



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UNIONIZATION OF UNIFORMED PERSONNEL  
IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE:  
THE QUANDARY OF THE SEVENTIES

THESIS

AFIT/GSM/SM/77S-4      Thomas W. Griesser  
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9 Master's THESIS


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## Preface

This study covers an area that attracted my attention almost three years ago. The unionization of Air National Guard Technicians and the organizing of enlisted crewmembers of the 514th Reserve Associate Wing at McGuire Air Force Base indicated to me that active duty Air Force personnel would eventually become the target of promoters of a military union. The subject is an extremely vital one which warranted a full-scale research effort to increase my knowledge and present material for the edification of others.

I am grateful to the many individuals who aided me with their time and effort, but I would like to identify a few in particular. First and foremost, I extend sincere thanks and appreciation to my thesis advisor, Lieutenant Colonel T. Roger Manley, for the direction, recommendations, and encouragement he provided during this arduous effort. Valuable aid was also obtained from Majors Charles McNichols and Saul Young and Captain Michael Stahl, all renowned AFIT "experts" on this issue. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the numerous participants and attendees of the 39th MORS for their time, attention, and indulgence with me as a student in this area. Most of all, the accomplishment of this thesis would have been impossible had it not been for the unfaltering love, aid, and enthusiasm of my wife, Beth, who provided the necessary secretarial skills and endured numerous editing sessions.

Thomas W. Griesser

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Abstract

→ This study provides a qualitative investigation of the military unionization movement, with its focus on the U.S. United States Air Force. The background for this report was based on a compilation of the most current information available dealing with the issue. This study also draws upon recent empirical research material which focuses upon the attitudes and opinions of military members ranging in rank from full colonel wing commanders to lower grade, enlisted personnel.

→ Forces both for and against unionization were explored in this study. Also identified and evaluated were major, perceived benefits and disadvantages of an Air Force union. The sources of empirical data were a large-scale unionization survey conducted by <sup>AFIT</sup> faculty members at the Air Force Institute of Technology and ancillary studies of selected Army personnel. These studies provided the bases from which discussion of the problems, effectiveness, impact, and appeal of a union in relation to the military members was derived. These quantitative aspects were then contrasted to more subjective evaluations of uniformed personnel.

Traditional patriotic values were investigated in terms of societal influences and the popular concepts of <sup>sociologist Charles Moskos'</sup> the 'institution-occupation' theory, of sociologist Charles Moskos. The applicability of the relationship of private,



(cont. from p vi)

public, and federal labor-management relations and the examples provided for any military unionism movement were also <sup>studied.</sup> ~~covered.~~

This study would appear to offer a good basis for each interested Air Force member to use in deriving his own personal attitudes concerning the issue. Additionally, the study would seem to indicate the need for possible Department of Defense and internal Air Force change and improvement in order to insure maximum development of human resources.

## UNIONIZATION OF UNIFORMED PERSONNEL

### IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE:

### THE QUANDARY OF THE SEVENTIES

#### I. Introduction

Traditionally, military members of the United States Air Force have relied on the judgment and decisions of the government executive and legislative branches and on the influential Air Force leaders to attend to their well-being. Recent events reported in the Air Force Times and other informative sources imply a challenge to this traditional system of providing for the members in uniform. Currently, interest in a more active representation system which takes the form of military unionism is at its highest level and appears to be increasing. It has even been professed that uniformed personnel in the Department of Defense are currently the only major group of employed Americans which have yet to be unionized (Grebeldinger, 1976).

This study will concentrate on events of the recent past which contribute to the possibility of a "blue-suit union". The predominant political, economic, and sociological aspects and implications of such a military union will be the main focus of attention. The importance of the issue cannot be underestimated for it eventually may affect all uniformed members of the United States Air Force and a large number of civilians.

## Background

The progress and achievements attained by labor representatives in private sector labor-management relations provide a convenient precedent for follow-on activities in the public and federal employment sectors. The basic sociological and economic fact that a free enterprise system inevitably produces employer-employee conflict extends to all three of these realms of labor relations (Badami, 1973). Although the operation of a military service is far from being a true "free enterprise system", the impact of these inherent characteristics is apparent in these current times.

In a recent study by Hagen and Johnson (1975) the authors contend that two factors enhancing the possibility of a military union are the implementation of the All Volunteer Force and the precedents established for federal employees by Executive Order 10988. The All Volunteer Force tended to civilianize the military to a limited degree by relaxing traditional demands on a conscripted armed force. The 1962 Executive Order has been described by other authors as allowing ... "government employees to organize and bargain with management, if only in a limited manner" (Gilpin & Haas, 1974, p. 2). However, other recent factors also tend to promote the desirability of a service union. The after-effects of the United States experience in Vietnam have only been partially realized. The tragedy and results of Watergate tend to weigh on the minds of those dedicated to the protection of the nation. Additionally, current

national politics dealing with defense expenditure cuts that may directly and indirectly affect each member of the armed forces may also foster a desire for strength in accumulated numbers through union organization.

#### Objectives and Scope

The objective of this study is to present a thorough investigation of the current possibility of the unionization of the United States Air Force. Particular emphasis has been given to a consolidation of past articles and works which deal with the issue of military unionization. Additionally, this work discusses and assimilates new concepts that augment and lend credence to the information of earlier investigations.

This study is designed to differ from earlier works in a variety of ways in that it will concentrate on the aspects and peculiarities of unionization of one specific service. Secondly, the revolutionary type issues of associations such as the American Serviceman's Union, popular during the Vietnam conflict, will not be the focus of attention. This study discusses modern military unionism as being concerned with issues that are more pertinent to each individual armed forces member and have less drastic ideological overtones. Finally, it will forego the somewhat traditional investigation of the military unions of various European countries. The writer must concur with Badami (1973) who observed that "recent writers have placed great weight on these



foreign examples as precedent for servicemen's unions in the American military" (p. 59). The experiences in these European nations are derived from unique political histories with correspondingly peculiar labor-management relationships which are generally recognized as being more supportive of trade unionism in the armed forces. Clear cut one-to-one comparisons with the United States situation are difficult to construct, and logical conclusions derived from such comparisons are difficult to justify.

#### Methodology

This study will examine the possibility of a union for military members of the United States Air Force through the use of historical and comparative analyses. However, it will not entail a detailed historical study of private sector trade unions and industrial relations within the United States. Because no specific survey data were generated exclusively for this investigation, the results of past questionnaires and interviews will be the source of quantitative information. In an effort to create this more current approach to the issue, professional studies, academic theses, as well as magazine and newspaper articles from the 1960's and 1970's serve as the primary information source. The implied results will be compared and contrasted to basic content of other associated recent works and publications.

In order to determine the possibility of unionization

within the Air Force ranks particular emphasis will be given to the review of the advantages and disadvantages of such representation to military personnel.

A detailed survey of available information is included which may help determine future trends of the movement. Various professional studies will be augmented by the recent, highly regarded work performed at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). Additionally, written correspondence of military members will be examined to determine any noticeable trend of service members to the issue. Finally, the positions of various existing professional associations in relation to a military unionization issue will be explored.

Chapter IV of the report will serve as a comparison of past traditional military values in light of current societal attitudes and pertinent organizational theory.

The somewhat vague aspects of possible military unionism concerns the designation of "who is management?" The fifth chapter will consider this question of categorization. The nature of collective bargaining in federal labor relations is an issue continually contested. The appropriateness of this process in any future labor relations in the various military services is an equally controversial issue and is also discussed.

The findings are summarized in the final chapter. The conclusions of this historical search will hopefully provide insight to the relative possibility of a unionized force of airmen and officers and the associated problems,

which could be encountered as early as next year. The research is conducted for the purpose of providing meaningful background for guidance of present and future official Air Force action with the unionization issue.

## II. Benefits and Disadvantages of Air Force Unionism

In February of 1977, Senator Strom Thurmond went on record stating that, "Unionization of the American armed services would cause enemies of freedom to rejoice all over the world" (AEI Defense Review, 1977, p. 25). This rather extreme proclamation tends to ignore a factor of the analysis that seems to be increasing in importance. In his actual discussion of the case against military unionization he contended that the vital issue must be judged on the single merit of national welfare. Although it is assumed that the national interest and primary support of national policy is of utmost importance to most uniformed members of the United States Air Force, it seems unreasonable to totally disregard the position of the individual serviceman in this era of modern organizational development. A valid appreciation of the gains and handicaps of a service union, which are derived from the perceptions of the military members themselves, is a most important aspect of the unionization issue that cannot be foreshadowed. Idealistic, scholastic reasons of justification of the issue must also be evaluated as they pertain to Air Force members.

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate present, major advantages and disadvantages of a service union for the officer and enlisted members of the United States Air Force. Such classifications should be tempered by the observations



of Quinn and Grabler (1971) who held that it would be foolish to attempt to propose any single issue as all good or all bad. The codification of the characteristics that follow is intended to reflect the general consensus which the writer construes to be the majority opinion of Air Force members.

The initial affirmation of this report stressed the past importance of civilian paternalistic attitudes and actions. Hagen and Johnson (1975) found that abolition of mandatory military service and the establishment of the All Volunteer Force raised ... "serious questions about congressional paternalism" (p. 65). They contend that the selective service draft made the legislators feel more obligated to servicemen because a cross culture representing the entire American society existed. Additionally, increases in tangible gains in the form of financial rewards and benefits resultant from an All Volunteer Force decreased congressional liability and placed more responsibility on the actual service departments themselves (Hagen & Johnson, 1975). This increased reliance on improved tangible benefits and a greater overall Air Force responsibility to its members kindles and supports a military-type system of "industrial jurisprudence." These situations tend to promote the system which was stressed by Professor Sumner H. Slichter. The increased emphasis on immediate economic aspects forces present-day Air Force members to be more concerned about fending for themselves without the

auspices of numerous legislative leaders. This reality imparts a military equivalent of the conduct of industrial relations whereby individual subordinates may desire a stronger voice in formulating the rules by which they work and live (Bloom & Northrup, 1977).

The explanations that follow indicate that advantages of a service union to Air Force members are of both the tangible and intangible type. Unionization would afford officer and enlisted personnel benefits that could be more readily recognized in a timely manner. The disadvantages of unionization might be seen as affecting the Air Force as a service rather than influencing each member individually. Additionally, the detriments seem to deal with aspects that would be relevant in the future rather than the present.

#### Tangible Benefits

A union for United States Air Force military personnel could attempt to secure certain future increased financial benefits for its members. Although Department of Defense policy currently prohibits "negotiation or bargaining over terms and conditions of military service," a strong representative agency probably could not be ignored. The tendency to shift budget appropriations from manpower expenditures in order to sustain an increase of hardware expenditures could be directly confronted (AEI Defense Review, 1977).

Wages. An old adage pertinent to the military held that

one could order a soldier to do just about anything legal and one could work him long hours, but it was almost sacrilegious to tamper with his pay. Increases in pay and salary equity in comparison to that of private sector employees probably comprise a major portion of the "bread and butter" issues sought by the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (The Times Magazine, 24 September 1975). Although military pay has increased tremendously since the early sixties, most servicemen seem to feel that annual pay raises have not offset current cost of living increases (Manley, McNichols & Young, 1977c). Inflation and continued rising costs continue to jeopardize the financial position of the Air Force member even with past pay raises and annual hikes in base pay. In the initial stages of organization to consider military unions, Clyde M. Webber stated that ... "economic issues are of ever-increasing importance to military men and women" (The Times Magazine, 24 September 1975, p. 22). The concern over such issues is equally affected by the historical fact that unions gained much of their popularity by attaining higher wages and pay for their members.

In the past, stringent arguments for the relatively lower military salary were justified by the improved sense of job security enjoyed by service members. Except in times following major wars or during announced and planned Reductions in Force the military member was almost assured of steady employment and income. The opportunity cost in



actual pay to the serviceman of this perceived sense of job security may be outmoded. Currently, some unions in the private sector have negotiated lifetime guarantees of work clauses in new contracts. Demands of this type obtained by such unions as the United Steelworkers and the Longshoremen's Unions enable their members to receive substantial portions of their usual wage, even if they are out of work for extended periods until an early retirement.

The Defense Manpower Commission Report (1976) extends the discussion of equity of wages by considering compensation issues in terms of "comparability" and "competitiveness." The report reiterates that a true comparison of the functions of military members with private sector employees is a difficult task. Yet, comparable pay and work aspects in relation to the private sector might seem to be diminishing because "the principle items of military compensation are increased across the board by the average increase in Civil Service salaries" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 283). However, the comparability principle may not be totally without merit regarding specific military tasks. Comparisons can be made between the job of an Air Force computer technician/programmer and his civilian counterpart who may work for Honeywell or International Business Machines. In this instance, the work itself as well as a person's longevity could be a sound basis for determining wages or for authorizing bonuses in the form of proficiency pay. The abolition or disregard for such bonuses could indeed be

an item of negotiation by a representative organization. Additionally, another comparison can be made between the pilots of the Military Airlift Command and commercial airline pilots. A comparable type of work and a similar work environment exists which also warrants attention under the comparability principle.

The Defense Manpower Commission concludes that "the dominant principle is that compensation should be competitive. It should be adequate to attract and retain the desired quantity and quality of personnel" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 286). If competitiveness is to be regarded with such great importance in determining Air Force salaries, perhaps the system has inherent internal inconsistencies. The retention rate of Air Force enlisted computer technicians is quite low. Many are attracted by civilian industry where comparable jobs bring higher pay. The same can be noted for the newer pilots flying in the Military Airlift Command. The Air Force compensation system does not seem to compete with those of civilian airline corporations.

In light of the stressed importance of the competitive principle, the Commission tends to seriously underestimate the value of collective bargaining. The implications that "comparability" and "competitiveness" are inconsistent with collective bargaining must be studied very carefully. Both are important aspects to be considered in relation to other compensatory alternatives that might increase the attractiveness of a union to active duty Air Force members.

Benefits. Apart from his basic military salary, the Air Force member derives important financial advantages from the so-called "fringe benefits" to which he is entitled. The term "fringe benefit" as used in this work refers to supplementary services or monetary allowances that help the officer or airman manage his personal and fiscal affairs. Some seemingly economic disadvantages of military life tend to be offset by these benefits. They are also referred to as "institutional benefits" and entail such things as medical care, commissary and base exchange privileges, on-base housing, and quarters and subsistence allowances (Defense Manpower, 1976).

The Defense Manpower Commission (1976) stresses the importance of convenience attributes and monetary advantages is supplemented by very pertinent psychological aspects. The military member derives a "sense of belonging" from these "fringe benefits," and from them he may be comforted by the fact that the Air Force is attempting to "take care of its own." This sense of security derived from these intrinsic benefits has a direct impact on the overall morale level within each service.

Unfortunately, various attempts to combat rising personnel costs have been aimed at decreasing some of these assumed advantages. Recent attacks on military commissaries survived past legislative modifications, but this issue is sure to reappear in the future. The current plan to meter utilities in on-base quarters will abolish a traditional benefit.

The current appeal of contemporary unionization seems to stem from the perceived erosion of benefits illustrated in the preceeding examples. The findings of the Defense Manpower Commission held that "attacks on these benefits arouse emotional reactions among military personnel all out of proportion to the intrinsic value of these benefits" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 340 [italics added]). Perhaps the implication here is that the monetary cost of these fringe benefits to the Department of Defense is more than outweighed by the innate, intangible worth assigned to them by Air Force servicemen. Therefore, the piecemeal dollar and cents savings must be closely scrutinized in terms of morale and attractiveness of Air Force duty. Senator Strom Thurmond (1977) supports this caution by indicating that perceived erosion of benefits is entirely detrimental to a well-motivated volunteer force. Finally, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management, Everett T. Keech, supports the tremendous impact of the erosion of benefits problem. Testifying before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed Services Committee, he stated:

We have been unable to overcome the impact on the morale of our people of the changes in military pay and benefits that have occurred over the past few years. Further, our attempts to explain and/or justify the rationale behind these various changes to our members has only served to create a significant and widening credibility gap. (Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 April 1977)

The significance of these statements in relation to the



basic issue should be explicitly clear. Dedicated career and first-term Air Force personnel may want to see more lucid expressions of concern for their welfare in these times of increasing tangible benefits for workers in private industries. The active representation inherent in unionism may provide an attractive means of sustaining or promoting these indirect incentives that help compensate for some of the harsher elements of military service. Active participation in future analysis may be deemed much more advantageous to the cause of the serviceman rather than the traditional advisory roles of professional associations and other agencies.

Retirement System. Clearly one of the most prevalent attractions to an Air Force career is the present retirement system. Most assuredly members consider this program to be a form of deferred compensation for twenty or more years of faithful service. The deferred extrinsic rewards inherent in the system create a strong financial motivation for men and women to join the Air Force and to make it a career (Porter, Lawler & Hackman, 1975).

