi-ch'iao  
Ho Yu-fa  
Hsiao Tao-sheng  
Juan Po-sheng

**Kwangsi CCP**

**1st Secretary** An Ping-sheng  
**Secretaries** Chao Mao-hsün  
Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang  
T'an Ying-chi  
Liu Chung-kuei  
Tu I

**Kwangtung CCP**

**1st Secretary** Wei Kuo-ch'ing  
**Secretaries** Chang Ken-sheng  
Chiao Lin-i  
Kuo Jung-chang  
Lin Li-ming  
Wang Shou-tao  
Yung Wen-t'ao

**Kweichow CCP**

**1st Secretary** Lu Jui-lin  
**2nd Secretary** Li Pao-hua  
**Secretaries** Chang Jung-sen  
Wu Hsiang-pi

**Liaoning CCP**

**1st Secretary** Tseng Shao-shan  
**Secretaries** Hu I-min  
Huang Ou-tung  
Li Po-ch'iu  
Liu Sheng-f'ien  
Mao Yüan-hsin  
Su Yü  
Wei Ping-k'uei  
Yang Ch'un-fu

**Ningsia CCP**

**1st Secretary** K'ang Chien-min  
**Secretary** Chao Chih-ch'iang (f)

**Peking CCP**

**1st Secretary** Wu Te  
**Secretaries** Hsieh Ching-i (f)  
Huang Tso-chen  
Liu Shao-wen  
Ni Chih-fu  
Ting Kuo-yü  
Wan Li  
Wu Chung  
Yang Chün-sheng

**Shanghai CCP**

**1st Secretary** Chang Ch'un-ch'iao\*\*\*  
**2nd Secretary** Yao Wen-yüan\*\*\*  
**Secretaries** Chou Ch'un-lin  
Hsü Ching-hsien  
Ma T'ien-shui  
Wang Hsiu-chen (f)  
Wang Hung-wen\*\*\*

**Shansi CCP**

**1st Secretary** Wang Ch'ien  
**Secretaries** Ch'en Yung-kuei  
Han Ying  
Ts'ao Chung-nan  
Wang T'ing-tung

**Shantung CCP**

**1st Secretary** Pai Ju-ping

### Organization Department

Leading Member Kuo Yü-feng

### United Front Work Department

Leading Members Li Chin-te  
Liu Yu-fa  
Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang  
T'ung Hsiao-p'eng

Foreign Intelligence  
Higher Party School  
Propaganda  
Social Affairs  
Women's Work

Young Communist League  
Political Departments of  
Agriculture and Forestry  
Finance and Trade  
Industry and Communications

No high-ranking officials have been identified  
in these departments since 1966.

### Ningsia CCP

1st Secretary K'ang Chien-min  
Secretary Chao Chih-ch'ang (f)

### Peking CCP

1st Secretary Wu Te  
Secretaries Hsieh Ching-i (f)  
Huang Tso-chen  
Liu Shao-wen  
Ni Chih-fu  
Ting Kuo-yü  
Wan Li  
Wu Chung  
Yang Chün-sheng

### Shanghai CCP

1st Secretary Chang Ch'un-ch'iao\*\*\*  
2nd Secretary Yao Wen-yüan\*\*\*  
Secretaries Chou Ch'un-lin  
Hsü Ching-hsien  
Ma T'ien-shui  
Wang Hsiu-chen (f)  
Wang Hung-wen\*\*\*

### Shansi CCP

1st Secretary Wang Ch'ien  
Secretaries Ch'en Yung-kuei  
Han Ying  
Ts'ao Chung-nan  
Wang T'ing-hung

### Shantung CCP

1st Secretary Pai Ju-ping

### Shensi CCP

1st Secretary Li Jui-shan  
Secretaries Hsiao Ch'un  
Huang Ching-yao  
Huo Shih-lien  
Wu Kuei-hsien (f)\*\*\*

### Sinkiang CCP

1st Secretary Sai-fu-ting  
2nd Secretary Yang Yung  
Secretaries Chang Shih-kung  
Ho Lin-chao  
Liu Hsing  
Nu-erh-t'í-yeh-fu  
Sung Chih-ho  
Szu-ma-i-ai-mai-t'i

### Szechwan CCP

1st Secretary Chao Tzu-yang  
Secretaries Chao Tsang-pi  
Ho Yün-feng  
Hsü Ch'ih  
Hsü Meng-hsia  
Li Tzu-yüan  
Tu Hsin-yüan  
Tuan Chün-i  
Wang Li-chih  
Yang Ch'ao

### Tibet CCP

1st Secretary Jen Jung  
Secretaries Ch'en Ming-i  
Feng K'o-fa  
Je Ti  
Kao Sheng-hsüan  
Pa Sang (f)  
T'ien Pao  
Yang Tung-sheng

### Tientsin CCP

1st Secretary Hsieh Hsüeh-kung  
2nd Secretary Wu Tai  
Secretaries Chao Wu-ch'eng  
Hsing Yen-tzu (f)  
Hsü Hsin  
Wang I  
Wang Man-t'ien (f)  
Wang Shu-chen (f)

### Tsinghai CCP

1st Secretary Chang Chiang-lin  
2nd Secretary Sung Ch'ang-keng  
Secretary

### Yunnan CCP

1st Secretary Chia Ch'i-yün  
2nd Secretary Wang Pi-ch'eng  
Secretaries Ch'en K'ang  
Liu Ming-hui

### LEGEND

This chart identifies officials known or believed to hold  
leading positions in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Names in RED—members and alternate members of  
the politburo

GREEN—the 195 members and 124 alternate  
members of the Chinese Communist  
Party Central Committee elected by  
the 10th National Party Congress  
on 30 August 1973.

—The members of the 10th Central  
Committee who have died since the  
Congress

\*\*—Dismissed from all party and government  
posts on 7 April 1976.

\*\*\*—Provincial leaders who appear primarily  
in Peking

(f)—Officials known to be female

April, 1976



**APPENDIX F**

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPARATUS OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**[Chart]**

**(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)**

POLITBURO OF THE  
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL LIAISON  
DEPARTMENT  
OF THE  
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Director Keng Piao  
Deputy Directors Chang Hsiang-shan  
Feng Hsuan  
Jen Yün-chung  
Shen Chien

*Global responsibility for maintaining relations  
with Communist parties*

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPAR

## CHIEFS OF MISSION

Afghanistan	Kan Yeh-tao	Mali	Meng Yueh
Albania	Liu Chen-hua	Malta	Liu P'u
Algeria	Lin Chung	Mauritania	Wang Peng
Argentina	Cheng Wei-chih	Mauritius	Wang Tse
Australia	Wang Kuo-ch'üan	Mexico	Yao Kuang
Austria	Wang Yüeh-i	Monqolia	Hsü Wen-i
Belgium	Li Lien-pi	Morocco	Chang Wei-lieh
Bulgaria	Chao Chin	Nepal	Ts'ao Ch'ih
Burma	Yeh Ch'eng-chang	Netherlands	Hao Te-ch'ing
Burundi	Ch'en Feng	New Zealand	P'ei Chien-chang
Cameroon	Chao Hsing-chih	Nigeria	Feng Yü-chiu
Canada	Chang Wen-chin	Norway	Ts'ao Ch'un-keng
Chad	Wang Jen-san	Pakistan	Chang Tung
Chile	Hsü Chung-fu	Peru	Chiao Jo-yü
Congo	Lü Chih-hsien	Poland	Liu Shu-ch'ing
Cuba	Chang Te-ch'ün	PRGRSV	Wang Jo-chieh
Cyprus	Tai Lu	Romania	Li T'ing-ch'üan
Czechoslovakia	Tsung K'o-wen	Rwanda	Huang Shih-hsieh
Dahomey	Ku Hsiao-po	San Marino	**Wang Ch'uan-pin
Denmark	Yüeh Liang	Senegal	Wang Chin-ch'uan
Egypt	Ch'ai Tse-min	Sierra Leone	Chao Cheng-i
Equatorial Guinea	Ch'en T'an	Somalia	Fan Tso-k'ai
Ethiopia	Yü P'ei-wen	South Yemen	Ts'ui Chien
Finland	Shih Tzu-ming	Spain	Ch'en Chao-yüan
France	Tseng T'ao	Sri Lanka	Huang Ming-ta
Germany, East	P'eng Kuang-wei	Sudan	Yang Shou-cheng
Germany, West	Wang Yü-t'ien	Sweden	Wang Lu-ming
Ghana	K'o Hua	Switzerland	Ch'en Chih-fang
Greece	Chou Po-p'ing	Syria	Ch'in Chia-lin
Guinea	Han K'o-hua	Tanzania	Li Yao-wen
Guyana	Wang Chan-yüan	Togo	Wei Pao-shan
Hungary	Li Tse-wang	Tunisia	Hou Yeh-feng
Iceland	Ch'en Tung	Turkey	Liu Ch'un
India	*Ma Mu-ming	Uganda	Ko Pu-hai
Iran	Ch'en Hsin-jen	United Kingdom	Sung Chih-kuang
Iraq	Hu Cheng-fang	United Nations	
Italy	Shen P'ing	New York	Huang Hua
Jamaica	Li Ch'ao	Geneva	Wang Ch'ung-li
Japan	Ch'en Ch'u	United States	***Huang Chen

## NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

Director Chu Mu-chih  
First Deputy  
Director Chang Chi-chih  
Deputy Directors Chang Cheng-te  
Hsieh Li-fu  
Miao Hai-ling  
Mu Ch'ing  
Shih Shao-hua  
Teng Kang

*Channels information collected by representatives  
abroad and serves a quasi-diplomatic function in  
countries in which the PRC has no diplomatic repre-  
sentation. NCNA has representatives in at least 52  
countries. The largest offices are in Cairo, Hong  
Kong, Tokyo and the United Nations in New York.*

## African Affairs Department

Director Ho Kung-k'ai  
Deputy Directors Chao Yüan  
Hsüeh Kung-ch'o  
Li Heng  
Wen Yeh-chan



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# APPARATUS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

**STATE COUNCIL**

**Premier** Chou En-lai

**Vice Premiers** Ch'en Yün  
Li Fu-ch'un  
Li Hsien-nien  
Nieh Jung-chen  
Teng Hsiao-p'ing

**AGENCY**

Mu-chih

Chang Chi-chih

Chang Cheng-te

Leh Li-fu

ao Hai-ling

Ch'ing

Shao-hua

ng Kang

representatives

omatic function in

diplomatic repre-

as in at least 52

in Cairo, Hong

ons in New York.

**MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE**

**Minister**

**Vice Ministers** Hsiao Ching-kuang  
Su Yü

**Foreign Affairs Department**

**Director** Ch'ai Ch'eng-wen

**Deputy Directors** Chao Ch'un-cheng  
Chu K'ai-yin  
Kan Mai  
Wang Yüeh-hsi  
Yin Tso-ch'en

*Supervises military missions abroad*

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**Minister** Chi P'eng-fei

**Vice Ministers** (in rank order)  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua  
Han Nien-lung  
Chung Hsi-tung  
Ma Wen-po  
Ho Ying  
Fu Hao  
Yu Chan  
Wang Hai-jung

**Assistant Minister**

**FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTES**

*Training academies for foreign affairs personnel*

**CHINESE PEOPLE FOR FOREIGN**

**President**

**Vice Presidents**

**Secretary General**

**GEOGRAPHICAL**

**DEPARTMENTS**

# PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

## LEGEND

This chart identifies key officials involved in various foreign affairs organizations of the People's Republic of China. Excluded are the foreign economic institutions, the tourist-oriented China Travel Service, provincial-level foreign affairs bureaus, bilateral friendship associations and other people-to-people organizations, all of which participate in various degrees in China's foreign affairs. Names in red identify members of the Politburo, and names in green identify members or alternate members of the 10th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The dotted lines linking organizations indicate some coordinating or directional responsibilities.

### MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- Minister  
Ministers  
(rank order)
- Chi P'eng-fei
- Ch'iao Kuan-hua  
Han Nien-lung  
Chung Hsi-tung  
Ma Wen-po  
Ho Ying  
Fu Hao  
Yu Chan  
Wang Hai-jung
- Deputy Minister

**FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE**

*Training academies for foreign affairs personnel*

**CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

President  
Vice Presidents  
Secretary General

Ch'iao Kuan-hua  
Chou Ch'iu-yeh  
Chou Pei-yuan  
K'o Po-nien  
Chou Ch'iu-yeh

**CHINESE PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATION FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES**

Chairman  
Vice Chairmen  
Secretary General

L' En-chiu  
Lin Lin  
Ting Hsi-lin  
Ting Hsueh-sung  
Yang Chi  
Ting Hsueh-sung

*Responsible for international people-to-people programs*

### ADMINISTRATIVE

### DEPARTMENTS

**Asian Affairs Department**

Directors

Lu Wei-chao  
Cheng Jui-sheng  
Ho Chang-ming  
Liang Feng  
Wang Hsiao-yün

**Soviet Union and East European Affairs Department**

Director  
Deputy Directors

Hsiang Chung-p'u  
Tien Tseng-p'ei  
Wang Ming-hsiu  
Yü Hung-liang

**West Asian and North African Affairs Department**

Director  
Deputy Directors

Ts'ao K'o-chiang  
Chou Chüeh  
Wang Pu-ching

**West European Affairs Department**

Director  
Deputy Directors

Wang Tung  
Hsü Wei-ch'in  
Wang Pen-chun  
Wang Pen-tso



# CHIEFS OF MISSION

Afghanistan	Kan Yeh-tao	Mali	Meng Yueh
Albania	Liu Chen-hua	Malta	Liu P'u
Algeria	Lin Chung	Mauritania	Wang Peng
Argentina	Cheng Wei-chih	Mauritius	Wang Tse
Australia	Wang Kuo-ch'uan	Mexico	Yao Kuang
Austria	Wang Yüeh-i	Monaoia	Hsü Wen-i
Belgium	Li Lien-pi	Morocco	Chang Wei-lieh
Bulgaria	Chao Chin	Nepal	Ts'ao Ch'ih
Burma	Yeh Ch'eng-chang	Netherlands	Hao Te-ch'ing
Burundi	Ch'en Feng	New Zealand	P'ei Chien-chang
Cameroon	Chao Hsing-chih	Nigeria	Feng Yü-chiu
Canada	Chang Wen-chin	Norway	Ts'ao Ch'un-keng
Chad	Wang Jen-san	Pakistan	Chang Tung
Chile	Hsü Chung-fu	Peru	Chiao Jo-yü
Congo	Lü Chih-hsien	Poland	Liu Shu-ch'ing
Cuba	Chang Te-ch'ün	PRGRSV	Wang Jo-chieh
Cyprus	Tai Lu	Romania	Li T'ing-ch'uan
Czechoslovakia	Tsung K'o-wen	Rwanda	Huang Shih-hsieh
Dahomey	Ku Hsiao-po	San Marino	**Wang Ch'uan-pin
Denmark	Yüeh Liang	Senegal	Wang Chin-ch'uan
Egypt	Ch'ai Tse-min	Sierra Leone	Chao Cheng-i
Equatorial Guinea	Ch'en T'an	Somalia	Fan Tso-k'ai
Ethiopia	Yü P'ei-wen	South Yemen	Ts'ui Chien
Finland	Shih Tzu-ming	Spain	Ch'en Chao-yüan
France	Tseng T'ao	Sri Lanka	Huang Ming-ta
Germany, East	P'eng Kuang-wei	Sudan	Yang Shou-cheng
Germany, West	Wang Yü-t'ien	Sweden	Wang Lu-ming
Ghana	K'o Hua	Switzerland	Ch'en Chih-fang
Greece	Chou Po-p'ing	Syria	Ch'in Chia-lin
Guinea	Han K'o-hua	Tanzania	Li Yao-wen
Guyana	Wang Chan-yüan	Togo	Wei Pao-shan
Hungary	Li Tse-wang	Tunisia	Hou Yeh-feng
Iceland	Ch'en Tung	Turkey	Liu Ch'un
India	*Ma Mu-ming	Uganda	Ko Pu-hai
Iran	Ch'en Hsin-jen	United Kingdom	Sung Chih-kuang
Iraq	Hu Cheng-fang	United Nations	
Italy	Shen P'ing	New York	Huang Hua
Jamaica	Li Ch'ao	Geneva	Wang Ch'ung-li
Japan	Ch'en Ch'u	United States	***Huang Chen
Kenya	*Li Shih	USSR	Liu Hsin-ch'uan
Korea, North	Li Yün-ch'uan	Upper Volta	Hsieh Pang-chih
Kuwait	Sun Sheng-wei	Vietnam, North	Wang Yu-p'ing
Laos	*Ling Chao-yüan	Yemen	Chang Ts'an-ming
Lebanon	Hsü Ming	Yugoslavia	Chang Hai-feng
Luxembourg	Li Lien-pi	Zaire	Kung Ta-fei
Malagasy Republic	Li Yao-wen	Zambia	Li Ch'iang-fen
Maldives	Huang Ming-ta		

Diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Cambodia, Central African Republic and Indonesia have been suspended or severed. Israel has unilaterally recognized the PRC; the PRC has unilaterally recognized the Bahamas and Grenada.

\*Representation at the Charge level

\*\*Representation at the Consulate level

\*\*\*Liaison Office

## Director Deputy Directors

Chang Chi-shan  
Chang Cheng-te  
Hsieh Li-fu  
Miao Hai-ling  
Mu Ch'ing  
Shih Shao-hua  
Teng Kang

Channels information collected by representatives abroad and serves a quasi-diplomatic function in countries in which the PRC has no diplomatic representation. NCNA has representatives in at least 52 countries. The largest offices are in Cairo, Hong Kong, Tokyo and the United Nations in New York.

