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
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)

Political Interactions and the Arab Sub-System.

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Final Report, 10 June 1977

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(s)

Donald A. Dubay

Dubay

Dubay, Donald A., MAJ, USA

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATSW-SE

12. REPORT DATE

10 Jun 77

13. NUMBER OF PAGES

154

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)

153 p.

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

DDC
REPRODUCED
SEP 2 1977
C

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

See reverse.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

One of the fundamental causes of war, posit a large number of political scientists, is the lack of communications among nations, as the absence of communications contributes to political polarization. The primary inhibitors to international communications are coalitions of nations, in the form of alliances and regions. Theoretically, for the latter, polarization begins with the development of regions as sub-systems within the international system.

It may be assumed that be examining a region's political cohesiveness, or degree of integration, it is possible to determine the impact of the integrative process on international communications (interactions among nations), which is the intent of this thesis. The thesis tests the hypothesis that as regional political integration increases, there is a corresponding decrease in political interactions between the nations of that region and other nations of the world. The method of analysis for integration and interactions is quantitative. The variables used are national, executive level state visits and diplomatic representative exchanges, both as a function of time. The region selected is the Arab World.

The thesis concludes that, for the Arab World, there is a direct relationship between political integration and extra-regional political interactions, with increases in the former adversely affecting international political interactions.



POLITICAL INTERACTIONS AND THE ARAB SUB-SYSTEM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1977

5L5-3150

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Accepted this 26th day of May 1977 by [illegible], Director, Master of Military Art and Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

One of the fundamental causes of war, posit a large number of political scientists, is the lack of communications among nations, as the absence of communications contributes to political polarization. The primary inhibitors to international communications are coalitions of nations, in the form of alliances and regions. Theoretically, for the latter, polarization begins with the development of regions as sub-systems within the international system.

It may be assumed that by examining a region's political cohesiveness, or degree of integration, it is possible to determine the impact of the integrative process on international communications (interactions among nations), which is the intent of this thesis. The thesis tests the hypothesis that as regional political integration increases, there is a corresponding decrease in political interactions between the nations of that region and other nations of the world. The method of analysis for integration and interactions is quantitative. The variables used are national, executive level state visits and diplomatic representative exchanges, both as a function of time. The region selected is the Arab World.

The thesis concludes that, for the Arab World, there is a direct relationship between political integration and extra-regional political interactions, with increases in the former adversely affecting international political interactions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is a project I had been planning to undertake for the past few years, thanks primarily to Dr. William Thompson, Professor of Government, Florida State University, who first exposed me to quantitative analysis in political science, and who encouraged such a project. I also wish to acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel Paul Grenier, my Research Advisor, who spend several tedious hours reviewing the many drafts and advising me on how to make some sense out of the mass of raw data; Mrs. Terri Callison, who proofed, typed and retyped the final copy, often when convenient for me but awkward for her and her family; and with special thanks to my wife, who tolerated and humored me through the emotional ups and downs I experienced in the research and preparation of this paper.

Any error or inadequacy in this thesis is to be attributed to myself solely.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The intent of this thesis is to analyze an aspect of international relations referred to as regional integration. Specifically, I am attempting to determine if there exists a deterministic relationship between increased regional integration and that region's members' interactions with other nations outside the region.

The correlational hypothesis to be developed will be tested quantitatively. The comparative analysis will be based on selected variables intended to measure political interactions among national government elites over a period of eleven years. The region chosen for the study is the Arabo-Islamic group of nations of the Middle East and North Africa.

In this chapter I will discuss briefly some political science approaches to the study of international politics; the analysis of regional integration, and the analytical approach used in this thesis.

Background

Prior to World War II, political science produced little in the way of research into conflict and deterrence, and other than historical analyses of national empires, political scientists seldom paid attention to the world outside the Western industrialized societies. Perhaps because of the global scale of World War II, the development of the

atom bomb, the birth of the United Nations, or the explosion in communications, political scientists changed their focus to one encompassing previously ignored regions of the world. Theories on the causes of conflict became "grand theories" of a global scale.

The first distinctive major movement in the study of international relations which attempted to construct valid global theories on the causes of conflict was "political realism" (see Chapter II for further discussion on the movement). One example of the work by political realists is Hans J. Morganthau's Politics Among Nations.[1] Political realism has since been followed by "systems" approaches, which promote a concept of international interdependence, at least in the sense that all political communities, such as nations, are capable of interacting with most other similar communities, if only for developing mutual awareness.

Besides the systems concepts, there also have evolved other approaches to the study of political science and, in particular, conflict. Examples of these are the decision-making models of Graham Allison in his Essence of Decision;[2] gaming theory, such as in A Strategy of Conflict[3] by Thomas Schelling, and others, including small group simulations, and still others which draw on other fields within the social and hard sciences. There is no identifiable cohesiveness to all of these efforts and, in fact, there simply does not exist a generally accepted "grand theory" which satisfactorily explains the causes of international conflict. There have, however, been some notable successes, particularly in research on national and sub-system levels.

One such work is the J. David Singer and Melvin Small long-term study on the correlates of war.[4] The authors discovered that, in the 20th Century, as alliances increased, so did wars. The implication was that as nations restricted their field of political intercourse within the international system, there arose an environment contributing to sub-systemic polarity and, hence, to conflict. While functionalists would hold that alliances and other sub-systems, specifically regions, were merely part of an evolutionary process of integration, the Singer-Small study strongly suggested that nations had limitations in their abilities or desires to interact with a large number of other nations, giving rise to sub-systemic polarity. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, there have been several other works which have supported this thesis.

The study of regional integration as a sub-systemic process and the impact of that process on the global system has received a great deal of attention in the past decade. Most of the work has dealt with the European Economic Community, but as other regions have evolved which have exhibited independence from the dominant national powers, more attention has focused on these groups of nations. This study will examine the political integration of one such group, or region.

The Problem

There are widely varying approaches to the study of regional integration. First, there is disagreement on what constitutes a region; what indicators and criteria are essential, such as geography, and cultural and social similarities; and a regional decision making body. Second, there also is considerable disagreement as to the definition of integration. In fact,

> Theory is not sufficiently advanced that there exists either a commonly accepted definition of integration or general agreement on the relevant indicators of integration.[5]

Another political scientist has written:

> Theory on international regions is still at a very primitive level, which is saying something in view of the state of theory in the field as a whole.[6]

> There is no generally accepted definition of integration.[7]

Not only do political scientists disagree on what criteria are to be used in defining regions and member integration, they also disagree on how to apply the criteria. One approach is to first determine the essential criteria (as perceived by the political scientist), then apply the criteria to nations and see which regions evolve. Such an inductive approach is used by those who view regional integration as a condition. Any resultant analysis is to determine the degree of integration at a given time.

Another approach is deductive, identifying both the regions and essential integrative factors, then measuring regional integration over a period of time. This longitudinal framework is used by those who see integration as a process, one which is developing continually. The concept of integration as a process often carries with it the idea that integration eventually will lead to the obsolescence of nations as international actors and, inevitably, to a supra-national body.

Approaches for the study of regional integration are almost limitless, given the many variables that may be subjected to analysis. My particular approach is neither revolutionary, nor entirely original, but it will, I hope, bring together some of the concepts and theories developed in the field. Also, the study is to provide a base for further, more comprehensive analysis, and a better understanding of

regions as sub-systems within the international system, and how these sub-systems operate the world environment.

The region selected for this study is the Arab World. In preceding pages and in Chapter II I discussed some of the ways one may define a region, whether by induction or deduction, and whether one's insight suggests regional integration as a condition or a process. The particular regional sub-system used in the paper comprises those countries generally considered to make up the Middle East and North Africa which are Arabo-Islamic in nature. These include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. All of these countries, or nations, satisfy the following criteria:

1. Geography: All are contiguous to at least one other selected country.

2. Language: All have Arabic as the dominant language (accepting that there are variations in local dialects). Most even stipulate in their constitutions that Arabic is to be the official language.

3. Religion: Islam is the dominant religion for all countries, save for Lebanon and, even in the case of the latter, there are more Muslims than Christians, excluding those Lebanese residing abroad.

4. Historical experience: All were members of the Arabo-Islamic empire, although not as separate states. All, save Morocco, came under domination of the Ottoman Empire for at least part of the existence of that Empire, and all were colonized by the Europeans, or came under suzerainty of the European powers, preceding and following

the fall of the Ottoman Empire, except for the Nejd and Hejaz regions of the Arabian Peninsula.

5. All are members of the Arab League, the regional organization established in 1945, "designed to strengthen the close ties linking the members and to coordinate their policies and activities and direct them towards the common good of all the Arab countries."[8]

6. All are members of the United Nations system, and all are represented in the League of Arab Nations, the organization responsible for promoting member views in the U.N. See Appendix A for a listing of the years of admission of Arab World countries into the U.N.

Also, on a not so easily quantifiable plane, the Arab sub-system promotes mutual awareness, or cognitive interdependence if you will, in the concept of Arab unity. The modern idea of Arab unity arose out of the colonial experience. More recently, it was verbalized and promoted by Gamal 'abd al Nasir with great success. The basic idea of Arab unity is that all Arabs are part of a greater political entity, based on their socio-cultural similarities. Admittedly, government elites often ignore the concept except when it is useful for their own particular purposes in mobilizing both internal and external support of certain policies.

As William R. Thompson discovered in his study on the Arab sub-system, the region does display some "uneveness of intra-sub-system connections," suggesting a Mashriq (East) versus a Maghrib (West) division, each having its own sub-systemic tendencies.[9] This, however, may be no more than an indication that the Arab sub-system is still developing and, viewed over time, such divisional sub-systemic

tendencies may be eliminated. The data provided in this study may shed some light on the matter.

There are other political actors in the Arab sub-system which are not included in the analysis, simply because the focus will be on government elites of the nations. The other actors, which have had varying degrees of political significance, are the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba'ath Party, and the Arabian-American Oil Company. The study of roles and influence played within the Arab region of these transnational actors could be a refinement in future work.

Analytical Approach

With regard to integration, my particular leanings support the view that regional integration is a process, a phenomenon which continually develops and evolves, but with certain limitations. While integration is expected to increase at the regional level, there is the matter of national sovereignty to reckon with. Also, with reference to the Singer-Small study, nations appear to be limited in their ability and desire to expand their field of integrative interactions. Nevertheless, the task at hand is to measure increases in integration, or cohesion, and to determine, if possible, any effect such sub-systemic integration has on the international system.

The correlational hypothesis I will be testing is: As regional political integration increases, there is a corresponding decrease in political interactions between the region's member states and states outside the region. For purposes of this paper, a distinction is made between interactions and transactions:

> Transactions are defined as items of actions that have at some point in time become so numerous, so commonplace, and so normal to their situation that they are accounted for conventionally in an aggregated form, usually by some unit other than item frequency (i.e., dollar values of trade, numbers of troops in the field, etc.). Interactions are, by our definition, single action items of a non-routine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in some clear sense are directed across a national boundary and have, in most instances, a specific foreign target.[10]

The hypothesis will require three measurements, that of regional integration, regional member state interactions with extra-regional nations, and the correlation between the two.

I have selected the Arab region for analysis, first because I am more familiar with this region than with most others. Also, the Arab region has not yet reached the level of maturity evidenced by the European Economic Community, nor does there appear to be a sub-systemic dominant-subordinate relationship that is found, for example, in Latin America (with the United States).

Of the nations in the Arab region, I am selecting 13 for analysis: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, The Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the Yemen Arab Republic. These countries comprise the core of the region. All have been independent for a sufficient time prior to the beginning date of the analysis (1965) to begin articulating national and foreign policies unclouded by emotional nationalistic themes. In short, I felt a period of maturation in self-government was necessary, particularly with regard to cognitive interdependence among the member states.

As mentioned earlier, I regard a developmental analysis of regional integration as the most fruitful approach, an approach which may have some predictive qualities. As such, the level of integration, and gradual extra-regional isolation will be seen as a function of time.

Data on selected variables will be collected for eight years, aggregated in four two-year periods, covering an eleven year span: 1965-66, 1968-69, 1971-72, and 1974-75. The reader will note that three years were omitted, providing a one year break between the two year aggregates. This was done purposely, for several reasons. First, data collection for the full eleven years may prove unmanageable, particularly if additional variables are examined at a later date. Second, the two-year aggregates selected are evenly spaced, which should aid in the assembly and analysis of the data. Third, some of the periods of greatest conflict in the region occurred during the three years omitted, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the 1970 Jordanian civil war, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Such intense crises as occurred during the years omitted are considered as abnormal to the integrative process, even given the belligerent proclivities of some Arab states. Conflict, however, was not unique to the years omitted. For example, in 1965 and 1966, both the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Saudi Arabia continued as adversaries in the Yemeni civil war. The 1970 Jordanian conflict with the Palestinians continued almost unabated until July 1971. The particularly tragic civil war in Lebanon began in 1974 and continued throughout 1975.

The two data variables selected for both regional integration and extra-regional interactions are state visits by government elites and mutual diplomatic representations (exchange of embassies and legations). For purposes of this study, the type of interactions selected must be observable, measurable, and reliable as indicators of integration. As will be discussed in Chapter II, several indicators are available which fulfill the above three conditions, including trade

data, travel, U.N. voting patterns, and so forth. In developing a base for future study, the two variables I have selected seem most appropriate. Both are political indicators, and can serve as a check on each other for anomalies which may develop. Also, both involve the government elites, the decision-makers of the subject countries.

For data collection of state visits, I have limited my attention to heads of state and their cabinets and, where appropriate, special envoys. I am not giving consideration to multilateral meetings and conferences sponsored by regional and international organizations (Islamic Conference, the Arab League), as these are not amenable to the analysis of this study.

I have given a great deal of thought to the possibility of rank-ordering the political status of the visitors, but I am forced to conclude that this would in no way add to the validity of the data. There simply are too many other considerations which would have to be dealt with. For example, do all heads of state share the same political status, and from whose perspective is this to be judged; what of ministers and prime ministers? Are the purposes and length of the visits to be rank-ordered also? Does a one week sojourn in a Moroccan seaside resort have twice the status as a three-day working conference in Damascus? These, and many more such considerations require too many judgmental decisions and would detract from the validity of the findings.

The visits, then, by necessity will ignore these with the hope that, given the four two-year aggregates, there will be an evening-out process. Not considered, of course, are state visits and communications data not readily available in public sources.

Mutual diplomatic representation data pose fewer problems. The indicator's greatest strength is that, by exchanging embassies or legations (no differentiation was made), it becomes an overt and measureable act by one state towards another as to that state's legitimacy and as a means of opening official political communications between the two. As for its measurement, either there has been an exchange of representatives, or there has not. A non-exchange is as significant (some would argue more so) as an exchange.

Major data sources are the Europa compendiums on the Middle East and North Africa for diplomatic representations and, the "Chronology" sections of the Middle East Journal for state visits. The latter source is supplemented by the New York Times Index, for cross-checking, especially where clarification of the data seems necessary.

Once collected, the data will be analyzed to determine any increases or decreases over time of the interactions, using the four two-year aggregates. There then will be an attempt to unearth any correlation between the trend in the number of regional interactions vice extra-regional interactions.

This study is based on some critical analytical assumptions and accepted principles in the discipline of political science. The two most important principles are:

1. The international system, comprised of nations as actors and regions, or blocs, as sub-systems, is valid.[11]

2. Regional integration is a developmental and measureable process.[12]

The critical assumptions are:

1. Regional cohesiveness can be measured by the number of interactions between states.[13]

2. Political interactions in the form of import and export of state visits by government elites and in exchanges of diplomatic representatives are valid indicators of levels of integration, as expressions of mutually shared interests.[14]

3. Nations tend to conduct most of their interactions with a relatively small group of nations which share common interests with them.[15]

4. The Arab region, as defined in preceeding pages, is an acceptable sub-system for this analysis.[16]

5. The exclusion of transnational actors, the exclusion of one year between each two year aggregate, and the limitation of interaction variables to state visits and diplomatic representation will not detract from the overall validity of the findings derived from testing the hypothesis.[17]

Other, more limited, assumptions are discussed elsewhere in the paper where appropriate.

Value of the Study

As noted earlier, there is no satisfactory explanation as to why nations act as they do, especially with regard to conflict. Most theories on conflict and on interactions are globally oriented. This study is an attempt to analyze national interactions at a lower, regional level. It is hoped that such analysis can contribute to an eventual global "grand theory."

