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







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
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




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6 **SOVIET CHINA POLICY AND THE
COURSE OF CHINESE POLITICS
1974-1977.**

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SOVIET "CHINA POLICY" AND THE COURSE OF CHINESE POLITICS
1974-1977

Robert L. Freeman, CPT, MI

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FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.



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SUMMARY

In this paper the author presents evidence from the Soviet, Chinese, and Western press in an effort to show the relationship between Soviet 'China Policy' and the course of Chinese politics for the period 1974-1977. He concludes that, the Soviets were convinced throughout the period, that the problem of Mao's succession could be settled in favor of 'pro-Soviet' military and civilian leaders, who would restore the strategic alignment of China with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviets continuously acted in word and deed to support these 'healthy internationalist (i.e., pro-Soviet) forces,' which indicates that Soviet 'China Policy' has been consistent over the past three years, and suggests that it has been based upon long-term strategic goals. The implication for the future is that, since the accession of Hua Kuo-feng has not permanently settled the power struggle among the Chinese leadership, the Soviets will continue to pursue a course of action which exploits the unresolved Chinese political situation in an attempt to assist pro-Soviet leaders in coming to power.

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INTRODUCTION

The Soviets frequently comment upon Chinese politics and policies in the open press. Western analysts of Soviet affairs have long been preoccupied with the question of whether these public pronouncements about Chinese events are relevant to Soviet foreign policy and strategy. In this connection, it is important first to determine what Soviet "line" is expressed in Soviet commentaries about China. Next, it is necessary to determine to what extent Soviet press statements reflect actual events in China. Finally, it is necessary to determine whether there is a relationship between Soviet words and actions. This is important because, presumably, some combination of words and actions comprises Soviet foreign policy, and because policy is governed by strategy.

Unfortunately, some Western analysts have inadequately examined the relationship of Soviet press statements and foreign policy actions to events within China, and as a result have drawn erroneous conclusions about Soviet expectations with regard to Chinese politics and policies. For example, in mid-1975 one well-known analyst provided the following characterization of the Soviet assessment of the Chinese succession problem:

...it appears that the Kremlin is no longer thinking that once Mao Tse-tung dies, "healthy (i.e., pro-Soviet) forces" will reassert themselves in the Chinese Communist Party and army, misunderstandings will be quickly cleared away, and a new and cooperative Sino-Soviet relationship will be born. Indeed, Soviet commentaries suggest that the succession to Mao and Chou En-lai is all but settled in favor of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and the extreme radicals in the party. They go on to

imply that if this is correct, a period of renewed turbulence will occur in Sino-Soviet relations-- although Sino-American relations will also suffer a setback.¹

A more recent analysis provided a similar assessment of Soviet expectations with regard to the course of Chinese politics:

The key question occupying Moscow...is not who will rule or how but whether there will be any groups or forces in post-Maoist China which will favor improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. From the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution to the present, Soviet prognoses have become increasingly pessimistic about this prospect. Until 1966, according to Soviet analyses, the Chinese leadership was divided between internationalist, i.e., pro-Soviet forces, and nationalists, and until 1971-72 it was not unusual for a Soviet commentator to envisage efforts on the part of some elements contending to post-Mao leadership to strive actively for a rapprochement with Moscow. At present Soviet descriptions divide the Chinese into three groups: the radicals, the pragmatists and the military. Whatever their differences, these groups are said by Soviet spokesmen to be united in their hostility to the Soviet Union. What divides them is said to be mainly domestic issues, or to a lesser extent, the question of relations with the United States. The Soviets in consequence now seem to exclude any important force or significant movement favorable to rapprochement with Moscow following Mao either in the short or longer term.²

In fact, an examination of Soviet statements and actions over the past three years reveals that before the death of Mao (and even after) the Soviets had not decided that the succession question was "all but settled," or that all groups struggling for power were "united in hostility to the Soviet Union." On the contrary, the Soviets seem to have been convinced throughout the period that the succession problem could be settled in favor of "healthy," pro-Soviet forces in China. Moreover, the Soviets acted to support these forces. The importance of this finding is that it suggests that

Soviet "China policy" has been consistent, and that Soviet strategy has been a consistent guide to policy. This is opposed to the formulations of the Western analysts quoted above, whose analyses seem to reflect the underlying assumption that Soviet policy has been simply a reaction to events in China.

Several important assumptions guided me in my examination of the evidence. First, a friendly China aligned with the USSR has, for national security reasons, been a fundamental, long-term objective of Soviet strategy, and this "China strategy" has consistently guided Soviet foreign policy. Second, an obliging political leadership in Peking is the key to a Sino-Soviet alliance. Third, the struggle for personal power and political preeminence among Chinese leaders is an essential feature of Chinese politics. It is in the context of the struggle for power that Soviet strategists must seek opportunities to influence Chinese leaders toward rapprochement.³

I began my research with the following hypotheses: First, I hypothesized that Soviet strategists understand Chinese politics-- particularly the struggle for power, and that this understanding would be reflected in Soviet actions and public pronouncements. Second, I hypothesized that beyond understanding Chinese politics, Soviet strategists would seek opportunities to influence the course of Chinese politics and policy to the advantage of the USSR, particularly to achieve rapprochement, by employing statements and actions which could be interpreted in China as support for pro-Soviet leaders seeking power.

Many major Soviet newspapers and journals carry articles about Chinese politics and policy. The most authoritative articles, that is, those articles which express the current "line" and which are expected to be noticed at home and abroad, appear in such publications as Pravda (Truth), Izvestia (News), and Kommunist (Communist), and I concentrated my research on the past three years of these publications. In order to test my hypotheses, it was necessary as well to use the Western press and Chinese press translations to examine the Chinese domestic situation and the international context in which Soviet actions and statements occurred. I also drew upon the work of several Western specialists on Soviet and Chinese affairs.

My research supported my hypotheses: The Soviets conveyed, by public statement and diplomatic and military action, their understanding of the Chinese political situation from 1974-1977. Moreover, during this period of time the Soviets persistently attempted to influence the course of Chinese politics through a consistent program of propaganda and actions directed against China. Specifically, the Soviets appear to have accurately assessed events in China which pointed to weakness in the political position of Mao Tse-tung and his followers, and acted in word and deed to exploit that weakness. Finally, the Soviets consistently implied their support for "healthy forces" in China--particularly among Chinese military leaders and rehabilitated civilian cadres. The remarkable consistency of the Soviet "line" toward China supports the validity of the original assumption that Soviet policy has been based upon a fundamental, long-term "China strategy."

In presenting and analyzing the evidence I have tried to show what "line" was suggested by soviet press statements about China, how this "line" was related to real events in China, and how what the Soviets said about China was related to other elements of foreign policy--such as diplomatic and military actions. In order to provide the reader with a substantial basis for understanding events in Chinese politics and Soviet "China policy" over the past three years, I have presented these events in the form of "case studies" for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976.

1974

Soviet press reports of Chinese political-military developments of late 1973 and early 1974 contained two important "lines." One was the implication that Mao's political preeminence was slipping. The other was the explicit claim that Mao faced organized opposition--particularly from within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

On 3 January 1974, an article in Pravda, based on foreign press reports, stated that of the 13 regional military commanders seven had been replaced, and cited three of them by name.⁵ The Pravda article noted that this was the greatest number of transfers since the massive purge in the PLA following defense minister Lin Piao's removal in September 1971,⁶ and ended with the observation that the latest transfer of commanders was part of an intensifying power struggle "among the various factions in the Chinese leadership."⁷ The theme of factional struggle was repeated just a few days later when Pravda cited the Chinese press on the situation in China. The article was noteworthy for several military-related themes. First, the article stressed that the transfers were carried out at the initiative of Mao Tse-tung and his immediate associates, including Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC), "who now hold de facto political, administrative, and military power in the country."⁸ Second, the article noted the appearance in China of "pragmatists," who had

"ideas of their own on how to run the country." Furthermore, the rise of the "pragmatists" was associated with the accumulation of discontent among Mao's opponents, who were present in the PLA officer corps. Proof of this, according to Pravda, was to be found in a Chinese press report of the work of the party committee of one of Peking's garrison regiments "in the area of exposing the machinations of Lin Piao's adherents in the regiment."⁹ Finally, the article repeated the foreign analysis that the shifts in personnel were an attempt to curtail the power of those officers who had become "autocratic rulers" in the provinces during and after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR).¹⁰ Then, in early February, Pravda reported that the strife among the opposing factions in the Chinese leadership was "flaring up with new intensity." Foreign observers, said Pravda, had noted mass meetings, the appearance of wall posters, and increased activity of city militia, and found the resemblance to the GPCR "unmistakable."¹¹

On the surface, these articles of early 1974 appeared to show that Mao wielded a great deal of power in China, despite opposition. Nevertheless, there was an implicit suggestion that Mao was not fully in control of events. It is possible to interpret the military transfers of December and January as examples of military men loyal to Mao being sent to strategic posts, reflecting the importance of the north-east region and the threat of war with the Soviet Union.¹² Another interpretation, explicitly supported by the Soviet press, held that

the transferred commanders of these military regions had stood firmly in their posts for many years and had built "mountain strongholds," and so they were removed by Mao to strengthen central control.¹³

Neither of these interpretations adequately explains the transfers, for besides their military posts, many of these commanders had held important political positions in their former regions, but none was appointed to a similar position in his new location. They were replaced in these jobs by civilians.¹⁴

My interpretation of the transfers is that they adversely affected Mao's political power. A specific example of this was the reassignment of Li Te-sheng, one of three transferred military leaders named in the 3 January Pravda article. Li had come to political prominence as a supporter of Mao during the GPCR. At the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, he became one of five Vice-Chairmen of the Party, and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.¹⁵ His subsequent transfer from Peking and out of the highest decision-making body deprived Mao of valuable support.¹⁶ Similarly, the transfers of the other two military personalities named by Pravda, Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu, may have had unfavorable implications for Mao. One Western analysis reveals that precisely these two commanders were "leaders slipping in authority" after the Tenth Party Congress, due to the elevation of other leaders, who did not reinforce Mao's interests, to superior levels.¹⁷ Thus, their transfer implied a further dilution of Mao's support.

The suggestion that these transfers were politically unfavorable to Mao was reinforced by Pravda's reporting on their origins. The foreign press, as cited in Pravda, noted that the shifts were initiated by Mao Tse-tung and Yeh Chien-ying.¹⁸ By linking Mao and Yeh, Pravda implied that the transfers represented a compromise between Mao and other Chinese leaders. The events of late 1976, in which the purge of Maoist "radicals" left Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-ying the sole members of the Politburo Standing Committee,¹⁹ make it possible to conclude in retrospect that Yeh was an opponent of Mao. Yet, it was apparent at least as early as the Tenth Party Congress that Yeh's status had been enhanced at the expense of previously higher-ranking officials associated with Mao's "camp."²⁰

The Soviets were in possession of a full account of the transfers, yet they cited three examples which superficially appeared to demonstrate Mao's control, but which actually signified a compromise. Since it is difficult to conceive of any possible propaganda value such a characterization might have within the Soviet Union, the conclusion is at hand that the Soviets were attempting to subtly convey their (correct) evaluation of Mao's weakened political situation, to Chinese leaders, without sacrificing their long-standing characterization of the Maoist regime as a harsh military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Mao, of course, was trying to conceal his weakness, particularly from the Soviet Union and from his pro-Soviet associates.

This analysis is supported, too, by Western reports that Teng

Tsiao-ping had played a "vital" role in arranging the transfers of PLA leaders.²¹ Reports of Teng's influence in the transfers further reinforce the suggestion that the transfers embodied a compromise. While he had been restored to political life by Mao in order to help dilute military influence in Chinese politics, Teng was instrumental in "rehabilitating" many officials, including former provincial Party Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and PLA cadres, who did not represent Mao's interests, and who diluted the authority of Mao's supporters.²² The implication, then, is that many of the civilians who replaced military men in political jobs were Teng's supporters. Consequently, the transfers did enable Mao to maintain military control in strategic geographical areas, but the political aspects of the transfers benefitted Teng.

Also related to the issue of Mao's control were developments in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius," which could not have been beneficial to Mao. For example, in March, Pravda drew upon the Yugoslav press to report that Premier Chou En-lai, "the main architect of the policy of improving relations with the USA," was the target of the campaign against Lin and Confucius.²³ If this were true, and because Chou's policy was also Mao's, this may be interpreted in two ways: either Mao was not firmly in control of the campaign, or Chou was no longer a reliable supporter of Mao. In either case, a weakness in Mao's position was evident.

The second important theme of Soviet press accounts of events

in China at that time was that of the existence of "oppositionist" forces within the PLA. While such articles appeared in January 1974, the clearest explication of the Soviet "position" was forthcoming only in May:

There are a good many indications that many people in the Peking ruling clique do not believe in the fabricated "Soviet menace." In all probability, one of these people was Lin Piao, whom the Maoists are trying in vain and completely without justification to depict as a Soviet agent. Evidently sober minded people in China disagree with this course. Fear of the possibility that they might take organized action against the anti-Soviet and antisocialist course, as well as the struggle for power, is forcing the Maoist ruling clique to engage in the systematic reshuffling of various groups of cadres- earlier party and economic cadres were persecuted, now it's the turn of the military and some local leaders, etc.²⁴

This article suggested, rather unequivocally, that the opposition to Mao within the Chinese leadership was large, that it was connected with the military, and that it had the potential for organized action. Unlike many previous articles on the subject it was authored and was not a restatement of foreign press reports, thus emphasizing its authoritative character. It was clearly intended to express Soviet support for "sober minded" (pro-Soviet) Chinese leaders.

A compelling feature of Soviet press accounts of events in China in late 1973 and early 1974 is that they seem to reflect a Soviet effort to draw a parallel between circumstances at that time and the circumstances surrounding the "Wuhan Incident" more than six years earlier. In July 1967, at the height of the GPCR, Chen Tsai

and Chung Han-hua, respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military Region, permitted their supporters to kidnap two Peking emissaries, in open and direct defiance of the central authorities. Mao, apparently fearing the possibility of general regional military rebelliousness, overreacted, and dispatched paratroopers and the East China Sea Fleet to Wuhan to overpower the mutiny.²⁵ The domestic, and particularly military, instability signalled by the events in Wuhan were not overlooked in Moscow. Soviet propaganda directed at China following the Wuhan Incident stressed the theme of aiding the anti-Maoist forces in China.²⁶ Moreover, as part of their campaign to exert pressure on China, the Soviets had built up their military forces on the Sino-Soviet border until by the Spring of 1968 they had assembled a half-million combat troops with accompanying logistical support elements. The incidents of armed border clashes increased. Soviet military pressure on China, coupled with strident propaganda, was viewed ominously in Peking, the more so as most PLA troops were committed to the internal, domestic struggle of the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, Mao was forced to terminate the GPCR and concentrate on national defense before he had achieved the full control he desired over institutions and personalities in China.²⁷

There was a close parallel between conditions on the Sino-Soviet border in 1973-1974 and those in 1967-1968. Contemporaneously with Mao's domestic problems, correctly perceived in Moscow, large quantities

of military material were stockpiled on the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet border, and before the Spring of 1974, 60 Soviet and Mongolian divisions faced 140 Chinese divisions. The Soviet units, particularly on the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers, shifted from a defensive to an offensive posture, simultaneously with the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles to the front.²⁸ According to Western reports of Soviet eye-witnesses, an "exceptionally large number of soldiers were killed" in border clashes in April 1974.²⁹

Furthermore, by raising the spectre of opposition in the ranks of the PLA, articles in the Soviet press reinforced the parallel between the circumstances at that time and events in the past. The issue is not whether Soviet press reports of "oppositionist" forces within the PLA reflected the reality within the Chinese armed forces, but rather that this was the impression the Soviets wished to convey. In 1967-1968 the PLA was not able to act effectively against the USSR because of its involvement in serious Chinese domestic strife, thus the threat of Soviet military force took on added significance. If in 1973-1974, pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese leadership had the support of PLA leaders, as claimed in the Soviet press, a similar result would occur.

While the claims of organized opposition to Mao may have been exaggerated by the Soviets to heighten uncertainty about the reliability of the armed forces among Mao and his followers, and to enhance the credibility of Soviet power, Mao's weakness was no illusion.

This was emphasized on 11 April 1974 at the United Nations General Assembly, where Teng Hsiao-ping articulated a new Chinese foreign policy in which China essentially withdrew from the challenge of the Soviet Union in the Communist movement.³⁰ The mere fact that Teng was the emissary to the UN showed his high standing in the Chinese leadership, and his speech, while anti-Soviet in tone, was clearly a retreat from the conflict with Moscow. This suggested that Mao was having trouble marshalling support for his policies.

