# DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COURSE

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROGRAM

REFLECTIONS ON BEING A
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEM
COORDINATOR (DASC)

STUDY PROJECT PAPER
PMC 77-2

Alex J. Johnson
LTC   USA

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FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

REFLECTIONS ON BEING A

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEM

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Individual Study Program

Study Project Paper

Prepared as a Formal Paper

Defense Systems Management College

Program Management Course

Class 77-2

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by

Alex J. Johnson
LTC   USA

November 1977

Study Project Advisor
Major Joseph Salvitti

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DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE

STUDY TITLE: REFLECTIONS ON BEING A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS
COORDINATOR (DASC).

STUDY PROJECT GOALS:

To provide a description and appreciation of the daily operational environment
in which the DASC must function; methods, procedures and techniques he can use
to function efficiently and effectively; and how these can be used to fulfill
his responsibilities to HQDA and the Project Manager (PM) with minimum conflict.

STUDY REPORT ABSTRACT:

The purpose of this paper is to provide the DASC, and other members of the
research, development and acquisition field, a brief explanation of: the
various elements of the daily environment in which the DASC must work, the
importance of each and how they influence his actions; the basis of the
expertise and credibility the DASC must possess, and how these relate to
and can be used in conjunction with the environment to produce effective
results; and the responsibilities of the DASC to HQDA and the PM, the rela-
tionship of each to his environment, expertise and credibility, and how
potential conflicts between these responsibilities can be minimized. Elements
of the environment include the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System
(PPBS); the Congressional Process; the ASARC/DSARC Process; and the Decision
Making Process.

The paper was prepared using previous personal experience, latest written
documents, and interviews with present and former PMs, and members of the
DARCOM, HQDA and OSD staffs. It is intended to supplement the education and
training of the DASC, and to provide other members of the program management
team an appreciation of the factors which influence the DASC's actions. It
should help newly assigned DASC's to quickly understand and appreciate their
role as members of the management team, thereby minimizing adverse impact on
their program because of inexperience.

SUBJECT DESCRIPTORS:

Program/Project Management, Major Policies	10.02.01.00
Major Acquisition Policies	11.00.00.00
PPBS	12.00.00.00

NAME, RANK, SERVICE	CLASS	DATE
Alex J. Johnson, LTC, USA	PMC 77-2	November 1977

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Army research, development, and acquisition environment is rapidly increasing in difficulty and complexity at all levels. Requirements are increasing while funds remain tightly constrained. Competition for funding is intense. Even under an outstanding PM, a program cannot survive for long without adequate funding. Yet, few programs will receive adequate funding without a capable, proficient management team. A good DASC is an invaluable member of that team. He is at the forefront in the daily battle for program funding and support in the HQDA, OSD and Congressional arena.

The objective of this paper is to help the DASC understand the environment in which he must champion his assigned program, the tools he must use, and his responsibilities to HQDA and the PM. To have an understanding of his environment infers the DASC understands the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Congressional process, the ASARC/DSARC process, and the decision making process. It is imperative that this inference be true. Championing of his program must be done within the context of complete support for primary Army needs. This could prove difficult since the two may not always be synonymous. Tools a DASC must use include personal expertise, credibility, and bureaucratic procedures.

When a DASC fully understands his environment, tools and responsibilities, he is in a position to prevent conflict between his responsibilities to HQDA and the PM and to exert enormous impact on his assigned program. It is hoped that this paper will help him to achieve that understanding quickly so that he will be able to make a maximum contribution to the Army throughout his tenure as a DASC.

It's not the critic who counts, nor the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man in the arena... whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood... who strives valiantly... who errs and comes short again and again... who knows great enthusiasms, great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause... who knows in the end the triumph of high achievement and who, if he fails, fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.

Theodore Roosevelt
On completion of the Panama Canal

THE WAY IT IS

LISTING OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study Project.

The purpose of this paper is to assist newly assigned Department of
the Army System Coordinators (DASCs) in understanding their principle
mission, and the actions required to accomplish it effectively and
efficiently. It identifies those activities that must be accomplished,
explains why they are necessary, and offers suggestions on how the activi-
ties have been performed effectively by previous DASCs. To paraphrase,
"The (DASC's) job is enormously complicated and difficult. The (DASC) is
overburdened with obligations; yet he cannot easily delegate his tasks.
As a result he is driven to overwork and is forced to do many tasks super-
ficially. Brevity, fragmentation, and verbal communication characterize
his work."[1] Yet the DASC function is an extremely important and rewarding
one if performed properly. With an early appreciation of his role, and an
initial awareness of how to perform this role, the DASC should be able to
minimize new job frustration and difficulties while maximizing output early.
This paper will also provide a basis by which the more experienced DASC
may review the manner in which he performs his job and may help him
prepare for new challenges with which he may not be familiar. Other
participants in Army research, development and acquisition assignments may
find the descriptive information useful as background information relative
to their roles in the overall process.

This guide is not to be used as a replacement for, but in conjunction
with AR 70-16, "Department of the Army Systems Coordinator (DASC)," and
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (DCSRDA)

1-1

Memorandums 1 through 26.

Scope of the Paper.

This paper will focus on the daily activities in which a DASC will be
involved. It identifies the critical prerequisites that allow a DASC to
be effective in the pressure packed research, development and acquisition
arena, and some of the daily interfaces he may have in the decision making
process, the ASARC/DSARC process, the planning, programming and budgeting
system (PPBS) process, and the Congressional process. Although these
processes are formal events which occur annually or at specific times in
the life cycle of the program, they strongly influence the daily activities
of the DASC. Each of these processes uses the prerequisites developed
throughout the paper, and may also involve definite strategy for that
particular process. The explanations of these processes in Chapters II
and III are not intended to be detailed descriptions of the processes.
Rather, they are meant to acquaint the reader with the importance and
interrelationship of these processes with the functions of the DASC. The
paper is scoped primarily as an operational guide for the new DASC. It
may also be applicable to other DCSRDA action officers who have responsi-
bilities similar to those of a DASC, but are not so designated.

Limitations of the Paper.

This paper is based on personal experience and on interviews with
Project Managers (PMs), DASCs and senior, experienced personnel in the
Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), Headquarters, Depart-
ment of the Army (HQDA), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
who have formerly been DASCs or worked on a daily basis with DASCs. There
was relatively little difference in perception of the role of an effective
DASC among those interviewed in spite of the wide range of backgrounds and

positions within the management chain. Although the experience and talent of those interviewed was extensive, the paper obviously cannot include each individual action or decision with which a DASC may be faced. Rather it attempts to identify areas and action patterns that are of importance or concern to most programs, and then suggest procedures which the DASC can use in these areas.

The dynamic nature of the research, development and acquisition business causes schedules to change, but the basic strategy and major events remain relatively stable. It is suggested that the strategy and major events, as outlined in this paper, are applicable for use by a new DASC, but that the timing of some of the events discussed may need to be adjusted to fit current schedules. This paper also excludes any listing of definitions or abbreviations, except as defined and used within the body. The DASC should have several other documents readily available which include these (AR 70-1, DA PAM 11-25, etc.), so that inclusion in this document would represent unnecessary duplication.

Organization of the Paper.

In addition to the Introduction and Summary, this paper is divided into three broad categories. The first category discusses the environment in which a DASC must function. This discussion includes Chapter II, Program Funding and Chapter III, Decision Making. The second category discusses the knowledge and tools an effective DASC must possess. This includes Chapter IV, Program Expertise and Chapter V, Credibility. The final major category is a discussion of how a DASC uses his environment, expertise and credibility to execute his responsibilities to HQDA and the PM. This is covered in Chapter VI, Responsibilities of the DASC.

CHAPTER II

PROGRAM FUNDING

Webster defines bureaucracy as "an administrative policy-making group; . . . government characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of authority."[2] Although popular belief seems to be that bureaucracy is synonymous with a process that is inefficient, ineffective, costly and time consuming, the Webster definition is applicable to the Department of Defense (DoD) arena in which the DASC must perform. It is necessary to accomplishment of the DoD mission. This bureaucracy specifically includes, but is not limited to, OSD, DA, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), DARCOM, Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) and other Services.

This paper will consider the functions of the bureaucracy with which the DASC must become thoroughly knowledgable if he is to operate effectively. These functions include location in the bureaucracy, program funding and decision making. Program funding encompasses the planning, programing, and budgeting system (PPBS) process, the Congressional process, and current year activities. Decision making encompasses daily activities and the ASARC/DSARC process. Although this paper treats each function separately, it should be recognized that all functions can be occurring simultaneously. For instance, a DASC may be submitting reclamas to an Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering (USDRE) fiscal year (FY) 1980 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) issue (programing), preparing final input for the FY 1980 Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) (budgeting), briefing Congressional staffers on some aspect of his program in support of the budget request for FY 1979 (enactment), monitoring

FY 1978 program expenditures (execution), preparing for an Army System
Acquisition Review Council/Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(ASARC/DSARC) review to be held within the next few months, and inter-
facing with the various elements of the decision making process on program
management issues or test results of his program, all within a one week
period. Each of these activities may legitimately be using a different
set of funding figures. Obviously, perspective, orientation and a
thorough knowledge of this maze is essential to the DASC. Figure 2-1
shows the Fiscal Cycle Overlap.

FISCAL CYCLE OVERLAP 4/

	1977												1978												1979											
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
FY77	Execution																																			
FY78	Enactment												Execution																							
FY79	Programming			Budget'g			Enactment						Execution																							
FY80			Planning							Programming			Budget'g			Enactment							Exec													
FY81								Planning						Programming			Budget'g																			
FY82																		Planning																		

Figure 2-1

Role of DCSRDA.

The first element of the bureaucracy with which the DASC must be
thoroughly familiar is DCSRDA, his home. Reduced to basics, the DCSRDA
mission involves: (1) acquisition of resources (money and material) to
enable the Army to perform its mission; (2) programing for those resources

using the POM and budget submissions; (3) defending the requested programs to OSD and Congress; and (4) ensuring the approved programs are effectively and efficiently managed and executed.3/ The DASC is deeply involved in all these functions.

Within the DCSRDA organization one also finds the checks and balances provided by those filling the roles of the integrator/arbitrator (Materiel Plans and Programs - PP), the advocate (Hardware Directorates), and the non-advocate (Systems Review and Analysis Office - SRAO). Here the DASC is cast into the role of program advocate by virtue of his location and job.

Further analysis of the DCSRDA mission reveals strong interrelation with other DA staff sections. Of particular importance in the development and procurement business is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). DCSOPS has the responsibility of justifying the need and priority for a system or program before DCSRDA initiates development. Both DCSRDA and DCSOPS are vitally concerned that Army needs be satisfied as expeditiously as possible. However, DCSRDA has resource constraints with which to develop and procure the weapons systems needed by the Army. Therefore, all desired programs are not affordable because of funding restrictions. This causes special emphasis to be placed on the management of programs to ensure that available resources are wisely used. It also forces a prioritization of requirements to ensure that those programs most important to the Army are funded. The DASC is the individual who is largely responsible for documenting the justification of his program if it is to be funded during budget formulation. The competition for funds is always extremely intense. Therefore, the DASC is constantly faced with a dichotomy. He must be the foremost advocate for his assigned program and

acquire adequate funding for it, while, at the same time he should support most strongly only those programs which are in the highest interest of the Army. These goals may not always be compatible, particularly with the stakes and competing pressures involved. In order to make appropriate recommendations in these situations, the DASC must have complete integrity, courage of his convictions, and a clear understanding of Army requirements. These factors help to make the DASC job one of the most challenging assignments an Army officer can have at the major or lieutenant colonel level.

Another factor to be considered is the relative informality of DCSRDA in comparison to other DA staff sections. It is not uncommon for the Director or the DCSRDA to call a DASC directly with a question on his program. This virtually eliminates delays for guidance and can have the effect of significantly reducing other staffing delays. It also results in minimal distortion in guidance. However, it does place a greater burden on the DASC to be constantly up to date on his program, be aware of potential issues or problems on the horizon and ensure his responses are prompt, accurate and reflect coordinated positions. This informality, in effect, gives the DASC a significant amount of authority not afforded other HQDA staff officers. It is imperative that the DASC use this authority judiciously, and not abuse it.

Planning, Programing and Budgeting System Process.

"Every defense program, no matter how large or small, must be able to generate, at all times, a "yes" answer to three questions:

     Is it needed or wanted by the defense forces?

     Is it technically feasible?

     Is funding available to develop and deploy it?

To answer these three questions, all programs are constantly involved in two parallel decision cycles. One they pass through each year of their lives - the FISCAL CYCLE. The other they pass through just once - the LIFE CYCLE.

While these cycles do run in parallel they do interact and can affect one another if either cycle comes up with a "no" answer to one of the three questions.

For instance, a program may have documentation to show that it is needed - a LIFE CYCLE decision. The R&D community states that it is technically feasible - another LIFE CYCLE decision. The DoD and the developing Service plan funding for it - a FISCAL CYCLE decision. But, should the Congress decide not to appropriate funds for it - a FISCAL CYCLE decision - then the program is "dead".$\frac{5}{}$

The FISCAL CYCLE includes the planning, programing, budgeting, enactment and execution phases which will be discussed briefly, as they pertain to the DASC, in this chapter. Although these phases occur sequentially, the process has three cycles occurring simultaneously each year in which the DASC must participate. See Figure 2-2.

1. Planning Phase: The Planning Phase begins in May each year with the issuance, by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), of Volume I of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). Although DCSOPS has DA staffing responsibility for the JSOP, portions of this may be seen briefly by the DASC for comments. In the past the limited time for review often negated meaningful input by most DASCs but this may change. The JSOP is to provide the advice of the JCS to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on the military strategy and force structure required to attain the national

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FISCAL CYCLE FLOW[6]/

Figure 2-2

security objectives of the US, and to provide planning guidance to the Chiefs of the Services and the Commanders of the unified and specified commands. The planning starts with the assessment of the threat to the security of the US and culminates with the projection of force objectives to assure the security of the US.[7] The planning phase which began in May 1977 will lead to the FY 1980 budget submit. Except for the brief review of excerpts of the JSOP, the DASC hasn't normally gotten involved in the planning until December when he began providing initial rationale to support proposed requests for the next POM. However, in a memorandum dated 26 October 1977, subject: "Improvements in the PPB System," the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) indicated that the Services will become involved in developing Consolidated Guidance (CG) as early as November to support formulation of the next POM. This is an effort to make the fiscal constraints less arbitrary and more meaningful. Following discussions with the Services in November, OSD will draft CG. This will be reviewed by the Services, discussed with the SECDEF, revised and then submitted to the President as Tentative CG. After review by the President, the Tentative CG will be revised by OSD and sent to the Services in mid-March as CG.[8]

This may mean that the DASC will provide impact statements for selected program funding levels as early as November or December to support formulation of CG. These funding levels will be preliminary Army objectives. Submissions for these impact statements should be received from and discussed with the PM during November. Supporting rationale should be strong, and must be refined and strengthened as the planning phase draws to a close. A word of advice to all DASC's is 'Never treat any budget exercise lightly. Funds once cut are extremely difficult to

recover.'

2. Programing Phase: The Programing Phase officially begins with the
SECDEF issuance of the CG, which is currently planned for mid-March.
However, as indicated above, the DASC has already been preparing for this
phase for a month or more. By the time the CG is issued, the DASC should
have refined the proposed program funding requests, been busy preparing
his case to support the request, worked with the Force Integration Systems
Officer (FISO) in DCSOPS to solidify or elevate the system priority, and
wargamed strategy with the PM to combat funding trade offs. This is done
in preparation for the Pre-Research Development Acquisition Committee
(RDAC) review to be held in early April.

In early March each division in DCSRDA will finalize their proposed POM
input. The division input is then reviewed and revised at directorate
level. These reviews include all Program Elements (PE). The DASC will be
required to defend his request to the Director or Deputy Director during
this review. The directorate review results in the official proposed fund-
ing request for each program to be presented to the Pre-RDAC.

The Pre-RDAC consists of representatives from DCSRDA PP, SRAO, the
Hardware Directorates, the Director of Army Research, DCSOPS, OTEA, TRADOC,
and DARCOM. Other DA Staff sections, such as DCSLOG or COA will have
observers when appropriate. The Pre-RDAC addresses issues raised by
programs not funded by the Hardware Directorates in preparing the POM.
Some programs will receive additional funds, some will remain the same,
and some will lose funds. The DASC is required to defend his program
before the Pre-RDAC if it is a Pre-RDAC issue or is suggested as a source
of funds for trade off during Pre-RDAC deliberations. This is normally
the last chance to get funding prior to submission of the POM. The

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period from late February until late April) is an extremely critical time for the DASC and the program. It is often advisable that the DASC forego any trips during this period in order to be better able to defend his program funding request. Damage done in this time frame is extremely hard to recoup.

