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
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


VI CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL



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STENOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT

VI

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of the

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

FIFTH PUBLICATION

STENOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT

REPORTS

about the

USSR and VKP(B)

CONCLUDING WORK

STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE

MOSCOW 1929 Leningrad

THE FORTY-FIRST SESSION

22nd of August, 1928

The report of Comrade Vargi on the economic condition of the USSR. Statements of Comrades Sikander Sur and Murphy. Chairman - Comrade Pyatintskiy

REPORT OF COMRADE VARGI

The age in which we live is an age of the decay of capitalism, of a dying capitalism, and at the same time is an age of the proletarian revolution. The fact of stabilization in no way changes the basic line of development. In this age the revolutionary proletariat is transforming into revolutionary armies, finding itself under the sole leadership of the Communist Party. The creation of these revolutionary armies is found in a variety of countries in various stages of development. In some countries the revolutionary ranks have only begun to close and in others the struggling proletariat has already accumulated significant fighting experience. In one country, the Soviet Union, the proletariat has already won victory, overthrown the bourgeoisie and taken into its own hands the power of state.

The usurpation of authority by the proletariat in the USSR changed the methods of the struggle in a radical way: these methods of struggle are being adapted by the proletariat in those countries where the power of state is still found in the hands of the bourgeoisie; other methods are found in the Soviet Union where the working class is found in power. But the class struggle continues in this age of dictatorship. The age of the proletarian dictatorship does not bring with it the end of the class struggle, but rather a different aspect of this struggle. It would be completely mistaken to assume that in the Soviet Union the class struggle no longer exists. In the

USSR methods of armed class struggle, typical for capitalist countries, are still being employed. I want to remind you that in the Soviet Union a week does not pass that somewhere a workers' correspondent or a village correspondent has not been killed by elements hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. The proletarian regime on its side is compelled to employ capital punishment against its enemies. Thus even the most acute forms of the struggle find their application in the Soviet Union right up to the present day. Nevertheless, comrades, the class struggle on the whole and the goals of the class struggle in the Soviet Union bear a different character than in the capitalist countries.

In the capitalist countries the proletariat is fighting against the capitalist state; in the USSR the proletariat is defending the state power and is defending the proletarian state. In the capitalist countries we are for revolution; in the USSR we are for evolution, for internal peace, and for the peaceful development of socialism. In the capitalist countries we are for the destruction of the capitalist system; in the Soviet Union we are conducting work for the transformation of the class society into a socialist one, and later into a communist one. In the capitalist countries we are the principal opponents of any class collaboration; in the USSR we stand up, on the contrary, for the cooperation of classes, and the union between the proletariat and the wide mass of laboring peasants forms the foundation of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union. This foundation, which Lenin underscored in all of his essays, constitutes the peculiarity of the dictatorship in the USSR. This is explained by the fact that in the Soviet Union there are approximately 60 million gainfully employed people in agriculture, whereas the number of workers in heavy industry comprise at best 5 million. It is by

this that the particular form of class struggle has been evoked in the USSR, a struggle for these crucial sections of the working peasantry. The struggle is being conducted, not against these sections, but against the capitalist elements and it is being carried on in the name of that one, who must by himself lead these millions of the masses of the laboring peasants. In his essays Lenin has underscored countless times this peculiarity of the situation in the Soviet Union. He warned continually about the possibility of conflict between the laboring peasants and the proletariat. In his last speech to the IV Congress of the Communist International, while talking about the conditions preceding the introduction of the NEP, he noted the following:

"That was the first and, I hope, the last time in the history of Soviet Russia when the large mass of peasantry was instinctively, although not consciously, against us in their mood." (First edition, vol. XVIII, part 2, page 90.)

But still earlier in his speech about a natural tax at the X Congress of the VKP(B), Lenin wrote the following:

"It is impossible to deceive the classes ... we must place the questions forthrightly; the interests of the classes are different; the petty farmer does not want that which the worker wants.

We know that only agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia, while revolutions have not as yet advanced in other countries... The peasantry, by the shape of its attitude which has been established in our country, in its discontent does not want this kind of alignment and will not exist longer in this way. This is indisputable. This will of the peasantry has expressed itself pointedly. This is the

will of the enormous mass of the working population. We must consider this and we are sufficiently sober politicians to say directly; let us reconsider." (Vol. XVIII, part 1, page 138.)

Despite the class struggle, there even exists in the Soviet Union a certain cooperation with the capitalist class. In the economy of the USSR the capitalist elements still fulfill several functions at the present time, since the socialist economy is not yet able to achieve its realization. Therefore, despite the struggle, cooperation exists simultaneously with the capitalists, a cooperation limited by the interests of the proletarian dictatorship, but all the same, cooperation. In one of his last articles in 1923 Lenin wrote:

"Of course in our Soviet Republic there is a social order based on the cooperation of two classes, the workers and the peasants, a cooperation in which the NEP participants, i.e. the bourgeoisie, are now tolerated under well-known circumstances. If there should arise serious disagreement between these classes, then a schism would be inevitable, but in our social order one finds that there is no basis for such a schism." (Vol. XVIII, part 2, page 115.)

Thus, comrades, the speech is about cooperation with an hostile class, subject to certain limits, and about cooperation with the peasant masses, it being presupposed that in every social layer in the Soviet Union there is not one moment inevitably leading to a break between the working class and the laboring peasantry. You can see how different the circumstances of the class struggle are in the capitalist countries and in the Soviet Union.

But the revolution in the Soviet Union and the proletarian dictatorship nevertheless comprise a part of the world revolution. The proletariat of the USSR represents only one of the squadrons of the world proletarian army, being a part of the international proletariat in its struggle with the world bourgeoisie. This is why it is absolutely necessary that the general staff of this army, the Congress of the Communist International, has a clear and accurate idea about the position of this first proletarian state and about the position of the principal army of the world revolution. Single leadership of the struggle is inconceivable if all the separate armies are vague about what is occurring in the fortress of the proletarian revolution. This is why I am attempting, inasmuch as it is possible in general for a foreigner, to sketch for you with complete clarity and with the greatest sincerity all that is occurring in the USSR. This is all the more necessary, since from the very origin of the Soviet Union the capitalist and social-democratic press has reported continuously about the decisive crises of the proletarian dictatorship. The smallest difficulty encountered by the USSR swells at once into a dreadful crisis. Of course, difficulties do exist in the USSR. I will dwell on these in detail later. But in the first place we should speak about the gigantic successes which the Soviet Union and the proletariat of the USSR have achieved during the last four years, from the time of the V All-World Congress, and in comparison with which existing troubles are relatively insignificant. I will elucidate in my report:

1. The economic successes of the last four years.
2. The growth of socialist elements in Soviet society.
3. An analysis of the class situation.
4. Present difficulties.
5. Perspectives of further development.

Economic Successes of the Last Few Years

I will begin with the successes of the last few years. These successes prove, despite the assertions of the bourgeoisie and the social-democrats, that the proletariat is really in a condition to manage and to further develop the productive forces created by capitalism. The successes of the USSR show that for the future history of mankind the capitalists are superfluous and that they represent an obstacle on the road of further development. The successes of the USSR attest to the fact that capitalism is a transient historical category. They prove this not only in theory but in fact as well. The grand construction of the last years makes this fact indisputable for every worker. In 1921 Lenin suggested that "the reconstruction of heavy industry will take no less than ten years and, with our poverty, will probably take longer." We may establish here that this is one of the few instances when Lenin was mistaken. The restoration of heavy industry did not last ten years, but much less. At the present time we can state factually that the reconstruction of the Soviet economy has been completed and that production has exceeded the pre-war level. A period of reconstruction of the entire economy has begun.

a.) The dimensions of production


Diagram no. 1 below pictures the development of production for the entire post-war period.

Diagram no. 1¹

1. Diagrams on the situation in the USSR are worked out according to data from GOSPLAN; comparison of international situations are by the "Institute of World Economy and Politics" in Moscow.

VALUE of PRODUCTION of the NATIONAL ECONOMY of the USSR in PERCENTAGES

к 1913 г. (1913 г. — 100 %).



The white line with black dots represents production as a whole, the black line shows industrial production and the black line with white dots describes agricultural production. The figures are calculated in such a way that the quantity of the most important products is multiplied by pre-war prices. You can see a very sharp fall in production during the revolution right up to 1920 and a strong increase after 1921, near the end of the civil war and during the transition to the New Economic Policy.¹

You see here a straight black line. It represents the pre-war level of production. You see also that production has crossed over the pre-war level.

1. The table and diagram give only very approximate data, since the computation of the portion of pre-war production arrived at for territory presently in the USSR presents particularly acute methodological difficulties. But this obstacle, of course, is not reflected in the general line of development.

You see simultaneously a difference in the position of industrial and agricultural production; in comparison with the pre-war period, industrial production is now significantly higher than agricultural. On this matter we must speak further. In the course of the last four years the growth of production assumed enormous dimensions. Allow me to cite several figures. The cost of agricultural products has been worked out according to the pre-war prices.²

<u>Years</u>	<u>Billions of Rubles</u>
1925	10.3
1925/26 ...	12.3
1926/27 ...	12.8
1927/28 ...	13.2 ³

The value of industrial production according to pre-war costs is compared below.

<u>Years</u>	<u>Billions of Rubles</u>
1924/25	5.0
1925/26	6.9
1926/27	7.8
1927/28	8.9

2. Data is taken from the control figures of GOSPLAN for 1927/28.

3. Data for the current economic year is taken from "Control Figures". The economic year ends Sept. 30, so that only the figures for the first 8-10 months of this year are known at the present time. The final total, most likely, exceeds several planned projections, especially in relation to industrial production.


In agriculture the growth of production compiled from year to year was 19%, 4% and 3% respectively; in industry - 39%, 14% and 13%. The delay in the rate of growth evidenced in these figures is a natural consequence of the circumstance in which we must no longer set in motion the old means of production inherited from capitalism; but rather, we must create new means of production ourselves.

Diagram 2 and 2a show the dimensions of the production of certain crucial industrial goods.

Diagram no. 2

PRODUCTION of the MOST IMPORTANT GOODS of STATE INDUSTRY in the USSR

Manufacture of the means of production Production of the means of consumption



oil cast iron kerosene/1,000 tons sugar/1,000 tons

coal cotton cloth/mil. meters wool cloth/ mil. meters

* УРОВЕНЬ 1913 = 1913 level

The straight line represents the pre-war level everywhere. You can see how the mining of coal, for example, sharply exceeded the pre-war level. The pre-war levels have not been surpassed up to this point only in heavy metalurgy, i.e. in the production of iron and steel.

In the year 1927/28 production arranged in percentage relation to the year 1913 is:

Coal	124	Woolen cloth ...	120
Oil	121	Matches	109
Cast iron	82	Sugar	65
Steel	90	Salt	102
Cotton cloth...	112	Lighting Oil ...	103

Diagram 2a describes agriculture for the last few years. You see that the development of agriculture took place significantly slower than the development of industry.

Diagram no. 2a

AGRICULTURE in the USSR




Diagram no. 2a is compiled on the basis of the following data; in percentage ratio to 1913 and arranged in 1927:

Sowing Area

Total sowing area	98.9
Sown with grain	94.5
Sown by technical methods	99.9
Sown by simple methods	162.0

Grain Harvest

<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Rye</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Oats</u>	<u>Corn</u>
104	127	17	94	278

Quantity of Cattle and Peasant Agriculture

1916 = 100

<u>Horses</u>	<u>Horned cattle</u>	<u>Sheep & Goats</u>	<u>Pigs</u>	Changed over to large horned <u>cattle</u>
88.22	113.4	111.2	98.5	102.8

The quantity of cattle in peasant agriculture has consequently already exceeded the pre-war level. This fact affirms the presence of internal build-up in peasant agriculture.

b.) Rate of Agricultural Construction

In the next moment I want to focus your special attention on the fact that the rate of agricultural growth in the USSR is significantly faster than in any capitalist country, beginning in 1921. I take 1921 as a starting point because this was the year of the greatest decline of production in the Soviet Union and simultaneously of the great post-war crisis in the capitalist countries. In the tables produced below the year 1921 is taken as 100.

The data on which these tables are based have been borrowed from League of Nations publications in the case of foreign countries and from control figures in the case of the USSR.

Square Area Sown with Wheat

1921-1925 = 100

<u>Country</u>	<u>1921-1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>
USSR	100	168.7	180.8
England	100	91.5	94.4
Germany	100	109.4	119.6
USA	100	97.0	100.8

Harvest of Wheat

1921 = 100


<u>Country</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>
USSR	100	156.9	204.6	186.4	348.1	400.2	365.8
England	100	89.9	81.9	72.9	73.3	70.3	76.4
Germany	100	66.8	98.9	82.8	100.7	88.6	111.8
USA	100	106.6	97.8	105.9	83.0	102.1	107.0

Diagram no. 3

Curve of Development of Agriculture

Sq. area of wheat
sown in 1921-1925

Harvest of wheat in
percentages in 1921



Sq. Area Sown with Rye

1920-1924 = 100

Country	1920-1924	1925	1926	1927
USSR	100	123.3	126.0	124.3
England	100	65.7	62.9	45.7
Germany	100	110.4	111.0	110.2
USA	100	80.1	70.9	74.0


Rye Harvest

1920-1924 = 100

Country	1920-1924	1925	1926	1927
USSR	100	133.6	147.0	158.6
Germany	100	137.3	109.1	116.4
USA	100	65.9	57.8	83.0

Diagram no. 4

Curve of Development of Industry in Percentages from 1921
(Coal)



Mining of Coal


1921 = 100

Country	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
USSR	100.4	167.1	182.9	203.2	304.1	354.6
England .	152.9	169.3	163.6	149.5	77.0	156.2
Germany .	96.4	57.1	87.3	97.5	108.8	112.8
USA	94.2	129.8	112.8	115.5	130.8	112.6

Diagram no. 4a

Curve of Development of Industry in Percentages from 1921

(Cast iron)



Production of Cast Iron

1921 = 100

<u>Country</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>
USSR	162.6	460.8	658.2	1348.6	1915.5	2576.3
England	187.4	284.5	279.2	238.5	91.7	274.5
Germany	123.1	66.1	104.7	136.4	129.2	175.7
USA	103.1	241.8	188.1	223.5	230.4	213.6


Production of Steel

1921 = 100

<u>Country</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>
USSR	196.2	394.5	618.9	1167.8	1581.8	1949.2
England	158.7	229.0	221.4	199.7	94.6	241.8
Germany	122.1	68.0	106.1	131.5	133.2	175.9
USA	179.9	227.2	191.7	229.4	233.5	214.1

Diagram no. 4b

Curve of Development of Industry in Percentages from 1921
(Steel)



Production of Crude Oil

1921 = 100

Country	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
USSR	123.2	135.2	156.5	181.1	217.3	241.7
USA	118.1	155.0	151.1	161.7	183.2	191.8
World	112.1	133.0	132.2	139.3	143.0	195.1
Production						

Consumption of Cotton


1921/22 = 100

Country	1922/23	1923/24	1924/25	1925/26	1926/27
USSR	81.6	95.7	199.0	280.7	236.6
Germany ...	78.6	80.9	103.7	98.5	126.8
England ...	97.0	94.9	112.9	138.2	139.1
USA	111.1	94.1	98.8	98.0	109.2

Diagram no. 4c

Curve of Development of Industry in Percentages from 1921

(Oil)



The extraordinarily quick growth of production in the USSR after 1921 is explained, of course, by the fact that initial point which we chose was very low. Industrial production in 1921 was quite insignificant. Right up to 1924/25 a quick ascent was possible thanks to the regeneration of inactive factories. In the course of 1926/27, when enlargement of production was the only way for building new plants and rebuilding existing ones, the growth of production took place at an entirely greater rate than in any capitalist country.

The objection might be put forth that all of these tables, diagrams and figures have been compiled on the basis of Soviet sources and are for this reason tendentious. We, therefore, will cite data comparing the development of the USSR and capitalist countries and published by sources which even bourgeois economists recognize as unconditionally reliable. This source is the League of Nations. The latter publishes yearly a large book about the dimensions of production and trade. In this book we find the following data on the level of production of raw material¹ and foodstuffs:

1. Uniform statistics of the production of industrial goods do not exist; However, the production of industrial goods in general is developing parallel with the production of raw materials.

Growth of Foodstuffs and Industrial Raw Materials in Europe

(Calculated on the basis of costs in 1913)

Row a - without the USSR

Row b - including the USSR

	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>
General index a.)...	87	94	103	95
b.)...	85	90	103	100
Index of a.)...	89	91	103	94
foodstuffs b.)...	87	87	105	102
Index of raw a.)...	84	98	102	97
materials b.)...	80	94	100	96

The data of the League of Nations thus draws the following picture. For all of Europe, without the Soviet Union, the general index of production was equal in 1926 to 95, i.e. it was 5% less than the 1913 level. Combined with the Soviet Union the same index worked out to 100. The inclusion of the USSR in the statistics of European production thus increased the index by a full 5%. This denotes that at the time when European production was still 5% below the pre-war level, in the USSR it was already much higher and according to data of the League of Nations, by including Soviet production in the general European index, we increase the latter from 95 to 100.

Although these figures relate to the production of foodstuffs and raw materials, and not to total industrial production, everything in the fast rate of industrialization in the USSR, about which we will speak later, leaves no doubt that the general level of the national economy in the USSR in comparison with pre-war times is higher than in the rest of Europe.

It should be noted especially that the USSR is responsible for this faster development exclusively on the basis of its own strengths. However, the reconstruction of the German, Polish, Italian etc. national economies was bound to the help of huge credits received by these governments from the USA, while the credits received from abroad by the Soviet Union were completely insignificant; they comprised only several million rubles in comparison to the tens of billions of marks received from abroad by Germany, whose population is two times less than that of the USSR. Without the help of the capitalist powers but rather in a struggle with these very same powers in the world market the proletariat of the Soviet Union succeeded in raising its economy to a significantly higher level in comparison with 1913 than the rest of Europe, according to data from the League of Nations. We consider it essential to emphasize this extraordinarily important fact.

c.) The Dimensions of the Accumulation

I have already mentioned that henceforth the development of the economy can no longer occur by utilization of the means of production inherited from the capitalists (methods which caused the quick ascent of the economy after 1921) but already in the course of the last two years we have found it necessary to build everything anew by virtue of our own power. This means that in the Soviet Union an extensive capital accumulation must occur. Whereas during the first years of the proletarian dictatorship the Soviet Union lived at the expense of that inheritance, and whereas, until 1924/25, the general property of the country had decreased, during the last few years an intense accumulation has occurred. I call to mind Lenin's speech at the IV Congress of the Communist International when he announced with a certain pride:

"From the beginning of this year we have still accumulated very little, somewhat more than 20 million gold rubles. But in any case this sum is at hand and we will use it just for improving our heavy industry." (Lenin, vol. XVIII, part 2, page 95.)

Meanwhile, for the last four years, from the time of the V Congress, this accumulation has been compounded: in the government economy and in the socialist sector the means of production total 9.5 billion rubles; the circulating means, i.e. raw materials and manufactured products, total 3.17 billion and consequently everything totals 12.9 billion. Thus for four years a round figure of 13 billion rubles has been accumulated. You can see what that modest 20 million over which Lenin rejoiced has turned into. In these figures are not included the accumulation of the peasant economy, of the private economy, in general and of the communal economy. The rate of accumulation will grow year in and year out. The principal capital accumulated in the socialist sector has been compiled in percent of cash value.

<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
2.2	3.7	4.6	5.8

This extensive capital accumulation has given the Soviet Union the opportunity to proceed toward the construction of new and mighty enterprises. I recall the ambitious scheme of electrification, the Dnieper dam system, the great railroad from Siberia to Turkestan, and the proposed construction of the Volga-Don canal. We have before us the opportunity to compare pre-war with present accumulation. Before the war the general national income was valued at a round figure of 15 billion rubles. From this sum, 2.7 billion rubles, i.e. 22%, belonged to the ruling class. Approximately only half of this 2.7

billion had been accumulated, since a significant part of it had been transferred into fictional capital (government debts and the like), so that in the national economy only 800 million to 1 billion rubles yearly was actually accumulated in the proper sense of the word.¹

d.) The Growth of National Income

Simultaneously, there occurred a sizeable growth in the income of workers. Whereas in 1924 the income of one of the gainfully employed persons in the cities came to an average 507 rubles, at the present time, in 1928, it totals 669 rubles. The income of a worker in a government plant increased correspondingly from 572 to 843 rubles.² Along with this, the level of prices has changed during the last four years very significantly. The budget index, i.e. the index of retail trade, totalled 1.86 billion 4 years ago, but at the present time is 1.95 billion. The general national income increased in the course of four years from 15.6 billion to 24 billion rubles, i.e. by more than

1. See the article by Ilinsky in "Bolshevik", 1928, no. 2.

2. Income of the Gainfully employed (in tens of rubles)

	<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
City	507	614	653	669
Rural.....	189	195	205	217
City workers	572	710	795	843
City bourgeoisie ..	1160	1413	1453	1493

"Control Figures for 1927/28", page 494

50%.¹

The general increase in the level of prosperity is expressed as well in every facet of the lives of the population. I point out, above all, the huge growth of the population. The population of the Soviet Union grew in the course of the last four years on the average of 3 million people per year, i.e. by the population of a small country.² The birth rate in the USSR is almost the highest in the world.³ It totals 43 in every thousand. The high birth rate exists despite the fact that Soviet laws do not prosecute abortions and despite the fact that every woman is allowed to decide for herself whether she wishes to bear a child. In the USSR no compulsion whatever exists to bear children. On the contrary, a woman not wishing to have children may turn for

1. "Control Figures" of GOSPLAN, national income figured in billions.

<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
15.6	20.3	22.6	24.2

2. Population worked out in millions:

<u>1921</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>
138.2	137.6	140.6	143.8	147.0

Now, at the end of 1928, the population of the Union is equal to approximately 150 mil., i.e. 7% more than in the same territory in the period before the war.

3. For the last few years the number of births worked out per thousand inhabitants: Germany - 19.5; England - 17.8; France - 18.8; Spain - 29.5; British India - 34.4; USA - 22.6. Only three small countries display a greater birthrate than the USSR, namely: Ecuador - 53.6; Guatemala - 44.2; Formosa - 44.1 (See "Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich.")

help to the Soviet medical institutions, clinics and doctors and free herself from this necessity by observing all normal rules of hygiene. And yet, the birth rate is unbelievably high! And since this high rate of birth coincides with the quick decline in the deathrate, the yearly increase in production totals the huge figure of 3 million persons.

The yearly mortality rate in Russia before the war was 29 deaths per thousand, whereas in 1926 it was only 21.4. The mortality rate thus fell by eight per thousand. This fact demonstrates the tremendous success of Soviet public health measures and of the Soviet state as a whole. The diseases which were ineradicable under the Tsars, such as cholera, completely disappeared, while the frequency of such diseases as typhus and tuberculosis declined drastically.

Before me is the article of Comrade Semashko, written by him on the tenth anniversary of the existence of NARKOMZDRAV [National Commissariat of Public Health Services-tr.]. It provides striking data on the successes of the Soviet Public Health Services. Childhood death, for example, was set in 1913 at 26%, i.e. one of the highest figures in Europe, but dropped in 1926 to 18.7%. Thus for every 100 newborn 7 less die annually in the first year of life at the present time than during the time of the Tsars.

Thus, great successes have been achieved in the improvement of the cultural level in general and in the dissemination of literacy, especially in relation to previously oppressed nationalities. All of this attests to the great successes taking place in the Soviet Union during the last several years.

Growth of Socialist Elements in Soviet Society


I will now move on to the second part of my exposition.

However significant all of this material and cultural progress, we must place before ourselves the following question. Is this progress connected with the development of socialism, or not? For the improvement of material prosperity, as well as a certain growth of the cultural level, has its place in America as well as in other capitalist countries. I am proceeding, therefore, to the question of whether all of this development

is at the same time development toward socialism. Above all, I should stress that the economy of the Soviet Union is divided into two parts - into socialist and private economic sectors. This division does not have an absolutely exact and constant nature, for one of the characteristic peculiarities of the development of Soviet Society consists precisely in the fact that the private economic sector is falling more and more under the influence of the socialist sector. The socialist, public sector has significantly strengthened itself in many aspects during the last few years. Allow me to introduce some crucial data. From the total number of hired workers in the USSR 80% belonged to the socialist sector in 1924, but at the present time this figure is 81%. From the total sum of gross production in 1924 the portion of the socialist sector was 30% and is now 40%. The share of capital investments equaled 44% in 1924/25, but now equals 65%. In these absolute figures we have the following picture: in 1924/25 production from the socialist sector equalled 4.2 billion rubles, and from the private sector equalled 11 billion rubles. In 1927/28 production from the former amounted to 8.2 billion rubles, i.e. it doubled; while production of the latter came to 13.8 billion, i.e. it increased by 20%.

Diagram no. 5

Gross Production in the USSR
in millions of rubles in percentages




This diagram depicts gross production of the socialist and private sectors. You can see that the production of the socialist sector has increased relatively well from year to year. Total production of the national economy is growing, but the production of the socialist sector is growing significantly faster. This phenomenon can perhaps be related to a more meaningful level of trade. For the last few years private trade has been almost completely forced

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out by the development of the cooperatives.

The Consumer Cooperative in the USSR

	Return in	Number	Number of
	millions of	of	members in
<u>Years</u>	<u>rubles</u>	<u>stores</u>	<u>thousands</u>
1921/22	-	20,479	-
1922/23	-	26,689	-
1923/24	-	37,129	7,125
1924/25	2,029	51,458	9,436
1925/26	3,788	62,736	12,461
1926/27	7,107	71,143	15,074
1927/28	10,070	77,631	17,889

The elimination of private capital from trade is illustrated by the following figures (in millions of rubles):

	<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
Return from private trade	4.0	5.7	5.2	-
Return from state & cooperative trade	10.6	-	23.7	-
Portion of state & cooperative trade	72.6%	-	-	84.5%

The faster growth of the socialist sector is shown in the following figures, characterizing the development of principal capital.

Principal Capital of the National Economy

According to the branch of production and the social sector in billions based on prices in 1925/26.¹

1. "Control Figures", pages 510-519.

	<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1927/28</u>	<u>Growth for four years</u>	
	beginning	end	in absolute	in %
	of	of	figures	relation
	<u>year</u>	<u>year</u>	—	—
National economy as a whole	55.5	64.7	9.6	17.3

According to Branch

1. Agriculture	23.0	27.5	4.5	19.6
a.) equipment	1.6	2.0	0.4	23.8
b.) cattle & fowl	6.6	8.6	2.0	30.8
c.) construction	14.0	16.0	2.0	14.1
2. Industry	6.6	8.8	2.2	32.7
a.) state & cooperative	6.0	8.0	2.1	38.2
b.) private	0.7	0.7	0.07	10.4
3. Large electrical stations ...	0.2	0.7	0.5	190.0
4. Miscellaneous	24.6	27.2	2.6	11.1
5. Living quarters in the cities	10.2	10.5	0.2	2.3

According to Sector

1. State & cooperatives	27.6	32.7	5.0	18.4
2. Private sector	27.5	22.0	4.5	16.3

According to Economic Category

a.) production capital	20.2	25.8	5.7	28.0
b.) return capital	11.8	13.3	1.5	13.0
c.) consumer capital	23.2	25.3	2.4	10.2

We can see that in the course of four years the growth of the socialist sector on the whole only insignificantly exceeded the growth of the private sector. A much different view is obtained if one follows the rate of develop-

ment from year to year.

Rate of Growth of Principal Capital in Percentages

	<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
State	0.3	3.2	5.1	7.1
Cooperative	21.5	17.7	23.9	22.3
Private	3.6	3.9	3.8	4.0

The growth of pure profits of state industry also attests to the development of the socialist sector.

These profits are worked out in billions of rubles.

<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
1.2	1.8	2.2	2.5

a.) Industrialization

Another aspect of this situation is the industrialization of the country. There is no need to prove here that the development of heavy industry comprises the basis for the proletarian dictatorship. In this regard the last few years have shown exceptional progress. Industrialization is absolutely essential to the Soviet Union, if it does not want to transform into an agrarian appendage of the capitalist world, and if it does not wish to lose its defensive capacity. At present the development of military technology is a decisive aspect of the capability of the country to defend its industrial development. An agrarian country, deprived of its industry, is defenseless during time of war and can then only conduct battle against an attacking country by uniting with some industrial state which can supply military equipment. This is why the development of heavy industry both in an economic

sense and from the standpoint of class politics is one of the prerequisites for socialist development and for the preservation of the proletarian dictatorship in the forthcoming battle with the capitalist world. This is why it is necessary to elucidate the process of industrialization with the help of a series of figures.

The relation between the exact positions of industrial and agricultural production has changed in the following way: in 1924/25 agriculture accounted for 67.6% of total production and industry amounted to 32.4%; in 1927/28 agriculture fell to 59.8%, while industry rose to 40.2%.

b.) Manufacture of the Means of Production

Manufacture of the means of production is growing significantly faster than industrial production in general. This fact is illustrated by the following figures:

Growth of the Manufacture of the Means of Production in State Industry

Value of Production in millions of Pre-war Rubles

<u>Year</u>	<u>Means of Production</u>		<u>Means of Consumption</u>	
1924/25	1142	41.6%	1603	58.4%
1927/28	2079	44.5%	3343	55.5%

Number of Workers

1924/25	703	50.6%	686	49.4%
1927/28	1060	55.0%	866	45.0%

Capital Investments in Millions of Rubles

1927/28	887	-	278	-
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Import of Means of Production


1924/25 65% of all imports

1927/28 88% of all imports

Diagram No. 6

State Industry in the USSR

- Gross Production in millions of rubles (pre-war value)
- - - Number of Workers (in thousands)
- Capital Investments (base capital) in tens of millions of rubles



We can see in this the following: in 1924/25 the value of the means of production manufactured was 41.6% and for the means of consumption was 58.4%. One can observe, consequently, a preponderance in the production of the means of consumption. In the current 1927/28 economic year the pro-

duction of the means of consumption is at 55%, while the manufacture of the means of production is at 45%.¹

Capital investments in 1927/28 in the manufacture of the means of production are 887 million rubles, while in the production of the means of consumption equals 278 million rubles. Thus in the present economic year four times more capital was invested in the manufacture of the means of production than in producing the means of consumption. We can see that a line for socialism, for industrialization and for the transformation of the country from an agrarian one into an agrarian-industrial society has been fully adopted.

I will proceed to the third part of my report, an analysis of class stratification.

Analysis of Class Stratification

In his analysis of the production situation in the USSR Lenin, as is well known, distinguishes five social-economic modes. In his words these are: socialism, state capitalism, private-capital economy, producers of small goods (hand-craftsmen, cottage industry and the peasantry), and the patriarchal economy. The last few years have not introduced any changes into this structure. But the actual position of each of the social-

1. The old, exact method of computation, accepted by the planning commission ("Control Figures of 1927/28" page 56, footnote), according to which the means of production and consumption are still given individually for each of the production branches, shows that in 1927/28 there is already a sizeable preponderance of the means of production of items in heavy industry. Means of production equals 57%, means of consumption 43%.

economic modes has undergone intensive change. Lenin's hope that a strong state capitalism would develop with the help of foreign concessions has not been fulfilled. At the present time these concessions play a very insignificant role in the Soviet economy. Production as a result of such concessions is less than one percent of the total industrial production of the country. Patriarchal economy also plays a small role. Therefore, at the present time there are only three fundamental patterns in the Soviet economy: socialism, manufacture of small goods and private capital. Corresponding to these are three basic classes: the proletariat, the peasantry (along with the handicraftsmen and the petty city bourgeoisie), and the capitalist class of the city and the country.

The question stands before us as to how the attitude between these basic classes is developing under the influence of the politics of the proletarian dictatorship. I must, above all, point out here the kind of development between the economic policies of the capitalist state and those of the proletarian dictatorship.

The goal of the economic policies of the capitalist states is the preservation, fortification and enlargement of the capitalist methods of production. Before the economic policies of the proletarian dictatorship stand the task of building socialism and the expulsion from the economic process of elements hostile to socialism. Capitalist economic policy is directed toward strengthening the class principle of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, in the USSR economic policy is directed toward strengthening the class principle of the proletarian dictatorship.

Capitalism had the support of the "most enterprising elements", especially the most enterprising elements of the peasantry. In the

Soviet Union one finds the improvement of the situation of the poor peasant, and the preservation of the average peasant in a struggle against the so-called "most enterprising elements" of the peasantry.

The capitalist world sets as its purpose the maximization of profits of the capitalists but the Soviet Union has as its goal maximizing the supply of the workers with all of the means of consumption.

In the capitalist countries the result is the subjection of independent producers to the yoke of capital; in the Soviet Union the economic position of independent producers, above all peasants and handcraftsmen, is improving by way of gradual collectivization. What kind of economic-political means can be found at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship? The proletarian dictatorship has at its disposal supremacy over the key positions of the economy and it is in this regard that the principal difference between the latter and the capitalist world lies.¹ They are, it is true, the general means, for example, taxation and tariff policy. But the proletarian dictatorship, having supremacy over the key economic positions, has at its disposal ways and means of influencing the private sector. Especially relevant here is the determination by state of the prices for industrial goods sold by individual members of the private-economic sector. The widest determination of prices by the state is for those items which the state purchases from private producers, and especially from the peasants. This is the basic policy

1. The development of state capitalism in this new phase reinforces the influence of the government. But if the railroads and factories etc. belong to the capitalist state, then, as before, power will be found in the hands of the great bourgeoisie.

of the banks which are state-owned, etc. It is quite clear that despite all of this great power, the impact on the private sector is set within fixed limits. The means of power, found at the disposal of the state, are not limitless. So long as the private sector exists in general, fixed limits can be assumed for the application of this government power. What are these limits? They possess both a political and economic character. In a political respect it is, above all, a necessity to preserve the cooperation with the broad mass of peasants. An economic policy, which would not recognize this limit and which by way of excessive use of the means of state power would lead to a break with the wide masses of average peasants, could, with the existence of specific conditions in the USSR, result in the fall of the proletarian dictatorship. This limit must not be exceeded.


What is the situation of the individual classes?

a.) Proletariat

The position of the proletariat has improved extraordinarily during the past few years. The actual salary of an industrial proletariat, including social insurance, is 134% of the pre-war period. Its growth is more favorable in comparison with the changes in salary in the most important capitalist countries.

Diagram no. 7

Movement of Actual Salary



The diagram shows two lines of development of salary in the USSR: one without social insurance and one including it. The second line indicates that in the last quarter of 1927 the salary of the industrial proletariat was 134% of the pre-war level.

A comparison with the most important capitalist countries draws the following picture (actual salary in 1913 = 100).

1. Figures for the USSR are from: "10 Years of Industry" published by the VSNKh. For the capitalist countries: "Revue du Travail" February 1928, published by the International Bureau of Labor.

USSR	134
USA	130
England	103.5
Germany - skilled workers	93
- unskilled workers	105

Thus, you can see that the actual salary of workers in comparison with the pre-war period is significantly higher in the USSR than in the capitalist countries, and at the same time one must note that for the capitalist countries we plainly cite official data which embellish the reality of things and which portray a much larger salary than is in fact the case. In reality, therefore, the difference between the USSR and the capitalist countries is still greater than the ~~above-~~ quoted figures show.

Of special concern is the working time which in 1926, i.e. before the conversion to the seven hour workday, averaged 7.5 hours per day in comparison with 9.6 hours per day before the war! You know that at the present time a large number of factories have changed over or are in the process of changing to a seven hour work day and in the mining industry a six hour day is being executed in relation to underground work. Further, each worker receives a 14 day paid vacation once a year. More than half a million workers yearly can go to vacation camps. In this way the position of the workers has improved significantly during the last few years. Since 1923 actual salary has

doubled. We do not mean that in the Soviet Union there are no severely exploited workers. These exist as well. We do not intend to conceal this. First, there exists a hidden form of exploitation of artisans working at home by capitalists, who, just as they do in the capitalist countries, formally place these artisans in the position of independent craftsmen. In such a capacity they are not subject to laws for the protection of labor and cannot be members of the trade unions. Several hundred thousand workers are found in this situation and they are left to the tyranny of the city capitalists and exploited severely by them. Their working hours are not subject to any legal limits. These hours sometimes come out to 12 hours a day and more. Moreover, there exists a powerful exploitation of agricultural workers by the rich peasant kulaks.

In the Soviet Union there are approximately 2 million agricultural workers! You will be astonished to discover that of this number no more than 500-600 thousand are organized in trade unions. However, comrades, you must not forget the huge size of the USSR. The problem of organizing farm workers who are spread throughout the entire USSR is something that you should not measure by the scale of Western-European governments. Keep in mind that the Siberian Express takes 10 days to make the trip from the Polish border to Vladivostok. Do not forget that the territory of the Soviet Union extends from the North Pole to the border of India. In this huge territory are scattered 800 thousand villages, many of which are located at a distance of a thousand kilometers from the closest railroad station, and in which live and work 2 million farm workers. A greater effort toward strengthening the trade unions and the proletarian dictatorship is demanded in order to organize these workers and free them from the exploitation of the kulaks. But

although certain groups of workers are still undergoing serious exploitation, nevertheless the position of the working class on the whole has improved extraordinarily and continues to improve quickly year by year. For this reason the whole proletariat is rallying behind the dictatorship.

b.) Small Goods Producers.

I will proceed to an elucidation of the peasantry under the conditions of rule by the proletarian dictatorship. I want, above all, to make mention of two theories. One of these, often proposed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie, runs thus: in the Soviet Union the industrial proletariat leads a parasitic existence at the expense of the peasants, i.e. it exploits the peasantry. For the investigation of this question I scrutinized detailed data, which I received from GOSPLAN and which touch upon the question of what the revolution did for the peasants and how the attitude of the city for the country developed under the Tsars' rule and how it developed under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Allow me to introduce here very important evidence. From the land of the church and private landowners the peasantry has received gratuitously 75 mil. hectares, and from the lands of the kulaks the working peasants have received another 65 million hectares, in total 140 mil. hectares. The value of this land exceeds 20 billion pre-war rubles. The income from this land in rough figures amounted to 1 billion gold rubles before the war. The fact that the proletarian dictatorship gratuitously gave the peasants land with a value of 20 billion gold rubles is the primary basis of the military union between the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle against the intervention of capitalist powers. But at the present time the basis of this union is beginning to lose its influence. The peasants already feel at peace with the land. The agrarian revolution for them is a concluded fact. There-

fore, in order to answer the question as to whether the industrial proletariat exploits the peasantry, one must conduct an inspection of the distribution of income at the present time.

In the capacity of a point of departure we will look at a capitalist country. What does the peasantry gratuitously give the city in a capitalist country? Taxes, rent, percentages of mortgages and other debts and expenditures for "better government", namely judicial expenses, fines etc.; in the Russia of the Tsars this played an especial role, i.e. continual bribes and so on. The peasants received nothing in return for these sums which they paid to the cities in Russia before the war. Let's look a bit more closely at individual items.

a.) Taxes. Before the war, allowing for that part of their taxes which was expended from the government budget on projects for the peasantry and which was consequently returned to them, the peasantry paid 500 million gold rubles per year. At the present time, for the same thing the tax burden of the peasantry is not more than 236 million gold rubles.

b.) Rent. Land rent, which before the war the peasants paid to the landowners, the church etc. amounted to 314 million gold rubles per (from an estimated 27,250,000 hectares, which the peasants rented in pre-war years at an average rate of 13 rubles per hectare.) Now this sum has completely been done away with.

c.) Percentage of mortgage debts, which the peasantry paid before the war, is determined to be a round figure of 100 million gold rubles. The revolution abolished this payment.

d.) Expenditure for the maintenance of the state. It is extremely difficult to determine how much the peasants paid in the form of fines, bribes, judicial expenses etc. I suggest that this sum amounts in no way to less than 100 mil. rubles per year.

We may draw the following conclusions: the peasantry pays at the present time without direct compensation from the city from 700 to 800 million gold pre-war rubles less than before the war! The presence of any disproportion withstands this fact, i.e. the conditions in which the prices of agricultural products in comparison with those of industrial goods (and this, by the way, is relevant world wide) are lower than before the war. This difference between the retail prices for industrial products and the prices, which the government pays for goods produced by the peasants, amounts to almost 40% in the current economic year. The peasants now sell their goods to the city at a maximum of 2.5 billion rubles per year. This is the sum of market prices of those goods from the peasant economy which are in demand in the city. 40% of this sum amounts to almost 1 billion rubles or 500 million in pre-war rubles. All of these figures have, of course, only a quite approximate character. In any case one may firmly establish that there is no question about exploitation in the sense that the industrial proletariat lives at the expense of the peasantry. One may with complete certainty confirm that the peasantry at present pays to the city without direct compensation several hundreds of millions less than before the war.

