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
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WILL JAPAN REARM?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOSEPH B. BERGER, JR. MAJ, USA
B.A., LaSalle College, 1966
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1977

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)



ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the possibility of Japanese rearmament using a comparative case study approach examining the periods 1870 to 1945 and 1945 to 1976. Major actors in each period are examined in order to understand the role they play and their views toward rearmament. For the period 1870 to 1945, the actors are the Emperor, the politicians, the military, the population, and the economic sector. During the later period, these same actors together with the American Occupation force are examined. The shift of political power and influence during each period is charted in order to determine any significant similarities between the two. An examination of the literature of both periods allows for additional similarities to be drawn. It is concluded that Japan probably will continue along a course of conventional but gradual rearmament.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although history rarely repeats itself closely enough for us to predict the future with certainty, it can at least give some useful insight into possible future developments. In 1868, Japan was an emerging Asian nation with little political, military, or economic strength. By 1905, she had become the strongest power in Eastern Asia, and by 1941, she was a world power at war. By 1945, however, she was disarmed and at conqueror's mercy -- a conqueror who wanted to insure she would never again wage war. Japan's recent history, therefore, is one of the rise and fall of military power. Is this cycle likely to be repeated? This paper examines that possibility.

While Japan's power at the moment is primarily in the economic sphere, its present and future military and political role in Asia and the rest of the world is a matter of importance. She is regarded by many as an economic giant, but a military pygmy. This is an anomaly in a world where the principle determinant of role and influence during the modern age has been the possession of military power and the will to use it. Will she elect to remain as she is now, or will she begin to take the necessary steps to achieve the status of a military power? Will Japan rearm?

In order to answer that question, a clear definition of rearmament is necessary. Rearmament, as used in this study, refers to:

- (1) a significant increase in the size of the armed forces.

For the purpose of this study, an increase of over 5% in a five year period without a similar increase in the size of the armed forces of her Asian neighbors (notably, the USSR, PRC, South Korea, and North Korea) would constitute a significant increase.

(2) a favorable public attitude toward the military. This will be judged in light of recent public opinion polls.

(3) an increase in the defense budget accounting for more than normal inflation and a growing defense industry.

The answer to the question of Japanese rearmament lies not only in the analysis of recent trends in these four areas, but also in an examination of what were the major factors which contributed to the earlier period of Japanese military buildup. The primary methodology of the study is an historical comparison of two periods of Japanese history, the first from 1870 until 1945, and the second beginning from 1945 until 1976, to determine if the conditions which contributed to the rise of Japanese military power from 1870 to 1945 have significant similarities with conditions existing in the post-1945 period. The study will focus on the major actors in both periods who were influential in decisions related to military power.

While many other factors could be considered in an analysis of Japanese rearmament, this study focuses only on those primary actors who could affect Japan's decision to rearm. The actors for the early period are: the Emperor, the politicians, the military, the zaibatsu, and the general population; for the later period, this study examines those actors just mentioned plus the Occupation Force.

Any decision by Japan to increase her military capabilities significantly is important to the US. Such a decision would reflect

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further major changes in the already changing US-Japanese relationship.

During the Korean War, Japan provided naval ports and staging areas for US troops. By the time the US was involved in Vietnam, the student riots and public sentiment of the Japanese people pointed toward a possible change in US-Japanese relations. Japan, while still an ally, became increasingly sensitive to international criticism for being an "American lacky," and sought a more independent relationship with the US. The question of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the American defeat in Vietnam caused Japan to increasingly question the credibility of the US defense commitment and the desirability of a continued close political-military relationship with the US.

The post-Vietnam era has been marked by other significant events changing the Asian balance. The three-pronged Nixon shocks (the textile embargo, the soybean shortfall, and the China visit) brought Japan to the realization that she might very well become of secondary importance to US interests in Asia. The Middle East oil embargo might very well be an example of Japan's feeling of the necessity to act alone. These shocks precipitated some significant changes in Japan's thinking and policy toward China, Taiwan, and the Koreans -- so much so, that there is an increasing air of uncertainty in the Asian balance. Japan watches Korea anxiously; unification of Korea under either government presents Japan with a powerful neighbor with a large, modern, well-equipped Army and economy. Should Japan change her military posture to meet such a changing world situation, it would certainly affect Washington, Peking, and Moscow.

To better understand the various opinions on Japanese rearmament, a review of the primary literature covering both periods will be examined next.

CHAPTER 2

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE.

Radical changes in political, social, and economic structures associated with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 transformed Japan into a modern nation. These same changes also thrust Japan onto the stage of international politics at a time of colonial and imperial expansion on the part of the great Western Powers. Many problems which confront Japan in the twentieth century arise from the attempt to reconcile demands of her modern role with her long historic tradition. The resulting identity crisis, experienced for the first time at the close of the nineteenth century, was expressed in growing extremism at home and military aggression abroad. It put Japan on a collision course not only with her Asian neighbors, but also with the rest of the world.

In a survey of her literature of the earlier period examining the factors that led to Japanese armament and the disaster of 1945, no two authors expressed exactly the same opinion as to when, how, or why the decisions were made that brought about a military buildup and war. There is more agreement, however, among the authors on who were the major actors in the armament decision and what were their relationships. The major actors during the 1870-1945 period were the population, the Emperor, the zaibatsu, civilian political leaders and bureaucrats hereafter lumped together as either a part of or an extension of the cabinets, and the military.

In his landmark book The Story of a Nation (1970), Edwin O. Reischauer focuses on the Japanese population examining their national

origin, culture, and economic growth. He traces the growth of nationalism among the people and concludes by stating that only because of this strong national solidarity could the Japanese have accomplished what they did. Reischauer notes that there was no better time for Japan's emergence as a world leader. The country was finally united, the population homogenous, and there was no other Asian power capable of stopping Japan's growth.

In Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (1973), James W. Morley introduces an edited collection of works examining the roles played by the cabinets, the military, the zaibatsu, and the population. In examining the cabinets, the book looks at Japan's lack of experience with nonmilitary rules as a difficult hurdle to overcome. The military, though certainly weak in the 1870s in terms of political power, possessed sufficient power by 1918 to be considered a political force. The zaibatsu, dependent upon the civilian leadership for its initial financial success, remained the political ally of the cabinet. The population, because of its common base and growing sense of nationalism, was willing to accept the actions of whomever represented the Emperor. Collectively, the authors felt that the military's ability to project itself as the will of the Emperor, greatly enhanced its acceptance by the population. This book is broad in scope, and yet concise, usefully developing most of the major factors that scholars argue led Japan to war. These factors include: (1) the cabinets were supplanted by the military who saw themselves moving into an Asian power vacuum caused by the near disintegration of China; (2) economically, Japan had to expand her economic power base to overseas areas in order to support her growing population; (3) her people saw Western colonialism as a desirable trait

to emulate; and (4) the people saw themselves as destined to be a major world power.

W. G. Beasley's The Meiji Restoration (1972) gives an account of the origins, development, and immediate aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. He sees its origins not in terms of economic distress or class struggle, but as a growing sense of national danger and pride, spurred on by Japan's contacts with the West. The national danger was perceived on the part of the Japanese as a fight for national survival; the rest of the world was attempting to limit her military power through a series of disarmament conferences. Similarly, Japanese economic power was being limited by means of embargos and unfavorable trade agreements. His focus, then, is on the population as the primary actor through what he calls "national will."

Herbert Feis' The Road to Pearl Harbor (1950) deserves note here because of its long passages quoting significant statements on Japanese-American relations and the US perception of Japanese actions from Stimson, Grew, Morgenthau, and Hull -- all fellow-members of the Roosevelt team with Feis, and all non-Japanese. He omits, however, an adequate discussion on economic and geopolitical factors which tended to drive the US and Japan into inevitable conflict. Additionally, Feis begins his study with 1937, by which time the internal power struggle in Japan was decided in favor of the military. Primarily, he adds the dimension of the international actors who exerted varying degrees of pressure on Japan during this period.


These books provide a representative sample of the majority opinion which, although diverse, focuses on how military leadership took advantage of a situation that allowed Japan the opportunity to expand her empire.

James B. Crowley's Japan's Quest for Autonomy (1966) maintains that Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s was the product of rational deliberation by the cabinets and military leaders, not the result of terrorist pressure or military feuds. His thesis is based on a comprehensive examination of the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Mukden incident, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Sino-Japanese War.

In more specifically identifying the catalyst for Japan's prewar militarism, David Bergamini in Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (1971) identifies the key role of the Emperor. He argues that Hirohito actually ruled prewar Japan, and that he cleverly manipulated his official civilian and military advisors in plotting the course of aggression which culminated in WW II. It is only fair to state that this account has received severe critical attacks from a number of scholars.¹

Finally, John Toland, in the first part of his work, The Rising Sun (1970), calls the upsurge of Japanese militarism "an expression of Asian aspirations." In this case, "Asian aspirations" refers to the Japanese belief that Japan was destined to be "the" Asian power -- protector and controller of that geographic area. "Asian aspirations" equated to expansionism. His account begins in 1936, but, unlike Feis (1950), Toland frequently reflects back on the roots of situations already developed by that time.

The diagram below attempts to identify the relationship among the actors on Japanese armament. The author proposing the relationship is identified by a number along the arrow, and is further explained below.



(Figure 2-1, EARLY CAUSES OF JAPANESE ARMAMENT)

(1) Reischauer (1970) suggests that traditionally Japan has had an overriding concern for national survival, with the population establishing the tradition. This national survival, when threatened by external economic blockades imposed by the Western powers and attempts to limit her overseas expansion by these same powers through disarmament conferences and treaties, forced Japan to take defensive action. This action was manifested in military armament.

(2) Morley (1973) stressed the influence exerted by the population as a reaction to national survival and economic growth. The influences of the cabinets and military were subordinate to this. He, too, stressed the unwillingness of the Western Powers to allow Japan to expand her economic base throughout Asia as a primary influence for resorting to military armament.

(3) Beasley (1972), like Morley, focused on national survival but disregarded economics as a primary cause of armament. He, too, examined the attempts of the Western Powers to limit Japanese expansion in Asia, principally through the Washington Conference and the London Naval Treaty. No actor stands out as a primary influence although he appears to favor the power of the population.

(4) For Feis (1950), economics drove the nation. The decision for armament was based largely on furthering this goal. Military power became necessary after the Western powers blocked Japan's Asian expansion -- expansion the author saw as necessary to further Japanese economic power. Feis did not credit the zaibatsu with the sole power to further economic goals, but interpreted economic goals as national goals shared by all the actors.

