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FROM CONFRONTATION TO COEXISTENCE;
THE EVOLUTION
OF
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

William R. Hudson
B.S., Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1968

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
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PREFACE

Soviet foreign policy towards the West has changed considerably since the Russian Revolution. Soviet policies have evolved to meet new conditions in a constantly changing world order. Soviet decision makers have demonstrated remarkable flexibility with their ability to shift the emphasis, the direction, or even the content of Soviet foreign policy. While such flexibility has played a major role in the rise of the Soviet state to great power status, many in the West viewed such flexibility as inconstancy and evidence that Soviet policies were not to be trusted.

Additionally, even the idea of detente has changed. Originally designed to reduce the probability of a major military confrontation between nations armed with nuclear weapons, detente has come to mean much more to both the Soviet Union and America. The United States had hopes that detente would end the Cold War and would lead, if not to genuine friendship at least to a true openness in Soviet-American relations. But the Soviets have never abandoned their idea of inevitable conflict with the West. Detente simply moved the arena for such conflict from the military to the ideological and economic. The Soviets also sought to use detente to satisfy a variety of tactical requirements: avoidance of a two front conflict so long as Communist China remains hostile to the Soviet Union, and access to Western technology and credits. The two views of detente, Soviet and American, have been further source of

(ii)

suspicion and distrust,

Foreign policy concepts have an evolutionary nature; tactics are changed to meet changing situations. To understand how detente ^{has} evolved from confrontation ^{to coexistence} and to gain some idea of what detente may be evolving into, it is necessary to review Soviet foreign policy since the inception of the Soviet state in 1917. Only by noting the directions that Soviet foreign policy tactics have taken in the past, can we hope to predict future Soviet policies. Perhaps the future of detente can be found in a study of its genesis.. 7000010

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CHAPTER ONE - DIVIDE AND WEAKEN

In Search of Contradictions

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has always had numerous foreign policy goals. Most of these goals have been identical to those of Tzarist Russia: security, international prestige and influence, economic advantages, warm water ports, etc. Other foreign policy goals were based on the state ideology of the Soviet Union. These goals included the elimination of international capitalism and the worldwide dominance of Communism.

After the 1917 revolution, the new masters of Soviet Russia chose "to exploit the contradictions and antagonisms among the Capitalists" as the theoretical and practical means to the ultimate goal of a Communist world.¹ Lenin first stated this theoretical and practical tactic to a meeting of the Moscow Party Secretaries in November 1920, pointing to the basic method behind all Soviet foreign policy in the years before World War II. Every action, every shift and flex of Soviet diplomacy would try to exploit the antagonisms among the capitalist nations, which to the Bolsheviks meant any non-socialist nation (democratic or fascist). The Soviets would do their utmost to help divide and weaken the capitalist world and to hasten its downfall.

The Soviet Union had its greatest success exploiting the divisions in the capitalist world in the years between November 1917 and September 1939. During these years, the Soviets displayed a remarkable ability to cut across contending foreign

power groupings while pursuing their own goals. Some prime examples of the successful application of the Soviet tactic of divide and weaken, include the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), the pacts signed with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and the non-aggression pacts with Germany and Japan (1939 and 1941 respectively). The Soviet leaders parlayed capitalist rivalries and ambitions into concrete advantages, achieving great power status only thirty years after seizing power.

World Revolutionaries

World War I brought a new actor to the stages of international relations. Imperial Russia had entered World War I in August 1914 to generally widespread patriotic fervor. The only dissent came from some leftist groups, including the Bolsheviks. Following some initial successes, the war turned against the Russians and on the eve of the March 1917 Revolution, Russian casualties were estimated at more than five and a half million men.² Russian military defeats and wartime economic disruption fueled social unrest which culminated in revolution and the Tzar's abdication. The new Provisional Government failed to restore the economy or to get Russia out of the war, and on November 7, 1917, it was the Bolsheviks who answered the people's calls for peace. In the Second Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks and their allies staged a coup, deposed the Provisional Government, and set up a Council of Commissars. The Council immediately issued a "Decree on Peace." This Decree marked the Bolsheviks' debut in diplomacy; it was the first state paper of Soviet Russia.³

The Decree underscored the two-fold character of the new government's aspirations in the realm of foreign policy. First, there was an immediate need to secure peace. Lenin knew that the Russian army was incapable of continuing the war. The Bolsheviks had to get Russia out of the war or they would be replaced as had been the Provisional Government.⁴ Secondly, the Decree on Peace included a reference to "liberating the toiling and exploited masses of the population from every form of slavery and exploitation."⁵ New language in world diplomacy, this statement underscored the Communist belief that true world peace would only be achieved by socialist revolutions in other countries, notably the industrialized, European countries. Lenin strongly believed that socialist revolutions were imminent in Europe. He counted on support from soon-to-be socialist governments to help the Bolsheviks stay in power.⁶

But Soviet idealism could not survive the realities of international diplomacy. Amidst impassioned dreams of a revolution sweeping Europe, the new rulers of Russia had to attend to the unpleasant task of securing an armistice with Germany. The result of the deliberations was the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed March 3, 1918. The treaty stripped Soviet Russia of one-third of its population. The Soviets lost the Ukraine, Finland, and the Baltic and Polish territories. Three centuries of prior Russian expansion were overturned. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk marked the end of innocence for the Bolsheviks. They went into the negotiations with Germany as world revolutionaries; the Bolsheviks emerged as men primarily concerned with the survival of their own state and personal power.

November marked the birth of the Bolshevik government, but the humiliating and costly Treaty of Brest Litovsk marked the real beginning of Soviet foreign policy.

A Soviet Strategy

The Treaty of Brest Litovsk influenced the decision of the Western Allies to invade Soviet Russia. As a result of the treaty, the Germans were freed to disengage large numbers of troops from the East and move them to the Western Front in time for a spring offensive. To counter such a move the Allies decide to ship some troops to Russia, in a limited intervention designed to open a new Eastern Front. A British landing at the northern port of Murmansk was followed by further allied landings (French, American, Japanese, etc.) at Vladivostok and Archangel.

Originally designed to open an Eastern Front, the character of the interventions changed and many of the Allied commands in the Soviet Union became inextricably tied to anti-Bolshevik or "White" counter-revolutionaries. The change in the character of the intervention became obvious with the military collapse of Germany in November of 1918. Some of the Allied forces now openly sided the Whites, while other nations, notably Japan and Poland, took advantage of the intervention to seize territory. But tepid Allied support was not enough to overcome the weaknesses of the White counter-revolution, and the Red Army was able to defeat the White threats. With the destruction of the Whites and the Treaty of Riga with Poland in 1921, the allied interventions ended.

The Polish and Allied military actions confirmed Soviet fears of foreign, capitalist, hostility to the new Communist regime in Russia. But a more accurate interpretation of the foreign military actions in Russia was made by George F. Kennan in Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941:

Viewed as a whole, the allied intervention of 1918-1920, did not resemble in any way the major concerted effort to overthrow the Soviet government which Soviet historiography today depicts it as having been. It consisted merely of a series of confined and uncoordinated military efforts, almost negligible in scale, lacking in any central plan, and having their initial origins, for the most part, in the necessity of the war with Germany. However, the intervention coinciding as it did with the Russian Civil War, came as a profound shock to the Soviet leaders, confirming them in many of their ideological prejudices, convincing them of the unalterable hostility of the capitalist world, providing an excellent excuse, destined to be employed for decades to come, for the maintenance of the severe dictatorship within Russia.⁷

Though a prime Bolshevik foreign policy goal was realized when foreign military intervention ended, a second goal remained unfulfilled. In the early years following the Bolshevik takeover, the new leaders were internationalists. They believed that the Russian revolution was only a prelude to further socialist revolutions in more industrially advanced nations. Lenin and his associates expected these revolutions and considered them vital to the continued existence of the new Soviet state. The Bolsheviks, with their urban worker power base, were woefully outnumbered in Russia. The Russian economy was staggering and foreign aid, which would only come from friendly, fellow socialist governments, was vitally necessary. But proletarian revolutions in Europe were not overthrowing capitalist governments. To foster such

revolutions and to gain control of the international socialist movement, Lenin formed the Communist International or Comintern in 1919. But even with control of the European socialist movements, the Soviets were unable to bring about a European revolution, and Communism remained precariously isolated in one country.

The failure of socialist revolutions to sweep Europe coupled with the experiences of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Riga, led to a major change in Soviet foreign policy priorities. Preparing for and leading a world-wide revolution against capitalism continued to be a part of Soviet ideology and propaganda, but revolution was no longer the prime Soviet foreign policy goal. The new goals of the Communist regime now centered on seeking trade, credit, and diplomatic recognition in order to restore a shattered Soviet economy. This short range goal could be pursued while, in Soviet theory, the Soviet Union grew strong and waited for the internal contradictions in the Western world to topple the capitalist structure. The Soviet leaders sought to keep Communism safe and strong in one country. If Soviet diplomacy could exacerbate the tensions in the West and hasten the downfall of capitalism, so much the better.

The Genoa Conference and the Treaty of Rapallo

As a first step toward obtaining economic aid, the Soviet Union sought diplomatic recognition. The United States was unlikely to give recognition since it was becoming increasingly isolated from foreign involvements. France was

also an unlikely source for Soviet recognition, since France held eighty per cent of the outstanding loans to the Tzarist government, all of which were repudiated by the Bolsheviks. France had also owned the most foreign property nationalized during the 1917 revolution.⁸ But Britain was a possible source of recognition and efforts toward normalizing relations with Great Britain began even before the end of the Civil War in Russia. In May 1920, Soviet negotiators met their British counterparts in London. The lengthy negotiations were finally concluded with a preliminary agreement signed March 16, 1921. An important adjunct of these negotiations, was that by engaging in them, the British were tendering de facto, though not de jure, recognition to the Soviet government.

A special pungency was given to the British-Soviet negotiations by the Lausanne Conference of 1922-1923. Following World War I, a nationalist uprising had deposed the Sultan and put Kemal Attaturk in power in Turkey. The new government succeeded in calling for a re-negotiation of the coventions governing the use of the Straits between the Black and Aegean Seas. The Soviets supported the initial Turkish demands for Turkish control of the Straits, but were finally disappointed when the Turks finally agreed to international supervision of the Straits. Still, the Soviet Union had made a friend of Turkey by supporting Turkish positions. This seemed to be at least a partial victory for the Soviet strategy of exploiting the differences in the capitalist world.

Western divisiveness also played a part in German-Soviet

relations. Concurrent to Soviet-British negotiations, the Soviets were attempting to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. The course of Soviet-German talks was made easier when early in May 1921, the Allies made public the amount of the German reparations bill, 132 billion gold Marks. The German cabinet was unwilling to accept this figure and resigned. On its way out, however, the Cabinet signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union as a protest against the Allied decision. At first, the new German cabinet attempted to meet Allied demands, but an unpopular League of Nations decision on the partition of Upper Silesia discredited this policy; the way was open for improved German-Soviet relations. Western divisiveness had paid dividends for Soviet diplomacy.

The Soviet Union encountered a major diplomatic challenge to the improvement of German-Soviet relations at the Genoa Economic Conference on European economic recovery. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were invited to the conference, the first time they had been invited to participate in an Allied conference since the end of World War I. Although the Soviets wanted to attend the conference, they were highly suspicious of the invitation. The Soviets were afraid that the capitalist nations, including Germany, would develop a united front in order to effect a massive economic penetration of the Soviet Union.⁹ The goals of the Soviet delegation to the conference were to prevent such a united front while seeking recognition and economic aid. The Soviets had already made a notable gain by being invited to the conference, which was

a form of de facto recognition of the Soviet Union by the countries involved.

Soviet optimism concerning the goal of preventing an Allied front was well founded; strife and disagreement among the Western governments were rampant. Britain and France had serious disagreements about how to deal with post-war Germany. The French wanted the entire 132 billion indemnity owed by Germany, even if this meant Germany's economic ruin. But the British would give up the reparations if that would stop the state of instability prevailing in the European economies.¹⁰ France also wanted to maintain a large army and to use the armies of the Little Entente (then under Marshall Foch) to force reparations payments, keep Germany disarmed, and guarantee France's security. The British were firmly convinced that only through disarmament would the nations of Europe balance their budgets and restore world trade.

Although the French and British were able to resolve their differences sufficiently to sign a mutual Defense Pact, continued French obduracy toward the Genoa Conference alarmed the Germans. Apprehension was widespread in France that an economic conference that included Germany and the Soviet Union would see French rights and reparations bargained away. The French government therefore made it clear that there would be no discussion of the German reparations debt at Genoa.¹¹ The German press answered by stating that if France continued to hold a "treat Germany rough" policy line, Germany would retaliate with a less conciliatory, more nationalistic policy of her own.¹²

The Soviet Union was quick to exploit the divisions in the capitalist camps. On January 17, 1922, Leon Trotsky, the head of the Comintern, stated: "The Genoa Conference is equivalent to a revision of the Versailles Treaty."¹³ French fears now crystallized into worry that Germany and the Soviet Union would band together at Genoa to have the Versailles Treaty scrapped. To counter such a coalition, the French proposed that the Allies meet and develop a common policy prior to the conference.¹⁴ These French maneuvers further worried the Germans, who saw Germany becoming isolated. German fears were exacerbated by the British-French Mutual Defense Pact which included a promise that there would be no revision of reparations money due France.¹⁵ Fear of an anti-German alliance grew in Germany, thereby providing an opening for Soviet diplomacy.

The Soviet Union played on German fears of isolation to secure the Soviet goals of recognition and economic aid. On their way to the Genoa Conference, the Soviet delegation stopped off at Berlin. The Soviet visit followed weeks of skillful hinting on the part of the Soviets that the Soviet Union was considering invoking Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty which allowed the Soviet Union to collect a share of German reparations. The implications were clearly that if the Germans would not ally with the Soviet Union, the Soviets would have to deal with the Western Allies. Such Soviet-Allied dealings could only be concluded if the Soviets paid their own debts, which could be done with money obtained from German reparations. The Germans responded to Soviet

pressure by completing and initialing a Soviet-German agreement concerning trade and diplomatic recognition. Before finally signing such an agreement, however, the Germans wanted to await the results of the Genoa Conference.¹⁶

At the conference itself, the British and French played right into Soviet hands. The two allies held numerous private discussions at the British villa, and once even met "coincidentally" at Portofino, where the Allied and Russian negotiators had motored to "see the Mediterranean."¹⁷ On Sunday, April 16, 1922, the Rapallo agreement between Germany and Russia was signed. In this agreement, the two governments agreed to "mutually renounce repayment for their war expenses and for damages arising out of the war ..."¹⁸ Germany further renounced debts arising from the Russian Revolution "provided that the Soviet republic shall not satisfy similar claims made by any third state."¹⁹

While not a military agreement (one had been concluded earlier), the Treaty of Rapallo was highly significant.²⁹ The treaty set a precedent for the repudiation of reparations payments from the Russian Revolution and World War I. Most importantly for the Soviet Union, the agreement served to split Germany away from the Allies and prevent the formation of a united capitalist front against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union had come out of the Genoa Conference a clear victor. The Soviets had received promises of further diplomatic contact and economic aid from Germany. The Soviet Union also received de facto recognition from the other conferees. And, the Soviet Union had successfully exploited Western

divisiveness, gaining new understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the capitalist world: rivalries and nationalistic suspicions. As the Soviet Foreign Minister reported to the Executive Committee of the Politburo: "The Genoa Conference brought to the surface the profound contradictions between England and France, Japan and the United States, between the victor countries and Germany, between Italy and France, etc."²¹ The Soviet strategy of divide and weaken paid handsome dividends at Genoa.

Soviet Failures

German-Soviet relations enjoyed their heyday from the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo until the summer of 1923. With Germany's official recognition following the treaty, the Soviet Union looked to Germany as the best hope for vitally needed foreign investment and credits. The French invasion of the Ruhr when Germany defaulted on reparations payments drove home the lesson of Genoa: Germany needed the Soviet Union to counter the hostile Allies. Then a new government took power in Germany and sought to repair relations with Britain and France. German Communists began to demonstrate against the new government's policy. Demonstrations culminated in a series of ill-timed and uncoordinated uprisings in 1923 which weakened Soviet-German relations.

The Soviet Union was alarmed at the signs of Allied-German rapprochement, but the weakened Soviet influence was unable to halt the progress of the Allied-German talks. The negotiations culminated in the Dawes Plan of 1924, which provisionally settled the problem of German reparations. The

Dawes Plan was followed by a series of collective security arrangements termed the Locarno treaties. With the Locarno guarantees operating (whereby Britain guaranteed the security of Western European borders), fears about Germany lessened and Britain was able to secure Germany's entrance into the League of Nations in 1926. The Soviets were worried. As Stalin stated in 1925: "Capitalist stabilization may be expressed in this, that the imperialist groups of the leading countries will try to come to an understanding about a united front against the Soviet Union."²² But the Germans were not yet ready to abandon the Soviet Union, and a German-Soviet commercial treaty was announced the same day that the German delegation left for Locarno. Rapallo was still operational.