This does not indicate, of course, that a part of the income of the peasants does not play a role in the construction of socialist industry. This does really occur and will continue to take place in the course of the next few years. Since the USSR does not receive foreign loans and since it does

not exploit colonies, that capital, necessary for industrial construction, must be created by the labor of those people, who work in the country itself. The 60 million self-employed peasants must assist industrial construction. This assistance in the form of disproportion will be a necessity until the USSR achieves and surpasses the level of capitalist countries.

But does this designate exploitation of the peasants? It in no way does. For, that part of income, which is taken from the peasants in the form of a "disproportion", is not squandered by the governing class, as took place before the war. What did this consist of then? At the expense of the peasants Tsarist families, landowners and clergy lived extravagantly. Russian landowners exported grain abroad, which had been taken by them in the form of leases and rent and then sent to Paris where they gambled away the profits. Such was the fate, of course rather simplified, of that part of their income taken from the peasants. The situation now is completely different. The part of the peasant's income given to the government goes for the creation of socialist industry, and according to the measure of success of the building of socialism, prices for industrial goods being demanded by the peasantry are being decreased, and the disproportions are being reduced.¹ Socialist industry will fully return to the peasantry that which it has temporarily taken. Since there is no exploitation of classes in the Soviet Union (with the

1. The disproportions at the present time reveal a tendency toward dissipating. The difference between retail prices for industrial goods and the prices, for which the government buys products from the peasant economy, amounted to an average per year of: in 1925/26 - 56%; in 1926/27 - 61%; in 1927/28 - 40% and 1928/29 (projected data) - 34%.

exception of small numbers of private city and rural capitalists exploiting their workers), then there can be no exploitation in the capitalist sense of the word.

The opposition, (in the first place Preobrazhensky), advanced the thesis of the necessity of the extraordinarily severe increase of prices for industrial goods in order for it to be possible to transfer a large part of the peasant income to socialist industry. I have already spoken about the fact that although the power of the proletarian government is very great, it is not limitless in either a political or economic sense. The economic limit of this power is caused in the following way. Whereas the city populations require yearly the goods produced by the peasantry and cannot live without them, the peasantry, if pressure should increase on them, can manage for a long time in a situation without industrial goods. The peasant can grow fibrous plants, spin yarn, weave cloth and make clothing for himself with his own hands. He can tan leather at home in the village and can order shoes there for himself. In case of necessity, he can use wood in place of steel. If the peasant finds that prices for industrial goods are excessively high, then he can turn to the closed cottage economy. In 1923 we actually observed a strike by the peasant consumers.

From another standpoint, in the Soviet Union one also finds private industry, i.e. the existence of trades, private capitalist industry and the cottage industry.

If prices for goods demanded by the peasants were too high, then the subsequently slowed-down forms of industrial production would have to advance in their development to socialism at the expense of state industry. More simply, if the peasant could get shoes, material, etc., from hand-

craftsmen or artisans cheaper than from the state, then, of course, he would buy them from the former. Thus an excessive increase of disproportions, which has been suggested by the opposition, would overturn all development in the Soviet Union. The result of such incorrect policy would be the reduction of market demand for products from the socialist sector, the development of industrial elements which are backward and hostile toward us and a tendency for the peasant economy to return to a closed cottage industry.

Such a price policy would be understandably intolerable and, therefore, would destroy the union of classes, i.e. the cooperation between the workers, the peasants and the proletariat. Thus, we can see that the industrial proletariat not only does not lead a parasitic existence at the expense of the peasants, but would not even be in the position to make such an attempt without endangering the building of socialism.

The incorrect theory of Otto Bauer, asserting that there is no proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union, but only rule of the peasants, is primitive capitalism. This theory, rather widely disseminated within the socialist-democratic party, is utterly and completely incorrect and, as it seems to me, has already been proven so to a sufficient degree by our preceding argument about the attitude of the peasantry toward the proletarian dictatorship and about the strengthening of the Soviet economy from year to year.

The correct policy of the party consists of the following: Immobilization of part of peasant production is temporarily necessary and inevitable since there is no foreign capital at our disposal for the creation of industry. But this immobilization of facilities can occur only within those

limits which will not destroy personal interest in production, will not stop the exchange between city and country and will not endanger the union between the peasantry and the proletariat. The immobilization of part of the peasant income will continue only until industry in the USSR is equal in its own development to that of greater development in the capitalist countries.

Trotsky's Theory on "Technical Backwardness"

I would like to make a few observations here on Trotsky's theory. This theory, as is well known, asserts that technical and cultural backwardness of the Soviet Union must lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship, provided the proletariat in Western Europe does not succeed in gaining state power. At the IV Congress of the Communist International Trotsky announced:

"But if the capitalist world still exists for several more decades, then that will designate the death of Soviet Russia."

We find an indirect answer to this in one of Lenin's last articles, in his notes "On Our Revolution (concerning the writings of N. Sukhanov)":

"If a definite level of culture is demanded for the creation of socialism (although no one is able to exactly say what this definite "level of culture" is), then it is impossible for us to begin again with the achievement of the pre-conditions of the definite level by a revolutionary means, and then later set out to overtake other nations."
(Lenin, vol. XVIII, part 2, page 119.)

We shall examine concretely the question of technical backwardness. In Trotsky's opinion, it is impossible to overtake the rapidly advancing technology of the capitalist countries. This is equivalent to a denial of the

revolutionary, creative strength of the proletariat. The capitalist governments have great advantages on their side: For a long time they have had the best technical institutions; the large capitalist monopolies (for example the German trust of the dye industry) conduct systematic scientific-technical work and have built lasting organizational bases for inventive activity. These monopolies, with the help of an extremely high remuneration for work, compel the best scientists to serve the interests of production.

But do we really have nothing with which we could oppose these advantages?

1.) In the capitalist world the selection of persons with a civilizing mission is bounded entirely within a narrow circle. Only the squandering rich can attend the higher learning institutions and all of these rich, even the very incapable and most degenerate, receive higher education. The son of a poor peasant, the son of an unskilled worker, even if he were three times a genius would not be able to attend an institution of higher education. In the Soviet Union, the selection of the talented and capable is carried out from the entire working population. We can hope, therefore, that at the end of a certain period of time we will have better engineers than the capitalists.

2.) In the capitalist world laborers work exclusively for the sake of salary. The result of their work is a matter of indifference to them. It is the affair of the capitalists. In our country, where the means of production are found in the hands of the working class and where there are no profits, each worker is interested in the improvement of the means of production and more or less takes part in the improvement.

3.) The capitalists set definite limits for technical progress: ordinarily only inventions are introduced, which for a given level of salary provide for higher profits. In the Soviet Union, the purpose of economic policy is to increase the prosperity of the worker and to shorten the working time and for there to be no such obstacle on this path of technological progress.

4.) Capitalism produces anarchistically. In the socialist sector of the national economy of the USSR production takes place in an orderly way which assures significant technical advantages. We may summarize the preceding statements thus: severe technological backwardness exists. This is a fact. But it is not proven that the rate of technical progress in our own country cannot be much faster (since it is not yet, unfortunately) than in the capitalist countries and that we will not succeed in catching and surpassing the latter.

A second instance of the pessimistic theory of Trotsky consists of the following:

Technological backwardness comprises an element of the economic base. In order to draw a conclusion from it about the inevitability of the overthrow of the dictatorship, one should point out those social powers and class powers which want to and can - on precisely the basis of this technological backwardness - overthrow the authority of the proletariat. According to our information, Trotsky never expressed himself clearly on this question. But on the basis of all of his ideas it is not difficult to establish that by such a social power he meant the peasantry. Technical backwardness, the high cost of industrial goods, the severely deep disproportions, the burdensome position of the peasant in comparison with neighboring capitalist countries, the

peasant uprisings which with the help of the capitalist governments will lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship, - such is the approximate drift of Trotsky's thoughts.

In contradiction to this, we can point to the fact that the position of the peasantry at the present time is significantly better than under the Tsarist regime and that the "disproportions", which are in almost all of the capitalist countries as well, show a tendency toward narrowing; and, that in the capitalist countries the broad mass of peasants are becoming proletariats whereas in our country the state authority does everything possible to render economic support and improve the economy of poor people. Trotsky's thesis that under the dictatorship the broad mass of peasants cannot remain satisfied for a long time is incorrect. Just as the would-be inevitability of the overthrow of the dictatorship is passed over, so is the impossibility of the construction of socialism in only one country.¹

Differentiation of the Peasantry

I will proceed to the process of differentiation of the peasantry and, in general, to the phenomenon of differentiation in the economy of the Soviet Union during the NEP period. With the introduction of the NEP, Lenin underscored that on the basis of free trade and of the small goods economy there would inevitably be capitalistic development and that the task of the Soviet

1. Characteristically, that the opposition, at first on the basis of Preobrazhensky's theory, having demanded the increase of prices for industrial goods, in 1927, on the contrary, demanded payments to the peasants of "reconstructed prices" i.e. voiced a directly opposite demand.

government and of the proletarian dictatorship consists of controlling this capitalistic development within a certain framework, and after the socialist economy strengthens itself on the foundation of the NEP, again forcing out the capitalist elements from the national economy. Lenin never viewed the NEP as a simple deviation, but as a deviation which should create a foundation for the later advance and transition to socialism. But what has occurred within the peasantry during the NEP? Without a doubt a well known differentiation has occurred. But to determine the degree of this differentiation is exceedingly difficult. Why? In the capitalist countries, where the free sale of land exists, a concentration of real estate gives a sufficiently exact scope of this differentiation. In the Soviet Union the sale of land is forbidden. Therefore, the education of the capitalist layer of the peasantry based on the amount of land owned is impossible. Additional different signs of the process of differentiation exist as well. Such a sign is, for example, the quantity of manufacturing area. In this regard there exist interesting statistics on the change in cultivated land for the last few years. We shall introduce the following table compiled by the TsSU.

Land under Cultivation for Every 100 Farms

<u>Quantity of Land</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1926</u>
Landless	4.4	4.0
Up to 4 hectares	81.0	67.0
4 - 8 hectares	13.0	23.0
8 - 13 hectares	1.4	5.2
More than 13	0.2	0.8

Comrade Rikov introduced several other facts in a report to the XV party conference:

Land under Cultivation for Every 100 Farms

<u>Quantity of Land</u>	<u>1922</u>	<u>1925</u>
Landless	6.9	4.2
Up to 2 hectares	46.0	33.0
2-6 hectares	40.3	49.3
6-10 hectares	5.6	10.2
More than 10 hectares	1.2	3.3

Both tables show that the portion of landless farms displayed a tendency to drop (it is unclear whether these farms were liquidated or were moved to a higher category). The number of farms with the greatest area of cultivated land grew and the average size of manufacturing space also increased.

The process of differentiation occurs along the following basic lines: a small part of the middle peasants transformed into kulaks and a part of the poor people into middle peasants and another part of the poor became proletariats and left the country. The middle peasant remains a central figure, forming the basic mass of the peasantry.

This development basically corresponds to the striving of the economic policy of the dictatorship. In opposition to capitalism it is effected in the line of ascent of the peasant economy as a whole.

The contradiction between the economic policy of the dictatorship and that of capitalism in regard to peasants clearly comes out in the following statement of the American agricultural expert, Professor Dovell. He writes

about the U.S. :

"The USA made a mistake in its agrarian policy. We cultivated too much land. Our production of plant and animal provisions grew more quickly than our population despite the fact that millions left the country and came to the city... We should cease regretting this and, on the contrary, prompt people to move to the cities. Two kinds of people leave agriculture. The greatest portion of these are the unfit farmers and only a small part belong to the best class of farmers. Economic conditions compel the unfit farmers to desert their farms. This is as it should be, and in the final analysis this facilitates the position of farmers as a whole."

But the land in cultivation is not a fully satisfactory indication, because there exist various hidden forms of differentiation, hidden forms of dependence of the poor peasant on the kulak and hidden forms of exploitation of the poor peasant by the kulak. The numerical correlation of the three basic layers of the peasantry are approximately as follows: in the Soviet Union there are about 25 million peasant farms. Of this number 8 million belong to the poor peasants, almost 16 million belong to the middle peasants and approximately 1 million belong to the kulaks. In relation to the number of kulaks there are a variety of suggestions. Larin shows 2%, Molotov suggests

from 3-4%, and KOMAKADEMIA (Kritzman-Gaister)¹ calculates from 5-7%. The opposition operates with a figure of 10%.

1. For the determination of the class position of the peasantry Gaister made use of facts on land in cultivation, the purchase and sale of labor, the rent of production equipment and the rental of land. He came up with the following groups.

- a.) Proletarian group: more than 50 days of hired labor per year.
- b.) Semi-proletarian group: from 20-50 days of hired labor per year.
Any working cattle or equipment is rented.
- c.) Middle peasants: from 10-20 days of hired labor per year, or, on the contrary, any kind of hired labor; rental or hire of cattle for 20 days, and rental of equipment for a period of ten days.
- d.) Prosperous middle peasants: making use of hired labor in the course of 20-50 days a year; rental of cattle for a period of 20 days a year and equipment for ten days.
- e.) Capitalist group: making use of hired labor not less than 50 days a year.

The number of separate groups were determined by Gaister with the help of quite complex methods and on the basis of limited access to peasant budgets in the following way:

	I	II	III	IV	V
Northern Caucasus	19.3	16.8	40.3	18.3	5.3
Ukraine	16.5	21.7	45.8	16.3	5.7
Urals	10.9	11.9	52.6	15.4	9.3

In making conclusions from these figures, we must remember that the regions included in the tables belong to areas with the most widely advancing

In reality, the situation is thus: the broader the layer which is considered to be kulaks,

the smaller the development between this layer and the middle peasants, because in the country there is in general a constant movement from middle peasant to kulak and back again.

It is not like in the city where the separate classes- capitalists, craftsmen and workers - are sharply defined from one another and where there is no doubt to which class one or another face belongs. In the country there occurs a constant shift from one category to another - between the poor peasants, middle peasants, prosperous middle peasants and the kulaks. If we assign too broad a layer to the kulaks, then the indication of exploitation, peculiar to the real kulak, disappears. I hold to the opinion, therefore, that if we consider the exploiter-kulak as the basic source of income which comes from the exploitation of other labor, then we must take as correct Larin's calculation, which fixes the number of kulaks at 2%. In this case the capitalist-exploitation layer of the peasantry stands clearly before us.

In what form does this exploitation occur? In agriculture, as is well-known, there are three basic elements - the land, the labor and the production equipment. In contemporary conditions the possession of the means of production plays a decisive role - and here is why. The revolution gave land to the landless peasant, but did not supply him with sufficient production

differentiation and that the method of work results in this differentiation appearing before us in a clearer light, than it is in reality. But this table clearly shows the predominant role of the middle peasant, especially if we add group IV to the group of middle peasants, in the spirit of Leninist determination.

equipment. The poor peasants partially lost the means of production which they had received during the period of the Revolution in the years of bad harvest. As a result, the general situation in the country was thus: the poor peasants had at their disposal land and their own labor, but they lacked the livestock and mechanical means to have the opportunity to cultivate the land.¹ In this lies the basis of the exploitation of the poor peasants by the kulaks. The forms of this exploitation are exceedingly diverse. The kulak leases the land of the poor peasant and then the poor peasant is obliged to help with the cultivation of the land and receives in return for this only a small portion of the harvest, the lion's share being taken by the kulak. Or, since such a lease on the strength of tax considerations is inconvenient for the kulak, the matter takes on a different aspect: the poor peasant hires the kulak along with horse and plow; formally the poor peasant appears to be the renter and the kulak works with his own plow, horse and tools on the peasant's land. Technically, the poor peasant is the renter-exploiter. In fact in this format is hidden the most severe exploitation of the poor peasant, since the kulak takes the overwhelming part of the harvest. Another such form of exploitation is as follows: The kulak cultivates, with his own horse and tools, the land of the poor peasant and for this the poor peasant must work for the kulak for a prolonged time. We can see, then, that since the land is not subject to sale and because the kulak is taxed quite heavily, differentiation and exploitation in the country takes on a variety of hidden forms. It is well understood that the proletarian dictatorship is striving to render any defense to the poor peasant against the kulak. The

1. Approximately 1/5 of peasant farms rent land ("Control Figures," p. 348). In the Ukraine 38% of the farms lease cattle and from 38 to 40% lease machines and tools (Ibid., p. 350).

Soviet rule gave the poor peasant seeds and credit for agricultural tools; tractors from state farms have tilled their soil; the farms of the poor peasants were joined together in collective farms and so forth. But the dictatorship is not yet able to resolve this question completely or fully to defend the poor peasant from the exploitation by the kulak. The socialist sector is still too poor for this. The Soviet Union is potentially one of the richest countries in the world and could be the richest. In the USSR, there are tens of millions of acres of uncultivated land, gigantic forests, many times larger in area than the whole of Germany. But we lack the necessary means of production to make use of this natural wealth. Since the Soviet government is not yet in a position to supply the poor peasants with all the necessary means of production, it is temporarily obliged to tolerate a situation in which the kulak uses the poor peasant's land in a variety of ways and also exploits the poor peasant himself. This situation will be ended at that moment, when industry in the USSR produces a sufficient number of plows, tractors and machines to give the poor peasant the opportunity to cultivate his own land; and, further, when it becomes possible to unite all of the poor peasants into collective farms.

What is the economic strength of the kulaks? I will cite here the extremely interesting figures of Larin, relating to the 2% of actual kulak-exploiters.¹ He quotes the following data: for every one hundred persons on the peasant farms there is an average 65 hectares of land, but for the same number of kulaks there is an average of 240 hectares, i.e. about four times more. The kulaks have twice as many cattle. Each of the farms of the kulaks uses an average of two hired laborers and the peasant farms employ

1. Larin. Private Capital in the USSR.

only an average 0.02 hired workers. Thus almost all of these day laborers are exploited by the 2% represented by the kulaks.

At the disposal of the kulaks is found in general 10-11 % of the land, 7.5% of the draught animals, 12% of the harvest production and 14% of the peasant handcraft production. We can see, consequently, that what is being talked about here is the layer of real peasant exploiters.

Capitalist elements exist in the cities. There is a private-capitalist sector of exploiters in the cities as well as in the country. According to calculations of Larin, approximately 12% of all industrial production of the country is in the hands of private-capitalists,¹ along with 17% of the number of industrial workers and capital of nearly 450 million rubles, a sum equal to 57% of general capital. Profits of the private capitalists amounts to 75 million rubles per year. As can be seen, we have here a case of the miserable-bourgeoisie.

It is interesting to note in this regard that the sector of capital has its own ideology and its own economic-political line. In an economic-political respect, private capital strives to create closed private-economic production and exchange along with the socialists, or in other words, it is striving to separate itself and to become independent from the socialist sector of the national economy. How does this occur in practise? The private capitalist purchases a variety of raw materials from the kulaks. These raw materials he hands over to the kulaks for processing into a capital base, within the limits of the system of distribution. The capitalist sends the goods

1. Heavy private industry--from 3 to 4%; small private industry--3%; pseudo-cooperatives--2% and the capitalist system of distribution (exploitation of handcraftsmen)--3.3%.

produced by the kulak through the channels of private trade and then he sells these goods primarily back to the peasants.

The large flexibility of these insignificant 'remainders' that have risen up from the former capitalist sector in the USSR has drawn attention. The Soviet government forbids the transport of private shipments of grain on the railroads. In response to this the capitalists transport their grain by river on private barges. They buy grain from the kulaks, send it on their own barges to private millers and there it is ground. Then they convey it to private merchants in the cities and sell it to private buyers. Thus we have before us a system of closed private-economic production and exchange. Such is the economic and political line of the bourgeoisie. Despite its undeniable flexibility, however, the bourgeoisie as a class is extraordinarily weak, for it is unorganized. A correct evaluation is needed here. While establishing its obvious strength in the economic area, the bourgeoisie as a class is completely powerless. It is in no condition to create any kind of organization whatever. As a class it is completely overpowered, without any rights, overwhelmed and of superfluous influence. It will only exist so long as it fulfills some necessary function in the national economy of the USSR. Why does it still fulfill a function? Because the socialist sector is not in a condition to service the trade between the city and the country including every last out of the way place in the Soviet Union. This new bourgeoisie fulfills an auxiliary function for the socialist sector in organizing barter between the cities and villages. At that moment when the Soviet economy and the socialist sector have strengthened themselves enough to be in a circumstance to fulfill this function, then this capitalist sector will be liquidated without the least bit of political difficulty.

Summarizing the above, we come to the following conclusions: From the three basic classes of the proletariat, which I have already mentioned, the poor peasants stand fully at the base of the dictatorship. Between the middle peasants and the proletariat there is an understood agreement, although in viewing the situation, the middle peasants have shown a familiar vascillation. The capitalist layer--the kulaks and the city capitalists--is hostile to the Soviet economy and to the dictatorship of the proletariat. But their strength, in any case, is not sufficient to create any difficulty for the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin often stated that the kulak is only dangerous when in a position to attract the middle peasant to his side. The task of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union consists precisely in preventing the kulak from seizing hegemony over the mass of middle peasants. The middle peasants, on 16 million farms, number approximately 40 million adult working persons. If such a strength turned against the proletarian dictatorship, then this would represent a tremendous danger and would indicate civil war. To prevent this is one of the fundamental tasks of the dictatorship. Realization of this is possible only by means of a close union with the rural poor and, simultaneously, a severe battle against the kulaks, as foreseen by the resolution of the XV Party Congress of the VKP(B).

The Role of a Planned Economy

It is well known to you, comrades, that in the USSR, in contrast to the anarchistic method of production in the capitalist countries, there exists a planned economy. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union does experience periodic economic difficulties. How is such a situation engendered? For the answer to this question we must devote ourselves to a consideration of the role of a planned economy under contemporary conditions where the private-socialist

sector exists right beside the socialist one. We can distinguish three functions of a planned economy: foresight, i.e. calculation of future economic development, influence and regulation. Calculation of future economic development occurs as well in the capitalist countries. Each large capitalist trust, for example, has its own research bureau which tries to determine the future development of demand and production. Such calculation also takes place in our planned economy. Our regulation extends, naturally, only to the socialist sector. In the state factories and on the state farms the Soviet economy can immediately determine what must be produced and how it must be produced. In the capacity of a mediary link there is a more systematic influence over the private economic sector. The Soviet government, of course, cannot establish a series of decrees specifying in exactly what quantities things must be produced, sold and purchased on 25 million peasant farms by handcraftsmen and artisans. This is impossible. But, in occupying a position of economic power, the Soviet government can exert strong influence on the pace of production and the level of demand. It is necessary for us, one might suggest, to increase the production of cotton. In such a case we would raise the prices for cotton and simultaneously supply the cotton producing regions with cheap grain in order to make it more convenient for the peasant to produce cotton for the state rather than grain for himself.

You can see that a principal difference exists between the regulation within the limits of the socialist sector and the systematic influence on the private economic sector. The storage and sale prices are the uppermost methods of systematic influence on the peasant economy. In order to direct the peasant economy on a determined course, we must maneuver in such a way that the purpose which we are pursuing will be advantageous for the peasant econ-

omy, which is governed by the consideration of individual profits. Only in this way is it possible to rule the peasant economy.¹ You can see how great the difficulties are which stand before us in a planned economy. If we had complete socialism and only one, single economy, then our beginning would consist of planning and implementation and only would experience problems of an essentially technical, and not economic, nature. At the present time the planned economy consists of foresight, systematic influence and regulation. These three elements must be in agreement, but in view of the complexity of the task such agreement does not always exist between them.

What are the separate tasks of the planned economy under present conditions? Its overall task is to direct the entire economy of the Soviet Union into a socialist channel. Separate, fundamental tasks are:

Proportional distribution of production between the means of production and means of consumption.

1. Quantitative correlations show that rule of the peasant economy as a means of influence in the market is quite possible. Data for 1927/28 is as follows (in billions of rubles):

	Socialist sector	Private- economic sector
Overall cost of production	12.9	19.6
Commodity production	11.4	5.4

Although the production of the private sector has increased by 1/3 more than that of the socialist sector, nevertheless as a result of the particularly large demand of the peasants on the market the production of the socialist sector is two times greater than that of the private economy. In this is found the great significance of the government price policy.

Continual balance between the prices of goods found on the market and the amount of money in circulation (preservation of the buying power of currency inside the country.)

The correct determination of the highest possible accumulation and ^{the} planned distribution of it between the first and second marketing schemes and between the separate branches of production (the plan for capital investment.)

The regulation of the exchange of goods between city and rural area in relation to prices and also in relation to the demanded form of goods.

Balance between exports and imports (preservation of the parity of currency on the world market.)

Proportionality of production in separate branches of production, supplying each other with raw materials and half-finished products on a vertical line (proportionality of internal building.)

Beyond these, the general purpose which stands before the planned economy is an economic policy, including an increase in the level of prosperity of all workers and the socialization of the means of production, etc.

This is why the difficulties which face a planned economy are exceedingly great, especially because the economic plan should be worked out not for just one year, but for 5-10 years ahead. The quality of the harvest, the changing interaction of the world market, the internal difficulties in carrying out the plan (the violation of the plan by separate trusts, the weakness of the economic apparatus, the sabotage by counter-revolutionary engineers and so on) - all of these hinder the creation and realization of

the economic plan. It is no wonder, therefore, if, despite a planned economy, we experience periodic crisis-like problems.

I consider it necessary, however, to underscore the following point: although the economic life of the USSR outwardly takes forms similar to capitalistic "money", "trade", "capital", "profits", state enterprise, competition, credit and so on - it is fundamentally distinguished from capitalism. Capitalism is an economy put into operation for the receipt of profits. Soviet economy, excluding its capitalist elements, has as its goal the satisfaction of the demands of the workers. It is completely incorrect, therefore, to examine the outwardly similar economic phenomena as identical.

Crises do occur in a capitalist economy but in the economy of the USSR there are only crisis-like phenomena. But in the capitalist countries crises are inevitable. The laws of the development of capitalism, periodically increasing production above the consumption capacity of society, of necessity reproduce ever newer and newer crises. In the economy of the USSR crises happen as a consequence of the imperfection of the planned economy. For capitalism - it is a crisis of overproduction. In our country these crises signal shortage. The mechanisms of the capitalist economy consequently reduces the consumption capacity of the working class and the independent producers. In the Soviet economy we observe a continual growth in the consumption capacity of the masses. Therefore, the richer and more developed capitalism becomes, the greater the crises. The richer the Soviet economy is and the greater its reserves, the more systematic its economy becomes and the less crisis-like phenomena it has to experience.

We must distinguish the rationale of the capitalist and socialist econo-

mies. Under capitalism the rationale aims at increasing profits and decreasing the share of the workers in relation to the value of their production. At the present time the capitalist rationale leads to mass unemployment, increased exploitation, and curtailment of working time. The rationale of the Soviet economy aims at increasing the quantity of goods and to reduce energy expended on them. It strives for the increase in work and the decrease of daily working hours!

Such a distinction exists as well in relation to unemployment. In a capitalist economy unemployment is an inevitable consequence of the path of economic development. Capitalism finds it necessary to constantly keep an army in reserve and, at the present time, in the period of the decline of capitalism, this army has the character of a chronic problem of the masses, and is a form of structured unemployment. In the USSR, on the contrary, unemployment exists only because of an impoverished economy. If all of the unemployed could be supplied with the means of production, then there would be no more unemployment; for already in our country this does not have nearly as much force as it does in the capitalist marketplace. To speak simply, if only we could supply the unemployed with the means of production, then it would be possible to build tens of thousands of houses in the USSR, a need which is exceedingly great. It would also be possible to supply these homes with furniture and all of the conveniences. It would be possible to build one-hundred thousand kilometers of highways and railroads, supply the peasant with first-rate, contemporary means of production and receive from him in turn a greater amount of raw materials. The market place does not put any obstacles in the path of enlarged production, for in the Soviet Union at the present time, despite the existence of private capitalistic elements, any increase in

production leads simultaneously to a growth in the consumption capacity of society. If the unemployed were supplied with the means of production, then naturally they would start to quickly receive salaries; they would not only begin to be producers but also consumers. Under capitalism the consumption strength of society always lags behind its production strength. Under capitalism there exists a constant starting and stopping of overproduction. In our country, on the other hand, there is a constant shortage of goods. I will speak more about this later. Here I only want to underscore that in the Soviet Union unemployment is not a phenomenon issuing from the social structure, but simply is a consequence of poverty and the shortage of the means of production, which would give the workers the opportunity to utilize their working strength.

I will cite one concrete example. In the central and southern regions of the USSR there is a significant abundance of population in the villages. There are also millions of hectares of uncultivated land. And yet there is no possibility to unite these two elements. Why? Because there is a shortage in the means of production in order to give the abundant agricultural population plows and horses with which to build farms etc. Both of these elements, owing to the presence of the third, are separated from each other and they will remain thus until the manufacturing force creates additional means of production.

I repeat: If, despite its planned beginning, the Soviet economy experiences problems, then these are caused by poverty, problems of miscalculation, lack of the means of production and economic reserves. But they are not the consequence of over-production.

A shortage of ready-made goods, frequent lines in front of stores (depicted by the social-democrats) and also the opposition of the VKP(b), as symptoms of crises, cannot under the circumstances really be considered as crisis-like occurrences. A deficit of items for consumption is naturally a consequence of the economic policy of the USSR. The goal of this policy is intense capital accumulation and maximum satisfactory supply of consumer goods to the population and at the same time a lowering of prices and in certain circumstances the limitation of manufacture by means of the present methods of production. The shortage of goods is an expression of the fact that the strength of society's demand has exceeded production strength, since in the process of accumulation a portion of a product enters the market in the capacity of the consumption strength of society before the production cost actually takes form in the means of consumption. More simply, when huge, new factories are being built, the construction workers receive salaries and the peasants are paid for the transport of materials and so on, long before the factory is ready and its items of manufacture appear on the market. Under normal conditions in a capitalist society (in peace time, with a stable currency) there is never a shortage of goods, since in the case of increased demand over supply prices will rise and a balance is restored which is equivalent to a decrease in the real income of workers. In a capitalist economy there are in addition (except industrial reserves of the army) unutilized parts of the production apparatus, even at times of high usage, which can be put in operation under certain market conditions in order to strengthen the supply of goods. Finally, the possibility of bringing in goods from abroad always exists, foreign credit being used for this purpose.

The Soviet economy is not in a condition to resort to these means. If,

for example, prices for industrial goods in the USSR would increase by 50% without a corresponding increase in salary and in fixed prices for products of the peasant economy, then the demand for industrial goods would change immediately and the lines in front of stores would disappear. But of course, the Soviet government cannot resort to such methods, since this would be a contradiction of its fundamental economic-political line. At the disposal of the Soviet government there are no unutilized means of production or store of raw-materials, with the help of which it would be impossible to increase production in relation to growth of demand, for all production opportunities are being utilized to the greatest extent for the maximum supply of goods to the population. The Soviet Union is in no condition to extend its production in correlation to the quickly growing consumption capacity in order to fully satisfy the growing "solvent" demand (either the present production apparatus is fully utilized already, or the furthest extension of production is limited by the available quantity of raw materials.) The Soviet government does not have the opportunity to eliminate the shortage of goods by means of imports. The acute and chronic shortage of goods will remain in the Soviet Union until it can achieve a level of developed reserves - just as in capitalism there is the characteristic appearance of latent and acute overproduction. But this shortage of goods in no way designates an economic crisis in goods produced.

Contemporary Difficulties of the Soviet Economy

I shall proceed to the question of the current year, to which the foreign press has devoted substantial attention. It is possible to read yearly in its press about some catastrophic crisis of the Soviet system, about a

break between the peasants and the proletariat, or about the overthrow of the dictatorship, etc. The foreign press has confirmed that the Soviet economy is experiencing a crisis. This point of view is completely false. There has not been a crisis in the Soviet Union. There are only difficulties, and truthfully speaking, there have been problems with grain-storage. Problems do exist in the grain economy, but there is no crisis in the Soviet economy. As evidence, I cite the following figures.

In the course of the first eight months of the current economic year industrial production increased in comparison with the preceding year by 20%, and salary increased by 12%, the productivity of labor by 9% and the prime cost fell approximately 6%. Thus one can't talk about any sort of crisis in industry! There is also no crisis in regard to the storage of raw materials and foodstuffs (with the exception of grain.) The storage of all kinds of raw materials rose in comparison with the past year by 25-100%. Once again one can't talk about a crisis.

Difficulties have only existed in relation to grain storage. The sources of these problems are varied. The basic reason is the lagging behind of agriculture under conditions of growing demand. Recall diagram no. 1, showing how much the development of agriculture has fallen behind the development of industry. In general one can say that on the whole agriculture has achieved the pre-war level, but the production of grain lags behind by 5% of the pre-war levels. In contrast to this, the population, as I have already said, has grown yearly by 3 million people. At the present time the population is about 6-7% greater than before the war. Hence, there is a difference of 11-12% in correlation between the production of grain and the number of consumers.

Furthermore, although the production of grain now stands at 95% of the pre-war level, only half of the amount it received before the war has entered the outer village markets. This occurrence is naturally a consequence of the agrarian revolution. The peasants liberated from the burden of land taxes now are eating better and, therefore, less grain enters the market. This is why there is now no import of grain.

What causes this backwardness in agriculture? The main reasons are as follows: above all is the low cultural level of the peasantry, the inheritance of the old Tsarist regime; although this cultural level has strongly improved, nevertheless it is still very low. The second reason is the severe disruption of land use. Of 25 million peasant farms - 8 million poor farms had such insufficient land space that it was disadvantageous even to have draught animals. Quick growth of production is impossible on such tiny scraps of land. To this figure belongs as well the *open-field* system, under which small plots of land were distributed to the peasants in 10-20 dwarfish plots. The final reason is the shortage of the means of production, about which I have already spoken. As a result of all of this, one hectare gives the Soviet Union only a quarter of the harvest which it yields in Germany, Denmark, Belgium and England - although the land is not at all poorer in quality. But this attests, on the other hand, to the presence of tremendous possibilities in the area of increasing harvest yield. It has been ascertained that by way of specific measures, which are neither especially complex nor demand large capital, that it would be possible in the not so distant future to double yield; for example, with improved seed, deeper tillage, large applications of manure, replacement of the approximately 5 million wooden plows still found in the USSR with iron plows, etc.

Such are the general reasons for agriculture lagging behind the rate of industrial development. For the last few years a series of specific reasons have also joined in. The peasant ran his farm in the capacity of a small independent producer and cultivated those crops which yielded the highest profits. Meanwhile, the prices for grain were exceedingly lower in comparison with prime prices for cotton, flax or other so-called industrial crops. It was advantageous for the peasant to supply the market with products of cattle-raising instead of grain, to cultivate fodder crops instead of grain or to use the grain as feed for livestock. Thus the industrial crops, the products of which (fibrous substances, plant oils) are necessary for state industry, gave the peasants higher income than yielded by cultivating grain. Consequently, there appears a relative reduction in the land sown with grain.

Furthermore, in connection with the broad investments in the socialist sector, the peasantry for the last few years has had a large income beyond the sale of agricultural goods. Part of the peasantry works in the cities in the capacity of builders and unskilled workers. Therefore, the broad span of building activity leads to the village receiving large incomes. Construction indicates further that the peasants' delivery trade, especially the transport of wood, stone, bricks and sand was a significant source of income for the more prosperous peasants. The computations of GOSPLAN show that the outside-the village income of the peasants amounted to 2.3 billion rubles in 1926/27 and 1927/28, i.e. almost as much as the peasant received for the sale of his own products to the city.

The prosperous peasant thus was able to pay his taxes and purchase industrial goods, without being obligated to sell his grain.

The influence of the kulaks appeared as well. According to Larin's computations, 14% of all peasant production and 20% of all grain entering the market was to be found in their hands. With regard to grain, of which there was only one harvest per year, 20% formed a very sizeable source of manipulation. If in some capitalist country some kind of brokering ring holds 20% of the harvest in its hands, then it would be in a position to rule the market and significantly raise prices. The kulaks made precisely such an attempt during the current economic year. They held back their own grain and influenced the more prosperous peasants to operate in the same direction. The result, as you know, was that at the beginning of 1928 the Soviet government purchased 2 million extra tons of grain, i.e. approximately 1/5 less than was foreseen according to the plan and absolutely necessary for the supply of the cities, industrial centers, army, etc.

From this situation came the necessity for the government and the party to begin to improve grain storage, to mobilize the party for this purpose and to use certain extraordinary measures against those kulaks, who withheld grain for speculative reasons. There arose a situation in which these capitalist elements inside the Soviet economy attempted to move outside the limits set for them by the proletarian dictatorship. The dictatorship answered this with extraordinary measures, viewing the withheld grain from the speculative goals of the peasant-speculators, forcing them to sell the grain and frequently confiscating their hidden grain reserves, etc. The result was satisfactory enough that on April first the deficit was covered. This period revealed with complete clarity the alignment of class strength in the village. The poor peasants and the day laborers showed the Soviet government that they were an organ of support in the struggle against the kulaks. They pointed out

where the grain hidden by the kulaks was, etc. Once again, the correctness of Lenin's political line is affirmed:

"One must know how to achieve accord with the average peasant; never rejecting this battle with the kulaks for a minute and firmly relying only on the poor...." (vol. XV, p. 564.)

After this campaign against the kulaks had ended, several new difficulties revealed themselves. They consisted of a failure in the winter grain harvest throughout a significant part of the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. In the spring the necessity for over-seeding was evident. The Soviet government was forced to give the poor peasants in these suffering areas 500 thousand tons of its grain reserves so that it would be possible to plant the summer grain in place of the winter grain. It is quite understandable that, in connection with the worsening aspect of the grain harvest, the grain storage in these regions was severely aggravated and by the end of the year a certain deficit existed. In addition, the Soviet government was compelled to give the village poor a certain quantity of grain since the kulaks, in response to the extraordinary measures taken against them, stopped selling grain in the village markets in order to evoke an anti-soviet mood. It is no secret that for the last few months the Soviet government imported nearly 250 thousand tons of grain from abroad, in order to satisfy the temporary demand and to parry the maneuvers of the kulaks.

What measures did the Soviet government take in order to prevent a future repetition similar to the occurrence with grain supply? These measures are familiar to the majority of comrades. Above all, there has been a rather sig-

nificant increase in the prices for grain from the last harvest (by 15-20%), so that grain crops in the future year will be no less advantageous to the peasants than others. Further, all measures are being taken in order to promote the development of individual farms of poor and middle peasants, but this support must be as much as possible in line with the eventual unity of these farms with collectivization by any means of cooperative association.¹ Also, it has been slowly decided to begin the extension of the existing state farms and the organization of huge, new state farms. This organizational work has already begun. Already in the current year, several hundred thousand acres have been tilled; and there is hope that over the next several years the state farms will gather enough grain to prevent the kulaks from again manipulating grain supply.

In spite of its very widespread representation, we must emphasize here,

1. The final resolution of this question will lead to the collectivization of agriculture. It can only occur with the agreement of the peasants. Lenin writes about this:

"The matter of transforming the petty landowners and reworking his psyche is an affair which will demand a generation" (Vol. XVIII, part 1, p. 139).

there is no crisis in agriculture in general and in grain production in particular. It is true, that in response to those compulsory measures taken against them, the kulaks somewhat curtailed the spring planting of grain. But, on the other hand, the poor and middle peasants with the support of the Soviet state significantly increased their acreage sown. Therefore, it is unnecessary to talk about a break between the proletarian and the middle peasantry. The enlargement of the sowing area by the middle peasants shows that there is no danger of such a break.

The kulaks and the bourgeois counter-revolutionary elements have spread rumors to the effect that the extraordinary measures, taken to assure the maintenance of grain storage, indicate the beginning of a return to military communism. They cherished the hope that they would succeed in attracting to their side at least the prosperous layer of peasants who were also effected in some places by these exceptional measures. In order to avoid this, the party and the government decided not to employ any kind of extraordinary measures in the new grain harvest campaign.

I will proceed to somewhat smaller and less negative occurrences, which often figure in our struggle against the social democrats and which, therefore, necessitate some elucidation. The social-democratic press often declares: "The proletarian dictatorship keeps house badly. How expensive the industrial goods produced by Soviet enterprises are!" Of course, it is impossible to dispute the fact that industrial goods in our country are more expensive than in the leading capitalist countries. Why? Because to a significant degree tools in Soviet factories have become obsolete; and also, due to the growth of the consumption capacity of the population, industry is often compelled to put into use obsolete enterprises in order to better satisfy demand.