Recommendations on POM formulation of the Pre-RDAC are reviewed by the RDAC and in turn by the Program Guidance and Review Committee (PGRC). The Army review process of the POM is completed with a review by the Select Committee (SELCOM) which is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA)$\underline{9/}$ Normally the DASC input to the POM submission is completed with the Pre-RDAC, although questions may be asked throughout the review process. The Army review and approval of the POM is usually completed in early May with the POM submitted to OSD for review and approval in mid May.

The POM is given an indepth review by OSD. The DASC will usually be most concerned with the results of the USDRE portion of this review, because quite frequently issues will result to which he must respond. Issues are disagreements between OSD and DA concerning some aspect of a program. USDRE will normally recommend to SECDEF a reduction or deferral of funding in a particular program or programs to achieve their objective. A funding deferral may be for funds in a year other than the program year of the POM. These issues may deal with such things as test plans, schedule, technology approach, documentation, funding level or management policies, to name a few.

The effective DASC should have a copy of the draft issue paper from his USDRE counterpart within a day after it is proposed, which is perhaps a week or two before it is officially received by the Army. The DASC

immediately, in conjunction with the PM, determines program impact of the deferral or reduction. The DASC also immediately informs his boss of the proposed issue. If appropriate, an attempt should be made at the action level to get the proposed issue deleted or favorably modified prior to official receipt by the Army. USDRE schedules a review of all issues in either late May or June. The DASC will normally accompany the Director or Deputy Director to this review and attempt to reclama the issue. Obviously, the justification must be accurate and very strong.

If the reclama fails, which often happens, especially when the DASC hasn't prepared a strong position, the program will have to be adjusted to comply with USDRE desires. The DASC should recognize that this issue can be a two edged sword. He should negotiate with USDRE to get the most favorable compromise for his program, then use the issue to ensure that the direction is complied with. For instance, USDRE may defer a significant amount of the next year's funds pending receipt of documentation such as a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP). The DASC and PM must determine program spend rates, schedule, objectives and time required to complete the DCP. The PM will specify to the DASC the cost for different periods of time. The PM and DASC should select a preferred alternative, such as submittal of the DCP in six months. The DASC must then sell that alternative and a minimum funding impact on the program to USDRE so the program doesn't stop. The DASC may then use the issue as a lever to ensure receipt of the DCP to HQDA for submission to USDRE by the suspense date. With the DCP must also come a requirement document from the user. Therefore, if the program is of sufficient priority, adequate pressure can be applied to speed up the bureaucratic process and perhaps field a needed system quicker than would otherwise happen. The moral here is that

receipt of an issue on a program need not be a disaster or even a hinderance to the program if the PM and DASC are flexible, think positively and use initiative.

Following the issue paper reclama process, the SECDEF will make decisions on each of these POM issues via the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is supported by a resources annex that provides a translation of resources to Program Elements (PE) in the FYDP. It is transmitted to the Army in July. The Army has two weeks to submit comments to SECDEF on the PDM. Following comments and reclamas by the Army, the original PDM is amended as necessary to incorporate new decisions. These are then sent, with a Status Report, to the President for review. After Presidential review and President/SECDEF meeting, the amended PDM is revised and sent to Services in late August. Figure 2-3 illustrates the PPBS process.

3. Budgeting Phase: Technically the Budgeting Phase follows the Programing Phase which ends with publishing of the PDM. In actuality, DASC preparation for the Budgeting Phase occurs during the same time reclamas of POM issues are underway. Consequently, the DASC may be in a position where he must anticipate worse case results from th reclama of his program issue while simultaneously selling an optimistic end result for the program in the budget year - a very difficult but achieveable task. The Division trade offs for the FYDP submission begin in June. Defense of the program request is then done at directorate level in July just as it was in March, with the summer RDAC meeting in late July to finalize the Army budget submission.

The procedures used in this process are the same those used in preparation of the POM during the spring. However, there are two things of which the DASC should be aware. First, the FYDP is an outgrowth of

PLANNING | PROGRAMMING | BUDGETING

Figure 2-3

JSOP = Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

R&C = Review & Comment

*This is currently under revision. The Defense Guidance and Planning and Programing Guidance will be combined into Consolidated Guidance. Dates will be adjusted slightly.

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the POM which was prepared in the spring, so a level and perhaps a direction, i.e. funding increase or decrease, has been established. Secondly, program factors and priorities can and often do change between March and July. Such things as favorable test results, technical difficulties or ASARC decisions may have significant impacts. The lesson here for the DASC is that the boss must continually be informed on the status of the program, work must constantly be underway to maintain or improve the priority of the program, and funding requirements and requests must always be current. If the funding requirements are valid but were not satisfied in the POM, or have changed based on additional guidance, appropriate requests with adequate rationale should be made in the July budget review. Although this is primarily a fine tuning of the budget based on the POM submission, changes can and will be made if justification is adequate. An effective DASC should never allow an opportunity to strengthen his program funding escape unused.

Following the same reviews as in the spring, the Army budget is finalized in August, printed and submitted to OSD for review and approval in late September.

The budget submittal is reviewed extensively by OSD upon receipt. During this review, the DASC will be scheduled to present a 15-30 minute briefing on his program to representatives of OSD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB representatives are making their review at this time in anticipation of receipt of the DoD budget in December. They will make final recommendation to the President in January, usually based on this review. For RDTE requests, OSD usually has representatives from both USDRE and the OSD Comptroller. For procurement requests, it is often just the Comptroller representatives.

These briefings will usually include a discussion of key system capabilities, program changes from the previous year and funds requested. If a DASC has a program in which funding requests are being made for both RDTE and Procurement, he will present two briefings to OSD/OMB representatives, one to support the RDTE request and one to support the procurement request. These briefings, which are normally scheduled from mid-October to mid-November, are extremely important to the program. A poor presentation or failure to satisfactorily answer questions here can result in a reduction or elimination of funding in the program budget request. Historically, about 10-15% of the Army budget request is taken away at this point. The DASC must anticipate issues and be prepared to address them in detail, as well as answer any other question which may be asked. Issues, called Program Budget Decisions (PBD), at this juncture may have a very short suspense when they arrive at DA, so reclamas must be prepared in advance and a united front, by DCSRDA, DCSOPS and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASA(RDA)) must be presented to get the funds restored. If this fails, the PBD's are inserted into the Army FYDP as a change. This is the last DoD review of the budget before it goes to OMB for final review and incorporation into the President's budget.

One other very important DASC action which occurs in this Budget Phase is preparation of the Descriptive Summaries. This is one of the most important documents the DASC will prepare all year. There are several specific formats, depending upon the type of program or project element involved. However, they all include a program background, program activities for prior years, the current year (in November 1977 the current year is FY78), the budget year, and to completion, program funding and

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test results. When these descriptive summaries are finalized, they are consolidated in one book, and submitted to Congress in support of the Army budget request. Preparation of these begins in October and must be finished by early December. The PM should definitely have input into these, but the DASC is responsible for final refinement and submission. This document will form the basis for the Army support of the program to Congress during the enactment phase, and will be used by staffers, not only in the current budget request, but will be compared against descriptive summaries from previous years to determine how consistent the Army story is or has been on any given program. The DASC must have a valid explanation for any change to the previous year's plan, any change in size of funding request and for future program plans. The descriptive summaries will also form the basis for the preparation of various fact sheets which will be provided to the Assistant DCSRDA (ADCSRDA), DCSRDA and ASA(RDA) to assist in their preparation for testifying before Congress on the Army budget request. Congressional fact sheets should also be derivatives of, and consistent with, the descriptive summary. Poor preparation of this document will usually result in an increased work load later on, and probably will significantly increase the vulnerability of the program to funding reductions during Congressional Review.

In those very rare instances where there is a valid need and desire to expedite a critical program by increasing funding in the budget year, after the budget leaves DA but before it leaves OSD, such an increase can be made as late as early December. However, the funds will have to come from other Army programs already approved by OSD, the justification will have to be extremely strong, the priority will be extremely high and USDRE will have to agree to the transfer of funds between programs already

included in the Army budget submission. This happens very, very
infrequently and is not a recommended course of action.

Completion of the OSD review is the end of the PPBS cycle. The DoD
budget, which includes the Army request is then sent to OMB for review and
then to the President for final review and approval. The DoD budget is
incorporated into the National Budget, which is then formally presented
to Congress in January accompanied by the President's Annual Budget
message.

Congressional Process - Enactment.

"Congressional review of the Defense portion of the President's budget
is undertaken from the separate standpoints of AUTHORIZATION of programs
and APPROPRIATION of funds. Annual authorizing legislation is required
for appropriations for: major procurement items (aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, other weapons); research,
development, test, and evaluation; authorized active duty military
personnel and strengths; setting the authorized personnel strength of the
selected Reserve components; and for the authorization of the military
construction program. Authorizing legislation is prepared by the House
Armed Service Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC). The Appropriation legislation is prepared by the Defense Sub-
Committees of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC)."[11]/

In addition to these committees which are responsible for authorizing
and appropriating the funds to support the DoD budget request; there is a
House Budget Committee and a Senate Budget Committee. They, in effect set
ceilings, in the form of concurrent resolutions, which state the maximum
amount that can be authorized and appropriated by Congress. Just as in

OSD, Congress historically authorizes and appropriates less than the Army requests.

"The Budget Committees relate all Federal appropriations bills to each other and to the overall budget targets. The DoD budget, in essence, competes with other Federal agencies' requests for constrained funds and the strongest justification determine the distribution. The DoD request is more susceptable to across-the-board reductions if total budget ceilings are exceeded. The decisions can be influenced by Budget Committees whose memberships are not necessarily defense oriented. To preclude unwanted cutbacks in high priority DoD programs, the DoD must ensure that justifications are strong enough to compete for funds with other requests and withstand hard challenges from the Budget Committees.

Each budget request contains, in addition to the budget year, estimates of costs for each of the next four successive fiscal years. The Congressional Budget Office is tasked to perform a five-year cost analysis on every such bill or resolution reported out by any committee except the Appropriations Committees. The GAO has been authorized to establish an Office of Program Review and Evaluation to assist the Congress with these analyses. The compatibility of the budget, the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) thus takes on greater importance as a result."[12]/

The DASC should recognize by now that securing approval of funds for his program is similar in many respects to the Super Bowl selection process. One keeps playing as long as one keeps winning. A loss at any stage of the process and the season is over.

1. Authorization Phase: After submittal to Congress by the President in mid-January, Congressional staffs review the overall National Budget

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and back-up material briefly, with detailed Congressional review commencing early in February as the HASC begins formal hearings. The SECDEF, the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs present their posture statements and testify on the overall DoD budget. In subsequent hearings, staff representatives of the DoD Components are then questioned on details of the programs and estimates of requirements as supported in the budget.

Prior to these hearings, at which the ASA(RDA), the DCSRDA and the ADCSRDA will testify as Army representatives, the DASC will be required to prepare an updated fact sheet for the ASA(RDA), the DCSRDA, and the ADCSRDA on each of his programs (usually in mid-December or early January). Although the specified format of these are different, the content is essentially the same and must be consistent with data in the descriptive summary. The Director of the Directorate to which the DASC is assigned will have a copy of the DCSRDA fact sheet (called grab and run sheets). The DASC will also be required to prepare possible questions concerning his program about which the ASA(RDA), DCSRDA, or ADCSRDA may be asked during testimony. These questions are also prepared about mid-December or early January. Answers will be requested with the questions or shortly thereafter. These questions will deal with any area which has been questioned previously, is controversial, or in which problems have or may occur. It is imperative that these questions and answers be prepared in conjunction with the PM. The DASC should not attempt to conceal or gloss over problem areas at this time, because to be caught short in an area where the Congressional questioner or staffer has valid, derogatory information that is unknown to the ASA(RDA), DCSRDA, ADCSRDA or the DASC can seriously erode the credibility of the witness and the program.

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Consequently, the capability to defend the funding request is significantly reduced. The key here is to have solutions or feasible courses to solutions for all questions and potential problems prior to the hearings.

There are often questions which the ADCSRDA, DCSRDA or ASA(RDA) can't answer, or requests for inserts to the Congressional Record to clarify points discussed during testimony. These are transmitted to the DASC for response following each appearance by an Army witness. They will be received through the Congressional Liaison channels and will require a response in 48 to 72 hours. The response must be factual, consistent with the descriptive summary, truthful, discussed with the PM, well written in the proper format, coordinated, and approved at directorate level all within the required time span. A thorough knowledge of the intricacies and status of the program is essential if the DASC is to be effective here. Failure to be effective bodes ill for the program.

"When the HASC completes its hearings, it publishes a report containing committee recommendations. The report is reviewed by the full House, debated, amended and a House Authorization Bill passed.

The SASC also holds a series of hearings, some in parallel with the HASC. The hearing preparations and procedures are the same for the DASC here as described above for the House hearings. After review by the full Senate, debate, amendments passed, the Senate passes its version of the Defense Authorization Bill"13/

If the funding of the DASC's program is reduced or eliminated by either the HASC or SASC, and this often happens to even well supported programs, a reclama must immediately be made to the other committee in an attempt to get the funds restored. The nature of the reclama will vary, depending upon the severity of the reduction and the priority of the

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program. It may range from a simple fact sheet, a briefing to the

staffers by the DASC or PM, a visit to Congress by the Director, ADCSRDA,

DCSRDA or ASA(RDA), to a letter from or appearance before Congress by the

USDRE or SECDEF, or any combination of the above. This is just another

reason the DASC must ensure that the priority of his program is as high

as possible, because the higher the priority, the stronger the support at

the highest levels.

If there are any differences between the House and Senate verions of

the Authorization Bill, they are resolved by a Joint Conference Committee

consisting of a small number of members from each house. Reclamas must be

submitted and support from one of the committees verified prior to the

meeting of the Joint Conference Committee, or the funds will be lost.

After resolving the differences the Conference Committee prepares and

issues its report.

"The Conference Report is first brought before the full House where it

may be debated, amended and a final Authorization Bill passed. It should

be noted that any amendments to the Bill at this time could result in the

necessity i_m another Conference Committee being established.

The Senate next takes up the Conference Report and the House Bill as

passed. After debate, amendments the Senate passes the Defense Authoriza-

tion Bill.

The bill as passed by both houses of Congress is then forwarded to the

President for signature to complete the AUTHORIZATION PHASE.

2. Appropriation Phase: the APPROPRIATION PHASE is very much similar

to the AUTHORIZATION PHASE in that the bill must be considered by committees

of each house, in this case by the Appropriations Committees, pass both

houses, be compromised in conference and finally passed and signed by the

President. For the FY79 FISCAL CYCLE, this phase will begin in February 1978 and run through to September 1978.

For the House, the first review is conducted by the House Appropriation Committee (HAC) which reviews the submitted DoD Budget and also the Authorization Bill passed. It should be noted that any item deleted during the AUTHORIZATION PHASE cannot be considered during the APPROPRIATION PHASE. After the review, the HAC prepares and issues its report which contains its recommendations."14/

The preparation for the hearings, the conduct of the hearings and response to questions following hearings entails the same activities for the DASC in the Appropriations Phase as discussed under the Authorization Phase. This is just another chance for the DASC to excel.

In addition to the preparations and activities discussed earlier, the DASC must be prepared to brief any of the Congressional Staffers on very short notice. This may be before or after the hearings. There may also be times when the DASC will actually participate as a witness in the hearings. In either case, whether briefing a Congressional Staffer, testifying or acting as a backup to someone else who is testifying, the DASC must have a thorough knowledge of his program.

"The report is reviewed and considered by the full House and after debate and possible amending, a House Appropriations Bill is passed. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) also holds hearings, some of which are in parallel with the HAC. The SAC then prepares its report which contains its recommendations. After review by the full Senate, debate, amendments from the floor, the Senate passes its version of the Appropriations Bill.

If there are any differences, and there usually are, between the

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House and Senate versions of the Appropriations Bill, they are resolved by a Joint Conference Committee consisting of a small number of members from each house. After resolving the differences the Conference Committee prepares and issues its report.

The Conference Report is first brought before the full House where it may be debated, amended and a final Appropriations Bill passed. It should be noted that any amendments to the Bill at this time could result in the necessity for another Conference Committee being established.

The Senate next takes up the Conference Report and the House Bill as passed. After debate, amendments the Senate passes the Defense Appropriations Bill.

The Bill as passed by both houses of Congress is then forwarded to the President for signature to complete the APPROPRIATION PHASE and ENACTMENT."[15]/

Current Year Activities.

1. "Apportionment Process: Once the Appropriations Bill is passed, it is binding as to how much the DoD can obligate thereu   nd, within its broad purposes, what can be bought.