The rising costs of this pension system make it a prime target for cutting defense manpower expenses. Indeed the Defense Manpower Commission kindles such attempts by concluding that "the military retirement system is not comparable to civilian retirement systems and is more generous" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 373). Such a statement and its intimate suggestions of change may seem unpalatable



to the Air Force member who served one or two assignments in the Vietnam conflict that produced the only American seven-year prisoners of war. Current proposed alterations to the present twenty-year retirement "privilege" range from extending the required amount of military service to thirty years to contributory programs which might establish the practice of vesting. The overall potential costs of a vested military retirement system must be carefully scrutinized. The establishment of vesting and settlements through severance pay may ultimately prove to be more costly because members are no longer compelled by the "golden handcuffs" motivation. After serving an established length of duty, proposed to be ten years, an Air Force individual can separate and not necessarily lose the financial benefit of his accrued time. Unpopular policy decisions could more easily result in retention losses and an increase in necessary recruiting and training costs.

The Commission ultimately asserts that the present military retirement system is inconsistent with defense requirements, and that a major restructuring is required (Defense Manpower, 1976). Such a conclusion undermines the present worth of the system to current and potential Air Force personnel. In order to sustain that worth, these personnel may find attractive the active participation of a union in the determination of future alterations or revisions. The national interest factor probably would remain of most significant importance in light of the estimated 1977 cost of over ten billion dollars for the present system. However,

the individual interests of the men and women in Air Force uniform must also be remembered. A union professes to assure the consideration of this factor.

### Intangible Benefits

The non-traditional form of motivation which deemphasizes authority and economic rewards would tend to appeal to areas of intangible interest of Air Force personnel. Union affiliation holds the possibility of broadening the prestige of an individual while conversely protecting that individuality through a more effective investigation of asserted injustices.

Prestige. In general, the United States Air Force is marked by a higher degree of prestige than other sister services (Moskos, 1977). Due to less manual labor and higher technical aspects of Air Force duties, this service enjoys a greater sense of dignity and has less problems attracting new recruits.

However, the stigma of the recent Vietnam experience still affects both the service as a whole and its individual members. The association of uniformed Air Force members with the unpopular military experience creates a somewhat hostile external environment for those personnel. Additionally, recollections of the low economic position held by servicemen in the past may invoke visions of a second class citizenry. The mere fact that the defense budget is continually under attack while other government programs, such as those associated with health, education, and welfare,

grow in scope is in itself a rather demeaning situation.

The introduction of unionism into the United States Air Force could serve a two-fold purpose. The first advantage would be that "an effective military union can provide a great service in increasing the status or prestige of a military career in the eyes of the general public" (Quinn & Grabler, 1971, p. 29). This first aspect would be for unions to deal with perceptions and opinions of the population outside the military. Additionally, the advent of unionism could bolster the self-perceptions of the military members themselves. Ideally, through active representation, servicemen's attitudes would be respected and presented during appropriate negotiations. Their opinions concerning wages, fringe benefits, changes to the retirement system, and many other issues could possibly be more effectively presented by an agency familiar with the procedures in the civilian sector.

Other secondary advantages may also be derived. An increase in recognition and prestige may strengthen the overall military influence. This development could attract a greater quantity and a higher quality of volunteer recruits into the Air Force. Additionally, a greater sense of work stability may be instilled. A stronger sense of self-esteem with one's Air Force profession could foster greater personal and job satisfaction. A more stable work force may result in less attrition thereby resulting in decreased recruitment and training expenses. These advantages are admittedly quite hypothetical and are totally

dependent on actual reception of the unionization concept and the manner in which internal operations are conducted.

Grievances. The intangible benefit derived from heightening one's own self-image does not totally encompass the non-material advantages of unionization of military services. Future changes to internal military operations may also be credited to the union influence.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the current methods of handling grievances from within the ranks is questionable. This discussion assumes and deals with only those complaints and allegations of injustices that are substantial in nature and in importance. Grievances of this type involve circumstances of an Air Force member's personal life or work environment which justify the protestation of actual or supposed occurrences. Petty gripes by perpetual trouble makers are not the gist of the following discussion.

With all due respect, the writer must disagree with the allegation of Professor Ezra Krendel (1975) who contends that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and ... "a variety of effective grievance procedures" are in fact quite efficient and satisfy the serviceman's requirement for due process (p. 207). The present grievance structure provides absolutely no guarantee of anonymity. Under both the Congressional inquiry method and by voicing grievances through the Office of the Inspector General the identity of the grievant is not concealed. Meaningful communication between the individual voicing a complaint and the alleged



offender is almost non-existent. The effort expended by both parties does not seem to be directed toward solving the actual problem. Conversely, the effort expended by both sides seems to be directed at attacking the other party (Kolb, Rubin & McIntyre, 1974). An investigation of the two grievance procedures noted above, reveals striking flaws in each.

The Inspector General on most Air Force installations is the vice commander of the unit. He is readily available to all officers and airmen in an effort to resolve any complaints. The finding of the 1946 board to investigate officer-enlisted relationships that ... "the office of the Inspector General.... (is) ineffectual and insufficiently manned" seems still very apropos. Questions regarding the effectiveness and the security of privileged information between the complainant and the Inspector General severely limit this means of resolving grievances. The close proximity to the chain of command of the Inspector General and other influential military managers tends to hamper this structure of resolving injustices. Hagen and Johnson (1975) feel that "many career officers and enlisted men believe it is career suicide to formally object to arbitrary decisions by their commander" (p. 82). The lack of faith in this system severely jeopardizes its usefulness, and hinders service personnel from expressing pertinent opinions.

The Congressional inquiry system is also of questionable utility in helping resolve grievances. Each serviceman has the right to ... "petition Congress for redress of a grievance"

(Badami, 1973, p. 71). An individual may derive gratification by the mere act of writing to his Congressman, but the satisfaction he gets by obtaining an uncomplicated solution of his complaint is questionable. The contents of a grievant's letter are forwarded back to his unit for action and reply. The system breaks down in that "acting on a complaint generally necessitates revealing the soldier's identity" (Badami, 1973, p. 72), and most individuals balk at the possibility of revealing themselves in such situations. The procedure due to these inherent drawbacks is unattractive, cumbersome, and potentially career damaging.

The detriments of these two means of handling grievances reveal the need for a more effective procedure to protect the rights of all officers and airmen. A union could provide such ... "a system which would provide a means of expressing real grievances without fear of reprisal through the military chain of command" (Hagen & Johnson, 1975, p. 83). Opponents of this proposal may argue that this new grievance handling structure may cause increased problems and would be detrimental to mission accomplishment. David Cortright counters the first argument by stating that ... "unions do not create employee grievances they simply try to deal with them and erase their causes" (AEI Defense Review, 1977, p. 13). Secondly, the conduct of most union grievance procedures in civilian industries is based on the precedent of settling any problems at the lowest possible management level. This practice saves time, money and administrative paperwork for all concerned. Therefore, an adaptive union-type

grievance procedure could possibly tend to benefit mission accomplishment by dealing with pertinent problems at the level at which they occur. A recognized union would be the exclusive bargaining agent for the servicemen which would provide an interface and would help articulate problems to military management and to legislative leaders. A credible and impartial third-party union partaking in military grievance procedures could assure that the identity of the complainant is not revealed and would help insure positive, deliberate action on complaints resulting in mutually satisfactory remedies to problems of non-operational matters.

#### Tangible Disadvantages

Unlike the material benefits that tended to serve the individual member, the tangible detriments of an Air Force union affect both the military man or woman and the entire service. Basically the more predominant tangible disadvantages encompass the financial aspects and organizational features of unionization within a specific armed service. These intrinsic characteristics deal with the possible institution of a union in a totally new environment.

Dues. The concept of unionization of the United States Air Force seems to offer redress for current internal problems. This appeal to officers and airmen is characterized by the affirmation that "Servicemen need somebody to represent them, that's for sure" (Air Force Times, 16 July 1975, p. 3). Obviously, AFGE has no intention of performing

this service free of charge.

The requirement for Air Force personnel to pay union dues has received little mention by the proponents of unionism. Just as monetary aspects such as wages present certain pecuniary advantages to service personnel, these same aspects present a hindrance to the concept. Dues will have to be paid from the same pocket that will receive potential salary raises. In September 1975, Mr. Clyde M. Webber made brief mention of the subject of union dues that were assessed against AFGE members at the time. He stated that total dues per month for most members came to about six dollars (The Times Magazine, 24 September 1975). That figure alone is not too significant but when annual payments are computed, the possible cost per member for a military union would be \$72. Although this is not a staggering price, it does seem significant enough to make both officers and airmen stop and reconsider the worth of union membership.

The method of assessing these dues is an equally important aspect. In that same article, Webber stated that these dues are charged to all members at a flat rate. If this discussion is carried over to the possibility of an Air Force union, all members, whether officers or airmen, would pay the same amount regardless of rank or grade.

Additionally and more importantly, the flat rate system would be most detrimental to those individuals probably most attracted by unionization. There is less disagreement over the need for a union with airmen than there is with



officers (Manley, McNichols & Young, 1976b). From the same source it can be construed that Air Force enlisted personnel are less opposed to joining a military union. Therefore, the lower grade, first-term enlisted personnel, who may accept unionism more readily, will be less able to afford the necessary dues.

The necessity for the payment of these relatively high dues in comparison to current membership costs of various Air Force professional associations may be a counter argument well employed against unions. The membership fees of these associations is much less than \$72 per year. It might behoove their management to have Air Force personnel question the true worth of union membership in relation to possible derived benefits.

Administrative Burden. A review of the labor-management relations structure for non-uniformed Federal workers and in the private sector shows that the establishment and adaptation of a union to United States Air Force operations would be exceedingly costly in terms of money, manpower, and wasted energy. A detailed examination of the legal ramifications that could arise due to the interrelation of a servicemen's union and the Air Force would require a thesis-length report in itself. The following discussion deals with major aspects that could arise and with which Air Force managers can readily identify.

A main difference that Air Force personnel would recognize in day-to-day dealings with a military union would be a

noticeable change in established procedures. The union would be one more agency, that would have to be informed and advised on a large number of matters affecting uniformed personnel. Air Force managers would have to adapt to this change in communication. The addition of this supplementary agency would have a tendency to increase required paperwork and hence enlarge the total amount of "red tape". Undoubtedly, union representatives would require an information copy of all correspondence which concerned the welfare of any or all personnel. This increased correspondence with union representatives would add to an already overtaxed administrative workforce (Farrington, 1976).

Current practices which are presently taken for granted would probably require considerable revamping. The common practice of administering an Article 15 could conceivably require the presence of a union representative. Grievances could be contested if specific rights of union representation were to be overlooked. The necessities of such strict procedures provide the possibility of the loss of high amounts of productive time. If union representatives were to become so intently concerned with the working hours of military personnel as they are with civilian starting and stopping times, the entire operation of an Air Force installation would indisputably be altered.

The advent of unionism would create a new realm of expertise in the labor-management relations field for Air Force personnel. Unique, additional requirements and changes in past procedures would probably manifest the

authorization of completely new manpower slots. These necessary positions would be staffed with people whose only job would be to represent the Air Force during dealings with the union. In all probability, it is imaginable that additional-duty positions would also be created at all levels of an organization to help insure adequate and legal relations concerning union matters. The hindrances in terms of manpower and time associated with these personnel practices is incalculable. One thing that is certain is that any costs associated with a union representing Air Force members would not be shared by that union. Expenses arising from alterations of old techniques or implementation of new union procedures would be the burden of the Department of the Air Force.

Associated with any new Air Force manpower positions created specifically to deal with unions is the required training of the individuals to fill those positions. Highly legalistic and sophisticated preparation would be required for these Air Force members. Additionally, Air Force commanders and supervisors at all levels would definitely have to attend some sort of Labor-Management Relations training in order to prepare for transactions with unions. The results of a recent AFIT survey reveal that Air Force personnel have an extremely low level of knowledge of Federal Labor-Management Relations (Manley, McNichols & Young, 1976b). Therefore, the need for such training is quite evident. The expense of such training in terms of time, effort, and dollars is again highly uncertain. Due

to the complexity of the subject matter, one can envision such training as being conducted similar to Human Relations training. If so, then every Air Force member could probably appreciate the cost to the Air Force in terms of facilities and unproductive time. Similarly, such expenses would be charged to the Department of the Air Force.

This brief examination reveals concealed expenses which do not readily come to mind during superficial discussion of the Air Force unionization topic. Of utmost importance is the fact that these are tangible disadvantages that affect the service as a whole and each and every uniformed Air Force member.

#### Intangible Disadvantages

The most emotional and vociferant arguments by Air Force and political leaders opposing any form of military unionization are based upon its intangible failings. These failings are in fact related to the overall effect on the national interests of the United States which would be particularly noticeable to the American public. Opponents contend that unionization is a blatant attack on command authority and as such fosters a decline in discipline. This division of loyalty of Air Force members could result in loss of pride and professionalism. Military unionization could have hidden political implications for the nation, and any form of aggressiveness in the movement could tarnish the public image of the United States Air Force. Finally, the most horrifying of all possible implications of a service



union would be the possibility of a strike by officers and airmen.

Impact on Discipline. Air Force leaders are strongly opposed to third-party union intervention into internal operational affairs. This intervention could seriously detract from the established chain of command as it exists today. The concept of an external interest faction monitoring Air Force management practices is probably the most distasteful aspect of the unionization movement. The increased pressure of dealing with new concepts of union influence and control is construed as having possible adverse effects on mission effectiveness.

The introduction of union organization trying to assist in the formulation of management policy could possibly result in a decline in discipline. On one hand, Air Force leaders would be less able to exert unilateral policy decisions without fear of being second guessed by union representatives. This hampering structure of third-party review could contribute to a sense of lack of faith in command leadership.

A corresponding, follow-on effect of this action could be an unforeseen division of loyalty of Air Force personnel. This may arise because of the primary union function to solve problems between superiors and subordinates. Air Force union members would be influenced by self-interest aspects of a union seeking sustained or improved benefits, and yet these same individuals are constrained by self-dedication to Air Force leadership and to the overall

mission. The commitment to either one cause or the other presents a tremendous possibility of internal, individual conflict that could result in deep-rooted problems throughout the service.

Loss of Pride. The United States Air Force is proud of a strong and still developing sense of tradition, esprit de corps, and professionalism. Another possible danger of third-party involvement by military unions would be a curtailment of these feelings. Union dedication to and concern with member monetary and financial betterment could detract from past heritage. Members could be inclined to review Air Force duty as just a job, and the Air Force would be seen merely as an employer (Moskos, 1976). An increase in concern for economic interests could attack officer and airmen concern for professional aspects of Air Force service. Additionally, the strong association with a larger group of non-military union members could detract from the pride and camaraderie which men and women in an Air Force uniform share today.

The Strike Issue. Perhaps the most highly feared issue of military unionization is the concern over the right to strike of American servicemen. Clyde M. Webber tried to make it very clear that AFGE has no intention of advocating the right of military personnel to strike (The Times Magazine, 24 September 1975). However, in the same article he also concedes that union organizations do not really have absolute control over their members. The fact that

..."people will take things into their own hands when they feel they have to" (Strickland, 1976, p. 144) is illustrated by the large-scale postal employees' strike of 1970. Therefore, if the members decide to strike over an issue, there is little that the organization can do to prevent it. The 1976 vote by AFGE delegates to authorize a strike call by leadership and to approve a strike fund enhances the possibility of the use of a strike by AFGE members as a persuasion tool against management (AEI Defense Review, 1977). This two-sided volatile argument tends to weaken the cause for military unionization because of the dangerous effects of possible strike or work slowdowns of United States servicemen.

William V. Rice, Jr. (1974) holds a more optimistic opinion of the hazards of the right-to-strike issue. He cautions that those who treat the words "union" and "strike" as synonymous are approaching the issue with stubborn preconceived notions. He judges ..."the argument that unions inevitably lead to strikes is absolutely wrong" (Rice, 1974, p. 57), and has a tendency to cloud the overall issue. It seems to be his opinion that safeguards could be structured in a union-military service operational environment which could forestall or completely prevent the possible use of the strike weapon. If an argument of this sort was possible, the movement for a union for Air Force members would undoubtedly gain attractiveness.

Lest any reader be overly comforted by the above convictions, one should recall a pertinent event from the

recent American past. Concerning the right of labor to strike shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, John L. Lewis declared "When the nation is attacked, every American must rally to its defense. All other considerations become insignificant" (Dulles, 1949, p. 332). This sense of patriotism seemed to be only short-lived because during World War II, the United States did experience some modest labor unrest and a few strikes. Could the same thing happen in this country in these current times? Are the American people and the military community ready to accept the AFGE no-strike declaration at face value? It could be a terrible American mistake to accept military unionization today only to find future national defense endangered by strikes or slowdowns for more lucrative wages or benefits.

