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
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
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
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The Nigerian case tended to validate this hypothesis. Conditions within the country deteriorated to such an extent that military intervention was inevitable. Tanzania also tended to validate the basic hypothesis in that the conditions suffered by Nigeria did not exist in sufficient number or severity to cause military intervention.

It was concluded that, if one sees the conditions mentioned in the hypothesis as independent variables in a great number and severity in an African country, there is a high probability of military intervention in politics.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA AND TANZANIA:
A STUDY OF THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE
OF CIVIL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
James L. Collins, MAJ, USA
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Name of Candidate James L. Collins

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Approved by:

Wicket Nutt Jr., Research Advisor

P. M. Wright, Member, Graduate Research
Faculty

Henry Samuel, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 1st day of June 1977 by [Signature],
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Purpose.....	1
Rationale.....	1
Methodology.....	4
II. NIGERIA.....	8
Historical Setting.....	8
Political Leadership and the Party System.....	14
Social and Economic Forces.....	21
The Army and Society.....	33
The 1966 Coups.....	41
Civil War.....	50
Political Impact of External Factors.....	54
III. TANZANIA.....	57
Union with Zanzibar.....	57
Association with Germany.....	58
Trusteeship and British Administration.....	60
Movement toward Independence.....	62
Political Leadership and the Party System.....	72

Chapter	Page
The Army and Society.....	82
Social Interactions and Economic Forces.....	87
The Effects of International Relations.....	95
IV. ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS.....	98
Prestige of Political Parties.....	98
Relations Among Politicians.....	101
Likelihood of External Intervention.....	103
Demonstration Effect.....	104
Domestic Social Interaction.....	105
Economic Factors.....	108
Corruption and Inefficiency.....	110
Military Power Politics.....	113
Conclusions.....	114
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	117

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Historically, the native military establishment has played a crucial role in transitional activities and establishment of social values in African nations. However, it was not until relatively recently that observers identified a total seizure of political power by African military elites. Research shows that this phenomena is less dependent on the strength of an affected nation's military than on the weakness of its incumbent civil institutions. This paper attempts to verify conditions which, if found to exist in an African nation, will tend toward instances of indigenous military intervention in politics.

Rationale

Africa, South of the Sahara, warrants attention because of its geographically strategic location, human resources, and as an increasingly important source of raw materials for industrialized nations. The finite nature of resources, and the highly competitive nature of international markets have created circumstances where industrialized nations will depend increasingly on Sub-Saharan Africa for raw materials and sources of energy.

The United States has traditionally avoided direct competition with other nations in Africa. However, events in countries such as Angola, Zaire, and Rhodesia have brought increasing United States involvement to the area. As a result of this, Sub-Saharan Africa today exists as an area for potential super power confrontations. The potential conflict revolves around increasing Soviet and Chinese activity in Africa and a corresponding increase in United States activity.¹

The United States seeks to maintain secure environments in the Indian Ocean, along the shipping lanes of the Mozambique Channel, the Cape of Good Hope, and in the South Atlantic.² Consequently, it is sensitive to the relationships which are maintained with and between countries within these areas. The Soviet presence in Somalia and Guinea, the Chinese presence in Tanzania and Zambia, coupled with the current political conditions in Mozambique and Angola have presented the Communist powers with potential control of resources and logistic bases that would be damaging to the strategic interests of the United States and which presently complicate relations between African nations.³

Prior to 1965, very little was written about the

¹Brown, GEN George S. "Current JCS Theater Appraisals." Commanders Digest, Vol. 20, No. 6, 17 March 1977 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Ibid., p. 12.

politics of Black African nations.⁴ Claude E. Welch, Jr., a prolific writer on the development of Africa's new nations, identifies three types of indigenous military involvements in national politics: (1) passivity and abstention from political involvement, (2) mutinies resulting from resentment against European officers or African political leaders, and (3) coups d'etat.⁵ These factors will be treated in Chapters II, III, and IV.

A knowledge of these types of civil-military interactions is essential for United States officials, military or civilian, who are tasked either to evaluate political conditions in African countries or to recommend military assistance to those countries. More importantly, these officials must know the conditions which are likely to intensify these inter-actions or lead to military intervention or takeover.

Presently, the United States maintains military personnel in Liberia, Zaire, and Kenya primarily to support military assistance and sales programs.⁶ The purpose of these missions is to enhance the particular nation's internal security, enhance African regional security, and

⁴Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 189.

⁵Claude E. Welch, Jr., Soldier and State in Africa, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p.5.

⁶Brown, p. 14.

to foster favorable bilateral relations.⁷ An understanding of civil-military relations in these and other African countries is essential to the success of the goals we have established in this area. The ability to recognize and evaluate trends and patterns within these nation-states to determine the likelihood of military intervention is highly desirable for United States personnel assigned to mission or embassy duty.

Methodology

In order to determine the validity of factors identified by Claude Welch that lead to military intervention, the two countries studied, Nigeria and Tanzania, will be treated in separate chapters. Each chapter will review the historical background leading to independence, the personalities and significant organizations involved in efforts toward independence, the relationship between the populace and the military, and the civil-military relations existing following independence. The time frame covered will be from the colonial period to the early 1970's.

In the late 1960's, Welch identified certain conditions which he felt tended to lead to military intervention in domestic African political affairs. These conditions, which I will refer to as Factors Leading to

⁷Brown, p. 14.

Military Intervention (FLMI), were designed to be applied only to African nations to determine the relative probability that the country's military will intervene. In a converse sense, the lack of these FLMI can be used to help explain why a country's military has remained inactive in political affairs. This research uses the FLMI in this manner and analyzes the effect of each on the probability of military rule. These FLMI are as follows:

1. Declining prestige of the major political party by:
 - a. increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance,
 - b. a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces, and
 - c. a consequent denial of effective political choice.
2. Schism among prominent politicians, thus weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former colonial power.
3. Lessened likelihood of external intervention in the event of military uprising.
4. "Contagion" from seizures of control by the military in other states. [demonstration effect]
5. Domestic social antagonism, most obviously manifested in states where a minority group exercised control such as the Arabs in Zanzibar or the Watusi in Burundi.
6. Economic malaise leading to "austerity" politics most affecting the articulate and urbanized sectors of the population.
7. Corruption and inefficiency of government and party officials. A corruption especially noticeable under conditions of economic decline would be most significant.
8. More army awareness of its power to influence

or displace government leaders.⁸

It is recognized that a number of additional variables may exist which could bear on civil-military relations. As an example, many African nations have pursued multi-lateral sources of aid to preclude dependence on single sources and reduce potential neo-colonial trends or internal meddling. In a number of these cases, military training is received from one country while military equipment comes from another. As a result, training and equipment are not always compatible. The Nigerian Army, as an example, has received training in Ghana, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Pakistan, and Canada. Such diversified training obviously has the potential of developing different values and attitudes and of yielding a less than fully cohesive military organization.⁹ Yet, while this fact must be understood, there is no evidence to suggest that it is of any importance in the instances of military intervention in Nigeria. On the other hand, the existence of a charismatic personality as the head of government, such as Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, might be sufficient within itself to forestall military intervention. In general, however, it is felt that Welch's FLMI provide sufficient and reasonably valid indicators

⁸Welch, p. 18.

⁹Uma O. Eleazu, "The Role of the Army in African Politics," Journal of Developing Nations, 7 (January 1973): 273.

for the determination of why the native military intervenes in African politics.

Nigeria (Chapter II) has seen several, often bloody, acts of military involvement in politics. The Nigerian chapter reviews the conditions which resulted in these acts of open military involvement and other crisis situations to determine who, why, and to what degree the military became involved.

Tanzania (Chapter III), while not immune to acts of military involvement, has retained a relatively stable civilian government in power since its independence. The effort in this chapter will be to show what conditions existed and what actions were taken by the government in order to insure against military intervention.

The Analysis and Conclusion Chapter (Chapter IV) applies the conditions in Welch's FLMI to each country and analyses the findings.

CHAPTER II

NIGERIA

Historical Setting

The history of the modern Nigerian nation dates largely from 1914, when the previously distinct northern and southern Nigerian Protectorates were amalgamated under British rule. Many of the indigenous cultural and political institutions that existed at this time were retained under British colonial rule. The retention of local institutions in some form of modification was in keeping with British colonial tradition.¹

The tribes of the north, which included the Housa, Fulani, Tiv, Kanuri, and Nupe, were culturally and economically tied to North Africa's Islamic centers by a complex series of trade routes that existed several hundred years before the arrival of the Europeans. This orientation brought about cultural and economic dominance to the northern tribes over all others in the area. Ethnic groups in the south, which included Ibo, Yoruba, Ido, Ibibio, Efik, and Ijaw, lacked written languages and depended on oral traditions for the preservation and

¹C. S. Whitaker, Jr. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 81.

transmittal of historical events. After the fifteenth century, the orientation of the southern tribes was directed toward coastal contacts rather than the interior trade routes.² Trade, initially in slaves and later in commodities, served as the stimulus for European expansion in the region. Eventually, British development of the southern coastal areas increased the political prominence of ethnic groups living in that sector, with the result that the north-south flow of dominance was reversed.

Throughout the period leading to independence, a background of growing political factionalism existed basically as a result of traditional ethnic tensions. Tribal rivalries and the potential for ethnic disunity have existed throughout Nigeria's history and have been heavy stumbling blocks in all efforts to achieve nationalism. Although an incipient nationalism of various tribal origins existed under the common denominator of opposition to alien rule, the civil service, labor, and youth organizations were the first who explicitly advocated national unity.³

Though not directly political in aim, the Nigerian Union of Teachers was the first important organization to spread throughout the country and to represent many ethnic

²Harold D. Nelson and Others, Area Handbook for Nigeria, DA Pam 550-157. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 41.

³Ibid., p. 62.

groups in its leadership. The major political effort, however, came from youth movements mainly through the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) which listed Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo, as one of its first leaders.

During the late 1930's, Nnamdi Azikiwe was the editor and/or founder of a number of newspapers in Ghana and Nigeria. Each of the newspapers he was associated with were extensively used as channels for attacks on colonialism. Azikiwe's educational and journalistic background was obtained in the United States. His first job with an African newspaper was in Ghana where he used his position to preach on Pan-Africanism and the evils of man's inhumanity to man. Influenced by America's propensity for sensational journalism, his format, style and content followed this pattern.⁴

Immediately following its founding in 1938, the NYM began to express a territorial nationalism that sought to unite all Nigerians and establish complete autonomy within the British Empire. By early 1941, however, there arose an organizational leadership crisis centered around ethnic identification. Azikiwe and other Ibos withdrew from the NYM and formed Nigeria's first true political party, the National Convention of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). A few years later, Nigeria's second political

⁴Thomas Patrick Melady, Profiles of African Leaders, (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 149.

party was born when the NYM evolved to the Yoruba led Action Group (AG) under the leadership of Tribal Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The organization of these two political parties precipitated a rivalry between the Ibo and Yoruba tribes which continued throughout the pre-independence and early post-independence days.

In response to growing charges that the existing constitution curtailed local political aspirations, a new constitution was published in 1946 under the title of the Richards Constitution. The elective principle was not extended by this constitution and effective power remained in the hands of the governor and his appointed executive council. This constitution did, however, establish the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions, each vested with houses of assembly and each dominated by the Housa, Yoruba, and Ibo tribes respectively. At the discretion of the governor, these regional houses were permitted to deliberate matters of regional concern and give advice to the governor. This prelude to federalism and institutional recognition of regionalisms was designed to give expression to ethnic and traditional diversity. While there is no general consensus regarding British intent, the Richards Constitution undoubtedly intensified regionalism as an alternative to unification.⁵ For the most part, the Western and Eastern Regions were carved from what had been

⁵Nelson, p. 65.

the Southern Nigerian Protectorate. This action gave the Northern Region approximately two-thirds of the country's land area and approximately one-half of its population.

During the 1940's, there was a rapid proliferation of labor organizations. Although labor unions had existed since 1912, they did not gain legal status or protection for their members until 1938 with the passage of the Trades Union Ordinance. The first unions registered in 1940 and numbered 14 in all, with a combined membership of less than 5000 members. By 1950, the total had increased to 144 unions with more than 144,000 members.⁶ In addition to the legalized status of labor unions, another reason for this rapid growth is that nationalistic pressures after World War II led to increased Nigerianization of almost all areas of endeavor. The subsequent history of the central labor movement was generally one of fragmentation and factionalism. These factors plus the absence of effective leadership kept labor from exercising the potentially powerful role as a national political pressure group.

Whatever Nigeria's tribal differences were, they did not include a desire to continue under British rule. Both individually and collectively, each political party cried out against colonial rule and demanded independence.

⁶Nelson, p. 97.

These demands all called for a unified Nigeria and not separate states. The British grant of internal self-government in 1951 was the first step toward independence. This grant, through the 1950 Constitution, gave renewed impetus to party activity and political participation on the national level. This constitution, however, incorporated regional autonomy as its model in keeping with the previous use of native authority in each region. It was not until the Constitution of 1954 that the federal principle of government was introduced.⁷ The 1954 Constitution also provided the framework for complete independence.

With the enactment of the 1954 Constitution, the Central Government of Nigeria operated in increasing degrees of autonomy from the British until independence was granted. Only international relations and matters of defense were reserved for British action. During this period, a conference of delegates from Great Britain and Nigeria was in frequent session attempting to establish guidelines for independence. By mutual agreement, the target date for independence was changed from 1959 to April 1960 and finally to October 1960.

On 1 October 1960, Nigeria became the sixteenth African state to achieve independence. Nigeria remained within the British Commonwealth and recognized the Queen of England as her titular head of state. Dr. Azikiwe

⁷Nelson, p. 66.

became its first native Governor General. On 1 October 1963, Nigeria became a republic within the British Commonwealth and Dr. Azikiwe became the new Head of State.