(5) While Crowley (1966) also felt economics tended to push Japan toward armament, he emphasized the role played first by the cabinets, and later by the military leadership. Crowley identified these two actors as the key forces that drove Japan toward armament.

(6) Bergamini (1971) identifies the Emperor as the major cause of Japanese aggression. He believes that the Emperor manipulated both his civilian and military leaders and singlehandedly planned several political assassinations and autonomous military actions in Manchuria and Russia. For Bergamini, the Emperor was a scheming intellect capable of manipulating a nation and fooling the world.

(7) Toland (1970) examines the military as an actor simply fulfilling the national will. For him, national will was the desire of the population to become the dominant Asian power. For this period, there is a lack of data on the roles of the zaibatsu and the Emperor, neither of which appears to have been adequately explored. Only after the publication of Bergamini's book (1971) is any substantial discussion found on the Emperor's role; and then, the discussion revolves around Mr. Bergamini's lack of scholarship. No author was found whose focus dwelt on the zaibatsu.

In the current period, the ten works examined are viewed not only with regard to the roles of the major actors, but also with regard

to how the author views the possibility of Japanese rearmament. For this period the following major actors are identified: the American Occupation Forces, the Emperor, the Politicians, the military, the general population, and the zaikai or modern zaibatsu. The various views of these authors on rearmament are summarized on charts at the end of this discussion.

In his book The United States and Japan (1965) and his later work previously noted (1970), Edwin O. Reischauer describes a future for Japan based totally on economic advancement without the use of military forces -- a system he later characterizes as "a post-military economic power."² According to Reischauer, Japan will not rearm. Because of economic success guaranteed through the cooperation of the politicians and the zaikai, Japan has established that there is little need for the use of military power. Japan has become, according to Reischauer, a world power through economic strength. To divert any of this money for rearmament would be a certain waste.

J. A. A. Stockwin, in Japan: Divided Politics In A Growth Economy (1975), maintains that while the government has presided over the world's fastest growing economy through a unique cooperation between government and business, its political process manifests fundamental and chronic division over basic issues such as constitution and foreign policy. The author sees this division in the recent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) split -- a split primarily over foreign policy, and the ever-growing popularity of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) who continue to argue against the Self-Defense Force (SDF) as a constitutional body. Because of the JSP position, the LDP cannot significantly increase the defense budget. For Stockwin, the economy or zaikai is represented as a single

strong actor, but the politicians lack the same solidarity.

In contrast, Nobutaka Ike in Japan: The New Superstate (1973) gives the reader a gloomy picture of Japan's economic future. Because of this, he predicts Japan will not rearm. Rearmament would result in the loss of international public sentiment, especially among her Asian trading partners. Considerable capital, therefore, would not be available for economic growth. While no actor appears to Ike to possess significant power, the zaikai is represented as the only actor possessing some measurable degree of influence.

John K. Emmerson's Arms, Yen, and Power: The Japanese Dilemma (1971), attempts to present a Japanese perception of such problems as relations with the US and her Asian neighbors and the implications of becoming a military power -- including nuclear weapons. Taken with his later Will Japan Rearm? (1973), Emmerson argues that while the Japanese can be expected to support a steady but moderate SDF growth, Japan's constitutional provisions against rearmament and its historically acquired "nuclear allergy" will prove strong barriers against any efforts to build an offensive military force. He sees political stability as the key to the future, but fails to account for the ever-decreasing power of the LDP obvious even in the early 1970s. He views the opinion of the population as playing an extremely important role in Japan's decision to rearm.

In Asia and the Road Ahead (1975), Robert A. Scalapino views Japan's future as politically, but not economically dependent. While he notes that rearmament would appear to be a logical course of action for the Japanese, Scalapino believes they will not rearm. His reasons are based on what he calls a national "frustration" which is manifested

in the Japanese inability to divert money away from economic growth and toward military rearmament. For him, the politicians possess the power to affect any change in Japan's decision to rearm.

James H. Buck's "Japan: The Problems of Shared Responsibility" in Foreign Policy and National Security (1976) offers four options for Japan in the future; these options are: (1) a disarmed, neutral/nonaligned Japan; (2) Japan entering into bilateral agreements -- notably with Russia and China -- in addition to a continued US Mutual Security Treaty (MST); (3) the development of an autonomous, strong, and potentially aggressive Japan with significantly increased military power; and (4) a continued reliance on the MST. After examining each option in detail, the author finally settles on the last option. He bases his conclusion on Japan's seeming unwillingness to initiate change in the Asian power structure. Buck believes that to do so would cause Japan to lose too many customers in Asia, and force an expenditure for rearmament she is unwilling to spend. He sees the influence of the zaikai as being sufficient to insure a status quo.

In The Postwar Rearmament of the Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (1974), James E. Auer provides a step-by-step tracing of the origins and the architects of postwar constitutional disarmament concomitant with de facto rearmament, and concludes that Japan will not totally rearm; that is, while her conventional forces will certainly continue a gradual growth, Japan will not acquire nuclear devices. His conclusion is based on the prohibitive cost of such rearmament (as influenced by the zaikai) and the national dread of nuclear weapons (as influenced by public opinion).

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in The Fragile Blossom (1972), argues that Japan's economic accomplishments and possible military power are indeed

a "fragile blossom." He expects domestic turmoil resulting from a soon-to-happen great economic stall. He emphasizes the national "trait" of the Japanese to command international respect and thus satisfy Japanese intense national pride. For the author, Japan can only gain this self-respect through rearmament after a period of economic decline. He feels that as a people they lack creative flexibility which is reflected in their imitative nature. As a result, they will respond to external change rather than create change themselves.

In Black Star Over Japan (1973), Albert Axelbank sees in Japan: (1) an increasing right-wing sentiment reflected in the resurgence of ultranationalistic groups so popular in the 1920s and 1930s; (2) a developing military-industrial complex evidenced by the growth of a specific arms-building industry; (3) national political development leading away from democracy toward imperialism, as noted in the recent increase in the power of the Emperor in domestic issues and the concurrent decrease in power of the ruling party (LDP); and (4) a national desire for power that only the possession of a nuclear-armed force could supply. A pacifist himself, Axelbank seems to overstate all that is "wrong" with Japan using very generalized statements instead of specific points to support his thesis.

One of the most famous books on Japan's economic future and a must for anyone looking at the subject is Herman Kahn's The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (1970). Although a number of scholars feel his predictions for Japan's future economic growth are too optimistic, he does present a case in projecting Japan's economic successes into the future. He feels that through the cooperation between the politicians and the zaikai, Japan has attained phenomenal heights. Therefore, she will seek to exercise political and military power commensurate

with her economic status as a world power. For Kahn, military power also means nuclear power. In essence, he projects growth rates comparable to the recent past well into the future. There is always the possibility, however, of a fallacy in this type of projection, but his view warrants strong consideration.

Almost without exception, the authors identify the close role between the politicians and the zaikai as the primary influence on any decision to rearm. The Emperor and military are each dismissed as possessing little or no influence. Strangely enough, while they identify this combination as holding the primary influence, they come to varied and conflicting conclusions on the question of rearmament. For that reason, an examination of the frequency of prediction for rearmament follows. The following charts indicate general categories of opinion by the authors surveyed. Generally, these views can be placed into three categories: (1) Japan will rearm with conventional and nuclear weapons; (2) Japan will rearm conventionally, but will not acquire nuclear devices; and (3) Japan will not rearm. Kahn (1970) is the best example of those holding the first view. Without exception, however, there were no Japanese authors found in this category. The second view is seen best in Auer (1974) who shares the most prevalent view -- the theory of gradualism; Japan's rearmament will be a slow, gradual development of conventional weapons. The third category, as exemplified by Reischauer (1970), views Japan's economic prowess alone to be sufficient to continue to provide the necessary security. The majority of Japanese authors share this view, as does the Japanese government.

In summary, contemporary authors tend to view the question of Japanese rearmament as indicated in the following table.

CONTENDING VIEWS ON JAPANESE REARMAMENT (1977).

CATEGORY	NUMBER (FREQUENCY)	
(1) Conventional and nuclear rearmament is likely	10	(21%)
(2) Conventional rearmament only is likely	37	(64%)
(3) Will not rearm	7	(15%)
TOTAL EXAMINED	54	

In a study using 1971 and earlier data, Donald M. Rhea³ ran a similar survey of thirty-four publications with the following results:

CONTENDING VIEWS ON JAPANESE REARMAMENT (1971).

CATEGORY	NUMBER (FREQUENCY)	
(1) Conventional and nuclear rearmament is likely	4	(12%)
(2) Conventional rearmament only is likely	22	(64%)
(3) Will not rearm	8	(24%)
TOTAL EXAMINED	34	

The following table combines the two studies for comparison and further identifies the distribution of Japanese authors in the current (1977) review of the literature for contrast with the views of Western authors.

CHANGING VIEWS ON JAPANESE REARMAMENT.

CATEGORY	1971 STUDY	1977 STUDY	(% OF JAPANESE AUTHORS)
(1) Conventional and nuclear rearmament	12%	21%	(0%)
(2) Conventional rearmament only	64%	64%	(37%)
(3) Will not rearm	24%	15%	(62%)

Percentages of Japanese authors were not available on the 1971 survey. The drastic changes in categories one and three probably reflect the affect of such events as the 1972 Nixon shocks, the 1973 oil embargo, America's withdrawal from Vietnam, and Sino-Japanese rapproachment -- all of which occurred after the completion of the 1971 survey. These events tended to increase Japanese concern for the reliability of the US security commitment. If this is the case, a trend toward an increasingly stronger and more independent Japanese military force is a distinct possibility.

Most Japanese authors, however, still feel that such an occurrence is unlikely. They see continuing Japanese economic success and security primarily based on US military support. For them, a major military buildup would be both economically and politically unwise. Most US writers, on the other hand, see a gradual Japanese rearmament as a minimum future scenario.

Some useful insight into which views are more likely to be proven correct can be gained from an analysis of the Japanese military buildup from 1870 to 1945.

CHAPTER 3

JAPAN, 1870-1945.

This case study of Japan from 1870 until 1945 examines the rise of the military in Japan. In so doing, the following major actors are investigated: the population, the Emperor, the zaibatsu, the politicians, and the military. It is through these actors that Japan developed from a feudal feifdom to a world power within the space of seventy-five years. After examining the actors, the period's characteristics are identified and then the relationship between the actor and the issue of Japanese arament is examined.