Degree of Power. David R. Segal (1976) stresses that actual unionization by military forces of the United States raises two more separate and important issues. He questions the degree to which a military union should be allowed to extend its influence beyond conditions of work of its members into actual management of the organization. It seems that this issue deals with the appropriate degree of aggressiveness that is tolerable for a military union. If a union were to exceed acceptable limitations of protecting the welfare of servicemen, a comparatively small organization could control policy aspects that should be determined by the general public. The reader only has to recall recent slowdowns and strikes by various police and firemen unions to appreciate



the problem. In these instances, the members of the unions took it upon themselves to deal with issues that affected their own welfare and ignored the public interest. These examples may expand public and governmental suspicion of the military unionization movement. Is the United States ready to accept a concept that initially makes reasonable demands for the welfare of military members but later shifts its interest to national policy or national defense issues? If no firm limitations to the scope of union activities are clearly established, the military unionization movement will probably encounter numerous objections.

Political Implications. The second issue stressed by Segal (1976) deals with a political aspect of military unionization. He questions the degree to which union operation could take place on a non-partisan basis. He further reasons that political implications could create turmoil within the actual union organization and could affect the entire realm of national politics. Segal (1976) observes also, the strong affiliation which exists between major unions and the Democratic party, seems incompatible with the more conservative outlook of the majority of military voters. Uniformed personnel might have difficulty accepting these contrary precepts. Such disparity could disrupt the traditional military posture of non-partisanship, or could cause discontinuity of traditional union political ties. As seen by the most recent American national election such influences could affect the final election outcomes.

Although the political affiliation issue is an admittedly obscure one, it seems to be a valid hypothetical question to present to all concerned with the possibility of military unionization.

This chapter has examined numerous aspects of unionism in order to better assess the impact unionization would have on Air Force morale, welfare, and discipline. Tangible and intangible benefits were considered and contrasted with disadvantages of the same groupings. The possible advantages and disadvantages and characteristics of a union for United States Air Force personnel were depicted in terms of effects on the individual, the service, and the nation.

### III. Review of Current Information

The advantages and disadvantages of an Air Force union, depicted in Chapter II are bolstered in importance when one correlates them to increases in defense manpower costs. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautions that the readiness of United States defense forces may be undermined by persistent concern over military benefits and standard of living (Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 February 1977).

In light of this, it must be noted that military manpower costs have risen from \$22 billion in 1964 to \$57.2 billion in 1977 and now account for nearly 60 percent of the defense budget (Cooper 1977). In this thirteen-year period personnel costs have risen an alarming 160 percent even as the number of men and women in uniform has declined since the Vietnam conflict. Richard Cooper (1977) in his defense of the All Volunteer Force notes that the following factors have contributed greatly to the growth in present manpower costs:

1. Post-World War II allowance of a 20-year military career as opposed to a 30-year career.

2. Annual military pay increases and implementation of comparability pay principle for civilian Federal employees which help determine military salaries.

3. Cost of living and "catch-up" pay provisions. (pp. 12 & 13)

These factors directly determine active duty and retirement

pay rates which are the initial, basic areas of concentration of a military unionization movement.

However, the tangible advantages of such unionism afforded the military member are about to come under closer governmental scrutiny. On 28 June 1977 President Jimmy Carter named Mr. Charles J. Zwick to head the nine-member Commission on Military Compensation. It was reported that if individual service members become increasingly more concerned with pay and benefits issues, the ... "soaring military manpower costs may prove to be an even more vexing problem than scrubbing a \$100 million (B-1) bomber" (Fliess, 1977, p. 3). On the same day, approximately 50 miles away at the United States Naval Academy, one working group in the 39th Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) began a three-day study of Human Resource Development and Management. Specifically, the purpose of this working group was to study the military unionization issue. As the Commission in Washington and its 25-member staff was formally tasked by Executive Order to review the military pay and allowances structure, others discussed theoretical issues and current attitudes and opinions toward military unions. The functions and purposes of both are so intricately associated that each will undoubtedly and eventually affect the other.

One opinion concerning the issues involved in both of these projects was voiced by Air Force General George S. Brown in his statement to Congress on the United States defense posture for fiscal year 1978. He stated that ... "since 1972, there have been repeated attempts to reduce,



eliminate, transfer, and transform military benefits which in the past have helped to convince the individual to enlist or to make Military Service a career" (Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 February 1977). A more recent Policy Letter (15 April 1977) reported the opinion of yet another influential individual who views the issues involving military pay, retirement, and other benefits plagued by fiscal constraints, pay gaps, and reductions. Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force, Everett T. Keech contended that government and Air Force leaders are obligated to reassure people in uniform through explicit actions that they care about the welfare of American servicemen and the quality of their lives.

The Commission on Military Compensation must complete work and render a final report by 15 March 1978. The MORS working group on military unionization concluded with results and findings which seem to be relative to the work the Commission will undertake. Possible policy decisions and the political programs which may result in future patterns of action should be formulated with regard to the inevitable effects on present-day and future military members.

Research conducted at AFIT and results presented at the 39th MORS dealing with opinions of segmented Army personnel all seem to indicate that any investigation of manpower costs can evoke intense personal interest and skepticism. This chapter will begin with a brief overview of these and other research projects. Additionally, letters to the editor of the Air Force Times and other publications will be

examined to determine impressions of military members to military compensation alterations. Such modifications can be correlated to activities centered on military unionization. The conclusion of this chapter will deal with relative positions of current professional associations and the emerging concept of military unions.

#### Recent Studies and Investigations

Anthropologists and sociologists have long recognized that the urge to combine with others for mutual protection and advancement is an intrinsic characteristic of human nature. Private sector labor unions and offshoots in the form of public and Federal sector labor organizations capitalize on the formulation of a combined voice and in the strength derived from large memberships. Gilpin and Haas (1974) contend that "unions exist primarily to satisfy employee needs which management has either failed to recognize or failed to act on in a manner which would fulfill these needs" (p. 15). Consequently, the implicit structure of military-governmental interactions reflects a possible attractiveness of a modified representation relationship in light of modern social trends.

Bloom and Northrup (1977) report that the quality of the labor force of the United States in terms of educational achievement, skills, and adaptability will continue to improve in the 1970's. Other authors stress that by 1985 over 75 percent of the civilian labor force will be high school graduates (Hagen & Johnson, 1975).

These projections of trends within the civilian work force have significant implications for any consideration of unionization of the military. These more highly educated personnel will be competing for more highly technical positions both in the civilian and military work environments. It is those individuals that the Air Force must attract in order to operate and repair increasingly sophisticated aircraft, missiles, and computer equipment, and it is those kinds of civilian workers who are joining unions in greater numbers. Cooper (1977) shows that up until 1976, under the All Volunteer Force concept, the percentage of non-high school graduates recruited has remained constant. Yet, as the overall number of graduates increases and the quality of the services remains the same, recruits should tend to reflect higher educational levels. Although patriotism, hopefully, is a strong motivator for most modern servicemen, it must be realized that like professional and technical workers they are only human and ... "do not like to be taken advantage of" (Chamot, 1976, p. 128) before or after any military service commitment commences. If the military structure is highly incompatible or noncompetitive with opportunities of private industry during post-draft recruitment, it may fall short of desired quantitative and qualitative goals.

#### Survey Findings

The June 1975 AFGE announcement of its intention to investigate the possibility of organizing the members of

American armed forces into a union startled government leaders, Department of Defense officials, and union members themselves. That initial proclamation and the more recent move to gain AFGE membership approval of such action provided the inspiration and agitation for numerous attempts to poll uniformed service members on their attitudes and opinions concerning military unionization. An investigation of the responses to numerous surveys provides government and military authorities a sound indication of current internal impressions of the rank and file in light of the changing profile of the average American worker and the current social atmosphere.

The surveys to be discussed in this work were sponsored by different interested parties. The United States Air Force has set the standard for the other services by sanctioning a survey conducted by individuals at the Air Force Institute of Technology (Manley, McNichols & Young, 1976b, 1977c). This survey evaluated the generalized position of officers and airmen toward unionization. It produced the largest and most representative number of respondents to date on this issue (938), and as such it will serve as the standard when discussing other investigations. Very recently, two smaller surveys to determine the attitudes of United States Army training and combat arms personnel toward unions (Segal, 1977; McCollum, 1977) were conducted by individuals without direct or official endorsement of that service. By comparing and contrasting these findings it is possible to minimize the deficiencies of one single



instrument and to attempt to formulate a more complete opinion of the American military members. The quantitative results of these studies will be augmented and highlighted by assessments made by a group calling itself the Citizen Soldier, which is an independent ... "research project on the economic and legal rights of servicemen" (Cummings, 1977, p. 49).

The responses to the questionnaire designed by Manley, McNichols, and Young (1977c) contained four main areas of concentration related to unionism: Perceived Problems, Union Effectiveness, Impact of Military Unions, and Views on Joining a Military Union. As with the other three forms of questionnaires (Citizen Soldier, 1977; McCollum, 1977; Segal, 1977) responses were sought from both officers and enlisted personnel. However, in order to keep this discussion within the scope of this study, only percentages indicating the combined response of both groups will be presented. Additionally, where responses are differentiated in a Likert-scale manner such as "Strongly Agree/Agree" or "Disagree/Strongly Disagree" in both the Segal and McCollum studies, these percentages will be combined to indicate a general favoritism to or dissatisfaction with the intent of the question. This portion of the chapter will deal with generalized results and responses of the works referenced. The detailed percentage responses may be found in the form of the original reports themselves.

Finally, the reader is cautioned that the small-scale studies conducted by McCollum at Fort Bragg and by Segal at

Fort Benning are not intended to be representative of the overall Army population. The McCollum sample consisted of 112 career soldiers from a select combat arms unit. The Segal sample was made up of 120 members of an Army training unit, which also might enjoy a higher morale level than the Army as a whole.

Perceived Problems. Many questions falling into this overall classification deal with issues that resemble the tangible benefits of unionization covered in the previous chapter. Manley et al. (1977c) found that 89 percent of all respondents felt that fringe benefits were in fact being eroded. More than three quarters of the officers and airmen seemed to indicate dissatisfaction with the present Air Force wage structure by affirming that pay raises within the last five years did not adequately compensate for inflationary cost increases. When the pay question was worded differently (McCollum, 1977) 60 percent of combat soldier respondents agreed to some degree. When asked about the need for union representation to insure competitiveness of military pay to civilian pay, the personnel responding seemed not to address the basic problem of increasing American living costs. Seventy-seven percent of all Air Force members queried agreed that the intangible aspect of public image of the military had been tarnished over the years. The two surveys administered to Army personnel did not attempt to determine the extent of these problem areas as the AFIT survey did. The way questions of

the former surveys were worded, these conditions were almost assumed to exist in the military environment.

As an added measure of inquiry, the Air Force investigation found that the majority of military respondents acknowledged the need for a congressional lobbying effort on their behalf and about half cited the need for third-party representation of members when involved in disputes with the Air Force.

In light of the responses, some form of third-party representation for quasi-collective bargaining purposes to influence congressional legislation on military matters gains credibility. From the problems which were perceived by Air Force members, it can be construed that something very relevant is missing which takes the form of ... "a bilateral decision-making process in which each party is expected to articulate and defend the interests of its own constituents vis-a-vis the goals of the other party" (Krendel, 1975, p. 99).

The problems associated with military fringe benefits, pay, and prestige might be more aptly dealt with and the rights of the individual servicemen insured to a greater degree by a structure that allows for more compromise and accommodation. Anthony F. Ingrassia uses the term "bilateralism" to describe the federal form of union-management relationship which may suggest an evolving form of military representation. He defines the term bilateralism as "a form of personnel management under which employees.... participate meaningfully and effectively in the formulation

and implementation of personnel policies and practices which affect their working conditions" (Ingrassia, 1973, p. 12). Such participation might provide a measure of control in the decision making process affecting defense compensation practices. These various descriptions of the purposes of unionism correspond directly with the opinions of surveyed uniformed personnel as to the utility of a military union.

Union Effectiveness. The present legislative means of determining matters affecting the military resemble the historic management practice known as "Boulwarism." Basically, appropriations, limitations, and policy issues are carefully debated or amended and are then imposed on military authorities and their staffs. Any negotiation which takes place usually covers only minor modifications or revisions (Bloom & Northrup, 1977). The American public and uniformed military members have seen unions effectively counter this procedure which provided management the advantage of the bargaining offensive.

In analyzing general Union Effectiveness, Manley et al. (1977c) conclude that military personnel believe they could derive many benefits from a military union. This is one of the areas where the results of the Air Force and Army surveys tend to exhibit strong similarities. Fifty-nine percent of all Air Force personnel questioned believed a union could prevent further loss of fringe benefits. McCollum (1977) found that 54 percent of his sample expressed similar feelings. Of the participants responding to the



1977 Segal study, only 51 percent had similar perceptions. It is significant to note that in all three surveys, over half of the respondents saw a tangible benefit in this area resulting from union representation.

A higher percentage of Air Force personnel (60 percent) saw more possibility of a union securing higher military pay raises for them than did members of the airborne training unit of the Segal study (45 percent). This may indicate a strong belief in the ability of a union to secure greater monetary benefits for Air Force members.

Further disparities arise between the attitudes of Air Force and selected Army personnel when the actual representation role of a military union was explored. More than 55 percent of all officers and airmen agreed that a union could effectively lobby in Congress for the military faction and could also help represent uniformed individuals in disputes with commanders or higher authorities. It is very interesting to note that Army training personnel have a much more reserved attitude toward this type of union effectiveness. A few more than 30 percent of those polled at Fort Benning felt that a military union could exhibit effectiveness in this area.

Of the training personnel surveyed by Segal, few believed in the ability of a military union to improve working conditions and also to assure that individuals would be treated with dignity. On both of these issues about 25 percent of all officers and enlisted training personnel surveyed either strongly agreed or agreed that

union membership would be beneficial. However, approximately 40 percent of the Air Force members responded favorably to the ability of a military union to prove effective in these issues of more personal concern. The opinions of these particular Army members when compiled and compared with the findings of Manley et al. (1977c) indicated that overall ... "the Air Force data suggested.... higher expectations of union effectiveness" (Segal, 1977, p. 12).

Impact of Military Unions. The intangible disadvantages previously noted are quantifiably evaluated in this section of the AFIT study. While opponents and proponents of unionism within the military might generally be in agreement concerning Perceived Problems and potential Union Effectiveness, there is bitter disagreement over the issues involving the Impact of Military Unions. Similarly, the investigators conducting the Air Force survey found that ... "differences in officer-enlisted perceptions appear to be greatest in this general area of questioning" (Manley et al., 1977c, p. 5). Additionally, it is in this area of the impact of unionism that a more extreme degree of variance between Army and Air Force responses exists. Of the Air Force members asked, "If military unions were established and recognized, the effectiveness of the Air Force would be decreased" (Manley et al., 1977c, Table 1), only 44 percent agreed. When questioned if a military union would decrease individual professionalism only 32 percent of those surveyed Air

Force members thought it definitely would. By contrast, when McCollum (1977) proposed a question that embodied both these aspects to personnel of the Army airborne unit, 54 percent of the officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) predicted detrimental effects of such unionism. In the AFIT survey about 25 percent more officers tended to support the concept that a military union would have harmful effects on discipline and professionalism. Quite surprisingly, the results of the McCollum study (1977) revealed that the same percentage of officers and NCO's, of those surveyed at Fort Bragg, agreed to the similar detrimental effects of unionism. The results reflected in this one Army study can be readily hypothesized by the fact that officer and NCO leaders of the combat branches instill and maintain a strong working relationship with subordinate units and individuals. Any third-party interference to that relationship could conceivably increase confusion thereby detracting from combat effectiveness. That effectiveness may also be hampered by the wide range of subjects that could be covered by a typical form of collective labor agreement (Bloom & Northrup, 1977). Restrictions on military management brought about by such issues as recognition, wages, overtime, vacations, and grievances of uniformed members could leave a military commander virtually powerless.

These differences in personal attitudes of sampled Army and Air Force members are almost contradicted by the opinions of officers, soldiers, and airmen on a very similar

subject which was phrased in terms of the possible negative effect of a union on discipline. As with the other factors just mentioned, personnel on the training post felt somewhat more strongly (59 percent) than did Air Force members (52 percent) about the negative effect of a union on discipline.

Strong majorities of both Air Force and the selected Army members believed that in the event of a military union, the strike is not to be considered a legitimate means of securing demands. Seventy-two percent of the Air Force respondents opposed the strike as a means of displaying collective action. McCollum found that Fort Bragg personnel exceeded that proportion by seven percentage points, and in both cases officers were more adamant in their disapproval than were enlisted personnel (Manley et al., 1977c). Although the numbers reflect these current attitudes, the dangers of strikes by military personnel must be remembered due to the potential amount of extensive power available to union authorities. An example for military members is provided by the blatant disregard by various policemen and firemen groups of ordinances prohibiting strikes by public employees, which was displayed by the Dayton firefighters in August of 1977.