The APPORTIONMENT process, exercised through the OMB, normally takes place in late September, early October, as the Appropriations Bill is finalized and passed. Apportionment reflects Presidential control and can restrict the rate or purpose of obligations as provided by law. It is designed to prevent overobligations. Funds are made available on a quarterly, annual, or other periodic basis. Apportionments are made on the basis of hearings conducted by OMB/OSD and DoD Components wherein apportionment requests are considered.

The Apportionment process also serves the important function of updating the budget which was submitted to OSD more than a year previously.

In the absense of an enacted appropriation, the SECDEF establishes
authorized obligation rates for each appropriation. After the appropria-
tion is enacted and the apportionment is released by the OMB, the
apportionment becomes the SECDEF's authorized obligation rate.

Following the establishment of the rate of obligation by the SECDEF,
the DoD Components allocate funds to responsible officials in their
organizations. These allocations are usually divided into suballocations,
allotments and sub-allotments or are included in operating budgets to make
funds available for commitments, obligation and expenditure. A commitment
is a reservation of funds based upon currently directed use of funds
leading to obligations. An obligation is a liability, e.g., a firm con-
tract for goods or services. An expenditure is payment of the obligation.
Allocations, commitments, obligations and expenditures are carefully
controlled to avoid overspending."[16/] The main concern of the DASC in
this phase is to make sure funds are allocated to his program in a timely
manner.

"NOTE: In instances where Appropriation Bills are delayed in the
Enactment Phase past the start of the Fiscal Year, the Congress can pass a
joint resolution to provide authority to continue operations pending
passage of the Appropriations Bill. This so-called "Continuing Resolution"
authorizes rates of expenditure not to exceed the lesser rate of (1) that
achieved in the preceding fiscal year or (2) that reflected in any prior
action of either body of the Congress. Obligations must also be in con-
sonance with approved programs and the rate of obligation established by
the SECDEF as well as any deferrals made in programs."[17/]

2. Execution Phase. The final phase of the FISCAL CYCLE is the execution
phase, or the phase where the funds are actually obligated. This phase

is in a third FISCAL CYCLE that is occurring concurrently with the
Programing Phase or Budgeting Phase of one FISCAL CYCLE and the Enactment
Phase of a second FISCAL CYCLE, with the DASC being deeply involved in all
three. Remember that the Planning Phase of a fourth FISCAL CYCLE is also
underway at the same time, but that the DASC is usually not involved in
this phase to any great extent. The execution phase is concerned with the
current FY which starts on 1 October each year and ends on the following
30 September. In November 1977, the current year would be FY 1978.

The only constant in the research and development business is change.
In order to be better able to react to this change the funding system has
some built in flexibility that allows the Army to adapt to changing
requirements, to take advantage of unexpected success or to address
unexpected problems on an expeditious basis. In almost all cases that any
of these three factors occur, more money is needed in some program. It is
up to the DASC to attempt to acquire the needed additional funds for his
program. In order to accomplish this he must know the rules, adhere to
them, and be prepared to act when the funds become available.

3. Reprograming: This is "making changes in the application of funds for
purposes other than those originally contemplated and budgeted for,
testified to, and described in justifications submitted to Congressional
committees in support of fund authorizations and budget requests."[18]/

DoD Instructions provide for three approved reprograming classes as
listed below:

"(1) Prior Congressional approval is required to reprogram any funds
to an item reduced by Congress or known to be of special interest to one
of the committees.

(2) Prior notification to Congress is required for other reprograming

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above specified thresholds for a budget activity or a program element.

(3) Below threshold actions are within the authority of OSD and are reported on a semi-annual or quarterly basis to Congress."[19]

The DA reprograming policies listed in AR 70-6 are in accordance with the above listed guidelines. At HQDA level, the Army is constrained by the same limits imposed on OSD. These limits allow the Army to ". . . make cumulative changes of less than $2,000,000 in the current-base-program amount of a program element.

(a) Cumulative reductions in excess of $2,000,000 may be made in a program element in prior year RDTE programs when funds are required to finance increased costs in other areas for the same program year.

(b) No exception to the $2,000,000 limitation can be made for increases."[20]

a. Above Threshold Funding: Above Threshold Funding involves a formal request to Congress for the additional funds. Any such request must be submitted through and approved by OSD. Funding requests going this route are often not approved in a timely fashion because of the slow approval process by Congress. They should be undertaken only as a last resort when several million dollars are involved on an extremely high priority program. The DASC will need to ensure that strong support has been generated throughout HQDA and OSD prior to initiating an Above Threshold Reprograming Request, or there is high likelihood of failure even after expenditure of a maximum effort.

b. Below Threshold Funding: These are the reprograming efforts in which the DASC will be engaged frequently, either in trying to increase his program's funding or prevent a decrease in funding to support requests for funding increases in other programs. Figure 2-4 summarizes RDTE

ABBREVIATED SUMMARY OF RDT&E REPROGRAMMING LIMITATIONS 21/

Program Status or Requirement Description	Action Required or Approval Level
1. Program (or item) denied by Congress.	Request for reprogramming is not permitted by law.
2. Program funding reduced by Congress, or known to be of special interest to a Committee, regardless of dollar amount.	Prior Congressional approval required. OSD must approve request to Congressional Committees.
3. Requirement is for $2 million or more. 4. Cumulative reprogrammings within the same fiscal year are $2 million or more. 5. New starts exceeding $10 million or more in first three years, regardless of first year amount. 6. New starts with significant follow-on costs.	Prior notification to Congressional Committees. OSD must approve the notification before forwarding to the Committees. If no response in 15 days, OASD (Program/Budget) will advise extent of reprogramming that can be initiated.

Figure 2-4

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7.	Reprogramming involves deferred funds or DDR&E Special Interest programs (any amount).	OSD (DDR&E) must approve use of deferred or Special Interest funds.
8.	Requirement for less than $2 million.	Service can approve and accomplish reprogramming action.
9.	Requirements under $500 thousand (AFSC) or $200 thousand (DARCOM) for minor cost increases not related to change of scope of planned effort.	MAJCOM can approve and initiate reprogramming action.

reprograming limitations.

In trying to increase funding for a program the DASC should remember that near the end of the old FY or the start of the new FY funds will usually become available for reprograming due to failure to obligate all funds in various programs. These funds can be reprogramed into the old FY program elements. Since this occurs almost every year, the DASC should be ready to make his case if additional funds are needed.

There is often a Formal Decrement List created early in the current year. This is a designation of potential sources of funds from approved programs to be transferred to high priority programs should the need arise. The programs listed on the Decrement List are usually the lower priority programs. Funding can be obtained from the Decrement Listing if required by an ASARC decision, if the DASC can make the case to solve a critical problem on his program, or to expedite a given phase. Funds may become available at other times during the year also, such as funds to fulfill inflation requirements, etc. Again, the program priority, the ability of the DASC to eliminate funding needs, and being prepared when the funds become available are the keys to getting funds reprogramed. A PM may be outstanding, but without proper funding his program will falter and eventually fail. Therefore, a DASC with knowledge of when funds will become available and an ability to get his fair share of those funds is an invaluable, essential, part of the management team.

It is just as important for the DASC to anticipate when additional funds are going to be required for other programs, and be prepared and capable of defending his program against funding reductions. To assist in making his case, the DASC should have a copy of the current PM spread sheets with items prioritized. Keep the program off the decrement list,

or it is, by definition, extremely vulnerable to reduction. Shortage of funds in a program means elimination of some of the tasks originally deemed essential to successful development. Extensive reductions will adversely affect essential tasks, thereby increasing the program risk and making the program vulnerable to termination. Any budget or decrement exercise must be approached as a matter of utmost importance and seriousness if the program is important. If it isn't important, it should be terminated. Failure in these exercises may well accomplish that end whether desired or not.

One further thing which the DASC must remember in this area is that any program which is reduced by Congress has, in effect, been capped and is not eligible for any reprograming actions during the year in which the Congressional action applies. The only exceptions to this are when the language in the authorization and appropriation legislation specifically states that the reduction was made "without prejudice" or that DoD does have authority to internally reprogram into the specific program element if so desired. Obtaining favorable language on potential Congressional reductions should always be a final fall-back compromise position by the DASC in his reclama to Congress should all hope of getting funds reinstated fail. Otherwise, his options in supporting the program fundwise are almost non-existent during the year of the ceiling.

Even though the PPBS seems to be quite complicated, it is imperative that the DASC learn this system thoroughly. Through it flows the life blood of every program. Complete familiarity with PPBS can be a major asset to the DASC in supporting the fund needs of his program.

CHAPTER III

DECISION MAKING

Decision making is extremely complex at the HQDA/OSD level. It is, by design, almost impossible to identify a single individual who makes any given decision. Rule is normally by consensus. It seems as if every effort is made to avoid confrontation and to accept compromises, many of which may be undesirable or even unworkable. Hard decisions are often avoided by delay or compromise. It is therefore imperative that a DASC learn to be flexible in his actions without compromising important principles. "Important principles may and must be inflexible."[22] He must be able to identify and achieve basic objectives, regardless of required deviations or excursions. Expertise, planning, negotiation, tenacity, and leverage are the key ingredients to success in this area.

Since decisions at the HQDA level are seldom, if ever made unilaterally or in a vacuum, in depth analysis and thorough staff coordination are mandatory. Conversely, the generation of an idea or paper which ultimately leads to a decision is normally best accomplished by one or two individuals. The product of this individual effort, which may be called a "strawman", will probably be refined and/or modified in the coordination process. But the DASC must ensure that the basic meaning, intent, or idea is not changed. Herein lies the challenge. Additional guidance on the principles and policies of staff action is presented in DA Memorandum 340-15, "Office Management - Staff Action Process."[23]

Characteristics of the Decision Making Bureaucracy.

Although certainly not an official HQDA position, there are certain characteristics which the author considers to be typical of the HQDA/OSD

decision-making bureaucracy. A listing of such characteristics would include:

1. Those with decision-making authority are relatively few.

2. Those who have (non-decision-making) authority but little or no accountability are many.

3. Those who have opinions on actions leading to decisions are legion.

4. Participants change with actions, depending upon staff interest.

5. Relative impact of the various participants varies with the action.

6. On most actions, coordination is normally effected with a small, common nucleus of participants.

7. The decision makers require as many facts as possible before they can or will make a decision.

8. Facts must be objective, concise and clearly presented with all sides of an issue addressed.

9. Conclusions and recommendations must be supported by the facts of the case.

10. A non-concurrence doesn't necessarily mean disapproval.

11. Staffing strategy of a controversial paper is extremely important.

12. The relative informality of DCSRDA provides a quick reaction access to the decision makers when necessary.

Some DASCs view several of the characteristics listed above as hinderances to the accomplishment of their mission. This certainly can be true. However, they might better be viewed as challenges which can provide a source of help and direction to the DASC. They will force the DASC to look at all aspects of a problem, allow him to use the combined expertise and experience of all those with whom the action must be coordinated, help him to formalize and perfect his defense of the action, and provide

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assurance that the stated position or recommendation is defensible and supported before it goes to the decision maker.

Another important aspect of the coordination process is that individuals may not necessarily oppose a program just because they question an action or aspect of the program, or because they non-concur in the action. This strategy is often used to force the DASC and PM to take a more indepth, non-emotional look at their program and prepare strong, objective rationale to support the particular point in question. It can also be used as a vehicle or lever to persuade another staff element, outside agency, or subordinate headquarters to readjust their position without appearing to have been wrong. If the DASC and PM will accept questions in this manner, and then get their homework done, it can often preempt much more serious questions by OSD and Congress. For most new DASCs, this is one of the most difficult lessons to learn. They will usually consider those who non-concur or question actions as the enemy, and will either become emotional in their defense or try to by-pass the problem area. Neither of these approaches is acceptable, although they may allow one to "win a battle while losing the war." If a DASC does his job well, he will anticipate areas that can lead to non-concurrences and take appropriate action to resolve them in his favor before they actually materialize. Coordination from all key staff elements is required for most critical actions. Concerns about a program are somewhat similar to sores in that the longer they remain open and unaddressed the more serious they can become. This means that sooner or later the question must either be answered satisfactorily for the doubters, or the program becomes vulnerable.

A third lesson one must learn quickly is to identify and understand the responsibilities of each staff section and to ensure input from the

appropriate section is strongly considered in preparing papers or staff actions (e.g. ODCSLOG input for the logistics annex of the DCP.) Without seeking and including appropriate input in an action, a DASC almost invariably builds a delay into final approval of the action and creates a high probability of trying to sell an untenable position. Most staff elements are very jealous of their areas of responsibility, so a new DASC certainly cannot afford to create problems for himself or his program by inadvertantly or purposefully attempting to usurp responsibilities or authority legally belonging to someone else. The penalty is too high. Regardless of how difficult or painful the experience may be, the DASC must find out who is responsible for a given area, get their thinking and address that input in the action if at all possible. AR 10-5, "Organization and Functions, Department of the Army," is must reading for the new DASC along these lines.

A review of the characteristics of the decision-making bureaucracy listed above is best accomplished by considering them from three different aspects. One aspect concerns the participants involved, another the knowledge required, and the third the mechanics used.

Participants in the Decision Making Bureaucracy.

In preparing an action for approval by one of the decision-makers, the DASC must ensure that his preparation is thorough, objective, and adheres to the decision-maker's guidance. The DASC should exert maximum effort to discover any hidden pitfalls, and to anticipate problems in an effort to prevent the decision-maker from being surprised. The decision-maker is extremely busy, and normally will need to spend minimal time on any one action. Therefore, the action must be presented accurately, clearly, and concisely, with the recommendations being a logical and supportable

derivative of the facts and conclusions. Care must be taken to ensure that approval of the action does not infringe upon the responsibilities of another staff element. During the coordination process the DASC must ensure that coordination is effected with all staff elements that have an interest in the action. Appropriate efforts must be made to resolve issues or non-concurrences before the action goes to the decision-maker for approval.

Most actions require a relatively fast response. If the assigned suspense cannot be met, the DASC should take appropriate steps to have it adjusted to a later date well before the original suspense date, and notify all intermediate points of document control within DCSRDA. This can preclude an unnecessary crisis because someone thinks a suspense has been missed. In conjunction with this, the DASC should understand that although he is responsible for bringing together facts for a decision, all data is not completely correct. Usually, the shorter the suspense, the more probable that incorrect data is likely to be used. This obviously causes the end product to be somewhat less credible. Therefore, the degree of credibility of information supporting an action should be conveyed to the decision-maker prior to the decision.

There are some key participants in the management team with whom the DASC must establish a strong, effective, dependable working relationship. These people will be involved in most actions affecting his program. They include, as a minimum, the PM, the FISO, and the DASC's counterparts in ASA(RDA), USDRE, and HQ DARCOM. This group represents views from the developer, the user, the Army Secretariat and OSD with indepth insight into the technical, operational, management, and political aspects of the program. Each can apply leverage in a different manner and to different

problem areas in the coordination process. A strong, unified position by these participants on a given action can do much to preempt problems during the coordination process. Each member of this group should actively participate during formulation of an action if possible, in order to establish a strong, defensible "strawman" that requires minimum refinement. The relationship within this group must be open, informal and candid; one that is rooted in mutual respect. This group should form the nucleus of the DASC's confidents from whom he receives advice and support. For ease of future reference in this paper, this group will be referred to as the "key group".

Even though the key group may form the common nucleus of participants for most actions, different participants may play key roles for selected actions. This depends upon the nature of the action and the concern of the participant. For example, OTEA may be a key participant on an action involving a test issue, but not be a participant at all on an action involving a management issue of the program, whereas the FISO would probably be a key participant in both instances due to strong program interest by DCSOPS. On the big actions, where many issues are merged, such as coordination of a DCP, many participants become key due to the requirement for total coordination. A non-concurrence here, caused by failure to resolve an issue, could lead to resolution by the VCSA, with a lower probability of the DASC achieving his objective if the issue or non-concurring staff element has been by-passed up to this point in the development process. Beware of short cuts on difficult issues, because they have a habit of coming back to haunt you.

When staffing a paper a DASC should recognize that some of the participant in the process have extensive knowledge in a very limited area.

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They may or may not be knowledgeable of the implications of their concern on the soldier who needs the system or of the funding implications required to support their preferred alternative. Often they do not care. They may lack a sense of urgency or objectiveness, and will quite frequently lean strongly on regulations to support their position. They will be eager to press an issue if they detect weakness in logic or resolve by the DASC, but will probably withdraw quickly if their position appears untenable. All have advice to give and want their time in the sun. The wise DASC will recognize this and be prepared. He should have a thoroughly prepared case, based on logic and rationalism rather than emotionalism. A basic understanding of at least the principles of operations research are invaluable in averting major problems with this type participant. Don't underestimate or take these people too lightly. It could be fatal to the action or program.

