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
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THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE: 1951-1976

by

James Lowell Freed

December 1976

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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The US-Japan Alliance 1951-1976

by

James Lowell Freed
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., Hanover College, 1967

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1976

Author

James Lowell Freed

Approved by:

Claude A. Buss
Thesis Advisor

Franklin T. ...
Chairman, Department of
National Security Affairs

J. A. Shroy
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The most vital foreign policy goals of the government of any country, are to provide for the physical security of the nation, and economic prosperity of its people. Although it is often difficult to evaluate foreign policy decisions on a strictly rational basis, ultimately the survival of the country depends on how successfully leaders achieve these objectives. Foreign policy "interests" in areas beyond the territorial confines of the nation are determined by the degree to which they contribute to the enhancement of the vital goals of security and prosperity.

The first, and most basic of the two objectives is security. At the very minimum, security refers to the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. Although security includes the perpetuation of the values, life-styles, patterns of social relations, and other elements that give a state its identity, security has traditionally been measured primarily in terms of military strength. Such a measurement includes not only independent strength, but also alliances, or combined military power. The ultimate rational basis for maintaining military strength is to provide for the physical survival of the nation. In the case of alliances, their success and durability is largely determined by the degree of security provided for all parties to the agreement. Although there have been rare instances where a state's security has been

preserved through a policy of unarmed neutrality, such a policy is risky as it relies on the actions of other nations for basic guarantees of territorial integrity and political independence.

Prosperity, or economic well-being, is interrelated with physical security. The elements of economic well-being are relatively few: natural resources, degree of self-sustenance, imports and exports, education level of the population, transportation system (internal and external), and industrial development level. The overall level of prosperity achieved by a nation depends upon the ability to maximize each of the categories, and security plays a key role in providing that ability.

If a nation must substitute imports for natural resources it lacks, the freedom to do so is clearly a security objective. Vital or strategic minerals not present within the borders of a state must be available from abroad if the elements of security are to be maintained. Such an objective can be attained by creating and maintaining stability in the world system through the processes of international relations, either diplomatic understanding or projection of military power. Pursuit of policies designed to establish and maintain a world order compatible with the survival and prosperity of the nation are the ultimate goals of any nation's involvement in the world arena.

Historically, the first step taken by the United States

in foreign policy was to establish security for its own borders. Its original problems, of course, resulted from its conflicts with European colonial powers. Once continental security was guaranteed, the United States began to gradually project its power and influence in foreign affairs beyond its own borders.

The first area that was considered vital to US security was the rest of the Western Hemisphere. As early as the Monroe Doctrine, the US declared to colonial powers that it considered the new world an area of particular interest. By preempting attempts by European powers to build military bases which could threaten the borders of the United States, the ring of US security was widened considerably. At the time of the Monroe Doctrine the United States lacked military power to back up the declaration and the doctrine's success was due largely to the understanding of England and the strength of the British fleet. Nevertheless, the Doctrine played a key role in US policy as recently as the Cuban missile crisis.

With regard to Western Europe, until World War I the United States had not become actively involved in European conflicts. Isolation, recommended by the founding fathers, was deemed adequate as a policy toward Europe. As long as there was no feeling that Europe could be dominated by any single country, the US was content to remain relatively isolated from European politics. The European threat to the

American way of life during World War I, and again during World War II, was not a threat of invasion. The United States decision to go to war in both cases was to prevent the formation of a unified Europe, with a system antagonistic to the US, under a militaristic centralized direction. Such a situation could have produced an ultimate direct threat to the physical survival of the United States, and thus had to be resisted in the opinion of the US government. Because of the concentration of industrial and technological power in Western Europe, the potential threat to the United States made it prudent to act to prevent dominance of that area by hostile powers.

Following World War II and the elimination of facism (or Naziism) as a threat to US security, the United States did not retreat to its former policy of isolation with regard to Europe. It had become clear to American leaders that the United States must actively pursue policies which would prevent hegemony of Europe by hostile powers. Facism was rapidly replaced by Communism as the force to counteract in Europe, and the war-torn allies of the United States were too weak to meet the task. The Truman Point Four program and the Marshall Plan were enacted to rebuild the European allies and prevent communist hegemony. It became clear to US leaders that a permanent military alliance was desirable to offset Soviet military power and the NATO pact was entered to perform that role. The NATO alliance,

continues to pledge US military forces in a commitment to prevent hegemony of Western Europe by a hostile power.

The East Asian area, like Europe, represents a large pool of resources which, if under single management, could threaten the security of the United States. The rise of communication and technology, especially air service, brought the Far East closer, and World War II drove home the idea that the Far East, as much as Europe and the Western Hemisphere had to be included in the determination of US vital interests. In Asia, as in Europe, during World War II, the United States was not threatened with an invasion of its homeland. However, the potential threat to the United States was made clear by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The prospect of a unified East Asia under the direction of Japan was unacceptable to US leaders.

Following World War II the United States was faced with a situation in Asia similar to Western Europe. As the spectre of a communist threat replaced that of Japan, the US moved to fill the power vacuum in Asia. Events in East Asia during the half dozen years following World War II brought the United States to the realization that a strong and friendly Japan was extremely important to its policy of preventing hostile hegemony in East Asia.

In the three regions of the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Far East, the United States has historically proven its interests were so vital it would be willing to

engage in general war to maintain them. The intrinsic value of these three regions to US security is such that they remain the primary areas of US foreign policy interests. In the Western Hemisphere, the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the US government's belief in the importance of its interests there. In Europe, US involvement in World Wars I and II exemplifies US interest. In East Asia, World War II, and to a lesser extent the Korean and Vietnam Wars showed US willingness to engage in war to protect what it considered to be its vital interests. In the Western Hemisphere the US seeks to maintain its own dominance; in Western Europe and East Asia it seeks to prevent the dominance of another power.

In the short period of time between the end of World War II and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, sweeping changes took place in world power alignments. Germany and Japan, wartime enemies, became postwar allies, while the Soviet Union and mainland China, wartime allies, became postwar enemies. Forces of rising nationalism in prewar European colonies contributed to the creation of a world system vastly different from the one that existed prior to World War II.

During this period, battlelines in the Cold War were drawn. Containment of communism became the primary method of attaining US policy goals; the defeat of American imperialism became the battle cry of communists throughout the world. The US extended its influence to become a dominant world power while the USSR, as the chief center of world communism,

expanded its own sphere of operations. The US goal of preventing single power dominance in East Asia was aimed at both the Soviet Union and China, representing what was felt to be a monolithic threat of world communism. While the USSR and the PRC formed their alliance and cooperated to develop their mutual strength, the United States countered with a chain of alliances aimed at surrounding the communist countries. During the early 1950s a policy of "massive retaliation" was asserted by the United States. Japan became the United States' most important Asian supporter in the drive for the containment of communism in the East Asian area.

During the Allied Occupation of Japan following World War II, the relationship between the United States and Japan changed drastically. This was accomplished in a short period of six years from September 1945 to September 1951. The strategic location of Japan and its tremendous military potential brought the United States to the realization that an alliance with Japan would be an important asset in furthering US security objectives in East Asia. The realization was slow in coming. During the Occupation there were many who felt that Japan should be punished and prevented from rebuilding its economy rather than rehabilitated and made strong again. The importance of rebuilding Japan and allying with it became clear as communist governments consolidated power in China and North Korea in the late 1940s, and the idea was hastened by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.

Since 1951, Japan has become the only country in East Asia whose intrinsic value to US security is so great that its loss would irreparably harm the US objective of preventing dominance of Asia by hostile powers. In no other western Pacific nation can US interests begin to compare in importance with those in Japan. US commitments to other Pacific nations, although important, are of lesser consequence. With the spectacular rise of the Japanese economy since World War II, the importance of Japan to US security objectives has become even more clear. Today, Japan has a highly developed economy with the third highest GNP in the world, and second only to the US in the non-communist world. Japan is the United States' second largest trading partner behind Canada, and the volume of oceanic trade between the US and Japan is the largest of any two countries in the world. Strategically, Japan's location in an area where the Soviet Union and China both have vital interests is important to the US. By maintaining an alliance with Japan, the United States has been able to further its goal of preventing hegemony in the area by forces hostile to it.

Moreover, Japan is potentially a great military power itself. With its broad industrial base and advanced technology Japan could easily become a powerful military, as well as economic force in Asia. Japan has the industrial capacity and technology to easily outproduce China in both nuclear and conventional arms. Japan's potential military power

makes it a far more important US interest than any other state in East Asia.¹ A continuing reason for the US alliance with Japan is to preclude the necessity for Japan to have a large military which could threaten stability in East Asia.

The main goal of this paper is to examine the military aspects of the US-Japan mutual security relationship. Although there are many economic factors in the alliance this paper will attempt to deal with them only as they affect security policy. The goal of US policy in East Asia has been to prevent hegemony by any power or powers hostile to the United States. The alliance between the US and Japan has been an important factor in achieving that goal and enhancing US security. The decision to ally with Japan was an important one in US diplomatic history. Because of the far-reaching implications that decision has fostered for the United States in the post-World War II era, it is important and useful to review how and why the decision was reached.

In the period following Japan's surrender there was little unanimity among the allies, or within the United States itself, concerning Japan's post-war future. Fear and suspicion of Japan ran high in the minds of other Pacific nations. The entire Asian-Pacific policy and alliance

¹ Clough, Ralph N., East Asia and US Security, pp. 31-32, Brookings Institution, 1975.

system of the US was affected by the fears of these nations. The context of the mutual security relationship of the United States and Japan must be viewed in relation to the larger system of alliances formed by the United States in Asia because it was formed with them in the minds of US leaders. Because of this the US-Japan alliance will be discussed in terms of the diplomatic maneuvering of which it was a part.

Although the act of signing an alliance can be placed in time as a static event, the functioning of it cannot. The US-Japan alliance has been constantly adjusted since it was signed in 1951. Roles and relationships between the two parties have altered considerably since the alliance's inception. When Japan signed the document it was weak and defenseless, economically as well as militarily. It had no military to speak of and no economy capable of supporting one. As a result, it was left to the United States to provide the bulk of manpower and equipment for the defense of Japan.

The phase of the alliance characterized by large US military aid and troop commitments occurred between 1950 and 1960. Although there are still some US forces stationed in Japan, and although US military aid to Japan continued into the late 1960s, a series of decisions between 1957 and 1960 altered the basic concept of the roles of the two parties. These decisions led to a formal revision of the security agreement in 1960.

The revised security treaty reflects the changing role and status of the two countries in their joint security

efforts. Japan had rebuilt its economy substantially by 1960 and had regained confidence and self-esteem. It was no longer acceptable to operate under the restrictions of the original security treaty. The desire for revision on the part of Japan did not indicate a weakening of the alliance, rather it showed a desire for a more equitable and more equal partnership. The result was the revised security arrangement which is still in force.

New modes of military transfers to Japan accompanied the revised security agreement. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, commercial sales, and licenses to manufacture equipment replaced Grant Aid as the means of transferring arms and training to Japan's Self Defense Forces.

In 1957, Japan launched the first of its defense buildup programs to fulfill its new role under the revised treaty. The defense programs and US military sales to Japan are two parts of a coordinated plan which were the result of Japan's attempt to develop a coherent philosophy of defense. More attention was focused on long range planning concerning the proper size, capability, role, and equipment of the Self Defense Forces. As a result, Japan began to separate its vital interests from those of the United States and embark on a more independent course in foreign affairs. Gradually during the decade of the 1960s and continuing through the mid-1970s, Japan began to cautiously rebuild the capability of its arms industry. Through a push-pull process

of domestic and international political maneuvering Japan has attempted to work around constraints resulting from World War II and build a sophisticated embryo of military forces and the means to equip them.

It was inevitable that Japan's tremendous economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s would create a new image in the minds of Japanese leaders of their role and importance in the US-Japan alliance. At the same time, US leaders looked at the growing balance of payments deficit with Japan and questioned the equitability of the costs of the alliance. Enmities, which might have been foreseen and negotiated at an early stage, were allowed to grow until they became intolerable. The Nixon "shocks" of the early 1970s resulted. The method applied by President Nixon to adjust the alliance relationship shook it to its foundation.

Other strains of political and psychological origins have affected the alliance. Differences of opinion about the value of the alliance to Japan and the US have led to enmities between the two countries. Although efforts are being made to clarify the value of the alliance, strains still exist.

The purpose of outlining the evolution of the US-Japan security agreement is to evaluate its validity. The world scene has changed drastically since the original pact was signed in 1951, and even since its revision in 1960. Has the alliance kept pace with these changes, or has it outlived its usefulness? The criteria must be the ability of the

alliance to continue to meet the security needs of the two parties. Should its validity be found lacking, what then are the alternative courses of action? If it is the US objective to prevent hostile hegemony in East Asia, how does the security pact with Japan further that objective? The agreement has been revised once to reflect the changing roles and demands of the parties. Perhaps a new revision is in order. Even though the present security treaty may still be adequate, there are actions which could be taken by both the United States and Japan to increase its effectiveness.

II. ORIGINS OF THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN
1945-1951

A. THE De facto GUARANTEE OF THE ALLIED OCCUPATION

Although the US agreement to aid in the defense of Japan was not formalized until the return of Japanese sovereignty in 1952, the actual commitment began with the surrender of Japan to General Douglas MacArthur on 2 Sept 1945. General MacArthur represented the combined Allied Forces that had been at war with Japan; however, the United States played the primary role in providing Japanese security during the ensuing Occupation of Japan. Within a few short weeks, the military of Japan was disbanded and General MacArthur said on 16 October 1945 that:

"Today the Japanese Armed Forces throughout Japan completed their demobilization and ceased to exist as such. These forces are now completely abolished... Everything military, naval or air is forbidden to Japan. This ends its military might and its military influence in international affairs. It no longer reckons as a world power either large or small." ²

The significance of General MacArthur's statement was difficult for Americans to appreciate. For well over half a millenium the Japanese had lived in a society dominated by military rule, culminating in World War II. In 1945 they were suddenly stripped of military forces and placed under the tutelage and protection of conquerors. Now the same military leaders who had ruled Japan were tried as war criminals by Allied military courts and the International

²

MacArthur, Douglas, Reminiscences, p. 155, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Military Tribunal for the Far East. All career military men were purged from public life and defense industries were dismantled or destroyed. In addition, restrictions were placed on war industries and the Japanese Constitution was soon rewritten renouncing war and prohibiting military forces and war potential.

During the first few years of the Allied Occupation, little thought was given to the future defense of Japan. According to the Potsdam formula, attention was instead focused on preventing Japan from again menacing the peace in Asia. Reform of economic and social flaws and the elimination of militarism, which the Allies felt had led to World War, took priority. The Occupation forces, of which 75% were US troops, constituted a defacto security guarantee.

It became obvious to General MacArthur at the outset of the Occupation that the US contingent of the garrison was necessary to protect Japan from being divided into occupation zones such as had occurred in postwar Germany. In 1945 the Soviets pressed for a separate occupation of Hokkaido not under General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). MacArthur refused even though General Derevyanko, commander of Soviet forces, threatened to move Soviet troops into Hokkaido without MacArthur's permission. General MacArthur told the Soviet commander that "...if a single Soviet soldier entered Japan without my authority, I would at once throw the entire

Russian mission, including himself, into jail."³ This was probably the first statement of intent by the US military to protect the Japanese from a Soviet military threat in Asia.

