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THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY ELITE:
AN OPERATIONAL CODE

by

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(20. ABSTRACT Continued)

operational code as a vehicle for predicting decision-making processes of political groups. Egyptian military leaders were the focus of the study because of their vital role in Middle Eastern affairs. Egypt, by virtue of its population and industrialization, leads the Arab world. The Egyptian military is both the dominant factor in Egyptian politics and the training ground for political leaders. One hundred six speeches and interviews between 1955 and 1975 provided the data for constructing the code. Findings: (1) The Egyptian military elite has a common approach to decision making borne of common experience and common social background; (2) They Egyptian military sees the political universe in perpetual conflict. They and will continue to feel that the only answer is strong and decisive action at the correct historical moment; and (3) The operational code, although flawed, is an excellent tool vehicle for analyzing group decision-making parameters.

The Egyptian Military Elite:
An Operational Code

by

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to define the decision space of Egyptian military leaders and to provide a tool for predicting future Egyptian military attitudes and decisions. The methodology used is the operational code construct developed by Alexander George and others. The research proceeded on two levels: 1) an analysis of the decision-making process of Egyptian military leaders, and 2) an analysis of the operational code as a vehicle for predicting decision-making processes of political groups. Egyptian military leaders were the focus of the study because of their vital role in Middle Eastern affairs. Egypt, by virtue of its population and industrialization, leads the Arab world. The Egyptian military is both the dominant factor in Egyptian politics and the training ground for political leaders. One hundred six speeches and interviews between 1955 and 1975 provided the data for constructing the code.

Findings: 1) The Egyptian military elite has a common approach to decision making borne of common experience and common social background. 2) The Egyptian military sees the political universe in perpetual conflict. They will continue to feel that the only answer is strong and decisive action at the correct historical moment. 3) The operational code, although flawed, is an excellent vehicle for analyzing group decision-making parameters.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has been written in the belief that the
Egyptian military is one of the most important variables in
the Middle East equation. When Gamal Abdul Nasir came to
power in 1952, it was the first time in 2500 years that an
Egyptian had ruled Egypt. (118:423) In addition, the Egyptian
regime has become a symbol to the rest of the Arab world
through its continuity. In the middle third of the 20th
century, there have been 35 coups in the Middle East, 15
between 1958 and 1963. (118:245) Since 1952, Egypt has had
none. This continuity, combined with Nasir's refusal to be
dominated by the western powers, has kept Egypt the leader
of an Arab world tired of chaos and exploitation. (155:180)
As examples of this leadership, Egypt has led the Arab world
to war in 1967 and 1973, and to the negotiating table for
the Sinai Accords in 1975.

Within Egypt the military's authority has been, and
continues to be, almost unquestioned. Nasir stated in his
Philosophy of the Revolution, "The state of affairs singled
out the armed forces as the force to do the job. The situa-
tion demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive
framework, far removed from the conflict between individuals
and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people." (146:42)
The influence of the military has continued since that time.
During the eight Nasir cabinets, the percentage of officers

in each cabinet fluctuated between 32% and 47%. Between 1952 and 1967 only one civilian held one of the four top posts. (151:112) Amos Perlmutter has stated that, "The survival of a Nasirite type regime after Nasir will probably continue to depend on the amount of support the Praetorian rulers receive from a small number of politically isolated elites, particularly the armed forces." (149:3) He also states that the regime of Sadat is entirely dependent on the military. (149:112)

The military's influence in Egypt and throughout the Arab world has been evident since 1952. Manfred Halpern has stated, "It was the Egyptian army coup of 1952 that marked the beginning of the end for traditional army regimes in the Arab world." (131:254) Nasir's decision to break with the west and buy arms from Russia was spurred by a desire to satisfy his military. This move broke the monopoly of western arms throughout the area. (136:129) One of the primary reasons for the 1967 war was the insistence by Field Marshal Amer and Air Force commander Fawzi that Nasir attack before Israel was mobilized. (108:56) In 1971 Sadat was forced to go to his military for support against the Ali Sabri coup attempt. (149:193) The ultimatum submitted by General Sadiq concerning the need to reduce Soviet influence was the deciding factor in Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisors. (149:226) Military pressure to reactivate the Suez front was a major factor in Sadat's decision to go to war in 1973. (110:5) In 1974 a delegation of Army officers

expressed concern to Sadat over the condition of the army. It is believed that this was the chief factor in Sadat's search for arms, first in the rapprochement with Russia, and then with overtures to the west. (113:1) Although in retrospect some might feel that Nasir at one point achieved control of his military, an incident in 1961 indicates otherwise. In that year President Nasir decided that Field Marshal Amer, Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, had become too powerful. Through a complicated series of political moves, he attempted to strip Amer of his power. The reaction within the military was so great that he had to reinstate him to avoid a coup. (151:360)

As the military influence seems obvious and the situation in the Middle East continues to be explosive, it becomes increasingly vital for U.S. decision makers to understand Egyptian decision makers. To dispose of an inquiry of this type by assuming that Egyptian officers make decisions based only on either their Arab heritage or the attitudes common to all military elites would be a tragic mistake. Therefore, this thesis attempts to construct the decision space of Egyptian military elites by analysis of their own speeches and interviews.

This thesis is divided into eight parts. Part I is the introduction. Part II is a statement of the problem in terms of: 1) the conflicting opinions about Egyptian military leaders today and 2) the utility of the type of information presented in the operational code. Part III

presents the behavioral variables that influence the code. They are: 1) the Arab mentality; 2) common characteristics of all military regimes; 3) characteristics common to all Arab regimes; 4) the status of military elites as a class in Egyptian society. Part IV is a historical review of the Egyptian military in terms of how this historical experience affects the military's operational code. The historical analysis is divided into four time periods: 1955-61, 1961-67, 1967-73, 1973-75. The division of the historical background into these periods performs a dual purpose. Firstly, if the operational code is to be a useful instrument for prediction, it must be assessed in the light of past historical experience. Secondly, each of these periods forms a distinct and separate experience for the military. Consequently, as a starting point the researcher can look for changes in the code from one period to the next. A change in decision-making patterns between periods is significant. However, the absence of change is also significant. Part V maps out the methodology and data used. Part VI is the operational code itself, Part VII is the summary. Part VIII is the conclusion, including predictions and suggestions for further research, and Part IX is the Appendix.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem in analyzing an elite, or a group of elites, is the low utility of current information. Most published biographies give education, positions held, and at best a short statement of the elite's personality. There is no clue to how the leader makes decisions, what his motivations are, or what environmental factors will bear on his perception of a problem. There is also a variety of studies on elites, and specifically Arab elites. However, they have severe shortcomings for the policy analyst. First, the information is second hand. The conclusions of the author are usually based on either a broad historical analysis or a sociological study of the culture. Although these studies are useful, and are used in this study as background material, they are much too broad to base a decision on. In addition, experts disagree on the results of their studies. As an example, Be'eri states, "The Arab officer politicians have no single outlook and no uniform ideology uniquely theirs." (118:360) Yet another analyst, P.J. Vatikiotis, states that, "The army officer corps represents the most cohesive elite of younger enthusiasts linked together by vague nationalistic aspirations and by concern for the social and economic frustrations of their fellow citizens." (153:xiii)

Another problem is that, until the past few years, there has been no systematic methodology that would indicate how leaders filter information and perceive problems, or how the

leader translates these perceptions into political action. There has also been no method for updating a leader's changing attitudes on a continuous basis. The operational code performs these functions. Although content analysis has been with us for some time, the operational code is a type of content analysis specifically designed to define the decision-making processes of political actors by reference to the statements of the actor over time. In short, the operational code construction asks the right questions. In addition, the philosophical and instrumental belief categories are structured so that additional information can be analyzed and changes in belief patterns noted.

A further problem in assessing the intentions of an elite is the possibility that the actor in question may die or cease to have influence on decisions. There is little value in studying a leader who may be replaced tomorrow. This thesis attempts to deal with this problem by proving that the Egyptian military forms a group possessing a common outlook and perception of the political universe, and that future military leaders can be counted on to perceive situations in approximately the same way.

III. BEHAVIOR VARIABLES

The operational code of the Egyptian military is a
result of many environmental inputs. Among these are the
Arab culture, the characteristics common to Arab military
establishments and to all military groups, and the Egyptian
military's status as a class. In discussing these variables
it will become obvious that the Egyptian code corresponds
to some aspects of each, but in some instances is exactly
the opposite. However, the code becomes clearer when evalu-
ated in the light of these factors.

A. THE ARAB CULTURE

1. Interpersonal Relationships

At the lowest level, the dominant characteristic of
Arab life is suspicion of one's surroundings. It has its
roots in the Bedouin stress on manliness on the one hand,
and the exaggerated conformity to the clan on the other.
This leads to intense rivalry and a sharp division of the
world into friends and enemies. (120:136) Another reason
for suspicion is the history of wars of conquest and the
resulting distrust of strangers. Consequently, Arab domestic
politics are characterized by ingroup/outgroup rivalries
that became anarchic at times. As Nasir once stated, "Every
man we questioned had nothing to recommend except to kill
someone else." (108:33) Because of this ingroup/outgroup

mentality, every Arab state is especially sensitive to
subversion.

The overriding concern of every Arab is honor (Sharaf)
and face (Wajh). The world is seen as a constant threat to
the individual image. The Arabs' answer is an exaggerated
emphasis on virility. As an example, Arabs were humiliated
by the Israeli use of women to guard prisoners. (108:34)
Because of this constant threat, the Arab behavior pattern
is one of intense verbal hostility. This verbal hostility
is a substitute for battle and can be traced back to inter-
tribal warfare, which was characterized by scuffling, hurling
of insults, but very little actual killing, unless the
situation got completely out of hand. (148:214)

In addition to Arab threats being idle, they are used
to relieve pressure and insure that action will not be taken.
In point of fact, the intention or plan for doing something
takes the place of actually doing it. This is partly due
to the fact that the verbalization of an intent in the Arabic
language leaves the impression that something has already
been done. (148:62) It is also due to the Arab penchant for
exaggeration. An Arab can be more deeply moved by the
eloquent use of his language than can members of other
linguistic groups. An Arabic speaker will emphasize a point
three or four times to get across that he means what he says.
This chacteristic, combined with a lot of wishful thinking,
led the Arabs to greatly exaggerate their performance in
the 1967 war. It also creates a problem when dealing with

non-Arabs. A statement that seems emphatic to a westerner might seem neutral to an Arab. (148:58)

2. Islam

From Islam the Arab gets his fatalism, which benefits him by carrying him over the rough spots of life, but retards him by making him adverse to any ambition to better himself. (148:310) This fatalism manifests itself in the Islamic belief in predestination. To the average muslim, man is simply playing out the role Allah has set down for him. Because of this belief, the concept of long-range planning is almost an affront to the plan Allah has laid down. Consequently he attributes the ills of the world and the events which shape his life "to fate, to the devil, or to imperialism." (148:152) As the operational code indicates, the Egyptian military has apparently been able to overcome this fatalistic attitude. Indeed, long-range planning is one of their main occupations.

Islam also contributes to the view that human nature is inherently depraved. If man is left to his own designs, a Hobbsian war of all against all will result. Consequently, Islam serves to bring order to the systems and to provide security through an all-encompassing law of interpersonal relationships, the Sharia law. (108:20) Since the Islamic law orders the Arab society, muslims fear that westernization will bring about the same transformation that it did to Christianity. Not a loss of religous principles per se, but a loss of the function of religon; for the muslin today still depends on Islam as his inner sustaining force. (148:146)

Islam is even more important to the officer class.
Islam, unlike Judeaism or Christianity, has military success
and conquest as its central idea, instead of martyrdom.
Although the liberal movement of the 1920's weakened Islam,
as a community, it is unchanged. Islam buoys up the posi-
tion of the officer class, and the fact that Egyptian offi-
cers throughout the years have been involved with the Muslim
Brethren is no accident. Arab national awakening almost
always brings forth an Islamic revival. However, the Islamic
tradition also inhibits the officer corps. As modernizers
they have no desire to retain old social forms, and the
Islamic law is extremely difficult to ignore. (118:177)

Islam also contributes to the Arab view of history.
Muslim theologians profess that, although all events are
ultimately determined by God, man has the capacity to react
to each event. Consequently, chronology instead of cause
and effect is the dominant theme in Arab history.

3. The Arabs and the West

An Arab considers himself the center of three cir-
cles. The inner circle is he and his relatives. The
middle circle is the western-introduced concept of a nation
as a distinct entity. The outer circle, and the one which
separates the Arabs from the rest of the world, is the
circle of Arab-speaking elites. (148:41)

This circle theory breeds a natural hostility toward
foreigners. To the Arab, just as all the muslims constitute
one nation, so do the unbelievers. Consequently, during the

1952 anti-British riots, several Copt churches were also burned. (143:95) However, the Arab wants desperately to participate in the culture of the west. Consequently, he alternately feels admiration and envy, love and hate toward the west. He wants to acquire western culture, yet he wants to eliminate western influence from his country as far as possible. Conversely, the Arab's feelings toward his own country are ambivalent. He is a patriot, but he hates his country for its backwardness. (148:198)

All of these attitudes color the Arab view of the international environment, inter-Arab relations, and the individual images that decision makers have of themselves. On the international level, the Arabs see a permanent conflict between the Arab and Christian worlds. The Soviets occupy an ambivalent position here. They are seen as allies because of their hostility to the west, but hostile because of the atheism of communism. The Arabs deal with them politically but reject communism.

There is a feeling that the westerners are up to no good, and they are seen as one monolithic religous system. As an example, the late King Faysal equated Zionism with communism because both emanated from the supposed monolithic west. (108:24)

On the level of inter-Arab relations, the Arabs are influenced by this same hatred of the west. Most of the boundaries in the Arab world were artificially created by western powers. Consequently, inter-Arab affairs are

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characterized by territorial squabbles. Arab sovereigns
have no compunction about interfering in the affairs of
their neighbors. (108:28) As a result of these rivalries,
alliances are hard to maintain. Only when the problem of
Israel arose, did the Arabs make serious attempts at unity.
(148:274)

The predicament of westernization can be summed up
in the fact that, while Arabs hate the superiority of western
technology, Arab governments measure their success by the
yardstick of mass benefit to the people in terms of education,
literacy, etc. This is a decidedly western concept. (148:290)

4. Arab Politics

As a result of the Arab cultural experience and devo-
tion to Islam, Arab decision makers operate in a perceived
environment of hostility. Their culture stresses individual
or group honor, honor that must be restored by violent verbal
or physical action. (108:337) The Arab decision maker also
operates in a world of polarity, of contrasting concepts of
unity-diversity, shame and honor, aggression, yet submission
to the will of Allah. Thus his value judgments are usually
black or white. This polarity can be seen in the extremes
of emotion expressed by Arabs. A usually docile Arab is
not only capable of frequent outbursts of emotion, but is
encouraged to do so. (148:162) However, as to Arab rhetoric
not representing reality, there is another side to the coin.
Former Chief of Israeli Intelligence, Y. Harkabi, says that
it should be taken very seriously because it reflects the

wishes and mind set of the speaker. It creates a set of
expectations. As an example, President Sadat, beginning
in 1971, began to issue threats that Egypt was going to do
something about the Sinai. These threats expressed a set
of aspirations which were eventually carried out. (108:8)

B. THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY

1. Military Interventions

Although the Egyptian military regime has many
unique characteristics, it is also like many other military
regimes throughout the world. There have been numerous
attempts to categorize and analyze military regimes. Welch
and Smith differentiate between "professional armies" whose
institutions are integral and who have distinct values
different from the rest of society, and the less professional
armies with fragmented institutional boundaries. (155:42)
Amos Perlmutter theorizes that there are two types of
armies, arbiter and ruler. The arbiter army rules for only
a limited time, develops no particular political ideology,
and tends to stick more to traditional military activities.
The ruler army works for direct military rule, develops its
own political institutions, and tends to be more radical.
He believes that the Egyptian military is one of these.
(149:4)

Most military regimes come to power through inter-
vention. There are several factors which contribute to
military intervention:

a. Low level of political institutionalization and lack of sustained support for political institutions

b. Weak and ineffective political parties

c. Frequent civilian intervention in the military

d. Defeat in war

·e. Foreign intervention

f. Conflicts among junior and senior officers

g. Involvement in internal pacification which brings the army into politics

h. Armies with high internal cohesion

i. External military aid which facilitates role expansion and greater autonomy of the armed forces, and gives them new expertise

j. Social mobilization that produces new officer class

k. Expanding content of military officers' education to encompass political issues customarily resolved by civilians

l. Perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially accompanied by the belief that the government cannot resolve this deterioration (155:10)

The degree to which the military controls a society is dependent upon:

a. Whether the officers are drawn from or incorporated into the same social strata as the governing elite. If so, military participation will be high.

b. Participation of the people in the political process.

c. Image of the military within society.

d. Confidence political leaders have in their hold on power. (155:6)

e. Morris Janowitz best summarized one of the reasons for military participation in politics when he said, "The basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment has shifted from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The new shift of the military requires that the professional officer develop more and more of the skills and orientation common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an outgrowth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military." (137:8)

Officers with close ties to individuals or groups that are opposed to government policies form the nucleus of conspiracies aimed at military intervention. However, military intervention resulting from specific policy grievances may lead to the restoration of civilian rule when the grievances have been rectified. Distrust of the total political system leads to military regimes of long duration. (155:23)

2. <u>Arab Military Regimes</u>

As mentioned before, military intervention in the Middle East is simply a continuation of the Islamic heritage. Beginning with the first modern army coup in Iraq in 1936, there have been 35 coups in the Middle East in the middle third of the twentieth century. There are several characteristics common to Arab military coups:

a. When Arab officers take over, it is to rid the country

of corruption. It is rarely the result of an external
threat. (118:360)

b. Officers who seize power tend to promote the military
ideology of the soldier as the ideal model.

c. Many Arab armies, and specifically Egypt, tend to
think of themselves as the instrument of the new middle
class. (134:253)

d. Nearly all of the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and
Iraqi officers who have staged coups fought on the Palestine
front in 1948. (131:52)

e. One third of all coups have taken place without the
help of civilian organization. (131:259)

f. Between 1949 and 1967 there were 30 military coups in
six Arab countries and only in two instances, both in Syria,
did the officers hand over rule to civilian leaders.
(131:259)

g. Foreign influence is minimal.

h. Many officers who have participated in coups have been
trained in their own country instead of abroad. (119:363)

i. The establishment of a revolutionary command council
is normal.

j. Two of every three armies in the Middle East are
career armies. (136:431)

k. In being the innovators of western technology, the
Arab armies became aware of the lack of any other equally
organized group. (155:182)

As a general rule, the armies that come to power in the Middle East possess five percent or less officers who are politically active. They come to power through a military coup and then establish a political ideology to sustain them. The old politics are labeled status quo. Modernization, industrialization, and mobilization become the new creeds. However, the army is usually more reformer than radical. It opposes rapid modernization under a one party system, unless dominated by them, and as such is in many cases anti-communist, as with Nasir's regime. (149:16)

3. Egypt's Regime

The Egyptian regime is one of the longest army-based regimes in modern times. (155:179) One reason is that Nasir's attempt to reprofessionalize the army and his insistence that the army not become involved in politics has prevented the Egyptian revolution from being shaken by a succession of military coups, as have such regimes as Syria and Iraq. (130:392) There are also other differences between the Egyptian coup and others like Iraq and Syria. The Egyptian officers who carried out the coup in 1952 were different in that they were of medium or low rank and were born between 1917 and 1922, as opposed to the Syrian and Iraqi officers who were born before 1900. (118:74) The Egyptian coup was one of the few in the Middle East that occurred without the cooperation of civilians. (130:392) The Egyptian army itself is somewhat unlike others in the Middle East in that the army since the Arabi revolt at the turn of the

century has been an independent political force. The main decision in 1952 was whom to give loyalty to. This is in contrast to the Jordanian army for instance, which represents *the classic Ottoman army.* It was recruited from Bedouin and Circassian minorities and sees its function as protecting the Hashamite kingdom. It is basically non-political and non-nationalistic. (149:11)

In some ways, however, the Egyptian regime is like others in the Middle East. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are similar because the officers came from the urban and middle classes and felt no attachment to the conservative landowners. (119:369) The Egyptian coup was also typical in that combat officers in the armour division were recruited to partici- pate. Also the threat of retaliation by the ruling monarchy forced the conspirators to set a definite date. As with Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, Egyptian officers abolished the monarchy and substituted a one-party system with the revolutionary command council at the top. (130:373) At first, like other armies, the Egyptian army suffered from the demise of professional rank and status due to situations in which junior officers play a role superior to that of senior officers because of their political expertise. Major Salem in the early days of the regime is an example. However, this has not been true in recent years. Nasir's efforts to professionalize the army have eliminated much of this political in-fighting. (149:20)

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C. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN SOCIETY

   1. Internal Structure of the Military

        In the last years of the monarchy, the ruling family
began to see the results of their fateful decision to allow
lower class boys to enter the military academy in 1936.
The officers who would eventually lead the revolution of
1952 were native Egyptians from a variety of groups. In most
cases fathers were middle grade officials, army officers,
village notables, and merchants. Most were middle or upper
middle class. Half of the fourteen original RCC members had
relatives who were officers. (118:319) A small portion
were urban business people. There were no representatives
of the peasant class, artesans, or small shopkeepers. At
the other end there were no large land owners' or aristo-
crats' sons. Unlike the Iraqi officer corps, there were
also very few sons of muslim religious functionaries.
(118:316) Many were sons of village leaders, an example
being Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, an original member of the
RCC and Minister of War from 1955 to 1969.