Because a significant portion of formerly qualified industrial workers died in the civil war and another portion occupy responsible positions in the Soviet economy, in the army etc. , the result in the last few years is that a large number of new but weakly trained workers have had their effect on industry. Finally, in our country production is more expensive because the utilization of the labor force is significantly less. Working time is now less than 7.5 hours per day on the average, and each worker receives yearly a paid vacation of not less than 14 days etc. It is understandable then, that with a lower level of technology, shorter working hours and less intensiveness of the work, production expenses must be higher in our country than in the capitalist countries.

In comparison with the pre-war period, the high prices are no greater than in the capitalist countries. Prices for wholesale goods have changed during the last few years in the following way (index of GOSPLAN - 1913 = 100):

	<u>1924/25</u>	<u>1925/26</u>	<u>1926/27</u>	<u>1927/28</u>
Agricultural products	143	147	141	136
Grain	138	124	101	101
Industrial products without excise duties	173	174	168	161

In this number:

Means of production	151	156	154	145
Means of consumption	181	182	175	169

In comparison with the most highly developed capitalist countries, indus-

trial goods in the USSR were more expensive, but that took place before the war.

It is often asked why is foreign trade so insignificant? "Why do you import and export only one-third of the pre-war amount?" And there is the often heard statement: "Before the war you exported yearly 10 million extra tons of grain and now the Soviet government imports grain! Well, you should manage better!"

This statement has some relation to reality. But what explains the situation which has been created? By the fact that the peasants and workers are better nourished than before the war. Production of grain is now 5% lower, the number of population 7% higher and people are being fed better. In consequence of this, the quantity of grain, which was formerly exported, is now consumed in the country itself. The pre-war export was not at all a result of overabundance. On the contrary, it was, as the German professor Zering has called it, a "starvation export." The peasants were starving. The landowners took away their grain in the form of rents and taxes, etc. They exported this grain and for it imported luxury items or used the profits to defray the expenses of Russian nobility abroad. At the present time the population of the Soviet Union is nourished better and this is why there are no grain surpluses. The export of grain has not stopped completely, however. Agricultural yield, from the farms of the poor and middle peasants and from the state farms, will quickly increase, and during the next few years the USSR will become a significant exporter of grain, because the internal demand for grain will not broaden limitlessly. It will only increase to a certain limit and then will begin to fall. In America, for example, demand for grain is significantly lower at the present time than 20 years ago. Why? Because

instead of this grain, a much greater quantity of animal products, meat, fowl, milk and vegetables, etc., are in demand. The same process is already noticeable in the Soviet Union. The city population has gone from a demand for black bread to a demand for white bread. Demand for bread has remained on the same level, while demand for meat and milk has increased.

Such is the explanation for the very insignificant part of our external trade. Naturally, we can import only as much as we export. There is no import of capital into our country. We receive no credit in any significant amount. Our exports will increase and consequently our imports will rise as well. But only after our population becomes satisfied will there appear any surpluses.

The curtailment of external trade is also caused by industrialization. Isolated from the capitalist world, the Soviet Union is forced to strive for its own self-sufficiency in order to maintain its defense capacity. It has been compelled to refuse some of the advantages of the international division of labor until the socialist soviet republics of Europe have been created.

I have already spoken about the problems of unemployment. Unemployment is caused in our country by the lack of necessary means of production. What is the composition of the unemployed? First, they number about 8 million poor peasant farmers who send their suffering sons and daughters to the cities. The second category of unemployed consists of a reduction of public servants, who have for a long time filled up the inflated Soviet apparatus. Unemployment in the USSR does not consist of industrial workers. Almost half of all unemployed are women and a third are so-called workers of intellectual labor. Skilled industrial workers comprise only 10% of the general

number of unemployed. Perhaps the question comes to mind as to why the Soviet government, in the presence of severe unemployment, pursues a rationale which deprives many workers of labor. Would it not be smarter to improve the methods of production and give work to a greater number of workers? This would be incorrect. This would contradict our attempt to place the industry of the Soviet Union on the same level with industry of the most developed capitalist countries.

However, there is a huge difference between this rationale of the Soviet Union and that of the capitalist countries. In the capitalist countries the main goal is the increase of profits and this increases the number of unemployed. In the USSR the purpose of its rationale is better and cheaper products. To the greatest extent possible, this rationale liberates manpower in our country and reduces working time to 7 hours per day, and for underground work in the mining industry to 6 hours per day. To the greatest extent possible, thanks to an improvement in the efficiency of labor and thanks to its entire rationale, the socialist industry will increase its production, will reduce its working hours and, together with this, new workers will be drawn into industry.

I shall dwell on yet another problem of technological strength, a problem which has a highly complex nature in our country. You are well acquainted with the occurrences connected with the mining process. It has been discovered that a group--truly, small but important--of technical specialists in the course of many years have resisted the building of socialism and have been found in association with capitalists that have fled abroad and in foreign governments. How can this be possible? The Communists rule everyone! But a good Communist is not necessarily the good administrator of a

trust, nor does he necessarily comprehend technical questions. To one who is not himself an engineer, it is very difficult to decide whether a certain specialist is a good man or a scoundrel. The condemned traitor-specialists in the mining process outwardly conducted themselves with regard to communism with absolute loyalty. Having performed acts of sabotage, they exiled themselves for the welfare of the Soviet Union. In this way they succeeded in deceiving the vigilance of the Communists, and lulling to sleep "proletarian distrust."¹

Why did these specialists relate hostilely to Soviet power and to the proletarian dictatorship? Recall the difference in the position of engineers in our country and in capitalist countries! In a capitalist country, an engineer nourishes the hope of making his way into the ranks of the great capitalists; but only in exceptional cases does he have the opportunity to do so by means of competent work in the interests of capital or by way of some technical innovation. His income can be equal to the incomes of millionaires. Politically, he has the opportunity to achieve the commanding heights of the

1. For the Communist it has been extraordinarily difficult to find the correct line with respect to technical specialists. Lenin writes on this subject:

"The Communist, not having proved his skill at unifying and modestly directing the work of specialists, entering the heart of the matter and studying it in detail, is a Communist who is often dangerous. We have many such Communists in our country and I would give a dozen of them for one conscientiously mastering his affairs and knowledgeable of the bourgeois specialist" (Vol. XVIII, part one, pp. 87-88).

capitalist state. In fact, in all capitalist countries there exists a higher layer of engineers who by nature of their incomes, their life-styles, and their entire ideology are very closely associated with the capitalists and form the constituent part of the bourgeoisie. It was from such earlier close association with capitalist elements that the Shakhtinskoye campaigns of the saboteurs came about.

In the Soviet Union technical specialists do not have such opportunities, as are available to them in capitalist countries. They cannot become millionaires, they cannot make their way into the ranks of the powerful capitalists and they cannot become political leaders. They are provided a certain, modest existence, and if they are not permeated and corrupted by the capitalist spirit, and if the joy of creation is preserved in them, then the growth of socialism gives them the opportunity to take part with all their energy in the development of productive strength, not striking against those limits which capitalism, in ruling production, places on the consideration of profits. And in fact, the predominant number of specialists are now loyal with regard to Soviet power. But there exists a small number, and it is that portion which until the war occupied the ruling posts in the capitalist economy and which right up to the present time has not moved honestly to the side of the working class, although it is true that it has cooperated with the working class, but not because of conscience.

Worst of all is the fact that there are so few engineer-communists! It is quite understandable that during the period of the imperial and civil wars the communists were deprived of the opportunity to spend five years in an institution of higher technical education. Only now are the first graduates of com-

munist-specialists appearing. But it is not enough for a communist to finish a higher educational institution. In order to turn into a really good engineer, he must have long years of practical experience. He who has just passed his exams today, is not yet in a position to administrate huge enterprises tomorrow.

And in this area we can observe a quite interesting struggle between the old capitalist generation and the new generation of red specialists. The old engineers strive to preserve a monopoly in their hands. They do not impart to young engineers all of their knowledge. They do not want to convey to youth their special expertise so that it would be impossible to do without them. In fact, without the old specialists it is impossible to bring to life the industrialization of the country, no matter how great the creative strength of the proletarian masses in the period of the dictatorship. The fact that, despite the systematic sabotage by the leading specialists year in and year out, the huge growth of production, pointed out by me in the first part of my report, has been possible attests to the exceptional amplitude of this strength.

The party and government have brought to realization a series of measures to prevent a repetition of the shakhtinskoye events. The most important of these measures are:

A pitiless punishment of saboteurs and a struggle against general, unfound "specialist problems"; an improvement in the position of the broad sector of specialists who should always recognize their personal responsibility; the intensive creation of red specialists and their involvement in corresponding branches of the production process; the attraction of foreign specialists;

the creation of technicians; the systematic deepening of the technical knowledge of the workers; the involvement of the working mass in the evaluation of practical technical questions; the technical education of the economic leadership; the decentralization of grandiose economic organizations, the existence of which extraordinarily complicates actual control over specialists and in which there are opportunities to conceal counter-revolution; the animation of party activity and union organizations; the freedom of self-criticism.

Often, and not without foundation, complaints can be heard about the bureaucratism in the USSR.

Lenin himself defined the Soviet government as "a worker's government with bureaucratic distortions." The struggle against bureaucratism constitutes right up to the present day one of the important tasks of party and government. The low cultural level of the masses inherited from Tsarism forms the basis of bureaucratism; the economy is still to be found in a period of construction, seeking but not having found the best organizational form; the inevitability of that circumstance in which in the government and economic apparatus there will be a significant number of indifferent or hostile elements¹, preoccupied mainly with having a justification of each step

1. At the IV Congress of the Communist International Lenin observed:

"At the top we have, I do not know exactly how many, but in any case, only several thousand, or at maximum several tens of thousands of them. But at the bottom there are hundreds of thousands of old officials, left over from the tsar and from bourgeois society, working partly consciously and partly unconsciously against us. Here in the short term there is nothing to be done

corresponding to a written resolution, etc. The best method of struggling against bureaucratism is recognized as the improvement of the cultural level of the masses and the free criticism of the activities of government workers by the peasants.

The housing shortage in the cities represents a severe aggravation. We must openly recognize that the housing conditions of the workers lags far behind the demands presented for better housing (the peasants, freely using materials from state forests, have built many new homes since the time of the revolution.) The acuteness of the housing question in the cities is a result of the present poverty of the Soviet economy. City construction designates that from products in the current year there should be derived an accumulation for 50-100 years ahead! A peculiarity of the construction consists of the fact that housing must not be built for just one year but for a decade. But the Soviet economy is in no position to produce such accumulation from the current years production. This is why, despite the improved construction activity of the last few years, there still exists a severe housing shortage in the large cities which will remain for long years to come.

It is impossible to underestimate the meaning of the existing difficulties and shortages. Bringing out, however, a comparison with capitalist countries, one must take into account that the Soviet power rules through the masses so that any abuse must be judged here completely openly, for it can be eliminated only by the active participation of the masses. In the capitalist countries

and this is undoubted. It is necessary to work over a number of years to perfect the apparatus, to change it and to draw new strength. We are doing this at a rather quick pace; perhaps too fast. (Vol. XVII, part 2, p. 97.)

small groups of the most powerful capitalists rule. All economic and political questions are decided there in small, closed circles. Capitalists hold in their hands the governmental, judicial and press apparatus and prevent the publication of any fact which is unfavorable to them. This is why in the "free" bourgeois press the everyday life of the capitalist countries is drawn in incomparably rosier colors than it really is. On the contrary, under Soviet power the actual situation is often intentionally depicted in a gloomy light so that the masses will all the more quickly pick up the struggle against the existing deficits.

Of course, a variety of problems exist in the Soviet Union. The change from capitalism to socialism is not a simple, even, easy process. It is realized in the conditions of an uninterested class struggle. For, day by day it is necessary to overcome ever newer and newer problems, in order to step by step reorganize the backward national economy into a socialist one.

This is neither a simple nor easy process. But we have no firm basis for pessimistic assessments of the perspectives for the building of socialism.

Perspectives for Future Development

Despite several deficits, the planned economy has already taken root in the USSR to such an extent that the next five-year plan gives us an opportunity to become familiarized with the future economic development of the Soviet Union. The basic lines are as follows:

In the course of the last five years, industrial production grew by 122%, the manufacture of the means of production increased by 142%, and production of the means of consumption by 109%. Despite this exceptional rate, it is a

long way from the superior growth in any capitalist country, and by the end of the five year period the demand for several important products - steel and iron, nonferrous metals and several chemical products - will not be satisfied fully. Toward the end of this period the production of tractors will amount to 60 thousand per year and demand will not be satisfied. This also relates, despite fast development, to the production of automobiles. The reconstruction of all the production apparatus of industry, rising from the base of anarchy of the capitalist methods of production (an unfortunate location) which were adapted to the capitalist distribution of income, will not be finished for another 5 years.

Salary has increased during these five years to 30-40% but in reality, as a result of lower prices, this is 50%.

Agricultural production should double in the course of the next ten years. At the end of the first five years the land area cultivated grew by 20%, and the harvest by 30-40%. In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to put to work in the fields of the Soviet Union during this five years no less than 150 thousand tractors, and wood plows must be completely replaced by iron ones. 50% of the land area sown with grain and 100% of the land area sown with the important industrial crops must be sown with a selected seed material, and the land area sown with fibrous crops will be entirely provided with artificial fertilizer, etc.

In the matter of extending the land area sown the state farms will play a great role. Land cultivated by them over the next five years will amount to not less than 20 million hectares and they will furnish, according to the satisfaction of special demand, not less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of grain per

year.

The collectivization of the peasant economy will achieve great success by way of cooperation and contracting.

Future perspectives are as follows:

The country will gradually change into an agrarian-industrial society. The favorable influence of the planned economy will become stronger and stronger. The significance of the social sector will be greater and greater. With the development of public trade organizations the role of capitalist elements will decrease more and more. The reduction in the cost of production of state industry will force the small private industry and handicrafts. The increase in the level of the individual peasant farms and the organization of the collective farms, and the subsequent struggle against the kulaks by means of the application of all available economic means, will more and more weaken the force of the kulak and assure the supply of grain and exports. The real salary of the worker will increase and the number of unemployed will be reduced, parallel with the growth of production. Further on only two of the five social economic types established by Lenin will remain: the socialist economy and the small goods economy of the average peasant, which is, however, increasingly more closely tied in with the overall economy. In correspondence with this, two classes will remain - the workers and the working peasantry. In a more remote perspective will appear the voluntary, gradual transition of the peasant to the collective farms. With the fading away of private property as a means of agricultural production, the class difference in general will disappear.

Under the conditions of a continuing dictatorship of the proletariat, the development of socialism is secured. Although at the present time in our

country there still exist classes hostile to the dictatorship, and although the class struggle still continues, nevertheless the proletarian dictatorship is not threatened in this regard with any serious danger. Danger only menaces from outside in the form of armed attack by the imperialist powers, which would bring into active battle the hidden counter-revolutionary forces within our country. The proletariat of the USSR is energetically preparing to repulse them.

"We have not been victorious," said Lenin in 1921 after the end of the intervention of the war, "since our military forces were insignificant, but the victory was really the circumstance in which the authorities were in no position to lead all of their military force in a movement against us. The workers of a country ruling them determined the course of the war to the extent that it was impossible to conduct war, and in the final analysis they decomposed the war against us by their passive and semi-passive resistance."

In the next war the entire world proletariat will be obliged to hasten all the more decisively to the aid of the Soviet Union, the only fatherland of workers, the lasting center of world revolution. The overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR by the united force of the capitalist powers would destroy the achievement of the last decade and for a long time would delay the victory of the world proletariat, and would senselessly prolong the generic suffering of the new society. This must not be! With the help of proletarians all over the world the proletariat of the Soviet Union will defend the common socialist society against any downfall until the victory of the world revolution.

Sikander Sur (India): Yesterday at the end of the session when there was a disagreement in connection with the prolongation of Comrade Rothstein's speech, the English translation was completely broken off. I addressed a protest to the translator, and Comrade Pollit from the English delegation followed my example. The translation was renewed for a certain period of time, but then suddenly it was again cut off. This happened, as I found out after the close of the session, when the votes were counted up for or against the colonial proposals.

Thinking that the previous argument had not been finished, the Indian delegation voted against, and now we have found out that it was then that the voting on these proposals was carried out.

All of our speeches have shown that we are against the theory of decolonization and, therefore, we cannot vote with those who defend it.

In such a situation, we, both Indian delegates having the right of a deciding vote, request that we be excluded from the number of persons voting against the proposal and be considered as having voted for its acceptance in principle even if an actual amendment is not made. Thus 12, and not 14, comrades voted against the proposals.

Murphy (England): In as much as the position of the English delegation expresses bewilderment at several members of the Congress, I consider it necessary to explain that Comrade Rothstein, having given his statement yesterday, spoke in the name of the majority of the delegation, the 4 members who expressed themselves for the line of the proposals on the colonial question.

(The session is closed.)

42nd Session

22 August, 1928 (evening)

Report of Comrade Manuilsky on the situation in the VKP(B).

Chairman Comrade Piatnitsky

Report of Comrade Manuilsky

In my report on the inner party situation of the VKP I must dwell on the results of the struggle of our party with Trotskyist opposition. Why is it necessary to pursue a question which has already been resolved by the party? Because it is important to return to this bit of our party history after the Trotskyist opposition has lost and after its Leningrad section has again been placed in the hands of the party, having publicly acknowledged its mistakes before the party, and after the latest grain problems so graphically displayed themselves to the workers of our own Union and to the entire Communist International; where would the opposition leaders bring our revolution if the governing powers entrusted them with the building of socialism and if they had begun to seriously realize the program of Smirnov, which would bring us better than a pair of years of quarreling with the peasantry but would move industrialization ahead faster? Is it not better to talk about the tasks now standing before the VKP? I think that the VI All-World Congress cannot avoid the lessons of the years-long struggle of our party against the Trotskyist opposition as if this question were boring and troublesome. The Trotskyist opposition was not only a phenomenon of our "national" order. The struggle against it has been conducted on every international front. Disbelief in the building of socialism in the USSR, characterized by the course of our opposition and closely intertwined with decadent and affected moods, arose in the Western European workers' movement in Germany in 1923, and can be discerned

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
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in the defeat of the universal English strikes and in the temporary deviation of the great Chinese revolution. The Trotskyist opposition reflects, therefore, not only the pressure of the non-proletarian classes within our country but it also reproduces its policy in hysterical zig-zags, raising the pressure of world capital against the entire international proletariat and its revolutionary fortress in the USSR.

The roots of Trotskyist ideology did not lie only in the platitudes of mutual class relations in the USSR, but ran much deeper, even relying on the objective situation developing in Europe after the first military revolutionary wave was heard. The struggle with the opposition was consequently not an artificial recording of the Russian argument in the Western European sections, but was a result of independently ripening social-democratic recidivism in the Western European party. The beginning of the opposition in the VKP only speeded up this process. Our period of the III Communist International is distinguished from the prewar period of the II International by the profound internationalization of the ideo-political life of all of our sections, their problems, their policies and their tactics. We are distinguished from the socialist party of old pre-war times in that the inner party struggles of our Communist Party no longer bear a narrowly defined local character. In composition, the III Communist International comprises a huge party, having victoriously accomplished the proletarian revolution, realizing the proletarian dictatorship for over ten years. It would be strange, if the fundamental questions of this party did not define themselves by the internal-party groupings of other sections. It would also be no less strange, if the lessons and experiences, which our party acquired from its struggle with the opposition, did not become the property of the entire Communist

International. The struggle against Trotskyist ideology was formed by elements of bolshevism in all communist parties. Only in light of that discussion, which the VKP and the entire Communist International conducted in its struggle with Trotskyism, as a doctrine reflected by the social-democratic experiences of the II International, do these answers become understandable to European comrades, answers which our party gives to current questions on the basis of the political course set down by the XV Party Congress. This course is not some sort of new turn in policy by the party. It is possible and inevitable only on the basis of the dissociation of the party from the crude opportunistic mistakes of the opposition, couched in bombastic pseudo-revolutionary phraseology. Its realization by the opposition only systematically ended in failure in as much as the party was compelled to concentrate very greatly against the opposition's accusations, which discredited and perverted the party line. Only by liquidating the opposition did the VKP obtain freedom of movement in the direction of a complete, large-scale realization of the party line. In my report, therefore, I must dwell on the fundamental and principal questions of our party policy, which the party has decided upon the basis of the experience accumulated in its struggle with the anti-Leninist views of the opposition.

But, before I move to the heart of the questions indicated, I would like to say a few words in passing about one story, intensively cultivated by the bankrupt opposition, both in the USSR and abroad. This story consists of the fact that some of those striving to return to the party opposition are attempting to explain their capitulation on the basis that the alleged party course, taken after the XV Party Congress, demonstrates the rectitude of the opposition's criticism. In the words of such people it has been published

that it was not a situation in which the opposition went bankrupt and having recognized its bankruptcy, capitulated before the party but a situation where millions in the party crossed over to the group of un^{known}acknowledged individuality, whose subjective estimation of the role of their personalities in history stands in deep contradiction to the factual side of things. These people, clinging on today, like drowning men to life preservers, from motives of their personal turns of mind, quite clearly are suggesting that in a huge country, where the population by no means consists only of mentally-ill and idiots, that someone seriously believes that the semi-menshevik views, which led to the fall of the adherents of the counter-revolutionary opposition, have really become the generally recognized views in our party. It is not the first time in the history of our party and the history of the worker's movement in general that we have already seen examples of how politically discredited groups are prepared to condescend to magnanimously give amnesty to stray parties. Such was the case with the unknown group "Forward" , having risen in the years of hard times at the end of the defeat of the working class in 1905. This group, in fact, having played the role of the ultra-left channel for the deviation from everyday life of the revolutionary work of separate groups of the intelligentsia, having blamed the Bolshevik Party for its opportunistic sins, and having completely putrified politically, up to that moment of the rise of the new revolutionary waves in Russia, proclaimed proudly in 1912 that the Bolshevik Party with Lenin at its head had crossed over to it, the group "Forward". Such was the case once with Trotsky, who, having wandered for 20 years in an anti-bolshevik course and separating himself from the Bolshevik Party on such basic questions as the estimation of the motive force of the revolution in relation to menshevism and in relation to the war, in

1917 on the eve of October approached Bolshevism, not as a victor, but as a man whom the Leninist party must teach anew.

"In the period between the 9th of January and the October strike of 1905," wrote Trotsky in 1922, "the views of the author (i.e. of Trotsky) toward the character of the revolution were developed and received the title of the theory of the permanent revolution... although there was an interval of twelve years before this was fully acknowledged." ("New Course", p. 194.)

And in a very well-known letter to Comrade Olminsky on the 6th of December 1921:

"I think my estimation of the motive force of the revolution was relatively correct."

But what is this evaluation of the motive force of the revolution, which found, according to Trotsky, its affirmation in October 1917 and which Trotsky considered correct in 1922 on the basis of the five-year experience of the proletarian dictatorship in our country? Perhaps it would not be worth dwelling on this if it had not emerged again in the adaption of the country to a different economic structure, to different social attitudes, to different groups of classes, to the various forms of mutual relations with imperialism, than had taken place in Tsarist Russia. We have in mind, for example, China, to which Trotsky turned in 1928 after the ideological struggle of our party with him regarding this evaluation and after his like-minded supporters wantonly blamed the leadership of the VKP for fabricating out of nothing the polemic of Trotskyism as an ideological trend; and he is now completely changing his old estimation of the revolution. In one of his

documents, addressed to the Congress on the question of the program, Trotsky, on the question of the revolution in China, develops approximately the following scheme of the socialist Chinese revolution.

There can be no democratic proletarian dictatorship of the peasantry in China as a phase, because from the very beginning the Chinese Revolution turned its front not only against the bourgeoisie in the city but also in rural areas, for feudalism in China is found in close economic ties with industrial capital. The proletariat inevitably must take authority upon its shoulders, because in China there are no classes capable of resolving the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic and agrarian revolution. But having seized power it is inevitably on the road to becoming a socialist revolution. The Canton revolt vividly illustrated this.

In one of his letters to his associates, now wandering about among the oppositionists, Trotsky writes:

"The overwhelming, decisive theoretical meaning of the Canton events for the basic questions of the Chinese Revolution consists precisely in the fact that we here, thanks to this adventure, have received something which rarely occurs in history or politics, an almost laboratory experiment of enormous scope. We paid dearly for it, but that much less have we a right to disregard its lessons. The conditions of the experiment had an almost chemically pure character. All of the preceding decisions strengthened, registered and affirmed as sure as two times two that the agrarian-bourgeois revolution, and that only those who "jump over", can speak about

the proletarian dictatorship, relying upon the union of the poor peasants, who comprise 80% of the Chinese peasantry ... Meanwhile, on the threshold of the events in Canton the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published its own resolution "Truths" in which it is said that the Chinese Revolution has taken a permanent character. The chairman of the Comitern, Comrade N. Kak, rendered the point of view at the Paris commune, which also displayed the elements of a laboratory experiment, that the proudhonist and blankists acted in defiance of their own doctrines and much more clearly revealed the class relations according to Marxist logic; thus in Canton the leaders, crammed to the very top with all of the warnings of the scarecrow of permanent revolution, having started to act, found themselves from the very first step guilty of this very primary, permanent sin."

Thus we have here an evaluation, which claims the right of international citizenship. Its author apparently is inclined to employ it in all countries at all times, wherever there is present a revolutionary situation.

Please do not complain, comrades, if I cite several quotations, characterizing these views and which have been quoted more than once in our discussions and therefore are very familiar to many of the participants of the VI All-World Congress. But to avoid these quotations is impossible, since they are the starting point of my succeeding statements. The theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky wrote in his foreward to the book "1905", expresses the thought that:

"...the Russian Revolution, before which stands the goals of the bourgeoisie, cannot resolve its most immediate bourgeois problems other than placing power in the hands of the proletariat. But the proletariat, having taken power, is not able to confine itself to the bourgeois limits of the revolution. On the contrary, precisely for the guarantee of its victory the proletarian avant-garde must in the very beginning effect through its government an incursion not only into feudal property but also into bourgeois property. The proletariat must also be in hostile confrontation not only with all groups of the bourgeoisie, who supported him in the very beginning of the revolutionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry, with whose cooperation he came to power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming majority peasant population can find its resolution only on an international scope in the arena of the world revolution of the proletariat."

If one reflects upon the developing line of thought in this quotation, then one will draw the following basic conclusions from it, characterizing the political physiognomy of the Trotskyist opposition as it appeared at the end of the struggle with the party:

1) The victory of the proletarian revolution in each separate country, if it is not supported by the world revolution, can be nothing else but a

temporary episode. And this means that one couldn't even think of any sort of extended consolidation of fighting in such a revolution. Its perspective is that of the June-revolt of the Paris proletariat in 1848 or in a better case, the Paris Commune. The roots of such a hopeless situation lie in the mood of the pre-war social democrats, who measured the revolutionary events by the scope of the first test of strength of the working class, and in defeat, having underestimated the will of the proletariat to gain power, these social-democrats are still shaking slavishly before the might of the capitalist system. It is impossible to qualify such a situation as other than revolutionary defeatism. For it is quite clear that if the world revolution had been late with its help, then the emergence of a proletarian country would have never occurred. Under these conditions "It is hopeless to think" writes Trotsky in another place:

"Thus affirms the experience of history and the theoretical understanding, for example, that revolutionary Russia could have resisted in the face of a conservative Europe or socialist Germany could have remained isolated in the capitalist world."

(Trotsky, Essays, vol. III, part I, pp. 89-90.)

Further it is completely clear that if the victory of the proletariat in each country can only last for a short episode, then it cannot be possible to speak further about any kind of permanent building of socialism. Under such conditions the proletarian party would only be left with maneuvering and delaying the time of its defeat. From the point of view of the NEP there can be nothing else but deviation. Nor would it be useful to think about any action to attack the capitalist elements of the economy about which Lenin

spoke at the XI Party Congress. In the best of circumstances this would be "walking in place", for:

"Without direct government support of the European proletariat," as Trotsky wrote, "the working class in Russia will not be able to hold on to power and transform its temporary government into a long lasting socialist dictatorship." (Our Revolution" p. 278.)

2) The second conclusion is that the victorious proletariat in each separate country inevitably will come into hostile confrontation with broad masses of the peasantry and will not be able to rule them or bring about the consolidation of the achievement of the revolution and its continuation along the road to the building of socialism. In this concept we find a very clear denial of the leadership role of the proletariat in the period of proletarian revolution, the doctrine (i.e. about the roles) of which forms one of the fundamental positions of Leninism on the question of the proletarian dictatorship.

3) The third conclusion. The mutual relationship of the proletariat with the peasantry according to Trotsky's concept is thought of not in the form of a union of the working class with the peasantry for the security of the governing role of the proletariat, but in the way of a class juncture, ending up inevitably in a serious break. Thus the focus of this class struggle, existing under conditions of capitalism, mechanically puts up with the situation in the country, while in those places where the proletariat has been victorious, he has at his disposal the opportunities to regulate the class struggle and to conduct his relations with the peasant by mutual

agreement. Along with such a resolution of this question is an indication of the equality between the peasantry, the natural allies of the proletariat and other groups deeply hostile to the proletariat. Emanating from the false presupposition that it is impossible to build socialism in any country where the proletariat has been victorious is that:

"We," as Trotsky writes in a completely Menshevik vein in his latest document, sent to this Congress "are still closer to a backward and uncultivated capitalism on the basis of our cultural level, our daily lives, and cultural conditions than to a socialist society."

The adherents of this idea cannot draw the false conclusion that they may define as capitalistic the development of the mutual class relations between the peasantry and proletariat in the country of the proletariat dictatorship or that they can produce this development under that kind of mutual class relationship which the working class has with its enemies.

4) The fourth conclusion. In connection with the previously stated form of mutual relationship of the working class with the peasantry the Trotskyist concept allots a specific role to the workers' government under the proletarian dictatorship. If this mutual relationship must inevitably develop in the period of the proletarian dictatorship in the form of a very violent and irreconcilable class struggle, then from here it follows that the workers' government must be as cruel an apparatus of coercion and suppression in relation to the peasantry as it is in relation to other hostile classes. In as much as the tasks of building socialism in the period of the proletarian dictatorship take a secondary role, and in as much as the task of prolonging

power is foremost until that time when the help of the world proletariat comes, thus the function of economic regulation in such a government acquires a very small meaning and, on the contrary, the function of administrative pressure and repression becomes the normal method of governing. The policy of such a government inevitably becomes the policy of unrestrained impulses.

And from this follows the fifth conclusion, concerning the completely false representation of the form of the proletarian dictatorship in its relation to the peasantry. It is quite apparent that if one doubts the possibility of union of the proletariat and the peasantry and if one proceeds on the basis of the inevitability of a "hostile clash" with the broad masses of the peasantry as well as with other groups hostile to the proletariat, then it is impossible not to come to a conclusion about the identity of the forms of the dictatorship to both the counterrevolutionary classes and the peasantry. This dictatorship will be realized not in the form of its ties with the peasantry, but in the form of its government over it. This will be a policy of command and not of leadership, a policy copying the methods of the bourgeois dictatorship in relation to the peasantry. In such a representation of the dictatorship in relation to the peasantry there is not one iota of Leninism or Leftism, but there is only an assimilation of strange bourgeois views on the essence of the proletarian dictatorship. And the falseness of this concept strikes one all the more sharply in that we do not class policy in regard to various social groups of the peasantry. The whole peasantry according to old social-democratic cliches are depicted by one general category, like a reactionary mass. The poor and middle peasant masses

form the basic layer of the village, and it is in relation to them that the proletariat in the period of the proletarian dictatorship must solidify its policy, must rely more strongly on the poor, and seek a union with the middle peasant masses, tearing it out from under the influence of the kulak power in the villages - these groupings completely disappear from the field of the adherents of this analysis. Between the kulak, in relation to whom the regime of the proletarian dictatorship bears an aspect different in relation to other groups in the village, and in the poor and middle peasant layers a sign of equality is again established; and the peasant kulak, poor peasant and middle peasant are set in one general rank before the proletarian dictatorship, isolated from the main mass of the peasantry.

Finally, the sixth conclusion is about the role of a workers party, having taken power in another country under conditions of delayed help from the international proletariat. Such a party inevitably would be presented with the following dilemma: either to die with honor in a battle of the peasantry and the proletariat, or take an anti-proletarian course of policy, and begin to adapt to the interests of its other classes, and gradually renovate itself. But in this there is a Thermidorian orientation in the relation of the proletarian dictatorship of the USSR and this ruling party dictatorship. Hence a disbelief also results in the VKP and the orientation toward the western Communist Party, only starting to fight for the victory of the proletarian revolution in these countries. Therefore the foremost problem of the Communist International is not the Bolshevization of its Western European Sections, nor the surmounting of the social-democratic population of the past but the europeanization of the VKP, i.e. a return to the old social-democratic ideas, put forth by Trotsky in the period of the struggle between

the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In this disbelief in the VKP it is necessary to search for the roots and ideas of the "third revolution" which was developed by the supporters of Trotsky abroad in page after page of the works of Maslov and Zul.

Is it necessary to demonstrate that the sum of these views resulting from this evaluation of the motive force of the revolution, which the Trotskyist opposition has considered correct up to now, has nothing in common with the policy of our party and will have nothing in common with it? If our party had conceived such a policy both in relation to the world revolution and in relation to the world revolution and in relation to the building of socialism, and in relation to the peasantry as well, it would cease being a Leninist party and would roll along the path of political gesturing, on a path of a group of people who have nothing to lose and who bear no responsibility before the world proletariat for the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR and consequently for the fate of the world revolution. The firm Leninist policy of our party would have been replaced by a policy of adventurous horse races and by the intellectual abandonment of the historical conditions in which the original struggle of the international working class took place for world revolution and it would inevitably end in breaking the spine of the workers in our Union and the communist movement throughout the world for a number of years. It is necessary to keep these conclusions of the position of Trotsky in mind, because in connection with them I must set down in my report six fundamental questions: 1.) on the international revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR; 2.) on the leadership role of the proletariat and on the forms of understanding with the peasantry; 3.) on the class struggle in the period of the proletarian dictatorship; 4.) on the role of the state

under the proletarian dictatorship; 5.) on the forms of the proletarian dictatorship and workers' democracy; 6.) on the role of the party and its hegemony.

On the International Revolution and the Building of Socialism in the USSR

I will proceed to the question of the international revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR. I will not dwell upon it for a long time, for the question of building socialism in each country was the subject of a very detailed discussion at the VII extended plenum of the IKKI. This question is above all a question of the help which will realize the building of socialism in the matter of the international proletarian revolution, in the matter of the revolutionization of the working capital of the country, in the matter of propaganda from the actual direct experience of our building of socialism and its advantages in the face of the system of capitalist slavery and exploitation, and in the matter of facilitating the task of the proletarian revolution in other countries in that the proletariat of our backward country by way of its incredible difficulties is setting the path, on which it will be easier for millions of workers in other countries to go after they have seized power. Only a crazy man or an incorrigible Social-democrat can find in this "messianism" i.e. the conviction in the providential mission of one's country, which Geda and Kautsky brought to social-democratism during the war. It would be superfluous and unworthy of our party and an insult to the Congress to prove by means of documents what is a truism for any communist, i.e. that our party both before the war of the proletarian revolution in our country and after its victory always examined it as part of the international proletarian revolution, that our building of socialism was a

cornerstone for the victory of socialism in the whole world. Workers throughout the world were witnesses to the worldwide reaction which took revenge on the Soviet Union, a reaction headed by the English bourgeoisie, for those feelings of honorable proletarian solidarity, which the workers in the Soviet Union displayed with respect to the universal English strikes and the Chinese Revolution. There is not one corner in the world, where a revolutionary movement has not raged, as in Indonesia, in Syria, in Vienna and around Sacco and Vanzetti in America and that the heart of our party has not beaten in unison with the oppressed. The question of the international revolution and the building of socialism, moreover, is a question of that help which the international proletariat, with its revolution and revolutionary support, can render to the victory of socialism in our country. Only a crazy person can think that reinforcement, going for the support of troops besieged in their fortress, is needless. Our path, therefore is so difficult and harsh and our problems are so great because the international revolution has been late. We are forced now to build an isolated economy under the conditions of the capitalist environment which opposes us, to isolate ourselves within the limits of our internal division of labor and to entrench ourselves from the capitalist pressure of the monopoly of external trade, in order to defend the right to build socialism which was won by us in the October Revolution. One must really lose any feeling of the revolutionaire in order to see in this a "national limitation". We know that the victory of the proletariat in other capitalist countries will compel us to reorganize our economy on the basis of an international division of labor. The duty of the internationalism of our party and of our working class will not at that time consist of creating independent branches of industry, liberating us from dependence on the

capitalist market, but will consist of uniting the highly industrialized countries with our more backward country on the basis of a common rise in production strength and the international division of work. All of this is truly indisputable, to which politically evil people can call out no rejoinder.

That which separated us from Trotsky is the very thing which separated Trotsky from the Bolshevik Party for a quarter of a century. For a quarter of a century, with only small interruptions during moments of the collapse of the revolutionary wave, Trotsky exploited leftist slogans to conceal his own opportunistic affairs. So it was that Trotsky occupied a centrist position in the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. So it was at the time of the imperialist war, when under the flag of extremely leftist-sounding internationalism Trotsky fought against Leninist defeatism, this highest form of proletarian activism in the struggle against the imperialist war, and against the appearance of the deepest feelings of proletarian solidarity, which the world-wide workers' movement somehow knew. So it was that Trotsky exploited the idea of the international revolution in order to subdue the creative impulses and the inextinguishable surging of the proletariat of our Union in building socialism and sowed scepticism and disbelief in the ranks of the international proletariat at the moment when stormy clouds were gathering over the Soviet Union. The path to world revolution does not lie with Zul but through an organized international communist movement and its main support - the VKP. Through Zul, the road leads only to Alma-Ata. With these observations I am finished with this first question.

On the Leadership Role of the Proletariat and on the Forms of
Ties with the Peasantry

I will proceed to the second question, a question of the leadership role of the proletariat in relation to the peasantry during the period of the proletarian dictatorship and the forms of its ties with the peasantry. Our revolution and the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in our Union for more than ten years provided a colossal experience in this respect, an experience which must be summed up for all Sections of the Communist International. Trotskyism never posed the question of the allies of the working class either before the revolution or after its completion. According to Trotsky the proletarian, isolated from all other classes, was the natural bearer of this revolution and the consolidation of its achievements. Therefore Trotskyism cannot find a place either in the proletarian revolution or in the system of the proletarian dictatorship or the peasantry or the working colony. It is in this that the birthmark of social-democratic ideology is expressed, and which underlies Trotskyism. Social-democracy was not capable of presenting the question of the proletarian revolution completely or associating the question of the workers' uprising with the movement of all oppressed and exploited people. The idea of a social proletarian revolution in the baggage of pre-war social-democracy played the role of a social myth, by which it was possible to deceive the workers. At the heart of the matter for a "purely proletarian" concept of the social revolution is hidden a deeply pessimistic attitude toward it. In fact this was the putting off of the historical period of the death of capitalism until that moment when capitalism transforms the majority of the population into proletarians and when the disintegration of the capitalist system will have matured so much that the proletarian revolutions will drop like ripe apples. Such a position on the question was allowed the pre-war pedants of the II International to maintain the view of "class irreconcila-

bility" in the face of deep anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian policy in regard to the proletarian revolution. In Trotskyism, therefore, the idea of the leadership role of the proletariat in relation to the peasantry was lost. In it was absent the idea of the tie of the working class with the peasantry. the idea of the proletarian dictatorship bore abstract forms, superfluous of the lively upkeep of concrete calculations of class strength in a given country under given historical conditions. Clumsily using slogans of an epochal form such as "permanent revolution" and "United Socialist States of Europe" , Trotskyism could neither give an answer at moments of temporary interruptions in the revolutionary process nor, as is evident in the latest evolution of Trotskyism, give answers of a purely social-democratic quality. Leninist teaching of our party in the presence of Trotskyism, in the first place, has set down and solved the problem of the allies of the working class by the experience of the Russian Revolution for the epoch of the proletarian revolution:

"The significance of the period, which is now beginning in Russia," said Lenin at the III All-World Congress, "from an international point of view, and if one views the international revolution as a jungle process, consists essentially of the fact that we must practically solve the question of the relations of the proletariat to the final capitalist class in Russia." (Stenographic Account of the All-World Congress, p. 357.)

Second, Leninist teaching subordinated the question of the peasantry, which many considered the fundamental side of Leninism, to the idea of the proletarian dictatorship;

"The fundamental question of Leninism, and its starting point is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions of its achievements, and of the conditions of its fortification. The peasant question, as a question of the allies of the proletariat in its struggle for power is a derivative question."

(Stalin, Questions on Leninism, p. 12.)

Third, and finally, Leninist teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat defined the forms of union with the peasantry, promoting in the first plan the leadership role of the proletariat in this union.