Although General MacArthur had to cope with attempts to disrupt the internal security of Japan, external security was not felt to be threatened until the perception of communism as a world force became stronger. The famous Kennan "X Article," calling for containment of communism appeared in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, and was directed primarily against Russia. The Chinese communists under Mao Tse-tung consolidated power and founded the People's Republic of China in October 1949, and meanwhile the communists consolidated their regimes in Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam. The communist ~~hand~~ showed itself in internal rebellions throughout Southeast Asia and the communist-non-communist cold war became hot war in Korea in 1950. The alarm generated in the United States as a result of these events, as well as the consolidation of Soviet power and hegemony in Eastern Europe, combined to motivate the United States to make plans for contributing to the defense of postwar Japan. Even during the cold war days of 1948, the goals of the Occupation had changed from protecting Asia from the Japanese menace to protection of the Japanese from the communist menace.

³
Ibid., p. 285.

The overriding US foreign policy objective remained that of preventing hegemony of East Asia by a hostile ideology or group of powers.

B. THE US POSTWAR TREATY SYSTEM

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States established alliances and mutual defense agreements with forty-two nations in an effort to put its security goals in action. The first of these, signed in 1947, was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known as the Rio Pact). This agreement, which included twenty Central and South American republics, underscored the mutual objective of maintaining the Western Hemisphere free of outside military aggression.

In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed. This agreement included the United States and Canada, plus ten European nations. By 1952 West Germany, Greece and Turkey had acceded to the treaty, raising the number of signatories to fifteen. Both the Rio Pact and the NATO Alliance have a very strongly worded action (or "trigger") clause calling for an attack on any one of the members to be considered an attack on all.⁴ These are the only two alliances the United States is a member of which call for immediate reaction in event of attack. Since the United States is by far the strongest partner in both treaties, this wording further

⁴ US Congress, Collective Defense Treaties, p. 22 and p. 77, US Government Printing Office, 1967.

establishes how vital the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe are to US security objectives.

In 1951 the United States signed mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. This formed the beginning of US involvement in Asian alliances. In 1953 the Republic of Korea and the US signed a mutual security agreement; a year later a similar pact was signed by the Republic of China and the US. In addition to these bilateral and trilateral agreements, the United States was instrumental in forming the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) with seven other governments in 1954. None of these agreements is worded as strongly as the Rio Pact and NATO Alliance. The Asian-Pacific treaties state that the parties recognize that an armed attack in that region would be dangerous to their peace and security and would be dealt with "in accordance with...constitutional processes." None of these agreements applies to the continental United States; however, they do apply to attacks on the US in their respective treaty areas.⁵

Although the United States is not a member of the Central Treaty Organization (formerly the Baghdad Pact), it did agree in 1959 to assist Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran in support of the pact. Under the terms of the bilateral agreements between the US and these threemembers of the treaty organization, the

⁵
Ibid., p. 82, 89, 92, 94 and 101.

United States provided military and economic assistance as well as the promise of "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in case of aggression against them.⁶

The period between 1947 and 1954 has been referred to as one of "pactomania" in US diplomatic history. The series of treaties entered into by the United States formed the basis for the US commitment to the defense of certain non-communist states against communist aggression in the Cold War period. Although the strength of the treaties varied, together they demonstrated the conviction that the limited defense of certain non-communist nations was important to US foreign interests.

C. NEGOTIATING THE JAPANESE TREATY

Initially, the guiding objective of the Occupation forces in Japan was to prevent the recurrence of conditions which had led to Japan's imperial and militarist policies. There was little thought of forming an alliance with Japan. The overall concept of the Occupation, according to the Potsdam formula, was:

"To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world...Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influences of militarism will be totally eliminated from

⁶
Ibid., p.1 and pp. 196-197.

her political, economic, and social life."⁷

Although the harshness of this decree faded as the Occupation progressed, the initial post-surrender policy formed the basis for early drafts of a Japanese peace treaty.

There was no clearcut agreement among US officials concerning the post-occupation peace and security provisions for Japan. General MacArthur and certain State Department officials favored an early peace treaty which would give legal form to the principles of the Post-Surrender Policy Directive. However, there were others in the Navy and Army who envisaged an indefinite occupation, following a preliminary treaty which would not restore full sovereignty to Japan but would re-establish diplomatic relations. This would have allowed the United States to retain strategic forward bases in Japan free of interference. General MacArthur was convinced that the Japanese had been reformed by the events of war and defeat and should be reinstated in the community of nations. Early in 1946, he stated that "Japan today understands as thoroughly as any nation that war does not pay...her spiritual revolution has been probably the greatest ~~the~~ world has ever seen."⁸

⁷
US Department of State, The Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, p. 74, US Government Printing Office, 1946.

⁸
Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Government Section, The Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 785, US Government Printing Office, 1949.

MacArthur also advised that Japan be allowed no armed forces beyond a police force sufficient to deal with internal disorders. Instead, Japan should remain disarmed and rely⁹ on the United Nations for its defense.

In 1946, with the conflict of opinion of whether or not Japan should be given a punitive treaty settlement still unresolved, the State Department drafted a tentative treaty. This agreement, which was formally submitted to the governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China on 21 June 1946, reflected the Post-Surrender Policy Directive. The preamble stated:

"It remains to ensure that the total disarmament and demilitarization of Japan will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require. Only this assurance will permit the nations of Asia and the world to return singlemindedly to the habits of peace."¹⁰

This draft paralleled a similar agreement put forward at approximately the same time for a settlement in Germany. Although not specifically stated, the draft implied that the four powers would directly control Japan's security indefinitely.

Furthermore, the draft called for a four power Commission of Control with authority to ensure the continued demilitarization of Japan after the Occupation. If the commission

9

Wheeler-Bennett, John and Nicholls, Anthony, The Semblance of Peace, p. 502, St. Martins Press, 1972.

10

Ibid., pp. 502-503.

were to find a violation of the disarmament and demilitarization clauses, the signatories would "take such prompt action-- including action by air, sea or land forces--as may be necessary to assure the immediate cessation or prevention of such violation or attempted violation."¹¹ The treaty was to remain in force for twenty-five years.

As early as the Moscow Conference of December 1945, the draft treaties calling for the disarmament of Germany and Japan were discussed. Stalin tacitly accepted the terms laid down for Japan by accepting similar ones for Germany. In July 1946, however, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, rejected the idea of joint allied control over the disarmament of Germany. Because of Soviet opposition to such a treaty with Germany, the United States felt it would not be worthwhile to press for similar terms for Japan. Although MacArthur and Secretary of State Byrnes agreed that a peace treaty with Japan should be concluded as soon as possible, the matter was delayed because of the Soviet attitude.

In March 1947, the United States again produced a draft treaty which was transmitted to Britain, China and the USSR. This draft, written by Dr. Hugh Borton, Chief of the State Department's Division for Japanese Affairs, and Dr. Ruth Bacon of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was similar to the previous treaty. Although the draft was never published,

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US Department of State, The Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, pp. 85-88, US Government Printing Office, 1946.

it has been summarized in other publications. The term of the treaty was to be twenty-five years, and Japan was to have no military forces or potential other than police. The treaty called for a strict interpretation of Article IX of the Japanese constitution which renounced all war-making capability. Inspection and enforcement of the restrictions were to be carried out by an Allied Commission of Inspection working under a Council of Ambassadors made up of members of the Far Eastern Commission.¹²

The United States requested a conference to be held in August 1947 to discuss the terms of the draft treaty. For various reasons the conference was never held. In Canberra, Britain and other Commonwealth nations were already planning to meet during the same time to discuss the Japanese situation. The Soviet Union and China refused to attend the conference in Washington because of differences of opinion on veto rights on provisions of the draft. The United States, faced with Chinese and Soviet intransigence, and British prior commitments, cancelled the meeting and resigned itself to tabling the desire for an early peace.

In retrospect, it was fortunate for the United States that neither of the first draft treaties was enacted. By early 1950, when the peace treaty with Japan was again actively

¹² Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, Op. cit., pp. 503-504, 1972.

pursued, world events had drastically altered US terms for a Japanese peace treaty. The communist threat to Western Europe and East Asia had increased in severity during the 1947 to 1950 period. Because of British inability to continue aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States had chosen to assume that obligation to prevent a communist takeover. This was followed by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, and the Chinese communist victory of 1949. US forces had withdrawn from South Korea by August 1948, and during the years 1949 and 1950, it had become increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was strengthening the North Koreans in the event of war against the South.

In June 1950, hostilities in Korea broke out, and the United States once again went to war in East Asia to halt "cynical, naked and brutal aggression." The combination of events of the Cold War convinced the United States that the idea of a punitive and restrictive peace treaty for Japan should be replaced with one that would rebuild Japan as a strong anti-communist force in East Asia.

As the US posture on the terms of a peace treaty with Japan began to change to favor a non-punitive peace, the issue of Japanese security, and the security of non-communist nations in Asia gradually became linked together. Within the State Department, however, the concept of a punitive treaty died hard. In a new draft written in September 1949 there was little change from the Borton draft of January 1948. Although

it did not call for reparation payments, it did contain restrictions on Japanese sovereignty and on the nation's war-making capability. The Japanese were not to be permitted to engage in war industries, and troops, 85% of them US, were to be stationed in Japan indefinitely.

By October 1949, a partial draft of a non-punitive treaty had been completed by the State Department. This was the first of the draft treaties which recognized the change in world power alignments resulting from the Cold War. This treaty called for the termination of all Allied control of Japan, and had no provision for any type of inspection team to insure that Japan was maintaining no military forces. Although the treaty still contained clauses which required Japan to pay reparations for the war, as well as promise to maintain democratic processes, other economic and agrarian reforms were to be left to the Japanese government. This change of attitude on the part of the United States reflected President Truman's National Security Council's recommendation of November 1948 to reduce the size of General MacArthur's staff and turn more responsibility over to the Japanese government. This eased the strains between the United States and Japan and changed the tenor of the Occupation to rebuilding Japan as a democratic stronghold in East Asia.

13

Ibid., pp. 507-508.

The Japanese Government under Yoshida, Katayama, and Ashida, as Prime Ministers, had consistently hoped since 1947 that some sort of security agreement could be worked out with the United States after the Occupation. Although it was suggested at one time by George Acheson that perhaps Japan should refer its security to the United Nations, the Japanese government felt that it would be a considerable length of time before that body would be able to guarantee Japan's security. Prime Minister Katayama transmitted these feelings through a document drawn up by Foreign Minister Ashida and Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Nishio, and written in the name of the Head of the Central Liaison Office, Tadakatsu Suzuki. This document stated that while Japan was in a position to deal with internal disturbances without outside aid, the best means of safeguarding her independence for the present was to enter into a special pact with the United States against external aggression.

Although the document did not formally request the continued stationing of US troops in Japan after the peace treaty, there did not seem to be any other way to guarantee Japanese security.¹⁴ The document prepared by the Katayama government was accepted without change by the Yoshida cabinet and remained the Japanese government's position throughout the negotiations

14

Yoshida, Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, pp. 264-265, Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1962.

leading to the treaty settlement in 1951.

No particular date can be given to the US decision to provide for Japanese security in the post-Occupation period, but it was relatively slow in coming compared to the non-punitive peace treaty idea. George Kennan, then director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, felt that the US should "devise policies toward Japan which would assure the security of that country from Communist penetration and domination as well as from military attack by the Soviet Union."¹⁵ He was dismayed, however, on a special mission to Japan for Secretary of State Marshall in 1948, that there was no US planning to provide for a US security guarantee of Japan after the Occupation. Largely as a result of Kennan's efforts, US planners began to seriously consider the future security of Japan.

By early 1950, the United States, although still without a specific plan, linked Japanese security with US worldwide defense commitments. In his famous speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated:

"...the defeat and the disarmament of Japan have placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security...I can assure you that there is no

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Kennan, George F., Memoirs: 1925-1950, p. 381, Little, Brown and Co., 1967.

intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan...that defense must and shall be maintained."¹⁶

Although Mr. Acheson's speech is most remembered for not including South Korea in US defense commitments, there was no doubt that by 1950, the US considered Japan's security to be a US responsibility.

This position was further consolidated the following month when the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China announced a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance which was directed specifically at Japan. According to Article I of that document:

"Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression."¹⁷

By this time the United States had already established that South Korea would not be included in plans for an East Asian security system. As early as March 2, 1949, General MacArthur, in an interview with London Daily Mail correspondent G. Ward Price, stated:

" It (the US Asian defense line) starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends

¹⁶ US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXII, pp. 115-118, US Government Printing Office, 1951.

¹⁷ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. X, pp. 334-338, United Nations Secretariat, 1950.

back through Japan and the Aleutian chain to Alaska."¹⁸ This concept was confirmed by Acheson's speech in January 1950. Most of the US troops, including all ground combat units, had been withdrawn from Korea during 1948 and 1949, and the United States apparently felt that the two Koreas would provide buffer zones advantageous to both the US and the communists.

US authorities in Japan began to focus attention on leftists, rather than rightists, and worried more about communist subversion than resurgence of militarism. The concept of the future Japan as a peaceful "Switzerland of Asia" gave way to a new image of a Japan which could become a non-communist defense stronghold in Asia. General MacArthur, in his New Year's message of 1950 emphasized that Japan had not forfeited the inherent right of self defense and spoke no more about the surrender of sovereign rights to rearm.

When Secretary Acheson appointed John Foster Dulles his Special Ambassador to negotiate a peace treaty between Japan and her former enemies in May 1950, there were several problems that had to be considered. As the Secretary said, he had to reckon with four groups: the Communists, the pentagon, US allies, and the former enemy, and that, of the four, the Communists gave the least trouble. Dulles asked Secretary

18

Weinstein, Martin E., Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 47, Columbia University Press, 1971.

Acheson for a year in which to negotiate a peace treaty and security treaty with Japan. Within a year and four months after receiving the assignment, both documents were signed in San Francisco.

Dulles realized that the only way to ensure an outcome favorable to the United States' security interests in East Asia was to foreclose any Soviet opportunity to sabotage the peace negotiations. He had just returned from his first visit to Japan in June 1950 when the North Koreans invaded South Korea. This event, combined with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 and the desperate need for US bases in Japan to support forces in Korea, convinced Dulles that the Soviets would do anything possible to disrupt Japanese peace and security treaty negotiations. As a result, his plan was to inform the USSR of all positions and progress of the talks, but to make sure that they had no opportunity to subvert US objectives. Dulles stated in August 1951 that "Throughout this period (of negotiations) the Soviet Union took an active, though non-cooperative part. I had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged ten memoranda and drafts."¹⁹ He rejected, however, Soviet claims that the Council of Foreign Ministers, formed at Potsdam on 17 July 1945, was the only body empowered to draw up a peace treaty

¹⁹
US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXV, p. 346, US Government Printing Office, 1951.

with Japan. Although there may have been some basis for the Soviet claim, Dulles held that the right of the Council of Foreign Ministers to draw up a peace treaty was limited to Germany. Without the veto the Soviets would have attained in that body, they were effectively blocked by the United States from influencing the treaty negotiations.

The communist government of China supported the Soviet position, but this was not the main area of concern to Dulles with that country. The problem of China was a question of which government--Communist or Nationalist--represented the Chinese. The United States maintained that the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek was the legal government; however, the British had agreed to recognize the communists under Mao Tse-tung. Neither the US or UK was willing to participate in an agreement with the Chinese government recognized by the other. This problem was solved during Dulles' visit to London in June 1951. The solution, according to a White House communique, "did not require any compromise of principle by anyone."²⁰ The Americans and British simply agreed that neither Chinese government would be invited to participate in the negotiations or signing of a treaty with Japan. Although this merely postponed the problem of which government Japan would recognize, and which China would receive

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Ibid., p. 1040.

territories renounced by Japan, the agreement helped to ensure that the San Francisco conference would progress smoothly.

In summary, Dulles dealt with the communist problem by ignoring Soviet claims and demands while keeping them informed through formal diplomatic channels. This was supplemented by agreement with the British that neither the Communist or Nationalist Chinese would be invited to take part in a treaty of peace with Japan. The Taipei Government was, however, kept informed by the US of the subsequent developments towards the conclusion of a treaty. A similar office was performed for the Peking Government by the Soviet Union.