Political Leadership and the Party System

The foundation of Nigeria's political system was the National Convention of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) which was largely responsible for applying the political pressure which led to Britain granting internal self-government to Nigeria in 1951 and independence in 1960. In the mid-1950's, the NCNC changed its name to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens with Dr. Azikiwe, its founder, still at its helm as Premier of the Eastern Region. Azikiwe held this position, which he had received as a result of the 1951 elections, until 1959 when the political alliance of NCNC and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was elected to national power and Azikiwe was appointed Governor General of Nigeria. Azikiwe was unanimously appointed President of Nigeria when the country became a Republic in 1963. He retired from active politics following the coup of January 1966 although he became an advisor to the military government of the Eastern Region following the second coup in July 1966.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, was an active figure in Nigeria's political arena during both pre and post-independence periods. His quarrels with Azikiwe during their involvement with the National Youth Movement

led to the formation of Nigeria's second political party, the Action Group (AG). The AG quickly became the ruling party of the Western Region. Under Awolowo's leadership, the AG pushed highly radical policies and demanded the rapid creation of a socialist democracy following the Ghanaian pattern. Apart from the inner-circle of the AG, this demand received little support. The AG reached its height of political influence in the late 1950's. Its demise occurred in 1962 when the federal government declared a state of emergency in the Western Region and many of the AG leaders were placed under house arrest. The emergency had been precipitated by an internal split over party tactics and a complicated set of political maneuvers which resulted in the disintegration of the regional legislature.⁸ During the aftermath of this crisis, Awolowo and several AG leaders were charged with the criminal misuse of public funds and a conspiracy to overthrow the Nigerian government by force. Awolowo was tried, convicted and sentenced to ten years in jail.

Samuel Akintola, another founding member of the Action Group, was the Western Region's Premier following independence. As a result of the 1962 political crisis in the region, Akintola was dismissed by the regional governor. He and his supporters withdrew from the AG and formed the United People's Party (UPP) which later became

⁸Nelson, p. 71.

known as the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The UPP pursued a policy of collaboration with the Northern People's Congress and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens in the federal parliament. Following a nationally supervised investigation and a 7-month state of emergency, Akintolo was reinstated as Regional Premier on 1 January 1964 by the Nigerian Prime Minister. This act met with strong AG opposition and greatly contributed to increasing political tensions at both the regional and national levels. Akintolo was assassinated during the coup of January 1966.

Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a member of the Hausa Tribe, was Nigeria's first Prime Minister. Abubakar, as he was most commonly known, brought dignity, an impressive personality, and strong urging toward national unification to the political arena of Nigeria. He pushed for national unity as the first goal of Nigeria with social and economic reforms reserved for secondary efforts. Abubakar's rise to prominence is rather unique in that he was not a descendant of local nobility in an area where heritage was of major importance. Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, Abubakar served as Secretary of the Northern People's Congress. In recognition for outstanding service to his country, he was knighted by the Queen of England in 1962. He was assassinated during the coup of January 1966.

Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, a member of the Fulani tribe,

was one of the founders and leaders of the Northern People's Congress. Additionally, he was a highly influential leader of the Mohammedan people of the north. Just prior to and following Nigeria's independence, he served as the Northern Region's Premier. He was also known as the Sardauna of Sokoto and was the cousin of the Sultan of Sokoto. The Sardauna, as he was most commonly referred to, served on the pre-independence conference of delegates which developed the constitutional guidelines for Nigeria's independence from Great Britain. His influence was of such a nature that virtually no political decisions were made without his first being consulted. In the period 1963 to 1965, the Sardauna's bid for religious glory, which seemed an obvious means of extending and reinforcing his political power, became increasingly more overt and aggressive. C. S. Whitaker, Jr. describes his activities as follows:

Undoubtedly the most striking and significant manifestation of this open indulgence in religious leadership, particularly so in light of the ostensibly secular nature of the premiership and its presumed function as a source of northern regional unity, was the series of "Islamic conversion tours" which the Sardauna undertook to lead through remoter areas of the region in which non-Muslims were numerous and historically resistant to Islamic penetration. In this single activity, if in no other, the Sardauna forfeited even the pretense of strictly "modern" conceptions of political leadership.⁹

Because of the Sardauna's influence and status, he was one of the first victims of the January 1966 coup, for it was

⁹Whitaker, p. 350.

felt that no governmental change would have been successful had he been allowed to live.¹⁰

In most cases, political parties were formed along tribal and regional lines and served to promote the desires of their respective interest groups. The ideals of nationalism, while espoused in efforts toward independence, seldom permeated the nation's political parties as a whole. Each denounced the idea of alien rule and sought independence for Nigeria as a single entity. However, the idea of nation-building and total unification was not a universally agreed upon goal. The Eastern Region, perhaps more than any other, advocated the idea of national unification and integration. Conversely, the Northern Region was more reluctant in the pursuit of this goal. This reluctance and advocacy was based on tribal and regional fears and aspirations. The Eastern Region contained the most highly educated and technically qualified personnel and envisioned the potentially dominating positions they could aspire to in the government and strongly favored unification. The Northern Region's educational system was not as developed nor were its people as competent in administrative areas as the westerners and easterners. The North, however, had enjoyed positions of dominance based on uneven population divisions and other favorable condi-

¹⁰The sources of this assertion and several others that follow are interviews of knowledgeable Nigerian officials whose information is thought to be reliable.

tions that British colonial authorities had created. The interactions of politicians and political parties reflected these situations. Ultimately, all efforts went toward ridding the country of its alien rulers.

The question of independence and the pre-condition of self-government were treated individually by the various regional parties. As a result, the three constituent states of the loose federation that was established evolved along parallel lines but at different paces. After August 1957, both the Western and Eastern Regions were self-governing. It was 1959 before the Northern Region received the same status. There were numerous details that differed among the three regional systems, but all adhered to parliamentary forms of government and enjoyed equally semiautonomous relations with the central government in Lagos.¹¹

Not only was governmental control decided and built along regional lines, but the army was also organized along similar lines as will be discussed under a subsequent heading. The basic problem that this generated was centered around how to establish a central government from semi-autonomous subjects and what power the central government should have. The fact that the Constitution established population figures as the basic determinant for political representation at the national level led to the formation

¹¹Nelson, p. 67.

of numerous alliances in the pursuit of political powers. Alliances were of extreme importance for once political power and control was achieved, the party(s) in power could manipulate all available assets of government to retain that power and control. The political climate in Nigeria was further complicated in 1962 when the Mid-Western Region was created from the easternmost provinces of the Western Region. This event added to existing tribal and regional cleavages and enhanced the need for alliances with the emergence of a new actor, the Mid-West, on the scene.

A brief description of several of the political parties and alliances that existed during the early independence era is as follows:

a. The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) which was composed primarily of the Northern Region's middle and lower working classes. The NEPU was small, of relative insignificance as a single party, and usually found itself in alliance with one or more of the non-regional political parties.

b. The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) was composed primarily of the Tiv tribe from the eastern portion of the Western Region. This group was primarily responsible for applying the pressure which led to the formation of the fourth region (Mid-West) of Nigeria and originally was included in the Northern People's Congress. It used the 1962 political crisis in the Western Region

to push its demand for the establishment of this new region.

c. The United Progressive Grand Alliance was a coalition of the Action Group, the NCNC, the UMBC and the NEPU. This coalition was designed to counter northern attacks on the president and northern treatment of Ibos during the mid-1964 period. It never became a parliamentary force because the elements creating its reason for being were short lived. It played a significant role, however, in the 1965 crisis in the Western Region.

d. The Nigerian National Alliance was a coalition of the NPC, the Nigerian National Democratic Party and other minor southern (both east and west) parties. This coalition had the specific and stated purpose of countering the United Progressive Grand Alliance. It too, was of major importance in 1965.

Social and Economic Forces

The year 1960 saw not only the birth of a new country but the beginning of political bickering on a grand scale. One of the first break-aways resulted from the Tiv people's cry for autonomy as indicated above. The turbulence that developed during this time frame ultimately led to the army being called in to subdue the opposition. In addition to the use of military forces, the Northern People's Congress used control of regional ministries to briefly cut off the Tiv country from federal revenue. At this time, the basis for Nigeria's political crisis was

the quarrel over spoils. Federal politics had turned out to be the politics of the north. Federal economics turned out to be the economics of northern development with the bulk of all federal development funds going to the Northern Region.¹²

Nigerianization and the departure of expatriate officials produced a great spate of openings in almost every area. It also produced fierce squabbles and political intrigues. An economic crisis added to this situation for as the world price of cocoa dropped and foreign capital investment shrank, unemployment grew until it reached nearly 30 per cent in eastern and western urban areas.¹³ Fierce competition for the few available jobs cut across all segments of the society. Again, tribalism and regionalism were the basic causes of this situation. For the attainment of a position or employment affected not only the applicant and his immediate family but also his kinsmen, local community, and region. This was especially true as the bureaucratic positions grew in terms of authority. As a result, disputes over choice positions easily led to inter-tribal conflicts.

The political processes throughout Nigeria were constantly the subject of intrigue, quarrels, inter-tribal

¹²Ruth First, Power in Africa (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 158.

¹³Ibid., p. 159.

strife, and ultimately national disunity. As mentioned earlier, the nation had been divided along regional lines that were designed to correspond to population dispersions. The organization of the federal government also reflected this dispersion. To insure the accuracy of the political division, a census was taken in 1962. Population figures were of vital importance, for on them rested the distribution of electoral representation and also the system of allocation and distribution of material resources.

With such high stakes, it was perhaps only natural, especially in the existing climate of political instability, that reported census figures tended to be inflated. The Eastern Region reported a population increase of 71 per cent since the previous census in 1953. Five of the 29 administrative divisions of the Eastern Region showed increases ranging between 120 and 190 per cent. It appeared that throughout the nation local officials deliberately inflated population figures in the hope of influencing the distribution of rewards from both the national and regional levels. The Federal Census Officer arrived at the obvious conclusion that the figures recorded throughout the greater part of the Eastern Region were false and inflated. A verification count in all regions was called for, but was rejected by the Eastern and Western Regions. The Western Region had reported a 60 per cent population increase over the nine year period between censuses.

The Northern Region, realizing that its control

of politics and economics would be jeopardized if it failed to show that it still contained more than one-half of the country's population, conducted a new count and "discovered" an additional 8.5 million people in its region. This discovery of a population "explosion" resulted in an increase of 84 per cent as opposed to the originally reported 30 per cent increase. Thus the Northern Region still claimed more than one-half of the population of the federation. The country's population expanded from 30.3 million in 1953 to 54.2 million by 1962 and included more than 600,000 in the capital city of Lagos.¹⁴ (It should be noted that Lagos has traditionally been treated as a separate federal entity and not part of one of the regions.)

The Development Program for the period 1962 to 1968 is a good example of how attempts to control resource distribution can take on regional rather than nation benefits. John P. Mackintosh illustrates this attempt as follows:

It is clear from the policy statements and debates on the Development Plan that the Northern Region started with proposals amounting to nearly double the £97 million which they ultimately accepted. Such a vast expenditure could only have been financed by increasing federal taxation and by altering the basis of revenue allocation, thus denuding both the Central Government and the other regions.¹⁵

¹⁴Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966. (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 81.

¹⁵John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 74.

The Eastern Region was more cautious in its economic proposals but wanted to start a number of industrial projects which showed no sign of ever paying their way. These proposals had to be tactfully eliminated. The Western Region presented both the most modest plan, in view of its resources, and the one which gave the most evidence of careful preparation. To remedy this, the federal planners established a rule requiring that the regions be capable of meeting the entire recurrent cost and one-half of the capital expenditure for all new projects.

In February 1964, the results of another census taken in November 1963 were released. All attempts to avoid the pitfalls of the 1962 census were practically ineffective. The Eastern Region's population figures duplicated those reported in 1962. The Western Region inflated its figures even more than in 1962 by adding another 2 million to its figures although it had lost territory through the creation of the new Mid-Western Region. The Mid-West, in its report, showed a total of 2.5 million people. The Northern Region reduced its "verified" 1962 figures by approximately one million, a relatively insignificant amount. A net gain of approximately 1.5 million people was reported in the 18-month interval between censuses which brought Nigeria's new total to 55.7 million.¹⁶

The Nigerian electoral process generated further

¹⁶Ibid., p. 552.

political crises. The most critical occurred in the Western Region in October 1965 which followed the hotly contested national elections in 1964. The national elections were contested by two political alliances formed by the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) led by the Sardauna, the Premier of the Northern Region; and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) led by Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region.

Regional and ethnic antagonisms provided the main issues for the national elections, the first since independence. The NNA expected Ibo domination of the federal government and sought support from the Yoruba to prevent such an eventuality. The UPGA charged the Muslim northerners with demonstrating anti-southern, anti-democratic, and anti-Christian attitudes.¹⁷

The NNA's appeal was essentially to conservative modernists and was based on the advantages of power that had been accrued as indicated earlier. The UPGA proposed to split the country into smaller states similar to the former colonial provinces and thereby strengthen the federal government. The obvious appeal of the UPGA was its intent to rid the government of domination by northerners.

The UPGA announced that it was boycotting the elections because of alledged charges of unconstitutional

¹⁷Nelson, p. 75.

electoral practices by the NNA. The election proceeded, however, except in the Eastern Region where voting locations remained closed. When the results of the election were announced, the northern coalition had won an overwhelming majority of the contested seats in the Northern and Western Regions. A special election was called to fill the seats from the Eastern Region. The NCNC candidates took the NNA's 197 seats and added them to the UPGA's 105. A second government was formed with multiparty representation. Executive power was placed in the hands of the three parties ruling their respective region. The effect of this act was to reinforce regionalism at the expense of national unity.

The scheduled elections in the Western Region took on added significance after the UPGA losses in the federal elections. If the UPGA could win control of the Western Region, it saw the potential of controlling the three regions in the south and the Federal Territory of Lagos. This possibility would not have threatened the northern control of the federal House of Representatives but would have given the southerners a majority in the Senate and thus provide them with more leverage over national legislation.

In the Western Region, Premier Akintola had used his years in office since the 1962 political crisis to destroy Chief Awolowo's support in the Action Group and build his own in the National Nigerian Democratic Party

(NNDP). Tribal chiefs, officials in local government, contractors, and business and professional men realized their livelihoods lay with the patronage the party in power dispensed. They began to switch their alliance to Akintola. Falling cocoa prices, rising unemployment, and continued rumors that Awolowo's jailing was the result of fabricated charges, added tremendous tensions to pre-election activities. Had Akintola's group been forced to submit to the popular vote, he probably would not have retained power. However, the use of blatant and unrestrained thuggery and ingenious trickery marked the election in the Western Region. Election offices were closed before opposition candidates could lodge their nomination papers. Ballot boxes were stuffed with ballot forms that had been distributed to supporters only days before the election. Ditches were dug around towns by the NNDP so that supporters of opposition candidates could not reach the polling stations. In one situation, an AG candidate won the seat, but, as his supporters were celebrating victory, they heard a radio announcement in which the polling figures of the two candidates were reversed. The AG won only 15 of 88 seats.¹⁸

The NNDP knew prior to the election that the price for cocoa was to take a significant reduction but withheld this information until after the election. This news on

¹⁸First, p. 157.

top of the election fraud pushed the countryside into open revolt. Farmers attacked land owners and merchants who had sided with the NNDP. Farms were destroyed, crops and other properties burned, and several people were burned at the stake by angry farmers. Telephone lines were disconnected, roads blockaded, and markets and motorparks boycotted or shut down. One town after another set up road blocks manned by UPGA supporters to prevent NNDP supporters from returning with force to further intimidate communities that had shown opposition sympathies. The police and the army were brought in to put down the revolt and restore order. The resulting security operation terrorized the peasantry to the point of gravely disrupting the harvest and marketing system. What had begun as a series of maneuvers designed to defeat rivals in elections had resulted in the destruction of the Western Region's government and led to a state of uncontrolled and uncontrollable lawlessness.¹⁹

Popular disillusionment with the method in which the federal government had operated during the national election grew throughout the country. The Prime Minister's refusal to declare a state of emergency in the Western Region during the election heightened distrust of the federal government. While the officially stated death toll in the Western Region was less than 50, more reliable estimates place the toll at more than 2000 people killed in the

¹⁹First, p. 157.