Like Germany, the Soviet Union was attempting a rapproachment with the West. An Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was signed in 1921, though it did not signal any real improvement in relations between the two countries. Tzarist debts still owed to British nationals continued to be an impediment to further improvements in relations. Particularly offensive to the British was the Soviet-Comintern propaganda, which was often aimed at the British Empire. In 1923, however, a Labor government came to power in Britain committed to improving relations with the Soviet Union. The British government formally recognized the Soviet Union in 1924. British recognition broke the dam and was closely followed by recognition from France, Italy, the Scandanavian countries, and China.

Soviet-British relations continued to fluctuate following

official recognition. In late 1924, a letter allegedly written by G. E. Zinoviev (the titular head of the Comintern), was leaked to the British press. The letter was strongly critical of the British government and called for widespread strikes and demonstrations. Although the letter was probably a forgery its impact on the public was credited with the defeat of the Laborites in the next elections.²³ The new British government, reacting to public outcry and influenced by Soviet support for nationalist revolutionaries in China, broke relations with the Soviet Union in 1927. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain were not resumed until 1929, when a Labour government again returned to power in Britain.

The Soviet Union's China policy was a major problem for Soviet diplomacy. Soviet support for the Koumingtang (KMT) revolutionaries in China was in keeping with fundamental Soviet foreign policy tactics. Support for any nationalist movements, even bourgeois, liberal movements, strained the imperialist, colonial empires of Great Britain, France, and Germany. Anti-imperialist independence movements added to the inherent contradictions of the capitalist world.²⁴ Thus the Soviets sent advisors and aid to Sun Yat Sen's forces in 1923, virtually creating, for Sun, the KMT army. Strangely, the Soviets attempted to maintain relations with the Imperial Chinese government in Peking also. This inconsistency was highlighted when Sun Yat Sen died. His successor, Chaing Kai-shek initiated a bloody purge of the nationalist organization, nearly obliterating the fledgling Chinese Communist

Party organized only a few years before. The Peking government also broke relations with the Soviet Union at this time.

The events in China were a disaster for Soviet diplomacy. The Soviets had supported an anti-imperialist movement successfully, but had then lost control and been rejected by that movement. And the Soviets had nearly sacrificed the local Communist Party doing so. Soviet policy of actively fomenting revolution had failed in China, and Soviet propaganda and actions in China had caused a serious setback for Soviet diplomacy in Britain. These failures highlighted the general failure of a Communist revolution to sweep the world. Whether due to ideological weaknesses or to Stalin's inability to follow Lenin as an international leader of the socialist movement, the failures caused the Soviet Union to downgrade active support of foreign revolutions for a time. The Soviets were now wholly convinced that cautious, patient aggravation and exploitation of Western rivalries was the only sure route to the fall of capitalism.

In Search of Security

Chinese turmoil led to a new Japanese involvement in China that seriously threatened the security of the Soviet Union. Following the break in Sino-Soviet relations in 1927, a pro-Nationalist warlord in Manchuria made an attempt to seize control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad from the Soviet Union. A Soviet display of force, however, was enough to secure continued control of the railroad for the Soviet Union. Seeing the Chinese weakness demonstrated so obviously, the Japanese decided to invade Manchuria. By 1932 the Japanese controlled Manchuria

and had established the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Japanese then pressured the Soviet Union to relinquish control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The Japanese were vastly more powerful than the Chinese warlord who had made the same to the Soviets demand in 1929. While the Soviet Union was relatively weaker since Stalin was collectivising the Soviet Union and a series of purges had weakened the Red Army. Thus in March 1935, the Soviet Union sold the railroad to Japan, eliminating all of the gains made by Russian policy in Manchuria since the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1894. Although the sale reduced the chances of immediate conflict in the Far East, the Japanese menace on the Soviet Union's eastern frontier remained a dominant foreign policy reality in Soviet deliberations.

The threat in the east was not the only war cloud on the Soviet horizon. During the early thirties, the Soviet Union made the mistake of supporting the National Socialist Party in Germany because the Soviet Union feared a rival socialist party (the German Social Democratic Party) more. Yet soon after Hitler's party came to power in 1933, it turned on the Communists. Hitler's anti-Communism and his statements on "Lebensraum" strained relations with the Soviet Union. In Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler wrote; "If we think of new soil, we can but think first of Russia and her subject border states,"²⁵ And in June 1933, German Deputy Foreign Minister asked the nations attending the World Economic Conference in London to "place at the disposal" of the German people lebensraum taken from an internally disrupted Russia.²⁶

Soviet-German relations were eventually strained to the

breaking point. The statements of Hitler and his foreign office were not enough by themselves to seriously strain relations with the Soviet Union. Such a strain did come, though, when Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union's old enemy, Poland in 1934. The Soviet Union saw the Polish-German pact as a repudiation of Rapallo, and it greatly increased Soviet fears of an eventual armed conflict with Germany.

A war between Germany and the Soviet Union in which the Western powers could remain aloof was the "nightmare of Soviet statesmanship;" it had to be avoided at all costs.²⁷ The Soviet Union hoped to avoid such a war by seeking neutrality through a series of non-aggression pacts with such countries as France, Poland, Italy, Rumania, and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The Soviet Union even asked Germany to join in a pact guaranteeing the security of the three Baltic states, a guarantee which would close at least one possible German invasion route toward the Soviet Union. But Germany refused to sign any guarantees and the Soviet Union had to seek security another way.

The Soviet Union now sought a general, Eastern Pact guaranteeing the security of eastern Europe as the Locarno Pacts had for western Europe. France was very much in favor of extending Locarno-type agreements to eastern Europe, since the French hoped to curtail the threat of German expansionism. The agreements were to be under League sanction, which necessitated the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations

in 1934. Further Soviet attempts were made to secure German participation in non-aggression guarantees; but in September 1934, Germany officially rejected the agreements. The Soviet Union's last attempt to engage Germany in a promise of non-aggression had failed and the Soviet Union turned West.

The turn necessitated by the failure of the German-Soviet alliance was one of the shifts in foreign policy direction that the Soviet Union was so adept at in the pre-World War II years. Negotiations began with the French. The talks culminated in a Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance May 2, 1935. A companion pact between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, to which the Franco-Soviet Pact was linked, was signed on May 16. The Soviet Union was turning first to one, then to another Western rival in an attempt to maintain Soviet security. No other major power of these years had such flexible foreign policy.

The two mutual assistance pacts were an expression of solidarity against the Nazi threat, but their guarantees did not entirely meet Soviet needs. To begin with, both pacts were bound to the League of Nations, and action resulting from any threat had to await "the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations," a slow process when your country is being invaded.²⁸ Also the pacts only applied to aggression "on the part of a European state."²⁹ The Soviet Union still had not gained an ally against Japan. Finally, the pacts only worked if France responded to aggression against Czechoslovakia first.³⁰ Unless the French helped the Czechs

resist any invasion, the Soviet Union was not obligated to intervene either. The Soviets did not wish to go to war with Germany over Czechoslovakia while the West stood by to pick up the pieces. The Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Pacts of 1935 were the high point of the Soviet Union's policy of collective security against the Nazi threat. But at their best, the two pacts were overly complicated, vaguely written, and so hedged about with conditions and exceptions as to be virtually worthless. They had "no effect on Hitler, on the course of international affairs ... or on the Second World War."³¹

Another Reversal

The Soviet Union first perceived in 1936 that collective security was not working. In that year the Spanish Civil War broke out and the Soviet Union sent men and supplies to the Republicans, while Germany and Italy supported General Franco's insurgents. The Soviets hoped their aid would prevent the encirclement of France and keep the enemy fascist powers from gaining strength and allies.³² The Soviet Union eventually became embroiled in the civil war to such an extent that they had a commanding role in formulating strategies for the Republicans. But Western governments, avowedly pro-Republican, did not match Soviet aid; even France gave no material support. As Franco's allies stepped up their aid, the Soviet Union saw the cause was hopeless and pulled out of the war, leaving Franco a clear road to victory in 1937. The Western alliance had failed to save Spain, and had failed in such a way as to increase Soviet fears that the West hoped to embroil the Soviet

Union in a war with the fascist powers. Spain and the unopposed German occupation of the Rhine in 1936 were clear indications to the Soviet Union that the policy of collective security was failing. Hitler's next moves were avowedly eastward. If the Western Allies would not act where their interests were clearly affected, in the Rhineland and Spain, the Soviet Union had no reason to believe that the West would act against Nazi aggression in the East.

The Soviet Union began to turn toward a rapprochement with Germany as collective security failed. The Soviets first began to press for increased commercial relations with Germany. Then a Soviet press release stated that Moscow would soon be approaching Berlin for an improvement in relations.³³ The results of the Munich Conference of September 29, 1938 gave further impetus to Soviet-German rapprochement. Though not surprised at the results, the Soviet Union viewed the conference as another failure for collective security and as a Western move toward isolating the Soviet Union. The Journal de Moscow stated that the Franco-Soviet Pact was not worth the paper it was printed on, that Russia had no allies, and that the British Tory government actually supported Hitler's war aims in the East.³⁴ After Munich, collective security was definitely a policy of the past and the way was open to Soviet-German collaboration.

As the impending war loomed closer, German-Soviet collaboration became more probable. In March 1939, Germany occupied Czechoslovakia and the next month Hitler denounced the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. After Czechoslovakia,

the British and the French issued guarantees to Poland. Assuming that Poland's guarantees had more substance than had Czechoslovakia's, Hitler was faced with the necessity of avoiding a two-front war. If Hitler wanted to attack Poland, and consequently face France and Britain in the West, he had to neutralize the Soviet Union in the East. During these same weeks of May and June of 1939, the outbreak of hostilities with Japan on the Mongolian-Manchurian border reminded Soviet policy makers about the dangers of a two-front war.

Rumors of a Soviet-German Pact increased. In May 1939, Maxim Litvinov, a Jew and an opponent of Soviet-German rapprochement, was replaced as Soviet Foreign Minister. His dismissal was accompanied by an announcement that Soviet foreign policy had shifted from collective security to rapprochement with Germany.³⁵ Also in May, the Germans stated that countering British encirclement attempts would be influenced by "the results of certain negotiations with representatives of other powers."³⁶ The Germans hinted at a Soviet Neutrality Pact which would enable the Soviet Union to do without Western help.³⁷

Stalin may not have been putting all his faith on German hints. Since the spring of 1939, negotiations had been underway between the British, the French, and the Soviet Union concerning a possible military alliance. The negotiations ran into numerous difficulties, including procedural ones caused when the Allies neglected to use top level diplomats who could make firm commitments. The talks eventually failed, but they

did serve the purpose of putting pressure on the Germans, who greatly feared a Western-Soviet alliance.

The Soviet Union put an end to German worries about a Western-Soviet alliance in August 1939. German-Soviet negotiations culminated in a trade and credit agreement, a Non-Aggression Pact, and a secret Protocol defining spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. The trade and credit agreement was announced first. Germany agreed to give the Soviet Union credit so the Soviets could buy German goods. The Soviet Union agreed in turn to deliver raw materials to Germany.³⁸

The Non-Aggression Pact had wide ranging possibilities. In the Pact, the two parties agreed not to commit acts of aggression toward each other (Article I), nor to lend any support to a third power attacking the signatories (Article II). The Pact also obligated both parties to refuse to participate in any grouping of powers hostile to either signatory (Article IV).³⁹ Thus the Non-Aggression Pact voided the Anti-Comintern Pact and obligated Germany to refuse to help Japan in any Soviet-Japanese conflict. The Soviet tactic of divide and weaken had been applied to the troubled situation in the East.

The Secret Protocol amounted to a virtual military alliance in which the Soviet Union and Germany planned to split Europe between them. In the Protocol, Germany and Russia defined their spheres of interest. The two countries agreed to divide the territories of the Baltic states and Poland, after determining "in the course of further political developments" whether maintaining Poland's independence served

German/Soviet interests.⁴⁰ The Protocol served to further German and Soviet territorial desires while still falling within the Soviet tactic of exploiting differences between capitalist nations, in this case, Poland and Germany.

The Japanese were well aware that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had "radically altered" the situation in the East.⁴¹ Japan immediately sued for an armistice on the Mongolian border and began negotiations with the Soviet Union on outstanding problems. The negotiations dealt with a border conflict, the question of fishing rights in Soviet water, Japanese oil and coal concession on Sakhalin Island, and payments still due to the Soviet Union for the Chinese Eastern Railway. But the Japanese were now determined to pursue a foreign policy independent of Germany and "to cooperate with those who are willing to cooperate with her."⁴² Soviet diplomacy had increased the contradictions inherent in the German-Japanese alliance; divisiveness between two capitalist nations was rebounding to Soviet advantage.

German actions gave impetus to Soviet-Japanese talks. German victories in Europe during 1940 provided the Japanese an opportunity to take over French and Dutch interests in Asia and the Pacific. Japan even signed a Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940; a pact which stated Japanese opposition to the Western Allies without reducing Japanese commitment toward an independent policy in the Pacific. The Japanese decision to move south from China, into the territories of the Western colonial powers, further

stimulated a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As the Japanese newspaper Hochi said on September 21, 1940, "If Japan wants to advance southward, she must be free of any misgivings in the North."⁴³

German-Soviet dissension about conflicting territorial claims and a Soviet unwillingness to join the Tri-Partite Alliance, added impetus to Soviet-Japanese negotiations. In April 1941, the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed, a pact very similiar to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Soviet-Japanese Pact also operated to prevent the Japanese from joining with the Nazis against the Soviet Union. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact greatly surprised Hitler. The Fuhrer had just met with the Japanese Foreign Minister before the latter had gone to Moscow to sign the pact with the Soviet Union. Hitler had told the foreign minister: "when you return to Japan, you cannot report to your Emperor that a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union is impossible."⁴⁴ In the midst of planning Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union, Hitler was upset with the Japanese pact. But the Japanese were determined to follow an independent course. The Soviet's divisive tactics had once more born fruit.

A New World Order

World War II brought about a major shift in the world order. Germany began Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. The Soviet Union responded by joining the Western Alliance and entering the war against Nazi Germany, signalling the beginning of the end for Hitler. The Soviet Union had ended the

First World War a shattered county; thirty years later, the end of another World War heralded the emergence of a new super-power onto the international arena. The Soviet Union went from rags to political riches in a generation and a half by exploiting the inherent rivalries and disagreements of the capitalist world.

Though it appeared as if the Soviet Union had consistently abandoned friends and allies for expediency's sake, one point must be remembered: all major powers were alike to the pre-World War II Soviet state, whether democracies or fascist states. The other world powers were all capitalists, committed to the overthrow of Communism, and hence, behind the pale of morality to Soviet statesmen. Any action was moral if it hastened the downfall of capitalism in the world.

The means to this end, the destruction of capitalism, for the relatively weak Soviet state were divide and weaken. As Lenin stated; "We as Communists, must use one country against the other ... We are doing this as a Socialist State, conducting propaganda and compelled to use every hour granted by circumstances to increase its strength as rapidly as possible."⁴⁵ The Soviet Union was weak and its only hope was to play the capitalist giants off against each other while the Soviet Union grew in strength. The Soviet Union fully expected the capitalist world to hang itself on its own rope. The Soviets needed only to supply a little extra push; they could then sit back and pick up the pieces.

CHAPTER TWO - THE OLD AND THE NEW

The New Order

In the period from the end of World War II until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Soviet foreign policy maneuvers began to fail with increasing frequency. In the immediate post-World War II era, Soviet foreign policy tactics remained essentially identical to pre-World War methods. Yet the world situation had changed drastically, and was continuing to change. There were no longer several blocs of competing, capitalist nations, whose rivalries could be exploited for Soviet advantage. At first, a bi-polar world emerged from the ashes of World War II, with the Soviet bloc squarely facing an enormously strong, American dominated Western bloc. And following closely thereafter, the ex-colonies of the emerging Third World would bring about a multi-polar world, composed of numerous small nations neither capitalist nor Communist. Pre-war Soviet foreign policy tactics were not applicable to the new world order; they would have to change.

National security and economic growth remained the prime goals for the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era. Increasing Soviet influence, even dominance, worldwide was the long range strategy chosen by the Soviets to achieve these goals. Only a Communist world could provide true security and economic opportunities for the Soviet state. As pre-war goals and strategies had largely survived the World War intact, so, too, had Soviet tactics. As Walter LaFeber has indicated

in America, Russia, and the Cold War:

The war-time alliance with the West apparently did not dent Stalin's outlook. His views of Western democracy, the danger of capitalist encirclement, the inevitability of war, the nature and sources of imperialism, and the impossibility of disarmament evidently changed very little ...¹

To meet apparently unchanged circumstances, Stalin chose the proven tactic of exploiting and divisions within the capitalist camp and those divisions between the imperialist capitalist powers and the ex-colonies of the Third World.