## African Affairs Department

Director  
Deputy Directors

Ho Kung-k'ai  
Chao Yüan  
Hsüeh Kung-ch'o  
Li Heng  
Wen Yeh-dan

## Consular Affairs Department

Director  
Deputy Directors

Ch'in Li-chen  
Kao Shih-k'un  
T'ien P'ing

## GEOGRAPHICAL

## DEPARTMENTS

### African Affairs Department

Director Ho Kung-k'ai  
Deputy Directors Chao Yüan  
Hsüeh Kung-ch'o  
Li Heng  
Wen Yeh-dan

### American and Oceanian Affairs Department

Director Lin P'ing  
Deputy Directors Ch'en Te-ho  
Wu Fan-wu  
Office of US Affairs  
Director Ting Yüan-hung  
Deputy Directors Chao Chi-hua  
Ch'eng Ch'i-hung  
Shen Jo-yün  
Responsible Person Ni Yao-li

### Asian Affairs Department

Director Lu Wei-chao  
Deputy Directors Cheng Jui-sheng  
Ho Chang-ming  
Liang Feng  
Wang Hsiao-yün

### Soviet Union and East European Affairs Department

Director  
Deputy Directors Hsiang Chung-p'u  
Tien Tseng-p'ei  
Wang Ming-hsiu  
Yü Hung-liang

## FUNCTIONAL

## DEPARTMENTS

### Consular Affairs Department

Director Ch'in Li-chen  
Deputy Directors Kao Shih-k'un  
T'ien P'ing

### General Office

Director Fu Hao

### Information Department

Director P'eng Hua  
Deputy Directors Hsiao T'e  
Wang Chen  
Yen Hung-liang  
Representative Wang Ch'ang-i  
Staff Members Ch'i Ming-tsung  
Yao Wei  
US Affairs Unit  
Director Ma Yü-chen

### International Organizations and Conferences and Treaty and Law Department

Director An Chih-yün  
Deputy Directors Ling Ch'ing  
Pi Chi-lung  
Shen Wei-liang  
Adviser Kung P'u-sheng

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Ho Ying  
Fu Hao  
Yu Chen  
Wang Hai-jung

**INSTITUTES**  
Training academies for foreign affairs personnel

**FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
President  
Vice Presidents  
Secretary General

Ch'iao Kuan-hua  
Chou Ch'iu-yeh  
Chou Pei-yüan  
K'o Po-nien  
Chou Ch'iu-yeh

**FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH  
FOREIGN COUNTRIES**  
Chairman  
Vice Chairmen  
Secretary General

Li En-chiu  
Lin Lin  
Ting Hsi-lin  
Ting Hsüeh-sung  
Yang Chi  
Ting Hsüeh-sung

Responsible for international people-to-people programs

**ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS**

**DEPARTMENTS**

**Asian Affairs Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors

Lu Wei-chao  
Cheng Jui-sheng  
Ho Chang-ming  
Liang Feng  
Wang Hsiao-yün

**Soviet Union and East  
European Affairs Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors

Hsiang Chung-p'ü  
Tien Tseng-p'ei  
Wang Ming-hsiu  
Yü Hung-liang

**West Asian and North African  
Affairs Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors

Ts'ao K'o-chiang  
Chou Chüeh  
Wang Pu-ching

**West European Affairs  
Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors

Wang Tung  
Hsü Wei-ch'in  
Wang Pen-chün  
Wang Pen-tso

**FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS**

**DEPARTMENTS**

**Information Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors  
Representative  
Staff Members  
US Affairs Unit  
Director

P'eng Hua  
Hsiao T'e  
Wang Chen  
Yen Hung-liang  
Wang Ch'ang-i  
Ch'i Ming-tsung  
Yao Wei  
Ma Yü-chen

**International Organizations  
and Conferences and Treaty  
and Law Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors  
Adviser

An Chih-yüan  
Ling Ch'ing  
Pi Chi-lung  
Shen Wei-liang  
Kung P'ü-sheng

**Personnel Department**  
Director  
Deputy Director

An Kuo-cheng

**Protocol Department**  
Director  
Deputy Directors  
European and American  
Affairs Department  
Director  
Deputy Director  
Diplomatic Services Bureau  
Director  
Construction Department  
Director  
Housing Department  
Director  
Personnel Department  
Director  
Service Department  
Director

Chu Ch'uan-hsien  
Kao Chien-chung  
Liu Hua  
T'ang Lung-pin  
Cheng Ho-k'ang  
Hsü Huang  
Tai Fang-ts'un  
Liu Ching-kuo  
Chih Sung-p'o  
Li Shu-t'ien

## **APPENDIX G**

### **PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY POWER**

[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, U.S. Army Ret., Col. John A. C. Andrews, U.S. Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes. 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.]



## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

### Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho Kuo

#### POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 3,691,501 square miles (including Tibet)  
Population: 825,000,000-875,000,000

Armed Forces: 3,250,000 (including security and border troops; .38% of population)  
Gross National Product: \$128 billion (1971; \$151 per capita)  
Annual Military Expenditure: \$12.8 billion (10% GNP)  
Steel Production: 43 million metric tons  
Fuel Production: Coal: 325 million metric tons Crude Oil: 23 million metric tons  
Electric Power Output: 70 billion kwh  
Grain Production: 230 million metric tons  
Merchant Fleet: 290 ships; 1.6 million gross tons  
Machine Tools (units): 50,000  
Civil Air Fleet: 30 jet, 18 turboprop and 70 piston transports

#### DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The armed forces of Communist China (all services being integrated within the People's Liberation Army-PLA) are controlled and administered by a Ministry of National Defense. This is one of the major administrative organizations under the State Council, which is the principal governmental executive authority (under the overall authority of the National People's Congress). There is a National Defense Council, whose approximately 100 members actually have little responsibility but much prestige. Real authority over the armed forces is exercised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCP), through its Politburo, with operating direction provided by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, consisting of the Party Chairman and five to seven other ranking members of the Party. The office of Chairman of the Republic is vacant.

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is organized along relatively conventional military headquarters lines, with overall staff coordination exercised by three departments: the General Staff Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Political Department. The last lost much of its power during the Cultural Revolution but has reappeared as an important force. Specific operational functions are administered by a number of staff directorates, which include: Armored Force, Artillery Force, Engineer Corps, Railway Engineer Corps, Signal Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense Command. A Second Artillery Corps, of which little is known, may be the nuclear weapons command. Under MND headquarters are the operating forces. The Scientific and Technological Commission for National Defense is under the direct control of the Minister of Defense, but is not under the operational control of the Chief of Staff of the PLA, who (subject to the authority of the Minister of Defense) exercises military command authority over the operation forces.

#### POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

The People's Liberation Army serves both domestic and foreign policy. The unique history of the PLA as an "army of

the people" has endowed it with a broad range of interior functions which may be aggregated in the "three supports and two militaries" slogan that had wide currency during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: "Support the left, support industry, support agriculture; exercise military control, give military and political training." In effect, such slogans cover activities as disparate as suppression of near-mutiny, as in Wuhan in July 1967; containing the more violent elements of youth or party activities, as was often the case in the Cultural Revolution; assumption of control over industry and political organs; and activity such as growing a good part of its own subsistence and helping local farmers in their work. At varying levels of intensity, depending on surrounding conditions, the Army has been extolled as a model for the whole populace. The PLA is, in actuality, the army of the party rather than the army of the people. Struggle for actual control of this political instrument is at the center of much of the recurring turbulence that appears in the PRC.

In more straightforward exterior functions, the PLA has the task of supplying the military component of a shifting national strategy. From 1968 onward, after the Soviet Union exercised what it described as the "right" of Socialist States to intervene by force, as in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the PRC's immediate concerns have focused increasingly on its 4,500-mile border in the north. The Russians, for their part, have increased their propaganda activity and their physical presence on the other side of the border. A series of relatively small but sharp encounters in the period March-August 1969 highlighted the level of tension wherever troops faced one another.

The conventional force structure and deployment of the PLA illustrates a realistic response to threat perceptions. The forces are being developed primarily as effective instruments for making the cost of conventional action against the Chinese homeland too high for the prospective gains, whether by the Soviet Union or the United States. There is little effort going into the development of substantial airborne or amphibious capability, further suggesting that large offensive efforts are not contemplated at this time. The steady improvement of capability does imply, however, that the PRC might be able to take significant military action over its borders, particularly in Southeast Asia. This is not likely, in the light of support, expressed or implied, by the super-powers to those neighbors, and Chinese fear of a two-front war. Any physical action to "liberate" Taiwan is unlikely at this time. This is reinforced by the often expressed conviction that reunion will come about without the use of force.

In January and February 1974 the PRC sent forces into the Paracel and Spratley Islands, displacing South Vietnamese units. Some observers believe that potential oil resources are at issue; others think that the PRC might use these locations for tracking Soviet fleet units in the South China Sea. In any case, this style of offensive overseas action is new to Peking's behavior.

The PRC is a late-comer on the nuclear weapons scene and lacks the resources to mount a program that could in any way hope to match those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently Peking's nuclear weapons policies have been directed to achieving maximum impact in both the political and military fields. On the political side the PRC asserts that it will never be the first to use these weapons. The Chinese program is celebrated as encouragement for the poorer countries of the world and as protection for them. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is regarded as desirable in breaking the nuclear monopoly of the great powers.

On the military side, the program has involved some 15 tests, including one underground and one missile-borne. (The missile is believed to have a range of six thousand miles.) The types tested lead to the conclusion that the PRC policy looks primarily to deterrence of the Soviet Union by deploying weapons that can reach targets in metropolitan Russia. This probably represents the best use that can be made of limited resources.

The Chinese ICBM continues to be the subject of much speculation. In July 1973 a large device was sighted at the test installation. Bigger than the Soviet's SS-9, it was reported to be the vehicle for the intercontinental weapon that the PRC has yet to test (although a 2,000-mile rocket firing was thought by some to be a reduced-range trial). Installations that might be associated with tracking have been reported on the northern slopes of Mt. Everest and on the east coast of Africa. An instrumented ship of some 12,000 tons has been reported in the Indian Ocean. Peking launched two earth satellites in April 1970 and March 1971. Some authorities think that the second used solid fuel. In early 1974 the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the PRC had several hundred nuclear-armed IRBM and MRBM. At the same time, US defense authorities were reported to have said that the PRC program was moving slower than expected and there would not be a missile capable of reaching the continental United States until 1976 or 1977 and 10 to 25 such weapons would not become available until 1979-80.

Current strategic policy is reflected also in conventional weapons development programs. For ground forces the programs for enhanced mobility and firepower clearly relate to a more effective defense against invasion. The air force concentrates on high performance air defense fighters and a relatively small number of bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons on Asian and some Russian targets. The navy is adding submarines and destroyers, gaining some modest offensive capabilities, but only incidental to the quest for better defense. All these programs are added burdens to nuclear costs and must be prosecuted with close attention to resources and money. Some of the major new items upon which effort appears to be concentrated are nuclear-powered submarines, hydrofoil patrol boats, missile firing destroyers, armored personnel carriers, fighter aircraft (mach 2, 50,000



feet), and across-the-board communications and electronics gear.

In deference to the egalitarian, revolutionary concepts of Maoist Communism, there are no ranks or grades within the PLA. No titles are employed, other than to designate each individual by the function he performs, as Soldier-Fighter Li, Squad Leader Ch'en, Company Commander Wu, Army Commander Lin, etc. The continuing emphasis on the need to eliminate bureaucrats and officials who exploit their positions for personal gain or comfort suggests that the privileges of rank are still sought and exercised.

There is a political officer in all tactical units, down to and including the company. In conformity with the relationships established by Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese Civil War, the authority of the political officer is superior to that of the tactical unit commander.

Beginning at age 18 every Chinese citizen is liable to military service, up to a total of four years. In practice only a small proportion of the six to seven million young people who become eligible for military service are actually conscripted; selection is done only after a careful screening of all eligible for conscription. Service in the Army is usually for two years, in the Navy for four years, and the Air Force for three years.

### STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a device created by Mao Tse-tung to give Chinese youth a revolutionary experience (however synthetic), to uncover and put out of office or reeducate those party officials who had lost their revolutionary zeal, and to purge those officials suspected of trying to capture the Chinese revolution and lead it down the "capitalist road." From August 1966 until the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, the country was torn by physical and verbal clashes between the numerous groups that appeared. The Red Guards—militant, activist young radicals—swept over the country, doing violence and destruction on a vast scale. The PLA was introduced to support the left, but at times the troops seemed to support more conservative causes. New Revolutionary Committees, dominated by the military, took over Party functions at all levels, as well as the operation of industry and economic affairs generally. Schools closed, production slowed, and the PRC withdrew from exterior contacts almost completely. There was an open rebellion by military authorities in Wuhan in July 1967. Thousands all over China were killed, beaten, and reviled. By the late summer of 1968 the tide was slackening and the young people were put under restraint.

The Ninth Party Congress, held in April, 1969, marked the apparent end of the more visible aspects of the Cultural Revolution. The PLA emerged as the single entity capable of functioning effectively in national affairs. The extreme left was segregated, the activist young were sent down to the countryside for education and training, literally by the

millions, and the effort was begun to rebuild the party after its deliberate destruction. Provincial party and special municipality committees were formed. While there were some notable exceptions, it was overwhelmingly true that the new bodies were dominated by the military and military commissar types who had made up the revolutionary committees of the Cultural Revolution period. The new Party constitution named Lin Biao as Mao's successor. Major changes appeared when schools reopened and production began to return to normal. 7 May schools undertook the retraining of cadres, teachers, and administrators.

Almost simultaneously with the Ninth Party Congress, the tension between the PRC and the Soviet Union began to move steadily to the foreground. The armed clashes that took place, although significant, were really tokens of a much wider split that involved old territorial aims, doctrinal differences, and the leadership of the communist world and the less developed countries. There have been efforts to deal rationally with these problems, but the buildup of military power has continued along both sides of the borders. Some estimates of Soviet strength there go as high as one million troops, with nuclear and conventional weapons appropriate to that number.

The Soviet threat naturally evoked a military response from Peking. Further, Chou En-Lai came to effective power as Premier and either made the first move toward improved relations with the United States or moved to accept American initiatives very quickly. From that point onward, the PRC moved rapidly back into the wider world. Peking replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the Chinese representative in the UN on October 25, 1971. President Nixon visited Peking in February 1972. An exchange of liaison officers has made intercourse between Washington and Peking much broader and more open, and Secretary of State Kissinger has made six trips to the PRC. Japan has recognized the PRC and is engaged in working through a number of thorny problems flowing from this act. Over 90 nations now have accorded full diplomatic recognition to Peking. In terms of relations and interests in the outer world, the leaders have made a massive change of direction and effort. The new relations between the United States and the PRC most certainly have required new calculations of power balances and prospects. Peking has changed its style and under carefully controlled conditions entered into substantial overseas trade activities. It would be wrong to think, however, that Peking is undergoing some major change of heart. This shift is tactical. It was to the PRC's interest to reduce tension with one of its two super-power opponents. For a number of reasons, including the real US desire to get out of Vietnam and to begin the reductions explicit in the Nixon Doctrine, the United States was a better candidate. The choicest epithets are now reserved for the Soviets, but the United States gets its share of castigation for "imperialism" and associated qualities. It is a question of Peking's perceptions of menace and priority of response.

While the exterior view of the PRC was brightening, strange events were occurring within. In September 1971 a number of prominent military personages disappeared. In addition to Lin Piao, the Minister of Defense and designated successor to Mao, there were the Chief of Staff of the PLA; the Political Commissar of the Navy; the Commander of the Air Force; and the Director of the General Logistics Department. Only Lin Piao has been accounted for. He is reported dead, killed in an attempt to flee the country after an attempt to assassinate Chairman Mao was thwarted. Of the others there is no word, nor have replacements been named.

In August 1973 the Tenth Party Congress was held and a new constitution approved. Chou En-lai felt called upon to rationalize dealings with an erstwhile enemy (the United States) in terms of revolutionary tactics. Military people were still prominent in the Congress but some reduction in military office holders took place. There was a general atmosphere of ideological debate and compromise over the right style of dealings and relations with the imperialists (the US) and social imperialists (USSR). There have been some indications of the possibility of efforts to mend the quarrel with Moscow, but the search for conciliation with the Soviets is not openly popular.

The recent sharp attacks on Confucius and his social theories have coincided with increasingly vocal exhortations to new revolution. In a move still not clearly understood, eight of the eleven powerful military region commanders were transferred in the closing days of 1973. Mainland China could be poised on the edge of another cultural revolution whose style and intensity cannot yet be identified.

China's greatest strategic problem would seem to be the maintenance of a screen of security from attack by the outside world, particularly from the north, while indulging in interior activities that could at any moment become destabilizing and require sizable intervention by the armed forces to quell interior disturbances.

Continuing resistance of Tibetans to the Chinese Communist occupation has caused the Chinese to maintain a harsh, repressive rule. Several Tibetan tribes persist in waging low-scale guerrilla warfare. The Chinese are also engaging in ethnic absorption through forced migration of Han Chinese. The Soviet Union has done what it can to exacerbate and arouse the ethnic minorities along its borders, particularly in Sinkiang. Local dissidence poses a problem for the Chinese authorities, but it is probably not serious.

Despite evidence of modest improvement in basic areas, the staggering problem of moving China into the modern world of industrialized nations remains. Eighty percent of the people live on 15% of China's total land and make their living from labor-intensive agriculture. Seventy-five percent of disposable personal income goes for such basic items as food, clothing, and shelter. China will for a long time have to face the huge problem of generating investment capital from a primitive base. The military budget, even though it represents 10% of

GNP, does not afford the resources to produce the quantities of military equipment, conventional and nuclear, that would be needed if China wanted to assert itself as an effective military power beyond its own borders in an aggressive fashion.

China has at times been unable to produce enough food to provide adequate sustenance to its vast population. In times of poor crops, the result has been widespread famine. Despite some improvement in agricultural and distribution methods in recent years, the population of China is estimated to be growing at a rate of increase greater than the rate of increased agricultural yields. The government has asserted an interest in birth control, but a total solution to this food-production population problem seems not yet to be in sight.

Under the strictly directed economy, China has made substantial economic progress, with industrial production and the gross national product rising sharply. However, in absolute terms, these increases were less than the economic gains being made at the same time in many of the more economically developed powers, and substantially less than either the Soviet Union or the United States. Thus, China's economic planners have had some very difficult decisions to make in the allocation of resources to support the national objectives. High priority seems to have been given to the weapons industry, with some emphasis on improved aircraft and the nuclear program.

Another great strategic problem is to persuade Soviet leaders that should Russia attack, China will use its limited array of nuclear weapons against targets in Russian territory, and that this loss and destruction would offset whatever Soviet gains might be expected from the devastation of mainland China.

The PRC seems to have satisfied itself that the United States will honor its commitment to come to the assistance of the Republic of China on Taiwan against any attempt to take that island or the offshore islands by force, but that the US will not support Taiwan in offensive operations against mainland China. Also, despite various kinds of economic and military assistance to North Vietnam, Peking carefully refrained from any armed involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Chinese refusal to accept the British-imposed McMahon Line of 1914 has resulted in continuing tension with India, punctuated by full-scale hostilities in October 1962. Having achieved a significant military success, and having occupied the areas claimed by China, Chinese troops halted their advance voluntarily, although there seems to have been no way that the demoralized Indian forces could have prevented their descent into the plains of North India. Since that time, however, the Indians have strongly reinforced and improved their forces along the disputed frontier, and the prospect for trouble there is always present. In 1965 Chinese activities along the border were directed to assist Pakistan in its fight with India, but achieved little. The Indians kept six very good mountain divisions in the high passes during the Bangladesh War in



December 1971. This, together with the ominous Soviet presence in the north, limited China's support of Pakistan to some weapons and verbal support. It is very important to the PRC to maintain control over the Aksai Chin region, through which runs the road connecting Sinkiang and the southern frontier.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Soviet military aid to the PRC has long since stopped. Peking does not buy military equipment abroad, although there are rumors of an impending discussion of purchase of civilian-configured helicopters from an American manufacturer. It has recently been reported from London that there is an arrangement being worked out for the provision of Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan aircraft engines to the PRC.

China, on its part, provides military assistance to selected clients, including legitimate ones such as Albania, Pakistan, Yemen, Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Rebels and insurgents like the groups in Palestine, Dhofar, and Jordan get arms, training and money. Pakistan has been granted an assistance credit reported to be some \$300 million, which includes one-for-one replacement of the Bangladesh losses. A military jet airfield will soon be in service to support the 20-odd MiG-17s and -19s given to Tanzania. Tanzanian forces have also been given ground weapons and patrol gunboats and a number of Chinese advisers.

The PRC tries to maintain a position that competes with that of the Soviet Union or, in some cases, the United States, within the limits imposed by relatively slender resources. The Chinese effort has had mixed results: participation in Indonesian affairs was disastrous for the Communist party there and for Chinese influence; some of the lower-key actions in Africa and the Middle East have at least maintained some influence and show a budding potential.

#### ALLIANCES

Despite the bitterness of China's ideological split with Soviet Russia, neither nation has repudiated their 30 year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950. It is likely that the terms would be invoked, and probably honored, if either nation were to become engaged in overt hostilities with the US. Otherwise the treaty is probably meaningless. Similar bilateral treaties with North Korea and Mongolia have comparable status, since both of these nations have supported the Soviet Union in the ideological split. There has been, however, some indication that the new PRC line in foreign relations has produced a significant move toward closer and warmer ties with North Korea. The tenth anniversary of the treaty between the two countries was celebrated with great intensity.

The only nation with which the PRC appears to have any kind of effective alliance is Albania. This alliance might have

some limited usefulness in harassing Soviet or American shipping from sea or air in the event of war with either. There have been some reports of excavations in Albania that might be the start of positions for missiles trained on Russia. Actually, the arrangement has little real significance.

#### ARMY

(In this and the following sections the figures used represent a rough average from several sources. The PRC does not publish useful information on this subject. This is equally true with respect to deployments.)