        The officer corps on the whole is not political.
The Free Officer corps contained only about 50 real activists
with another 300 politically active out of 20,000 before
1952. Since 1955 the composition of the officer corps has
remained essentially the same. However, although most
officers are still recruited from the small town middle
class, because of the elimination of bodaliyya, or payment

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for military service, university students and secondary
school graduates have started to enter service. President
Nasir encouraged university students to enter the army after
the 1967 war in an attempt to revitalize his officer corps.
This, however, may lead to problems in the long run. Although
these young officers performed admirably in 1973, tradi-
tionally students have felt that they have been the vanguard
of revolution and resent the exclusion of the students'
voice in the regime. (153:230)

In addition to the student faction, Leonard Binder
found divisions within the armed forces based on age group,
fields of specialization, staff versus line, old services
such as the Air Force versus new services such as the para-
troops, and the educational differences resulting from the
entry of medical and engineering students. He also noted
that there had been a notable increase in the prestige of
the engineering officer over line officers due to the
development projects within the Egyptian society which the
army has taken over. (121:422)

One of the chief problems within the military has
always been the wide gulf between officer and enlisted.
Be'eri cites examples in the 1956 Suez campaign of captured
Egyptian officers who wanted better conditions for themselves,
but never asked about their men. Although after the Yemen
war the military academy was opened to sergeant majors who
had served in Yemen, and privates who had two years active
service, generally it is still restricted to graduates of

secondary schools; thus the gap between officer and enlisted
is maintained. (118:324) However, much of this problem has
been eliminated by the influx of idealistic young university
students.

There is also a gulf between high ranking officers
and the mid level captains and majors. The latter group's
salaries are not commensurate with their rank and promotion
is slow.

Unlike some more highly politicized armies like
Syria, jumping of ranks is unheard of in the Egyptian army.
General Amer, who was promoted in 1963 from major to brigadeer
general, is a rare exception. (118:322) However, since the
revolution, rank is attained somewhat more quickly than
before. Before the revolution, colonel was attained at
about 26 years service. Now the average time is about 20
years. Some officers attain the rank of brigadeer by the
time they are 42 years of age.

Amos Perlmutter estimates that today the ruling
group in the army consists of 1,000 loyal officers, headed
by a small group of remaining free officers. (149:112) In
an analysis of a few of the top-ranking officers today, it
is apparent that the Egyptian elite is still that group of
officers who were in the army at the time of the 1952 revo-
lution. Although many were not part of the small free
officers group, all have ties with either Nasir or Sadat.
All military elites today have at least some of the following
characteristics:

a.   Born around 1920.

b.   A free officer.

c.   If not a free officer, friendship with Nasir or Sadat.

d.   Graduation from the military academy around 1938.

e.   Graduation from the staff college in 1950.

f.   Participation in the 1948 war in Palestine.

g.   Training in the Soviet Union.

h.   From a middle class family in the Upper Nile region.

Following are a few of the leaders who have been influential in recent years:

a.   General Ismail Ali — General Ismail Ali was appointed director of intelligence by Sadat in 1971. In 1972 he became Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War. He died in 1974. Born in 1913, he was slightly older than other elites. He graduated from the military academy with Nasir and attended Staff College at the same time. He was one of the first to study in the Soviet Union in 1957. He also participated in the 1948 war in Palestine. (117:14)

b.   General Muhammed al-Gammasy — General Gammasy replaced General Ismail Ali as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War. He was born in the Upper Nile region in 1921. His father was a textile merchant. He graduated from the military academy in 1939 with the present Chief of Staff, General Fahmi, and one year later than Nasir and Sadat. He also graduated from the Staff College in 1950 and studied armoured tactics in the Soviet Union. Of all the elites, he is unusual in that he also studied tank warfare in the United States in 1948-49. (140:6)

c. <u>Lt. General Muhammed Ali Fahmi</u> — General Fahmi was born in the Upper Nile region in 1920. He graduated from the military academy with General Gammasy in 1939 and from the Staff College in 1952. He studied air defense in the Soviet Union in 1964 and was commander of the air defense forces during the 1973 war. He was named Chief-of-Staff in 1975. (115:5)

d. <u>General Saadeddin al Shazli</u> — General Shazli was born in 1922. He graduated from the military academy in 1940 and the Staff College in 1952. He is a paratrooper trained in the Soviet Union in 1958. In 1969 he was appointed commander of the Special Forces and planned the canal crossing in 1973. (117:14)

e. <u>General Husni Mubarak</u> — General Mubarak is somewhat younger than the other elites and is presented here as an example of the new breed of elites. However, he still has some of the characteristics of the other military leaders. He was born in 1928 in the same district in the Upper Nile region that Sadat comes from. He graduated from the War College in 1949 and entered the Air Force as a fighter pilot. He received training in the Soviet Union as a bomber pilot in the late 1950's and was subsequently named head of the Air Force Academy in 1968, Air Force Chief-of-Staff in 1969, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in 1972, and Vice President of Egypt in 1975. In this last move he was promoted over Generals Fahmi and Gammasy, and as a personal friend of President Sadat is seen as a possible successor. (114:7)

2. The Military in Egyptian Society

The question of whether the Egyptian military represents a specific class has been debated frequently. Writing in 1961, P.J. Vatikiotis stated that the army officer class in Egypt is probably not a class in the sense that it shares similar social backgrounds or economic interests, but "Rather the army officers corps represents the most cohesive elite of younger enthusiasts linked together by vague nationalist aspirations and by concern for the social and economic frustrations of their fellow citizens." (They do share though a common educational background: secondary school, military academy, and some even staff college.) (153:xiii) Eric Nordlinger believes that the Egyptian officer is part of a new middle class that is a salaried class of teachers, administrators, scientists, lawyers, engineers, and white collar workers. This position makes them effective agents of social change. (147:1132) Leonard Binder believes that the military officer is part of a new middle class because, "In 1882 the native military officer group was the only one directly blocked from advancement within a bureaucratic framework by a foreign element. By 1952 nearly all the educated middle class found itself in a similar situation..." (121:421) Amos Perlmutter feels that the so-called new middle class is only an extension of the old bourgeoisie. "Thus the theory of a new middle class does not explain social change. At best, it can only explain

patterns of conflict over political power within the strata of the middle class." He also feels that there is no cohesion in this class because social status fragments the civilian and military sectors, and sets them against each other. (129:100)

In summary, the argument seems to center around motive rather than origin. The question is not whether army officers come from the same rural, middle class backgrounds that many other professionals come from. It is rather whether the military elite represents the middle class or uses it for political capital. Be'eri's analysis of the social origins and family background of 87 officers killed in the Palestine War in 1948 proves that most officers come from rural middle class backgrounds. (149:113) Be'eri states that, "Although the average general is not affected by the fact that his father was a carpenter to the same extent that a lawyer would be, the effect is still there; and the effect on the captain is greater than on the general." (118:294)

Since the social strata from which the officer corps is drawn also produces most of the professional men like lawyers and doctors, the army officers consider themselves intelligencia in uniform. However, they are the products of a narrow, fundamental Islamic education and also receive a rather narrow education at the academy. Thus, although shrewd, they tend to be anti-intellectual and anti-western. (149:58) There are few liberals and most favor social reforms but have been accused of being indifferent to the values of individual freedom." (118:360)

The basic motivation for these men to go into the army is of course as a vehicle for advancement. Many young officers think of their military careers as good training for high administrative posts in government and private enterprise. (120:395) There is a tendency toward early retirement to avoid low pensions by going into industry, and there is even a high-ranking officer in the Public Relations Bureau who finds jobs for retiring officers. (121:422) As Hans Daalder has noted, "The skills learned within the military may be applied to civilian pursuits. After the officers and men leave the service, the rational basis of military organization has a spillover effect upon organizational patterns throughout the society." (122:1133) Their dominance in the civilian sector has been well documented. During the eight Nasir cabinets, the percentage of officers fluctuated between 45% and 32%. From 1952 to 1967 only one civilian held one of the top four government posts. (149:112) In 1964, 43 out of 73 ambassadors were still former officers. (149:116) Welch and Smith estimate that after the 1967 war 65% of the leadership posts were held by officers. (155:200) In 1967 all ten men at the top were officers. (123:23) Since Sadat took office, the political departments like Defense, National Guidance, and the Foreign Office have been dominated by officers, while the more functional offices of Finance and Economics have been left to other elites.

In the final analysis, it appears that the public has come to accept the military regime for several reasons. First, the Middle East has had a tradition of military regimes because of the Islamic tradition of military conquest. (131:251) Secondly, military officers have always played an important role in Egyptian politics with the exception of the period of British control. (155:185) Thirdly, the public has witnessed the breakdown in parliamentary systems, and the army has proven itself to be a good organizer. (153:243) Monroe Berger has stated, "Whatever the regime's political motives may be in placing dozens of officers in high posts, their performance of these civilian functions has not been militaristic or unresponsive to non-military requirements." (119:21)

However, the army's rationale for control may be disappearing. At first the rise of the officer class was accompanied by the advancement of technocrats and technology. As the army modernized, it forced the society to do likewise. It was able to lead the way because of its technological expertise and ties with the west. The Egyptian army was the first to send its officers to Europe, the first to introduce European dress, and the first organization in Egypt to introduce compulsory education. However, with the modernization of the 20th century, there are many other groups whose education is equal to or superior to that of the officer class. Thus the officers have lost one of their rationalizations for leadership. The army now must claim leadership with regard to power alone. (118:359)

IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

A review of the history of the military is especially important in the case of Egypt. As the operational code will show, Egyptian military leaders depend on lessons learned for their source of knowledge, perhaps more than most other elites. The fact that history never repeats itself is not relevant here. The military elite believes that it does, and their interpretation of specific events influences their decision-making processes immensely. The historical discussion also forms a structure for evaluating changes in the operational code. The period from 1955 to 1961 was marked by the consolidation of the military regime's power and its rise to leadership in the Arab world. However, in 1961 several events occurred which began to erode the military's confidence and power. By 1967 the military was aggressively seeking to reassert itself. The 1967 defeat marked the military's low ebb, and the 1967 to 1973 period was characterized by the military's frantic efforts to regain its lost honor. The 1973 war accomplished this and the 1973 to 1975 period was characterized by a secure and powerful military. Since each one of these periods was a different experience for the military, the operational code is constructed so as to note changes between periods.

B. EGYPT BEFORE NASIR

A logical starting point for a historical analysis of the Egyptian military is Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. This event is of major historical interest to the Arabs because, in their view, the invasion jogged their historical memory and set the Arab world on a new course toward modernization. Its importance to the Egyptian military lies in the fact that it brought to Egypt Muhammed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, and with him a foreign elite that would rule Egypt until the 1952 revolution. Morroe Berger has stated, "Indeed, Egypt since Napoleon provides a good example of the introduction of social change under the impetus of military considerations designed to increase the nation's power in the international arena." (120:370) Muhammed Ali also began the cycle which would lead to a land-holding elite, foreign control of the military, and the ultimate politization of the army. Ali centralized control in his own hands in both the bureaucracy and the army, and his army became one of the strongest in the Middle East. However, it was a mercenary army led by Turks, Circassians, and Georgians. He preferred this to taking the stolid fellahin out of the fields where he was producing for the dynasty. (149:30) Although a few fellahin were admitted as officers, they seldom, if ever, achieved high rank. The first revolt against this foreign domination was the Arabi uprising in 1879. It was the last large-scale uprising before the British occupation and, although its

chief cause was officer discontent with low rank, it became

a spearhead for an overall reaction against foreign influence.

During the first half of this century, Egypt was under

British domination. The activities of the Egyptian army

during the occupation can be summed up in the fact that it

did not fire a shot in anger between 1899 and 1945, with

the exception of skirmishes with smugglers. During this

period the movement for independence took two forms. The

first was the Wafd party, formed in 1919 from a coalition

of groups devoted to westernization and de-Islamization.

It was Egypt's first mass party. However the Wafd was soon

enveloped in oligarchic politics, and by the end of World

War II had been coopted by the monarchy. It had become the

status quo party.

The second movement, and the one which served as a

vehicle for the future free officers, was the anti-western

Islamic revival spearheaded by the Muslim Brethren. It

found its supporters in the disaffected lower middle class,

both urban and rural, civilian and military. The Muslim

Brethren influence on the military was increased immeasurably

by the decision of the monarchy to admit men from the lower

class families to the military academy in 1936. The men

who entered the academy under this new policy were men like

Gamal Abdul Nasir, the son of a postal official. He, Sadat,

Abdel Hakin Amer, and others were not only from the same

middle class background, but had been politically active

as early as high school. (118:44)

These young officers who graduated in 1938 were galled by the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil and the preferential treatment given to non-Egyptians in the army. This dissatisfaction manifested itself in support for the Germans in World War II. Anwar Sadat was among the boldest officers hoping for a German victory. He was also one of the most loyal to the Muslim Brethren. (149:46) However, this was not typical. Both the Muslim Brethren and another anti-foreign group, Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) were competing for influence in the army. The Society of Free Officers formed in 1948 contained that group of officers who did not care to ally with either faction. These Free Officers were indeed fortunate in that their motivation for status and nationalism happened to coincide with that of the rising new social and economic class in civilian society. (153:218)

The Palestine War of 1948 was the catalyst which set in motion the forces which would lead to the overthrow of the regime. The Egyptian General Command had opposed participation in the war, but as Heikal stated in his Political Memoirs, "The resort to war to distract attention from internal difficulties is a common policy frequenty used by dictatorial states in modern and ancient history." (132:5) Indeed the monarchy insisted on absolute rule since World War II and the continually worsening economy had produced extremist political religious groups, increased terrorism, and a feeling among Egyptians that the only answer was revolution.

This reappraisal by Egyptians was only accentuated by the loss of Palestine. The loss was explained by the young officers as an inevitable outcome of social grievance; not as a cause but rather as an effect, and the beaten soldiers returned from the front not as culprits, but as victims of the excesses of the monarchy. (118:53)

C. THE 1952 COUP

The young officers returned from Palestine with an increased political awareness of civilian interference in the affairs of the military. A movement within the officer corps was now a necessity. Egypt at the time was experiencing increased pressure due to social mobilization. One fourth of the population lived in cities of over 20,000 in 1937. One third fit this category at the time of the revolution, and by 1966 two fifths lived in cities. (155:190) This was the new middle class. It lacked jobs, a standard of living, or a political voice. Peace had been maintained for centuries by an Islamic code which called for obedience to a political structure sanctioned by God. The new middle class lacked these traditional values and became a perfect vehicle for the military.

The date for the establishment of the Free Officers movement varies, but it is certain that it became active after the Palestine war. At the time of the coup, there were approximately 250 members of the Free Officers movement with a tight nucleus of ten to fifteen. (118:92) As mentioned before, the movement kept itself separate from

civilian groups and was one of the few to come to power
without the aid of the civilian sector.

The event which triggered the revolution was the offi-
cers club election of 1951. King Farouk supported a man
for the head of the officers club who had been cashiered
for corruption but later reinstated as Chief of Staff. The
officers' candidate was General Mohammed Naguib, a hero of
the Palestine war and respected officer. When he was elected,
King Farouk dismissed the officers club executive committee
and formed a new cabinet with his brother as Minister of
War. At the same time riots were taking place in the canal
zone over the refusal of the British to evacuate the canal
zone. The Free Officers decided to act.

The officers who took action were middle grade officers
with an average age of 33. The executive committee consisted
of ten majors, two lieutenant colonels, and two captains,
with General Naguib being brought in at the end as titular
head. All had graduated from the military college around
1938. Five were graduated from the Staff College in 1950.
As an indicator of their capabilities, one thousand officers
had been found suitable for the Staff College for this class.
Twenty six were picked. (118:85)

A quick and easy coup took place on 22 July 1952, and
a Revolutionary Command Council was formed from the execu-
tive committee of the Free Officers movement. They took
control with specific grievances against the throne, but
only general attitudes about political affairs. Nasir,

unlike leaders of coups in Iraq and Syria, enjoyed the confidence of his co-conspirators and thus was able to hold them together and develop a political ideology later. Binder states that this group's sole claim to authority was the fact that they, among all the disaffected groups, had taken the initiative. (121:421)

On 18 June 1953, the RCC dissolved the monarchy and declared Egypt a republic. All of the members donned civilian garb with the exception of Abdel Hakin Amer, who was designated Commander-in-Chief of the army. Since that time the military has had the following general chacteristics:

1. Distrust of civilians. In a series of moves after the revolution, Nasir viciously broke the unions and attempted to establish a single government-controlled organization. Nasir's regime was characterized as a series of efforts to create wide public support by a single political party controlled at the top. In 1953 he established the Liberation Rally, in 1957 the National Union, and in 1961 the present day Arab Socialist Union. All have failed to gain support even though the ASU has become more powerful under Sadat.

2. A desire to use the military as a model for society. After the revolution, Nasir realized that he had a good instrument for solving Egypt's economic problems. This was the mammoth Egyptian Civil Service. However, he did not trust it to civilian rule. A military man was put at each level of the civil service, and the percentage of posts occupied by military men has remained at about 40% ever

since. (155:200) The military propensity for smooth coordination, motivation and instruction from the top, and consensus by command has eliminated political conflict and political power at the lower levels. In addition, the flow of communications is in one direction, from top to bottom.