Stating as late as 1953 that "the inevitability of wars among the capitalist countries remains," Stalin firmly believed that he could exploit such conflicts and gain advantages for the Soviet Union.² By joining first one side, then the other, by staying in the middle and playing one capitalist nation against another, the Soviet Union had become a great world power. Stalin saw no reason to change a winning tactic.

Yet such tactics were not wholly applicable to the world order that had been newly forged in the furnace of World War II. The Soviet Union had become a great power, with all the restrictions and reduced options attendant to such a position. As leaders of a bloc of nations, the Soviets had commitments that had to be upheld, as well as policy positions that had to be maintained. The Soviet Union had grown in influence, stature, and power, acquiring a vast foreign policy momentum in the process. The U.S.S.R. could no longer change course and shift policies with ease. Losing its most necessary precondition, a flexible position, the pre-war Soviet policy of

divide and weaken was vitiated. Thus weakened, it had to face the new realities of a post-war world: nationalism, Soviet-bloc disunity, and a growing western solidarity in the face of the perceived Soviet threat.

The emergence of a strong and apparently threatening U.S. S.R. out of the destruction of the war did much to drive the nations of the West together. No longer split between competing and roughly equal capitalist powers, the post-war West was galvanized and united by a hugely predominant and wealthy United States. Alarmed by Red Army activities in Eastern Europe, the West became unified against the Soviet Union rather than against some third nation or group, which would have allowed the Soviets to play the old game of divide and weaken.

Third World nationalism was another reason for the failure of Soviet foreign policy tactics in the post-war era. A prime tenet of such tactics one mentioned in the Communist Manifesto, called for Soviet support for all "wars of national liberation."³ By detaching the colonies from Western rule, the Soviet Union could deal telling blows to the capitalist economies. Yet Soviet experience in China, Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia proved that a loss for the West did not necessarily mean a gain for the Soviet Union. All revolutions against imperialism were not pro-Communist. The nations emerging from the old colonial system were suspicious of all great powers, not just of the West.

Nationalism was a thorn in the Soviet side within the Soviet Bloc of client states also. In most cases these countries (of Eastern Europe and China) had Communist rule imposed by

force and the future would see several attempts to reduce or destroy this dominance. Even when Communism was not a foreign imposition, such as in Yugoslavia and China, nationalistic self-interests and ambitions would cause the client states to seek more and more independence from the Soviet Union. This boded ill for the Soviet goal of a Communist world. Perhaps the end of capitalism would not mean an end of threats to Soviet security, nor would it necessarily lead to Soviet pre-eminence in the world.

The period following the end of World War II until 1962 saw a bi-polar international order shade into multi-polarity. Soviet foreign policy would also have to change in response to the changing times. Failure to evolve new tactics, stubborn adherence to outmoded methods would nearly involve the Soviet Union in a nuclear war with the United States. The Soviet Union was a great power, and would increasingly have to resort to traditional diplomatic maneuvering in order to accomplish national goals. By the early 1960's, this point would be underscored by the Sino-Soviet rift and the Cuban missile crisis.

Action and Reaction

Soviet efforts at post-war expansion were impeded by the growing unity of the West under a strong United States, hampered by increasing nationalism in the ex-colonies, and slowed by dissension in the Soviet Bloc. The wartime allies, Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. had established a de facto agreement over division of the world into spheres of interest

at the three conferences and various bi-lateral meetings held during the war.⁴ But questions remained about the exact limits of those spheres. The Soviet Union was obviously paramount in Eastern Europe, but the western allies resisted further Soviet attempts to expand that predominance. Such resistance first took shape in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, the new battlefields of the Cold War.

The West and the Soviet Union were alike in recognizing the strategic importance of Iran. For the Soviet Union, it was a possible route to warm water ports and to British dominated India. Also, Iran was contiguous to the rich oil fields in Soviet Azerbaijan and Baku. The Soviets in particular, felt that this was a major consideration. And of prime importance to all, Iran was expected to be a major source of oil.

Initial Soviet efforts to influence Iranian oil field development failed. In October 1944, the Soviet Union asked Iran to grant oil concessions in northern Iran for Soviet development. But Iran worried about granting concessions to a government rather than a private company. Iran believed that an army of Soviet workers descending on its northern provinces could lead to a permanent partitioning of the country.⁵ So Iran placed a war-time moratorium on all oil concessions, and told the Soviet Union it could renegotiate after the war. The Soviet Union reacted strongly to this rejection. The Iranians subsequently believed that future Soviet attempts to detach Iranian Azerbaijan had their origin in this refusal.⁶

Subsequent to their wartime occupation of Iran, the Allies

had agreed to leave the country by March 2, 1945, but the Soviet Union apparently changed its mind. In September 1945, a revolt broke out in Azerbaijan, a northern Iranian province occupied by Soviet troops. Subsequently, Iran charged that the Soviet Union had engineered the insurrection. Support for this position appeared in December when Moscow radio announced that a national government was functioning in Azerbaijan.⁷ The recognition of the Azerbaijanian separatists was in line with the Communist policy of supporting wars of national liberation, a pre-World War II tactic also. Soviet support for the insurgents was aimed at weakening Western influence in the parts of Iran nearest to the Soviet Union.

The creation of a buffer state in northern Iran rather than Iranian oil was another reason for Soviet support of the separatist forces. In 1946 the Soviet Union was estimated to be the world's leader in proven oil reserves with 18 percent of the total reserves (the United States was in second with 15 percent).⁸ Thus, national security through expansion was undoubtedly a prime motive for Soviet actions in Azerbaijan.

Iran's reactions to the crisis were strictly nationalistic. In January 1946 Iran formed a new government with a prime minister who, it was hoped, could deal with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Ghavan was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-West. As he stated: "I am an Iranophile, profoundly patriotic," and dedicated to maintaining friendly relations with all countries only in regard to Iranian interests.⁹ The new Prime Minister was an example of growing nationalism in the Third World.

By this time, both the United States and Britain had pulled their troops out of Iran and the Soviet Union stood alone in violation of Iranian sovereignty and wartime agreements. Gavan led a mission to Moscow in Feb. 1946 and managed to secure the removal of some Soviet troops. But others stayed until the Soviets could feel, as Soviet newspapers put it, "the situation has been elucidated."¹⁰ The Soviet Union seemed intent on adding a part of Iran to the Soviet system of satellite nations.

The West reacted strongly to Soviet actions in Iran. Formal notes, newspaper articles, and unqualified Western support for Iran in the U.N. surprised the Soviets. They had not expected such resistance from the West.¹¹ But the West believed that Soviet actions in Iran were in keeping with Soviet activities in Eastern Europe. It appeared that the Soviet Union was intent on territorial expansion along its entire periphery; not just in Eastern Europe. Such expansion was seen by the West as part of Soviet designs for the spread of Communism worldwide, a plan that greatly worried the democracies of the West.

Faced with a surprisingly strong and unified Western reaction, the Soviet Union announced in March 1946 it would move its troops out of Iran within six weeks. The Soviets and Iran reached an agreement which facilitated the withdrawal. The agreement effectively repudiated Soviet support for the separatists, in return for the formation of joint-stock companies which would develop Iranian oil deposits in northern Iran, (the Soviets, of course, had 51 percent of the stock).

Considering Soviet oil reserves, such an agreement was more face saving than necessary. Without Soviet support the separatist movement soon fell to Iranian forces.

The Soviet Union had failed to secure a buffer state in Iran because of unified Western pressure and stiff Iranian nationalistic resistance. Iranian nationalism continued to play a role when the Ghavan government fell in 1947. The new government refused to ratify the Soviet-Iranian agreement; there would be no face-saving oil agreement for the Soviet Union. Soviet post-war tactics had failed in Iran.

Further Soviet Failures

The Soviet Union also encountered strong opposition to its policies in Turkey and Greece, while attempting to realize historic Russian ambitions: control of the Straits and warm water ports on the Mediterranean. In May 1945, the Soviet Union demanded a review of the Straits Convention. The Soviets also made territorial demands for two northern Turkish provinces, another attempt to secure buffer states. The Soviet Union gave weight to the demands with an extensive anti-Turkish propaganda campaign and by massing troops on the Soviet-Turkish border.

At this time, a Communist insurgency was also threatening the pro-Western government in Greece. The Communist insurgents were primarily supported by Yugoslavia, which had plans for a Balkan Federation to include Greece. The West however, perceived any Communist insurgency to be Soviet inspired, and further proof of Soviet expansionist goals.

The U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia had good reason to expect success in Turkey and Greece, British power in the mediterranean was on the wane. Trouble in the colonial areas, particularly Egypt and India, was a drain on exhausted British resources. The Communists believed justifiably, that further commitments military or economic. would be beyond British capabilities.¹² Also, the United States was apparently not committed to the defense of this area. Indeed, considering the ambivalent neutrality of Turkey during the war, there was every reason to expect that America would never help the Turks.

But the Communist expansionist tactics only caused the West to draw closer together, while solidifying Western opposition to Soviet policies. In February 1947, the British told the United States that Britain could not provide Greece and Turkey the \$250 million those two countries needed in order to resist Communist expansion. President Harry S. Truman responded to the British abdication in the Near East with a speech the following month outlining a plan to provide \$400 million to Greece and Turkey. The aid plan, known as the Truman Doctrine, was accompanied by rhetoric and polemics portraying the Communist activities as the beginning of a plan designed to destroy freedom throughout the world. Primarily designed to help the Truman Plan through Congress, the propaganda campaign set a tone that still exist. The battle lines of the Cold War were firming as the United States began to espouse its own two camps philosophy.

The Truman Doctrine evolved naturally into the Marshall Plan, designed to further Western unity and strength (economic

and hence, military strength). The Marshall Plan was originally conceived as a method of extending the Truman Doctrine to other underdeveloped areas of the world.¹³ But the plan that finally evolved centered on Europe, especially Germany, as the place where Communism most needed to be stopped. The American plan expected to restore and reconstruct the economies of Europe, on the premise that a successful, economically sound Europe would not be tempted into the Communist camp.

The Marshall Plan only reinforced old Soviet fears of capitalist encirclement. The Soviets were initially invited to attend the Paris Conference in June 1947, at which the British, French, and the Soviets would determine the details of an aid program. After first displaying great interest, the Soviet delegation walked out of the conference. The Soviets called the Marshall Plan a "Truman Doctrine with dollars" and refused to participate.¹⁴ At American and British insistence, each participant in the Plan would have to reveal details of economic needs and priorities. This would, of course, have revealed the very real Soviet economic weakness, something Stalin was determined to avoid. Soviet fears about the Plan increased when Czechoslovakia and Poland showed great interest in participating. Soviet pressure soon caused these two countries to withdraw their interest, but Stalin's fears that the Plan was designed to lure the Bloc countries away from the Soviet camp and increase Soviet isolation did not diminish.

The initial Soviet response to the Marshall Plan was a series of bilateral trade agreements (the Molotov Plan) which

eventually evolved into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in July 1947. As an agency for the centralization co-ordination and control of the Bloc countries, COMECON greatly increased Eastern Europe's dependency on the Soviet Union. Besides adding to Soviet control of the buffer states, COMECON also facilitated Soviet plans to extract wealth from the satellite economies. The traditional national interests of security and a strong economy were thus facilitated for the Soviet Union by COMECON.

For the Soviet Union, one final response ended the initial stage of the Cold War. In August 1947, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was created. Having just rigged Hungarian elections to sweep the Hungarian Communist Party into power in July, the Soviet Union entered the first meeting of the Cominform determined to take a firm stance against American actions in Europe. Soviet speakers reaffirmed support for wars of national liberation in a bi-polar world. They further denounced the United States for attempting to form the countries of Western Europe into a dependent bloc dedicated to overthrowing the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.¹⁵ The Soviet responses to the Marshall Plan ended the initial stage of the Cold War and put the finishing touches on hopes for continuing any semblance of the wartime alliance.

A Portent of the Future

Despite the Red Army, COMECON, and the Cominform, the Soviet Union did not enter the second phase of the Cold War with a united Eastern Europe as its ally. And, following the

Marshall Plan, Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, and George Kennan's "Sources of Soviet Conduct" article, the Soviets believed that such unity was vitally necessary. Yet the U.S.S.R. had needed to rig the Hungarian elections in order to secure a friendly government there. And in Czechoslovakia, Soviet military intimidation was required to veto Czech interest in the Marshall Plan and put a minority Communist Party in power. The Soviets were already having trouble with nationalistic disunity within the newly formed Communist Bloc of Eastern Europe.

The Yugoslav-Soviet rift which broke into the open in 1947 was a significant example of such disunity, and a portent of future problems. The Red Army had not made Yugoslavia Communist in World War II; Joseph Broz Tito had. Tito was a strong, nationalist leader, who had gained immense popular support and prestige in his country by leading the resistance movement which had expelled the Nazis at the end of World War II. Tito immediately made plans to enhance Yugoslavia's national interests. But Yugoslavian ambitions threatened Soviet goals. An independent Yugoslavia would not make an ideal buffer state, nor would it support Soviet economic reconstruction as well as a dependent satellite would. Further, Stalin's plans to extend Soviet influence, even domination, did not allow for the ambitions of a rival in Eastern Europe.

Stalin made several early attempts to control Tito's ambitions. Following the war, Tito contemplated participating in the Marshall Plan, realizing that Soviet economic aid would be minimal until the U.S.S.R.'s economy was rebuilt. But Tito

was forced to abandon this route to reconstruction when Stalin made it clear that the Communist Bloc countries would not be allowed to accept Western aid. The nationalistic and ambitious Yugoslav leader must also have been displeased with COMECON and Cominform, obvious devices of Soviet control.

Tito's plans for a Balkan Federation, led by Yugoslavia, exacerbated the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. At first, Stalin had not objected to Tito's expansionistic ambitions in the Balkans, nor did Stalin question Tito's devotion to Communism.¹⁶ But Stalin's feelings changed when Tito's stature as a rival Communist leader increased. To counter Tito's ambitions, Stalin vetoed plans for the Balkan Federation in January 1948. Stalin also encouraged dissident factions in the Yugoslav government to oppose Tito's economic policies.¹⁷

Soviet attempts to meddle in internal Yugoslav policies brought about the final break between the two countries. Yugoslavia had made numerous attempts to patch things up, but Stalin remained adamant. Yugoslavia responded to Soviet pressure by conducting a purge of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Then, on July 9, 1948, the Cominform released an official statement: "The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had parted with the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and had taken the path of nationalism."¹⁸ The Cominform, a Soviet tool, went on to encourage "sound elements" of the Yugoslav Party "to raise from below a new internationalist leader of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia."¹⁹ But Tito was too popular and too strongly entrenched. He successfully completed the purges and asserted his country's independence of

the Soviet Union.

Nationalism was leading to polycentrism within the countries of the Communist Bloc as well as in the ex-colonies of the West. Polycentrism had caused a major rift in the Communist bloc of nations, setting a serious example for the future. At a point when the Soviet Union felt the most threatened by the nuclearly armed West, socialist unity was severely shaken.

The Cold War Gets Hot

Troubled by dissidence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union came face to face with Western unity in Berlin. From 1945 to 1948, the chance of a general German Peace Treaty had receded in the face of increasing and constant bickering between the West and the Soviet Union. The first overt break came in the spring of 1946, when the West stopped deliveries of reparations from the Allied sectors of Germany to the Soviets.

The Soviet Union saw Western plans for German reconstruction as a threat to Soviet national security. United States plans to reconstruct the German economy were incorporated as a central plank of the Marshall plan, with the Ruhr's great resources "to be brought under the joint control of the Western Powers."²⁰ The Soviet Union was convinced that this would mean an anti-Soviet, militaristic Germany which would be a leader in Western wars of liberation aimed against the Soviet satellites.²¹

Soviet fears of Western intentions crystallized in a confrontation over Berlin. In March 1948, the West decided to continue German reconstruction without a peace treaty by forming a West German state from the Western sectors. The West supple-

mented this decision by instituting currency reform in its sectors. The Soviet Union responded to this initiative April 1, placing temporary restrictions on Western access to Berlin. But the West continued plans to form a West German state and included Berlin in the currency reform measures. In June, the Soviet Union blockaded all traffic into Berlin; the city was under seige.

The Soviet Union hoped to strain Western unity. A weak United States response would have caused the Germans to question the usefulness of any alliance with the United States. But the Western response caught the Soviet Union by surprise. The unprecedented, enormously successful airlift demonstrated Western determination to resist the Soviet Union. The blockade ceased in May 1949. As an attempt to reduce United States involvement in Europe, it failed miserably. If anything, the blockade spurred Western efforts to unite in the face of the apparent Soviet threat. The Soviet Union was beginning to learn that head on clashes with the West were unprofitable, serving only to increase Western unity and determination to resist the Soviet Union.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, further enhanced the unity of the Western camp. The Atlantic Pact, as the Soviets realized, was "of course, a sequel to the Marshall Plan."²² Though the final organization of NATO was delayed for years, the Soviet Union considered the Pact and its accompanying military aid program a direct effort to buildup the American satellites for future aggression against Soviet East Europe.²³ NATO was considered a threat

and a challenge to the Soviet Union.