The Population

The rise of nationalism during this period contributed to increasing military influence within the Japanese political system. Nationalism was fostered in the family, and encouraged by the process of urbanization and education. It was in the family structure that the child was first taught the ideals of loyalty, harmony, and cooperation. Family members were taught the ideals of ancestor worship and obedience to authority. These values included the Emperor, and thus, indirectly the government as well as the personal family.

It was the Japanese custom that the oldest son inherited the family estate; it was for the younger sons to strike out on their own. As the population increased during this period, the number of sons leaving home and settling in the urban areas increased. In 1895, only 12% of the 42 million Japanese lived in cities or towns of more than 10,000; by 1935, over 45%

of the 69 million Japanese lived in such urban areas, and over a quarter of the population lived in cities of more than 100,000 people, carrying with them the ideal of obedience to authority. By 1935, Japan was a highly homogenous society sharing ideals of loyalty and cooperation in national efforts. Urbanization, with the related improvements in communications, contributed a greater sense of national identity and common values. The closer living conditions insured a faster and more complete spread of ideas as people became more interested and aware of the activities of the government.

Expansion of Japan's educational system during this period further aided the rise of nationalism. By 1900, the curriculum was identical nation-wide. The same ideals of loyalty and cooperation taught in the home were reemphasized in the school with increasing nationalistic application. The chart below reflects the rapid expansion in the number of children that this education reached.¹



(Figure 3-1, CHILDREN ATTENDING PRIMARY SCHOOL, 1873-1935)

Through family, urbanization, and education the Japanese were able to foster nationalism as the accepted ideal. With a population thus socialized, the military found no large-scale popular opposition to its goals; instead, the military found a population generally eager to support nationalistic military goals. For example, when the military decided to exploit the situation in Manchuria in 1931, and when some of her young officers became involved in assassination attempts of politicians, there was never a public display of opposition. Instead, the assassinations and overseas military ventures were viewed by the population as necessary and the will of authority -- authority personified by the Emperor.

The Emperor

In 1867, the Shogun voluntarily surrendered his authority to the new Emperor Meiji and ended seven hundred years of military rule. The Emperor immediately went about establishing a national assembly that would allow all classes a share in the government. What started as a sharing of power for the Emperor in 1867, however, became a loss of power in 1938.

The potential problem of growing gaps between both the Emperor and the military and between the Emperor and the population, was reflected in the 1887 constitution. The Emperor, while under the constitution, was both a supreme authority and yet limited as a constitutional monarch. The contradiction between the government's policy toward the Emperor since the Meiji restoration that encouraged the population to regard him as a living god, and the simultaneous opposition to a personal and absolute monarchy that emphasized the Emperor's constitutional role, tended

to leave the Emperor with more symbolic than real power. This lack of real political influence led many to exploit the constitutional ambiguity on the role of the Emperor and justify various actions in the name of the Emperor even without his approval. For example, after the Manchurian incident of 1931, Colonel Anami Korechika, when asked why the Army had disregarded the Emperor's wishes, said: "It is we, taking advantage of the historical opportunity and getting hold of Manchuria for the nation and for the sake of a thousand years of tranquility for the Imperial House, who are obeying the real wishes of His Majesty."²

For those reasons, the Supreme Commanders (Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy) were able to justify their action by invoking Article XI of the Meiji Constitution and circumventing the PM whenever necessary. Article XI of the 1889 Constitution said, "The Emperor has supreme command of the Army and Navy." The military commanders used this as their basis for coordinating directly with the Emperor when it was to their benefit.

The Emperor became an object for manipulation in the struggle for power between the military and the politicians. For example, as a further result of the Japanese military seizure of Manchuria from China in 1931, and the subsequent formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, Japan was pressured to either withdraw from the area or be forced to withdraw from the League of Nations. The Emperor prepared an Imperial Rescript on the withdrawal from the League, and on 8 March 1933, presented it to the Cabinet. It contained two major points:

1. It is extremely regrettable for Japan to be placed in the unavoidable position of being forced to withdraw from the League.
2. Even though Japan withdraws from the League of Nations, we continue to cooperate and maintain close relations with other nations.³

The Cabinet debated these points and made some changes to the Rescript.

The Emperor then added two more points to the Rescript:

3. Japan does not disagree with the League, except, unfortunately, as regards Manchuria and will continue in the same spirit as the League despite withdrawal.
4. The civil and military (in Japan) should work in harmony in their respective spheres and should avoid intruding in each other's affairs.⁴

The Cabinet continued making changes in an attempt to dilute the force of the wording, especially the last point which was a reflection of the Emperor's disapproval of the actions of the military. Playing the leading role in this was the Army Minister who was particularly adamant about changing the last point and omitting the anti-military implications of the statement. As a result, the Emperor finally acquiesced to cabinet demands and agreed to say that "military and civilian officers must adhere to their designated duties."⁵

The Emperor continued to lose his ability to control the military. In July 1937, the Emperor instructed the Army Minister to announce to the press assembled in Tokyo that Japan had no intention of furthering aggression in China. By December, however, the Japanese Army attacked from Manchuria toward Shanghai and was pushing Chiang Kai-shek to accept surrender or annihilation. Neither the Emperor nor the PM could control the military.

Similarly, in early 1938, a Russian detachment moved into a position where Korea, Manchuria, and Siberia converged overlooking the Soviet naval base at Possiet Bay. The Emperor, convinced that war with Russia at that time was ridiculous, commanded his military not to move a soldier without his permission. Despite this, on July 30, the Japanese Army moved against the Russians, attempting to drive them off. Again, the military demonstrated that it was not subject to outside

control and de facto dictated Japanese foreign policy. By this time, the Emperor had virtually lost control over the military.

The Zaibatsu

Economic interests in Japan during this period were concentrated in the zaibatsu which initially were opposed to increased military influence, but soon found themselves subject to a military-dominated government. The zaibatsu were created by the government around 1890-1900, through low-interest loans and favorable legislation granted to select families in order to achieve faster economic growth. Japan, in the late 1800s, was economically very primitive, although even during this period Korea and Taiwan had begun to be distinguished as economically important to Japan. In the 1880s, the government began lending money to promising business families. These businessmen, successful in their initial expansion, continued to reinvest their money in more varied businesses so that by the early 1920s, they developed into large conglomerates. These family-based conglomerates accumulated tremendous wealth. The richest of these, the Mitsui family, was valued at \$4 million (1915 dollars). It was these families that naturally allied themselves with the conservative civilian politicians who had been instrumental in their development. The zaibatsu, in turn, provided the key sources of government revenues. Thus, the zaibatsu sided with the politicians in the struggle to control the increasing military influence.

The military, especially the ultranationalistic young officers, looked on the zaibatsu as Western, decadent, and possessing too much national wealth. This orientation was reflected in several assassinations that occurred during the 1920s and 1930s when some prominent business executives were killed by ultranationalistic elements within the society.

It should be noted that Japan's imperial expansion was essential to her economic development. Manchuria, for example, was an extremely important base for Japan's economic trade. Over 75% of foreign investment in Manchuria was Japanese; "particularly important was the South Manchurian Railway Company. There were a million Japanese subjects in Manchuria... and 40% of Japan's China trade was with this area. Arguments in favor of the expansion of this economic position had been powerfully bolstered by the depression."⁶

Since the government controlled the nation's economy, and thus the zaibatsu, when the military won control of the government in the late 1930s, it gained control of the zaibatsu as well. With zaibatsu money, the military was able to finance its overseas expansion.

The Politicians

An examination of the role of the politicians should begin with a brief historical statement that with the Meiji Restoration and establishment of a constitutional monarchy in the 1870s, some 700 years of military rule was overturned. Civilian control of the military, however, gradually eroded over the next 50 years. The cabinet was the dominant political force in the 1870s. It was composed of a small group of politicians which began to split into factions by the close of WW I. The Cabinet's loss of control over the military between 1870 and 1930, can be attributed to: (1) a loss of cabinet credibility with the population and military due to acquiescence to foreign demands; (2) assassination attempts directed at the Cabinet during the late 1920s and early 1930s; (3) an increase in military representation within the cabinets; and (4) the increasing military role overseas.

A series of diplomatic moves by the major world powers in the 1920s and 1930s were designed to limit Japanese territorial expansion.

The Washington Conference of 1921-22, for example, forced Japan to withdraw to her 1905 borders by 1925. Japan, however, was able to retain Korea which had become a colony in 1910. Japan agreed to a limitation of naval armament (tonnage) in return for Anglo-American promises to keep the Western Pacific between Singapore and Hawaii free of any new Anglo-American ports; a major provision of the Washington Conference called for a reduction in the Japanese Army of 60,000 men over a four year period (1922-25). This reduction included deactivation of four divisions and a reduction in the size of five additional divisions. All of these provisions were unsatisfactory to the Japanese military and tended to enforce an already growing body of dissention.

PM Homaguchi, at the London Naval Conference of 1930, forced the Japanese navy to accept a limitation on cruisers that "even American Naval experts (in private) agreed was unfavorable to Japan."⁷ At home, the Navy General Staff and some vocal extremists strongly objected to his "selling out" to the foreign powers. In November 1930, the PM was assassinated by a group of ultranationalistic young military officers. As a result of these conferences, there was a domestic backlash of increased nationalism and dissatisfaction with the civilian leaders who had been a party to this perceived humiliation.

Assassination attempts on conservative politicians planned by military and civilian ultranationalists eliminated several key officials and instilled fear on the part of the survivors. In March and October 1931, field grade officers attempted to place General Ugaki, and later General Araki, in control of the government using the Army to physically take control of Tokyo. Both plots were halted, the incidents hushed to protect the Army's reputation, and "two of the leaders were punished by

light confinement to quarters."⁸ This unusually light punishment for treason seems to indicate a reluctance on the part of the government to take strong action against the military.

On February 26, 1932, another group of ultranationalistic military terrorists planned to assassinate influential members of the Imperial Court for their antimilitary stand. Although their plot failed, it tended to heighten tensions. Shortly thereafter, another group of military officers and civilians belonging to the Blood League assassinated a prominent party politician and Mitsui executive. On May 15, a group of junior Army and Navy officers assassinated PM Unukai and other political figures. Other incidents in 1932, 1933, and 1935, resulted in the assassination of several moderate government, business, and at least one moderate military leader. These assassinations were, for the most part, spontaneous and lacked central direction, but they tended to eliminate opposition and acted to demoralize and discredit government officials by forcing otherwise moderate leaders to take aggressive public stands. The assassinations resulted in the further loss of control by the politicians.