> Whatever our degree of cynicism about "world government," part of the credit for peace might also have to be assigned to certain

aspects of international structure, in particular to the regional international structures which continue to appear. Where world government has proved impossible, peace-maintaining international organizations may nonetheless function on a regional basis, perhaps because a governmental structure collects around the implementation of some common economic interest, or because the shared cultural and ethnic attributes of the nations in the region create an interest in presenting a "common front" of image and legitimacy to the outside world.[18]

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

[1]Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

[2]Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

[3]Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[4]Ted Robert Gurr, Politimetrics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), 18.

[5]James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1971), 305.

[6]Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics (San Ramon, California: Consensus Publishers, Inc., 1972), 197.

[7]Ibid., 199.

[8]Europa Publications Limited, The Middle East and North Africa, 20th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1974), 119.

[9]William R. Thompson, "The Arab Sub-System and the Feudal Pattern of Interaction, 1965," Research Communications, 1968, 161.

[10]Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 713.

[11]See Chapter II, 24-25 for further discussion.

[12]See the section on Political Integration in Chapter II for further discussion.

[13]Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," The Integration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James Toscano (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), 23.

[14]Thompson, 154.

[15]Morgan, 193.

[16]Thompson, 154.

[17]Chapter II, 23.

[18]Fred I. Greestein and Nelson Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8, International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Westey Publishing Co., 1975), 217-18.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss briefly the evolution and characteristics of the systems approach to political science analysis. Also, in greater detail, I will review the concepts of the scientific study of international politics, the nation-state as a political actor, and political integration as viewed by functionalists and their critics. In the remainder of the chapter, I will comment on certain studies on political integration which have particular relevance to this study.

Realism

Since World War II there have been two major movements in the study of international relations. The first, termed political realism or, simply, realism, "dominated the study of international relations in America from 1940 to 1960."[1] The second movement, called here the systemic approach, has had pre-eminence in the last decade or so, and has adopted much of the "realist" concepts of viewing the international political process, but with some reservations.

Realists, according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,[2] are deterministic in that nation-states are seen as behaving solely according to what they perceive as their national interests. Focus, then, is placed on the nation-state as the primary political actor. Realists "have generally assumed that states are the only significant actors;

that they act as units; and that their military security objectives dominate their other goals."[3]

Nation-states are viewed by realists as constantly in some form of conflict of interest with other states. There exists no bilateral or multilateral harmony; there exists only a struggle for power. Open conflict is avoided when national interests are not threatened or when there is agreement in the existing balance of power among contending states. As such, an analysis of nation-state behavior must determine the measure of a state's power, based on geographical factors, technology, industrial growth, population, armed forces, political ideology, or any combination thereof.[4]

One of the more notable realists is Hans J. Morganthau. He defines all politics as a "struggle for power."[5] For Morganthau, the lessons of historical experience are paramount in decision-making, as is the concept that decision-making is a rational process. In assessing, or even predicting nation state behavior, the analyst must ask himself:

> ...what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible.[6]

According to Morganthau, political action can be only of three forms: "A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power."[7] The concept of balance of power, and political realism, is not unique to post World War II international politics. For example, Edward Gulick, in his excellent political history,

Europe's Classical Balance of Power,[8] explores in great detail balance of power as a political philosophy and policy in early 19th Century Europe.

This is a very brief look at both Morganthau and political realism. Realists have had an enormous impact on political science in general, and on the study of international relations in particular. One example is in the analysis of decision-making. Typical studies have been simulations of crisis decision-making, attempts to re-enact and examine the decision-making process which occurred when a nation-state's interests, and survival, were at stake. One example was an attempt to simulate the actions of key national leaders prior to the outbreak of World War I.[9] A related analysis was done by Graham Allison on the Cuban missile crisis, but with a new perspective that considered not only "rational" political leaders, but also bureaucratic and government organizational influences on the decisions ultimately made.[10]

Realists have provoked a considerable amount of criticism, and probably an equal amount of support among political scientists.[11] Nevertheless, some of the criticism appears valid,[12] particularly as concerns the idea of "national interest," the many interpretations of that interest, and the impossibility of quantifying such a concept for analysis. Too much emphasis must be placed on idiosyncratic behavior of a few people, and too much attention is given to highly publicized and unique occurrences, at the cost of ignoring the normal interactions and transactions among political communities.

The Systems Approaches

The critics of political realism have sought new approaches to the study of international political behavior and generally have all, in one form or another, focused on examining international politics as occurring within a global system, with all political communities participating actively within the system. Realists did not ignore the concept of an international system but, with their stress on national power, their system tended to be a bipolar system comprised of the major powers, and little or no attention was given to other nation-states. Rosecrance[13] and Young[14] were two that dismissed the concept of the exclusiveness of bipolarity. The former promoted a dynamic, multipolar world, with shifting alliances among nation-states, and groups of smaller, less powerful nations that had influence on "balances of power." Young, possibly with tongue-in-cheek, advanced still another concept, one of bi-multipolarity, a sort of dominant-subordinate system.

Still more variations have been offered by Morton Kaplan.[15] He has provided as many as ten structural forms of the international system to describe the behavior of nations acting within the system. The six primary model variants Kaplan proposed were: 1) a balance of power system, as supported by Morganthau; 2) a loose bipolar system, similar to Rosecrance's multipolarity, with an active role played by inter-governmental organizations; 3) a tight bipolar system, again, as supported by Morganthau; 4) a universal system, with a supra-national political body; 5) an hierarchical system, with the more powerful nation-states dominating the actions of others; and 6) a unit veto system, where the nation-states are in a position to, and do, threaten

each other for their own interests. This last model is closely linked to the first and fifth models.

All of these systems models of Kaplan, Rosecrance, Young, et. al., were attempts to develop frameworks within which to examine conflict and, particularly Kaplan's models:

> ...although less complex than the international system of the real world, are designed to facilitate comparison with the real world to contribute to a meaningful ordering of data, and to build theory at the macro-level.[16]

At present, the study of international relations has taken many diverse forms, all influenced in some way by both the realists and the systems model builders. Some of the new concepts and approaches to the study of relations between and among nations, as identified by Raymond Platig,[17] include:

1. Political integration, as the process of building larger political communities.

2. Conflict resolution, by the study of such phenomena as alliances and arms races.

3. General systems study.

4. Decision-making, by political leaders, analyzed by means of complex input-output models and paradigms.

5. Game theory, such as Thomas Schelling's zero-sum, non-zero-sum hypothesis.[18]

6. Simulation.

Not only have new approaches evolved:

> Most of the recent departures in theory and research rely upon concepts and techniques hitherto foreign to the field of international relations--concepts and techniques drawn from anthropology, communications, economics, operations research, psychology, and sociology. Along with the new concepts have come new practitioners equipped with mathematical techniques of data handling and analysis:

> some applying probability models, some searching for quantifiable indices of basic processes and factors, and some researching the storehouse of mathematical models for those that might fit....[19]

One technique identified by Platig is the use of quantitative data, which connotes a "scientific" approach to the study of international relations. As Platig noted, this is a relatively new methodology, and many of the "ground rules" for conducting quantitative political analysis have not been sufficiently developed in order to gain universal acceptance. There are, however, some standard analytical parameters and methods, which I will now discuss.

Scientific Study of International Politics

There are a number of terms used to describe the scientific approach to the study of international relations, all essentially meaning the same thing. One frequently used term is "macro-quantitative analysis," applied for the study of nations within a global system, using aggregate data.[20] Another is "politimetrics,"[21] paralleling the term econometrics, but again used in attempts to isolate a discipline within political science which deals with the study of national level political comparisons, based on aggregate data. A third term, the "scientific study of international politics," (SSIP)[22] is more inclusive in its description as its inventor sought to include the study of all political actors.

As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, political realists have tended to research particular events, organizations, and individuals as separate phenomena:

> ...a central difference between SSIP and what is often termed "traditional" research is a difference between a concern for characteristics of classes of events or entities as opposed to descriptions of unique events or entities.[23]

Obviously, the only practical way of accumulating and analyzing representative information on classes of political events and entities is to resort to quantitative procedures. As Greenstein and Polsby also point out, unlike the realist approach, SSIP requires not only a hypothesis or model as an analytical framework, but also operational rules for testing the hypothesis.[24] The necessity for the scientific approach, and its intent, is well defined by Charles McClelland:

> The scientific point of view arises from the conviction that there are many new things to learn about international behavior and that discoveries about the flow of interaction...as the reality of international relations are possible. The search is for patterns of conduct, the recurring responses, and the regularities of action in international situations. The frank objective of the scientific approach is to learn about patterns and trends in order to be able to predict what is likely to happen in international relations....The aim is to develop skill in showing "which way the wind is blowing" and, therefore, what might well happen under stated circumstances.[25]

The scientific approach consists of three fundamental interdependent procedures.[26] First comes the construct of a testable hypothesis. "A hypothesis is simply a statement about what is thought to exist, about how certain things appear to be related, or about how something operates."[27] Stated another way, a hypothesis says that if condition A exists (or occurs), then condition B develops, under constraints $X_1 \ldots\ldots X_n$, all other things being equal. A and B are variables, quantitatively measureable classes of data relevant to the hypothesis. For the hypothesis to be valid, there must be a correlation between variables A and B, and if variable A can be measured empirically, then variable B may be predicted.[28] The constraints of the hypothesis are analytical limitations, usually other relevant variables which are excluded from the hypothesis:

> Because of the extreme difficulty in accounting for all possible variables, social scientists in particular have "systematically excluded" certain variables in their theoretical formulations.... Explicit exclusions of variables does not make the theory false; it rather states more carefully the conditions under which the stated relationships will hold true.[29]

The second interdependent procedure following the construct of a hypothesis is to test, or operationalize, the hypothesis. This is where observable, measurable facts are fitted against the hypothesis. "A good hypothesis will include some indications of how the testing is to be carried out and it will be stated in a form so that there is a chance to show whether it is correct or not."[30] The third procedure is the analysis of the findings and, if warranted, a prediction based on the findings.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter and in Chapter I, there is no one complete set of rules for the scientific approach which is generally accepted and followed, nor has there been an attempt to organize research into a comprehensive effort. "...the scientific (or behavioral) approach has failed to produce enough material to support a general survey of international relations. The accomplishment to date amounts to little 'islands' of research...."[31] Nevertheless, there have been attempts to "bridge" these islands, by publications such as Gurr's Politimetrics,[32] which provide the researcher with accepted analytical tools for dealing with quantitative data, and by various compilations of data on variables frequently used in the scientific approach. One such work is the Taylor and Hudson World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.[33] This is a compendium of cross-national aggregate data on political and social indicators which

may be subjected to quantitative analysis. These works are attempts to develop commonalities in research techniques in order to link McClelland's "islands" of research.

The Nation-State as Political Actor

Up to now I have discussed some of the major approaches in political science research. Also, it was pointed out that one commonly held idea among the approaches was the concept of an international system comprised of various political communities acting within the system. The hypothesis of this paper relies on one form of these political communities, the nation-state. The nation-state is one of the variables selected for testing the hypothesis, and as such, requires my excluding other types of political communities. The following discussion is to justify, as it were, the selection of the nation-state variable as a valid technique, while excluding other similar variables (keeping in mind Teune's comments in a preceeding paragraph on the necessity of excluding valid and relevant variables).

"...the national state--our primary actor in international relations,"[34] has been a commonly held constant for most political scientists, with the possible exception of the functionalists, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Kenneth Boulding notes, "An international system consists of a group of interacting units called 'nations' or 'countries,' to which may sometimes be added certain supra-national organizations, such as the United Nations."[35] The attractiveness of viewing the global system as primarily a group of easily identifiable units sharing the same characteristics is based on a number of reasons, which Raymond Platig has examined.[36] "The most

persistent and common arrangement throughout recorded history is that of the territorial state, an arrangement wherein it has been relatively easy to identify a dominant (sovereign) center of power (government) within the territory."[37] Platig notes that, legally, sovereignty allows a government of a nation-state not to acknowledge the legitimacy of external restraints on its behavior, accepting that it does not consent to these restraints. Also, politically, sovereignty equates to autonomy, wherein the government of a nation-state requires sufficient power in order to reject or willingly accept the external restraints. For Platig, there is a caveat, however:

> It is obvious that not all states that enjoy sovereignty in the legal sense command sufficient power to enjoy autonomy. It is equally obvious that not even the government of the most powerful of states is able to avoid having some of its actions, both external and internal, influenced by external forces, especially those that can be brought to bear by the governments of other states.[38]

To Kenneth Boulding, the essence of a nation-state is its territoriality.[39] Given the dynamics of international politics, the "exclusiveness of territorial occupation" is important simply because no one nation can expand without it being at the expense of another state, hence, the constant opportunity for conflict. Ultimately, only the nation-state can provoke widespread conflict; in this sense it is the determinant in international relations.

For J. David Singer, it is the nation-state's ability to act which makes it important.[40] He views nations as "goal-seeking" actors which do so in a purposeful manner. "...nations move toward outcomes of which they have little knowledge and over which they have less control, but that they nevertheless do prefer, and therefore select,

particular outcomes and attempt to realize them by conscious formulation of strategies."[41] This view corresponds well with Graham Allison's rational actor model.[42]

It is no accident, then, that such research aids as the Taylor and Hudson Handbook focus on the nation for the compilation of aggregate data for use in the "scientific study of international politics."

Political Integration

One of the systems approaches coming into more frequent use is the study of political integration. Oran Young has noted that the move towards the study of integration has occurred in part because of the complicating relationships on a subsidiary level which have arisen due to the fracturing of a clearly defined bipolar world. He states that at present, regional sub-systems, as manifestations of subsidiary level relationships, are becoming significant actors in their own right in the global system.[43]

As with all other fields and sub-fields of political science, there is no one established technique with which to conduct research of political integration. Research has differed in the type and number of variables (integration indicators) selected, as well as in analytical frameworks used. All work in political integration has one common goal, however; that is, to examine the development of new political communities beyond the nation-state. Despite the diffusion in effort, there have been several analytical concepts developed which examine the processes and conditions of political integration. Representative works and comments are discussed below, followed by a closer examination of studies having a more direct bearing on the paper.

Michael Brecher, in an article titled "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," states that prior to 1960, the only level of analysis used in international relations was the nation-state. He notes that, while the nation-state level probably would remain paramount, "new macro-perspectives have emerged,"[44] The latter was a reference to a systems level of analysis, of which there are three identifiable groups, or sub-systems. These are the global political system, the dominant system, and the subordinate system. The dominant and subordinate systems comprise the global system. Brecher cautions, however that:

> The World System is not merely the sum of relations within the Dominant (bipolar bloc) System and in all subordinate systems; rather there is a need to link a model of the Dominant System with those of the subordinate systems in order to devise a comprehensive model of the World System.[45]

In answering his own question as to why there is a need to examine subordinate systems, Brecher provides four reasons.[46]

1. The analysis will give a region-wide perspective to area specialists.

2. It will permit the study of interaction among states, not merely the exploration of one state's actions and foreign policy.

3. For international relations specialists, a systems concept towards a sub-system such as a region will increase data analysis and will allow tentative hypotheses on unit (state or region) behavior. It is one step towards an empirical theory of comparative systems analysis.

4. "There is the question of the linkage between the Subordinate and Dominant Systems of the time. An inquiry into the nature and extent of penetration (or interpenetration) of the two systems will

shed light on the degree of autonomy of the Subordinate System and its units. It will also represent a first step towards achieving the goal noted earlier--an all inclusive model of the World Political System."[47]

Brecher identifies five subordinate systems, apart from the dominant systems of the US and USSR. These are the Middle East, American (Latin), Southern Asian, West European, and West African. Brecher's five subordinate systems are not intended to be all inclusive of the world's nation-states. Rather, these five systems satisfy the following required conditions:[48]

1. The scope of a subordinate state system is delimited, with the primary stress placed on geographic factors.

2. The system must have at least three actors.

3. Taken together, these actors are recognized by other actors as comprising a distinctive community, region, or portion of the global system.

4. The members of a subordinate system identify themselves as such.

For describing a specific subordinate system, Brecher recommends that the political scientist rely on the following indicators:[49]

1. Geographical proximity.

2. The year when the region became distinctive, both to the members and other nations (usually noted by the formation of a regional security, economic, or political organization).

3. The distribution of power within the region.

4. The organizational integration of the member states.

5. The amount and type of interactions among the members. "The degree of integration is closely related to...the character and frequency of interaction among the members."[50]

6. The degree of communications and transport among member states.

7. The similarity and dissimilarity of socio-cultural values of members.

8. The diversity of political systems among the member states.

9. The internal stability of the members.

Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, in The Integration of Political Communities,[51] also developed what they considered were key integrative factors for sub-systems. These were:

1. Geographical proximity. "The hypothesis is that the closer people live together geographically, the more likely are integrative relationships to develop among them; and the closer communities are to each other, the greater the likelihood of their political integration."[52]

2. Homogeneity. "...social homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of political integration."[53]

3. Interactions. "...cohesiveness among individuals and among communities of individuals can be measured by--and is probably promoted by--the extent of mutual relationships or interaction among them."[54]

4. Mutual knowledge, or cognitive proximity. The authors regard mutual awareness between groups of people as essential for political integration.