Western Region between August 1965 and January 1966.²⁰

During its first five years of independence, Nigeria's political elite staggered through a series of crises, each more damaging than the last. No holds were barred in the quest for power. Corruption, neither back-door nor minor, was extensively flaunted. Five years of fiddling with the coffers to subsidize the political elite and their parties in the contest for power had wasted the country's resources.

Graft and corruption were often difficult subjects to deal with and were generally treated as political rather than moral issues. The holder of public office, though compensated adequately for his service, was often seen as holding traditional offices and persons requesting favors still expected to compensate their benefactors in the traditional manner. Protests over the payment of this type of money was voiced generally only when it was politically expedient to do so, or when the level or number of payments demanded became exorbitant. The system of compensation for favors was so common in the Northern Region that even these types of complaints were rarely made.²¹

In describing the Nigerian view of bribery, Harold D. Nelson states:

²⁰Nelson, p. 76.

²¹Nelson, p. 288.

What appears as bribery to Westerners thus is regarded by Nigerians as a legitimate act of recognition due a superior or as a traditional method of obtaining favors. Even if the law, the government's anticorruption campaigns, and his own education create an attitude of opposition to it, a lower level public official often feels constrained to seek gifts from his clients and from the general public with whom he deals. Such acts are necessary to pay his superior for favors on his own behalf or for his subordinates. If he does not accept gifts, he will be unable to give gifts and thus will be unable to obtain the support he needs to do the job for which he is responsible.²²

As can be seen, government corruption often had the cooperation of the public as well as the will of the guilty. This permissiveness made it virtually impossible to eliminate such practices. While numerous commissions were appointed to investigate charges of corruption or misuse of public funds, seldom were the guilty punished to the full extent of the law, if at all.

Samuel P. Huntington looks at corruption with the assumption that there is a direct correlation between corruption and stability. He states that "the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority enables corruption to thrive on disorganization."²³ Irving Markowitz carries this further by adding that "corruption varies inversely with political organization because the machine or the party enables

²²Nelson, p. 288.

²³Irving Leonard Markowitz, Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 303.

organized group interest to effectively exercise legitimate authority, thereby transcending the interests of individuals and social groups and reducing the opportunity for corruption."²⁴ The instability of the Nigerian political system was highly visible especially in the 1964-1965 time frame.

Markowitz's views almost mirror the Nigerian situation as he states:

Corruption, then, results in the loss of liberty and the death of idealism. The blight spreads so that nothing remains exempt from manipulation, nothing remains that cannot be perverted by the rulers and the governing class. By paying for doing things that should be done anyhow, by suffering policy decisions manipulated by those with wealth and influence, by crushing faith in the capacity of popular agencies to bring real changes, by freezing the individual in his own possessiveness, and by disintegrating unity, corrupt government disinherit the poor and obliterate the dreams of communal societies.²⁵

The social and economic forces at work in Nigeria soon began to eat at the organizations which had been developed to guide the country toward nationhood. The unifying factor of fighting for independence no longer existed and politicians were free to espouse political thoughts more in line with the objectives of special interest groups rather than of a nationalistic tone. Not only was the system not improved from the colonial period, in many respects it was worse. The benefits of

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 305.

independence were invisible. Jobs vacated by the British prior to independence and by the expatriates after independence were dispensed without regard for qualification. Competition for the spoils of government was high. Jobs were rewarded to the supporters of the party in power. Unemployment increased at an alarming rate until it reached 30 per cent or better in many urban areas. Local governments contrived and manipulated for control and made a mockery of the democratic process while the federal government failed to adequately respond. The response of the government, employment of the police and the army in security operations, further disrupted the social and economic elements. As a result of these factors, the prestige and effectiveness of the political system rapidly declined in 1965.

The Army and Society

It would be practically impossible for the country to experience such devastating conditions and have its armed forces unaffected by politics. The regional cleavages and built-in discord of Nigeria's political system became, not surprisingly, an invitation for army intervention.

Prior to independence, Nigeria's Army was highly respected for its efficiency and discipline. Independence found Nigeria with five battalions and a few support groups organized into two brigades. These brigades were located

in Kaduna (North) and in Apapa (East). At the time of independence, however, only one in seven officers was a Nigerian. The highest rank, that of major, was shared by three Nigerians. Even with such a meager beginning, the Nigerian government decided to form a third brigade and send it to fight in the United Nations' Congo operation only one month after gaining independence. Fortunately, the army's performance during this operation was outstanding.

Politics was an integral part of Nigeria's Army from its formation when recruitment was controlled on a regional basis. The army was to be composed of recruits and officers with regional representation in proportion to that region's population. Fifty per cent of the army was to be recruited from the Northern Region and 25 per cent from the Eastern and Western Regions respectively. This procedure insured the North's control, not only of the political processes as described earlier, but also of the power of enforcement. It must be stated, however, that an effort was made to remove the army from politics and to keep it responsive to civilian control. British tradition was heavily engrained in the Nigerian Army and its officers and men remained generally apolitical throughout the first five years of independence.

Internal disharmony began to develop in the Nigerian Army through the process of Nigerianization of its officer corps. The process of Nigerianization began

by converting highly qualified Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to officer ranks and by filling the lower officer ranks with young, well educated, often academy trained men with no previous military experience. While this action brought experience in at the upper levels, it created problems of respect and status for many of the junior officers demonstrated a growing lack of respect for their commanders except for the very few commanders whose experience matched their responsibilities in the eyes of the young officers. The question of education played heavily in this status discrepancy. While the officers at the very top of the hierarchy clearly had the edge in experience and generally the edge in competency, the fact that they were ex-NCOs generally meant that they also had less formal education. With very few exceptions, all NCOs who were converted to officer rank were required to meet the minimum educational requirement for entry to the officer corps. This requirement was often satisfied by certificates obtained from correspondence courses which carried less prestige than formal attendance at a good secondary school or attendance at one of the British military academies such as Sandhurst. This group of young officers, with vastly better educational backgrounds than their superiors, rarely equated their qualifications with the experience or competency of their superior officers.

The attempt to establish a rigid status system between officers and other ranks was not easily accom-

plished in the Nigerian Army. The problems of merging this concept with those of the traditional Nigerian social system were enormous and not easily accomplished. Even the highly stratified societies of the Hausa-Fulani or Kanuri Emirates in the Northern Region generally lacked the kind of cultural differentiation between strata that would support the status barriers and differentiation in styles of life that are normal in European armies.

The cultural background of much of the Nigerian Army led enlisted men to expect that their relationship with superiors should be governed by patterns of reciprocity similar to those which traditionally accompanied difference in power and status in many Nigerian societies. As an example, officers were expected to show suitable largesse in entertaining their subordinates. Expectations of reciprocity and liberality were especially well developed between northern officers and their NCOs, both because of their similarity in social background and because a good portion of northern officers were sons or relatives of NCOs. The price paid by junior officers was in a sense even higher because the deference traditionally due to age among kinsmen and compatriots tended to reinforce the NCOs' advantage of military experience. In many ways, this explains the ability of the NCOs to effectively lead the coup

that took place in July 1966.²⁶

It is not unusual in British-type military organizations for there to exist some type of discrepancy in status and expertise between junior officers and their NCOs. The strain placed on the disciplinary system is often reduced by the officers exchanging some of their authority in return for the NCOs advise and support. This is often accomplished by allowing the NCOs to run much of the day-to-day affairs of the army.

A further distortion in the structure of the army came from the fact that Nigerian officers were rising rapidly in the chain of command and often moved frequently from one command position to another. At the same time, the progressive withdrawal of British officers meant that the latter were spending less and less time in the army and in command positions within it. Expatriate officers sent to Nigeria after 1960 generally spent less than two years there and were not in a position long enough to encourage organizational cohesion or provide adequate training for their local replacements. The combined effect of these factors was to produce high rates of succession in command positions. As an example, one battalion is reported to have had four commanders in the period of

²⁶Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1966-1967. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 168.

approximately one year.²⁷ Under such conditions, it would be very difficult for an officer to develop expertise in command, to stabilize his lines of authority over his subordinates, or to develop enough leverage over his subordinates to keep their initiative sufficiently under control. Robin Luckham, in covering the above problem, reflects the views of several expatriate officers he interviewed on the subject:

There was an overall feeling among the former expatriates that the Nigerians wanted jobs without the responsibilities going with them; that they were "difficult to teach," especially after Independence; that promotions were too fast and instead of remaining 2nd lieutenants for a couple of years after Sandhurst to "have the stuffing knocked out of them" like any British academy graduate, they quickly became company commanders; and as such were unwilling to accept advice.²⁸

While the above comments outline some of the basic causes of internal disharmony within the Nigerian Army, most of it was centered around education as perceived by junior officers. Most of the junior officers commissioned during the period leading to the January 1966 coup received their basic military training in England at either Sandhurst or Mons. The basic difference between these two schools is that Sandhurst was a two year institution which taught academic as well as military subjects while Mons was a short school which concentrated entirely on tactical

²⁷Ibid., p. 170.

²⁸Ibid., p. 173.

instruction. A rough parallel can be drawn between these two institutions and West Point and Officer Candidate School in the United States. One of the basic differences between these schools was that, while neither of them produced the equivalent of university training, Mons was generally reserved for the candidate with more education in his background than was Sandhurst. However, the Sandhurst graduate generally considered himself to be more of an elitist (social and military) than did the Mons graduate.

Up to the 1966 coup, military life was sharply differentiated from civilian life in Nigeria. The army's relative isolation from civilian life fostered an absolutist political outlook among middle ranking officers and predisposed many of them toward intervention against corrupt and dishonorable government. However, they were able to refrain from active anti-government activity mainly because of their association with the British apolitical tradition. Additionally, the lack of political boundary roles in the army, except at the level of the high command may have rendered it relatively impermeable to direct co-optation by outside political forces. It did encourage the development of a corporate ideology, unfavorable to the politics of the politicians. It is understandable why the higher ranking officer, who had the only real day-to-day contact with the political elite, refrained from becoming involved in the January 1966 coup although

several are known to have been made aware of the plan before hand. Several were known to have sentiments not greatly different from the majors who planned and executed the coup.

The civil sector was faced with many problems of a much different nature. While they too were involved in Nigerianization of both the public and private sectors, the majority of their mobility or lack of mobility was directly tied to the political arena. The legalization and proliferation of labor unions took care of many of the labor problems. Education and increased job opportunities did the same for the highly technical areas of employment. The British law of the mid-1950's which stated that no foreigner would be hired for any civil service position where there existed a qualified Nigerian, provided the mechanism for a smoother transition in this area. In any event, most of these areas were more closely tied to political activity than was Nigerianization of the military and were handled in purely political manners.

Even though the military was used in repressive ways in several cases, it was not viewed in a distasteful way by the civil populace. Since military pay equaled or exceeded that of the civilian economy, positions were highly sought after by eligible men and service in the military was considered honorable. In many ways, the military represented a separate society in Nigeria. Military officers in general were better educated than

their urban counterparts. Their language and social orientation were different from other professions. The necessity for and reliance on discipline made the military unique to other forms of livelihood. Its members were basically inactive in politics and it was not involved in nation building projects of any significance. In this way, and in keeping with inherited traditions, the army was viewed and treated as a non-political and harmless segment of society. As will be seen later, the government failed to take immediate or positive action after learning that unrest had built to the point that discussions were taking place regarding the overthrow of the government. The civilian sector had demonstrated its dissatisfaction with political affairs in the Western Region and the army had, with reluctance on the part of the government and the army itself, been used to restore order. Up to 1966, the army had remained relatively free of the divisive factors of tribalism and regionalism. However, once the army became actively political, it rapidly became divided along lines similar to the political parties it had hoped to cleanse.

The 1966 Coups

On 15 January 1966, Nigeria was launched along a path not atypical of other African nations who were experiencing the growing pains associated with independence. Major C. K. Nzeogwu, an Ibo, led a coup whose proported goals were to put an end to the political chaos that

existed in Nigeria and to rid the government of its corrupt elements. This coup, commonly called the Majors' Coup, was designed, in the words of Nzeowu: "to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system."²⁹

While much of the actual planning mechanism of this coup remains relatively unclear, it is clear that the coup was devised and led by a group of army majors, most of whom were from the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions, and that their planned actions included the seizure and execution of specific political figures throughout the country. While the Ibos made up the bulk of the planners and executors of the coup, there is little evidence to suggest that it was undertaken along tribal or even regional lines. While initial talk of organizing a coup began to take place in the Summer of 1965, earnest effort along these lines did not occur until sparked by the political crisis created by the elections in the Western Region in October 1965. There is strong evidence to suggest that at least one other coup was being considered at the same time that the Major's Coup was being planned. As indicated earlier, there is even evidence to suggest that the central government had been made aware of coup plans and were awaiting additional information regarding the plans and the con-

²⁹Markowitz, p. 303.

spirators before taking action.³⁰

Extra encouragement to the talk of coup planning as well as encouragement to the planners of the coup was the fact that coups had already taken place in Dahomey (17 November 1965), the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Kinshasha (25 November 1965), the Central African Republic (1 January 1966), and Upper Volta (3 January 1966).³¹

The timing of the coup appears to have been more than perchance for on the day it was started, four of Nigeria's nine combat units (battalion equivalent) were without the presence of their commanders. Most of the remaining five were considered pro-coup or neutral. Additionally, a high level meeting had taken place between the Sardauna, Chief Akintola, and others where the discussion was thought to include talks about the deteriorating situation in the Western Region and possible assignment changes of military personnel to forestall a coup.