The Chinese retreat was not immediately acknowledged in Moscow.³¹ Nevertheless, the Soviets seem to have recognized Mao's weakness and acted to exploit it. On 10 June, the Soviet position was expressed obliquely by Y. Tsedenbal, chief Party and state official of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). He declared in a speech that the Chinese leaders were pursuing an "annexationist" policy with respect to the MPR. Mongolia, he said, was under "constant political, economic and ideological pressure from China." He ended his speech with a call for normalization of relations with the PRC.³² The absence of any mention of military pressure in Tsedenbal's statement, in view of the combat activity and tension on the border, is noteworthy. It can be interpreted as a Soviet effort to represent the Chinese armed forces as not being a threat to the Soviet Union. This is directly related to Mao's political power, for if the Chinese Army could not be relied upon to carry out a policy hostile to the Soviet Union, then the position of those Chinese leaders favoring reconciliation with the USSR would be enhanced at Mao's expense.

Immediately after Tsedenbal's speech, the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee (one of Mao's creations—R.L.F.) became the object of public criticism in a wall-poster campaign. The first such posters appeared in Peking on 12 June, and "by 21 June the walls of the Chinese Army's General Political Department were covered with them." Moreover, according to Pravda, the campaign was "against the will of the Maoist center."³³ The implication was that the army was behind the campaign. But during the campaign, and as if to give the lie to Tsedenbal's statement, on 17 June China conducted a nuclear test in the atmosphere in the north-west part of the country "in immediate proximity" to the border of the MPR.³⁴ This can be taken to mean that there was at least some ambivalence in the position of the Chinese leadership on the subject of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin leaders may have been encouraged by China's apparent vacillation in her hostile posture toward the Soviet Union in the face of increased Soviet military pressure on the border.³⁵ On 25 June the Soviets dispatched a government delegation to Peking to reopen the long-stalled Sino-Soviet talks aimed at settling "border questions," but the talks were apparently inconclusive and the head of the Soviet delegation departed "temporarily" for Moscow after nearly two months in Peking.³⁶

Meanwhile, the Kremlin continued to press its "line" supporting a specific conception and specific expectations concerning Chinese political developments. In August, an article in Kommunist emphasized that the Maoist "inner circle" was not monolithic, that the various

groups within it were struggling for power, and stated flatly that the military was an "independent power." In this connection, the issue of opposition to Mao was raised again, not only by reiterating that the reassignment of commanders showed Mao's concern over the growing power of these local commanders, but also by suggesting that the Maoist course created its own opposition:

...the Maoists' antipopular course inevitably engenders a critical attitude to the leadership's policy within the country and is conducive to the spread of views³⁷ held by healthy internationalist forces in the PRC.

The article went on to state the key strategic issue which contributed to the "health" of those internationalist forces: "The Peking leadership does not have great confidence in the stability of the present US policy toward China."³⁸ In contrast, Kommunist offered the following formulation of the Soviet position:

The CPSU's policy toward the Chinese People's Republic is clear and consistent. It combines an uncompromising struggle against Maoism and the Chinese leaders' policies...with readiness for the complete normalization of relations with the PRC and the restoration of Soviet-Chinese friendship.³⁹

Then on 1 October, Pravda published a major article marking the 25th Anniversary of the PRC. The article expressed three major themes: First, the "unprecedented" assistance of the Soviet Union in the Chinese revolution and in the early economic development of the PRC; second, the incalculable damage done to China by Maoism, which had not only slowed its modernization, but had actually set it back; third, the article emphasized that the only way China could

progress was by returning to a cooperative stance vis-a-vis the USSR:

Historical experience indicates that the successful development of China can be achieved only along the lines of socialism and the consolidation of friendship with the socialist countries... Retaining friendly, fraternal feelings for the Chinese people, the Soviet people express the deep conviction that the coincidence of the fundamental long-term interests of the peoples of the USSR and China dictates the necessity of reestablishing and developing their cooperation.⁴⁰

At about the same time, the question of China's strategic orientation had indeed been a major issue of dispute among the Chinese leadership, and articles in the Chinese press indicated that the intra-Party struggle was going badly for Mao.⁴¹ Mao's weakened political position was recognized by the Soviets, although not immediately acknowledged, and was later reported in the open Soviet press. Particularly, an article in Voprosy Istorii, which purported to explain the campaign of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, stated that in the Autumn of 1974 the "pragmatists (that is, those who were not in agreement with Mao--R.L.F.) and their supporters in the army managed to restrain the zeal of the 'left-wingers' (Mao's supporters--R.L.F.) somewhat," and consequently Mao's inflammatory slogans disappeared from wall-posters and from the press.⁴²

Soviet propaganda efforts during this period of internal Chinese tensions seemed to reflect Moscow's appreciation of the course of the power struggle, and may be interpreted as attempts to capitalize upon Mao's weakness. Evidence of this may be inferred from Pravda and Izvestiia coverage of Secretary Brezhnev's 26 November speech in Ulan Bator, capital of the MPR. In his speech, Brezhnev criticized

the attitude of the Chinese in border negotiations, declaring that the Chinese had advanced, as a preliminary condition for talks on border questions, a demand for withdrawal of Soviet border guards "from a number of areas of our territory to which the Chinese leaders have now decided to lay claim and so have begun to call 'disputed areas'." While rejecting the Chinese demand as "absolutely unacceptable," Brezhnev noted also that the Soviets "are not losing hope" for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.⁴³

Although the border negotiations had apparently broken down considerably earlier, in mid-August, Brezhnev's speech represented the first public condemnation of Chinese intransigence over border issues at the recent round of the talks. The implication is, I believe, that the timing of Brezhnev's disclosure was probably deliberate. That is, it was delayed until Mao's weakened political position became graphically evident by the disappearance of Mao's "inflammatory slogans." The denunciation, delivered as it was by Brezhnev himself, carried the highest authority, and by condemning demands "now" advanced by Chinese leaders, Brezhnev implied that the talks were being held up only by the new Chinese demands. Conceivably, since a policy of intransigence toward the USSR was associated with Mao, by bringing the issue of Chinese intransigence into the open at a time when Mao was already under considerable pressure from the "pragmatists," Brezhnev would make it increasingly difficult for Mao to garner support for his anti-Soviet position.

In December, Pravda denounced as "lies" a London Daily Telegraph report that "in November Russian and Chinese troops had clashed along the Mongolian-Chinese border."⁴⁴ Since the Soviets had not responded to Western reports of border clashes in the Spring, it is reasonable to assume that Moscow had specific reasons for this public denial. Particularly, it would be entirely consistent with Soviet efforts to demonstrate that hostility toward the Soviet Union was the unjustified, and perhaps untenable, position of Mao and the "leftists," and that a policy of accommodation, associated with the "pragmatists," would be more appropriate in Sino-Soviet relations.

In reviewing the Soviet press on Chinese affairs for 1974, we note a rather consistent adherence to the two "lines" of Mao's implied weakness and the strength of his opposition, particularly in the armed forces. Moreover, it is evident that Mao's weakness was real, and that Soviet press statements and military and diplomatic initiatives were intended to exploit that weakness, by increasing tensions and heightening uncertainty about PLA reliability within the Chinese leadership. The Soviets were consistent, too, in their suggestion of support for "healthy forces" within China. In this connection, Soviet references to dissatisfaction in the PLA, statements recalling Soviet assistance to the Chinese revolution, and even statements denigrating the capability of the Chinese armed forces can be viewed as possible appeals to the older generation of military leaders who earlier had strong ties with the USSR, and

who might recognize the military advantages of Sino-Soviet co-operation. All this points to a conclusion that the Soviets may have been counting on "healthy forces" within the Chinese military to help shift Chinese policy toward rapprochement.

1975

As 1975 opened, the Soviet press continued to express the two "lines" of the previous year, but with one important change: Mao's weakness was openly displayed, and his compromises with other Peking leaders began to be discussed explicitly. It is very likely that the Soviets were emboldened by events early in the new year, which showed the serious erosion of Mao's political power.

In January, in anticipation of the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in Peking, Izvestiia carried an article on the internal political situation in China. Referring to foreign press reports, the article noted that the central power in China was weakening, and that rivalry in the ruling circles was intensifying. According to Izvestiia.

...preparations for the session of the National People's Congress, which has not met for 10 years, are encountering difficulties and creating discord. It is reported that the list of proposed deputies is being continuously revised and that the date of the session has not yet been set. Serious problems persist in the army, in which shuffling of military personnel is continuing.⁴⁵

Immediately prior to the 4th NPC, Peking leaders held the Second Plenum of the 10th Central Committee, in which forum was announced the election of Teng Hsiao-ping to the vice-chairmanship of the CC and to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Mao did not attend the plenum. During the NPC Teng was named first Vice-Premier of the State Council, and later was appointed Chief of Staff of the PLA. Neither did Mao attend the NPC.⁴⁶ The Amended State Constitution announced at the NPC was not at all favorable to Mao. While "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought" was declared the theoretical foundation

that determined the thinking of the state, Mao's personal leadership was not recognized. Moreover, he received no formal state post, although as Party Chairman he retained leadership of the armed forces.⁴⁷ The unprecedented circumstances of a CC plenum being held without the presence of the Party's chairman, and his disadvantageous personal position reflected in the results of the NPC, lead to the conclusion that Mao deliberately disassociated himself from these events. On the other hand, Teng's star rose. He was one of five vice-chairmen of the Party, the first among the newly designated vice-premiers (and acted as Premier as Chou En-lai's health worsened), and acquired a powerful position in the army.⁴⁸ Mao, at the very least, could not have been happy with the political events of January 1975.

On 5 February, an "analysis" of China's new constitution appeared in Pravda. The article noted that the Congress which had approved the new constitution was "a kind of a compromise between competing groups in Peking's ruling clique."⁴⁹ Just a few days later, a Pravda article which focussed on recent military appointments went further in suggesting Maoist weakness. The commentator stated that while overall leadership of China's armed forces was in the hands of Mao Tse-tung, in accordance with the new constitution, the practical leadership and day-to-day supervision of the army would be divided up among representatives of several competing groups, "not one of which has gained a dominant position." This suggested to the author a "highly temporary" compromise, which did not eliminate the sharp disagreement among the Peking leadership. The article stressed that

while there was an intention to avoid concentrating military power in the hands of any one leader, "as it had been under Lin Piao," nevertheless, the role of the army in China's domestic life was being increased, by assigning it essentially police functions. Moreover, the army would play an important role in the struggle for power:

Each of the groups contending for leadership of the country is counting on turning the armed forces into a reliable source of support during any possible upheaval, once it has finally established control over them.⁵⁰

The author, citing past tensions in relations between the army and the regime, further implied that Mao and his followers could not count on support from the army, and noted that "opposition to the Mao Tse-tung line has appeared with especial strength precisely in army circles."⁵¹ In short, this article clearly expressed the notion that the Chinese military was the key force in future Chinese political developments. It is logical then, that if the Chinese armed forces were a vital target of influence, to be exploited by various Peking leaders, then they could be no less important to the designs of Soviet strategists. Indeed, as 1975 progressed, the Soviets frequently spoke and acted in ways which could be interpreted as attempts to exploit the military aspects of the Chinese power struggle.

Mao's January domestic difficulties presented the Soviets with circumstances under which border negotiations might resume, and on 12 February the head of the Soviet delegation returned to Peking.⁵² It is possible that the Soviets had acted quickly to exploit Mao's weakness before a new Maoist campaign could gain a foothold, for

just a few days earlier, on 9 February, an editorial in People's Daily enjoined the Chinese people to "study well the dictatorship of the proletariat," and to read the documents of the NPC in this context.⁵³ This editorial warned of the danger emanating from the "bourgeois right," and signalled a broad new campaign by Mao against this "class enemy."⁵⁴ On 8 March, Pravda took note of this new political campaign, particularly the fact that in a report to the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973 Chou En-lai had said:

Lin Piao's antiparty clique was nothing but a handful of people; it was extremely isolated from the entire party, the entire army, and the people of the entire country and could not affect the situation as a whole.⁵⁵

Yet, in February 1975, precisely the opposite was being asserted in Chinese articles dealing with "the study of the dictatorship of the proletariat":

Lin Piao's antiparty clique represented an entire class; there were class roots and a social basis for its formation.⁵⁶

The Pravda commentator concluded that the result of this campaign would be "the slaughter of honest communists and workers," as during the Cultural Revolution.

The Soviet trepidations expressed in this article may have been well-founded, for the campaign apparently restored Mao's position sufficiently, so that by the latter part of March he was able to make an indirect overture to the US. Specifically, on 20 March a meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC took a decision to "pardon and release" all war criminals in custody, including a number

of Kuomintang officers. Hua Kuo-feng, who as Vice-Premier of the State Council and PRC, but especially as Minister of Public Security, undoubtedly played an important role in this event, declared at the meeting that "This act embodies the policy of Chairman Mao." Chou En-lai was also depicted as having had a hand in the decision.⁵⁷

A few days later, articles in Pravda and Izvestia revealed that the pardoned criminals had been warmly welcomed at a reception in their honor by Minister of Defense Yeh Chien-ying, and Hua Kuo-feng. But, beyond pardoning old Nationalist enemies, Peking announced as well that it had invited Taiwan to send a team to participate in the Third All-Chinese Games to be held in September.⁵⁸

My interpretation of these events is that they were intended by Mao to cement the relationship between the US and PRC during a period of time when a serious disproportion in the balance of forces in favor of the USSR, and against China, was emerging in Southeast Asia. In my opinion, the events signified a reaffirmation of the 1972 "Shanghai Communique" issued by President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai, which acknowledged that Taiwan was a part of China and that it was up to the Chinese themselves to work out a solution to their mutual problems.⁵⁹ That is, Mao's effort seems to have been an attempt to reduce the nagging "Two-China Problem," which had long been an obstacle to better Sino-American relations. This, I believe, makes sense, especially in the context of a precipitously deteriorating South Vietnamese position at this time, under the onslaught of

Soviet-supplied North Vietnamese troops.⁶⁰ A North Vietnamese-dominated Southeast Asia, with concomitant Soviet influence, would have been disadvantageous to the Chinese. It would also have been personally disadvantageous to Mao. It would not only tend to limit the international influence necessary for Mao to sustain a policy independent of the Soviet Union, but the failure of the US to prevent the rout could be exploited by Mao's pro-Soviet adversaries in the power struggle as exemplifying the unreliability of the US as an ally. This Sino-Soviet dimension of the conflict in Southeast Asia was undoubtedly an important issue of dispute among Chinese leaders, and Mao's "campaign to study the dictatorship of the proletariat" may be viewed as an effort to eliminate his opponents as strategic questions came to the fore. In addition to his domestic campaign and his overture to the United States, Mao took other initiatives in the world arena.

The Chinese were at that time working to secure for themselves a position of influence in Southeast Asia by aiding the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and by efforts to depict the USSR as a supporter of the Lon Nol regime. The Soviet Union, in turn, declared solidarity with the Cambodian Communist "patriots,"⁶¹ and flaunted a letter of gratitude from Norodom Sihanouk to N.V. Podgorny.⁶² Nevertheless, after the "liberation" of Phnom Penh on 17 April, and Saigon on 30 April, the Soviets showed that they were dissatisfied with the outcome of events in Southeast Asia by their reference to the "alarming

state of affairs in Indochina and the persisting hostilities in Cambodia."⁶³

At about the same time, the Chinese were trying to conclude a "treaty of peace and friendship" with Japan which was to include a special point, directed against the Soviet Union, on preventing the "hegemony of third powers."⁶⁴ The Soviets, who had for several years (particularly since the 21th CPSU Congress in 1971) been courting the Japanese to assist in the strategic development of the Soviet Far East,⁶⁵ were alarmed at this Chinese initiative to drive a wedge into Soviet-Japanese relations.⁶⁶ China's position in these negotiations was thoroughly denounced by Moscow,⁶⁷ as were China's simultaneous efforts to secure allies elsewhere in the world.⁶⁸

These Chinese actions represented efforts to ameliorate China's inferior position of influence in Asia, and break out of the "containment-of-China" position established by the Soviet Union. Moreover, these events seemed to exhibit the imprimatur of Mao. Simultaneously with efforts to enhance China's global influence, Mao was able to strengthen his own position, and the measure of success achieved by the "campaign to study the dictatorship of the proletariat," was likely enhanced by the death in April of an important Teng supporter, Tung Pi-wu.⁶⁹

In late May, an editorial was published in People's Daily, marking the fifth anniversary of Mao's statement condemning US imperialism.⁷⁰ This editorial has been interpreted as suggesting that the argument in favor of a shift of Chinese alignments away

from the United States and toward the Soviet Union may have had its advocates among the leadership.⁷¹ That such an argument had been advanced is not in question. What is relevant, however, is whether that argument had begun to predominate in Chinese policy. In fact, it had not, if the editorial itself can be considered reliable evidence. In the editorial, Mao's document was not reproduced in full, and the excerpt cited--one alluding to the possibility that big countries could be defeated by small countries--was not one of the most hostile passages in the original. Additionally, the analogy was made between the confirmed ability to defeat US imperialism (presumably in Southeast Asia) and the potential to defeat Soviet social-imperialism.⁷² That is, it is possible to view the editorial as advancing the argument that closer relations with the US would not result in the subjugation of China, a decidedly "Maoist" formulation.