Knowledge Required in the Decision Making Bureaucracy.

During the formulation phase of an action, the DASC should discuss the idea(s) with the PM and his counterparts in other staff elements. This allows him to get their input, to understand their thinking, to begin selling his position, to explore alternative ideas and staffing strategies, and to adjust his original plan for presentation and coordination of the action if appropriate. These discussions may be accomplished using either phone calls or informal meetings, depending upon the time available. The information being used must be reviewed for accuracy, considering again probable questions, credibility of the response, and time available. Adherence to guidance, accuracy, integrity and conciseness are of paramount importance. The DASC is expected to be completely knowledgeable of all aspects of the action, and able to clearly and forcibly explain the

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need for, or rationale behind, the action on very short notice. He must also establish very early the basic objectives of the action which cannot be compromised during staffing. He should get agreement on these as a minimum from the key group before staffing begins.

Following the action's formulation phase, formal staff coordination must be completed expeditiously, with resolution of issues being completed prior to presentation of the action for approval. The DASC must be able to ferret out concerns early and resolve them if possible. He should not make unnecessary compromises to avoid a non-concurrence, but must have strong rationale to justify his position. Reasonable suspense dates that can be justified should be established when coordination begins. The DASC must then enforce the suspense dates, maintaining a sense of urgency. If a staff element does not agree with the action, the non-concurrence should be required in writing by the suspense date. If the non-concurrence is not withdrawn, resolution will be effected at the lowest possible level in the decision chain. The DASC's boss should be advised early about any probable non-concurrence, the reasons for the non-concurrence and alternative courses of action, with the ramifications of each alternative. Strength of position on the issue, justification of the non-concurrence, priority of the action and the personalities involved will all have an impact on how and where the issue will be resolved and the action completed. The DASC must remain impersonal during this process. Emotionalism will decrease the chances of favorable resolutions. Success often depends upon flexibility, ingenuity, and a willingness to compromise unimportant points in order to arrive at a workable solution. A key to success when this happens is to keep looking for a workable solution until one is found. Conversely, the DASC must be prepared to submit non-concur-

rences on actions being coordinated with him if it is justified.

When faced with objections or non-concurrences, a DASC has three alternatives. These are: (1) to attempt to resolve the objection or non-concurrence through compromise; (2) stand fast on his position and escalate the issue for resolution by higher authority; or (3) disregard the issue. As discussed earlier, the latter approach is usually counter-productive. The second approach should be reserved for critical decisions. If the first approach is used, the DASC must be able to evaluate the validity of the objection, the credibility of the source of the objection, and understand the degree of the threat to the program. The threat varies depending on these other factors.

In depth knowledge of all aspects of the program is usually the best preparation for judging the validity of an objection. Knowledge of staff responsibilities, and the individual personalities involved is a key to evaluating credibility of the source of the objection. Consideration of political ramifications of the objection and of alternatives, combined with thorough knowledge of the program is the best preparation for assessing the threat of the objection to the program. The DASC may want to call on members of the key group to assist him in these evaluations. Once this is accomplished, he can then begin to understand the meanings and impact of the objections or non-concurrences.

The next step is to determine how and when to counter the objection. Timing is usually quite important, with immediate attack often being most desirable. But it is prudent to assess the degree and reliability of support for the action before initiating the counter. The DASC should once again verify that his position is solid and defensible, even though this should have been firmly established at initiation of the action. It

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is usually best to wargame the strategy with the PM, other members of the key group, and his boss before making a firm decision on the counter strategy. This is another instance where the informality of DCSRDA is of definite advantage in getting guidance for the best course of action. Whatever course is pursued, it is advisable that an alternative be selected for compromise which will give the other side the option for a face-saving withdrawal. This may enhance the chances for success.

Mechanics Used in the Decision Making Bureaucracy.

There are several methods which are used to obstruct or delay actions and programs. The DASC needs to recognize when these are being used against him, and perhaps he may need to use them himself on occasion. These methods include delay or non-concurrence of a staff action, insufficient priority, inadequate funding, lack of a firm requirement, failure to satisfy the requirement, technical objections, failure to comply with regulations, delay in a support study or documentation or unwillingness to press an issue against opposition.

All of the above methods of obstruction can be countered. When an action is being delayed, identify the location of the pressure point and apply leverage at that point to relieve the obstruction. This requires some experience and a thorough knowledge of the personalities involved and of the system. The non-concurrence is explained above. Insufficient priority is a user responsibility, although OSD can direct work on a program without user support until feasibility is determined. Inadequate funding is a function of priority and the ability of the DASC to justify a program. If a program fails to satisfy a requirement, that requirement can be waived or changed if the user so elects. Technical objections can be varied, and are countered in various ways using either technical or

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operational approaches. Regulations are written at HQDA and can be waived or changed if it is in the best interest of the Army. They are only guides, not unrepealable laws. Delay in a support study or documentation is, again, a matter of identifying the proper pressure point and using the right leverage to eliminate the delay. The leverage may be a phone call, a back-channel, a directive, additional funding, or some other factor. Unwillingness to press an issue against opposition may dictate replacement of the action officer involved in order to get some action if the program has adequate potential to the Army.

The important thing for the DASC to remember in this entire process is to work within the bureaucracy and to make it work for him. Don't try to fight the system - fight within the system. It is best to keep an audit trail, not to protect yourself, but so that you have a point of reference, and your replacement can learn the history of the program more easily. Maximum use of activity reports is a simple, informal method of making this trail. Ensure that information is transmitted vertically and laterally in a timely manner, especially to the key group. Don't allow any surprises to occur here, and keep all surprises to a minimum. Remember that regulations and directives are merely guidelines which can and should be changed if appropriate.

Just as in any other activity, proficiency in the performance of a DASC requires proficiency in staff procedures and a thorough knowledge of environment and personalities with whom one deals. The only way these can be attained and perfected is through practice. Don't hesitate to handle a staff action or participate on a study advisory group or study panel. These experiences are invaluable, and an essential part of the DASC's education. Whenever assigned to one of these activities, glean just as

much information from the experience as possible through active participation. It will serve in good stead later on. Through the entire process, strive to keep an open, inquiring mind and remain flexible.

Tools of the DASC.

The DASC has several personal and bureaucratic tools at his disposal to enable him to work effectively within the bureaucracy. The personal tools of expertise and credibility, each of which is composed of several factors, are discussed as separate chapters later in this paper. However, there are three other personal abilities which the DASC must have if he is to perform at an effective level. These are the ability to express himself clearly, concisely and pursuasively in writing on very short notice, the ability to speak articulately, persuasively and with authority on very short notice, and possession of the perserverence or tenacity to bring a job to success-ful completion in the face of very severe obstacles. These attributes are included within the credibility section, but are important enough to be reemphasized here as well.

The bureaucratic tools include the items discussed above under mechanics, such as program priority, funding, regulations/directives and staffing procedures. The DASC must become adept at using these items to his advantage. His participation on study and advisory groups and panels is a very effective tool, if properly used, to identify and preempt potential problems before they occur. The most important tool he has, however, is his position as a member of the HQDA Staff. In this position the DASC's responsibilities include: preparing and justifying program funding requests to HQDA, OSD and Congress; preparing various types of correspondence for approval and dispatch to Congress, OSD, other staff elements, and subordinate headquarters; recommending studies or other

actions necessary to support a program or a requirement; recommending suspense dates for receipt of actions by HQDA; recommending and organizing reviews of selected program aspects or issues by panels of outside experts; recommending special reviews of selected items by HQDA; and influencing the amount of "help" or guidance the PM receives at a given point in time. His position at HQDA also provides the DASC an opportunity to receive information from many sources in a timely manner. If he learns to properly collate this information, he should be in a position of being able to predict what will occur, and then be prepared to use the event to the advantage of his program. Judicious and timely discussion of this information, especially with members of the key group and the boss can be very productive. By selective and skillful use of the many tools available to him, the DASC can make the bureaucracy work for him and his program. Failure to master the use of these tools results in many frustrations and probable failure.

ASARC/DSARC Process.

In addition to the normal decision making process in which the DASC participates daily, his program will also be subject to a much more formal decision making process. "The top managers of the Army will participate personally in making face-to-face decisions on major acquisition programs. The Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) is the forum for such decisions . . . . The ASARC process complements the DSARC process."[24]/

Army programs achieve major status when ". . . designated by the Secretary of Defense as major system acquisition programs. This designation shall be determined on the recommendations of the (Secretary of the Army) and OSD officials. System programs involving an anticipated cost of $75 million in research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) or $300

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million in production shall be considered for designation as major system acquisitions. The management of system programs not designated as major system acquis.   ⏎ will be guided by the provisions of this Directive."25/

"The system acquisition process is a sequence of specified phases of program activity and decision events directed to the achievement of established program objectives in the acquisition of Defense systems. The process is initiated with the approval of the mission need and extends through successful completion of development, production and deployment of the Defense system or termination of the program."26/

The four separate phases of program activity are:

"Milestone 0 - Program Initiation Decision

Conceptual Phase during which solutions are identified and explored and solution concepts to a mission need, usually through the use of contracts with competent industry and educational institutions. The outputs are candidate solutions and their characteristics (estimated cost, schedule, performance and support parameters/concepts).

Milestone I - Demonstration and Validation Decision

Demonstration and Validation Phase is the period when selected alternatives are refined through extensive study and analyses, hardware development, test and evaluation. The objective is to validate the selected solution(s) and provide the basis for determining whether or not to proceed into the next phase.

Milestone II - Full-Scale Engineering Development Decision

Full-Scale Engineering Development is the period when the system/ equipment and the principle items necessary for its support are designed, fabricated, tested and evaluated. The intended output is, as a minimum, a pre-production system which closely approximates the final product, the documentation necessary to enter the production phase and the test results which demonstrate that the production product will meet stated requirements.

This phase may also include procurement of long lead production items and limited production for operational test and evaluation.

Milestone III - Production and Deployment Decision

Production Phase which starts with production approval until the last system/equipment is delivered and accepted. It includes the production of all principle and support equipment.

Deployment Phase which is the period beginning with the user's acceptance of the first operational article and extending until the system is phased out of the inventory. The Deployment Phase overlaps the Production Phase."[27] See Figure 3-1 for a graphical display of the acquisition process.

Milestone I, II and III require ASARC/DSARC decisions which either terminates the program or provide approval for it to proceed. They are extremely critical events in the system acquisition process of a system that require extensive effort and preparation by the DASC and PM. The DASC has the principle responsibility on the Army Staff to prepare his system for ASARC/DSARC reviews. These efforts can be divided into three distinct phases: 1. Prior to the ASARC review; 2. ASARC review through DSARC review; and 3. Post DSARC review. This paper will discuss some of the principle DASC activities during each of these phases.

1. Prior to the ASARC review:

The DCSRDA SRAO is responsible for administrative matters pertaining to the ASARC review.[28] These administrative matters will include preparation of: ". . . a guidance memorandum/letter to all interested agencies for DCSRDA approval and signature which outlines the major issues and information needs which must be addressed to bring a system to ASARC/DSARC; . . . a coordinated plan of action ("game plan") for the period

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MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROCESS FOR MAJOR SYSTEMS

MILESTONE 0

Continuing Analysis of Mission Areas

INITIATE MENS

SECDEF Approval MENS

Exploration of Alternative System Concepts

PREPARE LOA

MILESTONE I

ASARC I

SECARMY Recommendation and DCP

OR

OSD Staffing

DSARC I

SECDEF Decision

Demonstration and Validation of Alternatives
DT/OT I
PREPARE ROC

MILESTONE II

ASARC II

SECARMY Recommendation and DCP

DSARC II

SECDEF Decision

Full-Scale Engineering Development
DT/OT II
DT/OT IIa

MILESTONE III

ASARC III

SECARMY Recommendation and DCP

DSARC III

SECDEF Decision

Production and Deployment
Production Testing
Follow-On Evaluation

Figure 3-1

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immediately prior to a scheduled ASARC that will provide for the timely execution of those tasks necessary to bring a system to ASARC . . . and . . . perform a continuous review of the plan to ascertain its status and the system's readiness to proceed to ASARC."[29]/

The guidance memorandum and "game plan", which are prepared about one year prior to the ASARC meeting, are extremely important documents to successful ASARC/DSARC review preparation because they prescribe the "road map" to be followed to the ASARC review. Although SRAO has responsibility for their publication, the DASC, in conjunction with the PM, provides most of the input and actively participates in the preparation of each document. The DASC and SRAO representative prepare the initial draft of the "game plan". It is important that it include: (1) dates for the ASARC and DSARC reviews; (2) program alternatives; (3) management issues; (4) tasking for all information requirements; (5) suspense dates for all taskings; and (6) designation of all appropriate participants. The selection and preparation of appropriate management issues and viable program alternatives are of critical concern, because they often determine the direction of the program. It is imperative that the DASC and PM have done their homework thoroughly in this area, and include all viable alternatives so that alternatives are not invented at the ASARC table. However, they should not allow inclusion of improper or irrelevant issues or alternatives in these documents. The DASC must also ensure that informal coordination of the "game plan" is made at this time with his counterparts in ASA(RDA) and USDRE. This "game plan" sets the stage for an OSD-DA staff planning meeting which occurs six months later. Failure to obtain informal USDRE "game plan" agreement at this time may result in significant redirection following the OSD-DA staff planning meeting.

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Although SRAO is responsible for preparation and continual review of the "game plan", the DASC is responsible for its timely execution. One of his most important tools in execution of this "game plan" is an ASARC Ad Hoc Working Group (AAHWG). At the time initial preparation of the "game plan" begins, the DASC prepares a tasking for the formation of this AAHWG. Its members will include representatives from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research (ODUSA(OR)), OASA(RDA), most major HQDA staff elements, OTEA, TRADOC, DARCOM, SRAO and the PM. The DASC is the chairman. This tasking must be coordinated and approved by the DASC's Director prior to dispatch. It will include the date, place, and time of the first meeting. This should be very soon after the initial draft of the "game plan" is finished.

The DASC must secure active participation by all members of the AAHWG to ensure compliance with the "game plan". His ability to do this is a function of many things, the most important of which is his credibility, as discussed in Chapter V. A useful technique is for the DASC to distribute a memorandum for record following each AAHWG meeting indicating who will do what by when. The "game plan" will be reviewed and discussed at the first meeting of the AAHWG. After the meeting, it is revised as appropriate, staffed, approved and dispatched. The important point here is that the AAHWG must review and comment on the "game plan" before staffing so that their views have been considered, and they have participated in the pre-paration of the "game plan". This will make the plan stronger and more meaningful, speed up the coordination/staffing process, and provide a relatively high assurance of compliance. It is also very important that the DASC call regular monthly meetings of the AAHWG to keep all members informed on progress of various taskings, to keep the members involved in

the ASARC review preparation, to address and resolve issues, and to make
required adjustments to the "game plan". The forum which the AAHWG
provides for presenting, understanding, and resolution of issues is
extremely important to the DASC and the PM in formulating and refining
ASARC review and program strategy as the ASARC meeting approaches. The
DASC must ensure this forum is, and remains, one of openness and candor
where the various members are not reluctant to express their views and/or
concerns. There will be honest, sometimes unresolvable differences between
members of the AAHWG which will be clearly defined for the decision makers.
However, this group must foster a spirit of teamwork rather than an
advocate-adversary atmosphere if it is to retain its viability.

Leadership of the AAHWG may provide a severe challenge to the DASC,
but its potential utility in the ASARC review preparation process certainly
justifies acceptance of this challenge. The challenge can be significantly
reduced if the DASC and the SRAO representative will work together as a team
rather than as antagonists. The DASC needs advice from SRAO, and SRAO needs
information from the DASC and PM. If timely communication by either party
to satisfy these needs, including requested rationale, is not effected, it
can cause serious, unnecessary problems which may severely impact on the
DASC, the SRAO representative, and the program. When differences arise, it
is important to remember that both the DASC and SRAO are responsible to
assist in satisfying the most important needs of the Army in a timely
manner, regardless of individual perspectives. Refusal or inability to
communicate, particularly on differences, does not lead to accomplishment
of this mission.

For the DASC, the critical path to successful ASARC/DSARC reviews
includes timely completion and staffing of several documents. Important

items on this path usually include the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), the Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE), the Independent Parametric Cost Estimate (IPCE), the Outline Development Plan (ODE) or Development Plan (DP) (being renamed Outline Acquisition Plan and Acquisition Plan) depending upon milestone, test reports and independent evaluations of development testing (DT) and operational testing (OT). The DASC should use the AAHWG to monitor progress and apply pressure as required on completion of the BCE, IPCE, DP, test reports, and independent evaluations of DT and OT. He must not allow these to slip. He can influence completion and timely submission of the COEA through his membership on the COEA Study Advisory Group (SAG), and with related discussions by the AAHWG. The FISO has HQDA staffing responsibility for the COEA, but the DASC may need to assist him through AAHWG discussions or reviews.