By 1918, military representation in the Cabinet began to grow. During this time, the tradition of filling the Cabinet positions of Army Minister and Navy Minister with senior military officers began. Simultaneously, in an attempt to further delineate military responsibilities, the Home Ministry was created through the efforts of the Army and Navy Ministers. The Home Ministry was responsible for maintaining domestic law and order, thus releasing the military from domestic-police responsibilities. Because the Home Ministry was comprised of military leaders and continued to have its police members trained as part of the military establishment, this was, in effect, another cabinet position filled by

the military leadership. Together, then, by 1918, military personnel filled at least three seats in any cabinet formed. In this way, they were able to begin to build their influence in the government. Prior to this time, they were consulted on military matters, but had little official means of affecting national policy.

Allowing the military a strong role overseas further added to weakening the politicians' position. With the Twenty-One Demands placed on China in 1915, Japan first clearly articulated to the world her ambition to control China. Japanese interest in China was noted as early as 1874 with the Formosan expedition, the challenge to Chinese sovereignty in Korea, and the subsequent Sino-Japanese War which resulted in concessions from China.

As a result of increasing Japanese interest in China, international pressure through such means as the 1921-22 Washington Conference sought to limit Japanese expansion. Domestically, Japan was divided with regard to China. But in 1927, PM Tanaka brought government leaders together at the Eastern Conference for the purpose of formulating a China policy. The conference established the following as Japan's foreign policy toward China: (1) Japan would cooperate with legitimate (a term she would later define to suit herself) Chinese aspirations; (2) Japan would be prepared to take decisive steps toward protecting Japanese lives and property in China; and (3) Japan would take vigorous actions to dissipate anti-Japanese movements on the mainland.⁹ Thus, in 1927, the military and civilian government leaders agreed upon an integrated Japanese policy toward China. The identification of Mongolia and Manchuria as essential to Japan's security and economic interests in this policy led to the increasing acceptance of the use of force by Japan to enforce these policies. Since the Japanese army was charged with enforc-


ing these policies, the government had little alternative but to accept military action deemed "necessary" by the local Japanese military leaders on the Asian mainland who represented their government.

Even pro-military cabinets had difficulty controlling the military. Any incident requiring cabinet involvement in affairs deemed inappropriate by the armed services could cause the cabinet to topple. A number of cabinets toppled as a result of military pressure; one example was the cabinet of PM Tanaka.

The cabinet of PM Baron Tanaka was one of the most pro-military governments prior to 1930, but it fell into disfavor with the military and was forced to resign. Tanaka rose through the Army ranks to become Army Minister in the Hara cabinet in 1918. Although he was pro-military, some of the generals looked on him with distrust because of his political dealings. He brought China well within Japan's sphere of interests through the 1927 Eastern Conference. In 1928, however, it is believed officers of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria were responsible for the assassination of Chang Tso-Lin, a Chinese warlord who had been cooperating with the Japanese, because he appeared to change his concerns away from Japan and more toward Manchuria. Tanaka, with Imperial approval, attempted to punish the assassins, but the Army leadership refused arguing such actions would damage the morale of the entire Army. Unable to force the Army to comply, the cabinet fell.

In 1931, as a result of the Mukden (Manchurian) Incident and the inability to control the military, the cabinet of PM Wakatsuki fell. From May 1932 until April 1945, with the exception of a five-month period in 1939, the cabinets were either completely subordinate to military desires or, after July 1940, comprised of military members. The table below

reflects the change in cabinet orientation toward the military during the period 1918-1945. Each block indicates a change in cabinets except the period 1922-24 when a number of "transitional" cabinets ruled.



(Figure 3-2, CABINET ORIENTATION TOWARD THE MILITARY, 1918-1945)

With the exception of a short period in 1931, the cabinets became increasingly pro-military after 1926. While no one factor can be singled out as the cause, the combination of a lack of cabinet credibility with the population and the military, assassination attempts on cabinet members' lives, an increase in military representation within the cabinets, and the increase in military roles overseas contributed to a loss of cabinet influence.

The Military

The Japanese military underwent major changes between 1870 and 1945. Three areas of change are particularly important: (1) the changing mission of the armed forces; (2) the change in military structure and strategic orientation; and (3) the growth in political influence of the Japanese military.

The new conscript army of 1872 was looked upon by the Meiji Emperor and civilian leadership as a militia needed to provide for the internal defense and development of the new nation. The Army's first test came in 1877, when the samurai attempted to force the government

into war with Korea. The new army was successful in putting down the samurai rebellion and established itself as the nation's protector, loyal to the civilian leadership and the Emperor.

By 1882, the military posture of Japan included:¹⁰

TOTAL ARMY (Active)	37,543	(45 Regt's; no divisional structure)
TOTAL NAVY (Active)	2,914	
RESERVE	49,767	
POLICE	18,473	
TOTAL	188,697	
MILITARY/1,000 POPULATION	189.4/1,000	

This indicates a tremendous growth during the first ten years of the forces.

By 1890, the role of the Army had begun to change from domestic defense to protection of the expanding foreign empire of Japan. Japan's 1872 punitive expedition to Taiwan, at that time a province of China, was sent to punish the natives for killing some sailors from the Ryuku Islands, which, by this time were recognized as belonging to Japan. This successful expedition forced China to pay Japan an indemnity. Two years later, she forced the Korean Emperor to open his land and sign a "treaty granting Japan the special privileges usually demanded by European powers from Asiatic states."¹¹ Further fighting with China over Korea occurred. This was probably Japan's first hint to the world that she was a world power. She easily seized Korea in 1894, destroyed the Chinese Navy, over-ran Southern Manchuria, and even captured the port of Wei-hei-wei in China.¹² As a result of this war, China ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula at the southwestern tip of Manchuria to Japan.


Japan became the first Asian country to free itself of extraterritoriality in 1899, and by 1911, Japan had resumed complete control of her own tariffs -- two signs of western respect for her national power.






By 1900, Japan saw increasing Russian economic involvement in Korea as a threat. Russia, however, had strong European allies. In order to avoid a European coalition against her, Japan entered into a treaty with Great Britain in 1902, whereby each country pledged to come to the aid of the other in the event of an attack by two nations simultaneously.

Competition with Russia over Korea led Japan to initiate a devastating, unprovoked attack on the Russian Navy in February 1904, and a declaration of war in 1905. A chronological description of Japan's victory is found at the end of this chapter. In the 1905 treaty with Russia, Japanese interests in Korea were acknowledged, Japan gained possession of the Liaotung Peninsula, was granted control of all Russian railroads built in Southern Manchuria, and had ceded to her the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. She annexed Korea in 1910.

Japan entered WW I on the side of the allies in fulfillment of the obligations incurred by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Japan saw this as an opportunity to enlarge her Pacific empire. Quickly, she occupied the German territories in the Pacific. Japan retained possession of these islands under the provisions of the peace treaty ending the war.

Thus, during this period the Japanese military mission changed from that of a national militia in 1872 to a world military power by the year 1918. The map below indicates the spread of Japan's imperial empire in chronological sequence.



- | | |
|---|--------------------|
|  | 1895 |
|  | 1910 |
|  | TREATY OF 1905 |
|  | MANCHURIA, 1931 |
|  | TO MANCHUKUO, 1933 |

During this same period, the military changed in both its structure and strategic orientation. Initially, the Army followed the French system of military staff organization while the Navy used the British system. As a result of the Franco-Prussian War, a number of Japanese senior officers were sent abroad to study German military and

political functioning. In exchange, German officials came to Japan and helped analyze the Japanese military and political systems in an attempt to recommend improvement.¹⁴ As a result, the Army progressed from a loosely-structured militia lacking centralized direction in the 1870s (the French model) to one that reflected the "German model" of organization with an increase in centralization, control, and communication.

The rise of the Japanese Army as a political force is indicated by its relationship with the Cabinet and the Emperor. The military was totally responsive to the government well into the twentieth century. In suppressing the 1877 samurai rebellion, prosecuting the 1894 war with China, and conducting the 1904 war with Russia, the Army was implementing orders rather than formulating policy. During this time, however, the foundation was laid that led to the military usurption of political power.

The military enjoyed increased stature and public support as a result of its successes; its leaders were looked upon as national heroes. As a conscript service, it was of the people and enjoyed popular support. During this period, the military created two general staffs (Army and Navy) having the "right of supreme command" which made them answerable only to the Emperor. At the same time, Army and Navy Ministers began to be selected from within the selected services rather than from the civilian leadership. The military chiefs of staff used Article XI of the constitution, as noted earlier, to bypass the cabinet and deal directly with the Emperor. Thus the military became increasingly less subject to civilian control.

The loss of control over the military increased after 1930, is reflected in four significant events: (1) the Mukden (Manchurian) Incident of 1931; (2) Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933,

(3) the war with China in 1937; and (4) the 1938 conflicts with the USSR.

In early September 1931, the Emperor told Navy Minister Abo that the naval officers stationed in Manchuria involved in political maneuvering must be punished and further action of that nature must cease. Abo promised immediate attention, but plotting with the conspirators, themselves economically involved in the Southern Manchurian Railroad, averted any action until September 18, the night the Mukden Incident began. On that night, the Japanese Army units stationed in Mukden to protect the South Manchurian Railway, on the pretext that Chinese troops attempted to destroy the railroad, embarked upon the conquest of all of Manchuria. On September 23, 1931, the Army Minister was able to force the Cabinet into a position of providing the necessary funds ex post facto to support the troops which had already been dispatched to Manchuria without cabinet permission. As a result of this incident, the PM and his cabinet resigned on December 12, 1931.

As a further result of the Mukden Incident and the formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, Japan was pressured to either withdraw from Manchuria or be forced to withdraw from the League of Nations. The pressure used by the Army Minister to change the Emperor's Imperial Rescript (proclamation) on withdrawal was another indication of the growing strength of the military.


The Emperor's decision to announce in July 1937, Japan's intention not to commit further aggression in China was followed a few months later by Japanese military action against Chiang Kai-shek -- again, without governmental permission.

Again in 1938, the Emperor decided that confronting the Russians at Possiet Bay was ridiculous. Despite this, the Army moved against the Russians.

On the homefront, groups of ultranationalistic young officers and civilians in their numerous assassination attempts on moderate political and business leaders further emphasized the lack of control exercised over the military by either the Emperor or the various cabinets.