The nature and success of the Maoist campaign were indicated in articles which appeared in the Soviet press in the latter part of June. A 24 June article in Izvestiia noted that Mao had demanded an intensification of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to extirpate "newborn bourgeois elements" (newly rehabilitated cadres--R.L.F.) which threatened the "restoration of capitalism" in China.⁷³ (That is to say, the campaign was directed against those Chinese leaders who would seek a "revisionist" victory of the type Mao claimed had been achieved by Khrushchev and Brezhnev,

who had "restored capitalism" in the Soviet Union.⁷⁴) Izvestia further commented that in prosecuting this offensive the Maoists relied above all on the public security agencies, the army, and home-guard paramilitary forces.⁷⁵ A slightly earlier article in Pravda spelled out some of the details of the intensified "factional struggle... among the various groups of Maoists contending for full power":

It is believed that the so-called left-wing grouping, which includes, among others, Chiang Ching (Mao Tse-tung's wife) and Chang Chun-chiao, members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, and certain other figures has managed to establish control over the Ministry of Public Security and has secured the support of some army leaders. Taking advantage of these positions, the "left-wing" grouping has been able to shoulder aside the "moderates," whose leader, Chou En-lai, who has been in a hospital for more than a year, has appreciably curtailed his political activity and, according to some observers, has become a kind of "prisoner" of Chiang Ching and her confederates.⁷⁶

This report went far in implying the strength of Mao's position. It implicitly acknowledged that Hua Kuo-feng was then in Mao's "camp" (as he probably had been since the release of the "war criminals"-- R.L.F.), and that the expanded powers and punitive functions of his ministry were at Mao's disposal in his campaign, and that Mao had supporters in the army and in the Politburo. Moreover, the reference to Chou suggests that he was unable to use his political influence in any manner inconsistent with Mao's supporters. The suggestion was that Mao was prevailing in the struggle for power. This analysis is further reinforced by the Soviet use of the phrase "various groups of Maoists." Of course, not all of those contending for "full power" were Maoists, but by characterizing all the factions as "Maoists,"

the Soviets implicitly admitted to the strength of Mao's "camp" at that time, without sacrificing the flexibility to denounce any unfavorable outcome of the power struggle. Nevertheless, this article by no means suggested that the struggle for power was settled in favor of Mao's supporters, particularly because they had secured the support of only "some" army leaders. Indeed, within a very short time events turned significantly against Mao, and his degree of control over the army became an important issue.

Events of the Summer suggested that Mao's regime was under fire over domestic dissatisfactions. On 20 August, Pravda reported workers' and peasants' disturbances in a number of Chinese provinces, apparently beginning in mid-July. Mao had ordered the army to restore order, but had to use troops from neighboring districts because some of the troops from the local garrisons had gone over to the workers' side. A purge of local Party and military officials followed suppression of the disturbances. The article emphasized the workers' dissatisfaction with their standard of living, but far more importantly, repeated the themes of the unreliability of certain army troops and Mao's difficulty in controlling political-military processes and personalities distant from the center.⁷⁷

Then in late Summer and early Fall, Tyl i Snabzhenie (The Rear and Supply) published two articles "in honor of the 30th anniversary of the victory over militarist Japan," which detailed the speed and magnitude of the transfer of Soviet troops and material to the far-Eastern front upon the declaration of war against Japan,

and emphasized that the experience gained in that campaign was the subject of continuing study--an implied warning to China. In case there was any doubt that they were pertinent to present-day China, the articles ended by accusing the Maoists of falsifying the major role of the USSR in defeating Japan and assisting in the Chinese revolution, and declared that Soviet soldiers were poised on the border of the USSR, ready to fight for socialism.⁷⁸ Of course, it is not possible to assert that these particular articles were read in Peking, but they were representative of an intense Soviet propaganda campaign which undoubtedly came to the attention of Chinese leaders. At that time, articles in Pravda and Izvestia, as well as in other newspapers, journals and books, repeated the theme that decisive Soviet military and economic assistance was instrumental in the liberation of China, stressed the reliability of the Soviet Union as a "friend and ally" of the Chinese people, and called for a normalization of relations between the two countries.⁷⁹ Of particular note in this Soviet press campaign was the emphasis upon "extensive unselfish help" given by the USSR to the Chinese revolutionary armed forces. Once again, this theme may be interpreted as an appeal to certain older Chinese military leaders, many of whom were trained by Soviet officers during the earlier period of economic and military cooperation. This is logical, particularly in the context of the intensification of the debate among the Peking leadership over the strategic orientation of China.

Indeed, by the Autumn of 1975 the power struggle had intensified, and the strategic orientation of China was explicitly seen to be a major issue of contention among the Chinese leadership. An editorial in People's Daily of 4 September launched a new Maoist campaign against "capitulationism," that is, in the words of the editorial, "class capitulation at home and national capitulation in foreign affairs."⁸⁰ Since this editorial brought the foreign policy issue out in the open, and was quite consistent with Mao's earlier campaigns against the "revisionist line," there can be little doubt that it was directed against those leaders who favored rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

That the foreign policy issue had taken on new emphasis in the Fall, and that Mao seemed to be enjoying a measure of success, may be inferred from the proliferation of Chinese statements hostile to the Soviet Union during that time.⁸¹ Nevertheless, any assessment of Mao's apparent success must be tempered by consideration of Chou En-lai's complete withdrawal from public life in early September. As the "main architect of the policy of improving relations with the USA,"⁸² his support in foreign policy was important to Mao. His absence from the political scene could not have been to Mao's advantage, but could be viewed as useful to Teng Hsiao-ping, who had been engaged in "rehabilitating" and restoring to positions of responsibility veteran Party officials and PLA cadres—particularly as Chou's health critically deteriorated.⁸³ During Chou's incapacitation, and until his death in

early January, Teng acted in the capacity of Premier. Teng was unquestionably at the height of his power.

The Soviets appear to have detected Mao's vulnerability, for on 16 September 1975 they demanded that the Chinese return the helicopter and crew captured in China on 14 March 1974.⁸⁴ Since no such public demand had been made in over a year, it is possible that Moscow resurrected the issue to probe Mao's defenses, and perhaps "heat up" the conflict within the Chinese leadership. Eventually, Moscow's initiative would be rewarded. This specific Soviet initiative may have represented Moscow's evaluation of Maoist weakness and, furthermore, Soviet propaganda in general directed against China during the Winter of 1975 was optimistic in tone and conceded little strength to the "leftists." One important article declared that, "no matter how complicated the present conditions are in China, the Soviet people understand that in the end the Chinese people will find the way to occupy a single rank with the peoples of the socialist states..."⁸⁵ A subsequent article elaborated on the "way": the hope for China lay in the coming to power of those persons "blackened" during the Cultural Revolution (that is, Teng and his supporters—R.L.F.), some of whom had been rehabilitated and restored to their former jobs.⁸⁶

Indeed, with increasing numbers of Teng's supporters being rehabilitated, Mao was in a disadvantageous position to pursue his anti-Soviet course. Additionally, the dismissal of US Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in November, concurrently with Sino-American negotiations for President Ford's visit, was viewed with dismay by

Mao, and strengthened the pro-Soviet faction within the Chinese hierarchy.⁸⁷ Thus, when Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford visited China, in late October and early December, respectively, they met with a politically weakened Mao and a strengthened Teng.⁸⁸ In reporting on the President's visit, the Soviet press noted that the Chinese wanted the US to intensify its role in South and Southeast Asia.⁸⁹ The Soviet press also stressed the theme that there was wide divergence between the Chinese and US positions, manifested in the fact that no communique was issued at the end of the talks.⁹⁰ It seems likely that in the absence of a clear public expression of American support, Mao's position was undermined. Moreover, the death in December of another important Mao supporter, Kang Sheng, contributed further to Mao's disadvantage.⁹¹

On 23 December, Mao announced a further release of former Kuomintang officers, perhaps in an attempt to mitigate the course of events, which was going against him.⁹² Mao's weakness may be inferred from the announcement in Peking on 27 December, that the Soviet helicopter crew detained by the "Chinese public security organs" since 14 March 1974 had been released.⁹³ While Chinese and Soviet versions of the circumstances of the helicopter's capture differed considerably (the Chinese referred to it as an "armed reconnaissance helicopter," while the Soviets maintained it was a medical aircraft), the Chinese public security organs considered "credible" the Soviet crew's claim that the intrusion into China was unintentional, and had decided to release the crew and helicopter.⁹⁴ Because this clearly friendly

overture to the Soviet Union had to be authorized at a high level, the implication is that Teng had played an important role in this action, and had secured the support of other Chinese leaders—much to the detriment of Mao.⁹⁵

The contradictory events in China at the end of 1975 clearly attested to the intense struggle among the leadership, which continued into the new year.

The Soviet press in 1975 noted Mao's compromises with his associates, stressed the theme that Mao faced increasing opposition--especially in the armed forces, and even suggested that central control over the military was an "open question." Soviet statements which were appeals to certain Chinese military leaders continued in 1975, and a theme of Soviet support for rehabilitated cadres became apparent. Moreover, at several important junctures, when Mao exhibited particular weakness, the Soviets took action to keep pressure on Mao and his supporters. Consequently, these Soviet words and actions in 1975 may be viewed as efforts to influence the course of Chinese political life, and in this respect they cannot be distinguished from Soviet policies in 1974.

It is noteworthy that in 1975 pressure was kept on Mao and his supporters indirectly, by successful Soviet military action directed against Chinese interests in Southeast Asia and Africa, during a period of American weakness, rather than by direct military pressure on the Sino-Soviet border. It is possible that the Soviets reduced pressure

on the border to underscore their propaganda appeals to the Chinese military and rehabilitated cadres, who seem to have been important targets of Soviet policy. Indeed, such appeals would become more important as the power struggle intensified.

1976

On 1 January 1976 (one week before the death of Chou), the New Year's Day editorial in People's Daily signalled a new stage in the power struggle.⁹⁶ A subsequent Chinese article showed that the editorial had been directed against Teng.⁹⁷ The impending death of Chou and the necessity of appointing a new premier had precipitated a crisis for Mao. Teng, having long acted as de facto Premier, was in line for the job, and if he became premier would be in a position to succeed Mao. Mao successfully took action to prevent Teng from acceding to the premiership, and on 7 February the Chinese announced that Hua Kuo-feng was the new Premier.⁹⁸ The Soviet press reported the "split" in the CCP Central Committee which resulted in Hua being appointed Acting Premier, rather than Teng, bypassing the constitutional procedure which provided for the candidate's approval at a session of the National People's Congress upon the candidate's proposal by a Plenum of the CCP CC.⁹⁹ The announcement of a "split," and the appointment of an "outsider," that is, a man not then a vice-premier or a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, clearly indicated the compromise nature of Hua's promotion. Hua's title of "Acting" Premier further reinforces the notion that his appointment did not resolve the leadership dispute.

The significance of this latest stage in the Chinese power struggle was examined at length in a commentary which appeared in Pravda on 13 February. First, the commentator noted that attacks were being aimed against Party and State cadres (in Maoist terminology, "capitulationists" and "revisionists invested with power") who had been re-

pressed during the Cultural Revolution, but who had been recently restored to their posts. Second, the commentator observed that the deaths of Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, and Kang Sheng had left three vacancies in the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo and in State posts, and that the "leftists," who controlled the propaganda apparatus, were relying on Mao to strengthen their position--although his physical frailty was becoming more apparent. (In this context, the question of high-level vacancies would be directly connected to the question of who would succeed Mao--R.L.F.). Third, the commentator claimed that there was widespread sentiment among leadership cadres in favor of a "realistic" domestic and foreign policy associated with the so-called "moderate" or "pragmatic" line of representatives of the administrative and military apparatus. These "moderates" were strengthening their positions in the course of solving current state and economic problems. Fourth, the author addressed the meaning of Hua's appointment:

It should be noted that the course of events has led to the emergence in China of a stratum of party and state leaders who have not yet compromised themselves by taking a stand against the "leftists" and who are loyal to Mao Tse-tung, but at the same time their political biographies seem to assign them to the same category of key officials of the older and middle generations as the "moderates." For instance, Hua Kuo-feng, who, according to the Western press, was a compromise selection for the post of Acting Premier of the State Council, has been called a representative of this stratum within the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee.¹⁰⁰

In this connection, it is interesting to note an additional statement by the commentator:

Up to now Mao Tse-tung has systematically supported the "leftists," at the same time keeping the possibility of maneuver open and assuming the role of an "arbitrator" standing above the groupings.¹⁰¹

Here, the author thus implied that Mao might withdraw his support from the "leftists," in order to maintain some control over the choice of a successor, in the face of strong opposition by "moderates."

Indeed, the article as a whole suggested that the "leftists" were relying on an enfeebled Mao, that his support might end even before his death, and that Hua's personal loyalty to Mao did not militate against his inclusion in the ranks of "moderates" after Mao's departure from the political scene. The author's characterization of Mao as an "arbitrator," rather than a participant in the power struggle, was clearly erroneous in view of the oscillations in his personal political power. It is possible, however, to interpret this statement as a Soviet implication that Mao's physical power and political influence were so diminished that his continued existence would have little effect on the course of Chinese political life—except to the possible detriment of his supporters.

The Soviet commentary notwithstanding, Mao's New Year's campaign against Teng seemed to meet with additional success by the end of February, when former President Nixon visited China.¹⁰² The visit evidently was intended to symbolize Mao's dissatisfaction with the current state of Sino-US relations, and signified an appeal for fulfillment by the US of agreements made personally between Mao and Nixon regarding the balance of forces in Asia.¹⁰³ This gesture showed that Mao was still able to make his will felt among the Chinese leadership.

Nevertheless, the Soviets pressed their characterization of Mao as a spectator in the power struggle between "leftists" and "pragmatists." A 2 April article in Izvestia, while noting that "Mao is behind this entire struggle," said that the "leftists" were "trying to use him in their interests." The author observed that the campaign against Teng had become "fierce," and that a 28 March editorial in People's Daily had quoted Mao as saying of Teng that "this person draws no distinction between imperialism and Marxism, between white cats and black."¹⁰⁴ This phrase unmistakably refers to the strategic issue of China's international alignment. That is, a distinction must be drawn between capitulating to the "social-imperialism" of the USSR in order to develop and protect China, and following an independent path of development, that chosen by Mao, which does not foreswear Western involvements. The likelihood that this was a fundamental issue in the power struggle was reinforced by the author's comment that, "The question of China's economic situation has been chosen as a pretext for this struggle."¹⁰⁵

The climax of the campaign against Teng occurred in early April, beginning with the "incident" in Tien An Men Square. The "incident" began with the placement of posters and wreaths commemorating Chou En-lai on the traditional Chinese holiday of remembrance of the dead on 4 April. Several of the posters not only eulogized Chou, but contained remarks easily construed as attacking Mao. The posters and wreaths were removed by police, soldiers and militia. The next

day, secondary school students were prevented from placing new posters, wreaths and a portrait of Chou, and demonstrations ensued which lasted all day and into the evening. The demonstrations were quelled that night when Wu Teh, Mayor of Peking, backed up by PLA troops and militiamen, addressed the crowd and declared their activities "counter-revolutionary." In the wake of the demonstrations the Politburo met on 7 April and declared Hua Kuo-feng first Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier of the State Council, and dismissed Teng from all posts inside and outside the Party--although he was allowed to retain his Party membership.¹⁰⁶

The Chinese press seemed to welcome the demonstrations as an affirmation of the usefulness of the long-standing campaign to root out "bourgeois elements" in the Party and society, for their existence was graphically demonstrated by the "incident."¹⁰⁷ Another interpretation of these events is that the demonstrations were staged by Teng's opponent to "prove" his threat and precipitate his removal. This analysis is supported by the reasoning that, after the 28 March editorial which seemed to foredoom his political career, the subsequent "anti-Maoist" demonstrations could not have redounded to Teng's benefit.¹⁰⁸

The public Soviet analysis of events at Tien An Men in part coincided with the Chinese pronouncement that the demonstrations were "anti-Maoist" in character,¹⁰⁹ but went beyond this formulation in claiming that the domestic political struggle in China was becoming more acute and more complicated. Specifically, the "complication" was due to "an increasing process of demarcation in Chinese society,"

and "new groups of working people who oppose the Maoist leadership" being drawn into the struggle. The demonstrations, claimed the Soviets, were an expression of widening dissatisfaction with the Maoist course:

The Mao group's renunciation of the construction of socialism in China, which condemns the country to political isolation and economic stagnation, is having an ever greater effect on the development of the country's political life.¹¹⁰

But since an earlier Soviet commentary had noted that the "question of China's economic situation" was merely a "pretext,"¹¹¹ the present reference to "political isolation and economic stagnation" expressed the Soviet formulation that the question of China's strategic orientation dominated the dispute among the Chinese leaders.¹¹²

The mention of "new groups" who "oppose the Maoist leadership policies" raised important questions related to Mao's personal power. Specifically, it is possible that this statement alluded to the "emergence in China of a stratum of party and state leaders," referred to earlier in the Soviet press, who were loyal to Mao, but who, like Hua Kuo-feng, biographically resembled the "moderates."¹¹³ If this is so, then the importance of Hua's initial appointment as Acting Premier on 7 February, and his appointment as Premier and Party first Vice-Chairman two months later, must be carefully considered. The promotion of Hua was obviously a compromise, but the degree to which it weakened Mao may have been considerable. For example, after Teng was passed over, six of China's eleven military regions still remained under the command of Teng's appointees.¹¹⁴

Moreover, even after Teng's political demise, several "moderates" who had not been seen since the beginning of the anti-Teng campaign, returned to public life.¹¹⁵ These events support the conclusion that a "deal" had been made in Peking by which Teng was deposed, but in return the "leftists" had to moderate their campaign.¹¹⁶ The possibility that Mao had to make important concessions to "Teng's group" in early 1976 may account for Soviet insistence in press articles of that time that the power struggle was essentially out of his hands. But beyond recognizing that Mao's concessions to his opponents were symptomatic of his weakened political position, the Soviets acted in print to exploit this weakness by making a significant overture to the new Premier, Hua Kuo-feng, in late April.