3. An uncertain approach to economic reform. For the first four years, economic activity continued as it had before the revolution. However, in 1956 the government turned to a more socialistic economy. Banks were nationalized, maximum land holding size was reduced, and by 1965 the payroll for government employees had doubled. (155:211) However, President Sadat has reversed this trend and has eased the government's control of business. At this time Egyptian society is moving toward a more equal capitalist-socialist mix. This has given credence to the criticism that the military never had a real cause, but simply seized the opportunity to take power and cement their position at the top of society. Nasir said in a speech in 1960, "We reached our ideologies as a natural outcome of our experience."
(118:374)

4. Both Nasir and Sadat have made great use of their charisma. As Dekmejian has stated, "The regime lacked the ideology, inclination, and energy to shape the behavior of every lowly Egyptian, although it tried to influence large segments of the Egyptian people." (123:159) Nasir did this by routinizing and institutionalizing charisma. His phenomenal success in foreign policy and his ability to avoid becoming

the vassal of either superpower made him a leader of pan-Arabism without rival. Although many of Sadat's policies have been unpopular in some quarters, he also remains the leader of pan-Arabism.

After the revolution all officers of colonel or above rank were ousted except General Mohammad Ibriham and General Naguib. The vacant posts were not necessarily filled by free officers, but by officers loyal to the movement. According to Abd Al-Latif Baghdadi, an RCC member, decisions during this period were made by himself, Nasir, Amer, Zacharia Mohieden, Kamal Ad-Din Husayn, and Husayn Shafai. (154:101) This group set out to indoctrinate the army middle and junior ranks with a distinctive Nasirite ideology. The basic difference between these Nasirites and the Muslim Brethren, who were accelerating their attempts to convert the officer corps, was the secular versus religious orientation. Both stressed nationalism, but the Nasirites saw it as an economic duty while the Muslim Brethren saw it as an obligation of the Koran. In addition, the Muslim Brethren are violently anti-western, while the Nasirites emulate western organiza-tion and technology, even if they are philosophically anti-western.

Two themes dominated the early years. The first was the attempt by the RCC to convince the people that the army was the army of the people. Members of the RCC fanned out across the country, usually into their home districts, to convince the people that they represented them. The

second theme was the struggle with the Muslim Brethren.
The struggle centered around General Naguib's desire to
return to constitutional and parliamentary rule. When
Naguib was dismissed in February 1954, officers who followed
the Muslim Brethren protested. Although Naguib was brought
back temporarily, he was soon dismissed again. Now it was
open warfare between the Free Officers and the MB. An MB
laborer tried to assassinate Nasir on 26 October, 1954.
Nineteen MB leaders were put to death, and the MB were
outlawed.

D. 1955-1961

During this period the military cemented its authority
and enjoyed a period of unity and power that they would not
see again. General Amer's speech on the third anniversary
of the revolution indicated the objectives for the military:

1. A new generation of scientists and technicians.

2. Motorized divisions emphasizing maneuverability.

3. Home production of arms.

4. Training men to handle modern arms.

5. Army officers studying in Europe.

6. Emphasis on gigantic maneuvers.

7. Making life pleasant for conscripts. (1:1-10)

This last is of particular interest because Field
Marshal Amer's concern for the well being of his troops was
to make him immensely popular in the following years, and
indeed his power almost rivaled that of Nasir in the early

1960's. He operated throughout this period as an almost

independent entity and had exclusive jurisdiction over the

armed forces. Marshal Amer was a traditionalist and devout

muslim, the son of a prominent village notable. He dis-

couraged deviant behavior among the officers, but liked

them and often presented their case to Nasir. (149:179)

As Moore put it, "In discussing Nasir's removal of power

centers, the one possible exception was the army, ruled

independently by his close friend ar Vice President

Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer." (145:196)

As far as the military's position was concerned, "In

declaring itself against politics, i.e. against the exis-

tence of political groups in society which at least pur-

ported an alternative to power, the military regime had, by

1956, preempted all political activity in Egypt." (107:83)

The military had decided after the attempted assassination

by the MB in 1954 to isolate the Ulema, or religous hierarchy,

and had thusly eliminated them as opposition. The only

leftist free officer in power who might advance that cause

was Khalid Muhi al-Din. After his participation in the

1954 coup attempt, he fell from power and has not been in

the inner circle since. (107:185) With no representation,

the leftist cause was quickly suppressed.

On the international scene, Nasir advanced the theory

of positive neutrality. This was his vehicle to rid Egypt

of European influence. Nasir's emergence on the international

scene is well documented. In 1955 he agreed to buy arms from

Czechoslovakia and later admitted that he was really dealing
with the Russians. The following year Nasir asked the United
States for aid in building the Aswan Dam. After initially
agreeing to the request, the United States abruptly withdrew
its offer. In retaliation, Nasir nationalized the Suez
Canal. On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai with
assurances that France and Britain would follow in four
days. (125:713) Aware that French aircraft were already
participating in the war and that British troops were massing
on Cyprus, Nasir ordered his army to take up defensive posi-
tions west of the canal. The air raids on Port Said caused
international furor, and pressure from the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
eventually forced the Israelis, British, and French to with-
draw. Politically, Nasir emerged from the Suez crisis
stronger than ever. However, militarily, it was a smashing
defeat. A large part of the arms recently acquired from the
Soviets were destroyed, and the western world was blanketed
with accounts of the speed and ease with which the Egyptian
army was defeated. (125:714) The fact that the Egyptian
army had pulled back in anticipation of a combined French
and British invasion was overlooked. The Suez War was the
second blow to the prestige of the military. However, it
paled in comparison to the 1967 war and did not significantly
affect the military's position.

During this period the military was also undergoing
changes. Nasir was intent on making the military non-
political and continued to promote young, professional,

non-political officers. As Perlmutter says, "Divisional commanders were clearly non-political, professional officers." (149:143)

Within the Free Officers movement all of the leftists had been eliminated by 1956. Anwar Sadat and Hasan Ibrihim were relegated to secondary functions but would return to power later. All that remained in the inner circle were devout muslims junior in age to Nasir. (118:120)

One event in the closing years of this period led to friction between Nasir and his officers. In 1958 the United Arab Republic was founded with Syria, with the full coopera- tion of the Syrian Baathists, who feared a communist take- over. When a coup in 1961 in Syria dissolved the UAR, many officers, some very close to Amer, were highly vocal in their criticsm of Nasir's heavy-handed approach and many were arrested.

E. 1961-67

Although the reputation of the military was beginning to erode as the Yemeni war wore on, those officers who stayed in uniform did not have a bad time. Most received training at an Institute of Higher Studies of National Defense. A new rank of Army General was created, thus permitting more generals. Along with this top-heavy trend, staff officers continued to receive greater and greater weight in decision making. This would be a significant factor in the 1967 war. (109:xxviii) In addition, the Free

Officers kept control at the top to prevent the kind of coup that occurred in 1952. This contributed to a general lack of organization and communication. (130:121)

Outside of the army, events in the Arab world were heading toward a climax. Nasir had advocated a long term struggle with Israel and likened it to the struggle against the crusaders. During the Yemeni war he vehemently opposed a war with Israel because of troop commitments. However, Nasir was being pressured from all sides. Professor John Amos has chronicled some of the reasons for Nasir's decision to press the Israelis.

1. Nasir's economic projects had failed and the middle class was discontent.

2. Nasir had lost his image as the leader of the Arab world because of his refusal to come to the aid of Syria in the 1966 war.

3. Nasir and King Faysal were locked in a titanic battle for leadership. Faysal thought that Nasir was trying to use Yemen as a springboard for the invasion of the Arabian peninsula.

4. Nasir was becoming increasingly suspicious of the U.S. and suspected a U.S. (Israeli), Saudi plot. (108:56)

Into the breach stepped General Amer and the military. The military at the time was suffering from the same malady that would plague them until 1973. The army had performed poorly in 1948, 1956, and in Yemen. Amer, some say with the backing of Sadat, felt that a well-armoured Egyptian army

could at least hold the Israelis for two weeks and, if the war were not a clear victory, at least it would be a major achievement. In addition, General Amer and Air Force General Fawzi were able to convince Nasir that Egyptian rockets could destroy Israeli air attacks and that Egypt should strike while the Israelis were not mobilized. Low key maneuvers by the Israelis indicated to Nasir that the Israelis did not want to fight and that a political victory was possible. As is well known, Nasir closed the Gulf of Aqaba, stationed troops around the Straits of Tiran, and requested that the U.N. peace-keeping force be removed. Israel attacked on 6 June 1967. The Egyptian army lost 80% of its equipment and about 17,000 killed or wounded. (108:91) Although Egyptian units fought well in static situations, commanders were unable to improvise. The Egyptian High Command panicked and ordered retreat over the objections of its own planning staff. (108:92)

In the field the Egyptian army lacked leadership. The men did not trust their officers and inter-Arab cooperation was non existent. Heikal claims that Amer's order to withdraw meant that 80% of the Egyptian army never engaged the enemy. (133:181) This defeat, and the purge of the military afterward, set the tone for the third period under consideration.

F. 1967-73

The shift in the thinking of the military after 1967 is evident in their operational code. The events of the period

indicate that a shift in the code was almost inevitable.
The period between 1967 and 1971 was a struggle for power
between the Nasirist bureaucracy, the military, and the
technocrats led by Ali Sabri. (149:160) The military was at
a disadvantage during this struggle for obvious reasons.
The 1967 war separated the military from the political
leadership. The military felt betrayed. They felt that
Nasir should have pre-empted Israel in the middle of May,
instead of waiting for Israel to attack. In addition,
Nasir had first accepted full blame for the war, then
retracted his statement fifteen hours later and demanded
the resignation of 30 senior officers. Thus began a purge
of some 300 officers. Many of the officers purged were Air
Force, possibly due to the fact that close to 120 Egyptian
planes were shot down, compared to 30 Israeli planes. (149:84)
However, a more significant point is that all of the officers
who were purged in 1967 were political activists. (149:192)
Nasir's reasons for the purge are not clear. Be'eri states
that, "The top commanders of the Egyptian army were not
better or worse than the other leaders of the country; they
were not more or less efficient than their subordinates and
not more or less corrupt than the ideologists or the propa-
gandists. But they were made the scapegoats for the disaster."
(118:127) It is Be'eri's contention that a small part of
the officer corps was sacrificed to save the ruling class
and that the subsequent buildup by the Soviets enhanced the
prestige of the army. On the other hand, Perlmutter states

that, "On the whole, Nasir was not harsh enough with the army." (149:191) Be that as it may, Marshal Amer, Minister of War Badran, and six of the seven full generals resigned. General Muhammad Fawzi became Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Shortly after Marshal Amer resigned, he was accused of conspiring with members of the intelligence corps to overthrow the government. The man who had led the Egyptian army for so long was requested to commit suicide and apparently complied on 15 September 1967. Amer had been the army's protector within the ruling elite and an almost autonomous power since 1961. His death and the general humiliation of the war marked the low point in Egyptian military history. As the operational code will indicate, the armed forces as a whole became fanatical in their determination to retrieve their honor, even to the point of totally subjugating them-selves to a corps of Soviet advisors. In fact, George Haddad has stated, "A further cause for the purging of the officers was the alleged Soviet intervention to remove the military bourgeoisie and the anti-socialist commanders." (130:124) This did not endear the top military officers to the Russians. Many officers were so disgruntled at the apparent Soviet intervention and the long prison sentences given to the Air Commander (15 years) and the Vice Air Marshal (10 years) that they stopped wearing uniforms in the streets.

To the general populace, the 1967 war was styled al-nahsa, the set back, and was blamed on U.S. intervention.

However, the 1967 war, like Vietnam, was a media war and the sense of loss was much greater to Arabs everywhere because of the media coverage. Much of the rath of the public was aimed at the military. The public's rage was fueled by Mohammad Heikal, editor of Al-Ahram, who repeatedly attacked all levels of command. He attacked the higher echelons for lack of nerve and accused many officers of being promoted for non-professional reasons. He stated that:

1. Many officers had been in the same post for up to fifteen years, which led to bureaucratic inflexibility.

2. Highly qualified officers were taken out of the military and used in administrative posts as mayors of small towns, etc.

3. Officers cared only for pay and promotions.

4. Relationships between officers and men were couched in mutual distrust. (108:115)

On a more pragmatic level, General Riad, who became Commander-in-Chief in 1968, stated that the loss was due to:

1. Loss of air superiority.

2. Lack of organizational control and coordination.

3. Loss of communications. (108:115)

It was these shortcomings that the military set out to correct.

One of Nasir's first steps was to reorganize the army. By 1969 the Egyptian Air Force had been reorganized three

times, even though the Israeli Air Force Commander, General Hod, had stated that the Air Force command had done everything it could under the circumstances in 1957. (108:113) One of Nasir's most important decisions, however, was to triple the size of the standing forces and to recruit as many college students as possible. The goal was to upgrade combat efficiency by raising the educational level. Heikal reports that of the 800,000 Egyptians under arms in 1973, 110,000 were university graduates. (133:35) Nasir had given the order that any tank commander or officer responsible for electronic equipment must be a graduate of either an engineering or technical school. This decision was to increase the size of the armed forces and put a tremendous stain on the economy. The decision to increase the number of college students in the military produced an officer corps dissatisfied with the government's policies. As a result, two conspiracies to kill Nasir were reported between May and June of 1968. Both were said to be organized by officers with civilian help.

Another factor which significantly affected the attitudes of the military during this period was the continued influx of Russians. According to Heikal, the seeds of discontent had been growing since the 1955 Czech arms deal because:

1. The weapons that the Russians sent were unfamiliar.

2. Instruction manuals were in Russian.

3. Egyptians did not think that Russian equipment worked well.

4. The generals who were sent to the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1967 like Riad, Ismail, Fawzi, Mortaga, and Sadiq were already graduates of western military academies and disliked going back to the classroom and having instructors younger than themselves teaching them.

5. Instruction was through interpreters, and even when Egyptian officers spoke Russian well enough to dispense with interpreters, they were not allowed to attend some briefings.

6. Russian party literature attacked Egyptian officers for being bourgeois and lacking the background for a successful struggle. (133:180)

Nasir did not help matters by ordering that advice from Soviet experts was binding. This especially galled the Egyptians, who felt that they were better qualified by virtue of combat experience. The quality of the advisors, especially in the Air Force, was another problem. It was suspected that the Russians were using Egypt as an all weather training base for young pilots. Soviet military advisors were openly contemptuous of Egyptian pilots and refused to recommend supplying them with the most recent arms. To make matters worse, Soviet advisors took increasing control in selection and promotion of officers. (130:139) They also had the irritating habit of pumping Egyptian officers for political opinions — not a popular approach for an army whose strength and cohesiveness lay in its ability to avoid splitting itself politically.

Nasir, realizing that his army was unpopular with the
people and in turn the army was becoming increasingly dis-
satisfied with the Russians, decided that the best way to
avoid a coup and raise morale was to continue the war.
Backed by military leaders, Nasir engaged in a war of
attrition from 1968 to 1970. The war was designed to:
1) let Egyptian troops fight set piece battles backed up
by numerically superior artillery, 2) create the impression
that the 1967 war was not over, 3) try to head off the
proponents of unconventional warfare who were challenging
Egypt for leadership, namely the Palestinians. (108:126)
Unfortunately, the war of attrition ended disastrously with
a ceasefire sponsored by Secretary of State Rogers in August
1970. The military, who had originally backed the plan,
became disenchanted with the "no peace, no war" situation.
In addition, the Israeli air raids convinced Nasir to hand
over complete responsibility for air defense to the Russians
in 1970. However, in September 1970, the fortunes of the
military began to change. In that month President Nasir,
who had controlled his military to some degree for 15 years,
died. The main contenders for rule were: 1) Anwar Sadat,
who had not served in any capacity of real responsibility
during Nasir's reign, but who was a good speaker, a devout
muslim, and the apologist for the revolution; 2) Ali Sabri,
Nasir's liaison with the Soviets and the spokesman for the
Arab Socialist Union; 3) Zakhariyya Muhi al-Din, a moderate
who had been named by Nasir as his successor. (130:158)

Oddly enough the leftist, feeling that they did not have the power to take complete control, moved to put Sadat's name in nomination, thinking that he could be easily swayed. One of those who helped to elect Sadat was General Muhammad Fawzi, a non-political professional and strict disciplinarian who had succeeded General Riad as Minister of War after General Riad's death in 1969.

By 1971 the leftists had become disenchanted with their inability to control Sadat. A group headed by Ali Sabri, head of the ASU, Shara Gum'a, head of the secret police, and Sami Sharif, Nasir's former intelligence aid, moved to oust Sadat. They received the support of General Fawzi, probably only because Fawzi had family ties with Sami Sharif. The plan was for General Fawzi and key military personnel to affect the coup. Sabri and his group would then consolidate power. (149:194) Early in 1971 the leftist newspaper Taliah began to make anti-Sadat statements. When Sadat's plan to unite Egypt with Lybia and the Sudan was voted down by the Sabri-led ASU, Sadat knew that a coup was in progress. He turned to two professional military men for support — Chief of Staff Muhammad Sadiq and General Sa'd Shazli, a hero of the 1967 war. He also received the support of 100 officers ousted by Nasir in 1967. (149:193) The Sabri group was crushed and with it the radical elements who had been gaining influence since 1967. General Fawzi was dismissed and General Sadiq was appointed Minister of Defense. General Shazli became army Chief of Staff and General Ismail Ali was called out of retirement to become Chief of Intelligence.

After consolidating power, Sadat was confronted with
the same problem which Nasir had dealt with since 1952, a
disgruntled military. There were two factors during the
1972-73 period which disturbed the military. The first was
the reluctance of the Russians to provide arms and the
growing influence of Russian advisors. The center of this
controversy was the Minister of War and Commander in Chief,
General Sadiq. After taking over in 1971, General Sadiq
began to lobby persistently for a decrease in Russian influ-
ence. Russians continually tried to woo Sadiq because of
his obvious popularity among the armed forces and the popu-
larity of his anti-Soviet stand. (130:171) In addition,
Sadiq was popular with both junior and senior officers for
his efforts in raising their salaries. (108:148) However,
Sadiq's beliefs were becoming increasingly bothersome to
President Sadat. General Sadiq was in favor of total war
and thus made large demands on the Russians for weapons.
This only highlighted the Russians' reticence in supplying
arms. The final straw came in October 1972 when Sadiq refused
to mount an offensive against the Israelies without more
sophisticated weapons. (108:149) After heated discussion,
Sadiq, along with the Deputy Minister of War, Commander of
the Navy, and Commander of the Central Military Area were
dismissed. General Ismail Ali was elevated to Minister of
War. (130:183) This sent tremors throughout the armed
forces. Throughout 1972 rumors of mutiny circulated.

Part of the problem was the second devisive factor within the military. In keeping with Nasir's policy of upgrading the educational level of the armed forces, 70,000 students had now been inducted. Thus, civilian politics were introduced. The younger officers were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their career status. (108:148) Sadiq had sided with these elements, and his dismissal infuriated them.