The table below shows the military strength during the period examined. It should be noted that it was not until after the military finally took control of the government that military strength rose to its phenomenal size.¹⁵

SEE FOLLOWING PAGE



(SOURCE: The Statesman Yearbook, various editions)

(Figure 3-3, TABLE OF MILITARY STRENGTH)

The decrease in strength in 1921 and 1931 reflects the actions taken by the Japanese government in fulfillment of the disarmament treaties in Washington and London. The figures for total numbers of divisions from 1938 until 1941 inclusive are approximations.

Briefly, in relation to the other actors, the military during the period accomplished the following: (1) it split the relationship between the politicians and the Emperor through its autonomous actions and assassinations; (2) it attempted to discredit the Zaibatsu by displaying it as a paragon of wealth that would do better to be distributed among the population; and (3) it stood between the Emperor and his people and exploited the symbolic prestige of the Emperor to gain popular support.

The following table depicts the relative political power of the major actors during this period of analysis.

DATE PREDOMIN- ANCE OF POWER	1868	1870- 1890	1900- 1910	1910- 1914	1918- 1928	1928- 1932	1932- 1945
DOMINANT	EMP	EMP	EMP/ POL	POL	POL/ MIL/ZAI	POL/ MIL	MIL
SECONDARY		POL	MIL	MIL/ EMP	EMP	ZAI	POL/ ZAI
ANCILLARY		MIL	ZAI	ZAI		EMP	EMP

(Figure 3-4. MAJOR POLITICAL ACTORS IN JAPAN, 1868-1945)

Following is a chronology of military development in Japan from 1869 until 1939.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN, 1869-1939.¹⁶

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1869 Jan 3	Restoration of Imperial Power. Emperor Mutshuhits (Meiji Emperor) assumed control of government, supported primarily by the western clans. This was the start of Japan's emergence from feudalism. (700 years of Samurai military rules)
1871	Consolidation of National Power. Feudal lords replaced by Emperor-appointed governors; 300 "kingdoms" consolidated into 72 prefectures controlled by these governors.
1872	National Conscript Army. A national conscript force replaces the samurai forces of the daimyo domains.
1873	Feudal Structure Abolished. To aid in the further consolidation of national power, the Emperor abolishes the feudal system.
1873	Samurai Invasion Plan Rejected. The Emperor rejects the plan of former Samurai to invade Korea and claim it as part of Japan; no military intervention.
1874	Expedition to Formosa. Japan, claiming sovereignty over the Ryuku Islands, sent an expedition to Formosa to punish natives there for the murder of Ryuku sailors.
1874-6	Intervention in Korea. A Japanese vessel having been fired on in Korean waters, a Japanese naval expedition forced Korea to sign a treaty (Feb 25, 1876) establishing trade relations and opening sev-

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
	eral ports to Japanese vessels. Significantly this treaty recognized Korean sovereignty, ignoring nominal Chinese suzerainty.
1877 Jul-Sep	Saigo (Satsuma) Rebellion. The Samurai, protesting modern innovations and particularly the raising of a national conscript army rose against the government (but not against the Emperor). The most serious threat was the march of 40,000 Samurai on Tokyo. They were stopped, then defeated, by the new national army at Kumamoto.
1890	Navy Established. A foundation was laid for the Japanese Merchant Marine and Navy.
1894-95	Sino-Japanese War.
Jun	China sent troops by sea to Asau to restore order at the request of the Korean government. Japan responded by rushing troops directly to Seoul through Inchon. Meanwhile the Korean government suppressed the disorders, but neither China nor Japan would withdraw troops until the other did.
Jul 20	Japan seizes control of the Korean government.
Jul 25-29	Preliminary clashes occur at sea with Japan sinking a Chinese resupply ship and on land where the Chinese are defeated at Swonghwan.
Aug 1	Both sides declare war and rush reinforcements to Korea.
Sep 15	Japanese Army victorious at Pyongyang.
Sep 17	Japanese Navy victorious on the Yalu.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1894-95 (Cont)	
Nov 19	Japan captures Port Arthur.
1895 Feb 2-12	Chinese Navy destroyed.
Feb-Mar	Japanese Army marches into Manchuria.
Apr 17	Treaty of Shimonoseki. China recognized Korean independence, agreed to pay a 300-million-tael indemnity, and ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. Japan had proven herself a major military power.
1900	The Boxer Rebellion. Japanese troops fight together with Russian, British, French, and US detachments as an Allied Expeditionary Force. Her forces gained from this experience.
1902	Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Anglo-Japanese alliance guarantees Japan freedom from fear of intervention on the part of France or Germany if Japan fights Russia.
1904-5	Russo-Japanese War.
Feb 8	Without declaration of war, the Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at anchor in Port Arthur, causing severe damage.
Feb 10	Declaration of War.
May 1	Japanese Army defeats Russian forces in Manchuria.
May 19	Japanese Army defeats Russian forces on the Liaotung Peninsula.
1905 Jan 2	Russia surrenders Port Arthur after an eight month seige by the Japanese.

DATE	EVENT
Mar 10	Japanese win the Battle of Mukden.
Sep 6	Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan's limited war objectives had been won, while Russia received internal pressure to quit. Russia surrendered Port Arthur and one half of Sakhalin, and evacuated Manchuria. Korea was recognized as being within Japan's sphere of influence.
1910	Japan annexes Korea.
1911	Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The alliance was renewed for an additional 10 years.
1911	Japan resumes control of her tariffs.
1912	Meiji Emperor Dies. With the death of the Meiji Emperor and the ascent of his son to the throne, there is little change in government policies.
1914	Aug 23 Japan Enters WW I. Invoking the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan enters the war on the Allied side.
	Nov 7 Japan captures the only German base on the China mainland at Tsingtao.
	Nov-Dec Japan occupies Germany's Marshall, Mariana, Paula, and Caroline Island groups.
1915	Japan had first favorable balance of trade.
1918	War Ends. As a result of her participation in WW I, Japan acquires those islands occupied in 1914 as part of her empire.
1918	Change in National Power. Rule by a small clique changed to a struggle among diverse groups of military, bureaucrats, and businessmen to include

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
	the formation of political parties.
1918	First Party Cabinet. Kei Hara formed the first cabinet to come from a party system; anti-military.
1921	Hara Assassinated. In one of their first successful attempts, a group of young, ultranationalistic officers assassinate PM Hara.
1921-2	Washington Naval Conference. This was a disarmament treaty causing Japan to reduce the size of her Navy and her Army.
1925 Jan 20	Treaty with Russia. Diplomatic relations were established with the USSR. Japan evacuated Sakhalin.
1927	Eastern Conference. Headed by Japanese PM Baron Tanaka, this conference claimed from China what Japan unsuccessfully attempted to achieve with her 25 Points of 1915.
1928 May	Sino-Japanese Clash at Tsinan. The Japanese, again claiming special interests in Shantung, drove out the Nationalists and seized most of the province. Most Japanese troops were withdrawn a year later after an agreement with the Chinese.
1928	Kwantung Assassination. Ultranationalistic Japanese officers in the almost autonomous Kwantung Army (Liatung Peninsula) engineered the murder of the principal Manchurian warlord because of his attempts to unify Manchuria with China under the Nationalists.

DATE	EVENT
1930 April	London Naval Conference. This conference led to a treaty signed by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Japan, regularizing submarine warfare and limiting the tonnage and gun caliber of submarines; the limitation on aircraft carriers provided for by the Washington Treaty was extended. Great Britain, US, and Japan also agreed to scrap certain warships by 1933.
1931 Sep 18	The Mukden Incident. Japanese military, acting autonomously, began their occupation of Manchuria.
1932 Jan-Mar	First Battle of Shanghai.
1932 Feb 18	National Independence of Manchuko. This made Manchuria a virtual colony of Japan.
1931-36	Assassination Attempts. A number of ultranationalistic young officers and civilians kill or attempt to kill a number of conservative politicians, military, and businessmen forcing other moderate leaders to take more aggressive, militaristic stands.
1933 May 27	Japan withdraws from the League of Nations.
1934 Dec 19	Japan Denounces Washington and London Naval Treaties. Japan gave the required two years' notice that she was withdrawing from the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and assurance that, when the London Treaty expired at the end of 1936, there

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1933-37	would be no naval limitations agreement unless she could have equality to US and Great Britain. Growing Tension Between China and Japan. Chiang Kai-shek attempted to unify and modernize his backward nation in the face of increasingly aggressive Japanese actions.
1936 Feb 26	Military Revolt in Tokyo. A group of Young Army officers, impatient at the apparent hesitation of politicians to press ahead with the conquest of China, attempted to set up a military dictatorship. PM Makoto Saito and several other high officials were assassinated before the rebellion was suppressed.
1937 Jul 7	Outbreak of War in China.
1938 Jul-Aug	Undeclared Hostilities with Russia. Fighting over the poorly defined frontier where Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia met, Japan was unable to dislodge the Russians.
1939 May-Aug	New Undeclared Hostilities With Russia. Again, a fight over the same frontiers.

In summary, the Japanese military gained increasing political influence at the expense of the Emperor, the politicians, and the zaibatsu. An increased rise in nationalism was noted in the population. It was initially expressed in the educational system, and later, through the secret organizations that provided some degree of unity and order that

was missing from organized government by the late 1920s and into the 1930s.

The sequence of these developments provides useful insight for comparison with the contemporary period: (1) an increasing Japanese overseas involvement; (2) an increase in the size of the military; (3) the military began to take control of the government; and (4) the military, once in control of the government, controlled the zaibatsu.

The following conditions apparently contributed to the rise in military influence: (1) the external threat to Japan, especially from Korea, caused the need for a stronger military; (2) increased nationalism; (3) an existing Asian power vacuum wherein all of Japan's Asian neighbors were weak; (4) ineffective international attempts to limit Japanese expansion as seen in the Washington Conference, the London Naval Treaty, and the League of Nations; (5) lack of strong national leadership among either the politicians or the Emperor to hold the military in check; (6) a strong, well-organized and centrally controlled military; (f) the perceived need on the part of the military to protect Japan's vital overseas economic structure; and (8) the military's ability to repress political opposition throughout the later period.

The next chapter will examine the actors, the period's characteristics, and then the current relationship between the actor and issues of Japanese argument. The last chapter will determine to what extent there are similarities which exist between the actors and characteristics of the two periods.

CHAPTER 4

JAPAN, 1945 - 1976.