On 28 April, an article in Pravda called on the Chinese to return to the negotiating table, and implied an entirely new public Soviet proposal for normalizing the Sino-Soviet border situation. The author departed from previous (and subsequent) Soviet statements that the Chinese had demanded the return of 1.5 million square kilometers of territory, by noting, besides the Chinese demand, that specifically 33,000 square kilometers of territory were in dispute.¹¹⁷ This was the first public Soviet expression of the area technically contested in Sino-Soviet border negotiations, and while, therefore, not actually a new Soviet bargaining position, it did bring the precise border issue into the open and contradicted Maoist claims of Soviet intransigence. In this respect, the article can be viewed as an attempt to undermine the anti-Soviet position within the

Chinese leadership, and to offer the new Premier an opportunity to take the initiative in a less hostile stance toward the USSR. In mid-June, the Soviets reaffirmed their 28 April "feeler" for better relations with China.¹¹⁸

Also in June, the possibility of a "deal" between Mao and his opponents was acknowledged in the Soviet press. An article in the 17 June Prawda noted that while there appeared to be general unanimity in the Chinese press in its praise of the Cultural Revolution, and in condemnation of "capitalist roaders," there was obviously "a split in the country unequalled in intensity since the late 1960's":

The important question now is whether the so-called "leftists" will find the strength to change policy despite opposition throughout the country...Since the disorders in Peking, China watchers have been debating whether the rise of the "leftists" signifies a possible change in the political line adopted by Teng Hsia-ping's group.¹¹⁹

Since only a few weeks earlier the Soviet press had referred to the intensified Maoist campaign against the "arising" bourgeoisie within the Party, and to Mao's appeal to use the masses to "carry to the finish" the rout of Teng Hsiao-ping's supporters,¹²⁰ the possibility of a "change in the political line" by Teng's group suggested collusion between Teng's supporters and their Maoist opponents. Moreover, the question of "whether the so-called 'leftists' would find the strength to change policy," clearly indicated that the Soviets wished to imply a shift in influence away from the "leftists," and that the "rise of the 'leftists'" hinged upon a "deal" with Teng's supporters.

Not long afterwards, the Chinese, in one of their sharpest attacks on the United States in months, demanded withdrawal of all American forces from Korea and declared anew their determination to "liberate" Taiwan.¹²¹ At first glance, this clearly implied shift away from the Maoist position of ameliorating the "two-China problem." However, this apparent change must be tempered by the fact that the statement was made in connection with the 26th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, and so may have been merely rhetorical. Moreover, subsequently Chinese officials in Peking complained to Western visitors about the frequent "incidents" along the Sino-Soviet border, indicating that no lessening of Chinese-Soviet tensions had occurred.¹²²

By the Summer of 1976 the Soviets had decided to make their public position on Chinese domestic affairs explicit and unequivocal. In August, an article in Kommunist set forth a clear Soviet exposition of the situation in China, and announced Soviet expectations with respect to political events. Briefly, the article stressed the notion that because Mao had departed from the course of Marxism-Leninism, the socialist gains of the Chinese revolution had been all but undone, and now the petty bourgeoisie, rather than the proletariat, ruled China.¹²³ If this situation was not reversed, continued Kommunist, there was the danger that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie could fall under the domination of the foreign bourgeoisie.¹²⁴ Mao, by enlisting the support of the most reactionary segment of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie, had acted contrary to the

interests of the wide mass of the population—particularly the dissatisfied peasants. Objectively, this dissatisfaction could play a most important role in bringing down the Maoist regime, but it was not by itself decisive: "Very much here depends on a subjective factor, in part, on how correctly this or that leader points out the path to a spontaneous movement."¹²⁵ The article left no doubt as to who should lead the "spontaneous movement," or as to which path it should follow:

...objective reality demands a return to the healthy political course accepted by the Chinese Communists in 1956, ended with the revolution of 1966, to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, (and) other countries of the socialist commonwealth in the name of the interests of China itself.¹²⁶

The Soviets were saying that Chinese leaders who had advocated a "healthy political course," and were therefore expunged during the Cultural Revolution, but had since been rehabilitated, would be preferred by Moscow. In support of such leaders, the article set forth Moscow's promise of "a better form of international assistance to the Communists and workers of the PRC, rising to the struggle against Maoist autocracy."¹²⁷ The article concluded, characteristically, with an expression of Soviet willingness to normalize relations with China.

Beyond the obvious implications of this article with respect to the questions of succession and rapprochement, two additional implications should be noted. First, by emphasizing the petty-bourgeois character of Chinese society, the Soviets were establishing the theoretical basis for a new socialist revolution in China.

The Soviet formulation provided a before-the-fact rationalization, potentially useful to "healthy forces" who might request Soviet assistance in their struggle against Mao. Second, "bourgeois" had been an epithet used by Mao against his enemies. Here, it was being used to characterize Mao and his group, and was combined with the accusation that Mao had led China to the brink of foreign dominations. It is noteworthy that two months later Mao's "leftist" supporters were being denounced in China in terms consistent with this article.¹²⁸ That is, the rapidly changing events in China actually came to resemble the Soviet polemic! This is not, of course, to impute a connection between this article and the ultimate fall of the "Gang of Four," but it is nevertheless interesting to consider that the Soviet commentary quite specifically supported the position of Chinese leaders seeking to discredit Mao's supporters.

When the Kommunist article appeared in August, China was undergoing a period of increasing political unrest. Reportedly, factional disputes had occurred in several big cities, and national political issues were being manipulated to serve local factional ends.¹²⁹ It is likely that the "Popular Tree Incident" in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, and the US and Chinese reaction to it, figured importantly in high-level Chinese debate. Following the murder of two US Army officers in Panmunjom by North Korean soldiers, "informed officials" in Washington reported that Peking, at Washington's request, had played a major role in Pyongyang's abrupt switch from

aggressiveness to a less hostile stance.¹³⁰ This represented an important decision for China's leadership, in that it contradicted earlier public professions of support for North Korea, and showed that China had no objections to the US presence in South Korea. The decision to accede to the US request likely represented a defeat for pro-Soviet Chinese leaders, who might have hoped to parlay US-North Korean hostilities into a request for "fraternal assistance" from the USSR.

Mao apparently played his last card immediately before his death on 9 September. At a banquet in honor of former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuanhua declared that the rivalry for "world hegemony" was growing and was "bound to lead to a new world war."¹³¹ In this connection, according to Chiao, the Soviet Union was the main threat to peace. Chiao praised Schlesinger's assessment of the Soviet Union, but in remarks which could be interpreted foremost as critical of pro-Soviet Chinese leaders, as well as Ford administration policies, he stated that,

Confronted with the expansionist ambitions of this superpower, some people try appeasement and concession or even sacrifice others in an attempt to protect themselves. This is, of course, wishful thinking.¹³²

Upon Mao's death, the Soviet Union set out in earnest to publicly show good intentions toward a post-Mao China. Press articles were "correct," even complimentary toward the memory of Mao.¹³³ Soviet officials visited the Chinese embassy in Moscow and signed the book of condolences.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, less than a week after

Mao's death the Soviets demonstrated that there had been no change in their propaganda "line" which earlier had expressed support for "healthy forces" and which attempted to undermine "radical" influence in the Chinese military. Specifically, on 14 September a Soviet radio broadcast featured a former Soviet military advisor to China, who appealed directly to those PLA commanders who had learned their craft with assistance from the USSR "to constantly tell your young fighters about the glorious tradition of Sino-Soviet militant friendship so as not to let them fall victim to anti-Soviet propaganda."¹³³ The implication was that the Soviets still hoped to exploit the struggle among the Chinese leaders for control over the military.

China continued to state publicly that her policy was still anti-Soviet, but there were contradictory expressions of her anti-Soviet stance. For example, an article in the Party's journal, Red Flag, called the USSR a "paper tiger," while a commentary by the official New China News Agency (NCNA) referred to the USSR as a "military menace."¹³⁶ My interpretation of this difference is that the statement in Red Flag represented the position of the pro-Soviet group in the Chinese leadership, for the Soviet Union, characterized as a "paper tiger," thus presented no threat to China. On the other hand, the NCNA commentary set forth the dissenting views of those who had supported a Maoist conception of the USSR.¹³⁷ I conclude, then, that the debate over China's strategic orientation was continuing into the post-Mao era.

The first high-level Soviet exposition of post-Mao "China policy" was articulated by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in a speech to the UN on 28 September. He appealed for a normalization of relations with the PRC, but also invoked long-standing Soviet proposals for an Asian security system and a nuclear test ban--measures long unpalatable to Peking.¹³⁸ However, as if to contrast with Gromyko's speech, an entirely new basis for Sino-Soviet rapprochement was published on 1 October, on the 27th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. In addition to the congratulations to the Chinese people and a call for normalization of relations, conveyed by both Pravda and Izvestia,¹³⁹ on that day an authoritative article by the pseudonymous and highly-placed I. Aleksandrov appeared in Pravda. The article, without once mentioning Mao, gave a resume of Chinese socialist achievements and Soviet assistance in these accomplishments since WWII. The author stressed all of the friendly gestures of the USSR toward China, and reaffirmed the Soviet desire to establish better relations with the PRC and "see China as a flourishing socialist power." Absent from the article was the usual rancor and condemnation of Chinese intransigence. Referring to the period of friendship and cooperation of the USSR and PRC, Aleksandrov stated:

Up to the 1960's the Chinese People's Republic, together with other peace-loving states, took an active part in solving major international problems and consistently favored the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the complete elimination of colonialism. During that time the Soviet Union warmly supported such important initiatives proposed by the Chinese People's Republic as

the creation of zones of peace in Asia and the Pacific Ocean and the signing of a security pact among the Asian countries, with the US participating.¹⁴⁰

The implication of this statement was that not only was the Soviet Union prepared to improve relations with China, but that the USSR might even support Chinese initiatives toward improving relations with the United States! The consequences of this declaration, if taken at face value, would be highly unfavorable to those Chinese leaders who had taken a position of unremitting hostility toward the USSR, and who sought instead independent development with Western assistance, namely, Mao, and his supporters, the so-called "radicals." With this statement, the Soviets eliminated the "objective" need for Chinese antagonism toward the USSR—thus undercutting the "radicals" position and enhancing the rationale for a "pro-Soviet" orientation.

Hua moved against the anti-Soviet "leftists," placing them under arrest with army assistance as early as 6 or 7 October, and at the same time the Politburo named Hua the new Chairman. There was some delay in the official public announcement of these events, raising the possibility that Hua had not yet completely secured his position.¹⁴¹ But despite the lack of immediate definitive confirmation of the political situation in China, reports of the arrest of Chiang Ching (Mme Mao) and other prominent "leftists" coincided with the appearance of wall-posters during the weekend of 9-10 October which announced that Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng was succeeding Mao as Party Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces.¹⁴²

As soon as the Soviets learned of these events, they tested the strength of Hua's position by unofficially "leaking" an ultimatum to the Chinese. The threat against China was conveyed in an article which was first published in the last two editions of the London Evening News on 12 October, and reprinted in the London Daily News and Paris France-Soir on 14 October.¹⁴³ The author was Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist and reported KGB operative who has on occasion been the instrument by which the Soviet leadership has made thinly-disguised threats against China. Particularly, his services had been used by the Soviets during the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969. On 16 September 1969, an article authored by Louis in the London Evening News brought the border crisis to a high-point. Louis indicated that the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which had justified the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, could be applied to China, that China's nuclear center at Lop Nor was a target of Soviet missiles, and that a leader might emerge from "anti-Mao forces" who would ask other socialist countries for "fraternal help."¹⁴⁴ The Soviet threat of intervention and nuclear bombardment induced the Chinese to negotiate over the boundary issue in October 1969.¹⁴⁵

This precedent, set in 1969, was apparently the rationale behind Louis' article of October 1976. Louis wrote that with the anti-Soviet "radicals" in disgrace, the time was ripe for rapprochement between the PRC and USSR. According to Louis, the Soviets were counting on Chinese military men who had been trained in the

USSR during the earlier period of military and economic cooperation, and who appreciated Soviet might, to swing the balance of Chinese policy to cooperation with the Soviet Union:

... it is generally believed in Moscow that there are still some Chinese military leaders of the older generation with whom it could still be possible to reach an agreement... (who) are capable of accurately assessing Soviet military might and of realizing that it is not a paper tiger.¹⁴⁶

Louis went on to imply that a majority of Soviet leaders were anxious to attack China, so the new Chinese policy should be forthcoming "within the coming month."¹⁴⁷

Soviet insistence, through Louis, that the USSR was not a "paper tiger," contradicted the official Chinese formulation, sanctioned by Hua Kuo-feng.¹⁴⁸ Since, in my analysis, the "leftists" in the Chinese leadership had claimed that the USSR was a "military menace," the Soviets could not advance a characterization of Soviet might identical to that of the "leftists," with impunity, until there was no danger of such a formulation being used by the anti-Soviet "leftists" to support their position. This, I believe, accounts for the timing of the indirect Soviet threat, that is, after the "leftists" were under arrest. However, the question of why the Soviets took such a bold step, out of character with other public expressions of good-will toward China, is less easily explained. The Soviet maneuver was intended to elicit a response, probably from the Chinese military, or even from Hua, himself, in order to test the degree of Hua's support in, or control over, the Chinese military. This would be entirely consistent with continuing Soviet

interest in the Chinese military as a force for rapprochement. Significantly, subsequent events showed that the Chinese did respond to Soviet overtures--perhaps to the threat--but this would not become evident until the end of October.

As if to answer the Soviets, the Chinese on 17 October conducted an underground nuclear test, and attributed its success to recent decisions of the CCP Central Committee "headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng."¹⁴⁹ The implication was that while Hua was in charge, he was not so firmly in power that the Chinese press could announce his accession to the chairmanship.

On the diplomatic front, the Soviets on 19 October conducted extensive meetings at the highest Party and state level with representatives of the MPR, and concluded negotiations in which "the participants...gave special attention to the tasks of securing peace, security and good-neighborliness in Asia on the basis of the combined strengthenings of all Asian states."¹⁵⁰ By repeating the long-standing formula for an Asian security scheme, which had been rejected by the Chinese, and by reconfirming Soviet-Mongolian solidarity, the Soviets implied that their policy of "containing" China would continue.

Similarly, Brezhnev's 25 October speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum implied that nothing had changed between the USSR and PRC. Brezhnev noted that a complicated political process was occurring in China, and that it was presently difficult to say what the future political course of the PRC would be. But it was already

clear that "the foreign policy line pursued by Peking in the course of a decade and a half, has been solidly discredited throughout the whole world."¹⁵¹ He then offered to restore relations with China on the basis of "peaceful coexistence," as with any other country, but further expressed the hope that good relations could be restored on the principles of "socialist internationalism." In this connection, he emphasized that in relations between the USSR and PRC "there are no questions which could not be resolved in the spirit of good-neighborliness. We will act in this direction further... (it) will depend upon which position will be taken by the other side."¹⁵²

Then, in a further bid for normalization, Brezhnev sent congratulations to "Comrade" Hua Kuo-feng on his formal accession to the post of CCP Chairman. The message was noteworthy because, for the first time in many years, a Chinese official was addressed as "Comrade," and because the nominal sender of the message was Brezhnev, rather than a Soviet organization. The Soviet greeting was rejected out of hand by the Chinese.¹⁵³

Despite the Chinese rejection, the Soviets through Victor Louis, conveyed the impression that the threat had worked and that there were indications that the Chinese had acted to improve Sino-Soviet relations. In an article which appeared first in the London Evening News on 29 October, and then in Paris France-Soir on 1 November, Louis reported from a Sino-Soviet border town that relations between customs officials had changed from hostile to amicable, and that anti-Soviet tracts had been removed from the Chinese Railway

station. Louis concluded that a "certain change" in Sino-Soviet relations had taken place in less than a month, "as...predicted."¹⁵⁴ Curiously, the official Soviet press at that time acknowledged no such "change" in Sino-Soviet relations, and on 2 November even complained that the Chinese press continued to repeat anti-Soviet attacks.¹⁵⁵

However, on 4 November, a Soviet editorial referred to Sino-Soviet relations in the language that Brezhnev had used in his 25 October speech, but with certain significant differences. Essentially, the editorial stated that relations between the two countries should be based on the principles of "socialist internationalism," that there were no issues between the USSR and PRC which could not be resolved in a spirit of "good-neighborliness," and that the matter depended upon the position the "other side" would take. The editorial varied from Brezhnev's earlier formulation in that the references to uncertainty over the future political course of China, and the offer to establish relations on the basis of "peaceful co-existence," were omitted.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the article conveyed the impression that China and the Soviet Union were on friendlier terms, and perhaps that China had accepted the "peaceful coexistence" proposal.