Nzeogwu, through his position at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna (Northern Region), was able to judge many of the army's middle ranking officers and contact those whose ideology was thought to be in tune with the coup planners. The actual plans of the coup were simple. The inner circle of planners

³⁰Luckham, p. 18.

³¹Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives. (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 133.

included personnel assigned to all regions and to many key locations. They were to take control of key government installations, search out and arrest certain key officials and military leaders, and assassinate those who had been identified as requiring removal in order to insure the success of the change of government. However, there were too many assignments and too few conspirators to accomplish the required actions successfully. Bad timing on the part of several of the actors caused the schedule to go astray and detracted from the anticipated success of the operation. In fact, the only really successful operation was that taken by Nzeogwu who, in his capacity as Chief Instructor, had been practicing night movements of troops and was able to maneuver his troops to their positions without attracting undue attention. All others were less successful in the accomplishment of their assigned objectives. This resulted in Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding (Army Commanding General), being able to avoid capture and eventually bringing the majority of the army back under his control by mid-morning the day of the coup. Several key political and military personnel, however, were killed during the early part of the attempted coup. These included the Sardauna, Chief Akintola, Prime Minister Abubakar, the commander of the Second Brigade, the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Finance, the Adjutant General, and the Quartermaster General. A total of fifteen people were

killed during the coup.³² The majority of those killed were northern politicians.

Ironsi gradually regained control of the military as it became increasingly clear that the coup had not gone according to plan and more military units responded to Ironsi's call for allegiance. Hurried consultations took place between Ironsi, two senior Northern People's Congress ministers, the Attorney General and the Deputy Inspector General of Police. At the end, Ironsi, an Ibo, was given complete authority to handle the situation and run the government. Ironsi, already in contact with Nzeogwu in an effort to halt the coup, announced to the people that he had been given executive powers, that the constitution had been abrogated, and that Military Governors would be appointed to each of the Regions under the control of a Federal Military Government (FMG).

Nzeogwu, after hearing that Ironsi had been given executive powers, surrendered telephonically under the condition that Ironsi not return the government to its political status quo ante. Nzeogwu also received promises that coup planners would be free from future legal prosecution. Ironsi, in effect, had staged a de facto coup within a coup.

³²Raph Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future. (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971), p. 43.

Successful as he may have appeared to have been, Ironsi was placed in an extremely delicate position. It was impossible to overlook the ethnic undertones presented by the coup. It was also difficult for Ironsi to disprove any prior knowledge of coup plans. Opponents, especially from the Northern Region, accused him of having prior knowledge of coup plans. He was alledged to have assumed command of the coup when it became evident that the original plans were failing to accomplish their goals. This allegation was furthered by the arrangement between Ironsi and Nzeogwu regarding the freedom of the plotters.

The January coup left a legacy of shock and mistrust among Nigeria's military which was especially sharp among its northern enlisted ranks. Rumors and counter-rumors spread rapidly regarding who the leaders were, which officers had been killed, and what was to be done to the conspirators. The new government under Ironsi did little to quell these rumors and never published an official casualty list or held military burial ceremonies. This action fed the existing rumors and helped create new ones. Feelings of disorientation generated by the coup and the conditions of ambiguity which surrounded it were augmented by a number of strains that the army was placed under. The organization of the Nigerian Army was not of sufficient strength to handle the dislocation in discipline brought about by the January coup or the political pressures put upon it by having its leaders govern the country.

The situation was made worse by changes in the distribution of authority in the army which resulted from the elimination of many of the officers at the top of the chain of command during the coup. Discipline weakened and it became common for subordinate officers to talk back, question orders, or stand by what they felt were their rights.³³ Several military units, especially in the north, initially refused to take orders from Ironsi or any of the Ibo officers.

Critical changes were created in the ethnic composition of the officer corps by the January coup. Ibos moved from a position of numerical inferiority among the thirty most senior officers to a position of numerical dominance, although they suffered a slight decline in the middle ranks from which they moved. Of the 12 officers promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May 1966, eight were Ibo and only one a northerner. A close analysis, however, shows no evidence of systematic discrimination in favor of the Ibos as a group for each of the 12 newly promoted Lieutenant Colonels were equal in terms of seniority. Some new assignments even suggest that an attempt may have been made to placate the Northern Region by delicately balancing some of the regional assignments. It is known that many of Ironsi's actions were specifically geared to

³³Luckham, p. 54.

rewinning the support of traditional northern leaders.³⁴

These facts, however, did not change the perception of many northerners who only saw that the north had lost power and that the east had gained it. Thus it was easy to believe that conspiratorial design rather than the demographic characteristics of the officer corps had placed Ibo in command.

In May 1966, riots broke out in several northern cities following student demonstrations over the Federal Military Government's Decree Number 34 which proposed to abolish the regions and make the country a unitary state. The northern organizational elite, the civil servants, school teachers, and university students felt threatened by the new government's proposed action. Northerners believed that their only chance for success rested with the existing Northern Region's public service system which excluded southerners.³⁵ Their fear was that in the open competition for jobs that a unitary system would produce, the northerners, with a smaller number of university graduates, would not be able to retain the positions and privileges that were guaranteed under the regional system.

The northern military hierarchy, initially in favor of the decree, began to be rapidly caught up in the suspicions and fears that were generated in the civilian

³⁴Markowitz, p. 315.

³⁵Markowitz, p. 316.

sector. Latent regional and ethnic hostilities became activated and led to well-organized pogroms in several northern cities resulting in the death and mutilation of hundreds of Ibos. By mid-July 1966, northern soldiers had reached a semi-mutinous state which increased in intensity until a counter-coup took place which resulted in the death of Ironsi and more than 200 political and military leaders.³⁶

Under the leadership of a number of junior northern officers and NCOs, the revolt began late on the night of 28 July 1966 when several officers and men broke into the officer's mess at Abeokuta (North of Lagos in the Western Region) and killed their commanding officer and several other officers. They then began to take over armories in several other military installations and to disarm eastern troops. Early on the 29th, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, alerted all units of the army. By this time, however, a number of installations had been taken over by northern elements and Ironsi and a number of other key personalities had been killed.

Gowon, a northerner from a Christian minority tribe, was dispatched by the Supreme Headquarters Chief of Staff to speak with the rebel forces. The coup's leaders made Gowon stay with them and asked that he, as the most senior northern officer in the army, act as their spokes-

³⁶Uwechue, p. 43.

man. Gowon's acceptance of the offer has not been completely clarified as to motive. There are those who say that he was involved in the coup planning and acted in the background up to this point. There are others who say that his ethnic background made him sensitive to minority concerns while his regional origin made him acceptable to those who, without his cooperation, devised and executed the coup. The truth appears to be somewhat of a mixture of the two views.

The July Coup, or NCOs' Coup, as it is commonly called, provided a number of things to calm the fears and suspicions of many northerners. Along with the student led riots and demonstrations, and the May pogroms, the July Coup provided an excuse to rape, pillage, and terrorize under the cover of demonstration, mutiny, and rebellion. Many harbored ill feelings for the Ibos because of their reputation for being hard, money grabbing merchants and traders. These feelings were vented through mass murder and destruction. Those who felt that the January Coup had been an Ibo plot were given an opportunity for revenge. For whatever reason, northern troops and tribesmen undertook a murderous and seemingly senseless path to grievance redress and governmental change.

Civil War

Following the July Coup, anti-Ibo sentiment became more and more widespread in the Northern Region. It

reached a high point in the September-October time frame when, without apparent precipitation, the worse slaughter of all occurred which resulted in the slaughter of up to 30,000 Ibos and other easterners. This sent Ibos fleeing to the east by the millions.³⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, the Eastern Region's Military Commander and Governor, had attempted to persuade the government to stop the rioting and murdering. He also had begged Ibos residing in the north to remain and endure. Ojukwu's requests, which were prior to the holocaust of September, were made on the assumption that the earlier riots, as well as the July Coup, had been natural reactions to the January coup and that normalcy would return. However, the September-October events shed a different light on the Nigerian situation. The government had expended little effort to stop the rioting or protect Ibo citizens. What little action there was was late and ineffectual. All evidence seemed to suggest that the massacres were either government planned or sanctioned. Markowitz illustrates how these opinions could have been fostered in his comments:

In order for mass killings to occur two conditions are necessary: first, the host community must feel itself threatened by the "outsiders;" secondly, a state of great tension exists because of depression or war.Even though anti-Ibo resentment was widespread, an organizational mechanism was still necessary for wholesale butchery. The massacre started only when established authority allowed the spread of the

³⁷ Nelson, p. 235.

belief that they would promote, or at least condone, attacks against Ibos. Thus, the pogroms and warfare in Nigeria, though they involved the death and maiming of tens of thousands, represented far more than simply a rekindling of ancient tribal animosities.³⁸

The July Coup had unleashed widespread demands for a return to regional autonomy that grew to such proportions that they endangered the very existence of Nigeria. The massacres caused a massive flight to Ibos and other Easterners to their home region. Northerners and other non-easterners residing in, or in the case of the military, stationed in the Eastern Region decamped and made a corresponding mass exodus to their respective regions. Ojukwu, who had never accepted Gowon's succession of General Ironsi as supreme commander, threatened to withdraw the Eastern Region as a separate political entity. The Western Region, in April 1967, announced that if the east seceded, the west would not feel compelled to remain a part of Nigeria as the country would no longer be a workable unit.³⁹ The Mid-Western Region's Governor immediately demanded that his region be declared a neutral territory in any ensuing conflict. For all practical purposes, Nigeria had ceased to be a nation-state by April 1967.

Ojukwu announced that he was retaining all revenues originating in the Eastern Region to assist in the resettlement of returning Ibos and other Easterners.

³⁸Markowitz, p. 317.

³⁹Nelson, p. 235.

The resettlement problem itself had generated additional sore points between the "central government" and the east. The Eastern Region had allocated one million pounds to aid in refugee resettlement while the federal government provided only 300,000 pounds or roughly 25 cents for each of the nearly two million refugees.⁴⁰ While the east was successful in withholding taxes and other revenues from the federal government, oil was not a major issue for all oil revenues were paid directly to the federal government by the oil companies and oil production was scarcely affected.⁴¹

On 27 May 1967, Ojukwu declared that the Eastern Region was a sovereign republic to be known as the Republic of Biafra. The Federal Military Government responded by declaring a state of emergency and issued a decree abolishing the regions and dividing the country into 12 states. On 30 May, Colonel Ojukwu formally announced the secession of the Eastern Region. General Gowon declared the move an act of open rebellion and federal troops began an attack on the self-proclaimed government on 6 July 1967. The general war which ensued developed into one of the bloodiest episodes in African history. The Nigerian Army expanded from approximately 9000 in July 1966 to more than 40,000 in July 1967. The

⁴⁰Uwechue, p. 45.

⁴¹Nelson, p. 235.

Biafrian Army grew from approximately 2000 Eastern Nigerian officers and men to more than 25,000.⁴²

The resulting civil war, which lasted until January 1970, was extremely costly to both sides. The war has been described on numerous occasions as one of the most tragic events of the Twentieth Century. It is estimated that, by the end of the war, between two and three million people died of the effect of the war or by starvation.⁴³ Additionally, the war drained a stagnant economy, expanded existing tribal cleavages, and disrupted politics both intra- and inter-regionally. An analysis of the war and the political events following it will not be conducted as they are beyond the scope of this research.

Political Impact of External Factors

Since independence, Nigeria has played an influential role in the development of and direction taken by the African unity movement. Pan-Africanism has been heralded by a number of Nigerian personalities on both a personal and official basis. It has consistently maintained a moderate stance regarding the sovereignty of states and non-interference in domestic affairs. It has also strongly supported functional integration and has

⁴²Uwechue, p. 8.

⁴³Peter Schwab (ed), Biafra. (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971), p. 1.

long urged the establishment of a West African common market.

Nonalignment, as the official policy, has resulted in the country being able to maintain friendly relations with both the East and the West although most of Nigeria's political leaders have traditionally favored the West because of long lines of cultural, educational, and social ties.

Throughout the history of Nigeria, its strongest ties have been with England. Although many easterners felt that Britain made statements and provided assistance more favorable to the Northern Region during the civil war period, this feeling has not led to any trend away from its Western or British inclination. While the civil war brought Nigeria and Biafra into super-power politics, there was no division along typical East-West lines. Great Britain and the Soviet Union supported and supplied Nigeria while the Peoples Republic of China, the Republic of South Africa, France, Portugal, and Israel supported Biafra. The United States advocated a united Nigeria but refused to aid either side militarily.⁴⁴

Nigeria actively sought and received military, economic, and technical assistance from any source willing to provide such assistance on the conditions that it refrain from involvement in domestic issues. Nigeria's

⁴⁴Ibid.

foreign policy has not been significantly affected by events in the international arena nor have international relations been significantly affected by events in Nigeria. The foreign factor plays, at best, a marginal role in Nigerian politics.

Nigeria like any other nation-state, can be expected to call for external assistance in any situation it feels incapable of resolving and where its national existence is threatened.

CHAPTER III

TANZANIA

Union With Zanzibar

Great Britain granted independence to Zanzibar in December 1963. On 26 April 1964, the governments of Tanganyika and Zanzibar announced the formation of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Six months later, the official name became the United Republic of Tanzania.

From their initial union to the present, Zanzibar has maintained a semi-autonomous relationship with the mainland in nearly all aspects of their contact. Situations in Zanzibar have seldom had any effect on conditions on the mainland portion of the union. For these reasons and the fact that political life on Zanzibar is highly complicated, an analysis of the politics of Zanzibar is not included in this analysis.¹

¹The histories of the mainland and island portions of the United Republic of Tanzania bear little resemblance to each other. While they shared the experience of 70 years of colonial rule, the method of this rule differed tremendously. The British, during the period they controlled both entities, made no effort to administratively link the two.

The internal situation in Zanzibar during the colonial period differed from that in Tanganyika primarily

Association With Germany

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, German interest began to develop along the East African coast. This interest was generated primarily by a desire to expand German commercial activities in the region. It was also a deliberate attempt by the Germans to colonize part of the African continent where British interest existed in order to embarrass the British and gain French support for such anti-British activities.²

Under the leadership of Karl Peters, the Society for German Colonization concluded a series of treaties on the mainland in which tribal chiefs of the interior area accepted German protection. The area then became known as German East Africa and was administered at no expense to the German Government by the Society for German Colonization. The German East Africa Company (GEAC), which was

through the presence of an Arab economy and political oligarchy superimposed upon an African population that was itself divided between indigenous natives called Shirazas and African immigrants from the mainland. The Arab community and the Indian community, which played a significant role in commercial and economic affairs, benefited more than the Africans from the political, economic, and social changes instituted by the colonial administration. During the drive toward independence, a strong division developed between nationalist forces in Zanzibar which was largely the direct outcome of political and racial antagonism that resulted from the increasingly unequal distribution of political and economic power during the colonial period.