Items on the ASARC review critical path which are of most concern to the DASC include the COEA, the Materiel System Requirement Specification (MSRS) and the Decision Coordination Paper (DCP). The latter two require significant personal involvement by the DASC for successful completion:

(a) MSRS - The MSRS defines in detail, for the costers, each of the ASARC review alternatives. It requires significant input from both the PMO and the user. Preparation is time consuming and difficult. However, it should provide the thread of consistency through which all cost studies can be updated. The DASC must present the MSRS to a meeting of ASARC representatives chaired by the Director, SRAO, at least six months before the ASARC review. The DASC should have the AAHWG review and revise the MSRS as necessary before presentation to the meeting of ASARC representatives for approval. Information contained in the MSRS is essential in preparation of the BCE and IPCE. These studies are time consuming and

have very rigid time requirements. Consequently, failure to obtain MSRS approval at the six months deadline will probably cause a delay in the ASARC review.

(b) DCP: An OSD-DA staff planning meeting is required four to six months prior to the DSARC review to approve a DCP outline and the items of the "game plan" outlined above. A "For Comment" copy of the DCP must then be submitted to USDRE two months prior to the ASARC review.[30/] If the DASC is to influence the outcome of the OSD-DA staff planning meeting and submit the "For Comment" version of the DCP to OSD on time, preparation of the DCP must begin very soon after issuance of the "game plan". The PM has responsibility for initial preparation and submission of the DCP to HQDA. The DASC must then coordinate it with all major staff elements of HQDA, revising as appropriate, and submit it to USDRE.

From a practical standpoint, the DASC needs to have a rough draft copy of the DCP provided informally to him at least six to seven months before the ASARC. He also needs to schedule the OSD-DA staff planning meeting four and one-half to five months before the ASARC. (See figure 3-2) This schedule would then allow approximately one month to incorporate HQDA guidance into the rough draft. This would be done informally by the DASC, FISO, and representatives from SRAO, ASA(RDA) and PMO. They should be particularly concerned with the sections on management issues, alternatives, NATO Standardization and thresholds in this initial review. Once a consensus has been arrived at here, the DASC should then informally discuss the rough draft DCP with his counterpart in USDRE to get his guidance and to establish a position for the OSD-DA staff planning meeting. The proposed schedule allows two weeks for this phase. It is premature to discuss the draft DCP with the AAHSG at this time. After the OSD-DA staff

DCP STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

Figure 3-2

planning meeting, all comments and guidance should immediately be given to the PM informally. The guidance is then also transmitted through formal channels, including verification of a suspense date for the DCP to be at HQDA. This allows the PM about two months to make revisions and complete staffing through DARCOM. During this two month period the PM may want the AAHWG to informally review the draft DCP.

When the "For Comment" draft of the DCP formally arrives at HQDA, the DASC will begin coordination immediately. The AAHWG will need to help on this, because he will have only two or three weeks to get the DCP to USDRE. That means all concerns should be resolved before the DCP arrives at HQDA. The only alternative is to require the DCP earlier, which may not be very practical. Two weeks after formal transmittal to USDRE, the DCP will be returned to HQDA with the OSD and OJCS comments. These will have to be incorporated by the DASC. The DCP should then be reviewed by the AAHWG before the ASARC preliminary review, although the tight schedule may preclude this. Additional guidance may be given at the ASARC preliminary review. If so the DASC will also incorporate this guidance into the DCP and have the AAHWG review the product as the initiation of HQDA staffing.

This DCP has now become the "For Coordination" draft. Staffing should be complete and the revised DCP provided to all ASARC principals one week before the ASARC review. Assuming the ASARC preliminary review is one month before the ASARC meeting, there are only three weeks to complete the required staffing.

In addition to staffing documents, the DASC must continually be on the move ferreting out concerns and assisting the PM in finalizing the ASARC review strategy. The DASC should, at the PM's request, arrange for the PM to give preliminary briefings to each ASARC and DSARC principal. The

ASARC principals can be briefed either before or after the ASARC preliminary review. Briefings of DSARC principals should be after the ASARC preliminary review and perhaps even after the ASARC review, depending on program stability. This allows all principals to become familiar with the program, and to express any concerns they may have. It also provides an opportunity to give the principals the true program picture, as seen by the PM, without modification by a staffer and it gives the PM and DASC time to research any new questions or issues which may arise. These briefings can be very important to ensuring that the ASARC and DSARC reviews are successful.

Another item of concern to the DASC before the ASARC review is the ASARC preliminary review. The ASARC Executive Secretary will ensure attendance of ASARC representatives at the preliminary review. The purpose of the ASARC preliminary review is to review the presentations, and to assess the degree of readiness for the ASARC meeting. It also provides an opportunity to review affordability of the program, which seems to be growing more important. Timing of the ASARC preliminary review is important. Twenty to thirty days between the preliminary review and the ASARC is highly desirable. This provides adequate time to complete necessary staffing and to make adjustments for problems arising at the ASARC preliminary review. Less than 20 days increases risk of incomplete ASARC review preparation. More than 30 days tends to require updating of the presentations due to changes occurring in the program, or may cause schedule delays.

There is a tendency to overlook the importance of the procurement funding profile and the procurement purchase and delivery profiles in ASARC review preparation. The DASC must check these closely, as well as

the authorized acquisition objective (AAO). He must know the components of the AAO and ensure it is based on an updated Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). The BOIP is a FISO responsibility. The DASC should encourage an innovative procurement profile, but one that is defensible. He must be familiar with the leader-follower concept and other methods of incorporating competition into the procurement program. If it is an ASARC III review, he must ensure the PM has viable alternatives, perhaps even including a product improvement proposal (PIP) for an item in the field should costs of the development system become prohibitive. Remember that cost will be a major factor in the final ASARC decision.

The DASC is required to present several briefings to selected ASARC principals prior to the ASARC review. These are spelled out in ODCSRDA Reg 15-14. All are important and require thorough preparation.

2. ASARC review through DSARC review: The DASC must ensure that he has a seat at the ASARC presentation. Seat assignments are made by SRAO. He should have a book of all pertinent program facts indexed to allow quick reference if required. However, he should have the key program facts, and an understanding of how they were derived, thoroughly memorized and available for instant recall. The DASC may not be called on to answer any questions, or it may not be appropriate for him to make any comments. However, very often he will be required to answer a question or to give a brief background on some item, so he must be ready. A verbal answer when needed during the meeting can eliminate the need for a paper after the meeting, or may even eliminate a potential issue. The DASC may also provide written comments or information to his director during the ASARC meeting, which may help to resolve an issue that arises. If the DASC has required information, he must ensure that it is appropriately provided in

a timely manner. After the ASARC meeting may be too late.

During the ASARC meeting guidance will be given on some required changes to the DCP. As a minimum, these will involve the alternatives and possibly management issues. The DASC is responsible for making these changes, getting the DCP coordinated and submitted through formal channels to the Defense Acquisition Executive and all members and DSARC review participants 15 working days prior to the DSARC meeting.[31/] There will be times when this period may be different than specified in the directive, depending upon when the DSARC review is scheduled. The DASC should provide copies of the "For Coordination" draft of the DCP informally to his counterpart in USDRE as soon as it is revised and while staffing is ongoing. It may even be necessary to provide him one informally before the ASARC review, particu. if the program is relatively stable or the ASARC and DSARC reviews a. . eduled close to each other (less than 30 days).

A third important function the DASC has during this period is to pre-brief the Deputy USDRE for Test and Evaluation (DUSDRE(T&E)) in OSD. This may be satisfied with a briefing by the PM, depending upon the preferences of the DUSDRE(T&E) and the PM. The DASC must ensure that this requirement is satisfied and that any other DSARC members who should be briefed are given briefings. It is important that attempts be made to resolve any issues outstanding, and that as much program support as possible be generated before the DSARC meeting. The DASC must know the OSD positions on the various issues and work with the PM in an attempt to modify them if they conflict with the DA position. He must keep his boss informed of these positions and any changes to them.

The DASC must also ensure that the selected alternative is affordable

ard will be supported by the Army in the budget. There is a major disconnect between the ASARC/DSARC process and the PPBS process. Approval by the ASARC and DSARC does not necessarily mean that the program will be funded to support the selected alternative. This is a major responsibility of the DASC. He must ensure throughout both processes that the preferred Army alternative is funded in the FYDP and that the Army selects the alternative for which it has budgeted, or that the decision makers at the ASARC/DSARC reviews are aware of any differences before they make a decision. This is one of the reasons it is so important that the DASC and PM be deeply involved in the preparation of the "game plan" and the guidance memorandum a year before the ASARC meeting. They can have a major impact on program strategy, regardless of decisions made at the ASARC/DSARC reviews. If the ASARC/DSARC decisions require $2 million or more over the approved budget in either the current year or the budget year, it will mean going to Congress with a request for additional funds. Even if these are approved, a program delay often ensues because of the time required for approval. The DASC really has to work the funding problem hard.

There will be some pre-briefs for the DSARC review for which the DASC is required to make administrative preparations. This is not a major requirement, but it is one which could cause embarrassing problems if not handled properly.

3. Post DSARC review.

The DASC may or may not be able to get a seat at the DSARC review. He should try. If he fails, he must discuss the DSARC meeting in detail with his boss and his counterparts in USDRE and OASA(RDA) to ensure that he understands the guidance given. It will be his responsibility to ensure

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that DA complies with this guidance.

Within 30 days after the approved DCP is signed by the SECDEF, it must be revised incorporating the SECDEF direction. The DASC is responsible for this revision. He should get a copy of the DCP and the action memorandum informally from his counterpart in USDRE as soon as they are signed so he can begin revision. Otherwise he may not be able to meet the 30 day suspense due to administrative delays in receipt of the document. Once the DCP is revised and staffed, it is distributed. It now constitutes a contract between DA and OSD on the future program direction. The DASC has to continue to monitor the program to ensure that DA abides by this contract.

CHAPTER IV

PROGRAM EXPERTISE

Program expertise is one of the DASC's most important tools. This expertise lies in the technical, operational, management, status and related programs areas. The DASC is the Army expert on his program in Washington, D. C. He will be required to respond to questions and/or issues in each of the above areas on very short notice or on an immediate reaction basis. The speed, accuracy and authority with which the answer is supplied often has a major impact on how effectively a program progresses, or how severely it is challenged from within the bureaucracy. It can also significantly influence the number of responses which the PM must make to justify or defend his program at DA and OSD.

System Capabilities and Characteristics.

The DASC must know the critical performance capabilities and characteristics of his system and the relative importance of each. These may include such performance parameters as range, accuracy, speed, etc. which are essential to successful mission accomplishment of the system. Even though he should have fact sheets and a grab and run book with this information itemized and tabbed, he must also have the parameters memorized so as to be able to respond immediately to questions about them.

It is important that the DASC have a working knowledge of the technical language and general technical principles applicable to his system. With this basic knowledge, the DASC will be in the position of being able to explain in layman's language how the system functions, what factors are most likely to enhance or degrade system performance, and to understand the potential impact of proposed hardware changes on system performance.

4-1

Many recommendations made by the DASC concerning management issues are based at least in part on his technical understanding of the program. Obviously, a basic technical understanding of the program should be beneficial in these instances. However, he cannot and should not be the primary technical authority on the system, nor should he become involved with the technical minutia or trivia of the program.

There will be meetings or program reviews, often participated in by contractor personnel, where the technical characteristics and their impact on operational performance will be the primary subject. The DASC may be called upon to make recommendations concerning a proposed system modification or perhaps he will discuss with outside contractors alternate approaches of achieving comparable operational results. In both these instances it is imperative that the DASC have a basic understanding of the technical principles involved in order to comment intelligently and to keep the contractor honest in his presentations.

These meetings and reviews provide perfect learning situations for the DASC as long as he is willing to ask questions in any area not fully understood. The contractor personnel are usually quite competent technically, are normally willing to explain a question, and quite often are very good at doing so. There is no excuse for one not understanding a concept or technology if that person doesn't ask any questions concerning the concept or technology.

There may be other times when the DASC may need to explain a concept of which he is unsure. If so, he should not hesitate to discuss the concept with technical experts on the DA staff or Secretariat, or request assistance from the technical experts in the project manager's office or from the contractor. However, it is usually prudent to cross check

contractor technical presentations with a competent government authority until the DASC is satisfied with the contractor's credibility and integrity.

A third way to increase one's technical expertise is to request that a technical expert in a given area provide required briefings in that area, and then attend the briefing as an observer. This allows one to increase technical knowledge about the system and to become familiar with the type of questions that will be asked about the system.

In addition to the verbal technical upgrading methods, the DASC may also want to use some basic text books or technical literature to improve his knowledge or understanding of a given technology area. If so, the Army Library in the "A" Ring of the first floor of the Pentagon contains excellent sources of written material on most technologies. This is easily accessible to the DASC.

A final way in which the DASC may increase his technical expertise is to discuss/review related programs, determine the strong and weak points of those programs, how the system has performed under different conditions, and why. If the technology is effective, determine whether it would be worthwhile to apply some aspect of it to his program. Perhaps a key attribute for a DASC to have in this area is a continual thirst for knowledge. He should never be satisfied with his current information base. Technology is advancing so rapidly that failure to continually upgrade his knowledge results in obsolescence. This the DASC cannot afford.

Operational and Organizational Concepts.

Although DCSOPS has DA responsibility to monitor and approve requirements, an effective DASC must be at least as knowledgeable of the need and operational aspects of the system as the PISO. Memorization of key areas

of the operational need document is not a sufficient operational background for the DASC. He must know and thoroughly understand the basis for the need; why his system is being developed to satisfy that need; what void in capability it will fill; why it is important that the void be filled; what system it will replace; what differences there are in capabilities; any alternatives to the system under development; which operational parameters of the system are most critical and why; the basic employment doctrine and tactics for the system; and the interfaces required to achieve optimal system effectiveness. The DASC must have an understanding and appreciation for both the actual and perceived importance of the developmental system to the Army and to DoD. This type of information provides the basis for determining system priority, which ultimately determines program funding level. This is the basic life blood of any program. Anything that involves program funding is of critical concern to the DASC.

In addition to knowing and understanding the need for the system, the DASC must know who within the Army has been designated proponent for the system, and the basis for the selection. He should become thoroughly acquainted with the individuals in the user community who have responsibilities for any of the factors, such as training, tactics, doctrine, basis of issue (BOI), etc., that may impact on the development program. The DASC must determine who does and who doesn't support the system requirement, and the degree of that support within the user community, at HQDA, and in OSD.

The DASC must understand the operational and organizational (O&O) concept to be used with the system. This should be reviewed analytically to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the concept, because these will become factors of important consideration in certain studies, such as

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the COEA, which are required prior to each ASARC/DSARC. The DASC may also be able to offer suggestions on changes to the O&O concept which may enhance system effectiveness without operational penalties. The O&O concept should include an integrated logistics support (ILS) plan, which can become a real achilles heel in any program if not closely monitored. The message in this discussion is that the DASC must not automatically agree to an action merely because it is not within his primary area of responsibility. If an area has an impact, or potential for impact, on the development program, as do operational considerations, then the DASC must become deeply involved in critical reviews of those areas. Otherwise, he risks losing control of the program, and being reduced to a reaction officer rather than a DASC.

In addition to understanding the overall requirement, the DASC must know the various individual operational parameters, the relative importance of each, and why they are important. He needs to understand how the parameters were formulated, and to ascertain the validity of the parameter. Obviously, if the DASC doesn't believe certain parameters are valid, he should ensure that the user reviews, and either changes or justifies the parameter in question. One reason for this is that frequently OSD or Congress will question the DASC in reference to possible "gold plating" or over design of a system versus the true need. Without a thorough knowledge of this area, and an ability to clearly articulate that knowledge, the DASC may witness an arbitrary funding reduction to his program because an individual in OSD or a Congressional staffer is convinced that cost reductions can be achieved through a design modification without an adverse impact on the perceived "real need." Another important aspect of this knowledge of operational parameters is to know the degree of flexibility

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of the user on various parameters, and any range of possible trade offs.
This information is important in making judgements on requests for funding
support by the PM if part of the funding is programed for work in support
of a questionable parameter. This must be considered in relation to
overall priorities for the Army and, on occasion, may have to be traded
off.

As discussed earlier, the relationship between the DASC and FISO is of
critical importance. They must work as a team and constantly be helping
each other. The FISO has responsibility for the requirement document and
any changes made to it, the BOIP and the COEA. All of these must be pre-
pared or updated prior to each major decision point. A change in any of
these items could have a significant impact on program cost to which the
DASC would have to react. It is therefore imperative that these areas be
closely monitored by the DASC, and that major changes in a short time be
precluded if at all possible.