With the dismissal of Sadiq, pressure for action from within the military began to come from Chief of Staff Shazli. Because of this pressure and continuing joblessness and student riots, Sadat feared a coup at any time. As an example of the turmoil, General Ismail was reported by An-Nahar in October 1973 to have tendered his resignation because of pressure from within the military to attack immediately. (108:151) Actually the dispute was a personal disagreement between Ismail and Shazli. General Ismail had been picked as Minister of War because of his lack of politics. Shazli on the other hand had achieved his position because of his meticulous approach and quick grasp of detail. The two men did not like each other at all. (130:185)

Beneath the surface, plans for another assault were continuing. The first training exercise for a canal crossing had been held in 1967 under the name Liberation I. President Sadat was working on four necessary conditions for the defeat of Israel:

1. A coalition of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

2. A coalition of oil-producing states to support them.

3. Diplomatic isolation of Israel and reduction of Israeli propaganda.

4. Neutralization of Palestine opposition to all-out war. (108:162)

This last condition also applied to Sadat's own forces. One of the reasons for Sadiq's dismissal was his insistence on an all-out effort with sophisticated weapons. His replacement, General Ismail, worked long and hard to convince his army that the man, not the weapon, was the most critical factor, and that there were advantages to a limited war. (108:209)

The chief architect of the canal crossing was General Shazli, a charismatic leader in the Patton tradition. His preparations for what came to be called Operation Badr, and the constant drills that he put his troops through between 1971 and 1973, were probably the reason that the crossing was such a success. In addition, Sadat's removal of Sadiq eliminated the major opponents to the hawks led by Shazli.

Egyptian planning for the 1973 war involved farsight unheard of before:

1. An enormous logistics network with extensive communications was constructed, replete with secret fuel depots.

2. The main Egyptian force was to be kept under the protection of the air defense.

3. The air force was to be used in the ground support
role.

4. A comprehensive propaganda campaign was launched to
convince both Egyptians and westerners that Egypt's goals
were limited to recovering lost territory.

5. Egyptian forces for the first time fought for clearly
defined national, strategic, and tactical objectives.

6. Arab leadership was vastly improved. Many high-ranking
officers had been cashiered and officers of proven ability
put in their places. The gap between officers and men had
been narrowed.

7. In the period between the wars, a cadre of young
professionals had been developed who could respond to
Shazli's leadership.

8. Arab familiarization with arms and logistics had
vastly improved. (108:281)

As October 1973 approached, events were coming to a head.
The Russians were still slow to provide weapons because of
the fear that more weapons would convince the Egyptians to
open the Suez front. On the other hand, President Sadat
felt that the other Arab governments were not going to
provide more money until they saw some movement. (133:11)
As Sadat contemplated this dilemma, Israel continued to
settle the Sinai, the Syrian-Israeli air war increased in
intensity, and the PLO increased its guerrilla raids. How-
ever, the main impetus was once again the army. An-Nahar
reported on 5 February 1973 the growing hostility of the

army. It was noted that two units along the Suez front had mutinied and that two Egyptian pilots had countermanded orders and fought an aerial battle with Israelis. (110:5) As Professor Amos had noted, "The decision made by Nasir to reorganize and expand the Egyptian army had the latent consequence of building up an organizational momentum. By rebuilding Egyptian military capabilities and at the same time recruiting highly politicized students, Nasir set in motion the forces within the military which put enormous pressure on Sadat to act." (108:321) The fall military exercises, which usually were designed for domestic reasons, produced an input for action. Once the military officer's career had been locked into training for action, an irresistible push was generated.

On 6 October 1973, Russian families were evacuated and tactical missiles moved forward. Much to the surprise of the Egyptians, the Israelis took no action. At 1405 Operation Badr was put into effect. By 1930, 80,000 men had penetrated the Sinai to a depth of three kilometers. The Egyptian command had expected to take up to 26,000 casualties during the crossing, but took only light losses. (133:33) Against the advice of the Russians, who suggested taking the passes, the Egyptian command felt that they should maintain a solid wall on the east bank and let the Israelis beat themselves against it.

In spite of early successes, the tide of battle turned after the first five days. During that period the high

command had decided on a pause to regroup. This gave the
Israelis an opportunity to put pressure on the Syrians.
On 14 October, in response to Syrian pleas, the Egyptian
forces moved out from under their air defense and attacked.
When they did, Israeli anti-tank missiles and aircraft began
to take a heavy toll. On 16 October the Israelis broke
through to the west bank at Bitter Lake and encircled the
third army. At this point a controversy developed which
has still not been solved. General Shazli, according to
Heikal, advocated withdrawing some units to fight the
Israeli bridgehead at Bitter Lake. General Ismail, however,
feared that any withdrawal would precipitate the same kind
of collapse that it did in 1967. Sadat agreed. At this
time Ismail suggested that a ceasefire was in order. On
19 October a ceasefire was arranged for the 22nd. (133:246)

During the war Egyptian discipline and morale had been
high. Even the surrounded third army showed little inclina-
tion to surrender. But why had the war occurred? Why had
the Arabs for the first time initiated the war themselves?
As Patai has concluded, the October war was an exception to
the Arab propensity for substituting words for action. In
this case there were overriding considerations. Arab honor
had been damaged, and an Arab must take revenge for loss of
honor or he is permanently dishonored. (148:x) Heikal put
it in typically Arab terms when he stated, "The war empha-
sized the importance of the historical dimension. Today's
situation is the creation of yesterday." (133:267)

G. 1973-75

The operational code of the Egyptian military changed
after the "victory" of October 1973. However, the change
was not as dramatic as some might think. The victory of
Arab arms certainly gave the Egyptian military confidence.
With their honor restored, the military was more amenable
to negotiation and significantly slackened its pressure on
President Sadat to continue the war. The initial advance
of the Egyptians represented not only the first victory of
Egypt over Israel, but also the first time since the days
of the crusades that Arabs managed to gain the upper hand
in open large-scale armed conflict with a non-muslim, western-
trained and equipped army. (148:ix) It might seem odd that
Egypt, including its military, considers the 1973 war a
victory, when most observers feel that by 19 October the
Israeli forces had taken command of the battlefield. How-
ever, President Sadat summed up the feelings of Egyptians
when he stated, "We have dealt Israel a blow she will never
forget, but now the U.S. is in the war against us. I
cannot order them to continue the war against the U.S."
(111:5) Consequently, the Egyptian people felt that they
had really beaten Israel. As to the results of the victory,
Patai reports, "As a result of the Arab victory, the Arabs
have rid themselves somewhat of the bitterness and self-
criticism that was the pattern from 1967-73. They have not
only become willing to negotiate with Israel, but have begun
to import western equipment to a degree that would have seemed

impossible before the war. It is interesting that Egypt
has been credited with the victory and it is Egypt who has
led the way in negotiations. Those countries that have not
been able to chalk up a victory are opposed to all accommo-
dation." (148:11)

The victory has also had other effects. For some time
after the war, the military felt confident enough to pressure
President Sadat to restore Soviet arms shipments. (108:340)
However, it appears that the perceived inferiority of Russian
equipment and the traditional problems with arms deliveries
have continued to make the military dissatisfied.

After the war there were several changes in military
leadership. General Shazli and the commanders of the second
and third armies were dismissed. All of these officers
had been violently opposed to any negotiations or cease
fire. However, one of the reasons for the removal of Shazli
might have been to remove potential leaders of military
opposition to Sadat. (108:290) In December 1974 General
Ismail Ali died and was replaced by General Abd Al-Gamassy.
Hiekal calls General Gamassy the best equipped intellectually
to lead the Egyptian armed forces. (133:185) An indicator
of his ability, and the trust that President Sadat has for
him, is the fact that Sadat appointed him Chief-of-Staff
after General Shazli was dismissed. In addition, it was
General Gamassy who negotiated the ceasefire at the end of
the 1973 war. (116:574)

However, although the military is somewhat satisfied
since 1973, it still pressures President Sadat to continue
the conflict. An-Nahar reports that during the summer of
1974 a delegation of army officers went to President Sadat
to express their concern for the weak state of the army
resulting from the arms lost in 1973, and to encourage him
to strengthen it in any way possible. It is believed that
this was the chief factor in Sadat's rapprochement with
Russia in 1974. (113:1) However, the army seems to have
a love-hate relationship with the Russians. Although they
know they need Russian arms, they harbor an intense dislike
for the Russian advisors and are disgusted with the problems
in procuring arms. The basic fact, however, is that the
military feels that the war is not over. An-Nahar also
reports that one of the reasons that Sadat wanted a solution
in the Sinai was that the military was insisting that they
could encircle and destroy Israeli units on the west bank
of the Suez. (112:1) As an example, Lt. General Muhammad
Ali Fahmi, Chief-of-Staff of the army, has stated, "Our
armed forces are in a race with time, so they must be in a
position of strength from the standpoint of organization,
training and development." (124:B1) However, even if the
Israeli question is settled, the military will still take
priority. As Patai has stated, "The October war has increased
the conflict between the moderate states led by Egypt and
the radical states headed by Syria, Libya, and the PLO."
(148:xii) Thus, it appears that conflict will reign in the

Middle East, even if the Israeli question is settled. In addition, proof that the military is still the dominant factor in Egyptian society was provided by President Sadat himself when he named General Husni Mubarak, Air Force Commander during the 1973 war, as his First Vice President.

V. METHODOLOGY

A. THE OPERATIONAL CODE METHODOLOGY

1. Leites Contribution

The concept of a construct which will allow an analyst to discover a political actor's belief system was originally developed by Nathan Leites in two works: _The Operational Code of the Politburo_ in 1951 and _A Study of Bolshevism_ in 1953. The first book proceeded on the theory that, "Our awareness of Soviet strength and success has not been matched by a knowledge of the Politburo itself." (141:i) Leites used two types of sources for his code: 1) the actual writings of Lenin and Stalin, and 2) the historical record of Bolshevik reactions to certain situations. Leites' stated intention was "not to discuss the major theories of Leninism-Stalinism, but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct." (141:xi) The book was divided into twenty chapters with tiles such as "Predictability and Unpredictability" and "Resistance to Attack". In _A Study of Bolshevism_, Leites continued this approach, using the writings of Lenin and Stalin and passages from Russian literature. In this second work, he called for a full utilization of the material he used. By full utilization he meant, "The application of procedures now usually called content analysis — roughly speaking, the establishment of

frequencies of occurrence of the beliefs I shall describe."
(142:20)

2. The George Construct

Professor Alexander George's contribution to the
operational code was to critique Leites' efforts and to
organize the code into categories that did not conflict and
overlap and that reflected the questions that a policy
analyst needed to ask.

Professor George's first contribution to the code
was his book Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences
Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II, in 1957. He
found that during World War II the FCC achieved an accuracy
of 81% in predicting Nazi activities by monitoring Nazi
propaganda broadcasts and trying to identify patterns of
reasoning. (126:ix) He determined that, "An action schema
dealing with political decision making would have to take
into consideration the value system of the political elite,
that is, the set of values and value priorities which
determine the objectives which the elite pursue and its
choices of action from among the alternatives open to it.
It would have to take into account what has been referred
to as the operational code." (126:22)

George postulated that two methods of research could
be used to define this operational code. The direct method
involved studying the actions of the actor. The indirect
method involved studying the writings of the elite about
strategy and tactics. (126:51) However, in the final analysis

he concluded, "The operational code, however, cannot be safely used alone to predict or explain the actions of an elite. For one thing, an elite may revise its general view of correct strategy and tactics on the basis of new experiences and a subsequent reevaluation of past events." (126:51)

In his article in the June 1969 International Studies Quarterly, Professor George first discussed the work of Nathan Leites. Although the Leites' work was a combination of the operational code and a socio-psychological account of the historical origins of Bolshevism, George believed that the operational code part could be extracted and that, "These beliefs implicitly or explicitly held by the political actor can be inferred or postualted by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to the political scientist." (127:193) George, like Leites, also believes that, "An elite's fundamental beliefs about politics are probably resistant to change for various reasons, of which unconscious motivations are but one factor." (127:196) In his critique of Leites, George points out that Leites did not identify the order, hierarchy, and interrelationships among the various elements of the code. (127:196) Consequently, George's arrangement of the code into a set of five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs is his primary contribution to the operational code methodology, and the construction used by most researchers in the field.

The basic code as developed by George and his application to Leites' research on the Bolsheviks is presented here for two reasons. First, it presents the code as utilized in this thesis. Second, it gives the reader an elite group's operational code that can be compared to the Egyptian military's code as a frame of reference.

a. Philosophical Beliefs

Philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises the actor makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, and the role of the individual in history. (127:199)

1. <u>What is the essential nature of political life?</u> Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents? The Bolsheviks considered the universe one of conflict; the fundamental question being who will destroy whom. It came from an objective, Marxist view of history.

2. <u>What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations?</u> Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respect? The Bolsheviks' position was optimistic due to the ideological premise of the triumph of communism.

3. <u>Is the political future predictable?</u> In what sense and to what extent? The Bolsheviks are of course determinant because of their Marxist view of history.

However, the indeterminant view dominated in many cases because the rate of historical development was considered uncertain. This produces a behavior of intelligent, well-calculated action.

    4. <u>How much control or mastery can one have over historical development?</u> What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction? The Bolshevik view was that dedicated, intelligent, and disciplined actors could determine social change within fairly wide limits. Thus the party should seize any opportunity.

    5. <u>What is the role of change in human affairs and in historical development?</u> The Bolsheviks felt that there is no chance in human affairs due to the Marxist-Leninist explanation of history. A corollary to this is that it is not only not possible to muddle through, but dangerous to do so. Thus, there is only one correct line of policy.

    b. Instrumental Beliefs

    These are beliefs about the strategy and tactics that should be employed in advancing one's interests.

    1. <u>What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</u> The Bolsheviks felt that one should not set objectives by first calculating the probability of achieving the goal or by limiting the objectives to what can probably be attained with the means at one's disposal. Rather, one should counter the tendency to be conservative and try to optimize or maximize gains as opposed to a satisficing strategy.

2. **How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?** The Bolsheviks' answer to this question was to push to the limit, engage in pursuit once the enemy is weakened, and know when to stop.

3. **How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?** The Bolshevik attitude is that one can strive to achieve major objectives, such as the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, but risks must be minimized by minimizing means.

4. **What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?** The Soviets felt that they must be able to bide their time, but they also must not let any opportunity pass.

5. **What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?** Among other views, the Bolsheviks feel that to be rude to the enemy might heighten his estimate of Soviet strength and weaken mass support for his policies.

c. Summary

In assessing the Bolshevik code, Professor George concludes that there would be some resistance to change because of: 1) Personal rigidities; 2) A tendency to view problems in terms of interpretation of past history, and also in terms of decisions that the elite has made before. (127:220)

In later research proposals with Professor O.R. Holsti, Professor George refined the code and called for

further research. In the earlier article he had postulated three constraints on the rational decision maker: 1) The political actor's information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; 2) His knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the consequences of a course of action; 3) It is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is best. (127:197) However, in assessing the uses of the operational code, Professor George believes that the code affects certain tasks that precede a decision, namely diagnosis, search, analysis, and prescription. (128:47) Thus, the code beliefs are one of the intervening clusters of variables that constrain decision making. He also believes that the code has added importance in certain types of situations: 1) Non-routine situations like wars, alliances, etc.; 2) Decisions made by top leaders affected less by organizational processes; 3) Long-range policy planning in which uncertainty of the future brings out differences among policy makers; 4) Ambiguous situations due to little information and open to a variety of interpretations; 5) Circumstances of information overload where a considerable amount of filtering is needed; 6) Unanticipated events where the initial reaction might depend on a belief system; 7) Situations of stress in which normal cognitive processes are impaired, such as frustration or aggression. (128:17)

3. Other Research

Although the use of the operational code has been limited until recent years, there have been approximately 17 to date. The subjects include Mao-Tse-Tung, Lester Pearson, Richard M. Nixon, Senator Frank Church, and J. William Fullbright. These studies have tested the utility of the code and made further suggestions. In his code of J. William Fullbright, Dr. Kurt Tweraser found that, "The fact that beliefs and premises are not articulated in a systematic fashion does not necessarily mean that they are non-existent. But it does mean that considerable inferential leaps are necessary to bring them into the open." (152:2) Dr. Tweraser took a qualitative approach to his research because of the problem of imperfect data. His presentation consisted of a running narrative describing the code interspersed with historical background. In defense of his technique he states, "It should not be forgotten that decision makers themselves tend to deal with these variables in qualitative and sometimes incredibly imprecise terms, and the greater precision introduced by the analyst through quantitative techniques may not necessarily result in greater predictive power." (152:38)

In his operational code of Senator Frank Church, Dr. Lock Johnson also used a qualitative approach. He felt that construction of the code required knowledge of events during Senator Church's life such as the changing nature

of the cold war, Vietnam, etc. Dr. Johnson also found that
Senator Church's code changed as a result of Vietnam. He
then used the code as a dependent variable influencing
subsequent behavior. Dr. Johnson concluded , "The researcher
will still be unable to predict with confidence the precise
behavior of the subject in any specific circumstances, but
he will have an idea of the probable range of choices
acceptable to the subject in a decision situation." (138:2)
Dr. Johnson felt that the dimensions of the code form a
continuum and that the code will be dynamic. He felt that
beliefs will expand and contract in response to the psycho-
logical and situational pressures. (138:7) One of Dr.
Johnson's more important findings was the importance of
the situation preceding a decision. He stated, "...that
the point in time just before the occurrance of a political
act can provide a rich source of data for explaining the
actual behavior." (138:4)

In his research on former Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, Dr. G.G. Gutierrez found that, "It is not enough to
know about the attitudes and perceptions of decision makers
and publics. In fact, such data may be misleading, if they
are not informed by an analysis of the systematic processes
out of which these attitudes and perceptions arise and
within which they function." (129:8)

4. Advantages of the Operational Code Methodology

In light of the research to date, the advantages of
using the operational code are:

1. The questions in the code developed by George reduce Leites' original concept to a manageable number of questions which form a logical connection between beliefs about the enduring features of the political universe and beliefs about strategy and tactics necessary to achieve goals.

2. The answers to the questions are likely to be stable over time.

3. The questions reflect the purposes of a policy maker's research in that they form the beliefs which influence the opponent's most important perceptions about conflict.

4. Over time, the methodology allows the analyst to note changes.

This thesis incorporates many of the techniques used by other researchers and seeks to correct some deficiencies. Like Leites' original research, this thesis concentrates on an entire group instead of one individual, on the theory that such a code will provide a structure by which new recruits to the Egyptian military hierarchy can more easily be evaluated. This thesis also accepts the findings of others that the code is dynamic and can change, and attempts to quantify these changes.

This research proceeds on the theory that historical background and knowledge of events are important in both evaluation of the code and predicting future events.

An attempt is also made to correct one apparent deficiency in other codes. Unlike other research in content analysis, the reliability of the coder will be established.

5. Data

The material used in this study consists of 106 public statements made by Egyptian military leaders from 1955 through 1975. For purposes of this research, a military elite is defined as a military officer who retains his rank and whose statements are either published in Egyptian news sources or translated by United States Government agencies. The sources for this data are: _Egyptian Gazette_, _Foreign Broadcast Information Service_, _Joint Publication Research Service_, and one pamphlet translated from French. Military elites were defined in this way for several reasons: 1) Due to the usually strict censorship of the Egyptian media, only those officers with power and influence would be allowed to speak; 2) A problem arose in that Egyptian officers move freely from the military to the civilian sector. Consequently, some line must be drawn between those who represent the military and those who are more loyal to the civilian government. Therefore, only those officers who retain their rank are considered to speak for the military.

The problem of identifying military elites in government is simplified by the fact that there are traditional posts which military officers occupy. Some of them are: Minister of National Guidance, Minister of War, Governor of the Suez, and Minister of the Interior. The officers studied in this analysis vary in rank from major to field marshal.