*Personnel:* 2,550,000 (including railway engineer troops)

#### *Organization:*

- 11 Military Regions (each usually having 2 or 3 military districts; generally there is one army in each military district)
- 30 armies (equivalents of Western army corps; usually 2 or 3 divisions each, 3 artillery regiments; plus, sometimes, armor and cavalry units)
- 120 infantry divisions\* (6 independent; the other 114 are in the 30 armies)
- 5 armored divisions
- 3 cavalry divisions
- 2 airborne divisions
- 1 mountain division (in Tibet)
- 20 artillery divisions (component regiments are normally attached to infantry divisions and include AT and AA units as well as field artillery)
- 11 railway engineer divisions
- 17 independent artillery regiments
- 5 independent AT artillery regiments
- 30 independent AA artillery regiments
- 5 independent armored regiments
- 67 independent engineer regiments
- 2 independent signal regiments
- 34 independent motor transport regiments

*Deployment:* Divisional strength is believed to be by military regions as follows (including all types except artillery divisions). (It is possible that more troops from Southern and Eastern areas have been moved to the north, raising the number of divisions there by 5 to 10.)

Sinkiang - 5 divisions  
Shenyang (Manchuria) - 16 divisions  
Peking - 17 divisions  
Tsinan - 5 divisions

\*Average 12-14,000 in strength; armored, cavalry and airborne divisions are slightly smaller.

Nanking - 8 divisions  
 Foochow - 9 divisions  
 Wuhan - 14 divisions  
 Lanchow - 11 divisions  
 Chengtu (including Tibet) - 10 divisions  
 Canton (including Hainan) - 17 divisions  
 Kunming - 5 divisions

From time to time there is evidence of the formation of special mission-oriented task groupings and activity. Observers on Taiwan say that there has been extensive airfield improvement and expansion of infrastructure in the coastal area across the Strait, as well as an active rotation and training program for air units. A South Seas Command based on Canton, Kunming, and Hainan Island has also been reported.

North Vietnam and Laos: There were over 15,000 railway engineer troops (1 railway engineer division) and some construction engineer troops in these two countries at one time, but this number has been reduced.

#### *Major Equipment Inventory:*

JS-2/3 heavy tanks  
 T-34 medium tanks  
 1,200+ T-59 medium tanks (Chinese-made copies of Soviet T-54)  
 T-60 amphibious tanks  
 T-69 light tanks  
 APCs (Chinese designed and built)  
 light, medium, and heavy artillery pieces  
 1,200+ AA guns  
 SAM launchers (SA-2 Guideline)  
 SSM launchers

*Reserves:* China claims to have a civilian militia of 200,000,000, which is practically the entire working force of the nation. These include about 125 million men and 75 million women. Most of these apparently are ordinary militiamen (men between 30 and 50, and women between 16 and 50) few of whom probably have any weapons training, and for whom few weapons and little equipment are available. There are perhaps 5,000,000 "backbone militiamen", carefully selected men between the ages of 16 and 30, who apparently receive annual training, and for whom weapons and equipment are probably in adequate supply in terms of Chinese equipment standards. Backbone militia units, up to battalion strength, are mobilizable for internal security tasks and as a source of reserve manpower for the PLA. Theoretically the entire militia force is mobilizable in division strengths, each division having an indefinite number of regiments, and each regiment including one backbone militia battalion. In practice, it is

likely that ordinary militia units would be mobilized only for emergency home-guard type duties.

## **NAVY**

*Personnel:* 180,000 (including 16,000 Naval Air Force and 28,000 Marines)

#### *Organization:*

##### **3 fleets:**

North Sea Fleet, approximately 240 craft, about 19% of total navy strength, from Yalu River to Lien Yuen Kang;

East Sea Fleet, approximately 700 craft, about 57% of total navy strength, from Lien Yuen Kang to Chao An Wan;

South Sea Fleet, approximately 300 craft, about 24% of total navy strength from Chao An Wan to Hainan.

##### **3 escort squadrons (one per fleet)**

##### **4 landing craft squadrons (two for East Sea Fleet)**

##### **2 submarine squadrons (none for South Sea Fleet)**

##### **4 minesweeper squadrons (two for East Sea Fleet)**

##### **2 torpedo boat squadrons (North Sea Fleet)**

##### **2 auxiliary ship squadrons (1 divided between North and South Sea Fleets)**

##### **6 naval air divisions**

##### **1 independent naval air regiment**

##### **10 marine units, 4 amphibious tank units (size unknown; may be amphibious-trained Army troops)**

##### **10 coast artillery regiments**

#### *Major Units:*

##### **1 ballistic missile submarine (G class; SSB)**

##### **39 submarines (W and R class; SS)**

##### **3 coastal submarines (S-1 and M-V class; SSC)**

##### **8 destroyers (4 Gordy class; 4 new construction with SSM)**

##### **8 destroyer escorts (DE)**

##### **11 escorts (PF)**

##### **20 submarine chasers (Kronstadt class; PC)**

##### **35 missile patrol boats (Osa and Komar class; PTFG)**

##### **21 fleet minesweepers (20 T-43 class, 1 Bathurst class, MSF)**

##### **6 coastal minesweepers (MSC)**

##### **215 torpedo boats (80 P-6, 70 P-4, 65 hydrofoil)**



- 225 patrol gunboats (Shanghai class; PG)
- 50 fast patrol craft (Swatow class; PTF)
- 21 landing ships, tank (LST)
- 13 landing ships, medium (LSM)
- 16 landing ships, infantry, large (LSIL)
- 10 landing craft, utility (LCU)
- 12 river gunboats (PRG)
- 408 auxiliaries and miscellaneous service craft
- 300 MiG-15/17 fighters
- 100 Il-28 light bombers
- 20 Tu-4 medium bombers
- trainer/support aircraft
- helicopters
- (Total: about 500 shore-based naval aircraft)

*Major Naval Bases:* Tsingtao, Lushan, Taku, Shanghai, Huangpu, Chou Shan, Amoy, Foochow, Whampoa, Changkiang, Tsamkong.

*Reserves:* There are about 350,000 trained naval reservists.

## AIR FORCE

*Personnel:* 220,000 (including about 90,000 in air defense units)

### *Organization:*

- 20 fighter and fighter-bomber divisions (3 air regiments per division, 3 squadrons per regiment)
- 6 bomber divisions
- 1 transport division (sufficient airlift for about 2 infantry regiments)
- 5 independent air regiments
- trainer/support units and helicopter squadrons
- 32 independent AA artillery regiments (1,000 + AA guns)
- 9 radar regiments
- miscellaneous service and support ground regiments

### *Major Aircraft Types:*

- 3,060 combat aircraft
  - 1,000 MiG-19 fighters
  - 1,500 MiG-15/17 fighters
  - 300 MiG-21/F-9 interceptors
  - 10 Tu-4 medium bombers
  - 100 Tu-16 medium bombers
  - 150 Il-28 light bombers
- 1,050 + other aircraft (including approximately 350 aircraft of the Civil Air Bureau)

- 450 transports (An-2, Il-12/14, Il-18)
- 300 helicopters (Mi-4, Alouette III)
- 300 MiG-15 trainers, trainer/support aircraft
- SS-4 IRBMs (supplied by USSR)
- SA-2 Guideline SAM

*Major Air Bases:* There are a total of 170 air bases and airfields, of which half are jet capable, and within 745 kilometers of Taiwan. First-line fighter/interceptor bases: Luchiao, Foochow, Tenghai; second-line fighter/interceptor bases: Tsaochiao, Liencheng, Pingtan; third-line fighter/interceptor bases: Hungchiao, Chienchiao, Changsha, Hsincheng, Nanhai; other bases include: Shenyang, Peking, Nanking, Canton, Sian, Kwangchan, Kunming, Wuhan, Chengchow, Lhassa.

*Reserves:* There are about 500,000 trained air reservists.

## PARAMILITARY

There are about 300,000 security and border troops. The latter are organized into 19 infantry-type divisions and 30 independent regiments permanently stationed in the frontier areas, in addition to the regular divisions deployed in the associated military regions.

The People's Armed Police is now referred to as a public security force. The civilian militia has a claimed strength of 200 million, but its effective element is probably no greater than seven million.

**APPENDIX H**

**MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

[Chart]

(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)

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# MILITARY ORGANIZATION

## LEGEND

This chart identifies key officials known or believed to hold positions through the Military District level in the military organizations of the People's Republic of China. Names in red identify members of the Politburo, and names in green identify members or alternate members of the 10th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The following abbreviations are used:

MD Military District  
MR Military Region

## MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission supervises weapons research and development. The functions of the National Defense Industries Office remain obscure. Through its regional offices, however, it apparently coordinates the military with the civilian sectors of the economy. The defense-oriented ministries of the State Council supervise the production of military hardware and supplies by diversified plants.

## MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOLS

The Ministry of National Defense supervises the Academy of Military Science. In addition, the three departments and the various service arms of the People's Liberation Army supervise their own specialized schools.

## GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT

Director	Chang Tsung-hsun
Deputy Directors	Chang Hai-ying Chang Hsien-yueh Chang Ju-kuang Chang Ling-pin Chang T'ien-yün Feng Yung-shun Hsü Pin Luan Hsueh-wen Pai Hsiang-kuo Sun Hung-chen
Political Commissars	Chang Ch'ih-ming Kuo Lin-hsiang

### Air Force

Commander	Ma Ning
Political	
Commissar	Wang Hui-ch'iu

### Armored Force

Commander	
Political	
Commissar	

### Artillery Force

Commander	Chang Ta-chih
Political	
Commissar	

## MILITARY REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

### Canton MR

Commander	Hsu Shih-yu
1st Political	
Commissar	Wei Kuo-ch'ing

### Hunan MD

Commander	Yang Tai
Political	
Commissars	Chang Li-hsien Chang Ping-hua Cheng Hsiao-feng Li Chen-chün

### Kwangsi MD

Commander	Chao Hsin-jan
Political	
Commissars	Liu Chung-kuei Wang Pan-wen Wei Tsu-chen

### Kwangtung MD

Commander	Chang Ching-yao
Political	
Commissars	Ch'en Te Su K'o-chih

### Fu-chow MR

Commander	P'ei Ting-chün
Political	
Commissars	Li Chih-min Liao Chih-kao

### Fukien MD

Commander	
1st Political	
Commissar	Liao Chih-kao

### Kiangsi MD

Commander	Ch'en Ch'ang-feng
Political	
Commissar	Chang Chih-yung

### Lan-chow MR

Commander	
Political	
Commissars	

### Kan

Commander	
Political	
Commissar	

### Ning

Commander	
Political	
Commissar	

### Sher

Commander	
1st Political	
Commissar	

### Tsing

Commander	
1st Political	
Commissar	

# ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

## MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE STATE COUNCIL

Minister Yeh Chien-ying  
Vice Ministers Hsiao Ching-kuang  
Su Yu

## MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Chairman Mao Tse-tung  
Vice Chairmen Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien  
Nieh Jung-chen  
Teng Hsiao-p'ing  
Yeh Chien-ying  
Members Chang Ta-chih  
Ch'en Hsi-lien  
Li Ta-sheng

## PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

### GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff Teng Hsiao-p'ing  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien  
Ho Cheng-wen  
Hsiang Chung-hua  
Hu Wei  
Li Ta  
P'eng Shao-hui  
Wang Shang-jung  
Wu Hsiu-ch'uan  
Yang Ch'eng-wu

### GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Director Chang Ch'un-chiao  
Deputy Directors Liang Pi-yeh  
T'ien Wei-hsin  
Wei Po-f'ing

## SERVICE ARMS

### Engineer Corps

Commander Ch'en Shih-chu  
Political  
Commissar Li Chen

### Navy

Commander Hsiao Ching-kuang  
Political  
Commissar Wang Hung-k'un

### Railway Corps

Commander Chang I-hsiang  
Political  
Commissar

### Second Artillery Corps

Commander  
Political  
Commissar

### Signal Corps

Commander  
Political  
Commissar Hu

## MILITARY REGIONS AND DISTRICTS





# REPUBLIC OF CHINA

## MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

**Chairman** Mao Tse-tung  
**Vice Chairmen** Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien  
 Nieh Jung-chen  
 Teng Hsiao-p'ing  
 Yeh Chien-ying  
**Members** Chang Ta-chih  
 Ch'en Hsi-lien  
 Li Te-sheng

## GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

**Director** Chang Ch'un-ch'iao  
**Deputy Directors** Liang Pi-yeh  
 T'ien Wei-hsin  
 Wei Po-f'ing



### Railway Corps

**Commander** Chang I-hsiang  
**Political Commissar**

### Second Artillery Corps

**Commander**  
**Political Commissar**

### Signal Corps

**Commander**  
**Political Commissar** Huang Wen-ming

### Sinkiang MR

**Commander** Yang Yung  
**1st Political Commissar** Sai-fu-ting

### South Sinkiang MD

**Commander** Ch'eng Chih-wen  
**Political Commissar**

### Wu-han MR

**Commander** Yang Te-chih  
**1st Political Commissar** Wang Liu-sheng

### Honan MD

**Commander** Chang Shu-chih  
**1st Political Commissar** Liu Chien-hsun

### Hupei MD

**Commander** Hsin Chün-chieh  
**Political Commissars** Chang Hung  
 Ch'en Chi-te  
 Liu Ch'ing-ling

### Hopeh MD

**Commander** Ts'eng Mei

### Inner Mongolia MD

**Commander** Yu Tai-chung  
**Political Commissar** Wu Tao

### Shansi MD

**Commander** Hsieh Chen-hua  
**Political Commissars** Liu Shih-hung  
 Liu Yen-chuan

**Political Commissars**  
 Sun Hung-chen  
 Chang Ch'ih-ming  
 Kuo Lin-hsiang

**Air Force**

Commander Ma Ning  
 Political Commissar Wang Hui-ch'iu

**Armored Force**

Commander  
 Political Commissar

**Artillery Force**

Commander Chang Ta-chih  
 Political Commissar

**MILITARY**

**Canton MR**

Commander Hsu Shih-yu  
 1st Political Commissar Wei Kua-ch'ing

**Hunan MD**

Commander Yang Ta-i  
 Political Commissars  
 Chang Li-hsien  
 Chang Ping-hua  
 Cheng Hsiao-feng  
 Li Chen-chün

**Kwangsi MD**

Commander Chao Hsin-jan  
 Political Commissars  
 Liu Chung-kuei  
 Wang Pan-wen  
 Wei Tsu-chen

**Kwangtung MD**

Commander Chang Ching-yao  
 Political Commissars  
 Ch'en Te  
 Su K'o-chih

**Fu-chou MR**

Commander P'i Ting-chün  
 Political Commissars  
 Li Chih-min  
 Liao Chih-kao

**Fukien MD**

Commander  
 1st Political Commissar Liao Chih-kao

**Kiangsi MD**

Commander Ch'en Ch'ang-feng  
 Political Commissar Chang Chih-yung

**Ch'eng-tu MR**

Commander Ch'in Chi-wei  
 1st Political Commissar Liu Hsing-yüan

**Szechwan MD**

Commander Hsieh Cheng-jung  
 Political Commissar Lu Chia-han

**Tibet MD**

Commander Ch'en Ming-i  
 1st Political Commissar Jen Jung

**K'un-ming MR**

Commander Wang Pi-cheng  
 1st Political Commissar Chou Hsing

**Kweichow MD**

Commander Ho Kuang-yü  
 2nd Political Commissar Shih Hsin-an

**Yunnan MD**

Commander  
 1st Political Commissar Chou Hsing

June 1975



**Lan-chou MR**  
Commander Han Hsien-ch'u  
Political  
Commissars Hsien Heng-han  
Li Jui-shan

**Kansu MD**  
Commander Chang Chung  
Political  
Commissar Lung Ping-ch'u

**Ningsia MD**  
Commander  
Political  
Commissar

**Shensi MD**  
Commander Huang Ching-yao  
1st Political  
Commissar Li Jui-shan

**Tsinghai MD**  
Commander Chang Chiang-lin  
1st Political  
Commissar Sung Ch'ang-keng

**Peking MR**  
Commander Ch'en Hsi-lien  
1st Political  
Commissar Chi Teng-k'uei

**Hopeh MD**  
Commander  
1st Political  
Commissar Ts'eng Mei

**Inner Mongolia MD**  
Commander Yu Tai-chung  
1st Political  
Commissar Wu T'ao

**Shansi MD**  
Commander Hsieh Chen-hua  
Political  
Commissars Liu Shih-hung  
Liu Yen-chuan

**Sinkiang MR**  
Commander Yang Yung  
1st Political  
Commissar Sai-fu-ting

**South Sinkiang MD**  
Commander Ch'eng Chih-wen  
Political  
Commissar

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Wang Pi-ch'eng  
Chou Hsing

**chow MD**  
Ho Kuang-yü  
Shih Hsin-an

**nan MD**  
Chou Hsing

**Nanking MR**  
Commander Ting Sheng  
Political  
Commissars Liao Han-sheng  
P'eng Ch'ung

**Anhwei MD**  
Commander  
1st Political  
Commissar Sung P'ei-chang

**Chekiang MD**  
Commander  
1st Political  
Commissar T'an Ch'i-lung

**Kiangsu MD**  
Commander  
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Commissar Wu Ta-sheng

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Commander Li Te-sheng  
Political  
Commissar Tseng Shao-shan

**Heilungkiang MD**  
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Commissars Kuo Ch'iang  
Liu Kuang-t'ao


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Political  
Commissar Li Tao-chih

**Tsina**  
Commander  
1st Political  
Commissar

**Shan**  
Commander  
Political  
Commissar

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## **APPENDIX I**

### **LIN PIAO'S MANIFESTO; THE WORLD IN PEKING'S IMAGE**

[Reprinted from: Communist China: A Bibliographic Survey, 1971 Edition.  
Washington, Department of the Army, 1971 (DA PAM 550-9).]

# LIN PIAO'S MANIFESTO

## *The World in Peking's Image...*

A CONDENSATION

### THE GENERAL ARGUMENT FOR WAR AND VIOLENCE

The Chinese revolution is a continuation of the great [Russian] October Revolution. . . . The Chinese revolution and the October Revolution have in common [that] in both . . . state power was seized through violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat was established [and that] in both the "socialist" [that is, communist] system was built after victory in the revolution. (22 right)

In the last analysis the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence. . . .

. . . Comrade Mao using the simplest and most vivid language advanced the famous thesis that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." He clearly pointed out: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle holds good universally, for China and for all other countries." (23 left)

#### WAR IS A GREAT SCHOOL

We know that war brings destruction,

sacrifice and suffering to the people. But . . . the sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations . . . and even the whole of mankind. . . . War can temper people and push history forward. In this sense war is a great school. . . . (28 left) Lenin said: ". . . War, as a tremendous historical process, has accelerated social development. . . . War has shaken up the masses, its untold horrors and sufferings have awakened them. War has given history momentum. . . ."