"The Mensheviks," said Lenin at that III Congress, "reason thus: the peasantry constitutes the majority and we are pure democrats - therefore the majority must decide. But since the peasantry cannot be independent, then in all practicality this designates nothing else but an uprising of capitalism."

(Stenographic Account of the III Congress, p.357.)

Thus Leninist teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the union with the peasantry as on the conditions of its achievement and consolidation was for our party a theoretical compass, preserving it above all from the Trotskyist understanding of the proletarian dictatorship, which was opposed to the tie with the peasantry, i.e. an understanding which took the question of the peasantry from the theory of the proletarian dictatorship and turned it into a question of a civil war with the peasantry; but on the other hand this teaching preserved the party from another possible understanding, which abolished the fact of the leadership role of the working

class with respect to the peasantry, and reduced the question of the proletarian dictatorship exclusively to a question of the agreement with the peasantry, thinking of the proletarian dictatorship as a coalition of two classes at the beginning of complete political equality. If the first Trotskyist understanding of the proletarian dictatorship had inevitably led the proletariat to a break with the peasantry then the second understanding, if it were to be made official in our country, would threaten by its enactment to lead the proletarian dictatorship to the degeneration to a purely bourgeois democracy and to the ascent of capitalism. And these questions are not idle ones for our party, and they have more than just theoretical meaning. The question about the leadership role of the proletariat, the question of the ties with the peasantry, the question of which social groups from the country will close the front of the proletarian struggle, all of these questions will come up systematically before our party in the period separating us from the second wave of the world revolution. On these questions the international capital and counter-revolutionary groups in our country will feel the strength of Soviet power in the USSR; above all the correlation of class strength both inside our own country and in the international arena will press for the practical solution of these questions. A variety of ideological movements will be formed in our party. We have seen, for example, that during the last grain harvesting campaign there were tendencies in our lower party organizations toward such an understanding about the union with the peasantry, which emasculated the form of class from the system of the proletarian dictatorship. In our state and party apparati, closely bound to the country, communists have sat here and there, who "closed" with the highest ranks of the kulak in the village and have yielded to his moods and have demonstrated a solid resistance to the measures of our party, directed toward strengthening the

grain-harvest. These people, having lost a feeling for their class and having placed themselves under the influence of their environment from the point of view of another class, vulgarized the idea of close ties and copied the Menshevik understanding of the union of the working class with the peasantry, about which Lenin warned at the III Congress. Along with this we have seen a different kind of tendency in the so-called practice of the dog-eared party line during the period of this campaign; these tendencies in their development and formation would grow to an understanding of the proletarian dictatorship, which is characteristic of Trotskyism. But it is completely evident, that after the ideological chaos, which was the object of Trotskyist opposition, and after that long-term work which we carried out in our party in the struggle with Trotskyism, having educated our party on the realization of the necessity of close ties with the peasants, there is now a tendency of the second order which is less dangerous for our party than the tendency leading to the weakening of the leadership role of the proletariat in the business of establishing closer ties with the peasantry.

Thus from the examples presented it is clear that it is impossible to pose the question of the proletarian dictatorship separate from the question of its union with the peasantry; and from another angle, it is impossible to examine the problem of the union with the peasantry apart from its corresponding significance with respect to the problems of the proletarian dictatorship. Any obliviousness to this will be an undoubted deviation from Leninism and will inevitably lean either to the side of Trotskyism or to the side of pure Menshevism. The tie is not a non-class union with the destruction of class interests. It is a union of classes, possessing its own peculiar class interests. But from this absolutely correct Marxist position, i.e. that the work-

ing class and peasantry share each others' class interests, Trotskyism drew the false conclusion that these interests must inevitably lead to hostile confrontations. Our party has fought incessantly for a number of years against the theory of a break with the peasantry and if we had nurtured our party on this theory, we undoubtedly would have ruined the greatest historical duty entrusted to us by the world proletariat. On the other hand, we think that this is the antithesis which stands opposite Trotskyism, i.e. that a close tie presupposes the unity of class interests on the basis of the self-sacrifice of one class of its own interests and the constant concession of one class to another. With such an understanding of these close ties, the union of the working class with the peasantry would never be darkened by transient contradictions. This would be the most placid form of union. But such a union does not exist in nature. That union which we realized with the peasantry in the course of the ten years after the revolution presupposed mutual concessions, mutual distribution of the burdens and deprivations associated with a transitional period.

"We are the state power," said Lenin at the III Congress, "We are in a position to distribute the deprivations to a certain degree, to entrust them to several classes and thus to ease relatively well the position of individual sections of the population. But according to what principle must we act? According to what is fair or according to what the majority wants? No. We must act practically. We must carry out the distribution in such a way as to preserve the power of the proletariat. This is our only principle." (Lenin, Stenographic Account of the III Congress, p. 359.)

Our tie with the peasantry has not always been ideal. First, the peasantry has sometimes reminded us that the correct proportion in the "distribution of burdens" has in its opinion been breached. It has reminded us of this by methods peculiar to the peasantry, for example, reducing the land in cultivation during the period of military communism. Our latest grain producing problems were also one of these reminders. Sometimes the government of the proletarian dictatorship in its turn has been compelled to remind the peasantry about the duty of an ally. Second, relying upon the poor and holding course for a lasting union with the middle peasants, we never closed ourselves in with the kulaks. At times we had very strained relations with this social group in the villages. It is sufficient to recall even the Makhnovsky movement in the Ukraine. Therefore to vulgarize the question of union as a counterbalance to the incorrect Trotskyist orientation and to deny in general during the period of the proletarian dictatorship the possibility of temporary, partial and local collisions with individual groups in the country would be from our point of view absolutely incorrect. The wisdom of Leninist policy as a question of unity exists precisely in "distributing deprivations" in correspondence with the ratio of class strength and ruling by the single principle of preserving the proletarian dictatorship. Therefore, at different times during the Russian Revolution the forms of our ties with the peasantry have differed. There was a time in our country when our ties bore the character of a military union for the common armed struggle against the landowners and capitalists. This type of union had out-lived itself with the end of the civil war. In 1921 we understood after some incidents that it was necessary to change this form of union to another, based on the economic tie of the proletariat with the peasantry.

Putting NEP into operation, we established market relations on the basis of this economic tie; but not merely by reconstructing the capitalist elements of the market, but by taking the most important command positions for the proletariat and allowing it to regulate these market relations to a certain degree. We know that it is precisely this kind of tie which will last for a very long time. This type of union will last the entire historical period until the whole foundation of societal relations is reconstructed. The misfortune of our opposition consists of the fact that it understood neither the nature nor the historical temper of this period, that it wanted to correct this form of union by hysterical tugging and that it inevitably would have finished itself off with a breakdown of Trotskyism. But at the same time, for each thoughtful Communist it has been completely clear that in putting NEP into operation when the position of the socialization of industry was extraordinarily weak and when elements of the market threatened to trample us, we do not have to remain only within the framework of free competition of various economic forms and, inevitably, according to the degree of our strengthening, we will proceed against the private-economic elements of our economy. We do not think of NEP only as a deviation, nor do we think of it as a permanently established position of strength nor as a permanent division between the socialist and private-capitalist sectors of the economy. For us it has been completely clear that the reinforcement of the position on public industry, the increase in solidity of the economy and planning and regulation of our economy will inevitably entail the limitation of elemental market relations in the matter of ties with the peasantry. What other sense could the slogan have, that Lenin flung out at the XI Party Congress to the effect that, of course, it is a deviation, but must we proceed in the direction of every economic front? Already the cooperative plan of Lenin has sig-

nificantly altered the basic variant of the ties, established at the beginning of NEP. Undertaking, developing and strengthening this plan, we, according to the words of Lenin, "have found that the degree of union of private interests and private trade interests and its control and examination and control by the government is the degree of its submission to general interests. Trotsky, in one of his recent documents sent to the Congress, attempts to weaken the meaning of this cooperative plan for advancing the building of socialism by reference to the fact that this plan of cooperation touches upon the social-organizational and political aspect, but does not help one iota in solving the material-production aspect of socialist construction. Such a question can only be posed by a hopeless philistine who, in general, does not believe in socialism and who considers that a higher type of socialized economy than the small individual economies cannot change the scanty material-production base, inherited by us from the revolutionary period. It is well-known that under the capitalist sector the enlarged economy serves as the basis for the increase of production strength thanks to its advantages over small production. But why is the economy that was extended at the beginning of socialization under the dictatorship of the proletariat losing this quality?

Further, why does Trotsky consider that the question of the political authority of the working class does not play a role in broadening the material-production basis of the economy built by the hands of the proletariat? The great French Revolution, returning political power to the hands of the bourgeoisie and defeating the "social-organizational" forms of feudalism, as is well known, significantly broadened the material-production base of the French economy at the end of the 18th century, transforming France from a country of handicraftsmen and corporations into a country of capitalist speculation.

We admit that the French bourgeoisie was, for its time, foremost in its general attitude and that our country, in relation to other capitalist countries, was lagging behind--but then Trotsky was confused on the purely Menshevist position on the question of the immaturity of our country for socialism. To deny the influence of the "social-organizational" form on the level of the material-production base means to renounce Marxism. In the entire history of capitalism and of pre-capitalist economic types it is possible to discern that the "social-organizational" forms were not just a derivative of the material-production structure but also in their turn had an influence on this structure. In our own development we have come to just such a point in our relations with the peasantry, where, through higher social-organizational forms, the proletariat is striving to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and to increase the profitability of agriculture. Trotsky, who suggests that the collective forms of agriculture will not increase the material-production base of agriculture, falls into the embrace of that kulak ideology, which was represented by Professor Kondratyev. Our latest plan of organizing the collective and state farms, that was promoted by the XV Party Congress, is nothing new in principle and displays no new turn in our attitude towards the millions of individual peasant farms. The party realizes that many years will yet pass, in the course of which, individual peasant enterprise will occupy a very visible place in the economics of our country. Our plan of collectivization, promoted for the eleventh year of the proletarian dictatorship, is only the furthest development and extension of Lenin's co-operative plan. We are now gaining great experience, attempting to create from the sediment of village life the supporting points of socialism, which until this time we have possessed in the cities in the form of command positions. This task is most complex and difficult in as much as we must over-

come individual prejudices and habits that have developed over long years, and by our actual experience convince millions of peasants systematically and persistently, year in and year out, of the advantages of the collective form of farming over the individual. This stage in the advance on the remainders of capitalism in our country will be quite lengthy. And, during this stage, we must not forget for a minute that our only principle henceforth will be the preservation and consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship. That which will characterize this stage will be the necessity for us to differentiate to a greater degree among the forms of our ties with the peasantry than before. Issuing from the market situation of NEP, but bridling the elements of the market by our government positions and with the help of the peasant economy on the one hand and on the other hand, having strengthened our work of collectivization of the peasants and the lowest groups of the middle peasant economy and creating exemplary Soviet farms, we will not get a series of channels for the action of the proletariat on the peasantry in consolidating its ties with it. We cannot forget about the most important instrument of making these ties, the cultural revolution, that is occurring in our country and is reeducating the young rising generation from the main peasant mass in the political and social ideas of the October Revolution. Our movement of agricultural correspondents, patronage societies, and the huge political-educative role of our Red Army returning from a gray, half-literate youth in the villages, the layer of village activists who are the reformers of its daily life, the radio waves, the steel threads of electrification--all these tools of unification do not play the final role in the sovietization of our villages. We cannot further lose sight of such channels of action as the unionizing of farm laborers, workers in the sugar industry, wood workers, etc. Finally, the political work that is taking place among

the poor has acquired a great significance in establishing ties with the villages.

The widespread, large-scale plan of unification, well thought out by our entire party is a plan proven by the experience of the mutual relations of the proletariat with the peasantry during the eleven years existence of the proletarian dictatorship in our country. Our party opposes the lifeless and deadly pessimistic scheme of Trotskyism, issuing from the presupposition of the inevitable growth of class conflict between the working class and the peasantry.

The Class Struggle in the Period of the Proletarian Dictatorship

The third question on which it is necessary to dwell and on which the problem of unification in part rests, is the question of the class struggle in the period of the proletarian dictatorship. Does there exist a class struggle under the proletarian dictatorship? It is quite clear that so long as classes exist, the class struggle cannot disappear, nor even die away under a single socialist regime. This indisputable truth struck one fully and distinctly under the proletarian dictatorship during the Civil War. The Civil War is the most "pure" form, the form of class struggle the most devoid of all "democratic" conventions and false sayings about the socialist world. This is all very clear and demands no explanation. A somewhat different and more complex matter stands out from the second phase of the proletarian dictatorship during the period of NEP. Here the weapons have been complex, the exploiting classes have been suppressed; one of their parts has been physically exterminated, another portion has emigrated, a third has surrendered at the discretion of the victorious proletariat, become calm and gathered itself up

under the conditions of the new structure and gone to work in service of the Soviet power. The military specialists, the technical intelligensia, and finally the new bourgeoisie, given legitimacy during the regime of the proletarian dictatorship--all of these recognize Soviet authority and "are cooperating" with it. The proletariat is utilizing for the building of socialism, that very same technological strength that the bourgeoisie used during its own rule for the building of capitalism. This confuses the fact that it is possible to create an illusion of the cessation of class struggle and of the complete harmony of the classes under the proletarian dictatorship. Peaceful conditions without civil war and without serious class confrontations with anti-Soviet elements are capable of being framed too idyllically, until the Shakhtinsky Sabotage deals us a blow on the head. Further confusion exists on the question of class ties. Once "tie" meant the cooperation of the working class with the peasantry and once cooperation meant the end of the class struggle. Such confusion is unnecessary and it can only complicate the situation. The victorious procession of socialism in our country will more and more strongly draw the peasant under the influence of the proletariat and class contradictions will be increasingly wiped out and the elements of the community of class interests must stand out before all others. The correct perspective is confused by the tendency that appeared in many of us to somewhat idealize the present state of things. Finally, our attachment to an analysis of the mutual relations of classes in a period of proletarian dictatorship according to a simplified analogy based on the opposing class attitudes existing under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie also is a cause of our downfall. We shall take the question of class struggle and of class cooperation during the period of capitalism; and we will turn the social pyramid upside down and in this way construct our analysis of mutual

class relations under the proletarian dictatorship. Therefore, it will be extremely useful to establish above all, how Lenin saw the question of class struggle under the proletarian dictatorship.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," wrote Lenin, "is also a period of class struggle which is inevitable until the annihilation of class and which changes its particularly violent and peculiar forms, eventually stopping after the overthrow of capital. Having gained political power, the proletariat cannot simply stop the class struggle; but can continue it henceforth until the total destruction of classes occurs, but of course in a new environment, in a different form and by different means." (The Great Start, vol. XV, p. 249.)

What did Trotskyism make of this absolutely correct Leninist view of the nature of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat? Did it set out to make a caricature that it could not complete, proceeding from the inevitability of class conflict with the peasantry? According to the Trotskyist scheme, the Civil War, that the working class conducted along with the peasants against the landowners and capitalists, had to inevitably develop into a civil war between the working class and the peasantry. Civil war would, therefore, turn into a normal condition of the proletarian dictatorship. That the class struggle in the period of NEP, during the building of socialism, after the liquidation of the White Guard mutinies, after the capitulation of the capitalist classes, elapsed, as Lenin said, into other surroundings, leading to other forms and different methods--is what the Trotskyist opposition considered rightist leanings.

First of all, the opposition did not understand the character of the cooperation of the proletariat with the fundamental mass of the peasantry in the period of NEP, and of the economic cooperation, appearing as a continuation of the cooperation on the front of the class civil war against the landowners and capitalists. What does this cooperation itself represent? Perhaps by analogy one might put it under the category of the cooperation of classes that it is possible to observe in capitalist society? History gives us many examples of class struggle and class cooperation in the well-to-do capitalist countries. The struggle of the Whigs and the Tories in England ended by means of a class compromise, with the settling of the English landlords into a system of English capitalism; and the Prussian junker knitted itself together with the financial capital of Germany just before the revolution and then after the Revolution of November 9th. Here we have before us such a form of class cooperation that ends with the division of political power between the cooperating classes. This division of power is possible because these classes, such as the industrialists, banking aces and formidable landowners, stand on a common foundation, the institution of private property and exploitation. There can be no such cooperation in the capitalist countries as, for example, between the working class and the well-to-do, for there is a difference in their social bases. The highest ranks can cooperate: the Sittrins and the Thomases, but not the working class as a whole, because the social gap between them and the whole system of capitalism is too huge and cannot be eliminated by any coalition policy of the Social Democrats. The proletariat is the only collective class which cannot divide power with a single other class, lodged on the foundation of private property and exploitation. The proletarian dictatorship is a form of power that is founded on cooperation with the peasantry, but not on the "democratic" division of

authority. The proletarian dictatorship is not the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The former stands on the foundation of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, on the foundation of the socialist transformation of society and on the foundation of the dictatorship of one class; and the latter still remains on the foundation of capitalism and the division of authority between the proletariat and the peasantry. The slogan of the worker-peasant government that the V World Congress interprets as the synonym of the proletarian dictatorship, designates that in the name of the workers' government in our country the policy of very attentive and very absolute consideration of all the interests and demands of the basic core of the peasantry is being carried out. The peasantry, both in capitalist society and in and under the proletarian dictatorship, are very similar and as a class is the closest and friendliest to the proletariat. To win the peasantry over to its side is the basic task of the proletariat, both before and since the revolution. But in the peasant's view of his intervening social situation there are two forces at war.

"The peasant as a worker is drawn toward socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The peasant as a seller of wheat is drawn toward the bourgeoisie, to the freedom of trade, i.e. back to the 'acknowledged', old, 'original' capitalism." (Lenin, vol. XVI, "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers," p. 227.)

The essence of our cooperation with the peasantry does not at all lie in the fact that we support its prejudices or that we have maintained the course of the petty, private producers; but in the fact that the proletariat helps the peasant to raise himself and helps him to develop the productive

strength of his farming, attempting to direct the peasant's economic effort in the channel of collective form.

"What does it mean to rule the peasantry?" asked Lenin at the All-Russia Conference of the VKP in May of 1921. "It means, first, to conduct the line for the destruction of classes, but not against the small producer. If we should become confused about the fundamental and basic line, then we would cease to be socialists and would fall into the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, into the camp of Social-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most evil enemies of the proletariat." (vol. XVIII, p. 270.)

But from this correct Leninist position the Trotskyist opposition again drew false and harmful conclusions. "To conduct the line not against the small producer, but for the destruction of classes" the opposition has interpreted as meaning that the socialist form of economy does not reprocess the petty individual economies, but instead, devours them (Preobrazhensky.); and that the attitude of the proletariat toward the peasant was formed according to a capitalist relation of the mother country to a colony; the more economically backward the state is, while changing to a socialist organization of production, the more socialist accumulation in it is forced to rely on the exploitation of pre-socialist forms of economy. If one reflects on the entire economic program of socialist accumulation of the Trotskyist economist Preobrazhensky, then right in front of us is a conception completely thought through to its end, building the class mutual relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry under a proletarian dictatorship just as they developed during the period of primary accumulation of capital between the

knight of profit, the paladin of capital and the exploited mass of small producers of the pre-capitalist type, whose tragedy Marx so clearly described in the chapters on primary capitalist accumulation. The Trotskyist opposition does not understand that because our economy experiences periodic difficulties due to the absence of base capital during the period of reconstruction, we can not set out on the path of capitalist speculation in an era of accumulation and we, as a government of the proletariat and as builders of socialism, can not use those methods that created the fund of capitalist accumulation in all the countries of capitalism. The Trotskyist opposition also does not grasp that its super-industrial comparisons of the rates of our development with the rates of development of capitalist countries is high-sounding nonsense, because this quantity is not comparable to other data. Capitalist industry does not know the seven-hour working day, nor all of those forms of social insurance, nor material expenses for the prosperity of the working class, for the improvement of its physical, moral and cultural levels that we have realized in our own poor country. But these parallels of the Trotskyist economic programs are not accidental. They flow from its entire orientation, treating our socialist construction in a Menshevist manner as one of the forms of capitalism, though uncultured and lagging behind, and, therefore, view the relation of the proletariat with the peasantry through "capitalist" glasses. If we take up the question of differentiation in the village, we can see the fundamental mistake of Trotskyism, that represented this differentiation according to Stolypin with two poles: rural paupers on the one hand, and the kulaks on the other, with the washing away of the middle peasant; Trotsky did not take into account, first, that under the proletarian dictatorship we have the opportunity to analyze such a process and, secondly, that the differentiation of the peasantry under the conditions of

the proletarian dictatorship occurs against a background of general rise in almost all layers of the village. Thus Trotskyism on the relations of the working class with the peasantry was killing the idea of a special kind of cooperation, that our party had defended. On the various relations of the different social groups within the village, Trotskyism got caught up in those forms of class struggle (dispossessing of the kulaks), that were characteristic for 1918 and for the period of the liquidation of the remainder of serfdom in our villages. Trotskyism did not understand that the correct Leninist slogan, "rely on the poor peasant, strengthen the union with the middle peasant, and do not relent for a minute in the fight against the kulak," in the situation of the strengthening of the government of the proletarian dictatorship must be carried out through the government, through its organs and not in the manner of 1918, when the basis of the proletarian dictatorship had been undermined by counterrevolutionary conspiracies and when the proletariat sparked the poor spontaneously to civil war with the kulaks precisely because the proletariat did not have at its disposal the channels of governmental and economic influence to bridle the kulaks. What were the relations of the working class under the proletarian dictatorship with the new bourgeoisie (NEP members), and the representatives of the concept of capital? Is it possible to bring these relations within the understanding of this class cooperation that exists in capitalist countries among the homogeneous social groups that stand on the soil of capitalism? Lenin, in his article "How We Must Reorganize the 'Workers' and Peasant Inspection Team' (Rabkrin)", speaking about "our social layer, based on the cooperation of the workers and the peasants," shows that for this cooperation, "NEP members are now allowed under certain conditions," i.e. the bourgeoisie. Of course, no one should come to the conclusion from these words that Lenin stood for

for the point of view for the cooperation of three classes under the proletarian dictatorship. To allow under certain conditions, established by the class that allows it, means to make use of the NEP-members. It is the kind of cooperation that exists between rider and horse. From the fact that the worker is allowed to work in a factory under certain conditions, that have been established by the capitalist, the worker's relations to the capitalist in no way become cooperation. They do not become class cooperation under the mass character of this phenomena. The attitudes of class cooperation appear at a time when depraved elements of the bourgeoisie, separated and torn away from the working class rise on the soil of capitalism and turn their backs to the working class. Is it possible to speak about the new bourgeoisie or the representatives of concessionaire capital and say that they came from the soil of capitalism and that they turned their backs on their own class? Such a notion is absurd and this is apparent from the fact that Lenin in that very same article, several lines below, reminds the Party of its old slogan in relation to the new bourgeoisie: "Who is who?"

"In the latest account," he says, "the fate of our Republic will depend on whether the peasant mass goes along with the working class, preserving loyalty to an ally, or giving it to the NEP members, i.e. to the new bourgeoisie, and separating itself from the workers, splitting them." (vol. XVIII, part 2, p. 124.)

Only the representatives of the technical intelligentsia can turn their backs to the bourgeoisie and be constant to the point of view of the working class and even this is not without great difficulty, as the Shakhtinsky affair confirms.

But to deny such a possibility of reeducation of a part of these social groups by the proletariat is not to see the creative power of the working class, that infects other vacillating and intermediate layers; and, in effect, this would mean under-evaluating the strength of the proletariat and falling into the most stupid approach, that has never been our party's frame of mind. Our class struggle against the new bourgeoisie is trying, as is evident by the example of the Kondratyev group, to strengthen its ideological front and is leading the way now "in other surroundings, in other forms and with different methods" than it did against the old capitalist classes. We have tolerated, under certain circumstances, the participation of the new bourgeoisie in our economic life and we are utilizing its organizational potential, paying it tribute for its science; but we have not for a minute lost sight of the fact that in its person we have a dangerous, insidious class enemy who, gritting his teeth, cooperates because he does not have strong enough fangs for a large class war. This class, taken by itself, has been destroyed in our country; but it is dangerous, not in its own particular class layer, but in connection with that of other classes. It is dangerous, because it tries to frustrate the union of the working class with the peasantry through the top ranks of the kulaks; but, above all, it is dangerous because behind it stands the total force of world capital. The forms of class struggle in our country depend not only on our will, but on our relative strength in the international arena as well. The advance of world capital on the USSR will inevitably influence the relative strength inside our country and it will increase the political activity of all social groups hostile to the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would, therefore, be Manilovism on our part if we did not take into consideration the fact that under the circumstances of the increasing activity of world capital, the class struggle

in our country can appear not only in the guise of economic competition of different economic structures.

On the Role of the State in the Period of the Proletarian Dictatorship.

The fourth question, stemming from the problem of the struggle of classes under the proletarian dictatorship, is a question on the role of the workers' government. The government of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a government of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and differs from capitalist government, inspite of its class composition, by the fact that it is endowed with economic functions of proportions that no other government in the world possesses. These functions arise from the nature of the public economy and in no case can they be put on the same level with the tendencies of the state-capitalism in those countries, where the entire economy is built on the base of private property. Under the proletarian dictatorship the new tasks of "government by the people" and "government by things" are joined to the functions of the workers' government and to the functions of administration, i.e. the functions of planning and regulation. Our Gosplan and the VSNK are both the main organs of the proletarian dictatorship and the administrative apparatus of the Soviet government. Not one bourgeois government knows what the nature of these organs are, nor the character of their goals and class policy. Under socialism, when classes disappear, the political functions of the government die off, but do not disappear and, on the contrary, the functions of social planning and control grow in their significance. Also touching upon this question is the matter of what nature are the functions that acquire predominant influence during the transitional period, and this depends on the concrete circumstances of the correlation of

class forces both inside the country and on the international scale. It is quite evident that, for example, in the Hungarian Soviet Republic, besieged from all sides by enemies, there was insufficient planning or building of the economy. It was precisely in the first months and years of the proletarian dictatorship, when the class struggle took on an armed aspect, that the political and administrative functions appeared in the first plan in the policy of the workers' government. When we fought with Kaledin, Kornilov and Kolchak, we directed or more accurately tried to direct our economic life by means of orders, mobilizations, work armies, shock campaigns and repressions. Under conditions of destitution and disorganization of the national economy we attempted to solve the problems of under-production with communist subbotniks. There was nothing else that could be done when the country stood under the rifle, and the scrawny hand of hunger strangled the worker and the poor peasant. That person is a vain pedant who from the height of our experience of the second term of the proletarian dictatorship would now begin to treat the period of military communism as a system of nonsense. But this regime, from the point of view of Trotskyism, stemming from a condition of permanent war with all classes, including the peasantry, under the proletarian dictatorship by no means was only a stage of the dictatorship, responding to the correlation of forces at that time, but was the normalized regime of the proletarian government during the transfer period between the two waves of the proletarian revolution. Was it really untypical of the entire system of Trotskyist views that in 1921 when the regime of military communism began to outlive itself, and when we stood, at the moment of the Kronstadt incident, before a serious class crisis, that Trotsky suggested that our party move further along the path of administration, influence, centralization and absorption

by the proletarian government through the coalescence of even the unions? In this project the absorption of the unions by the government during the period of the proletarian dictatorship was a whole problem of pushing the country forward to socialism exclusively by methods of naked class violence, while the correlation of class forces developed in the new stage of the revolution. These traits later were reflected in that discussion, which Trotsky conducted with the party on the question of the general plan. Trotsky's "plan" was based on quickly jumping over the lean horse of the peasantry and replacing it with the steed of mechanized industry. Or a socialism, built contrary to the mood, desire and will of the millions of peasants, or in other words, inevitable death. There was no place in Trotsky's plan for an historical segment of time in which to recast the peasant economy, or Lenin's "cooperative socialism." Trotsky did not understand that after the liquidation of the civil war according to the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship and according to the increase in the substance of the social sector of the economy, the class constraint in the policy of the worker's government takes different forms, which are distinguished from the military period. To plan and to regulate economic life does not mean to float on the will of the economic elements and only make plans based on what really exists, but with conscious interference in the economic processes in a country of small and insignificant peasant farms, at times having a tendency to turn the interests of the workers and peasants, taken in a broad historical angle, and to regulate and to change the direction of these processes for the advantage of the working class. At this time during the NEP the government does not stand and cannot stand on the free-trade point of view, i.e. noninterference in the internal class struggle, translated into the language of economics in the form of a struggle of the socialist and private sectors of the economy. By financial measures,

price policy and tax policy, we will conduct the class policy as we did in the first days of the proletarian dictatorship, but in different forms and by other means. But if the Trotskyist opposition has come to rest on the grounds of these new relations created during the NEP, acknowledging the new forms of our class policies, even there it has so monstrously destroyed all worthy proportion, so grossly broken up the relations between various economic forms, That this Trotskyist "new policy" has inevitably grown into the Trotskyism of the period of War Communism. With this new policy, a fundamental element has been lost, that principle which Lenin in his relations with the peasantry, on the question of the "distribution of hardships", considered the only (primary) principle - preservation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But does it follow from the fact that we have beaten Trotskyism on the question of their over-stressing the kind of methods of class coercion that were necessary for a certain period of the proletarian dictatorship, that we, in essence, reject these methods? At the present stage, could not changing conditions require us to make use of such measures of class coercion, that will go beyond the limits of planned functions of the government's work, precisely because, we take as our point of departure, the principle of the preservation of the dictatorship of the proletariat bequeathed to us by Lenin? Of course, it comes to no one's mind to deny such a possibility, since this would mean, first of all, that we admit the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the USSR with the capitalist world right up until that moment when socialism will have been constructed in the USSR. For example, war might require the proletarian government to restore certain measures which were characteristic for the first period of the proletarian dictatorship. But even besides war, there could be extraordinary internal conditions necessitating the application

of extraordinary measures. For example, the usual normal measures of economic planning might turn out to be insufficient before the deaf resistance of individual classes. Political groups hostile to the regime of the proletarian dictatorship might begin to move or, finally, individual, social groups might try to betray our planning and regulation, developed on the basis of the well-known relation of forces and by ways and means unforeseen by the Soviet Constitution. Under such conditions extraordinary measures, differing in the character and degree of their intensity and depending on the seriousness of the situation, will become the means of self-defense of the proletarian dictatorship. Let us take the question of the extraordinary measures we 'had' to apply during the recent difficulties with grain collection. Why did we resort to them? We applied them because, towards Jan. 1, 1928 we had a grain shortage of 128 million poods, because our entire economic plan was under threat of failure; because the supply for the working class was under question and an interruption in the supply threatened a quarrel with the workers; and because, after discussion ended and after a series of years of peaceful respite, our Party was too "tranquilly" settled, having let grain collection take its own course. We would not have been Bolsheviks, able to tear down obstacles, nor revolutionaries, capable of struggling with difficulties, if under these conditions we had simply scratched our heads and put our hope only on the planning organs. When we had achieved the necessary results in grain collection, and when we noticed that these measures, directed against the kulak-upper layers of the countryside, showed a clear tendency to strike at the middle peasant, then we changed them. We changed them because they threatened to produce the opposite of that purpose in service of which they were introduced. But the application of extraordinary measures gave occasion to the kulak elements in the villages and to merchants and speculators

in the cities to spread evil rumors that the NEP had been abolished and that our Party had arrived at the policy recommended by the Trotskyist opposition. The capitalist press strongly supported this version. That NEP, which international capital desired and strived to link to both the kulak in the villages and the NEP members in the city, is not the NEP which our Party allowed to exist under certain conditions. This NEP is not only the dictatorship of the marketplace over the planned economy, it is the abolishment of the monopoly of foreign trade, the squandering of our socialized industry with all of the resulting consequences in the relations of the classes, and the limitation of the achievements and rights of the working class. There can be no such NEP in our country, a country in which the building of socialism has been victorious.

On the Forms of the Proletarian Dictatorship and the Workers' Democracy

The fifth question is on the forms of the proletarian dictatorship and the workers' democracy. From that which has already been said, it follows that the forms of the proletarian dictatorship according to Trotsky are always characterized by the cruel predominance of the elements of repression. They cannot be otherwise, because the proletarian dictatorship is a war of one class against the others. These forms are always the same during a transition period, because in a state of permanent class war there are no "respites" or intervals. The proletarian dictatorship and the proletarian democracy are antithetical because Trotskyism considers the proletarian dictatorship as a direct opposite of the bourgeois dictatorship. Under the dictatorship of capital the bourgeois democracy is only a fig leaf for the dictatorship. The proletarian dictatorship has no need of any such fig leaves. Trotskyism does

not take into account the special character of the proletarian dictatorship, resulting from the fact that it is a dictatorship of the minority, but in the interests of the majority, whereas the dictatorship of the well-to-do classes is a dictatorship of the minority in the interests of the exploiting minority. Further, Trotskyism does not understand the second trait of the proletarian dictatorship, namely, that it is based on unity with the peasantry. These two fundamental traits of the proletarian dictatorship, distinguishing it from the dictatorship of the well-to-do classes, make the proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy not only exclusive of each other, but make one without the other inconceivable. Extraordinary circumstances, such as war and counterrevolutionary movements, can narrow the dimensions of proletarian democracy, but they cannot kill it, because the proletarian dictatorship would then take the form of a dictatorship of a group of leaders acting without the masses. Such a dictatorship could not hold out ten years, nor even ten months, nor a week. Could we fight against the whole capitalist world, sending its expeditionary forces against the proletarian revolution, supporting the campaigns of counterrevolutionary generals with material means and munitions, if we were not assured of support from the millions of workers in our Union? Could we build socialism, breaking down age-old traditions, habits, the entire individual way of life inherited from the past, with methods and ways of the kind of dictatorship that would have stood over the masses and acted without them and in spite of them?

"The proletarian dictatorship," said Lenin in his pamphlet, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," "is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy and Soviet authority is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic in the world."

But the proletarian democracy is a class democracy and it is not a democracy for all, but only for the proletariat first and for those layers of the peasantry that support the proletarian dictatorship. In the proletarian democracy the leadership role of the proletariat does not disappear, because it would otherwise not be a proletarian democracy, but a democracy of the workers and the peasants. All of these traits and distinctions, that exist between the proletarian dictatorship and the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, remain in force for these two kinds of democracies. The question of at what moments the elements of the proletarian dictatorship appear stronger, is a question of the form of the proletarian dictatorship. Why do these forms depend on the proletarian dictatorship? They depend on the correlation of forces between the country of a proletarian dictatorship and the capitalist world surrounding it. If the capitalist world had not put so much pressure on the proletarian world, the process of the development of the proletarian democracy would have occurred much faster than under the present conditions, when the government is surrounded on all sides by enemies. Second, the forms of the proletarian dictatorship depend on the distribution of class strength inside the country. If one were to present a theoretical situation such that all of the classes stood unconditionally behind the proletariat, tried to submissively alter the individual forms of the economy, reeducated themselves in a socialist spirit, allowed themselves to be used for the building and strengthening of socialism (the technical intelligentsia, concessionaire capital, the new bourgeoisie), then the growth of the proletarian dictatorship would not be interrupted and we could proceed without class conflict toward the destruction of classes and toward the transformation of the proletarian dictatorship into a highly developed democracy of labor. But we live in a condition of aggravated class struggle in the

international arena and in an epoch of war and revolution which exclude such forms of development and we exist in a period, when even the influence of the international labor situation will respond all the more to the aggravation of class struggle in the USSR. Therefore the forms of this dictatorship can change under the influence of the factors of an internal and international order. Third, and finally, the forms of the proletarian dictatorship depend on how the avant-guard of the proletariat, in the face of the constant work of the Party, is able to educate the working masses, how successfully it can draw to the avant-guard the fundamental mass of the peasantry and after that, the poor and middle layer of the peasantry. It is completely clear that if, for example, the Spartacists had succeeded in taking over power in Germany in January 1919, when a substantial layer of the working class supported the party of Noske, then the forms of the proletarian dictatorship would be different than at present, when the Communist Party in Germany is one of the most massive Sections of the Communist International. Their dictatorship to a greater degree approximates "Jacobin" forms than the dictatorship of the Communist Party that leads the fundamental deciding layers of the working class. That which for years has characterized the mutual relationship between the avant-guard and the working masses in our country, following the end of the Civil War, is the uninterrupted strengthening of the close ties between our Party, the working class and the broad mass of the peasantry. In what sense is our latest slogan of "self-criticism" to be taken? In the sense that it is still necessary to advance the process of "growth" of the Party with the working mass, to correct mistakes with their direct help, to correct the deviations of our governmental and economic apparatus, that at times reflect the pressure of other classes, and ruthlessly to expose bureaucratic distortions. We place our authentic mass proletarian dictatorship against

that dictatorship that wants freedom for separate groups of the intelligentsia and for Trotskyist factions that must have been engendered by political parties prepared for a transformation to a bourgeois democracy. The White Guard press and the press of the capitalist countries on the basis of our latest grain-harvest difficulty prophesied a crisis in our country in relation to the peasantry. But one would have to be a complete idiot, and not a politician, in order not to understand that if the relation between the peasantry and the working class has endured such a crisis, then the political party, governing the greatest country in the world, would have committed madness in promoting at that moment the slogan of self-criticism, involving in this criticism the power of millions of non-party workers and peasants. What bourgeois government would risk evoking a wave of criticism, inciting dissatisfaction, giving directives to the ruling party and in no way restraining criticism on the part of the working mass, if it was experiencing a crisis of the mutual relations of the classes? Doesn't every non-party worker abroad tell himself, considering the daily reports of Mr. Shafer and other bourgeois correspondents, who abuse the hospitality of the Soviet Union: "How devilishly courageous these Bolsheviks are, if they do not fear the criticism of their peasants at the instant of a crisis. It is evident that this is one of the exceptionally durable governments in the world." We know that one of our neighboring states recently had a crisis in its relation with the peasantry, having come to the surface in a movement in Alba-Yuli. The affair even reached the state of mobilization of land and air forces in order to prevent the advancement of the peasants on Bucharest. Just let the ruling Rumanian boyars open all the stops on the criticism of their masses. Why are the Bolsheviks not afraid of this? Because the White Guard of all countries "needs" a crisis in the relationship between the peasantry and the proletariat in the USSR, in

order to warm up the interventionist appetites of the capitalist governments, because there is not a party in the world that would have defended the interests of the proletariat and of the broad mass of the peasantry and there is not a party in the world that would have believed in the creative strength of the working mass as the Communist Party has, and because, there is not a democracy in the world more open and more truthful than Soviet democracy.

We raised the political life to a level such as neither the "workers'" government in England, nor the social-democratic government in Switzerland, nor any one government in a capitalist country has achieved. The countenance of our country has become unrecognizable. A country of pogroms, illiteracy and obscurity is becoming each day more and more a country of a new socialist culture. A new generation of free people is growing and a firm wall of the builders of a new life is being prepared. Take as an example the movement of our agricultural and workers' correspondents. In out-of-the-way corners a new type of Soviet public-spirited person is being molded from the rottenness and stagnation inherited from the period of slavery. Take our practise of advancement: In 1925 alone, in our Party, there were promoted from the ranks of the workers 7,459 people to responsible economic and administrative posts. In our country there is almost not one more or less large party organization that could not be designated for its serious achievements in this area. But even this movement is only a beginning.

Why should we be afraid of self-criticism? Under these conditions of self-criticism the instrument of independent action is formed, that spurs new millions into active participation in the building of socialism. This building of socialism is not only the affair of the one million members of our party, or the affair of the leaders of trusts, of cooperatives or of the

Soviet workers. It is becoming the affair of an entire mass. We must, as everyone knows, eliminate in the masses the old psychology that divides the people into the governed and the governing, and that examines the building of socialism as an affair implemented by the "top people"; it is necessary that the masses learn to consider this building of socialism with all of its achievements and insufficiencies as its own vital, personal affair. Self-criticism is necessary for the nurturing of a feeling of socialist citizenship.

Lenin wrote at one point about the participation of the masses in the building of socialism:

"As hundreds were the founders (i.e. of a certain regime) during the epoch of serfdom and as thousands and tens of thousands built a government during the period of capitalism, so now the socialist transformation can be completed with the active participation of tens of millions in the direction of the government."
(Lenin, vol XVI, p. 23.)

The Role of the Party and its Hegemony in the Period of the Proletarian Dictatorship.