Further evidence that there had been a change in Sino-Soviet relations was contained in the congratulatory message sent by the PRC to the USSR on the 59th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. Superficially, there did not appear to be much difference between the current and past anniversary messages. For example, the Chinese stated that they would "support and develop inter-

state relations on the basis of the five principles" of peaceful coexistence, which was not a departure from the previous year. However, for the first time in seven years the message did not refer to the border problem, and did not tie improvement in Sino-Soviet relations to the solution of concrete problems.¹⁵⁷ Other events surrounding the anniversary proved equally interesting. At the traditional military parade there was no mention of China by Minister of Defense Marshal Dimitri F. Ustinov, whereas in 1975, a verbal attack on China by the late Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei A. Grechko provoked the Chinese Ambassador to leave the reviewing stand. Moreover, for the first time in about a decade, the ranking Chinese diplomat at the traditional evening celebration of the holiday held in the Kremlin, heard no anti-Chinese speeches and did not walk out.¹⁵⁸ Contemporaneously, on 8 November both Pravda and Izvestiia reported that a Soviet film documenting the October Revolution had been shown on Peking television, and would be shown throughout China.¹⁵⁹ Unquestionably, then, between October and November a change, apparently favorable to the Soviet Union, had indeed occurred in Sino-Soviet relations.

The Soviets attempted to reinforce the impression of an amelioration of hostilities between the two countries in a lengthy article published in Izvestiia on the 110th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen. The article stressed the value of the cooperative measures in Sino-Soviet relations championed by Sun, and the reverence of the USSR for this "great friend of the Soviet people." The article noted that in Sun's time it had been the imperialist powers which had

subjugated China, and, in a statement which could be interpreted as criticism of present-day Sino-American relations, observed that the Soviet Union had early-on sent to China an ambassador as a diplomatic representative, rather than an envoy, "as was the practice of the capitalist powers, which slighted China as a second-rate, dependent country."¹⁶⁰

Nevertheless, on 15 November China, in a speech by Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien at Peking's Great Hall of the People, flatly rejected a return to friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Clearly referring to Soviet efforts to portray an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, Li stated that the Soviets "kept creating false impressions of relaxation of relations." He dismissed this as "wishful thinking" and "daydreaming." The Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet-bloc diplomats had earlier walked out in protest at other remarks by Li.¹⁶¹

But the Soviets were hopeful that a rapprochement could be effected, and continued to cautiously express this view publicly. A 23 November Soviet press summary of the Chinese situation implied that the purge of the "leftists" and the current Chinese "balanced" reevaluation of political campaigns of the past ten years, including the Cultural Revolution, which revealed the negative side of these campaigns, were leading toward more moderate policies in cultural and economic matters--that is, policies followed before the Cultural Revolution.¹⁶²

Over the next few days, factional disputes and regional disturbances, which had been occurring in China for some time, intensified into armed clashes, and Hua sent troops to quell the fighting.¹⁶³ On the basis of press reports dispatched at that time, it is possible to conclude that the fighting in the provinces reflected the struggle for power occurring at the center, and that the root issue was potentially useful for the Soviet Union. For example, "military control" had to be established in Fukien Province, strategically located opposite Taiwan. The Fukien Provincial Party Leader, Liao Chih-kao, a close associate of Teng Hsiao-ping, had been purged during the Cultural Revolution and then rehabilitated in 1973. Liao had been the object of mob attacks in his province, reportedly instigated by Chiang Ching and her "leftist" cohorts.¹⁶⁴ Contemporaneously with the dispatch of troops to Fukien Province, there were indications from Peking that Teng Hsiao-ping might be returned to public office. For example, in his first major speech on 24 November, at the laying of a cornerstone for the Mao Mausoleum, Hua Kuo-feng omitted the criticism of Teng from a list of current policies, although in his eulogy to Mao on 17 September Hua had called for the Chinese people to "deepen the struggle to criticize Teng Hsiao-ping." Additionally, some Western analysts speculated that Teng had played a role in helping Hua organize support for the purge of the "leftists," and that his supporters, particularly army leaders, were pressing for his rehabilitation.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, there were signs that Chiao Kuan-Hua, China's Foreign Minister, had been accused of

"overzealousness" during the campaign against Teng, as well as having had associations with the "leftists," and that he would be removed from his post.¹⁶⁶ From these reports it is evident that as the end of November approached, the decision of whether or not to rehabilitate Teng Hsiao-ping was a matter of considerable dispute in China, and the sharpest disagreements could be viewed as being between Teng's supporters and his "leftist" detractors. His return to public life would have represented a victory for "moderate" civil and military cadres who represented Teng's "constituency," and, in my analysis, the prospect of his imminent restoration must have encouraged the Soviet Union in its quest for rapprochement.

In order to take immediate advantage of any sudden ascendancy of "moderate" forces, which would surely accompany the rehabilitation of Teng, the Soviets on 27 November sent the head of the Soviet government delegation on Sino-Soviet border settlement talks back to Peking. When he had left China the previous year, the chief Soviet negotiator had said he would not return until there was a good chance for substantive developments in the talks.¹⁶⁷

Then on 1 December, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress met to consider, among other issues, questions of "appointments and removals" of personnel.¹⁶⁸ As had been hinted in November, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua was removed and replaced by Huan Hua, the former PRC representative to the UN.¹⁶⁹ But not only was Teng not restored by the NPC Standing Committee, there were indications that Hua and his allies in the Party and military had formed an extended leadership group which included

several key military leaders outside the Politburo.¹⁷⁰ The implication was that Hua had been able to maintain the support of the military by conceding to them new positions of power in the leadership, yet at the same time exclude Teng. While the Soviets had good reason to welcome Hua's continued purge of the "leftists," they could not have been pleased with his apparent success in excluding the chief "moderate" from the leadership group, and in maintaining an anti-Soviet stand, while at the same time retaining support among the Chinese military.

The Soviets were apparently reluctant to criticize Hua for his slowness to move on rapprochement, but acknowledged the unfavorable character of Chinese public insistence that nothing had changed between the PRC and USSR:

In materials on international themes in the Chinese press, the same line goes on and on: the publication of articles with attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist states.¹⁷¹

The Chinese confirmed Moscow's worst suspicions that relations were not likely to soon improve by the publication at a national agricultural conference in December of Mao's previously largely unpublished 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships."¹⁷² In speaking of the relationship between China and other countries Mao had said:

Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries, learn all that is genuinely good in the political, economic, scientific and technological fields and in literature and art. But we must learn with an analytical and critical eye, not blindly, and we mustn't copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically. Naturally, we mustn't pick-up their shortcomings and weak points. We should adopt

the same attitude in learning from the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries... Some people never take the trouble to analyze, they simply follow the "wind." Today, when the north wind is blowing, they join the "north wind" school; tomorrow, when there is a west wind, they switch to the "west wind" school; afterwards when the north wind blows again, they switch back to the "north wind" school. They hold no independent opinion of their own and often go from one extreme to the other.

...We must firmly reject and criticize all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from learning the advanced sciences and technologies of capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in the management of their enterprises. 173

In a speech at the agricultural conference, Hua quoted from Mao's 1956 speech to say that "We must do our best to mobilize all positive factors to build China into a powerful socialist country."¹⁷⁴ By publishing Mao's speech and by invoking these words of Mao, Hua showed clearly that he intended to retain the option of a flexible foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union and the West. But even more explicitly, Hua claimed that the defeat of Chiang Ching's group had averted a civil war in China, and had prevented the "leftists" from "capitulating to imperialism and socialism," the terms ~~from~~ the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁵ However, the implied even-handed future course of Hua's policy could be questioned, for in his 1956 speech Mao had said of the USSR, "The Soviet Union differs from our country in that, firstly, tsarist Russia was an imperialist power and, secondly, it had the October Revolution. As a result, many people in the Soviet Union are conceited and very arrogant."¹⁷⁵

The Soviets, in summarizing Hua's speech, dropped the title "Comrade," and focused on those statements dealing with turmoil in China-- thus implying that the political situation in China had not yet worked itself out. Soviet dissatisfaction with Hua was quite evident in the article's conclusion:

Hua Kuo-feng's speech and related propaganda materials (presumably Mao's speech--R.L.F.) contained attacks against so-called "social-imperialists" and so forth, which have long been used in China for slandering the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.¹⁷⁷

Thus, at the end of 1974, the Soviets were confronted with a new Chinese leadership which promised to carry on a foreign policy of "Maoism without Mao," essentially unfavorable to the Soviet Union, for it seemed to foreswear rapprochement, and left unresolved the long-standing problem of strategic security on the USSR's southern border.

1976 represented a transition period for China--and for the Soviet Union as well. That is, the Soviets were forced to try different approaches in an effort to deal successfully with the new Chinese leadership. The Soviets in no way departed from their objective of achieving rapprochement with China, and engaged in several tactical maneuvers aimed at achieving their goal. Soviet policy in 1976, reflected primarily in propaganda efforts, was quite consistent with Soviet policy of the previous two years. The propaganda "line" expressing support for "healthy forces," particularly rehabilitated cadres, continued in 1976, and became quite explicit. It is interesting to note that Soviet appeals for the loyalty of Chinese military leaders were undisguised, and were voiced before

and after Mao's death, implying that Soviet strategists continued to consider the Chinese military as an important force for rapprochement. The Soviets were briefly, in late October or early November, able to achieve some apparent measure of success in dealing with the new Chinese leadership on a better basis than had been evident in the past. However, relations quickly worsened, and by the beginning of 1977 there were no signs of an amelioration of the mutual hostility which had characterized Sino-Soviet relations for more than a decade and a half.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the three years under consideration, the Soviets pursued a rather consistent policy toward China, a policy which, in its essence, was intended to cause China to return to the Soviet orbit. Soviet policy was guided by the long-term strategic imperative of securing the USSR's border with China. Broadly speaking, Soviet strategists hoped to achieve this goal by taking actions, to the extent possible, to enable a leadership friendly toward the USSR to come to power in China, a leadership which would conduct a foreign policy favorable to the USSR. To this end, Soviet "China policy" supported pro-Soviet Chinese leaders, and sought to discredit those leaders who were opposed to closer relations with the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Soviets preferred the ascendancy of "moderate," or "pragmatic," Chinese leaders, over "leftists," or "radicals."

The implementation of Soviet "China policy" was assisted by a generally accurate perception of Chinese politics and events in China which might represent favorable opportunities for "healthy" pro-Soviet forces. When such opportunities arose, the Soviets acted to create favorable conditions for the rise of pro-Soviet influence in Chinese politics, or at least a diminution of the sway of anti-Soviet forces.

Soviet "China policy" was expressed in many ways, and was to a great extent revealed in the open Soviet press. The Soviets employed direct and indirect military pressure, took diplomatic initiatives, and mounted a propaganda campaign, in an effort to

achieve their objective of a China aligned with the Soviet Union. In this context, the Soviet press was a particularly important instrument, not only in conveying—explicitly or implicitly—Soviet perceptions and expectations concerning the course of Chinese politics, but in conveying expressions of support for groups in China perceived as political allies of the USSR.

Taking as evidence Soviet statements and actions in the context of political events in China, as well as events elsewhere in the world, it is clear that the Soviets perceived certain Chinese military leaders and civilian cadres as a force for influencing Chinese policy toward rapprochement with the USSR. These were the officials who had advocated "moderate" policies in Chinese domestic and foreign affairs, and with whom the Soviets believed they could "deal." Before and after Mao's death, the Soviets consistently pressed for the resolution of Mao's succession in favor of "moderate" leaders, who might be induced to align with the Soviet Union. While the accession of Hua Kuo-feng temporarily encouraged the Soviets, the subsequent course of Chinese politics turned out to be unfavorable to rapprochement. Nevertheless, the apparent consistency in Soviet "China policy" over the past three years suggests that it is indeed a product of a consistent, long-term strategy, and thus not easily given up by Moscow. Persistency in pursuing rapprochement with China is likely to be a characteristic of Soviet policy in the future.

What can be said of the most recent developments in Sino-Soviet relations, and what are the immediate prospects for rapprochement?

In the new year, Hua Kuo-feng took steps to carry on a "Maoist" foreign policy. That is, a policy which did not foreswear contacts with the West. Chinese actions included continued propaganda condemning the "restoration of Capitalism" in the "revisionist" Soviet Union,¹⁷⁸ praise for late Premier Chou En-lai's support for Chairman Mao's "brilliant decision" to promote good Sino-American relations,¹⁷⁹ and an indirect "peace signal" on the Taiwan issue to the United States, which stated that, "...regarding the disputes between China and the United States resulting from the forcible U.S. occupation of Taiwan, the Chinese Government has always stood for a settlement through negotiations without resorting to force."¹⁸⁰ Shortly after this article appeared, a US Government official revealed that China had sought, through indirect channels, to review the question of American demands for compensation for the nationalized property of American corporations and individuals in China, and Chinese demands for Chinese assets frozen in the United States.¹⁸¹ The latest development in China's foreign policy was the revelation in early March, that the Chinese government was interested in purchasing Western weapons to modernize its army.¹⁸²

But during the first months of 1977, and simultaneously with Chinese "feelers" to the West, the political situation in China became increasingly complex. Particularly, there were indications that Teng Hsiao-ping had either been restored to a post on the PRC State Council, or was about to be returned to public life.¹⁸³

Soviet press articles stressed the tumult in Chinese political life,

and concentrated on various aspects of the purge of "leftists" occurring throughout the country.¹⁸⁴ The Soviet press also emphasized the notion that there was popular support in China for the rehabilitation of Teng, and that among the Chinese leadership there was considerable dispute over the campaign against the "Gang of Four," and over the question of restoring Teng.¹⁸⁵ Further, one Soviet article implied that Hua was encountering opposition from Teng's supporters, and that Hua's political position was insecure.¹⁸⁶ Finally, in an article published for wide distribution in both Pravda and Izvestia, the Soviets declared that political conditions in China were extremely uncertain, and that the development of events in China would be of a "contradictory character."¹⁸⁷

It is likely that the Soviets are awaiting the resolution of the on-going high-level debate in Peking over the fate of Teng Hsiao-ping. Based upon public Soviet expectations of the past three years, they would probably welcome his return to power, but more than that, would welcome the ascendancy of "moderate" policies which Teng represents. In fact, in the short term it seems unlikely that there can be a major breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations without Teng's return. However, Hua, having originally come to prominence as a compromise among competing groups, would find his personal political preeminence diluted by Teng's restoration. It is therefore unlikely that he would gracefully concede power to Teng. Nevertheless, the Soviets, by noting that Hua has been opposed by Teng's supporters,¹⁸⁸ have not ruled out the possibility of Teng's rehabilitation, or at least the ascendancy of his

policies, through the influence of "healthy forces" in China.

The present situation, in which an anti-Soviet, possibly pro-Western foreign policy is emerging from the Maoist succession, is unacceptable to the Soviets because it threatens the strategic security of the USSR. Therefore, the Soviets will continue to pursue the "China Policy" which they have consistently followed in the past. We can expect that in the future the Soviets will employ direct and indirect military pressure on China, threats, diplomatic maneuver, and propaganda, in an effort to bring about the strategic alignment of China with the Soviet Union.

In pursuit of this objective, the Soviets will make a special effort to increase the influence of "healthy internationalist forces" in China's military and civil leadership. In the three-year period under study, we noted that while in 1974 the Soviets applied direct military pressure on the Sino-Soviet border in an attempt to influence the course of Chinese politics, in subsequent years the Soviets were able to rely on indirect forms of pressure as "healthy forces" were perceived as gaining in strength. The future ascendancy of such "pro-Soviet" influence in China would hold out promise to Moscow that Soviet strategic aims could ultimately be achieved without resort to direct force. However, if "pro-Soviet" forces are unable to achieve some degree of political prominence in the Peking leadership, then Soviet opportunities for influencing the course of Chinese politics by propaganda and diplomacy would be reduced. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union might find the option of external military pressure on China more and more attractive.