In diametrical opposition to the Khrushchev revisionists, the [genuine; that is, Chinese] Marxist-Leninists never take a gloomy view of war. Our attitude toward imperialist wars of aggression has always been clear-cut. First we are against them . . . secondly we are not afraid of them. As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples, so far from opposing them, we invariably give them firm support and active aid . . . [and] when we grow in strength, as time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid. . . . (28 right)

#### PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IS RUBBISH

The Khrushchev revisionists claim that

if their . . . line of "peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition" is followed, the oppressed will be liberated and "a world without weapons . . . and without wars" will come into being. . . . The kind of rubbish peddled by the Khrushchev revisionists has already taken a great toll of lives in a number of countries. . . . The essence of the . . . line of the Khrushchev revisionists is . . . the demand that all the oppressed peoples . . . and all the countries which have won independence should lay down their arms and place themselves at the mercy of the U. S. imperialists and their lackeys. . . . (28 left)

### II

#### PEOPLE'S WAR: THE COMMUNIST ROAD TO VICTORY

How was it possible for a weak country [China] finally to defeat a strong country [Japan]? How was it possible for a seemingly weak [Chinese communist] army to become the main force in the war? The basic reasons were that the War of Resistance Against Japan was a genuine people's war led by the Communist Party of China. . . . (9 right)

Today, the U. S. imperialists are repeating on a world-wide scale the past

Preceding Page BLANK - F



actions of the Japanese imperialists in . . . Asia. It has become an urgent necessity for the people in many countries to master and use people's wars as a weapon against U. S. imperialism and its lackeys. (10 left)

Since World War II people's war has increasingly demonstrated its power in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Indonesia, Algeria and others have waged people's wars against the imperialists and won great victories. (25 left)

Provided each people studies these lessons [post-World War II people's wars] well and creatively integrates them with the concrete practice of revolution in their own country, there is no doubt that the revolutionary peoples of the world will stage still more powerful and splendid dramas in the theater of people's war in their own countries and that they will wipe off the earth once and for all the common enemy of all the peoples, U. S. imperialism and its lackeys. (29 right)

#### PEOPLE'S WAR— A PROTRACTED WAR

In his celebrated work, *On Protracted War*, Mao pointed out [that in the China-Japan confrontation]: Japan was a powerful imperialist country [while] China . . . was a weak semi-colonial, semi-feudal country.

Japan's advantage and China's disadvantage determined the impossibility of a quick victory for China.

On the basis of this . . . Mao formulated the strategy for a protracted war. China's War of Resistance would be protracted, and prolonged efforts would be needed gradually to weaken the enemy's forces and expand our own so that . . . we would . . . finally . . . defeat him. (11 right)

Mao pointed out that . . . the war . . . would pass through three stages: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, and the strategic offensive.

The protracted war was also a process of mobilizing, organizing and arming the people. It was only by mobilizing the entire people to fight a people's war that the war . . . could be persevered in and the Japanese aggression defeated. (12 left)

### III BASIC STRATEGY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR

#### FROM RURAL POWER BASES TO CAPTURE OF CITIES

Mao . . . during the War of Resistance Against Japan developed his thought on the establishment of rural base areas and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture

them. (12 left)

The [Russian] October Revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the countryside, while the Chinese revolution won nationwide victory through the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and final capture of the cities. (22 right)

Mao's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations and particularly for the struggles of the . . . peoples and nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys. (24 left)

#### ENCIRCLEMENT OF NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE

The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. (24 left)

Taking the entire globe, if North America and western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." . . . In a sense the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of "cities" by the "rural areas." In the final analysis the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. (24 right)

#### SIMULTANEOUS PEOPLE'S WARS

U. S. imperialism is stronger, but also more vulnerable, than any imperialism in the past. . . . Its human, military and financial reserves are far from sufficient for . . . dominating the whole world. . . . It is besieged by ring upon ring of people of the whole world. (26 left)

The struggles waged by different peoples against U. S. imperialism reinforce each other and merge into a torrential world-wide tide of opposition to U. S. imperialism. The more successful the development of a people's war in a given region, the larger the number of U. S. . . . forces that can be pinned down and depleted there. When the U. S. . . . are hard pressed in one place, they have no alternative but to loosen their grip on others. . . . This colossus of U. S. imperialism can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head, and others at its feet. That is why the greatest fear of U. S. . . . is that people's wars will be launched in different parts of the world

. . . particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. . . . (26 left)

#### DUTY TO PROMOTE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONS

Of course, . . . only when the people in a country are awakened, mobilized, organized and armed can they overthrow the reactionary rule . . . ; their role cannot be . . . taken over by any people from the outside. In this sense revolution cannot be imported. But this does not exclude mutual . . . support on the part of revolutionary peoples. . . . Our [Chinese] support and aid to other revolutionary peoples serve precisely to help their self-reliant struggle. (28 right)

Those countries which have won victory [that is, in which the communists have already gained power] are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. (22 right)

### IV MILITARY PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR

#### FROM GUERRILLA WAR TOWARDS MOBILE WARFARE

Engels said, "The Emancipation of the proletariat . . . will have its specific expression in military affairs and create its specific new military method." (17 right)

During the War of Resistance Against Japan Mao laid down the following . . . principle for the communist-led armies: Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions.

Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces . . . deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare, and finally defeat the enemy. (18 left)

#### WAR OF ANNIHILATION.

War of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of our military operations . . . regardless of whether mobile or guerrilla warfare is the primary form of fighting. (18 left)

True, . . . in guerrilla warfare much should be done to [simply] disrupt and harass the enemy, but it is still necessary actively to advocate and fight battles of annihilation, whenever conditions are favorable. In mobile warfare superior forces must be concentrated in every battle so that the enemy forces can be wiped out one by one. . . . Mao has pointed out:

" . . . Injuring all of man's fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not

as effective as annihilating one of them.

"In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and even five or six times the enemy strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. . . . Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even." (18 right)

#### HOW TO FIGHT A SUPERIOR ENEMY

Mao has provided a masterly summary of the strategy and tactics of people's war:

"You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't."

In other words, you rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly conscious revolutionary people; you give full play to your superiority and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fighting and we have ours. When you want to fight us, we don't let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to fight you, we make sure that you can't get away and we hit you squarely . . . and wipe you out. When we are able to wipe you out, we do so with a vengeance; when we can't, we see to it that you do not wipe us out. (19 left)

Revolutionary armed forces should not fight with a rockless disregard for the consequences when there is a great disparity between their own strength and the enemy's. If they do, they will suffer serious losses and bring heavy setbacks to the revolution. (18 left)

It is opportunism if one won't fight when one can win. It is adventurism, if one insists on fighting when one can't win. Fighting is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics. . . . Because of the necessity of fighting . . . we admit the necessity of moving away. The sole purpose of moving away is to fight [again] and bring about the final and complete destruction of the enemy. (19 left)

#### BASIC TACTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

In the . . . [Chinese] Civil War, Mao enumerated the basic tactics of guerrilla warfare as follows:

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

Guerrilla war tactics were further developed during the War of Resistance Against Japan. In the base areas behind the enemy lines everybody joined in the fighting—the troops and the civilian population, men and women, old and young. . . . Various ingenious

methods of fighting were devised, including sparrow warfare, land mine warfare, tunnel warfare, sabotage warfare, and guerrilla warfare on lakes and rivers. (18 left)

(A footnote in Lin Biao's article defines sparrow warfare: ". . . a popular method of fighting created by the Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla and militia units behind the enemy lines. . . . It was used flexibly by guerrillas or militiamen, operating in threes or fives, appearing or disappearing unexpectedly [like sparrows] and wounding, killing . . . and wearing out the enemy forces.")

#### PEOPLE'S WAR REQUIRES A PEOPLE'S ARMY

"Without a people's army the people have nothing." This is the conclusion drawn by . . . Mao . . . from the Chinese . . . revolutionary struggle. This is a universal truth of Marxism-Leninism.

The main form of [that Chinese revolutionary] struggle was war and the main form of organization was the army which was under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

At the start of the War of Resistance Against Japan . . . the people's army led by the . . . Party had only a little over 40,000 men. . . . Mao pointed out that . . . it was imperative greatly to expand [the army]. The whole Party [said Mao] should give close attention to war and study military affairs. Every Party member should be ready at all times to take up arms and go to the front. (16 right)

The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies [that is, the two main communist armies in the Chinese-Japanese conflict] were founded on . . . Mao's theory of army building. They were armies of a new type, a people's army. . . . Guided by . . . Mao's theory on building the people's army, our army was under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and . . . carried out the Party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies.

During the anti-Japanese war our [communist] army . . . performed three tasks set by . . . Mao: . . . namely, fighting, mass work and production. It was at the same time a fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps. Everywhere it went, it did propaganda work among the masses, organized and armed them and helped them set up revolutionary political power. . . . They also made use of every possibility to engage in production themselves so as to overcome economic difficulties, better their own livelihood, and lighten the people's burden. (17 left)

The essence of . . . Mao's . . . theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must

be given to politics; that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the life-line of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and military technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technique, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of . . . commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses.

All this makes the people's army . . . fundamentally different from any bourgeois army. . . . (17 right)

#### V POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR

##### THE UNITED FRONT

[In fighting imperialism] a Communist Party must hold aloft the national banner and, using the weapon of the United Front, rally around itself the masses and the patriotic and anti-imperialist people so as to unite with all the forces that can be united. . . . (14 right) This means that the revolution embraces in its ranks not only the workers, peasants and the urban party bourgeoisie, but also the national [that is, middle or even upper] bourgeoisie and other "patriotic" and anti-imperialist democrats. . . . (24 right) If we abandon the national banner, adopt a policy of closed-doorism [in respect to non-communist elements] we [would only] isolate ourselves.

[But] within the United Front the Communist Party must maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence . . . and insist on its leading role. (14 right)

This means that the revolution can only be, nay, must be, led by the proletariat and the genuinely revolutionary party armed with Marxism-Leninism and by no other class or party. (24 right)

##### STAGES OF TRANSITION TO SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Mao's theory . . . is the . . . theory of revolution of stages; namely, the national-democratic [during which the communists lead a United Front of communist and non-communist forces] and the socialist [stage].

The national-democratic revolution can be fulfilled only through long and tortuous struggles. In this stage . . . imperialism and its lackeys are the main enemy. In the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys it is necessary to rally all anti-imperialist forces, including the national bourgeoisie and



all patriotic personages. . . . The national-democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel.

Mao criticized the wrong idea of "accomplishing both at one stroke" and pointed out that this utopian idea could only weaken the struggle against imperialism. . . . (25 left)

The Chinese revolution provides a successful lesson for making a thorough-going national-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat . . . [and] for the timely transition from the national-democratic to the social revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. (25 left to 25 right)

## VI IMPERIALISTS ARE NOT TO BE FEARED

### IMPERIALISTS ARE PAPER TIGERS

In view of the fact that some people were afflicted with the fear of Imperialists and reactionaries . . . Mao put forward his famous thesis that "the Imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers". . . . He said in appearance they are terrifying but in reality they are not so powerful. The history of the people's war in China and other countries provides conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings is a universal law of development of people's war.

Mao points out that we must despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically.

Without the courage to despise the enemy and without daring to win, it will be simply impossible to make revolution and wage a people's war. . . .

It is likewise impossible to win victory in a people's war without taking full account of the enemy tactically . . . without examining concrete conditions . . . and without adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country. . . . (23 right)

The Imperialists are extremely afraid of . . . Mao's thesis that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers, and the revisionists are extremely hostile to it. They all . . . attack this thesis and the philistines follow suit by ridiculing it. But . . . the light of truth cannot be dimmed by anybody. (24 left)

### POWER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT

U. S. Imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But . . . nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly. U. S. . . . has been condemned by the . . . whole world for . . .

dropping atomic bombs on Japan. If it uses nuclear weapons again, it will become isolated in the extreme. Moreover, the U. S. monopoly of nuclear weapons has long been broken. . . . If it threatens other countries with nuclear weapons, U. S. imperialism will expose its own people to the same threat.

Even if U. S. . . . brazenly uses nuclear weapons it cannot conquer the people who are indomitable.

However highly developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be . . . In the final analysis the outcome of a war will be decided by the sustained fighting of ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields, by the political consciousness of men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice. . . . (26 right) The reactionary troops of U. S. imperialism cannot possibly be endowed with the . . . spirit of sacrifice possessed by revolutionary people. The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb. (27 left)

Since Lenin led the Great October Revolution to victory, the experience of innumerable revolutionary wars has borne out the truth that a revolutionary people who rise up with only their bare hands at the outset finally succeed in defeating the ruling classes who are armed to the teeth. People's armed forces beginning only with primitive . . . rifles and hand grenades have in the end defeated the imperialist forces armed with modern planes, tanks, heavy artillery and atom bombs. Guerrilla forces have ultimately defeated regular armies. "Amateurs" . . . never trained at any military school have eventually defeated professionals graduated from military academies.

The Khrushchev revisionists insist that a nation without nuclear weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons. . . . Is not this openly forbidding people to make revolution?

The Khrushchev revisionists assert that nuclear weapons and strategic rocket units are decisive, while conventional forces are insignificant and that a militia is just a heap of human flesh. For such ridiculous reasons they oppose mobilization of and reliance on the masses in the "Socialist" [that is, communist] countries to get prepared to use the people's war against imperialist[s]. They have staked the whole future of their country on nuclear weapons and are engaged in a nuclear gamble with U. S. imperialism with which they are trying to strike a political deal. . . . Their line in army building is the bourgeois line which ignores the human factor and sees only the material factor and which regards tech-

nique as everything and politics as nothing. (27 right)

### PEOPLE'S WAR NEED NOT ESCALATE INTO NUCLEAR WAR

The Khrushchev revisionists maintain that a single spark in any part of the globe may touch off a world nuclear conflagration and bring destruction to mankind. . . . There have been wars of national liberation throughout the 20 years since World War II. But has any single one of them developed into a world war? . . . (27 right)

### CHINESE MILLIONS CAN DEFEAT SUPER-POWER OF U. S.

The U. S. Imperialists are now clamoring for another trial of strength with the Chinese people, for another large-scale ground war in the Asian mainland. . . . The Chinese people definitely have ways of their own for coping with a U. S. Imperialist war. . . . Our methods are no secret. The most important one is still mobilization of the people . . . making everyone a soldier and waging a people's war.

We want to tell the U. S. . . . that the vast ocean of several million Chinese people in arms will be more than enough to submerge your few million aggressor troops. . . . The naval and air superiority you boast can not intimidate the Chinese people, and neither can the atom bomb. . . . If you want to send troops, go ahead; the more the better. We will annihilate as many as you can send. . . . We have the courage to shoulder the heavy burden of combating U. S. Imperialism and to contribute our share in the struggle for final victory over this most ferocious enemy of the people of the world. (29 right)

## VII THE ATTACK ON SOVIET REVISIONISM

### KHRUSHCHEV REVISIONISM IN COLLUSION WITH U. S.

In every conceivable way U. S. imperialism and its lackeys are trying to extinguish the revolutionary flames of people's war. The Khrushchev revisionists [that is, the Soviet leadership, Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian], fanning people's war like the plague, are heaping abuse on it. The two [U. S. and Soviet Union] are colluding to prevent and sabotage people's war. (10 left)

Whether one dares to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against . . . the imperialists and their lackeys, whether one dares to fight a people's war against them is tantamount to whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most

effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine [Chinese] from fake [Soviet] revolutionaries, genuine [Chinese] Marxist-Leninists from fake [Soviet] Marxist-Leninists. (23 right)

It is sheer day-dreaming to think that . . . we too [like the Soviets] will lose our revolutionary fighting will, abandon the cause of world revolution and discard Marxism-Leninism. (23 right)

The propaganda of the Khrushchev revisionists against people's war . . . the publicity they give to defeatism and capitulationism tend to demoralize . . . revolutionary people everywhere. . . . They have completely betrayed the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and have become betrayers of the people's war. (28 right)

The Khrushchev revisionists have come to the rescue of imperialism just when it is most panic-stricken and helpless in its efforts to cope with people's war. Working hand in glove with the U. S. imperialists they are doing their utmost to spread all kinds of arguments against people's war and, wherever they can, they are scheming to undermine it by overt or covert means.

The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionists are opposed to people's war is that they have no faith in the masses and are afraid of U. S. imperialism, of war and of revolution. . . . They submit to the nuclear blackmail of the U. S. imperialists and are afraid that, if the oppressed peoples and nations rise up to fight people's

war—or the peoples of socialist [that is, communist] countries repulse U. S. imperialist aggression—U. S. imperialism will become incensed, they themselves will become involved and their fond dream of Soviet-U. S. cooperation to dominate the world will be spoiled. (27 left)

The Khrushchev revisionists regard imperialists like Kennedy and Johnson as "sensible" and describe us [Chinese communists] together with all those who dare to carry out armed defense against imperialist aggression as "bellicose." This has revealed the Khrushchev revisionists in their true colors as the accomplices of imperialist gangsters. (28 left)

To win the struggle against U. S. imperialism and carry people's war to victory the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throughout the world must resolutely oppose Khrushchev revisionism. (28 right)

. . . There are bound to be people's wars. . . . It is certain that such wars will develop vigorously. This is an objective law independent of the will of either the U. S. imperialists or the Khrushchev revisionists. The revolutionary people of the world will sweep away everything that stands in the way of their advance. Khrushchev is finished. And the successor to Khrushchev revisionism [that is, the current Soviet leadership] will fare no better. The imperialists . . . , and the Khrushchev revisionists, who have all set themselves against people's war, will be

swept like dust from the stage of history by . . . the revolutionary people. (28 right to 29 left)

### VIII VIETNAM: SOCIALIST VICTORY ASSURED

The struggle of the Vietnamese people against U. S. aggression . . . is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U. S. aggression. . . . No matter what U. S. imperialism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people will do everything in their power to support the Vietnamese people until every single one of the U. S. aggressors is driven out of Vietnam. (29 left)

Vietnam is the most convincing current example of . . . defeating U. S. imperialism by a people's war. . . . They [the U. S.] are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will lead to a chain reaction. . . . But the more they [the U. S.] expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction . . . the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that U. S. imperialism can be defeated and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

All people suffering from U. S. imperialist aggression, oppression or plunder, unite! Hold aloft the . . . banner of people's war. . . . Victory will certainly go to the people of the world! (30 left)



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## APPENDIX J

### PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LOCATIONS OF MINERAL OPERATIONS OR FACILITIES

(Table)

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[Reprinted from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]



Locations of mineral operations or facilities

Name	Product or facility	Coordinates (approximate)
Anhua.....	Antimony.....	28°-08' N; 110°-39' E
Anshan.....	Cement, iron and steel, iron ore, fertilizer.	41°-07' N; 122°-57' E
Chanchian.....	Phosphate rock, cement.....	21°-12' N; 110°-23' E
Ch'anglu.....	Salt.....	Approx. 39°-10' N; 117°-50' E
Ch'angsha.....	Lead-zinc, aluminum.....	28°-12' N; 112°-58' E
Ch'angte.....	Diamond.....	29°-02' N; 111°-41' E
Chiaotso.....	Coal.....	35°-15' N; 113°-13' E
Chihsi.....	.....do.....	45°-20' N; 131°-00' E
Chinhsi.....	Oil refinery, cement.....	40°-45' N; 120°-50' E
Chin Hsien.....	Manganese.....	22°-00' N; 108°-30' E
Chuannan.....	Uranium.....	24°-40' N; 114°-30' E
Chuchou.....	Uranium plant.....	27°-50' N; 113°-12' E
Chungking.....	Iron and steel, cement, oil refinery.	29°-34' N; 106°-35' E
Fuhochung.....	Tin.....	Approx. 24°-40' N; 111°-25' E
Fushin.....	Coal, cement.....	42°-06' N; 121°-46' E
Fushun.....	Coal, oil shale, oil refinery, cement, aluminum.	41°-52' N; 123°-53' E
Haich'eng.....	Talc, magnesite.....	40°-52' N; 122°-45' E
Hantan.....	Cement, steel.....	36°-35' N; 114°-29' E
Harbin (Ha-erh-pin).	Cement, fertilizers.....	45°-45' N; 126°-39' E
Hokang.....	Coal.....	Approx. 47°-05' N; 130°-20' E
Hsiangshan.....	Pyrite.....	Approx. 31°-40' N; 118°-40' E
Hsiangt'an.....	Manganese.....	27°-50' N; 112°-55' E
Hsik'uangshan...	Antimony.....	27°-47' N; 111°-29' E
Hsuijen.....	Barite.....	24°-25' N; 110°-15' E
Huainan.....	Coal.....	32°-40' N; 117°-00' E
Huaipei.....	.....do.....	34°-00' N; 116°-45' E
Huangshih.....	Lead smelter, steel, cement....	30°-13' N; 115°-06' E
Huili.....	Zinc deposit.....	26°-41' N; 102°-15' E
Hulutao.....	Lead-zinc smelter.....	40°-43' N; 121°-00' E
Hungtoushan.....	Copper mine.....	Approx. 42°-40' N; 124°-20' E
Hwashan.....	Barite.....	36°-12' N; 119°-52' E
I-yang.....	Antimony.....	28°-36' N; 112°-20' E
Kailan.....	Coal.....	39°-38' N; 118°-11' E
Kaiping.....	Talc, magnesite, fluorspar....	40°-24' N; 122°-20' E
K'aiyang.....	Phosphate rock.....	27°-05' N; 107°-00' E
Karamai (or Ko-la-mai).	Oil and refinery.....	45°-30' N; 84°-55' E
Kuchiu.....	Tin mine, tin refinery, copper deposit.	23°-23' N; 103°-09' E
K'unming.....	Iron and steel, copper refin- ery, fertilizer, cement, lead- zinc refinery.	25°-04' N; 102°-41' E