The sixth and final question is on the role of the Party and its hegemony in the period of the proletarian dictatorship. Does the conclusion that the party is dissolving in the masses and that its hegemony in the leadership of all areas of socialist construction must be weakening at the present moment, stem from the tendency of the proletarian democracy to expand during the period of the proletarian dictatorship? With such a weakness of party hegemony caused by the growing complexity of problems of leadership of all economic and

and political aspects of life, does this not call forth the need for greater still specialization on these problems that demand not only general political presuppositions but also serious familiarity with the details of each question of political and economic administration that confronts the party? Characteristically, the whole opposition, from whatever side it has come--either "left" of "right"--inevitably begins with a strike at party hegemony, in which it has seen the "suppression" of the apparatus, the "incompetence", the suffocation of initiative, the "dictatorship" of the Politburo and the importunate interference, etc. And this shows that the question of the hegemony of the Party in terms of its monopolistic position during the proletarian dictatorship was, is and will be that point toward which the drive of the non-proletarian classes will strive and it is around this question, above all, that the opposition has and will gather. In opposition to proletarian democracy and the hegemony of the Party, the Trotskyist group played under the guise of internal suppression and the bureaucratization of the party apparatus. In striking against the hegemony of the Party, the whole oppositionist trend, in fact, has conducted a struggle against the proletarian dictatorship. For there can be no proletarian dictatorship without the leadership of the class-conscious avant-guard of the working class at the head of the Party, absorbing everything that is best, most true, and most talented from the proletariat. History knows of no dictatorship that would not have been ruled by that class that is the leader of the dictatorship. The hegemony of the Party without proletarian democracy would turn into a proletarian dictatorship within a dictatorship, separated from class. Proletarian democracy without the hegemony of the Party would not be a proletarian dictatorship, but a transitional regime of bourgeois dictatorship. It would be a temporary episode as was the government designated in Germany after the November Revolution or the reign

of the Social Democrats in Hungary after the surrender of power to them by the Communists. The old French syndicalism turned out to be so shamefully bankrupt that it denied the role of a political party to the working class. The Italian proletariat, as well, in 1920 displayed such complete impotence, having seized the factories, that it did not have a party capable of leading it to battle and to victory. But in the period of the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Party increased still more in comparison with the period preceding the seizure of power: and not only in the instance of the Civil War, but precisely in that period of socialist construction, when the proletariat had to resolve the complex problems in the presence of class conflict. The proletariat, having destroyed the bourgeoisie and the landowners, was faced with the class of small producers, whom it was impossible to banish or suppress and with whom it was necessary to live in harmony, to alter and to reeducate by their own protracted, persevering and organized work.

"They," said Lenin, "surround the proletariat from all sides with petty bourgeoisie elements, imbue it with these elements, corrupt it and constantly evoke within the proletariat the relapse of petty bourgeois feebleness, instability, individualism and shifts from enthusiasm to despondency. It is necessary to establish strict centralization and discipline within the political party of the proletariat in order to withstand this and in order to realize correctly, successfully and victoriously the organizational role of the proletariat (and this is its primary role). The dictatorship of the proletariat is the persistent struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative,

against the force and tradition of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a very terrible force. Without the Party, steeled and hardened in the struggle; without the Party, availing itself of the trust of all honest men in a given class; without the Party, knowing how to follow the moods of the masses and influence them, it is impossible to successfully conduct such a struggle. To gain victory over the huge, centralized bourgeoisie is a thousand times easier than 'to gain victory over' the millions and millions of small farmers; and they realize the very same results by their daily humdrum, inconspicuous, imperceptible, corrupt activity that the bourgeoisie need that restores them. That one who would weaken the iron discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) is a person who is in fact helping the bourgeoisie against the proletariat." (Lenin, vol. XVII, p. 136.)

Let's take as a concrete example our own country of the proletarian dictatorship. Do not petty bourgeoisie elements bear down upon the proletariat from all sides? Our proletariat is closely tied with the peasantry, unlike any other European country. It barometrically reflects in its mood, even the smallest dissatisfaction of the peasantry. We have seen this despite our latest grain-production problems and those difficulties that we had this summer with the seasonal workers rushing out to the villages. Our proletariat is a proletariat of a great peasant country, in which developing industry shows a demand for workers and scoops them up from those leaving the villages, and is not frozen stiff in either quantity or quality in relation to its own growth. It has within it a variety of layers: It has a very insignificant

layer of pure-blooded proletarians who have been broken off from the village. But along with it there is a huge mass of proletariat closely connected to the everyday, kindred economic conditions of the peasant way of life. Here it is possible to establish an entire gradation of types of this union, beginning with those peasants for whom seasonal work in the cities is simply additional income for the peasant budget and ending with those layers that have no other sources of material existence, except that of their own work. And if in Western Europe this kind of structure of the peasantry as a class, possessing a variety of layers, serves as a base for the formation of various directions for the workers' movement, then in our country under a single political party led by the proletarian dictatorship, this structure is the source of maturation for different groups and trends in our party. The party, that would not under these conditions regulate its own social composition, which is a deposit of the new raw layers of the working class, would have been swept over by elements of the semi-rural and semi-bourgeois moods. This would be a policy of pursuing the tail of events (xvostism), of an adaption of the Party to the transitional mood, but not the Bolshevik policy of raising the level of class consciousness of the proletariat, nourishing it and bringing it all the more closely to the avant-guard. For the past ten years we expanded the parameters of our party with great caution and we have fought against the fantastic suggestions that in 2-3 days the entire working class will pour into our party. We have not forgotten for a minute, that the task of the communist, Leninist education of our skilled workers, of their Bolshevik tempering and of the "digestion" of these new layers flowing into our Party is the most complex task. In fact in the ranks of our party only 0.3% consists of the underground workers who entered the party before the revolution of 1905 and only 0.8% represents those who entered before the February

Revolution; i.e. our old guard, having been bombarded in ideological battles and tempered under the conditions of the Tsarist underground, comprise only a little more than 1% of the members of our party. Our second generation of the Civil War which comprises almost one-third of our Party (1917 - 4%; 1918 - 6.4%; 1919 - 10.4%; 1920 - 11.8%). The remaining two thirds of our Party is the generation entering it after the end of the war and after the introduction of the new economic policy. Further, it is impossible to let go sight of the fact that our party, ruled by the proletarian dictatorship, is distinguished from the party, interested in only the conquest of power, by the great quantity and variety of the functions which it fulfills. The basic nerve of activity of our fraternal sections is this agitation propaganda and organizational work in the masses. We should direct, manage, trade, plan, arrest, judge in order to preserve the proletarian government from the attempt of any counter-revolution and we should serve as red directors, public prosecutors, professors and commanders in the army etc. We are filling the posts of leadership and control of the dozens of trusts, cooperatives, the hundreds of provinces, the district and regional executive committees, railroads, waterways, postal system, and telegraph system etc. with members of the party. We have been compelled to divide our single party into groups, with its special "co-operative and administrative interests. To remain a communist, always having before one's eyes the interests of his own class, to not forget the specific, assigned interests of its apparatus and to know how to subordinate the individual proletarian will, demands a serious Bolshevik perserverance. That which solders together all communists, spread out over tens of thousands of versts in as many diverse fields of work is something which does not allow them to run the legs off of the proletariat - i.e. the Party, its control and its leadership. Just weaken the leadership one iota, and you will get a

new system of "disproportions", the edges of which, in the face of groups connected with different branches of work, will flock to different sides. In this regard we should attempt to break up class conflicts. The proletarian dictatorship, expressed in the unity of party leadership, would be dispersed and in our country peculiar parties with narrow corporate interests would be formed, incessantly in conflict with themselves. Isn't this really evident in the Shakhtinsky affair? In one way it would be worth it to the party to be a little neglectful and to lessen its own vigilance and to begin to allow a small measure of dependence on economic organization as a break has resulted along all lines of the Soviet apparatus and the unions. The experience of the international workers movement teaches us that opportunism always proceeds along this line, freeing members of the Party from its leadership. All Communist Parties working under capitalist conditions know this.

This is why the Leninist Party, developing and deepening proletarian democracy in the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat decisively rejects every attempt of Trotskyist-Menshevist revision of the idea of the Party's hegemony.

Conclusion

Our Party's XV Congress has by its decisions demonstrated before the view of all, how many untruths and distortions there were in all those evaluations of the slipping of our Party down onto the track of Thermidorism, as the inner development of our Party has been called by the opposition. By the decisions of the XV Congress, by the course undertaken by the Party afterwards, the opposition has been beaten, not only within our country, but on an international scale. What can it oppose to these decisions and to this

course? Helpless babble about leftist zigzagging? Malicious crowing that the Party will not sustain this course and will slip to the right? The ridiculous declarations of persons who have lost a sense of comedy of their readiness to help realize "leftist zigzagging"? The Leninist Party does not need the help of people who have lost their baggage, who have approached the final Menshevist border. The Leninist Party has enough strength to carry on the line of the XV Party Congress with a steel hand, to beat every attempt of revisionism on these decisions. This is a party that has led the country of the proletarian dictatorship through the greatest difficulties and fiercest experiences of internal and international order in the course of ten years of revolution. It has fulfilled and will continue to fulfill victoriously this task until that moment, when the help of the international proletariat arrives, knowing with certainty that there are no paths more to the left than the Leninist path, and that the paths on the right would bring the VKP and the Comintern astray from the great proletarian road, leading to the victory of the working class and to socialism.

(The session is closed.)

43rd Session

23 August, 1928

Declaration of the Party on the reports of Comrades Varga and Manuilsky.

Speeches of Comrades Telman, Semar, Bell, Pogich, Straxov and Faxri.

Chairman Comrade Bela Kuhn.

Telman (Germany). In yesterday's plenum we heard the reports of Varga and Manuilsky and we have decided that the Presidium and the Executive Committee of Comintern must see quickly to the forwarding of these reports to the Sections in the form of brochures with the corresponding diagrams and tables. The reports could be of great help to us in our struggle with the lies and treacherous politics of international social-democracy that are directed against the Soviet Union. The reports could be a significant support to the work of our revolutionary movement.

As to the discussion at the plenum of the situation in the Soviet Union and the VKP(B), the various delegations have decided to present their point of view to the plenum of the VI Congress in written form.

By instruction of the German delegation, the delegation from Communist Youth International (KIM), and the delegations from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Australia, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, I make the following declaration:

The undersigned delegations, in relation to the report on the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the VKP(B), declare the following:

"1) The Communist Parties and Sections of Comintern represented by the undersigned delegations, wholly and completely approve of the political and

organizational line of the VKP(B) and its Leninist Central Committee. Their correct Bolshevik policy, confronted with the most difficult conditions of imperialist encirclement, has led to the significant successes of the building of socialism, to the unwavering rise of the material and cultural levels of the worker-peasant masses, to the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the reinforcement of the authority of the USSR as the center of the international revolutionary movement, the stronghold of the proletarian class struggle and the base of support for the struggle of the oppressed colonial peoples.

2) The most important results of socialist construction are: the achievement of socialist industrialization; the development of state industry to a level higher than the pre-war one; the unwavering numerical growth of the industrial proletariat; the introduction of the seven-hour working day; the increase of real wages and the productivity of labor; and the major reconstruction of the entire industrial process. Along with the rise of socialist state industry, the significance of the remaining economic command-posts of the proletarian state has also been increasing: transportation, the state budget, the bank and credit networks and the trade apparatus, which has succeeded in winning the decisive position in the market by securing the monopoly on foreign trade and by systematically expelling private capital and replacing it with that of the state cooperative economic organizations. The agricultural policy of the Party has also achieved substantial success: the expansion of cultivated land; the general increase of agricultural production; and the strengthening of the ties between city and country.

3) These successes do not and can not mean the elimination of the dangers and contradictions arising from the objective conditions of the building

of socialism, from the technological and economic backwardness of the country and from the pressure of internal class forces hostile to the proletariat and the counterrevolutionary policies of all the imperialist governments hostile to the USSR. To these difficulties relate: questions of import and export; base capital; the reduction of the prime cost of production and industrial prices; unemployment; and food shortages in the countryside, on the one hand, and grain collection for the cities, on the other.

4) All the policies of the VKP(B) originate from the correct principle that the surmounting of these difficulties and the further forward movement along the path of socialism can be achieved only by the determined struggle of the Bolsheviks against all hostile class forces. To the growing activity of capitalist elements, the attempts of sabotage by the counterrevolutionaries and the corruptive influence of bureaucracy, the working class, headed by the VKP(B), opposes the reinforcement of the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, the still greater development of proletarian democracy and the still greater strengthening of the activity, independence and revolutionary self-criticism of the broad proletarian masses. The Party answers the anti-proletarian pressure of the Kulaks in politics and the economy with the unwavering policy of union of the working class supported by the poor and middle peasantry, and with the intensification of the offensive against the Kulaks.

The decision of the XV Congress of the VKP(B) on the transfer of the fragmented peasant economy to the track of heavy production by further collectivization (collective working of the land, intensification and mechanization of agriculture, socialist collectivization of the countryside) with the simultaneous transformation of its capitalist elements and the comprehensive

development of individual farms of independent small and middle-sized producers takes on a special significance.

5) The undersigned delegations, in the name of the Communist Parties and Sections of the Comintern represented by them, find that the former Trotskyist opposition within the VKP(B), that began with the revision of the teachings of Lenin, has come to the position of Menshivism. Originating with opposition to the possibility of the successful building of socialism in the USSR, their opposition has come to a denial of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR (a "Thermidor"). In consequence of the tactical and organizational orientation of its program, the Trotskyist opposition has become an instrument of the petty bourgeoisie elements struggling against the proletariat of the USSR and also the auxiliary unit of international social-democracy. In the international arena, the Trotskyists have joined with the open enemies of and the renegades from Communism who have been excluded from the Comintern, (e.g., Maslov, Ruth Fisher, Korsch, Suvarin, etc.). The undersigned delegations approve all of the decisions of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) directed against the Menshevist opposition; and they also approve of their expulsion from the Party by the XV Congress. The undersigned delegations declare their solidarity with all measures undertaken against the activity of the opposition that undermines the proletarian dictatorship. Simultaneously, they approve of the corresponding decisions of the plenums of the Executive Committee of Comintern adopted since the V World Congress. The subsequent struggle of the Comintern and the VKP(B) against the petty bourgeois Trotskyist groups had led to their complete liquidation in the USSR and in Comintern. Membership in the Trotskyist opposition and the propaganda of its views were and are not compatible with membership in the ranks of Comintern.

6) The undersigned delegations especially emphasize the increasing danger of capitalist intervention against the USSR. The more significant the successes of socialist construction, the stronger is the offensive of the imperialists against the Soviet proletarian state, and the closer approaches counterrevolutionary war against the USSR. This war, whose inevitability was predicted by Lenin, hangs over the eleventh year of the existence of the dictatorship like a threatening cloud over the masses of all countries. In this gigantic class war the Comintern must endure and withstand its world-historic battle trial. The Comintern unfurls the banner to transform the war of the exploiters into a civil war of all the oppressed for the victory of the proletarian dictatorship in the strongholds of capital. In the present situation, the most important task for the Communists of all countries is the mobilization of all the international proletariat and all oppressed peoples for the defense of the USSR, as the single socialist fatherland of the working class, as the center, the base and the strongest supporter of world revolution."

Signatures:

German delegation: Telman.

Communist Youth International: Schuller, Xitarov.

Czech delegation: Ilek, Zapototsky.

Polish delegation: Kostrzheva, Belevsky.

Austrian delegation: Koplenig.

Hungarian delegation: Bela Kuhn.

Lithuanian delegation: Angaretis.

Latvian delegation: Krastyn

Estonian delegation: Anveldt.

Swedish delegation: Oskar Samuelson.

Norwegian delegation: K. Sederstrem.

Finnish delegation: Manner.

Danish delegation: Munch-Peterson.

Semar (France). The delegations of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland and Holland wholly approve of the political and tactical line that has been formulated by the VKP(B) in the resolutions of its Central Committee and its conferences and congresses since the V Congress of Comintern.

In particular, they approve, on the one hand, the decision of the XV Congress of the VKP(B) which was able to adopt all measures necessary to prevent the weakening of the ties between the proletarian masses and the masses of the poor and middle peasantry necessary for the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship. On the other hand, they approve of the energetic measures for the formation and increase of numbers of Soviet collective farms and, also, for the continuation of work for the strengthening of the small and middle-sized individual farms to increase the productive capacities of the farms and draw them into socialist construction through cooperatives.

The systematic application of these resolutions has led to the economic and political strengthening of the USSR. This is demonstrated by the incontestable successes of the building of socialism, by the improvement of the situation and conditions of labor for the workers (the rise of wages, the gradual introduction of the seven-hour working day, housing construction, etc.), and by the development of industry, thanks to the introduction of the socialist rationale, which has increased the productivity of labor and facilitated the growth of general production to higher than the pre-war level.

This policy has also made it possible to achieve a more real and fruitful tie between the proletarian and peasant masses, thanks to the active sup-

port of the poor peasantry and the union with the middle peasantry in the constant struggle with the Kulaks. As a result, we have reinforced the hegemony of the proletariat and strengthened its dictatorship.

This development of the USSR, occurring at a fast pace in the spirit of socialism, its flourishing on a sixth part of the world sphere and its ever growing influence throughout the world--all this leads to the fact that the exploited and oppressed masses of the capitalist and colonial countries look more and more upon the Soviet Union as the revolutionary fortress and the chief supporter of the world proletarian revolution.

But, the stronger the USSR becomes and the more its influence on the international workers' movement grows, the more the imperialist powers try to destroy it--today, with the help of economic blockades, and tomorrow, by war feverishly prepared for with the cooperation of social-democracy. The bourgeoisie and social-democracy count on the unavoidable difficulties that spring from the burdensome inheritance from the old regime and from a weakly developed industry and backwardness in technology that foretell the ruin of Bolshevism. At the same time, they strive to support all external and internal counter-revolutionary forces that oppose Soviet construction.

The VKP(B) at work has proved its capacity to overcome these various difficulties (in the policy for formation of grain stores, in the problem of export and import, in the elimination of goods shortages and unemployment, etc.), and its firm determination to put an end to the criminal counterrevolutionary sabotage within the country and to repel unwaveringly the accusations and threats of imperialism. It has behind itself, the secure support of broad worker-peasant masses of the USSR and the active aid of the proletariat of the entire world.

The measures adopted by the VKP(B) for the improvement of the work of the Party and the unions and, in particular, for the installation of widespread, healthy self-criticism from the bottom up, for the persistent struggle with bureaucracy, stagnation and routine; and finally, for the perfection of the mechanism of various Soviet institutions--all these measures facilitate the increase of initiative, the reinforcement of the tempo of work of the broad masses and the elimination of all possible difficulties.

The undersigned delegations approve, in particular, of the energetic measures adopted by the VKP(B) to intensify the attack on the Kulaks and the NEP-men who, in the given situation, represented both an economic and a political danger.

Only the Trotskyist opposition, that has, at the present time, come to Menshevism, has dared to deny the correctness of the line of the VKP(B) and Comintern and to carry on a demagogic struggle with the decisions and resolutions of these two leading organs.

With their denial of the possibility of building socialism in one country, with their shameful declarations about the Thermidor of the Russian Revolution, with their factional work on an international scale and, especially, with their machinations within the VKP(B), placing the very existence of the dictatorship under threat, the Trotskyist opposition has joined with the worst enemies of Communism and must be branded together with them.

Therefore, the delegations of the Parties noted above completely approve of the decrees adopted by the VKP(B) in relation to the opposition and, also, of the resolution of Comintern on this question.

The delegations declare that the government of the proletariat is obliged to adopt the most energetic and severe measures in relation to those who, by their criminal activities, impede the building of socialism and expose the Revolution to danger, since this is a question not only of discipline, but the life and death of the proletarian dictatorship.

Opposition in various Sections of Comintern take up the same lying accusations of the bourgeoisie and social-democracy, elucidating them from the "point of view of the Left." They carry on a struggle with the line of the Comintern in regard to basic questions of theory and tactics.

For example, the Belgian opposition, after having introduced a split in the Party, blames the Comintern and the Unions' International (Profintern) for undermining the unity of the unions and carries on a struggle with the Communists in close contact with the leaders of the Amsterdam International.

In Holland, the Trotskyists facilitated the departure from Profintern of the unions joined with the National Workers' Secretariat and their subsequent emergence on the path to reform syndicalism.

In the Italian Communist Party, a small oppositional minority from the old Bordighi movement has introduced in immigration, in particular, a systematic criminal sabotage of the activity of the Party. And it has, in part, introduced sabotage of the Party's activity within mass organizations and in defense of the General Confederation of Labor in Italy. Thus, it has objectively supported counterrevolution and, in certain instances, even provocation.

In France, the opposition has resorted to the same method of splitting the Party. With its lies and its meaningless accusations directed against

the active workers of the VKP(B), it has shown itself the best accomplice of social-democracy and the bourgeoisie in their struggle with Bolshevism. After the expulsion of its more active elements, the opposition has gradually broken up and dispersed and, at present, is completely ignored by the masses.

The VI World Congress must resolutely condemn the international Trotskyist opposition that serves the cause of the counterrevolutionaries by its demoralizing within the Party, that supports social-democracy in its struggle with Bolshevism and the USSR and directly plays into the hands of the bourgeoisie in its preparations for war with the government of the proletariat.

The VI Congress appeals to the worker-peasant masses of the world to rally its ranks around the Russian Revolution, to defend it with all means from imperialism and to trust the valiant Bolshevik Party and the Third International which will show them the way to victory over capitalism by the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Delegations of the Communist Parties of France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Holland.

Bell (England) Delegations of the USA, England, Canada, Latin America, South Africa and New Zealand declare:

The events that have taken place since the V World Congress of Comintern confirm the correctness of the decisive measures adopted by the Executive Committee of Comintern in relation to Trotskyism and its allies within and without the Soviet Union and in the ranks of Comintern. With its policy on the peasant question, the VKP(B) is successfully coping with a whole series of problems connected with an undeveloped country that has a large rural population. The struggle with the Kulaks and with all the elements striving

to arm a new bourgeoisie can be drawn to a successful conclusion, that is, to the introduction of forms of collective farming on the base of industrial development, that produces the tools of production and industrialization for the countryside. In spite of the prophecies of the Trotskyists the VKP(B) is rapidly approaching this goal.

The political line of the VKP(B) has adopted all measures at the expense of its own resources to assist the development of state industry and large-scale industrial enterprises under conditions of financial blockade abroad and counterrevolutionary sabotage within the country. This political line has been crowned with a series of shining successes. The assertion of the Trotskyists that the position of the proletariat would steadily worsen has turned out to be a pitiable and baseless slander. The introduction of the seven-hour working day in a whole series of important branches of industry, along with the growth of production and the creation of better conditions for social and cultural life, serve as proof that the position of the workers is not worsening, but on the contrary is getting better.

The limits to further improvement are exclusively a condition of the poverty of the country's resources, encircled as it is by the hostile capitalist world. Yet if the Trotskyists deny this, then the class-conscious workers of all countries will therefore know that the building of socialism in the USSR is rapidly moving forward.

In connection with the strengthening of the Soviet Union, an even closer rapprochement of the worker-peasant masses with the foreign proletariat is occurring, based on their joint struggle with world imperialism. Having destroyed the Anglo-Russian Committee, the reformist leaders of the unions exposed their own role as "perpetrators" of the split in the international

unity of the proletariat. This facilitated a greater still clarification of the minds of active workers in the struggle for international unity of the unions, and gave a new impulse to the movement for unity among the masses. Precisely in this connection, the line of the Comintern, and not the Trotskyist line, turned out to be correct.

The Trotskyist affirmations on "national narrow-mindedness" and the sacrificing of world revolution for the sake of narrow nationalistic goals were especially refuted by that steadfast support and aid that the proletariat of the USSR, inspired by the VKP(B), rendered to English miners and the general strike in England and during a whole series of industrial conflicts of international significance. The political support rendered by the VKP(B) to all oppressed peoples and, in particular, to the Chinese Revolution, is a further refutation.

It is especially necessary to expose as base slander the accusations of degeneration, petty-bourgeoisness and opportunism directed against Comintern. These accusations ignore the numerical growth of our Communist Parties and the strengthening of their influence, and, also, the active roles which they played and continue to play in the far-reaching movements that characterize the present-day shift of the working masses to the left. As examples may serve the conduct of the British Party during conflicts in the mining, textile and wool industries; the conduct of the American Communist Party among the miners, textile and garment workers, at the head of the struggle of the Negroes and colonial masses with American imperialism and in the growth of the Communist movement in the countries of Latin America as well; and the conduct of the organization of the Communist Party which now wields an ever growing influence on the proletarian and peasant movements in Latin America.

Finally, in connection with the strengthening of the Soviet Union, parallel to the growth of capitalist contradictions and rivalry among the imperialists, the growth of armaments and maneuvers for the formation of an anti-Soviet imperialist block whose purpose is war with the USSR, as the center of the world socialist revolution--the Trotskyist opposition is a source of strength for all enemies of the Comintern. The Trotskyist opposition has served as a source of new strength and inspiration for our social-democratic enemies, with their slanderous accusations of "Thermidorism," "opportunism," and "national narrow-mindedness" directed against the leaders of the VKP(B), with their counterrevolutionary, factional activity with the formation of a second party in mind and with their slanderous accusations of degeneration and opportunism against the Comintern. Thus from the lips of the Trotskyists the revolutionary proletariat has heard the same accusations, which, in the course of many years, it has grown accustomed to hear from the Social-Democrats. The continuing Trotskyist propaganda has made the sowing of pessimism in the ranks of the Comintern and the international proletariat its objective.

Delegations from the United States, England, Canada, Latin America, South America and New Zealand consider that the VI World Congress must approve the decisions of the VII, VIII, and IX plenums of the Executive Committee of Comintern and, also, the line undertaken by the XV Congress of the VKP(B) to condemn and expel the Trotskyist opposition and to ignore all their declarations that are not characterized by an unconditional rejection of all their false accusations and their political line.

Signatures:

USA: George Lovston.

Latin America: Ramirez.

England: T. Bell.

South Africa: S. P. Bunting.

Canada: George Ners.

New Zealand: R. F. Griffin.

Rogich (Yugoslavia). By instruction of the Balkan Communist Parties, of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece, I make the following declaration:

Consistently carrying out Leninist policies, the VKP(B), under the experienced leadership of its Central Committee, has achieved great success in the building of socialism, inspite of the imperialist economic and political anti-Soviet block. In the fortress of world revolution, thanks to the VKP(B), the union of workers and peasants has become unshakeable. Having become stronger, the dictatorship of the proletariat has succeeded in achieving tremendous results in the past few years.

The material and cultural level of the working masses of the city and countryside rises daily; industrialization moves ahead rapidly; the production process is improving and the productivity of labor increases. Increasingly, the socialist economy is forcing out private capitalist industries. One notices the outstanding successes of the building of socialism in every field.

The transfer from a capitalist to a socialist economy, to Socialism, in this technically and economically backward country is tied to great difficulties and dangers. In view of the absence of the necessary means for the large-scale investment of base capital, industry in the USSR, inspite of its fast growth, is unable to appease the goods shortages in the countryside completely, nor to lower industrial prices to a level corresponding to the price of agricultural production.

These and other difficulties of the transitional period, that can be completely overcome, are being overcome by way of a resolute struggle with all elements hostile to the building of socialism and by way of self-sacrificing work. Relying on the support that is closely tied both with the broad

masses of the working class and the poor and middle peasantry, the VKP(B), with the cooperation of and under the control of the broadest mass of workers, is confidently and resolutely carrying on the struggle against hostile class elements within the country and repelling the attack of the imperialist powers. Only the rallying forces of the Leninist Party with a single leadership can overcome the difficulties of the transitional period and successfully perfect the building of socialism inspite of all its internal and external class enemies.

We wholly and completely approve of the expulsion of the Trotskyist opposition from the ranks of the VKP(B). the Trotskyist opposition left the path of Lenin. It has lost faith in the existence of the proletarian dictatorship and in the building of socialism in the USSR. It has sunk into the swamps of social-democracy. In the Balkan countries Trotskyist opposition found supporters only among insignificant groups of intellectuals and Greek liquidators which the Greek Communist Party has definitively eliminated with no effects. All Parties must in the future, as before, resolutely and disciplinedly eliminate all opposition that departs from the firm soil of Leninism.

In the approaching war that capitalist powers are feverishly preparing for against the USSR--the supporter of all the exploited and the oppressed--the Communists of all countries are putting into practise Lenin's slogan on the transformation of an imperialist war into civil war, into the dictatorship of the proletariat. The international proletariat now has a fatherland which it must defend.

Under the direction of the world proletarian party of Comintern, the proletariat and the working peasant masses of the Balkans will struggle against the dangers of war; but if there is war, they will defend their fatherland,

the USSR.

Signatures:

Delegation of the C. P. of Yugoslavia: Rogich, Lidin, Nakovanovich,
Spaxich.

Delegation of the C.P. of Bulgaria: Asenov, Shajtanov, Stefanov.

Delegation of the C.P. of Greece: Saris, Sifneos, Nikolai.

Delegation of the C.P. of Rumania: Petrulesku, Stanku, Valtazar.

Straxov (China). The undersigned delegations consider that the question of the development of the USSR and the socialist construction of the Union as the fatherland of the world proletariat is the most important question before the international Communist movement. In spite of the slander and counter-revolutionary propaganda of the world-wide imperialists, Social-Democrats and the Kuomintang, the VI Congress of the Communist International, ten years after the victory of the Great October Revolution in Russia, can, in our opinion, state with pride and joy that:

1) The building of socialism in the USSR under the leadership of the VKP(B) has already achieved significant success. In spite of the assertions of the Trotskyist opposition regarding the impossibility of socialist construction in one country, we find that with its own forces the USSR has, in the course of 5-6 years, restored large-scale industry. Productivity in the USSR has already surpassed the pre-war level; the rate of economic development in the Soviet Union is stronger than that of any capitalist country. The socialist economy of the USSR has begun a new period of reconstruction. For example, the rate of iron and steel production in the USSR is greater than that of England or the United States, and so forth. All this reduces to dust the disbelief of the Trotskyist opposition and all the counter-revolutionary propaganda of the imperialists, the traitors to socialism and

the Kuomintang--traitors to the Chinese Revolution, who, using the words of the Trotskyist opposition, always say that Trotsky himself, "leader" of the October Revolution, affirmed that the Revolution "opened the way for capitalist development."

2) The policy of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) in relation to the peasantry is the only correct one. The recent difficulties in grain collection in the USSR demonstrate most graphically where the opposition leaders would have led the revolution if the direction of socialist construction had been entrusted to them and if they had seriously begun to implement their program that would have it better for the VKP(B) to quarrel with the peasantry for a few years, but move more rapidly towards industrialization. We find that in the course of a quarter of a century of development of the VKP(B), with a few minor exceptions, Trotsky has always outwardly exploited leftist slogans to conceal his opportunist line. Trotsky now exploits the idea of international revolution in order to put an end to the out-pouring and inextinguishable agitation of the USSR proletariat on the matter of the building of socialism. He sows skepticism and unbelief in the ranks of the international proletariat in relation to the USSR at the moment when the clouds of war are gathering over the Soviet Union. We declare that it is not only the right, but the duty of the proletarian state to apply repression against all who slip down to the path of Menshevism, to the path of counterrevolutionary struggle against the proletarian dictatorship.

3) The prosperity and development of the USSR is all the more important for the world proletariat, since it is the center of the world proletarian revolutionary movement, of the national liberation movement and of colonial rebellion and war against the imperialists. The USSR, with its

development and successes in socialist construction, uplifts not only the proletariat the world over, even those of backward countries engaged in a struggle for liberation and power; but also the millions of colonial peasants, the millions working in the decisive struggle for land against the rule of the imperialists, capitalists and landowners, against national and any other type of oppression. The colonial working masses see with their own eyes that only in union with and under the leadership of the proletariat, as in the USSR, can they achieve their own liberation in the struggle for socialism.

4) The Chinese Revolution developed under the influence of the victorious October Rebellion and with the significant help of the proletariat of the USSR. Its successes are those of the USSR. The development of the Chinese Revolution and the unfolding of the plebian agrarian coup together constitute a great threat to the world's imperialism. Exactly for this reason, the imperialists and the Kuomintang traitors along with them fiercely attack the USSR and the Chinese Revolution simultaneously. The imperialists now carry on not only an open intervention in China (the Sinan events) to suppress the Chinese Revolution, but they are preparing for war against the Soviet Union in every way. Not only are they winning over social-democracy by inter-locking yellow union bureaucrats together with the government apparatus and training them as "running dogs" for war against the USSR; but they are also trying to buy the Chinese bourgeoisie, to fabricate an atmosphere against so-called "red imperialism" in China. In India, English imperialism is trying ruthlessly to smash and suppress the growing revolutionary movement of the worker-peasant masses. Along with this, they are feverishly increasing their war preparations in order to make use of India as a base in a war against the Soviet Union. In this respect, it is especially important that the Indian workers and peasants, spontaneously rising in a struggle against

English imperialism, correctly make use of the lessons of the Russian and Chinese revolutions: It is the same in regard to Indonesia and other colonial countries.

Everyone is for war against the USSR, for struggle against the proletarian revolution and the Chinese Revolution and for the suppression of revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial territories--this is the politics of imperialism.

5) The Trotskyist opposition is attempting to take its theory of permanent revolution, already condemned in 1905, to China. It has gone so far as to call the Canton Rebellion a clearly shady enterprise, and, by dint of this, considers every organization of peasants (even Chinese peasants) on the national scale as counterrevolutionary. In this, it is objectively only helping the imperialists, social-democracy and the Kuomintang in their struggle against the Chinese Revolution. Wholly and completely in sympathy with the decisions adopted by the VII, VIII and IX plenums of the Executive Committee of Comintern on the Russian and Chinese questions and also with the decisions of the XV Congress of the VKP(B), the undersigned delegations declare their full support for the policies of the VKP(B) on internal and international questions.

Delegation of the C.P. of China.

Delegation of the C.P. of Japan.

Delegation of the C.P. of India.

Delegation of the C.P. of Indonesia.

Delegations from other eastern countries.

Farxi (Turkey). The Turkish, Persian, Syrian, Palestinian and Egyptian Parties and those of other Arab countries declare their solidarity

with the declaration of the German delegation. They consider the policies and tactics of the VKP(B) and the Executive Committee of Comintern as the correct line. They approve of the decisions of the XV Congress of the VKP(B) and those of the plenums of the Executive Committee adopted against the petty bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Trotskyist opposition. The enumerated delegations know by their own experience that the USSR is the only country for the international proletariat, the only supporter of the international workers' movements and liberation movements of colonial countries. We completely agree with the declaration of the German Communist Party.

Chairman. No one else has anything to direct to this question. Let us turn to the selection of a commission for the composition of a resolution. The Presidium proposes the following comrades for the commission: Telman, Semar, Bell, Straxov, Rogich, Farxi and reporters Manuilsky and Varga. (The proposal is accepted unanimously.)

(The session is closed.)

44th Session

29 August, 1928

Report of the Credentials Commission (Comrade Pyatnitsky). Report of the Charter Commission (Comrade Pyatnitsky). Ratification of the Charter of Comintern.

Chairman Comrade Remmele

Chairman. In the time that has passed since our last plenary session, a heavy blow has fallen on our fraternal Czechoslovakian Party: Comrade Xoras, one of the founders of the Czechoslovak Party, died of a heart attack. Let us honor his memory by rising. (The delegates rise.)

Comrade Xoras was one of the most zealous comrades of the Party, who was always found at the front line of the revolutionary struggle. During the Civil War in Soviet Russia he fought in the ranks of the Red Army; he was one of the first to join the Russian Revolution. Later, he returned to Czechoslovakia to fulfill his duty as a revolutionary warrior. That Comrade Xoras was chosen, at forty years of age, to be a delegate to the Congress, witnesses that not only in the days of struggle at the front during the Civil War, but later during the fierce battle on the front of Communist propaganda and agitation, he fulfilled his duty to the end. He died doing work dedicated to the revolutionary struggle. Cremation of his remains will take place today at four o'clock.

Let us turn, comrades, to the order of the day. The first point is the report of the Credentials Commission. Comrade Pyatnitsky is granted the floor.

Report of the Credentials Commission

Pyatnitsky. The Credentials Commission has surveyed and approved the credentials of 372 voting and 143 participating but non-voting delegates. 475 delegates participated in the V Congress: 342 voting delegates and 133 non-voting; 515 delegates are participating in the VI Congress--40 credentials more.

Invitations to send representatives to the Congress of the Executive Committee of Comintern were sent to 66 Parties and organizations having as a whole 4,024,159 members. From this number, 1,798,859 are members of the Communist Party and sympathizing organizations. Of these 1,210,954 are members and candidates of the VKP(B) and 583,105 are members and candidates of other Parties in capitalist and colonial countries. Delegates of the Young Communist League (KSM) represent 2,225,300 members: 2,030 members of the Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union and 195,300 members of the Young Communist League of capitalist countries. Communist Party dues for the first quarter of 1928 are calculated on the basis of these figures. It is probable that at the present moment the numerical composition of the Communist Party is greater.

Thus, of those invited to the Party Congress 58 Sections participate with voting and non-voting delegates. At the V Congress, 42 Sections with voting delegates and 7 with non-voting delegates were present--in all 49 Sections. Now we have 58 Sections represented, 9 more than at the V Congress. 57 Sections have been invited with voting delegates. 52 are represented here, from which it follows that 5 are missing. They are: Australia, Portugal, Korea, Egypt and Cuba. As far as Australia, according to the message received, the delegates are on the way. They may arrive before the end of the Congress.

From the 9 Parties and organizations invited with non-voting delegates, 6 are present; 3 absent: the People's Revolutionary Party of the Tanatuvian Republic and the Communist organizations of Peru and the Philippines. 9 Parties are present at the VI Congress that were not represented at the V Congress, these being Palestine, Colombia, Syria, Uruguay, Equador, Paraguay, Venezuela, New Zealand and Chile. Represented at the V Congress, but not at the VI are the Communist Parties of Portugal, Egypt and Korea.

Now I will acquaint you with the results of the statistical processing of the questionnaires circulated among the delegates. In all 468 completed questionnaires were processed. Of this number:

337 were completed by voting delegates

131 were completed by non-voting delegates

47 delegates did not complete questionnaires.

Distribution of Delegates by Sex

	Voting	Non-voting	Total	Per Cent
Men . . .	313	119	432	95.8
Women . .	12	7	19	4.2
	325	126	451	--

At the V Congress there were fewer questionnaires processed than at the VI, but women had a proportionally greater representation (5.37%). At the V Congress, men and women were distributed in the following way:

	Voting	Non-voting	Total	Per Cent
Men . . .	189	76	265	94.63
Women . .	11	4	15	5.37
	200	80	280	--

I consider that the decrease of the number of women at the VI Congress is a minus which the Party must indispenably correct by the next Congress. The percentage of women at Congresses must, in any case, be no less than the percentage of women in the Communist Parties.

On the Social Position of the Delegates

428 delegates listed their social positions on their completed questionnaires.

By type, the occupations of these 428 delegates are distributed in the following way:

	VI Congress:						V Congress:	
	Voting		Non-voting		Total			
	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
Workers	166	57	48	37.40	214	50	116	57.14
Service/Office Workers	44	14	25	19	69	16	Not including delegates from VKP(B).	
Intelligentsia & Free professionals	60	20	48	36.30	108	25.6		
Independent	2	0.6	0	--	2	0.4		
Peasants	8	2.4	5	3.8	13	3		
Agricultural Workers	2	0.6	1	0.75	3	0.7		
Bureaucrats	5	1.6	1	0.75	6	1.4		
Domestics	2	0.6	0	--	2	0.4		
Various types (Not listed above)	9	2.8	2	1.5	11	2.5		
	298	100	130	100	428	100		

According to the current type of occupation, the delegates are distributed in the following manner:

	Voting		Non-voting		Total	
	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
Workers	78	26	12	9.2	90	21
Service/Office Workers	6	2	5	3.8	11	2.5
Intelligentsia & Free Professionals	17	5.7	11	8.4	28	6
Independent	3	1	0	--	3	0.6
Peasants	1	0.3	0	--	1	0.2
Domestics	1	0.3	0	--	1	0.2
Agricultural Workers	1	0.3	0	--	1	0.2
Unemployed	2	0.6	3	2.25	5	1.1
Various types (not listed above)	4	1.2	0	--	4	0.9
Party Workers	185	62.6	99	76.35	284	67.1
	298	100	130	100	428	100

Of all these figures, I pause on those citing factory and party workers.

According to these figures, of 428 delegates, only 90 voting and non-voting delegates, that is, only 21% now work in factories.

284 delegates, or 67.1%, are paid Party workers, the majority being former factory workers.

We have detailed figures only on seven separate delegations. The figures are these:

In the French delegation there are 9 workers directly from their factories, equalling 21%, and 27 party workers, equalling 73.8%.

In the Czech delegation there are 5 factory workers (14.7 %) and 28 Party functionaries (82.3%).

In the Italian delegation there are 5 factory workers (29.4%) and 12 Party workers (70.59%).

In the German delegation, there are 9 factory workers (29%) and 21 Party workers (72.8%).

In the Yugoslav delegation, there is not a single factory worker but 3 Party workers (75%).