Views on Joining a Military Union. Perhaps no other issue has received more universal attention than the actual percentages of servicemen who would consider becoming card-carrying union members. The 1977 AFIT study, the two recent Army assessments, and the Citizen Soldier survey all



investigated this aspect and obtained similar results. Because the responses of officers and enlisted personnel were strikingly incompatible and reflected distinct beliefs possibly tempered by rank, these results will be explained separately.

The Air Force survey found that 21 percent of the officers and 34 percent of the airmen questioned feel a definite need for a military union (Manley et al., 1977c). The result of the 1977 Segal work revealed that 29 percent of all officers and warrant officers polled agreed to some degree that there was in fact a need for a military union. Surprisingly, in contrast with some of the previous findings in the same work, 50 percent of the enlisted Fort Benning personnel, from both junior and senior ranks, indicated this same need. In the Citizen Soldier release of 5 July 1977, it was reported that 16 percent of all officers felt that there is a need for a union for "service people." However, a majority of 52 percent of enlisted people from all the services responded in agreement to this same item. The compatible findings of these three investigations indicate that enlisted personnel see a stronger need for a form of military unionism than do officers. Actually, the numerical breakdown only tends to validate the obvious since members of enlisted ranks are subject to lower basic pay rates, and to privileges or status that do not equate to those of officers. Additionally, they are more apt to be subjected to administrative and jurisdictional disciplinary procedures.

Professor Manley and his colleagues (1977c) found that

only 16 percent of Air Force officers would in fact consider joining any military union. More than double this percentage (37) of airmen responded that they would join. In comparison, Segal (1977) obtained almost identical responses from his group of Army personnel. Thirteen percent of those officers and 43 percent of the enlisted members indicated they would in fact seek membership in a military union. On the other hand, 21 percent of the Army Fort Bragg officers questioned in the McCollum (1977) study were receptive to union membership. However, the percentage of the enlisted personnel in this study agreeing that they would join a union dropped to the 40 percent level.

On the whole, when the results of all surveys are examined, approximately a third of all respondents indicated they would be inclined to join a military union. Opponents of unionization of the military might scoff at these figures and contend that a clear consensus of support for the movement is lacking. Those holding that position must be cautioned on two counts. First of all, the portion of undecided officers and enlistees who would join a union falls between 22 and 31 percent depending on which survey one looks at. Should those individuals become convinced that a military union could and would benefit them, they might provide the added support to actively pursue military unionization. Secondly, under present provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act concerning representation and elections in the private sector (and similar provisions in the Federal Sector Executive Order), only 30 percent of the employees

are required to petition for and support the desire that elections be conducted to determine which specific agency will act as their representative (Schoen & Hilgert, 1974).

A final comment is interjected to help the reader evaluate the timeliness of the military unionization issue. The AFIT survey (1977c) explored the attitudes of Air Force personnel toward the inevitability of a military union. Overall, 29 percent of all respondents felt the move was inevitable. Twenty-seven percent were undecided, and 44 percent saw no chance of a military union. Yet, members of the Citizen Soldier staff assert that the results of their later investigation (1977) "...suggests that conditions which exacerbate pro-union attitudes may have worsened in the year since the Air Force conducted its poll" (p. 2).

#### Unsolicited Feedback

Data collection activities, such as the surveys that were described in the previous section have been shown to be very useful in organizational diagnosis and development. The information derived from each of the investigations can be judged on its own merit and is available to both military and civilian leaders to help determine the likelihood of military unionization. These quantified results are meaningful in themselves because of the recognition of actual or perceived problems within the military organizations. Porter, Lawler, and Hackman (1975) emphasize the worth of such inquiries by stating that "such diagnostic and feedback activities usually result in a substantially

more complete and more sophisticated understanding of the organization than is obtained from initial descriptions of 'the problem' by managers" (p. 478).

The validity of such diagnostic and feedback activities notwithstanding, strong indicators of organizational health are available from alternate sources. Letters to the editors of various reputable publications provide an excellent source of unbiased information from individuals who chose to respond by their own choice. This section will provide a collection of non-statistically validated comments by active duty and retired personnel. These comments are intended to supplement and highlight some of the survey trends of the previous discussion. The responses were compiled mainly from past issues of the Air Force Times in order to provide insight into the opinions of Air Force personnel. Additionally, letters to other publications are also included to reflect further impressions. It must be noted that publishers reserve the right to edit letters as they see fit and print those they judge to be of most interest to their readers. Therefore, the letters quoted below may not reflect a universal consensus but they do exhibit contemporary ideas of the times.

A sampling of the letters to the editor of the Air Force Times include the following:

How long is it going to be before Congress realizes that it takes more than patriotism and dedication to get people to join the service? Congress is cutting benefits left and right without considering that many young people joined the service for the benefits. (5 February 1975, p. 15)



As our Commander in Chief and the Defense Department have chosen to be our adversaries, it should be evident to all servicemen that only an organization of the rank and file can look after our interests. We urgently need an American Servicemen's Union. (5 February 1975, p. 15)

The military pay at present is more than comparable to that of any civilian job. The benefits, such as retirement, so far outstrip civilian retirement that they boggle the mind. (4 June 1975, p. 13)

Wouldn't the term 'pilfering of benefits' be more appropriate since thousands of people decided on military careers under the impression that they were earning these benefits. (11 June 1975, p. 13)

AFGE General Counsel Leo Pellerzi as quoted by the Air Force Times: 'People are selecting a military career as a means of livelihood and not for patriotic reasons. Servicemen aren't responding to attack on the country. They want to be paid.' Mercenary, according to Webster: Acting merely for reward.... Go home Mr. Pellerzi - You and your union don't represent me! (30 July 1975, p. 15)

I have long been against unions.... (but) we do not seem to have any effective representation. As a result, we have seen a constant erosion of benefits during one of the most inflationary periods of our nation's history. We have continued to sacrifice while others were not forced to do likewise. I cannot welcome unions but I feel we have been left no other choice. (27 August 1975, p. 15)

Congress is messing with our Comstores (SIC) again. It looks like we are going to be nailed with state income taxes.... Unionization is a drastic step, one I certainly hope need never be taken. However, if unionization is what it is going to take to put a stop to continuous erosion of our benefits, then so be it. (24 December 1975, p. 15)

I favor a military union. I would join one today if possible. There is no one to represent me or my views in Washington. Servicemen must form a pressure group to represent their wants and needs not what the Air Staff wants us to have. Things must change! (26 April 1976, p. 17)

I am against a union for American armed forces personnel. I believe it would abuse power just

as other unions do.... I think it is time to quit crying about 'our benefits' and speak of the 'country's benefits.' (17 May 1976, p. 15)

I suggest that Congress take the time to see why military personnel would want to join a union.... It is now time for the military to have collective bargaining in its dealings with the government. (30 August 1976, p. 15)

Come on fellow military members, let the unions help us! (27 September 1976, p. 15)

Striking union firemen in Youngstown, Ohio let buildings burn.... Please tell me why similar malfeasance will not occur in the event military people become union members. (25 October 1976, p. 15)

A man on television said, 'You have to have alot of dissatisfied people to have a union.' Now guess why the military wants a union? (8 November 1976, p. 15)

A military union? The idea chills me. If I were young and still in the military, I would look hard at the people who are trying to lead me up this golden path of plenty. What are they after? Who pulls their strings? (6 December 1976, p. 15)

In recent months I have noticed mounting willingness on the part of the average Air Force member to accept military unionization.... But the members do not want a union. Instead the members want equity and to be treated with decency and respect. Our Air Force leaders better wake up or we will indeed, have a union by default. (21 March 1977, p. 15)

A union is an extremely poor course for us to take to try and save our benefits and earn a livable wage. But we have been deserted by our service leaders, Congress, and our military associations.... If the union is not the answer, what is? (4 April 1977, p. 12)

Letters to the editors of other publications are noted on the following page. The basic advantage to such upward communication is that it allows subordinates to voice their opinion directly to high-ranking authorities. They,

then, may receive the meanings of that communication and attempt to institute organizational changes.

Kenneth Blaylock claims that the majority of requests for union organization of the military comes from 'career types - NCO's and officers.' Let me assure your readers that career U. S. Marines are not asking for unionization. If the 'career types' in the other services are prounion, then I fear for the nation's safety. (U. S. News & World Report, 18 April 1977, p. 13)

Tell me something, Robin Beard: If soldiers had a labor union, would they have had to fight an undeclared war?.... A military labor union is inevitable! (U. S. News & World Report, 18 April 1977, p. 13)

I have followed with great interest the Air Force Association's position on the formation of a union for the military.... In almost every issue of your magazine we see articles concerning the constant erosion of our military benefits and strength.... Unless something is done, and soon, the troops are going to demand something be done.... And the elite of the Air Force must fear a union the way a slaveship captain feared the sound of native footsteps in the dark. But with common sense and intelligence, lots of trouble can be averted. A desire to unionize results from mistreatment, so the message should be clear. (Air Force Magazine, April 1977, p. 10)

#### Professional Associations

Military personnel have a tendency to question the need for a union when military associations are already in existence. David Cortright contends the most vocal opponents of the unionization movement come from these same professional military associations and other such conservative organizations (AEI Defense Review, 1977). In contrast, union leaders cite associations for nonfulfillment and disappointment in terms of the needs and problems of the members as one of the main reasons armed services personnel

seek a stronger voice in the form of unions.

The true antagonism between the two factions was apparent in a report by one such association. In an article titled "Air Force Association (AFA) Position Paper on Unionization of the Military" the AFA begins with some rather compassionate rhetoric on the wondrous past achievements of trade unions. The position paper, found in the July 1976 edition of Air Force Magazine, then blasts away at the basic concepts of military unions. The fundamental concern of the report is concentrated on supposed dangers to national military effectiveness expressed as the contrariety of unionization to the basic nature of military purpose and structure. Additionally, it is obvious to the most non-informed reader that the movement is a direct threat to sanctity of a following the AFA has enjoyed for many years.

Conversely, union spokesmen, predominantly from the AFGE, continually stress the point of supposed ineffectiveness of the associations, although their stand on the closing of commissaries is a conceded exception. In 1975, Mr. Clyde Webber cited the associations as doing a very poor job in representing servicemen. He stated that "all you can assume is that if they thought the associations could help them, they wouldn't be turning to us" (The Times Magazine, 24 September 1975, p. 22). The statement probably has the leaders and staffs of some associations scratching their heads. Although these organizers of associations must feel they have "produced" more than adequately, they continue to see the tide of unionism rising.



The dilemma viewed by the involved and uninvolved observer of this confrontation of ideas is that many military associations are already established to do exactly what the unions are promising (Strickland, p. 116). The associations themselves seem to be committed to serve two masters: their membership and the military establishment. Some professional organizations have been charged with concentrating too much emphasis on the latter. If members perceive increased concern with hardware and weapons development, political aspects, and historical research, they might soon feel slighted. As personal benefits become more subjected to attack, these same members may demand greater action on matters that directly affect them. If these associations could demonstrate continual rather than sporadic Pentagon attention to servicemen's needs and grievances, the need for a union might well disappear. However, Pentagon leaders do not seem to display equal receptiveness to the support and the criticism rendered by professional military organizations. This disparity and the true meaning of the current unionization movement is exemplified in the phrase "If defense leaders are worried about more aggressive spokesmen, they might do well to listen more closely to the voices which have been speaking for years on behalf of military people" (Air Force Times, 16 July 1975, p. 11). Backers of the unionism movement contend that military and civilian officials would be more attentive to the demands or suggestions brought forth by them. Union representatives could serve the needs of

the servicemen to a higher degree with this more interested audience.

On the other hand, Quinn and Grabler (1971) feel that a strong union movement within the military could render increased support from members themselves. They contend that unionism would affect the conduct of internal military personnel affairs by demanding ... "support from and imposing discipline on its members - unlike the present military associations that do not require active military support" (p. 40). The effect of increased mutual concern and attention might be productive in terms of increased military efficiency and in increased member satisfaction. Perhaps just the mere threat of a potential external force could be productive in these terms.

It has been brought out previously that many Department of Defense authorities vehemently oppose the movement for military unionization. However, many of these same officials actively support professional military associations and encourage all military people to join. One has only to be on any Air Force base during the annual AFA membership drive to realize this point. Starting with the highest ranking commander on down, most will exhort base personnel to join. These past practices of unrestricted membership drives and outward support by senior officers and NCO's may provide a legal loophole for the unionization movement. Although, the legalities are much too complex to adequately explore in this section, a precedence seems to have been set by previous on-base recruitment drives by military associations.

It seems that one activity cannot be restricted while the other is allowed to continue unabated. Therefore, as the military unionization movement matures, the various associations may be confronted with new restrictions which eliminate past supportive practices, or agencies professing unionization could experience equal freedom during membership campaigns.

A current issue of extremely high applicability to many service personnel, may soon effect the on-going confrontation between present associations and fledgling unionism. The retention of the commissary system in the past has been attributed to the intense efforts in unity of the various professional military associations. However, as the present issue of retired military personnel holding civil service jobs, or "double-dipping" as it is called, becomes a more volatile issue, all active duty and retired military will be focusing on the moves these same organizations make. Although muted outcries have been expressed, little or no apparent action has been evident on the part of the personnel who are affected now or who may be involved in the future. The associations are caught between the proverbial "rock and a hard place." They must display open concern for the benefits of their members, and yet, they must be careful not to offend current administration officials in order to sustain proven harmonious relationships. It probably goes without saying, that the proponents of military unionization are also noting all the developments of this highly inflammatory issue. Should the associations exhibit only lip

service to the position of the uniformed military member, unions may take advantage of the situation and intensify the potential crusade to incorporate military personnel into their roles.



#### IV. Values: Old and New

Opponents of military unionization may contend that quantitative results of the aforementioned studies do not realistically represent the consolidated opinion of all service personnel. These opponents may also be relieved to know that the noted letters to the editor are responses from a minority of rabble-rousers. These subjective opinions can be supplemented by logical reasoning, which may in turn forecast rejection of any unionism action.

Logic may be devised to show that a union for service personnel has three strikes against it. Initially, opponents might stress that an American military union could not work. It has been shown that due to peculiar political structures European military unions are allies in concert with the various national political parties and governments. Conversely, a look at the American labor movement quickly reveals that unions in the United States have served as adversaries to government and management. These fundamental differences indicate that the European experience with military unions could not be equally applied to armed forces of the United States.

Many might try to indicate that unions for the American military should not be allowed. The thought may provoke unethical and inherent feelings in these opponents. Such people may welcome a law prohibiting union organization and membership in the armed forces. The solicitation of

legislative bills of this sort by the elected American lawmakers is fundamental reason in itself that an American service personnel union should not be allowed to work.

The third basic argument against military unions is the most rudimentary of indications that they would not work. Arguments are presented that a union for military personnel would disrupt the chain of command, diminish internal discipline and professionalism, and could eventually hamper the combat ability of the United States forces. The appearance of an outside party to represent servicemen creates an impression of two masters. The division of loyalty between a union and military superiors and policy would not work and would not be in the best national interest.

The list of could-not's, should-not's, and would-not's reveals only one position of an intricately complex question. Although these reasons for restriction of military unionism are quite reasonable, changes in the external or non-military environment also greatly affect the mechanisms and operation of the military organizational system. In the present post-Vietnam period, duty to country and patriotism seem to have been relegated to secondary status as military and civilian authorities depend more on material incentives in order to attract volunteers (Lane 1976). This greater emphasis on economic considerations tends to violate a traditional practice whereby ... "our country can keep people 'on the cheap' between wars" (Berry, 1976, p. 2). A paradox evolves because recruiting practices stress military pay, travel, veterans benefits, and retirement systems; all of which

result in higher expenses at a time when the manpower budget is being subjected to increased scrutiny.

In this chapter, the overall predicament of military expenditures, unions, and the external environment will be investigated. Modern influences of society directly penetrate the traditional values which can be summoned from the speech by General Douglas MacArthur, which reverberated with the words "Duty, Honor, Country." Additionally, the implications derived from that presentation will be examined in light of the contentions of the noted sociologist Professor Charles C. Moskos, Jr.

#### Modern Societal Influences

The study of an organization as a system and of the forces influencing that system reveals that the components usually reflect the characteristics of the complete entity. As such the military community as a part of the overall society is subjected to similar influences and trends of the American lifestyle. The apparent decrease in the distinctions of the military community from civilian society seems to reflect that influence of societal forces at work. Examples of changes in the public sector employment and in individual and group values indicate a need for introspection of the military sector.