5. Functional interest. "...integration would be viewed as dependent on the extent to which the dominant functional interests are

shared in each community and thus could be advanced by inter-community agreement or association."[55]

6. Communal character and social motive. "...societies may acquire by cultural inheritance and learning a set of behavioral dispositions so pervasive and compelling that the whole group will tend to act in a distinctive manner."[56]

7. Structural frame. The authors ask what role members play in an established regional organization as community decision-makers.

8. Previous integrative experience.

9. Sovereignty--dependency status. This is to be measured both intraregionally and externally, as to the influence of a dominant power.

Integration theory usually involves some form of analysis over time. Often, these theories are based on the proposition that political community development is expansionist, and will lead to the integration of a global supra-national community. Essentially, national sovereignty, as discussed in preceeding pages, is not regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to integration. As such, much of the theorizing and analysis tends to disregard the nation-state as a unit of analysis. This particular school of thought generally is referred to as "functionalism." For functionalists, the key to integration is the expansion of mutual transactions on all levels of society. There also is the concept of a "spillover" effect; expansion of transactions in one area will lead to the growth of the number of transactions in another area.

Karl Deutsch, in an article in The Integration of Political Communities,[57] focused his analysis on the international flow of mail as a measure of integration. For Deutsch, the essence of integration is communications. Along with such transactions as mail flow, Deutsch

also has conducted analysis on such routine behavior as air travel between communities.[58] The level of analysis for Deutsch normally has been metropolitan centers of the world. A similar approach stressing communications has been used by Michael Haas, but Haas has placed the caveat that, "The communication subfunction is performed usually in dyads between official representatives of two basic units."[59] Haas, then, differs from Deutsch on the types of communications considered significant.

A follower of Michael Haas is Karl Kaiser. In an article in World Politics, titled, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems,"[60] Kaiser analyzes various forms of regional subsystems, based on social, economic and political interactions between communities. Of particular interest to Kaiser is the role played by government bureaucracies and how they communicate with similar bureaucracies of other nations in carrying out routine governmental functions. For Kaiser, as this form of communication increases, so does political integration.

A fourth functionalist, Ernst B. Haas, the author of Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization,[61] also has emphasized the analysis of government representatives and institutions. For Ernst Haas, integration occurs as a learning process for these representatives and institutions, but as with the other functionalists, communities and organizations are the units of analysis, not the nation-state. Also, he states:

> The main reason for studying...regional integration...is normative: the units and actions provide a living laboratory for observing the peaceful creation of possible new types of human communities at a very high level of organization and the processes that may lead to such conditions.[62]

As with most functionalists and, indeed, others studying political integration, the techniques employed normally are based on the gathering and analysis of empirical data, arranged as to type of transactions. Another approach, used by Joseph Nye, Jr., in Pan-Africanism and East African Integration,[63] was to conduct a large number (over 100) interviews with political elites, and then perform a qualitative analysis on the nature and extent of integration.

Still another non-quantitative approach was used by Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye, in a World Politics article titled, "Trans-governmental Relations and International Organization."[64] In the article, the authors contend that international organizations promote and facilitate transgovernmental and transnational relations--the greater the involvement in inter-governmental organizations (IGO's), the greater the extent of various types of relations (political, economic, and military).

As with the work done by Kaiser, Koehane and Nye regard as a critical milestone in integration the expansion of communications between bureaucracies of various countries without resort to issue by issue guidance from their respective foreign ministers. Such communi-cations, or "sub-unit relations," are viewed as performing two basic functions: Transgovernmental policy coordination and transgovernmental coalition building. The latter is especially significant, as the authors, using the European Economic Community (EEC) (a favorite unit of analysis for functionalists), state that bilateral and multilateral bureaucratic relations can and do usurp some of the policy making functions of a national leader and his cabinet. Mutually shared interests of like bureaucracies are seen as transcending national

interests. Examples of such bureaucracies are Interpol, the military services, the EEC agencies, and regulatory agencies. Also, agencies outside the community, such as the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, the U.N. Council for Trade and Development, and the World Health Organization, all of the U.N. system, are seen as contributing to the bureaucratic coalitions. As for the analytical technique used by the authors, they relied solely on a qualitative, issue-oriented approach.

These functionalists are not without their critics, however. John Herz has noted, "There are indicators pointing in another direction: not to 'universalism' but to retrenchment; not to interdependence but to a new self-sufficiency; toward area not losing its impact but regaining it; in short, trends toward a new-territoriality."[65] Herz's comment was directed toward both nation-states and groups of nations organized into regions. A main reason for Herz's conclusion on this "new-territoriality" involves two national level considerations. The first is the concept of sovereignty, in both a legal and political sense as presented by Platig in preceeding pages. The second consideration has to do with a nation-state's limitations on national resources to expand its international transactions and interactions, and simply on the desires of national leaders to restrict their interactions with those nations with which it shares common interests.

Even Karl Deutsch, the functionalist, in concert with J. David Singer, in an article in World Politics, titled, "Multipolar Power Systems and Internal Stability,"[66] commented at length on this "anti-functionalist" phenomenon. The authors acknowledge that, with an increase in nations as political actors in the international system, there is a geometric increase in the number of possible "dyads" (pairs

of interacting units). Also, as a nation enters a coalition of nations, such as a regional organization, the coalition exerts an inhibiting influence on the freedom of that nation to interact with non-coalition nations. The influence can be in many forms, such as psychological (the interactions may not be in the interest of the coalition as a whole), or in demands for interaction with the nation by other nations within the coalition.

The authors conclude that this joining of a coalition produces for all members a reduction in opportunities for interactions with other nations. The net impact is a destabilizing one for the international system as a whole. There are fewer opportunities for mutual cooperation among nations in different coalitions.

The concept of nations organizing into coalitions is based on a few assumptions. First, "All association depends on the existence of identical interests."[67] *Also, as seen by Morganthau,* all alliances and coalitions result from "purposeful commitments" and conscious decisions by nation-states.[68] In short, nations join together because they want to, and usually because they share common interests.

Beside the Singer-Small study on the correlates of war discussed in Chapter I, and those presented above, Singer also has written:

> ...no nation has the resources to engage in serious efforts to influence a great many of the others at any given time; we select our influence targets because of the perceived importance of our relationship to, and our dependence upon, them. In addition, there is a particular tendency to concentrate such efforts upon those nations with which we are already in a highly competitive and conflictful relationship, devoting far fewer resources to those with whom our relations are either friendly or negligible.[69]

A conclusion by Patrick Morgan in Theories and Approaches to International Politics is that:

> Every government is concerned about and interacts relatively intensively with some group of nations smaller than all of the nations of the world. The implication is that for many aspects of international politics the world is best thought of as a collection of clusters of nations, that much of the business of international politics takes place within these groups and between them.[70]

Cantori-Speigel and Russett

As mentioned a number of times in previous pages, there is no one established way of defining and analyzing political integration. This also is true of those works examining regionalism as a facet of political integration. Several works on regionalism and integration, which are of special interest to this paper, will be discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter.

The first two works to be reviewed are The International Politics of Regions,[71] by Louis Cantori and Steven Speigel, and International Regions and the International System,[72] by Bruce Russett. A comparison of these two works offer several similarities and dissimilarities; however, both works have the same basic intent: To define existing regions as groups of nation-states and sub-systems within the international system.

Cantori and Speigel base their analysis of regions on the premise that the "interaction of relations within the region,"[73] or subordinate system, is an integral part of the global system, the other parts being the dominant system, identified as the "confrontation of the most powerful of nations,"[74] and the nation-state system, as individual units within the international system. With regard to regions, more specifically,

> ...a subordinate system consists of one state, or two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic,

> linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system.[75]

For the authors, there are some more specific criteria in identifying existing regions:

1. A region may consist of only one nation-state.

2. A nation-state may belong only to one subordinate system, or region.

3. There are geographical limitations to the subordinate system.

4. "Social, economic, political and organizational factors are...relevant."[77]

5. Subordinate systems characteristically exhibit complex political, social and economic interaction and transactions.

6. "Indigenous political relationships, geographic factors, and social and historical backgrounds help to define a subordinate system."[78]

7. External "power" influences contribute to the composition of a subordinate system.

8. The composition of subordinate systems is dynamic because of the fluidity of ideological and political factors, even given the relative stability of social factors and geographic boundaries of nation-states.

In applying their integrative criteria, Cantori and Speigel conducted their analysis on a judgmental, qualitative basis. Also, there was a noticeable absence of attempts to measure integration as a developmental process. The authors seem to have relied on several articles by other political scientists to account for the latter, which

they included in their study. All of the articles are speculative in nature, and are issue and personality oriented. For example, one such article discusses Arab unity,[79] using the traditional approach of focusing on Gamal 'abd al Nasir and his abortive attempts to present a legitimate United Arab Republic, much in the same vein, but not as brilliantly, as Malcolm Kerr's The Arab Cold War, 1958-1970.[80]

By the speculative and "realist" use of their criteria (i.e., no testing of any hypothesis), Cantori and Speigel identify 15 world regions, each characterized by a core of one or more states, a group of peripheral states, and an "intrusive system," a group of states applying external influence on the others in the core and periphery. One example is the Middle East region, where the core comprises ten Arabo-Islamic states (North African states are considered as a separate Arab region), with a periphery of non-Arabic, Middle Eastern states (i.e., Turkey, Cyprus, etc.). The states within the intrusive system include the US and the USSR.

To further attempt to define the nature and character of their 15 regions, the authors group their regions into four classes, representing their degree of integration. These classes, in descending order of integration, are the integrative system, the consolidated system, the cohesive system, and the coherent system. For example, the core Arab states in each of the Middle East and North Africa regions are considered as cohesive systems, based, again, on the judgmental, non-quantitative application of their integrative criteria. For a cohesive system to exist, the authors require a high degree of congruence, among the states, of one of the pattern variables, or indicators.[81]

The greater the integration, the larger the number of pattern variables which exhibit a great deal of congruence.

While the Cantori and Speigel work provide some assistance to political scientists for developing analytical frameworks with which to examine integration, the authors do not shed any light on techniques which may be used to measure the dynamics of the integrative process. For this, we may turn to Bruce Russett's study on integration.

Early on in his study, Russett voices a concern regarding definitions of regions, cautioning that, "Different definitions and different criteria will often produce different regions, and no two analysts may fully agree as to what the appropriate criteria are."[82] Also, he disapproves of defining regions by a single, deterministic criterion or indicator, and states that there are many acceptable groupings when a variety of thoughtfully selected criteria are used. For Russett, his essential criteria, stated as regions, each exhibiting a particular characteristic, are:

1. "Regions of social and cultural homogeneity; that is, regions composed of states which are similar with respect to several kinds of internal attributes."[83]

2. "Regions of states which share similar political attitudes or external behavior."[84]

3. "Regions of political interdependence,"[85] or the existence of inter-governmental interdependence through organizations.

4. "Regions of economic interdependence."[86]

5. "Regions of geographic proximity."[87]

Unlike the Cantori and Speigel study, Russett treated each of his criteria as "sub-hypotheses," and attempted to test the existence

or non-existence of regions using aggregate data for key variables correlated with each of the criteria. Once accomplished, he then correlated all of the regions unearthed by each of the criteria, to arrive at a composite group of regions.

To operationalize and test the first proposition, above, Russett collected and analyzed data on 54 different variables, ranging from language and ethnicity, to the GNP and income distribution for each nation-state on which data was available, for a given year. The result was a group of four large regions. The second proposition, concerning political attitudes, was examined by the use of U.N. voting patterns as the variable. Here, Russett discovered five fairly distinct regions. Russett examined his third proposition, on political interdependence, by measuring common membership in inter-governmental organizations, which resulted in seven major groupings (including one region comprising 12 of the 13 states used in this thesis as a valid region). Economic interdependence, the fourth proposition, was explored by use of an import and export trade data variable, resulting in nine regions. The last proposition, concerning geographical proximity, was examined by measuring air distances from nation-state capitals. Here, four regions evolved. Data for all of the variables was collected for individual years. Russett did not attempt any longitudinal studies, except when comparing the economic and political interdependence propositions, where two years, 1951 and 1963 were used,[88] and for a brief look at the impact of geographical proximity on conflict (all conflict which resulted in 100 or more battle deaths) where conflict was measured for the period 1946 through 1965.[89]

Of special interest to this paper, when Russett applied all of his criteria (propositions) to the nation-states, there emerged a distinctive Arab group comprising the same Arab countries discovered when he examined his political interdependence proposition.[90] The Yemen Arab Republic, the 13th Arab country used in the thesis, habitually was left out of Russett's findings due to a consistent lack of data on that country.

Russett's major conclusion from all of his analysis and correlations is that, "There is a progression toward the integration of still larger units, but for the forseeable future, it will involve only the integration of regional subsystems and not the entire international system."[91]

Galtung-Reinton-Thompson

Johan Galtung, in a series of articles prepared for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and published in that institute's periodical, Journal of Peace Research, discussed some concepts and principles to consider when analyzing political integration. In one such article, in defining integration,[92] Galtung was adamant on the necessity of viewing integration from the proper perspective. To Galtung, integration is the process where two or more political actors, be they nation-states or municipalities, form a new actor, such as a region, which functions as a legitimate political actor in its own right.[93] Also, he views integration as a building process. New actors formed by integration may combine with other such new actors to form a larger unit.[94] By using different integrative principles, or criteria, in various combinations, much as with the work done by Russett, a whole family of political actors may be defined.

Galtung sees integration as based on three principles, with the nation-state as the unit of analysis.[95] First is territorial integration, or geographic proximity; second is organizational or vertical integration, where nations join together for division of labor principles; third is associational or horizontal integration, where nations join together because of similarity in national interests. This normally is evidenced by participation in inter-governmental organizations. For Galtung, an example of integration usually will contain characteristics of all three principles. To account for changes in regions over time, Galtung devised a "structural-functional matrix,"[96] which presumably may be used to measure the dynamics of integration over time; I say presumably because Galtung did not design the analytical framework and assumed limitations with which to operationalize the matrix.

In a sister article,[97] Galtung expands on his three integrative principles, and examines one characteristic of regional integration, that of rank dependence among the region's members. The nations examined were those of the NATO and Warsaw Pact systems. According to Galtung, member interactions should be determined by member status within the region. The three organizational, or rank dependence, propositions which explain the interaction process, are:[98]

1. Homology proposition: "Systems that are comparable in rank and in interaction will tend towards structural similarity."[99]

2. Feudality proposition: "The higher the total rank of the pair (interacting), the easier the interaction process."[100]

3. Polarization proposition: "The lower the total rank of the pair, the higher the tendency to break interaction in case of conflict."[101]

Galtung tested his hypothesis using three major variables.[102] The first, the interaction variable, required data on 15 types of interactions, obtained from international yearbooks and Keesing's Contemporary Archives. The 15 interaction variables included diplomatic relations, state visits, U.N. interaction, trade, cultural agreements, and travel. For the time variable, Galtung selected the period June 1941 to December 1955, divided into four phases. The third major variable, the rank variable, was determined by a simple big power and small power distinction. The big powers were those with a Security Council veto power.[103] Galtung's methodology was to correlate the various interaction patterns, via tabular and graphic analysis, with the nations aligned according to rank. The time variable was used selectively, and not with each interaction variable.

For the diplomatic relations variable, Galtung included data on the establishment of an embassy or legation, the absence of these, and on accreditations where the diplomatic representatives were based in a third country. As for state visits, Galtung included as visitors the heads of state/heads of government, and foreign ministers, and their visits from one region to the other. Intra-regional visits were not counted. For validity comparisons with the state visit data, Galtung used U.N. interaction data provided by an earlier study.[104] Trade data analyzed and correlated included both the number and duration of agreements and the partners, and the extent of trade,

based on the Europa yearbook for the regions for the year 1964.[105] Travel data included statistics on visas, tourist restrictions, and tourist flow, again for a single year, 1963.[106]

For his efforts, Galtung concluded that regions operate on a feudal system. The big powers interact more with the other big powers, and the interactions are at a high level. Medium and small powers have a low intensity of interactions, and usually with big powers and not among themselves. For Galtung, this means that regional big powers are repressively dominant, whether by design or chance, and control regional interaction initiatives. The other conclusion is that the regional system becomes unstable during periods of conflict.[107]

Using the Galtung principles and feudal hypothesis of interaction, Per Olav Reinton, also in a Journal of Peace Research article,[108] attempted to demonstrate the validity of Galtung's findings by a study of Latin America. Reinton's hypothesis was, "that a nation's status in a particular system determines its intensity of participation, the character of its behavior, and its capability of influence in the system."[109]

Reinton's variable was the import and export trade data within the region, and between the region's members and the US and Western Europe, for 1965. There was no time variable, but Reinton did use a rank variable, distinguishing between high, medium and low status countries of Latin America. For his analytical methodology, Reinton relied mostly on tabular and graphic analyses, with occasional use of self-devised degree of interaction scales in order to measure intensity levels.