In the Belgian delegation there are 3 factory workers (75%) and one Party worker. The delegate participating, but not voting (a Party worker), is a member of the Executive Committee of Comintern.

In the Swiss delegation there is one factory worker and one Party worker (33.33%).

More detailed figures about the composition of all the delegations will be appended to the minutes of the proceedings.

Now, as to the function fulfilled by the delegates of the VI Congress in their own Parties. These figures apply to the 284 paid Party workers.

Delegates	Voting	Non-voting	Total
Members of Central Committees	115	30	145
Secretaries of Central Committees	39	5	44
Chairmen of Central Committees	5	0	5
Editors of Central Party Organs	25	4	29
Members of the Central Control Commission of VKP(B)	10	2	12

Delegates	Voting	Non-voting	Total
Members of Executive Committee of Comintern (IKKI)	12	6	18
Members of International Control Commission	0	4	4
Members of Executive Committee of the Young Communist League	16	5	21
Members of District Party Committees	52	6	58
District Party Committee Secretaries	40	5	45
Editors of Provincial Newspapers	2	0	2
Leaders or Workers of Divisions of Central Committees or District Committees	45	28	73
Union Secretaries (or Directors of Union Divisions)	22	1	23
Members of Executive Committees			
a) Unions' International	1	4	5
b) Peasants' International	1	2	3
c) Sports International	0	3	3
d) International Committee for Workers' Assistance	0	2	2
e) International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters	1	0	1
f) Anti-imperialist Leagues	1	0	1
g) Pacific Secretariat (Unions' International)	0	1	1
Secretaries of Central Committee of the Young Communist League	19	0	19
Party Workers, directing work among peasants	2	0	2
Party Workers, directing work among Negroes	1	1	2
Party Workers, directing work among women	2	0	2
Leaders of Factional Work in Cooperatives	4	0	4

In my view, the composition of our Congresses must be rather different. In any case, the predominance of functionaries in the composition of the Congress is undesirable. If it is impossible to send Party members--factory workers--then it is undoubtedly possible to send active Party workers who are involved in work with the masses, and not paid Party functionaries. It would be desirable to have more Communist workers who are directly from the factories at our Congresses.

Now, the age of our delegates:

	Voting		Non-voting		Combined Total	
	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
20 yrs.	3	0.9	1	0.75	4	0.9
¹ 21-30 yrs.	130	39	34	25	164	35
¹ 31-40 yrs.	135	39.9	60	46.45	195	41.2
41-50 yrs.	54	16	28	21	82	18
51-60 yrs.	9	2.7	7	5.3	16	3.4
61-71 yrs.	5	1.5	2	1.5	7	1.5
Total	336		132		468	

Party Seniority of the Delegates:

	Voting Delegates		Non-voting Delegates		Combined Total	
	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
1. Before the 1905 Revolution	19	6.7	13	11.8	32	8.1
	ave. seniority = 28 yrs.		ave. seniority = 27 yrs.			
2. After 1905 Revolution but before 1917	20	7	11	10	31	7.9
	ave. seniority = 18 yrs.		ave. seniority = 19 yrs.			
3. After 1917 to 1928	244	86.3	86	78.2	330	84
	Ave. Party seniority = 7 yrs.					

1. The majority of delegates--359--belong to these age categories.

Thus, the majority of delegates to the VI Congress joined the Party after 1917.

Figures on Membership of Socialist or Social-Democratic Parties
Before 1917

	Voting Delegates	Non-voting	Combined Total
1. Before 1917, those belonging to the S-D Parties 57		33	90
	Ave. seniority in S-D Party = 18 yrs.	Ave. seniority in S-D Party = 22 yrs.	
2. From 1917-1919, joined an S-D Party 22		3	25

Thus, 115, 29.3% of the delegates to the Congress were members of Social-Democratic Parties, not counting the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik), before joining the Communist Party.¹

Before Joining the Communist Party

Belonged to the Young Communist League:

Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates	Total
20	7	27
Ave. seniority in League = 10 yrs.	Ave. seniority in League = 3 yrs.	

From the number of delegates belonging to other revolutionary parties in the past (Kuomintang, Sarekat-Islam, North African Star, etc.):

Delegates:	Voting	Non-voting	Total
	13	8	21
In Addition:			
In Poalei-Tsion	1	-	-
With anarchists	1	-	-

1. In capitalist countries.

149 voting delegates and 59 non-voting delegates, or in total, 208 delegates have never participated in any other kind of party or organization (not including the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik)). Thus, the majority of delegates (including former members of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik)) joined the Communist Party directly.

Now, of the union membership of the delegates:

Delegates:	Voting		Non-voting		Combined Total	
	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
Union Organized	275	80	77	67	352	77
Not Union Organized	48	14	25	24	73	16
Expelled from Unions	5	1.4	2	1.7	7	1.5
Inexact or No Figures Reported	13	4.6	10	7.3	23	5.5
	341	100	114	100	455	100

48 voting and 25 non-voting delegates are not union-organized, that is a total of 73 delegates (16%). We have long ago achieved the organization of members of the Communist Parties. It will be difficult for Communist Parties to broaden and stabilize their influence in the unions if not all members belong to and work in the unions. It can definitely be considered that, on the average, every Communist can influence ten workers directly around him (so that during elections for representatives of the organization for every Party member there will be ten more votes). It follows that every Communist not a member of his union by this fact refuses to influence workers surrounding him: He does not facilitate the growth of communist influence in the unions; on the contrary, he facilitates the diminution of this influence. Moreover, such Communists impede the growth of class unions. Actually, how can

the Communist Parties of capitalist countries successfully carry on recruitment work among the workers and service people to bring them into the unions if even the Communists are not all union organized? Even now we have 20-30% of the members of the Communist Party who are still not organized. How can we achieve union organization of the average member of the Party, if even the Party delegates at this Congress, the more active forces of the Party, are not organized? In my opinion, this must be ended. Immediately upon return, the comrade who still does not belong to a union must surely join.

Delegates Participating in Former Congresses:

	Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates	Total
In: I Congress . . .	8	2	10
II Congress . . .	25	12	37
III Congress . . .	44	27	71
IV Congress . . .	51	31	82
V Congress . . .	74	40	114
Total	202	112	314

Total Congresses Participated in:

	Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates
In: One	69	21
Two	28	13
Three	7	16
Four	9	5
Five	4	2
	117	57

Delegates Who Have Not Participated in Any Congress:

Voting Delegates		Non-voting Delegates		Combined	
Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent	Total	Per Cent
209	64	69	63	278	54

Such are the numerical statistics.

Now I will turn to the manner of government at the VI Congress.

What manner of government has been employed at previous congresses? Each delegation has had a certain number of votes, depending on the numerical composition of its Party, regardless of the number of delegates present.

At the V Congress, a special paragraph was amended to the charter of Communist International regarding the manner of government at the congresses of Comintern. I will read the relevant paragraph: Paragraph 7, article 4:

"The number of voting delegates for each Section is defined by special decree of the Congress according to the number of members of the given Party--and to the political significance of the given country."

According to this, the V Congress decreed:

"The Congress instructs the Executive Committee of Comintern to survey the decision of the III Congress relating to the distribution of votes among the separate Parties included in the Comintern according to Paragraph 7, article 4, and propose the introduction of the relevant changes to the VI Congress."

The IX plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern has worked out a proposal for introduction at the Congress that the Credentials

Committee proposes to ratify. For comparison I will acquaint you with the manner of government established by the III Congress, adopted at the III, IV and V Congresses, and with the proposal of the IX plenum of the Executive Committee.

At the III, IV and V Congresses the Parties were subdivided into five groups: Members of the first group had 40 votes, regardless of the number of delegates present; members of the second group--30, of the third--20, of the fourth--10 and of the fifth-- 5 votes.

First Group

(6 Sections with 40 votes each)

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. C.P. ¹ of Germany | 4. VKP(B) |
| 2. C.P. of France | 5. C.P. of Czechoslovakia |
| 3. C.P. of Italy | 6. Communist Youth International |

Second Group

(7 Sections with 30 votes each)

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| 1. C.P. of America | 5. C.P. of Poland |
| 2. C.P. of England | 6. C.P. of the Ukraine |
| 3. C.P. of Bulgaria | 7. C.P. of Yugoslavia |
| 4. C.P. of Norway | |

Third Group

(11 Sections with 20 votes each)

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1. C.P. of Austria | 7. C.P. of Switzerland |
| 2. C.P. of Belgium | 8. C.P. of Sweden |
| 3. C.P. of Spain | 9. C.P. of Japan |
| 4. C.P. of Holland | 10. C.P. of Hungary |
-
1. Communist Party (C.P.).

5. C.P. of Rumania

11. C.P. of Latvia

6. C.P. of Finland

Fourth Group

(11 Sections with 10 votes each)

1. C.P. of Azerbaijan

7. C.P. of Lithuania

2. C.P. of Georgia

8. C.P. of Persia

3. C.P. of Denmark

9. C.P. of Indonesia

4. C.P. of India

10. C.P. of Estonia

5. C.P. of Canada

11. C.P. of Turkey

6. C.P. of China

Fifth Group

(9 Sections with 5 votes each)

1. C.P. of Argentina

6. C.P. of Egypt

2. C.P. of Armenia

7. C.P. of Portugal

3. C.P. of Byelorussia

8. C.P. of Australia

4. C.P. of Brazil

9. C.P. of Iceland

5. C.P. of Greece

The IX expanded plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern, according to the decision of the V Congress, proposes the following distribution of credentials: each Communist Party may have, henceforth, only as many voting delegates as the Congress grants voting credentials; in accordance with this proposal the Credentials Commission has organized its own work. I now announce the manner of government that has been worked out by the IX plenum of the Executive Committee.

Distribution of Voting Credentials at the VI Congress and the
Numerical Composition of the Delegates

Groups of Countries	Per Section: Total Votes	Delegates Present:		
		Voting	Non-voting	Total
1st Group	50			
(1 Section)				
RSFSR ¹		50	4	54
2nd Group	30			
(1 Section)				
Communist Youth International		30	5	35
3rd Group	25			
(4 Sections)				
C.P. of France		25	6	--
With Communist Organizations in French Colonies:				
Indochina	3	--	--	--
Algiers	2	--	--	--
Tunis	1	--	--	--
	<hr/> 6	25	6	37
C.P. of Germany		25	6	31
C.P. of Czechoslovakia . .		25	10	35
C.P. of Italy		18	--	18
4th Group	20			
(3 Sections)				
C.P. of England		19	2	21
C.P. of China		20	9	29
C.P. of America		20	5	25

Groups of Countries	Total Votes	Voting	Non-voting	Total
5th Group	15			
(1 Section)				
C.P. of Poland		14	10	15
6th Group	10			
(3 Sections)				
C.P. of India		3	3	6
C.P. of Sweden		8	3	11
C.P. of Ukraine		9	0	9
7th Group	7			
(5 Sections)				
C.P. of Bulgaria		6	1	7
C.P. of Yugoslavia		4	0	4
C.P. of Finland		7	5	12
C.P. of Norway		7	1	8
C.P. of Argentina		4	0	4
8th Group	5			
(4 Sections)				
C.P. of Japan		5	0	5
C.P. of Indonesia		3	3	6
C.P. of Mexico		3	1	4
C.P. of Byelorussia		4	1	5
9th Group.	4			
(5 Sections)				
C.P. of Hungary		4	0	4
C.P. of Austria		4	0	4

Groups of Countries	Total Votes	Voting	Non-voting	Total
(9th Group--continued)				
C.P. of Belgium		4	0	4
C.P. of Canada		4	0	4
C.P. of Rumania		4	0	4
10th Group	3			
(6 Sections)				
C.P. of Holland		3	0	3
C.P. of South Africa		3	0	3
C.P. of Australia		0	0	0
C.P. of Switzerland		3	0	3
C.P. of Georgia		3	0	3
C.P. of Azerbaijan		3	0	3
11th Group	2			
(20 Sections)				
C.P. of Armenia		1	0	1
C.P. of Chile		1	0	1
C.P. of Denmark		3	0	3
C.P. of Spain		1	0	1
C.P. of Estonia		1	1	2
C.P. of Latvia		2	1	3
C.P. of Lithuania		2	1	3
C.P. of Greece		2	0	2
C.P. of Portugal		0	0	0
C.P. of Turkey		1	0	1
C.P. of Palestine		1	0	1
C.P. of Persia		2	0	2

Groups of Countries	Total Votes	Voting	Non-voting	Total
(11th Group--continued)				
C.P. of Egypt		0	0	0
C.P. of Brazil		2	0	2
C.P. of Colombia		0	2	2
C.P. of Ireland		1	0	1
C.P. of Korea		0	0	0
C.P. of Uruguay		1	0	1
C.P. of Cuba		0	0	0
C.P. of Ecuador		0	1	1
12th Group	1			
(1 Section)				
C.P. of Syria		1	0	1

In total there are 372 voting delegates and 81 non-voting delegates at the Congress from Communist Parties enumerated above.

Besides these, there are represented, but with no vote:

C.P. of New Zealand	1 delegate
C.P. of Venezuela	1 delegate
People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia	1 delegate
C.P. of Paraguay	1 delegate
Communist Group of Iceland	1 delegate

In addition, the Credentials Commission has given guest tickets to the delegation from Outer Mongolia, since relations between the Comintern and the Revolutionary Party of Outer Mongolia have as yet not been settled. Delegates from the Korean Party have also received guest tickets, since not all

of the invited Communist groups have appeared and the Credentials Commission was not able to give non-voting participation to a single group.

I propose that the Congress ratify the work of the Credentials Commission and the proposal of the IX plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern on the distribution of voting credentials.

Chairman. Let us move for debate. Who wishes to take the floor on the report of Comrade Pyatnitsky? Apparently there are no persons wishing to. Let us move for a vote. First I put to a vote the question of distribution of voting credentials: Are there any objections to the distribution of voting credentials proposed by Comrade Pyatnitsky? I ask that you vote with ballots. Who is for? Who is against? Who abstains?

The proposal is adopted unanimously.

Now I put the report as a whole to a vote. Who is for adoption of the report and for its publication? Who is against? Who abstains?

Thus, the report of the Credentials Commission is considered ratified.

Chairman. Let us turn to the second point of order of the day--the report of the Charter Commission. Comrade Pyatnitsky again has the floor.

Report of the Charter Commission

Pyatnitsky. The Commission of the question of organization at the V Congress also surveyed the statutes. It introduced many changes into the Charter that were worked out by the II Congress, but the Commission left the Introduction in the form in which it was adopted earlier. The Commission then gave as its motivation the fact that there are many points in the

Introduction which ought to be included in the program, but since the Comintern had no program, it was necessary that there be an Introduction to the Charter.

Since a program for the Communist International will be adopted at this Congress, the Senior-convention proposes to delete the introductory part of the Charter. Therefore, let us propose to delete the Introduction to the Charter from the Charter.

Chairman. Vote for the proposal just announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky on the deletion of the Introduction from the Charter, since it has been included in the program. The resolution is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. Paragraph one has been reedited in this way to begin, "The Communist International, the international brotherhood of workers, is the union of Communist Parties," and so on. Thus, paragraph 2, beginning, "The name 'Communist International' is given to the new international brotherhood of workers," has become superfluous. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the old Charter remain as they were. Several delegations have suggested the introduction of paragraphs relating to the work of communist factions in mass organizations to the statute. These points were not in the Charter. This is explained by the fact that at the V Congress the question of organization of the Party was put first, and all attention was directed primarily on the organization of cells in the factories. Communist factions in mass organizations did not exist at all then, with the exception of the communist factions in parliaments and municipalities. Then there was no need to introduce points into the Charter about communist factions. Already at the first organizational conference in 1925 after the V Congress much attention was devoted to this question.

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A whole division on communist factions has been included in the model Charter that was ratified by the Communist International and has now been adopted by the majority of the Sections.

After the V Congress, such large-scale non-party organizations developed, like the International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters and of war veterans and atheists. They have their own international centers and it is now necessary to define their relations with Comintern. Therefore, some delegations have proposed the introduction of a special point on communist factions. This point has been formulated by us; I will read it. This is paragraph 6:

"In all non-party worker and peasant organizations and organs (in unions, cooperatives, sports unions, organizations of war veterans, in congresses and conferences, in municipality institutions and soviets, in parliaments, etc.) where there are at least two Communists, communist factions must be organized with the purpose of strengthening the Party's influence and realization of its policies within these organizations."

Paragraph 8. "Factions are subordinate to the corresponding organs of Party leadership.

Point 1. Communist factions in organizations and organs having an international character (Unions' International, International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters, International Committee for Workers' Assistance, etc.) are subordinate to the Executive Committee of Comintern; factions in organizations and organs are subordinate to the corresponding local Party leadership centers.

Point 2. The organizational structure and forms of leadership of the work of communist factions is defined by special instructions from the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Central Committees of the Sections of Comintern."

These two paragraphs are new.

Chairman. Are there any objections or additions? No? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. From paragraph 9 of the old text (now paragraph 10), we have deleted everything that speaks of the chairman of the Comintern. Paragraph 9 reads: "The World Congress elects the chairman of Communist International, the Executive Committee of Comintern and the International Control Commission." We deleted the words "chairman of the Communist International." The fact is that already at the VII plenum of the Executive Committee of Comintern a decree on the dissolution of the institution of the chairmanship of Comintern, and on the creation, in its place, of a collective organ for collective leadership was introduced. Therefore, as you know, after the VII plenum of the Executive Committee there has not been a chairman of Comintern and on the strength of this it is necessary to delete from the Charter what, in fact, no longer exists.

Chairman. Who is for the proposal announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. The Charter Commission has also decided to delete paragraph 19 on the Organizational Bureau. This paragraph speaks about the laws and functions of the Bureau. But at the VII plenum it was decided to liqui-

date the Organizational Bureau and its voting functions will , instead, be transferred to the Political Secretariat. Therefore, we decided to delete the point from the Charter.

Chairman. Are there no objections to this proposal, announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? No? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. The Charter Commission has included two new paragraphs. These paragraphs concern the permanent bureaus of the Executive Committee of Comintern abroad. The need for direct leadership of the Sections by the Executive Committee has been felt in recent times by almost all of the Sections. As is apparent from the report of the Credentials Commission, the Comintern includes Sections from countries very far from Moscow: Australia, those of South America and Africa and others. It is absolutely impossible for the Executive Committee of Comintern to rule directly from Moscow, and therefore, by decree of the IX plenun it was decided to organize a West European Bureau abroad. Possibly it will become necessary to organize such bureaus in South America also and, perhaps, in the East. Therefore, the Charter Commission has decided to introduce a special point about these bureaus. The two paragraphs are 20 and 21, which I will now read to you:

Paragraph 20. "The Executive Committee of Comintern and its Presidium has the right, in order to establish closer ties and better leadership of the Sections of Comintern, to create permanent bureaus (West European, South American, Eastern and other bureaus of the Executive Committee of Comintern)."

Point. "The sphere of activity of permanent bureaus is established by the Executive Committee of Comintern or the Presidium of the Executive Committee of Comintern. Sections

of Comintern, over which the sphere of activity of the permanent bureaus is distributed, must be informed of the full powers given these bureaus.

Paragraph 21. "The Sections are obliged to activate the instructions and directions of the permanent bureaus. The instructions and directives of the permanent bureaus can be appealed to the Presidium of the Executive Committee of Comintern or to the Executive Committee by the Corresponding Sections, but this does not free them from the obligation to fulfill the decisions of the permanent bureaus prior to their alteration by the Presidium or the Executive Committee of Comintern."

Chairman. Who is for the proposal announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. We have replaced paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the former Charter with other paragraphs. These formerly stated that the Executive Committee of Comintern elects the Secretariat, the editorship of the journal "Communist International" and the International Secretariat of the Communist Women's Movement. The Executive Committee was able to do this earlier, since it met, according to the Charter, once a month. But now, as you will see by our new proposal, as it is suggested that the Executive Committee meet only once in six months, it is impossible to give this right solely to the Executive Committee. If, let us say, the Secretary of the Executive Committee or the editor of an organ were either to go away or, for some reason, had to be replaced by another, then it would be impossible to do so without the permission or decree of the Executive Committee. Therefore, we have replaced these paragraphs with a new one; in the new text paragraphs 25 and 26 will state:

"The Presidium elects the Political Secretariat, which is the major executive and preparatory organ of the Executive Committee and the Presidium of Communist International.

The Presidium elects the editorship of the periodical magazine and other publications of Communist International."

As far as the apparatus, since we still do not have a definite and fixed structure, then we must continually change and improve the apparatus depending on the need. Therefore, this right is also given to the Presidium. Paragraph 27 reads:

"The Presidium of the Executive Committee of Communist International designates the International Women's Secretariat and the permanent commissions for groups of countries (the Leninist Regional Secretariat--Lendersecretariat--and creates departments.).

The Presidium is given the right to arrange the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in the most expedient fashion."

Chairman. Are there no objections to the proposal announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. To paragraph 24, now 29, has been added an article on instructors. We already have instructors, primarily in the Organizational Section. These instructors are not well met by the Parties everywhere. It very frequently happens that for several months they are not allowed to work and they are interfered with. Now the Charter Commission has decided to add a special article about instructors to paragraph 24, now 29, where the plenipotentiary Executive Committee of Comintern is mentioned so that Parties

would not only not interfere with the fulfillment of the tasks that the instructors are entrusted with; but on the contrary facilitate their every task. This article reads:

In addition, the Executive Committee and the Presidium of Communist International have the right to send instructors to the separate Sections of Comintern. The rights and duties of the instructors are defined by the Executive Committee, to whom the instructors are responsible for their work."

Chairman. Are there no objections to the proposal introduced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. The Charter Commission has decided to delete section IV about the expanded plenums (paragraph 26). The expanded plenums were introduced after the III Congress. The majority of the members of the Executive Committee had to be in Moscow the entire time, since the Executive Committee of Comintern had to meet once a month. In addition, there was still the Presidium which met weekly and, in fact, the composition of the Presidium almost coincided with the Executive Committee. Depending on the questions being surveyed, the sessions of the Presidium were called now sessions of the Presidium, now sessions of the Executive Committee. The expanded plenums of the Executive Committee of Comintern, in fact, were transformed into small congresses. Therefore, the Charter Commission proposes that the expanded plenums of the Executive Committee as such be done away with, and in their place permanently work the Executive Committee of Comintern as an organ elected by the Congress.

Between the V and VI Congresses we held three expanded plenums and two ordinary plenums of the Executive Committee of Comintern. The first plenum

(V), was March through April, 1925. At this plenum 281 representatives of the Party were present, of them 136 voting and 145 non-voting delegates. The VI plenum was held February through March of 1926. There were 246 delegates, 98 voting and 148 non-voting. Several Parties were represented by almost as many delegates as are present at this Congress. At the VI plenum the French Party was represented by 27 delegates; at this Congress they have 37 delegates. The VII plenum was in November through December of 1926 with 195 delegates present, 97 of them voting. The VIII ordinary plenum was in May, 1927. There were 75 delegates present, 34 of whom were voting members, principally from the Executive Committee. Finally, the IX plenum was held in February, 1928; 72 delegates were present. There were 31 voting members, these being members of the Executive Committee.

Questions which were discussed at the May and February plenums in 1928 were no less important than those at preceding plenums. These plenums demonstrated that questions were discussed much more quickly there than at the preceding plenums precisely because there were fewer comrades. As to the seriousness of the discussions, however, these plenums were not inferior to those of former plenums. This experience has shown us that it is better to turn to calling a plenum of the Executive Committee. In special cases, if a question of one or another Sections will be discussed, then besides the members of the Executive Committee, the representatives of the local organization are to be invited; but no more expanded plenums, that were in fact congresses, are to be called. Meanwhile, we are reproached because we have not called a Congress for four years, whereas, actually, between the V and VI Congresses there were three. (Manuilsky: "That's correct!")

The Senior-convention declared itself in favor of calling plenums of the Executive Committee once every six months and at these plenums to put forward major questions of principle. In addition, the Senior-convention has required large-scale Sections of Comintern to maintain authoritative delegates of their Communist Party in Moscow so that the Presidium, from plenum to plenum would be an authoritative organ, that could decide all question that have to be resolved between plenums. As you can see, from this arises the proposal concerning the composition of the Executive Committee. There is a proposal for the expansion of the Executive Committee so that the Committee would be connected with all Sections so that when the comrades gather for plenums their experience could be made use of.

Chairman? No objections? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. Paragraph 25 of the old Charter, paragraph 23 of the present Charter, defines the schedule for meetings of the Executive Committee and the number of its members who must be present at the Executive Committee sessions so that they will be authorized to implement decisions. We have introduced a similar paragraph (24) regarding the sessions of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of Comintern.

Chairman. No objections? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. Former paragraph 27, now 28, on the International Control Commission has a new, more precise formulation. The International Control Commission was first created at the V Congress. We had had no experience of the Control Commission's work. Now, after four years of experience, we can make the functions of the Commission more exact.

The former paragraph 27 read that the functions of the International Control Commission included "examination of complaints from separate persons or entire organizations on disciplinary measures applied to them by the Sections and the presentation of the Commission's understanding of the issue to the Executive Committee of Comintern which will make the specific decision." From this paragraph it is evident that the International Control Commission was not an independent organ and could only suggest one or another measure for action upon to the Executive Committee. The International Control Commission is given definite independent functions by the paragraph to be adopted in the new edition of the Charter. This paragraph reads:

Paragraph 26. "The International Control Commission examines questions having to do with the unity and solidarity of the Parties belonging to Comintern and also with the separate members of one or another Party as Communists.

In this line it:

a) investigates complaints on the actions of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties, if members of the Party have been subject to disciplinary punishment by the latter Central Committees on the grounds of political difference;

b) investigates analogous matters regarding members of the central institutions of the Communist Parties, and, equally, matters regarding separate members of the Parties that it considers necessary to subject to its examination or that are received on the suggestion of the voting organs of the Executive Committee of Comintern."

From this paragraph it is evident that the International Control Commission has now been given independent functions.

30
Chairman. Who is for the adoption of the new paragraph? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. Paragraph 32 of the Charter (formerly 30), includes a change: the former paragraph read:

"Sections belonging to Communist International, especially Sections of neighboring countries must support the closest organizational and informational ties with one another."

Now these three lines will be formulated in this way:

"Sections belonging to Communist International, especially Sections of the mother country and their colonies and Sections of neighboring countries must support the closest organizational and informational ties with one another."

Chairman. Are there no objections to the change in paragraph 32? It is adopted.

Pyatnitsky. The remaining paragraphs are as they were.

Chairman. Who is for the adoption of the Charter of Comintern with all the amendments and additions announced by Comrade Pyatnitsky? It is adopted unanimously.

(The session is closed.)

45th Session

29 August, 1928 (Evening)

Report of the War Commission (Comrade Bell). Report of the Political Commission (Comrade Telman). Declaration of Comrades Johnston and Lovston. Resolutions regarding the International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters (MOPR).

Chairman Comrade Ileik

Report of the War Commission

Bell (England). In presenting the report of the War Commission, I would like to make one or two parenthetical remarks. For purely technical reasons, the final text of the theses adopted by the Commission and editorial sub-commission was not distributed to all the delegates. The amount of technical work that has gone into the preparation of the resolution on the international situation, programs and amendments to the latter was too heavy a burden for the technical apparatus. Having weighed the situation, the Presidium decided that as it is absolutely necessary to distribute the Program and amendments to it immediately to all delegates, and the resolution on the international situation as well, the theses on the war question might be distributed in only a limited number of copies. An oral report about the changes that these theses have undergone in the Commission must be made. We estimated that the report of the Commission would not be scheduled before Thursday and as a result, we must ask your pardon for the absence of amendments in Russian and French translations and for the fact that the latter have not been distributed as yet.

However, I would like to tell the Russian and French comrades that the essential amendments passed at the last session of the Commission were adopted by the editorial sub-commission, where only a few editorial changes were introduced. The text of the theses that you have in hand does not include all our amendments: We have affixed them as additions to the theses. It was entirely impossible to include them in the final text in all languages in the time given for the distribution of this text before this plenary session. I only point out that these amendments contain many purely editorial or stylistic changes and few of them are major. The editorial commission, after our session on Sunday, surveyed every one of these amendments in detail and, therefore, the additional list, together with the text, represent the final theses.

A further note. In the theses there are many references concerning illegal work, that is impossible for many of our legal Parties to publish. Our Commission has not refused any single attempt to examine in detail the tactics of the Party in its struggle with war. In consequence of this, we have these sharp formulations that are illegal in nature in some countries where our Party itself is legal. The new Executive Committee must define in what form the theses must be published. The Commission expresses the hope that the editing of the final text and its preparation for publication will be done in the shortest possible time in order to present the final text to the Parties as soon as possible.

Turning to the final text, I would like to say a few words relating to the structure of the theses. Our first draft contained 8 sections and took up more than 49 pages. Our hope was, where possible, to shorten or condense the theses, reducing them to a lesser volume. Our final text contains 5

sections of various division and takes up 38 pages, only 11 pages fewer than before.

Having examined our draft, the Commission, first of all, opposed the tendentiousness found in places of the theses and expressed with a certain abstractness and academicism. The new title of the theses, "Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of Communism," reflects the new orientation of the theses and the new approach of the Commission. I must say, however, that the basic principles of the theses have not undergone any changes. All of the amendments made to the text either concern the practical activity or underscore the practical forms of work and as much as possible eliminate what might have been interpreted as academicism or abstractness.

The first section of our first draft has been reduced to one chapter. The chapter, entitled "Introduction" and another, concerning the economic and political situation, were united in a single section. During the preparation of the draft we still did not know exactly what group of questions Comrade Buxarin was preparing to address in his report devoted to the international political situation.

As a result, our first draft had several **repetitions** we have tried to abbreviate. We have also effected certain changes, shifting several parts of the first two chapters to the last section and regrouping the latter to create a better and clearer arrangement.

Our first draft had a rather descriptive character. The final text of the theses gives more direct and definitive instructions about the practical direction of our activity. For example, our final text points out more clearly and directly that the League of Nations is an instrument of preparation

for war. In addition, we point out relevant to the war against the Soviet Union, that all the forces of imperialism are directly interested in an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. At the same time the necessity of drawing the agricultural workers into the struggle and the significance of the national minorities, etc., have been more thoroughly examined than in the first draft. The first and second sections of the original draft now are included in the first section under the title, "Threats of Imperialist War."

The first section of our final text includes the third, fourth and fifth sections of our original draft. The latter are now a part of the section entitled, "Relation of the Proletariat to War." With this regrouping and abbreviation of our first draft, we have tried to include in the second section the struggle of the proletariat with imperialist war, the proletarian defense of the Soviet Union and its support and leadership of the national-revolutionary wars of the oppressed peoples.

The well-known debates have arisen in the Commission regarding the classification of types of war given in our original draft. Our first draft spoke about two particular categories of war--reactionary and revolutionary war. Then we gave a classification of each, dividing them into three different types. The debates, arising over this detailed classification, showed that many comrades feared possible misunderstandings and confusion. It was felt that we, conforming to scientific reasoning, were trying to realize too subtle sub-divisions. In order to avoid this abstract classification and also to underline the unity of the actions of the proletariat in different fields of the struggle against imperialism, we simplified the text, pointing out three types of war according to the resolution of the VIII plenum. The types of war are: first, the struggle with imperialist war; second, defense

of the Soviet Union; and third, national-revolutionary wars against imperialism. The tactics in relation to each of these three types of war have been sufficiently detailed.

Significant debate arose over the tactics in the struggle with imperialists. In our first draft much was said about the application of "boycott." In this section we attempted primarily to tie all the types of opposition to imperialist wars together, that is, refusal to supply, transport, etc., with mass actions in every field of proletarian activity. Our first draft attempted to tie all these measures with a refusal to enlist in countries with voluntary armies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This led us to use the term "boycott."

This particular question elicited a rather extended debate.

Although no one objected to the principle of showing resistance to the imperialists in the enlistment of recruits, many comrades feared that our terminology might lead to some identification of us with the pacifists. Upon these considerations, we corrected this section, giving it a clearer formulation on the question of individual and mass refusal of military service and showed, with sufficient clarity, that our struggle in this field has nothing in common with the pacifists. Our final draft clearly establishes that nothing can be achieved by the application of pacifist methods of individual or mass refusal of service on the grounds of purely pacifist considerations, and that the proletariat can achieve success only by means of work within the army. In our text, it is shown that mass opposition to recruitment in countries with voluntary or mercenary armies is part of the general mass activity of the proletariat against war.

A well-known discussion on the question of fraternization and desertion also took place in our Commission. Here, also, there were no particular principal disagreements: it was only necessary to formulate certain questions more clearly. Some comrades objected to the point in our first draft that fraternization is exclusively a question of our activity at the front. They insisted that it is necessary to tie in the activity at the rear and at the front as a magnet for the general proletarian struggle against the war. Some comrades were afraid that, speaking of fraternization only as an activity at the front, we would isolate and narrow all our tactics connected with the slogan of fraternization. Others went to the opposite extreme portraying fraternization as primarily the goal of partial needs. In our final text, fraternization is spoken of as the goal of all our activity at the rear, in the armies and at the front. Our theses do not present fraternization as a pacifist method, but points out with sufficient clarity that fraternization, desertion and partisan war all lead to the transfer of the proletariat from the army of the imperialists to the revolutionary army. This transfer of the proletariat from imperialist to revolutionary armies is the highest form of fraternization.

In connection with the question on the defense of the Soviet Union we had a small discussion about who is an ally of the Soviet Union. In the final text we give a precise grouping and clearly and definitively establish that the defense of the Soviet Union is a matter for the international proletariat and the proletariat of the Soviet Union. In this, the peasantry of the Soviet Union, together with the national-revolutionary forces of the oppressed colonial peoples are the reliable allies. In our evaluation of the national-revolutionary forces of the colonial peoples we have borrowed much

from the amendment proposed by our Chinese comrades, which derives from the experience of the Chinese Revolution.

Then, in connection with the question of our conduct in relation to armies, several comrades have expressed familiar doubts in regards to the slogan, "Not one man, not one kopek." It has been pointed out that this slogan originated with the anarchists. We have studied this question sufficiently and have simplified it still more, giving a clearer definition in order to avoid any confusion.

On the question of a proletarian militia, a militia of the workers, the Red Guard and the Red Army, a rather long discussion took place before the Commission. What interests us at the present time and what the Communist Parties must remember and see clearly is that Social Democrats are now beginning to flirt with the slogans of so-called "people's army," the "democratic militia," and so on. This is a great danger to us. It is necessary that we draw a clear enough boundary between our conception of the proletarian militia and the "people's armies" and "democratic militia" of the Social Democrats. We have made it clear in our theses that our basic purpose is the arming of the proletariat, the Red Guard, the proletarian militia and the militia of workers; the worker-peasant militia, proposed by some comrades from Latin America, is only a slogan for the arming of the proletariat. They are all necessary steps for the military policies of the proletarian revolution, preceding the creation of the Red Army.

In some countries it is possible to speak more openly about the Red Guard; in others, for example in Latin America, it is necessary to speak about the worker-peasant militia. But the basic line adopted by the

Commission is that we cannot dogmatically put to the question all of these slogans. Our main purpose--and this is duly emphasized in the theses--is not the organization of a counter-bourgeoisie army under peaceful conditions: We must put the slogan of the Red Army forward as the highest form of proletarian militia and as a slogan of the preparation for armed rebellion.

Some comrades considered that we **were** acting counter to the VIII plenum. This is not so. On the contrary, we have developed and extended the correct line of the VIII plenum. The section of the theses recalled above also defines our conduct in relation to the bourgeois militia, universal military service, mercenary armies and militarization. I turn to the question of partial needs. We had debates concerning shortening the term of military service. Some comrades are afraid that the demands of our Parties regarding a shortening of the term of military service could be confused with pacifist ideas about the elimination of military service and the army. It is clear that in various countries the appearance of confusion is a possibility among certain comrades, if they have not adapted to the concrete situation of their particular country. For example, it is well known that in Germany the bourgeoisie willingly agree to shortening the term of military service, if only to make it possible to get better educated troops. However, the situation in Germany can be regarded as an exception.

What interests us primarily is the following: not to be afraid to put this slogan forward, applying it to a concrete situation in the corresponding countries and clearly representing this slogan as the slogan of mass mobilization against imperialism. The idea of gradually shortening military service, leading finally to the elimination of the army, is not our idea; but we put this slogan forward as a means of mobilizing and guiding the masses,

as a means of demoralizing the bourgeois armies. At the same time, we must clearly recognize the necessity for the proletariat (and this is worked out in the theses) to learn to use weapons.

The third section of the theses raises the question of the proletariat's relation to the army and the question of armies in colonial countries. Here we have made use of the experience of the Chinese struggle. In this section we analyze the question of national armies, for example, the army of the first period of the Chinese Revolution, of imperialist armies and the question of the transformation of national armies into armies serving imperialist goals, and a third, mixed type existing in India, Morocco, Egypt, etc.

In the fourth section we address the problem of the proletariat's relation to the question of disarmament, with the social-democratic program of disarmament. We analyze the Trotskyist ideas and also the position of the so-called left Social Democrats on the question of disarmament. In our final text the difference between the program of the proletariat in power and that of the proletariat struggling for power is clarified. We especially emphasize the struggle against fascism, in its different forms.

Regarding the last section, "Defects in Work and Tasks of Communist Parties," I wish to point out that we had a series of important proposals presented to the Commission in written form about the work among women and peasants, the struggle with fascism and about the work among national minorities, and a series of other questions. These proposals were included in the last section.

The Commission was, in particular, occupied with a paragraph of this section that speaks about the necessity for development of more energetic

international action against war. This is a very important question. We have repeatedly said in our discussions that the Parties are not active enough, either in their own country or in the international arena. In this connection we have discussed in much detail the possibility of developing a familiar type of international action on individual events. The new Executive Committee will, no doubt, study this question in detail.

In the process of examining the whole question of our anti-war activity, the Commission has established that various divisions are engaged in this work: Agitprop, the Organizational Division, Peasants International and so on. We introduce the proposal that the new Executive Committee should designate a special commission for the coordination of this work.

At the same time that we here at the plenary session discussed our relation to war, coincidentally, the II International was also discussing its position on the question of war. In our discussion we stated and emphasized that rationalization, international cartels, trusts, etc., and the increased competition arising at the base of the capitalist rationalization all lead to war. The II International, discussing the same question at the same time, stated that international cartels and large-scale capitalist amalgamations are the instruments of peace.

In our discussions we have exposed the League of Nations as a direct instrument of preparation for war. At the same time, the II International declared that the League of Nations is the only guarantee of peace and that it is necessary to apply all means of coercion, including violence, against all governments refusing to submit to its international arbitration.

From this it is clear that the point made in our report about the possibility that Mac Donald, Vandervelde and Boncoeur and the representatives of social-democracy will come out under the white banner of the League of Nations against the Soviet Union, no longer appears an exaggeration.

We have insisted in our discussions that the overthrow of imperialism is the only way to realize final universal disarmament. The II International has stated that only under the leadership of the League of Nations and with the help of peaceful persuasion will it be possible to attain disarmament.

We declare that the II International is the direct instrument of imperialism, that it is in some relations even more imperialistic than the imperialists themselves. At the same time that we make this declaration, the renegade Renodel has come out against the government, refusing to resort to arbitration, affirming that in such cases rebellion is a sacred duty.

In our report and in our theses we have stated the basic lines on which it is necessary for us to concentrate and to intensify our work.

Our Parties must pay more attention not only to a clear understanding of the contradictions of capitalist economics leading to war, but to the influence that the Social Democrats still have among significant layers of the proletariat.

Our theses emphasize that the anti-war work of the Communist Parties need not be looked upon as only a matter for the specialists. The anti-war work of the Communist Party must be a matter for all the Parties as a whole; it must be a part of their mass work. In this relation, and we must repeat this, it is necessary to intensify the mass work of our Parties in all coun-

tries. It is necessary to intensify our international activity and with all possible speed, while we still have time, to prepare our forces.

These theses that we present to you today are not the product of any one person's work, but represent the result of the collective work in which the majority of the Parties' leaders at this Congress took part. These theses can not be viewed as an academic tract. They are attempts to discover our practical tasks and to point out the practical lines of work for each Party to realize our common goal--the overthrow of capitalism. These tasks must be realized by all our Parties under the banner of the Communist International.

I propose to the Congress the final text of the theses to be adopted unanimously.

(After voting, the theses are accepted unanimously.)

Report of the Political Commission.