United States military leaders were probably the most obstinate group that Ambassador Dulles and Secretary Acheson had to deal with. ²¹ Bases which US forces had occupied since 1945 had become an integral part of the US military presence in East Asia. Unlike other overseas bases, US military installations in Japan were unfettered by problems of host country sovereignty. As long as the Allied Occupation of Japan lasted, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in the person of General MacArthur (later General Ridgeway) was the ultimate authority in Japan. This arrangement gave US military field commanders freedom to operate without restriction by Japanese authorities. These commanders, as well as top pentagon officials, were even more reluctant to relinquish this freedom once the Korean War began. As a result, the military was wary of giving up

²¹Emmerson, John K., Arms, Yen & Power, p. 68, Dunellen, 1971.

the security of the Occupation for the uncertainty of the return of sovereignty to Japan.

Dulles attempted to guarantee as much freedom of action as possible for the US military in his negotiations. In the first place, the treaties he negotiated applied only to the main islands of Japan. This was the agreed term of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, which limited Japan to the four main islands of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, together with certain adjacent islands. This meant that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, including the important US bases on Okinawa, would not be covered by the treaty. In fact these islands were formally placed under the United Nations trusteeship system with the United States as sole administering authority. The United States, under Article III of the Peace Treaty had "...the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."²²

Secondly, the US had the right, but not the obligation to station troops in Japan under the Security Treaty. This also gave more flexibility to US forces, as did the clause permitting US forces to be used to "...contribute to the

²²
Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, Op. cit., pp 725-726, 1972.

maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East." ²³ Thus, US military forces were not limited to protecting Japan, but could be used at the discretion of the United States anywhere in the "Far East".

Finally, the Security Treaty required Japan to gain the prior consent of the United States before granting any bases or rights of maneuver or transit to military forces of any other country. This clause also sought to assure the US military that their preeminent position in Japan would not be threatened by the ending of the Allied Occupation.

When Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, announced in May 1947 that in order to promote world recovery it was necessary "to push ahead with the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia--Germany and Japan," there ²⁴ was wide disagreement among the allies concerning Japan. The countries Dulles had the most difficulty convincing that Japan should be accepted as a friend rather than punished as an enemy were Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. Leaders of these countries felt that the future containment of Japan was as important as the containment of the Soviet Union. As a result, they were very concerned that the United States provide a brake on Japanese military capability--especially long range naval

23

Weinstein, Martin E., Op. cit., pp. 137-138, 1971.

24

Sansom, George, "Conflicting Purposes in Japan," p. 310, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1948.

25
ships.

The main concern of the Philippines, besides the containment of Japan was the question of reparations. Dulles was quite adamant in his view that Japan should not be subjected to a punitive peace treaty. To him the question of war reparations should be taken up under separate bilateral agreements and not be included in the peace treaty.²⁶ Dulles, as Dean Acheson later wrote, left the Philippines "simmering in their dream of eight billion dollars in reparations."²⁷

All three of the former Pacific allies demanded, and received security treaties with the United States as a quid pro quo for agreeing to a non-punitive peace treaty with Japan. Although there is some disagreement on this interpretation²⁸ it was no secret that the other nations of the Pacific did not share American enthusiasm for a Japan without war potential restrictions.

Treaties with these three countries solidified and extended the US Pacific defense perimeter referred to by General

25
Menzies, Robert Gordon, "The Pacific Settlement Seen From Australia," p. 62, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, Jan 1952.

26
Dulles, John F., "Laying Foundations for Peace in the Pacific," US Dept of State Publication #4148, USGPO, 1951.

27
Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation, p. 540, New American Library, 1970.

28
Starke, J.G., The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, pp. 62-75, Melbourne University Press, 1965.

MacArthur and Mr. Acheson. They all continue in force in 1977, and have played a role in defining US interests in the region of the Pacific.

Neither the ANZUS or Philippine Treaties have had the force, or needed it, that other US commitments have. Fears of a revival of Japanese naval strength went unconfirmed and none of the countries have been threatened since the treaties were signed. Perhaps another reason for the US treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines was a psychological one. It seems likely that the United States wanted to express a commitment at least as firm to its former allies as to its former enemy.

Dulles was able to persuade the United States' Pacific allies that Japan should be granted a non-punitive peace treaty. He pointed out to them that the United States could no longer play the role of policeman in Japan, and it was much better to have Japan as a future friend than a vanquished and impoverished enemy.

The Japanese position was aided by the passage of time. Had a peace treaty been signed shortly after the war when anti-Japanese feelings ran strong among the allies, the terms of peace would have undoubtedly been more strict. The growth of the communist threat in Asia, especially the Korean War, also aided the Japanese. Dulles told Prime Minister Yoshida that the aim of the United States in the course of his negotiations was to frame a treaty of peace between friendly nations, not

between victors and vanquished. In view of the earlier treaty drafts prepared by the US State Department this would not have been true had a treaty been signed in 1947.

The Japanese had consistently wished a treaty linked with a security treaty since 1947. In 1951, although they agreed that signing a peace treaty which did not include the Soviet Union or China would leave problems for the future, they were willing to sign one with as many nations as possible. The Japanese government also felt that Japan could handle its own internal security if the United States could be persuaded to provide external security. Although Dulles pressed Japan to develop a military force of some 350,000 men, Prime Minister Yoshida resisted this both on economic and constitutional grounds. He did not feel that the Japanese economy could possibly support a force so large. (Japan's GNP in FY51 was only \$15 billion). Article IX of the Japanese Constitution prohibited "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential", and Article XVIII banned involuntary military service. While Yoshida could agree to the National Police Reserve established in July 1950, he did not feel that it could be significantly increased beyond 125,000 men at that time. He did, however, outline plans for a gradual increase in size under a Ministry of Defense.³⁰ This satisfied Dulles

²⁹ Yoshida, Op. cit., p. 250, 1962.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 267.

somewhat but there were still some legal problems.

The Vandenberg Senate Resolution of 1948 prohibited the United States from forming definitive security arrangements with other countries unless they were able to provide "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Because Japan had no military forces capable of this, the Security Treaty had to be a provisional one based on the agreement that Japan would "itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." The Vandenberg Resolution also prevented the United States from assuming an obligation to defend Japan, or to maintain forces in Japan to guarantee its security and independence. The US was instead granted the right to do so, but not the obligation.

The United States was especially concerned about the possibility of insurrection after the Occupation. As a result, under the terms of the treaty, US forces could also be used:

"at the express request of the Japanese Government to quell large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."³¹

Dulles fully realized that the Japanese were buying American security at the price of a portion of their sovereignty. He stated, however, that:

"Sovereignty which is not defensible is an empty husk. Japan, disarmed physically, legally and psychologically, is not now in a position to defend itself. Left alone,

31

Dulles, John F., "Security in the Pacific," pp. 178-179, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1952.

she would be surrounded and menaced by a Great Power of demonstrated aggressiveness and she would not, in that position be able to lead an independent existence."³²

Dulles also felt that the granting of US bases by Japan was an important contribution to the security of the Far East and Japan, but that this was a "small price for Japan to pay for security worked out with a nation of her own choosing, which has amply demonstrated respect for Japan's sovereignty and which, to a unique degree, possesses power to deter aggression."³³

During 1950 and 1951 Dulles was able to gradually achieve consensus among the four groups he had to deal with. He made numerous trips abroad to negotiate with the main parties and was able to arrive at terms which were satisfactory to them. The British had been willing to compromise on the China issue; Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines received assurances that the United States would aid in providing security for them; Japan regained its sovereignty and a security treaty; the United States retained bases in and around Japan which allowed it to maintain its military presence in East Asia. Dulles negotiated four treaties during the fourteen-month period he served as Special Ambassador. On August 30, 1951, the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, and on

32

Ibid., p. 180.

33

Ibid., p. 181.

September 1, 1951, the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) Security Treaty. Finally, on September 8, 1951, both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the US-Japanese Security Treaty were signed.

Although the Soviet Union, with the assistance of its communist bloc allies attempted to obstruct the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles and Acheson successfully thwarted these attempts. Prime Minister Yoshida assured the United States that his government intended to recognize Nationalist China. Yoshida's move effectively quelled US Senate opposition to the Peace and Security Treaties, and assured their ratification on March 29, 1952. The Treaties became effective on April 28, 1952, and on that day the Japanese signed the promised Treaty of Peace with Nationalist China.

Throughout the period 1945-1951, the United States clearly marked out its relationship with Japan as a vital interest in East Asia. As hostilities between the US and USSR intensified during the Cold War, the United States moved to define more clearly its foreign policy goals in the Pacific. The Korean War no doubt hastened US actions to redefine its defense perimeter in that area; however, there seems to be no doubt that the objective of preventing communist, Soviet and/or Chinese hegemony never altered. The United States did not come by its Asian-Pacific security commitments, especially the Japanese one, by default. The foreign policy objective was clearly and deliberately pursued by actively

negotiating alliances in the area which would ensure that
United States security interests would be promoted.

III. PERIOD OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JAPAN: 1950-1960

The Military Assistance Program (MAP), or grant aid of military equipment and training, began with the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and continues to the present day (1977). Under the terms of this law the United States retains title to equipment and the recipient nation cannot retransfer items to third party without the authorization of the United States. Throughout the twenty-five years this program was in effect, the United States transferred nearly \$38 billion worth of equipment. About \$1 billion of this³⁴ went to Japan, or about 2.5% of the total amount.

Japan began receiving MAP aid officially in 1954, and the program continued until 1967. The bulk of the aid, however, had been given by 1959, and thereafter dropped off rapidly. (Aid peaked at \$131.5 million in 1959, was down to \$34 million by 1963, and was only \$433 thousand in 1967). Although the aid continued into the 1960s, its declining value after 1959 made the period between 1954 and 1960 most important. The year 1960 also coincided with the revision of the Security Treaty, and with it the rising importance of military sales rather than military aid. By the time the treaty was revised, Japan had received approximately 90% of the total MAP aid granted under the program, and was already transitioning to a

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Refer to Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix for total Military Assistance figures.

military purchase program. The years 1957-1960 constituted a period of transition from military aid to military sales.

The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 was never envisioned as a permanent agreement. The preamble to the treaty states:

"Japan desires as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan."

The treaty stated, however that Japan was expected to:

"...increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression..."³⁵

The provisional nature of the agreement placed responsibility upon Japan to build a military force capable of defense against outside aggression, as well as internal disturbance.

In 1950, shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea, General MacArthur authorized the formation of the National Police Reserve. Initial size was set at 75,000 men and it was primarily a home guard type of organization responsible for maintaining internal security. Although mostly a ground force, a small coastal patrol was also included.

By 1952, the force had grown to around 125,000 men and was reorganized into the National Safety Force. The primary mission remained internal security despite the reorganization. The Coastal and Ground Safety Forces were a step toward assuming more responsibility for defense, however, and Japan displayed

35
Weinstein, Op. cit., pp. 137-138, 1971.

willingness to expand the forces' capability. US Grant Aid was one method Japan desired to further increase its defense capability.

The writers of the Security Treaty realized that Japan was not able to provide for its own defense at the time of signing. Therefore, the US forces in Japan were to temporarily provide for the "security of Japan against armed attack from without."³⁶ US forces could also be used for maintaining internal security if called upon by the government of Japan. In order to assist Japan in assuming the responsibility for its own defense, the United States was prepared to grant military assistance to Japan in the form of weapons, training and equipment.

Before this aid could be given legally, however, Japan had to comply with the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the Vandenberg Resolution, which called on Japan to pledge its own "continuous and effective self-help" in defending the country from external attack. In addition, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 called upon Japan to:

"...fulfill the military obligations...assumed under the Security Treaty...(and to) make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic conditions of the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world...(and to) take all reasonable

36

Ibid., pp. 137-138.

measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America."³⁷

In response to the obligation to provide measures for external defense incurred under the Mutual Assistance Agreement, Prime Minister Yoshida reorganized and expanded the Japanese military forces. During the summer of 1954, debate over the reorganization in the Japanese Diet was long and heated. Many of the delegates feared that creation of the type of forces required by the new agreement with the United States would lead to a new rise of militarism; others felt that the economy of Japan could not support a military force of the size and type envisioned. Communist delegates opposed the reorganization on the grounds that Japan was merely becoming a puppet of US imperialism by establishing a military force supplied by the Americans.

In spite of the opposition, two laws pertaining to the reorganization were passed in July 1954. The first of them was the Defense Agency Establishment Law. This law created a Defense Agency and a Joint Staff Council under the command of a civilian Director General. The Director was not given cabinet rank, but worked under the Prime Minister. He did however become a Minister of State without portfolio. The

37

US Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 5, Part 1, p. 669, US Government Printing Office, 1954.

second law, the Self-Defense Forces Law, renamed the Ground and Coastal Forces the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, and added an Air Self Defense Force. The mission of the Forces, according to the law, was "to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression, and when necessary, to maintain public order."³⁸ The total authorized strength of the forces was 152,110 men. Thus, for the first time since the end of World War II, Japan was pledged to contribute to its own defense against outside aggression. The provisions of the two laws passed in 1954 qualified Japan legally to receive US military aid.

Despite the lack of legal basis, the beginning of US military aid was 1950, not 1954. Japan actually began receiving military assistance with the inception of the National Police Reserve in July 1950. According to the New York Times, 13 Nov 1952:

"Exact amounts and types of equipment given to Japan since 1950 are 'top secret' and the authority to turn over equipment is unclear since it has not been open to Congressional approval. General Mark W. Clark, Commander of the Far Eastern Command, will only say that the Japanese have been given enough equipment adequate for a light police type force. The Far Eastern Command also refused to release any figures on the dollar value of the arms equipment given to Japan, but the total is known to run into millions."³⁹

³⁸ Weinstein, Op. cit., pp. 75-76, 1971.

³⁹ Jordan, William J., "US Signs Accord in Tokyo to Lend Japan 68 Warships," New York Times, Section 1, p. 1, 13 Nov 1952.

The same Times article announced the signing of the Charter Party Agreement, under which Japan was loaned 68 military ships. The loan, which actually was approved by Congress on 8 July 1952, was comprised of 18 Patrol Frigates and 50 large landing craft.⁴⁰ Since Japan did not qualify for a comprehensive program of military aid at that time, the deal was handled as an executive agreement with both countries obtaining prior Congressional approval. The arrangement was similar to the World War II Lend Lease program with a term of five years and an option to extend for an additional five years. According to the Times, "At least some of the vessels were part of those loaned to the Soviet Union during World War II."⁴¹ The first of these ships was transferred to Japan on 14 January 1953, and the transfer was completed by December of that year.

The Charter Party Agreement was by far the largest transfer of military aid to Japan prior to 1954. However, smaller amounts of equipment had also been transferred. Although US figures for the military aid given to Japan between 1950 and 1954 have never been declassified, Japanese sources set the figure at \$210.8 million for FY51-FY53.⁴²

⁴⁰ US Congress, "Loan of Certain Naval Vessels to Government of Japan," Report #2195, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 18 Jun 1952.

⁴¹ Jordan, Op. cit., p. 1., 13 Nov 1952.

⁴² Interview with Lt. Col. Mineo Senda, Japanese Air Self Defense Forces, Asst. Air Attache, Japanese Embassy, May 1976.

This period of time, of course, coincides with the Korean War. The failure to declassify the material after such a long time seems mysterious. However, according to Commerce Department representatives, the figures were probably "misplaced or destroyed during department moves" during the past twenty-five years. Department of Defense officials were also unable to provide figures for this period.