Manley, McNichols, and Young (1976a) highlighted three societal forces which affect the modern operation of the military organization: the formation of power blocks; the rise of individualism; and decreased tolerance of frustration.

Members of the American public seem to exhibit less inhibitions today and are adamant in their desire to join together for what they believe. Groups which feel they have been deprived or discriminated against seek the power of numbers to pursue their causes. The recent surge by proponents for equal rights and representation for homosexuals supplements long-standing movements such as black power or women's rights. The example put forth by such movements of unity present an excellent model for disgruntled military members to follow. If servicemen and servicewomen can be convinced that unionism provides more actual organized efficacy than present unification organizations, they may be inclined to face the possible consequences and imitate these past successful courses of action for specialized demands.

In contrast to the quest for increased influence through group solidarity is the fact that the more highly educated military member may also exhibit greater individualism. As service personnel perceive their basic material and tangible needs as becoming more satisfied, they may shift attention to increased emphasis on matters dealing with self-esteem, recognition, and more personal fulfillment. These three Maslovian-type requirements are well illustrated in the Manley et al. (1977b) definition of individualism as ... "the insistence by the military member that he or she be respected as an individual personality" (p. 10). The more astute officers and airmen serving today are apt to be more inquisitive and investigative. Many seem to be less willing



to accept a problem or a situation at face value. Military members pursuing greater individualism may exhibit less reliance on standard operating procedures, which may be reflected in the response that "that's the way we have always done it." Continued convictions centering on time-honored beliefs or seemingly out-dated customs as a method of degrading the unionism movement may prove ineffective in the present era of higher intelligence levels and creativeness of national defense forces. This heightened urge of individualism is echoed by demands from uniformed personnel that they be "used well" in addition to being treated well. Professor Manley and his associates (1976a) reasoned that, "the degree to which these expectations are not met by the services will quite likely have a bearing on their attitudes toward military unionization" (p. 10).

The common thread linking trends of unification and individualistic desires might be identified as the tolerance of frustration. Incongruity of organizational and individual goals leads to inefficiency and dysfunctional effort. Service members feeling impeded by revelations of "the brown shoe days" can experience frustration or disgust which may become readily noticeable. The possibility of reverting to norms which were adequate for past operation could be absolutely inappropriate to an adaptive and flexible, modern military. If civilian society represents an adequate model for the military to emulate, it should become apparent that blind reliance on past procedures has little place in a changing world whether or not the profit motive is

paramount.

Younger military personnel may experience disappointment if the point is continually made that the basic salary and fringe benefit situation has never been so good. Habitual references to past financial hardships and to recent improvements may be meaningless to service individuals who joined totally expecting current fiscal benefits and with the anticipation of being awarded future increases. Therefore, frustration might be sparked by the two distinct aspects of the advertisement of those benefits and the right to those benefits.

Farrington (1976) stressed the point that perhaps the services cannot always deliver what they advertise. Individuals who join the military with definite expectations about health care, pay systems, educational benefits, travel, leave, and retirement benefits may become extremely frustrated if those expectations are not fulfilled. However, it seems almost apparent that military recruiters have been advertising for years beyond the ability of the Department of Defense to guarantee delivery and to retain proclaimed benefits (Farrington, 1976). The actual benefits themselves may be inconsequential, but if service people perceive a loss or degradation of those that were advertised, personal frustration and disenchantment could grow.

Such disharmony between individual desires and organizational goals may also become more apparent if the servicemen's perceived rights to the basic benefits are questioned. Recent responses by high-ranking civilian and military

leaders seem to reflect that questioning attitude. If service personnel discern current actions to be contrary to the effect of "taking care of its own" or as a tradeoff of people programs for weapons acquisition or modernization, increased frustration becomes possible. Anthony J. Farrington (1976) makes an all-important point by writing that:

It is incredible to think that service people do not perceive the totality of their loss of benefits, and are almost naive to think they can be made to swallow budget cuts as a sacrifice for all other taxpayers. (p. 79)

The thesis treating loss of benefits as a fact and the antithesis that it is unthinkable for military personnel to shoulder a major portion in defense costs, leads to the possible hypothesis that frustration could easily prevail.

While he was Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger emphatically chastized his service secretaries and their staffs for continually including the erosion of benefits issue in periodic discussions. As reported in the Air Force Times, Air Force General George S. Brown later lent credence to Doctor Schlesinger's demands by making the ... "point that military people do not have the right to retain benefits they have today" (9 February 1976, p. 3). The illusion that military career personnel do not serve so much because of pay and benefits but rather because of the interesting jobs and patriotic duties, could evolve as one of the major causes for frustration and personal irritation.

The few major causes of frustration discussed above deal with events pertinent to the military chain of command

or governmental hierarchy. However, it must also be considered that if the available fulfillment of expectations of benefits lags far behind the opportunities available to civilian workers, both career and non-career uniformed members may question the satisfaction derived in the military environment.

The growth of public employee unionism presents an interesting example with which the military unionization movement can be compared. Until the mid-1900's public sector employee unions were not extremely popular, yet ... "since the mid-1950's, the public sector unions have been the only ones in the labor movement to increase membership at a rate faster than the increase in the labor force" (Bloom & Northrup, 1977, p. 682). Like the history of these unions, the military counterpart may be seen as experiencing initial opposition and condemnation from many fronts, which could diminish gradually, leading to common acceptance as has been the case in the private, public, and federal sectors.

The rise of employee unions in the public sector has also brought about increased membership to previously non-unionized professionals and technicians. The increased incidence of unionism among teachers, doctors, policemen, and firemen serves as an additional example for military members to follow. Dennis Chamot (1975) contends that job concerns of professional and blue-collar workers have become quite similar, which has led to the rise of this unionism. He stresses that authority and decision making,



salary and work schedules, grievance procedures, and job security are special problems of professionals that make the concept of white collar unions so attractive. These problems are not unique to the civilian realm. If they were strong enough to foster unions for professions, it certainly must be considered that they may provide adequate justification for a military union.

Past organizing activities of both public sector employees and professionals seem to require that the military institution examine all alternatives, benefits, and costs of the unionism challenge. Doctors Manley, McNichols, and Young (1976a) discovered a low level of knowledge of Federal Labor Management Relations among military personnel. If uniformed members become more educated on this subject, the similarities of the trials and tribulations of the public and federal sector employees to their own may become more widely appreciated. The revelation of success of others in somewhat similar situations may initiate greater interest in the final, corresponding endeavor - the military union.

Two legislative works, the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, helped foster the spread of unions in the private and public sectors and still apply today. Fairly recent Executive Orders provided for recognition and basis for power of federal sector unions. Executive Order 10988, signed by President Kennedy in 1962, was a milestone for these unions in that it realigned powers of the federal civil service structure and established rules for the new type labor-management activities (Strickland, 1976).

Needed changes were instituted in Executive Orders 11491 and 11838, which were implemented respectively by President Nixon in 1969 and President Ford in 1975. Specific bargaining rights for government employees' unions and newly established labor-management bargaining procedures were derived from this chain of amendments to the basic Order (Farrington, 1976). The persistent and gradual evolution of these rights for federal employees may serve as an example for supporters of military unionism.

That current situation is characterized by David Cortright (1975) in his book Soldiers in Revolt as one of ... "unprecedented difficulty now facing the military" (p. 155). Although his warning may seem somewhat stern, Cortright also reveals another source of frustration other than those previously stated in that the roots of the crisis or the difficulty might be within the civilian society itself. Cortright relies on the findings of a noted sociologist Max Watts who contends that:

The evolution of industrial society is leading to a generalized decline in the armed forces of all developed countries (and) that a high degree of capital accumulation and the life-style changes this entails result in a marked change of attitude toward the military. (Cortright, 1975, p. 156)

In order to associate the military with the basic needs of young people today, there may have been too much of a tendency to emulate civilian society. The use of monetary incentives to attract and retain members, and the utilization of the business cost-effectiveness yardstick to measure

the worth of recruiting and retention programs could prove detrimental. Strickland (1976) implies that heightened Pentagon interest ... "on material benefits may be paving the way for unionization" (p. 111). First of all, if the promised benefits are not provided to uniformed personnel, they may become frustrated and may join a union in order to attain redress for the basic unfairness. Secondly, this tendency of the Department of Defense to borrow so heavily from the business world may help convince service members that they closely resemble the employees of those businesses, and they too might join unions.

Modern societal influences greatly affect the current military unionization issue. It has been contended that "the authoritarianism and rigidity of military hierarchies are ill suited for the consumerist, gratification-oriented society" (Cortright, 1975, p. 156). The emergence of subcultures and liberation lifestyles could foster the association of all or some of the military or Air Force members into a benefits-centered, grievance-centered, or prestige-centered union. The questioning attitude of younger personnel could also be served by such an organization. Finally the military member, who is bombarded by recollections of the past with little consideration given to the external civilian environment and its opportunities, may generate purposeful unrest to organize for strengthened representation. Successes of welfare and minority groups and of business and public employee unions have explicitly demonstrated that tolerance for frustration is diminishing as time passes.

As other groups seem to be enjoying improving benefits and recognition military members may turn to the unionism concept to enhance solidarity, gain individualism, and to alleviate frustration (Manley et al., 1976a).

#### Duty, Honor, Country

The point made by David Cortright dealing with the unprecedented dilemma of the military community seems to neglect the effect of traditional highly-held patriotic motives. The contention that "the austerity of garrison life and the narrow, nationalistic pursuits of armies are increasingly irrelevant to the youth of advanced industrial society" (Cortright, 1975, p. 156) seems to be overly pessimistic. Any perceived decline in military prestige can be associated with the overall values of American society as a whole. In the increasingly affluent and technological surroundings of today, the Pentagon may have borrowed a great deal from the business world and the corresponding increased emphasis on material benefits. The significant contributions of the issue of monetary rewards and tangible benefits to the question of unionization cannot be overlooked but might be examined along with traditional values.

Retired Navy Captain Paul Schratz (1977) seems to disagree with this point in his questioning of whether current military fringe benefits, which he contends are based on past standards, can or should be maintained. He views selected military benefits such as the Survivor



Benefit Plan and the present retirement system as being much more generous than those available to civilians. His basic belief that current military pay is higher than ever before reveals only half of the question. If past pay scales were once low, then even quantum wage increases, to the highest level ever, still do not really assure comparability or competitiveness with civilian salaries.

The underlying belief that certain benefits available today were instituted when the military cadre was more elite and much smaller in size and are no longer applicable to current larger armed services can create many problems. At the June 1977 MORS, Captain Schratz stressed these increases in benefits since the early 1900's. His contention that service personnel must not and should not believe that these benefits are immutable, neglects the realistic situation that if people in uniform perceive a loss of benefits they may seek basic satisfaction in the civilian environment. The constant tampering and tinkering with and bickering over military fringe benefits might well have a detrimental effect on the deep-rooted patriotic values of uniformed personnel.

Major General Herbert Sparrow alluded to this situation in an open letter he wrote entitled "The Promises Men Live By." He discussed the benefits-part of military pay and how the aspects of mutual trust and loyalty were connected with those benefits. His statement that ... "mutual trust is a pearl of great price for lack of which history has shown that mere numbers of men, even with advanced technology,

are no sure defense" (Sparrow, 1975, p. 21) is interpreted by this writer as the General's attempt to link material and tangible concerns with patriotic beliefs. It seems almost inconceivable that one motive would be the sole driving force of the members who defend this nation. Emphasis on material aspects of military compensation seem to be highlighted in the unionization movement, providing an aura that the intangibles of "Duty, Honor, Country" may be somewhat latent in military personnel today.

On 12 May 1962, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur addressed the cadets of West Point in one of the most moving and inspirational speeches of all times. His presentation of "Duty, Honor, Country" probably affects every man and woman who has donned an American military uniform. Those three words and the speech itself must take on significant meaning in light of the current movement for a military union. Various aspects of the speech will be examined fifteen years later in order to ponder the original meanings and their impact today.

In his 1964 memoirs, General MacArthur noted the evolutionary change that had taken place in the military, which he had witnessed. One paragraph explicitly reflects his thoughts and seems to be especially applicable to the unionism movement of recent times. The General wrote:

Great changes have taken place in our military establishment, some good, some not so good. Materially the improvement has been spectacular, psychologically yet to be proven. The men in the ranks are largely citizen soldiers, scholars or airmen.... men not dedicated

to a profession of arms; men not primarily skilled at the art of war; men most amazingly like the men you know and see and meet each day of your life. (MacArthur, 1964, p. 414)

One might question if, in the year of his death, MacArthur was actually forecasting radical changes for the military. Are the material and psychological refinements reaching a point where the man on the street and the average military man become indistinguishable? Proponents of military unionism would want nothing better. The more similar soldiers, sailors, and airmen become to the average civilian, the more unions can strive for like representation and benefits. The reference by General MacArthur to the term "citizen soldier" is ironic in that fifteen years later the public interest group seeking reform of the military justice system and equal rights for service personnel, has coined the term in its title.

The gist of the MacArthur address focused on patriotism and service to one's country. The true meaning seems to center on self-denial and self-sacrifice at all costs for the service to the flag. Excerpts of the presentation characterize the men and women in uniform as unquestionably dedicated individuals fervently acting for their nation. The basic assumption that such motivation drives many or most service personnel would leave little appeal for the concept of military unionization and suggests a limited chance of success. The teaching and message which support the above concept can be seen in these following selected lines:

Duty, Honor, Country! These three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be.... They mold you for your future roles as custodians of the nation's defense.... The soldier above all other men, is required to practice the greatest art of religious training - sacrifice.... Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government: Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. (MacArthur, 1964, pp. 423-426)

Sacrifice should be an easily understood concept, which is an inherent trait of military service. Family separation, frequent moves, long working hours, and the possibility of facing danger or even death are implied hardships one faces as soon as he or she raises his right hand to take the oath of an officer or airman. The intention of the General of implying that military members divest themselves from "processes of government" and other civilian dealings would be extremely difficult to accept. Power groups, extremist influence, and personal liberties are some of the features of the societal influence discussed earlier in this chapter. In the years since this inspiring presentation, the impact of forces for change within the American society on the military establishment seems to have increased. As they do, perhaps traditional patriotic values become somewhat obscured and the move for military unionization is afforded greater impetus.

The required sacrifice entailed in the military



profession today is more adequately analyzed in relation to the personal values and expectations of the military members and the requirements of "Duty, Honor, Country." Many members of the military establishment may question the values of fifteen years ago. Overall goals and objectives seem to be constantly reevaluated which requires increased interaction with and participation in social and governmental affairs (Cleland & King, 1975). The aloofness of the military man or woman may be a thing of the past. The description of the military man of the 1950's or 1960's corresponds to what Cleland and King call the "organizational man." He tends to mirror the description of the typical military man MacArthur referred to:

He is devoted primarily to the service of the organization. He found little difficulty in reconciling his personal goals with those of the organization. If a real conflict developed, cultural influences of the organization strongly conditioned him to subordinate his goals to the purposes and well-being of the organization. Typically, the validity of organizational goals was accepted - certainly not openly questioned. To do so may have been disloyal if not subversive. (Cleland & King, 1975, p. 206)

Is this the type person that MacArthur was referring to? Does the profession of arms and dedication to "Duty, Honor, Country" necessarily mean that great national problems and social considerations are of little concern to the service member as he may have suggested? Is the disloyalty of the "organizational man" echoed in the assertion that if one were to fail the "long, gray line" or the flag, millions of images of fallen warriors would

haunt him with the magic words "Duty, Honor, Country" (MacArthur, 1964, p. 426)? Can the image of the "whole man," who must be both a leader and a manager with technical expertise and of compassionate human understanding, conform to the demanding mold of past decades?

If one accepts the premise that the military establishment has tended to parallel changes in the business world and if society does, in fact, influence the lives and interactions of service personnel, can the characteristics of modern civilian managers pertain to the military officers and enlisted personnel of today? Is it anything less than obvious that the 1962 descriptions put forth by General MacArthur may not be totally applicable in the 1970's? Cleland and King (1975) describe the present managers as being concerned with ... "identity, simulation, openness, concern, change, questioning the existing order of affairs, and a determination to be heard" (p. 207).

Modern members of the armed forces witnessing such modifications in management roles and experiencing evolving personal values may be less assured of the propriety of past military attitudes and norms. Individuals seeking greater participation in the determination of personal and organizational goals and affecting appropriate change may augment their patriotic convictions with additional, non-traditional concerns. If the military environment and structure is unreceptive to these possible attitudinal changes and requirements of its personnel, the men and women of the armed forces of the United States may turn to

other organizations. Discrepancies can be addressed through the use of internally initiated renewal, or the alternative may be ... "if unions seem to offer redress, service people will be prone to listen" (Berry, 1976, p. 5).