A final concern of the DASC with the operational concepts area is the
marriage of the operational and the technical. Again, this requires a
thorough understanding of both areas. The DASC must be familiar enough
with the technology available to be able to determine which technologies
could be used to satisfy a given requirement, i.e. location of a moving
target can be accomplished using radar, acoustic, laser, optical, and
photography. The DASC should recognize the major advantages and limita-
tions of each technology involved, the relative maturity and sophistica-
tion of each, and the current state-of-the-art in each. It is pertinent
also that one understands the degree of understanding and acceptance of
each of these technologies by the user community and by members of various
staff elements in DA and OSD. This knowledge is used in ascertaining

whether the system under development is using the most appropriate technology to accomplish the desired mission and, if so, why. A case should then be prepared to support continued development, rather than terminate the program and pursue a development using a more novel or exciting technology. It seems as if most people who comment on actions know all the weaknesses of the mature technology, which is usually the lowest risk development approach, but only the good things about the newer technologies. Consequently, even with solidly conceived programs which are progressing satisfactorily, the DASC is constantly faced with the need to defend his program in the technology versus operational capability debate. Basic homework done in a timely manner here can prevent many challenges to a program later.

Program Status.

For most DASCs, attaining satisfactory proficiency in the two previous areas is a major challenge. Once achieved, maintenance of that proficiency is relatively simple. In the area of program status, attaining proficiency, while difficult, is not nearly as challenging as maintaining that proficiency, due primarily to the extremely dynamic nature of the research and development business.

A recommended point of departure for the DASC to achieve proficiency in the program status area, is to become thoroughly familiar with the Materiel Acquisition and Decision Process as discussed in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-109, 5 April 1976, subject: "Major Systems Acquisitions"; DoD Directives 5000.1, 18 January 1977, subject: "Major Systems Acquisitions" and 5000.2, 18 January 1977, subject: "Major Systems Acquisition Process"; and AR 70-1, 1 May 1975, subject: "Army Research, Development and Acquisition"; AR 15-14,

24 January 1975, subject: "Systems Acquisition Review Council Procedures"; and AR 1000-1, 5 November 1974, subject: "Basic Policies for Systems Acquisition by the Department of the Army". A basic understanding of these publications is absolutely essential.

The location of a DASC's program within the acquisition cycle is a major factor in developing his funding and program support strategies, due to differing requirements of the different phases of the cycle. He obviously must determine this location, and he must review the history of the program to learn how it got to its present position, what have been some of the problems, and how have these problems been solved. He should then review the program plans for such things as key projected milestones, projected initial operational capability (IOC), and the current status of the program in relation to the projections. Immediately following, or concurrent with the schedule and status review, the DASC will want to review the program funding profile to include history, current status and projections.

One thing to be alert for in these reviews is the intent and/or support OSD and Congress have displayed toward the program. Success in achieving past schedule and performance projections, combined with minimal cost growth, usually generates program support from OSD and Congress. Conversely, major problems in achieving schedule, cost and performance projections indicates possible high risk, and often results in lack of program support or objection to the program by OSD and Congress. Consequences of the latter situation are quite serious and obviously require a significantly different approach by the DASC than the former. These reviews of program history and a review of the program need, should provide the DASC insight into the funding priority, or lack of priority,

which his program possesses.

In reviewing the program history, the DASC should probably start by studying the program descriptive summaries for as far back as they are available. In addition to the background and funding information, they include the reasons for any schedule or funding changes. Once this is complete, the program should be discussed in detail with the departing DASC if he has not yet left. Then a study of all program DCP's, Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR's), and the requirement document (Letter of Agreement or Required Operational Capability) should be made. Study of these documents and the regulations/directives listed above, in conjunction with the orientation by the departing DASC, should provide enough basic information for the DASC to begin to understand his program. The next step is a visit with the FISO. The study of the various documents should have raised some questions which the FISO should answer, particularly in regards to the program priority. The FISO may also want to discuss the operational requirement for the program. If so, the DASC should certainly pursue this opportunity to collate additional information.

These initial literature reviews and discussions should be completed within two or three days after the DASC arrives at DCSRDA. Then allow about a week or ten days to begin getting an appreciation for the pace and nature of the action in the Pentagon. During this time the new DASC would want to become acquainted with the other Washington members of the key group and to get their views on the program he is being assigned. Efforts should be made during this period to establish points of contact in several other staff elements in HQDA in addition to the key group. Within about two weeks after reporting to DCSRDA, the DASC should make a two or three day visit to the Project Management Office (PMO) for detailed

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briefings on all aspects of the program. This is when he should become very familiar with the total program. These briefings should include a review of program objectives, history, technology, test results, contracts, funding, schedule and potential problem areas. The DASC should ask questions on any and every point he doesn't fully understand during these briefings.

The best way to begin the review at the PMO may be a series of detailed briefings on the SAR if the program has a SAR requirement.[32/] The SAR contains the kind of information in most of the areas that concerns the DASC at this time. The SAR also provides a logical format for discussion of additional funding requirements, and the validity of these requirements. The DASC should question much of the information presented to ensure its accuracy and validity. The bonus of this approach is that the SAR is becoming more of a common denominator for program discussions with OSD or Congress. Therefore, the information in the SAR must be accurate and consistent, and the DASC must completely understand the information so he can discuss it intelligently. This provides the opportunity to accomplish all these things.

Although much of the information on contracts is included in the SAR, the DASC should ensure that he understands the type of contract, the total contract cost, amount of fee, incentives (if applicable), and any options that are included in the contract. The DASC should also determine what cost schedule control system criteria are being used to monitor the work by the contractor. The DASC should know and understand this information so he will be able to respond knowledgeably to questions on cost, schedule, contractor credibility, and degree of assurance regarding his answers to the previous three areas. The DASC should find out what support contracts the PM has awarded, why they were awarded, the type, cost, and duration of

each, and what is expected from each contractor. In-house funding and its uses should then be discussed.

Another area included in the SAR which the DASC must thoroughly understand is Design to Cost (DTC). The DASC must know what DTC goal has been established, what is the base year and production quantity established for the DTC, what items are included in the DTC computations, what effort has the contractor expended to date on the DTC, and what is its current status. This is an area in which the DASC can expect frequent questions from both OSD and Congress, so he should know it thoroughly.

An item which the DASC may be required to justify in detail before the Pre-RDAC is the need for the number of prototypes being requested for fabrication (if more than one), the use of each, the cost of the prototypes singly and in total, and the date that assembly begins for each model. This is an excellent time for the DASC to get that information, and to satisfy himself as to the need for the models requested.

An area of more concern and value than many people realize is testing. Good test results are the most effective means available to refute the inevitable claims by the theoreticians that the system can't possibly achieve its performance requirements. It is advisable to ensure tests are objective, low risk, and at the earliest possible time in the program. In this way, there is a high probability of achieving the good results which a resourceful DASC can use to effectively support the program. In this initial visit to the PMO, the DASC should review prior test results, if any, the purpose, location and time of the testing, the tester and the results. He should also review plans for future testing and get the same information except for results. When testing is actually underway, the DASC must have a procedure established with the PM to get test results

daily if permissible. This information is especially useful when requesting additional funding, defending a funding input to the POM or FYDP, or attempting to resolve an issue where test results are applicable. The importance of test results as a tool for the DASC can't be overemphasized.

In addition to attaining proficiency in the program status area, the DASC must establish procedures that allow him to meet the challenge of maintaining that proficiency at a very high level. To do this, he must have a quick access channel to the PM at any time. It should be informal, so as to enhance candid, timely, two-way information exchange. No surprises can be afforded in either direction here. The DASC should also have ready access to the key staff members of the PMO, so they can provide needed information if the PM is not available in an emergency. This initial visit to the PMO provides an opportunity for the DASC to meet these people, and begin to learn who are the most proficient and reliable in their area. The DASC should understand the strengths, weaknesses, and experience levels of the key staff of the PMO in order to be able to judge the reliability of information received from them. He cannot afford to have a naive relationship with the PM and his staff which blindly accepts any information offered as completely factual. The relationship must be open and candid.

Key Program Issues.

A fourth area in program expertise that is of major concern to the DASC is that of key program issues. This area will probably require more of the DASC's time than any other except program status. Program issues will usually develop in three specific areas - Program Track Record, Program Weakness - Real and Perceived, and Political.

The program track record is the degree of success the program has had

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in staying on schedule, within cost, maintaining a stable requirement, completion of scheduled testing with good results, and successful innovations by the PM. Delays in schedule or testing immediately raise issues because of the probable need for additional funds, a later IOC to the troops and/or possible technical problems. Increased cost may have the implied connotation of cost overrun, which immediately creates suspicion. A change in the requirement usually leads to increased cost and schedule delays, and quite often extensive questions from OSD and Congress. If the PM tries innovations and they are successful, he is a hero. If they fail, his management ability becomes suspect. The DASC must exert maximum pressure on   PM to remain on schedule and within cost, and he must work with the FISO to prevent requirement changes that will cause schedule delays or cost growth. He must also be alert to anticipate possible issues in any of these areas and resolve them during the formulation stage if possible.

A program may have strength in its support by the user, its track record, priority, need, maturity of technology, system capability or alternative developments. Each of these areas could also be a weakness. All of these areas were discussed in some detail earlier in this section, so no further discussion is needed here except to say that the DASC again must anticipate problems and work to eliminate them before they become solid. Two other weaknesses are much harder to combat. One is integrated logistic support (ILS). This is of keen concern to OSD and Congress, and the user, because of potential operational problems caused by equipment failures once it is fielded. These lead to increased operational and support costs. Increased emphasis and management control by the PM is about the only way to attack this problem. A final potential weakness is

survivability. This is an area which cannot be tested, so the DASC and PM are at the mercy of the study experts. About the only way this can be effectively addressed is through a study or a modification of doctrine and tactics. The DASC and PM will have to wargame this one to determine the best approach.

Political issues are somewhat more difficult and more serious because they are often concerns at the OSD and/or Congressional levels. They include such things as commonality, interoperability, affordability, joint service 'r lications, duplication, type of competition and NATO Standardization. Precluding or defuzing issues in commonality, interoperability and duplication depends upon the DASC doing his homework, using his information sources to the maximum and convincing the PM to pursue commonality and interoperability when appropriate. The DASC's Division Chief or his counterpart in SRAO should be able to provide assistance in identifying candidates for commonality or interoperability, so it is recommended that these sources be relied upon for help. Affordability is usually a matter of preventing surprises, especially sudden ones. A good relationship between the PM and DASC can usually serve to prevent this type issue. If competition is to be used, ensure that the rationale to support this course of action is objective and valid. The same must be true if competition is not used. This is an area where guidance vacillates frequently and quickly. Therefore, it is a matter of analyzing the alternatives, selecting what is best for the program and then defending that position. The joint service implications and NATO standardization areas are relatively new, but are going to become increasingly important in the months ahead. The prudent DASC will watch these areas closely, talk to those involved in ongoing efforts in these areas and chart his course accordingly. The one

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thing which must <u>not</u> be done is to neglect these areas.

Knowledge of Related Programs.

The DASC is in the position at HQDA to determine which Army programs are related to his. This can be done through informal discussions with other DASC's, his Division Chief, his SRAO counterpart and members of the key group. If there is a possibility that a program is related to his, the DASC should determine how and to what degree this relationship exists, what is the priority of the other program, and what is its status. Status in this case, includes funding level, IOC, location in the acquisition cycle, test results and risk. It is important to ascertain also the commonality potential with the other program and which direction the commonality should flow.

Another area for consideration here is the potential interrelationship with the related program. What is involved? What are the potential results? What are the operational implications of using the related program and the DASC's system together; separately? It may be necessary to recommend a study effort to look at these factors if they appear to be valid concerns.

The DASC is in a better position than the PM to make the initial search for related programs and to make appropriate recommendations concerning them. He must recain the big picture at his level and be constantly searching for the best solution for the Army. It is also the responsibility of the DASC to keep the PM informed about any programs which may be related. He may even recommend that the PM contact the PM of the other program for further discussions to determine if there is a relationship. With the continuing restrictions on funds, there is high probability that emphasis to have fewer programs will increase. This

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means the DASC will be expected to look very closely in this area to ensure maximum commonality and interoperability is achieved and minimum duplication occurs.

CHAPTER V

DASC CREDIBILITY

Lack of thorough knowledge and appreciation of the bureaucracy, and/or inadequate program expertise will severely reduce a DASC's effectiveness. Lack of credibility will render him ineffective.

Credibility can be defined as "Worthiness of belief . . . Worthy of confidence; reliable."[33/] Performance by previous DASC's has created a high level of credibility for the DASC position. In effect, a portion of this credibility, defined in this paper as pseudo-credibility, is automatically transferred to a newly assigned DASC for a quasi-probationary period. During this period, which varies with the individual, the new DASC, through his knowledge, personal attributes, and performance, will replace this pseudo-credibility with his own true credibility. This true credibility may be higher or lower than the initial pseudo-credibility, dependent upon how well the DASC performs his job. The time required to establish a DASC's credibility is also partially dependent upon the circumstances which the DASC faces. The more difficult the circumstances to which he must respond, the quicker the establishment of true credibility. Established credibility is not a constant, but requires continual maintenance. This chapter of the paper discusses factors involved in establishing and maintaining that credibility.

Information Base.

One of the items most important to the DASC in both establishing and maintaining credibility is a solid, timely, prolific information base or system. Timely, accurate information is strength and a key to success. A good, effective information system prevents surprises. It is reliable and

provides information in sufficient time to permit preparation of an
effective counter to a potentially adverse issue before it matures and is
fully surfaced. Conversely, lack of information is a weakness that leads
to failure. Information that is inaccurate or unreliable is often worse
than no information. Such information often causes surprises to occur
rather than prevents them. If information is late, it is essentially a
lack of information. For example, it is of little value for the DASC to
learn that funds were available for reprograming and were provided to
selected programs yesterday, if he needed the funds but was unaware of the
impending action in time to act.

In building his information system, the DASC should "consider the words
of Richard Neustadt, who studied the information-collecting habits of
President's Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower:

> "It is not information of a general sort that helps a President
> see personal stakes; not summaries, not surveys, not the bland
> amalgams. Rather . . . it is the odds and ends of tangible detail
> that pieced together in his mind illuminate the underside of issues
> put before him. To help himself he must reach out as widely as he
> can for every scrap of fact, opinion, gossip, bearing on his
> interest and relationships as President. He must become his own
> director of his own central intelligence!"[34]

The DASC must operate in this same manner.

One of the first lines of communication he will establish is with the
PM. No surprises can be afforded between the DASC and the PM. As stated
previously, their relationship should be open, candid, and informal.
Their information exchange should be timely and complete. He must be able
to contact the PM anytime, day or night, in an emergency. The PM must

also be able and willing to contact the DASC at anytime, either in the office or at home. Program emergencies periodically occur during nonduty hours, especially if testing is underway in a different time zone, such as in Arizona or California. Surprises must be precluded and problems discussed early so a course of action acceptable to both the DASC and PM is pursued.

These two men must discuss all management issues, wargame alternative actions to counter each by considering probable impacts on schedule, funding, and risk, and the probable reactions by various elements in DA, OSD, Congress, the user, OTEA, and any other agency with an interest, and then select an alternative which is best for the program and supportable at all important levels. They will also prioritize trade offs, if necessary, during funding drills. These discussions should be conducted before the actual funding exercises begin, and include the potential impacts of each trade off.

The key group identified and discussed in Chapter III is extremely important to the DASC's information base. This group must understand and appreciate each others concerns and understand the basis for those concerns. The relationship will be very similar to that with the PM, except that it is usually not necessary to call these men after duty hours. Confidence will be established among group members that cannot be betrayed if the group is to remain viable. One betrayal can have a significantly adverse impact on any credibility he may have acquired. Once lost in this manner, it will be almost impossible to recover. The members of the key group should interface daily, using either phone calls, personal visits, or lunch time to get updated. Informal discussion of plans, ideas and problems prevents many mistakes and allows formulation of viable

alternatives very early.

In addition to the key group, the DASC should identify and establish working relationships in as many HQDA staff elements with a staff interest in his program as soon as possible. The single, most important aspect of these relationships must be integrity. Without integrity and trustworthiness, the DASC is doomed to become a victim of the bureaucracy rather than a user of it. He should maintain two way communication with these people, although it may not be as frequently as with members of the key group. The concerns of these people must be recognized and addressed, in relation to the program. Another thing the DASC must do quickly is to determine the reliability of the contacts in the other staff elements. This is of critical importance. Maintaining a good working relationship with these people facilitates the coordination process once credibility has been established.