²Allison B. Herrick and others. Area Handbook For Tanzania: DA Pam 550-62, (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 48.

also headed by Peters, later assumed administrative control of the protectorate.

Although the British did not desire to see the Germans become influential in this area of Africa, they made no move to stop the establishment of the protectorate because of their need for German cooperation in other parts of the world. This desire not to antagonize Germany also led to the British urging the Sultan of Zanzibar to establish relations with Germany which were ultimately to the Sultan's disadvantage.

Because of growing financial difficulties, the GEAC was forced to relinquish administrative control of the mainland to the German Government in 1889. The Germans spent the majority of the 1890's consolidating their hold on the protectorate. These consolidation efforts incorporated a combination of methods including the making of treaty agreements and extremely violent actions when necessary. The Germans also employed Zulu, Sudanese, and Somali mercenaries in these actions in addition to German and local African troops.

Arab and Swahili speaking officers supplemented German personnel in administratively running the interior. The use of akidas, as these officers were known, aided the spread of the Swahili language into the interior but also created one of the greatest grievances that the Africans voiced. These men were generally strangers in the coastal hinterland where they served and were unable to blend into

the environment they governed. The combination of their alien Islamic culture, their great power to tax, and their quasi-military status incensed many of the people under their jurisdiction. These and other grievances climaxed in the Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905-1907 during which more than 120,000 persons died and great destruction occurred throughout the country. The memory of this struggle against foreign domination remained with the Africans over the years and served as an inspiration to those seeking independence in the 1950's.³

At the end of the German period of influence following World War I, much of African village life continued as it had before the arrival of European dominance. Although the Germans allocated new responsibilities to many traditional tribal chiefs, introduced cash crops, and imported their European system of education, they made few real or lasting contacts with the average African.

However, the introduction of the Swahili language through the use of akidas resulted in the later adoption of Swahili as the official national language. This single national language proved to be an invaluable unifying factor in the struggle for independence and nationhood.

Trusteeship and British Administration

After World War I, German East Africa, minus Ruanda and Burundi, became a League of Nations mandate

³Ibid., p. 51.

administered by Great Britain. The territory was then given the name Tanganyika. In 1946, following the demise of the League of Nations, Great Britain placed Tanganyika under the trusteeship system of the United Nations. As will be seen later, this international supervision, particularly that of the United Nations, played an important role in the movement of Tanganyika toward independence even though administrative and political policies were reserved to the administering powers during this same period.

Although Tanganyika was not a battleground during World War II, 92,000 Tanganyikans served in the British forces. In 1944, the prospect for an eventual end to World War II led to the planning of activities concerned with the possibility of inflation and unemployment caused by returning ex-soldiers.

The first official planning document, the Ten-Year Plan for Tanganyika, was published in 1946. It provided primary consideration for communications and education for the country. In the educational field, emphasis was placed on primary schools and technical training, especially for returning soldiers.⁴

The beginning of Tanganyika's political institutions occurred roughly between 1945 and 1955. During this time frame, the British recognized the need for and began action toward the democratization of native authorities

⁴Ibid., p. 61.

and the establishment of local native governments. The British also attempted to promote interracial cooperation by involving all races in a variety of old and new governmental councils from village to provincial level.

The idea of interracial membership with non-Africans serving as more than just advisors was not successful and the government later decided to concentrate on district councils rather than provincial ones. Several of these councils failed because of a number of reasons including a lack of public support, a lack of sufficient administrative powers, and a lack of qualified technical staffs. They also could not keep up with the tremendous growth of nationalism as this growth tended to demote the holders of traditional authority in the eyes of the native populace. The primary reason for the attempt to establish multi-racial councils was an effort to counter the possible separatist sentiment which could arise in organizations composed of single tribes. Both the United Nations' Visiting Mission in 1948 and the colonial administration advocated this policy which is undoubtedly one of the major reasons that tribalism and regionalism have not played significant roles in the development of the new country.

Movement Toward Independence

The origin of Tanzania's present political system can be traced to the year 1927 when the Tanganyika African

Association (TAA) was organized. A group of civil servants, primarily junior officials and teachers, organized TAA as basically a social club for urban Africans. As a result of this organizational slant, the TAA attracted little attention from either the African public or the European community. The TAA met with tacit British approval because of this lack of direction and the resulting fact that it did not appear to be a threat to the existing administrative system. A number of middle class Tanganyikans had recognized the fact that wealth, status, and influence in their society were largely in the hands of Europeans and Asians. It was this recognition and search for self-improvement which led to the formation of TAA. By the 1940's, TAA had taken on new, although largely undefined, political objectives and activities. Its membership soared to nearly 2000 with chapters in 39 population centers. Its lack of definitive programs led to ridicule from colonial administrators. When the association applied for registration as a cooperative society, the Provincial Commissioner at Dar es Salaam remarked: "The African Association is in the unhappy position of not knowing what it wants and will not be happy until it gets it."⁵ TAA had taken on the growing cry for independence but with

⁵Alexander MacDonald. Tanzania: Young Nation in a Hurry, (New York, Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1966), p. 47.

only limited enthusiasm or innovation.

In the late 1940's, a number of political actions by colonial administrators coupled with several natural disasters led to the airing of protest through organized efforts. The Meru Tribe made the most significant of these protests. It was their protest which first thrust African interests into the international political arena. In 1951, the British government decided to evict approximately 3000 Meru from their fertile farmland between Mounts Meru and Kilimanjaro so that the land might be assigned to European dairymen. When pleas to the government in Dar es Salaam met with negative results, the Meru Citizens Union sent one of its members, Karila Japhet, to New York to address the United Nations in an appeal to the decision. Karila, the first Tanganyikan to appear before the United Nations, was unsuccessful in his efforts to induce the Trusteeship Council to force restoration of the tribal lands. The question that plagued native Tanganyikans was, what was to stop the colonial government from turning more and more of the country over to white settlers? This question of alienation of land was the issue which finally brought political consciousness to the tribes of Tanganyika.⁶

The Tanganyika African Association reacted as if it had been waiting for just an issue. It welcomed Karila

⁶Ibid., p. 46.

Japhet back from his trip to New York and sent him on a tour of the territory to report on the case of the evicted Meru. He was also urged to speak out on the need for national independence. With this act in 1953, the TAA suddenly became political. The year 1953 is significant in the political history of Tanzania for more than this one reason for it was in this year that Julius K. Nyerere was elected president of TAA.

Nyerere, one of 26 children of Chief Nyerere Furito of the small Zanaki tribe, was one of only two Tanganyikans to have been educated outside of the country at that time. He was educated in Uganda at Makerere College and in 1949 matriculated at the University of Edinburgh, graduating in 1952. He returned home and taught biology at St. Frances School in the community of Pugu just outside Dar es Salaam. In 1952, Nyerere became active in TAA.

Nyerere's first action following being elected president of TAA was to merge TAA's educated urban membership with the Meru farmers who were protesting the British land distribution scheme. This merger necessitated a reorganization and redirection of the TAA. In 1954, the name was changed to the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU became the first true political party in Tanganyika and directed its development along nontribal and basically nonracial political lines. This nonracial orientation, however, did not come easily. During the first nine years of TANU's existence, membership was only

open to black Africans.⁷

The arrival of the United Nations' Visiting Mission in Tanganyika in August 1954 provided TANU and Nyerere their first opportunity for international recognition and prestige. The Mission reported that its members had been impressed by TANU's moderation and sense of realism and suggested that there be a timetable established for political development in Tanganyika that would conclude with an African-controlled government. This not only was recognition of TANU as the responsible voice of the people of Tanganyika but also served as notice that independence was only a matter of time.

TANU officials, although elated over the general contents of the Mission's report (published in January 1955), were concerned over the possibility that the colonial government's condemnation of the report plus the British Government's angry objections might offset the favorable impact of the report. The TANU Central Committee decided that Nyerere should go to New York and present an oral petition to the Trusteeship Council to backup the statements and views of the visiting Mission.⁸

Nyerere's visit to the United Nations had at least

⁷Hugh W. Stephens. The Political Transformation of Tanganyika: 1920-67, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1968), p. 122.

⁸Ibid., p. 126.

two important effects. First, it gave birth to his recognition as a charismatic leader. This perception of Nyerere has contributed tremendously to his political success. His appearance before the Trusteeship Council and open opposition to the British in the face of their disapproval was regarded by many Africans as an act of successful defiance of the all-powerful colonial government. Secondly, his presentation before this international body was so impressive that it denied the British the opportunity to label him an irresponsible agitator. He skillfully used the issues of racial discrimination and democracy and dwelt on TANU's opposition to the British concept of racial parity because of the potential it provided for white minority rule. Nyerere stated: "We have never advocated that self-governing Tanganyika should be governed by Africans alone, What will satisfy my people is a categorical statement both by the Council and by the Administering Authority, that although Tanganyika is multiracial in population, its future government should be primarily African."⁹ The Trusteeship Council adopted the 1954 Mission report in its entirety, making it a matter of record for the General Assembly.

Returning home, Nyerere began building TANU into a national party. He was aided in this effort by the union's young general secretary, Oscar Kambona. Together

⁹Ibid., p. 127.

they travelled throughout the country addressing village meetings, urging support for and membership in TANU, and arguing for national unity as opposed to tribalism. Throughout their speeches, non-violence was stressed.¹⁰

TANU stepped up its campaign for independence and demanded that national elections be held. Nyerere again appeared before the United Nations in 1956 and called for universal adult suffrage and a definite timetable for constitutional advance to independence. This increase in activity had the effect of changing European indifference to TANU activities to an attitude of fear. The community of approximately 20,000 Europeans formed its own political party called the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). Ivor Bayldon, UTP's chairman, called for continuance of the political status quo, charged TANU members with acting like American gangsters, and urged "responsible" Africans to join the UTP.¹¹ Nyerere responded to these charges by calling the UTP the Governor's Party and stated that although TANU was determined to obtain freedom for Tanganyika regardless of how long it might take, the struggle would be confined to peaceful and lawful means.

In April 1956, the government agreed to Nyerere's call for elections and scheduled the first election to be in two phases: late 1958 and early 1959. Ten consti-

¹⁰MacDonald, p. 51.

¹¹MacDonald, p. 54.

tuences were established with voters choosing one candidate from each of the three racial categories; African, Asian, and European. The requirement for a voter to have a high school education or an income of \$50 or more per year restricted the number of Africans eligible to vote. TANU accepted the voter restraint and the multiracial formula for government as the best that was available at the time.

A third party, the African National Congress (ANC), joined the campaign. Zuberi Mtemvu, TANU's secretary in the Eastern Province, broke away from TANU and formed ANC. ANC's stated policy was Africa for Africans. TANU's moderate racial policies were condemned by Mtemvu who also stated that TANU's non-racialism too closely resembled the UTP's multi-racialism.

Julius Nyerere made another trip to New York in protest of the fact that the United Tanganyikan Party too closely resembled the government's party. He so impressed the United Nations' General Assembly's Fourth Committee that it passed a resolution that Tanganyika "shall be guided toward self-government or independence and shall become a democratic state in which all inhabitants have equal rights."¹² The English language press in Dar es Salaam hotly denied that Nyerere had the right to speak for Tanganyika's African millions. Two months later, the government instituted a short-lived ban on TANU by

¹²MacDonald, p. 55.

refusing requests for open-air meetings, refusing registration of new branches, and banning existing branches of TANU. In spite of such difficulties, TANU prospered and grew to nearly 200,000 dues paying members by 1958.

In recognition of this strength, the government lifted its ban of a year earlier and dissolved the Legislative Council as Nyerere had demanded. The Governor appointed a new council and named Nyerere a council member representing Dar es Salaam. Nyerere resigned from this post three months later charging that the new council was designed to be a rubber stamp for the governor.

Great Britain appointed a new Governor to Tanganyika in 1958 in the person of Sir Richard Turnbull who had a reputation for improving race relations in Kenya, his last assignment. This appointment greatly changed the political climate. Turnbull advanced the date of elections by six months and showed every indication of possessing understanding and compassion. In response, TANU chose not to become involved in a number of actions that would have resembled defiance of the new Governor.

The result of the two phased elections was that all TANU candidates were elected. Of the 30 seats of the new council, 15 were contested and TANU candidates swept each one.¹³

In August 1960, another general election was held.

¹³MacDonald, p. 57.

This time, all 71 seats of the Legislative Council were open for election. Tanganyika's government changed from white to black with this election as TANU won 70 seats, 58 without opposition. The lost seat went to a former TANU member who subsequently rejoined the party.¹⁴ The overall effect of this was to make Tanganyika a de facto one-party state, with Julius Nyerere heading the new administration under the title of Chief Minister, an appointed position.

After the 1960 elections, Nyerere was asked by Governor Turnbull to form a government in September of that year. In May 1961, internal self-government was granted by Great Britain with Nyerere serving as Prime Minister with an almost all African Cabinet. Tanganyika was granted independence on 9 December 1961 and chose to remain within the British Commonwealth system. Tanganyika became a republic exactly one year later with Nyerere serving as its first president. Nyerere took office in January 1962, after having defeated his only rival, Zuberi Mtemvu by an overwhelming majority in the first election following independence and the first on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

In the struggle for independence, Nyerere and TANU used several highly successful tactics. The first was to develop a political organization composed of all segments of the society and spread throughout the country. This

¹⁴MacDonald, p. 58.

broad base of support made TANU the party of the people instead of the urbanized elite only. Secondly, Nyerere orchestrated a political campaign designed not only to win African support but designed to obtain international support through the United Nations and British support through the use of legal, non-violent tactics. The continuous attempt to work with colonial administrators within the established system produces highly successful results for Nyerere and TANU, especially following the assignment of Governor Turnbull to Tanganyika. The third tactic was to make use of a number of highly dynamic personalities within the TANU organization to inform the population of TANU goals and help pursue self-government and independence. This highly articulate, ideologically sophisticated leadership brought its peasant-based movement not only into statehood but nationhood with the tactics described above.

Political Leadership and the Party System

As mentioned earlier, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was organized primarily in opposition to TANU. Its purpose appeared to be to promote the continuance of white rule, although this was not a specifically stated policy. At the height of its strength just before the 1958 elections, it numbered approximately 11,000 members with Africans comprising nearly 73 per cent of its membership. Its leader, Ivor Bayldon, campaigned for the European seat in the Southern highlands but lost to a woman candi-

date, Marion, the Lady Chesham. By 1959, UTP had ceased to exist as a result of increasing TANU popularity, growing apathy toward TANU in the European community, and declining UTP membership.