Interesting correlations between these two schools of thought on the military environment can be derived from the recent "Report on the Attitudes and Perceptions of Air Force Commanders" (Commanders' Survey). Published as AFIT Technical Report 77-2, this report consisted of responses from 2,695 individuals occupying the position of a commander (Manley, McNichols & Stahl, 1977a). The relatively senior sample of Air Force officers does not necessarily represent the views of the entire Air Force as a service nor the military structure as a whole, but it does provide indications from a statistically valid sample size.

Commanders responded to three questions which dealt with "Career Decision Factors." Two of these questions essentially deal with the influence of "Duty, Honor, Country" in their personal value ranking. These questions are:

- (1) Which factor originally influenced you to make the Air Force a career?
- (2) Which factor today would influence you the most to make the Air Force a career?  
(Manley et al., 1977a, pp. 4-45 & 47)

Of the thirteen factors included in the original survey, nine proved most significant to these two questions. These nine factors included: my Air Force job, the retirement

system, travel and new experiences, training and education opportunity, security of Air Force life, opportunity to serve my country, promotion system and opportunity, pay and allowances, and Air Force leadership and supervision. "Opportunity to serve my country" is the factor most readily associated with the aspect of "Duty, Honor, Country."

The wording of the two questions themselves required the respondents to rank order past, original values and present attitudes today. In attempting to establish the relative importance, one can examine the responses from the "senior" and "junior" participants, and the factors can be arranged in order of importance of the overall, aggregate sample (Manley et al., 1977a).

In relation to question number one, "opportunity to serve my country" was ranked as the second most important career decision factor by the colonels surveyed. Lieutenant colonels rated this factor fourth, and majors, captains, and lieutenants all rated it as the sixth most important factor in their original career decision. It is statistically unsound to associate any definite causation between the two higher rankings of individuals, whose careers started in the late 1950's or early 1960's, and the sentiment of the times expressed in the speech by MacArthur. However, it is interesting to note that officers from the late 1960's and early 1970's management group have seemingly less outward concern for patriotic appeals. It is also useful to note that when ... "the factors are arranged in



decreasing order of importance to the overall sample" (Manley et al., 1977a, p. 4-46) "opportunity to serve my country" was again rated as the sixth most important, original reason for considering an Air Force career.

When the commanders were asked to rank the factors that would most influence a career decision today, the patriotic theme seemed to be of even less importance. Colonels ranked both "opportunity to serve my country" and "training/education opportunity" as the fourth most important current factors. The "Duty, Honor, Country" factor was also rated fourth, tied with two others, by all the lieutenant colonels collectively. The majors, as a group, felt that, along with three other factors, "opportunity to serve my country" was the least important in making a career decision today. All the captains and lieutenants taken together in respective ranks rated service to their country last. When the factors are arranged in overall order of decreasing importance in relation to this second question "opportunity to serve my country" is deemed a minimally important factor, on about the same level as "travel and new experiences."

One might suspect that the impact of the patriotic ethic has decreased. When these results of the Commanders' Survey are analyzed, one surmises that "opportunity to serve my country"/"Duty, Honor, Country" decreases in importance as officers progress from the senior to more junior grades. Respondents seem to become less strongly associated with the "organizational man" image. Additionally,

as the responses from the various grades are explored one can see that the importance of "opportunity to serve my country" either seemed to decrease in importance or was tied with other factors as least important. Finally, Manley et al. (1977a) found that the factor dropped from sixth to eighth place overall when the original and present career motivations were compared.

New sets of personal values and expectations seem to have inspired modified thinking by managers and perhaps military personnel. The result of the Commanders' Survey of a cross-section of Air Force officers implies that patriotic appeals have lost effectiveness. Perhaps dependence on the traditional appeal of "Duty, Honor, Country" as a means of countering military unionism needs to be closely examined.

#### The Moskos Models

If the importance of traditional patriotic drives has in fact lost some of its past appeal, in what direction might military members move? Grebeldinger (1976) sees the service person as perceiving that he is almost powerless and alone on matters that greatly affect his life. He writes that ... "the dollar and benefits are very real daily concerns of today's military member" (Grebeldinger, 1976, p. 82). The promotion system, the retirement program, commissary privileges, the base exchange, and medical benefits are all factors that the man or woman in uniform can identify with and associate to his family situation.

Increasing concern with material benefits and job security runs the risk of resulting in lowered esprit de corps or hampered individual commitment.

On the other hand, Professor Ezra Krendel (1975) contends that the emerging characteristics of American armed forces will result in organizational tendencies that are both uniquely civilian and historically military. That prediction is easily reconcilable with the three models of an "institution," a "profession," and an "occupation" theorized by noted military sociologist Charles Moskos. The changes fostered by the introduction of the All Volunteer Force, patriotic appeals, and protection of individual interests bear upon the basic concepts of these models. The belief that "a military hitch is no longer a patriotic duty to God and country but a peacetime job with civilian pay" (Schratz, 1977, p. 26) also entails various concepts of this three-model conceptualization. Perhaps a greater understanding of and realization of these factors may serve as needed preparation for understanding military unionism. Segal (1976) seems to envision the Moskos models in relation to the military environment, as dealing with the ... "inherent strain between organizational requirements to maintain combat effectiveness, on the one hand, and social pressures to maintain a socially representative and responsive military establishment on the other" (p. 2). The more the military organization depends on unique "institutional" characteristics and dedication, such as "Duty, Honor, Country", the less responsive it tends to be to

the more "occupational" needs of the uniformed members. A basic appreciation for each model provides for a greater understanding of the capacity of each to influence the military unionization movement.

With the implementation of the All Volunteer Force in January 1973 the military began to compete with civilian industries for new members through stronger dependence on the basis of monetary incentives. Moskos (1977) observed that currently four million young men each year reach the age to qualify for military recruitment. He predicted that in the 1980's, due to lower birth rates, that number will drop to about three million per year. If the attractiveness of military service is not enhanced through appropriate appeals of each model, military manning might suffer. Added to this potential danger is the problem of the Total Force Concept and the difficulties experienced in National Guard and Reserve recruiting campaigns. The near crisis state of recruitment of these members signals possible trouble for the future. The increasing insistence of leaders and policy makers to act as though military work-roles are equivalent to civilian occupations deals directly with the concepts of Moskos and the possibility of military unionization (Segal, 1976).

The first type of theoretical framework to be used to look at the military environment is what Moskos describes as the "institutional model." This model is based on the concept of a calling which implies a type of sacred mission, the purpose of which transcends individual self-interest



(Moskos, 1976). This presumed "higher good" has very religious overtones and entails a sense of "apartness" or difference. Segal (1976) captured that sense of distinction in his description of the military work and leisure worlds where ... "both worlds were integrated on the military installation, where personnel played, worked, shopped, and lived" (p. 5). The notion of self-sacrifice can easily be associated with the concepts of "Duty, Honor, Country" or national defense and the inherent dedication one must profess and practice. The employing institution and the degree of sacrifice are almost ends in themselves. Basic trust rested in the system which provided relatively low levels of economic support but where paternalism, direct concern for constituents, and the sense of "taking care of its own" was paramount (Moskos, 1977). Service leaders and civilian officials seem to continually revert to the declaration that the military organization is an institution, which serves as the single, most important motive for personnel to serve in the national defense forces. The adequacy of the all-encompassing presumption might well be carefully examined as the military unionization effort seems to gather momentum.

The "professional model" is the second Moskos model, and it centers primarily on the task itself. This model is "legitimated" by specialized expertise, training, and a service orientation (Moskos, 1977). Individuals who fit into this model would be characterized by the fact that they are likely to pursue and practice that profession

throughout a lifetime. For instance, few medical doctors or lawyers would be inclined to switch professions after completing the necessary, lengthy and expensive education. Grievances, disputes, or controversies would normally be addressed to an appropriate professional association, such as the American Medical Association. Such associations, in turn, wield a powerful influence over actual practices. While many career military members like to think of themselves as true professionals, the military does not really seem to fit into this second model (Moskos, 1977). Many of the requirements and characteristics are not fulfilled by career members of the military organization. Consequently, this professional model may be mentioned only infrequently in further discussion of military unionization.

The third Moskos model, which is gaining increasing acceptance, is the "occupational model." The primary basis of this model is the increased emphasis and priority of self-interest displayed by individuals. Moskos (1976) concisely describes the "occupational model" as being justified in terms of the marketplace where prevailing monetary rewards are determined by equivalent skills. The implication that ... "first priority inheres in self-interest rather than in the employing organization" (Moskos, 1976, p. 1) has an intrinsic appeal to trade unionism. This model may have special attraction to the gratification-oriented society which Cortright described, since it tends to relate to the hedonistic desires of the individuals themselves. The thought of considering military service as

a mere occupation, in this strict sense of the word, may appall many civilian and military leaders plus uniformed members themselves. The intense emotion and consternation generated by the discussion of this last model makes it a major focal point of unionism in the military.

Recent discussions concerning the advent of military unionism in relation to the Moskos models deal primarily with the "institution" and "occupation" models. However, discussants must be aware that such models are only derived expressions of the real world which cannot be assumed to provide accurate prediction. Consequently, it would be totally irrelevant to think of a military structure consisting of all members who are imposed with super-patriotic incentives or with super-selfish motives. Moskos (1977) himself interjects his discussion of these three models with the warning that no pure type of model exists or can exist in the military environment. Manley, McNichols, and Stahl (1976c) further expand on this aspect by stressing that "...occupation and institution values are not mutually exclusive, they exist concurrently" (p. 4). As a result, the developing overall values of the national defense forces can be reviewed as lying somewhere between strong dedication to country and an intense interest in individual self-concern.

The "developmental analysis" of Professor Moskos (1976) results with the overall proposition that the armed forces of the United States are becoming less associated with the institutional model. He seems to indicate that patriotic

values instilled in military members have become subordinate to greater concern for personal, material interests. According to the Professor, this shift of military interest toward a more occupational model was initiated with the introduction of the All Volunteer Force, which relied on recruiting that was ... "based on monetary incentives determined by marketplace standards" (Moskos, 1976, p. 2). Since that event, the eligible and qualified young male or female has been a resource for which both civilian concerns and the military have been vying. Should these individuals begin to look upon themselves as commodities, they may attempt to maximize their own interests by manipulating the competitors for ultimate tangible and intangible returns. The danger of such exploitation in the pseudo-competitive atmosphere lies in the fact that it may be brought forward when an individual joins either a civilian corporation or a military service. In the military, increased shifts toward the occupational format because individuals seek constant improvements or additional tangible or intangible benefits, could help promote the possibility of a military union.

On 11 March 1977 at a seminar presentation for AFIT students and instructors, Doctor Moskos contended that the military was shifting away from an "institution" and toward an "occupation" for the following reasons:

- (1) the proposition for the military to go to a strict salary system would make it very similar to civilian corporations where little worker concern exists for those



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
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organizations; (2) the current legislative actions to reduce military benefits; (3) the increased desire to live off of military complexes so that military members can get away from their work; (4) the past and continuing proposals to institute pay raises for military personnel; and (5) the increase in the use of litigation to solve disputes, such as with Reductions in Force, which may signify the breakdown of commitment to the institution.

Additionally, Moskos (1976) stresses two changes or consequences which could result from the shift of the military toward an occupation. He first stresses the possibility of the adaptation of a form of trade unionism. The second prediction he makes deals with the civilianization of jobs formerly held by uniformed military members. The proximity of the second outcome was perhaps highlighted in the 1 October 1975 issue of the Air Force Times which stated:

The nation may have armed forces that are increasingly satisfied with job security and material benefits while military tasks fall more and more into the hands of contract civilians.  
(p. 18)

Segal (1976) echoed similar remarks when he described the means of accommodating the desires of civilian workers. He observed that greater concern of worker democracy could be expressed through unionization, which could also reflect a higher interest in an improved quality of life. Air Force personnel have recently experienced service-sponsored quality of life investigations. Air Force members will

probably use such investigations to evaluate and determine their attitudes and values toward unionism in the institutional or occupational format.

The respondents to the Commanders' Survey, referenced in the previous section, exhibited an interesting tendency to shift their values away from the "institutional model." In the opinion of all the officers, the "retirement system" was the second most important factor in the original decision to make the Air Force a career. Originally "pay and allowances" must have been an almost insignificant determinant because it was ranked eighth. Subsequently, when the factors were ranked according to which were more important today, notable changes took place. "Retirement pay" was the biggest percentage gainer and "pay and allowances" switched from eighth place to the third position. These observations and the seeming decline of importance of the patriotic motives verified in the previous section seem to support the concepts of the Moskos "institution-occupation" theory. The authors of the AFIT technical report summarized their observations very succinctly by stating "the high placements of retirement pay and security, when contrasted with the low placement of service to the nation, would seem to support the Moskos thesis" (Manley et al., 1977a, p. 4-48).

These same three authors are currently attempting to derive quantified and measurable differences of occupation and institution values for various subsets within the Air Force. In order to accomplish this they categorized



the five following factors as occupation values: "a comfortable life," "family security," "individual freedom," "personal recognition," and "job satisfaction" (Manley, McNichols & Stahl, 1976c, p. 6). The five other elements constituting the institution values are: "a sense of accomplishment," "loyalty," "national security," "integrity," and "trust" (Manley et al., 1976c, pp. 6 & 7). The tentative results of this yet unpublished effort by the three AFIT professors show the occupation values ranked second, first, sixth, tenth, and fourth respectively by 73 percent of the 10,687 individuals, who responded to the second Quality of Life survey of Spring 1977. Furthermore, the institution values listed above were assigned ratings of third, ninth, fifth, eighth, and seventh. The overall interrelationships of all ten factors are depicted in Table I.

Table I  
Ranking of Occupation and Institution Values

Value Elements	Classification	Actual Ranking
Family Security	Occupation	1
A Comfortable Life	Occupation	2
Sense of Accomplishment	Institution	3
Job Satisfaction	Occupation	4
National Security	Institution	5
Individual Freedom	Occupation	6
Trust	Institution	7
Integrity	Institution	8
Loyalty	Institution	9
Personal Recognition	Occupation	10

(From AFIT/ENS unpublished work 1977)

As the reader can see, three of the occupational-type factors were rated in the top five of importance value. Moreover, three of the institutional values were rated

quite low in the bottom five most important factors. Although, this analysis is far from complete, the basic initial rankings may indicate that a cross section of the Air Force population seems to support the Moskos thesis that the military may in fact have started the shift from a calling to an occupation.

The results of the analysis of the 1977 data are presented in Table 1. The table shows the initial rankings of the 10 factors by the Air Force population. The factors are listed in descending order of their initial ranking. The factors are: 1. Military Service, 2. Military Training, 3. Military Leadership, 4. Military Discipline, 5. Military Honor, 6. Military Loyalty, 7. Military Courage, 8. Military Skill, 9. Military Endurance, and 10. Military Sacrifice. The initial rankings are: 1. Military Service (1), 2. Military Training (2), 3. Military Leadership (3), 4. Military Discipline (4), 5. Military Honor (5), 6. Military Loyalty (6), 7. Military Courage (7), 8. Military Skill (8), 9. Military Endurance (9), and 10. Military Sacrifice (10).

Table 1  
Ranking of Occupations and Institutional Values

Ranking	Occupation	Institutional Value
1	Occupation	Factor 1: Military Service
2	Occupation	Factor 2: Military Training
3	Occupation	Factor 3: Military Leadership
4	Occupation	Factor 4: Military Discipline
5	Occupation	Factor 5: Military Honor
6	Occupation	Factor 6: Military Loyalty
7	Occupation	Factor 7: Military Courage
8	Occupation	Factor 8: Military Skill
9	Occupation	Factor 9: Military Endurance
10	Occupation	Factor 10: Military Sacrifice

From 1977 data, the following factors were rated as the top five of importance values. The factors are: 1. Military Service, 2. Military Training, 3. Military Leadership, 4. Military Discipline, and 5. Military Honor. The factors were rated as the top five of importance values.

## V. Labor Relations Impact and Legislative Emphasis

In Chapter IV the military unionization movement and how it is strongly influenced by public attitudes, patriotic drives, and by economic motives was defined. The phenomena of growing militancy and apparent disrespect for authority along with the rise of professional unions further signal the overall complexity of the situation.

The attitudes of senior military and civilian leaders also bear closely on the problem. If high-level leaders continue to profess the incompatibility of unionism and the military, but some lower-level managers and service personnel perceive beneficial advantages, a conflict seems imminent. Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the incompatibility of the two in his remark that "military personnel cannot live up to the oath of service and still work under a union contract. We can't have it" (Air Force Times, 23 February 1976, p. 10). However, the Defense Manpower Commission seemed to question the rigidity of the oath by reporting that "people do as they are directed because the compensation for doing so outweighs the penalty of refusal" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 437). This statement tends to stress the importance of compensation for doing a job, which seems to suggest the military situation is conducive to unionization.