This case study of Japan from 1945 until 1976 examines key actors in the Japanese political system, characteristics of the period, and the relationship between each actor and the issue of rearmament. In so doing, the following major actors are investigated: the American Occupation Forces, the Emperor, the politicians, the military, the general population, and the new economic interests as reflected in what will be referred to as the Modern Zaibatsu or Zaikai. Primarily through these actors, Japan developed from a war-devastated, conquered country into what today is often called an economic superpower.

The American Occupation Forces

General MacArthur and his forces did more to change the structure of Japanese life than anyone since the Meiji Emperor. From August 28, 1945, when he and American troops flew to Japan to begin the Occupation until April 28, 1952, when the Occupation officially ended, the very fiber of the Japanese way of life was changed. Most notable of these changes were: (1) the speedy demilitarization of Japan; (2) the promulgation of a new constitution; (3) a change in the Emperor's role; (4) the efforts to develop a new economic base; and (5) the efforts to change the educational system, and, therefore, the attitude of the people.

A remarkable degree of cooperation, respect, and single-minded purpose existed between the conqueror and the conquered in demilitarizing

the country. Initially, MacArthur ruled through the existing Japanese government after purging it of militarists and other ultranationalists, both civilian and military alike. The Army and Navy Ministries were converted into demobilization ministries which were responsible for administering the speedy demobilization of the military force structure, and then went out of existence. Politically, organizations judged to be ultranationalistic or militaristic were outlawed; political prisoners were freed; and the Shinto religion-state relationship was nullified. As in Germany, war criminals were speedily brought to trial. Military leaders accused of war atrocities were quickly dealt with, including the hanging of seven former leaders. The most significant of these actions was the so-called purge of anyone thought to have been sympathetic to the Japanese war effort. Anyone felt to be at all responsible for Japanese imperial expansion was barred from government service or any position of authority or responsibility in the country. Approximately 200,000 persons were involved in this purge.¹ The purge touched not only military leaders and government officials, but also business executives and educators.

The Occupation forces left Japan with a new constitution. Emerson (1970) states that the original Matsumoto drafts of the constitution, when received by MacArthur on February 1, 1945, were unacceptable. His first impulse was to return the drafts with the guidance that they were not acceptable because they had not established the democratic reforms regarded as indispensable for a future Japanese government. Instead, two days later, he assigned his staff the task of drafting a constitution giving them the following guidance.

I deem these four points as essential: (1) Preservation of the Emperor System with constitutional limitations; (2) renunciation of war and war making; (3) abolition

of the feudal system, including the continuing rights of peerage; and (4) patterning of the budget after the British system.²

The original draft of Article 9, the no-war clause of the constitution, was unconditional in its wording. It read as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.³

To the second paragraph, the qualifying clause reading "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," was added. This was introduced by Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, then a member of the House of Representatives, who later served briefly as Prime Minister in 1953. Today, a significant segment of the government feels it can justify rearmament without a constitutional amendment.

The constitution also provided the establishment of a British type of parliamentary system to govern the country. The House of Representatives became the supreme political power while such prewar competitors for this role as the Privy Council, the House of Peers, and the military were abolished. As described by Reischauer (1970), "the high court officials and the bureaucracy were made clearly subordinate to the Prime Minister (PM), who was to be elected by the House of Representatives from among the members of the Diet....The powers of the upper house (house of Councillors) were clearly subordinated to those of the House of Representatives."⁴ It is the lower house, then, that must decide on the question of rearmament by amending the constitution.

The role of the Emperor changed completely as a result of the

Occupation. On January 1, 1946, the Emperor Hirohito disclaimed his "Okami" or heavenly sovereignty at the insistence of MacArthur. Originally, popular feeling in Great Britain and the US was to prosecute the Emperor as a war criminal. Through the intercession of such American experts on Japan as Joseph Grew and Edwin O. Reischauer, however, it was decided to allow him to remain as the symbolic Japanese leader. To do otherwise, would have completely demoralized the Japanese. Therefore, through the new constitution, he became "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people" leaving him with no political power at all.

The Occupation forces attempted to both destroy the zaibatsu's monopoly of wealth in order to develop a healthy economic system for Japan and to take control of most of the family holdings. However, neither of these efforts were completely successful. As a result, today one finds significant elements of the same infrastructure that existed prior to WW II. Labor unions were encouraged. A significant challenge lay in the technical lag Japan experienced as a result of WW II. She was isolated from many of the technical advances enjoyed by the rest of the world during the period of her military build-up. WW II dealt the Japanese economy a severe setback. The 1946 Gross National Product (GNP) was equal to that of 1917-1918; the prewar annual peak for GNP reached in 1939, was not matched until 1954. Within seven years, however, the Occupation forces pushed Japan over many of these economic hurdles.

Although not totally successful, the Occupation attempted to significantly change the role played by Japan's primary political actors. The Emperor was reduced to a symbol wielding little influence;

the military was, at least temporarily, abolished; the zaibatsu monopoly was modified significantly; the politicians were returned, constitutionally, to their pre-1918 stature; and democracy was introduced to the population. There is some concern that the democratization of the Japanese population may not be a completed process; a recent example is Prime Minister Sato's statement that the Lockheed scandal was a major test for the survival of democracy in Japan. This unique military demobilization by 1947, has given scholars and government analysts reason to look for any signs that could be interpreted as the first steps toward the type of military build-up that Japan underwent in the 1930s.

The Emperor

As already stated, the new constitution reduced the Emperor to that of a symbol with no political power. This was, in fact, the very condition of his survival. He officially has no political influence today, and although the chrysanthemum curtain still shields him from the world's view, only a relative handful of the approximately 200,000 currently organized ultranationalists even speak of returning to an imperial empire. The Emperor performs certain political functions such as occasional state visits, but policy is left to the PM and his cabinet. Today, the Emperor's influence is severely limited by the constitution; however, he remains the only actor that has consistently been able to supply the nation with a sense of historical continuity. Under periods of national stress and disorientation, which could result from events similar to the Lockheed scandal and the oil embargo, he could once again become a major influence.

The Politicians

Today, Japan has five major political parties -- the Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP), the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the Democratic Socialists, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Clean Government Party. The LDP has ruled Japan exclusively since 1955. While commentaries tend to overestimate the unity of the political views and programs of "big business," it is fair to say that most political parties are financially dependent upon the economic sector, whether the zaikai or somewhat smaller regional corporations.⁵ The LDP can best be described as a loose coalition of factors united for purposes of legislative action and elections; the number of factions in recent years has been as high as thirteen.⁶ While the LDP has lost the great majority it previously held in the Diet, it is still the nation's most powerful party and remains responsive to the needs of big business. Japan's foreign policy has been most aptly described as low-postured and economically oriented. It has been cleverly called "Japan, Inc." to reflect the almost total commitment to furthering the country's economic development.⁷

The government's stand on the possession of nuclear weapons has gradually evolved from the complete rejection of nuclear weapons of the post-WW II era to their current position that the development and possession of nuclear weapons is legal, but that current needs indicate a policy that precludes their possession. Japan ratified the Nuclear Disarmament Treaty in 1976, stating its continued dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. However, the Defense Agency White Paper of 1970 stated that small-yield nuclear weapons needed for self-defense and not a threat to another nation would be constitutionally legal.⁸ The 1976 White Paper also stresses the importance of the US umbrella, but this time no mention is made of the possession of small-yield tactical nuclear weapons.⁹ It would appear, though, that from a legal standpoint, Article IX to the constitution is


not an obstacle to armament.

The Nixon shocks, the US loss in Vietnam, and the Carter announcement on a withdrawal of US ground forces from Korea have, at least outwardly, not changed Japan's statement of dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. For the first time since 1945, however, Japan is moving toward a more independent Asian defense policy. While the government today is composed of many political actors with conflicting political viewpoints, a significant portion of the conservative elements of these parties would be favorably disposed toward a stronger military capability if the security commitment of the US to Japan were severely degraded.

The Military

The Occupation forces quickly demilitarized Japan. She remained so until 1950, when, at US insistence, Japan formed a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR) with a primary mission of internal protection. Following the Korean War in 1953, the NPR was renamed the Security Force freeing it of police actions. In July 1954, the newly-renamed Self Defense Force numbered 150,000. Its mission remained basically unchanged until 1972, when the SDF became responsible for the defense of Okinawa -- its first overseas responsibility since 1945. Today, the SDF is subdivided into three areas: (1) a Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) authorized 180,000; (2) a Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) of 40,000; and (3) an Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) of 43,000.¹⁰ The SDF remains under civilian control possessing the capability to expand its number in the event of an emergency. To accomplish this mission, a larger percent of the SDF is cadre (officers and non-commissioned officers) than usually

otherwise found. The chart below depicts the growth in size of the GSDF.



(Source: Defense Agency White Paper, 1976)

(Figure 4-1. GSDF GROWTH, 1950 - 1975)

The following chart depicts the relative strength of Asian powers in ground forces relative to Japan.

COUNTRY	TOTAL DIVISIONS (In or around Japan)
USSR (In the Far East)	30
CHINA (PRC)	142
NORTH KOREA	24
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	24
US (In the Far East)	2
JAPAN	13

(Source: Defense Agency White Paper, 1976)

(Figure 4-2. DEPLOYMENT AROUND JAPAN)

A comparison of the strengths of Japan's historical enemies relative to Japan's shows why she is concerned about a possible subsequent unification of Korea under either flag. Korea remains geographically Japan's closest possible adversary.

The SDF remains under the tight control of a civilian-run ministry with no autonomy. While the military leaders are consulted on defense-related matters, none of today's military leaders are in politically powerful positions.

The Population

The voice of the Japanese population is heard more today than ever. As a result of the Lockheed scandal, elections were held and the LDP received significant set-backs. The Japanese people were displeased. In any consideration of rearmament, then, this factor must be considered.

During the riots of the early 1960s, during the Lockheed scandals, and during the oil embargo, the population showed signs of searching for a strong political leadership capable of supplying unity and order to the nation. This was not unlike the same search manifested in the 1920s - 1930s by such ultranationalistic organizations as the Blood League. During that time, the population viewed the government as not having the nation's best interest at heart; this was shown to the population by such unfavorable treaties as those resulting from the Washington Conference and the London Naval Treaty. During the Lockheed scandal, no political party was without fault. There was no one in the political arena perceived by the population as being able to supply this unity and strong leadership and direction. The question of the democratization of the population remains unanswered.

The population, while not anti-military, probably would oppose increasing military participation in Japanese politics. In October 1975, the Cabinet Information Office, Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, initiated a national public opinion survey on the Self Defense Forces and defense issues. According to the survey, 69% of the respondents considered the SDF "good" while 18% viewed the SDF as "bad".