Lady Chesham, a former American citizen, was unknown to the leaders of TANU when she entered the national political race as an independent. She had initially been a member of UTP but had resigned when she decided that its multiracialist policies were unacceptable frauds.¹⁵ She entered the election partly to combat UTP and its policies. This was done with TANU support of her as an independent and later as a member of the union. She was later appointed to the Executive Committee of the TANU Parliamentary Party.

Zuberi Mtemvu, the founder and leader of the African National Congress (ANC), based his political hopes on advocating not only rapid but total Africanization of all aspects of Tanganyikan governmental processes. As evidence of the smallness and relative insignificance of the ANC, Mtemvu received only 53 votes in the 1958 election. Mtemvu again ran against Nyerere in the 1962 election and again was resoundingly defeated. This loss plus increasing calls for political unity led to a merger of ANC with TANU in 1963 which completed the de facto single-party state.

¹⁵MacDonald, p. 56.

Other small and insignificant political parties existed during brief periods just before and after independence was granted. However, the growing trend toward independence, TANU's non-racial orientation, increasing international support, and declining British opposition accounted for the demise of these parties. The dynamic leadership provided TANU by Nyerere was also a contributing factor.

Oscar Kambona was one of the key leaders of TANU and of the government following independence. His dynamic leadership and close association with Nyerere contributed significantly to the success of TANU in terms of both membership and policy. Following independence, he was appointed one of the first members of the Council of Ministers. In his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kambona led the challenge against "external meddling" in Tanzanian affairs. This challenge was perceived as a result of statement by the United States regarding Tanzania's association with the People's Republic of China. In 1966 and 1967, Kambona's political powers were drastically cut. President Nyerere resuffled his cabinet during this period and assigned Kambona to duties in lesser ministries. In mid-1967, Kambona resigned from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and went into exile in England amidst rumors of a planned overthrow of the government. Kambona later admitted knowledge of a planned coup to oust President Nyerere but denied any

involvement in the plot.¹⁶ In January 1968, he was publicly accused by President Nyerere of having large bank balances which could not have been accumulated with his official salary and known income.

Rashidi Kawawa was also one of the early political leaders of Tanzania. Prior to independence, Kawawa served as Secretary-General and later President of the Tanganyika Federation of Labor. In 1960, Kawawa was appointed as one of the first members of the Council of Ministers. When Nyerere resigned as Prime Minister in 1962, Kawawa was appointed to fill the vacancy. Under his leadership, the government became much less inhibited about overruling expatriates in civil service. His actions as Prime Minister demonstrated that Africans were indeed in control and served to solidify the TANU organizational structure and enhance its prestige among native Tanganyikans. Nyerere commented on Kawawa's role in government by stating:

....If I had remained in the Government, I would have resisted many things which Rashidi did successfully. My idea of efficiency is slightly more western and my emphasis would have been more on efficiency. Rashidi's emphasis was more on "give the fellows a job and they well learn." I do not think we would have done these things if I were in the government. As I was outside, we did two things: (a) Rashidi did some necessary things in government which I should not

¹⁶Herrick, p. 447.

have done, and (b) in the meantime, I was handling the party.¹⁷

Kawawa later became Second Vice President of the Republic and the unofficial heir apparent to Nyerere.¹⁸

Initially, TANU was somewhat split as to the speed that Africanization should take. There were those who argued that the retention of an expatriate system of operation would not have accomplished the goals of independence. Others were more realistic, especially when considering the huge severance pays which would have been required if British and other foreign officials were released immediately.

Nyerere realized that gradualism would be in the best interest of the country not only from the economic point raised by the issue of severance pay but because of the lack of sufficient numbers of qualified administrators to assume complete control of the country's administrative functions. He also realized that some reasonable compromise would have to be reached in order to satisfy those calling for immediate Africanization and to replace those expatriates who would not want to remain under the new government's control. Through an arrangement aided by the

¹⁷Cranford Pratt. The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 205.

¹⁸The position of First Vice-President is reserved for the leader of the government in Zanzibar.

British Government, several hundred civil servants were retained on a contractual basis. Those who left were paid their severance pay over a five year period with loans granted by Great Britain. This action, which demonstrated British willingness to cooperate with the new government, served to avoid the potential of economic chaos and allowed progress to go on in a relatively unhampered manner.

In 1963, a Presidential Commission was appointed to survey the mechanism required for the formation of a Democratic One Party State. The commission, with Kawawa serving as its chairman, functioned for two years under the restriction that their finding must be in accordance with the principles that: (1) Tanganyika be a republic with an executive head of state, (2) the rule of law be preserved, (3) all citizens have equality, and (4) there be maximum political freedom within the context of a single national movement. Their recommendations, which reflected widespread support for the above principles, were included in the 1965 Interim Constitution of Tanzania.¹⁹ (It is again noted that the country became the United Republic of Tanzania in October 1964 following the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This development was reflected by changing the first name of TANU from Tanganyika to Tanzania.)

¹⁹Christian P. Potholm, Four African Political Systems. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 142.

In the relationship between the government and the party, the government serves as senior partner. The TANU organization is subordinate to the governmental structure at all levels. Since the majority of the government's leaders are also senior members of TANU, conflict and confusion are almost non-existent along these lines since the party and government are mutually dependent on each other.

The highest organ within TANU is the National Conference which is composed of 400 to 450 members drawn from all areas of government and party including the National Assembly, national, regional and district TANU offices, and delegates from various departments and affiliated organizations. The National Conference meets every two years.

The National Executive Committee is composed of 18 high-level party members and is, in fact, the supreme policy-making body of both the government and the party. It meets every three months and seldom has any of its decisions circumscribed by the National Conference although provisions exist for such an event.

The basic unit of the party is the cell and usually numbers approximately 15 members. Above the cell are the Branch, District, and Regional Divisions in ascending order. Each of these divisions consists of an executive committee and an annual conference. While the TANU constitution specifies that all party officials and conference delegates must be elected, the constitution

does not specify how the elections are to be conducted.²⁰

The creation of a democratic one-party nation under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, a man dedicated to the preservation of political competition, resulted in the establishment of a loosely knit internal party organization. All of the national organs of political expression were encouraged to express themselves through the TANU organization to ensure that political competition would take place within the party and its affiliate structures. This was in preference to the establishment of a multi-party system where party struggles were viewed as being more disruptive than beneficial, especially as election time approached.

The establishment of Tanzania's one-party system of government where all governmental functions emanate from the party structure has been classified by Cranford Pratt as evidence of the existence of harmony and popular will with which Julius Nyerere operated. The representative quality of Nyerere's leadership is, therefore, one of the reasons he has been so successful in establishing and maintaining himself in control of the party and of the state. Several rules were established to insure that the main objectives of TANU were adhered to and which permits Tanzania to be called a democratic one-party state. Some of these are as follows:

²⁰Herrick, p. 221.

1. Anyone may be nominated to be a candidate for election to the National Assembly if he or she is a member of TANU and has the support of 25 electors.

2. TANU is not a closed and ideologically exclusive party. Membership is open to anyone willing to accept the aims and objectives of TANU, a requirement that excluded very few from party membership.

3. An Annual District Conference and the National Executive Committee of TANU determines through interviews and other means, which two candidates will be permitted to run for an electoral office.

4. No candidate may spend money on his own campaign.

5. Election meetings are organized by the District Executive Committee of the party and each meeting is addressed by both candidates in the constituency.

6. No candidate can claim that he is supported by any prominent TANU leader and no one may campaign in any constituency on behalf of any candidate.

7. No tribal language may be used in electioneering and no appeal may be made to issues of race, tribe, or religion.

8. A three-man supervisory team of TANU elders from outside the region attends all election meetings to insure that these rules are obeyed.²¹

²¹Pratt, p. 205.

The electoral system as outlined in part above demonstrates the efforts that have been made to avoid the pitfalls of tribalism, regionalism, and factionalism that have plagued so many other African nations. It was hoped that along these lines, national unity could be achieved and maintained.

The Tanzanian form of democracy is supported by Julius Nyerere through the assertion that pure democracy was too clumsy for modern states to conduct their affairs. He further states that the discussion that is tolerated and, in fact, promoted, in the TANU one-party system is as democratic a process as possible. Nyerere adds:

To the minds molded by Western parliamentary tradition and Western concepts of democratic institutions, the idea of an organized opposition group has become so familiar that its absence immediately raises the cry of "dictatorship." It is no good telling them that when a group of 100 equals have sat and talked together until they agreed where to dig a well (and "until they agreed" implies that they will have produced many conflicting arguments before they do eventually agree), they have practiced democracy. Proponents of Western parliamentary traditions will consider whether the opposition was organized and therefore automatic, or whether it was spontaneous and therefore free. Only if it was automatic will they concede that here was democracy!²²

In the above manner, Nyerere denounces the view that the establishment of a one-party system of government is synonymous with the destruction of the democratic process.

²²Irving Leonard Markowitz, Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 294.

The Army and Society

Although Tanganyika was not a battlefield during World War II, the territory felt the impact of war especially in terms of manpower requirements. During the war, approximately 92,000 African Tanganyikans served under the banner of the King's African Rifles.²³ These forces fought with the British in East Africa against the Italians, in Madagascar, and in the Burma campaign. Throughout the 40 years that Tanganyika was under British control, the Tanganyikan Army was under British command and tutelage.

Returning World War II soldiers brought with them a sense of nationhood and togetherness gained while representing their country in combat in distant lands. This feeling of nationhood, however, was never translated to political terms or activity. This is probably the result of association with British soldiers and their basically apolitical nature. A small force of less than 2000 were retained in the army and performed self-defense and internal security missions. The only other experience the army has had in combat occurred between 1952 and 1954 when a small contingency was sent to Kenya during the Mau Mau uprisings.

When Tanganyika received its independence, its army consisted of two battalions of African soldiers led by British officers and noncommissioned officers. This

²³MacDonald, p. 39.

force totaled nearly 2000 Africans including several African officers, none above the rank of Captain.²⁴

On 12 January 1964, a revolt took place on the island of Zanzibar. Rebel Africans, held down by the ruling Sultan and the Arab-controlled Zanzibar Nationalist Party, seized the police armory and other government buildings. The Sultan fled the island. Resistance brought death to 500 Arabs as the Afro-Shirazi Party took over Zanzibar.

The Tanganyikan Rifles, the name given the army after independence, viewed the events on Zanzibar as a simple operation. As a result of this and several long standing grievances, the army mutinied just eight days later. The army's grievances centered around the desire for an increase in pay and Africanization of the officer corps. Soldiers from the First Battalion in Colito Barracks, just five miles outside Dar es Salaam, moved in on the capital and commandeered government buildings, the airport, and the radio station. Since there was no real attempt to overthrow the government and the fact that they were poorly organized, the mutineers took no further action.

After meeting with the Minister for External Affairs and Defense, the soldiers agreed to return to their barracks while the government reviewed their demands for better pay and replacement of British officers. Some soldiers, however, did not return to Colito but remained

²⁴Herrick, p. 452.

in Dar es Salaam. Their continued rebelliousness led to rioting and to the looting of primarily Asian shops. Seventeen deaths were recorded as a result of this action. As negotiations continued, it became apparant that several of the leaders of the mutiny were beginning to regret that they had failed to attempt an overthrow of the government. They began demanding "blackmail type" conditions which caused the negotiations to reach a stalemate.

On 25 January 1964, British Commandos, at the request of the Tanganyikan Government, arrived by helicopter and began the task of rounding up and disarming the army. This also included action against the Second Battalion in Tabora which had joined in the mutiny. The disarming efforts went smoothly and no serious incidents were recorded.

With the exception of the few civilians who took part in the rioting, the mutiny had no real effect on the population. The looting of primarily Asian stores did not reflect total civil or military animosity toward Asians.

Although the mutiny was repressed, the government conceded that Africanization of the army had not taken place fast enough. As quickly as possible, British officers and noncommissioned officers were replaced by Africans. British Commandos remained in their peace keeping role for approximately three months when they were replaced by Nigerian troops who remained in Tanzania for six more months while the army was being totally reorganized and

staffed. This reorganization was the result of the government's realization that the loyalty of the army could not be assured in its existing state. Immediate steps were taken to increase the pay of military personnel. African noncommissioned officers were promoted to officer rank to fill the vacancies created by the dismissal of British officers.

The army was redesignated the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) and placed under the command of Brigadier Sarakikya, whose loyalty during the mutiny was unquestioned. By 1965, a well-screened force of approximately 1300 men had been formed, organized in three battalions, and stationed in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, and Nachingwea. The former Liberation Army of Zanzibar was incorporated as an integrated battalion although command of it remained in Zanzibar's control.

In an effort to exert a check on political activities within the army, President Nyerere appointed Selemani Kitundu, a regional commissioner, to the position of Political Commissar for the defense forces with the rank of colonel. Members of the new army were required to be members of TANU and were given full political rights as well as lengthy indoctrination.²⁵ Additionally, an army reserve corps was formed from members of the TANU Youth League. This reserve, the United Republic Volunteer Corps,

²⁵Potholm, p. 158.

was placed under the direction of the deputy secretary-general of the party, John A. Nzunda. These actions were all designed to reduce the potential of political activity within the army.²⁶

In an effort to diversify the receipt of military assistance, British military instructors were replaced by personnel from the People's Republic of China, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Israel assisted in training the police forces. This diversification of training, however, has not provided evidence of a lack of cohesion in the military.

Additional measures were taken to provide further assurance of the loyalty of the army. First, the army was not allowed to ruminate in its barracks but instead, was put to work on such nation-building projects as village development and road building. The new army also announced plans for self-help projects such as the establishment of classes designed to make every soldier literate, the establishment of a dairy farm in Tabora, and the development of poultry, corn, and peanut farms by the battalions in Dar es Salaam and Nachingwea.²⁷

All enlistments are voluntary. Recruits volunteer in response to recruitment campaigns or as part of their two-year National Service obligation. Noncommissioned

²⁶MacDonald, p. 232.