FOOTNOTES

¹Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Interests and Policies in the Asian-Pacific Region," Orbis 19 (Fall 1975): 770 (Emphasis added).

²"Moscow Looks at China After Mao," Soviet World Outlook 1 (15 December 1976): 7 (Emphasis added).

³Richard Thornton, "Problems and Prospects for Research on China," International Studies Newsletter, Preliminary Issue B (Winter 1973): 24-30.

⁴This is not to say that authoritative statements do not appear elsewhere in Soviet print. Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star), Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette), Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), Novaia i Noveishaia Istorii (Recent and Current History), Istoria SSSR (History of the USSR), Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn' (International Life), Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka (Problems of the Far East), and other newspapers and journals carry articles about China, and I included them in my investigation. However, certain publications present particular credibility problems, as for example, Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, the journal of the Institut Dal'nego Vostoka (Far Eastern Institute) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Institute was founded in 1971 to be the academic center of the ideological counterattack on Maoism. Its journal, published quarterly since 1972 (in Russian, English, and Japanese), performs a "coordination" function, that is, expounds the Party line for Soviet sinologists and other fellow travelers. See: E. Stuart Kirby, Russian Studies of China (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), pp. 3-4.

⁵"Peretasovka v Kitaiskoi Armii" (Shake-up in the Chinese Army), Pravda, 3 January 1974, p.5. Information made available by the Chinese on 1 January indicated that changes were made in the commands of eight of eleven military regions. See: George C.S. Sung, China's Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1975), p.26. Moreover, the shift involved an exchange of regional commands between four pairs of military commanders. See: Kenneth Liberthal, "China in 1975: The Internal Political Scene," Problems of Communism 24 (May-June 1975): 2. The Pravda article named only three of the commanders: Li Te-sheng, Chien Hsi-lien, and Hsu Shih-yu, despite broader information provided by the Chinese on 1 January.

⁶There are several useful accounts of the Lin Piao "Affair" and its consequences. See: Richard C. Thornton, China, The Struggle For Power 1917-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973): 336-339; Parris H. Chang, "Report From China: Political Rehabilitation

of Cadres in China: A Traveller's View," China Quarterly, no. 54 (April-June 1973), pp. 331-340; Richard Wich, "The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question," China Quarterly, no. 58 (April-May 1974), pp. 231-248; Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," China Quarterly, no. 58 (April-May 1974), pp. 249-285.

⁷"Peretasovka v Kitaiskoi Armii," p. 5.

⁸"Inostrannaia Pechat' o Polozhenii v Kitae" (The Foreign Press on the Situation in China), Pravda, 7 January 1974, p. 4.

⁹Ibid. Shortly before the transfer of PLA officers, Mao had altered the nature of the "anti-Confucius" campaign, begun some months earlier, to include the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius." The analysis subsequently presented in the Soviet press was that the transfer of military commanders was a direct consequence of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, and was in fact, "the first practical result of the campaign." See: L. S. Perelomov, "Mao, Legalisty i Konfutsianty" (Mao, the Legalists and the Confucians), Voprosy Istorii (Questions of History), no. 3 (March 1975), pp. 117-133. This campaign was an oblique way of commenting upon contemporary events by drawing parallels to Chinese history. Confucius was an ancient "revisionist" who supposedly wanted to restore slaveholding to feudal China. Lin Piao, too, wanted to "reverse the wheel of history," by advocating the restoration of the strategic relationship which existed between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1950's. The "anti-Confucius" campaign was directed against contemporary "revisionists," that is, pro-Soviet Chinese leaders. The inclusion of Lin Piao's name in the campaign clarified the strategic issue, and emphasized that the campaign included targets in the military. See: "China's Anti-Confucius Campaign," Asia Research Bulletin, 28 February 1974, p. 2241; Eugene Shilaeff, "The 'Young' Successors to the Peking Leadership and the Soviet 'Revisionists'," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, no. 226/75 (30 May 1975), p. 3.

¹⁰Just two days later, Literaturnaia Gazeta repeated foreign press reports of dissatisfaction among the Chinese military and in the civil bureaucracy as well: "Kitai Segodnia: Chto-to Proizkhodit. No Chto Imenno?.. Po Strenitsam Zarubezhnoi Pechati" (China Today: Something is Happening. But What?.. In the Foreign Press), Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 2 (9 January 1974), p. 9.

¹¹"Obostrenie Bor'by za Vlast' v Kitae" (Power Struggle in China Sharpens), Pravda, 9 February 1974, p. 5.

¹²John Burns, "Attack on Mao Aide Puzzles Experts," Washington Post, 15 April 1974, sec. A, p. 16.

¹³Sung, China's Regional Politics, p. 25. Mr. Sung concludes that the shifts occurred after "compromises and consultations" between Chou En-lai, perhaps acting as Mao's emissary, and key commanders.

¹⁴Parris Chang, "China's Military," Current History 67 (September 1974): 105; Merle Goldman, "Chinese Ideology After the Cultural Revolution," Current History 69 (September 1975): 69; Lieberthal, "China in 1975," p. 2.

¹⁵Parris H. Chang, "Political Profiles: Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-sheng," China Quarterly, no. 37 (January-March 1974), pp. 128-131. Li Teh-sheng was one of the first few regional/provincial PLA leaders to use force in support of the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution, and he continued to be a reliable executor of Mao's policies. In September, 1970, Li was appointed Director of the PLA General Political Department. The selection of Li to control the Party apparatus within the PLA was apparently a move by Mao to wrest control of the PLA from Lin Piao and his followers. His promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee and vice-chairmanship of the Party may have been intended to extend Mao's influence in the PLA and to checkmate the former marshal, Yeh Chien-ying, who was associated with the "Pragmatists."

¹⁶Edward E. Rice, "The Second Rise and Fall of Teng Hsiao-ping," China Quarterly, no. 67 (September 1976), p. 498. Li's removal was confirmed at the Second Plenum of the 10th CC in early January 1975, when Teng Hsiao-ping was promoted to positions of Vice-Chairman of the Party and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, while Li Teh-sheng was simultaneously officially demoted from these positions to the rank of ordinary member of the Politburo.

¹⁷Wich, "Tenth Party Congress," pp. 236-237.

¹⁸"Inostrannaia Pechat' o Polozhenii v Kitae," p. 4.

¹⁹Fox Butterfield, "Confusing Peking Picture," New York Times, 26 October 1976, sec. A, p. 2.

²⁰Wich, "Tenth Party Congress," pp. 236-237. Specifically, it was Chiang Ching (Mme Mao) who most conspicuously lost ground to Yeh Chien-ying during the 10th Party Congress. The original New China News Agency report and live television coverage listed Chiang in her customary position immediately ahead of Yeh. A subsequent report reversed the positions of Chiang and Yeh, while keeping the rest of the list intact.

²¹Chang, "China's Military," p. 131. Teng had been "rehabilitated" and restored to a vice-premiership in April 1973, after having been purged early in the GPCR. He was elected to the CC at the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, was admitted to the CCP Politburo and made a vice-chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission in December 1973, and was elected to a vice-chairmanship of the Party, to member-

ship on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the posts of senior Vice-Premier of the State Council and PLA Chief of Staff in January 1975. Teng's comeback had been sanctioned by Mao, for in the wake of the "Lin Biao Affair" it was necessary to reduce military influence in Chinese politics, and increase civilian control by rehabilitating Teng and other veteran officials. See: Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?," Problems of Communism 25 (July-August 1976): 5-6.

²²Wich, "Tenth Party Congress," pp. 236-237; Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?," p. 10; Chang, "Political Rehabilitation of Cadres in China," pp. 335-336.

²³M. Yakolev, "O Polozhenii v Kitae" (On the Situation in China), Pravda, 8 March 1974, p. 5.

²⁴O. Borisov, "Kto Meshchet Normalizatsii k Sovetsko-Kitaiskim Otnosheniiam" (Who is Preventing Normalization-On Soviet-Chinese Relations), Izvestiia, 16 May 1974, pp. 2, 4 (Emphasis added).

²⁵Chang, "Political Rehabilitation of Cadres in China," p. 336. See also: Thornton, China, pp. 306-308; Thomas W. Robinson, The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1970) (also published in China Quarterly, no. 47 (July-September 1971)). It is noteworthy that although Chen and Chung were court-martialed and dismissed, after several years of "reeducation" they were restored to the ranks of "responsible persons" in the PLA, with Chen serving in the Foochow Military Region (MR) and Chung in the Canton MR. This may be one reason why Mao, in the shift of commanders, sent his supporter Hsu Shih-yu to Canton.

²⁶"Korni Nyneshnykh Sobytií v Kitae" (The Roots of Present Events in China), Kommunist, no. 6 (April 1968), pp. 102-113; "O Kharaktere 'Kul'turnoi Revoliutsii' v Kitae" (On the Character of the "Cultural Revolution" in China), Kommunist, no. 7 (May 1968), pp. 103-114; "O Politicheskom Kurse Mao Tse-duna na Mezhdunarodnoi Arene" (The Political Course of Mao Tse-tung in the International Arena), Kommunist, no. 8 (May 1968), pp. 95-108; O. Vladimirov and V. Riazantsev, "O Nekotorykh Voprosakh Istorii Kompartii Kitaiá" (On Certain Questions of the History of the Chinese Communist Party), Kommunist, no. 9 (June 1968), pp. 93-108; A. Kholodovskaia, "Razgrom Profsoiuzov v Kitae" (The Destruction of Trade Unions in China), Kommunist, no. 10 (June 1968), pp. 90-99; A. Nekrasov, "Na Vneshneekonomicheskoi Politike Gruppy Mao Tse-duna" (On the Foreign Economic Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group), Kommunist, no. 12 (August 1968), pp. 102-112.

²⁷Thornton, China, pp. 322-323.

²⁸John Dornberg, "Sino-Soviet War Predictions Rise," Washington Star-News, 19 March 1974, sec. A, p. 5; "Sino-Soviet War Preparations," Asia Research Bulletin, 28 February 1974, p. 2241.

²⁹"Hard Words on Sino-Soviet 'Conciliation'," Soviet Analyst 3 (28 November 1974): 2. An eye-witness who spent two years in the Irkutsk area had noted the disturbances on the Chinese-Mongolian border. Supply trains were sent daily to the East, and they returned with zinc coffins: "In April 1974 an exceptionally large number of soldiers were killed, and at that time sealed coffins arrived in Irkutsk which even relatives were not allowed to open... Everyone in Irkutsk is convinced that war with China is inevitable." Talk of sealed zinc coffins coming back through Irkutsk in April, which residents presumed to be from some undisclosed border clash, was also reported by Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 336. Eye-witness reports from Soviet Central Asian cities noted extensive civil defense exercises and urgent bomb shelter construction against nuclear attack. See: "Hard Words on Sino-Soviet 'Conciliation'," p. 2. Other indicators suggest the occurrence of significant border clashes at that time. For example, major awards were presented for defense of the Sino-Soviet frontier. Specifically, in 1974 the Trans-Baikal Military District was awarded the Order of Lenin. See: Uchebnoe Posobie Po Nachal'noi Voennoi Podgotovke (Text-Book for Initial Military Training) (Moscow: DOSAAF, 1975), p. 23. Moreover, on 12 April 1974, by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the daily newspaper of the Trans-Baikal Military District was awarded the Order of the Red Star for "great merits in the mobilization of Soviet soldiers in the defense of the Soviet homeland and faithful work in the communist and military education of the forces of the district." See: "Gazeta i Boevaia Podgotovka" (The Newspaper and Military Readiness), Voennyi Vestnik, no. 9 (September 1975), pp. 39-41. For additional discussion of awards and decorations presented to forces on the Sino-Soviet border see: Mackintosh, "Soviet Interests," p. 773.

³⁰Franz Michael, "China and the Soviet Union: Waiting for Mao to Die?," Current History 69 (September 1975): 104. Briefly, the new Chinese formulation divided global relations into three "worlds": that of the superpowers (the US and USSR), that of the lesser capitalist countries, and the "third world"--the world of revolution--which socialist China would lead. In this new scheme the socialist "camp" no longer existed. Thus, China's former challenge to the Soviet Union for leadership in the socialist camp was abandoned under the excuse that the camp no longer existed. According to Michael, "The new formulation of the three worlds and of China's role in the world can therefore be regarded as a retreat from the conflict with Moscow, in the same way that the Chinese isolation during the cultural revolution was a safety device to prevent foreign intervention in an internal conflict." See also: B. Koloskov, "Vneshnepoliticheskie Kontseptsii Maoizma" (Foreign Policy Conceptions of Maoism), Opasnyi Kurs (Dangerous Course) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 176, also published in Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn' (International Life), no. 1 (January 1976), pp. 51-63; I. Alekseev and G. Apalin, "Ideologicheskie Diversii Pekina" (Peking's Ideological Subversions), Opasnyi Kurs, p. 217, also published in Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', no. 9 (September 1975), pp. 47-59.

³¹"Na VI Spetsial'noi Sessii General'noi Assamblei OON" (At the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly), Pravda, 12 April 1974, p. 4.

³²"Plenum TsK MNERP" (Plenary Session of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party), Pravda, 11 June 1974, p. 4.

³³B. Koloskov, "O Chem Rasskazyvaiut Datsybao" (What the Wall-Posters Say), Pravda, 7 July 1974, p. 5.

³⁴"Reshitel'nyi Protest" (Emphatic Protest), Pravda, 21 June 1974, p. 5. As further evidence of the consistency of the Soviet position, despite continued Chinese nuclear tests in the atmosphere, "polluting the atmosphere over the MPP," and "provocations on the border," the Soviets maintained that Chinese military preparations "pointed out the course of militarization of the whole country," but that "the strength of the Maoists is wasted in failure." In other words, China did not represent a threat. See: G. Ochirbat, "Vo Vred Delu Sotsializma—O Podryvnykh Deistviakh Maoistov Protiv Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki" (Harmful to the Cause of Socialism—About the Undermining Actions of the Maoists Against the Mongolian People's Republic), Trud (Labor), 7 September 1974, p. 3.

³⁵There can be little doubt that the Sino-Mongolian border was an important Soviet Military pressure point against China at that time. In addition to evidence already cited, note that the Soviets mounted a propaganda campaign to secure the loyalty of important national minorities in this strategic area. See: "Indiiski Zhurnal o Politike Maoistov" (Indian Magazine on the Policy of the Maoists), Pravda, 21 June 1974, p. 5; Hsiao Chu-mao and Mu Lieh-sheng, "Opasnoe Skhodstvo—Pis'mo iz Kitaia" (Dangerous Resemblance—Letter From China), Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 32 (7 August 1974), pp. 9, 14. Note also close co-operation between political officers of the Soviet Army and the Mongolian People's Army in the realm of population control "to increase battle-readiness." See: "V Ordene Lenina Zabaikal'skom Voennom Okruge" (In the Order-of-Lenin Transbaikal Military District), Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), no. 9 (May 1974), p. 94.

³⁶"Pribytie v Pekine" (Arrival in Peking), Pravda, 26 June 1974, p. 4; "Ot'ezd iz Pekina" (Departure From Peking), Pravda, 19 August 1974, p. 3.

³⁷"Kitai Posle X C'ezda KPK" (China Since the 10th CCP Congress), Kommunist, no. 12 (August 1974), pp. 97-115 (Emphasis added).

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰A. Krushinsky, "K 15-i Godovshchine KNR" (On the 25th Anniversary of the PRC), Pravda, 1 October 1974, p. 4.

⁴¹John Bryan Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng; The Significance of the Colour of the Cat," China Quarterly, no. 67 (September 1976), pp. 464-465.

⁴²Perelomov, "Mao Legalist i Konfutsiantsy," pp.132-133 (Emphasis added).

⁴³"Po Puti Sotsializma, Druzhy i Mira" (On the Path of Socialism, Friendship and Peace), Pravda, Izvestiia, 27 November 1974, p. 3.

⁴⁴"Deili Telegraf' Opiat' Lezhet" (Daily Telegraph Lies Again), Pravda, 20 December 1974, p. 5.

⁴⁵M. Yakolev, "Problemy Ostaiutsia Nereshennymi-Zarubezhnaia Pechat' O Vnutripolicheskom Polozhenii v Kitae" (Problems Remain Unsolved--Foreign Press on the Internal Political Situation in China), Izvestiia, 4 January 1975, p. 3 (Emphasis added).

⁴⁶Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 466.

⁴⁷I. Aleksandrov, "Lozungi i Praktika--O Novoi Konstitutsii KNR" (Slogans and Practice--On the PRC's New Constitution), Pravda, 5 February 1975, p. 4. (Also published in Opasnyi Kurs, pp. 51-62.)

⁴⁸Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," pp. 466-467.

⁴⁹Aleksandrov, "Lozungi i Praktika," p. 4.

⁵⁰A. Krasikov, "Chto Skryveetsia za Peremeshcheniiami v Kitae" (What is Behind the Hidden Shifts in China), Pravda, 9 February 1975, p. 5.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²"Pribytie v Pekin Glavy Sovetskoi Delegatsii" (Head of Soviet Delegation Arrives in Peking), Pravda, 13 February 1975, p. 4.