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Locations of mineral operations or facilities--Continued

Name	Product or facility	Coordinates (approximate)
K'unyang.....	Phosphate rock.....	24°-45' N; 102°-33' E
Kwangchow.....	Iron and steel, cement, aluminum.	23°-07' N; 113°-15' E
Lanchou.....	Oil refinery, steel, aluminum..	36°-03' N; 103°-41' E
Linchuan.....	Barite.....	28°-02' N; 116°-17' E
Liuliho.....	Cement.....	39°-36' N; 116°-01' E
Luchou (or Luchow).	Fertilizers.....	28°-53' N; 105°-23' E
Luta (Dairen, Talien).	Steel, cement, salt, fertilizer	38°-55' N; 121°-39' E
Ma-an-shan.....	Iron ore, steel, cement.....	Approx. 31°-44' N; 118°-22' E
Maoming.....	Shale oil and refinery.....	21°-39' N; 110°-54' E
Mentoukou.....	Coal.....	39°-56' N; 116°-02' E
Mukuei.....	Manganese.....	23°-30' N; 110°-15' E
Mutanchiang.....	Cement, aluminum.....	44°-35' N; 129°-36' E
Nanch'ung.....	Oil, natural gas.....	30°-48' N; 106°-04' E
Nanking.....	Oil refinery, phosphate plant, fertilizer, cement.	32°-03' N; 118°-47' E
Nanting.....	Alumina.....	36°-45' N; 118°-05' E
Nant'ung.....	Phosphate rock.....	32°-02' N; 120°-53' E
Paot'ou.....	Steel, oil, cement, aluminum...	40°-36' N; 110°-03' E
Peip'iao.....	Coal.....	41°-48' N; 120°-44' E
Peking.....	Steel, petrochemicals, oil refinery, coal, cement, fertilizers.	39°-56' N; 116°-24' E
Pench'i.....	Coal, iron ore, iron and steel, cement.	41°-20' N; 123°-45' E
P'ingtingshan...	Coal.....	33°-44' N; 113°-18' E
Sanmen Gorge....	Water power, aluminum.....	Approx. 35°-00' N; 110°-00' E
Shanghai.....	Steel, copper smelter, cement, lead refinery, fertilizer.	31°-14' N; 121°-28' E
Shaokuan.....	Lead-zinc mine and smelter.....	24°-48' N; 113°-35' N
Shengli.....	Oil and oil refinery.....	Approx. 37°-30' N; 118°-00' E
Shenyang.....	Copper smelter, lead refinery, steel.	43°-38' N; 124°-03' E
Shihchingshan...	Iron ore, steel.....	23°-44' N; 99°-26' E
Shihmien.....	Asbestos.....	29°-20' N; 102°-28' E
Shuangyashan...	Coal.....	46°-40' N; 131°-21' E
Shuikoushan....	Lead-zinc mine.....	26°-33' N; 112°-35' E
Tach'ing.....	Oil and oil refinery.....	Approx. 46°-10' N; 125°-00' E
Taiyuan.....	Cement, steel, oil refinery, fertilizer, aluminum.	37°-52' N; 112°-33' E
Takang.....	Oil and oil refinery, salt, natural gas.	Approx. 39°-00' N; 117°-40' E
T'angshan.....	Barite, cement, coal, steel....	39°-38' N; 118°-11' E
Taolin.....	Lead-zinc-fluorspar mine.....	27°-50' N; 112°-18' E
Tatung.....	Coal, cement, oil refining.....	40°-45' N; 113°-18' E



Locations of mineral operations or facilities--Continued

Name	Product or facility	Coordinates (approximate)
Tientsin.....	Steel, petrochemicals, fertilizers, cement.	39°-08' N; 117°-12' E
Tuchiang.....	Antimony.....	25°-42' N; 108°-11' E
Tungch'uan.....	Copper mine.....	26°-08' N; 103°-10' E
Tungjen.....	Mercury mines.....	25°-07' N; 105°-56' E
Tungkuanshan....	Copper mine.....	Approx. 31°-30' N; 118°-00' E
Tushantzu.....	Oil and refinery.....	44°-20' N; 84°-51' E
Tzuliuching (or Tzukung).	Salt, natural gas.....	29°-24' N; 104°-47' E
Tzupo.....	Coal, aluminum, cement.....	36°-48' N; 118°-03' E
Wafangtzu.....	Manganese.....	39°-35' N; 122°-00' E
Wuhan.....	Steel, fertilizer, cement.....	30°-35' N; 114°-16' E
Wuyi.....	Fluorspar.....	28°-53' N; 119°-48' E
Yangchiachangtzu	Lead-zinc, molybdenum mine.....	40°-48' N; 120°-30' E
Yangchiang.....	Tungsten.....	21°-50' N; 112°-00' E
Yangchiatan.....	.....do.....	27°-40' N; 111°-50' E
Yangchuan.....	Coal.....	37°-54' N; 113°-36' E
Yao Hsien.....	Cement.....	34°-52' N; 109°-01' E
Yaokanghsien....	Tungsten (scheelite).....	25°-36' N; 113°-23' E
Yaoling.....	Tungsten.....	23°-00' N; 114°-00' E
Yingk'ou.....	Magnesite, salt.....	40°-40' N; 122°-17' E
Yingte.....	Pyrite.....	24°-10' N; 113°-24' E
Yumen.....	Oil and refinery.....	40°-17' N; 97°-12' E
Yungtung.....	Cement.....	36°-44' N; 103°-24' E

**APPENDIX K**

**RISE IN THE MINERAL OUTPUT OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

(Table)

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[Reprinted from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]



# Rise in the mineral output of the People's Republic of China

(Thousand metric tons)

Selected items	1952	1957	1962	1965	1970	1974
Coal.....	66,000	128,000	250,000	300,000	360,000	450,000
Crude petroleum.....	500	1,400	6,800	10,000	22,000	65,000
Refined petroleum.....	300	1,300	6,500	9,000	21,000	60,000
Iron ore <sup>1</sup> .....	4,300	15,000	30,000	35,000	44,000	60,000
Pig iron.....	2,000	6,000	15,000	18,000	22,000	30,000
Steel ingot.....	1,350	5,350	10,000	15,000	18,000	27,000
Rolled steel.....	1,100	4,250	9,000	12,000	14,000	21,000
Aluminum.....	0	20	100	100	130	200
Copper, refined.....	10	50	100	100	100	150
Lead, refined.....	5	45	80	100	100	100
Zinc, refined.....	10	40	90	90	100	100
Manganese ore.....	200	700	800	1,000	1,000	1,000
Tungsten, content <sup>2</sup> .....	8	7	8	7	7	8.5
Antimony.....	8	15	15	15	12	12
Tin.....	10	24	28	25	20	20
Cement.....	3,000	7,000	8,000	11,000	15,000	<sup>3</sup> 25,000
Salt.....	5,000	8,000	10,000	13,000	15,000	25,000

<sup>1</sup>Equivalent 50 percent iron grade. Tonnage in 1974 would be closer to 55 million when compared with other countries.

<sup>2</sup>Tungsten content of concentrate.

<sup>3</sup>Can be anywhere from 20 to over 30 million tons.

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**APPENDIX L**

**FUELS AND POWER, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**(Map)**

(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)

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[Reprinted through the courtesy of the Bureau of Mines, from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]



**APPENDIX M**  
**MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREAS, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

(Map)

(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)

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[Reprinted through the courtesy of the Bureau of Mines, from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]

**APPENDIX N**  
**MINERALS AND METALS, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**(Map)**

**(Located in envelope attached to inside back cover)**

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[Reprinted through the courtesy of the Bureau of Mines, from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]



## APPENDIX O









### WORLD MINERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS, 1974

(Table)

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[Reprinted from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]

World mineral significance of People's Republic of China basic industrial materials, 1974 (million metric tons).



NOTE: CHINA DENOTES PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC); W. GERM., FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; S. KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA; SAUDI A., SAUDI ARABIA; VENEZ., VENEZUELA; INDON., INDONESIA; AB. DH., ABU DHABI.

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## APPENDIX P


### WORLD MINERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA NONMETALLICS EXCLUDING CEMENT, 1974

(Table)

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[Reprinted from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]

World mineral significance of People's Republic of China nonmetallics excluding cement, 1974 (thousand metric tons unless otherwise noted).



NOTE: CHINA DENOTES PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC); W. GERM., FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; S. KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA; CZECH., CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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**APPENDIX Q**







**WORLD MINERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA EXPORT METALS, 1974**

(Table)

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[Reprinted from: The People's Republic of China; A New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base, by K. P. Wang. Washington, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1975.]

World mineral significance of People's Republic of China export metals,  
1974 (metric tons unless otherwise noted).



NOTE: CHINA DENOTES PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC); S. KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA; MALAY., MALAYSIA; INDON., INDONESIA; YUGOSLV., YUGOSLAVIA.

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**APPENDIX R**  
**REPUBLIC OF CHINA BACKGROUND NOTES**

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[Washington, Department of State, May 1976 (Publication 7791).]

department of state \* may 1976

## OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of China

## GEOGRAPHY

Although continuing its claim of legal sovereignty over all of China, the

Republic of China (R.O.C.) exercises control only over the island of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands (Pescadores), and the so-called "offshore islands."

Taiwan lies 130-200 kilometers (80-125 miles) off the southeastern coast of the China mainland. It and the Penghu Islands lying to the west are administered together as the Province of Taiwan.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 35,981 sq. km. (14,000 sq. mi.; about the size of Mass., Conn., and R. I. combined). CAPITAL: Taipei (pop. 2.1 million). OTHER CITIES: Kaohsiung (1 million), Taichung (575,000), Tainan (550,000), Keelung (375,000).

## People

POPULATION: 16.1 million (Dec. 1975 est.). URBAN: 52%. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.85% (1975). DENSITY: 450 per sq. km. (1,165 per sq. mi.). ETHNIC GROUPS: 98% Han Chinese (87% Taiwan origin, 13% mainland origin), less than 2% aborigines. RELIGIONS: Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity. LANGUAGES: Standard Chinese based on Peking dialect (official); principal local dialects—Taiwanese Hokkien; Hakka. ADULT LITERACY: 93%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: Male 67.1 yrs.; female 72.5 yrs.

## Government

TYPE: One-party presidential republic. ESTABLISHED: 1911; moved to Taiwan in 1949. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Dec. 25, 1947.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Vice President, Premier (Head of Government and President of Executive Yuan—Cabinet). *Legislative*—National Assembly, Legislative Yuan. *Judicial*—Judicial Yuan. *Others*—Control Yuan, Examination Yuan.

POLITICAL PARTY: Kuomintang (KMT—Nationalist Party). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 20. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: Taiwan Province; Taipei

Special Municipality; certain offshore islands of Fukien Province (other areas of China are all under PRC control).

FLAG: Red field with white sun in blue rectangle in upper left corner. For the Chinese, red, white, and blue symbolize sacrifice, justice, and fraternity.

## Economy

GNP: \$14.4 billion (1975). REAL GROWTH: 7.8% (1970-75 annual avg.). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$700 (1975). REAL PER CAPITA GROWTH: 4% (1970-75 avg.).

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 25%. *Labor* 37%. *Products*—sugar cane, sweet potatoes, rice, vegetables, asparagus, mushrooms, citrus fruits, pineapples, bananas, cassava.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 23%. *Products*—textiles, electronics, light manufactures, cement.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, natural gas, limestone, marble.

TRADE (1975): *Exports*—\$5.3 billion: textiles, machinery, plastics, metal products, plywood, wood products. *Partners*—US \$1.8 billion, EC \$727 million, Japan \$700 million. *Imports*—\$5.9 billion: raw materials, crude oil, capital goods. *Partners*—Japan \$1.8 billion, US \$1.6 billion, EC \$678 million.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 38 New Taiwan dollars (NTS)=US\$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total*—\$2.1 billion (1949-73). *US only*—\$1.5 billion (AID programs ended in 1965).

ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED: Technical aid to 49 countries since 1961.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Essentially confined to economic, commercial, technical, and non-governmental organizations.

The offshore islands occupied by the R.O.C. are administratively considered a subdivision of the mainland Province of Fukien. They consist of two principal islands—Chinmen (Quemoy) off the city of Hsiamen (Amoy) and Matsu off Fuchou—plus a few adjacent minor islands.

Taiwan (or "Formosa") itself is about 395 kilometers (245 miles) long and 100-145 kilometers (60-90 miles) wide. A north-south mountain range forms the backbone of the island with the highest peak, Yü Shan, rising to 3,997 meters (13,110 ft.) above sea level. The eastern slope of this range is exceedingly steep and craggy, but the western half of the island is generally flat, fertile, and well cultivated.


The Tropic of Cancer bisects Taiwan at a point slightly south of its midpoint. The climate is semitropical, with June-August the wettest period and June-September the hottest. The island lies in the earthquake and typhoon belts and suffers periodic damage from violent rains, floods, winds, and tremors.

## PEOPLE

Taiwan has a population of over 16 million, with about 120,000 on the Penghu Islands and 75,000 on the offshore islands (excluding the military). It has one of the highest population densities in the world.

The "Taiwanese," who number





about 14 million, are descendants of Chinese who migrated from the crowded coastal mainland areas of Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces within the last 300 years. The 2 million "mainlanders," who arrived on Taiwan in 1949 and thereafter, came from all parts of China. About a quarter-million aborigines, believed to be related to tribes in the Philippines, are now being assimilated into the general population.

#### Languages

Native Taiwanese speak a variant of the Amoy (Hokkien) dialect of southern Fukien, although the Hakka dialect is common in two north-western counties, Hsinchu and Miaoli, and in small enclaves in southern and eastern districts. All but a very few older people on Taiwan now also speak Mandarin, the official Chinese dialect, which has been the medium of instruction in the schools for almost three decades. As a result of a half century of Japanese rule, many Taiwanese over 50 years old also speak Japanese.

#### Religions

The predominant religion is a combination of Buddhism and Taoism, brought to Taiwan centuries ago by the original Chinese settlers of the island. A small number of Chinese Muslims came to Taiwan with other refugees from the mainland after the Communist victory there in 1949. Christian missionaries have been active on Taiwan since before the Japanese occupation, and today over 600,000 are practicing Christians, the majority Protestants.

#### Education

About 4.4 million people (over 27% of the population) are in school. This reflects the relative youthfulness of the island's population, almost half of which is under the age of 20. Since 1968 a 9-year free educational system has been in effect. Six years of elementary school are compulsory for all children over the age of 6, and almost 90 percent then go on to attend 3 years of junior high school. About a third of junior high school graduates pass examinations and enter 3-year senior high and vocational schools.

Taiwan's extensive system of universities, colleges, junior colleges, and other institutions of higher learning currently enrolls, through competitive examinations, almost 300,000 undergraduate and graduate students. Of the island's approximately 294,000 college graduates during the last 10 years, about 103,000 took degrees in social sciences, 64,000 in engineering, 32,000 in humanities, 27,000 in education, 22,000 in medical sciences, 17,000 in natural sciences, 15,000 in agriculture, 9,000 in arts, and 5,000 in law. Over 2,000 students from Taiwan come to the United States each year for advanced education.

#### HISTORY

According to Chinese sources, Chinese migration to Taiwan began as early as the sixth century. The major influx took place during and after the 17th century from the Chinese mainland Provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. From 1624 to 1661 the Dutch held a base on Taiwan, but they were driven out by Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung), who used the island as a base in his attempt to defeat the Manchus and restore the Ming Dynasty. The Manchus conquered the island in 1683, and the Chinese exercised sovereignty over the island until 1895, when it was ceded to Japan following the Sino-Japanese War.

At the end of World War II in 1945, the Republic of China Government, headed by President Chiang Kai-shek, received the surrender of the Japanese forces on Taiwan. It has administered the island since that time. The government moved to Taiwan and established its capital at Taipei in December 1949, following the conquest of mainland China by the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) by Mao Tse-tung's victorious forces. Both the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. maintain that there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part.

#### GOVERNMENT

In keeping with its claim to be the government of all China, including Taiwan, the R.O.C. maintains intact the full array of central government

#### TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Taiwan's climate is hot and humid in summer and chilly and humid in winter. The climate in the northern half of the island resembles that of the south-central US; the southern part is similar to Fla. In winter light jackets and sweaters are recommended; in summer, light airy garments are essential. An umbrella is handy year round.

*Customs*—For a stay of less than 2 weeks, a transit visa and confirmed onward reservations are required; for a stay of less than 2 months, a tourist visa, which is valid for 1 month and can be extended for another month, is required. All must have a certificate of inoculation against smallpox. Those coming from infected areas need cholera, yellow fever, or plague shots.

*Health*—Serious epidemics and diseases are infrequent on Taiwan. High pollen counts and air pollution may cause discomfort to people with allergy and asthma conditions. Drinking water served at Taipei's major tourist hotels is safe. When dining out, however, drink only hot or bottled drinks.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone and telegraph services are modern and efficient. Bilingual assistance is available through most hotel switchboards. Telephone rates are inexpensive.

*Transportation*—Car rentals are available on Taiwan. Although there is an extensive bus system in Taipei, foreign visitors tend to rely on the inexpensive taxis for transportation. When completed, the North-South freeway should provide excellent links by car to the island's other major cities. For the present, however, travel around the island by Taiwan's comfortable passenger express trains is recommended. Flights are available from Taipei to Taichung (15 minutes) and Kaohsiung (half hour).

bodies originally established on the mainland before withdrawal to Taiwan. The governments of Taiwan Province and Taipei Special Municipality are separately constituted local bodies distinct from the national government.

Under the 1947 Constitution, the sovereignty of the people of the R.O.C. is exercised by the National Assembly. This body was formed through elections held in 1947



## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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The R.O.C. Government Information Office prints and distributes a number of magazines and newsletters in the U.S. which contain information on current events and government policies in Taiwan.

throughout China to fill its 3,045 seats on a territorial and occupational basis. Fewer than 1,300 of the original members of the National Assembly are still

alive. Fifteen new seats representing districts on Taiwan were established in 1969, and an additional 53 seats were created in 1972 for Taiwan Province,

Taipei City, various occupational groups, and women's organizations. Those whose seats were created in 1972 hold 6-year terms. The R.O.C.

has determined that all others hold their seats "indefinitely," in view of the impossibility of holding new general elections for assemblymen from constituencies on the mainland of China. In addition to electing the President and Vice President, the National Assembly has the power to amend the Constitution and the powers, as yet unexercised, of initiative and referendum.

The President stands above the five branches (yüan) of the government: Executive, Legislative, Control, Judicial, and Examination Yüan. He is assisted by the Office of the President, which is headed by a Secretary General; and he appoints the Premier, with the consent of the Legislative Yüan. The Premier-President of the Executive Yüan (Cabinet)—is responsible for policy and administration.