Asia, the focus of a great deal of world attention in 1949 and 1950, also posed problems for the realization of Soviet goals. The importance of the area to the Soviet strategists was undeniable. Stalin had taken the unprecedented step of recognizing the Ho Chi Minh government while Ho's forces were still fighting the French (January 1950). He had not done so for the Greek or the Chinese Communists, a point that must have rankled Mao. (Sino-Soviet relations in post-war years will be dealt with in a later section.)

Elsewhere in the Far East, two regimes, one Soviet sponsored and one American backed, faced each other across the 38th parallel of Korea. In December 1949, the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Korea; the United States did the same a few months later. Then, on June 25, 1950, the North Koreans launched an invasion aimed at uniting the peninsula under a Communist government.

The North Korean invasion was a prime example of a Soviet client state pursuing nationalist objectives and ambitions that conflicted with Soviet national interests. The Korean war at its height could have involved the United States and the Soviet Union in open military conflict; taking such a military risk was certainly not in the best interests of the Soviet Union at that time. Still, many historians believe the North Korean invasion was Soviet sponsored; certainly, most American leaders thought so at the time.²⁴

Yet, Stalin was too busy in 1950 to undertake any military gambles as risky and full of consequences as the Korean War.

At this time he was preoccupied with anti-Titoist purges in the satellites and in the Soviet Union. Opposition to Stalin's policies was found even among the Soviet hierarchy. Georgi Malenkov and other Politburo members were calling for an end to the thesis of inevitable wars in the atomic age. This faction wanted to modernize Soviet approaches to economic development, reduce Stalinist style repression, and maintain a meaningful co-existence through peaceful competition with the West.²⁵ With such internal opposition, the still unsurpressed heresy of Titoism in satellites, and the still-to-be-assimilated fact of a new ally in China (with a Communist ideology and leader uniquely its own), Stalin could not have been inclined to support policy complications like the Korean invasion.

Diplomatic events also indicate that the Soviet Union did not expect the Korean invasion. When the invasion was launched, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations was absent from the Security Council. The Soviets had been boycotting the U.N. for some time over the lack of Communist Chinese participation in that organization. Had the Soviets expected the invasion, they surely would have been in the Security Council to veto any possible U.N. action. Soviet absence made possible the nearly unanimous vote condemning North Korea as an aggressor. After that vote, the Soviet response continued to be slow, an indication of Soviet surprise and of a need to consider the situation. The invasion was launched on the twenty-fifth of June, yet the Soviet Union waited until July 3 to begin a propaganda campaign in favor of the North Korean action (after having labeled the invasion an internal matter on June 27). The Soviet Union did

not even return to the Security Council until August.

The North Korean invasion only served to increase Western unity and fears of Soviet intentions. After the North Korean invasion, the United States was more firmly convinced than ever that Communism was evil and that it had to be fought wherever it appeared around the world. Truman's message to Congress in July 1950 stated that the United States was determined "to increase its military strength and preparedness, not only to deal with aggression in Korea, but also to increase our common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression."²⁶ Korea led directly to the arms race, including the United States' decision to rearm Germany. Soviet aggression, as Korea was considered, also enhanced Western unity by convincing nations like France that the Soviet Union was a danger to world peace that must be stopped.²⁷ And in the East, the United States and Japan signed a peace treaty in September 1951. With the security pact that followed, stationing United States troops in Japan, the Japanese moved firmly into the Western camp.

The Korean War was also instrumental in increasing the polycentrism of the Communist camp, reducing socialist unity. Only China derived any real benefits from the Korean conflict. After having just finished twenty years of intermittent civil war, it was Chinese volunteers who had to rescue North Korea, a Soviet ally and client state. Chinese success in throwing back the United Nations' troops lent China new stature in Asia. China was not weakened by the conflict, but unified and strengthened; while being made even more aware of the need to make

its own way in world affairs. Chinese leaders were convinced that a war with the United States would only benefit certain circles in the U.S.S.R. who would have wanted to see two Soviet rivals weaken each other in conflict.²⁸ China's desire to seek its own path to socialism was only strengthened by the Korean War.

A Time of Transition

Soviet attempts to continue old tactics into the post World War II world had failed. In Iran, Turkey, and Berlin, Soviet attempts to exploit Western weaknesses and divisiveness were unsuccessful; only succeeding in increasing Western unity and opposition to Soviet policies. Socialist unity was weakened by the Yugoslav-Soviet rift and threatened by the rise of a new and potentially rival Communist regime in China. A Soviet-United States military conflict was nearly brought about by a small nation, client to one of the giants, seeking its own national objectives.

Stalin's reaction to opposition at home and setbacks abroad was typically militant. First, in October 1952, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, he reaffirmed Soviet belief in the inevitability of conflict with the West, re-emphasized a defense oriented economy, and affirmed Soviet domination of the Bloc countries.^{28a} He was going to continue the traditional policies and tactics. In January, he announced a Doctor's Plot, aimed at certain high Soviet officials. The circumstances were very reminiscent of the events leading up to the bloody purges in the thirties. But before the purge really

started, Stalin died on March 5, 1953.

The new leadership, led by Malenkov, recognized the need for new tactics to achieve the traditional Soviet foreign policy goals of security, a strong economy, and world power. While Stalin had spoken of exploiting contradiction between the Western states, the new leaders realized that such contradictions were truly most apparent between the imperial countries and their ex-colonies the underdeveloped nations. Stalin had spoken of wars of national liberation, but his enthusiasm had waned considerably after experiences with nationalistic leaders like Chiang and Kemal Ataturk, and after Communist losses in Malaysia, Iran, and Indonesia. Rather than support Nehru and Sukarno in their attempts to steer an independent course, Stalin called them "tools of imperialism."²⁹ The new leadership in the U.S.S.R. recognized the importance of the underdeveloped nations of the Third World and would seek tactics that could turn the ex-colonies' nationalistic aspirations to Soviet ends.

Stalin's heirs would also seek to reduce the polycentrism of the socialist camp. Soviet policies toward the Communist Bloc countries and China were due to change. Stalin's heavy-handed, terror tactics and the purges had caused much unrest in the Bloc countries of Eastern Europe. In 1953 the Soviet Union even had to use tanks to put down riots in East Germany. Malenkov and the others knew that the living standards and conditions of the satellites must be improved in order to enlist the satellites' willing support and alliance.

Malenkov also recognized the need for a new approach to

the West. The atomic bomb made overtly militant tactics too dangerous. The West, particularly the United States, was still the major enemy who would destroy the Soviet Union if possible, but a more sophisticated and less heavy-handed approach to Soviet-Capitalist competition was necessary. Malenkov believed in accommodation and negotiation rather than in direct confrontation. He stated that "at the present time there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries..."³⁰ Though Malenkov would be deposed by 1957, his policy directions would continue.

The Soviet Union gave immediate indications of the new trends in foreign policy. Trends which included a Korean armistice which effective July 27, 1953. The Soviet Union also agreed to attend the Geneva Conference of April 1954. Ostensibly called to deal with the Korean situation, the conference actually dealt more with Indo-China. The Geneva accords on South East Asia divided Vietnam and provided for a coalition government in Laos. The French were finally out of Indo-China, but within a year, they would be replaced by the Americans. Ho Chi Minh had won only a partial victory at Geneva and he became more dependent on the Chinese because of it.³¹ The Chinese again emerged as the big winners. They were admitted to the conference table with the major powers at Geneva, and they bargained with as equals. Chou En-lai's trip to India and Burma following the conference, and his call of Asia for Asians enhanced China's new stature.³² The East was breaking away from the colonial powers, but the gains were not necessarily

Soviet.

The new trends in Soviet foreign policy, which were exemplified by the Korean armistice, did not mean that the Soviet leaders had completely broken with the past foreign policy tactics. A plan to include a rearmed West Germany in NATO was finalized at the Paris Conference in September 1954. The following month the Soviet Bloc countries held a meeting in Moscow, setting the stage for the Warsaw Pact. The Pact was reminiscent of COMECON, as the Soviet response to a Western organization in Europe was to set up a competing organization. The Warsaw Pact did not represent a major change in East Europe's situation, but it did allow the Soviet Union to keep troops in the pact countries; a major method of insuring loyalty without appearing to be an occupying power.

In early 1955, Nikita Khrushchev used opposition to Malenkov's economic policies to depose Malenkov from his pre-eminent position. Khrushchev then proposed a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, making a trip to Belgrade in order to restore Soviet-Yugoslav relations. But Tito remained cool toward the Soviet delegation and toward the effort to ameliorate past difficulties. Tito may have welcomed a renewal of relations with the Soviet Union, but he was not about to allow the Soviets to dominate Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was, and remained, the prime example of the new polycentrism in the Communist world.

Despite the continued evidence of polycentrism, Khrushchev went to the Geneva Summit Conference in July 1955, armed with some evidence of Communist Bloc solidarity: The Warsaw

Pact, a limited Yugoslav rapprochement, and a new treaty with China. The Soviets had also made several overtures to peace such as the Austrian State Treaty and the return to Finland of Porkkala Naval Base. Yet all preparations came to nothing and the conference was essentially devoid of results. Khrushchev only gained moral support for his co-existence policies, as he returned to face his opponent in the Twentieth Party Congress exclaiming about the spirit of Geneva.

Khrushchev was successful however, and the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 expanded and publicized the new directions in Soviet foreign policy. The Congress declared that war with the West was no longer inevitable and that, although America was still the Soviet Union's number one enemy conflict would be through economic and ideological competition, not nuclear war. The conference also removed barriers to rapprochement with Yugoslavia, et al., by recognizing that there were different roads to Socialism. The Congress formally recognized parliamentary roads to socialism, stating that violent revolution was not the only way to achieve a socialist state. And a strict bi-polar approach to the world order was finally abandoned as the Congress stated that there could be neutral nations who were neither pro-Soviet nor pro-West. The new tactics would aim at wooing these nations away from their neutralism and toward, if not into, the Soviet sphere.³³

While heralding major changes in Soviet foreign policy, the revisions had less immediate effect than did Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin. Khrushchev attacked the cult of the

individual developed by Stalin. He went on to list numerous alleged mistakes and crimes committed by the dictator, including the purges, economic failures, and the problems with Yugoslavia and China. Khrushchev felt that he had to attack Stalinism in order to make way for new tactics. He knew that the doctrine and political legacy of Stalinism provided a powerful bulwark against change.³⁴ Also, there was some indication that Khrushchev wanted to make room for his own cult of personality.³⁵

One of the reasons for new tactics in Soviet foreign policy was to decrease polycentrism in the socialist countries; but, ironically, Khrushchev's speech had the reverse effect. Pro-Stalinist leaders and governments who had faithfully followed Stalin's lead were discredited and lost legitimacy. Anti-Stalinist leaders, even some non-Communists who had been purged, were given new incentive for a return to power. The speech led to riots and open rebellion. Polycentric nationalism in the satellites was increased, not controlled by the speech.

Poland was a major example of the havoc caused by Khrushchev's speech. In June 1956 riots broke out in the Polish city of Poznan. The Polish government followed the rioters demands and began to liberalize the government and to reorganize the Politburo (to include Wladyslaw Gomulka, recently released from imprisonment as an anti-Stalinist). Despite Soviet pressure and a visit from Khrushchev, the Poles remained firm. Recognizing the continued pro-Soviet stance of the new Polish government, the Soviet Union backed off and Poland gained new autonomy.

Polish success inspired the Hungarian revolt that followed.

Student riots in October forced a change in government and Imre Nagy came to power. The new government responded to popular demand and announced the formation of a new, non-Communist government which would pull Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact (a move Poland had not made, and one step too far in Soviet eyes). November 4, Soviet tanks moved in and a new pro-Soviet government was put in power. Poland and Hungary demonstrated the strains in the Soviet Bloc. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was becoming eroded, or held by force of arms only. The Communist Bloc was anything but nonolithic.

The Middle East

One of the first tests of the new Soviet approach toward Third World nationalism took place in the Middle East. Previous Soviet attempts to intrude into this area, e.g. Iran and Turkey, were heavy-handed power plays. Following the Twentieth Party Congress, the new Soviet leaders were determined to try a new tactic. They would exploit anti-Western feelings, playing on the ex-colonial nations' feeling of resentment toward the West. In short, the Soviets would try to exploit nationalism.

The Soviet Union made its first attempts to apply the new tactics in response to a British-backed threat (in Soviet eyes) to Soviet national security. After the war, the British tried to form a Mid-East Defense Command (MEDC) as a bulwark against apparent Soviet expansionism. The Soviets considered the MEDC to be a major threat. They stated in a note to the Western allies in January 1952 that the MEDC "is to serve ... the purpose of encircling the Soviet Union ..." and is "a preparation for

a third world war."³⁶ But MEDC failed as the Soviet threat seemed to lessen following Western victories in Iran, Greece, and Turkey. MEDC also failed due to intense, principally Egyptian, opposition inspired by nationalism and anti-Western sentiments among the Arab states.³⁷

The West was more successful in 1955. Following the failure of MEDC, the West encouraged the formation of bilateral defense pacts among the nations in the Mid-East contiguous to the Soviet Union. These pacts culminated in a general military alliance called the Bagdad Pact in late 1955. Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and eventually, Britain joined in a norther tier of defense against the Soviet Union. The Soviets were as worried about the Baghdad Pact as they had been about MEDC. And the other Arab states, particularly Egypt, believed the British were using the Pact to extend colonial control, Soviet-Egyptian relations began to improve as a direct result of the Baghdad Pact.

Signs of the problems inherent in any attempts to exploit Third World nationalism began to appear along with the first hints of Communist-Arab rapprochement. The first hints of Communist-Arab rapprochement appeared at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. Delegates from twenty-nine countries, many newly independent ex-colonies, met to form a unity of purpose among the nations of the emerging Third World. Though there were no concrete results from the conference there was unanimous feeling that the Third World "would not accept control by any power or combination of powers,

regardless of disguise."³⁸ The conference made it clear that there was no consensus for support of any side; not the West, nor the Soviet Union, nor even Third World leaders like India. The ex-colonies were fervently nationalistic, and would seek their own goals, not those of any other power.

But Soviet tactics did make major strides in the Middle East. In September 1955 Nasser announced an Egyptian-Czech arms deal. This agreement clearly showed that the Soviet Union, through its Czech agents, had "leapfrogged and flanked the Northern Tier, as so much of a Maginot Line, and reached deep into the Middle East to the very core of the Arab area."³⁹ The Soviet Union further enhanced its relations with the Arab world through increased diplomatic, cultural, and even religious missions. So 1955 was a turning point for Soviet-Arab relations, a clear demonstration of new Soviet tactics supporting old Soviet goals.

Soviet tactics did enhance the Arab position and resulted in weakening Western influence in the Middle East. In June 1956 the British moved their troops out of the Suez canal area. On July 19, the United States withdrew an offer to finance Egypt's Aswan High Dam, in part because it appeared that Egypt was moving toward the Soviet sphere and in part because it would be too costly (with Egypt unable to pay her share after having mortgaged half her cotton crop for years to come for the Czech arms deal).⁴⁰ One week later Nasser nationalized the Canal and said he would use its revenue to finance the Aswan Dam. October 29, 1956 British and French planes began to bomb Egyptian targets and the following day Israeli forces invaded

Egypt.

The Soviet Union had the pleasure of seeing Western unity severely tested by the Suez crisis. The United States had not been informed by its allies of their impending attacks. Following the bombing the United States brought immediate pressure to bear, which, coupled with a United Nations agreement, secured a cease fire and eventual pull-back by the invading forces November 15, 1956. Western contention was evident when the British House of Commons passed a resolution which deplored "both the resolution of the General Assembly calling for immediate withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt and the attitude of the United States or America which is gravely endangering the Atlantic Alliance."⁴¹

The Soviet victory was not, however, complete. International tension in an atomic age was dangerously exacerbated as the United States responded to Soviet threats toward British and France by ordering a Strategic Air Command alert. Nor was Soviet prestige in the Arab world without its shadow. The Soviet Union did increase its relations with Egypt, concluding a major loan for the Aswan project in 1956 (\$250 million). But a Soviet offer (made only after the cease fire had been arranged) to send fifty thousand "volunteers" to fight for the Egyptians worried the Arabs. An Arab League meeting in November 1956 expressed great concern over the idea of thousands of Communist volunteers flooding the Arab countries.⁴² As soon as the United Nations police force was in place the Arabs happily rejected the Soviet (and similiar Chinese) offer.⁴³ Western losses in the Third World did not necessarily

mean unadulterated Soviet gains.

Nor was the West locked out of the Middle East after the Suez crisis. In 1958, further crises in Lebanon and Jordan, coupled with the increased Soviet presense in the Mid East, caused a strong United States response. United States marines landed in Lebanon to prevent the overthrow of the pro-West government there and British paratroops landed in Jordan to aid the beleaguered king. These actions were followed by the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1958. It stated that the United States was "prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by International Communism ..."⁴⁴ Again, the West responded to Soviet pressure by drawing together and strengthening its opposition to Soviet policies.