⁵³"Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," editorial, People's Daily, 9 February 1975, trans. in Peking Review 18 (14 November 1975): 4.

⁵⁴This attack suggested the inclusion of some military men among the "class enemy," for while criticism of Lin Piao had been muted at the 10th Party Congress, just before the congress his heresy had been relabelled "ultra-rightest" from "ultra-leftist." See: Wich, "Tenth Party Congress," pp. 233-234, 247; Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 459.

⁵⁵M. Yakolev, "Novaya Politicheskaya Kampanii v Kitae" (New Political Campaign in China), Pravda, 8 March 1975, p. 5.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷"Osvobozhdenie Voennykh Prestupnikov v KNR" (Release of War Criminals in China), Pravda, 20 March 1975, p. 5. See also: M. Yakolev, "Kogo Miluiut v Pekine?" (Whom is Peking Pardoning?), Pravda, 21 March 1975, p. 5.

⁵⁸"V Pekine Chestvuiut Voennykh Prestupnikov" (War Criminals are Feted in Peking), Pravda, 25 March 1975, p. 5; "Pekinskie Reverantsy" (Peking's Reverances), Izvestiia, 29 March 1975, p. 3.

⁵⁹"Joint Communiqué," included as appendix to Francis O. Wilcox, China and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 87-91.

⁶⁰The loss of Ban Me Thout on 13 March 1975 triggered Saigon's decision to withdraw from the Central Highlands—a rout followed. See: "The Communist Takeover: How Breakthrough in South Vietnam Developed After Paris Truce Accord," New York Times, 1 May 1975, p. 20.

⁶¹Yu. Antoshin, "Provokatsionnyi Vypad-Replika" (Provocational Attack-Rejoinder), Pravda, 31 March 1975, p. 3.

⁶²Norodom Sihanouk, "Predsedateliu Presidiuma Verkhnego Soveta SSSR N. V. Podgornomu" (To N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), Pravda, 29 March 1975, p. 1.

⁶³Yevgeni Zhukov, "Narodam Azii-Bezopasnost' i Mir" (To the Peoples of Asia—Security and Peace), Pravda, 14 December 1975, p. 4. (Reprinted as "Collective Security in Asia," Sputnik (June 1975), p. 83 (Emphasis added). While this article originally appeared before Communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, the Soviets saw no reason to alter this phrase in the text when it was reprinted in June. Moreover, the victories achieved by the "patriots of Cambodia" received very terse mention in the Soviet press. For one of the few see: Andrei Krushinsky, "Kolonka Kommentatora-Fariseiskaya Positsiia" (Commentator's Column Pharisaical Position), Pravda, 27 April 1975, p. 5. The Chinese, too, were dissatisfied with developments in Southeast Asia, and their dissatisfaction was noted by the Soviets, who reported that when Speaker of the House Carl Albert visited China he "did not note among the Chinese signs of gladness in connection with the successes of the people's armed forces in South Vietnam." See: "Boi k Vostoku ot Saigona" (Battle to the East of Saigon), Pravda, 11 April 1975, p. 5.

⁶⁴V. Kudryatsev, "Mnenie Obozrevatelja: Vokrug Odnogo Proekta" (Commentator's Opinion: About a Certain Draft), Izvestia, 25 April 1975, p. 2; I. Latyshev, "Zamysly Maoistov" (Intentions of the Maoists), Pravda, 25 April 1975, p. 5.

⁶⁵See, for example: F. Dyskonov, "Dal'nii Vostok: Problemy i Perspektivy" (The Far East: Problems and Prospects), Ekonomicheskaja Gazeta, no. 5 (January 1975), p. 13; V. Syrokomy, "Most Cherez More-Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo Sovetskogo Soiuza i Iaponii Uspeshno Razvivaetsia" (Bridge Across the Sea-Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Japan is Developing Successfully), Literaturnaja Gazeta, no. 14 (8 April 1975), p. 14, continued in Literaturnaja Gazeta, no. 15 (9 April 1975), p. 14.

⁶⁶V. Kudryatsev, "Mnenie Obozrevatelja: Vokrug Odnogo Proekta," p. 2; Andrei Krushinsky, "Kolonka Kommentatora: Provokatsionnye Prizyv" (Commentator's Column: Provocational Appeals), Pravda, 2 June 1975, p. 3.

⁶⁷"Po Povodu Odnogo Vizita v Pekin" (Concerning a Certain Visit to Peking), Pravda, 18 May 1975, p. 2; I. Latyshev, "Peregovory Okonchilis Bezrezul'tatno" (Talks End Without Results), Pravda, 2 October 1975, p. 5; I. Latyshev, "Opasnaia Ustupchivost' Pekinu" (Dangerous Submissiveness Toward Peking), Pravda, 26 November 1975, p. 5.

⁶⁸"Pekinskie Triuki v Persidskom Zalive" (Peking's Tricks in the Persian Gulf), Pravda, 17 May 1975, p. 5; A. Krasikov, "Pekin Ischet Soiuznikov" (Peking Searches for Allies), Pravda, 19 May 1975, p. 3; Yuri Zhukov, "Kolonka Kommentatora: Podstrekateli" (Commentator's Column: Instigators), Pravda, 20 May 1975, p. 5; Yu. Shtykanov, "Replika: Komplimenty Pekinu" (Rejoinder: Compliments to Peking), Izvestia, 21 May 1975, p. 2.

⁶⁹"Peking Pays Last Respects to Comrade Tung Pi-wu," Peking Review 18 (11 April 1975): 3-6.

⁷⁰"An Illustrious Historic Document," editorial, People's Daily, 20 May 1975, trans. in Peking Review 18 (23 May 1975): 6. Note that this rather mild attack on the US came on the heels of the "Mayaguez Incident," and subsequent Chinese declaration that China "could not take measures" in the event of American armed intervention in Cambodia. See: "Intsident u Poberzh'ia Kambodzhi" (Incident Off the Coast of Cambodia), Pravda, 15 May 1975, p. 5.

⁷¹Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 473.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³G. Nikolayev, "Pekin: Nastuplenie Na Prava Trudiashchikhsia" (Peking: Offensive Against the Working People's Rights), Izvestiia, 24 June 1975, p. 3.

⁷⁴Shilaeff, "The 'Young' Successors to the Peking Leadership," p.3.

⁷⁵Nikolayev, "Pekin: Nastuplenie Na Prava," p. 4.

⁷⁶"Pod Znakom 'Levogo' Uklona" (Marked by "Left-Wing" Deviation), Pravda, 20 June 1975, p. 5.

⁷⁷M. Yakolev, "Protiv Interesov Trudiashchikhsia Kitaia" (Contrary to the Interests of the Chinese Working People), Pravda, 20 August 1975, p. 5. Subsequent reports indicated that soldiers were actually substituting for workers to maintain industrial production. See, for example: A. Biriukov, "Na Rabochikh Mestakh Soldaty" (Soldiers Substitute for Workers), Pravda, 6 September 1975, p.5.

⁷⁸I. Kishch, "Tylovoe Obespechenie Sovetskikh Voisk pri Razgrome Dal'nevostochnogo Agressora" (Rear Supply of Soviet Forces in the Defeat of the Far-Eastern Aggressor), Tyl i snabzhenie, no. 8 (August 1975) pp. 41-46; A. Dobriakov, "Organizatsiia Voinskikh Perevosok dlia Obespecheniia Razgroma Agressora na Dal'nem Vostoke" (Organization of Military Transports to Insure the Rout of the Aggressor in the Far East), Tyl i Snabzhenie, no. 9 (September 1975), pp. 50-54.

⁷⁹A. Mikhailov, "Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke i Sud'by Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii" (Victory in the Far-East and the Fate of the Chinese Revolution), Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', no. 8 (August 1975), pp. 41-50; S. Ivanov, "Pobedonosnyi Final-K 30-letniiu Razgroma Militaristskoi Iaponii" (Victorious Finale--On the 30th Anniversary of the Defeat of Militarist Japan), Izvestiia, 2 September 1975, p. 2; M. Kapitsa, "K 30-letniiu Razgroma Iaponskogo Militarizma--Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke" (On the 30th Anniversary of the Defeat of Japanese Militarism--Victory in the Far East), Pravda, 3 September 1975, p. 4; A. Dymkov, "Stranitsa Istorii" (A Page of History), Izvestiia, 28 September 1975, p.2. This article was a review of O. Borisov, Sovetski Soiuz i Manchzurskaia Revoliutsionnaia Baza, 1945-1949 (The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base, 1945-1949) (Moscow: Mysel', 1975); "Postoiannomu Komitetu Vsekitaiskogo Sobraniia Narodnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstvennomu Sovetu Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki" (To the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic), Pravda, 1 October 1975, p. 1.

⁸⁰"Unfold Criticisms of Shui Hu," editorial, People's Daily, 4 September 1975, trans. in Peking Review 18 (12 September 1975), p.7.

⁸¹V. Goncharov, "V Ugodu Mezhdunarodnoi Reaktsii" (To Please International Reaction), Pravda, 22 October 1975, p. 5.

⁸²Chou has been so depicted in both the Soviet and Western press. See, for example: Yakolev, "O Polozhenii v Kitae," p. 5; Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 473.

⁸³Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" p. 10.

⁸⁴T. Gaidar, "Kazhdaiia Piod' Zemli-Iz Pogranichnogo Bloknota" (Every Inch of Land--From a Border-Guard's Notes), Pravda, 16 September 1975, p. 6.

⁸⁵M. Georgiev, "Dvadtsat' Shest' Let KNR" (Twenty-Six Years of the PRC), Pravda, 1 October 1975, p. 4.

⁸⁶M. Yakolev, "Za Chto Ob"iavlenu Gonenie na Kitaiskikh Uchenykh" (Why the Persecution of Chinese Scholars was Proclaimed), Pravda, 17 December 1975, p. 5.

⁸⁷Bernard Gwertzman, "China Displeased With the Ouster of Schlesinger," New York Times, 9 November 1975, p. 1; Michael Pillsbury, "Mao Must Compromise," Newsweek, 8 December 1975, p. 56.

⁸⁸"Visit G. Kissindzhera v KNR" (H. Kissinger's Visit to the PRC), Pravda, 18 October 1975, p. 5; "G. Kissindzher v Pekine" (H. Kissinger in Peking), Pravda, 23 October 1975, p. 5; "Poezdka Dzh. Forda" (G. Ford's Trip), Pravda, 30 November 1975, p. 5; "Pekin Protiv Razriadki" (Peking Opposes Detente), Pravda, 3 December 1975, p. 5.

⁸⁹"K Peregovoram Dzh. Forda v Pekine" (On G. Ford's Talks in Peking), Pravda, 4 December 1975, p. 5; Oleg Orestov, "Mezhdunarodnaia Nedelia: Obozrenie" (International Week: Survey), Pravda, 7 December 1975, p. 4. Asia was not the only area of the world where the resolve of the US was being tested--and was found wanting by China. The successes achieved by the Soviet--and Cuban-supported MPLA in Angola were enhanced by the December 1975 US Senate vote to cut off aid to two anti-Soviet groups: UNITA (trained by a Chinese military mission) and FNLA. See: "Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 24 November 1975, p. 38; Russell Watson with Lloyd H. Norman, Tim Joyce, Andrew Jaffe, Fay Willey, Steven Shabad, "Angola: Detente Under Fire," Newsweek, 19 January 1976, p. 8; "Predatel'skaia Rol' Pekina" (Peking's Treacherous Role), Pravda, 24 December 1975, p. 5.

⁹⁰"Zavershenie Visita Dzh. Forda" (G. Ford's Visit Ends), Izvestiia, 5 December 1975, p. 5.

⁹¹"Peking Pays Last Respects to Comrade Kang Sheng," Peking Review 18 (26 December 1975): 3-6; "Konchina Kan Shena" (Death of Kang Sheng), Pravda, 17 December 1975, p. 5.

⁹²"Amnistiia Gomin'danovtsam" (Amnesty for Kuomintangists), Pravda, 24 December 1975, p. 5.

⁹³"Osvobozhdenie Ekipazha Sovetskogo Vertoleta" (Soviet Helicopter Crew Freed), Pravda, 28 December 1975, p. 5; "Vozvrashchenie Na Rodinu Ekipazha Sovetskogo Vertoleta" (Soviet Helicopter Crew Return to Their Homeland), Pravda, 30 December 1975, p. 5.

⁹⁴"Soviet Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Crew Released," Peking Review 19 (2 January 1976): 7.

⁹⁵Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 474.

⁹⁶"Nothing is Hard in this World if You Dare to Scale the Heights," New Year's Day Editorial, People's Daily, 1 January 1976, trans. in Peking Review 19 (2 January 1976): 8-10.

⁹⁷Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, "Criticism of 'Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link'," People's Daily, 29 February 1976, reported in Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?," p. 7.

⁹⁸Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 477.

⁹⁹Y. Semyonov, "Gor'kie Plody Maoizma—'Kul'turnaia Revoliutsiia i Politika Pekina" (The Bitter Fruit of Maoism—"Cultural Revolution and Peking's Policy), Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', no. 8 (August 1976), pp.39-50.

¹⁰⁰A. Petrov, "Vnutripoliticheskaia Bor'ba v Kitae" (The Internal Political Struggle in China), Pravda, 13 February 1975, p. 5. (Similarly, a Western analyst noted that although Hua appeared to enjoy Mao's confidence, his past record identified him more with the veteran Party officials than with the "leftist radicals." See: Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?," p. 14.)

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Richard Steele with John Lindsay, Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Hal Bruno, "Citizen Nixon in Peking," Newsweek, 1 March 1976, pp. 30-31.

¹⁰³"Provokatsionnaia Politika Pekina" (Peking's Provocational Policy), Pravda, 4 March 1976, p. 8; Yu. Shtykanov, "Nash Kommentarii: Opasnye Ambitsii Pekina—Podzhigatel'skaia Politika Maoistkogo Rukovodstva Idet Vrazgez s Chaianniami Narodov" (Our Commentary: Peking's Dangerous Ambitions—The Maoist Leadership's Inflammatory Policy Conflicts with the People's Aspirations), Izvestiia, 6 April 1976, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴Leonid Zamytin (General Director of TASS), "Vzgliad na Problemy: Novyi Raund Bor'by za Vlast' v Pekine" (Looking at a Problem: A New Round of the Power Struggle in Peking), Izvestiia, 2 April 1976, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵Ibid. (Emphasis added).

¹⁰⁶ Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," pp. 478-479.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 479; "What Does the Incident at Tien An Men Square Show?," editorial, People's Daily, 18 April 1976, trans. in Peking Review 19 (23 April 1976): 12. Significantly, this editorial linked Teng with "healthy forces": and portrayed his defeat as a setback for the Soviet Union.

¹⁰⁸ Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress," p. 479.

¹⁰⁹ "K Sobytiyam v Kitae" (On Events in China), Pravda, 7 April 1976, p. 6; Semyonov, "Gor'kie Plody Maoizma," pp. 43-46.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ See footnote 105.

¹¹² Just the day before, an Izvestiia article had raised the strategic issue by denouncing Peking's efforts to create a "counter-balance to the Soviet Union" in Asia. See: Shtykanov, "Nash Kommentarii: Opasnye Ambitsii Pekina," p. 3.

¹¹³ Zamyatin, "Vzgliad na Problemu," p. 3.

¹¹⁴ Paul Brinkley-Rogers and Sydney Liu, "China: Very Much Amiss," Newsweek, 15 March 1976, p. 22.

¹¹⁵ Andrew Nagorski with Paul Brinkley-Rogers and Lloyd H. Norman, "In the Wake of a Storm," Newsweek, 26 April 1976, pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ I. Alekandrov, "Pekin i Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia" (Peking and Soviet-Chinese Relations), Pravda, 28 April 1976, p. 5; K. Andreyev, "Antisovetizm i Antikommunizm—Ideologiya i Praktika Maoizma" (Anti-Sovietism and Anti-Communism—Ideology and Practice of Maoism), Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', no. 6 (June 1976), p. 42; Semyonov, "Gor'kie Plody Maoizma," pp. 39-50.

¹¹⁸ "XVII C"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revoliutsionnoi Partii—Rech' Tovarishcha F. D. Kulakova" (17th Congress of the Mongolian People's-Revolutionary Party—Speech of Comrade F. D. Kulakov), Pravda, 16 June 1976, p. 4.

¹¹⁹ "Obstanovka v Provintsiakh Kitaa" (Situation in China's Provinces), Pravda, 17 June 1976, p. 5 (Emphasis added). On the same page in Pravda, a short article noted Mao's unsatisfactory state of health. The implication was that the "radicals" were about to lose their main source of support. See: "Soobshchenie iz Pekina" (Information from Peking), Pravda, 17 June 1976, p. 5.

¹²⁰"O Polozhenii v Kitae" (On the Situation in China), Pravda, 5 June 1976, p. 5. See also: M. Yakolev, "Izbienie Kommunistov v Kitae" (Assault on Communists in China), Pravda, 23 June 1976, p. 5.