Telman. The Political Commission has discussed, in a series of sessions, the many proposals introduced by the individual delegations about changes: It has attempted to include in the draft of the theses the most important viewpoints and the practical changes in separate sections and various actual situations. Of course, the work of the Commission was unusually difficult; the delegates themselves took the most animated part in the introduction of proposals and changes. We were unable to include all the proposed amendments, changes and ideas in the draft of the theses. We have started from the following considerations: First, we tried as far as possible not to lengthen the theses themselves. Secondly, if the subject were of general positions already contained in the former resolutions and decrees, we did

not include them. And, thirdly, we have introduced only topically new points of view in the individual sections in order to amplify various problems already in the draft of the theses of the Russian delegation.

It goes without saying that in studying the individual changes, many amendments unfortunately could not be taken into consideration, for example, the proposal of the Austrian delegation who wished to include a special section on Austria in the draft. The Commission did not have in mind rejecting the proposal in the main. However, it decided, that since two resolutions on the Austrian question adopted by the Presidium have already been produced, and since still another resolution is being prepared which the Presidium will adopt, considering this, there is no need to include the Austrian delegation's proposals in the theses. These are impressive reasons.

The proposal relating to the Near and Arab East, presupposing the inclusion of a special section, we also rejected. We got together with the Colonial Commission on this question. We asked them if they would be able to include a section concerning a problem having special significance for our Parties in the Arab East in their resolution.

In the Commission itself, there were no arguments relating to specific problems. We only exchanged opinions concerning how many of the numerous proposals we could include in the draft. The delegates will see, on the basis of those amendments recorded and now at hand that there are several new proposals to the general draft of the theses that have been worked out by the Russian delegation. In particular, there is a new section relating to the politics of schism carried on by reformists and reformist union bureaucracy on an international scale, and relating to our tasks.

In addition, also included is a section on chronic unemployment, with the altered structure of development elicited by capitalist rationalization, and with the growth of the productive forces, the intensification of work, the **monstrous** exploitation of the working class, etc. Further, we have redone an important paragraph that, in the former theses, was designated by the number 37 and the question was mainly of unions and our tasks within them. The draft of this paragraph was improved. It strives primarily to grasp new, topical methods and tasks in the unions for Communist Parties. With such rewriting, of course, the character of the theses was changed to no small degree. But, in this way, the structure of the theses stands out rather more boldly.

In connection with the assurance of the entire Congress that the danger from the right is now the primary danger threatening the workers' movement, we have, in addition, strongly emphasized the idea of the necessity of struggle with the danger from the right in several sections that speak of the internal situations of countries and of various Sections.

There are still a few brief remarks relating to important changes and new points of view already distributed in written form to the deputies.

In the first section additions on the suggestion of the Russian and Czechoslovak delegations draw a more exact picture of the character of the periods. I think there is no reason to touch on this specifically here: the reason is already contained in the formulations as to why we are more clearly defining the general character of the first and second periods.

In the first section of the theses draft under the title, "Technology and the Economics of the World Economy," we have tried, speaking about the

contradictions of capitalism, to illuminate in greater detail the inseparable link between the growth of productive forces and increasing contradictions. Along with the German problem, we have more boldly emphasized the portrait of the decline of English imperialism. The English delegation introduced a special proposal that this be added. Along with the major Anglo-American contradictions, the German problem and the decline of English imperialism also have a great significance, indeed, for the present period. We have expanded and added more to this section.

In the same section, a new paragraph on international unemployment has been included. In connection with the ever increasing development of rationalization, with the improvement of the productive apparatus and the great intensification of work connected with this, with the greater exploitation of the working forces and the increase of unemployment arising from this, we must intensify our activity in this field. In connection with the regrouping in the productive process (along with qualified workers, unqualified workers are used, increasing the number of women and young people), we must devote greater attention to this field than has been given to it in the practical work of our Sections in recent times.

In the second section, devoted to the relations between individual governments and problems of so-called internal politics, we have tried, in general, to emphasize more strongly the characteristics of the world hegemony of the United States and to illuminate still sharper the contradictions between the United States and England. This shows that America, in recent times and more now than at any earlier time, is attempting to weaken the might of England by destroying the monopolistic position of England in rubber and oil, and by undermining her position in Egypt and the Sudan as a

producer of cotton. A special supplement has been included on this question.

Further, in the third section--on the governmental authority of the bourgeoisie and the regrouping of class forces--we have included a small, but extraordinarily essential insertion relating to the evolution of the bourgeois government structure in paragraph 14. This small addition has all the more significance since in the next section, that is, the section on the class struggle, social-democracy and fascism, we have also included a new paragraph that illuminates the schismatic politics carried on by the reformists and the reformist union bureaucracy.

The previous insertion on the evolution of bourgeois government structure--in the third section--has a connection with the peculiar development of social-democracy in the present very serious period.

In the first place, the employers' organizations are merging with the bourgeois government apparatus. In the second place, in connection with this, is the increasing significance of the economic struggle that is receiving a more sharply expressed political character and serving as a political factor to a greater degree than at any earlier time. In the third place, in connection with evolution of bourgeois government structure and in dependence on the tactics and policies of the bourgeoisie, even social-democracy is changing its tactics and policies in relation to problems of government; it has to change the methods of its tactics in relation to the revolutionary class front as well. The stronger the revolutionary class front, the more energetic and malicious the struggle of the reformers against it. In consequence of this we included a new article under point 21 that especially emphasizes the

necessity for struggle for unity and against the active schismatic policies carried on by the reformists and the reformist-allied democrats.

This article reads thus:

"At the given moment this widely practised politics of class schism on the part of the reformist leaders, who according to the dictates of the bourgeoisie, exclude the better revolutionary elements from proletarian mass organizations, is an integral constituent part of their politics of cooperation with the bourgeoisie with the purpose from the very beginning of exploding the internal unity of the proletarian fighting ranks and, by this, **weakening** their resistance to the attacks of capitalism. This policy is one of the necessary kernels of all social-imperialistic politics (the politics of armament, their anti-Soviet politics and plunderous policies in the colonies)."

This article has extraordinarily important significance for present and future tasks of all the Sections of Communist International in the world: In consequence of the attacks of the reformists and reformist union bureaucracy, we are obliged to change our method of struggle against them and begin a more intensive struggle against the activity of the reformists directed towards class schism. We must define our tactics in such a way as to oppose a struggle of the masses for class unity to the reformist politics of splitting up the most important mass, non-party organizations (unions, cooperatives, culture and sports organizations).

With the growth of influence of the Communists, with the strengthening

of the revolutionary opposition within these organizations, the danger of schism also grows. The reformists are applying all their forces to hinder the conquest of these organizations by the revolutionary opposition and their transformation, in the same way, into organizations of the revolutionary class struggle. The article relating to fascism takes on a special significance in this section. In the original draft, fascism was spoken of primarily in connection with Italy and Poland. But the fascist problem as a whole, the entire development of fascism with its particular forms in different countries, has not been studied in sufficient detail. The following ideas are developed in the paragraph we have changed: first, that the general fascist methods are directed towards the corruption of the masses and the destruction of workers' organizations and organizations of the poorest peasantry; secondly, that the Congress recognize the presence in almost all countries of fascist tendencies and the embryo of social-democratic parties and reformist union bureaucracy. There are series of comrades at the Congress who would like to divide mechanically, one from the other, both methods made use of by the bourgeoisie in the struggle with the working class. But especially when the revolutionary class front is growing, when the contradictions of capitalism are increasing, then the means represented by bourgeois democracy are insufficient for the bourgeoisie and its minions. Then it must apply other, more severe methods to enslave the working class. This amendment reads:

"There are fascist tendencies and the embryos of fascist movements in more or less open view almost everywhere now. The ideology of social-democracy, the ideology of class cooperation, coincides with fascism on many points. Fascist methods, applied in the struggle with revolutionary movements exist in embryo in

the practise of many social-democratic parties and in the practises of reformist union bureaucray."

The Political Commission includes this idea, because we think that there are functionaries in even the largest Sections who still do not see this new form of development, and because the Congress has required us to pay attention to the development of such phenomena. Then these methods, that the bourgeoisie will be forced to resort to in the struggle with the class-conscious proletariat with the growth of revolutionary war, will not catch us unawares.

I have already said that in the fifth section, entitled, "Colonial Countries and the Chinese Revolution," that we have found it impossible to include a section on the Arab East. This was hindered not only by practical considerations (I have already introduced these): we also proceeded from the fact that precisely in this section it is necessary to emphasize what is most essential in the contemporary international situation in connection with the development of world revolution. Some comrades will, perhaps, be displeased; but we think that the Colonial Commission agrees with the practical considerations of the Political Commission and, perhaps, will include such a section in the theses on the colonial question. In the fifth section the topic is China, India and South America. Here it is apparent that China, and especially India, where recently the struggle is again growing, have a great significance for the work and tasks of Comintern.

The sixth section, entitled, "The Tactical Orientation and Basic Tasks of Comintern," was reedited and primarily the paragraph on union work was corrected. The significance of this paragraph is emphasized especially by

the fact that the greatest quantity of amendments from all delegations was introduced here. We have used basically all these amendments and, especially, those on the question of new methods and tasks in the field of strike strategy and tactics, on the question of our methods in relation to reformist politics of exclusion and the question of mass struggle for class unity, not just national but on the international scale. We have given consideration not so much to the general task, as to the topical, new methods and tasks that we will have to implement and fulfill in our union work.

All Sections wanted to include the majority of their own amendments in the seventh and final section, entitled, "The Results of Work, Achievements, Mistakes and Tasks of the Individual Sections." Of course, because many Commissions, as for example the Polish and Czechoslovak, still had not finished their work, it was not possible for us to change this section, since the delegations of these Sections might need and desire it.

But, the Political Commission was obliged by virtue of the relation of the Congress to these problems and to their discussion in the various commissions to change several sections concerning the internal life and position of the individual Sections in order to add to the theses that political and intra-party face that has found its expression in the work of the individual commissions. Proceeding from this, we included several changes in the last section. Above all, new paragraphs on the Balkan and Scandinavian countries were introduced. It is not necessary to say much on the significance of these two groups. The significance of our Sections in the Balkan countries is understood by everyone, in connection with the growing danger of war and with the military preparations of the imperialists against the Soviet Union. The recent comparatively strong strikes in the Scandinavian

countries and the union among the Finnish, Norwegian and Russian union organizations also have their own significance for the present situation.

We have again surveyed those parts of the theses where the subject is the individual Sections and have included new articles concerning the French and Italian Sections. In the article about the Italian Section and the situation in that Section, it was particularly emphasized that the Parties have not succeeded in time--deduced from the general development of fascism--in resorting to new methods and effecting a rearrangement of their organizational work in relation to the fascist regime. Therefore, the Italian Section, in its further development, must look more vigilantly to its own problems and, simultaneously, intensify and sharpen its work and methods in relation to fascism.

In the article on the French Section it was especially emphasized that the chief danger in the Party is now the primary danger. The decree of the IX plenum stated that weakness and discord had appeared in the electoral struggle. Therefore, it is essential to realize, on the basis of new tactics, an intensification of work by means of deepened party discussions useful for the Party. In addition, the Party must intensify its struggle against rightist leanings and in line with this, against the "leftist" tendencies that have appeared especially in the Paris organization.

As for the article on China, several amendments have also been introduced to it. They are, on the one hand, connected with an evaluation of the past, and on the other, have significance for evaluation of future development. The Chinese delegation to the Political Commission was of the opinion that the most important future task is the mobilization of the masses; that,

consequently, it is necessary to intensify mass work and to pay attention to these tasks in light of the current development of the revolution. In addition, we have composed several new formulations, precisely on the question of evaluation of errors committed by the leadership of the Chinese Party.

Such are the most important changes that the Political Commission proposes to the Congress. I would like to note that the significance of the theses is clear to each of us. These theses are the directives for our work, the directives for a broad complex of tasks: for our declarations against the preparations of the imperialists for war; for revolutionary work in the colonies; for the defense of the Soviet Union; for those major new tasks before us in Latin America; for the creation of mass organizations and for the fulfillment of tasks whose significance even we and many of the delegates have, perhaps, not yet realized.

I submit that the theses create an exceptionally favorable basis for work, with the facility to isolate and concretize our tasks in individual countries and continents. With genuine Bolshevik clarity in the expression of the problem, with unwavering, relentless struggle against reformism, we have resolved the tasks before us in the revolutionary spirit, in the spirit of Leninism.

Proceeding from this, the Political Commission proposes that the draft of the Russian delegation together with the additional suggestions and amendments be adopted. (Applause.)

Chairman. Let us turn to a vote on the political theses based on the draft of the Russian delegation with changes, introduced by Comrade Telman in the name of the Political Commission. Let us vote on the theses as a

whole. Who is for? Who is against? Who abstains? The these are adopted unanimously.

Comrade Johnston asks for the floor in the name of the American Commission to make a statement, and in the name of the Central Committee of the Yorkers' Party Comrade Lovston. I give the floor to Comrade Johnston. I stipulate that no more than three minutes is granted for each statement.

Johnston (U.S.A.). The minority from the Communist Party delegation from the United States agrees with the theses of Comrade Buxarin and votes for them, but notes its disagreement with paragraph 52, devoted to the United States, on the following considerations:

a) the section does not sufficiently emphasize the growing contradictions before American imperialism that are magnifying the radicalization of the masses and increasing the perspectives for mass struggle; it does not sufficiently emphasize the inability of the majority of the Central Committee to see these new phenomena and select the policies relevant to them.

This section does not condemn the majority of the Central Committee for its persistent attempts to free our Party from the implementation of the basic line of Comintern policy (Pepper, Lovston, etc.);

b) this section does not reject clearly enough the rightist line of the majority leadership that is systematically exaggerating the difficulties and understating the possibilities for struggle;

c) this section does not condemn distinctly enough the opposition of the majority leadership to the decisions of the IV Congress of Unions' International, in particular, on the question of organization of the unorganized unions.

The serious, opportunist mistakes made by the Central Committee in its work among the Negroes has not been condemned. The neglect of this important work has undergone insufficient criticism for almost two and a half years;

d) this section does not condemn the extreme right wing of the garment workers' union and in the cooperatives and does not stipulate any measures for the reorganization of Party leadership in these two important fields of work;

e) this section does not set straight the mistaken line of the Central Committee in the field of anti-imperialist work (the United States, in its role as England's accomplice, the support of Japan and China, etc. by the United States);

f) this section does not sufficiently clearly point out that the main danger in our Party comes from the right and that it is necessary to mobilize the Party for struggle with the rightist danger. We suggest that it would have been more correct to formulate a thesis concerning the Workers' Party in such a way: "The slogan on the creation of a Workers' Party is no longer a slogan for agitational or organizational campaign, but in this period must be used only as propaganda;"

g) we state that we welcome the proposal contained in the corrected theses that we should intensify the recruitment of workers into our Party and make a decisive shift to the idea of promoting the worker elements to leadership posts in our Party. We acknowledge and have begun to correct the mistakes we have made and will continue to do so.

At the same time we will continue to insist on the necessity of further turns to the left of our Party's politics in full agreement with the

Comintern line.

Lovston (U.S.A.). In the name of the Central Committee of the Yorkers' Party and by instruction of our delegation I declare our complete unity and deep approval of the political theses introduced by the Russian delegation. Concerning ourselves, in our opinion, the theses note, primarily, the successes of our Party, precisely: 1) in the demonstration of great revolutionary activity; 2) in making use of the crisis of American politics; 3) in that the party has steadfastly led a series of obstinate and fierce class battles (the miners' strike); 4) in the campaign against punishment of Sacco and Vanzetti, who were leaders of the Party; 5) in the weakening of the long-lived factional struggle; 6) the Central Committee conducted the correct politics on the Labor Party question. Finally, we note our concurrence with the evaluation of the economic situation and the development of American imperialism, given in the Central Committee. We emphasize that we entirely agree with the theses and in their criticism of the following mistakes of our Party:

1) not enough energy in the matter of organizing the unorganized; 2) a lack of work among the Negroes; 3) a weak struggle against the expansion of American imperialism in Latin America; 4) rightist mistakes in relation to the Socialist Party which, as it is clear, can be carried on only at the expense of majority leadership.

The section of the theses devoted to America assumes that the opposition's accusations of rightist leadership in the American Party are dismissed. The theses reject the opposition's accusations that the American Communist Party conducts rightist politics. The resolutions speak of the mistakes made by comrades belonging to various groups, but these mistakes are not the line.

The opposition accuses the Central Committee of suppressing the masses, but the theses answer this accusation, pointing out that the Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee, was the steadfast leader of fierce class battles. The opposition puts forth the demand that the Congress send an open letter to our Party with the proposal to change the leadership, the base of which, in the course of four years, has been the Rutenberg group. It sees Foster's group as a trade-unionist group with opportunist leanings.

The theses correctly state that we must destroy the system of two groups in the American Party. We must put an end to factional struggle. We agree with this entirely, but to do this we need primarily two pre-conditions. First, the Central Committee must act in the capacity of a central committee and not as a group. This condition is already being implemented and will continue. Secondly, the minority must subordinate themselves to the majority. We hope, that after this Congress, the minority will do this. The present international situation and the situation of American imperialism imperatively demand that we should destroy the system of two groups and have a single policy.

Under present conditions of the strengthening of imperialism, the rightist danger is the greatest; we promise to struggle more energetically with it and for this we must have a unified party. Therefore, it is necessary to carry on the communist line and emphasize the need for struggle for the destruction of factionalism. We state that the opposition must adopt this section of the theses on the subjection of the minority to the majority without any reservations. In the name of the Central Committee we promise to continue to act loyally in the capacity of central committee. We promise to struggle energetically with opportunism, more than ever before; we promise to

strengthen the proletarian elements in the leadership of the Party and to work for the unification of the unorganized, to intensify our activity among Negroes and to struggle with the imperialism of the United States in Latin America. We will not permit the opposition to provoke us and will continue our present line on the unification of the Party. We consider that the theses and work of the VI Congress marks the beginning of a new period for our Party, promising faster development and more favorable conditions for the existence of a single Bolshevik Party in the United States.

Chairman. Let us turn to a discussion of the resolution on the International Committee for Workers' Assistance (MOPR). Comrade Remmele has the floor.

Remmele. During the work of the Congress a special commission consisting of delegates from all Parties was organized for the discussion of the question of the activity of the International Committee for Workers' Assistance. The result of the work of the commission has found its expression in the resolution already surveyed by the Senior-convention. Now we present this resolution to the Congress for adoption.¹

Chairman. Does any one wish to speak? There is no one desirous. I put the resolution to a vote. It is adopted unanimously.

(The session is closed.)

1. See the VI issue of the stenographic account, "Theses, Resolutions, etc."

46th Session

1 September, 1928

Report of the Program Commission (Comrade Buxarin). Report of the Colonial Commission (Comrade Koo Sin Yen). Report of the Commission on the Elaboration of the Resolution on the Reports of the USSR and the VKP(B). Resolutions on the Reports. Decree on Appeals. Acceptance of New Parties into Comintern. Resolutions on the Implementation of the International Campaign against War. Elections of the Executive Committee and the International Control Commission.

The Close of Congress.

Chairman Comrade Remmele.

Buxarin. Comrades, in the General Program Commission, we had a basic, over-all discussion. Eleven plenary sessions of the Program Commission met. In my own concluding speech at the plenum of the Congress I have already reported both on the work of the General Program Commission and on the discussions that occurred in its sessions on the most debated questions. Besides this General Commission, the Narrowed Commission worked for another whole week. The fact is that many various additions, critical notes, concrete proposals and amendments were added to the draft. The critical notes and amendments numbered more than 600. Thus, before the Narrowed Commission stood the rather difficult task of conducting a second critical evaluation of all these amendments in order to adopt some of them, to decline others and to rework many for inclusion in the text of the Program. After a week of work, I made the report of the Narrowed Commission to the plenum of the General Commission; again discussion developed. The work of the Narrowed Commission was approved, but new proposals were introduced. Therefore, after the session of the

General Program Commission , we had to do a little more work. In the process of this work we stated that, besides examining the great number of concrete proposals from different sides, we must fulfill still another task: Reading the draft of the Program as a whole revealed a series of defects, in significant measure stylistic; and we had to eliminate these defects and thus correct the text. I think that it is entirely impossible to report to you here all the amendments, every type of regrouping and the minor stylistic changes included in the Program draft. The new text of the draft has been distributed to all comrades and I proceed upon the conviction that all the comrades have read this text, and not only read, but critically thought it over. I will pause, here, on just a few more essential changes in the Draft of the Program.

First of all, we adopted a completely new article that has been included in the division on the course of capitalist development. The division characterizes the various changes in the general mode of life, in social relations arising on the base of capitalist structure and changes in such fields as that of family relations, culture and so on. The corresponding proposal was introduced by Comrade Clara Tsetkin and a few other comrades. Therefore, according to the wish expressed by Comrade Tsetkin and our International Women's Organization, we have added correspondingly to our draft of the Program. In the discussion at the General Program Commission and the plenum of the Congress it was observed that there is an omission in the Program draft, precisely, in the part concerning the evolution of the existing bourgeois rule. This was a defect in our Program draft and therefore in connection, in part, with the analysis of the fascist movement and the fascist regime, we have had to include in the draft a rather voluminous article de-

voted to the evolution of the governmental power under conditions of monopolistic capital and the crisis of capitalist construction. Then, rather major work was done in connection with the article that was devoted to the process of development of world revolution and an article treating social-democracy.

A whole series of comrades changed their original opinion here. When we were discussing these questions in the Narrowed Commission, the majority declared themselves for the elimination from the Program draft of a segment containing the historical characteristics of different stages of the world revolutionary process and of the treachery committed by the Social Democratic Party. They wanted to replace these segments--especially on the second question--with others giving not a historical description, but a systematic characterization. Since this point of view was asserted by the majority in the Narrowed Commission, we adopted the relevant resolution. (I myself was here, among the minority.) But after my first report, in the debates of the General Program Commission where all the comrades had a chance to speak their opinion on this question freely, the former point of view won out again, and the General Program Commission decided to restore to the text the segment devoted to the characteristics of the world revolutionary process and of the treachery of social-democracy. However, according to all the dialectical rules, this was not a simple repetition of the former, but, so to speak, an "enhanced" repetition. Since the General Program Commission decided not to recognize the new "systematic" text, it was accepted in another place at the beginning of the sixth chapter, where the subject is the various currents in the workers' movement and where the characteristics of various types of social-reformism are given; but where there was no general systematic state-

ment of reformist theory. In this way we resolved the problem. In its entirety, we have the old text with the characteristics of social-democratic treachery in its former place and a more systematic statement at the beginning of the sixth chapter. This is the third series of essential questions on changes in our draft.

The fourth question is the problem of fascism. All comrades recall how animatedly this question was discussed at the plenum of the General Program Commission. A series of proposals were introduced. At first there was rather a lot of disagreement on this question. But we have succeeded in coming to a single conclusion and this conclusion is stated in the Program draft --in the article devoted to fascism.

I will not speak here on the questions themselves, since I have already reported on this to the plenum of the Congress.

The fifth series of questions, where there were rather major additions, are questions on the more contemporary forms of capitalist construction, the forms of capitalist organization and contemporary trusts and the question of rationalization and its consequences, etc. Our draft of the program had transgressed in that these burning questions were not allotted enough space. We have corrected this defect: we have formulated the relevant articles and included them in the proper places.

Major changes, entirely major changes, I would say, have been introduced into the text of the fourth chapter, where the subject is the transitional period. As is known to all the comrades, this chapter gives the characteristics of the general lines of the transitional period, on the one hand, and on the other, contains a whole series of sub-divisions with a short state-

ment of the needs of the proletarian dictatorship and its tasks. In this part of the Program draft there are not only additions and changes, but also two new sections: a section on labor protection and questions connected with this; and a section devoted to the national and colonial questions, and a series of other additions of similar character. In the debates of the General Program Commission, we heard no objections on this.

The seventh series of changes is devoted to the colonial question. In this relation our draft limps: we have not mentioned the different kinds of colonies concretely. We had in mind almost exclusively the kind of colonies where the building of capitalism exists in more or less open view. The problems of the hegemony of the proletariat and the relations between the proletariat and the peasants--all these burning issues are in our draft. But, there is almost not a single word there about the colonies, where the economic development is still, to a significant degree, on a pre-capitalist basis, where the native population still has a tribal social and economic way of life. It was necessary to fill in this gap and we have fulfilled this task. Speaking here to the question, we must announce that we have proposed, here, the slogan of "people's soviets" or peasants' soviets and coordinated all other questions with this position.

In the sixth chapter there are also rather major changes. Not touching upon the stylistic side, I must note that new ideas have been incorporated here by us. There are articles devoted to the confessional movements among the working class--Catholicism, Protestantism, and so on. At the beginning of the chapter we gave a differential analysis of various social phenomena, of movements in the ranks of the proletariat hostile to us--the influence of large-scale bourgeoisie on the proletariat, on the one hand, and the ideo-

logical influence of the petty bourgeoisie and various other layers, such as the lumpen-proletariat, the intellectual déclassé Bohemians, etc., on the other hand.

In analyzing the various aspects of reformism, we have devoted space to cooperative socialism that was not in the earlier draft. This change was introduced on the initiative of the workers of the cooperative movement, on the one hand, and on the other, by representatives of a series of delegations.

In the new text a special point has been made, devoted to Austromarxism and the characteristics of this ideological current in social-democratic reformism. But, in this chapter in general, individual articles have been regrouped and in the conclusion, as at the beginning of the draft of the Program, the ideas of the unity of the proletariat has been moved to the primary position. We introduced these changes in the first stage of our work, that is, before discussing them in the General Program Commission. In the second stage of work in the Narrowed Commission, in part as a result of discussions in the General Commission, it has become clear that after all we have done, there are still a series of defects in the Program draft. For example, after a series of changes made in chapter four, where we coordinated the systematic part better with the question of our needs, it turned out that articles about higher education, specialists from the ranks of the proletariat and various cultural tasks of the proletariat rush into the structure of the Program draft like deus ex machina. It is not difficult to understand, how this happened. The original statement had a more historical character; in the process of systematization it turned out that from the point of view of architectonics, the formulations all began to sag. This made it necessary for us to reformulate major articles and remove them to the relevant place. Now

there is a special division on the cultural revolution and its bases, on the tasks of the proletariat in the period of cultural revolutionary transformation. We have illuminated the tasks of the proletariat concerning work within the popular masses, that is, using Marx's words, the problem "of making people people." This is a completely new section in the Program draft. Earlier, in the first stage of work in the Narrowed Commission, several comrades pointed out that in spite of the presence of special articles in our Program devoted to Sun Yat-senism and Gandhism, the orientation was too "European." Several comrades dwelled especially on so-called Garvey-ism that has a certain influence among Negroes in the United States. We put this question to the General Program Commission and the majority of comrades voted for the inclusion of a corresponding article. In connection with this decision we formulated the relevant article. The last chapter on strategy and tactics came out a little unsystematically in the second part, where the subject is the strategy and tactics of Comintern itself. In part a consequence of the comrades' general fatigue, the concluding part of the draft turned out to be somewhat unsystematized. Therefore, we had once more to survey all six chapters of the text, here to eliminate something, or to make some problems more prominent, and to bring order to the material. As to what degree we have succeeded in this--let the plenum of Congress judge.

Such, on the whole, are the most important changes that we propose to the plenum of Congress. There is no doubt that after the rather difficult work we have done, the draft of the Program is significantly improved. Of this you can be assured by careful comparison of the two texts. The greater portion of the text of the Program has been either composed anew or so reworked that probably only 40% of the old text remains unchanged. In my view,

this is due to the fact that in the Congress and in the Program Commission the work done by us was truly collective. We collectively discussed not only all the essential questions, but all the secondary problems, at first in the General Commission and then in the Narrowed Commission.

Of course, it is not especially agreeable that this work has been somewhat protracted. The Congress of the II International, for example, only lasted for a couple of days. In as much as the question on the program was put forward by us, we had to perform the relevant work carefully, and this requires time. We held up almost every word for examination; we critically analyzed almost every idea and discussed nearly every proposal. From what was proposed we adopted all that was sound, reasonable and useful and as a result of this authentic-collective work we now have a Program draft that is much better than the former one. This by no means signifies that the present draft of the program is irreproachable and absolutely ideal, but relatively speaking, I and the majority of comrades present here are sure that this Program draft can be adopted. Now we will disperse to our homes... We go our own ways, but no longer without a Program. We will now have a Program. This document will undoubtedly have great worldwide historical significance. It is easy to find in this justification for the fact that our work was somewhat protracted.

In the name of the Program Commission I ask the plenum of the Congress to adopt the Program of the Communist International.

(Thunderous applause, turning into an ovation. The delegates stand and sing "The Internationale".)

Chairman: The draft of the program which awaits adoption has been dis-

cussed in the course of many days in the Program Commission and in the plenum of the Congress. Therefore, it remains only to vote. If there is to be discussion, then only in the form of short statements. Does anyone wish to make a statement? No. Let us vote.

(The Program is adopted unanimously with the sounds of "The Internationale" in the background.)

Chairman: The floor passes to Com. Koo Sin Yen for a report on the Colonial Commission.

Koo Sin Yen: My task is to give only a very brief report on the most important changes and additions that the Commission has introduced to the original edition of the theses: the Commission, consisting of representatives from almost all of the more important parties of the colonial countries, has indeed done a major job. Thanks to this work the draft of the theses, as it seems to me, has been significantly improved; but, unfortunately, it has also greatly expanded. We have been unable, to date, to finish the work of abbreviating it.

The most important additions introduced by the Commission are the following:

The Commission added to the first chapter more detailed statistics relating to the important events of the Chinese Revolution and the important events of the revolutionary movements in India, Indonesia, etc. This was necessary because the original draft suffered somewhat from a lack of connection with a concrete historical base; it was, so to speak, inclined to the theoretical side. Now we have attempted to eliminate this deficit. This has

been realized to some degree in consequence of the fact that we decided to reject the grouping of countries by various types. This was done in part, because we do not have enough information about the various colonies.

We have now concretized that part of the theses in which, in the original draft, tactical questions were put in a generalized form: now this part of the theses encompasses only one group of colonial countries, that is, China, India, Egypt, Indonesia, e.g. the most important countries. The statement, it seems to me, has gained much by the concretization.

As for the second chapter, the Commission did not agree with the basic line of the draft relating to the essence of imperialist colonial policies. We made many additions in order to state the question more clearly. We considered the export of capital to the colonies in more detail and made it clear that the export of capital to the colonies hastens their capitalist development, but, at the same time the enslavement of the colonies to finance capital increases more and more.

In addition we have introduced clarity also in that we have definitely pointed out the difference in situations of the individual dominions, especially in such colonies and semi-colonies as the South-African Dominion. There are indeed very many problems. In a sense, the role of the export of capital, even the very essence of capitalist colonial policy is completely different for these countries. The export of capital to the dominions has a direct influence on their industrialization. Here, the difference between a colonial regime in the direct sense of this word and the colonial system as it appears in India and in China, e.g. the purely colonial countries, must be especially sharply emphasized. I have already said that the part of the

theses concerning the role of the national bourgeoisie and the various stages of the revolution, e.g. of the period that sets in after the seizure of power by the proletariat and the peasants - that this part is concretely timed for China, India, Egypt etc. An attempt to formulate certain tactical questions more concretely was also made. With this, the tactical line was completely adopted by the Commission in the form that it had in its original draft. However, everything was presented more clearly and derives from the two stages that now, for example, appear in the Indian revolutionary movement on the one hand, and in the Chinese on the other. These are, so to speak, two different degrees of development of the revolutionary movement. Of course we in the commission in no way kept those changes that have been effected by the Indian and, all the more, by the Chinese bourgeoisie a secret. We have worded everything so that there would be no room for any confusion.

Further, we have added much to the chapter on the most pressing tasks of the Parties in the colonial countries. This has been done not only in a general form, but in conformity with the individual countries. We have included points on the tasks of our Communist Parties, especially in China, in India and in the Negro colonies. We have included a special part on the Negro question as it is, on the whole, now in the United States, and paused on the tasks before our Parties in the Latin-American countries, in Egypt, etc. Thanks to this concentration, although it may have been possible to do it in a very brief form, I think the theses have gained a great deal.

We have also introduced various additions relating to the role of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, striving, even here, for greater concreteness.

As far as I can recall, this concludes the most important changes and additions introduced into the theses. As I have said, the fundamental, basic line of the Commission was not changed. During the discussion, as the comrades probably remember, the disputed questions were very fiercely discussed. I think that precisely this kind of sharpness in the posing of questions was of much use to us because thanks to this we succeeded in expressing more definitely in the theses a whole series of questions that were earlier given one-sided or incomplete formulation, or were, in general, not sufficiently clear. It is entirely natural that during the discussion we did not manage without a series of fierce, and sometimes one-sided accusations. But it seems to me that after the unanimous adoption of the resolutions of the Commission, there will be no trace of these accusations.

I must especially emphasize that in my concluding words I express a rather one-sided view of the development of the English Communist Party in relation to the new line. I take full account of the fact that the English Communist Party is making great efforts to assimilate the new line. On the example, of the last additional elections we were convinced that the Party was succeeding. In addition, I did not have it at all in mind to say that the English Party was not evolving towards Bolshevism. If one recalls the work done by the English Party in the workers' movement, then it would be completely one-sided to affirm that the English Party is not able to serve as an example for the other Parties. I personally have always been of the opinion that for all capitalist countries the English Party is certainly able, in this sphere, to be the model for communist work. This says not a little; on the contrary, it says much. With a clear conscience, I can extend my hand to the representatives of the English Party and acknowledge that they have many achievements.

But, the obligation to move in the future in the same direction lies upon them.

I have essentially nothing more to add to what I have said earlier. I wish only to emphasize once more the significance of the subjective factor, the building of our Parties in the colonies. The existing weakness in the work of building the Party in these countries must be eliminated in the course of the next few years. The responsibility for the implementation of this task falls on the new Executive Committee of Comintern. At the next Congress we must have powerful Communist Parties not only in China, but in India and other important countries. Without the solution of this problem we will not be able to move forward. No resolutions, even the most wonderful, will help if we do not succeed in organizing strong parties in the colonial countries in the next few years.

I wish to direct the attention of the comrades to the fact that, for example the French Party, in my opinion, is carrying out its work in this field in the best possible manner, but has made a mistake. The Parties in Tunis and Algiers are not independent parties, but Sections of the French Communist Party. This, comrades, must not continue. Lenin's point of the necessity of overcoming the mistrust of native workers, even if of a revolutionary frame of mind, shows us that, in this sense, it is correct to be very careful and grant complete independence to the Parties of colonial countries. The comrades from capitalist countries are, of course, obliged to help the comrades from colonial countries with their advice and work in the building of the colonial parties, in the struggle against imperialism and the bourgeoisie in the colonies; but they must grant these Parties political independence.

It seems to me that the French Communist Party should introduce this corrective in the realization of its wonderful work in this direction in Algiers, Tunis and Morocco.

In this way we develop our Parties in the colonial countries. This major question was before our Commission during the elaboration of the draft of the theses. It is the question nearest and most important to the practical work of the Executive Committee of Comintern for the future. There are points in our theses that the comrades must examine, first of all, from the viewpoint of the task of building our Parties. From this viewpoint, we firmly stress the need for unmasking the national-reformist bourgeoisie in the colonies and the problem of correct direction in the struggle to unmask the bourgeoisie to free the working masses from the influence of national-reformism.

After this brief explanation I ask, comrades, that you adopt the theses.

Chairman. Let us turn to a vote on the colonial theses.¹ No one asks for the floor to make a statement. Therefore, the Congress may apply the same method of action as for the first point and turn to a vote. Who is for? Who is against? Who abstains? I declare the unanimous adoption of the theses on the colonial question. Let us turn to the resolution on the reports on the position of the USSR and the VKP(B). Comrade Telman has the floor.

Telman. We of the Commission on the Question of the USSR are of this point of view: the point of view of the Congress on the reports of Comrades Varga and Manuilsky has already been clearly expressed in the plenary sessions in connection with the declarations made by the Sections. Therefore,

1. See VI issue of the stenographic account, "Theses, Resolutions, Decrees."

we originally assumed that these declarations were enough to define our relation to the situation within the Soviet Union and the task of the VKP(B). We began from the point that the most important statements had already been made in these declarations. In the end, we all decided, since a final vote had not been taken at the plenum, to sum up in one general document all the important ideas and proposals contained in the individual declarations and propose it to the Congress so that such a resolution could be voted on here.

The Commission proposes the following resolution on the reports on the situation in the USSR and the VKP(B).

(The resolution is read.)¹

Chairman. Does anyone wish to speak? No one does. Let us move on to the vote. I state that adoption is unanimous. Let us move on to proposals on appeals. Comrade Kolarov has the floor.

Comrade Kolarov announces draft decrees on the following appeals:

On the case of Trotsky, Sapronov, et al.

On the Maslov case - Ruth Fischer.

On the case of Syuzanna Zhiro [as transliterated], et al.

On the case of the Vaynkop [as transliterated] group.

As Comrade Korolov announces the decrees they are put to a vote and accepted unanimously².

1. See VI issue of the stenographic account, "Theses, Resolutions, Decrees."

2. For texts of decrees, see 6th edition of stenographic record, "Theses, Resolutions, Decrees".

Next, Comrade Kolarov announces the proposal of transferring the appeal of the Vasil"kiv-Turyanskiy group and of others who were excluded from the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine for consideration by the new Comintern Executive Committee.¹ This Proposal is adopted.

Chairman. Let us move on to a consideration of the requests of a number of parties and organizations concerning their acceptance around the sections of the Comintern. Comrade Ember-Dro [as transliterated] has the floor for the appropriate report.

Ember-Dro. The Brussels Congress of the II International ended with the protest of comrades invited to this Congress who were representatives of colonial and semicolonial countries. Our Congress is to end with the inclusion of seven new sections of colonial and semicolonial countries: these sections request that they be included as part of the Communist International.

Between the 5th and 6th World Congresses the communist parties of Cuba and Korea and the Irish Workers' League appealed to the Executive Committee of the Communist International and to its Presidium with the request for their preliminary inclusion as part of the Communist International. At the 6th World Congress four new parties raised the question of their acceptance the Communist Parties of New Zealand and Paraguay, the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Columbia, and the Socialist

1. See the decree of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, adopted on 26 September 1928 and published in "Pravda" No. 227, 29 September 1928.

Party of Ecuador.

The Korean Communist Party was founded in 1925. In March 1926 it was provisionally included in the International by the Presidium, in which regard it was to gather together, group, and organize all communist forces in Korea.

In Cuba, the communist group which had existed for a number of years already was formed into a Communist Party. It took an active part in organizing the worker movement, worked actively on uniting the syndicalist movement and, by its revolutionary actions, caused repressions on the part of the Cuban government which was supported by North American imperialism. By decision of the 8th Plenum of the Executive Committee, the Communist Party of Cuba was provisionally accepted as a member of the Communist International.

In Ireland, at one time, we had the ephemeral existence of a small communist group. At the 8th Plenum the Executive Committee was to make a statement concerning the existence and further development of the Workers League of Ireland, trying to form a Communist Party. The 8th Plenum of the Executive Committee decreed the recognition of the Workers' League of Ireland as the only section of the Communist International in Ireland; the Plenum charged it with forming into a Communist Party as rapidly as possible.

In New Zealand, for many years the communist organization was part of the Communist Party of Australia. But this communist organization itself developed into an independent

party. Now, it is placing before the World Congress the question of its recognition as a section of the Communist International independent of the Australian Communist Party.

A communist group has existed in Paraguay since 1922; it increased, developed, and acquired influence among the working class and among the peasantry: several months ago it was transformed into a Communist Party and now is requesting membership in the Communist International. This communist party is still weak ideologically and organizationally. It is also requesting that the Communist Party assist in its further development.

In Columbia, the workers' movement which later, after a number of workers' congresses, became united, developed in recent years, initially on the initiative of the American Federation of Labor and the Columbian government. At the beginning, these workers' congresses were completely under the influence of the Columbian government. But in 1926, at the III Congress of Workers of Columbia, the communist fraction carried along a considerable majority, the overwhelming majority of the members of the Congress of Workers. The creation of a Revolutionary-Socialist Party was decreed. This Revolutionary-Socialist Party, which embraces the entire trade union movement and which is based on the collective entry of the trade unions and on the organization of the best fighters of the trade union movement, unanimously resolved at its II Congress in 1927 to join the Communist International. By the

end of 1927 the Revolutionary-Socialist Party of Columbia had two daily newspapers, and 10 weeklies. The entire working class and the organized trade union movement of Columbia were under its influence. Because of the growth in the revolutionary influence of the party, the government was forced to resort to measures of exclusion and issue exceptional laws in order to place the entire movement outside the law and frustrate communist propaganda in Columbia.