The situation took a further turn against the Soviet Union in 1958. Soviet support for Arab Communist Parties had aroused the concern of many Arab leaders, including Nasser. Following the destruction of Nasserite forces by the new, pro-Communist government in Iraq, Nasser began opposing Communism. In December 1958 Nasser cracked down on Egyptian Communists, jailing 200 of them. Arab nationalism and ambitions resisted any opposition, whether Western or Communist.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Russo-Chinese relations have been strained since their earliest confrontations and the unequal treaties of the 1860's. Russia, gained hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory in the Far East at the expense of a weak China. The importance

of this annexation to Communist China was demonstrated as early as 1936 when Mao stated that it was the "immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories ..."⁴⁵ Mao thus made little distinction between Imperial Russian and Soviet expansion and imperialism. Territorial antagonisms exacerbated the natural competition that existed between two large and powerful nations who both sought mineral resources, arable land, living room, and political influence among the other Asian nations.

Relations were not improved by the half-hearted support given Mao by the Soviet Union in Mao's fight against Chinese Nationalists. The Soviet Union had literally created the Kuomintang army, only to be repaid in 1927 with Chiang's betrayal; a betrayal which nearly destroyed the fledgling Chinese Communist Party which had followed Moscow's orders to work with the Nationalists. Stalin continued his half-hearted support of the Chinese Communists through 1945, when he ordered the Chinese Communists to join Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist government as a minority party.⁴⁶ Mao did not follow Soviet orders, but continued to struggle against Chiang, and created the People's Republic of China in October 1949.

The first treaty signed between the Soviet Union and Communist China gave ample indication of a strain between the two socialist countries. The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed February 14, 1950, after two months of difficult negotiations. The treaty called for mutual assistance if Japan or any state uniting with Japan, i.e. the United States, attacked one of the signatories, but no provision was made for assistance to China if Formosa, again

with United States help should attack China.⁴⁷ Such mutual assistance was distinctly one sided.

Economically, China fared little better. Soviet occupation of Dairen Port Arthur, and the Chungchun Railroad continued: China would even have to compensate the Soviet Union for improvements and construction. Soviet-Chinese economic agreements were little different than Imperial Russian concessions established in the previous century. The Soviet Union demanded and received majority interest in joint-stock companies exploiting Chinese mining oil, and air service concessions. Finally, a Soviet loan of \$300 million was minimal considering China's needs and subsequent Soviet aid to Eastern European nations.⁴⁸

Although future treaties reduced Soviet pre-eminence (China regained Port Arthur, Dairen, and the Chungchun R.R.), it took the Korean war to bring about a major change in the Chinese position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Prior to the war, the Soviet Union continued Tzarist traditions and easily dominated China for Soviet purposes. Soviet methods were hardly less heavy-handed and imperialist than were Tzarist Russian tactics. But following the Korean armistice, the Chinese made their debut on the international stage at the Geneva conference. China was now a recognized partner (though still junior) to the Soviet Union.

China began to assert her independence and to seek her own goals based on Chinese Communist ideology and Chinese nationalistic aspirations. Following the Geneva conference, Chou En-lai

asserted China's new stature with a tour of Eastern Europe, Burma and India. In the latter two countries, he demonstrated China's independent ambitions by sounding an Asia-for-Asias theme.⁴⁹ In September of 1954, the Soviet Union and China abolished the joint-stock companies. For the first time since contact with the West, China had fully recovered her sovereignty.

The Sino-Soviet rift began to broaden rapidly after 1954, fed by ideological and nationalistic conflicts. The Chinese disagreed strongly with the new Soviet thesis that war with the capitalist West was not inevitable; nor did the Chinese believe there were non-violent roads to socialism. China did not fully support de-Stalinization, though Mao did launch a limited de-Stalinization with his: "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" speech in May 1955. The rift was not yet in the open, as China supported Soviet actions against Hungary and in the Mid East (the Chinese later stated that Russia promised at this time to help China develop atomic weapons, even to provide a sample bomb - perhaps in order to secure Chinese support?).⁵⁰

Soviet-Chinese relations were further strained by Chinese militancy in an atomic age. In November 1957 Mao led a Chinese delegation to the Moscow Conference where he led an attack on Yugoslav revisionism and re-emphasized the possibility of nuclear war. Mao shocked the delegates at the conference by casually noting that "China was a vast and populace country and she would survive ... It was unfortunate that a small Communist country like Czechoslovakia might be obliterated, but Communism would go on. and that was the important thing."⁵¹

Mao's advocacy of atomic brinkmanship was predicated on an assumption of Soviet military superiority, which in turn was based on Soviet statements about ICBM stockpiles and by Soviet achievements such as Sputnik. But Moscow knew the real weakness of the Soviet Union and did not welcome Mao's aggressiveness. Nor did Moscow welcome the implications inherent in Mao's further statement that "the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind."⁵² Such a statement could have applied equally to the United States or the U.S.S.R. as the West Wind.

The Soviet Union first attempted to control Chinese militancy indirectly. In January 1959 the Twenty-first Party Congress in Moscow called for the creation of an atom free zone in the Pacific. The Soviet Union hoped to trade a nuclear free China for a Western commitment not to rearm Germany.⁵³ In keeping with the offer, Moscow repudiated the agreement to give the Chinese nuclear technology on June 2 1959. Moscow displayed further disenchantment with China's belligerency by remaining neutral during the Chinese-Indian border conflicts in 1959. And, following Khrushchev's trip to Camp David, he journeyed to China and warned the Chinese against "testing the capitalist system by force," declaring that "Socialism cannot be imposed by force of arms."⁵⁴ Faced with Chinese rivalry and belligerency, the Soviet Union was opting for peaceful co-existence on the western front. The Soviets were beginning to realize that Western support would be useful in containing the Chinese threat.

In January 1960 the Sino-Soviet rift broke into the open, The Chinese stated openly at a Warsaw Pact meeting, that China

would not be a part of any atom-free zone in the Pacific. China went on, in a later article attributed to Mao, and stated that nuclear war would not destroy civilization. Mao fully supported the Leninist view of revolutionary wars as the only means to socialism, and decried any idea that war with the West was not inevitable.⁵⁵ The Soviets labeled Mao's position madness.⁵⁶

The final break was made in June when the two powers met at Bucharest (during the Congress of the Rumanian Party). Both delegations restated their positions in heated discussions, during which Khrushchev called Mao an "ultra-leftist, an ultra-dogmatist, indeed a left revisionist," while accusing China of "great-nation chauvanism."⁵⁷ In July and August, the Soviet Union pulled its technicians out of China. This action was a serious blow, as it came at a time when China was suffering from the excesses and mistakes of the Great Leap Forward.

The Soviet Union had come full circle in its relations with China, from imperialist power, to overbearing ally, and finally, to open enmity. Ideological differences, age-old national antagonisms, and a rivalry for leadership of world Communism all played a part in exacerbating the Sino-Soviet rift. Essentially, a nationalistic China was not content to suffer Soviet domination, either ideologically or nationally. For the Soviet Union, the growth of the Chinese threat in the East gave new impetus to the policy of peaceful co-existence with the West. The Soviet Union could not afford two front confrontations, particularly when one of the opponents (soon both) had nuclear weapons,

The Last Gamble

Though there were many reasons calling for detente with the West, the Sino-Soviet rift being one of the primary ones, such a policy was postponed as Khrushchev decided to make one last gamble to rescue the failing Soviet foreign policies. The scene of this gamble was Cuba, though the events in Cuba were inextricably tied to a new Berlin crisis.

The Soviet gamble was a return to hard-line tactics, partially calculated to disprove Chinese allegations that Khrushchev's policy of co-existence meant that the Soviet Union was going soft on Capitalism. The first round opened in Berlin in late 1958, with a Soviet ultimatum giving the United States six months to settle the Berlin problem, or East Berlin would be turned over to East Germany (who, presumably, would be even more difficult for the West to deal with). The Soviet Union hoped to pressure a treaty which would demilitarize Germany. The deadline was relaxed to allow for the 1960 elections, in hopes that the new president would be more amenable to Soviet demands. But President John F. Kennedy came out favoring a stronger NATO and an increase in United States defense expenditures. The increases were largely determined by Kennedy's desire to restructure the United States armed forces for brush-fire wars, but Soviet blustering over Berlin and worsening relations between the United States and Cuba were further reasons. Again, Soviet pressure was creating a greater Western intransigence, as Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's bullying at their 1961 summit conference by asking Congress for an additional

\$3.2 billion for defense purposes. Kennedy stated July 25, 1961 that the United States must "be prepared to resist with force" and should begin a "long-term buildup of our strength."⁵⁸

The Soviet Union decided to press harder for an agreement on Berlin. Escalating Soviet interference, including air traffic interference and tank confrontations, culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. Ostensibly, the Wall was to prevent the flow of East Berliners to the Western sector, but the Soviet Union did note that a fear of a remilitarized West Germany, armed with nuclear weapons was a major worry. The Soviets also stated that "the need for these measures will disappear when a peace settlement with Germany is effected ..."⁵⁹

Soviet pressure tactics evoked the same responses from the West that they had in the past, though the initial response was weak. There were no sanctions or economic embargoes as in 1948. But Kennedy's position had been made clear when he noted in his July speech that "the Atlantic community has been built in response to challenges ..."⁶⁰ The West drew closer together in response to Soviet truculence. The United States sent 40,000 more troops to NATO in Europe and the other allies also increased their contingents.

Soviet pressure in Berlin, and also in Cuba, was largely determined by the hopes that a more militant Soviet attitude towards the West would induce the Chinese to acknowledge Soviet leadership in foreign policy. At the least, the Soviets hoped the Chinese would not develop nuclear weapons, weapons

weapons that would be unnecessary as long as the Soviet Union was militantly anti-Western.⁶¹ Moscow increased pressure on the West by announcing a resumption of atmospheric tests of nuclear devices, followed two months later by an explosion of the largest device ever detonated. Soviet militancy was partially successful when the Sino-Soviet rift became more muted in 1962, even after the Soviets relaxed the deadline for the peace treaty. Soviet notes, pressure, and harassment continued in Berlin, but the big gamble would be played in Cuba.

Cuba had only recently begun to play a role in the Cold War. Fidel Castro had gained power when Juan Batista fled the country in 1959, and Cuban-United States relations soon began to deteriorate. Assessing the worsening relations between Castro and the United States, the Soviet Union sent Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960 to sign a treaty with Castro. The agreements gave a small loan to Castro, promised a market for Cuban sugar and promised some technical/industrial assistance.⁶² But the Soviet Union at this time only agreed to consider establishing formal diplomatic relations. Formal relations were actually established after the U-2 incident in May 1960. Soviet-Cuban military agreements were only made after the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.

Apparently the Soviet Union decided to install offensive missiles in Cuba by mid-1962.^{62a} Although, the Soviet Union itself noted that offensive missiles in Cuba were unnecessary since the Soviet Union could defend Cuba from Soviet bases, there were compelling strategic reasons for moving offensive missiles into Cuba.⁶³ For one thing, such a military coup

would greatly enhance Soviet prestige in the Communist world, with a subsequent reduction of Chinese influence. Further, the missiles could be used to trade for United States concessions over Germany.

But the gamble failed. By September 4, there was growing concern in the United States over increased Soviet shipments to Cuba. Although the United States first believed that the arms shipments were for defensive purposes only, an American overflight of Cuba on October 14, 1962 revealed thirty launch pads for medium and intermediate range offensive missiles. Responding to this Soviet gamble, the United States announced the Cuban blockage on October 22. Following an immediate exchange of letters, the Soviet Union agreed to remove its offensive armament from Cuba, and to refrain from placing more there in the future.

This ended "the most comprehensive and far reaching policy design effected by the Soviet Union since World War II."⁶⁴ By backing down, the Soviet Union lost any hope of underscoring her power and dynamism in such a manner that no Communist country would have dared to object to her leadership. Any hope of restraining China's nuclear arms development or of forcing a German peace treaty along Soviet lines was temporarily lost. And the Soviet Union's inclination to gamble became severely repressed for a long time.

The gamble had, by now predictably, evoked further Western unity and opposition to Soviet intentions. An OAS resolution on Cuba issued October 23, stated unanimously that "the Soviet Union's intervention threatens the unity of the

Americas and its democratic institutions ..."⁶⁵ Additionally, the Soviet failure severely strained Soviet-Cuban relations. Castro refused to admit inspection teams on Cuban soil, despite Soviet entreaties, and went so far as to admit, publicly, that there were "some differences between the Soviet government and the Cuban government."⁶⁶

Soviet foreign policy tactics were forced to undergo change in the post World War II era. Soviet heavy-handedness in Iran, Turkey, and Greece had not only failed to achieve Soviet goals, but had aroused and united the West in firm opposition to the Soviet Union. Soviet pre-war tactics of divide and weaken were not applicable in the post-war, bi-polar world. As a major power and leader of one side of the world line-up, the Soviet Union was too exposed and had too little flexibility to use effectively the pre-war tactics of divide and weaken.

New forces were abroad in the post-war world, calling for new approaches, new foreign policy methods. Nationalism was a strong force, both in the Third World and in the Communist Bloc nations of Eastern Europe and China. By developing new tactics the Soviet Union could take advantage of the nationalistic aspirations of the emerging former colonial countries of the Third World, and turn those nations against the West. Yet, the nations of the Third World were not looking for new, Soviet, masters. The ex-colonies would seek their own ends, even if it meant involving the two super powers in direct confrontation.

The Soviet Union also needed new tactics to handle growing

disaffection in Eastern Europe and China with Soviet domination. These nations had their own, also nationalistic, aspirations; aspirations that often conflicted with Soviet wishes. The Soviet Union needed to develop tactics that would contain Eastern European nationalism, hopefully without the need of constant, and costly military interventions.

Perhaps the most significant factor calling for new Soviet foreign policy tactics, was the Sino-Soviet rift. Conflict with China ideologically threatened the Soviet Union's position as leader of the World Communist movement, a position that was a powerful tool for achieving Soviet national goals. And, hostile Chinese forces on the Soviet Union's eastern border were a direct and major threat to Soviet national security. The Soviet Union had to find new tactics that would neutralize and isolate the Chinese threat.

Overriding all these concerns was the danger of open confrontation with the West that could lead to military conflict in a nuclear age. Soviet goals of national security, economic strength, and world power would still be served best if the Soviet Union could subdue the West and become the pre-eminent power in the world. But the methods used to achieve such an overall goal could not include open and major military conflict with the West. The competition for world dominance between the Soviet Union and the West, led by the United States, would have to be fought with new tactics, tactics that would not lead to nuclear war. Peaceful coexistence was not an end to the Soviet Union, it was a means of avoiding nuclear conflict while intense competition was pursued by other, safer, and more effective means.

CHAPTER THREE - THE TURN WEST

Enter Detente

The post-World War II years had given the Soviet Union many good reasons to rethink its foreign policy tactics. The West had clearly demonstrated in Iran and Turkey, the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba that Soviet pressure tactics only increased Western unity and firmness in the face of any apparent Soviet threat. Further, nationalism was a serious problem for the major powers in the post-war era. Although nationalism posed some possibilities for Soviet political gains at Western expense, it also posed big problems for the Soviet state. Vietnam, the Middle East, and other publicly visible spots in the emerging Third World were at once areas of opportunity for Soviet diplomacy and threats to world peace in a nuclear age. And the U.S.S.R. was a colonial power in its own right, facing nationalism and reaction to nearly two decades of Soviet dominance and exploitation in Eastern Europe and China. Soviet foreign policy difficulties were getting out of hand; it was time to institute fully the new approaches that had been developed by the new leadership in the Soviet Union.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was the first true indication that new tactics were being implemented. Signs of the new approaches had been evident since Stalin's death: peaceful coexistence was already in the world lexicon of diplomatic

language. But the implementation of the new methods had had to await the failure of the Soviet gamble in Cuba. The talks on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had been going on for a year when the treaty was finally signed by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union on July 25, 1963. The three nations agreed not to test bombs in the atmosphere, outer space, or in the ocean. Due to disagreements over on-site inspections, underground testing was not covered in the treaty. Eventually about one hundred other nations signed the treaty, including West Germany and East Germany. France and China did not sign. The United States and the Soviet Union also signed and inaugurated the hot-line communications system between America and the Soviet Union. And both countries were signatories to a United Nations resolution against orbiting nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was seeking to increase channels of communication, even co-operation, with the United States.

The Soviet Union believed that it had no choice but to reach an understanding with the United States. Internal economic problems, a power struggle that would lead to Khrushchev's ouster, and the looming threat of China, all called for a reduction in tensions on the Soviet Union's western borders. The Soviet leaders had to retrench, for "as long as the Gordian knot of Sino-Soviet disputes remains uncut, Soviet freedom of operations in foreign affairs is severely restricted,"¹

Unrest in Eastern Europe

Soviet problems in the Far East were nearly matched by dissent and disaffection in the satellite nations of Eastern

Europe. Economic problems in the Bloc nations, low living standards, and production problems (particularly in agriculture) were creating great dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership. The satellites also lost respect for Soviet methods and ideology as Soviet economic problems became more serious. Finally Eastern European rivalries were traditionally strong and not to be easily overcome by the superficial gloss of a shared (and mostly imposed) ideology.