¹²¹"China Says it Will 'Free' Korea, Taiwan," Stars and Stripes, 27 June 1976, p. 23.

¹²²"Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, 26 July 1976, p. 13.

¹²³V Lazarev, "Sotsial'nye Istoki Maoistskoi Politiki" (The Social Sources of Maoist Policies), Kommunist, no. 12 (August 1976), pp. 105-112 (Emphasis added).

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 112

¹²⁵Ibid., (Emphasis added)

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 114.

¹²⁷Ibid. (At this time "Maoists" dominated the Standing Committee of the Politburo. After the death of Chu Teh in early July, Yeh Chien-ying was the only leader left in the Standing Committee who did not reinforce Mao's interests. This supports the notion that the Soviet appeal was directed at a broader segment of the Chinese leadership.—R.L.F.)

¹²⁸Fox Butterfield, "China's Leftists Are Now Called 'Capitalist-Roaders'," New York Times, 20 October 1976, p. 3.

¹²⁹"Wide Unrest Reported in China Areas," Stars and Stripes, 31 August 1976, p. 4.

¹³⁰Jeremiah O'Leary, "Peking Helped Pacify North Korea, Officials Say," Stars and Stripes, 28 August 1976, p. 12. Chinese intercession was probably requested when Secretary of State Kissinger, after the slaying of the two Army officers by North Koreans, met with Huang Chen, head of China's Liaison Mission in Washington.

¹³¹"Chinese Predicts World War," Stars and Stripes, 9 September 1976, p. 2.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³"V Pekine" (In Peking), Pravda, 11 September 1976, p. 5; "Tseremoniia v Pekine" (Ceremony in Peking), Pravda, 12 September 1976, p. 5.

134. "Poseshchenie Posol'stva KNR" (Visit to PRC Embassy), Pravda, 14 September 1976, p. 4.

135. "Moscow Stops Anti-China Polemics," Soviet World Outlook 1 (15 October 1976): 2. Other Soviet broadcasts to China reiterated Soviet military and economic aid to China before and during the formative years of the PRC, and a broadcast on 18 September pronounced Soviet support for China's efforts to "liberate" Taiwan.

136. "China Says Policy Still Anti-Soviet," Stars and Stripes, 27 September 1976, p. 27. The Red Flag article was transmitted in part by the New China News Agency on 26 September, along with the somewhat contradictory commentary in which the Soviet Union was referred to as a "military menace." Since this was not the same as calling the Soviet Union a "paper tiger," there was an apparent difference of opinion among Chinese leaders with access to the media, concerning relations with the USSR.

137. The NCNA has in the past presented the pro-American, anti-Soviet viewpoint during high-level debates on Chinese foreign policy when other press organs set forth the pro-Soviet "line." See: F. Charles Parker, "The Progress of Soviet Strategy, March-July 1964" (Research paper, The George Washington University, March 1974), p. 8. Moreover, contemporary events suggest that NCNA was the "mouth-piece" for the pro-Mao faction in the Chinese leadership. In the 6-7 October 1976 purge of "leftists" supporters of Mao, officials of the propaganda organs--specifically People's Daily and Hsinhua News Agency (NCNA)--were arrested. See: "Zapadnaia Pechat' o Sobytiakh v Pekine" (Western Press on Events in Peking), Pravda, 14 October 1976, p. 5; Butterfield, "China's Leftists Are Now Called 'Capitalist-Roaders'," p. 3. Denied access to the media, the "radicals" were unable to publicly voice their dissatisfaction with the officially-sanctioned "line" that the Soviet Union was a "paper tiger," and so their characterization of the Soviet Union as a "military menace" was not observed in the Chinese press after 8 October, although the epithet "paper tiger" continued to be printed after that date. See: "Soviet Military Threat: Reality Not 'Myths'," 24 September NCNA commentary, trans. in Peking Review 19 (8 October 1976): 25, 45; "The Chinese Government Will Continue to Carry Out Resolutely Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line and Policies in Foreign Affairs," Speech by Chairman of the Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua at the U.N. General Assembly Session of 5 October, printed in People's Daily, 10 October 1976, trans. in Peking Review 19 (15 October 1976): 11; "New Tsars' Offensive Bears Seeds of Defeat," Peking Review 19 (5 November 1976): 19; "Soviet People's Struggle Against New Tsars," Peking Review 19 (12 November 1976): 2.

138. "XXXI Sessia General'noi Assamblei OON--Vystuplenie A.A. Gromyko," (Thirty-First Session of the U.N. General Assembly--A.A. Gromyko's Speech), Pravda, 29 September 1976, pp. 4-5; "Moscow Stops Anti-China Polemics," p. 2.

139. "Postoiannomu Komitetu Vsekitaiskogo Sobraniia Narodnykh Predstavitelei i Gosudarstvennomu Sovetu Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki" (To the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council of the Chinese People's republic), Pravda, Izvestiia, 1 October 1976, p. 1.

140. I. Aleksandrov, "Dvadstat' Cem' Let KNR" (Twenty-Seven Years of the PRC), Pravda, 1 October 1976, p. 4 (Emphasis added). Many previous Soviet articles had, with qualification, praised the political course taken by the Chinese before the 1960's, but this was the first, to my knowledge, to mention Soviet support for Chinese initiatives toward the US. This article could be viewed two ways: historically and contemporaneously. Viewed historically, the article does not make a great deal of sense. At the end of the 1950's and in the early 1960's the Soviets put public pressure on the Chinese on behalf of an "atom-free zone...in the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin," a proposal ignored by China. In the early 1960's the Moscow-Peking dialogue escalated into a dispute, then a conflict, and finally a rift. Thus, Soviet support for Chinese initiatives which included the US is unlikely. See: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 377, 394-432. For a list of Soviet disarmament proposals see: "Soviets Express Satisfaction With UN," Soviet World Outlook 2 (15 January 1977): 5-6. Additionally, Chinese diplomats in Moscow, when questioned by a US political officer, said that they were not aware of the specific Soviet-supported Chinese proposals alluded to in the Pravda article (Darryl Johnson, Interview, US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, Germany, January 1976). The likelihood that the article cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to historical events suggests that it may have more contemporary meaning. Chinese initiatives toward the US could not be considered beneficial to the USSR in the long term, because they would be detrimental to Soviet national security. Thus, the Soviet expression of support may be viewed as a tactical maneuver calculated to influence events in present-day China.

141. Fox Butterfield, "More Moderate Policy for China Indicated in Anti-Leftist Campaign," New York Times, 22 October 1976, sec. A, p. 8; Joseph Kraft, "Peking Politics Calm Down," New York Post, 9 February 1977, p. 33; "Zapadnaia Pechat' o Sobytiakh v Pekine," p. 5; Yuri Yakhontov, "Mezhdunarodnaia Nedelia—Obozrenie" (International Week—An Overview), Pravda, 17 October 1976, p. 4. See also: "Demonstratsiia v Pekine" (Demonstration in Peking), Pravda, 22 October 1976, p. 5; "Sin'khua o Demonstratsii v Pekine" (Hsinhua on Demonstration in Peking), Pravda, 23 October 1976, p. 5.

142. "Peking Wall Posters Report Hua is Named as Party's Chairman," New York Times, 10 October 1976, pp. 1, 20; "Mao Widow Held in Plot," Times Union, 12 October 1976, p. 1. On 12 October an official Chinese

spokesman in Peking confirmed that Hua had been appointed Chairman of the Party, Chairman of the Military Commission, and would continue as Prime Minister; he declined to comment on the rumors of the arrests of the "leftists." See: "Appointment of Hua as Party's Chairman Confirmed by Peking, New York Times, 13 October 1976, pp. 1, 11.

¹⁴³Johnson, Interview; "Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 1 November 1976, p. 40; "Moscow Attempts to Double Game Peking," Soviet World Outlook 1 (15 November 1976): 5.

¹⁴⁴"Moscow Attempts to Double Game Peking," p. 5; Thornton, China, pp. 332-333.

¹⁴⁵Thornton, China, p. 333.

¹⁴⁶"Moscow Attempts to Double Game Peking," p. 5; "Worldgram," 1 November 1976, p. 40.

¹⁴⁷Ibid. Reinforcing the credibility of the Soviet threat, on 15 October US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that the United States "would not take lightly a massive assault on China." Moscow, in turn, capitalized on its ability to repudiate Louis' "unofficial" statements as not representative of Soviet policy, and attacked Kissinger's "provocation." See: Boris Strel'nikov, "Mezhdunarodnaia Nedelia--Obozrenie" (International Week--An Overview), Pravda, 24 October 1976, p. 4; "Eto Belymi Nitkami Shito, Gospoda!" (It Was Sewn With White Threads, Gentlemen!--that is, it was obvious--R.L.F.), Pravda, 27 October 1976, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸"The Chinese Government Will Continue to Carry Out Resolutely Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line and Policies in Foreign Affairs," p. 14.

¹⁴⁹"Iadernyi Vzryv v Kitae" (Nuclear Explosion in China), Pravda, 19 October 1976, p. 5; "Nuclear Test in China is Boost for Hua," Stars and Stripes, 19 October 1976, p. 8.

¹⁵⁰"Zavershenie Sovetsko-Mongol'skikh Peregovorov" (Conclusion of Soviet-Mongolian Negotiations), Pravda, 20 October 1976, p. 1. See also: "Beseda L.I. Brezhneva's Y. Tsedenbalom" (L.I. Brezhnev's Talks With Y. Tsedenbal), Pravda, 20 October 1976, p. 1.

¹⁵¹"Rech' Tovarishcha L.I. Brezhneva na Plenum TsK KPSS 25 Oktiabria 1976 Goda" (L.I. Brezhnev's Speech at the CPSU CC Plenum 25 October 1976), Pravda, 26 October 1976, p. 2.

¹⁵²Ibid.

153. "Predsedateliu Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kitaia Tovarishchu Khus Go-Fenu" (To the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Comrade Hua Kuo-feng), Pravda, 28 October 1976, p. 1; "Moscow Attempts to Double Game Peking," p. 6.
154. "Moscow Attempts to Double Game Peking," p. 6; Darryl Johnson, Interview. It is interesting to consider that Louis' reference to the disappearance of anti-Soviet literature from the Chinese railway station may indeed have reflected important changes in China. Specifically, on 15 October an official of the PRC Railways Ministry disclosed that the Minister of Railways, Wan Li, a longtime Party leader and "moderate," who was reported ousted from his post only the previous month, had been reinstated. It is not unreasonable to impute a connection between the reinstatement of Wan and the removal of the anti-Soviet tracts. More importantly, the return of Wan may have been perceived by the Soviets as representing the ascendancy of "moderate" forces in China, which would be to Soviet advantage. See: Fox Butterfield, "Wall Posters in China Charge Four Leftists With Plotting Against Party," New York Times, 16 October 1976, p. 5.
155. "K Sobytiyam v Kitae" (On Events in China), Pravda, 2 November 1976, p. 5.
156. "Dorogoi Mira i Sotrudnichestva" (On the Path of Peace and Cooperation), Izvestiia, 4 November 1976, p. 1.
157. "Prezidiumu Verkhnego Soveta SSSR--Sovetu Ministrov SSSR" (To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR--To the Soviet of Ministers USSR), Pravda, 9 November 1976, p. 3, Izvestiia, 10 November 1976, p. 3; "Prezidiumu Verkhnego Soveta SSSR--Sovetu Ministrov SSSR" (To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR--To the Soviet of Ministers USSR), Pravda, 9 November 1975, p. 4; "Soviet Celebration is Again Low-Keyed," New York Times, 8 November 1976, p. 3.
158. "Soviet Celebration is Again Low-Keyed," p. 3.
159. "Po Pekinskomu 'Televideniiu'" (On Peking Television), Pravda, 8 November 1976, p. 5, Izvestiia, 8 November 1976, p. 6.
160. "Revoliutsionnyi Demokrat, Drug Stranu Sovetov--K 110-letiu co Dnia Rozhdeniia Sun' Iat-Sena" (Revolutionary Democrat, Friend of the Country of Soviets--on the 110th Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen), Izvestiia, 13 November 1976, p. 4.
161. "Friendlier Relations With the Russians Rejected by Chinese," New York Times, 16 November 1976, p. 2.

162 "Polozhenie v Kitae" (Situation in China), Pravda, 23 November 1976, p. 5; "First Soviet Criticism of Hua," Soviet World Outlook 2 (15 January 1977): 6.

163 Fox Butterfield, "Peking Sends Army to Area of Clashes," New York Times, 26 November 1976, sec. A, pp. 1,3.

164 Ibid.

165 "Signs Suggest Teng May Re-emerge," Newsday, 27 November 1976, p. 4; Fox Butterfield, "Teng Seen Making Comeback in China After April Purge," New York Times, 28 November 1976, pp. 1, 21. The implication that Teng had army support may be gleaned from indications that after he had been removed from his posts in April 1976, while retaining his Party membership, Teng had stayed at a hot springs resort outside Canton, where he coordinated strategy for counterattacking the "leftists" after Mao's death with two other Chinese leaders--Yeh Chien-ying, the Defense Minister, and Li Hsien-nien, who became the senior Deputy Prime Minister. See: Butterfield, "Teng Seen Making Comeback," p. 21.

166 Fox Butterfield, "Peking Purge May Have Claimed New Victims," New York Times, 27 November 1976, p. missing.

167 "Prebytie v Pekin" (Arrival in Peking), Pravda, 29 November 1976, p. 3; "Soviet Aide Back in Peking for Talk," New York Times, 28 November 1976, p. missing.

168 "Zasedanie Postoiannogo Komiteta VSNP" (Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC), Pravda, 2 December 1976, p. 5.

169 "Zasedanie Postoiannogo Komiteta VSNP" (Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC), Pravda, 3 December 1976, p.5.

170 Fox Butterfield, "Senior Leaders of Army in China Believed Gaining Decisive Power," New York Times, 11 December 1976, pp. 1,9.

171 "Pekinskaia Pechat' o Polozhenii v Kitae," (Peking Press on the Situation in China), Pravda, 21 December 1976, p. 5.

172 Fox Butterfield, "Hua Predicts Purge Across China in '77," New York Times, 29 December 1976, pp. 1, 3. The text of the speech had reached the outside world during the Cultural Revolution, when it was printed in limited-circulation Red Guard pamphlets.

173 Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Major Relationships," Peking Review 20 (1 January 1977): 23-24 (Emphasis added).

174 Fox Butterfield, "Hua Predicts Purge," p. 3; Hua Kuo-feng, "Speech at the Second National Conference on Learning From Tachai in Agriculture," Peking Review 20 (1 January 1977): 32.

175 Butterfield, "Hua Predicts Purge," p. 3.

176 Mao, "Ten Major Relationships," p. 25.

177 "Soveshchanie v Pekine" (Conference in Peking), Pravda, 30 December 1976, p. 5, Izvestiia, 31 December

178 "A Factual Report—Crushing the 'Gang of Four' was a Wise Decision by Chairman Mao," Peking Review 20 (14 January 1977): 30-31.

179 "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs," Peking Review 20 (28 January 1977): 11-12.

180 Ibid., p. 11. The article, which appeared in People's Daily a week before President Carter's inauguration, endorsed the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué as grounds for normalization of relations between the United States and China. See: "China Sends a Peace Sign on Taiwan," Newsday, 14 January 1977, p. 10.

181 "K Amerikano-Kitsiskim Otnosheniam" (On American-Chinese relations), Pravda, 19 February 1977, p.5.

182 Drew Middleton, "China Arms—Peking Shows Renewed Interest in Buying Weapons From West to Modernize its Forces," Stars and Stripes, 2 March 1977, p. 10. It is possible that the Chinese decision to seek arms from the West was reached during a series of major military meetings held in Peking in the early part of February. According to a Soviet source, participants in these meetings discussed anti-aircraft defense, scientific research, and military production. See: "Soveshchaniia v Pekine" (Conference in Peking), Pravda, 7 February 1977, p. 3.

183 Fox Butterfield, "Signs Growing in China that Teng has Been Reinstated to State Post," New York Times, 14 January 1977, p. missing

184 See, for example: "Poezdka v Khanchzhou" (Trip to Hangchow), Pravda, 1 February 1977, p. 5; "Pekinskaia Tsenzura" (Peking Censorship), Pravda, 20 February 1977, p. 5; See also footnotes 185, 186, 187, below.

185 "V Pekine" (In Peking), Pravda, 15 January 1977, p.5.

186 "Publikatsii v Pekine" (Publications in Peking), Pravda, 25 January 1977, p. 5.

187. "Bor'ba Protiv 'Gruppy Chetyrekh' v Kitae" (Struggle Against "Group of Four" in China), Pravda, 26 February 1977, p. 5, Izvestia, p. 3.

188. "Publikatsii v Pekine," p. 5.

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- _____. "Lozungi i Praktika--O Novoi Konstitutsii KNR" (Slogans and Practice--On the PRC's New Constitution). Pravda, 5 February 1975, pp. 4-5.
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
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