Of the \$210.8 million noted by Japanese sources, Japan's Ground Forces received \$88.5 million worth of equipment, including 244 tanks and 47 aircraft. Air Forces, which were not formed until the reorganization of 1954, received none of the aid. The remainder, including the vessels mentioned above,⁴³ went to the Maritime Forces.

Following the March 8th 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the United States and Japan, on May 14th, signed an additional vessel loan pact. Under the terms of this agreement an additional 159 ships, with a total value of \$80 million were loaned to Japan. Over the following two decades the document was in force, many of the vessels were eventually declared excess stocks and were given to Japan as grant aid with no return date stipulated.

Of the 159 ships, a total of 37 landing ships and 18 patrol frigates were physically returned to the United States. Others, including two destroyer escorts "returned" on 14 June 1975,

43

Ibid., May 1976.

ending the loan agreement, were merely transferred to grant aid and remained in Japan. Thus, under the two vessel loan agreements of 1952 and 1954, the United States loaned Japan a total of 227 ships, and a total of 55 were physically returned to the United States. This left 172 ships, 170 of which were converted to grant aid.⁴⁴ The remaining two ships are not accounted for and presumably were either lost at sea or scrapped.

In addition to the vessels, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force also received a considerable amount of other equipment as grant aid. Under the Military Assistance Program, the naval forces received \$263.8 million in aid. Of this total, \$54.5 million was made up of the vessels converted to grant aid. It is significant that as late as 1967, over 40% of the tonnage of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces was made up of US owned ships.⁴⁵ Since that time the percentage has declined considerably as US ships were replaced by newer Japanese owned ones. The Maritime Forces were also provided with 217 aircraft under MAP. Naval aircraft in 1968 were also 40% US owned. Unlike the ship ownership situation, a significant percentage of aircraft were still US owned in 1973.⁴⁶

44

US Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vols. 3-23, US Government Printing Office, 1952-1973.

45

Auer, James, The Postwar Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces 1945-71, p. 95, Praeger Publishers, 1973.

46

Ibid., p. 96.

Military grant aid to Japan's Air Self Defense Force totaled \$422.3 million through the life of the MAP program. This included 1248 aircraft. From the standpoint of defense capability, the most significant items among the aircraft were 482 F-86s. The delivery of this type aircraft to Japan began in FY55, and some are still in use today.

Grant aid to Japan's Ground Self Defense forces under the Military Assistance Program was \$168.8 million. Of this total, 226 tanks and 295 miscellaneous combat vehicles are included. The number of tanks recorded by DOD figures differs significantly from Japanese sources, which record 782 tanks for the years 1951-1956 alone. For this same time period, Japan's Ground Forces also received 179,000 metric tons of ammunition. DOD figures for the entire period of military assistance valued ammunition at slightly over \$28 million. US sources also list 339 large caliber guns and howitzers, 196 Nike missiles, and 360 Hawk missiles which went to the Ground Forces.

Also of importance during the period of US Military Assistance Program aid to Japan were a total of nearly \$175 million of excess defense articles.⁴⁷ Specific items of equipment are not listed; however, the excess defense articles program consisted of equipment considered to no longer be of use to the US military, and was transferred directly from a US

47

DSAA, Data Management Division, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, pp. 28-29, USGPO, 1975.

with the modest size of the National Police Reserve, over 2% of the GNP (\$333 million) went to defense.

As Japan's economy began to recover in the early 1950s (helped largely by orders from the US for equipment to support troops in Korea), Japan's expenditures for defense also increased. By 1960, Japan's GNP climbed to \$35.4 billion, and the defense budget rose to \$436 million. The percent of GNP going to defense decreased to 1.23% and the percent of the total government budget allocated to defense declined from 18.23% to 10%.⁴⁹ The trend of rapidly increasing GNP, and moderately increasing defense expenditures has been a consistent one. As a result, although total defense expenditures have increased each year, the percentage of GNP to defense and percentage of the national budget to defense, have consistently declined.

During this period of time the size of US forces in Japan gradually declined as the size of the Self Defense Forces increased. From the initial 75,000 man Japanese force of 1950, the Self Defense Forces incrementally increased in size to 206,000 by 1960. US Forces declined from 260,000 to 47,000 during the same period of time. The combined strength of the two forces declined from around 350,000 in 1954 to 250,000 by 1960.⁵⁰

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Lt. Col. Senda interview, Op. cit., May 1976.

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Buck, James H., ed., The Modern Japanese Military System, p. 242, Sage Publications, 1975.

The combination of US aid and increasing defense expenditures by Japan gave the Self Defense Forces a much greater capability in 1960 than the original National Police Reserve of 1950. However, estimates of actual ability to withstand attack vary widely. Even though equipment was more modern, stockpiles of ammunition remained extremely small. In the face of a conventional attack on Japan, the Self Defense Forces would only have been able to hold out for a matter of a few days before running out of ammunition.⁵¹ This indicated that Japan still depended on the United States as the primary defense against external attack.

Recalling the terms of the 1951 Security Treaty and the position of Prime Minister Yoshida during negotiations of that arrangement, the primary function of the SDF in 1960 was still to provide internal security. On the surface, it looked as though the SDF was gradually being strengthened to replace departing US troops. However, if ammunition stockpile estimates were correct, it indicated that the combined defense strength of the SDF and US Forces Japan actually decreased considerably as a result of the US reduction of forces in Japan. Although not stated publicly, reduction of tensions in East Asia may have caused the two governments to feel capabilities could be safely reduced while still maintaining the effectiveness of the alliance.

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Interview with Mr. Dennis Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, May 1976.

The regional political situation in East Asia changed significantly during the 1950s. Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu stated in 1956, that he "could see no situation developing which would lead Japan ever again to play an active role in the world arena," forces were already in motion which would make this statement unrealistic. He saw Japan as a passive state, acted upon by others, but not acting upon others. This attitude, conditioned by the Occupation, had already shown signs of changing by 1954. 52

The Democratic Party of Japan, formed in October of 1954 in the wake of scandal in the Yoshida government, had selected Ichiroo Hatoyama as its leader. With the aid of the Socialists, Hatoyama was elected premier and took office on December 7, 1954. Immediately after being elected, Hatoyama declared that normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were his central policy goals and this quickly became the slogan of the Democratic Party. Since Prime Minister Yoshida had done little but extend US occupation policies, this marked the first independent foreign policy move by Japan since World War II. Hatoyama, in opposition to Shigemitsu, also advocated revision of Article IX to allow Japan to rebuild its military forces.

The fear that communism, in the form of the Chinese-Soviet monolith, was determined to sweep through Asia had influenced

Dulles heavily during the security treaty negotiations. Penetrations of Japan's airspace by Soviet MIG fighters during the Korean War, and the possibility of a communist inspired insurrection in Japan were important factors during the negotiations. These themes were shared by the Yoshida government and largely provided the basis for the security treaty and Japan's foreign policy with regard to its communist neighbors.

In part, because of the effectiveness of the US efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from playing any effective role in the Occupation of Japan, the post-Occupation relations of Japan and the Soviet Union were formed by the United States. No contact was made with the Japanese government by the Soviet Union during the Occupation, and political influence was sought only among the "people" through the support of left-wing groups in Japan. Japan's communists in 1949, advocated revolution by force. They staged what was called a "rally for the rising of the people" at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Several of the US Occupation troops were injured at the rally and both Yoshida and General MacArthur were seriously alarmed at the prospects of a Soviet sponsored uprising. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was specifically aimed at Japan and the United States. In addition, Soviet demands for the neutralization of Japan and recognition of Communist China at the San Francisco Peace Conference set the tone of post-War Japan-USSR relations.

The change in Soviet policy towards Japan did not occur until 1954, after the death of Stalin. On September 12, 1954,

the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to normalize relations with Japan. There followed nearly two years of negotiations between the two countries during which there were many false starts and interruptions. In the end, all issues except the return of Japanese territory seized by the USSR in the waning days of World War II were settled. Diplomatic and economic relations were normalized and the state of war between the two countries was terminated. The Soviet Union agreed to support Japan's application for membership in the United Nations, which it did on December 12, 1956. Furthermore, the two countries agreed to settle all disputes peacefully and to refrain from interference in each others' internal affairs. Finally, the Soviet Union recognized Japan's right to individual and collective self defense. Despite the Joint Declaration of 19 October 1956, however, no formal treaty of peace was signed, and the question of occupied territory has never been resolved.

Internationally, the mid-1950s was a time of thaw in the global Cold War with the impact of the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" especially evident in East Asia. It was most prominently manifested at the Geneva Conference of 1954 which temporarily halted the war in Indo-China, and at the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference, which condemned bipolar confrontation and apparently launched the Third World as a new force in world politics. This was also the period when Japan, under Hatoyama moved toward a wider and more independent international

role. In addition to the effort toward reconciliation with the Soviet Union, increased contact with Communist China and the settlement of war reparations with the Philippines figured prominently in Japanese foreign policy during the mid-1950s. Thus, while the US and Japan gradually strengthened the military capability of Japan, the Japanese, under new leadership simultaneously began to move back into the international arena of world politics.

During the period of the 1950s, Japan gained a new sense of self-confidence. Its economy began to recover from the war, as evidenced by the growth of its GNP; the military was gradually restructured and slowly rebuilt; Japan began to venture out into world politics again and gained UN membership; and the terms of the Sino-Japanese normalization included the recognition of the US-Japanese Security Treaty.

Although Hatoyama was successful in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union to end the state of hostilities that had existed since 1945, the forces of internal political differences forced him to resign when the agreement was completed. Even though Yoshida had been out of office for two years, the sharply divergent tack of Hatoyama's foreign policy faced strong opposition from the Yoshida followers. In spite of the fact that the agreement with the Soviet Union was tied to Soviet acceptance of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the shift was radical enough for the Diet opposition forces to make political capital. As a result, Hatoyama announced his

retirement intentions on 10 August 1956. This led to an intensified battle by the opposition to discredit him through criticism of the Soviet negotiations. During the final months of 1956, while the negotiations took a turn for the worse, chaos reigned the the Diet.⁵³

In December 1956, Tanzan Ishibashi took over as Prime Minister of Japan. Ishibashi was a supporter of the normalization of relations with Japan's communist neighbors, and felt that with the Soviet problem "solved", the next move should be to negotiate an agreement with Communist China. Despite the fierce opposition in the Diet that had accompanied the Soviet negotiations, there was a general feeling of optimism and independence in Japan. The departure from the Yoshida foreign policy, so closely connected with the United States, combined with the Soviet agreement and UN membership to give the Japanese a feeling of acceptance and self-confidence. Normalization of relations with China was a natural extension of the movement to re-enter world politics as an independent nation.

China had been carrying out an effective campaign since 1954 aimed at closer Sino-Japanese relations. The great potential for trade with the Chinese, the often expressed Japanese attitude of cultural affinity with China, and the effective propaganda effort of China combined to provide

⁵³ See: Hellmann: Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics for a complete discussion.

important impetus to re-establishment of normal relations. By 1956, Japanese exports to mainland China exceeded those to Taiwan in value, and Ishibashi found considerable support for opening negotiations.

Normalization was not to come, however. Ishibashi's age and health forced him to resign before negotiations could begin. At the age of seventy-two, and after only two months in office, he was forced to resign. Normalization of relations with the Peoples' Republic of China did not take place for another fifteen years following the Nixon trip to China.

IV. PHASING OUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE:1957-1960

When Nobusuke Kishi took office on 21 Feb 1957, it appeared that the trend begun by Hatoyama and Ishibashi would be continued. In his first news conference, Kishi stated that he favored increased trade with Communist China and that, "from the point of view of national sentiment, the Japanese people desire that the present security treaty and administrative agreement between Japan and the United States should be abolished."⁵⁴

Japan's growing sense of pride plus the increasing unpopularity of US bases in Japan resulted in pressures for Japan to accelerate the trend towards more independent foreign policies. Kishi felt that the solution to these pressures was to press for a revision of the Security Treaty. As early as 1955, he had accompanied Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on a trip to the United States during which revision was discussed. The joint communique which was released at the end of that visit stated:

"...efforts should be made...such that Japan could... assume primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland...when such conditions were brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present security treaty with one of greater mutuality."⁵⁵

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Ibid., p. 46.

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US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 419-420, US Government Printing Office, 1955.

By the Spring of 1957, as Kishi planned a visit to the United States, he was well aware of growing public sentiment for revision of the treaty. Numerous public opinion polls taken during 1957 showed that the Japanese public was anxious for revision and the withdrawal of US troops. He proceeded cautiously with his plan to revise the treaty as he prepared for the US visit. Not wanting to promise too much to his people and then return empty-handed, he made no definitive statements prior to the visit. He placed the China normalization problem in the background by tying revision to increased ties with the PRC in the public mind, and made it clear that the first step to a more independent foreign policy was revision of the treaty.

During the same period of time, Japanese opinions on the major objections to the 1951 treaty were formulated. These were:

(1) The treaty was one-sided and unequal. The United States had the right to station troops in Japan, but there was no specific obligation for the US to defend Japan.

(2) There was no time limit specified.

(3) The possible use of US troops for internal riot control.

(4) There were no restrictions on the use of US troops from Japan in other areas of the Far East. Thus, Japan might be dragged into war against her will.

(5) There was no restriction on equipping US troops in Japan with nuclear weapons.

(6) There was no obligation for the US to abide by the UN charter in the treaty.

The major objections became Kishi's goals in revising the Security Treaty. He was aware, however, that in order to obtain US agreement, he would have to make preparations for Japan to assume a larger share of the burden of its defense. The 1955 joint statement of Shigemitsu and Dulles made it plain that the United States considered the buildup of Japanese forces a necessary step in revision. In preparation for this Kishi had the First Defense Buildup Program drawn up.

On May 20, 1957, The Basic National Defense Policy was approved by the cabinet, and on June 14, 1957, it also approved the First Defense Buildup Program. The plan was vague and set no specific goals of the buildup, only saying that the program was decided:

"With a view to the buildup of the minimum requirement of a self-defense potential in accordance with the Basic National Defense Policy and in keeping with national resources and conditions."⁵⁶

Apparently, this was enough to satisfy the United States. In a joint statement issued at the end of Kishi's US visit on July 8, 1957, President Eisenhower said:

"The United States welcomes Japan's plans for the buildup of her defense forces and accordingly, in consonance with the letter and the spirit of the

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Auer, James E., The Postwar Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, p. 157, Praeger Publishers, 1973.

Security Treaty, will substantially reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces. The United States plans still further reductions as the Japanese defense forces grow."⁵⁷

The communique also called for the establishment of a joint committee to consider future adjustments in the relationships between the two countries.

Although Kishi returned to Japan with the diplomatic triumph he had sought, it was a year before Foreign Minister Fujiyama, on July 9, 1958, proposed to Ambassador MacArthur that talks be opened. The United States replied with three options:

- (1) A simple base lease agreement.
- (2) Rewording of the old treaty.
- (3) A new treaty.

Kishi, over foreign office objections, replied on August 25, that Japan desired a new treaty. The United States agreed and negotiations were opened on October 4, 1958.⁵⁸

The revised treaty was finally signed on January 19, 1960, after prolonged negotiations and domestic political turmoil. During that time, relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union deteriorated. On 19 November 1958, PRC Foreign

57

US Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, p. 52, US Government Printing Office, 1957.

58

Packard, George R., III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, pp. 70-73, Princeton University Press, 1966.

Minister, Ch'en Yi, in a note to Kishi, accused him of plotting against the PRC and warned him to come to his senses or face disaster.⁵⁹ Chou En-lai stated to visiting Japanese correspondents on July 25, 1957, that:

"We have no objection to Japan's friendship with the United States, but the point is Kishi went to the United States to curry favor from his American masters by slinging mud at the new China."⁶⁰

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a note to the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, said:

"Is it not clear to everyone today that in conditions of a modern rocket-nuclear war all Japan with her small and thickly populated territory, dotted moreover with foreign war bases, risks sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the very first minutes of hostilities?"⁶¹

In December 1958, the Soviets urged Japan to adopt neutrality and in return they would guarantee such neutrality by creating a "nuclear free zone" in East Asia.