Disaffection within the satellite states was widespread. In East Germany, the nation perhaps most tightly allied to the Soviet Union, the living standards were far less than those of West Germany. Poland was more relaxed after the 1956 riots, but support for Soviet leadership was still largely due to fear of a resurgent Germany. As a Polish citizen interviewed by U.S. News stated: "We all know that the Russians bad as they are, they are better than the Germans."² Even Hungary, whose client status had been reinforced by Soviet tanks, already showed a decay in the official ideological line. A senior Hungarian Party theoretician stated, "The Stalin era completely vitiated our ideology and turned it into a mere means for keeping bureaucrats in power," and, "there is almost nothing about Hungary today (1964) that is truly Communist."³ The overt independence and dissatisfaction exhibited by Yugoslavia and Albania had its echoes in the more firmly controlled nations of Eastern Europe. Soviet control was far from firm.

Rumania was a prime example of Eastern European dissatisfaction and desire for increased independence. Rumania was

rebelling against past Soviet tactics used to insure domination over East Europe. On April 22, 1964 Rumania formally announced that all World Communist Parties were equal. This announcement was a response to nearly ten years of Soviet maneuvering toward an economically interdependent Eastern Europe. If the Bloc states could have been tied to each other economically, then Soviet political control would have been greatly enhanced.

Soviet maneuvers toward Bloc interdependence began in 1955, when Khrushchev first proposed the principle of economic specialization for COMECON nations. COMECON had been virtually defunct since its creation as a reaction to the Marshall Plan. The Soviets hoped to revive COMECON through specialization, wherein each member nation was to produce only those parts of the production cycle (raw materials or finished products) that a nation was most suited for at that time. This plan was in opposition to the individual plans of some nations, which would have attempted to create the entire range of a productive cycle within each country.

Soviet offers of economic aid to the satellites made the plans for the COMECON nations somewhat more palatable. At first the new facilities required to implement specialization were undertaken without Soviet aid. But the costs of specialization proved too much for many states. The economic strains caused by attempts to create a specialized economy contributed to Polish and Hungarian disaffection in 1956. In that year the Soviet Union expanded its rationale for Bloc

specialization. No longer simply a means to economic recovery, specialization would be encouraged to promote interdependence which would increase dependence on the Soviet Union.⁴ The Soviet Union began to advance generous credits to promote specialization. This tactic may have been more subtle than tanks, but the goal was the same, domination of Eastern Europe.

The Soviets made some attempts to quiet fears about their motives. The Soviet Union issued the "Declaration of October 30, 1956," which admitted to past violations of satellite sovereignty and promised to respect the independence and equality of these countries in the future.^{4a} The Soviet Union may have meant to keep the promises in the Declaration, for the Soviets evidently hoped to promote economic interdependence and specialization by appealing to self-interest rather than by fiat. In December 1959, COMECON adopted a formal charter which stated:

All recommendations and decisions of the Council are adopted only with the consent of the member countries concerned and each country is entitled to state its position on any question studied in Council ... The recommendations and decisions do not concern countries which have abstained on a question.⁵

Even after Soviet declarations of non-interference, Rumania did not support specialization. Rumania wanted to maintain its economic growth through the expansion of heavy industry, rather than through a concentration on existing extractive industries such as gas and oil. Also, the Rumanians recognized the political considerations behind the Soviet plan. And, "the decision of the Kremlin to politically perpetuate the Soviet Bloc through the economic back-door, rather than

by a return to Stalinist methods of control, created the objective conditions of a new kind of revolt against Soviet domination."⁶

Rumania's desire for economic independence received a boost from the Sino-Soviet feud. In the early 1960's, Rumania was preparing for an ambitious six year plan calling for the rapid development of heavy industry; but the Rumanians needed Soviet credits and aid. The Soviet Union could have used this need to get Rumania to agree to the principle of COMECON integration, except the Soviet Union also needed support, against China. Thus, in November 1960, the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement authorizing credits for Rumania, while Rumania announced support for the Soviet position. Rumania later came out in support of the Moscow statement in December, in which eighty-one Communist Parties recognized the Soviet Union as the "vanguard of the Communist world movement."⁷

But, when Sino-Soviet polemics subsided somewhat in 1962, the Soviet Union attempted to promote Bloc integration more strongly. The Soviets began explicitly to criticize Rumania for its failure to adhere to the principle of socialist division of labor and for Rumania's "autarkic tendencies."⁸ Rumania countered by increasing trade with non-Communist countries such as India and Indoesia. The Rumanians even signed an agreement with an Anglo-French consortium for construction of a steel-rolling mill at Galati, Rumania. Rumania also increased its trade with China.

The Soviet Union decided to try a new tactic. Rumania

had made it clear that it was not going to specialize at the expense of its own economic development. The Rumanians did not want to remain economically underdeveloped, useful only as a supplier of raw materials and a market for the other COMECON countries' products. But Rumania also made it clear that it would not relax internal controls on individual freedoms (speech, press), democratize the government, or follow an independent (pro-West) foreign policy line. The Soviet Union did not want to use tanks again. The Soviets much preferred quiet in the West as long as they faced a militant China in the East. As long as Rumania sought only economic and not political independence the Soviet Union would not interfere. This was the beginning of a more flexible approach towards the East European satellites. By allowing a limited autonomy, particularly in such areas as economics and agricultural methods, the Soviet Union was spared much of the effort and expense that a tighter, more doctrinaire and militant control would require. More flexible tactics in Eastern Europe also reduced, somewhat, the nationalistic tensions in the satellites, allowing the Soviet Union to turn more of its energies eastward toward the Chinese threat.

Turning East

The Sino-Soviet rift, so ably exploited by the Rumanians, continued to grow in seriousness and public exposure. In September 1964, Pravda published an interview given by Mao that had first been printed in the Japanese press. In the interview, Mao classified the U.S.S.R. as an imperialist state. Mao

cited the countries of Eastern Europe which had their land appropriated by the Soviet Union, including Poland and Rumania. Mao especially criticized the Russian involvement in the unequal treaties of the Nineteenth Century. Added to Mongolia, which the Soviets had also appropriated, the unequal treaty lands appeared in Chinese eyes as land stolen from China. Mao demanded their return.⁹

Mao's interview may have been the last straw which broke the back of the Khrushchev regime. Certainly, the rift with China was viewed by many of Khrushchev's opponents within the Politburo as a major failure and danger. Khrushchev's internal policies and the state of the Soviet economy were also straining the viability of the regime. Khrushchev had attempted a major reorganization of the Party structure and purpose which was designed to increase his power.^{9a} The reorganization was strongly resisted by many Party officials. Additionally, the Soviet economy, particularly the agricultural sector, was experiencing great problems which were not helped by failures of the magnitude of Khrushchev's Virgin Lands scheme. The Virgin Lands scheme was an attempt to improve agricultural production through the expanded utilization of previously unfarmed land in Eastern Russia. The scheme failed to meet production goals due to the poor climate and soils in the eastern regions. Soviet agriculture perennially fails to meet production goals.

Unlike Stalin's death, Khrushchev's ouster would not lead to any major changes in Soviet foreign policy tactics. On October 16, 1964, the Soviet press announced that Chairman Khrushchev had requested that he be released from his official

duties because of "his advanced age and ailing health."¹⁰ The new leaders were Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, both long time Party officials whose style of leadership was decidedly less flamboyant than Khrushchev's. The new leadership was characterized by caution and conservatism. Its prime goals were to increase the internal strength and stability of the Soviet Union while avoiding disastrous foreign policy gambles such as the Cuban debacle.

Khrushchev's fall was viewed with undisguised glee in Peking, and led to a short-lived detente between the Soviet Union and China. Once more expressions of unshakable socialist unity began to appear in the press of both nations. But the rapprochement was uncertain and doomed to fail. The new regime in the Soviet Union had no intention of abrogating to China the Soviet Union's place as the vanguard of the world socialist movement. And the return of any Soviet territory, or even that of a Soviet ally like Outer Mongolia, to China was out of the question.

Still, the detente between the Soviet Union and China might have lasted longer but for the war in Vietnam. An increase in American support and aid for South Vietnam caused concern in Moscow. In February 1965 Kosygin visited Hanoi, both to express Soviet support for Ho Chi Minh's regime, and to plead for moderation in Hanoi's dealing with South Vietnam and the United States. The Soviet Union favored a negotiated settlement in Vietnam; believing that North Vietnam was in the stronger position and knowing that such a settlement would put the least strains on the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence

with the West. But the Chinese viewed any Soviet detente with the West with great suspicion, fearing a Soviet-American alliance against the People's Republic of China. Thus, the Chinese were against any negotiated settlement in Vietnam, pushing for a total defeat of the South Vietnamese and their American allies. The Chinese knew that a continuation of the Vietnam war could only exacerbate tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, as each government supported an opposing side.

The United States almost played directly into Chinese hands. During Kosygin's visit in February 1965 the United States began Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Kosygin was put in a very awkward position. In its position in the vanguard of the socialist movement, the Soviet Union officially supported wars of national liberation such as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were waging. Kosygin was forced to authorize a large increase in Soviet aid to North Vietnam.

The Soviet Union continued to push for a negotiated settlement to the Vietnamese war, a position the Chinese opposed for a variety of reasons. In March 1965, the Soviet Union sent a huge shipment of advisors and equipment by rail toward North Vietnam. The shipment was stopped at the Chinese border, where only the arms were allowed to proceed. Peking denied transport to nearly 20,000 Soviet advisors.¹¹ China believed that the presence of so many Soviet advisors would turn North Vietnam into a Soviet satellite.^{11a} With the leverage such advisors could develop, the Soviets could arrange a negotiated

settlement, paving the way for improved United States-Soviet relations. Also, a strong Soviet presence in North Vietnam would mean a Soviet encirclement of China, a situation the Chinese could only view with alarm.

The different approaches to the settlement of the Vietnam war ended the short Sino-Soviet truce that had begun at Khrushchev's ouster. Chinese attacks appeared in the official press labeling the new Soviet leaders "incurable revisionists," arrogant power politicians whose aim was "to rule the world in partnership with the American imperialists."¹² The Soviets replied that Communists who rejected joint action against the common enemy were not fulfilling their sacred international duty. The Sino-Soviet dispute had resumed.

The Sino-Soviet rift also affected Soviet tactics toward the Third World nations. Increasingly, Soviet foreign policy in the ex-colonies would be directed against another socialist country, China, as well as against the West. Such flexible tactics were an expression of traditional power politics and not the virulent anti-capitalist sentiment expected of the leader of the world Communist movement.

The Sino-Indian border dispute in the late 1950's saw the first beginnings of such Soviet foreign policy flexibility. In December 1958, a Soviet diplomat publicly expressed his government's embarrassment over Chinese aggressiveness on the Sino-Indian borders. By September of the following year, Tass published an official statement declaring the neutrality of the Soviet Union toward the Sino-Indian conflict. By 1960 the Soviet Central Committee was criticizing China for its

aggression and in 1963 Khrushchev called the Chinese policy toward India a "Hitlerite policy."¹³ As relations between Moscow and Peking deteriorated, Soviet-Indian relations improved. The Soviet Union stepped up economic aid to India, including the transmission of equipment to build military roads in the Indian-Chinese border areas. Soviet neutralism was definitely slanted toward India.

The Cuban crisis and its aftermath forced the Soviets to return to a more truly neutral position concerning the Chinese-Indian conflict, but this position was short lived. In October 1962, China launched a massive attack on the Indian border. But the Chinese did not follow up their initial successes and eventually withdrew. Following the Chinese attack the Soviet Union stated, that if it came to a choice, the Soviet Union would support its fellow socialist state.¹⁴ But by 1963 the Soviet Union was again actively wooing India as China began massive ideological attacks on the Soviets. By August, Pravda was denouncing Chinese aggression and accused China of exploiting the Cuban situation to attack India.

The Soviets used traditional Great Power methods to woo India. After the October 1962 conflict between India and China, the Soviet Union and East European nations concluded thirty-three industrial project pacts with India, including the building of armaments factories.¹⁵ Such activity was bitterly resented by the Chinese. But the Soviet Union was determined to keep India from leaning to the West when seeking aid against China. The Soviets also hoped to influence the other Afro-Asian nations through a neutralist leader like India, who

was friendly to the Soviet Union. Finally, India could be built up by the Soviet Union as a major rival to China in Asia, another step toward Soviet encirclement of China.¹⁶

Events in another Asian nation were also influenced by Sino-Soviet rivalry. August 1964, President Sukarno of Indonesia delivered a long polemic with an anti-West, pro-China theme. In January 1965 Indonesia walked out of the United Nations, despite Soviet pleas to remain a member. The Soviet Union had sent over a billion dollars in aid to Indonesia, helping to create one of the most influential Communist parties in Asia. The Indonesian Communists supported Sukarno first, in his move away from the West, then in his United Nations walkout, and finally in his move toward an alliance with Peking. Sukarno and China planned to collaborate in fomenting wars of national liberation in Southeast Asia, pushing the West out of the area, and splitting South Asia between China and Indonesia.¹⁷

When the Indonesian army staged a coup upsetting Sukarno and threatening to obliterate the Indonesian Communist Party, the Soviet reaction was very mild. October 1965, the Indonesian army put Sukarno under arrest, reversed his politics toward China and the West, and turned on the local Communists. Soviet reaction to the destruction of another Communist Party was mild because the Indonesian Communists had been Pro-Chinese.^{17a} As in India, the Soviet Union was more interested in controlling and countering China than in any supposed ideological brotherhood. The Soviets reacted like any other great nation, intent upon countering a dangerous rival and pleased with setbacks to that rival's plans.

Soviet reaction in India and Indonesia was dictated almost entirely by the Sino-Soviet conflict and the fear that any further expansion of Communism in Asia would rebound to China's advantage and would be contrary to the Soviet Union's national interests. As Adam Ulam notes in Expansion and Coexistence: "By 1965, the Soviets had in their own way developed a philosophy of 'containment' of Asian Communism."¹⁸ Soviet foreign policy tactics were becoming more and more those of a sovereign nation threatened on her eastern border, rather than those of the leader of the world-side, anti-capitalist revolutionary movement. To the Soviet Union, China was more threatening than the capitalist West.

Back To Europe

In 1966 the Twenty-third Party Congress in Moscow squarely faced the dilemma of detente with the West while arming against a socialist neighbor in the East. The Congress was determined to strengthen internal controls, both to forestall any liberalizing trends that increased contact with the West might engender and to prepare for any possible military conflict with China. A limited re-Stalinization highlighted by a crackdown on liberal dissension was promulgated along with the first Five Year Plan to give a proportionately higher emphasis on consumer goods production than to producer goods. Agriculture was to receive special care also. The Congress wanted to tighten the political reins while giving a better quality of life to the Soviet citizen. The Congress also determined to provide material help to anti-Western revolutions

while avoiding gambles that could risk open military conflict with the West. Although Khrushchev's removal and the Vietnam War had led to a temporary impasse in United States-Soviet Union detente, peaceful coexistence was still the aim of the new leaders. Such a policy was the safest for the Soviet nation in a nuclear age especially when the Soviets already faced one enemy in the East. The Soviet Union had always tried to avoid two-front confrontations.

Soviet desires for a detente with the West were enhanced by Western recognition of Soviet difficulties. In the past, Soviet strong-arm pressure tactics had caused the West to draw together and develop an anti-Soviet unity. But Soviet preoccupation with economic failures, with Eastern European pressures for more autonomy and with China, indicated to some Western leaders that the Soviet threat to the West was correspondingly lessened. Perceiving a reduced Soviet threat, major Western allies began to seek a more independent course for their national policies, a course less tied to the United States national interests.

Under Charles de Gaulle, France was the first major Western ally to seek an independent policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Since returning to power in 1958, de Gaulle had been insistent that "France must share in the big decisions."¹⁹ De Gaulle had first suggested a triumvirate to rule the Western world, including the United States, Great Britain, and France. Eisenhower said no, and Kennedy agreed since he and his advisors considered France a "negligible quantity."²⁰

De Gaulle then tried to pressure the Johnson administration by attacking United States policy in Vietnam, and by making state visits to South America (a traditional United States sphere). When entreaties and pressure both failed, de Gaulle acted. In April 1966, de Gaulle told the United States that NATO had one year to get out of France, and that French forces in NATO would be withdrawn by July of that year.^{20a} Charles de Gaulle's independence was prompted by several perceptions. First he was convinced that the United States had intrigued to prevent France and West Germany from joining forces to lead Western Europe. De Gaulle was ambitiously determined to restore French influence and prestige in the world, and he was highly suspicious of any nation which might oppose such ambitions. De Gaulle was also concerned that the United States preoccupation in Vietnam might embroil United States allies in the Vietnam conflict. Thirdly, France feared that the United States had been mis-using America's tremendous economic strength to establish American dominance throughout the world under the pretext of resisting Communism. Finally, de Gaulle felt that NATO was obsolete. He wondered, "in Western Europe today, who fears a Soviet attack?"²¹

France responded to an image of the Soviet Union as a stable world power which sought only peaceful coexistence. Soviet preoccupation with internal problems, the satellites, and China, produced an air of international non-involvement which added to the Soviet aura of respectability. The Soviets did not seem to be advocating world revolution any longer. So de Gaulle began to expound his notions of detente with the

Soviet Union and the East European satellites. He made several trips to the satellites and prepared for a trip to Moscow. When the United States finally announced its intention of engaging in detente, it found France was already there.