The dilemma is further intensified by the example set forth in the achievements of unions in the private and public

sectors. Recent Executive Orders and amendments affecting federal employee labor relations also provide a framework of negotiable and non-negotiable matters for which armed forces members may display increased, future interest.

This chapter explores the unionization issue in conjunction with many characteristics of traditional labor relations and with respect to potential legal issues. In terms of labor-management associations, both parties are usually distinctly identifiable. The current situation in the military is less clear cut, and it seems beneficial to separate the two parties involved in this issue. The appropriateness of collective bargaining affecting service benefits and public expense is an extremely important aspect which warrants examination. The usefulness of a mutually understood agreement as opposed to a type of explicit contract is also investigated. Many opponents to military unionization base their convictions on a feeling of "military necessity," which could unintentionally surpass the interest of service members. This concept is considered to be an underlying aspect of recent legislative bills and congressional hearings to be reviewed as a conclusion to this chapter.

#### The Management Faction

The study of private sector unionism starts with a clear understanding of the terms "labor" and "employers." A similar course of action seems reasonable in undertaking an investigation of the military unionization movement.



Although military personnel are not legally classified as "employees," they do, in fact, seem to be ... "part of the working population which offers its services for hire" (Bloom & Northrup, 1977, p. 30). These same authors contend that civilian labor problems arise because of the economic activity dealing with compensation that transpires between the "workers" and the people or firms for which they work.

In relation to the situation in the armed forces, the government and the public seem to fulfill the role of the employer. Military personnel provide their services to insure the public good of national defense in return for compensation considerations through monetary rewards and tangible or intangible benefits. If the unique characteristics and requirements of military service imposes too much hardship for uniformed personnel and their families, then that career or "occupation" may no longer be deemed acceptable (Defense Manpower, 1976). This potential situation and its associated problems denote the need for attention by management of the defense forces.

Typically, the military commander may have been considered the manager of his subordinates. He basically controls the activities of the people below him and is ultimately responsible to insure that the "job" is accomplished. The military commander is faced with a task unique to managers which is distinguished by the flexibility in his ability to alter management style to get the job done (Farrington, 1976). However, he may not be inhibited by stringent mores and worker aversion as his closest

civilian counterpart.

At the 39th MORS conference, Army Colonel C. A. Miller (1977) expressed further support for the idea of not equating the military commander with management. He suggested that the common practice of referring to the commander as "the old man" does not impart the same feelings that civilian employees would have for their employer or manager. Within the military unit there seems to exist a unique sense of solidarity which is lacking in the civilian labor environment. Although the commander may formulate local rules and regulations concerning the actual work itself, he is seen as having little influence in broader issues or policies such as pay, retirement, or benefits.

Colonel Miller (1977) also makes the point clear that the relation between officers and enlisted personnel should not be thought of in terms of the traditional management-labor breakdown. Again, the fundamental sense of unit integrity and "primary group cohesion" is probably unlike that found in the civilian labor environment. This modern-day contention seems to be supported by Shils and Janowitz (1948) who found that ... "when isolated from civilian primary groups, the individual soldier comes to depend more and more on his military primary group" (p. 285). Although there has been a greater integration of the military community into civilian society because of decreased isolation of uniformed personnel or the fact many military families now live off base, the basic physical appearance and mission distinctions of these personnel still underscore the

existence of "military primary groups."

Some might assert that senior officers comprise the top management of the armed forces. Commanders of the individual services and of the major commands do occupy positions of high visibility and are responsible for making a multitude of operational decisions. However, in reality they seem to make very few policy decisions because of legal aspects of civilian control which tend to preempt their decision-making prerogatives. This impression is further intensified by Air Force Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones who stated in the May 1977 issue of the Airman magazine that:

It's the feeling that the senior sergeants' hands are tied; that the majors' hands are tied; that the colonels' hands are tied; that the generals' hands are tied; as the big decisions are being made in Washington. (p. 49)

The message of this quotation seems to reject the concept that any serviceman past his first term obligation is automatically a part of management (Schratz, 1977). According to the second highest-ranking Air Force officer, there is a widely held perception that the most important management decisions are not made by him or his counterparts.

General Jones further emphasizes that members and heads of various governmental organizations and agencies seem to feel a need for meddling in the economic and social affairs incorporated in military benefits (Airman, May 1977). Uncoordinated bureaucratic activity may further prompt service personnel to presume that civilian officials and their staff members feel little compassion for their cause.



The Defense Manpower Commission indicates agreement with General Jones in its report when it noted that very little true managerial and policy-making authority is granted to uniformed military leaders. Moreover, the Commission stated that:

The President, as Commander in Chief, the Congress of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense are jointly and severally in the position of responsible leadership over the armed forces. It is they who must make the rules and regulations and require military obedience. (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 63)

In this regard, the attitudes of military members toward possible unionization will probably be most affected by the concern expressed by such governmental leaders. The uncertainty that service men and women feel about their future does not seem to completely be a result of decisions made by generals. Military personnel probably tend to accept that decisions on "bread and butter issues" are decided upon by officials of the current administration and the Congress.

The implications of this assertion should be quite clear. If ... "there appears to be a significant communication gap between departmental policy makers and units in the field" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 60), military personnel may feel that no one, in both high and low positions of authority, is looking out for their interests. Unilateral decisions made by these management types may promote unrest. Budgetary and policy determinations



which are reached with little regard for the consolidated opinion of military personnel could influence the evolution of military unionization.

#### The Role of Collective Bargaining

A major aspect of the military unionization issue is the pertinence of collective bargaining in military matters. Many civilian and military leaders have voiced stringent opposition to the suggestion. Collective bargaining is the process whereby two representative parties negotiate in good faith for the sole purpose of reaching an agreement on the issues at hand. Proposed legal restrictions and vehement opposition are clearly apparent in the wording of paragraph (c) of Section 1 of Senate Bill S.997 (1977) which states that "the process of conventional collective bargaining and labor negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the United States military organization" (p. 2).

Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown in an 18 July 1977 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, addressed the issue of collective bargaining as one of the four principle aspects to be included in a comprehensive Department of Defense directive dealing with the military unionization "problem." In the proposed directive, military commanders and supervisors would be forbidden to engage in any type of bilateral collective bargaining process dealing with matters of wages, benefits, grievances or other conditions of military duty (Brown, 1977).

Both types of action aimed at preventing military unionism portray a typical unattractive feature. The persistent characteristic of the proceedings remaining completely unilateral is sustained by each. With the spread of collective bargaining throughout the American economic culture, it is natural to expect its influence to be felt by the military. Recent settlements such as that awarding Bell Telephone employees a thirty-one percent salary increase over a three-year time span may possibly make military members question whether or not they are getting the short end of the economic stick. Future union settlements which are equally generous to other factions of the civilian work force may prompt uniformed personnel to demand some form of negotiations protecting their interests.

The bureaucratic process of formulating service rules, restrictions, and economic constraints, without adequate external representation of military interests, may be viewed as a violation of concepts of effective communication. Reliance on the belief that such legislative actions are affected by current lobbying measures and therefore should not be questioned, may be difficult for military members to accept. The discipline level and respect for authority might conceivably deteriorate if dissatisfaction with what is perceived as a one-sided system increases.

The military might learn a great deal from the civilian example whereby effective communication between employees and management develops respect and good will. Consolidated employee opinion expressed by a single agency allows for

more complete discussion of mutual problems. Equal representation by both sides might foster the achievement of mutual communication which Rogers and Roethlisberger (1952) describe as being ... "pointed toward solving a problem rather than toward attacking a person or group" (Kolb, Rubin & McIntyre, 1974, p. 248). The present structure of unilateral communication results in civilian departments justifying military-related decisions and attacking unionism as creating problems. However, military members may question the current process by indicating receptiveness toward perceived improved representation efforts.

Numerous examples of resistance to collective bargaining in the public sector provide precedence for a developing form of negotiation dealing with military matters. The staunch resistance presently displayed may decrease with the passage of time. Krendel (1975) reported on the opposition Herbert Hoover displayed toward public sector collective bargaining in 1928. The argument presented then, and still prevalent, is that decisions rendered by the legislative body were considered sovereign, and bargaining based on economic needs or consideration of employees was unfounded. Hagen and Johnson (1975) wrote that in 1937 national interest and governmental limitations also prevented collective bargaining in public sector matters. As time passed and substantial gains were made by private sector unions, negotiation over working conditions, wages, and benefits for public sector employees became commonplace.

More recent developments support the legality and acceptability of collective bargaining in the federal sector. On 17 January 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 which established a basic structure for collective bargaining with the federal government. Hagen and Johnson (1975) describe the move as a sincere effort "...to establish a modern system of labor-management regulation within the federal service" (p. 28). Throughout the evolution of collective bargaining in the public and federal environment, certain lessons and problems have arisen, which influence the applicability of such negotiation to the armed forces.

Although the complexity of labor situations within the Department of Defense make it virtually impossible to discuss them all, major issues concerning collective bargaining and defense issues can be investigated on a limited basis. Many of the same charges initially opposing the use of collective bargaining in the private and public sectors would seem useful to counter this practice by a military union.

First and foremost, such collective bargaining is attacked as violating governmental sovereignty. The "law of the land" or the undisputed power of Congress to enact legislation to regulate the military forces would be jeopardized by a stronger influence of members of the national defense force. Conflicts during actual negotiation might interrupt essential services the armed forces provide (Harris, 1975). To support this point, opponents



to military unionization need only point to the turmoil created by walkouts or slowdowns of other public service employees such as police or firemen.

Military pay scales and benefits are determined by legislative authority. Implementation of the bargaining process over such issues ... "would interfere with the budgeting process" (Harris, 1975, p. 19). Desired monetary increases that would affect overall fiscal planning, might be reflected by an amended tax schedule. The fundamental means of strengthening the employee position in any negotiation is the threat of withholding services. Strikes, slowdowns, and similar job actions could have far-reaching effects on national defense and the impact on foreign affairs.

The national government may not relinquish control of the deterrent forces of this nation as quickly as city, local, and state governments did of teachers, police, and firemen. When all the facts are examined, it is possible that present members of the military system may ultimately abandon attempts to alter the decision making structure in view of the paramount "national interest."

The term may tend to become more ambiguous in relation to the inactivity of United States military forces in the late 1970's. Still, that sense of devotion to "national interest" seems to be evident in that military personnel tend to accept limitations of certain constitutional rights. Senator Strom Thurmond specified that historical requirement by stating that "the First Amendment rights

of our uniformed military must give way to the extent that they conflict with the duties required of servicemen accomplishing their mission" (AEI Defense Review, 1977, p. 18). The Senator also discusses the ... "small abridgment of rights" as the price service personnel must pay to assure an effective defense force. A dilemma arises in that military members relinquish freedoms guaranteed to all other citizens, yet they experience frequent attacks on their compensation plans. It might be more acceptable to realize the first limitation as a duty requirement if the second phenomenon did not arise quite so often. This example of military double jeopardy could possibly alter past feelings toward the merits of collective bargaining.

The concept of "national interest" may also be examined in terms of "military necessity." This phrase is a second means of explaining restrictions to the Bill of Rights, which are based on the need to accomplish the military mission through a high level of discipline (Sullivan, 1969).

"Military necessity" might be equated to the term "compelling need" which was introduced into the federal labor relations spectrum by Executive Order 11838 of 6 February 1975. That Order basically expanded the realm of possible negotiation between an agency and a labor organization. The only imposed limitation was when internal agency policies and regulations depicted a "compelling need" to omit nonnegotiable issues pertaining to its operation (Strickland, 1976). A "need" established by the Federal Labor Relations Council may bar negotiations

on behalf of non-uniformed federal employees much like "military necessity" affects the recourses available to uniformed personnel. The basic comparison determining "military necessity" involves the rights of uniformed men and women and military need in a ... "balancing test (which) has a potential impact on national security" (Grebeldinger, 1976, p. 76).

Agencies promoting military unionism might objectively search the feelings of "national interest" and current "military necessity" to form a basis for matching the rights of individuals against the needs of a disciplined military. On the other hand, Grebeldinger (1976) voices the possibility of increased interest in collective bargaining in defense matters in stronger terms by stating:

Traditional arguments that wide discretion is vested in federal authorities to discipline and control military members and that the military service demands surrender of certain rights vested with private citizens widely miss the mark in today's environment. (p. 77)

#### An Implicit or Explicit Contract

Much has been written about the disparities in benefits that service people feel they are entitled to and those they actually receive. One of the purposes of a military union would be to mutually decide on the work terms and conditions military members are subjected to along with their remunerations and benefits. By partaking in a shared decision-making process a union might end what uniformed personnel ... "believe is a violation by the



government of the contract they entered into when they enlisted" (Strickland, 1976, p. 2).

Human resources can no longer be considered a free commodity because during these times of force reductions they are scarce and must be allocated among competing ends. The rule of "having to do more with less" is particularly applicable to manpower functions. The reduction in the number of available personnel in uniform ironically constrains the legislative body and service departments, which instituted these decreases. Fewer and fewer opportune cost reductions, aimed at trimming the military budget, may be available in the future. Navy Captain Jack Caldwell (1975) goes even further in emphasizing this trend by writing that "no union work force in the world would tolerate the current service personnel policy situation" (p. 24).

The problem of the presumptive broken enlistment contract occurs when a benefit is changed, the time between promotions is increased, or a school opportunity is eliminated. As a retort to this growing attitudinal problem, various influential military and civilian leaders question the legality of demands concerning recruiting promises (Sparrow, 1975). Harris (1975) summarizes the situation by noting that:

For generations, young men have volunteered for a military career under a specified set of conditions - an unwritten contract. This contract was frequently changed arbitrarily and without neutral appeal. The result was that only a few could refuse such abuse and change careers;



others less adventuresome and self-reliant lingered on with a feeling of bitterness and betrayal. (p. 56)

The contract based on the norm rather than on law implied many promises as to pay, benefits, and opportunities. The loss of credibility generated by such modifications of a contract of unlimited liability can cause other difficulties. As Harris indicates, many individuals who are on active duty may serve out their commitments and then seek civilian employment. This rather immediate loss is supplemented by persons who may have been considering a military career. The dissuasive effect in these terms is incalculable in aspects of manpower and money.

One of the most evident reversals of all time was made by Senator William Proxmire after the results of the March 1976 AFIT unionization survey were released. The staunch critic of military spending seemed to retract earlier attacks by stating that fringe benefits should not be cut. Proxmire stated that "you have to fulfill the contract. That includes benefits for the fellow that went in yesterday with the understanding he could retire after 20 years" (Plattner, 1977, p. 6). Senator Proxmire was reiterating a 1976 finding of the Defense Manpower Commission which concluded that personnel policies and practices that individuals valued highly must not be changed without adequate consideration of the possible consequences. Alterations to personnel policies or implied contractual stipulations could hasten the advent of military unionism and could hinder future recruitment and retention efforts.

Conversely, the Defense Manpower Commission expresses the belief that policy decisions which are heavily affected by monetary constraints should be disclosed to the maximum extent. The contention is that service personnel would appreciate knowing true facts, which are not obscured by a multitude of promises (Defense Manpower, 1976). Accordingly, when such policy changes are required, the Commission recommended that:

All active, Guard, and Reserve guarantees and incentives should be adjusted periodically, depending on the changes in the market and the need to attract volunteers at the time.  
(p. 192)

Interestingly, it appears as though this recommendation might well result in the same dilemma that exists now. Timely verification and reasoning of any changes to the pay or fringe benefit program are not the disgruntling issues. The upsetting feature is the perception by military members that they have been deprived of something they regarded as one of the terms of the implied contract of recruitment.

Summarily, the Defense Manpower Commission recommended an action which probably would be taken by a military union. As a means of consolidating an explicit list of all compensations which military members could expect to receive, it was suggested that ... "a 'Bill of Rights' should be enacted specifying the benefits that accrue from military service.... which would only be changed or eliminated prospectively and.... would not apply to those

already in the Service" (Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 434).

A union would probably demand such a listing as a starting point of a more extensive explicit agreement. The commission seems to appreciate the usefulness of this procedure for reducing the feeling of servicemen that their benefits are in jeopardy. The tacit understanding that unionism might compel Defense officials to distinctly specify the terms of recruitment and thereafter insure that those conditions are fulfilled may possibly be a point of attraction in a time when fringe benefits seem to be under continual attack.

#### Congressional Action

Recently, an Air Force general seemed to discount the possibility of applying the concepts of collective bargaining, labor relations, and distinct contracts to internal operations of the Air Force. The contention was based on the premise that "the Air Force is a union - an inside union.... bound together by common understanding, dedication, and purpose" (Dixon, 1977, p. 1). Reliance on these allegiances may not be universally accepted.