The main legislative organ is the Legislative Yüan (Parliament), originally with 773 seats. The current membership of approximately 430 consists of about 370 of the original legislators elected throughout China in 1948, 11 elected in 1969 to "indefinite" terms, and 52 whose seats were created in 1972 and whose term of office is 3 years. Only about 200 members now regularly attend sessions of the Legislative Yüan.

The other elected branch is the Control Yüan, which is responsible for checking on the efficiency and honesty of the government. Only 56 of the 180 members originally elected in 1948 are now able to attend its sessions. Two seats were created in 1969 to represent Taipei Special Municipality, and 15 other seats were created and filled in elections held in 1972 and 1973. Those who took office in 1972 and 1973 serve 6-year terms; the others hold their seats "indefinitely."

The Judicial Yüan includes a 17-member Council of Grand Justices, which functions like the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution. The Examination Yüan has functions somewhat similar to the U.S. Civil Service Commission.

The top local government organs are the Taiwan Provincial Government (located in central Taiwan at Chunghsing New Village, near Taichung) and Taipei Special Municipality. The Governor of Taiwan

Province and the Mayor of Taipei are appointed by the central government. An elected Provincial Assembly and City Council have limited powers over local affairs. Many positions at subordinate levels of government are filled by local election.

#### Principal Government Officials

President—Yen Chia-kan  
Vice President—vacant  
President, Executive Yüan (Premier)—Chiang Ching-kuo  
Vice President, Executive Yüan (Vice Premier)—Hsü Ch'ing-chung  
President, Control Yüan—Yü Chün-hsien  
President, Examination Yüan—Yang Liang-kung  
President, Judicial Yüan—T'ien Chiung-chin  
President, Legislative Yüan—Ni Wen-ya

#### Ministers

Communications—Kao Yü-shu  
Economic Affairs—Sun Yün-hsüan  
Education—Chiang Yen-shih  
Finance—Li Kuo-ting  
Foreign Affairs—Shen Ch'ang-huan  
Interior—Lin Chin-sheng  
Justice—Wang Jen-yüan  
National Defense—Kao K'uei-yüan  
Ministers Without Portfolio—Kuo Ch'eng, Li Lien-ch'un, Li Teng-hui, Yeh Kung-ch'ao, Lien Chen-tung, Yü Kuo-hua, Chou Shu-k'ai  
Chairman, Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission—Ts'ui Ch'ui-yen  
Chairman, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission—Mao Sung-nien  
Ambassador to the U.S.—James C.H. Shen

The R.O.C. maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2311 Mass. Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008, and Consulates throughout the U.S.

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Chiang Kai-shek, who had been the R.O.C.'s foremost political and military leader since 1927 and President since 1948 (except for a brief period of semiretirement), died on April 5, 1975. He was succeeded in office by his Vice President, Yen Chia-kan, who had been elected along with Chiang by the National Assembly to a 6-year term on March 21, 1972. Yen, who

had been Premier of the R.O.C. from 1963 to 1972, is widely considered to have played an important role in Taiwan's economic success. The Office of Vice President is now vacant.

The Premiership is currently held by Chiang Ching-kuo, elder son of Chiang Kai-shek, who is also the Chairman of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party). Chiang Ching-kuo had assumed most of the day-to-day responsibility of governing the country well before his father's death, and the succession was smooth and uneventful. As Premier, the younger Chiang has continued his father's basic policies of anticommunism and dedication to the ultimate goal of reunifying China under KMT control.

The KMT, organized along Leninist lines, closely parallels the government at all levels. Most of the top government officials, including Cabinet members and the Governor of Taiwan Province, are members of its Central Standing Committee, which corresponds roughly to a politburo. The Standing Committee is elected annually by the Central Committee of the KMT from nominees proposed by the party's Chairman. At lower levels, there are KMT committees organized on a provincial, county, and district basis and in various vocational groupings. The lowest level of party organization is the cell, composed of 3-15 members.

Party funds are derived from dues and contributions paid by members and from the proceeds of party-operated businesses. The KMT has about 1 million dues-paying members, about two-thirds of whom are of Taiwanese origin. Almost all senior military officers and government officials are KMT members.

A revision of the Constitution in 1948 granted virtually unlimited emergency powers to the President. These powers remain in effect and are the basis for strict security measures administered under martial law. Criticism of basic governmental policies, such as "mainland recovery" or anticommunism, and organized opposition to the government are proscribed; otherwise, personal freedoms are considerable. Growing political liberty on local issues and gradual evolution toward a more open society are evident.



## GOALS OF THE 6-YEAR PLAN

	1975 Prelim.	1981 Target
GNP (current prices, US\$ billions) . . . . .	14.4	29.1
GNP (in 1975 US\$ billions) . . . . .	14.4	20.7
Per Capita Income (current prices, US\$) . . . . .	700	1,300
Population (millions) . . . . .	16	18
Annual Rate of Growth (%) . . . . .	1.85	1.69
Reliance on Foreign Sources of Energy (%) . . . . .	70	55
Foreign Trade (current prices, US\$ billions) . . . . .	11.3	24
Sector Shares of GNP (%):		
Agriculture . . . . .	14	10.5
Manufacturing . . . . .	35	39
Export Trade . . . . .	37	52.5
Commodity Prices (1975=100%) . . . . .	100	140.7

Two minor political parties—the Democratic Socialist Party and the Young China Party—are tolerated but have no significant government influence or following on Taiwan. Successful non-KMT candidates have generally run as independents.

Friction between native Taiwanese and other Chinese who came to Taiwan from the mainland after the Japanese surrender originally constituted a serious problem. It has greatly diminished with the passage of time and the mutual assimilation of both Chinese groups. Since 1972 Premier Chiang has made a concerted effort to bring Taiwanese into more senior positions in the R.O.C. central government. Taiwanese continue to hold most of the elective and appointive positions at the provincial and local levels.

Upon withdrawing to Taiwan in 1949, President Chiang Kai-shek's government brought with it from the mainland a relatively sophisticated government bureaucracy, party organization, and military establishment designed on the scale of China as a whole and vastly larger than required to govern Taiwan itself. Despite the burden this placed on the island's limited resources, it contributed to the government's ability to effect policies which had earlier been committed, but which it had been unable to carry out while governing the mainland. These policies, combined with generous amounts of U.S. aid and the hard work of the local population, greatly facilitated the island's rapid modernization.

## ECONOMY

During the past two decades, Taiwan has changed dramatically from an agricultural to an industrialized economy. Rapid industrialization has been linked to production for markets in industrial countries. Foreign investment in Taiwan, primarily from overseas Chinese, the United States, and Japan, has played a major role in introducing modern technology to the island.

In the decade 1963-73 GNP rose by 9.9 percent annually in real terms. However, during the inflationary period following the 1973 oil embargo, demand for Taiwan's industrial exports slumped along with the economies of key industrial nations. In 1974 the R.O.C. adopted a successful economic stabilization program to combat rising prices and inflationary pressures, while launching 10 major infrastructure projects to stimulate economic activity. These projects were prologue to a new 6-year plan for economic development in the years through 1981. Already well advanced, they are expected to set the stage for new growth by modernizing transportation and communications systems, augmenting the island's energy supply, and developing new industries in petrochemicals, steel, and shipbuilding and repair.

### Major Infrastructure Projects

A north to south freeway on the Western Plain (to be completed by December 1978) will connect the northern port of Keelung with the

capital, Taipei, the central cities of Taichung and Tainan, and the industrial port city of the south, Kaohsiung. The railroad system will be modernized through electrification (by 1978) and extended by construction of a new line (December 1978) between Suao and Hualien, key towns on the east coast.

Construction of a new international airport at Taoyuan, 18 miles from Taipei, is due for completion in 1978. Taipei's international airport is currently served by 12 international carriers, including Northwest, Pan American, and Flying Tiger lines from the United States.

New port facilities at Taichung on the west coast and Suao on the east coast will supplement Keelung and Kaohsiung ports, which now handle most of the island's rapidly growing foreign trade. The first stage of Taichung's port development is due for completion in 1976; stages two and three are due by 1982. Suao is to be completed by 1981.

Transportation facilities in Taiwan, among the best in Asia, already include over 5,500 km (3,410 miles) of railroads and 8,845 km (5,484 miles) of paved roads, most of which are on the Western Plain. Improving these networks in the west and extending the links to the eastern part of the island will further improve the system and relieve congestion in some areas where economic growth has been especially dynamic.

Four nuclear power plants are currently under construction and at least two more are planned for completion during the next decade. The first unit will begin operation by October 1976, with a capacity of 636,000 kilowatts. Fuel for the reactors is being imported from the United States and comes under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Taiwan's energy requirements have soared since industrialization of the island began. For example, consumption of electric power increased from 1.1 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) in 1952 to 18.8 billion kWh in 1974. This power was generated 77 percent by thermal and 23 percent by hydroelectric power plants in 1974. Oil imported from the Persian Gulf is the basic fuel for the thermal power

plants. To alleviate its dependence on foreign sources for oil, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation and other multinational oil companies have begun exploration in the offshore waters and on land in Taiwan.

A petrochemical complex, an integrated steel mill, and a shipyard to build 450,000-ton supertankers are other major projects underway at Kaohsiung.

### Industry

The bulk of Taiwan's industrial production is concentrated in light and medium manufacturing. Many of the highest growth industries have been relatively labor-intensive, often manufacturing exclusively or largely for export. Export processing zones (EPZ's), combining the advantages of an industrial zone and a free-trade area, have attracted local and foreign investments totaling \$178 million since 1966, when the first one was opened at Kaohsiung. By 1974 three EPZ's, located at Kaohsiung, Nantse, and Taichung, were exporting goods valued at \$511 million (9% of total exports). Because of the great success of EPZ's in Taiwan, other countries, with R.O.C. help, have sought to establish them to aid their industrialization and development.

For the future, R.O.C. policy goals include upgrading technology and transforming the economy to include heavier, more capital-intensive and more skill-intensive industries that can raise productivity and the standard of living. Foreign investment and partic-

ipation in this process are welcomed. The electronics, petrochemical, machinery, steel, and shipbuilding industries are expected to play key roles in this upgrading process.

### Agriculture and Fishing

Agriculture, declining in relative importance as a sector of the economy, is still very important in Taiwan. Although only about one-fourth of the land is arable, virtually all of it is cultivated and produces two or three crops each year. Growth of this sector has been slower than other parts of the economy, and this trend is expected to continue. Throughout the period covered by the 6-year plan, agriculture's annual growth rate is expected to be 3 percent, and the economy as a whole 7.5 percent.

Taiwan's major agricultural products are sugar and rice; sugar cane production was 8.9 million metric tons and rice crops totaled 2.5 million metric tons in 1974. As the principal staple food, rice is largely consumed domestically, although some is exported to Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. Sugar is an important export commodity, and in the past decade mushrooms and asparagus have become major exports. Other export commodities include pineapples, bananas, tea, and citrus fruits. Pigs and poultry are significant livestock items.

Taiwan imports increasing amounts of grain; the island's diet has improved and farmers have turned to cash crops for export. From the United States

alone, Taiwan expects to import 7.2 million metric tons of corn, wheat, and barley and 2.8 million metric tons of soybeans over the next 5 years.

Fisheries, particularly deep sea fishing, are expanding rapidly. With the catch increasing over 85 percent in the last 10 years, the fishing industry makes a significant contribution to the diet and export earnings of Taiwan.

### Trade

Rapid trade expansion fueled Taiwan's economic growth over the past 20 years. Total trade tripled in each 5-year period since 1955. Industrial products accounted for 84 percent of export earnings, compared to 46 percent a decade before. The share of agricultural and processed agricultural products dropped from 54 percent to 16 percent in the same period, even though the absolute value increased \$630 million. The composition of imports is also similar to that of industrialized countries, with over 61 percent of imports consisting of raw materials and 32 percent capital goods.

Principal trading partners continue to be the United States and Japan, although trade with other areas, notably the European Community, has been increasing. The R.O.C. is seeking to diversify its suppliers and customers in the future.

### DEFENSE

The maintenance of a large military establishment, which absorbs 7-8 percent of GNP and accounts for about half of the national budget,

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1955-75

	(US\$ millions unless specified)				Average Annual (%) Growth in 5-year Periods			
	1975	1970	1965	1955	1970-75	1965-70	1960-65	1955-60
GNP	14,400	5,659	2,822	752	20.4	15.0	12.6	15.8
GNP (at constant prices of 1971)	8,916	5,854	3,759	1,832	7.8	9.3	8.9	6.1
Per Capita Income (US\$)	700	305	178	65	25.9	11.5	9.3	11.9
Per Capita Income Real Growth (%)					4.0	6.0	5.6	2.3
Foreign Trade (Customs Value)	11,254	3,005	1,006	324	32.5	24.7	17.4	7.6
Exports	5,321	1,481	450	123	30.9	27.2	29.8	6.4
Imports	5,932	1,524	556	201	35.4	22.7	14.1	8.6
Industrial Production (Index 1971=100)	149.4	80.6	33.9	10.9	13.6	18.9	14.0	10.2
Agricultural Production (Index 1971=100)	105.7	98.7	80.6	47.6	1.4	4.2	6.0	4.9
Prices (Index 1952=100)								
Consumer	517.5	291.4	235.4	132.7	13.3	4.4	2.4	9.7
Wholesale	407.9	238.0	216.8	127.0	12.6	1.9	2.1	9.2



places a substantial, but increasingly manageable, burden on Taiwan's expanding economy. The R.O.C.'s armed forces number about 500,000; two-thirds are ground forces, and the rest are split about evenly between air and naval personnel, including marines. The reserves total more than 2 million men. Conscription is universal for men over the age of 19.

The R.O.C. armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the United States, but in recent years the government's stress on military "self-reliance" has resulted in the growth of indigenous military production capabilities in certain fields. The R.O.C. adheres to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and has stated that, although it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, it will not do so.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Although expelled from the China mainland in 1949, the R.O.C. has steadfastly maintained its claim to be the only legal government of China. Over the years, however, most countries—including all in East Asia except the Republic of Korea—have withdrawn recognition from the R.O.C. and established diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. Government in Peking. The R.O.C. was unseated in the United Nations by the P.R.C. on October 25, 1971, and has subsequently been deprived of the Chinese seat in virtually all U.N.-affiliated organizations as well as most other international organizations. It is, however, still a member of a number of economic and technical organizations, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and INTELSAT, among others. Individuals and associations in Taiwan continue to play an active role in international nongovernmental organizations.

The R.O.C. has diplomatic relations today with about two dozen countries, including the United States. In view of Taiwan's importance in international trade, many countries which have broken diplomatic relations with Taipei have found it advantageous to preserve much of the substance of the preexisting relationship, including

varying degrees of informal liaison with Taipei authorities. Of the many forms which such links have taken, the most widely known is the Japanese model. Under this arrangement, the Japanese have sponsored private "Interchange Association" offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the R.O.C.-sponsored "Association for East Asian Relations" has offices in Tokyo and two other Japanese cities. These offices handle commercial, cultural, and other dealings between Taiwan and Japan.

### U.S.-R.O.C. RELATIONS

The United States continues to maintain diplomatic relations and a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. Grant military assistance to the R.O.C. ended in June 1973, but credits for purchases of military equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Act continue at modest levels.

U.S. economic assistance to the R.O.C. ended in 1965, after providing over \$1.5 billion since 1949. This assistance was a key factor in the exceptional economic progress achieved on Taiwan, which has resulted in the R.O.C. becoming a major trading partner of the United States. In 1975 two-way trade totaled \$3.6 billion, mostly in farm products and machinery (U.S. exports) and textile products and appliances (U.S. imports). In addition U.S. private investment on Taiwan exceeds \$600 million.

While maintaining ties with the Republic of China, the United States has, since 1969, undertaken a series of initiatives to improve its relations with the People's Republic of China. This policy led to President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972. In the Shanghai communique issued at the conclusion of that visit, the two sides stated their belief that "the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world." Various steps have been taken to further this process, including expanded trade, people-to-people contact, and regularized communication between the

two governments as signified by the establishment of Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking. President Ford visited Peking in December 1975 and reaffirmed the U.S. intention to complete the normalization of relations with the P.R.C.

U.S. policy with respect to the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland of China is also stated in the Shanghai communique. In it the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." With this prospect in mind, the United States affirmed as an ultimate objective the withdrawal of all American military forces and installations from Taiwan. It stated that in the meantime it would progressively reduce these forces and installations as tension in the area diminished. Significant U.S. military reductions have taken place since that time, and U.S. combat forces are no longer stationed on the island. Further reductions in remaining forces will be made in accordance with U.S. policy objectives and as security requirements in the area permit.

### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Leonard Unger  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Paul M. Popple  
Counselor for Economic Affairs—Joseph B. Kyle  
Counselor for Political Affairs—Frank N. Burnet  
Counselor for Public Affairs—Robert J. Clarke  
Defense Attaché—Col. Jacques K. Tetrick, USAF  
Director, U.S. Trade Center—Arthur R. Pothuisje  
Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command—Vice Adm. Edwin K. Snyder  
Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)—Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Forney, Jr.

The U.S. Embassy is located at No. 2 Chung Hsiao West Road, Section 2, Taipei, Taiwan.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7791, Revised May 1976

## **APPENDIX S**

### **U.S. RELATIONS WITH REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

[Reprinted from: United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970; A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, Department of State, 1971 (Publication 8575).]



Relations between the United States and the Republic of China continue to be close, although that government has not favored our efforts to bring about more normal relationships with Communist China.

Our basic defense commitment to the Republic of China is contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, which commits the United States to take action, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to meet an external attack against Taiwan and the Pescadores. The United States will not, in taking steps to improve relations with Communist China, alter our treaty relationship or associations with the Republic of China. The Secretary of State gave such assurances to President Chiang Kai-shek during the Secretary's visit to Taiwan in August 1969. They have since been reiterated. We also undertook energetic diplomatic efforts during 1969 and 1970 to insure that the Republic of China—whose population of 14.5 million is greater than that of two-thirds of the other members—retained its membership in the United Nations. We intend to continue to oppose attempts to deprive it of its place in the United Nations.

Effective use of earlier U.S. aid by imaginative economic planners and administrators within the Republic of China's Government, as well as the considerable talents of a hard-working people, have made it possible for the Republic of China not only to become one of the first countries in Asia no longer needing economic assistance (aid ended in 1965) but also to embark on a course of self-sustained growth and development toward a modern, industrial society. The standard of living of the average citizen of Taiwan, in sharp contrast to the situation on the mainland, has continued to improve strikingly. Gross national product increased in 1970 by 10 percent in real terms; per capita income increased 7.6 percent to approximately \$292.

The twin engines of the economic growth of Taiwan have been trade and foreign direct investment. The value of foreign investment has grown more than 250 percent in the last three years. American investors, chiefly in electronics and chemicals, have provided about half of the new investment during the period 1952-70. Special efforts by the Government of the Republic of China to encourage both foreign and domestic investment in export-oriented industries have caused Taiwan's foreign trade to increase six and a half times in 10 years. The United States is also the most important trading partner of the Republic of China. American imports from that country, how-

Preceding Page BLANK - FIL

ever, are growing at a somewhat more rapid rate than our exports to it. To strengthen our trade position, we held a successful exhibition of advanced American industrial machinery in Taipei in November 1970 and we are conducting other export-promotion activities.

Scientific and technological advances have spurred the growth and diversification of industry and trade in the Republic of China. In addition to the private U.S. transfer of technology to Taiwan through investment and licensing, the U.S. Government entered into a Cooperative Science Program with the Republic of China on January 23, 1969, to increase cooperation between scientists, engineers, scholars, and institutions of research and higher learning, and to use the special facilities available in each country. In addition, under a successful State Department pilot project, an outstanding American scientist was appointed Special Assistant to our Ambassador for science and technology, and has helped the Chinese to apply technology in areas of high potential return.

The continuing growth of Taiwan's economy has made it possible for the Republic of China to expand its efforts to help other countries. Since 1961, agricultural demonstrations, organized under its "Vanguard" program, have provided grassroots technical assistance, primarily in Africa, but also in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Since 1968 the United States has given partial local-currency support to this program, which now operates in 27 countries.