Trouble With Allies

As the Twenty-fifth Congress had stated however, though the Soviet Union itself sought peaceful coexistence with the West, Soviet policy supportes anti-Western forces in the emerging nations of the Third World, a policy that the Soviets would find to be nearly as dangerous and costly as direct confrontation with the West. Since 1957 the Soviet Union had been pouring equipment into the Arab countries. In just ten years that aid totalled at least one billion dollars.²² The Kremlin strategy was to arm and equip revolutionary and anti-Western regimes. In the Middle East, this policy led to the most humiliating foreign policy reversal since the Cuban crisis.

Soviet reversals followed the surprisingly complete Israeli victory. On May 15, 1967, Egypt stated that it had become clear from Israeli statements and from Soviet sources that Israel was preparing to invade Syria. Egypt then sent forces into the frontier areas and, following the withdrawal of the United Nations Expeditionary Forces, seized Sharm el-sheikh which blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union publicly supported the Arab policy and made no attempts to dissuade Egypt from its course. But the Israelis counter-attacked and smashed the Arab armies. In three days, a nation of 2.7 million people defeated one hundred million Arabs. When the full extent of the Arab defeat became clear, the

Soviet Union dropped its demands for the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from Arab lands, and began to support the United States' sponsored initiative for a cease-fire.

The Soviet Union lost more than equipment with the defeat of its Arab proteges. The Soviet Union had placed its prestige in the hands of nations that the Soviets could not truly control. The Arabs had had ten years of Soviet support and aid, yet the Arab armies had still been humiliated. Being a Soviet ally was obviously no sure route to success. Further, the Soviet agreement to the United States initiative in the United Nations was viewed by many as a well-out of the Arabs. Even Cuba, ordinarily a strong Soviet supporter (though Cuba had its own experiences with Soviet retreats), called the cease-fire a "scandalous backdown."²³

If the Arab-Israeli war made one point clear, it was that the Soviet Union could not play a great power role without paying a price. The post-war dilemma of the great powers was that power and influence were increasingly costly and dangerous. Now it was the client states of the Third World who were exploiting the great power rivalries, much as the Soviet Union had done before World War II. But the Soviet Union and the United States were determined that a small conflict would not mushroom into the final nuclear war. For its part, the Soviet Union relinquished active military propagation of Communism worldwide and the policy of coexistence began to assume a more genuine form. The Soviet Union believed that collaboration with the United States towards reducing international tension that could lead to a nuclear war was vitally necessary. The

Soviet Union could not afford to let its client states drag the U.S.S.R. into a confrontation with the West, just to satisfy the national policy of that client.

Controlling client states was also a problem for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. In the Mid East, the real problem had been that the Soviets had "responsibility without power;" the Arab states were not satellites contiguous to the Soviet Union and were therefore "ultimately uncontrollable."²⁴ But distance did not pose a barrier to Soviet control with the Eastern European satellite of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1967 the Stalinist Novotny's position as head of the Czech government was untenable. His reactionary tendencies, oppressive regime, was a ruined economy all conspired to bring him down. He was replaced December 1967 by Alexander Dubek, with Soviet blessings.

Then, the new regime began a liberal turn that greatly worried the Soviet Union. The new Czech leadership responded to the mood of the country and began to liberalize the Czech regime at an increasing pace. By June, press censorship was abolished, freedom of speech was greatly increased, and economic reforms were planned. The Czechs believed that total dependence on trade with the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries had hurt the Czech economy. Plans were formulated for increasing trade and economic contact with the West. The emphasis of the reforms would be toward capitalist, profit oriented methods, with the West providing the capital for the economic conversion.

The Czechs began to demonstrate definite anti-Soviet feelings. The essence of Czech feelings was provided by Ludvik Vaculik's manifesto "Two Thousands Words." Vaculik's article was a call to progressives to oppose conservative reactionaries. The article advocated public criticism, demonstrations, resolutions, strikes, and boycotts to bring down those who misused power and brought about public harm.²⁵ Public support for the author's sentiments was widespread.

The Soviet Union could not allow such sentiments to get out of hand in such a strategically vital satellite as Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia did not have a Tito as its helm, nor did it occupy an insignificant strategic position like Albania. Czechoslovakia was squarely situated between the Soviet Union and West Germany and Czechoslovakia also split Eastern Europe along the North/South axis. Still, the Czechs did not seek to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, as had Hungary in 1956, and Rumania had been allowed to institute economic reforms. But Czechoslovakia, which lay alongside the volatile (and often nationalistic itself) Ukrainian S.S.R. was demanding social liberalization. The Soviet regime, newly embarked on a limited re-Stalinization program and intent on increasing internal control, could not allow a contiguous neighbor to plant the seeds of free speech and a free press. Nor could the repressive regimes of Poland and East Germany allow a socialist neighbor to liberalize and provide an example of successful revolution to the Poles and East Germans.

The Soviet Union felt compelled to resort to the old tactics of armed control for the Czech satellite, though, the

Soviets probably knew that such tactics were costly. After two meetings with Czech negotiators, in which the Czechs refused to modify their plans, 400,000 Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968. The invasion met virtually no armed resistance, with the Czech army largely commanded by Soviet personnel. The invasion signified a phase "in which the naked security and national interests of the Soviet Union had been unambiguously given a higher priority in Soviet calculations than ideological considerations."²⁸ Even Poland admitted to cooperating in the invasion on grounds of "reasons of state."²⁷ Castro called the action immoral and contrary to basic Communist precepts, but supported it on the grounds of Cuban self-interest.²⁸ A loss of ideological status was only one cost of the invasion for the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia previously moving toward a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, began to cool Soviet Yugoslav relations. Tito even visited Prague before the invasion to back the Czechs after he had denounced the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council (Yugoslavia was not a member, but had requested the opportunity to speak). Rumania publicly encouraged the Czechs, refused to take part in anti-Czech meetings of the Warsaw Pact, and even approached Yugoslavia about an anti-Soviet defensive pact. Rumania continued its defiant stand after the invasion, and vowed never to allow Warsaw Pact forces on Rumanian soil again.²⁹ Finally, world Communist parties, led by those of France and Italy loudly denounced the Soviet action.

Still, the Soviets evidently believed that suppressing the

seeds of liberalism so near to home was worth the cost. Czech national sentiment turned to resignation within a few months, and after a new regime took over in Czechoslovakia, the country returned to internal policies more acceptable to the Soviet regime. The Soviet Union had succeeded in demonstrating its right to interfere in the affairs of other socialist nations, whenever, in Soviet eyes, the interests of socialism were threatened. This became officially known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, a doctrine that, while successfully applied in the Czech's case, could have lead to increased tension in the Soviet Far East. The fear that the Soviet Union might decide to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to the Sino-Soviet dispute must have seriously worried the Chinese.

The economic costs of the Brezhnev Doctrine were underlined a few years later. In December 1970, the Polish government raised food prices. Rioting resulted which highlighted the economic inefficiencies of the Gomulka regime and led to the formation of a new government under Edward Gierek. The Soviet Union was forced to grant aid to Poland as it had to the new Czech regime earlier, despite the fact that the Soviet economy was in trouble because Soviet policy prevented Poland and Czechoslovakia from revamping their economics and saving the situations through their own efforts. Like the Mid East, Eastern Europe was becoming an increasing burden on the Soviet economy. The Soviets had to provide guaranteed markets for Eastern European goods, which provided little incentive for improvements and innovations. Soviet control demanded Soviet

subsidy, a burden the Soviet Union was finding more and more difficult to carry.

Soviet problems in Eastern Europe loomed the larger in light of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Sino-Soviet rift was "no mere conflict over personalities or even ideologies, but a raw power struggle for domination of Asia and the Communist camp."³⁰ With the buildup of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Mao became involved in an internal power struggle. Mao's power had been undermined by the economic failures of the Great Leap Forward and by Mao's refusal to cooperate in socialist brotherhood with the U.S.S.R. over Vietnam. To counter those in the Chinese government who favored cooperating with Moscow, Mao and his followers initiated the Cultural Revolution, an "all out attack against the Soviet Union and against the party opposition in Communist China."³¹

Initiated in 1965, the Cultural Revolution caused Soviet-Chinese relations to deteriorate into open warfare. As the Soviet Union became increasingly identified in Chinese eyes, as anti-Mao and anti-China, border incidents began to increase. At one point in October 1966, an estimated two million Chinese took part in mass demonstrations on the Soviet frontier in support of Chinese territorial claims. February 1967 saw the situation become especially intense as the Soviet embassy in Peking was besieged by Chinese mobs. Tension increased, and both sides reported border fighting throughout 1968.

In 1969 the border clashes between the Soviet Union and China became a major point of contention. On March 2 of that year, a small island on the Ussuri river (the border between

China and the Soviet Union) became the scene of serious fighting. Each side gave a diametrically opposed account of the clash on the Ussuri, but both sides admitted to losing a number of border guards in the fighting. Further fighting occurred on March 15, 1969, involving tanks, artillery and possibly as many as three thousand Soviet troops. Casualties were heavy for both the Chinese and the Soviets.^{31a} Both the Soviet Union and China gave major press coverage to the Ussuri incidents, and national feelings in both countries were strongly aroused. Eventually the press campaign died down, however and the two countries entered into negotiations over the border issue. The negotiations defused the immediate fighting but tensions along the 4,700 mile border remained high. Since 1969 the Soviet Union in particular has accelerated the civilian and military development of the Far East, and the Amur-Ussuri area in particular, in light of the possibility of further armed conflicts in the area.

The Last Straw

Both China and the Soviet Union took the 1969 border clashes extremely seriously. The Soviet Union initiated a major military buildup in the Far East following the Ussuri River clashes. Eventually the Soviets had over forty five divisions of their best troops along the Soviet-Chinese border; the main weight of Soviet conventional armed might had shifted from the West to Asia. The obvious shift of military power was a tremendous physical threat that the Chinese could not overlook. This was especially true in light of the

Brezhnev Doctrine, and after Czechoslovakia, the Chinese "seemed to awake to the full seriousness of the situation."³² While in the Soviet Union the border conflicts had raised popular fervor to a pitch not seen since World War II, as it had been that long since any nation had dared to enter into open, military conflict with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were "driven to the view that China may be a permanent threat on the Soviet borders in Asia and a permanent rival elsewhere."³³

Moscow's attempts to isolate the Chinese met with only limited success. In 1971 the Soviet Union and India signed a treaty which provided for mutual assistance should one of the signatories be threatened by a third party, i.e. China. But India had been beaten by China in 1962, and was virtually neutralized by continuing tension with Pakistan. At the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in Moscow, the Soviet Union was not even able to muster enough support to secure a verbal condemnation of China for splitting the unity of the Communist world. Key parties such as Italy and Rumania, even argued for the right of each party to follow an independent path and argued against the imposition by any party of its views on another party. The Twenty-fourth Congress just highlighted the deteriorated position held by the Soviet Union in the worldwide movement.

Soviet fears about China were amplified by the growing China-United States dialogue. Alarmed by the Soviet military buildup along the Soviet-Chinese border and by continued Soviet attempts to isolate China, the Chinese initiated the "ping-pong" diplomacy that would culminate in the Shanghai Communique. China had been alarmed since Stalin's death by

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Soviet overtures for peaceful coexistence toward the West, particularly toward the United States. At first, the Chinese viewed such agreements as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement as a Soviet-United States attempt to reach an alliance against China. As it became clear that American failure in Vietnam was turning the United States inward in an attempt to heal its own internal problems the Chinese worried less about an active military coalition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Still, an active and flourishing Soviet-American detente would free the Soviet Union in the West and allow it to concentrate Soviet energies against China,

The Chinese decided to reduce the impact of detente, and, if not to stop it, at least to reduce detente's perceived anti-Peking character. To this end, China made overtures to the United States following the 1969 border flare-ups with the Soviet Union. Several preliminary trips to China by presidential advisor Henry Kissinger culminated in the 1972 visit to Peking of President Richard Nixon. The Shanghai Communique, issued at the end of the visit on February 27, 1972, actually said little of a substantive nature. Yet both the United States and China agreed in the communique that they opposed "hegemony and power politics of any kind." The two nations stated in the communique that they were especially opposed to "the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony ..." in Asia and the Pacific. And they stated that it would be against the "interests of the peoples of the world" for a major country to collude with another against

other countries in order to "divide the world into spheres of interest."³⁴

The long range outlook for Asia was significantly affected by improved United States-Chinese relations. Asia now had no single nation dominant; it now exhibited a delicate balance of power between the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the United States. For the Chinese who thought, as Prince Sihanouk said in 1972, that "Russia is the main enemy," the normalized relations with the United States (and eventually with Japan) reduced China's fears of a two-front conflict.³⁵ And with the end of the Vietnamese War the fear of a two-front war was laid to rest. China and the U.S.S.R. now faced each other across nearly five thousand miles of border with their attention and energies hardly averted by any other imminent threats.

Detente in the West

An improvement in Soviet-West relations was one reason the Soviet Union was able to face China without much fear of a second-front confrontation in the West. The shift in Soviet-West German relations had taken place when Willy Brandt's government came to power in West Germany. The Soviet Union had strong interests in creating better relations with West Germany, a result that could only benefit the Soviet economy. Also, a unilateral improvement could cause West Germany, and other European nations, to reassess the need for United States troops in Europe: leading to a reduction of the western military threat and reducing United States influence in the world.

The question of post-World War II European boundaries

was the first point that the Soviet Union and West Germany dealt with. August 12, 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany signed a treaty which recognized the present European boundaries as fixed and inviolable, including the Oder Niesse and the East German boundaries. Brandt stated that "nothing is lost with this treaty that was not gambled away long ago."³⁶ Brandt also noted that the purpose of Ostpolitik (Brandt's policy of developing better relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) was to improve relations with East Europe and the Soviet Union while strengthening West Germany's ties with the Western allies. West Germany had finally given up on reunification of the two Germanies.

It was with the Western allies in mind, however, that West Germany refused to ratify the 1970 agreement with the Soviet Union, until the Soviets had reaffirmed the free status of Berlin. This agreement was soon forthcoming as the four powers involved signed the first major agreement with the Soviet Union over Berlin since the agreement that ended the Berlin blockage in 1949. Signed August 23, 1971, this agreement guaranteed Western access to Berlin, formally recognized West Berlin to be a part of West Germany, and increased West Berliner's access to East Berlin (though not vice versa).^{36a} With this agreement signed, the way was open for President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972.

Nixon's visit, and the agreements that followed were not unopposed in the Soviet hierarchy. The United States had just mined Haiphong Harbor and was conducting a stepped up bombing campaign of a major Soviet ally. Signing agreements

with the United States while North Vietnam was being bombed incensed many in the Soviet military.³⁷ Earlier in May Soviet hardliners in the Politburo had tried to get President Nixon's trip cancelled due to the bombing. The hardliners were defeated by Brezhnev and their leader, Ukrainian Party boss Pyotr E. Shelest, was demoted just twenty-four hours before Nixon arrived.^{37a}

Despite the opposition the United States and the Soviet Union signed a number of agreements with potentially far reaching consequences. Nixon's talks with the Soviet leaders produced agreements in such areas as trade, ecology and the environment, science and technology, harassment of ships at sea world peace, and strategic arms limitations (SALT). The agreements reaffirmed that there were truly only two superpowers in what many were calling a multi-polar world. These two superpowers reaffirmed their determination to avoid direct military confrontations that could lead to nuclear war. In particular the SALT agreements put limits on the numbers of nuclear delivery systems (though not on the number of warheads) held by each power and was a beginning in the effort to reduce and eliminate the nuclear arms race.

Still, there were many vital areas of contention left out of the mutual agreements. For one, China was never specifically mentioned, though the Chinese threat was perhaps the primary reason that the Soviet Union was seeking detente with the West. The possibility of closer United States-Chinese relations remained a major Soviet worry. Further, another major reason for detente access to Western technology and credits

was signed but not ratified by the United States due to eventual United States Congressional opposition to internal Soviet policies toward the Jews. The Soviet Union sought to improve the living conditions within the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Soviet consumer demands were clear, as was the lesson of the recent Polish riots. But Soviet attempts to facilitate trade and gain "most favored nation" status foundered. Soviet hopes in this area remain in limbo today.