²⁷MacDonald, p. 175.

officers are promoted from the ranks if they have evidenced adequate educational and leadership qualifications. Officers must be Tanzanian citizens, members of TANU, between the ages of 18 and 22, have a clean police record, possess above average educational qualifications, and be in good health. The personnel requirements for this deliberately small army has not adversely affected the labor market. The military forces enjoy a respected position in society. Salaries and other conditions of service are sufficiently attractive that an adequate supply of volunteers is constantly available. The army's current strength of approximately 4000 has been kept small because of financial constraints, the lack of any serious threat to Tanzania's sovereignty, and the desire by the government not to create an unwieldy or potentially unreliable force. Nyerere recognized the unreliability of the army during the 1964 mutiny. Modernization and social improvement also took precedence over the maintenance of a large military force.

Social Interactions and Economic Forces

Tanzania's pursuit of progress has been along lines calling for social interactions at all levels of the population. The concept of ujamaa (familyhood) is used to describe the Tanzanian form of socialism. This concept draws from the traditional African heritage the recognition of the society as an extension of the basic family

unit. Ultimately, it seeks to extend this thought beyond tribal or national boundaries to include all of Africa. This is not to suggest that Tanzania has any thought of exporting its political ideology for with its small army and a weak economy, it is not in a position to provide more than moral support and a geographic area for various liberation movements to operate from. In addition to the concept of ujamaa, the slogan of the party and the nation is Freedom and Work (Uhuru na Kazi). There appears to be little question that the government's dedication to the doctrine of freedom and work and the lack of conspicuous consumption helps to stress the positive relationship between the government and the people and that in this way, poverty seems to contribute to and provide support for the regime.²⁸

No history of traditional African Kingdoms exists in the plural society formed by the more than 100 tribes of Tanzania. Tribal rivalries, while existent to some degree, did not play a significant role in the development of the country in either its colonial status or in independence. Most tribes, while occupying specific territories, live in harmony with other tribes and many have established relations of mutual dependence.²⁹ The interactions of all

²⁸Potholm, p. 167.

²⁹Herrick, p. 89.

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
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tribes has increased since independence and the political doctrine of ujamaa became widespread and accepted. Religious tolerance is also present in the Tanzanian society. Approximately one-half of the country's population adheres to various forms of traditional tribal religions while the remainder is approximately evenly balanced between Islam and Christianity.³⁰

In an attempt to promote the idea of democracy and maintain the effectiveness of the traditional authority system, President Nyerere was faced with a monumental task. Before independence, TANU exploited certain dislocations in traditional life for political ends. After independence, however, it attempted to incorporate traditional leadership into national social plans. At a meeting with representatives of the Tanganyika Chief's Convention in late 1961, Nyerere informed the chiefs of the need to de-emphasize the role of the traditional chief in favor of the more democratic system the nation had chosen to follow. Nyerere stated that: "democracy demanded that the chairman of local councils should be elected but they would clearly place the chief, who in the past had been the sole ruler in his chiefdom, in an anomalous position." and that "The problem was likely to be a temporary one as the educated sons of chiefs would not wish to inherit so insecure a post and would prefer to serve the country in

³⁰Herrick, p. 179.

other ways. Government hoped that chiefs would be replaced on their voluntary resignation when local conditions were suitable.³¹ Nyerere was able to satisfactorily sway the majority of the chiefs toward the idea of democracy without difficulty. In this way, he was unhampered in his efforts to establish political support at the "grass roots" level. The transition of authority from the traditional to democratic was handled with relative smoothness over time.

In outlining various methods for social interaction to take place, President Nyerere designed certain guidelines in what is known as the Arusha Declaration of February 1967. Perhaps the main purpose of the Declaration was to show that all segments of the population were equally important and should progress together rather than one progressing at the expense of another, as under the capitalistic system. The Declaration called for ending most of the material privileges of the established elite. It demanded that the state better serve the interests of the urban workers and rural peasants, repudiated foreign aid as an erosion of sovereignty, and insisted on the construction of a motivating ideology which would unite and lead the people.³² The government's opposition to the development of a

³¹Markowitz, p. 168.

³²John R. Nellis. A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example, (Nairobi, Kenya, Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 149.

privileged class is reflected in the following portions of the Declaration:

No TANU or Government leaders should hold shares in any company.

No TANU or Government leaders should hold directorships in any privately-owned enterprises.

No TANU or Government leaders should own houses which he rents to others.³³

In keeping with this policy, President Nyerere cut his salary and those of the Ministers by 20 per cent, and those of civil servants by 10 per cent.³⁴ This action in 1966 typified Nyerere's desire for national progress ahead of personal gain for himself or his people.

It was natural that this type of program and limitation of personal gain was not received well by the nation's elite. Many debates were conducted as a result of the Declaration but the ability of the "Teacher," as President Nyerere was affectionately called, to reason, persuade, and cajole, overcame almost all open objections. Those placed in the position of having to explain to their constituents the basis for their objections were hard pressed to do so and as a result, tempered their overt reactions.

While Tanzania was left with the British system of government, President Nyerere chose the path of socialism based on the extended family concept as indicated

³³Potholm, p. 166.

³⁴Potholm, p. 166.

earlier. Nyerere's idea was that if the nation's primary goal was to be development, the use of any system other than socialism would not benefit the society at large but would primarily benefit only a small segment of the society. In a sense, Nyerere related the country to the tribe-family concept with the governmental leader (himself) as the tribal leader or father of the family.³⁵ Above all, President Nyerere charted a course for his country which reflected a total unwillingness to subordinate his country's independence for any reason, political or economic.

Nyerere was not willing to accept assistance of any sort where the requirement for or implication of external control existed. While socialism was the internal policy, international activities were of a non-aligned nature. Cooperation with and assistance from all forms of government were welcomed as long as the basic requirement to stay away from internal meddling was met.³⁶

Tanzania's economic stability has been questionable since prior to independence. When independence came without the corresponding arrival of anticipated foreign capital, serious "belt tightening" measures had to be taken. The search for diversified foreign assistance re-

³⁵ Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 168.

³⁶ Potholm, p. 174.

sulted from more than a desire to reduce dependence on Great Britain. Investments were sorely needed from any possible source. To date, Tanzania has received aid from the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the People's Republic of China, France, both Germanies, Israel, and several other countries.³⁷ Tanzania's initial efforts were toward building and improving its educational system and then its economic base.

The People's Republic of China has been the largest single provider of assistance to date. The People's Republic of China's grant of an interest free loan exceeding \$400 million to build the Tanzanian half of the Tanzanian-Zambian Railroad Authority was the largest single loan by a Communist government, exceeding the \$325 million Soviet financed Aswan High Dam project.³⁸

For more than three years, 15,000 Chinese and 15,000 Tanzanians worked on the Tanzanian portion of the railroad. This provided much needed capital for Tanzania not only through the 15,000 jobs directly related to the railroad, but also from the thousands of other indirectly related jobs. These additional jobs came from service connected activities and jobs created by the railroad

³⁷ Potholm, p. 175.

³⁸ John G. Nettleton. The TANZAM Railroad: The PRC in Africa versus United States Interests, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air Command and General Staff College, Air University, 1974), p. 65.

itself. Additionally, in order for the railroad to be functional as intended, it required major work on the port facilities of Dar es Salaam. Economic activity of all calibers were created or increased by the railroad project.

The aspects of technical and economic assistance provided by various countries has often required that repayments include the import of consumer items which has hampered internal development in consumer related products. However, the benefits of aid has generally outweighed the disadvantages.³⁹ Economic stability, while not immediately visible, is being approached slowly and systematically. The nationalization of potentially disruptive organizations such as labor unions has tremendously assisted the government in avoiding, or at least controlling internally induced economic crises. At the same time, little objection has been voiced by the population because of the highly favorable results the government-run unions have produced. Alexander MacDonald cites an example of the benefits gained by the government-run labor union:

Even those who questioned the wisdom or ethics of the government take-over of the labor movement could not fail to be impressed by the 1965 report by Minister of Labor Kamaliza on the first-year accomplishments of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers. Labor strife, the Minister reported, had been almost eliminated. During 1962, the year prior to NUTA's supplanting the Tanganyika Federation of Labor, there had been 417,500 man-days of work lost because of industrial disputes. In 1964, only 5,855 had been lost.

³⁹Pratt, p. 171.

In the same period the average wage of Tanzania's 400,000-odd workers had increased 44 per cent: from \$17.08 to \$24.64 a month.⁴⁰

The Effect of International Relations

As indicated earlier, Tanzania has pursued a course of non-alignment and independence while receiving assistance from a multitude of nations. The gamut of donors is not in itself remarkable or unusual but Tanzania's apparent commitment to an independent course of action despite all manner of aid and her success at adhering to that policy is unusual.

Tanzania was in the company of a number of African nations in her opposition to such global events as the French nuclear tests in the Sahara and the United States paratroop operation in the Congo (1964). She eagerly accepted Nigerian military assistance following the mutiny of the Tanzanian Army but was the first African state to recognize the breakaway regime of Biafra three years later (1967). In spite of African opposition to her stand regarding Biafra, Tanzania continued to champion the Biafrian claim to nationhood.⁴¹

In 1965, Tanzania expelled more than 300 U. S. Peace Corps workers after diplomatic quarrels over Tanzania's receipt of military assistance from the People's

⁴⁰MacDonald, p. 233.

⁴¹Potholm, p. 175.

Republic of China. The U. S. State Department's protest of Chinese military involvement in Tanzania drew an angry reaction from President Nyerere. He stated that: "This country is, in fact, completely Western: in government, in business, in schools, Now I make a little attempt to be nonaligned and the West asks me if I realize the risk I'm taking. The maximum risk is that the army will revolt. My army revolted in January and it was not trained by Chinese."⁴²

Tanzania has jointly courted the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China while often expounding views in direct opposition to those of her benefactors. When the Chinese were negotiating the terms of the Tanzanian-Zambian Railroad, Tanzania voiced direct opposition to the suggestion that the Nationalist Chinese be unseated in the United Nations although she did favor the seating of the People's Republic of China. Despite this, the bulk of assistance received by Tanzania in the late-1960 and early-1970 time frame came from the People's Republic of China.

In Africa, Tanzania favors the creation and preservation of internal political unity and independence from foreign influence. It is positively committed to the liberation of those Africans still under minority governments. By 1970, Tanzania had taken the responsibility for

⁴²MacDonald, p. 206.

caring for more than 40,000 refugees from southern Africa and the Congo.⁴³ A number of liberation movements are headquartered in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania has been a strong supporter of the Organization of African Unity and helped establish the East African Community and East African Common Market with Uganda and Kenya.

Julius Nyerere, the father of Tanzania, and evangelist for African independence and unity has been one of the foremost African spokesmen of modern times. Having realized his goal of independence for his country, his views regarding the unification of Africa are summed up in this quote:

African nationalism will not have triumphed until three conditions are fulfilled. First, the whole of Africa must be free from foreign rule. Second, African nationalism must become an instrument of African unity. Third, the freedom of nation-states must be followed by the maximum possible freedom for the individual within the political unit. Until these three desiderata are achieved, the current African revolution will not be complete.⁴⁴

⁴³Potholm, p. 174.

⁴⁴MacDonald, p. 237.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS

We will now apply Welch's factors leading to military intervention (FLMI) to the conditions outlined in Chapters II and III to explain the advent of military regimes in Nigeria and the continuation of civil rule in Tanzania.

Prestige of Political Parties

The major difficulty that Nigeria experienced in the realm of political parties was that no party truly represented goals and values that spread across regional boundaries. No political organization represented a cross-section of Nigeria. Instead, the political atmosphere was clouded by regionalism and factionalism begun by the colonial powers and perpetuated through tribal jealousies and mistrust.

For the first five years of the existence of Nigeria as an independent state, the prestige of the various political parties remained relatively high in the ethnic or regional arenas in which they operated. The publicly obvious misuse of power and authority eventually brought about the total destruction of the government in the Western Region. Internal security operations conducted

by the military further complicated the already disrupted nature of life in the region. Not only did the party in power suffer from these events, but a general, almost nation-wide distrust of politicians and political parties was fostered. This distrust, however, was directed at opposition parties more so than at parties in general. Available evidence suggests that this political crisis served as the final insult that prompted military intervention in the January 1966 coup by elements of the Nigerian Army.

Additionally, the existence of political alliances did not signal the merger of political ideologies. Indications are that these alliances were strictly marriages of conveniences and not of love. Each was designed to either preclude a party from retaining political control or was designed to perpetuate the power in being. The pursuit of the corrupt system of rewards was the basic unifying force which created many of the alliances. While these facts may not be unusual when compared to other alliance systems, they reflect a system centered around efforts toward personal benefits rather than nationalist goals.

The political environment in Nigeria gradually became praetorian. The national leaders occupied positions of authority but did not rule the country. Their policies were not considered as binding by all political actors. Each region conducted its political activities in nearly an autonomous manner. Further, the ability of

Major General Ironsi to quickly "defang" the coup leaders and assume complete control of the government is evidence of the praetorian nature of Nigerian politics.

The Tanzanian political atmosphere was completely different. Its major political party, the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU), never suffered from a loss of prestige nor did any of the other political parties that initially existed.

While TANU was not without political opposition, this opposition was conducted in an open and legitimate manner. The period when government pressure on TANU existed was also a period when TANU's prestige and membership were on the increase among native black Africans. The international esteem of both Julius Nyerere and TANU increased during this same time frame.

Tanzania's development into a one-party state resulted from a combination of dwindling objection to TANU by the European community and TANU's increasing calls for national political unification. The previous exclusion of non-blacks from membership in TANU had ceased by 1958. The visible evidence of this, the appointment of Lady Chesham to TANU's Executive Committee, served to counter many of the European's objections and demonstrated the true nature of TANU's nonracial policy.

Of the two examples, only Nigeria evidences this element of FLMI. It is noted however, that the lost prestige was not the result of either a reliance on force,

or a stress for unanimity. Instead, it resulted from a denial of political choice through fraudulent election means.

Relationship Among Politicians

The relationship among Nigerian politicians has historically been filled with distrust and intrigue. These conditions were primarily the result of tribal and/or regional attitudes and not the result of direct or personal animosity between individuals. Each political party's attempt to achieve advantages for its tribe or region accelerated the mistrust that typified political maneuvering.

The conflict between Premier Akintola and Chief Awolowo is one of the few examples of severe intra-party disharmony where individual personalities were the causal factors. Nigerian politics was noted more for its tribal and regional orientation than for reliance on specific personalities. The dominant person in each of the political parties was viewed as representative of the party rather than an individual personality. This is the reason that so few personalities were mentioned especially from the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions. The political parties of Nigeria were developed along regional lines not because of schisms between personalities but because of uncompromising tribal differences.