Apparently, both the Soviets and the Chinese saw the political dissension in Japan during the negotiations as an opportunity to break Japan away from a treaty with the United States altogether. Despite the combination of internal and external political tensions, which resulted in widespread rioting

⁵⁹ "Japan Receives Chinese Warning," Japan Times, 20 November 1958.

⁶⁰ "Interview with Chou En-lai," Japan Times, 31 July 1957.

⁶¹ Contemporary Japan, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 593-594, May 1960.

as the treaty came up for ratification in 1960, the treaty was approved by the Diet and the US Senate, and ratifications were exchanged at Tokyo on June 23, 1960.

Although Kishi was forced to resign as a result of the widespread dissension caused by the treaty revision, the cast of US-Japanese security relations had been made by the ratification of the revised treaty. Virtually all goals of the Japanese government sought during the negotiations were embodied in the new treaty. The United States agreed that an attack on either party in Japanese administered territory would be dangerous to the peace and security of both parties, and would act in accordance with constitutional provisions and processes to meet such an attack. A time limit of ten years was set by the treaty with automatic annual renewal unless one of the parties indicated otherwise. The clause allowing the use of US troops for internal riot control was dropped in the new treaty. Japan was given the right of prior approval before US troops could be used in areas outside the territory of Japan. Japan also gained the right to approve major changes in deployment of US forces and their equipment. This meant that the deployment of nuclear weapons, could, and has been regulated by the Japanese. Under the so-called three non-nuclear principles the Japanese government has stated that the manufacture, possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Finally, the treaty stated that nothing inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and its charter would be allowed

under the agreement.

One of the most important clauses in the new treaty was Article III. This stated that:

"The Parties individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack."⁶²

The original security arrangement met the goals of both parties for a number of years. However, with the recovery of Japan during the 1950s, a new treaty which gave Japan more equality was proper. With increasing equality and responsibility, Japan assumed the burden for providing more of its own defense. The inception of the first defense buildup plan was an indication of Japan's willingness to accept a greater role in defense.

Chart 3 of the Appendix shows graphically the transition from Grant Aid to Sales. Aid, which peaked in 1959, declined rapidly thereafter. US government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) combined with commercial sales contracts climbed rapidly and surpassed MAP in FY63. Thus, as the roles of the two countries altered with the revision of the security treaty, Japan began to steadily increase arms expenditures as grant aid declined.

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US Congress, Collective Defense Treaties, p. 83, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, US Government Printing Office, 1967.

V. PERIOD OF FMS AND COMMERCIAL SALES:1960-1975

United States sales of arms to other countries, including those to Japan, are made under two categories: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and commercial sales. Foreign Military Sales are completed on a government to government basis with US agencies completing much of the transaction. Once the sale is approved by the various agencies and the method of payment (credit or cash) is agreed upon, the items are shipped to the recipient. In the case of commercial sales, US government agencies play a lesser role. Although the government still controls the types and amounts of equipment that can be sold to other countries through the granting of export licenses, most of the price and type of payment negotiations are conducted by the company making the sale. In both cases, FMS and commercial sales, the US Congress must approve all transactions in excess of \$25 million. Since the purpose is to show the trend from grant aid to sales, the sales procedure is of little consequence; the important criteria is whether the equipment was given as aid, or paid for by the recipient.

Grant aid military transfers built up rapidly annually until the mid-1950s. Following that time grants leveled off and began a gradual decline in total value through the 1960s and 1970s. From a low of around \$56 million in 1950, grant aid peaked at \$2.3 billion in 1958, and declined to \$766 million by 1975. In contrast to this annual sales of equipment to other countries showed a steady increase, from virtually zero in 1950 to nearly

\$4 billion by 1975. Sales and grant aid totals are in terms of actual deliveries rather than orders, and are conservative in relation to non-government estimates. For example, the New York Times, on 14 April 1975, estimated total US transfers for FY 75 at \$10.3 billion, with \$8.3 billion of this FMS and the remaining \$2 billion aid and commercial sales.

This general trend to more sales and fewer grants has also been the pattern for US transfers to Japan. As mentioned earlier, a portion of the reason for this was the increasing ability of Japan to pay cash for military equipment, as well as the desire for greater independence in foreign policy. At the same time, the United States showed a greater reluctance to give grant aid to countries who could afford to pay for the equipment. This trend probably would have taken place even if the Security Treaty had not been revised. However, the trend was accelerated by the changing nature of the US-Japanese security arrangement. In the cases of other US allies in the area such as Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, all were still receiving substantial amounts of US aid in FY75. (\$8, \$137.5, and \$14.9 million respectively). Purchases by Japan from 1950-1975 exceeded the total purchases of all three of these countries combined. Therefore, even though the pattern of Japan follows that of US transfers worldwide, it has been an accelerated one in relation to other US allies in the area.

Foreign Military Sales to Japan began in FY56. Total amounts transferred during the first four years were relatively small, averaging only about one and a half million dollars per year. In 1960, however, coinciding with the revision of the security treaty, the annual amount jumped to nearly \$9.5 million. The annual amount between FY60 and FY75 varied between \$9 and \$42 million with FY68 and FY72 the peak years.

Items of Foreign Military Sales to Japan indicate that the major objective was to improve air defenses. Although the Ground Self Defense Forces received the bulk of the equipment (\$161 million), most of this went to ground to air missile systems. The only non-air defense major weapons sold to the Ground Forces under the FMS program were thirty 105mm howitzers and seven 155mm howitzers. In contrast to this the Ground Forces received 152 Nike and 181 Hawk ground to air missiles.

According to DOD sources purchases for the Air Self Defense Forces under FMS totalled \$92 million. However, only fourteen aircraft are enumerated, twelve C-46s and two SH-34 helicopters. The total delivery cost of the airplanes alone was \$85.6 million. This seems an unlikely figure for such a small number of aircraft. Japanese government figures for the same period list a total of 105 aircraft, with 35 of these going to the Air Forces. This includes fourteen RF4, seven C-46, and fourteen T-34 aircraft. Other aircraft purchases which went to Ground and Maritime Forces are thirty-four helicopters, twenty-nine B-65, two T-34, and five TC-90 aircraft. The Air Defense Forces also received

nearly 1600 air to air missiles, mostly Sidewinder infrared
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and Sparrow radar types.

Maritime Defense Forces purchased \$97 million worth of equipment under the FMS program. Only six ships, three each, of the Landing Craft and Landing Ship variety are listed in DOD figures, with a total value of \$7.7 million. This leaves nearly \$90 million unaccounted for in both the US and Japanese governments' figures. A portion of this, of course, is the aircraft previously mentioned which went to Maritime Forces. Other major items, however, are unavailable for listing.

Figures concerning US commercial sales and licensing agreements are not as complete as those for FMS. DOD sources only list the total dollar amounts from its inception in FY60, through FY74. No unclassified breakdown by service branch or major types of equipment is available. Although the information is sketchy, the annual totals shown in Table 5 of the Appendix are useful in comparing Japan's commercial purchases to those of other US allies in the Asian-Pacific area.

Japan accounted for over 10% of US total commercial arms sales from FY60 to FY74. Japan's cash commercial purchases exceeded the total of all other East Asia allies combined. The grand total of \$495 million in commercial purchases by Japan represents a very small portion of total Japanese military procurement. The entire commercial sales amount is less than

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Interview with Lt. Col. Mineo Senda, JASDF, Assistant Air Attache, Japanese Embassy. Figures given are from several Japanese Government sources, May 1976.

one third of the military procurement for FY74 alone.

Licensing agreements between the US and Japan are even more difficult to analyze. The US goal when approving a license for the manufacture of equipment by Japan is to obtain 50% of the dollars it would have cost Japan to buy a weapon outright. For example, if a US airplane costs \$4 million to buy outright, the United States requires that half of that, or \$2 million worth be manufactured in the United States. Even though it costs Japan more than \$4 million to manufacture rather than buy outright, the US still requires 50% of the \$4 million price made in USA.⁶⁵

Japan's goal in negotiating a licensing agreement is to have 85% of all items actually made in Japan.⁶⁶ This would mean that \$2 million required by the United States would represent only 15% of the total cost to Japan if both parties satisfy their requirements. This would increase the price of the \$4 million dollar airplane to nearly \$27 million. Although Japan is willing to pay a higher price for equipment that is manufactured domestically under license, they would not be willing to pay nearly seven times the outright purchase cost.

What results is a complicated arrangement of the licensing

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Interview with Lt. Col. Richard Milburn, USAF, Department of Defense, Arms Transfers Office: Japan and Korea, May 1976.

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Lt. Col. Senda Interview, Op. cit., May 1976.

contract with a sliding ratio of US versus Japanese manufacture. For example, in a contract for 100 airplanes under a licensing agreement, the first group might be wholly made in the US. The second group might be pre-fabricated in the US and assembled in Japan. A third group might be 50% US made, a fourth 75% Japanese made, and the fifth 100% Japanese manufactured. The cost to Japan would also slide with the change in percentages. The first group being purchased outright and the United States progressively receiving less cash through the life of the contract.

Based on the outright purchase price of \$4 million, the United States would receive \$200 million for the 100 airplanes throughout the contract, but the amount per aircraft would be constantly decreasing. Even though the price per airplane would be about three times more than the outright purchase price of \$4 million because of expenses of setting up manufacturing facilities, the Japanese goal of 85% manufactured in Japan would be met. The price per airplane is higher but this method saves foreign exchange and provides jobs, expertise, and permanent domestic manufacturing capability. Rather than paying out \$400 million in foreign exchange for the 100 airplanes, the Japanese pay only half that amount while avoiding much of the very high cost of research and development it would take to turn out a totally domestically designed and built airplane. As a bonus, manufacturing techniques and technology which can be applied to other items is gained at relatively low cost. The United States also gains foreign exchange from the arrangement

which adds to a favorable overall balance of payments with Japan.

A further complication in attempting to analyze sales under licensing agreements is that all items included in a contract are considered to be built in Japan. Even though, as the above example shows, a portion of the total number ordered are actually wholly or partially made in the United States, the entire number is listed as made in Japan. Of the total aircraft procured by Japan through 1975, 1,433 were supposedly made in Japan, and only 105 purchased outright. Nearly all of the military aircraft made in Japan are of US design and were made under licensing agreements. None of these airplanes are included in US or Japanese figures of sales to Japan. Because of the complicated nature of licensing contracts, a breakout of US sales under this type of agreement is impossible without a detailed analysis of all the contracts. The figure would be large, however, even for only the fighter aircraft. Using purchase prices of \$4 million for the 69 F4 aircraft, \$1.2 million for the 197 F104 aircraft, and \$500 thousand for the 205 F-86 aircraft made in Japan yields a figure of \$615 million. If the US goal of receiving 50% of outright purchase price was obtained, this would mean \$307.5 million which was not listed as sales to Japan. Total unaccounted sales would probably exceed \$1 billion if it were possible to separate percentages of all aircraft actually sold to Japan under the license agreements. The accounting practice does not indicate that there has been any attempt to hide sales of aircraft or other equipment under

licensing agreements. It does, however, make it very difficult without access to contract terms to obtain a true picture of amounts of equipment sold to Japan.

Table 6 of the Appendix is a summary of all types and amounts of arms transactions between the United States and its allies in the Asian-Pacific area. Total Japanese procurement from the United States (its only foreign supplier) was \$2.1 billion between 1950 and 1975. The percentage of grants and purchases is roughly equal, and as noted earlier the bulk of grant aid was received between 1950 and 1960. Total Japanese procurement of military equipment in the post war period was \$9.1 billion.⁶⁷ Of the \$7 billion made in Japan, some percentage was actually produced in the United States under the licensing agreements discussed above.

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Ibid., May 1976.

VI. JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE

In July 1956, the National Defense Council was created. This group was instituted to formulate overall national defense policies and goals. Among the responsibilities of the council, one of the most important was the planning of force levels and equipment requirements of the Self Defense Forces. It was also responsible for the formulation of the "Basic Policies of National Defense" at the direction of Prime Minister Kishi in May 1957. This document still provides the basis for Japanese defense plans and policies. The basic policies embrace the following four points:

- (1) Support of United Nations activities, international harmony, and the realization of world peace.
- (2) Stability of national life, promotion of patriotism, establishment of foundations for national security.
- (3) Gradual build-up of effective defense power within the limit of need of self-defense according to the national strength and conditions.
- (4) Preparedness to deal with aggression from outside, on the basis of mutual security accords with the United States until the time when the UN would become ready to stop aggression.

In conjunction with the statement of basic policies, the National Defense Council, in June 1957, outlined the goals of the

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"Reference Materials: Basic Policies for National Defense," unpublished material provided by Lt. Col. Senda, May 1976.

defense force buildup which covered the years 1958 through 1960. These goals, which later became known as the "First Defense Buildup Program," included six regional divisions, four mixed brigades and 180,000 men for the Ground Self Defense Forces. The Maritime Self Defense Force goal was 124,000 tons of vessels and 200 airplanes, and the Air Self Defense Force was to have 33 air units and about 1300 airplanes. Because of longer construction time periods, the Air and Maritime levels were extended to the end of FY62.⁶⁹

This first program was part of the overall strategy to induce the United States to revise the security treaty, and was a modest beginning to buildup Japan's Self Defense Forces. Ground Forces were built up to replace departing US ground combat troops which were withdrawn under the joint agreement between Prime Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower of July 1957. Even before this agreement, US troop strength had declined significantly after the Korean War. In 1952 there were 260,000 US military men stationed in Japan. By the end of 1956, this number had declined to only 117,000. During 1957 an additional 30,000 were withdrawn, and by the end of the First Defense Plan in 1960, there were only 47,000 US troops stationed in Japan. These figures do not include US troops stationed in Okinawa, which did not revert to Japan until 1972. By 1976, total US

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All figures concerning Defense Buildup Programs provided by Lt. Col. Senda.

troops in Japan and Okinawa were reduced to 50,000 with two
70
thirds of them in Okinawa.

While US troops were departing, the Self Defense Forces grew in size. From the original 75,000 man National Police Reserve of 1950, the Self Defense Forces, by 1960, had a total authorized size of 230,935. Although authorized troop strengths have never been attained, by 1956, there were actually 188,000 men in the SDF. This increased to 211,000 by the end of 1957 and 215,000 by the end of 1959. In 1960, however, possibly as a result of the adverse conditions accompanying the revision of the Security Treaty, actual troop strength declined to 206,000. By 1976, there were about 250,000 men in the Self Defense Forces. The turmoil of the Security Treaty revision in 1960 also delayed the beginning of the Second Defense Plan until 1962.

In July 1961 the National Defense Council announced the Second Defense Force Buildup Program. This plan differed from the first one in the realization that Japanese forces had to assume more of the functions formerly performed by US forces. Actual strength in terms of men and amounts of equipment changed only slightly. However, there was an increase in capability due to more sophisticated equipment. Ground Forces authorized troop strength remained at 180,000; however, 30,000 reserves were added.

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Mansfield, Mike, "The End of the Postwar Era," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report, p. 8, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, US Government Printing Office, August 1976.

The Maritime Forces increased tonnage to about 140,000 and the Air Forces decreased to about 1,000 airplanes. The Air Forces began to receive F104 fighters to replace older F86 models, and Japan received four ground to air missile units complete with a BADGE radar system.