There were other areas of international tension which were not resolved by the Moscow agreements. Two such areas, the Vietnam conflict and a general European Security Conference, would eventually be resolved. Other, including the Mid East question and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) in Europe would continue to be sources of contention between the two superpowers. Mutual reduction of foreign (United States and Soviet Union) troops stationed in Europe remains a matter of active negotiations today as do questions relating to an extension of the SALT agreements, SALT II.

Signs of Strain

One of the outstanding problems that remained unresolved by the Moscow agreements concerned the Middle East. The Six Day War had dramatically deepened Egypt's dependency on the Soviet Union. The Soviets had responded to Arab, particularly Egyptian, demands for more aid by increasing arms shipments to replace all arms lost by the Arabs. Also, by 1970, the Soviets began to participate directly in Egypt's military effort by manning and operating sophisticated air defense weapons

systems (SA-2s, SA-3s, and advanced Mig fighters) in the Suez Canal zone. In September 1970, Gamel Nasser died and Anwar Sadat assumed power in Egypt. He immediately signed a fifteen year treaty with the Soviet Union obtaining more Soviet equipment in preparation for the inevitable war with Israel.³⁸

But the Soviet Union, remembering earlier fiascos, was still trying to keep tensions from boiling over in the Mid East. The Soviets sought a level of tension that would keep anti-Western feeling high among the Arabs, while avoiding another disastrous military action. Also, in 1972 the Soviet Union took sides in the India-Pakistan conflict against a Moslem country and removed some war material from Egypt to do so. Such actions and the Soviet "no war, no peace" (a policy of keeping Mid East tension high, while stopping short of open warfare) formula were causing discontent among the Arabs.³⁹ Additionally, the Arabs were more than a little worried about possible Soviet domination (imperialism) in the Mid East while remembering themselves that Soviet aid did not guarantee victory.^{39a}

Arab worries were further increased by the Moscow agreements, some of which seemed to apply directly to the Mid East situation. One, the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," stated that the two countries "attach major importance to preventing the developments of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations." The Basic Principles also said the two superpowers would "do their utmost to

avoid military confrontations ...," and that they had a special responsibility to prevent from arising situations which would increase international tensions.⁴⁰ To the Arabs, the Soviet Union seemed to be promising to prevent, in cooperation with the United States, any Arab action in the Mid East.

Relations between the many Arab states and the U.S.S.R. became severely strained. Due to the Moscow agreements and Soviet intransigence about supplying advanced offensive weapons, Sadat expelled thousands of Soviet advisors and military personnel in 1972. But the Soviets were still able to sign new aid agreements with Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinians and by February 1973 Soviet shipments were again streaming into Egypt.

Soviet support for the Arabs was not in keeping with the spirit, or the letter of the Moscow Agreements and the Basic Principles. By September 1973, the Soviets knew about the impending Arab attack on Israel. The Soviets did not try to prevent the development of the situation by reducing arms shipments, nor did the Soviet Union enter into reciprocal negotiations with the United States concerning the attack. Such negotiations were mentioned in the Basic Principles in order to prevent from arising international situations which could lead to a Soviet-American military confrontation.⁴¹

Soviet actions during the war were also only marginally in a spirit of detente. In October the Arabs launched their surprise attack with initial success. At first the Soviet Union did call for peace, but as the Egyptians seemed to be

winning, the Soviets began to call for more support for the Arab action. The Soviets even sent demarches to Iraq and Algeria telling them to join Egypt in the field and reminding the other Arab countries that they had been given Soviet equipment for the purpose of waging war against Israel.⁴² But early Arab victories stopped and by the second week of fighting the Israelis were winning the war.

The war severely strained detente. With the Israelis winning, the Soviet Union called for a cease fire, asking Henry Kissinger to come to Moscow for talks aimed at stopping Israel and saving detente. When the United States did not agree, the Soviets then sought a type of alliance. Israel was threatening to surround and wipe out the Egyptian 3rd Army when the Soviet Union and Egypt called for a joint United States-Soviet Union military involvement. The United States again refused, and when the Soviet Union threatened unilateral action (by alerting some 50,000 airborne troops), the United States put its armed forces on alert. On October 26 Brezhnev made a conciliatory speech and the United States alert was cancelled. The Soviet Union then helped to secure a disengagement and eventual end to the immediate conflict. But such conciliatory help did not obscure the fact that earlier Soviet actions were hardly conducive to relaxing international tensions. It was becoming increasingly clear that Soviet and American definitions of detente differed greatly.

The Arab-Israeli war did not result in clear cut advantages for either the Soviet Union or the West, a reminder that the Third World nations were not just new pawns in a Cold War,

but entirely new factors. The West was hurt by threats of an oil embargo from the Arabs, threats which caused much strife among the Western allies. Disagreements were serious enough to hinder United States re-supply efforts for Israel when major United States allies refused permission to use airports or even to fly over their borders. The Soviets suffered further loss of prestige in the Arab world both because Soviet help in Arab eyes had been vacillating and half-hearted, and because, once more it was the Western ally who won the war. The Soviet Union was forced to watch impotently as the United States maneuvered diplomatically and restored diplomatic relations with the Arab world to their "most potent level ever."⁴³ The Soviet Union lost diplomatic leverage in the Mid East and the United States, Egypt began to turn to the West, and the Soviet Union again had lost huge amounts of costly equipment. Once more the Soviet Union was reminded of the danger of great power politics in the Third World.

One More Try?

Soviet-American efforts toward detente continued despite Third World conflicts and internal opposition in both countries. In August 1975, the heads of state of thirty-six nations met and held a general European Security Conference at Helsinki, Finland. The Soviet Union had been seeking this conference for thirty years; hoping to clear up questions of national boundaries left over from World War II. The statement issued at the end of the conference formally recognized the boundaries of Europe, including the lands annexed by the Soviet Union. Soviet dominance, long a fact, was now officially recognized by

the West. In return for this recognition, the Soviet Union gave some vague promise to respect the sovereignty of nations and to refrain from the use of force in international relations. The Soviets also promised to be more open in the exchange of people and information between the Soviet Union and the West.⁴⁴

Since Helsinki, Soviet American detente has virtually stalled. SALT II talks have reached an impasse over which weapon systems should be included in the new agreements. Recent CIA estimates that the Soviet Union has increased its defense spending have fueled widespread American criticism of detente,⁴⁵ as have reports that the Soviets have increased their armed forces by 900,000 at a time when the United States has reduced its forces.⁴⁶ To many in the United States, the Soviets have used detente to lull the United States into false security while the Soviets raced to improve, modernize, and increase Soviet armed might. Soviet military expansion has seriously strained United States-Soviet detente.

Economically, the bonanza of trade that detente was to have opened between the United States and the Soviet Union has not materialized. United States refusal to ratify the 1972 Moscow trade agreements, has led the Soviet Union to shift its technical and industrial shopping to Western Europe and Japan.⁴⁷ And when the Soviets did deal with United States American traders, as in the massive grain sales, United States public reaction has often been very negative. Many in the United States blame American food price increases on the Soviet grain deals. Soviet American trade has remained stalled, or when significant, has done little to advance detente.

Finally, Soviet-American agreements to cooperate in relaxing international tensions also seem to have failed; or as in the case of the 1973 Mid East war, the agreements have operated only belatedly. Other areas where Soviet and American interests continued to clash increasing and not relaxing international tensions, included Portugal, Angola, and southern Africa. The vague precepts and promises in the Basic Principles did not seem capable of reducing international competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such competition will continue to take place on Third World battlefields straining and possibly destroying detente.

The problem with detente, especially with the American loss of faith, lies largely in the definition of what detente means. To the United States detente meant a reduction in world tension in order to avoid nuclear war and an increase in dialogue and contact with the Soviet Union which would lead to a lowering of the Iron Curtain. American detente was supposed to lead to less international confrontation and more amicable cooperation. The Soviets did not view detente in the same light as did Americans. Detente to the U.S.S.R. was simply a "strategic alternative to overtly militant antagonism."⁴⁸ The U.S.S.R. did not abandon its conflict and competition with the capitalist world. The Soviets were simply seeking less dangerous means of pursuing such competition in the nuclear age. About the only area where the American and Soviet definitions of detente agreed was in a sincere desire to avoid nuclear war.

The Soviet Union pursued the issue of detente for many reasons. The Soviets wished to weaken the Western Alliance

by making the alliance appear unnecessary or even an obstacle to world peace as well as an obstacle to improved Western-Soviet relations. The Soviets decided to avoid previous pressure tactics such as Berlin and Cuba, as such tactics only caused the West to draw together against the Soviet Union. Also hopefully a less militant Soviet Union would reduce the United States defense effort and possibly the United States presence in Europe. The Soviets wished to legitimize their domination of Eastern Europe, and to reduce or remove any threats on their western front. If successful, such reduced tension in the West would allow the Soviet Union to concentrate on the Chinese threat in the East.

The Soviet Union has met many of its goals, while the United States has failed to secure even the rather poorly defined goal of increased Soviet-American amicability and international cooperation. Even the hope of reducing the danger of nuclear war has been threatened by a continued Soviet military buildup. Still, detente remains a cornerstone of United States policy, and in the U.S.S.R. the Twenty-fifth Congress reaffirmed in 1976 a course "aimed at further improvements" in United States-Soviet relations.⁴⁹

CHAPTER FOUR - FROM CONFRONTATION TO COEXISTENCE

Soviet foreign policy tactics have evolved through three major stages. Following World War I, when the Soviet Union was a relatively weak and solitary representative of a new social system, the Soviets had to resort to divisive tactics against the more powerful capitalist world powers. But a new world order was forged in the fires of World War II. The Soviet Union emerged a world power, one of the strongest nations in the world and a leader of an entire bloc of satellite nations. In this period, continuing until 1962 and to the Cuban crisis the Soviet Union attempted to continue some of the divisive tactics of the previous era while also applying newfound Soviet strength. Soviet tactics, however, increasingly failed to secure Soviet goals and the Soviet Union was forced to develop new tactics after 1962. The Soviet approach after the Cuban missile crisis consisted primarily of a detente with the West.

The basic goal for all Soviet foreign policy tactics has always been to secure national and ideological safety for the Soviet Union, maintaining a safe haven from which the Communist ideology could eventually spread throughout the world. This was certainly the goal for Soviet diplomats following World War I and the 1917 Revolution. While initially the Soviet leaders may have hoped or even expected Communist revolutions to sweep Europe and the world following the 1917 Revolution, events such as the humiliating Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the allied intervention, and the war with Poland

soon convinced the Soviet leaders to seek more practical goals: security recognition and economic aid.

The means to such ends as security, recognition, and credits were restricted to the exploitation of differences and rivalries existing in the capitalist world. Surrounded by apparently hostile powers, the Soviet Union could only try to play one capitalist nation off against another. In this the Soviet Union was enormously successful. Examples of such successes include the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 which used German-French distrust to secure a German ally and credits for the Soviet Union. When the rise of Hitler threatened Soviet security, Soviet tactics managed to exploit British, French, and Czech fears of Germany to secure the Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pacts in 1935: these pacts were attempts to formalize a united front against the Nazi menace. But the failure of the united front in Spain of 1936 and at Munich in 1938 caused the Soviets to shift again. Soviet diplomatic flexibility ably exploited German worries about a two front conflict to secure the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, a pact which promised safety and territorial gains to the Soviet Union in the coming World War. Finally, the Soviet Union exploited Japanese distrust of Germany after the Nazi-Soviet Pact to secure the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in 1941, securing the Soviet Union's eastern border and allaying Soviet fears of a two-front conflict. In all, the Soviet Union gained recognition, security and time to build its strength, and even economic aid through a divide and weaken foreign policy tactic. Such success set the stage for the emergence of the Soviet Union in

the post-World War II era as one of the most powerful nations ever.

Following the Second World War, Soviet goals remained much the same though Soviet tactics had to change to fit the new world order. The post-World War II era appeared to be bi-polar with the Soviet Union as one of the poles. As the leader of a bloc, the Soviets had a position to maintain: Soviet diplomatic options were far more restricted, as was Soviet flexibility. Hence Soviet divide and weaken tactics, used so successfully to stave off the capitalist threat before World War II, were far less effective after 1945. During the years between 1945 and 1962 the U.S.S.R. attempted to evolve several new methods of dealing with the Western threat.

The Soviet Union attempted to exploit Western divisiveness to some extent, particularly in the Mid East where Western positions were not identical. But the new unity of the West, a unity enhanced by United States strength and an apparent threat from the Soviet Union, made divide and weaken tactics most ineffective. The Soviet Union also tried to use its new position as one of the most powerful nations in the world to secure Soviet goals. But in many cases, such as in Iran, in Turkey, and in Berlin, Soviet pressure tactics not only failed to secure Soviet aims, but increased Western unity and hence the Western threat to the Soviet Union.

Soviet tactics met increasing failure in the post-World War II era due largely to the new international influence such as rising nationalism the growing Western unity in the face of the Soviet threat, and growing dissent within the Communist

Bloc. As noted, the Western unity expressed in strong opposition to Soviet desires was responsible for many Soviet failures. But nationalism, a desire on the part of the smaller nations of the Third World for autonomy, freedom from imperialism (Western or Soviet), and a single-minded drive for Third World national interests also led to costly Soviet foreign policy failures. From Indonesia to the Mid East and even into the Bloc nations of Eastern Europe, small nations sought to apply pre-World War II Soviet tactics of divisiveness to secure the small nations' goals at the expense of Cold War rivalry. Not only did the Soviet Union spend money and influence prodigiously, with little return, to secure Soviet gains at Western expense, but time and again the conflicts of small client states threatened to embroil the great nations, the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear war over issues that were vital only to the small nations involved. This nationalism had its echo in the Bloc countries and led to increasingly costly Soviet investments in military and economic control in order to continue Soviet control, a control that was decisively not continued in China.

Soviet failures and Soviet acceptance that a nuclear post-World War II era needed a basic change in Soviet foreign policy directions, eventually led to the Soviet acceptance of detente with the West. The Cuban crisis was the last major failure and gamble based on old Soviet misconceptions about how the West would react to Soviet pressure. Following Cuba, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty led eventually to the 1972 Moscow Agreements formalizing detente. The Soviet leaders were

convinced by continued dissension in Eastern Europe that Soviet control would have to be redefined in order to defuse Eastern European nationalism. And Western credits and trade, secured through detente were necessary ingredients in the new Soviet tactics toward Eastern Europe.

The Middle East exploded again and again, convincing the Soviets that Soviet gains in the Third World would have to be sought with more caution and restraint or the small nations would embroil the Soviet Union and the United States in a war in which there would be no winners. Soviet tactics in the Middle East came to reflect greater Soviet caution. Though the Soviet Union in no way gave up the idea of encouraging anti-Western trends and groups in the Third World, such encouragement would be less likely to include Soviet pilots and troops. The Soviets were playing a safer, if more conservative and traditional, brand of diplomacy.

Finally, the growing reality of the Chinese threat caused the Soviets actively to seek detente as a means of avoiding a possible two-front conflict. Sino-Soviet rivalry became open enmity and even open warfare by 1969, Soviet fears of China, and of a possible United States-China alliance, led directly to the Soviet desire for the Moscow Agreements in 1972. The Moscow agreements and previous agreements signifying a detente with Western Europe, enabled the Soviet Union to reduce tension in the West and to concentrate on the eastern threat. Further, a United States-Soviet Union detente, would lead to the possible review by Western European nations of the need the continued presence of United States troops

in Europe. Indeed, the apparently reduced Soviet threat might lead to the abrogation of the Atlantic Alliance and to a serious reduction of United States influence in Europe, one of the Soviets' most sought-after goals.

But detente with the West was by no means finalized by the Moscow agreements; many problems remained. The stalled SALT II and MBFR talks, Soviet intervention in Africa and Portugal, and dissatisfaction in the United States with everything from the Helsinki Agreements of 1974 to the Soviet grain deals have all been problems that remain to plague and hamper detente: particularly in Western eyes. For to the West, detente was more than simply a means to avoid nuclear war by making outright military confrontations with the Soviet Union less likely. Detente to many Americans was supposed to signify a lowering of the Iron Curtain, a more open, even a more friendly dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, of course, did not share this American ideal. To the Soviet Union, detente was simply a tactical maneuver to take confrontation with the West out of the military arena and into more peaceful, but no less competitive arenas. This basic misconception and disagreement of what detente means to each side has led to dissatisfaction in both camps, Soviet and American, with peaceful coexistence.

Detente with the West is the latest in Soviet tactics: it entails an attempt to recognize post-World War II realities and to secure Soviet goals of national and ideological security, or dominance. The Soviet Union maintains a flexible

foreign policy. If the world situation changes or if detente ceases to secure Soviet aims, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly seek other solutions or new tactics. Such tactics may include a rapprochement with China while once more turning to a hard line in the West; though only time will tell if such is the Soviet intention. The Soviet Union may have believed that the 1974 Helsinki Agreement signalled the last gasp for detente, and that if no further gains materialized, the Soviet Union will put detente in the tactical trashpile.

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