The DASC will also want to establish contacts in other services and in agencies outside HQDA. This allows one to build a broad base of understanding for his program, to gain insight into related programs or technology, to increase his own technical expertise, and to identify and possibly resolve potential issues before they become critical. It also provides an avenue for technology transfer to the program at reduced risk and low cost, and for possible funding support of selected aspects of the program which may be in a high risk area.

Communication with people is a primary goal. This involves listening as well as speaking. It is important that the DASC get out of the office frequently, and meet the various participants in their home arena. Face-to-face communications are vitally important. This also allows the DASC an opportunity to observe first hand some of the pressures which influence

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the other participants. He should try to put himself in the other person's place and attempt to understand those pressures so he will be better able to counter them. This also provides an opportunity for informal, off-duty contacts. These are extremely important in getting the job done, and often provide the basis for resolution of previously insoluble differences.

If the DASC hopes to maximize the effectiveness of his information base, he must develop a maximum number of information sources, determine the reliability of each source, and cross check information with that from other sources if at all possible. The DASC will specialize in use of the verbal, so development of his memory capability should be a high priority item. He cannot afford to disregard information from any source without thorough evaluation of the information. In collating the information received, the DASC must recognize how the information affects his program, and then filter the unnecessary portions out before transmission of the information anywhere. He must be clearly attuned to the political concerns and areas of emphasis by DA, OSD and Congress, and what the personalities involved are most likely to do under varying sets of circumstances. The DASC must also be clearly attuned to what is not said as well as what is said. Quite often the unspoken things are most important.

Once the DASC has collected the information, he needs to use it for the good of the program. Information is perishable, and usually should be acted on early to realize maximum value. The action will vary with the situation. Sometimes, the information will merely be transmitted to a different participant, or stored. It may be used to make a decision on a schedule change, funding request or some other aspect of the program. Don't try to work in a vacuum, here. Get help from the PM, the key group, the boss, or another DASC.

Keep an Open Mind.

Almost all individuals interviewed in preparation for this paper expressed strongly the belief that the DASC must be an advocate for his program. The conflicting pressures of the DASC job include a need that he be objective in his program support, but several of those interviewed indicated serious concern that both roles could be played concurrently. They believed the DASC could not be totally objective. Definitions of the two words by Webster support this concern. However, there was no disagreement on the belief that the DASC can and must keep an open-mind, although even this may be difficult at times.

This author believes it is imperative that the DASC maintain an open mind, and be willing to listen sincerely to all sides of a question or issue while supporting his program. This includes being open-minded toward criticism of the program or various aspects of it. One must also be able to understand and follow the logic being used, but to quickly, almost instinctively, identify weaknesses or deficiencies in the logic, assumptions or stated "facts" being used. This leads one to find solutions, rather than to hide problems, and to react positively and quickly to valid concerns. It does require complete integrity and trustworthiness in all actions and relationships. However no suggestion is made that the DASC be naive in his beliefs. This can be as disastrous as keeping a closed-mind.

The recommendation to keep an open mind while supporting the program is based on the assumption that the DASC has a clear, comprehensive understanding of all aspects of program expertise for his program as discussed in Chapter IV. To attempt to be an open-minded advocate with less than total program expertise borders on sheer folly. However, failure to be open-minded is also sheer folly if a DASC hopes to attain an

acceptable level of credibility. It is therefore imperative that he obtain the program expertise discussed in Chapter IV as a necessary prerequisite to establishing credibility.

By using the open-minded approach, the DASC can begin to eliminate emotionalism and hope as necessary ingredients of program defense, and instead support his program using rationalism and logic. Over the long term, this is by far the strongest and most viable method of achieving objectives of the program and the Army. It is well to remember that smart people who thought they were doing the right thing have, in the past, done some dumb things. Without an open-minded approach, the DASC may be a party in allowing a dumb thing to proceed unencumbered to its date with destiny, which may not be in the Army's best interests. The open-minded approach is a dangerous approach for the weak in spirit, because it definitely leads to internal conflict. It may mean a possible reassessment of one's original position if, after thorough evaluation of the criticism, there appears to be a better solution. This reassessment would then have to be resolved with the DASC's boss and the PM prior to officially changing the original position. This may even be compounded by a short suspense date for completion of the action or resolution of the issue. Such is the type of daily dilemma which often confronts the DASC.

It is important that momentum be established early and that the program maintain that momentum once established. Doing this means staying in step with the PM, or perhaps phrased more correctly, to keep the PM in step with the dictates and desires of Congress, OSD and HQDA. To do this, the DASC must be able to identify the critical path to fielding early and ensure that the program momentum, especially along that critical path, is maintained. It is up to him to keep the PM from becoming overprotective

of the program, and to keep it moving along the critical path, even when problems threaten. The DASC has the requirement to plan ahead and the vantage point that should allow him to do so. His familiarity with the acquisition cycle, his intimate knowledge of his program, and his information base should allow him to anticipate most problems prior to their occurance so that he and the PM can develop timely counterstrategies.

Even though this paper has discussed at length the relationship between the DASC and the PM, and that both should have the same program objectives, it must be recognized that the DASC's first loyalty belongs to his boss at HQDA. He must be responsive to his boss, and provide him the data necessary to make the hard decisions. This is no job for a "yes" man, because many of these decisions require extensive, difficult discussions if the best interests of the Army are to be satisfied. The DASC has developed confidences which he cannot afford to betray in these discussions. Yet he must often use information from these sources to allow his boss to make the best decision. He may be faced with a dichotomy of pressing for his program or allowing a different program, which may be more important to the Army, get priority for a limited amount of funds. A difficult moral decision may have to be made as to the proper action. Once a decision is made, even though it may have been opposed by the PM and/or the DASC, it is up to the DASC to tactfully persuade the PM to fully support the decision, and attempt to achieve the best possible results from what may be a less than desirable task or situation. Through all of this, he should keep a sense of humor, because things can always get worse.

Oral Presentation.

In addition to being an open-minded advocate who drives his program

through much of the daily bureaucratic maze of the Pentagon, the DASC also has the job of selling his program. He must be an articulate, persuasive briefer who can communicate with individuals at all echelons on very short notice and with minimal preparation. He must have in his files three or four briefings with slides that can be adapted within five minutes for presentation at any level of HQDA, OSD or Congress. This requires not only a complete grasp of all aspects of program expertise, but the ability to translate that expertise, using layman's language, into a saleable product even, to a hostile audience. Again, the information base can be an invaluable asset here by allowing the DASC to know the concerns of his audience, and then being able to address these concerns in the briefing. In many of these briefings, eye contact and ability to "read the audience" is extremely important. Anticipation and perception of the mood of the audience can't be overemphasized if the DASC is going to succeed in selling his program. Proficiency in this area can be improved with practice. The DASC must remain cool, even in trying situations, and not allow frustrations to interfere with his effectiveness. He must also believe very strongly in his program and be able to support it using unemotional, irrefutable logic if he is to succeed against the hostile audience.

A couple aspects of program expertise which deserve slightly increased emphasis are those of the need, the technology and their interrelationship. The DASC must be able, not only to translate these into layman's language, but also be able to paint a vivid, verbal picture of the validity of the need and the program, why his program is the most appropriate marriage of the technology with the need, and where it belongs in the overall Army and DoD scheme. This picture must be communicated in such a way that it will

be accepted by the key personnel being briefed.

Ability to write was discussed earlier, so will not be repeated here, except to emphasize that proficiency in this area is no less important than the proficiency in speaking.

Responsiveness.

Another area that influences a DASC's credibility is his responsiveness to requirements and requests for information. A basic prerequisite here is for the DASC to have a clear understanding of research and development language/terminology so that he can understand the request. He must also be familiar with the expected format of the reply, so that he can provide the proper response in the correct format. Both are important. The correct response using the wrong format will result in an opportunity to redo the paper in the correct format.

The DASC should know the source of the request and recognize its relative importance. The multitude of demands on the DASC often dictate that some tasks be delayed while more important tasks are completed. The source of the request will usually be a factor in determining priority of response. When the response is prepared, the DASC must ensure it is consistent with the HQDA position, PM objectives and other program documentation such as the SAR and the descriptive summary. The information must be accurate and current. The response must be as timely as the priority dictates. A request cannot be completely disregarded without potential of future problems resulting. The response must also comply with the request, without volunteering information in areas not addressed by the request. Each request is usually for a specific purpose and requires specific information, often in a specific format. The perceptive DASC will anticipate many of these requirements and requests for information, and will

become very adept at cutting and pasting from existing papers in the files. This allows him to satisfy many of these requests in a short time with minimal effort.

Action - Not Reaction.

The credible DASC is one who has the ability to see and understand the "big picture" and not become inundated with minutia. He will look ahead and ensure that his program plan is continually adjusted to meet and overcome potential challenges in an optimal manner. He is a planner, a driver and a doer as the requirements dictate. Often he may be doing all three simultaneously. The good DASC does his homework thoroughly and completely in order to be prepared for the crises which he anticipates and which inevitably happen. In the pressure packed arena where requirements far outdistance resources, he is able to prioritize his activities and budget his time so that the important activities always get done in time to influence the action. He recognizes those things he can change and proceeds to change them if appropriate. The good DASC also knows that he cannot afford to have a "wait and see" attitude, because this will result in him losing control of the situation, which leads to disaster. Rather, he stays on the attack, believing that the best defense is a good offense.

Style.

Each DASC must use the style that is most effective for him. It must be genuine. An artificial style is quickly perceived by many with whom the DASC works regularly, with a resultant loss of credibility. The DASC's style must enable him to function effectively amid almost constant confusion. It must be a style that encourages him to accept any responsibilities offered, and to perform at full speed under constant pressure, because the short suspenses and pressure are always present. His style

must allow the DASC the opportunity to frequently rise above the din, take an objective view of the situation, and reorient on his basic objectives. Otherwise, he will tend to become ineffective. The din is great and continuous. The DASC cannot be an alarmist, but must be able to perceive threats to his program and to take appropriate actions quickly. He must have a style that is adaptable, so that he can effectively react to widely varying situations. He will most probably be faced with a wide range of problems. His style should lead the DASC to avoid confrontation if possible, yet enable him to achieve his relatively inflexible basic objectives. Above all, the DASC must have a style with which he is comfortable, yet allows him to retain his perspective of things as they really are.

Some of the style characteristics discussed above involved ability to operate effectively under pressure. This also requires effective time management. Time seems to be one of the most scarce resources available to the DASC. The following ideas [35]/ are suggested as possible aids to the DASC in gaining and maintaining control of his time:

1. Prepare a written list each night of things which must be accomplished the next day. Prioritize the list and keep it on the desk. Do the items in order of priority as time allows. Check off each item as it is completed.

2. Try to block out time each day, or every second day, to meet informally with your counterpart in OUSDRE, OASA(RDA) and ODCSOPS. Program and quantify this time. Do not allow it to be open ended.

3. Block out time each day for a discussion with the PM. Make notes of items to be discussed and record answers. This time should be quantified.

4. Keep a list of questions which need to be answered, and set a block of time each day to call the appropriate source for information on these questions. This time should be quantified.

5. Try to arrange your schedule so that a period of 60-90 minutes each day is set aside for written work on actions being prepared for staffing. During this period accept only "crisis" phone calls. Have the secretary take the message on the others, and return the call later the same day.

6. Arrange a quantified block of up to 60 minutes to review documents, reports, proposals, etc. Phone calls should be handled as in 5 above. It may be best to schedule both 5 and 6 for the morning hours.

7. Arrange a quantified block of 30-45 minutes each day, or every second day, to handle unexpected requirements. If none are received, use this time to complete as many items off the priority list as possible.

8. Arrange visits by contractors to preclude interference with the quiet work time. The afternoon may be most appropriate for these visits.

9. Take some action on each incoming paper immediately, even if that action is no more than filing the paper in a "hold" file. Move all papers out of the "in" basket within three days, either by completing the action, filing (to include hold file), or destruction. When an item has been in the hold file for a year without action or adverse impact, it should be moved either to destruction or to the permanent file.

10. Organize your filing system within 60 days after assuming your

DASC duties. Keep it up to date. File items immediately.

11. Plan for meetings so that when they are held you can move quickly toward the objective. Ensure that the objectives of the meeting are clearly understood by all attendees.

There is also a word of caution about style. The style must be one that does <u>not</u> allow the DASC to take chances on security. The short suspenses, heavy pressure, and large amount of classified material all tempt a DASC to take short cuts to meet suspenses. However, there are two don'ts the author strongly recommends:

1. Don't leave the xerox machine without double checking to ensure that all papers have been removed from both the output basket and the reproduction glass.

2. Don't ever put any classified paper in your desk drawer. In fact, keep papers of any kind in the desk to a bare minimum.

There have been several extremely promising careers abruptly terminated because an outstanding DASC was trying to get a paper somewhere quickly and overlooked a classified paper still in the xerox. Or perhaps he was running to catch the last bus and didn't make a thorough security check, resulting in a classified document being left outside the safe. The carelessness, or inattention to detail, especially in a fast moving, pressure packed situation, just isn't worth the price. Sharply hone your security habits.

This chapter has focused on the factors impacting on DASC credibility. As can be seen, credibility originates with the factors discussed in Chapters II, III and IV, and culminates with some additional things that are extremely important. The road to credibility is rocky, steep and arduous to travel, but it is the only one that leads a DASC to success.

CHAPTER VI

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DASC

The dichotomy a DASC may face when determining the best interest of his program versus the best interest of the Army is further complicated by a perceived conflict between his responsibilities to HQDA versus his responsibilities to the PM. The degree of this latter apparent conflict depends on the DASC's credibility, his ability to work with people, and his ability to skillfully use the various personal and bureaucratic tools available to him. This chapter will outline duties he must perform to support HQDA and the PM, some relationships between the two sets of duties, and suggestions on how to minimize any perceived conflicts.

Areas of Responsibility to HQDA.

The essence of all the DASC functions listed in AR 70-16 is that he is the DA Program Orchestrator for his assigned program.$\underline{36}/$ To effectively orchestrate his program the DASC must completely support the program using an open-minded approach, total program expertise and a thorough knowledge of the bureaucracy, as previously discussed. If he does not believe in the program and support it completely, he should recommend termination and/or be transferred to other duties at the earliest possible date.

1. Represent the Program: In order to orchestrate his program, the DASC must be able to represent the PM on any aspect of the program. He is the PM's representative on the Army Staff. However, issues and strategies must be discussed and wargamed with the PM prior to the DASC stating the PM's position. He cannot afford to abuse the privilege of speaking for the PM, or unilaterally attempt to change the program. This is a good way for the DASC to destroy his credibility quickly.

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As the program orchestrator, the DASC must be able to represent the program at any time. This requires that he be articulate in speaking and writing, know his subject and audience, and provide only that information requested. It is usually counterproductive to be too wordy or to address irrelevant issues of the program. The decision makers and other information requestors cannot afford the luxury, nor do they wish to have the DASC prove how smart he is with each paper or in every briefing. They do want the representation of the program to be timely, accurate and presented in an understandable manner. The ability of the DASC to effectively represent the program on short notice allows the PM to devote more of his time to program management rather than presenting a continuous road show. Obviously, the only way the DASC can respond effectively is to have total program expertise.

2. Make Recommendations. The DASC will continually be making recommendations on the various aspects of his program. The recommendations may be in the form of funding requests, answers to questions, response to issues or concerns, or, perhaps more subtly, in the form of information papers. Recommendations also occur as the result of inaction by the DASC, such as failure to request funds, failure to address issues or concerns or responding too late or improperly to requests for information. Inactions are usually negative responses.

3. Discipline Process: In program orchestration, a DASC disciplines the system: (1) through taskings and directives he prepares; (2) with reviews, briefings, and meetings which he recommends; and (3) through documentation he prepares and/or reviews. These taskings are normally discussed in detail with the PM prior to issue. The degree of HQDA program direction varies depending on OSD or Congressional interest,

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program potential, size or track record, and position in the acquisition cycle. These factors, in effect, determine the form and amount of program discipline the DASC will administer.

4. Organize Support. The DASC organizes program support by getting maximum benefit from the PPBS, ensuring that all issues and concerns are properly addressed, and through timely, effective program representation. He also uses phone calls and visits to organize support. Constant interface with all elements directly involved in the program, and many who are only indirectly involved, is the best way to keep people involved and to ferret out concerns or reservations. It can also provide an understanding of the personalities, individual and organization biases, and the pressures affecting those personalities and organizations, that interact with the program. An open-mind is just as important in these phone conversations and visits as it is in other daily Pentagon activity.