Concentrating on a balance between national interest and the welfare of servicemen, the Defense Manpower Commission reported the need to prevent military unionism. In its report, the Commission concluded that Congress institute legislative ... "power to discourage a member of the armed forces from joining a union or similar organization if membership entails disobeying lawful orders"



(Defense Manpower, 1976, p. 62). As a result, numerous bills to prohibit such union organization and membership were introduced during the 94th and 95th meetings of Congress.

Senate bill S.997 of 15 March 1977 is the latest, anti-military union legislation, which like previous bills, attempts to amend chapter 49 of title 10 of the United States Code. This proposed bill would prevent any member of the armed forces or the Coast Guard on active duty or a member of the Reserves from joining an organization which would attempt to negotiate over terms of work, service, or pay of those members. Congressional implementation of the constitutional power to regulate the military forces is founded on the necessity to insure control, discipline, and unquestioning obedience of uniformed service personnel to fight and, if necessary, die for the security, survival, and liberty of the United States. Legislators believe so strongly that a military union would jeopardize these requirements that an individual could be fined up to \$10,000 and/or be subject to imprisonment for up to five years. The severity of this punishment in relation to the ultimate cost to the individual service member (his or her life) may enlarge the unilateral aspects of the oath of military service. Government leaders might well consider the antagonistic effect such decrees might have on military members who could tend to become more concerned with improved representation for their desires.

Undoubtedly, if this law were passed, it would be



tested in civil courts. Stressing the Supreme Court doctrine that "the military, by necessity, is a specialized society separate from civilian society," Senator Strom Thurmond (1977) contends that "prohibiting unionization of the military would be a valid exercise of legislative authority" (AEI Defense Review, 1977, p. 17). Another writer suggests that like their civilian counterparts in the private, public, and federal work sectors, military members also ... "have a First Amendment right to join together.... to improve their living and working conditions" (Badami, 1973, p. 27).

The Commission further recommended that the Department of Defense publish a revised directive prohibiting commanders from recognizing or bargaining with a union (Defense Manpower, 1976). The 1 August 1977 edition of the Air Force Times reported that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had promised such a ... "directive controlling military unions by mid-September (1977)" (p. 6). Four weeks later, that same publication printed the draft form of that directive, which was introduced into the Federal Register. Secretary Brown indicated that he hoped this departmental directive would eliminate the need for anti-union legislation. His intent seemed to show that the situation could be effectively taken care of without action by external parties. The directive would be similar to proposed legislation in that it would prohibit military personnel from using such job actions as strikes or work-slowdowns, but could be implemented more quickly and would be more flexible (Air

Force Times, 1 August 1977). Although a directive would also attempt to restrict recruiting efforts by military unions, its greatest advantage is that it would probably be able to survive a constitutional challenge in the courts (Air Force Times, 1 August 1977). The debate over whether a law or a directive would be the most effective means for disallowing a military union should be settled once and for all so that commanders and directors know what actions they can take in relation to such unionization efforts.

As a concluding sidelight to the examination of the means of prohibiting a military union, many representatives in Congress seem to feel that improving the service grievance redress procedure would eliminate current desires of implementing some form of negotiating procedure for military issues. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee devoted hearings in July and August 1977 to the subject of the military grievance procedures. Civilian and military leaders are considering new methods for service personnel to voice their complaints and to insure corrective action is taken. The effort is commendable but perhaps more effort should be expended to derive initial corrective action to problem areas. Congressional and military leaders should be aware that AFGE has announced that:

Stewards would become involved in grievance procedures over promotions, housing, leave, foreign service, education and training, temporary duty, travel allowances, commissary and exchange privileges, recreation facilities, parking, day care, dress and hair codes, political

rights, police, fire, and traffic regulations,  
health and dental care, efficiency ratings,  
equal opportunity, safety and reprimands.  
(Air Force Times, 20 June 1977, p. 9)

Although Congress and AFGE are addressing the same title of "grievance procedures" each seems to have distinctly different opinions of what it encompasses. The legislators seem to have concentrated on grievances that primarily center on immediate personal and financial problems of military members, whereas AFGE officials seem to be attempting to become involved in all aspects of military life. Danger exists in this lack of communication. Both parties may feel they are coordinated in their effort to improve conditions for service personnel when dysfunctional energy is being expended. AFGE could possibly culminate its struggle by forming a military union at the same time a Department of Defense directive and an anti-military union law are instituted. If this should happen, would uniformed personnel be benefitted in any way?

## VI. Summary and Conclusions

This study has examined issues which are pertinent to military unionism and its implications for Air Force management. The historical analysis has reviewed many aspects or events that pertain to the American armed forces and to labor-management relations in the United States. It considers rhetorical discussion of military unionism in the light of data and information provided by empirically based research. Although many studies and periodical articles on the subject of military unionization have been analyzed, no concrete solutions have been offered.

The United States Air Force and the other services are facing a serious threat of unionization. Hopefully, this consolidation of material from the 1970's will assist the reader in arriving at a credible personal position concerning military unionization. Recognition of that possibility and appreciation of the potential problem is the first step in dealing with the situation. The individual chapters of this thesis provide valuable background information for one to consider when formulating those personal attitudes.

### Summary

General George S. Brown (1977) suggested that intangible rewards and tangible rewards are two areas of motivation for Air Force personnel. The discussion in Chapter II of the advantages of unionism corresponds closely to that



suggestion. The perceived level of prestige associated with being a member of the military and adequate means of handling grievances are both positive intangible factors on the ... "personal sense of fulfillment from the Service way of life" (Brown, 1977, p. 36); whereas loss of pride, the detrimental impact of unionism on discipline, and the imminent strike issue are possible union disadvantages which may detract from that sense of fulfillment. Wages, benefits, and the military retirement system are important aspects of "regular military compensation" which are designed to provide ... "an adequate standard of living in relation to peers in civilian life" (Brown, 1977, p. 36). Chapter II addresses the theme that a military union might detract from these tangible rewards by imposing dues and an increased administrative burden on Air Force members.

In Chapter III, a description of the characteristics of the labor force supplement an examination of current survey findings on military unionization. An analysis of a large-scale Air Force study is augmented by a review of two smaller Army studies. The areas of interest in these studies centered on perceived problems of unionism, union effectiveness, the impact of military unions, and views of joining a military union. Interestingly and significantly, the Air Force investigators found ... "that the most potent predictor of whether or not an individual states he would join a union is the individual's perception of the impact on military unions on mission effectiveness" (Manley, McNichols, Stahl, 1976c, p. 23). Support of the findings

of this research of attitudes and opinions of service men and women is reinforced by analysis of recent letters to the editor of several publications. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of the role and response of professional military associations to military unionization. The review shows that if such a union is formed and is somehow prevented from striking, that organization will resemble present-day military associations. Those associations now enjoy a high degree of acceptance and might well be preferred over a new union.

Chapter IV considers the role of traditional military values in relation to the influence of modern society. "Duty, Honor, Country," the motto of the United States Military Academy, instills specific images of the military member. Extra hours of work, extended family separations, physical and psychological stress, and the personal risks entailed in the military profession may tend to take on new dimensions in relation to the Moskos sociological theory. His two models which can be used to depict the military as an "institution" or as an "occupation" have frequently served as a framework for recent discussions and writings about military unionization, and will probably continue to be used in the future.

The fifth chapter reviews the applicability of some aspects of civilian labor relations to the military environment. It is shown that any form of union representation would have to deal with the members of executive agencies and elected congressmen, if the true "bread and butter"

issues are to be explored. The prospect of the direct negotiation of collective bargaining concerning military matters could possibly result in a more explicit military contract as a condition of the oath of service. This chapter centers around the aspect of fair and faithful discussion of issues through mutual communication that is based on the fact that both parties have substantial power bases. The overall applicability of the subjects of this chapter is summarized by the Farrington (1976) statement that "the history of unionization of the public sector has its roots in a brand of worker dissatisfaction which correlates nicely with the current motivation for military unionization" (p. 87).

### Conclusions

Senator John Tower characterized the long-term implications of military unionization as "horrrifying." Senator Jake Garn stated he ... "had never heard a more ridiculous proposal than to unionize the military" (Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 18 July 1977), and that he would oppose the move at all costs. Such modifiers as "horrrifying" and "ridiculous" suggest an intensity of emotion over the issue of military unionization, which might well lead the Congress, service leaders, and military associations into taking decisive action. If these individuals are convinced that people in uniform are seriously considering unionism as a means to insure adequate representation of their needs and desires, more attention to

the concern of military members may result.

On the other hand, Congress might opt to enact legislation banning union membership. It was recently reported that such a bill has been approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee in an unannounced session (Air Force Times, 15 August 1977). However, in order to get to the root of the overall problem, senators and representatives might well take the advice of "the services' top enlisted men.... that benefit cuts, not inadequacies in military grievance procedures, are pushing frustrated service people toward unions" (Air Force Times, 15 August 1977, p. 29).

One might logically suggest that discord within the military will increase if the perceived erosion of benefits continues (Hagen & Johnson, 1975). Additionally, if military members sense an increasing disparity between civilian and military pay, hours of work, and benefits, they may tend to be more receptive to the advances of organizations promoting military unionization. The above concept was rejected by the past Secretary of Defense Schlesinger who contended that inflation has caused the decline of perceived benefits and the military, like segments of the civilian community, was going to have to get used to less and less tangibles (Shoemaker, 1975). This controversial statement seems hardly apropos during times of increasing wages and seemingly expanding American materialism. Service personnel perceiving losses of personal benefits compounded by increases in material gains of civilian union members may respond favorably to the



recruitment attempts of individuals advocating military unionism.

If legislation such as Senate bill S.997 is passed or if a new Department of Defense directive prohibiting membership in military unions is instituted, their legality would most certainly be challenged. Military lawyers at the 39th MORS who discussed the legal aspects of unionizing the military concluded that a law of the type currently being introduced within the Congress would probably not survive a court battle. Badami (1973) concludes that "the creation of a servicemen's union, if kept within proper bounds , is both a constitutionally protected First Amendment right of servicemen and a circumstance in the best interest of the military" (p. 76).

The fate of an anti-union directive issued by the current Secretary of Defense is supposedly less uncertain. Secretary Brown in his 18 July 1977 letter contends that a directive can be more narrowly worded, can be guided in its application, and cannot be challenged "on its face value." Consequently, it seems to be the consensus of Defense Department legal experts that such a directive ... "can more successfully survive a constitutional challenge in the courts" (Brown, 1977, p. 2). In either case any form of prohibition of military unionism is surely to be met by legal suits from AFGE or the Citizen Soldier, and possibly from powerful civilian groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union.

Assuming the right of personnel to join unions was

upheld in the courts, the agency representing military members would most likely deal with issues and contract items that cause little initial disturbance and create minimal disruption. A foreseeable union tactic is that "pioneer recognitions are likely to be unobtrusive, innocuous agreements organizing [Air Force members] in support units and non-tactical areas where the workload is stabilized by a large civilian-unionized workforce" (Farrington, 1976, pp. 29 & 30). Farrington originally hinted that only enlisted personnel would be eligible for such union membership. This writer disagrees and proposes that officers, non-commissioned officers, and airmen would all be eligible to join that same union.

As early as 1971, Quinn and Grabler stressed a constraint to union activity that ... "anytime the United States military forces are engaged in or even moving toward armed conflict, the union must be required to cease all activities until a return to peace or a state of normalcy occurs" (p. 46). AFGE officials stress that union representation would be discontinued during such occurrences, and they would and should have no influence on tactical decisions. The writer perceives this proposition to be ludicrous in that a military union would ultimately seek to enforce its right of representation during both peacetime and wartime situations. At the 39th MORS, Doctor Alan Sabrosky (1977) contended that habits formed by a unionized military in peacetime probably cannot be drastically altered in times of war.

Given this premise, an ominous warning arises. Historically, the strike has been implemented as a bargaining tool when a specific service or good is most necessary (Sabrosky, 1977). Manipulation of defense forces during times of national or international crisis could have profound, disastrous effects on the United States and to the world situation. These implications of military unionism are frightful and could severely detract from the movement.

An interesting caveat develops as one examines the military unionization movement. Proponents of unionism as well as AFGE officials themselves tend to impart the illusion that AFGE is the panacea for all military personnel troubles. At the 39th MORS, Mr. William Hutt, a civilian union official, presented the thought that AFGE may not be as prepared to represent military members as the public is led to believe. He contended that it might be difficult for AFGE to transfer procedures used in the civilian sector to the military environment. Very unique problems of military unionization exist. AFGE has not resolved means of representing opposing military and civilian positions on such vital issues as dual compensation, the mix of military duty and civilian work time, and the use of contract civilians for military tasks. If these and similar issues of conflicting interest cannot be resolved internally by AFGE, then perhaps the advantages of a military union to uniformed personnel may not be as extensive as professed.

Correspondingly, the final recommendations of the Commission on Military Compensation will, in all probability, affect the attitudes of military members concerning unionization. Major changes to the military retirement system or the requirement that military retirees forfeit some or all of their retirement pay in order to obtain a civilian post could be items that might convince "undecideds" or "opponents" that they need a military union.

While conducting research for this study, the writer found that some authors, academicians, and individuals affiliated with civilian unions tended to view the development of military unionization as inevitable and imminent. Even General David Jones, the Air Force Chief of Staff, cautions that unionized armed services could be a reality within five years if military people perceive increased uncertainty about their futures (Airman, May 1977). In spite of all these opinions and in light of all the possible monetary benefits of military unionism, the writer finds it difficult to believe that officers and enlisted personnel would ignore the special trust and confidence of the nation in their patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities to which they swore, if the defense of the nation is at stake. Organizers of a military union have the difficult task of convincing military personnel that membership would not diminish mission effectiveness in any way.

A possible alternative to unionism is a type of representative organization which compromises the extremes of a union and the military associations. The Association of



Naval Aviation is, perhaps, a form of such an alternative. The aim of members of this organization is to bring civilian control of the military back into perspective by attempting to stem the receding authority of military leaders. As they envision it, high-ranking, military retirees would represent the interests of armed forces members strictly in personnel issues. Such a group could be more appealing to uniformed personnel because it eliminates stigmas which members might associate with unions, and it might serve as an acceptable alternative for those who feel military associations are basically representing the interests of large corporations of the military-industrial complex.

However, these assertions are not meant to imply that the military unionization movement can be ignored. The editors of the Air Force Times stated this feeling well in the 10 September 1975 issue by writing "we hope the services don't make the mistake of not giving it [unionization] the attention it deserves" (p. 13). The situation must be examined accurately and realistically so that it can be dealt with intelligently in order to yield solutions which are acceptable and comfortable to all.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown (1977) summarizes the overall situation in a sincere and objective manner by stressing that:

I do not believe it is in the best interest of our country or of our Armed Forces to allow our people in uniform to perceive that a union would provide a fairer, more equitable way of life than will the American people as a whole through Congress.... They ask fair treatment, and

a sense of equity in their future. This country - the richest in the world and the most productive in history - can afford to meet the needs and reasonable expectations of its servicemen and women. Honorably, it can do no less. (p. 40)

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
## VITA

Thomas W. Griesser was born on 16 November 1943 in Huntington, New York where he grew up. He attended Walt Whitman High School and upon graduation in 1961, enlisted in the United States Air Force. While an airman, he attended the United States Air Force Academy Preparatory School and earned a regular Air Force appointment to the Academy. After graduating in the class of 1967, he entered Undergraduate Pilot Training and received his pilot's wings in 1968. His first rated assignment in the EC-121 aircraft was followed by a Southeast Asia tour as a Forward Air Controller in an O-2A to an Army Special Forces unit in central Vietnam. Prior to entering AFIT in June, 1976 to pursue a Masters of Science Degree in Systems Management, Captain Griesser spent five and one-half years in the Military Airlift Command as a C-141 aircraft commander and instructor pilot, and as an operations staff officer for the 438th Military Airlift Wing and 21st Air Force (MAC) at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. He is married to the former Beth DeRiemer of Carmichael, California.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study provides a qualitative investigation of the military unionization movement, with its focus on the United States Air Force. The background for this report was based on a compilation of the most current information available dealing with the issue. This study also draws upon recent empirical research material which focuses upon the attitudes and opinions of military members ranging in rank from full colonel wing commanders to lower grade, enlisted personnel. Forces both for and against unionization		

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BLOCK 20 (continued) were explored in this study. Also identified and evaluated were major, perceived benefits and disadvantages of an Air Force unionization survey conducted by faculty members at the Air Force Institute of Technology and ancillary studies of selected Army personnel. These studies provided the bases from which discussion of the problems, effectiveness, impact, and appeal of a union in relation to the military members was derived. These quantitative aspects were then contrasted to more subjective evaluations of uniformed personnel. Traditional patriotic values were investigated in terms of societal influences and the popular concepts of the "institution-occupation" theory of sociologist Charles Moskos. The relationship of private, public, and federal labor-management relations and the applicability to and examples provided for any military unionism movement was also covered.

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