Appendix A depicts the speeches by year group.
There are 38 from 1955 to 1961, 27 from 1961 to June 1967,
16 from June 1967 to October 1973, and 25 from October 1973
through 1975. Although the population sample for the 1967-73
period is somewhat smaller than the others, this deficiency
is overridden by the fact that the period between the wars
is critical to evaluate in order to predict future military
attitudes.

Although there is still the question of whether
public statements reflect private beliefs, only open sources
were used in this study because the intent here is to allow
the user to continue to monitor the public statements of
Egyptian military elites and update the code. In addition,
private conversations with the subjects were not within the
scope of this project.

6. Coding Units

Coding was accomplished by use of content analysis.
The actual structure of the code was adapted from Dr. O.R.
Holsti's Operational Code Belief Systems: A Codebook.
Dr. Holsti used the same basic structure that Professor
George originally developed, with two minor changes.
Philosophical Belief one was divided into 1a, 1b, and 1c,
and Philosophical Belief five relating to chance was incorpo-
rated into Philosophical Belief three. The Holsti codebook
is particularly adaptive to this research in that the code-
book is much more specific in defining the code. As an
example, Philosophical Belief 1a is divided into seven

subcategories. Instead of asking the question, "What is the nature of the political universe?", the analyst asks also, "What is the nature of conflict?, What are the conditions of peace?, What are the sources of conflict?, What is the scope of conflict?, What is the role of historical development?, and What is the source of knowledge for this belief?" Within each subcategory there are typologies of responses which allow the coder to determine approximately what type of answers he is looking for. For instance, in asking, "What is the nature of conflict?", the coder is trying to determine if the actor considers the world: 1) conflictual; 2) harmonious; 3) mixed; 4) something other than one of these types. This format has several advantages for the researcher. It permits an analyst not familiar with the more complex aspects of content analysis to accomplish an operational code in depth by giving specific instructions and typologies of responses that give a frame of reference for possible answers. The code also provides for beliefs outside any of these typologies. Because instructions are so specific, a wider range of material can be covered by using a number of coders, the theory being that the codebook prevents widely skewed and largely intuitive results when using a large number of coders. The typologies of responses also allow the code to be more easily quantified. And lastly, but most importantly, the codebook reflects the purposes of the military and political analyst.

Because content analysis is used to construct this code, the rules of content analysis are reviewed here. In content analysis, the information must be fitted into:

a. Categories

Holsti states that categories for each content datum must be mutually exclusive. The 53 separate categories were selected from George's construct and Holsti's codebook to structure the answers to the code. In selecting the categories and possible answers, this thesis departs from many studies which draw the themes from the material wherever they occur and whatever they happen to be. This approach has the advantage of discouraging intuitive guesses about the material and permits the same structure to be used on two actors or groups of actors and the results compared.

b. Units

Common units are single words, themes, characters, sentences and paragraphs. Themes are the most used units in research on propaganda, values, attitudes, and beliefs. The thematic units in this thesis were also predetermined from the typologies of responses presented by Holsti. As an example, in searching for the actor's concept of the political universe, possible answers (or themes) are: conflictual, harmonious, mixed, or some other form. These are the themes for which the coder searches.

Another problem is using the operational code is establishing a linkage between the code and the information

processing system of the actor. (150:24) The methodology
of this thesis is to select the types of themes or responses
which will affect the cognitive processes of an actor, and
then see if these themes are present in the material. For
instance, an actor who sees the political universe as con-
flictual will probably interpret most political situations
as a crisis.

      c. Unit of Enumeration

      The unit of enumeration for this thesis is
theme frequency. Frequency is defined as the total number
of times the theme appears within each time frame (1955-61,
etc.). This method allows changes in frequency to be noted.
Professor Holsti points out the pitfalls of using frequency
as a unit of enumeration. He states that frequency may
prove insufficient because, "It fails to take intensity
into account." Is the item on the front page of the book?
Measuring intensity requires coders to take on one additional
judgment. (134:123) This problem occurred during analysis
of Instrumental Belief three, concerning risk. In this case
there were several important documents concerning the
Egyptian army during the 1973 war which seemed to indicate
how military leaders really felt about risk. The writer
made an intuitive judgment about the content of Instrumental
Belief three based on the intensity of these few documents.

    7. <u>System, Generality, Reliability, Validity</u>

      a. System

      The system in this thesis involves sampling
material over a twenty year period concerning a variety of

subjects. This eliminates systematic errors that might

occur if a specific period were used. As Professor Holsti

notes, a random error will be cancelled out by using this

method. (151:134)

b. Generality

Generality requires that the results be theor-

etically relevant. In this case, the code is combined with

the stated objectives of the military elite and predictions

are made.

c. Reliability

Reliability requires that "repeated measures

with the same instrument on a given sample of data should

yield similar results." (134:151) In this study ten coders

were chosen: four had knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs;

three were National Security Affairs students but were

specialists in other areas; and three were Naval Postgraduate

School students in other curricula. All ten coders were

asked to read a series of four paragraphs taken at random

from the material. After each paragraph, a belief category

was described which related to the paragraph. Themes or

types of responses were then described and each encoder

was then asked to mark which themes, if any, were present

in the paragraph. In this test the ten encoders agreed

50% to 80% of the time over the four categories. The

average was 67.5% In comparing the results of the test with

the findings of the writer, it was found that the majority

view of the ten encoders agreed with the analyst in three

of the four categories. The reliability test and specific results are described in Appendix B.

d. Validity

Validity in this thesis is concurrent. That is, the results are compared to historical data.

VI. OPERATIONAL CODE

As discussed earlier, constructing the operational code has been greatly facilitated by the typologies developed by Professor O.R. Holsti in his code book. Prior to each part of the analysis, typologies will be presented to give the reader a frame of reference for the results. Numbers represent the numbers of references in the material which applied to the category. It was possible to find more than one reference in some cases. Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of references which applied to the category being analyzed. As an example, in Table 1, 97% of all references to a political universe or the international system from 1955 to 1961 described the system as conflictual.

A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

1(a). <u>What Is The Essential Nature of the Political Universe?</u> By asking this question we are attempting to discover the actor's more enduring beliefs about politics, history, social life, etc.

a. What is the nature of the political universe? The actor may believe that the universe is: 1) conflictual; 2) harmonious; 3) a mix of the two; 4) his beliefs might fit into the "other" category.

TABLE I

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	CONFLICTUAL	96(97)	18(100)	12(100)	19(98)
2	HARMONIOUS	1(1)			1(2)
3	MIXED	1(1)			
4	OTHER				

Over the years the Egyptian elite has been consistent in its view of the political universe as conflictual. General Amer refers to a world "rent by troubles and tensions." (1:2) In fact, there are frequent references to "the struggle" in describing the pursuit of goals. (2:2) Major Salem, Minister of National Guidance in the first years of Nasir's rule, and an original member of the Revolutionary Command Council, talks about "our former calamities, disasters, and agonies" in recounting Egypt's contact with the west. (5:1) In later years there is reference to the belief that, "The road is long and arduous." (45:2) Vice Admiral Fuad refers to "a journey of battles" in 1974. (99:6) Two phenomena should be noted here. Firstly, the military saw the international system as conflictual throughout the period of analysis, regardless of the situation at any given time. Secondly, the system is seen as conflictual even after the 1973 war, when Egypt's victory might be expected to mellow them somewhat.

b. What are the sources of conflict? The actor might consider the sources of conflict to be: 1) human

nature; 2) attributes of a particular state or group of states such as ideology, politics, or economic situation; 3) attributes of the international system like ideology, colonialism, economics, or power politics (alliances, arms races, security needs, etc.)

TABLE 2

			1955-61	61-67	67-73	73-75
1	HUMAN NATURE		1(2)			1(2)
2	STATES		15(48)	10(45)	10(81)	17(98)
	a.	IDEOLOGY	4(14)	3(15)	2(18)	
	b.	POLITICS	6(20)	6(30)	8(64)	17(98)
	c.	ECONOMICS	2(4)			
	d.	OTHER	3(10)	1(5)		
3	INT SYS		16(50)	11(55)	2(19)	
	a.	IDEOLOGY				
	b.	COLONIALISM	12(39)	11(55)	2(19)	
	c.	ECONOMICS	3(7)			
	d.	POWER POL	2(4)			

In the period from 1955 to 1961 the percentages indicate a fairly even split between nations and the inter- national system as sources of conflict. In the early years imperialism was the main source of conflict, and alliances with imperialists were seen as "an alliance between the strong and the weak, which was but a kind of domination in a new form." (4:2) Imperialism was interchangeable with

"developed countries" and "neo-colonialists". (53:4)
However, as the figures indicate, the term imperialism was
dropped at times and specific states like Britain and France
were singled out. There are two aspects to this early
period. First, America maintained an uncertain status. As
Nasir said, "With regard to America's stand, I do not know
what America's stand is." (13:A9) Secondly, Israel was not
singled out as one of the chief sources of conflict until
1961. Zionism was first mentioned in 1960 when Major Kamal
ad-din Husayn referred to "the aggressive forces of
imperialism and zionism." (31:B20)

From 1961 to 1967 the trend was for zionism to
be mentioned more often and for the United States to come
into focus as one of the chief sources of conflict. At
first the problem was seen as an alliance between imperial-
ists and Israel, e.g. "Israel, which derives its existence
and viability from imperialism, is an imperialist base
threatening freedom." (41:B2) However, from 1967 to 1973
the U.S.-Israeli connection was made, e.g., "The American-
made weapons which pour into Israel will not frighten us."
(78:16) Between 1967 and 1973 the spectre of Israeli aggression
was also mentioned frequently as the chief source of con-
flict. As General Ismail stated, "The conflict between us
and Israel is a cultural confrontation." (77:22) Consequently,
the pattern of Israeli aggression, backed by American weapons,
emerged most clearly in the 1967-73 period and has stabilized
in the 1973-75 period. The other trend in the 1973-75 period

is that the zionist movement as distinct from the Israeli government has become more frequently mentioned as the most important source of conflict.

One trend running through the entire analysis is evident in the "other" category. Since this category represents references to nations as sources of conflict without any specifics as to why, it is obvious that over the years the military seems to have become more specific in identifying the enemy.

c. What are the conditions of peace? The actor may believe that peace depends on: 1) better education or information; 2) eliminating one nation or group of nations;[1] 3) eliminating inequalities in resources, standards of living, etc.; 4) maintaining a balance of power in the world by containing expansionist desires, returning to the status quo, forming blocs, etc.; 5) transforming the international system itself through some form of world government.

TABLE 3

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	EDUCATION	2(7)			1(6)
2	ELIMINATING A STATE		9(53)	2(13)	
3	INEQUALITIES	2(7)			
4	BALANCE OF POWER	11(66)	6(40)	10(87)	15(88)
5	TRANSFORM SYSTEM	3(14)			1(6)
6	OTHER	1(5)	1(7)		

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[1]Note: Only references to the impact of eliminating a nation on the international system are included in this category.

As the table indicates, the military elite
basically believes in the balance of power concept for
maintaining peace. The only period when this was not true
was the period leading up to the 1967 war when the condition
of peace was to "erase the myth of Israel." (65:1) However,
there have been variations in this balance of power concept.
At first it was necessary to "purge our land of the occupier
and usurper." (7:1) The occupier was referred to as the
imperialist, capitalist, of the "free world". Other pros-
pects for peace lay in Arab unity and the formation of a
third bloc to compete with the east and west blocs. (9:A7)
From 1961 to 1967 this balance of power concept included
"supporting liberation movements for world peace." (58:4)
In the period from 1967 to 1973 the balance of power concept
involved a change from eliminating Israel to "liberating
every last inch of our land". (80:11) Remember that the
difference between balance of power and eliminating a nation
for purposes of this research is the difference between
destroying an actor, as opposed to driving him back and
containing his expansionist tendencies.

Since 1973 this balance of power concept has
continued. As General Mubarak said, "Our primary interest
is to maintain the international balance." (107:D6) However,
there is one important factor in Egyptian military thinking
that must be considered in assessing this balance of power
concept. Throughout the period of analysis, the military
has felt that the only way to achieve peace if through force.

As General Amer said, "We are now preparing to use the
language of force to establish peace." (1:2) In 1975
General Gamassy stated to the army, "With your arms you will
put an end to its (Israel) expansionist ambitions." (105:D22)
Consequently, in containing Israel and taking back its
territory, the Egyptian military may still feel that Israel
must be destroyed or incapacitated in order to contain her.

     d. What is the nature of conflict? In this category
we are trying to determine whether the actor considers poli-
tical interaction: 1) zero-sum. That is, the stakes in
the political game are fixed and a loss for one side is an
equal political gain for the other side; 2) non-zero sum.
The stakes are flexible and there are instances in which
cooperation will benefit all parties. In addition, a loss
by one party might result in a much larger gain for the
other party; 3) mixed. The nature of the conflict depends
on the situation.

TABLE 4

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	ZERO-SUM	11(59)	10(83)	8(80)	11(72)
2	NON ZERO-SUM	5(21)	1(17)		5(28)
3	MIXED	4(20)	2(20)	2(20)	
4	OTHER				

As might be expected, the Egyptian military has
consistently seen political action as zero-sum. There are

continuous references to "the strong and the weak". (4:2)
As an example of the absolutes involved, Colonel Sadat,
now President, writing in Al-Jumhuriyya in 1956 said, "The
formation of a third world bloc is a knockout blow to the
vestiges of imperialism which is staggering today." (9:A7)
Needless to say, the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been
seen as zero-sum. The percentages for non-zero-sum reflect
the Egyptian belief in the benefits of Arab unity. Although
the concept of the Arab-Israeli conflict as zero-sum has
never changed, the concept of the international system has
changed in recent years. In 1975 General Gamassy stated,
"The American intervention to achieve peace does not mean
ruling out a Soviet role toward this end." (107:D6) It
would appear that the concept of mutual cooperation between
competitors for the gain of all is beginning to creep into
Egyptian military thought. Therefore the nature of conflict
seems to depend on the actors, not the situation.

     e. What is the scope of conflict? An actor may
see issues as: 1) linked. That is, each issue is part of
a larger or more fundamental conflict; 2) spillover. Each
issue is separate but has a high potential for spillover
either from one issue to another or from one geographical
area to another; 3) separate.

TABLE 5

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	LINKED	10(46)	13(80)	10(100)	7(50)
2	SPILLOVER	2(54)	4(20)		5(33)
3	SEPARATE				3(17)

Egyptian military elites tend to see issues as either linked or having a great effect on each other. In many cases all issues are linked to "the historic struggle". (31:B19) Over the years this struggle has included the fight against the imperialists, Israelis, royalists in Yemen, and economic chaos on the home front.

In the early years, issues were considered to have considerable geographic spillover. Egypt was the center of both Africa and Asia, and as such anything that happened to her affected these areas. Col. Nasir said, "He who attacks Egypt attacks the entire Arab nation." (13:A10) Col. Sadat said, "Our revolution has now proved that it is no longer a local one." (22:B4) As for Israel, the National Defense and Security Committee stated in 1967, "Israel is also a threat to the security of the region and the peace of the world." (71:6) This search for some kind of linkage or at least spillover can even be seen in state planning, e.g., "The Arab revolution is capable of bringing about total revolution in all fields." (58:1) These linkages are strongest when military elites talk about war. All wars are seen as a natural extension of the revolution, e.g.,

"The October War was a landmark in the history of our
struggle." (97:D6)

The important trend in this category is an
increase in references to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a
separate issue apart from other international issues after
the 1973 war. (95:12) Unfortunately, this was expressed
as a belief that the conflict must be solved militarily
and could not be part of some larger international debate
or settlement. During the 1973-75 period however, these
references only amounted to 17% of the total. Therefore,
this feeling that the conflict is a special issue has still
not gained much momentum.

f.   What is the role of conflict: This category
explores the actor's feelings about whether conflict is:
1) necessary. That is, conflict is indispensable for the
achievement of goals: 2) functional. Conflict is costly
and distasteful, but helpful in achieving goals; 3) dys-
functional. Conflict stands in the way of achieving goals.

TABLE 6

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	NECESSARY	9(27)	4(17)	12(77)	8(36)
2	FUNCTIONAL	9(27)	3(13)		6(22)
3	DYSFUNCTIONAL	15(46)	7(33)	3(23)	8(36)

The Egyptian military throughout the period has
seen the value of conflict in developing the armed forces.
As Lt. General Aly Gamal said in 1963, "I am fully confident

that you have acquired adequate experience in combat,
making you now fully prepared and ready..." (51:2) The
only difference of opinion among officers has been whether
conflict was indispensable (necessary category) or basically
costly but helpful (functional). As the figures indicate,
battle was considered indispensable between the wars, but
returned to a more equal distribution between necessary and
functional after the war. As an example of the philosophy
that conflict is necessary, in 1963 General Amer said,
"Conflict is part of life itself." (44:1) In 1975 General
Gamassy said, "It requires effort, sweat, and blood to
preserve our past with all our heritage and glory." (105:D22)

The percentages in the dysfunctional category
reflect the view that Egypt might be a casualty of the cold
war between the United States and Russia. As Colonel Sadat
said, "We do not want the cold war, we want true peace."
(9:A6) This feeling was responsible for Egypt's adopting
the philosophy of positive neutrality during the early years.
(19:B4) Needless to say, conflict between Arab states is
seen as dysfunctional.

1(b). <u>What is the Fundamental Character of One's
Political Opponents and of Other Significant Political Actors?</u>

a. What are the opponents' goals? Is the opponent:
1) destructionist. The opponent has unlimited goals such as
universal hegemony or radical transformation of the existing
international system; 2) expansionist. The opponent is
aggressive but his goals fall short of destruction;

3) defensive. The opponent is chiefly concerned with security or maintenance of the status quo; 4) conciliatory. The opponent is ready to undertake at least limited accommodation; 5) active seeker of peace. The opponent is prepared to undertake major peace initiatives.

TABLE 7

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	DESTRUCTIONIST	6(30)	9(40)	5(45)	
2	EXPANSIONIST	6(30)	4(20)	4(36)	6(30)
3	DEFENSIVE	3(13)			8(40)
4	CONCILIATORY				
5	SEEKER OF PEACE				
6	OTHER	5(27)	9(40)	1(19)	6(30)

Analysis in this category indicates that the military is somewhat divided in its perception of the goals of the enemy, and in many cases is very vague and unsure. Although the imperialists were seen as destructive at times like the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, in many instances, they were seen as what could be termed exploitive. (13:A1) This belief is represented in the other category. It was felt that the imperialists wanted to hold Egypt back, to hinder its progress, to keep it from leading the Arab revolution, e.g., "The objective and aim of the aggression against Egypt was to rob it of its rights, to prejudice its independence, and to destroy the whole of Arab nationalism by doing so."

(17:A25)   However, exactly what Egypt's enemies wanted
(destruction, territorial expansion, security, etc.) was
uncertain.

The conflict with Israel is somewhat sharper,
and there appears to be a trend. At first Israel is seen
as expansionist. (27:B2)   However, between the wars the
intensity of feeling if evident in the fact that Israel is
seen as bent on destruction, e.g., "The next war will not be
restricted only to military operations, it will be a total
war." (76:55)   Following the war there appears to be a
change in perception. Although General Ismail and others
frequently refer to the "expansionist desires of Israel"
(94:D7), many more references to Israel's security goals
begin to appear. The "Israeli theory of security", a term
describing Israel's quest for secure buffer zones in the
Sinai and Golan Heights, is seen as Israel's chief goal.
(96:1)

b.   What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
Is the opponent driven by its own characteristics such as
ideology, historical goals, internal needs, leadership traits;
or is he driven by external forces like traditional power
politics or external pressures or policies of others?