**APPENDIX T**


**MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**(Text and Map)**

[Reprinted from: Collective Defense Treaties. Washington, Government Printing Office, 21 April 1969 (91st Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print).]







# MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA<sup>1</sup>

## Parties

Republic of China and the United States.

## Collective defense

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." (ARTICLE V)

The Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, in its report on this treaty included the following statement to clarify the nature of the commitment in Article V:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that the obligations of the parties under article V apply only in the event of external armed attack; and that military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China, shall not be undertaken except by joint agreement."

Such understanding reflects an agreement manifested in an exchange of notes dated December 10, 1954 (see p. 103), under which the use of force from the areas specified must be pursuant to joint agreement, except for emergency actions by way of self-defense. (S. Ex. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4.)

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement." (ARTICLE VII)

The Senate Report explained that "the administration made it clear that this provision did not impose on the United States an automatic or mandatory obligation" to dispose its forces in the area but that the United States is "free to station forces or not, as circumstances may indicate." (S. Ex. Rept. No. 2, p. 5.)

An agreement on the status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of China was signed at Taipei on August 31, 1965, and entered into force on April 12, 1966. (See p. 446.)

**Treaty area** (see map facing p. 218.)

"\* \* \* the terms 'territorial' and 'territories' shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West

<sup>1</sup>Text on p. 101. See also p. 198 for text of resolution authorizing the President to employ U.S. Armed Forces to protect the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions.



Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." (ARTICLE VI)

Included in the "island territories in the West Pacific" are such groups as the Ryukyus (including Okinawa), the trust territories (former Japanese mandated islands), and Guam. (S. Ex. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5.)

To avoid any possible misunderstanding concerning the legal status of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations included the following statement in its report:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies." (S. Ex. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.)

To avoid any doubts as to the nature of the "mutual agreement" required, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations included the following in its report:

"It is the understanding of the Senate that the 'mutual agreement' referred to in article VI, under which the provisions of articles II and V may be made applicable to other territories, shall be construed as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States." (S. Ex. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5.)

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

**APPENDIX U**  
**KUOMINTANG OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**[Chart]**



# KUOMINTANG OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

## DIRECTOR GENERAL

CHIANG Kai-shek

## SECRETARY GENERAL

CHANG Pao-shu

## DEPUTY SECRETARIES GENERAL

CH'IN Hsiao-i

HSIEH Jan-chih

HSÜEH Jen-yang

## CENTRAL STANDING COMMITTEE

### Members (21):

CHANG Ch'i-yün

CH'EN Ta-ch'ing

CHENG Yen-fen

CHIANG Ching-kuo

CHIANG Yen-shih

CHOU Chih-jou

HSIEH Tung-min

HU Chien-chung

HUANG Chieh

HUANG Shao-ku

KAO K'uei-yüan

KU Cheng-kang

KUO Ch'eng

KUO Chi

LI Kuo-ting

LIN T'ing-sheng

NI Wen-ya

SUN Yün-hsüan

YEN Chen-hsing

YEN Chia-kan

YÜAN Shou-ch'ien

## CENTRAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

### Presidium (11):

CHANG Chih-pen  
CHANG Chün  
CH'EN Li-fu

CHIANG-SUNG Mei-ling  
HO Ying-ch'in  
HSIEH Kuan-sheng  
HSÜEH Yüeh

HUANG Kuo-shu  
LI Szu-ts'ung  
LI Yü-ying  
SUN Fo

### Members (138):

CHANG Chih-pen  
CHANG Ch'ing-en  
CHANG Ch'ün  
CHANG Ho-hsiang  
CHANG Li-sheng  
CHANG Pang-chen  
CHANG T'ieh-chün  
CHANG Wei-han  
CH'EN Chao-ch'ung  
CH'EN Chao-ying  
CH'EN Ch'i-ch'uan  
CH'EN Chia-shang  
CH'EN Chih-mai  
CH'EN Chih-ming  
CH'EN Chih-p'ing  
CH'EN Hsiung-fei  
CH'EN Hsüeh-p'ing  
CH'EN Kan-heng  
CH'EN Li-fu  
CH'EN Ta-ch'i  
CH'EN Tzu-feng  
CH'ENG Ts'ang-po  
CHIANG Chien-jen  
CHIANG Fu-ts'ung  
CHIANG Hsüeh-chu  
CHIANG Po-chang  
CHIANG-SUNG Mei-lin  
CH'EN Ch'i-ch'en  
CH'EN Ta-chün  
CH'EN Yung-ho  
CHIN Wei-hsi  
CHOU Mei-yü  
CHU Fu-sung  
FANG Chih  
HANG Li-wu  
HO Chung-han  
HO Wen-chiung  
HO Ying-ch'in  
HSIAO Cheng  
HSIAO Tsan-yü  
HSIAO T'ung-tzu  
HSIAO Yü  
HSIEH Kuan-sheng  
HSIEH Ying-chou  
HSÜ Hsiao-yen  
HSÜ Huan-sheng

HSÜ Pai-yüan  
HSÜ Shao-ch'ang  
HSÜEH Yü-ch'i  
HSÜEH Yüeh  
HU Kuei  
HUANG Ch'ao-ch'in  
HUANG Chen-ch'iu  
HUANG Chen-hua  
HUANG Chi-lu  
HUANG Hsing-hua  
HUANG Hung-ch'iu  
HUANG Jen-chun  
HUANG Jen-lin  
HUANG Kuo-shu  
HUANG Po-tu  
K'O Chun-chih  
KU Cheng-ting  
KU Chu-t'ung  
KUAN Ch'ung-ying  
KUANG Lu  
KUANG Yao-p'u  
KUO Chi-ch'iao  
LENG Hsin  
LI Chien-ho  
LI Chüeh-chih  
LI Mi  
LI P'u-sheng  
LI Shou-yung  
LI Szu-ts'ung  
LI Yü-ying  
LI Yung-hsin  
LIANG Han-ts'ao  
LIANG Hsü-chao  
LIEN Chen-tung  
LIN Hsi-p'ing  
LIN Shen  
LIU An-ch'i  
LIU Chien-ch'ün  
LIU Ch'in  
LIU K'o-shu  
LIU T'ien-lu  
LO Ch'i  
LO Chia-lun  
LO Lieh  
LO SANG I-hsi  
MA Ch'ao-chun

MA Ch'eng-hsiang  
MA Hsing-yeh  
MA Pu-ch'ing  
MEI Yu-cho  
MIAO P'ei-ch'eng  
PAI Yün-t'i  
PAO Shih-t'ien  
PEI Ming-yü  
SA Meng-wu  
SHEN Ch'i  
SHEN Hui-lien  
SHEN I  
SHEN Tsung-han  
SHIH Chüeh  
SUN Fo  
SUN Lien-chung  
TAI K'uei-sheng  
T'AN Po-yü  
T'AO Hsi-sheng  
T'ENG Chieh  
TENG Ts'ui-ying  
T'EN Chiung-chin  
TS'AI Kung-nan  
TS'AI P'ei-huo  
TSENG Hsü-pai  
TS'UI Tsai-yang  
TUNG Wen-ch'i  
WAN Yao-huang  
WANG Hsing-chou  
WANG Ping-chün  
WANG Shao-t'ing  
WANG Shih-chieh  
WANG Shu-ming  
WANG T'ieh-han  
WANG Tsung-shan  
WANG Tung-yüan  
WEI Tao-ming  
WU Ching-hsiung  
WU Hung-sen  
YANG Chi-tseng  
YANG Chia-yü  
YANG Liang-kung  
YEN Kuo-fu  
YOLBUS  
YÜ Ching-t'ang  
YÜ Han-mou



# TENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Elected April 1969)

## Full Members (99):

A pu-tu-la

CHA Liang-chien

CHAN Ch'un-chien

CHANG Ch'i-yün

CHANG Hsi-wen

CHANG Pao-shu

CHAO Chü-yü

CHAO Tzu-ch'i

CH'EN Chien-chung

CH'EN Ta-ch'ing

CH'EN Ta-yüan

CH'EN Yü-ch'ing

CHENG Yen-fen

CHIANG Ching-kuo

CHIANG Yen-shih

CH'EN Chien-ch'iu

CH'IN Hsiao-i

CHOU Chih-jou

CHOU Chung-feng

CHOU Hung-t'ao

CHOU Shu-k'ai

CH'Ü Shao-hua

CH'U Sung-ch'iu

FENG Ch'i-ts'ung

FENG Ch'ing-fu

FU Yün

HSIEH Jan-chih

HSIEH Tung-min

HSÜ Ch'ing-chung

HSÜ Ch'ing-lan

HSÜ Nai

HSÜ Su-yü

HSÜEH Jen-yang

HU Chien-chung

HU Lien

HU Mu-lan

HUANG Chieh

HUANG Shao-ku

I Chin-ch'iu

KAO Hsin

KAO K'uei-yüan

K'O Shu-pao

KU Chen-fu

KU Cheng-kang

KU Feng-hsiang

KUO Ch'eng

KUO Ch'i

LAI Ming-t'ang

LAI Shun-sheng

LI Chih-min

LI Chung-kuei

LI Huan

LI Kuo-ting

LI Pai-hung

LI Shih-fen

LI Yü-hsi

LIANG Yung-chang

LIN T'ing-sheng

LIU Chi-hung

LIU Hsien-yün

LIU Kuang-k'ai

LIU Yü-chang

LO Heng

LO Yu-lun

LO Yün-p'ing

LÜ Chin-hua

LU Han-pu

MA Chi-chuang

MA Shu-li

MAO Sung-nien

NI Wen-chiung

NI Wen-ya

P'AN Chen-ch'iu

P'ENG Meng-ch'i

P'I I-shu

SHANG-KUAN Yeh-yu

SHEN Ch'ang-huan

SHEN Chien-hung

SHEN Chih-yüeh

SUN Yün-hsüan

T'ANG Chen-ch'u

T'ANG Chün-po

T'ANG Tsung

TENG Ch'uan-k'ai

TS'AO Sheng-fen

WANG Jen-yüan

WANG Min

WANG Sheng

WANG T'i-wu

WENG Ch'ien

YANG Hsi-k'un

YANG Pao-lin

YEH Hsia-ti

YEH Hsiang-chih

YEN Chen-hsing

YEN Chia-kan

YÜ Chi-chung

YÜ Kuo-hua

YÜAN Shou-ch'ien

## Alternate Members (48):

CHA ch'i-szu-ch'in

CHANG Hsi-che

CHANG Kuo-chiang

CHANG Kuo-ying

CHANG Tao-min

CHANG Yen-yüan

CHAO Hsiao-mei

CH'EN Mien-hsiu

CH'EN Shui-feng

CHIANG Lien-ju

CHIAO Chin-t'ang

CH'ING Pa-t'u

CHOU Hsiang

CHOU Hsüan-kuan

CHOU Mu-wen

CHOU Pai-lien

CHOU T'ien-hsiang

CHUNG Ch'iao-kuang

HO Ch'ing-hua

HO I-wu

HO Tsung-yen

HSIA Kung-ch'üan

HU Hsin-nan

LI Ho

LI T'ien-shan

LIANG Tzu-heng

LIEN Chan

LIN Chin-sheng

LO Ts'ai-jung

LU Ching-shih

P'AN Tse-yün

SHIH Lien-fang

SUN Chih-p'ing

SUN I-hsüan

SUN Kuei-chi

Ta Mu-lin-wang-ch'u-k'o

TAI Chung-yu

TS'AI Hung-wen

TSANG Yüan-chün

TU Yüan-tsai

TUNG Shih-fang

WANG Kuo-hsiu

WANG Shu-lin

WANG To-nien

WANG Ya-ch'üan

WU Hsiang-lan

YÜ Chung-chi

YÜAN Chin-hsien

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**CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC**  
**ENTERPRISES**  
**SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE**

**Chairman:**

**YÜ Kuo-hua**

**Vice Chairmen:**

**LI P'ai-hung**

**HU Hsin-nan**

**CHANG Hsin-hsia**

**POLICY COMMITTEE**

**Secretary General:**

**CHAO Tzu-ch'i**

**Deputy Secretary Generals:**

**FENG Ching-fu**

**CHAO Tzu-ch'i**

**CHOU Yeh-p'ing**



HO Chung-han  
HO Wen-chiung  
HO Ying-ch'in  
HSIAO Cheng  
HSIAO Tsan-yü  
HSIAO T'ung-tzu  
HSIAO YÜ  
HSIEH Kuan-sheng  
HSIEH Ying-chou  
HSÜ Hsiao-yen  
HSÜ Huan-sheng

LIN Shen  
LIU An-ch'i  
LIU Chien-ch'ün  
LIU Ch'in  
LIU K'o-shu  
LIU T'ien-lu  
LO Ch'i  
LO Chia-lun  
LO Lieh  
LO SANG I-hsi  
MA Ch'ao-chun

WANG Tung-yüan  
WEI Tao-ming  
WU Ching-hsiung  
WU Hung-sen  
YANG Chi-tseng  
YANG Chia-yü  
YANG Liang-kung  
YEN Kuo-fu  
YOLBUS  
YÜ Ching-t'ang  
YÜ Han-mou

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5

**FIRST SECTION**  
(Organizations and Activities  
in Free China)

Chief:

CH'EN Chien-chung

Deputy Chiefs:

LI Ho  
KUO Che  
YÜ Hsueh

**SECOND SECTION**  
(Organizations and Activities  
in Mainland China)

Chief:

YEH Hsiang-chih

Deputy Chiefs:

P'AN Tse-yün  
CHIAO Chin-t'ang

(Organ

Chief:

MA

Deputy

K'O  
LI Y  
TSE

**DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE**

Chairman:

LI Shou-yung

Vice Chairman:

MA Chi-lin

**FINANCE COMMITTEE**

Chairman:

HSÜ Po-yüan

Vice Chairmen:

CHANG Shih-lun  
CH'EN Ch'ing-yü  
CH'EN Han-p'ing

**PLANN**

Chair

TEN

Vice

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g-hsiung  
-sen  
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CHANG Kuo-ying  
CHANG Tao-min  
CHANG Yen-yüan  
CHAO Hsiao-mei  
CH'EN Mien-hsiu  
CH'EN Shui-feng  
CHIANG Lien-ju  
CHIAO Chin-t'ang  
CH'ING Pa-t'u  
CHOU Hsiang  
CHOU Hsüan-kuan  
CHOU Mu-wen  
CHOU Pai-lien

HO I-wu  
HO Tsung-yen  
HSIA Kung-ch'üan  
HU Hsin-nan  
LI Ho  
LI T'ien-shan  
LIANG Tzu-heng  
LIEN Chan  
LIN Chin-sheng  
LO Ts'ai-jung  
LU Ching-shih  
P'AN Tse-yün  
SHIH Lien-fang

Ta Mu-lin-wang-ch'u-k'o  
TAI Chung-yu  
TS'AI Hung-wen  
TSANG Yüan-chün  
TU Yüan-tsai  
TUNG Shih-fang  
WANG Kuo-hsiu  
WANG Shu-lin  
WANG To-nien  
WANG Ya-ch'üan  
WU Hsiang-lan  
YÜ Chung-chi  
YÜAN Chin-hsien

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### SECRETARIAT

Chief:

LAI Shun-sheng

Deputy Chief:

LIU Chao-t'ien

ON  
Activities  
(ina)

### THIRD SECTION (Organizations and Activities Abroad)

Chief:

MA Shu-pao

Deputy Chiefs:

K'O Shu-pao

LI Yüan-ch'ien

TSENG Kuang-shun

### FOURTH SECTION (Publicity)

Chief:

CH'EN Yü-ch'ing

Deputy Chiefs:

CH'EN Shu-t'ung

HSÜ Wen-yüan

LU Ch'i-yang

MITTEE

### PLANNING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE

Chairman:

TENG Ch'uan-k'ai

Vice Chairmen:

LO Ts'ai-jung

TS'UI Ch'ui-yen

YANG Chia-lin

### PARTY HISTORY COMPILATION COMMITTEE

Chairman:

HUANG Chi-lu

Vice Chairman:

TS'UI Ch'ui-yen

### TAIWAN PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS

Chairman:

LI Huan



Shih-fang  
Kuo-hsiu  
Shu-lin  
To-nien  
Ya-ch'üan  
ang-lan  
g-chi  
hin-hsien

SECTION  
(city)

FIFTH SECTION  
(Social Affairs)

Chief:

LIANG Yung-chang

Deputy Chiefs:

CHANG T'ai-hsiang

CHENG Sen-ch'i

SHIH Ch'i-yang

SIXTH SECTION  
(Chinese Communist Affairs)

Chief:

HSU Ch'ing-lan

Deputy Chiefs:

KAO Wei-han

LI Pai-hung

YANG Jui

STORY  
COMMITTEE

WOMEN'S ACTIVITIES  
COMMITTEE

Chairwoman:

CH'EN Chien-ch'iu

Vice Chairwomen:

CHU Chien-hua

P'AN Chin-tuan

CADRES CONTROL BOARD

Chairman:

LI Chin-ch'iu

Vice Chairman

HSIUNG Wen-ming

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**SIXTH SECTION**  
**(Chinese Communist Affairs)**

Chief:

HSU Ch'ing-lan

Deputy Chiefs:

KAO Wei-han

LI Pai-hung

YANG Jui

**CADRES CONTROL BOARD**

Chairman:

I Chin-ch'iu

Vice Chairman

HSIUNG Wen-ming

**REVOLUTIONARY PRAGMATISM  
AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

President:

CHANG Kai-shek

Director:

YUAN Shao-ch'uan

Dean:

WANG Tiao-hua



### THIRD SECTION

#### Organizations and Activities Abroad)

Chief:

MA Shu-pao

Deputy Chiefs:

K'O Shu-pao

LI Yüan-ch'ien

TSENG Kuang-shun

### FOURTH SECTION

#### (Publicity)

Chief:

CH'EN Yü-ch'ing

Deputy Chiefs:

CH'EN Shu-fung

HSÜ Wen-yüan

LU Ch'i-yang

### ORGANIZING AND EVALUATION

#### COMMITTEE

Chairman:

TENG Ch'uan-k'ai

Vice Chairmen:

LO Ts'ai-jung

TS'UI Ch'ui-yen

YANG Chia-lin

### PARTY HISTORY

#### COMPILATION COMMITTEE

Chairman:

HUANG Chi-lu

Vice Chairman:

TS'UI Ch'ui-yen

### TAIWAN PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS

Chairman:

LI Huan

First Secretary:

CH'EN Shui-teng

### TAIPEI MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS

Chairman:

LIN Chin-sheng

Vice Chairmen:

HSÜ Shu-yü

LIN Ch'i-chün

First Secretary:

MA Chen-fang

**APPENDIX V**  
**GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**[Chart]**



1

First Bureau  
(Political Affairs)

Director:

FU Ti-ch'üan

Deputy Director:

LIU Hou

Second Bureau  
(Military Affairs)

Director:

TS'AO Yung-hsia

Deputy Director:

KO Keng-yü

Control Yuan

President:

LI Szu-ts'ung

Vice President:

CHANG Wei-han

Secretary General:

I Shuo

Examination Yuan

President:

SUN Fo

Vice President:

YANG Liang-kung

Secretary General:

CHUNG T'ien-hsin

Ministry of Audit

Auditor General:

CHANG Tao-min

Ministry of Examination

Minister:

LI Shou-yung

Political Vice Minister:

# GOVERNMENT OF

2

## Presidium

Secretary General:

KUO Ch'eng

Deputy Secretary General:

LIU Tung-yen

## Third Bureau (General Affairs)

Director:

LI Chih

Deputy Director:

HUANG Tsung-shih

Bureau  
(General Affairs)

ang

Pres

Vice

Sec

Dep

Per



# MENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

3

## National Assembly

### Presidential Office

#### President:

CHIANG Kai-shek

#### Vice President:

YEN Chia-kan

#### Secretary General:

CHANG Ch'ün

#### Deputy Secretary General:

CHENG Yen-fen

#### Personal Chief of Staff:

LI Yü-hsi

KAO K'uei-yüan

### Committee on Constitutional Revision

#### Chairman:

CHIANG Kai-shek

#### Vice Chairman:

KU Cheng-lung

#### Secretary General:

KUO Ch'eng

#### Deputy Secretaries General:

WU Sheng-ku

HUANG Shao-tzu

### National Security Council

#### Chairman:

CHIANG Kai-shek

#### Secretary General:

HUANG Shao-tzu

#### Deputy Secretaries General:

CHANG Tsung-liang

WANG Min

TUNG Shih-fang

### Executive Yuan

#### President:

YEN Chia-kan

#### Vice President:

CHIANG Ching-kuo

#### Secretary General:

CHINA

4

Committee on  
Constitutional Research

Chairman  
CHIANG Kai-shek  
Vice Chairman  
KUI Cheng-feng  
Secretary General  
KIU Cheng  
Deputy Secretaries General  
WU Shang-wei  
HUANG Shao-tai

National Security Council

Chairman  
CHIANG Kai-shek  
Secretary General  
HUNG Shih-ku  
Deputy Secretaries General  
CHANG Tung-fang  
WANG Min  
TUNG Shih-fang

Military Strategy  
Advisory Committee

Chairman  
HO Ying-ch'ing  
Vice Chairman  
SEI Ch'ing  
HUANG Chin-ling

Mainland Research Council  
and Research Unit

Chairman  
HUNG Shih-ku  
Vice Chairman  
CHANG Tung-fang  
TUNG Shih-fang  
WU Min  
Secretary General  
KIU Cheng  
Deputy Secretaries General  
HUANG Shao-tai  
CHAO Kuei-an



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Deputy Director:  
LIU Hou

6

Control Yuan

President:  
LI Szu-ts'ung  
Vice President:  
CHANG Wei-han  
Secretary General:  
I Shuo

Examination Yuan

President:  
SUN Fo  
Vice President:  
YANG Liang-kung  
Secretary General:  
CHUNG T'ien-hsin

Ministry of Audit

Auditor General:  
CHANG Tao-min  
Deputy Auditor General:  
WANG P'ei-yüan

Ministry of Examination

Minister:  
LI Shou-yung  
Political Vice Minister:  
CHOU Pang-tao  
Administrative Vice Minister:  
MEI Lin-kao

Ministry of Personnel

Minister:  
SHIH Chüeh  
Political Vice Minister:  
TS'AO I-yüan  
Administrative Vice Minister:  
LO Wan-lei

Ministry of Communications

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hsin

f Examination

Minister:  
tao  
Vice Minister:

of Personnel

Minister:  
Vice Minister:

Judicial Yuan

President:  
HSIEH Kuan-sheng  
Vice President:  
HSIEH Ying-chou  
Secretary General:  
CHOU Ting-yü

Council of Grand Justices

Supreme Court

President:  
CH'EN Pu-sheng

Administrative Court

President:  
KU Ju-hsün

Committee on the Discipline  
of Public Functionaries

Chairman:  
MA Shou-hua

Legislative Yu

President:  
HUANG Kuo-shu  
Vice President:  
NI Wen-ya  
Secretary General:  
YUAN Yung  
Deputy Secretary General:  
HSIAO Hsien-yin



Bureau  
al Affairs)

Tsung-shih

8

Legislative Yuan

President:

HUANG Kuo-shu

Vice President:

NI Wen-ya

Secretary General:

YUAN Yung

Deputy Secretary General:

HSIAO Hsien-yin

Executive Yuan

President:

YEN Chia-kan

Vice President:

CHIANG Ching-kuo

Secretary General:

CHIANG Yen-shih

Deputy Secretary General:

CH'Ü Shao-hua

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Directorate General of Budget,  
Accounts and Statistics

Director General:  
CHOU Hung-t'ao

Deputy Director General:  
HSIEH Jen-wei

Ministry of Co

Minister:  
CHANG Chi-che  
Political Vice Minis  
WANG Chang-s  
Administrative Vice  
FANG Hsien-ch'

Vocational Assistance Commission  
for Retired Servicemen

Chairman:  
CHAO Chü-yü

Vice Chairmen:  
HSIEH Ch'i-chia  
WEI Ch'ung-liang

Secretary General:  
(Vacant)

Deputy Secretaries General:  
CHAO Ts'ai-piao  
HUANG T'o-jung  
LIU Ch'eng  
WEI Te-mao

Overseas Chinese Affairs  
Commission

Chairman:  
KAO Hsin

Vice Chairmen:  
HO I-wu  
YÜAN Chin-hsien

Ministry of Personnel

Minister:

SHIH Chüeh

Political Vice Minister:

TS'AO I-yüan

Administrative Vice Minister:

LO Wan-lei

Administrative Court

President:

KU Ju-hsün

Committee on the Discipline  
of Public Functionaries

Chairman:

MA Shou-hua

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### Ministry of Education

Minister:

CHUNG Chiao-kuang

Political Vice Minister:

CHOU Kuang-chou

Administrative Vice Ministers:

LIU Hsien-yün

WANG Ya-ch'üan

### Ministry of Finance

Minister:

LI Kuo-ting

Political Vice Minister:

MAO Chao-k'uei

Administrative Vice Minister:

WANG Shao-yü

### Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister:

WEI Tao-ming

Political Vice Minister:

YANG Hsi-k'un

Administrative Vice Minister:

SHEN Chien-hung

### Ministry of

Minister:

HSÜ Ch'ing-chung

Political Vice Minister:

CHI Yüan-p'u

Administrative Vice Minister:

T'ANG Chen-ch'u

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Ministry of Interior

Ch'ing-chung

Vice Minister:

Yüan-p'ü

Administrative Vice Minister:

Chen-ch'ü

Ministry of Justice

Minister:

WANG Jen-yuan

Political Vice Minister:

WANG Tao-yüan

Administrative Vice Minister:

LIANG Heng-ch'ang

Ministry of Education

Minister:

HUANG Chieh

Vice Minister:

MA Chi-chuan

Administrative Vice Minister:

TS'UI Chih-tung

YANG Shao-chuan

LEI K'ai-huan

Chief of the General Administration:

LAI Ming-fan

Vice Chiefs of the General Administration:

CHENG Wei-yuan

YÜ Po-sheng

LEI Yen-chün



14

### Ministry of National Defense

Minister:

HUANG Chieh

Vice Minister:

MA Chi-chuang

Administrative Vice Ministers:

TS'UI Chih-fao

YANG Shao-llen

LEI K'ai-huan

Chief of the General Staff:

LAI Ming-fang

Vice Chiefs of the General Staff:

CHENG Wei-yüan

YU Po-sheng

LEI Yen-chün

Council

### Government Information Office

Director:

WEI Ching-meng

Deputy Director:

CH'U Wan

### Bureau of Personnel

#### Administration

Director:

WANG Cheng-i

Deputy Directors:

CH'EN Chen-pang

FENG Hsin-fu

**APPENDIX V**  
**GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

**[Chart]**

**APPENDIX W**

**REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) ARMED FORCES  
AND MILITARY POWER**

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[Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, US Army, Ret., Col. John A. C. Angrews, US Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes. 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.]



## CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (TAIWAN)

### Chung-hua Min-kuo Republic of China

#### POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 13,887 square miles  
Population: 15,135,000  
Total Active Armed Forces: 500,000 (3.03% population)  
Gross National Product: \$9.39 billion (\$467 per capita)  
Annual Military Expenditures: \$700 million (7.45% GNP)  
Steel and Iron Production: 1,250,000 metric tons  
Fuel Production: Coal: 4.5 million metric tons  
Crude Oil: 123,000 metric tons  
Refined Petroleum Products: 8.3 million metric tons  
Electric Power Output: 15.17 billion kwh  
Merchant Fleet: 316 ships; 1.3 million gross tons  
Civil Air Fleet: 8 jet, 12 turboprop, and 37 piston transports

#### DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The President of the Republic of China (ROC), Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, is commander in chief of the armed forces, but the day-to-day operation of the forces is now entrusted to younger men. The services are not integrated, but are centrally administered through a Ministry of Defense and coordinated operationally by a General Staff somewhat similar to the US Joint Staff. The Chief of the General Staff exercises a dual function. He is Chief of Staff to the President in command and operations as well as Chief of Staff to the Defense Minister in administration. The President's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who is considered by many to be his most likely successor, is now Premier.

#### POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

While the eventual return to the mainland is the central goal of the Nationalist leaders, the prospects for a classical invasion decrease. The Taipei government now emphasizes the capability of fast-moving elements that could reach the mainland and cooperate with anti-communist or non-communist elements there in rising against the Peking government. This would take place in a time of turbulence and internal strife on the mainland and would be the first step in the reunion of all China under Nationalist leadership. Meantime, attention goes to the assurance of economic progress and the maintenance of strong armed forces which, while they now seem oriented on effective defense, would be able to act offensively under proper conditions. The defense costs and commitments displayed testify to the realism of the Nationalist view. (It is noteworthy that, despite this burden,

Taiwan — making good use of US economic assistance — has prospered economically in the last two decades, and no longer requires American economic aid.) An essential secondary objective of ROC military policy is to secure and stabilize the Taiwan Straits area as its contribution to the Chinese-American mutual security treaty.

After having survived the ravages of World War II—in which China's manpower losses were exceeded only by Russia, Germany, and Japan—the National Government was defeated by the Chinese Communist armies in a bitter civil war (1945-1949), fled to Taiwan, and was displaced in mainland China by the People's Republic of China. Social, political, and psychological factors, as well as serious military errors and reverses, contributed to this defeat. A major objective of military policy has been to correct these shortcomings. With substantial US military assistance and advice, particularly since 1953, it appears that this effort has been to a large degree successful.

The strength of the armed forces is maintained by conscription with military service being mandatory for all male citizens over the age of 19. Service is for two years. The percentage of those of mainland origin in the armed forces is steadily decreasing, although they still dominate in the higher ranks. The majority of the troops, particularly in the lower officer and enlisted ranks, is now of Taiwan origin. The growing prosperity and rapid industrialization in Taiwan are making it more difficult to interest youth in the service as a career, whether they be of mainland or of local birth. The government is coping with this problem in good part by the maintenance of a well-trained and readily available reserve, which now has more than one million members.

#### STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

It is evident to the ROC that it cannot return to mainland China without massive foreign support and assistance, or without a chaotic breakdown of the central Chinese Communist regime. It has been made clear that the United States will not provide support for any such offensive operations, although the US Government has officially announced its determination to preserve the independence and integrity of Taiwan from communist aggression. Even if mainland China should fall into turmoil that might support hope of a successful action, it is doubtful that the US would provide the kind of economic, logistical and other support that would probably be essential for such an invasion.

The determination of the ROC to retain its control over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, immediately adjacent to the shores of the mainland, has posed a major strategic problem to the government. Despite repeated and protracted bombardments, and numerous threats of communist offensives against these islands, effective land and air defensive measures, plus American support, have enabled the ROC to retain these footholds. The fact that the ROC controls one province of

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China (Taiwan) and parts of another (Quemoy and Matsu are in Fukien province) has considerable political significance in the context of the unresolved civil war. The islands also have some strategic value, particularly Quemoy, which controls Amoy and traffic in that part of the coastal area. It would be extremely difficult to use Amoy as a mounting area for an assault against Quemoy or the main island of Taiwan. There is no such thing as absolute invulnerability, but the cost of action against either target would be extremely high for the attacker.

There is now the additional factor of Communist nuclear weapons. Their use would change the prospects absolutely, since the destruction of only a few targets would severely cripple Taiwan. But, first, the retaliatory power of the United States would have to be reckoned with; second, such action might very well trigger some Soviet move in the north, and a two front war is a nightmare to Peking. As an intangible influence there is also the question of how the Communists would view the use of nuclear weapons against their brethren on Taiwan whose "liberation" is their avowed purpose.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Since 1950 the United States has provided \$2.85 billion in military assistance to the ROC. A US Military Mission has been stationed on Taiwan since 1951, to assist the Chinese in their utilization of American military equipment provided under the Military Assistance Program. Taiwan has given some support to others, but on a modest scale.

#### ALLIANCES

The only alliance of the ROC is the mutual security treaty with the United States. Under related bilateral agreements, several US Air Force units are based on Taiwan, and base facilities are also provided for the US Seventh Fleet. The US Navy's Taiwan Strait patrol has been discontinued and the level of support now required for an occasional ship visit is small. Apparently the United States has also provided U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft for surveillance of mainland China. Normally the US military presence on Taiwan has consisted of several hundred men, mostly in the MAAG and the Taiwan Defense Command, and in some communications activities. The Vietnam War brought a sizable logistic support effort to Taiwan, involving at the peak about 9,000 men. The number is now being reduced slowly, in accordance with President Nixon's promise that the force would be decreased with the relaxation of tension in the area. This element, mostly Air Force, now numbers 7,000.

The United States declined offers of military participation in the war in Vietnam, as it did in the Korean War. However, several civic action units worked in South Vietnam, assisting the government in various aspects of rural development.

In October 1971, the Republic of China was expelled from

the UN, and its seat was taken by the People's Republic of China. Since that time, a majority of the nations formerly recognizing Taipei have switched their relations to Peking. The US is the only major nation now having the full range of relations.

#### ARMY

*Personnel:* 390,000 (including 60,000 on Quemoy and 20,000 on Matsu)

##### *Organization:*

- 4 armored brigades
- 12 infantry divisions
- 6 light divisions
- 4 special forces groups
- 2 airborne brigades
- 3 armored cavalry regiments
- 1 SSM battalion (Honest John)
- 2 SAM battalions (Hawk and Nike-Hercules)
- 1 SAM battery (Nike-Hercules)

##### *Major Equipment Inventory:*

- 480 medium tanks (M-47 and M-48)
- 500 light tanks (M-24 and M-41)
- tank destroyers (M-18)
- APCs (M-113)
- SSMs (Honest John)
- SAMs (Hawk and Nike-Hercules)
- 66 helicopters (50 UH-1, 7 H-34, 9 KH-4)
- 10 PL-1 trainers
- 105mm, 155mm, and 203mm howitzers
- 155mm guns
- AA guns (40mm and up)

*Reserves:* Approximately one million trained reserves are available, as are required weapons and equipment when mobilized.

#### NAVY

*Personnel:* 35,000

##### *Major Units:*

- 16 destroyers (DD)
- 16 destroyer escorts (DE)
- 3 escorts (PCE; converted MSF)
- 11 submarine chasers (PC)
- 12 submarine chasers (SC)
- 1 escort transport (APD)
- 15 coastal minesweepers (MSC)
- 2 inshore minesweepers (MSI)
- 1 minelayer (converted MSF)
- 1 gunboat (PGM)

- 4 torpedo boats (PT)
- 46 patrol boats (YP)
- 21 auxiliaries and support ships
- 21 landing ships, tank (LST)
- 1 landing ship, dock (LSD)
- 15 landing ships, medium (LSM)
- 5 landing ships, infantry, large (LSIL)
- 30 landing craft (LCT, LCU)
- 3 landing ships, support, large (LSSL)
- 2 amphibious force flagships (converted LST)

*Major Naval Bases:* T'ai-nan, T'ai-tung, Chi-lung, Tso-ying, Penghu

*Reserves:* About 60,000 trained reservists

## AIR FORCE

*Personnel:* 80,000

### *Organization:*

- 8 fighter-bomber squadrons (F-100, F-5)
- 4 fighter interceptor squadrons (F-104)
- 2 fighter-reconnaissance squadrons (RF-101, RF-104)
- 1 ASW squadron (S-2)
- 1 SAR squadron (HU-16, PBV)
- 1 transport wing (C-46, C-47, C-119, C-123, Boeing 720)
- 1 helicopter wing (H-13, H-19, Hughes 500, UH-1)
- 1 trainer/support wing (PL-1, PL-2)

### *Major Aircraft Types:*

- 279 combat aircraft
  - 190 fighter-bombers (90 F-100, 100 F-5)
  - 63 F-104 fighter-interceptors
  - 17 fighter-reconnaissance aircraft (4 RF-101, 13 RF-104)
  - 9 S-2 ASW aircraft
- 294 other aircraft
  - 141 transports (40 C-46, 50 C-47, 40 C-119, 10 C-123, 1 Boeing 720)
  - 10 SAR aircraft (6 HU-16, 4 PBV)
  - 46 helicopters (10 H-13, 7 H-19, 6 Hughes 500, 23 UH-1)
  - 100 + trainers and support aircraft (PL-1, PL-2, and others)

*Major Air Bases:* Taipei, Hsinchu, Tao-yuan, T'ai-chung, Chia, T'ai-nan, Ping-tung, Kung-k'uang (USAF).

*Reserves:* About 130,000 trained reservists.

## MARINE CORPS

*Personnel:* 36,000

*Organization:* 2 divisions

*Reserves:* 65,000 to 70,000 trained reservists

## PARAMILITARY

There is a militia numbering about 175,000.



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Official:

PAUL T. SMITH  
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* DAMO-SS (5)	USAIMA (5)

For Explanation of abbreviation used, see AR 310-50.

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- 8. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHART)  
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**Figure 4. — Bureau of Mines Special Publication.**  
**The People's Republic of China,**  
**a New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base.**






2

# FUELS AND POWER



R





# COAL PRODUCTION



10-20 MILLION TONS



5-10 MILLION TONS



LESS THAN 5 MILLION TONS

COALFIELD



NEAR-SURFACE DEPOSIT



DEEPLY BURIED DEPOSIT

# PETROLEUM



REFINERY



SHALE OIL



OILFIELD



GASFIELD




AREA WITH




Fertilizer

4









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**Figure 6. — Bureau of Mines Special Publication.**  
**The People's Republic of China,**  
**a New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base**






# MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREAS



# RIAL



4




<b>METALLURGY</b>	<b>MACHINE BUILDING</b>		<b>LIGHT INDUSTRY</b>	<b>CHEMICALS-</b>
<b>ALUMINIUM</b>	<b>AGRICULT.MACH.</b>	<b>LOCOMOTIVES</b>	<b>CERAMICS</b>	<b>CEMENT</b>
<b>COPPER</b>	<b>BEARINGS</b>	<b>MACH.TOOLS</b>	<b>SILK</b>	<b>CHEMICALS</b>
<b>IRON</b>	<b>CUTTING TOOLS</b>	<b>RAILROAD CARS</b>	<b>SUGAR</b>	<b>FERTILIZER</b>
<b>LEAD</b>	<b>ELECT.EQUIP.</b>	<b>SHIPBUILDING</b>	<b>TEXTILES</b>	<b>GLASS</b>
<b>STEEL</b>	<b>ELECTRONICS</b>	<b>TRACTORS</b>		<b>PAPER</b>
<b>TIN</b>	<b>HEAVY MACH.</b>	<b>TRUCKS</b>		<b>PHARMACEU</b>
<b>ZINC</b>	<b>INSTRUMENTS</b>			<b>RUBBER</b>
				<b>TIRES</b>

----- **ECONOMIC REGION BOUNDARY**

 **MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREA**







1


**Figure 5. — Bureau of Mines Special Publication.  
The People's Republic of China,  
a New Industrial Power with a Strong Mineral Base.**






2

# MINERALS AND METALS



ND






**ALUMINUM**



**ANTIMONY**



**ASBESTOS**



**BARITE**



**CEMENT**



**COPPER**



**DIAMOND**



**FLUORSPAR**



**IRON & STEEL**



**LEAD & ZINC**



**MAGNESITE**



**MANGANESE**



**MERCURY**



**MOLYBDENUM**



**PHOSPHATE**



**PYRITE**



**SALT**



**TALC**



**TIN**



**TUNGSTEN**



**URANIUM**