Reinton's findings supported those by Galtung. Reinton discovered where trade was concerned, that pairs of interacting nations with a high rank interacted at a high or medium intensity. Mixed pairs of high and medium ranks interacted at a medium or low intensity. Medium ranked pairs had low interaction. Mixed medium and low ranked pairs had low or minimal interaction. Mixed high and low pairs had few interactions, which were dominated by the high ranked unit. Last, pairs of low rank had few or no interactions. All of these findings supported Galtung's feudal hypothesis for regional interactions. Reinton also stated:

> Though the data concerns Latin America alone, we believe that the conclusions are valid for any system of nations, not just for systems of nations with a cooperative climate, with constantly interacting units, with stable patterns of interaction and so on.[110]

This "perceived" challenge by Reinton for replication of his findings in another region prompted William R. Thompson to do just that, with the Middle Eastern core of Arab states.[111] Thompson's region comprised 13 Arab states, the same 13 used in this thesis. As with Reinton, Thompson did not employ a time variable. One year, 1965, was used for data collection of his two interaction variables--trade and state visits. Trade data was used in the same manner as in the Reinton study. The state visit data was used in the same manner as in Galtung's study. The state visitors included heads of state/heads of government, and foreign ministers. For measurement of interaction intensity, Thompson used Reinton's methods of ranking degrees of intensity. The actual rank ordering was accomplished differently, however. Thompson borrowed some of Reinton's technique and employed other measures. Essentially, states were rank ordered according to

newspaper circulation, radio distribution, population, size of country, and GNP.[112] A refinement was Thompson's use of Spearmen's coefficient in his rank order correlation. The coefficient is based on a simple algebraic formula providing percentages of correlation.[113]

Data analysis by Thompson was by a series of tabular and graphic analysis depicting various mixes of interactions vice rank orders of states, much the same technique used by both Reinton and Galtung. While the analytical methodology used by Thompson essentially was the same as used by the other two analysts, his findings differed markedly. "...my findings suggest that the feudalistic interaction pattern is not universal."[114] Thompson suggested this was because of the fluctuating "status" structure among the Arab states. Defining high, medium and low rank orders was not as facile a task as in either Latin America or Europe.

While these three approaches, by Galtung, Reinton and Thompson, were accomplished for reasons somewhat different than my own, they nevertheless are significant in the variables employed and the analytical techniques used to test their hypotheses, as this thesis draws heavily on both.

Alger - Brams

The last two works reviewed in this chapter will be dealt with briefly as the characteristics of one, in particular, are discussed in some detail in Chapter III. Both of the studies were attempts to identify nations which serve as influence centers in the world, around which integration on a regional basis may occur. The first study

is by Chadwick Alger and Steven Brams, published as an article in World Politics, titled, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter-governmental Organizations."[115]

The study presents data for 1963-64 on the location of diplomats in 119 nations, the number of diplomats each country sent abroad, the number of diplomats hosted by each country, and the average size of each diplomatic mission. The second interaction variable was the extent of participation in international organizations by each nation; both variables were then correlated for measurements of each nation's official international contacts. The analytical methodology was limited to tabular analysis.

While no significant findings regarding regional integration evolved, the authors did discover that, "Diplomatic exchanges and inter-governmental organization affiliations are correlated with each other at moderately high levels."[116]

The second study was by Steven Brams, the co-author of the first. In his study,[117] Brams attempted to amplify his research on influence centers by employing a state visit variable. His use of this interaction variable is discussed at length in Chapter III.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

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[6]Ibid., 5.

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[30]McClelland, 5.

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[35]Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, 1959, 120.

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[37]Ibid., 15.

[38]Ibid., 15-16.

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[40]Singer, 20-29.

[41]Ibid., 25.

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[43]Young, passim.

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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodology to be employed in testing the hypothesis: As regional political integration increases, there is a corresponding decrease in political interactions between the region's member states and states outside the region.

The underlying principles basic to an examination of political integration, political interactions, and regional systems have been discussed at length in the preceeding chapters. In this chapter I will identify the region to be examined, the political interactions to be used as variables for measuring integration, and the use of a time variable, as well as the sources for gathering the requisite aggregate data for analysis.

Method of Analysis

The hypothesis, as stated, requires three broad measurements. First, integration of the subject region will be measured; second, political interactions between the member states of the subject region and other nations of the world will be examined; third, inter-regional political interactions as a measurement of integration will be correlated with the political interactions between the member states and the other states, to identify degrees of congruence, over a span of several years.

There exists a broad spectrum of regions as sub-systems of the international system which have been developed by political scientists, as discussed at length in Chapter II, the compositions of which have varied based on the criteria applied. The region I have selected for this study, the Arabo-Islamic region of the Middle East and North Africa, has been identified as a valid region, or sub-system, by several analysts examining integration.

There are numerous indicators which may be employed as interaction variables to measure the integrative process of this region. I have decided to use the interaction variables of state visits by government elites, and the establishment of diplomatic representation to measure political integration of the region. Both variables have been used in the past. The same variables will be used to measure the degree of interaction (by definition, the degree of integration) with the member states of the region and the other states of the world.

Aggregate data will be collected for each of the interaction variables and will be subjected to various tabular and graphic analyses in a time series framework in order to discover and measure trends in the extent of the interactions.

Data Sources

In his state visit analysis, Steven Brams[1] relied solely on the New York Times Index for his data, and referred occasionally to the New York Times when clarification of data was necessary. In evaluating his sources, Brams acknowledged problems in relying primarily on the New York Times Index, pointing out that the New York Times publications

occasionally did not report on all state visits by government officials, particularly visits involving smaller, less newsworthy countries.[2]

To avoid such single source problems, I relied primarily on the "Chronology" sections of the Middle East Journal, and used the New York Times Index for some cross-checking of journal data where clarification of the data was required. The Taylor and Hudson World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators states:

> Although there is some built-in overlap between Middle East Journal and the New York Times Index (in that the former uses the latter as one of its primary sources), the net contribution of the journal is of the same order of magnitude as that of the Associated Press.[3]

For compiling data and statistics on political and social indicators, the Taylor and Hudson World Handbook found regionally oriented publications such as the Middle East Journal very useful and avoided reliance on a single source, namely the New York Times Index, for regional data for the same reason given by Brams.[4]

The Middle East Journal "Chronology" sections draw on a wide variety of sources, including: The New York Times, the London Times, Le Monde (Paris), Reuters, Agence France Presse, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, D.C.), Pravda (Moscow), the Arab News Agency (Cairo), bulletins of the Middle East embassies in Washington, Arab News and World Report, Palestine Affairs, Mideast Mirror (Beirut), Israel Digest (Jerusalem), el-Moujahid (Algiers), al-Thawrah (Damascus), al-Nur (Baghdad), al-Hadaf (Kuwait City), L'Opinion (Rabat), al-Ummah (Khartoum), al-Ahram (Cairo), and al-Anwar (Beirut). This list of sources is representative and far from complete.

For diplomatic representation data, I relied primarily on the Europa compendia of The Middle East and North Africa. The Europa

publications data was supplemented by the Middle East Journal, the New York Times Index, and the Department of the Army Area Handbooks for each Arab world country, particularly to obtain specific dates of the dissolution and establishment of diplomatic representation. As with the Middle East Journal, the Europa compendia draw on a wide variety of primary sources, most of which are regionally oriented.

Compiling state visit data was, of course, dependent on the proper identification of government elites. For the most part, both the government officials' names and their positions were provided at the same time. On those few occasions when only a personal name was used, one or more of the following sources were searched to verify that individual's political status to determine his qualification as a "government elite:" The Europa compendia; the Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century[5]; Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, edited by Frank Tachau[6]; and the Department of the Army Area Handbooks on particular countries.

The Region

The unit of analysis for this study is the nation-state, even though the Arabo-Islamic region includes several transnational, political actors. The primacy of the nation-state as a political actor is well supported by political scientists, some of whose views on the matter are presented in Chapter II; therefore, only nation-states will be examined.

The Arabo-Islamic region comprises some 18 nation-states, identified on page 5 in Chapter I. Of these, I have selected 13 as most representative of the region, and as most appropriate for

subjecting to analysis, mainly because these 13 nation-states have been active politically for a sufficient amount of time. The 13 countries are: Algeria, Egypt (also known as the United Arab Republic during most of Gamal 'abd al-Nasir's regime), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, The Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the Yemen Arab Republic.

These same 13 countries were used by William Thompson in his study as representative of a separate Arab region.[7] Bruce Russett identified 12 of the 13 as a separate region, excluding Yemen, primarily because of a lack of data on that country.[8] Louis Cantori and Steven Speigel, in their study on regions, separated the 13 in two regions, the Middle East and North Africa, the cores of which comprised the 13 countries. As for the Cantori and Speigel division of the Arab world into two regions, Thompson dismissed its significance,[9] as did Leonard Binder--"Such groupings have not basically altered the Middle Eastern system."[10] As Thompson had noted, Binder commented that pan-Arabism (Arab unity) enhanced the interaction of the Arab members of the Middle East.[11] Michael Brecher also made note of the seemingly special relationship which exists among the Arab states:

> In the Middle East, for example, relations among the core Arab members are spatially continuous and complete, intense and acutely multilateral. The actors are in constant contact, at every level, and use every form of interaction--diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural, personal.[12]

There are political scientists, such as Johan Galtung, who share the concern that a dominant power in a regional system seriously affects the pattern of interactions, in fact, may even distort any measurement of those interactions. In consideration of these concerns,

Brecher notes, "There is no Great Power in the Middle East, real or potential. Most units in the Arab core are of the same order of power."[13]

In measuring regional integration, the political interactions will be considered for all Arab states, not only for the 13 countries. In comparing and analyzing all interaction data, however, attention will be focused on these 13 countries.

Other Nations of the World

Extra-regional nations in this study were grouped into five divisions, or blocs. The composition of the five groups were held constant for the data collection and analysis of both state visits and diplomatic representation. The list of nations for each group is at Appendix B. Included in the appendix is a discussion of the rationale for developing the five groups and the placing of certain nations within the groups. The five divisions used are Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe-USSR, and Western Europe-North America-Oceania.

Interaction Variables--State Visits

As I mentioned in Chapter I, state visit data collected and measured in the study includes bilateral visits by heads of state, their ministers and special envoys, where appropriate. These I have referred to collectively as government elites, the major decision-makers of their countries or, as Johan Galtung would have it, "the holders of collective representative status."[14] Also, "It is governments which for the most part, exercise the powers in so-called sovereign states and among which, therefore, one might expect to find many of the main power centers that interact on a global scale."[15]

As discussed elsewhere, there have been some studies which explored the government elite-state visit variable in measuring national level interactions, for example, the works by Steven Brams, Johan Galtung, and William Thompson. All three proceeded with two basic assumptions--the significance of government elites, and the significance of state visits as major political activity.

Platig has stated that there are a variety of government-to-government and nation-to-nation interactions, and, "Among the many forms of governmental interactions the most important are diplomatic, military, and economic."[16] Accepting the importance of official political relations, there must also be a distinction made among the many forms of such activity, the most significant of which is an official state visit by a senior member of government. To reinforce this point, I quote from the state-visit study by Brams:

> The kind of international relations data analyzed here is visits between heads-of-state and other high-level government officials for all nations in the world in 1964, and 1965. These data were chosen because they probably come as close as any comparative and publicly available information to reflecting the flow of influence between the major decision-makers of nations. When a high-level government official travels to a foreign nation, he usually does so because he wishes to convey information or exert influence in a manner and to a degree which could not be done otherwise. If it could, he would be much more likely to try to communicate or exert influence through other channels, such as through his ambassador or a representative to an international organization. There seems good reason, therefore, to believe that most high-level government officials visit their counterparts in foreign nations to discuss matters on which they think they can be more influential than their representatives.[17]

The next obvious question to resolve is who, specifically, qualifies as a government elite? Both the Galtung and Thompson studies limited their selections to heads of state/heads of government and their foreign ministers. As Brams was measuring international political

influence patterns, his selection was slightly more discrete, partly because he was more inclusive in deciding which official positions rendered an individual elite status. Brams divided his selected officials in two levels.[18] The first level, and those with a greater impact on influence measurements, included heads of state, leaders of the dominant party in a parliamentary or Communist system, deputy heads of state, and foreign ministers. The second level included other cabinet and sub-cabinet ministers, leaders of political parties, and other government connected officials.

Kenneth Boulding offers a third choice:

> There is usually a continuum of power among the persons of a society: thus in international relations there are usually a few very powerful individuals in a state--the chief executive, the prime minister, the secretary of state or minister of foreign affairs, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces.[19]

The purpose of this study is neither to measure influence as Brams did, nor is it to discuss nationally internal political dynamics. It is to record and examine that unique political/diplomatic interaction (as concerns state visits) which may be used to highlight the extent of mutual interests shared among nations. Also, as quantitative analysis is used, consistency is critical; therefore, it is recognized that most countries, and certainly all of the subject Arab countries, have similar governmental structures, i.e., a head of state, a deputy or deputies, and a cabinet of ministers. While names of official positions vary, their functions generally do not. Granted, there are differences in political and power status of official positions for each country, an argument in favor of avoiding a status rank ordering of such positions. To develop a consistent and broadly representative group of government elites, I am including the following:

1. Heads of state, whether prime ministers, monarchs, presidents, ruling council chairmen, or leaders of dominant political parties in parliamentary or Communist systems. Monarchs in both parliamentary monarchies and monarchical dictatorships are included.

2. Deputy heads of state.

3. Cabinet secretaries and ministers.

4. Special envoys for chief executives, where the special envoy's stature is clearly superior to sub-cabinet officials (to account for a retired Dean Achison pressed into service for an unusual event, or for a Bouteflika of Algeria, whose official position--U.N. Ambassador and President of the General Assembly--does not sufficiently account for all of his political stature). Special envoy visits will be used sparingly, and only where the situation clearly requires it.

I discussed in Chapter I some of the considerations I have given to data collection of state visits. Listed below are the specific parameters and restrictions I have employed in the collection of that data.

1. State visits by national representatives only will be considered, as the focus of this paper is on the nation as the primary political actor within the international system.

2. Only state visits by government elites will be considered.

3. Data sources are restricted to publicly available accounts of the visits.

4. The reader must keep in mind that a state visit occurs only when government elites of the two or more nations involved actually conduct some sort of meeting. This automatically excludes visits

conducted simply for personal reasons. For example, this would exclude a visit to England by the Saudi Arabian Interior Minister for the purpose of purchasing a country estate, or a visit to Paris by President Bourghiba of Tunisia for medical treatment. Such visits are included only if the visit also resulted in a meeting(s) with host government officials.

5. While neither Galtung, nor Thompson made such a distinction, I concur with Brams, that, "Visits, even from more than one nation, on commemorative occasions (e.g., a national anniversary) or ceremonial occasion (e.g., an inauguration or funeral) are counted if they result in private talks or meetings between officials of the visiting and host nations."[20]

6. Multilateral meetings and conferences will be disregarded, conforming with Thompson,[21] and for the reasons Brams has outlined:

> Visits to multilateral conferences have not been counted, since the host nation may be the location for a conference for purely idiosyncratic reasons (e.g., warm climate) that are unrelated to its "political" influence or importance. Furthermore, the significance of a nation's receiving bilateral visits of officials from, say, twenty nations over the course of a year is probably quite different from the significance of its receiving these officials for a multilateral conference at a single time. For these reasons, data on visits to multilateral conferences have not been considered comparable to data on bilateral visits.[22]

7. Visits conducted by a party of officials or hosted by several officials will be considered as one visit.

8. Group meetings, or visits, and the use of third countries pose some problem, but the following guide appears satisfactory:

> When officials of two nations meet for talks in a third nation, each of the visiting nations is considered to have visited the other. However, when the dispute between the two nations is mediated in a third nation, officials from each of the disputing nations are considered to be visiting the mediating nation instead of visiting each other. Our assumption in this latter case is

> that the primary political force at work will be the influence of the mediating nation on the disputing nations, and secondarily the influence of the disputing nations on each other.[23]

9. As discussed in Chapter I, there will be no rank ordering of visits based on the nature of the visits, nor will there be an attempt to differentiate on types of visits conducted--economic, political, or military. All state visits are assumed to be political interactions.