TABLE 8

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	IDEOLOGY	3(15)	3(27)	5(43)	
2	HISTORIC GOALS	10(70)	7(73)	5(43)	9(40)
3	INTERNAL NEEDS	3(15)		2(14)	12(60)

TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

	1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
4 LEADERSHIP TRAITS				
5 POWER POLITICS				
6 EXTERNAL NEEDS				
7 OTHER				

As the figures indicate, the military believes
basically that some internal force drives its opponents,
but what the motivation is is extremely hard to derive.
There are many references to the aims of the opponent but
few to the opponents' source of motivation. The motivation
assigned to most opponents, especially the imperialists, is
a basic historical interest in domination of the Arabs, e.g.,
"The enemies of the Arab revolution among the forces of
imperialism and neo-colonialism know that the striking down
of Egypt is the target which would enable them to realize
their ambition to gain control of all Arab lands." (53:4)
In most cases the motivation is economic, not ideological,
e.g., "The battle was one between spiritual and material
values." (7:1)

However, between the wars ideology did come in
for more criticism. This was usually in reference to
zionism, e.g., "We are in fact convinced that the zionist
movement, which wants to bring back to Israel the Jews
who are spread all over the world, is basically aggressive

and expansionist." (73:69) After the 1973 war the trend

abruptly reversed. Reflecting a more pragmatic view, the

military becomes more interested in the internal needs of its

enemies. As mentioned above, the Israeli thoery of security

became more prominent. In addition, there is more reference

to the internal needs of the superpowers. Russia's "interests

in the Mediterranean" are seen as the result of security

needs. (107:D7) As for America, "America, as the leader

of imperialism, wants to keep us away from the Soviet Union

and wants to keep the Soviet Union away from the region

because of the oil." (82:20)

    c. What is the generality of the adversary's

hostility or opposition? Does the actor believe that:

1) the opponent's hostility is all encompassing and long

term, or does the actor believe that; 2) the conflict is

shaped by a specific issue which, if solved, could lead

to normal relations.

TABLE 9

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	GENERAL/PERMANENT	22(80)	11(100)	6(85)	6(75)
2	SPECIFIC/LIMITED	4(20)		1(15)	2(25)
3	OTHER				

Obviously, the Egyptian military sees the con-

flict with all opponents as permanent and of an all-encompassing

nature, e.g., "Our enemies, the imperialists, are today

plotting as they did in the past." (22:B4) Throughout the
period there are references to the belief that "the battle
is continuous." (77:24) There is one trend, however. The
impression is given that the source of conflict is the
specific issue of the Israeli security theory in the
1973-75 period. Although this issue is considered all
encompassing in many cases, there are some references to
the belief that peace centers on this Israeli theory of
security.

     d. What is the likely response of the adversary
to our conciliatory moves? Will the opponent: 1) recipro-
cate in this situation; 2) reciprocate in other situations;
3) ignore; 4) take advantage in this situation; 5) take
advantage in other situations.

TABLE 10

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	RECIPROCATE IN THIS SIT.				
2	RECIPROCATE IN OTHER SIT.				
3	IGNORE	4(25)		1(15)	4(40)
4	TAKE ADVANTAGE IN THIS SIT.				
5	TAKE ADVANTAGE IN OTHER SIT.	12(75)	6(100)	7(85)	6(60)

     The Egyptian military, like other military
elites throughout the world, feels that any attempt at

conciliation will be either ignored or taken advantage of
in other areas. This is another example of the military
elite's propensity for finding linkages between issues.
As General Amer said, "Should we ever align ourselves, we
would be giving away part of our independence." (11:B4)
General Ismail Ali echoed these sentiments in speaking
about Egypt's decision to attack in October 1973. "If
we did not begin the fighting, the enemy would." (85:17)
Note that this feeling did not change after the war.

     e.   What will the opponent's response be to a
policy of firmness? Will the opponent: 1) back down and
concede important points; 2) ignore the firm policy and
proceed with his own timetable; 3) reciprocate in this
situation with his own hard line; 4) reciprocate in other
situations; 5) respond impulsively.

TABLE 11

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	BACK DOWN	15(93)	10(100)	5(34)	12(80)
2	IGNORE	1(7)		9(66)	
3	RECIPROCATE IN THIS SITUATION				4(20)
4	RECIPROCATE IN OTHER SITUATIONS				
5	RESPOND IMPULSIVELY				
6	OTHER				

The Egyptian military still maintains the tra-
ditional Arab belief that a policy of firmness or show of
force will cause the enemy to back down. The best deterrent
is a strong army. "The UAR armed forces realize that they
are the greatest dissuasive force possessed by the compre-
hensive Arab struggle." (53:4) Note that between the wars
the belief grew that the Israelis were ignoring Egypt's firm
stand and were proceeding with their own timetable. This
was indicated by references to the fact that "force was the
only means". (83:3) After the war the belief that the
opponent could be backed down reappeared, e.g. "If we can
succesfully challenge the Israeli security theory, then
that will lead to certain results in the short and `ong
term." (96:2)

    f. What is the opponent's image of one's own
nation? Does the opponent consider Egypt: 1) destructionist;
2) expansionist; 3) defensive; 4) conciliatory; 5) an active
seeker of peace.

TABLE 12

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	DESTRUCTIONIST	1(5)			
2	EXPANSIONIST	7(33)	4(40)	3(50)	
3	DEFENSIVE				
4	CONCILIATORY				
5	ACTIVE SEEKER OF PEACE				
6	OTHER	13(62)	6(60)	3(50)	

There were also few references to the opponent's
image of Egypt. Although there were numerous references in
the early years, they tapered off as time went on. Note
that there were no references after the 1973 war.

In the early years it was believed that the
imperialists thought Egypt was weak and backward. Their
references were entered in the "other" category. Note
that there are consistent references to this until after
the 1973 war, e.g., "Our enemies used to say that we could
not rely on ourselves." (25:B3) Along with this, there
were occasional references to the belief that the enemy
regarded Egypt as Egypt regarded the enemy, i.e., expansionist.
"They fear that the wave of progress will spread to their
country." (40:B5) However, one of the strongest statements
about the opponent's view of Egypt came from General Ismail
in October 1972, when he told his men, "You should know
that we are facing an enemy that sets little store by us,
thinking we are not capable of fighting." (82:21) The fact
that such a statement occurred before the war and that
there were no references after the war seems to indicate
either a decreasing concern or awareness of the enemy's
images.

g. What is the opponent's view of conflict? Is
conflict: 1) inevitable, or can it be avoided; 2) is
conflict considered desirable or undesirable.

TABLE 13

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	INEVITABLE AVOIDABLE	4(100)	4(100)	6(100)	6(100)
2	DESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE	10(90) 1(10)	8(100)	10(100)	6(100)

The military has held consistently throughout the years that their opponents consider conflict inevitable and desirable for the achievement of goals. As for the imperialists, "They have created Israel in order to secure a hostile base with intentions similar to theirs." (60:18) As for Israel, "Israeli policy is built on aggression." (41:B2)

h. What are the opponent's decision-making processes? Is the opponent: 1) a unitary actor (Model I); 2) an actor whose policies are the result of bureaucratic inertia and thus possesses a certain continuity over time regardless of leadership (Model II); 3) an opponent with competing groups within its nation. Are there moderates with whom one can deal within an opponent's nation (Model III).

TABLE 14

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1974-75
1	MODEL I	20(80)	10(91)	7(77)	8(66)
2	MODEL II				
3	MODEL III	5(20)	1(9)	2(23)	4(34)

The military has typically seen the opponent,
whether it be one nation or a group of nations, as a mono-
lithic unit. Most references are to the "free world",
the imperialists, or the developed nations. (15:A2) Israel
is treated in the same manner. However, starting before
the 1973 war and increasingly thereafter, the trend has
been toward a Model III analysis. Opponents are perceived
to be a mixture of competing groups and interests. In
discussing supposed United States intervention in the 1973
war, General Shazli states that, "The logic is with Kissinger."
(92:3) The Zionist movement, instead of just Israel, has
come in for more criticism. (73:69) As for Israel, "Most
of the Israeli prisoners were captives of Israeli domestic
propaganda. They have lost confidence in their political
parties." (94:D9)

i. What is the opponent's approach to choosing
objectives? This category and the next attempt to define
the opponent's operational code as seen by the Egyptian
military. 1) is the opponent an optimizer or a satisficer.
Does he pursue the best goal or will he be satisfied with
a goal that is attainable under the circumstances; 2) are
the opponent's goals realistic or unrealistic; 3) is the
opponent flexible or inflexible; 4) is the opponent
predictable or unpredictable.

TABLE 15

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	OPTIMIZE	9(70)	4(75)	2(50)	3(75)
2	SATISFY	4(30)	1(25)	2(50)	1(25)
3	REALISTIC	1(33)			2(50)
4	UNREALISTIC	2(67)		2(100)	2(50)
5	FLEXIBLE	2(25)		2(100)	
6	INFLEXIBLE	6(75)			3(100)
7	PREDICTABLE	7(70)	2(100)		3(75)
8	UNPREDICTABLE	3(30)			1(25)

There were very few concrete results in this
category. Military spokesmen seem to be divided on the
opponent's operational code. This low perception of enemy
methods and intentions has been consistent throughout the
analysis. However, a few beliefs are consistent. Most
opponents are perceived as using an optimizing strategy.
As noted in other categories, the military felt that the
imperialists were bent on total domination of everything
Arabic. As for Israel, Israel was believed to "rampage in
the region without fear of being repelled or punished."
(82:21) The enemy's goals were usually seen as unrealistic,
e.g., "The proposal (to internationalize the canal) is
foolish and mad." (12:A1) The enemy's pursuit of objectives
was seen as predictable. However, there was a change in

perception of Israel after the 1973 war. Between the wars
the Israeli flexibility in changing strategy and tactics was
highly regarded, e.g., "He was not able to strike any of
our targets and affect the operation of our air defense
system, and this caused him to revise his mode of operation
and the tactics of his air force." (80:11) However, after
the war Egypt's military success led to a lower opinion
of Israel, who was seen as basically inflexible in terms
of strategy. As General Ismail stated after the war, "As
a result (of a wide attack along the canal) the enemy
would be slow in making any effective counter-attack on
the ground." (85:17)

j. How does the opponent pursue objectives? Does
the opponent 1) prepare ground by making very careful
preparations; 2) try and see. That is, the opponent takes
action as a way of testing what is feasible. It is not
necessary to determine in advance what the outcome will
be; 3) incremental approach. The opponent emphasizes the
value of limited gains; 4) blitzkrieg strategy. The opponent
commits a major portion of his resources and a full scale
effort to the achievement of goals.

TABLE 16

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	PREPARE GROUND				
2	TRY & SEE				
3	INCREMENTAL	9(60)	6(100)	3(37)	
4	BLITZKRIEG	6(40)		5(63)	5(100)

The results in this category do not show any consistent trends because perceptions are dependent on the opponent in question. The imperialists are usually regarded as employing an incremental or piece meal approach. For instance, they are trying to exploit Arab disunity in order to "establish their foothold and consequently dominate us." (28:B5) There are also constant references to plotting and conspiracies to gain a foothold. (38:B8) On the other hand, Israel is believed to employ the allout blitzkrieg strategy. They were accused of "launching a horrible war." (19:B5) They were also accused of "violating everything as never before." (78:15)

k. How does the opponent cope with risk? Does the opponent seek to maximize gains or minimize losses?

TABLE 17

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	MAXIMIZE GAINS	7(54)	4(100)		2(33)
2	MINIMIZE LOSSES	6(46)		4(100)	4(67)

The results of this category basically reflect a growing awareness by Egypt that Israeli manpower is limited. The 100% for the 1961-67 period reflect the belief that Israel would do anything for territorial expansion. However, after the 1967 war, Egyptian military leaders began to formulate their plans on the basis of Israel's need to minimize the loss of their limited resources. They

stated, "The enemy has built the Bar'-Lev line to give
confidence to his troops." (83:13) As for the breach at
Deversoir, "The enemy was compelled to withdraw from the
bulge because he was certain that the situation was not
in his favor." (94:D8)

1(c). What is the Nature of the Contemporary
International System?

a. What is the structure of the present system? Is
the world polarized into two centers of power with rela-
tively rigid and antagonistic policies, or is it a plural-
istic world with several centers of power and more flexible
alignments?

TABLE 18

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	POLARIZED	7(100)	4(100)	2(100)	6(100)
2	PLURALISTIC				

Although the Egyptian military throughout the
years has loudly proclaimed, "The future of the world is
no longer determined by one or two states," (9:A6) it
becomes obvious that they see the world as polarized.
Colonel Sadat once said, "East is east and west is west
and never the twain shall meet. Kipling was right." (9:A5)
Thus although Egypt sees the world as polarized, they have
steadfastly refused to join either bloc, e.g., "Our positive
neutr   competiton between big blocs in inter-
national society. It is not a bargaining with the best

bloc." (9:A6) Throughout the years military leaders talk
in terms of big power confrontation. (82:20) In addition,
Egypt has always sought to loosen this system by forming
a power base of third world countries, e.g., "The third
world bloc has actually and factually been formed." (9:A7)
Even in recent times, although military leaders have tried
to stay neutral, they still work within the framework of a
polar world. General Mubarak viewed the world as possessing
two centers of power when he said, "An American intervention
to achieve peace does not rule out a Soviet role toward
this end." (105:D22)

P2. <u>What Are the Prospects for the Eventual Realization</u>
<u>of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?</u>

a. What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
Are one's goals: 1) destructionist. The actor's goals are
unlimited, including universal hegemony; 2) expansionist.
The actor is active in the pursuit of his interests, but
his goals fall short of total destruction and do not include
transformation of the international system; 3) defensive.
The actor is primarily concerned with security and main-
tenance of the status quo. His quest for security may
infringe on another's sovereignty and could even lead to
destroying part of the opponent's nation. His concept of
the status quo may also be open to question; 4) conciliatory.
The actor desires at least limited accommodation; 5) active
seeker of peace. The actor desires to undertake major
initiatives for peace.

TABLE 19

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	DESTRUCTIONIST		2(13)	2(28)	
2	EXPANSIONIST	6(18)	2(13)		
3	DEFENSIVE	21(67)	11(74)	4(58)	12(100)
4	CONCILIATORY				
5	SEEKER OF PEACE	2(6)		1(14)	
6	OTHER	3(9)			

Although the military has seen itself in a
defensive role consistently, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between their defensive posture and an expan-
sionist attitude. At first General Amer was able to say
that Egypt's goal was "the imposition of peace unto the
frontiers of Egypt and the protection of liberty and jus-
tice. We aspire to perfect security." (1:1) However,
later on as Egypt assumed leadership in the Arab world,
this defensive attitude became more aggressive, e.g., "Today
our armed forces march everywhere to safeguard the princi-
ples and objectives of Arab nationalism," (46:5) and "We
support liberation movements in the wide Arab homeland."
(50:1) Prior to 1967 this defensive attitude became
destructionist with regard to Israel. The military spoke
of "eliminating Israel" (42:1) and "erasing the myth of
Israel." (64:9) However, the military still felt that this
was necessary to defend Egyptian territory. Throughout the

period the goal remained security and defense of the status quo. When Egypt realized that they had been mistaken in their policy of destruction of Israel and that the better course was one of containment, their stated policy became even more a classic defensive strategy as defined for the purposes of the research. As General Sadiq said, "We are determined to liberate our land which has been soiled by the enemy." (73:43) However, the important point here is that the Egyptian strategy may have changed from destruction to containment, but the underlying goal as perceived by the military has always been defense of Egyptian security.

      b. Should one be optimistic or pessimistic about the achievement of goals? Is the actor optimistic or pessimistic about the pursuit of goals? If he is optimistic, is this optimism qualified? Or does he express this optimism in the pursuit of some goals and pessimism in the pursuit of others?

TABLE 20

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	OPTIMISTIC UNQUALIFIED	10(38)	5(35)	4(66)	7(63)
2	OPTIMISTIC QUALIFIED	12(46)	8(58)	1(17)	4(37)
3	MIXED	3(11)			
4	PESSIMISTIC	1(5)	2(7)	1(17)	

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Analysis of responses in this category indicates that the military has been fairly consistent in its optimism about goals over the years. As General Amer said, "We are completely overcoming all obstacles, most of which we have smoothed out." (1:1) The fact that this attitude persisted between the war years, and especially leading up to the 1973 war, attests to Egyptian faith in the ultimate "final victory." (56:1) However, at times this optimism has been qualified, usually this qualification concerns the "intrigues of the plotters." (13:A2) As General Amer stated, "The Arab nation faces many threats from the enemy." (41:B2) Pessimism usually concerns the efforts of outside powers to intervene, e.g., "Undoubtedly the danger exists that all that is being done at the United Nations will turn out to be only useless wishful thinking." (72:43)

There is another aspect to this optimism that should be noted. The military is most optimistic about its general, long-term goals like "peace and prosperity." (2:5) These long-range goals seem to be granted unconditional optimism. "We are determined to achieve happiness and protect her from any harm, whatever our sacrifice." (76:56) Their pessimism concerns short-term policy undertaking like Arab unity. (4:1) Any optimism concerning short-term policy undertaking is usually conditional on some event, i.e., a strong army, Soviet assistance, third world alignment, etc.

c. On whose side is time? Is time on one's own side or on the side of the opponent?

TABLE 21

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	OWN	19(100)	4(100)	2(40)	9(100)
2	OPPONENT			3(60)	

The military feels that time is on their side
in the pursuit of goals. This is part of their basic opti-
mism regarding the achievement of goals. As General Amer
said, "Our desert will bury our enemies." (1:2) General
Shazli stated after the 1973 war, "The longer the war
continued, the enemy would be forced to go on its knees."
(90:3) However, there was one period when this was not the
belief. Between the wars, opinion shifted to the belief
that time was on the opponent's side, e.g., "Because today
we are more than ever convinced that if the situation does
not develop it will worsen rapidly." (72:66) After the war
the traditional belief in the advantage of time returned.

P3. Is the Political Future Predictable? In What Sense
and to What Extent? What is the Role of Chance in Human
Affairs and History?

a. Is political life predictable? Does the actor
consider political life predictable or capricious?

TABLE 22

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	PREDICTABLE	16(90)	7(100)	5(71)	6(67)
2	CAPRICIOUS	2(10)		2(29)	3(33)

Although the Egyptian military prefers to believe that political life is predictable, there is another trend that should be kept in mind. The military has traditionally been suspicious of purely political processes and in fact considers the use of force the most predictable way to achieve political goals. In 1955 Colonel Sadat stated, "International treaties and agreements will be given one simple interpretation." (2:1) Although there is a certain amount of predictability in this statement, it indicates a growing dislike for this type of process. By 1974 General Ismail said, "Our guarantee of winning this struggle either through peace or war basically depends on our strength and military preparedness." (96:1)

As to what aspects of political life are predictable, historical development seems to be the most predictable. This correlates with the military's optimism about long term goals and belief that time is on their side. General Amer said in 1955, "The battle that we are engaged in will decide the sort of army we have during the ten years to come." (1:4) In 1975 General Gammasy indicated the same belief in the predictability of historical development. He indicated that the October war was only "one of the stages in the revolution." (100:13) Short term policy outcomes are seen as somewhat less predictable, and in fact Israel was seen as extremely unpredictable between the wars, e.g., "We must raise the level of our readiness to face any treacherous attempt on the part of the enemy." (73:43)

P4. How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over Historical Development?

a. What is the role of the leader? Should the leader: 1) actively use politics to shape or guide historical development; 2) intervene when feasible.. That is, should the leader know when to intervene and when not to? Should he know which problems are solvable and which are not? 3) mediate between contending forces. Should the leader be a broker? 4) discern historical trends. Should the leader identify the main trends of historical development and pursue policies that are in harmony with these trends? 5) avoid intervention. Should the leader let issues unfold at their own pace? 6) control uncertain, but must act. Although the leader does not know whether control of historical development is possible, he should believe that he must act as if it is possible.