The charts that follow give a more specific breakdown of the public's image of the SDF, and compare these attitudes with an earlier survey (1972).¹¹

This first chart shows the overall public image of the Japanese SDF.

PUBLIC IMAGE OF JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE - AS A PERCENTAGE

G O O D I M A G E		B A D I M A G E		N O O P I N I O N
I Have A Good Image	I Do Not Have A Bad Image	I Don't Have A Good Image	I Have A Bad Image	
21(17)%	48(42)%	14(19)%	4(5)%	13(7)%

(1) For comparison, the numbers in parenthesis indicate the results of a similar survey conducted in November 1972.

(2) 3,000 people were sampled; 2408 responded (80.3% response rate).

(3) A double stratified random sampling method was used.

(Figure 4-3. PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCE)

The public viewed the role of the SDF in the following terms:

Maintenance of national security57 (56)%
 Maintenance of domestic security21 (20)%
 Anti-disaster rescue operations13 (10)%
 Cooperation in community relations program.....1 (2)%
 Others0 (0)%
 No opinion8 (12)%

The following chart reflects the public's opinion on the need of the SDF.

THE SDF SHOULD BE MAINTAINED	THE SDF SHOULD BE ABOLISHED	NO OPINION
79(73)%	8(12)%	13(15)%

(Figure 4-4. NEED FOR THE SELF DEFENSE FORCE)

Among those who indicated they fear the SDF may be involved in a war, most of the respondents cited "international conflicts and troubles" as their perceived reason. The distribution of responses to this question was:

FACTORS WHICH MAY INVOLVE JAPAN IN WAR

International conflicts or troubles 56%
 The Japan-US Security Treaty (MST) 16%
 The United Nations doesn't function properly... 13%
 Lack of defense power..... 16%
 No particular reasons 13%
 Others 9%
 No opinion 18%

In further examining why Japan would not become involved in war, the following reasons were given:

REASONS WHY THERE IS NO DANGER OF JAPAN BECOMING INVOLVED IN WAR


The Constitution renounces war 29%
 The UN has been striving to maintain world peace... 28%
 The Japan-US Security Treaty (MST)..... 23%
 The people are high motivated to self-defense 13%

The SDF	2%
No particular reason	17%
Other	3%
No opinion	5%

If the surveys are valid, the need for and respect of the SDF has risen. The public no longer appears to be as anti-military as it was in 1945-1950. Although the question of rearmament was not addressed directly, it would appear that the population would not be so opposed to rearmament as it would have been earlier.

The Zaikai

From the period 1955 until about 1967, Japan experienced a period of extraordinary industrial growth. As the following chart indicates, Japanese economic recovery from the devastation of WW II exceeded even the high rates of France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom during this period.



(Figure 4-5. COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1958-1967)

For almost the next five years, her economic growth was at rates that suggested to most economists that by 1985, Japan would be the third

ranking economic power in terms of GNP behind the US and the USSR.

This phenomenal growth stopped in 1973, however, in the wake of the oil embargo. The GNP grew less than three per cent with the private sector's smaller plants and equipment investors hardest hit. Oil for Japan remains a problem. Over 70 per cent of her primary energy requirements are derived from oil; over 60 per cent of her total oil consumption is used by her industrial and non-energy sectors. Almost all of her total oil supply is imported. Among the economic powers, Japan is the most dependent on oil supplied by outside sources, thus she is more vulnerable to supply reduction or price increase and the related effects of the runaway inflation, large-scale unemployment, and a significant increase in the external payments deficit.

Presently, the economic sector is recovering slowly from this economic "pause" as some of her business and political leaders describe it, but the recovery is slower than anyone would like. This will continue to be a slow increase because of her dependence on oil and other imported raw materials. The chart below lists 13 major raw materials and Japan's dependence on their importation as a percentage of consumption.¹³

Aluminum.....	93%	Manganese	87%
Chromium	90%	Natural rubber	100%
Cobalt	100%	Nickel	100%
Copper	93%	Phosphates	100%
Iron (ore & metal)....	100%	Tin	90%
Lead	67%	Tungsten	100%
Zinc	74%		

(Figure 4-6. DEPENDENCE ON SELECTED INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, 1974)

A relatively new and growing sector of the economy is that of arms and arms-related manufacturing. Some of the zaikai such as Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, and Sony see defense contracting as a new area where Japanese technology can spread. This economic interest in defense is being reflected to a certain extent by the increase in defense contracts. Kahn (1970) points out that defense contracts in 1964 were \$311 million, grew to \$675 million by 1968, and exceeded \$1 billion by 1970.¹⁴

The economic sector is driven by past success and the prospect of continuing a high growth rate. There is a possibility that economic interests may look to the defense sector and arms trade as an opportunity to stimulate Japanese economic growth.

Conclusion

Developments since WW II have caused a shift in the political power structure of Japan. This chart attempts to reflect that shift.

DATE PREDOMI- NANCE OF POWER	1945- 1951	1952- 1960	1960- 1965	1965- 1973	1973- 1976
DOMINANT	OCC FORCE	POL	POL/ ZAI	ZAI	ZAI/ POL
SUBORDINATE	POL	ZAI	POP	POL/ POP	POP/ EMP
ANCILLARY	ZAI	POP	MIL/ EMP	MIL/ EMP	MIL

(Figure 4-7. POLITICAL POWER SHIFTS, 1945 - PRESENT)

The occupation forces provided the country with: (1) the elimination, at least initially, of the military as an actor leaving the poli-

ticians the time necessary to reestablish their power; (2) the elimination of the Emperor as a primary actor, leaving him as a symbolic leader; (3) a new constitution giving the politicians unopposed power with which to lead the country; and (4) a new economic base from which the country was able to develop.

The Emperor is now a figure-head divorced from all power that could, in any significant way, influence the course of Japanese history. The Emperor no longer can be considered an important actor.

The Politicians are no longer a single force, but rather, numerous factions opposing each other on many issues. In one area, however, the economic development of Japan, they generally agree. There is widespread consensus on the high national priority accorded to economic growth.

The military is not yet a major political actor in Japan. It is a small, volunteer force not unpopular but lacking the strong nationalistic popular support it once enjoyed. Today, it is tightly controlled by a civilian minister.

The population, although still relatively homogenous, is diverse in its opinion, yet strong enough to have its desires known. It is a more active participant in the political area and more outspoken in its views.

There is a general consensus among all of the political actors that economic development should be a high priority national goal. Some economic interests are attempting to move more into weapons manufacturing, but so far, this idea has not received wide acceptance.

All of the major actors discussed in this period appear to be far less homogenous than the similar group studied in the previous period.

This is especially true of the political leaders who are quite factionalized within the various parties.

In summary, the following points can be made about the relationship among actors during this period:

- (1) there is no single strong actor in this period except, perhaps, for the zaikai.
- (2) the politicians almost exclusively support the economic sector.
- (3) the politicians are factionalized more according to stands on particular topics than according to party.
- (4) the population has taken a more active role in voicing its opinion.
- (5) the military is a small, politically weak actor, highly controlled by civilians.
- (6) the population's view of the military has improved since 1945-1950.
- (7) the zaikai's phenomenal early success has been substantially slowed by the oil embargo and its aftermath threatening the very future of the economy.

The following chronology attempts to summarize the more important military-related events occurring since 1945.¹⁵

DATE

EVENT

1945-1952

MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Under the firm control and guidance of MacArthur's military government, the Japanese government and nation began recovering from the devastation of WW II.

<u>DATE</u>		<u>EVENT</u>
1946	Nov 3	A New Constitution. This became effective May 3, 1947. Among its provisions was a renunciation of the right to wage war.
1950		National Police Reserve. At the insistence of the US Forces, a 75,000 National Police Reserve was formed with the sole mission of internal protection.
1951	Sep 8	Peace Treaty with the Allies. Unable to obtain Soviet agreement to negotiate a peace treaty, the US and 48 other non-communist nations signed a treaty with Japan. At the same time, the US signed a bilateral defense agreement with Japan.
1952	Apr 28	Occupation Formally Ends. With her enactment of the 1951 Peace Treaty, Japan regains her independence.
1953		Security Force Named. The NPR was renamed the Security Force and was freed of its police actions.
1954	Mar 8	Mutual Defense Agreement with US. Under this, the US was to give Japan about \$100 million in subsidies for production of munitions and food.
1954	Jul 1	Official Rearmament Approved. After prolonged national and legislative debate, Japan enacted legislation authorizing new armed forces.
1956	Oct 19	State of War with Russia Terminated. A joint Japanese-Soviet declaration was signed.
1960	Jan 19	Renewed Mutual Defense Treaty with the US.

The next chapter will compare the relationship of rearmament during both periods and attempt to reach conclusions on whether or not Japan will rearm.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The Actors

A comparison of the roles of the major actors during both periods provides one indication as to the possibility of Japanese rearmament.

The Emperor

Early Period

- * Initiated constitutional monarch system of government.
- * Increasingly lost control of the government.
- * By 1937, totally lost control of the government.
- * Through the period, the office of the Emperor was held in high esteem.

Current Period

- * Set up as a figure-head with no real power by the Occupation Forces.
- * Has no control over the military.
- * Presently has little influence over the nation's destiny.
- * Presently, the office is still held in high regard.

The Emperor has little power today to influence the decision to rearm. Those ultranationalistic groups in both periods who act or acted in the name of the Imperial Empire acted for an ideal, not for the Emperor, himself. This was noted in the military actions in Manchuria and Possiet Bay when the Emperor attempted to block the military from acting in both cases. Today, the Emperor apparently has little direct influence with regard to the issue of rearmament.

The CabinetEarly Period

- * Historical basis in the Meiji Constitution
- * Originally one unified body that began to factionalize in 1918.
- * Originally pro-zaibatsu; enacted legislation to assist the economic sector.
- * Intimidated by assassinations of its members in 1920s-1930s.
- * Military increasingly became cabinet members and eventually controlled the government.

Current Period

- * Post WW II basis in the 1948 Constitution.
- * Unified only a short period of time, presently factionalized.
- * Presently has economic development as its primary objective.
- * In recent years, public pressure as a result of scandals has toppled cabinets.
- * Military not found in any cabinet post.