While the First and Second Buildup Programs depended heavily on US assistance on the basis of the Mutual Security Act, in the Third Buildup Program it became imperative to pursue a direction of greater self-effort because of anti-US feeling in Japan and criticism raised in the United States. Under the Third Defense Buildup Program, approved by the National Defense Council in November 1966, several major programs were begun. The stated goal was " to buildup effective power that is to most efficiently cope with localized wars or wars below such level with conventional weapons."⁷¹

The Maritime Defense Force received about 48,000 tons of new ships under the Third Program. This amounted to 56 vessels, including one equipped with "Tartar" ship to ship missiles. Other vessels were fourteen escort ships, including two helicopter carriers and five submarines. The Maritime Forces also received 60 fixed wing anti-submarine aircraft and 33 anti-submarine helicopters.

Air defense capability was augmented with two units each

⁷¹
"Reference Materials: Basic Policies for National Defense,"
Op. cit., p. 2, May 1976.

of Hawk and Nike-Hercules ground to air guided missiles.

Selection of the F4 as the new first line fighter aircraft and beginning deployment also took place under the Third Program.

The Ground Defense Forces were expanded slightly with an increase of 8,500 men. New equipment for the Ground Forces included 83 large and medium helicopters, about 160 armored vehicles, 10 transport planes, and replacement of about 280 tanks.

In October 1970, Director General Nakasone of the Defense Agency published Japan's first "White Paper on Defense". He advocated buildup of an "independent force" or "autonomous defense capability" for the Self Defense Forces. The use of these terms in defining the purpose of the Self Defense Forces caused quite a stir both in Japan and abroad. The basic positions contained in the White Paper were:

- (1) All strategies were "exclusively for defense".
- (2) Japan would take a position of "independent" or "autonomous" defense, with the Japan-US Security Treaty in a supplementary relationship.
- (3) Japan would formulate a concept of a "non-nuclear, medium sized nation" with corresponding defense responsibilities.

These concepts in themselves were not radical departures from former Japanese policies. However, one section which aroused controversy was radical for Japan. Mr. Nakasone wrote that he felt that:

"It is possible for Japan from a legal point of view to possess small nuclear weapons if they are within the framework of minimum necessity for self defense and if they do not pose a threat of aggression to other countries.⁷²

This passage was interpreted as indicating that the gate to nuclear armament had been opened, thus rekindling fears that Japan was embarked on the road to the revival of militarism.

It should be pointed out, however, that Japan shows little indication of developing nuclear weapons. Although the country has an extensive nuclear electricity generating program, there has been no move to convert this to a nuclear weapons industry. Japan has kept the nuclear option open and is capable of producing nuclear warheads in a short period of time. It has signed, but not ratified, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is currently building a fast breeder reactor capable of producing plutonium which could be used in warheads. There is no need for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as long as the US nuclear guarantee is reliable and desirable. It would be nearly impossible for the government to overcome domestic opposition to nuclear weapons unless a crisis should arise. In the meantime, Japan's capability to become a nuclear power must be considered by other nations.

The Defense Agency, in April 1971, released its own draft plan for the Fourth Defense Buildup Program. This called for total appropriations of about \$18 billion or nearly double

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Iwashima, Hisao, "Japan's Defense Policy," Pacific Community, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 20, July 1976.

the Third Program, and added further to the fears of military expansion. Nakasone subsequently left the Defense Agency, and by the time the National Defense Council announced the official Fourth Defense Program in February 1972, appropriations had been cut to about \$15 billion.

Under the Fourth Defense Buildup Program (FY72-FY76) the Ground Self Defense Forces were to receive 280 tanks (of which 160 are new models). In addition, 170 armored vehicles (136 new models), 90 automatic mobile cannons, 90 self-propelled artillery, 159 tactical aircraft (154 helicopters), as well as augmentation of three units of Hawk missiles were to be added.

The Maritime Self Defense Force was authorized 13 escort ships, including two equipped with helicopters and one with ship to ship missiles. In the total of 54 ships to be received were five submarines and one supply ship. In addition 92 aircraft, including 87 anti-submarine type were ordered. Air Self Defense Forces were to augment two units of Nike ground to air missiles and make preparations to add another unit. They also ordered 46 F4 fighters, 14 RF4 reconnaissance planes, 59 T2 trainers, 68 F5T2 support planes, and 24 C1 transport aircraft.

The Fourth Program, with all its controversy, ended up being little more than a modest continuation of the Third Program. Soaring inflation during the period of the Fourth Program caused some delays and cutbacks in the equipment

authorized, and forced Japan to alter buildup goals somewhat. An emphasis on quality rather than quantity developed as the government sought ways to reduce expenditures with a minimum effect on the capabilities of the Self Defense Forces.

According to figures provided by the Japanese Embassy, the Ground Self Defense Forces will be authorized 180,000 men on active duty and 39,000 reservists by the end of the Fourth Program. These will be divided into five armies consisting of thirteen divisions and eight Hawk missile groups. The Maritime Forces will total 168,000 tons of ships and about 290 aircraft, mostly anti-submarine type. The Air Forces will have about 920 aircraft in sixteen squadrons, twenty-eight radar sites and five groups of Nike missiles. Most of the equipment in all three branches is fairly new and relatively sophisticated. Although small in relation to what could be supported by Japan's economy, it is unlikely that the composition or size will be altered in the foreseeable future.

Near the end of the Fourth Program, Japan began to alter the concept and direction for future acquisition of equipment. For the first time, Japan appeared to feel that merely continuing with a fifth, sixth, seventh buildup plan without setting an absolute limit on expansion was not desirable. Prior to this, little thought was given to setting ultimate goals of force levels and equipment. Director General Sakata in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in March 1976, outlined his plans for the post-Fourth Defense

Buildup Program. His concept is to set limits on peacetime standing defense capabilities and thereby prevent public apprehension that the buildup might continue on an open-ended basis. He also stated, however, that:

"My idea was also to make it clear on the other hand, that such a capability will be flexible enough to be expanded, if tension mounts or a crisis is imminent, to the counter-contingency capability within a relatively short warning time."⁷³

Sakata went on to say that he planned to streamline various elements of the Self Defense Forces, and that priority was on quality rather than quantity.

"In practice," he said, "higher priorities will go to
(a)manpower education and training
(b)patrol and warning functions, and
(c)intelligence and communications systems.
These will be strengthened even beyond the level of the standing defense capability if necessary, so that they could always be ready to meet any contingency."⁷⁴

The motives for Sakata's concept for defense buildup in the future reflect several conditions which have become evident in the past few years. In his opinion, the concept reflects:

"(a) Our reponse to an economic, financial restriction imposed on defense in this transition period from high to stable economic growth.
(b) Our strategic-political assessment that the climate of detente will remain basically unchanged, although certain risks might confront general international relations.
(c) Above all, most importantly our own political judgment

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Sakata, Michita, untitled speech to Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, p. 4, March 1976.

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Ibid., p. 5.

or rather my own political judgment that now is the time for establishing a guideline for the standing defense capability in peace time, if we are to gradually build up our defense capability for our self defense without unnecessarily threatening our neighbors or without demanding excessively larger shares of national resources."⁷⁵

Throughout Japan's series of Defense Buildup Programs, a budgetary constraint of spending less than one percent of GNP developed. Although the earlier budgets were approximately two percent of GNP, by the 1960s the one percent barrier was firmly established. The upper ceiling on spending for defense developed as a psychological barrier which the government is not likely to exceed unless there is a grave crisis. The people of Japan, always wary of remilitarization, accept the one percent figure as necessary, if not proper. However, any discussion of exceeding that limit meets stiff resistance. Even though Nakasone advocated establishing a parity between defense and social programs in the budget, this has not been attempted and probably will not be.

Sakata indicated in his speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club that the trend to more equipment domestically produced for the Self Defense Forces would be continued. A domestic capability to manufacture items for the military contributes to the ability to expand military forces if a crisis should arise. He indicated that a greater emphasis would be placed on research and development in order to reduce Japan's dependence on advanced foreign technology for the

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

design and production of weapons systems. Sakata feels that:

" As a fundamental principle, I would say that it is desirable in any sovereign country with self defense capabilities to have a production base for munitions. And, in fact, most of the rifles, many of the ships, and most of the tanks we have are produced in Japan with our own technology."⁷⁶

The Japanese arms industry actually got its start during the Korean War, and many people, including former Prime Minister Yoshida credited the arms industry with beginning Japanese economic recovery. Since that time the Japanese arms industry has gradually expanded to produce about \$1 billion worth of equipment annually. (See Table 7 in the Appendix for a list of the top ten Japanese arms producers). Much of the equipment, of course, is produced under license from US companies, as was discussed previously. In recent years, however, Japan has begun to design and produce domestically many of the items it previously purchased. This is an important continuation of the trend to more self reliance on the part of Japan. The move from grant aid to purchasing and licensing is being extended to domestic design and production. Although much of the equipment is relatively unsophisticated the trend is toward more sophisticated items. According to the Baltimore Sun on 21 July 1975, a Mitsubishi designed tank has features more sophisticated than US models. The tank:

"carries 12 soldiers, can go 33 miles an hour and, unlike

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Ibid., p. 7.

American tanks, can be raised or lowered in any or all of its four corners to conform with rough terrain. The amphibious version allegedly could protect its passengers from nuclear radiation and with minor modifications, carry soldiers from Japan to the Asian continent."⁷⁷

In the past few years Japan's aircraft industry also began to design and produce new aircraft. The T-2 supersonic trainer and its support fighter version, the FST-2, are totally designed by Japan. Japan also designed and manufactures the C-1 transport and the MU-2 utility plane. These developments, especially the design and production of supersonic aircraft indicate that Japan is placing increased emphasis on research and development which will lead to more autonomy in weapons procurement.

The figures shown in Table 7 of the Appendix, of course, include items made under license. However, it is significant that of total military procurement of \$1.5 billion in 1974, \$1.2 billion was manufactured domestically, and more than half of all orders were filled by the top ten companies. This confirms Sakata's statement that Japan will attempt to manufacture domestically as much of its military equipment as possible. The establishment of a base of production will provide an important capability to expand production in time of crisis. According to one article, Japan's arms industry could expand to the point where it would be capable of producing

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Seiden, Matthew J., "Tokyo Arms Industry," Baltimore Sun, Section 1, p. 1, 21 July 1975.

\$15 to \$20 billion worth of equipment annually.⁷⁸

It would be difficult for Japan to expand its arms industry to such a high level without making basic changes in its arms export policy. Prime Minister Miki, in a report to the upper house of the Diet on January 28, 1976, reiterated Japan's position on the export of arms. He stated that the government had no intention of changing its three principles regarding the ban on overseas arms sales. The ban applies to communist countries, countries under UN sanctions, and nations involved or believed to be involved in international conflicts.⁷⁹

Fumihiko Kono, advisor to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, stated recently that Japan must consider exporting weapons to pay for foreign oil. Mr. Kono said:

"Arms exports will enable Japan to obtain oil. Oil producing nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia want weapons rather than industrial plants. Japan pays a huge amount of foreign exchange to oil producing countries to buy their oil, but there's very little they want to buy from Japan."⁸⁰

Kono's conviction is not shared by members of the Diet, however. On February 4, 1976, the House budget committee was thrown into confusion over conflicting government replies to a question over Japan's weapons exports. Mr. Masaki of the Komeito Party insisted that a total of nearly 12 million Yen worth of

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Yates, Robert, "Japanese Firms Fight Ban on Arms Exports," Chicago Tribune, Section IV, p. 9, 9 February 1976

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"Miki Reiterates Weapons Export Ban," Mainichi Shimbun, p. 1, 28 January 1976.

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Yates, Op. cit., p. 9.
92

ammunition had been exported to countries banned by government policy in the past five years. These countries included both North and South Korea, China, South Africa, and North Vietnam. The "ammunition" turned out to be harpoons and rivets, which are included in the category of guns, ammunition and their equivalents.⁸¹ The story shows that Japan has a long way to go before Mr. Kono's prediction that "arms exports are needed unavoidably to get oil," will be recognized by the government of Japan.

According to one Department of Defense source, however, Japan has approached the United States unofficially concerning the manufacture of older models of US equipment for export. Such items as spare parts for models of missile systems and airplanes no longer used by US forces would probably be considered. Many times these items are not economical for US manufacturers because changes in new models have eliminated certain parts. Even though US forces only receive the newer models, many other countries who have only the older ones still need replacement parts. This might be an area where Japan could gain some foreign exchange with oil countries; however, the government ban on exports would still have to be changed.

The growth of the defense industry and the results of the

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"Diet in Conflict Over Arms Exports to PRC," Tokyo Kyodo, p. 5, 4 February 1976.

four Defense Buildup Programs still leaves some question as to the actual capability of the Self Defense Forces. The increase in size and capability of the SDF leads to the conclusion that it has assumed the former US responsibility for Japan's external defense. According to a National Defense Council staff report prepared in 1966, Japan during the 1970s would face three potential threats: nuclear attack, conventional attack, and large scale internal disorders which could develop into a war of national liberation.⁸²

For countering the nuclear threat, Japan intends to rely entirely on the US deterrent. Against conventional attack, the policy is to cooperate with the United States within the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty. Although Japan is capable of preventing infiltration and repelling probing attacks, it could not cope with a large scale invasion. Although official ammunition reserves are calculated on a basis of two months, they would probably be used up in a week or less.⁸³ In effect, then, the Japanese still rely on US forces to deter a large scale conventional attack. If support from the US was lacking, the last line of defense against the invader would be a protracted guerrilla war.

⁸²
Buck, Op. cit., p. 46, 1975.

⁸³
Ibid., p. 47.

Japan's forces are capable of handling internal security, preventing infiltration, and repelling probing attacks. Despite the growth of the SDF since 1954, it still must rely primarily on the US for external defense. The Self Defense Forces insure that a potential attack on Japan will be of a large enough magnitude that Japan can invoke the Security Treaty. Beyond this, the mission of the Self Defense Forces is essentially the same as it was in 1954.

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Ibid., pp. 45-48.

VII. STRAINS IN THE ALLIANCE

Strains of varying degrees and types have occurred in the US-Japanese alliance since the beginning of the arrangement. As discussed earlier, one result of these differences was the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. Although intended to make the treaty more equal in its treatment of Japan, while preserving security goals of both nations, the revised treaty did not totally eliminate differences of opinion between the two parties. Strains and misunderstandings occurred as a result of changes in the world situation, redefinition of US commitments, and growth of Japan's power and self image. Despite attempts to alleviate them, many differences remain which affect the security agreement.

Economic strains developed as Japan's economy recovered from the devastation of World War II. By the late 1960s Japan had emerged not only as the largest overseas trading partner of the United States, but also as its largest competitor. As Japan's search for overseas markets intensified, it was inevitable that competition become more intense. Charges of Japanese unfair business practices became widespread among US firms whose profits were declining under increased competition. The so-called "Kennedy round" and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) eased problems somewhat, but recent charges by US manufacturers that Japan is still "dumping", or charging less for the same product in the US than it sells for in Japan, indicate that the problem still exists.

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
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In terms of effects on the security relationship, the high cost of maintaining US troops and bases in Japan had a severe effect on the balance of payments between the two countries. In 1969, the Pentagon estimated that the cost of maintaining overseas commitments for that year was \$43 billion, or slightly more than half the FY70 defense budget of \$80 billion. Congressional estimates set the figure at \$50 billion,⁸⁵ not including \$2.6 billion requested for military aid. Chart 8 of the Appendix shows the effects of defense-related balance of payments with Japan which the United States felt had grown to an intolerable level. Although the balance of payments deficit for military-related items was partially resolved by actions taken by President Nixon, this was not accomplished without considerable ill feelings on the part of the Japanese.