5. Be a Team Member. Regardless of the aspect of program orchestration, the DASC has to function as a team member. His position carries a significant amount of influence and prestige which, if used judiciously, can be converted into strong leverage for his program. The position and attendant responsibilities require that all his requests and/or actions be based on bona-fide needs, logical reasons and mature judgement. He cannot afford to make unreasonable requests or idle threats. If the DASC flaunts his authority and/or position, his effectiveness will be quickly and seriously eroded. This can adversely impact his program.

6. Collect Information. A major part of program orchestration is collection and collation of information. This provides the basis for many actions and program recommendations. These actions and recommendations must be based on truth and facts. Basing them on half-truths, misrepresen-

tations or wishes can result in disaster for even a strong program. The DASC should also be aware that regardless of the information source or validity, once the DASC states a position based on that information, the position belongs to him. It is his to defend. An attempt to transfer responsibility for the position to someone else is either useless or counterproductive. The DASC must therefore be convinced he is taking the right position, and understand how to support it. Information credibility is often a function of reaction time available to provide the information. In requesting information the DASC should allow maximum possible time for outside input or taskings. Ensure that those sources know they have maximum preparation time, and understand the impact if they are late. When transmitting information, try to transmit its degree of credibility if possible.

7. Provide information: The ability to prioritize without panic, to include knowing when to react fast and when to do research, is an essential attribute of a successful DASC. All requests are not of equal importance. It is impossible to give them all equal time, or to answer all of them immediately or in detail. In his prioritization the DASC considers the source of the request, probable impact on the program, availability of information required for the response and other requirements he may have. The prioritization must often be done very quickly in order to favorably influence the suspense date assigned to the request. This means the DASC also has to be able to think and plan on the move, and to mentally store many facts for instant recall. There is little or no time to sit and plan, or react in a deliberate manner. It sometimes seems as if the telephone never stops ringing, or that requests never cease. Often the only way the DASC can get quiet to complete a priority task on time is to take his work

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to the Army Library, or to work after duty hours, or on Saturday or Sunday.

8. Synthesize Information. A significant factor in the success of his program orchestration effort is the DASC's ability to synthesize information based on his program expertise, knowledge of the bureaucracy, the political atmosphere, potential issues, and guidance he has been given. This ability must be constantly used and finely honed until it becomes second nature. The insight and perception gained when the synthesis process is based on logic and facts is usually very reliable, and provides a key ingredient to program success. Failure here, often places the DASC in a reaction role and causes a loss of DASC credibility. A DASC credibility loss results in more demands on the PM for briefings or information, particularly by OSD, thereby detracting from his time available for program management. Increased direct interface between the PM and OSD may reduce the information available to the DASC and the timeliness of HQDA guidance to the PM. This quickly reduces the DASC's effectiveness, and increases the probability of divergence between the program goals of the PM and those of HQDA, causing an adverse impact on the program. Any program is driven in large measure by funds availability, and HQDA normally provides funds to support only those goals acceptable to HQDA. A DASC neither wants, nor can afford, major differences between HQDA and PM goals.

9. Conduct Meetings/Reviews. One of the primary tools the DASC will use to orchestrate the program is the scheduling and/or conducting of meetings. He will be responsible for recommending the meeting or review, the subject, the participants, the time, and the place. Once the recommendation is approved the DASC will organize the meeting/review, and sometimes even conduct it. For the meeting to be worthwhile, the purpose and objectives of the meeting must be clearly defined and understood by all

participants prior to the meeting. This can be done in the tasking message

for the meeting. During the meeting, the leader will need to prevent

confusion and misunderstanding, and to keep the discussion productive.

This requires thorough briefing of the leader on all aspects of the subject

prior to the meeting to ensure he thoroughly understands the subject,

probable issues and probable positions of all participants. Following the

meeting, minutes should be prepared and dispatched to all participants

within a very few days. These minutes should include items discussed,

results of discussion, any issues left unresolved, any taskings, and

suspense dates for those taskings.

Some worthwhile guidelines for conducting a meeting or review include:37/

    a. Start the meeting on time.

    b. Have an agenda and follow it.

    c. Seating arrangement is important.

    d. Control the talkative.

    e. Draw out the silent.

    f. Protect the weak.

    g. Encourage the clash of ideas.

    h. Watch out for suggestion-squashing reflex.

    i. Close on a note of achievement.

It is important that the DASC have a reasonable and achievable

objective for recommending a meeting or review. He must ensure appropriate

participation through his recommendation, tasking, and prior coordination.

He must also ensure his boss isn't surprised at the meeting. The DASC

should know what will be briefed, and the probable positions of all

briefers prior to the meeting. He must recognize and adhere to the limits

of his authority, both in organizing and in conducting a meeting or review.

He must also learn the mechanics of reserving and preparing a room for a briefing. This just can't be left to chance. Mistakes in the little things can cause big problems.

Areas of Responsibility to the PM.

1. Policy Advisor. Although the use of the DASC will vary with the PM, the DASC normally has four broad areas of responsibility to the PM. One is as a major policy advisor to the PM. His position in the decision making process, his daily interface with the key decision makers, and his participation in the policy formulation process provide unique insights into current thinking, trends and pressures of HQDA, OSD and Congress which can be immediately transmitted to the PM. These insights are extremely important to the PM because they allow him to adjust his program in a timely manner in order to be responsive to new guidance, or to thoroughly assess impacts of inappropriate changes and be able to present strong, timely rebuttals to those change proposals. The effectiveness of the DASC's information base is a critical element in this policy advisory role. He must be acutely attuned to the political situation and participants as they impact on his program, and he must know immediately when and why they change. The same need applies to concerns and potential issues. This information is discussed with the PM on a daily basis. The ability to anticipate these changes and issues is of critical importance to both the DASC and the PM.

The DASC also provides the PM information on related programs, and gives ideas on the importance and possible areas of relationship of these to the PM's program. The PM is then in a position to conduct appropriate investigations to determine possible areas of cooperation or technology transfer between the programs. As a final part of his advisory role, the

DASC ensures the PM completely understands the HQDA position and guidance pertaining to his program. It is imperative that the HQDA and PM program goals be the same. The DASC and PM must exert every effort to prevent surprises from occurring between them, and to keep their goals the same.

2. Strategy Formulation. A second broad area is to assist the PM in formulation of program strategy. This is related to the advisory role in that the pressures of HQDA, OSD, and Congress are provided to the PM by the DASC. It differs in that the impacts of these pressures are wargamed on the current program and on selected alternative strategies in an effort to anticipate any need for change. These selected alternatives are then considered with respect to funding needs, and whether any required funding changes can be accommodated. If so, how. This process will certainly identify the critical path and ensure that planning is done to support the critical path requirements. These sessions offer an excellent opportunity for the DASC to ensure that he has no conflict between his responsibilities to HQDA and to the PM if he can convey to the PM the true meaning of HQDA guidance and the need to follow it.

The DASC also assists in formulation of program strategy by influencing the amount and type of "help" the PM gets in determining program direction. If there is a difference in HQDA and PM goals, the requirements for explanations by the PM, and the advice he gets from both the decision makers and those in positions of authority without program responsibility will significantly increase. A proficient DASC can eliminate much of this if he is doing his job and has gotten the PM to aline his goals with those of HQDA. However, if the PM is trying to pursue a strategy without solid, supportable rationale, perhaps he needs additional "help" or guidance in adjusting his perspective.

The DASC assists in formulation of ASARC alternatives. This may be an area of significant initial differences between the DASC and the PM. However, the DASC has the responsibility to ensure that the alternatives cover all options, and that they are stated in a manner that allows them to be defended through the ASARC/DSARC process. He cannot allow the PM to exclude alternatives just as a program protective device. This is often counter-productive. The DASC also has the obligation to question the PM on rationale for selection of the preferred alternative, and to ensure it is supportable. However, the DASC must be extremely careful, in all his actions and assistance, not to ursurp the power or perogatives of the PM. He should rely heavily on friendly persuasion. The PM has final responsibility for the results of the program strategy.

3. Maintain Urgency. The DASC must maintain a sense of urgency in the program. He should resist changes to the program that lengthen the schedule or increase the cost. These reduce program credibility and make it more difficult to defend in the HQDA, OSD, and Congressional arena. The DASC can use several of his tools here, such as recommending special program reviews to key decision makers, providing inadequate justification for funding requests or not acting on reprograming needs for a change. These should be done with the full knowledge of his boss and the PM, and only when he has very defensible rationale for doing so.

4. Apply Leverage. The fourth area of responsibility to the PM is for the DASC to use his leverage as appropriate to assist the PM. This can be done as a normal part of his HQDA responsibilities such as presenting program briefings to various staff elements at HQDA, OSD or Congress. He consistently supports the program goals and objectives at these levels. If it is necessary for the PM to appear at HQDA, OSD or Congress, the DASC

can ensure this occurs in a timely manner before the situation gets out of hand. However, the thrust should be to reduce these demands to a minimum.

Influencing the funds available to the PM is another way the DASC applies leverage. He makes quick reaction trade-offs to achieve the proper funding availability. These should be discussed with the PM in strategy sessions prior to the action if possible. If not, then the PM must be notified of the action at the earliest possible time.

The DASC can also influence the actions of TRADOC, DARCOM or other agencies by recommending taskings, directives, reviews, and meetings, or through informal lobbying via phone calls. These are very powerful tools which are not otherwise readily available to the PM. In addition, the DASC assists in determining the degree of program visibility at HQDA, OSD and Congress. This visibility may vary depending upon the stage of development and the program activities underway. It is influenced by such things as participants at briefings, reviews, or meetings, with activity reports, visits to test sites, distribution of test results and availability of other types of documentation. The degree of visibility to be aimed for should result from the strategy formulation with the PM. The DASC will then execute the strategy at HQDA and OSD. It is important to be able to accurately judge the probabilities of program success before determining visibility goals.

The DASC, through participation in studies, and as a member of study advisory groups (SAG), project advisory groups (PAG), panels or working groups can certainly exert leverage to assist the PM. The most common ways are to support program goals, provide rationale from the Pentagon environment that supports the preferred course of action, and be able to clearly articulate why other alternatives are less desirable courses of

action. When studies must come to HQDA for approval, the DASC has the option of recommending that DCSRDA non-concur if the basic methodology or approach is incorrect. He has a responsibility to make his position and the rationale to support his position known to the SAG chairman at the earliest possible date. He must also keep his boss informed of any concerns he may have, and ensure they become a matter of record very early.

A final area of leverage available to the DASC is the responsibility to coordinate all activities and most primary documents necessary to complete development. This can be a tremendous lever, because it gives the DASC the opportunity to make final recommendations of wording of the documents being submitted for approval. If he has really done his homework, the coordination process provides the vehicle to get his program approved in a form that is most readily defended.

The apparent conflict between DASC responsibilities to HQDA and the PM need be no more than that if he understands his priorities, stands by his guns, and tactfully convinces the PM that his program objectives must coincide with the program objectives of HQDA. Herein lies one of the major challenges of being a DASC.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

The DASC is a prominent and influencial member of the Program Development and Acquisition Management Team for his assigned program. Yet his role is paradoxical. His responsibilities include supporting or defending a program, yet severely questioning that same program; urging the PM to use all possible haste in achieving a required capability, yet convincing his boss that the program must be slowed down to prevent impending disaster; admonishing the PM to stay within the approved program funding profile, yet using all his wiles to justify the need for additional funds when he believes it is in the best interest of the Army and the program; developing a belief in a program that encompasses the full range of his emotions, yet sustaining that belief through logic and facts; always rushing to meet impossible suspenses, yet never too busy to talk to someone about the most important program in the Army; usually carrying an almost impossible work load, yet always willing to accept additional work if it will help his program; and continually being faced with the most frustrating or maddening decisions imaginable, yet being able to retain a sense of humor and laugh at adversity.

The Air Force suggests that "the Legislative Program and Budget Cycle keeps rolling along; it does not stop to provide time for the uninitiated. Every new (DASC) must be ready to produce immediately and do it in an efficient and orderly manner. There is no time to 'practice'."[38]/ This is all true. Yet the DASC does practice daily and the uninitiated do become initiated and do survive. The speed with which they become initiated has a direct impact on their assigned program - the faster, the better.

This paper has presented, through the eyes of a former DASC, as leavened with some very sage advice from many very fine and knowledgeable individuals, some of the things a DASC can do to reduce this initiation period. It is imperative that he know the procedures used to fund programs and how decisions affecting those programs are made. He must learn the bureaucracy and how to use it to his advantage. Bureaucracy is not necessarily a dirty word. The DASC must gain program expertise as explained in Chapter IV. This will probably not come easy. It requires hard work and constant study. He must build a high degree of credibility. His success here will have a direct impact on his efficiency, or lack thereof. An ability to speak and to write articulately are essential. The DASC must continually strive to improve in these areas, regardless of his proficiency. He should never hesitate to use a dictionary, a thesaurus or even a grammar book. They can be the most valuable aids he has. And most importantly, he must be able to work with people, to place himself in the other person's position and to communicate. Only in this way can the big puzzle be fitted together.

"The high achiever needs the organizational climate and capability to sustain, or hopefully, to increase his measure of contribution. Satisfaction and liking for the job are strongly dependent upon this."[39/] The DCSRDA provides such an organization, and the DASC jobs provide the opportunity and challenge.

The author is convinced that there is no place in the Army where a major or lieutenant colonel can make a greater contribution or exert a greater impact on the Army if he is willing to enter the arena every day and to pay the price. The price is high, but the payoff is rewarding and exhilarating.

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PARTICIPANT:	ADVISOR:	DATE:
LTC Alex J. Jennson (Army)	MAJ Joseph Salvitti	8 Nov 77

STUDY PROJECT TITLE: Reflections on Being A Department of the Army Systems Coordinator (DASC)

OVERALL PURPOSE OF PROJECT: (What plan to learn and Why) To understand, from a program development and acquisition viewpoint, the principal formal and informal responsibilities and relationships of the DASC necessary to maximize his effectiveness and efficiency as a member of the program management team.

SPECIFIC STUDY PROJECT GOALS: (to be achieved or questions to be answered)
To identify, define and provide an insight into the principal formal and informal responsibilities and relationships necessary for the DASC to function effectively and efficiently as a member of the program management team during system development and acquisition.

PROJECT AND REPORT BODY ALTERNATIVE TO BE USED: Formal Report

STUDY METHODS TO BE USED AND DATA SOURCES:

Survey of literature and regulations.
Interviews with Project Managers and members of DARCOM, DA and OSD Staffs.
Instructors and course material.

TENTATIVE OUTLINE OF PROJECT REPORT: (Be as specific as possible.)
I.   Introduction - Purpose, scope, limitations, organization of report.
II.   Program Funding.
III.   Decision Making.
IV.   Program Expertise.
V.   DASC Credibility.
VI.   Duties of the DASC
VII.   Summary.

KEY MILESTONES: (Include schedule to typist.)
Document and literature search completed	wk 7
Interviews completed.	wk 10
First draft submitted.	wk 14
Report ready for typing.	wk 15
Report completed.	wk 17)

Progress review milestones: Weeks 7, 10, 14   .

DEFENSE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT COLLEGE

STUDY TITLE: REFLECTIONS ON BEING A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS
COORDINATOR (DASC).

STUDY PROJECT GOALS:

To provide a description and appreciation of the daily operational environment
in which the DASC must function; methods, procedures and techniques he can use
to function efficiently and effectively; and how these can be used to fulfill
his responsibilities to HQDA and the Project Manager (PM) with minimum conflict.

STUDY REPORT ABSTRACT:

The purpose of this paper is to provide the DASC, and other members of the
research, development and acquisition field, a brief explanation of: the
various elements of the daily environment in which the DASC must work, the
importance of each and how they influence his actions; the basis of the
expertise and credibility the DASC must possess, and how these relate to
and can be used in conjunction with the environment to produce effective
results; and the responsibilities of the DASC to HQDA and the PM. the rela-
tionship of each to his environment, expertise and credibility, and how
potential conflicts between these responsibilities can be minimized. Elements
of the environment include the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System
(PPBS); the Congressional Process; the ASARC/DSARC Process; and the Decision
Making Process.

The paper was prepared using previous personal experience, latest written
documents, and interviews with present and former PMs, and members of the
DARCOM, HQDA and OSD staffs. It is intended to supplement the education and
training of the DASC, and to provide other members of the program management
team an appreciation of the factors which influence the DASC's actions. It
should help newly assigned DASC's to quickly understand and appreciate their
role as members of the management team, thereby minimizing adverse impact on
their program because of inexperience.

SUBJECT DESCRIPTORS:

Program/Project Management, Major Policies	10.02.01.00
Major Acquisition Policies	11.00.00.00
PPBS	12.00.00.00

NAME, RANK, SERVICE	CLASS	DATE
Alex J. Johnson, LTC, USA	PMC 77-2	November 1977