Today in Japan, the Cabinet rules the country. It is almost totally supportive of the economic sector and has the SDF under its tight control. While factionalism exists, there is no strong military force as part of the ruling body. The cabinet designs the national military strategy. In the early period, the strategy was one of imperial expansion using the military to accomplish this expansionist goal. Today, the national strategy is best described as "Japan, Inc.," whereby the government totally supports the economic sector, which involves economic "expansion" into almost all of the world's major markets.

Today, the cabinet controls the military, is responsive to the needs of both the zaikai and the general population, and has little need to deal with the Emperor. The cabinet today is very much in control in Japan.

The Zaibatsu/ZaikaiEarly Period

- * Begun and nurtured by the govern-

Current Period

- * Begun and nurtured by the govern-

ment for the purpose of furthering Japanese economic development.

- * Became closely allied with the cabinet in the struggle against the military.
- * Was not able to block Japanese armament.
- * Never controlled other actors.
- * Initially built a gradual arms production base.

ment for the purpose of furthering Japanese economic development.

- * Is presently closely allied with the government.
- * Presently, a group within the zaikai favors rearmament as a means to stimulate the economy.
- * Has great influence in the government today.
- * Attempting to widen its very small arms production base.

In the earlier period, the economic sector never possessed the influence it possesses today. It is far more influential today with more people involved. Because the zaikai today have significant influence in government, they could affect rearmament under these conditions: (1) rearmament is viewed as the only feasible alternative to stimulate the economy; (2) the economic sector stands solidly united in its decision; and (3) the government is prepared to convince its Asian neighbors and the US that rearmament is an "acceptable" option.

The Population

Early Period

- * Highly homogenous in culture and national objectives.
- * Actively participated as members of the conscript force.
- * Generally passive to governmental actions; accepted them as the "will" of the Emperor and his government.

Current Period

- * Highly homogenous in culture with a diversity of political opinion.
- * Have the option to belong to the all-volunteer SDF.
- * Relatively more active in the governmental process, often challenging decisions deemed questionable.

During the early period, the population accepted the actions of the government almost without question. Today, the general population is much more active in the governmental process and wields some degree of influence. In the early period, the population was generally nationalistic; today, this same nationalism is channeled along the pragmatic lines of economic success and somewhat tempered by the bitter lessons of WW II.

The Occupation Force

While there is nothing to compare it to in the earlier period, the legacy of the Occupation Force is still evident today in the areas of (1) the Constitution, and (2) the democratic political system. With regard to rearmament, the constitution still contains a provision renouncing war, while the stability of the democratic political system is still questioned. These factors present obstacles to rearmament that were not present during the earlier period.

The Military

<u>Early Period</u>	<u>Current Period</u>
* Initially established by the Emperor with constitutional constraints.	* Initially established by the government with a questionable constitutional basis.
* Originally a militia.	* Originally a militia (self defense force)
* Expanded to overseas areas.	* Presently has garrisons on the Ryuku Islands with the potential of further overseas projections.

One of the primary missions of the Occupation Force was the immediate and total demilitarization of Japan. Yet, by 1950, she again began a gradual evolutionary process of starting with a small police

force that within three years was relieved of its police responsibilities in order to focus attention more on military defense.

Summary

A comparison of the relative political power of the major actors during each period is reflected in the charts below.

DATE PREDOMI- NANCE OF POWER	1868	1870- 1890	1900- 1910	1910- 1914	1918- 1928	1928- 1932	1932- 1945
DOMINANT	EMP	EMP	EMP/ POL	POL	POL/ MIL/ZAI	POL/ MIL	MIL
SECONDARY		POL	MIL	MIL/ EMP	EMP	ZAI	POL/ ZAI
ANCILLARY		MIL	ZAI	ZAI		EMP	EMP

(Figure 5-1. MAJOR POLITICAL ACTORS IN JAPAN, 1868 - 1945)

DATE PREDOMI- NANCE OF POWER	1945- 1951	1952- 1960	1960- 1965	1965- 1973	1973-
DOMINANT	OCC FORCE	POL	POL/ ZAI	ZAI	POL/ ZAI
SECONDARY	POL	ZAI	POP	POL/ POP	POP
ANCILLARY	ZAI	POP	MIL	MIL	MIL

(Figure 5-2. MAJOR POLITICAL ACTORS IN JAPAN, 1945 - 1976)

Based on this comparison of the actors, the following similarities are apparent:

(1) the Emperor's power is extremely limited and his potential for influence is difficult to gauge.

(2) the cabinet's basis is in the constitution.

(3) the cabinet remains the primary supporter of the nation's economic development.

(4) public pressure remains an influence over the cabinet.

(5) economic development/advancement remains the primary national goal.

(6) the economic actors remain the dominant financial backers of the conservative elements of government.

(7) a gradually growing war production base exists.

(8) a highly homogenous population able to exert pressure on the government.

(9) the military was initially established as a militia but expanded to overseas areas.

The following differences also exist:

(1) today, the Emperor's power is substantially less than during the early period.

(2) today, the government is much more factionalized than during the earlier period.

(3) today, a segment of the zaikai is much more interested in increasing its arms production base than during the earlier period.

(4) the military lacks the political control it had during the early period.

Comparison of Sequence

A comparison of the sequence of events that originally led to armament with the current periods shows:

First, there was an increasing overseas economic involvement beginning in the 1880s and continuing throughout the period; today, Japan is economically involved with virtually every modern world nation.

Second, there was an increase in the size of the military to support increased overseas involvement; today, the military has shown only two periods of growth - during the Korean War and in 1972, which coincided with the US drawdown in Vietnam, in both cases apparently related to changes in the military threat.

Next, following economic and military expansion, there was an eventual government takeover by the military; similar developments currently appear unlikely.

Finally, the military gained control of the zaibatsu; again, this is currently unlikely to occur although there is some indication of economic interest increasing military production.

While the sequence might recur, current trends in this direction are difficult to discern.

Comparison of Conditions

A comparison of important conditions existing during the earlier period with the current period indicates that:

(1) during the early period, an external threat existed to Japanese security; today, Japan feels threatened by a United Korea.

(2) during the early period, nationalism thrived; today the Japanese remain a homogenous people with a trace of nationalism reappearing.

(3) an Asian power vacuum existing in pre-war Japan, but not evident today.

(4) Western powers attempted to block Japan's expansion during the 1920s and 1930s; today, the US has attempted to protect some American economic production from Japanese competition which may be perceived as an obstacle to Japanese economic growth. The Mid East oil embargo also reminded Japan just how vulnerable the economy is.

(5) the politicians and the Emperor were unable to control the pre-war military; a problem nonexistent today.

(6) during both periods there exists a well-organized and centrally controlled military.

(7) the perceived need on the part of the pre-war military to protect Japan's vital overseas economic posture is not apparent today.

(8) the military today cannot repress political opposition as it did during the early period.

Significant conditions not present currently involve the military's inability to wield any degree of political control over the politicians and the military. While the military is well-organized and centrally controlled, it is well in the hands of the civilian government.


The Issue of Rearmament

Rearmament, as used in this study, refers to (1) a significant increase in the size of the armed forces, (2) a favorable public attitude toward rearmament, and (3) an increase in the defense budget accounting for more than normal inflation and a growing defense industry.

Armed Forces Increase

The charts below depict the military strength for each of the two periods.


MILITARY/1,000
POPULATION



(Source: The Statesman Yearbook)

(Figure 5-3. MILITARY STRENGTH/1,000 POPULATION, 1870-1945)

MILITARY/1,000
POPULATION



(Source: Defense Paper, 1976)

(Figure 5-4. MILITARY STRENGTH/1,000 POPULATION, 1950-1975)

Although the size of the armed forces has been relatively stable over the past ten years, there was a significant increase during the period 1950-1965. However, the present size of the SDF is comparable to the period around 1900, just prior to Japan's first major strength increase during the early period. Data indicates that the forces were built up in the early period as a result of external conflict. Similarly, during the second period expansion can be seen as a response to the external conflict of the Korean War. Further expansion could quite possibly come as a result of the American loss in Vietnam and the apparent upcoming US drawback from South Korea.

Favorable Public Attitude

As indicated in Chapter 4, the public's opinion of the SDF has improved over the last few years. In the earlier period, there was a strong sense of belonging among the people because of the conscript; today's force does not have that advantage, but has well over 60% of the population viewing it in a favorable light. (See Figure 4-4). It would appear that the population is more ready to support rearmament now than at any time since 1945.

Increased Defense Budget

The chart below shows the annual defense spending as a percentage of the Gross National Product.



(Figure 5-5. JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING, 1950 - 1975)

While the defense budget has been relatively steady for the last five years, this compares to the 1900 period as reflected in the Statesman Yearbook. While any increase in the budget might only reflect inflation, an increase of 10% or more would soon be reflected in either military size, equipment, or research and development. None is apparent at this time.

Conclusions

Based on this information, it is the conclusion of this author that:

(1) Japan, while following a policy of gradualism, has already rearmed conventionally. The mission of the SDF, to deter an attack on Japan, is similar to that of most other armed forces. Similarly, Japan has acquired a limited capability to project military forces overseas, although the size of the SDF remains relatively small.

(2) Japan will continue to follow a national strategy based on her economic development. The zaikai will, if it finds it necessary to

stimulate economic growth, encourage increased arms production.

(3) The population would support further rearmament if it meant economic survival.

(4) The military could gain political influence in the foreseeable future with the development of a major external threat. This author believes that US withdrawal from South Korea could supply this catalyst.

(5) The Emperor probably will not possess increased influence in the foreseeable future. Therefore, he will not likely affect significantly any decision for rearmament.

(6) The government, having recently ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, probably will not elect to develop a nuclear capability in the near future. She will, however, maintain the capability to become a nuclear power.

Although recent trends do not constitute rearmament and the relationship between primary actors does not suggest rearmament in the immediate future, there are some notable similarities to the 1900 period. With this in mind and the probable US withdrawal from South Korea, there is an increased probability that the cycle will repeat itself. Japan will rearm.

ENDNOTES

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2. Edwin O. Reischauer in a speech entitled "Japan: Model for the Future?" delivered to the annual convocation of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara at Washington, DC. The date is unknown, but is in the 1971 time frame.

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4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Fairbanks, p. 584.
7. Ibid., p. 577.
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15. The Statesman's Year-Book; various years, as indicated.
16. R. E. Dupuy and T. N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

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4. Reischauer, p. 226-227.
5. Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 64.
6. Ibid.
7. Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 201. While this is commonly used sobriquet, Kahn gives a good explanation of its meaning.
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12. Kahn, p. 207.
13. Information supplied by US Department of the Interior, 1975.
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