Japan, of course, must look to its own economic health in its trade policy. The rapidly increasing price of oil especially was felt by Japan. During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Japan felt it necessary to pursue an independent course in relations with the belligerents. While the United States supported Israel and expected its allies to do likewise, Japan secured its supply of oil by condemning Israel and expressing sympathy with the Arab side. This was an important digression for Japanese foreign policy which indicates that Japan is willing to make hard decisions contrary to US policy when

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Congressional Quarterly Staff, Global Defense, p. 37, US Government Printing Office, 1969.

necessary. In the future, as competition for markets and resources becomes more intense, strains involving economic issues will probably increase in frequency and intensity.

Political strains have also had effects on the US-Japanese Alliance. The Japanese people at times have questioned whether the Security Treaty value to Japan outweighs its disadvantages. Some Japanese critics claim that the right of the United States to use bases to support military action in other areas of the Far East is dangerous to Japanese security. Many Japanese deny any threat to Japan from either the Soviet Union or China, and fear that US actions could result in war for Japan. Although the Japanese government has the right to veto the use of US forces in Japan in other areas, critics complain that the right of prior consultation was never invoked by Japan during the Vietnam War. This is given as proof that the Japanese government has been too compliant in bowing to American desires.

US Forces in Japan, although generally on good terms with the Japanese public, have not always been on best behavior. Even a few incidents of violence make a strong impression on the Japanese. The bases, furthermore, are a reminder of the US Occupation of Japan. Even though the relationship between the two countries has altered considerably since the Occupation, the growing sense of pride and self confidence of the Japanese people make it difficult to accept US bases and the ever increasingly valuable land they are located upon.

Changes in East Asia tension levels led to perhaps the

greatest strain on the alliance. There is a general lack of concern in Japan for threats to security because there has been little tension in the area which has affected Japan directly. While critics contended that US actions might drag Japan into war during the Vietnam era, the new argument is that the Mutual Security Treaty is unnecessary because of recent events. These critics claim that because of detente, better relations between the US and China, and Japan and China, combined with better North and South Korean relations, and the Sino-Soviet split, there is no need to worry about security in Japan. As one DOD official put it "Perhaps we have done too good a job in providing security for Japan." It seems possible that the lack of public concern for security in Japan resulted because the Mutual Security Treaty has been so effective. Although the critics claim that the treaty limits Japan's pursuit of independent foreign policy, especially with respect to communist countries, Foreign Minister Ohira in 1972 claimed that the treaty actually caused better Sino-Japanese relations. China, he stated, wants the Security Treaty to counter the threat of Soviet hegemony in East Asia. This was confirmed by Chou En-lai's support of a larger Japanese defense effort in discussions with Prime Minister Tanaka in 1972. ⁸⁶ Nonetheless,

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Beecher, William, "Chou is Said to Have Given Japan Military Assurances," New York Times, p. 8, 14 December 1972.

it is difficult for the Japanese government to justify to its people the need for a high state of readiness in the absence of threat.

Within Japan, opposition parties and the general public have kept pressure on the ruling Liberal Democrat Party to limit or eliminate defense spending. Criticism has centered on Article IX of the Constitution which forbids Japan to maintain armed forces or war potential. Judge Fukushima of the Sapporo High Court declared on September 7, 1973, that the Self Defense Forces were indeed unconstitutional. He claimed that "merely because they are needed for the defense of the country cannot provide the grounds for denying that they are war potential or armed forces."⁸⁷

On October 20, 1973, the Yomiuri Newspaper conducted a poll which showed that 34% of the respondents supported the Fukushima decision, while 31.8% did not (34.2% answered don't know or no response). However, 45.7% felt that the SDF should be retained until the Supreme Court reviewed the decision, and 41.7% felt the Supreme Court would overturn the decision. In the event the decision should stand, only 19.6% felt the constitution should be revised and the SDF made a clear-cut armed force. The results of this poll show that the Japanese public holds a rather ambivalent attitude toward the SDF. Although fairly evenly split on whether or not the SDF is

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Seymour, Robert L., "Japan's Self Defense: The Naganuma Case" p. 429, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 4, 1974.

constitutional, apparently only about 20% of the respondents⁸⁸ felt that Japan should have "clear-cut armed forces."

The lack of public understanding and support of the need for the SDF is one of the basic problems which the government of Japan is attempting to address. Directors General Nakasone and Sakata both recognized the need to educate the population on the necessity and desirability of the Self Defense Forces. In a report prepared by the Committee to Consider National Defense in 1975, the members stated:

"...public ambiguity on the need for a strong national defense is coupled with the fact that on practical defense issues, public opinion is divided in a thousand different directions...It is vital that the government swiftly unify its views on defense issues, and then place those issues before the public to seek national understanding and cooperation." Furthermore, "...national defense efforts are meaningless without public approval, and the Japanese people show little or no concern about defense issues."⁸⁹

Opposition parties have also been instrumental in establishing the one percent of GNP limit on defense spending. Officially, the platforms of opposition parties call for the complete dissolution of the Mutual Security Treaty, followed by some form of neutralism and disbanding of the SDF. Although the opposition has no voice in the writing of the government budget, they do have the power to paralyze the Diet and prevent passage indefinitely. Recent stalling of the budget helped to

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Ibid., p. 433.

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Committee to Consider National Defense, A Study of Japan's Defense Issues, pp. 18-23, Japan Defense Agency, 1975.

force the resignation of Prime Minister Miki, and was a great embarrassment to the ruling LDP. However, as long as the budget has been held to less than one percent of GNP, opposition parties have acquiesced. Defense Agency officials have attempted to persuade the Finance Ministry to increase defense budget requests to around two percent of GNP on several occasions. However, fears that this would cause an eruption in the Diet (as well as among factions of the LDP) brought a prompt veto.⁹⁰ The LDP has recently suffered election losses and the resulting gains by opposition parties could affect future defense spending.

The one percent restriction has brought outcries from some members of the US Congress. Faced with the high cost of the Vietnam War, high inflation rates, and unfavorable balances of trade with Japan, and disillusion with US military involvement in Asia, some government leaders feel that Japan is getting a "free ride" when it comes to paying for security. This attitude could become even more prevalent should economic difficulties between the United States and Japan become more pronounced.

Lack of concern for defense issues has made it difficult for the United States to accept Japan as a full partner in the alliance. Although there have been attempts, mainly by the Japanese, to rectify this through regular meetings at the ministerial level, results have been limited. Lack of concern for the importance of Japan in the alliance was the response of

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Buck, Op. cit., p. 55., 1975.

many US leaders; this in turn created ill feelings among Japanese at being treated as a "Junior partner". The resulting stress reached its zenith with the Nixon trip to China. Known as the "Nixon shock" to the Japanese, because of the lack of consultation with Japan prior to the trip, it seemed a deliberate attempt to demonstrate US lack of concern for the alliance. As President Nixon said in his State of the World Message of 1972:

"Until this year, the Japanese still tended to consider that their dependence upon us limited independent political initiatives of our own, while their political problems commended some independence of initiative on their part... we recognize that our actions have accelerated the Japanese trend toward more autonomous policies...(this is) desirable because it is a necessary step in the transformation of our relationship to the more mature and reciprocal partnership required in the 1970s."⁹¹

President Nixon seemed to be reminding Japan that US foreign policy was made in Washington, not Tokyo, and it was time for Japan to grow up and stand on its own feet. To a Japanese population that feels it is already suffering under the terms of the alliance, this indeed was a shock.

Although it seems short-sighted of some Japanese to claim that the Mutual Security Treaty is no longer necessary because of reduced tensions, there is no doubt that for the present there is no overt threat to Japan's security. The Nixon Doctrine, however, and later statements by President Ford make it clear that Japan must maintain forces adequate for its

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Nixon, Richard M., "US Foreign Policy for the 1970s" The Emerging Structure of Peace," p. 42, US Government Printing Office, 9 February 1972.

own defense if it expects to maintain the Mutual Security Treaty. The retrenchment of US forces following the Vietnam War, created some fears in Japan concerning the credibility of the US commitment to Japan's security. Although most Japanese consider the US pullout from Vietnam a wise move, there is still some doubt about US future intentions. Fears have subsided in the past two years; however, many Japanese feared an outbreak of hostilities in Korea in the aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam. US reaction to such an outbreak was uncertain in Japan. Fear of being dragged into war in Korea competed with fear that the US would not support South Korea. Tension over Korea subsided with no resolution of how the allies would have coordinated if hostilities had broken out. After the furor of the so-called "Three Arrows Plan" of the 1960s, both governments were relieved that Korea remained quiet.

Credibility of the US nuclear guarantee has also been questioned in Japan. Some Japanese feel that the US would not be willing to risk nuclear war in defense of Japan. Director General Sakata stated that this fear is groundless if one understands deterrence. The lack of such understanding on the part of the Japanese public, he feels, is the reason for questioning the US nuclear umbrella. Although he may be correct, as long as the population does not understand, US credibility will be questioned. This is an area on which Sakata has pledged to educate the public in hopes of relieving strains.

The Japanese public's "nuclear allergy" has also caused strains on the alliance. The Japanese government has proclaimed its policy on nuclear weapons to be no manufacture, no use, and no introduction into Japan. Prior to the reversion of Okinawa it is likely that the United States stored nuclear weapons there. When the Ryukyu Islands became a prefecture of Japan once again in 1972, they also were placed under the Japanese nuclear policy. There have been widespread accusations by the opposition parties, however, that the US continues to maintain nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Recent testimony by Admiral Le Roche (USN retired) also caused a furor in the Diet. The Admiral alleged that US aircraft carriers did not unload nuclear weapons prior to calling at Japanese ports. Although not a direct admission of introducing nuclear weapons to Japan, it was interpreted as such by opposition parties. The Japanese population was shocked to learn of the Admiral's testimony, and this only added to feelings that the United States does not respect Japan as an equal partner.

Recurring themes in the strains between the two allies center around the change in the relationship over the years without a corresponding change in responsibilities and status. Japan is no longer a defeated, occupied country with a small economic base. It has grown to the third largest GNP in the world. The confidence which accompanies this status causes Japan to be sensitive and resentful when slighted. The United States seems to be lagging behind these changes in its attitude toward Japan, and continues to treat it as somehow inferior to

the US. On the other hand, Japan has held on to its dependent status even while demanding more freedom in its foreign policy. The refusal to provide more than one percent of GNP for defense, and to take on more responsibility for its security are coupled with terms such as "autonomous defense" and cries for more independence. Although none of the misunderstandings or strains are threatening to bring the dissolution of the treaty, there does not seem to be a mechanism for promoting better understanding and easing the strains.

VIII. CONCLUSION

There are many yardsticks for measuring the success of an alliance. One measure of success is the extent to which individual policies are achieved. The strength of interests underlying an alliance compared with other interests of a nation must also be considered. Members of an alliance must agree not only on general objectives, but also on common policies and implementation of them. The value of an alliance requires an examination of specific policies and measures taken by the contracting parties in implementing the alliance.

There are three main reasons nations form alliances: security, internal stability, and status. Nations are concerned only indirectly and conditionally with international stability. Their concern centers on the degree to which their own security and status is affected, and their involvement is conditioned by satisfaction with their role in upholding international security.⁹² Thus, the value of an alliance may be measured by comparing assets and liabilities of available combinations of alliances. Since each member of an alliance must give up some measure of flexibility in its foreign policy, the alliance must be continuously re-evaluated in terms of how well it compares with other options. The alliance will endure only if it continues to be the most advantageous option open to its

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Liska, George, Nations in Alliance, p. 30, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.

members.

The alliance between the United States and Japan was formed on the common interests, or at least compatible interests of the two nations. Japan, weak and unable to provide its defense, needed the alliance to insure security while rebuilding its economy and government. The close relationship with the United States which developed during the Allied Occupation made the US the only logical choice for an ally. Events of the late 1940s and early 1950s convinced the Japanese government that the communist powers constituted a threat to its security which only the United States could counter. Initially conceived as a temporary arrangement until such time as the United Nations could guarantee peace, the Japanese felt that the alliance was as good a bargain as any available. They were willing to give up some autonomy in return for security by allowing US forces to be stationed in Japan and conceding the necessity to form a small military force.

The alliance provided for additional internal security for Japan by allowing US forces to be used to quell disturbances in conjunction with Japan's forces. Although this clause was never invoked, it gave the government of Japan assurance of American help if it were needed to preserve order within the country. Japan also gained status with other countries in Asia by allying with the United States. It is unlikely that the growth of Japan's economy and stature would have been as smooth and rapid without the alliance with the United States.

The United States, as the leader of the "free world," and very concerned with the threat to peace of the communist movement, also desired the alliance. Although secondarily concerned with preventing the resurgence of militarism in Japan, events on the Asian mainland provided the main threat to US security goals in Asia. Soviet Communism, combined with communist victory in China and the invasion of South Korea, convinced the United States that alliance with Japan was desirable.

The Security Treaty provided the United States with bases in Japan which were helpful in fulfilling US security goals. The decision to pursue a non-punitive peace treaty and a security agreement with Japan was slow in coming to the United States. However, the goals were reached with US security interests in mind and should be justified on that basis. The physical security of Japan was secondary to the US goal of preventing hostile hegemony in Asia. To project US power into the region of East Asia, it was desirable to have secure base areas in Japan for the stationing of US troops. The ability to use those troops in other parts of East Asia was an important goal of the United States. This was confirmed by the Nixon-Sato Communique and more recently by the Ford-Miki meeting. Although the use of troops is subject to prior consultation with the Japanese government under the terms of the present treaty, overall Asian stability is an important part of US foreign policy.

Initially the United States was willing to provide a large

amount of Grant Aid to Japan with which to increase the capability of its forces. Japan, in order to qualify for this aid, reorganized the structure and role of its military forces. Although staying within the provisions of Articles IX and XVIII of the Constitution, the capabilities of the Self Defense Forces were increased considerably.

As Japan's economy recovered, Grant Aid was no longer appropriate. The US chafed at Japan's low level of defense expenditures, and Japan wanted more independence in making foreign policy. The conflict was resolved partially by Kishi's efforts to revise the Security Treaty. The revision, however, was made with the realization that Japan would have to pay for increased autonomy with a greater share of responsibility. The revision was made in a era of reduced tension in East Asia, and many of the clauses of the original treaty were changed to the satisfaction of the Japanese government.

Although the alliance remained intact, Japan began to pay cash for equipment it had previously received as Grant Aid. As its economy recovered fully during the 1960s, more and more of this equipment was manufactured in Japan. A series of Defense Buildup Programs provided the basis for a cautious expansion of defense capability. Always remaining within one percent of GNP, the Self Defense Forces were supplied with modern equipment and Japanese industry acquired the ability to manufacture it domestically. Licensing fees and sales of equipment to Japan provided foreign exchange to help offset the high cost of

maintaining US troops in Japan.

The security arrangement has not been free of strains. As Japan's economic strength grew, it became the largest competitor as well as largest overseas trading partner of the United States. The intense competition for world markets continues to be a sensitive area for both countries. As balance of payment deficits became larger, President Nixon took action to force changes in currency exchange rates. Although this has eased problems somewhat for the United States, Japan has still not fully recovered from the sting of the Nixon "shock".

Other strains in the US-Japan alliance have been caused by different outlooks on defense. The people of Japan, generally, do not perceive much threat to their security. In their opinion, the Mutual Security Treaty has given more benefit to the United States than to Japan. US bases and the presence of foreign troops are a reminder of the Occupation of Japan following World War II. This, many Japanese feel, does not reflect accurately the present day status of their country.

The small defense budget and questionable constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces have led to strains also. Many US leaders do not feel Japan is supporting its own security needs satisfactorily. Claims that Japan is "getting a free ride" in defense while using defense savings to increase economic competition are common. ⁹³ The Japanese government, feeling that

⁹³ "Schlesinger Chides Japan on Defense," p.62, New York Times, 30 Aug 1975.

the public and opposition parties will protest greater defense expenditures, has not allowed defense costs to exceed one percent of GNP. Larger percentage budget requests from the Defense Agency have consistently been denied.