The situation in Ecuador is similar to some degree. The Socialist Party of Ecuador was founded in 1925; a communist group which tried to win the party over to the side of the Communist International actively worked in it. This party was organized precisely in the same manner on the basis of the collective membership of professional organizations and individual entry of the most active fighters of the workers' movement. The party has behind it the masses workers and a considerable part of the peasant movement. At its I Congress in May 1926, the Party unanimously declared itself in favor of joining the Communist International.. This decree was affirmed in the fall of 1928 by means of a referendum in all provincial organizations of the Party.

Both Parties, after they had voted to join the Communist International, were accepted as sympathizing Sections. Now, here at this Congress represented by their own delegates they ask for final acceptance into the membership of Comintern.

The Senior-congress, having examined the requests of the new Parties, proposes the following resolution to Congress for its adoption. (The resolution is read).

Chairman. Let us turn to a discussion of the report and resolution on the acceptance of new Sections into the membership of Comintern. Does anyone wish to make a statement? No. Let us vote. I announce a unanimous acceptance. Comrade Parades has the floor to make a statement.

Parades (Equador). In the name of the delegations from the South-American Parties accepted into the membership of Comintern, I express their deepest satisfaction. The delegates give their sworn promise that the new Parties will steadfastly struggle shoulder to shoulder with the entire international proletariat. The Parties of Equador and Colombia will apply all their forces, following the leadership of Comintern, to go forward on the path to Bolshevism, mass struggle and preparation for the proletarian revolution.

Chairman. Let us now turn to an examination of the proposal for the implementation of an international campaign against war. Comrade Bell has the floor.

Bell (Great Britain). The question of war has been at the center of all our discussions at this Congress. It occupied a prominent place both in the discussion of questions on the international situation and of that within the Parties and in the discussion of the question of the Program. In our theses on the struggle with the danger of war, we noted the practical lines of our work for the realization of the struggle against imperialist war and in defense of the USSR and colonial countries.

In my concluding speech I have already recalled that during our Congress, the Congress of the II International was also going on, the course of which demonstrated that the leadership of the International goes hand in hand with the imperialists. Further, staged by the imperialists and surrounded by all

kinds of ceremony, there took place the adoption of the notorious Kellogg Pact, concerning the outlawing of war.

In the face of these circumstances we have a situation in which the imperialists together with their underlings from the II International are consolidating their ranks in preparation for a new war against the USSR.

During our discussion of the theses in the Congress, the circumstance was emphasized that many of our Parties have begun work against the danger of war in an entirely feeble way. I am convinced that our Congress will put an end to the indifference shown by many of our Parties and that we will leave this Congress with firm resolve to do the maximum in our own countries and in the international arena to prepare the proletariat for the defense of the proletarian revolution from imperialism, for the struggle with imperialist war, in preparation for the armed rebellion of the proletariat and world revolution. On this consideration, taking into account the necessity to drive for the practical implementation of our international campaign of struggle against the danger of war, the Presidium introduces the following decree for the affirmation of Congress:

(The draft of the decree is read.)

Chairman. Does anyone wish to speak on the proposal introduced by Comrade Bell? No. Let us vote. I declare the proposal adopted unanimously.¹

Now we must elect the Executive Committee and the International Control Commission. I give the floor to Comrade Torez to introduce the proposals.

Torez (France). After careful study of the proposals and considerations

1. See VI issue of the stenographic account, "Theses, Resolutions, Decrees."

of the individual delegations, the Presidium introduces for the discussion of Congress, the following draft for the membership of the new Executive Committee:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Americo Ledo (Brazil) | 30. Musso (Indonesia) |
| 2. Barbé (France) | 31. Pick (Germany) |
| 3. Bell (England) | 32. Popesku (Rumania) |
| 4. Blenkle (Communist Youth
International) | 33. Pruxnyak (Poland) |
| 5. Boshkovich (Yugoslavia) | 34. Pyatnitsky (USSR) |
| 6. Buxarin (USSR) | 35. Remmele (Germany) |
| 7. Vizer (Switzerland) | 36. Rest (Communist Youth
International) |
| 8. Gioldi (Argentina) | 37. Rykov (USSR) |
| 9. Gomez (Uruguay) | 38. Samuelson (Sweden) |
| 10. Gotvald (Czechoslovakia) | 39. Semar (France) |
| 11. Dengel (Germany) | 40. Serra (Italy) |
| 12. Jaquesmot (Belguim) | 41. Sifneos (Greece) |
| 13. Ilek (Czechoslovakia) | 42. Spechtor (Canada) |
| 14. Carillo (Mexico) | 43. Skrypnyk (UkranianSSR) |
| 15. Kato (Japan) | 44. Stalin (USSR) |
| 16. Katayama (Personally) | 45. Telman (Germany) |
| 17. Campbell (England) | 46. Torez (France) |
| 18. Kolarov (Bulgaria) | 47. Ferdi (Turkey) |
| 19. Bela Kuhn (Hungary) | 48. Fermin Araya (Chili) |
| 20. Koo Sin Yen (Personally) | 49. Foster (America) |
| 21. Koplenig (Austria) | 50. Furubotn (Norway) |
| 22. Lensky (Poland) | 51. Xitarov (Communist Youth
International) |
| 23. Lu-Kuang (China) | 52. Hsyang (China) |

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 24. Lovston (USA) | 53. Clara Tsetkin (personally) |
| 25. Lozovsky (USSR) | 54. Tsyui Vito (China) |
| 26. Manner (Finland) | 55. Chaterzhi (India) |
| 27. Manuilsky (USSR) | 56. Chilbum (Sweden) |
| 28. Mitskevich (Latvia, Lith.,
Estonia) | 57. Shmeral (Czech) |
| 29. Molotov (USSR) | 58. Ercoli (Italy) |
| | 59. Ember-Dro (personally) |

Chairman: Does anyone wish to speak on the proposal. No one. I also propose to announce the list of proposed candidates and then vote on the list as a whole.

Torez (France): The following comrades are proposed as candidates:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. Asano (Japan) | 24. Mojrova (USSR) |
| 2. Biyu (Communist Youth
International) | 25. Naorodzhi (India) |
| 3. Boshnich (Yugoslavia) | 26. Pascal (Spain) |
| 4. Varga (personally) | 27. Pollit (England) |
| 5. Verchik (Czechoslovakia) | 28. Furman (Poland) |
| 6. De Visser (Holland) | 29. Rejman (Czechoslovakia) |
| 7. Hansen (Norway) | 30. Riasco Julio (Colombia) |
| 8. Garlandi (Italy) | 31. Silep (Sweden) |
| 9. Hector (Germany) | 32. Sokolik (Poland) |
| 10. Gitlow (USA) | 33. Tegerson (Denmark) |
| 11. Gonner (USSR) | 34. Turni (Italy) |
| 12. Huan-li (Communist Youth
International) | 35. Ulbrecht (Germany) |
| 13. Gusev (USSR) | 36. Frachon (France) |
| | 37. Horner (England) |

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 14. Guiswood (USA) | 38. Chang-Piao (China) |
| 15. Darsano (Indonesia) | 39. Chen-Kyang (China) |
| 16. Dimitrov (Bulgaria) | 40. Shauki (Egypt, Palestine, Syria) |
| 17. Dorneau (France) | 41. Schiller (Germany) |
| 18. Zapototsky (Czech) | 42. Evert (Germany) |
| 19. Cavanna (Australia) | 43. Yaroslavsky (USSR) |
| 20. Lovitsky (Poland) | |
| 21. Lopez (Cuba) | |
| 22. Maloka (South Africa) | |
| 23. Monmusseau (France) | |

Chairman: As there are no other proposals, let us vote, I declare the affirmation unanimous.

Let us now turn to the election of the International Central Commission.
Comrade Torez has the floor.

Torez: The following comrades are proposed for membership of the International Control Commission:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1. Anveldt (Estonia) | 12. Mondak (Czech) |
| 2. Angaretis (Lithuania) | 13. Strola (Finland) |
| 3. Weinstone (USA) | 14. Solts (USSR) |
| 4. Weis (Czechoslovakia) | 15. Stefanescu (Rumania) |
| 5. Gorkich (Communist Youth International) | 16. Stuchka (Latvia) |
| 6. Iskrov (Bulgaria) | 17. Syu Yu En (China) |
| 7. Cachen (France) | 18. Flieg (Germany) |
| 8. Codovilla (Argentina) | 19. Cheng Chen (China) |

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|
| 9. Kon F. (USSR) | 20. Shargi (Persia) |
| 10. Madzhi (Italy) | 21. Eberland (Germany) |
| 11. Murphy (England) | 22. Tsxakaya (USSR) |

Chairman: Are there any other proposals? does anyone wish to speak? No. I put it to a vote. It is adopted unanimously.

Let us now listen to the proposals relating to the manifesto of the VI World Congress to the workers of the world and to the concluding speech of Comrade Buxarin. Comrade Buxarin has the floor.

Buxarin: We have come to the end of the work of the VI Congress of the Comintern. Of course one can say, that was the "Long Parliament" of revolutionary communism. But our work was work that is to the highest degree useful to the further development of revolutionary communism. At the Congress, more, perhaps, than at any other of the previous Congresses of the Communist International, we have a broad review of all of the forces of the international Communist movement. If during the II International, debates at the Congresses usually turned into the statements of the most outstanding leaders from several of the so-called leading, e.g. imperialist, countries, then at our Congress it was the representatives, leaders and champions of the revolutionary proletariat from all countries who came before workers of the whole world. From the largest, most powerful, most rapacious and most "civilized" imperialist countries to the remotest and most forgotten colonies, the people who are only now beginning to enter the historical arena, from the most powerful strongholds of capitalist development to the most out-of-the way corners of our planet have come the representatives of the revolutionary working class and laboring masses at our

Congress. And they all have taken a most animated, lively and active part in the work of our Congress. The questions which were before us in the order of the day were all also questions of an unusual scale, unusual significance, and unusual extent. A single question on the Program of Comintern, whose adoption represents a completely major historical landmark on the oath of the international working class; this one question is already so unusual, so out of the ordinary and at the same time so all-embracing and difficult that for the sake of this one question the Congress of the Communist International could have been called. This question alone, so encompassing in content could successfully take up the work of the entire Congress.

In the history of one movement, surveyed not just from a specific viewpoint as the history of the international revolutionary movement of the working class in general, the adoption of this document undoubtedly constitutes an entire epoch. The adoption of the Program is the law for many, for our many sections and for millions of the proletariat, who travel under our revolutionary banner.

That the Communist International was able, finally, to adopt its international program - it is true, after a very significant preparatory period, true, after a great deal of effort, and true, after a serious if not completely successful attempt - is still one fact that already expresses and reflects the great eternal and internal growth of our movement: an external growth in our movement - in that we have elaborated our draft at this Congress, in the process of lengthy collective work, and in that representatives of the most varied units of the great international revolutionary army have participated in its elaboration; internal growth in that both our

discussions and all our work at this Congress have shown beyond all argument the unquestionable major ideological growth of our movement. If one compared the work which we have done on this question at previous Congresses, at the IV and V, with the tremendous work done at the VI Congress now drawing to a close, we would see a great turning point. This is true not only from the point of view of the amount of labor that we have spent, but from the point of view of the quality of that labor. In the remotest corners of the globe, among recently formed Communist Parties and those only just forming in the remote colonial peripheries of our movement, 10,000 versts from its industrial centers, we observe how the ideas of Marxism and Leninism are penetrating to the very depth of the working class, absorbing up certain circles of revolutionary peasantry, becoming the spiritual and ideological axis of the Communist movement that is growing everywhere. At this Congress we have had to sum up the entire great historic period of the development of our movement. Because several years have passed since the V Congress, we have had to sum up this major historical segment of time: the whole world - the countries of imperialism, the colonial sector of the world economy and the emerging mighty power of the working class, the proletarian dictatorship of our country has survived a great deal during this period.

Not without argument, nor without that discussion that is a sign of growth and vitality of ideas of our great Communist constitution, we finally arrived at a unanimous evaluation of the historical period in which we live. We had to weigh on the scales of Marxist analysis what was called "the third period" of development of the world capitalist crisis in the adopted resolution. We tried and we think that it was with the help of collective effort that we have succeeded - to weigh and analyze on the basis of exact Marxist

analysis of those particulars which differentiate the present historical period. We weighed and evaluated the new technical development, that is increasing the productive forces of capitalism, and the new organizational forms of capitalism. We have given a precise evaluation of the specific period of capitalist stabilization which we are experiencing now. We precisely analyzed what is in usual terms called "the negative aspects" of this stabilization and what in our terms is called the inalterable course of development of this stabilization's contradictions. We drew the basic tendencies of development out of a whole series of facts; we stated the universal intensification of the class struggle. It is a series of facts that tell us and guarantee that new human cadres of men will emerge in the arena of battle and finally put an end not only to the development of capitalist society, but to capitalist society itself. We have evaluated numerous, ever-growing, freakish and sharp contradictions that have piled up one on top of another. In our resolutions and in our decisions we have laid a firm foundation for our tactics - tactics for the revolutionary struggle with capitalism, a struggle to the death.

Before us stands the task, in light of these basic tendencies, of addressing the question that constitutes the main feature of the present time - the question of war. The Communist International has repeatedly addressed itself to the problem of war. The communist International is itself a child of war - it was born in the menace and storm of the great imperialist war and of the growing revolutionary crisis of capitalism. Comintern itself is not the child of the old, rotten unstable epoch of pre-imperialist development. It is the product of an epoch which was saturated with menace. In the future the Communist International will perhaps have to put this question

more concretely than it has at this VI Congress. But, comrades, we have had to address this question about the danger of war now, not only "in general" but from the viewpoint of particular conditions that are developing now. The universal preparation for war, the current war in China, the mobilization of imperialist armed forces preparing for a fight among the imperialist governments and for an attack against our Republic of Soviets, now all occur under the guise of an ideological deceit, that is completely extraordinary in its dimensions. Never were there so many schemes, so many official declarations, so many "peaceful" announcements. Never before did a pacifist phase promenade so basely decorated about the streets of all the cities and towns as now. And never before has so thoroughly a rotten, bigoted, hypocritical lying and false pacifist ideology been circulated so reinforced by the official heralding of imperialism as now, when this very imperialism is doing everything possible and impossible to unleash the elements of a new imperialist war. This pacifist lie, which serves as a smoke screen for the military preparations of imperialism, has never been used as a cover with such persistency, such energy and, one can say, with such cynical sincerity by the agents of imperialism among the working class as by the Social-Democratic Parties.

This is why we have had to take up the problem of war under particular conditions and resolve it from the viewpoint of the specific historical period that we have now entered. We have had to sharpen this this question, exactly as with a series of other questions, both from the point of view of direct struggle with imperialism and of the struggle with its still strong agent, the Social-democracy, which we must overthrow and make tremble on its back because the working class can only win the victory of communist revo-

lution over its political corpse.

The colonial question has been before us, but there is a great difference between that time when we discussed this problem at former Congresses, even at the II Congress under the direct leadership of Comrade Lenin, and the present situation. Then, there were not many questions on our work in the colonies. Since that time our international revolutionary movement in its colonial sector has experienced such tremendous, such gigantic events, our horizons have so expanded, the Parties have accumulated such vast experience, that they now are or were or soon will be in the fires of fierce class struggle in the colonies, in direct combat with foreign imperialism. Thus, we had to address and resolve a series of new tasks.

The Chinese Revolution and the rebellion in Indonesia alone gave us a whole series of new problems. If we have earlier addressed colonial problems as somehow cohesive, general problems without a detailed solution; if, before, we have elucidated only the most general, approximate outlines of our strategy and tactics in the colonies; then, in the first place, the events of the Chinese Revolution have given us a whole series of concrete and more particular strategic and tactical questions. To take stock of this truly vast experience was the task of our Congress.

Finally, we have, I hope, to make the final entry on the page of our internal history that could have signified a Trotskyist crisis within the Communist International.

At the previous V Congress we had to address this question, but it grew into a very significant problem both for the proletarian dictatorship

in the USSR and for the whole of Comintern. A very long time ago the genius and seer of scientific Communism and its founder Marx wrote in one of his fragmentary passages, that the true sweep of revolutionary communism would only finally begin, when the working class will have seized political power in its own hands in some one country. The entire revolutionary movement would then have its own durable power base. The international communist movement has this base in the person of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the country of former tsarist despotism.

But, comrades, if on the one hand the international workers movement and colonial revolutions in colonial countries have here their own mighty stronghold, then it is completely understandable that cracking and swaying of the main party framework at the very foundation of the international workers movement unavoidably rock the whole system of our movement, unavoidably make the whole international communist army unsteady. The Parties have not survived this crisis without inner spasms and illness, without friction. The sound instincts of the working class, the sound instincts of its communist avant-guard, now set before a perspective of very great and decisive battles, this instinct for class unity, for the necessity of unity in the communist ranks has, first of all, brought about the total defeat of the Trotskyist opposition among us. Almost immediately, its pitiable splinters broke apart in all the remaining Parties who have banished the former spies of social-democracy from their midst.

The Congress has made the final entry. We lost a whole series of our former battle comrades. The list that was just read during Comrade Kolarov's speech and the vote that was taken here on this account signify the political death of these people.

We do not know whether they are destined to rise again . If they do arise, we will not have one drop of pity for them. On the contrary. But we are happy, at the same time, to state that having lost a series of persons, we have acquired a series of new Parties, of new collectives in Korea and New Zealand, in Ireland, in Uruguay, Paraguay, Equador and Colombia. We have acquired important new detachments of battle comrades and we enter the future period with new forces, with new certainty, the powerful certainty of our ultimate victory.

Summing up the work of our Congress, we can say here: there will be a celebration on our street! This without fail! Now the time has already passed when social-democratic prophecies of capitalist stabilization could foretell the demise of our Party. Our Parties are tempered under the blows of the hammer of history and our Parties enjoy greater and greater solidarity. Our Parties are becoming ever more powerful factors in political life. If the international bourgeoisie now tries - and it in all likelihood shall try, as it is leading the matter to this - if it tries to unleash all of its servitors against us, if it takes up arms and plunges mankind into a new war, if it "risks" the existence of our Union, then at the same time, in this consists our deepest conviction and firmest hope - it also risks its own historical being.

Many years have already passed since the First Imperialist War, and our Soviet Republic has already counted more than a decade of its own existence. Communist International, founded in 1919, will soon also celebrate its tenth anniversary. If we compare our force during the First Imperialist War, those tiny groups, sometimes just single individuals, who followed the banner of revolution, if we compare them to the great detachments of the

international revolutionary movement following Comintern, then we can say with complete conviction: our strength is unbeatable. We will never, not for one second, fear any attack against us, since we know: during this period we have grown colossally strong; we are historical progress; our class is the bearer of the greatest historical mission; our class is the class that is destined to win worldwide power! (Thunderous applause. The delegates stand and sing "The Internationale.")

In the name of the Presidium of the present Congress, I propose that the plenum of the Congress adopt the manifesto in the name of the VI Congress of Communist International. (The manifesto is read.¹ Applause. All the delegates stand and sing "The Internationale".

1. See VI issue of the Stenographic Account "Theses, Resolutions, Decrees."

Appendix to the Report of the Credentials Commission

Social Composition of the Individual Delegations.

Exact statistics on the social composition are presented by seven delegations: French, German, Czechoslovak, Italian, Yugoslav, Belgian and Swiss. The composition of these delegations is:

1. French Delegation

(31 voting delegates, including the delegates of the colonies, and 6 non-voting delegates).

	Former type of Occupation						Present type of Occupation					
	Voting		Non-voting		Total		Voting		Non-voting		Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Workers . . .	20	80	5	83	25	67	6	19	2	33.33	8	21
Office Workers	5	8.4	-	-	5	13.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intelligentsia & Free Prof.	5	8.4	1	17	6	17	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bureaucrats	1	3.2	-	-	1	2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Not listed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	33.33	2	5.2
Party workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	81	2	33.33	27	73.8

2. Czech Delegation

(25 delegates voting, 9 non-voting delegates. A total of 34 delegates.)

Former type of Occupation:						Present type of Occupation:					
Voting			Non-voting			Voting			Non-voting		
Total %			Total %			Total %			Total %		
Workers . .	12	48	6	66.66	18 52	3	12	2	22.22	5	14.7
Office Workers	3	12	2	22.2	5 14.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bureaucrats	3	12	1	11.12	4 11.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Free Prof.	4	16	-	-	4 11.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intelligentsia	2	8	-	-	2 6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peasants . .	1	4	-	-	1 3	1	4	-	-	1	3
Party Workers	-	-	-	-	-	21	84	7	77.78	28	82.3

3. Italian Delegation

(17 voting delegates total)

	Social Origin		Present Occupation	
	(Exclusively voting delegates.)			
	Total	%	Total	%
Workers	10	58.82	5	29.41
Petty Bourgeoisie . .	6	35.28	-	-
Agricultural Workers	1	5.90	-	-
Party Functionaries	-	-	12	70.59

4. German Delegation

(25 voting delegates, 6 non-voting delegates)

	Former Occupation						Present Occupation					
	Voting		Non-voting		Total		Voting		Non-voting		Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Workers . . .	21	84	3	50	24	90.3	8	32	1	16.66	9	29
Agricultural Workers	1	4	-	-	1	3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office Workers	1	4	1	16.66	2	6.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intelligentsia	2	8	2	33.34	4	12.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unemployed . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16.66	1	3
Party Workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	68	4	66.68	21	72.8

5. Yugoslav Delegation

(4 voting delegates)

	Former Occupation						Present Occupation					
	Voting		Non-voting		Total		Voting		Non-voting		Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Workers . . .	3	75	-	-	3	75	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office Workers	1	25	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others . . .	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	25	-	-	1	25
Party Workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	75	-	-	3	75

6. Belgian Delegation

(4 voting delegates, 1 non-voting)

Former Occupation						Present Occupation					
Voting			Non-voting			Voting			Non-voting		
Total	%		Total	%		Total	%		Total	%	
Workers . . .	3	75	-	-		3	75	-	-		3
Office Workers	1	25	1	100	2	40	-	-	-	-	-
Party Workers .	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	25	1	100	2
											40

7. Swiss Delegation

(3 voting delegates)

	Former Occupation		Present Occupation	
	(Only voting delegates)			
	Total	%	Total	%
Workers	1	33.33	1	33.33
Office Workers . .	1	33.33	-	-
Artisan	1	33.33	1	33.33
Party Workers . . .	-	-	1	33.33

Non-Voting Delegates Who Arrived after the Report of the Credentials Commission:

From: Ukraine 1 (Mikolos)	From: Syria 1 (Sadek)
Georgia 1 (Kaxiani)	Poland 1
Algiers 1 (Moris)	Hungary 1 (Bela Kuhn)
Tunis. . . . 1 (Amerdi)	Australia 1 (Green)
Holland 1 (Lakerveld)	

Total: 9

In all, 381 voting delegates (by count of the Credentials Commission-- 372); in all, 150 non voting delegates (by count of the Credentials Commission--143; 7 arrived after the report).

Total voting and non-voting delegates--532 (by count-- 515). Parties given the right to have voting delegates-- 53 (by count-- 52; Australia then arrived) and Parties with non-voting delegations-- 5. In total-- 58.

List of Participants in VI All-World Congress
of Communist International.

Country Represented:	Voting	Non-voting
1. Australia	1. Green	
2. Austria	1. Shoenfelder	
	2. Benedict	
	3. Kershey	
	4. Koplenig	
3. Azerbaijan	1. Agaverdiev	
	2. Safarov	
	3. Nusrat	
4. Algiers	1. Sastr	
	2. Saidun	
	3. Moriss	
5. U.S.A.	1. Biettleman	1. Jones
	2. Cannon	2. Ford
	3. Don, William	3. Epstein
	4. Engdoll	4. Brodsky

Country Represented:	Voting	Non-voting
5. U.S.A. (continued)	5. Foster	5. Adams, Mary
	6. Gomez	
	7. Johnston	
	8. Newton	
	9. Lovston	
	10. Pepper	
	11. Hovel	
	12. Zisskind	
	13. Weinstone	
	14. Zem	
	15. Points	
	16. Tallantyre	
	17. Touxay	
	18. Carleton	
	19. Weeks	
	20. Wallace	
6. England	1. Arnout	1. Jones
	2. Bell	2. Guardi
	3. Bennet	
	4. Murphy	
	5. Rothstein, Andrew	
	6. Lober	
	7. Hennington	
	8. Pollit, Marjorie	
	9. Cox, Edriss	

Country Represented:	Voting	Non-voting
6. England (con't)	10. Priestley	
	11. Fergusson	
	12. Selkirk	
	13. Mason	
	14. Kriegan	
	15. Lambley	
	16. Hill	
	17. Coran	
	18. Browen	
	19. Stewart	
7. Argentina	1. Onofrio	
	2. Pelufo	
	3. Riccardi	
	4. Ravetto	
8. Armenia	1. Kostanian	
9. Byelorussia	1. Knorin	1. Ignatovsky
	2. Goloded	
	3. Chervyakov	
	4. Pilar	
10. Belgium	1. Kennen	
	2. Bool	
	3. Minnaert	
	4. Dijoux	

Countries Represented	Voting	Non-voting
11. Bulgaria	1. Shaitanov	1. Tsonev
	2. Asenov	
	3. Lazarov	
	4. Kolarov	
	5. Dimitrov	
	6. Stefanov	
12. Brazil	1. Latserda	
	2. Gonzales	
13. Germany	1. Braksentaller	1. Dietrich
	2. Blenkle	2. Kreft
	3. Heckart	3. Neiman
	4. Groube	4. Nischwitz
	5. Dengele	5. Flieg, Leo
	6. Dieter	6. Ulbricht
	7. Ziegel	
	8. Mueller	
	9. Bernhardt	
	10. Opiets	
	11. Pietsuch	
	12. Paris	
	13. Remmele	
	14. Reuss	
	15. Tellman	
	16. Tiettle	
	17. Florin	

Country Represented:	Voting	Non-voting
13. Germany (con't)	18. Zimmer	
	19. Schneller	
	20. Schulte	
	21. Schumann	
	22. Schrek	
	23. Schuz	
	24. Schreter	
	25. Evert	
14. Holland	1. Zagers	
	2. De Visser	
	3. De Fries	
	4. Lakerveld	
15. Greece	1. Saris	
	2. Sifneos	
16. Georgia	1. Tsakaya	1. Lezhava
	2. Kaxiani	
	3. Kartvelashvili	
17. Denmark	1. Christianson	
	2. Peterson	
	3. Tegerson	
18. Hungary	1. Borna	
	2. Diniis	
	3. Matrai	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
18. Hungary (con't)	4. Kemeni 5. Bela Kuhn	
19. India	1. Sikander, Sur 2. Raza 3. Spenser	1. Dett 2. Maxmu 3. Ali
20. Indonesia	1. Manavar 2. Padi 3. Samin	1. Tselebes 2. Semaon 3. Alfonso
21. Ireland	1. Carney	
22. Spain	1. Navarro	
23. Italy	1. Vinccenti 2. Garlandi 3. Votte 4. Brunnio 5. Gheretti 6. Morro 7. Tosco 8. Gallo 9. Notti 10. Nobille 11. Nikoletti 12. Serra 13. Sacetti	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
23. Italy (con't)	14. Oresti	
	15. Rinaldi	
	16. Renzi	
	17. Rossi	
	18. Ercoli	
24. Indochina	1. Vann	
	2. Vin	
	3. Tao	
25. Canada	1. MacDonald	
	2. Spector	
	3. Niel	
	4. Nevis	
26. Communist Youth International	1. Schuller	1. Bespalov
	2. Gipner	2. Gorlov
	3. Mering	3. Nasonov
	4. Auer	4. Mazut
	5. Laybrandt	5. Kayava
	6. Geminder	
	7. Lass	
	8. Boll	
	9. Osebe	
	10. Feunberg	
	11. Malmros	
	12. Lieppe	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
26. Communist Youth International (continued)	13. Williams	
	14. Galopen	
	15. Loverra	
	16. Nikolau	
	17. Ferra	
	18. Williamson	
	19. Darcey	
	20. Jung	
	21. Gorkich	
	22. Limanovsky	
	23. Rossen	
	24. Pavlov	
	25. Fokin	
	26. Marcucci	
	27. Rest	
	28. Lyu, Va-Cho	
	29. Fyn, Ten-Lee	
	30. Xrshel	
27. China	1. Chen-Kuan	1. Tan-Chin
	2. Yan-Chen	2. Yu-Shen
	3. Shu-Shau-Chen	3. Chai-Ta-Che
	4. Chang-Biao	4. Wan-Fu
	5. Wan-Shen	5. Nemtsev
	6. Chan-Chen	6. Ho
	7. Shu-En	7. Tien

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
27. China (con't)	8. Wan-Chan	8. Liang-I-tse
	9. En-Shen	9. Wan
	10. Wan-Chi	10. Den-E-chao
	11. Chan-Chun	11. Vorovsky
	12. Li-Shen	
	13. Tao-Chi	
	14. Shao-She	
	15. Tu-Ta-kuai	
	16. Nao-May	
	17. Yu-Fey	
28. Colombia	18. Straxov (Tsyui-Vitor)	
	19. Pioneer	
	20. Ma-Tao-chin	
		1. Gardenas
		2. Arse
29. Latvia	1. Stuchka	1. Lapin
	2. Krastyn	
30. Lithuania	1. Angaretis	1. Mitsketch
	2. Kunas	
31. Mexico	1. Carrillo	1. Shtierner
	2. Ramirez	
	3. Contreraz	
32. Norway	1. Ostvestad	1. Ketlesen
	2. Hermansen	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
32. Norway (con't)	3. Bercholdt	
	4. Tvedt	
	5. Karlson	
	6. Andersen	
	7. Sederstrom	
33. Palestine	1. Xaider	
34. Poland	1. Pruxnyak	1. Adamchik
	2. Kostrzheva	2. Gross
	3. Lensky	3. Skulsky
	4. Belevsky	4. Slivinsky
	5. Stanislavsky	5. Ring
	6. Miletsky	6. Elner
	7. Korchik	7. Andzheevsky
	8. Gryunbaum	8. Bartoshevich
	9. Xolodnyj	9. Dutkevich
	10. Pruzhansky	10. Purman
	11. Novitsky	
	12. Stiller	
	13. Gurnitsky	
	14. Zelinsky	
	15. Yunovich	
35. RSFSR	1. Artyuxina	1. Bauman
	2. Bubnov	2. Antselovich
	3. Buxarin	3. Unshlixt

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
35. RSFSR (con't)	4. Vasilev	4. Doletsky
	5. Voroshilov	5. F. Kon
	6. Gej	6. Solts
	7. Grigorev	7. Ryazanov
	8. Gusev	8. Kirsanova
	9. Dogadov	9. Shubin
	10. Enukidze	10. Shotman
	11. Ikramov	11. Trilisser
	12. Isaev	12. Juzefovich
	13. Karlinin	13. Yaglom
	14. Kirov	14. Vartanyan
	15. Kosior, St.	
	16. Krupskaya	
	17. Kujbyshev	
	18. Lozovsky	
	19. Manuilsky	
	20. Mif	
	21. Lapse	
	22. Lominadze	
	23. Lunarcharsky	
	24. Martynov	
	25. Milchakov	
	26. Milyutin	
	27. Mikoyan	
	28. Molotov	
	29. Ordzhonikidze	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
35. RSFSR (con't)	30. Osinsky	
	31. Pyatnitsky	
	32. Raskolnikov	
	33. Rudzutak	
	34. Rykov	
	35. Saxat Muradov	
	36. Stalin	
	37. Smirnov	
	38. Stasova	
	39. Teodorovich	
	40. Tomsky	
	41. Uglanov	
	42. Xitarov	
	43. Shvarts, S.	
	44. Shkiryatov	
	45. Shmidt, V.	
	46. Yaroslavsky	
	47. Yanson	
	48. Kotov	
	49. Polonsky	
	50. Uxanov	
36. Rumania	1. Barkadzhiu	
	2. Stanku	
	3. Baltazar	
	4. Petrulesku	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
37. Persia	1. Sultan-Zade 2. Rizaev	
38. Syria	1. Hassan 2. Sadek	
39. Tunis	1. Michelle 2. Amedi	
40. Turkey	1. Faxri	
41. Uruguay	1. Sala	
42. Finland	1. Kuusinen 2. Manner 3. Blum 4. Salminen 5. Elving 6. Strem 7. Lund	1. Sirola 2. Malm 3. Lepola 4. Vasten 5. Lextinen
43. France	1. Cachin 2. Reno, Jean 3. Semar 4. Torez 5. Bernard 6. Racomon 7. Cost 8. Seillor	1. Julesbere 2. Rabate 3. Deleaubel 4. Marion 5. Marianne 6. Creme

Country Represented

Voting

Non-voting

43. France
(con't)

9. Bont
10. Devernier
11. Frachon
12. Roque
13. Truillars
14. Crie
15. Forresté
16. Gurdeau
17. Perrin
18. Pio
19. Robert, Ivonn
20. Lebuque
21. Sarasin
22. Barbe
23. Bieux
24. Vetsel
25. Ieausere

44. Ukrainian SSR

1. Kaganovich
2. Akulov
3. Lovitsky
4. Polatskaya
5. Postyshev
6. Postolovsky
7. Gopner
8. Demchenko
9. Mikolos

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
45. Czechoslovakia	1. Tatran	1. Klivar
	2. Vobetska	2. Krejbix
	3. Chitinska	3. Krejtsinger
	4. Gaken	4. Pishek
	5. Appelt	5. Novakova
	6. Vejnraux	6. Pospeshil
	7. Rejman	7. Novotnyj
	8. Slansky	8. Yunek
	9. Mondok	9. Shmeral
	10. Ilek	10. Vakonn
	11. Bolen	
	12. Dobrovalnyj	
	13. Garus	
	14. Shtern	
	15. Zapototsky	
	16. Unfalvi	
	17. Petro	
	18. Dtogi	
	19. Melixar	
	20. Tuma	
	21. Yansk	
	22. Shafranko	
	23. Kalarikova	
	24. Graxam	
	25. Najdenov	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
46. Chili	1. Munos	
47. Switzerland	1. Vildberger 2. Bodemann 3. Krebs	
48. Sweden	1. Vretling 2. Sillen, Signe 3. Flieg, Nils 4. Landen 5. Tunell 6. Chilbum 7. Samuelson 8. Sillen, Hugo	1. Dagersted 2. Andersen 3. Flieg, Elza
49. Equador		1. Paredes
50. Estonia	1. Anvelt	1. Ryatas
51. Yugoslavia	1. Agich 2. Lidin 3. Spaxich 4. Rogich	
52. South Africa	1. Venting, Sidney 2. Benting, Beatrice 3. Rue	

Country Represented	Voting	Non-voting
53. Japan	1. Katayama 2. Kato 3. Omura 4. Hossio 5. Tanaka	

Parties with Non-voting Delegates

54. Inner Mongolia	1. Boenbator	2. Horlo
55. New Zealand	1. Griffin	
56. Venezuela	1. Martinez	
57. Paraguay	1. Ibarolla	
58. Iceland	1. Bernson	

Organizations with Non-voting Delegates

Members IKKI ¹	1. Fiala	Communist Factions of International Workers' Assistance	1. Mizano
	2. Gzhegozhevsky		2. Myuntsenberg
	3. Tsetkin, Clara		
	4. Ember, Dro	Communist Factions of MOPR ³	1. Geller
	5. Hanzen		2. Schmidt
	6. Jaquesmot		3. Drabkina
Members IKK ²	1. Brouder	Communist Factions of Unions International	1. Vitkovsky
	2. Laursen		2. Appelt
	3. Pegelman		3. Kozelev
	4. Kabakchiev		4. Geller

1. Executive Committee of Communist International (IKKI)
2. International Control Commission (IKK)
3. International Aid Society for Revolutionary Fighters (MOPR)

(Organizations with Non-voting Delegates)

Institute of Press
Correspondents

1. Yulius

Communist Factions
of Sports
International

1. Aksamit

2. Butte

3. Kedrov

Communist Factions
of Peasants'
International

1. Dombal

2. Brandler

3. Gorov

Individual Persons Invited as Non-voting Delegates

- | | |
|--------------|-------------------|
| 1. Abramov | 15. Idelson |
| 2. Bamater | 16. Koganitsky |
| 3. Berzin | 17. Krens |
| 4. Valetsky | 18. Kornblume |
| 5. Burm | 19. Kreshich |
| 6. Williams | 20. Lentz |
| 7. Virtanen | 21. Mojrova |
| 8. Grolman | 22. Mixajlov |
| 9. Varga | 23. Smolyansky |
| 10. Bozhich | 24. Stepanov |
| 11. Demar | 25. Hejmo |
| 12. Dunker | 26. Sturm, Goethe |
| 13. Zavadsky | 27. Yablonsky |
| 14. Zorge | 28. Yulius |

Distribution of Voting Credentials by Country

Delegation	Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates
1. Australia	1	-
2. Austria	4	-
3. Azerbaijan	3	-

Delegation	Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates
4. Algiers	3	-
5. U.S.A.	20	5
6. England	19	2
7. Argentina	4	-
8. Armenia	1	-
9. South Africa	3	-
10. Byelorussia	4	1
11. Belgium	4	-
12. Bulgaria	6	1
13. Brazil	2	-
14. Hungary	5	-
15. Germany	25	6
16. Holland	4	-
17. Greece	2	-
18. Georgia	4	-
19. Denmark	3	-
20. India	3	3
21. Indonesia	3	3
22. Indochina	3	-
23. Ireland	1	-
24. Spain	1	-
25. Italy.	18	-
26. Canada	4	-
27. Communist Youth International	30	5
28. China	20	10
29. Colombia	-	2

Delegation	Voting Delegates	Non-voting Delegates
30. Latvia	2	1
31. Lithuania	2	1
32. Mexico	3	1
33. Norway	7	1
34. Palestine	1	-
35. Poland	15	10
36. RSFSR	50	14
37. Rumania	4	-
38. Persia	2	-
39. Syria	2	-
40. Tunis	2	-
41. Turkey	1	-
42. Uruguay	1	-
43. Finland	7	5
44. France	25	6
45. Ukraine	10	-
46. Czechoslovakia	25	10
47. Chili	1	-
48. Switzerland	3	-
49. Sweden	8	3
50. Ecuador	-	1
51. Estonia	1	1
52. Yugoslavia	4	-
53. Japan	5	-

Countries with Non-voting Delegates

54. Inner Mongolia	2	56. Venezuela	1
55. New Zealand	1	57. Paraguay	1
		58. Iceland	1

Organizations with Non-voting Credentials

1. Executive Committee	6	5. International Workers Assistance	2
2. International Control Commission	4	6. International Aid Society for Revolutionay Fighters	3
3. Institute of Press Correspondents	1	7. Unions International	4
4. Peasants International	3	8. Sports International	3

Individual Credentials 28

Total Voting Delegates 381

Total Non-voting Delegates. 151

532

Glossary

- Comintern - Communist International.
- Gosplan - State Planning Committee.
- Hectare - Unit of measure of surface area, equal to 2.471 acres.
- IKK - International Control Committee.
- IKKI - Executive Committee of the Communist International.
- KSM - Communist Youth International.
- Kolkhoz - Collective farm.
- Kronstadt - Fortified port on the Gulf of Finland near Leningrad, famous for the occurrence of an uprising of sailors of the Red Navy, who had been staunch supporters of Bolshevism. The rebels demanded, among other things, the calling of a constituent assembly and the resumption of free-trade. Although the result was quickly repelled by armed force it caused Lenin to supplement police repression of discontent by changing his policy in an attempt to ameliorate the causes for discontent among the population. The NEP was a direct result of this.
- Kulak - A name given to the well-to-do class of farmers in Russia. They are often known for profiting from less fortunate members of the peasant class. The kulaks were strongly opposed to Soviet land policies, in particular the collectivization of farm land.
- Khvostism - Literally, 'following in the tail of events'
- MOPR - International Organization for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters.
- Narkomzdrav - National Committee of Health Services.
- NEP - New Economic Policy - Change in economic policy in which the Soviet government reinstated capitalist elements such as private manufacture and sale of goods and services into the economy in the early 1920s in order to stimulate a seriously deficient economy. This temporary expedient was eventually liquidated in the late 20s and early 30s under Stalin.
- Pood - Unit of weight, equal to approximately 32 pounds.
- Profintern - Professional Unions International

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- Rabkrin - Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Team.
- Sovkhoz - State farm.
- Spartacists - German Communist Group led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebnicht, which attempted and failed to start a revolt and establish a Soviet Republic in Germany in 1919.
- Subbotnik - Name derived from the Russian word for 'Saturday' and used to designate those individuals volunteering to do extra-curricular work for the good of the country and the advancement of socialism. Lenin himself is reputed to have participated on occasion as a subbotnik, although this is unverified.
- TsSU - Central Soviet Administration.
- Verst - Unit of distance, equal to approximately 2/3 of a mile.
- VKP (B) - All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
- VSNKh - Supreme Soviet of the National Economy.

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