> Except in rare cases, the interactions of governments of sovereign states take place within a framework of constant concern for the relative power of the interacting states vis-a-vis one another and other states. Therefore all interactions--whatever their outward form--are either frankly and intensely political or subject to becoming so on short notice.[24]

For his own purposes, Brams offered the following:

> Given that we are not generally privy to meetings between high-level government officials from different nations, the task of trying to measure the exercise of influence in such meetings would appear to be nearly impossible. If we forget for the moment about what transpires in such meetings, however, and instead focus on who visits whom, the pattern of communications might provide a clue to the influence process.[25]

Interaction Variables--Diplomatic Representation

Besides state visits, the second indicator of political interaction I have selected for analysis is diplomatic representation. There are several reasons which make this particular variable attractive in measuring various concepts of integration. For those measuring national status and influence, the number of missions and diplomats hosted and sent abroad are considered useful indicators. For comparative analysis in transnational communications and interactions, the number and identity of nations exchanging missions are indicative of mutual interests among nations. Alger and Brams have stated, with

regard to the "universal" diplomat, "...he has emerged from royal courts to become an even more visible representative of his government's interests in, and involvement with, the host nation."[26]

Since both state visits and diplomatic representation are examples of official political interaction, the use of both in integration analysis should enhance that analysis. William Thompson, in discussing the validity of his state visit data for the Arab world, states, "In any event, a possible control measure could be introduced by analyzing the number of diplomats/embassy within the sub-system."[27]

The Taylor and Hudson World Handbook includes diplomatic representation data for each nation in much the same fashion as used in the Alger and Brams study, but diplomatic representation analyses have been meager in number and in approaches. The latter reported, "There exist no systematic studies of the diplomatic behavior of nations, nor even comparative statistics on bilateral and multilateral forms of international representation."[28]

In this study, the diplomatic exchange variable is used, intellectually, as an indicator of shared mutual interests among nations and, quantitatively, for comparative analytical purposes with the state visit variable in measuring sub-systemic integration and that integration's correlation with interactions of sub-system member states conducted with extra-regional states. The intent, then, is not merely to identify how many diplomatic missions each state hosts and establishes abroad; rather, the identity of nations for each set of exchanges (dyads) is critical to the study. The diplomatic mission data has been collected, using the following parameters:

1. Only embassies and legations and, when representation is in absentia, ambassadors and chargé d'affaires, have been considered. There is no rank ordering based on the presumed status of embassies vice legations.

2. An exchange, or dyad, is counted for each instance of reported representation, regardless of whether the diplomatic representative is based in an embassy in a third country, the same procedure followed by Galtung.[29] Alger and Brams, however, did not include absentee representation, as a peculiarity of their study.[30] Absentee representation is considered significant and essential to this study for several reasons. First, to indicate a mutual interest between two nations, the representation is more of a true measure than the physical location and size of the diplomatic mission itself. The latter would be of interest to someone attempting to measure political status and influence. Second, it must be recognized that diplomatic missions are expensive to operate and most countries resort to multiple representation for some, or all, of their missions abroad. To exclude absentee representation would distort the necessary information.

3. Each exchange, or dyad, is counted for each subject year if diplomatic relations were maintained for more than six months in that year. For example, if Country A had official diplomatic relations with Country B on 1 January, but severed relations on 5 August of that year, the exchange would be counted. If diplomatic relations were established between Countries A and B prior to 30 June in a given year, and relations were maintained through the end of December, that exchange also would be counted.

4. Diplomatic exchange data is collected in two separate categories:

a. Exchanges among the states of all of the Arab world, for a regional perspective;

b. Exchanges between the 13 subject countries of the Arab world and every other nation, for a global perspective.

Time Variable

As discussed in Chapters I and II, integration is viewed by political scientists either as a condition or as a process. The former attempts to explain the characteristics of integration, and the extent of integration for any one community. The latter attempts to predict the course of integration, usually by the quantitative measurement of selected variables over a period of time. This study of Arab world integration is process oriented and, as such, integration is examined as a function of time.

The time variable comprises four two year aggregates in an eleven year period: 1965-66, 1968-69, 1971-72, and 1974-75. Reasons for the selection of these particular two year aggregates are discussed in Chapter I. The minimum of a two-year grouping was considered significant in the Alger-Brams study (1963-64) on diplomatic representation and inter-governmental organization activity, and in the Steven-Brams study on state visits, mostly to capture data on state visit reciprocity, and delays in reciprocating the establishment of diplomatic representation. William Thompson, although he used only one year in his study, alludes to the desireability of using multi-year groupings.[31]

Should the reader be concerned about the omission of the years 1967, 1970 and 1973, and the fact that these were periods of intense crisis in the Arab world, it is felt that at least two of these years, 1967 and 1973, would be the least appropriate for the study on integration--interactions during these years were more national defense and security oriented, than intended for long range integration purposes. As for precedence in omitting certain time periods in international relations analysis, based on the elimination of least appropriate periods of time, a classic example is provided by Samuel P. Huntington and his studies on arms races, where periods of conflict, by calendar year, were not included.[32]

Data Correlation and Analysis

The analytical techniques I am employing in correlating and evaluating the data collected are not original, although the types of data subjected to comparative analysis are. Briefly, the analysis will proceed as follows:

1. Arab world state visit and diplomatic representation data over the four two year aggregates will be analyzed, in graphic and tabular form, to identify trends in increases or decreases. The findings will be represented in total numbers and as percentages.

2. State visit and diplomatic exchange data between the 13 subject countries and each of the five non-Arab region country groupings will be analyzed similarly.

3. The sets of data for 1 and 2 above will be correlated to determine the degree of congruence, upon which conclusions will be based.

4. Anomalies in the congruence of data will be discussed qualitatively where unique events may have caused marked fluctuations in the findings.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

[1]Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 583-99.

[2]Ibid., 585 and 599.

[3]Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 421.

[4]Ibid., 417-19.

[5]Yaacov Shimoni and Evytaar Levine (eds.), Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1974).

[6]Frank Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).

[7]William R. Thompson, "The Arab Sub-System and the Feudal Pattern of Interaction, 1965," Research Communications, 1968, 154.

[8]Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System (New York: Rand McNally, 1967).

[9]See Chapter I, 6.

[10]Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, Vol. 10(3), 1958, 421.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Michael Brecher, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, January 1963, 227.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations," New Approaches to International Relations, ed. Morton A. Kaplan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 272.

[15]Raymond E. Platig, "International Relations as a Field of Inquiry," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 15.

[16]Ibid., 16.

[17]Brams, 584.

[18]Ibid., 585.

[19]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, 1959, 121.

[20]Brams, 587.

[21]Thompson, 159.

[22]Brams, 585-86.

[23]Ibid., 586-87.

[24]Platig, 16.

[25]Brams, 584.

[26]Chadwick Alger and Steven Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter-governmental Organizations," World Politics, Vol. 19(4), July 1967, 647.

[27]Thompson, 154.

[28]Alger and Brams, 646.

[29]See Chapter II, 42.

[30]Alger and Brams, 649.

[31]Thompson, 154.

[32]Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, 1958, 41-83.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to present the findings of the stated hypothesis as operationalized according to the methodology described in Chapter III. The findings are presented in the following sequence:

1. Arab World integration.
2. Arab World interactions with non-Arab nations.
3. Correlation and comparison of 1 and 2, above.

Arab World Integration

As was discussed in Chapters I and III, measurements of Arab World integration for the stated period considered interactions among the 13 subject countries, and interactions between them and the other Arab countries. Arab countries other than the subject countries reached nationhood at varying times during the period of analysis. These countries were included in the analysis for the following years:

Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen - 1968-75

Bahrain - 1972-75

Oman - 1972-75

Qatar - 1972-75

United Arab Emirates - 1972-75

Arab World integration was measured using the two interaction variables of state visits and diplomatic representation. The former is discussed first. The state visit analysis is based on the data depicted in the tables C-1 through C-13, State Visit Data for each subject country, and tables C-14 through C-17. state visit data displayed as dyads (two countries interacting) and frequency of visits among the dyads, all in Appendix C.

The first measurement of regional state visit data is of the actual number of visits conducted, as in the table below.

Table 4-1

Two Year Aggregate	Number of State Visits
1965-66	67
1968-69	187
1971-72	186
1974-75	203

Table 4-1 shows a very definite trend toward increased numbers of visits, except for one less visit in 1971-72 than in 1968-69. When this data is subjected to further mathematical manipulation, in projecting the number of visits for the 1977-78 time period, the results are as shown in Figure 4-1 on the next page.

The projection for 1977-78 is 266 regional state visits, a substantial increase from the previous time period. See Footnote 1 at the end of the chapter for an explanation of the statistical method used. A projected reduction of visits for 1977-78 would suggest a move away from integration, while an increase, as seen in Figure 4-1, suggests continued integration.



Figure 4-1

Arab World Regional State Visits: By Two Year Aggregate-Projection for 1977-78.

Relying solely on total numbers of state visits for the two year aggregates can be misleading, if only because the number of Arab World countries was not constant throughout. In fact, because the number of Arab World countries increases, a small increase in the number of state visits could actually portray a relative decrease in state visit intensity for the region; therefore, another analytical perspective regarding state visits is useful in validating any assumptions. This other analytical method I have employed focuses on the number of dyads for each two year period, as a total and as a percentage of total possible combinations. One dyad represents two countries conducting one state visit. The significance of this particular measure is that it depicts the extent of visits, i.e., the numbers of countries visiting and visited, rather than gross numbers of visits. The implication is that increased regional integration would be manifested by a relative increase in the number of dyads--most, or all, of the region members are conducting visits with more of their regional colleagues. The table below, Table 4-2, shows the number of dyads for each two year period.

Table 4-2

Two Year Aggregate	Number of Dyads
1965-66	30
1968-69	59
1971-72	75
1974-75	88

The results on state visit dyads are based on the data in Tables C-14 through C-17 in Appendix C.

Perhaps an even more telling measurement than the number of dyads is to consider the dyads which occurred as a percentage of the dyads which were possible for each two year aggregate. For example, for 1965-66, there were 156 possible dyads--each of the 13 Arab countries could have conducted at least one state visit with each of the other 12 countries. For 1968-69, with the addition of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen, each of the 13 subject countries could now conduct state visits with 13 other countries, and so on. Visits among the Arab nations which are not part of the 13 subject countries were not counted. The dyads as percentages are as seen in Table 4-3 below. Table 4-3 shows that the subject countries are expanding their range of visiting partners within the region at an even faster pace than the increase in possible dyads caused by increases in Arab countries. This is depicted by the column of percentages of possible dyads. See Table C-18, Appendix C, for consolidated data on the number of regional countries visited by each subject Arab country.

Table 4-3

Two Year Aggregate	# of Dyads	Possible Dyads	Percentage of Possible Dyads
1965-66	30	156	.19
1968-69	59	169	.35
1971-72	75	195	.38
1974-75	88	221	.40

As discussed earlier[2], the concept of subsystemic polarization has been raised concerning the Arab World, specifically, the development of a split into a Maghreb versus a Mashriq (West vs. East) division. A look at the state visit data in Appendix C seems to dispel much of

this contention. The state visit data for the Maghreb countries was analyzed to see if these countries did in fact perform independently of the other Arab nations.

The two tables below present data on a three country Maghreb and a four country Maghreb, respectively. All four countries formed the Maghreb Permanent Consultation Committee prior to the period of analysis; however, Libya and Morocco severed diplomatic relations in 1972, and did not resume them until 1975. Tables 4-4 and 4-5 below show the state visits among the countries of the Maghreb, as percentages of all of their regional visits.

Table 4-4

Algeria - Morocco - Tunisia

Two Year Aggregate	% of All Regional Visits
1965-66	.25
1968-69	.31
1971-72	.40
1974-75	.21

Table 4-5

Algeria - Libya - Morocco - Tunisia

Two Year Aggregate	% of All Regional Visits
1965-66	.32
1968-69	.53
1971-72	.50
1974-75	.35

The expected percentage for any three subject countries interacting is .25, and for four countries, it is .33. Comparing the actual

percentage with the expected, both the three and four country groups behaved similarly--interactions were higher than the expected percentage for two of the periods, and were equal to or lower than the expected values for the other two time periods, suggesting that there is no compelling motivation for these countries to interact among themselves any more than with other Arab nations.

Along with state visits, I have used diplomatic representation as an interaction variable. The specific parameters adhered to in using this variable are in Chapter III. The data collected has been organized in single year group charts in Appendix C (Tables C-19 through C-26). In calculating exchanges of diplomatic representatives among the Arab states for each of the four two-year periods, the number of exchanges (those nations having formal diplomatic relations) for each of the two years were added, then averaged (divided by two). The result was then used as representative for the two year period. Also, the possible combinations of Arab World diplomatic representation was used, calculated by determining how many countries (Arab) with which each of the 13 subject countries could have had diplomatic relations, for each pertinent year. These yearly totals were then averaged for each of the two year periods.

Table 4-6 on the next page shows the average of "diplomatic dyads" for each two year period, compared with the average of possible dyads, represented as percentages.

As shown in the table, the actual number of dyads remains constant for the first two two-year periods, then increases rapidly for the next two. When comparing the actual dyads with the possible

Table 4-6

Diplomatic Representation - Arab World

Two Year Period	Dyads	Possible Dyads	% of Possible Dyads
1965-66	149	156	.95
1968-69	149	169	.88
1971-72	160	195	.82
1974-75	204	221	.92

dyads, there appears to be a time lag; yet, by 1974-75 the 92 percent of possible dyads means that the 13 subject countries have formal diplomatic relations with nearly every other Arab state. Only 17 of the 221 possible dyads have not taken place. Table C-27 in Appendix C portrays the number of dyads for diplomatic representation, by year, for each subject country, and as totals for each year.

A primary purpose for using diplomatic representation as an interaction variable was as a check for the state visit variable. Erratic, unexplained behavior of a large number of state visits would be harmful to any test of the hypothesis. A review of both state visit and diplomatic representation data for the Arab World reveals that there were only two repeating examples of states conducting state visits while not having exchanged diplomatic representatives. These were the dyads of Lebanon and Syria, and the Yemen Arab Republic and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). It is interesting to note that both pairs of nations shared similar concerns--nations of both pairs are geographic neighbors, and both pairs have had chronic and, occasionally, violent border disputes.

Interactions With Non-Arab Countries

As discussed in Chapter III and in Appendix B, non-Arab nations of the world were divided into five groups, or blocs. Generally, each of these five blocs was intended to represent the major regional divisions in the world as to its own particular blend of geography, political affinities, and level of industrialization. Not all nations were included--only those with which the subject countries had overt political interactions.

In this section of Chapter IV, the findings presented are both state visits and diplomatic representation between the subject Arab countries and all non-Arab nations. The former is presented first.

Table 4-7 below is a compilation of the data contained in Tables C-28 through C-31 in Appendix C.

Table 4-7

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By Subject Countries - Two Year Aggregates

Two Year Aggregate	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
1965-66	47	45	3	54	64	213
1968-69	54	31	2	60	75	222
1971-72	41	27	2	57	89	216
1974-75	66	14	3	48	121	252
TOTALS	208	117	10	219	349	903

The performance of each country group reveals some interesting patterns. Arab World (the 13 subject countries) interactions with Asia are of fluctuating intensity, yet there appears to be an overall

upward trend. State visits with African nations, however, decrease steadily, from a high of 45 in 1965-66, to a low of 14 in 1974-75. There were very few state visits to or from Latin American countries, generally accounting for barely one per cent of total visits for any one two year period. USSR and East European state visits show a gradual, perceptible decrease. Subject country state visits with the North America/West Europe/Oceania group of nations increase fairly evenly for the first three time series, then jump sharply (by 36 per cent) to 121 visits for 1974-75.

As Table 4-7 shows, the state visit totals for the two year periods remain nearly constant, except for 1974-75, where there is a sizable increase.

The second interaction variable concerns diplomatic representation. Tables C-32 through C-39 contain the basic data for this variable. The two tables below are compilations of this data. The first, Table 4-8, provides total numbers, while Table 4-9 depicts the share of diplomatic representation for each non-Arab group with the 13 subject Arab countries, presented as percentages.