Despite the strains and restriction of budget, the alliance has satisfactorily met the security goals it was designed to meet. There are several areas which might be improved, however. The first, and probably most important is the need for better coordination and communication between the two countries. The United States government must realize the uniqueness of the status of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. It is highly unlikely that Japan will revise either Article IX or Article XVIII of its constitution. War making capability and involuntary service in the military will therefore remain unconstitutional. It is also unlikely that Japan will increase defense expenditure beyond the unofficial limit of one percent of GNP. Furthermore, in the absence of dire threat to security, it is unlikely that a large defense force would gain the support of the general public. Like a mathematical equation, these are the constraints, or "givens", that must be worked with to solve the problem.

On the other hand, the Japanese government must realize that the United States probably will not continue indefinitely to pay the large costs of maintaining troops in Japan. As Japan's economy grows further, it will probably be seen as more threatening by the United States. Faced with ever rising defense costs, it will be tempting for the United States to

to seek greater compensation from Japan.

Efforts by the Japanese Defense Agency to promote greater awareness of the need for defense and the value of the alliance to Japan should also be increased. Although both Nakasone and Sakata stated this as a goal of their administrations, effects seem limited. SDF members are still barred from many universities and their status appears to have declined since the late 1960s.⁹⁴ Campaigns to promote the goal of "greater defense consciousness" are needed to point out the value of the alliance to Japan. This will not be an easy task for the Japanese government, but it is an important one if the alliance is to be maintained.

Although Japan has renamed and restructured its defense forces twice during the term of the alliance, further moves to restructure would benefit the agreement. Faced with budget restrictions and a shortage of manpower, a more extensive reservist program would seem beneficial. At the present time there are only 40,000 men authorized in the Ground Forces Reserve. This is an extremely small pool to draw upon in time of crisis. The United States, faced also with budget restriction, has been successful in allocating responsibilities to National Guard and Reserve units. This seems to be a way for Japan to gain the more autonomous defense stated as a goal of the Defense Agency without incurring inordinate expenses.

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Doolin Interview, Op. cit., May 1976.

The present rank structure of the SDF, which is heavy with officers and senior enlisted personnel, would lend itself well to such a reserve program. A reserve plan would, of course, depend on the success of the government's efforts to promote awareness of defense needs among the public.

If tensions in the East Asian region remain at the relatively low level of the past few years, it seems likely that the United States can continue safely to reduce force levels in Japan. If this is coupled with increased capability of the SDF, security goals of the two countries can continue to be met while reducing the irritant of foreign troops in Japan.

While Japan should increase its capability against conventional and unconventional attack, there seems to be little justification for developing an independent nuclear capability. Public sentiment in Japan against such a move, combined with the high costs of development mitigate against it. Although the US nuclear guarantee has been questioned by some in Japan, its validity seems current today. Further efforts by the Defense Agency to explain concepts of deterrence might aid in maintaining confidence in the US nuclear guarantee.

The trend of the alliance over the past twenty-five years has been good in many respects. Japan has gradually taken on more responsibility for defense despite remaining deficiencies. The move from Grant Aid to sales to licensing, and finally to domestic design is a beneficial trend. It demonstrates Japan's

willingness to assume more responsibility while at the same time building up a defense industry capable of expansion in time of crisis. A gradual reduction of reliance on the US for equipment has befitted Japan's changing status, but ammunition stockpiles should be increased. Because of the small size of the SDF, Japan will probably continue to import some equipment from the United States for reasons of economy; however, it seems to be mutually beneficial for Japan to have the capacity to manufacture many of its needed defense articles. A strong Japanese defense industry helps promote the US goal of preventing hegemony by hostile powers in East Asia, while enhancing Japan's goal of secure borders.

The general objectives of the alliance have been met with good success. The costs to both parties has been reasonable and the terms of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty seem flexible enough to continue to meet the security goals of the two parties. As Japan increases independent foreign policy initiatives, the two countries should renew efforts to cooperate in maintaining security objectives. Japan and the United States should continue to provide first rate equipment for the SDF, and increase capabilities to coordinate forces for the defense of US and Japanese security goals in East Asia.

APPENDIX

A major problem of researching military transfers is the lack of definitive sources. Such traditional publications as the Military Balance and those of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are lacking for various reasons. One reason is the wide range of definitions of military equipment. Borderline cases such as trucks, medical supplies, and uniforms are treated differently by different sources. In other cases, figures published by non-government organizations such as the two above cannot even remotely be reconciled with those published by government agencies. A case in point is the SIPRI estimate of Japanese arms exports. Their figures place the value at approximately \$165 million for the years 1950-1968. Japanese government figures for the same period set the value at only \$40 million.

Part of the disparity of sources can be attributed to differences in accounting methods. For example, should a five year old airplane given as grant aid be valued at its original cost, an amortized cost based on its age, or its replacement cost? The method used results in grossly different figures for its value. When these problems of definition and accounting are multiplied over the twenty-five years of the US-Japan alliance, the possibility of accurately reporting transfers becomes remote.

Wide disparities are also evident between US and Japanese official government sources. Japanese figures show over \$200

million of military aid received from the US from FY51-53. US figures for the same time period are zero. Similar accounting differences are present among various US government agencies.

The methodology used throughout this paper to attempt to cope with the above problems are as follows:

1. If only one source of material for the time period or equipment was available, that source was used.
2. Priority was given to actual numbers of equipment over the cost of the equipment.
3. For consistency, figures provided by the US Department of Defense were given priority over all other sources. Other sources for the same time periods which conflicted with DOD figures are noted for comparison.
4. IF DOD figures for a period were not available, they were taken from other US government agencies, if possible.
5. When no US government data were available, data from Japanese government sources were used if available.
6. If no US or Japanese official government data were available for the information desired, unofficial non-government sources were used. Such publications included the Military Balance and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute publications.

TABLE 1

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DELIVERIES
(VALUE IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

SELECTED ITEMS/CATEGORIES	NUMBER DELIVERED
Aircraft Fighter F-86	482
Aircraft Anti-sub S-2	60
Aircraft Cargo C-47	4
Aircraft Cargo C-45	33
Aircraft Cargo C-46	36
Aircraft Trainer T-6	233
Aircraft Trainer T-33	248
Helicopter SH-3	1
Helicopter CH-21	10
Aircraft Observation O-1	119
Aircraft Patrol P-2	58
Aircraft Utility HU-16	6
Aircraft Utility U-19	39
Aircraft Utility U-7	62
Aircraft Miscellaneous	<u>74</u>
Total Aircraft	1465
Total Value	\$399,700.
Destroyers	6
Submarines	1
Destroyer Escorts	2
Landing Ships	30
Landing Craft	79
Minesweepers	13
Patrol Frigates	18
Barges, Fuel oil	1
Harbor Tugs	7
Rescue Boats	12
Miscellaneous craft	<u>1</u>
Total Ships	170
Total Value	\$54,486.
Artillery Anti-Aircraft	12
Artillery 105mm Howitzers	145
Artillery 155mm Howitzers	93
Tanks	226
Tank Recovery Vehicles	15
Misc Combat Vehicles	295
75mm Guns	75
90mm Guns	28
155mm Guns	<u>2</u>
Total Vehicles and Weapons Value	\$107,719.

SELECTED ITEMS/CATEGORIES	NUMBER DELIVERED
Total Ammunition Value	\$28,061.
Nike Missiles	196
Hawk Missiles	360
Tartar Missiles	40
Miscellaneous Missiles	<u>20</u>
Total Missiles	616
Total Value	\$28,370.
Total Communications Eqpt. Value	\$86,093.
Total Other Equipment Value	\$12,431.
Total Const action Value	\$8,245.
Total Rehabi itated Equip. Value	\$11,065.
Total Supply Operations Value	\$69,213.
Total Training Value	\$44,591.
Total Other Services Value	\$4,892.
Implementing Agencies	
Army	\$168,781.
Navy	\$263,810.
Air Force	\$422,275.
Total Country Program Value	\$854,866.

TABLE 2

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DELIVERIES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WORLD</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>TAIWAN</u>	<u>S. KOREA</u>	<u>PHILIPPINES</u>
1950	55.8	-0-	-0-	.1	1.5
1951	980.0	-0-	9.5	10.8	6.8
1952	1,481.0	-0-	38.4	.8	11.2
1953	4,159.0	-0-	173.8	3.7	34.5
1954	3,296.0	.5	154.3	3.4	12.0
1955	2,396.0	39.4	297.1	20.2	15.8
1956	2,920.0	97.9	345.2	201.5	33.2
1957	2,078.0	111.0	169.7	258.8	23.7
1958	2,325.0	130.9	149.6	331.1	21.1
1959	2,050.0	131.5	232.7	190.6	20.5
1960	1,697.0	85.8	135.9	187.1	19.5
1961	1,344.0	66.9	84.4	192.1	23.6
1962	1,427.0	74.0	84.4	136.9	20.5
1963	1,806.0	34.2	85.2	167.8	24.3
1964	1,116.0	28.0	108.2	140.1	16.4
1965	1,100.0	20.0	100.2	148.1	10.4
1966	1,071.0	1.2	76.5	153.1	26.0
1967	1,011.0	29.1	70.4	149.8	21.0
1968	790.0	3.6	115.0	197.4	29.1
1969	645.0	.3	55.3	210.0	18.8
1970	544.0	.5	37.9	216.3	15.7
1971	559.0	-0-	18.7	140.5	16.5
1972	555.0	-0-	19.7	164.3	16.0
1973	524.0	-0-	11.5	113.4	14.2
1974	716.0	-0-	54.3	91.1	15.9
1975	766.0	-0-	8.1	137.5	14.9
TOTAL	37,413.0	854.9	2,636.1	3,556.5	483.4

(Australia and New Zealand received no MAP aid)

TABLE 4

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DELIVERIES 1950-1975
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WORLD</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>AUSTRA- LIA</u>	<u>TAI- WAN</u>	<u>S. KOREA</u>	<u>PHILIP- PINES</u>	<u>NEW ZEALAND</u>
FY50	2.0	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
FY51	18.7	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
FY52	71.6	-0-	2.1	-0-	0.2	0.5	-0-
FY53	160.7	-0-	10.6	-0-	-0-	0.1	-0-
FY54	120.7	-0-	1.6	-0-	-0-	0.3	-0-
FY55	118.6	-0-	1.9	0.2	-0-	0.1	-0-
FY56	118.6	1.0	7.7	0.2	-0-	0.1	-0-
FY57	68.1	.6	2.2	0.2	-0-	0.1	-0-
FY58	343.1	1.9	1.3	0.2	-0-	-0-	-0-
FY59	201.7	2.7	30.2	-0-	-0-	0.5	-0-
FY60	326.4	9.4	6.9	0.2	-0-	1.1	0.1
FY61	289.1	10.9	6.9	-0-	-0-	0.2	0.9
FY62	328.8	15.6	7.5	-0-	-0-	0.2	-0-
FY63	717.8	9.1	35.0	-0-	-0-	0.2	2.2
FY64	479.8	15.2	22.5	0.1	-0-	0.4	0.2
FY65	703.4	25.1	30.8	0.8	-0-	0.5	3.0
FY66	821.8	18.8	66.2	1.3	-0-	0.3	9.1
FY67	886.5	14.1	78.6	4.5	-0-	0.1	18.9
FY68	1,051.8	41.3	127.8	10.9	1.5	0.4	9.1
FY69	1,227.6	12.4	113.0	13.5	0.7	0.2	11.6
FY70	1,383.0	19.4	52.5	36.9	1.9	0.8	10.1
FY71	1,460.7	21.1	75.0	58.2	0.4	1.3	23.1
FY72	1,467.5	42.2	51.1	56.2	2.4	0.7	8.3
FY73	1,392.8	33.3	96.5	72.0	1.2	-0-	3.6
FY74	2,219.4	23.1	172.8	96.1	13.2	1.7	4.6
FY75	3,439.1	38.9	29.6	116.5	57.4	5.8	4.6
TOTAL	20,119.3	356.1	1,030.2	468.2	79.1	15.8	109.6

CHART 3

GRANTS VS. SALES
TO JAPAN 1954-1974

US \$ MILLIONS




TABLE 5

U.S. COMMERCIAL SALES DELIVERIES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WORLD</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>AUSTRALIA</u>	<u>N.ZEA- LAND</u>	<u>S. KO- REA</u>	<u>TAI- WAN</u>	<u>PHILIP- PINES</u>
FY60-64	955.1	120.1	1.1	0.1	0.7	1.0	0.7
FY65	155.8	8.5	1.0	0.3	-0-	0.6	-0-
FY66	196.4	18.3	3.7	0.3	-0-	0.7	-0-
FY67	237.9	25.4	8.3	0.1	1.6	0.7	-0-
FY68	257.1	30.3	0.6	0.1	0.6	1.2	0.2
FY69	250.8	40.0	1.4	0.4	1.9	1.9	0.4
FY70	437.6	62.5	1.9	-0-	1.1	2.8	-0-
FY71	396.8	71.5	1.6	0.6	2.0	7.8	0.5
FY72	423.6	20.8	14.5	0.6	0.7	5.4	0.3
FY73	362.1	39.7	5.9	0.6	0.2	6.0	0.2
FY74	502.2	58.6	5.6	0.6	1.1	8.1	2.0
FY60-74	4175.4	495.4	44.8	3.1	9.9	36.1	4.3

TABLE 6

TOTAL U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES 1950-1975
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>WORLD</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>AUSTRA- LIA</u>	<u>N. ZEA- LAND</u>	<u>S. KOREA</u>	<u>PHILIP- PINES</u>	<u>TAIWAN</u>
SERVICE FUNDED	16,509.6	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,153.6	9.6	-0-
EX-IM BANK CREDIT	3,275.1	-0-	601.9	80.2	-0-	-0-	29.0
FMS CREDIT	5,828.4	34.8	115.6	1.5	171.9	22.6	396.4
FMS CASH	20,119.4	356.1	1,030.2	109.6	79.1	15.8	468.2
COMMERCIAL SALES	4,175.4	495.4	44.8	3.1	9.9	4.3	36.1
MAP	37,412.9	854.9	-0-	-0-	3,566.6	483.4	1,636.1
EXCESS ARTICLES	6,582.7	175.0	-0-	-0-	940.2	93.5	948.4
OTHER	210.8	210.8	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	94,113.3	1,916.1	1,792.5	194.4	5,921.2	621.1	4,514.2


TABLE 7

JAPAN'S TOP TEN ARMS PRODUCERS 1974

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>\$ MILLIONS</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>MAIN ITEMS</u>
1	Mitsubishi Heavy Industry	250.0	21.4	Aircraft, trucks, ships, weapons
2	Kawasaki	214.6	18.4	Aircraft, repair work, ships, weapons
3	Ishikawa Harima	118.0	10.1	Jet engine and ship repair
4	Mitsubishi Electric	39.6	3.4	Communications equip- ment and radar
5	Nihon Electric	27.3	2.3	Communications equip- ment
6	Sumitomo Heavy Industry	21.3	1.8	Ships
7	Nihon Seikozyo	17.7	1.5	Weapons
8	Shinmeiwa	17.7	1.5	Aircraft repair
9	Mitsui Zosen	17.3	1.5	Ships
10	Toshiba Electric	17.0	1.5	Communications and radar equipment
	TOTAL (TOP TEN)	740.5	63.3	
	TOTAL (ALL COMPANIES)	1,169.3	100	

CHART 8

DEFENSE TRANSACTIONS IN THE
US/JAPAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS



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