In this category military leaders surprisingly indicated in almost 100% of the references that the leadership should actively use politics to shape Egypt's progress. Although this is a typically military philosophy, it is surprising that the leadership did not tend toward the more Arabic syndrome of discerning political trends and designing policies that were in harmony with them. Most of the beliefs in this category were framed in the context of the army's role in leading the nation, e.g., "The army acts the role of the advanced guard" (27:B1) and "The army is the shield protecting the people." (35:B4) As one general

put it, "It is possible to control the nature and the
rapidity of social changes through government planning."
(62:5) An example is President Sadat's expulsion of the
Russians in 1972. General Ismail said, "These decisions
were made by President Sadat. The president of the
republic is more intent on Egypt's interest than anyone
else ." (80:20)

       b. What source of knowledge is used to provide
philosophical beliefs? Does the actor use: 1) ideology.
The actor draws on or cites a body of thought, literature,
or beliefs; 2) trends. The actor extrapolates from a
series of events such as defense budgets, GNP; 3) experi-
ence. The actor draws on his own personal experience as
proof; 4) history. The actor uses the lessons of history
or parallels between past and contemporary events; 5) specific
events. The actor generalized from a single event or a
very limited number of specific events; 6) faith. The actor
explains that the point he is making must be accepted on faith.

TABLE 23

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	IDEOLOGY	4(3)		1(2)	1(2)
2	TRENDS	14(11)	3(9)	3(13)	1(14)
3	EXPERIENCE	4(3)	3(9)	5(13)	5(14)
4	HISTORY	37(31)	15(46)	6(16)	8(26)
5	SPECIFIC EVENTS	50(43)	10(31)	18(51)	16(46)
6	FAITH	10(8)	1(5)	4(10)	3(8)

There are two factors to be noted in this category. First, the most frequent source of knowledge or proof about philosophical issues is the generalization about some specific event, e.g., "Proof that Israel's allegations are false are the decisions given by the truce committee in similar incidents." (8:1) The military forms a conception of the results of an event and then uses this conception as proof of their philosophy. From 1961-67 the Yemini war was used in this way. (45:1) From 1967-73 it was the 1967 war. (77:18-19) Since 1973 it has been the October war. (90:3) The second most-used source is the use of historical parallels, e.g., "History does not ordain it alone, but ordains it with sacrifice and fire and violent battle." (76:16) There are also frequent references to the history of the struggle and "Egypt's traditional position". (1:2)

The second aspect of this category is the fact that ideology is used surprisingly little. In all 106 speeches there was only one reference to the philosophy of Nasir, that by General Shazli. (78:8-12)

B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

In the instrumental phase of the code we are interested in the more pragmatic issues of strategy and tactics and the best methods to achieve goals.

Il. <u>What is the Best Approach for Selecting Goals or Objectives of Political Action?</u>

a. How should one establish goals or political action? Should the actor use: 1) a comprehensive framework

or master plan; 2) a mixed strategy of the comprehensive
and individual approaches depending on the circumstances;
3) individual issues. The actor should look at the
immediate problem at hand and the opportunities afforded
by the circumstances.

TABLE 24

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK	13(100)	6(100)	6(86)	9(90)
2	MIXED STRATEGY				
3	INDIVIDUAL ISSUES			1(14)	1(10)

The military generally has always agreed that
goals should be established within the framework of an
overall master plan. This framework at times has been
Arab unity, state planning, etc. As noted in other cate-
gories, all strategy prior to the 1967 war was contained
within the concept of eliminating Israel. After the 1967
war the strategy was switched to recovering occupied terri-
tory. Although there are references to "The waging of war
in different areas, each of which requires special tactics",
the goals themselves usually reflect the overall comprehen-
sive framework. (61:14)

b. What is the nature of the goals to be sought?
Should the actor seek goals that are: 1) optimal. That
is, should the actor stick to his fundamental goals and
avoid the risk of settling for less than one could otherwise

achieve; 2) feasibl . That is, should the actor be pre-
pared to strive for goals that advance one a limited dis-
tance toward long term goals. This theory holds that it
is permissable to divide long range goals into a series of
lesser ones; 3) mixed. That is, the actor adopts goals
depending on the issue.

TABLE 25

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	OPTIMAL	15(100)	4(100)	5(80)	1(15)
2	FEASIBLE			2(20)	7(85)
3	MIXED				

Over the years the thinking of the military
has changed from optimal to feasible goal setting. After
the 1967 war the military changed its goal from eliminating
Israel to driving Israel from the Sinai. During the period
between the wars it appears that many generals were trying
to hold on to the optimizing strategy and simply substituted
the long range goal of expulsion for the previous goal of
elimination. This is probably due to the fact that the
impetus for the change came from President Sadat and the
military was resisting the change in goal-setting philosophy.
One of the best examples of the change to a feasible approach
was General Ismail's speech to his men in November 1972
when he stated that the goal was "expulsion if possible,
annihilation if he refuses to leave." (80:21) This also

represents a good example of the transition between the
two philosophies. Note that the original optimizing
strategy is still there. However after the 1973 war, the
change was more apparent. General Ismail stated in Novem-
ber 1973 that his mission was to "destroy the Israeli
security theory" and that this would have long-term results.
(83:20) He also stated that, "The Egyptian armed forces
achieved the political objectives of the October military
operation." (92:D7) This is in contrast to earlier years
in which General Amer had talked of "complete victory and
no less", (52:1) and final victory that will "achieve all
of our aspirations". (30:B3)

c. What are the paths to achievement of goals?
In achieving goals does the actor believe that: 1) there
is only a single path that will achieve success. To be
flexible is to compromise the possibility of achieving
success; 2) there are multiple paths to achieving goals.
Each path has a probability of success between 0 and 100%.

TABLE 26

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	MULTIPLE				5(71)
2	SINGLE	12(100)	5(100)	4(100)	2(29)

This category also shows a change after the 1973
war. Prior to that war there was general agreement that
there was only one path to the achievement of a goal that

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could assure success. Generally it was the path of Arab
unity. "This cooperation (between Arab countries) was the
only means to put an end to our former calamities." (5:1)
There was also talk about "The path of dignity and freedom."
(49:1) Although at times the military spoke about accepting
multiple schools of thought in developing tactics, the end
result was always the one best way, e.g., "After reviewing
tactical methods applied in different parts of the world,
we perfected a new system of military tactics." (53:1)
However after the 1973 war, statements began to appear that
indicated the military might be beginning to accept the
multiple path approach, e.g., "Political efforts and mili-
tary efforts are proceeding along parallel lines." (101:D1)
General Gamassy was able to say that U.S. efforts to settle
the Middle East issue did not preclude a Soviet role."
(105:D6) He was also able to say that the Arabs should
develop an arms industry in addition to diversifying
their source of weapons. (106:D4)

     d. Are there value conflicts in the pursuit of
goals" Does the actor believe that: 1) all goals are
compatible or at least linked in such a way that the
achievement of one will insure the success of the other;
2) tradeoffs are necessary. That is, two major goals are
incapable of being achieved simultaneously.

TABLE 27

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	GOALS COMPATIBLE	20(90)	4(40)	5(100)	2(25)
2	TRADEOFFS NECESSARY	2(10)	6(60)		9(75)

Results in this category reflect the fact that there have been two periods in which the military has felt that there were goal conflicts. The first was the period following the breakdown of the UAR and the attempt at Arab Unity. Although previously General Ali Amir, Chief-of-Staff, had been able to speak of "one consolidated block leaving no room for differences" (28:B3), in 1964 General Hakim Amer, Minister of War, had to admit, "Differences may well arise between the governments in view of the differences in the stages of development, but the full encounter between the people of the Arab world emanates from the unity of their history." (52:4) This statement also illustrates the military's method of coping with these value conflicts. They tend to deny that they really exist.

The second period of value conflict followed the 1973 war. Although all goals were seen as compatible with "the common destiny" (79:17) leading up to the war, speaking about tactics in retrospect, General Ismail referred to "a plan that will guarantee the safety of our forces

and their capability of continuing, and at the same time come as a complete surprise to the enemy." (89:4) Most references to goals after the war concerned this value conflict between protecting forces and achieving victory.

I2. How Are the Goals of Action Pursued Most Effectively?

a. Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon goals? The actor's choices here are self-explanatory.

A review of the material indicates that the military does not believe in modifying, substituting for, or abandoning a goal once it has been established. As General Amer stated, "What would disgrace us would be to abandon our mission." (19:B6) The only references prior to the 1973 war in this category concern scaling a goal up, e.g., "Our role is no longer restricted to just protecting the borders. Our message today is more general and comprehensive." (36:B29) Although the military did in fact modify its goal of eliminating Israel and substituting the goal of liberating occupied territory, they do not speak of this as goal substitution. It appears that the only situation in which a goal could be modified would be the danger of the destruction of the armed forces. After 1973 there were references to this situation. As General Ismail stated, "I was ready for any losses and sacrifices, but I was determined on one thing, the preservation of my forces." (83:16)

b. What approach should be used in the pursuit of
goals? Should the actor use: 1) prepare ground; 2) try
and see; 3) incremental approach; 4) blitzkrieg.

TABLE 28

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	PREPARE GROUND	17(85)	5(62)	7(70)	8(61)
2	TRY AND SEE				
3	INCREMENTAL				2(16)
4	BLITZKRIEG	3(15)	2(38)	3(30)	3(23)

The military has consistently held that the
best approach to a goal is careful preparation, e.g., "We
are fully prepared." (23:B9) "Entering a battle with the
enemy requires prior preparation and coordination." (68:5)
In point of fact, their beliefs combine both the prepare
ground and blitzkrieg typologies. "The next war will not
be a war restricted only to military operations, it will
be a total war — either survival or extinction of the entire
state and all its sectors. As to when we decide to enter
the battle with the enemy, we must be fully aware that the
state has taken into account the moment that we will enter
the battle with all our might." (74:55) The military has
often touted the beneficial effects of the Yemeni war, but
they have never advocated the try and see method of entering
a war with what they consider to be an uncertain outcome
just to see if the tactics work. Until the end of the 1973

war they also never advocated an incremental approach with intermediate short-term goals. However, after 1973 this belief in incrementalism began to appear. General Ismail said, "The immediate task was to remove the effects of six years waiting under arms." (83:17) There were also references to the fact that the short-term goal of challenging the Israeli security theory might have long-term results. (94:1)

c. Under what circumstances should one push harder, accommodate, or step back?

The military feels that in all situations the best strategy is to push harder, e.g., "Our armed forces will no longer turn the left cheek after the right has been slapped." (16:A16) "Force is the only means to make Israel return Arab territories." (81:13)

I3. How Are the Risks of Political Action Calculated, Controlled, and Accepted?

This category was analyzed differently because the Egyptian military seldom discusses risk in their public statements. However, there are several important speeches, most of which deal with the 1973 war, which indicate the military's attitude toward risk. For this reason no chart nor percentages are presented in this section.

a. How is risk assessed? Does the actor assess risk in terms of: 1) a comprehensive framework. That is, in relation to all of one's goals and aspirations, not just the problem at hand; 2) specific undertakings. The actor calculates risk in light of the particular policy; 3) specific

tactics. The actor assesses risk solely in terms of tactics.
As an example, in this category a bombing raid would be
assessed in terms of its probability for success or failure,
instead of in relation to over-all goals.

The Egyptian military assesses risk in relation
to the overall goals and aspirations. In other words, their
main consideration is usually what effect the success or
failure of a policy or tactic will have on their overall
goals of sovereignty, Arab unity, etc. As an example, the
decision to diversify arms is judged more in terms of its
impact on Egyptian military sovereignty than in terms of
the likelihood for eventual conversion to other sources of
supply. (87:13) In addition, the most frequent references
to risk are couched in terms of a comprehensive goal. "Our
people are aware of the dangers facing them and the stages
of the struggle which they had to go through." (36:B27)

b. What approach should be employed to limit or
control risk? Should the actor limit or scale down goals,
or should he limit means?

The military has changed its approach to con-
trolling risks since the 1973 war. Prior to that, the usual
policy was to limit means, e.g., "We must reinforce this
region with enough forces to insure its security without
prejudicing the main concentration of the nation's forces."
(78:9) However, it appears that they began to think more
in terms of limiting goals as the 1973 war approached. In
trying to convince his troops that they could fight with the

weapons they already had, General Ismail said, "The leadership is bent on assigning tasks to us that can be implemented." (80:20)

c. How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs associated with risk? Does the actor: 1) maximize gains or minimize losses. How does the actor deal with; 2) action versus inaction; 3) immediate action versus delay.

In dealing with tradeoffs, the military at first concentrated on maximizing gains, e.g., "We will crush everything standing in the way of our happiness." (52:4) However, in speeches after the 1973 war, it appears that military leaders had become more interested in minimizing losses. During the 1973 war, General Shazli's concern about losses was reflected in his discussion of the problems of crossing the canal. "The third problem was how the engineers were to carry out these vast engineering operations while they were under fire from the enemy, who controlled the east bank. The fourth problem was how the infantry was to hold out against enemy counter-attacks." (82:1) As General Ismail said after the war, "I knew what it would mean if we lost our army." (83:16)

Given a choice between action and inaction, the military typically believed that some action was necessary. (69:84) They would act immediately instead of delaying, e.g., "There is no reason or logic, nor is there any motivation to delay beginning the struggle now." (76:15) "If we did not start the fighting, the enemy would." (83:17)

d.   In what circumstances are high-risk policies mandatory or permissible? In what circumstances are low-risk policies mandatory or permissible?

The military believes that high-risk policies are necessary in case of a threat to their territory or sovereignty. (13:Al) They are also more inclined to take risks in military situations than when the policy involves international negotiation. (70:65-71) Their stance on positive neutrality is an example of a low-risk policy in international relations.

I4.   What Is the Best Timing of Action to Advance One's Interests?

a.   How important is timing in achieving long-term aspirations? How important is timing in the success of specific policy undertakings?

TABLE 29

	1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
MAJOR ASPIRATIONS				
1 IMPORTANT	12(100	3(50)	5(50)	6(100)
2 NOT IMPORTANT		3(50)	5(50)	
POLICY UNDERTAKINGS				
1 IMPORTANT	8(100)	4(100)	6(60)	6(100)
2 NOT IMPORTANT			4(40)	

There is general agreement along leaders that timing is important in the pursuit of both major goals and specific policies. However, the importance of timing lies

in the importance of always beginning initiatives immediately.
There is a sense of urgency in most of the references to
timing by military leaders, e.g., "We wish to race with
time." (19:B6) "We are approaching crucial and decisive
months in making our decision." (99:4) "We decided to
intervene immediately in case of any aggressive action taken
by Israel against Syria." (69:84) Timing is also seen as
important in battle, although not as important as prepara-
tion. Thus success can be achieved by "exploiting the
element of surprise to a maximum degree, and by shattering
and confusing the enemy command." (87:13)

Those references which indicate that timing was
not important usually stated that outcomes were inevitable
no matter when initiatives were taken. "There shall inevi-
tably be a day when justice and truth will prevail once
mone." (52:1) "We are heading confidently and steadily
toward the realization of the objectives of the Arab nation."
(48:1)

b. Under what circumstances is action required,
permissible, or prohibited?

To the Egyptian military, action is required
to: 1) seize the correct historical moment; 2) in response
to an initiative; 3) during a stalemate.

The first case contained the most references.
The military's belief that they must seize the correct
historical moment is one of the strongest parts of their

code. "All this (strength of the armed forces) is bound to increase their effectiveness and ability to perform their duty upon receiving word that the time has come to move in defense of the honor and rights and cherished aspirations of the Arabs." (52:1) "The day has come for the liberation of Palestine." (64:1)

Action is also required in response to a situation. "The armed forces will be at full alert to carry out their battle assignments on the Israeli front according to developments in the situation." (69:84) Action is also required during a stalemate, as noted by the frequent references to the unacceptability of the no peace, no war attrition from 1968 to 1970. (83:16)

I5. What Is the Utility and Role of Different Means for Advancing One's Interests?

a. What tactics does the actor use? Which tactics are most appropriate and least appropriate for achieving goals?

As mentioned earlier, Egypt over the years changed from elimination of Israel to recovery of occupied territory, and then to challenging the Israeli security there. In addition, Egypt has sought Arab unity through this period.

In pursuit of Arab unity, Egypt has most often used the tactic of the summit conference. This tactic reflects the Arab penchant for arbitration. From the Brioni conference in 1956 to the Rabat conference in 1974, Egypt

has frequently called summit meetings in an attempt to arbitrate disputes and unify the Arab world under the leadership of Egypt.

As for the varying strategies employed against her enemies, usually Israel, the Egyptian military philosophy was summed up by General Amer when he said, "We will use the language of force to establish peace." (1:2) Within this context, the best tactic is seen as mobilization of all the resources of the state to support a massive armed force of coordinating Air Force, Naval, and ground forces, e.g., "Total armed struggle mobilizing all of the resources of the state." (28:B4) "The UAR possess the biggest striking force in the Middle East." (51:1) "It is important that the dissuasive forces should be capable of extending their long arms to deliver this retaliatory blow anywhere." (51:1) "It is the massive preparation, the farsighted planning, the coordination of various branches, and the final mobilization that allowed us to move into the battle together on land, sea, and air." (89:9) General Ismail emphasized this need for coordination when he spoke about the reasons for the 1967 defeat. "There can be no battle without defense from the air ... loss of communications control means loss of the battle." (68:5) Needless to say, the least appropriate tactic in this philosophy is the war of attrition which Egypt engaged in from 1968 to 1970. As General Ismail said tactfully, "My opinion was that the war of attrition had served its purpose." (83:16)

After the 1973 war, this reliance on the use
of force began to change slightly. The military began to
state that "The armed forces stand ready to resume fighting
if peace efforts fail." (97:6) "Political and military
efforts are proceeding along parallel lines." (101:D1)

A tactic that the military has scorned in all
circumstances has been international interference, e.g.,
"Egypt will never agree to any international organization
whatever it may be called." (13:A5) "The United Nations
cannot force Israel to give up the occupied lands." (81:13)

b. What does the actor consider to be politically
relevant power?