Table 4-8

Two Year Period	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
1965-66	111	92	68	77	179	528
1968-69	129	132	82	84	191	618
1971-72	146	147	84	90	201	667
1974-75	172	182	101	100	234	790

Table 4-9

Two Year Period	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.
1965-66	.21	.17	.13	.15	.34
1968-69	.21	.21	.13	.14	.31
1971-72	.22	.22	.13	.13	.30
1974-75	.22	.23	.13	.13	.30

As shown in Table 4-8, each non-Arab country group increased in the number of diplomatic representation dyad. The figures for each two year period are averages. Tables 4-9, using the same basic data as in Table 4-8, depicts the amount of dyads with the 13 Arab countries as percentages. Remarkably, even though there are considerable changes in the number of dyads for each two year period, each country group's share of representation stays almost constant, except for the 1965-66 period.

As with the findings in Arab World interactions, there was high correlation in the partners for state visit dyads and diplomatic representation dyads. There were very few instances of countries conducting state visits without having formal diplomatic relations. The latter may be a precondition for the former. If it were the opposite (the conduct of state visits prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations), then the data in Table 4-7 would suggest that the North America/West Europe/Oceania and Asia groups should have the lion's share of diplomatic dyads. Such a correlation does not exist, however, especially not in keeping with the percentages of the share of state visits with the 13 subject countries, as seen in Table 4-10 on the next page.

As for those few instances where countries conducted state visits without having diplomatic relations, examples are the visit of a US Presidential envoy to Algeria in 1972 concerning the Vietnam war, and some of the initial visits by the US Secretary of State to Egypt and Syria following the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Table 4-10

State Visit Dyads With Subject Arab Countries - As Percentages

Two Year Aggregate	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.
1965-66	.22	.21	.01	.25	.30
1968-69	.24	.14	.01	.27	.34
1971-72	.19	.12	.01	.26	.41
1974-75	.26	.06	.01	.19	.48

Correlation of Regional and Non-Regional Interactions

Before beginning any correlation of findings between Arab world interactions and interactions between the 13 subject countries and non-Arab nations, the data and findings were reviewed for any significant variations in trends which might have an adverse impact on the validity of any conclusions developed in this thesis. While several variations in trends were identified, only one was viewed as providing cause for concern. This is the state visit data for 1974-75 between the subject Arab countries and non-regional countries in general, and concerning the North America/West Europe/Oceania group of countries in particular.

Where state visit totals had remained nearly constant for the first three time series (213, 222, 216), there was a jump to 252 for

the fourth time series (1974-75). While collecting the state visit data, I had taken care to organize the state visit data, as dyads, into imports to and exports from the subject Arab countries. This data is in Tables C-40 through C-47. The only markedly unusual information noted in these tables is in Table C-46 which shows that the import of visits from the North America/West Europe/Oceania group of nations to the subject countries in 1974-75 was over 112 percent more than in the next highest total for a two year period (68 versus 32 in 1971-72). Also, for the first three time series, total imports and exports of state visits were nearly constant, as seen in the following table:

Table 4-11

Two Year Aggregate	Import	Export
1965-66	71	142
1968-69	97	126
1971-72	87	129
1974-75	130	122

During the 1974-75 period, the activity which generated the largest number of state visits was the peacekeeping effort by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In nearly every trip to the Middle East by Dr. Kissinger, his modus operandi was to visit with officials of several Arab countries, usually Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, plus Israel, on several occasions during the same trip. The purpose of the visits was to open and maintain a dialogue among the participating countries. As such, while Dr, Kissinger may have met with President Sadat, for example, five times during a particular Mid-East trip, the last four

meetings would have been to maintain the dialogue begun in the first meeting. A termination of discussions, if only temporary, would occur with Dr. Kissinger's departure from the region. I accounted for these visits, therefore, by noting each subject country visited by Dr. Kissinger during a particular trip and acknowledged only the initial meeting with a subject country's official(s).

The peacekeeping visits of Dr. Kissinger paralleled in many ways the visits to the Middle East by the UN Secretary, Kurt Waldheim, following the 1967 Mid-East war. While it is not the intention of this thesis to delve into the nature of bilateral interactions, hindsight suggests that perhaps the Kissinger visits should have been dealt with in a special category. Possibly the best compromise is to perform the comparisons of interactions both with and without consideration for the Kissinger visits. There were 36 such visits during the last two year period, a sufficient number to affect any comparison. Figure 4-2 on the next page graphically displays the correlation, or lack thereof, between Arab regional state visits and visits conducted between the subject Arab countries and non-regional countries.

As the figure shows, there is a correlation between increases and decreases of visits, when the Kissinger visits are included, with both showing overall increases from the first to the last two year period. The extent of the increases differ, however. For Arab region state visits, there is an increase from 67 to 203 visits, an increase of 203 percent. For non-regional visits, the increase is from 213 to 252, an increase of 18 percent. Excluding the Kissinger visits, the non-regional visits increase from 213 to 216 visits, or by one percent.



Figure 4-2

State Visits: Inter and Extra-Regional,
By Two-Year Aggregates

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

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
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
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1965-66
1968-69
1971-72
1974-75
1974-75
- Non-Regional State Visits
- Regional State Visits

Figure 4-3

Another way of viewing state visit data is to note the amount of visits as percentages, rather than number totals. By this method, it can be determined more readily as to which group of nations, Arab versus non-Arab, receive the larger "share" of visits. This evaluation is presented in Figure 4-3, page 86. The chart shows percentages for both the inclusion and exclusion of the Kissinger visits. When including the Kissinger visits, unlike the graph portrayal in Figure 4-2, which shows consistency for the first three time series, Figure 4-3 shows that non-Arab nations had a very consistent share of Arab state visits for the last three time series, but a reduction of more than 20 percent from the first two year period, when a large majority (76 percent) of state visits conducted by Arab states were with non-Arab countries. When the Kissinger visits are excluded, the pattern then becomes one of a gradual decrease of the share of state visits by non-Arab nations. (The Kissinger visits accounted for four percent of the non-regional state visits for 1974-75).

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

[1]The statistical method employed is the method of least squares, applied to time series. In the following table, the independent variable X is time and the dependent variable Y shows the state visit values at various times.

Year	X	Y	$x=X-\overline{X}$	$y=Y-\overline{Y}$	x^2	xy
1965-66	0	67	-1.5	-94	2.2	141
1968-69	1	187	-.5	26	.2	-13
1971-72	2	186	.5	25	.2	12
1974-75	3	203	1.5	43	2.2	64
	$\Sigma X=6$	$\Sigma Y=643$			$\Sigma x^2=4.8$	$\Sigma xy=204$
	$\overline{X}=1.5$	$\overline{Y}=161$				

To determine the Y value for the next time series (1977-78), the following formula is used:

$$y = \left(\frac{\Sigma xy}{\Sigma x^2}\right) x$$

For our purposes, the value of Y evolves as follows:

$$y = \frac{204}{4.8}\ x = 42x$$

$$Y-161=42(4-1.5) \text{ or } Y=161+105=266.$$

The equation is called the regression line of Y on X.

[2]See Chapter I, page 7.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis was to test the hypothesis that, as regional political integration increases, there is a corresponding decrease in political interactions between the region's member states and states outside the region. As presented in Chapter IV, there were three phases in testing the hypothesis.

The first phase was to determine trends in Arab World regional integration. The findings strongly support the contention of increased regional integration. The number of state visits among the region members increase rapidly and steadily. Also, the number of dyads, or different visiting partners, increase greatly, accounting not only for the addition of new Arab World nations, but also for greater diversity in visitors. Table 4-3, page 75, shows this quite clearly. The possible existence of divisions within the region which could skew analytical results, as well as give cause to question the very existence of a "region," is firmly discounted. This supports similar findings by William Thompson[1] and Leonard Binder[2]. Another finding in support of increased regional integration is the development and extent of diplomatic representation exchanges. Arab World countries, by 1974-75, each had formal diplomatic relations with nearly every other country in the region.

The second phase in testing the hypothesis was to measure political interactions by the 13 subject Arab countries with nations outside the region. The primary variable used, as in the first phase, was the conduct of state visits. As seen in Table 4-7, page 79, there is an increase in total number of visits but, significantly, only for the last two-year aggregate, during which the US Secretary of State was most active. Excluding these visits by Dr. Kissinger, the number of state visits is practically constant throughout.

The third phase in analyzing the findings was to compare the results of the first two phases, shown graphically in Figures 4-2, page 85, and 4-3, page 86. The first conclusion is that there is a large increase in the total number of state visits (regional and non-regional). Also evident is that the greatest portion of this increase occurs among Arab World countries, whether including or excluding the Kissinger visits.

While the first statement of the hypothesis on regional integration is substantiated, there was not a corresponding decrease in non-regional political interactions, specifically state visits. At most, there is a small (18 percent) increase over the 11 year period of analysis and, excluding the Kissinger visits, the two year totals are nearly constant. What did occur with non-regional visits was a shift of visiting partners, by country group, away from Africa and East Europe/USSR groups, toward the Asia and West Europe/North America/Oceania groups, especially toward the latter, even excluding the Kissinger visits for 1974-75. Unfortunately, using the data collected, it is not possible to explain this shift satisfactorily.

There was a dramatic increase of state visits during the period of analysis and it can be concluded that the lion's share of the increase occurred among Arab World countries. Because of the very large difference in the rates of increase in state visits for the Arab World (203 percent) versus non-Arab World visits (from one to 18 percent when excluding or including the Kissinger visits), it is possible to conclude that the hypothesis is valid, if rates of increases of state visits are considered, rather than total visits.

Recommendations

> Are regions each unique in their politics or can we generalize about them all? Is regional politics a microcosm of the entire world, so the concepts and theories derived from one can be applied to the other?[3]

Perhaps the most valuable part of this thesis is that Arab World regional political integration, using established principles and analytical techniques, has been measured, as a function of time. As such, the same method may be used to replicate similar political integrative processes for other well defined regions in the world.

What has not been proven conclusively is the casual relationship between increased political integration and systemic polarization within the international system, a phenomenon alluded to by John Herz as "a new-territoriality"[4] and explored at length, conceptually, by Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer,[5] and others discussed in Chapter II. Such a phenomenon could be explored further, using the same data generated in this thesis, by more sophisticated regression and correlation analyses, emphasizing intensity and degrees of interaction. As an additional refinement, a third variable, membership in international organizations, could be used, as done by Alger and Brams.[6]

Other than the political integrative process, regional political behavior was analyzed briefly in another area--divisions within the regional sub-system. Again, relying on the same data provided in this thesis, regional political behavior could be examined as to centers of influence within the region, by measu ing imports vice exports of state visits, in the same manner as was done by William Thompson and others who focused on influence patterns. If regional politics is in fact a microcosm of world politics, the behavior of these centers of influence (one or more nations) could provide valuable information necessary for formulating the still elusive "grand theory" of the international system.

A qualitative refinement of the thesis would have been to discuss events which caused significant increases or decreases in political interactions. Such a discussion would not enhance the validity of the findings, but it would provide the reader with points of reference for the large amount of data in Chapter IV and Appendix C.

Mentioned briefly on page 81 was the possible causal relationship between state visits and diplomatic representation, with the latter seemingly being a precondition for the former. Alger and Brams discovered a correlation between membership in international organizations and the exchange of diplomatic representation.[7] Should a similar correlation be discovered between state visits and diplomatic representation, causal relationships among all three political variables could be determined, providing both valuable practical and theoretical information on regional political behavior.

I have concerned myself in this thesis with political interactions solely. The increased politicization of economics,

worldwide, however, raises the question of the role of international trade and finance as effective, long range, political tools. With the data and findings of this thesis as background, a useful analytical excursion would be to collect data on international trade, as imports and exports, direction of trade, and the share of the trade to GNP's. One method would be to correlate the political and economic data by the five non-regional groups in Appendix B. Such analysis may uncover, for example, that the Arab World countries, despite their public stand as champions of the Third World, are interacting more with industrialized nations and less and less with the underdeveloped nations, at least as concerns non-regional interactions.

The list of other possible research and replications is almost endless. Those mentioned above seem the most relevant to this thesis.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

[1]William R. Thompson, "The Arab Sub-System and the Feudal Pattern of Interaction, 1965," Research Communication, 1968, 161.

[2]Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, Vol. 10(3), 1958, 421.

[3]Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics (San Ramon, California: Concensus Publishers, Inc., 1972), 197.

[4]John Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 77.

[5]Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and Internal Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16, 1964, 390-406.

[6]See page 46, Chapter II.

[7]Chadwick Alger and Steven Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter-Governmental Organizations," World Politics, Vol. 19(4), July 1967, 646-63.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

YEAR OF ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED NATIONS

COUNTRY	YEAR OF ADMISSION
(Subject Countries)	
Algeria	1962
Egypt (U.A.R.)	1945
Iraq	1945
Jordan	1955
Kuwait	1963
Lebanon	1945
Libya	1955
Morocco	1956
Saudi Arabia	1945
Sudan	1955
Syria	1946
Tunisia	1956
Yemen, Arab Republic of	1947
(Other Arab Countries)	
Bahrain	1971
Oman	1971
Qatar	1971
United Arab Emirates	1971
Yemen, Peoples' Republic of	1967

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

NON-ARAB WORLD COUNTRY GROUPINGS

ASIA

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Burma
Cambodia (Khmer Republic)
China, Rep. of
China, People's Rep. of
Cyprus
India
Indonesia
Iran
Japan
Korea
Korea, Democratic People's Rep.
Laos
Malaysia
Mongolia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Thailand
Turkey
Viet Nam, Rep. of
Viet Nam, Democratic Rep. of

AFRICA

Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Chad
Congo, People's Rep. of
Dahomey (P. R. of Benin)
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad/Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

EASTERN EUROPE-USSR

Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany, Dem. Rep. of
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Yugoslavia

WESTERN EUROPE-NORTH AMERICA-OCEANIA

Australia	Malta
Austria	Monaco
Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Denmark	Norway
Finland	Portugal
France	Spain
Germany, Federal Rep. of	Sweden
Greece	Switzerland
Iceland	United Kingdom
Ireland	USA
Italy	Vatican
Luxembourg	

The rationale behind the development of only five groups of nations other than Arab world nations was to maintain a small number of groups, or blocs, which would both be manageable for data analysis, yet sufficiently discrete so as not to distract from the stated purpose of the thesis. Several more groups of nations could have been devised, especially if I were to adhere to a composite of the criteria most often used for delineating regions. Given the extensive amount of data already required to test the hypothesis, however, there had to be tradeoffs elsewhere.

The nations listed in each group are by no means inclusive. I have listed only those nations which had one or both of the selected

political interactions with one or more of the subject Arab countries. South Africa and Rhodesia, for example, are not listed in one of the groups because they had no such interactions with the Arab states.

Of the countries listed in the Asia group, Iran, Turkey and Cyprus may raise some question. All three, however, traditionally have been recognized as Middle Eastern and posed no serious problem in my judgment in placing them in the Asia group, even given the strong Enosis movement in Cyprus. My choice of states for the Africa group proved clearcut and should raise no questions from the reader.

I included Cuba in the Latin America group for obvious geographic and socio-cultural reasons, even though Cuba exhibits political preferences more in line with the Eastern Europe-USSR group of states. From an Arab world perception, however, I am taking license and assuming Cuba is viewed more as a "third world", Latin American state.

Of the states in the Eastern Europe-USSR group, both Albania and Yugoslavia do not fit neatly into the group, yet there is even less logic in placing either one in another group.

There is one "non-nation" listed, the Vatican, in the Western Europe-North America-Oceania group. The Vatican, however, acts as a separate state, to include establishing diplomatic representations in various countries. Politically, the Vatican interacts with sovereign states as a state, and that relationship seems to be accepted by the international political community.