Tanzania's politicians were not noted for the

close harmony of their relationship especially during the pre-independence days. Personality and procedural differences led to the defection from TANU of such leaders as Zuberi Mtemvu and the formation of several opposition political parties. The primary nature of this opposition was, however, centered around policy and procedure rather than personality. As a result, Mtemvu and others were able to rejoin TANU and add a unifying effect to the political atmosphere. Nyerere's strongest opposition came from Ivor Bayldon, the chairman of the United Tanganyika Party. Again, the bulk of this opposition was political and not personal.

Almost all interest groups are represented within the TANU structure. Political discussions from disaffected elements are encouraged in order to forestall factionalism. Political discussions generally are centered around the speed with which TANU goals should be achieved or the means to be employed in the attempt to reach these goals rather than on the goals themselves. The charismatic nature of Nyerere's leadership had reduced the tendency for direct personal confrontations.

In viewing the Tanzanian political system, Irving Markowitz notes that:

Nyerere welcomes a system of opposition within a stipulated consensus for practical as well as philosophical consideration. This assumes that public debate will bring out more of the facts, that bureaucrats and officials will be less able to hide their faults and inequities, and that popular participation in government will result in increased popular support

of the government.¹

The above statement reflects Nyerere's attempt to establish a democratic system in a forum type of atmosphere. This type of system also allows him to maintain political control over disaffected elements.

The nationalist movement prior to independence was relatively unaffected by the differences found in the black political parties of both countries. The goal of ridding the country of alien rule was practically universal in both Nigeria and Tanzania. One major difference is that in Nigeria, no leader arose above the tribal/regional basis to lead in the pursuit of freedom while in Tanzania, one did.

Of the two examples, this factor of Welch's FLMI is reflected more in the political atmosphere that existed in the Western Region of Nigeria between 1963 and 1965 than in any period of Tanzanian politics.

Likelihood of External Intervention

A study of the history and attitudes of each country indicates that neither is likely to experience direct intervention by an external power other than by invitation. The two coups of 1966 and the civil war between 1967 and 1970 failed to lead to external involvement

¹Irving Leonard Markowitz, Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 296.

of a direct nature in Nigeria. There is no evidence to suggest that any nation even considered taking overt action during any of the mentioned periods of crisis in Nigeria. The lack of any significant periods of crisis in Tanzania other than the army's mutiny also fails to show any intent by an outside power to intervene in Tanzania's domestic affairs. The use of British and Nigerian forces to restore order in Tanzania was at the specific request of the legitimate government in power and was terminated as rapidly as possible. It can be reasonably assumed that neither government would hesitate to call for outside assistance in any situation that its domestic forces could not adequately cope with. This factor was insignificant for this study.

Demonstration Effect

As indicated in the Nigerian Chapter, a number of African nations experienced military coups just before the January 1966 coup in Nigeria. While the internal situation in Nigeria was the major basis for the coup, it would be impossible to exempt the effect of the success experienced by military elements of other countries in their coup attempts. The same reasons that coup leaders in other countries gave for their takeovers were given by the Nigerian coup leaders. The decision to assassinate certain key officials also occurred in many of the earlier coups for reasons as insuring a smoother transition of authority rather than reasons related to personality or

procedural conflicts. An additional factor is that, not only are the five countries that experienced military coups located in the same geographic area, the coups mentioned all occurred within a 60-day period. It is intuitively likely that the demonstration effect played a role.

The leaders of the army mutiny in Tanzania acknowledged that they were led toward their action after viewing the successful overthrow of the government in Zanzibar, an independent country at the time. They followed the same action with the exception that no one was killed in the actual takeover of government installations and buildings as had occurred in Zanzibar.

These facts lead to the conclusion that both Nigeria and Tanzania were significantly affected by military actions which took place in other countries. By classifying the army mutiny in Tanzania as a case of intervention, it can be said that military elements intervened in the politics of both countries partly as a result of the demonstration effect.

Domestic Social Interaction

The manifestation of social antagonisms characterized daily life in Nigeria. Each of the three major tribes assumed that at least one of the other tribes was, in some way, against it. While unions of Ibo and Yoruba or Hausa and Yoruba have existed, never has there existed a union of Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba. The traditional posi-

tions of leadership have been stronger in the Northern Region because of the historical development of the country which depicted the dominance of the Hausa and Fulani tribes ruling as a result of their association with commercial elements of North Africa. The trend toward reversing this situation began with commercializing the coastal areas, which created greater advantages for the Western and Eastern Regions. Oil, found primarily in the Eastern Region, also brought heavy external influence to this area and more educational advantages in order to create technical expertise in the native labor market. Knowledgeable Nigerian sources state that the Ibo people have provided more technicians, lawyers, doctors and other specialists than any other tribe on both a numerical and percentage basis. Yet, British administration of the country created conditions which remained favorable to the retention of northern dominance while promoting regionalistic tendencies. Actions such as these served only to aggravate the social and political climates. Inter-tribal and inter-regional interactions were based on the pursuit of political controls and the system of spoils it provided. While a specific date can be given to show when Nigeria attained statehood, no date exists for it becoming a nation. The only goal that ever transcended tribal, religious, and regional barriers was the mutual desire for self-government in lieu of alien domination. Nationalist goals and objectives have been elusive. Political interactions

have reflected and/or caused this condition in the Nigerian society.

In the Tanzanian setting, social interactions have been of an entirely different nature. Deliberate and effective attempts have been made to avoid tribalism, racism, and regionalism. The political party structure is, and has always been, built along lines promoting national unity in politics and society. The political elite have been kept from profiting from the development of the nation at the expense of the less fortunates. The social interactions promulgated by this system were characterized by harmonious relations. This is not to say that serious disagreements have not existed in the system. The political party has taken action to promote the exchange of differences of opinion and ideals and has provided a workable format for the public to air its grievances and participate in an open and free electoral process. The military has been interwoven into the nation's entirety from economic to social to political. The nation's goals and objectives have seldom been major political issues. Instead, emphasis has been placed on questions of speed and methodology. The progressive record the party has to show detracts from the arguments of those who might advocate a tremendous deviation in tactics.

While both countries have a multitude of indigenous languages, only Tanzania has an African language as its official national language. Swahili carries neither of

the negative potentials of belonging specifically to a particular tribe or of being a carry over from colonial government. In addition to English, all persons in Nigeria must learn the language of the major tribe in their region in order to adequately communicate and/or do business outside of their local village. Language, in this sense, has been more successfully used in Tanzania as an African oriented unifying factor for domestic social interactions.

A similar situation exists with regard to religion. Nigeria's population is composed of approximately 44 per cent Muslims, 22 per cent Christians, and the balance subscribing to traditional African religions. The religions are primarily distributed along regional lines with Muslims dominating the north, Christians the east, and traditional African religions dominating the west. This situation adds an additional complicating factor to the phenomenon of regionalism. Tanzania's religions are more evenly distributed and have become extremely flexible over the years. Religion is not a significant factor in Tanzania, while it is in Nigeria because of its regional distribution.

All of these facts indicate that domestic social interactions tend to be highly complicated and of a non-cohesive nature in Nigeria, while the unifying principle of ujamaa exists in Tanzania.

Economic Factors

The Nigerian Civil War severely strained the economic infrastructure of Nigeria and drained its foreign exchange reserves. Prior to 1970, Nigeria's economy was heavily centered around agriculture. However, the widespread nature of corruption in the Nigerian economy has restricted its efforts toward economic as well as political stability. The diversity of foreign economic assistance has tended to be somewhat of a stabilizing factor. The existence of large oil reserves in Nigeria has greatly increased the potential sources of economic assistance. Nigeria has continued to favor western political and economic styles but has not hesitated to seek and accept economic support from Communist governments as well. Nigeria, as a result, has been able to avoid instituting policies of an austere nature and has few real problems in this area.

The austere economic policies of Tanzania have existed since it gained independence and have been the result of both natural disasters and the non-receipt of anticipated foreign investment. The greatest single source of economic assistance has come from the People's Republic of China whose outlined procedures for repayment have led to some of the factors that limit the potential for economic stability. These procedures called for the purchase of consumer and industrial goods which, in turn, have restricted the establishment of an industrial based economy. As of the early 1970's nearly 90 per cent of the

available work force was involved in subsistence farming which adds little to economic growth for modern nations.

The initial establishment of austere policies served as an agitator to the political elite and urbanized segments of the population. Much of the verbalized objection, however, were calmed by President Nyerere's use of public discussions which made rejection of his policies difficult for politicians and other wealthy men to explain to the public. As a result, both the good and bad have been shared by everyone to some degree and this has reduced the potential for the perception of relative deprivation to be of significance in the society. Tanzania, having experienced greater amounts of economic malaise, has not been on the border of economic collapse. Its experiences, however, are more closely associated with this factor of the FLMI.

Corruption and Inefficiency

Reams of material have been written regarding corruption in Nigeria. If any factor can easily be related to Nigerian life, the one requiring the least effort and for which there is the most supportive evidence is corruption and inefficiency. Graft, corruption, nepotism, and intra-tribal favoritism abounded within the Nigerian system. The widespread and almost universally accepted nature of corruption in Nigeria became almost directly related to efficiency. Efficiency was more common when

urged through the payment of bribes or the promise of other benefits. The professed reason for the January 1966 coup was to depose Nigeria's corrupt government. This action received additional impetus from the crises in the Western Region between 1964 and 1966. The blatant misuse of public funds coupled with the misuse of political authority spurred the military to action as a self-professed revitalizing and cleansing force.

The experience of inefficiency was common to both Nigeria and Tanzania especially during the period when expatriates were being replaced with native blacks who, many times, learned their jobs as they performed them. Tanzania's experience in this area was less noticeable in comparison because it lacked corruption to the extent that it tended to illegitimize government and politics. Major efforts were taken by Tanzania to control and make less disruptive any acts of government that might border on corruption. The Arusha Declaration provided specific guidelines which tended to lessen the likelihood of blatantly corrupt practices or profiteering in government. The adoption of the concept of ujamaa in the pursuit of African Socialism also tended to reduce or control practices of an openly corrupt nature.

Additionally, political promises were never totally ignored in Tanzania. Strong, continuous, and well planned efforts were undertaken to industrialize the country and provide continuous feedback as to the status of the

situation. Hard work, shared adversities, and patience were the prescribed national character for Tanzania. In contrast, Nigeria displayed ill-conceived economic objectives, unrealistic ventures into industrialization and a number of other traits which did not reflect favorably on the efficiency of the national government.

Concerning corruption, Markowitz writes:

In underdeveloped countries, another factor in corruption is the difference in status and education between civil servants and their clients. The African bureaucrat, a high school or university graduate, leads a style of life that puts him on a different plane from the illiterate peasant or laborer, for whom government appears remote and terrifying in its regulations: "In approaching a civil servant the peasant is not generally an informed citizen seeking a service to which he is entitled but a subject seeking to appease a powerful man whose ways he cannot fathom; where the modern citizen might demand, he begs or flatters."²

Tanzania's efforts to improve education have been tremendous especially considering the economic base from which it has to operate. Approximately 50 per cent of Tanzanian children attend primary school with approximately 3 per cent in secondary levels.³ This compares with approximately 1 per cent of Nigeria's children in school through the secondary

²Ibid., p. 304. Citing James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. IX.

³Allison B. Herrick and others. Area Handbook for Tanzania, DA Pam 550-62, (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. viii.

level.⁴

Military Power Politics

It is obvious that the Nigerian Army became highly involved in the power politics of its country. Its overthrow of the government adequately demonstrates that it was aware of the power it possessed. During the five years between independence and military intervention, the army was called upon to establish or restore order on several occasions. In each of these experiences, the army became more involved in political situations and created severe public consequences. The last use of the military prior to direct intervention on the national level in 1965 aided in extending and furthering the disrupted nature of life at the regional level. Other than when Major General Ironsi initially contacted key civilian leaders of government, during the height of the January Coup, no serious consideration was voiced regarding the military returning the government to civilian leadership. The Nigerian military fully realizes its power and has shown no indication of relinquishing it.

With the exception of the army mutiny in 1964, there is no evidence that the Tanzanian military has been involved in internal security operations where it could

⁴Harold D. Nelson and Others, Area Handbook for Nigeria, DA Pam 550-157, (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. viii.

realize its potential to influence or displace government leaders. After reorganization, it became highly politized organizationally while remaining apolitical functionally. The Tanzanian military does not evidence this aspect of the FLMI while the Nigerian clearly does.

Conclusions

In analyzing the findings in these two countries and applying them to Welch's FLMI, the following insights were gained.

1. Nigeria evidences six of the eight factors of the FLMI. The only two areas not applicable to Nigeria were: (a) the likelihood of external intervention, and (b) the existence of economic instability. All other areas were found to exist and assist in explaining the reason for military intervention.

2. Only two of the areas were applicable to conditions in Tanzania. These were the presence of a demonstration effect caused by the revolt in Zanzibar and the existence of economic instability. In each of these cases, however, the severity of the factor was relatively mild. The army's mutiny was short lived, conceived with limited objectives, poorly led, and rapidly resolved. Economic weaknesses continue to exist but not to the point of approaching political collapse. Sufficient sources of foreign assistance have been located and economic progress continues, though slowly.

3. The use of Welch's FLMI shows that the existence of so many factors made military intervention in Nigeria not only likely but inevitable. It appears, from both analysis and admissions, that the most significant of the factors as far as Nigeria is concerned was the corrupt nature of the Nigerian government. Yet, it may be that this reason was cited because the existence of such an open display of corruption constitutes a condition more easily identified and one which tends to lend more legitimacy to military intervention. There is no evidence to show that the practices that were condemned by the coup makers were eliminated or even reduced following the overthrow of the government. Similarly, it is highly possible that the attacks against the Ibos in northern Nigeria were, at least in part, used to disguise efforts to eliminate specific individuals from the military without the risk of the destruction of the military as an organization. A. R. Luckham notes that:

To make a direct attack on senior officers would be to challenge the entire authority systems of the army. In contrast, hostilities of other kinds, such as that between different ethnic groups, do not run up against the same kind of constraint and this may help to explain why antagonisms in the army gravitated during 1966 towards ethnic and regional conflicts in so freewheeling a manner.⁵

⁵Markowitz, p. 318. Citing A. R. Luckham, "The Nigerian Military: Disintegration or Integration?" Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, ed. Panter-Brick, p. 61.

4. Welch's FLMI can and do provide a useful tool for examining conditions in a nation to predict the likelihood of military intervention. As such, it is of use to any United States official to assist in the evaluation of conditions existing or developing in a country. An understanding of the factors leading to military intervention is beneficial not only in determining why military organizations intervene in their country's political affairs, but also in understanding the actual or potential political involvement of a nation's military.

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