TABLE 30

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	MILITARY ONLY	18(69)	15(78)	4(80)	6(100)
2	OTHER	8(31)	4(22)	1(20)	

Obviously, the military feels that the most
politically relevant power is the armed forces. Since the
Egyptian army is the largest in the Middle East and is the
dominant force in Egyptian politics, this is a logical con-
clusion. There are two aspects of this category that are
worth noting. The first is that the philosophy of military
power as the most relevant political force became even
stronger after the army's performance in 1973. Secondly,
it is interesting to note what other sources of power the

military considers relevant. A review of the material indicates that Arab unity has been a dominant theme throughout. In the early years of the regime Egypt's geographic position put it strategically between Africa and the Middle East, and supposedly allowed it domination of the eastern Mediterranean. However, there have been few references to this in recent years. A consistent theme, and the most dominant throughout the period of analysis, has been that confidence and the will of the people are relevant sources of power. As Colonel Sadat stated, "True power is the conviction which stirs a people to struggle for their right to live in freedom." (16:A16) Major Salem, Minister of National Guidance, said, "Japan had been a weak country, but once she had begun to have confidence in herself she became a great power in less than 50 years." (4:1)

     c. What resources does the actor consider available or not available to further political ends?

     The resources that the Egyptians feel will further their political ends the most are:

  1. Socialism.

  2. Modern arms from the superpowers.

  3. Manpower. "It only befits us, as an Arab nation whose population is 110 million people and whose annual national income is more than 26 million dollars, to accept the Israeli challenge." (81:12)

     Socialism and the social system have been mentioned often as a resource. However, the second two items are the

most important in terms of a trend. Until General Sadiq
was dismissed in 1972 the emphasis was on weapons. Indeed,
part of the reason for Israel's miscalculations of 1973 was
that Israeli intelligence did not believe that Egypt would
attack without overwhelming weapons superiority. However,
after General Ismail took command a new philosophy developed.
General Ismail began to preach that the man, not the weapon,
was the most important factor. After the war he stated,
"The strength of a weapon depends on the man who holds it."
(83:17) This feeling that training and the individual
soldier are important is still prevalent today.

On the other side of the ledger, the resource
that the military feels is most lacking is an Arab arms
industry. General Shazli stated in October 1973, "Arab
military production did not exceed 100 million dollars
annually against 427 million dollars worth of Israeli
military production every year." (81:12) In 1974 General
Ismail was still lamenting the fact that "we are not an
arms producing state." (93:6)

d. What is the source of knowledge for the actor's
instrumental beliefs?

TABLE 31

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
1	THEORY	22(43)	17(42)	13(42)	23(57)
2	TRENDS	2(3)	3(8)		
3	EXPERIENCE	7(15)	7(17)	7(26)	4(8)

TABLE 31 (Cont'd)

		1955-61	1961-67	1967-73	1973-75
4	HISTORY	7(15)	3(8)		
5	SPECIFIC EVENT	9(18)	10(25)	5(16)	14(35)
6	FAITH	3(6)		5(16)	

The first aspect of this category to note is
that theory has been the chief source of knowledge for
instrumental beliefs throughout the period of analysis.
This is as opposed to the chief source of knowledge for the
philosophical beliefs, which was specific event interpre-
tation. Examples of these theories are the Egyptian con-
cepts of general mobilization (74:55), economic planning
(19:B5), and the theory that all goals must be accomplished
in the shortest possible time. (36:B28) The comparison
of the sources of knowledge for the two different belief
systems seems to support the contention that the Egyptian
military still maintains definite theories on the conduct
of war and state planning, but seems to adopt its political
philosophy from specific events as each occurs.

The second important aspect of this category is
that specific event interpretation is the second most impor-
tant source of knowledge. The specific events which shape
the military's instrumental beliefs are, of course, the
1967 and 1973 wars. This also seems to support the contention
that the military operates to a large degree on a lessons
learned basis.

VII. <u>SUMMARY</u>

A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

P1a. <u>What is The Eseential Nature of The Political Universe?</u>

The military sees the political universe in a state of perpetual conflict, regardless of the individual successes or failures. They view this conflict as zero-sum in the case of Israel or any other enemy. However, in the area of super-power relations there have been indications of a non-zero-sum philosophy in recent years. They tend to view the basic source of a conflict as an individual state's expansionist desires as opposed to defects in the international system itself. In recent years the state has been Israel backed by the U.S. However, they view conflict as a necessary part of historical development and in the case of military tactics they see conflict as indispensable. They tend to look for linkages between issues and in most cases will view a conflictual situation as a link in the continuing struggle. If they cannot establish a linkage between issues they will look for a spillover from one issue to the next.

P1b. <u>What is The Fundamental Character of Ones Political Opponents and of Other Significant Political Actors?</u>

The Egyptian military seems to be somewhat vague in its assessment of the opponent and his methods for

achieving goals. The military sees Israel as it sees itself. Israel is thought to be interested in expanding its borders to achieve security, a basically defensive orientation. Israel is also seen as being driven by internal needs such as security and economic stability. Russia and the United States are perceived in the same manner.

The military sees conflict as permanent and encompassing all issues. Only recently has there been an indication that problems can be separated from each other and that the specific resolution of Israel's security needs might lead to peace. However, the military also still strongly believes that any conciliation will be ignored and taken advantage of, and that a show of force will make any enemy back down. They also feel that their opponents, and to some extent the United States and Russia, see conflict as inevitable and desirable. They feel that most opponents will try to optimize objectives instead of being satisfied with short term results. They also feel that the opponent is predictable, but unrealistic and inflexible. They feel that Israel uses a blitzkrieg or all out effort to achieve goals, but that the United States and Russia employ more of a piecemeal or incremental approach. In addition, since 1973 the military has begun to believe that Israel is more interested in minimizing losses than in maximizing gains.

Since 1973 there have been few references to how the military feels that opponents regard Egypt. When they

do comment, the military feels that opponents see Egypt
as weak and backward.

One of the most important parts of the question
is the fact that, since 1973, there have been many indica-
tions that the military sees the opponent's nation as con-
sisting of a group of competing elements, some of whom
can be dealt with.

Plc.   What is The Nature of The Contemporary International
System?

The Egyptian military sees the world as definitely
polar. Usually they see the international system as bipolar
with Russia and the U.S. the centers of each pole. Even
when they speak about Russia and the U.S. cooperating in a
Middle East solution, it is from the standpoint of cooperation
between poles.

P2.   What Are The Prospects For The Eventual Realization
of One's Fundamental Political Values and Aspirations?

The military sees itself as it sees it enemies.
That is, they see themselves as motivated by defensive
goals, usually security and maintenance of the status quo.
However, the opponent might have to be destroyed to attain
these goals. The military is generally optimistic about long
term goals like the "final victory", but tends to be pessi-
mistic about short term goals. Optimism or pessimism is
usually contingent on some specific event such as third
world unity, a strong army, Soviet aid, etc. Time is
considered to be on the side of the Egyptians.

P3. <u>Is The Political Future Predictable? In What</u>
<u>Sense and to What Extent? What is The Role of Chance in</u>
<u>Human Affairs?</u>

The military believes that the political future is
predictable, but only because it has faith in the use of
force. Political processes are seen as much less predic-
table. The most predictable part of life is historical
development and the certainty of final victory.

P4. <u>How Much Control or Mastery Can One Have Over</u>
<u>Historical Development?</u>

In almost all cases the military feels that the
leader should actively try to control events and that the
leader can have an effect on both government planning and
international politics.

In formulating its philosophical beliefs the mili-
tary most often forms a general theory from its interpre-
tation of some specific event like a war. Second in impor-
tance is the use of historical parallels. Ideology such
as the philosophy of Nasir or readings from the Koran are
used very little.

B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

I1. <u>What is The Best Approach For Selecting Goals or</u>
<u>Objectives of Political Action?</u>

The military feels that the best approach to
achieving goals is to formulate each objective within a
framework of an overall master plan. The goals themselves

should be more feasible than optimal. In other words, challenge the Israeli security theory rather than destroy her. Since 1973 there has also been an awareness that tradeoffs might be necessary because some goals, such as protection of the army as a political force and destruction of Israel, are incompatible.

I2. How Are The Goals Of Action Pursued Most Effectively?

The best way to pursue a goal is to prepare carefully and then go ahead. Few military leaders advocate an incremental approach of intermediate, short term goals. Once established, a goal cannot be modified or substituted for unless it is scaled up. The only exception is a case in which the entire army is in danger of extinction. In addition the best strategy to achieve goals is to push harder if progress is slow instead of pull back.

I3. How Are The Risks of Political Action Calculated, Controlled, and Accepted?

The risks of political action are assessed in terms of the overall goal, rather than in terms of a specific tactic. The question is not whether the bombing raid will be a success or not, but what effect the bombing raid will have on the achievement of final victory. Given the choice between maximizing gains and minimizing losses, the Egyptian military will opt for minimizing losses. The military will take action over inaction, and will act immediately rather than delay. They will also take more risks in military action than in political action.

I4.   What is The Best Timing of Action to Advance
One's Interests?

Timing is extremely important in achieving goals.
It is usually important to act as soon as possible. Action
is required to: 1) seize the correct historical moment;
2) in response to an initiative; 3) during a stalemate.

I5.   What is The Utility and Role of Different Means
For Advancing One's Interests?

The military feels that ⎯he best tactic is usually
force, and the best use of force is a massive, coordinated
attack by air, naval, and ground forces backed by the full
mobilization of the state. That is, an attack in the Russian
manner. The least appropriate tactic with enemies is the
type of war of attrition used from 1968 to 1970. However,
the best tactic to use among other Arabs is the summit con-
ference, with Egypt in the lead. Needless to say, the most
politically relevant power is the army. Among the resources
that the military values most is manpower, or the individual
soldier. This is as opposed to ultra-modern weapons. Other
resources that are politically relevant are the confidence
and will of the people. The resource that is most lacking
is an Arab arms industry.

The source of knowledge for instrumental beliefs
are general theories such as mobilization, economic planning,
etc., as opposed to specific event interpretation for the
philosophical beliefs. However, specific event interpretation

is the second most important source for instrumental beliefs. In other words, the general theories of politics that the Egyptian military has always maintained act as the chief source of knowledge for strategies and tactics.

VIII. CONCLUSION

A. PREDICTIONS

In using the operational code it is important to remember that the code defines the actor's perception of a problem and his approach to problem solving that has evolved from his political experience. It is, therefore, vital in discovering how a political leader will react to a situation. However, the operational code is only one of the factors involved in a decision. History never totally repeats itself and there are always unique factors which will influence a decision. In addition, a political leader many times operates in an environment of partial knowledge. However, in moments of crisis the actor will rely more and more on the lessons he has learned previously and on his general philosophical and instrumental beliefs, i.e., his operational code. With this caveat in mind several predictions can be made concerning the military's attitudes towards current problems by use of the operational code and historical background.

1. With the continuing emphasis on the individual as Egypt's chief resource, training will continue to play a major role in the planning of the armed forces. Egypt will continue to develop its own facilities for this purpose.

2. On the question of arms diversification the military will be scenario oriented. If the military does not perceive

an immediate threat to its existence, it will go along with President Sadat's efforts to diversify weapons. The military is not satisfied with the performance of either Russian advisors or weapons. However, the military feels that any single alliance with either superpower is domination. A gain for either the U.S. or Russia in Egypt is a loss for the military because of their zerc-sum philosophy. It should be kept in mind that the military sees the international system as one of continuing conflict and will interpret most situations as a crisis. If the military perceives a threat to its position within Egyptian society, it will pursue whatever course is necessary to maintain itself.

3. It is always possible that the military might push for resumption of the war. Their operational code indicates that they feel that it is necessary to take action when presented with an initiative by the enemy. They also feel that it is necessary to seize the correct historical moment to initiate an action. It is against their nature to let that correct moment pass. Also remember that their chief source of knowledge for their philosophical beliefs is interpretation of past events, and they have interpreted the 1973 war as a victory for Egyptian arms. They also believe that a show of force will make an enemy back down. This was one of the reasons for their maneuvering prior to the 1967 war.

4. If the military were to decide to attack again it would be an all out effort, but for limited goals. The military will not jeopardize its existence. The goal of an attack will probably be to challenge the theory that Israeli occupation of the Sinai provides it with defensible boundaries.

5. The one resource which the Egyptians feel that they need the most is an indigenous arms industry. They will continue to try to develop one.

Another set of predictions can be made about the behavior of military elites by using the operational code. One of the objects of this research was to explore the changes in the operational code over the years. The research indicates that there were unique aspects of the military's operational code which gave it the impetus to push for war at all costs after 1967. Should these aspects of the code ever occur again it will be an indication that the military is once again beginning to feel that war is the only answer. The following indicators will be present if the military's operational code reverts to the 1967-73 period.

1. If the conflict with Israel is linked to overall world peace and the military indicates that resolution of this conflict immediately is the only answer to attaining the "final victory."

2. Return to an overwhelming belief that a firm stand by Egypt will be ignored and that force is the only instrument that will work.

3. Continued statements that the world sees Egypt as weak and backward and that Egypt's honor is at stake.

4. Return to a strong model I attitude. That is, a feeling that Israel is a monolithic unit and that there are no competing groups within Israeli politics who might listen to reason.

5. Return to a destructionist attitude.

6. Return to the belief that time is on the side of the opponent.

7. Reappearance of an optimal instead of satisficing strategy.

8. Return to the philosophy that there is only one correct path instead of multiple paths to the achievement of goals.

9. Return to maximizing goals instead of minimizing losses as the best way to cope with risk.

B. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The operational code has proven to be an excellent vehicle for assessing a political leader or group of leaders' approach to decision making and problem solving. Egyptian military elites agreed to a large extent in their operational code and the code was consistent over time. The results of the code agreed with the trends in the history of the Egyptian military. The code is especially effective for military and political analysis because it uncovers those aspects of decision making which are most important in formulating military and political strategy.

There are two criticisms of the results of the code which seem to be valid. The first is that the code was constructed from public statements. Although there is an advantage in this method in that the actor's public statements are easily available and his code can be monitored by most analysts, there is no method for comparing public statements with private statements. Although analysis over time aids in eliminating this problem, further research is needed to compare Egyptian military elite private and public statements. Further research is also needed on other elite groups in the Middle East so that operational codes can be compared. Only then will it be possible to establish whether the operational code construct can distinguish between individuals or between groups. The only group that the code can be compared to at this time is that of the Politburo. A comparison here indicated many differences. The Politburo engaged in intelligent, well calaculated, and pragmatic decision making. The Egyptian military acts on lessons learned and in accordance with the correct historical moment. The Bolsheviks felt that one should not set goals that are feasible, but the Egyptian military since 1973 has begun to adopt this philosophy. There are enough differences in philosophies that a good distinction can be made. However, the test will come in comparing contemporary Middle East groups.

A second set of problems involves construction of the code. As noted in the text, in assessing the military's

philosophy concerning risk taking, the author decided that several statements were more important than others in constructing this part of the code. If the code of the Egyptian elite is a good indicator, subjective judgements by the analyst will always be necessary in constructing an operational code. Therefore, there will be problems in a true quantification of an operational code. The second problem in this area is evident in the reliability test. One statement was selected for analysis because, in the opinion of the author, the statement contained no relevant data for constructing the code. The object of this part of the exercise was to determine if the ten encoders would have a tendency to make inferential leaps about the content of the material. This is one of the most common problems in constructing an accurate operational code. The results show that a majority of the encoders assigned a belief category to this statement. The answers were skewed in several directions. This indicates that considerable training will be necessary if an extremely large group of encoders were used in covering a large body of material. It also indicates that the operational code may best be constructed by a few analysts who are extremely familiar with the methodology. In any event, further research is needed to construct a good reliability test that can be universally applied and can be made a part of the code itself.

APPENDIX A

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION

Average   —   5.3

Low - 1969   —   0

High - 1974 —   14

APPENDIX B

RELIABILITY TEST

The following test was given to ten encoders from the Naval Postgraduate School as described in Section III. The following results were achieved:

1. Intercoder reliability. Overall average reliability of 67.5%.

Question	A.	B.	C.	D.
	80%	50%	50%	60%

2. Comparison of encoder results with the results of the author.

Question	A.	B.	C.	D.
	80%	0	50%	60%

Note that in Question B. none of the encoders agreed with the author. This question was inserted because it did not have any data relevant to the code. The question was whether a group of encoders not extremely familiar with the material or the operational code methodology would tend to make assumptions about the answers to the questions. Apparently they would, regardless of their familiarity or lack of familiarity with the subject. The fact that the author in this case was more conservative than the encoders in collecting data should add validity to this code.

This exercise is intended to explore a political actor's operational code belief system. The code includes beliefs concerning the political universe, one's fundamental goals, the best strategy for achieving these goals, and a conception of what the opponent's goals are. Please read each passage and then select the best answer to the question which follows. Place an x next to the appropriate response. Do not infer anything. If there is no specific sentence or phrase in the passage which indicates the actor's belief, mark no reference. Disregard prior opinions about the countries involved.

A. In these decisive days in the history of humanity, in these days when justice struggles to defend its existence in the face of the falsehoods, aggression, evil, international chaos, domination, tyranny and imperialism, in these days Egypt, your homeland, stands firm in safeguarding its sovereignty.

What is the nature of the political universe?

   1. Conflictual (x) The author states that conflict is the normal state of relations.

   2. Mixed ( ) There is reference to both conflictual and consensual aspects of the international system.

   3. Harmonious ( ) The actor regards the political universe as one with many shared interests among individuals, nations, etc.

   4. No reference ( )

B. I particularly single out the imperialist base threatening
peace. Israel's policy is built on aggression. Israel
obtains modern arms to gain armament supremacy.

What are the opponent's goals?

1. Destructionist ( ) The opponent is believed to have
virtually unlimited goals; such as universal hegemony,
destruction or radical transformation of the international
system.

2. Expansionist ( ) The opponent is regarded as aggressive,
but his goals fall short of total destruction.

3. Defensive ( ) The opponent is believed to be primarily
concerned with his own security or maintenance of some
status quo.

4. Conciliatory ( ) The opponent is vewed as ready and
willing to undertake at least limited accommodation.

5. No reference (x)

C. As for coordination, it is 100% coordination on the
military level and 100% coordination at the political
level. As military men we have a clear objective, namely
liberating our lands and giving the Palestinian people
their legitimate rights. We are training and working
sincerely to achieve this objective with our military
means.

What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?

1. Destructionist ( ) The actor's goals are unlimited,
including universal hegemony.

2. Expansionist ( ) Although the actor is active in the
pursuit of interests, his goals fall short of total destruc-
tion, and do not include transformation of the international
system.

3. Defensive (x) The actor is primarily concerned with
security and maintenance of the status quo. His quest for
security may infringe on another's sovereignty and could
even lead to destroying part of the opponent's nation.
His concept of the status quo may also be open to question.
However, he sees himself as primarily concerned with security
instead of hegemony or territorial expansion.

4. Conciliatory ( ) The actor desires at least limited
accommodation.

5. Active seeker of peace ( ) The actor desires to
undertake major initiatives for peace.

6. No reference ( )

D. The next war will not be a war restricted only to military
operations, it will be a total war — either survival or
extinction of the entire state and all its sectors. As to
when we decide to enter the battle with the enemy, we must
be fully aware that the state has taken into account the
moment that we will enter the battle with all our might,
our capacities, and our human and material resources in
every section of the state by means of complete general
mobilization to serve the war effort.

What are the approaches to the pursuit of goals?

1. Prepare ground ( ) The actor believes that the best way to pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations.

2. Try and see ( ) The actor takes action as a way of testing what is feasible and what is not. It is not necessary or feasible to determine what the outcome will be.

3. Incremental ( ) The actor emphasizes the value of limited gains.

4. Blitzkrieg strategy (x) The actor believes that the most effective strategy involves committing a major portion of one's resources and a full scale effort to deal with the problem.

5. No reference ( )

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