APPENDIX C

Table C-1

Regional State Visits Conducted By ALGERIA

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Egypt	1	2	3	3	9
Iraq	2	2	1	5	10
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	1	0	1	2
Lebanon	0	0	1	0	1
Libya	0	6	4	3	13
Morocco	2	4	6	1	13
Saudi Arabia	2	0	0	2	4
Sudan	0	0	1	0	1
Syria	1	4	1	1	7
Tunisia	0	2	6	2	10
Yemen	0	1	1	1	3
S. Yemen	-	5	5	0	10
Bahrain	-	-	0	0	0
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	0	0
U.A.E.	-	-	0	0	0
TOTALS	8	27	29	19	83

Table C-2

Regional State Visits Conducted By EGYPT

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	1	2	3	3	9
Iraq	7	7	1	2	17
Jordan	0	12	2	5	19
Kuwait	3	1	5	4	13
Lebanon	0	2	4	0	6
Libya	0	2	12	5	19
Morocco	3	1	0	1	5
Saudi Arabia	2	5	8	9	24
Sudan	2	5	6	5	18
Syria	3	8	8	2	21
Tunisia	1	0	3	0	4
Yemen	10	8	2	1	21
S. Yemen	-	6	1	0	7
Bahrain	-	-	1	0	1
Oman	-	-	1	0	1
Qatar	-	-	1	2	3
U.A.E.	-	-	2	4	6
TOTALS	32	59	60	43	194

Table C-3

Regional State Visits Conducted By IRAQ

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	2	2	1	5	10
Egypt	7	7	1	2	17
Jordan	0	8	0	2	10
Kuwait	2	6	3	1	12
Lebanon	1	3	2	2	8
Libya	0	3	0	3	6
Morocco	0	0	0	2	2
Saudi Arabia	1	7	1	5	14
Sudan	0	1	0	2	3
Syria	0	3	2	0	5
Tunisia	0	0	2	3	5
Yemen	0	3	3	0	6
S. Yemen	-	3	3	1	7
Bahrain	-	-	1	1	2
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	1	1	2
TOTALS	13	46	20	31	110

Table C-4

Regional State Visits Conducted By JORDAN

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	0	12	2	5	19
Iraq	0	8	0	2	10
Kuwait	2	3	0	2	7
Lebanon	1	6	2	0	9
Libya	0	2	0	0	2
Morocco	1	0	1	1	3
Saudi Arabia	1	6	6	6	19
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	0	1	1	14	16
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	2
Yemen	0	0	0	1	1
S. Yemen	-	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	-	-	0	2	2
Oman	-	-	1	4	5
Qatar	-	-	0	2	2
U.A.E.	-	-	0	2	2
TOTALS	6	38	14	41	99

Table C-5

Regional State Visits Conducted By KUWAIT

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	1	0	1	2
Egypt	3	1	5	4	13
Iraq	2	6	3	1	12
Jordan	2	3	0	2	7
Lebanon	1	0	2	2	5
Libya	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	7	5	2	2	16
Sudan	0	0	2	1	3
Syria	1	2	4	2	9
Tunisia	0	1	0	0	1
Yemen	0	1	1	1	3
S. Yemen	-	2	1	1	4
Bahrain	-	-	0	1	1
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	0	1	1
TOTALS	16	22	20	20	78

Table C-6

Regional State Visits Conducted By LEBANON

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	0	1	0	1
Egypt	0	2	4	0	6
Iraq	1	3	2	2	8
Jordan	1	6	2	0	9
Kuwait	1	0	2	2	5
Libya	0	0	0	1	1
Morocco	0	0	1	0	1
Saudi Arabia	0	3	4	2	9
Sudan	0	1	0	0	1
Syria	0	2	5	8	15
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	2
Yemen	0	1	1	0	2
S. Yemen	-	1	0	0	1
Bahrain	-	-	0	0	0
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	0	0
U.A.E.	-	-	0	1	1
TOTALS	4	19	23	16	62

Table C-7

Regional State Visits Conducted By LIBYA

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	6	4	3	13
Egypt	0	2	12	5	19
Iraq	0	3	0	3	6
Jordan	0	2	0	0	2
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	0	0	1	1
Morocco	1	2	0	0	3
Saudi Arabia	0	1	0	1	2
Sudan	0	3	2	3	8
Syria	0	1	2	2	5
Tunisia	0	4	8	5	17
Yemen	0	1	2	0	3
S. Yemen	-	1	3	4	8
Bahrain	-	-	0	0	0
Oman	-	-	1	0	1
Qatar	-	-	0	0	0
U.A.E.	-	-	1	1	2
TOTALS	1	26	35	28	90

Table C-8

Regional State Visits Conducted By MOROCCO

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	2	4	6	1	13
Egypt	3	1	0	1	5
Iraq	0	0	0	2	2
Jordan	1	0	1	1	3
Kuwait	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	0	1	0	1
Libya	1	2	0	0	3
Saudi Arabia	1	2	0	1	4
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	0	0	0	0	0
Tunisia	1	1	1	2	5
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0
S. Yemen	-	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	-	-	0	0	0
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	1	1	2
U.A.E.	-	-	0	1	1
TOTALS	9	10	10	10	39

Table C-9

Regional State Visits Conducted By SAUDI ARABIA

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	2	0	0	2	4
Egypt	2	5	8	9	24
Iraq	1	7	1	5	14
Jordan	1	6	6	6	19
Kuwait	7	5	2	2	16
Lebanon	0	3	4	2	9
Libya	0	1	0	1	2
Morocco	1	2	0	1	4
Sudan	2	1	4	3	10
Syria	0	0	3	11	14
Tunisia	3	0	2	0	5
Yemen	0	0	2	3	5
S. Yemen	-	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	-	-	0	0	0
Oman	-	-	1	1	2
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	0	1	1
TOTALS	19	30	33	48	130

Table C-10

Regional State Visits Conducted By SUDAN

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	0	1	0	1
Egypt	2	5	6	5	18
Iraq	0	1	0	2	3
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	0	2	1	3
Lebanon	0	1	0	0	1
Libya	0	3	2	3	8
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	2	1	4	3	10
Syria	0	0	1	1	2
Tunisia	0	0	0	1	1
Yemen	0	1	0	1	2
S. Yemen	-	3	0	0	3
Bahrain	-	-	0	1	1
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	1	1	2
U.A.E.	-	-	2	2	4
TOTALS	4	15	19	21	59

Table C-11

Regional State Visits Conducted By SYRIA

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	1	4	1	1	7
Egypt	3	8	8	2	21
Iraq	0	3	2	0	5
Jordan	0	1	1	14	16
Kuwait	1	2	4	2	9
Lebanon	0	2	5	8	15
Libya	0	1	2	2	5
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	3	11	14
Sudan	0	0	1	1	2
Tunisia	0	0	1	1	2
Yemen	0	3	1	1	5
S. Yemen	-	3	2	0	5
Bahrain	-	-	0	1	1
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	1	1	2
TOTALS	5	27	32	46	110

Table C-12

Regional State Visits Conducted By TUNISIA

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	2	6	2	10
Egypt	1	0	3	0	4
Iraq	0	0	2	3	5
Jordan	1	0	1	0	2
Kuwait	0	1	0	0	1
Lebanon	1	0	1	0	2
Libya	0	4	8	5	17
Morocco	1	1	1	2	5
Saudi Arabia	3	0	2	0	5
Sudan	0	0	0	1	1
Syria	0	0	1	1	2
Yemen	0	0	1	0	1
S. Yemen	-	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	-	-	0	1	1
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	0	2	2
TOTALS	7	8	26	18	59

Table C-13

Regional State Visits Conducted By YEMEN

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75	TOTALS
Algeria	0	1	1	1	3
Egypt	10	8	2	1	21
Iraq	0	3	3	0	6
Jordan	0	0	0	1	1
Kuwait	0	1	1	1	3
Lebanon	0	1	1	0	2
Libya	0	1	2	0	3
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	2	3	5
Sudan	0	1	0	1	2
Syria	0	3	1	1	5
Tunisia	0	0	1	0	1
S. Yemen	-	2	2	2	6
Bahrain	-	-	0	1	1
Oman	-	-	0	0	0
Qatar	-	-	0	1	1
U.A.E.	-	-	0	2	2
TOTALS	10	21	16	15	62

Table C-14

State Visit Dyads - Arab World 1965-66

DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS
ALG-EGY	1	EGY-SYR	3	LEB-KUW	1
ALG-IRQ	2	EGY-TUN	1	LEB-TUN	1
ALG-MOR	2	EGY-YEM	10	LIB-MOR	1
ALG-S.A.	2	IRQ-KUW	2	MOR-JOR	1
ALG-SYR	1	JOR-KUW	2	MOR-S.A.	1
EGY-IRQ	7	JOR-S.A.	1	MOR-TUN	1
EGY-KUW	3	JOR-TUN	1	S.A.-IRQ	1
EGY-MOR	3	KUW-S.A.	7	S.A.-SUD	2
EGY-S.A.	2	LEB-IRQ	1	S.A.-TUN	3
EGY-SUD	2	LEB-JOR	1	SYR-KUW	1
			TOTALS:	30	67

Table C-15

State Visit Dyads - Arab World 1968-69

DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS
ALG-EGY	2	IRQ-SUD	1	LIB-SUD	3
ALG-IRQ	2	IRQ-SYR	3	LIB-TUN	4
ALG-LIB	6	IRQ-YEM	3	LIB-YEM	1
ALG-MOR	4	IRQ-S.Y.	3	LIB-S.Y.	1
ALG-SYR	4	JOR-KUW	3	MOR-EGY	1
ALG-TUN	2	JOR-LEB	6	MOR-LIB	2
ALG-YEM	1	JOR-LIB	2	MOR-S.A.	2
ALG-S.Y.	5	KUW-ALG	1	MOR-TUN	1
EGY-IRQ	7	KUW-EGY	1	S.A.-JOR	6
EGY-JOR	12	KUW-S.A.	5	S.A.-LIB	1
EGY-S.A.	5	KUW-SYR	2	S.A.-SUD	1
EGY-SUD	5	KUW-YEM	1	SUD-YEM	1
EGY-SYR	8	KUW-S.Y.	2	SUD-S.Y.	3
EGY-YEM	8	LEB-EGY	2	SYR-JOR	1
EGY-S.Y.	6	LEB-S.A.	3	SYR-LIB	1
IRQ-JOR	8	LEB-SUD	1	SYR-YEM	3
IRQ-KUW	6	LEB-SYR	2	SYR-S.Y.	3
IRQ-LEB	3	LEB-YEM	1	TUN-KUW	1
IRQ-LIB	3	LEB-S.Y.	1	YEM-S.Y.	2
IRQ-S.A.	7	LIB-EGY	2		
			TOTALS:	59	187

Table C-16

State Visit Dyads - Arab World 1971-72

DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS
ALG-EGY	3	IRQ-SYR	2	LIB-OMN	1
ALG-LEB	1	IRQ-TUN	2	LIB-UAE	1
ALG-LIB	4	IRQ-YEM	3	MOR-IRQ	1
ALG-MOR	6	IRQ-S.Y.	3	MOR-JOR	1
ALG-SUD	1	IRQ-BAH	1	MOR-LEB	1
ALG-TUN	6	IRQ-UAE	1	MOR-TUN	1
ALG-S.Y.	5	JOR-LEB	2	MOR-QAT	1
EGY-IRQ	1	JOR-S.A.	6	S.A.-SUD	4
EGY-JOR	2	JOR-TUN	1	S.A.-SYR	3
EGY-KUW	5	JOR-OMN	1	S.A.-TUN	2
EGY-LEB	4	KUW-IRQ	3	S.A.-YEM	2
EGY-LIB	12	KUW-LEB	2	S.A.-OMN	1
EGY-S.A.	8	KUW-S.A.	2	SUD-LIB	2
EGY-SUD	6	KUW-SUD	2	SUD-SYR	1
EGY-SYR	8	KUW-SYR	4	SUD-QAT	1
EGY-TUN	3	KUW-YEM	1	SUD-UAE	2
EGY-YEM	2	KUW-S.Y.	1	SYR-ALG	1
EGY-S.Y.	1	LEB-S.A.	4	SYR-JOR	1
EGY-BHA	1	LEB-SYR	5	SYR-TUN	1
EGY-OMN	1	LEB-TUN	1	SYR-YEM	1
EGY-QAT	1	LEB-YEM	1	SYR-S.Y.	2
EGY-UAE	2	LIB-SYR	2	SYR-UAE	1
IRQ-ALG	1	LIB-TUN	8	TUN-YEM	1
IRQ-LEB	2	LIB-YEM	2	YEM-ALG	1
IRQ-S.A.	1	LIB-S.Y.	3	YEM-S.Y.	2
			TOTALS:	75	186

Table C-17

State Visits Dyads - Arab World 1974-75

DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS	DYADS	VISITS
ALG-EGY	3	JOR-UAE	2	MOR-UAE	1
ALG-IRQ	5	KUW-ALG	1	S.A.-LIB	1
ALG-LIB	3	KUW-IRQ	1	S.A.-SUD	3
ALG-S.A.	2	KUW-JOR	1	S.A.-SYR	11
ALG-TUN	2	KUW-S.A.	2	S.A.-YEM	3
ALG-YEM	1	KUW-SUD	1	S.A.-OMN	1
EGY-JOR	5	KUW-SYR	2	S.A.-QAT	1
EGY-KUW	4	KUW-YEM	1	S.A.-UAE	1
EGY-LIB	5	KUW-S.Y.	1	SUD-BAH	1
EGY-S.A.	9	KUW-BAH	1	SUD-QAT	1
EGY-SUD	5	KUW-QAT	1	SUD-UAE	2
EGY-YEM	1	KUW-UAE	1	SYR-ALG	1
EGY-QAT	2	LEB-IRQ	2	SYR-EGY	2
EGY-UAE	4	LEB-KUW	2	SYR-LIB	2
IRQ-EGY	2	LEB-S.A.	2	SYR-SUD	1
IRQ-LIB	3	LEB-SYR	8	SYR-TUN	1
IRQ-S.A.	5	LEB-UAE	1	SYR-YEM	1
IRQ-SUD	2	LIB-LEB	1	SYR-BAH	1
IRQ-TUN	3	LIB-SUD	3	SYR-QAT	1
IRQ-S.Y.	1	LIB-TUN	5	SYR-UAE	1
IRQ-BAH	1	LIB-S.Y.	4	TUN-SUD	1
IRQ-QAT	1	LIB-UAE	1	TUN-BAH	1
IRQ-UAE	1	MOR-ALG	1	TUN-QAT	1
JOR-IRQ	2	MOR-EGY	1	TUN-UAE	2
JOR-S.A.	6	MOR-IRQ	2	YEM-SUD	1
JOR-SYR	14	MOR-JOR	1	YEM-S.Y.	2
JOR-YEM	1	MOR-S.A.	1	YEM-BAH	1
JOR-BAH	2	MOR-TUN	2	YEM-QAT	1
JOR-OMN	4	MOR-QAT	1	YEM-UAE	2
JOR-QAT	2				
			TOTALS:	88	203

Table C-18

Number of Arab World Countries With Which Subject Countries Interacted (State Visits)

	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72	1974-75
Algeria	5	9	10	9
Egypt	8	12	16	12
Iraq	5	11	12	14
Jordan	5	7	7	11
Kuwait	6	9	8	13
Lebanon	4	8	10	6
Libya	1	12	9	10
Morocco	6	5	6	8
Saudi Arabia	8	8	10	14
Sudan	2	7	8	11
Syria	3	9	13	13
Tunisia	5	4	10	9
Yemen	1	9	10	11

Table C-19

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1965

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	O	X	X	X	-	X	-
BAH	-		-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EGY	X	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	-
IRQ	X	-	X		X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
JOR	X	-	X	X		X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
KUW	X	-	X	X	X		X	O	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
LEB	X	-	X	X	X	X		X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	-
LIB	X	-	X	X	X	O	X		X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
MOR	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X		-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
OMN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
QAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.	O	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-		X	X	X	-	X	-
SUD	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X		X	X	-	X	-
SYR	X	-	O	X	X	X	O	X	X	-	-	X	X		X	-	X	-
TUN	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X		-	X	-
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
YEM	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-		-
S.Y.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-20

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1966

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
BAH	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EGY	X	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	-
IRQ	X	-	X		X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
JOR	X	-	X	X		X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
KUW	X	-	X	X	X		X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
LEB	X	-	X	X	X	X		X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	-
LIB	X	-	X	X	X	X	X		X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	-
MOR	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X		-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	-
OMN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
QAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-		X	X	X	-	X	-
SUD	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X		X	X	-	X	-
SYR	X	-	O	X	X	X	O	X	O	-	-	X	X		X	-	X	-
TUN	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X		-	X	-
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
YEM	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-		-
S.Y.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-21

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1968

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
BAH	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EGY	X	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
IRQ	X	-	X		X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
JOR	X	-	X	X		X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
KUW	X	-	X	X	X		X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
LEB	X	-	X	X	X	X		X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
LIB	X	-	X	X	X	X	X		X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
MOR	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X		-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
OMN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
QAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-		X	X	X	-	X	O
SUD	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X		X	O	-	X	O
SYR	X	-	X	X	X	X	O	X	O	-	-	X	X		O	-	X	O
TUN	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	O	O		-	X	O
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
YEM	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-		O
S.Y.	O	-	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	-	-	O	O	O	O	-	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-22

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1969

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
BAH	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EGY	X	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
IRQ	X	-	X		X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
JOR	X	-	X	X		X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
KUW	X	-	X	X	X		X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
LEB	X	-	X	X	X	X		X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
LIB	X	-	X	X	X	X	X		X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
MOR	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X		-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
OMN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
QAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-		X	X	X	-	O	O
SUD	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X		X	O	-	X	O
SYR	X	-	X	X	X	X	O	X	O	-	-	X	X		O	-	X	O
TUN	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	O	O		-	X	O
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
YEM	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	O	X	X	X	-		O
S.Y.	O	-	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	-	-	O	O	O	O	-	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-23

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1971

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
BAH	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EGY	X	-		X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
IRQ	X	-	X		X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	X
JOR	X	-	X	X		X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
KUW	X	-	X	X	X		X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
LEB	X	-	X	X	X	X		X	X	-	-	X	X	O	X	-	X	O
LIB	X	-	X	X	X	X	X		X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	X	O
MOR	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X		-	-	X	X	X	X	-	O	O
OMN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
QAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.A.	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-		X	X	X	-	X	O
SUD	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X		X	X	-	X	O
SYR	X	-	X	X	O	X	O	X	X	-	-	X	X		X	-	X	O
TUN	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X		-	X	O
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
YEM	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	-	-	X	X	X	X	-		O
S.Y.	O	-	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	-	-	O	O	O	O	-	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-24

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1972

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		O	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	X
BAH	O		X	X	X	X	O	O	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
EGY	X	X		X	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IRQ	X	X	X		O	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X
JOR	O	X	O	O		X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O	O	X	X	O
KUW	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
LEB	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	O
LIB	X	O	X	X	O	X	X		O	O	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	O
MOR	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O		X	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	O
OMN	X	X	O	O	X	X	X	O	X		O	O	O	O	X	O	O	O
QAT	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O	O		O	O	O	O	O	X	O
S.A.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O		X	X	X	O	X	O
SUD	X	O	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O	O	X		O	X	X	X	O
SYR	X	X	X	X	O	X	O	X	X	O	O	X	O		X	X	X	O
TUN	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X		O	X	O
UAE	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	X	X	O		X	O
YEM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X		O
S.Y.	X	O	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-25

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1974

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BAH	O		X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O
EGY	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IRQ	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
JOR	X	X	X	X		X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
KUW	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LEB	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X
LIB	X	O	X	X	O	X	X		O	O	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
MOR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O
OMN	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	O	X		X	X	O	X	X	X	X	O
QAT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X		X	X	X	X	O	X	O
S.A.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	O	X	O
SUD	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
SYR	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
TUN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	O
UAE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	O	X	X	X		X	O
YEM	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		O
S.Y.	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X	O	O	O	O	X	X	O	O	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-26

Arab World Diplomatic Representation - 1975

	AL	BH	EG	IR	JO	KU	LE	LI	MO	OM	QT	SA	SU	SYR	TU	UAE	YM	SY
ALG		O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BAH	O		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
EGY	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IRQ	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
JOR	X	X	X	X		X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
KUW	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LEB	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X
LIB	X	X	X	X	O	X	X		X	O	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
MOR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O
OMN	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	O	X		X	X	X	O	X	X	X	O
QAT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X		X	X	X	X	O	X	O
S.A.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	O
SUD	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
SYR	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
TUN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	O
UAE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X		X	O
YEM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		O
S.Y.	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X	O	O	O	O	X	X	O	O	O	

X - Diplomatic Representation

O - No Diplomatic Representation

Table C-27

Subject Country Diplomatic Representation
In Arab World - By Year

	1965	1966	1968	1969	1971	1972	1974	1975
Algeria	11	12	12	12	12	13	16	16
Egypt	11	11	13	13	13	15	17	17
Iraq	12	12	13	12	13	14	16	16
Jordan	12	12	12	12	11	10	15	15
Kuwait	11	12	12	12	12	16	17	17
Lebanon	11	11	11	11	11	15	16	16
Libya	11	12	12	12	12	10	12	14
Morocco	12	11	11	11	11	12	14	16
Saudi Arabia	11	12	12	11	12	13	15	16
Sudan	12	12	11	11	12	11	16	17
Syria	10	9	9	9	10	11	16	15
Tunisia	12	12	10	10	12	13	16	16
Yemen	12	12	12	11	11	15	14	16
TOTALS	148	150	150	148	152	168	200	207

Table C-28

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries

1965-66

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	3	8	-	6	3	20
Egypt	13	13	1	23	11	61
Iraq	6	-	-	2	-	8
Jordan	2	1	-	-	9	12
Kuwait	8	2	-	4	7	21
Lebanon	2	2	1	-	3	8
Libya	1	-	-	-	6	7
Morocco	1	2	-	2	11	16
Saudi Arabia	3	5	-	-	5	13
Sudan	1	5	-	-	1	7
Syria	2	-	-	9	-	11
Tunisia	4	7	1	7	8	27
Yemen	1	-	-	1	-	2
TOTALS	47	45	3	54	64	213

Table C-29

1968-69

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	2	3	1	10	6	22
Egypt	1	9	-	11	5	26
Iraq	6	1	-	8	1	16
Jordan	6	-	-	2	9	17
Kuwait	9	2	-	2	7	20
Lebanon	1	-	-	1	6	8
Libya	4	1	-	1	9	15
Morocco	6	3	-	2	4	15
Saudi Arabia	7	3	-	-	8	18
Sudan	-	6	-	6	-	12
Syria	2	1	-	13	1	17
Tunisia	10	1	1	3	18	33
Yemen	-	1	-	1	1	3
TOTALS	54	31	2	60	75	222

Table C-30

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries

1971-72

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	3	5	2	5	6	21
Egypt	1	4	-	23	15	43
Iraq	9	-	-	9	2	20
Jordan	2	-	-	-	8	10
Kuwait	5	-	-	-	2	7
Lebanon	3	-	-	2	9	14
Libya	-	5	-	4	10	19
Morocco	-	1	-	1	9	11
Saudi Arabia	5	6	-	-	9	20
Sudan	2	5	-	2	7	16
Syria	4	-	-	8	4	16
Tunisia	4	1	-	-	7	12
Yemen	3	-	-	3	1	7
TOTALS	41	27	2	57	89	216

Table C-31

1974-75

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	6	1	-	3	10	20
Egypt	9	-	1	12	28	50
Iraq	16	1	-	6	5	28
Jordan	1	-	-	2	19	22
Kuwait	3	-	1	2	5	11
Lebanon	1	-	-	1	1	3
Libya	6	8	-	4	6	24
Morocco	2	3	-	1	6	12
Saudi Arabia	8	-	1	-	15	24
Sudan	2	-	-	-	2	4
Syria	9	-	-	15	15	39
Tunisia	2	1	-	2	9	14
Yemen	1	-	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	66	14	3	48	121	252

Table C-32

Subject Country Diplomatic Representation-
Extra-Regional

1965

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	8	9	7	8	16	48
Egypt	15	14	13	8	15	65
Iraq	10	3	2	8	14	37
Jordan	10	2	5	4	15	36
Kuwait	6	1	0	4	8	19
Lebanon	12	10	20	5	20	67
Libya	5	2	0	3	12	22
Morocco	9	5	8	7	18	47
Saudi Arabia	8	5	2	0	10	25
Sudan	7	18	0	8	16	49
Syria	9	0	4	7	14	34
Tunisia	5	6	2	7	17	37
Yemen	1	1	1	6	2	11
TOTALS	105	76	64	75	177	497

Table C-33

1966

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	10	10	8	7	16	51
Egypt	15	17	15	9	15	71
Iraq	10	4	2	8	14	38
Jordan	12	1	4	4	14	35
Kuwait	6	2	0	6	8	22
Lebanon	14	15	20	6	21	76
Libya	5	6	2	3	15	31
Morocco	9	11	10	7	20	57
Saudi Arabia	10	9	2	0	11	32
Sudan	9	18	0	8	15	50
Syria	9	4	5	8	14	40
Tunisia	7	10	5	7	16	45
Yemen	1	1	0	6	2	10
TOTALS	117	108	73	79	181	558

Table C-34

Subject Country Diplomatic Representation-
Extra-Regional

1968

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	11	16	6	8	12	53
Egypt	17	24	18	9	16	84
Iraq	11	4	1	8	17	41
Jordan	11	2	5	4	15	37
Kuwait	7	4	2	7	12	32
Lebanon	14	13	21	7	23	78
Libya	5	7	2	5	16	35
Morocco	10	11	10	7	20	58
Saudi Arabia	11	10	3	0	12	36
Sudan	9	18	0	8	15	50
Syria	10	3	6	7	14	40
Tunisia	7	13	7	6	17	50
Yemen	5	2	0	8	1	16
TOTALS	128	127	81	84	190	610

Table C-35

1969

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	11	16	6	8	14	55
Egypt	18	23	18	9	16	84
Iraq	11	5	1	9	17	43
Jordan	10	2	5	5	15	37
Kuwait	8	4	4	5	11	32
Lebano	14	16	21	7	23	81
Libya	5	7	2	5	16	35
Morocco	10	13	10	7	20	60
Saudi Arabia	11	11	3	0	13	38
Sudan	9	18	0	7	14	48
Syria	10	3	6	8	14	41
Tunisia	8	16	7	7	17	55
Yemen	5	2	0	7	2	16
TOTALS	130	136	83	84	192	625

Table C-36

Subject Country Diplomatic Representation-
Extra-Regional

1971

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	14	16	8	9	17	64
Egypt	20	26	17	9	16	88
Iraq	11	5	1	8	17	42
Jordan	10	2	5	5	15	37
Kuwait	8	6	2	8	12	36
Lebanon	15	15	21	7	23	81
Libya	4	7	2	6	17	36
Morocco	11	14	10	7	20	62
Saudi Arabia	13	11	3	0	13	40
Sudan	9	18	0	8	13	48
Syria	10	3	6	8	14	41
Tunisia	9	17	7	7	17	57
Yemen	9	2	0	8	6	25
TOTALS	143	142	82	90	200	657

Table C-37

1972

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	15	17	7	9	17	65
Egypt	20	26	19	9	16	90
Iraq	13	6	2	9	17	47
Jordan	9	2	5	5	16	37
Kuwait	10	6	4	6	12	38
Lebanon	15	16	21	8	23	83
Libya	4	8	2	6	17	37
Morocco	11	13	9	8	19	60
Saudi Arabia	12	13	3	0	13	41
Sudan	9	18	0	8	13	48
Syria	10	6	6	7	14	43
Tunisia	11	19	7	7	18	62
Yemen	9	2	0	8	7	26
TOTALS	148	152	85	90	202	677

Table C-38

Subject Country Diplomatic Representation-
Extra-Regional

1974

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	15	22	9	9	17	72
Egypt	20	24	15	9	19	87
Iraq	13	8	4	8	18	51
Jordan	14	5	5	9	18	51
Kuwait	11	13	9	8	18	59
Lebanon	18	23	19	9	22	91
Libya	11	14	5	8	18	56
Morocco	11	12	9	9	17	58
Saudi Arabia	12	15	4	0	15	46
Sudan	12	17	3	8	20	60
Syria	9	2	8	7	17	43
Tunisia	12	18	7	9	19	65
Yemen	9	2	0	7	12	30
TOTALS	167	175	97	100	230	769

Table C-39

1975

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	18	23	9	9	20	79
Egypt	22	32	20	9	23	106
Iraq	14	10	4	8	18	54
Jordan	12	4	5	7	16	44
Kuwait	11	14	9	8	19	61
Lebanon	17	24	20	9	23	93
Libya	12	15	6	8	17	58
Morocco	12	12	10	9	18	61
Saudi Arabia	13	15	4	0	17	49
Sudan	14	17	3	8	18	60
Syria	11	3	8	8	16	46
Tunisia	13	18	7	9	21	68
Yemen	8	2	0	8	13	31
TOTALS	177	189	105	100	239	810

Table C-40

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries - 1965-66

IMPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	2	2	-	2	1	7
Egypt	11	3	-	12	4	30
Iraq	3	-	-	-	-	3
Jordan	1	1	-	-	1	3
Kuwait	1	2	-	-	2	5
Lebanon	2	2	1	-	-	5
Libya	1	-	-	-	3	4
Morocco	1	1	-	-	1	3
Saudi Arabia	-	3	-	-	1	4
Sudan	1	-	-	-	1	2
Syria	1	-	-	-	-	1
Tunisia	2	-	-	1	1	4
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTALS	26	14	1	15	15	71

Table C-41

EXPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	1	6	-	4	2	13
Egypt	2	10	1	11	7	31
Iraq	3	-	-	2	-	5
Jordan	1	-	-	-	8	9
Kuwait	7	-	-	4	5	16
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	3	3
Libya	-	-	-	-	3	3
Morocco	-	1	-	2	10	13
Saudi Arabia	3	2	-	-	4	9
Sudan	-	5	-	-	-	5
Syria	1	-	-	9	-	10
Tunisia	2	7	1	6	7	23
Yemen	1	-	-	1	-	2
TOTALS	21	31	2	39	49	142

Table C-42

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries - 1968-69

IMPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	2	2	-	7	3	14
Egypt	-	5	-	5	1	11
Iraq	1	1	-	1	-	3
Jordan	1	-	-	1	2	4
Kuwait	5	2	-	2	1	10
Lebanon	1	-	-	-	2	3
Libya	1	1	-	-	4	6
Morocco	3	3	-	2	3	11
Saudi Arabia	5	2	-	-	1	8
Sudan	-	4	-	1	-	5
Syria	-	1	-	7	-	8
Tunisia	3	1	-	1	9	14
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTALS	22	22	0	27	26	97

Table C-43

EXPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	-	1	1	3	3	8
Egypt	1	4	-	6	4	15
Iraq	5	-	-	7	1	13
Jordan	5	-	-	1	7	13
Kuwait	4	-	-	-	6	10
Lebanon	-	-	-	1	5	6
Libya	3	-	-	1	5	9
Morocco	3	-	-	-	1	4
Saudi Arabia	2	1	-	-	7	10
Sudan	-	2	-	5	-	7
Syria	2	-	-	6	1	9
Tunisia	7	-	1	2	9	19
Yemen	-	1	-	1	1	3
TOTALS	32	9	2	33	50	126

Table C-44

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries - 1971-72

IMPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	-	5	2	3	3	13
Egypt	1	4	-	8	2	15
Iraq	5	-	-	3	1	9
Jordan	1	-	-	-	2	3
Kuwait	2	-	-	-	2	4
Lebanon	1	-	-	1	5	7
Libya	-	3	-	1	5	9
Morocco	-	1	-	1	5	7
Saudi Arabia	1	1	-	-	2	4
Sudan	1	2	-	1	-	4
Syria	2	-	-	3	3	8
Tunisia	1	1	-	-	1	3
Yemen	-	-	-	-	1	1
TOTALS	15	17	2	21	32	87

Table C-45

EXPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	3	-	-	2	3	8
Egypt	-	-	-	15	13	28
Iraq	4	-	-	6	1	11
Jordan	1	-	-	-	6	7
Kuwait	3	-	-	-	-	3
Lebanon	2	-	-	1	4	7
Libya	-	2	-	3	5	10
Morocco	-	-	-	-	4	4
Saudi Arabia	4	5	-	-	7	16
Sudan	1	3	-	1	7	12
Syria	2	-	-	5	1	8
Tunisia	3	-	-	-	6	9
Yemen	3	-	-	3	-	6
TOTALS	26	10	0	36	57	129

Table C-46

Extra-Regional State Visits Conducted By
Subject Countries - 1974-75

IMPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	2	1	-	2	7	12
Egypt	5	-	1	3	14	23
Iraq	8	1	-	3	3	15
Jordan	1	-	-	1	9	11
Kuwait	2	-	1	1	4	8
Lebanon	-	-	-	1	1	2
Libya	5	3	-	1	-	9
Morocco	-	3	-	-	4	7
Saudi Arabia	4	-	1	-	8	13
Sudan	-	-	-	-	2	2
Syria	4	-	-	6	12	22
Tunisia	-	1	-	1	4	6
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTALS	31	9	3	19	68	130

Table C-47

EXPORTS

	Asia	Africa	L.A.	E.E./USSR	N.A./W.E.	TOTALS
Algeria	4	-	-	1	3	8
Egypt	4	-	-	9	14	27
Iraq	8	-	-	3	2	13
Jordan	-	-	-	1	10	11
Kuwait	1	-	-	1	1	3
Lebanon	1	-	-	-	-	1
Libya	1	5	-	3	6	15
Morocco	2	-	-	1	2	5
Saudi Arabia	4	-	-	-	7	11
Sudan	2	-	-	-	-	2
Syria	5	-	-	9	3	17
Tunisia	2	-	-	1	5	8
Yemen	1	-	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	35	5	0	29	53	122